

ISRAELI HISTORY, POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Jihad in Palestine

Political Islam and the
Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Shaul Bartal



Jihad in Palestine

The 21st century exists in the shadow of the return of extremist Islam to the center of the world's political stage, a process that began at the end of the previous century. While researchers have focused on the rise of Hamas, this return has in fact manifested itself in a range of independent Islamic extremist groups with their own philosophies.

Jihad in Palestine provides a comprehensive study of the variety of Islamic extremist groups operating inside Israel/Palestine today, examining their philosophies and views concerning martyrdom, as well as their attitudes to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. These ideologies are presented in their own words, thanks to the author's extensive translations and commentary of primary sources in Arabic, including the writings of Islamic Jihad, al-Jamia al-Islamiya, Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, Hamas and the Islamic Movement. The book studies the attitudes of these organizations towards the fundamental issues surrounding *jihad*, including the concept of personal obligation, the relationship of the movement to the peace agreements and attitudes towards Jews expressed in the movement's writings. Exploring the basic theories of sacrifice and analyzing modern-day Palestinian society, it promotes a greater understanding of the religious angle of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The book will be of interest to students and scholars of Middle East Studies, Jewish Studies, Political Islam, and Terrorism and Political Violence.

Shaul Bartal served extensively in various security capacities in the West Bank. He is a Lecturer on Palestinian Affairs at Bar-Ilan University.

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Foreword

The 21st century exists in the shadow of the return of Islam to the center of the world's political stage, a process that began at the end of the previous century.

In today's world, radical Islamic movements flourish everywhere, like mushrooms after the rain. Europe is filled with Muslims who have immigrated there, changing the face of that continent. Everywhere they move, they preach the word of Allah to all mankind. The call of the *muezzin* echoes throughout the world. Even at Ground Zero in Manhattan, New York, where the largest terrorist attack in history took place (on September 11, 2001), a magnificent Córdoba mosque now stands. It appears that it does not matter at all that Muslim extremists carried out an attack there in the name of Islam. In the eyes of the Muslims, the building of the mosque in that specific place closes a circle that calls out to Muslims everywhere in the world, saying "In the end we will win."

It is not easy as an Israeli and as a Jew to read the words of the Islamic extremists. Their literature contains an internal logic and a deep sense of the righteousness of their way. According to their understanding, their way is a way of *jihad* (holy war) and *ishtishad* (martyrdom), the way of those who fight for God and who are willing to sacrifice their souls for Him.¹ The way of *jihad* requires the believer to make a supreme effort for God (*Fi Sabil Allah*) until death and a willingness to sacrifice oneself for one's beliefs (*ishtishad*). According to their theology, their way is the right one and the only way to ensure the rebirth of Islam. Whoever does not accept their way or who strays from the path, even a little, is considered a traitor to Islam. There is no forgiveness for him and there is no absolution for his deeds. Morning and night, in the name of Allah, they justify their activities against the Jewish, Zionist Israeli "conqueror."² There are those who emphasize the Jewishness of the enemy, like the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (the Islamic Liberation Party), and there are those who emphasize that the struggle is against Zionism and Israeli racism (for example, the Islamic Movement in Israel). Their way is clear and consolidated. There is no room in the House of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) or in the House of Faith (*Dar al-Eiman*) for the Jews who murdered their prophets—using their own expression.³

In this book I have concentrated on explaining the world outlook of the Islamic extremists based in Palestine. Unfortunately, the majority of modern researchers prefer to write about the Hamas movement—Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic Resistance Movement). For some reason, very little has been written about the other Islamic movements competing for the hearts of the Palestinian youth. Heading the list of the other movements is the Islamic Jihad in Palestine, which is divided into two branches: Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis (the Temple, a nickname for Jerusalem), and Islamic Jihad Palestine. In addition, I have also discussed the Hizb al-Tahrir movement, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem, which has its own special standing and which has even been recognized by the Israeli legislature,⁴ and the Islamic Movement headed by Ra'ed Salah. In a number of cases, I have used advertisements that were published by organizations that are subsidiaries of the above organizations. Thus, for example, I use the advertisements of the organizations that are connected with the Muwassat al-Aqsa li-Tanmiya (al-Aqsa Foundation for Development), whose members are also members of the Islamic movement 'fi al-A'radh al-Mukhtalah 'am 1948' (inside the conquered territory of 1948—the way Israel is described), headed by Ra'ed Salah. This is different from that 'fi al-Dafa al-Gharbiyah wa al-Qutaa', Gaza's Islamic movement, which is located in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and is better known throughout the world as Hamas.

For some reason, despite the increase in Islamic organizations active in Palestine, the few researchers who have studied these organizations present them as if they were offering exactly the same wares to their target audience there. This book offers a rare look at the fascinating little-studied world of the Islamic extremist organizations. Are there ideological differences between them? If so, what are they? Do different conditions affect the methodologies of *dawah* (the social activities of the Islamic organizations)? For example, how do Israeli conditions affect the actions of the Islamic Movement in Israel? How do they express their unique Palestinian identity? Because if it is as they argue, that all Muslims belong to one big nation with one God and one law (called *shari'a*, the Islamic Law), how does their Palestinian identity come to fruition? What does each movement choose to emphasize and why? The purpose of this study is to test deeply these ideas from the Islamic point of view and from the dogma of the "way of *jihad*" in Palestine.

This book tests the ideology and dogmatism that has characterized these movements from the time of their inception. This book is not intended to be a comprehensive study of each and every organization mentioned here, although I hope that additional research of this kind will be carried out in the near future. The book explains the increase in the phenomenon of "Holy Death" (*al-shaada*)⁵ in Palestinian society from the Islamic point of view. Unfortunately, it is the religious point of view that sets the tone of Palestinian nationalism. This religious extremism that affects Arab Muslim Palestinian society is expressed by the rise of Hamas over Fatah as the leading organization. This rise of the Hamas organization is seen in the results of the

election held by the Palestinian Authority in January 2006. As a result of this election, in June 2007, the Hamas organization gained control of the Gaza Strip and pushed the Fatah organization out.⁶ At this stage, it is still too early to know how the Unification Agreement, signed on April 23, 2014, will influence or be continued until after the Palestinian election to be held in January 2015. It was possible, according to Fatah members with whom I met during 2014, that Rami Hamadalla's appeasement government would fail and elections for both the presidency and the Palestinian Legislative Council would be postponed. This would be another union failure like the agreement in May 2011 and the Doha Agreement signed on February 6, 2012. In light of this, there is a real need to understand the Palestinian Islamic stance and their views regarding a solution to the Palestine problem.

This book is based mainly on the translation of booklets, proclamations and pamphlets distributed by Islamic loyalists in Palestine to mosques, schools, religious colleges (*madares*) and other places. In translating this material, I have tried to use them as is, straight from the sources without any explanation. This has been done through the use of explanation and exegesis taken from the rich research literature that exists on political Islam. Political Islam is a very exciting field and one like no other. It was not easy to separate the straw from the chaff.

I feel that it is imperative that modern-day researchers of Islam, academics studying the topic and others who find this subject interesting, hear the voices of the Islamic extremists as they read this book. I believe that it is important that non-Islamic readers (infidels) gain an understanding of the ideas of the radical Islamic thinkers.

The first part of this book presents the *jihad* organizations that exist today in Palestine. While this includes the central *jihad* organizations, it does not cover many other smaller ones that are "blooming," mainly in the Gaza Strip under Hamas rule, such as the Jaish al-Islam, Jaljalat and others. I have chosen to open this section with a chapter that deals with the will of Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, who outlined the *jihad* way for those who follow in his footsteps. Presented here are the theoretical perceptions behind the Death of Martyrs and the *jihad* for God. The books by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, as my friend Dr. Asaf Maliach presents in his book, are a guideline for the Islamic extremists in the Arab world in general and in Palestine in particular.⁷

The second part of this book deals with the Hamas movement. It presents in detail its position as it appears on websites identified with the organization and its ties to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the "captured" territories of 1948, as this is the northern faction of the Islamic movement headed by Ra'ed Salah Mahagna. While it is true that much has been written about the Hamas movement, I believe that there is a need to present and emphasize the organization's views, especially after it won the election in the Palestinian Authority in 2006 and after the revolution in Gaza in 2007. Likewise, it is important to presents the ties of Hamas with the Islamic movement in Israel.

The third and fourth chapters deal with the Islamic Jihad organization and its student organization, al-Jamia al-Islamiya. These movements have not yet received scholarly recognition nor have they been studied by academia. In addition, their views have never been presented to the general public in a manner similar to the way in which they represent themselves to the Palestinian believer on the street whom they are trying to recruit. Similarly, they have to deal night and day with the question of what makes them special and different from all the other Islamic movements and why their organization should be supported rather than their competitors from Hamas or Hizb al-Tahrir.

The fifth chapter is an analysis of the views of the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami movement. It appears that from the time that the pioneer work of Amnon Cohen⁸ was published, very few studies have been carried out analyzing this movement. Despite the fact that this movement lacks a military branch, this does not prevent the young people of the movement from absorbing hatred of the Jews and a dream of establishing a Caliphate to be launched when the time is right through military means similar to the methods used successfully by the Hamas movement. However, this will only happen, like the Hamas success, after they have concluded “training the hearts” and have moved on to “sharpening the sword.” That is why a presentation of the ideology of this movement is so important. In addition, many young people who follow the principles of the movement carry out *jihad* activities against Israel despite the fact that they are not required to do so according to the movement’s ideals. *Jihad*, according to the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, is a voluntary activity until the Caliphate is established and a *jihad* is announced against the infidels.

The second part of the book deals with two central topics in the philosophy of the local Islamic extremists located in Israel and in the territories held by the State of Israel. The first topic relates to negotiations with Israel from the Islamic point of view: Is there any chance whatsoever that there can be discussions with Hamas or with the Islamic Jihad or with any other organization that supports the way of *jihad*? Is there a chance that there can ever be the possibility of achieving peace of any kind in the Middle East where religion is the factor that determines history and the consciousness? I have chosen to present a translation of a pamphlet by the Islamic Jihad organization that was already written and distributed by the time the Madrid conference took place. This pamphlet has not lost its relevance with the years that have gone by and many Islamic factors still quote from it to bolster their arguments.

The second topic is the one of Jerusalem, which unites all elements of the Palestinian nation. The fight for al-Aqsa and Jerusalem is always there, if not always violent. The ways of *jihad* are many and do not only include the sword. In this chapter I have chosen to bring translations of the various proclamations distributed in Jerusalem—mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad-Beit al-Makdis and Islamic Movement in Israel. This is, of course, together with the many mentions of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa mosque which are also mentioned by the other movements.

The translations and transcriptions are as close as possible to how they appear in the original. I deviated from the accepted transcription a few times, mainly where an Arab concept is well known in a different form. For example, I have written the word *Khilafa* in its more familiar form to the English speaker—Caliphate. However, these are the exceptions rather than the rule. The majority of the names in English have been written according to the accepted transliteration of Arabic.

Jihad in Palestine was first published in Hebrew in 2012 by Carmel publishing house. Over the past three years, the *jihad* in Israel has continued killing innocent people living there. This book has been updated and contains additional details about those organizations.

I would like to thank all of my students from Bar-Ilan University and all of my many colleagues who encouraged me to publish this book, especially Dr. Rivka Shpak-Lissak for both her encouragement and help. Thanks also to my many friends from various stations in my life, whether from my army service or from academia, where I was exposed to and where I caught the “fever” for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. A special thanks to Symcha and Joan Shpak from Maryland, USA. Without their aid, this book probably would not have been published.

I would also like to thank Professor Efraim Karsh who made the publishing of the English version of this book possible. A special thanks to Mrs. Roberta Bienenfeld who worked very hard translating this book and aiding me to reach the goal of publishing an updated version in English of *Jihad in Palestine*. This book could never have seen the light without the aid of these two people.

In conclusion, I would like to thank my dear family, especially my wife Tamar, who has supported me and encouraged me to finish this book in order to present the viewpoint of the *jihad* organizations.

Notes

- 1 The concept of *ishtishad* means to sacrifice one’s soul in a war for honor and for the defense of Islam. This trait is even greater than the sacrifice of the *mustashid*, the warrior who fights and sacrifices himself for *jihad*. This is to differentiate him from a “simple” *shahid*, which is any Muslim killed by infidels. Matti Steinberg, *Facing their Fate, Palestinian National Consciousness, 1967–2007* (Tel Aviv, 2008), pp. 260–62.
- 2 Also against the hated West, the new crusaders, the atheists, the communists and the hypocritical Arab regimes. However, in this study, I mainly test the approach of the *jihad* towards the Jews and Israel. See Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Ohr Yehuda, 2006), pp. 84–86; Meir Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism, the Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv, 1994), p. 10.
- 3 See, for example, Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, *Hamas ... al-Jadur al-Tarikhiya wa al-Mithaq* [*Hamas, Historical Roots and Pact*] (Peshawar, 1989), pp. 506.
- 4 The Islamic Brotherhood movement in Jerusalem was recognized as an illegal organization, separate from the other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas and the Israeli Islamic movement), and was declared illegal on July 23, 2007 by Minister of Defense Ehud Barak. See the Ministry of Defense, www.mod.gov.il/pages/general/pdfs/teror.pdf.

- 5 From the beginning of the al-Aqsa *intifada* (from September 2000 to the end of 2004—Arafat died in November of that same year), 133 suicide bombings were carried out. An additional 132 potential suicide bombers were caught alive on their way to carrying out attacks. This is according to the statistics of the Secret Service. Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *The Seventh War, How We Won and How We Lost the War with the Palestinians* (Tel Aviv, 2004), p. 143.
- 6 In this context, it is important to mention the book by Abdillah Balkaziz, *Azmat al-Watani al-Falastini, min Fatah ilah Hamas* [*The Crisis in the Palestinian National Undertaking, from Fatah to Hamas*] (Beirut: Dirasat al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya Center, 2006). This book, like many others, presents Hamas as the leading movement on the Palestinian street and argues that Fatah has finished its historical job in leading the Palestinian national movement and that the time has now come for the Hamas movement to lead the Palestinian nation.
- 7 Asaf Maliach and Shaul Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem, al-Qaeda, the Global Islamic Jihad and the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation* (Tel Aviv: Matar, 2009), pp. 12–14.
- 8 Amnon Cohen, *Parties of the West Bank under Jordanian Rule* (Jerusalem, 1981).

Introduction

The concept of *jihad* against the Jews in a war over Palestine was first used in the 1930s by Sheikh Izz al-Din Abd al-Qadir al-Qassam (1883–1935). At the beginning of the 1930s, this sheikh advocated *jihad* against the British infidels and the Zionists. According to Palestinian sources, it was not the poor who were drawn to his sermons but just the opposite—the cream of the Palestinian youth. This movement, originally called al-Jahadiyah, excelled in planning activities. In 1935, al-Qassam was killed in the name of *jihad* in a battle near Ya'abed,¹ while carrying out heroic activities against British special forces. Thus, the sheikh sacrificed himself for *jihad* in Palestine. His supporters followed his good example and adopted his methods during the years of the Great Arab Revolt (Turath al-Arabiyyah al-Kabirah)² under the name Fasa'el Izz al-Din al-Qassam (al-Qassam companies). These companies committed the first acts of murder against the Jews and the British at the beginning of the Great Arab Revolt.³

The sheikh was not ethnically a Palestinian. He was born in the village of Jableh in the year 1882, near the city of Latakia in Syria. He was raised in a religious household where he was nursed on the basics of the Qur'an and its laws. He studied at al-Azhar University with Sheikh Muhammad Abduh. There he stood out as a very talented sheikh among the sheikhs of al-Azhar. While there, he began expressing his opinions against the British conquest of Egypt (the fortress). He also preached in al-Istiqlal (the independence) mosque.

In Palestine, al-Qassam received a salary from the Upper Muslim Council which, at that time, was headed by the Mufti Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni. Productive personal ties developed between al-Qassam and Mufti Amin al-Husayni which were expressed in diverse ways in the years that followed. In 1928, he participated in the founding of the Islamic Student Union (Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin) and was its president.⁴ The group that surrounded Izz al-Din al-Qassam, known by the nickname Jama'at al-kaff al-aswad (the Black Hand), became legendary. It carried out many terrorist attacks against Jews in Yagur, Nahalal, Balfouria and Kfar Hasidim. It also made an assassination attempt on the British soldiers who cooperated with them.⁵ The death of al-Qassam lit the fire of the Great Arab Rebellion in 1936–39.⁶

Izz al-Din al-Qassam preached *jihad* and sacrificed his soul for the Arab people and the Islamic nation. A Jewish Agency account in 1935 mentions

2 Introduction

that Izz al-Din al-Qassam recruited over 200 youths who were registered with him for Islamic activities. This report by the Jewish Agency also indicates that the sheikh traveled to Jerusalem, where he participated in a meeting of the Upper Muslim Council and where he raised various ideas that were rejected by the participants, except for the Mufti Amin al-Husayni.⁷ Apparently, al-Qassam's *jihad* activities were coordinated with the Mufti Amin al-Husayni, which can be deduced from research carried out by Emil Ghuri,⁸ who was very close to the Mufti and a member of the Arab Higher Committee. He argues that al-Qassam was a member of the Arab Husayni party and fully coordinated his activities with the Mufti Amin al-Husayni.⁹

The sheikh's asceticism and his legacy of *jihad*, which he bequeathed to the masses, found expression in the many demonstrations and in the great turmoil after his death. "The news of his death shook up Palestine from one end to the other," stated the pro-Husayni newspaper *al-Jam'ia al-Arabiya* (The Arab Union).¹⁰ Another Palestinian newspaper, *Palestine*, quotes the sheikh asking his people to fight until the end because their actions were "*Jihad for God and the Motherland.*"¹¹

Palestine also quotes from the testimony of Hassan al-Bair, one of al-Qassam's members:

I am from the village of Barkin. In the beginning I was a thief and I broke the law. One day Sheikh al-Qassam came to me and tried to convince me to return to religion and he even taught me to pray and to do things that are not against the laws of God. A short time ago, Sheikh al-Qassam, the deceased, took me to one of the hills near the village and gave me a gun. When I asked him why he was giving me a gun, he answered me: "*In order to learn how to use it and you will join with your brothers in the jihad for God.*"¹²

After his death, Izz al-Din al-Qassam continued to be an inspirational center for the Muslims in Palestine and on how one should act for the *jihad* in Palestine. Even "secular" organizations such as the Palestine Freedom Front of Ahmad Jibril respected him—in the 1960s, they called one of their units the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade.¹³ This was before Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, adopted the hero of the Palestinian *jihad* as the flag bearer and symbol of its military arm. "And his blood was like a lighthouse for the generations who wished to walk on the righteous path."¹⁴ Even Arafat, after he returned to Gaza and as a part of his struggle against the Hamas influence on the Palestinian Muslim public, included words about Izz al-Din al-Qassam in his speeches, saying "[b]ecause we are all fighting for the revolution ... we, the sons of Izz al-Din al-Qassam."¹⁵ There is a long history for the *kataeb* (brigades) of Izz al-Din al-Qassam.¹⁶

In 1928, when the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood movement was established, it was headed by Hassan al-Banna (1906–49) in Egypt. In a short time, this movement succeeded in gathering great influence in Egypt and

neighboring Arab countries. By the 1930s and 1940s, the Muslim Brotherhood movement was well established in Egypt and had spread throughout all of the Arab countries surrounding it—with branches in Jordan and Palestine as well as in other places.

In May 1946, the way to *jihad* was laid in Palestine when the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established there. This branch was founded in Jerusalem with the blessing of the traditional leadership that existed at that time. The Mufti Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni was named branch director,¹⁷ although he was not in Palestine during that period (World War II) as he had fled to Cairo. The Mufti joined forces with the Führer, Adolph Hitler, preached *jihad* against the British and the Jews, and worked with the Axis powers to fight the Allies.¹⁸ After this, the British Mandatory Government of Palestine prohibited him from returning to Palestine. During this period, the Palestinian movement received its direction from the mother organization in Egypt. The number of Muslim Brotherhood activists in Palestine grew continuously so that by 1948 there were 12,000–20,000 men spread out in 25 branches in all parts of the country.¹⁹

The Israeli War of Independence (1948–49), was, for the Muslim Brotherhood movement, a slap in the face. It attacked their faith as the infidels, especially the Jews, had beaten the Muslims. On an organizational level, the Muslim Brotherhood activists in Palestine were scattered everywhere, despite the receipt of significant military aid from the mother organization which had sent its forces (some 10,000 warriors) to fight in Palestine.²⁰ In reality, movement activists were spread out over two areas: The Gaza Strip, under Egyptian administration, and the West Bank, under Jordanian rule. This geographic divide also led to a division of the branches. Those in the Gaza Strip were subservient to the mother organization in Egypt, while those in the West Bank were under the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan.²¹

In the State of Israel that had just been established, there were no Muslim clerics who could fill the hole that the war had left behind. The fleeing of 700,000 men included many of the religious leaders. In reality, the only leader who did not flee was Sheikh Tahir al-Tabari who once suggested a population exchange, a call that did not have much influence.²² This situation changed when, in the 1970s, a new stream of Muslim youngsters from among the Israeli Arabs began to study in the religious colleges in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), where they were exposed to the Islamic influence of the activists of the world Muslim Brotherhood movement. These youth returned to make a real revolution among Israeli Arabs²³ by re-establishing the Muslim Brotherhood, this time in Israel.

From that time on, it appears that the term “*jihad*” as a concept, as a way of freeing Palestine, turned into the central idea in the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs against the Zionist movement and the State of Israel. This is the message that was also expressed in the calls to participate in the struggle of al-Aqsa *intifada*.²⁴ The peak of the *jihad* was, of course, self-sacrifice, the death of the martyrs for God. Thus, the believers fulfilled their mission to protect

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Islam. “The holiness of death” is a fundamental part of this phenomenon, in direct contrast to the belief in the “sanctity of life” on the Jewish side.²⁵

The disagreement between the Islamic movements in Palestine has many facets, but all of the movements have the same goals: the destruction of the State of Israel and a fight without compromise against the Zionistic conspiracy which rules out giving up even a small part of Palestine. The disagreement is over the manner in which the activities are carried out. What activities should be given greater weight? Propaganda activities? Policy? Or military action? Is the *jihad* a commandment for all only when the Caliph comes and redeems the Islamic nation? Or perhaps it is a personal responsibility that falls on each and every one (*fard kifaya* or *fard al-'ayn*)? Even though all the Islamic terminology is identical and all of the movements use the same concepts, there still exist differences between them. This book attempts to show the uniqueness of the various movements, where there are 70 faces of *jihad* against Israel.

Notes

- 1 Muhammad Musbah Hamdan, *al-Isti'mar wa-al-Sahyunia al-Alamia* [Colonialism and World Zionism] (Sidon: Dar al-Kutba al-Asriya, 1967), p.177; Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam successfully recruited top Arab youth from Haifa, Zefat and villages all around Palestine. Due to his success on the battlefield against the British, the British ordered him killed. In the end, he died a martyr in the sanctification of God's name, in a battle near Ya'abed (a village in the Jenin district), a battle that today is used by all of the streams of Palestinian society as an example of how to defend the Motherland. According to Dr. Mohsen Mohammed Saleh, *History of Palestine: A Methodical Study of the Palestinian Struggle* (Cairo, 2005), p.214, this revolt was in the planning for ten years. Arab sources indicate that 12 of the sheikh's followers joined him at the battle at Ya'abed, a four and a half-hour battle against 400 British fighters. The sheikh was killed there together with two of his followers. We shall see that Arab writers tend to exaggerate battle descriptions as well as the descriptions of the relative forces, which often differ greatly from the reality.
- 2 The brothers of al-Qassam were called al-Ikhwan and were divided into departments called Fasa'el Izz al-Din al-Qassam. According to Palestinian writers, they were responsible for the breaking out of the Great Arab Revolt in 1936, a revolt that was part of the commandment of *jihad* that their leader Izz al-Din al-Qassam bequeathed to them. Samih K. Farsoun, with Christina E. Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinian* (Oxford, 1997), pp.105–7.
- 3 According to another version, which appears on Islam.net, this organization was established in 1926. See an editorial about the life of al-Qassam (no author), <http://main.islamweb.net/media/index.php?page=article&lang=A&id=30432&sa=U&ei=xGDDTK7KNZe8jAe4yoW5BQ&ved=0CBEQFjAG&usg=AFQjCNFd60YgFEBq3TroOBFFJQo3S7KZ0g>.
- 4 Samih Hamouda, *al-W'ai wal-Thawra: Dirasa fi Hayat wa Jihad al-Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam 1868–1935* [The Consciousness and the Revolution: A Lesson on his Life and the Jihad of Izz al-Din al-Qassam] (Jerusalem, 1981), p.319.
- 5 Mustafa Kabha, *Journalism in the Eye of the Storm: The Palestinian Press Shapes Public Opinion, 1929–1939* (Jerusalem, 2004), p.113.
- 6 See the editorial on Islam.net mentioned above: <http://main.islamweb.net/media/index.php?page=article&lang=A&id=30432&sa=U&ei=xGDDTK7KNZe8>

- jAe4yoW5BQ&ved=0CBEQFjAG&usg=AFQjCNFd60YgFEBq3TroOBFFJQo3S7KZ0g; also, Farsoun and Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, pp.105–7.
- 7 CZ'M (The Central Zionist Archive), S25/22224: Mazmorani Report to the Arab Office of the Jewish Agency, June 16, 1935. An additional report from Jan. 25, 1935 is quoted by Kabha, *Journalism in the Eye of the Storm*, p.113.
 - 8 Emil Ghuri was born in Jerusalem in 1907 and died in Jordan in 1984. He was very active in the Arab nationalistic movement in Palestine during the British Mandate. He served as the general secretary of the Palestine Arab Party as well as one of the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee (led by the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni) in London in 1936. In 1949, he was a representative of the Arab Higher Committee at the United Nations. From then on, until 1968, he held many different positions where he represented Palestinian matters in all types of international forums, mostly as a representative of the Arab Higher Committee. Thus, for example, in 1950–52, he served as a representative of the Arab Higher Committee in Beirut. In 1952, he moved to Egypt where, up until 1966, he was the director of the Propaganda and National Rebellion Office of the Arab Higher Committee. In 1966, he returned to Jerusalem, at that time under Jordanian control, and filled a number of positions in the Jordanian government. See also the article by Husni Jarar on Emil Ghuri, which describes him as a political philosopher of the new Palestinian Arab movement. From the website Rabata Odaba al-Sham—union of the authors of *al-sham*, a nickname for the countries of Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon, www.odabasham.net/show.php?sid=8182&sa=U&ei=923DTKahK5WTjAeckfS4BQ&ved=0CAUQFjAA&usg=AFQjCNEsw0Bsbq8UWJaSHkiC3SH_2qlFIQ.
 - 9 Emil Ghuri, *Filestin, Aber Stine 'Ama* [Palestine: Sixty Year Journey] (Beirut, 1971), vol. 1, pp.251–52.
 - 10 *Al-Jamiaa al-Arabiya*, Nov. 22, 1935. This newspaper was edited by Manif al-Husayni, the nephew of Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni. The slogan of the newspaper was that if Arabism was humiliated, Islam was also humiliated. Kabha, *Journalism in the Eye of the Storm*, pp.23–24.
 - 11 *Palestine*, Nov. 21, 1935, emphasis added.
 - 12 *Palestine*, Nov. 23, 1935, emphasis added. Years later (as will be shown), Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the Palestinian, preached exactly the same things and thus inspired Osama bin Laden's world of *jihad*.
 - 13 An organization established at the beginning of the 1960s by Ahmad Jibril and Ali Bushnaq, made up of Palestinians and former Syrian army officers. The organization operated out of Syria against Israel and was divided into three military units: Abd al-Latif Suroor, named after a Syrian military officer killed in 1966; Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, named after an army commander of Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (the army of the holy *jihad*), from the Jerusalem area, who was killed in the battle of the Qastal; and Izz al-Din al-Qassam. In December 1967, the organization merged with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. An additional split took place in 1968 when the faction headed by Ahmad Jibril left and formed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command. Yocheved Weintraub, *Terrorist Organizations* (Tel Aviv: Head Educational Officer, 1974), pp.15–16.
 - 14 This was said by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and will be discussed further in later chapters. See Asaf Maliach and Shaul Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem: al-Qaeda, the Global Islamic Jihad and the Israeli–Palestinian Confrontation* (Tel Aviv: Matar, 2009), p.23; and Abdullah Azzam, *Hamas ... al-Jadur al-Tarikihiya wa al-Mithaq* (Peshawar, 1989), p.14. Azzam proudly describes the martyrdom activities of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam.
 - 15 Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine* (New York, 2008), p.43.

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- 16 Ibid., p.37. The military arm of Hamas carrying this name was established only in 1991, after the first *intifada* that was set in motion in December 1987 began to fade.
- 17 A different version believes that Muslim Brotherhood activities were already taking place during the period of the Great Revolt of 1936–39. The movement's advertisements at that time indicate that such activities took place during the period of the revolt. The branch in question, however, was only officially established in the 1940s. Meir Litvak (ed.), *Islam and Democracy in the Arab World* (Tel Aviv, 1997), p.147.
- 18 Two books highlight the pro-Nazi activities of the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni during this time. See Jennie Lebel, *Hajj Amin and Berlin* (Tel Aviv, 1996); and also David G. Dalin and John F. Rothmann, *Icon of Evil: Hitler's Mufti and the Rise of the Radical Islam* (New York, 2008). See also an article by Dr. Shaul Bartal, "The Palestinian Leader Haj Amin al-Husseini and Hitler," Rivka Shpak Lissak website, June 14, 2011, <http://rslissak.com/content/palestinian-leader-haj-amin-al-husseini-and-hitler-drsaul-bartal>.
- 19 Litvak, *Islam and Democracy in the Arab World*, p.147.
- 20 Hatem Yusuf Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwan al-Muslamim fi filastin hata 'am 1970* [Jihad of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine till 1970] (n.p.: Markaz Abhat al-Mustakbal, 2009), pp.3–6, 152–59.
- 21 Litvak, *Islam and Democracy in the Arab World*, p.147.
- 22 Ori Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel: Between Hammer and Anvil* (Jerusalem, 1992), p.206; Sheikh Tahir al-Tabari, the Mufti of Tiberius during the era of the mandate, was the only religious law adjudicator left in the area of the State of Israel after the 1948 war.
- 23 Ibid., pp.270–74.
- 24 *Al-Sabah* (The Morning), Sept. 2000. From an article in this newspaper, which served as one of the mouthpieces of the Palestinian Authority. The article that stated that the time of the *intifada* (resistance or uprising) had come and the time of *jihad* had arrived is mentioned by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *The Seventh War: How we Won and How we Lost the War with the Palestinians* (Tel Aviv, 2004), p.73.
- 25 Ismail Haniyeh expressed it well in an interview in the *Washington Post*: "The Jews love life more than any other nation, they prefer not to die." Quoted by Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, p.138. See also Sleman al-Shafhe's theory describing how a *shahid* is born (he explains it cynically as, "A Saint is Born"). The Islamic movement's training in Gaza is harsh, sometimes including sleeping for 40 days, from twilight until the time to say the morning prayers, in an open grave, in order to "Live the life of the dead." Sleman al-Shafhe, *Captive: A Look from Gaza* (Tel Aviv, 2009), pp.40–41.

Part I

The *jihad* way in Palestine

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1 Virtues of the *shahid* and holy death

Whoever does an evil deed will not be recompensed except by the like thereof; but whoever does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer—those will enter Paradise, being given provision therein without account.

Surat the Forgiver (40), verse 40¹

A Background

In order to understand the meaning and the importance of *jihad* to the Muslims of today, one has only to take a look at recent Arab literature. A good example of the *jihad* concept can be found in a pamphlet distributed for free in the mosques of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.² This pamphlet, written by Islamic extremists in Palestine, presents the legal and moral basis for the believer to seek out a martyr's (*shahid*) death. It attempts to convince the believer that he must be ready to sacrifice himself for God and for the nation of Islam by carrying out activities against the Zionist enemy. According to the pamphlet, this is not a choice but rather a commandment from God which must be carried out in order to redeem his soul and his nation. Only a true believer and someone with great skill can convince the young, innocent men to bravely blow themselves up into hundreds of pieces of meat and blood to become a martyr. This religious text justifies suicide attacks and explains that holy death (*al-shahada*) is a religious obligation in Islam.

The frontispiece of the pamphlet is divided into two parts. On the upper part of the page appears the headline,

The will³ of a superhero in a period of moral decay.

The writing on the left-hand side of the pamphlet (in parentheses) indicates that the pamphlet has been distributed without cost in order to enable every Muslim who wishes to study it, to learn the importance of the martyr's death. This pamphlet is just one of many of its type bringing religious discourse to the masses, preaching sacrifice to the general public in the various mosques in

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the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and providing the general Palestinian public accessibility to the views of extremist Islam.

There is a continuation to the above headline on the bottom half of the pamphlet. It reads:

*A will for a world fighting a holy war
Patience is for Allah the warrior
To the Islamic nation*

On the back of the pamphlet appears a photo of Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam of the village of Silat al-Harithiya in the Jenin district. Abdullah Azzam, also known as the “*jihad* sheikh,” is admired by many Muslims—those imbued with enthusiasm and ideology and who carry his name on their lips before they commit suicide.⁴ This last will addresses the future generations. According to the pamphlet, that is why it is of such great importance to distribute it to each and every mosque and to every house where there are Muslims, who will swallow its words enthusiastically.

This pamphlet of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine strengthens the hands of the brothers-in-arms of those loyal to Islam in Palestine who see themselves as continuing in the way of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the father of Palestinian *jihad* of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). A portion of the Islamic Jihad organization even nicknamed themselves Ikhwan al-Qassam (Brothers of al-Qassam), or Qassamiyun, in memory of their hero. The pamphlet is dedicated to the brothers of the struggle of al-Qassam and Hamas.

The dedication appears on the second page of the pamphlet, preceding even the presentation of the holy words explaining and justifying the holy martyrs:

*In the name of God the merciful and the beloved
This pamphlet is dedicated to the holy souls of the merciful friend (the Hebron martyrs).⁵
To the heart that leaps with faith.
To the noble who delayed the treason.
To the holy warriors everywhere who raise the slogans of Islam up high ...
To the most pure of souls of our martyrs, they are the most free and the righteous ones⁶ who wrote with their pure blood [in a way] that arouses awe are a good example of perseverance, militarism and leadership ...
To the fathers and mothers who went, put and prepared the Godlike Islamic generation ...
To the brothers of the way of al-Qassam and Hamas, we will read them this book ...
From those who hold shahada [a martyr's death] and anbar ⁷ al-mujahideen [the holy warriors], in the way of truth, strength and freedom ...
This pamphlet is dedicated to:
The martyrs of Ibrahim al-Khalil 16/4/1995⁸
The martyr Jihad Ghlma*

The martyr Adel Saad al-Falah (Jaber)

The martyr Tarek Hamdi Ali al-Natsha

On the next page there appears a photograph of the martyr Jihad Ghlma and on the final pages appear photos of the other two martyrs—Adel al-Falah and Tarek al-Natsha. The pamphlet does not explain what act was carried out on the date when these three martyrs gave their lives.

B Translation of the last will of the superhero

In the name of the merciful and beloved God.

Among the believers [*al-rejal*]⁹ are men true to what they promised Allah. Among them is he who has fulfilled his vow [to the death], and among them is he who awaits [his chance]. And they did not alter [the terms of their commitment] by any alteration—that Allah may reward the truthful for their truth and punish the hypocrites if He wills or accept their repentance. Indeed, Allah is ever Forgiving and Merciful.

Surat the Combined Forces (33), v. 23–24¹⁰

In this pamphlet there are two articles that are, in effect, a eulogy and a lamentation for Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. The authors of the articles in the pamphlet are Dr. Amar Suliman al-Ashkar and Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, the spiritual teacher and mentor of Osama bin Muḥammad bin 'Awaḍ bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement.¹¹ Both were knowledgeable in the laws of Islam and were known for their support of *jihad* against unbelievers. Both were connected to the fighting that took place in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and made a connection between the struggle in Palestine against the Jews and the struggle against “the communist atheists.”

Dr. al-Ashkar does not mention the name of the martyr but, from the content of his words and the context in which they are said, it is clear that it is a eulogy on the death of Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam. After the poetic eulogy, the pamphlet reprints the will of Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. This will was read after the death of Galal ad-Din Haqqani, one of the leaders of the Afghan revolt, who was killed in April 1986, during the war against the Soviets. The words of Ashkar and Azzam were gathered together to give hope and faith on the righteousness of the way of the Islamic warriors and include an explanation of the importance of battle against infidels. The pamphlet explains that the Islamic nation is currently in a stage of war in which it is surrounded on all sides. That is why the people of the Muslim nation must be drafted and fight shoulder to shoulder against the army of the infidel, wherever they are, whether in Afghanistan or Palestine.

The *jihad* is not just a religious commandment; it has enormous value to Muslims, although not everyone is suited to becoming a martyr. *Jihad* warriors are the pioneers who go before the camp, fighting the war of the whole Islamic nation. We see an intimate picture of a *jihad* warrior and feel the

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“pride of the unit” of a united family believing in the righteousness of their ways (*'aaela mujahida*). That is why the men of Islamic Jihad in Palestine, those who founded the organization, were nicknamed *al-Talia al-Islamiya*—the Islamic pioneers.¹²

Azzam served as the spiritual teacher of Osama bin Laden and his teachings serve as the ideological basis for the justification of *jihad* in every place where Islam was once practiced. Despite the fact that the articles before us deal with *jihad* and how it relates to the war in Afghanistan, and despite the fact that it appears as if the pamphlet were written at the end of the 1980s, it is important to *emphasize that this booklet, which carries the logo of Islamic Jihad in Palestine and all of the ties of that organization, was dedicated to the martyrs of Hebron, an event that apparently took place in 1995.*

The principles of *jihad* and its advantages are characteristics that are shared in all the war zones where Islam is fighting—in Afghanistan, Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. While it is true that the principal aim is to free Jerusalem and fight for Palestine, one must first fight the enemy who is close by. These are the Arab regimes that are not loyal to Islam. The commandment of *jihad*, as Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj describes in his book, is the most important of all principles of the Islamic religion.¹³ Although not counted as one of the five pillars of Islam (*arkan al-Islam*), according to radical Islam, *jihad* is the sixth pillar. Its value is very great both in our world and in the world to come. The existence of this commandment promises continuity and development of the Islamic nation, the realization of Islam's goal to become the major world religion, and the reward of heaven to believers.

1 Article by Dr. Amar Suliman al-Ashkar

The connection between death and carrying out the will

Dr. Amar Suliman al-Ashkar¹⁴

Thank God who blessed us with Islam, who lit up our hearts with the Qur'an and who gave us, the creatures that he created, a portion of his kind benevolence. Prayer and peace upon his followers and the commander of the holy warriors who were sent away [were taken from us] with mercy forever. There they will dwell together with God and their comrades who sacrificed their souls for God. The victory is theirs before God. [It is our wish] that their deeds of kindness and the commandments that they have carried out for God will stand in their stead on Judgment Day and afterwards.

The last will that was handed down from them is the will of a superhero, one who was raised up during this period of decline and slump [in attributes and morals]. [The late Abdullah Azzam] is a man who felt and saw the epidemic besieging the Islamic nation worldwide which desired to wipe out the vision and Islam. [This] ruinous [process] leaves nothing, not even a remnant [of our values].¹⁵ He sacrificed himself to protect his nation and his religion. Because of this, he even neglected his family and

relatives. It is as if he is saying to his children who are included in his will that, “It is true that I neglected you, but what else could be done as the troubles that the Muslims were facing were serious [and it was necessary to act] for [the future] of the babies. Thus, the horrors [such as these] which befell the Muslim nation and aged the children will not return.”

It is true that our martyr took his pen and wrote and composed for the people of this nation. His voice still echoes when he calls for aid for the men and he warns them about the danger that is about to come down on their land. He waves his sharp sword while he rides on his noble horse.¹⁶ *He fights the Jews on most of the land of Palestine and in its valleys. At the time that he sanctified the grace of jihad in Palestine* we saw him atop the mountains of Afghanistan, in its plains and in its valleys, roaring like a lion and fighting the communist atheists.¹⁷

It is true that our dear martyr was already like a flame that lights the way for all of the family of Islam. Like the flames of fire [that wind around] the enemies of God. His writings [of our martyr] reached the East and the West and were passed on to readers who still keep the faith and our great tradition. Because he wrote these words out of the pain and the suffering that he lived with and watched. That is how the right words came out. [Words] that come of the heart enter the heart, [words] that come out of the tongue and do not skip the ears. Those who say—for the Mercy of God—at the time when he opens with his fiery words, I wrote these words out of a feeling of loss of life and with high expectations [in order] for us to dream to have them come true. After the strong pain that we have already suffered and the bitter worries that fill us in order for these words to be said and mold the reality.

When the salvation will come [his writings] will reflect most fully the sensations of the individual and his feelings and the reality of the battle and its magnitude. His writings paint the deviousness of the world and the wonderful and respected and justified confrontation in opposition [against world anti-Islamic conspiracies] by the heroes of the struggle who are shaping the history of Islam with their blood and who are building a magnificent palace of skulls and body parts.¹⁸

The words of Sheik al-Shahid [Abdullah Azzam] spoken at the eulogy of Sheikh Tameem al-Adnani remain with us. [He also] fills our life and shocks our hearts. His voice still echoes via the video cassettes and the resounding audio against the enemies of God and penetrates into the heart strings of those who worship God.

As a matter of fact, his desire was that after he died a martyr’s death, his writings would be strong, as words have no value if they are not justified by deed [*jihad*]. Many times our martyr quotes the words of the martyr Sayyid Qutb,¹⁹ God’s mercy on him: Because his words will remain like brides of wax [that remain forever], even if we die, because we rebelled [for the sake of God] we will achieve rebirth [in the next world or when there is an arising of the dead].²⁰

Our respected brothers were not [spoiled] and their location was unpleasant except on the battlefield where they clashed with the enemy who was found on the land of the *jihad*. Like he [our martyr] says in one of his rousing opening words: The sweetness of the *jihad* is hard for the soul and [it is hard] to think of the feeling of suffering as sweet in this way. [The soul] will be happy to drink from the fullness of his grace [the *jihad*] and will rest only between the blessed bullets and the tunes of the guns and the sound of the jets.

[Our martyr] feared that he would be deprived of this big blessing like many [other people] who pray to God that they will not be deprived of the *jihad*. Because people are afraid that God will deprive them of the blessing of *jihad* due to ignoring or lack of dedication or neglect [of the commandment of the *jihad*]. The *jihad* has its own enormous virtue that only those who are worthy of it can feel [due to] the virtue of his loved ones and his parents. The *jihad* is not an idle conversation that passes through my mind. It is not, that one day I will return to the normal soft and quiet life from breakfast to lunch to supper until sleep. [The *jihad* is a life full of meaning.]

I feel very concerned that when I am invited to the front or to the army camps, when I return to Peshawar²¹—despite the fact that my family and the princes of the *jihad* are there—the murmurings in my heart grow and are hurt due to the difficulties throughout the long drawn-out period on the land of *al-Ribat* and the war.²²

Our martyr has said other rousing words in a different opening: There is a merging of happiness with those [the same martyrs] who preceded us on God's path, [who overcame] the great fear [and carried out] the commandment that our heart feels deeply. This conclusion [on the virtue of the *jihad*] deprives [ordinary] people who return to their work [every day] in the middle of an ordinary life. Those people who live inside this world and who die on top of one of the offices or between the covers of a book or from a heart attack on the streets of one of the Arab cities. [This man] misses the chance of the century that God gave him in Afghanistan. He hopes to enter heaven but he will get to the threshold [of heaven] and that is where his soul will live or die.

I dare to say that our brother, the martyr, reached what he yearned for and received what he hoped for. We love those that work for Islam who publicize the commandments [the *jihad*] and walk towards its light and bestow it upon the future generations of the children of the Muslim [nation]. Because my honored brother—may God's mercy be upon him—wrote of this commandment that is a central idea [in Islam]. He saw in it [this commandment] the essence of his standing up to the trial [as a believer]. That is how he understood and learned it. The main idea of this commandment is the *jihad*—[it is] the way that the [Islamic] nation will be saved from those beating it, and with it one can achieve the victory of God and His satisfaction. Without our perseverance in praising him

[God], to protect Him²³ and to overcome our enemies, we would be worthy of contempt in the name of God. That is why He has commanded to us the [commandment] of *jihad* for the Islamic nation. The whole nation [without exception]. The average man as well as the clergy as well as the learned man. [God] demands from the mother that she sacrifice her sons to the *jihad* and to martyrdom. And it is a commandment to all Muslim children when they mature to love horsemanship²⁴ and martyrdom. Likewise, it is commanded to the rich to donate generously and invest in the field of war and sword.

One must not blame the commandment because the commandment asks this. When [the believer is found] in a place of danger, then the feelings [of the believer] change and he becomes stronger and pure [for] his family, his relatives and his nation. That is [God's] instruction that we are commanded to do.

Because Abdullah Azzam, one of the branches on a large tree that shades the good and generous Islam, the tree that grew the [Caliph] Umar ibn al-Khattāb, Saad ibn Abī Waqqās, Khālid ibn al-Walīd, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (Umar II) and Salah ad-Din [al-Ayyubi].²⁵ It is impossible to put a price on their gift and it is impossible to reduce the harvest of their fruit. Our desire is [to adopt] the behavior of *al-rejal*, the sons of the great tree that shades all of Islam. Their words and their wills [are] signs on the side of the [right] road and they light up the way of those that walk on the righteous path and the righteous. Pray to God and the blessing of God on His servant and His Prophet Muhammad, his family and the friends of the Prophet and his blessings on them.

Signed,

Suliman al-Ashkar

2 Article by Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

The article by Amar al-Ashkar is just an introduction to the article by Sheikh al-Mujahid (holy warrior sheikh) Abdullah Azzam, who at the end of the article is described as “a branch from the great shade of Islam.” Abdullah Yusuf Mustafa al-Azzam, born in 1941, was one of the most important philosophers of fundamentalist Islam. In his books and writings, Azzam raises the greatness of the *jihad* and of the martyr's death. One of his sayings, after he fought with the holy warriors in Afghanistan together with his pupil Amar al-Ashkar, was:

I feel that I am only seven years old, the amount of time that I have spent in *jihad*, one year in Palestine and six years in Afghanistan. This is my age, the rest have no value.²⁶

Azzam wrote many books on law and religion in which he presented his ideological theories. These theories included the combination of three main values:

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- The importance of *dawah* and fighting in Palestine against the Jews.
- A combination of Islamic studies and religious preaching on the use of violence.
- Fighting infidels wherever they are, with an emphasis on the value of *ishtishad*, the self-sacrifice of the believer.

These three values are the string that ties together all his books, such as *al-Asaile wa al-Ajwaba al Jihadia* (Questions and Answers about Holy War), *al-diffa'a an Aradi al-Muslimin Aham Farud al-Aaiyan* (The Defense of Muslim Lands—Most Important of Personal Obligations), and *Hamas ... al-Jadur al-Tarikihiya wa al-Mithaq* (Hamas, the Historical Roots and its Pact).²⁷ Azzam was personally influenced by the personality of Sayyid Qutb, the philosopher of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, who has been designated a giant in Islamic thought.²⁸ The many references to Sayyid Qutb in practically every book or article that deals with radical Islamic thought truly justify this nickname.²⁹

Azzam's desire was that Palestine would eventually be free, ruled by an Islamic regime and united with the other Islamic states:

We will force the world to recognize us, if they recognize us—good, if they don't, that is their problem. We will fight, we will beat our enemies; we will establish an Islamic State on the slice of land, like in Afghanistan. Afghanistan will expand, the *jihad* will spread. Islam will fight in other places. Islam will fight against the Jews in Palestine and will establish an Islamic state in Palestine and an Islamic state in Afghanistan and in other places. Afterwards, all of these states will merge into one Islamic state.³⁰

Azzam believed, however, that *jihad* for Jerusalem would arrive only at the end, after a number of earlier stages, of which the freeing of Afghanistan was one.³¹

The personality of Azzam, the Sheikh al-Mujahid, who combined in his lifetime *The Law and the Work of Jihad*, served as an inspiration for the Hamas movement, which also named a military academy after him.³² His writings and articles are still widespread among the many Islamic organizations that see them as literature that guides them on their way. The Islamic organizations in Palestine also admire this figure. Therefore, what is more worthy than quoting Azzam's words in this pamphlet on Islamic Jihad in Palestine? The will, due to its importance, is rendered here in its entirety. The division of the paragraphs and emphasis are all as in the original, unless indicated otherwise.

The will of the poor one who worshipped the exalted God

Abdullah Yusuf Azzam

From the house of the hero commander, Sheikh Galal ad-Din Haqqani,³³ in the afternoon hours of Monday of the 12th month of *Shaa'ban*, in the

year 1406 from the *Hijra* [from the beginning of the Islamic calendar], April 20, 1986, I write these words.

Thank God. We praise [God] and we ask for his aid and for his forgiveness. May God protect me from the evil desires and from the sins that we have committed. The one who guides us, the same God [on the righteous path] and does not deviate from His ways [and also] whoever makes a mistake and is not led on the righteous path as He is. I testify that there is no other God than Allah. [He is] one and He has no partners. I testify that Muhammad is His servant and His messenger.

God's vision is not easy but the reward [to the believer] is also not easy. You leave the mourning [on the death of the martyr] but [know] that it would be even worse for your future [for you as a believer], if it would be easier [to live as a believer without carrying out the commandments of *jihad*].

My love for the honorable *jihad*,³⁴ has truly spread throughout my whole life, my bones, my emotions, my heart and my feelings. *Surat al-Tawba* [The Repentance] and its verses, according the judgment of [infidels] by Allah.³⁵

This verse [which will be explained later] represents the final version of the *way of the jihad* in this religion and the Day of Judgment that will squeeze my heart with suffering. My soul is torn into pieces and is scattered when I see my failure and the failure of all of the Muslims [in their relationship] towards the fighting for God.

Because the Verse of the Sword, cancelled³⁶ [and replaced, according to the *shri'a*] the other verses that are mentioned before this. [It could be] after 20 verses—or 40 verses [or] after 100 verses of the *jihad* (that are mentioned in the Qur'an before Allah gave the Verse of the Sword). Because the version that decides and the decisive answer [in the Verse of the Sword that comes in the end] there are those that give the answer to anyone who wishes to enjoy himself with the verses of war for God. Or to dare face towards the verses that are explained [in the Verse of the Sword] or to switch [these verses] with an open meaning and a different ending. Therefore, one should see these last verses [about the *jihad* obligation] as a final instruction of the text.

The Verse of the Sword says:

[Indeed, the number of months with Allah is 12 [lunar] months in the register of Allah [from] the day He created the heavens and the earth; of these, four are sacred. That is the correct religion, so do not wrong yourselves during them]. And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively. And know that Allah is with the righteous [who fear Him].³⁷

Or the verse:

And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer and give *zakah*, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is forgiving and merciful.³⁸

The excuses of people [who avoid] feeling the war for God [they are many]. These people make excuses and put their feelings to sleep willingly [this is] in order to prevent themselves from feeling for fighting for God [and see in the fighting] a game. It is just the opposite; they must take it upon themselves that the creator will be their God and that they must worship Him. We [in the Qur'an] have been commanded about these types of manifestations [as it appears] in the text of the Qur'an: "And leave those who take their religion as amusement and diversion and whom the worldly life has deluded."³⁹

The finding of an excuse for acting without preparation [to fight for God] is the province of small souls which do not yearn to reach the heights [the *jihad*] and they are dispersed like seeds in the wind.⁴⁰

*If the souls had lofty idealism, they would work [the people] for their materialistic goal.*⁴¹

The proximity to the al-Haram mosque⁴² and its courtyards are not given for comparison [as opposed to] the *jihad* for God. [The real Muslim is not the believer who preserves the Haram and gives charity] [as it appears] in the verses:

Have you made the providing of water for the pilgrim and the maintenance of al-Haram mosque equal to [the deeds of] one who believes in Allah and the Last Day and strives in the cause of Allah? They are not equal in the sight of Allah. And Allah does not guide the wrongdoers. The ones who have believed, emigrated and striven in the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives are greater in rank in the sight of Allah. And it is those who are the attainers [of success]. Their Lord gives them good tidings of mercy from Him and approval and of gardens for them wherein is enduring pleasure.⁴³

When these verses were brought down to us, the followers of the Prophet Muhammad⁴⁴ were already divided as to their interpretation of what is the best way to worship [God] after belief. One of them said, "[Sacrifice and prayer] in the building of al-Haram mosque." The second one said, "Only those who give water to the pilgrims on the *Hajj* [to Mecca and Medina] to drink." The third said, "Only those who work on *jihad* for the sake of God."

These sentences remind us directly of this question. That the *jihad* for the sake of God is mightier than prayer inside al-Haram mosque building. This *sura* especially [emphasizes] and gives the reason [for this] due to the disagreement between those who followed [the Prophet] on this topic.

In the *sura*, it appears as if there is no explanation for why it has been removed or a [reason] for its uniqueness nor the explanation behind it. This is because its meaning is totally clear according to the text. The mercy of God on Abdullah ibn al-Mubarak who sent to al-Fadil ibn 'Ayad the following: His clear missive to people which criticized their deeds. The mercy of God, the servant of God, the son of the blessed that was sent to al-Fadil ibn 'Ayad.⁴⁵

*Hey! The servants of al-Haramain [Mecca and Medina],
If only you saw us
[Instead of] learning the work [of God]
You are playing
Those who love to color their cheeks with their tears.
And our necks are painted with our blood.*

Did you see the words of those who are familiar with the Islamic law and who tell of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad? [Abdullah] ibn al-Mubarak and al-Fadil [ibn 'Ayad]? Have you seen these neighbors who have been excommunicated and the work [of God] that is within? This at the time when there is hurt and humiliation of the holy. [At the time] that they spill my blood [the believers] and defile the pride [of Islam]. That is how the religion of God is laid on the earth. Say again—*this is a game with the laws of God*.⁴⁶ [In other words, those who keep the religious commandments but do not work with violence and keep the fighting *jihad*—that is a game with the laws of God.]

It is true that the Muslims have left the land where they were slaughtered. [Should] we just lift up our hands in surrender or rather should we take practical action in order to return to us the Muslim lands? This is a sin [to do this] and we must solve this problem [or these people] because this behavior of theirs is like a game of the religion of God. [They] who caress the feelings [the believers] create a false display that continues to fool the souls that fall in their hands.⁴⁷

What must be the decision and how should the Muslim and the female Muslims behave against the aggressive enemy?

I have already shown this when I wrote in my book that the defense of Muslim lands is the most important of all the personal duties⁴⁸ as was shown before me by Sheikh al-Islam ibn Taymiyyah.⁴⁹

The aggressive enemy who destroys religion and the [entire] world, we cannot see this as a requirement according to [our] faith to protect it [and to prevent its destruction].

I do not see any way—God knows—what the difference is today: Between deserting the fighting for God to deserting the prayer, the fast, the giving of charity. (It denies Islam and it denies Islam.)

I see the families of the land [standing] together in these days before the great responsibility before the King of the universe where [will be designed] a hand on history.

I see that it is impossible [for a Muslim] to escape his responsibility and leave the *jihad* even a little. It is the same thing if there is [he is busy] with *dawah* [an invitation to Islam] or a book or culture or anything similar to that.

I see that every Muslim on the face of the earth has suffered because he has left the *jihad* [the fighting for the Lord]. Every Muslim must carry on his shoulders the crime of leaving the gun. Everyone who will be found

by God—even if it is not because of corruption—and the gun is not in his hand, God will see him as a criminal and one who is transgressing! Because he has left the fighting [for God] and the fighting today is an individual duty [*fard al-'ayn*] on every Muslim on the face of the earth without any exceptions [from this responsibility]. To leave this responsibility is a crime. Because this is a requirement, [if] one does not repent and carry it out, he will have to give an accounting of it [on carrying it out] to pay for the crime and for not carrying it out.

I see—and God knows—who are the ones who are exempt before God because they have left the *jihad* and these are: the blind, the limping, the sick, the weak among the men, the women and the young who are unable [to participate in the fighting] and those who have not been instructed for that. Therefore, even those who are unable to wander to the land of the war and who do not know the way to it.

The people are all criminals because they have left the fight. *There is [no] difference between the fighting in Palestine or in Afghanistan or in any other point wherever it may be among the lands that are humiliated by the infidels and who humiliate [the believers] with their impurity.*⁵⁰

I see that one cannot be allowed freedom from the fighting [if] for one day and from being drafted into battle for God. There is no permission for vacation [of this type] for a man from his father, nor for a spouse from his spouse, nor for a borrower to the man he owes, nor for the sheikh from his student and not from the amir [the commander of the believers] to his subordinates.

All of the religious wise men of the [Islamic] nation throughout all the periods of history thought this way.⁵¹ If something happens that is similar to this situation [where a requirement exists to do *jihad*], the son goes out without permission from his father and the husband without permission from his wife. Whoever tries [to get permission] is wrong [in his behavior] regarding this problem. As it is, as if he is keeping his desires without being instructed about them by God.⁵²

[The answer] on this matter is definite and clear and there is no confusion or uncertainty. One cannot confuse the [requirement of *jihad*] in any way whatsoever. There is no way to play at it or to explain [this issue] any other way [than the explanation given here].

Because the amir of the believers does not ask for permission for *jihad* in these three situations:

If the amir fails in the *jihad*. [In other words, if it is possible that he is not appropriate to carry out the mission or that there is a need to reorganize the forces.]

If he missed the time of getting permission [*jihad* has an appropriate time to be proclaimed and that is when the enemy attacks. It is necessary to announce *jihad* before it is too late.]

If the learning [the mental preparation] of ours prevents us [temporarily] until the beginning of the *jihad*.⁵³

Here I see that the Muslims today: Responsible for every phenomenon that takes place in Afghanistan and for every drop of blood that is poured there. There they are—and God knows—participating with their blood for every failure of theirs. They [the fighters] acquire what is sacrificed for them, the weapons that protect them and the medicine that takes care of them. The money with which they buy their food and the tractors that will dig the ditches [for fighting].⁵⁴ Here is the place to comment on the big explanation: Whoever had a lot of food in their hands and saw someone who was hungry and left him until he died. If the owner of the food made a mistake—I will think about him that he will not die—if he is protecting his religion in his thoughts (and for his relatives) if he was [his relatives'] leaning post and they lost him due to their stories and their opinions. One of the two: [I will let him be] because he is protecting his religion with his special money [if he donates it to the right cause]. The second opinion: I will cut away from him because he fights [and he should have aided the same hungry person] (111/2–112).⁵⁵

There is no accounting and no punishment waiting for those who are rich and the monies that are wasted on desires and they spill [their money] for nothing on caprice and luxuries.⁵⁶

Where are the Muslims?

Your life is *jihad*, your glory is in *jihad* and your presence is fatefully connected through the *jihad* way.⁵⁷

Where is the *dawah* [the call for Islam]? There is no resurrection [for Muslims] under the sun if your [physical] abilities and your weapons are not ready and at hand forever against the tyrants, the infidels and the sinners.

*Those that think that the religion of God can win without jihad and fighting and blood and these body parts and skulls, do not understand the nature of this religion.*⁵⁸

The prestige of the preachers and the strength of the *dawah* and the magnificence of the Muslims cannot be without fighting.⁵⁹ A *hadith* says:

Because God is inclined [to implant] fear into the hearts of your enemies but it is up to you to expel desire from your heart.

They say, “What are the desires of the messenger of God?”

It is said, “Loving this world and hating death.”

And in an additional *hadith*, “And the hatred of fighting.”⁶⁰

So fight, [O Muhammad], in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] might of those who disbelieve. And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment.⁶¹

Because sharing strengthens and overcomes [the infidels] without fighting:

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And fight them until there is no *fitnah* and [until] the religion, all of it, is for Allah. And if they cease—then indeed, Allah is seeing of what they do.⁶²

And the *fitnah*—the heresy and the wandering is what they share. [In other words, *fitnah* is not just a civil war but also a denial of Islam.]

Because the *jihad* is the only guarantee for peace on earth:

And if it were not for Allah checking [some] people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted, [but Allah is full of bounty to the worlds].⁶³

Because the *jihad* is the only guarantee that watches over the rites [of God] and the house of his servants.

And were it not that Allah checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned.⁶⁴

Preaching for Islam

Desire death that grants you life! Do not cause yourself to fall due to your desires [for something else other than death]. Do not make the mistake of following useless gods. Where are you [who dare] to trick your souls with a book that you will read [the Qur'an] and with additions that are not required [according to the religion] that you will work with? Do not take it upon yourselves to deal with easy things [that will come] instead of the significant ones [which are the *jihad* and the sacrifice for God]:

[Remember, O believers, when Allah promised you one of the two groups—that it would be yours]—and you wished that the unarmed one would be yours.⁶⁵

Do not obey anything else except for *jihad*. There is no permission for a commander [and a ruler] to announce a general draft except [for the need] of *jihad*. Because *jihad* is the basis for calling you, to fortify your religion and to protect your rights.

Woe, the teachers of the Islamic religion (ulamaa al-Islam)

Advance to lead this generation, return our sovereignty and don't cause disaster and load yourself with debts. Where are you and the set tables of the evil ones who depress the hearts [of the believers] and who kill your intelligence? They [the evil ones] will stop you in every period [that is] and will divert your hearts from you.

Woe, our Muslim brothers

Overcome your years and the strengthening of the evil on your land. How beautifully the poet expressed this:

Wake up from your dreams of the shameland where is the roar of the lions?

And the evil of the regiment grows strongerland we are as worthless as slaves.

Tied like slaves who have surrendered! why do [we] have clothing of iron-plated armor?

When will we put an end to this/when will be put an end to this? ⁶⁶

Woe, the community of women

Where are you and the life of luxuries? Because a life of luxury is the enemy of the *jihad*. A life of luxury hurts the righteous souls. Beware of the luxury items and be satisfied with just those things that are needed [for your lives]. Teach your sons manly roughness [*al-khashuna* and *al-rajula*] for bravery and *jihad*. Your house should be a dwelling of lions. Do not let your house be a bird farm where the birds are fattened for slaughter. Endow your sons with a love of *jihad*, horsemanship and the storm of battle.

[You the mothers] because of the problems of Islam you have to try to sanctify at least [one] day a week for education [for a good life] and to try to make them imagine their lives as similar to the lives of the immigrants [*al-muhajiroun*]⁶⁷ and the holy warriors. Where is the dry bread [that needs to be eaten]? [It is up to you] not to stray [and to give only] food that can be wrapped together with a slice of bread and a sip of tea.

Woe, the children

They were educated on the music of the shells, the sounds of the cannon, the hum of the jets and the thunder of the tanks, [do not educate them] on the beautiful tunes, music of the leisure time and the satiation of bed.

Are you [soft] like a woman? If so, there are many souls to be assimilated by you. [The way of pampering is not the way of the fighting Muslim and a man.]

Woe, Umm Muhammad⁶⁸

Praise be to the Lord who has repaid me and the Muslims well. You who have been tolerant of me for a long time due to this way [of the *jihad*]. You who have swallowed with me the sweet and bitter cups of life. You who have given me aid to cross this blessed road and to graze in the fields of the *jihad* [on you will come a blessing].

When you left the work of your house in the year 1969, in the days that we had two babies and a small child. You lived in one room made of tin that had no kitchen or bathroom. The day that you left the house, you were pregnant. You increased the family and raised the children and

many learned from you [your ways]. You hosted our guests [satisfactorily]. You trusted in God and you received from Him everything, whether a lot or a little.

Praise be to the Lord who repays those that fear Him. Blessed be the Lord who gives you God-like patience [and for my way] during the same long homeless period where you alone carried the heavy burden [of raising the family].⁶⁹

I already knew you as a self-denying person, one who does not complain about the hard days when you are lacking the means and are without luxuries. This does not mean that you will not yearn for easier times in this world. This world isn't [the center] of your heart, therefore most of the time is in your hands [utilized properly].

For the life of *jihad* is an enjoyable life. Because you made an effort with patience, washing things with your hands [and lived a life satisfied with little], is much more beautiful than [the life] that is the opposite of this, a life with a love for pleasant things and luxury items. The obligation of asceticism is loved before God. Making do [with little] that exists in the hands of people [causes that] it will be loved in the eyes of man.

The Qur'an is true forever and is the glory of life. Observing His laws willingly and requesting forgiveness before dawn makes your heart transparent [before God]. Worship [God] with sweetness. Do good deeds before Him. Do not expand [with luxuries] in this world. After [you will behave in this way] as presented, you will be men of this world with calmness in your hearts. Hope is with the God that He will let us enter the next world as He let all of us enter this world.

And where are you my sons?

You fought with me and we were together just for a short time. But do not give up my teachings easily.

True, I have already lit you [with the enthusiasm of faith]. What details shall I give, and the difficulties of the Muslims amaze even the woman who nurses her baby. What can be done and those who have died for the Islamic nation demand sacrifice also from the children.

God is not interested in living in a cage with you like the chicken lives with her chicks. We cannot cool down the soul or close the flame that blazes and burns in the hearts of the Muslims. There is no land that should be left between you for a long time [if you do not rise up and the situation will continue like this]. The conditions of the Muslims will stick to whoever has a heart filled with wisdom.

Why are there people among you who chase after the pleasures of happiness? [Who say] put down the tray for me and lift up the tray which is between the meats and the different types of sweets?

Yes, God, all my life despises the luxuries. [All of the luxuries] are the same such as clothes, food or a place to live. [God] will carry you and lift

you up to a place where there are only those who are satisfied with a little and He will keep you far away from falling in with those who are affluent.

I command to you the vision of al-Salaf⁷⁰ [the Suna family and the Prophet's group]. And you should obey this prophecy. I command to you the Qur'an, recite it and protect it. Watch your tongue and keep the fast days [in *Ramadan*] and be men of virtue. You must work for the Islamic movement [at every time and place]. It is important that you learn that there is no amir in the movement [whatsoever] or authority over you that can prevent you from the *jihad*. [There is no amir] that can guide you to persevere with *dawah* that will keep you away from the manliness [*al-rajula*] and the culture of horsemanship. Do not listen to anyone who will try to prevent you from *jihad* for God. Throw away [these words] and ride [into battle]. Now you can be whole and more loving [before God] when you ride [into battle].

I command you, my sons, obey your mother and respect your sisters (Umm Hassan and Umm Yehyah). I command you to learn the principles of the *shriyah*. I command you to respect your eldest brother Muhammad. I command you about the love that should be between you. Respect your grandfathers and grandmothers and respect them very much. Listen to your aunts [on the side of your father] (Umm Faiz and Umm Muhammad). After that God will grant you much reward. Pray for his mercy and respect our family. Truly help our friends and everyone who is our comrade.

According to the different sections of jihad

Consider much the swords of [Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar, [Burhanuddin] Rabbani and [Mohammad Yunes] Khaled. Because what they are doing today,⁷¹ they are reaching the way of *jihad*. They are watching over the way [of *jihad*] preventing any deviation. Do not forget the leaders who are inside [Afghanistan] such as Galal ad-Din [Haqqani] and Ahmad Shah Massoud and the engineer Bashir. Trust in God's benevolence. [To all my friends from the holy warriors] Mulai Arslan, Farid and Muhammad Alem and Washir Alem/Baghman and Sayyid Muhammad Hanif/al-Luker.⁷²

May God bless you and thank you. Be a witness to God that there is no God but Him. The God that forgives you and brings you good.

This is how the will of Abdullah Azzam ends.

C Azzam's theory in practice

Azzam, together with his two sons, Muhammad and Ibrahim, fulfilled the desire to die as martyrs by dying in a mysterious explosion in Peshawar on

December 25, 1989. The reasons for his death are still foggy. There are various opinions on who was behind his death. Was it the Israeli Mossad, as was argued by his student, the one who was following in his footsteps, Osama bin Laden? Or was Bin Laden himself involved in Azzam's death due to their differences of opinion? No matter the cause, Azzam's influence on world *jihad* in general and specifically Palestinian *jihad* is great.⁷³

On May 2, 2011, the United States assassinated Osama bin Laden and his son. This action was carried out by American commando soldiers, so it seems that "for some reason" this exceptional disciple went the way of his teacher. Already after the elimination of Bin Laden, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, eulogized the martyr Osama bin Laden with deep feeling: "The dogs of the West murdered a lion, one of the lions of Islam."

Bin Laden was well aware of the hunt for him but that did not stop him from continuing on the *jihad* way and for serving as an example and a wonder for holy warriors all over the world, including in Palestine, according to Hamas leaders. It is no surprise that the head of the Hamas government, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood activists in Jerusalem, went out of their way to praise Bin Laden and his ideological beliefs together with a promise of death for his murderers from the hated West.⁷⁴

Azzam's belief that one should protect the lands of Islam wherever they are and with whatever means is not new or unique to him. For example, the Sunni sheikh, Dr. Salah ad-Din 'Arqa Dan, a member of the Unification of the Ulama of Lebanon and one of the leaders of al-Jamia al-Islamiya in Sidon, said:

The Muslims, the Sunni and the Shiites agreed once and forever that fighting against the enemy that has captured Islamic land is a personal requirement [*fard al-'ayn*] which falls on every individual in society. How much more so when we are speaking about Israel. From this starting point there is no need for a legal ruling or permission. This is a responsibility just like prayer.⁷⁵

Azzam's uniqueness is in his emphasis on the magnitude of the individual as a *jihad* fighter. Because the *jihad* is a lofty personal responsibility of the believer, there is no need for any organized venture of any kind in order to carry out *jihad* activities against the infidels; it is enough with a bullet and a gun.⁷⁶

The influence that Azzam, the "*jihad* sheikh," as he was nicknamed, had on *jihad*, particularly in Palestine, was great.⁷⁷ There is no Islamic movement in Palestine that does not esteem his character and his philosophy. The advertisement by Islamic Jihad, in which his will was translated, proves how much of an influence his words have had on the *jihad* Islamic movements in Palestine. Azzam perhaps felt a special closeness to Hamas, as appears from his remarks and from the book that he wrote on the movement, but he surely also supported the way of the Islamic Jihad movement, especially after the

intifada broke out in December 1987. There are studies that try to present the facts as if he objected to the way of Islamic Jihad because this is the version of “Jihad now,” but this ignores the need to teach the masses through *dawah* and preparation of hearts.⁷⁸ However, as the advertisements of the movement as well as this document show, the opposite is true.

The Hamas movement has also been precise in highlighting the part that Azzam played in the movement’s heritage. After his death, the military arm of Hamas in the West Bank was renamed the Holy Regiment of Abdullah Azzam. This lasted until the beginning of the 1990s when it was combined with the military arm in the Gaza Strip under the name Regiments of Izz al-Din al-Qassam.⁷⁹ Likewise, as mentioned above, the military academy of Hamas in the Gaza Strip is also named after him. In a missive from the Hamas movement, the following was publicized in February 1990:

The words written in your will were engraved very deeply into our souls. At this stage, everyone who reads them feels the truth of your words. That is why it is pleasant for us to respond to them in order that they will remain as a chandelier that will light the way of the *jihad* for our youth ... when we read your will ... The love of the *jihad* gains control over me and my life, my soul, my feelings ... And when you repeat the saying of the individual outstanding people who lived before you: “Yearn for death and you will be granted life.” Your true words enter us quietly and peacefully. Until they have turned our youth into the lava that spits out its fire on the soldiers of the exploiting enemy in a way that would have satisfied you with its existence of [the movement] of Hamas and in the way in which Hamas has turned into a symbol throughout the world. When it was said about you the *shahid* of Islam—they were right. When they said about you, the *shahid* of Afghanistan—they were also right. But we also say that you [Azzam] were also the *shahid* of Palestine, not because you are one of the sons of the Palestinian nation but because you left the place of the *jihad* in Palestine only when the doors were closed.⁸⁰

The Islamic movement legally active in Israel also felt a special tie to Sheikh Abdullah Azzam and his philosophy. This tie was based on appreciation and mutual respect. At the rally that took place in Oklahoma City in 1988, Azzam heaped compliments on Sheikh Abdallah Nimer Darwish and blessings on the other paralyzed men (except for Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who also received compliments from him) that Darwish, from the year 1948, educated a generation on the captured land. The man with a paralyzed hand turned Palestine into “a region waiting to be called.” In his book on Hamas, Azzam wrote:

A whole book is needed in order to give this man the respect that he deserves. He is from the sons of the village of Kafar Qasem who repented and afterwards was a teacher in Umm al-Fahm which was a communist

district. He came out against those who predicted the future and the soothsayers and he said, repeatedly, that we are the chosen people. Umm al-Fahm was transformed into an important fortress of Islam. Abdallah [Nimer Darwish] established the Jihad Brigades that were discovered by the Jews. The Jews trembled in fear and narrowed his steps.⁸¹

The leaders of the Islamic movement who were arrested at the beginning of the 1980s included Sheikh Ra'ed Salah Mahajna (born in 1958), who was arrested and convicted of terrorist activities with Hamas. Sheikh Ra'ed Salah was chosen to run for mayor of the city of Umm al-Fahm in 1989 (where he continued to govern until 2001), the year in which Azzam said the above. There was a split in the movement close to the 1996 election to the Israeli Knesset, which was led by Abdallah Nimer Darwish. Darwish led the al-Qā'ima al-'Arabiyya al-Muwaḥḥada (United Arab List) party that participates in Knesset elections and is involved in Israeli politics. Ra'ed Salah, who totally opposed participation in the Israeli Knesset election, began to stand at the head of his own organization, usually called the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel. This was unlike the position of his teacher and the founder of the movement, Abdallah Nimer Darwish, who did support participation by the members of the movement in national elections and whose movement will be referred to from this point onward as the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel. Similarly, it is actually the Northern Branch which is the one that has appeared in the headlines many times and demonstrates its loyalty to pure Islam without compromise according to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁸²

In the Arab media and in the advertisements of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ra'ed Salah is called the head of the Muslim Organization in Conquered Palestine, or the head of the Islamic Movement Inside Palestine on the Areas of 1948. Therefore, for example, words of support were showered upon Sheikh Ra'ed Salah by Dr. Muhammad Badie (the eighth general guide (chairman) of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the al-Ikhwan site; Badie has headed the Egyptian branch of the international Islamist organization since 2010). These words of support were said after Ra'ed Salah was imprisoned in Ayalon prison, where he served a five-month sentence for attacking a policeman at the Mugrabi Gate in Jerusalem. However, according to the publicity in *Sawt al-Aqsa* (The Voice of al-Aqsa), this imprisonment is the result of the Zionist desires of the Zionist conquering regime to harm the struggle of Ra'ed Salah and his brother al-Murabatun—People of the Ribāṭ (a fortified outpost) against damage to Islam's holy places in Jerusalem.⁸³

Of course, Ra'ed Salah and the rest of the Islamic movement activists use the expression *al-Murabatun*, whose meaning according to al-Jadd ibn Rushd is, “[h]olding fast to outposts of the Islamic lands in order to protect the Muslims therein,”⁸⁴ and also refers to the outposts themselves. Its root appears in the Qur'an as the command *rabitū*:

O you who have believed, persevere and endure and remain stationed and fear Allah that you may be successful.⁸⁵

This expression characterizes the outlook of Hamas, Islamic Jihad in all its factions, and the various factions of al-Qaeda that are active in the Arab countries (including a number of small Palestinian organizations that are active in the Gaza Strip and tied to al-Qaeda).⁸⁶ Palestine was Islamic land that was stolen through the “strength of the upper arm” and now it is in the suburb of Islam. That is why there is a personal religious duty (*fard al-'ayn*) to get it back from the Jews.

Sons of Palestine, the time has come to swear loyalty to death, it is good to die with respect, the sons of Palestine ... There is no return after today. Go after this death where the way has recently been opened. The time has come to go up the steps of preparation and death for *Allah* [*ish-tishad*] ... There is no super strength and there is no tiny strength. What is important is the power of the will that is derived from faith in religion [in Islam] and trust in the Master of the universe.⁸⁷

When turning to the Muslims, Azzam indicated that there is no reason to fear death for God because:

The *shahada* are those who write the history of the nations, as the history of the nations is only written with blood and sweat. They are the ones that build the palace of glory, as palaces of glory are only built with skulls and with body parts that have been torn off of the body. They are the ones who keep this tree of religion from shriveling and dehydrating. This tree of religion shall only be watered with blood. They are the inspectors as they knew their way to Allah while others lament them and others make fun of their thoughts. They are the ones that love death in order for them to be granted life.⁸⁸

It is only natural that it is specifically Azzam who praised the death of the martyr and the sacrifice of life and he hoped that he, too, would be designated a *shahid* after his death. Thus, for example, there are many widespread descriptions that claim that Azzam's body was not harmed from the strength of the blast, as opposed to the bodies of his sons which were dismembered. The smell of his blood was like the smell of musk. Azzam's wife, Umm Muhammad, saw him in the sky dressed in white clothes like an angel (a hint of purity) and her sons Muhammad and Ibrahim were at his side wearing green clothes (the color of Islam), while he still asked his son Hudhaifa, who was still alive, to call to prayer and call the *takbir*, *Allāhu Akbar* (God is great).

These legends are a widespread method to glorify the martyr, as can be seen in the following story of the martyr Muhammad Musbah Hamed, which is used here to glorify the *shahid*.

D The “tragic” life story of *shahid* Muhammad Musbah Hamed⁸⁹

The death of a martyr was always the gasoline that fed sacrifice among the general population. The holy one who is tortured, “the *shahid*,” who dies for the sanctification of God and the homeland serves as a good example showing others how to walk in his path. All of the Islamic factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have learned from this to glorify the “tales” of the martyrs. Abdullah Azzam is not the first who glorified the idea of sacrifice and turned it into an inseparable part of his doctrine, but there is no doubt that his views greatly influenced many young Muslims who sanctified the idea. Among them, of course, the youth of Palestine.⁹⁰ This approach serves a number of goals:

- First, to show the rest of the believers that the way of the *shahid* is the right way in the eyes of God and man.
- Second, to encourage others to walk in his path and to continue the bitter battle against the Zionist enemy.
- Third, to proffer respect to the families of the martyr who “gave” their son for this glorified purpose.

The publicizing of the family of the martyr, his immortalization and a description of the sacrifice made by a family member—(holy warrior)—serves social goals for the family of the martyr and his community, and lessens the pain of the loss of the “dear” son. It can be seen how these goals are expressed from the text before us, which describes the biography of a *shahid*, one of many, who fell as a martyr for God and the Motherland in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas.

The shahid, the holy warrior, Captain (Naqeeb) Muhammad Musbah Hussin Hamad “Abu Abdullah”

His birth and genealogy⁹¹

Our holy warrior, *shahid*, was born in the Nussirat Refugee Camp on Saturday morning on October 25, 1986, (the 21st day of the month of Şafar in the year 1407 from the *hijra*⁹²). The *shahid* grew up in an important family. His family emigrated (as refugees) from al-Maghar [a burned village] in the year 1948 like the rest of the Palestinian families who emigrated from their original villages and settled in the Nussirat Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip.

The family of the martyr included seven brothers and two sisters from both of the parents and it was God’s decree that he would be the first *shahid* from among his brothers. Our martyr received both his elementary and high school education at UNRWA schools.⁹³ He graduated high school in 2004. His high school was named after Khālid ibn al-Walid.⁹⁴

His personality and qualities

Our martyr was characterized by a good heart, a good temperament and the quality of humility. He respected the aged and was happy to help the younger children. There is testimony to the fact that this was the way he acted. The residents of the Nussirat Refugee Camp attest to that. And so that is how the martyr Muhammad grew with a love of God and Islam. From his youth, he was drawn to religion and he was eager to carry out the five daily prayers in the mosque of the martyr Sayyid Qutb. He was especially enthusiastic about saying the early morning prayers⁹⁵ as the rest of the worshippers testify. He was also always enthusiastic at the other later morning prayers [*salat al-duha* prayer, which takes place at approximately 10–11 am], and on fast days he used to suffer more than the others and he initiated many things at the mosque.

The family of the holy warrior ('aaela mujahida)

Our *martyr* belongs to a family of religious holy warriors who know their duties and love their religion and their homeland. There were many martyrs from this family and we will mention the following names: The martyr, holy warrior Khair ad-Din Ahmed Hamed, the martyr Naael Muhammad Hamed, and the martyr Hisham Ismail Hamed who carried out the attack on Nezarim in 1995. In this attack on Nezarim, his brother, Hussam Ismail Hamed, also took part.⁹⁶ The martyr Yunes Muhammad Hamed and his friend in the activity [of sacrifice] the martyr Anas Fawzi Hamed who also sacrificed himself for the sanctification of God's name, on the same day, together with Yusuf Hamed, as they were good friends with good relations between them.

The choice of jihad as a way of life

From the moment that he opened his eyes and saw the Zionist conqueror who was humiliating the heart of his nation [Palestine] and his faith [Islam], the love for *jihad* for God grew in his heart and he began to hate the nightmare of the military occupation more and more. He signed up for membership in the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood organization in 2005. From this moment, our martyr began to take part in all of the activities of the movement, in parades and conferences. He also took part in the activities of distributing the election propaganda of the party of change which represented Hamas in the second election that took place for the Palestinian parliament.⁹⁷

From the moment that the respected personage, the holy warrior, the martyr Said Seyam⁹⁸ announced the formation of a [military] force to be implemented, our martyr joined its ranks. He carried out a great number

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of many different activities in different places from the time that he joined, including an activity in Jenin and a special activity in Deir al-Balah. In 2007, after the military decision and victory [over Fatah] by the battalions of the martyr Izz al-Din al-Qassam,⁹⁹ our martyr worked in the police center in Abu Medin [south of Gaza], where he held the rank of second lieutenant [*mulazem awal*].

In 2007, our *shahid* drew up a marriage contract with one of the girls in his family and he was engaged to her for a month. But God's desire was different. God wanted to lead him so that he would marry beautiful virgins that he would take if it was God's will.¹⁰⁰

The day of his death as a martyr

On the morning of Black Saturday, on December 27, 2008, our martyr prayed at the later morning prayers at the Abu Medin Center. A few minutes before his death as a martyr, he still read the *Surat of al-Imran*.¹⁰¹ Afterwards, the planes of the Zionist conquerors came and they launched a treacherous bomb against the Palestinian police position. And that is how our martyr joined the Garden of Eden of our prophets, our righteous and our martyrs, and it is good for him to be in their company. Only those like him are taken to God. We will not recommend anyone else to God but him.

Stories about the martyr

His fiancée related that she saw him in a dream two days after he sacrificed his life as a martyr, and he was dressed in white clothes and stood in an [enchancing] place full of trees and running rivers. According to her, he told her that he was happy and that she should not mourn him because he died to sanctify God's name and he is considered blessed before God.

The martyr Muhammad would reach out his hand to help all who were needy and he would receive them in his house, anyone with a problem, or he was willing to help the police center in Abu Medin. After his death, the family members of the *shahid* had a number of cell phone conversations on the cell phone of the *shahid* Muhammad from those that he had helped and they asked about him and wanted to know if he was injured in the attack, and when they heard about his death they mourned him greatly.

May the Lord have mercy on the martyr and may he be placed in heaven together with the prophets, the righteous and the martyrs, and it is good for him to be in their company and our last prayers, it is good to thank God the Lord of the world.

In the name of God the merciful and beloved

May peace be with you and the mercy of God and his blessing

Have mercy on us God and let us rest in the upper heavens
The respected martyr
The Lord gave and to Him we will return
The Lord will patch up the wounds of the martyr
And will respect the holy warrior
Who protects Islam and returns it to its sovereignty
Will the fear of death discourage from revenge?
*Yahya Ayyash and afterwards Salah Shahada.*¹⁰²

Afterwards, after many lines of additional blessings and justification for the judgment, the names of an additional 232 martyrs are listed alongside their Hamas military ranks. A large number of those on the list were members of Hamas who were killed during “Operation Cast Lead” (the war in Gaza), which took place from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009 in the Gaza Strip. Afterwards, there is a caricature of a fighting image, a man from Hamas fighting the Zionists, who is all fire and a flame on a background of the map of Palestine. On the site one can find additional tales of the martyrs who died in recent years at the hands of the Zionist enemy while they were carrying out their jobs.

The men of Hamas do not ask themselves what those same martyrs did in the name of the organization that led them to their deaths. They do not explain that “opposition deeds” were carried out—including shooting missiles into Israel into crowded areas where there were innocent civilians. The opposition to the military occupation is, as said before, a religious commandment required of every believer (*fard al-'ayn*). The activities of the Zionist enemy are always treacherous activities lacking respect. The Zionist enemy attacks the men of Hamas from above while they are still at their posts. Death is seen in their eyes as a new way of life whereby the believer is able to achieve self-fulfillment in heaven together with the righteous, the prophets and the virgins. The more damage that the martyr has caused the Zionist enemy, the greater his standing. Yahya Ayyash and Salah Shahada are figures for admiration and all the martyrs should follow in their footsteps. This way of sanctifying death over life is missing from the eyes of many,¹⁰³ including Judge Richard Goldstone, who examined what happened in the “Cast Lead” operation. For some reason his eyes were prevented from seeing the “magnificence of Hamas” and the rest of the Palestinian *jihad* organizations.¹⁰⁴

In the upcoming chapters I shall survey the world outlook on the various organizations that have adopted the *jihad* way and *ishtishad* as a way of life. Some of these are active in Palestine and some describe themselves as branches of international organizations that are spread throughout the Muslim world. Some carry out *jihad* in practice and several of them delay it for the future. Every organization carries its individuality proudly and supports, in its own way, the *jihad* way against Israel which has no right to exist at all in Palestine.

Abdullah Azzam's uniqueness is that he built the most comprehensive ideological basis and justifies *jihad* against Israel by every means. In his book on the roots of Hamas, Azzam emphasizes that he is a link in a chain of religious men beginning with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood; Muhammad Rashid Rida and his students, including the Mufti Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Hussayni, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and the head of the Upper Muslim Council; and Izz al-Din al-Qassam. In this manner, there are legal rulings from the sages of the *Ulama* (Islamic scholars) from al-Azhar University, Iraq and Najd (Saudi Arabia) from the 1930s and others up until Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of Hamas today. The *fatwah* (a juristic ruling concerning Islamic law) says that He is one and there is no other but Him, and it is necessary to act against the Jews in any way of *jihad* and whoever helps them, the Jews, in any way, his sentence is death. There is no forgiveness and there is no absolution for those who help the Jews steal the land of Islam.¹⁰⁵

Notes

- 1 The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com>. The passage speaks of retribution for evil deeds (an eye for an eye). It also says that the reward for believers is very grand.
- 2 No author, *Wasiyah Batel al-Qima fi 'Aser al-Inhirar, Wasiyah al-'Alam al-Mujahid, Saber li-Allah Madhrem ila Umat al-Islam* [A Will for a World Fighting a Holy War Patience is for Allah the Warrior to the Islamic Nation] (Kuwait: Dar al-Nafees, n.d.).
- 3 The Arabic word used here is *wasiyah*, which refers to the document called a will, usually intended to be read after one's death.
- 4 An example of this can be seen in the film "The Hamburg Cell," about a group of radical Islamists based in Hamburg, Germany, which included students who eventually came to be key operatives in the 9/11 attacks. See the article by Oshrat Kotler-Bengal, "Journey into the Mind behind al-Qaeda," *Nana* 10, Jan. 30, 2010, <http://news.nana10.co.il/Article/?ArticleID=696066>.
- 5 The Arabic terminology used here is *shahada al-khalil al-Rahman*, which means the martyrs of the "merciful friend." "Merciful friend" refers to Father Abraham. The city of Hebron is called *al-khalil*, and the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the burial place of Father Abraham, is called *Haram al-khalil* or *Haram al-Ibrahimi*.
- 6 The Arabic word used here is *al-abrar*, which can be translated with any one of the following adjectives (all of which are appropriate): honest, righteous, entitled and pure.
- 7 *Anbar al-Mujahideen*. This is the precious stone of the holy warriors. Amber is the gem derived from the fossilized resin and trees thickened in the ground. The holy Muslim warriors are like this precious gem in the way of truth, might and freedom.
- 8 The meaning here is that this pamphlet is dedicated to the memories of the holy ones of Hebron.
- 9 The term *al-rejal* means "the heroes." In this context, the term *rejal* refers to the men of truth who reveal courage and sacrifice which are manly attributes. See Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Sub-Tenants: Israeli Arabs, their Status and the Policy Towards Them* (Jerusalem, 1992), p.17.
- 10 The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/33>.
- 11 It is accepted that Abdullah Azzam taught Osama bin Laden during the 1970s at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. During the 1980s, Azzam decided not to

- return to Palestine but to continue on to Afghanistan together with his student, Bin Laden. Dore Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West Bank and the Future of the Holy City* (Tel Aviv, 2008), p.199.
- 12 This was the first name of the Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine which was headed by Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi and Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz 'Awda. Meir Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism: The Islamic Jihad Movement* (Tel Aviv, 1994), p.17.
 - 13 Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, *al-Jihad, al-Farida al-Ghaiba* [The Jihad: The Neglected Obligation] (Cairo, n.d.), pp.28–30. This important pamphlet deals with different aspects of the value of *jihad* and uprisings against rulers, even if they are Muslim infidels, as was Anwar Sadat, who was called “the Pharaoh of Egypt,” who was president of Egypt at that time. Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam established the Egyptian *jihad* organization in 1979. In this pamphlet, he presents the ideological basis for the assassination of Sadat. See also Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.199, 237–38.
 - 14 This apparently refers to Amar Suliman al-Ashkar, a *kadi* (religious court judge) with great influence in Jordan. He authored many books on religion, among them: *al-Waha al-Wadeh fi Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiya al-Urduni* [An Explanation of the Legal Lawful Status of the Individual in Jordan] (Amman: Dar al-Nafees, 1997). In Jordan, he is considered a conservative in his approach towards ritual law. Ismail al-Ashkar, a relative, serves as a member of parliament for the Hamas party. Additional activists from this family can be found in Islamic Jihad and in Hamas.
 - 15 The Arabic term used here is *madmara la yibqi wla yadhira*, which means to destroy without leaving a remnant or a trace. This expression frequently serves as a description of the peace process with Israel.
 - 16 A description that is usually used to describe Salah ad-Din al-Ayyubi.
 - 17 Emphasis added. Azzam fought in Palestine in 1969–70, up until Black September. Only much later, during the 1980s, did he join Osama bin Laden and fight in Afghanistan. In his book on the roots of Hamas, Azzam boasts of his activities including the Rutenberg Action, which took place on June 5, 1970, and the Sayyid Qutb Action, which was carried out by him on Aug. 29, 1970. Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.34–35.
 - 18 These words appear as if they have been taken from the words of Abdullah Azzam that were quoted in Sheet #79 of the Pakistani weekly *Laheeb al-Maaraka* (Flames of Battle): “We are honored to serve those who write history with blood and who build fortresses of fame through the use of skulls and body parts that were torn from the body.” Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p. 40.
 - 19 Sayyid Qutb, born on Oct. 9, 1906, was executed by hanging by the Egyptian authorities in Aug. 1966. From 1939 until 1948, he served in a senior post in the Egyptian Education Ministry. In 1948, he traveled to the United States in order to study for a Master's degree. There he was exposed to Western culture and he developed a revulsion for it. When he returned to Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1954, he was arrested by the Egyptian authorities and was released for health reasons in 1965. In prison, he authored two well-known books: *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an* [In the Shade of the Qur'an], and *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* [Milestones along the Way], which is mentioned here. His book *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* emphasizes the West's struggle today between heresy and faith. In 1966, he was re-arrested by the Egyptian authorities and was executed by hanging. His books, and especially *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, are a source of inspiration to Islamic loyalists all around the Muslim world and they even influenced Osama bin Laden's perceptions. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.14.
 - 20 “And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision” (*Surat al-Imran* (3), v. 169), is quoted many times in political Islamic writings. For example, this

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- sentence opens Ahmad Mahmud Muhammad al-Qasim, *Shahada intifadat al-Aqsa* (Ramallah, 2002), a memorial volume for 200 “chosen” *shahada* from the *intifada*.
- 21 Peshawar is the capital of the northwest province of Pakistan. It is a city relatively close to the Afghanistan border and it has a large Muslim population. A great many of the *jihad* warriors in Afghanistan, and today the Taliban, found it to be a comfortable base for their activities as it was close to the Afghanistan border.
- 22 The land of *al-Ribat* is the name of the Islamic frontier where the forces of the faith—the Muslims—fight against the heretics—the Christians and the Jews. That is why both Afghanistan and Israel have won the nickname *Ard al-Ribat* using the terminology of the Islamic extremists.
- 23 In the original, the word *hami* is used. This means a place that has to be protected, such as the tent encampment of the tribe, one’s house, the Motherland, etc.
- 24 In the original, the Arabic word used is *al-farusyā*—knighthood. This means expertise in horsemanship and fighting on horses. In other words, the children of the Muslims were naturally inclined from their creation to fight the enemies of God and to develop fighting skills.
- 25 Umar ibn al-Khattāb (c. 586–590 until Nov. 7, 644) was the second Caliph in Islam from among the four honest Caliphs (*al-Rashidun*). During his reign, Islam made its greatest conquests. Salah ad-Din (c. 1138–93) was the sultan under whose rule Jerusalem was captured and the Crusaders banished at the Battle of Hattin in 1187. Saad ibn Abī Waqqās (595–664) and Khālid ibn al-Walīd (592–642) are the names of famous military leaders in the army of Islam. Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (c. 682–720) was an Umayyad caliph who ruled from 717 to 720. Among Muslims, he is considered one of the greatest men and leaders in history. He is commonly regarded as the fifth caliph *al-Rashidun*. In other words, Azzam is compared to the top military leaders in the first generation of Islam.
- 26 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.19.
- 27 Abdullah Azzam, *al-Asaile wa al-Ajwaba al Jihadia* [Questions and Answers about Holy War] (Peshawar: Maktab al Khidmat al-Mujahideen, n.d.); Azzam, *al-diffa’a an Aradi al-Muslimin Aham Farud al-Aaiyan* [The Defense of Muslim Lands—Most Important of Personal Obligations] (Amman: Maktabat al-risalah al-haditha, 1987); Azzam, *Hamas*.
- 28 Abdullah Azzam, *Emlak al-fikr al- Islami, al-shahid Sayyid Qutb* [The Great Islamic Thinker, the Shahid Sayyid Qutb] (Peshawar: Center of al-Shahid Azzam al-Alami, n.d.).
- 29 Qutb, *Ma’alim fi al-Tariq* (Palestine, 2004), p.9. This new edition, published by Hamas, has an introduction praising him in his role as a teacher and as a good example for generations.
- 30 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.19.
- 31 Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.20–21. Gold also quotes Ayman al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s second in command, who believed that the fall of the Egyptian regime was an objective that would precede the *jihad* in Jerusalem.
- 32 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (Mala’m), May 26, 2009. This article is based on a short film that was produced in 2007 and which was captured during the Cast Lead Operation. In this film, Azzam is described, as are the training and the other activities of the students at the military academy established in his memory, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/hamas_073.htm.
- 33 Sheikh Galal ad-Din Haqqani was one of the holy warriors who fought with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. For example, they both participated in the battle of Jawar. Sheikh Galal ad-Din Haqqani was killed in a

- battle that took place shortly after this one. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp.50–51.
- 34 The Arab expression used here is *hib al-jihad al-ali*, the love of the distinguished *jihad*, “respected.” The expression *al-ali* indicates the highest attribute among all of the attributes. The name *al-ali* is also another name for the creator.
- 35 The *Surat al-Tawba* (the Repentance) verses, especially verse 29, also known as the “Verses of the Sword.”
- 36 *Nasekh* or *Nasikh*. Theological principal method in the *shri’a*. When there is a contradiction between two verses in the Qur’an, the newer revelation overrides the previous revelation. Mark A. Gabriel, *The Unfinished Battle between Islam and the Jews* (Lake Mery, Florida, 2003), pp.46–49.
- 37 *Surat the Repentance* (9), verse 36. The Noble Qur’an site, <http://quran.com/9>.
- 38 *Ibid.*, verse 5.
- 39 *Surat the Cattle (al-An’am)* (6), verse 70. The Noble Qur’an site, <http://quran.com/6>.
- 40 The Arabic word used here is *e’adad*, which means preparation like the Qur’an said in *Surat al-Anfāl [The Spoils of War]*, verse 60. According to Abdullah Azzam’s way of thinking, you cannot make *jihad* without mental and physical preparation. Therefore, for example, training camps were established at Peshawar (in Pakistan close to the Afghanistan border) for the Islamic volunteers before they joined the battles in Afghanistan. Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.113.
- 41 In other words, they were working for their material good in the next world. There all the materialistic goods are saved for them and not finished forever.
- 42 *Masjid al-Haram* is a nickname for the holy mosque. The three important mosques in Islam are in Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, and all three are called by this nickname.
- 43 *Surat the Repentance* (9), verses 19–22. The Noble Qur’an site, <http://quran.com/9>.
- 44 The followers of the Prophet Muhammad, the *sahaba*, are the ones who accepted the religion of Islam at the beginning, while still in Mecca. See Reza Aslan, *No God but God* (Tel Aviv, 2010), pp.87–89. Azzam mentioned these followers and talked about them a lot. Ibrahim al-’Ali, one of Azzam’s students, indicates that according to Azzam, the purpose of the *sahaba* was a request for death. That is why Azzam mentioned them so often. No author, *Takrim al-Shahid Abdullah Azzam* [Special Commemoration for the Martyr Abdullah Azzam] (n.p., 1989), sound tape.
- 45 Sheikh al-Fadil ibn ’Ayad, one of the most well-known religious sages in Islam, who is known for his asceticism. Many stories have been written about his asceticism and his righteousness. He lived during the period of the Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid at the end of the 8th century. He died in the year 187 of the Hijra, 809 AD. See the site of Majlis al-Eqla’a [The Take-off Committee], Feb. 24, 2007, <http://islam.afdhl.com/show.php?id=570>.
- 46 Emphasis added.
- 47 This is very strong criticism by Abdullah Azzam against all of the governments’ religious sages who he says have put the Muslims to sleep and who, in reality, prevent them from protecting their rights. Therefore, for example, Azzam attacks the religious sages of al-Azhar University in Egypt who stood by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt at the time the Camp David Agreement was signed. He called them the “Sellers of the sentences of God at a cheap price.” Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.168. He also comes out against the religious sages who do not agree with his understanding of *jihad* and who rely on a weak *hadith* (Islamic tradition), who see the big *jihad*, the soul *jihad* and not the little *jihad*, the fighting for God, as the most important thing. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

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- 48 There exist two versions—a long one and a short one—of his book *al-diffa'a an Aradi al-Muslimin Aham Farud al-Aaiyan*. In this book he presents organized religious rulings that determine that the requirement of *jihad* is a personal duty (*fard al-'ayn*) in our generation. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp. 90, 126–128. Azzam also quotes Ibn Taymiyyah in his book *Hamas*, pp. 43–44.
- 49 Taqi ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah (1268–1328) was an Islamic religious wise man from the Hanbali school of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). His political writings advocated a return to the roots of ancient Islam and a renewal of the rebirth of Islam. He laid the foundation that gives legitimacy to rising up against a Muslim ruler who does not keep the religion properly. His views molded the attitude towards fundamental *jihad* of Sayyid Qutb, Sa'id Hawwa, Ahmed Yassin, Abdullah Azzam and others. Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (Tel Aviv, 1994), pp. 103–14.
- 50 Emphasis added.
- 51 Reuven Paz, *Suicide and Jihad in Palestinian Radical Islam: The Ideological Aspect* (Tel Aviv, 1998), pp. 7–18. A review of suicide and sacrifice in Muslim tradition.
- 52 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp. 99–100.
- 53 In other words, according to Azzam, these are the only three situations where a ruler is not permitted to ask from his subjects obedience to *jihad*. The first two incidents are related to the ruler and show that he is not worthy of leading the believers. The third case is related to the preparation of the people for *jihad* in order that they will be ready when they enter the battle. Abdullah Azzam, for example, was the *Amir* (the leader) of the Muslim volunteers who answered the call of *jihad* in Afghanistan and he prepared them. Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp. 50–60.
- 54 The person responsible for a large portion of the financial support was Osama bin Laden, who obtained the majority of the monies for the purpose of such activities. This is in addition to the donations raised by Abdullah Azzam from Islamic funds that supported *jihad*. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp. 36–39.
- 55 *Hadith* (no mention of the source). There are a lot of *hadiths* that encourage the believer to give charity and promise punishment to those who do not give. However, if someone fights at *jihad* or gives money for this, he will not be punished. See Immanuel Koplewitz, *Life and Religion in Early Islam: A Selection of Hadiths from al-Bukhari's Sahih* (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2011), pp.159–68.
- 56 In other words, money has a purpose only if it helps to carry out *jihad*. *Jihad* through money. Whoever is able to give and does not give from his money for the purpose of this lofty commandment will receive retribution on his judgment day. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.95.
- 57 This is one of Abdullah Azzam's favorite sentences and it appears many times in his meditations. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.101.
- 58 Emphasis added.
- 59 The propagandist who preaches the word of God is very important according to Azzam, as he is the one who leads the public on the right path. From here we learn of the importance of these propagandists—they need to be talented and honest in order to influence the nation with their words and deeds. Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp.116–20.
- 60 The original text carries no indication of the source of the *hadith*, which is used in both versions.
- 61 *Surat the Women (al-Nisa')* (4), verse 84. The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/4>. Professor Uri Rubin, in his Hebrew translation of the Qur'an, adds side comments. He says that even if you, as a believer, are found alone, get up and fight and win, you are responsible just for yourself. Uri Rubin, *The Qur'an*

- (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 2005), p.78. This approach of a personal war for each private individual man who is fighting alone, even when he has no chance of winning, is accepted in Islam and is based on many judicial sources. Paz, *Suicide and Jihad*, p.11–12.
- 62 *Surat the Spoils of War (al-Anfal)* (8), verse 39. The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/8>. "There will not be any *fitnah*." In other words, there will be no more heresy and wandering after other gods. The intent of this sentence is the way Sheikh Abdullah Azzam explains it.
- 63 *Surat the Cow (al-Baqarah)* (2), verse 251. The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/2>. In other words, war is mostly positive and contributes to the development of the world.
- 64 *Surat the Pilgrimage (al-Hajj)* (22), verse 40. The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/22>.
- 65 *Surat the Spoils of War* (8), verse 7. The Noble Qur'an site, <http://quran.com/8>. This sentence refers to the Battle of Badr (March 13, 624 AD). In this battle, two convoys of men from the Quraysh tribe went out to fight. One was made up of warriors who were ready for battle and the other one was made up of merchants. The text rebukes the believers who wanted to take the unprotected convoy—the group of merchants, who were lacking weapons. God thought otherwise and the believers beat the fighting men of Quraysh.
- 66 Azzam does not mention the poet's name, nor from which poem these lines are taken.
- 67 *Al-muhajiroun*. This is the respected nickname for those same first believers who migrated with the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in the year 622 and who founded the first Muslim community. The character of the first immigrants is respected by all Muslims up until today. *Hadith* based on *asnad* (the chain of acceptance), which relates to the immigrants, is considered a healthy *asnad* with compelling validity. Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.99–102.
- 68 A nickname for Azzam's wife, Samira Attila, the mother of his oldest son Muhammad, who was killed together with him in an assassination that took place on Nov. 24, 1989.
- 69 Umm Muhammad educated her children well. Azzam's grandson, Sheikh Mohammed Anas was among those who took part in the Turkish flotilla to the shores of Gaza in May 2010, and in which nine *jihad* activists who were on the *Mavi Marmara* ship were killed. According to Soumya, the mother of Mohammed Anas and the daughter of Azzam, "[o]ur father taught us about stubbornness and about the noise of the planes in order to serve the Islamic matters and the Palestinian matter." "The *Shahida* Narrative and the Struggle in the Declarations of those Who Took Part in the Flotilla," MEMRI, June 8, 2010, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=2408.
- 70 *Al-Salaf*, usually *al-Salaf al-saleh*, means the straight path of our forefathers. He is one of the early Muslims from one of the first three generations of the proponents of the religion.
- 71 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Mohammad Yunus Khales are the three leaders of the Afghani rebellion against the Soviets. The will was written in 1986, as mentioned previously. Abdullah Azzam was accepted by all of the factions of the Afghanis *majahadin* and worked hard in order to impose peace among them and prevent disputes. It is to his credit that they were successful in uniting and reaching an agreement regarding ruling the country in Feb. 1989, after the Soviet army withdrew. Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.61.
- 72 In the article that Dr. Ahmad Mahmud bin Isa wrote, which was published in a Saudi Arabian daily newspaper, *al-Riyadh*, he indicates that Azzam was the

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- moderating force in the Afghani *jihad* because he knew how to work with all factors. His death caused the split in the Afghani *jihad* as well as an internal war between its leaders. That is why it appears that at least on this topic, his followers did not keep this will. “Testimony According to Islamic figures in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s,” MEMRI, Dec. 8, 2004, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=1170.
- 73 Zvi Yechazkeli, “Documentation of the Eulogy for Osama bin Laden in the al-Aqsa mosque,” News, Channel 10, Mar. 3, 2011.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 *Al-Dastour*, Jordan, Sept. 3, 1984.
- 76 See the article, “The Islamic Site Explains How to be Drafted into al-Qaeda,” MEMRI, Sept. 4, 2007, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=634.
- 77 See, for example, the article in al-Qaeda’s new periodical, *The Voice of Jihad*, which examines the writings of Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri (the leader of al-Qaeda today since the assassination of Bin Laden), MEMRI, Oct. 14, 2003. In the article it is argued, among other things, that the blood of a non-Muslim is permitted like the blood of a dog, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=1463/.
- 78 This is the approach of Maliach and Shay, who argue that Azzam even objected to the ways of the movement. The author finds this to be an unlikely argument, especially after the *intifada* broke out, during which both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement took an active part in the *jihad* activities against Israel. Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.174.
- 79 See a special interview with Sheikh Salah al-Aruri, the founder of the Regiments of Abdullah Azzam in the West Bank: “Leqaa Khass: Maa al-Sheikh Salah al-Aruri, Musasas Kataaeb al-Aqsa bi al-Dafa al-Gharbiya,” *Qassamiyun—Majallat Kataaeb al-Shahid izz ad-adin al-Qassam*, 22, September 2011, pp.16–17.
- 80 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.179.
- 81 Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.79–80.
- 82 Today, Ra’ed Salah and Kamal Khatib live in the Northern Triangle (The “triangle” is a nickname for the Arab villages that are close to the West Bank boundary), in the area of Wadi Ara. The men of the Southern Sector, Abdallah Nimer Darwish and Ibrahim Sarsur, live in Kafar Qasem which is south of the triangle. Both movements are active among the Muslim population in all parts of Israel.
- 83 From the website of the Muslim Brotherhood, July 25, 2010, www.ikhwan.net/forum/showthread.php?132389.
- 84 Al-Jadd ibn Rushd, *Kitab al-Muqaddimat al-Mumahhidat* [Prefatory Principles] (Cairo, 2007), vol. 1, pp.275–6; see also Shlomi Eldar, *Getting to Know Hamas* (Jerusalem, 2012), p.202, which describes *al-Murabatun* of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
- 85 *Surat Family of Imran (al-’Imran)* (3), verse 200. The Noble Qur’an site, <http://quran.com/3>.
- 86 The organizations are: Jaysh al-Islām (the Army of Islam), Jaysh al-Umma (the Army of the Nations), Ahrar al-Watan (Freedom of the Nation), al-Salafiyyah, (a Muslim who emphasizes the *salaf*—ancestors), Saif al-Haq al-Islamiya (the Sword of Islamic Truth) and Jaljalat (thunder). Hamas has been trying to limit the activities of these organizations as part of its policy of managing the conflict. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp.291–92. See also the site of Israel’s General Security Service (Shab’ak), www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/pages/21-06-09.aspx.
- 87 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.172.

- 88 Abdullah Azzam, “Min uome al-Shahada” (Who are the Martyrs?), *Laheeb al-Maaraka* (Peshawar), 86 (Jan. 13, 1990), p.29.
- 89 This article was published with this name on a Middle East magazine site, June 13, 2010, www.mideast.co.il/p-2_a-331/.
- 90 For more details regarding the importance of the *shahid* in Abdullah Azzam’s philosophy, see Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp.102–4.
- 91 This short biography of Hamas activist Muhammad Musbah Hamed appears on *al-Takwa* (Religious Fervor) site, where it was placed on Dec. 27, 2009. This is one of the sites that expresses the viewpoint of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine: <http://altakwa.net/forum/showthread.php?t=52147> (in Arabic).
- 92 The second month in the Islamic yearly calendar. The Muslim calendar begins from the time of the *Hijra*—Muhammad’s trek from Mecca to Medina which began on July 16, 622 AD and 1 Muharram according to the Islamic calendar.
- 93 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides food, employment, education, health services and places to live for Palestinian refugees. As of 2011, according to Palestinian estimates, there were approximately 5.5 million to 7 million refugees. For more details, see www.unrwa.org.
- 94 Khālīd ibn al-Walīd is a famous Muslim militarist who captured Palestine and Syria, among other places, during the years of the first and the second Rashidun Caliphate, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr and Umar ibn Khattab.
- 95 *Salat al-fajr* is the early morning prayer, usually said around 4–5 am.
- 96 This is the date that appears in the Arabic text despite the fact that the attack actually took place in November 1994 when three Israeli soldiers were killed. The will of Hisham Ismail Abd-el Rahman Hamed, a suicide attacker who blew himself up in November 1994 at Nezarim, killing three Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) officers and wounding two Israelis and four Palestinians, reflects the state of mind of the *shahid* at the time of the attack. He wrote:
Dear family and friends! I write this will with tears in my eyes and sadness in my heart. I want to tell you that I am leaving and ask for your forgiveness because I decided to see Allah today and this meeting is by all means more important than staying alive on this earth.
Boaz Ganon, “Suicide Attacks: An Overview/Analysis,” *Defense Journal*, May 2002, www.defencejournal.com/2002/may/attacks.htm.
- 97 The election mentioned here is the one held in January 2006 in which Hamas won. The first election to the Palestinian Council took place in 1996 and Hamas boycotted that election. In the election of 2006, Hamas won 76 seats out of 132. See Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.95–96.
- 98 Said Seyam (1959–Jan. 15, 2009) was the founder of the Operational Force of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a resident of the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood in Gaza and the son of a refugee family from the village of al-Jura (now part of Ashkelon). During his years in Hamas, he was responsible for the establishment of the Hamas radio station, Sawt al-Aqsa (The Voice of al-Aqsa), and also its television station which operates under the same name. After the election in Jan. 2006, he served as minister of the interior and national security in the Hamas government. In this position he initiated that the security forces would be loyal to Hamas alone, and the martyr described here is one of his recruits. On Jan. 15, 2009, he was assassinated together with his brother, Iyad Seyam, who was also a Hamas leader, along with Saleh abu Sharkh, the head of the security organization of Hamas. See Amir Buhbut and Amit Cohen, “The Gaza Strip Assassinate the Minister of the Interior of Hamas Said Seyam,” *Nrg News*, Jan. 15, 2009, www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/840/900.html?hp=1&loc=1&tmp=1779.

- 99 After Fatah was defeated in the Gaza Strip by Hamas, the whole area was taken over by Hamas. As a result of the takeover, the Palestinian police in the Gaza Strip were replaced with men from Hamas. This revolution, which is also called a civil war, lasted from June 7–13, 2007. During these six days, the strongholds of Fatah were captured, including the presidential campus of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.107–9.
- 100 The payment that righteous men receive in heaven is described as follows: “The smallest prize of those who win a place in heaven is a dwelling place filled with 80,000 servants and 72 virgins and on top of each one is a skullcap adorned with pearls, aquamarine and rubies, wide, like the distance between the suburbs of Damascus and Sana’a.” Ephraim Herrera and Gideon M. Kressel, *Jihad: Fundamentalist and Fundamentalism* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, and Kinneret: Zmora-Bitan Publishing House, 2009), p.51.
- 101 It is not insignificant that there is an emphasis that the martyr was busy saying verses from *Surat al-Imran* in the Qur’an, as in this *sura* is written: “If a wound should touch you—there has already touched the [opposing] people a wound similar to it. And these days [of varying conditions] we alternate among the people so that Allah may make evident those who believe and [may] take to Himself from among you martyrs—and Allah does not like the wrongdoers—And that Allah may purify the believers [through trials] and destroy the disbelievers. Or do you think that you will enter Paradise while Allah has not yet made evident those of you who fight in His cause and made evident those who are steadfast?” (*al-Imran* (3), verses 140–142, the Noble Quran site, <http://quran.com/3>). This appears in an al-Jamia al-Islamiya pamphlet, *Rawah wa Mawaqef* (The Islamic Union, Positions and Values) (n.p., n.d.), p.10. The union has been declared illegal and acts throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a student union of Islamic Jihad in Palestine. Union publicity, like this pamphlet, preaches *jihad* in Palestine against the Zionist conqueror.
- 102 Yahya Abd-al-Latif Ayyash (1966–96) was born in Rafat in Samaria. He learned engineering at Bir-Ziet University. In the 1990s, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and specialized mainly in the creation of improvised bombs. He was one of the founders of Izz al-Din al-Qassam in the West Bank. At the beginning of the 1990s, he planned many terrorist actions, in which over 100 people were killed. In the end, he was assassinated in his home in Beit Lahia by a booby-trapped cellular phone which was given to him by someone close to him. Over 100,000 people participated in his funeral in the Gaza Strip. He is considered a good example and a symbol in Palestinian society, especially among Hamas members, but not only them, and the government compound in Ramallah is named after him. Salah Shahada (1953–2002) was born in the Gaza Strip. He was one of the founders of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade, the military arm of Hamas. As part of his activities, he was responsible for many terrorist attacks, among them the kidnapping of the soldiers Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon on February 16, 1989, during the first *intifada*. During al-Aqsa *intifada*, he began to give orders to the men of Hamas in the West Bank and he led the Hamas attacks against Israel. On July 22, 2002, he was assassinated together with his assistant by Israel after a bomb was planted in his house. An additional 14 people were killed, among them members of his family. Hamas established a military academy in his name in the Gaza Strip. According to a former top man in the secret service, it is possible that he cooperated with Israel during the time that he sat in prison. Arik Weiss, “A Senior Person in the Secret Service: Shahada was a Collaborator,” Nrg News, Jan. 22, 2009, www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/843/723.html?hp=0&loc=103&tmp=912.
- 103 See Professor Gideon M. Kressel’s introduction which analyzes the holiness of life and the holiness of the deaths of the martyrs in Islam, in Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.20–23.

- 104 Richard Goldstone, "Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," UN Human Rights Council, Sep. 15, 2009, pp.447–60.
- 105 Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.32, 46–49. Azzam quotes the full text of the *fatwah* from the Islamic Conference that took place on Jan. 26, 1935, and which was headed by the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Hajj Muhammed Amin al-Hussayni, and was in the presence of all the religious sages of Palestine and the neighboring Arab states. Also the *fatwah* of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), one of the leading thinkers of the philosophy of *salafiya* and Hajj Muhammed Amin al-Hussayni and Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who were his students. Menahem Milson, "Reformers against Islamists in the Arab World Today," MEMRI, Sept. 1, 2004, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?ID=107345_memri&lang=he&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=1134.

2 Factions of the Muslim Brotherhood

Allah is our goal. The Prophet is our leader. The *Qur'an* is our law. *Jihad* is our way. Death in the way of Allah is our exalted hope.

Slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood¹

A The uniqueness of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)

The Islamic Resistance Movement, Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-'Islāmiyyah, or Hamas, stands out from the other various factions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. It was founded in December 1987, at the beginning of the first *intifada*. According to other opinions, however, it already existed in 1986.

Hamas has very deep roots. In the eyes of the movement, these roots were already intertwined with those of the Muslim Brotherhood when, in the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood began to act in Palestine under the guidance of Hassan al-Banna.² Azzam's book on the roots of the movement begins with a description of the establishment of the Islamic Movement in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 and with the movement's ties to Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Hussayni and Izz al-Din al-Qassam in the 1930s and 1940s. It is Hamas and not the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is the real movement that follows in the footsteps of the Palestinian Mufti Hajj Amin al-Hussayni and Izz al-Din al-Qassam.³

The Hamas organization sees itself as a widespread Palestinian nationalistic movement, one worthy of leading the Palestinian people to independence and to the total liberation of its land. As a movement aspiring to rule the entire Palestinian public, Hamas has developed and established local Islamic institutions that provide services for the whole population. Hamas' system is based on the magnificent Islamic tradition of resistance which began during the period of the British Mandate (with Izz al-Din al-Qassam), and on its widespread social activities which were organized by al-Mujama al-Islami in the 1970s and influence the hearts towards Islam in Palestinian society.⁴ These religious and educational activities and the influence of hearts also won limited cooperation with the Israeli regime, which saw the organization as a counterweight to the activities of the PLO.⁵

Unlike the other *jihad* organizations which view themselves as pioneers and do not invest a lot of energy and resources in “civilian” issues that do not directly affect the struggle with Israel, Hamas theology rejects this way of thinking. The Muslim Brotherhood traditionally supports *dawah*, the building of mosques, widespread diverse activities and the strengthening of faith until *jihad*, a long-term goal, is reached. This is the way that the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Hussayni viewed these activities, up until the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–39. It was also Hamas’ point of view up until the first *intifada*, the *Intifadat al-Jihad*, which began in December 1987. Up until that time, the organization kept busy with the preparation of hearts and the preparation of society for *jihad*. In the eyes of the movement, it was the first *intifada* that ripened the moment for the *jihad* of the Muslim Brotherhood to erupt.⁶

There are many important reasons that led the movement to understand that the time was ripe for a visible armed struggle. The main reason was the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 which greatly affected all of the activities of the Islamic Movement everywhere. It was the first time that the Islamic Movement had become the ruling party and created an Islamic state.⁷

The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was a period of blossoming for the Islamic movements all over Palestine and Greater Israel.⁸ The Islamic Movement in Israel was founded in the year 1979 by Abdullah Nimer Darwish who established the Usrat al-Jihad (the Jihad Family), and by Sheikh Asa’ad Byud al-Tamimi who established the Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis organization. In 1983, the secret military arm of the Islam Brotherhood, al-Mujahideen, was established in the Gaza Strip. The leader of the organization was the aforementioned Sheikh Salah Shahada. This military arm is considered the basis of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas. In 1979, Islamic Jihad in Palestine was also founded and, at the beginning of the 1980s, it began to carry out its activities. It was influenced mainly by the Egyptian *jihad* organization. In this period, the Sarya al-Jihad, the military company of the *jihad* that was tied to the Fatah movement, also began its activities.

In 1984, a group of activists under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, which included Salah Shahada, was imprisoned. The activities of the Islamic Jihad movement challenged the Muslim Brotherhood. Yassin thought that the time was right to move on to the next stage. The movement began to hoard weapons and prepare for a military confrontation, but it was exposed by the General Security Services and its activists were arrested. They were later freed in the framework of a prisoner exchange with the Ahmed Jibril organization in 1985.⁹

After his release from prison, Sheikh Yassin was very careful about his activities until the first *intifada* broke out on December 9, 1987.¹⁰ On August 18, 1988, the Hamas Charter was publicized. This charter was filled with anti-Jewish motifs such as the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and unequivocal statements that only Islam is the path toward victory over Israel. The charter

also includes all the elements that appear in the will of Abdullah Azzam as described in Chapter 1.

In those days of the first *intifada* the PLO was beginning to sound more moderate after the publicity surrounding Faisal Abdel Qader al-Husseini's document and discussions of peace with Israel.¹¹ The Hamas Charter then appeared which explained that there was nothing to talk about with the Jews and the rest of the infidels. "Israel will rise up and continue to exist until Islam destroys her like [Islam] destroyed that which preceded it [usually meaning the Crusaders]."¹²

In Hamas' first proclamation during the *intifada*, the following words were said:

Hey! *al-Murabitun* [the defenders] of Palestine, the pure and the loved land. Hey! All ye residents, men and women. Hey! Children of ours. Here are the Jews, the brothers of apes, the murderers of the prophets, the blood suckers, the war agitators—murdering you, depriving you of your life after they have stolen the Motherland and your home. Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream:

If so, how can we overcome them? Here the men of Hamas draft the *takbir* [the phrase *Allāhu akbar*—Allah is greater]: Faith in the strength of God.

Therefore, they proclaimed in their faces, "*Allāhu akbar, Allāhu akbar*" from their army, "*Allāhu akbar*" from their planes and from their weapons. Take into account that when you are fighting with them to ask one of two favors: The martyr's death or victory over them and their rout.¹³

In the eyes of Hamas, the first *intifada* lasted up until 2000, while the second *intifada* began in September 2000 and continues today. We learn this from a short film that appears in the Hamas educational curriculum. The period of the agreements between September 1993 until July 2000 is considered, in the eyes of the movement, a cynical but successful attempt by Israel to divide Palestinian society and to cause a *fitna*—a war between brothers.¹⁴ Hamas has never forgiven the PLO for its recognition of Israel and its cooperation on security issues with Israel during the period of the agreements and even for a short time afterwards. According to Hamas, in order for the PLO to return and become a leading factor in Palestinian society, it must retract its recognition of Israel and must re-adopt the armed struggle approach while redefining the supreme aim—the liberation of all of Palestine, from the river to the sea.¹⁵

When al-Aqsa *intifada* broke out on September 28, 2000, it led to a period of unification between all the Palestinian organizations. Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PLO worked together against the Zionist enemy in both military and propaganda activities. The activists of the military arm of Islamic Jihad and the Jerusalem companies (Saraya al-Quds) acted hand in hand with the military arm of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The Islamic factions, which were previously outwardly persecuted by the Palestinian Authority, now worked

together in cooperation with the Kataa'ib Shahada' al-'Aqsa (al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), the new military arm affiliated with Fatah or with Kataa'ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). During this stage of the second *intifada*, it appeared that the differences of opinion were forgotten, but this is not the case. On March 22, 2004, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was assassinated as he exited al-Mujama al-Islamiya mosque after early morning prayers. Like Abdullah Azzam in his time and Bin Laden later, Sheikh Yassin also "won" the honor of dying with relatives, his nephew and his daughter's husband, who were with him at the time: The paralyzed sheikh turned into a symbol and example together with all the Arab and Islamic symbols of the holy warriors.¹⁶

In January 2006, Hamas participated in the Palestinian Authority elections. This participation showed that the party was ready, at least legally, to accept the authority of the Palestinian Authority and the law of the Palestinian electorate. However, something different occurred. Hamas' success in the 2006 elections proved that the party was willing to enter into a position of leadership and compete against the PLO for the leadership of the entire Palestinian nation. Hamas built a strategic program to deal with American-Israeli pressure. Hamas wanted the United Nations (UN) and Islamic countries like Qatar and Turkey to be more involved in what was happening in Palestine. The elections opened up another stage for diplomacy against Israel.¹⁷

When Hamas was not allowed to manage the Palestinian Authority and its government as it wished, it carried out a revolution in Gaza in June 2007 which continues to the present day. Hamas now rules the Gaza Strip without interference.

The first unity agreement between Hamas and the PLO was signed in April 2011. It does not contain any real policy changes as the Hamas movement is still unwilling to recognize Israel and coordinate security with it.¹⁸

Has there been any change at all in the Hamas platform or in its world outlook of no compromise with Israel since its formation during the first *intifada*? Did the responsibility that Hamas received as a result of the election in the Palestinian Authority effect any changes in Hamas foreign policy towards Israel?

Abdallah Frangi, who holds the foreign affairs portfolio in Fatah and who was the most senior man in Fatah in the Gaza Strip until the 2007 revolution, was optimistic after the Hamas election victory. In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, in answer to the question if the participation of Hamas in the elections could be explained as recognition of the State of Israel, he said:

This [participation in the elections] is *de facto* recognition, despite the fact that Hamas does not say this explicitly. The goal of these documents is to force Hamas to assume political responsibility for itself.

Hamas' election victory and a Hamas government at the expense of the Palestinian Authority are due to the agreements that the PLO signed with

Israel. It was his opinion that Hamas and the PLO would reach a compromise. In his words:

A disagreement between Hamas and Fatah is not in the interest of *jihad* in Islam. The sides clearly declared that they were interested in an agreement that would include all of the parties. But they [Hamas] have achievements as it relates to the agreement in Israel. The rejection of the agreement with Israel will not have a great affect on Palestinian society.¹⁹

However, Frangi's optimism did not last. The unity government between the PLO and Hamas that was established after the election fell apart as a result of the Hamas revolution in Gaza. It took only six days (in June 2007) for the Hamas fighters to control all of the Gaza Strip. The PLO men who were caught alive received an "educational" Islamic punishment: They received typical Hamas justice for those who cooperate with the Jews, being led through the streets of Gaza, naked, and afterwards, taken out to the desert to be killed. Some of them met a quick death, falling out of or being thrown from a 15-storey building. Some 100 PLO men were killed and about 200 were injured.²⁰ A different version reports that there were 161 Palestinian dead and 700 injured.²¹

Through this step, Hamas succeeded in achieving all that it had objected to at Oslo: A division of the captured 1967 areas between two separate political entities hostile to one another—a Fatah state and a Hamas state—distancing the solution of two states. Was this Hamas' intention when it took control over the Gaza Strip? Hamas knew that Israel could not sign an agreement when there were two dwarf Palestinian states already in existence—one in the Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank.

Immediately after the January 2006 elections, the Quartet, which included Russia, the United States, Europe and the UN, placed conditions on Hamas if it wanted to receive international recognition. These conditions included the official recognition of the State of Israel, a clear rejection of violence and a willingness to carry out negotiations in the framework of a peace process. Hamas refused.²²

The Hamas refusal can be seen as a natural progression of its ideology based upon its radical view against the Jews as appearing in the Hamas Charter and from a summary of the Hamas history that has been discussed here.²³ Any attempt to justify Hamas' successful revolution as a reaction to the difficult economic situation in Gaza is absurd.²⁴

On each Palestinian day of memorial, such as the day that the Balfour Declaration was issued (November 2), the day the State of Israel was established (May 15), or the anniversary of the decision to partition Palestine (November 29), Hamas takes pains to explain its allegiance to only one political solution in all of Palestine: That Palestine cannot be divided in any way, shape or form.

Take as an example the anniversary of the 63rd year of the UN Resolution on the partition of Palestine (Resolution 181 from November 29, 1947):

Palestine, from the sea to the river, belongs only to the Palestinian nation. This decision [Resolution 181] is cancelled legally and politically. Palestine, from the sea to the river, is the private property of the Palestinian nation and an inseparable part of the Arab homeland and the Islamic nation. One must adhere to the rights of the Palestinians which include full return of all of the Palestinians to all of the Palestinian land.²⁵

Mosab Hassan Yousef, the son of the leader of Hamas, Sheikh Hassan Yousef, was raised in an extremely religious Islamic household. Over the years, the son served as a senior collaborator of the Israeli General Security Services (Shabak) in Judea and Samaria. In this position he acquired the nickname “The Green Prince.” “Prince” symbolizes his being one of the top leaders of Hamas and “green” symbolizes the color of Islam.²⁶

Jihad is the epitome of the aspirations of Hamas and in it the organization sees its mission. Mosab expressed this well in his description of the ladder of faith for the Muslim believer. On the bottom rung of the ladder are the ordinary people, those who believe in Islam but are not active in the political arena. At the top of the ladder are the fundamentalists, the *jihad* fighters, the murderers of women and children in the name of the glory of *Allah*. In the middle are the “moderns.” According to Mosab, these “moderns” are considered harmless but from them grow the fundamentalists—*jihad* activists in the name of God.²⁷ Islam is the religion of *jihad* and sacrifice. There is no such thing as moderation. He is not the only one who flees from Islamic society and has given such a description.²⁸

Despite all this, one must remember that in the end, Hamas sees itself as a party in power which should represent a wider interest in addition to being a *jihadist* party. Historically, some Hamas supporters actually took part in the January 20, 1996 election under different independent parties such as al-Itahad al-Watani al-Falastini (the Islamic National Union, with Hamas dissident members like Mahmud al-Habash), which did not explicitly associate themselves with Hamas.²⁹ This was in order to avoid direct participation which would have required supporting the Oslo Agreements that the party found not only unfortunate from its point of view, but to which it strongly objected.

Why did Hamas agree to participate officially in the election of 2006 but refuse to do so in 1996? The answer to this is that in the eyes of Hamas, by 2006 there was a distinct possibility that it could win the election, thereby enabling it to impose other conditions on the discussions with Israel.

The Hamas approach is to carry out a struggle with Israel with ceasefires from time to time but without arriving at a final lasting solution. The battle with Israel is a fight for awareness, a sort of competition on the amount of strength of decisiveness and depth of will. This battle is based on religion.

From Sheikh Hassan al-Banna to Ahmad Yassin and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, there cannot be any permanent compromise in Palestine. According to Hamas, it is clear that in the end, slowly and patiently (*al-saber*—patience until victory) and Islam will win.³⁰

B Translation of the “summary of the history of Hamas”

On September 15, 2006, approximately eight months after winning the election, the Hamas movement revealed its political platform, including an historical review of its activities and principles. There are 11 paragraphs in this review which, one by one, detail the ideological platform of the movement and its outlook from an historical perspective. The review is displayed proudly on the movement’s website.³¹

Unlike the Hamas Charter, which was fully translated into many different languages, this author has yet to see a translation of the review. Due to its importance, this book has included a full translation of the historical review, as follows.

1 All about the Hamas organization

Hamas is an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement. [Hamas] is a nationalist resistance movement of the people which provides the right conditions to implement the freeing of the Palestine nation. [This condition] will save [the nation] from evil and lead to the emancipation of our land from the exploitative military occupation. [Hamas] obstructs the Zionistic plan which has been approved by the powers of new colonialism.

The Hamas movement is a *jihad* movement in the broadest sense of the concept of *jihad*. The movement is a part of the Islamic revival and it believes that this revival is the primary base [that will lead] to the emancipation of Palestine from the river to the sea. It is a populist movement that gives practical expression to the populist stream of thought on the efforts needed to deeply root the Palestinian people and the Islamic nation [into Palestinian soil]. [The Palestinian nation] sees, in the vision and in the premise of Islam, a stable base [of action] against the enemy. [The Islamic vision] carries original assumptions and counter-plans to all the plans [of the Zionist enemy] that is fighting against the [Islamic] nation. The Hamas movement gathers in all of the believers to its values who are ready and able to bear the results of the conflict and the struggle and the confrontation with the Zionistic plan.

2 The organization’s symbol³²

The organization’s symbol includes a picture of the mosque of the Dome of the Rock [Qubbat al-Sakhrah], on top of which rests a small map of Palestine. In the picture of the Dome [of the Rock] two Palestinian flags fly, each of them half an arc. They are presented as standing and hugging the Dome of

the Rock. On the right-hand flag appears the testimony, “There is no God but Allah.” On the left-hand side [a continuation] of the verse is written: “And Muhammad the messenger of Allah.” On the bottom, [the flags] are hugging the Dome. There are two crossed swords which split the base of the Dome [of the Rock] and then are separated from each other. In this way, [the swords] unite the base of the Dome of the Rock. [These swords are also displayed in the Muslim Brotherhood Symbol.]

Under the picture [of the movement’s symbol], the word Palestine is written. On the ribbon beneath this word, under the picture, is written the phrase: “The Islamic Resistance Movement— Hamas.”

This picture symbolizes, through the use of the mosque and the verse, that there is no God except for Allah and Muhammad is his messenger. This illustrates the Islamic nature of the [Palestinian] problem. The picture symbolizes the ideological depth of the vision [of Hamas]. The inclusion of the map emphasizes the steadfast Hamas position on how the conflict will be resolved—[the freeing] of all Palestine, according to Mandate borders, out from under the occupier’s yoke. The movement refuses to narrow the problem down to just the areas captured in 1967.

The two swords symbolize strength and nobility as they have always been understood in Arab consciousness. The Hamas movement, which is involved in the conflict with the [Zionistic] occupier, does not consider any value except for the value of [Arab] nobility and respect. The movement gathers its strength against its concrete enemy without any compromise or deviation [from its values].³³

3 The development process of the Palestinian question

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas—distributed the announcement of its founding on the 15th day of the month of Kanon al-Awal/ December 1987.³⁴ However, the movement’s roots appeared in the 1940s. The movement is a branch of the Islamic Brotherhood movement.³⁵ Before the [establishment of Hamas] was announced, the Muslim Brotherhood used other names which reflected its political views in relationship to the Palestinian problem, for example al-Murabitun ‘ala Ard al-Isra’ [The Defenders of the Land of the Night March]³⁶ and Harakat al-Kifah al-Islami [The Islamic Struggle Movement] and others.

3.1 Factors for the growth [of the organization]

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas—was established due to the influence that various activities and factors had on the Palestinian nation since the first *nakba* [catastrophe] of 1948. Likewise, the 1967 defeat [also contributed to it] in a special way. There are two main clauses that influenced the factors that affected the movement’s development and they are: The political development of the Palestinian question and where this

problem led, up until the end of 1987; and the development of the Islamic Revival [al-Sahwa al-Islamiya] Movement in Palestine and the achievements of [the revival of Islam] which reached them during the 1980s.

3.1.1 THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM

The Palestinian nation sacrifices itself on the issue of Palestine because [for it], this issue is one of life and death. It is an issue of a cultural war between the Arabs and the Muslims on one hand and the Zionists on the other. Already, immediately after the *nakba*, the refugee problem began. [So, too,] the problem of expulsion due to the aggression and the concession of two thirds of [Mandatory] Palestine after the 1967 defeat. [This defeat] pushed the Palestinian nation to grab the reins of the [Palestinian] issue into its hands as shown by the Palestine Liberation Organization and the National Opposition [military] organizations.

However, the Palestinian revolutionary program, which was assembled and consolidated by the PLO during the 1980s, presented a chain of withdrawals on the outside and on the inside which led to weakness and [only] showed instability. During the 1970s, it was impossible to see the many signs that would lead the PLO to accept compromise solutions at the expense of the authentic rights of our people and our nation—[compromise solutions] that negate the sworn promise in the Palestinian National Charter [the last Palestinian Charter of the PLO from 1968]. These signs [of moderation] began only after the Palestinians were abandoned which became clear after the signing of the Camp David Agreements and the Zionistic invasion into southern Lebanon, which also included a siege on Beirut in 1982.

This siege [on Beirut] was the greatest insult to the [Islamic] nation since the 1967 War. Despite the historic steadfastness [*al-sumud*] by the internal Palestinian opposition which successfully held on for three months throughout the siege on an Arab capital, shamefully, no real Arabian factor reacted [or became involved] during this siege. A result of the siege was that the PLO was weakened and it left Lebanon. Thereafter, the streams inside the organization that called for an agreement with the [Zionist] enemy were strengthened.³⁷

The compromise agreement and the concessions included the abandonment of basic [Palestinian] stands in the conflict with the Zionistic plan. The two major concessions were:

- 1 Recognition of the Zionist entity and its right to exist on the land of Palestine.
- 2 A concession by the Zionists on a part of Palestine but not on most of the area.

Under these circumstances, these are the conditions reached by the Palestine Liberation Organization. This is how the strategy of armed struggle [which the organization previously supported] collapsed. In this fashion, Arab and international attention to the Palestinian question and [Palestinian] goals was diminished. The majority of the Arab states adopted and invested the bulk of their strength in order [for the Palestinians] to win acceptance as a recognized state. The Arab states either did this on purpose [to legitimize Israel] or not on purpose [but in order to help the Palestinians]. That is how [political] support was created for the idea of a [Palestinian] state. These [ideas] were particularly expressed after the adoption of the decision to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian nation at the Arab League meeting held in 1974 at the Rabat Summit Conference.

After the Iraq–Iran war broke out, the Palestinian question became insignificant [in] Arab and international [eyes]. At the same time [of the Arab–Iraq War], Zionist policy turned tougher and firmer [towards the Palestinians] in coordination with the United States of America which, in 1981, signed a strategic cooperation agreement. [The United States] also supported the [Israeli] declaration of the annexation [of the area] of the captured Syrian Golan Heights [by Israel] and the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

The Arab states were stuck with their false illusions, [and left only] with the hope [that they could] carry out the results of the vision of the American government.³⁸ In the meantime, Zionist extremism developed and became dominant, mainly in the rightist parties that influenced the policy and management of the [Zionist] entity. The policy of deterrence that was adopted by the Zionist entity as a result of the treaties that it signed [with the United States and other additional countries] is a policy that cannot be denied. As a result, [Israel], in its arrogance, carried out a death operation on the Tunisian seashore and, in October 1985, indiscriminately blew up the military headquarters of the PLO. These [Israeli] activities were carried out with reliance on and full encouragement on the part of the American government which took it upon itself to raise false hopes for the Arabs and lead them to believe that they could carry out the desires of the various [Arab] summit conferences!

On the international level, the United States promoted broad giant steps against the Soviet Union in order to force its will and its control not only in a specific area but on the whole world. This was at a time when the world's troubles were growing worse day by day. So, too, were the problems that existed inside the Soviet Bloc which demanded that the United States address its internal problems [those inside the Soviet Bloc countries]. These problems stemmed from the severe centralization of the Soviet administration. The withdrawal [of the Soviet Union] from the conflicts in the area left the [world] arena to the Americans. Thus, the role of the Soviet Union in the region came to an end in a way that was unexpected by

the Arab states and by most of the Palestinian factions. That is how the rights and the political stand in the conflict [with the Zionists] were damaged.

3.1.2 THE CENTER OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL

Palestine is a witness to the widespread, clear and tangible development of its growth and its exposure to the Islamic revival, just like in the other Arab states—a development that has led to the growth of the Islamic movement and the expansion of its ideology and organization; a development that applies to the areas of Palestine occupied since 1948 and also to the Palestinian centers in the diaspora. That is how the Islamic stream in Palestine was created. This stream faces two major challenges [that try] to weaken it and they are:

First: The reprioritization by the Arab states of the Palestinian question to the very lowest priority level.

Second: The retreat of the Palestinian revolution in its competition with the Zionist project. Therefore, [the Palestinian revolution] began to adopt a position of co-existence with [the Zionist entity] and now focuses on its disagreements with [the Zionists] on the conditions of this co-existence.

Because these two setbacks [described above] continue, there is an accumulation of negative influences flowing from the depressing policy of the Zionist occupier and tyrant against the Palestinian people. This has led to the ripening of the idea of resistance among the Palestinian people inside Palestine and outside it. It was understood that there was no alternative to the Islamic Palestinian program of *jihad*. This plan began with the establishment of the [organization] the *jihad* family [Usrat al-Jihad] in 1981 and the group of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 1983 [and] other [groups].³⁹

At the end of 1987, the new conditions ripened enough to be presented as a new plan that would challenge the Zionist plan and its expansion. The new [Islamic] plan is based on a new foundation which stands in harmony with the internal and external changes [that have taken place in Islamic society].

Thus, the Islamic Resistance Movement— Hamas—was founded as the practical expression of these [developmental] factors.⁴⁰

That is how the Islamic Resistance Movement— Hamas—was created, a natural reaction to the [difficult] circumstances in which the Palestinian nation found itself; a reaction to the just problem according to which it is necessary to end the Zionist occupation of Palestinian lands that has existed since 1967.

Public opinion took a part [in the plan] of creating a Palestinian national consciousness. This consciousness is what characterizes the Palestinian Islamic stream [as it is expressed] in the crystallization of the Islamic

Resistance Movement plan—a plan whose roots began at meetings [held] during the 1980s. That is how the various departments of the resistance organization were created. Thus, for example, a public movement for the Islamic stream was created in 1986 which prepared the public in a practical manner on the way to struggle against the Zionist occupation.⁴¹

The Palestinian youth, together with students from al-Najah University and Bir Zeit University in the West Bank and the Islamic University in the Gaza Strip, took part in the riots against the occupation authorities. These student riots ripened the conditions needed to draft the Palestinian public [into] opposing the [Zionistic] occupation—particularly as a result of the [Zionist] occupation's criminal policy and their increasingly oppressive methods which troubled the conscience of the [Palestinian] public. [As a result,] the opposition desired [because of this] to abuse its soul in the name of opposition to the [Zionistic occupation].

3.2 The development of the dispute

This is how the criminal attack by a Zionist truck driver was carried out on 6 Kanon al-Awal/December 1987 against a small car transporting Arab workers who died sanctifying God's name. [In this incident] four Palestinian men, residents of the Jabalyah refugee camp, were killed. That is how a new stage of *jihad* for our Palestinian nation was declared. As a reaction, a general draft [of our Palestinian people] was called. This first proclamation of the Islamic Resistance Movement—*Hamás*—was announced on December 15, 1987. The proclamation indicates the beginning of a new stage of *jihad* for the Palestinian nation against the nightmare of Zionist occupation. This is the phase where the Islamic stream leading the opposition [to the occupation] is represented.

The conspicuousness of the *Hamás* movement worried the Zionist enemy and put the Zionistic military intelligence on alert which then used all its resources to keep track of the movement and its leadership. As a result, occupation authorities began to pay attention to the response of the [Palestinian] public to the strikes [which were announced by the movement]. They also began to pay attention to the rest of the opposition activities carried out by the movement since its inception which called out [to the public], [for example,] the publication of the movement's charter. Immediately afterwards, on the very same day [that the charter was published], a series of arrests were made on a group of the movement's commanders and their supporters.⁴²

In this war campaign against it, in May 1989, [*Hamás*], the movement, suffered from the largest amount of detentions. This campaign included the arrest of the founder, Sheikh al-Mujahid [holy warrior] Ahmed Yassin.

Later on, *Hamás* developed different methods which [also] included the imprisonment of Zionist soldiers.⁴³ In the winter of 1989, [the movement]

invented the “war of knives” against the occupation soldiers. In 1990, an additional campaign of arrests began against movement [members]. This was in December 1990. The occupation regime deported four of the movement’s symbols and leaders. This was explicitly considered as a negation [of the legal rights] of the movement’s members. Accusations were brought against them for crimes on which they were judged and found guilty.

The movement entered into a new stage when, at the end of 1991, it announced the establishment of its military arm, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Martyr Brigades.⁴⁴ The new [military] department began to gain power by carrying out activities against the occupation soldiers and its settlers. In December 1992, the movement’s fighters kidnapped the soldier Nissim Toledano. As a reaction to the kidnapping, the Zionist authorities [of the occupation] began a wild campaign of arrests against the members and the commanders of the movement. In addition, the former prime minister of the enemy, Yitzchak Rabin, decided to expel the symbols of our [Palestinian] people as a first precedent of a group expulsion, as a punishment to the Hamas movement.⁴⁵

The expellees from the two movements, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, presented an honorable example of fighters who remained stubbornly on their land, no matter what the price. [Prime Minister] Rabin was forced to allow them to return after a period of only one year after their expulsion. [During that year] they lived in a temporary camp under the sky in Marj al-Zuhour in southern Lebanon.⁴⁶

The expulsion did not bring the activities of the Hamas movement or the activities of the military department of the movement to a halt. The year 1993 saw the highest recorded average amount of altercations between the Palestinian people and the soldiers of the Zionist occupation. This is in addition to the military attacks against the soldiers of the occupation and the settlers. As a result of this wave of national opposition, the enemy placed a tight curfew on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in an attempt to harness the rise of the opposition.⁴⁷

In February 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish terrorist settler, dared to carry out a crime against the worshippers at the Ibrahimi mosque [the Tomb of the Patriarchs] in Hebron. This [action] led to the sacrifice and the sanctification of God’s name [*ishtishad*] of over 30 Palestinians and to the wounding of an additional 100 from the bullets of the Jewish terror. The size of the crime and its influence pushed the Hamas movement to announce an all-out war against the Jewish occupation and a widening of the area of the activities [of the movement] against any Israeli living on Arab lands in Palestine. This was in order to force the Zionists to stop their crimes against the unprotected Palestinian residents.⁴⁸

Today, the Hamas movement stands as the primary force acting against the Zionist plan. Despite the total war campaign by the [Zionist] enemy from which the movement suffers, that has not stopped it from becoming

the main force protecting the Palestinian dream and its fruition. The movement grants the Palestinian people, all of the people of the Islamic nation and all those born *free* throughout the world, faith in the possibility [of victory] in stopping the Zionist project—a project that since the beginning of the 1990s is in its golden age. [Hamas] offers hope and the possibility of destroying and defeating [the Zionist project], with the help of God.

4 The dispute with the Zionists according to Islamic thought

The Hamas movement believes that the dispute with the Zionists in Palestine is an existential one. It is a critical dispute between [various] cultures which is impossible to resolve except by the destruction of the cause. [The cause] is the Zionistic settlement in Palestine which exploits its land and expels and uproots its residents [of the land].

The Hamas movement is sure that the Hebrew state's plans are totally threatening [to the Palestinian people]. We are not talking about just a [local] entity but [an entity] with [territorial] area desires. [Zionism] is a plan complementary to the covetousness of the new colonial powers which wish to control the fate of the [Islamic] nation and its wealth. They achieve this by preventing any organization whatsoever [inside the Islamic nation] and by strengthening the divisions between their policies. [Their goal] is to separate the Islamic nation from its cultural roots and strengthen their economic, political and military control and even to impose their own ideology.⁴⁹

The Hebrew state is an effective way to break up the geographic continuity between the central Arab states. It is a [colonial] tool leading to the diminution of the resources of the [Islamic] nation and its efforts. [Israel] is the spearhead whose purpose is to strike down everything connected with the [Islamic] rebirth plan.

Palestine is the arena for the central confrontation with the [Zionist] project and it is considered the basis for the momentum [a bridgehead] and a stable station [of the Zionistic and colonial forces]. The Zionistic plan aims to include all the Islamic states [that are exposed] to the danger and to their teasing. The Hamas movement believes that from the day it was created, Zionism has been a dangerous threat to all the Arab states and a strategic danger challenge to all the Muslim states. The 1990s led to a [serious] change which demonstrates the attempts to enlarge this danger that does not stop at the borders [of Palestine].

Hamas believes that the best way to manage the dispute with the Zionist enemy is [through] the centralization of the abilities of the Palestinian people [against the enemy]. It is necessary to carry the flag of *jihad* and the struggle against the Zionist presence in Palestine by any means possible. [One should] leave the coals of the struggle [against the Zionistic enemy] burning. This is up until the conditions enabling a decisive

conclusion regarding the battle with the [Zionist] enemy [due to] the opposition of the Arab and Islamic nation, [conditions which will also include] the recruitment of a force and the strengthening and the centralization of the abilities and the means of [the Islamic nation] which will act politically in a unified manner and with one intention.

In order to implement this, there is a need to believe in the holiness of Palestine and in its [special] place in Islam. It is necessary to understand the danger in the long run of the Zionist plan in Palestine. Hamas believes that one cannot separate [between the parts of Palestine] in any way or means or give up even a part of the land of Palestine or recognize the rights of the Zionist occupier on that part. Every part should belong to the Palestinian nation and to all the Arab Muslims. [One should increase] the number of dead Zionistic enemies until they leave Palestine just as they immigrated to it.⁵⁰

5 The military option in the Hamas plan

In its survival plans, the Jewish state opposes all Arab and Islamic revitalization plans. If not for the dwindling and deterioration of the national culture of the [Islamic] nation, the Zionists would have been unable to⁵¹ realize their dream and establish their state on the land of Palestine. This deterioration [in the Arab world] is a fact understandable to the Zionists and they express their objections to any plans [of Arab revitalization] in words and deeds that would add new abilities to the Arabs and Muslims. If the attempts succeed [in leading] to an Arab and Muslim awakening [this would be] a dangerous strategic situation for Israel. The Zionists believe that a unification of Arab resources or their total merger under a revitalized [Islamic] leadership will become the main threat to the Hebrew state. This belief has pushed the leaders of the [Jewish] state, from the time of its founding, to act for the integration [of the state] within Arab and Islamic space and to become a part of it in the economic sense. This is what explains the stubbornness of the supporters of compromise and agreements [with Israel] on the marketing of the plan under the cover of economics.

From this analysis one can understand the role of military activities in the plans of the Hamas movement. Military activities are considered a strategic means which are positioned across from the Zionist program [for the area]. This is the only guarantee for the continuation of the struggle and to divert the Zionist enemy [from expanding] outside Palestine due to the lack of an Arab Islamic plan to achieve full freedom [of the Zionist area].⁵²

In other words, strategically, military activities are a [crucial] tool of the Palestinian nation. This basic tool keeps the coals of the struggle in occupied Palestine burning. Thus, [the military activity] prevents the Israeli intrigues which aim to remove tension [from the Palestinian

occupation] and place it in the direction of the [other] divisions in the Arab and Islamic world.

That is why military activities are considered a deterrence that prevents the Zionists from placing the security of the Palestinian nation in danger. This was expressed in a series of brave attacks which the movement initiated as a reaction to the terrorist crime of Baruch Goldstein against those praying in the Ibrahimi mosque (February 1994).

Therefore, it is necessary to continue on this road which intensifies the pressure on the Zionists and forces them to change their behavior which is hostile to the interests and the rights of our people in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

The Hamas movement believes that an integration of Israel into Arab and Islamic space would bring about the cancelation of all of the rejuvenation and reawakening plans for the Islamic nation. Israel's intention is to maintain the weakness of the [Islamic] nation in its relationship to it. Israel does this with the permission of the United States and with its cultural influence in order to carry out the agreement plan [the Israel-Palestinian agreement]. The main purpose of this plan is to create a tie between the economies of the Arab states and their various abilities in order to create a new economic area order headed by Israel.⁵³

The Hamas movement's opposition to the occupation is not aimed at the Jews due to their religion but is in opposition to the occupation, their presence and the suppressive regulations that they make.⁵⁴ These objections are not related to the area's peace process, as claimed by the Hebrew state and the supporters of the political agreement, which are based on inequality in the balance of powers [between Israel and her supporters and the Islamic nation]. Indeed, the resistance [*muqawama*] began even before the Madrid Conference. The movement has no hostility towards or war with any international factor. The [movement] does not carry out armed attacks on the assets of other states. The only area of resistance where the movement is active is against the Zionist occupation which distresses [our people] inside the Palestinian lands. When those responsible in the Zionist [leadership] threatened that they would bring the war against Hamas outside the occupied territories, Hamas warned the Zionist authorities on the dangers involved with the carrying out of that step. Hamas emphasized that it does not desire to widen the struggle into a much wider circle.

The goal of the Hamas movement in its opposition to the occupation is a strike at military targets. By its opposition, the movement yearns to avoid [activities] that will lead to the injuring of civilians. Even in specific incidents where a number of civilians were killed by opposition activities carried out by the movement, these were in self-defense, for example the reaction of the movement to the Ibrahimi mosque slaughter that was carried out against innocent civilians of the Palestinian people in Hebron. This slaughter was carried out at a time when the murdered Palestinians were praying in the mosque. The slaughter was carried out by settlers and

the occupation forces. In order to emphasize the caution taken to prevent badly hurting civilians on all sides, the Hamas movement suggested a number of times a humanitarian action according to which both sides would stop hurting civilian targets and thus they would remove [the civilians] from the conflict cycle. However, the Zionists rejected this initiative and ignored it and they carried on in a way that emphasized their terrorist nature and their refusal to prevent the bloodshed among the innocent sons of the Palestinian people.

The Hamas movement strongly desires to respect and keep its opposition activities against the Zionist occupier according to the laws of Islam, the rights of man and the normalcy of international law. It [the movement] does not have any desire to kill or spill blood as the Zionists [do] in carrying out opposition activities.

6 The stance of the Hamas movement on the political arrangement

As the Hamas movement has emphasized many times, it is not against the principle of peace; it is for peace and it is committed to achieving it. The movement agrees with all of the nations of the world on the great importance of achieving solutions [to the struggles] around the world. But there is a need for a just peace that will return all the rights to the Palestinian nation—a peace in which they can realize their rights to freedom, the right of return, independence and a decision regarding their futures.

The movement is of the opinion that the agreements [with Israel] are not enough to meet the minimum aspirations [of the Palestinian nation]. The agreements are not just and they cause injustice and damage to our nation. [The agreements] repay the attacker [Israel] for its attack and recognize the right to steal from others by force. The attacker is trying to force all of the conditions of victory on the unfortunate and to cause them to give up their rights. This is a peace of exploitation. Peace provisions like this, of exploitation and evil, will never succeed nor have a long life.⁵⁵

The starting point for the basis of all political arrangements [that will be achieved] or one of its paragraphs will include within it recognition of the rights of the Zionist enemy to exist on a majority of the land of Palestine. This [agreement] does not answer the great deprivation [of the rights] of the sons of the Palestinian nation. [These rights] are:

The right of return, self-determination, the building of an independent state on the entire land of Palestine and the establishment of national institutions.

This issue [an agreement with the Zionists] does not only go against the norms and international conventions and humanitarianism but also falls into areas that are not permitted according to Islamic law. [Therefore,] it is impossible to accept them. The land of Palestine is blessed Islamic land that the Zionists exploited with force. The *jihad* is a Muslim requirement to expel all of its occupiers.

Because this is the way it is, the movement rejects the plans of [George] Schultz and [James] Baker, the ten-point plan of [Husni] Mubarak, the plan of [Yitzchak] Shamir and the Madrid-Washington pact. Hamas emphasizes that the most dangerous plan that was suggested up until now was the plan of "Gaza and Jericho First." This agreement was signed in Washington on September 13, 1993 between the Zionist entity and the PLO command.

[This agreement] is accompanied by documents of mutual recognition between the sides which led to the signing of additional documents that were called The Cairo Agreement, the Taba [Agreement] and others. These agreements are not only dangerous because they include recognition of a permanent presence of the Zionist sovereignty on all of the territory of Palestine, normalize the relations between the Zionists and the Arabs and [agree to] Zionist hegemony on the area, but due to the agreement on this by the Palestinian side.

This step [by the PLO leadership] does not truly represent the Palestinian nation. Because the meaning of this agreement [with the Zionists] is a closing of the Palestinian file and the negation of the rights of the Palestinian people to demand and to claim its legitimate rights or to use legitimate means in order to achieve them. In addition, the meaning of this agreement is a negation of the rights of the majority of the Palestinian people to live on its land in its Motherland. As a result, this agreement does not only have a limited influence on the Palestinian people but it also has a wider influence on the Arab and Islamic nations.⁵⁶

Taking into account the seriousness of this compromise that lays on the conference table, as of now, the movement's stance is based on the following points:

To warn the Palestinian nation of the seriousness of compromise [with Israel] and the agreements that come from this compromise.

Activities for the consolidation of the Palestinian forces that are against an agreement [with Israel] and any agreements that stem from them. These activities will give expression to the movement's stand on Palestinian, Arab and international affairs.

A demand to the committee working in the PLO command to withdraw from the negotiations with the Zionist entity and to retract its signature from the Gaza-Jericho agreement [the Oslo Agreement]. This agreement is a threat to the existence of our nation in Palestine and in the diaspora, for the present generation and to our descendants.⁵⁷

Communication with other involved Arab and Islamic countries with a demand from them to withdraw from the negotiations [with Israel]. Likewise, to demand from them that they avoid responding to any conspiracy to widen [political] relations [normalization] with the Zionist entity and to stand by our side in conflict with the Zionist enemy and its plans.

7 *The positions of Palestinian power*

Hamas sees that the Palestinian national activity arena needs to include all of the viewpoints and efforts of those who participate in the opposition to the Zionist project. The movement emphasizes that unity of Palestinian action should be the worthy purpose of all of the powers and factions. Palestinian activities must flow from this approach [of unity of action].

The Hamas movement tries to act in cooperation and coordination with all the powers and factions active in the arena [the battle with the Zionists]. This cooperation will flow from a competitive base of the common ground and wide agreement without differences of opinion [between the different streams].

The Hamas movement tries to strengthen shared national activity and sees [as right] any shared national activity based on the obligation and activities to free Palestine. This obligation also includes non-recognition of the Zionist enemy and the refusal to give the enemy any recognition of its right of existence on any part of Palestine whatsoever.

The Hamas movement emphasizes that despite the fact that there are important differences of opinion in points of view or in the uniqueness of the efforts needed to be carried out in the national [Palestinian] activity arena, there is no justification in any situation at all, whatever it may be, to use violence or arms in order to solve the differences and to resolve the problems or to coerce the viewpoints and thoughts inside the Palestinian discourse.⁵⁸

The Hamas movement protects the Palestinians and their rights without discrimination of religion, race or social class. The Hamas movement believes in the rights of the Palestinian people from all its social classes and ethnic groups to protect its land and to free its Motherland. The movement believes that the Palestinian people is one nation [made up of] Muslims and Christians.⁵⁹

8 *The stance of the movement in regard to self-rule*

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas—sees the self-rule plan as no more than a division [of Palestine], like all the other partition plans whose goal it is to agree to live with the Zionist enemy. The movement believes that the Zionists agreed to the establishment of this autonomy in order to carry out all their goals during this same time period as the self-rule and afterwards.

The Palestinian Authority is supported by a force of 30,000 armed policemen who are outfitted with many special police resources. The policemen are required to carry out the Palestinian Authority's commitment to the agreements [with Israel]. From the beginning, these commitments included acting vigorously against the activities of the opposition and striking down the [military] companies [of the organizations that

oppose the agreement] and weaken them. This was in order for them to support compromise and agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

The Palestinian Authority acted recklessly when it signed the Oslo agreements which, in reality, hide the fact that it agreed to and gave a sort of legitimization to the occupation and its ways. For example, the Palestinian Authority agreed to build roads that bypass the settlers which thus grant the Zionist settlements a legal legitimacy.

The Hamas movement believes that the Zionists tried to prevent any dealings with the movement and its *jihad* program by hiding behind Palestinian self-rule. The movement understood that igniting a military confrontation between itself and the Palestinian Authority would be the realization of a very important Zionist plan that would be an answer to some of its ambitions.

This Hamas way of thinking is reflected in the way that Hamas has prevented any worsening of the conflict with the Palestinian Authority. This is despite the actions of the Authority, its oppression and its denial of human rights in the areas of its self-rule that have resulted until now with the murder by ambush of the holy warriors, the firing at worshippers and the arrest of hundreds of Palestinian people by using the pretext of supporting the Palestinian opposition factions. These arrestees experienced horrible conditions and torture which for a number of those who were arrested, led to a death by torture.

The Hamas movement sees the Oslo Agreements as a framework for deception⁶⁰ whose purpose is to provide security to the Zionists at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people. However, the Hamas movement stuck to its opposition to these agreements and works using popular and public means to make them fail. This is without hurting the Palestinian Authority and its symbols but maintaining the use of force. The movement believes that the way of the Palestinian Authority and its political plans are doomed to failure and destruction because its security [is derived] from the Oslo Agreements.

9 The stance of Hamas in regard to the other monotheistic religions

The Hamas movement believes that Islam is the only religion that is egalitarian, tolerant and promises freedom. The movement proffers cultural human values. It only becomes an enemy as a result of hostile demonstrations by an enemy nation.⁶¹ The Hamas movement is of the opinion that life in the shadow of Islam creates the perfect atmosphere for co-existence between the monotheist religions and that history is the best witness of this.

The movement is guided by the words of God, "There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion"⁶² and according to what God has revealed,

Allah does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because of religion and do not expel you from your homes—from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.⁶³

From these basic premises, the Hamas movement respects the rights of the other monotheistic religions. Christians found on the land of Palestine are considered partners in the Motherland. They [the Palestinian Christians] suffer equally from the occupation by the conquering [Zionist] authorities, just like their Muslim brethren. They are the ones who participated in the confrontation with the occupier and were hurt by its racist attempts. They [the Christian Palestinians] are an inseparable part of the Palestinian nation. They have the same rights and the same obligations.

10 The movement's stance in regard to the other independence movements

As a resistance movement fighting against the occupier and Israeli racism, the movement identifies itself with the problem of worldwide nationalistic independence. Hamas supports the legitimate yearnings of the nations trying to be free and to end the discriminatory racist occupation. Hamas showed solidarity with the South African nation's struggle against apartheid and blesses them on the ending of the evil racist regime that ruled there.

11 Foreign relations

Hamas believes that a difference of opinion regarding events does not prevent communication and cooperation with every factor of our Palestinian nation ready steadfastly to support opposition of the cruel occupier [Israel]. The Hamas movement does not get involved in internal matters of policy nor does it get involved in the politics of the local governments.⁶⁴

Hamas acts to encourage the Arab and Islamic governments to solve the differences between them and to unify their stance on national topics. The movement refuses to support one [Arab-Islamic] political side against another and refuses to be on any side in any political matters [in the internal Arab world].

Hamas believes in Arab Islamic unity and blesses any attempt made in order to achieve this.

Hamas demands that all governments, parties and Arab and Islamic powers stand by their commitments [to] advance and assist [the victory] of our people, solve the Palestinian problem and steadfastly support their opposition to the Zionist occupation. Likewise, they must make it easy for our movement to carry out its activities and to aid it in carrying out its mission.

Hamas believes in the importance of dialogue with all the governments, parties and international powers, no matter what faith, nationality or

political regime. The movement has no objections to cooperation with any side that deals with seeking justice for our problem and which will aid us in achieving our legitimate rights. This is also true for any side that can influence [world] public opinion and familiarize them with the ways of the Zionist occupation and its inhuman steps against the Palestinian people.

Hamas is not hostile to anyone based on faith or race. Hamas fights only those states and organizations that are involved in carrying out evil against our nation or which aid the Zionist occupier in its aggressive ways against our nation.

Hamas yearns to limit the confrontation with the Zionist occupier to Palestine [alone]. Hamas does not want to move the conflict to another arena outside Palestine.

The Hamas movement calls on states, organizations, international committees and independence movements worldwide to stand by its side in [search for a solution] to its righteous [Palestinian] problem. We call on them to censure the repressive ways of the [Zionistic] occupation authority which acts by violating the laws of international justice and the rights of man. In that manner, world opinion will be created which will pressure the Zionist entity to end the cruel occupation of our land and holy places.

Hamas sees itself as a folk movement responsible to all the Palestinian public. The establishment of Hamas by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin during the first *intifada* heralds a new decisive stage, one where the Muslim Brotherhood activists began to carry out their world view in relation to a Palestinian state established on all the land of Palestine. Indeed, according to Hamas, the Jews do not have a right to any portion of Palestinian land. It is not insignificant that Azzam, in his book, cites the slogan that Sheikh Yassin coined during the first *intifada*: “*Khaybar, Khaybar Ya Yehud, jaysh Muhammad Sawf Ya’ud*” (Khaybar, Khaybar, oh Jews, the army of Muhammad will return).⁶⁵ According to Hamas, what happened to the Jews of Khaybar in the Saudi Arabian peninsula, who were exiled and slaughtered by the Islamic sword in the 7th century, will happen to the Jews in the State of Israel.

C Reciprocal relations with the Islamic Movement in Israel

The Islamic movement, led by Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, holds beliefs that are very close to those of Hamas. The newspaper of the movement, *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* (The Voice of Truth and Freedom), was even shut down a number of times by the Israeli censor due to its support of the Hamas movement.⁶⁶ This newspaper also receives money from Hamas members enabling it to continue publishing. It is also popular in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The messages of *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* also appear simultaneously in Hamas newspapers like *al-Resala* or *Filastin al-Muslimah*.⁶⁷

The Islamic Movement appears on the Muslim Brotherhood site as a subsidiary of the Muslim Brotherhood, similar to Hamas. In other words, according to the Muslim Brotherhood, there are two movements representing the Palestinian Arabs. The first is Hamas, headed by Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip, and Khaled Masha'l, a top political leader in the movement currently residing in Damascus. The second is the Islamic Movement of the Interior Areas on the 1948 Lands, headed by Ra'ed Salah.⁶⁸

Abdullah Azzam, the ideologist of the worldwide *jihad* movement and Hamas in particular, emphasizes in his book that in fact we are speaking about one Islamic movement:

After the 1967 defeat, the young people in occupied Palestine shook off the idols to which they were mistakenly attached and which they had worshipped for a short time. They began searching for a way out and looked for an ideological vision to be granted to them. This is after they grew tired of all the slogans and after all of the [secular] lights fell, the exalted God led them to Islam. From that time on, they did not stop being involved with their Qur'an in which is found the soul, the life and the light and the proper guidance from the *Suna* [its ways and laws] of the Prophet [Muhammad] and within are found the wisdom and the governmental authority.⁶⁹

That is how Azzam related to the Islamic revival among Israeli Arabs after they tired of Rakah (the communist political party in Israel) and the satellite Arab parties of the Labor Party in the State of Israel. These young people were drawn to al-Qassamiya ideology (the messages of Izz al-Din al-Qassam) like Abdallah Nimer Darwish who studied at the Islamic College in Nablus, al-Ma'd al-Islami, and Ra'ed Salah, who learned at the Islamic College in Hebron.⁷⁰

Azzam continues with praise for the dramatic change in Abdallah Nimer Darwish, who abandoned the communists whom Azzam attacked strongly and even accused of cooperating with the Jews and recognizing the right of the Jews to live. These statements are aimed mainly at the Rakah activists such as Emil Toma, Emil Habibi, etc. Even Mahmoud Darwish, the nationalistic Palestinian poet, received fundamental criticism as a result of his cooperation with Jewish factors. This criticism stems from the fact that the Rakah/Hadash (both names refer to the Israeli communist party) activists, in its later reincarnation, agreed to be a part of the Israeli Knesset. Just the fact that they entered the Israeli Knesset shows that they supported the existence of the State of Israel and they accepted the rules of the game that the Jews wrote for them.⁷¹ This is a summary of Azzam's arguments which Ra'ed Salah continues to hold until today.

Azzam emphasizes the revolution that the city of Umm al-Fahm has undergone:

In Umm al-Fahm there was a dangerous communist stronghold. This is the reason why many of the city's residents decided to return it to Allah, deserted communism and carried the Islamic *dawah* until the name of the city was changed from Umm al-Fahm (the mother of charcoal) to Umm al-Nur (the mother of light). This is the challenge that Abdallah Nimer Darwish, a man of the cloth, offered [in the face of the communists]. Abdallah repeats his words because we are the nation chosen by God. That is how Umm al-Nur became an important fortress among the fortresses of Islam.⁷²

Azzam praises Abdallah Nimer Darwish on the establishment of the *jihad* companies (Sarayat al-Jihad) among the Israeli Arabs. The members of this movement also included Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and Sheikh Kamal Khatib. Azzam is sad that the Jews exposed the existence of Sheikh Darwish's *jihad* movement. "This is because the Jews saw it as a threat which led to their intimidation and panic." According to Azzam, as a result, the Jews limited Darwish's movement, reduced his activities and prevented him from continuing to lead his movement.⁷³

The truth is different. Sheikh Darwish's movement was specifically established in order to hurt violently Israeli society and the Israeli economy. It was not insignificant that members of the movement were arrested as a result of their activities. It is necessary to indicate that throughout the years, many terrorist activities were carried out by activists who identified themselves with the Islamic movement even if they were not counted as active members.⁷⁴

In 2003, indictments were brought against members of the Islamic movement headed by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah Mahagna, due to their activities on behalf of Hamas in order to finance the movement's institutions in Israel and also to raise money and support for the Hamas prisoners and donations for the families of the Hamas martyrs.⁷⁵

The activities of Sheikh Salah have received great exposure on the various Hamas sites. The sheikh has been persecuted, according to them, due to his uncompromising stand on the issue of Jerusalem and his proud Palestinian stance. The sheikh has even been called "the sheikh of al-Aqsa" by the magazine of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades—al-Qassamiyun. In the same issue, a poem was even dedicated to him.⁷⁶

In an honorable ceremony with many participants that took place in Beit Hanoun on June 18, 2011, Ismail Haniyeh, the prime minister of the Hamas government in Gaza, announced a stadium named for him, the Stadium of Ra'ed Salah. This stadium, according to the words of Ismail Haniyeh, carries the name of the "great Palestinian leader."⁷⁷ According to Sheikh Saleh al-A'ruri, the founder of the military arm of Hamas in the West Bank, Sheikh Ra'ed Salah and Sheikh Kamal Khatib are the flesh of the flesh of the Islamic

Renaissance movement. They are the ones who founded the Islamic coalition (al-Kutla al-Islamiya) at Hebron College. In an interview, Sheikh al-Aruri emphasized the continuity of the duty that he has fulfilled as head of the Islamic coalition at the Islamic College in Hebron (as Ra'ed Salah did before). In his words, "From this student organization grew the military arm of Hamas in the West Bank."⁷⁸

The anti-Semitic statements used by Ra'ed Salah do not bother the speakers for the Islamic movement. These expressions, ones that equate the Jews with Nazis, bloodsuckers and war instigators, etc., appear in Hamas proclamations, in the organization's charter and are expressed in the speeches by its spokespersons. One such example is a description of Jews as bloodsuckers which appeared in the Hamas proclamations during the *intifada*.⁷⁹ In a speech given by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah in February 2007, he said:

We are not a nation based on hate. It is not us who have let ourselves once eat bread soaked in the blood of children ... whoever does not understand to what I am referring should ask what happened to the children in Europe ... The Jews are blood suckers, that is their nature.⁸⁰

The imagery of the Jews as bloodsuckers is a common occurrence in Hamas publicity, such as in the *intifada* proclamations discussed earlier.

In a different place, Salah used the Holocaust and compared the Jews to the Nazis. In remarks that are similar to what is written in the Hamas Charter, Salah argues: "Zionism is equal to Nazism and if the Nazis carried out the Holocaust, then Israel is carrying out more than a Holocaust against the Palestinian nation."⁸¹

The Hamas Charter emphasizes that the Islamic Opposition Movement is standing against this "Evil Nazi Tartar invasion." In the spirit of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion," which are explicitly mentioned in the movement's charter, that is exactly how the Zionist invasion of Palestine is described.⁸² This is despite the fact that from an historic viewpoint, the Jews are not invaders. Jews throughout the generations have always lived in the land of Israel and were, already in the 19th century, a majority in certain areas, including Jerusalem. The Jewish "right of return," or the existence of a Jewish tie to the land, is not recognized at all by Hamas or by the Islamic Movement in Israel.⁸³

Attempts to limit the organization by different Jewish factors, including rightist factors, resulted in reactions of contempt and disrespect. An example of this is found in an article that appeared on a site identified with Hamas,⁸⁴ entitled, "Marzel announces the expulsion of Sheikh Ra'ed Salah from Palestine." The content of the article is as follows:

The representative of the Zionists, the extremist Baruch Marzel, demanded the expulsion of the leader of the Islamic Movement from the Occupied Areas of Palestine from the Year 1948, Sheikh Ra'ed Salah of

Palestine. This was during his participation at a Zionist parade at the entrance to the village of Umm al-Fahm, “We will still expel Ra’ed Salah from Umm al-Fahm and Israel, because he is a non-desirable person.”

The Palestinians from Umm al-Fahm and its surrounding villages were ready from the morning hours for confrontations with the Zionist protestors who organized and protested in the open across from where Sheikh Salah was living. The occupation forces were spread out in an intensive manner in the area of Wadi ’Ara—the road of Wadi ’Ara which is the main road into the city of Umm al-Fahm. This is in addition to increased flights of fighter planes over the city skies.

As a result, serious riots broke out between the residents of the city and the occupation police. This was despite the experience [of the police] to separate those who had assembled. Dozens of Palestinians longed to receive the results of their opposition [as injuries from] being beaten with sticks to strangulation caused by tear gas [grenades]. A portion of those injured were a part the leadership of the Land Arabs from Inside [the areas] of 1948. Included [in the injured] were the representatives [members of the Knesset] Haneen Zoabi and Afu Agbaria. This is in addition to a number of journalists [who were present].

Sheikh Kamal Khatib, the Deputy Head of the Interior Islamic Movement, who was also present, said:

The extreme right, led by [Baruch] Marzel, does not represent just itself but also represents the entire Israeli government which prevents, through the use of hate and racism, all that is Palestinian.

He added:

What has been done is that an entire country has stood up and answers to the dreams of the extremists to come and to demonstrate across from the office of the Islamic movement. In other words, the meaning is that the entire government is extreme and advises them. That is because of the decision [to allow the demonstration] was taken and they did not attempt to prevent them from entering the city of Umm al-Fahm.

A Zionist petition to the High Court was granted to a group of settlers which encouraged the “Zionist rightist extremists” to demonstrate in the city of Umm al-Fahm. This was as a reaction to the participation of Sheikh Ra’ed Salah in the freedom flotilla aimed at breaking the blockade around Gaza a few months ago.

Sheikh Salah was hidden in a Zionist jail, where the prison authorities signed him on for a period of five months after he was convicted by the court with assaulting a policeman. This was during the course of his activities of protecting the al-Aqsa mosque.

This is where the article ends. It is very similar to many articles found on Hamas websites.

Some of the items that can be learned from this report on Sheikh Ra’ed Salah include:

- Salah is officially described as the leader of the Islamic Movement inside the State of Israel. In retrospect, there are not two factions but only one Islamic Movement, and that is the movement of Sheikh Salah.
- The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in Israel is total. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is an encompassing one between the Jewish nation and Jewish State, and the Palestinians, Arab nation and the Muslims. Kamal Khatib expressed this well when he said that Israel is against anything that is Palestinian.
- The ambiguous attitude towards the judicial system in Israel. When an appeal was presented to Israel’s district court regarding Sheikh Ra’ed Salah’s nine-month prison sentence, theoretically this implied recognition of the authority of the Israeli courts.⁸⁵ Yet, in the publicity of the Islamic Movement and Hamas, the petition to the High Court is described as a petition to a Zionist Court which gives judicial immunity to Zionist policy.
- Sheikh Ra’ed Salah is a type of Palestinian holy martyr persecuted due to his opinions and his activities for the Palestinian people (participation in the “freedom flotilla”) and his defense of what is holy to Islam (protection of the al-Aqsa mosque).

In an additional article, one that was publicized on the website of the Islamic Movement, there appears to be additional sympathy towards Sheikh Ra’ed Salah who is presented as a holy martyr. It is important to note that Sheikh Salah was reprimanded by the Or Commission (an inquiry panel appointed by the Israeli government) for his part in fanning the flames of the riots of October 2000, in which 12 Arab-Israeli civilians, one illegal resident and a Jewish Israeli were killed. The article emphasizes the role of the Israeli Arabs in the October 2000 riots and sees their participation as an expression of solidarity among all the divisions of the Palestinian people who are seeking a just solution to the Palestinian question—a solution which, according to Hamas and the Islamic Movement, would mean the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place. Israeli counter-activities, through the use of the police and the secret service, are described as preventative with a tendency forcibly to thwart racist, anti-Muslim approaches. The article includes this paragraph:

The nationalistic stream [among the Palestinian citizens of Israel] is in distress and includes both the nationalists and the Islamic movement. There is a difference as it relates to their political-nationalistic positions and tendencies. As a result of these activities [by Palestinians who are Israeli citizens], the enemy attacked the supporters of this stream by inciting the courts, wars, deportations—as in the case of Azmi Bishara or in an arrest like in the case of Ra’ed Salah.⁸⁶

Every Israeli activity for development and progress in the city of Jerusalem is immediately seen as a reason for a world war between Judaism and the Islamic

Movement. Even the building of a museum, such as the Museum of Tolerance, on the area of an old Muslim cemetery that has not been in use for a long time (since the period of Jordanian rule), was turned into a battleground between the Islamic Movement and the State of Israel.⁸⁷

According to the Hamas article, Ra'ed Salah is the leader of the Islamic movement and he is persecuted for no fault of his own by the Zionist state. His expressions against the Jews, which border on anti-Semitism, and include heavy accusations against the Jews for already being bloodsuckers in Europe, are not mentioned at all. According to Hamas, as it appears in its proclamations and in its charter, these expressions are correct. The article indicates that Israel is trying to object to the activities of the 1948 Arabs and is also trying to prepare public opinion for an additional transfer of the Israeli-Arab public by inciting the Israeli-Arab masses. At the time of Ra'ed Salah's imprisonment, the Hamas movement went out of its way to declare itself against aggression and to oppose the Jewish-British conspiracy that led to the arrest of the sheikh in Britain. The Hamas website, which represents the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, publicized Haniyeh's call for Britain to free the sheikh immediately from his imprisonment and to act decisively for the removal of the Zionist criminal blockade of the Gaza Strip. According to him, the Palestinian people have defined the way of return and that is by way of opposition. Ra'ed Salah is part of the Palestinian people and a partner in its way.⁸⁸

D A realistic look at the Muslim Brotherhood in the whole Mandatory Palestine

Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood inside Jerusalem, and the Islamic Movement (both factions) in Israel are the offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was established in Egypt in 1928. Thus, for example, at the founding meeting of Hemmah (the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and Expulsion Plan), on June 7, 2009; an association affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, Jerusalem, participated even though it had been declared illegal, alongside activists from the Muslim Brotherhood, Jerusalem, such as Muhammad Arnaout.⁸⁹ The Mufti Sheikh Akrame Sabri, known for his extreme views against Israel, and the former MK, Sheikh Abbas Zachur, from the Islamic Movement in Israel—Southern Faction, also participated.⁹⁰ One must assume that the participation of Knesset member Zachur in the founding conference of the Islamic non-profit organization of this type, one that has ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem and with Hamas, which are both known as illegal organizations, testifies to an ideological identification with their ideals.

One of the two founders of Hemmah, Abd al-Basit Abu al-Mufalfel, explained that because they were Israeli residents of Jerusalem, the Muslim Brotherhood—Jerusalem, wanted to act mainly in the area of *dawah*, spreading the ideology and educating hearts. Its aim is to achieve a legal

status similar to that which exists inside the Islamic Movement. In his words, there is no difference between the Muslim Brotherhood, as the mother organization, and Hamas and the Islamic Movement, except from the point of view of the distribution of tasks. That is why the Muslim Brotherhood—Jerusalem is prevented from carrying out military missions in Jerusalem. They are only allowed to undertake activities that are not military in nature. Both have widespread ties with the international al-Quds organization whose honorary president is the well-known Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who in the past was active in the Muslim Brotherhood. The international al-Quds organization has also given its support to the existence of Hemmah.⁹¹

Today, Yusuf al-Qaradawi serves as the most well-known Islamic law theologian for the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood movement, despite the fact that he is not an official member. The sheikh also serves as a mufti who sits in the principality of Qatar and who, through *al Jazeera*, distributes the most extreme messages against Western culture, the West's control of the Arab and Islamic world, and against Israel. His words are broadcast mainly through the program "al-Shari'a wa al-Hayah" (The Shari'a and the Life), which presents the Islamic attitude towards society.⁹² After Sheikh Ahmad Yassin's death, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi became the most accepted law adjudicator for the Islamic Movement in Palestine and his books are distributed throughout Palestine on both sides of the green line and in East Jerusalem. It is not insignificant that, even in 1989, in his book on Hamas, Azzam indicated that it was up to all members of the Islamic Movement to read the words of the Islamic adjudicators, among them the books of al-Qaradawi.⁹³

The activities of the Muslim Brotherhood—Jerusalem are also supported by Muwassat al-Aqsa li-Waqf wa al-Turath (al-Aqsa Foundation for Sacred Property and Heritage) and Muwassat al-Aqsa li-Tanmiya (al-Aqsa Foundation for Development), both belonging to the Islamic Movement—Northern Faction. Many activities run by the men of the Islamic Movement are organized together with Hamas activists inside Jerusalem—for example, the activities in Silwan against Jewish settlement in the area, archeological digs close to the Temple Mount, the King's Garden project and others. As an example, the Silwan activities are run together with Sheikh Abd al-Karim Abu Sneina, a prominent Jerusalem activist who lives in Silwan.⁹⁴

It is hard to find any difference between the substance of the remarks made by the head of the southern faction when compared with those made by the northern faction. For example, Sheikh Ibrahim Sarsur, who was the leader of the southern faction of the Islamic Movement, sent his condolences to the leader of Hamas, Mahmoud al-Zahar, on the death of his son. An announcement published in *al-Mithaq* (The Faith), a newspaper of the southern faction, said:

With solidarity with our brothers and our Palestinian nation ... the Islamic Movement feels great sorrow and sends its condolences to the sons of the Palestinian people, to the residents of Gaza and to Dr.

Mahmoud al-Zahar on the circumstances of the falling of his son Hussam on his way to Allah. Our prayers are that Allah should have mercy on all of the slain of our Palestinian people and that they will be settled in higher heaven. [Signed] Sheik Ibrahim Abdullah [Sarsur], head of the Islamic Movement.

Further on in the condolence letter, the sheikh calls the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) activities against Hamas in which Hussam al-Zahar, an activist in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, was killed, “A barbaric, wild massacre.”⁹⁵

In another example, as a result of the arrest of Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, *al-Mithaq* newspaper, which represents the southern faction, expressed total support for Sheikh Ra’ed Salah. The front page of the newspaper carried a picture of Sheikh Salah. Sheikh Hamad Abu Daa’bas, the head of the southern faction today, is quoted as saying, “We must save my brother, the Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, from the bad trouble that he is in.”⁹⁶ Sheikh Abu Daa’bas was chosen as the replacement for Ibrahim Sarsur as head of the movement and even had the privilege to be with Sheikh Salah in May 2010 on the hate flotilla to the Gaza Strip called the “Flotilla to Freedom.”

A careful examination of the newspapers *al-Mithaq* of the southern faction and *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* of the northern faction shows that there is no ideological difference between the two Israeli factions of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁹⁷ However, Ra’ed Salah, the head of the northern faction who is recognized by Hamas as the head of the Islamic Movement in the occupied territories of 1948 (of both factions), expresses his anti-Israel stance more strongly. It is no surprise that all Ra’ed Salah’s speeches appear on the different Hamas websites.⁹⁸

It is unsurprising that since 2011 both factions have been discussing unification. Although that unification has not taken place yet, there is a lot of coordination between the two factions. Ever since 1996, when for the first time the Islamic Movement stood for an election, and up until 2011, they were unable, from their point of view, to show any significant advances. In an interview with Sheikh Kamal Khatib, Ra’ed Salah’s assistant spoke of the dialogue between the two factions:

In the present stage, there are understandings between the two factions of the movement and I hope that it will take shape in the unification of the Islamic Movement, especially since the head of the southern faction, his honor Sheikh Hamad Abu Daa’bas, has announced that if the price of the unification of the movement is non-participation in the elections [for the Knesset], they will not participate in them. These words created a base for dialogue and we hope that all of these matters will be decided and we will reach full unification ... At this moment we are at the beginning of [this] dialogue and there is much optimism ... with this and parallel to it, there are close to 16 years of distance and separation that have left many topics that each movement has adapted as a mechanism for themselves and we

are trying to find a mutual mechanism which will manage all of these matters, and with the help of Allah we will succeed ...⁹⁹

The Hamas faction of the Brotherhood in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip also has a tendency to create artificial distinctions between the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jerusalem, who are Israeli residents and who work mostly in *dawah*, similar to the Islamic Movement in Israel, and Hamas, which works more in the military field in the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This artificial divide was revealed when four movement activists (Muhammad Mahmoud Abu Tir, Minister Khaled Ibrahim Abu 'Arafah, Muhammad Imran Tutah and Ahmad Muhammad Attoun) were arrested and exiled from Jerusalem. All four were residents of Jerusalem and activists in the Muslim Brotherhood—Jerusalem, which was recognized as a Hamas branch in the city. All of them were chosen to serve as members of the Palestinian parliament from the Hamas party of change and reform. As a reaction to the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, Israel arrested these Hamas representatives and with their release, the interior minister instructed the removal of their status as permanent residents in Israel and expelled them from Jerusalem's borders. Their activities deviated from the mere expression of support and *dawah* activities for the Islamic Movement. This is not just preparing hearts, but also preparing swords of the Hamas movement. Today it is clear that they are representatives of the Hamas movement whose activities are illegal in all of the land of the State of Israel.¹⁰⁰

The principle of hiding Hamas activities (*al-taqiyya*) and the attempt to act in other ways were expressed in the setting up of military organizations such as “the Defenders of al-Aqsa.” In his research (according to the Shab'ak website), Iyub Azam Abu Karim admitted in his investigation that he acted in a subsidiary of Hamas called the “Defenders of al-Aqsa.” In his own words, he tells how, in 2007, he was drafted into Hamas and how, in this framework, he carried out a number of attacks against Israeli targets as part of his understanding of *jihad* against Israel. The organizational purpose of “Defenders of al-Aqsa” was, in his words, “to create an additional framework to carry out *jihad* against Israel without being directly tied to Hamas.” This gives Hamas much more flexibility. The directives for such organizational activities came straight from Fathi Ahmad Muhammad Hamad, the minister of the interior in the Hamas government.¹⁰¹

It appears that even this faction of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip is split into many more small rebellious organizations which act separately from the Hamas movement—but only in theory.

The shape of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Israel and Palestine spreads over all the different factions. Some of them carry out *jihad* activities against Israel, several of them use their Israeli citizenship or their legal status as residents or citizens of Israel to help each other in different and varied ways. There is mutual reciprocity between all of the Muslim Brotherhood factions as all of them are a part of the Islamic Movement and take

sustenance from the same sources. Thus, for example, both factions of the Islamic Movement in Israel donate funds to the families of Hamas martyrs under the category of charity to orphans and widows. If one judges their declarations, no one disagrees that all the factions are dedicated to the same goal of *jihad* against Israel and the destruction of the Jewish entity that exists in Palestine.

Jihad can take many different forms—economic, social, legal, through propaganda and also military. All of these means are acceptable in the eyes of the factions of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to carry out their goal to establish an Islamic Palestine at the expense of all the territory of the State of Israel.

Notes

- 1 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.25. This slogan also appears on other Islamic sites, including Hamas sites. It also appears explicitly in the eighth paragraph of the Hamas Charter.
- 2 Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filastīn hata 'am 1970*, pp.20–29.
- 3 Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.13–16, 29, 33. Azzam especially emphasizes his close ties with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood together with the holy warriors in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s. See also the undated pamphlet, “al-Mathuwrat lil-Mu’alam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna, Kanuz la Tiendab” [Tradition of the Martyr Teacher, Hassan al-Banna, Inexhaustible Treasure]. This pamphlet, carrying the Muslim Brotherhood movement’s slogan and the movement’s message, was found in the hands of Hamas activists in Jerusalem. Matthias Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew Hatred* (Jerusalem, 2008), pp.62–64.
- 4 Ronni Shaked and Aviva Shabi, *Hamas: Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalist Movement* (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing, 1994), pp.51–75.
- 5 Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, *Speaking Stones: The Words Behind the Palestinian Intifada* (Tel Aviv, 1989), p.34. Al-Mujama al-Islami was established in 1973 under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In 1978, the organization received recognition from the civilian administration. Meir Litvak, “The Islamic Movement, a Different Palestinian Identity,” in David Manshari (ed.) *Islamic Fundamentalism: A Challenge for Regional Stability* (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, 1993), p.58. According to Litvak, Jordan also worked to strengthen the stand of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank as a counterweight to the strength of the PLO.
- 6 Ibid.; Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.24–25; Farsoun and Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinian*, pp.100–1, 105.
- 7 See a special interview with Sheikh Salah al-Aruri, the founder of the Regiments of Abdullah Azzam in the West Bank, “Leqaa Khass: Maa al-Sheikh Salah al-Aruri, Musasas Kataaeb al-Aqsa bi al-Dafa al-Gharbiya,” *Qassamiyun—Majallat Kataaeb al-Shahid izz al-adin al-Qassam* 22, September 2011, pp.16–17.
- 8 Shahada Marwan, “al-Qaeda fi Gaza Tahat Ra’ayah Hamas, Mustaqbal Tanazim al-Qaeda fi Palestine” [al-Qaeda in Gaza under the Protection of Hamas: The Future of the al-Qaeda Organization in Palestine], *Majalat al-Asr* [Periodical of the Generation], Apr. 16, 2006, www.alasr.ws/index.cfm?method=home.con&contentID=7682.
- 9 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, p.59; Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.76–80. The full story and with the full documents, the charge sheet and the Israeli court decision is in Dr. ’Attef ’Adwan, *al-Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Hyatu wa-Jihadu*

- [Sheikh Ahmad Yassin: His Life and his Jihad] (Beit Hanoun, Gaza Strip, 1991), pp.131–49, 197–232.
- 10 Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew Hatred*, pp.95–98.
 - 11 David Anthony and Sari Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life* (Tel Aviv, 2008), pp.212–14. This book includes the conditions leading to the writing of the Faisal al-Husseini document which turned out to be the basis of Arafat's Declaration of Independence and the Algiers Conference at the convention of the National Palestinian Council in November 1988.
 - 12 In the opening of the Hamas Charter there is a sentence attributed to the Imam al-Shahid Hassan al-Banna which can be seen in its Arabic source, from the *al Jazeera* site, www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/0b4f24e4-7c14-4f50-a831-ea2b6e73217d#0. It can also be found in a Hebrew translation of the Hamas Charter which can be found on the site of the Reut Institute, <http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/officialheb/20060206Hamas%20Covenant.pdf>. Azzam also quotes the complete text of the Hamas Charter in his book *Hamas*, pp.55–73.
 - 13 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, p.199. On this same theme, see also the opinions of Ra'ed Salah as brought by Yonatan Lis, Yoav Stern and Yuval Yoaz, "A Draft of the Indictment against Sheikh Ra'ed Salah who Called for a Battle over the Freeing of al-Aqsa," *Ha'aretz*, Aug. 8, 2007. This article also appears on the Walla site and can be found at: <http://news.walla.co.il/?w=//1150859>.
 - 14 From a Hamas propaganda movie, part 10, *al-Intifada min Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, Mulabasat al-Intifada al-Falastiniya, 1987–2000* [The Intifada from the Beginning to the End, Circumstances of the Palestinian Intifada 1987–2000], Oct. 14, 2007.
 - 15 Elijah Levi and Ronen Madzini, "Ismail Haniyeh: The PLO Should Recant its Recognition of Israel," *Ynet*, Apr. 29, 2011, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4062309,00.html.
 - 16 *Al-Resalah*, Oct. 25, 2004. This Hamas newspaper, published in the Gaza Strip, emphasized that the sheikh's liquidation was carried out by an American Apache helicopter. Eight other holy warriors (Hamas fighters) were killed that day and an additional 15 were injured. Among the dead were also Khamis Sami Mustahi, the sheikh's nephew, and his son-in-law. The newspaper also emphasizes that the liquidation was carried out as a response to an activity carried out earlier in Ashdod by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas and by the Shahada' al-'Aqsa of the PLO. In this activity, 11 Israelis were killed and dozens of Israelis were wounded.
 - 17 Ahmad Fahami, *Hamas bayn Zamanin* [Hamas between Two Times] (n.p.: Jami'a al-Haqq Mahfuzah, 2006), pp.24–31. Hamas has to quiet down the resistance for a while and be more diplomatic.
 - 18 Levi and Madzini, "Ismail Haniyeh."
 - 19 Interview with Fatah leader Abdallah Frangi, "The Israeli Threats Make Us Stick Together," *Spiegel Online International*, June 28, 2006, www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,424106,00.html.
 - 20 Christoph Schult, "Hamas' Triumph of Violence," *Spiegel Online International*, June 18, 2007, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,489185,00.html.
 - 21 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.107–9.
 - 22 Fahami, *Hamas bayn Zamanin*, pp.24–25.
 - 23 It is no surprise that Sayyid Qutb's book *Marakatuna maa al-Yahud* [Our War with the Jews] (Cairo: Dar al-Sharuq, 1993), originally published in 1954, became a bestseller among the men of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. Especially popular was the book's fourth chapter, pp.20–38.
 - 24 Abdallah Frangi argued that as a result of high unemployment in Gaza, many activists worked with both organizations, Hamas and the PLO, due to economic factors. Schult, "Hamas' Triumph of Violence."

- 25 A public statement by Hamas from a Palestinian information site affiliated with the movement, Nov. 28, 2010, www.palestine-info.info.
- 26 Avi Issacharoff, "The Father was One of the Founders of Hamas, the Son an Agent for the Secret Service for over a Decade," *Ha'aretz*, Feb. 26, 2010, www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1152319.htm.
- 27 Musab Hassan Yousef, *Son of Hamas* (n.p.: Tyndale House Publishers, 2010), pp.11–12.
- 28 Like Bridget Gabriel, a Lebanese Catholic who migrated to the United States and who has been researching this field. Brigitte Gabriel, *They Must Be Stopped: Why We Must Defeat Radical Islam and How We Can Do It* (New York, 2009), pp.72–74.
- 29 No author, *Toward the Election in the Autonomy* (Tel Aviv: IDF Publishing, Nov. 8, 1995), pp.13–14; Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence* (Tel Aviv, 1999), pp.191–202. Integration without identification; thus, for example, Imad Falluji, the editor of *al-Watan*, a Hamas journal that closed down, was appointed communications minister, and Sheikh Talal al-Sider of Hebron was appointed by Arafat as an advisor on religious affairs and after 1997 became the minister of youth and sports for 20 months. He then served as a state minister for three years. Both of these were well-known Hamas men who ran as independents in the 1996 elections and were appointed by Arafat as members of the Palestinian cabinet.
- 30 Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, pp.124–25; see also Matti Steinberg, *Facing their Fate: Palestinian National Consciousness, 1967–2007* (Tel Aviv, 2008), pp.272–386; Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwān*, pp.129–41.
- 31 "Nabda a'n Harkat Hamas" [A Summary of the History of Hamas], from the website of the Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A'alam (The Palestine Information Center), Sept. 15, 2006, a site affiliated with Hamas, www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEPMO%2bi1s7YjyNYgnCrGxy9LphpYtjbpN10jo4ZpAEj22uHhDqullJcP2sHDTgZIJCR3C2afNaApr%2bmcRhAOq3FNcmJzvxLcU9gqBHHcqmhrDvamPtU%3d.
- 32 The symbol is available in the official Hamas site at www.hamasinfo.net/ar/Default.aspx#&slider1=1.
- 33 The two swords also appear in the symbol of the movement that preceded Hamas—that is the Muslim Brotherhood. They testify to the organization being a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine. This symbol of the swords also indicates the desire of the Muslim Brotherhood movement to use force in order to achieve its goals. See, for example, the short propaganda film clip of the Muslim Brotherhood, "Min Nahan wa-Madha Narid?" [Who Are We and What Do We Want?], Sept. 28, 2007.
- 34 Ya'acov Havakook and Shakib Saleh, *Islamic Terrorism: Profile of the Hamas Movement* (Tel Aviv, 1999), p.65. According to this book, the Hamas founders who took part in the meeting on Dec. 10, 1987 included: Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the spiritual leader who was assassinated by Israel during the the al-Aqsa *intifada* on Mar. 22, 2004; Salah Mustafa Shehadeh, a social worker from Beit Hanoun, who was assassinated by Israel during al-Aqsa *intifada* on July 22, 2002; Dr. Abd al-Aziz Ali al-Rantissi, a doctor who led Hamas for only a month after taking over from Ahmad Yassin, and who was also assassinated by Israel on Apr. 17, 2004; Issa Khalil Nasser, an engineer from Rafah; Mohammad Hassan Khalil, a teacher from al-Shati Refugee Camp; and Dr. Ibrahim Fares al-Yazuri, a pharmacist from al-Rimal neighborhood.
- 35 Litvak, *Islam and Democracy in the Arab World*, p.147, According to Litvak, Islamic activity was already taking place during the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–39. However, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was only officially established in 1946 under the leadership of the Mufti Hajj Muhammad

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- Amin al-Husayni. In 1948, there were 12,000–20,000 members in 25 branches throughout all of Palestine. This is despite the fact that Musab Hassan Yousef, in his book *Son of Hamas* (pp.9–11), indicates that the first branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1935. Havakook and Saleh indicate in their book, *Islamic Terrorism*, pp.27–28, that the roots of the movement were established in 1931 at the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem.
- 36 Guy Aviad, *Lexicon of the Hamas Movement* (Tel Aviv, 2008), pp.23–25. Today the name “al-Murabitun” (The Defenders) is the name of Hamas’ popular army which numbers approximately 5,000 men and can be found in the Gaza Strip. This army took an active part in the Hamas revolution against the PLO regime in June 2007.
- 37 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, pp.38–44. These are a few of the Hamas arguments against the peace initiative and the compromise taken by the PLO which strived to establish a Palestinian State on the lands of 1967. These ideological changes are already expressed in the period of the first *intifada*, in the war of the proclamations between the two organizations, especially after the PLO’s declaration of independence in Algiers on Nov. 15, 1988.
- 38 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, proclamation #1, p.199. These words are especially appropriate for the Egyptian army to which Hamas turned and asked: “Did you sleep during the period of the embarrassment and the surrendering contract [the Camp David contract]? Did your national jealousy die and did your pride run out while the Jews are still carrying out serious and despicable crimes every day against residents and children? What happened to the descendants of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, [al-Malik al-Muzaffar Saif al-Din] Qutuz and [al-Malik] al-Zahir [Rukn al-Din] Baibars [the three sultans who defeated the enemies of Islam in their own time]?”
- 39 Marwan Shahada, “al-Qaeda fi Gaza Tahat Ra’ayah Hamas, Mustaqbal Tanazim al-Qaeda fi Palestine,” *Majela al-Asr* [a periodical], Apr. 16, 2006, www.ala sr.ws/index.cfm?method=home.con&contentID=7682.
- 40 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, p.59. Hamas argues that the *intifada* that broke out was an Islamic *intifada* despite the fact that Hamas did not initiate it and was dragged into it. It was only pressure from the ground that caused the Brothers to change their stance and this occurred only on Dec. 14, when they finally allowed it. Litvak records the day on which Hamas publicized its first proclamation as one day earlier, without mentioning the establishment of the movement.
- 41 Yousef, *Son of Hamas*, pp.19–20. Yousef argues against the commonly held view. In his book he writes that the organization was already established in 1986 but only began to carry out terrorist activities as a result of the *intifada*. The participants who met in Hebron with the goal of founding such an organization were: Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas; Mahmoud Jamal al-Natsha from Hebron; Jamal Mansour from Nablus; Sheikh Hassan Yousef; Muhammad Muslah from Ramallah; and Ayman Abu Taha from the Gaza Strip.
- 42 In Arabic, *wa-ansarha*. The meaning of the Islamic term *al-ansar* (helpers) refers to the men of Medina who joined the Prophet Muhammad when he arrived in their city and who were loyal to the new religion. A comparison of the supporters of Hamas who joined that organization to the supporters of the Prophet Muhammad at the beginning of Islam is an interesting analogy.
- 43 Cpl. Ilan Saadon and Sgt. Avi Sasportas were kidnapped in 1989. Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.134–41.
- 44 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, p.60. In the early 1980s, the military branch of the movement was already called *al-Mujahideen* and it worked side by side with the other branches that grew during the *intifada*. Among them was *al-Majd* (The

- Fame), which dealt with those who collaborated with Israel, with the corrupt foundations in society and also *Jihaz al-hadeth*, an event-planning system responsible for initiating demonstrations and confrontations with the IDF, the writing of slogans and the enforcement of strikes.
- 45 Sgt. Maj. Nisim Toledano was kidnapped on Dec. 13, 1992; Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.11–21.
- 46 During 1992–93, there were approximately 1,500 Hamas activist prisoners. In December 1992, Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin exiled 412 men. Hamas indicates that Rabin was forced to let them return but fails to mention that the reason for this change in policy is due to Israel losing a court case brought by human rights organizations in the name of the exiled, which was decided in the Supreme Court of the Jewish State which instructed the government on the limitations of the expulsion. *Ibid.*, p.61. Aviad, *Lexicon of the Hamas Movement*, p.16–17.
- 47 It was not insignificant that an increase in the number of activities for 1993 is emphasized. This is the year in which the Oslo Accords were signed. It was Hamas' purpose to show that the *intifada* was not dying. Taken from a Hamas propaganda film in which the filmmakers indicate that Israel turned to Arafat asking him to save them and take care of the local opposition. As Rabin said, "Arafat will deal with Hamas without Baga'tz and Betzelem." See: *al-Intifada min Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, Mulabasat al-Intifada al-Falastiniya, 1987–2000*, Part 10, Oct. 14, 2007.
- 48 Aviad, *Lexicon of the Hamas Movement*, pp.287–94. Between the years 1989–2008 there were 687 Israelis killed in the military activities of Hamas and thousands were injured in 245 acts of terrorism.
- 49 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, pp.63–65. Hamas pretty much explains the struggle with Israel as a cosmic one of war between the sons of light and the sons of darkness, as it was in the 1960s. This is a war between two civilizations: between Islam and Judaism, between the party of God (Hizb Allah) and the party of the Satan (The Jews).
- 50 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.29. These are the exact words from the last will of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood, which were said close to his death and are quoted by Azzam in his book: "It is necessary to smash the head of the Jewish adder snake," and "A Jewish State is a danger to Muslims." That is why all of the Muslim Brotherhood branches in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Palestine are committed to acting against the existence of the Jewish state.
- 51 This is Sayyid Qutb's exact conclusion in his book *Marakatuna maa al-Yahud*, pp.36–38. Ronald L. Nettle, *Past Trials and Present Tribulation: A Muslim Fundamentalist View of the Jews* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1987), pp.32–62. Nettle also includes an English translation of Qutb's chapter against the Jews, at the end of his book.
- 52 Aviad, *Lexicon of the Hamas Movement*, p.120, in the entry about Ahmed Yassin. According to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, one is allowed to reach a temporary settlement with Israel without abandoning the *jihad* against it. This is, according to his method, until Israel disappears from the map in the year 2027. The conditions of the agreement included full withdrawal from the lands of 1967, the dismantling of the settlements and the freeing of all Palestinian prisoners.
- 53 *Al-Sabil* [The Way], May 5, 1989. Quoted by Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism*, pp.14–15. Words of this nature are frequently publicized by Islamic factors. The argument is that any positioning towards the freeing of Palestine through Islam will hurt Israel, the imperialistic forces, and all of the factors of divisiveness and lies inside the Arab and Muslim states.
- 54 On the other hand, this does not prevent Hamas from using anti-Semitic expressions toward the Jews and calling them by different nicknames such as the

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- “sons of apes” and “my brothers the pigs,” or to use the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” as has been shown in the Hamas Charter. In the words of Hatem Yusuf Abu Zaydah, a Hamas activist, in *Jihad al-Ikhwan al-Muslamin*, “This is a battle between the true religion that the Muslims represent and the false religion represented by the heretics and leading the list are the Jews” (p.9).
- 55 See the interview with Khalid Mashal, director of the Hamas Foreign Office, on their website on the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Martyr Brigades. The headline reads, “Our top priority is to be free.” In this article, Mashal is asked about the peace process and he expresses relatively moderate views. However, he believes that there will be no political agreement with Israel without any real implementation of the “right of return” for the Palestinian refugees into free Israel and Jerusalem under the rule of Islam. “Our Priority is to be Free”, November 7, 2010, www.qassam.ps/interview-3733-The_full_text_of_the_interview_with_Khalid_Mashal_Our_priority_is_to_be_free.html/.
- 56 Hamas also presents Yasser Arafat as someone who sold out his values to Israel, which used him to overcome the Islamic opposition (*al-muqawama al-Islamiya*). From a Hamas propaganda film, Part 10, *al-Intifada min Bidayah wa al-Nihayah, Mulabasat al-Intifada al-Falastiniya, 1987–2000*, Oct. 14, 2007.
- 57 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, pp.67–68. This demand reappears frequently and is often used by Hamas in their arguments against the PLO. Hamas argues that it represents the Palestinian nation and therefore the PLO is not authorized to sign an agreement with Israel. This is in addition to the accusation against the PLO of being traitors to its values as they were expressed in the national charter of the organization.
- 58 It is nice to preach but not nice to follow through. When Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the organization showed just how such declarations were totally separate from their actions. In the civil war that broke out in the Gaza Strip on June 7–13, 2007, there were 161 Palestinians killed and close to 700 people injured. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.107–9.
- 59 *Ibid.*, pp.110–12. The Islamic zealots, among them Hamas, do not have any special affection for the Christians. Christians are often suspected of being conspirators with the West and with the Zionist enemy. After the revolution in Gaza in June 2007, the various streams of Islam, led by the Hamas, began to persecute the small Christian community that was found in the Gaza Strip. In a number of the incidents, they forced Christian personalities to convert to Islam by force, such as Professor Sana al-Sayegh, a lecturer at the Palestinian University in the city of Gaza. These persecutions, which included robbery and the burning of Christian institutions, caused most of the Christians to leave the Gaza Strip.
- 60 The Arabic phrase used here is *sagha mudhalla*, which means a pattern leading nowhere, “misleading.” This is a play on words, as *sagha* also means a man who goes off the straight path—the path of God.
- 61 This is a parable of an argument between kindergarten children. The Jews are the ones who opened with hostile activities and not the Palestinian Arab Muslim nation.
- 62 *Surat the Cow (al-Baqarah)* (2), verse 256. The Noble Quran site, <http://quran.com/2>.
- 63 *Surat She that is to be Examined (al-Mumtahanah)* (60), verse 8. The Noble Quran, <http://quran.com/60>.
- 64 In retrospect, the PLO also has this principle. The meaning of non-intervention refers to matters in the Arab states, but the question also relates to Hamas: Is it really carrying out this principle? There will be a separate discussion of this later.
- 65 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.41.
- 66 *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, www.sawt-alhaq.com/web/pages/Category.aspx?Id=2, a newspaper. See, for example, that on Dec. 22, 2002, Eli Yishai, the minister of

- the interior, issued a closure order against the newspaper due to its support of Hamas. The period of the order was for two years. The Islamic movement reacted against it, arguing that this was part of a world campaign that the United States and the world Zionists were mounting against Islam. This is similar to what occurred in 1990 when Aryeh Deri, the minister of the interior at that time, shut down the newspaper close to the time of the American attack. Reactions to the closing of the newspaper for *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* can be found on MEMRI, Jan. 9, 2003, www.memri.org/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&dbid=articles&act=show3&dataid=1578.
- 67 See also Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.234–37.
- 68 See www.ikhwan.net/forum/showthread.php?132389, July 25, 2010, the Muslim Brotherhood site. It is possible to see this in the words of support publicized on *Sawt al-Aqsa* (a Hamas news service station) and in telephone conversations between Dr. Muhammed Badie, the director of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time of writing, and Ra'ed Salah, before he was sent to prison.
- 69 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.39.
- 70 Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*, pp.270–71. Stendel also indicates the failure of the Arab states to find a solution to the Palestinian problem as well as the difficulties in Israeli Arab society.
- 71 Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.38–39.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p.40.
- 73 *Ibid.*, p.40.
- 74 Eli Rechtes, “The Islamic Movement in Israel, A Decade of Balance,” in David Menashri (ed.) *Islamic Fundamentalism: A Challenge to Area Stability* (Tel Aviv, 1993), p.74; Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.224–25. One example of such an activity took place in Feb. 1992, when three Israeli Arabs cruelly executed three Israeli soldiers in an army camp near Kibbutz Gilad.
- 75 File 272/03. BSh’P 5601/04. An indictment against Ra’ed Salah Mahajne, Mahmoud Mahajne (Abu Samra), Tawfik Mahajne, Nasser Aghbariya and Suleiman Aghbariya. The indictment was submitted on June 24, 2003. All of the prisoners, members of the Islamic Movement—the Northern Faction, were convicted based on it and they admitted their crimes in a plea bargain. The detailed indictment reveals very deep ties between the Islamic Brotherhood faction called the Islamic Movement in Israel—the Northern Faction, and the Muslim Brotherhood faction called Hamas.
- 76 *Al-Qassamiyun*, sheet 22, Sept. 2011. This is a periodical published by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. The nickname is attributed to the editor on the opening page of the magazine, and the poem in honor of Sheikh Ra’ed Salah appears on a background of the Temple Mount, p.33.
- 77 MEMRI, June 19, 2011, “What’s New? A Summary of News from the Middle East, June 19, 2011.” A translation into Hebrew of a news item first broadcast on a site identified with the movement, June 18, 2011, www.palinfo.com/site/PIC/default.aspx. On a report from MEMRI, see www.memri.org/cgi-eboxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=2880.
- 78 *Al-Qassamiyun*, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, pp.12–14.
- 79 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, p.199.
- 80 Lis et al., “The Preparation of the Indictment against Ra’ed Salah,” *Ha’aretz*, Aug. 8, 2007.
- 81 This quote can be found at Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam, www.palestine-info.info, May 23, 2009.
- 82 The Hamas Charter, para. 32, deals with the attempt to isolate the Palestinian nation. It is based on the translation of the charter from the original Arabic, which appears on the Reut Institute website, <http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/officialheb/20060206Hamas%20Covenant.pdf>.

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- 83 Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.121–23. Clear documentation from 1864, based on the reports of the foreign consulates, indicates the existence of a Jewish majority in the city of Jerusalem. International legitimization and recognition of Jewish rights in Palestine can be seen in the Balfour Declaration, publicized on Nov. 2 1917; in the wording of the setting up of the British Mandate, after World War I, which included Palestine and the land of Israel and even in the UN Charter that approved the British Mandate after World War II.
- 84 Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A'alam site, Oct. 27, 2010, www.palestine-info.info. This article was featured on the site's main news page.
- 85 See P001687/07, *The State of Israel vs. Ra'ed Salah Mahajne*, the ruling of the Hon. Judge Yitzhak Shimoni from the Shalom Court in Jerusalem, Nov. 5, 2009. In this decision, the judge calls attention to the negative behavior by the accused during the deliberation and the sheikh's accusations against the Israeli regime for carrying out crimes against al-Aqsa. The judge, in his reasoned ruling, rejects his arguments and sentences him to nine months imprisonment for attacking a policeman.
- 86 A'wad Abd al-Fatah, "Habab October ... Hamaya al-Munajazat, wafa li-al-shahada" [The October Uprising ... Keeping the Achievements and Moving on to the Martyrs' Death], from a site identified with Hamas, Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A'alam, at www.palestine-info.info, Oct. 26, 2010. The end of the article states that the article was originally published on the *Arab 48* site on Sept. 25, 2010.
- 87 *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, Oct. 31, 2008.
- 88 The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades site, July 9, 2011, www.alqassam.ps/arabic/news1.php?id=22867. "Haniyeh, al-Shaa'b al-Falastini Hadad Tariq al-Uda w-eye Tariq al-Muqawama" [Haniyeh the Palestinian People Defined the Way of Return as the Way of Opposition].
- 89 Muhammed Ben Fowzi Arnot is a Muslim Brotherhood activist from Jerusalem who has a wide range of Hamas contacts. See the verdict by Judge Moshe Baram, Shalom Court, *The State of Israel vs. Muhammed Ben Fowzi Arnot*, B'S 14805/09, Dec. 9, 2009.
- 90 Abbas Zachur was chosen for the 2006 Knesset election in 2006 and served there until the 17th Knesset in 2009. He is remembered as one of the leaders of the Islamic Movement in Israel and as an Arab leader in the city of Acre. Although he ran in the 2009 election as a member of the Balad Party and won the fourth position, he was unsuccessful in entering the Knesset.
- 91 See www.hemmah.net. From the movement's website, gleaned from various dates during the years 2009–11.
- 92 Mordechai Kedar, "The Al Jazeera Training Exercise Deviation," *Makor Rishon*, Diary, July 8, 2011, pp.10–11.
- 93 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.54. In para. 13, Azzam asks the members of the Islamic Movement to read the works of Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Mustafa Mashhur, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and others, all Islamic philosophers and activists in the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood.
- 94 See for example: al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, *Sarakha Tahdhir min Mukhataat 'Kedem Yerushalaim 'Urshalim Awal* [A Warning Call from the Program for the Advancement of Jerusalem-Jerusalem First] (Umm al Fahm, n.d., but according to content, written sometime between 2009 and 2010; al-Quds Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee of Silwan, *Silwan... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud* [Silwan: A Struggle for Survival and Presence] (Jerusalem, April 2010). Abd al-Karim abu Sanina appears in the pamphlet alongside Ali Ahmad Jabareen, one of the leaders of the northern Islamic Movement, who lives in Umm al Fahm.
- 95 *al-Mithaq*, January 18, 2008.
- 96 *al-Mithaq*, July 8, 2011.

- 97 This is also the conclusion of Mordechai Kedar, an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, in “The Arab-Israeli Citizens: Directions and their Meaning,” *Nekuda*, June 2007. In addition, one can also see this from the content of the articles that appear on the sites of both factions of the Islamic Movement. *Al-Mithaq*, www.methaq.org/ar, and Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya, www.sawt-alhaq.com/web/pages/Category.aspx?Id=2.
- 98 See for example, Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/search.aspx.
- 99 These remarks were publicized in an interview published on *Islam Online* of Sheikh Kamal al-Khatib, titled “Deputy to Ra’ed Salah in Israel: There is No Difference between Citizens and Military Men,” MEMRI, July 7, 2011, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show2&dbid=articles&dataid=2910.
- 100 Department of Information for the Muslim Delegation, Palestinian Legislative Council, *Khayma al-Iatisam* [Protest Tent] (West Bank, 2010). This is an official magazine published by the Palestinian parliament. In this issue, the struggle of the four Islamic representatives, led by the former minister on Jerusalem affairs in the Hamas government, Khaled Ibrahim Abu ’Arafah, who were exiled from their homes, is described. The issue opens with the blessings of the head of the Palestinian municipality legislature, Dr. Aziz Duwaik. See also: “Red Cross Slammed for Silence over Arrest of Palestinian Lawmaker,” *The Electronic Intifada*, October 15, 2011, <http://electronicintifada.net/content/red-cross-slamm-ed-silence-over-arrest-palestinian-lawmaker/10485>.
- 101 “The Defenders of al-Aqsa—The Military Section of Hamas which Serves as a Camouflage for Hamas Military Activities against Israel,” from the General Security Services site, July 7, 2011, www.shabak.gov.il/publications/study/Pages/hamas-130611.aspx.

3 Islam and Palestine

The philosophy of the Islamic Jihad

A day or night of girding the war saddle is preferred to a month of fasting and prayer.

*Hadith*¹

A *Jihad* now

The Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine is exactly what its name says it is. Its acknowledged goal is to encourage the *jihad* way in Palestinian society. This organization has significantly influenced the Muslim Brotherhood into adopting the belligerent *jihad* way over the course of the first *intifada* (1987–93). It is as if the men of Islamic Jihad argued the following in front of the Muslim Brotherhood (from which it had separated and whose approach it opposed): “Do not say a day will come—bring the day.” In other words, the Islamic Jihad in Palestine was telling the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip: Do not be satisfied with just the preparation of the hearts as part of *al-Mujama al-Islami*, but also act in the *jihad* way. *Jihad* now and not for the future. This way of thinking apparently began even before the successful Iranian Revolution, which we look at later, and grew stronger after the 1979 revolution and in the early 1980s. Right from its inception, the organization had an organized, pioneering plan of *jihad* in Palestine against the eternal enemy of the Muslims and the believers: the Jews.²

The disagreement that broke out at the end of the 1970s between Dr. Fathi Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz al-Shaqaqi, once head of the organization, Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Awda and Ahmad Yassin, the head of the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was not an ideological argument but a practical one. All of them saw all of the land of Palestine as land belonging to the *waqf* (an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law), which could not be divided. All of them objected to the secular nationalism of Fatah and all of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) factions:

The land, all of the land, either it will be the land of heresy or the land of Islam. There is no place for Arab Palestinian land or Jewish land ... the

whole land is for Allah and there is no place to sanctify the land other than to sanctify the land to Allah alone ... Nationalism, as a tie to the land, does not appear except in a society controlled by intellectual and ideological atrophy.³

A fascinating expression of the disagreement between Islamic Jihad and Hamas can be seen in one of the *jihad* proclamations apparently published in July 1988 during the first *intifada*:

Ten months after the blessed uprising, [from October 6, 1987, the day that the *intifada* broke out according to Islamic Jihad] several suspicious elements supported by the occupation authorities and imperialism were revived in order to shake the dust of years off of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, making him shine, placing him in a framework and giving him the label of a leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Just like that! Suddenly, this respected Sheikh of ours has turned into a shining television star where the Zionists dictate to him how to criticize the nationalist forces fighting in occupied Palestine and outside of it. The question is: Where was Sheikh Yassin for over 20 years? No one ever heard of him ... Everyone knows that this organization [Hamas] is nothing more than a name on a piece of paper. Its conspicuousness, especially now, is nothing more than a part of the conspiracy by the Jewish occupiers who wish to create a dispute between the Islamic Holy Warriors.⁴

Hamas activists and Islamic Jihad activists all react to the character of the dispute with the Jews in an identical manner. All of them, including members of Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood, grew up on the well-known story of Sayyid Qutb in *Marakatuna Maa al-Yahud* (Our War with the Jews), and of course, all agree with Abdullah Azzam's anti-Jewish words as they are expressed in his books.⁵ These men all believe that the words in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" are pure truth.⁶ All of them also view the struggle between Judaism and Islam as an eternal battle between two opposing cultures. In the 1970s, up until the *intifada*, the Muslim Brothers were the standard bearers for activities in the preparation of the hearts in Islamic society. The Islamic Jihad movement disagreed with the older organization and promoted its stirring slogan, "*Jihad* now." When seen from this point of view, it was a pioneer before the Islamic camp in Palestine. This movement considers itself the first *jihadist* movement under Israeli control, due to its activities when the first *intifada* broke out in 1987.⁷

The military activities of the Islamic Jihad organization, which was founded in 1979, were a guiding principle for the movement. Islamic Jihad has focused almost exclusively on violence and terrorism against Israeli civilians and soldiers and has generally ignored the need for an effective social welfare system, thus differing itself from Hamas both ideologically and operationally.⁸ In the beginning, these activities were carried out under the name of Islamic

Jihad in Palestine even though there were other factions also operating under this name. Some of these other factions were tied to Fatah, others to the other Islamic factions such as the Usrat al-Jihad of Abdallah Nimer Darwish, the founder, or perhaps it is more appropriate to say the reviver, of the Islamic Movement in Israel and the Islamic Jihad organization—Beit al-Makdis (the Temple Mount). It is not surprising that the Islamic Jihad organization sought a different way to emphasize its uniqueness. Today, certain Palestinian writers argue that it is the Islamic Jihad organization, headed by Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shalah, that is the successor to the *jihad* factions active in the 1980s.⁹ This organization has a small *dawah* network similar to that of the Hamas movement. The organization also has a military arm called the al-Quds Brigades. Today, the activities of this arm stand out, particularly the launching of rockets and missiles from the Gaza Strip towards the home front of the State of Israel. It also continues without pause its attempts to carry out quality attacks against Israel.

Despite the expulsion of the Islamic Jihad leaders, including Fathi Ibrahim Shaqaqi himself, the founder of the organization, 'Abd al-Aziz Awda and others, the organization is still very active. Since Dr. Shaqaqi's assassination in Malta on October 1995, it is Dr. Ramadan Shalah, one of the organization's founders, who now heads the organization.¹⁰ His seat of power is in Damascus. Muhammad al-Hindi, also one of the organization's founders, is the head of the organization's political arm and the man responsible for overseeing propaganda and explaining the steps taken by the organization. He resides in the Gaza Strip.

The organization's ideological viewpoint negates the possibility of any Jewish presence at all in Palestine—either within the 1967 boundaries or the 1948 boundaries. The organization does not commit itself to the Oslo Agreements or to the Tahadiya Agreements—the ceasefires that were agreed between Israel and Hamas. As far as the speakers for the organization are concerned, it is not a part of the Palestinian Authority. It has never recognized the Palestinian Authority as a legitimate ruling entity and therefore, unlike Hamas, it did not participate in the elections for the Palestinian Authority that took place in 2006. In light of this, it sees itself as free to act against Israel without any political limitations whatsoever.

The organization's *jihad* plan is absolute and includes aid to the remainder of the factions in order to free Palestine. The organization sees itself as a pioneer before the camp but it expects the camp to walk in its footsteps. A small example of this can be seen in an item published on the *Falastin al-Youm* website in November 2010:

Abu Ahmad, the speaker for al-Quds Brigade, the military arm of Islamic Jihad, said *that the opposition factions in Gaza established a joint operation room in order to unite their military activities. In the event of a new war, red lines would not exist and its rockets would reach past Be'er Sheva and Ashdod.* He also said that the opposition strives to pass on its

experience to the factions in the West Bank in order for them to act daily against the settlements and the army bases. And if Israel withdraws to the borders of 1967, the opposition will continue its activities in order to free all of Palestine.¹¹

There is only one *jihad* faction still active in the struggle against Israel from among all of the *jihad* factions active during the 1980s. Two other organizations, the Islamic Jihad Brigade and the Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis, suspended their activities in the 1990s for various reasons and a number of their people joined the ranks of the Islamic Jihad organization. This is despite the fact that Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis, founded by Sheikh Asa'ad Bayyoud al-Tamimi, continues from time to time until today to distribute proclamations. This chapter focuses on the Islamic Jihad organization because, in the words of Dr. Saleh, it is the inheritor of the 1980s *jihad* organizations and serves as an inspiration to additional groups with this name.¹²

B Questions and answers in Palestinian *jihad* philosophy

In a series of Islamic Jihad pamphlets titled “Islam and Palestine,” the organization defines its goals and plans.¹³ The pamphlet quoted below defines the importance of Palestine in Islam in the mirror of the Islamic Jihad organization through an historical survey of the organization. The pamphlet is written in two parts. The first part explains the role of the Islamic stream in the fight for Palestine, its loyalty to Palestine and the struggle's influence. The second part consists of questions and answers that are of interest to the Islamic Jihad organization.

On the cover of the pamphlet, under the headline “Islam and Palestine,” the following appears on a background of what appears to be the Old City of Jerusalem with a mosque in the middle:

The Islamic plan for our generation in Palestine

Under the headline appears the pamphlet's table of contents:

- Early signs and what will follow in their footsteps, the date and the ideology, the philosophical stream and the organization
- Questions and answers

The pamphlet opens with the following verses from the Qur'an:

Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-Haram to al-Masjid al-Aqsa, whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing. (1)

And We gave Moses the Scripture and made it a guidance for the Children of Israel that you not take other than Me as Disposer of affairs. (2)

O descendants of those We carried [in the ship] with Noah. Indeed, he was a grateful servant. (3)

And We conveyed to the Children of Israel in the Scripture that, “*You will surely cause corruption on the earth twice, and you will surely reach [a degree of] great haughtiness.*” (4)

So when the [time of] promise came for the first of them, We sent against you servants of Ours—those of great military might, and they probed [even] into the homes, and it was a promise fulfilled. (5)

Then We gave back to you a return victory over them. And We reinforced you with wealth and sons and made you more numerous in manpower. (6)

[And said], “If you do good, you do good for yourselves; and if you do evil, [you do it] to yourselves.” *Then when the final promise came, [We sent your enemies] to sadden your faces and to enter the temple in Jerusalem, as they entered it the first time, and to destroy what they had taken over with [total] destruction.* (7)

[Then Allah said], “It is expected, [if you repent], that your Lord will have mercy upon you. But if you return [to sin], We will return [to punishment]. And We have made Hell, for the disbelievers, a prison-bed.” (8)¹⁴

The majority of commentators attribute these sentences to events of destruction in the first and second temple periods when the kingdoms of David and Solomon were established and to the Hasmonean kingdom during the second temple period.¹⁵ Islamic Jihad’s explanation of these sentences is different, according to which the first time that the children of Israel oppressed the land and were arrogant was in the past, during the periods of the first and second temple as one. The second time the Jews were arrogant and oppressed the land is a prophecy from the Qur’an for the future. This future came to pass in 1948 when the Jews oppressed the land and exiled the majority of its Arab residents, and in 1967 when the Jews captured Jerusalem and what was inside it—the al-Aqsa mosque. That is how the prophecy was fulfilled, when Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers entered the Temple Mount and shamed the Arabs by destroying all that they had captured. The Muslim believers need to act with faith in order for their strength to be renewed and for God to pity them. That is the only way that they can deal with the second arrogance of the children of Israel.

Hamas commentators explain these verses from *Surat al-Isra’* differently. Hamas prisoner Fahmi ’Aid Ramadhan al-Mashaira, who called himself Abu ’Ubaydah al-Muqaddasi, wrote the following explanation in the introduction to his book:

The Jews corrupted this land, the first time in Medina and al-Hijaz, before and after the messenger [Muhammad] and his fellows arrived. They succeeded with the grace of God to remove this corruption. The second time of their [the Jews] corruption is here, [in] our land, in Palestine,

as this [these verses] are clarified [by our] modern commentators. This is the interpretation of the noble verse in *Surat al-Isra'*. "You will surely cause corruption on the earth twice and you will surely reach [a degree of] great haughtiness."¹⁶

The meaning is the same: The second corruption is Israel's existence and it should be destroyed.

I have changed the order of the translation and have begun this chapter with the second part of the pamphlet, the one that deals with the questions and answers as they were given by the movement's spokesman and founder. It appears that these answers supply appropriate explanations to all those who do not understand the difference between the way of Islamic Jihad and the way of the rest of the Palestinian movements, particularly that of Hamas. The answers have been given by the movement's spokesperson, Dr. Fathi Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz al-Shaqqaqi, known as Abu Ibrahim.

Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi is the founder and the general secretary of the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine. His family is originally from the village of Zarnuka, near Rehovot. His family emigrated to the Gaza Strip in 1948 and settled in Rafah. Fathi Shaqaqi himself was born in the Rafah refugee camp in 1951. He began his university education at Bir Zeit University but completed his study of children's medicine at Zagazig University in Cairo, Egypt. He was arrested in 1979, during his stay in Egypt, due to his ties with Islamist factors and for the publication of his book *al-Khomeini, al-Hal al-Islami wa-al-badil* (Al-Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and its Alternative).¹⁷ On November 1, 1981, he returned from Egypt to the Gaza Strip as he was wanted by Egyptian security forces. After his return, he established the Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine and served as its leader. Israel arrested him a number of times—in 1983 and in 1986. He was expelled from the Gaza Strip on August 1, 1988. From there he immigrated to Damascus where he established his command. Shaqaqi did not hesitate to work in different Arab capitals for the Palestinian problem, as he saw it. He was assassinated in Malta on October 28, 1995, while on his way back from a successful visit to his command post in Damascus from his visit to Qaddafi in Libya.¹⁸

***The Islamic plan for our generation in Palestine: Questions and answers*¹⁹**

Dr. Fathi Ibrahim [is] the official speaker for the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine, holding clear philosophical positions in the fields of philosophy, politics and the activities [of the movement]. He has been involved in the ideological and political activities [of the movement] from the beginning. From his seat [in Damascus], he teaches and completes his task of [controlling the] military activities inside Palestine for which he was arrested in his [own] garden and even exiled because of it. This discussion with him was held while he was in one of the districts of an Arab capital.²⁰

Question: What is the Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine and what is its stance as compared with those of all the other ideological political forces in Palestine?

Answer: The Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine tries very hard to answer the questions of the Muslim Palestinians of our generation. [The *jihad* organization] began with a philosophical discussion among a group of young, educated Muslim Palestinians during their studies in Egypt. The problem that these young people faced, those who were there from the mid-1970s, was how to throw away the secular nationalistic arguments [of the PLO activists] or to work to postpone the freeing of Palestine while removing Islam [from the discussion with questions about the struggle like the Muslim Brotherhood]. That is why [these same young people] argued frequently with some of [the members] of the Muslim Brotherhood or with those same [people] who considered Islam a loathsome religion as expressed in the literature of the secular organizations [as did those who belonged to] the Colonial Opposition Front!! On the other hand, the Islamic factor imposed a responsibility on its friends to keep Islam without recognizing its uniqueness and its centrality to the Palestinian problem which it felt could be postponed until the right conditions for *jihad* ripened and liberation arrived.²¹

That is the problem that we faced in the mid-1970s, where one could simultaneously see the distance from the Qur'an, from history and from the reality of the Palestinian question, from what we did when we accepted our strategic symbol: The Palestinian problem is the central problem of the Islamic movement/the Islamic nation. The meaning of this slogan is that there is no alternative to immediately beginning *jihad* without any postponement, hesitation or delay. From this we learn that one needs to solve the [Palestinian] question in Islam through the carrying out of *jihad* in order to free Palestine.

The Islamic Jihad movement is not only a fighting military group, as can be seen by its many activities, but the movement also frequently adds, before [the other movements], a new way of looking at things in relationship to Islamic activity [with] methodical and clearly defined opinions while paying attention to understanding Islam, Islamic history and the [Islamic] movement. Likewise, the movement recognizes science and facts [and uses them], for example in the periodical *al-Mukhtar al-Islami* [The Islamic Choice], which was published in Cairo in 1979 for the Islamic pioneers. So, too, in the periodical *al-Islam wa-Falastin* [Islam and Palestine] and also dozens of books, publications and the pamphlets published by the organization. In this way, Islamic Jihad in Palestine promoted the participation and the activities by the development of Islamic activities in our generation. The organization never stopped doing this as part of its practical business of *jihad* against the central enemy of the nation.

Thus, the Islamic Jihad movement participates and renews in thought and in general Islamic conversation especially in the Palestinian [dialogue]. The movement today, despite its young age, has a practical political stance and a lot of influence inside Palestine. [This is the uniqueness of the Islamic Jihad movement.]

Question: What are the ties of your Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine with the PLO, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas? What are the points that you have in common and what are your differences of opinion?

Answer: Starting from the beginning of the 1980s, we began acting vigorously in Palestine. We clearly showed the primary contradiction that existed in the attitude towards activities against the Zionistic enemy. [Our] activities were considered just an irritation to the enemy and the [Islamic] nation distanced itself from their execution.²² This enemy can only be uprooted [from Palestine] by force, as part of an inclusive campaign that will probably last for a long time. However, there are other Palestinian forces from whom we are ideologically and politically divided and our political and ideological discussions with them will last until we no longer have differences. We will solve the disagreement between us without conflict and without the use of violence. Despite the current existing critical atmosphere in this framework [of discussions between us], we are advancing our stance inside the PLO. *Our stance is that Islam, jihad, and Palestine are the three symbols that drive us and lead us in the Islamic movement.*²³ The PLO often carries some of these symbols as well. But what has happened in the past few years, specifically the organization's political concessions on Palestine without compensation, has created cracks between us. This rift is growing day to day and it is becoming almost impossible with every meeting of ours in light of the standpoint of the present organization.²⁴ In regard to our relations with Hamas, we emphasize that the Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine [brings] new blood and a new spirit to the Islamic movement. Our movement renews and digresses from it [from the Muslim Brotherhood movement]. There is a disagreement from an Islamic point of view just like there have been disagreements between the loyal Muslims²⁵ of all periods. This is with the knowledge that we are united in Islam and that Islam is stronger than what separates us. We are always putting out our hands to our brothers in Hamas for mutual assistance, coordination and unity. The *intifada*/revolution²⁶ also testifies to our true sacrifice between our standpoints. We hope that in this way we will fulfill and we will create a united Islamic stance that will heal and will lead the believers—a stance that will anger their enemies from the collaborators and infidels.²⁷

Question: It is known that a part of your activities stem from the organizational ties between you and the Fatah movement because Fatah provides you with aid and infrastructure. What is your reaction?

Answer: Let me add that this is an antiquated argument. The possibility [that Fatah is involved in the establishment of *jihad*] stems from a

black goal.²⁸ Believe me, if that was the truth, then why was a movement like the *jihad* movement created and established in the first place? [This happened] only because we looked at our souls. Yes, we were the last of all the [opposition] factions to be written down and we took upon ourselves the suffering in the establishment and the renewal [of our organization]. We are an independent Palestinian Islamic organization—philosophically, politically and organizationally. But there are the questions of support and aid. I want to make it clear and argue that we [the Palestinian Jihad], are the only Palestinian movement that does not receive any aid or help for any of its activities from the PLO or from Fatah. That is why we have had to reduce the intrigues.²⁹

Question: What is the story of the Islamic Jihad Brigades?

Answer: The brigades of the Islamic Jihad are not an independent organization, but that is their name [the military arm] until we complete the agreement between our movement and that of the Brothers and others.³⁰ It will be the address for our military activities and our attempt to absorb a larger number of holy warriors. The agreement is a guarantee that when the Islamic Jihad Brigades are established as a defined and independent organization, it will be clear that political opinions should no longer be published under that name [of the brigades]. The organization will also not allow the collection of donations in the name of *al-Saariya*.³¹ A public statement by the Brothers who were cooperating with us and supporting us called the brigades “the Jihad Brigades,” after the heroic martyrs Abu al-Hassan Qassim and “Hamdi” Adwan al-Tamimi, who died as martyrs in the month of *Shubat* [February] 1988.³² This was an incident that triggered a little bit of excitement and skepticism and caused us to return to the plan of establishing the Islamic Jihad Brigades. However, we still do not publicize military public statements in the name of the brigades in the years that have passed since then, unlike the enemy who does attribute the activities of the brigades, and this has happened to Fatah more than once. This is because a number of other brothers have not ended their ties with the Fatah movement.³³

Question: How many jihad [organizations] are there in Palestine today? Have these splits and disagreements been created when [these same organizations] went in the direction of jihad?

Answer: Despite the fact that there are many small and marginal organizations here and there which can be found at the side of every thought of every organization existing in Palestine, this trend does not just exist in occupied Palestine or only in regard to the Islamic Jihad movement. [The Islamic Jihad movement] alone furthers its stance and its methods in a manner that does not cause disagreements or dissension—the same split argued by those who ask how many *jihad* [organizations] there are. [There are] those who argue that a split presently [between the *jihad* organizations] is a passing phenomenon. This is incorrect in regard to the real implementation of the *jihad* movement [Islamic Jihad in

Palestine], which is considered to have the highest compatibility between ideology, politics and the organization. This is the way of representing the [leadership] of the movement who are really far away from Palestine due to its way of *intifada*/rebellion.³⁴ As a result of this, a number of important members of the military commanders and the cadres of the Islamic Jihad movement who had on their heads *shamaha*,³⁵ al-Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda, the spiritual counselor of the movement. All of the military commanders and cadres remained together until they finished the establishment of one Islamic *jihad* movement. Afterwards, they acted in the *jihad* way and when they are outside the occupied Motherland within a different organizational framework. So where is this supposed split?

Just as you do not have to neglect the use of the function of force and a number of simple tools, so is their attempt [of the enemy] to destroy the name of Islamic Jihad which ruins their places of rest and chases after them. Because this force and these tools [of different *jihad* organizations] are similar to each other like brothers. Hatred of the enemy is ready for this plot [to spread lies]. But God protects their steps and our movement and our holy martyrs whom they are also trying to ambush.³⁶

Question: What are your ties in all [disciplines] with Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah?

Answer: The Iranian Revolution has already presented itself as a good example of an Islam that opposes and rebels, emphasizing Islam's strengths on the plane of political activity and its influence while leading the public. [The meaning] as bestowed by the Imam [Ruhollah] al-Khomeini to the Iranians has left the Muslims with a new meaning in a world that is ruled by materialistic and corrupt fulfillment.

Therefore, we must follow in these footsteps, like all of the heroic world Muslims. Our movement, which looks towards the Islamic Revolution [in Iran] as an ally and a friend to the Muslims who are in a conflict with the cooperators and the infidels and the arrogant, is a totally independent movement that supports the Iranian stance out of mutual guarantees [as Muslims].³⁷

This is for the following reasons:

1. The approach and the Iranian responsibility towards Islam as a practical way of life, taking standpoints through Islamic unity and in its framework through spiritual elevation over [consideration of] nationalism, religious systems or ethnicity.

2. Their stance in regard to the Palestinian problem.

It is the Iranian position in regard to these two questions that defines our stance and our ties to Iran or to Hezbollah. Its military activities [of the Hezbollah organization] against the Zionist enemy stamped its positive signature inside occupied Palestine until the activities of Hezbollah [became a good example] of a martyr's death and the dream of every young Palestinian. We will strengthen our friendship with Hezbollah and we will support the *jihad* activities of that organization just as we will

support any Islamic movement that fights with *jihad*. So, too, with any Arab regime that has no official ties with any of the sides (such as Iran).³⁸

Question: Is it correct that you have been accused of joining the Shia?

Answer: Yes there was a scandal like that. That was an additional attempt to distance the nation from our *jihad* and our ideology. This is because of the uniqueness and the centrality of Palestine and our pushing for *jihad* now. This was the plot—that our position stems from the *Shia*. We will not stop gathering our views and our beliefs from the words of the caliphs, the religious wise men and the Muslim judges from the *Suna* family such as the ant [hoard].³⁹

Question: What is your stance in regards to the Gulf crisis?

Answer: From the early days of the crisis, we emphasized that we were speaking about an internal Arab Islamic problem and any foreign intervention was suspect. This Western Atlantic invasion is no more than a new crusader war led by America in order to ensure its control over this area like in the rest of the world. [The goals of America also include] the prevention of the loss of the oil wells and the additional natural resources slipping through its hands and also a continuation of the divisions [in the Arab world]. An additional goal is the protection of the Zionist entity by basing this entity as a fated edict against our nation, its problems and the blessed *intifada* of ours. The [Western] invasion is also aimed at stopping the reawakening of Islam and has come out against it. Because we have so announced and rejected [the American operation] and we have come out against this invasion. We [Islamic Jihad] have rejected all the symbols and headlines that were revived as a result of and during the [invasion]. We have demanded from the Arab and Islamic nation and public and from all the martyred warriors who are rebelling and those who are loyal and who will go out against the forces of the invasion because they will burn the land under the balls of their feet and they will return as defeated or they will die in the desert.⁴⁰ It is necessary to solve the Iraqi–Kuwait problem according to the free will of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi nations—a solution based on a united Arab Islamic stand which rejects foreign interference as well as demanding the withdrawal of the foreign forces immediately.

Question: After three years of intifada, where will we go from here? What will be the influence of the Gulf War [August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991] on the intifada?

Answer: After one looks around a little bit, one can see that since the Gulf crises, the *intifada* is in retreat. The truth is that the events of the Gulf pulled the eyes of the world by force [from their involvement in the *intifada*]. The Palestinian nation was the central topic in the world [before the events in the Gulf] and world awareness focused on the Palestinian nation in general and on what was happening inside the occupied homeland in particular. [World public opinion] is something that this nation needs fully. [The nation] knows that everything that

happens in the area turns [the Palestinian problem] over in the beginning and it turns over a new [stage]. This is because those with this problem [in other words the Palestinians] are aware of the source of this [problem] and the danger within, and therefore it is very highly emotional [from their point of view]. They are aware that the problem and what caused it and its result all [exist] at the same time.⁴¹

When the Gulf crisis broke out, during the third week or at the beginning of the fourth week, the Palestinian people waited [for the crisis to pass]. But the events and confrontations broke out quickly, sharply and violently [and they continued]. This blessed *intifada* already made it clear that it was a natural part of people's lives and that there was no way to uproot it. The [intifada] has turned into a way of life that people go to each morning just like workers go to their factories and students go to their schools. This is [an integral] part of their lives, strength and tremendous morale without any possibility of extinguishing it or quelling the coals. The *intifada*/revolution cannot free al-Aqsa, not in the evening of the day and not in the morning of the next day as long as it is alone and orphaned, limited and isolated.⁴² They [the rest of the Arab states that stand on the side] present [to the *intifada*] crumbs instead of covering their blindness and their open shame to all of those with whom they are connected by games of chance and the stock market. The *intifada* is a genius event renewal and a wonder.⁴³ The *intifada* is racist in its righteousness [*because it is aimed against the Jew*]. It has not stopped since the First World War and the Balfour Declaration [in 1917] in various forms. The *intifada* changes the balance of powers as a result of the *jihad* of the nation—all the [Islamic] nation—and this is the way. We already imposed [a hard blow] —in the *intifada*—we advanced on the right road but we are at a difficult and tiring point of the struggle. *Jihad* is long and will not end quickly, but our dawn will still light. The flags of Islam will still fly on top of al-Aqsa mosque and on all sides of Beit al-Makdis.

When we test the Gulf crises in a real, deep way, one cannot say that we depended on public opinion or that we depended on the Arab stance, which was nothing but deception. Therefore, God will save us from all those hugs that kill. Hugs that try to cause us to accept the official Arab international standpoint as a solution to our problems which is through the American Zionistic way which is carried out today as if a fragrance.⁴⁴

These questions and answers fully explain, in the words of Fathi Shaqaqi, the organization's heritage. We, in Islamic Jihad, are not step-children of the Islamic movement but a significant part of it. Islamic Jihad is the pioneer going ahead of the camp. Just like Islamic Jihad was the first that began the first *intifada* already in October 1987 [*not* December 1987!] and began with a series of cruel terrorist attacks unlike any before in which dozens of Israelis

were killed so that the rest of the movements, including Hamas and Fatah, adopted our way and went in our footsteps. The uniqueness of the Islamic Jihad movement is “in the newness of its activities and the daring of its members.”⁴⁵ On the movement’s site you can view fighting films where movement activists are seen wearing the special brown and yellow colors on their heads with an emphasis on the pride in the unit of the organization.⁴⁶

C The Islamic action plan of the Islamic Jihad organization

The Islamic action plan is expressed in the first part of the Islam and Palestine brochure. The plan is simple and repeats the motifs that also exist in the other fundamentalist movements. Despite the fact that some time has passed since these words were written, these words are still distributed in various different publications and also on the website of Saraya al-Quds, the military branch of the movement. Due to its importance, an exact translation of the content is given here:

The early signs and what will come as a result of them, the date and the ideology, the philosophical stream and the organization.

1 Where did the idea to establish a jihad Islamic movement come from?

Does the new era come where the dream and the plan for independence come true? Is it not a little early, is not [the time] too early for a secret movement!! Is it really a secret movement? Has the time passed and is it no longer [for the establishment of this movement]? Can it not be like this at its foundation [an independent secret movement]? I will ask about this big subject a lot but will not answer it in this file. This is because there will never be a [file] large enough to tell about the history of the movement from the beginning of the dream and the first discussion that took place in the middle of the 1970s until [the movement] became one of the three most important forces inside the occupied homeland. [This] was by adapting a modern-day Islamic program, revolutionary and independent, which grants victory and glory with God’s help.

I will try to answer many of [these] questions on this large subject in this file—either simply or elaborately. This file will not mention some of the other parts [of the first *intifada* events], despite the fact that it would advance a clear answer on a different portion of these events. The answers [that will be presented] refer to a basic and urgent matter of investigation and important learning which were carried out by mistake a number of times [and now it is time to explain this correctly]. Those [who oppose the movement] write about it—with an intellectual and emotional argument [with us, the Islamic Jihad movement] whose faith is lacking in them.

We are not a derivative of the Fatah movement—despite the fact that some of us or a small number of our brothers lived and fully withstood

the national test in a way with far-reaching consequences. Likewise, we did not leave the Muslim Brotherhood organization, as many people believe, despite the fact that a large part of our important leadership lived and withstood the difficulties of this experience. [We] are part of the new, modern Islamic experience and from the religious atmosphere—as in the correct expression—“be one of the most important workers with certain influence or move on.”

Despite the depth of the Islamic experience and its important Islamic tradition [throughout the years], [a tradition] that stands on the ruins of the nationalistic experience, we will not be predisposed to materialism or to dividing our one organization for the good of one [of the nationalistic groups]. In no way will ten or twenty intellectuals from the middle class band together to create a top party [separate from us]. [We] will not be like the Nationalistic Front which left the Arab nationalistic movement nor like Fatah which exited the womb of the Muslim Brotherhood but remained nationalistic parties.⁴⁷

This is the generation of rebirth of the Islamic movement of our generation whose period has come after the setting of the sun of the caliphate (in 1924). A generation that has been consolidating from the year 1967 and which is fulfilling its mission with its own ideology and with the organization of its movement [the Islamic movement]. But, after he died as a martyr, [Hassan] al-Banna was the beginning of the generation of persecution. Although after the catastrophe of the summer of 1967 and the falling of the *Beit al-Makdis*,⁴⁸ the 1967 War was a thundering defeat and an historic earthquake for the [Islamic] nation from among all the events that were and for the conscience of the nation [how did it get to here]. That is how [the Islamic reawakening] gradually arrived. The third generation: the generation of the awareness and the revolution which deals with the challenge after the falling of the caliphs. We have arrived from a road of suffering of that generation and have grown from among the ruins of that same [historic] earthquake. [The withdrawal in 1967] was, for us, like the night that a dream was broken. The Palestinian question moves for us on a blocked road, as if the specialness [of Palestine] died ... We cried ... We screamed for help ... We cracked our heads [from pain] ... so we screamed word after word until we finished expressing the crying [over the destruction]. Then we began to be happy again at the moment that we revealed the mission and the historical fear of the creator which is unlimited and which is found on top of the holy *Beit al-Makdis*.

In no way will we stop carrying out this policy but only in [the way] of Islam, as we have sometimes been asked. In no way will we bow under the weight of Palestine except [only] from the Qur'an. We can only hope for that distant day when Palestine is alone [and when we] are holding on to her land and no more than that. That is what has happened to us. We [are] at the height of the suffering, at the height of the strength of

thought. The *jihad* and its suffering [due to the struggle over Palestine]. [We are working] from the point of view of trying to be serious and from prayer that they have inside them to get close to God. We are testifying on Palestine ... We testify on her [as it is written] in the heart of the Qur'an ... We testify on the [night] journey of al-Isra' which only lasted a few hours. But this *sura* was left as is throughout all of our history that has lasted 1,400 years from Mecca to Medina until the Beit al-Makdis. From Muhammad, peace be upon him, and from the Qur'an which was brought down to us by the Prophet Muhammad. The perfect Qur'an is its righteous way and in its deeds from Banu Qurayza to the Likud [party] from the Hira cave⁴⁹ to the Camp David Accords. From the first promise until the last promise [in the future to come], "to spy after the houses" until "you will not have any notables"⁵⁰ from the Qur'an to the Qur'an. We embraced one another. We cried out from happiness. We began everything after this without time. Without time in light of this we discovered the secret words.

From studying this part of the pamphlet, a number of interesting points arise and it is fitting that one should give an opinion of them regarding the movement.

First of all, the movement defines itself as one made up of many different streams of Palestinian society and not as one that has left the Muslim Brotherhood or Fatah. The movement emphasizes that it is independent, original and new, and is not a movement that separated from other movements due to arguments or differences of opinion, as some researchers have argued.

Second, there is the historical perspective of the movement, according to which there are three generations in the Islamic movement. The first generation is that which initiated and fought. The generation that existed from 1924, the year of the abolition of the caliphs in Turkey, until 1949, the date of the assassination of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The second generation is the defeated generation which suffered the persecution of the secular regimes led by Egypt under the leadership of Nasser. This generation groaned in the prisons of the regime. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Islamic activists of that generation looked forward to a defeat of the Egyptian Army due to Nasser's crimes against the Muslim activists and the murder of the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Sayyid Qutb. The third generation is the generation of hope. It considers itself a part of a generation that acts due to an Islamic calling of *jihad* which is aimed at the total freeing of the lands of Palestine.

Third, there is the attitude towards Jerusalem. There is no mention in this document of al-Aqsa but rather by the Jewish name of the location, Beit al-Makdis (the Holy Temple). This is where the first temple of King Solomon stood, and the second temple. The importance of the Temple Mount is not just due to Muhammad's night journey, which is mentioned in *Sura* 17 and

discussed here previously, but also because the Jewish Temple was in that place. The Islamic name for Jerusalem, Beit al-Makdis, stems from this fact.

Fourth, there is the Jewish connection. The informative historical connection that the *jihad* activists make between Banu Qurayza, the Jewish tribe that was cruelly murdered according to Muslim tradition by Muhammad, and the Likud movement of today that represents the Jewish regime just as his Banu Qurayza represented him in his time in the city of Medina. This comparison also openly hints at what the fate of the Jews of the Likud movement should be in the end.⁵¹

Fifth, there is the Islamic crisis. While it is true that Islam went downhill, there is nothing from their point of view that illustrates this better than the comparison between the revelation of Muhammad in the Hira cave to the embarrassing surrender agreement, the Camp David Agreements, which were carried out by the Egyptian national movement. One should absorb the political ways from the Qur'an and from the Prophet and not enter into these types of agreements with the enemy.⁵²

2 What caused us to be the pioneers?

In no way shape or form can there be a sufficient compromise between Islam and nationalism as remarked upon by a senior personage in the Israeli Secret Service to one of us many years ago in our first years [as an organization]:

You ... you are worse than whatever preceded you [from all of the other Palestinian nationalistic organizations]. You are those who focus on [the tear] between Islam and nationalism. Because of this, it is [hard] to throw you off your path, except for ripping you out by your roots.

We could not be like this in the middle of the way [between nationality and Islam]—a way that reflects a continuing disagreement between the absolute fact until the history from the Qur'an to Palestine, an argument that does not know what will be and continues [this argument between us] like an example.

In no way will this journey be easy—the journey that has caught us [filled with] mines and in the land [of Palestine]. But we have become strong in our faith and in our piety and we have dealt [in our own way] with the despair:

Indeed, no one despairs of relief from Allah except the disbelieving people.

*(Surat Yusuf, verse 87)*⁵³

He said, “And who despairs of the mercy of his Lord except for those astray?”

*(Surat al-Hijar, verse 56)*⁵⁴

And also against fear:

Those to whom hypocrites said, “Indeed, the people have gathered against you, so fear them.” But it [merely] increased them in faith, and they said, “Sufficient for us is Allah, and [He is] the best Disposer of affairs.

(*Surat al-Imran*, verse 173)⁵⁵

And against those who retreat:

[Muhammad is not but a messenger. [Other] messengers have passed on before him. So if he was to die or be killed, would you turn back on your heels [to unbelief?]?] And he who turns back on his heels will never harm Allah at all; but Allah will reward the grateful.

(*Surat al-Imran*, verse 144)⁵⁶

What depresses us more is those who do not understand how much it weighs on us [the lack of your understanding] because some of them think that this [the Islamic Jihad movement] is a passing phenomenon. This is because they do not understand the movement of history and the logic of history. They do not understand the secret of the questions that we answer [in our faith]. A portion of them initially praised us: “This is the real Islam that we are seeing.” But afterwards, they disappeared in this manner and they looked forward to how much [profit] they could make from this phenomenon [of the youth of Islam]. They also do not understand this movement. You see there is no possibility that you will see it is right to change the God and therefore there is no possibility to change the promised and independent Islamic plan [which provides a solution] to a number of ways of looking at the things that are not clear [in society] or to build [the society] like a large river. We understand the matter that this is a [vision] that will take a long time and we are advancing the time [or the redemption]. We have already dug into the rock with our fingernails. We have gathered [knowledge] and we have thought until many were astonished how we could carry out our dream [of the Islamic plan] in a political manner, in a way with influence, and the more days that pass that lack the regular conditions, such as the lack of technique and the experience [like the nationalist movements]—but we are blessed with an ideology and with a [strong] will and [energetic] blood.

3 *Who led the first intifada and when did it break out?*

After we have presented these words, is it possible to announce what is the essence of our journey. No ... because the truth is that what has awakened [the public] is one photographic picture after another. [This picture] teaches [us] and it depends on the distance [that we have to go] until we reach freedom. But the total research [on our journey], its purpose, is just to add another proven argument on the need for *jihad*.

Sheikh Musbah al-Suri was one of the members of the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine who was murdered on an October night in 1987.⁵⁷ The sheikh became a martyr when killed by a bullet by the men of the Israeli *mukhabarat* [*shabak*, secret service]. The hero sheikh finished publicizing parts of the Qur'an, 30 chapters, chapter by chapter, verse by verse. He fell, wallowing in his own blood on that same night in October, after many long years of *jihad* and opposition passed him by. In 1985, the sheikh was released after he had sat in jail for 15 years. This is after he became submerged in a trial where he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Truly [the sheikh] was worthy of getting out of prison earlier—in order to join the ranks of his friends in the Islamic Jihad movement and to continue the killing [of the infidels] after he was released from prison after a year of imprisonment [in order for him to continue on the way] of freedom and *jihad*. In the end, after a whole year [of imprisonment], Sheikh al-Mujahid led a famous jail break from the Gaza prison with five of his holy warrior brothers. During a period of five months, Musbah and his brothers spread fear among the ranks of the [Zionistic] enemy, until Gaza was turned into a hell—as one of them said. Not just this, but in addition, one of the Knesset members demanded a withdrawal from Gaza without any limitations or terms. All this was a result of the activities of Islamic Jihad in which Sheikh Musbah participated [according to] the movement's plans.

Musbah was the first of the heroes who escaped from prison at the same time with additional martyrs. It was on the same night of that immortal evening of the month of October. One cannot compare [this day] to ordinary days. It was on a Tuesday night, October 6 [*Tishreen al-Awwal*] in 1987. On that same night, the heroes of Islamic Jihad, Muhammad al-Jamal, Sammy al-Sheikh Khalil, Ahmad Halas, Zahadi (Fayez) Qaraqe, entered a wild war against the soldiers of the occupation and the men of the secret service. They killed them and hurt [the enemy] until the four heroes who were organized by [Sheikh] Musbah fell and they joined the unending ranks of those who were sacrificed.⁵⁸

October 6, 1987 is a turning point, the most important day in the lives of the Palestinian nation. The blood of the five martyrs magically influenced the [Palestinian] public. They [the brothers] were joined from the hills of Palestine and they stormed [the enemy] who was in their way on the way of the [five] martyrs. It was like a large river which flowed with plenty, flowing from the blood [of the martyrs] that were renewed. The people eulogized them. All of the people went to their funeral and marched to their graves [of the martyrs]. That is how the shouting in the Palestinian street [to wake up and act against the occupation] increased in that same year [1987]. The public that eulogized and was angry [over the deaths of the martyrs, the members of Islamic Jihad] around the smell of musk and around the birds that flew around their bodies and their graves around and around ...⁵⁹

The babies that were born in those days and in those weeks carried the marvelous names of the martyrs. With their pure blood, the nation entered and Palestine entered and the Islamic Jihad movement entered a new stage in the stages of the struggle. With the blood [of the five martyrs], we all entered the *intifada*—the revolution. That is how the Palestinian nation captured a new stage in the stages of the hard and long struggle. That is how the Islamic Jihad movement entered its third stage while only a few years since its creation. [The activities of the movement] are above the [battle]field where they touch one another with the whole truth and between, the words of nothingness and the total lie. The total truth is represented by the plans of God and His servants who believe in Him and in their heads their fierce heroism. The worlds of total lies are represented by the children of Israel, the Western crusader attack and their tools and those that today replace them in the area.

The Battle of Shuja'iyya took place on October 6, the day that the *intifada* broke out according to Islamic Jihad. This is how this movement highlights its uniqueness—as a pioneer in front of the camp. The one that led to the first *intifada* is not Fatah, which was established at the end of the 1950s, nor the Muslim Brotherhood, from which Hamas grew, but the Islamic Jihad which according to its members represented a young movement, refreshed, innovative and pioneering. Founder rights go to the men of the organization who announced out loud, “*Jihad* now.”

In this section, the historical division in the development of the movement also stands out as presented by Islamic Jihad. The first stage, the one in which the movement was founded, is the founding stage from the end of the 1970s. The second stage, after the return of Fathi Shaqaqi to the area of the Gaza Strip from 1982 onward, is the period of the beginning of the *jihad* and the movement's military activities. The third stage is from the time that the *intifada* broke out up until the 1991 Madrid Conference. At this stage Islamic Jihad saw itself as a partner in the struggle of the Islamic bloc and as its leader, together with Hamas. The pamphlet deals with only these first three stages.

The Islamic Jihad approach prides itself on the total distinction between good and bad and between truth and lies. From its point of view, its way is the way of *jihad* and the killing of innocent Jews which is a true way and one which is elevated and admired. The way of the children of Israel and the Jews today is a way of lying and they have to be destroyed because this is the word of God. Their responsibility to *jihad* is absolute without any concessions. Death in the struggle against the Jews is of course seen as blessed and, according to them, it will only stop when the Jews are finally subdued.

4 Principles of Islamic Jihad

At the beginning of the 1980s, the sons of the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine began to define their identity, their positions and their influence.

At the time of the sinking [of Islam], they began to dream about the return of Islam to the historical stage above Jerusalem and its streets, the *Beit al-Makdis* and the corners of the *Beit al-Makdis* [Jerusalem and her surrounding areas]. They chose to establish a bridgehead in the war against the colonial-Zionist plan. And so it was, at the beginning of the 1980s, [the members of Islamic Jihad] began to publicize from above the lands of al-Isra' and al-Miraj [and to present themselves] as a power from God which carried clear plans explaining that it is Islam and the world in its [current] state that have returned to create [Islamic] things from the revolutionary Islamic point of view that is clear and marked.

So it was with the movement's ability to build its leadership within a short period, to build its strength which would carry out its practical tasks and their future activities. Most important is that it was able to be a pioneer in uniting the [Palestinian] public which reveals its glory. [This public] revealed the faithfulness of the movement, its steadfast stance, its military willingness [for battle], its dedication and its sacrifice.

This first stage is different in the character of its public activities and in the ability [of the movement] to mobilize propaganda and in centralized political activities. That is how [the activities of the movement] reached all of these places—the mosques, the houses, the streets, the schools, the various institutes, the universities, the associations, the institutions and the various professional institutions [of Palestinian society]. That is how it had the ability to establish an Islamic stream, of the people and *jihad*. The movement began to redesign the next step and to lead to an exit from the situation where there was a lack of an Islamic presence and a forgetfulness of [Islam] as it existed in Palestinian society during the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. This was until [the Palestinian nation] came in direct contact with the conflict with the Israeli manifestation and with the principles [of the movement] that are expressed in its strategic slogan of Islamic Jihad: "The Palestinian problem is the central problem for the Islamic movement in our generation."

This is a slogan that began in an exceptional manner and even very, very exceptional, through advertising over a small number of months. That is how a *jihad* stream, active on the Palestinian street, yearning for an Islam that fights the holy war [*al-Islam al-Mujahid*] was created. Already, in the first attempt by the [Islamic] stream which took place in the student election in the Islamic institutions in Gaza at the beginning of the 1981/82 school year, it received 16.5% of the vote while the Fatah covenant and the left received only 22% of the vote.

This stage also differs in its proclamations and its many secret publications that the movement put out on its own, which the [Palestinian public] was not used to before this. These were publications, newspapers and printed books. Among them were these publications:

- *Al-Nur al-Islami* [The Islamic Light]: [The] distribution [of this newspaper] reached a record number due to the distribution method. The newspaper pages emphasized the *dawah* (the reading and the invitation) to the [Islamic] program and the consolidation of all of the points of view of the Islamic revolution. In regard to the subject of the Palestinian problem [it emphasized] that it was the central problem and it should be paid attention as a daily Islamic matter. In addition, the newspaper also looked at the subject of Islamic unity which is one of the central problems that the newspaper dealt with.
- *Al-Haqiqa* [The Truth] was published by the Islamic Student Association in the occupied Motherland which represents the general student branch of the Islamic Jihad movement. The newspaper was filled with discussions on the problems of the students. Likewise, the newspaper included social problems in addition to general Islamic problems.
- *Sawt al-Mustadh'afin* [The Voice of a Depressed People]: This is a secret newspaper also published by the movement [Islamic Jihad] and which was also distributed among the students.
- *Al-Bayan* [Public Opinion]: This was published consecutively as a replacement for *al-Haqiqa* newspaper. This was one of the most important publications ever published by the Islamic Student Union in the occupied homeland and its distribution numbers were high in relationship to the other publications of Islamic Jihad and perhaps even more from any [other] written publication in the field of the occupied homeland. The newspaper dealt with the problems of Islam, Palestine and the most important student problems.
- *Sawt al-Jama'a al-Islamiya* [The Voice of the Islamic Group]: This is a weekly publication published by al-Jamia al-Islamiya movement in Gaza.⁶⁰ It represents the Islamic Jihad bloc of students inside the universities. Due to the small size of [the movement], it was influential until it turned into a newspaper of only one page, despite the fact that the newspaper dealt with a number of problems [in each issue]. *Sawt al-Jama'a al-Islamiya*, like the newspaper *al-Bayan*, was published continuously in 1984–85.

It should be added that these newspapers and publications, which were written by the movement or in which it wrote a part of the lessons or from the large books of the Islamic philosophers which stand out in their special importance due to their depth, the way is clear, an explanation of the recurring Islamic positions and the return of [the way of] *jihad* for the nation.⁶¹ That is how the movement published a number of lessons of the [Islamic] plan in a series of pamphlets called *Dafater Islamia* [from Islamic companies], among them:

- *The Palestinian Problem is the Central Problem. Why? (al-Qadiye al-Filistiniyeh Qadiye Merkaziya, li-mada?)*

- *The Beirut Battle: The Palestinian Experience from the Islamic Point of View (Ma'arakat Beirut: al-Taghriba al-Filistiniyeh min manzur Islami)*
- *Fatah, from the Momentum to the Valley (Fatah min al-Intalaqa ila al-Baq'a)*
- "Is there a Revolution in Islam?" (Hal fi al-Islam Thoura?), *al-Mustalah [The Reformer]*
- *The Ebb and Flow in the Islamic Way (al-Mad wa-al-Jazar fi al-Massira al-Islamiya)*
- *The Characteristics of the Longed for Identity (Malamah al-Dat al-Manshuda)*⁶²

That is how this stage continued with conferences and lessons, the buying of knowledge, the *dawah* activities and the studying [of the Qur'an] in the mosques, in buildings, in universities and organizations. The mosque of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, which is found in the northern Gaza Strip, is considered one of the largest mosques in the Gaza Strip. The mosque served as a *jihad* center where activity never ceases. The Friday sermon and prayers were led by the same religious wise man, holy fighter Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda. At any weekly opportunity, there was a meeting [where there were gathered] an enormous number of people from the Muslim Palestinian nation. They fulfilled the [commandment] of prayer and listened to the Friday sermon at the mosque which, for a long time, excelled at drawing [the listening public] in its own way [that was defined] and its own components [for a solution to] all of the problems on the two planes—the Islamic and the Palestinian. That is why the mosque Izz al-Din al-Qassam turned into a weekly meeting place for the public with Sheikh al-Mujahid [Abd al-Aziz Awda]. The presence of the movement [of Sheikh Awda] was [felt] throughout Palestine on the other days of the week as well, with his preaching and explanations encouraging *jihad* for God and opposition to the occupation. When [its movement] was reaching its experience and killing those who were carrying out the sin [killing collaborators with Israel].⁶³ [Its goal was] to wake up the [Palestinian] public, to express its anger and its protests which even reached the hospital where he was lying. [The public also] came to the mosque where [the sheikh] always was and from where he would publicize the foundation of his ideals, a collection of his traditions [that supported his sermons]⁶⁴ and the continuation of the method of *jihad* and revolution. [As a result of the sheikh's activities] al-Jamia al-Islamiya proclaimed that as a representative of all of the desires of the [Palestinian] students in one voice, "We are all Abd al-Aziz Awda, Islam, Awareness and Revolution."

At this same stage, the Islamic Jihad movement again went out and led the public in its holiday prayers outside, under the open sky, while holding a political religious demonstration which showed that we were not

afraid of anyone. That is how the occupying authorities were pushed into carrying out a surprise attack on the location of the holiday prayer and prevented the prayers by armed force. The Islamic Jihad movement began to revive the *Laylat al-Qadr* [the Night of Fate] which takes place each year.⁶⁵ The movement revived this great night with a ceremony and an Islamic party which took place in the plaza of the al-Aqsa mosque where there were thousands of the sons of the Palestinian nation present. There they recited verses from the Qur'an, they preached sermons and they spread *dawah* [which dealt] with the problems of the nation by explanations and analysis. This is with teaching and singing songs of *jihad* and the *intifada*.

At every chance like this, the movement made sure to concern itself with positioning itself to the public, standing at its head and protecting it while it was standing before it, by showing an uncompromising personal example. The movement excelled in its pioneering job and stood at the head [of the insurrectionists] in the *intifada* of April 1982, which broke out as a result of the firing incident by one of the occupation soldiers inside al-Aqsa mosque. The movement erupted [against the occupation] and as a result of this event circulated its public opinion and its *dawah* literature under the name, "The Sons of the Islamic Intifada in Palestine." The movement published secret publications under the name the "Movement of the Sons of the Qur'an" and also "the Sons of al-Aqsa." As a result of that event, Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda led a public protest inside the large mosque building al-Omari in Gaza. The movement brought out the sons of the Gaza Strip and the loudspeakers of the mosque called out to come to the great al-Omari mosque where the public could meet the sheikh and his brothers who were present there.

The [Israeli] occupation authorities were unable to keep quiet when faced with this revolutionary *jihad* spirit. In the months of August and September 1983, the [authorities] began a campaign of widespread arrests in the ranks of the movement which included the brother Dr. Fathi al-Shaqqi and 25 of his brothers [movement activists]. These arrests were group arrests [administrative arrests], the first against any Islamic group in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip taken by the Israeli authorities since 1967. Despite the cruel punishment that the Israeli government and their secret service meted out, there was no way that they were able to reach the power base [of the movement] or its organizational infrastructure. This is despite the fact that [the Israeli authorities] tried to do so over a long period of questioning of over five months. At the same time, the [occupation] authorities rejected [the request] for the house arrest of Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda and also a number of his brothers [movement activists] who were accused of membership in the Islamic Jihad movement. That is how they prevented Sheikh [Abd al-Aziz Awda] entrance into the Islamic University where he would give lectures and classes on the Islamic *shari'a*.

But this way [of occupation], these defeats, were unsuccessful in crushing [the organization] and were without value. These arrests became a new turning point in the way of the movement and drove the public to rally around it. That is how a year passed, one in which administrative arrests were carried out which led to the stage of armed *jihad* which became stronger between the years of 1986–87. That is how the movement, despite the unusual pressure [that was forced on it], succeeded in carrying out military actions and to realize through its armed activities its strategic symbols, “the Palestinian problem is the central problem of the Islamic movement.” This activity in no way lessened the character of the people’s activities, drafting the crowd and political activities that survived in the first level [of movement activities]. On the contrary, [the movement’s activities] gave momentum to its establishment of a new protective force, real and stable [for the Palestinian people].

In the month of March 1986, the Israeli authorities arrested the brother Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, and accused him of involvement in an armed association, which, since 1984, had carried out eight military activities against the occupation forces. Approximately two months afterwards, Sheikh Musbah al-Suri was arrested with a group of his brothers on the charge of carrying out military activities against the occupation forces, carrying [illegal] weapons and a large number of other military activities. In the same year, he carried out a number of self-sacrificial activities in which a Jewish doctor and settler was stabbed and killed. On October 10, 1986, the Islamic Jihad Brigade carried out an activity that took place close to the *al-Buraq* wall in Jerusalem.⁶⁶ The activity was executed against the Givati Brigade and they harmed approximately 70 people from the enemy. Immediately after that same activity, these heroes were arrested. In this [round of arrests], the leadership [of the organization] and additional activists in the West Bank were also arrested.

In May 1987, the heroes of Islamic Jihad in the central Gaza jail carried out a jail break from the jail of the occupiers—the first since 1967. These six holy warriors, led by Sheikh Musbah al-Suri and the brother Muhammad al-Jamal, were able [to escape from prison], despite the harsh prison security conditions where they sunk and were locked up. Their good choice was bravery—sacrifice. They continued to act [against the enemy] despite the difficult security conditions that continued [in the Gaza Strip]. They succeeded in escaping from [the prison] for a period of five months. During that time [of their escape] they spread fear throughout the enemy lines. They rose up and killed one of the settlers. This was up until the patience of Sammy al-Sheikh Khalil failed and in the late morning hours he carried out an assassination operation on the military police command in the Gaza Strip. After he competed with one of his brothers about who would get up and carry out heroic activities, Sammy won. On October 6, the heroes (the same ones who escaped, except for Sammy and Sheikh Musbah al-Suri), at the time that they chose, the time of

their sacrifice, on the gates of the Shuja'iyya [neighborhood], entered bravely into their wild war against the occupation soldiers and the men of the *Shabak*. Then, the [Islamic] nation awoke to bring the news of its sons who fell while still standing, burning the fire of life. That is how all of us entered into the blood of the *intifada*/revolution.

During that same period, an additional group of Islamic Jihad rose [whose purpose] was to eliminate some of the collaborators and traitors. This group [of Islamic Jihad] attacked with machine guns and shot at the car of the Israeli secret service and killed and injured [the people] inside. That is how an additional group of the [Islamic] Jihad was established under the leadership of the engineer Suliman al-Zahiri who was trained in the West Bank to blow up a car in one of the most important military centers inside the Zionist entity. The fighting holy sister Ataf 'Alian was ready in time to command the sacrificial activity [*amaliyat istishhadia*]. But the occupational authorities discovered the fighting association before it finished preparing and training for the [sacrificial] activity.⁶⁷

5 *The intifada of Islamic Jihad*

That is how we succeeded in introducing the [Islamic] people and the nation to the third stage [of the growth of *jihad*]. The *intifada*/revolution carried out a series of heroic activities (by the Islamic Jihad movement) throughout the occupied Motherland with an intensity that the Motherland has not seen for a long time. That is how the year was before the *intifada*, from October 1986 until October 1988. This year was really a year of Islamic blood and red sacrifice [from this blood] which gave our people self-confidence [in its abilities]. This caused an inside explosion, an enormous burst of energy of faith, which was suddenly awakened and with its strength went outside its regular limitations in order to deal with what comes next—to the continuing *intifada*, to the gates of al-Aqsa where we are always on the way [to carry out] the last oath.⁶⁸ A way that the great God leads us up upon.

That is how October 6 began. That is the day when the outbreak began and the [Islamic] nation didn't stop from that day until the day that it was declared, on the *intifada* on the official date that it broke out, on December 8 [*Kanun al-Awwal*], 1987. The anger and the mass demonstrations and the clashes with the soldiers of the occupation did not stop.

On the eve of that same day [October 6, 1987] the Islamic Jihad movement informed the nation of the sacrifice of the cavalry hero Muhammad al-Jamal and Sammy al-Sheikh Khalil and Ahmad Halas and Zahadi (Fayez) Qaraq and their brother Sheikh Musbah al-Suri who preceded them by a only a few days.⁶⁹ In the days that came afterwards, there were thousands of flyers that carried pictures of the martyrs, distributed by the movement, covering the streets of the homeland. That is how the Palestinian public knew about the revolution and was freed

from coming out against [the enemy]. At the Friday prayers, Sheikh al-Masjid 'Abd al-Aziz Awda, from the *manbar* [the prayer stage] in the mosque [Izz al-Din] al-Qassam preached the *al-shahada* sermon [sacrifice for God] to the Palestinian public which abandoned its fear, its concerns and hesitations and went in the way of the martyrs. [The public] called for and ordered an immediate commitment to choose the way of sacrifice in the confrontation against the Zionist enemy.

After a week passed filled with the funeral processions of the martyrs, there were demonstrations and heavy clashes against the occupation soldiers. The pictures of the martyrs covered the electric poles and the street crossroads. [During] the Memorial Day, at the end of the week of their martyrdom, the Islamic Jihad movement published a small booklet [which memorialized] the five martyrs and carried the name "Intilaqa al-Dam wal-Shahada" [The Blood Tie and the Sacrifice for God]. At the end of the booklet there was a signature by [the movement] with the name al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Filastin [The Islamic Resistance in Palestine]. That is the name created by al-Mujama al-Islami [the Islamic Assembly] after a number of months as a headline for participating in the *intifada*.⁷⁰

At the same time [of the *intifada*], the [occupation] authorities stopped dozens of the sons of the Islamic Jihad on the charge of planning, participating and aiding in a group of activities of the Islamic Jihad, for example, what happened to the brother Dr. Fathi al-Shaqaqi [when he was] in the Nafha prison in the desert. Dr. Shaqaqi was re-interrogated with the charge that he made contact with the martyrs [of the organization], knew the way they would act and he gave them [his permission] while tracking their activities from inside prison. During this same period, he [Dr. Shaqaqi] was a witness to the intensity of all types of torture [that were used] against the sons of Islam in the investigation rooms of the enemy.⁷¹ That same cold October night Azzam and Ibrahim al-Najjar, Dr. Muhammad al-Hindi, Abdullah al-Saba'a, Abdullah al-Zaq and others [organization activists] were detained [after they were caught by Israel]. They suffered under the noose of the hangman and their skin sparkled like stars under the skies of the homeland.⁷² Their worn out bodies were leaking blood in the small rooms where they were in solitary confinement cells. Their brothers [the fighters] were outside the walls. Due to this, al-Jamia al-Islamiya organized bloody, violent riots in the big prison during which [a number of activists] were injured.

The *intifada* broke out in order to realize the rights [of the Palestinian people]. The first decision made by the occupational authorities [as a result of the *intifada*] was to distance and exile Sheikh al-Masjid 'Abd al-Aziz Awda from the homeland on November 17, 1987. This is the sheikh who continued [to excite the masses] after the *al-shahada* activity and others. The [Palestinian] public understood [after the *al-shahada*] that it was necessary to rebel and to revolt through confrontations with the occupation. As a result of this, the occupation authorities saw that the

armed Islamic activities were what was causing the people to rebel and a result of the distribution of orders and the call to *jihad*. After the news of the exile of the sheikh was publicized, the public awoke to protest and to declare that they rejected the decision of the exile. The confrontation [with the occupation] also spread to the West Bank. In the mosque [Izz al-Din] al-Qassam on the prayer stage of the sheikh, stood a masked *mujahid* whose sermon preached about *jihad* and its history. In the [Amr ibn] al-As mosque,⁷³ calls for a mass gathering were heard with people arriving at al-Qassam mosque from everywhere. They began to gather round the sheikh's prayer stage and they cried because they could not see him. In the mosque, the man with the masked face announced from the prayer stage, while simultaneously inciting the souls until they reached the peak of anger [against the occupation]. [After his words,] the people took to the streets in an historic demonstration [where the people] were taking everything that was thrown in their way and throwing it at the attacking occupation soldiers. The occupation soldiers ran away from the crowd. On November 20, 1987, the Islamic Jihad movement published a proclamation under the name "al-Haraka al-Islamiya fi al-Watan al-Muhtal" [The Islamic Movement in the Occupied Homeland]. [In the proclamation, the movement] demanded that the public rise up against the exile of the sheikh [Awda]. The public demonstrations [against the exile] continued [in addition to a continuation of the movement's military activities]. Thus, for example, the heroes of Islamic Jihad carried out a military action against the soldiers of the occupation in north Tel Aviv. On December/*Kanun al-Awwal* 5, 1987, one of the Islamic Jihad fighters succeeded in killing one of the Israeli settlers in the middle of the city of Gaza. Events similar to this one developed one after another. [Because of the death of the settler] a Zionist settler driving an enormous truck carried out a surprise attack on a number of Palestinians on the main road north of the city of Gaza. He killed four of that group and injured a number of additional Palestinians. A [rumor] spread that the Israeli was the brother of the settler who was killed and this crime was an act of revenge for his murder. That is how December 8 came and a new milestone was placed on the way of the *intifada* which strengthened and lasted as it was fed each morning [anew] by the blood of the martyrs.

On the same day, December 8, and before the announcement was published about the sacrifice of the four Palestinians, the printing house of Islamic Jihad prepared a proclamation [that called for] the continuation of its previous clear way and argued for it. [This was] before the decision was made to stop the publishing house from printing this same proclamation [due to the truck incident]. The truck incident re-escalated the [aggression] on the part of the enemy and proved in a new conversation the discrimination [from which the Palestinians suffer]. That is how the children of the first Islamic Jihad were on a mission [for *jihad*]. Members of the movement were ready to act [in the way of *jihad*] on the practical

plane and over time. From there the emotions flowed to a point (October 6 and December 8, 1987), their understanding and their symbolism. They withdrew the previous proclamation from the printing house and they began [to write] and to prepare a number of new speeches [by using] a new language. The members of the movement stood out in their activities. That is why they rewrote the first proclamation in the way of the *intifada*, on Wednesday, December 9, 1987. The publication [of the proclamation] and its distribution in large amounts ended on Thursday December 10, 1987. And so it was that on the morning of Friday, December 11, until noon of that same day, the first proclamation of the *intifada* came out signed in the name of the Islamic Jihad movement. The proclamation covered all of Palestine and called on the public to rebel due to the murder of the four martyrs in the event of the truck.

The proclamation also called for a general total strike already at the beginning of the *intifada*.⁷⁴

The more days that passed, the more sons of our people were added, hundreds and thousands, who proclaimed, "There is no God but Allah." The Islamic Jihad transferred/led, inundated/distributed awareness/attention. In addition, the writer for the news agency Agence France-Presse (AFP) described the Jabaliyah camp as one of the fortresses of Islamic Jihad in Palestine. On the same day of the week [of the *jihad*] December 9, 1987, it was said:

The residents of the Jabaliyah camp are those who began to rebel, with stones and with empty bottles which they spread around and threw in every direction and way. Hundreds of the Palestinian youth declared out loud, "the Islamic Jihad." At a distance of dozens of meters, the Israeli soldier declared, "Now, those [standing across from us] are doing this from choice and will not go back [backwards] and therefore the blood will flow."

From the beginning of the first strike on Saturday, December 12, the public began to take to the streets and declared, "*Allāhu akbar ... Allāhu akbar ... al-jihad ... al-jihad*." After a week, on Friday, December 18, the Islamic Jihad movement distributed its second proclamation [from the time the *intifada* broke out] on December 8. [The proclamation came out] under the headline, "Forward on the way of the holy *jihad*."⁷⁵

General of Southern Command Yitzhak Mordechai gave his first explanation of the *intifada*, which he called "the riot events" [in the Strip]. According to him:

There are activists [from organizations] that are behind the events [as a result of two events]. The first event is the decision to exile Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Awda [from the Gaza Strip]. The second event is the one of the semi-trailer ...

But the "riot events" later turned into a real war, as said briefly by Yitzhak Shamir, [the head of the Israeli government]:

This is a real war which wants to eliminate the State of Israel. They [the demonstrators] do not want only Gaza and Nablus, but they want Jaffa and Haifa as well.

As the days passed, [new] names of martyrs were added every day. Islamic Jihad lost Ra'ed Shahada and Khaled Amr and also Muhammad al-Yazuri who sacrificed himself while stabbing an Israeli soldier. [And] Salah al-'Attar and Misra el-Batniji who sacrificed himself on the roof of the Ibn 'Uthman at the Shuja'iyya mosque, and Bassam Sabbagh, Muhammad Jaradat and Iaad al-Ashkar, the special, who sacrificed himself while throwing stones at the occupation soldiers from on top of the [Izz al-Din] al-Qassam mosque. And Saadi al-Shawa [who also fell] who sacrificed himself at the same time that the [prisoners] at prison Ansar 3, which is found in the Negev, rebelled. And so there were others who fell, who gave their lives as a present because of ideology and for the homeland.⁷⁶

Thus it was the Islamic Jihad movement was the first to ask the Arab police [who served with Israel] to quit their jobs in the occupation authority. This was expressed openly in a public statement distributed publically by the movement in the city of Jerusalem on the date of January 21, 1988. According to the proclamation, [the movement] also threatened any Arab who sold a house or land to an Israeli—his verdict was death.⁷⁷

On the same day, on January 21, 1988, Yitzhak Shamir acknowledged to the *Bild* newspaper, which is published in West Germany, that, "The PLO and the Islamic Jihad movement are those who are responsible for the *intifada* in the West Bank and in the Strip."

In the month of February 1988, the Islamic Jihad activists entered the villages of Silat al-Harithiya and Ya'bed which are in the Jenin district to battle [where they threw] hand grenades at the occupation soldiers. On Wednesday, February 10, the *Davar* newspaper stated that:

Last week, the occupation forces arrested dozens of young people suspected of being activists for Islamic Jihad in Silat al-Harithiya and Ya'bed in the area of Jenin. It should be noted the soldiers carried out a surprise attack on the two villages and fought a difficult battle against the young people there, while infiltrating—going house to house despite being attacked on all sides with Molotov cocktails.⁷⁸

On Tuesday, February 16, 1988, that same newspaper, *Davar*, mentioned that:

The Israeli forces arrested Islamic Jihad who previously escaped from them [the forces succeeded in this] while carrying out a surprise attack on the village Deir al-Ghusun near Tulkarem the previous week.

The newspaper indicated that those arrested were responsible for everything that had happened in the area of Tulkarem as related to the terrorist activities and riots [against Israel].

The proclamations of the Islamic Jihad continued to announce demonstrations and strikes, beginning with the month of December 1987 and continuing until mid-January 1988. These were the only proclamations that announced this until the United Nationalist Leadership became organized during January and began to publish its proclamations. That is how the rumors about the Islamic Jihad were spread, as they were inside the United Leadership [and a part of it].

Even the Israeli newspaper, *The Jerusalem Post*, quoted a security source who believably described that there was a United Leadership made up of 15 members. Of these, eight [members] represented the Islamic Jihad [movement] and the others represented the rest of the [opposition] factions. In addition, the United Leadership even publicized that the members of the Islamic Jihad were inside it. But the truth is, the United Leadership is made up of Fatah, the Nationalistic Front [for the freeing of Palestine], the Democratic Front [for the freeing of Palestine] and the Communist Party. The Islamic Jihad movement, which politically disagrees [with the stance of the United Leadership] and calls for the complete release of the land of Palestine, did not sign any proclamations supporting an international conference. [Likewise, it has not signed any of the proclamations that called for] discussions with the enemy for the establishment of a Palestinian state on part of Muslim Palestine [as was distributed by the members of the United Leadership].

And, on the morning of Sunday, February 14, 1988, two of the leaders of the Islamic Jihad Brigades in Palestine, the brothers Abu Hassan Qassim and “Hamadi” al-Tamimi, sacrificed themselves in Limassol, Cyprus. They were also accompanied by the brother al-Mujahid, Marwan Kayyali. They were killed in a treacherous terrorist activity which was planned and carried out by the Zionist “*mukhabarat*”—Mossad.⁷⁹

The Islamic Jihad Brigades described to the nation and served [as an example] of a new cavalry company [made up of] the pure martyrs as God, may He be exalted and rise up, promised the nation, to all of the martyrs and to all of the holy warriors that if the *jihad* flag will continue to wave and to rise when it is carried by military brigade after military brigade then they will succeed in the freeing all of Palestine.

On the second day, after the sacrifice of [Abu Hassan and Qassem Hamadi al-Tamimi], the angry masses in Palestine came out while it was blessing the martyrs and they brought them to their glory.⁸⁰ [The masses] cursed the enemy, the Zionistic arrogance, with stones and against the terrible [Zionist] terrorists. On the 40th day after their sacrifice, Islamic Jihad announced mourning and a general strike in all of the occupied areas. This proclamation was widely carried out [by the masses] and that magnificent day was a grand finale.

That is how Islamic Jihad entered the third stage of the *intifada*, the *jihad* stage, the same stage that it initiated in its long and hard struggle.

From then, they did not know even a minute of inaction for the *intifada*, this amazing, wonderful event [of the breaking out of the *intifada*] larger than the ability of any of the divisions [whatsoever] or party or organization. The movement fulfilled its job which it gradually acquired in its struggle and its *jihad* which lasted for years and many months. But what is clear to all is that which cannot be denied, which is that the Islamic Jihad movement has already showed an active and important presence. Just as the movement showed a presence [through the] blood of the martyrs of Shuja'iyya and in the [mass] demonstrations that aroused their sacrifice.

Similarly, in regard to the demonstrations that broke out as a result of the decision to exile Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz Awda, the movement was also ready and present in the daily proclamations that accompanied these events. This was proof to the public on the wonderful *jihad* revolutionary activity. Why should this be denied in regard to the functions of all the nationalistic powers which were ready for years in the Palestinian arena? The movement also held onto its role in the general or the private struggle. The participation [by the movement's activists] really influenced the general [public] by awakening the Unified Nationalistic Leadership to the *intifada*. It is impossible to deny that this also occurred in the other Islamic movements which advanced to the way of *intifada* by force and with new momentum.⁸¹

That is how it was with our nation at the time that the spark of the *intifada* was lit—the revolution, the same immortal night October 6, 1987. There was no other event similar to it as there was on that same night when they were crowned with the headlines of their efforts and their struggles [of the *jihad* warriors] which lasted a long time. In a Reuters news agency article, as a result of the sacrifice by the heroes of Islamic Jihad in the Shuja'iyya battle, it was said:

[In this battle] the four rooted Muslims were killed in a shooting battle with the Israeli occupation forces in the Gaza Strip. This is the month of valor of the Palestinian resistance which hangs their pictures, advertised in the Palestinian newspapers, on the fences of the houses. Their secret organization, Islamic Jihad, broke out with courage and captured the imagination of the young people suffering from a life of poverty in a Strip that is overly populated.

Secular people and the left are not afraid [of the occupation]. Respected people such as the nationalistic hero, Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi, the head of the Red Crescent in Gaza, expressed wonder at the new Muslim uprising. Al-Shafi said:

This decision, by the same prisoners who escaped [from the Gaza jail] to remain and to kill instead of escaping far away [from Palestine], there is no disagreement that this step created a tremendous impression. That is how the Islamic Jihad movement captures its prominent place in the destruction of the occupation.

In a continuation of the same article, the Reuters agency indicated that Israeli General Amram [Mitzna], the Israeli Army commander in the West Bank and the commander of the central area of occupied Palestine,⁸² described the Islamic Jihad movement as one that, "Acts with courage and strength in its fight against the occupation." The largest of the Hebrew papers, *Yedioth Ahronoth*, wrote in the same period in December 1987 that:

The extreme Muslims⁸³ created without any disagreement the most dangerous security problems as they do not recognize the security forces responsible for the occupation in the area of [the Gaza Strip and the West Bank].

The same newspaper even added that anyone who comes close to Friday prayers at the Izz al-Din al-Qassam mosque [in the Gaza Strip] will see the group of worshippers throwing stones. There is the need for a lot of patience in order to dedicate oneself and to join the members of Islamic Jihad [in their activities].

After the entry of Islamic Jihad into the *intifada* [which led] to the strengthening of the *jihad* and to its escalation, it should be mentioned that the entry of the movement [to the *intifada*] was in no way at the expense of its faith, its values and its firmness. The *intifada* is one stage in a long, exhausting, wild struggle [against the occupation]. The armed *jihad* is the safest way to crumble the Zionist colonialist plan. In no way will the activists of Islamic Jihad stop their attempts to stab the occupation soldiers. Therefore, for example, there was the attempt to stab [a Jew] by Muhammad al-Yazuri, in the first month of the *intifada*. There was also the attempt by Yasser al-Khawaja who stabbed four enemy officers at the gates of the Gaza prison while he was being stripped [of his clothes] and he became a good example [in his death]. Everyone also heard on the news that the names of the [heroes] of the movement were mentioned first due to their sacrifice for God. In an announcement on the day of their sacrifice [October 6], which is the day of the uprising and the revolution where the military action plan went into affect against the occupation soldiers. Likewise, these activities influenced a portion of the Islamic Jihad activists during the months of October and November [*Tishreen al-Awwal* and *Tishreen al-Thani*], 1988. Due to the steps taken by the occupation authorities, a situation was created in Gaza, Jerusalem and in the northern part of the West Bank, and simultaneously [at the time of the uprising] nine houses that were revealed as the houses of the activists of the Islamic Jihad were ruined and destroyed.

At the same time [as the *intifada*], at the beginning of 1989, one of the Islamic Jihad warriors charged with preparing a car bomb with the intention of blowing up one of the gates of the Zionist military bases was judged in the [Israeli] court. [The warrior] as well as his car and the explosives were discovered by the occupation authorities in October 1988. Immediately [after that same warrior] was judged, another one, who

exploded hand grenades on the day of the confrontations and the rebellion on October 6, 1988, [was judged].

After this brief general survey on the way of blood and the *shahada* [the sacrifice] it will be understood that the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine which respected God, may He grow and be elevated, is that which constitutes the nucleus of Islamic Jihad activity on the land of *al-Ribat*.⁸⁴ This is a mighty nobility that was realized due to [these] historical circumstances and [this] historical stage. This does not mean that only the Islamic Jihad movement has a monopoly on *jihad* in Palestine. This movement is not the only one that has chosen this sanctified path.

At the same time [during the 1980s] that the movement created the nucleus of Islamic and *jihad* activity throughout the period [of its activity], the movement turned into a wider and larger part of the Islamic movement due to its pioneering role in the revival of Islam in Palestinian society. It is worth emphasizing that the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine does not represent all the Islamic streams. There are additional factions inside the movement and outside it, despite its centrality from an historical perspective. Due to these reasons and during this historical period, the movement is the pioneer of the holy warriors in carrying out *jihad* activities in Palestine that increase day by day. This does not necessarily mean [that the holy warriors] of the movement are not the most exceptional in the movement more than the others who are fighting with them. In fact, they are the ones who strengthen and increase them. [This is what the movement warriors do] from faith and religiosity and the commitment [to Islam], the ability [to act], their preparation and their motivation to carry out all the jobs of *jihad* on the land of *al-Ribat*. [The movement's development] was, at an historical moment, made into an historical matter and surrounded during historical circumstances. The commander of the movement blesses all the holy warriors who have the ability and those who are loyal without differentiating between them in a matter of time, place or their names. [The movement] tries to unite all of the holy warriors by freeing Palestine under the world view that is expressed through awesome Islam. The only issue in regard to this is the agreements [between the different holy warriors] over time. This is not only a religious commitment [*shar'at*]. And it is a crime to give it up [and to present it] like a secular strategic problem that does not differentiate or understand the importance of the [Palestinian problem]. The secular take on the dispute is lacking the ability to reach a unification of forces and is without the ability to get close to the will of God and to lead to victory.⁸⁵

[We will say this] one last time, ... the way of blood and sacrifice as a tradition and as a good example⁸⁶ will in no way cease on [the land] of Palestine, the land of *al-Ribat*. United by the martyrs who testify that in the future the war will end!!!

That is how the first chapter, the description of the Islamic Jihad plan in Palestine, ends. In the booklet it states that behind this publication is the Center of Selected Islamic Studies (Markaz Dirasat al-Mukhtar al-Islami). This is a detailed description of the first *intifada*. Many similar documents can be found, especially on the many websites and advertisements of the Islamic Jihad movement. The message is the same: We are Islamic Jihad—the pioneers. We have never stopped fighting against Israel. We are those who initiated the *jihad* war in the 1980s and we did not wait for the other organizations. We are those who led to the breakout of the first *intifada*. We also succeeded in showing the true face of Israel during the period of the agreements (1993–2000). Israel is an occupying power that needs to be fought in any way and one cannot reach an agreement with it. We have also participated in the second *intifada* and took a central part at the side of the other streams. Our way is one and clear. *Jihad* until victory.

Palestinian objections to Jews holding land in Palestine are very strong. Dr. Ramadan Shalah expressed it this way that even if the Jews converted and became Muslims, they would continue to fight the *jihad* way:

We are not fighting the Jews because they are Jews or to turn them into Muslims. The campaign against the Jews is about Palestine and it stems from the evil that was caused by stealing our land and exiling our nation. That is why we will continue to fight the Jews even if they convert. If the Jews convert to Islam but continue to hold on to Palestine through this evil [in other words, Israel], the religious ruling is, according to the words of Allah, “Fight against anyone who has done you injustice even if he fulfills the commandments that Allah has commanded us.”⁸⁷

Dr. Shalah continues that one has to relate to Palestine as:

A sacred religious property, a sacred nationalistic property, a sacred nationalistic Arab property, which cannot be degraded—not even one grain of it in all its aspects ... and because of this, the *jihad* is a *shar'ai* duty for us. It is a *shar'ai* duty that cannot be turned about by pulling a quill from the sanctified to that which is not permitted ... As we have been commanded to fast, pray and go on a *hajj*, that is how we have also been commanded to fight.⁸⁸

D Islamic Jihad from the first *intifada* onward

According to the understanding of Islamic Jihad, it was their organization which, from the beginning of the *intifada* in 1987, initiated and organized and never stopped carrying out showcase activities and dealing with the Zionist occupation. From the point of view of the organization, the *intifada*, in effect, never stopped, not even during the period of the Oslo Agreements, which they refused to accept. The organization likes repeatedly to glorify its

high-class activities such as the massacre that took place at the Beit Lid junction on January 22, 1995, in which 22 people were killed and 66 injured, or another attempt at the Beit Lid junction on September 9, 2001, where 11 people were hurt in a car bomb explosion. Another terrorist attack was organized by Iyad Sawalha, one of the organization's senior men from Hebron. In this event, which took place on October 21, 2002, fourteen people were killed by a booby-trapped jeep that blew up at the Pardes Hanna junction near Egged bus number 841. Also "the attack in the worshippers' route" in Hebron on November 15, 2002, in which 12 people were killed and among them the Hebron brigade commander Colonel Dror Weinberg, was attributed to Islamic Jihad.⁸⁹

The organization activists who died during these battles with Israel, or who blew themselves up near shopping centers and buses, murdering many civilians who were good examples of those Palestinians who went on their way. There is widespread martyr literature in which their good qualities are described—up until the time that they decided to take the path of the martyr and sacrifice themselves for the greater Palestinian good. The organization draws great satisfaction from reports in the Israeli media that describe the fear and the terror that it has succeeded in spreading among the residents of Israel.⁹⁰

Throughout the years, especially since the beginning of the 1990s, from the time of the conference that took place in 1991 as a result of the Madrid Conference, the tie with Iran has been strengthened noticeably. This was expressed in the adoption of Hezbollah's methods in the organization, through cooperation in a number of activities in Lebanon, by belligerent declarations of support by senior Iranian officials and organization activists. Iran directly aids in the funding and the training activities of the organization and the heads of the regime there frequently express their pride in this.

In October 1993, as a result of the Oslo Accords, the organization joined the Rejection Front, headed by Hamas, together with the National Front to Free Palestine and the National Front—General Headquarters and another six small organizations. The seat of the Rejection Front is in Damascus. This initiative did not last long as the Nationalistic Front left. This front received Iranian support and met a few times, mostly in Syria.⁹¹

During the al-Aqsa *intifada* other organizations joined, among them Fatah and the Fronts, and even the People's Party alongside Hamas. This period, which lasted from September 2000 and in reality until the disengagement, can be called "the period of the Palestinian revolt movement." During this period, the men of Islamic Jihad supported Yasser Arafat and supported resistance together with all the other Palestinian streams.⁹² At this time the movement appropriated for itself the heroic battle of the Palestinian "opposition" (*al-muqawama*) which took place at the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002, headed by Muhammad al-Tawalba who was killed during the battle.⁹³

After the disengagement, which was seen as a victory for the Islamic resistance over Israel, the *jihad* activists, together with the Hamas activists, carried out terrorist activities against Israel. For example, the organization launched

rockets that carried the name al-Quds to the settlements around Gaza and Ashkelon. Israel, as part of its struggle against this response, was forced into carrying out a military operation in the Gaza Strip in order to strike at the infrastructure of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The military activity (Operation Cast Lead) began on December 27, 2008 and lasted until January 17, 2009, and resulted in limited military success as was originally planned. There were 1,305 Palestinian dead, mostly Islamic Jihad and Hamas militants. Eventually, the operation stopped after a ceasefire (*tahadiya*) with Hamas.⁹⁴ Since then, from Operation Pillar of Defense (November 14–21, 2012) to the last war in Gaza (Operation Protective Edge, July 8–August 26, 2014), the Islamic Jihad organization has continued relentlessly in its attempts to carry out terrorist activities against Israel, at least until today.⁹⁵

In a political public declaration from May 31, 2011 by Sheikh Nafez Azzam, a member of the political office of the Islamic Jihad organization who voiced his doctrine of the Islamic Jihad organization:⁹⁶

The Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people will not end. The Zionist entity, throughout the entire period, has been busy by all means possible in increasing [these means] against the Palestinian people and not just against the sons of the Islamic Jihad ... Thus, for example, after the signing of the appeasement [The Fatah-Hamas Agreement], the Zionist enemy tried to focus on the existing division in order to lead to confusion and bewilderment in the Palestinian Street. This points to the fact that the occupation did not change its policy in regard to the Palestinian people and the resistance that was carried out in the absence of fear.⁹⁷

In the continuation of the public declaration, Azzam expresses confidence that the intra-Palestinian appeasement agreement put an end to the political arrests against the people of his organization which the Palestinian Authority took as an answer to the needs of the Zionist occupation. Whereas the cessation of political arrests was a part of the agreement, the public declaration concludes that on this day (May 31, 2011), there were wide arrests carried out on the ranks of Islamic Jihad in the area of Jenin, “which in the eyes of the occupational authorities is considered a stronghold of the Islamic Jihad movement in the occupied West Bank.”⁹⁸

This is, therefore, the theory of the Islamic Jihad organization in Palestine, an organization which, although small, wins great approval among the Palestinian people, and sometimes even more than that received by the Fatah organization. Thus, for example, in a survey carried out in the Lebanese refugee camps in 2006, the respondents expressed greater admiration for the Islamic Jihad than for the activities of Fatah.⁹⁹ Many thousands take part in the Islamic Jihad summer camps in the Gaza Strip. Islamic Jihad is a small but leading organization in the resistance against Israel.¹⁰⁰ In the aftermath of Hamas’ electoral victory in 2006 and its armed takeover of Gaza in 2007, the organization urged Hamas to focus on *jihad* against Israel instead of

fighting fellow Palestinians, politically and military.¹⁰¹ After Operation Cast Lead, while sometimes having differences of opinion with Hamas, the *jihad* organization has continued its activities even while breaking the agreement that was announced in the Gaza Strip after the operation.¹⁰²

Notes

- 1 The text is quoted from Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror* (Ohr Yehuda, 2006), p.59. This text, together with additional quotes from the Hadith that relate to *jihad*, are taken from 'Alaa ad-Din 'Ali bin Hussam ad-Din al-Matqi, *Kanz al-'Ummal* [The Treasure of Deeds] (Heydar Aabad 1312, 1894–95), vol. 2, pp.252–86.
- 2 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.52, describes the Iranian Revolution's influence on the Islamic Movement and the fear felt by the Jews and the Americans because of it.
- 3 Abd al-Qadar Yassin, "Mawqa Hamas fi Zahra al-Islamiya fi al-Dafa wal-Quta'a" [Hamas Stands on the Islamic Trend in the West Bank and Gaza Strip] (al-Urdon al-Jadid, Fall 1988), p.47, quoted by Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism*, p.13.
- 4 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, pp.271–72.
- 5 Qutb, *Marakatuna Maa al-Yahud*, pp.20–38; Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.5–6, points out the negative personality of the Jews and has many quotes from the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." An additional book by Azzam, *al-Sartan al-Ahmar* [The Red Cancer] (Amman, 1980), also accuses the Jews at length for all the revolutions occurring worldwide, with an emphasis on the part the Jews played in the Communist Revolution. The book is filled with anti-Jewish messages on every page, messages that are also expressed in the Hamas Charter.
- 6 Evidence of this can be seen in the Hamas Charter, which explicitly mentions the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" as mentioned in the previous chapter. In regard to Islamic Jihad, see Hadassa Ben Itto, *The Lie that Wouldn't Die: 100 Years of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (Tel Aviv, 1988), pp.338–39, which includes the story of the Islamic Jihad activist Hisham Ismail Hamed, who in 1994 carried out a suicide attack. The Protocols are another method of persuasion that justifies strikes against the Jews.
- 7 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.41; Saleh, *History of Palestine*, p.267–68.
- 8 Joshua L. Gleis and Benedetta Berti, *Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), pp.110–11.
- 9 Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.267–68. These words are used mainly to describe the *jihad* brigades led by Ibrahim Sirbal and Islamic Jihad, Bayt al-Maqdis, headed by Sheikh Asa'ad Bayyoud al-Tamimi.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p.268. Dr. Ramadan Shalah left an academic position at the University of Southern Florida in order to take up his new job as head of the Islamic Jihad.
- 11 *Falastin al-Youm*, a newspaper, www.paltoday.ps/arabic, Nov. 25, 2010, emphasis added. This happened in the last war in Gaza, July 8–August 26, 2014.
- 12 Saleh, *History of Palestine*, p.267.
- 13 *Al-Islam wa-Filastin, al-Mashro'a al-Islami al-Muaaser fi Filastin* [Islam and Palestine, The Islamic Plan of our Generation in Palestine] (n.p., n.d., but published during the 1990s).
- 14 *Sura the Night Journey (al-Isra')* (17), verses 1–8. The Noble Qur'an, <http://quran.com/17>.
- 15 Prof. Uri Rubin's Hebrew translation, *The Qur'an*, pp.226–27, footnotes 4–7. In his comments he indicates that the first time it is events that led to the destruction of the first temple in 586 BC and the second time it is also events that led to the destruction of the second temple in the year 70 AD. Thus, Rubin adds "We have sent at you our slaves," to his literal translation regarding the second time.

- In regard to the first time, it is possible that the slaves mentioned are Babylonian or Roman, but in regard to the second time, it is talking about the actual Muslim believers themselves who need to deal with the humiliation and the occupation of the mosque.
- 16 Abu 'Ubaydah al-Muqaddasi, *al-Hayat al-Thalatha ma biyn al-Dunya wa-al-Akhirah* [The Third Period, Between the Good in this World and Paradise] (Jerusalem: Hamas Publishing, 2012), p.3.
 - 17 Fathi Ibrahim Abd al-Aziz al-Shaqaqi, *al-Khomeini, al-Hal al-Islami wa-al-badil* (Cairo: al-Mukhtar al-Islami, 1979). This book presents the revolution in Iran as an example of the revolution that will occur in Palestine against the secular elements. Saad al-Sweyrki, "al-Jihad al-Islami wa-Asala al-Tanzim wa-al-Manaj al-Hawiya al-Madhabiya" [al-Jihad al-Islami and the Question of Planning and Methods], *al-Hewar al-Mutmaden*, April 29, 2008, www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=132922.
 - 18 "Fi Zikra al-Ishtishad al-Dactur Fathi al-Shaqaqi, al-Shahid al-Mualem al-Dactur, Fathi ibrahim abd al-Aziz al-Shaqaqi (abu Ibrahim), Muasses wa-Amin 'am Harka al-jhad al-Islami fi Filastin" [In Memory of the Sanctification upon Death of Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, the Martyr, the Guide and the Doctor, Fathi Ibrahim Abd al-Azziz (abu Ibrahim), the Founder and General Secretary of the Islamic Jihad Organization in Palestine]. A biography of the organization's leader which eulogizes his death as it is expressed on the Islamic site, al-Hassan al-Nafsi [The Spiritual Fortress], <http://bafree.net/alhisn/showthread.php?t=98983&page=1>, Oct. 29, 2010.
 - 19 *Al-Islam wa-Filastin*, pp.23–31. A translation of the questions and the answers as they appear at the end of the pamphlet, after the presentation of the organization's plan.
 - 20 The interview with Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi apparently took place in Damascus on Oct. 3, 1990.
 - 21 Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism*, p.14. This is really the big disagreement between the Islamic Jihad movement and the Muslim Brotherhood. What comes first: The preparation of the hearts or the sharpening of the swords? Until the *intifada*, the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank supported the approach of the preparation of the hearts before the opening of *jihad* activities, which is why a number of the members of the Islamic Jihad are among the ranks of the Brotherhood who were organized in al-Mujama al-Islami and al-Jamaiaa al-Islamiya established their own organization.
 - 22 In other words, Islamic Jihad activists argue that they were the pioneers in their guerrilla opposition against the Zionist enemy. The *jihad* activists were the first to begin military activities against Israel inside the areas that were held by them when they were acting inside the population imbued with a spirit of sacrifice that stemmed from the radical belief in Islam. In their words, from the beginning of the 1980s, they were the first who overcame the barrier of fear of the IDF.
 - 23 Emphasis added.
 - 24 In the original, "*Liqa ma Nahaj al-Munazama al-hali*." The word *liqa* means, among other things, a face-to-face meeting with the enemy. In other words, according to the PLO's view of *jihad*, it is coming closer and closer to the views of the Zionist enemy. I believe that there is no more worse accusation than that.
 - 25 *Al-Mukhlasin*, "The Loyalists." This is an Islamic expression which relates to those pure souls loyal to the way of Islam.
 - 26 The repetition is in the original. This is also the shaking off of and the revolution against Israeli rule.
 - 27 The collaborators are idol worshippers who collaborate with another God. According to the writings of Sayyid Qutb and the other radical Islamic philosophers, all those who do not believe in the Islamic faith and his emissary Muhammad are infidels. In other words, this is a wide term that includes within

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- it both the Jews and the Christians, despite their standing as people of the book. Sura 5, verse 82 explicitly explains that the Jews and the collaborators are those whose loathing for the believers is very great. See Robert Spencer, *The Complete Infidel's Guide to the Koran* (Washington, DC, 2009), pp.95–110.
- 28 Litvak, *The Islamic Movement*, p.69. There were claims and even researchers who argued that the activities of the *jihad* organizations at the beginning of the 1980s were related to the activities and the planning of Khalil al-Wazir (abu Jihad). Apparently, we are talking about the activities of the *jihad* brigades whose three leaders were killed in Cyprus in 1989. According to Shaqaqi, of course, we are talking about an argument that has no merit which was aimed at hurting the perception of his organization.
- 29 This is criticism of the PLO, which is filled with intrigues and conspiracies from all types of organizations and competing groups. Shaqaqi argues that his organization is a later one.
- 30 It is not clear who the other brothers are with whom the activists of the Brotherhood worked in order to establish the Islamic Jihad Brigade. Apparently we are talking about activists from the rest of the *jihad* organizations and the Muslim Brotherhood. The purpose of the name change was to draw additional volunteers to the ranks of the organization which would increase the number of its members.
- 31 The Islamic Jihad Brigades are the military arms of the Islamic Jihad organization. In Arabic, they are called *Saraya al-Jihad Islami*. This name already existed in 1990, but only as a temporary name. Later on in the 1990s, the name was changed to *Saraya al-Quds*—the Jerusalem Brigade.
- 32 Majela al-Asr site, www.alasr.ws/index.cfm?method=home.con&contentID=7682, Apr. 16, 2006. On this site is a comprehensive survey of the *jihad* activities in Palestine along with photos of Hassan al-Nassrullah, the Hezbollah secretary, and Bashar Hafez al-Assad, the president of Syria. According to a speaker of the movement, Muhammad Sultan al-Tamimi, known as “Hamdi,” and Muhammad Ebhitz, nicknamed “Abu al-Hassan Qassim,” were killed by the Israeli Mossad when they were in Limassol, the capital of Cyprus. According to the advertisements on the *Majela al-Asr* site, these two martyrs, activists of Islamic Jihad, stood out as symbols of the *jihad* against Israel inside the occupied territories. Fathi Shaqaqi was really impressed by the ability of Mossad to act outside Israel in order to take out these leading *jihad* activists. This wonder did not prevent him from suffering a similar fate. Shahada, “al-Qaeda fi Gaza.”
- 33 Ibid. This is a reference to the *Saraya al-Jihad* of the Jihad Brigade that grew within Fatah and continued contacts with the PLO through the activities of Abu-Jihad.
- 34 The first *intifada* that appears in Islamic publicity is the *jihad intifada*, which broke out on Dec. 9, 1987. As a result, the leaders of Islamic Jihad were expelled and, like Fathi Shaqaqi, were assassinated later in Malta. Abd al-Aziz Awda, who lived for a while in Damascus and Cairo, returned in the end to the Gaza Strip in March 2000.
- 35 *Shamaha* is the nickname of honor given to a man of the cloth. “Honor his Holiness.” Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda preaches until today at the Izz al-Din al-Qassam mosque, and his sermons, which drip hatred of Israel and the Jews, are spread online through a large number of sites.
- 36 The enemies are not necessarily the Jews but also the other Arab factors that are trying, according to his argument, to distribute lies and to argue about the factions and the divisions in the ranks of the Islamic Jihad. That is why, according to Shaqaqi, one must prevent them from doing this.
- 37 In his sermon on Friday, Dec. 14, 2001, in honor of Jerusalem Day, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani expressed his deep ties to the Islamic Jihad in Palestine. He

- decided that this organization was the mother of all of the many Islamic movements that broke out as a result of the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The *jihad* organization is one of many that grew which are tied by umbilical cord to Iran and influence all the countries in the area in their battle with international arrogance. "Rafsanjani on the Use of Nuclear Weapons against Israel," MEMRI, Dec. 21, 2001, www.memri.org.il/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=572.
- 38 As opposed to countries such as Egypt or Jordan which had peace ties and friendship with Israel and therefore one could not make a political or military pact with them.
- 39 The ant hoard. Shaqaqi writes about this and says that just like ants know how to hoard food, so do they take the best from both the Shia and the Sunni, just like ants. It is not automatically understood that the Sunni *jihadist* organization has created a brave tie and is close to the Shi'ites' *jihad* factors. The split between Sunni Islam and Shia is ancient and still influences what happens in the Middle East. See Amal Bibar, "The Shi'ites against the Sunni—the Internal Split in Islam," *Maarachot*, 434, Dec. 2010, pp.10–15.
- 40 There is some ridicule here about the campaign to free Kuwait and to overthrow the ruler of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, in 1991. The "Desert Storm" campaign began on the night of June 16–17, 1991, after the expiration of the ultimatum placed on Saddam Hussein by the United Nations. The coalition powers, headed by the United States, succeeded in defeating the Iraqi Army in Kuwait but the campaign ended on Feb. 28, 1991, without the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. US President George Bush, Sr, was afraid of getting involved in Iraq since it would lead to too many American sacrifices and to "dying in the desert." See Charles Pope, "Cheney Changed his View on Iraq, he said in '92 Saddam Not Worth U.S. Casualties," *Seattle pi*, September 28, 2004, www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Cheney-changed-his-view-on-Iraq-1155325.php.
- 41 The problem is the existence of the State of Israel. Israel's establishment is the reason for the Palestinian problem because, in their words, the Palestinian people were expelled from their land. Israel is also the result of the tragedy that befell the Palestinians from 1948. That is why Israel is the problem, the cause and the result.
- 42 *Ma'azul* is an expression used for a sick person who is isolated from his environment. That is what the Palestinian *intifada* is, as long as there are no other Arab nations joining the struggle against Israel.
- 43 *Mu'ajaza* means "miracle" or "wonder"—in other words, a miracle from God. This is also the term used for the Prophet's miracles. The *intifada* is a miracle from God who has mercy on his creations and allows them to rebel against Jewish rule.
- 44 The pamphlet ends with reading the last call which thanks God, the master of the universe, and gives the date of the interview and the place where it was publicized. *Liwa al-Urduniya*, Oct. 3, 1990.
- 45 Sarayat al-Quds, www.saraya.ps, July 7, 2011. One can see from the design of the site that its contents have been influenced by Hezbollah.
- 46 Ibid.
- 47 This is the background, for example, of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Kamal Adwan, Muhammad Yusuf al-Najjar, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Mamdouh Saidam and others. See Dr. Mohsen M. Saleh and Dr. Basheer M. Nafi, (eds), *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2005* (Beirut, 2007), pp.22–23.
- 48 As in the original. The members of Islamic Jihad often call the Jerusalem area by this name, which is the ancient Islamic name for Jerusalem from the Middle Ages. For example, the faction that was established by Asa'ad Bayyoud al-Tamimi is called Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis (Jerusalem).

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- 49 The Hira Cave is found near Mecca on a hill called Jabal al-Nur. According to Islamic tradition, it is in this cave that the Prophet Muhammad received the Qur'an from the Angel Gabriel.
- 50 Attention to the verses from the Qur'an.
- 51 Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.55–56. The Islamic tradition speaks of the murder of 800 men of the tribe after they were starved and their property was stolen from them by the Prophet Muhammad in the market square of Medina. This cruel murder is used as inspiration by the religious Muslim sages until today.
- 52 More details on this later, in Chapter 6, where there is a translation of a pamphlet published by al-Jamia al-Islamiya, "al-Mufawadhat min Manzur Islami, Saraha fi Dhamir al-Umma l'adhara ila Allah wa-al-Tarikh wa-al-Ajyal al-Qadima" [The Negotiations from an Islamic Point of View, a Call to the Conscience of the Nation and an Explanation According to the Words of God on History and the Future of Future Generations] (n.p., n.d.).
- 53 The Noble Qur'an translation of *Surat Yusuf* (12), <http://quran.com/12>.
- 54 *Surat al-Hijar* (15), the Noble Qur'an, <http://quran.com/15>. This *sura* is called "The City of Stone," the city of the sons of Thamud who rebelled against their prophet, Saleh.
- 55 Ibid., *Surat Beit Amram* (3), <http://quran.com/3>.
- 56 Ibid., verse 144. This verse turns to the believers. Will they retreat from their faith if Muhammad dies during one of the battles? Muhammad warns them that God will repay good to the *lil-Shakerin*; those who value God's goodness thank Him.
- 57 This refers to Sheikh Musbah Hassan al-Suri, nicknamed Abu Khaled. The sheikh was judged in a military court and sentenced to life imprisonment but he succeeded in escaping from prison together with another four prisoners. It was a number of months before the Israeli secret service caught and killed the escaped prisoners during a shoot-out in the Shuja'iyya neighborhood of Gaza on Oct. 6, 1987. The sheikh himself was killed in an additional gun battle that took place on Oct. 2, 1987. In the eyes of the movement, this battle symbolizes the beginning of the *intifada*. In the publicity of Islamic Jihad, the sheikh appears as the founder of the military arm of the organization. See "Shabka Hawar Bawaba al-Aqsa Manbar al-Jihad wa-al-Muqawama" [A Network Forum of the Portal al-Aqsa, a Stage of the Jihad and the Opposition], www.alaqasgate.org/vb/showthread.php?t=28939. On the site, activists in Islamic Jihad express themselves at length, right next to the symbols of the organization, about the importance of the activities of Sheikh al-Suri.
- 58 From an article by Nicolas Dot-Pouillard and Eugénie Rébillard, "The Intellectual, the Militant, the Prisoner and the Partisan: The Genesis of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (1974–1988)," *The Muslim World*, 103, Jan. 2013, p.176. There are differences of opinion about who really died in this battle of Shuja'iyya. The first three are mentioned here and there were an additional three members: 'Imad Saftawi, Khalid Salah and Salah Shtawi.
- 59 The smell of musk around the birds that flew around their bodies described Paradise where those martyrs went after their death.
- 60 The next chapter describes in detail the stance of al-Jamia al-Islamiya as reflected in its own publicity.
- 61 Azzam, *Hamas*, p.54. Azzam indicates the names of the top Islamic philosophers in his book and these include: Hassan al-Banna, the brothers Muhammad and Sayyid Qutb, Said Hawa, Mustafa al-Mashhur, Yousef-al-Qaradawi, Fathi Yakan, Abū 'l-A'lā Mawdūdī and others.
- 62 A large part of these was publicized in a similar version, also without any indication of the author, as *Masirat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin—min Manshurat Harka*

- al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin* [The Islamic Way of Jihad in Palestine—from the Publicity by the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine] (Beirut, 1989), pp.15–60.
- 63 In other words, dealing with those who are, according to his outlook, traitors to Islam such as those who cooperate with Israel, other moderate factors, and also those secular bodies that are causing society to sin with drugs, immorality and alcohol.
- 64 In the original, *Masnadtaha*. A “tradition” of *hadith*, of the Prophet Muhammad, as it was passed down from generation to generation in a chain of traditions that is accepted in Islam. There are also the fake or the weak *hadiths* and this is because their *asnad* is not in order. There are a number of *hadith* files that are accepted as relatively reliable. In these traditions, which represent the way and the words of the Prophet, there is a validity similar to that of the *Mishnah* and the Talmud in Judaism.
- 65 *Laylat al-Qader*. The night which, according to Muslim belief, the Qur’an was lowered from the sky and within it God listened to the prayers of his believers. Usually we are referring to an odd-numbered night, which falls on the 27th day of the month of Ramadan every year.
- 66 Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.96, 146–49. *Ĥū’it al-Burāq* is the Arabic name for the Western Wall. It is called *al-Buraq* after the Prophet Muhammad’s magic winged horse (even though throughout history other walls of the Temple Mount were identified with this name).
- 67 Ataf Ailan, imprisoned in Israel for ten years, was released in 1997.
- 68 As was indicated at the beginning of the translated pamphlet that quotes *Sura al-Isra’* (*Sura* 17, verses 7–8).
- 69 In the original, their activities were called *Istishad al-Fursan al-Abtal*—sacrifice for the God of the heroic knights. The image of a knight with weapons, especially on a background of al-Aqsa, was often included in the publicity of the *jihad* movement. Education for bravery and for knighthood is an aristocratic education appropriate for Muslims, as was presented by Abdullah Azzam in his will, introduced in an earlier chapter.
- 70 This refers to the Hamas movement, *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah*—the Islamic Resistance Movement. The Muslim Brotherhood was active in the Gaza Strip under the name al-Mujama al-Islamiya (Islamic Unification). It appears that even with the name Islamic Resistance Movement, there were Islamic *jihad* fighters who were pioneers in front of the camp.
- 71 This refers to the period from Oct. 6, 1987, the day of the deaths of the terrorist activists, until the breakout of the first *intifada*.
- 72 The hangman or the jailer is described as *jalad*—skinner, which is how the Israeli jailers and the Shabak investigators are mostly described. It should be noted that there are similar descriptions appearing in Arab literature that relate to prisons in Egypt and Syria.
- 73 One of the military leaders, aṣ-Ṣaḥāba, a friend of the Prophet Muhammad. He is mainly known as one of the talented commanders who participated in the capturing of Palestine and Egypt in the 7th century.
- 74 Mishal and Aharoni, *Speaking Stones*, pp.267–68, includes a proclamation without a date. It is possible that this is the proclamation referred to here. The proclamation opens with the words, “Hey, Muslims, hey holy warriors.” Islamic Jihad is the first to kindle the flame of revolution and call for the leaving of the mosques to protest in demonstrations. It rendered asunder the dawn of the Islamic people’s revolution to free the holy land and the prophets from the impurity of Zionism ...
- 75 In the original, “*Ila al-Imam ya Masira al-Jihad al-Muqadas*.” That is the slogan chosen by the *jihad* activists. The word *imam* also has a very deep religious meaning of caliph or religious leader. There is a play on words here that hints at the future Caliphate. The holy *jihad* was also the name of a gang of Palestinians

- in the War of Independence between the years 1947–48. This army was under the command of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who was considered a national hero in Palestinian historiography.
- 76 The text does not indicate why each person named here died, except for a few individuals. It is not clear why the writers of the Islamic Jihad chose to indicate just these names and not their activities.
- 77 See Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.46–49; Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.324–26. This is a religious ruling that has been known from 1935 to today and appears in many different ways among many different personalities, from Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni to Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi.
- 78 It is no surprise that in Silat al-Harithiya, the village of his birth and the place where Azzam lived, there was a strong infrastructure of Islamic Jihad which also follows his doctrines.
- 79 In reality, we are talking about a faction called the Islamic Jihad Battalions, which broke from Fatah and fought in southern Lebanon against Israel. At the head of this faction was Muhammad Hassan Ebhitz, nicknamed Abu Hassan Qassim, and Muhammad Basem Sultan al-Temimi, known as Hamdi. Their elimination led to the disintegration of the faction. See Shahada, “al-Qaeda fi Gaza; also Saleh, *History of Palestine*, p.267; Shaked and Shabi, *Hamas*, pp.203–4.
- 80 These sentences are about the second day after the truck accident when the four Palestinian workers were killed at the beginning of the *intifada*, in other words on Dec. 10, 1987.
- 81 According to Islamic Jihad, this is the spark that lit the flame of the *intifada* and awoke the other movements, including Fatah, the PLO leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood, which established Hamas after the *intifada* broke out.
- 82 Amram Mitzna served as a general of the Central Command in 1987–89.
- 83 In the original, *al-Muhtaasebeen*, “zealots,” “extremists” or also those who are fervent in their religion.
- 84 *Ribat* refers to the guard duty at a frontier outpost in order to defend *dar al-Islam* (the house of Islam). The one who performs *ribat* is called a *murabit*.
- 85 This is criticism against the PLO and the secular organizations that are a part of it, including Fatah and the fronts (the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, the Popular Front—General Command, and other small organizations), which neglected the religious topic and tried to turn the Palestinian problem into a national issue rather than an Islamic issue.
- 86 In the original *sunna al-haya*, *sunna* as a custom and as a good example to all the believers—in this case, the whole Palestinian population. This description relates in general to the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad—Sunna al-Nabi, which are an example for all believers.
- 87 This speech was made by the leader of Islamic Jihad in Beirut on March 29, 1999. From MEMRI, www.memri.org/cgi-webaxy/sal/sal.pl?lang=he&ID=107345_memri&act=show&dbid=articles&dataid=62.
- 88 Ibid. These remarks are very similar to the words in Azzam’s will, examined in the Introduction.
- 89 The Islamic Jihad sites mention the large terrorist attacks of the organization with undisguised pride on their operational success in killing women and children in cold blood. Thus, for example, on the Saraya al-Quds site, under the headline “*al-Amaliyat al-Jihadiya*,” the pictures of the martyrs are shown with pride while alongside them are the details of their activities and where they sacrificed themselves. See www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Operation.
- 90 This site shows a list of the attacks plus photos of the martyrs, their life stories, how they reached the road of sacrifice and how many they succeeded in killing in their lives. One example is the horrifying story of the martyr, “the top choice,”

- Hamza Samudi, who was responsible for the Megiddo attack on the Egged bus line 830 which took place in June 2002. In the attack, 18 people were killed, www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=10853. For a list of the Israeli dead in this attack, see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mfa.gov.il/MFA/Pages/default.aspx. www.fresh.co.il/vBulletin/showthread.php?t=189969.
- 91 Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.268–69.
- 92 This is the opposite of what men from Fatah, like Muhammad Dahlan and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), preached in public against the policy of Arafat. See Saleh and Nafi, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2005*, pp.25–26.
- 93 Muhammad al-Tawalba served as head of the military faction of Islamic Jihad. After his death, his replacement was Iyad Sawalha, who died in the battle in the Kasbah of Jenin in November 2002. See Saleh, *History of Palestine*, p.269.
- 94 Palestinian books describe this as “The Slaughter in Gaza.” They see it as a continuing event that began on June 26, 2006 with the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, until the end of the Cast Lead campaign. Cast Lead has won a respected place in the deeds of the Zionistic slaughter of Palestinians. The Palestinians record 1,305 dead, among them 410 children and 110 women and over 5,400 injured. The Palestinians also mention, of course, the great devastation left in the Gaza Strip after the campaign. They do not bother to indicate all of the rockets that were shot at the Israeli settlements and the damage that these rockets, launched by Hamas and *jihad* organizations, caused. Yaaser Ali, *al-Majazer al-Israeila be-haq al-Shaab al-Falastini* [The Deeds of Israeli Slaughter] (Beirut, 2009), pp.85–95.
- 95 On the Saraya al-Quds site, 57 selected attacks appear, including photos of the martyrs who carried them out. The majority of the attacks are from 2000 onward. Each attack is indicated with praise for the martyrs, the extent of the damage that was caused, and the glorification of their deeds, www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Operation. In addition, the organization’s opinions of their current *jihad* activities also appear, while sending threats to the Zionists, www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=News&id=1.
- 96 Even Sheikh Nafez Azzam, from the Jenin area, from the village of Silat al Harithiya. He is a member of Shiekh Abdullah Azzam’s family.
- 97 An opinion that can be found on the “Site of the Military Milestones of al-Quds Brigade,” May 31, 2011, www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=10769.
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Dr. Mohsen Moh’d Saleh and Ziad al-Hasan, *The Political Views of the Palestinians Refugees in Lebanon, General Survey May 2006* (Beirut, 2006), pp.32–34.
- 100 In the Islamic Jihad’s day camp which took place in the summer of 2010 in the Gaza Strip, there were only 10,000 participants compared with the 100,000 children in the Hamas day camps that were organized in parallel. However, we are still talking about a substantial force that influences the population. See Johnathan Orich, “Day Camps, the Hamas Way: Military Practice and the *Jihad* Slogans,” IDF Speaker, Sept. 14, 2010, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/News_Channels/today/10/09/1402.htm.
- 101 Gleis and Berti, *Hezbollah and Hamas*, pp.111–12.
- 102 For example, the event that occurred on August 24, 2011, when rockets were fired at Ashkelon and the Eshkol area. In their reaction, the IDF fired at the Gaza Strip and killed a number of Islamic Jihad activists. Shabka al-Mithaq al-Alamiya, “6 Shahada wa 30 Jariha fi Salsala Gharat khlal 24 Sa’ah” [Six Martyrs and Thirty Injured during a Series of Attacks within 24 Hours], Aug. 25, 2011, www.methak.org/ar/?articles=topic&topic=15373&highlight; see also the opinion of the organization from Sept. 7, 2011, in light of the fear of military action against the *jihad* infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, www.saraya.ps/index.php?act=Show&id=14605.

4 Al-Jamia al-Islamiya

And whoever disobeys Allah and His Messenger and transgresses His limits—
He will put him into the Fire to abide eternally therein and he will have a
humiliating punishment.

Surat al-Nisā' (The Women) (4), 14¹

A Background

Al-Jamia al-Islamiya (the Islamic Union) is one of the student union branches of the Islamic Jihad movement in Palestine, which is tied to the Islamic Brotherhood. In a short pamphlet, only 12 pages long, al-Jamia al-Islamiya presents a position paper where the movement's take on the struggle in Palestine is described.²

Al-Jamia al-Islamiya is similar to other movements throughout the Arab world, from Indonesia to Morocco, that carry this name. The Palestinian movement is closest to the Egyptian branch of the movement due to the similar backgrounds of their founders who are both from the Islamic Jihad. Islamic Jihad is first and foremost a social association with an Islamic social agenda. It does not focus only on *dawah* activities whose aim is struggle and *jihad*, but sees itself as a tool for the fixing of Islamic society and for designing public religious behavior (such as fasting during the month of Ramadan) and supervising the implementation of the prohibition of drinking and selling of alcohol and pornography and the rest of the “sick evils from the West.” The pamphlet translated below surveys the local example of al-Jamia al-Islamiya.³

On the pamphlet's cover appears the movement's symbol. In the middle of the symbol is a small-scale map of Palestine. At the top of the symbol there is a replica of the Dome of the Rock mosque (Masjid Qubbat al-Sakhra). On top of the dome are the words, “There is no God except for God” (*La ila ilala*). In the center, between the walls of the mosque illustration, there is a tightly closed hand holding a knife blade. An enlargement of this symbol also appears on the back of the pamphlet. The integration of a knife onto the background of the Dome of the Rock mosque indicates to the followers of Islam that one must protect al-Aqsa and all of Palestine⁴ through violence as

this is the only way that will lead to victory over the non-Muslims in Palestine—the way of *jihad*.

At the bottom of the cover are written the words “Vision and Principles” (*Rawa wa-Mawqaf*).

B Translation of “The Vision and the Principles of al-Jamia al-Islamiya”

1 Dedication

In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate

Who leads us on the right path

To all the faithful to the people, their problems and their nation⁵

To all those students who are zealous for their religion and their homeland.

The religion which helps one appreciate who has the right to grasp the arm with strength and does not prevent the uprising.

To those who are fed up with the attempts that were made and failed

To all of the free men and the respected⁶ in beloved Palestine

Until al-Aqsa spire and the flags of Khaybar⁷ are no longer covered in shame.

Until we are able to fight a just fight, the struggle continues, [a struggle of] blood on His holy lips [the lips of Islam].

We will let you all know about:

The progress [of the followers] to carry out the religious duty

[For] the brothers, humanity and respect

God helps, and He is the best witness for [helping].

2 Familiarization [with the organization] al-Jamia al-Islamiya (the Islamic Union):

It prepares the students to be Muslim, sociable, contributing and revolutionaries inside the winning Islamic movement. The movement strengthens the Islamic plan and the world revolution [which] breaks out from inside the population and protects [the population] until the rule of God is achieved.

It is an organization that wishes to change and to consult on everything that is *jahili*⁸ and to lead [the people] to the [real and true Islamic] government for the [Islamic] society which will live in accordance [with it].

It does not allow the *jahiliyyah* situation to influence Islamic beliefs and values. That is why it influences and acts and feels the feeling and the events [among the Muslims]. The Islamic population does not long for suffering and does not give in to it or to the discrimination [that exists towards it]. In addition to it being the tongue of its [Islam’s] solution, as the expresser of the worries, pains and the hopes of [the followers].

It understands that in order to exit the serious crisis [that can be] only through the return to the original, wonderful Islam.

3 *The values of al-Jamia al-Islamiya*

The values and the most important characteristics that are found in al-Jamia al-Islamiya are:

The Palestinian problem is the central problem of the Islamic movement [due to] the Qur'an's approach [which is related] to the root of the Islamic–Jewish conflict.⁹

The return of the Islamic Caliphate according to the ways of the prophets is central to the carrying out of the expectations.

Because the Arab regimes are the last hope for the Zionist entity which is surrounded by security belts and [because] it [the Zionist entity] is a regime of heresy and must be brought down, captured and replaced with an Islamic [regime].

Because the lost West is the pioneer of boastful forces [in the world] which humiliate and hurt the Muslims and *al-mustad'afin*¹⁰ [forces]. These boastful forces strengthen the Zionistic and Western boasting. That is why it is necessary to fight against the Western ideas and everything that is derived from them either in thought or in methods or in plans.

Because the unity of the Islamic movement is a *shari'a*¹¹ obligation [according to the Islamic religion] and is a most important pre-condition to carry out the goals and the challenges standing [before the movement].

We must refuse to sign on the most unusual and unfair solutions that have been brought to us by the family of infidels [*ahl al-kafir*] and the secularists.

4 *The goals of al-Jamia al-Islamiya*

To fulfill the commandments of God, may He be praised and elevated, and the faithful (*al-Mukhalasin*) for the worthy purposes [of God].

Activity in order to keep God's constitution as represented by the states of the Islamic caliphs.¹²

Activities for the freeing of Palestine from the Zionist thieves.

To strive for the establishment of a real *jihadist* and revolutionary society while carrying out regular *jihad* educational activities.¹³

The dispersing of the holy warriors¹⁴ and their leaders [among the Islamic nation] who will carry the burden of the Islamic way to the population.

To carry the Islamic multitudes towards Islam.

The [turning] of the Palestinian population's awareness towards the Islamic mission in accordance with the various revolutionary methods that will fit in with the desire for a future that will bring with it freedom.¹⁵

Coping [with] the crises and the challenge [of] the modern Western culture and a solution to our problems [through Islam] as a result of this challenge.

5 *The basic theoretical premises of al-Jamia al-Islamiya*

The belief in God gives a logical reason for all the various shapes of the universe, humanity and life.

The belief in a world to come and the role of retribution for communities [of the faithful] who walk in the [right] way according to the positive goals of Islam.

The certain belief in the vision of the patriarchs of Islam [*al-Salaf*],¹⁶ the righteous [which are fitting] for the whole family [of humankind].

The belief in the essentiality and the necessity of establishing Allah's rule over this land—a rule that will be expressed by the establishment of a Caliphate.

Al-Qur'an and the Sunna¹⁷ are the most important sources for receiving and asking for justice.

[Islam] as a whole: When we take the religion and we gather it and we refuse [to keep only] a part of our commitment [and not another part]. The Lord explains and says:

So do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the recompense for those who do that among you except disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment. And Allah is not unaware of what you do.

(*Surat al-Baqarah* (The Cow), verse 85)¹⁸

Science: Islam is the [source] of human knowledge and the source of the world's methods for research and thought. As a result of this, we [the Muslims are] a world community that adopts from all the scientific systems in the world and from all the methods in order to achieve its righteous goals.

6 The methods of *al-Jamia al-Islamiya*

Dawah with wisdom,¹⁹ while drawing conclusions and preaching [about] charity [in Islam] to a Muslim audience.

To show, to teach, to advise Muslims [on the way of Islam].

[To publicize] the known law which prohibits the denial of the *shari'a* laws that will continue forever without interruption.²⁰

To produce a benefit from any means and from any field that serves and fulfills the goals of *al-Jamia al-Islamiya* [even if] it does not appear in the texts²¹ of the Qur'an and stable Islamic law.

[This combination of] excuses and explanations together with all the means of popular motivation²² in order to build eternal scientific [knowledge based on Islam].

The *jihad* for God and in all ways.²³

7 The ideological vision of *al-Jamia al-Islamiya*

The vision of the patriarchs, for all of the righteous of all families [on earth] and this means that we must emphasize Islamic meditation [*ishti-had*]²⁴ and the pure ideas that are far away from all the types of *jahiliyyah* [ignorance] and the deviation from the straight and *al-bad'a*²⁵ path which

nurses from the pure and permanent fountain of the words of the merciful God may His blessing be on him.²⁶

The good of the *hadith*²⁷ [is] the Lord's dogma and the best teaching is that of Muhammad, the mercy of God upon him and blessings upon him. [And anyone who adds] innovations hurts God's commandments as they were expressed by His Prophet.

We understand the [Islamic] vision on its values and its commandments. All those who disagree with [these] ideological values deny the most important thing. [Even if he is a Muslim] there is no return [to Islam] only to these values and they are the vision [of the followers].

This area [of what is faith] is disagreed upon [today] and one may not, from the outset, permit the accusation of heresy. [Therefore, in order to prevent this,] we must belong to the school [*madrassa*] of the patriarchs and reject all that was promoted by exaggeration and by incomplete means [in recent generations]. The test of innovation nicely presents the foundation of the problem [that led to the setting of Islam].²⁸ [If we do not do this, we will cause]²⁹ an eruption and clashes which will lead to separation and to *fitnah*.³⁰ That is why the most important thing [is] to leave the *bad'a* [the innovations of heresy] and walk in the ways of the original *Sunna* [Islamic tradition] and thus we will not lead to an even bigger *bad'a*.³¹

We must belong to the schools of our righteous patriarchs. In other words, adopt the spirit of our patriarchs and their deeds [as expressed] in the written dogma (Qur'an) and in the rest of the other areas and in the tradition [*hadith*]. We must make ourselves suit in all the ways [to the ways of our patriarchs] and to promise confidently [by their actions] and their spirit in all of the areas.

8 *Membership's stages*

Faith: A declaration and a call to the word of God. Surrender, obedience and admiration for the completeness of God; may He be blessed and rise up, in all of the *shari'a* work [pertaining to the law] where we must praise God.

Awareness: Understanding the Islamic way of thinking [and understanding] the depth of the problems in Islam today. Political awareness to the present [depressed] state and a [corresponding] moral commitment to Islamic standards [for fixing the world].

Commitment: Deep faith. A valuable commitment. [Despite] those wishing to steal [the nation's opinion] with deception while distorting [the faith] and using lead bullets.³² Compared to those followers who commit to the way of Islam tying their future and their lives to Islam. A final tie that can only be severed by death. In other words, the commitment to pay a high price for standing strong³³ and screaming in the face of nothingness [which is alien to Islam].

Revolution: This is a unique revolution. A responsible revolution that begs for God's mercy to send the caliph [who will return the Islamic Caliphate to its greatness]. The responsible revolution that begs for God's mercy for the poverty and the shortages common to the public. The responsible revolution that does not abstain from work. Therefore, this is a revolution [against] tyranny and boastfulness in Islam.

[The stages are:]

Vision, revolution, mobility, faith, awareness and revival.

*Commitment ...*³⁴

9 Our assembly as an organization

For one goal, for one ideological philosophical vision and one ideology [to implement the obligation] imposed upon us for one purpose. One ideology and one purpose [and the implementation of obligations] imposed upon us into one ideological content and one action plan that describes and solves our problems in a natural way. That is why we shall realize and we shall all gather and there will be no factions. [We will be] as one unit without any divisions between us.

10 The legacy

When we look at our legacy and our patriarchs' efforts, those who bequeathed to us the ideological thought and the Islamic law.³⁵ From this are derived two dimensions:

The first dimension: Understanding Islam from that stage [of our patriarchs].

The second dimension: The challenges and the stages that are imposed upon us [on the Muslims].

[In accordance with this,] it is possible that it is up to us to look at [our] heritage in order to find the reaction and the appropriate Islamic awareness for the challenges that are imposed upon us. One can count a number of ways according to the solutions and the crises [that we are undergoing]. Therefore, it is possible that it is up to us to get closer in our understanding of the amazing God who watches over us and the Islamic heritage that "It is impossible not to absorb [from it] understand and implement."³⁶ We are the inheritors of the meaning—that we understand [our] heritage, we comprehend the brilliance that is found in this heritage. We must gain understanding because there is no alternative [then to understand] the challenges [that were positioned] in front of our patriarchs. On one hand, we must understand their tests and on the other hand, we must comprehend that there are challenges that are still [continuing] in addition to those challenges that our patriarchs met and with which we are now coping.

We will reform our work [our ways] and we will reach this [Islamic] heritage without insolence [towards others] and without accepting only part of the word of God.

11 Our place among the Islamic powers

Al-Jamia al-Islamiya is an inseparable part of the Islamic movement [and our friends] stand as pioneers in order to save Islam and the return of the Islamic political entity to its place. In order to carry out this goal, the union strengthens its ties with all the powers of the Islamic movement from an understanding [of the situation]. As it is said:

O you who have believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion—Allah will bring forth [in place of them] a people He will love and who will love Him [who are] humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers; they strive in the cause of Allah and do not fear the blame of a critic. [That is the favor of Allah; He bestows it upon whom He wills. And Allah is all-Encompassing and Knowing].

Surat al-Maa'idah (the Table Spread) (5), verse 54³⁷

Therefore, one must consider the fact that [there exists] the ability to distinguish between the existence of ties among the followers on one hand and the existence of ties between the followers and the infidels and the enemies on the other hand. These ties need to be [based on] the Qur'an.³⁸ They also should be based on a complete observation of [the relationships] in the negotiations and the keeping of ties inside of the House of Islam and outside it. [It is up to Islam] to lead the followers and to solve the [problems] of shortages and poverty [in society] that humiliate the respect of the Muslims and the shortages and poverty that are not seen. [It is up to Islam] to clarify the damage to those [who are persecuted] who are being spied upon. [One should] solve their problems and reach out a supporting and helping hand to them. Because they have a need to be paid attention to with courtesy [and] restraint from being hurt. Also, their good advice [is hidden] inside [their] commitment to the framework and the non-violation of the good advice [that is hidden in the Islamic religion]. That is the reason that al-Jamia al-Islamiya sees in this [the correcting of the pain of the Muslims] as one of the most important things that will lead to a victory of the Islamic vision and to carry it out in our day.³⁹

A unification of all the free Muslims. In regard to this, [the unification of] all the private leaderships or groups on all of the planes without a real commitment to the methods that are built by the community and this is weird conduct [from our point of view] and will not die in our charitable communities ... and this we reject and defend. That is why we call to all the families of the Islamic movement⁴⁰ for a constructive discussion on the ways to cooperate and coordinate activities that will lead to a unification of the plan and of the perception. Before we carry this out, [the cooperation and the coordination] we must commit on a *dawah* with great value [which will be carried out] and on their lives [the Islamists that they are] the true hope. That is why it is possible that we need to look at our place inside the Islamic

movement, inside Palestine and outside it as a location that will not change [in the future]. We will not neglect a part of our brothers [from the other movements] due to a more fitting execution of one of our brothers [in our union]. In no way will we neglect the carrying out of the demands of the brothers of all the Islamic movement spinoffs meaning that we are obligating them to [self-]sacrifice. Because we ascribe importance to this [the sacrifice] as the root of our religion. If we must go into details, we will say:

Our place in the Muslim Brotherhood organization and the other organizations in Palestine that we think of as the closest to us, as those whose general base assumptions and goals are close ... It is true [that there are] differences of opinion among us [also in regard to] the means and the way of thinking about the nation and what its boundaries are. However, this does not mean that we will not adopt one of the solutions [or] that we will neglect any way of coordination as part of our efforts, all of us together, [in dealing with] the present challenges.

No way in the world will we ever accept any reduction in the matter [Islam] or in the role [of Islam]. The *dawah* of [needs to be] open to [our] goals—the strategic level—[is] to create unity between us and the [different Islamic] movements—The [united] Muslim Brotherhood organization ... with its apologies within and with the lack of agreement inside [between its parts] ... we will bring to light, together with them, with the mercy of God with us,⁴¹ by reducing the gap between us. This is our approach and our attitude toward them [the other movements] ...

It is not possible that it has not been said in this context, that we do not wish nor do we build a [cooperative] base with our Muslim brothers. [But, on the other hand], we say in this context that we will not wish whoever is in [a full unity] with us and with (the Islamic freedom party and the other Islamic organizations [like the Muslim Brotherhood]) [because] we accept that all these movements [have] a most important role.

12 Our provisions⁴²

Piety and law.⁴³ Strong confidence and experience. Caution and faith in the creator that He will lead the world through mercy. Asceticism [from the life] of the world that leads to the next world ... and one cannot reach all this except through (a *jihad* journey that will last in all the public and personal planes). *In other words, the attainment of the understanding of the situation and the [Islamic] revolution demands total jihad, continuing and continuous which fits in with the total Islamic spirit.*⁴⁴ And this modern plane [of understanding the present situation] emphasizes the question [the education] and the necessity to present an answer to the problem [that exists in Islam] which demands a solution in order to fulfill the Islamic vision all around.⁴⁵

Indeed, our organization believes in the importance of education for the individual and the community in order to reach the perfect situation of humanity before God. [The organization] believes that education (an

encompassing procedure that continues without being neglected on one hand and without [any] limit at a certain stage). The education [will be carried out] through a number of methods. *As the work of the creator was carried out at night and raises up the soul from its desires, such is the patience regarding the soldiers of the enemy which purifies the soul and cleanses it.*⁴⁶ Education [is] an encompassing process which demands the investment of an effort of surrendering the soul and sublimating the behavior with a commitment towards knowledge and an attachment to feelings [that are expressed] in the way of Islam. Therefore, one must sacrifice a part of the Islamic personality on the private and social plane in order to be able to continue with this personality and this organization in a condition of peace. Why not be redeemed and remove the despots and lift up the words of God and in this way the Lord will solve the attempts [in this world] and will purify the followers?

And we will surely test you until we make evident those who strive among you [for the cause of Allah] and the patient, and we will test your affairs.

*Surat Muhammad (47), verse 31*⁴⁷

Or do you think that you will enter Paradise while Allah has not yet made evident those of you who fight in His cause and made evident those who are steadfast?

*Surat al-'Imrān (Family of Imran) (3), verse 142*⁴⁸

It can be said that the Islamic personality cannot be excellent or stand out except [in *jihad*] and one cannot verify the sources that belong to Islam except in *jihad*.

Therefore, one must continue to work diligently in the way of jihad (the stage of choosing good) and that is the stage of shahada:

If a wound should touch you—there has already touched the [opposing] people a wound similar to it. And these days [of varying conditions] we alternate among the people so that Allah may make evident those who believe and [may] take to Himself from among you martyrs—and Allah does not like the wrongdoers—And that Allah may purify the believers [through trials] and destroy the disbelievers.

*Surat al-Imran (Family of Imran), verses 140–141*⁴⁹

Therefore, one must sacrifice (because education [is] a continuing activity that is not possible except with the death of people) and it is clear that one cannot justify education without *jihad* and [the God] will not leave in any of the condition of the conditions to cause a separation between them [between education and *jihad*].

Likewise, one cannot justify the neglecting of the problem and the obligation to a way of life and to violating [part of the responsibilities in Islam]

instead of explaining the *jihad*,⁵⁰ and all of Islam continues and perseveres and the commitment of the followers will not be total except with their commitment to all of the facets of Islam. Fear of God and the laws, asceticism and *jihad*, faith and experience, carefulness and faith in the mercy from above.

13 Our understanding

The understanding of Islam in its entirety as understood by the first generation and our organization which rejects the hate and commits to whatever was said [in the book]:

[Then, you are those [same ones who are] killing one another and evicting a party of your people from their homes, cooperating against them in sin and aggression. And if they come to you as captives, you ransom them, although their eviction was forbidden to you]. So do you believe in part of the Scripture and disbelieve in part? Then what is the recompense for those who do that among you except disgrace in worldly life; and on the Day of Resurrection they will be sent back to the severest of punishment. [And Allah is not unaware of what you do].

Surat al-Baqarah (The Cow), verse 85⁵¹

In line with this, we reject the [existing] division in Islam because we understand that this division is a characteristic of the characteristics that exist in Islam [creating] social alienation. That is why we reject the [internal] division between the tribes of Islam and the [internal] division in the plan for the Islamic revolution. Our organization negates with this [any attempt] at details on a regional or national [basis] or [details on] the ways [to carry out] its goals. [We] invite all of the current Islamic powers to compete together from inside the total Islamic plan and the unity that stands in the way of our problems [the West and the Zionists] in the Muslim world. That is how we shall implement our desire for wholeness and we will implement the intent of our nation [the nation of Islam] and *al-shahada* in both of the worlds.⁵² Through this world understanding of al-Jamia al-Islamiya [the propaganda and preaching for Islam] [and understanding of] the Islamic plan which justifiably rejects the organization's solutions [compromises] on the Islamic problems. It [the organization] believes that all dogma and miracles exist in Islam and any imitation hurts Islam. The organization declares its submissiveness and it listens to and obeys the Islamic vision which includes *shari'a*. It is important to indicate that every partial accord [between Islam and the West] that was made in the past by the Arab regimes or as there are [those] who are glorifying other side aspects of Islam.⁵³ This is not [a test of compatibility] but a trick to go around the feasibility of the Islamic mission and to pass with these plots the Islamic revolution.⁵⁴

From here is our understanding of Islam in its entirety which places upon us the responsibility (for the revolutionary plan regarding the way of *jihad*) as

the only way to establish a Kingdom of God [whose purpose] is to distance and remove the despots from their place in control, from their ability to decide and from their ability to direct. That is how each movement separately will cause [the removal of the despots from their countries] so that there will be created a combined movement which is whole [out of all of the movements] until they arrive at the stage of a folk uprising. These movements will use *any of the means that are available to them*⁵⁵ in order to bring to fruition the total Islamic revolution that they desire to reach. This is [as a matter of fact] the main goal out of all of the goals of al-Jamia al-Islamiya.⁵⁶

We understand the light of Islam which guides us on the straight path, according to our traditions, which reveals and exposes the character of the Western challenge, the modern and the materialistic ... and it is up to us to commit an act that will strive for justice and social equality and for the neutralization of [Western] arrogance. Create a situation that guards and prevents any compromise or concession on the lands of the Muslims. Here there is a need for deep learning in far away cooperative places [with] a belonging to the international law [and with attention] to the ties between the countries [which will act] as one shoulder [for this learning]. We must reach and understand the factors and the reasons for the secularism in order to prevent [the situation] where we will fail [in carrying out our goals] in our Muslim world.

14 *Our loyalty*

To God, His Messenger and His followers:

Your ally is none but Allah and [therefore] His Messenger and those who have believed—those who establish prayer and give *zakah*, and they bow [in worship].⁵⁷ And whoever is an ally of Allah and His Messenger and those who have believed—indeed, the party of Allah—they will be the predominant.

Surat al-Maa'idah (the Table Spread) (5), verses 55–56⁵⁸

Because the question of loyalty [to God, His Messenger and His followers] is a question of principles and most important to the individual and to the community. And [reference to this question] from the point of view between the individual and the community in the first stages of the [activities] of al-Jamia al-Islamiya [and even] outside it. That is what the martyr Sayyid Qutb said in his important book, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*.⁵⁹ Because the first steps on our way in which we will overcome the *jahiliyyah* society and the *jahiliyyah* rule and its way of action. [In them] we will not try to justify our responsibility half way, [for partial activities] no matter [if] few or many. Each one of us can be raised up⁶⁰ and act at these crossroads where we find ourselves at the same time that we will publicize the unity plan [to carry out our goals] otherwise it is possible that we hurt our goals and lose our way.

Along with this, the topic of loyalty [to Islam] is a religious obligation that molds the [Islamic] movement in an important way. We will not allow any [deviation from this duty] at any opportunity due to the holiness of the way that demands the Islamic goals ... *through Islamic victory which is the way of the "jihad revolution"*⁶¹ through the consideration of the fact that there exist [on this way] difficulties in understanding the holy [ideology] [and carrying out] the goals. [God] will prepare the way on where the evildoers will suffer and will be surrounded [by] the centers of revolution until they straighten out and fail with their means to kill the Islamic revolutionaries at the stage that [precedes] the pain⁶² because the understanding of loyalty will open wide the gate of historical responsibility towards the Muslims and their problems. All together we will create the rule of the word of God and the *shari'a*, with a full commitment to build a united Islamic plan that will clash with the sinners⁶³ and will clash with the Western plans because it is the understanding of loyalty [to God, the Messenger and the Muslims] is what defines for us the perfect political plan, not Eastern or Western.⁶⁴ Our camp will be in this framework:

An [Islamic] camp whose purpose is to carry out the will of God.

An [Islamic] camp that will disperse the evil and the abomination.

15 The operation of the pact⁶⁵

Our vision: Is the way of our righteous patriarchs in their trials and in the details [of their deeds].⁶⁶

Our way: *al-dawah*, the commandment of the [good] laws and the forbidden heresy⁶⁷ and the denial of the existence of the Creator. And also the existence of *jihad* for God.⁶⁸

Our understanding: Understanding the entire Islam.

Our provisions: Fear of God and knowledge of God [*Taqwa wa-'Alm*]. Extreme faith and experience. Caution and faith in the Creator who will rule His world with mercy. Asceticism [from] the world which leads to the world to come.

Our loyalty: To God, His Messenger and His followers.

Our assembly: For one purpose and one vision to act as one.

This is the end of this pamphlet.

C Al-Jamia al-Islamiya in Palestine in a practical test

Al-Jamia al-Islamiya in Palestine is just one of the many organizations acting under this name in all of the Arab countries. The Indonesian branch that carries this name is one of the most prominent and is defined by both Israel and the United States as a terrorist organization.⁶⁹ The Egyptian branch that carries this name is also defined as a terrorist organization and its activists

were persecuted by the Egyptian regime until the January 25, 2011 revolution when President Husni Mubarak was toppled from his position. The Palestinian branch of the movement is even smaller and is defined as a student movement of the Islamic Jihad in Palestine by its founder Fathi Shaqaqi. There is no evidence for any connection between these organizations except for their name.

The student union of al-Jamia al-Islamiya of Islamic Jihad is active in all of the universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This student movement is an important component in the civilian infrastructure supporting the terrorism of the organization and is involved, as is the student movement of Hamas, in incitement to terrorism and in the distribution of the ideas of the Islamic radicals at the universities in the territories. The members of this student movement are an important element in the recruitment of activists to the ranks of the Islamic Jihad organization and activating them for *jihad* missions.⁷⁰

Like the rest of the organizations in the Arab countries, this organization also tries to mold a social-Islamic order that will prepare the young hearts in Palestinian society for Islam.⁷¹ This pamphlet expresses the importance of the organization's activists in the field of education and imbuing Islamic values into a generation of Palestinian students at the various universities. The movement acts on two moral planes. The first is its activities in relationship with the Palestinian Authority which has often been seen in the last decade as a despotic ruler acting in the spirit of Western values and which should be replaced with an Islamic regime. The second plane is that of *jihad* for God against the Zionist occupier. This is the uniqueness of the Palestinian organization which sees itself as pioneering in the general Islamic revolution that will lead to a change in society, and as a fighting force against Israel.

The pamphlet translated above presents the world view of the Islamic organization al-Jamia al-Islamiya which is active in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria. The organization is seen as an illegal organization according to the pronouncements of the Israeli Ministry of Defense.⁷² The movement preaches for a military struggle against the State of Israel using any possible means. This can be seen by its goals and its views which are stated in the translation presented in this chapter. On the movement's website, one can find the following:

Israel is an illegal exploiting entity ... according to the law one cannot recognize its existence or allow it to exist in security in Palestine our Motherland ... the *jihad*, the holy war for Allah, is a legal right in order to expel the invaders and the settlers from the Islamic and Muslim areas.⁷³

The idea that it is necessary to switch the Zionist entity with an Islamic Caliphate also appears in the pamphlet. There is no discernible difference between these goals of al-Jamia al-Islamiya and those of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, including its branches. The difference is on what each group emphasizes—the military activities over *dawah* activities.

The *jihad* is a general commandment and requirement imposed on every Muslim wherever he may be (*fard al-'ayn*). Not just men are allowed to participate in this struggle but any Muslim, male or female, wherever they are, may do so. Thus, for example, Sheikh Abdullah Azzam⁷⁴ indicates the following:

The *jihad* will remain a requirement for every individual until all of the other countries which were once Muslim will return to us, until Islam will rule within them again. Here there are in front of us Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Tashkent, Andalusia ...⁷⁵

This is the purpose of *jihad* in Palestine, returning the land to its Muslim owners. And this is a religious commandment (*fard al-'ayn*) that rests on every Muslim.

In order for followers really to act according to this religious commandment, it is necessary to initiate an appropriate education system (*al-tarbiya*) which will internally prepare Palestinian-Muslim public opinion. This education system must include within it the basic values of the Islamic faith. This includes the character of the desired regime and intensive learning about the ways of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions (*ashab al-nabi*) and the four righteous *al-rashidun* caliphs who governed the Muslim nation in the 7th century, after the death of Muhammad. This pamphlet emphasizes that in no way whatsoever is it permitted to be satisfied with only educational activities for the public but education must be combined with practical lives, in other words, by the realization of the *jihad* way against the Zionist infidels (the chapter that deals with Our Provisions in the pamphlet). This echoes the argument that already existed in the 1980s among the members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Gaza Strip,⁷⁶ an argument that led to the break-off of Islamic Jihad from the Muslim Brotherhood and the carrying out of anti-Israel activities in the name of the organization. This argument also led at the beginning of the first *intifada* in December 1987, to the creation of the Hamas movement from within the Muslim Brotherhood and the beginning of military activities of the new movement.⁷⁷

Therefore, al-Jamia al-Islamiya acted to recruit both women and men for *jihad* activities against Israel. For example, in November 2003, Sabrin Abu Umrah, a 20-year-old student from al-Najah National University in Nablus, from Islamic Jihad, was arrested after she tried to carry out a terrorist suicide attack in Jerusalem. When arrested, authorities found her will in which she wrote:

I give my cheap soul to God. I dedicate this terrorist attack to the pure souls of the slain [soldiers]. My mother, my brother, my sisters—do not be angry. My leaving today is difficult but we will meet, with the help of God, in heaven.

The person who sent her, Manel Sab'ana, was also arrested—a single 19-year-old girl from Qabatiya (near Jenin), who was chosen, in her first semester of art studies at al-Najah University, to serve as the head of the al-Jamia al-Islamiya branch at the university. It is her claim that women have a no less important job in *jihad* for God. Although the female martyr will not receive 70 males in heaven, her place there is ensured and all of her sins will be forgiven. If the female martyr is married, she will be the lady in charge of the 70 virgins for her husband, or a different group of virgins if she is single.⁷⁸ The reward of Paradise also includes the salvation of her family and an entrance ticket for 70 members of her family whom she will meet in Paradise.⁷⁹

In August and September 2006, a number of leading female activists of Islamic Jihad in Palestine were arrested by Israel's general security services. The reason for their arrest was the accusation that they served as beneficiaries for the purpose of receiving monies from Islamic Jihad command in Palestine from Syria headed by Dr. Ramadan Shalah. These activities took place at the offices of the Institute for Prisoner Care, Musasat Mishkat al-Assir (Light for the Prisoners) in Hebron and Ramallah. This institution is active throughout the West Bank and provides economic, financial and legal aid for families of prisoners which it receives from the Islamic Jihad in Palestine. Among the female activists also arrested was Rania Abu Khdeir, a 26-year-old resident of Surif, which is north of Hebron. She was the head of al-Jamia al-Islamiya at Hebron University. She and her friends were suspected of using the money that they received in their accounts in the framework of contributions to *dawah* not only as aid to the prisoners but as funding for the operational activities of Islamic Jihad.⁸⁰

Israeli Arabs learning at the universities in the territories are also exposed to the ideology of al-Jamia al-Islamiya and are, from time to time, tempted to join it. An example of this is the story of Anis Safouri, an Israeli citizen and a resident of Shafaram. In the first months of 2008 he was in contact with Muhammad Salah Badr, a resident of Beit Lakiya (from the Ramallah area), who was active in al-Jamia al-Islamiya at Bir Zeit University. At this time, Safouri was studying journalism and communications at the university and lived in Ramallah for that purpose. As a result of this connection, Safouri took responsibility for the publicity of al-Jamia al-Islamiya in the Ramallah-al-Bireh area for the publication of articles and the writing of internet reports which included details on the activities of Islamic Jihad and the ties of the Islamic terrorist activists to the families of the prisoners and those killed.

During May 2008, Muhammad Salah Badr and Anis Safouri began planning the establishment of a terrorist cell to carry out various terrorist activities against Israel. Among the activities planned were the murder of Israeli lecturers and scientists and attempts to hurt soldiers at the Ateret check point which is close to Bir Zeit University. Likewise, they planned on kidnapping and shooting two collaborators with Israel, Mazen Mughrabi and Shukri Assi. In order to carry out these activities, Safouri enlisted the help of his cousin, Hussam Khalil, a 20-year-old resident of Shafaram, who was learning

electronic engineering at Mu'tah University in Jordan. Safouri and Muhammad Badr contacted the organization's headquarters in Syria and with Ramadan Shalah, the commander of the Islamic Jihad, they asked for funding for their activities. They planned on calling themselves "the cell of the martyr Imad Mughniyeh." Mughniyeh served as a Hezbollah operations officer. They worked within the framework of the Saraya al-Quds, the military arm of the Islamic Jihad. The plans did not succeed and they were caught by Israel's General Security Service and placed on trial.⁸¹

The *dawah* system fulfills a central position in spreading the laws of Islamic fundamentalism and recruiting those loyal to the Islamic organizations. *Dawah*, which means invitation or explanation, is an Islamic term which relates to propaganda activities that spread the Islamic religion among society. These activities are usually centered in the mosques, through preaching and the distribution of proclamations and brochures such as this one and lessons on the Qur'an, etc. The *dawah* activities also include the charity organizations in the refugee camps and in the Palestinian cities. Through these activities, aid is given to the needy and the Islamic movements build up their strength.

Thus, for example, between the years 1996–2000, Hamas focused on building a *dawah* system in the Gaza Strip. During this period, unemployment stood at 25% and Fatah appeared strong. Later on, when the economic situation worsened, Hamas increased its power through the use of this system which then aided Hamas to win the January 2006 election and increase its strength.⁸² After the Hamas revolution in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the *dawah* institutions of Hamas and Islamic Jihad were shut down in the West Bank by the Palestinian Authority, and in their stead alternate institutions of welfare were established that were supported by the Palestinian Authority.⁸³

The monies for the *dawah* system come from a variety of sources abroad—from Iran, Hezbollah, Islamic unions on the Saudi peninsula, Islamic student unions in Europe and in the United States, and also from fanatic Palestinian organization such as the Munir al-Maqdah faction which separated from Fatah and is found in London. At the beginning, the monies were designated to support the families of martyrs,⁸⁴ to establish kindergartens and fund other charitable activities. During the al-Aqsa *intifada*, these monies also served as a means to finance the *jihad* against Israel.⁸⁵

It was only in 2004 that the State of Israel began to invest efforts into trying to prevent fund transfers to Islamic factors in the West Bank.⁸⁶ Sometimes the closing of the *dawah* organizations is carried out through cooperation with Palestinian Authority factors interested in weakening the Islamic movements in the West Bank. In a search that took place in the offices of the Musasat Mishkat al-Assir institution in Tulkarem on August 2006, much literature inciting against Israel was found. Under questioning, the female prisoners admitted that they were used as money couriers for the needs of the institution and also for the transfer of money to the terrorist cells.⁸⁷ The institution, whose activities were defined as charity and aid to the families of

prisoners in Israel and to the families of the martyrs from the Islamic Jihad organization, is just one example of an institution that was a part of the *dawah* of the Islamic Jihad.

Similar to the Islamic Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and the rest of the Islamic Jihad organizations, even al-Jamia al-Islamiya is influenced by the meditation of the martyr Sayyid Qutb. Qutb, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, is thought to be the most influential philosopher in the world *jihad* movement. His influence is mainly found in his coining the expression “*jahiliyyah al-jadida*,” the new “ignorant” era. According to his ideology, the Muslims have returned to the primitive pre-Islam era when they were inferior.⁸⁸ In order to return from this era to one of Islamic growth, there is a need to begin an Islamic revolution which will renew the birth of Islam by replacing the current “secular” leaders whose loyalty to Islam is doubtful and who have been surrendering to the West.

The society of the ignorance that preceded Islam [*jahiliyyah*] is any society that is not an Islamic society ... every society that does not serve Allah and only Allah ... By this objective definition, we place in this ignorant society of the primitive pre-Islamic era every existing society that today exists in the world, first and foremost, the communist societies, ... the idol-worshipping societies (such as India, Japan, the Philippines and Africa), ... the Jewish and Christian societies, and in the last part of this category are those societies that claim they are Muslim in the belief in Allah as the only God ... but they are not in the ranks of Allah in the organization of their lives ... they ... attribute God’s characteristics to others apart from Him as they let others take away His sovereignty ... the kingdom of Allah in this world is not explained as the rule by people who are considered superior, people of religion ... No, the explanation is the *shari’a* that rules and the turning to Allah according to the clear rules that He set.⁸⁹

This is the ideological basis against secular Arab rule which does not see Islam and the *shari’a* as the source thus obligating his government. This secular rule, even if it is Arab—such as the Palestinian Authority—needs to relinquish its place to those loyal to Islam.⁹⁰ While Islamic Jihad did mark the way, it was the Hamas movement that actually carried out the opposition to the secular rule. In a Palestinian civil war that lasted six days, from June 7 until June 13, 2007, Hamas gained control of the Gaza Strip by cruelly removing Fatah rule there. During those six days, Hamas succeeded in gaining control over all the Palestinian Authority institutions. At least 161 Palestinians were killed and close to 700 were wounded in this war. According to various reports, followers of both Islamic Jihad and Hamas, those loyal to Islam, acted with joy as they cruelly killed. This included the execution of two leading Fatah activists who were thrown to their deaths from a tall building.⁹¹

During this period, from June 2007 until May 2011, a number of efforts were made to unify Fatah and Hamas. These efforts led to an “appeasement” agreement which was finally signed on May 3, 2011.⁹² As a small organization, Islamic Jihad accepted the appeasement agreement with the awareness that it was possible that in the upcoming election of 2012, slated to take place in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) institutions and in the Palestinian Authority, the shared Islamic stream of Islamic Jihad and Hamas could win a majority of seats and lead the PLO and the Palestinian Authority into a new period. During the four years in which a separation between the government in the West Bank and the government in the Gaza Strip existed, the Islamic Jihad organization and its student union, al-Jamia al-Islamiya, only recognized the authority of the ruling Hamas government in Gaza while denying the authority of the Salām Fayāḍ government in the West Bank.⁹³ The historic appeasement agreement between Hamas and Fatah and the promises for change in Palestinian society presented a challenge to the power of Islam, including Islamic Jihad.

No Palestinian election was held in 2012. Hamas and Fatah faced many difficulties in fulfilling their agreements and these quickly fell apart. On April 23, 2014, Hamas and Fatah signed another appeasement agreement. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and senior Fatah official Azzam al-Ahmad announced that the two factions had fulfilled a “national responsibility” by reaching this agreement.⁹⁴ Professor Rami Hamdallah became the prime minister of the new Palestinian government that represented both Fatah and Hamas. After the kidnapping of three Israeli boys (on June 12) by Hamas members and the war in Gaza (July 8–August 26, 2014) in which both organizations, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, took part against Israel, Hamas agreed to another agreement with Fatah on September 23. This allowed the Palestinian Authority’s return to the Gaza Strip in order to run the government there—for the first time in seven years.⁹⁵ Hamdallah held a Cabinet meeting in Gaza and visited Haniyeh on October 9, 2014.⁹⁶ A Palestinian election for both the presidency and the Palestinian parliament was scheduled for 2015. It is hard to know at this time if this appeasement agreement will succeed.⁹⁷

Notes

- 1 This verse relates to Islam’s inheritance laws and, in a broad sense, to Islamic tradition where those who keep the religion will earn a great reward in heaven. The Noble Quran site, <http://quran.com/4>.
- 2 Al-Jamia al-Islamiya, *Rawa wa-Mawqaf* (n.p., n.d.).
- 3 Emmanuel Sivan, *The Crash within Islam* (Tel Aviv, 2005), pp.12–15.
- 4 The movement’s symbol also appears in the publicity of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, Nov. 8, 2006, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/p_ij_f1106.htm, which presents proclamations by Islamic Jihad. In the picture, the symbol of al-Jamia al-Islamiya appears alongside a photo of Fathi Shaqaqi. On top of al-Jamia al-Islamiya’s symbol there is a picture of the Dome of the Rock mosque and on top of that is written “The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine.”

- On the side of the symbol there is a picture of a gun and the Qur'an. This picture illustrates the values of the organization.
- 5 The order here is important. First is loyalty to the people—the Palestinian people; second is the problem—the Palestinian disaster and the way to solve it; and third is the nation—the Islamic nation. Loyalty to the Palestinian people precedes loyalty to the Islamic nation according to this list of priorities.
 - 6 *Al-ahrar wa-al-Shurafaa: Ahrrar*. Those who have been freed. The expression “free” men means free from sin. *Shurafaa* means respected or noble. This is an Islamic play on words. In Arabic, this word is a nickname for the friends of the Prophet and also a nickname for the holy places, including Jerusalem (*Haram al-Sharif*), and the area of the holy mount.
 - 7 Al-Aqsa mosque is covered in shame as it is under Jewish rule. The flags of Khaybar symbolize the Jewish community which was located in the Saudi Arabian peninsula during the period of the Prophet Muhammad. The residents of Khaybar who were killed and plundered now control al-Aqsa mosque and their flags, the flags of the Jews, fly over al-Aqsa and cover the spires of the mosque in shame. For more information regarding the Jews of Khaybar and their fate, see Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.57–60, 277–78.
 - 8 *Jahiliyyah* means ignorant or pagan. It is an Islamic expression relating to the period preceding the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic religion in the Saudi Arabian peninsula. It is also used in a derogatory sense to describe the leaders who are not acceptable to those faithful to Islam.
 - 9 The Qur'an's approach toward the Jews is clear and is expressed in the stories regarding the Prophet Muhammad's attitude towards the Jews of the Banu Qaynuqa, Banu Nadir and Banu Qurayza tribes on the Saudi Arabian peninsula. These were Jewish tribes that lived in Medina during the period. Muhammad exiled them and plundered their property. The last Jewish tribe, the Banu Qurayza, received an especially cruel fate when Muhammad commanded that all the men be killed. About 800 men were killed with one stone. The sources emphasize the cruelty that the Prophet used while, at the same time, he was giving charity and authorization for his deeds. That was also the fate meted out to the Jewish residents of Khaybar in the Saudi Arabian peninsula by Muhammad and by the (substitute) second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb. See Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.54–61; Martin Gilbert, *In Ishmael's House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010), pp.8–26.
 - 10 *Al-Mustad'afin*: The “weak,” the “submissive.” This expression shows the policy towards all the Muslim people. They all suffer from the humiliation caused by the forces of the destructive West.
 - 11 *Shari'a*. This is Islamic law, which is based on the Qur'an, the Sunna and the *Hadith*. The Qur'an is a book of religious law and the Sunna and the *Hadith* are complementary religious books which tell of the deeds of the Prophet and the friends of the Prophet and guide Muslims in every phase of their life.
 - 12 The Islamic Caliphate is a religious expression that relates to the rule of the Islamic nation in accordance with religious Islamic values. The caliph (the one who is a substitute for the Prophet) is the top religious, political and military authority in this regime. The golden age of the Islamic caliphs is the framework to which the faithful would like to return. It is the period of the four caliphs, *al-rashidun*—in other words, the period of the four righteous caliphs who ruled over the Islamic nation and led the Islamic conquests after the death of Muhammad in the 7th century.
 - 13 A struggle and military activity for the spreading of Islam in opposition to the world of heresy (anything that is not Muslim can be described as heresy and is defined as such by the religious wise men of that period). In order to succeed in the goal of *jihad*, it is necessary to educate for *jihad* from an early age. Thus, for example, in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Muhammad Salah al-Munajjed speaks about

- education for *jihad* and hatred of the Jews. One needs to worry about the awakening of the spark of *jihad* in Muslim souls. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, p.299.
- 14 The export of *jihad*. The more acceptable explanation of this is the export of the Islamic revolution. See *ibid.*, pp.275–79, 295–300.
 - 15 It is not clear to what type of freedom the pamphlet is referring. Is it freedom from secular regimes? Freedom from Israel? Internal freedom from the ideas of the West? Or perhaps all of these together?
 - 16 *Al-Salaf* is the patriarchs, an Islamic expression that relates to the righteous—the Prophet Muhammad, the prophets mentioned in the Qur’an and the friends of the Prophet as they appear in the Qur’an and in the religious literature concerned with their positive activity. Their way is an example to all believers. For more, see the Shabka Tariq al-Salaf, www.alsalafway.com/cms/index.php.
 - 17 The Sunna is a group of traditions that relate to the actions of the Prophet Muhammad and his friends, the devotees (*al-sahaba al-nabi*). The *Hadith* is a collection of traditions that obligates all followers of Sunna and Shi’ah Islam (there are differences between the two streams in the definition of the friends of the Prophet, especially as it relates to the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr as Şiddiq (Abdullah ibn Abi Quhafa), Umar ibn al-Khattāb and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān).
 - 18 This is a quote from *Surat al-Baqarah* (2), which relates to the stubbornness of the Jews in accepting the Qur’an in its entirety. The Jews are only willing to accept a part of the word of God. They deny the rest and do not accept anything after Muhammad. In other words, they reject the idea of God’s revelation to the Prophet Muhammad and his prophecies, which to Muslims are also a part of the word of God. Hence the mention of the complete verse that appears above. They will receive a very severe punishment due to their refusal to accept all of the word of God which includes the Qur’an and faith in Muhammad as God’s messenger. The Noble Quran site, <http://quran.com/2>.
 - 19 Wisdom (with wisdom, with sense) (*al-hikmah*): the word *al-hikmah*, which is used in the Arabic text, is one of God’s (who is the source of all knowledge) names.
 - 20 This law exists in every Arab country. According to the law in Syria, Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, in the Islamic religion, *shari’a* is the legal base for the law. A denial of *shari’a* law is considered a criminal action.
 - 21 Texts (*nasos*) is also an Islamic expression, relating to the Qur’an and to Islamic law. In other words, one may use “secular” means if they serve Islam.
 - 22 *Al-tahridh al-shaabi* means popular motivation, and refers to the various methods of communication that also serve as methods of incitement against Islam, and also for the distribution of the words of Islam throughout the entire world, as in this case. There is a play on words here on the part of the writer.
 - 23 All of the means that sanctify *jihad* as a holy war in order to reach the goals of Islam. It is not only *jihad* (meaning a believer’s efforts to conquer the inner evil inclination) as believed by moderate Muslims currently living in the West, but *jihad* using not only these internal efforts but all means including the use of the army, murder, writing, money, political support and propagandizing as well.
 - 24 *Ishthihad* is an Islamic expression referring to philosophical diligence and investigation in Islam. This approach brought Islam to a philosophical openness in the 9th century and to the creation of four central schools in Suni Islam: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali. Since then, it has been as if the gates of *ishthihad* have been closed. This was renewed again in the last century by the various Islamic fundamentalist movements such as the Wahabiya on the Saudi Arabian peninsula, the Muslim Brotherhood and also al-Jamia al-Islamiya, which published this pamphlet. Chris Hurrie and Peter Chippindale, *What is Islam? A Nearby Neighbor that We Must Know* (Tel Aviv, 1991), pp.94–101, 122–26.
 - 25 All these are Islamic expressions that represent the way of heresy based on occurrences from the Jahiliyyah period—a period of ignorance from the pre-Islamic

- period. A deviation from the excellent straight path that appears in the holy Islamic books and the innovations (in knowledge), innovations in law, which go against Sunna and are considered heresy in Islam.
- 26 *Sla alla 'alayhu wa-slam*: God will give him mercy and guard him. An Islamic expression that refers to the Prophet Muhammad.
- 27 *Hadith* are the traditional collection (the Mishnayot) that tell of the deeds of the Prophet Muhammad and his righteous friends and what they said. This collection is inseparable from Islamic legal literature and a guide to the believer in all of life's domains. The *hadith* literature is known by the name *al-Sahih* (the real books). There are two collections which are dedicated to Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (born 810), and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj ibn Muslim ibn Ward ibn Kawshādh al-Qushayrī al-Naysābūrī (born 812).
- 28 Sivan, *The Crash within Islam*, p.9. Sivan clearly presents a diagnosis, the medicine and the following ways of action as expressed in this pamphlet.
- 29 This is a rejection of all the Western theories that the secular leaders of the Arab countries have tried to introduce. In the eyes of the zealots of Islam, these Western ways, especially Western democracy, are strange to Islam and only damage the Muslim nation.
- 30 *Fitnah* (civil war). The first Islamic civil war broke out between the army of Alī ibn Abī Tālib, the fourth caliph, and the armies of Mu'āwiyah ibn 'Abī Sufyān. In this war, many Muslims were killed. It led to the great division in the Islamic world, between the Shī'ah (Alī's faction) and the Sunna. This greatly influenced Muslim circles throughout the generations. Hurrie and Chippindale, *What is Islam?*, pp.74–75.
- 31 *Bad'a* (innovation) is against the right way of Islam and is heresy. Thus, for example, Western democracy is defined as a type of *bad'a*.
- 32 This refers to the enemies of the Islamic faithful from within, secular rulers who do not accept Islam in its fundamentalist version such as, for example, General Pervez Musharraf, the ruler of modern-day Pakistan. This regime, despite being Muslim, is objected to by the Pakistani branch of al-Jamia al-Islamiya and other Islamic movements tied to al-Qaeda. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.258–60.
- 33 In the original, *'an tasmad*, to stand strong, an expression of opposition but not necessarily active opposition. Thus, for example, the Palestinians often describe *al-sumud* as standing strong against Israel. Likewise *al-sumud* is one of the names for the Creator. See Shaul Bartal, "Yassar Arafat: The Immortal Martyr-Abu Amar," *e-mago*, a magazine on topics of culture and content, www.e-mago.co.il/Editor/history-3359.htm, May 28, 2010; also Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.55.
- 34 Emphasis in the original.
- 35 The writer uses the expression *salafna*, in other words, our patriarchs. He is referring to the Prophet Muhammad and to the friends of the Prophet, who brought philosophy and Islamic law to the Muslims.
- 36 In the original, *la bad min istay'aba wa-fahma wa-tajawaza*. In other words, all inclusive. According to the understanding of the Islamic faithful, the source of everything is in Islam. Islam includes all of the right laws and all of the ways and all of the shapes of rule—everything that is related to man, without exception. One just has to understand this according to their method.
- 37 The Noble Quran, <http://quran.com/5>. This verse gives the Islamic faithful permission to pull the people after them into battle against the infidels.
- 38 In the original it says in Arabic, "*al-Qaeda al-Qur'ani*." In other words, the "base" or "the foundation" of the Qur'an. Is this the additional source of the name of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda—*al-Qaeda al-Jihad*? In any case, the Islamic zealots tend to use this expression often as a factor that justifies their way of action.
- 39 The suffering of the Muslims in society stems from the secular regime: In the case of the Palestinians, from the Israeli occupation and, in a certain way, from the

- regime of the Palestinian Authority; in the case of the Egyptians, from the ruler at that time, President Husni Mubarak.
- 40 In the original, "*Fasa'el al-haraka al-Islamiya*." This expression is also used in the sense of families and also in the sense of divisions or military brigades. So, for example, the expression *fasa'el al-muqawamah*—the opposition brigades. The activists of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades who were active during the period of the Great Arab Revolt, 1936–39, are also called by the name "*Ihwan al-Qassam*," and were divided by military divisions called Fasa'el Izz al-Din al-Qassam. Farsoun and Zacharia, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, pp.105–7.
 - 41 In the original Arabic it says, "*Bi-haq Allah alimah*." This is an Islamic expression that literally means "with the justice of God upon us." Here, too, there is an additional combination of one of the names of Allah—*al-Haq*—the just. We are obliged to God.
 - 42 In the original Arabic the word used is *zadna*, which means our provisions. This word can also be defined as our food. This is an additional Islamic expression that symbolizes a name for the deeds of man in this world that provision him in the next world.
 - 43 The Arab words used here are *taqwa wa-'alm*, which can be translated as righteousness and science.
 - 44 Emphasis added.
 - 45 The problem is, of course, the challenges of modernism and the infidel West. These challenges are the ones that enabled the falling of Palestine into the hands of the Jews.
 - 46 Emphasis added.
 - 47 The Noble Qur'an, <http://quran.com/47>.
 - 48 *Ibid.*, <http://quran.com/3>.
 - 49 *Shahid*: the one who dies for the sanctification of God in Islam is the chosen of God. God chooses him among all of the truly faithful. Therefore, of course, he will have a great reward in heaven. The education preached in Islam is aimed at preparing the followers for this way of *jihad* for Islam and for death for the sake of God. This part is similar in content to Azzam's will which is fully translated in the pamphlet "*Wasiyah Batel al-Qima fi 'Aser al-Inhilar, Wasiyah al-'Alam al-Mujahid, Saber li-Allah Madhrem ila Umat al-Islam*," discussed in the Introduction. The emphasis here is in the original text.
 - 50 In the original, *daawi al-jihad*. In other words, preaching for the way of *jihad* in that *jihad* is part of the responsibility of the Islamic follower that cannot be separated from the other responsibilities. Therefore, every follower, wherever he is, is committed to *jihad* just as he is committed to the rest of the commandments in Islam.
 - 51 The Noble Quran, <http://quran.com/2>.
 - 52 *Al-'Alamein* means two worlds—this world and the world to come, which is saved for the followers and for those who died for God (martyrs).
 - 53 In other words, all those who preach moderate Islam or who try to show that Western values also exist in Islam, for example Suhaib bin Sheikh, who strenuously objects to the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in France and is considered to be moderate in his views. However, he did not receive even one vote in the election held for the Muslim Council in France. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.236.
 - 54 This is the basic approach of the Islamic zealots. Everything exists in Islam and Islam has nothing to take from the West. This point of view is the one that influences the Islamic zealots in the various organizations (*al-jamaat*) in the Arab world to come out against Muslim liberalism which wishes to integrate Western ideals into Islam such as, for example, democracy. Sivan, *The Crash within Islam*, pp.104–7.
 - 55 Emphasis added.

- 56 In other words, the establishment of one encompassing Islamic movement that will rule over the whole world. In each country there will be a branch of al-Jamia al-Islamiya (the Islamic Community) or the Muslim Brotherhood which will act to gain control of the regime through popular opposition. However, in reality, all of them are one movement with one joint goal. Is it any wonder that the majority of Arab regimes adopted suspicious approaches towards the Islamic movements and the various unions? *Ibid.*, 102–9.
- 57 In other words, those who define themselves as Muslims and who keep the five commandments in Islam. This verse mentions three of the five principles: belief in God and in the messenger of God, the commandment of prayer and the giving of charity.
- 58 The Noble Qur'an, <http://quran.com/5>.
- 59 In my humble opinion, the writer definitely meant Qutb's conclusions that appear in the last chapter and which carry the headline, "*Hada Hiye al-Tariq*" [This is the Way]: Qutb, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, pp.178–92. To understand the importance of this book, see Sivan, *Radical Islam*, pp.94–103.
- 60 The expression *al-'Ulaa* was used here, which on one hand means to rise up to the righteous way and on the other hand is one of God's names.
- 61 Emphasis added.
- 62 The pains mentioned here refer to the stage of labor pains that will, in the end, see the Islamic goal realized. Just as birth comes with difficult pains, so too will the Islamic revolution arrive after difficulties and exertion on the part of followers.
- 63 The Arabic word used here is *al-tawaghit*, which means the sinners, the despots, the evil ones. It appears that this word was chosen by the Islamic zealots to purify those from the Western world who do not believe in their way or act against fundamentalist Islam in the Arab states, like some "secular" rulers in Arab countries.
- 64 See also Qutb, *Marakatuna maa al-Yahud*, in the chapter "The Truth behind the Islamic Bloc," pp.43–46.
- 65 The word meaning pact used here is *mithaq*, which also means covenant. This is a term used to explain a legal and moral document that has binding validity, like an oath, in the eyes of God—for example, the Islamic Covenant of Hamas and the National Covenant of the Palestinians. For the attitude towards the word *mithaq*, see Yehoshafat Harkavi, *The Arab Position in the Israeli–Arab Conflict* (Jerusalem, 1974), p.13.
- 66 The vision of the Islamic fundamentalist movements is based mainly on the golden age of the first four caliphs who followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad. This is the central clause in all of the ideological platforms of the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movements. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p.28.
- 67 The Islamic expression *mankar* that is used here symbolizes the denial of the existence of the Creator, which is, in essence, heresy. The role of al-Jamia al-Islamiya is, among other things, to prevent the heresy and the denial of the existence of God in order to establish the rule of God.
- 68 *Jihad* for God as Islamic zealots understood it and analyzed in length also takes up an entire chapter in Qutb's book *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq*, pp.57–85.
- 69 To learn more about the activities of the Indonesian branch and its control of Indonesian society, see Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.224–28. This branch is also responsible for the terrorist attack in Bali, on Oct. 12, 2002, in which approximately 200 people were killed. See also the Ministry of Defense, according to which al-Jamia al-Islamiya, which is centered in Indonesia, is a terrorist organization since March 12, 2003: www.gov.il/pages/general/terror.asp (accessed Feb. 2, 2010).
- 70 See www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/pij_f1106.htm, for the publicity of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, Nov. 8, 2006.

- 71 Sivan, *The Crash within Islam*, pp.20–21.
- 72 The Ministry of Defense, www.gov.il/pages/general/terror.asp (accessed Feb. 3, 2010). According to the information presented on the website of al-Jamia al-Islamiya in the Gaza Strip, it was already declared an illegal organization by the Minister of Defense Binyamin Ben Eliezer on Feb. 25, 2002, and was again declared an illegal movement on Oct. 15, 2007, according to an announcement made by Ehud Barak, the minister of defense at that time.
- 73 See www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/pij_f1106.htm, published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center, Nov. 8, 2006.
- 74 See further details in Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, and his words which are quoted in their entirety in the first chapter.
- 75 Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.92–93.
- 76 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.20–21. This is the viewpoint of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who, in 1973, established al-Mujama al-Islamiya (the Islamic Center). This center saw its activities as an important part of educating the Palestinian public and preparing it for the future struggle with Israel. Israel, from its point of view, gave Yassin permission to establish this center as it felt that words were less damaging than arms, and that the center would serve as an equalizer against the influence of the PLO. See also Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.92–93; and 'Adwan, *al-Sheikh Ahmad Yassin Hyatu wa-Jihadu*, pp.73–80.
- 77 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.22. Islamic Jihad had already split from Yassin's movement at the end of the 1970s when a group of activists argued that *tarbiya* (educational activities) were not enough and that it was necessary to include the way of *jihad*. The break out of the *intifada* threatened to divide the movement again between those who supported a continuation of education and training alone, and those who preached the way of *jihad* combined with *tarbiya*. In the end, the decision was made to support Yassin to establish Hamas and to move on to the stage of military activities. See also Chapter 2, regarding the splits in the Muslim Brotherhood.
- 78 Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, pp.149–50. In addition to the reward mentioned above, if the female martyr is married, she will be the lady in charge of the 70 virgins for her husband or a different group of virgins if she is single.
- 79 This is according to Yomana, a suicide bomber, in an interview carried out inside an Israeli jail. Anat Berko, *The Smarter Bomb: Women and Children as Suicide Bombers* (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2010), p.18.
- 80 See www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/pij_f1106.htm, published by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, Nov. 8, 2006.
- 81 The sentence was given in the Haifa central court house on Mar. 26, 2009, by Y. Elron, R. LeMelschtrich-Later and M. Gilad. According to this sentence, Anis Safouri was found guilty of the charges brought against her and was sentenced to 14 years of prison. Her cousin, Hussam Khalil, was also found guilty and sentenced to two and half years of prison. *The State of Israel vs. 1. Anis Safouri (prisoner) and 2. Hussam Khalil (prisoner)*, TF'H (Haifa) 5039–08. All of the details above are taken from the judgment.
- 82 Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, pp.53–54. The *dawah* system is what enabled Ahmed Yassin, the leader and the founder of Hamas, to succeed in recruiting support for his movement. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.20–21, 37.
- 83 That is how the Palestinian Authority aided 60,000 people who were previously supported by Hamas and were now supported by the Authority as part of the struggle to reduce the influence of the Hamas movement in the West Bank. *Ibid.*, pp.126–27.
- 84 Economic support was also an incentive to convince the potential martyr. For example, Salah al-Bukhari of Islamic Jihad recruited Shadi Bahalul, a 19-year old,

- to carry out a suicide attack. When the potential martyr Bahalul was caught before carrying out the attack, he tried to argue that his sisters were dependent upon him for their support. The recruiter from the *jihād* had informed him that they would worry about the economic future of the family. Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, pp.147–48.
- 85 Ibid., pp.153–56. Harel and Issacharoff describe the method for the receipt of money. When an attack was successful, this money was distributed by those who organized the attacks. “Attack money” could reach as high as thousands of shekels, depending on the number of injured on the Jewish side.
- 86 Ibid., p.156.
- 87 See www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/pij_f1106.htm, publicity from the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center, Nov. 8, 2006.
- 88 In this original period of ignorance, the residents of the Saudi Arabia peninsula were idol worshippers who basically worshipped three central gods, the daughters of God—al-Uzzá (Fortitude), al-Lāt (the Goddess) and al-Manāt (Faith). This is in addition to their belief in the holiness of the Kaaba, who was educated by Father Abraham and his son Ishmael, and inside her, the sacrifice of Ishmael took place according to tradition. This period is described in a very picturesque way by Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.43–50.
- 89 A section from Qutb’s book *Ma’alim fi al-Tariq*, pp.91–96. Also quoted by Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.132–33. The martyr Sayyid Qutb and the part of his book that deals with the understanding of faithfulness in Islam (at the end of the pamphlet) are mentioned as a basis for understanding al-Jamia al-Islamiya.
- 90 Hamas’ success in the general election to the Palestinian Authority on January 25, 2006 and in the civil war in June 2007, during which it seized control of the Gaza Strip for itself, disproved the general assumption by researchers that, “[t]he Islamic movements, especially the Sunni movements, do not try to take control of the regime for themselves as they prefer to stay behind the scenes.” Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, p.27.
- 91 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.107–9.
- 92 See Elior Levi, “Historical Appeasement: Fatah and Hamas will Establish a Temporary Government,” Ynet, Apr. 27, 2011, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4061391,00.html; Shaul Bartal, “Negotiations from an Islamic Point of View,” *The Mid-East Magazine*, June 25, 2011, www.mideast.co.il/p-2_a-409.
- 93 At the end of the process, all the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip, including the Islamic Jihad, signed and accepted the principles of the Appeasement Agreement. Elior Levi and Roi Kais, “The Factions in Cairo: An End to Factionalism on the Way to a State,” Ynet, Apr. 27, 2011, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4061516,00.html; see also the articles on al-Jamia al-Islamiya university site in Gaza, which deal with this topic, www.iugaza.edu.ps/ar; and Dr. Muhsen Muhammad Salah, *al-Mulkhas al-Tanafidi li-Takrir, al-Istartaigi al-Falastini li-Sana 2010* [A Summary of the Palestinian Strategic Report for 2010] (Beirut, 2011), pp.4–5.
- 94 Ruth Eglash and Ann Gearan, “Palestinian Groups Fatah, Hamas Announce Accord that Could Threaten Mideast Peace Talks,” *The Washington Post*, April 23, 2014.
- 95 William Booth, “Hamas Agrees to Cede Some Power in Gaza to Fatah for the First Time in Seven Years,” *The Washington Post*, September 25, 2014.
- 96 “Palestinian Unity Cabinet Sets Up Gaza Operations,” *The Washington Post*, October 9, 2014.
- 97 William Booth and Anne Gearan, “Palestinians Form New Unity Government that Includes Hamas,” *The Washington Post*, June 2, 2014.

5 Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami arises

And we wanted to confer favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and make them leaders and make them inheritors.

Surat al-Qaṣaṣ (The Stories), verse 5¹

A The return of the caliph

Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, the Islamic Freedom Party, was established in 1952 by Sheikh Muhammad Taqi al-Din bin Ibrahim al-Nabhani (1909—December 11, 1977) of Jerusalem, Asa'ad and Ragheb Bayyud al-Tamimi of Hebron,² Abd al-Qadim Zaloum of Hebron (who became the party leader in 1977), and Sheikh Ahmad al-Daghour of Tulkarem. Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani had close ties with the Mufti Hajji Muhammad Amin al-Hussayni and was the founder of the Haifa Muslim Brotherhood in 1946.³ In March 1953, after discussions with the Jordanian regime in the West Bank, the founders of the movement announced its establishment—not as a political party but as a union according to Ottoman law.⁴ The party split off from the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Jordan.⁵ The party's positions are very close to those of the Hamas movement which is, according to its platform, a Palestinian branch of the world Muslim Brotherhood movement.⁶ At the beginning there were a number of attempts to unite the two movements but these efforts failed.

Over the years, the Islamic Freedom movement has become international similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Palestinian branch, a central one, is important to the movement. There are also branches in Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Australia, the United Kingdom and other Western countries. Thus, for example, the movement held a convention in the United States, in the city of Chicago, on July 19, 2009. Thousands participated and called for a return of the Caliphate while expressing support for *jihad* in Iraq against American and British forces.⁷

The movement operates various centers for the spreading of its dogma. Its main message is the importance of founding an Islamic Caliphate and establishing an Islamic state similar to the one that existed during the period of the

Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs. This period, which took place at the beginning of Islam, was, according to the words of the founders of the movement, a “pure era,” before any bad and damaging influences penetrated into Islam and confused the thoughts of the Muslims.⁸ According to this way of thinking, the role of Muslims is to spread the *dawah*—the word of Islam, to all the world’s inhabitants. The purpose of the existence of an Islamic state (if there is unity and if the Muslims work toward this goal) is to implement *jihad*.⁹ In other words, the *jihad* is a general commandment (*fard kifaya*) which is incumbent upon the ruler, the caliph, and not a personal requirement (*fard al-’ayn*) which is placed on an individual.¹⁰

The requirement of *jihad* is not for everyone. Those who are left behind have an obligation to learn the religious principles. When the holy warriors return from the battlefield, those who remained behind will learn the principles that the fighters have learned. Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, understands the meaning of this law from the way the friends of the Prophet Muhammad conducted their lives and from the Qur’an.¹¹ *Jihad* for God is a war against the infidels and their subjugation to the Muslims. However, according to Nabhani’s arguments, a weakness in Islam has caused a number of religious wise men to change the meaning of the term into one that is broader and more general, an idea used to protect believers from their inclinations and not just as a war for God in which Spain, Africa, Byzantium and Persia were captured during the period of the expansion of the Islamic state.¹²

Beginning in the 17th century, Islam has been in a permanent descent. Since the 19th century, the situation of the Muslims has become worse due to the Western invasion into the Muslim countries. This invasion included missionary activities and the endowing of Western cultural values foreign to Islam and which contradict it. This process worsened during the 20th century. Islam is a religion of the state (*ahqam*), which is why the attempts by the various factors in society to turn Islam into a personal religion only weaken the Muslim nation and explain the sinking of Islam. The Freedom Party’s purpose is to restore Islam to its former glory, to return the Muslims to the period of the origins of Islam and to rebuild the Caliphate that was destroyed by the West and by the Jews.¹³ As it relates to this point, the movement diagnosis is no different from those of the other political Islamic organizations that have been described previously.

The Freedom Party has always separated itself from the Muslim Brotherhood movement. During the period of Jordanian rule, up until 1967, the Freedom Party objected to ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian establishment. This objection was simply because there was no room for individual nationalism in the Freedom movement’s ideals. After the 1967 War, a change took place in the Freedom Party’s way of thinking. Now, they explained, as opposed to the beliefs of the Brothers, there is no place for general preaching and mass education of the whole population but rather a need to work with a limited target audience. They believed that one needed to work to prepare the Islamic elite that was committed to the struggle for an

Islamic national state. The Freedom Party also now believed that Muslims have only one nationality—the Muslim nationality. Therefore, they rejected the legitimacy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the idea of a Palestinian nationality as emphasized by Hamas.¹⁴

Since 2003, and at least until 2013, Ataa Khalil Abu al-Rashta, a Jordanian, has served as the global leader of the Freedom Party. Originally from Hebron, he replaced the previous leader (now deceased), Abd al-Qadim Zaloum, in this position. The party has great popularity in the areas of the West Bank. There are even Israeli Arabs who support the party and identify with its goals. Thus, for example, on August 10 and 11, 2007, the movement held a mass rally in al-Bireh with over 10,000 participants. In addition, other party rallies were held in all parts of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The slogan of the party's rallies was "the Caliphate is the rising power."¹⁵

In the eyes of the movement, the return of the Caliphate is some sort of magical solution for all of the troubles that befall the Muslims from all sides. All publicity distributed by the movement emphasizes that, in the end, the Caliphate will return as a cure for the problems of the Muslims. The caliph is not just a religious leader but first and foremost a military leader, similar to the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs who came after him. In every movement advertisement and opinion two main motifs appear—the Caliphate and war. In the Palestinian context, these motifs are especially prominent.

Thus, for example, on October 6, 2009, the movement publicized a proclamation which stated that it was impossible to regain Jerusalem through protests or by sitting on the fence. According to the movement, there was only one way to free Jerusalem and that was by bringing in military forces to destroy the Jewish entity.¹⁶ This proclamation was distributed during the holiday of the Feast of Tabernacles which was close to this date. On the Feast of Tabernacles demonstrations broke out in all corners of Eastern Jerusalem as a result of rumors that had spread according to which a Jewish visit to the Temple Mount was planned in order to lay down the cornerstone for the third holy temple building.¹⁷ In the proclamation, the Freedom Party presented the injustice by the ruling Jewish occupation towards the holy Muslim places. This injustice included the digging of tunnels under the mosques on the Temple Mount, the holding of religious Jewish ceremonies in the holy area of the Temple Mount and disturbing the Muslim worshippers. What was the reaction of the Muslims? Apathy. Those Muslims who did react were either killed or thrown in jail. The Arab states and the other Arab leaders slept and did not react against the Jews.

What is the way to free al-Aqsa? In the eyes of the Freedom Party, that way is "as clear as the sun." It is through a military solution as it was in the days of the generation of Salah al-Din against the Crusaders. "Then the only wailing that was heard were the individual calls by the Muslims of "Allāhu Akbar."¹⁸ The movement believes that only when the Muslim armies join

forces under a common flag “can they free and clean al-Aqsa mosque from the pollution of the Jews and their offspring.”¹⁹

In their eyes, one cannot reach any compromise with the Jews. The Freedom Party indicates that Palestine cannot be divided and it is necessary to free it all. Palestine is holy ground and it belongs to the Muslims alone. The land of Palestine is overflowing with the blood of the holy warriors who saturated its soil. The struggle is neither nationalistic nor one with the Arabs. It is a religious struggle between the Jews who are the enemy of God and the Muslims. According to the movement, the enemy has succeeded in its plot in that it was able to incite the Muslims in a nationalistic direction and turn the problem of Palestine into one of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The question that remains, according to the movement, is not which settlements should be evacuated or frozen or where the nationalistic solution will be. The question is how to free the whole of Palestine?²⁰

In this same proclamation, the movement calls on all Muslims to unite. This unity should include all the Muslim states—Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and others, not only the Palestinians.

Victory or a Martyr’s Death? In reality they both come together and will explode in the face of the scum of the earth, the Jews ...

Can you, as a Muslim, ignore the damage and the suffering of al-Aqsa and remain apathetic to the rule of the despots ...²¹

According to the words of the movement, there is no need to fear from the Jews as God is with the believers and there is a commitment to this in the Qur’an: “They will not harm you except for [some] annoyance. And if they fight you, they will show you their backs; then they will not be aided.”²² This proclamation then adds the famous *hadith*: “Fight the Jews until the stone will say, ‘Hey Muslim, here is a Jew, come and kill him.’”²³

Muhammad al-Shweqi, a Hizb al-Tahrir activist, explains in his book, *Al-Mahdi* (The Expected Savior), who will come and the second Caliphate, according to the (Muslim) prophets’ way, when the Day of Judgment will be. He explains how the *hadith* mentioned earlier, the one about the battle of Judgment Day between the Jews and the Muslims, in which the trees and stones take a part, belongs to our time—to the 21st century:

[In the 7th century,] after the Jews were expelled from half of Saudi Arabia [and the expulsion of two Jewish tribes from the state, the Jews of Khobar and the murder of an additional Jewish tribe], they [the Jews] had no country nor any army to kill [them]. Only in this century in Palestine. As the *mahdi*, the caliph who would save [Islam] would come at the end of days and close to the time [of Judgment Day] because the battle with the Jews is at the end of time and this will be self-explanatory that we are talking about a state in which the Jews will be gathered in Palestine and in the holy temple until the appearance of the *mahdi* and his policies

which will kill the Jews and free Palestine and the holy temple [Jerusalem] and with the help of Allah this should take place soon.²⁴

The *murder* of the Jews, according to Muhammad al-Shweqi, also brings additional *hadiths* as proof. According to his argument, this will only happen at the end of time, in other words, in our time. In an additional *hadith*, a battle on Judgment Day is indicated between the forces of faith, headed by the *mahdi*, and the Jews by the gates of Lod—in other words, in Palestine. According to his understanding, the Jews represent absolute evil and are supporters of Dajal (an expression for the devil), but at the end, the believers will be victorious over the Jews and return Palestine to their hands.²⁵

The movement has often repeated and emphasized this desired solution. After the events surrounding the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” of May 31, 2010, the movement came out with a proclamation for this event which carried the lead:

The blockade will never be broken by petitions or by pilgrims to the UN. It can only be done by moving the armies that surround the Jewish entity like a bracelet which is wrapped around a hand.²⁶

On the same day that the *Mavi Marmara* ship was taken over, nine Turkish civilians who were onboard on their way to the Gaza Strip were killed. The movement came out against futile attempts like this to break the blockade on Gaza and once again expressed its firm opinion regarding a solution to the problem of Palestine.

The proclamation presents the “truth” from the point of view of the movement. Boats, under various country flags with people from various nations, attempted peacefully to break the blockade against Gaza. Even Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey “danced with happiness and expressed himself that the day that the blockade on Gaza will be breached is very close.”²⁷

However, according to the proclamation, the expected occurred. The Jewish state sent battleships and soldiers who killed those they were able to kill and injured those they were able to injure, and they took the “survivors” to the occupied Ashdod port.

And what did the leaders of the Arab states do? They went to the UN and to the Security Council and whined and cried that the Jews committed crimes against international law and the right to sail in international waters. The movement makes fun of the Arab states and their pathetic frightening attempts which represent their futile attempts against the Jewish state.

According to the movement, the solution cannot just be the breaking of the blockade. The Muslims need to solve the problem of the blockade on Gaza by eliminating its cause. It is necessary to unite all the Muslim armies and to

hit the Jewish state from a place that is unexpected. That is how to get rid of the problem of the blockade on Gaza. It will happen automatically after the Muslim armies crush the Jewish state.

This is the only way to remove the Jewish State and to free the blockade on Gaza, the West Bank and the rest of the areas that are nearby for this ...²⁸

The movement addresses the rulers of Turkey, the offspring of the Ottoman state, and Pakistan and Iran in ridicule and asks them how they intend to carry out their threats of blowing up Israel. Are their words only fraud and deception? “We are witnesses that you, the rulers of the other Arab and Islamic states are *liars*.”²⁹

What is the model for a real leader? According to the Freedom Party the answer is clear. The following examples of real leaders are brought: The second caliph, ‘Umar al-Faruq, Salah al-Adin and the Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid II. These leaders did not just talk. They talked only a little but they accomplished a lot. ‘Umar al-Faruq³⁰ is another name for Umar ibn al-Khattāb, the second caliph under whose 7th-century reign the great Islamic conquests were carried out.³¹ Umar was the first caliph who took upon himself the name Amīr al-Mu’minīn, the commander of the believers. Salah al-Din was the one who freed Jerusalem and Palestine from the yoke of the Crusaders in 1187. Abd al-Hamid II was the last real Ottoman caliph, a lamb loyal to Islam, who rejected all attempts by the Jews to settle. Due to this refusal, the Jews hurt the Ottoman Empire’s economy but the money did not blind Abd al-Hamid II.³² This is why the Jews destroyed the Ottoman Empire—it was a way to settle Palestine. This is according to Islamic scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi.³³

The proclamation addresses the Muslims and says:

You, the Muslims, know what the solution is. The solution is of course that only the *jihad* way can remove the Jewish State. Whoever does not follow in this path and who does not agree with it is a sinner and a traitor.

Therefore, as the movement explains, it is up to the Muslims to object to those Muslim leaders who are not ready to hear the voice of reason and act for *jihad* in Palestine. The proclamation concludes with the hadith attributed to Abu Bakr: “If people see the enslaver and do not bind his hands, Allah will punish them together with him.”³⁴

Unlike Hamas, this movement was not persecuted by the Palestinian Authority until the signing of the appeasement agreement between Fatah and Hamas. This is because the movement negates an armed struggle and *fitna* (civil war) in Islam.³⁵ The Freedom Party preaches a return to the original Islam of the four *al-Rashidun* caliphs.³⁶ This is similar to the beliefs of the

other radical Islamic movements. The movement believes that only a renewal of the Islamic Caliphate, which was dismantled in Turkey in 1924 by the “West” that was afraid of it, can stand strong against the attacks of the imperialistic West and Zionism.³⁷ That is why the movement is not active militarily and is satisfied by sharp incitement against the policies of the Palestinian Authority and the West.

The movement believes that the problem of Palestine is not one of the Palestinians alone. The problem of Palestine is an Islamic issue which touches all Muslims, wherever they are. Therefore, only Islamic military unity will succeed in subduing the Zionists and returning Palestine to its legal owners and to the Muslim nation. Only the Caliphate, which will be established, will have the right to declare a *jihad* (*fard kifaya*) against Israel and destroy the Jewish state. This is in contradiction to the world outlook by the Muslim Brotherhood and the other Islamic Jihad factions discussed earlier, which believe that the freeing of Palestine is not conditional on Islamic unity and therefore it is in the area of a personal obligation (*fard al-'ayn*) of the believer. According to the view of the other Islamic fundamentalist movements, as opposed to the Freedom Party, *jihad* activities against Israel need to be at all times and in all places.³⁸

B The right way to return land to the hands of the Islamic nation

An article from March 2008 published in a journal distributed by the Freedom Party views the movement *vis-à-vis* the return of the Gaza Strip into Muslim hands. The journal’s editorial tries to explain why Gaza was returned while the West Bank and other areas of Palestine are still under occupation. The uniqueness of this editorial is that it shows the reciprocal relations, according to the outlook of the Freedom Party, with the American agents—President of Egypt Husni Mubarak and head of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) on one hand, and the European agents, Hamas, on the other hand. All this is going on while the “virtual”³⁹ State of Israel is watching the struggles and disputes with pleasure and malicious joy.

The headline of the article reads:

The return of Gaza to its original status, its unforgiveable crime⁴⁰

The article continues:

Israel imposed a full blockade on Gaza on January 23, 2008. As a result, the situation there became what one can only describe as a disaster.⁴¹ The Muslims who are there have no fundamental ability [to deal] with [the blockade] that they face except by penetrating the fence that Israel has built unilaterally. Egypt, for its part, [also] tightens [the blockade] by guarding [its border with the Gaza Strip], thus preventing infiltrations to

outside [the Strip]. These Egyptian and Israeli activities are in opposition to the international decisions [that dealt with this topic].

The Muslims there [in Gaza], see that they are receiving the hand of betrayal at the time that they turn to and yearn for heat. They cry out desperately for brotherly aid from their brothers [Egypt]. But the orders [to the Egyptian soldiers] are exactly the opposite [of those expected]. [Along the border] soldiers from the [Egyptian] border patrol and the anti-riot on-call teams waited to greet them with clubs. The Egyptian forces had orders [that allowed them] to hit, to drive out and break the bones [of the Palestinian infiltrators from the Strip]. That is how [the Egyptian forces] acted [against their brothers from the Gaza Strip].

The intensity of the flow from Gaza [of Palestinians trying to get out] can be described as a *tsunami*. [As a result of the Egyptian moves,] angry feelings were aroused [in Egypt's public opinion] against the Egyptian decision. [The Egyptian government] began to fear confrontation and the negative reflection in Egyptian public opinion.⁴²

[As a result of this concern,] [President] Mubarak announced that he had given an order to his men to allow the men of the families of Gaza to equip themselves with food, medicine and gasoline ... Afterwards, he began to act in an unacceptable manner giving orders to return Gaza to its previous situation. In [various] meetings, [Mubarak] said the opposite of what he had announced [previously] and that is how it was until the people of Gaza returned to their prison. [The people of Gaza] entered Gaza an additional time and thus an historic chance to become free from the indecent Israeli occupation was missed ...

We do not want to analyze with these words all that happened and took place in Gaza from a political point of view. But, we do want to illuminate the conspiracy [that is being developed on the backs] of the families in Gaza on the part of Israel, America and Europe which are [in reality] the *de facto* controllers of what is happening. We emphasize that the Muslims will have no security, will have no protection and there will be no end to their tragedy unless a Caliphate is quickly [established] in our days, may Allah will it.

The reason for this situation is the [policy of] Israel which has done things and taken [different] steps in order to lead to this crisis. [Israel] has expressed its satisfaction with the possibility that it would come out of the crisis in the Strip with Egypt taking the responsibility for the residents of the Strip. Thus, [for example,] Deputy Minister of Defense Matan Vilnai said:

We wish to break off our ties with the Gaza Strip. That is what we started [to do] over two years ago and this [policy] stems from our desire to stop the supply of electricity and water that they [the people of Gaza] will receive from someplace else.

The housing minister said: "It is up to Egypt to take responsibility for it [the Gaza Strip]."

A security source [whose name is not mentioned] said: “Egypt should not be surprised [if the responsibility for the Strip is passed on to it]. It is only a matter of time [until this happens].”

The [Israeli] communications media have already mentioned that: “A great opportunity was created to roll the responsibility for the Gaza Strip onto the shoulders of Egypt.”⁴³

Why is there such satisfaction in Israel about such a step?

The reason is because Gaza has always been rebellious and insubordinate and Israel was always subduing it. [That is how it was] before the withdrawal from it at the end of 2005 and also after Israel’s disengagement. We will absolutely not allow all the attempts at killing, the bombings, the murder, the destruction and the blockade ... to prevent locally made missiles [the *qassams*] from reaching their targets in the [Israeli] settlements. But Israel has changed the equation and will not let Gaza rest [even] for one hour a day until it stops developing its military abilities [against it] ... Now it [Israel] wants Egypt to accept this burden upon itself [responsibility for the smuggling of weapons into the Strip]! This is because Israel has already informed the whole world that Egypt is already committed and has chosen [the way] of peace. [Israel], from its point of view, has defined Gaza [as a hostile entity], although it is aware of the seriousness of its commitment according to the rules, arrangements and international agreements [in regard to the Gaza Strip] ... This is the meaning of this step in which Egypt, if it takes upon itself what the Israelis want, will be [responsible] for preventing the flow of weapons and the guarding of the borders [with Israel].

However, already at the beginning, Egypt rejected the Israeli game by acting to reject [the Israeli plan]. [Egypt] ordered its security forces and its on-call teams [to take care of] its own riots and to prevent the infiltration and the flow [of the people] from the Gaza Strip to Egypt, even through the use of force ... [The Egyptian forces] beat the people and insulted them despite the order [that they received] which was just to remove them from the [Egyptian] area [and return them to their place]. That is why the armed [among the population of the Strip] rose up and destroyed a portion of the fence and opened up breaches and [the people] flowed through them in a strong stream.

Consequentially, Mubarak revised his announcement to the people of Gaza [and declared] that he [now] allowed them [to stock up on] humanitarian products ... He did this [while at the same time] commanding [his people] to make it difficult [for the people from Gaza] so that they would return to Gaza (by closing stores, [creating a] lack of merchandise, blocking the roads and not giving aid to the residents of Gaza) ... In addition, the Egyptian representatives used their two-way meetings with Hamas to agree to open up the [Rafah] crossing under the same

conditions that existed before the [Israeli] blockade [on the Strip]. Because the situation on the border with Egypt was in a state of confusion [*sadah madah*] it could not [be allowed] to continue and so it was ...

So that is how the Gaza family returned to prison due to the government's preference and Mubarak's (who was 80 years old) policy. [He] acted like God and made treaties with the infidels which allowed them to reach the north of his country by international charter flights.

What is his [Mubarak's] explanation for this complaint [of discrimination against the Muslims in Gaza]? Mubarak said that he wanted to keep his distance from the divisions among the Palestinians and that he would not allow any of [the sides] to come close [and influence Egypt] or to infiltrate inside it [Egypt] out of consideration for the national security [of his country].

A short time afterwards, Egypt officially announced and declared that it was worried about what had happened [in the Strip] and announced that its soldiers did not throw rocks [as they were accused]. Likewise, [it declared,] that it was ignoring the infiltration of groups of families from Gaza [through] the Egyptian borders and lands and that it recognized the significance of this for the residents of the Strip. [The announcement made it clear that Egypt] would not allow in any way a repetition of what had occurred because it had its own borders and its own land and its own rules. This is its prerogative, its duty and its responsibility to protect itself [the land of Egypt] ... As a result of this, Hamas took all the responsibility and began to watch over these events [so that they would not be repeated] from its direction.

It will be noted here that Mubarak committed himself to act in accordance with the contracts, the decisions and the international agreements in their entirety in regard to this question [of the border with Gaza]. Mubarak did not limit Israeli and American demands beyond [the international decisions that were accepted].⁴⁴

Israel already announced its concern over the smuggled weapons that continue to flow [to inside the Strip]. [As a result of this,] Mubarak announced that he was changing his decision that allowed the people of Gaza to enter Egypt in order to stock up on [various items] during their visit (even though they were not carrying weapons). Likewise, President Mubarak announced on December 25, 2008, that: "These are international borders and we must protect them."

Mubarak emphasized that Egypt understood very well the importance of this issue and what it had to do about it. In reality, Mubarak's words were those that America demanded him to say. He was watching over the [artificial] borders and was just repeating his instructions which were as they were [before which prevented the people from Gaza from entering).

What about Hamas?

While the events in Gaza were occurring, [the Hamas representatives] committed themselves to holding an international Palestinian conference in Syria which would explain its decisions [regarding the Israel–Palestine conflict] and would significantly increase its [efforts to prevent] the spreading of the [*dawah*] propaganda which is significantly incorrect (its legal authority [of this conference] is real). For example, the rejection of the recognition of Israel and [the importance] of holding onto Palestine from the sea to the river and from Rafah to Ras al-Nakura [Rosh Hanikra]. The announcement of the freeing [of all Palestine] before the [announcement] of a state. The rejection of the Annapolis [plan] and the building of settlements and the rejection of all that was said by the Oslo team or the team of [Mahmoud] Abbas in the name of the Palestinian nation. [A total rejection of any Jewish state] not inside Palestine and not even as a sanctuary [for the Jews] ...⁴⁵

It is true that by participating in this conference and by publicizing its decisions [against Israel], Hamas entered into a situation where Egypt accused it of protecting the decisions of the committee, decisions that could entangle Egypt as well on the topic of Gaza [as Egypt does recognize Israel]. The transfer of the Palestinian problems to inside Egypt erodes the national security there as a result of what occurred in Gaza and in their market.⁴⁶

That is the reason that [Hamas] announced that the main agreement which resolves the blockade on Gaza is invalid.⁴⁷ Hamas recommended the opening up of a dialogue with the Egyptian side [in order] to permanently open up the [Rafah] crossing with new conditions and rules. [Hamas did this] because it saw that there were those who did not represent the rights of the Palestinians or take them into consideration as, according to them, the crossing would not become Palestinian–Egyptian but Palestinian–Arab [the way it should be].

That is why it announced that it was its intention to negotiate with [Mahmoud] Abbas regarding the management of the crossing. It is also clear that we are talking about the return to the [previous] orders which allowed [movement] at the Rafah crossing, as it was before the [Israeli] blockade was imposed, [this time] with all sorts of easements to reduce the suffering of the people of Gaza [at the crossing]. A public statement by the European Union [EU] said that the observers [the Europeans who were there before Hamas controlled the Strip at the Rafah crossing] would return to their work and [the EU] would carry the financial burden and the insurance that is required in order to help people.

It is possible that the goal [of the European public statement] is to support Hamas with which it has ties. It is possible that in this way Hamas will solve its problem with the Europeans [in regard to the operation of the crossing]. It is clear that in this way Europe is beginning

to [be involved] in the Palestinian problem through the use of economic and humanitarian aid to people.

But Abbas, one must understand Abbas. He still ascribes importance to himself and [believes] that it is he alone who represents the “legal” Palestinian Authority, [an authority] which is dependent on international recognition and recognition by the Arab states and Egypt which do not recognize any other Palestinian government [the Hamas government that is competing with it]. [According to Abbas,] the Authority is alone but not apart [a different government] and is the one that gives answers regarding the operation of the crossing and who will traverse it. This is what the Authority does when it stands behind the steps of the [Israeli] blockade on Gaza and condemns the directions that it receives from Israel and which are coordinated with it.

That is how there is a division between the Strip and the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority rejects coordination with Hamas until [Hamas] regrets the revolution that it carried out in the Strip during the period when it [the Authority] was coordinated with Olmert [the Israeli prime minister]. This team [Abbas and his advisors] attacks [Hamas policy]. This is the Oslo team that hovers over the many suspicions against it on many different matters. [This team] grants importance to the absurd missiles [the *qassams*] which, according to [Abu Mazen], are the reason for the tragedy of the [Israeli] blockade. [And therefore Abu Mazen] coordinates with Egypt and is in touch with it regarding [the topic] of reinstating the directions [of the movement] for Gaza as it was before the blockade.⁴⁸

Where are the Muslims?

It is no coincidence that Gaza returned to its original status, its unforgivable crime. Her Muslim sons sacrificed themselves for her.⁴⁹ [Unfortunately,] the positions of the rulers of the conspiracy and the fear embarrass and hurt. [Mahmoud] Abbas became closer to Israel and America. Hamas became closer to the Europeans. Mubarak will not defy the commands of America. Truly the fate of the Muslims and the circumstances [in which they find themselves] and the disasters from which they suffer have no way out for them except with the righteous caliphs, the Caliphate that God will bring back to us.

The caliph will teach all of the Muslims that the only way that Palestine will be returned and that the pride of the Muslims [will not be returned] except through the renewal of the righteous caliphs. Truly, there is no way back to Palestine, except through a Caliphate that unites [all] of the Muslim lands into one land, one state, one nation and their peace is one and their war is one. Caliphs who pity them [the Muslims] as a father pities his sons.⁵⁰ A caliph who is seen as number one in the eyes of the Muslims and in their souls.

Where are the Muslims?

We are all with God [and follow His words] from the beginning until the end. We are all [found] together with God, with one religious rule [*shari'a*], all of us together will get the correct guidance and the salvation.⁵¹ We turn to the Muslims in Palestine and we will say unto them that the majority of the killing, the injustice, the poverty and your humiliations and those who plan against you, when the time comes, each of you will be crowned [as your payment by God]. Here are your rulers who desire the well-being of your enemies before you by day, without shame. We have and you and the Muslims who join us [have] just one haven and one defense. You must keep the commandment to you to be one nation that walks in the way of God. You must be one of the friends of the caliph but one of those people who work for him.⁵² May Allah have pity on you. We invite your fathers, your wives and your children [to this good work]. We invite you to this good work. [We invite] the righteous caliphs according to the vision of the prophets. The glorified said:

And we wanted to confer favor upon those who were oppressed in the land and make them leaders and make them inheritors.

Sura al-Qasas (The Stories), verse 5⁵³

One would have expected that as a result of the political changes that took place in 2011, which included the Egyptian revolution in which Mubarak was ousted from his seat as the ruler of Egypt, that the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt would be opened freely and include the transfer of merchandise, and that the internal Palestinian appeasement agreement would change Hizb al-Tahrir's criticism against the Egyptian regime. But that is not what happened.

In a proclamation that came out at the end of the month of Ramadan, Hizb al-Tahrir expressed its view regarding the Egyptian revolution thusly: It believed that the Egyptian revolution was a "deception" and that Egypt was still courting America. What especially bothered the party was the democratic method adopted by the new Egyptian regime. Democracy is a Western method, imported and strange to Islam. According to a public statement by the party, only the return to Islam and to the rule of the caliphs, which will remove the current evil regime, will lead "*ahel misr*" (the family of Egypt) to freedom, justice and living with respect.⁵⁴

C Abu Mazen's treason to the Islamic nation⁵⁵

Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were renewed in May 2010. At this time, these discussions were called "getting closer discussions" and were mediated by the American envoy George Mitchell. In July 2007, Barack Obama had already expressed cautious optimism in regard to the success of the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.⁵⁶ At the beginning of

September, the discussions were renewed in Washington. These discussions continued for about a month and were carried out in the shadow of Israel's decision during that same period on whether or not to renew or stop the ten-month building freeze in the settlements. Although Abu Mazen indeed received a green light from the Arab League to participate in these direct discussions with Israel during the month of October, after Israel finally announced that it did not wish to renew the building freeze, the Palestinians finally withdrew from the negotiations.⁵⁷ During this month the question arose on whether Mahmoud Abbas could overcome the opposition of the Islamic streams in order to reach an historic peace settlement with Israel in another year. In a public statement by the Islamic Freedom Party from that same period, the movement's stance was made evident: it totally rejected any compromise or agreement with Israel. The movement also made it clear that its opposition to the talks stemmed from religious reasons alone. This is the legal Islamic standpoint that prohibits any negotiations with the Jewish entity.

This statement was publicized in the Arab press and on the movement's website exactly parallel to the time of the opening of the talks between Mahmoud Abbas and Binyamin Netanyahu on Friday, September 3, 2010:⁵⁸

Abbas to Netanyahu: We will not allow anyone to carry out activities or damage that will hurt your security!

[In other words,] the Palestinian [nation], which has been suffering for over 60 years at the hands of the thieving and cruel [Zionist] enemy, has faced many disasters that were not prevented. [Mahmoud] Abbas is not prevented from sharing jokes and wide smiles with the prime minister of that same enemy. Why [should this behavior] seem strange as he [Abu Mazen] backed down from all his demands, requests and petitions. He [Abu Mazen] is hasty in his behavior in conducting negotiations on the holy land. A slip of the tongue by [Mahmoud] Abbas: "We will not let anyone carry out activities or damage that will hurt your security." [This] expresses the essence of the existence of the Palestinian Authority.

In a theatrical meeting [in Washington], he [Abu Mazen] did not come out against the way in which the crisis was managed by the United States. The head of the government of the Jewish entity expressed much self-satisfaction emphasizing the demands on his entity and the need to recognize the Jewishness [of] "Israel"⁵⁹ and he presented his many important security demands.

In addition to this, Netanyahu asked Abbas and his [Palestinian] Authority to do their jobs and their work. [Likewise,] Netanyahu emphasized the importance of security in the eyes of the Jewish entity. As a matter of fact, Netanyahu demanded from Abbas that he not just be satisfied with the condemnation of the latest event (the Hebron Operation) and he made it clear that [Abbas] had no choice but to commit himself to arresting those who carried out the operation. The truth is that there is no reason for Netanyahu to demand this from the Palestinian

“security” system, [because] it has already, for a long time, preceded the occupation forces by placing barriers at the entrance to Hebron and at all of its exits. [The Palestinian security forces do this] while searching and carrying out searches and reckless surveillance so that they will not see anything like this [military activities against Israel] or even anything close to it. [The Palestinian security forces do] this at a time when there are attacks by settlers on the people, while burning their mosques and their agricultural areas.

At the same time that Abbas emphasizes—in a humiliating way [and shamed]—to Netanyahu that the PLO’s intentions towards the Jewish entity are good and that its [Israel’s] security receives their full dedication, Abbas boasts about his security forces in conjunction with this and in what [his forces] have succeeded in doing. [His people] stopped the rented car [that was used] in the latest Hebron Operation. They arrested whoever sold it and whoever bought it ...

In conjunction with this event, [which was described], we in the Freedom Party—Palestine party, will emphasize the following items:⁶⁰

- 1 These negotiations are an indecent crime⁶¹ because this is a perfect sin—sinning against the laws of *shari’a*. These [negotiations] are in the sphere of being a traitor to God, His messenger and His believers. This is a new struggle in the fight whose purpose is to eliminate the problem of Palestine. [This struggle] is carried out by the Freedom Organization [Palestine] and its baby in the form of the Palestinian Authority while carrying out their suicide program on the land of *al-Isra’ wa-al-Miraj*.⁶²
- 2 Neither the Freedom Organization, [the PLO,] nor any of the other entities among the organization has the unrestricted [authority] to acquire or [cede] even a little finger of the land *al-Isra’ wa-al-Miraj*. Any loathsome agreement signed between the Freedom Organization [the PLO] or the Palestinian Authority or any other organization and the Jewish entity will not obligate the Muslims in any way at all and will be a nullified agreement.
- 3 The relationship with the American plans and all those who fall in its lap [end up being harmed]. [Those who follow America] are only bequeathing to themselves robbery and shattering in this world and the next. [These American plans] do not achieve anything in [this] world, except for political scandal and failure which come at the expense of the [Islamic] nation and its friends for a time, while losing control of the situation from the side of those who hold [onto these programs]. In the time of the resurrection of the dead, the Day of Judgment, [those who are in a relationship with America] will receive a huge punishment for what they committed themselves to according to their crimes and their deceit.

- 4 About the objections to these discussions [with Israel], there are those who tell them that they are nothing or that they stem from a lack of understanding [by those who oppose them] through the use of a national or an Arab camouflage [on the part of the PLO] or all sorts of other complicated expressions [whose purpose is to justify the discussions with Israel]. There is no basic difference with the stance of the [Palestinian] Authority except for the manner and the details [on how to achieve the goal]. However, the opinion of Islamic religious law says that every negotiation with the Jewish entity while finding solutions and accords is *haram* [a serious religious prohibition] according to *shari'a*. Because the problem of Palestine will only be decided on the battlefield when the Muslim armies free every inch of it [of the land of Palestine] if the Master of the universe so wills it. And afterwards, [when the freeing of Palestine] becomes a reality and the old Caliphate is re-established, may it come speedily in our day, with the help of God.⁶³

If the promise of the Creator comes and you have negated it from before you and you enter a mosque, it is as if you have entered for the first time and you will try to justify yourself but you will not be free from guilt.⁶⁴

The Hebron Operation was a terrorist attack in which four residents of the settlement of Beit Haggai were murdered—Talia and Yitchak Aimes, Kochavia Even-Haim and Avishai Shindler. They were killed while traveling in the car belonging to the Aimes, the parents of six children who are now orphans. The car in which they traveled was attacked in a shooting ambush on August 31, 2010. The Hamas movement took responsibility for the event. Speakers for the movement praised the “successful attack on the road.” Fawzi Barhoum, one of the speakers for the Hamas movement, said:

We are talking about the result of the crimes of the occupation against the Palestinians and of the failure of the security coordination between the Fatah authority in the West Bank and the occupation.⁶⁵

The Palestinian Authority did, in fact, condemn the serious attack that same night. Palestinian President Salam Fayyad announced to the press that the attack specifically hurt Palestinian interests and that the Authority would take steps to investigate the incident. Fayyad even pointed out that the timing of the attack was aimed at sabotaging the peace efforts and the discussions that were taking place in Washington.⁶⁶ One week later, the Palestinian Authority reported the arrest of the activists of the cell that carried out the attack near Beit Haggai and also an additional attack near the Rimonim intersection. The Authority indeed boasted that they had caught all those involved in the Beit Haggai attack and also all those connected to the car in which the Hamas

activists had traveled. As a reaction to the arrests, Hamas warned the Authority: "You know that the martyrs that reached the heart of the occupation can also reach you."

This threat also appeared in a proclamation published by the organization, which added that the arrests of organization members would not succeed in stopping the Hamas military arm which would hit, in their words, at "any place at any time that it wants to."⁶⁷ Hamas and the other Islamic groups see the security coordination between Israel and the Palestine Authority as a betrayal and a crime against Palestine and Islam.⁶⁸

The Islamic Freedom Party continues to gain many supporters from among the residents of the West Bank in the areas of Judea and Samaria. One cannot ignore the rapid growth of the movement which grows quickly not only in the traditional centers such as Hebron, Jerusalem and the Arab periphery, but also in the Palestinian refugee camps and in the centers in the north and the West Bank. The widening of the support for the Freedom Party apparently stems from the Authority's persecution of Hamas and Islamic Jihad members and the activities of the Authority against the *dawah* (the preaching, the calling to Islam) of these movements.⁶⁹ The internal Palestinian struggle (Hamas–Fatah) only helps the Freedom Party to expand its ranks despite the fact that it expresses views that are close to those of Hamas and it opposes the security cooperation with Israel. In its opinion, and in its own words, the Palestinian Authority is like Israel's watchdog which carries out the demands of Israel, "the arrogant."⁷⁰

Despite this, one notices that the men of the Freedom Party, as opposed to those from Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are not calling for an open war against the Palestinian Authority. They are not arguing like the men of Hamas that the government of Salam Fayyad and the activities of the Palestinian Authority are illegal.⁷¹ They still recognize the legitimacy of the regime in Ramallah but argue that it has to change its ways and stop the security cooperation with the occupation authorities. The criticism against the Palestinian Authority is practical and within the permitted bounds of sharp political critique. The movement distributes its views through the use of *dawah* and extensive advertising. One can guess that the movement is successful in spreading its criticism because it does not yet have a military wing of its own.⁷²

The Freedom Party presents the policy of the Palestinian Authority as one that goes against Islam and is prohibited according to Islamic law. According to its argument, the difference between the Freedom Party and the Palestinian Authority is not in its final goals, which are the freeing of all of Palestine and the destruction of Israel. The difference between them is in the way of achieving this and in the details; the difference is tactical and not fundamental. There is unity in the goal between the people of the Palestinian Authority, "the partner for peace," and the Freedom Party and the other Islamic streams. According to the Freedom Party, the argument is over a basic religious principle of whether or not one is permitted to negotiate or

mediate with the Jewish entity called “Israel” in order to achieve the final goal of freeing Palestine.

The answer of the various Islamic streams to this question is clear, but what is the stance of the Palestinian Authority? Is all the moderation of the Palestinian Authority on the outside alone? Is the cooperation between the Palestinian security forces and their “betrayal” of their people temporary and aimed only at the need for negotiation?⁷³ Do the people from the Freedom Party who are continuing to act freely in the areas of the Palestinian Authority know something about the goals of the Authority that we do not know?

It appears that the answer to this is hidden in the pragmatism of the Freedom Party. If the Freedom Party desires life, then it must act in a manner that will not arouse the anger of the security forces in the Authority against it. Therefore, despite the fact that in the eyes of the Freedom Party the very existence of negotiations is invalid by its essence and is against religious law, the movement’s publicity is very careful in not describing the men of the Palestinian Authority as traitors. Seeing the steps taken by the Palestinian Authority against Hamas, the Freedom Party has no desire also to become a target for punishment by the Palestinian National Security Forces—even if it is sure that the Authority must adopt the Islamic way in its handling of its relations with Israel.

D The future of the Jewish state

An additional characteristic that appears in the Islamic Freedom Party’s approach is, as mentioned previously, its attitude toward the Jewish problem. The movement does not hide its anti-Semitic overtones toward the Jews in its writings, unlike the other Palestinian movements, which present the problem of Palestine as a problem against Zionism.⁷⁴ The movement’s writings do not mention the nationalistic movement of the Jewish people at all. According to them, the conflict is between Islam and Judaism. The State of Israel is mentioned as the state of the Jews or as the Jewish entity. To them, there is no difference between the different streams of Judaism, within or outside the State of Israel. The movement’s standpoint is firm. Palestine is sacred to Islam and an indivisible part of the “House of Islam” and no Jew has the right to live within it. This is similar to the holiness of the Saudi peninsula, where Jews and anyone else who is not a Muslim are not permitted to live. The eviction of the Jews from the Saudi Arabian peninsula led to the spread of Islam and so it will be after the eviction of the Jews from Palestine.⁷⁵

The book that presents this unified outlook in relationship to the problem of Palestine and other places is *Political Problems: Occupied Muslim Land*,⁷⁶ which contends that there are seven countries under occupation according to the Islamic Freedom Party—Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Cyprus, Southern Sudan and Iraq.⁷⁷ Palestine is at the top of the list. The first chapter deals with the problems of Palestine, which are fully presented in

detail and explain the Freedom Party's perception of the problem of Palestine which is close to its heart.⁷⁸

Because Palestine was a pearl in Muslim history before its capture and afterwards, [Palestine] was the center of pride in the Muslim countries. That is why it was exploited and destroyed, due to its great importance to our enemies. It was turned into a cemetery for the Crusaders, the Tartars and it will be like that for the enemies of God who are the Jews, with the help of God ... Within it were decisive campaigns in which the Crusaders lost, as in the battle of Hattin (in 1187) and the battle of Ain Jalut (in 1260).⁷⁹ And so it will be with the help of God the decisive last battle with the Jews to return Palestine the free and the pure to the houses of the Muslims.⁸⁰

The movement briefly expresses its stance regarding its future and a solution to the problem of Palestine. The movement's attitude regarding the Jewish problem does not deviate from the writings of the other Muslim Arab philosophers who presented the problem of the Jews as a danger to humanity and to the whole world. This apocalyptic war in which Jewish Israel will be destroyed is described in many Islamic writings as an Islamic victory on Judgment Day. According to this approach, on the day that the Caliphate is established and *jihad* is announced against the West, the Jews will be destroyed to the last one of them because of their role in the evil forces.⁸¹

Why did the Western countries establish the infidel state of the Jews, like sticking a dagger in the heart of the Muslims in Palestine?

The book gives three main reasons for this:⁸²

- 1 They [the West] created a strange entity [Israel] among the Muslims of the area in order to prevent the continuity of [the Arab countries] and to distance [the possibility] of their uniting.
- 2 The infidel [Western states] has enflamed the area with the conflict with the Jews and in this they tried to make [the Muslims] forget the original conflict of theirs with the infidel West which put an end to the Caliphate. Before the Jews were strengthened with a state of their own in Palestine, the conflict was between the Muslims and the West. By the fact that the Jews captured Palestine, the center of the conflict became this thieving entity. Thus the pressure of the conflict was eased by the reality [with the infidel West].
- 3 They [the West] rested from the problem of the Jews in their countries. The Jews are known already for their corruption, their immorality and the damage that they cause.

Here the writers show their "familiarity" with American history and they quote the American "President" Benjamin Franklin in a speech that he made

to the American people at the founding convention of the American Constitution in 1789.

There is a great danger threatening the United States of America and that is the danger of the Jews. They, being who they are, hurt and lower the moral level [of society] and lower the level of security and commerce ... They are bloodsuckers and plunder the treasuries. I especially warn you so that you will not be prevented from taking out the Jews permanently. [Otherwise] your children and your children's children will curse your graves.⁸³

From this point onward the history of the Jewish–Muslim conflict in Palestine is described as a struggle between two ways of thinking—the British imperialistic way whose agents were President of Tunisia Habib Bourguiba (1903–2000) and King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan (1935–99); and American imperialism which is represented by President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–70) and President of Iraq Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–63). The English way of thinking bases the solution on one bi-national country under Jewish control. The American way of thinking is based on two countries, one for the Jews and one for the Arabs.⁸⁴

The political players in the area are described as marionettes dancing to the music of Britain and America.⁸⁵ The Israeli wars, such as the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, are also described as having been planned by the powers of Britain and America, who activated their agents in the Arab countries to act against Israel and led to a war whose results were pre-determined.⁸⁶ The powers acted in order to solve the problem of Palestine according to their wishes. The Freedom Party complains how the Western countries succeeded in convincing the PLO and the Arab countries to incite the Palestinian conflict away from the idea of rejecting the very existence of a Jewish state and instead focus on which areas occupied by Israel in the 1967 War the new small state of Palestine would be established.⁸⁷

To the movement, the problem of Palestine is a clear one that has only one solution: *jihad*.

The Palestinian problem will not free itself from the impurity of the Jews, [and from] regimes that wish to be in the bosom of the enemy;⁸⁸ regimes that bring public disasters to what is sacred to the nation [in the light] of day; regimes that watch over their weak monarchs and their shamed crowns. The outcome of this will not be the freeing of it [Palestine] as the [Palestinian] Authority does not have any ability or power. Palestine was conquered by Umar [ibn al-Khattāb] and Salah al-Din [al-Ayyubi] freed it from the Crusaders. One day, the children of Amar and the children of Salah al-Din will still go to Palestine on a pilgrimage and will free it from the filth of the Jews.⁸⁹

The problem of Palestine is not only a problem of the families of Palestine or of the Arabs alone but is, in essence, an Islamic problem. There is simply a problem of Islamic land and a problem of Islamic holy places that were forcibly raped by the infidel Jews with the aid of the large infidel countries, Britain and America, in support of the cooperating Muslim regimes. Palestine is an Islamic land and it is the southern part of the *Bilad al-Sham*.⁹⁰ Palestine was conquered by the Muslims with their blood and they cannot plow conspiracies against it and give up even an inch of it. They cannot [give up] even one pebble from the dust of the horse of the holy warrior or a drop of blood of a martyr [who sacrificed himself for it].

The King of all of the Muslims [Allah] commanded the Muslims to give their blood and their souls in order to ensure the continuation of its return [to the Muslims]. Every neglect of even an inch of it is in the area of treason to God, in [Muhammad] His servant and His believers. God commanded the Muslims about *jihad* to save Palestine from the state of the Jews and to uproot the Jewish entity in Palestine from its base. That is how the [Muslims] will remove America and all the infidel countries that reach out for it.⁹¹

The problem of Palestine, if it is solved, will only be solved with the strength of the holy warriors. For this, the Islamic nation needs strong leadership that knows how to deal with the countries of the infidel West and the state of the Jews. The strength of America is fleeting and it cannot navigate the conflict as it pleases forever. In addition, the Western infidel countries are conflicted among themselves which weakens their ability to object to a Muslim nation. The movement calls on Muslims to wake up and unify and understand that the solution to the problem of Palestine is hidden in unity under the rule of the caliphs.

The chapter that deals with Palestine ends on an optimistic note, despite the fact that there is a reprimand for the Muslims:

The Caliphate alone is a guarantee for the removal of America and Britain from the international arena. The law and authority that rules in America dictates the international stance. The Caliphate is that which will save the world from its evil and distribute the kindness and goodness to the end of the world. The Caliphate will destroy the Jewish entity that occupies Palestine which is the land of *al-Isra' wa-al-Miraj*⁹² and which will return Palestine whole to the House of Islam. All this is in your hands, you the Muslims. “[So do not weaken and call for peace] while you are superior; and Allah is with you and will never deprive you of [the reward of] your deeds.”⁹³

The movement believes that the Palestinian problem is the most important of the Muslim problems and, unlike the other movements that have been

surveyed above, the movement does not preach for *jihād* now as do the men of Islamic Jihad or Hamas. Movement activists are, however, permitted to take part in *jihād* activities on a voluntary basis of their being “chosen.” These activities are not only parades in Hebron or flying flags, but also include the riots on the Temple Mount and occasionally the planning and carrying out of terrorist acts by individuals or small unorganized cells.

There are also those members who could not hold back from violence and therefore left Hizb al-Tahrir. Annas Shawaqi of East Jerusalem is one example. From the age of ten he was active in the movement. According to him, he left the Freedom Party in order to take part in the “army of the country,” which belongs to al-Qaeda organization. Kamal Abu Qwaider, another activist in the same exposed al-Qaeda cell, told Annas that a number of the people in the underground cell were members of Hizb al-Tahrir and they were tired of waiting as the party only threatened and did not do anything. In other words, the activities of the Freedom Movement are what led these young people from East Jerusalem to activities in al-Qaeda.⁹⁴

In the meantime, according to the speakers of the movement, until the time is ripe for the Caliphate which will start a *jihād*, it is necessary to act for the ripening of conditions in society that are suitable. In other words, the preparation of the hearts of the masses to bring them closer to Islam. A revival of the idea of the Islamic Caliphate. The replacement of the corrupt leaders in the Arab countries and in the Palestinian Authority, of both its central branches, Fatah and Hamas.⁹⁵ Of course, the idea of a Palestinian state inside the 1967 border, an idea still being put forward by the Palestinian Authority headed by “Abbas, *Raees Sultat Ramallah*” (Abbas is described by the speaker of al-Tahrir as president of the Ramallah Authority and not as the president of Palestine, which is how he mainly describes himself and his supporters in Ramallah) is, in principle, an unacceptable idea as we are talking about a state that would exist under Israeli occupation and serve Israel’s security as it has done until now.⁹⁶

When will the conditions be ripe? There is no definite answer for this. Even the Hamas movement at the beginning of the 1970s supported the preparation of hearts and the preparation of society before it turned to the *jihād* way as a means of solving the problem of Palestine. Will a similar process happen to the Freedom Party as well? Only time will tell.

Notes

- 1 *Sura the Stories* (28), verse 5. Noble Qur’an, <http://quran.com/28>. This sentence originally referred to the children of Israel who were oppressed by the pharaoh. It is very interesting to see how the verse’s meaning has been reversed and now refers to the Palestinians who are oppressed by Israel and America. The propagandists of the Freedom Party mention this verse many times in different, but similar, contexts, such as in the article on Gaza presented here.
- 2 Hatina, *Palestinian Radicalism*, pp.24–25, 54–55. Asa’ad Bayyud al-Tamimi served temporarily as the imam of the al-Aqsa mosque. In 1969, he was exiled by Israel to

Jordan. He was one of the leading supporters of the *jihād* brigades that cooperated with the men of the Fatah movement. In 1988, after the declaration of independence that recognized the rights of the Jews to a state in the framework of the decision of Partition 181, he broke off relations with the PLO and established the Islamic Jihad movement—Beit al-Makdes.

- 3 Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn fī Filastīn hata 'am 1970*, p.28.
- 4 1953 (1376 by the *Hijra* calendar) is the year of the official founding of the party as it appears on the movement's website, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org. Likewise, see Amnon Cohen, *Parties of the West Bank under Jordanian Rule* (Jerusalem, 1981), pp.194–95. The Jordanian government at that time did not agree to the establishment of the movement and imprisoned its leaders.
- 5 Shaul Bartal, *The Palestinians from the Neqba to the Fedayeen, 1949–1956* (Jerusalem, 2009), pp.192–94; Shaul Bartal, *The Fedayeen Emerge: The Palestine–Israel Conflict 1949–1956* (Bloomington, 2011), pp.187–90; Cohen, *Parties of the West Bank under Jordanian Rule*, pp.194–96.
- 6 “The Hamas Charter,” ch. 1, para. 2. A Hebrew translation of the charter can be found in Aviad, *Lexicon of the Hamas Movement*, p.261.
- 7 The Investigative Project on Terrorism, “Hizb ut-Tahrir in America: Preaching Hate, Building a Caliphate,” July 17, 2009, www.investigativeproject.org/1095/hizb-ut-tahrir-in-america-preaching-hate-building; also Gabriel, *They Must Be Stopped*, pp.9–10.
- 8 Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, *Concepts of Hizb al-Tahrir* (London, n.d.), pp.4–5. This is an English translation of the book by the founder of the movement which was apparently written in the 1950s.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p.5.
- 10 This is the opposite approach to that of *jihād* as presented in the previous chapters through Abdullah Azzam and Islamic Jihad.
- 11 Al-Nabhani, *Concepts of Hizb al-Tahrir*, pp.8–9.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p.10.
- 13 *Ibid.*, pp.6–12. According to many Islamic factors, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), who cancelled the institution of the Caliphate in March 1924, was a *dönmeh* (a Jew from the Sabbatai Zevi movement, a movement that converted to Islam). Many nationalistic Arabs were Christian agents, such as Michel Aflaq (1910–89), the founder of al-Ba'ath, and George Habash (1926–2008), the founder of al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab in the 1950s and the National Front for the Freedom of Palestine in the 1960s. Sāṭī' al-Ḥuṣrī (1882–1968), another pan-Arab nationalist, was also accused of being a *dönmeh* like Atatürk. Sivan, *The Crash within Islam*, pp.132–33.
- 14 Yifrah Zilberman, *Radical Palestinian Islam in Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1993), p.8.
- 15 “The Rallies of the Islamic Freedom Party in the Areas of the Palestinian Authority and in the World,” Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (Mal'am), Aug. 26, 2007, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/islamic_lp0807.htm.
- 16 A public statement from the party's website, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/791.
- 17 Because of this, additional calls for incitement were made by other entities to go and protect al-Aqsa. This will be shown in a later chapter.
- 18 See the public statement from the party's website, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/791.
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 *Ibid.*
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *Surat al-Amram* (111), the Noble Qu'ran, <http://quran.com/3>.

- 23 The *hadith* of the Stone and the Tree also appears in al-Bukhārī and also by al-Muslem. See Koplewitz, *Life and Religion in Early Islam*, p.167; the words of Abu Horaira, p.254, and also the words of Abdullah Ibn Umar. These traditions are considered most credible according to the Islamic tradition.
- 24 Muhammad al-Shweqi, *al-Mahdi al-Muntazar wa- al-Khulafa al-Thaniya al-Manhaj al-Nabawi* [The Messiah that will Come and the Second Caliphate According to the Prophet's Way] (Beit al-Makdes: Annsar al-Amal al-Islami al-Muwahed, 2007), pp.82–83. His book carries the logo of Hizb al-Tahrir, with a black flag with the call for testimony on a background of a globe. On pages 81–82, the author surveys the sources for this *hadith*. He quotes from the *hadith* book of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Muslem and from the *hadith* book of Ṣaḥīḥ-al-Bukhārī.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp.83–89.
- 26 See the movement's proclamation on their website, May 31, 2010, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/898.
- 27 *Ibid.* See what Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had to say after the Israelis gained control of the Turkish flotilla when he described the Israeli action as an act of terrorism by the Israeli State. "The Flotilla to Gaza: The Head of the Turkish Government, Erdoğan the Israeli Activity is an Act of Terror on Behalf of the State," *Ha'aretz*, May 31, 2010, www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1171430.html.
- 28 See www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/898.
- 29 *Ibid.*
- 30 *Al-faruk* means "the wise," the one who distinguishes between right and wrong.
- 31 For details about the life of the second caliph through the eyes of the believers, see <http://rasoulallah.net> at <http://montada.rasoulallah.net/index.php?showtopic=10610>. This site examines a number of the stories from the Qu'ran. The lives of the Prophet Muhammad and Umar ibn al-Khattāb are heartily praised on this site and not only due to their conquests.
- 32 See the book published by the Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala* [Political Problems, the Conquered Muslim Countries] (Beirut, 2004), pp.5–6. Similar items praising Sultan Abd al-Hamid II also appear in a recording made by Hamas on the problem of Palestine, part 8, "An Tariq al-Khaid'a, min al-Taslal al-Mustkin—ila al-Hajum al-Muslem" [In the Way of Deception, from Quiet Infiltration to Attacks by the Muslims, 1870–1948], October 5, 2007.
- 33 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, "al-Halqa (13): Qiyam Dawla Kiyān al-Sahayuni, Akhtar Ahdath al-Qaren" [Building a Zionist State is the Most Dangerous Event of the Last Century], *al-Qaradawi* site, December 2, 2011, www.qaradawi.net/life/8/5394-13-.html.
- 34 See www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/nshow/898.
- 35 Despite this, the Authority still oversees the activities of the movement and does not allow it to carry out mass rallies. Thus, for example, in July 2008 the party turned to the Palestinian Authority protesting that it was prevented from holding a mass central rally to commemorate the falling of the caliphs. See www.jcpa.org.il/JCPAHeb/Templates/showpage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=2&TMID=178&FID=502&PID=0&IID=17040.
- 36 This refers to Abu Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, Umar ibn al-Khattāb, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān and Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib. These were the first four caliphs in Islam who ruled after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. The era of these four caliphs was a golden age for the Islamic nation according to the Islamic extremists.
- 37 The official end of the Ottoman Caliphate took place on March 3, 1924, orchestrated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This brought about a crisis in Islam. Since that period, Sunni Islam no longer has a supreme legal religious authority. While this does allow for some religious legal flexibility, those loyal to Islam blame this act of Atatürk on the hated West, despite the fact that the end of the sultan and the Caliphate were a part of the Turkish revolution that was initiated by Atatürk, who

- turned Turkey into a republic. This revolution, in effect, saved Turkey from collapse and protected its sovereignty. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, pp.28–29; also Bernard Lewis, *The Growth of Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem, 1991), pp.207–19.
- 38 A publication of the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (Mala'm). The Center for the Intelligence Heritage (Mala'm), "The Rallies of the Islamic Freedom Party in the Areas of the Palestinian Authority and throughout the World," July 26, 2007, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/islamic_lp0807.htm.
- 39 The Arabic word used here is "*al-Mazuma*," which means "fictitious." While other countries are just mentioned in the article by their names, throughout the article, whenever Israel is mentioned, its name is placed in parentheses to show that its status is different from that of all the other countries. According to the understanding of the Freedom Party, Israel is only a temporary country which has no right to exist. This stand is not unique to Hizb al-Tahrir but is common to the other Palestinian streams and even today it is included in a portion of Fatah publicity.
- 40 "A'ada Gaza ila ma kanat aliah Jarima la Tighaft," *al-Wai, Jam'aya-Faqriah-Taqqiyah* [Magazine for the Understanding of Society, Thought and Culture], sheet 253, 22nd year, book 1429, Safar 1429 (Hijra), Feb. 2008, pp.3–5.
- 41 In the original Arabic, the word "*karratha*" is used to mean tragedy, Holocaust, catastrophe. The Gaza blockade was imposed during this period due to the final rejection of the petitions brought by B'tselem and additional human rights organizations to the High Court against the methods taken by Israel to punish those in the Gaza Strip. See www.btselem.org/hebrew/gaza_strip/siege_tightening.asp.
- 42 In other words, it is really Egypt that is responsible for the "Israeli" blockade on the Gaza Strip. See also the article by Avi Tarango, "Israel is Not Responsible for the Blockade on Gaza," Ynet, Jan. 19, 2010, www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-3836237,00.html.
- 43 According to the human rights organizations, Israel is the one responsible for the welfare of the residents of Gaza, mainly in the field of health, sanitation and infrastructure, despite the disengagement. See the report written by Maskit Bendel, *The Disengagement Plan and its Implications on Health in the Gaza Strip* (Tel Aviv, 2005). In this report, the words of the researchers and the representatives of the human rights organizations are introduced to explain in no uncertain way that Israel is responsible for the humanitarian conditions of the Arabs in the Gaza Strip. This stance is, of course, adapted by the PLO as it appears on the site of the Negotiations Department: "Gaza: Occupation by Siege," www.nad-plo.org/etemp/late.php?id=114 (accessed Sept. 11, 2011).
- 44 This is *incorrect*. According to the reports of the security forces, Egypt often opens up the Rafah crossing which it uses as a pressure valve against Hamas. See Amos Harel and Fadi 'Eyadat, "The Rafah Crossing is Not Closed: Egypt Allows the Passage of People Regularly," *Ha'aretz*, June 23, 2008, www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/995369.html.
- 45 On Nov. 20, 2007, the United States officially announced the assembling of the Annapolis Committee in Maryland. Participants included representatives of the Quartet, the Arab League and the G-8. At the conference, support was expressed for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. In the conference's summary announcement made on Nov. 27, 2007, it was reported that the negotiations between Israel and the PLO were moving toward a lasting solution. At the conference, it was discussed that in about a year there would be a signed permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Gregory S. Mahler and Alden R.W. Mahler, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Introduction and Documentary Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp.282–84.

- 46 This refers to the Hamas revolution and Hamas taking control over the Gaza Strip from June 7–13, 2007. See Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.107–19.
- 47 The treaty between Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt which regulates the conditions for traversing the Rafah crossing from the Gaza Strip to Egypt. According to this treaty, which was signed with the Palestinian Authority in Nov. 2005, European observers will be placed at the Rafah crossing alongside Palestinian forces from the Authority which will coordinate the crossing with Egypt and be responsible for its operation. See Harel and 'Eyadat, "The Rafah Crossing is Not Closed."
- 48 The Egyptians take an active part in the "blockade" on Gaza. Thus, for example, when Hamas, Egyptian activists and other international elements tried to demonstrate on the Egyptian side of the border against the Egyptian policy in regard to the crossing, the Egyptians used their best forces against them and prevented them from reaching the crossing and traversing it. See the *Walla* news website, June 12, 2010, <http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/22/1685687>.
- 49 In another place, even before the disengagement, speakers for the Freedom Party indicated that "[t]he withdrawal from Gaza stemmed as a result of an Israeli motive due to the demographic problem. This withdrawal does not dramatically affect the security of the Jewish State." Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, pp.32–33.
- 50 The caliph has a holy status like that of the Prophet (the word caliph means the Prophet's replacement). Therefore, due to his high level, he can pity the Muslims as a father pities his sons.
- 51 The Arabic term used here is "*hadah wa-al-khallas*," which means proper training, in other words, in the way of Islam and salvation. The Arabic expression used here "*al-Mahdi*" means guiding in the right way. The Arabic "*al-Khalas*" means the savior, one of the names of Allah.
- 52 The Arabic term "*Ansar al-Khalifa*" means friends of the caliph. The word "*ansar*" refers to the aides of the Prophet Muhammad who joined him in the city of Medina and accepted the Islamic faith. As they were among the first who accepted the Islamic faith, they are greatly respected. See Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.99–101.
- 53 According to the Noble Qur'an site translation, <http://quran.com/28>.
- 54 A political public statement of the movement, "*al-Dawla al-Madaniya alati Yirad Taswakha lakum hiye dawla 'Almaniyah la 'Alaqat laha bial-Islam fanbadhaha wla Taqbulha wla Yardu 'an al-Khulafa al-Rashda Badilah*" [The civilian state that is being marketed to you is a secular state. It has no tie to Islam. You must abandon it and not accept it and not be satisfied with it instead of the righteous caliphs]. From Aug. 26, 2011, www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/AR/wshow/1109.
- 55 This part is based on an article by the author: Shaul Bartal, "The Betrayal of Abu Mazen of the Islamic Nation," *The Mid-East Magazine*, Oct. 3, 2010, www.midea.st.co.il/p-2_a-358.
- 56 "The Obama Government, Self-Sacrificing Talks Bear Fruit," *Nrg*, Jul. 2, 2010, www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/127/855.html.
- 57 Ali Waked, "The Palestinians Suspend the Negotiations—Israel is Responsible," *Ynet*, Oct. 2, 2010, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3962762,00.html. In Dec. 2010, in an attempt to find a solution to the crisis, a suggestion was raised for an additional temporary agreement with the Palestinians which was also immediately rejected. Barak Ravid, "Prime Minister, the Negotiations with the Palestinians Should End with an Intermediate Agreement," *Ha'aretz*, Dec. 27, 2010, www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1237239.
- 58 The movement's proclamation can be seen on its website alongside additional proclamations that condemn the negotiations: <http://pal-tahrir.info/publications/hizb-palmedia-releases/2177-2010-09-03-17-05-27.html>.

- 59 According to the Freedom Party, Israel is always asking the PLO to recognize its Jewishness. This is despite the fact that the PLO has already recognized Israel's right to exist on July 23, 1982, as a result of its failure in the Lebanese War. Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.10.
- 60 The complaints of the Freedom Party are no different from those that appear in more detail in a pamphlet published by al-Jamia al-Islamiya, *al-Mufawadhat min Manzur Islami, Sarakha fi Dhamir al-Ummah Adhara ila Allah wa-al-Tarikh wa-al-Ajyal al-Qadima* [Negotiations from the Islamic Point of View, A Call to the Conscience of the Nation and an Explanation According to the Words of God, of History and the Future Generations] (n.p., n.d.). This pamphlet also raises strong objections to cooperation with the United States and a lack of understanding that the United States is not a fair mediator. The pamphlet will be examined in full in the next chapter.
- 61 In Arabic, *jarima mankara* means a despicable crime. The word *mankar* also means denying the existence of the Creator. It is as if they want to say that this crime is even in the state of heresy to God.
- 62 In Arabic, *ard al-Isra' wa-al-Miraj*. This is an accepted nickname for the land of Israel which is Palestine. The source for this name is the night journey to the sky taken by the Prophet Muhammad, which many believe is a night dream journey to al-Aqsa mosque (the mosque at the edge), which appears in *Sura 17* in the Qur'an. There are many interpretations of this (including the early Islamic traditions) that doubt that the *sura* is really referring to al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, but this is the explanation that Islam has chosen since the 10th century. See Rubin, *The Qur'an*, p.226, comment 1.
- 63 This is also the conclusion of the Islamic Jihad activists in the pamphlet "al-Mufawadhat min Manzur Islami," p.20–21, 28. Here too, they ask the Palestinian Authority to learn from Salah ad-din al-Ayyubi and the *jihad* against the Crusaders. There the Muslims did not try to negotiate with the Crusaders but fought them until they freed the whole of Palestine.
- 64 It is not explained where this verse is taken from, but its meaning is clear.
- 65 Anshil Pepper, Avi Issacharoff, Jonathan Lis and Yaniv Kobovitz, "Four Murdered in the Terrorist Shooting Attack in the West Bank, the Hamas has Taken Responsibility," *Ha'aretz*, Sept. 1, 2010, www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1187471.html.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid., Sept. 8, 2010, www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1188676.htm; Avi Issacharoff, "The Palestinian Authority: We have Arrested Two Suspects in the Carrying Out of the Attack at Bet Haggai and the Rimonim Junction." In other words, the complaints by the Authority on the arrest of members of the cell that carried out the attack at the Beit Haggai junction were already known to the members of the Freedom Party on Sept. 2, 2010, the day of the official announcement in the Israeli media.
- 68 See, for example, the book by Abdullah Ghaleb Barghouti, Hamas suicide bomber organizer now serving 69 life sentences, *Muhandis 'ala al-Tariq, Amir al Zill* [Engineer on the Way: Prince of the Shadow] (Dar al-Barghouti le-Nshar wa-al-Toziya, 2013), pp.18, 32. In his book he calls the Palestinian security forces Zionist dogs who are corrupt since they coordinate with Israel.
- 69 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.189.
- 70 This is also the interpretation accepted by the Islamic organizations, including Hamas, according to which the Palestinian Authority conducting relations with Israel is like treason to the Palestinian nation. See the site of the Palestinian Information Center (Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A'alam), a site identified with the Hamas movement. The headline is, "Report: The Government of Fayyad is One of the Most Unsuccessful in the World," Oct. 2, 2010, www.palestine-info.info/ar/defa

- ult.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7VCfk%2fUfq58sO33riNnB4xC4kZMAZbJAQRJzC%2b64izH78T4OKZ6LX00pXhGKv9L2r8%2fzctz%2f5skcRezjTQL93PdW3pEEExqdxZMWVz2kOAMJ38%3d.
- 71 Ibid. Hamas' argument in the article indicated above was that Fayyad's illegal government, one not chosen by the Palestinian nation, carried out 1,297 collaborative activities with the security forces of the Zionist occupier. The article is based on one published in the United States in *The New York Review of Books*. The article emphasizes, of course, the failure of the illegal government in Ramallah in all areas, including economically, along with its activities against the Palestinian resistance movement in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
- 72 This method of action was also that of Hamas at the beginning, which is why it is possible that the Freedom Party is waiting for a crisis similar to the *intifada* in 1988 in order to establish its own military arm. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.189.
- 73 According to Hamas, this cooperation against the Palestinian opposition led to the least amount of terrorist activity since 2000: "Report: The Fayyad Government, One of the Most Unsuccessful Governments in the World," Oct. 2, 2010, www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd87MDI46m9rUxJEpMO%2bi1s7VCfk%2fUfq58sO33riNnB4xC4kZMAZbJAQRJzC%2b64izH78T4OKZ6LX00pXhGKv9L2r8%2fzctz%2f5skcRezjTQL93PdW3pEEExqdxZMWVz2kOAMJ38%3d.
- 74 This interpretation is similar in content to the interpretation by Sayyid Qutb as expressed in his book, *Marakatuna Maa al-Yahud* (presented in previous chapters), and by Abdullah Azzam in his book, *al-Sartan al-Ahmar*. These two books show the Jews as the source of all evil and are full of classic anti-Semitic motifs.
- 75 This approach is not unique only to Hizb al-Tahrir but characterizes all of the other Islamic movements including al-Qaeda, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.233–37.
- 76 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala* (Beirut, 2004).
- 77 It appears that the order here is according to the importance that the Freedom Movement attributes to these places. This study only deals with the aspect of how the movement sees the freeing of Palestine.
- 78 As indicated previously, the founders and the leaders of the movement are Palestinians with Hebron origins. The Freedom Party branch in Palestine is one of the largest of the movement. The centers of the movement in Palestine are mainly in Hebron, Ramallah and East Jerusalem, each with over 1,000 members. The movement also has smaller branches in Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarem. See the website of the Palestinian branch of the movement, <http://pal-tahrir.info>; and also the website of the Commemoration Center (Ma'lam), "The Rallies of the Islamic Freedom Party in the Areas of the Palestinian Authority and Around the World," Jul. 26, 2007, www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/Hebrew/heb_n/html/islamic_lp0807.htm.
- 79 The Battle of Hattin took place near Tiberius on July 4, 1187, between the forces of the Crusaders under the command of Guy of Lusignan, and Salah ad-din al-Ayyubi. This battle was a symbol and a wonder in Muslim history due to their success against the infidels. The Battle of Ain Jalut was held near the Ein Harod spring of today, on Sept. 3, 1260, between the forces of the Mamluks, under the command of the Mamluks' Commander Baybars, and the Mongolian forces (also called the Tartars) under the command of Hulagu Khan the Mongol. The Mongols invaded the Middle East from the deserts of Asia. They executed the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad al-Musta'sim in 1258. This battle is often remembered in Muslim historiography and shows how the Muslims succeeded in beating the Mongols, who were considered "undefeated."
- 80 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.5.

- 81 An example of this type of book is that by Dr. Abd al-Nasser Madbuli al-Khudari, *al-Harb al-'Alamiya al-Thlatha baine al-Islam wa-al-Gharb* [The Third World War between Islam and the West] (n.p., 1990). Take particular note of chapter 4, with the title “Harb al-Mahdi Maa al-Yahud” [The War of the Messiah with the Jews], p.41–56. Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.236–37.
- 82 The reasons are translated directly from the Arab text. Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.8.
- 83 Ibid., pp.8–9. Despite Benjamin Franklin’s achievements and many publications, there is no evidence of him having anti-Semitic inclinations or hatred of the Jews in his writing. Quite the opposite! In addition, *Benjamin Franklin was never president of the United States*. Although he is very famous in American history, it is not because he was president, a job that he never held. These things are famous although they are not truths. See also Dr. Tareq al-Suwaidan, *al-Yahud, al-Mawsu’aa al-Mussawara* [The Jews Illustrated Encyclopedia] (Kuwait: al-Abda’a al-Fakri, 2009), p.448.
- 84 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, pp.9–18.
- 85 Israel is the fruit of the Western plot that supports regimes that cooperate which must be taken down on the way to independence. See Zilberman, *Radical Palestinian Islam in Jerusalem*, p.2.
- 86 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, pp.13–14.
- 87 Ibid., pp.28–30. A description of the road map according to the vision of US President George Bush, Jr: “This plan laughs at the old men of the [Palestinian] Authority and the rulers of the Arab states and mocks their feelings.”
- 88 In the eyes of Hizb al-Tahrir, the term “enemies” is very broad and includes Europe and the United States. That is why regimes such as Egypt in the days of Mubarak, and Jordan in the days of King Hussein, or his son Abdullah, who yearn to be supported by the West, cannot lead to the end of Israel.
- 89 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.36.
- 90 *Bilad al-Sham* is a nickname for the land of Syria, of which Palestine is considered the southern part.
- 91 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, pp.36–37.
- 92 *Ard al-Isra’ wa-al-Miraj* is a nickname for the land of Palestine.
- 93 Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.40. Based on *Surat Muhammad*, verse 35, the Noble Quran, <http://quran.com/47>.
- 94 See *The State of Israel against Kamal Abu Qwaider and Ahmad Shawaqi*, BA’S H (Jerusalem) 13589/08, T.F. (Jerusalem) 7706/08. A Decision of the Shalom Court in Jerusalem Headed by Judge David Mintz, July 31, 2008. See also: Efrat Weiss Ishum, “Six Israeli-Arabs Founded al-Qaeda Cell,” Ynet, July 18, 2008, www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-3569923,00.html.
- 95 Thus, for example, after the signing of the Appeasement Agreement, the Hizb al-Tahrir activists took to the streets and waved flags against the agreement that it saw as an Arab-American conspiracy to extinguish the Palestinian problem. Elior Levi, “The Palestinians Celebrated Appeasement, the Hamas Flags were Raised in the West Bank,” Ynet, May 6, 2011, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4065498,00.html.
- 96 Testimony to this are the words expressed by engineer Baher Salah, a member of the Information Office of Hizb al-Tahrir in Palestine. In a public statement issued by the movement on Sept. 17, 2011, as a reaction to the words of Nabil Sha’ath on security cooperation between the Authority and Israel, Salah said: “Cooperation is something that the Authority should be ashamed of.” Salah nullifies the Palestinian initiative in the United Nations because the security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians will continue and it will be a state under occupation. This is not a real free state but just part of the American-Israeli performance: <http://pal-tahrir.info/events/29-press-interview/3647-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز>.
[يا-يا-أنا-يكون-يهود-أحرص-منها-على-عدم-انتهيارها.html](http://pal-tahrir.info/events/29-press-interview/3647-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز-حزب-التحرير-فلسطين-كفى-السلطة-حز).

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Part 2

Studies of *jihad* philosophy

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6 Negotiations from the Islamic point of view

Then declare what you are commanded and turn away from the polytheists. Indeed, we are sufficient for you against the mockers.

Surat al-Hijr (the Rocky Tract), verses 94–95¹

A Is there a chance for peace negotiations?

Is there a chance to negotiate with Hamas or with any other Islamic organization in order to achieve peaceful coexistence between the State of Israel and the fundamentalist Islamic Palestinians? That is the question that the pamphlet translated below, which has been distributed to Islamic zealots, tries to answer. The pamphlet discusses Islamic principles regarding negotiations between Muslims and infidels.

On the frontispiece, the following headline appears:

*Negotiations from an Islamic point of view*²

*A call to the nation's conscience and an explanation according to the Word of God of the history and the future of the generations to come
An advertisement of the Islamic Union [al-Jamia al-Islamiya]*

On the back page of the pamphlet is the following:

There is no reason for this weak and traitorous solution of dying for God, my brother, or being locked up in jail and thus uprooting our position from its source.

We will not misappropriate our trust and we will not cease in our faith in the victory of God that will surely come ... because the *surat al-Isra'* disperses all of the illusions of the wise who are set in their opinions [and who believe] in false illusions of security and peace.

The enemy will not, according to his deeds, dream of reaching peace as long as the *surat al-Isra'* is in our hearts.

In other words, the *surat al-Isra'* (sura 17, the chapter in the Qur'an where Muhammad ascends to the sky),³ expresses the tie between the Temple

Mount (*Haram al-Sharif*) and the Prophet Muhammad to those who are loyal to Islam, and does not allow Muslims to accept any attempt at compromise with the enemy. This refusal to compromise stems from two main reasons:

- The importance of al-Aqsa mosque in the eyes of the Muslims.⁴
- The treason of the Jews as expressed in this *sura* where the Jews deny the Prophet Muhammad and the words of God that he speaks.

The text continues to describe the same two instances where the prophets were sent to bring about the repentance of the nation of Israel and the infidels.

And we conveyed to the children of Israel in the scripture that, “You will surely cause corruption on the earth twice, and you will surely reach [a degree of] great haughtiness.”⁵

The children of Israel are a stubborn people who do not listen to the voice of the prophets who were sent to them. If this is so, how can one make peace with them? *Surat al-Isra'* reveals, so to speak, the true face of the infidels and the children of Israel. That is why we, those loyal to Islam, those who believe in who was brought down to us in the *surat al-Isra'*, are unable to make peace with them. If this is so, what are the principles for negotiations from the Islamic point of view? The pamphlet introduced here will present these answers from the point of view of the Islamic loyalists.

The pamphlet begins with a dedication (on the first page) to all those who recognize and who are loyal to the Islamic vision but are unwilling to lean towards a compromise solution of two states for two nations. Already in the dedication, one can see the ideological opposition by the Islamic stream to compromise agreements with Israel (“the American illusion”) and to the possibility of a compromise with the Jews who represent the culture of Khaybar.

B Translation of the pamphlet on negotiations from an Islamic point of view

1 Dedication

To all those who are loyal to their religion, their homeland and their faith.

To all those who surrender on the land of “al-Isra’ wa-al-Miraj.”⁶

To the religion that has been hurt by the experience of fascism and imported solutions.

To the religion [that is passed on] from father to son who know the truth and who reveal the forgery in the place of the hypocrites and the tired⁷ and who are not enchanted by the deluded American illusion.

*To those who will not negotiate about the homecoming of those who return.*⁸

Until we give justification to the jihad for constant and continuous struggle.

Until we do not stop speaking about the things that are bad for us and ambush us.

Until there is no more need for al-Aqsa mosque to carry the shame of the flags of Khaybar.

We will begin with a blessing for the modest [al-jihad] effort.

In the name of God the merciful.

“So do not weaken and call for peace while you are superior; and Allah is with you and will never deprive you of [the reward of] your deeds.”⁹

After this introduction, the pamphlet addresses its Islamic audience beginning with an explanation of the Islamic world’s opposition to the humiliating negotiations and agreements with the enemies of Islam—negotiations that have been taking place with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) since 1991 (at the Madrid Conference) until today.¹⁰ According to the Islamic zealots in Palestine, any agreement with the Zionists based on historic compromise falls within the area of treason. One must wait patiently and continue with the struggle against the Zionists until they surrender, as Allah is with the believers and the patient. It is prohibited for Muslims to be enticed by the false illusions of the West. Although the pamphlet was written during the Madrid Conference, it is very easy to relate today to the arguments given by the Islamic zealots that are found within it.

Within the pamphlet, one can also find an explanation for the terrorist attacks by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad against the State of Israel and the Jews who live within it. It is not just a desire for supposed revenge on this event or another, such as the actions of Dr. Baruch Goldstein at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. It is the desire to stop the negotiations between the PLO and Israel, whatever the price—even at the cost of having to sacrifice young men on the altar of Islam and the Motherland.¹¹ Israel’s negative reactions to these “sacrifices” carried out inside the State of Israel indicate the cruelty and the treachery of Israel in the eyes of the Islamic zealots and prove that one cannot carry out negotiations with the Zionistic enemy. In this pamphlet, which is translated below, this ideology is explained clearly, in detail.

***In the name of God the merciful*¹²**

2 Our responsibility as Muslims to reprimand those who err

Oy to our family. Oy to those we love. Oy to the nation suffering and fighting a holy war. Oy to those who have brains and a conscience. Oy to the Muslims of the world. Did you know or did you not know? Will you hear or was it not heard? Will you look and we will not look? Are you as

confused as we are? Will you believe all that you are told and not pass it on? Because [we hope] that what they tell about the [horrible] suspicion will not come true; [and we hope] that the heavy nightmare and the troubles [that are expected to happen to us] are [only] bothersome dreams and far away from justice and truth! What can we tell you, oy, our dear family and how can we explain to you the grief that fills our hearts? How can we explain to you the sadness and the worries that crush our nerves and [our] fear for our beloved Palestine, which is one of the most beautiful of Muslim countries? [Our] fear for you [the sons] of our good-hearted family, the heroes, the pure, in the face of the terrible disaster that befell us. And we see all the corners of the world and those within who are cruel, collaborating on this crime. And what adds to our wonder and our dismay is the collaboration by a portion of the Palestinians whom we were sure of and whom we imagined guarding over the people of Palestine—in this same historical massacre that now justifies those who rose up for freedom. [According to these people,] the capture of [the land] from the Zionist enemy from 1948 will not end. They [these same Palestinians who are collaborating in the negotiations] agree with them [the Zionists] and they are sinning and making a mistake in that they accept this [the lands of 1948] as an existing fact and one must understand that a change in the international balance [towards the Palestinians] is to demand of them [the same Palestinians] that they will give away this land as a present to the sons of Zion without any compensation.¹³

Who is the respected Palestinian who can accept and justify the concession of a portion of the blessed land? Who can justify a Palestinian delegation recognized as a representative of the nation that is headed by a communist¹⁴ and among the names of the delegation members there is a Christian woman¹⁵ and among the remnants of the enemy not only are there Marxists [communists] and secularists but a portion of the members of the delegation are from the criminal Jordanian regime. All of these dare to sell Palestine in the name of nationalism. Who can justify the sacrifice from so many people who love Palestine such as we know took place during the *intifada*? Who can justify the condemnation of the *intifada* by Palestinians who argue that they represent the nation? Who can justify the rule and the self-rule which will be according to the blueprint of the criminal Zionist command which holds a grudge and this is the solution of a good part of the way [of the uprising]. Is this the final result of our nation's *jihad* after all these years that have passed? We must protect ourselves from this craziness and this collapse and this withdrawal and raise up our voices on this [disaster] until this is heard by all of the people, until they [the Palestinians in the peace talk delegation] remove their fingers from their ears [and prevent themselves] from walking into the void.

Oy, my beloved family, [we turn to you] from the deepness of our injury. [We turn to those] who belong to justice and who have clear sight and who, from love and dedication to Islam and to Palestine and its

people *al-Murabat*¹⁶ comes this declaration. We will understand the truth about it that we will declare, that a day will come and the reason for this [Zionistic] harassment will be expelled from the beginning, until the good ones from our family finish with a happy party, until the time comes close for the establishment of a future state. We will understand that we cannot carry the family members who negotiate and advance forward [in the discussions with Israel] without warning them of the danger that intends to destroy everything beautiful in our lives. We will explain that these people suffered greatly due to their holy Muslim problem and look impatiently to achieve results [the negotiations] and they are worried by our words, and we say that despite the fact that the journey is long and that [there is still] a good part of the way [to go] that has not been already achieved. Because our enemy will not grant us our rights on a gold platter. Because it [the enemy] knows that if we receive our rights, the meaning is [from their point of view] that this will be the end of its presence. We know that this cry will shock the notables and the collaborators in the negotiations and they must consider our damaged voices in the harmonic symphony and lying explanations; perhaps [they] will try to strangle this cry because it will [disturb] them from creating an atmosphere that is appropriate, that will accept this contaminated peace plan.

However, all of these things will not prevent us from speaking the truth in a loud and thunderous voice, without stuttering, and to publicize the truth from these external circumstances. One must ascribe importance to [this action] as a *shari'a* responsibility to prove and to bring proof of the perseverance of all the sons of our nation until [they reach] those [who] participate in the negotiations [with Israel].¹⁷ Because it does not matter what happens to the Palestinian problem. In this Europe [in this conference in Madrid] it will be considered a great crime in every understandable way and silence about this will be considered treason. Whatever is told [about this same committee] will be considered a great heresy and there is no escaping from the fact that we will not act to clarify it and our tradition for which there is no limit to our love and it is in our blood and in our souls. With the intention of acting to fulfill the will of God and to make Him happy in all things while protecting Palestine and Islam, we will happily [sacrifice] our blood and our souls, as did the Messenger [the Prophet Muhammad], a blessing of God upon Him and on His blessings, say: "Every one of you men who sees the heresy and does not change or eliminate it and does not spread [the word of God] in his words and this is [the word of God] does not light his heart, he weakens the faith."¹⁸ Therefore, we must spread and publicize the words of justice and reveal the truth about the criminal enemy.

We explain these truths which are supported by evidence, as a result [of having brought this] evidence until we explain the reasons [for our views], until those who are surprised and tired wake up from [this] illusion. We will declare the truth until we save [the situation]. It cannot be that we

will save those with brains and consciences who are being deceived and who are involved in the negotiations or who support them without knowing the truth and without their acting [accordingly]. We cannot wholeheartedly use the strong words of courage, the sounds and the thundering until everyone hears them and they are understood by all. We did not choose this style [which is] harsh and not pleasant [to hear] but Islam demands this from us and because we love the respected sons of our nation, it is our duty to do this. [How] can we leave the relationship towards this weapon [and how can] we leave the publicity of this weapon, the weapon of words that thunder and penetrate. And we do not use [anything] besides this weapon because the blood of our nation is depending on it and it is very dear to us and we swear that these words will influence the intelligence of the believers and their hearts. We know that a part of those who participate in the negotiations understand that we are not saying [that it is] all right. We will not stop publicizing the truth until our ears accept the reasons and we empty and throw away our anger and our hate which weigh us down on the leaders of the sons of Zion who stand behind the *fitnah*,¹⁹ which is misleading and crumbling the unity of our nation and fully slaughters the [Palestinian] revolution and the *intifada* with all our bones.²⁰

3 *The Jewish character*

Why should it surprise [that this is how it happens] because the sons of Zion are the descendents of the apes and the pigs²¹ who kindled the flames of the *fitnah* [civil war], and why should it surprise that they [the Zionists] distribute their drugs²² and are busy with their humiliating tricks and their intrigues and their conspiracies in order to smash anyone who puts an obstacle [in the way of their carrying out] their great aspirations²³ and all of us know their black history and their philosophy and their despised deviousness. We understand that the Jews feel that the pride of the Palestinians, at least of a portion of them, has lessened, or that the [Zionists] murderer [from our nation] and advertise [their advanced] weapons in the faces of the same part [of the Palestinians]. They [the Zionists] think that [our] pride has run out when it only purifies the Palestinian blood [as a result of their actions], until the criminal agents, who operate with their lives and serve [the Zionists], join.²⁴ We understand them very well and we understand what motivates them [the collaborators] and what is [the greatness of] a part of cruelty in the Zionist brain that is infected with historical hate. Here we say these things in order to give security to our nation that we will not be [in any way] a tool for destruction and evil without our giving [this] good and positive explanation. We will say to this criminal enemy, their death is in your anger, we recognize their nature and their wisdom and they will not succeed in scaring us by their large robbery and impurity.

4 An agreement with the Jews means surrender

Now, after this preface and after this introduction, we will get into the topic more deeply and that is the negotiations and the continuation of colonialism,²⁵ which is included in it, and we will present a series of questions that stems from a survey of this [topic].

What does the negotiating Palestinian delegation hope to realize [there] through the negotiations? Is it possible that the Zionists will accept the demands of the Palestinian delegation? What has the negotiating delegation achieved from the beginning of the negotiations until now? Do the members of the negotiating Palestinian delegation believe that the United States of America and Europe, despite the fact that the Soviet bloc is also there, can be fair regimes [towards the Palestinians]? Do the members of the negotiating Palestinian delegation believe that the Arab regimes participating in the negotiation talks are zealots for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state [or do they hope that this state will not] really be independent but one which is dependent on the West? What are the goals of the Zionist entity [which hides] behind its participation in the negotiations? After we deal with these questions and others, we will raise another group of questions and problems that need to be presented to the members of the delegation [in order to] find reasons for their treasonous steps and their shame.

We are enraged by these [theoretical] questions of why should we not try negotiations as we will not lose anything that has been achieved as it [the negotiations] is only ink on paper.²⁶ [In retrospect,] what is the alternative to the negotiations that perhaps will achieve nothing and we [the members of the delegation] must and are committed to participating in them due to personal and current reasons that force us into doing this.

What is the religious [*shari'a*] point of view on the question of the negotiations and the signing of a peace treaty with the Jews? [This point of view] raises many questions. In order to remove the doubts and the wondering²⁷ from the ears of our nation's brothers, we must discuss all of the questions that were previously presented and we will bring our opinion. We will judge the stance of the Palestinian delegation that takes part in these negotiations and also [ask] if this delegation has one united, consistent standpoint [regarding the results of the negotiations]. We [must] raise all of the questions that can possibly be raised in our minds [which will examine] all that is loyal and important in our eyes, until we reveal the truth with all of its intensity, until we fulfill our jobs [to present our stance] with all our strength. After this, we are sure that our nation will say its piece and will surprise everyone as it surprised at the beginning of the *intifada*.²⁸ Before we begin with a discussion on the questions that were raised above, we have no choice but to publicize that the negotiating Palestinian delegation works under the sponsorship of the PLO command, without any disagreement between its members because the

delegation only carries out the instructions and the directions of [the PLO command]. That is why the PLO carries the responsibility for every position that is presented by this delegation, because this delegation would not dare to change the directions of [the PLO command] or disagree with it.

Likewise, we have no alternative other than to publicize the nature and the makeup of the negotiating Palestinian delegation which absolutely executes its job with the blessing of the United States of America and the Zionist entity and agrees with them. Because the head of this delegation is considered to be an ex-communist, [and] likewise the spokesperson for this delegation is a Christian women who is considered one of the enemies, together with the other enemies who are [the Christians and the Jews], people of injustice. They [the members of the delegation] do not have an historic view of the ancient struggle [between Islam and Judaism]. Therefore, we can only assemble them and tell a portion of them to test [thoroughly] all round themselves [and listen] to the dozens of questions [that we are asking] and to the dozens of questions. Therefore, that is why we need to love to write this criticism [about the delegation] on which hangs the definition of [the makeup] of the members of the negotiating Palestinian delegation because [this criticism] is the truth and this criticism is supported by clear evidence [and this same evidence] is that which compels the policies and the conditions and which defines the names of the members of the negotiating delegation and the division of the roles inside it. [Steps] that were aimed at bringing about the presentation of a clear position on the part of the PLO command force the conditions and the positions of [this] problem that are more appropriate to other problems. And they [the Jews] are convinced that on the side of the receiver—the Palestinian delegation—there is no leadership, only surrender and agreement.

And before we focus on the topic of the negotiations, not only does it basically accept the Zionist entity as [a side] in the negotiations and this stems from the strategic and dangerous capitulation plan as carried out by the PLO command until it succeeds in satisfying the will of the great Satan—America—and the Zionist entity, and we mention these capitulations. [We mention] the Cairo Declaration, where the head of the PLO condemns the terror and the injuring of Zionist civilians and stops the implementation of the armed struggle inside occupied Palestine [which has been taking place] from 1948 [in order to] free the occupied Motherland.²⁹ Truly, these declarations were carried out and approved in Geneva³⁰ at the beginning of the *intifada* and indeed this military command completed its surrender with the fictitious declaration of independence in the “Tsnobar” [Pine] Palace in Algeria on November 10, 1988. [This declaration] completes the legal recognition of the presence of the Zionist entity on two thirds of the land of Palestine as defined in the partition agreement whose number is 181.³¹ The only agreements that

are found between the Cairo Declaration and the fictitious declaration of independence are those declarations in which there are a large number of surrenders whose content does not include the policies of the Palestinian National Covenant. We say that except for these surrenders, which were freely given [the Cairo Declaration and the declaration of independence,] which preceded the negotiations or the first round of them, [the goal] of the negotiations is to acquire self-rule [autonomy] according to the Zionist conditions which are not of equal value in the agreement being developed. Despite the fact that we see that in the end, despite the loathsomeness in this [proposed] agreement, it is still better [than what exists] in many ways.

And now, we let the Palestinian delegation to the negotiations begin answering the first question, which was previously presented:

What do the members of the Palestinian delegation who are participating in the negotiations want to achieve and what are they carrying in their sacks and have they set red lines for themselves, strong red lines that they will not budge from? What is the damaging paperwork that is in the hands of this delegation which will be used by them throughout the whole period of the negotiations? Are the subjective and objective conditions worthy of the Palestinian nation and the Palestinian delegation?

We, throughout all the critique, did not rush to [participate] in the rounds of negotiations to reach results or satisfaction, since the Palestinian delegation does not hold standpoints or stable positions [and it has no] minimum ceiling. We are also afraid that the Palestinian delegation is changing its position towards colonialism and consults on its problems and positions [in the negotiations] after every round of talks. In this way the delegation withdraws [from its positions] because it [the delegation] of course does not understand or control the dangerous documents that may be used as long as the negotiations continue, and yet, it is possible that they will force the raw ideas in them [in the same documents] onto the other side [the Palestinian]. The Palestinian delegation also understands from all of the sides participating in the negotiations what is expected of them regarding their positions, [that they should be] supportive of the opinions of the Zionist representatives without a difference if these sides [that are participating in the talks] are Arab or Western. The Palestinian delegation also understands that it does not have any real choice before it but to accept what is presented to it by the Zionist entity [as a solution] or to withdraw from the negotiation talks. That is why we understand that the question is whether or not to agree or to withdraw from the negotiations [with Israel]. Withdrawal is not acceptable to the [members] of the Palestinian delegation because it is not important to any other side and, perhaps, would even make some of the other sides happy as the absence of the Palestinian delegation would not prevent the continuation of the talks between the other sides in the negotiations [and would even] move them forward.³² The Palestinian delegation knows this very well

and thus we are [ready] to help them express this after every new round with the Zionist representatives whose goal it is to lengthen the negotiation talks without giving in on anything [on their part], until the fire of the *intifada*, which is considered a pressuring factor [and is crumbling] the infuriating unity of the Zionists, subsides.³³ Because the Zionist delegation tries to delay [the Palestinian delegation] with the goal of achieving an additional [different] document. Why should there not be a special document [of surrender] in the hands of or owned by the Palestinian delegation? After this clarification that we have discussed, we will ask why we have this craziness and the surrender and these compromises? Until when will this surrender continue [by the Palestinian delegation] and are there any limits?

All that which is not being told about these surrenders returns us to the root of the understandings and the illusions that are advanced by the PLO command and which places its weight on the negotiation talks and thereby changes the character of the dispute with the Zionist enemy.

5 *The PLO is a traitor to the Palestinian nation*

In the recent past, [the members of the PLO] were sure that their dispute with the Zionist enemy was a cultural dispute³⁴ (an existential dispute and not a border dispute) but today, we see them agreeing to this death shroud described [by them] and it includes inside it a solution of surrender in the way of rule and self-rule on parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including the presence of dozens of settlements that rest on the tops of the mountains and also an enormous number of military camps and thousands of acres of the lands that will be considered military areas that one is not allowed to get near.³⁵ As [this] is presented by the Palestinian delegation in a respectful way and showing that it has agreed, there will be a regime and self-rule without having [any] tie to the topic of security or to that of ground water. In addition to this, [it also agrees] that this entity be tied to the traitorous Jordanian regime [collaborators] in the framework of a united confederation [unity] that will perhaps even include the participation of the Zionist entity in this impure unification. Is this what our nation expected, the nation that wrote down its heroic wars and spilled the dear blood of our sons in the streams of the battles [with Israel]? Why should we reduce our understanding of freedom and independence in order to reach such a low? Can those who knew that the dispute with the enemy was a cultural dispute and that [the enemy] gave them and charts for them a red line and does not allow them to deviate seriously from it and from the same conditions that are found and are included in the same plan that is equal to treason in this culture that we respect [as our culture], because any deviation from this [in order to receive] this reward [of the proposed autonomy] is against the existence of our nation and its beliefs and the hopes of this [Palestinian] nation

belong to the [Arab Islamic] culture that is rooted inside us and testifies in front of us on the history. Did the PLO command and the central stream in stop believing that the struggle with the Zionist enemy is a cultural struggle?!

Is what is happening now a continuation of the harmful negotiation discussions being conducted and testify that the members of the delegation are close [to a solution] or far from one? [Does it testify] that the Palestinian delegation believes in this cultural outlook [that was explained earlier]?! Before we leave this point which we want to make very clear, we [need] to ask, could it be that the delegation (as our respected delegation [of the Palestinian nation] is made up of communists and Christians and secularists and the sinners from the criminal Jordanian regime, and we will not stop and we will say even more than that)—could it be that the delegation in these discussions [due to its problematical makeup] has a united stand in the understanding of the cultural conflict [of the Arab-Muslim culture *vis-à-vis* the Jewish Western culture]?! Is this the culture [of the enemy] that we agree upon or work for, as this delegation, which sins with the blessing of the great Satan and the Zionist entity and those who agree with them [is doing]?! After this clarification and explanation, we are sure that the PLO leadership and with it the negotiating Palestinian delegation did not stop believing [the truth about the enemy's intentions]—because they believed from the beginning—that our conflict with the Zionist enemy is a cultural conflict and they [the PLO command] will not reach this understanding until they place [it] constantly before them on the negotiating table. At that moment, [when the understanding is laid before them] they will strongly hold onto their position. In other words, they will make the Americans and the Zionist entity mad and therefore, in the end, they are continuing [the talks] for an undetermined amount of time. In regard to this, the Palestinian delegation [which is participating in the talks] is considered as suicide [from the point of view of its friends] because this delegation is not sorry that it is participating in a lost war and there is direct evidence of this [which is expressed] in its presence during the rounds of the negotiations [while] accepting the dictates of the Zionists and the Americans.

6 *A political analysis of the Israeli parties*

Can it be that the Palestinian delegation or the Zionist delegation slept or will concede, during the negotiations on any of their permanent political or historical standpoints? Where do they expect to get with this concession? We are sure that all of the important Zionistic parties that have influence on the political decisions [in the State of Israel] believe in [their] ideology on the historic land of Israel and believe in the right of the Jews to settle on the mountain or in the valley [of the historical land of Israel],

especially in this area of al-Aqsa mosque. There cannot be even one personality or party that will accept or will think about giving up or abandoning even a tiny part of the historical land of Israel and whoever does that will be seen as [carrying out] treason to Zionism—which hopes that all the historical land of Israel will be under its power and [Zionistic] arms—[and giving away a tiny piece of the land of Israel is considered] a great crime and great treason. We cannot think of a [political] personality or a [Zionist] party that thinks differently. A number of those who imagine that there are some sort of deep differences of opinion [in Israel] between the Likud Party and the Labor Party around the Palestinian question and these [differences of opinion] feed and intensify this illusion in the eyes of respected Palestinian personalities who do not stop to distract [themselves] with a false illusion of an impure peace which, in the end, they are inclined to distort, and this stems from this ambiguousness that feeds this illusion. There is no escaping this conclusion and we are sure that the differences of opinion between the Likud Party and the Labor Party are hidden in the nature of the ties and the [way of] dealing with the Palestinian residents who are found within the land of Israel [in other words the Israeli Arabs].

It appears that the Likud Party is preferred [in the eyes of the Jewish residents of the state] and has within it [a majority] of the residents of the State of Israel, and it crushes all those who try [other] security solutions in order to achieve peace for the Zionist citizens. However, the Labor Party does not support this solution [of the Likud movement]. Perhaps due to the flow of the revolution and the uprising,³⁶ But, even in its eyes, [a solution different from Likud's] is impossible because of its preparedness to maintain Zionist security inside the entity's borders or outside them, despite the fact that the Labor Party sees the position of the Likud Party as impossible to achieve as they [the position of Likud] ruin the atmosphere that will lead to the signing of a peace agreement with the regimes of the infidels and traitors.³⁷ The Labor Party is building on the fact that there is no other choice than to grant the Palestinian residents self-rule and self-government [autonomy] on part of the historic land of Israel [and this] in a temporary way, and that it will be possible to guarantee the security of the [Zionist] entity and the Zionist residents. Thus, [through a so-called solution to the Palestinian problem] it will enable the State of Israel [to come out] of its isolation among the surrounding countries and it will be able to open up the gates of the Arab and Muslim Motherland to the avarice of the Zionists.

Likewise, [all of the members] of the two parties [Likud and Labor] believe in the historical [and whole] land of Israel—without any difference between the two parties—it cannot be [that] in the negotiations [they] will place the [topic] of the land [on the negotiating table] and [they] will agree to discuss and examine this area [of dividing the area] in the negotiations but [they] only [want] to conduct the negotiations on

the problems of the Palestinian residents who are found inside the fictional Land of Israel [*al-mazuma*]. All [of the members] of the two parties use methods and security facts in order to [justify] the activities of the Zionist entity and devote themselves with fervor [so that] in no way will these things, which are particularly worrying to the rest of the Zionist parties, happen. Because the two parties are not ready to accept a Palestinian state on even one inch of the land of Israel. It does not matter under what condition [this state arises]. Now, after we have explained the truth [behind] the Zionist stance on the Palestinian question, is there somebody who will sign or agree with the Zionist entity to grant the Palestinians rule and self-rule? Can this suggestion be the seed of an independent Palestinian state? We see that even from the beginning of this [the Madrid Conference] and after the [celebratory] declarations [that opened the conference] and in light of the results of the rounds [of talks], nothing has been achieved. These talks have [only] caused losses and have not achieved anything [positive] that shines on the horizon [for the benefit of the Palestinians].

7 *What is the aim of the Zionists in an agreement?*

What does the Zionist entity wish to achieve by participating in the negotiations with the Palestinians?

The Zionist entity has many demands and ambitions and much covetousness and this entity yearns to draw up and sign a peace treaty with all of the Arab countries which will aid it in spreading [in every direction] and in promising security to its residents [and if] the doors of the Muslim Arab Motherland will be open to it. [In that way, it can realize] its covetousness and its Satanic plans and this is the real [Zionistic] plan, and if it is possible for them to achieve these rights [as described above] without giving the Palestinians any of their rights. We will in no way stop or hesitate to say this. The Zionist entity understands clearly that the situation and international conditions and the Arab and Palestinian situation will not permit and will not allow the Palestinians any [possibility] of influence or security or accepting a situation like this [where the Palestinians do not receive their rights].

An agreement like this [that is offered in the talks] will give the Zionist entity the legal right, according to international law, on [the very fact] of its existence on the land of Palestine and will promise the Zionist entity [a continuation of its existence] due to the lack of the possibility to establish a Palestinian state that will exist as an enemy to it [the Zionist entity]. Because how can a Palestinian entity grow under the sponsorship of a hostile peace like this [object to the Zionist entity]. Even if this continues, [the same situation of an imagined peace,] in no shape or form will it be better than any [other] state of those participating in this [peace] agreement [such as Jordan and Egypt]. In addition to this, Palestine does not

have sources of revenue (quarries such as those in the oil nations of the Gulf) that will be earmarked for it to be a rich nation by itself. In addition to this, [in the plan as it is suggested] there will be [in the suggested state of Palestine] a lack of access to the sea and [a lack of] independent airspace to tie it to the outside world and to aid it in specializing and in foreign trade as it would like. Thus, a Palestinian entity will grow [dependent] by the agreement with the Zionist entity and with the Arab collaborating regimes and the West. In no way can one trust the Zionist enemy and in no way can one think that they [the Palestinians who are taking part in the negotiations with the Zionists] will succeed in receiving and carrying out the rest [of the goal] of the struggle [which is] the freedom of Palestine.

What did the members of the negotiating Palestinian delegation and the PLO command achieve from the beginning of the talks until now?? We cannot think of even one thing that the Palestinian delegation achieved or succeeded in from the beginning of the talks until now. However, even more than that, everything [that can be] told [until now] is exactly the opposite. Because, when the Palestinian delegation came to the negotiating table with plans in its bag, it imagined and expected a Palestinian state as part of the solution. It [the Palestinian delegation] was surprised by the Zionist wisdom and by the Zionist logic and its meaning. It [the Palestinian delegation] began to reduce and reduce [its demands] until it agreed to the plan of government and self-administration [which would exist] concurrently among the dozens of settlements on the tops of mountains that crown the Palestinian cities and the villages until they choke them. In addition to this, the topic of Jerusalem was totally removed from the negotiations, as if Jerusalem were not considered part of the land of Palestine, despite [the fact] that there is no holier place than it [Jerusalem] in the entire world. Despite this collapse [in the] capitulation and treasonous [talks], the Palestinian delegation did not stop rejecting, and justifiably so, the attempt to set the character of the regime and the weakened rule [suggested in the talks by Israel]. That is until there is [this autonomy] that is lacking any authority [that should be] included in this government and in a real administration. This [autonomy] is seen as empty of all [ruling] authority as all of the authority [is found] under the supervision of the Zionists [who control] the land, the people, the water and the foreign relations. This [the self-rule promised in the talks] cannot be considered in any way [a solution] to the process that is leading our people to freedom and independence. [A solution] that returns our legal rights to us which [can be] represented only by a total freeing of the lands of Palestine and the total elimination of the cancerous growth whose name is Israel. If there is a thing [self-rule] like this [that is suggested] towards which the delegation of defeat and shame is pushed, they [the members of the delegation] will continue to be present at the rounds of the negotiations and, as we have learned, we will not

accept or achieve [any] rights [as a result of this] that are fitting to mark for this nation [the Palestinians] but, as we have learned, [just] the opposite. Any addition and continuation of the talks will lead to new capitulations in every round of the negotiations [with Israel].³⁸

What is [this] that the Palestinian delegations see and how are they surprised at what is [supposed] to take place around them?! And what is this [thing] that has not stopped hiding behind a portion of the dangerous documents that [are supposed] to surprise the Zionist entity and the great Satan? Is the whole world forcing the Zionist entity to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river? Is the delegation of shame competing with the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes³⁹ which will put pressure on the Zionist entity and on the great Satan [America] with the intent that they will agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state? Are they [the members of the Palestinian delegation] gambling on the conscience of the West and the great Satan, who are those responsible for the tragic reality of our patient people?? Does the delegation of shame and defeat hope that the great Satan will pressure the Zionist entity into withdrawing from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and will allow them to establish a Palestinian state in a real manner?? Is the PLO command and the defeatist delegation sure that the great Satan can be a government that judges justly and tells the truth and puts aside all of the differences of opinion that exist between the sides negotiating? Where is the logic and from where is this thought? How did this thing happen to the same people who are well-known as men of [knowledge] in history and in politics? One last thing, what is it that is pushing and encouraging the Palestinian delegation to continue the negotiation talks after they have understood the truth [about the Zionists] and they know the range [of activities] of the administrative authority that approve for them [the Zionists] in order to activate them [these authorizations] through [the delegation]?

Is there anything as depressing and which causes pain and seriously hurts our Palestine in its justice and its respect [and we] will not stop [thinking] and fixing our thoughts on the West and the great Satan or we will believe in the fairness [of the West and the United States]. Is there anything more embarrassing than this [that hurts] in a serious manner our Palestine and our respect. [Are we] able to believe in the innocence of the collaborating Arab regimes? Why did the delegation of defeat and surrender participate in this contaminated plot whose purpose is to rule against Muslim Palestine and to erode our Muslim nation's *jihad*? How will we accept the poison of the Palestinian delegation that sits around the table together with the killers of our babies and our mothers?! How can we believe this delegation and who respects it [in this period] of the end of *Ayhul* [September]? [How] can we believe all of this cruelty that spreads inside the Muslim Arab homeland?! How can we believe this delegation [at a time] when the great Satan absorbs the blood of the weak

nations? How can we tell this? What does the negotiating delegation hope for and look forward to with those who are participating in this stupid attempt and in this defeat that pushes our nation to pay a high price and turns the wheels of *jihad* dozens of years backwards?!

8 *The PLO is wrong and is being led astray by the West*

True, our Palestinian and Muslim nation is missing much [knowledge] of the reasons [that explain] the craziness of the PLO command [and its behavior] in the political maze and the foolishness and the stupid tactics and the childish gambling on its part that are leading it [the PLO command to destruction]. [This military command] does not lead or advance this institution [to any place] and it acts without faith and without moral inhibitions and without values and without any minimal feeling for the tragedy [that has overtaken] this nation and without [feelings] for the respect of this nation [the Palestinians]. This failed institution reveals its helplessness and it is it that which is known as the representative of the [Palestinian] nation. One must make it clear to this institution that the blood of the Muslims and their historic land are not up for a test [and there is no place] for the same surprising suspect developments [that are caused as a result of the negotiations with Israel].

There is no doubt that the official Palestinian command does not believe in any ideology or any principle and does not understand the meaning of the cultural struggle [between us and the Jews] and there is no obstacle that is expressed and controls its behavior of veering off the straight and perverted path.⁴⁰

[What is the *raison d'être* for the existence of the PLO] after this institution [the PLO] committed the sin [negotiations with Israel]. This is after the organization was established [in the 1960s] and grew and the fighter division became a part of it.⁴¹ It is true that this institution [the PLO], carried out a [serious] crime from the same moment that it erred and committed a heavy sin and a serious ideological crime and hurt the historic and cultural rights of the [Palestinian] nation. Because the crime of this institution is especially in its central stream [in other words Fatah] and is limited in the other [streams].⁴² In addition to the first sin [of the negotiations with Israel], there are additional sins including the failure to announce that it is on the Islamic side of the war [between us and the Jews] and the failure to adopt Islam as the way of life that could limit the [evil] behavior of this institution, its supporters and its ministers who represent the nation and who are known [by the public] as being corrupt.⁴³ We say that there is an Islamic choice [for the nation] in the war and in its job [of freeing Palestine] and one must review this thought regularly!! Does the PLO and those in charge of it, who breathe into it the breath of life, not know that the Palestinian nation is a Muslim nation that ascribes the [proper] importance and place for Islam? Do they [the

men of the PLO] not believe that the land of Palestine is blessed and holy and cannot be freed except according to the views of the Qur'an?! If this official Palestinian institution had learned this, [it would understand] that one cannot achieve a just and successful revolution without integrating and keeping the ideology of our Muslim Palestinian nation!!! If this command, this defeatist institution [the PLO], had learned that there is no real independence without holding onto the vision of a nation⁴⁴ and protecting the culture and its nationalism!!

The one who is sure that the goal of the real revolution is the improvement of circumstances and the economic situation of the nation which are a result of the difficulties of the hated occupation, is wrong. Whoever is sure that the goal of the revolution is exchanging the government with a different government until there is a new government [like the one that was suggested in talks with Israel] that is far from the vision of the nation and its desires, is wrong. After the PLO and its commanders and its friends have committed a heavy sin in this area [of understanding the goals of the Palestinian Islamic revolution] and will not leave the blood of our Palestinian nation [which is] for the most part Muslim and will not allow this leadership to betray the Islamic identity for even one virtue [of the virtues of our nation]. Because [the PLO argues] that the democracy, which it emphasizes, is included in it and is soon coming and it becomes clear that [the PLO] decides according to the minority [among the people] and acts as an absolute majority. We all know that the Christians in our land do not behave honestly and they are a despised small minority among our Palestinian nation.⁴⁵ All of the mistakes that this institution [the PLO] and its perverted and scared command [make] stem from the fact that [this command] does not adopt the [Islamic] ideology of the nation. Yes, there is confusion [inside the PLO] which leads to political ideas [of making peace with Israel] and to agreeing [to the talks]. Likewise, there exists within the organization a great lack of order which changes the appearance of the organization and reveals the secrets of the organization from the beginning. As a result of this [confusion], this PLO command changes its principles in an unplanned manner and according to its mood. It defends the high price [that is demanded from it in the talks]. This stems as a result of the [deep] confusion in which it is found. [Its agreement] to pay this [high] price [to Israel] stems from the defeats and the strong blows that it received from the enemy [but] those loyal [to their nation] and their allies do not change the [way] of their choosing in any way. After the PLO command, especially the stream that cooperated with and controls its institutions, developed, the slogans [which are] a mistake and stupid, the [PLO] does not have any credit [mandate] in the current reality and one should relate to and hope that the organization's [the PLO's] Islamic clothing will be unnecessary and will allow for the transition [to the negotiations with Israel].⁴⁶ It is true that there were efforts such as these slogans [PLO

slogans], which had many deficiencies such as learning the use of an armed struggle or that it is necessary to implement all of the many basic activities that are needed to solve the difficult problems [without giving details on how they will implement these activities in the name of unity of the Palestinian goal].⁴⁷

By emphasizing these slogans which were raised by the PLO leadership, these slogans also won [the support of] world public opinion [which recognized the PLO]. Those who watched over the official Palestinian command, which held onto these stupid slogans, caused the loss of respect for themselves and their credibility in the land of reality. With this, the [PLO leadership] opened the [world] space before the criminal enemy in order to act [in a different way] that does not use oppression and recklessness. It [the enemy] believes and acts in every way to contradict the real [arguments] of the official Palestinian command which maintains its general and world stance [which it attained as the representative of the Palestinian nation]. This stance is more important to it than guarding over the freeing of Palestine because the faith [of the PLO leadership] in the presentable stupid slogans [of theirs] emphasizes, strengthens and explains the stupidity connected to a lack of sophistication and superficiality [which exist in these slogans]. Is it world public opinion that protects it [on this faith of the PLO command]? Is it the attitude of the Western nations that sucks the blood of the mainly subjugated nations? This is the attitude of the spoiled Western residents who do not understand anything straight [and decent] in their lives except for sex and drugs!! And one must take into account all the words of the wise men and their explanations [regarding the Western world], because the Western governments do not truly understand the logic and [their] benefits and everything that goes against their logic [of the Western states] cannot be that they will support it or that they will look at it in a positive manner.⁴⁸

The winning of the necessary world public opinion cannot be truly justified, only if we become humiliated slaves of the evil West and, if we have acted like this, we will not flee and we will not, in any way, win the approval of this boastful West. We will not forget what the hands of the criminal West can cover up, the Muslim blood that was widely [spilled] throughout the whole Muslim Motherland during World War I and afterwards. We will never forget the crimes of France in Algeria. We will never forget the crimes of Italy in Libya, and we will never forget the crimes of Britain in Palestine and Iraq. Because the West has not stopped its crimes as [we see] exist [today] and is unable to spread out without sharing this atrophied leadership [the PLO and all of the pro-Western Arab countries]. This is a West that watches over the PLO command in order to win the desired [public] opinion [and the PLO command] is competing for their friendship and their satisfaction [of the West]. Will we not understand how these ideas came [for negotiations with Israel] to this

leadership [the PLO] and led us to this low level? Did those who are in this command forget that it is the West that overthrew the state of the Ottoman caliphs⁴⁹ and tore the body [of the Ottoman caliphs] into little countries that are subordinate to and humiliated by the ministers of the Zionist entity [which is found] inside our heart of hearts, in the apple of our eye, Palestine?

After we have explained these facts, it really does arouse wonderment and it is odd that a number [of members] of the official Palestinian leadership have not, up until now, stopped waving these slogans and [continue] to lean on [the West] as a backrest that cannot be trusted [the promises of these countries] and do not understand that world public opinion cannot be the truth [a safe backrest] even if they bend their knees to the steps of the criminal West as this [world public] opinion [is] a wild criminal animal, lacking a conscience and feelings for the fate of the weak. Because world public opinion, which America, its allies and its agents⁵⁰ create, does not respect the weak and does not believe in logic and justice.

9 What is the true way that must be adhered to?

Now, and after we have approved the truth regarding the inequality of colonialism [during the talks], the negotiations that are taking place with the addition of the compromises on our rights, we need to ask: How will the delegation of shame and surrender understand and accept this truth? How will the [Palestinian delegation] accept the firm decision for immediate withdrawal from the criminal negotiations?

There is in this the fact that the struggle [still] continues and that the sacrifice [of our nation] is truly great and there is no chance of winning this aspect until we understand and explain [the motives] of colonialism in the revolution and the additional demand for sacrifice. Because this is a foreign rationale and the people who are suggesting things like this [compromise with Israel] do not understand the logic and the basic idea [of the conflict with Israel] and do not understand the meaning of splendor and respect.⁵¹ They do not believe in religion or any [other] human respected idea.

Everyone knows that every nation has an ideological organization [like the PLO] which is responsible and does not give itself concessions and is unwilling to give up on any [of its values] or to hurt them due to foreign reasons, even if the cost is blood of the sons [of the nation]. For what are people worth if they do not have any principles and what are they worth without ideology? Will people, our people, continue, [to carry this] while they are losing these meanings and these valuable principles? How can there be an ideology like this and an idea like this as Islam teaches us that life is valueless [without faith] and that surrender to the enemy is the greatest crime and that the *shahada*⁵² is like a dear medal for the hearts

of all the believers. All that is despised is for God and all sacrifice [by the believers] before their reward is paid [to them] and in return [they will be granted] benevolence by the satisfaction of the marvelous and exalted God.⁵³ Because the communication with God and following in his ways fills us with peace⁵⁴ and we put our trust in that the suffering we are enduring [is] for the protection of the ideas that are holy to us, and is it possible to hide [things] such as these [clear] agreements on the logic of those who participate in these evil negotiations or those who lead us [the members of the delegation] and support them?!

Is it not possible that the official Palestinian leadership speaks about the struggle and calls for a revolution during [a long period of] a quarter of a century for a revolution for which there is no security that it will be realized under the present conditions. Did they have a plan during that same period? Did this leadership forget it [and if so], it should not have had to throw it out [the plan] because independence and defense of an ideology and of [Muslim Palestinian] culture [are] despite the [burden] and the great sacrifice and the bitter conflict which is quoted a lot [throughout] history. Palestine, the way it fell [and deteriorated], under the sharp fingernails of the Crusaders and did not even come close to 100 years [until] the Muslims weakened the [kingdom of the Crusaders] during that same period until it was freed but in no way did they recognize the rights of the Crusaders to be present in it [Palestine] and in no way did they leave the choice of *jihad* and in no way did they abandon their weapons. [That is what must be done today] until our evil enemy which is in no way supported and led by any right and truth or false Biblical evidence around the imagined historic rights to Palestine.⁵⁵ Because this evil enemy continues to stick to these imaginary stories and copy them [in writings], generation after generation, in order to ascribe importance to it [the problem of Palestine] and turn it [Palestine] into a holy problem, [and we] cannot forget or allow this situation [in Palestine] and any time that it [Palestine] is found under these circumstances. The Zionists continue to hold onto this imaginary right which no one agrees with, but [only] they have this unique quality that is approved by their phony Torah and with their collection of false historical tales.⁵⁶ As this evil enemy is in no way ready to give up on the lying claims and the foolish words that have continued for thousands of years. Why does the despair and disappointment seep into the hearts of those who preach defeat and surrender instead of [searching for] reasons to protect our nation and the rights of our blood? How will we be infected with it [the despair of defeat] and how did they, who protected our nation and stood up for our rights, turn into those who sell their land and recognize the legitimacy of the presence of the Zionist entity on the holy land? Where are the rights and where is the freedom [when] the control of the Zionist enemy continues on the land of Palestine.

10 There is no acceptable excuse to justify negotiations with the Zionists

It is true that the spokesperson will ask, why all this hullabaloo around the participation of the Palestinian delegation in the negotiation talks? And the spokesperson will also add, what could happen if we try the negotiation talks and we participate in this experiment until the end? And what will happen to us if we also recognize the decision of the Security Council or we sign a peace agreement with the Zionist enemy in the hope that it will achieve something that can ease the suffering of our people a little; if they are totally unsuccessful in writing [an agreement] in the negotiation talks and also if we fail [anyway] to fulfill everything [our goals in Palestine]? *We will not lose anything because we will not give them [the Zionists] in honesty [and we will only give them] "a signature of ink on paper."* ⁵⁷

Yes, this opinion and this presentation of [the above] is strange, hard to understand, foolish and suspicious. Is it possible that something [good] will come out of these arguments like those that were explained [when the agreement with the Zionists was signed] and as a result people will live during a period of American and Zionist blessing which will come into the world? Could it be that there will be something [good] such as the nonsense from the people who lived through the Kuwait crisis [and saw] how the West drafted its armies and forced Iraq to withdraw to its planned borders due to a "[signature of] ink on paper." There was no way that [they, the Americans] were satisfied with that, but they invested great effort in order to erase Iraq and to draw a line through its plan to make a new border and a new state policy due to "ink on paper" without anyone objecting. Because the whole power of the world's boastfulness is a partner to the plot against Islam and Muslims. Here we are amazed and we criticize [the fact] that "smart" people came to Palestine who do not doubt that America brings blessings to the world [and controls] all of the international institutions and implements its aspirations without [any] limitations in the political and economic world, war and peace, history and geography.

How can we argue about and regret [afterwards] what we knew and what we wrote after we signed "ink on paper" and learned that we are weak. We cannot accept this or carry the responsibility in the procedures such as those [that we will agree upon in the negotiations] and afterwards retract the agreement that we agreed to [in an agreement with the Zionists] on one hand. In no way will we be able to change anything that we have signed after we have participated [in reaching] the decision [to sign and accept the conditions of the agreement] by choice. Afterwards, will we not need to pay off [what was written] in the words of the agreement that we will sign with the Zionist enemy? Will people with imagination think that one day they will be in a position that will allow them to limit America and its allies? Because these are words of foolishness [that there

is no meaning to only “ink on paper” with the Zionists] and cannot be accepted by smart people.

11 *Peace with the Zionists should not be compared to the Treaty of Hudaibiya*

Truly, these questions practically ask themselves. We are not happy to incite [against the talks] due to stupid reasons but we are sorry about the things that are dear to us and to which we are committed. Because we have promised you that we will be reliable and we will explain the topic truthfully and we will fulfill our duty until they [the negotiators] stop putting their fingers in their ears [and they stop] walking towards the abyss⁵⁸ because some of those who wonder about these stupid things [that are against] the Islamic religion, it is their intent to give and spread [their principles] because the counselors of *shari'a* law recognize and are sure that it is not permitted from a religious point of view⁵⁹ to reconcile with the Zionist entity. They [the law counselors] are amazed and astonished by the differences between this peace [with the Zionists] which is against the duty of the Messenger, the prayer of God and His blessings upon him, a day of *al-Hudaibiya*⁶⁰ or [the agreement] that was not carried out in the time of Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi in the Crusader wars.⁶¹ Did these people think about these stupid questions? Did the communist Palestinian delegation head demand what the [Islamic] religious stance was before he came to the table of treason and surrender? Is it not their business that the speaker in the name of the Palestinian delegation is a Christian woman? Is that not a matter for worry [according to the laws of the Muslim religion]?

Will the secular and sick members of the Palestinian delegation respect [the truth] as would the people of Islam? Are they committed [as we are] to ideology, to religious ritual, to the *shari'a* and a way of life? Why do they not mention Islam except in their principles of treachery and surrender? Is this their [the members of the Palestinian delegation] shameful outlook to the Islamic mission and to its role for men of culture? We are amazed how a number of them strengthen [their principles] and compare the peace [with the Zionists] to *al-Hudaibiya* peace, which was signed by the leader of mankind who is infallible,⁶² Muhammad, may God's prayers and blessings be upon him, in what we see as a conspiracy against Islam. We wonder how they [the members of the delegation], make this comparison [of peace with the Zionists] to that agreement [*al-Hudaibiya*] which God blessed in his beloved book [the Qur'an] in a crucial conspiracy that [exists] in the halls [of the cities] Madrid, Washington and the Arab capitals. There [they] discuss the sale of Islamic land which Muhammad, may God's prayers and blessings be upon him, purified and annexed [to Islam], [purified] from the exploitation, the criminals and from the arrogance of the idol worshippers. Here we are on our precious watch, reducing the normal value [of *al-Hudaibiya* peace] and making a

comparison between the peace of *al-Hudaibiya* which a creation of God, [the Prophet Muhammad,] signed and watched over, with what is happening now [the negotiations with the Zionists] which is a conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims.⁶³ We are on a watch of ours that is dear to us and makes a comparison with what the Muslim hero, Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, did in the freeing of Palestine that guides us, which bent the stance of the contaminated Crusaders and those who hold a grudge against Muslims. We refuse and are not ready to make a comparison between what was with this Muslim hero and what is happening [to our sorrow] today with the Christians and atheists, members of the defeatist Palestinian delegation.

We totally reject the use of Islamic and *shari'a* [Muslim] law [in order] to cover up the crimes of those who have failed and who are reconciling [with the Zionist entity] which does not respect Islam, does not believe in it and whose laws are not considered [in their eyes] religious laws. When the Palestinians make up a delegation of Muslims who fear God [it is clear] that it will be this delegation that will demand [the carrying out of] the laws of Islam by fighting [with] the Jews and in no way will we go back and give an explanation on the laws of Islam on the treatment of demands such as these [of the Jews]. Likewise, we do not think that the intelligent and loyal Islamic leadership⁶⁴ is ignorant of the Islamic religion [and all that is related] to [the desired] battle against the Jews, just as we do not think that there should be in it [the Islamic Palestinian delegation] stupidity, fear and activities [that lead] to ideas [such as] appeasement [with] the Jews and they [the Jews] befoul the land of al-Isra'⁶⁵ and spread immorality throughout the land. We are not sure that [there can be] a leadership or company or nation based on Islam that does not yearn for *al-shahada*. We do not think that [a society or nation like this] can think [about a different way] except for *jihad* until a holy death or victory—especially when the central problem of the Muslims is [found] in the sharp fingernails of the nation that is the most foul nation known in history [the Jews]. Now, after we have carried out our job [of explaining] to those with intelligence and a conscience, do they [the members of the Palestinian delegation and all of their supporters] have any explanation left for [continuing to] support the negotiation talks [with the Jews] in which they bargain and compromise and concede the lands of Islam? Here we all are, confident because any sane man or one with a live conscience who does not receive any [personal] benefit from [this negotiation] from behind. [Here we all are, the sane and those with a conscience] as can be said, those satisfied with a little which is rooted in knowledge [understand] that the way of negotiations is the criminal way.⁶⁶ This way [the way of negotiations] is the way of humiliation and surrender. Here we value the reasons for the situation and the difficulty in the process [the winning of the freedom of Palestine]. Despite this, we are not distancing [ourselves] from those who will ask us, and we will convince them of the

uselessness in the negotiations. We are not distancing ourselves [from anyone] in order to publicize to those who are not convinced of the uselessness of these talks but are still asking about the alternative at the same time.⁶⁷

12 *The solution to stop and return to the jihad way*

If the beggar was respected, he would in fact reject the knowledge of the truth. That is what we also say to those who are respected [the members of the Palestinian delegation] that they must urgently, first thing, stop the way of mistakes,⁶⁸ blood and treachery immediately. Even if you support this way [and wish] to walk on this path [stop walking on it] until, if only, the alternative will already be revealed to us and we will delineate [for ourselves] the way of true redemption. Because the lack of finding an alternative that is [currently] hidden from your eyes, does not justify the stubbornness [of the members of the Palestinian delegation] to walk on the path of doom, withdrawal and surrender when there is [another] alternative that is clear and pure. One possible alternative for you is Islam and the continuation of the *jihad* for God who will promise us happiness in this world and in the world to come. We will absolutely go downhill if we listen there to those who ask what the alternative is [to the way of the talks]. They ask this out of their bad intentions for themselves and for the nation and they convince that there is no place to think about this alternative [of Islam] and that they recognize it as good. [The right way] is the [way] of Islam, the *jihad*, the uprising and the revolution against the invaders.

Here we are saying to those who carried [and led] the revolution, the conflict and the armed struggle for [almost] a quarter of a century: you who spread [the revolution] and carried the pain [of the Palestinian nation] and the assets and the resources of the nation, now you reveal that you made a mistake and went on a path of crime?! Should you not be ashamed of yourselves? Should you not be ashamed of the history and you recognize the intruder and you know the nation that is broken from the attack [of the enemy] and from the treason, and you beautify the fateful crime for them [the crime of the negotiation talks with the Zionists] and you will cloth him [with this crime] in nationalistic clothing. That is how they will recognize you [the PLO and its supporters] as guardians of the people?! As the alternative is to continue to stick to Islam and to our legal rights.⁶⁹ It is true that the alternative is linked⁷⁰ to the land of *al-Ribat*⁷¹ and a continuation of the *jihad* and the *intifada*. Because this is the alternative and it is the only way in order, first, to [execute] God's intent and then, second, to fulfill the victory and third, to remove the suffering of our people because our Zionist enemy, the criminal and the cowardly, does not understand anything except for the language of fire and bullets. [Our enemy] will never retreat or concede on even a particle of the land but [only] when he feels the fear that is chasing

him everywhere or when he achieves [only] one result [and does not find a way out] will this [happen] because all of the luck is found on it, the land of Palestine, which cost [us] dozens of dead and wounded. Because the *saber* and the *sumud* [patience and standing strong], bring about completeness to our cultural heritage and increase the [chance] of the hastening of the time for victory. In regard to the surrender, its meaning is the destruction of all the factors for final eternal victory [of the Palestinian nation].

Because the Zionist enemy is a deadly cancerous growth that forces us to do everything in our power in order to encircle it [the Zionist entity] into a narrow place, if we are unable to destroy it. We must do everything that we can in order to remove it from its place from where it can spread inside the body of the Islamic nation because the spread [of the cancerous Zionism] will cause a postponement and crying, road signs of our Islamic plans that will not take place or succeed in our days [in this case]. Here we are full of confidence in the victory of God, here we are full of confidence that world reality can change with the help of God.⁷² There is no way that the control of the great Satan [America] and the Zionist entity will continue forever. [This is] because God's tradition emphasizes this [in our faces] and because God has promised us there in the *Surat al-Isra'*, from the prophets and from our righteous and pure so that we may continue to wave the principles of *jihād* [and remain] *al-murabatun* on the land of al-Isra', until the victory of God arrives. [Then we] will testify on the loss of the state of the children of Israel and its destruction.⁷³ Because it is worthwhile and preferred to continue to try even a thousand times until the hour of promised victory arrives [for us] with the help of God. Because if we humiliate [ourselves] and we sign these agreements with the blessings of international law which solve the [problem] of our nation without *jihād*, is this the future [that we will receive]? For us, it is worthwhile and preferred to wait patiently and to carry the pains of *jihād* and the sacrifice a thousand times instead of being cursed by the generations that follow that we neglected their rights and their land and delayed the [national] awakening vision. We will not forgive those who negotiated [with the Zionists]; we will not forgive those who surrendered and they will not be forgiven by God; they will not be forgiven by history and they will not be forgiven by the children of stones, the persecuted heroes; they will not be forgiven by the mothers of the martyrs or by those who lost their eyes or [lost] some of their other friends in the arena of the uprising. They will not be forgiven by those prisoners who carry the glow of their choice of prison in order to protect the borders of Palestine and the culture of the Muslim nation.

How shall we rid [ourselves] of the suffering [of the people of our nation]; [how shall we rid ourselves of] that which the defeat delegation fabricates. We see the prisons [of the enemy] expanding day after day and the houses are being destroyed and the lands are being expropriated. How can we lift up the suffering of our nation if it [the Palestinian delegation]

does not understand the meaning of the suffering [of the Palestinian nation]? Could it be that the spoiled Palestinian delegation will feel the meaning of the suffering with which our rebelling and patient nation lives? And will this delegation make sure in practice to lift up the [Palestinian] pain? If this argument is right and just, who will make the delegation suffer from its presence [at the talks] and support the *intifada* and its development? At least this delegation [could have] made sure that it did not waste money on unsuccessful and criminal trips⁷⁴ and that they do not bring [anything] to our nation except for shame and defeat. Instead of spending this money on hotels and travel, it should have been used to force, direct and watch over [the money] in order to strengthen the *intifada* with it. Because the money that was spent and will be spent by the negotiating delegation and gets the choir advising it to agree enough [in order] to strengthen the families of the conquered land. It is not money that should be spent on the poisoned media and the cheap journalism that spreads the infected peace and proclaims it.

The sons of our beloved families, we will return to you the happiness that is with you. We will return to you the glory, the respect and the victory. We will promise you that they will not trick you with their fabricated and lying slogans. We will make sure that you will not trust the criminal members who stain their hands with the blood of their grandfathers, our brothers and our sons. There is no [other] option except for *jihad* and there is no [other] alternative except for Islam and the *intifada* and nothing else will lead us anywhere except to the abyss. We need to make this conspiracy of rule and self-rule fail. Fame to your legal rifles which are dispersing the enemy.

Among the believers are men true to what they promised Allah. Among them is he who has fulfilled his vow [to the death], and among them is he who awaits [his chance]. And they did not change [the terms of their commitment] by any alteration.⁷⁵

The truth is for the awesome God.

Allāhu Akbar wa-al-'Aza li-al-Islam [God is great and glory to Islam].

C Is there any justification at all for peace with Israel?

The translation of the above pamphlet shows that the Islamic zealots in Palestine have an answer for every argument that can be used to justify the agreement with Israel. The pamphlet attempts to explain the lack of logic in the arguments of those who support the agreement. It deals with two main areas:

- 1 The practical—"the voice of reason and justice"
- 2 Faith

The arguments of the moderate stream in Palestinian society—read that as the PLO—and especially the men of Fatah, are as follows:

- 1 Israel is an accomplished fact and therefore we must accept its existence.
- 2 The Prophet Muhammad also signed a peace agreement with the men of Mecca, the Hudaibiya Agreement, and so are we.
- 3 A signature on a piece of paper is not an agreement that obligates the future generations and it can be recanted.
- 4 There is wide international support in Europe and the United States for making peace with Israel.
- 5 Peace with Israel will bring an easement of the conditions of the occupation.
- 6 The armed struggle or *jihad* could continue for many years.
- 7 There is a political stream within Israel that is interested in peaceful coexistence.
- 8 The Palestinian nation is too weak to free all of Palestine; therefore, one needs to aspire to a compromise solution.

The purpose of this pamphlet is to present the Islamic view which deals with all these arguments one by one. The main argument touches on a sensitive religious nerve and that is the argument regarding the comparison with the Hudaibiya Agreement. The Hudaibiya Agreement was signed between Muhammad and the people of Mecca in 628 AD. Arafat and other spokespersons in the name of the PLO often emphasize the similarities between this agreement and the Oslo Accords.⁷⁶ Here, in this pamphlet, which is from the early 1990s, in the period of the Madrid Conference, attention is already paid to this argument which is heard for the first time in all of the Islamic circles and which negates the comparison with the Hudaibiya Agreement for the following reasons:

- First, who signed? Can one compare Yasser Arafat (Abu Amar), Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and any other Palestinian leader to the Prophet Muhammad “who is free from mistakes and who acts with the guidance of God?”⁷⁷ In addition, a number of the members of the delegation are secular communists and Christians who, of course, cannot argue that they are acting in the spirit of the ways of the Prophet or that they support the traditional moral beliefs of the Prophet Muhammad.
- Second, what is the purpose of signing? The purpose of the signature on the Hudaibiya Agreement was to enable Muhammad and those who believed in him to come to Mecca, to the most holy place, and pray there. Muhammad agreed to this in exchange for his commitment not to fight with the people of Mecca. On the other hand, the purpose of the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, etc., is to enable the “Jewish thieves” to gain a foothold on holy Islamic Arab land which they captured by force, exiling its residents. As far as the men of the Islamic Jihad are concerned, all of Palestine—from the river to the sea and not only the areas of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip which were captured in 1967—are holy Islamic lands that must be freed. The Hudaibiya Agreement had a

limited purpose. The purpose of the agreements signed at the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords was serious and broad with great pan-Islamic meaning that deviate from the limited Palestinian tie. Any compromise agreement with Israel is presented through the Islamic view, which all of the Islamic movements in Palestinian society share, that it is an agreement of surrender and even a part of the general plot against the Islamic Arab world.

- Third, the temporary nature of the agreement. The Hudaibiya Agreement is seen as a limited agreement from the point of view of commitment. The agreement is limited by the Prophet Muhammad to only ten years. In other words, even if Muhammad would not have breached the contract after two years, he would have been able to act however he wanted at the end of the period of the contract with the people of Mecca. The agreements with Israel and the United States, according to the arguments of the Islamic spokespersons, are not limited in time. They have within them a consistent rushing towards a final solution that will solve the conflict with Israel and announce an end to the conflict. Since from the Islamic point of view the only solution to ending the conflict is the complete freedom of Palestine, one cannot reach an agreement with Israel, not even on the areas of 1948.
- Fourth, the nature of the agreement. The nature of the Hudaibiya Agreement is capturing through peaceful means (*al-Fatah al-Islami*). The agreement was signed in 628 AD, two years after the Prophet Muhammad captured Mecca and freed the Kaaba without a battle. The Prophet did this through the strength of his faith and security in God and with the strength of his penetrating words which were spread among the men of Mecca. In other words, *jihad* by pen and by expression. That is how Mecca was captured in 630 AD. The meaning of the agreement with the Israeli nation is an acceptance of the existence of a foreign entity, one that is not Muslim, on the holy soil and that is a part of the land of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) that was stolen and its inhabitants exiled. The purpose of this acceptance is clearly not to determine the existence of some foreign entity but to enable it to continue to exist.⁷⁸

What stems from this is, of course, that through Islamic eyes, any comparison of the Oslo Accords with the Hudaibiya Agreement is outrageous due to the reasons and arguments by the representatives of the Islamic streams that were presented to Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the latter of whom chose not to sign any agreement with Israel that would declare an end to the conflict. At Camp David, Yasser Arafat lost the historic chance to reach an agreement with Israel, as did Abu Mazen in 2008.⁷⁹ As long as we are still talking about an intermediate agreement with Israel that does not obligate them for more than a limited period, this can be explained and presented as a modern version of the Hudaibiya Agreement. The moment we talk about a permanent solution that accepts Israel as a Jewish state, the

agreed right to exist upon the land that is at its source Islamic *waqf* land, there is in this a reason for crying for generations. An agreement like this is not only a capitulation to the Jews and to the West, but also an Islamic precedent, the first of its kind, that there will be a foreign presence that was achieved through the force in the *Dar al-Islam*.

D Islamic objections to the peace process

The stance of al-Jamia al-Islamiya which represents Islamic Jihad in Palestine and which was discussed in the previous chapter, is presented in the pamphlet above. Even though there is no date of publication on the pamphlet, one can estimate that it was written during the period of the Madrid Conference based on its content. In other words, it was written in 1991–93. The stance presented in the pamphlet reflects the stance of Islamic Jihad and, to the same extent, that of the Hamas movement. Also expressed are the objections of the Islamic streams to these talks.

Those who participated in the negotiations with the Israeli nation are frequently defined as traitors on the Palestinian matter which has been clarified earlier. In the eyes of the Islamic zealots, an agreement with the Zionist enemy, the selling of land to the Zionists and cooperation with the Israeli security authorities, are all in the framework of treason to Islam and the sentence of those who are guilty of this is death.⁸⁰ The solution to the problem of Israel in the eyes of those loyal to Islam is one *jihad* for God for whom there is no one else like Him. This way is the one that stirred up the Palestinian masses and led to the victory of Hamas in the January 25, 2006 election, a win that was not only due to disappointment in the corrupt leadership of the Fatah organization.

Even at the time of the Madrid Conference, which opened on October 29, 1991, the opposition of those loyal to Islam against the participation of Palestinian representation in the negotiations with Israel had begun. Proclamations and pamphlets (like the one above) of Hamas and Islamic Jihad called this conference “the land sale conference.” Ahmad Yassin said that the talks made him sad and angry. He also said that now it would be impossible to sit with Arafat and that the Palestinians could no longer be one united nation.⁸¹ Already during the Madrid Conference, Hamas revealed that they had the ability to be flexible and they did not rule out the possibility of reaching a ten-year *hudna* (ceasefire) with Israel. As a result of this, Hamas temporarily accepted the existence of Israel. This is despite the fact that Yassin predicted that by 2027 the State of Israel will have disappeared from the map. However, of course, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad were unable to reconcile in any way with the existence of a Jewish state on a part of the land of Palestine as a permanent solution for generations.⁸² In 1993, Sheikh Bassam Jarrar, a prominent Hamas member, published his book, *The Decline of Israel in 2022*. In this book he analyzed Qur’an verses. He concluded that

the State of Israel would only exist for 74 years.⁸³ Many Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists believe that this prediction will come true.

In December 1991, as a result of the talks at the Madrid Conference, Iran circulated a call to Hamas and to Islamic Jihad to participate in a conference that would discuss a Muslim *intifada* against Israel. The conference took place two months later in Damascus. As a result of the conference, Musa Abu Marzouk visited Teheran and received a commitment for yearly financial support from Iran of \$30 million.⁸⁴ Dr. Ramadan Shalah, the head of the Islamic Jihad, also received a commitment of Iranian financial support as a result of this conference.

Members of the Islamic movement in Israel were also partners to the concerns of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad on what could happen at the Madrid Conference. The feelings of the members of the movement in Israel appear to be taken from the pamphlet translated above. That is how the newspaper *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* (The Voice of Freedom and Justice) publicized it in a number of articles published from October 1991:

The question to be asked is: What excuse will our leaders find for their failure ... the paralyzed leadership of the Palestinian nation [called the PLO command in the version translated in the pamphlet above] needs to understand that peace conferences like this are like water that does not have a taste, color or smell. Israel is unwilling to withdraw from the 1967 borders and even more so from the 1948 borders ... The United States, which is the great Satan, is untrustworthy and will not act for the rights of the Palestinian nation. Also Europe and the UN support Israel ... The conference will also result in a division among the Palestinians which will become their sacrifice.⁸⁵

Sheikh Kamal Khatib compared the Madrid Conference to the Granada Conference of 1491, in which control of the city was transferred from the Muslims to the Christians:

Even today, there are negotiations being carried out between uncompromising Israel and the defeated, divided weak Arab nation, whose leaders are half-men [*ashba al-rijal*]. There have been 500 years minus 25 days that have passed between the surrender conference of Granada and the surrender conference of Palestine.⁸⁶

Ra'ed Salah also strongly expressed his opinion against the Madrid Conference, arguing:

The conference is a drama of selling the Motherland. If up until now there was one Sadat, now we have 100 Sadats who are willing to sell out the Motherland.⁸⁷

The Oslo Agreement of 1993, which symbolized hope for a better future, also led to Hamas' decision, made in 1993, to invest all its financial and military efforts to weaken the Palestinian Authority and Fatah and to prevent any compromise with Israel. As a reaction to this, the Palestinian Authority took many steps against Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. These steps did not stem from Israeli or American pressure to weaken Hamas but were mainly influenced by the internal struggle between Hamas and Fatah on the hegemony of the Palestinian street. Many Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists were arrested and there were a number of violent confrontations between the sides until al-Aqsa *intifada* broke out in September 2000.

At the beginning of al-Aqsa *intifada*, all of the Palestinian institutions were inclined to cooperate in the way of *jihad* against Israel. Fatah established the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade (Kataa'ib Shahada' al-'Aqsa), which carried out a line of attacks against Israeli targets. The Al-Aqsa Brigade used the same Islamic narrative as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. During this period there were a number of attempts on the part of Fatah to convince Hamas to join the PLO and to reach an historical appeasement agreement between the organizations. However, all these attempts failed.⁸⁸ Ahmad Yassin announced that he would absolutely not agree to accept any compromise or agreement with Israel, and that he would not agree to stop the opposition. More than that, Yassin argued that there was no basic difference between the Fatah movement and Hamas, and he was disagreeing with any attempt by Fatah to limit the *jihad* of the Hamas movement.⁸⁹ Yassin's successors also continued with the same line of opposition to the agreement with Israel. Yassin wrote about how Fatah encouraged terrorism against Israel. The latest example, as of November 2014, was Mahmoud Abbas's letter to Muataz Hijazi's family, the man who attempted to murder Rabbi Yehuda Glick in Jerusalem on October 29, 2014.⁹⁰

During the second *intifada*, due to the suicide attempts against Israel, the number of those who supported the activities of the Islamic Jihad and Hamas gradually rose. Thus, for example, in November 2000, approximately 3,000 men demonstrated and clashed with the Palestinian Authority due to the arrest of Muhammad al-Tawalba, a leader in the Islamic Jihad. In February 2002, additional altercations between the Palestinian police erupted when approximately 200 people demonstrated outside the Hebron prison in the West Bank. There were approximately 60 Islamic Jihad activists and additional Hamas prisoners imprisoned there at that time. These altercations led to the evaluation that, in the end, Arafat would be replaced by the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which did eventually occur in the Gaza Strip.⁹¹

In January 2004, *al-Qabas* newspaper in Kuwait published that the head of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, at a gathering of an international committee, was preparing a new political initiative that would bring about an end to the conflict and the al-Aqsa *intifada*. This would be similar to the first Madrid Conference which met in 1991 and led to the end of the first *intifada*. The purpose of the conference was to restart the negotiations toward a

permanent solution between Israel and the Palestinians, similar to what took place at the Madrid Conference. According to the report, Arafat would approve the proposition at the central PLO council and afterwards would try to get it approved at the summit meeting of the Arab states that was to take place in Tunisia in March 2004. However, this international conference never took place.⁹² Arafat died as a result of illness in November 2004.

On January 26, 2006, an election took place for the Palestinian Authority. In this election Hamas won 76 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian National Council. Despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority was a body established as a result of the agreements between the PLO and Israel, after the election Hamas announced that it did not recognize those agreements and it was not ready to negotiate with Israel. According to the Hamas point of view, and those of all of the other Islamic zealots, Israel has no right of existence at all, not even on the land of 1948. Therefore, the struggle with Israel needs to continue until the total expulsion of the Zionist attacker⁹³ (as it appears in the translated pamphlet).

On November 27, 2007, the Annapolis Conference convened. At the conference, US President George Bush, Jr, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the head of the Palestinian Authority, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel, tried to get the peace agreement moving again. The same Islamic bodies that had objected to the Madrid Conference returned to argue against the negotiations with Israel. This time they did so in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas. Among other topics, they argued that the United States was striving for negotiations with Israel in order to cover up its failures in its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Israel was striving for negotiations due to its failure in the Second Lebanese War and due to the losses that were caused by the Palestinian opposition brigades during the “blessed” *intifada*. In this situation, the agreement by Abu Mazen to the negotiations was a life preserver for the Israelis and the Americans.⁹⁴

In reaction, masses of Palestinians demonstrated in the Gaza Strip against the conference while carrying automatic rifles and wearing green hats with the symbols of Islam. The demonstration expressed their rejection of the Annapolis Conference similar to their rejection of the Madrid Conference—a rejection that expresses the total negation of the existence of negotiations with Israel. This is how Mahmoud al-Zahar, one of the Hamas leaders, expressed it: “Every man who stands up against the resistance or cooperates with the occupation ... is a traitor.”⁹⁵ Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas government, asked the various Arab states to boycott the conference and said: “We will let the whole world hear, we will not give up even one centimeter of Palestine and we will not recognize Israel.”⁹⁶ The leader of Hamas, Khalid Mashal, declared: “Hamas is preparing and launching the third and fourth *intifadas*, until the victory is achieved.”⁹⁷ Moshir al-Masri, another official leader of Hamas, said: “Jews, return because we have already dug graves for you.”⁹⁸

During the period before the Oslo Accords, Hamas also distributed messages against the PLO and against the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the

Madrid Conference talks, which were similar to those of the Islamic Jihad that distributed this pamphlet. The predictions of several researchers—according to whom, as a result of the Oslo process, Hamas would be revealed as a pragmatic partner that would reconcile with the Oslo process and with negotiations with Israel—were proven partially correct.⁹⁹ Indeed, Hamas did succeed in becoming integrated into the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, which was established as a result of the Oslo Accords (similar to the national unity government with Fatah from January 2006 until June 2007). However, this was done without their moderating their ideological stance and without recognizing Israel.¹⁰⁰ More than that, when the window of opportunity from the point of view of Hamas arrived, it cancelled the authority of the institutions of the Authority which limited it, and it completely took control over the rule of the Gaza Strip. The flexibility of Hamas and the rest of the Islamic organizations is only a tactical flexibility on its method of action, and not in its ideology which totally negates the very existence of Israel.

Therefore, it is surprising that, in fact, Lieutenant General (retired) Shaul Mofaz, former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Army and former defense minister, and one of the leaders of the Kadima movement, came out with a political plan that included talking to Hamas. Mofaz decided that because “Israel is a democratic nation it will respect all elected Palestinian leadership and will carry out negotiations with them.” Mofaz also includes Hamas in this generalization. However, Mofaz also limits his opinion:

But, if Hamas refuses to negotiate with Israel, Israel will keep for itself the right to act in any way in order to protect the security of its citizens. *Whoever will reject our extended hand will know that the same hand can also harm.*¹⁰¹

Because Hamas won the January 2006 election (and as long as no new election has been held), it is therefore Hamas that makes up the chosen Palestinian leadership, and it is only with them that it is possible to carry out negotiations and not with the government of Salam Fayyad. However, Hamas denies the right of Israel to exist and therefore it cannot, from the outset, be a partner in the negotiations until it publicly declares the negation of the paragraphs in the Islamic Covenant that deny Israel the right to exist and declares that it is ready for the existence of Israel.¹⁰² It does not appear that Hamas will give up its ideological values in the near future, however.

Negotiating with Hamas means adopting Hamas' stance in regard to its being the representative of the Palestinian nation. According to this standpoint, the delegation of Salam Fayyad is not a legitimate government because it was not chosen by the Palestinian nation in the last election. Mahmoud Abbas deviated from his authority when he appointed Salam Fayyad the head of the Ramallah government.¹⁰³ It cannot be, according to the spokespersons of Hamas, that a man who is the head of al-Wasat Party, which received only

two mandates out of 132, should become the prime minister.¹⁰⁴ Even the petition of Abu Mazen to the UN with the demand for recognition of a Palestinian state inside the 1967 borders outraged Hamas, this time because the meaning of the recognition of a Palestinian state by the UN is also recognition of the state of “Israel” on 80% of the land of historical Palestine. As a senior person in Hamas, Salah Bardawil, said:

Abu Mazen should have returned to the Palestinian people and formulated a national strategy based on objections to the occupier and the drafting of the Islamic Arab nation ... what was taken by force will be returned by force.¹⁰⁵

In the newspaper *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya* of the Islamic Movement in Israel, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, the assistant to Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, described Abu Mazen well as a result of his turning to the UN as a “Palestinian *Jouha*.” Abu Mazen, “the president of the Ramallah Authority,” did not achieve anything, according to his argument, except for humiliation of himself and the Palestinians. There is no place for negotiations on Palestine. Palestine is a problem of Islamic justice and not a problem of commerce in negotiations.¹⁰⁶ This basic stance against the negotiations with Israel is shared by all the Islamic zealots in Palestine of all nuances.

Notes

- 1 In *Surat al-Hijr*, Muhammad is commanded to announce the words of God without fear of the collaborators (apparently this refers to idol worshippers) because one has to trust in Allah. That is how the Islamic loyalists feel, who have written this pamphlet and warn of the internal traitors who are negotiating with the Zionist enemy. Taken from the Noble Qur’an translation, <http://quran.com/15>.
- 2 This chapter is partially based on the author’s article, “Negotiations from an Islamic Point of View,” *Mid-East Magazine*, Nov. 25, 2011, www.mideast.co.il/p-2_a-409. The pamphlet on which the article and this chapter are based is al-Jamia al-Islamiya, “al-Mufawadhat min Manzur Islami, Sarakha fi Dhamir al-Ummah Adhara ila Allah wa-al-Tarikh wa-al-Ajyal al-Qadima” [Negotiations from the Islamic Point of View, A Call to the Conscience of the Nation and an Explanation According to the Words of God of History and the Future Generations] (n.d., n.p.).
- 3 The opening is from *Sura 17, Surat al-Isra’* (The Night Journey) which describes Muhammad’s journey to Masjid al-Aqsa (the mosque on the edge). The Noble Qur’an translation, <http://quran.com/17>. Also from the brochure *al-Islam wa-Filastin, al-Mashro’a al-Islami al-Muaaser fi Filastin*, for which the translation appears in Chapter 3.
- 4 Despite the fact that they were religious scholars, they explained Masjid al-Aqsa as a place in heaven and not in Jerusalem. See Rivlin, *al-Qur’an, Sura 17*, comment 3, p.279; Emmanuel Sivan, *Arab Political Myths* (Tel Aviv, 1988), pp.89–97.
- 5 *Surat al-Isra’* (The Night Journey), verse 4, from the Noble Qur’an translation, <http://quran.com/17>.
- 6 A nickname for the land of Palestine—the land of the destination of the Prophet Muhammad’s night journey where he ascended to the sky from the al-Aqsa mosque.

- 7 This relates to the same moderate voices in the Palestinian public who are apparently bewitched by the American illusion of deceit. That is why they despair of achieving the goal of freeing the holy lands of Palestine. The expression *al-Madhbū'ain*, the hypocrites, is widespread in the Qur'an and relates to those who on the outside look like believers but whose actions are totally the opposite.
- 8 Negotiations for the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. The right of return is a holy right in the eyes of Islamic loyalists as Muslims have the right to return to their land. Negotiation on this right is seen as unfaithfulness to the religion, the Motherland and the whole Islamic nation. See al-Harakah al-Islamiyah, *Watheeqa 'Aaed* (Umm al-Fahm: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Mu'aserah, 2008). This is why Arafat was so stubborn regarding this right as well as on sovereignty on the Temple Mount site. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.49.
- 9 The message is already obvious from this verse, which opens the pamphlet straight after the dedication. The Muslims do not need peace and they do not need to beg for peace from the enemy (Zionism and the West). *Surat Muhammad* (47), verse 35. The Noble Qur'an translation, <http://quran.com/47>.
- 10 In October 1991, the ruler of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, organized a conference with Hezbollah, Hamas and other Islamic organizations (such as Islamic Jihad and al-Jamia al-Islamiya) in order to affect negatively the peace conference in Madrid between Israel and the Palestinians. "We must cross our hands in order to defeat this conference and we know that this conference [the Madrid Conference] is a disgrace." Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.41.
- 11 The first successful suicide attempt took place in Afula on April 1994 when a suicide terrorist blew himself up near a crowded bus. Nine passengers were killed and dozens were injured. A few days later, an additional terrorist suicide attack took place in Hadera. Although Hamas claimed that the attacks were carried out as a reaction to the murder of 29 worshippers at the Cave of the Patriarchs, the use of violence against the Zionist enemy in order to hurt the negotiations between Israel and any Palestinian factor whatsoever is buried deep in the ideological doctrine of Hamas. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.41–42.
- 12 The division of the pamphlet in subsections according to various topics and the emphasis in the translation are by the author of this volume.
- 13 This was the argument of many Islamic Palestinian personages and organizations against the establishment of a Palestinian state on the area of 1967. This was expressed very well by Azmi Bishara in a speech that he made at the American University in Beirut, in honor of 61 years from the *Nakba*. In his speech, Bishara rhetorically asked his audience, which included many men from Hezbollah, to answer the question of what it was that the Arabs fought for before 1967. The land of 1948. He emphasizes that at the foundation of the problem is Israel and the lands of 1948. The clip is found on the Balad Party site. "Muhadarah al-Daktor: Azmi Bishara," www.tajamo.org. For exactly this reason, a top man in Hamas, Sammy al-Zuhari, also expressed his opposition to the United Nations' recognition of a Palestinian state inside the borders of 1967 in light of the request by the Palestinian authority. Asaf Gibor, "The Palestinian Foreign Minister: Approached the UN this Month, We Have the Needed Majority," *Makor Rishon*, Sept. 16, 2011.
- 14 Dr. Haidar 'Abd al-Shafi stood at the head of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Al-Shafi was indeed a member of Hizb al-Shayyua'i al-Filastini (the communist party in Palestine). For a certain period, he was also active in the Popular Front (a socialist organization founded by the Christian Dr. George Habash) and a founder of the Palestinian Red Crescent. Al-Shafi stood at the head of the Palestinian delegation in Madrid between the years 1991–93. Al-Shafi supported the "Two States for Two Nations" solution but strenuously objected to the Oslo Accords as he argued that there should be direct negotiations on permanent

- topics in order to prevent Israel from making facts on the ground during the intermediary period. Al-Shafi died in Gaza at the age of 88 filled with bitterness towards the Palestinian leadership headed by Arafat. See Yoseph Algazi, "The Transfer is a Tangible Danger," an interview with Dr. Haidar 'Ibd al-Shafi, Apr. 2, 2002, *Ha'aretz*, www.haaretz.co.il; and an additional news item from Sept. 25, 2007, from the same site, "Dr. Haider 'Ibd al-Shafi Dies in Gaza at the age of 88."
- 15 Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, an Anglican Christian, was born in Ramallah in 1946. She became famous as a spokesperson for the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks at the Madrid Conference in 1991–93. After the terms of the Oslo Accords were publicized, she resigned her position, criticizing the agreements and the way they were developed. However, she agreed to serve as the Palestinian Authority's minister of science and education, a position that she held up until 1998. She also held a number of top academic positions at Bir Zeit University. In 2001, during the al-Aqsa *intifada*, she was appointed spokesperson for the Arab League. In 2005, she was awarded, together with Minister of the Knesset Zahava Gal-On from Meretz, the Mahatma Gandhi International Award for Peace and Reconciliation in South Africa. She lives in Ramallah with her husband and two daughters. See also Pinhas Inbari, *With Broken Swords* (Tel Aviv, 1994), p.320.
 - 16 *Al-Murabat* means "the protector," "to entrench oneself," an Islamic expression for those who lock themselves up and protect the holy land on the borders of Islam against the powers of the infidels (the non-Muslims). Islamic writings sometimes describe Palestine as *Ard al-Ribat*. This is the land that one must defend from the enemies of Islam (who today are defined as Israel and the West). The Palestinians are today found somewhere at the spearhead of the Islamic war against the infidels. It is not surprising that Hamas' Islamic yearly calendar carries the headline *al-Murabatun*.
 - 17 The commandment to rebuke your colleague, according to Islamic law. As seen later in the pamphlet, there is a religious commandment and a duty according to the *sunna* (tradition) to admonish the infidels, including those among the Muslims who are using methods of heresy.
 - 18 *Hadith* of Ibn Sa'aid al-Khudri, quoted from Sahih Muslim [Ibn al-Hajjaj]. This *hadith* is based on *Surat the House of Amram* (3), verse 110. See also Islam Web, <http://articles.islamweb.net/media/index.php?id=76925&lang=A&page=article>.
 - 19 According to the Islamic zealots in Palestine, Israel is, of course, the cause of the dispute between the various parts of the Palestinian nation and the element responsible for the bloody conflict between Hamas and Fatah, in the bloodbath that took place in the Gaza Strip in 2007, when Hamas took control. The civil war in Palestinian society is derived directly from Zionist enemy strategy which utilizes a policy of divide and conquer. In the eyes of the Hamas movement and the rest of the radical Islamic movements, the Palestinian Authority activists can be considered existing in the area of traitors and are almost considered collaborators with Israel. These are also the words of Sleman al-Shafhe, a journalist for the second Israeli channel who has a wide variety of sources in Gaza, including from Hamas. al-Shafhe, *Captive*, p.37.
 - 20 The original Arabic is: *Min al-warid ila al-warid* [from the vein on the right side of the neck to the vein on the left side of the neck]. In other words, a complete decapitation.
 - 21 Based on the Qur'an (*Sura* 5, verse 60). It is a very common expression regarding the Jews found in Islamic fundamentalist literature that deals with Zionism and the destruction of the State of Israel. The Jews are like animals: Apes are a symbol of the mimicry that exists in them and pigs are a symbol of their impurity. See also Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.55–56; Gabriel, *The Unfinished Battle of Islam and the Jews*, pp.6–7, 19–20.

- 22 The Jews are experts, of course, in spreading drugs and poison. According to one tradition that exists regarding the death of Muhammad, he was poisoned by his Jewish wife Safiya who was from the tribe of Banu Qurayza, a tribe that Muhammad ordered eliminated, with all men of the tribe murdered and their property confiscated. Arafat was also poisoned by Israel. That is what a large majority of the residents of the Palestinian Authority believe and that is how it appears in the official biography of Arafat on the Fatah website. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.60–61; also in the official biography of the martyr Abu Amar which appeared on www.fateh.org.
- 23 The Jews are tricksters and liars and they are planning tricks against the Palestinians all the time. Even during negotiations with them, the feeling among those loyal to Islam is that one has to test every Israeli suggestion strictly in order to check where the intrigue behind this suggestion is hiding. Thus, this is also how the negotiations with Israel were carried out by the Hamas representatives, as can be seen in the words of Abu Anas, who was seen as an expert for the Israeli side and who is quoted in al-Shafhe, *Captive*, pp.184–86.
- 24 In the original, *oumalaa*, which means collaborators. This word is usually used in a negative context as in collaborating with the nation of Israel. In other words, traitors whose punishment, if they are caught, is known—death.
- 25 Zionism is colonialism, which is why any agreement that recognizes Zionism means a victory for Zionist European colonialism. That is how the ideas are presented in a wide array of Palestinian literature from the 1950s onward. An example of such an approach is in Hamdan, *al-Isti'mar wa-al-Sahyunia al-Alamia*. This approach also includes Palestinians who are Israeli residents, and was expressed in the Haifa Declaration from 2007, www.mada-research.org/UserFiles/file/publications_pdf/haifahebrew.pdf.
- 26 In the original, “Habar ala Waraq”—a common expression that a signature is only “ink on paper,” that is not worth anything.
- 27 In the original Arabic, “*ghamud*,” which means “a lack of clarity,” “confusion.” This word serves as a religious expression and relates to wandering away from the honest way, from the way of Islam.
- 28 In the original Arabic “*intifada*,” which is an expression that relates to a citizen’s rebellion. Here the words allude to the first *intifada* which broke out in December 1987 and really came as a surprise to all sides—Israel, Jordan and the PLO. See Ehud Ya’ari and Ze’ev Schiff, *Intifada* (Tel Aviv, 1990), pp.9–43.
- 29 The author does not indicate when the Cairo Declaration took place but apparently we are talking about the talks that were nicknamed “The Cairo Dialogue” and which discussed the initiative of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. According to this initiative, which was publicized in the middle of Sept. 1989, there would be full democratic elections in the territories, including East Jerusalem, and a dialogue between the Palestinian delegation and the Israeli delegation would begin based on Resolutions 242 and 181. The Cairo Declaration led to an additional initiative by the United States which was announced on November 1, 1989 by Secretary of State James Baker. In December, Egypt announced that the PLO agreed to the plan with a number of reservations and Israel did as well. However, the dialogue in Cairo did not lead to any agreement between the sides. On the Israeli side, then Minister of Defense of the unity government Yitzhak Rabin was present in Egypt and, on the Palestinian side, Jamil Tarifi and Radwan Abu Ayyash were present. Inbari, *With Broken Swords*, pp.87–93; Guy Bechor, *Lexicon of the PLO* (Tel Aviv, 1995), pp.215–16, 322–24.
- 30 On Dec. 13, 1988, Arafat spoke in front of the UN General Assembly in Geneva. In his speech, Arafat emphasized that the PLO was willing to reach a comprehensive solution between the sides involved in the Israeli–Arab conflict, including a Palestinian state (which he had announced previously in 1988),

- together with Israel and the other neighbors. This was in the framework of the International Peace Conference based on Resolutions 242, 338 and 181, with respect for the rights of all of the countries in the area, including Israel, to exist in peace and security. Bechor, *Lexicon of the PLO*, pp.169, 171.
- 31 The decision regarding Palestinian independence was formulated by the well-known Palestinian writer Mahmoud Darwish, and was read by Arafat at the 19th annual session of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers. In this decision, the PLO announced a Palestinian state whose capital was Arab Jerusalem. The decision is based on UN Resolution 181 from 1947 which calls for the establishment of two countries, Jewish and Arab, and thus also recognizes the State of Israel. This declaration stands in opposition to the Palestinian Covenant (paragraph 19 from 1968). For the full version and additional explanation on the declaration, see Bechor, *Lexicon of the PLO*, pp.83–87; and Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.372–78.
- 32 The Madrid Conference included delegations from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine-Jordan, and Israel. The conference opened on Oct. 30, 1991 in a celebratory manner with speeches from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and US President George Bush, Sr. On the Israeli side, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir participated. The foreign ministers participated from the Arab countries. During the period when Israel was governed by the Likud Party, there were five rounds of talks in which mainly procedural issues were discussed. At this conference, Israel was only willing to talk about limited autonomy for the Palestinians. From the Knesset, Feb. 20, 2010, www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/heb/madrid.htm.
- 33 Ibid. Indeed Israel, under the leadership of the Likud and the prime minister at that time, Yitzhak Shamir, did not agree in any way to give up territories in the framework of the negotiations but only to deal with limited autonomy for the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
- 34 This is how the conflict over Palestine was seen in the eyes of those loyal to Islam. Reza Aslan writes that during his visit to Iran he saw huge pictures of Muhammad al-Durrah, the child who became a Palestinian symbol during al-Aqsa *intifada*, and alongside him a soldier in Iraq, under which was written: “Yesterday Palestine, today Iraq.” Aslan brings additional examples which show that the Palestinian conflict is seen as a cultural existential conflict for all of Islamic Jihad warriors, including al-Qaeda. Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.11–14.
- 35 This is also the criticism that was heard regarding the Oslo Accords from Sept. 1993 and all the subsequent intermediate agreements. The settlements, together with the army bases, remained in the areas of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Specific large areas, especially along the Jordan Valley and north of the Dead Sea, are described as security areas. Thus, the area that was transferred as a result of the agreement with the Palestinians is very small in scope. In this instance, why is it in Israel’s interest to continue to discuss with the Palestinians the return and the evacuation of the rest of the area? What is the Palestinian interest in negotiations with Israel on such a small piece of land?
- 36 The first *intifada* which broke out in Dec. 1987 is what led the Labor party to strive to achieve a political solution for the Palestinian problem. That is how the events were presented by al-Jamia al-Islamiya which represents Islamic Jihad in Palestine. In other words, the way of *jihad* and resistance influences the Zionist to withdraw and to strive for a political solution.
- 37 In the original Arabic, *anzama al-rida al-umalaa*—regimes that are betraying Islam (*rida*) and the collaborators (*al-umalaa*). Apparently the reference here is to the Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian and Jordanian regimes which participated in the Madrid Conference and are led by parties or people who do not identify with the Islamic zealots.

- 38 These items remind one very much of the criticism by many Palestinian factors including Hamas factors, to the publicity on the concessions made by the Palestinian representatives in the negotiations with Israel. These concessions were presented on *Al Jazeera* and based on 1,600 various documents that were leaked from the office of Saeb Erekat, an incident known as “Al Jazeera Leaks” and which even led to the temporary firing of Saeb Erekat, the top Palestinian delegate in the negotiation delegation with Israel today who was also in the Madrid delegation, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011212135152355248.html>.
- 39 The two regimes even run after and limit the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in their areas. An example of this can be seen by the steps taken by King Abdullah II of Jordan, who forced the Hamas offices to move their activities from Amman to Damascus. The step by King Abdullah is explained by Hamas as additional proof of the capitulation of the Jordanian regime to the West. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.47.
- 40 In essence, the negotiations with Israel were a deviation from the righteous path and from the correct nationalistic path. This deviation is defined later in this pamphlet—that the negotiations with Israel are a sin and a crime against Islam.
- 41 The PLO was established on May 28, 1964, as a result of a decision by the Arab League. After the Six-Day War, in July 1968, the *fedayeen* organizations joined the PLO and at the head, the Fatah organization which constituted the leadership. Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.249–62.
- 42 The intention here is the rejection of organizations inside the PLO, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which objected to going to the Madrid Conference and later to Oslo and re-established the Rejection Front.
- 43 The heads of the PLO were known as corrupt according to the Islamic view even before the Oslo Accords in 1993. What happened after the Oslo Accords only proves the arguments of the Islamic zealots on the danger of the corruption that was hidden in the PLO command because they were not operating according to the right path of Islam.
- 44 There is deliberate use here of “*Umma*” rather than “*Shaab*” (both meaning nation or people) because, according to the Islamic zealots (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the rest of the fundamentalist Islamic groups), the expulsion of the Zionist attacker from the land of Palestine is part of the whole Islamic vision of the nation and belongs to all Muslims, and is not just the responsibility and the vision of the Palestinian people.
- 45 The Islamic zealots do not have any affection for Christians. They often suspect them of collaborating with the West and the Zionist enemy. After the revolution in Gaza in June 2007, the Islamic streams, headed by Hamas, began persecuting the small Christian population in the Gaza Strip. In a number of cases, well-known Christians, such as Professor Sana al-Sayagh, a professor at the Palestinian University in the city of Gaza, were converted by force. These persecutions, which included robbery and the burning of Christian institutions, led to the Christians abandoning the Gaza Strip. See Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.110–12.
- 46 Yasser Arafat and the heads of the PLO often used Islamic expressions during the course of their speeches. The existing Islamic motifs in the Fatah movement and the PLO are what prevented Arafat from conceding anything connected to the demands of the Palestinians regarding the Temple Mount. As will be shown in the next chapter, apparently the discussions on the Temple Mount led to the collapse of the negotiations between Arafat and Ehud Barak in 2000. See Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, pp.29–30; Anthony and Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country*, pp.310–12; Daaira Shuon al-Mufawadhat [Negotiation Affairs Department], *Nazrat 'ala al-Mufawadhat* [Negotiations Primer] (Ramallah: PLO Publishing, 2010), pp.20–23, 42–43, 46.

- 47 These PLO slogans enabled it to continue and become the umbrella organization for the various Palestinian organizations in their platforms and in the makeup of its members. Therefore, in order to keep Palestinian unity until achieving freedom for Palestine, use was made of these general slogans and the differences between the organizations were blurred. Danny Rubinstein, *The Mystery of Arafat* (Vermont, 1995), p.80.
- 48 Indeed, the West has no real positive values. This view is based quite reasonably on the modern Islamic texts beginning with Sayyid Qutb up until Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, as shown by Uriya Shavit, Idan Barir, Sagi Polka and Ofir Winter, who in their articles describe this in detail. Uriya Shavit (ed.), *The Decline of the West, the Rise of Islam? Studies on Civilizational Discourse* (Tel Aviv, 2010), pp.132–61, 181–260; Sivan, *The Crash within Islam*, pp.57–65.
- 49 The official cancellation of the Ottoman Caliphate which was carried out on Mar. 3, 1924 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, initiated a crisis in Islam as Sunni Islam no longer had a top religious legal authority. See Chapter 5, note 37. Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, pp.28–29; Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.207–19.
- 50 This means its allies and its agents; in other words, those who collaborate with it. It is possible that the meaning here is for the Arab countries—Jordan, Egypt and Syria—that participated in the Madrid Conference as indicated earlier in the pamphlet, and which were presented as criminal nations that collaborated with the West.
- 51 In the original Arabic, *al-Sharaf wa-al-karama*, which are two words with identical meanings that express respect. The first word, *al-Sharaf*, expresses respect with a more religious connotation, such as *al-Haram al-Sharif*.
- 52 *Shahada*, the martyr's death for Islam and the word of God. The *shahada* is the justification for carrying out acts of murder against the enemies of Islam. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, p.18; Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.81–91.
- 53 In the original Arabic, “*wanil reda allah 'az waja'*”, the grace of God, who is exalted and who will rise; as all of the acts of man are aimed at satisfying the will of God, *Reda Allah*.
- 54 *Sakinah* means “divine spirit,” “serenity” or “rest.” This is also a play on words expressing the meaning of the divine spirit, the spirit of God, in serenity and rest for those who have faith in God.
- 55 This argument frequently appears in the writings of Palestinians since the 1950s, according to which the Jews have no Biblical or historical hold on the land of Israel and there is no tie between the Jews who are mentioned in the Bible and the Jewish Zionists who are living in Palestine. Thus, for example, see the important book by Hamdan, *al-Isti'mar wa-al-Sahyunia al-Alamia*, pp.94–112, chapter 8, in which he explains his conclusions from Jewish history. The title of the chapter speaks for itself: “The Jews today have no national rights in Palestine and in no way are they the descendents of the ancient Israeli nation.” Recently, a sort of Hebrew version of this chapter has come out in the book by Shlomo Sand, *When and How was the Jewish Nation Invented* (Tel Aviv, 2008), especially pp.185–228. Zand, like his Palestinian colleagues, agrees with the approach that “the forgetting of the forced conversion and the great voluntary conversion to Judaism was an imperative condition ... for a special nationality which wandered and which secluded itself, and of course definitely imaginary” (p.183). Later he indicates the source of the Jews today and denies any tie between them and the Jewish nation of yore.
- 56 The criminal enemy holds onto its tales and its forged Torah in order to justify holding on to the holy land, at the expense of the Palestinian nation. That is exactly what Hamdan argues in *al-Isti'mar wa-al-Sahyunia al-Alamia*, p.12. That is also what Zand argues in *When and How was the Jewish Nation Invented*,

- p.268. The Zionists invented themselves as a nation at the expense of the Palestinian-Arab nation. Bartal, "Shlomo Sand—Light for the Arab People," *Middle East Quarterly*, winter 2015, forthcoming.
- 57 *Habar ala warak* means ink on paper. In other words, something simple that when looking back does not really commit—a signature, it does not matter on what, is only a little ink on paper. This expresses disrespect for the signature on a binding document. Many Arab and Palestinian writers relate in this way to the peace agreement with Egypt and the various Oslo Accords as a justification for their signature.
- 58 *Hawiya* means an abyss. This is also a play on words as an additional meaning to this word is purgatory. That is to say, this is apparently what is expected for those PLO negotiators if they reach an agreement with the Zionists.
- 59 In Arabic it is "*Herma al-Salah ma al-Kiyan al-Sahyuni*," which means a serious religious prohibition to make peace with the Zionist entity. Those who make peace with Israel and sign a peace agreement with it are traitors to Islam. This stance is also analyzed in great detail in the aforementioned book by Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, *al-Jihad, al-Farida al-Ghaiba*, pp.61–66. This book prepared the ideological infrastructure for the murder of President of Egypt Anwar Sadat, in 1981.
- 60 Al-Hudaibiya Agreement was made between Muhammad and the men of Mecca in 628 AD, signed in a place called al-Hudaibiya, between Mecca and Medina. The terms of the agreement were very demeaning from the point of view of the Prophet Muhammad but he accepted them and signed the agreement. The term of the agreement was ten years but Muhammad decided to renege upon it after only two years. Thus, a religious law was fixed for generations regarding the nature of an Islamic agreement according to *al-Hudaibiya* example—an example of an agreement that one is allowed to break according to the relationship of the forces, as explained by Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.78–80.
- 61 Salah ad-Din al-Ayoubi, who freed Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187 and expelled them from the land, did not try, according to Muslim writers, to reach an agreement with the Crusaders. One can learn about Salah ad-Din's stance from the speech that his friend the sultan made and also from his personal story, when he turned to Richard the Lionheart, who stood at the head of the Crusades and whose purpose it was to return Jerusalem into Christian hands, and said: "Say to the English, to that dog: 'What is this craziness to you!? You will not be able to capture al-Quds in which the light of Allah will never be extinguished.'" That is why the figure of Salah ad-Din is a model for imitation for the Islamic zealots of today. Sivan, *Arab Political Myths*, p.104. Despite this, today's Arab writers ignore the fact that Salah ad-Din and his successors signed a number of agreements with the Christians in which they, in effect, recognized the rights of the Christians to live on parts of the land of Israel. One such example is the agreement between Salah ad-Din and Richard the Lionheart. Islamic zealots today argue that this agreement was not carried out. Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.113–14.
- 62 In the original Arabic, *ma'asum*. This is a common name for the Prophet Muhammad which means impervious to mistakes and sins with the grace of the Creator. The Prophet cannot make a mistake in any activity that he does and all his words are the truth. This is the foundation of the *shari'a* (the laws of the Islamic faith). See Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.69–71.
- 63 Thus, for example, in a speech in South Africa, Yasser Arafat said the following: "This agreement [the Oslo Accords], I do not consider it any more important than the agreement [al-Hudaibiya] which was signed between Muhammad and the Quraysh tribe. And you remember how Amar [the second caliph and one of the friends of the Prophet], Umar [ibn al-Khattāb] objected to it and acted towards it

- as a terrible abomination” (Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, p.79). Arafat even repeated these things over and over again, on many occasions, as can be seen clearly in the work of Gabriel, *They Must Be Stopped*, pp.39–40; Efraim Karsh, *Oslo War: Anatomy of Self-Deception* (Ramat Gan: Begin Sadat Center for Strategies Studies, September 2003), pp.7–8.
- 64 It is absolutely clear who the wise men of the loyal Islamic command are. These are, of course, the leadership of the Islamic Jihad which published this pamphlet, and the leadership of Hamas whose views are close to those of the Islamic Jihad movement.
- 65 The accepted name for Palestine, as presented above.
- 66 *Athem* means “criminal” or “sinner.” The negotiations are a crime against the Palestinian nation and are also a religious sin.
- 67 A sting against the PLO which, on one hand, is not ready to stop the negotiations with Israel and, on the other hand, is always asking in the Palestinian media and in their writings, what is the alternative? Is there another way to end the conflict with Israel? The answer of the loyal to Islam, as can be seen, is as clear as the sun.
- 68 In the original, “*khata*,” which means “mistake” or “error,” and also “sin.”
- 69 In the original, *Huquqna al-shari’a*, in other words, due to our legal rights, these are according to human law (*al-Qanun*) and they are according to *shari’a*, the laws of the Islamic religion. The Islamic zealots often describe their rights and their activities according to *shriyah* with its double meaning as in the example above.
- 70 *Sumud*, or standing fast. Holding on to the land and the earth in face of the foreign enemy. This expression is full of Palestinian terminology that describes the struggle with Israel.
- 71 *Ard al-Ribat* is another name for Palestine, widespread among Islamic zealots. *Ribat* is a religious term meaning fortifications and self-defense, and symbolizes the war between the Muslims and the infidels in the areas along the Islamic borders—a situation which, according to the arguments of the Islamic zealots, exists today in Palestine. The men of Islamic Jihad, Hamas and the Islamic Movement often use this expression in different ways, even to describe the Palestinian nation, the nation *al-murabat*. This expression is repeated many times throughout the book.
- 72 In the original, “*min adhen Allah*,” with God’s authority.
- 73 The struggle is once again a religious struggle between the children of Israel who are described in a negative fashion in the Qur’an and those who believe and fortify themselves and make a stronghold (*al-murabatun*) against them. This is based, according to this Muslim approach, on the words of the Prophets in *Sura* 17 in the Qur’an, *Surat al-Isra’* (the Night Voyage), which gives religious approval for this.
- 74 The delegation’s trips to the talks in Madrid and in the United States for the various rounds of negotiations in order to hold discussions with Israel.
- 75 *Surat the Combined Forces (al-Ahzaab)* (33), verse 23. Those who justify in the name of God things that are incorrect are like the men from the Palestinian delegation who are trying to justify an agreement with Israel and compare it to al-Hudaibiya. In the end, they will die or they will foresee the salvation of God and will lose their status.
- 76 See for example, all of the quotes and reminders of this in Dan Shifan, *Palestinians in Israel: The Arab Minority and the Jewish State* (Ohr Yehuda, 2011), pp.117–19.
- 77 See footnote 62.
- 78 This is also the message of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Mubasharat bi-Intisar al-Islam* (Signs Testify to the Victory of Islam) (Cairo, 1999), pp.21–28. Al-Qaradawi is

- today's top religious authority for the Hamas movement and his words receive widespread popularity throughout the Muslim world.
- 79 In the matter of the Palestinians missing the opportunity at Camp David and at the Annapolis Conference and the reasons for it, see Shiftan, *Palestinians in Israel*, pp.149–52; Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.9–12, 175–93; Mohsen Mohammed Saleh and Rabi'a al-Danan, *Takrir Malumat (4), Masar al-Mufawadat al-Falastiniya al-Israeliyya ma bin Anapolis wa-Qima al-Arabiya fi Dimashq (Harif 2007–Rabi'a 2008)* [Information Report, the Ways of Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations from Annapolis Up until the Arab Summit Meeting in Damascus (Fall 2007–Spring 2008)] (Beirut, 2008), pp.63–65; Benny Morris, *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp.135–50; “Interview with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, ‘I Will Not Back Down’,” *Der Spiegel*, July 2, 2010, www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,676374,00.html.
- 80 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.55. The elimination of collaborators did not always stem from their real activities for the benefit of Israel. We are often talking about personal altercations. See also Avi (for security reasons, so the book argues, his full name is not given), *The Martyr from Lebanon: The True Story of the Hezbollah Commander Who Worked for Israel* (Tel Aviv: Poenta Publishers, n.d.), pp.10–14. The author explains how his brother was taken to be killed in a field court after he was accused of spying for Israel.
- 81 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.38.
- 82 Hamas' stance is expressed in its proclamation of the Muathamer Ulmaa Palestine (The Council of Religious Sages in Palestine, *Fatwa al-Musharaka fi Muathamer Madrid wa- al-Sulh maa Israel* [Religious Ruling on Participating in the Madrid Conference and Peace with Israel], Jerusalem, Nov. 1, 1991. The proclamation emphasizes Islamic Jihad's most important arguments, which have been translated in the pamphlet and examined in this book but which indicate that at least one can weigh a ceasefire agreement (*hudna*) for a limited time with the Zionist entity until the believers can achieve a final victory. See also Steinberg, *Facing their Fate*, pp.254–56; Küntzel, *Jihad and Jew Hatred*, p.127. Yassin believes that there is a cyclicity of 20 years in the conflict with the Jews. According to him, 20 years after Hamas wins the leadership of the Palestinian nation, Israel will be destroyed.
- 83 Bassam Nihad Jarrar, *Jawall Israil 'Aam 2022* (n.p., 1993).
- 84 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.38–39.
- 85 The words of the editor of *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, Khalid Ahmad Mahana, from Oct. 18, 1991, quoted by Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*, p.414. Leading the opposition stood the leaders of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement, including Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, the mayor of the city of Umm al-Fahm and Sheikh Kamal Katib from Kfar Kana.
- 86 *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, October 25, 1991; Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*, p.414.
- 87 *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, November 1, 1991; Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*, p.414.
- 88 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.70–77.
- 89 *Ibid.*, p.74. Yassin's words are quoted from an interview published on Jan. 10, 2003. He explained that as members of Hamas, they came to Cairo to the appeasement talks but not in order to carry the white flag in the face of the Zionist enemy. According to his argument, the Palestinian Authority itself supports the activities of *jihad* against Israel and that is why he does not understand why they are asking Hamas to stop.
- 90 See “Ntanyaho wa-Liberman yedanan Risalat Abbas li-'Aaylat al-Shahid Hijazi walati lam Tinsharha 'Wafa'” [Natanayahu and Liberman Criticized Abbas letter to Hijazi Family that Wafa Did Not Publish], Amad (Fatah website), November

- 3, 2014, www.amad.ps/ar/?Action=Details&ID=48186. Abbas's letter is attached to the article.
- 91 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.60.
- 92 "Kuwaiti Newspaper: Arafat is Initiating a Second Madrid Conference," Ynet, Feb. 11, 2004, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2857143.html.
- 93 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.96–97.
- 94 Saleh and al-Danan, *Takrir Maluamat*, pp.6–8. Of course, the conclusions of the researchers are that one cannot reach an agreement with Israel.
- 95 These accusations were clearly aimed at Abu Mazen and the men of Fatah who were trying again to carry out negotiations with Israel. Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.157.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, pp.18–19. The book was written even before al-Aqsa *intifada*, the disengagement plan, the elections for the Palestinian Authority and Hamas gaining control over Gaza. In this book, Hamas is described as a movement in which one can also find a sort of ideological moderation due to its flexibility to become integrated into the Palestinian Authority, which was created as a result of the agreement with Israel. This is also how Steinberg relates to the tactic of managing the conflict with Hamas, in *Facing their Fate*, pp.248–56.
- 100 Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp.95–99.
- 101 Minister of the Knesset Lieutenant General (in the reserves) Shaul Mofaz, *The Mofaz Plan for a Political Solution: A Principal Organizing Idea* (The Knesset, Nov. 2009), p.8, original emphasis. This plan was publicized in the media at the end of 2009 and the publicity created a lot of feedback, as we are talking about the first time that a leading Israeli politician had indicated that there was a need to reach a settlement with Hamas as well, although only under certain conditions. The plan was also distributed among all the members of Kadima and was presented as part of the political vision of the Kadima movement.
- 102 The full charter of the Islamic resistant movement (Hamas), as publicized on Aug. 18, 1988 and published in Arabic by Azzam, *Hamas*, pp.55–73. At the beginning of the charter, the martyr Hassan al-Banna (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928) is quoted as saying that, "Israel will get up and continue to exist until Islam destroys it as it destroyed what came before it" (p.55). Afterwards, it describes the obligation of *jihad* in Palestine and there is a description of the Jewish-Nazi injustice to the Palestinian Muslim nation.
- 103 From the Hamas website, "Report: The Fayyad 'Government' among the Most Unsuccessful Governments in the World," *Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A'alam*, Oct. 2, 2010, www.palestine-info.info.
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Roi Kais, "Hamas, Abu Mazen's Speech is Full of Anger and Lacking Content," Ynet, Sept. 23, 2011, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4126644,00.html.
- 106 *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, Sept. 24, 2011, Sheikh Kamal Khatib, "Abu Mazen wa-al-Mufawadat wa-Tejara al-Bayadh" [Abu Mazen, the Talks and Commerce with Eggs], www.sawt-alhaq.com/web/pages/Details.aspx?Id=11713.

7 The struggle over the al-Aqsa mosque

Exalted is He who took His Servant by night from al-Masjid al-Haram to al-Masjid al-Aqsa, whose surroundings We have blessed, to show him of Our signs. Indeed, He is the Hearing, the Seeing.

Surat al-Isra' (The Night Journey), verse 1¹

A The publicity of the “Jerusalem” movements

Jerusalem, and particularly al-Aqsa, are frequently mentioned in the publicity of the Islamic zealots. Among the streams of the Muslim Brotherhood, these advertisements by the Islamic Movement (which represents the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem and the publicity of the Muslim Brotherhood in Israel) stand out. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem, headed by Muhammad Arnaout, is explicitly defined as a union prohibited by the Israeli Defense Ministry. Despite this, its activities continue through its website and through its political activities as part of the List of Change and Reform which represents the Hamas movement in the parliament of the Palestinian Authority.² The issue of Jerusalem's status in a permanent agreement concerns all of the streams in Islamic society. According to the arguments of many Islamic factors, Israel led Arafat astray in that it postponed the issue of Jerusalem until the permanent solution. That is why Israel continues to control the areas where the Islamic faithful are active against these Israeli activities.³

Examples of Muslim Brotherhood activities in Jerusalem are the actions of the Hemmah movement. This movement was established on June 7, 2009, by Abd al-Basit Abu al-Mufalfel, who is close to the activists of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem. The founding congress of the organization was supported by the international al-Quds institution (an institution close to the Muslim Brotherhood under the presidency of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Also present was a former Israeli minister of the Knesset, Abbas Zachur, and Sheikh Akarme Sabri, the former Mufti of the Palestinian Authority). According to the movement's arguments, they wish to act in a manner similar to the Islamic Movement in order to object to the plans of destruction, expulsion and settlement in Jerusalem.⁴

Other publicity that stands out belongs to the Islamic Movement headed by Ra'ed Salah. *Al-Qassamiyun* magazine of the Izz al-Din Brigade, in an article in the September 2011 issue, nicknamed Sheikh Salah the “al-Aqsa sheikh.” In an editorial, and also on an additional page inside, the sheikh’s part as one of the holy warriors and the “faithful” who protect al-Aqsa from the realization of the Zionist dream to build the imaginary third holy temple on the ruins of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque.⁵ The chapter that follows presents only a sample of the publicity of the streams of the Muslim Brotherhood (the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem, which is defined as part of the Hamas movement according to Israeli law, and the Islamic Movement in Israel) and Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis, which deals with the issue of Jerusalem.

B Memorial day for the 1969 burning of al-Aqsa mosque

On October 2, 2009, Ra'ed Salah Mahagna, the head of the northern faction of the Islamic Movement in Israel, spoke at an assembly called “*al-Aqsa fi Khater*” (al-Aqsa is in danger) which was organized by the Islamic Movement. Right after this assembly, riots broke out in Jerusalem in the area of the Temple Mount.⁶

In the assembly organized by the Hamas organization in October 2010, it was said that Ra'ed Salah only expressed out loud the words of Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and especially Hamas. Al-Qaradawi, called on the Muslims:

from the entire Islamic nation to come from all corners of the world on Friday, October 9, 2009, to make an effort and to pray before God. [He preached] to strengthen the occupied city of Jerusalem and the holy warriors and *al-Murabatun* who protect al-Aqsa mosque at the time of the Zionist break-in into the al-Aqsa courtyard and demanded that our people go out and demonstrate and with clear calls that our hearts are with al-Aqsa ... [Sheikh al Qaradawi] warns of the occupation that wishes to divide the mosque between Muslims and Jews as it did, for example, at the Tomb of the Patriarchs.⁷

A number of leaders in the Islamic Movement were arrested at this time and given evacuation orders. During the events, a number of Islamic Movement activists locked themselves up and even slept on the Temple Mount. They also distributed a number of proclamations,⁸ including the one given below. This proclamation was distributed by the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and Expulsion Plan which used the acronym Hemmah. The meaning of the Arabic acronym is “ambition and decisive decision.” The committee’s slogan, which appears at the bottom of the proclamation, is “Jerusalem is ours, of those faithful to Islam and we are determined as Muslims to continue and to watch over it.”

The following appears on the first page in front of a picture of al-Aqsa mosque taken after the fire in 1969. There is also a picture of a fire as part of the background that appears at the top of the page. From the point of view of the Islamic faithful, any event at al-Aqsa mosque is one with cosmic meaning, one that touches the Islamic world in particular and the whole world in general. The caption for the proclamation reads:

*World support day for al-Aqsa mosque
In memory of the
Burning of the al-Aqsa mosque*

The inside pages of the proclamation are divided into two. On the right-hand side, on a brown background, appears the sentence,

A generalized outlook on the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque.

On the left-hand side, the story of the 1969 burning of the al-Aqsa mosque is told. It is printed over a background depicting the mosque. This incident is used as an example of the conduct of the occupation regime and its attitude towards this holy place:

The burning of the al-Aqsa mosque by an Australian Jew named Michael Denis Rohan took place on August 21, 1969. The Israeli occupation authorities disconnected the water to the *haram* area [the Temple Mount] and prevented the approach of the Palestinian residents to the area where the event was taking place. The Jew known as Michael Rohan kindled the fire at the blessed al-Aqsa mosque. The fire caused damage and was a serious disaster for the blessed al-Aqsa mosque. In addition, [the fire] caused a heavy loss of a part of the mosque that included many places in the blessed mosque. Among those places was the *manbar*⁹ of the savior king Salah al-Din which represents a work of rare art from wood. The *manbar* was created by the commander Nur al-Din Zangi in Aleppo [in Syria] which was later transferred to Jerusalem by the commander Salah al-Din. And also a fully perfect *mihrab*,¹⁰ with pictures and perfect designs, in a 400-square meter field. There is also gold and mosaic in the wooden cupola and the wooden decoration in the ceiling of the *mihrab*. [The fire] damaged and destroyed two support pillars in the area of the dome of the *mihrab* and the arch. Likewise, the fire destroyed the *Surat al-Isra*¹¹ which was written on the golden mosaic on top of the *mihrab*, and also the southern divider which was coated with variegated marble. The fire also totally damaged the pillars, designs and arcs in the prayer areas of three of the galleries and parts of the ceiling which fell to the ground. Similarly, the fire damaged 48 special windows, whose uniqueness lies in the way they were produced and the style in which they were carved.

These [same unique windows] prevented the entry of direct light into the mosque. The flames [of the fire] almost reached and touched the dome of the mosque. That is what would have happened if the Muslims had not risked their lives in extinguishing [the fire] *against the will of the Zionist occupation authorities*.¹² The Zionist forces prevented the civilian defense forces in Jerusalem from reaching the al-Aqsa mosque and also the rescue forces that hurried to the mosque from the Palestinian districts in Ramallah and Hebron. The occupation government lied and at first argued that the fire was caused by an electric fault and did not last a long time until it reported that this young man [Michael Rohan] had caused it [the fire]. And this was done only after the [Zionist government] already released a declaration [to the press]. The majority of the countries of the world condemned this attack and the [UN] Security Council assembled and publicized Resolution 271 which convicted the Hebrew State and requested it to cancel all of its tricks [conspiracies] aimed at changing the *status quo* in Jerusalem. As a result of this, the first summit was held with all the heads of the Islamic countries a month after the fire at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. [At the summit meeting] the announcement was made regarding the founding of the Organization of the Islamic Conference which met and decided on its establishment on 25 September 1969. [The Organization of the Islamic Conference] includes 56 countries and represents their inhabitants, including also the non-Muslim minorities, and represents over a fifth of the world's inhabitants.

On the last page of the proclamation, five pictures are presented. Three of the pictures are in black and white and two pictures are in color. The first two pictures represent the fire rising from between the charred walls of al-Aqsa. Two additional pictures represent the burned part of the inside of the mosque which includes the magnificent *manbar* of Salah al-Din. The last picture represents the remnants of the destruction around the area of that was burned. At the bottom of the page is the symbol of the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and the Expulsion Plan, which is in the shape of a tightly closed hand symbolizing a fist and underneath it the word *Hemmah* is written in Arabic. Next to the symbol appears the full name of the committee. This back page of the proclamation emphasizes what those faithful to Islam in Palestine do in order to protect the al-Aqsa mosque. This is what is written:

[We founded our organization] because Israel's expertise is in dealing with extremism against our rights in our blessed mosque. The purpose of the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and Expulsion Plan (*Hemmah*) is to defend al-Aqsa. The committee does this together with the faithful¹³ [and] *al-murabitun* [who protect] those who put [the responsibility] on their shoulders and who wave the maximum [the majority] of the reactions [for the mosque] and carry the nation so

that it will continue with its first responsibility in raising [and developing] awareness [of the plots] being planned against al-Aqsa and that is their mission. Their second [activity], in addition to doubling the movement for the blessed al-Aqsa mosque, is the strengthening of the tie to the al-Aqsa mosque [on the part of the faithful], and heaven forbid¹⁴—we hope that [the stream of defenders] will not decrease—that the tie to this matter [on the part of Hammah and the rest of the Islamic faithful] which especially touches everyone in the Islamic nation [to come and protect the Temple Mount].

Therefore, one must announce and create a Memorial Day to remember the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque. A world Memorial Day for the moral support for the al-Aqsa mosque. The whole world will value this [the Memorial Day] and [Israel] will not continue and will not enjoy it and will not be tempted by their sinful urges [to hurt] any damage that there is at the al-Aqsa mosque and they [the Zionist occupation authorities and their supporters] will not dare to return due to the heavy price that they will have to pay if they try again.

The Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and Expulsion Plan (Hemmah), which represents the Islamic organization affiliated with the Islamic Movement, sees itself as a pioneer in front of the camp. Hemmah's purpose touches all those who believe in the Islamic nation. They, those who go before the camp, are streaming in their multitudes to the al-Aqsa mosque and their very presence protects al-Aqsa from additional attempts to hurt the mosque. The protection of al-Aqsa is a general Islamic mission which touches the whole Islamic world. That is why there is a requirement on the part of those who support the goals of the movement to help it. This aid does not have to be active, it can also be passive, in other words, the doubling of the number of visitors to al-Aqsa in order to protect it.¹⁵

Al-murabatun, those who entrench themselves, are those same Islamic activists who were commanded to protect the holies of Islam. The use of this expression, as has been shown earlier, is widespread among the Islamic movements, beginning with the Islamic Movement in Israel headed by Ra'ed Salah and ending with Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to the Islamic calendar, one printed by Hamas, the headline reads *al-murabatun* and inside appear pictures of the martyrs Ahmed Yassin, Abdullah Azzam, Ibd al-Aziz Rantissi and Yahya Ayyash. The calendar also notes the memorial days for the martyrs who are also *al-murabatun*. In other words, those who protect and fight for Islam in the land of the book, Palestine, and who are fulfilling their *jihad* requirement.

The Memorial Day for the burning of al-Aqsa is therefore aimed at achieving two important purposes. First, a general team building of all the believers and the supporters for aid and awareness of the activities that are needed in order to protect al-Aqsa. Second, the creation of a balance that will

serve as a deterrent between the Islamic nation and its representatives and those who are plotting against the al-Aqsa mosque who are represented in the proclamation as the Israeli or Zionist occupation authorities and also as the Hebrew state.

This was not the last time that Sheikh Ra'ed Salah used the memory of the fire in al-Aqsa (which took place on August 23, 1969) as an excuse to inflame Muslims against Israel and Jews. In August 28, 2013, Sheikh Ra'ed Salah announced that the Jews planned on bursting into al-Aqsa during the Jewish Tishrei holidays in order to separate the al-Aqsa yard between the Jews and the Arabs, similar to what was done in Hebron. He placed full responsibility of the burning attempt in al-Aqsa on the Jews who even now want to build the third temple. Because of this, he called on all Muslims to come and take part in *Yum al-Nafir* (a day of general recruitment).¹⁶ On September 4, he called on all Muslims to protest at al-Aqsa just before the Jewish new year—Rosh Hashanah—and during the Feast of Tabernacles (Succoth). He was arrested by Israeli police on September 3 for incitement and the court banned him from Jerusalem.¹⁷ There were mass demonstrations held on the Temple Mount during those holidays.

1 The call of the al-Aqsa mosque to its believers

An additional proclamation carrying the date of Ramadan 1, 1430, or August 21, 2009, was distributed by Islamic activists in Eastern Jerusalem. It passed on an additional excellent message regarding the activities that the real believer should carry out in order to save al-Aqsa. On the right side of the proclamation appear the Hemmah logo and a hand tightly closed into a fist. Underneath and written in Arabic, is the word Hemmah. Also on the right side of the proclamation is what the acronym Hemmah stands for just as it appeared in the previous proclamation—the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and the Expulsion Plan. The words Jerusalem Committee also appear at the bottom of the proclamation as well as the slogan of the above organization and also the date when the proclamation was issued. On the lower left-hand side of the proclamation appears a picture of a *Cactaceae* bush. This bush is also known as a “*sabra*” and is a type of cactus. (Israelis born in Israel are called “*sabras*” because they are supposed to be prickly on the outside like this cactus but sweet and juicy on the inside.)

*In the name of God the merciful and the compassionate
Al-Aqsa calls ... Free me from my imprisonment, when will you accede to
the commandments [of God]?¹⁸
Your heart, yah Aqsa ... it has no fault and it is not easy on your land
Our nation al-Murabut on the land of al-Asra al-Marje¹⁹*

The [painful] memory will return and Jerusalem will cry and al-Aqsa will cry, against the will of those who hold a grudge and this is the

time ... Yes, this is the time, may it happen quickly to you, with the victory of Allah, the victory is close. On the sad Memorial Day of the burning of al-Aqsa mosque by the racist Zionist Michael Rohan that took place on August 21, 1969. The breakers of trust, the Zionists, on their part did not stop making fun of and betraying and tricking our beloved mosque. [The Zionists] dig and reveal the foundations of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque in order to find definitive proof to search and find the remnants of the imagined *haykal* [the accepted nickname in this literature for the Jewish holy temple that rested on the Temple Mount]. [This can be achieved] only if they destroy and establish their imaginary temple on the ruins [of what they] find in the digs among the parts of the al-Aqsa mosque [where they] will establish a place of their prayers.

They are the enemies of God in these days, limiting all those [things] that are most loved in the blessed the al-Aqsa mosque, the religion needs to live bravely, only because the Muslims love the al-Aqsa mosque, [despite] the confiscations [of Palestinian property], the destruction, the digging on the roads and the destruction of homes and the imposing of unfair taxes and high fines and the siege on the city²⁰ ... all of the policies that are being taken by the occupation authorities against holy Jerusalem [there is] *one purpose and that is the emigration of the residents of the city of Jerusalem and their replacement by settlers who come from all corners of the world [who do] not have rights to our beloved Motherland.*²¹

Today, one must continue to carry the burden of the al-Aqsa mosque until the flocks of the settlers [that break into al-Aqsa] supported and defended by the Zionist institutions, which forcefully push into the blessed al-Aqsa mosque every day, challenging and humiliating the feelings of the worshippers and Muslims worldwide.

Because of the active steps that the Israelis are taking by competing fanatically over the rights to our blessed mosque, the Jerusalem Committee for the Prevention of the Destruction and Expulsion Plan (Hemmah) is protecting it. [The committee] does this together with *al-mukhlasin* and *al-murabitun* [the loyal and the entrenched]. Those who lean and lift up on their backs the majority of the activities [for the mosque]. They lay out the way for the nation which will carry as its first responsibility on its ascent which is the [development] of awareness [of the plots] that are being planned against al-Aqsa and that is their mission. Their secondary [activities], in addition to doubling the size of the activity in the beloved al-Aqsa mosque, is the strengthening of the tie to the al-Aqsa mosque [by the believers]. And [this tie], heaven forbid that it will decrease—the tie for this matter [on the part of Hemmah and the other Islamic loyalists] which especially relates to every person of the Islamic nation.

Therefore, one must announce and create a memorial day for the burning of the al-Aqsa mosque. A day of worldwide support for the al-Aqsa mosque. The whole world will value this [the memorial day] and

will not [let the Jews] continue and will not enjoy it and will not be tempted by their sinning inclinations [to do] any type of damage to the al-Aqsa mosque and will not dare [the Zionist occupation authorities and their supporters] to return due to the heavy price that they will have to pay if they try again. [These two last paragraphs repeat themselves over and over again similar to the previous proclamation.]

*Therefore, we are calling with all of our self-respect and love for al-Aqsa mosque which is shared by all of the people, the parties and the institutions to make a yearly memorial day for the burning of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque, a day of worldwide support of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque.*²²

At the conclusion of the proclamation, the full name of the committee, its slogan “*al-Quds—’ind kul humm—Hemmah,*” and the date that the proclamation was published—Ramadan 1, 1430, or August 21, 2009—appear again.

This proclamation follows the line of thought of those loyal to Islam who believe that the victory over the enemy is close. The enemy in this context is the State of Israel. Ra’ed Salah Mahagna, the head of the Islamic Movement in Israel, is quoted at a conference in Umm al-Fahm in 2006:

The Israeli occupation in Jerusalem will be removed much faster than you think. Soon Jerusalem will be the capital of the largest Islamic state, of the nation.²³

These words were also repeated by Ra’ed Salah in his speech at the conference that took place on October 2, 2009:

Be patient until you win and al-Aqsa mosque will be undefeated. Maybe it will be damaged but we will win with the help of God.²⁴

The Islamic outlook presented in the proclamations and in the comments of the activists of the Islamic fundamentalists in Israel indicates a well-defined enemy and that is the settlers. But the settlers are, in effect, all of the Jews in the land of Israel and it does not matter from where they came. The Islamic spokespersons are strict in this definition. The settlers come in numbers, in flocks, like animals,²⁵ and they wish to switch the Palestinian nation in its homeland and that is why they must be fought. They are the spearhead of the Zionist occupation authority and that is why the struggle must focus on them. At the conference held in June 2009, an interview took place with Sheikh Ra’ed Salah which appeared on the website of the international al-Quds organization, an institution whose president is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who today serves as, among other things, an adjudicator of Islamic law for the Hamas organization.²⁶ In the interview, Sheikh Salah argues the following:

Question:

The plans of the occupation [forces] are continuing vigorously to unify the holy city and to control the al-Aqsa mosque. What are these plans that are making the city and the mosque suffer?

Answer:

It is clear that the occupation has begun to speed up its crazy steps in order to bring about the Judaization of al-Quds [Jerusalem], and all the evidence shows that the occupation aspires to carry out plans within the next ten months, plans that are part of a ten-year plan. Due to this, it has begun to act like a crazy person and is working to Judaize al-Quds, its real estate and its institutions, and it acts to impose ethnic purification on our people in al-Quds. It is already clear that the occupation has decided for itself that up until the year 2020, ancient al-Quds will be purified from our people in order for it to have only a Jewish character, and by the year 2050, all of al-Quds, which is described by the occupation as “Greater Jerusalem,” will be purified. All of world Zionism is behind it as are the Western institutions and the Protestants who are Zionists themselves [and who] have raised the funds, and [recruited] their media and their politics for the benefit of a Jewish al-Quds.²⁷

Ra’ed Salah’s speech on October 2, 2009, repeated his arguments against the settlers, whom he said were trying to capture Jerusalem:

We are asking to create a victory and protection for Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa mosque and all of the holy places in Jerusalem ... until the end of the Israeli occupation from occupied Jerusalem and from the occupied al-Aqsa mosque with the help of God. That is why you, my family, who are present at this festival, and you, my family in Jerusalem, the Palestinian family in Negev, the triangle, Galilee, on the mountains of the seashore, Acre, Haifa, Lod and Ramla, we now need to be in a state of readiness in order to be present and connected to the blessed al-Aqsa mosque and we [all of the Muslims] are asked to turn this connection of ours with al-Aqsa into a human shield in order to protect the al-Aqsa mosque and to stand up to the Israeli occupation and to the curses of the settlers. We have begun this in the past; now come and we will continue this tomorrow and the next day until God agrees ...²⁸

There is no doubt that the curses of the settlers [endanger al-Aqsa and al-Quds], as you know they have announced in the Israeli media and in Hebrew of their evil intention of breaking into the al-Aqsa mosque in two days’ time, on Sunday, and to continue this break-in into the al-Aqsa mosque throughout next week. That is why, my family, I call on you from here, whoever answers the call of Jerusalem and whoever answers the call

of the al-Aqsa mosque, whoever among you will stand and say, “At your service, Jerusalem, at your service al-Aqsa. We are coming to you Jerusalem. We are coming to you al-Aqsa.”²⁹

This speech was given around the time of the events of the Feast of Tabernacles (Succoth) which fell on October 2–10, 2009. The sheikh referred to the alleged aim of the factors in religious Zionism who urged their followers to come to Jerusalem and, if they could, also to visit the Temple Mount in the framework of the limited amount of access to visitors on the part of the Israeli police. However, after the speech of Ra’ed Salah, on the eve of the first night of the Feast of Tabernacles, clashes broke out in which stones were thrown and tourists who came to visit the Temple Mount were attacked. During the whole Succoth (2009) holiday, stones were thrown at the security forces in additional neighborhoods in Eastern Jerusalem as well, such as Issawiya, Ras al-Amoud, Silwan and Shu’afat.

In a radio interview, Ali Abu Shekha,³⁰ indicated that:

We are standing in the face of many repeated attempts by the settlers and the Israeli police forces to enter the area of the mosque and we push them back.

Because of the disturbances, the Israeli police prevented the Jews from going up to the Temple Mount during the same Feast of Tabernacles. This fact did not prevent Ali Abu Shekha from expressing himself like this and presenting his world outlook that the settlers want to rule over us, the Muslims, in the blessed al-Aqsa mosque.

The Jews want to control al-Aqsa area and build their imaginary temple.³¹ Solomon’s temple, according to the understanding of Islamic and Palestinian factors, was not in Jerusalem. Thus, for example, the historian Abeer Ziad, and an Arab tour guide, Ruben Abu Shamsiyeh, who work in the City of David Museum, told Palestinian television that they were passing on information that differed from what they were supposed to pass on to students and tourists.

According to one of them (the historian or the tour guide), the museum made up stories in order to create an historical right and an historical aspect as if the Jews were there 3,000 years ago and as if they had buildings and a presence there.

The Palestinian television moderator asked Ruben Abu Shamsiyeh what he did when he accompanied groups of tourists and he saw a presentation of history that was full of lies and was an artificial, illusory history. Abu Shamsiyeh answered:

The exhibit at the City of David museum is full of mistakes and I am trying to show the historical and neutral point of view using the information that I have drawn from several [other] historical institutions. I do not only totally rely on what is written on the walls and on the

inscriptions in the museum. It is more important to me to pass on the Arab point of view but in a much more historically neutral manner.³²

The researcher Ziad added:

A documentary movie is presented in the museum which is full of historical lies and the archeological evidence in Jerusalem points to the fact that the Kings David and Solomon did not live in Jerusalem or Palestine and there are no buildings in the city that are attributed to them.³³

Ra'ed Salah declares that the Jewish plan for al-Aqsa is based on the establishment of an imaginary temple. These are his words:

Likewise, the occupation has begun to radicalize, increase and develop methods of its attacks on al-Aqsa mosque, and in its black dreams it longs to destroy the al-Aqsa mosque and to build the legendary temple on the ruins of the al-Aqsa mosque. In these days, it is building over 100 Jewish synagogues which surround the al-Aqsa mosque on all sides and they have placed a large gold-colored candelabrum a few meters from the Mughrabi Gate—one of the gates of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque—and they have announced that this candelabrum is only temporarily outside of the al-Aqsa mosque until it is possible to build its legendary temple and to move this candelabrum inside as one of the symbols of the awaited and promised legendary temple. This proves that the occupation is serious in its feverish and barbaric efforts to continue its attacks on the blessed al-Aqsa mosque.³⁴

Islamic factors dispute the tradition that King Solomon built the holy temple on the Temple Mount even though this tradition has support in a *hadith* attributed to Muhammad. Arguments against this claim put forth that the Muslim Beit al-Makdis, which is the Muslim al-Aqsa, is not the Jewish holy temple. An educational pamphlet published by the 'Amarat al-Aqsa wa-al-Mukadasat institution, affiliated with the Islamic Movement and which was even closed down due to its relationship with Hamas, offers the following explanation: According to the Qur'an and tradition, King Solomon was a Muslim prophet but according to the Jews he was just a simple king. Therefore, because the Muslims have greater respect for King Solomon, they have the preferred rights to what he built. An additional argument claims that King Solomon built the al-Aqsa mosque in its present location and also built the Jewish holy temple, but it is not clear exactly where he built the latter. It could be that the temple was built somewhere in Silwan or perhaps on Mount Grizim, as argued by Sheikh Najeh Bakirat, the head of al-Aqsa Waqf Department of Handwriting and Heritage on the Temple Mount. Either way, there is no proof that the Jewish Temple was ever on the Temple Mount. All of the Jewish arguments for this are lies and based on legends.³⁵

According to this line of thought, the holy temple is a myth and if there was one, it never stood on the Temple Mount. This is also what Yasser Arafat, the former head of the Palestinian Authority, thought, and what Sari Nusseibeh, a member of the Palestinian delegation that was headed by Arafat at the Camp David Summit in September 2000, believed. Nusseibeh describes Arafat's approach toward the Jewish holy temple after the failure of the talks, due to, among other things, a lack of a solution to the problem of Jerusalem and the holy places:

When he returned to Palestine, Arafat poured oil onto the fire when he added myths. He explained the verses from the Qur'an in order to prove his imaginary thesis according to which the King Solomon's holy temple was in Yemen. At a certain stage, at a time when they wandered forty years in the desert, the children of Israel made a wrong turn and reached a place that was very far from Jerusalem. Do you know the story of the Queen of Sheba who sent a bird to Solomon and he received it on the same day? How could a bird fly so fast? Because the holy temple was in Yemen! When I heard this, says Nusseibeh, I was filled with fear lest the chairman was losing all ties with reality.³⁶

Later, Nusseibeh recognized that the Islamic loyalists were twisting the history of Jerusalem. Nusseibeh, who comes from a Palestinian Jerusalem family of a high Islamic social class and whose family has lived in Jerusalem for generations, since the capture of Jerusalem by the Caliph Umar and the entrusting of the key of the Church of the Tomb into the hands of the founder of the family, Obaydah ben Samet, writes that it is clear that Jerusalem is also holy to the Jews and he emphasizes that:

Tour guide books that were printed in Syria over a 100 years ago called the area on which the Dome of the Rock stands the Jewish Temple. These things were written as something accepted ...³⁷

In the eyes of today's Islamic loyalists, ideas that were accepted in Islamic writings in the past are today deemed heresy and treason. Despite this, up until 2000, it was still possible to find guide books that were printed in Ramallah which recognized the true location of King Solomon's Temple as on the Temple Mount, as well as the special Jewish tie to Rachel's Tomb, the City of David, etc.³⁸

This accusation that the Jews were planning on destroying the mosques in Haram al-Sharif and replacing them with a third holy temple was also the main cause of the events that led to both the first and second *intifadas*. In an educational film that is part of the Hamas curriculum, the excavations on the Temple Mount and its environs were described as a central factor in the breaking out of the first *intifada* in 1987.³⁹ Al-Aqsa *intifada* events, which began with the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on September 28,

2000, were fanned by Sheikh Hassan Idrisi, among others, who argued that Sharon, “the mosque desecrator,” went up to the Temple Mount as part of a plan to destroy the Temple Mount and build the Jewish Temple in its place.⁴⁰

In the past few years, Islamic consciousness towards the Jewish presence on the Temple Mount has grown. This is due to the efforts of the various religious Jewish organizations encouraging visitation to certain areas of the Temple Mount. In the pamphlet of the al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, titled, “The city of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa mosque—from 2009 to where?” there is a full report on the alleged Israeli crimes that have taken place on the Temple Mount. The pamphlet includes many photos that document these Israeli crimes on at least 30 topics, and is widely distributed among the members of the Islamic and Hamas organizations in Eastern Jerusalem.

Thus, for example, in paragraph three of the pamphlet, one that deals with the student ceremonies on the plaza of the Temple Mount, it says:

In 2008 dozens of those are considered religious law adjudicators [*marjia*] in the Jewish Talmud on the fact that they support and preach to the children of Israeli society to break into the al-Aqsa mosque and to carry out religious ceremonies there. They themselves rose up and broke into al-Aqsa in order to serve as an example to their admirers. This was done at a time when there were a few among all of these adjudicators who thought of this beforehand [that it was necessary to enter al-Aqsa]. What is repeated over and over again is [the call] to speed up the steps needed and push forward the building of an imaginary temple at the account of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque.

Yehuda Glick was one of those same rabbis that the Waqf Foundation and the Islamic organizations working in Jerusalem pointed to, who has for a number of years been one of the leaders in the process of bringing groups of Jews to the Temple Mount. On October 29, 2014, a young Muslim, an Islamic Jihad activist named Moatez Hijazi, tried to kill Glick. The chase after the shooter by the Israeli security forces led to his death. Once again, the city of Jerusalem was caught in a whirlpool of violence, which continued on and off from the time of the murder of the teenager Muhammad Abu Khdir, a resident of Shu’afat on July 2, 2014.⁴¹ Hamas was also very quick to bless the shooter and his family, as Abu Mazen did in a letter to Hijazi’s family. They even rewarded them with a certificate of appreciation on which was written the following:

For the heroic act of the hero Moatez Hijazi, from the village of Silwan in occupied Jerusalem, who died heroically as a martyr when he heard the voice of al-Aqsa mosque which he protected, the treasure of our homeland, to light for us in his pure blood the way of freedom and victory with the help of Allah.⁴²



Figure 7.1 Certificate of appreciation
Source: Photograph by Shaul Bartal

2 Woe is me on worshipping God

That is how a proclamation of the Islamic Movement—Beit al-Makdis, from Rajab 12, 1430 (July 5, 2009), opens. The name of the movement reveals its bond to the holy temple—the ancient Islamic name of Jerusalem. The movement is better known as Islamic Jihad—The Holy Temple.⁴³ This faction of Islamic Jihad began operating independently in the latter part of 1988. The organization was established by Sheikh Asa'ad Bayyoud al-Tamimi, who served until then as the intermediary between Fatah and Islamic Jihad, which had broken off ties with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority as a result of their moderation and agreement to negotiations with Israel. The organization was supported by Iran and maintained relations with Muammar Gaddafi, the ruler of Libya.⁴⁴ The movement's organizational seat is in Jordan, where it is close to the Muslim Brotherhood which, in turn, has close ties to the Jordanian *waqf* authorities as a result of the peace agreement with Jordan regarding the Temple Mount. Now it represents the Muslim Brotherhood inside Jerusalem.

This proclamation was distributed in the framework of the opposition to the Judaization of Jerusalem such as opposing the King's Garden project where a tourist park was supposed to be built in the City of David in the village of Silwan. The proclamation was distributed throughout Jerusalem during this period and great opposition was expressed against the steps to Judaize Silwan village in a plan that was supposed to include the destruction of Arab homes, the purchase of homes in the village and the insertion of Jewish tenants in their stead. The proclamation called for the residents to wake up before flocks of settlers entered their homes, when it would be too late.

A translation of the proclamation:

In the name of God, the merciful and the beloved,

Woe onto us in the worship of the Creator.

Woe unto us from the worship of the Creator.

Woe unto us on Silwan,

Woe onto us for al-Aqsa,

Woe onto us on Jerusalem.

During the period in which the rough Zionist attacks advance on Jerusalem and at the time that the same attack advances with enthusiasm on Silwan, the gate of the al-Aqsa mosque. At the time that this attack on al-Aqsa mosque continues with enthusiasm, the gem of Jerusalem, the crown of the entire Islamic nation. At the time that the sons of the nation are competing among themselves in regard to the protection of the al-Aqsa mosque and al-Aqsa does not have to do anything except to thank the martyrs who protected it and its gates. Especially at this time a *dawah jahiliyyah*⁴⁵ goes out which penetrates [us] in a way that we cannot estimate the severity of this outlook and which does not weigh and does not

even consider even a little bit to move away to something that is preferred. This demand comes from us, from the village of Silwan which is the gate to the al-Aqsa mosque, in hidden hands to take apart social security and to divide the people in the house on one hand and the neighborhood on the other.⁴⁶ That is what will be said to the settlers. “Come wherever you want, we have opened up the road so that you will reach al-Aqsa safely and peacefully.”

From there, from Jerusalem to the noble Silwan, a symbol of standing steadfast at the gates of al-Aqsa mosque (steadfastness) which tells all those who are not deteriorating from afar, [to carry out] irresponsible activities [of coexistence with the Jews] because these activities will be responsible [for whole] areas not objecting to [the Jewish settlement]. One must repeat over and over again [the prohibition]—God did not allow—that they will be carried out with an accusatory finger (*al-fitnah*,⁴⁷ God will curse those who awaken it). As to those who feed this *fitnah* and who are happy with it and stand and look at the disease of this glorious nation, they were told to their faces that they will be proven false [and will not succeed] in their efforts. Just as God has taken us out of all *fitnah* [and we went out] from all of them and everything is behind us, we will get out of all this, with the help of God. In no way will this thing remind us of anything but pain [of what happened] and we will be even stronger than before as God has asked [and we will stand steadfast] on the watch of the al-Aqsa mosque, and we will die and sacrifice ourselves for this and we will not be humiliated.

And what about you, the Silwan family?

Will you love it that God will forgive you? Will you not desire to be friends of the [Prophet] Muhammad, may the prayer of God and His blessings be on you? Will you not love to be guards [on the watch] of the blessed al-Aqsa and have nothing stand in your way? Will you not be the first who need to exaggerate this [the struggle]?! Therefore, one must get angry about your training, by your standing on the side of your migration to your tents ... and you will not feel what happens to you [except] after you [feel] sadness [at] the steadfastness and [your] perseverance [which have become] rare [after the Jews have entered your houses]. Leave the *fitnah* in its crib and be the servants of God, my brothers. Remove the preaching of *fitnah* from your vocabulary. Your mosque al-Aqsa is in danger, so do not allow the flocks of settlers into your homes. And do not be the first who exaggerate with this.

[Who say], “Our Lord, let not our hearts deviate after You have guided us and grant us from Yourself mercy. Indeed, You are the bestower.”⁴⁸

The proclamation ends with this last sentence. At the bottom of the page, appears, as said before, the signature of the Islamic movement Beit al-Makdis and the date of its publication, July 2009.

Sheikh Asa'ad al-Tamimi, the former imam of the al-Aqsa mosque and a person of great influence in East Jerusalem, is the one who in 1988 established, as a result of the declaration of Palestinian independence, al-Jihad al-Islami Beit al-Makdis. Al-Tamimi consistently preaches for armed struggle against Israel and the rejection of any compromise agreement with it. The sheikh's opinions were also expressed in a letter that he sent to Arafat on November 19, 1988, as a result of the Palestinian declaration of independence. In this letter, Sheikh al-Tamimi severely criticized the stance of the nationalistic streams for both ideological and practical reasons, and rejected the decisions of the Palestinian National Council.⁴⁹

The sheikh served as the imam of al-Aqsa mosque under the Jordanian regime. In 1969, he was exiled to Jordan by Israel due to his beliefs, but continued to influence the Jordanian *waqf* which is active on the Temple Mount until today. This proclamation illustrates influence of this movement in the last year. His son, Muhammad Assad Bayyoud al-Tamimi, recently published an article attacking Hamas for being too moderate, headlined, "I ask for refuge from the One up above, from the bad behavior of Hamas." The only meaning for this wording is a comparison of Hamas to the devil.⁵⁰

The reason for al-Tamimi, Jr.'s attack on Hamas is the cruelty in the way in which Sheikh 'Abd al-Aziz al-Latif Moussa, a leader of the Jund Ansar Allah (Army of the Supporters of Allah), was destroyed with his supporters.⁵¹ Thus, Hamas was in reality turned into the Zionist border police as they zealously watch over the peace on Israel's southern border. Israel has no right to exist at all. Tamimi, Jr. continues to accuse the leaders of Hamas of being criminals, exactly as his father before him accused the Fatah leaders of being criminals due to their declaration of independence in November 1988.

C Silwan, the struggle for presence and survival⁵²

One of the projects that, in retrospect, proved the arguments of the Islamic streams that the purpose of the Israeli activities was the banishment of the Arab residents and exchanging them for Jewish settlers, is the King's Garden project planned for the village of Silwan. This tourist project was designed to sprawl through the area of the City of David national park.⁵³ According to the planned project, 22 illegal buildings would be destroyed and in their place a tourist park would be built for the benefit of the tourists who visit the area to see ancient Jerusalem and the residents who remain there. The project's purpose, along with the development of a community center for the residents of Silwan village, is to develop a tourist center based on the historic nature of the area.

In this place, according to the Jewish faith, the kings of Israel established their garden. The common belief is that this is where King Solomon planted his gardens and wrote Ecclesiastes under its trees. The flowerbeds and the roses that bloomed in the "King's Garden" are mentioned in the Song of Songs. The offerings and the perfumes that grew in the garden were created

with the addition of olive oil from the Mount of Olives and even served the priests of the temple in their work. In the olden days, there were potters, designers and craftsmen. The residents of the area grew fruit, medicinal plants and perfumes in the garden. The intelligent development of this site would be a stimulus for the economic-tourist development of the entire neighborhood, improving the existing infrastructures and turning the area into a “must see” for every visitor to Jerusalem.⁵⁴

Today, there are 88 houses on the site, the majority of which were built illegally after 1967. In the city’s plan, only 22 of these homes would be destroyed and the King’s Garden project would be built on the cleared area. In the framework of the project, many public buildings would also be constructed including classrooms, kindergartens, playgrounds, etc. Likewise, reparations would be given to the evacuated families plus addition aid to enable them to build their houses legally. The rest of the existing houses in the area would be approved retroactively and the legal actions against them would be dropped. Theoretically, this is a project aimed at benefitting the residents of the neighborhood and is one which regularizes a complicated municipal and legal problem. This is in addition to developing a tourist attraction that would include restaurants and hotels which would provide additional incomes for the residents of the area.⁵⁵

The planned project aroused the Palestinian Islamic organizations operating in the city against this step of the Israeli “occupation” authorities. The arguments used included not only practical ones against the destruction of homes and the resettlement of the residents but were mainly against the historic narrative that was at the foundation of the plan. In other words, did King David actually live in Jerusalem and was he active in a place called the City of David, or are we talking about a Zionist invention that rests on a false history? Is the King’s Garden plan only another stage of establishing a false historic and archaeological site in order to justify the existence of an “imaginary” Jew who lived in Jerusalem over 2,000 years ago?

A pamphlet was published by the Muassasah al-Quds li-Tanmiya (Jerusalem Foundation for Development)⁵⁶ and the Lajnat Hai al-Bustan (al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee) Silwan—al-Quds, only a month after the municipality publicized its plans for the King’s Garden project, titled “Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud” (Silwan ... Struggle for Survival and Presence), and emphasizes the Islamic tie to the area that today is called the City of David. The pamphlet presents the struggle of the residents of Silwan against the “King’s Garden” project and suggests an alternative plan to that presented by the City of Jerusalem. In the plan suggested by the committee of community residents, not even one house should be evacuated or destroyed.⁵⁷ This is despite the fact that the residents of the area have acknowledged that their houses were built illegally. However, the main reason for opposition to the project, despite the generous compensation, is religious in origin, as they are drafting “historical information” in order to build a foundation for their objections.⁵⁸

On May 11, 2011, the High Court of Justice, which dealt with the claim by the residents against the City of Jerusalem for its intention, finally published its decision regarding the plan, despite the residents' objections to a plan that was in a framework beneficial to the residents and offered fair compensation to the small number of residents who were asked to vacate their homes. For some reason, the representatives of the residents did not bother to express their religious stance which absolutely negates all Jewish presence on the Temple Mount, but instead directed their arguments to the hearts of the judges by asking them to prevent their removal due to poor planning and requested that the architect be replaced for personal reasons of the residents of the neighborhood. In the pamphlet, translated here, their radical standpoint is presented in Arabic, a stance that the Israeli judges never heard. Although at the end of the process the court acquiesced for the present to the demands of the residents of the village and prevented the implementation of the plan, the struggle to carry out the plan has not yet ended.⁵⁹

The nationalistic-religious conflict stands at the center of the demands of the residents of Silwan. The arguments for good governance, the rehabilitation and development of their city to which the city is obligated, are seen in their eyes as part of a master plan to change the character of Jerusalem from an Arab city to a Jewish-only one. The significance of the plan presented by the neighborhood committee and the Jerusalem Institute of Development is to show that it is possible to do things differently: Develop an area without destroying resident housing and legalizing all of the construction deviation and illegal building that has taken place throughout the years. In essence, their plan asks for a prize for those who built illegally due to "nationalistic" reasons. At the end of the pamphlet, these explicit arguments appear. They are translated below:

*1 The struggle of al-Bustan neighborhood in Silwan*⁶⁰

When the wild [Jewish] attack on Jerusalem⁶¹ began, at the time that the Arabs and the Muslims were distracted from their business [of the Palestinians]. This is while the Silwan neighborhood deals anew with the struggle of standing steadfast [*sumud*] of the sons of Jerusalem for the general protection of the guarantee of their city. [This protection includes] confrontation regarding the Judaization steps which are a basis for the expulsion of the residents in order to teach them a lesson and to push them to leave those places where they were staying and to relocate the residents to other places. They [the Jews] are threatening to destroy these buildings after the city of Jerusalem rejected the request to legalize them according to the sketch of the [architectural] plans and the plans that were advanced by the families [in Silwan] in order to approve their homes even before the occupation of the city in 1967 and whatever was built according to them.⁶² The city of Jerusalem is acting to expel 750 residents from their homes in the [al-Bustan] neighborhood, using the argument

that the building is illegal and that the existing buildings are found in an area that has an historical value! The city of Jerusalem is sacrificing and ignoring the organized plans that are there [regarding Silwan]. The topic, since 1977, is the plan by the city to destroy and expel the Arab residents with the purpose of “rehabilitating” the area in order to establish the “City of King David.” The methods for the current Judaization are the restoration of new streets as part of the expulsion steps taking place in al-Bustan area since 2004. Since then, the Israeli city management [the Department of Licensing and Supervision] has given an ultimatum to the residents to [legalize] their homes. The city distributes demolition writs for all of the buildings [in the neighborhood] due to illegal building. That is how the activities to influence the media began, the unofficial and the official, to solve [the problem] without carrying out the decision to demolish [the houses]. The city demanded that the residents organize for themselves [building] permits for the area. The city then began to lay fines on “illegal” construction, in its words. The residents began to act legally and through engineers in order to gain approval for the building in the area. Thus they would fulfill all the terms for legalizing the building and would reject the plans of the local committee for planning and construction [in Jerusalem].

It is clear and evident that the carrying out of the destruction and expulsion plans would complete in rapid steps the turning of Jerusalem into a Jewish city. This is because the reason for carrying out the Israeli plan is the removal of all of the Arabs from East Jerusalem by 2020 [as Ra’ed Salah argued in his speech that was mentioned earlier]. This is a decision by the Israeli government to empty the city of its Arab residents in order to enable them to overcome [the demographic problem] that stems from the estimated increase in the Arab population in East Jerusalem. Because the number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is nearing 275,000 Arabs, [the Israeli government aspires] to there being 182,000 more Jewish residents than the number of Arabs in the city. This [the government carries out] through many other additional means that serve the realization of the strategic goal of “Judaizing the city.” For example, the cancellation of identity cards and the levying of difficult taxes [on the Arab population]. In that way, they try to create [using this method] a chain of conditions leading to the expulsion of the residents and the destruction of their homes due to the “rehabilitation of buildings” which will be populated by new [Jewish] settlement. That is how a determining influence will be created on the whole demography in the areas that are called, “the areas surrounding Jerusalem” or the “holy basin.”⁶³ That is how new facts on the ground will be created which will threaten the future of the Palestinian side [in the city]. All this on the basis of what started as a result of the words of the former US President [Bill] Clinton [who said], “Whatever is Jewish in Jerusalem will stay under their

[Jewish] control and whatever is Palestinian will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority.”⁶⁴

The activities of destruction and Judaizing of the Silwan neighborhood are tied into a report that represents the desires of the Israeli occupation authorities. [According to the report] the Israeli authorities began carrying out the Judaization of Silwan while they were concentrating on the southern part of the ancient village. This is a part of the project to turn the village of Silwan into a center of Jewish tourism as a neighborhood of al-Bustan [where the spring and the City of David national park are], which is the center on which this [project] will be built. In order to ease the carrying out of the plan, they are camouflaging it as a tourist and commercial project and one which is building underground buildings. However, the sketches and the names by which they are called clearly prove that the purpose of the project is to Judaize all of Silwan. The Israeli institutions do not pause from carrying out excavations in village area. They are digging tunnels and leading to a geographical change while erasing Arab history and beginning the Judaization of what is above and underneath the ground. In the shadow of the disaster, in which al-Bustan neighborhood is found, the city of Jerusalem is firm in its opinion to pass its plans which at first center on the destruction of homes and the neighborhood and the expulsion of the residents, while purposely twisting our current [historical] information. This is what the city does in the name of political goals [which it is advancing] because there is not, as of yet, a plan that fully describes and organizes the village and its surroundings. Therefore, we have decided to advance an alternative improved plan for the good of the residents of the neighborhood while refuting the lying arguments of the city regarding the improvement and the development which are misleading the world so that they can aggressively continue and not have to stop doing so. We see and prove that City Hall is rejecting our new plans which take into account all of the international and local aspects. Here we will thank everyone who contributed to the continuation of our steadfastness and who visited us [in our protest tent] and supported us, private people and various institutions.⁶⁵ We thank all the engineers and lawyers. We especially want to mention the Jerusalem Institute for Development which did not limit itself when standing with the families of al-Bustan neighborhood.

We will never stop our support of our brothers, our friends and people of conscience who are living to continue to stretch out their hands and to establish their steadfast stance.

Even if the road is long. ⁶⁶

The residents of Silwan feel that they are on the defensive. They are standing, according to their view, against a satanic plan in which the Jews are trying to cause a disaster (*karitha*)⁶⁷ that threatens not only their physical presence but

also their historical presence. In a dangerous situation like this, it is a requirement for them to act in practical ways in order to ward off the evil that threatens their very existence in the village. According to them, the Israeli government wants to act to change the demographic situation in Jerusalem for the benefit of the Jewish majority: The destruction of Arab housing in all of East Jerusalem and the expansion of the Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem. The slogans carried by the residents of Silwan were: “*Silwan—Samedon fi al-Bustan*” (We discover steadfastness in al-Bustan neighborhood], and slogans that see the struggle as a symbol of strength and respect, “*Ramz ’Azatnah ... wal- Karamatnah.*”⁶⁸

There is a significant lack of respect towards the city of Jerusalem and its activities. In the imaginary world in which they live, any city activity is explained as having a political goal behind it. Their approach is supported by circles in the Islamic movement, among them Sheikh Ra’ed Salah. The Jerusalem Institute for Development is an institution that was established by the Islamic Movement and its standpoints are expressed in this pamphlet. In an additional pamphlet, titled “*Kadam Yerushlayim*” (Ancient Jerusalem), Ra’ed Salah’s speech appears. According to this speech, everything that Israel does in Jerusalem, beginning with the paving of streets and up to and including the light railway, any development activity that is being carried out in the city has one purpose—the advancement of the plan to Judaize Jerusalem. Therefore, it is clear that the Israeli steps are offensive and one must object to them in every way.⁶⁹

The way to object to the King’s Garden plan is an integrated one which combines many different activities:

- 1 A struggle over historical awareness.
- 2 A populist struggle against the new Jewish settlement.
- 3 A struggle against the sale of land/houses to Jews.
- 4 A struggle against the activities of the city of Jerusalem.
- 5 The strengthening of the steadfastness of the population.

In Hamas advertisements, and also in the newspaper of the northern faction of Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya, there appear all of the means and the ways to object to the activities of the Judaizing of Jerusalem and the building of the third temple on the ruins of al-Aqsa—from a third *intifada* to public activities to the rewriting of history.⁷⁰ In the pamphlet written by the Jerusalem Institute for Development and the neighborhood committee of al-Bustan there also appear the following items. They only appear in Arabic, but here are some parts that have been translated:

2 Area plan for al-Bustan in Silwan⁷¹

The City Hall of Western Jerusalem argues using lies that this plan’s purpose is the creation of a Garden for King David for the benefit of the residents and

that it will try to draw tourists to the area. But the truth is that the purpose of the plan is as follows:

- The erasure of any Islamic Arab Palestinian identity in the city of Jerusalem and the switching of this identity to a Jewish one from the point of view of history and religion.
- The transfer of a large number of Jerusalem Arab residents (*mukdesin*) to an area far away from the al-Aqsa mosque and the ancient [Silwan] village and, if possible, outside Jerusalem.
- To separate the al-Aqsa mosque from the Arab and Palestinian neighborhoods of the city of Jerusalem in order to prevent a line of defense that protects the al-Aqsa mosque.
- To create geographical continuity between the center of settlement in the Old City and its surroundings and the settlements that are found at the edges of the city of Jerusalem.

*2.1 Introduction*⁷²

City Hall, in the western part of the city, is, in practice, responsible for carrying out its goal which is to Judaize the blessed Jerusalem. This includes [archeological] digs and tunnels and the many activities that are carried out by the various settler organizations in the village of Silwan. [These activities] are especially carried out in the areas of [the spring] Ein Silwan, which is included in the general program of the Judaization and the gaining of total control of the area, with the goal of completing the project of the Judaization of the area called the “City of David.” [For this purpose,] City Hall has introduced a new plan with the purpose to distance over a thousand Jerusalem residents from their homes in the al-Bustan neighborhood in Silwan and expel them from their lands for the benefit of the garden and a place for tourists to tour!!!

2.2 Location and borders

The village of Silwan sits south of the al-Aqsa mosque and the word Silwan is derived from the Roman expression Silwan, which means markets and animal feed. Approximately 50,000 people live [in this area]. In the northern part, the village is defined by the al-Aqsa mosque, the wall of the Old City and the Mughrabi neighborhood which was totally destroyed in 1967. In the west is the neighborhood of Talbiyah. South is the lands of Beit Safafa and in the east are the villages of Abu Dis, al-Azariya and al-Tur.⁷³

As can be seen, the residents of Silwan are not convinced that the King’s Garden plan will benefit the village. The plan, according to them, is part of a Jewish satanic plan to Judaize Jerusalem. The city of Jerusalem is not

recognized by them at all. They constantly protest against it because it only represents the western part of the city. That is why Arab advertisements spread through Eastern Jerusalem emphasize this attitude towards the city by calling it “the City Hall of Western Jerusalem.” This does not, of course, prevent the Arabs of Eastern Jerusalem from working at the “hated” City Hall and receiving their salaries. There is here some sort of phenomenon of denial in which the Arabs of Jerusalem live. Also, in the second part of the location and borders, the existing Jewish neighborhoods in the city of Jerusalem are not mentioned at all. As if possible, Silwan is still surrounded only by Arab neighborhoods and villages in Arab Jerusalem. According to them, Silwan is open to a Jewish attack whose purpose is to change the makeup of the population. The memory of the committee for the neighborhood residents does not forget or forgive what happened in the Mughrabi neighborhood which was adjacent to the Western Wall and destroyed due to a decision by the Israeli government immediately after the Six-Day War.⁷⁴

The pamphlet continues:

2.3 *Silwan, the most important place in al-Quds*

Silwan, the most important place in al-Quds, was dedicated to the *darwishes* by the third righteous caliph, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, who will find goodness from the Creator.

In the village, there is a spring known as Ein Silwan which is connected to the history of the city of Jerusalem. The formation of this water source was already established during the Canaanite period. The water was transferred in canals which were built by the Yevus people, the original builders of Jerusalem, and, until today, there are still archeological remnants of the establishment [of this water system]. The waters of the spring pass through a 533-meter underground aqueduct until they reach the pool of Ein Silwan on the side that is across from the known Wadi al-Helwe, a place where the waters of the Silwan spring gather. The spring is of cultural and historical importance for the city of Jerusalem as it is the source of water for the residents of the city from the time it was founded. The waters of the spring fed the city residents during the Canaanite period. Canaanite Jerusalem was dependent on the waters of the spring up until the Byzantine period. During the reign of Herod, who built part of the pool of the spring's water, only a portion of these spring waters were needed.⁷⁵ During the early Islamic period, the Muslims took care of Ein Silwan and the third righteous caliph, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, arose and expanded the spring, re-dug it and dedicated it to the Muslim *darwishes* in Jerusalem. From this period, Ein Silwan and the land around it are considered as belonging to the Islamic *Waqf*, under the supervision of the Holy Muslim Committee which today is represented by Daarah al-Awqaf al-Islamiyah in Jerusalem [the Holy Department in Jerusalem].

Many of the sources tell of the importance of Ein Silwan during the Islamic period. The ancient source for this is the book by al-Muqaddasi (*Ahsan al-Taqasim*),⁷⁶ about the third caliph, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān, who dedicated this spring for the benefit of the families of Jerusalem. This spring was given priority under the command of a number of the caliphs loyal to Islam—the Umayyad Dynasty, such as Caliph Mu'āwiyah ibn 'Abī Sufyān, and the Caliphs al-Walid and Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Malik. After Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi captured Jerusalem from the hands of the Crusaders in the 11th century (the second capture of Jerusalem), he dedicated both the village and the spring to al-Madrassa al-Salhiya. Thus, the village and the spring returned and were renewed as completely belonging to the Islamic *waqf*. This area had existed as part of the Islamic *waqf* for the thousand years that have passed since the conquest of Salah al-Din. The spring is still under the supervision of the *waqf* and earns income for the *waqf*. The registration of the area as [belonging to the] *waqf* was only accepted at the beginning of the 19th century. The registration included all of the income from every piece of land that is found in Silwan, including the spring that is found in the village.

2.4 *The Judaization of Silwan*

The general plan by the city of Western Jerusalem is the Judaization of the blessed city of Jerusalem which includes the village of Silwan and especially al-Bustan neighborhood, a very important base for building Talmudic Jewish Jerusalem. Thus, for example, Ein Silwan was transformed in their eyes into becoming Ein Gichon. Al-Bustan area became the King's Stream and the [neighborhood] of Wadi al-Helwe, which they shoot at, they call the City of David.⁷⁷ Except for the changing of the [original] names, which are rejected by the stories of the Talmud regarding the area, and except for the archeological excavations in the area of Silwan, they [the Jews] are extending the time of the digs in the area around the ancient city until other Israeli institutions are established there which will prove the historical presence in the area. The archeological excavation digs are unscientific archaeological excavations and are only excavations that belong to the activities of the aggressive settlements in the Silwan area. The excavations here are carried out by the Elad organization which acts in cooperation with City Hall of Western Jerusalem and the Israeli Antiquity Authority whose purpose it is to finish the project of the Judaization of the total Silwan area.

The situation today is that the area of the neighborhood of Wadi al-Helwe in Silwan is in the early stages of the Judaization of the neighborhood. The spring is found in the lowest part of the neighborhood and this area is called by them "City of David." This area, which is marked and excavated today, passes under the Ein Silwan mosque and is excavated under the Ein Silwan mosque and also under the area that is

around the spring. As a result of these excavations, a collapse of the kindergarten buildings has begun as well as the yard of the mosque which rests right on top of the spring. This situation will lead to an abandoning of the area and thus make way for the Judaization and the conversion of the area into a totally Jewish area. This belongs [to the plans of City Hall] and is accompanied by a plan to destroy the Palestinian living quarters of the Silwan families in the al-Bustan neighborhood, a topic that was raised over a year ago.

This plan is for the Judaization of the northern area and here it is important to mention the establishment of the Jewish settlement in Ras al-Amoud which is near the village of Silwan. This plan is also connected to the Judaization of the area of the Mughrabi Gate [the Temple wall plaza today] and the destruction of Mamaluke Road which led from al-Aqsa mosque and passed through the Mughrabi Gate.⁷⁸ *All these are derived from one single plan and that is—the Judaization of an area of Jerusalem and the expulsion of its residents.*⁷⁹

2.5 *The struggle for survival and presence*

The city of Western Jerusalem is trying to lead its plan to match the existing reality according to the theories that appear in the literature of the Talmud *despite the fact that we are talking about holy Islamic Arab land.*⁸⁰ In order to carry out the goal, the city established and dedicated a tourist center in the City of David, which is part of the plan for the City of David. That is how steps began in the Ein Silwan tunnels which end up at the Ein Silwan pool which is close to the Ein Silwan mosque. *During this same tour [in the Ein Silwan tunnel], which is accompanied by Israeli tour guides who represent the City of David Organization [to the visitors] and the establishment of the first and second temples [in the past] and on the efforts to establish [today] the third temple [at the] place of the blessed al-Aqsa mosque [without mentioning the Islamic history of this place].*⁸¹

In this context, it must be noted that the city of West Jerusalem has annexed, since 1967, over 70,000 *dunam* of Silwan land, among them land upon which they have established the *moshava* of Maaleh Adumim, one of the largest Israeli settlements in the West Bank. [The city] limited the residents to limited, defined, fenced-in geographical areas and does not permit them [the residents] to build homes outside the fenced areas. That is how the Western City [of Jerusalem] prevents the residents of Silwan, who emigrated there in 1948, to recover from their expulsion [and the loss of their property]. Despite the fact that they have in their possession all of the papers and documents that prove their ownership over this property. It [the city] demands that they now abandon their land and their homes in a third migration, and this is the same residents who already migrated twice from their lands, in 1948 and in 1967.⁸²

This pamphlet is signed by the Committee for the Residents of al-Bustan Neighborhood. Among members of the committee, Abd al-Karim Abu Snina (Abu Hamed)⁸³ stands out. He preached to the residents of Silwan from the spring's mosque and asked them to come and save the mosque from the control of the Jews. In his words, he led a pogrom against the Jewish residents of the City of David who also live in Silwan. In an event from August 26, 2010, Sheikh Abu Snina announced by loudspeaker that the residents "should come and protect the spring mosque from the settlers." As a result of this call, which was in the middle of the night, many came and began to throw stones at Jewish homes and burn the cars of the Jewish residents.⁸⁴

In other words, for Silwan, as elsewhere in Jerusalem, there is no Jewish tie, either historical or archeological, that authenticates the words of the Bible as they relate to the first and second temples. The archeological remains in Jerusalem are Canaanite or Muslim. The archaeological remnants found in Jerusalem excavations that describe the Jewish past of the city, such as, for example, the address of the Shiloah, are not even mentioned. The only Jewish king who is sometimes mentioned, but in a negative manner, is Herod, and this is due to the negative ties that this king had which are indicated in Jewish sources.⁸⁵ Speakers from all sides of the Palestinian political spectrum and from many different areas are trying enthusiastically to hide every archeological argument that presents a tie to the Jewish people or confirms the stories in the Bible that are connected to the Kingdom of David or to the period of the second temple.⁸⁶

The pamphlet continues to indicate the Islamic sources that support the historic arguments of the city's residents.

It is not a coincidence that the men of the Jerusalem Fund and the neighborhood committee, especially 'Uthmān Ibn 'Affān, the third caliph of the four righteous caliphs (644–656 AD). In his period there was a flourishing Islamic empire at its height which had been inherited from Umar ibn al-Khattāb. During this period the Qur'an was edited and the foundations for the world of Sunna Islam were determined. The actions of Muhammad and the four righteous caliphs who came after him were a symbol for generations. Every believing Muslim must follow in their footsteps and accept their leadership without question. If the Ottoman caliph dedicated Silwan to the Islamic *waqf*, then no Muslim is able to change this and anyone who agrees to a change is a heretic.⁸⁷ Salah al-din al-Ayyubi was also used to justify the myth of Islamic ownership over Silwan forever. He, the one who freed all of Palestine and Jerusalem, saw that it was right to return the crown of old and Silwan to the *waqf* for the Muslims. Even if the area of the spring was written as *waqf*, it was only recorded as such at the beginning of the 19th century. This does not change the status of the area of Silwan and turn it into an Islamic holy place for generations. It must be said that modern studies know exactly where the borders are of the Waqf al-Salahya (the *waqf* that is attributed to Salah al-Din) and the Shiloah Spring is not included in this area. If

so, then what is the purpose of the Israeli steps according to the writers, residents of Silwan?

The archaeological digs in Jerusalem are not scientific according to the writers and are only a means to justify the counterfeiting of Jewish history. All the finds discovered there and which belong to the Jewish history of the area are irrelevant for determining the city's history. The Antiquities Authority, which is a body of the State of Israel, does carry out excavations at this location. In these excavations, many artifacts have been discovered that totally refute the arguments of the Palestinian factors.⁸⁸ But why let facts get in the way to confuse and hurt the Palestinian and Muslim struggle against the Jewish presence in Jerusalem? In the pamphlet translated here, the steps for the Judaization of Silwan, which are based on history made up by the Jews for this purpose, are described at great length.⁸⁹

*According to their method, the Jews are forging the history of Jerusalem and their writings in the Talmud and all of the other holy literature repeat the same lies generation after generation.*⁹⁰ From where does all this evil depicted in the program that was presented come from? Why is it important for the Jews to Judaize Jerusalem? From an historical point of view, they do not have, so to speak, any archaeological ties to the city and its sites. That is the answer of this pamphlet which is under the headline that emphasizes that the struggle is one about their very existence as Palestinians.

Silwan is somehow the lobby through which the settlers are trying to Judaize Jerusalem. These Judaization steps not only include the purchase of houses by the various non-profit organizations in Silwan but there is also a distorted view of the history of Jerusalem.

In other words, the Palestinians argue that the Jews are faking the history of the city and twisting it and presenting alternative history whose purpose is to prove an historical and archaeological tie to the Jewish people. These steps are being carried out parallel to the additional steps that determine facts on the ground whose purpose, in the end, is the Judaization of Jerusalem and the establishment of the Jewish holy temple. These steps are being carried out, according to the Islamic speakers, in order to lead to the third *intifada*, which will prevent Israel from carrying out its intentions.⁹¹

It is not only Islamic forces that, to the best of their abilities, are trying to thwart any Israeli attempts to build in East Jerusalem or to apply sovereignty on the entire city. The Palestinian Authority is also illegally active in the city breaking the intermediary agreements that prohibit its activities. This activity is nurtured through aid from international and Israeli factors which see the Israeli activity in East Jerusalem as an obstacle to peace. Examples of such activities are the conferences that the Authority organizes inside the Jerusalem neighborhoods as well as the activities of the Palestinian Authority's governor, Adnan al-Husseyini, and on behalf of the minister responsible

for Jerusalem, who see themselves as responsible for East Jerusalem as well. In the monthly *Al-Hayat al-Islamiyah al-Masihiyah le-Nasara al-Quds wa-al-Muqaddasat* (the Islamic-Christian Committee for Protecting Jerusalem and the Holy Places), Israeli crimes in East Jerusalem and the activities of the Authority toward various factors due to this activity⁹² are described in detail.

The importance of Jerusalem in Islamic thought is great. Jerusalem was the first *qibla* (direction of prayer in Islam) chosen by the Prophet Muhammad. It is the land of prophecy and blessing. Jerusalem is, as Sheikh al-Qaradawi emphasizes, the problem of every Muslim.⁹³ Therefore, how would it be possible to compromise over Jerusalem or even a small part of it with the Zionist robbers. Every step or change, even a small one, in Jerusalem and especially on the holy Temple Mount, including the Western Wall, is being watched and is described as part of a Jewish plot. According to these Muslim groups, the Jews have no right to their holiest places in Jerusalem.⁹⁴

On the websites and in the *dawah* literature of Islamic Jihad and Hamas there are many photos of a warrior with his weapons against a background of the Temple Mount, mostly the Dome of the Rock. The goal is the liberation of all Palestine—and the headline is the expulsion of the Jews from Jerusalem. According to their approach, one needs to free Jerusalem from the Jewish impurity of *khaybar* which defiles the spires of al-Aqsa. Until the freedom of al-Aqsa is achieved, the struggle with the Jews and the *jihad* will continue.

The Islamic attitude towards Jerusalem makes the assumption that Islam is the only *din al-haq* (true religion) while Judaism is the *din al-batal* (religion of lies).⁹⁵ According to this way of thinking, Islam has replaced Judaism and Christianity as the true religion and is on a higher level of faith. However, nowadays, since Judaism has returned to life and strength and Jewish Jerusalem is being rebuilt, this may lead to the building of a third holy temple which cannot possibly be allowed, thereby creating religious Islamic opposition before everything else. That is why there is such a strong struggle against the Judaization of the city by trying to deny any Jewish tie to Jerusalem and the land of Israel.⁹⁶

Notes

- 1 The English translation of this verse is from <http://quran.com/17>. This is the only verse in the Qur'an that hints that the al-Aqsa mosque is in Jerusalem. Khaled Abu 'Arafah explained to me that Jerusalem is mentioned in the Qur'an seven times. Every place the Qur'an mentions the holy land, it is referring to Jerusalem because the land is only holy because of this city. Interview in Jerusalem with Khaled Abu 'Arafah, Feb. 1, 2012.
- 2 The Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem is recognized as an illegal union, separate from all the other branches of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas and the Islamic Movement in Israel). It was declared illegal according to Israeli law by Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak, on July 23, 2007. See the Defense Ministry website, www.mod.gov.il/pages/general/pdfs/terror.pdf. Muslim Brotherhood activists who, in reality, represent Hamas in the Palestinian parliament are: Muhammad Mahmoud Abu Tir, Minister Khaled Ibrahim Ishak Abu 'Arafah,

Muhammad Imran Saleh Tutah and Ahmad Muhammad Ahmad Attoun. These four were arrested due to their membership in the Hamas organization and were expelled to the area of the Palestinian Authority. They still carry out their struggle to return to the Jerusalem area and have even established a protest tent on this matter. Their activities against their expulsion are described in detail in a pamphlet published under the auspices of the Palestinian Legislative Council, titled *Khima al-Tisam* (Protest Tent) (Ramallah: al-Daara al-Alamiyah lil-Nawab al-Islamiya al-Daffa al-Gharbia, 2010). Some of them succeeded in finding temporary sanctuary in the office building of the Red Cross in Jerusalem but their expulsion still hangs over their heads and it is possible that they will be expelled in the future.

- 3 See Hillel Cohen, *The Market Square is Empty: The Rise and Fall of Arab Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 2007), pp.183–94. Similar remarks were made to the author when he interviewed Ahmad Attoun, a Hamas representative from the Jerusalem area to the Palestinian Legislative Council, who was arrested on September 26, 2011 because he refused to leave Jerusalem.
- 4 See the Hemmah movement’s website, www.hemmah.net.
- 5 See the editorial in *Qassamiyun*, a periodical published by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, p.1. On page 33 the members of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam indicate that they are at the front for the protection of the al-Aqsa mosque. On page 34 of the magazine there is a “Song of Praise” to Sheikh Salah, whose picture is at the top on a background of al-Aqsa. The author of the rhyming song is Ibrahim Abu al-Hawa. The connection is clear.
- 6 The riots lasted ten days, and took place during the same period as the celebration of the Feast of Tabernacles. The riots included stone throwing and the throwing of Molotov cocktails at the security forces stationed in Silwan, Issawiya, Ras al-Amoud and in the area of the entrance to the holy temple, especially in the Muslim Quarter. During this time, the entry of Jews to the Temple Mount was limited and sometimes prohibited. A number of proclamations were also distributed, among them this proclamation, which was found all over East Jerusalem.
- 7 Dr. Zahid is referring to the words of Sheikh ‘Abd al-Aziz al-Zaydani, a man of the cloth with great influence in Yemen and elsewhere, who joined with al-Qaradawi to start a *jihad* against Israel. Dr. Issam al-‘Abd Zahid, “al-Jihad fi Fiker al-Imam al-Qaradawi,” in Dr. Talib Hamad Abu Sha’ar, Ismail Haniyeh et al. (eds) *Jahud al-Doctor Yusuf al-Qaradawi, fi Hidamat al-Islam wa-Nasrah al-Qadiya al-Falastinia* [Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Efforts in the Service of Islam and his Support for the Palestinian Case] (Gaza Strip: Office of the Martyrs and Religious Matters, 2010), pp.153–54.
- 8 Among those lodging on the Temple Mount during those days was Ali Abu Sheikha of the Islamic movement, an advisor on the matters of Jerusalem who argues that his stay there was part of the good deed of *i’tikāf*, “seclusion,” a religious commandment where the believer prays and lodges on the *masjid* as a personal requirement. Interview with Ali Abu Sheikha, Jerusalem, October 18, 2009.
- 9 A raised platform, usually of wood, on which the preacher (*al-khatib*) stands and preaches his sermon.
- 10 A niche in the wall facing Mecca which symbolizes the direction of prayer (*al-qibla*) in the mosque.
- 11 A chapter in the Qur’an dealing with the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent to the sky from al-Aqsa, *Surat al-Isra’* (The Night Journey), as quoted above. See <http://quran.com/17>.
- 12 Emphasis added.
- 13 *Al-mukhlisin*, the loyalists. An Islamic expression relating to those who are pure in the soul and loyal to the way of Islam, but also an expression used for their savior, another name for Jesus, for example *al-Mukhales*— the Savior.

- 14 “*La Qadr Allah*”, not valued by God. An Islamic expression which indicates that one is forbidden to do things that are against the will of God.
- 15 For example, in an interview with Ali Abu Sheikha on Radio Monte Carlo on Oct. 10, 2009, he calls for the *murabatun* to come and watch over al-Aqsa. In the interview he indicates that he is in al-Aqsa and he describes the fights that are supposedly taking place on the Temple Mount between the police and the settlers and *al-murabatun* who are on the Mount and are protecting it. In a meeting with this author, after he was arrested due to these events, Ali Abu Sheikha tried to compare the events and the call of the heads of the Islamic movement as a message of peace and indicated to the author that he and Ra’ed Salah called on people to come and to be present on the Temple Mount and to pray there in their multitudes, and that was the meaning of their call to come and protect al-Aqsa. In an interview with Shiekh Kamal Khatib of the Islamic Movement in October 2009, the author was told that the “reason for our presence at al-Aqsa was to protect it.”
- 16 See: “al-Sheikh Salah Yad’au ila al-Nafir al-’Aam li-Nasra al-Aqsa” [al-Sheikh Salah Call Day of General Recruitment to Support al-Aqsa], *Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam*, Aug. 28, 2013, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=139527; “ Hamas: I’atiqal al-Sheikh Ra’ed Salah lan Yewaqef Sha’abna ’an al-Zahaf li-al-Aqsa Ghadan,” *Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam*, Sept. 3, 2013, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=139796; “Ra’ed Salah: Ajra’aat al-Ihtilal Tuasas li-Taqsim Zamani wa-Makani li-al-Aqsa,” *Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam*, Sept. 9, 2013, www.palinfo.com/site/pic/newsdetails.aspx?ItemId=140043.
- 17 ’AM’I 20317-09-13, *Ra’ed Salah Mahajne vs. the State of Israel*. A decision on the appeal which took place in the Central Jerusalem Court, Judge Arnun Darel, Sept. 15, 2013.
- 18 In the proclamation the word “*majib*” is used, which means, “we will answer” or “we will acquiesce.” The word is very meaningful in Islam and is another name for the Creator.
- 19 The *sura* of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent to the sky from the area of the al-Aqsa mosque. According to this *sura*, Muhammad arrived on his wonderous horse al-Buraq, and he alighted from his horse and ascended to the sky. There is no mention of Jerusalem in this description, which appears in the Qur’an, but this is the accepted explanation by the Islamic religious leaders. See *Surat the Night Journey*, in Rivlin, *The Qu’ran*, pp.279–95. Likewise, see also Rivlin’s note 3, that it is possible that the mosque referred to is found in Mecca and not Jerusalem. See also note 1, p.226.
- 20 This refers to the attitude of the Palestinians towards the boundary fence around Jerusalem and Israeli law which places limitations on the Palestinian residents of Judea and Samaria from entering Jerusalem.
- 21 Emphasis added.
- 22 Emphasis in original.
- 23 Roni Shaked, “The Leader of the Islamic Movement: The Capture of Jerusalem will End Soon,” *Yedioth Ahronoth*, Sept. 17, 2006; also Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.40–41, which also quotes Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ali Hosseini Khamenei from Iran, who express themselves in a similar way. The Islamic state that will arise will of course include the Arab states and will be called “The State of the Islamic Nation.”
- 24 Ra’ed Salah’s speech in Umm al-Fahm at the conference “Umm al-Fahm is in Danger.” At the conference, (which was called *al-muhajiroun*) 50,000 observers took part. They applauded enthusiastically to the calls of “With spirit and blood we will free you al-Aqsa.” Convention participants included many well-known important figures from East Jerusalem, among them Hatem ’Abd al-Qadr ’Aid, who holds the Jerusalem Ministry in Fatah and who, until recently, was also the minister on Jerusalem affairs in the Palestinian Authority, and who lives in the

- Shu'afat Refugee Camp; Sheikh Abdullah Alqam from East Jerusalem who is also known as a religious figure; and others.
- 25 Although this proclamation does not indicate which animals the settlers resemble, there are many Islamic sources that refer to the Jews as pigs and apes. Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.55–56.
 - 26 Regarding Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and his influence, see Shagi Pulka, “The Setting of the West and the Rise of Islam under the Authority of Abdullah Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” in Shavit (ed.) *The Decline of the West, the Rise of Islam?*, pp.132–61.
 - 27 From a translation of an article from Nov. 10, 2009, <http://memri.org.il>.
 - 28 These words were first translated from the Arabic by the author from Ra'ed Salah's speech at the 14 al-Mahrajan Conference of Oct. 2009. Channel Shams Palestine, www.youtube.com/watch?v=9KPRja1Z1n0.
 - 29 Ibid.
 - 30 Radio interview with Ali Abu Sheikha, Islamic movement advisor on Jerusalem matters on Radio Monte Carlo, Oct. 10, 2009.
 - 31 That is how the Jewish goal is described in an editorial in *Qassamiyun*, a periodical published by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, p.1.
 - 32 Yahel Shalom, “Arab Workers in the Tower of David Museum: David and Solomon Did Not Live in Jerusalem,” *Makor Rishon*, Jan. 8, 2010. The two quotes above are taken from this article.
 - 33 Ibid.
 - 34 The Jewish Temple is nothing more than a legend, but the attempt to establish a real temple is a dangerous plan. In this interview, Ra'ed Salah argues that President Mubarak presented to Netanyahu an alleged existing plan to build the legendary Temple at the expense of the al-Aqsa mosque and that Netanyahu did not deny this. From a translation of an article on the MEMRI site, Nov. 10, 2009, www.memri.org.il.
 - 35 Abd Allah Ma'aruf 'Amer, *al-Madkhl ila Drasah, Masjid al-Aqsa al-Mubark* (Jerusalem: Muassasah 'Amarah al-Aqsa wa-al-Muqadasat, n.d.), pp.140–44.
 - 36 Anthony and Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country*, p.312. According to Nusseibeh's arguments, the discussions at the Camp David talks of 2000 blew up because of the subject of the Temple Mount. There are many who agree with this opinion even on the Israeli side. See Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, p.70.
 - 37 David Anthony and Sari Nusseibeh, *Once Upon a Country*, pp.385–86. Also the advertisements of the High Muslim Council in regard to al-Haram al-Sharif from 1924. A photograph of this advertisement appears in Dore Gold's book. In the text, the holiness of the Temple Mount is already recognized from ancient times as is the connection with King David. Regarding the holy temple that was there, al-Haram al-Sharif, it was said: “Its identification with Solomon's Temple is not at all in dispute”: Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, p.279.
 - 38 Dr. Adel Yahya, Dr. Ma'ayan Sadek and Dr. Hannah 'Abd al-Nur (eds) *Dalil Falestine al-Siyahi al-Daffa al-Gharbia wa-al-Quota Gaza* [A Tourist Guide to Palestine, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip] (Ramallah: Muassasah al-Falestinya lil-Tabadel al-Thaqafi, 2000), pp.40, 46–47, 57.
 - 39 It is clear that there are many other different reasons appearing in research literature on this topic. The Palestinian argument appears in Hamas educational films—in the ninth part, titled: *Israel-al-Hilm al-Sahayoni, al-Af'ae al-Yehudiyah ... Tatal be-Rasah* [Israel—the Zionist Dream, the Jewish Snake (Adder) Sucks his Head, 1948–1987], Oct. 5, 2007; and the tenth part of the series titled: *al-Intifada Bidaya wa-Nihaya, Malabasat al Intifada al- Falestinya* [The Intifada from the Beginning to the End, the Reasons for the Palestinian Intifada, 1987–2000], Oct. 14, 2007. The Palestinians emphasize in their school books that the conflict is a religious-based one. These films (in Arabic), which describe the Palestinian history of the conflict, are found at: <http://palestineremembered.com> and are called “Palestinian

- History for Beginners.” These films are found alongside other films that present the Palestinian narrative.
- 40 Harel and Issacharoff, *The Seventh War*, p.19.
 - 41 William Booth and Ruth Eglash, “Knife Attacks on Israelis Add to Unease; Two Killed in Separate Assaults,” *The Washington Post*, November 10, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/knife-attacks-on-israelis-add-to-unease-1-killed-3-wounded-in-two-separate-assaults/2014/11/10/226cc9c2-ad89-4194-ba66-cf4d0fc9d7d3_story.html; Nir Hasson, “Prominent U.S.-Born Right-Wing Activist Seriously Wounded in Jerusalem Shooting,” *Ha’aretz*, Oct. 29, 2014, www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.623487; Yaniv Kubovich and Nir Hasson, “Shin Bet Believes Yehuda Glick’s Shooter Had an Accomplice,” *Ha’aretz*, Oct. 31, 2014, www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.623781.
 - 42 From the certificate of appreciation that was sent to the Hijazi family from al-Kutla al-Islamiya (the Islamic Bloc) at Bir Zeit University. Al-Kutla al-Islamiya is a Hamas-affiliated student organization at universities in the West Bank and Gaza.
 - 43 To differentiate it from the Islamic Jihad in Palestine under the leadership of Dr. Ramadan Shalah, which is the central faction of the *jihad* organizations in Palestine and has been presented in previous chapters. The Beit al-Maqdis faction is much smaller but one with much influence—particularly in the area of East Jerusalem.
 - 44 Anat Kurz (ed.), Maskit Burgin and David Tal, *Islamic Terrorism and Israel: Hezbollah, Islamic Palestinian Jihad and Hamas* (Tel Aviv, 1994), pp.129–30.
 - 45 *Dawah jahiliyyah* means “calling of infidels,” which relates to the pre-Islamic age of ignorance. The Islamic zealots place everything that is principally invalid and unjust and incorrect as belonging to the *jahiliyyah* period.
 - 46 In the original, *Bein Abnah al-beit al-Wahed waal-Hai al-Wahed*. This means between family members of one family from a single neighborhood.
 - 47 *Fitnah* means “argument.” In the history of Islam, the *fitnah* symbolizes “civil war” between believers, which breaks out due to a religious conflict. An additional meaning of the word is also heresy, “wandering” from the straight path. That is why one must prevent a conflict of this type among the Muslims who live in Silwan. In this case, the writer means the differences of opinions on the way that one should behave towards the Jewish settlers in Silwan.
 - 48 The Arabic word used here is *al-Wahab*, which means “the generous.” This is another name for the Creator, *Surat Family of Imran* (3), verse 8, <http://quran.com/3>.
 - 49 Kurz et al., *Islamic Terrorism and Israel*, p.122.
 - 50 Mordechai Kedar, “How to Support Terror without being Called a Terrorist,” *Maraah*, a magazine that deals with politics, society and culture, Aug. 28, 2009, www.maraah-magazine.co.il/show_item.asp?itemId=27&katavaId=978&levelId=64776&archLev=1.
 - 51 “ Hamas Police End Standoff with Muslim Extremists,” Fox News, July 22, 2009, www.foxnews.com/story/2009/07/22/hamas-police-end-standoff-with-muslim-extremists/.
 - 52 This chapter is based on my article, “The Battle over Silwan: An Attempt to Erase the Jewish Historical Attachment to Jerusalem,” *Middle East Quarterly*, 19(3), Summer 2012, pp.31–41.
 - 53 The Jerusalem Development Authority and the City of Jerusalem launched the King’s Garden on Mar. 2, 2010, www.theisraelproject.org.
 - 54 *Ibid.*, p.7. See also Baruch Teana (ed.), *The Shiloah Spring in the City of David: Chapters for Study on the Shiloah Spring which is the Gichon at the Foot of the City of David, According to the Bible and Sages and the Wise Men of Israel from the Early and the Late Periods in the History of Israel throughout the Generations* (Jerusalem, 2010). This book, as its name, expands and explains the Jewish history of Silwan until today.

- 55 Idan Yosef, "This is How the Development Plan of the Garden of the King in Jerusalem will Look, First Class," News 1, Mar. 3, 2010, www.news1.co.il/Archive/001-D-231774-00.html?tag+23-08-39.
- 56 *Muassasah al-Quds li-Tanmiya* is The Jerusalem Development Fund, a non-profit organization founded in Jerusalem on Mar. 20, 2008. Well-known Islamic figures cooperate with this fund which is, in reality, another institution of the northern stream of the Islamic Movement based in Umm al-Fahm. The fund is also active in legal and social-economic aid to the Arabs of East Jerusalem. *Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud* [Silwan-Struggle for Survival and Presence] (Jerusalem, Apr. 2010), pp.1–3, <http://nabd-alquds.com/?p=4526>. See also the attitude towards and the appreciation for the activities of the movement on the Islamic Jihad website *Shabka Nida al-Quds* [The Reading Network for Jerusalem], May 31, 2011, www.nedayequds.com/arabic/index.php/2011-06-08-14-37-52/152-2011-05-31-08-35-14.html.
- 57 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, "Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud," pp.7–14.
- 58 According to their words, they are refugees from 1948 who went to live in the area of Maaleh Adumim until they were expelled from there in 1967 as a result of the establishment of the city of Maaleh Adumim. For various reasons, over the years they built their houses without permission from the authorities. Their expulsion at this time, as a result of the establishment of the "King's Garden" project, is in fact a third expulsion. Neighborhood spokespersons do not bother to mention in the pamphlet the amount of reparations that were offered or the fact that the proposed plan does not include all of the houses but only a small proportion of them. *Ibid.*, p.6.
- 59 *Jerusalem Post*, May 12, 2011.
- 60 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, "Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud," pp.24–26. It must be indicated that the pages translated here and later are written only in Arabic and are intended for the local population. The rest of the pages in the pamphlet are written in two languages—English and Arabic—and are aimed at the human rights organizations and additional international elements that can aid the residents in their struggle—each factor according to the language appropriate to it.
- 61 The text does not indicate when this was—in 1967 or perhaps recently?
- 62 According to their arguments, the buildings were built as part of a never approved building plan for this open area by the Jordanian regime before 1967. The residents, even during the legal process in the courts, never presented any documentation that supported this claim.
- 63 "The holy basin" is a political-geographic nickname for the Old City between the walls which includes the area of the Temple Mount. This area is not defined exactly, but it is usually used in theoretical-political discussions on the future of Jerusalem.
- 64 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, "Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud," pp.25–26.
- 65 After the announcement of the plan, the residents established a protest tent in the center of Silwan. Here they centralized their struggle against the Judaization plan. Gatherings by leftist activists and other international organizations that helped them in their struggle were held in the tent.
- 66 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, "Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud," p.26.
- 67 *Karitha* is an expression used for the Holocaust, meaning destruction, or disaster. In the 1950s and 1960s, this was used as a synonym for the *Nakba*, the disaster of 1948. An example of this is the book by Abdullah al-Tel, *Karithat Falastine*,

- Mudakarāt Abdulla al-Tel, Qa'ad Maarakat al-Quds* (Cairo: Dar al-Masri, 1959), a book in which he analyzes the reasons for the defeat and the disaster in Palestine.
- 68 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, “*Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud*,” p.27, on which one can see a photograph of a demonstration where residents are carrying signs with these slogans.
- 69 Ra'ed Salah in his introduction in the pamphlet of al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, *Sarakha Tahdhir, Min Mukhatat Kedem Yerushalaim—Urshalim Awalan* [An Urgent Cry: A Plan for Advancing Jerusalem—Jerusalem First] (Umm al-Fahm, 2009), pp.2–3. The pamphlet shows the Israeli plans (undated) in Jerusalem.
- 70 “Sheikh al-Azhar Yada’u le-Ahbat al-Mukhatatat al-Sahayonia li-Hadam al-Aqsa” [Sheikh al-Azhar Informs on the Thwarting of the Zionist Plan to Destroy al-Aqsa], Markaz al-Falastini li-al-A’alam, Sept. 17, 2011, www.palestine-info.info; Editorial, *Qassamiyun*, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, p.1. On page 18, the Zionist crimes to al-Aqsa are described under the headline “*Irahabyun— Terrorists*” (alongside photos of the head of the Israeli delegation with an emphasis on Ariel Sharon and Yitzchak Rabin). On page 33, they indicate that the members of Izz al-din al-Qassam are at the forefront of the fight to protect al-Aqsa mosque and its activities. Abdullah Zaydan, “Kul Karsh Tidad’ a fi Suke al-Quds howe Musahma fi Maaraka al-Sumud wa-Muwagaha al-Tawhid” [Every Cent that is to be Paid for in the Markets of Jerusalem is a Stockholder in the War of Standing Strong (for the Arab Residents of Jerusalem) and the Objections to the Judaization Activities], *Sawt al-Haq wa-al-Horiya*, Apr. 29, 2011, www.sawt-alhaq.com/Web/Pages/Deta ils.aspx?ID=10615.
- 71 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, “*Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud*,” pp.4–6, explaining in Arabic the real reason why the Arab residents of Silwan resist the Kings Garden plan. A complete translation follows.
- 72 *Ibid.*, p.4. This is the introduction of the original text.
- 73 *Ibid.*, p.4.
- 74 The Muqrabi neighborhood was a crowded neighborhood founded in 1193 by Salah al-din. The neighborhood was originally designated for those originally from Morocco and that is from where it got its name. The neighborhood was destroyed on June 10, 1967, and its 650 residents were evacuated and received compensation. That is where the open area near the Wailing Wall was created. It is important to note that during the period of the British Mandate, the Jews suffered from the arm of the residents of the neighborhood and from the incited Arabs who passed by the area and entered the Temple Mount through the Muqrabi Gate. See Yuval Baruch, who serves as an archeologist in the Jerusalem area for the Department of Antiquities, “Ma’ale Hamougrabim—the Real Story,” on the Department of Antiquities site, www.antiquities.org.il/article_Item_ido.asp?sec_id=17&sub_subj_id=468.
- 75 Who was Herod? During what period was he active? Why did he establish the pool? Who lived in Jerusalem during those years? Those who are rewriting history in this pamphlet simply ignore all this.
- 76 Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Muqaddasi lived in the 10th century (335–390 from the *Hijra*, 945–1000 AD). His book, *Ahsan al-Taqasim fi Ma’rifat al-Aqalim* [The Best Way to Recognize Geographic Places] (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1967), details the history and the geography of the various areas inside the Islamic empire during the period of the Abbasid Caliphate. The source for the pamphlet does not bother to list the page that refers to him in this thick book, but he is mentioned there. Regarding the importance of al-Muqaddasi for the understanding of Arabic geography of the 10th century and its general importance, see www.alargam.com/general/arabsince/10.htm.
- 77 There are also Palestinian sources who think otherwise. These argue that the aqueduct of the Shiloah was built by Hezekiah, the king of Judah, to carry water

- from the Ein Gichon spring, and that King David did indeed built his city in Jerusalem. Yahya et al., *Dalil Falestine al-Siyahi al-Daffa al-Gharbia wa-al-Quota Gaza*, pp.40, 51.
- 78 The Mugrabi Gate which leads in the direction of the Temple Mount and al-Aqsa mosque, which is inside it, from the direction of the Jewish Quarter.
- 79 Emphasis added.
- 80 Emphasis added.
- 81 Emphasis added. This is somehow the goal of the Jews in the City of David: To establish the third (imaginary) temple. That is what is argued, as mentioned previously; also see the aforementioned Hamas publicity.
- 82 Jerusalem Foundation for Development and al-Bustan Neighborhood Committee, *Silwan ... Siraa Bekaa Wawagud*, pp.5–6.
- 83 Originally from Hebron.
- 84 Ariel Noi, “Riots in Silwan. Firefighters were Attacked; Cars were Burned,” *Walla*, Aug. 26, 2010, <http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/1726205>.
- 85 In part eight of the educational films on Palestine, Herod is presented as the one who destroyed the holy temple. The title of the film is *'An Tarik al-Khida'a min al Tasel al Mustakin ila al-Hajum al-Muslem* [The Way of Deceit, from the Ingratiating Infiltrations to the Muslim Attacks, 1870–1948], www.palestineremembered.com/GeoPoints/Palestinian_History_For_Beginners_5375/Article_2839.html, Jul. 24, 2007. This is the same Herod whom our sages praised for the widespread restoration that was carried out on the holy temple until it was said, “Whoever did not see Herod’s building never saw a beautiful building in his life,” Baba Batra, 4.a.
- 86 See Shaul Bartal, “Who Invented the Invention of the Jewish Nation,” *e-mago*, Oct. 4, 2010, www.e-mago.co.il/Editor/history-3366.htm; Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.12–14; and Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Quds Qadiya kol Muslem* (Doha, 1998), www.qaradawi.net/new/library/2/288-2014-01-26-18-53-56 (the entire book can be found on the website); Saleh, *History of Palestine*, pp.10–74.
- 87 Herrera and Kressel, *Jihad*, pp.105–7. The Islamic conquests continued during the period of the Caliph ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān. ‘Uthmān also edited the Qur’an until he was murdered in 656 AD by the supporters of Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph. See also Aslan, *No God but God*, pp.189–95.
- 88 See the site of the Antiquities Authority, www.antiquities.org.il/search_eng.asp?q=city+of+dauid&image1.x=24&image1.y=9. The results of the excavations in the City of David over the past few years are reported on this site.
- 89 Shaul Bartal, “The Battle over Silwan: An Attempt to Erase the Jewish Historical Attachment to Jerusalem,” *Middle East Quarterly*, 19(3), pp.39–41.
- 90 See al-Jamia al-Islamiya, *al-Mufawadhat min Manzur Islami ...*, pp.20–21; Hamdan, *al-Isti'mar wa-al-Sahyunia al-Alamia*, pp.94–112.
- 91 See the aforementioned advertisement of al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, *Sarakha Tahdhir, Min Mukhatat Kedem Yerushalaim*. The pamphlet goes into small details through the use of aerial photos of the Jewish plans to Judaize Jerusalem and to build an imaginary holy temple. The pamphlet quotes, among other things, the speeches of Sheikh Ra’ed Salah Mahagna on the matter discussed here. See also the advertisement by the Markaz al-Darasat al-Muasara [The Center for Modern Studies] in Umm al-Fahm, a center identified with the Islamic movement headed by Ra’ed Salah. Ibrahim Abu Jaber, “Mashri’a Tawhid Madinat al-Quds wa-Fars Ishta’al Intifada Thalatha” [A Judaization Plan for the City of Jerusalem Lights the Spark of the Third Intifada], Mar. 4, 2010, www.center-cs.net/Web/Pages/Details.aspx?ID=363.
- 92 Thus, for example, the Dec. 2009 journal describes many activities such as the closing of the French Cultural Center in East Jerusalem on Dec. 17, 2009; the destruction of a protest tent in the neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah by the city of Jerusalem on Dec. 18, 2009; an interview with Hatem ‘Abd al-Qadr ‘Aid, who

holds the Jerusalem file for Fatah, Dec. 27, 2009; or an article that deals with the destruction of 103 Palestinian buildings in Jerusalem in 2009. Al-Hayat al-Islamiyah al-Masihiyah le-Nasara al-Quds wa al-Muqaddasat, Salsala Taqdir 22, “Waqa’a wa-Ahdath” [Incidents and Events], Dec. 2009, pp.4–7. See also the website of this committee in concert with and supporting the Palestinian Authority, www.elquds.org.

- 93 Al-Qaradawi, *al-Quds Qadiya kol Muslem*. Al-Qaradawi emphasizes that the chapters of the pamphlet placed on his site bring the holiness of Jerusalem and include the religious proof for this. See Gold, *The Fight for Jerusalem*, pp.94–118.
- 94 Mahmud Abu ’Ataa, *Madinat al-Quds wa-al-Masjid al-Aqsa, 2009 ... ila Ayna?* (Umm al-Fahm: Muassasah al-Aqsa lil-Waqf wa-al-Trath, 2009), pp.1–37.
- 95 Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwān al-Muslamin fi filastin hata ’am 1970*, pp.9, 129, 133–34. Since Hasan al-Banna in 1928, this is one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s core principles about Israel.
- 96 See Ra’ed Salah’s introduction in Ahmed Fathi Khalifa, *Dalil Awal al-Qiblatayn; Thani al Masgidayn wa-Thaleth al-Haramayn* [The Guide to the First Qibla, the Second Mosque, the Third Holy Place] (Jerusalem: Muassasah al-Aqsa, 2012), pp.17–18.

Afterword

In January 2006, the Hamas movement won the democratic election held in the Palestinian Authority. The movement won 76 of a total of 132 seats on the Palestinian National Council, realized its declared purpose and became the ruling party.

The Hamas electoral victory was not only due to the disappointment in the corruption of the Palestinian Authority, as many Fatah factors have tried to argue,¹ but was mainly due to the widespread support by the Palestinian population for Hamas, support that reflects the strength of the Islamic streams.²

Unfortunately, due to the Fatah movement's objections, Hamas was unable to enjoy the fruits of its victory. Its leaders felt limited in their ability to carry out the Islamic Vision as they saw it in the area of the Palestinian Authority. These struggles led to the Hamas revolution in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, which led to Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip until the appeasement agreement was signed on April 23, 2014, and the Rami Hamdallah government was established.

If we consider the January 25 election as a survey representing the percentage of support for the various political streams in Palestinian society, and if we take into account, as the centers of Palestinian research do, that the men of Islamic Jihad, despite the fact that they announced a boycott of the election, in practice, voted for Hamas,³ we can thereby conclude that the Islamic stream, which is made up of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, has support of approximately 60% of the population.⁴ It is necessary to add to this figure the 10% of the population that supports Hizb al-Tahrir. This movement did not participate in the election held in the Palestinian Authority as it ideologically opposes both Hamas, which it sees as a European agent, and Fatah, which it sees as an American agent. Thus, the sum of the support for the Islamic parties, as described in this book, already stands at about 70% of the residents of the territories.

An analysis of the trends in Palestinian public opinion from a survey carried out in the Lebanese refugee camps in May 2006, after the election to the Palestinian Authority, also shows a clear advantage of the Islamic stream over the secular stream. This survey was conducted in both 2005 and 2006—in

other words both before and after the election for the Palestinian legislative council. In 2005, support for Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) stood at 12.7% and in 2006, after the election, it stood at 10.6%. In these surveys, both Ismail Haniyah and Khalid Mashal received higher results than Abu Mazen (12.5% and 13.6%, according to the 2006 survey).⁵ The Hamas movement was rated in third place, in certain aspects, after Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in terms of percentage support among the population.⁶ However, the most worrying statistic is that even among those who support Fatah, there is no unequivocal support in the possibility of peace with Israel. After the election of January 2006, 66% of Fatah supporters in the refugee camps supported Hamas' demand to not recognize Israel despite the pressure on Hamas to do so. In the rest of the movements, the majority supporting the non-recognition of Israel stood at "only" 80% and up. If you include Islamic Jihad supporters and Hamas, we are talking about a majority of 96.5% and higher.⁷

Even the election for the presidency, which took place in 2005, the one in which Mahmoud Abbas was chosen as president of the Palestinian Authority, testifies to the weakness of the support for Abu Mazen and his government. After Yasser Arafat's death in November 2004, Abbas was chosen as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In the election for the presidency, which was democratic and held on January 9, 2005, under international supervision, there were seven candidates, among them Abu Mazen, who received a majority of 62% of the votes (in other words, 38% of the Palestinian voters did not choose him at all). The candidate who received the next largest number of votes was Mustafa al-Barghouthi, a past leader of the communist movement and the secretary of the "National Initiative," an institution that drafts international support for Palestinian rights. He won a 20% share of support. One fact that is often forgotten is that only 65% of the Palestinian public voted. In other words, 35% boycotted the election for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority. If you add that number to those who already voted but who did not vote for Abu Mazen, it appears that he was chosen for the presidency by only a 36% share of the Palestinian public.⁸ What will happen in the next election (due to be held in 2015 according to the appeasement agreement)? Will Abu Mazen lose his position as president in favor of an Islamic candidate?⁹

It is the widespread *dawah* literature (of which only a minute amount has been translated for this book) distributed among Palestinian society that is responsible for the anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli approaches and which negate any effort toward coexistence with the Jews and with Israel. The *dawah* literature is, at its source, a call to the believer to come and join Islam. *Dawah* is also a social welfare activity that gives popular support to the Islamic groups.¹⁰ However, in addition to being reading matter, the *dawah* literature has additional goals (examples of which can clearly be seen through the translated pamphlets in this book), which can be divided into four main categories:

- To teach Islamic education and recruit supporters for Islamic groups.
- To slander the names of the national secular Muslim leaders or the infidel rule.
- To call on Islamic leaders and the Muslim traitors to repent.
- To strengthen Islamic identity in its struggle against the tyranny of the foreign ruler (Israel) and to encourage any activities that will impair it.

The literature translated for this book definitely falls into these criteria. Thus, for example, the pamphlet on negotiations from an Islamic point of view combines several categories. It is a call to the Palestinians' leader and the Muslim traitors (according to the view of Islamic Jihad) to repent, as well as a document that slanders the PLO command and those who carry out negotiations in the name of the Palestinian people. The pamphlet, which is the will of the heroes of God, serves to portray the proper way of life for the believer and the proper education for the young Muslim. The purpose of the pamphlet of al-Jamia al-Islamiya is to draft supporters for Islamic Jihad, etc. However, in addition to the recruiting and the preparation of hearts, the *dawah* literature is also a means of criticizing existing society. It is a means to expel sick ideas that hurt the Muslim community as well as a warning to those who do not obey the order of the Islamic conscience.

In this context, the *dawah* literature of the Islamic Movement in Israel is especially interesting. It does not first address the rulers but rather speaks directly to the members of the Muslim community, a minority in their Motherland, who, according to their system, are ruled by foreign despotic rule. From the beginning, the Jewish ruler is seen as a heretic who will never listen to the voice of the faith. Accordingly, the purpose of this literature is to draw as clear a picture as possible of the crimes of the occupier—read that as the State of Israel—with an emphasis on the religious aspect of its activities. In other words, in their eyes, the Jewish State acts in a contemptible way due to the cosmic struggle between Islam and heresy, and especially between Muslims and Jews—a struggle with roots in Islam from the period of the Prophet Muhammad. The purpose of the struggle is to establish an Islamic state on the ruins of the State of Israel. It is possible that this goal will only be reached in stages and not all at once, but in order to achieve it, it is necessary to have widespread *dawah* activities on the part of the Islamic organizations.¹¹

This *dawah* by Islamic organizations whose members are residents with Israeli citizenship is especially evident in the Jerusalem area where, in addition to the regular known organizations such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Freedom Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), there are local organizations which, for the most part, have ties like these or others with a larger mother organization. Thus, for example, "Hammah," which is tied to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem and Hamas, al-Aqsa Union for Development which is, in reality, a branch of the northern Islamic Movement under Ra'ed Salah in Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad—Beit al-Makdis is a branch of Islamic Jihad that sits in Jordan. The *dawah*, in this case, is aimed at a Muslim population with political rights

in the State of Israel. Its purpose is to consolidate this group so that it can deal more effectively with the “tyrannical Jewish rule” (their words) and protect what is holy for Islam. This is the fourth and unique goal of the Islamic movements active in Israel and which use their freedom of speech and organization given to them by the State to their advantage.¹²

The *dawah* is an introduction that prepares the hearts to carry out *jihad* against the infidels. In the words of Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azzam:

There is no escaping the fact that the *jihad* way for the victory of the religion of Allah will take place through a *dawah* which is clear and open in regard to the unity of the creator and to the implementation [of the idea] that “There is no God other than Allah” in the souls of the people and in the uniqueness of the divinity and the knowledge of God and afterwards the uniqueness of the names and the descriptions. The *dawah* will begin from the first moment, from the gathering of the people around it and then, when there will be [a] group of people gathered around it who will sacrifice themselves for it and will live for it, under the *jahiliyyah* [the burning] and will begin to move around in order to make it fail. That is when there will be a battle between this group and the *jahiliyyah* and on the way people will fall. There is no alternative than to capture a piece of land that it is appropriate where the religion of Allah will exist and there is no escaping the fact that the propagandists will invest their efforts and their *jihad* in the direction of this land until Allah will grant them the victory.¹³

The challenge for everything that relates to the Islamic Movement in Israel is doubled and tripled. The *jahiliyyah* is not just the government, which is a Jewish infidel government, but also those Muslims who cooperate with the Jewish government and who are ready to accept its direction.¹⁴ Here it is important for the Islamic Movement to emphasize its uniqueness to its Islamic friends. That is why it is also the northern faction of the movement that vehemently opposes any type of integration into the central regime, such as running for the Knesset—because in that way lies recognition, albeit partial, of the legitimacy of the infidel regime, the same regime that, according to them, carried out the disaster of 1948 and is responsible for the Judaization of Jerusalem and contaminating al-Aqsa.

The *dawah* provides a way to recruit believers into the movement and encourage their commitment which is derived from their being Muslims who are members and who hold onto the Islamic identity despite the challenges that they currently face, and enables them to muddy anyone who does not agree with this way. The followers of the Islamic movements receive great respect for fulfilling the words of God. That is why if they die, they are martyrs. “And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision.”¹⁵ If they are imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority or by the Jewish occupier, they are

really free because the slaves of God are not afraid of prison bars.¹⁶ If so, what do you have to fear? According to them, only the fear of God over them and it is only the Day of Judgment that they need fear, and what they will say in front of the sovereign. Because it is only those, “And those who strive for us—we will surely guide them to our ways. And indeed, Allah is with the doers of good.”¹⁷

It is acceptable to divide the *dawah* into four central stages. According to these stages, one can see the development of the *dawah* literature of the Islamic institutions in Palestine.¹⁸

The first stage

This is the stage that calls for the cleaving to Allah. In this stage, it is the purpose of the *dawah* pamphlets to provide messages to distribute the words of Islam and educate the people on the blessings of faith. Thus one can analyze the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip during the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁹ One can also analyze the activities of the Islamic Movement’s branches during the 1970s and 1980s. Islamic education begins in the mosques, in the streets and everywhere. When describing the education of the martyrs, many of the descriptions contain references to the education that the martyr suckled from a young age at the nearby mosque, and to his religious devotion.²⁰

The second stage

The second stage is that of cold war. The authors of the *dawah* booklets use them to spread the messages whose purpose is to slander the ruler and to clash with him. This is the situation if the ruler is a Muslim, as it is in the instance of the Palestinian Authority from its establishment in the 1990s until today.²¹ This is also the situation where the ruler is the State of Israel under Jewish leadership. The purpose of the *dawah* is to slander that same state. The *dawah* propaganda does not hesitate to use all the demagogic means at its disposal. It is possible that a situation can arise where the ruler will see incitement in the *dawah* activities that endangers his stance or will act against the various *dawah* organizations such as the activities of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank against the Hamas organizations—for example, al-Tadhamun organization in the Damascus area or the limited Israeli activity against the advertisements of the Islamic Movement headed by Ra’ed Salah.

The third stage

The third stage is that of *jihad* or war. Victory of any kind will be won over the ruler and the *dawah* will be incorporated into the *jihad*. Only the Hamas movement reached this stage, as in 2007, when a revolution was carried out in the Gaza Strip and all the men of the Palestinian Authority who were seen as

a totally *jahili* regime (according to Sayyid Qutb's *Takfir*) due to their total (not just partial) willingness to cooperate with Israel, were expelled. It continued on its way of *jihād* in the Gaza Strip through the use of shooting rockets at Israel and the *dawah* which called, of course, for the continuation of the struggle against Israel and a unification around the Islamic flag, succeeded, through a unity demonstration and Islamic power, to free Gaza without any agreement or limiting conditions to the continuation of the opposition.²² According to the survey in December 2013, 40% of the Palestinian people believe in Hamas' way for the struggle.²³

The fourth stage

The fourth stage is that of final victory. All of the people will come under the wings of Islam as groups and as individuals, for which read: A Muslim Palestine will be established on all of the captured land from the river to the sea. At the end of the process, the whole of Palestine will be freed, which is the goal of all the Islamic movements from Islamic Jihad to the Islamic Movement in Israel.

Reading one pamphlet after another, one article after another about the Islamic Movement, it is impossible to ignore their bottomless hatred of the Jews. The problem of Palestine is not due to the establishment of a non-Muslim state but stems more from the very existence of a Jewish state. The anti-Semitism against the Jews is powerful. All evil and sickness stems, in their opinion, from the nature of the destructive Jew. Various "experts," such as Muslim Brotherhood activist Hassan al-Bash,²⁴ make the Zionist education a factor for the Jews having a particularly mean nature.²⁵ There are a number of reasons for this:

First, the consequences of the bitter rivalry between Muhammad and the Jewish tribes in Medina are felt even today in regard to the feelings of the Muslims towards the Jews. This rivalry, which is attributed to three of the Jewish tribes in Medina and to the Khaybar who were expelled, murdered and whose property was confiscated, make up a model for Jewish-Muslim relationships until today. What was good during the period of the Islamic forefathers of the Prophet and the first caliphs is of course good for those who continue in their ways. The combination of ancient Islamic tradition regarding the Jews in relation to later anti-Semitic motifs is a most destructive anti-Semitic combination.²⁶

Second, the setting of Islam. Even the Jews, the most despised of nations, succeeded in establishing a flourishing state. Combine this with how, in the Muslim world, backwardness rules and economies are at a low point. The world is upside down. It should be Islam that is exalted and nothing more so. That is how it is in relationship to Western culture and especially in regard to the Jews, the sons of patronage (*ahl al-dimmah*), from yesterday, who now appear to have achieved greatness.²⁷

Third, the penetration of Western anti-Semitic motifs. It is impossible to ignore the penetration of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” into the Muslim Arab world. There is a direct reference to the protocols in the Hamas Charter. One cannot say, as the Hamas organization does, that it has nothing against the Jews, but only against Zionism, as long as the movement openly argues in its *dawah* literature and in its charter that the Jews are responsible for all the revolutions and for all the evil, and it warmly adopts the classic anti-Semitic motifs.²⁸ These motifs exist, as has been shown already in the formulation of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Taqi al-Din bin al-Nabhani, Asa’ad al-Tamimi and others. One cannot say that the struggle is against the Zionists while the activists of the Islamic streams believe with all of their might that on Judgment Day, the stone will tell the believer, “Hey, there is a Jew behind me; come and kill him.” Al-Qaradawi, in his analysis of this hadith of the tradition of the tree and the stone, explains it by saying that all the Muslims will gather under the Islamic flag just as the Jews are gathered under the flag of Judaism, and then the victory spoken about above will take place. The Jews today are a mixture (of mostly Khazarites), but they are united in their religion and in their struggle against the Muslim Arabs.²⁹

Fourth, the damage of al-Aqsa, a Muslim symbol. Even if there were periods when Islam was able to be more tolerant towards other religions and allow, for example, the existence of a Jewish synagogue on a mountain, this was all from a stance of control. Today, the Jewish presence on *waqf* land—a holy Islamic place for many generations, in their words—is in the framework of allowing something impure into the house. The renewal of a Jewish presence, which was prohibited for religious reasons for hundreds of years in the area that was considered *waqf* in the eyes of the Muslims, is something very difficult to imagine. This is because Islam is on the defensive against the entire world and it is possible that the Jews will renew the past and in the near future rebuild their third temple on the ruins of the Muslim symbol called al-Aqsa, a step that is, from the point of view of the Islamic loyalists, an announcement of Judgment Day in their struggle against the hated Jews.³⁰

Fifth, Israel is a Western colonial project. In this way, the Islamic movements are no different from the other nationalistic movements or from similar perceptions among Israeli Arabs. Israel is a Western creation that was established with the aid of the British colonial power that continues to exist with the aid of American colonialism. The struggle against colonialism in all its aspects already began at the beginning of the 20th century, initiated by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and has continued, in many forms, until today. The one remnant that sticks out the most in regard to the presence of colonialism is the State of Israel, where the Europeans gathered the Jews in order to solve two problems at once—getting rid of the Jewish presence in their countries and weakening the Muslim world. This is the message that one gets from reading Islamic writings of all of the above-mentioned movements.

These are the central reasons why it is impossible to reach any agreement with Israel. The Islamic movements in Palestine emphasize that they are not alone in the fight as they represent the entire Muslim nation in the struggle against Israel. Today, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Freedom Party are international Islamic parties which are active everywhere that there is a concentration of Muslims, whether in Arab states or in the Western world. The Islamic Jihad organization is only one group with this name, which exists in a large number of Arab states, among them Egypt, Malaysia and so forth. The uniqueness of the struggle in Palestine is the centrality of the question of al-Aqsa to the Muslim way of thinking and because the Jews are deemed an enemy of Islam in this part of the country.

In a joint proclamation issued by all of the opposition movements and streams in Palestinian society, the following paragraphs, which are the common denominator between the secular nationalistic Palestinian movements and Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are emphasized. The proclamation was published in 2004 after the announcement of the disengagement plan, in a book, one of whose authors is Jaafar bin Khadra, a legal advisor for the PLO.³¹ The proclamation includes six paragraphs:

- We see the Zionist withdrawal from all parts of our blessed land as a victory for our nation and to our non-ending opposition. If the thieving enemy does not wish to retreat on his own from all parts of our land [the opposition will continue]. He is [the enemy] that toiled throughout a period of 100 years of struggle to subjugate our nation and to break our will. But in no way will they reap anything but failure after failure.
- *Any Zionist withdrawal, which is the will [of the enemy] to do, will be without restrictions or conditions and without any commitment or guarantees for the security of the enemy. [Such a withdrawal] will be of equal value to the first step which will lead to the freeing of what is left of our land. Because of this, the opposition will continue until we chase out the occupier.*³²
- Sharon's plan [the withdrawal] carries with it great dangerous obligations to our nation and to our rights. At this time [Sharon] will expand and give the settlements in the West Bank a stronger base and will neutralize the Gaza Strip from the struggle. In that way, the inner Palestinian crisis will increase and the attempts will continue to defeat the opposition and to destroy the struggle through [the use] of [advanced] means on the [Palestinian] land which are legitimized by the American stance that has made a covenant with the Zionist enemy.
- We will write this down as offensive in our eyes: The invention of a military role by one of the Arab sides in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank amazes us.³³ Because our fighting and patient nation expects words of support from its [Arab] nation and a place to lean rather than unacceptable matters in regard to the relationship to the fighting nation protecting our land and respecting its nation, its holy places and its culture.

What has been transformed for us revealed an accusation [from Arab states] of a problem hidden inside the Palestinian nation [which accuses us] and not the nightmare occupation of our land.

- Because the Palestinian nation understands the value of the equality of rights and freedom, it views the struggle from a summarized position of [achieving] steadfast national rights but not from the position of a victim. Despite [the fact] that there were many sins and suffering and even the will of our people lacking peace, [our nation] did not give in to the occupation. Our nation succeeded in distancing itself from all these difficulties [of the occupation]. After this, we are filled with the fear of God and pride for our nation which advances the base that has been decided for it in our steadfast stance and reaching the way of opposition that will remove the suffering until release and freedom.
- The Palestinian nation believes that it is an inseparable part of this nation which is [for it] a deep strategy that grants it historical support. [This nation] will not accept the existence of an area of refuge existing on its margins as a perfect alternative for mutual aid [of the nation] and for cooperative activity. Our nation is fulfilling its national mission and its opposition. It [the Palestinian nation] rises up and continues to unite the Arab line and to work towards finishing its building in which it will carry out the freedom of our nation and [a solution] to our problems.

The signers of this proclamation are (in the order in which they are written): the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement—Fatah, the Islamic Jihad movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF), the Palestinian Communist Party, the Pioneers of the National Independence War (Talia'a Harb al-Tahrir al-Shabiyah) and the forces of al-Sa'iqa (The Storm). All of these movements are defined in the proclamation as opposition movements.³⁴

The proclamation emphasizes the character of the struggle including a *jihad*, meaning with significant effort and with all means and in every way against Israel. Opposition, *al-muqawama*, is not an expression used only by the Islamic opposition movements but is also widely used in Palestinian terminology by movements such as the Palestinian Communist Party which does not have a military wing and sees itself as a part of the Palestinian opposition to Israel. The “challenge of opposition” that Israel must deal with is even wider than the Islamic movements.³⁵ This occupation is an expression that includes within it not only the areas of 1967, as per their definition, but, in reality, all of the parts of historical Palestine as they appear explicitly in the second paragraph. To Israel as a state, there is no alternative but continued opposition which has lasted about 100 years. Any one-sided withdrawal, as Israel did in Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip, will lead to an additional

withdrawal that will be accompanied by the well thought-out use of a combination of a military struggle, diplomacy and propaganda by all of the Palestinian organizations.

The way of *jihad* today is widely developed, beginning with donations to the Palestinian organizations, *dawah* activities of Islamic organizations, financial support and aid to the needy, Qur'an lessons in the mosques and the establishment of learning groups (*usrat al-Qur'an*). All this in addition to the vigilant military activities justified by dozens of articles and books from all parts of the Arab and Muslim world which analyze this issue from every possible angle. There are other places where there is a requirement of *jihad*—against the West and against the infidels in Iraq or Afghanistan—but the *jihad* in Palestine is the most significant.³⁶

The Al-Aqsa mosque is seen as an Islamic and Palestinian symbol. It is under actual occupation because a factor foreign to Islam, the Jews, rule over one of the most holy places in Islam. It is no wonder that all the organizations reviewed in this book have the goal, at least in their declarations, to free al-Aqsa from the defilement of the Jews. The flags of Israel that are raised in “occupied” Jerusalem are seen as the flags of Khaybar, the same Jewish oasis on the Saudi peninsula where the Prophet Mohammad and the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattāb fought. It is no coincidence that the second *intifada* was called the “al-Aqsa *intifada*” (September 28, 2000–November 2004).

On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped and murdered by the Hamas organization. The bodies of these three Jewish teenagers, Gilad Sa'ar, Naftali Frankel and Ayal Yirfrach, were found on a parcel of land belonging to the commander of Hamas, Hossam Qawasmeh, who confessed to what was attributed to him and who told the story of the kidnapping to his interrogators.³⁷ Because of this incident, there were revenge activities carried out by the Jews, of which the most terrifying was the kidnapping of a Palestinian youth, Muhammad Abu Khdeir, from the Shu'afat neighborhood in Jerusalem and his murder on July 2, 2014. His death and the additional war in Gaza that broke out as a result of the firing of missiles by Hamas incited a wave of violent riots by various factors which was supported by all the Palestinian organizations, with an emphasis on Fatah and Hamas.³⁸ The peak of all of this violence (as of time of writing, in late 2014) was on Tuesday November 18, when two terrorist activists of the National Front for the Freeing of Palestine penetrated a synagogue in the Har Nof section of Jerusalem and killed four Jewish worshippers as they were praying. Policemen who hurried to the location killed the terrorists, but one of the policeman was injured and died of his wounds.³⁹ This bloodbath became known among the Palestinian organizations as the “Jerusalem *intifada*.”⁴⁰ This is why “as long as Jerusalem is found under the feet of the Zionists, the *jihad* for the freeing of al-Aqsa will continue.”⁴¹ Sheikh Najeh Bakirat, director of the Manuscripts and Tradition Bureau in al-Aqsa *waqf*, expressed it well when he defined it like this:

I am a Muslim Palestinian Arab and I want the regime to be Muslim Arab and not in the hands of the infidel. There are of course many different explanations for the meaning of infidel. There is a differentiation in Islam between an infidel from the people of the book [*ahl al-Kitāb*], the Jews and the Christian, and other infidels, including Muslims. But the religious term is anyone who denies Muhammad as the messenger of God. He is an infidel.⁴²

Sheikh Bakirat is a citizen of Israel who lives with his family in the Sur Baher Jerusalem neighborhood. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shaloudi, who carried out a terrorist attack near the light railway at the Ammunition Hill station in Jerusalem, is a resident of the Silwan neighborhood. Muataz Hijazi, mentioned in the previous chapter for trying to assassinate Rabbi Yehuda Glick on October 29, 2014, is a resident of Abu Tur.⁴³ Ibrahim al-Akari, who carried out an additional attack near the light railway on November 5, 2014, is a resident of Shuafat refugee camp in Jerusalem.⁴⁴ The two terrorists who carried out the attack on the Har Nof synagogue on November 18 are Ghassan Abu Jamal and 'Uday Abu Jamal, both residents of the Jabal Mukaber neighborhood.⁴⁵ All of the above are residents of Israel and carry Israeli identity cards. The support for the freeing of al-Aqsa as a religious-nationalistic holy symbol is widespread and reaches all of the Palestinian organizations, and not only the Palestinian organizations. It appears on Facebook and on the websites of Fatah and the PFLP, who supported the attack and even took responsibility for it. For example, in a photo of those who carried out the Har Nof synagogue attack (from the Facebook page of the PFLP from November 19, 2014), on the left-hand side appears the symbol of the PFLP and on the right-hand side the symbol of Fatah.

This book describes the Islamic point of view on the way of *jihad* in Palestine until the victory. The challenge that the State of Israel must meet is to continue organizing a struggle against the Muslim world, sometimes even at the price of damaging compromises that promote limited ceasefires. Unlike the 1950s and 1960s, the Israeli–Arab conflict has been turned into a religious rather than a nationalistic struggle. Israel needs to get help from the Christian states such as the United States which today deal with Islamic terrorists as well.⁴⁶

In order for it to guarantee its own survival, Israel has to be stronger militarily. It must continue living with this religious conflict which has no real solution. Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations can calm tensions but not solve this religious conflict. Will the State of Israel learn to deal with the Islamic political challenge that is continuing to gain momentum in the Arab countries and among the Palestinian nation, which is a small but important part of the Arab nation, and the Islamic nation today? Will the Jewish nation learn to stand up for itself and win the challenge of the inter-religious struggle of political Islam? Will Israel be able to stand against Islamic State (ISIS), Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other, smaller organizations? Only time will tell.

Notes

- 1 This was the opinion of Hatem Abd al-Qader 'Aid, former minister of Jerusalem affairs in the Palestinian Authority, who holds the Jerusalem file in Fatah. Interviewed by the author in Jerusalem, Dec. 30, 2009.
- 2 This is the opinion of Benny Morris and other Palestinian researchers in their analyses of the election results in Palestinian society. Morris, *One State, Two States*, pp.152–60; Saleh and Nafi, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2005*, pp.35–42.
- 3 Saleh and Nafi, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2005*, pp.39–40.
- 4 See Amira Hass, "Palestinian Survey: Haniyah Defeats Abbas," *Ha'aretz*, Dec. 12, 2012, www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/1.1887793; "Palestinian Survey: Support of Hamas—the Highest Peak in Eight Years," NRG News, Sept. 2, 2014, www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART2/616/501.html.
- 5 Saleh and Ziad, *The Political Views of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon*, pp.27–30. According to these surveys, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) only receives support from members of his movement and this support is limited.
- 6 *Ibid.*, pp.32–34. Hamas leads Fatah in two surveys regarding satisfaction about the activities of the Palestinian movement in relationship to their serving the nationalistic Palestinian struggle, one from Nov. 2005 before the elections and one after the elections, from May 2006. In the second survey, it also leads Islamic Jihad in measuring satisfaction. In other words, it is not the level of corruption of the Authority that caused a decrease in Fatah support but rather its loyalty to the struggle with Israel.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p.35.
- 8 Saleh and Nafi, *The Palestinian Strategic Report 2005*, p.27.
- 9 According to a survey published by Khalil Shikaki (director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research), Ismail Haniyah had greater support than Abu Mazen. If elections for the presidency had been held at the time of the survey, Haniyah would have received 48% of the vote while Abu Mazen would only have received 45%. This is not the only survey that had these results. See Hass, "Palestinian Public Opinion Poll."
- 10 Matthew Levitt, *Hamas, Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), pp.229–33.
- 11 See *The State of Israel vs. Kamal Abu Qwaider and Ahmad Shawaqi BA'SH* (Jerusalem), 13589/08, T'F (Jerusalem) 7706/08, a decision in the Jerusalem Shalom Court, headed by Judge David Mintz, July 31, 2008. In this file, al-Qaeda activists, Israeli residents of East Jerusalem, who originally belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir were judged. The Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb al-Tahrir published many *dawah* pamphlets similar to those quoted in this book. Judge Mintz explicitly talks about the tri-stage plan of the suspects. First stage: Draft as many activists as possible. Second stage: Gather as many weapons as possible in order to carry out terrorist attacks. Third stage: Carry out attacks and open up an armed struggle against the State of Israel.
- 12 See al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, *Sarakha Tahdhir, Min Mukhatat Kedem Yerushalaim*, p.20. This is the back page of the pamphlet's binding where al-Aqsa Foundation of Umm al-Fahm and the positions existing at the institution are explained.
- 13 Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, p.119. The source of these words already appears in the writings of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Mira Tzoref, "The West-West, Islam-Islam and Will Never Meet: A Study of the Writings of Hassan al-Baneh," in Shavit (ed.) *The Decline of the West, the Rise of Islam?* pp.126–27.
- 14 According to Sayyid Qutb's *takfir* attitude, this principle justifies a governmental coup. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* [Ma'alim fi'l Tareeq], ed. A.-B. al-Mehri, chapter 5, p.91. For the original Arabic text, Qutb, *Ma'alim fil-Tariq*, p.92.

- 15 *Surat 'Āli 'Imrān*, verse 169, <http://quran.com/3>. This verse appears on the first page of the book by Ahmad Mahmud Muhammad al-Qasim, *Shahada Intifadat al-Aqsa*. Al-Qasim presents a list of 200 selected *intifada* al-Aqsa martyrs from the time of its inception through June 2002.
- 16 See the speech by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah in Arraba, June 21, 2010, www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6-2urAULB4. The words of Salah at the festival that was organized in honor of the freed prisoners of Arraba. At this festival, in front of the released prisoners, the sheikh emphasized that even if one is physically in jail, their inner freedom cannot be taken from them. In this emotional speech, the sheikh disclosed his experiences in Israeli jail and his feelings regarding the meaning of freedom.
- 17 *Surat al-'Ankabūt* (The Spider), verse 69, <http://quran.com/29>. This verse is very popular in the *dawah* literature as it is used to convince the believers to join the Islamic organizations.
- 18 This division is presented in the dogma of Abdullah Azzam. It is accepted as a basis for the establishment of an Islamic state and an Islamic society among all the radical Islamic movements. See Maliach and Shay, *From Kabul to Jerusalem*, pp.116–24.
- 19 Abu Zaydah, *Jihad al-Ikhwān al-Muslamin fi filastin hata 'am 1970*, pp.124–28.
- 20 For example, the story of the martyr Muhammad Musbah Hamed, which has been translated on al-Taqwa website. Shaul Bartal, “The Story of the Tragic Life of Martyr Captain Muhammad Musbah Hamed,” *Middle East Magazine*, June 13, 2010; the story of the life of the martyr Mohammed Razek Gunid of Jabaliyah, martyred on June 14, 2009, *Qassamiyun*, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, p.9; and also many stories in the book by al-Qasim, *Shahada Intifadat al-Aqsa*, for example, Maher Rajb Yusuf 'Abd of Khan Yunis, who died as a martyr on Sept. 30, 2000, pp.48–40, or the martyr Yusuf Diyab Yusuf Khalaf of Gaza who loved prayer and died as a martyr on Oct. 8, 2000, p.112.
- 21 As Barghouti described in his book *Muhandis 'ala al-Tariq*, pp.18–19, 32, 56.
- 22 See the words of Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar in the Hamas journal, *Palestine al-Muslama*, September 2001, pp.18–19, 21–24, 26–29. Here he predicts and blesses, already in 2001, the one-sided Israeli separation from the Gaza Strip without any pre-conditions or restrictions as Israel did in its exit from Lebanon. Al-Zahar's words support Matti Steinberg's take on the outlook of the Hamas management of the conflict. Steinberg, *Facing their Fate*, pp.379–82, 417.
- 23 See Pull #50, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, director, Dec. 19–20, 2013, p.6, www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2013/p50e.html.
- 24 Hassan al-Bash was born in Haifa, Palestine, in 1947. His family emigrated to Damascus, Syria, during the *Nakba* of 1948. Al-Bash earned a teaching license for the Arabic language from the University of Damascus in 1973. Later he even finished a doctorate in the study of theology. Afterwards, he was also involved in a wide range of Muslim Brotherhood newspapers. Thus, for example, he edited the *Majalat al-Jihadiya*. Hassan al-Bash is considered a leading researcher on Zionist culture and the Jewish religion. He has already authored 32 books, the majority of which deal with these topics and include many slanderous ideas about the Jewish religion and a presentation of the forgery in the Bible and in Christianity. Among his books are: *Al-Fikra al-Sahyonia wa-al-Adab al-Ansari* [Jewish Thought and Racist Literature] (Damascus, 1979); *Manhaj al-Jihad al-Qur'ani* [The Ways of Jihad in the Qur'an] (Damascus, 1991); *al-Insan fi Mizan al-Qur'an* [The Humanity of the Balance of the Qur'an] (Tripoli, Libya, 1992); *al-Qur'an wa-al-Turath in Yitfaqn Wain Yiftrqn* [The Qur'an and the Torah—On What Do they Agree and on What Do they Disagree?] (Damascus, 2000); *al-Amaliyat Istishhadia* [Activities of Sacrifice to Sanctify the Name of God] (Damascus, 2003); and many others in this style.

- 25 A pure analysis of the hatred of the Jews and their culture which includes a twisted view of Jewish history and an historical approach toward the Jews as a mixture of 17 different and strange nations that are not Semitic, appears in the work of Hassan al-Bash, *Al-Tarbiya al-Sahyonia, Min Ansariyat al-Torah-ila Damu'ya al-Ihtilal* [Zionist Education from Biblical Racism—on Murder from the Occupation] (n.p., 2002–03). In the third part of the book the author deals with Zionist education and terror (“Al-Tarbiya al-Sahyonia wa-al-Irhab”), where he shows that the stories in the Bible educate for terror and murder. His examples include the massacre at Jericho by Joshua and the massacre by the Jews of the citizens of Shushan during the period of Queen Esther, pp.140–75.
- 26 Küntzel, *Jihad and the Hatred of the Jews*, pp.124–25.
- 27 See also Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Arabs' Position in their Conflict with Israel* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968), pp.203–78.
- 28 Interview with Hamas parliament member, Ahmad 'Atun in Jerusalem, Sept. 25, 2011. According to him, Hamas did not invent what is called anti-Jewish incitement in their charter. It is not incitement as it is all truth. The Jews wrote “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,” and Hamas just cited from them.
- 29 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Khattab al-Sheikh al-Qaradawi* [The Speeches of Sheikh al-Qaradawi] (Cairo, 2003), vol. 5, pp.281–89. This *hadith* also appears in the proclamations and opinions of all the Islamic movements that were surveyed in this research. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, “Hal Naadi Israil Lanha Xamaiya,” Jan. 5, 2009, <http://qaradawi.net/library/71/3686.html>; al-Shweqi, *al-Mahdi al-Muntazar wa-al-Khulafa al-Thaniya al Manhaj al-Nabawi*, pp.81–83.
- 30 See *Qassamiyun*, sheet 22, Sept. 2011, pp.1, 28–31. Publication of al-Aqsa Foundation for Waqf and Heritage, *Sarakha Tahdhir, Min Mukhatat Kedem Yerushalaim*, pp.2–3. Speech by Sheikh Ra'ed Salah warning about these dangers. Later, detailed plans are presented in the pamphlet which prove, as if possible, these arguments.
- 31 The book was written by attorney Jaafar bin Khadra, a member of the Palestinian National Council and the Legal Advisor of the PLO together with attorney Rola Yusuf al-Barghouti, a member of the National Palestinian Committee to the International Court on Israeli War Crimes. *Jidar al-Fasel al-'Aunseri* [The Racist Separation Fence] (Damascus, 2004), pp.110–13.
- 32 Emphasis added.
- 33 Criticism is expressed against Arafat by the Arab regimes, mainly Jordan, which attack Arafat on the basis of non-agreement to the solution suggested at Camp David by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and US President Bill Clinton. The Arab media do not understand the purpose of an additional *intifada*. Dr. Fahed al-Fanek, *al-Ra'i*, Mar. 22, 2001, and April 2, 2001.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 Michael Milstein, *Muqawama: The Rise of the Challenge of Opposition and its Influence on the Security of Israel* (Tel Aviv: Institute for the Study of National Security, December 2009). The writer relates primarily to the military challenge and less to the additional challenges that stem from these beliefs.
- 36 Hizb al-Tahrir's book discusses in detail these seven states where the requirement of *jihad* exists today. Among them are Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Southern Sudan, Chechnya and Greek Cyprus. Hizb al-Tahrir, *Qadiya Siyasiya, Balad, al-Muslimin al-Muhtala*, p.3.
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- 40 Hamas proclamation, Nov. 20, 2014.
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- 42 *Ibid.*
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