SYDNEY D. BAILEY

THE MAKING OF RESOLUTION 242

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by

Sydney D. Bailey

LEBANON Hula
Quneitra
SYRIA
Haifa
Mediterranean Sea
Ramtha
Netanya
Jenin
Mount Ajlun
Qalqiliya
Nablus
Mafraq
Tel Aviv
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Jericho
Amman
Bethlehem
Gaza
Hebron
Khan Yunis
Rafah
Samu
Beersheba
Port Said
El Arish
ISRAEL
Qantara
Abu Aweigila
Qusayma
Jordan R.
JORDAN
Suez Canal
Port Tawfiq
Kuntilla
Nakhl
Thamad
Elat
Aqaba
SINAI
EGYPT
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
SAUDI
ARABIA
Islands
of Tiran
Sharm el Sheikh
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km

CONTENTS

PREFACE

This book is about the war in the Middle East in June 1967 and the efforts to bring about a cease-fire and draw up a frame-work for a peaceful and accepted settlement, culminating in the adoption of resolution 242 by a unanimous vote of the UN Security Council the following November. The United Nations played a crucial role in those events, registering both unnecessary failures and unexpected successes, and I have drawn heavily on UN records. I have also used published memoirs, though there is much more published material from the Israeli point of view than from the Arab. Whenever possible, I have supplemented published accounts by unpublished recollections. Many friends who were actively involved in Middle Eastern affairs in 1967 commented on the first draft of the book and in some cases agreed that I might quote from their comments. Some still hold official positions and may not be mentioned by name. To them and to the following I express my gratitude, though responsibility for the final text is mine alone: Nissim Bar-Yaacov, Sir Harold Beeley, Marigold Best, William B. Buffum, Odd Bull, Lord Caradon, Adeed Dawisha, Walter Eytan, James Fine, Sir Leslie Glass, Arthur J. Goldberg, Gunnar Jarring, George Ignatieff, Carol Jensen, Diane Jumet, Arthur Lall, Ann M. Lesch, Sir Anthony Nutting, Sir Anthony Parsons, Indar Jit Rikhye, Shabtai Rosenne, Robert Rosenstock, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean Rusk, Peter Sallah, Oscar Schachter, Hans Tabor, Lord Thomson of Monifieth, Brian Urquhart, Irena Yost, and Ron Young.

I have again received a great deal of help from the library at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I wish to thank, in particular, Nicole Gallimore and John Montgomery.

Egypt and Syria united in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. Although the union was dissolved in 1961, Egypt continued to be known officially as the United Arab Republic until 1971. I have, however, referred to the country as Egypt throughout.

In transliterating place names and other proper nouns from Arabic or Hebrew into the Roman alphabet, I have preferred familiarity to consistency, except that I have called the Israeli port Elat but, in chapter 11, have followed UN practice in calling the Israeli destroyer the *Eilat*.

Occasionally precise times are important. Unless otherwise stated, all times in the book are local.

7 April	clash between Israel and Syria
16 May	general Indar Jit Rikhye (commander of UN Emergency Force) receives informal Egyptian request for removal of UN Force
18 May	UN Secretary-General Thant receives formal Egyptian request for withdrawal of UN Force
22 May	president Nasser announces that the Gulf of Aqaba will be closed to Israeli cargoes
24 May	Security Council convened at request of Canada and Denmark. U Thant confers with president Nasser in Cairo
24–26 May	Abba Eban (foreign minister of Israel) in Paris, London, New York, and Washington
30 May	Egypt and Jordan conclude defence agreement
1 June	coalition government formed in Israel
4 June	Iraq accedes to Egypt-Jordan defence agreement
5–10 June	Six Day War
10 June	Soviet Union severs diplomatic relations with Israel
14 June	withdrawal of UN Emergency Force completed
17 June	UN General Assembly convenes in emergency special session
23 and 25 June	president Johnson and prime minister Kosygin meet at Glassboro, New Jersey
28 June	General Assembly adopts resolution on humanitarian assistance
4 and 14 July	General Assembly adopts resolutions on status of Jerusalem
19 July	U.S.–Soviet agreement, later rejected by both Israel and the Arab states
29 Aug. to 1 Sept.	Arab summit conference in Khartoum
19 Sept.	UN General Assembly convenes in regular session
21 Oct.	Israeli destroyer *Eilat* sunk
7 Nov.	non-aligned and U.S. draft resolutions submitted to Security Council
9 Nov.	Latin American proposal circulated at request of India

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Add.	Addendum (addition of text to main UN document)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
Corr.	Corrigendum (to correct errors, revise wording, or reorganize text of UN document, whether for substantive or technical reasons)
GAOR	General Assembly Official Records
G.A. res.	General Assembly resolution
OP	Observation Post
Rev.	Revision (new text superseding and replacing a previously issued UN document)
SCOR	Security Council Official Records
S.C. res.	Security Council resolution
UNEF	UN Emergency Force
UNRWA	UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization

INTRODUCTION

The electric hush in the UN Security Council chamber was broken by applause, as fifteen hands were raised to record a unanimous vote in favour of resolution 242. There were several diplomatic surprises on that day in November 1967, but undoubtedly the greatest was that Vasily Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, voted for the British draft, even though he had put forward his own text only two days previously.

More than half the members of the Security Council had submitted or co-sponsored proposals for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and yet when it came to the scrunch, they withdrew their own texts or asked that priority should be given to the British proposal.

The crisis in the Middle East had erupted six months earlier, when president Nasser had on 18 May asked U Thant to remove the UN peace-keeping force from Egyptian territory. One of the recurring features of the Middle Eastern conflict is that every hostile act cited by one side has been preceded by another hostile act cited by the other. Three dangerous developments had preceded Nasser's withdrawal of consent for the presence of the UN force on Egyptian territory, developments which were mentioned by U Thant in a special report to the Security Council on 19 May 1967.

First was a rising tide of guerrilla activity against Israeli targets by Palestinian irregulars. The Syrian government, while supporting Palestinian organizations, disclaimed responsibility for their guerrilla activities, but the UN observation organization had always taken the line that a state that had agreed to a cease-fire had an obligation to ensure that irregular forces on territory for which it was responsible did not commit violations. U Thant claimed not to know in 1967 whether the Arab governments were doing all that they could to prevent guerrilla attacks on or in Israel, but he noted that these attacks were occurring

with 'disturbing regularity' and were provoking 'strong reactions' in Israel.

It had been the policy of Israel since the state was founded to re-taliate strongly for Arab attacks or cease-fire violations, but in May 1967, some Israeli statements had gone beyond the usual warnings about retaliation and had included implied threats to topple the Ba' athist régime in Syria. It is difficult now to identify precisely who is-sued these threats, as some of the more vigorous statements were made in unattributable press briefings. In a crucial speech on 22 May, president Nasser referred to 'impertinent' threats against Syria made by Israeli prime minister Eshkol. U Thant described some of the statements which had been attributed to high Israeli officials as 'particularly in-flammatory'.

The third factor in the rising tension in the middle of May 1967 was a series of rumours that Israel was massing troops near the Syrian border. Information to this effect was apparently given to Anwar Sadat, then presiding officer of the Egyptian legislature, who was leading a delegation to the Soviet Union. Not only was he told of Israeli troop concentrations in the north-east, but Nasser claimed after the war that Sadat was also warned that Israel was 'on the point of attacking Syria.' When Israel decided that the military element in the annual Independence Day parade in Jersalem should be somewhat muted in 1967, the Arabs assumed that this was because the armour was needed elsewhere. Field marshal Hakim Abdul Amer, the Epyp-tian commander, was so worried about reports of Israeli military con-centrations that he asked the Soviet ambassador in Cairo whether the reports were confirmed by satellite observation, only to be told that the satellites did not indicate whether Israel's military deployments were for defensive or aggressive purposes.

In his report of 19 May, U Thant had described the situation in the Middle East as 'extremely menacing'. No country at that stage had irrevocably decided to fight, but crises of this kind acquire their own momentum, and it would have required external intervention of an unusually vigorous kind to have halted the drift to war. U Thant had no legal basis for challenging Egypt's right to withdraw consent for the presence of the UN force on Egyptian soil, but he asked Israel whether the UN force could be transferred to the Israeli side of the line, only to be reminded that Israeli governments had consistently refused to have foreign troops on Israeli soil.

The states most directly involved, whether as members of the Secur-ity Council, or as members of the advisory committee on Middle East

peace-keeping, or as providers of contingents for the UN Force in Sinai, could have asked for the convening of the General Assembly or the Security Council to consider how the international community should respond to Egyptian actions. Some of them pointed out to U Thant that they had the right to do this, but none exercised the right until after the situation had deteriorated still more. Thant himself could have convened the Security Council, but decided not to do so because of a Soviet threat to use the veto.

On 22 May, Nasser announced that the Gulf of Aqaba would be closed to Israeli cargoes. This was not only a major vertical escalation of the crisis, but it was also a horizontal escalation. Until this point, the crisis had been regional in scope: now it had far-reaching international implications, because the right of free and innocent passage through an international waterway was challenged. Israel had received assurances in 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba would be kept open, and it was only on this assumption that Israel had agreed to withdraw its forces after the Sinai-Suez war.

The Egyptian blockade persuaded Canada and Denmark that the Security Council had to act, even though U Thant was on a peace mission to Cairo. The Council met on 24 May, only to be subjected to Afro-Asian and Communist complaints that the crisis in the Middle East was being artificially inflated and dramatized by Western imperialists.

The response in London to the Aqaba blockade was that a declaration on the right to free and innocent passage should be drawn up for international sponsorship, that an attempt should be made to have this endorsed by the UN Security Council, and then that the right should be asserted by sending a multi-national naval force through the Strait of Tiran and into the Gulf. This idea was pressed in the cabinet by Harold Wilson and George Brown, though the defence chiefs had some technical reservations. The minister of state in the foreign office, George Thomson (now Lord Thomson of Monifieth), was sent to the United States to commend the British plan. Thomson found that official opinion in Washington was much like that in London: the White House and the State Department were generally favourable on political grounds, but the military chiefs and the Pentagon stressed the logistic and other technical difficulties if Egypt should resist with force.

Thant had been in Paris when news of the Aqaba blockade reached him. In Cairo on 24 May he pressed the need for a breathing spell, which Nasser accepted so long as the blockade could remain in force. Thant raised with Nasser the possibility of having a special UN envoy in the

region, to which Nasser agreed so long as the UN presence would be diplomatic and not military.

The other diplomatic traveller at this time was Abba Eban, Israel's foreign minister. In Paris he met president de Gaulle, who warned Israel not to fire the first shot. In London Eban went straight to 10 Downing Street, finding that Wilson well understood Israel's predicament. When Eban reached New York, he was told that the government at home had re-assessed the Egyptian danger and was now stressing the military threat from Sinai rather than the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. The plan for a multi-national naval force idea was already in danger of collapse, and this new military assessment from Israel rendered it marginal if not irrelevant.

Eban's task was to try to persuade Lyndon Johnson that an Egyptian attack on Israel would be tantamount to an attack on the United States. He encountered some scepticism in Washington, as U.S. intelligence sources did not agree with Israel's new military assessment. Johnson, over-committed in Viet-Nam, could not give Eban the unconditional assurances that Israel sought, but he went as far as he could in supporting Israel's right to security. Eban returned home to find the cabinet in session and opinion equally divided between those favouring war at once and those willing to give diplomacy one last chance.

The Israeli decision was a postponement of the military option, not a rejection. Inter-party discussions led on 1 June to the creation of a national coalition government, with general Moshe Dayan as minister of defence and Menachem Begin as minister without portfolio. Israel was now ready for war.

Arab military preparations also proceeded apace. King Hussein of Jordan patched up his quarrel with president Nasser, under the watchful eyes of Ahmed Shuqairi of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Shuqairi returned to Amman with Hussein and paid an ostentatious visit to the El Aksa mosque in East Jerusalem.

The Security Council held four more sterile meetings, but no substantive proposal was put to a vote. The great powers urged their friends in the region to exercise restraint, but the parties to the conflict had stopped listening.

Israel struck Egyptian airfields on the morning of 5 June, Jordan and Syria came to Egypt's assistance, but within six days it was all over. Israel captured all of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan (including East Jerusalem), and a slice of the Golan Heights. The whole of Palestine was now in Jewish hands. The Security Council was in almost continuous session, issuing a number of cease-fire calls. The Hot Line between Moscow and Washington was used for the first time.

By Mid-June, it had become evident that debate and diplomacy in the Security Council had just about exhausted its utility, and the Soviet Union called for an emergency special session of the General Assembly, in which all UN Members sit. When it became known that prime minister Alexei Kosygin would lead the Soviet delegation, Lyndon Johnson proposed that a bilateral summit meeting should be held in Glassboro, roughly mid-way between New York and Washington. The meeting was no doubt useful, but agreement on the Middle East eluded the two leaders. A month later, however, the two super-powers devised a formula which combined Israeli withdrawal and an Arab commitment to peace, only to have it rejected by both sides. The only achievement of the emergency UN Assembly was to pass a resolution in favour of humanitarian aid to war victims and to condemn Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. Thereafter the emergency Assembly dwindled into futility.

The ordinary annual session of the General Assembly convened on 19 September, and the search for a Middle East peace formula was resumed. Various informal and formal drafts were put forward, but it was the British proposal that was finally approved by unanimous vote on 22 November. This resolution included principles and necessities for peace in the Middle East and the appointment of a special representative of the UN Secretary-General to promote an agreed settelement.

The British draft was intended to be a balanced text. Lord Caradon, the British ambassador, worked hard for agreement, but he has always insisted that credit for unanimity should go to Vasily Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister. The only country to say in public that the resolution was unacceptable was Syria, which condemned the British proposal as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The Palestine Liberation Organization objected that resolution 242 was defective because it treated the Palestinians as refugees and not as a nation with the right to a homeland of their own. But the greatest difficulty about resolution 242 has been that it contained a major ambiguity in asking Israel to withdraw from occupied territories. The Arabs have always taken the line that Israel should in principle withdraw totally on all fronts, with only minor and mutually-agreed frontier adjustments. Israel has always maintained that if that had been the intention of the Security Council, the resolution would have called for withdrawal from *the* territories or withdrawal to the armistice demarcation lines which were in effect from 1949 to 1967.

Those who work at the United Nations for too long often come to

believe that a UN resolution ends what had previously been an open question. The truth is that a UN decision is often only a first step, and vigorous international action is needed to convert agreement on a verbal formula in New York into reality. The tragedy of resolution 242 is that to the diplomats at the United Nations, resolution 242 was the end of a process: to ambassador Gunnar Jarring, it was only the beginning, because he was entrusted with the task of converting verbal agreement in New York into political reality in the Middle East in accordance with the resolution's provisions and principles. And the further tragedy has been that Jarring's efforts received insufficient support from the major powers. Israel increasingly behaved as if the territories occupied in 1967 were part of Israel itself, and this increased the determination of the Palestinians to recover what had been taken. The 1967 war was not to be the last Israeli-Arab resort to armed conflict.

Thus the cycle of violence and counter-violence was renewed. Just as the 1967 war arose in part from past mistakes, so the 1967 war constituted the seeds of future conflict. George Kennan has written that every mistake is in a sense the product of all the mistakes which have gone before, from which fact it derives a sort of cosmic forgiveness; and, at the same time, that every mistake is the determinant of future mistakes, from which it derives a sort of cosmic unforgiveableness. So it has been in the Middle East.

1. BACKGROUND TO ARMED CONFLICT

> What the Soviet Union regarded as pinpricks, Israel felt as
> stabs in its heart. Gideon Rafael, quoted in *Moscow and
> Jerusalem* by Avigdor Dagan, p. 207.

After the short Sinai-Suez war of 1956, British and French forces
withdrew and there was established the first UN peace-keeping force
(the United Nations Emergency Force, UNEF), interposed between the
belligerent armies. The final phase of Israel's withdrawal was delayed
until the Israeli government was satisfied that Palestinian guerrilla raids
from the Gaza Strip would cease and explicit assurances had been received
about access through the Strait of Tiran and to the port of Elat in the
Gulf of Aqaba. After a complicated set of negotiations involving UN
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and the Israeli, Egyptian, U.S.,
and other governments, it was agreed that the Gulf of Aqaba comprises
international waters and that no nation is entitled to prevent free
and innocent passage; and that in the event of the closure of the Gulf,
Israel would be entitled to exercise self-defence under Article 51 of
the UN Charter. Israel was never willing that UNEF should be deployed
on the Israeli side of the frontier, as was initially envisaged at the
United Nations.

For a decade, Israel's expectations about both the cessation of guerrilla
raids from territory administered by Egypt and access to the Gulf of
Aqaba were realized, but the Suez Canal remained closed to Israeli
cargoes, and guerrilla attacks from Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon con-
tinued. The attacks increased after 23 February 1966, when a radical
Ba'athist régime took over in Syria and Hafiz el Assad became minister
of defence. There were several incidents between Syria and Israel in
the Hula demilitarized zone, and a draft resolution of the Security
Council calling on Syria to 'strengthen its measures for preventing
incidents' ran into a Soviet veto.[1] There had also been a number of
guerrilla incursions into Israel in the early months of 1967.[2]

The war of 1947-9 had been a calamity for the Palestinians. Having
taken up arms to defeat the UN partition plan, the Palestinians had

ended up without even the truncated Arab state that the United Nations had envisaged. After the armistices in 1949, the West Bank had been incorporated into Jordan, and the Gaza Strip was administered by Egypt. The Palestinian movement was coordinated by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella organization formed by six underground Palestinian groups or factions, replacing the shadowy All-Palestine government. The first chairman of the PLO was Ahmed Shuqairi, whose strident threats caused such consternation in Israel. It is widely believed in Israel that Shuqairi threatened to throw the Jews into the sea, but I have been unable to trace any such threat in express terms. In what is said to have been a press interview on 1 June 1967, the text of which was supplied by Shuqairi to the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, he was asked if the PLO intended to throw the Israelis into the sea, and replied, 'We do not want to throw the Jews into the sea. That is an old accusation . . . The future of the Israelis is a matter to be decided by the United Nations.' Asked about the future of Jews who had not been born in Palestine or in other Arab countries, Shuqairi replied, 'They will go back the way they came; they came by sea, and they will go back by sea.' In a later statement addressed to the Jews of Israel and published in an Arabic-language periodical in Beirut, Shuqairi said that the PLO did not want to annihilate the Jews, 'nor to cast them into the sea, as Israeli propaganda has falsely claimed.'[3]

The PLO had been founded in May 1964, when over 400 Palestinian representatives had assembled in East Jerusalem for the founding conference and had adopted a covenant, which was subsequently amended. Shuqairi had been assistant secretary-general of the League of Arab States and had also worked in the diplomatic service of number of Arab countries. He was for a time a protégé of president Nasser of Egypt, but he had broken with King Hussein of Jordan at the beginning of 1967 and had tried to engineer Jordan's expulsion from the Arab League. He had become increasingly autocratic, having dissolved the PLO Executive Committee and substituted a Revolutionary Council of his own nominees. Maxime Rodinson sums up Shuqairi as 'rather muddle-headed, inclined to be carried away by his own words, with a taste for the grand gesture, and capable of making two equally shattering and totally contradictory statements in the same breath.' The Soviet Union never took him seriously: a Soviet official told the Israeli ambassador in Moscow in 1966 that Shuqairi 'did not represent anyone' and had never received an official invitation to visit Moscow, which news much pleased Abba Eban, who had just succeeded Golda Meir as Israel's foreign minister.[4] The fact was and is that the Palestinians have no significant

role in a Zionist Israel: Mohamed Heikal has described them as 'men with a cause but without a country'.[5] I knew Shuqairi when he was in the Syrian mission to the United Nations in 1955–6.[6]

On the Egypt-Israel frontier, the UN Emergency Force cooperated with the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), created by Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, and did its best to supervise and maintain the armistice and cease-fire commitments, but the Arab governments claimed that they were not responsible for Palestinian attacks launched from their territory.[7]

Israel retaliated for these attacks with increasing severity. UNTSO reported periodically on violations of the armistice and cease-fire, including acts of retaliation (see Appendix 1). The Security Council held 66 meetings on the Palestine question in the decade after the Sinai-Suez war and adopted four resolutions. The first was a balanced text, calling for equivalent steps from the two sides.[8] The second was in non-polemical language but urged Israel to comply with a decision of one of the armistice commissions.[9] The last two resolutions called for equivalent actions by the parties, but in one case determined that an Israeli attack had been a flagrant violation of an earlier resolution of the Security Council, and in another case censured Israel for violating the UN Charter and the armistice.[10] Three proposals were vetoed by the Soviet Union, two being balanced texts, but one contained a condemnation of an action which could only have been launched from Syria.[11]

Israel's ambassador at the United Nations, Gideon Rafael, has written that by the middle of 1966, Israel's assessment was that the Soviet push southwards would soon gather 'dangerous momentum', and that by and large British officials shared Israel's analysis and concern. But Abba Eban had 'no premonition of crisis.' He told a press conference that Israel's neighbours were unlikely to disturb the security balance: ' I have reason to believe that [they] have read the signals.' It was true that the early months of 1967 had been 'turbulent', he said, but no more so than during many other years, and Eban had no reason to think that 'the usual raids and reprisals would set off a total clash of arms.'[12]

There was, however uneasiness about the Middle East in UN circles. Egypt and Syria had concluded a defence agreement in November 1966, involving limited measures of coordination and integration. Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited Cairo from 29 March to 1 April 1967 for talks with president Nasser, and Israelis were anxious, perhaps unnecessarily, by the references in the communiqué to 'friendship and mutual confidence'. General Odd Bull, head of the UN truce

organization, was worried because of provocative Israeli patrols close to the armistice lines.[13] He had been warned by Ralph Bunche, a senior UN official, that trouble was likely once Israel began to tap the Jordan waters, and Golda Meir once said to Bull, 'Oil we can buy, water we cannot live without.' Eric Johnson, under mandate from president Eisenhower, had drafted a plan for the unified development and control of the Jordan Valley in 1953, but the plan had been rejected by both Israel and the Arabs.[14] In 1964 Israel began to draw water from the Jordan River, and the Arabs decided to establish a Jordan Diversion Authority, construct a dam across the Yarmak River, and divert the Hasbani and Baniyas Rivers, which are tributaries of the Jordan. Israel made several attacks on the facilities of the Jordan Diversion Authority in 1964–6. Tension in the area mounted and, in general Bull's words, 'the result was the 1967 war, a war for the control of waters resources . . . The war did not come as a surprise.'[15]

On 15 January, Secretary-General U Thant reported that he had received disturbing accounts of military activity in the area, and he appealed to Israel and Syria to exercise restraint.[16] The Israel-Syria armistice commission, which had not met for seven years, held three extraordinaery meetings under the personal chairmanship of general Bull, but the only result was that the two sides re-affirmed their commitment to refrain from hostile or aggressive action, but without clearing up the difficulties in the Hula demilitarized zone.[17] On 7 April, there was a clash between Syrian and Israeli forces, first on land and then in the air, and six Syrian MiG fighters were shot down. This incident, and an Israeli reprisal raid into Jordan the previous November, exceeded the usual level of Middle Eastern border violence. General Bull was in Norway on sick leave in April 1967, but on 8 April he received a telegram from UN headquarters saying that a dangerous situation was developing, and on 20 April he was asked to return to the Middle East as soon as possible. Bull noticed increased military activity in Israel at the end of April.[18]

The day after general Bull was summoned back to Jerusalem, the Soviet government warned Israel that it was dangerous to play with fire 'in a region in immediate proximity to the frontiers of the Soviet Union . . .' The Soviet Union expected Israel to weigh the situation carefully and not heed those who, with political myopia, were making their country 'the plaything of hostile outside forces,' thus jeopardizing the vital interests of the Israeli people and the fate of their country. The Soviet Union was worried about reports of Israeli troop concentrations close to the Syrian border. Egypt, according to president

Nasser, had on 13 May received 'definite information' from 'Soviet friends' about Israeli military concentrations and news of an Israeli 'decision' to attack Syria, 'starting on 17 May.' Information to this effect was apparently given to Anwar Sadat, at that time presiding officer of the Egyptian parliament, who was in the Soviet Union from 27 April to 14 May as leader of an Egyptian delegation.[19] It was on the basis of this information, writes Mohamed Heikal, that Nasser decided to send troops into Sinai. It is uncertain where the Soviet Union got its information from, but it has been reported that Syrian intelligence officers had arrived in Cairo on 8 May and told president Nasser of an impending Israeli attack against Damascus, and Hisham Sharabi adds that the Syrian information was 'corroborated by Lebanese sources.' Although Nasser made public the information in his possession about Israel's military plans, he seems to have received it with some scepticism, and general Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of staff, was sent to Damascus to investigate.[20]

Not much time elapsed before rumours of Israeli troop concentrations reached Israel itself, and on three occasions Soviet Ambassador Dimitry Chuvakhin was invited to visit the border area and see for himself that all was normal, but he declined the invitations. General Bull writes that normal daily patrolling by the UN had not uncovered any unusual troop concentrations.[21]

Israel complained to the United Nations about Syria on 14 April and 11 May.[22] Syria complained about Israel on 12 April and 15 May,[23] and Jordan also complained on 17 and 19 May.[24] On 8 May, U Thant sent a message to general Bull, supporting the efforts which Bull had made to resurrect the Israel-Syria mixed armistice commission in order to sort out the continuing problems about cultivation rights in the Hula demilitarized zone.[25] On 10 May, Gideon Rafael saw Ralph Bunche and asked him to tell U Thant of Israel's growing concern at 'the rapidly deteriorating situation . . .'[26] The next escalatory step came from Israel, however, when foreign military attachés in Tel Aviv were given a briefing to the effect that if guerrilla attacks instigated by Syria should continue, Israel would have to take military action, 'designed to topple the Damascus army regime . . .' On 14 May, Israeli papers reported an interview with general Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's chief of staff, in which he compared the Syrian régime unfavourably with the governments of Lebanon and Jordan. 'Therefore the aim of action against Syria is different from what it ought to be against Jordan and Lebanon.' Rabin does not mention this crucial interview in his memoirs. Whatever Israel's intentions may have been, such remarks were interpreted in the

Arab world as foreshadowing military action to displace the Syrian régime, and Nasser referred to these threats the following week when he announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.[27]

Israeli threats were also taken seriously in Damascus, where an Israeli attack was expected at any moment. General Hafiz el Assad, Syrian minister of defence and later president, told a press conference on 19 May that Israel would soon embark on 'expanded aggression or war . . . instigated by America'.[28]

Israeli threats against Syria, even if conditional, together with Soviet reports that Israel was massing troops on the Syrian frontier, put Egypt in a quandary, and Nasser's military deployments in Sinai were made in the hope of easing Israeli pressure on Syria. On 14 May, field marshall Hakim Abdul Amer of Egypt issued a Battle Order, referring to Israeli threats and placing the armed forces on full alert. Eban told Gideon Rafael to let it be known that no Israeli forces were concentrated along the Syrian border and that Israel had 'no intention of initiating conflict in any sector'. Ralph Bunche told Rafael that UN observers agreed that there were no unusual concentrations of Israeli troops, and Eban's message was passed on to Nasser. The Israeli cabinet took the view at this stage that Nasser's military moves were 'a political stunt, not a military threat', but to be on the safe side, a partial Israeli mobilization was ordered.[29]

On 13 May, a UNEF convoy from Port Said was prevented by the Egyptians from using the ferry across the Suez Canal at Qantara. When the convoy eventually reached Rafah, near Gaza, it reported 'large-scale' Egyptian troop movements. This did not unduly alarm general Indar Jik Rikhye, the UNEF commander: UNEF was accustomed to this sort of thing, for the anniversary of the establishment of the state of Israel was approaching. 'It was the season for an exchange of verbal threats, demonstrations, parades across the border and high tension', wrote Rikhye.[30]

Israel holds a military parade in May each year on Independence Day. For 1967, the Israeli cabinet decided that the usual parade should be in Jerusalem where, according to the armistice agreement with Jordan, only specified arms were allowed. On this occasion, according to Eban, the parade was to be kept strictly 'within the limits prescribed in the armistice agreement . . .' Some Israeli politicians, including David Ben-Gurion, thought that the decision to limit the scope of the parade was a mistake. In any case, what might have been a conciliatory gesture was interpreted by the Arabs as a breach of the armistice and a violation of 'UN resolutions relating to the status of Jerusalem', for the absence of armoured formations in Jerusalem was assumed to mean that they were needed somewhere else. Jordan denounced the Israeli

decision as a 'serious' provocation, and the Arab Group at the United Nations described the provocation as 'flangrant'.[31] A UN spokesman stated that, even if the parade were legal, it was provocative, and general Bull and diplomatic representatives of the major powers conspicuously absented themselves.[32]

While the parade in Jerusalem was taking place, Ahmed Shuqairi was reviewing PLO fighters in Gaza. If war should break out, he declared, Israel would be completely annihilated. He doubted whether there would be many Israelis alive after the Arab victory, but native-born Jewish survivors would be allowed to remain in Palestine.[33] The Middle East was coasting towards armed conflict.

1. Text of vetoed proposals in Sydney D. Bailey, *Voting in the Security Council*, Bloomington, Ind., and London, Indiana University Press, 1969, pp. 197 (veto 109).
2. *Middle East Record*, vol. 3, 1967, pp. 170–1, 489.
3. Fuad A. Jabber (ed.), *International Documents on Palestine, 1967*, pp. 570–1 (docs. 334 and 432).
4. Jabber, pp. 478, 487–9, 491, 496–500, 505–6, 522–5 (docs. 283, 284, 285, 293, 297, 306); *Middle East Record*, pp. 315–6; Leila S. Kadi, *Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem (1936–1950), (1964–1966)*, Beirut, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1966, pp. 104–6; Rashid Hamid, 'What is the PLO? '*Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. IV, no. 4 (summer 1975), pp. 94–6; Hussein A. Hasouna, *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A study of Middle East Conflicts*, New York, Oceana: Leiden, Sythoff, 1975 (Litho.) pp. 267–8; Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs*, pp. 115, 163–6; Avigdor Dagan, *Moscow and Jerusalem: twenty years of relations between Israel and the Soviet Union*, pp. 192, 195; Eric Rouleau and others, *Israël et les Arabes: 1e 3e combat*, pp. 40–5.
5. Mohamed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World*, p. 12.
6. For his speeches in the Security Council, see SCOR, 10th year, 707th mtg. (16 Dec. 1955), paras. 1, 40–97; 709th mtg. (22 Dec. 1955), paras. 3–45, 75–88; 713th mtg. (17 Jan. 1956), paras. 19–78; 715th mtg. (19 Jan. 1956), paras. 1–15, 151–6; 11th year, 718 mtg. (28 March 1956), paras. 32–51; 721st mtg. (4 April 1956), paras. 13–33; 724th mtg. (31 May 1956), paras. 21–52; 725th mtg. (31 May 1956), paras. 1–29; 727th mtg. (1 June 1956), paras. 21–83; 728th mtg (4 June 1956), paras. 97–133.
7. SCOR, 21st year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1966, pp. 30–2, S/7412; 1289th mtg. (26 July 1966), para. 57; *Middle East Record*, p. 166.
8. S.C. res. 127 (S/3942), 22 Jan 1958.
9. S.C. res. 162 (S/4788), 11 April 1961.
10. S.C. res. 171 (S/5111), 9 April 1962; S.C. res. 288 (S/7598), 25 Nov. 1966.

11. Text of vetoed proposals in Sydney D. Bailey, *Voting in the Security Council*, Bloomington, Ind., and London, Indiana University Press, 1969, pp. 194–7 (vetoes 105, 108, 109).

12. Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israel's Foreign Policy, A Personal Memoir*, p. 129; Abba Eban, *An Autobiography*, pp, 315–6; Jabber, p. 2 (doc. 6).

13. Charles W. Yost, 'How it began', *Foreign Affairs*, p. 305; *Middle East Record*, p. 22; Odd Bull, *War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and Views of a U.N. Observer*, pp. 101, 103. 'At the time' writes Eugene V. Rostow, 'we [the Americans] thought [Gromyko's visit] extremely important . . . It was almost surely the green light for Nasser', letter to the author, 11 July 1983.

14. Kathryn B Doherty, 'Jordan Waters Conflict', *International Conciliation*, no. 553 (May 1965), pp. 23–4.

15. *Middle East Record*, pp. 120–1; letter to the author from general Odd Bull, 4 April 1983. General Bull points out that after the 1967 war, Israel took control of the water resources on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and he mentions also the destruction of wells of the excellent agricultural project of the Arab Development Society between Jericho and the Jordan River. Jewish settlements on the West Bank have drawn water in such a way as to interfere with Arab irrigation.

16. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for January to March 1967, p. 26, S/7683

17. Ibid., pp. 29, 33, 39–42, 64–5, 184–8, S/7685, S/7690, S/7696, S/7734, S/7784; *Middle East Record*, pp. 173–4; Jabber, pp. 479–86 (docs. 281, 282).

18. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 20–1, 24–30, 53–7, S/7843, S/7845, S/7863; Bull, p. 106; Jabber, p. 512 (doc. 300); Yost, 'How it began', p. 106; Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World: the Crisis of 1967*, p. 13.

19. Jabber, pp. 6, 539, 621 (docs. 16, 318, 392); Dagan, pp. 204–7; Rafael, p. 133; Mohamed Heikal, *Nasser: the Cairo Documents*, p. 217; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, pp. 174–5; *Middle East Record*, p. 22; Theodore Draper, *Israel and World Politics: Roots of the Third Arab-Israeli War*, Appendix B, p. 238; Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War, 1967: The Origin of the Arab-Israel Conflict*, Appendix 9, p. 319.

20. *Moshe Dayan, Story of my life*, p. 291; Hisham Sharabi, *Palestine and Israel: the lethal dilemma*, New York, Pegasus, [1970?], p. 100; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 174; Jabber, p. 500 (doc. 293); Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, p. 52; *Middle East Record*, pp. 188, 191.

21. Yost, 'How it began', p. 309; Rouleau, p. 75; Brecher, p. 362, f.n.5; Anthony Nutting, *Nasser*, p. 298; Bull p. 104.

22. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 34–7, 82–6, S/7853, S/7880.

23. Ibid., pp. 30–1, 90–1, S/7849, S/7885.

24. Ibid., pp. 101–3, 105–6, S/7890, S/7893.

25. Ibid., pp. 78–9, S/7877.

26. Rafael, p. 136.

27. Jabber, pp. 538–9, 550, 555, 560 (docs. 318, 328); *Middle East Record*, p. 187; Eban, p. 319; Rafael, p. 136; Nadav Safran, *Israel: the embatteled ally*, pp. 391, 395, 406; Draper, p. 73; Yost, 'How it began', p. 307, Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Sinai Blunder*, p. 199; letter to the author from general Odd Bull, 4 April 1983.,

28. Jabber, pp. 517–8, 526–31, 534–6 (docs. 303–4, 308, 309, 314); *Middle East Record*, p. 132; letter from major general Indar Jit Rikhye to the author, 13 June 1983.

29. Eban, p. 319; Rafael, pp. 136–7; Rabin, p. 52; Brecher, pp. 362–3; Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, p. 245; Yost 'How it began', p. 313; *Middle East Record*, p. 185.

30. Rikhye, p. 13.

31. Eban, pp. 319–20; *Middle East Record*, p. 181; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War*, p. 18; Henry Cattan, *Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conlict*, London, Longman, 1973, p. 129.

32. *Middle East Record*, p. 181.

33. Ibid., pp. 194, 204, 317; Bar-Zohar, p. 18.

2. EGYPT CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF
UN EMERGENCY FORCE

U Thant should have . . . called a meeting of the Security
Council under Article 99 regardless of a veto threat . . . Had
he done so he would have emerged with less damage to his
reputation. General Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Sinai Blunder*,
pp. 181—2.

The situation was already tense when, on 16 May, the commander of
the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai, general Rikhye, received
'a very important communication' from the Egyptian chief of staff,
general Mohammed Fawzi, brought by special courier to UNEF head-
quarters in Gaza, to the effect that Egyptian forces were being de-
ployed 'in Sinai on [Egypt's] eastern borders' in order to resist Israeli
aggression, and asking for the withdrawal of the UN Force from 'ob-
servation posts along [Egypt's] borders . . .' The note concluded
with a brusqueness not unknown in military communications, 'In-
form back the fulfilment of this request.' Believing that such a step
might well lead to war, Rikhye replied that he could comply with the
request only if instructed to do so by the UN Secretary-General. He
noted the substance of the letter and promised to transmit it to UN
headquarters.[1]

Rikhye at once informed Thant what had transpired, and he also
advised general Odd Bull in Jerusalem of the situation in Sinai. He
instructed UNEF to continue its normal duties. General Bull has des-
cribed Rikhey's action as 'entirely correct' and his conduct through-
out the crisis as 'most commendable'. While Rikhey's response was
undoubtedly correct from a procedural point of view, Rikhye now
believes that he should have gone to Cairo as soon as he received the
Egyptian demand.[2]

It is not easy to be certain what were Nasser's motives in asking for
the withdrawal of UNEF. Egyptian forces had been in the Yemen in
support of the Republican faction since 1962, and Egypt had been
reproached by Jordan and other Arab states for hiding behind UNEF.
It was alleged that this was allowing Israel to receive military supplies
through the Gulf of Aqaba. The prime minister of Jordan, Wasfi Tell,
had claimed that the UN Force was 'a hindrance' to Arab aims, and

King Hussein had said that Egyptian forces should not be in the Yemen but in 'the territory from which they and we could set forth to recover our rights.' Nasser, with his Pan-Arab aspirations, wished be in the vanguard of Arab militancy and resented these criticisms from brother Arabs.[3]

Nor is it certain how widely Nasser consulted before reaching decisions. The full Egyptian cabinet seems to have met only once to consider the crisis, but there had been military discussions for some time about the possibility of asking for the withdrawal of UNEF and the occupation of Tiran by Egypt, and whether such steps would precipitate war with Israel. Field marshal Amer, the Egyptian military commander, was worried because of the insistent Arab taunts that Egypt was sheltering behind the United Nations, and he believed that it would be possible for Egypt to ask UNEF to withdraw, but without closing the Gulf of Aqaba or providing Israel with a *casus belli*. This, at any rate, was the evidence subsequently given to an Egyptian court by Shamseddin Badran, the minister of war at the time. Badran believed that if Amer had raised military objections to the removal of UNEF, 'no measures with their subsequent hazards would have been taken.' Amer could have been frank with Nasser, for he was a veteran of the Egyptian revolution, and he and Nasser had been good friends for 30 years. Nasser was, however, 'very wary of a strong army, fearing he might not be able to control it.' He, therefore, 'encouraged internal rivalries . . .' On the question of UNEF, Nasser was as firm as anyone in insisting on Egypt's legal right to withdraw consent for the presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil, but he was initially rather more cautious than some of his colleagues about what would follow. Nasser 'was not against our going to war', but he did not want Egypt to deliver the first blow. The issue for Egypt, according to Badran, was whether to strike first and find itself facing the United States as well as Israel, or to wait for Israel to strike and then face only one enemy. The military officers 'were enthusiastic and wanted to fight.' They were confident that Israel would not attack, because their intelligence experts had estimated that Egypt was superior in armour, artillery, and air power. 'No one believed that the Jews had secured immense technical facilities from the U.S.A. . . .'[4] General Odd Bull finds it difficult to understand how the Arab countries could have underestimated the strength of the Israeli forces. General Rikhye subsequently heard about the differences between Nasser and the Egyptian armed forces: 'The troops had been . . . readied for attack, but Nasser stopped them . . .'[5]

Egyptians have maintained that Nasser never envisaged the total

withdrawal of UNEF, simply its redeployment. Sir Anthony Nutting, who knew Nasser well, is sure that Nasser had expected Thant to leave a UN contingent at Sharm el Sheikh.[6] General Bull believed that Egypt's intention 'was not that UN forces should be completely withdrawn . . . but only from the [armistice] demarcation line.' Mohamed Heikal, a close confidant of Nasser, Mahmoud Riad, the foreign minister at the time, and Ismail Fahmy, foreign minister for four years under Sadat, all maintain that Nasser did not want the withdrawal of UNEF from Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip, but only from the international frontier between Sinai and the Negev, and that it was Thant's 'inflexibility' in insisting that UNEF should be deployed in accordance with UN decisions or totally withdrawn that precipitated the crisis.[7] Ismail Fahmy writes that Nasser decided to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF 'without consulting anyone in the Foreign Ministry', and general Rikhye was later given the same information by Egyptian diplomats. Rikhye makes it clear, all the same, that the Egyptian brigadier who handed him the letter 'did particularly ask me to remove my posts at Sharm el Sheikh . . .'[8]

As soon as the Egyptian demand became known, Israel's UN ambassador, Gideon Rafael, on the instructions of foreign minister Abba Eban, rushed to the 38th floor at UN headquarters and told Ralph Bunche of Israeli apprehensions. Israel considered that there had been an express commitment in 1957 that the Gulf of Aqaba would be kept open, and that it was only because of an assurance to this effect that Israel had agreed to withdraw its forces from Sinai. Bunche replied that U Thant had been advised by his legal counsellor that the presence of UNEF on Egyptian soil depended solely on Egyptian consent. U Thant, said Bunche, was calling Nasser's bluff: once Nasser realized that U Thant would not redeploy UNEF but insist that the Force stayed where it was or leave entirely, Nasser would abandon the request for withdrawal. Rafael did not agree with this assessment and believed that Israel and Egypt were now on a collision course. Bunche accepted that 'the decisive question' had still to be faced: whether Egypt would reoccupy Sharm el Sheikh.[9]

U Thant was later to describe general Fawzi's letter to general Rikhye as 'cryptic . . . both unclear and unacceptable . . .' Rikhye's report reached Thant at 5.30 p.m. (New York time) on 16 May, and by 6.45 p.m. he was in conversation with Mohamed Awad el Kony, the Egyptian ambassador to the United Nations. Thant told el Kony that any request for the withdrawal of UNEF must be addressed directly to the Secretary-General from the Egyptian government. Thant gave el Kony

a note reminding him of the so-called 'good faith' *aide-mémoire* nego-
tiated by Dag Hammarskjold in 1956, whereby Egypt and the United
Nations were to be guided by the resolution of the General Assembly
establishing UNEF and affirming Egypt's 'willingness to maintain
UNEF until its task is complete.' A request for the redeployment of
UNEF, stressed Thant, was 'tantamount' to a request for complete
withdrawal. To redeploy UNEF, as UN under secretary Ralph Bunche
was to explain later in a letter to the *New York Times*, would make
UNEF 'a party to the resumption of war' between Egypt and Israel,
and Bunche had always tried to avoid a UN responsibility for a renewal
of fighting. Thant explained to el Kony that if a formal request for the
withdrawal of UNEF should be received, he would comply and would
tell the UN General Assembly what he had done and why. Thant sub-
sequently received a formal communication from Mahmoud Riad
stating that Egypt had decided to terminate UNEF's presence from
Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip. U Thant expressed 'deep mis-
givings about the likely disastrous consequences' and said that he would
appeal to president Nasser to reconsider the decision, but el Kony told
him that Mahmoud Riad had phoned to advise against such an appeal.
Sir Anthony Nutting considers that Thant should have disregarded this
advice, and general Rikhye also believes that Thant should have addres-
sed an appeal directly to Nasser, as this 'would have provided the Egyp-
tians with the face-saving device which they badly needed . . .' Rik-
hye suggests that Thant should have gone to Cairo at once or sent a
UN official such as Ralph Bunche or Brian Urquhart: 'in any case
[writes Rikhye] I should have been asked to proceed to Cairo . . .'[10]
General Bull was 'in complete agreement' with Thant's action, which
Bull believed had 'the full support' of Ralph Bunche. 'I don't agree
with the strong criticism directed against Thant', writes Bull. 'Thant
was a wise man, a wisdom we in the West could learn from.' Brian
Urquhart also notes 'the irrational . . . condemnations of U Thant
by a great number of people who should have known better.' U Thant,
Urquhart has written to the author, 'was just about the only person
who tried to provide some means of stemming the tide and the only
one, so far as I know, who actually went to Cairo to talk to Nasser.'[11]

This was not the first scare that Egypt wished to re-militarize Sinai.
After the Sinai-Suez affair in 1956 and the establishment of the UN
Force, Egypt had kept Sinai largely demilitarized, but when tension
between the Arab states and Israel increased in February 1960, Egypt
began to move troops into Sinai. The commander of the UN Force
stressed that this contravened the post-Suez accords, and Egyptian
forces withdrew.[12]

The Egyptian request for the removal of UNEF precipitated the crisis which led inexorably to war three weeks later. It was a rash move on Nasser's part, and it is natural to ask whether a major diplomatic effort by U Thant or external powers could have prevented war. Certainly there was much criticism of Thant's ready agreement to withdraw UNEF. 'U Thant was an honest, decent, even courageous man, but out of his depth in this crisis. His great counsellor, Ralph Bunche, was slowly getting old, sick, and blind.'[13] One of Thant's more severe critics was Arthur Lall, a former Indian diplomat with good UN connexions and from whose outstanding study of UN diplomacy at this time I will often quote. The Egyptian demand [writes Lall] was, 'on the face of it, inconsistent with the terms and conditions of [Egypt's] own acceptance of the Force . . . an admission of default in its obligations under the Armistice Agreement', and negated UN efforts to maintain peace. It certainly led to a new round of armed conflict, but it is doubtful whether the demand for withdrawal was, on its own, a violation of the armistice agreement. President Johnson was shocked and puzzled by Thant's action. Eugene V. Rostow, who headed an inter-departmental task force in Washington, thought that Thant had moved 'precipitately – and disastrously.' Harold Wilson (now Lord Wilson) described Thant's decision as 'ill-judged, procedurally wrong . . .', though Wilson is himself in error in writing that the UN Force had been set up under the aegis of the Security Council, for it had been established by the General Assembly after the Sinai-Suez episode, following British and French vetoes of cease-fire resolutions in the Security Council. George Brown (now Lord George Brown), the British foreign secretary at the time, has described the decision as 'extraordinary . . . very ill-considered . . . totally unnecessary and unexpected'. While the decision was legally correct, he wrote, wise men should not deal with big events as though they were conveyancing property in a solicitor's office. The United Nations Secretariat needed 'a very different character' at its head. Golda Meir found Thant's reasoning inexplicable, though it is not true that Thant 'didn't refer the matter to anyone else.'[14] Certainly there were those who believed that Thant should have convened the Security Council under Article 99 of the UN Charter, which provides that the Secretary-General may draw the attention of the Security Council to 'any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.' That was my own view at the time, and general Rikhye also believes that Thant should have done so, in spite of the threat of a Soviet veto if the Council had tried to take a substantive decision.

It had been envisaged in 1956 that any Egyptian request for withdrawal would be submitted to the UNEF Advisory Committee. When news of Fawzi's letter reached Thant, he first consulted informally the representatives of countries providing contingents and then, when the official Egyptian request for withdrawal had been received, the UNEF Advisory Committee, which had not met for several years, plus the countries providing contingents. The reactions varied. India, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia fully supported Thant's position on withdrawal. Indeed, there were rumours at UN headquarters that the Indian and Yugoslav contingents would be withdrawn whatever decision Thant would come to, and UNEF without these non-aligned contingents would begin to look too like a NATO force. Thant has written that India and Yugolavia had made it clear that their contingents would be withdrawn 'the moment the request for the withdrawal of UNEF was officially known . . .' Former Israeli ambassador Michael Comay goes so far as to refer to 'the unilateral withdrawal' of the Indian and Yugoslav contingents, and George Ignatieff, the Canadian ambassador to the United Nations at the time, points out that Thant had already told the Egyptian ambassador that a request for withdrawal would be respected. General Rikhye insists, however, that no actual decision to withdraw these two contingents was made in advance of Thant's own decision. In New York, Ignatieff joined Hans Tabor of Denmark in cautioning Thant against complying with the Egyptian request and urged him to try to gain time by going to Cairo in search of a negotiated solution. Brazil, Denmark, and Norway were also in favour of delay. Brazil pointed out that the UNEF Advisory Committee was entitled to ask that the General Assembly be convened, and Canada insisted that the withdrawal of UNEF was a matter for the Security Council or the General Assembly: while the original deployment of UNEF had required the consent of Egypt, as host country, it had also involved Israel and the countries providing military contingents. Sweden hedged. Raph Bunche, from the UN Secretariat, took the view that once Egyptian consent had been withdrawn, Thant had no option but to remove the force. No formal proposal was made for convening the General Assembly, which Lall finds 'totally inexplicable'.[16]

Thant raised with Gideon Rafael the possibility of deploying UNEF on the Israeli side of the armistice demarcation line, but this was rejected by Israel as 'entirely unacceptable'. It would not, on its own, have assured Israeli access to the Gulf of Aqaba though it would have interposed a symbolic barrier to Egyptian military threats from Sinai, a matter which was soon to assume importance in Israeli eyes. Arthur

Goldberg recalls that the United States could not support the idea of moving UNEF to Israel. 'It made no practical sense since there was no possibility that either Nasser or the Israeli government would have accepted this suggestion.'[17] Thant believed that if only Israel had decided otherwise, 'the course of history could have been different.' Thant set in train arrangements for 'the orderly withdrawal' of UNEF, but he again told Egypt of his 'serious misgivings'.[18]

There now began a period of intensive diplomacy. The Western diplomatic missions in New York held a series of meetings in the Danish offices. Abba Eban suggested that U Thant should visit Egypt and Israel, and possibly also Damascus, in an effort to prevent war. Gideon Rafael told U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg of this idea, and Goldberg passed it on to U Thant.[19] Eban called in Soviet ambassador Chuvakhin and drew his attention to the increased tension because of Palestinian guerrilla raids against Israel. 'We hear all the time about saborteurs', Chuvakhin is quoted as replying, 'but we have no proof that those responsible are the Syrians and not the CIA.'[20] President Johnson wrote to Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin, affirming support for Israel but suggesting a joint initiative of the super-powers to stem the drift to war, and Arthur Goldberg assured Soviet ambassador Nikolai Federenko that the United States was not colluding with Israel. Johnson also cabled Israeli prime minister Eshkol, spelling out America's deep concern and urging restraint. ' . . . I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted.' Dean Rusk, the U.S. secretary of state, wanted to be sure that Israel and Britain did not cherish any illusions about the capacity of the United States to assume new military commitments, for the Viet Nam war was causing great internal stresses and external strains for the United States. William Quandt finds U.S. policy at this time to have been 'cautious, at times ambiguous, and ultimately insensitive to the danger that war might break out at Israel's instigation', and Theodore Draper writes that the events of 1967 represented 'the final stage of bankruptcy' of U.S. policy in the Middle East, because 'the United States was caught with almost no leverage against the Arabs 'Car chaque victoire diplomatique des Etats-Unis à l'étranger constitue une défaite pour eux dans le monde arabe . . .'[21]

The head of Israeli military intelligence (Aman), general Aharon Yariv, had recommended that if Egypt called for the withdrawal of UNEF, this should be regarded as 'a clear indication of Egypt's aggressive intentions.' Eshkol, in replying to Johnson's cable, blamed Syria

for the tension, but insisted that Egypt must remove its troops from Sinai. He asked the United States to reaffirm its commitment to Israeli security and to tell the Soviet Union that it had done so. Eban reports that Eshkol also sent a message to president de Gaulle, promising not to initiate hostile attacks 'until or unless they [Egyptian forces] close the Strait of Tiran to free navigation by Israel'. Eban sent notes to Maurice Couve de Murville and George Brown on similar lines: Israel's determination not to acquiesce in a blockade was 'solid and unreserved', and Nasser should be under no illusions. Israel had enjoyed 'a decade of free passage' and would not return to a blockaded position. France did not reply, and Eban considered that London and Washington responded with 'cautious generalization'.[22]

The United States had raised with Britain and France the possibility of invoking the Triparite Declaration of 1950 which *inter alia* affirmed unalterable opposition to the threat or use of force and to any violation of frontiers or armistice lines.[23] Britain had maintained for seveal years that the Tripartite Declaration had been overtaken by events and now took the line that to rely on the Tripartite Declaration would harm Britain's relations with the Arab world and would also commit Britain to maintain the frontiers, not only of Israel, but of Egypt as well. France took a similar view, which greatly disappointed Israel.[24] By now, Israel had informed the maritime powers that if the Strait of Tiran should be closed, 'Israel would stop at nothing to cancel the blockade', and Eshkol had ordered a substantial mobilization of reserves. Yitzhak Rabin, the chief of staff, ordered all commanding officers to make it clear to their men that Israel was heading for war. 'Without doubt we faced the gravest situation Israel had known since the War of Independence.'[25]

In Sinai itself, Egyptian troops proceeded to occupy UNEF observation posts ('a serious violation of UNEF's rights and privileges', wrote Rikhye), and proceeded towards the frontier with Israel. Thant told Rikhye to do all he reasonably could to maintain the position of UNEF and to avoid humiliation 'without, however, going so far as to risk an armed clash.' UNEF troops 'did not resist by use of force', reported Thant, 'since they had no mandate to do so.' UNEF's withdrawal would be 'orderly, deliberate, and dignified . . .'[26]

During the night of 17-18 May, an entirely fortuitous incident at Rafah almost led to an open breach between UNEF and Egypt. Four Bedouin broke into the Canadian compound and, during the ensuing melée, one was shot and killed. Egypt might have held that this was going beyond the UNEF rule of not using force except in self-defence but, fortunately for the United Nations, the dead man turned out to be

a well-known criminal. Nothing more was heard of the incident. The next day, the UN flag was ceremoniously lowered in Gaza.[27]

On 18 May, Rikhye told Thant that Mahmoud Riad had summoned the ambassadors of countries providing UN contingents and told them that UNEF had ended its tasks and must depart. The same day, Egypt refused clearance for a UN aircraft. Rikhye protested, and the refusal was countermanded. Rikhye then took off, only to find his aircraft being chased by two Israeli jets – 'a blatant attempt to hijack our plane . . . an attempt at banditry in the air . . . a most deplorable and dangerous act', wrote Rikhye. A strong protest was lodged with the Israeli authorities, leading to a formal expression of regret.[28]

The following day, Secretary-General Thant issued a new report on the situation in the Middle East, which he described as 'extremely menacing.' The Egypt-Israel Mixed Amristic Commission had been denounced by Israel ten years previously, though the United Nations had never accepted the validity of this unilateral act. The Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission had held several 'emergency and extraordinary meetings', but substantive progress had not been possible 'owing to an impasse over a position taken firmly by Syria.' There had been a new surge of 'El-Fatah activities, consisting of terrorism and sabotage,' for which the Arab governenments had 'officially disclaimed responsibility', and UN observers were unable to halt these activities. Thant pointed out that such insidious action was contrary to the 1949 armistice agreements. There had also been a spate of intemperate and bellicose utterances, especially from Israel. Rumours and reports had been in circulation about Israeli troop movements and concentrations near the border with Syria, but Israel had maintained that there had had been and would be no unusual military acitivity on the part of Israel and that Israel would initiate no military action 'unless such action is first taken by the other side.' Egypt's withdrawal of consent for the continued presence of UNEF had added 'one more frontier on which there is a direct confrontation between the military forces of Israel and those of the Arab neighbours.'[29]

The Arab states, as so often, were plagued with disunity. King Hussein of Jordan, at loggerheads with Egypt and with the new Ba'athist régime in Syria, was cultivating the Gulf monarchs. Tension between Jordan and Syria came to a head on 21 May when a car-bomb from Syria exploded at Ramtha on the frontier with Jordan, killing 16 people and injuring 28.[30]

Rikhye believed that, given Egyptian cooperation, it would be possible to complete the withdrawal of UNEF in about forty-five days. His plan

was to concentrate UNEF in the Gaza Strip and to leave there by sea. At 6 a.m. on 19 May, he received formal notification from U Thant that UNEF was to be withdrawn. This was not to be accomplished without difficulty.[31]

Notes

1. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 5, para. 6.3(a) and (b) of A/6730; Rikhye, pp. 14−22; U Thant, *View from the UN*, p. 220.

2. Bull, pp. 106−7; and letter to the author, 4 April 1983; Rikhye, pp. 162−3, 182.

3. Jabber, p. 476, 503−4 (docs. 280, 295); *Middle East Record*, p. 192; Mahmoud Riad, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*, pp. 22, 36; Anwar Sadat, *In search of Identity*, p. 172; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 163; Khouri, p. 245; See also Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis*, 1967, p. 7; Nutting, pp. 392, 395, 397, 414; Brecher, p. 324; Winston Burdett, *Encounter with the Middle East: An Intimate Report on What Lies Behind the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, pp. 214, 238.

4. Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Offices in Arab politics and society*, pp. 44, 78, 85, 89, 99−100, 104, 117, 120, 122, 126−7, 248; Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East*, p. 21; Nutting, p. 410; Burdett, pp. 214, 230, 239−41.

5. Letter to the author, 4 April 1983; Rikhye, p. 168.

6. Conversation with the author, 17 March 1983.

7. Bull, p. 108; Riad, p. 18; Heikal, *Nasser*, p. 218; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 176; Fahmy, p. 19; Rikhye, pp. 19, 160; Nutting, p. 399.

8. Fahmy, p. 19; Rikhye, pp. 160, 163−5.

9. Eban, pp. 321−3; Rafael, pp. 137−9. Eugene V. Rostow has written to the author (11 July 1983) that 'it was explicitly understood [in 1975] that any Egyptian denial of maritime rights in the Strait of Tiran would justify an Israeli use of force in self-defense under Article 51' of the UN Charter. 'This is a matter of moment, since it confirms that the closing of the Strait was "the first shot".'

10. Conversation with the author, 17 March 1983, Rikhye, pp. 52, 82, 164−5, 182.

11. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 121, para 5 of S/7906; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 5−7, 11−12, paras. 6, 3 and 7 of A/6730 and para. 22 of A/6730/Add.3; Draper, Appendix 7, p. 174; Thant, p. 224; Nutting, p. 402; Bull, pp. 107−8 and letter to the author from general Bull, 4 April 1983; letter to the author from Brian Urquhart, 5 Aug. 1983; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984; Rafael, p. 140.

12. Rikhye, p. 162; David Ben-Gurion, *Israel: a personal history*, p. 757.

13. Letter from a diplomat who knew Thant at this time, 26 July 1983.

14. Lall, pp. 18–9; Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 290; Eugene V. Rostow, *Peace in the Balance: The Future of American Foreign Policy*, p. 256 and letter, 11 July 1983; Harold Wilson, *The Labour Government 1964–70*, p. 506 Harold Wilson *The Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel*, p. 330; George Brown, *In my way*, p. 136; Golda Meir, *My life*, p. 296; Eban, p. 319; Howard and Hunter, pp. 47–9; Raymond Aron, *De Gaulle, Israël et les Juifs,* pp. 125–6, Rouleau, p. 77.

15. Rikhye, pp. 169, 181–2; Henry M. Christman (ed.), *The State Papers of Levi Eshkol*, p. 128.

16. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 7, 11–2, 20–1, para. 8, 10 of A/6730, paras. 21, 24–5, and Annex of A/6730/Add. 3; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 120–1, para. 4 of S/7906; Thant, pp. 220–6, 479; Bull, p. 107 and letter to the author, 4 April 1983; Rikhye, pp. 53–6, 67, 151, 173, 177, and letter to the author, 25 July 1979; letters from George Ignatieff and Hans Tabor to the author, 17 May 1983 and 23 Jan. 1984 respectively; Lall, pp. 19–20; Michael Comay, *U.N. Peace-Keeping in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 67; David Kimche and Dan Bawly, *The sandstorm: The Arab-Israel war of June 1967: prelude and aftermath*, p. 95; Bar-Zohar, pp. 38, 56, 63; Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, pp. 72, 186; Aron, pp. 23, 125; Khouri, p. 246.

17. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1527th plenary mtg. (20 June 1967), para. 6; Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 11, A/6730/Add. 3, para 21; Thant, p. 223; letter from general Odd Bull to the author, 4 April 1983; letter from Arthur J. Goldberg to the author, 5 April 1983.

18. Thant, p. 223.

19. Eban, pp. 324, 330; Rafael, pp. 130, 140; Brecher, pp. 367, 373.

20. Dagan, p. 213; Eban, pp. 325–6.

21. Johnson, p. 290; William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976*, pp. 39–41; Draper, pp. 85, 87; Rouleau, p. 161; Jonathan Trumbull Howe, *Multicrises: Sea power and global politics in the missile age*, p. 55.

22. Rabin, p. 54; Eban, pp. 327–9; Brecher, p. 372; Quandt, pp. 39–40.

23. Sydney D, Bailey, *How wars end,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982, vol. II, pp. 547–8.

24. *Middle East Record*, p. 59; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, pp. 332–3; Eban, pp. 328–9; Bar-Zohar, pp. 48, 69; Quandt, p. 40.

25. Johnson, p. 290; Quandt, p. 40; Eban, p. 326; Rabin, p. 55; Michael Brecher, pp. 318–9, 373–4.

26. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 6, 7, 11, paras. 6(e) to (h) and 9 of A/6730, paras. 15, 17 of A/6730/Add. 3; SCOR,

22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 112, para. 13 of S/7896;
Rikhye, pp. 23—7.

27. Ibid., pp. 27—8.
28. Thant, p. 222; Rikhye, pp. 28—35; Jabber, p. 19 (doc. 31).
29. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 109 -13, S/7896;
UN press release SG/SM/708, 11 May 1967.
30. *Middle East Record*, pp. 127—8.
31. Rikhye, p. 40.

3. EGYPT CLOSES THE GULF OF AQABA

Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. Lyndon
Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 293.

The Gulf of Aqaba, about 100 nautical miles long and between 7
and 14 miles wide at the middle and lower parts, lies between Egyp-
tian Sinai and Saudi Arabia, but Jordan and Israel have access at ad-
joining ports at the head of the Gulf. The Jordanian port is Aqaba
and the Israeli port Elat (called Elath or Eloth in the Old Testament).
The Strait of Tiran, giving access to the southern end of the Gulf from
the Red Sea, is some 8 nautical miles across. The island of Tiran lies
roughly in the middle of the Strait: it became part of Saudi Arabia
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire but was occupied by Egypt
with Saudi agreement in 1950. Aqaba is Jordan's only port, and Elat
is Israel's only port east of Suez.[1]

President Nasser's fateful speech about the closing of the Gulf of
Aqaba to cargoes destined for Israel was made at an air base in Sinai.
Nasser referred to Israeli 'threats' to occupy Damascus and overthrow
the Syrian government. If Syria should be attacked, 'Egypt would enter
the battle from the first minute.' Egypt would also help the Palestinians
by preventing Iranian oil from reaching Elat. Egypt's military occupa-
tion of Sharm el Sheikh was an affirmation of Egyptian rights and
sovereignty over the Gulf of Aqaba. This Gulf constituted Egyptian
territorial waters. 'Under no circumstances will we allow the Israeli
flag to pass through the Aqaba Gulf. The Jews threatened war. We
tell them: You are welcome, we are ready . . .'[2] Egypt issued a decree
that no Israeli ships or ships with military cargoes for Israel would be
allowed to pass through the Strait. All ships seeking to enter the Gulf
would be inspected, and ships trying to force a passage would be
fired on.[3]

Nasser elaborated the decision in a number of later speeches and at
a press conference. The Strait of Tiran comprised 'Egyptian territorial
waters' and was under Egyptian sovereignty. Taking over Sharm el

Sheikh would undoubtedly mean confrontation with Israel, but 'the mere existence of Israel' was an aggression. If Israel should attack Egypt or Syria (and the threat was conditional), it would be 'total war with the basic objective of destroying Israel . . .' But Egypt's enemy was not only Israel: it was also those behind Israel. 'Today Israel is America . . . Britain also is one-hundred-per-cent aligned with Israel . . . America is only interested in the interests of Israel, and so is Britain . . .' Military planning by Egypt would disregard the possibility that the United States would intervene to help Israel: 'I leave this out of my calculations.' The Arabs had to prepare for full-scale war with Israel and, with God's help, would be victorious.[4]

General Rikhye comments that although Nasser said the Gulf of Aqaba would be closed, the blockade never entered into effect while the UN Force was there. 'If any Egyptian troops or naval vessels arrived in the area, it could only have been after the departure of UNEF.'[5] Although both Egypt and Israel attached great importance to the right of access to the Gulf of Aqaba, Arthur Lall reports that the last Israeli ship to enter the Gulf was 'about eighteen months' before the Egyptian blockade was imposed, though some cargoes were no doubt reaching Elat in non-Israeli ships. The fact was that Elat was temporarily in eclipse, and the significance of closing the Gulf was as much political as economic.[6]

Nasser disclosed later that the Egyptian decision to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba was taken at a meeting at his home the day before the announcement was made, and there is reason to think that the decision was taken without prior consultation with the Soviet Union. In a statement issued the day after Nasser's speech, the Soviet government expressed criticism of Israel and solidarity with the Arabs but, as Nadav Safran points out, the Soviet Union was 'conspicuoulsy careful not to make any explicit reference to the closing of the Strait of Tiran.' A Soviet official is quoted as saying later:

> We think that Nasser went too far . . . Indeed, we advised Nasser not to plunge into an adventure . . . We were not consulted about the withdrawal of the UN troops from Sinai and not informed of the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba by the Egyptians.

Indeed, Egyptians were later to complain that the Soviet Union had misled them, first with inaccurate reports of Israeli troop concentrations in the north, and later about the extent and kind of Soviet assistance if war should come.[7]

Ralph Bunche, who for twenty years had been handling Middle

Eastern matters in the UN Secretariat, had told Gideon Rafael that the crucial question was whether Egypt would occupy Sharm el Sheikh as a prelude to closing the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli cargoes. The Egyptian decision to blockade the Gulf seems in retrospect to have been extremely rash, but on a number of aspects Nasser had been given incomplete or inaccurate information. He had been told by his own intelligence chiefs that the Arabs were superior to the Israelis in the main classes of military equipment, In spite of the 1949 armistice agreement, Egypt considered itself to be in a state of war with Israel, but passive cold war rather than active hot war. Nasser was misled by his own military experts and was confident that the Arabs would prevail if the war became hot, whereas Israeli and Western intelligence services thought that if war came, the Arabs would be defeated in a matter of days.

Nasser also believed that the Soviet Union was so committed to the Arab cause that it would intervene directly and decisively if there should be any risk of an Arab defeat. There had been the talks with Gromyko in Cairo at the end of March and a series of delegations in both directions, including the Egyptian parliamentary visit to the Soviet Union led by Anwar Sadat. Nasser was confident of Soviet support when he made his blockade speech, but the crucial conversations on this matter were between the Egyptian war minister, Shamseddin Badran, and Soviet leaders in Moscow, *after* Nasser had announced the Aqaba blockade. The statement of the Soviet government following Nasser's blockade speech criticized Israel for threatening the Arabs, and referred to the fact that Egypt had asked the United Nations 'to pull out its troops', but there was no reference to the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.[8] Officials in the Egyptian foreign ministry did not regard this as a mere oversight, but Nasser was not at this stage taking advice from his foreign office.

Six days after the blockade speech, Nasser spoke at a press conference of widespread Afro-Asian support,[9] after which he heard from Shamseddin Badran of his conversations in Moscow. 'When I met Shams Badran yesterday, he gave me a letter from . . . Kosygin in which he says that the Soviet Union supports us in this conflict, and will allow no country to interfere until the situation returns to what it was before 1956.' In the name of the Egyptian people, Nasser thanked the Soviet peoples for their magnificent attitude and true friendship.[10]

Nasser was by temperament impetuous, headlong even, and he was not in good health at the time. As it turned out, the Aqaba decision was disastrous for the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular, for it was the signal to Israel that war was unavoidable, and it led to the capture and continued occupation of the West Bank.

It is possible that the Egyptian military chiefs were having second thoughts about Israel's military capability. Mohamed Heikal writes that field marshal Amer was so confused about the contradictory reports about Israel's military preparations that he asked Soviet ambassador Dmitry Pozhidaev whether the Soviet Union could discover the deployment of Israeli forces by satellite observation. In due course the reply came back that the Soviet Union was uncertain whether Israeli troop concentrations were a deliberate provocation or merely prudent precautions against a Syrian attack.[11]

The belief in Cairo that the Soviet Union would give active and significant military support to the Arabs in the event of war seems to have originated in conversations between Shamseddin Badran, Egyptian minster of war, and Soviet leaders. When Badran was in Moscow, he met Kosygin on 23 May, and Kosygin expressed pleasure that Egypt had already achieved its aims by peaceful means; but he went on to urge restraint. The plea for restraint was repeated by Gromyko. Finally, there was a conversation between Badran and his Soviet counterpart, marshal Andrei Grechko, at the airport. Grechko urged on Badran the need for restraint, but assured him, 'We shall be by your side always.' After Badran's aircraft had taken off, the Egyptian ambassador in Moscow thanked Grechko for his reassuring remarks, to which Grechko rejoined, 'I just wanted to given him one for the road.' Whatever were Grechko's intentions, Badran believed that he had a promise of active military support, and he so reported to Nasser. The next day Nasser assured the Egyptian parliament that the Soviet Union was a friendly power 'and stands by us . . .' Some reports go even further and quote Nasser as saying that the Soviet Union 'will not allow any country to intervene . . .'[12]

It was after midnight on 22/23 May when Nasser's speech was broadcast over Radio Cairo, and it was 4.30 a.m. (Israeli time) when prime minister Eshkol was informed. There were intensive consultations within Israel and a new surge of diplomatic activity: 'la crise diplomatique se développa selon la logique impitoyable de la politique de puissance.'[13] Israel had already addressed a letter to the president of the Security Council, complaining that Syrian leaders had manifested with unprecedented brutality and frankness the avowed aim of opening a total war against Israel. The intolerable situation created by Syrian aggressiveness had compelled Israel to take countermeasures. Gideon Rafael now told the Security Council that Egypt's action constituted a grave challenge, not only to Israel but to the whole international community.[14] It was widely believed in Israel, especially by Yigal Allon among

the politicians and by general Ariel Sharon among the military commanders, that Nasser's action amounted to a declaration of war against Israel and required an immediate military response, but foreign minister Eban wished for a major diplomatic effort before resorting to the military option.[15] As tension mounted, the embassies in Tel Aviv urged foreign nationals to leave Israel.[16]

President Johnson sent messages to Nasser, Eshkol, and Kosygin. Johnson assured Nasser that he had followed from a distance Nasser's efforts to develop Egypt, and that he understood 'the political forces' operating in the Middle East, as well as 'the ambitions and causes of tension, the memories and the hopes.' Major disputes should not be settled by illegal movements of men and arms across borders. Neither Israel nor the Arab states wanted war, but there was a very grave danger of misadventure or miscalculation. The right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf of Aqaba was a vital international interest. He suggested that vice president Hubert Humphrey, 'the friend who enjoys my utmost confidence', should visit the Middle East.[17] Johnson wrote in similar terms to Syria. Both countries were asked to defer any further moves for forty-eight hours.[18]

Nasser, wishing to avoid an overt and direct clash with the United States at such a critical stage, welcomed the proposed visit. He did, however, comment privately to Mahmoud Riad, 'I doubt gravely the sincerity of Johnson', and Anwar Sadat was sure that Johnson was working for Israel. Nasser waited ten days before replying to Johnson. Egyptian forces had 'never started any aggression' but would resist with all their might if attacked. It was Israel that was violating the armistice agreements. Innocent foreign shipping would be allowed passage in 'our' territorial waters. The Palestinians had the 'unshakeable right' to return to their homeland, and the crossing of armistice lines by Palestinian irregulars was 'no more than a manifestation of the anger rightly felt by this people at the complete neglect of their rights . . .' Vice president Humphrey would be welcome whenever he cared to visit Egypt, and Nasser proposed a reciprocal visit to Washington by Egyptian vice president Zacharia Moheiddin.[19]

In the message to Eshkol, Johnson said that he had been in touch with Moscow and had received 'a moderate and encouraging reply', and he hinted at the possibility of 'suitable measures' to deal with the Aqaba blockade, possibly through the United Nations. Eban thought that this letter had been drafted by a cautious bureaucrat and did not represent Johnson's real views.[20]

To Kosygin, Johnson wrote of the harassment of Israel by Syrian-based

guerrillas and suggested that both super-powers should use their influence 'in the cause of moderation . . .'[21]

There was considerable internal turmoil in Israel. The Knesset convened, and Eshkol called on the international community to maintain the right of free passage. Several Israeli commentators found Eshkol's style timid and apologetic: 'The tone [writes Michael Bar-Zohar] was one of appeasement.' Yitzhak Rabin, the chief of staff, went to see David Ben-Gurion, the Grand Old Man of Israeli politics; but Ben-Gurion, so audacious in 1947–8 and 1956, was now in the wilderness. Ben-Gurion believed that Nasser did not want war and that if Israel struck the first blow, it would be isolated internationally. 'We have been forced into a very grave situation,' he warned Rabin; 'We must not go to war.' During this period, general Dayan made a point of not consulting Ben-Gurion. When the news reached Ben-Gurion of the outbreak of war on 5 June, he wrote in his diary that it was 'a grave error'[22]

A meeting of Israel's political and military leaders was held in Tel Aviv on 23 May, chaired by Eshkol and including Abba Eban (foreign minister), general Dayan (soon to become minister of defence), Menachem Begin of the Gahal Party (soon to join a coalition government as minister without portfolio), Golda Meir (secretary of the Mapai Party), Shimon Peres (secretary of the Rafi group), Yitzhak Rabin (chief of staff, later to become prime minister), and Ezer Weizmann (chief of military operations and later minister of defence in Begin's first government). Eban, who strongly favoured close ties with the United States, read a cable from the Israeli embassy in Washington, conveying a formal U.S. request to take no action for forty-eight hours and saying that Lyndon Johnson would not feel responsible for any actions by Israel about which he had not been consulted. The 'flurry of activity', writes Eugene Rostow, had been precipitated by a British plan for a multinational naval force and a message from the U.S. ambassador in Israel 'that he could not hold out for long without a new idea.'[23] The majority of those Israelis present at the Tel Aviv meeting wanted a full mobilization of reservists but did not favour any Israeli request for a U.S. naval escort in the Gulf of Aqaba. It was suggested that Eban should make a quick tour of Western capitals to make sure that governments had not forgotten the 1957 assurances about access in the Gulf of Aqaba. 'My arrival in Washington', wrote Eban, '. . . would make it more difficult for the United States to urge the renunciation of our rights.' Eshkol was at first opposed to Eban's making the trip and was supported by Golda Meir, but eventually it was agreed that Eban should visit the United States. The Meeting in Tel Aviv ended with agreement on three points:

— The Egyptian blockade was an act of aggression;
— Israel would agree to the U.S. request for a delay of forty-eight hours;
— A ministerial visit to Washington was authorized.

Rabin, who was beginning to wilt under the strain, was allowed to give up his official responsibilities for a day or so.[24] Harold Wilson believes that underlying the Tel Aviv discussions was the feeling that Israel had given away too much in 1957. 'Israel was restive about her enforced withdrawal from her gains in Sinai following the Suez campaign.'[25]

After it had been decided that Eban should go to Washington, the question was raised, probably by Eban, whether he should not also visit Paris and London, to which Eshkol agreed, and cables were despatched to the Israeli embassies in the two capitals. The message to Walter Eytan, the Israeli ambassador in Paris, to the effect that 'Eban would be arriving in Paris early next morning and asking me to arrange a meeting with de Gaulle, arrived 'around midnight'. At that hour it was 'impossible [for Eytan] to arrange anything.' He therefore suggested that Eban should go to the Hilton hotel at the airport, 'take a room [and have a rest,' while Eytan explored getting a meeting with de Gaulle. This was not easy, for it was a Wednesday, the normal day for a French cabinet meeting, and Eytan believed that getting an appointment with the Gaulle at such short notice was 'little short of impossible'. He used his contacts to good effect, however, and succeeded in getting an appointment for noon: 'I was amazed that I had succeeded . . . but I think Eban took it as a matter of course.'[26]

On 23 May, president Johnson made a major public statement on the situation. The 'purported' closing of the Gulf of Aqaba added a new and very grave dimension to the crisis. The international community had a vital interest in the right of free and innocent passage. The blockade of Israeli cargoes was illegal and potentially dangerous to world peace.[27]

The Security Council had not considered the Middle East since the Israeli attack on Samu the previous November, but Egypt's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba could not be ignored. On 23 May, Canada and Denmark joined in asking for an urgent meeting 'to consider the extremely grave situation in the Middle East which is threatening international peace and security.' Canada and Denmark would have liked the Council to have met as soon as Egypt asked for the removal of the UN Force, but Thant took the line that Egypt was legally entitled to withdraw consent for the presence of the UN Force. Ambassador Hans Tabor of Denmark told Thant that legally he was doubtless correct 'but I was not as sure that he [was] politically right.' Tabor had suggested that Thant

should visit Cairo. Thant replied that once a formal Egyptian request to withdraw the UN Force had reached him, he would then consider going to Cairo 'at an appropriate time.'[28]

The Security Council then had 15 members: five permanent members with the right to veto substantive proposals for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Nationalist China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus ten members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, two from Latin America (Argentina and Brazil), three from Africa (Ethiopia, Mali, and Nigeria), two from Asia (India and Japan), one from Eastern Europe (Bulgaria), and two Western states (Canada and Denmark). There was no Arab member as there had always been, except for 1951–2 and 1955–6 when Turkey and Iran respectively had provided a Middle Eastern voice. The agenda item was inscribed as 'The situation in the Middle East' and not as 'The Palestine question' as had always been the case previously. The Security Council has not taken up the Palestine item since 1966, though it remains seized of the question.

Why did the Security Council not meet until 24 May, eight days after the first Egyptian request for the withdrawal of UNEF? After all, the Council has 'primary responsibility' for world peace and security, and acts on behalf of all UN Members.

When a crisis occurs, the Council is not automatically involved, even if it is formally seized of the matter, for it meets only as a result of a specific request from a Council member or the General Assembly, or if a 'dispute or situation' is expressly brought to its attention, or if the Secretary-General informs the Council that world peace is threatened.[29] Israel could have regarded the Egyptian request about UNEF as creating a situation 'likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security', but Israel had long since lost confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations. U Thant could have considered the situation as a 'matter which . . . may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security', but he probably believed that to act against the wishes of the parties would reduce his chances of playing a useful role in future.

If the parties and the Secretary-General were unwilling to act and the General Assembly was not in session, what of the fifteen members of the Council? The president of the Council in May 1967 was ambassador Liu Chieh of Nationalist China. It is the president who convenes the Council and takes the lead in informal discussions about procedure and substance. In May 1967, seven members of the Council had diplomatic relations with Nationalist China (Taiwan) and seven with the People's

Republic (Peking), and some of those which recognized Peking were reluctant if not unwilling to deal formally with a representative of Taiwan. U Thant mentioned this difficulty in a conversation with ambassador Tabor of Denmark. Tabor reported to other Western diplomats Thant's view that informal consultations under the chairmanship of Nationalist China would not be fruitful.[30]

Council members like to have an idea of the likely outcome before calling for a meeting, but this in the nature of things is impossible. Indeed, the more critical the situation and the more wide-ranging the issues, the more difficult it is to predict how things will turn out. The Middle East problem had been troubling the international community for two decades, and every member of the Council had several good reasons for adopting a low profile. A debate in which the parties took a vocal part would inevitably be heated, and the chances of an agreed resolution were slim. Why call the Council simply to allow the parties to let off steam in public?

Arthur Lall points out that none of the parties asked for a meeting, and that the Soviet Union had reservations about consultations with the United States for fear that this would lead to later charges of collusion on the part of the super-powers. Lall also mentions the wish of some Council members to await a full report from U Thant before calling a meeting – although this does not explain the Council's inaction between the Tuesday, when Egypt called for the withdrawal of UNEF, and the end of the week, when it became known that Thant planned to visit the Middle East. Lall's final explanation of the Council's failure to meet was, as he puts it, the absence of 'a lively habit of continuing consultation' among Council members. Lall comments that the failure of the Council to meet earlier was 'regrettable and in some degree inexplicable': the Council failed to read the writing on the wall. General Bull regarded it as 'a classic example' of the Council's failure, and (he adds wrily) Secretary-General Thant got the blame.[31]

When, in the end, Canada and Denmark took the initiative in calling for a meeting, they referred to Thant's report of 19 May expressing 'deep anxiety about . . . an increasingly dangerous deterioration'' of the situation in the Middle East, and added that there had been a further deterioration since Thant had issued his report. The clear implication was that they were calling for a meeting because Thant had failed to do so, and some people saw in the memorandum an implied rebuke of Thant.

Ambassadors Ignatieff of Canada and Tabor of Denmark had, in fact, been trying to convene the Security Council from the time that Thant had informed them of the Egyptian request for the withdrawal of the

UN Emergency Force. Tabor had asked Thant whether he planned to convene the Council, and Thant had replied that a meeting of the Council 'could hardly avoid dramatizing an already extremely difficult situation', and this would be counter-productive. It was not until president Nasser announced the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and Thant had embarked on his peace mission to Cairo that the necessary nine votes could be secured for approving the agenda.[32]

The Security Council met twice on 24 May, but much of the time of the first meeting was directed to the question of Chinese representation and not to the rising tension in the Middle East. Soviet ambassador Nikolai Federenko raised the China issue, and he also objected to the haste in convening the Council, 'the artificial dramatization of the situation' by Western powers: 'is it not a case here of a hidden desire to interfere in someone else's business . . .?' He re-affirmed the Soviet view that China's UN seat was illegally occupied by 'the Chiang Kai-shek group . . .'[33]

The Council, in the guise of adopting the agenda, then embarked on a leisurely debate on the two Soviet complaints about procedure. Bulgaria supported the Soviet Union, and Ethiopia said that its participation in a meeting under the presidency of Nationalist China should in no way prejudice his government's policy on Chinese representation.[34] Ethiopia, France, India, and Nigeria thought it unwise to engage in debate while Secretary-General Thant had not returned from the Middle East: as the Indian ambassador put it, 'precipitate action by the Council' could 'only complicate' the mission of the Secretary-General.[35] Mali considered that 'this abrupt convening' of the Council would not lead to a reduction of tension in the Middle East.[36] In spite of these objections, the agenda was approved without a vote, and Egypt and Israel were invited to participate in the proceedings.[37]

During the substantive debate, Canada and Denmark submitted a draft resolution, 'impartial and limited in scope', expressing support for Secretary-General Thant and asking UN Members to avoid worsening the situation. The proposal was 'deliberately mild' and 'ostensibly' in support of Thant's mission to Cairo, writes George Ignatieff, and Canada hoped that Thant would regard the expression in the resolution of full support for his pacifying efforts as giving him authority to send observers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization to replace the UN Emergency Force. In addition, Canada suggested informal consultations among Council members.[38] Britain and the United States took the same line, the United States expressly soliciting Soviet cooperation. J.T. Howe believes that Goldberg's speech on this occasion

represented a significant softening of the stand which Lyndon John-
son had articulated the previous day.[39] India said it would be willing
to engage in informal consultations in accordance with accepted prac-
tice, but not in consultations regarding the draft resolution of Canada
and Denmark.[40] Mali was opposed to consultations,[41] as were the two
Communist members of the Council: indeed, Federenko stated that the
Soviet Union would not take part in them. He again objected that
'certain forces are artificially heating up the atmosphere . . .' The fine
words of the Western powers were 'merely verbality, merely paint and
paper.'[42] Ambassador Roger Seydoux said that France relied on the
sense of responsibility and resolve to safeguard peace of Middle Eastern
leaders: the Security Council was impotent 'so long as the principal
Powers are not in agreement among themselves.'[43] Ambassador el Kony
of Egypt criticized 'the bandwagon of hostility' against Egypt and the
'overt provocation': the proposal of Canada and Denmark was an
attempt to sabotage the mission of U Thant.[44] Gideon Rafael reaf-
firmed Israel's ardent quest for peace.[45] The Council adjourned without
taking a decision. Arthur Lall notes that the two meetings on 24 May
were 'largely infructuous'.[46]

On the same day as the two meetings of the Security Council,
Israel's ambassador in Washington, Avraham Harman, paid a quick
visit to Gettysburg to see former president Eisenhower in order to
discover if his recollections of what had been agreed in 1957 coincided
with those of Israel. Ike said he was not in the habit of making state-
ments, but that if questioned by the media, he would say that the
Strait of Tiran was an international waterway and that it would be
illegal to violate the rights of free passage.[47]

As soon as Egypt's formal request for the withdrawal of UNEF
reached U Thant, he had told el Kony that he would like to visit
Cairo, 'preferably accompanied by Ralph Bunche.' Egypt objected to
the presence in Cairo of a U.S. citizen, so Thant was accompanied by
general Rikhye, and he also had the advice in Cairo of general Bull
as well as the head of the UN agency for Palestine refugees. Mohamed
Heikal believes that both the United States and the Soviet Union had
approved the idea of U Thant's visit, and Riad was later to note 'a dis-
tinct similarity of approach' of the two super-powers. He 'assumed'
that Thant's proposals 'must have been underwritten by the US . . .',
and he noted that 'The Soviet Union actually played the role demanded
of it by Johnson . . .' On the other hand, Riad received a report that
president Johnson 'was failing to show any interest in U Thant's mis-
sion . . .'[48]

When Thant reached the airport in Paris *en route* for Cairo, he was handed a report of Nasser's speech about the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Thant's first instinct was to cancel the trip, but he finally decided to go agead 'and find out what Nasser had in mind.' Nasser later told Thant that he had wanted to announce the decision on Aqaba before the UN party arrived. 'Had we not done so until after your arrival here you would have asked us not to blockade the Gulf. It would have been impossible for us to refuse a request from the Secretary-General of the United Nations.'[49] It is apparent from this remark that Nasser had respect for the United Nations and its Secretary-General, and that he might have found it difficult to refuse a request from Thant that he should reconsider his request for the removal or redeployment of the UN Force.

On 24 May, Thant and Rikhye met in the morning with Riad and in the evening with Nasser. Thant (who was suffering from a painful tooth) told Nasser that India, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia fully supported his decision on the withdrawal of UNEF. Brazil, Canada, Denmark, and Norway had not favoured complying with the Egyptian request, and Sweden did not seem to have favoured immediate withdrawal. No member of the UNEF Advisory Committe had wanted to take the initiative in calling the General Assembly into session. Some delegations had suggested that Thant should have invoked Article 99 of the Charter, which empowers the Secretary-General to convene the Security Council if he considers that world peace is threatened. Thant had declined to do so 'because the Soviet representative had made it clear to him that his country would oppose any move by the Council to question Egypt's right to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF'.[50]

Thant made a number of specific suggestions for reducing tension:

– The construction of a barbed wire obstacle along the armistice demarcation line. Riad said this was 'an old question,' unacceptable to Egypt. If Israel wanted to put barbed wire on its side, Egypt would not object.
 Thant made an appeal to freeze the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba for two or three weeks. Nasser agreed to cancel the blockade, but he would not agree to UN supervision.
– Thant wished to appoint a personal representative in the area. Nasser said that he would accept a UN diplomatic presence in Cairo, but not any appointment which might 'indicate international [military] presence after withdrawal of UNEF', other than the mixed commission under the 1949 armistice or some other arrangement which would involve Israel on a reciprocal basis.[51]

There was some discussion about the disposal of UNEF stores. Riad said the Egyptian army 'had everything', but all armies were greedy for more. Nasser said that Egypt was willing to refer the Aqaba issue to international arbitration or judicial settlement, but he could not understand Israeli alarm: 'The last ship with an Israeli flag had passed through the Straits of Tiran nearly two years earlier.' Nasser told his visitors that there were divisions within his own cabinet and that his armed forces were more eager for action than he was: 'The troops had been . . . readied for attack, but Nasser had stopped them from attacking.'[52]

Nasser wanted to confer a high military decoration on UNEF, but Thant said he needed time to consider this generous offer. Nasser assured Thant that Egypt would not be the first to attack: 'we have no intention of attacking unless we are attacked first . . .'[53]

On 26 May, Thant issued a report on his conversations in Cairo. Nasser's assurance that he would not initiate the use of force was a constructive step. Israel believed that the expulsion of UNEF and the closure of the Gulf had represented aggression, and Israel had rejected Thant's proposed moratorium and also the proposal for a special representative of the Secretary-General in the area. Thant drafted a paragraph for inclusion in his report to the Security Council to the effect that his proposal for a special representative had been accepted by Egypt but not by Israel, but he was persuaded by colleagues in the UN Secretariat to drop the passage as unduly provocative. He did, however, mention the idea of a special representative to several diplomats, and it eventually bore fruit. Thant left in his report a plea for 'a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside . . .' Lall comments that Thant's report was 'so consequential a document' that the Security Council did not meet again until 29 May.[54]

Eban now set off on his tour of Western capitals. He was already aware of 'exaggerated French discretion and reserve'. President de Gaulle himself was handling the Middle East. Accompanied by Israeli ambassador Walter Eytan, Eban went to the Elysée Palace, arriving just as cabinet ministers were dispersing. Eytan believes that de Gaulle cut short the cabinet meeting so as to receive Eban, 'a sure sign that de Gaulle recognized the extreme urgency and danger of the situation.'[56] De Gaulle was accompanied by foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville. Michael Bar-Zohar reports that de Gaulle was 'tense, almost anxious . . . worried, nervous.' Before Eban could sit down, de Gaulle said in a loud voice, 'Ne faites pas la guerre.' Eban said that it was Egypt that had opened hostilites, but de Gaulle insisted that the country

which fired the first shot was the aggressor. Indeed, said de Gaulle, Israel's enemies were hoping that Israel would open hostilities, but Israel would be wise not to satisfy these expectations. France's declaration of 1957 on freedom of navigation was 'correct juridically', said the president, but 1967 was not 1957, and in 1967 the Soviet Union had to be associated with an attempt to find a solution. He added that Thant had acted hastily in withdrawing UNEF: he would have done better to have awaited four power consultations.[56]

Eban flew from Paris to London the same evening. The British cabinet had met earlier in the day, and Harold Wilson was pleased to find George Brown, the foreign secretary, 'at his superb best'. At this stage, Britain was taking 'the strongest position' of all the Western powers. Wilson had re-affirmed Britain's 1957 declaration that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway and that Britain supported 'international action' to uphold the right of free passage. He hoped that U Thant would be able to persuade Nasser that the UN Force or some other form of UN presence could be deployed in Sinai. Michael Bar-Zohar quotes George Brown as saying, 'This time, Nasser has gone too far.'[57] Brown proposed that the Security Council should be convened and invited to pass a resolution calling for the Strait of Tiran to be kept open. Meanwhile, a multi-national naval force should be established 'to keep the Gulf of Aqaba open to the shipping of all nations.' It would not be possible to prevent the Gulf from being closed, wrote Wilson, but assurances that it would be re-opened might dissuade Israel from going to war. Wilson notes in his book on Israel that access to Elat was vital to Israel's economy.[58] A conjectural account of the cabinet meeting will be found in Appendix 2, pages 198–9.

George Thomson, minister of state in the Foreign Office, had gone to Washington to discuss 'diplomatic and possible military action', but he had been warned not to enter into any commitments. In addition, Thomson was told to make it clear that Britain 'did not wish to seem to be taking the lead . . .' The British attitude, according to a senior U.S. official, was 'If everyone else is willing to sign, then you can count on us.' The British hope was that the proposed naval force 'should not be solely Anglo-American.' Thomson met Dean Rusk and outlined British suggestions to him. Eugene Rostow reported on this conversation to president Johnson, who was 'in a receptive frame of mind . . .' On the other hand, U.S. ambassador Arthur Goldberg regarded the multi-national force ideas as 'a non-starter.' The lack of Western support would have meant that the United States would have had to act alone in convoying Israeli ships through the Strait of Tiran, 'and since

we were involved in the Vietnam war, Congress would not have approved our doing so.'[59] There was, however, sufficient support for the British idea in U.S. government circles to discuss it with key members of Congress 'and with other interested governments.' One writer comments that Britain's stand on the 1957 assurances to Israel about the Gulf of Aqaba was at this stage 'much stronger' than that of the United States.[60]

The British idea for a naval task force, sometimes known derisively as the regatta or the flotilla, was welcomed in 'many parts' of the U.S. government. Johnson and Rusk were 'convinced and vigorous advocates.' There were, however, sceptics. Shimon Peres describes it as a suggested plan of operations 'compounded of the unavoidable and the unknowable', and Golda Meir wrote that president Johnson 'couldn't persuade the French or British to join him' in including an Israeli ship in an international convoy. Eshkol thought the idea was important and useful, evidence of international opposition to Egyptian aggression.[61]

Eban's visit to London had been 'casually conceived and improvised' He drove straight from the airport to 10 Downing Street, from which Edward Heath and Sir Alec Douglas-Home were emerging just as he was about to enter: they had been 'to express their concern [wrote Wilson] and to be reassured that we [the British government] were doing all in our power . . .' Eban notes that he had gone to Paris starry-eyed but had come to London in a more sceptical mood, and he was pleased to find that Wilson felt 'a decent respect' for the Israeli predicament. Wilson told Eban that the cabinet had met earlier that day and agreed that the Egyptian blockade must not be allowed to triumph. Wilson doubted the feasibility of de Gaulle's proposal for four power talks. Eban noticed that Wilson did not advise Israel how to act, an approach which he called 'realistic and mature'. Indeed, he was much encouraged by the conversation and he comments that 'Wilson was showing a distinguished statesmanship', moving with assurance and precision. His only complaint was about Wilson's pungent pipe tobacco.[62]

The British cabinet met again on 25 May, only to be told that Egypt had mined the Strait of Tiran (which was probably not true). George Brown had been trying to cultivate Nasser, but this policy had 'collapsed overnight.' Wilson and Brown were initially strongly pro-Israel, supported to some extent by Denis Healey, the minister for defence, but after Healey and consulted the chiefs of staff, he became markedly more cautious. Brown had been to Moscow, 'hoping to persuade the Russians to help us in acting as mediators': the Russians had

been uncooperative, but Kosygin had said to Brown, 'Tell Mr. Wilson that we have no interest in a flare-up . . .' Britain had by now been in touch with other countries about the idea of a naval task force but had found little support for such 'robust action.' Wilson had sent a telegram to de Gaulle, drawing his attention to the implications of the Egyptian threat, and de Gaulle had responded by repeating his suggestion for four-power talks. Wilson's response to de Gaulle's proposal for four-power talks seems to have lacked his customary decisiveness. Britain 'welcomed the initiative of the French Government', wrote Wilson, and suggested a quadripartite meeting at UN headquarters before taking the issue to the Security Council. He cabled Lester Pearson of Canada, 'supporting the general line of President de Gaulle's four-power approach.' and Pearson replied that 'we should all stay together . . . in the United Nations . . .' Wilson also sent a message to Kosygin 'commending de Gaulle's proposals.' Kosygin replied that the Soviet Union was restraining the Arab states, which did not want military conflict, but he added that if Israel committed aggression, the Soviet Union would assist the victims. On the other hand, Wilson cabled president Johnson with 'an analysis of de Gaulle's motives and a proposal that we should by-pass Paris . . .' It was hardly surprising that other countries should have been uncertain precisely where Britain stood.[63]

Richard Crossman, lord president of the council and leader of the House of Commons, had missed the two crucial cabinet meetings because he had been on holiday in Cyprus, but he had consulted some of those who had been present in his usual gossipy way. On the basis of what he picked up, he wrote in his diary that the discussion had been 'passionate and extremely stirring'. The cabinet secretariat had 'dehydrated' the discussion, so that the record was 'trimmed down' to suit the conclusions that Wilson wanted to have on record.[64]

Britain had announced the previous year its intention to disengage from military commitments east of Suez, but the aircraft carrier *Victorious* and an escort frigate, returning from the Far East, passed through the Suez Canal and were ordered to be held at Malta; and the carrier *Hermes,* near the southern tip of India *en route* for Singapore, returned to the Red Sea, reaching Aden on 31 May. Britain was being subject to growing Arab threats to withdraw sterling balances.[65]

In preparation for Eban's visit to Washington, Johnson consulted widely, including a trip by general Andrew Goodpaster to see former president Eisenhower. Johnson had found opinion in Congress sympathetic to Israel, but opposed to any action by the United States

alone. There was a widespread feeling that the United States was having to carry the anti-Communist can single-handedly in Viet Nam, that the U.S. was militarily over-committed.[66]

Johnson had a 'deep personal attachment' to Israel, but his main aim was to restrain the Israeli leadership from going to war. A senior U.S. official said later that a genuine effort was made to put together a naval force 'but we had trouble getting any takers.'[67] 'The Dutch committed themselves . . . without being asked. The Shah [of Iran] offered ships. LBJ believed he had commitments from Australia and Canada.'[68] One difficult issue was whether Israel should take part. When the Israeli ambassador in Washington realized that Johnson was trying to restrain Israel, he started phoning his friends in the U.S. Jewish community, 'and soon Jewish leaders all over the country were calling the President.' This greatly annoyed Johnson, but some days later, when Dean Rusk was asked at a press conference if the United States would restrain Israel from precipitate action, he replied, 'I don't think it is our business to restrain anyone.'[69]

In Israel, as a result of pressure from the military chiefs, Eshkol had decided to shift the emphasis from the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba to the threat of an imminent Egyptian attack from Sinai. This change, in Goldberg's view, was because Israel could not continue to deploy its 'large civilian army' in Sinai. 'Israel's economy would have been disrupted and the morale of its army would have been undermined.'[70] Eshkol drafted a telegram to Eban about the new military assessment, and the director general of Eshkol's office showed the draft to Rabin, who felt that the text was 'not strong enough.' The draft cable was amended so as to refer to 'a grave danger of general attack' by Egypt and Syria. What was vitally necessary, in the Israeli view, was a U.S. declaration that any attack on Israel was equivalent to an attack on the United States, the declaration to be given concrete expression by orders to U.S. forces in the region 'to combine operations' with Israel against any possible Arab attack.[71]

When Eban reached the United States, ambassador Avraham Harman handed him Eshkol's personal and top secret cable with its 'stunning surprise' of a new military assessment. Eshkol told Eban that he had received startling information from 'impeccable sources' that Egypt would launch an offensive within twenty-four hours. Eban was asked to press the United States for an assurance that an Arab attack on Israel would be viewed as an attack on the United States. Although Eban was personally sceptical about the new assessment, he loyally carried out the policy of his government.[72]

William Quandt comments that once a crisis situation is defined and a course of action is set, 'it becomes extraordinarily difficult to redefine the stakes and the risks.' Eban now had no option but to try to do this, but the consequence of the shift in emphasis was that Israel suffered a serious loss of credibility at an important moment.[73]

Eban told Dean Rusk about the new Israeli perspective, reading to him the text of Eshkol's cable. This 'came as a surprise to Rusk', and after making some inquiries, Rusk told Eban that none of the U.S. intelligence agencies had information to confirm any aspect of the new Israeli assessment. Rusk told Eban that Senate opinion was favourable to Israel's cause 'but only on the condition that the United States would not be alone'. Eban cabled Eshkol with more information about the plan which Britain and the United States were concocting, beginning with a declaration by maritime powers on the right to free passage into the Gulf of Aqaba, but backed by a multi-national naval task force to assert that right. The draft declaration asserted that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway. 'Our Governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags . . . and . . . join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.' Some U.S. officials predicted that Lyndon Johnson would go so far as to pledge that the Strait would be opened, 'even if there was [Egyptian] resistance', and a high U.S. official said later that the United States would have intervened militarily if there had been any risk that Israel would be defeated or if the Soviet Union had intervened directly to support the Arabs.[74]

The next morning, Rusk phoned Eban to ask whether he would still be in Wahington the following day, by which time the results of U Thant's trip to Cairo would be known. The 'leisurely implication' of this question alarmed Eban. Thant's report, in the Israeli view, was not 'the decisive factor', and Eban was worried by all the talk about the United Nations. Eban told Rusk that he had to leave Washington on the Friday night in order to be back in Israel for the regular Sunday cabinet meeting. Johnson, thinking that Eban was holding a pistol to his head, is said to have remarked, 'If the gentleman from Tel Aviv is in such a hurry, he can go home right away.'[75]

Eban next went to the Pentagon where he saw Robert McNamara, the secretary of defence, and General Earle Wheeler, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Just as the conversation was beginning, Eban was handed a cable from Israel confirming the military appraisal which he had received the previous day. But this was not how the U.S. defence establishment evaluated the sitation: '. . . Egyptian forces were

still not arrayed in a posture indicating an early assault.' General Bull had reported that the Israeli allegations had been investigated by UN observers, who found nothing to substantiate them. Bull adds that the whole area was 'full of rumours' at this time.[76]

On balance, the defence experts in Washington were not enthusiastic about the idea of a muli-national naval force – 'a military man's nightmare', reports Quandt. As the plan was regarded as undesirable by the defence experts, they did little to make it feasible. The State Department, on the other hand, saw political advantages in the plan.[77]

Harold Wilson had been due in Canada for the Expo 67 in Montreal, but the Middle East crisis forced him to curtail his stay. Canada 'never felt anything but regret that it had not worked out as we had hoped', noted Lester Pearson, but Britain was 'in a sense represented by the presence of the Queen and Prince Philip . . .' Lyndon Johnson saw Pearson on 25 May and agreed on joint action to safeguard freedom of shipping through the Strait of Tiran, but Pearson patiently explained that this time, in contrast to 1957, he could see 'no UNEF rabbit to pull out of a hat . . .' Johnson was a little irritated by Mike Pearson's criticism of U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, but he was gratified by Canada's willingness to take part in the regatta. Back in Washington, Johnson was told by his senior advisors that war in the Middle East was inevitable unless the United States acted effectively by sending a naval force through the Strait of Tiran. Eugene Rostow reports that there was good reason to suppose that Egypt would not interfere with the multi-national force. The problem was that this advice had, in a sense, been overtaken by events, for Israel was no longer stressing the dangers arising from the closure of the Gulf but Egypt's military preparations in Sinai.[78]

There were those in Israel who suspected that Eban's meeting with Johnson was deliberately delayed: indeed, it was not until mid-day on Saturday 27 May that the Israeli leaders received the first report on Eban's talk with Johnson. On the Friday evening, Eban had made his way to the White House by a circuitous route in order to avoid undue publicity. Lyndon Johsnon found the conversation 'direct and frank.' He listened carefully to Eban's exposition, which was no doubt eloquent, and to Israel's request for support. When Eban explained why Israel feared an all-out Egyptian attack, Johnson asked Robert McNamara to summarize the findings of the U.S. intelligence agencies. McNamara said that the best judgment in Washington was that an Egyptian attack was not imminent: if this assessment was wrong and Egypt did attack, the view in Washington was that Israel would easily

prevail. Johnson said that the United States would do everything possible to have the Gulf of Aqaba open to the shipping of all nations, but to give the unconditional assurance of support that Israel was seeking was beyond the president's powers. 'You can assure the Israeli Cabinet [that] we will pursue vigorously any and all possible measures to keep the strait [of Tiran] open.' It was necessary to work through the United Nations, but if the UN should prove ineffective, Israel's friends would have to indicate what they could do. Johnson still had hopes of a multi-national naval force, but he could move no faster than Congressional opinion would support. On the suggestion of Robert McNamara, Johnson told Eban that he would try and persuade Congress to pass a Joint Resolution authorizing the use of force.[79] 'Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.' This sentence was repeated several times to give emphasis. Eban reports that he asked if he could tell the Israeli cabinet that the United States would use every means in its power to ensure that the Strait and the Gulf would be open for Israeli shipping, and Johnson confirmed that this was correct. He gave Eban an *aide-mémoire* which stressed that the United States hoped to work with other maritime nations to keep the Gulf open to free and innocent passage, but urging Israel not to be responsible for the initiation of hostilities. The *aide-mémoire* repeated the words 'Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.' Bill Quandt comments that it did not take a Talmudist to read into this phrase the hint of a green light to Israel – adding 'and there were plenty of Talmudists in Israel . . .' Riad believes that the CIA wanted war and that Johnson opted to 'unleash' Israel, and W.C. Eveland, a former CIA official, claims that president Johnson authorized James Angleton, a CIA specialist on the Middle East, to inform Ephraim Evron, Israeli minister in Washington, that 'the U.S. would prefer Israeli efforts to lessen the tension but would not intervene to stop an attack on Egypt.'[80]

Dean Rusk, on the other hand, regards Quandt's interpretation as 'sheer nonsense: we were expecting the Egyptian Vice President in Washington for a dicussion of the reopening of the Strait of Tiran; further, we thought we had an assurance from the Israelis that they would not move precipitately and the Russians had similar assurances from the Arab side.' 'President Johnson made it very clear to Abba Eban that we opposed any early resort to military action by Israel . . . The Israeli Cabinet knew [that we were expecting the Egyptian vice president to visit Washington] when they decided to launch the operation two days before that visit was to take place . . . It would be a serious distortion of anything said by President Johnson to Abba Eban

to suppose that the President gave Israel a "blank cheque" or that Israel had a right to believe that Israel would have United States support whatever they decided to do.'[81]

Eban flew from Washington to New York, where he had a final converation with Arthur Goldberg. Eban was struck by Goldberg's 'calm rationality', which always shone forth in moments of crisis. Goldberg advised Eban to consider the president's commitments as 'conditional.' He said that the proceedings in the Security Council were 'already petering out.' Eban advised Gideon Rafael that in the Security Council debates, he should 'speak only in terms of general principles and not elaborate too much.' What precisely he meant, wrote Rafael, 'remained obscure . . .'[82]

During the night of 26/27 May, while Eban was returning by air to Lod (Lydda), the Soviet ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Cairo roused the two heads of government from their beds with urgent messages. The message to Eshkol, delivered by Dmitry Chuvakhin, was moderate in tone and urged Israel to settle the conflict by non-military means. 'We turn to you in order to avoid creating in the world another center of war, which would bring suffering without end . . . It is easy to light a fire, but to put out a conflagration may not be at all easy . . .' It would be more difficult to extinguish the flames than was imagined by those who were 'pushing Israel beyond the brink of war . . .' Eshkol was impressed by the restrained tone of the communication, though he found the style of the Soviet ambassador hostile and rude.[83]

The Soviet ambassador in Cairo, Dmitry Pozhidaev, advised Nasser that the Israelis had alleged that Egypt was about to attack Israel, perhaps even at dawn the next morning. This confirmed the report which Eugene Rostow had already given to the Egyptian ambassador in Washington. Rostow had summoned the ambassador "at a late hour in the night' and told him that Israel 'had information' that Egypt intended to mount an attack. This would expose Egypt to danger: the United States was urging both parties to 'maintain self-control', adding that the United States would be 'against whoever fires the first shot.' Nasser was to refer to this conversation in a speech after the war. The Soviet message to Nasser, similar in tone and content to the one to Eshkol, urged Egypt not to go to war. It was widely believed in official circles in Washington that Soviet ambassador Dmitry Pozhidaev had contributed to the rising tension, and a senior U.S. official was to comment later that Pozhidaev was one big trouble-maker. He was replaced later in 1967.[84]

The Israeli cabinet was in session when Abba Eban reached Lod

airport after his overseas trip, and it sat thoughout the night of 27/28 May. There had been significant changes in Israel during Eban's brief absence. Egyptian intentions had been reassessed, and though there was now a feeling that war was inevitable, it was considered in political circles that Israel should have some sort of wider coalition government before striking. Yitzhak Rabin reports that Eban at this stage was 'strongly opposed to war'. Eshol had told Rabin that the National Religious Party was threatening to pull out of the coalition if the cabinet decided for war. He added that Eban had notified him that if the cabinet decided for war now, 'he too would immediately submit his resignation.' Eshkol seemed to Rabin 'weary and dejected.' Eban himself maintains that all he wanted was the respite which Lyndon Johnson was commending so forcefully. Opinion in the cabinet was equally divided between those who favoured further diplomacy before resorting to armed force and those who could see no sufficient reason for any further delay. In the end, the cabinet agreed to a further breathing spell.[85]

Notes

1. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, vol. V, pp. 711, 722; 1951, Vol. V, pp. 585–8.
2. Jabber, pp. 538–41 (doc. 318).
3. *Middle East Record*, p. 198.
4. Jabber, pp. 547–65, 577–9 (docs. 326, 328, 329, 339); Draper, Appendices 10. 11. 12. pp. 222, 224, 230–1, 234; Laqueur, Appendices 10, 11, 12, pp. 295, 305, 310; Rouleau, pp. 85–6.
5. Letter from general Rikhye, 13 June 1983.
6. Lall, p. 37; Khouri, p. 248; Lawrence L. Whetten, *The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Great Power Behaviour*, p. 51; Laqueur, p. 95.
7. Jabber. pp. 11–2, 623 (docs. 24, 393); Safran, *Israel: the embattled ally*, pp. 399–400; Draper, pp. 80–1; Dagan, p. 292; Lall, pp. 30–1.
8. Jabber, p. 11–2 (Doc. 24).
9. Ibid., p. 556 (doc. 328).
10. Ibid., p. 565 (doc. 329).
11. Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 175; Quandt, p. 54.
12. Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, pp. 178–80; Heikal, *Nasser*, pp. 218–9; Riad, pp. 34–5; Draper, pp. 79, 100, 234; Nutting, p. 407.
13. Aron, p. 126.
14. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 116–8, S/7901; 1342nd mtg. (24 May 1967), para. 68.
15. Brecher, pp. 378–9, 383, 385, 389; Laqueur, p. 135; *Middle East Record*, pp. 164, 179.

16. Ibid., p. 375.

17. 'The idea of the Moheiddin-Humphrey visits came at the end of a long cycle of cables. The Egyptians published the news on Saturday [3 June]. Many people thought that publication triggered the Israeli attack . . .', letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983.

18. Jabber, pp. 7–9 (docs. 20–1), Johnson, p. 291; GAOR, 22nd regular session, 1573rd plenary mtg. (29 Sept. 1967), paras. 92, 104, 134; Quandt. pp. 42–3.

19. Jabber. pp. 565–8, 573–5 (docs. 330, 336); Riad, pp. 20–2; Sadat, p. 282; Eban, p. 334; Bar-Zohar, p. 83; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 122, para. 9 of S/7906; GAOR, 22nd regular session, 1573rd plenary mtg. (29 Sept. 1967), para. 105.

20. Quandt, p. 42; Rabin, p. 60; Bar-Zohar, p. 68.

21. Johnson, p. 291.

22. Middle East Record, p. 195; Ben-Gurion, pp. 759–61; Rabin, pp. 58–9; Dayan, pp. 319 and 321; Bar-Zohar, pp. 64, 69, 121, 133–5; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978, pp. 312–6; Brecher, p. 563; Randolph S. and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War*, pp. 199–200, 225–6.

23. Letter from Eugene Rostow to the author, 11 July 1983.

24. Rabin, pp. 63–4; Kimche and Bawly, pp. 62, 139–40; Eban, pp. 334–7; Dayan, pp. 319–21; Bar-Zohar, pp. 75–7; Yoram Peri, *Between battles and ballots: Israeli military in politics*, pp. 162–3; Laqueur, p. 126; Brecher, p. 380; Ben-Gurion, p. 761; Nutting, p. 393.

25. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 329.

26. Letter from Walter Eytan to the author, 1 May 1983.

27. *Select Chronology and Background Documents on the Middle East*, pp. 211–3; Johnson, p. 291.

28. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 118–9, S/7902; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.

29. UN Charter, Articles 11(3), 24(1), 35, and 99; Rules of Procedure 2 and 3.

30. Lall, pp. 5–6; Rikhye, pp. 85, 171; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984. Both Lall and Rikhye refer to the problem caused by the fact that Nationalist China was president in May 1967, but give incorrect information about the members of the Security Council with diplomatic relations with Peking at that time. They were Britain, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, India, Mali, and the Soviet Union.

31. Lall, pp. 4–5, 8–10; Bull, p.111.

32. Letters to the author from George Ignatieff and Hans Tabor, 14 Sept. 1983 and 23 Jan. 1984 respectively.

33. SCOR, 22nd year, 134th mtg. (24 May 1967), paras. 8–58; Samir N. Anabtawi, 'The United Nations and the Middle East Conflict of 1967', *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective*, edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, p. 130.

34. SCOR, 22nd year, 134st mtg. (24 May 1967), paras. 31, 53.

35.   Ibid., paras. 43–5, 47, 54, 57.
36.   Ibid., para. 30.
37.   Ibid., paras. 59, 61.
38.   Ibid., para. 75; Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 119, S/7905; letters to the author from George Ignatieff and Hans Tabor, 14 Sept. 1983 and 23 Jan. 1984 respectively; SCOR, 22nd year, 1342nd mtg. (24 May 1967), paras. 23, 25.
39.   Ibid., para. 14, 38, 98–100; Howe, p. 54.
40.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1342nd mtg. (24 May 1967), para. 81.
41.   Ibid., para. 95.
42.   Ibid., paras. 40, 42, 82–4, 91, 93.
43.   Ibid., paras. 27–8.
44.   Ibid., paras. 53, 58, 59.
45.   Ibid., para. 68.
46.   Lall, p. 29.
47.   Eban, p. 354; Bar-Zohar, p. 99. President Johnson also sent an emissary to Eisenhower, with the same result; letter from Eugene V. Rostow to the author, 11 July 1983.
48.   Thant, p. 231; Bull, p. 109; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar,* p. 176; Riad, pp. 20–1, 30, 37.
49.   Thant, pp. 233–4; Rafael, p. 139; Rikhye, p. 75.
50.   Thant, pp. 478–86; Rikhye, pp. 66–79, 169, 181–2; Bar-Zohar, p. 102.
51.   SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 120–4, S/7906; Riad, p. 20.
52.   Rikhye, pp. 167–8; Rouleau, pp. 82–3.
53.   Riad, pp. 20–1.
54.   Thant, pp. 239–40; Lall. p. 32.
55.   Letter from Walter Eytan to the author, 1 May 1983.
56.   Jabber, p. 13 (doc. 26); Eban, pp. 339–43; Bar-Zohar, p. 81, 93–6; Peres, p. 231; Aron, pp. 87, 118; Wilson, *Labour Government*, p. 517; Brown, p. 136.
57.   Jabber, p. 13 (doc. 27); Bar-Zohar, p. 80.
58.   Wilson, *Labour Government*, p. 508; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, pp. 332–3, 335, 338–40; Eban, p. 348.
59.   Letter to the author from Arthur J. Goldberg, 5 April 1983.
60.   Howe, p. 80 and Appendix B, p. 363; Johnson, p. 292; Quandt, p. 46; Bar-Zohar, pp. 98–9.
61.   Rostow, p. 261; Shimon Peres, *David's Sling*, p. 232; Meir, p. 297; Christman, p. 128.
62.   Eban, pp. 344–7; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 336; Bar-Zohar, pp. 96–7.
63.   Richard Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister*, Vol. II, 1976, pp. 353, 393; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, pp. 335, 338–40, 346–7; Thant, p. 246; Eban, p. 348; Bar-Zohar, pp. 48, 74, 174–5; Lester B. Pearson, *Memoirs, 1957–1968*, London, Gollancz, vol· III, 1975, pp. 307–8; Aron, pp. 86–8.

64. Crossman, p. 356.
65. Howe, pp. 82–4, 149.
66. Quandt, p. 44; Rostow, pp. 75, 263 and letter, 11 July 1983; Howe, pp. 31–3, 36, 44, 54–8, 63, 68, 108–9, 125, 129, 135–7, 140–1, 144, 155–6, and Appendix B, pp. 363, 365; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 347.
67. Howe, Appendix B, pp. 362–3, 366.
68. Letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983.
69. Howe, p. 36; Eban, p. 385.
70. Letter to the author from Arthur J. Goldberg, 5 April 1983.
71. Rabin, pp. 68–9; Rafael, pp. 143–5; Brecher, p. 385.
72. Ibid., p. 144; Eban, p. 349; Brecher, p. 397; Howe, p. 66; Quandt, p. 48.
73. Ibid., pp. 46, 49; Brecher, p. 385.
74. Eban, pp. 348–50; Dayan, p. 344; Rafael, p. 144; Draper, p. 105; Quandt, p. 50; Howe, Appendix B, p. 365.
75. Eban, p. 351. Bar-Zohar, p. 116; Whetten, p. 7.
76. Eban, pp. 351–2; Bull, p. 112.
77. Quandt, pp. 47–8, 52; Howe, pp. 56–7, 68, 151; Bar-Zohar, p. 117.
78. Lester B. Peason, *Memoirs, 1957–1968*, London, Gollancz, 1975, vol. III p. 137; Rostow, pp. 260, 263 and letter, 11 July 1983; Bar-Zohar, pp. 123, 174–5.
79. Letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983.
80. Rabin, p. 70; Quandt, pp. 50, 53–4, 56; Eban, pp. 353, 356–9; Johnson, pp. 293–4; Bar-Zohar, pp. 123–7; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 340; Riad, pp. 37, 42; Wilbur Crane Eveland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East*, New York and London, Norton, 1980, p. 324.
81. Letters from Dean Rusk to the author, 28 March 1983 and 24 August 1983.
82. Eban, p. 360; Rafael, pp. 145–6.
83. Dagan, pp. 216–7; Eban, pp. 366–7; Bar-Zohar, p. 128; Brecher, p. 385; Thant, p. 246.
84. Riad, pp. 35–6; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 182; Jabber, pp. 21, 622 (docs. 33, 393); Nutting, p. 411; Bar-Zohar, pp. 111–2; Draper, Appendix 14, pp. 239–40; Howe, Appendix B, p. 364; Rouleau, p. 85.
85. Rabin, p. 68, 71; Eban, pp. 365–7; Dayan, p. 331; Bar-Zohar, pp. 135–8; Kimche and Bawly, p. 143.

4. ISRAEL OPTS FOR WAR

> I did not want war for the excitement of it, I did not even
> want war for victory's sake, but I wanted war as a solution
> to a situation that was unbearable. Yael Dayan, *A Soldier's
> Diary*, p. 16.

One of the main purposes of the United Nations is to prevent the
unilateral resort to armed force except in self-defence, and so U Thant
decided to make one more appeal to Israel and Egypt for restraint.
During the course of Sunday, 28 May, UN under secretary Ralph
Bunche phoned Israeli ambassador Gideon Rafael to say that there was
an urgent message for Eshkol. '. . . Bunche requested [the Israeli mis-
sion in New York] to keep [the] lines of communication with Jerusalem
clear so that the message could get through instantly.' The message
from Thant would be a 'strong and urgent personal appeal.' The im-
perative need was for time so that the intensive efforts which Thant
and others were making could have a reasonable chance to achieve con-
structive results. Thant was appealing to Eshkol and Nasser for re-
straint during a further cooling-off period.[1]

Later in the day, Bunche asked Rafael to 'forget' about the message
to Eshkol. Rafael speculated that Nasser had rejected the appeal, and
U.S. ambassador Goldberg later confirmed to Rafael that this was the
case. Rafael comments that this was the third time that Thant had
abandoned his efforts in the face of Egypt's opposition: Thant 're-
called his missive with the same alacrity as he had withdrawn the UN
forces.'[2]

But Thant had not thrown in his hand, for two days later, Nasser
received from Thant a cable calling for a further breathing spell of two
weeks. A similar appeal had been sent to Eshkol. Mohamed Heikal
regarded this message as 'the real turning point in the crisis', for it
was assumed in Cairo that the contents had been agreed in advance
with the United States and the Soviet Union, and that this meant
that 'no offensive action' would be taken by Israel during the two-
week period. Thant's appeal was 'direct, personal, and most urgent . . .'
Thant was 'seeking time, even a short period,' during which the parties

would exercise special restraint, forego belligerence, and avoid all other actions which could increase tension. Thant understood that 'in the normal course of events' no Israeli ship was expected to seek passage through the Strait of Tiran in the following fortnight. He was not asking Nasser to make a formal public commitment, but he hoped that Egypt would not interfere with non-Israeli shipping passing through the Strait during the next two critical weeks. Heikal does not say how Nasser responded to Thant's appeal, but he notes that the letter 'effectively ensured the restraint in Cairo for which U Thant pleaded and from which Israel was to be beneficiary.'[3]

London and Washington were also intensifying their efforts to persuade the parties not to act precipitately. Harold Wilson had sent Lyndon Johnson ' a lengthy assessment' of the situation, warning him of the possibility of an Israeli ultimatum. In spite of all the efforts of the United States and Britain, wrote Wilson, the government of Israel might feel obliged to assert its right to pass through the Strait of Tiran by force 'in whatsoever manner and at whatever time seem most appropriate to them.' This, for Israel, was a vital issue. Wilson also sent Eshkol a friendly message urging Israel 'to continue a policy of restraint . . .'[4]

Johnson had also sent another message to Eshkol. Speaking 'as Isreael's friend', Johnson warning Israel not to take pre-emptive military action. Dean Rusk added a note to the effect that Britain and the United States were still 'proceeding urgently' with the plan for a naval task force. 'The Dutch and the Canadians have already joined even before a text was presented to them'. Unilateral action by Israel would be 'irresponsible and catastrophic.' Rusk also sent a message to Gromyko reiterating the call for a two-week moratorium.[5]

The Soviet Union was now acting with caution. Moscow warned the United States that Israel was preparing for war. Sir Anthony Nutting thought that the Soviet Union had been deceived by a 'calculated leakage' by Israel, reinforced by 'fictitious radio messages' which had been intercepted by Soviet ships on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. Be that as it may, the Soviet Union urged Johnson to tell Israel how dangerous it would be to start a war. Eshkol, in a message to Kosygin, denied that Israel was seeking to bring about a change of régime in Syria or was acting on behalf of external forces. The Jewish people had suffered grievously at the hands of the Nazis, and the survivors had found a new life in their ancient homeland. Nothing was dearer to the Israelis than peace. 'We appeal to you . . . and to the great Soviet people to understand the grave situation in which we find ourselves.' The Soviet Union should join the other great powers in pressing for a permanent peace settlement in the Middle East.[6]

President de Gaulle joined in the diplomatic activity by reiterating his proposal for four-power talks. None of the parties wanted armed conflict, he claimed: this clearly was the case for Israel, and it seemd to be true also for Egypt and Syria. The French initiative could lead to a reduction in tension and thereafter to a settlement of the more burning questions that arise in the Middle East.[7]

Johnson's latest message to Eshkol had the desired effect in Israel, for when the Israeli cabinet reconvened on the Sunday evening, 28 May, there was a distinct change of mood. Fifteen hours earlier, opinion had been equally divided between those supporting and those opposing the immediate use of force: now there was a substantial majority in favour of delay.[8]

Half an hour after the cabinet adjourned, Eshkol broadcast a speech to the nation. Egyptian aggression would be opposed 'at the time of need'. The government was continuing the international diplomatic effort to assure free passage through the Strait of Tiran, and decisions had been taken so that it would not be necessary to take military action for self-defence. Moshe Dayan and Michael Bar-Zohar report that the speech had been hurriedly typed and contained many errors: the sheets were evidently handed to Eshkol in the wrong order, which confounded the confusion. 'The effect was catastrophic', wrote Dayan. 'Public doubt and derision gave way to an overwhelming sense of deep concern.' Even those who were most loyal to Eshkol realized that it was a disastrous performance. Yitzhak Rabin has written of the 'respect' he felt for Eshkol. 'But in May 1967,' he wrote, 'Eshkol was no longer the same man he had been in 1963 . . .' Nadav Safran calls Eshkol 'a kind and decent person, but a pragmatist and compromiser by nature.' David Kimche and Dan Bawly go further and write that Eshkol, for all his political acumen, was a man of compromise who procrastinated whenever possible and lacked the strength, decisiveness, and charisma which a leader needs in time of crisis. U Thant, on the other hand, rejoiced that Eshkol had spoken with such moderation.[9]

After the broadcast, Eshkol had an unhappy meeting with the defence chiefs, who at this stage were more belligerent than most politicians. 'I don't think Eshkol wanted a war', writes general Odd Bull; 'the military establishment, however, certainly wanted a showdown with their Arab neighbours.'[10] Eshkol told the military that Israel would not attack before the political alternatives had been exhausted. He is reported as saying that Eban must have misunderstood president Johnson, who could not now fulfil the commitment 'as worded by . . . Eban.' Johnson had given 'less an outright promise . . . than our

foreign minister had understood it to be.' It was also believed by some in Israel that Eban had underestimated de Gaulle's negative attitude.[11]

Eshkol was now able to tell president Johnson that, in the light of U.S. assurances that the Strait would be opened by 'any and all measures' (Israeli version) or 'every possible effort' (U.S. version), Israel had decided 'to await developments for a further limited period', but adding that it was vital that an international naval escort should pass through the Strait of Tiran 'within a week or two.' The moment was nevertheless approaching when advice to Israel would lack any moral or logical basis. 'The time is ripe for confronting Nasser with a more intense and effective policy of resistance.' This message seems to have annoyed Johnson, for he thought that Eshkol had agreed 'to give us two weeks to open the Straits.'[12] Johnson did not want the Israelis to think that to accede to the plea for delay meant that they had a blank cheque to do whatever they pleased and then claim unconditional U.S. support. Johnson asked that this be made clear to the Israeli embassy in Washington, and Israel interpreted this as a distinct weakening of the assurances given to Eban the previous week. The Israeli embassy understood that a declaration by the maritime powers was being drafted and would be open to all nations, but they now realized that there would be no threat to use force. This was reiterated when Johnson replied to Eshkol, a message which did not reach Israel until 3 June, two days before Israel attacked. Johnson repeated once again that Israel would not be alone unless it decided to go alone. The United States, in concert with others, would provide 'as effective . . . support as possible . . .' Dayan found Johnson's new communication 'long, convoluted, and negative in tenor', and he wrote that Eshkol too was disappointed. '. . . [T]he Americans were trying to appease the Egyptians', Dayan concluded. It was certainly becoming clear that the United States was not going to involve itself alone in enforcement action against Egypt, but many Israelis assumed that the United States would not mind if Israel found its own means of 'breaking out of the siege and blockade . . .'[13]

The Israeli ambassador in Washington, Avraham Harman, arrived in Israel at the same time as Johnson's latest letter. Gideon Rafael had met Harman at the airport in New York and asked him to tell Eban that all political and diplomatic means of redress at the United Nations had been exhausted. The Security Council would take no action of consequence and the armada, as Harman called it, 'would never leave the safe haven of governmental chancelleries.' Rafael adds that up to now he had received no specific directives from Israel, nor had he been informed of any major decision. When Harman reached Israel, he told Eban

of a non-committal conversation with Dean Rusk and of Rusk's renewed plea for restraint.[14] At the same time, the State Department let it be known on 30 May that the Sixth Fleet was being concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranian.[15]

The United States had affirmed to the Soviet Union the international character of the Strait of Tiran. This must have struck a somewhat symphathetic chord in Moscow. The Soviet Union had never regarded the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway but could hardly relish an action which might be interpreted as a precedent for closing the Bosphorus. The Soviet Union had already notified Turkey that ten Soviet warships would pass from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, beginning on 30 May. A tanker and a submarine supply vessel passed through the Strait on 30 May, three frigates and two other ships on 3 June, a destroyer on 4 June, and two more warships the following day.[16]

Abba Eban took Soviet hostility for granted but did not expect active military intervention if and when war came. He told foreign correspondents that Israel was not alone, for others would make common cause to restore the situation in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; but he rejected any suggestion that other ships could enter the Gulf, 'but not Israeli ships.' Eban's belief in the curative powers of the United Nations for severe international ailments was 'very limited'. Nobody need urge Israel to be restrained — 'it is a waste of paper and ink to tell us that there is sometimes virtue in a policy of waiting . . .' The people of Israel could bear the burden of tension over a period of time, if that should be necessary, but time was running out.[17] The Soviet Union was highly critical of this statement and again claimed to be working for peace: Israel should exercise restraint.[18]

There was now a new round of debate in the Security Council. Gideon Rafael has described these meetings as 'a sterile game of oratorical strikes and counter-strikes', and Eban found it difficult to read the records of the proceedings in New York without a gasp of disbelief. 'Not for one hour', he writes, 'did the proceedings rise above ineptitude and cynicism.'[19]

The Council met at the request of Egypt to consider urgently Israel's 'repeated aggression', and meetings were held on 29, 30, and 31 May. The basic issue, Egypt now maintained, concerned the Palestinians. Israel had a long history of violating international law and agreements. Certain powers, 'for their selfish interests', were diverting world attention from the true culprit. The Gulf of Aqaba had been 'under continued and uninterrupted Arab domination' for over a thousand years,

and Egypt was under no obligation to allow free and innocent passage 'to an enemy during a state of war . . .'[20] Egypt had the support of the Soviet Union in condemning 'the intrigues of the imperialist forces . . . provocative threats and acts against the Arab States.' Israel, it was alleged, was being encouraged in its aggressive policy by the United States.[21]

Israel denied having aggressive intentions, but because the Arabs had made 'sudden and threatening moves', Israel had been compelled to take 'limited precautionary measures.'[22]

Several members of the Council repeated the call for a cooling-off period and appeal for restraint, but Thant was surprised that Federenko did not support his plea. 'It was beyond me why the Soviet representative could not endorse the line of action that President Nasser had accepted a few days earlier.'[23] Lord Caradon, the British ambassador, said that the problem of access to the Gulf of Aqaba concerned not only the states bordering the Gulf but also the interests of all maritime powers. Indeed, the issue was not simply peace in the Middle East but 'the effectiveness of the World Organization which we are all pledged to support . . .'[24] India believed that 'no State or group of States should attempt to challenge by force the sovereignty of [Egypt] over the Strait of Tiran.'[25]

There was a moment of light relief, or of potential relief, when ambassador Goldberg requested that the meeting be recessed for ten minutes for a reason which was too delicate to state in public, but Federenko did not consider that 'some kind of mysterious delicacy' should be allowed to interrupt the Council's work, so the debate continued.[26]

No formal proposal calling for restraint was introduced during the first two meetings. On 31 May, Egypt submitted a draft resolution which would have called on Israel to respect its obligations, and the United States submitted an alternative text which called on both parties to exercise restraint. Neither proposal was put to the vote, however, and the Council agreed to adjourn for two days and resume its work on 2 June. Lall cannot understand why a proposal for restraint was not submitted on 29 or 30 May, and he is highly critical of the Council for its failure to act at such a crucial juncture: '. . . no sense of real urgency . . . a degree of dilatoriness . . .'[27]

The day after Lord Caradon had spoken in the Security Council, the British cabinet again discussed the Middle East, as Harold Wilson was on the point of leaving for North America. The Foreign Office had circulated a long paper which Richard Crossman found less 'exuberant' than the ideas of the previous week, but 'passionately anti-Russian and

anti-Nasserite' in tone. Harold Wilson and George Brown still aimed at 'a holding resolution' in the Security Council about access to the Gulf of Aqaba. If this should fail to resolve the issue, as seemed likely, an international maritime force should be assembled to escort convoys through the Strait of Tiran – although it was not thought necessary that an Israeli ship should necessarily be included in the first convoy. Wilson accepted that Egypt would have some rights of inspection and control over shipping through the Strait, but he believed that Israel should be guaranteed the right of innocent passage. The British plan, according to George Brown, would be 'international peace-keeping outside the United Nations . . . which the Russions couldn't veto.' The trouble was that it was now becoming clear that few other countries were willing to contribute to a multi-national naval force. Lyndon Johnson had made it clear that he wanted to see Wilson and de Gaulle 'out there with their ships all lined up', but Britain was unwilling to take part in a purely Anglo-American effort, and France would not participate under any circumstances. Moreover, there was no prospect of implementing de Gaulle's idea of four-power summit talks. Richard Crossman thought that Israel would not start a war, but he considered the Wilson-Brown plan to be 'singularly inane'. The day after the cabinet meeting, the British carrier *Hermes* reached Aden, soon joined by six frigates and a squadron of minesweepers. Shortly thereafter, three British ships entered the Gulf of Aqaba.[28]

The irrepressible Crossman had lunch with Chaim Laskov, a former Israeli chief of staff, who told him that what Israel ought to have done was to have made a pre-emptive strike as soon as Egypt asked for the withdrawal of UNEF. A multi-national naval force was unnecessary. Britain should keep up the flow of arms to Israel and use its veto in the Security Council when Israel struck; but other than that, Israel expected nothing from the United Kingdom.[29]

There were by now two special U.S. envoys in Cairo, Robert Anderson, who had been a member of Eisenhower's cabinet and informal envoy to Nasser, and Charles Yost, a professional diplomat. Anderson was in Egypt on business and was able to arrange with Nasser that vice president Mohieddin should arrive in Washington on 7 June. Yost saw Mahmoud Riad, the foreign minister, who told him that Egypt would not initiate military action but would not cancel the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. Yost and Riad did, however, arrange to accelerate Mohieddin's visit to Washington, which was now fixed for 5 June. Yost was later to comment that his trip had been 'futile'. Maxime Rodinson and Michael Bar-Zohar report that Egypt re-affirmed that it would raise

no objection if the question of acces through the Strait of Tiran were referred to the International Court of Justice, though information to this effect was not made public at the time.[30]

The domestic political turmoil in Israel was now coming to a head, 'the most bitter and intense political fight the country has yet seen . . .' Discussion of a change in the composition of the Israeli government had begun to surface on 21 May. Eshkol had been prime minister and minister of defence since 1963, and there was a widespread feeling that the two offices should now be separated. There were three possible candidates for the defence ministry. First, David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Rafi faction which had seceded from the Labour Party in 1965 ('the first open revolt against the old, East European élite . . .') and which was to rejoin Labour in 1968. There were many leading Israelis, including Abba Eban, who did not now fully trust Ben-Gurion's flair for leadership. Second, Yigal Allon, deputy prime minister and minister of labour, who happened to be in the Soviet Union when the crisis erupted but returned to Israel on 24 May. Third, general Moshe Dayan, chief of staff at the time of the Sinai-Suez war of 1956 and later minister of agriculture. Eshkol himself was opposed to Dayan's appointment, fearing that he would spend too much time with the troops at the front.[31]

The separate but related question was whether it was possible to widen the basis of the government. The Labour coalition had the consistent support of 73 members of the Knesset out of 120, sometimes 75. The aim of widening the goverment was to bring in the Rafi group (with 10 members in the Knesset) and Gahal (a merger of the Herut group and the Liberals in 1965, with 26 members in the Knesset, including Menachem Begin, the former Irgun commander).

The convoluted political permutations of this period are difficult to follow, but the highlights seem to have been as follows. Eshkol at first had hesitations about any major changes, but he told Dayan that he wished to form an all-party ministerial committee for foreign affairs and defence, to include Eshkol himself, Eban, Allon, and Begin: would Dayan join the committee as representative of the Rafi faction? Dayan firmly declined. A proposal that Ben-Gurion should become prime minister was floated by Shimon Peres but rejected by Ben-Gurion himself. Begin then suggested to Eshkol that Ben-Gurion should become prime minister and minister of defence, with Eshkol himself as deputy prime minister in charge of civil affairs. Not surprisingly, Eshkol's reply was 'sternly negative.' A variation on this idea was then tried, that Eshkol should invite Ben-Gurion to join the government, either as minister

of defence or in some other capacity, but this also was turned down by Eshkol.[32]

There was strong support for the idea that the Rafi group should join the coalition, but Rafi would agree to this only if Dayan were to become minister of defence. Eshkol saw Dayan on 28 May and offered to make him deputy prime minister or minister without portfolio, perhaps with Allon as minister of defence, but Dayan was not interested. Yitzhak Rabin (minister of defence 'in all but name') suspected that Dayan wished to replace him as chief of staff, but Dayan denied this. 'You are chief of staff, and I shall obey every order. . . I merely want to take part in the war . . .' Golda Meir, who was fundamentally opposed to any idea of broadening the government and had turned against Ben-Gurion and his dissidents in Rafi, suggested that Dayan be made a minister without portfolio, but this was tuned down by Rafi. Eshkol met Dayan again on 31 May and offered to make him deputy prime minister, but Dayan again refused. Eshkol consulted Rabin and then announced that Dayan would be given a command on the southern front. Eshkol had in mind to give the defence ministry to Allon, with Dayan as foreign minister and Eban kicked upstairs as deputy prime minister, but Eban let Eshkol know that he was not interested in a merely titular post, and Dayan still insisted on an active military role.[33]

This complex political game was finally brought to a conclusion when Allon reluctantly agreed that he should not be considered for the defence ministry, and this left Eshkol free to give the post to Dayan. On 1 June, Eshkol offered Dayan the defence portfolio in a new wall-to-wall national coalition, and Dayan accepted. As soon as Dayan's appointment became firm, Rafi and Gahal agreed to join the coalition, Begin and Josef Saphir becoming ministers without portfolio. A cabinet meeting was held that night, soon joined by the three new ministers. Dayan had the impression that Eban was still unenthusiastic about military action, but the truth was that Eban's hesitations had now been dispelled. Eban had already told Rabin that he no longer had any 'political inhibitions' about the use of force, for he was clear that the time was now ripe for military action.[34]

After Dayan had taken over the defence ministry, he outlined his ideas to his colleagues. The longer the war was delayed, the worse it would be for Israel. 'I said that we should launch a military attack without delay [wrote Dayan later]. If the Cabinet should make such a decision at its next scheduled meeting on Sunday, June 4, we should strike the next morning . . . The campaign would last from three to five days.' When Israel attacked, there would be immediate international

intervention through the UN Security Council to stop the fighting. 'The fact that the new minister had been a successful Chief of Staff [writes Yoram Peri] gave him prestige among the military . . .' Dayan's daughter Yael reports that the appointment of her father as minister of defence caused an immediate change of mood in Israel's defence forces, 'quite noticeable and postive . . .' Commanders and soldiers seemed 'to have been given a second wind . . .'[35]

It was now clear that the Aqaba blockade was not going to be ended by an international regatta. Britain and the United States had approached more than eighty countries and only two other countries (in addition to Israel) were firm in their willingness to play an active naval role, the Netherlands and Australia. In addition, three others would support a declaration on innocent passage: New Zealand, Belgium, and Iceland. Canada,[36] Italy, and Mexico had withdrawn from the the proposed armada, and West Germany, Portugal, Argentina, and Panama still had the matter under consideration.[37]

France was remaining aloof from the Anglo-U.S. efforts. President de Gaulle said his policy was positive neutrality. Every state had the right to exist, but France would not approve or support the state which first resorted to arms. A *de facto* situation of détente could provide an occasion for four-power talks: 'pour le moment la priorité est à recherche de la paix.' On 2 June, it was announced that France was suspending the supply of arms to Israel. President de Gaulle had told Eban that France would not allow Israel to be destroyed, but if Israel should take the initiative in the use of force, it would win military successes but later find itself in growing difficulties. War in the Middle East 'cannot fail . . . to have very unfortunate consequences for many centuries. . .'[38]

In the light of Johnson's most recent message to Eshkol, which the Israeli government had interpreted as a significant weakening of Washington's stance, Eshkol and Eban decided to send another envoy to sound out U.S. opinion, and the choice fell on Meir Amit (head of Mossad, Israel's secret intelligence service, and a former head of Aman, Israel's military intelligence). Amit travelled to Washington incognito, and visited the Pentagon and the CIA, but not the White House or the State Department. Amit confirmed that support for the regatta had waned, but he advised his government to 'wait a few days'. His assessment was that the United States would not mind if Israel ended the blockade in its own way.[39]

From the time that the government of national unity was formed in Israel, there were intensive and almost continuous discussions among

political and military leaders. There was still pressure from the generals for an early resort to armed force, but Eshkol wanted it to be clear to president Johnson that Israel had allowed time for diplomacy to work. The crucial cabinet meeting on 4 June resulted in a formal decision to take military action 'in order to liberate Israel from the stranglehold of aggression . . .', but a bland and misleading communiqué was issued for public consumption. Eban justified the decision to go to war as being in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which affirms the inherent right of self-defence 'if an armed attack occurs', until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures.

Israeli leaders believed that they had done everything possible to preserve the security of the state by peaceful means. Rafael has written that '. . . Israel did not leave a stone unturned to prevent war', and Menachem Begin insists that, although Nasser was not about to attack Israel directly, the June war was 'a war of no choice' on Israel's part.[40] In a sense, of course, any war can be avoided if the main war aims of one side or the other are discarded, but Israelis considered in 1967 that what was at stake was the preservation of the state, and this is something that self-respecting politicians do not willingly compromise.

It was not only Israel that was resigned to war, for Arab military preparations proceeded apace. Egyptian units reached Sharm el Sheikh by helicopter and took charge of the water-distillation plant from the Canadian contingent of UNEF.[41] Ahmed Shuqairi of the PLO had told Palestinian fighters to take over UNEF's positions in the Gaza Strip and had placed several thousand irregular soldiers at the disposal of the Arab states. Iraq agreed to send troops to Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, and an Iraqi-Egyptian defence pact was signed in Cairo on 4 June. Iraqi troops arrived in Syria on 25 May and in Jordan on 3 June. Saudi Arabia offered military support to the front-line states, Sudan mobilized, and token military contingents arrived in Egypt from Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Kuwait. Iraq convened a meeting in Baghdad to discuss the Arab use of the oil weapon, and it was agreed to suspend the flow of Arab oil to any state which committed or supported aggression. Iran was urged to stop selling oil to Israel, and Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia said that they would stop the flow of oil if Israel attacked any Arab state. Egyptian public statements became increasingly bellicose. Most alarming for Israel was the arrival in Cairo of King Hussein accompanied by Ahmed Shuqairi, to sign a defence agreement with Egypt. Jordanian forces were placed under the command of the Egyptian general Abdul Munim Riad. Shuqairi returned to Amman with Hussein, and on 2 June, made an ostentatious visit to the el Aksa mosque in East Jerusalem.[42]

Nasser found it difficult to believe that Israel would choose war, but he was convinced that if war should come, the Soviet Union would give active help to the Arabs. This belief underlay the long talk which he had with Sir Anthony Nutting, the British conservative politician who had resigned his ministerial post over the Suez affair. Nasser was convinced that Israel would not fight a war on two fronts. If the West should actively help Israel, 'Russia could not fail to respond.'[43]

The Security Council had been due to convene on 2 June, but the meeting was deferred until the following day, a Saturday. The French ambassador, Roger Seydoux, warned Rafael that he would have to expound to the Council the Gaullist thesis that responsibility for war would rest with the party which fired the first shot. Rafael deployed the familiar argument that it was Egypt which had precipitated the crisis. Seydoux relayed the gist of the conversation to his foreign minister, who authorized him to 'soften the wording'.[44]

Rafael, speaking first, said that Israel had been subjected to 'a constant barrage of vituperation and threats . . .' Arab aims were to lay a smoke-screen to conceal their own aggressive activities, to portray the intended victim as the aggressor, and to paralyse the international community. What was needed was not a breathing spell but action to avert the danger.[45] Egypt, in a written communication, noted that certain states, claiming to speak on behalf of the maritime powers, were trying to exert pressure against Egypt.[46] Seydoux favoured an appeal to the parties to refrain from using force.[47] Morocco said that Egypt had promised not to initiate violence or war: a similar assurance should be sought from Israel.[48] The Soviet Union attacked U.S. aggression in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Viet Nam. The Council took no substantive decision but agreed to meet again the following Monday afternoon.[49] Lall comments that the Security Council was not short of time but of 'a clear perspective of the dangers.'[50]

It was ironic that as the Middle East drifted to war, the UN Force was being steadily withdrawn. During the conversation between Riad and Thant on 24 May, Riad said that he had already told the Canadian ambassador that if there were any delay in the withdrawal of Canada's UNEF unit, Egypt would expel it by force. Three days later, Riad sent a cable to Thant complaining that the Canadian government had 'persistently resorted to procrastination and delay' over the withdrawal of its UNEF contingent and asking that its withdrawal be completed within forty-eight hours. General Rikhye believed that the Egyptian authorities had always been suspicious of the Canadian contingent and that these suspicions were exacerbated by the report that Canadian

naval vessels had entered the Western Mediterranian. Rikhye took the line that he could not accept strictures on any particular UN contingent: 'Now that one of my contingents had been asked to leave quickly it was time for the rest of us to leave as well.' UN officials in New York thought that Rikhye was being unnecessarily prickly: the Canadian contingent should be withdrawn as quickly as possible, and the remainder of UNEF in accordance with the original schedule. As the last Canadians departed from the airfield at Gaza, Rikhye experienced 'a feeling of abandonment and helplessness mixed with a sense of foreboding.' Thant considered this episode about the Canadian contingent 'very unpleasant'. On his next visit to Cairo on 3 June, Rikhye found a general consensus that war was imminent.[51]

Towards the end of May, general Bull was warned by a Syrian officer that war was inevitable, but Bull insisted that UN observers should continue with their normal tasks. On 4 June, Bull was returning from Beirut to the West Bank but found that the airport at Qalandiya near Jerusalem was 'closed for repairs'. He therefore proceeded to Amman, were his aircraft was destroyed in the Israeli attack the following day.[52]

While Bull was trying to land at Qalandiya, Rikhye was flying from Cairo to El Arish, from where he travelled by car to Rafah and Gaza. Egyptian military deployments seemed to him to be exceedingly puzzling. The dispositions were defensive in nature, but too far forward. The next morning he started to draft a message to Thant but it was interrupted by firing from the direction of the Gaza beach.[53]

The Israeli air force commander, general Mordechai Hod, estimated that it would take three hours to destroy Egypt's air force: thereafter, the Israeli air force would be free to shift its attention to Jordan, Syria, and Iraq if any of them should come to Egypt's aid. The Israeli strike was fixed for 7.45 a.m. on 5 June.[54]

Notes

1. Rafael, p. 147.
2. Ibid. p. 148.
3. Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, pp. 176–8.
4. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 340; Brecher, p. 398.
5. Quandt, pp. 54–5; Eban, pp. 369–70; Bar-Zohar, p. 140; Brecher. pp. 398, 400.
6. Nutting, pp. 397–8 and conversation, 17 March 1983; Brecher, p. 398, Eban, p. 369; Jabber pp. 49–50 (doc. 48); Quandt, pp. 54–5, Dagan, pp. 220–3.
7. Brecher, pp. 322–3, 399; Bar-Zohar, p. 141.

8. Eban pp. 371–3; Bar-Zohar, pp. 142–3.

9. *Middle East Record*, p. 197; Jabber, p. 23 (doc. 36); Rabin, pp. 57, 72; Dayan, p. 333; Ben-Gurion, p. 763; Eban, pp. 374–5; Peres, p. 234; Kimche and Bawly, pp. 63–4, 141, 148; Bar-Zohar, pp. 144–5; Uri Avnery, *Israel without Zionists: a plea for peace in the Middle East*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1968, p. 29; Safran, *Israel: the embattled ally*, pp. 173–4, 396, 405–9, 417; Howard and Hunter, p. 26; Thant, p. 247.

10. Letter from general Bull to the author, 4 April 1983.

11. Rabin, pp. 72–4; Dayan, p. 331; Peri. p. 245; Laqueur, pp. 146–9; *Middle East Record*, p. 197.

12. Letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983.

13. Johnson, p. 294; Quandt, p. 56; Eban, pp. 383, 395; Dayan, pp. 332, 342, 345–6; Bar-Zohar, pp. 160, 175; Brecher, pp. 413–4, 420.

14. Rafael, p. 150; Eban, pp. 394–5; Bar-Zohar, p. 176; Quandt, p. 59.

15. *Middle East Record*, p. 203.

16. Howe, pp. 59, 75 and Appendix B, p. 364; Paul Jabber and Roman Kolkowicz, 'The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973', in *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, by Stephen S. Kaplan, p. 426; Bar-Zohar, p. 162; Laqueur, p. 169.

17. Eban, pp. 393, 398; Jabber, pp. 28–9 (doc. 41); *Middle East Record*, p. 200.

18. Dagan, pp. 223–4; Brecher. p. 413.

19. Rafael, p. 146; Eban, pp. 376, 378.

20. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 124–5, S/7907; 1343rd mtg. (29 May 1967), paras. 43, 51, 75, 79, 102.

21. Ibid., paras. 254, 259, 304.

22. Ibid., para. 164.

23. Ibid., paras. 25, 205, 208; 1345th mtg. (31 May 1967), para. 125; Thant, p. 246.

24. SCOR, 22nd year, 1343rd mtg. (29 May 1967), paras. 147, 154.

25. Ibid., para. 222.

26. Ibid., paras. 187–97.

27. Ibid., 1245th mtg. (31 May 1967), paras. 31 (S/7916/Rev. 1), 89 (S/7919), 142–4; Lall, pp. 38–9, 41.

28. Crossman, pp. 356–8; Brown, pp. 136–7; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, pp. 341–2, 346–7; Johnson, p. 292; Thant, pp. 248, 251; Howe, pp. 84, 149. The statements of Wilson and Brown in the House of Commons on 31 May and Wilson's press conference in Washington on 2 June are reproduced in Jabber, pp. 30–7, 42–8, 51–3 (docs. 44, 46, 51).

29. Crossman, p. 360.

30. Johnson p. 294; Quandt, pp. 55, 57, 59; Riad, pp. 21–2; Sadat, p. 282; Jabber, p. 622 (doc. 393); Charles W. Yost, *History and Memory*, New York and London, Norton, 1980, p. 238; Rodinson, p. 207; Rouleau, p. 83; Bar-Zohar, pp. 166–8, letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983. Recently declassified reports from Anderson and Yost, obtained under

the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, can be found in Donald Neff, *Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that changed the Middle East*, pp. 178–9, 187–8, 388–9.

of defence, war was inevitable; letter to the author, 4 April 1983.

31. Kimche and Bawly, pp. 61–2, 143, 152; Bar-Zohar, p. 134.

32. Dayan, p. 331; Ben-Gurion, pp. 761–2; Eban, pp. 387–8; Brecher. pp. 377, 381, 384.

33. Ben-Gurion, pp. 763, 766, 767; Eban, pp. 390–1; Dayan, pp. 335–6; Rabin, p. 74; Peri, pp. 162, 204; Kimche and Bawly, pp. 63, 143; Bar-Zoahr, pp. 134, 164, 171; Brecher, pp. 389, 409, 415, 425.

34. Eban, pp. 386, 392; Ben-Gurion, p. 768–9; Dayan, p. 337; Rabin, p. 75; Bar-Zohar, pp. 172–3; Brecher, pp. 429–30.

35. Dayan, pp. 339–40; Rabin, p. 76; Peri. p. 163; Yael Dayan, *A Soldier's Diary*, p. 25. General Odd Bull writes that once Dayan had beome minister of defence, war was inevitable; letter to the author, 4 April 1983.

36. On Canadian policy, see Jabber, pp. 13–7 (doc. 28).

37. Eban, p. 383; Johnson, pp. 295–6; Rafael, p. 153; Peres, p. 233; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 346; Bar-Zohar, pp. 174–6; Whetten, p. 8.

38. *Middle East Record*. pp. 202–3; Jabber, pp. 50–1 (docs. 49, 50); Eban, pp. 398–9; Dayan, p. 343; Peres, p. 231; Bar-Zohar, pp. 178–9, 183–5; Brecher, p. 419; Johnson, p. 292; Thant, p. 251; *Select Chronology and Background Documents on the Middle East*, p. 265.

39. Eban, pp. 348–5; Dayan, pp. 332, 342; Brecher, p. 417; Quandt, pp. 56–7.

40. Churchill, p. 74; Eban, pp. 400, 403; Rabin, p. 76; Brecher, p. 319, 422–3; Rafael, p. 151; *Jerusalem Post International*, 22–28 Aug. 1982, p. 14; Quandt, p. 58.

41. Letter from general Rikhye to the author, 13 June 1983.

42. Jabber, pp. 537, 568–9, 577–9 (docs. 317, 332, 338, 339); *Middle East Record*, pp. 196, 200–4, 244, 317, 402; Ben-Gurion, p. 771; Thant, pp. 247–9, 251; Nutting, pp. 405, 414; Rikhye, pp. 85, 94; Bar-Zohar, pp. 152–3, 159; Brecher, p. 419; Howard and Hunter, p. 25; Edgar O'Ballance, *The Third Arab-Israeli War*, pp. 27, 29, 32, 34–6.

43. Nutting, p. 398, and conversation with the author, 17 March 1983.

44. Rafael, pp. 149–50.

45. SCOR, 22nd year, 1346th mtg. (3 June 1967), paras. 10, 50, 52.

46. Ibid., Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 129–3-, S/7925.

47. Ibid., para. 221.

48. Ibid., para. 138.

49. Ibid., paras. 251–7.

50. Ibid., para. 263; Lall, p. 45.

51. Thant, pp. 243–5, 480, 487–8; Rikhye, pp. 87–92; Jabber, pp. 555, 559, 560 (doc. 328).

52. Bull, p. 112.

53. Rikhye, pp. 96–9.

54. Rabin, p. 77.

5. THE JUNE WAR

> The Jews threaten war. We say they are welcome to war
> we are ready for war, our armed forces, our people, all of
> us are ready for war . . . President Gamal Abdul Nasser, speech
> on 22 May 1967, reproduced in *International Documents on
> Palestine*, p. 540.

Monday

At 7.45 a.m. Israeli time on Monday 5 June, 8.45 a.m. in Cairo, just
as Egyptian commanders were on the way to their offices and air
force pilots on the way to their training courses, Israeli aircraft attacked
four Egyptian bases in Sinai, three bases near the Suez Canal, one in
the Nile valley, and two in the Egyptian delta; and, in the ensuing
four hours, eight other subsidiary bases. In these devastating strikes,
some 300 out of Egypt's 340 combat aircraft were destroyed, most
of them of Soviet manufacture.[1]

Shortly after the first attacks, general Odd Bull, head of the UN
observers in Jerusalem, received an urgent request to visit the Is-
raeli foreign office, where he was told of the outbreak of hostili-
ties between Egypt and Israel and asked to convey a message to King
Hussein of Jordan. The United States was asked to transmit a similar
communication.[2] These messages urged Hussein not to take part in the
war, but warned that Israel would use all means at its disposal if Jordan
decided to fight. 'This was a threat, pure and simple,' wrote general
Bull, 'and it is not the normal practise of the UN to pass on threats
from one government to another.' But this was not a normal situation,
and Bull decided he had no alternative but to transmit the message
to Jordan. By the time the message reached Amman, Jordanian forces
were already engaged. Israel responded with air strikes against Amman
and Mafraq. General Bull made three separate attempts to arrange local
cease-fires, but without success.[3]

By this time, Syrian planes had attacked Haifa; in addition, Iraqi
planes from Habbaniyah (west of Baghdad) had attacked targets on
Israel's Mediterranian coast. Israeli planes then attacked airfields at
Damascus and four other places in Syria (Dumayr, Sayqal, Marj Riyal,

and a desert station on the oil pipeline code-named T-4), as well as Habbaniyah in Iraq.[4]

By mid-afternoon, these attacks had virtually eliminated the air forces of Jordan and Syria, for the loss that day of 26 Israel planes. Field marshall Amer and a group of senior Egyptian officers had been flying from Cairo to Thamad when the first attack took place and, according to Mahmoud Riad, the air defence system in Sinai had been 'shut down'. Amer and his fellow-officers could not find an airfield in Sinai where they could land, so the plane returned to Cairo. A warning from Jordan to Egypt that Israeli aircraft had been seen on radar screens at Mount Ajlun was not decoded because 'the code was changed that very same day.'[5]

During the course of the Monday morning, three Jordanian soldiers entered Government House in the UN zone south of Jerusalem, known in Hebrew as the Mount of Evil Counsel. General Bull was astonished at this instrusion into the demilitarized UN area, and he ordered the Arab soldiers to leave. 'The greatest surprise in my life [writes general Bull] was when Jordanian soldiers entered the UN Government House area. We [UNTSO] had been assured by both parties, even after hostilities began, and even after the shooting began in Jerusalem, that Government House should be respected and not violated. I have never been so angry in my life after I was informed of the violation. I ran out in order to stop them. Finally I pursued the three soldiers . . . but they remained in our grounds until they were driven out by the IDF [Israeli Defence Force] a few hours later.'[6] UN staff barricaded the outside gate and all the doors, but the Jordanians proceeded to open fire from the UN compound against Israeli territory. Bull then phoned the Israeli foreign ministry to explain what had happened, but the line went dead. Shortly after this, Israeli soldiers opened fire and had soon captured Government House, expelled the UN personnel, and cut the UN radio link with New York. For the next twelve weeks, UN observers had to operate from the YMCA. General Bull found the Israeli authoities uncooperative in the matter, but on 11 August, Thant was able to announce that Israel intended to return Government House and about one-third of the land formerly in the UN zone, and had agreed that the non-returned area would not be used for military purposes. The United Nations resumed part occupancy on 23 August, but Thant did not abandon the claim of the United Nations to the whole zone.[7]

News that fighting had broken out reached U Thant in New York at 3 a.m. (New York time) causing him, for the first time in his memory, to miss his morning meditation. At about the same time, Gideon

Rafael received a message from the head of the UN department in the Israeli foreign office: 'Inform immediately the President of the Sec. Co. [Security Council] that Israel is now engaged in repelling Egyptian land and air forces.' At 3.10 a.m., Rafael woke ambassador Hans Tabor, the Danish president of the Security Council, with the news that Egyptian forces had 'moved against Israel'. Twenty minutes after Rafael's communication to Tabor, Egypt formally complained to the Security Council that Israel had committed 'treacherous premeditated aggression'. Tabor summoned the Security Council to meet. Rafael had received 'strictest instructions' to refrain from volunteering any military information, but at 6.30 a.m. he received from a cipher officer a sealed envelope with the 'stimulating' news that the Israeli air force had destroyed more than 250 Egyptian planes.[8]

Dean Rusk reached the State Department in Washington shortly after 3 a.m., and at a few minutes after 5 a.m., he telephoned president Johnson with news of the fighting. Rusk then sent a message to Gromyko through ordinary diplomatic channels: 'We feel it is very important that the United Nations Security Council succeed in bringing this fighting to an end as quickly as possible . . .' At 7 a.m., the White House issued a statement expressing the president's concern and calling for an immediate cease-fire, linked to 'a new beginning of programs to assure the peace and development of the entire area' – 'a highly conscious and deliberate decision', according to Gene Rostow. A little before 8 a.m., defence secretary Robert McNamara telephoned Johnson to say that the Hot Line from Moscow to the Pentagon was being activated: this was the first use of the Hot Line other than for tests since it had been installed in 1963. Soon prime minister Kosygin was at the other end, expressing Soviet concern at events in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, said Kosygin, would like to cooperate with the United States in working for a cease-fire, and the United States was asked to exert what influence it could be on Israel. Johnson, in reply, urged that both super-powers should keep out of the conflict and expressed support for a cease-fire, which should be sought through the United Nations. Arthur Goldberg had been on the phone to Johnson an hour before this, and the exchanges on the Hot Line were followed by consultations between Goldberg and Federenko in New York. At Federenko's suggestion, Goldberg met the Egyptian ambassador, Mohamed Awad el Kony, and made the case for an immediate cease-fire, but at this stage Egypt would agree to a cease-fire only if it were linked to a withdrawal of forces by Israel. It is likely that the United States would have supported the Arab demand for Israeli withdrawal

if Egypt had been willing to withdraw its forces from Egyptian Sinai and end the Aqaba blockade.[9]

The UN Security Council convened at 9.30 a.m. The president of the Council, Hans Tabor, was (in the words of Arthur Lall) 'vigorous, politically sensitive, and highly personable', and he conducted the proceedings throughout a difficult month 'with firmness and drive.' The Security Council, having vacillated for three weeks, now 'seemed too dazed to respond immediately . . .' Goldberg had already been in touch with Gideon Rafael: not surprisingly, Goldberg's anxiety was very noticeable to Rafael.[10]

Secretary-General Thant reported to the Council the scanty information he had received from UN representatives in the area.[11] Both Israel and Egypt claimed to be repelling an invasion by the other, and both claimed to be acting within the self-defence article of the UN Charter.[12] India expressed 'profound shock and grief' that Indian members of the UN Emergency Force had been killed.[13] The meeting was suspended at 11.15 a.m. in the expectation that proceedings would be resumed after a short interval, and some representatives remained in their seats or in the Security Council chamber. It was not until after 10 p.m. that night that the meeting was resumed, and then only to hear from the president of the Council that consultations were still going on.[14] This delay greatly exasperated Lord Caradon.[15] According to Lall, Israeli diplomats admitted privately that Israel had struck first.[16]

During the early part of the morning, Eban had seen the ambassadors of Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France, and (according to William Quandt) he told the U.S. ambassador that Egypt had attacked first. Eban then went to Eshkol with the draft of a letter to president Johnson, cataloguing the acts of aggression committed by Egypt and expressing the hope that the United States would do everything possible to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting and enlarging the conflict. This 'courteous but frank' hint to the United States was, in Eban's view, a 'most crucial' point. Similar messages were sent to Wilson, de Gaulle, and the leaders of other states friendly to Israel: the letter to Wilson made the point that Israel was anxious to avoid war with Jordan.[17]

Eshkol also sent a message to Kosygin explaining that Israel was repelling 'the wicked aggression that Nasser has been building up against us . . . an extraordinary catalogue of aggression that must be abhorred and condemned by opinion in all peace-loving countries — a ruthless design to destroy the State of Israel, which embodies the memories,

sacrifices and hopes of an ancient people . . .' Eshkol appealed to Kosygin to join in an effort to achieve peace based on the independence and territorial integrity of all nations. 'We claim nothing except peaceful life in our territory, and the exercise of our international rights.' This crossed with a message from Kosygin condemning Israel's 'treacherous aggression . . . a direct and open violation of the United Nations Charter . . .' The Soviet Union demanded an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces.[18]

In the House of Commons, George Brown said that Britain must not take sides. The immediate aim was to persuade the Security Council to call for a cease-fire. Richard Crossman thought that Brown's statement was 'absolutely first-rate.' Crossman, who was 'desperate and distraught', saw the Israeli ambassador, who assured him that Israel 'would not occupy the whole West Bank . . .', because Israel had no wish to have 600,000 additional Arabs inside Israel.[19]

During the Monday afternoon, the State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey, told the media that the U.S. attitude to the conflict was 'neutral in thought, word, and deed.' This greatly annoyed the president: 'I have never seen him more upset', a senior official was to say later. Johnson told Dean Rusk to clarify the situation, and later that day Rusk explained that while the United States was not a belligerent and in that sense was neutral, the president was deeply concerned and not indifferent about the outcome. 'I want to emphasize that any use of this word 'neutral', which is a great concept of international law, is not an expression of indifference . . .' This had the effect of confirming the opinion of many Arabs that the United States had encouraged Israel to go to war.[20]

Throughout the day, the delegates' area at UN Headquarters in New York was buzzing with huddling delegates. Ambassador el Kony of Egypt asked Hans Tabor, president of the Security Council, to inform the Council that Egyptian aircraft had destroyed part of the Israeli air force and that unfortunately there might have been some civilian casualties. Tabor replied that this information should be conveyed to the Council by el Kony himself. Later in the day, during a phone conversation with Gideon Rafael, Tabor expressed deep sorrow at the loss of civilian Israeli lives, and Rafael said he was touched by Tabor's concern. Rafael had been told to carry out a diplomatic holding action so as to provide time for Israel's armoured forces to reach their objectives.[21] The Arab countries of the Middle East declared war on Israel, except for Lebanon; Israeli sources report that there were sharp differences of view between Lebanese prime minister Rashid Karame, who

wanted to go to war, and the president and commander-in-chief, who favoured caution.[22] Arab petroleum ministers met in Baghdad and called on 'all Islamic and friendly oil-producing countries, in particular Iran', to prevent petroleum from reaching 'the Zionist gangs in occupied Palestine . . .' Arab oil suppliers suspended pumping or stopped the export of oil to supporters of Israel, Syria closed the pipeline across its territory, and Lebanon prevented the loading of oil which had come from Iraq and Saudi Arabia.[23]

Britain's diplomatic line, which Wilson had expressed in a message to Johnson, was that the West should not allow the Security Council to become bogged down in an endless discussion about who was the aggressor: the pressing need was for a simple call for a cease-fire. France and India were suggesting that the Security Council should call for a cease-fire, but linked to a withdrawal of forces. Mahmoud Riad claims that a draft resolution to this effect would have been approved but for U.S. 'pressure and delaying tactics'. Riad also writes that Goldberg presented a 'counter-resolution which made no reference to Israeli withdrawal . . .' Tabor, who was on reasonable personal terms with Federenko without finding him flexible, spoke with him on the phone, but there was no agreement on what the best outcome of the resumed meeting of the Security Council would be. Goldberg had been trying all day to get in touch with Federenko, but at this stage Federenko refused to meet Goldberg outside the Council chamber. It was not until 5 p.m. that Federenko 'emerged from his hide-out full of pent-up energy.' The Soviet stance at this stage was that Israel had committed aggression. Israeli leaders were saying that they were fighting for the existence of the Israeli state, but the one thing which would undermine the very existence of Israel, in the Soviet view, was the course of recklessness and adventurism chosen by the Israeli rulers. The task for the United Nations was to condemn Israel's aggression.[24]

Thant issued a report on the efforts of UN representatives to arrange cease-fires. He told the Council that Israeli forces had occupied the UN enclave containing Government House in Jerusalem and that UN observers had been 'escorted into Israel.' Firing was continuing in and around Jerusalem, and Thant supported the idea that it should be declared an open city, a proposal which was endorsed by Italy.[25]

The Security Council eventually reconvened at 10.20 p.m. on the Monday evening, and Tabor said that informal consultations were 'still going on', so he adjourned the meeting until 11.30 a.m. the next morning. He also circulated informally a draft resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire, and a revised version of this was to be approved the following day.[26]

General Bull holds the Soviet Union 'largely responsible' for the Security Council's delay in calling for a cease-fire, but he heaps warm praise on Lord Caradon ('undoubtedly the outstanding figure in these Security Council debates') for his efforts to reconcile divergent opinions. What the Council should have done, in Bull's view, was to have called on the first day of the war for a cease-fire at a specified time and have appointed UN observers to supervise the cessation of fighting. Lall mentions three reasons for the Council's relative failure: first, the fact that the parties themselves lacked interest in the operations of the Council; second, the 'strong penchant' of the super-powers for 'large dramatic steps'; and, third, the failure of the ten non-permanent members to press for vigorous action. Ambassador Hans Tabor of Denmark stresses that when the parties disagree and the major powers promote divergent remedies, the medium and smaller states can have only limited influence: '. . . the world in 1967 was not ripe to leave decisions on matters of life and death to an international organization . . .'[27]

In Israel, Eshkold told the Knesset that Israeli forces had gone out to repulse Arab aggression, but he said that Israel had no territorial claims. In an order of the day, Dayan stated that Israel had 'no aims of conquest.' Israel's only purpose was to resist 'the attempts of the Arab armies to conquer our land,' and to 'break the ring of blockade and aggression.' Dayan made no secret of the fact that, while the Egyptian blockade of Aqaba was the opening move of the war, 'the first shot in the literal sense' was fired by Israel, 'and fired well . . .'[28]

Some Arab military help reached the three front-line belligerents. The Iraqi air force made a number of strikes against Israel on the first three days of the war, some Iraqi land formations entered Jordan and were engaged, and some Algerian units reached Egypt. Under the military agreement between Jordan and Egypt, Jordanian forces were under the command of general Abdul Munim Riad of Egypt, which caused some resentment in Jordanian military circles. Saudi forces began moving towards Jordan and Libyan forces towards Egypt. Republican Yemen, Morocco, and Tunisia announced demonstrative or precautionay military moves. All this was to little avail, however: during the first days of the war, Israel captured the demilitarized Government House area of Jerusalem as well as Khan Yunis, Rafah, and El Arish in the Gaza area.[29]

It is not easy to be sure how soon Nasser realized the extent of the military disaster which had befallen Egypt. Mohamed Heikal reports that when Nasser visited military headquarters, 'the facts were hidden from him.' Earlier in the day, Nasser had phoned King Hussein

to tell him that Israel had bombed Egyptian bases. 'We answered by bombing hers', Nasser had said, 'We are launching a general offensive in the Negev.' Egypt's aim, Nasser had said, was to occupy as much of Israel as possible before the UN Security Council should call for a cease-fire. Mahmoud Riad writes that eventually Nasser phoned to tell him that 'all Egyptian military airfields had been hit and [the Egyptian] air force had been paralysed.' At the same time, reports Riad, the military command was broadcasting communiqués claiming that dozens of enemy aircraft had been shot down. Eric Rouleau quotes Nasser as saying that not a single general had the courage to tell him the truth. 'While I passed the [Monday] studying maps to see how we could fall back on defensive positions . . . I did not know that my Air Force had practically ceased to exist.' Eventually, at 4.00 in the afternoon, someone told Nasser, 'We have no planes any more.' When the truth could no longer be hidden, Nasser was told that 'the Israelis could not have done it all on their own and the Americans must have helped . . .' A U.S. newspaper quoted president Johnson as saying to his wife, 'We have a war on our hands' The use of the words *we* and *our* convinced Nasser that there had been U.S. collusion. Indeed, Heikal reports that Nasser was told by 'men he trusted' that 'two planes with American markings, apparently coming from bases in Saudi Arabia, flew over the Suez Canal.'[30]

On the first day of the war, UNEF camps in the Gaza Strip were hit by Israeli artillery and a UNEF convoy near Khan Yunis was strafed by an Israeli aircraft.[31] During the night of 5/6 June, there was an unfortunate incident involving the UN Force. General Rikhye had ordered that UNEF buildings in Gaza should remain lit, in the hope that UN installations would be immune from deliberate attack. The Egyptians complained that this was helping the Israelis, and Rikhye agreed to rescind the order if Egypt would do what it could to safeguard the lives of UNEF personnel.[32]

Tuesday

By the Tuesday morning, Nasser had at last realized the extent of the military calamity which had overtaken the Arabs. Field marshal Amer, who had broken down during the Suez war ten years previously, was in a state of 'almost total collapse.' Early on the Tursday, Nasser phoned foreign minister Riad to say again that the Egyptian air force was 'totally paralysed'. Nasser was by now certain that the United States had colluded with Israel and had decided to sever diplomatic

relations with Washington. Riad argued that this would not help Egypt, but to no avail. (Egypt had cut relations with Britain in 1965 over the Rhodesian issue.) Syria, Algeria, Sudan, the Yemen Republic, and Iraq also broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, and Egypt announced that because Britain and the United States were intervening on behalf of Israel, navigation through the Suez Canal was being suspended.[33]

Nasser phoned King Hussein on the Tuesday morning, and Israel was able to obtain a transcript of the conversation. According to this transcript, Nasser suggested that they should announce that the United States and Britain were collaborating with Israel by attacking the Arabs with carrier-borne aircraft. Hussein agreed, because at the time he believed it to be true. The previous morning, the Jordanian air force radar had picked up some unidentified planes over the Mediterranean. 'Of course,' said Hussein later, 'radar can't tell a plane's nationality', but from the silhouettes the aircraft seemed to be Hawker Hunters, which Israel did not have. (They were probably French-made Mirage or Mystère fighters.) Nasser told Hussein that Egyptian planes had been bombing Israeli bases since early morning: 'Our confusion was increased [Hussein was to say] by the fact that Egyptian information on the number of Israeli planes already destroyed made it difficult to believe there were so many enemy planes still able to fly.' It was not until the Tuesday evening that Hussein learned that the Egyptian air force had been almost totally destroyed and that the situation on the ground was desperate. The intensity of the Israeli attack had convinced the Egyptian High Command that the United States and Britain were aiding Israel. Britain and the United States denied the Arab allegation, but Hussein was at first unconvinced. Thus was born the 'big lie', as Harold Wilson has called it. Once Hussein found out the truth, the Anglo-American denial was immediately broadcast over Radio Amman.[34] Nasser eventually became convinced that Britain did not given direct military help to Israel, but he remained dubious about the U.S. role and distrustful of France because he had heard from foreign intelligence sources that Israeli civilian planes were landing at Toulouse every hour to collect French military supplies.[35]

Wilson had by now received from Kosygin a cable which was notable because it contained no insults or recriminations, urging Britain to work for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. Wilson did not reply until after the cabinet had met for what Richard Crossman called ' desultory discussion' on the Middle East. George Brown's line (according to Crossman) was that, whatever anyone's personal sympathies, 'Britain must

remain neutral and be seen to be making peace between the two sides', otherwise the supply of oil would dry up and sterling balances would be withdrawn. The 'unwise' talk the previous week of sending warships through the Strait of Tiran had 'entirely disappeared.' Lyndon Johnson, according to Crossman, was 'not in the least inclined to do anything positive to help Israel.' The United States had stopped the supply of arms to both sides, and Britain also suspended arms shipments for a short period.[36]

In the light of the cabinet discussions, Wilson replied to Kosygin that Caradon was trying to reach agreement with Federenko and Goldberg at the United Nations on 'an expanded draft resolution' calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, 'without prejudice to the responsibilities, rights, claims or positions of others.' Kosygin responded by urging that the Security Council should 'use its powers' to ensure that its own decisions were respected.[37]

Kosygin had sent a similar message to Lyndon Johnson over the Hot Line. Johnson replied that a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces must not be allowed to jeopardize Israel's rights, and he specifically denied the Arab charges of direct Anglo-American military involvement. 'I told him [wrote Johnson] that since his intelligence knew where our carriers and planes were, I hoped he would emphasiz the facts to Cairo.'[38]

During the course of Tuesday, the second day of the war, the Arabs had suffered further military reverses. King Hussein cabled Nasser that Jordan was fighting without air cover and was losing one tank every ten minutes. Jordanian forces would fight 'gallantly and honourably . . . to their last breath', but Hussein feared 'an overwhelming calamity.' By the end of Tuesday, the Gaza Strip was now in Israeli hands, and general Arik Sharon's division had taken Abu Aweigila in Sinai. Israel had also capured the demilitarized zone on Mount Scopus and other northern suburbs of Jerusalem, as well as Jenin, Qalqiliya, and the road from Latrun to Ramallah. Mahmoud Riad believes that 10,000 Egyptian soldiers lost their lives on the Tuesday.[39]

There was now a certain amount of tension between Israeli officers and the UN Emergency Force, especially when a UNEF colonel of the Sikh regiment received from an Israeli officer a note reading, 'It is a warning that if I know about Egyptian or Palestinian soldiers hiding in Indian camp under protection of United Nations flag, I, as Commanding Officer of Israeli troops in the street will: *Blow Up Your Camp.*' The truth was that after the Indian UNEF contingent had suffered casualties as a result of earlier Israeli strafing near Rafah, some Indian soldiers

had taken shelter in abandoned Egyptian trenches. When Israeli troops captured the trenches and found UNEF soldiers carrying personal weapons, they assumed they had been fighting along with the Egyptians. This incorrect report was embroidered as it was passed on, and was to cause much ill will.[40]

Eban was torn between his wish to stay in Jerusalem in order to combat any fresh attempts to oust him from the cabinet, and his feeling that he ought to be in New York to resist any Security Council decision which would call for a withdrawal of Israeli forces. Goldberg and Federenko were trying to draft a compromise resolution, and Gideon Rafael sent Goldberg a private note: 'I appeal to you not to agree to any withdrawal clause . . . before belligerence including Tiran blockade is terminated. Nasser should never again reap a political victory from a military defeat.'[41] There is a phrase in Spanish that victory confers no rights (*La victoria no da derechos*), to which Israeli diplomats in New York added, 'and defeat confers no privileges.'[42]

Eban knew that it was normal UN practice to link a cease-fire to a withdrawal of forces. 'A special effort of imagination and intellectual resourcefulness would be needed if these two concepts were to be separated.' Eban saw his task as being to ensure that a call for an end to the fighting was not accompanied by 'any automatic restoration of the territorial status quo.' When he reached the airport in New York, he immediately phoned Goldberg and gave him 'an intense lecture about the irreparable damage' which would be inflicted on post-war peace efforts if the armistice régime should be re-affirmed. Goldberg, writes Rafael, listened to Eban with 'inexhaustible patience and unmatched courtesy'. Rafael later went to the U.S. offices and was relieved to find that the draft resolution avoided all mention of withdrawal or the armistice régime.[43]

The Security Council did not convene until 6.30 p.m. on the Tuesday, the delay (according to Lall) being that the members of the Council considered that no useful purpose would be served by an earlier meeting. The fact that the Council is not meeting in public does not necessariliy mean that the Council is inactive. Indeed, the Council has increasingly met privately and informally in a room near the Council chamber in order to search for agreement before meeting in public. On 6 June, the Council had spent 'long hours of consultation in the President's room',[44] and before debate could take place, Hans Tabor, in his capacity as president, presented to the Council the fruits of informal consultations which had 'resulted in unanimous agreement' in the form of a draft resolution calling, 'as a first step', for an immediate

cease-fire and cessation of all military activities in the Middle East, and asking the Secretary-General to keep the Council 'promptly and currently informed . . .' Although the proposal was submitted by the president, an Arab speaker claimed in the debate that it had been sponsored by 'the four great Powers'. The draft resolution was approved unanimously (see Appendix 3).[45] This was only the second occasion since the Security Council had begun work in 1946 that a text was negotiated in private consultations, introduced the president, and approved unanimously.[46]

The decision of the Security Council was followed by the customary debate. Eban, hot-foot from Jerusalem, again asserted that Egypt had started the fighting and that Israel was acting in self-defence: Israel welcomed the cease-fire appeal. Eban was pleased at the warm reception accorded to his speech and reflected on the 'fantastic contrast' between the criticism to which he was being subjected at home and the adulation he was encountering in New York.[47]

The Arabs condemned the resolution as 'a complete surrender to Israel.' What was needed was 'to condemn the aggressor [and] apply the sanctions provided for by the Charter.' Syria accused Britain and the United States of active military involvement in support of Israel. Mali, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union condemned Israeli aggression, and the Soviet Union called for 'the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the aggressor's troops . . .'[49] The United States took the line that the most urgent need was for a cease-fire, and the other Western members of the Council said the adoption of a resolution had been only a first step. Both Britain and the United States denied any military involvement, and Britain proposed 'an immediate impartial investigation' of the charges.[50]

At 8 p.m. on the Tuesday evening, just after the Security Council had adopted the cease-fire resolution, president Johnson made a brief statement on television welcoming the Council's decision and expressing the hope that the parties would 'promptly act upon it.'[51]

Wednesday

During the course of Wednesday, the third day of the war, Israel made further gains in Sinai and on the West Bank. Qusayma (Sinai) and Sharm el Sheikh (close to the Gulf of Aqaba) were captured. The Egyptian army disintegrated, leaving many thousands to die. 'It was a sight that even the victors did not savour', wrote Yitzhak Rabin: 'ragged, barefoot and terrorized, the troops left their shattered illusions behind

and fled . . . I issued explicit orders against opening fire on Egyptian soldiers who surrendered themselves. Of those who fell into our hands only the officers were to be kept in detention; the rest would be allowed to cross the Canal and return home.' The Egyptian officers had not led well. 'I think the Egyptian soldiers are very good', said general Arik Sharon, 'but their officers are shit.' General Rikhye has written that the military capability of the Arabs was found to be a myth.[52]

On the West Bank of the Jordan, Israeli forces took the remaining part of the Old City of Jerusalem as well as Bethlehem, Jericho, Nablus (the Biblical Shechem), and Hebron. The Israelis had not expected that Jordan would take part in the war, so the capture of the West Bank was an unexpected gain. Generals Dayan and Rabin went into the Old City of Jerusalem and visited the Western Wall, a place of special holiness to the Jewish people, and the chief military chaplain blew the traditional ram's horn.[53]

On the Wednesday, Nasser cabled King Hussein to tell him that Israel had attacked 'with planes in far greater numbers than allowed for by our estimate . . .' Egyptian forces were still engaged in heavy fighting, but the Egyptian military command had established 'beyond all doubt' that Britain and the United States were colluding with Israel. The truth was that Egypt was no longer in a position to continue fighting, and Jordan had by now already accepted the call of the Security Council for a cease-fire. Egypt still hoped that it would be possible to link a cease-fire to a withdrawal of forces, and during the course of the Wednesday, Riad contacted the countries which were represented on the Security Council and said that a call for cessation of hostilities 'must, of necessity, order . . . a withdrawal to the armistice lines . . .' That evening, Egypt received a message from the Soviet Communist Party urging Egypt to accept a cease-fire. Having failed to persuade Egypt on a state-to-state basis through ordinary diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union was now communicating with Nasser on a party-to-party level. In a voice choking with grief and bitterness, Nasser phoned Riad to say that the collapse of the armed forces had been 'total, far beyond anything he had imagined . . .'[54]

The Soviet government helped the Arabs by issuing a tough statement demanding that Israel should abandon its 'aggressive and adventurist policy', otherwise the Soviet Union would 'reconsider' its relations with Israel and take a decision about the continuation of diplomatic relations.[55]

President de Gaulle had been in touch with Kosygin about the best way of attaining a cease-fire and repeating his plea for four-power

talks. France was applying an arms embargo to the region. Foreign minister Couve de Murville told the Chamber of Deputies that the task of external powers must be to work together for long-term agreement rather than an imposed solution. France would be proud to play its part in bringing about that agreement.[56]

Two short meetings of the Security Council were held on Wednesday at the request of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Federenko repeated his condemnation of Israeli aggression and introduced a draft resolution which, in its operative parts, was similar to the one approved the previous day, except that the cease-fire call was now a demand. This draft should, he said, be put to the vote at once. In spite of Riad's efforts to persuade Egypt's friends not to call for a cease-fire without also calling for a withdrawal of forces by Israel, the Soviet draft contained no demand for Israeli withdrawal, though it did contain a specific time-limit for compliance.[57]

These two meetings of the Security Council were 'the bitterest and most acrimonious' in U Thant's memory, and Federenko used 'the kind of intemperate language . . . seldom heard in the Council chamber.' Be that as it may, the Soviet draft was approved unanimously shortly after the lunch break (see Appendix 4). During the course of the first meeting, U Thant announced that Jordan had accepted the cease-fire, and shortly afterwards Israel also agreed to a cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity. The weakness of the Council's decision was that it contained no provisions to ensure that the decision was respected, though Canada proposed (unsuccessfully) that the Secretary-General should take measures to bring about 'full and effective compliance'. As the Council had failed to call for withdrawal by Israel, Egypt now asked that Israel should be condemned. Ambassador el Kony took the opportunity of complaining to the Council of the 'intimidation and unjust treatment' to which he had been subjected in New York City.[58]

Thursday

During Thursday, the fourth day of the war, Israel completed the occupation of the West Bank. Kuntilla, Thamad, and Nakhl in Sinai were also captured. But Israel made one serious blunder that day by attacking a U.S. intelligence-gathering ship, the U.S.S. *Liberty* (classification AGTR-5), leaving 34 dead – 'including a number of American Jews', adds Yitzhak Rabin. Most U.S. ships were taking care to stay well away from the area of conflict, but the Israeli air force had standing orders to attack any unidentified vessel approaching or near the coast.

When Israeli Mirages attacked the *Liberty* about 13½ miles from the coast, they thought it was a Soviet ship or perhaps an Egyptian supply vessel. The Israeli air force notified the Israeli navy that the ship had been hit, 'and one of our ships finished the task [wrote Rabin]by firing off torpedoes . . .'[59] A Soviet destroyer offered its assistance to the stricken vessel, but there was some harassment of the U.S. Sixth Fleet by Soviet warships, which American officers thought was deliberately provocative.[60]

When news of the attack on the *Liberty* reached the Pentagon, Robert McNamara's first thought was that it was a Soviet attack, but U.S. officers on the scene knew that responsibility lay with Israeli pilots, who were doubtless 'tense, eager, and a little trigger happy.' When the identity of the attackers was confirmed Johnsons informed Moscow by Hot Line, so that the Soviet Union should not interpret the movement of U.S. carrier-borne aircraft as a hostile move, and Kosygin was asked to inform 'the proper parties.' That evening, Soviet ambassador Pozhidaev in Cairo asked for an urgent meeting with Riad and read to him the full text of Johnson's message to Kosygin. The U.S. ambassador in Moscow later reported that this use of the Hot Line had impressed the Russians: it was precisely this sort of purpose for which the system had been installed. But in spite of the U.S. message which had reached Cairo through the Soviet Union, Nasser regarded the presence of the U.S.S. *Liberty* in the Eastern Mediterranian as further evidence of direct U.S. involvement on Israel's behalf. In a speech after the war, Nasser claimed that information gathered by the *Liberty* was transmitted to Israel. Israel offered 'abject apologies' to the U.S. naval attaché in Tel Aviv, but later denied U.S. allegations that the *Liberty* had been identified as a U.S. ship 'approximately one hour before the attack' and that the incident was 'an act of military recklessness reflecting wanton disregard for human life.' Israel paid $3.5 million to the United States as compensation for the loss of life. Eban, commenting on the incident, writes that those who take risks must sometimes incur tragic sacrifice.[61]

One possible explanation of the attack was that Israel believed that El Arish was being shelled. Another explanation offered by W.C. Eveland, a former CIA officer, was that the attack was ordered by general Dayan in order to destroy the 'incriminating evidence' of doctored Israeli radio messages which the United States had intercepted, designed to encourage Jordan and Syria to enter the war. Eveland claims that Israel had never intended to limit the war to Egypt.[62] James M. Ennes Jr., who was a deck officer on the *Liberty* at the time, also believes

that the attack was deliberate, but that the purpose was to prevent the interception of radio messages relating to the imminent Israeli offensive against Syria on the Golan Heights. He claims that vital deck logs were subsequently re-written in order to conceal Israeli culpability. He also reports muddle on the part of the United States, including the fact that binoculars on the *Liberty* had been withdrawn from look-outs and that urgent messages from the Pentagon to the *Liberty* about its positioning were misrouted, one being sent to the Philippines, one to Greece, and one being lost in Germany, so that not a single message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached the *Liberty* when the attack took place   'one of the most incredible failures of communication in the history of the Department of Defense.'[63]

The *Liberty* incident did not interrupt UN diplomacy in New York. Eban 'thought it wise' to keep in close touch with Arthur Goldberg. The United States had been developing a new text for the Security Council, looking beyond a possibly fragile cease-fire to a stable peace. Eban argued passionately against any reference to the armistice régime: 'The only thing that had never been tried was peace', not merely the interruption of hostilities, but real and permanent peace.[64]

The Security Council met twice on the Thursday at the request of the United States and a subsequent Soviet request. Both the United States and the Soviet Union submitted draft resolutions. The U.S. draft would have called on the parties to comply with the Council's cease-fire resolutions and to initiate dicussions 'using such third-party or United Nations assistance as they may wish', looking toward 'viable arrangements' for 'the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel,' the renunciation of force, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace. Lall considers this proposal to have been too sweeping and far-reaching, and also defective because it did not indicate the extent of Israeli withdrawal. In Lall's view it would have been wiser simply to have called for negotiations without specifying processes and methods.[65] The Soviet draft resolution would have condemned Israeli aggression and demanded that Israel withdraw. Federenko said that the Security Council must not allow Israel to enjoy the fruits of its criminal aggression. He referred to a U.S. radio network which had quoted an Israeli diplomat as admitting that 'Israel was the first to engage in military operations', and he said that Israel's crime would not go unpunished.[66] Lall considers that the Soviet draft was 'too drastic'. Secretary-General Thant reported that Egypt had now agreed to a cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity.[67]

Eban denied that Israel was defying the United Nations: the defiance of peace-loving principles had arisen from Egypt's 'sudden, brutal, sustained concentration of hostility . . .' Rafael denied the allegation that Israel had started the war: 'legal proceedings have been instituted against those who have published this false statement.'[68] Caradon was of the opinion that the Council was much too slow in acting. What was now needed was not another decision in New York, but action in the Middle East.[69] Lall comments that Caradon's 'highly constructive and reasonable remarks' were, in effect, 'a dissociation from the . . .wide-ranging texts . . . [of] the super powers . . .'[70] The Council adjourned without voting on any of the proposals , but it had not gone unnoticed that Israel had announced that it would not give up the Old City and the rest of East Jerusalem.'[71]

Crossman noted in his diary that pro-Israeli feeling in Britain was 'overwhelming' and that there was 'a great sense of triumph and victory'.

> No-one worried about the Israeli pre-emptive strike being an act of aggression. Their army has brought off the biggest military victory in our lifetime . . .[73]

Friday

Eban was now being urged by family and friends to return to Israel, and he set off for home on the Thursday evening, to find Israeli leaders in a state of hesitation about whether or not to attack Syrian forces on the Golan Heights. Eshkol explained to Eban that general Dayan was being extremely cautious, partly to avoid over-extending Israeli forces and partly so as not to provoke the Soviet Union into active military intervention. Eventually Dayan agreed to assault the Golan Hights – though without consulting the prime minister or the chief of staff. Once Dayan had decided to act, reports Eban, he 'went over to a character-istically vigorous prosecution of the plan.' The attack was launched just before mid-day on the Friday.[73]

The first meeting of the Security Council on the Friday was called at the request of Syria and began just before lunch (New York time, early evening in the Middle East). Syria had informed U Thant of its acceptance of the cease-fire some five hours *before* the Israeli attack was launched, and Rafael was informed of this by a UN official at 1.05 a.m.[74] At 5.30 a.m., Rafael informed the president of the Security Council that Syria was continuing to shell Israeli territory.[75] Half an hour later, Syria requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council.

Thant received three further communications from the Syrian foreign minister (at 7.14, 8.21, and 10.32 a.m.) alleging that Israel was disregarding the cease-fire, and the Syrian ambassador repeated these charges when the Council finally met.[76] Just before the Council convened, Thant had received a message from general Bull to the effect that military operations were continuing and that Damascus was 'having an air raid.'[77] Rafael told the Council that Syria was continuing military operations: Syria's acceptance of the cease-fire was merely 'camouflage'. Israel was willing to cease military operations, but only on the basis of reciprocity.[78]

A draft resolution with no named sponsor was introduced by the president and adopted unanimously. This confirmed previous resolutions and demanded that hostilities should cease forthwith (see Appendix 5).[79] Before the end of the meeting, both Israel and Syria had confirmed their acceptance.[80]

The Council adjourned at 4.30 p.m. and reconvened at 7.15 p.m. in an unpleasant and tense atmosphere, with frequent interruptions, dubious points of order, and abusive shouts from the public galleries.[81] Federenko complained that the meeting was nearly an hour late in starting and that he had been given no information as to the reasons for the delay. The president of the Council explained that one member of the Council, the United States, had wished for time to communicate with president Johnson in Washington, which led Federenko to comment that the president of the Council should be at the disposal of *all* Council members and should not accord special consideration to the wishes of the United States.[82] Thant said he had communicated the Council's decision of that afternoon to the parties, and Syria and Israel had confirmed that they would abide by it, though Syria complained of continued Israeli violations.[83] El Kony confimed Egypt's acceptance of the cease-fire. Rafael writes that el Kony's statement was made 'with tears in his eyes', and Eban (who was not present) has written of the 'air of humiliation' on el Kony's face as he announced that Egypt had accepted the cease-fire, adding that he retired to a small lounge behind the Security Council chamber where he was 'unashamedly dissolved in tears.'[84]

It was not altogether surprising that el Kony was upset, because just as the previous meeting of the Security Council was assembling, news was coming through that president Nasser had resigned, along with field marshal Amer. Nasser said he was willing to take personal responsibility for the débâcle because, in the final analysis, he was constitutionally responsible. 'I have decided to retire from all official positions and all

political roles and to return to the ranks of the people . . .' In accordance with the constitution, said Nasser, he was entrusting the presidency to his 'friend and colleague', vice president Zacharia Mohieddin. He was not 'liquidating the Revolution', but revolution could not be the monopoly of one generation only. The National Assembly met and voted not to accept Nasser's resignation, which was withdrawn the next day.[85]

Egypt and Syria had told the Security Council that Israel was not observing the cease-fire and that Israeli forces had advanced to 'the doors and the entrance to Damascus'.[86] Israel, in reply, said that the violations were coming from the Arab side.[87] Goldberg regretted the slowness of the Council in taking decisions.[88] Caradon hoped that the guns would soon be silent, so that the Security Council might follow suit, which inspired Federenko to add sourly that he would be silent 'only when the guns of the Israeli aggressor fall silent.'[89] Arthur Lall notes that some of the Communist diplomats 'started to hint privately that volunteers from certain states might, after all, go to the assistance of the Arab states.'[90] The Council decided to ask the parties to cooperate with the UN observers and restore the use of Government House in Jerusalem to the UN truce obervers (see Appendix 6).[91] Caradon commented on the unaccustomed unity of three permanent members: 'The idea came from the representative of the Soviet Union, the enthusiasm from the representative of the United Kingdom and the precision from the representative of France' – at which Federenko commented that someone of his proletarian origin could not match the ready wit of a British lord, 'even a socialist one.'[82] Rafael considered that Federenko's verbal barrage was 'unsurpassed in vehemence by anything heard before', and Sir Leslie Glass has commented that Federenko was 'a slick operator and opportunist . . . not a constructive diplomat.'[93]

When the meeting was over, UN under secretary Aleksei Nesterenko called the Israeli and Syrian ambassadors into a room and gave each of them a copy of the latest cease-fire resolution and asked for an immediate reply. Rafael replied stiffly that when a reply was received from Israel, it would be given to the president of the Council. 'So far it has been the practice that governments instruct their ambassadors and not the Secretariat of the United Nations . . .'[94]

Saturday

The Security Council had adjourned at 10.50 p.m. on the Friday night, but three hours later the president received a request from Syria for

another emergency meeting because, in spite of the fact that all the parties had agreed to abide by the Council's cease-fire calls, Israeli forces had occupied Quneitra, on the Golan Heights, and were heading towards Damascus.[95]   When the Council convened at 4 a.m., Thant reported on the messages he had received from general Bull, the last one reporting that Damascus had been attacked from the air, but also reporting Israeli assurances that Quneitra had not been occupied and that Israeli forces were not on the road to Damascus. Lall has noted the 'immense value' of the information from UN observers, a tangible contribution to the cause of peace.[96]

Israel denied Syrian allegations and maintained that cease-fire violations were being committed by Syria, and U Thant reported that Israel had asked that UN observers should be sent to the area to see for themselves.[97] Bulgaria thought that Israel's purpose was to promote a *coup d'état* in Syria.[98] Federenko complained that 'Israel's pirate gangs' were conducting an air raid against Damascus. Thant considered that Federenko's 'vituperative attacks' and 'calculated taunts' directed against Goldberg on this occasion did not befit the Security Council chamber.[99]

The Council meeting was suspended for half an hour at 6 a.m. and then adjourned at 7 a.m.[100]

An hour and ten minutes later (8.10 a.m. in New York, 2.10 p.m. in Israel) the Council reconvened: not surprisingly, tempers were short. Secretary-General Thant confirmed that Israeli air attacks against Damascus had taken place.[101] Israel denied that Quneitra had been occupied and claimed that Israeli aircraft over Syria were simply engaged in 'protective measures'.[102]

Caradon maintained that the over-riding need was to stop the fighting 'and stop it at once.'[103] Ethiopia asked that the parties should respect international humanitarian law.[104] Bulgaria urged the Council to condemn Israel for 'the treacherous attack' on Syria.[105] Federenko announced that the Soviet Union had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel, and he warned that the Soviet Union 'with other peace-loving States' might have to apply sanctions. After a meeting of East European representatives in Moscow held at the suggestion of president Tito, all Warsaw Pact countries and Yugoslavia broke relations with Israel, except the German Democratic Republic (which had no diplomatic relations with Israel) and Romania (which desired foster the peace process, which would hardly have been possible if relations with Israel had been severed).[106]

At about the same time as Federenko was speaking in New York, Soviet ambassador Chuvakhin 'stormed' into Eban's office in Tel Aviv to repeat the warning which Federenko was giving in the Security Council. Eban was surprised and embarrassed as Chuvakhin, his eyes full of tears, announced the severing of diplomatic relations. Eban replied that as relations between the Soviet Union and Israel were bad, 'we ought to strengthen and reinforce our embassies,' to which Chuvakhin responded: 'What Your Excellency is saying is very logical. But I have not come here to be logical. I have come here to tell you that we are breaking relations.'[107]

Shortly after the Security Council had convened, general Bull and general Dayan met in Tel Aviv. Dayan had contacted Bull at 1 p.m. (Israeli time) and asked him to visit his office in Tel Aviv at 2 p.m. Dayan had been inspecting the Golan front and was about 30 minutes late, so that by the time they met the Security Council meeting had already started. 'My meeting with Dayan . . . was undramatic', writes Bull: 'Since Israel had achieved all their war aims against Syria, he agreed to my proposal, including time for a cease-fire, which generally held.' It was agreed that the cease-fire should take effect at 4.30 p.m. GMT (6.30 p.m. in Israel, 7.30 in Syria, 12.30 in New York). While Bull and Dayan were talking, Israel completed the capture of Quneitra. Rafael was able to tell the Security Council of the agreement at about 10.30 a.m. (New York time), and Secretary-General Thant confirmed this before the Security Council adjourned.[108]

The Syrian ambassador told the Security Council that when Goldberg had been speaking, he was at a loss to understand whether he spoke for the United States or for Israel, and he again alleged that the United States was helping Israel. Goldberg's knuckles were white as he gripped hard to hide how deeply he had been pained. Hurt and angry, he denied the charges.[109] The Soviet Union described the United States as 'a direct accomplice encouraging the aggressor.'[110] The Council adjourned at 11.15 a.m., again without taking a decision.

The United States believed that the Golan operation had been unnecessary, and Dean Rusk got in touch with Eban 'in near panic' to insist that Israel should comply with the Security Council's cease-fire calls forthwith. During the course of the second Security Council meeting on the Saturday, Goldberg asked Rafael to join him in the delegates' lounge and, on specific and urgent instructions from president Johnson, urged Israel to announce that it was ending military operations. Rafael reports Goldberg as saying that the United States government did not want the war to end as the result of a Soviet ultimatum . . .'[111]

There were good reasons for U.S. caution at this stage for Moscow had that day sent a stronger note to Israel than at any other time during the crisis, threatening 'to adopt sanctions against Israel . . .'[112] Kosygin informed Johnson of this over the Hot Line while the Security Council was holding its second meeting. Kosygin said that Israel's defiance of the United Nations might lead to a grave catastrophe. At such a very crucial moment, the Soviet Union might have to take independent action, 'including military.' Johnson double-checked the translation and was told that the Russian text had used the words 'including military'. Johnson wanted to be sure that Kosygin understood that the United States was also willing to take military risks: the Sixth Fleet was under orders not to approach nearer than one hundred miles off the Syrian coast, so Johnson cut the restriction to fifty miles. A White House official was later to recall: '. . . we made it clear over the hot line that we were not going to look in a relaxed fashion at their intervention. We moved the Sixth Fleet towards the Eastern Mediterranean to make this clear to the Soviets.' This move was indeed soon noticed by Soviet surveillance ships, and Johnson found that messages from Kosygin later that morning were 'more temperate.'[113]

The Security Council met late that evening, for the third time in twenty-four hours, at the urgent request of the Soviet Union.[114] The meeting was punctuated by a great many points of order, some authentic, others bogus, and there was a recess of one and three quarter hours at 11 p.m.[115] Thant confimed that Damascus had been bombed and Quneitra occupied by Israeli forces: military activity was continuing.[116] Israel 'categorically and repeatedly' denied that its aircraft had attacked Damascus and claimed that the occupation of Quneitra had taken place *before* the new cease-fire had entered into force. Israeli forces were 'adhering scrupulously to and maintaining fully the cease-fire arrangement.'[117] Federenko said that the Security Council must compel the high-handed aggressors to respect the Council.[118] Goldberg took strong exception to the Syrian hint that he represented Israel. 'I will not accept from anybody the concept that . . . I speak from any other basis than the interests of the United States of America . . . Any imputation to the contrary I will not tolerate . . .' He introduced a draft resolution demanding scrupulous respect for the Council's cease-fire appeals.[119] The Council adjourned at 2.40 a.m. on the Sunday morning, again without taking a decision but 'with a deep sense of relief and in a state of complete exhaustion.'[120]

During Saturday, the sixth day of the war, Egypt announced that Israeli air attacks the previous day had resulted in the blocking of the

Suez Canal, though U.S. sources reported that Egyptian ships had been loaded with cement and deliberately sunk.[121]   Field marshall Amer had resigned with Nasser, and during the Saturday, it was announced that Shamseddin Badran, the minister of war, had also resigned. Badran was arrested on 25 August, and Amer was placed under house detention and later committed suicide. Both men were said to be in contact with secret anti-Nasser groups in the armed forces.[122]

Some legacies of the June War

Each war which Israel has fought against the Arabs was to be the last; and it is true that the Arabs can fight, and lose, and live to fight again another day, whereas a total defeat of Israel might mean the end of the Jewish state. Golda Meir hoped that the 1967 victory was so complete that Israelis would never have to fight again.[123] As in 1956, Israel achieved its two main objectives, the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and the elimination of the military threat from Sinai; but the continued retention of Arab territory has meant that it was not to be the last Arab-Israeli war. The area newly occupied by Israel in Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank of the Jordan, and the Golan Heights, was three times the size of Israel proper, and Yitzhak Rabin commented that 'a million hostile Arabs' would now be living under Israeli rule.[124] Lyndon Johnson noted that it is easier to launch a war than to make peace, and Henry Kissinger has commented that it is easy to get into wars but much harder to get out of them:[125] so it has proved in the Middle East.

James Cameron has written that the war of June 1967 was 'a truly tragic absurdity . . . the most stupid, meaningless, . . . and indeed pre-ventable war of all time.' Any war can be avoided, of course, if the one side decides not to strike or if the other side decides to surrender without fighting. But in the situation as it was in the Middle East, the slide to war seemed inescapable from the middle of May. General Odd Bull believes that the war could have been postponed − for example, by a bold Hammarskjold-like initiative − but could not have been avoided.[126]

Professor Fred Khouri believes that the responsible leaders on both sides 'neither wanted nor planned for war.' Certainly one can see fateful steps by the main parties which in retrospect seem imprudent or which had unforeseen consequences; the friends of the parties dithered at critical moments or failed to pursue consistent and single-minded poli-cies; U Thant could have gained time by delaying the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force, and the Security Council dallied for three weeks before the outbreak of war, and often during the fighting.[127]

Eugene Rostow believes that the blame for the war should be ascribed to 'Soviet and Egyptian miscalculation': the Soviet Union 'wanted the fruits of victory without war.' Abba Eban finds it difficult to recall an instance in the modern age in which a major power played so prominent a role in fomenting conflict between regional adversaries.[128] My own view is much closer to Ilana Kass's assessment, that the Soviet Union viewed the escalating crisis with 'cool aloofness and virtually fatalistic resignation'. The authors of an important study of Soviet diplomacy believe that, of all the participants, Moscow's behaviour was 'the most restrained, conservative, and cautious . . . generally circumspect . . .'[129]

Both Israel and the Arabs turned to their friends for diplomatic and even military help. Anwar Sadat believed that Lyndon Johnson had worked for Israel and had 'urged the Israelis to attack Sinai'. General Bull put the matter more discreetly when he wrote that 'the Israelis turned to the United States to 'maintain the balance of power, and did not turn in vain', and Bill Quandt notes that Lyndon Johnson was careful never to accuse Israel of aggression.[130] Nasser certainly believed that the United States could have prevented the Israeli attack if its leaders had been so minded, and he found it difficult to accept that the Soviet Union would tolerate a humiliating defeat for the Arabs without direct military intervention. He was 'sad but not altogether surprised' at Soviet circumspection: he had kept in his safe a telegram from Nikita Khrushchev during the Suez crisis a decade earlier, urging Egypt to act with moderation.[131] Nasser was unquestionably 'carried away by his own impetuosity' (Sadat), 'more inclined to reaction than to action' (Nutting), and his health was not good in 1967.[132] Lall believes that Nasser had made it 'pretty clear' that he was willing to go to war: 'He had pumped himself up into a dangerous state of overconfidence.'[133] The truth seems to be that Moscow was taken by surprise by Nasser's demand for the withdrawal of UNEF and his decision to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba. Lord George Brown has always believed that the Russions did not want a military clash, and several writers note that the Kremlin thought that the Arabs were going too far. The Soviet Union promised to replenish Arab stocks of arms, but deliveries were delayed.[134]

It is not easy to be sure how many people were killed, injured, or captured during those six days. Estimates of the number of Israeli servicemen killed range between 679 and 777, and injured between 2,563 and 2,811. Nasser said that 11,500 Egyptian officers and men were killed, and Lutwak and Horowitz give the figure of 20,000 for

wounded Egyptians. The Prime Minister of Jordan estimated Jordanians killed or missing as 6,094 and injured as 762. Syria admitted 170 dead and 1,898 injured, but other sources give much higher figures. Iraq lost 10 killed and 30 wounded in air attacks.[135]

The UN Emergency Force also suffered casualties, for it was shot at from both sides. During the fighting 14 Indians and one Brazilian were killed, and twenty Indians and one Brazilian wounded.[136]

Estimates of prisoners of war can be derived from national sources and reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross for those POWs repatriated after the war, though these figures are not consistent. Israeli sources indicate that 11 Israelis were captured by Egypt, 1 by Syria, 2 by Iraq, and 1 by Lebanon, and all were repatriated after a short delay. Estimates of Egyptian POWs range from 4,300 to 5,500 and Jordanians from 425 to 463: all sources give 361 POWs for Syria. All POWs were repatriated by 1969.[137]

Further information about prisoners and other humanitarian problems was provided three months after the war under the terms of a resolution of the General Assembly, by which Secretary-General Thant was asked to report on the activities of the UN Agency for Palestine refugees 'on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure' and on help to 'other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need . . . as a result of the recent hostilities . . .' (see Appendix 9). Israel was willing to allow some newly-displaced Palestinians to return to the West Bank. On 25 August, Thant asked Israel to extend the deadline for their return. Israel blamed Jordan for the difficulties which Palestinians had encountered in returning to the West Bank but agreed to extend the deadline until 31 August. At the beginning of September, Thant issued two reports on governmental humanitarian aid, as it had been reported to him.[138]

Eban admitted that the exodus of Palestinians from the West Bank, along with the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem, had created an international climate uncongenial to Israel's cause. There were differences of opinion in Israel about occupation policy. Dayan had ordered the removal of all the barriers dividing Jerusalem, but the Ministry of the Interior and Mayor Teddy Kollek prophesied 'wholesale bloodshed'. Dayan disregarded their 'highly colored predictions'.[139]

A special report on Jerusalem was prepared for Secretary-General Thant by ambassador Ernesto A. Thalmann, a former Swiss observer at the United Nations. The Arabs had made several complaints about the situation in Jerusalem, whereas Eban was confident that substantial progress could be made towards 'appropriate expression' of 'the special

interest of the three great religions in Jerusalem.' He believed that no international or other interest would be served by the divisions and barriers of partition. All Jerusalem's residents, he said, were enjoying equal rights and opportunities.[140]

Thalmann reported in September on the legislative measures by which Israel had on 28 June extended its law, jurisdiction, and administration to East Jerusalem and the surrounding area. The following day, the East Jerusalem municipality was dissolved and the controls and barriers which had formerly separated the two parts of Jerusalem were abolished. The Israeli authorities stated unequivocally that 'israel was taking every step to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city which were not controlled by Israel before June 1967.' The process of integration was 'irreversible and not negotiable.' Some 70,000 to 75,000 Arabs lived in East Jerusalem, of whom 81% were Muslim and 17% were Christians. Ambassador Thalmann commented on the orderly appearance of the Old City. 'Arabs and Jews were mingling.' Walls and buildings in the no man's land between the two front lines were being bulldozed, and 'one could see the debris of levelled houses.' A number of shops were closed but most of the hotels had reopened. Municipal services were being restored, and the economic situation was improving. The Jewish High Rabbinical Court had been moved to East Jerusalem, and Muslim courts were functioning.[141]

Israel alleged that several synagogues had been destroyed during the Jordanian occupation and that a Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives had been desecrated. St. Anne's Church, near St. Stephen's Gate, had been damaged during the fighting, as had the Augusta Victoria Hospital and the YMCA in East Jerusalem. One gate of the El Aksa mosque had also been damaged. The Western Wall had been placed within the compentence of the Ashkenazy and Sephardic Chief Rabbis. Arabs complained to Thalmann about the desecration of Islamic Holy Places, the application of Israeli laws, the dissolution of the municipal authorities, the attempt to apply the Israeli educational system to Arab schools, economic dislocation and strangulation, and the incorporation of East Jerusalem into the Israeli state system without consulting the people. The government of Israel, on the other hand, said that it was determined to maintain freedom of access to the Holy Places of all faiths and to protect them from desecration. The Knesset had passed a law for the protection of and access to the Holy Places, and prime minister Eshkol had assured religious leaders that the internal administration of Holy Places would be in the hands of the different religious communities. Most of the Christian churches were adopting

a policy of 'wait and see' about Jerusalem, but the Roman Catholic Church still favoured an international régime, as it had in 1947–9. The World Council of Churches expressed appreciation for the way the Holy Places were being cared for. A number of religious representatives raised with Thalmann the importance of maintaining links with Arab countries, the exchange and replacement of clergy, and the movement of pilgrims. Kollek considered Thalmann's report 'fairly favorable'.[142]

Dayan, as Israeli minister of defence, had wanted to make the military occupation as tolerable as possible for the Palestinians, though he was prepared to be 'stern', as he put it, when this seemed necessary. 'We would blow up houses . . . that had served to shelter saboteurs or where stores of weapons and explosives had been found . . . Another measure was exile', by which the governor of Arab Jerusalem was banished to Safed. But Dayan was aware of Arab susceptibilities. When he had visited the Dome of the Rock, the magnificent mosque on the Haram el Sharif in the Old City of Jerusalem, he was shaken to find the Israeli flag flying. He at once ordered it to be removed: the Israeli flag should be flown over the office of the governor, but not from a place of religious worship. He took exactly the same line later when he found the Israeli flag over the Cave of Machpelah, near Hebron, where Abraham was said to be buried,[143] a shrine holy to both Jews and Muslims.[144]

To advise and help on humanitarian issues, U Thant obtained the services of Nils-Goran Gussing, and Gussing's final report was published on 2 October. According to Gussing, over 300,000 Palestinians had been newly displaced, of whom 113,000 were already refugees from 1948. The Jordanian authorities estimated that 170,000 Palestinians had applied through the International Committee of the Red Cross to go back to the West Bank from Jordan, and that 14,150 had returned. The Syrian government 'strongly desired' the return of those Arabs displaced by the Golan fighting, but Syria 'was not willing to enter into direct negotiations with Israel . . .' Displaced Palestinians in Egypt wished to return, and the Egyptian government was leaving the arrangements to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross.[145]

Gussing reported that both sides were treating prisoners of war correctly, but Egypt objected that 289 Egyptian civilians from the Gaza area were being detained by Israel in El Arish. It had been alleged by Israel that some five or six hundred members of the Jewish community in Egypt had been detained and held incommunicado, but Egypt maintained that the UN resolution did not apply to the Jewish minority

in Egypt, so that this matter was outside Gussing's mandate. As for the Jewish minority in Syria, then numbering about 4,000, the Syrian ment had said they were treated 'in exactly the same way' as other Syrians: it was true that some Syrian Jews were restricted in their movements because they were suspected of anti-government activities, but so were some Christians and some Muslims.[146]

Gussing said that he had received excellent cooperation from the Israeli authorities. He had been accompanied on all official travels by a representative of the government of Israel, but some conversations would have been franker if he had been able to meet and talk without witnesses. The Arab governments had complained that Israel had made systematic efforts to expel the Palestinians from the occupied territories. Gussing had found it difficult to determine the line between physical and psychological pressure, but 'certain actions authorized or allowed by local military commanders' had been an important cause of the flight of the Palestinians. The 'extensive looting' in Quneitra had been largely the responsibility of Israel, but it was difficult to form a firm opinion regarding Jordanian complaints of Israeli looting. There had undoubtedly been 'vast destruction' of villages, but some of this had been a direct consequence of military operations, and there had been some deliberate destruction by Israel 'for strategic and security reasons . . .'[147]

Gussing had visited Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus (Shechem), and Qalqiliya and had found that the general Arab economy had come to a standstill as a result of the June fighting. He reported that the Israeli authorities would allow the Arab population of the Gaza Strip to work on the West Bank.[148]

Perhaps one should close this account of the June War and its legacies with a final vignette which conveys something of the mood of some of the Arab leaders. It comes from the memoirs of Anwar Sadat, then presiding officer of the Egyptian parliament. Uncertain what to do when war broke out, Sadat 'just went home . . ., dazed and broken-hearted . . .' He didn't know how to occupy himself, so he went for long walks, unable to locate himself in time or space. He kept in touch with Nasser and field marshal Amer by phone, but he found that Amer answered 'drily and irritably . . .'[149]

NOTES

1. Dayan, pp. 351–2; Rabin, p. 82; Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1982,

pp. 151–2; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, London, Allen Lane, 1975, pp. 226–8; Henry Cattan, *Palestine and International Law: The Legal Aspects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, London, Longman, 1973, p. 126; John D. Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East*, pp. 23–5, 185–6.

2. Letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983.

3. Bull, p. 113; Eban, pp. 405–7; Dayan, p. 336; [King] Hussein of Jordan, *My 'War' with Israel*, pp. 64–5, 71.

4. Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1982, p. 153; Dayan, pp. 352–3, 355, 366; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 352; Hussein, pp. 71–3; Nutting, p. 417; O'Ballance, pp. 63, 80; *Middle East Record*, p. 226.

5. Ibid., p. 214; Riad, pp. 24–6.

6. Letter from general Bull to the author, 4 April 1983.

7. SCOR, 22nd year, 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), para. 20 and note 1; 1353rd (9 June 1967), paras. 198, 242; Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 132, 134, 141–2, 146–7, 149–50, paras. 2 and 12–3 of S/7930, para. 4 (VII) of S/7930/Add. 3, para 8 of S/7930/Add. 4, para. 4 of S/7930/ Add. 5, para. 4 of S 7930/Add. 6, para. 7 of S/7930/Add. 7; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 27–30, 32–6, S/7930/Adds. 20, 27, 29, and para. 3 of S/7930/Add. 31; Bull, pp. 114–6, 138; Thant, pp. 255–6; Eban, p. 407; Dayan, pp. 355, 366; Rabin, p. 106; Comay. p. 36.

8. Thant, p. 254; Rafael, pp. 154–5; Eban, p. 403; Jabber, p. 59 (doc. 60); SCOR, 22nd year, 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), para 4; Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 130, S/7926.

9. Jabber, p. 56 (doc. 56); letter to the author from Eugene V. Rostow, 11 July 1983; Johnson, p. 297–8; Howe, p. 90; Quandt, p. 62; Thant, p. 261; Rafael, pp. 156–7; Bar-Zohar pp. 209–12.

10. Lall, pp. 46, 56; Rafael, p. 154.

11. Lall, p. 47; Eban, p. 410; SCOR, 22nd year, 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), paras. 10–21.

12. Ibid., paras. 30–3, 36–9, 53.

13. Ibid., para. 24.

14. Ibid., paras. 56–7.

15. Ibid., para. 54; 1351st mtg. (8 June 1967), paras. 57–9.

16. Lall, p. 48.

17. Eban, pp. 404–5; Quandt, p. 61.

18. Dagan, pp. 225–7; *Middle East Record*, p. 236; Jabber, pp. 54–5 (doc. 54).

19. Ibid., pp. 55–6 (doc. 55); *Middle East Record*, p. 235; Crossman, pp. 364–5; see also Rabin, p. 93.

20. Johnson, p. 299; Howe, pp. 93–4, 152, and Appendix B, p. 367; Jabber, pp. 58–9 (doc. 59); Draper, p. 111; Churchill, p. 149; Sadat, p. 175.

21. Rafel, p. 155; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.

22. The text of declarations of war by Iraq, Libya, and Kuwait are in Jabber,

p. 582–3 (docs. 343–5); statements of Arab solidarity are in Ibid., pp. 579–84, 589–90, 600–1 (docs. 341–2, 346–7, 356–7, 373); see also *Middle East Record*, p. 439.

23. Jabber, p. 584 (doc. 348).
24. Letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984; Rafael, pp. 155–7. 168; Thant, p. 257; Howe, p. 102; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 348; Lall, pp. 49–50; Eban, pp. 410, 414; Riad, p. 27; Ilana Kass, *Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Policy Formulation, 1966–1973* p. 31; *Middle East Record*, pp. 226, 235–6, 244–5; Howard and Hunter, p. 30; Jabber, pp 56–7 (doc. 57).
25. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 132–5, 159, S/7930, S/7932.
26. Ibid., 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), paras. 56–7; 1349th mtg. (7 June 1967), para. 29.
27. Bull, pp. 118–9, 121 and letter to the author, 4 April 1983; Lall, pp. 108–9, 113–5; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.
28. Christman, p. 125; Bull, p. 126; Dayan, pp. 355, 379; *Middle East Record*, p. 20; Rafael, p. 155.
29. Peter Young, *The Israeli campaign*, pp. 80, 125, 129; *Middle East Record,* pp. 222, 227, 246.
30. Ibid., p. 214; Hussein, p. 71; Riad, pp. 23–4, 29–30; Heikal, *Nasser*, pp. 222–3; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, pp. 181–2; O'Ballance, p. 68.
31. SCOR, 22nd year, 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), paras. 18–9.
32. Rikhye, pp. 106–9.
33. Riad, pp. 25–6; *Middle East Record*, p. 245; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, pp. 181–2; Thant, pp. 257–8; Johnson, p. 299; Draper, p. 110; Dagan, pp. 234–6; conversation with Sir Anthony Nutting, 17 March 1983.
34. Hussein, pp. 82–6, 92; Jabber, pp. 64, 534–5, 586, 591–2, 607, 624–5 (docs. 66–7, 314, 351, 358–60, 380, 393); Whetten, p. 10; Thant, pp. 257–8; Wilson, *Labour Government*, p. 512; Wilson, *Chariot of Israel*, p. 349.
35. Conversation with Sir Anthony Nutting, 17 March 1983.
36. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel,* pp. 348–9; Crossman, pp. 364, 366, 370.
37. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel,* pp. 348–9; Crossman, pp. 364, 366, 370. (doc. 68).
38. Johnson, p. 299.
39. Riad, p. 32; Jabber, pp. 586–7 (docs. 350, 352–4) Israeli aircraft mistakenly bombed one of their own tank columns near Jenin. Hirsh Goodman, "The errors of battle", *Jerusalem Post International,* 2–8 Sept. 1984, p. 10; Hirsh Goodman and Ze'ev Schiff, "The attack on the Liberty", *Jerusalem Post International,* 6 Oct. 1984, p. 13.
40. Rikhye, pp. 124, 133, 135, 138–9, 151–2.
41. Eban, p. 411; Rafael, pp. 158–60; 168.
42. Conversation with Shabtai Rosenne, 26 June 1983.
43. Eban, pp. 411, 415; Rafael, pp. 158–9; Comay, p 24.

44. Lall, p. 50; letter to the author from a diplomat who participated in the discussions, 22 April 1983.

45. Thant, p. 258; SCOR, 22nd year, 1348th mtg. (6 June 1967) paras. 4, 258–9; S.C. res. 233 (S/7935), 6 June 1967.

46. The other occasion was 27 Sept. 1965 in connexion with Kashmir.

47. Eban, pp. 416–8; SCOR, 22nd year, 1348th mtg. (6 June 1967), paras. 155, 179.

48. Ibid., paras. 218–23, 228.

49. Ibid., paras. 52, 76, 80; Kass, p. 32.

50. SCOR, 22nd year, 1348th mtg. (6 June 1967), paras. 12, 14,–6, 32, 33 (S/7936), 39, 109, 238, 240–3; 1350th mtg. (7 June 1967), para. 73(S/7939; Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 177–8, 270, S/7963, S/7997.

51. Johnson, pp. 299–30; Jabber, p. 74 (doc. 74).

52. Rabin, p. 89; Peter Young, 1967, p, 112; Rikhye, pp. 147, 136, 171. 147, 136, 171.

53. Rabin, pp. 83, 88, 89; Dayan, p. 368; O'Ballance, p. 223.

54. Hussein, pp. 65, 94–5, Riad, pp. 27–30; Jabber, pp. 592–5 (doc. 363, 368; Eban, p. 420; Lall, p. 51.

55. Dagan, pp. 229–30; Jabber, pp. 76–7 (doc. 78).

56. Johnson, p. 299; *Middle East Record*, pp. 235–6; Jabber, pp. 79–84 (doc. 81).

57. Lall, p. 57; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 162–3, S/7938; 1349th mtg. (7 June 1967), paras. 4–7, 8 (S/7940), 9–10, 38; 1350th mtg. (7 June 1967), paras. 6–14.

58. Thant, p. 259; SCOR, 22nd year, 1349th mtg. (7 June 1967), para. 13 (S/7946); 1350th mtg. (7 June 1967), paras. 13, 23–4, 38; Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 166, S/7945; S.C. res. 234 (S/7940), 7 June 1967; Lall, p. 60; Jabber, p. 76 (doc. 77).

59. James M. Ennes, Jr. *Assault on the Liberty*, pp. 3, 7–9, 60, 67, 82–5, 129, 137, 153–4, 161, 220–1, and Appendices I, and II pp. 248–9, 270–5; Phil G. Goulding, *Confirm or Deny*, pp. 93–6, 107–113, 129, 135–6; Johnson, pp. 300–1; Howe, p. 95; Rabin, p. 85; Eban, p. 421; Bar-Zohar, pp. 244–5; O'Ballance, pp. 265–7. The *Liberty* was first told she could approach no closer than 100 miles to the coast of belligerent nations, then no closer than 12.5 nautical miles to Egypt and 6.5 nautical miles to Israel, then 20 and 15 nautical miles respectively, then 100 miles to either belligerent; but none of these messages reached the *Liberty*.

60. Kaplan, pp. 167, 433; Ennes, p. 116.

61. Howe, pp. 102–3; Johnson, p. 300; Ennes, pp. 97–100, 198–9, and Appendices E, R, S, and T, pp. 242, 284–8; Goulding, pp. 97–8, 134; Riad, p. 30; Jabber, pp. 624–5 (doc. 393; Eban, p. 421; Bar-Zohar, pp. 245–6; *Middle East Record*, p. 234.

62. An explosion at an Egyptian ammunition depot near El Arish was thought by the Israelis to be naval shelling. Hirsh Goodman and Ze'ev Shiff, "The attack

on the Liberty", *Jerusalem Post International,* 6 Oct. 1984, p. 14. See also Stephen Green, *Taking Sides,* New York, Morrow, 1984, pp. 212–42, 356–9; Goulding, p. 135; Wilbur Crane Evenland, *Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East,* New York and London, Norton, 1980. p. 325.

63.   Ennes, pp. 45–7, 53–4, 211–3, Appendices A and N, pp. 226–33, 270–5; see also 'The USS *Liberty* cover-up' by James M. Ennes, Jr., *Middle East International,* no. 202 (10 June 1983), pp. 13–5; Goulding, pp. 130–2.

64.   Eban, p. 419.

65.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1351st mtg. (8 June 1967), paras. 2, 15, (S/7952), 95; Supplement for April to June, pp. 168–72, S/7950, S/7952/Revs., S/7954; Lall, pp. 63–4, 66–8, 113.

66.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1351st mtg. (8 June 1967), paras. 45, 47 (S/7951), 122, 122, 155; Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 166, S/7947; Lall, pp. 65, 68; Kass, p. 32.

67.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1351st mtg. (8 June 1967), para. 31 (S/7953).

68.   Ibid., paras. 78–9, 149.

69.   Ibid., paras. 59, 64. On British policy, see the statements of Brown and Wilson in the House of Commons, reproduced in Jabber, pp. 84–90, 92–96, 99–100 (docs. 82, 87, 91).

70.   Lall, pp. 69, 71.

71.   Thant, p. 260; see also Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 92).

72.   Crossman, p. 370.

73.   Peri, pp. 80, 137; Eban, pp. 420–2; Rabin, pp. 83, 88, 89; Dayan, pp. 373, 380; Howe, p. 104.

74.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 2, 7–8, (see also paras. 133, 166–7).

75.   Ibid., para. 3.

76.   Ibid., paras. 4, 9, 14, 16, 22–4, 134–6, 165, 237.

77.   Ibid., para. 17.

78.   Ibid., paras. 30–6, 172, 198.

79.   Ibid., para. 39; S.C. res. 235 (S/7960), 9 June 1967.

80.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 175–6 (S/7958), 186; Thant, p. 260.

81.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1353rd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 62–3, 127, 211.

82.   Ibid., paras. 7–13.

83.   Ibid., paras. 19–22.

84.   Ibid., para. 27 (see also 1351st mtg., para. 31, S/7953); Jabber, pp. 593, 593, 596 (docs. 365, 371); Rafael, p. 161; Eban, p. 420.

85.   Jabber, pp. 596–9 (doc. 372); *Middle East Record,* pp. 553–6.

86.   SCOR, 22nd year, 1353rd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 20 (S/7983), 29–31, 46, 71–2, 112, 180.

87.   Ibid., paras. 36–8, 79–87, 183.

88.   Ibid., 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 40–50.

89.   Ibid., paras. 211, 216.

90. Lall, p. 78.

91. SCOR, 22nd year, 1353rd mtg. (9 June 1967), para. 242.

92. Ibid., paras. 228–9.

93. Rafael, p. 163; letter to the author from Sir Leslie Glass, 26 July 1983.

94. Ibid.

95. SCOR, 22nd year, 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 5, 27; Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 181, S/7967; Lall, p. 82.

96. SCOR, 22nd year, 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 9–22; Howe, p. 104; Lall, pp. 84, 90.

97. SCOR, 22nd year, 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 22, 52–4, 114, 118, 141.

98. SCOR, 22nd year, 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), para. 136.

99. Ibid., para. 75; Thant, p. 262.;

100. Ibid., paras. 110, 146.

101. Ibid., 1355th meg. (10 June 1967), para. 3; Thant, p. 263.

102. SCOR, 22nd year, 1355th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 10, 15–6, 69, 96–7.

103. Ibid., para. 66.

104. Ibid., para. 138.

105. Ibid., para. 112.

106. Ibid., para. 91; Dagan, pp. 234–6; *Middle East Record*, pp. 68, 241–2; Draper, pl 110; Jabber, pp. 30, 98–101, 104–5 (docs. 43, 89, 93, 96, 101); Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 183; Kass, p. 32.

107. Eban, p. 423; Abba Eban, *The new diplomacy: International Affairs in the Modern Age*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1983 [hereafter cited as Eban, *New Diplomacy*], p. 375.

108. Letter to the author from general Odd Bull, 4 April 1983; Bull, p. 120; Eban, p. 422; Rafael, p. 164; Howe, p. 106; SCOR, 22nd year, 1355th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 68, 156–7, 204; *Middle East Record*, pp. 230, 240.

109. Ibid., paras. 185–8, 191–2; Sydney D. Bailey, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 131; Kamel S. Abu-Jaber, 'United States Policy toward the June Conflict', in Abu-Lughod, p. 160.

110. SCOR, 22nd year, 1355th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 166–7.;

111. Rafael, p. 164; letter from Dean Rusk to the author, 24 August 1983; see also Dayan, p. 377; Rabin, p. 92; Bar-Zohar, p. 263; Stephen Green, *Taking Sides*, New York, Morrow, 1984, pp. 356–7.

112. Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 93); Kaplan, pp. 167, 435; Eban, p. 422; Dayan, p. 378; Howe, pp. 105–7, 116.

113. Johnson, pp. 301–3; Howe, Appendix B, p. 364; Kass, p. 29.

114. SCOR, 22nd year, 1356th mtg. (10/11 June 1967), para. 3 (S/7970).

115. Ibid., paras. 77–80, 83–3, 128, 132, 134, 136, 142.

116. Ibid., paras. 22–3, 25, 32–3, 96, 204.

117. Ibid., paras. 156–7, 204.

118. Ibid., paras. 17, 76.

119. Ibid., paras. 71, 74 (S/7971).
120. Rafael, p. 165.
121. *Middle East Record*, p. 245
122. Ibid., pp. 558–61; Riad, pp. 33–5, 41; Young pp. 167–8; Be'eri, pp. 125, 128–9.
123. Meir, p. 304.
124. Rabin, pp. 92–3.
125. Johnson, p. 303; Seymour M. Hersh, *Kissinger: The Price of Power: Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House,* London, Faber, 1983, p. 76.
126. James Cameron in the *Evening Standard*, 28 May 1967, reprinted in *The Best of Cameron*, London, New English Library paperback, 1983, p. 151; letter from general Odd Bull to the author, 4 April 1983.
127. Khouri, p. 256; Aron, p. 123.
128. Rostow, p. 264 and letter to the author, 11 July 1983; Eban, *New Diplomacy*, pp. 205–6.
129. Kass, p. 28; Kaplan, pp. 167, 463.
130. Bull, p. 125; Quandt, pp. 60–1.
131. Conversation with Sir Anthony Nutting, 17 March 1983.
132. Sadat, pp. 173, 199–200, 282: Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 175; Nutting, pp. 398–9, 412 and conversation, 17 March 1983; Kass, pp. 33–4; Draper, pp. 80–1; Glassman, p. 53.
133. Letter to the author, 19 March 1983.
134. Lall, pp. 30–1; Dagan, p. 218; Brown, p. 135; see also Charles W. Yost, 'The Arab-Israeli War: How it began', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, no. 2 (Jan. 1968), p. 319; Bar-Zohar, p. 162; Howe, p. 159.
135. *Middle East Record*, pp. 232–3; Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, London, Lane, 1975, p. 228; Yael Dayan, *A Soldier's Dairy, p.* 114; Ben-Gurion, pp. 785–6; Eban, p. 422; O'Ballance, p. 167.
136. Thant, pp. 227, 255; Rikhye, pp. 102, 110, 115, 126, 130, 150–5.
137. *Middle East Record*, pp. 232–3; Report on the Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 1967, p. 8; Report on the Work of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 1968, p. 33; Christiane Shields Delessert, *Release and repatriation of prisoners of war at the end of hostilities . . .*, Zurich, Schultess Polygraphischer, 1977, pp. 118–9, n. 57.
138. G.A. res. 2254 (ES-V), 4 July 1967); SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 199–209, 220–1, 294–6, S/8124–A/6787, S/8133–A/6789, S/8153–A/6795; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 33–9, A/6792 and Add. 1; GAOR, 22nd session, Annexes, Agenda item 94, pp. 1–9, S/6847 and Adds. 1–5, A/7233; Dayan, p. 400.
139. Eban, p. 438; Dayan, pp. 385–6. Kollek later admitted that "Dayan was proved right." Teddy and Amos Kollek, *For Jerusalem.* p. 202.
140. *Middle East Record*, p. 290; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 195, 257, S/8121–A/6785, para. 155 of S/8146–A/6793.
141. Ibid., pp. 235–6, 238–42, 247–9, paras. 14–5, 20–1, 33, 35, 39–40,

44, 46, 48–57, 64, 97–8, 109 of S/8146–A/6793.

142. *Middle East Record*, pp. 280, 290; Jabber, p. 620 (doc 392); SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 250–2, 254–5, paras. 111–29. 139–40, 142–3, 145 of S/8146–A/6793; Kollek, p. 202.

143. Genesis 23, 9 and 19; 25, 9; 49, 30; 50, 13.

144. Dayan, pp. 371–2, 388, 402.

145. Jabber, pp. 381–466, 651–2, 659–61, 665 (docs. 274–5, 407, 416, 419); S/8155, 15 Sept. 1967 (mimeo.); SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct.–Dec. 1967, pp. 84, 90, 107–8, 119, 122–4, 126–7, paras. 14, 40, 93, 159(c), 181, 183, 190, 200, 202 of S/8158–A/6797.

146. Ibid., pp. 116, 128–30, paras. 142, 207, 218–9, 221.

147. Ibid., pp. 83, 87–9, 92, 94, 96–7, paras. 9, 22, 25, 28, 33, 35, 50–1, 60, 73, 75.

148. Ibid., pp. 105, 112–3, paras. 86, 122.

149. Sadat. p. 175.

6. THE CEASE-FIRE TAKES HOLD

It is rare, indeed, that a cease-fire can be self-executing. You have provided the intermediary, co-ordination and observance which were essential to bring the cease-fire into reality. Message from U Thant to general Odd Bull, chief of staff, UN Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem.

During the course of Sunday 11 June, after the new cease-fire had entered into force and been confirmed by the parties, Thant received a Syrian complaint of Israeli advances beyond the cease-fire line. This allegation was communicated to Gideon Rafael, who got in touch with his government but received "only a vague reply". Rafael later visited Israel and heard that some over-enthusiastic Israeli units had been trying to improve their military positions.[1]

The Security Council convened once more on the Sunday evening to consider the Syrian complaint. By this time, Israel had raised with general Bull the possibility of using UN good offices for an exchange of prisoners of war, a proposal which U Thant fully supported.[2] Diplomatic tempers in New York were again short, the complaint this time being that relevant documents were not available in all of the Council's languages.[3] Once again Syria alleged that Israel was violating the cease-fire,[4] which Israel again denied.[5] Federenko, in an abrasive speech, drew attention to the draft resolution condemning Israeli aggression which he had submitted the previous Thursday, but he did not ask that it should be put to the vote.[6] The United States stressed the need for more information, and Britain, Canada, and Japan wanted the Council to call again for full respect for the cease-fire.[7] The Council recessed at 2.20 a.m. for consultations, after which the president of the Council introduced a draft resolution condemning "any and all violations of the cease-fire" and calling for full cooperation with UN observers. This was approved unanimously (see Appendix 7).[8]

Although it was after midnight, the Council was enlivened by two characteristic speeches from Jamil M. Baroody, a veteran diplomat representing Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Baroody, as was his wont, ranged widely — the Crusades, the expulsion of American Indians from Manhattan, one of Gandhi's campaigns of non-violence (which, said

Baroody, drove a British army captain "stark mad"), the gullibility and decadence of the West, Nambia, Viet Nam, etc., which led the president of the Council to offer several mild reproofs.[9]

It was now the job of the UN observers to delineate the cease-fire lines, both on the ground and on maps. General Bull hoped to have a demilitarized buffer zone two kilometres wide between the two front lines, but this did not prove possible, and the buffer zone on the southern part of the Golan sector was in places no more than 300–400 yards in depth. Bull found it relatively east to demarcate the Israeli line "for the Israelis knew exactly where their forward troops were . . ." It was much harder to demarcate the line on the Syrian side, for the Syrian army "lacked accurate information as to the where-abouts of many of its units."[10]

The Security Council met four more times on 13 and 14 June, this time at the request of the Soviet Union. U Thant reported that UN observers did not yet have access to Government House in Jerusalem. General Bull had raised with Israel the need for freedom of movement for UN personnel. Israel had expressed anxiety about prisoners of war in Arab hands, and Jordan had complained that Palestinian refugees were being "coerced and compelled" by Israel to leave UN camps.[11]

The Soviet line was once more that Israeli aggression "cannot remain unpunished." The Soviet government had that day sent a tough message to Israel, comparing Israel with "the Hitlerite invaders", which elicited an angry response from Israel a few days later (". . . false and tenden-tious statements . . . Israel expresses its profound revulsion . . . ").[12] Federenko again proposed that the Security Council should vigorously condemn Israel's aggressive activities and should demand an immediate withdrawal from Arab territory, but the two operative paragraphs of the Soviet proposal of 8 June were defeated. Eban regards this as "a significant political victory" for Israel, because only four states voted in favour of the paragraph in the Soviet draft which would have con-demned Israeli aggression (the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, India, Mali) and only six voted in favour of withdrawal behind the armistice lines (the same four, plus Ethiopia and Nigeria). Eban adds that "both the Arabs and the Soviets" underestimated the support for Israel.[13]

Goldberg said that condemnations were "rarely effective diplomatic actions", and he introduced a draft resolution to reiterate the request for scrupulous implementation of the Council's "repeated demands for a cease-fire" and calling for prompt discussions "looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force

regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights, and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East . . ." Some of these ideas were to find a place in resolution 242 the following November.[14] Federenko said he would veto this text if it were put to the vote: "no amendments or revisions . . . will help matters." He added that as the Security Council was unable to take the necessary decisions, other ways must be sought; and the Soviet Union requested Secretary-General Thant to take the necessary steps for convening the UN General Assembly in emergency special session as promptly as possible. The Soviet Union later requested that the General Assembly should not convene before 19 June.[15]

Since the adoption of the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950, it has been possible to convene the General Assembly in emergency special session if the Security Council fails to exercise its primary responsibility for peace and security. The Soviet Union had consistently opposed this attempt to by-pass the Security Council, so the Soviet request made no reference to the Assembly's rules of procedure for convening emergency special sessions based on the Uniting for peace Peace resolution (rules 8, 9, 10, 16, and 19), citing only the ordinary rule about an explanatory memorandum being needed for each item proposed for inclusion in the agenda.

India had suggested on 9 June that the UN Secretary-General might "depute a personal representative to the area to help in reducing tension and restoring peaceful conditions", and this was supported by Brazil, Britain, Canada, Ethiopia, and France.[16] This idea was to find a place in resolution 242.

During the debate, the Arabs repeated the charge that the United States had given active support to Israel, and the United States again denied the charge. There were also Arab complaints of U.S. Zionist support for Israel, but Goldberg said again that Zionist pressures had no bearing on U.S. policy.[17]

There was another long and discursive speech by ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia, during the course of which he complained that U Thant was not paying proper attention. Thant explained that he had been listening attentively but that he had turned away for a minute because Ralph Bunche had brought him an urgent message from general Bull. Bunche told Baroody of his regret for the incident, and Thant expressed complete faith in Bunche; but Federenko was able to use the incident to attack the UN Secretariat.[18]

The one positive outcome of four otherwise dismal meetings was the unanimous approval of a proposal by Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia,

with a minor textual amendment suggested by Mali, which called on Israel to respect the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims (see Appendix 8). Lall comments on the inability of the Council to demand "moderation and ... limited steps forward", but he again praises Caradon's "wise and necessary words."[19]

George Thomson, in a statement in the House of Commons, said that Britain was encouraged by the key part which general Odd Bull was playing in arranging "the final and effective cease-fire", and he hoped that the UN observers would soon be able to return to Government House in Jerusalem. British subjects were still being evacuated from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, up to that point without loss of life. Four British cargo ships were stranded in the Great Bitter Lake, and the Suez Canal remained closed. Oil supplies were still stopped or restricted, but Thomson repeated that Arab allegations of British and American active military help to Israel were completely unfounded. Dick Crossman thought that Thomson had done the job "quite well." Crossman noted in his diary that the House of Commons lived in "a world of wish-fulfilment and illusion," discussing in all seriousness how Britain should "shape the future of the Middle East." But Israel's victory had exposed Britain's impotence, wrote Crossman. Neither Cyprus nor Malta had allowed Britain to use base facilities for helping Israel, and Britain's responsibilities in the Gulf made her "obsequiously anxious to please the Arabs."[20]

Harold Wilson had written to de Gaulle, stressing the partial responsibility of the Soviet Union for what had happened. Britain, like France, had been strictly neutral in the war, wrote Wilson, but there had been "substantial nuances of difference between us." Britain "still supported" the French proposal for a four power approach, and both countries had "taken the same line in cutting off arms."[21] Wilson also wrote to Lyndon Johnson, expressing doubts about whether anything useful would come from his (Wilson's) personal participation in the emergency Assembly and saying that from the beginning of the crisis he had not looked with favour on de Gaulle's proposal for a Big Four meeting outside the Security Council. U Thant noted that "a great majority" of UN Members now favoured an emergency General Assembly and that prime minister Kosygin planned to head a large Soviet delegation.[22]

In an important statement in the Knesset on 12 June, Eshkol had said that Israel would not return to the pre-war situation. "To the nations of the world I say ... Alone we fought for existence and our security; we are entitled to determine what are the true and vital

interests of our country, and how they shall be secured." A new situation had been created which could serve as a starting point in direct negotiations for a peace settlement with the Arab countries. "Faithful to herself and looking with confidence to the future, with the aid of the Rock and Redeemer of Israel, this nation shall yet dwell in safety."[23] Yisrael Galili, minister in charge of information services, had already said that Israel could not return to the 1949 armistice agreements and demarcation lines, as these had been "completely erased" by Arab armies. Dayan was also to insist that Israel should retain military control over the West Bank, whatever the external pressures, while allowing the Arab inhabitants a good deal of autonomy. The decision to retain the occupied territories, wrote Thant, sowed the seeds of the 1973 war.[24] But Gideon Rafael, who was visiting Israel, found that the prevailing opinion was to return the Arab-populated areas of the West Bank to Jordan, though with "certain modifications" of the boundary. Menachem Begin, now a minister without portfolio, was opposed to the adoption of any definite Israeli position. Rafael himself favoured "flexibility on withdrawal and firmness on peace." He stressed that the world, and especially Israel's friends, "would not tolerate the creation of a new Palestine refugee problem." There was some discussion inside and outside the Israeli government about whether Eban should be advised by a watchdog committee: Eban did not mind being advised or watched, but he wondered who was meant to be the dog. When plans were being made for Israeli representation at the forthcoming special Assembly, it was suggested that Dayan and Begin should accompany Eban. In a frank conversation with Eshkol, Eban made it clear that he could not proclaim Israel's message to the world unless he were liberated from domestic intrigues. "It would be as grotesque for two or three ministers to lead a delegation to the General Assembly [wrote Eban] as it would be for two or three generals to be in command of an armored division."[25]

Notes

1. Rafael, pp. 166–7.
2. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 143, 145–6, 243–4, para. 6 of S/7930/Add. 3, paras. 4–6 of S/7930/Add. 4, S/7973; 1357th mtg. (11 June 1967), para. 2.
3. Ibid., paras. 12–8.
4. Ibid., paras. 22, 180–4.
5. Ibid., paras. 35–6, 201, 217–21.

6. Ibid., para. 55; Lall, p. 92.

7. SCOR, 22nd year, 1357th mtg. (11 June 1967), paras. 64, 107, 119, 142.

8. Ibid., paras. 68, 214, 223—4; S.C. res. 236, 11 June 1967.

9. SCOR, 22nd year, 1357th mtg. (11 June 1967), paras. 124, 128—31, 141—2, 152, 159—63, 165, 196.

10. Bull, pp. 121—4; Comay, pp. 31, 41.

11. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 147—8, 245—6, 248, paras. 4, 6, 7 of S/7930/Add. 5, S/7975, S/7979; 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 125—32.

12. Jabber, pp. 104—5, 112 (docs. 101, 108).

13. SCOR, 22nd year, 1358th mtg. (13 June 1967), paras. 26, 45 (s/7951/Rev; 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 192, 199, 202; Eban, p. 426.

14. SCOR, 22nd year, 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 185 (S/7952/ Rev. 3), 214. See also Jabber, pp. 105—7, 133 (docs. 103, 109).

15. SCOR, 22nd year, 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 206, 208—9; 1361st mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 116—7, 121; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 2, A/6717; doc. A/6719, 15 June 1967 (mimeo.).

16. SCOR, 22nd year, 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), para. 102; 1359th mtg. (13 June 1967), para. 37; 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 25, 85, 171; 1361st mtg. (14 June 1967), para. 27.

17. Ibid., 1358th mtg. (13 June 1967), para. 301; 1359th mtg. (13 June 1967), paras. 9, 16, 21, 23—8, 42—6, 55, 57—8; 1360th mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 267—8.

18. Ibid., 1358th mtg. (13 June 1967), paras. 119—91; 1361st mtg. (14 June 1967), paras. 30—48, 51, 54, 64—70, 77—80.

19. Ibid., paras. 9, 82; S.C. res. 237 (S/7968/Rev. 3), 14 June 1967; Lall, pp. 99, 101.

20. Jabber, pp. 107—8 (doc. 104); Crossman, pp. 381—2.

21. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel,* pp. 355—6, 358; Thant, p. 261.

22. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel,* pp. 56—7; Thant, p. 266.

23. *Middle East Record,* p. 276; Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 92); Thant, p. 263.

24. *Middle East Record,* p. 276; Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 92); Thant, p. 263.

25. Rafael, pp. 170—2; Eban, p. 428.

7. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSIONS

> The fifth emergency special session of the [General] Assembly turned out to be futile despite the glittering assemblage of world leaders... One of the many disappointments... was the meeting between Premier Kosygin and President Johnson ... I personally felt that it was unbecoming for two heads of state to resort to a measuring tape on a map to determine a place equidistant from New York and Washington, merely for reasons of prestige. U Thant, *View from the UN*, pp. 271–2.

There were 123 UN Members when the General Assembly convened in emergency special session on Saturday 17 June. President Nur ad-Din Atasi of Syria led his country's delegation, and King Hussein of Jordan arrived part of the way through the session, visiting Britain, France, Italy, and Greece on his way home. Fourteen heads of government also took part. Twenty-five meetings were held in the first phase of debate, which lasted just over a fortnight. During this period, U.S. president Johnson and Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin had a short summit meeting in New Jersey.

After the first phase of debate in the emergency Assembly, there were two meetings of the Security Council (chapter 8), followed by a second phase of debate in the Assembly, comprising nine additional meetings in as many days (chapter 9). The Assembly then adjourned and reconvened for one meeting on 18 September, the day before the opening of the Assembly's regular annual session. The meetings were presided over by ambassador Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan and by various vice-presidents.

Soviet leaders engaged in an intensive diplomatic campaign. President Podgorny took in Belgrade, Cairo, and Damascus, and prime minister Kosygin made a point of visiting Paris on his way to New York, where he received a warm welcome, and again on his way home. When Johnson learned that Kosygin was coming to the United States, he invited him to the White House or Camp David, but Kosygin asked why a meeting was not possible in New York. Johnson countered with the idea that they should meet at Maguire Air Force Base in New Jersey, but Kosygin said that while New Jersey was convenient, he didn't fancy the idea of meeting at a U.S. military base. Frantic explorations in Washington led to the idea of meeting in Glassboro, a peaceful

college town 15 miles south of Philadelphia and almost mid-way between New York and Washington. Thant thought it was unbecoming for two world leaders to resort to a measuring tape to decide where to meet: "... the United Nations would have been the ideal forum." Johnson and his party arrived in Glassboro in style by helicopter, but Kosygin had to travel by limousine from New York and was delayed by heavy traffic on the motorway.[1]

Johnson found Kosygin "reserved and friendly". Whenever Johnson mentioned the possibility of limiting strategic arms, Kosygin changed the subject to the Middle East. Johnson presented his comprehensive plan for a Middle East peace settlement, but Kosygin focussed on the issue of Israeli withdrawal. The United States, complained Kosygin, talked about territorial integrity but ended up protecting aggression. He suggested referring the Aqaba question to the International Court of Justice. By and large, the discussions were inconclusive, though they may have persuaded the Soviet government that it was not enough simply to condemn Israeli aggression or to demand Israeli withdrawal, thus paving the way for an agreed resolution in the Security Council four months later. It was agreed that the two foreign ministers would keep in touch. Johnson thought that some progress had been made on the general question of arms limitation, but Dean Rusk does not recall "any significant discussion ... about limitations on the arms buildup in the Middle East." Johnson did meet "very privately" with Kosygin for one session, "and the matter might have come up then", but Rusk is sure that there was no "agreement" on the matter. All the same, Washington was disturbed by the escalating flow of arms to the region, and it is noteworthy that both the United States and the Soviet Union included provisions for controlling this flow in their draft resolutions in the Security Council the following November. Thant commented that initially there was a sense of relief and even ebullience at the United Nations about the Glassboro summit, but that nothing came of the well-publicized meetings: it was one of the many disappointments of the summer.[2]

During the course of the session, the emergency Assembly received a further report from Secretary-General Thant on the withdrawal of UNEF, 14 communications from general Bull on the observance of the cease-fire or Israel's seizure of Government House in Jerusalem. one report from the Secretary-General on humanitarian questions, and one report from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.[3] There were also a number of Arab complaints that Israel was treating refugees and other war victims inhumanely, as well as Israeli denials.

Israel expressed deep regret that members of UNEF had suffered casualties during the fighting and offered to pay to the bereaved families the death grants to which they were entitled. Israel also complained of Arab treatment of Israeli POWs and captured civilians.[4]

The main debate in the General Assembly was opened by Soviet prime minister Kosygin. His speech, wrote Rafael, was "full of political pep" but delivered with "the monotonous voice of a town crier." Eban noted that Kosygin's voice was calm, but he considered that the substance of what he had to say was harsh. The Soviet Union condemned Israeli aggression and demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories which had been seized.[5]

Criticism of Israel was the line followed by all speakers from Communist countries.[6] Albania, no longer part of the Soviet bloc, was exceptionally vituperative, attacking both Israel and the Soviet Union,[7] while Poland was relatively restrained in its attacks on Israel.[8] Romania had carefully distanced itself from the other members of the Soviet bloc, favouring an Israeli withdrawal but also negotiations for a lasting peace. The Romanian prime minister pleaded in the General Assembly for a new international ethic and offered Romanian help in bringing about a peaceful settlement. Lall thought that Romania's contribution was "worthy of the United Nations."[9] The Soviet draft resolution was defeated, and the stunned expressions on the faces of Andrei Gromyko and the Arab foreign ministers gave the Israeli delegates "almost sensual satisfaction." The proposals of Albania and Cuba were also defeated.[10]

Most of the Arab states were by now reconciled to some kind of settlement with Israel, though there was some fear of another Israeli attack. When King Hussein was in Cairo, Nasser urged him to negotiate with "the Americans" for a total Israeli withdrawal, so long as Egypt did not have to conclude a separate peace. Nasser was deeply grateful for Hussein's active support in the war: Hussein had been "brave and honest", and Nasser was ready to share everything Egypt had with Jordan, "to link its destiny fully and finally with the cause of the heroic Jordanian people under your patriotic leadership . . . " Hussein presented his ideas to president Johnson on 28 June, offering to demilitarize the West Bank if Israel would withdraw. Johnson pressed Hussein to engage in direct negotiations with Israel. Hussein later reported to Nasser on his talks, and it was clear to them that new Arab concessions would be needed if Israel were to be induced to withdraw from the West Bank. Neither Jordan nor Egypt exported oil, however, so neither could use the oil weapon, a matter that had greatly interested Nikolai Podgorny, the Soviet president. Podgorny, who had been in Cairo to

help mend the Soviet-Egyptian fence, assured Nasser of Soviet support but stressed the importance which the Soviet Union attached to a political settlement by peaceful means. He invited Nasser to visit Moscow, and Nasser offered the Soviet Union naval facilities in the Mediterranean. It was presumably during Podgorny's visit that arrangements were finalized for the visit of Soviet warships to Alexandria. Soon Cairo was awash with "Les rumeurs les plus fantastique". The Soviet Union stepped up the supply of arms, and "in a fairly short time Egypt and Syria were being supplied [with weapons] by the Soviet Union on a scale far exceeding anything seen before 1967, including the most up-to-date missiles", though deliveries were not as prompt as the Arabs had hoped.[11]

In the General Assembly, the Arabs expressed their gratitude for Soviet help, praised de Gaulle, complained about U.S. support for Zionism and Israel, and alleged that Israel was mistreating Arab civilians in the occupied territories. Lall found the speech of Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt "replete with benignity", and King Hussein's speech "sobering": the "most persuasive and comprehensive" Arab speech, in Lall's view, was delivered by prime minister Mahgoub of Sudan. Ambassador Baroody of Saudi Arabia made seven separate interventions during this phase of debate.[12]

The African and Asian countries condemned Israel and supported the Arabs, and India repeated the suggestions which it had previously put forward in the Security Council. Yugoslavia took the lead in convening the non-aligned delegations,[13] and a draft resolution based on Tito's ideas was submitted, co-sponsored by India and fourteen other non-aligned countries. This would have called for withdrawal by Israel, asked for strict observance of the cease-fire, asked the Secretary-General to appoint a representative to assist in securing compliance and to keep contact with the parties, and have asked the Security Council to "consider all aspects of the situation in the Middle East" and seek a peaceful solution in accordance with the UN Charter.[14]

The Latin American and Carribean countries called for a settlement of all issues in accordance with international law: indeed, the speeches of their representatives put strong emphasis on juridical principles, anxiety about the Holy Places in Jerusalem, and concern for the Palestinian refugees. Lall considers that Latin American diplomats showed "admirable restraint". A draft resolution sponsored by most of the states in the region would have asked for no threat or use of force, declared the occupation or acquisition of territory by force to be invalid, called for freedom of transit through international waterways,

urged an appropriate and full solution of the refugee problem, affirmed the territorial inviolability and political independence of all states in the region "through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones", and called for an international régime for the city of Jerusalem. This proposal seemed to U Thant "most even handed and realistic". Riad maintains that Goldberg did his best "to obstruct and derail" the Latin American proposal. Federenko urged Riad to vote in favour of the Latin American text, but Riad said that Egypt was bound by the principle of Arab solidarity, and the Arab states had agreed to oppose it because it seemed to reward Israel with a prize for aggression. Although the Latin American proposal failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority (to the delight of Israel and the United States, according to Riad), it formed a basis of negotiation four months later.[15]

In spite of the most intense efforts, the non-aligned countries were unable to devise a text which all the parties would accept, nor had a compromise with the Latin Americans been possible. Lall believes that if the non-aligned countries had moved faster, or if it had been possible to defer the vote for a week or so, an agreed text might have been produced. When the draft of India, Yugoslavia, and other non-aligned countries was put to the vote, it won a majority but not the necessary two-thirds. Eban regarded this as one of Israel's greatest political victories ever.[16]

George Brown addressed the Assembly for Britain on 21 June, just after Harold Wilson had been to Paris to see de Gaulle. Wilson had found de Gaulle "old and tired", dejected because Kosygin had turned down his proposal for four-power talks. France had been traditionally supportive of Israel and critical of the Arabs, but de Gaulle couldn't understand why Britain always sided with the United States. The two men could agree on only two things about the Middle East: that for a time they had both taken the same line about cutting off supplies of arms, and that neither intended to go to New York for the emergency Assembly. Wilson noted that de Gaulle was seventy-six and had little to look forward to: after his death, wrote Wilson, France's influence in the world affairs declined until Giscard d'Estaing sought a role for France within the European Community.[17]

In his speech in the Assembly, George Brown stressed the need to strengthen the UN truce organization. Britain had long-standing ties of friendship with all the states of the region. There should be no "territorial aggrandizement": if Israel purported to annex the Old City of Jerusalem, it would lose much international support. Eban found that

Brown's speech had caused anxiety in Israel because of the possibility of "preventive international action" over Jerusalem. Eban thought that Brown was original, lucid, and humane, but he had "an unpredictable range of emotional reaction" and "no excess of false modesty."[18]

The British cabinet met the next day and Wilson reported on his talks in Paris. George Thomson warned about threats to sterling balances and the oil problem. Several ministers asked why George Brown was making such great speeches: wouldn't it be more prudent for Britain to keep its head down? Crossman noted in his diary that Brown had been getting more critical of Israel since the war. It would be intolerable, in Crossman's view, for Israel to withdraw to "the insane" armistice demarcation lines, which were "impossible peace frontiers." At the end of the meeting, Wilson responded to the criticisms of George Brown - the "most brilliant evasive action" that Crossman had ever seen, "absolutely brilliant..." What Brown had meant, said Wilson, quoting his foreign minister's New York speech verbatim, was that there should be "no territorial aggrandisement", but equally no "automatic" annexation of occupied territories. Crossman came to the conclusion that Wilson and Brown were "talking one language to the Jews outside and another language to us inside Cabinet."[19]

Maurice Couve de Murville, French foreign minister, drew the Assembly's attention to the interests of the great powers, which emphasized "the world-wide nature of the crisis." Lall comments that France's emphasis on big-four consultations was "unique" and only added obstacles to international understanding.[20]

Most of the other Western speakers stressed the principles for a comprehensive settlement, principles which later found a place in resolution 242. Italy and the Netherlands emphasized the need for economic development transcending national barriers.[21] Sweden offered to provide additional personnel for the truce organization.[22] Canada pressed for the full use of UN agencies, including the Palestine Conciliation Commission.[23] The Netherlands spoke of the need for free access to the Holy Places.[24]

Lyndon Johnson had decided not to appear at the United Nations. The United States regarded the emergency Assembly as "premature" since possibilities in the Security Council had not been exhausted. Kosygin was in New York, and if Johnson had put in an appearance, de Gaulle and Wilson would arrive too, and a four-power meeting would be unavoidable. "I'll stay here," said L.B.J., "and make a speech on Monday [19 June], before the Assembly opens." Kosygin was due to speak at 10.30 a.m. on the Monday, and Johnson appeared on the

television screen half an hour earlier, stressing the following principles: disengagement and withdrawal of forces, recognition of the political independence and territorial integrity of all countries within recognized boundaries, the right of all sovereign nations to exist in peace and security, a just and equitable solution of the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, registration and limitation of arms shipments. Thant was disappointed that Johnson had chosen to make an important statement outside the United Nations: "... by design or coincidence, President Johnson downgraded the United Nations..."[25]

Goldberg had spoken briefly in the Assembly on the Saturday, perhaps without clearing the text with Wathington,[26] repeating U.S. reservations about the convening of the Assembly, but emphasizing the intention of the United States to make a constructive contribution to the session. Goldberg spoke again on the Tuesday morning, emphasizing the principles which had formed the crux of Johnson's television address. The U.S. principles were put in a draft resolution, but this was not pressed to a vote.[27]

Eban had advised the government of Israel "to proceed with patience and refrain from any ostentatious action." While in New York he received his government's proposals for peace and was "pleasantly surprised" by their moderation. The government, wrote Rafael, had "clearly subordinated territorial claims to the postulates of peace." The Israeli plan was based on "the original international boundaries", but with demilitarization of the areas from which Israeli forces would withdraw. Eban told Dean Rusk that his government was examining the constitutional precedents for separating the West Bank from Jordan, to which Rusk responded drily that there were plenty of precedents "for letting people themselves decide." There were differences of view within Israel about the timeliness of annexing East Jerusalem, and the delegation in New York, including a multi-party group of parliamentarians, sent a cable stressing the harm that would be done if an announcement on the taking over of East Jerusalem were made while the United Nations was debating Israel's withdrawal. They urged that action on East Jerusalem should be deferred until after the Assembly had adjourned, but to no avail.[28]

Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem (for that is what it amounted to) caused great international concern, in some cases indignation, and it has not been generally recognized. Johnson and Rusk were forthright in their condemnation of Israel's hasty act, taken without consultation with religious leaders or friendly states. The Vatican issued a statement reaffirming its stand in 1947—9, that "the only solution" which offered

"a sufficient guarantee for the protection of Jerusalem and its holy places" was international supervision and control of the city and its vicinity.[29]

Eban, who spoke best extemporaneously, sat up most of the night drafting the main Israeli speech, and he went to the rostrum immediately after Kosygin. He stressed, as did subsequent Israeli speakers, the long standing Arab threats and provocations, and he "reject[ed] with indignation any statement... asserting that Israel [was] responsible for the hostilities..." He referred to the paralysis of the United Nations: every "just and constructive judgment" in the Security Council had been frustrated by the veto, so the Council had become a one-way street. The Soviet government had formulated "an obscene comparison" between Israel's defence forces and the Hitlerite hordes. The Soviet Union had asked that the General Assembly should be convened, said Eban, not for the purpose of devising constructive solutions, but merely in order to condemn Israel. Instead of ascribing blame, the Assembly should prescribe "a series of principles for the construction of a new future in the Middle East". It was not possible to restore "everything to where it was before 5 June... " He said that everything was normal and peaceful in the occupied territories, that Israelis were not being allowed to settle on the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, and that no Arabs were being expelled other than those who had been living in synagogues in the Old City of Jerusalem. Israel's legislation about the administrative union of East and West Jerusalem was "not a retreat, but an advance towards the situation of peace, reverence, sanctity and free access..." Eban said that Israel wished to negotiate freely with her neighbours "durable and just solutions..."[30]

Lall found Eban's speech "forthright" so far as it went, though some important matters were undefined, and general Bull thought that Israel was missing an opportunity for peace. "If Israel had wanted real peace after her great victories in 1967, she might have achieved it." Israel, in Bull's views, should have put all her cards on the table and offered to withdraw from all territories occupied in 1967 in exchange for recognition, justice, and security. If that had happened, then the Arabs, shocked by the total defeat, would have agreed.[31] U Thant thought that Eban was "linguistically nimble, politically able, and personally affable," but Thant replied in firm tones to Eban's strictures on the United Nations. Thant said he had engaged in proper consultations before deciding to withdraw the UN Emergency Force. It had always been the intention of the General Assembly that the Force should be stationed on both sides of the line, but Israel had consistently refused to have the Force on Israeli territory.[32]

Thant was no doubt feeling sensitive at this time about criticisms of his reaction to the Egyptian demand that UNEF should withdraw. The previous day there had been published in the *New York Times* the text of an *aide-mémoire* which Dag Hammarskjold had prepared on 5 August 1957 regarding the "good faith" agreement with Egypt about UNEF. This had not been issued as a UN document and its existence was not known beyond a small circle. Hammarskjold had lodged a copy with Ernest Gross, a former deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, and Gross had used this as background material for a passage in a book on the UN published in 1962. On the day on which Thant had issues his first report to the Security Council on the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force, Gross had sent a copy of the Hammarskjold *aide-mémoire* to the U.S. mission to the United Nations. The release of the memorandum at this particular juncture could have been highly embarassing to U Thant, and I have tried to learn what action was taken by U.S. diplomats, though without success. I have, in particular, consulted ambassador Arthur Goldberg and William B. Buffum, who was Goldberg's deputy in 1967 and is now a UN under secretary. Ambassador Goldberg has no recollection of the Hammarskjold memorandum, and Buffum cannot shed any light on the subject as he was not personally involved in 1967. Although an Israeli friend has suggested to me that the *aide-mémoire* was circulated to some or perhaps all members of the Security Council in 1957, I have found no evidence to this effect.[33]

It is clear from the *aide-mémoire* that the "good faith" understanding which Hammarskjold had negotiated in Cairo in November 1956 had been concluded with difficulty because of Egypt's insistence on its undisputed legal right to request the withdrawal of UNEF and Hammarskjold's wish to induce Egypt to limit its freedom of action by making a request for withdrawal dependent on UNEF having completed the tasks entrusted to it. Ideally Hammarskjold would have liked to tie Egypt by an agreement that withdrawal should be decided by the General Assembly. "Put in this naked form, however, the problem could never have been settled." Hammarskjold had therefore devised the "good faith" formula. If Egypt requested withdrawal, the matter would at once be brought before the General Assembly. If the Assembly found that UNEF's task had been completed, withdrawal would take place. If the Assembly found to the contrary and Egypt maintained its stand, "Egypt would break the agreement with the United Nations." It had been no easy task to persuade Nasser to accept this formula, wrote Hammarskjold, and three times Hammarskjold had

threatened to withdraw UNEF and report the fact to the General Assembly. He had spent seven hours with Nasser on 17 November 1956, and then jotted a few lines in his diary: "How humble the tool when praised for what the hand has done."[34]

As soon as the Hammarskjold *aide-mémoire* was published in 1967, U Thant issued his own comments, but in the form of a press release rather than as an official UN document. Thant stressed that the *aide-mémoire* had not been issued as a UN document, nor had it been conveyed to the Egyptian authorities, and its very existence had been known to only a small circle. Indeed, Thant cast doubts on the authenticity of the document ("...if it existed at all..."). The so-called "good faith agreement of November 1956" could not possible have envisaged or have had any relevance to "the function defined for UNEF by the General Assembly" on 2 February 1957.[35] The document ignored the fact that UNEF had operated only on the Egyptian side of the 'ine "because of Israel's firm refusal to accept it on the Israeli side", and "no one could possibly question the full right of [Egypt] to move its troops to the line whenever it might choose to do so" and thus make it impossible for UNEF to perform any useful function. The release of the document at such a critical time raised "some question of ethics and good faith."[36]

The row about the publication of this memorandum could not but cast a pall over the General Assembly. The president of the Assembly made two interventions in the debate, one on humanitarian matters, and one suggesting that there was "a broad consensus" or "virtual unanimity" on certain political issues.[37] Israeli measures in Jerusalem gave rise to a draft resolution sponsored by five Islamic countries, declaring the Israeli decision to be invalid and asking that it be rescinded. A separate resolution on human rights and humanitarian questions, sponsored by a mixed group of twenty-six countries from different regions, welcomed a previous decision of the Security Council; noted the humanitarian activities of Red Cross agencies, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the president of the General Assembly; welcomed, endorsed, or commended the work of the UN Agency for Palestine Refugees; called or appealed for humanitarian aid to the region; and made two requests to the Secretary-General to report. The draft on Jerusalem was passed by 99 votes to none, with 20 abstentions (see Appendix 9), while that on human rights and humanitarian questions was passed by 116 votes to none, Cuba and Syria being the only abstainers (see Appendix 10).[38]

The resolutions on Jerusalem and humanitarian questions were

passed by substantial majorities but it is difficult to explain the voting on the Afro-Asian and Latin American proposals on a political settlement if attention is directed solely to the intrinsic merits of the texts. Regional or ideological solidarity undoubtedly played a significant part. Three countries voted in favour of both drafts (Cameroon, Congo-Zaire, Japan) and eleven others abstained or were absent on both (Haiti, Kenya, Laos, Maldives, Malta, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden). Most Western countries voted in favour of the Latin American-Caribbean text, but France, Greece, Spain, and Turkey abstained, and all the sponsors of the non-aligned draft except Cambodia and all the Communist and Arab countries voted against. The non-aligned draft had the support of all the Arab states and all the Communist states except Albania, but the Latin American and Caribbean states voted against. Israel voted against the non-aligned text and abstained on the Latin American-Caribbean draft.

Eban has noted that the United Nations is a stage, but that the play can be anything from high drama to sordid farce. His colleague Rafael commented that on this occasion "... the United Nations distinguished itself more by the selectivity of its compassion than by the universality of its humanity."[39]

Notes

1. *Middle East Record,* pp. 21, 24, 27, 68; Johnson pp. 481–3; Thant, pp. 272–3.
2. Johnson, pp. 483–4; Jabber, pp. 122–4, 180–1, 189 (docs. 119–21, 199, 208); letters to the author from Dean Rusk and Eugene V. Rostow dated 24 August 1983 and 11 July 1983 respectively; *Middle East Record*, p. 40; Thant, pp. 272–3.
3. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 8–9, A/6730/Add. 2; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 151–6, 271–5, 299–302, S/7930/Adds. 10–17, S/8001-A/6723, S/8021; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 22–30, S/7930/Adds. 18–23; Thant, p. 276.
4. For Arab complaints, see SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 257, 268–9, 282–3, 286–7, 295–7, S/7988, S/7989, S/7991, S/7993, S/8004-A/6725, S/8007-A/6726, S/8017-A/6733; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 57–8, 60–1, S/8030-A/6744, S/8032-A/6745, S/8033-A/6747; 1531st plenary mtg. (22 June 1967), para. 4; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1533rd plenary mtg. (23 June 1967), paras. 2–9; 1541st plenary mtg. (29 June 1967), paras. 5–7; 1542nd plenary mtg. (29 June 1967), paras. 138–42. For Israeli communications, see SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 280–1, 292–3, 298–9, S/8003,

S/8012, S/8013-A/6729, S/8019-A/6734; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 61–2, 67–8, 102–3, S/8034-A/6748, S/8041-A6751, S/8069-A/6762; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1534th plenary mtg. (23 June 1967), paras. 125–32; Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 21–2, A/6732.

5. Rafael, p. 173; Eban, p. 431; Lall, p. 123; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1526th plenary mtg. (19 June 1967), paras. 66, 69, 82.

6. See Jabber, pp. 119–20, 128–32, 138–9 (docs. 117, 128, 130, 137).

7. SCOR, 5th emergency special session, 1535th plenary mtg. (26 June 1967), paras. 18–68 (esp. 34, 47); 1545th plenary mtg. (3 July 1967), paras. 82–91.

8. Ibid., 1534th plenary met. (23 June 1967), paras. 53–89; 1547th plenary mtg. (4 July 1967), paras. 1–10.

9. *Middle East Record,* pp. 38, 236, 242; SCOR, 5th emergency special session, 1533rd plenary mtg. (23 June 1967), paras. 129–64 (esp. 156, 164); 1548th plenary mtg. (4 July 1967), paras. 67–75; Lall, p. 117. See also Jabber, p. 169 (doc. 179).

10. SCOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 39–40, 43, A/L.519, A/L.521, A/L.524, A/L.525; 1548th plenary mtg. (4 July 1967), paras. 157–8, 169–74, 176; Lall, p. 147; Eban, p. 440.

11. Jabber, pp. 611–2 (docs. 383–4); Bull, pp. 125–6, 141; Riad, pp. 42–6, 49, 53; *Middle East Record,* pp. 20, 24–6, 259–60; Rouleau, pp. 145, 160; Glassman, p. 53.

12. Riad. p. 42; Lall, pp. 129, 150; Rouleau, pp. 111, 161; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1526th plenary mtg. (19 June 1967), paras. 200–8; 1527th plenary met. (20 June 1967), paras. 137–77; 1529th plenary mtg. (21 June 1967), paras. 38–67; 1530th plenary mtg. (21 June 1967), paras 37–100; 1536th plenary mtg. (26 June 1967), paras. 1–28, 148–209; 1538th plenary mtg. (27 June 1967), paras. 149–76; 1541st plenary mtg. (29 June 1967), paras 21–51; 1549th plenary mtg. (5 July 1967), paras. 100–22, 214–225.

13. For Yugoslav policy, see Jabber, pp. 126–8 (doc. 127).

14. SCOR, 5th emergency special session, 1530th plenary mtg. (21 June 1967), paras. 152, 155, 157, 172–3; 1548th plenary mtg. (4 July 1967), para. 167; Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 40–2, A/L. 522 and Revs; *Middle East Record,* p. 80.

15. Lall, pp. 155–6, 159–60, 163–4, 166; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 42–3, A/L.523 and Adds. and Rev. 1; 1548th plenary met. (4 July 1967), paras. 58, 177; Thant, p. 272; Riad, p. 47.

16. Lall, pp. 172–6, 183–4; Eban, p. 440.

17. Wilson, *Chariots of Fire,* pp. 357–9, 361; Crossman, p. 392; Jabber, pp. 118–9, 138, 141 (docs. 116, 135–6, 139).

18. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1529th plenary mtg. (21 June 1967), paras. 13, 15–6, 28–30; Eban, pp. 436–8.

19. Crossman, pp. 392–3, 554. See also Jabber, pp. 132–7 (docs. 131–3).

20. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1531st plenary mtg. (22 June 1967),

para. 99; Lall, pp. 142—3. For other statements on French policy, see Jabber, pp. 109—12, 114—5 (docs. 106, 107, 111).

21. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1529th plenary met. (21 June 1967), para. 135; 1539th met. (28 June 1967), para. 54(6).

22. Ibid., 1533rd plenary mtg. (23 June 1967), para. 96.

23. Ibid., paras. 118—20.

24. Ibid., 1539th plenary mtg. (28 June 1967), paras. 48, 54(7).

25. Jabber, pp. 116—8 (doc. 114), also p. 137 (doc. 134). SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 256—7, S/7987-A/6718; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1527th plenary mtg. (20 June 1967), paras. 17—21; Rostow, p. 265; Eban, p. 430; Thant, pp. 267—8.

26. Conversation with a diplomat who was in New York, 26 June 1983.

27. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1525th plenary mtg. (17 June 1967), paras. 3, 26—31; 1527th plenary mtg. (20 June 1967), paras. 12—46; 1548th plenary mtg. (4 July 1967), para. 175; Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 39, A/L. 520: *Select Chronology and Background Documents relating to the Middle East,* U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1969, pp. 241—3.

28. Rafael, pp. 176—8; Eban, p. 438; Jabber, pp. 115—6 (doc. 113).

29. Jabber, pp. 120—1, 125, 142, 614—5 (docs. 118, 123—4, 140, 387); *Middle East Record,* pp. 45, 295—6.

30. Ibid., pp. 429, 432; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1526th plenary mtg. (19 June 1967), paras. 157—63, 165—81; 1536th plenary mtg. (26 June 1967), paras. 96, 107—41, 143—4; 1541st plenary mtg. (29 June 1967), paras. 100—8; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 73—7, S/8052-A/6753.

31. Lall, p. 140; Bull, pp. 125—6 and letter to the author, 4 April 1983.

32. Thant, p. 269; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1527th plenary mtg. (20 June 1967), paras. 1—11.

33. Letters to the author from Arthur J. Goldberg, William B. Buffum, and Brian Urquhart dated 10 January 1984, 16 September 1983, and 31 August 1983 respectively; letter from a U.S. diplomat, 18 August 1983; letters from British diplomats, 12 July 1983, 28 July 1983, and 8 September 1983.

34. *International Legal Materials: Current Documents,* May-June 1967, pp. 595 - 602; Dag Hammarskjold, *Markings,* translated by W.H. Auden and Leif Sjoberg, London, Faber, p. 121.

35. G.A. res. 1125(X), 2 Feb. 1957.

36. UN Information Centre, London, PR/67/23, 20 June 1967; Thant, p. 271.

37. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1536th plenary mtg. (26 June 1967), paras. 29—37; 1549th plenary mtg. (5 July 1967), paras. 2—19.

38. GAOR, 22nd session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 43—4, A/L. 527; 1548th mtg. (4 July 1967), paras. 178, 181; G.A. res. 2252 (ESS-V), 4 July 1967; G.A. res. 2253 (ESS-V), 4 July 1967; Thant, p. 274.

39. Eban, p. 429; Rafael, p. 176.

8. UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES TO DEPLOY OBSERVERS ALONG SUEZ CANAL

> The capacity of [the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization], even with scant facilities for observation, to transmit information to the Security Council was of immense value...
> Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967,* p. 84.

There had been a serious military incident on the Suez Canal on 30 June, and there were several clashes at the beginning of July, leading Thant to suggest to Egypt and Israel that UN observers were needed to prevent violations of the cease-fire. On the morning of Saturday 8 July, Egypt asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. That afternoon, Israel also asked for a meeting. The Council convened at 6 p.m., and more than half of the meeting was taken up with a Soviet complaint about the form of the provisional agenda. The Council met again on the Sunday afternoon and, with two suspensions, continued until after midnight.[1]

Egypt complained of new Israeli aggression.[2] Israel referred to a "chain of incidents" but claimed that the first violations had been committed by Egypt.[3] Federenko condemned Israel for again disturbing the peace, attacked the United States for its acts in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic, said that the Soviet Union firmly supported the Arabs, and suggested that the Security Council should impose sanctions against Israel – though he made no express proposal to that effect, even in informal consultations.[4] Mali urged the Security Council to secure an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories.[5]

U Thant proposed formally that UN observers should be deployed between the two sides in the Suez Canal area,[6] and this idea was supported by Britain, the United States, and India.[7] Caradon and Goldberg expressed dismay at Federenko's intemperate speech, and Caradon called for security and stability in the Middle East, to be achieved by international authority and action.[8] Finally, a statement of consensus in support of the Secretary-General's proposal was drafted in informal discussions, read by the president, and accepted by the Council. The president then strengthened the consensus by twice calling it a "decision", and no member raised objection (see Appendix 11). Lall

comments that the decision was "more substantive" and "somewhat stronger" than the earlier calls for a cease-fire.[9]

General Bull at once contacted the parties about implementing the consensus. When he met Dayan on 12 July, Dayan asked what terms for patrolling Egypt would accept, as he wanted conditions to be the same on both sides of the Canal. At first, Dayan would not agree that UN observers should be free to move from their observation posts, and he wanted the cease-fire line down the middle of the Canal to be marked on a map. Bull found the Egyptians suspicious and unhelpful, wishing to impose conditions which were "completely unacceptable" to the United Nations. The Egyptians rejected Dayan's proposal for a line down the middle of the Canal, holding that the whole of the Canal was Egyptian territory. Bull pressed for a ban on navigation by both sides, and eventually an implicit agreement to suspend normal navigation was accepted by Israel and Egypt.[10]

Egypt and Israel both raised difficulties about the use of radios across the Canal by UN observers, and Egypt also objected to the use of code. Bull said that these restrictions would make it impossible for UN observers to perform their functions. Eventually agreement was reached that radio communications across the Canal would be routed through Bull's headquarters in Jerusalem, but Egypt stood firm on the ban on code. In the end, both Egypt and Israel agreed to limited UN land patrols. It took about three weeks to sort out these practical problems. Bull would have liked at least two UN patrol boats, but the parties never agreed to this.[11] By 5 August, 16 observers had been deployed on each side. Bull reports that on 12 August, Thant asked for an increase in the number of observers to 50.[12]

Bull's problems were not yet over, however. "It required two weeks of very difficult negotiations before the observers could work fairly efficiently. Eventually 9 OPs [observation posts] were deployed on each side of the Canal, with a minimum of communications to support [them]." Later, during the so-called War of Attrition (1969–70), the number of OPs on each side was reduced to 5.[13] Israel insisted that when Bull wished to cross the Canal, he should do so in an Israeli boat, but as Israel had no boats on the Canal at this stage, "this was tantamount to an Israeli veto ..." The observers were constantly at risk from firing, and Bull asked Thant for metal helmets and splinter-proof vests. Thant was at first most reluctant to meet this request "on the grounds that [it] had never been done before," but eventually agreed. In the middle of July there was another episode of firing across the Canal, with air support, leading to casualties on both sides. On 26

August, there was a further resurgence of military activity and an Egyptian fighter plane was shot down: both sides blamed the other for violating the cease-fire. The most serious incident, however, took place ten days later when the UN observers heard three explosions, which an Egyptian officer explained were due to "firing practice". Small Israeli vessels now appeared in the vicinity of Port Tawfiq, and Egypt warned that if they crossed beyond a certain line, they would be fired on. They did, and they were; and Israel retaliated by shelling Port Tawfiq and Suez. Soon there was firing along the whole length of the Canal, leading to 42 Egyptian civilians and 3 soldiers being killed and 161 injured. Israeli forces also suffered heavy casualties.[14]

Notes

1. *Middle East Record*, p. 297; Thant, p. 277; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 69–71, S/8043, S/8044; 1365th mtg. (8 July 1967), paras. 2, 5–8, 14–18, 27–31, 33–9, 46–9.
2. Ibid., paras. 62–6.
3. Ibid., paras. 86, 89–103.
4. Ibid., 1366th mtg. (9/10 July 1967), paras. 4–18, 21, 23, 26–9; Lall, p. 201.
5. SCOR, 22nd year, 1366th mtg. (9/10 July 1967), paras. 60, 67–8.
6. Ibid., 1365th mtg. (8 July 1967), paras. 58–60; 1366th mtg. (9/10 July 1967), paras. 73–4; S/8046, 9 July 1967 (mimeo.).
7. SCOR, 22nd year, 1366th mtg. (9/10 July 1967), paras. 40, 42–3, 49–50, 121.
8. Ibid., paras. 32, 45–6.
9. Ibid., paras. 125–7, 130; Lall, p. 203.
10. Bull, pp. 132–6; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to September 1967, pp. 81–6, paras. 12–22 of and Annexes to S/8053/Add. 1, and S/8053/Add. 2; Comay, p. 41.
11. Bull, pp. 134–5; *Middle East Record,* pp. 298–9.
12. SCOR, 22nd year, 1366th mtg. (9 July 1967), paras. 125–7; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 77–83, S/8053 and Add. 1; Thant, p. 280; Bull, p. 138.
13. Letter to the author from general Bull, 4 April 1983.
14. Bull, pp. 139–40; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 35–41, 226–7, 229–32, S/7930/Adds. 31–5, S/8140, S/8145; *Middle East Record*, pp. 298, 300.

9. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESUMES EMERGENCY
SPECIAL SESSION

> The United Nations served as a potent catalyst in the transfor-
> mation of the Arab refugee problem from a humanitarian
> issue ... into an intractable political problem. Inexhaustible
> debates and repetitive resolutions dehumanized an essentially
> humanitarian and manageable problem and turned it into a
> weapon of war ... Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace,* p. 176.

The emergency special General Assembly resumed its debate on 12 July
after a week's "reprieve", being kept alive "by artificial diplomatic
respiration", as Eban put it. The Assembly continued in session for ten
more days, searching once again for a basis for peace. Britain was eager
for a settlement and was anxious to have the Suez Canal re-opened.
George Thomson had said in the House of Commons that Britain
wanted the friendship of the Arab countries, for Britain was dependent
on oil from the Middle East. "George Brown ... did not mince his
words", writes Gideon Rafael, "when recounting the losses the closure
of the canal was causing his country." The Soviet Union had convened
a conference of East European Communist Parties, including Yugo-
slavia but not Romania, which had reaffirmed support for the Arabs.
At the same time, the Soviet Union had urged the Arabs to be more
flexible and to abandon non-recognition of Israel in exchange for
Israeli withdrawal. Egypt was undoubtedly more flexible than pre-
viously, but the Arabs were seriously divided.[1]

During the first three days of the resumed session of the General
Assembly, much attention was directed to a proposal on Jerusalem
initiated by Pakistan and co-sponsored by six non-Arab Islamic
countries. This did not add anything to the Assembly's previous res-
olution: it deplored Israel's failure to implement the Assembly's call to
rescind all measures to alter the status of Jerusalem and asked the
Security Council "to ensure the implementation of the present resolu-
tion." The main purpose of the proposal was not to change anything
in the Middle East but, as Lall stresses, it was useful mainly for the
purpose of extending the life of the session. The proposal was passed
by a large majority, with a mixed group of eighteen abstainers (see
Appendix 12).[2]

The Latin American-Carribean countries and the non-Arab countries

of Africa and Asia took little part in this phase. The Communist states again gave full support to the Arabs and condemned Israel, though Albania also attacked Soviet revisionism.[3] The Arabs deplored the failure of the General Assembly to induce Israel to withdraw and criticized Israel for looting property and mistreating people. Ambassador Baroody, prolix as ever, made three more orotund interventions, severely trying the patience of the Assembly's president.[4]

Eban denounced the orgy of bigotry and hatred manifested by critics of Israel, defended Israeli acts in Jerusalem, and reaffirmed Israel's willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement with its Arab neighbours.[5]

The most passionate Western speaker was Lord Caradon, who succinctly summed up the tasks before the Assembly:

> There must be disengagement and withdrawal; there must equally be final security against renewed hostility; there must be relief and rehabilitation on a new and imaginative scale never before contemplated [; there] must be demilitarized frontiers; there must be an end of the arms race; there must be a restoration of international authority.[6]

The president of the Assembly, ambassador Abdul Rahman Pazhwak of Afghanistan, did his best to encourage the blocs and groups to seek agreement, but without success. There was a desultory debate on 17 July on credentials and Chinese representation, and a procedural motion to approve the report of the Credentials Committee was adopted.[7]

Then, suddenly, a break-through seemed close. Leadership of the Soviet delegation was the responsibility of foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, ably assisted by Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador in Washington and a former under secretary in the UN Secretariat, "a crafty diplomat", according to Rafael. Dobrynin and Goldberg met on 18 July and discussed a revised version of the draft which the Latin American and Caribbean states had submitted in the first phase of the emergency Assembly, but amended in the light of the remarks of the president of the Assembly. The crucial paragraphs of this new draft would have affirmed (to please the Arabs) that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible so that Israel's forces would withdraw, and have affirmed also (to please Israel) that all states in the region were entitled to political sovereignty and territorial integrity, free from threat of war, so that claims of belligerency should be terminated. The draft would have asked the Security Council to continue its efforts with a

sense of urgency, working with the parties and making use of the presence of the United Nations, and looking towards a just solution of all aspects of the problem. There was enough of a common mind on this draft for a meeting between Gromyko and Goldberg to be held the following day. This led to substantial U.S. Soviet agreement on an amended version of the Latin American text. The "conquest of territory by war" would have been declared to be inadmissible so that "parties to the conflict" should withdraw "without delay" from territories occupied after 4 June: each state had the right to maintain "an independent national state ... and live in peace and security ..." This agreement, writes Lall, was "unexpected, belated, and swift" and had "a memorable character ..." Its advantage, in the U.S. view, was that it would split the moderate Arabs from the extremists.[8]

Gromyko asked for a recess of twenty-four hours so that he could commend the agreed text to the Arab delegations, but they rejected it out of hand. The non-aligned states were dismayed at this Arab intransigence, and there was "profound and even bitter disappointment" in most groups in the Assembly.[9]

It is interesting how both parties blamed the other for the collapse of the U.S.–Soviet compromise. Bernard Reich writes that it was "not cleared by the Arab states and did not come about." Mahmoud Riad does not refer to Arab opposition to the compromise, simply commenting that the United States "withdrew its support ... only forty-eight hours later."[10] The Soviet Union thereafter took the line that the draft should be regarded as a tentative working paper only.

But the truth was that both the Arabs and Israel rejected the text, and Eban told Goldberg that Israel would not withdraw its forces on the basis of the U.S.–Soviet draft. Israel was suspicious of any signs of U.S.–Soviet cooperation at the United Nations. Israel considered that the wording about withdrawal could be interpreted to mean withdrawal to the armistice demarcation lines, so that the United Nations would become "a cover for continued belligerence." Moreover, the reference to the inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war was, in Israel's view, a "doubtful principle ..." Eban told Goldberg that he could see no difference between the U.S.–Soviet formula and Kosygin's call for unconditional withdrawal, and he warned that if the U.S.–Soviet draft were persisted in, "the United States would embark on a collision course with Israel." The Israeli delegation was especially indignant because it had not been "taken fully into the confidence of the United States" about the discussions with the Soviet Union. Eban had the impression that Israel's American friends were "acutely un-

comfortable." But president Johnson told Eban that the further Israel moved from the territorial situation which had prevailed before the June war, the further Israel moved from peace.[11]

Thant considered that Dobrynin's appearance in New York was a significant feature of this period, and he noted gleefully in his memoirs that Federenko was "on the way out." The fact that the U.S.–Soviet draft was unacceptable to the parties did not lessen its significance and in Thant's view "added luster to Goldberg, who is himself a Jew, as well as to Gromyko and Dobrynin . . ."[12]

After the failure of the Gromyko-Goldberg formula, there was nothing useful the Assembly could do. A proposal of Austria, Finland, and Sweden to remit the Middle East question back to the Security Council as a matter of urgency and to adjourn the Assembly was approved on 21 July by 63 votes to 26 (mainly Arab, but including Albania and Cuba), with 27 abstentions (including France, Israel, and Yugoslavia) (see Appendix 13).[13]

The emergency session of the General Assembly "turned out to be futile", wrote Thant, "despite the glittering assemblage of world leaders." The debate, wrote Caradon, had been "long, fruitless and frustrating . . ."[14] The session had, however, prepared the way for the unanimous agreement which was achieved the following November, by making it clear that the Arab-Soviet bloc demand for withdrawal by Israel without any corresponding move by the Arabs had no chance of gaining the necessary votes in either the General Assembly or the Security Council. Eugene Rostow believes that this was achieved by the Johnson–Kosygin meeting at Glassboro, "coupled with our successful blocking tactics at the General Assembly . . ."[15] In any case, the Assembly does not exist simply to pass resolutions.

The Assembly, it is true, did adopt a resolution on humanitarian assistance during the first phase, but this merely called for, welcomed, noted, endorsed, or commended actions by others. The Assembly approved the Islamic proposal which considered invalid the Israeli measures to change the status of Jerusalem and called on Israel to rescind them and desist from further measures; and ten days later, the Assembly deplored Israel's failure to implement the previous resolution. In addition the Assembly adopted three procedural resolutions, one approving the anodyne report of its Credentials Committee, one asking the Security Council to take up "the tense situation in the Middle East . . . as a matter of urgency" (which it did, but three months later), and one asking the regular session of the General Assembly to consider the Middle East "as a matter of high priority", which eventu-

ally resulted in a decision of the General Assembly merely to maintain the item on its agenda. Not only had the underlying dispute not been solved: it had been intensified and prolonged.[16]

There was, of course, much diplomatic activity outside the United Nations. Eshkol told the Knesset that Israel wanted peace and cooperation with its Arab neighbours, to be achieved by direct negotiations "with all the Arab States together, or with any Arab State separately", but that Israel would never again return to "a situation of constant threat ... of blockade and of aggression." As for the territories recently occupied ("the new areas", Eshkol called them), Israel would maintain "fair and equitable relations" with the inhabitants. Eban repeated these points but added that the "June 5th map" of the Middle East had been "destroyed irrevocably."[17]

Nasser delivered a lengthy and polemical speech on 23 July. Egypt had faced "a voracious conspiracy ... a piece of diplomatic fraud... an operation of political deceit..." The aim of Egypt's enemies was to make the Egyptian people despair, but Egypt had lost a battle, not a war. Sandwiched in this long speech was one sigh of hope. The struggle, said Nasser, was primarily political, and Egypt would never close the door to a political solution or to political contacts, "absolutely never." Syria's posture was much more intransigent.[18]

The Soviet line was that Israeli aggression was part of a world-wide imperialist conspiracy against the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[19]

Much U.S. concern was directed to the threat of a new regional arms race in the Middle East.[20] In addition, Lyndon Johnson was encouraging Yugoslavia to exert its utmost efforts towards permanent peace in the region, and president Tito toured the Arab capitals to confer about the U.S. message. Tito took the position that there must be full Israeli withdrawal, on the ground that aggressor should not be rewarded. He favoured the stationing of UN peace-keeping forces along the demarcation lines between Israel and the Arab states, freedom of navigation for Israel in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, and a new effort to deal with the problem of Palestinian refugees, the settlement to be under-girded by a four-power guarantee.[21] These ideas were discussed with Johnson and Rusk at the end of August. The U.S. government thought there was little chance that Tito's plan would be accepted, though Britain viewed it "with sympathy".[22]

A series of radical Arab leaders visited Cairo and approved a Sudanese invitation for an Arab summit meeting, which was held in Khartoum at the end of August.[23] Syria was at loggerheads with the more

conservative Arab régimes and did not participate.[24] There was some opposition to the presence of Shuqairi of the PLO at Khartoum, and he did not endear himself to the other Arab representatives when he interrupted King Hussein to say that only Palestinians could decide the future of the West Bank. As for Johnson's five principles, said Shuqairi, "I refuse to pay this high price." There could be no settlement in the Middle East before a solution had been found for the Palestine problem. Nasser retorted that the Arabs were too weak to recover the West Bank by military means: if the West Bank were to remain indefinitely under Israeli rule, it would gradually become Israeli territory. On 1 September Shuqairi stalked out of the Khartoum conference, and by the end of the year he had lost the confidence of the PLO leadership and had resigned from the chairmanship.[25]

King Hussein made an extensive tour of eight Arab capitals in August, advocating the demilitarization of the Arab areas from which Israel would withdraw, the ending of Jordanian belligerence, and U.S. aid for the settlement of Palestinian refugees on the West Bank.[26] Nasser, who was now warmly disposed towards King Hussein, insisted that because the United States and the Soviet Union were both pressing for a political solution of the Palestine problem, this was the only way forward "at the present time." The Arabs had to move quickly, because the military option was not now open to them. "Thus we have before us only one way ... political action." The Arabs could not bring themselves to deal with Israel directly, so King Hussein should approach the Americans and "agree with them" on the recovery of the West Bank. The Khartoum conference agreed to work for the elimination of the aggression and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, but in the framework of three noes: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. It was reported in the Western press that the conference reached a secret understanding that there would have to be minor revisions of the demarcation lines with Israel, demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula, UN supervision of key border areas, and the future of the Gaza Strip to be subject to negotiation. Several Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya had already resumed oil supplies, and the Khartoum conference decided to end the collective boycott.[27]

Kamel Abu-Jaber writes of the Khartoum conference that "the Arab leaders agreed to seek a peaceful settlement, a political rather than a military settlement ..." Israel could hardly see it in that light, for the conference endorsed the three negatives. These noes did not totally exclude progress towards a settlement, but there was little emerging

from Khartoum to reassure Israeli opinion that the Arabs would agree to real peace.[28]

Just before the conclusion of the emergency Assembly, Secretary-General Thant issued his final report on the first UN Emergency Force. When the request for the withdrawal of UNEF was received, it had consisted of 3,378 men, the major contingents coming from Brazil, Canada, India, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

There had been some looting of UNEF property, pilfering, and vandalism by Israeli soldiers.[29] Thant wrote that, while it was desirable to define clearly in advance all conditions relating to the presence and withdrawal of peace-keeping force, this was unlikely to prove practicable. Once a peace-keeping force was no longer welcome, it could no longer perform a useful function. Peace-keeping should not be confused with enforcement: "The two cannot be mixed." Peace-keeping is quite unlike ordinary soldiering. "The soldier is trained basically to fight. In UNEF, however, he was ordered to avoid fighting [and] could use force only in the last resort in self-defence." UNEF was international "only in a limited sense" as each national contingent normally retained its separate identity. Peace-keeping could succeed only if accompanied by serious and persistent efforts to solve the underlying problem.[30]

In the introduction to this annual report, Secretary-General Thant suggested that it would be "definitely possible", even if difficult, to work out in detail "a blueprint for the solution of the major Arab-Israeli problems in the Middle East . . .", but this would require "international effort, assistance and concerted action . . ." Thant suggested a set of principles, derived from the armistice agreements of 1949 and the UN Charter, which would be relevant to such a blueprint. The United Nations would need strengthened machinery. One helpful step would be to authorize the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to the Middle East to serve as a "channel of communication, as a reporter and interpreter of events and views . . . and as both a sifter and harmonizer of ideas in the area."[31]

The largest number of diplomatic communications to the United Nations during this period concerned alleged violations of the cease-fire or alleged breaches of humanitarian norms. There were 8 Arab[32] and 4 Israeli[33] allegations that the cease-fire had been violated, and 4 denials by Israel;[34] and there was one Syrian and 3 Jordanian complaints about Jerusalem.[35] There were 10 Arab complaints[36] and two from Israel[37] of violations of the Geneva Conventions or other breaches of international humanitarian law, wanton damage to cultural or

religious property, intimidation of civilians, or looting and vandalism. Israel denied all the Arab charges of humanitarian violations except one relating to Jerusalem,[38] and Jordan denied the authenticity of documents which had formed the basis of one Israeli complaint.[39] Israel also complained about an Israeli national who had been "kidnapped by Syrian soldiers" the previous year and subsequently killed, and made a more general allegation that an unspecified number of Israeli citizens in Syrian prisons "were kept incommunicado for many years . . . suffering the most brutal and inhuman physical and mental torture."[40]

The emergency session of the General Assembly adjourned on 21 July but the session was not formally closed. The closure of the session took place on 18 September, the day before the annual regular session of the Assembly opened, and the emergency session asked the regular session to consider the Middle East question "as a matter of high priority" (see Appendix 14).[41]

Notes

1. Lall, p. 204; Eban, p. 442; *Middle East Record*, pp. 19, 59; Rafael, pp. 184—5; Crossman, p. 414; Brecher, p. 323; Riad, p. 49.
2. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 44, A/L. 528 and Rev. 1; 1554th plenary mtg. (14 July 1967), para. 86; G.A. res. 2254 (ES-V), 14 July 1967; Lall, pp. 206—7.
3. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1558th plenary mtg. (21 July 1967), paras. 76—7; Jabber, pp. 150—2 (docs. 146—7).
4. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1555th plenary mtg. (17 July 1967), paras. 10—45; 1558th plenary mtg. (21 July 1967), paras. 16—46, 252—65; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to September 1967, pp. 63—4, 66—7, S/8037-A/6749, S/8040-A/6750.
5. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1550th plenary mtg. (12 July 1967), paras. 86—97, 101, 103—9, 112; 1554th plenary mtg. (14 July 1967), paras. 61—6, 74—6; 1558th plenary mtg. (21 July 1967), paras. 229, 239; see also 1538th plenary mtg. (27 June 1967), paras. 90—116.
6. Ibid., 1553rd mtg. (14 July 1967), para. 8.
7. Ibid., 1554th plenary mtg. (14 July 1967), para. 10; 1555th plenary mtg. (17 July 1967), para. 1—6; 1556th plenary mtg. (17 July 1967), para. 60; G.A. res. 2255 (ES-V), 17 July 1967.
8. Rafael, pp. 178—81; Eban, pp. 442—3; Thant, p. 281; Lall, pp. 208—13 and Appendix 25, p. 312; Riad, pp. 38—9; *Middle East Record*, p. 83.
9. Ibid., p. 83; Lall, p. 212; Rafael, pp. 181—2; Eban, p. 444.
10. Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States—Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p. 127, n. 18; Riad, p. 39.
11. Rafael, pp. 180—1, 183, 185; Eban, pp. 443—4.

12. Thant, pp. 276, 281, 285.
13. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 44, A/L. 529; 1558th plenary mtg. (21 July 1967), para. 179; G.A. res. 2256 (ES-V), 21 July 1967.
14. Thant, p. 271; Lord Caradon and others, *U.N. Security Council resolution 242: a case study in diplomatic ambiguity,* pp. 3–4.
15. Letter to the author, 11 July 1983.
16. Thant, p. 271; Caradon, pp. 3–4; G.A. res. 2252 (ES-V), 4 July 1967; 2253 (ES-V), 4 July 1967; 2254 (ES-V), 14 July 1967; 2255 (ES-V), 17 July 1967; 2256 (ES-V), 21 July 1967; 2257 (ES-V), 18 Sept. 1967.
17. Jabber, pp. 156–7 (docs. 155, 157).
18. Ibid., pp. 621–34, 665–75 (docs. 393, 420); see also pp. 662–4 (doc. 417).
19. Ibid., p. 161 (doc. 165).
20. Ibid., pp. 143, 148–50, 160, 164–5 (docs. 143, 145, 162, 170); see also pp. 180–1, 189 (docs. 199, 208) and pp. 140–2 (docs. 138, 141).
21. Ibid., pp. 154, 157–60, 661 (docs. 152, 156, 159–61, 416).
22. Riad, p. 52; *Middle East Record,* p. 69.
23. Jabber, pp. 593–4, 601–2, 606, 612–3, 617 (docs. 366–7, 375, 379, 385, 390).
24. Ibid., pp. 601–5 (docs. 374, 377).
25. *Middle East Record,* pp. 136–7, 139, 259, 264, 318; Jabber, pp. 650, 686–7 (docs. 405, 428); Riad, pp. 51, 55–6; Rouleau, p. 43.
26. Jabber, pp. 646–51, 658–9, 661 (docs. 402, 404, 406, 415–6).
27. Jabber, pp. 602, 614–5, 642, 644, 652–7 (docs. 376, 386, 397, 399, 408–9, 411–2); *Middle East Record*, pp. 138, 259–62, 264–6, 404; Riad, p. 54.
28. Kamel S. Abu-Jaber, "United States Policy toward the June Conflict", in Abu-Lughod, p. 164; Riad, p. 57; Hussein A. Hassouna, *The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts*, New York, Oceana: Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975 (litho.), p. 256.
29. GAOR, 22nd session, Annexes, Agenda item 21, pp. 5, 9–12, 15, paras. 29, 67–80, 85, 117–21.
30. Ibid., pp. 2–5, paras. 2, 9, 16, 22, 24.
31. GAOR, 22nd session, Supplement no. 1A, A/6701/Add. 1, p. 7, para. 49.
32. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to September 1967, pp. 85–90, 93–4, 100–1, 103–4, 226–7, S/8054, S/8056-A/6757, S/8057, S/8059, S/8061, S/8062, S/8067, S/8070, S/8140.
33. Ibid., pp. 90–2, 101–2, 229–32, S/8059, S/8060, S/8068–A/6761, S/8145.
34. Ibid., pp. 71–2, 89, 107–8, 114, S/8049, S/8058-A/6758, 8074, S/8079.
35. Ibid., pp. 113–4, 135, 146–7, 150–3, S/8078, S/8093-A/6774, S/8107-A/6780, S/8109-A/6782.
36. Ibid., pp. 95–9, 112–3, 121, 141–3, 153–6, 160–2, 210, 212–3, 225–6, S/8064-A/6759, S/8077-A/6767, S/8086-A/6769, S/8101-A/6777, S/8110, S/8115-A/6783, S/8117-A/6784, S/8125-A/6788, S/8127, S/8138-A/6791.

37. Ibid., pp. 100, 122—8, 133—5, S/8065-A/6760, S/8087-A/6770, S/8092-A/6773.
38. Ibid., pp. 106—7, 117—8, 122—8, 143—5, 147—9, 196—8, 221—2, 225, 287, S/8073-A/6763, S/8082-A/6768, S/8104-A/6778, S/8105-A/6779, S/8108-A/6781, S/8123-A/6786, S/8134-A/6790, S/8137, S/8147-A/6794.
39. Ibid., pp. 108—9, S/8075-A/6765.
40. Ibid., pp. 133—5, S/8092-A/6773.
41. G.A. res. 2257 (ES-V), 18 Sept. 1967.

> The United Nations is like a stage on which anything can be enacted — from high drama to sordid farce. *Abba Eban, An Autobiography*, p. 429.

The UN General Assembly meets annually in regular session, normally convening on the third Tuesday in September. The session begins with a general debate during which the heads of delegations provide *tours d'horizon* of undoubted generality. In 1967, virtually all speakers in the debate referred to the Middle East, even if briefly, the other major preoccupations being Viet Nam, Southern Africa, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

During the course of the general debate, the Secretary-General issued nine reports from UN observers on exchanges of fire across the Suez Canal. The firing on 12 September had been initiated by Egypt, that on 21 September by Israel, and there had been firing in both directions on 27 September. Both sides engaged in overflights on 11 October.[1] Syria complained that Israel was mistreating the Palestinians in occupied territories, which Israel denied. The Palestine Conciliation Commission reported that the June war had served "to further complicate an already very complex problem."[2]

At an early stage in the UN session, King Hussein visited Moscow, where he expressed the gratitude of the Arabs for diplomatic support at the United Nations and maintained that Israel was a vestige of imperialism. President Podgorny blamed Western imperialists for encouraging and aiding Israel. A communiqué after the talks stressed the identity of attitudes, as well as the need to eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression. There were reports in the Israeli press that Hussein had made contact with Israel through an intermediary, but these reports were always denied by Jordan.[3]

Hussein visited Cairo twice, first before visiting Moscow and then as a prelude to a lengthy tour of other major capitals. Riad had persuaded Nasser that the most promising tactic at the United Nations would be to convene the Security Council. Riad did not entertain

any false hopes that Israel would abide by a Security Council call for withdrawal, but he wanted to force Israel into a position of having to reject a UN call. Riad considered that a discussion of Middle East questions in the Security Council would relieve the Arab states from voting and thus save them from exposing their disunity. In spite of inter-Arab differences, Nasser and Hussein were able to agree on a five-point peace programme:

recognition of the right of all states to exist, including Israel;
— end to the state of belligerency and war;
— international waterways, including the Suez Canal, to be open to all nations;
— withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in June;
— a real solution to the refugee problem.[4]

From Egypt, Hussein went to Algiers, Madrid, Paris, Bonn, and London before going to Washington and New York, partly to see to the replenishment of Jordan's military hardware, but mainly to discuss the prospects for a peaceful settlement.[5]

There is always a spurt of diplomatic activity during the first three or four weeks of each regular session of the General Assembly, when so many foreign ministers are in New York. Gromyko had met Riad in Moscow on 5 September and again on 10 September. He met Rusk on 25 September, and shortly thereafter, U Thant suggested that the time had come to remit the Middle East problem to the Security Council.[6]

The general debate in the UN Assembly began on 21 September, though there was little new to be said that had not already been said in the Security Council or during the emergency special Assembly. The Arabs attacked Israel and, in more muted terms, the United States, and thanked the Soviet Union for political support. Egypt complained of a systematic "campaign of deception" about the facts in the Middle East for which the United States bore a special responsibility.[7] The Muslim countries drew attention to the situation in Jerusalem. There was a good deal of Afro-Asian support for the Arabs, though some non-Muslim countries took a non-aligned position (". . . Thailand is unwilling to take sides . . ."). Ghana was convinced that it would be possible to draw up a general treaty to outlaw belligerency in the Middle East and to control the arms race. On 19 October, the elected members of the Security Council, under non-aligned leadership, began their own search for a framework for peace.[8]

The Soviet bloc expressed support for the Arabs and denounced Israel. The Soviet Union proposed that Israel should compensate Egypt,

Jordan, and Syria for the material damage which those countries had suffered.[9] Bulgaria supported the idea of "unofficial private meetings of the Security Council" at foreign minister level.[10] Albania attacked the "imperialist-revisionist 'holy alliance'" of the Soviet Union and the United States, citing as evidence the meeting of Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro the previous June.[11] After about a fortnight, Soviet foreign minister Gromyko returned to Moscow and was replaced by Vasily Kuznetsov, a fair-minded man with a conciliatory style. Kuznetsov was soon engaging in intensive negotiations on the Middle East, backed up in Washington by ambassador Dobrynin, who saw Dean Rusk on 19 October.[12]

Abba Eban, for Israel, said that the tension of the previous June was "largely of Soviet manufacture". Eban insisted wrily that national suicide is not an international obligation. The Arab states, he said, regarded the United Nations as a shelter against the necessity of peace. Knowing very well what was being discussed informally, and not liking it, Eban insisted that Israel sought no declarations of guarantees, no general affirmations of Charter principles, no recommendations or statements by international bodies. What Israel proposed was a permanent end to armed conflict "by pacific settlement and direct agreement."[13] He was especially interested in the line pursued by King Hussein of Jordan. Immediately after the war, Jordan was inclined towards a negotiated settlement; but when Israeli policy was given expression in the Allon Plan, whereby Israel would retain strategic areas of the West Bank, and now that Israel had established the first four military settlements in occupied territories, Jordan realized that the idea of a demilitarized Arab West Bank was not on the cards. As Jordan was bound by the Arab agreement at Khartoum, Hussein was in no position to discuss a separate peace with Israel. King Hussein, wrote Eban, preferred to have no bread and leave Israel to be criticized for holding all of the West Bank rather than have the two-thirds of a loaf that Israel was willing to relinquish. It was, wrote George Ball, "an unfortunate conjunction, for had the two countries then negotiated the return of the West Bank, the festering Palestinian issue might now be largely an historical reference."[14]

The Latin American and Caribbean countries reaffirmed their support for the proposal which they had submitted to the special session earlier in the year. This united position was possible, claimed one foreign minister, because of the respect for law in the region, the deep cultural roots, the intellectual brilliance of Latin America's contribution to international law.[15] Venezuela stressed the necessity

138

of moving by stages, but without ever losing sight of the ultimate goal of peace.[16]

The Western countries pressed for a new attempt to agree on the framework for a settlement. George Brown told the Assembly that it was deplorable that there was still no agreement on how to tackle the main causes of the conflict. He was concerned at reports that Israeli settlements were to be established in the occupied territories. When Richard Crossman was at Balmoral for a Privy Council meeting in October, he learned that Harold Wilson favoured an Israeli pull-back of 25 miles, and that Wilson wanted Israel to remember what Britain had done for that country. Crossman retorted that Israel had no reason to be grateful to Britain. "Everything they've gained they've got by winning wars, breaking treaties and affronting the United Nations. It's terribly dangerous but it's their way of life." Brown expressed the hope that Crossman didn't talk like that to the Israelis. "Of course I don't ..." replied Crossman, "... I'm a dove ..." Later in the month, the cabinet decided to seek the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt. Crossman raised some awkward questions, so Harold Wilson took refuge in asking Brown to "prepare a paper for Cabinet ... "[17] Mahmoud Riad had appreciated George Brown's handling of the issue in New York, and the way was opened to the resumption of diplomatic relations. A senior British diplomat, Sir Harold Beeley, then visited Cairo, and after a few minor matters had been resolved in discussion with Egyptian ministers, he met Nasser on 21 October. Agreement to resume diplomatic relations was quickly reached, and was announced a month later.[18]

Notes

1. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 40–6, 306–7, 311–6, S/7930/Adds. 35, 37, 40, S/8163, S/8169, S/8173; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 63–6, 164–5, 171–2, 179–80, 186–8, S/7930/Adds. 42–3, S/8183, S/8188, S/8194, S/8195-A/6863, S/8198, S/8202-A/6871.
2. Ibid., Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 313–4, S/8171-A/6844; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 159–62, 168–71, S/8178-A/6849, S/8181-A/6856, S/8187-A/6857, S/8192-A/6859; GAOR, 22nd session, Annexes, Agenda item 34, A/6846.
3. *Middle East Record,* pp. 31–2, 259; Hussein, p. 115; Jabber, pp. 168–9 (doc. 178).
4. *Middle East Record,* p. 146; Riad, p. 58; Hussein, p. 118; Jabber, pp. 687–8 (doc. 429).
5. *Middle East Record,* pp. 62, 404.

6. Ibid., pp. 25, 86.
7. GAOR, 22nd session, 1573rd plenary mtg. (29 Sept. 1967), paras. 87, 90.
8. Ibid., 1580th plenary mtg. (5 Oct. 1967), para. 36; 1565th plenary mtg. (25 Sept. 1967), para. 65; Lall, p. 227.
9. GAOR, 22nd session, 1563rd plenary mtg. (22 Sept. 1967), para. 106.
10. Ibid., 1575th plenary mtg. (2 Oct. 1967), para. 92.
11. Ibid., 1573rd plenary mtg. (29 Sept. 1967), paras. 39, 48.
12. Lall, pp. 226—7.
13. GAOR, 22nd session, 1566th plenary met. (25 Sept. 1967), paras. 127—8, 144, 147, 155; Jabber, pp. 153, 171, 179—80 (docs. 150, 185, 197).
14. Middle East Record, p. 288; Eban, p. 446; George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs,* New York and London, Norton: Toronto, MacLeod, 1982, p. 439; Riad, pp. 80—1.
15. GAOR, 22nd session, 1572nd plenary mtg. (28 Sept. 1967), paras. 62—3.
16. Ibid., 1573rd plenary mtg. (29 Sept. 1967), para. 8.
17. GAOR, 22nd session, 1567th plenary mtg. (26 Sept. 1967), paras. 90, 97; Crossman, pp. 513, 537; Jabber, pp. 181—3, 189—92 (docs. 200, 209).
18. *Middle East Record,* p. 61.

11. THE SINKING OF THE *EILAT*

Some moves... were planned, but most decisions were apparently taken on the spur of the moment. Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War,* p. 82.

On 21 October, the British-made Israeli destroyer, the *Eilat*, approached Egyptian territorial waters and opened fire. Egypt returned fire with four *Styx* cruise missiles from a *Komar*-class patrol boat, and the Israeli warship was sunk. Of a crew of 198, 47 were killed and 91 wounded. Israel claimed that the *Eilat* was outside Egyptian territorial waters, but Egypt maintained that it was inside. In any case, as general Bull stressed, these events were "clear violations" of the cease-fire. A later report by Brigadier Chaim Bar-Lev concluded that there had been no negligence or disregard of orders by any of the Israeli officers involved, but that it had been an error of judgment to regard the *Eilat*'s mission as a routine patrol.[1]

Egypt, humiliated in June, rejoiced in October, and there was a good deal of Arab political and press comment about the skill and daring of Egyptian sailors.[2] This euphoria was brought to an abrupt halt three days later when, in what Bull described as "an operation... to avenge the *Eilat*", Israel opened fire with artillery against the Egyptian oil refinery at Port Tawfiq. Egypt asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council: Israel, in reply, claimed that the firing in the Port Tawfiq area had been initiated by Egypt. It was United Nations Day, and the request for a meeting of the Security Council reached U Thant while he was attending a celebratory concert in the General Assembly hall. The Council convened at 9 p.m. the same evening and agreed to the participation of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The Council continued until after midnight and held two further meetings the next day.[3]

U Thant indicated that he would like to strengthen the UN observer mission in the Suez Canal sector, and he later reported that he favoured the establishment of nine additional observation posts involving an increase in the number of observers from 43 to 90. He also wanted

more and better equipment.[4] Federenko stressed that a decision to increase the number of UN observers "must be examined by the [Security] Council in accordance with...the Charter", and he submitted a draft resolution which would have authorized the strengthening of the UN observer mission in line with Thant's request: this was not pressed to a vote and was merely intended to imply that Thant did not have authority to act without an express decision of the Security Council, whereas the non-Communist members of the Council took the view that Thant already had authority to act under the Council's consensus of 9 July (see Appendix 11).[5]

Egypt asked the Council to undertake enforcement measures against Israel, which was now "the outlaw of the international community."[6] The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Mali, while not going as far as Egypt, thought that the Council should condemn Israel and demand also that compensation should be paid to Egypt for the damage caused; and the Soviet Union introduced a draft resolution to that effect.[7] Israel said that recent events were a culmination to a long series of Egyptian provocations. If there should be a wish for an investigation into the location of the *Eilat* when it was sunk, the Israeli government would "co-operate fully..."[8] The United States proposed that the Council should condemn "any and all violations of the cease-fire".[9] In the end, a balanced resolution was drafted in informal negotiations. This regretted "the casualties and loss of property...", condemned "the violations" of the cease-fire, and demanded an immediate prohibition of military activities in the area. It was adopted unanimously (see Appendix 15).[10]

Harold Wilson said in the House of Commons that it was not for Britain to express an opinion on the merits, timing, or location of events in the Middle East, but they could "only exacerbate an extremely difficult situation."[11] In the Security Council, Caradon expressed disappointment at the apparent lack of urgency shown by Council members. "For months we have been urging the appointment of a United Nations special representative." He disclosed that members of the Council had been "working with urgency, particularly in the past few days, to establish and declare the principles which should govern a settlement..." What he hoped would emerge from these consultations was a fair and balanced draft resolution.[12] Caradon's ideas had wide support, notably from Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Nigeria, and the United States.[13]

Notes

1. *Middle East Record*, pp. 301–2; SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct. Dec. 1967, pp. 70, 188–90, S/7930/Add. 49, S/8203, S/8204, S/8205; Bull, p. 146.
2. Jabber, p. 713 (doc. 444).
3. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct.–Dec. 1967, pp. 64–9, 191–3, S/7930/Adds. 44–8, S/8207, S/8208; 1369th mtg. (24 Oct. 1967), paras. 6–8; Thant, p. 286; Bull, p. 146.
4. SCOR, 22nd year, 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), paras. 6–10; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 76–9, S/8053/Add. 3.
5. Ibid., 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), para. 42; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, p. 210, S/8236.
6. Ibid., 1369th mtg. (24 Oct. 1967), para. 25.
7. Ibid., paras. 64–5, 129–30; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, p. 193, S/8212.
8. Ibid., 1369th mtg. (24 Oct. 1967), para. 33; 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), para. 56.
9. Ibid., 1369th mtg. (24 Oct. 1967), para. 85; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, p. 194, S/8213.
10. S.C. res. 240, 25 Oct. 1967.
11. Jabber, p. 181 (doc. 200).
12. SCOR, 22nd year, 1369th mtg. (24 Oct. 1967), paras. 40, 43.
13. Ibid., paras. 52, 82, 96, 123, 135, 140; 1370th mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), para. 12; 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), paras. 45, 66–7, 69.

Resolution 242 has dominated the diplomatic scene in the Middle East as the only accepted, though differently interpreted, common denominator... [It] has shown an unexpected resistance to wear and tear in a swiftly changing world. Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace,* p. 190.

For the next month, the Council devoted itself to the task which Caradon had adumbrated, with a mixture of public debate and private diplomacy. Written communications from the parties to the conflict were few in number and reasonably unprovocative in tone. Israel complained twice of Jordanian violations of the cease-fire, and Jordan made one counter-complaint against Israel. Fatah, a mainstream Palestinian organization, issued a comment on the first Israeli complaint, and also addressed communications to U Thant and the International Red Cross Committee on humanitarian issues. At least one diplomat in New York considered that this use of normal diplomatic communications was a sign of growing Palestinian maturity. UN observers reported a number of over-flights of the cease-fire lines. There was an explosion in a vehicle on the Israeli side on 9 November which UN observers at first ascribed to Egyptian firing but later said was due to "an accidental explosion within the vehicle itself."[1]

Senior figures from around the world travelled to New York. Vasily Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, arrived on 16 October. Kuznetsov's style was reasonable and conciliatory. Gideon Rafael found him "a skilful and respected negotiator", and Mahmoud Riad writes that he was "very stable, fair and far-sighted", respected by all UN delegates. U Thant described him as "pleasant and relaxed", very different from the acidulous Federenko.[2]

Abba Eban broke his journey in London so that he could speak at a meeting to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on a national home for the Jews. Richard Crossman also spoke, making "an implicit attack on the United Nations and an overt plea for direct negotiations..." Eban met Harold Wilson and George Brown, who told him that Britain was "in general agreement" with the United States, but that as Britain now had "tolerable" relations with Egypt, it was

sometimes possible to pursue a somewhat independent line. Brown told Eban that Britain would advocate Israeli withdrawal, but only in the context of permanent peace and to such secure and agreed boundaries as would provide satisfactorily for Israel's security.[3]

Mahmoud Riad had been to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and had then visited Paris in order to hand over a letter from Nasser expressing his esteem for de Gaulle and his policies. He arrived in New York in combative mood and treated Goldberg as if he were a front man for Israel. "There is no need for me to get to know Israel's position now," he told Goldberg, "for the U.S. political position conforms to that of Israel." Riad reports Goldberg as pointing out that the Egyptians "were the ones to start the aggression against Israel." Riad complained that the proposal which the United States was sponsoring was "an Israeli draft under a US name": it was ambiguous "and did not contain one clear statement about Israeli withdrawal", but Goldberg assured him that the U.S. proposal meant Israel's withdrawal. Sometimes it was necessary to be ambiguous: the important thing was that the ambiguity should be balanced. King Hussein of Jordan, who had seen Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk in Washington, told Riad that Johnson had assured him that Washington favoured "Israel's complete withdrawal", but Riad retorted that Johnson would never change his policy of "supporting Israel's aggression". Egypt could not accept a resolution which did not clearly stipulate "the inadmissibility of Israel's occupation of Arab territories..."[4] Hussein hinted in his public statements that the problems of the area could be solved if only Israel would withdraw substantially from occupied territories. The Arabs would then recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and security.[5]

On 13 October, the president of the General Assembly suggested that the Assembly should interrupt its consideration of the Middle East,[6] and members of the Security Council then resumed the informal efforts to find a framework for peace. Meetings were held almost daily, and the negotiations were "persistent and prolonged". When it became clear that these discussions were unavailing, the five permanent members of the Council "let it be known ... that they would welcome any initiative which the non-permanent members of the Council might take..." The non-permanent members began their separate efforts on 19 October. There were also two-power talks and meetings of six of the non-aligned members of the Council, as well as consultations with the parties - though Israel complained later that an Afro-Asian proposal had been "formulated without consultation with Israel." Britain and the United States, in particular, made "urgent representations" in the capitals

mainly involved. A good many papers and proposals were considered, including all the formal and informal proposals circulated during the emergency Assembly earlier in the year, documents emerging from the Kosygin-Johnson meeting at Glassboro, part of U Thant's introduction to his annual report, a working paper of Canada and Denmark,[7] and a succession of Latin American and Afro-Asian drafts. At the beginning of November, Argentina, Denmark, and India were asked by the non-permanent members to form a drafting committee, but they were unable to resolve the difficulties.[8] On 3 November, the Big Four began a new round of consultations. Riad reports that Kuznetsov asked him whether it would be useful to submit the U.S. Soviet draft of the previous July. Riad said that Dean Rusk had told the foreign minister of Morocco that no such draft existed. This incensed Kuznetsov, writes Riad, who complained of "an American attempt at chicanery": the United States, said Kuznetsov, was "trying to derail the Security Council . . ."[9]

On 7 November, Egypt asked for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, and there were rumours in the UN lobbies that this was an attempt to wreck or at least slow down Hussein's advocacy of a moderate Arab position. Be that as it may, Hussein cut short his travels in North America and paid a private visit to Paris.[10]

The Security Council held a night meeting on 9/10 November, after which Argentina and Brazil initiated a new round of consultations, though without success. On 13 November, the lead passed to Britain. Three days later, Caradon formally submitted a British draft.[11]

The Council held seven meetings between 9 and 22 November. A good deal of the time of the first meeting was taken up with a procedural wrangle about the order of speakers. Several representatives, and especially Caradon, stressed the urgent need for progress and the hope of unanimous agreement.[12]

The Arabs, with Third World and Communist support, insisted that any resolution must provide for Israeli withdrawal.[13] Israel wanted a resolution in which any withdrawal would be linked to an Arab commitment to real peace.[14]

There were five draft resolutions. The first was submitted by India, Mali, and Nigeria and was usually known as the three-power proposal, sometimes as the non-aligned draft. In preparing this, the sponsors used as a "basic document of reference" the draft prepared by 16 Latin American and 4 Caribbean countries and submitted to the emergency Assembly the previous July.[15]

The second proposal was the Latin American text itself, circulated

to the Security Council on 9 November at the request of India. Neither of the two Latin American members of the Security Council asked for the circulation of the July proposal, but Argentina disclosed after the vote on 22 November that a new Latin American text had been prepared "strictly in accordance with the terms of the [July] draft", but that this had been withheld so as not to prejudice the chances of the British proposal.[16]

The third proposal was submitted by the United States. The Israeli government had strong objections to the text and asked Rafael to convey these to Goldberg. Rafael tried to persuade the United States to postpone the formal submission of the proposal for an hour or so, but he also urged his own government to abandon its objections. Goldberg was furious with Israel for stalling, as the delay enabled India to get the three-power draft in first and thus secure priority for it. The new U.S. draft differed in some respect from the July proposal of the United States. The latter had referred vaguely to "disengagement and withdrawal of forces" whereas the November text affirmed the need for "withdrawal of forces from occupied territories". The July text had referred to "negotiated arrangements with appropriate third-party assistance", whereas the later U.S. formulation envisaged a special representative of the Secretary-General who would assist the parties "in the working out of solutions . . . "[17]

The fourth proposal was from Britain, submitted somewhat later than the first three. In presenting the draft, Caradon explained that Britain had based its proposal on the principles of the Latin American text, but modified after consultations with the parties. The draft did not belong to one side or the other: "it belongs to us all"[18] — although George Brown confessed that he liked to regard it as "My Resolution 242."[19] Goldberg has pointed out that another source of the resolution was the U.S. draft submitted to "the resumed Security Council meeting" (presumably the U.S. draft of 7 November) and that the United States "took the primary role" in the drafting and adoption of the British proposal, though he has sometimes disclaimed pride of authorship and sometimes expressed pride of paternity; and Eban insists that the United States "was at least an equal partner" with Britain.[20] George Ignatieff, the Canadian ambassador, considered that the British draft resolution "was the work of many delegations including the Canadian, working especially through the Latin American delegations . . . "[21] But whoever was the author, Caradon admitted that the text was not perfect: it represented an attempt to be fair, just, and impartial.[22]

The fifth proposal was sponsored by the Soviet Union. The United States had no wish to reject out of hand peace on the basis of a proposal sponsored or co-sponsored by the Soviet Union, but the Soviet draft turned out to be "extreme", in Caradon's view. It was introduced at a late stage, "an unforeseen development", according to Lall.[23]

As it was the British draft which was finally approved and became the famous resolution 242, it may be as well to indicate its content and the extent to which it differed from other proposals (see Appendix 16).

A proposal or resolution of the Security Council usually consists of both preambular and operative paragraphs. The preambular paragraphs form an introduction to the decision and begin with present participles such as *Expressing, Emphasizing, Recalling, Affirming.* The operative paragraphs represent the actual decision and begin with such verbs as *Decides, Instructs, Requests, Urges.*

The first preambular paragraph of the British draft expressed "continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East." This was taken verbatim from the three-power proposal, and was also used in the U.S. text. The Soviet proposal would have been more explicit and have expressed concern at the increased tension in the area and the lack of progress towards a political settlement.

The three-power, U.S., and Soviet proposals, but not the British, would have referred to the Security Council's cease-fire resolution 233 of 6 June (see Appendix 3) and the procedural resolution of 21 July of the emergency Assembly (see Appendix 13). The Latin American proposal would have described the cease-fire as "a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which must be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties". The Soviet draft would have noted that there had been violations of all the Council's cease-fire resolutions (see Appendices 2, 3, 5, and 7) and have also recalled the emergency Assembly's resolutions on humanitarian aid (see Appendix 9) and Jerusalem (see Appendices 10 and 12).

The first part of the second preambular paragraph of the British proposal would have emphasized that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible. The Soviet draft also contained this point but used the more colourful word "seizure" rather than "acquisition". The three-power text declared acquisition "or occupation" of territory to be inadmissible, while the Latin American proposal stated that the validity of occupation or acquisition of "territories" should not be recognized. The point about the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war did not appear in the U.S. draft.

The second part of the second preambular paragraph of the British draft should be considered in conjunction with the last part of operative paragraph 1(ii). The preambular paragraph emphasized the need to work for "a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security", while the last part of operative paragraph 1(ii) affirmed the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Eban reports that the first version of the British text did not meet Israel's minimal claim because there was inadequate provision for "leaving secure boundaries open to negotiations." Under strong Israeli and U.S. pressure, Caradon worked "assiduously", as Eban puts it, to produce a text acceptable to the parties.[24] All the other drafts referred to the need for peace and reaffirmed the prohibition in the Charter on the threat or use of force; and the three-power, U.S., and Soviet texts mentioned also the right of states to a secure existence. The reference in the British proposal to "secure and recognized boundaries" was taken without change from the U.S. draft, and there was a similar formulation in the draft resolution of the three Afro-Asian states.

The third preambular paragraph of the British proposal emphasized the obligation of UN Members to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter, which sets out the principles on which the Organization is based. This was taken without change from the U.S. proposal, and similar wording appears in the other drafts. The three-power proposal affirmed in express terms the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means, and the Latin American text asked the parties to the conflict to have recourse to the procedures for peaceful settlement indicated in the UN Charter.

The first operative paragraph of the British text affirmed the principles required for a just and lasting peace, beginning with "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict". The idea of referring to "territories" only had been discussed in nongovernmental circles earlier in the year, but the wording in the British proposal was based on part of the U.S. draft, which called for "withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories": Goldberg made it clear that this "refers, and was always intended to refer, to the armed forces of Israel."[25] The Soviet text called for a withdrawal of forces to positions held before 5 June, while the three-power and Latin American texts envisaged withdrawal from "all the territories" occupied during the June war and not simply from "territories".

The second principle in the British draft was the termination of claims or states of belligerency, a principle which was included in the other four proposals.

The third principle was respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area. This principle, worded variously, appeared in the three-power, U.S., and Soviet drafts: the Latin American text referred only to "conditions of coexistence based on good-neighbourliness".

The British draft went on to affirm the necessity of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways. This requirement was included in all the other proposals, and Goldberg said that this referred to both the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal.[26] The three-power text added "in accordance with international law". India said that it had been told in informal consultations that the reference to international law "merely serves to confuse the issue, to promote prolonged litigation, etc"; India was unconvinced on this point but was prepared to examine very carefully any new arguments about the wording.[27] The Soviet proposal also referred to "Innocent passage" but added "in accordance with international agreements". One problem about the three-power and Soviet formulations was that the Arab states had not accepted the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea.

The second "necessity" in the British proposal was for a just settlement of the refugee problem. This requirement appeared in all the drafts ("appropriate and full solution..." in the Latin American proposal).

The third "necessity" affirmed in the British draft was to guarantee "the territorial inviolability and political independence" of every state in the area "through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones". This was derived from the Latin American proposal and was taken over by both Britain and the United States. The Afro-Asian proposal had no specific reference to the possible use of demilitarized zones. India, no doubt with Kashmir in mind, stressed that demilitarization cannot be implemented without the consent of the states concerned.[28]

Both the U.S. and Soviet drafts would have called for a limitation of the destructive arms race in the Middle East, "wasteful" according to the United States, "useless" according to the Soviet Union.[29] The Latin American text would have reaffirmed "the desirability of establishing an international régime for the city of Jerusalem..." None of the other drafts included a specific reference to Jerusalem.

The third operative paragraph of the British proposal asked the UN Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to establish and maintain contact with the states concerned, a formulation also present in the U.S. draft and, in slightly different form, in the three-

power proposal. The British proposal had begun life as a definition of the tasks of the Special Representative, based to some extent on an earlier draft of Canada and Denmark. Britain then added to this definition of tasks a number of principles on which the peace process might be built. As consultations with the sponsors of other formal or informal proposals proceeded, the British text was gradually expanded to make the wording acceptable to the parties and their friends. Once the agreement of the parties had been secured, there was a good chance that the proposal would get a strong vote in the Security Council and even that a veto would be avoided.

Surprising as it may seem in retrospect, the definition of the mandate of the Special Representative had been very difficult. It had been agreed for several months that the Secretary-General should provide some sort of help to the parties in moving towards real peace, but Israel was anxious lest good offices should slide into mediation, and mediation into arbitration. Israel wanted direct negotiations with the Arab states, as a symbol of Arab acceptance of Israel's legitimacy, the only UN help being to bring these direct negotiations about. Levi Eshkol had said that UN mediation would "accomplish nothing": what was needed was "a match-maker".[30] Eban writes that the first version of the British proposal would have virtually given the Special Representative the power to dictate a settlement and that he urged that the aim should be simply to bring about agreement.[31] In the British text as finally submitted, the aim of the Special Representative's contacts was defined as being "to promote[32] agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement". The U.S. draft envisaged the Special Representative as "assisting ... in the working out of solutions ... and in creating a just and lasting peace ..." The aim of the Special Representative was defined in the three-power text as being "to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution ..." The Latin American proposal, which was originally submitted to the General Assembly, would have asked the Security Council to continue dealing with the situation in the Middle East, cooperating directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations in the area. The Soviet proposal would have stressed the need for the Security Council to continue its efforts with a view to solving "all aspects of the problem" within the framework, "collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations".

The final paragraph of the British text, taken verbatim from the U.S. proposal, asked the Secretary-General to report progress "as soon as possible." The three-power draft would have asked for a report "within

thirty days", but if this period were too short, the sponsors were willing to consider other suggestions.[33]

The UN Charter provides in Chapter VI that the Security Council may recommend procedures or methods of adjustment in cases of dispute or similar situations[34] or may itself recommend terms of settlement in defined circumstances.[35] In the early years of the United Nations, the Security Council approved complex terms of settlement in a number of cases: Palestine (by implication).[36] Kashmir,[37] Indonesia,[38] In the first two cases, the terms of settlement were rejected by at least one of the parties, and in the third case, the resolution was overtaken when the parties themselves agreed on a new negotiating procedure. After 1949, the Council was more hesitant to suggest complicated terms of settlement, preferring to recommend procedures or methods for resolving the matter at issue.[39] The British proposal on the Middle East which became resolution 242 was a partial return to the earlier practice: the preamble and the first two operative paragraphs represent principles and necessities on which terms of settlement could be based, while operative paragraphs 3 and 4 relate to a procedure or method of adjustment.

The British proposal contained no reference to or quotation from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is included if a resolution is supposed to have binding effect. Indeed, several speakers in the debate said or implied that the Security Council should merely make recommendations on the Middle East under the peaceful settlement provisions of the Charter,[40] and the official Security Council *Repertoire* deals with the British draft as in part an application of Chapter VI of the UN Charter.[41]

Palestinians have often complained since 1967 that the resolution was faulty in referring only to "a just settlement of the refugee problem" and not to the right of the Palestinians to have their own national homeland or state. Rafael regards this as a "most conspicuous omission ...", but Riad considers that to have referred to the Palestinian question after the Arabs had just suffered a total military defeat would not have helped the Palestinian cause. One senior official considers that the Security Council "should have realized that the formulation on the Palestinians was wholly inadequate and that the Palestinians... would not be prepared to be ignored." Lord Caradon recalls that in 1967 "we all took it for granted that the occupied territory would be restored to Jordan." The West Bank had been occupied by the Arab Legion during the Palestine war of 1947–9 and later incorporated into Jordan, but this incorporation had been strongly opposed by the Arab League and

recognized *de jure* only by Britain and Pakistan. With a single exception, the point about Palestinian national rights was not made during the debates in November 1967. The odd man out was Syria, which rejected the three-power, U.S., and British proposals. The British text was defective, said the Syrian ambassador, because it neglected the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, "the uprooted, dispossessed people in exile, crying for justice for over twenty years..." The omission of any mention in the British draft of the will and rights of the Palestine Arabs was deliberate. If the British proposal were passed, he said, "another unjust and tragic chapter in the history of the Arab world" would begin. The success or failure of a resolution would have to be judged by the results.[42] The British text was also denounced by the Palestine Liberation Organization and by Fatah, one of the constituent bodies of the PLO.[43] General Odd Bull believes that the reference to refugees rather than Palestinian national rights was a compromise: he considers that the Palestinians ought to have accepted the resolution, on the understanding that "the refugee problem can only be solved by accepting the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the right to establish a state of their own."[44]

But the most vigorous and sustained controversy, in 1967 and since, has concerned the reference in operative paragraph 1(i) of the British draft to Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the recent conflict" (*Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit*). The U.S. draft would also have called on Israel to withdraw from "occupied territories", but the other three proposals referred either to withdrawal from "all the" territories or to withdrawal to the positions held on 5 June.

Did the British draft intend total Israeli withdrawal on all fronts, or only partial withdrawal? If there is uncertainty about the meaning of a UN text, one can examine the translation of it by the UN Secretariat into languages other than English. In 1967, the Security Council used five official languages (Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish), of which English and French were also working languages. As there is no definite article in Russian or Chinese, there can be no distinction in those languages between "withdrawal from territories" and "withdrawal from *the* territories". Bernard Reich believes that there is a discrepancy between the English and French versions, that while the English version refers to "territories", the French text talks of "the territories". I hesitate to write dogmatically on such a delicate issue, but my own inclination is to disagree with Reich and share the view of Shabtai Rosenne that the French version is "an accurate and idio-

matic rendering of the original English". France's UN ambassador made a similar statement in the Security Council at the time.[45] In Spanish, however, we find that when the British proposal was in draft form, the words used were "*Retiro . . . de territorios*", but that when the proposal had been formally approved and became a decision, the Spanish wording had been changed to "*Retiro . . . de los territorios.*" In any case, as Shabtai Rosenne has stressed, the negotiations which preceded the vote were based on the English text, and ambassador Gunnar Jarring always acted on the basis of the English version.[46]

During the ten days before the vote, Caradon and his colleagues engaged in a forceful campaign in the English language to commend the English version of the text, and in order to commend, they also had to expound, interpret, clarify, explain, elucidate. The Arabs and their friends made strong efforts to have the word "the" inserted before "territories" in the English version, believing that withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from "the" territories occupied in the recent conflict would certainly mean total withdrawal, whereas the reference to withdrawal from "territories" could be interpreted to mean partial withdrawal.[47] According to Rafael, Caradon himself tried to have "the" inserted before "territories" and seemed "disappointed" when he encountered a resolute rejection from Israel and the United States.[48] Before the vote was taken, according to Israeli sources, the Soviet Union made a final appeal to president Johnson to agree to withdrawal from "all the occupied territories", but Johnson "politely but firmly declined . . ." Eban reports that Kosygin then suggested dropping "all" but leaving in "the", but Johnson was by now fed up with the issue and again made "a typically firm" reply that "the noncommittal text" was to be left as it was.[49] Throughout the discussions and negotiations, Israel resisted all efforts to call for complete withdrawal, either because total withdrawal was by now inconceivable for Israel, or at least so as not to close off any options. Eban recalls that discussion of the various drafts occupied many sessions of the Israeli cabinet. Some Israeli diplomats believed that the adoption of the resolution would necessarily lead to direct negotiations, but there is nothing in the text which could give rise to that expectation, and the appointment of an intermediary "to establish and maintain contacts" was necessary precisely because of the past unwillingness of the Arabs to deal with Israel directly. Ambassador Jarring later took the view that, while direct negotiations might help, they were not a requirement of the resolution. Abba Eban believes that the resolution "called on the Arab states to conclude peace agreements with Israel as the condition for liberating their lost

territories"; but this is what the resolution might be held to imply, not what it actually says.[50]

If it was impossible to *amend* the text to the liking of the Arabs, was it possible to persuade Britain to *interpret* the text as meaning total withdrawal? On 15 November, Caradon showed Mahmoud Riad the British draft. "[D]oes this mean that the Israeli forces will withdraw from some, not all, territories?", Riad asked. "Of course not", replied Caradon. "The text means all and not some of the territories", meaning that it applied to all sectors — Sinai and Gaza, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the Golan Heights. Riad asked Caradon to meet the heads of the Arab delegations at the Jordanian mission where, writes Riad, Caradon repeated that Israel was to withdraw on all fronts, which Riad took to mean that withdrawal would be total and not partial, and that the resolution could be implemented "within a period not exceeding six months." There must have been some misunderstanding about Riad's expectation of early progress: the general view in the Security Council was that the adoption of an agreed resolution would be a major advance, but that progress towards a peaceful and accepted settlement would be painfully slow. Riad reports that he later told Kuznetsov that Caradon had assured him that the British text meant total withdrawal, and that Kuznetsov replied that this was also his understanding. Lall reports more cautiously that Caradon assured the Arabs "that their position on the question of withdrawal remained unprejudiced."[51] It has been reported that Goldberg told the Jordanian delegation that if Jordan accepted the British draft the United States would work for the return of the West Bank to Jordanian authority, "with minor modifications," in exchange for peace. Caradon believes that later doubts about what the resolutions intended arise "from wishful thinking or from natural prejudice — often from both... we all took it for granted that the occupied territory would be restored to Jordan."[52]

Following the assurance that the Arabs believed that they had obtained from Caradon, they and their friends began to take the line that regardless of what the wording said, what was meant was total Israeli withdrawal. Lall writes that there were informal discussions before the vote was taken and that Caradon said that if India interpreted the draft as calling for total withdrawal, Caradon would say that each member of the Council was entitled to his own interpretation but that the Indian interpretation would not bind the Council. Kuznetsov then said, according to Lall, that if Britain were to repudiate the Indian interpretation before the vote took place, the Soviet Union

would veto. In further discussions, writes Lall, Caradon agreed to omit from his statement any express mention of the Indian interpretation not being binding: he would simply repeat what he had said two days previously that each delegation should state "the separate and distinct policy of the Government it represents ... it is only the resolution that will bind us, and we [the British government] regard its wording as clear.'[53] Argentina made it clear that it would have preferred a draft calling for withdrawal from "all the territories".[54]

Following the informal bargain between Caradon and India, several delegations, including India, Mali, Nigeria, and Bulgaria said in the Council that they took it for granted that what was envisaged was total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories,[55] and the Soviet Union said that it had voted for the resolution precisely as India had interpreted it.[56] Goldberg, on the other hand, said that he had voted on the draft resolution only, "and not for each and every speech that has been made", though he is now sure that less than total withdrawal was intended.[57] Eban, for whom the issue was crucial, said he was communicating to the Israeli government "nothing except the original English text". He urged India not to read into the text what was not there: "every word, long or short, which is not in the text, is not there because it was deliberately concluded that it should not be there."[58]

It can be argued that whatever the resolution says in the separate paragraphs, the resolution as a whole can only mean total withdrawal, except for such minor rectifications as the parties may agree on. General Odd Bull points out that if one links "withdrawal of Israel armed forces" with the preambular "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war", there should be "no room for argument."[59] Caradon has taken the view that there was no justification for Israeli annexation of territory, though he accepted that there would have to be minor adjustments of borders so as to satisfy the demands of common sense. Sir Leslie Glass, who was Caradon's deputy, believes that Britain had "almost total withdrawal ... in mind, except for the straightening out of certain minor salients."[60] Ambassador Jarring would have had a simpler task if the definite article had been inserted before "territories". "I sometimes wonder if the omission of the definite article could be legally defended on the basis of the U.N. Charter or at least its spirit. On the other hand I well understand that with the definite article inserted there would probably not have been a Resolution 242. Or, perhaps a very weak resolution, with the Soviet Union abstaining."[61]

In the situation as it was in November 1967, five months after the

war, Israel would not agree to total withdrawal on terms acceptable to the Arabs, and the United States would not agree to a resolution unacceptable to Israel. Britain consistently refused at the time and since to give a public interpretation of what was intended. Caradon insisted that the text spoke for itself. "I need not attempt any detailed explanation".[62] In his view the wording was "both fair and clear."[63] George Brown was later to write that he had often been asked to spell out exactly what the resolution meant, but had always refused to go further than what it says. If the draft had called for withdrawal from "the territories" or "all the territories", wrote Brown, it would have been impossible to get it through.[64] The draft, then, must have been deliberately ambiguous. "Indeed [a senior diplomat had written], it was immediately and publicly interpreted in totally different senses by the opposing parties." The readiness of the Security Council to take refuge in ambiguity on such a crucial issue was, according to one view, a major mistake.[65]

A couple of days before the vote was taken on 22 November, Kuznetsov saw Caradon alone and asked whether a vote could be delayed. Caradon hesitated, but Kuznetsov said, "I am not sure that you fully understand what I am saying to you. I am personally asking you for two days." Caradon took this request as a hint that the Soviet Union might abstain rather than veto. Indeed. Kuznetsov had already said that the Soviet Union would give strong support to any resolution which provided for the immediate withdrawal of Israel's forces from all Arab territories. Caradon "took the risk of acceding to Kuznetsov's request ... because he trusted Kuznetsov — quite a brave decision." French diplomats were "very suspicious and anxious" about the delay, "no doubt rendered cynical by long experience by Federenko ... "[66]

When it came to the vote, which took place somewhat sooner than Caradon had expected the sponsors of the three-power and Soviet drafts agreed not to press their proposals to a vote, and the United States asked for priority for the British draft. Goldberg said that if the British draft were approved, the U.S. draft would not be pressed. The Latin Americans said they stood by "the ideas" contained in their July draft, and France said it would have preferred the Latin American text, which had "considerable advantages"; but Britain had produced a text "which would be rejected by no one ... " Kuznetsov said that the U.S. proposal was ambiguous and obscure, and Bulgaria took the view that the United States was in reality not in favour of withdrawal by Israel. Israel itself agreed to the designation of a special representative, who "could play a useful role in bringing parties together", so long as

this did not prejudice "our policies or our negotiating position ..."[67]

So it was that when the British proposal was put to the vote on 22 November, all fifteen members of the Security Council raised their hands in support (see Appendix 17). The adoption of the resolution was accompanied by warm applause, including cheers from the public galleries. Caradon was surprised and delighted at the Soviet affirmative vote: "the main credit for the unanimous Resolution", writes Caradon, "must go to ... Kuznetsov." Caradon was later to celebrate Kuznetsov's conciliatory style in verse:

When prospects are dark and hopes are dim,
We know that we must send for him;
When storms and tempests fill the sky,
Bring on Kuznetsov, is the cry

He comes like a dove from the Communist ark,
And light appears where all was dark;
His coming quickly turns the tide,
The propaganda floods subside.

And now that he has changed the weather,
Lion and lamb can vote together.
God bless the Russian delegation,
I waive consecutive translation.[68]

The day after the vote on resolution 242 Thant announced that he had designated Gunnar Jarring, Swedish ambassador in Moscow, to be his special representative. Thant had approached the government of Sweden about the release of Jarring five weeks earlier. Jarring had previously represented Sweden in Washington and at the United Nations, and had undertaken a special mission for the Security Council about the Kashmir dispute in 1957. Thant has written that Eban was "delighted" at the choice of Jarring, that Arab diplomats were "equally happy", and that the Big Four were "also enthusiastic". Caradon knew Jarring's reputation as a highly respected diplomat: "we could not have found a better Special Representative..." The Swedish government had told Thant of Jarring's availability on UN Day.[69]

A lot of people wanted to claim credit for resolution 242. At a meeting of the British cabinet on the day after the vote, George Brown struck Crossman as being "intoxicated" with Britain's success at the United Nations. The resolution had been drafted by Caradon, wrote Crossman, approved by the Security Council, and accepted by Israel. What Brown didn't seem to realize, in Crossman's view, was that the resolution demanded "a total Israeli withdrawal."[70]

The adoption of resolution 242. was a tribute to patience and persistence "unanimity ... through protracted and meticulous negotiation ...", as Lall put it, "a new level of achievement in international diplomacy ..." Never had the prospect of peace been brighter, wrote Lall the following year: the only things that could prevent this opportunity from being converted into reality were "grave errors on the part of the international community ..." Goldberg thought that the resolution was the best that the Arabs and Israel could hope for.[71]

Notes

1. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 70–3, 205–6, 239–41, 243–4, S/7930/Adds. 50–55, S/8222, S/8254, S/8258; 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), paras. 8–9; 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), paras. 3 52; Jabber, pp. 694–5 (docs. 435–6, 440); letter to the author, 7 June 1983
2. Rafael, p. 186; Riad, p. 70; Thant, pp. 284–5.
3. Jabber, pp. 185–6 (doc. 204); Eban, pp. 449–50; Crossman, p. 554.
4. Riad, pp. 60, 62, 64, 65; *Middle East Record,* pp. 50, 54, 63, 70, 404.
5. Ibid., pp. 267–8; Jabber, pp. 693–4 (doc. 434).
6. *Middle East Record,* p. 87.
7. Letters to the author from George Ignatieff and Hans Tabor, 17 May 1983 and 23 Jan. 1984 respectively.
8. For Danish and Indian policies, see Jabber, pp. 160–1 (doc. 164) and 144–8, 167, 169–70, 177 (docs. 144. 174, 180–1, 193) respectively.
9. SCOR, 22nd year, 1370th mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), paras. 5, 12; 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), paras. 90, 165, 200, 228–9, 235, 246; 1375th mtg. (13 Nov. 1967), paras. 50, 58, 132; 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), paras. 53–4; 1379th mtg. (16 Nov. 1967), paras. 6–7; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), paras. 123, 167; GAOR, 22nd session, Supplement 1A, A/6701/Add. 1, para. 49; Thant, pp. 288–90; Lall, pp. 227, 230, 234–5, 237, 249; Caradon, pp. 4 7–8, 26; Rafael, p. 188; *Middle East Record,* p. 87; Riad, p. 67.
10. *Middle East Record,* p. 268.
11. Ibid., p. 88.
12. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, p. 208. S/8226; 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), paras. 4–46, 158–82; 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), paras. 33–41.
13. For Arab policy, see Jabber, pp. 167, 676–7, 688–93 696–9 (docs. 175, 422, 430–1, 433, 438–9, 441).
14. See Eshkol's speeches in the Knesset in Ibid., pp. 183–5, 188 (docs. 202, 207).
15. SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), paras. 91. 105, 113. 200; 1379th mtg. (16 Nov. 1967), para. 45; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1982), para. 70; S/8227, 7 Nov. 1967 (mimeo.).

16. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 42–3, A/L. 523/Rev. 1; S/8235, 9 Nov. 1967 (mimeo.); SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), para. 89; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), para. 160.

17. Ibid., Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 208–9 S/8229; 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 44; GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 39, A/1.520; Lall, p. 237; Rafael, p. 187. On U.S. policy see also Jabber, p. 170 (doc. 182).

18. S/8247, 16 Nov. 1967 (mimeo.); SCOR, 22nd year, 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), paras. 22, 30.

19. Brown, p. 14.

20. SCOR, 22nd year, 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), para. 59; Caradon, pp. 26–7, 49. The U.S. delegation has claimed that it was mainly responsible for the wording of the British draft and for the leg-work of commending it in national capitals; letter from Arthur J. Goldberg to the author, 14 March 1983; letter from Arthur Lall to the author, 19 March 1983; Arthur J. Goldberg, "The Importance of Private Negotiations", in *Paths to Peace: the UN Security Council and its Presidency*, edited by Davidson Nicol, Oxford and New York, Pergamon, 1981, p. 118; Arthur J. Goldberg, "Hussein's misreading of History", *Jerusalem Post International*, 3–10 June 1984, p 11; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981*, p. 96

21. Letter from George Ignatieff to the author, 17 May 1983.

22. SCOR, 22nd year, 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 40; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), para. 61.

23. S/8253, 20 Nov. 1967 (mimeo.); letter to the author from Dean Rusk, 24 August 1983; Caradon, p. 51; Lall, p. 255; Kass, p. 57. Bernard Reich mentions "Two proposals by the Soviet Union" but one of these was to authorize Thant to deploy more observers in the Suez Canal area (Reich, p. 130 n. 31).

24. Eban, p. 451; Rafael, p. 185.

25. SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), para. 63.

26. Ibid., 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), para. 68.

27. Ibid., 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), para. 93.

28. Ibid., para. 92.

29. Bernard Reich writes that the major omission from the Soviet draft was any reference to the need to prevent an arms race in the region "which was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and thus was not included in 242" (Reich, pp. 130–1, n. 32). The Soviet draft did in fact link an end to belligerency and acceptance of international obligations to "measures to limit the useless and destructive arms race...", see SCOR, 22nd year, 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 7 (S/8253), operative para. 4.

30. Reich, p. 130, n. 26.

31. Eban, p. 451.

32. Stephen Egerton, a British diplomat has written to the author (10 Nov. 1982 and 8 Sept. 1983): "This is my verb worked in during the small hours in a session between Caradon and Goldberg."

33. SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), para. 94.

34. Article 36(1).

35. Article (37(2).

36. S.C. res. 42, 5 March 1948.

37. S.C. res. 47, 21 April 1948.

38. S.C. res. 67, 28 Jan. 1949.

39. See, for example, S.C. res. 80 (S/1469), 14 March 1950, S.C. res. 91 (S/ 2017/Rev. 1), 30 March 1951, and S.C. res. 123 (S/3793), 21 Feb. 1957, re Kashmir; S.C. res. 113 (S/3575), 4 April 1956, re Palestine; S.C. res. 135 (S/ 4328), 27 May 1960, re relations between the Great Powers; S.C. res. 186 (S/5575), 4 March 1964 re Cyprus; S.C. res. 188 (S/5650), 9 April 1964, re relations between Britain and Yemen; S.C. res. 199 (S/6129), 30 Dec. 1964, re the Democratic Republic of the Congo; S.C. res. 203 (S/6355), 14 May 1964, re the Dominican Republic.

40. SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), paras. 95 (India), 107 (Nigeria), 266 (Argentina); 1375th mtg. (13 Nov. 1967), para. 135 (India); 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), paras. 54 (U.S.A.), 84, 86 (Canada); 1379th mtg. (16 Nov. 1967), para. 18 (Britain); 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 8 (Soviet Union); 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), para. 48 (India).

41. *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council Supplement 1966–8*, pp. 183–4; see also Shabtai Rosenne, "Directions for a Middle East Settlement – Some Underlying Legal Problems", *Law and Contemporary Problems*, vol 33 (1968), p. 57; Eugene V. Rostow, "Legal Aspects of the Search for Peace in the Middle East", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 64, no. 4 (Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, 1970), p. 68.

42. Rafael, p. 190; Riad, p. 74; letter to the author, 14 December 1983; Caradon, p. 13; SCOR, 22nd year, 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), para. 8; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), paras. 7, 12. 24 197; Jabber, pp. 716–7, 731–5 (docs. 446 458–9).

43. Ibid., pp. 715–6, 721–3, 727–9 (docs. 445. 451, 454).

44. Letter to the author from general Odd Bull, 4 April 1983.

45. Reich, p. 131, note 33; SCOR, 22nd year, 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), para. 111; Shabtai Rosenne, "On multilingual interpretation", *Israel Law Review*, vol. 6, no. 3 (1971), p. 363.

46. Ibid., pp. 360–2. The draft resolution in Spanish is in UN doc. S/8247*, 18 Nov. 1967 (mimeo.).

47. Rostow pp. 269–70.

48. Rafael, p. 189.

49. Ibid., p. 189; Eban, p. 452.

50. Ibid., p. 451; Caradon, p. 49; conversation with Shabtai Rosenne, 11 March 1984; Eban, *New Diplomacy,* p. 206.

51. Riad, pp. 66–71, 85; Lall, p. 261; memorandum from a retired diplomat, 10 Feb. 1984.

52. Caradon, pp. 10, 13; Quandt, p. 65, f.n. 54.

53. Lall, pp. 260–1; SCOR, 22nd year, 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 40; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), paras. 60–1.

54. Ibid., para. 162.

55. Ibid., paras. 52–3, 76, 141, 189.

56. Ibid., paras. 118–9.

57. Ibid., para. 186; Caradon, p. 22.

58. SCOR, 22nd year, 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), paras. 93–4 202.

59. Letter to the author, 4 April 1983.

60. Caradon, pp. 9, 13–4, letter of 3 November 1982, and conversation on 2 December 1982; letter from Sir Leslie Glass, 26 July 1983.

61. Letter to the author from a diplomat, 5 April 1983.

62. SCOR, 22nd year, 1379th mtg. (16 Nov. 1967), para. 14; 1381st mtg. (20 Nov. 1967), para. 31.

63. Letter to the author from Lord Caradon, 3 November 1982

64. Brown, p. 233.

65. Letter to the author from George Ignatieff, 17 May 1983; Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: critical years in America's foreign policy,* p 160; letter to the author, 14 December 1983.

66. Caradon, pp. 5–6; letter to the author from Sir Leslie Glass, 26 July 1983; SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov. 1967), para. 145.

67. Caradon, p. 6; SCOR, 22nd year, 1373rd mtg. (9/10 Nov 1967), paras 150–6, 268; 1375th mtg. (13 Nov. 1967), paras. 63 109; 1377th mtg. (15 Nov. 1967), para. 101; 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), paras. 54, 64, 108–9.

68. Caradon, pp. 3, 6; SCOR, 23rd year, 1433rd mtg. (19 June 1968), para. 123; Riad, p. 72.

69. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 244–5, S/8259; Thant, pp. 285, 287–8; Caradon, pp 10–1.

70. Crossman, p. 589.

71. Lall, pp. 273, 279; Caradon, pp. 27–8.

13. THE ELUSIVE PEACE

[A]n historic rebuke to the international community, an opportunity shamefully lost. Lord Caradon, *A case study in diplomatic ambiguity*, p. 10

Henry Kissinger recalls that soon after taking office, he was invited to have dinner at the British Embassy. When someone quoted from Security Council resolution 242, writes Kissinger, the words seemed to him so platitudinous that he thought the speaker was joking. "It was a mistake I was not to repeat. By the end of my time in office I had become like all the other old Middle East hands; word had become reality, form and substance had merged."[1]

Resolution 242 was the culmination of a major international crisis, and diplomatic effort in response, extending over six months The problem for one who seeks to narrate these events is, as Walter Laqueur has emphasized, "when and where to start."[2]

Isarelis were almost unanimous in regarding the war of June 1967 as a war of no choice.[3] Syria had always been the Arab state that had been most unwilling to accept Israel's legitimacy, and the Ba'athist coup in Damascus in 1966 had led to a significant increase in Arab terrorist attacks in Israel and cross-border raids by Palestinian guerillas, mainly operating from Jordan or Lebanon. On Count Bernadotte's advice, the Security Council had decided in 1948 that no party was entitled to violate the cease-fire in the Middle East on the ground that it was undertaking retaliation or reprisals against another party,[4] and this obligation had been reinforced the following year in the four armistice agreements. The UN Charter does not impair the inherent right of self-defence, but Secretary-General Hammarskjold had taken the line that the actual exercise of this right is "under the sole jurisdiction of the Security Council..." While parties to the armistice agreements had reserved the right to exercise self-defence, Hammarskjold considered that this did not permit them to undertake acts of retaliation.[5]

Israel had always held that to prohibit all retaliation played into

the hands of those who wanted to disturb the peace of the region, and Israel had always retaliated for Arab attacks, usually on a heavy scale. In May 1967, however, some Israeli leaders had begun to distinguish between Syria and other Arab states. In the case of Egypt, guerrilla attacks had largely ceased after the Sinai-Suez war of 1956. Jordan and Lebanon were now being used as bases for Palestinian attacks, but without the approval of the authorities, so Israel again made it clear that retaliation would be directed against infiltrators in these two countries and those who supported them or gave them sanctuary. In the case of Syria, on the other hand, where the authorities were promoting the idea of a popular liberation war and were actively encouraging and helping the Palestinian guerrillas, Israeli spokesmen hinted that it might be necessary to overthrow the government in Damascus.[6] This was probably intended as a piece of declaratory deterrence, but declaratory deterrence is often interpreted by the other side as a threat.

I know of no hard evidence that Israel backed up its declaratory policy with new military dispositions before the second half of May 1967. On 11 May, however, Syria sent a memorandum to Arab revolutionary and progressive parties alleging that Israel was preparing an act of aggression against Syria,[7] and two days later, president Nasser received reports that Israeli troops were being concentrated in the north-east of the country near the armistice demarcation line.[8] Shortly after 15 May, according to Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli chief of staff at the time, Israel learned about troop movements by Egypt and responded with limited military precautions.[9] On 16 May, the Soviet media began to disseminate reports that an Israeli attack against Syria was imminent.[10] As the crisis built up, the Soviet Union gave strong diplomatic support to Syria and the other Arab states, but without expressing the approval of Palestinian guerrilla activities.[11] UN Secretary-General Thant reported on 19 May that UN observers had found no exceptional military deployments on the Israeli side of the line with Syria,[12] and the same day Israeli foreign minister Eban invited the Soviet ambassador in Tel Aviv to visit the border areas and see for himself that all was normal, an invitation that the ambassador declined.[13]

President Nasser thus faced a predicament. He could not render decisive military aid to Syria so long as Egyptian troops were bogged down in Yemen, but there was one step he could take that would increase the pressure on Israel and at the same time remove the basis for Arab reproaches that Egypt was sheltering behind the United

Nations. That was to ask for the removal of the UN Emergency Force from the Egyptian side of the frontier in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, a step which Nasser soon took, but without consulting his own foreign ministry. Egyptians have claimed that Nasser simply wanted UNEF redeployed, not totally withdrawn, but in that case, the oral and written communications to UN officials were badly drafted: general Indar Rikhye, the commander of the UN Emergency Force, recalls that the brigadier who handled him a letter from the Egyptian chief of staff on 16 May specifically asked him to remove UN troops from Sharm el Sheikh, which was more than one hundred miles from the international frontier,[14] and the formal Egyptian request to U Thant two days later said that Egypt had decided "to terminate" the presence of UNEF in Sinai and the Gaza Strip, so Egypt was requesting "the withdrawal of the Force" as soon as possible.[15] An experienced diplomat has commented that up to this point Syria, Israel, and Egypt had behaved imprudently and provocatively, but that none had taken an irrevocable decision in favour of war; and he adds that Soviet rumour-mongering about Israeli troop concentrations had exacerbated the situation.[16]

If the UN decisions in 1956−7 to establish the Emergency Force had been necessary, what was the responsibility of the international community a decade later, when Egypt asked that the Force be withdrawn? Although it is never easy to persuade a government to change its mind on such a fundamental issue, once the decision is made public, U Thant did consider making a personal appeal to president Nasser to reconsider the decision, but was advised by foreign minister Riad that "such a request would be sternly rebuffed."[17] In the light of this advice, Thant decided not to make a direct personal appeal to Nasser.

One way of responding to the Egyptian action, had Israeli agreement been forthcoming, would have been to have redeployed the UN Force on the Israeli side of the international frontier. This would have removed the United Nations presence from Sharm el Sheikh which controlled the Strait of Tiran and access to the Gulf of Aqaba, and thus ended an important UN role, but it would have meant that Egypt could not strike at Israel from Sinai without encountering the UN Force, and this Egyptian threat was soon to become Israel's chief anxiety. But Israel had always taken a firm position against stationing UN or other foreign troops on Israeli soil, and Thant's proposal for redeployment of the UN Force was quickly rejected.[18]

There were intermediate courses between keeping the Force in its normal positions in Sinai and Gaza, and withdrawing it completely

that UN officials could have put before Nasser, even if one eliminates (rightly, as I think) the idea that the Force could remain in the area but be redeployed on Egyptian territory in such a way that it was not interposed between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. It is certainly puzzling in retrospect why U Thant did not immediately visit Cairo and the other Middle Eastern capitals, or send Ralph Bunche or general Rikhye on his behalf. One proposal that could have been placed before Nasser, perhaps of a stopgap nature, would have been to replace the UNEF contingents by observers from the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was under the direct control of the UN Secretary-General and the UNTSO Chief of Staff: this was certainly in the minds of Canada when it joined with Denmark in asking that the Security Council should meet eight days after the Egyptian request to general Rikhye. Another possibility would have been to have created a multi-national force outside the UN framework: this was the solution adopted for Sinai in 1979, when the Soviet Union threatened to veto any proposal to use the United Nations for supervising the Camp David agreements. There are problems about the political and military control of non-UN forces, as there are with UN forces, but these are by no means insuperable. It is possible, of course, that Egypt would have found non-UN peace-keeping as objectionable as the UN Emergency Force.

Whether or not these ideas seemed worth pursuing, U Thant should have asked himself whether, in his opinion, the matter threatened international peace and security, thus entitling him to use his discretion under Article 99 of the Charter in formally drawing the attention of the Security Council to the new situation. Thant made it clear later that he considered invoking Article 99 but was deterred from doing so by the threat of a Soviet veto;[19] but it may be doubted whether that was a sufficient reason for not resorting to this special procedure. Moreover, any one of the fifteen members of the Security Council could have called for the Council to investigate the situation, on the ground that its continuance was likely to endanger international peace and security (Article 34 of the Charter); or one of the other 108 UN Members could have brought the situation to the attention of the Security Council or, if it were considered that the Council had failed to exercise the functions assigned to it in the UN Charter, to the attention of the General Assembly (Article 35). Several UN Members considered calling for a meeting of the Security Council or the General Assembly at this stage, but none actually did so until a further week had elapsed.

Abba Eban had asked UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold in

1957 what would happen if, at some future date, Egypt should with-
draw consent for the continued presence of the UN Emergency Force
on Egyptian soil, and Hammarskjold had replied that an "indicated
procedure" would be for the UN Secretary-General to inform the
Advisory Committee for UNEF, "which would determine whether the
matter should be brought to the attention of the [General] Assem-
bly."[20] Thant had on 17 May 1967 convened an informal meeting of
the countries providing UNEF contingents and told them of the
Egyptian request, and the following day he similarly informed a meet-
ing of the UNEF Advisory Committee and representatives of three
states providing contingents but not members of the Committee:
according to Thant, no proposal was made for exercising the Com-
mittee's right to convene the General Assembly to take up the Egyptian
communication.[22] It was understandable that Israel should feel
aggrieved that the procedure indicated by Hammarskjold in 1957 was
not followed a decade later when the eventuality arose. A symbolic
international barrier between two hostile parties had thus been re-
moved.

U Thant now set off to see Nasser, and it was while he was at the air-
port in Paris that he learned that Egypt was closing the Gulf of Aqaba
to Israeli cargoes. Thant recalled in his memoirs that he now believed
that war was inevitable. His first reaction was to cancel the trip to
Cairo "and report to the Security Council", but after consulting col-
leagues in the UN Secretariat, he decided to go ahead "and find out
what Nasser had in mind."[23]

It seems that Egyptian military chiefs, misled by faulty intelligence
about Israel's capabilities, and banking on more military assistance
from the Soviet Union than Moscow was prepared to render, were
eager to avenge the defeats of 1947–8 and 1956.[24] It would have
been perfectly possible for Egypt to have secured the removal of the
UN Force without proclaiming a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, for it
was crucial for Israel to prevent such a blockade, and this had been one
of the main Israeli motives for the Sinai-Suez war of 1956. Perhaps
some Egyptian leaders were in 1967 beginning to believe their own
propaganda, for it had been the Arab taunt since 1948 that Israel was
essentially weak, even if occasionally buttressed by external aid. Nasser
had discussed with his military commanders the idea of calling for the
removal of UNEF, an act within Egyptian sovereignty, but without
taking a step that Israel was bound to regard as a *casus belli*.[25] Im-
petuous and brave by temperament, Nasser was on this issue inclined to
caution.[26] In the end, however, and perhaps against his own better

judgment, he accepted the advice of military commanders who had been revolutionary comrades-in-arms since the Egyptian monarchy had been overthrown fifteen years previously. The fact that Thant would soon arrive in Cairo spurred Nasser to act quickly, for it was inconceivable that such a provocative step as a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba could be announced while the UN Secretary-General was in the country.[27] This shows that Nasser respected the United Nations, and it supports the view of those who believe that Thant should have made a direct personal appeal to Nasser over the withdrawal of the UN Force. The Aqaba blockade convinced most Israelis that war was unavoidable, and it also had the effect of internationalizing the issue.

The slide of the Middle East to war unfolded with the inevitability of Greek tragedy. There is a growing body of literature about crisis management, and it is striking how decision-makers on both sides in 1967 conformed to what Irving Janis and Leon Mann call "groupthink" in unconsciously pursuing conformity and concurrence. Of the eight symptoms of "groupthink" cited by Janis and Mann, the following five were evident on one or both sides in 1967:

an impression of invulnerability, creating undue optimism and encouraging the taking of risks;

an unquestioned belief in the group's morality, inclining the members to disregard the moral consequences of their decisions;

stereotyped views of enemies as being too evil, weak, or stupid to warrant an attempt to negotiate;

pressure on members who question the stereotypes or illusions of the group, and stress on the notion that dissent is tantamount to disloyalty;

self-censorship of deviations from the apparent consensus of the group, leading to an illusion of unanimity.[28]

The hesitations which Canada and Denmark had previously felt about taking the initiative in convening the Security Council were swept away by Nasser's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. In spite of the fact that Thant had not completed his errand of peace in Cairo, Canada and Denmark called for a meeting of the Security Council and submitted a draft resolution which was intended to strengthen Thant's hand and might, by implication, give him the Council's backing if he should decide to send UNTSO observers into positions vacated by the UN Force.

It is understandable that the Arabs states should have been uneasy

about the move of Canada and Denmark, for the clear implication was that it was Egypt's Aqaba blockade that had precipitated the new crisis; but it was disobliging of Egyptian ambassador el Kony to describe the draft resolution of Canada and Denmark as "an attempt to sabotage the mission of the Secretary-General",[29] for it was intended to support Thant and, if it had been approved, would have had that effect. But what Canada and Denmark found even more disheartening was the abuse poured on them by some of Egypt's friends, and particularly the unwillingness of India to engage in informal consultations about the draft resolution.[30] It was a stroke of bad luck that the president of the Security Council for the month should have been Nationalist China, recognized by seven members of the Council but not recognized by seven others. This gravely weakened the potential for quiet diplomacy.[31] The Council met on six occasions during the twelve days before war broke out but took not a single substantive decision. Coming on top of Thant's agreement to withdraw the UN Force at Egypt's request, the failure of the Council to act over the blockade of Aqaba simply reinforced the Israeli belief that the United Nations was impotent and irrelevant.

One of the effects of the Cold War is that, when things go wrong in an area outside of bloc politics, both sides see the hidden hand of the other behind the disturbance. The proposal of Harold Wilson and George Brown for a multi-national naval task force to keep open the Gulf of Aqaba was partly motivated by the belief that the Soviet Union would veto a substantive proposal in the Security Council asking Egypt to rescind the blockade.[32] Moreover, there were plenty of influential U.S. voices that saw Egypt as nothing more than a Soviet proxy. In reality, it seems most unlikely that the Soviet Union had advance warning of Egypt's blockade decision, and an official statement by the Soviet government issued by TASS the following day made no mention of it.[33]

Although the Western powers were in broad agreement that Nasser had acted unwisely, they had difficulty in coordinating their responses. The United States laid stress on an exchange of vice presidential visits by Egypt and the United States, while at the same time trying to moderate Israel's military exuberance. Britain promoted the idea of a multi-national maritime force, though the proposal eventually collapsed, partly for lack of enthusiastic international support and partly because the proposal lacked relevance once Israel had decided that the main threat was not the Aqaba blockade but Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai. France, in 1956 so close to Israel, now took the line

that the country which fired the first shot was the aggressor. France pressed strongly for a Big Four meeting, which caused London to tergiversate. Harold Wilson, proud of his consistent record of support-ing Israel, assured de Gaulle that Britain was in favour of a Four Power meeting, while at the same time doing little to bring it about. He cabled prime minister Kosygin "commending de Gaulle's proposals", but he suggested to president Johnson that they should "by-pass Paris", and he later told Johnson that from the beginning of the crisis he had "not looked with favour on a Four-Power meeting outside the UN Security Council."[34] Moreover, there were differences of view in both London and Washington between those who saw diplomatic advantages in the plan for an international naval force to ensure free passage into the Gulf of Aqaba and those who foresaw serious military difficulties should there be resolute Egyptian resistance. There were, in addition, differences among the few countries willing to participate in the naval force. Israeli leaders took the line that as Israel was the victim of the Egyptian blockade, an Israeli ship should take part in the first inter-national convoy: other countries, including Britain, believed that it would be wiser to assert and implement free and innocent passage as a principle before sending in an Israeli vessel.[35]

Israeli foreign minister Eban believed that Israel should not strike until everything possible had been done to obtain explicit assurances of U.S. support,[36] and Eban was sent to Western capitals to make sure that governments understood how gravely Egypt was disturbing peace. While Eban was *en route* to Washington, however, the Israeli government switched its assessment of the major Egyptian threat from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Sinai peninsula:[37] as U.S. intelligence sources did not confirm the new Israeli appreciation, Eban suffered an important loss of credibility at a crucial juncture.[38] Israel's predicament was further exacerbated when it was discovered either that Eban had read more into president Johnson's assurances of support than Johnson had intended or that the U.S. commitment to Israel was significantly weakened after Eban had left Washington. It is likely that pro-Israel lobbying of the White House by American Jews had begun to be counter-productive.[39]

During the last week before Israel struck, both sides simply readied themselves for war. President Johnson appealed for a further breathing spell, and this led to a decision by Israel to delay resort to armed force, but not to abandon it.[40] A coalition government was established, bring the Rafi and Herut groups into the government, with general Moshe Dayan as minister of defence and Menachem Begin as minister

without portfolio. Dayan, a former chief of staff, was popular with the Israeli armed forces, and he advocated an early and major assault on Egypt.[41] Prime minister Eshkol continued to be conciliatory or irresolute, depending on one's point of view, and he certainly gave a feeble impression in a radio address and in talks with senior military officers.[42] Another Israeli emissary, Meir Amit, was sent to Washington to assess U.S. opinion, and Robert Anderson and Charles Yost were sent from Washington to Cairo in an effort to moderate Nasser's flamboyance. Egypt had accepted Thant's plea for a further breathing spell, being under the impression that Israel had done so as well and that therefore Israel would not strike while it was in effect.[43] The Security Council continued its futile debate; but U Thant was incensed that Soviet ambassador Federenko did not support his appeal for a breathing spell, especially as it had already been accepted by Egypt.[44]

General Dayan had estimated that Israel would need to defeat the Arabs in three to five days, before international pressures forced a cease-fire.[45] From the Arab point of view, three options were theoretically open: to defeat Israel quickly and decisively (never a realistic option), to prevent or at least delay an Israeli victory, or to secure international diplomatic intervention for a cease-fire as quickly as possible. Egyptian military chiefs must have realized by noon on the first day of the war that Israel was not going to be defeated, although it is likely that this was not understood in Amman and Damascus until the following day.[46] The second option, to prevent an Israeli victory or at least to delay it beyond three to five days, was also quickly eliminated: this was accepted in Egypt and Jordan by the end of the second day of the war (Tuesday), and probably by Syria the next day.[47] In this situation, the best Arab tactic at the United Nations and in the capitals would have been to work for a cease-fire resolution as soon as possible, but this assumed that Arab diplomats knew the facts about the extent of the military disaster that had befallen the Arab forces. When Nasser realized the enormity of the Arab defeat, he offered to resign but was persuaded by the Egyptian national assembly to stay on.[48]

The Security Council met briefly on the morning of the first day of the war, Monday, and heard an oral report from Thant about the outbreak of hostilities, and statements by Israel and Egypt, both claiming to be acting in self-defence because the other had struck first. The Council then agreed to "a short recess for urgent consultations", but the recess lasted eleven hours because Soviet ambassador Federenko was unavailable earlier. When the Council eventually reconvened at 10.20 p.m. on the Monday evening, the sitting lasted only five minutes

and was then adjourned until 11.30 a.m. the following day. In fact, it was not until almost 7.00 p.m. on the Tuesday evening (midnight in the Middle East) that the Council was able to meet and adopt its first cease-fire resolution.[49] The best part of two days of the Six Day War had now elapsed. General Odd Bull rightly blames the Soviet Union for the Council's failure to act more promptly.[50]

From the Israeli point of view, the diplomatic tasks in New York once war had broken out were three: to delay as long as possible the adoption by the Security Council of a cease-fire resolution, to avoid any formal reaffirmation of the 1949 armistice agreements, and to try and separate a cease-fire from the usual demands for withdrawal of forces.[51] By the end of Wednesday, both Egypt and Jordan had agreed to a cease-fire on the basis of reciprocity, as had Israel, and neither of the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council had called for an Israeli withdrawal.[52]

Dayan hoped that Syria would agree to a cease-fire on the Golan Heights without further fighting, but as Syrian resistance continued, an Israeli attack was launched.[53] Syria eventually agreed to a cease-fire just after midnight (New York time) on 9/10 June,[54] but the Israeli advance continued until Quneitra had been captured.[55] The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, threatened to impose sanctions "including military", and hinted that "volunteers" might go to the assistance of the Arabs.[56] Israel's continued military activity and the Soviet response caused some consternation in Washington and led to strong diplomatic representations to Israel. Several Israeli sources suggest that the United States did not want the war to end as a result of a Soviet ultimatum,[57] but Dean Rusk assures me that he can find no substance to this idea.[58] In an effort to lower the temperature, Israel suggested to general Bull that he should send UN observers to the front.[59] The Security Council passed two more cease-fire resolutions,[60] but the atmosphere at the United Nations was not helped by the bitter and caustic interventions of Soviet ambassador Federenko.[61]

The United Nations was strongly criticized for the failure to react with vigour to the manifold provocations from the Middle East after the middle of May 1967, but it was to the United Nations that the international community turned once the fighting had stopped. As on previous occasions, UN observers were called on to demarcate and supervise the cease-fire lines. Demarcation was difficult on the Golan Heights because the Syrian military command did not know the precise location of some of their forward units.[62] A month after hostilities had ceased, it was necessary to deploy UN observers along the Suez Canal,

and these observers were strengthened in August and again the follow-
ing October.[63]

Wars are fought by combatant members of the armed forces but it is
often the civilians who incur most suffering. About 350,000 Pales-
tinians were displaced by the June fighting, and Thant had to bring
pressure on Israel to allow a reasonable time for those wishing to return
to do so.[64] Thant's representative for humanitarian matters tried to
make enquiries about the treatment of Jews in Arab countries, but
Egypt took the line that this was beyond the scope of the Security
Council's rather imprecise mandate, and Syria flatly maintained that
their Jewish minority had the same freedom as other Syrian nationals.[65]

The main issue for the international community, as it has been after
each Arab-Israeli war, has been whether the situation should be patched
up by short-term and possibly precarious ameliorative measures or
whether an attempt should be made to move more decisively in the
direction of genuine and lasting peace. The Israeli stance in 1967, as
before and since, was that cease-fires, truces, and armistices were not
enough. "The only thing that had never been tried [wrote Eban] was
peace". That was true, but it is always easier for the victor to stress the
virtues of peace than for the vanquished.[66] For the Arabs, the aftermath
of military defeat was the worst time for the bold step of offering an
honest peace in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from newly-occu-
pied Arab territory. King Hussein seems to have understood in 1967
what concessions the Arabs would have to offer to Israel if the West
Bank were to be recovered,[67] but most of the other Arab leaders would
have regarded an imperfect agreement between Israel and a defeated
Jordan as betrayal, as they did when president Sadat made a bargain
with Israel a decade later. Nasser was grateful to Hussein for entering
the war and was for a time willing that he should speak in the United
States for the Arabs,[68] and president Johnson (to quote Kissinger)
"had in effect promised Jordan the 1967 borders with minor ratifi-
cations as a bait for Jordanian acceptance of Resolution 242."[69] But
the fact was that the coalition government in Israel of which Menachem
Begin was a member became increasingly unwilling with every week
that passed to consider a territorial compromise.[70]

There were plenty of Israelis who pointed out that the Arabs had
turned down the chance of peace on the basis of a partitioned Pales-
tine in 1947 and again in 1949: if Israel vacated the territory taken in
1967 in exchange for a paper peace, who could be sure that the Pales-
tinians would not build up their strength until they were in a position
to destroy the Zionist state? By extending Israeli control on the periph-

ery, the Jewish heartland would be marginally further from Arab bases. The difficulty in practice was and is that the periphery is eventually populated with Jewish settlers, so that the periphery has to be defended as stoutly as the heartland.

The Arabs were slow to face the fact that some of the Zionist ideologues in and around Herut and Likud were not simply interested in pragmatic security but believed that, as descendants of Abraham, the Jewish people had inherited a right to the whole of Greater Israel, a right which had been sealed by the obligation of the world to compensate the Jews for their unspeakable suffering during the Hitler times. To the Arabs, on the other hand, the creation of a Zionist state in Palestine was guilt money for Jewish sufferings, but paid for by the Palestinians rather than those who had supported or connived at Nazi atrocities; and the Arabs had not forgotten how eager were both the United States and the Soviet Union to pose as the true friends of Israel in 1948.

Western governments were in 1967 opposed to any move by Israel to annex Arab territory occupied during the war, and when Abba Eban told Dean Rusk that Israel was examining the precedents for separating the West Bank from Jordan, Rusk's chill comment was that were undoubtedly precedents for letting the people themselves decide. The Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem only seventeen days after the end of the fighting, though disguised as merely the extension of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Old City and the surrounding areas, was generally taken as a bad omen of Israeli intentions. The Israeli decision was subsequently censured by a unanimous vote in the UN Security Council.[71]

The effort to find a framework for peace began in the Security Council as soon as the fighting stopped but within four days had run into the threat of a Soviet veto. Attention then shifted to a special emergency session of the General Assembly, with a collateral summit meeting between president Johnson and prime minister Kosygin in a peaceful backwater roughly equidistant from New York and Washington. This summit meeting was not well prepared, and Abba Eban has commented astringently that no situation is so bad that a badly conceived summit meeting cannot make it worse.[72]

The Latin American group in the UN General Assembly produced successive compromise texts which UN Secretary-General Thant regarded as "most evenhanded and realistic", but these failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority. The Arabs believed that this was because of ambassador Goldberg's diplomatic machinations.[73] Israeli ambassador Gideon Rafael considered that the debates in the General

Assembly tottered between recrimination and rebuttal, rarely sobered by a sprinkle of constructive thought.[74]

There was a brief moment of hope when the two super-powers came within a millimetre of agreement. This took the form of a draft that would have linked Israeli withdrawal to an affirmation of the right of all states to live in peace and security. This was quickly turned down by both Israel and the Arab states, and it is interesting that Dean Rusk does not now recall the draft.[75] It is likely that greater enthusiasm on the part of the super-powers for cooperation with the other would have helped to break the diplomatic stalemate, but both Israel and the Arabs were suspicious of all moves towards super-power cooperation, and both were determined to reject any imposed settlement.[76] After five weeks of work, the emergency General Assembly abandoned the attempt to agree on a framework for peace, an effort which Secretary-General Thant described as "futile" and which Lord Caradon found to be "fruitless and frustrating".[77]

It is not surprising that those who worked hard for agreement should have been disappointed that it had eluded them, but the effort had not been entirely useless, for the international community now understood what the main elements of a UN decision should be, and the seed had been sown of the idea that Thant should not exercise good offices himself but should designate a special representative to act for him.[78] U Thant, while remaining within the bounds of propriety, could have discouraged the idea of a special representative and have insisted that a delegation of important peace-making responsibilities would undermine the authority and prestige of the office of Secretary-General. It is possible that Dag Hammarskjold, had he lived, would have welcomed the challenges of 1967. But the vigorous diplomacy which would be needed was not U Thant's style, and he had other tasks to attend to.

In spite of the raucous "noes" at the Arab summit in Khartoum, there were some signs that all except the most radical Arabs had accepted that diplomacy had now to be given a chance.[79] If the Arabs had been willing to negotiate directly with Israel as soon as the war ended, or at least to have engaged in proximity talks similar to the armistice negotiations in Rhodes in 1949 or to the subsequent discussions in Lausanne sponsored by the Palestine Conciliation Commission, it is possible that a bargain could have been struck. But Arab governments regarded non-recognition and the refusal to deal directly with Israel as a bargaining counter, to be abandoned only in exchange for a significant Israeli concession. The most that the Arabs would agree to do in 1967 was that King Hussein should have a free hand to negotiate with

the Americans, not the Israelis, offering minimal concessions in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal.

The regular annual session of the General Assembly convened on 19 September in a somewhat more tranquil atmosphere than in the preceding months. Middle Eastern polemics were surprisingly muted, and King Hussein pressed on with his moderate diplomacy. Soviet ambassador Federenko, usually so mordant, acted with unaccustomed restraint and soon handed over his Middle Eastern responsibilities to the more irenic Vasily Kuznetsov. A variety of forums for drafting and negotiation tried to produce an acceptable formula – the two super-powers separately and together, the super-powers plus Britain and France, the ten non-permanent members of the Security Council, the Latin Americans, the non-aligned states, Canada and Denmark. Israeli diplomats did their best to discourage the effort to formulate general principles for a settlement, stressing instead the need for direct negotiations. Israel, said Eban, sought no external declarations or guarantees, no general affirmations of Charter principles, no recommendations or statements by international bodies – none of these could replace the sovereign responsibilities of the governments concerned. No service was done to international causes, said Eban, by clever but ineffectual substitutes for direct and reciprocal national commitments.[80]

The resolution finally approved unanimously by the Security Council on 22 November comprised an affirmation of legal and political principles and the setting in motion of a procedure for the promotion of agreement. When the members of the Security Council have to vote on a draft resolution, the most important question is, of course, the precise wording of the text, for if it is approved, it is the text that represents the decision, not the motives of the sponsor or the reaction of the parties. But in reaching a decision on how to vote, members are inevitably influenced by other considerations, especially on who are the sponsors and what is likely to happen if the proposal should not be approved. Lall believes that great powers tend to submit sweeping and drastic proposals which lead to discord. The medium and smaller powers, in Lall's view, concentrate on smaller steps, and it is to them that the international community looks for "the most acceptable formulations of solutions . . ."[81]

In 1967, the two super-powers were identified with one or other of the parties. The United States was thought by the Arabs to have been firmly committed to Israel, witness the omission from the U.S. draft resolution of any reference to the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war. The Soviet Union was believed by Israel to have been partly

responsible for the outbreak of war; and Bulgaria, though speaking in more courteous tones than the Soviet Union, always followed the Soviet lead when it came to voting. Nationalist China, although still occupying a permanent seat in the Security Council, spoke only for the offshore island of Taiwan and tended to adopt a low profile on Middle East questions.[82] The two Latin American members of the Council, Argentina and Brazil, found it difficult to move far from the text which the region had sponsored but which had failed the previous July, especially during the early phase of discussion in November. Ethiopia and Japan were thought to be too close to the United States. Indira Gandhi of India was on good personal terms with Nasser, and this reduced the chances of the non-aligned proposal. Of the Western members, Canada and Denmark had perhaps had their fingers burnt in May, and France had taken a strong stand against a war initiated by Israel.[83]

Britain was therefore the Council member with as good a chance as any of coming up with an agreed proposal. It was not the case, of course, that an acceptable draft was lying around waiting for a sponsor: indeed, the British delegation "hesitated for a long time" before putting forward a draft. Britain faced "a sea of difficulties", and Caradon's assessment eight days before the vote was that Britain had only a "sporting chance" of collecting the necessary 9 votes. A week later, Caradon told the Foreign Office in London that he hoped for as many as twelve affirmative votes, but a negative Soviet vote would constitute a veto. "We took over the drafting of this resolution when pretty well everybody else had failed", writes George Brown.[84]

The belief that it was now up to Britain was reinforced by the personal stance of "the redoubtable Lord Caradon", to quote Arthur Lall. Caradon was "the architect and prime mover", general Odd Bull has written: "he did an excellent job all through the crisis." It was "his finest hour ... He worked tirelessly and determinedly." George Brown thought he did "an absolutely monumental job". Nobody had called more persistently or more strenuously for a determined effort to find a UN framework for progress, a position from which Caradon has not moved. He was on good personal terms with most leading delegates and had "a respectful understanding" with Goldberg. Caradon's position was not that agreement at the United Nations would solve all the problems, but he believed that if there were no agreed resolution at the United Nations, there would be no progress towards a solution, only repeated resorts to violence. He maintained that the basic and reasonable demands of the parties were not incompatible, that the Israelis

could have security and peace, and the Palestinians could have justice and freedom. The British proposal offered a fair balance, and a Special Representative could use a resolution of the Security Council to nudge the parties steadily in the direction of agreement.[85]

By November, it was widely believed that the Security Council could not afford to fail. To do nothing, Caradon has written, would "certainly lead to ultimate disaster [and] another war..."[86] The parties had stated their claims, and it was now up to the Security Council to establish a framework for movement. There would be no advantage to anyone in further delay. There was also the practical consideration that the Middle East item had to be disposed of, so that the Security Council could turn its attention to other issues. The adoption of resolution 242 enabled the Security Council to take up other matters, but the General Assembly decided to place "The situation in the Middle East" on its 1968 agenda, and the same item now occurs annually. Finally, as Caradon has noted, there was "an element of luck", for the Security Council is not often unanimous.[87]

The text finally submitted by Caradon to the Security Council was not a totally new creation, for it borrowed freely from other proposals. Like the U.S.—Soviet formula of the previous July, Israeli withdrawal was linked to the right of states to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, and other principles in the resolution dealt with the affirmation of principles in the UN Charter, the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war, the ending of belligerency, guarantees for the territorial integrity and political independence of states, justice for the refugees, and freedom of navigation through international waterways. The resolution also asked Thant to appoint a special representative "to establish and maintain contacts ... to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement ..." The resolution was, however, ambiguous on one central issue and, on certain other key aspects, was interpreted differently by the parties; and in some respects the resolution has been overtaken by later developments. From the moment the resolution was passed, there has been disagreement as to whether the reference to Israel's withdrawal "from territories" occupied in 1967 envisages total or partial withdrawal by Israel from some or all occupied territories; there has been disagreement as to whether the resolution is a programme to be implemented or principles to form the basis of negotiations, and as to whether Jarring's mandate entitled him to formulate precise questions or proposals designed to promote agreement or to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement; and events since 1967, including the 1973 war in the Middle

East, the conflict in the Lebanon, the changing fortunes of the PLO, and Sadat's willingness to deal with Israel face-to-face, have had a bearing on the possibilities for implementing the resolution as it stands.

It has been said that Lord Caradon and his colleagues, in their enthusiasm to maximize agreement, fudged some of the issues covered by the resolution or interpreted the wording differently on different occasions. One would expect different emphases in different diplomatic conversations: when speaking privately to Abba Eban, Caradon would no doubt have emphasized those parts of the resolution affirming Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders; when speaking privately to Mahmoud Riad, Caradon would no doubt have emphasized the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war and the requirement that Israel should withdraw from occupied territory. But published accounts and unpublished recollections of what British diplomats said in explanation of the test are in crucial respects inconsistent. My own impression after examination of copious records and memoirs, and after extensive conversations with those directly involved, is that Caradon considered that because it was inadmissible to acquire territory by war, Israel would have to withdraw from all fronts, except for such insubstantial adjustments as might be agreed by the parties, in exchange for a firm Arab commitment to real peace. When pressed to go further and to mark on a map where the new borders would be, or to explain in public precisely what was the legal content of real peace, British representatives declined to comment: it was the wording of the British proposal and not someone's interpretation of it that was to be put to the vote.[88] But whatever Caradon said, he must have said it persuasively, for the British proposal was approved on 22 November by unanimous vote. Caradon had written that the main credit for unanimity should go to Kuznetsov.[89]

Resolution 242 had been more than five months in gestation and had been approved by a unanimous vote in the Security Council. The Egyptian foreign minister, Mahmoud Riad, reports that he had received the impression from Western diplomats that the resolution would be implemented in less than six months,[90] but that was not to be. Indeed, it was not at first clear which of the parties had "accepted" the resolution.

There had never been any doubt that Jordan would be very happy to see resolution 242 fully implemented. On the day before the resolution was put to the vote, King Hussein had said that the resolution could open the way to a just and durable peace; and Jordanian foreign minister Abdul Munim Rifai said on 27 November that although the

resolution was not all that the Arabs had hoped for, it contained elements that the Arabs wanted to affirm. Ambassador Jarring was formally told of Jordan's acceptance on or about 25 February 1968. King Hussein took the straightforward attitude that the resolution was a bargain in which Israel would offer territory in exchange for an Arab commitment to peace.[91] Nasser at first expressed the view that resolution 242 was "not enough", but on 20 February Egypt informed Jarring that it was ready to implement the resolution as a whole, and this was made public a month later.[92] Israel had told Jarring on 12 February 1968 of its acceptance of the resolution but this was not made public until 1 May. During the course of a debate in the Security Council on Israel's decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem, the Israeli ambassador, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said almost casually that Israel had told Jarring of its acceptance of the resolution in February. This was to cause difficulties in Israel when some of the more hard-line politicians queried whether Eban had received cabinet authority to tell Jarring that Israel accepted the resolution.[93]

Syria had made it clear in the Security Council that resolution 242 was not acceptable, and this was repeated the day after the vote in an official comment in Damascus. Britain, "the first and principal cause of all the disasters and tribulations that have befallen the Palestinian people since the Balfour Declaration", affirmed Syria, was continuing her "historic imperialist task of perpetuating and consolidating aggression and expansion . . ." The British proposal, which confirmed the principle of solving problems by armed force, was "absolutely and resolutely rejected" by Syria.[94] It was not until after another war that Syria accepted the resolution, and then only by implication and conditionally. After the 1973 war, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for cessation of all military activity, the implementation of resolution 242 "in all of its parts", and negotiations between the parties.[95] The following day, Syria accepted the new resolution on the understanding, first, that Israel would withdraw completely from all Arab territory occupied in June 1967 and subsequently; and, second, that the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people would be safeguarded in accordance with UN resolutions.[96]

The embryonic Palestine Liberation Organization issued a moderately-worded rejection the day after the vote on resolution 242. The question of Israeli withdrawal, claimed the PLO, was dealt with in the resolution in a superficial rather than a decisive way, leaving Israel many loopholes to justify the continued occupation of Arab territory.

The resolution failed to state the right of the refugees to return to their homes, and ignored the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The appointment of a special representative of the UN Secretary-General was "a repetition of unsuccessful attempts in the past" and would provide Israel with yet another opportunity "to impose the *fait accompli* and to engage in further aggression and expansion." The resolution, asserted the PLO, undermined the principles agreed at the Khartoum Conference.[97]

Resolution 242 had asked Thant's special representative "to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement..." Initially Secretary-General Thant's reports on ambassador Jarring's efforts were almost entirely about procedure, and Jarring's substantive activities were veiled in secrecy: he had engaged in a round of talks "mainly for the purpose ... of getting acquainted", he was concerning himself with both primary and secondary problems, his efforts had been directed at obtaining an agreed statement of position, he was renewing his contacts with the parties, he had in mind to initiate another round of talks, the governments concerned intended to designate representatives to new discussions.[98]

A series of reports by the Secretary-General in 1971, as well as communications from the parties, made it clear that while Jarring had helped to solve a few marginal problems, the central issues remained intractable. Eban was under a cabinet directive not to commit Israel to *any* position before the government had ascertained that the Arabs intended to conclude a just and lasting peace. For this among other reasons, Israel stood for direct negotiations and no withdrawal from occupied territories until a peace treaty had been agreed. Egypt and Jordan still refused to contemplate direct negotiations until Israel had made a clear commitment to withdraw to the territorial positions occupied before 5 June 1967.[99] For a time in 1968 it seemed as if Egypt, Jordan, and Israel would be willing to confer under Jarring's auspices, but it eventually became clear that agreement on the location or format of any discussions was lacking. Israel regarded resolution 242 as a statement of principles on the basis of which the parties would negotiate peace, including Israeli withdrawal to "secure and recognized borders", whereas the Arab states considered that the resolution provided a plan for resolving the Middle East dispute according to modalities to be laid down by Jarring, including withdrawal by Israel from all territories occupied during the June war.[100]

In an attempt to break the deadlock, Jarring submitted a questionnaire to Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel in March 1969, designed to elicit their attitudes to elements of the package of measures contained in resolution 242. The four governments confirmed their acceptance of the resolution, but Israel repeated its unwillingness to withdraw until peace treaties had been concluded, and Egypt and Jordan repeated their refusal to conclude peace treaties until Israel had withdrawn, but now withdrawal was not be to the 1949 armistice lines, but to the partition lines of 1947. In other words, Israel was to give up not only the territory occupied in 1967 but that occupied in 1947–9 as well. This was no doubt intended as a bargaining ploy at the beginning of negotiations, but Israel interpreted it as a sign that Egypt and Jordan were not seriously interested in negotiating. Lebanon simply affirmed that it considered that the 1949 armistice agreement was still valid. Syria had not then accepted resolution 242 and was unwilling to receive Jarring in Damascus.[101]

Jarring made another attempt to initiate serious discussions in 1970, but Israel declined to take part unless Egypt would agree to observe "in its entirety" the cease-fire after the so-called War of Attrition. On 30 December, Israel at last informed Jarring that it was ready to take part in fresh discussions, and on 1 February 1971, UN Secretary-General Thant expressed "cautious optimism" because the main parties were at last willing to talk.[102]

Jarring now felt that he could best fulfill the role of good offices by making clear what he believed were the necessary "parallel and simultaneous" commitments that the parties would have to make if a peaceful and accepted settlement were to be achieved. On 8 February 1971, he handed to Egypt and Israel identical *aide-mémoires*, asking them to make to him "simultaneously and reciprocally" certain prior commitments, subject to an eventual peace settlement. Israel was asked to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Egyptian Sinai, and Egypt was asked to commit itself to real peace. A week later, Egypt accepted the specific commitments which Jarring had requested, and Jarring informed Israel to that effect. On 26 February, Jarring received a paper from Israel which contained no specific reference to the commitment which he had sought, but informing him that Israel would not withdraw to the 1949–1967 armistice lines. This marked the virtual collapse of Jarring's intermediary efforts.[103]

Israel's uncompromising response to Jarring puzzled some of Israel's best friends. U.S. secretary of state William Rogers was later to ask an Israeli cabinet minister why Israel had replied to Jarring in such arro-

gant and adamant terms. "What baffles me [said Rogers] is why a nation that is so smart with words, comes to stand so alone in the world."[104]

Between April 1969 and September 1971, Jarring's good offices had been supplemented by Four Power talks in New York, designed to support resolution 242. U.S. ambassador Charles Yost, who took part in these, had the impression that "all four genuinely wished and sought agreement." Israel resisted any notion of an imposed settlement, and foreign minister Eban informed the three Western ambassadors in Israel "that the Israeli government would not receive Mr. Jarring if he was sent to Israel to negotiate an agreement reached by the Big Four."[105] In 1969–70 U.S. secretary of state William Rogers made a valiant attempt to nudge Egypt and Israel nearer to agreement on the implementation of resolution 242. U Thant considered the second Rogers proposal "the most balanced and comprehensive plan ever presented by Washington and constituted a real initiative..."[106] In 1971, four African Heads of State made a joint effort in the same direction, but without success.[107] In 1971 and 1972, the General Assembly urged the UN Secretary-General to take steps to implement resolution 242,[108] and in July 1973, the United States found itself casting a veto in the Security Council in order to prevent the Council from strongly deploring Israel's continuing retention of "the" territories occupied in 1967.[109] Ten weeks later, Egypt and Syria launched a military assault on Israel.

The first cease-fire resolution of the Security Council after the 1973 war called for the implementation of resolution 242 "in all of its parts", and the 1967 and 1973 resolutions of the Security Council were reaffirmed at Camp David and in the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The inclusion of the words "in all of its parts" in the 1973 resolution presumably meant that the provision in resolution 242 for the appointment of a special representative and for progress reports by the UN Secretary-General had been expressly reaffirmed. Resolution 242 became the basis for the peace conference on the Middle East which met briefly and inconclusively in Geneva in the winter of 1973–4.

All those who had dealings with Jarring about Middle Eastern matters testify to his utter integrity, his circumspection and discretion, his conscientious attention to details, his patience and persistence in the face of disappointments and setbacks. He had served in the Swedish diplomatic service in key posts, including both Washington and Moscow, and had been widely praised for his skill in executing

a special assignment for the UN Security Council regarding Kashmir in 1957.[110] Thant's announcement that Jarring had agreed to serve as Special Representative was generally welcomed. Saadia Touval, in a study of peace-making in the Middle East, comments that Jarring's chances of success were from the start "very small indeed": Jarring was cautious and discreet, but in Touval's view he "lacked sufficient imagination and creativity..."[111] Israel's ambassador Gideon Rafael considers that Jarring was "more of a scholar than a dashing diplomat ... a silent traveller, plodding his way in a thankless attempt to narrow the gap ...", lacking in boldness because of "his inclination to disentangle painstakingly every thread of the Gordian knot, instead of cutting it with one well-aimed stroke."[112]

Rafael's comment would be justified if it were clear beyond peradventure that one well-aimed stroke would have induced the parties to patch up a quarrel with its roots deep in tragedy, myth, and history. President Sadat was able to make an heroic gesture by going to the heart of the enemy camp, and by this means created "a new reality", as Henry Kissinger has put it.[113] Jarring, like all UN peace-makers, had to fight without tangible weapons. If, in the end, his mission failed, it was primarily because some or all of the parties preferred disagreement to an imperfect compromise, and secondarily because the major powers did not reinforce Jarring's quiet efforts with sufficient determination and vigour.

No state that has expressly accepted resolution 242 has withdrawn its acceptance, though president Sadat considered doing so. According to Ismail Fahmy, Sadat disliked the affirmation in the resolution of the right of *all* states in the Middle East to live in peace. He apparently gave serious consideration to revoking Egypt's acceptance but was persuaded by Fahmy that this would be a mistake.[114] Israel's attitude since 1968 has been ambivalent. It was Israel's rejection of the Jarring memorandum in 1971 that led to the end of Jarring's overt usefulness, and Israel's Likud government was even less willing than its predecessors to see the resolution implemented, yet Israel has regarded resolution 242 as a touchstone of Arab intentions.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union voted for resolution 242 and were committed to it as a basis for the Geneva conference or other negotiations.[115] The communiqué after the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in 1972 included what Kissinger called "a meaningless paragraph" reaffirming support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with resolution 242.[116] During the 1973 super-power summit, according to Kissinger, there was "the conven-

tional haggle" over the communiqué, and on this occasion Gromyko refused to include a reference to resolution 242.[117] In 1974, the communiqué after the summit included agreement on a just and durable peace in the Middle East based on resolution 242.[118] When president Nixon visited Cairo in 1974, the communiqué asserted that a just and durable peace in the Middle East rested on total implementation of resolution 242.[119]

In the context of the second Sinai Disengagement Agreement in 1975, the United States assured Israel that it would not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the PLO denies Israel's right to exist and has not accepted resolutions 242 and 338, a commitment which president Carter confirmed.[120] The United States also assured Israel in 1975 that it would oppose and if necessary veto any proposal to alter resolutions 242 and 338 adversely or in ways incompatible with their original purpose.[121] But president Carter and his team took the view that the commitment to Israel "did not exclude occasional informal contacts..." When Carter fired Andy Young, U.S. ambassador at the United Nations, it was not for talking to the PLO but for doing so without informing Washington.[122]

President Carter and Cyprus Vance, his secretary of state, fully supported resolution 242, interpreting it to mean that Israel should withdraw from most of the occupied territory on all fronts and with only minor and agreed border adjustments, and that the territory from which Israel would withdraw should revert to the Arab authorities that controlled them before 1967. Carter regarded the civilian Jewish settlements in the occupied territories as "illegal under international law and also contrary to Resolution 242."[123] The latter comment is perhaps to read more into the wording of the resolution than is there.

Carter and Vance went to some lengths to try to secure the conditional acceptance of resolution 242 by the PLO, invoking the help of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Carter agreed that if the PLO accepted the resolution, it had the right to express reservations about its inadequacy on the Palestinian issue. Cyrus Vance submitted to Saudi Arabian leaders a formula which read as follows.[124]

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, with the reservation that it considers that the resolution does not make adequate reference to the question of the Palestinians since it fails to make any reference to a homeland for the Palestinian people. It is recognized that the language of Resolution 242 relates to the right of all states in the Middle East to live in peace.

PLO chairman Yassir Arafat would have liked a more far-reaching interpretative formula, asserting the national rights of the Palestinians in a state of their own, and the repatriation of refugees. At one point, the United States thought that the efforts to persuade the PLO to accept the resolution conditionally had been successful: Vance told the press that he had heard from Saudi Arabia that a change in the PLO's stance was "imminent", and it was on this basis that Carter made an unduly optimistic statement to the effect that Palestinian leaders had indicated "indirectly" that they might accept the resolution. If the PLO had been willing to accept the U.S. formula, this would have opened the way to dialogue with the United States. Carter told Ismail Fahmy, the Egyptian foreign minister, that if the PLO accepted the resolution, even with conditions, "he would then appoint a personal representative to establish formal contacts with the PLO and its chairman . . ." Fahmy recognized Carter's sincerity but he believed that the PLO could not accept the resolution "unless the US made a move in its direction". He suggested that the United States should exert pressure on Israel to recognize the PLO. When Fahmy said that resolution 242 was defective in referring to the Palestinians as a refugee problem, Carter replied, "I want to be very clear that, if your proposal is to amend 242, the United States will veto it."[125] Yigal Allon, a veteran Israeli politician, once commented to the Americans that if the PLO accepted resolution 242, it would no longer be the PLO.[126]

If it was difficult to induce the PLO to accept resolution 242, it was importance in the eyes of the parties. The PLO has laid great stress on recognition, as a symbol of legitimacy: Israel and the United States have withheld recognition, for precisely the same reason. Even in the absence of formal recognition, Israel and the United States have from time to time had to deal with the PLO on a pragmatic basis.

It it was difficult to induce the PLO to accept resolution 242, it was almost as difficult to persuade Menachem Begin's Likud government in Israel that the resolution means what it seems to mean. Indeed, there have been plenty of Israelis who believed that resolution 242 is no longer relevant: that was Golda Meir's view in 1973,[127] and it was Menachem Begin's position at the beginning of the tripartite meetings at Camp David in 1978. At one stage he admitted that the resolution "applied to all fronts" and that some withdrawal by Israel would be necessary, but he later hedged by explaining that while the resolution "applied" to all fronts, it did not require withdrawal on all fronts.[128] President Sadat agreed at Camp David not to insist on the express reaffirmation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition

of territory by war (which is in the second preambular paragraph of the resolution) so long as the resolution itself were reaffirmed. When the Israelis received the U.S. draft agreement for comment, they deleted all references to 242, but the references were subsequently reinstated by the United States. The framework for peace in the Middle East affirmed that resolution 242 "in all its parts" is the agreed basis for a peaceful settlement, looking to "future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security . . . for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338", leading to "a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts." Negotiations for the future of the West Bank and Gaza would be based on "all the provisions and principles" of the resolution. The agreed framework for a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel stated that all of the principles of resolution 242 would apply; and the treaty itself, agreed the following year, stated in the first preambular paragraph that the two parties were convinced of "the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338".[129]

It is natural that questions should be raised about the continued relevance of a resolution passed more than sixteen years ago, and that attempts should be made from time to time to have the Security Council adopt a supplementary text or even to "amend" resolution 242. The procedural situation is that when a draft resolution is submitted to the Security Council, amendments and sub-amendments are in order, but once a proposal has been put to the vote and approved, there is no way of amending it. The nearest the Security Council has come to changing a previous decision occurred in 1949, in connexion with the Indonesian question. The Council had approved an elaborate resolution setting out a procedure for the transfer of authority from the Netherlands to a United States of Indonesia, but subsequently the Indonesian Republicans accepted a Dutch proposal for a round table conference in the Hague. As it would have been absurd in the new situation for the Security Council to have insisted that every detail of its resolution should be implemented in full, the Council approved a proposal submitted by Canada to send a telegram to the Council's subsidiary organ in the field to the effect that the proposed round table conference would be "consistent with the purpose and objectives" of the Council's previous decision.[130]

The Security Council often re-affirms previous decisions. The Council re-affirmed resolution 242 in 1968 after a number of incidents in the Suez Canal area; and after the 1973 war in the Middle East, the Council re-affirmed resolution 242 "in all of its parts".[131]

The Security Council can, of course, add to one of its decisions by adopting a supplementary resolution. In 1973, eight non-aligned members of the Council submitted a proposal which would have strongly deplored Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied in 1967, have expressed opposition to changes in the occupied territories which might obstruct a peaceful settlement or adversely affect the fundamental rights of the inhabitants, and have affirmed "the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians" (see Appendix 19). The proposal was vetoed by the United States, the fifth U.S. exercise of the veto. In 1976, six non-aligned members of the Council submitted a proposal to the effect that Israel should withdraw from "all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967", affirming the right of the Palestinians to self-determination "including the right to establish an independent State in Palestine . . .", affirming also the right of Palestinian refugees either "to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours" or "to receive compensation for their property", and affirming further that "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area" should be guaranteed "within secure and recognized boundaries". A British amendment to re-affirm "the principles and provisions" of resolutions 242 and 338 was defeated, and the six-power proposal was then vetoed by the United States, the 13th U.S. veto (see Appendix 19).[132] In 1982, Egypt and France submitted to the Security Council an informal working document and later a draft resolution in connexion with the situation in the Lebanon which, inter alia, would have re-affirmed resolution 242, re-affirmed also that all Middle Eastern states had the right to "existence and security", re-affirmed "the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people including the right to self-determination with all its implications", asked that the Palestinian people should be represented in any negotiations by the PLO, and called for mutual and simultaneous recognition by Israel and the PLO (see Appendix 20). This draft was briefly debated, after which the Security Council turned its attention to other matters without putting the draft to the vote.[133]

Some of those who were directly involved in the diplomacy leading up to resolution 242 now believe that the effort was misconceived, that the Arab states were too divided and in too defeatist a mood after the 1967 war to venture into the turbulent waters of direct negotiations

with Israel for a true and lasting peace, and that Israel was decreasingly willing after 1967 to contemplate withdrawal to the extent that would have been necessary to excite the interest of even the most accomodating Arab. "My feeling is that the world community blithely went ahead on the basis that a great job had been done in the Security Council towards producing a Middle East settlement. In fact, all they had done was to adopt a text which differing parties could each claim that they were adhering to without being vulnerable... to the accusation of being in breach of a Security Council Resolution." It would have been better, according to this view, if the Security Council had itself retained the responsibility for promoting agreement, instead of going for agreement for agreement's sake. Even a failure by the Security Council to produce agreement might have been better than providing the parties with the feather bed of resolution 242 to lie back on. Unanimouse voting in the Security Council, the critics maintain, should not be mistaken for the willingness of the parties to implement an agreement. "This should provide a lesson for the future – never agree for the sake of agreement."[134]

It is, of course, easy to be wise after the event, but the mood in 1967 was that two decades had been spent at the United Nations tinkering with secondary Middle Eastern issues, while disregarding fundamentals. The hope in 1967 was that after three decisive victories over the Arabs (1947 9, 1956, 1967), and with the appalling memories of the Holocaust receding, Israelis would have been inclined to be magnanimous; and that the Arabs had at last come to accept the fact that Israel's legitimacy could not be wished away by harsh words or brave deeds. Most Jewish Israelis have believed that the security of the state has depended on a willingness to use its own strong right arm, even in the face of hostile world opinion, and not depend on external promises, commitments, or guarantees: most Arabs have believed that a Zionist state in the Middle East is an outpost of imperialism that will wither away as Western support for something essentially anarchronistic diminishes. There is enough truth in both these beliefs to fuel the flames of unremitting political and intermittent military conflict.

Perhaps there was a brief moment in 1967–8 when vigorous diplomacy could have propelled the parties into a partial agreement, but opinion on both sides has hardened since then. The Arab states have continued to pay lip-service to Palestinian rights, but the PLO has been manipulated and fragmented, and PLO advocates of coexistence like Said Hammami and Issam Sartawi have been murdered. The Arabs, it is sometimes said, accept the proposal that is no longer available, rather as

Egypt and Jordan rejected the UN partition plan in 1947 but accepted it twenty years later, when it was no longer on offer. If the PLO leaders had advocated peaceful coexistence with Israeli Jews in 1967, there might now be a small Palestinian state west of the river Jordan. As it is, the occupied territories are increasingly peopled with Jewish settlers, and some of the best Palestinian families are choosing exile.

Israeli Jews, supported by world Jewry and in receipt of massive aid and arms from successive U.S. administrations, have shown astonishing military skill, but poor political judgment. One friend of Israel commented recently that each Israeli military victory over the Arabs makes it less likely that there will be a Zionist state in the Middle East in fifty years time.[135] Israel's refusal to deal with the PLO has had the effect of increasing Palestinian militancy. The Zionist ideology had many noble aspirations, but it is sad that those who had suffered so grievously from persecution and homelessness at the hands of the Nazis should have looked so callously on the tragedy that has befallen the Palestinian Arabs. Those Arabs who find themselves in Israel proper have never enjoyed equal rights.

Resolution 242, like all human constructs, was not perfect, but it was, as general Odd Bull has stressed, "a good platform for working out a comprehensive peace."[136] If those who spoke in its favour had backed their respectful words with energetic deeds, the parties might have been as willing to take risks for peace as they had been for war. Former ambassador George Ignatieff of Canada, on the basis of talks with senior Soviet diplomats, believes that peace has been elusive in the Middle East "primarily because the USA and Israel failed to build on the diplomatic contacts" generated by Kosygin and Kuznetsov. The United States, in Ignatieff's view, could have brought pressure to bear on Israel to negotiate a withdrawal to recognized frontiers, "but the job was left to poor Jarring without support." If the Middle East is approached on the basis of confrontation between the super-powers, writes Ignatieff, "instability is bound to result and recurring wars ..."[137] Ambassador Hans Tabor of Denmark, who presided over the Security Council throughout June 1967, notes the divergent positions of the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, and the fact that "these three permanent members ... did not have a strong interest in using the Council and putting the necessary pressure behind its action."[138] Sir Leslie Glass also believes that the super-powers lacked the will to press resolution 242 on their clients with sufficient vigour.[139] General Bull considers the failure to implement resolution 242 to have been "a great tragedy",[140] and an experienced diplomat lays much of

the blame on the tendency of the United States to exclude the Soviet Union from Middle Eastern peace-making.[141]

Charles Yost has stressed that it is not enough for the United Nations to pass resolutions of recommendation. In the case of resolution 242, the Security Council had a "solemn obligation" to impose a settlement or at the very least to impose measures that would ensure that armed conflict was not renewed, and Yost had no time for those who "sanctimoniously repeat that they would never think of 'imposing' a settlement."[142] Lord Caradon considers that the failure to implement resolution 242 was "an historic rebuke to the international community, an opportunity shamefully lost."[143]

There have been other approaches to peace-making in the Middle East since 1971, including Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the 1973 war, president Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, and the Camp David negotiations. The lessons of these experiences are that the implementation of agreements has to be phased – the step-by-step approach – and that it is necessary to deal at each stage with some matters extraneous to the step or steps in that stage – the comprehensive approach. The framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David, for example, could not be limited to bilateral relations between Egypt and Israel but had to include provisions for the participation of representatives of Jordan and the Palestinian Arabs in future negotiations for Palestinian self-government.

There are different but overlapping problems in the Middle East: domestic instabilities, inter-Arab rivalries,[144] the tendency of external powers to manipulate clients, the competition for strategic advantage, escalating levels of arms, access to oil. All these are exacerbated because the central Israel-Palestine problem is frozen in intransigence. One day, perhaps, an imaginative leader on one side or the other will come to realize that the only future worth having will be based on generosity and coexistence. Resolution 242 could then come into its own; but until then, peace remains elusive.

Notes

1. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (hereafter cited as Kissinger, vol. I), p. 341.
2. Laqueur, p. 3.
3. Peri, p. 246.
4. S.C. res 56 (S/983), 19 Aug. 1948.

5. SCOR, 11th year, Supplement for April to June 1956, pp. 40–1, paras. 40, 44–5 of S/3596.

6. *Middle East Record,* pp. 159–61, 164–5, 186–8.

7. Jabbour, pp. 526–9 (doc. 308).

8. Ibid., pp. 539, 550, 555, 560 (docs. 318 and 328).

9. Rabin, p. 53; Dayan, p. 287.

10. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1526th plenary mtg. (19 June 1967), para. 26; *Middle East Record,* pp. 188–9.

11. Ibid., pp. 13, 20, 184, 319.

12. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for April to June 1967, p. 111, para. 9 of S/7896; Bull, p. 104; Rafael, p. 137.

13. Yost, "How it began", p. 309. Eban reports this conversation with the Soviet ambassador in his autobiography (pp. 325–6) but does not refer to the invitation.

14. Rikhye, pp. 19, 163.

15. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 4 and 11, paras. 2 of A/6730 and 22 of A/6730/Add. 3.

16. Letter to the author, 1 Nov. 1982.

17. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 12, para. 22 of A/6730/Add. 3; Thant, p. 224.

18. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1527th plenary mtg. (20 June 1967), para. 6; Annexes, Agenda item 5, p. 11, para. 21 of A/6730/Add. 3; Thant, p. 223.

19. Ibid., p. 481; Rikhye, pp. 181–2.

20. GAOR, 11th session, Annexes, Agenda item 66, p. 71, paras. I.A.2 and I.B.2 of Annexes to A/3563 (conversation on 25 Feb. 1957).

21. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 7 and 11, para. 8 of A/6730, and para. 13 of A/6730/Add. 3; Thant, pp. 220–1.

22. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, Annexes, Agenda item 5, pp. 7, 12, para. 10 of A/6730, para. 23 of A/6730/Add. 3; Thant, pp. 224–5.

23. Thant, pp. 233–4.

24. Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar,* pp. 179–80; Heikal, *Nasser,* p. 219; Riad, pp. 34–5; Nutting, pp. 149–50; Jabber, p. 565 (doc. 329).

25. Burdett, pp. 214, 239.

26. Rikhye, pp. 167–8.

27. Ibid., p. 75.

28. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision-making: a Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment,* New York, Free Press: London, Collier Macmillan, 1977, pp. 129–33, 179–80, 398–400.

29. SCOR, 22nd year, 1342nd mtg. (24 May 1967), para. 59.

30. Ibid., para. 81.

31. George Inatieff, "Prompt and Regular Access to Political Government at Home is Essential", in *Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency,* edited by Davidson Nicol, Oxford and New York, Pergamon, 1981, pp. 134, 138; Davidson Nicol, with Margaret Croke and Babatunde Adniran, *The United Nations Security Council: towards greater effectiveness,* New York, UN Institute for Training and Research, 1982, pp. 44–7, 77–82; letter to the author from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.

32. Brown, p. 137.

33. Jabber, pp. 11–2 (doc. 24).

34. Wilson, *Chariot of Israel,* pp. 336, 338–9, 341, 356; Eban, p. 346.

35. Meir, p. 297; Jabber, p. 28 (doc. 41); letter to the author form Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.

36. Eban, p. 334.

37. Ibid., pp. 348–9; Rafael, pp. 143–4; Rabin, pp. 68–9.

38. Eban, pp. 351–2; Johnson, p. 293; Quandt, p. 49.

39. Howe, p. 36; Bar-Zohar, p. 116.

40. Eban, pp. 371–3.

41. Dayan, p. 339; Rabin, p. 76.

42. Dayan, p. 333; Rabin, pp. 72–3.

43. Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar,* pp. 176–7.

44. Thant, p. 246.

45. Dayan, p. 339.

46. Riad, pp. 23–4.

47. Hussein, pp. 92, 95; Riad, pp. 30, 32.

48. Jabber, pp. 596–9 (doc. 372).

49. SCOR, 22nd year, 1347th mtg. (5 June 1967), paras. 28, 54, 56–8; Rafael, p. 156; Eban, p. 415.

50. Bull, p. 118; Brecher, p. 320.

51. Rafael, p. 157; Eban, p. 411.

52. S.C. res. 233 (S/7935), 6 June 1967; S.C. res. 234 (S/7940), 7 June 1967.

53. Dayan, p. 380.

54. SCOR, 22nd year, 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), paras. 2, 7, 133, 167, 171, 175–7; 1353rd mtg. (9 June 1967), para. 21.

55. Ibid., paras. 19–20, 22, 71–2, 112, 180; 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), paras. 5, 22, 27; 1355th mtg (10 June 1967), paras. 3, 68. 204; 1356th mtg. (10/11 June 1967), paras. 22–3, 25, 32–3, 96, 204; 1357th mtg. (11 June 1967), paras. 22, 180–2; Bull, pp. 119–20; Thant, pp. 260–3.

56. Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 93); Johnson, pp. 301–3; Lall, p. 78.

57. Rafael, pp. 164–5; Dayan, pp. 377–8; Eban, p. 422.

58. Letter to the author, 24 August 1983.

59. SCOR, 22nd year, 1354th meg. (10 June 1967), para. 53.

60. S.C. res. 235 (S/7960), 9 June 1967; S.C. res. 236, 11 June 1967.

61. SCOR, 22nd year, 1353rd mtg. (9 June 1967), para. 229; 1354th mtg. (10 June 1967), para. 75; Thant, p. 262.

62. Bull, pp. 121–3.
63. SCOR, 22nd year, 1366th mtg. (9/10 July 1967), para. 125 (S/8047); 1371st mtg. (25 Oct. 1967), paras. 6–9; Bull, p. 138.
64. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for October to December 1967, pp. 119 and 126, paras. 159 and 202 of S/8158-A/6797; Thant, p. 282.
65. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for October to December 1967, pp. 129–30, paras. 218–221 of S/8158-A/6797.
66. Eban, p. 419; letter to the author, 14 December 1983.
67. Jabber, pp. 648–51, 693–4 (docs. 404, 406, 434).
68. Jabber, pp. 611–2 (docs. 383–4); Riad, pp. 46, 53–5; Hussein, p. 118.
69. Kissinger vol. I, pp. 345, 374; George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs,* New York and London, Norton: Toronto, MacLeod, 1982, p. 439; Riad, pp. 64–5, 80–1; Quandt, p. 65, f.n. 54.
70. *Middle East Record,* p. 276; Jabber, p. 100 (doc. 92); Thant, p. 263; Rafael, p. 196.
71. GAOR, 5th emergency special session, 1529th plenary mtg. (21 June 1967), paras. 15–6; S.C. res. 267 (S/9311), 3 July 1969; Rafael, pp. 177–8; Jabber, pp. 125, 142 (docs. 123–4, 140).
72. Eban, *New Diplomacy,* p. 23.
73. Thant, p. 272; Riad, p. 47.
74. Rafael, p. 177.
75. Lall, p. 312; Thant, p. 281; Rafael, pp. 178–84; Eban, pp. 443–4; Riad, pp. 38–9; letter from Dean Rusk to the author, 24 Aug. 1983.
76. Riad, pp. 30, 39, 112; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar,* pp. 176–8; SCOR, 22nd year, 1348th mtg. (6 June 1967), paras. 258–9; GAOR, 22nd regular session, 1575th plenary mtg. (2 Oct. 1967), para. 92; Eban, pp. 443–4; Rafael, pp. 181, 183, 197–9; Rabin, pp. 115, 118; Thant, p. 329; Lall, p. 4.
77. Thant, p. 271; Caradon, p. 3.
78. SCOR, 22nd year, 1352nd mtg. (9 June 1967), para. 102.
79. Jabber, pp. 627, 631–2 (doc. 393).
80. Jabber, pp. 627, 631–2 (doc. 393).
81. Lall, p. 113.
82. On the policy of the People's Republic of China, see Jabber, pp. 22–3, 26–7, 62, 71–5, 176, 192–4 (docs. 35, 40, 64, 70–2, 75, 190, 210).
83. Lall, p. 236. On Canadian policy, see Jabber, pp. 90–2, 180 (docs. 84–5, 198); on French policy, Ibid., pp. 171, 186–7 (docs. 183, 205).
84. Caradon, pp. 7–8; Brown, p. 233.
85. Lall, p. 250; letter to the author from general Odd Bull, 4 April 1983; letter to the author from Sir Leslie Glass, 26 July 1983; Brown, p. 233; Caradon, p. 5; Riad, p. 66.
86. Caradon, p. 4.
87. Ibid., p. 8.
88. SCOR, 22nd year, 1382nd mtg. (22 Nov. 1967), para. 61.
89. Caradon, p. 6.

90. Riad, p. 69.

91. *Middle East Record*, p. 272; SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, p. 20, para. 10 of S/10070; Vance, p. 176.

92. *Middle East Record*, pp. 271–2; SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, p. 25, para. 9 of S/10070; 23rd year, Supplement for January to March 1968, pp. 275–6, S/8479-A/7074; 28th year, Supplement for April to June 1973, p. 46, para. 51 of S/10929.

93. Ibid., 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, p. 19, S/10070, para. 8; 23rd year, 1418th mtg. (1 May 1968), para. 111; Rafael, pp. 197–9.

94. Jabber, pp. 716–7 (doc. 446); Riad, p. 82.

95. S.C. res. 338 (S/11036), 22 Oct. 1973; Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of...*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978, pp. 930, 936; Kissinger, vol. II, pp. 553–5, 564–5; Eban, pp. 524, 527, 532; Rafael, pp. 307–9.

96. SCOR, 28th year, Supplement for October to December 1973, p. 84, S/11040; Riad, p. 253.

97. Jabber, pp. 715–6 (doc. 445).

98. SCOR, 22nd year, Supplement for October to December 1967, p. 326, S/8309; 23rd year, Supplement for January to March 1968, pp. 20–2, S/8309/Adds. 1 and 2; Supplement for July to September 1968, pp. 27–8, S/8309/Add. 3; Supplement for October to December 1968, pp. 31–3, S/8309/Add. 4; 25th year, Supplement for July to September 1970, pp. 125–6, S/9902.

99. Ibid., 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 19–20, paras. 4–10 of S/10070; Riad, p. 78; Rafael, pp. 194–5; Rabin, p. 106.

100. SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 20–2, paras. 11–25 of S/10070; Eban, pp. 455–6; Rafael, pp. 196–7; Rabin, p. 107; Riad, pp. 78–9.

101. SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 21–7, paras. 20, 27–9 of and Annex I to S/10070; Thant, p. 299; Riad, p. 98; Rabin, pp. 107, 109.

102. SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 23, 27–8, 44–5, 48, paras. 35–8 of and Annex II to S/10070, S/10070/Add. 1, S/10083, S/10089; Rafael, p. 252.

103. SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 29–30, 55–6, 97–8, paras. 7 12 of S/10070/Add. 2, S/10098, S/10141-A/8292; Supplement for October to December 1971, pp. 57–60, para. 24 of the Annexes to S/10403-A/8541; Thant, pp. 348–9; Eban, pp. 472–4, 480, 486; Dayan, pp. 453–4; Rafael, pp. 231, 253–7, 266; Rabin, pp. 150–2; Riad, pp. 188–9.

104. Rafael, p. 266.

105. SCOR, 24th year, Supplement for October to December 1969, p. 95, S/9485; 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, p. 22, para. 32 of S/10070; 28th year, Supplement for April to June 1973, p. 47, para. 63 of S/10929; Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, p. 129;

Kissinger, vol. I, pp. 353, 363; Thant, pp. 313, 329; Riad, pp. 112, 123–5, 209; Eban, p. 464.

106. SCOR, 26th year, Supplement for January to March 1971, pp. 22–3, paras. 33–4 of S/10070; Thant, p. 335; Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of...*, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978, pp. 478–9; Kissinger, vol. I, pp. 373–7, 575–82; Eban, pp. 464–70; Dayan, pp. 425, 451–2; Rafael, pp. 200–12, 224–6, 228–30; Rabin, pp. 123–8, 138–40; Riad, pp. 109–111, 114–5, 130–1, 137–8, 148–9. For the details of the two proposals of William Rogers, see *Arab Report and Record*, 1–15 Dec. 1969, pp. 521–2, and SCOR, 25th year, Supplement for January to March 1970, pp. 97–100, S/9588 (first Rogers plan); and SCOR, 25th year, Supplement for July to September 1970, pp. 125–6, S/9902 (second Rogers plan).

107. SCOR, 28th year, Supplement for April to June 1973, p. 50, paras. 93–6 of S/10929; Eban, pp. 476–8; Riad, pp. 220–1.

108. G.A. res. 2799 (XXVI), 13 Dec. 1971; G.A. res. 2949 (XXVII), 8 Dec. 1972.

109. SCOR, 28th year, Supplement for July to September 1973, pp. 20–1, S/10974; the U.S. explanation of vote is in Ibid., 1735th mtg. (26 July 1973), paras. 123–36.

110. See my *Procedure of the UN Security Council*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 105.

111. Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979*, Princeton, N.J., and Guildford, Surrey, Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 136, 160–3.

112. Rafael, pp. 193, 195, 199.

113. Kissinger, vol. II, p. 647.

114. Fahmy, p. 11.

115. Kissinger, vol. I, pp. 616, 1247, 1300; Kissinger, vol. II, p. 754; Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar*, p. 211; Sadat, p. 229; Riad, pp. 84, 94, 315.

116. Kissinger, vol. I, pp. 1247, 1493; Riad, p. 229; Eban, p. 480; Rafael, p. 274.

117. Kissinger, vol. II, pp. 295, 1236.

118. Riad, p. 285.

119. Riad, p. 281; Fahmy, p. 154; Kissinger, vol. II, p. 1129.

120 Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*, pp. 281, 287, 290, 300, 327, 371; Brzezinski, p. 94.

121. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings, 6 and 7 Oct. 1975, p. 252; Fahmy, pp. 164, 193–4; Riad, pp. 294–5; Rafael, p. 324; Rabin, pp. 215, 250.

122. Brezezinski, pp. 94, 102; Carter, p. 491.

123. Vance, pp. 160, 183, 191, 207, 221, 231; Brzezinski, pp. 101, 109, 240, 242, 244, 246; Dayan, *Breakthrough*, pp. 18, 62 67–8, 110–1, 165.

124. Vance, p. 188; Brzezinski, p. 95; Riad, pp. 303 4; Dayan, *Breakthrough*, p. 23.

125. Carter, pp. 302, 308; Vance, pp. 177, 182, 188, 189; Brzezinski, pp. 94–5, 102–3, 105; Riad, p. 304; Fahmy, pp. 197–8, 202–4.

126. Vance, p. 171.
127. Kissinger, vol. II, p. 539.
128. Carter, pp. 288, 312, 336–7, 385–6; Vance, pp. 160, 182–4, 186, 206, 208, 210; Brzezinski, pp. 246–7, 260, 264, 268; Dayan, *Breakthrough,* pp. 5, 7, 20, 83, 119, 124, 126, 167.
129. Carter, p. 387; Vance, pp. 183–4, 193, 220, 222; Dayan, *Breakthrough,* pp. 167, 175; Ezer Weizman, *The Battle for Peace,* London and New York, Bantam, 1981, pp. 366, 372; Fahmy, p. 303.
130. S.C. res. 67 (S/1234), 28 Jan. 1949; SCOR, 4th year, 421st mtg. (23 March 1949), pp. 5, 25–6.
131. S.C. res. 258, 18 Sept. 1968; S.C. res. 338 (S/11036), 22 Oct. 1973.
132. SCOR, 28th year, Supplement for July to September 1973, pp. 20–1, S/10974; 31st year, Supplement for January to March 1976, p. 19, S/11940.
133. UN doc. S/15317, 28 July 1982; S/PV. 2384, 29 July 1982, pp. 6–11, 16–7, 21, 26 -30, 32–5; S/PV. 2385, 29 July 1982, pp. 13–6, 19, 21, 42–50, 62–5, 76–7, 82–90 (all mimeo.).
134. Letter to the author, 14 December 1982; Bull, p. 178; letter to the author, 23 December 1983; letter from Hans Tabor, 23 Jan. 1984.
135. Conversation with the author, 1 December 1983.
136. Letter to the author, 4 April 1983.
137. Letter to the author, 17 May 1983.
138. Letter to the author, 23 Jan. 1984.
139. Letter to the author, 28 July 1983.
140. Letter to the author, 4 April 1983.
141. Memorandum to the author, 6 Sept. 1983.
142. Yost, *Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs,* p. 186.
143. Caradon, p. 10.
144. Brecher, p. 323.

APPENDICES

1. *UNTSO reports on Arab-Israeli border incidents, 1957–66 **

date	location	SCOR
March 1957	Lake Hula	12th year, Supplement for April to June 1967, pp. 4–7, S/3815; Supplement for July to Sept. 1967, pp. 2–11, S/3844 and Add. 1.
July 1957	Government House, Jerusalem	Ibid., pp. 38–61, S/3892; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1967, pp. 1–2, S/3892/Adds. 1 and 2.
May 1958	Mount Scopus, Jerusalem	13th year, Supplement for April to June 1958, pp. 74–100, S/4030; Supplement for July to Sept. 1958, pp. 1–3, S/4030/Add. 1.
Dec. 1958	Lake Hula	Ibid., Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1958, pp. 23–32, S/4124; 844th mtg. (15 Dec. 1958), paras. 1–8.
Jan. 1959	Ma'ale Habashan	Ibid., 14th year, Supplement for Jan. to June 1960, pp. 6–9, S/4154.
Jan. 1960.	Tawafiq-Beit Qatsir	Ibid., 15th year, Supplement for Jan. to March 1960, pp. 11–50, S/4270.
April 1961	Jerusalem	Ibid., 16th year, Supplement for April to June 1961, pp. 29–36, S/4792 and Add. 1.
March 1962	Lake Tiberias	Ibid., 17th year, Supplement for Jan. to March 1962, pp. 100–110, S/5102 and Add. 1; 1001st mtg. (4 April 1962), pp. 2–7.

*For earlier incidents (1949–56), see my *How Wars End,* vol. 2, pp. 543–4.

date	location	SCOR
Aug. 1963	Almagor	Ibid., 18th year, Supplement for July to Sept. 1963, pp. 83–139, S/5401 and Adds. 1–4; 1058th mtg. (28 Aug. 1963), paras. 3–4.
Nov. 1964	Tel-El-Qadi (Tel Dan)	Ibid., 19th year, Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1964, pp. 70–185, S/6061 and Add. 1.
July 1966	Lake Hula	Ibid., 21st year, Supplement for July to Spet. 1966, pp. 46–53, S/7432 and Add. 1, S/7433.
Oct. 1966	Jerusalem	Ibid., Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1966, pp. 40–4, S/7553.
Nov. 1966	Samu	Ibid., 1320th mtg. (16 Nov. 1966), paras. 5–14; Supplement for Oct. to Dec. 1966, pp. 88–94, S/7593 and Add. 1.

2. *Conjectural account of British cabinet meeting, 23 May 1967*

Patrick Gordon Walker, in the second edition of his book on cabinet government, has included an "imaginary" account of a cabinet meeting, based in part on the real meeting held on 23 May 1967. In addition to the facts given in the text of section 3, it may be inferred from Gordon Walker's account that Wilson apologized for calling the meeting at short notice and without papers having been circulated in advance, and that George Brown said he had been up until a late hour the previous night reading the telegrams as they had come in. Brown was in favour of vigorous action, and he warned that to do nothing was just as much a decision as to do something. The Soviet Union was pouring in arms to the Middle East. Brown's greatest fear was that the war would spread, and this would have an adverse effect on Britain's economic interests. British women and children had been advised to leave the area. If hostilities should break out, Britain would try to get a UN organ to pass a cease-fire resolution.

The chancellor of the exchequer, according to this "imaginery" account, warned of the grave economic consequences of war: our fuel supplies would be at risk, the balance of payments would be adversely affected, and the pound would be weakened. He thought that the risk of intervention by the super-powers had been exaggerated. The defence secretary, who had previously supported the idea of vigorous naval action, had consulted his experts and now had doubts: what Wilson and Brown were proposing was politically attractive but militarily unattainable. A naval operation in narrow, well-protected waters was nonsense. If British ships were

fired on, they could only return fire and withdraw. Wilson, according to this "imaginery" account, pointed out that the Egyptian government was shaky and would hesitate to fire on British ships. The defence secretary said that to assemble a naval force might exert political pressure, but it was foolish to hope that a wild and inexperienced government would fail to open fire. As Britain could not bring effective force to bear, it was better not to try.

Those favouring the use of force argued that Britain still had some power and influence. Aggression must not be allowed to succeed. Principles should come first. Britain could not simply fold its hands and hope for safety.

Those opposing the use of force wondered how we would extricate our men if their activities should be resisted. Britain was no longer the world's policeman. Britain might be militarily successful but on the political defensive. It would better not to take sides. If others should take the initiative, Britain might join in, but only as one of a number of sponsors.

Patrick Gordon Walker, *The Cabinet*, revised edition, London, Cape, 1972, pp. 153–164.

3. *Security Council res. 233 (S/7935), 6 June 1967*

The Security Council,

Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,

Having heard the statements made in the Council,

Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,

1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

4. *Security Council res. 234 (S/7940), 7 June 1967*

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forth-with as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East [*resolution 233 (1967)*], military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

5. *Security Council res. 235 (S/7960), 9 June 1967*

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

1. *Confirms* its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

2. *Demands* that hostilities should cease forthwith;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

6. *Security Council consensus, 9 June 1967*

The Council decided to request the parties concerned to extend all possible co-operation to United Nations observers in the discharge of their responsibilities, to request the Government of Israel to restore the use of Government House to General Odd Bull and to ask the parties to re-establish freedom of movement for United Nations observers in the area.

7. *Security Council res. 236, 11 June 1967*

The Security Council,

Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in documents S/7930 and Add. 1–3,

1. *Condemns* any and all violations of the cease-fire;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible;

3. *Affirms* that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;

4. *Calls for* full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities.

8. *Security Council res. 237 (S/7969/Rev. 3), 14 June 1967*

The Security Council,

Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of the war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings,

Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,

Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,

1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,

3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council.

9. *General Assembly res. 2252 (ES-V), 4 July 1967*

The General Assembly,

Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,

1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby the Council:

(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East additional sufferings;

(b) Considered that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war;

(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict;

(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations had taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

(e) Recommended to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;

(f) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council;

2. *Notes with gratitude and satisfaction* and endorses the appeal made by the President of the General Assembly on 26 June 1967;

3. *Notes with gratification* the work undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians;

4. *Notes further with gratification* the assistance which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing to women and children in the area;

5. *Commends* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue the activities of the Agency in the present situation with respect to all persons coming within his mandate;

6. *Endorses,* bearing in mind the objectives of the above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and are in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

7. *Welcomes* the close co-operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and of the other organizations concerned, for the purpose of co-ordinating assistance;

8. *Calls upon* all the Member States concerned to facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in which assistance is being rendered;

9. *Appeals* to all Governments, as well as organizations and individuals, to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and also to the other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations concerned;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to report urgently to the General Assembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and 6 above;

11. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

10. General Assembly res. 2253 (ES-V), 4 July 1967

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

1. *Considers* that these measures are invalid;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.

11. Consensus of the Security Council (S/8047), 9 July 1967

Recalling Security Council resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June, 234 (1967) of 7 June, 235 (1967) of 9 June and 236 (1967) of 11 June 1967, and emphasizing the need for all parties to observe scrupulously the provisions of these resolutions, having heard the statements made by the Secretary-General and the suggestions he has addressed to the parties concerned, I believe that I am reflecting the view of the Council that the Secretary-General should proceed, as he has suggested in his statements before the Council on 8 and 9 July 1967, to request the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, General Odd Bull, to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

12. General Assembly res. 2254 (ES-V), 14 July 1967

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

Having received the report submitted by the Secretary General,

Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

13. General Assembly res. 2256 (ES-V), 21 July 1967

The General Assembly,

Having considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Considering that the Security Council continues to be seized of the problem,

Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and the proposals considered during the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to forward the records of the fifth emergency special session of the General Assembly to the Security Council in order to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation in the Middle East;

2. Decides to adjourn the fifth emergency special session temporarily and to authorize the President of the General Assembly to reconvene the session as and when necessary.

14. *General Assembly res. 2257 (ES-V), 18 September 1967*

The General Assembly,

Having considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Expressing its utmost concern about that situation,

1. Decides to place on the agenda of its twenty-second regular session, as a matter of high priority, the question on the agenda of its fifth emergency special session;

2. Refers to its twenty-second regular session, for consideration, the records of the meetings and the documents of its fifth emergency special session.

15. *Security Council res. 240, 25 October 1967*

The Security Council,

Gravely concerned over recent military activities in the Middle East carried out in spite of the Security Council resolutions ordering a cease-fire,

Having heard and considered the statements by the parties concerned,

Taking into consideration the information on the said activities provided by the Secretary-General in documents S/7930/Add. 43, Add. 44, Add. 45, Add. 46, Add. 47, Add. 48 and Add. 49,

1. Condemns the violations of the cease-fire;

2. Regrets the casualties and loss of property resulting from the violations;

3. Reaffirms the necessity of the strict observance of the cease-fire resolution;

4. Demands of the Member States concerned to cease immediately all prohibited military activities in the area, and to co-operate fully and promptly with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

16. Proposals before the UN Security Council in November 1967

United Kingdom (S/8247, 16 Nov. 1967)	India, Mali, Nigeria (S/8227, 7 Nov. 1967)	United States (S/8229, 7 Nov. 1967)	Latin America and Caribbean (A/L. 523/Rev. 1, 4 July 1967; S/8235, 9 Nov. 1967)	Soviet Union (S/8253, 20 Nov. 1967)
The Security Council, *Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,	*The Security Council,* *Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,	*The Security Council,* *Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.	*The General Assembly,*	*The Security Council* *Expressing* concern at the lack of progress towards a political settlement in the Middle East and at the increased tension in the area.
—	*Recalling its* resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June (1967) on the outbreak of fighting which called for, as a first step, an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area	*Recalling* its resolution 233 (1967) on the outbreak of fighting which called, as a first step, for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of military activities in the area	*Considering* further that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council and accepted by the State of Israel and the States of Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic is a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, a step which must be reinforced by other measures to be adopted by the Organization and complied with by the parties.	*Noting* that there have even been violations of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June, 234 (1967) of 7 June, 235 (1967) of 9 June and 236 (1967) of 12 June, a cease-fire which was regarded as a first step towards the achievement of a just peace in the area and which which was to have been strengthened by other appropriate measures,
—	*Recalling further* General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V)	*Recalling further* General Assembly resolution 2256 (ES-V)	—	*Recalling* General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) 2253 (ES-V), 2254 (ES-V) and 2256 (ES-V),
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war	Occupation or acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible under the Charter of the United Nations	—	declares that the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by such means should not be recognized;	the principle that the seizure of territories as a result of war is inadmissible:
and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,	*Emphasizing* the urgency of reducing tensions, restoring peace and bringing about normalcy in the area,	*Emphasizing* the urgency of reducing tensions and bringing about a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,	*Considering* that all Member States have an inescapable obligation to preserve peace	*Emphasizing* the urgent necessity of restoring peace and establishing normal conditions in the Middle East,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,	*Affirms* that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and more particularly of the following principles of the United Nations . . . settle their international disputes by peaceful means,	*Emphasizing further* that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,	to have recourse in all cases to the procedures for peaceful settlement indicated in the Charter of the United Nations;	*Declares* that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations . . . the obligations assumed by them under the Charter of the United Nations and international agreements

United Kingdom (S/8247, 16 Nov. 1967)	India, Mali, Nigeria (S/8227, 7 Nov. 1967)	United States (S/8229, 7 Nov. 1967)	Latin America and Caribbean (A/L. 523/Rev. 1, 4 July 1967; S/8235, 9 Nov. 1967)	Soviet Union (S/8253, 20 Nov. 1967)
1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;	Israel's armed forces should withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the recent conflict;	*Affirms* that the fulfilment of the above Charter principles requires the achievement of a state of just and lasting peace in the Middle East embracing withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories.	*Urgently* requests Israel to withdraw all its forces from all the territories occupied by it as a result of the recent conflict;	*Urges* that the following steps should be taken: (a) The parties to the conflict should withdraw their forces to the positions they held before 5 June 1967
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency	all States in the area should terminate the state or claim of belligerency	termination of claims or states of belligerence.	The parties in conflict to end the state of belligerency.	*Considers* that, in harmony with the steps to be taken along the lines indicated above, all States in the area should put an end to the state of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area	It is obligatory on all Member States of the area to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of one another	mutual recognition and respect of the right of every state in the area to sovereign existence, territorial integrity political independence,	to endeavour to establish conditions of coexistence based on good-neighbourliness	Every State must respect the political independence and territorial integrity of all other States in the area;
and their rights to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;	Likewise, every State has the right to live in peace and security free from threats or acts of war...Likewise every State of the area has the right to be secure within its borders	secure and recognized boundaries, and freedom from the threat or use of force;	to avoid the use of force in the international sphere... *Reaffirms* its conviction that no stable international order can be based on the threat or use of force,	All States Members of the United Nations in the area should immediately recognize that each of them has the right to exist as an independent national State and to live in peace and security, and should renounce all claims and desist from all acts inconsistent with the foregoing...The use or threat of force in relations between States is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations;
2. *Affirms further* the necessity (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;	There should be guarantee of freedom of navigation in accordance with international law through international waterways in the area;	*Affirms further* the necessity For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;	Guarantee freedom of transit on the international waterways in the region;	Innocent passage through international waterways in the area in accordance with international agreements
(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;	*Affirms further:* There should be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees;	For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;	Achieve an appropriate and full solution of the problem of the refugees	There must be a just settlement of the question of Palestine refugees;

(continued)

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;	—	(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;	guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States of the region, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;	—
—	—	(d) For achieving a limitation of the wasteful and destructive arms race in the area;	—	measures to limit the useless and and destructive arms race
—	—	—	Reaffirms, as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international régime for the city of Jerusalem	—
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;	3. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a special representative to the Middle East who would contact the States concerned in order to co-ordinate efforts to achieve the purposes of this resolution	Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned with a view to assisting them in the working out of solutions in accordance with the purposes of this resolution and in creating a just and lasting peace in the area;	Requests the Security Council to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency, working directly with the parties and relying on the presence of the United Nations	Deems it necessary in this connexion to continue its consideration of the situation in the Middle East collaborating directly with the parties concerned and making use of the presence of the United Nations with a view to achieving an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.	to submit a report to the Council within thirty days	Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.	—	—

17. Security Council res. 242 (S/8247), 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East.

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

18. Extracts from draft resolution sponsored by Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, and Yugoslavia, 24 July 1973, doc. S/10974

The Security Council,

Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,
. . .

Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to

respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded,

. . .

1. Deeply regrets that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242 (1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

2. Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

3. Expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

4. Supports the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

5. Expresses its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;

6. Declares that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

. . .

19. Extracts from draft resolution sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, Romania, and Tanzania, 23 January 1976, doc. S/11940

The Security Council,

. . .

Convinced that the question of Palestine is the core of the conflict in the Middle East,

Expressing its concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and deeply deploring Israel's persistence in the occupation of Arab territories and its refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

Reaffirming the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force,

Reaffirming further the necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region based on full respect for the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

1. Affirms:

(a) That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours to do so and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property;

(c) That Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967;

(d) That appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee, in accordance with the Charter, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;

2. Decides that the provisions contained in paragraph 1 above should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

20. Extract from draft resolution sponsored by Egypt and France, 28 July 1982, doc. S/15317

The Security Council,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),

. . .

Reaffirming the obligation of all to respect strictly the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all countries and the legitimate national rights of all peoples in the Middle East,

Reaffirming further the obligation that all States shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and that they shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Determined to seek the restoration of peace and security in the region based on the principles of security for all States and justice for all peoples,

. . .

1. Considers that the settlement of the Lebanese problem should contribute to the initiation of a durable restoration of peace and security in the region within the framework of negotiations based on the principles of security for all States and justice for all peoples, in order namely to:

(a) Reaffirm the right of all States in the region to existence and security in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

(b) Reaffirm the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination with all its implications, on the under-

standing that to this end the Palestinian people shall be represented in the negotiations and, consequently, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall be associated therein;

(c) Call for the mutual and simultaneous recognition of the parties concerned;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with all the parties concerned including the representatives of the Palestinian people, to make proposals to the Security Council designed to achieve by political means the objectives mentioned above, with a view to the recognition of and respect for the existence and security of all;

. . .

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215

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INDEX

Abu-Jaber, Kamel S., 130

Albania, 126

Algeria, 74

Allon, Yigal, 31, 60–1, 137, 185

Aman (Israeli military intelligence), 22, 62

Amer, field marshal Hakim Abdul: and Israeli troop deployment, 2, 12; and UNEF withdrawal, 17; and estimated Israeli strength, 31; and outbreak of war, 69; collapse, 75; resignation and suicide, 85, 90; Sadat and, 95

Amit, Meir, 62, 170

Anderson, Robert, 59, 170

Angleton, James, 47

Aqaba (port), 28

Aqaba, Gulf of: Egypt blockades, 3, 28–32, 34, 37, 39, 41–2, 45, 47, 57, 62, 71, 91, 166–9; Israeli access to, 7, 18; Israel receives supplies through, 16; Security Council and, 59; Israel opens, 90; as cause of war, 167

Arab Development Society, 14 *n*15

Arab League, 151

Arab Legion, 151

Arafat, Yassir, 185

Argentina, 155, 176

Assad, Hafiz el, 1, 12

Atasi, Nur ad-Din, 109

Bá'athist régime (Syria), 7, 24, 162

Badran, Shamseddin, 17, 30–1, 90

Balfour Declaration, 143

Baniyas river, 10

Bar-Lev, brigadier Chaim, 140

Baroody, Jamil M., 103–5, 112, 126

Bar-Zohar, Michael, 33, 40–1, 55, 59

Beeley, Sir Harold, 138

Begin, Menachem: in government of national unity, 4, 60–1, 169, 172; and outbreak of war, 33, 63; and Eban's post-war position, 107; and resolution 242, 185

Ben-Gurion, David, 12, 33, 60

Bernadotte, Count Folke, 9, 162

Brazil, 21, 92, 176

Brezhnev, Leonid, 183

Britain: proposes resolution 242, 1, 5, 145–52, 156–7, 176–7, 179; and Tripartite Declaration, 23; suggests multinational naval force, 33, 41–2, 54, 59, 62, 168; and Gulf of Aqaba blockade, 41–2, 59, 169; military disengagement east of Suez, 43; urges cease-fire, 73; accused of collaboration with Israel, 76, 80, 106; popular support for Israel, 84; resumes diplomatic relations with Egypt, 138; reaffirmation and amendment to resolution 242, 187

Brown, George (*later* Lord George-Brown): and Gulf of Aqaba blockade, 3, 168; on UNEF withdrawal, 20; message from Eban, 23; and Eban's London visit, 41; overtures to Nasser, 42; visits Moscow, 42–3; and Security Council, 59; on outbreak of war, 72; on British neurtrality, 76; on USSR and 1967 war, 91; at UN General Assembly, 113–4, 138; on closing of Suez Canal, 125; meets Eban, 143–4; on resolution 242, 146, 156–7, 176

Buffum, William B., 117

Bulgaria, 87, 176

Bull, general Odd: and provocative Israeli actions, 9–11, 55; on Arab under-estimate of Israeli strength, 17; and UNEF withdrawal, 16, 18–19; on failure of Security Council, 36; and Thant's Cairo visit, 38; on Israeli assessment of Egyptian threat,

Nasser's decision in 1967 to expel the UN Force from Sinai and to close the Gulf of Aqaba to cargoes for Israel, led to the third Arab-Israeli war. Following a cease-fire and six months of almost constant diplomacy, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a British peace proposal – the famous resolution 242.

In this study, which is based on UN records and archives, and the recollections of people directly involved, the author shows how political pressures forced the parties to accept a peace formula which was later said to be ambiguous and which was beginning to fail only four years later. With all its defects and uncertainties, resolution 242 remains the only internationally-agreed framework for peace in the Middle-East. The author suggests that one day an imaginative leader on one side or the other may realize that the only future worth having will be based on generosity and co-existence, and that resolution 242 could then, at last, come into its own.