JOHN F. KENNEDY

and the

POLITICS OF ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL



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To Irith and Doreen

Foreword

The subject of US relations with Israel evokes an extraordinary range of pleadings and prejudices. Some see US support for the Jewish State as an 'unnatural' attachment, not explainable by objective American interests and concerns in the Middle East, and they therefore underline the role of extraneous influences (especially domestic lobbies). But many of those who see the relationship more favorably also stress the importance of subjective factors (in their case shared values or religious sentiments) that likewise transcend a narrow definition of national interest. Thus there is a widely-shared assumption, among observers who agree on little else, that Israel constitutes a special case in US foreign policy that defies the usual tools of analysis; lost to sight in the heat and smoke of partisan battle are the everyday questions one would usually ask in the study of state-to-state relations.

In this murky landscape the recent work of Abraham Ben-Zvi is like a flash of lightning on a stormy night. Instead of rehashing the old tired arguments, Ben-Zvi does something that is refreshingly old-fashioned in a period when fashionable epistomology has enthroned prejudice as principle: he has gone to the sources to see what the evidence says. As in his previous book, *Decade of Transition*, which documented the beginnings of a more supportive stance in US policy during the Eisenhower administration, he has combined a historian's meticulous attention to primary sources with a political scientist's sensitivity to conceptual implications of the evidence.

Drawing upon presidential archives in the United States and state archives in Israel, many of them recently declassified, Ben-Zvi documents with exceptional clarity the slow but steady process in which US policymakers under two Presidents, responding to shifting strategic realities and perceptions of American interests, came gradually to a policy of maintaining an arms balance in the Arab–Israeli conflict and a close

working relationship with Israel. Contrary to commonly held opinion, the major thrust of this shift came before rather than after the 1967 war, and it was not tied to particular personalities or lobbying campaigns (though the domestic dimension was, of course, an important aspect of a complex relationship). In fact, the period in which Israel was viewed primarily as an unwanted obstacle to pursuit of closer ties with Arab nations was fairly short-lived, being limited to the first part of the Eisenhower years. The 'crossing of the Rubicon' to an informal strategic partnership with Israel came, as Ben-Zvi demonstrates, in the 1962 sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel by the Kennedy administration.

The key to this decision, which was the beginning of the US arms relationship with Israel, was a reversal of thinking in the defense community based on the lack of success with earlier approaches to the Middle East. This made possible a 'winning coalition' of security experts and domestic political advisors that carried the day over continuing opposition of diplomats and Arabists (a division that has remained in Washington's bureaucratic politics). But lest this be cast in simple 'pro-' and 'anti-' language as popular accounts often have it, Ben-Zvi reminds us that closer relations with Israel were also seen as a means of exerting greater influence and constraint over Israel actions.

Nothing is ever as simple as it seems, and this study of a complex tectonic shift in US policy is an illuminating essay in how superpower policies respond over time to changing realities. To be sure, major powers do have a margin of choice (and accordingly they do make dumb mistakes), but generally the basic lines of their policy are not determined by arbitrary influences or chance factors. This path-breaking study of a historic passage that has often been misread should serve as a model for studies of controversial questions.

Professor Alan Dowty
University of Notre Dame
2002

Preface and Acknowledgments

This manuscript was originally intended to be the first chapter in a comprehensive book surveying various ways in which successive American administrations have attempted, since 1962, to use the sale of arms to Israel as a leverage for extracting from the Israeli recipient a wide range of political compensations. However, my research at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston and the Israeli State Archives (ISA) in Jerusalem provided me with such a wealth of documentary material that the planned chapter analyzing the Hawk decision of August 1962, was ultimately expanded into a separate book-size manuscript.

Although various facets of the decision of the Kennedy Administration to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel have already been alluded to in chapter 4 of my book, *Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American–Israeli Alliance*, my renewed encounter with the documentary material (and particularly with the recently declassified papers and oral history interviews of Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council (NSC)) led me to significantly update, modify and expand the original analysis. Whereas *Decade of Transition* only briefly and intermittently touched upon the intragovernmental debate which preceded the Hawk decision, the present work specifically seeks to identify all the groups competing for influence and dominance within the Kennedy Administration in an effort to comprehensively reconstruct and elucidate the bureaucratic game (both in terms of the respective cognitive maps of the various individuals and groups involved, and their relative influence) as well as the actual dynamics of the decision-making process as it unfolded during the spring and summer of 1962. In addition, while *Decade of Transition* explained the formation of the American–Israeli alliance almost exclusively in terms of the changing strategic landscape in the Middle East, the following analysis of the Hawk decision will approach the strategic setting as merely one element in a vastly complex,

multidimensional context. The strategic, neo-realist paradigm and line of argumentation will thus be augmented (or mitigated) by additional clusters of explanatory frameworks and variables, such as those patterned on the logic and basic premises of the 'domestic politics' orientation.

I wish to thank the staff of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, the Brender–Moss Library at Tel Aviv University, the ISA in Jerusalem, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Archives in Tel Aviv for their valuable technical and bibliographical assistance.

I also wish to thank most sincerely Azar Gat, Aharon Klieman, Zach Levey, David Tal, and all my colleagues at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University for their thoughtful suggestions on various aspects of this work. I am equally indebted to Sylvia Weinberg for her dedicated and thoroughly professional work on all the technical aspects of the manuscript, and to Ofry Shoval and Gil-Li Vardi for assisting me in researching and processing the documentary material at the ISA and the IDF Archives.

Georgina Clark-Mazo edited the book in a most professional and meticulous way. I deeply appreciate her thoughtfulness, concern for every detail, perfectionism and goodwill. My cooperation with her was a most stimulating and enriching experience, for which I am most grateful.

Abbreviations

AIPAC – American–Israeli Public Affairs Committee
DDE Library – Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
DIA – Defense Intelligence Agency
FRUS – Foreign Relations of the United States
IAF – Israeli Air Force
IDF – Israeli Defense Forces
ISA – Israeli State Archives
JFKL – John F. Kennedy Library
NSC – National Security Council
NSF – National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library
PCC – Palestine Conciliation Commission
POF – President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library
PPK – Papers of Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library
UAR – United Arab Republic
UN – United Nations
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees

1

Introduction: The Debate

In recent years, various facets of American–Israeli relations – such as the role that ideological and strategic factors, respectively, played in the formation of the American–Israeli alliance – have become the subject of a heated debate among scholars.[1] Notwithstanding the irreconcilable differences between some of the overall interpretations[2] and the specific lines of argumentation advanced in the context of certain specific and delimited case studies, most works have remained fully and irrevocably committed to the belief that the Six Day War of June 1967 constituted a major watershed in this relationship, transforming what had been a tenuous, conflict-ridden framework into a *de-facto* security alliance that was now predicated upon 'common political, ideological, security and strategic interests.'[3] As Bar-Siman-Tov further observes:

> The watershed in establishing the special relationship was Israel's military victory in 1967, which not only increased Israel's strategic importance but [also] created a new political and strategic situation in the Middle East, especially in the Arab–Israeli conflict.[4]

Oblivious to an entire cluster of regional developments (such as the failure of the American effort – which came to a head in the mid-1950s – to recruit and mobilize several Arab states as Cold War allies and partners[5]) that had laid the groundwork for the establishment of the American–Israeli alliance almost a decade *before* the 1967 crisis started to unfold, proponents of this thesis have largely ignored the period following the Jordanian Crisis of July 1958, during which Israel came to be increasingly perceived in Washington as a strategic asset to the United States by virtue of its ability to deter the pro-Soviet Egypt from completely disrupting the Middle Eastern balance of power.[6] By virtue of its relative tranquility, the decade that preceded the Six Day War has

received little attention from scholars, and has been altogether downgraded and outweighed by periods that seemed either permeated with tension and fraught with crisis and conflict, or rich in diplomatic activity and pregnant with prospects of regional accommodation.[7] Largely overlooked in the existing literature was the possibility that, for all its apparent relative uneventfulness, this period could still be viewed as a decade of incubation, in which the seeds of change in the very essence and intrinsic nature of American–Israeli relations had not only been planted, but had begun to bear fruit.

In other words, the possibility that the Six Day War and its regional ramifications further accelerated and intensified processes that were already in progress – rather than initiating the shift of American diplomacy from the one pole of depicting Israel as a strategic burden to its interests in the Middle East to the other extreme of perceiving it as a reliable asset and bulwark against the recalcitrant forces of radicalism and militancy – remained mostly unexplored in the plethora of works that sought to reconstruct the processes by which the American–Israeli alliance was shaped and forged.

As a step toward replacing at least some of the crude dichotomies and simplistic generalizations that still abound in the literature surveying the origins and formation of the American–Israeli alliance, the following analysis will focus on a major turning point in American–Israeli relations, namely, on President John Kennedy's decision of August 1962 to sell Hawk short-range, anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. Although – as we shall see – the Kennedy Administration justified this unprecedented sale of sophisticated weapons systems in terms of certain specific contextual factors (such as Israel's vulnerability to air strikes) and refrained from linking it directly to the very essence of the American–Israeli dyad, the Hawk decision established new ground rules and behavioral patterns that would later constrain the Johnson Administration and limit its margin of maneuverability *vis-à-vis* Israel well before the outbreak of the Six Day War.

Thus, regardless of the American effort to downplay the magnitude and significance of the move, the August 1962 decision can be seen in retrospect as the crossing of the Rubicon and as the impetus for predicating the American–Israeli framework upon new strategic premises. In other words, regardless of the administration's intentions and interpretations, the Hawk decision was broadly perceived by all protagonists to the Middle East dispute as a valid index of a major swing in the American

posture toward Israel, and thus as a 'dramatic turning point in the history of American–Israeli relations.'[8]

And indeed, once the precedent of selling advanced weapons systems to Israel had been established, it became easier for future administrations to cope with a defiant and recalcitrant bureaucracy (in particular the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State) that initially remained oblivious to the changing strategic landscape, and clung tenaciously to its perceived notions regarding the dangers to American regional interests inherent in the supply of sophisticated weapons to Israel. The sale, on 29 July 1965, of 210 M-48 Patton tanks (and, in 1966, of 100 Skyhawk planes) was the first major manifestation of the policy that had been inaugurated in 1962 and had become comprehensively evident prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the Arab–Israeli zone in 1967.[9]

Indeed, against the backdrop of this sequence of arms deals precipitated by the Hawk decision, it is clear that, contrary to Bar-Siman-Tov's assertions,[10] the Six Day War further reinforced and accelerated – but did not initiate – certain patterns of behavior that had been closely predicated upon the vision of Israel as a power capable of defending the remaining pro-Western strongholds in the region in the face of continued Soviet penetration and encroachment.

It is, therefore, hoped that by reconstructing the essence and dynamics of the Hawk decision, and by elucidating some of its strategic and conceptual origins – as well as the ramifications – a more nuanced and differentiated picture of the strategic and domestic processes by which the American–Israeli alliance was actually delineated and formed will emerge.

Specifically, the following analysis will examine the relative weight assigned – in the context of the Hawk decision – to considerations patterned on quintessential strategic premises[11] as juxtaposed with those predicated upon domestic-electoral considerations.[12] Seeking to avoid the sweeping generalizations that still abound in the literature, which attribute Washington's apparent swing toward Israel exclusively to the impact of the cluster of domestic – rather than strategic – factors that evolved around the growing power of the Jewish lobby in Washington,[13] the following reconstruction of the actual dynamics by which the Hawk decision was made will focus on the more specific and delimited context of the decision-making process. In particular, an effort will be made to elucidate the role played by various individuals, who differed from each

other in terms of their respective power, resolve, bargaining skill, and world view, and who strove to build a 'majority coalition' which would enable them to carry out their preferred policy toward Israel and the Palestinian refugees in accordance with their respective images of Israel and the Middle East, as well as in accordance with the perceived requirements of the domestic political environment.[14]

What was, then, the essence of the Hawk decision? Who were the individuals who continuously competed with one another in their quest to capture the attention and commitment of the central decision-maker? What bargaining strategies did they adopt and in what ways did they attempt to manipulate their bureaucratic opponents into acquiescence? To what extent were they motivated by the perceived requirements of the domestic American scene?[15] Furthermore, what were the lessons drawn by members of the Kennedy Administration in the course of the months that followed the decision?

Before proceeding to analyze the essence of the Hawk decision, the following chapter will seek to elucidate the traditional arms sales posture that was pursued by the Eisenhower Administration during the decade that preceded August 1962. Did the Hawk decision represent a sharp deviation and departure from deeply held convictions and policies continuously adhered to by the Eisenhower policy élite; or was it the culmination and institutionalization of certain processes that had started to unfold during the second term of the Eisenhower Presidency?

NOTES

1. For two interpretations of American–Israeli relations from the early 1990s, which differ fundamentally from one another in terms of their basic premises, see David Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), as juxtaposed with George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990). See also Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948: A "Special Relationship"'? *Diplomatic History*, 22, 2 (1998), pp. 231–62; Michael N. Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 400–7; Abraham Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the American–Israeli Alliance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Hannan Bar-On, 'Five Decades of American–Israeli Relations', in Anita Shapiro (ed.), *Independence: The First Fifty Years* (Jerusalem: The Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1998), pp. 377–407 [in Hebrew]; Peter L. Hahn, 'Commentary: Special Relationships', *Diplomatic History*, 22, 2 (1998),

pp. 263–83; Robert J. Lieber, 'US–Israeli Relations since 1948', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2, 3 (1998), pp. passim [http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria].

2. For two inherently incompatible interpretations see Cheryl A. Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), as juxtaposed with Abramo F.K. Organski, *The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in US Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
3. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948', p. 232. For similar interpretations see Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', p. 438; Hahn, 'Special Relationships', p. 263; William B. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Foreign Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press, 1977), pp. 46–63; Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 152–3.
4. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948', pp. 232, 259.
5. Hahn, 'Commentary', p. 268.
6. For an early illustration of this approach see Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 414–19.
7. Another aspect of this tendency to overlook or downgrade the pre-1967 period can be seen in the fact that some – albeit not all – of the books and monographs which offer a broad overview of American policy in the Middle East, or which explore the Arab–Israeli peace process, begin their analysis with the Six Day War and its immediate ramifications. See, for example, Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*; William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982); Shlomo Slonim, *United States–Israel Relations, 1967–1973: A Study in the Convergence and Divergence of Interests* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1974).
8. Quoted from the memorandum that was sent on 28 August 1962 from Haim Yahil, Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, to the Israeli embassy in London. Israel State Archives (hereafter ISA), Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3777/7: 1. See also, in this connection, Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 178–9.
9. Mordechai Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement from the United States', in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *Dynamics of Dependence: US–Israeli Relations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 84, 100–1; Gerald M. Steinberg, 'Israel and the United States: Can the Special Relationship Survive the New Strategic Environment?', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2, 4 (1998), p. 1 [http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria]; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, p. 106.
10. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948', p. 259.
11. For illustrations of this strategic approach see, for example, Mitchell G. Bard, *The Water's Edge and Beyond: Defining the Limits to Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 189–90;

Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, pp. 95–7; Ethan Nadelmann, 'Setting the Stage: American Policy Toward the Middle East, 1961–1966', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 14, 1 (1982), pp. 436–7; Douglas Little, 'From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed: Seeking Order in the Middle East', in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: America's Foreign Policy, 1961–1963* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 159; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 25; George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 136–8.

12. For an analysis of this domestic interpretation see Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 13–18. See also Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', pp. 440–7; Charles Lipson, 'American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits', in Gabriel Sheffer (ed.), *US–Israeli Relations at the Crossroads* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 130–4; Bernard Reich, *The United States and Israel: Influence in the Special Relationship* (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 183–6; Melvin I. Urofsky, *We Are One! American Jewry and Israel* (New York: Anchor Press, 1978), p. 333.
13. See, in this connection, Mitchell G. Bard, 'The Influence of Ethnic Interest Groups on American Middle East Policy', in Eugene R. Wittkopf (ed.), *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 2nd edn (New York: St Martin Press, 1994), pp. 79–88; Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'Paradigm Lost? The Limits of the American–Israeli Special Relationship', *Israel Affairs*, 4, 2 (1997), pp. 2–7; Abraham Ben-Zvi, 'The Dynamics of American–Israeli Relations', in Abraham Ben-Zvi and Aharon S. Klieman (eds), *Global Politics: Essays in Honor of David Vital* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 219–35; Barnett, 'Identity and Alliances in the Middle East', p. 438; Samuel W. Lewis, 'The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance', *Middle East Journal*, 53, 3 (1999), p. 365.
14. The term 'majority coalition,' which entails the formation of a coalition capable of carrying out its preferred policy, was developed by Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 349. See also Abraham Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 7–16. While the following analysis of the Hawk decision will occasionally draw upon the author's earlier work on the Kennedy Administration (see *Decade of Transition*, particularly chapter 4), the availability of newly declassified documentary material at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston will hopefully result – in the following pages – in a more nuanced and differentiated picture of the actual dynamics, by which the Hawk decision was made, than the one presented in that book.
15. See, in this connection, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 162; Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, p. 353.

2

The Sale of Arms to Israel, 1953–60: Perceptions and Policies

Motivated by the vision of a worldwide Communist threat to the global balance of power, and alarmed by the rapid fall of all the East European states to Soviet domination, the Eisenhower Administration embarked on a policy that sought to encircle the Soviet Union with states allied to, and supported by, the West. In the Middle East, which was fully incorporated into this confrontational vision, this overriding strategic goal was to be accomplished by strengthening the defense of the 'northern tier states' as a first step toward forging a security alliance among such regional powers as Egypt, Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan.[1]

Perceived as critical 'because of its geopolitical importance and the value of its oil resources to Western Europe,'[2] the Middle East quickly emerged, in the thinking of President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, as a major front in the global effort to contain Soviet penetration and encroachment. In order to prevent these processes and effectively challenge the Soviet quest for new strongholds, it was essential for Washington to try and induce regional powers such as Egypt and Iraq to align themselves with the United States in an all-encompassing, omnivorous confrontation with Soviet designs by providing them with generous military and economic support.

This preoccupation with the role assigned to the Arab world in blocking, through a series of bilateral and multilateral defense alliances, a political or military Soviet thrust into the Middle East, led the Eisenhower Administration to adopt an extremely reserved attitude toward Israel and to endorse at least some of the basic Arab positions concerning the appropriate means of resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict.[3] The fear of Arab defection and alienation clearly overshadowed, in the thinking of Washington's policy-makers, any other consideration, and led the

architects of American diplomacy and strategy in the Middle East to refrain – in view of the continued Arab–Israeli conflict – from any pro-Israeli move or gesture, including in the sphere of arms procurement.

The recognition of the Arab order of priorities completely permeated American thinking on the Middle East and was incorporated into the complex of objectives that the Eisenhower Presidency sought to promote. This is evident in the numerous statements, declarations and policy initiatives that followed Secretary Dulles's exploratory mission to the region of May 1953, which reflected American determination to proceed toward containment by winning the goodwill and trust of the Arab world. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Henry A. Byroade:

> Some of [the Arabs] are fearful. In certain areas the fear of one's neighbor exceeds that from any other direction. It is a surprise to many Americans that Soviet encroachment and imperialism is not recognized in parts of the Middle East as the primary danger. Some in the Middle East see an enemy much closer at hand. They turn their thoughts and actions not toward the security of the whole region but to [the] security of one against the other, and they thus present a picture of disunity of purpose which is being exploited by the agents of the Soviet Union.[4]

This propensity to pursue an accommodative course toward such regional powers as Egypt and Iraq – at the direct expense of Israel – as a means of enticing them to contribute to the defense of the West against Soviet encroachment was further reinforced by the pervasive vision of Israel as a socialist society dominated by a 'leftward' orientation and continued ideological attachment to Marxist ideology.

The fact that, during the period following the establishment of Israel, there was still 'a lingering anti-American feeling' in Israel, and that such leaders as Golda Meir were reluctant – on ideological grounds – to commit themselves to a pro-American posture and believed that neutrality between East and West could ideally serve Israel's interests, added another layer to President Eisenhower's innate predisposition to approach Israel with utmost suspicion and unabated reservations.[5]

During the first term of the Eisenhower Presidency, this perception of Israel as a major liability to American strategic designs and interests was continuously reflected in the ensuing policies. Not only was Israel

excluded from any discussion of the regional security system that the administration had begun to forge as soon as it took office in January 1953, it was specifically denied military aid, security guarantees, and even some less tangible gestures of friendship and empathy.

Thus, while in 1949 Israel had become a recipient of technical and economic aid from the Truman Administration, it was continuously denied arms and access to a variety of security programs and frameworks, such as 'Operation Stockpile' and 'Operation Gift.' Seeking to construct a broadly based, inter-Arab 'structure of containment' in the Middle East, the administration regarded such initiatives as the idea of an American 'security contract' with Israel, the plan to store American strategic supplies in Israel (under the auspices of 'Operation Stockpile'), and the proposal to include Israel in the USA Off-Shore Procurement Program (whose administrators were authorized to place massive orders for military and civilian supplies on behalf of American forces overseas), as incompatible with the American national interest, and thus as inherently detrimental to the overriding desire 'to advance the administration's understanding with the Arab world.'[6]

In subsequent years, notwithstanding the renewed Israeli effort (which culminated in 1955) to obtain formal security commitments from the Eisenhower Administration that would guarantee its borders, no such guarantees or a defense treaty with the USA were in fact forthcoming. Indeed, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's intensive drive – predicated upon his conviction that 'a mutual defense treaty' between the US and Israel was the most effective means of persuading the Arab world that 'its dream of wiping us out' could not be implemented – proved abortive.[7] Convinced that the conclusion of a bilateral defense treaty with Israel would be incompatible with its desire to consolidate in the Middle East a broadly based, multilateral defense alliance that would prevent the Soviet Union from dominating this strategically vital area, the Eisenhower Administration remained unreceptive to the idea. Instead – during the years 1953–56 – it continuously pursued an extremely accommodative posture toward the Arab world, in the hope of ultimately enticing both Egypt and Iraq to contribute to the defense of the West against Soviet encroachment while maintaining a detached and non-committal attitude toward Israel.

In the words of the Israeli Ambassador to the USA, Abba Eban, which clearly elucidate Washington's operational code when approaching the strategic landscape of the Middle East during the first two years of the Eisenhower Administration:

> Israel could no longer count on the United States for the protection of its interests because America was resolved, chiefly for Cold War reasons, to make a very strong bid for Arab support ... The first two ... years of Dulles's tenure were very unhappy years ... the speech that Dulles made on returning from the Middle East [on 1 June 1953], did enunciate the view that the basis of Arab alienation with the West was the existence of Israel.[8]

In the field of arms procurement, the Tripartite Declaration – which was issued in May 1950 by the United States, France and Britain in an effort to limit arms shipments to the region – sealed the fate of the first unofficial Israeli request (submitted through American-Jewish intermediaries), despite President Truman's initial willingness to consider it favorably.

Similarly, although the Eisenhower Administration secretly approved, in late 1955 and early 1956, the limited sale of arms to Israel by the French and the British in an effort to prevent the disruption of the regional balance of power in the wake of the September 1955 arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia and thus reduce the danger of an Israeli preventive strike, it remained – throughout the 1950s – fully committed to its initial posture of refusing to supply almost any arms to Israel.

In this respect, and against the backdrop of the administration's innate reluctance to become a 'major' arms supplier to the Middle East, the fate of the first formal Israeli request for arms from the Eisenhower Presidency (submitted in February 1953) can be viewed as but one illustration of Israel's chronic inability (which continued to be manifested until August 1962) to engender change in the American position on arms sales. It was the first link in a long chain of abortive and futile efforts designed to change the course and direction of American diplomacy and strategy in the region.

In the Eisenhower era, this protracted experiment in futility started to unfold in 1953, when the Ben-Gurion Government submitted to the Eisenhower Administration its request for anti-aircraft guns. This request was turned down by the administration, which was adamant in its refusal to sell Israel any weapons systems except spare parts and ammunition.

More than a year later, in June 1954, Secretary of State Dulles rejected a second Israeli request, this time for the purchase of 24 F-86 American jets, maintaining that Israel enjoyed a qualitative superiority *vis-à-vis* its

Arab protagonists by virtue of 'the efficiency of [the] Israeli forces and [their] shorter lines of communication.'[9]

The conclusion, in September 1955, of a major arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia provided the impetus for accelerating the Israeli search for arms in the West, and led Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to forcefully demand that the administration guarantee that the balance of military power within the Egyptian–Israeli dyad was not disrupted. In his 21 October 1955 meeting with Secretary Dulles, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett made an urgent appeal for the supply of large quantities of modern arms, including 48 F-86 fighters, 60 Patton tanks and 40 (105-mm) Howitzers.[10] However, none of Sharett's arguments, which underscored the dangers to Israel and to regional stability inherent in the September 1955 Egyptian–Czech arms deal, precipitated any reorientation of the American arms sale policy toward Israel, as the Secretary of State remained fully and irrevocably committed to his initial irreconcilable posture of refusing to supply arms to Israel. As Dulles elaborated on 20 October 1955, in a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC):

> For the United States to sponsor an arms race between Israel and the Arab states would be a very futile action ... Our best course of action is to assume that the arms deal between the Soviet Bloc and Egypt was a 'one-shot affair' and [respond] in the negative to all of Israel's [arms] requests ... In any event, we would probably lose out in backing Israel.[11]

The Israeli retaliatory raid against Syria, which was carried out on the night of 11 December 1955 across the border on the northeastern shore of Lake Kinneret (resulting in 26 Syrian casualties), sealed the fate of the Israeli arms request and provided the administration with a convenient pretext for formally rejecting the Israeli appeal. Maintaining that 'any unilateral action in Israel's favor would be liable to aid Soviet expansion among the Arab states', President Eisenhower – in his press conference of 7 March 1956 – openly challenged the Israeli argument that the key to regional stability lay in a favorable balance of military power that would effectively deter its protagonists:

> We do not believe that it is possible to assure peace [in the Middle East] merely by rushing some arms to a nation that at most can

> absorb only that amount that 1.7 million people can absorb whereas – on the other side – there are some 40 million people.[12]

This unabated conviction that 'backing Israel might be very costly to vital United States national interests,'[13] and that a series of unilateral Israeli concessions on core issues (rather than an accelerated arms race) constituted the only feasible way to achieve an Arab–Israeli accord, was repeatedly augmented and reinforced by a spate of deterrence threats, which warned that a deliberate strategy of escalation by Israel along the Arab–Israeli borders, in an effort to ultimately impose a settlement from a position of relative strength, 'would not be tolerated by the Western powers.' Instead of continuously predicating its behavior in the Arab–Israeli zone upon the premises of deterrence, coercion or confrontation, Israel was called upon – in the aftermath of the Egyptian–Czech arms deal – to rely upon 'the international rule of law' (rather than upon 'an arms race') as a means of 'assuring [its] security.'[14]

Ben-Gurion's additional appeal on 16 March 1956 to President Eisenhower to reconsider the American position was equally abortive. In his message of 30 April 1956 to the Israeli Prime Minister, the American President stated that he was 'not persuaded that it would serve the cause of peace and stability in the world for the United States to accede to your request for arms.'[15] Thus, seeking continuously (despite Egypt's defection to the East) 'to immunize the Arab states against the Soviet danger,' the Eisenhower foreign policy élite remained irrevocably committed to its pre-existing conviction that neither a security contract with Israel nor the sale of arms to the Jewish state would be compatible with this objective but would rather 'speed up the process' of Soviet penetration into the region.[16]

In the words of Secretary Dulles who, on 10 April 1956, painted an acutely menacing, almost apocalyptic, picture of the regional – as well as global – political, economic and strategic ramifications that were bound to result from the supply of American arms to Israel:

> We do not think arms shipments to Israel [are] the answer to Israel's vulnerability in the face of Soviet shipments to the Arabs because it would alienate the Arabs and result in cutting off Arabian oil. This in turn would greatly weaken Europe economically ... and Europe would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union for economic survival and for its oil imports. Thus we would save Israel but lose Europe.[17]

During the second half of the 1950s it became increasingly clear to the architects of American foreign policy that their initial hopes of consolidating a broadly based alliance in the Middle East that would effectively deter Soviet encroachment could not be reconciled with the actual dynamics of a recalcitrant region, whose main actors remained defiant (or indifferent) to American predilections and objectives. As the hope of achieving Arab unity and of forging a multilateral coalition against the Soviet threat receded into the background against the regional backdrop of incessant inter-Arab rivalries and cleavages (such as the friction between Egypt and Iraq) and pervasive hostility toward the West and the colonialist legacy, there was no need to persist any longer in the effort to secure Arab goodwill by coercing Israel into territorial concessions and political isolation, or by imposing upon it comprehensive economic sanctions (as was the case during the Sinai Crisis of 1956–57). Indeed, as the acutely menacing vision of Arab defection to the Soviet orbit becoming partially realized, despite the early American predisposition to approach Israel with utmost suspicion and unabated reservations – and to endorse at least some of the Arab preferences and positions in the Arab–Israeli sphere – President Eisenhower became increasingly predisposed to reassess his view of Israel as a strategic liability and as an impediment to Washington's regional plans, albeit not his specific policies *vis-à-vis* the Ben-Gurion Government.

A major 'trigger event' or precipitant along the road of this perceptual change that provided a major impetus for accelerating the swing of the pendulum from the vision of Israel as a strategic liability to American regional designs to the view of Israel as an indispensable asset to American and British strategic plans and objectives, was the July 1958 Jordanian Crisis. Coming in the wake of the 1957 crises in Jordan and Syria and the American intervention in Lebanon, the dramatic events of July 1958 demonstrated that, despite the costs and risks in terms of Israel's relations with the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion – unlike such traditional allies of the West as King Saud of Saudi Arabia – was prepared to contribute to the Anglo-American operation which was designed to rescue King Hussein from the surrounding forces of radical Arab nationalism. The overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy and the subsequent suspension of all Iraqi oil supplies to Jordan exacerbated King Hussein's domestic predicament and led to the British decision to dispatch 2,200 paratroopers from Cyprus to protect Amman and Western interests in Jordan, and to the American decision to ship vital strategic materials to Jordan.

At first glance, the role assigned to Israel – in the operation permitting the British and American airlift to Jordan through Israeli air space – may appear marginal and relatively insignificant, as it did not commit any Israeli troops to the defense of the Hashemite Kingdom. Nonetheless, the decision to grant overflight rights to British and American aircraft en route to Amman precipitated an acute crisis in Israeli–Soviet relations, with the Soviet Union resorting, on 1 August 1958, to harsh and threatening rhetoric in an effort to force Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to reassess his position. Furthermore, the Israeli decision to permit the overflights, despite the risks involved, diametrically contradicted the attitude of Saudi Arabia, which was perceived in Washington as a major regional bulwark in the confrontation with radical Arab nationalism, but which adamantly refused to allow Britain the use of the American airfield in Dhahran for resupply. Nor did Saudi Arabia agree to grant Britain and the US overflight rights. The only alternative option for the USA and Britain was to fly through the Suez Canal and Aqaba, but no less than two weeks were required in order to make this route operational.[18]

Faced with the unwavering Saudi determination that the Western powers should pull the chestnuts out of the Middle Eastern fire without involving them directly in any strategic move against Iraq, Egypt, or Syria, and deprived of any other viable option, the administration – fearing the imminent collapse of the Hashemite Kingdom – looked increasingly upon the Israeli overflight clearance as a major strategic contribution to its effort to prevent a drastic disruption of the regional balance of power in the wake of the Iraqi revolution. As Secretary Dulles acknowledged in his 21 July 1958 meeting with Ambassador Eban: 'We appreciate Israel's acquiescence in the airlift to Jordan. We were trying to find alternatives but the matter was very difficult.' Impressed with Israel's willingness to defy the Soviet Union and contribute to the Jordanian operation, the Secretary was uninhibited in alluding – in the same meeting – to the American commitment to the survival of Israel:

> Our action with respect to Lebanon should give Israel confidence that we would respond in similar circumstances to an Israeli appeal ... If there should be a meeting at which there would be a definition of vital interests, we would not agree to the exclusion of Israel. This would be unthinkable.[19]

Thus, although excluded from the initial American vision of a broad regional security alliance, Israel became – in July 1958 – a *de-facto* partner

of the Western powers in their drive to prevent the collapse of the fragile and embattled Jordanian regime. With Saudi Arabia unwilling to co-operate in the operation it wholeheartedly supported, Israel emerged as the only regional power prepared to take risks for the sake of 'blocking the spread of the [Iraqi] coup to the western sector of the Iraqi–Jordanian union' and thus of 'relieving the situation in the area.'[20]

This revised vision of Israel's role in the aftermath of the Jordanian Crisis was most clearly and comprehensively articulated in a memorandum entitled: 'Factors Affecting US Policy Toward the Near East', which was submitted, on 19 August 1958, to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board. In a section entitled: 'Should the United States Reconsider its Policy Toward Israel?' the paper stated:

> If we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only strong pro-West power left in the Near East.[21]

The recognition that, in addition to its valuable role of permitting the USA and Britain the use of its airspace, Israel could play a balancing role *vis-à-vis* Egypt and thus help deter President Nasser from any direct effort to topple the Jordanian regime, surfaced on several occasions in the course and aftermath of the Jordanian Crisis, and reflected the growing change in the American perception of the regional landscape.

Whereas Eisenhower and Dulles had in the past vehemently opposed the pursuit by Israel of a deterrence posture *vis-à-vis* Egypt, fearing that it could set in motion a highly dangerous escalatory process, in July and August 1958, they came around to support precisely this strategy. In view of the imminent menace to the very existence of both the Lebanese and Jordanian regimes, the administration became increasingly prepared to look upon Israel as the only regional power capable of deterring and restraining Cairo's ambitions. On occasion, the President even toyed with the idea of enticing Israel to launch a military strike against Egypt. Thus, on 16 July 1958, at the height of the Jordanian Crisis, and provided with evidence that President Nasser had instructed his agents in Jordan to assassinate King Hussein and overthrow the Jordanian Government, President Eisenhower noted to Secretary Dulles 'that the strategic action in the circumstances would be to turn Israel loose on Egypt, thus going for the head of the snake.'[22]

In most instances, however, the architects of American diplomacy

recommended a less ambitious stratagem, namely, the use by Israel of a deterrence posture *vis-à-vis* Egypt as a means of preventing President Nasser from exploiting a protracted state of turmoil and instability in Jordan. Thus, on 8 August 1958, in his meeting with the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Lord Samuel Hood, Secretary Dulles remarked 'that he saw some advantages in the existence of an Israeli threat [to militarily intervene in Jordan],' adding that 'what was important was what Egypt thought the Israelis would do [if Jordan collapsed]. If Egypt thought the Israelis would touch off a big war, it was doubtful if Egypt would want Jordan.'[23]

And indeed, on a number of occasions during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the crisis the threat of an Israeli military intervention in Jordan was conveyed directly to Egypt in an effort to deter President Nasser from disrupting the Hashemite Kingdom. Clearly, American diplomacy was now fully prepared to at least implicitly endorse and repeatedly use the 'West Bank Scenario' (according to which Israel would occupy the West Bank of Jordan if the Hashemite Kingdom were on the verge of disintegration) as a potential deterrence weapon *vis-à-vis* Egypt. Thus on 6 August 1958, in the course of the meeting which took place in Cairo between Deputy Under Secretary for State and Political Affairs Robert D. Murphy and President Nasser, the American emissary was unequivocal in warning that an Egyptian intervention in Jordan would inevitably precipitate an Israeli drive to capture the West Bank. Contrary to the plethora of messages from 1953 to 1956 to the Egyptian leadership, which had depicted Israel as a potentially expansionist entity, whose intransigent and irreconcilable behavior along the Arab–Israeli front constituted the main obstacle to peace, Murphy's 6 August 1958 statement viewed 'the Israeli reaction ... to the disintegration of the Hashemite Kingdom' as a strictly defensive move. As Murphy further elaborated: 'I expressed [the] opinion [that] in the event of an Egyptian intervention in Jordan, Israel would attack and that would be a situation the US could not control.'[24]

One week later, in a meeting that Secretary Dulles held on 14 August 1958 with Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fauzi, he similarly relied upon the threat of an Israeli intervention in Jordan as his major deterrence instrument *vis-à-vis* President Nasser, maintaining that 'if the Jordanian regime were overthrown, there would be a danger that Israel would conquer the West Bank.'[25]

Almost three months later, in the wake of the evacuation of the British

paratroopers from Amman and against the backdrop of the growing concern that Egypt would seek to exploit the power vacuum in order to overthrow King Hussein and install a pro-Nasserite regime in Jordan, the hope that Israel could effectively deter President Nasser continued to dominate the thinking of Secretary Dulles, who was left now without any viable option for coping with the crisis. As he remarked on 31 October 1958 to the British Ambassador in Washington, Harold Caccia:

> Apparently, Egypt really believes that ... Israel will take over the West Bank of the Jordan now that British troops have departed ... Since the Israelis could mobilize very quickly ... and take over the West Bank, should they so desire ... Egypt was particularly sensitive in this respect.[26]

This series of statements and messages, which envisioned Israel as a strategic asset to American interests and as a reliable stronghold in the continued confrontation with the recalcitrant forces of Arab nationalism, was further reinforced by a plethora of promises and assurances to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, which reiterated the American commitment to Israel's well-being as an independent and viable national entity.

Notwithstanding this emerging perception of Israel as a key Western bastion and a power capable of deterring and restraining Egypt, and notwithstanding the impact that the Israeli decision to permit the British and American overflights *en route* to Jordan had upon the thinking of Washington's high policy élite, it became clear in subsequent months that a gap continued to exist between perceptions and actual behavior. Thus, while the seeds of regional collaboration between Washington and Jerusalem were clearly planted during the turbulent days of July 1958 (which witnessed the establishment of new channels of communication between Washington and Jerusalem regarding security matters), and while the architects of American foreign policy became convinced, in the aftermath of the crisis, that the Israeli threat to use force if King Hussein were overthrown had indeed restrained Egypt and blocked Nasserist expansion, the American–Israeli alliance remained embryonic during the remaining two and a half years of the Eisenhower era. More specifically, the recognition that 'the situation in the Middle East has been substantially altered since our last consideration of an Israeli arms request,'[27] and that Israel was capable 'of contributing, from its resources of spiritual strength and determination, to a stable international order,'[28] did not lead

the President and his Secretary of State to significantly modify such tenets of their initial regional policy as their long-standing refusal to supply sophisticated weapons systems to Israel.

Although the administration did agree, on 26 August 1958, to sell Israel 100 (106-mm) anti-tank recoilless rifles 'plus reasonable quantities of ammunition and spare parts' (and also at the same time facilitated Israel's Centurion tank deal with Britain), and although it reiterated, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, its belief 'that Israel should be in a position to deter an attempt at aggression by indigenous forces,' it remained committed to its basic policy of refusing to become a major supplier of arms to Israel.[29] And indeed, the Israeli request for tanks, small submarines and electronic equipment, which was submitted in July 1958 as a direct result of 'the developments in Baghdad,' was rejected as the Department of State reiterated its traditional opposition to the supply of advanced weaponry to Israel: 'Political considerations militate against our being a large supplier of heavy military equipment to Israel. We prefer that the Israelis look elsewhere, particularly to the British and the French.'[30] Accordingly, in his meeting of 2 October 1958 with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Secretary Dulles formally informed her of the administration's decision to turn down the Israeli request. However, Israel was indeed permitted to use American civilian aid in order to purchase weapons systems from such sources as Britain, France, Switzerland and Italy.

The fact that during the second half of the decade, the Israeli Mossad provided the CIA with invaluable military, political and economic data about the Arab world, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern bloc, could not tip the scale in Israel's favor. While this uninterrupted flow of information concerning such developments as the beginning of the de-Stalinization process in the Soviet Union was perceived as yet another indication that Israel was capable of providing useful strategic services to the United States, it did not erode Washington's long-standing reluctance to sell sophisticated weapons systems to Israel. Indeed, notwithstanding such Israeli contributions to the CIA as the interception and transfer to CIA Director Allen Dulles of the full text of Chairman Nikita Khrushchev's speech, of February 1956, to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist party – which included a massive and unprecedented indictment of Stalin's crimes – and notwithstanding the growing collaboration between the Mossad and the CIA in such African countries as Ghana and Kenya (where the CIA financed various Israeli projects and used the Israeli

presence to promote certain Cold War objectives), these indications of strategic convergence between Washington and Jerusalem did not lead President Eisenhower to reconsider the traditional American position on arms sales to Israel.[31]

Clearly, the collapse of most pro-Western strongholds in the region and the evaporation of any residual hopes to consolidate an anti-Soviet front did not result in any immediate reorientation of American arms sales policy. Unwilling to become engaged in a regional arms race, the administration remained 'reluctant to become a principal source of supply for the area.'[32] And while American policy-makers decided, in 1959, to quietly endorse the Israeli notion of a 'Periphery Alliance,' namely, an anti-Nasserist bloc consisting of Israel and such non-Arab states in the Middle East as Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, they remained unreceptive to Israel's requests for tangible assistance for this 'project.'[33] Maintaining that Israel already had 'an overall quantitative superiority over the combined armed forces of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia,' Washington remained adamant in its refusal to extend military aid to Israel on the basis of its 'shared concern with Turkey over the threat from Nasser.'[34] Thus, although Washington did agree, in the summer of 1959, to allocate to Israel $100 million in technical and financial assistance over the following two years, it still refused to cross the Rubicon and conclude a major arms deal with the Ben-Gurion Government. It remained equally adamant in its opposition to any activity (such as the visits of American diplomats to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) facilities) which could be interpreted 'as support or sympathetic interest in the IDF.'[35]

It was only during President Eisenhower's last year at the White House that a window of opportunity was opened for Ben-Gurion's Government to purchase from the administration six batteries of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. The Israeli request for the Hawk missiles was officially submitted to the Department of State by Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman on 9 February 1960, as part of a comprehensive and ambitious arms request list, which included 'nearly 100 aircraft of the latest models, 530 tanks, 300 armored cars, 60 Howitzers, 250 recoilless rifles, 600 missiles of the Sidewinder and Hawk types, two small submarines and a large quantity of electronic equipment.'[36]

Ironically, the relentless efforts by the Israelis to obtain the Hawk missile, beginning in February 1960, unfolded against the backdrop of a continued debate within the general staff of the IDF over the most effective means of reducing Israel's vulnerability to an Arab (particularly

Egyptian) air strike. Convinced that the combination of an air-to-air missiles capability and the formation of a large fleet (comprising 150 aircraft) of fighter bombers capable of destroying the Arab air forces on the ground, would constitute the optimal, most reliable strategic deterrence against a surprise attack from the south or from the north, the commanders of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), General Dan Tolkovsky and General Ezer Weizman opposed, in 1958 and 1959, the purchase of surface-to-air missiles. General Weizman, in particular, was adamant in his opposition to the surface-to-air option, insisting – in a memorandum handwritten on 23 September 1959 – that the IAF 'should not predicate its defense posture upon surface-to-air missiles.'[37] And while the Chief of Staff in 1958, General Haim Laskov, and several high-ranking officers in the General Staff continuously sought to base Israel's deterrence upon air-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, rather than upon fighter (and strike) aircraft, even they did not envision the development of a surface-to-air missile capability as a central or crucial component of their recommended strategic doctrine.

It was only in early 1960 that this order of military priorities was finally changed. The growing recognition by the IDF of its vulnerability against the backdrop of Egypt's accelerated procurement program (which included the recent supply of Soviet MIG-17 fighter planes and TU-16 heavy bombers) converged with, and was further reinforced and augmented by, a broad cluster of political considerations. These revolved around the belief that the long-standing Israeli desire to commit the Eisenhower Administration, both militarily and politically, to Israel's defense had now become, at long last, a viable and tangible objective in view of the revised Middle East strategic landscape. The belief that a window of opportunity for predicating the American–Israeli framework upon new parameters and ground rules was now opened for Israel was, in turn, augmented by the conviction that the *de-facto* French–Israeli alliance had already passed its peak and could now only expect to decline and erode. As Levey observes:

> Although France sold Israel most of the arms that the Israelis required after the Suez crisis, Israel's leaders continued to harbor grave reservations regarding relations with Paris. Israel's policy-makers never viewed France as a long-term alternative to close ties with the United States. Moreover, Ben-Gurion feared that France would 'desert' Israel as soon as it solved its Algerian problem. The

> Israelis did not express these fears in public forums so as not to jeopardize relations with France, but both Ben-Gurion's diary and the protocols of meetings of Mapai's committees reveal the hope among Israel's leaders that they [could] replace dependence upon France for arms with a close relationship with the United States that would include the supply of American arms.[38]

Indeed, convinced that the special relationship that had developed between Israel and France in the mid-1950s would not last indefinitely (in view of France's traditional interests in the Arab world), the Israeli political and military leadership (with the exception of Shimon Peres, the Director-General of the Defense Ministry, who later became the Deputy Defense Minister) was determined to make the United States Israel's major arms supplier and patron, believing that unlike the transient and instrumental nature of the informal French–Israeli alliance, American ties with Israel could well develop into a durable and viable security relationship. The high command of the IDF in particular insisted now that Israel forcefully pursue 'the American military option,' and the February 1960 arms request reflected its assessment that, politically and strategically, only the United States was capable of continuously ascertaining that the balance of military power between Israel and Egypt was maintained.[39] This strategic reasoning was further augmented and reinforced by an entire cluster of tactical and operational considerations such as the desire to use Hawk anti-aircraft missiles for defending the recently constructed Dimona nuclear reactor.

The supply, in late 1959, by the Soviet Union of advanced fighter planes (such as the MIG-17) and heavy bombers (such as the TU-16), to Egypt, exacerbated Israel's security dilemma and convinced its military leadership (with the exception of the IAF Commander Weizman) that unless provided with defensive capabilities that were available only from the United States, the IDF would not be able to effectively implement the very essence of Israel's long-standing strategic doctrine, which evolved around the overriding need to meet any impending threat to Israel's security by launching a pre-emptive strike designed to neutralize the enemy's air force. General Weizman, however, remained continuously skeptical regarding the effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles but was overruled by the Chief of Staff of the IDF, General Zvi Zur.

The Israeli initiative – which was thus precipitated both by this sense of vulnerability in the face of enhanced Arab capabilities (particularly in the air) and by the need to find a viable and long-term alternative to the

'French connection' – culminated in March 1960. In the course of his 10 March 1960 meeting with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion forcefully called upon his host to reassess the American posture by underscoring Israel's vulnerability to an Egyptian air attack. Maintaining that:

> At the present time Egyptian bombers can carry three tons of bombs ... the new bombers [the Egyptians] were getting from the Soviet bloc will be able to carry ten tons of bombs ... and to destroy Tel-Aviv without too much trouble.[40]

Continuously preoccupied with Israel's security and imbued with the lessons of the Holocaust, Ben-Gurion saw Arab hostility toward Israel as 'deep and long-lasting.' Utterly pessimistic regarding the prospects of peacefully resolving the Arab–Israeli dispute in the foreseeable future, he was unwilling to compromise on issues which were inextricably related to Israel's well-being and capacity to uninterruptedly control its own fate. His remarks to President Eisenhower quintessentially reflected these pervasive fears and concerns that were inherent in Ben-Gurion's perceptions of history as well as of the geopolitical realities of the Arab–Israeli predicament.

Against the backdrop of this highly menacing vision, which was patterned on the Prime Minister's background images of the emotion-laden, perpetually conflict-ridden regional environment (with the new Soviet MIG-19 fighter that was scheduled to be delivered to Egypt in late 1960, depicted as capable of 'finishing' Israel in a surprise attack), it was only natural for Israel to expect the President to approve its February 1960 arms request, particularly such items as the Hawk missile, 'which [could] only be obtained in the US.'[41]

The Prime Minister's emotional plea for meeting Israel's urgent defense needs failed to impress President Eisenhower, who refused to deviate from the traditional premises of American policy, maintaining that while the administration 'was not indifferent to Israel's arms needs ... the nations of Western Europe ... could better supply arms to Israel than could the United States.'[42]

Although Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's meeting of 10 March 1960 with President Eisenhower did not provide the impetus for modifying the American arms sales policy, his subsequent meeting of 13 March 1960 with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter resulted in an apparent breakthrough, with the Secretary of State promising to consider the Israeli

request 'sympathetically and urgently.'[43] Indeed, contrary to numerous earlier instances in which Israeli statesmen and diplomats who sought military assistance from the US were promptly and unequivocally turned down, Ben-Gurion's detailed presentation of Israel's urgent defense needs in view of the rapidly changing balance of power, profoundly impressed Secretary Herter.

Faced with the apparent collapse of the long-standing American dream – which had preoccupied the architects of American diplomacy during most of the 1950s – of forging a broadly based inter-Arab security organization for the purpose of containing Soviet penetration into the region, Herter (unlike his predecessor Dulles) was now apparently prepared to decouple the American security posture toward Israel from broader American concerns and objectives in the region, and thus to review the Israeli request on its intrinsic merits and exclusively within the delimited parameters of the American–Israeli–Egyptian triad. In the course of his 13 March 1960 meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, when asked whether his stated willingness to review the Israeli request 'sympathetically and urgently' could be considered 'a positive reply,' Herter confirmed to Ben-Gurion that 'that [was] a fair assumption.'[44]

Despite Secretary Herter's belief (expressed in the course of his meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, G. Lewis Jones, that took place immediately after Herter's meeting with Ben-Gurion had been concluded) that 'we should do something promptly in connection with Israel's needs for air defense equipment for use in the event of an attack [by Egypt],' and that 'this means the supply of ground-to-air missiles,' no change in the traditional American position on the sale of arms to Israel was in fact forthcoming.[45]

And although Secretary Herter most forcefully supported the sale to Israel of the Hawk missiles in the course of his meeting of 27 July 1960 with several of the Department of State's Middle East experts (including Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Parker T. Hart, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, T. Livingston Merchant, and Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, H. Armin Meyer), he ultimately accepted the unanimous opinion of his subordinates (as well as of such Pentagon officials as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, John A. Dabney), who vehemently opposed any deviations from the traditional parameters of American arms sales policy. Indeed, the Secretary's conviction that 'there was no reason to deny Israel ... the purely defensive Hawk missiles,' and

that 'unless better arguments could be presented ... the Israelis should have the missiles,'[46] did not precipitate any congruent action by the Eisenhower Administration at the end of the day.

Confronted with the united front of Department of State and Pentagon officials, who argued 'that the Israelis were well ahead of [Egypt] in supersonic aircraft,'[47] that 'introducing such spectacular weaponry into the area would have serious consequences in the form of an increased arms race, with the Russians backing Nasser,'[48] and that the Hawk's sale 'would link us closely to Israel's security at the expense of our relations with the rest of the Arab world and to the benefit of the Soviets,'[49] Secretary Herter decided to acquiesce and set aside his reservations. The memorandum from his 27 July 1960 meeting with Under Secretary Merchant, Acting Assistant Secretary Hart, and Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Meyer, clearly records the bureaucracy's unequivocal victory over the Secretary of State. It stated that 'after a general discussion of the question, the conclusion emerged that we would not provide the missiles to the Israelis.'[50]

In the final analysis, then, the broadly based belief that the Hawks 'were not essential to Israel's security' was further reinforced and augmented by considerations related both to regional stability and to the 'appearance of impartiality,'[51] which the administration continuously sought to project. These considerations – which were closely patterned on the traditional premises of American diplomacy and strategy as they had been shaped and delineated during Eisenhower's first term as President – ultimately outweighed and overshadowed the cluster of concerns and calculations, which were predicated upon the recently established image of Israel as a power capable of protecting American interests and the remaining pro-Western strongholds in the region in their confrontation with the forces of radicalism and militancy. The fact that various parts and branches of the administration, and particularly the staff of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, remained fully and invariably committed to their preconceived vision of Israel as a socialist society dominated by a 'leftward' orientation and continued ideological attachment to Marxist ideology, further reinforced and buttressed the bureaucracy's innate predisposition to deny Israel highly sophisticated weapons systems. The sale of Hawk missiles to Israel, warned Assistant Secretary Jones in his 7 July 1960 message to Under Secretary Merchant, could well result 'in an undesirable exposure of secrets.'[52]

Despite this strategic victory of the bureaucracy of both the Pentagon and the Department of State in the interdepartmental and intradepartmental debate over American arms sales policy, Secretary Herter still hoped to secure a tactical, face-saving achievement in his quest to modify the administration's thinking and behavior. Contrary to the recommendation of his advisers, who 'did not believe our answer to the Israelis should leave the door open,' the Secretary of State 'felt other considerations might suggest a delay of several months before closing the door completely.'[53]

Notwithstanding Herter's desire to keep the option of revising the American posture alive by initiating a comprehensive review of American arms sale policy (which, he hoped, could lead to the re-examination of the Israeli case in view of the imminent supply to Egypt of the new MIG-19 fighter planes), he was once again induced – at the end of another encounter with the Department's Middle East experts – to set aside his views and thus to seal the fate of the Israeli request only one week after his supportive view had been so emphatically articulated.

On 4 August 1960, in a letter from the Secretary of State to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Israel's request was formally turned down.[54] Closely patterned on the arguments that had surfaced on 27 July 1960, in the respective presentations of Hart, Merchant, and Meyer, the letter incorporated their rhetoric and terminology. Insisting that 'the introduction of such spectacular weaponry into the Near East area [was bound] to contribute to an intensification of an arms race to the detriment of the states concerned,'[55] the message effectively brought to an end a long and intricate process of intergovernmental, as well as of intragovernmental, bargaining. Clearly, despite the growing strategic convergence between Washington and Jerusalem, the Eisenhower Administration – which remained convinced that Israel was capable of coping effectively with any threat to its security[56] – was still unprepared to close the gap separating the perceptual from the operational and thus to predicate its arms sale policy upon the changing regional landscape.

It would be left to President Kennedy to close this gap and thus to translate into concrete action what remained, at the end of the Eisenhower Presidency, an essentially unstructured and embryonic partnership.

It is to the examination of this concrete action – namely, the decision to sell Israel the Hawk missile, which was made two years after Secretary Herter had reluctantly turned down an earlier Israeli request for arms – that we now turn.

NOTES

1. Geoffrey Aronson, *From Sideshow to Centerstage: US Policy Towards Egypt, 1946–1956* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 96–124; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 26–7; Uri Bialer, *Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation*, 1948–1956 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 265; Robert J. Lieber, *No Common Power: Understanding International Relations* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), p. 61; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 525; Peter L. Hahn, *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 180; John D. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 131–225; Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 198–9; Shibley Telhami, *Power and Leadership in International Bargaining: The Path to the Camp David Accords* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 50.
2. Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 56. See also Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 152; Fred I. Greenstein, *The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as President* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 71; Michael J. Cohen, *Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 239–72; Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 71–104.
3. Mordechai Gazit, 'Ben-Gurion's Attempt to establish Military Ties with the United States', *Gesher*, 32 (1986–87), p. 57–63 [in Hebrew]; Zach Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers, 1952–1960* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), p. 8; Neil Caplan, *Futile Diplomacy: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo–American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1954–1956* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 25.
4. Quoted from the address that was delivered on 9 April 1954 by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Henry A. Byroade, before the Dayton World Affairs Council. *The John Foster Dulles Papers*, Box 73, 'Middle East' folder: 4 (hereafter *Dulles Papers*); Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. Citations from the *John Foster Dulles Papers* are published with permission of Princeton Universities Libraries. See also Mordechai Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', pp. 100–1; David Tal, 'The American–Israeli Security Treaty: Sequel or Means to the Relief of Israeli–Arab Tensions, 1954–1955', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 31, 4 (1995), pp. 828–48; Steven Z. Freiberger, *Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East* (Chicago, IL: Ivan Dee, 1992), pp. 84–105; Isaac Alteras, *Eisenhower and Israel: US–Israeli Relations, 1953–1960* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 21; Shimon Peres, *Battling for Peace: Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995), p. 117.
5. Teddy Kollek, *For Jerusalem: A Life* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p. 97. See also Bialer, *Between East and West*, p. 261; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 132. As Levey points out, despite the outburst, in the early 1950s, of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, such coalition parties as Ahdut Ha'avoda and Mapam 'continued to call for a more "balanced"

approach in foreign policy' (Ibid., p. 132). The fact that most Israeli leaders (including Prime Minister Ben-Gurion) were deeply suspicious of Britain, further reinforced this reluctance to become committed to a pro-Western orientation (Ibid., pp. 134–5).

6. Leopold Yehuda Laufer, 'US Aid to Israel: Problems and Perspectives', in *Dynamics of Dependence*, p. 130; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 31; Tal, 'The American–Israeli Security Treaty', p. 843; Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, pp. 46–7.
7. Uri Bialer, 'Facts and Pacts: Ben-Gurion and Israel's International Orientation, 1948–1956', in Ronald W. Zweig (ed.), *David Ben-Gurion: Politics and Leadership in Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), p. 217. Bailer quotes from Ben-Gurion's diary entry of 12 May 1955.
8. Quoted from Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban's interview, recorded on 28 May 1964. *Dulles Oral History Project*, *Dulles Papers*: 17.
9. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 12. See also David Tal, 'Symbol, not Substance?: Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles, 1960–1962', *International History Review*, 22, 2 (2000), p. 305; Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', p. 91; Alteras, *Eisenhower and Israel*, pp. 177–8; Gideon Rafael, *Destination Peace: Three Decades of Israeli Foreign Policy* (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), p. 46. For an analysis of earlier Israeli efforts to secure arms from the US, see Doron Almog, *Weapons Acquisition in the United States, 1945–1949* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1987) [in Hebrew].
10. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 12. See also Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', pp. 90–1.
11. Dulles's remarks of 20 October 1955. Memorandum of the 262nd meeting of the NSC. *Foreign Relations of the United States 14: The Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1955* (hereafter *FRUS*) (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 622. See also Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', p. 91; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, pp. 29–30; Bialer, *Between East and West*, pp. 272–3; Zaki Shalom, *Policy in the Shadow of Controversy: The Routine Security Policy of Israel, 1949–1956* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1996), pp. 94–7 [in Hebrew]; Motti Golani, *There Will Be War Next Summer: The Road to the Sinai War, 1955–1956*, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1997), p. 109 [in Hebrew].
12. Eisenhower's press conference of 7 March 1956. Quoted by Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement', p. 11. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 57. On the Kinneret raid and its ramifications, see Golani, *The Road to the Sinai War*, Vol. 1, pp. 103–4.
13. Dulles's remarks of 11 January 1956. Memorandum of his conversation with President Eisenhower and Robert B. Anderson. The meeting took place on the eve of Anderson's peace mission to the Middle East as the President's special envoy. *Dulles Papers*, Box 10, 'Subject Series' folder: 3. See also Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 44.
14. Quoted from Dulles's letter of 6 February 1956, to members of the House of Representatives. *Dulles Papers*, Box 101, 'Congress' folder. See also Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 109.
15. Eisenhower's message of 30 April 1956, to Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 15: 589. See also Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 31; Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 57.

16. Dulles's remarks of 30 October 1955. Quoted by Foreign Minister Sharett (who met Secretary Dulles in Paris on that day). Moshe Sharett, *Personal Diary, 1953–1956*, Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv Book Guild, 1978), p. 1266 [in Hebrew].
17. Dulles's remarks of 10 April 1956, to the leadership for the House of Representatives. *FRUS* 15: 506.
18. David Tal, 'Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37, 1 (2001), pp. 142–58. See also Nigel Ashton, 'A Great New Venture?: Anglo–American Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 4, 1 (1993), pp. 80–1; Alan Dowty, *Middle East Crisis: US Decision-Making in 1958, 1970, and 1973* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 43–6; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 75–84; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, p. 62; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 116–17; David W. Lesch, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 143; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, pp. 130, 134.
19. Dulles's remarks of 21 July 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with Eban. *FRUS* 13: 72. See also Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 134. On the Israeli perceptions and expectations from the West as a result of its crisis behavior, see David Ben-Gurion's *Personal Diary*, Vol. 24 (diary entry of 24 July 1958), pp. 93, IDF Archives.
20. Quoted from the remarks of General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were made on 16 July 1958, in the course of a conference with President Eisenhower. *FRUS* 11: 309. For a similar view see Dulles's remarks of 21 July 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with Eban. *FRUS* 13: 72. See also Moshe Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude toward the Kingdom of Jordan', *Israel Studies*, 1, 2 (1996), pp. 140–69.
21. See the memorandum entitled: 'Factors Affecting US Policy Toward the Near East', which was submitted on 19 August 1958 to the NSC by S. Everett Gleason, Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC Planning Board. White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1952–61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 23: NSC 5801/1: Policy Toward the Near East (1), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene: 6 (hereafter DDE Library). A memorandum from 3 October 1958, which was submitted to the NSC by S. Everett Gleason, expressed a similar view, albeit in a more implicit form. It stated that 'the virtual collapse, during 1958, of conservative [regimes in the Near East], left radical nationalist regimes almost without opposition in the area ... and has brought a great challenge to Western interests in the Near East.' 'Faced with this challenge,' the memorandum concluded, 'we must determine which of our interests may be reconcilable with the dominant forces in the area.' White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1952–61; NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 23: NSC 5820/1: Policy Toward the Near East (1), DDE Library: 1–2. See also, in this connection, Haggai Eshed, *One Man Mossad: Reuven Shiloach: Father of Israeli Intelligence* (Jerusalem: Edanim, 1988), pp. 269–73; Zaki Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan, 1960–1963: Perils of the Pro-Nasser Policy* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), p. 6.

22. Eisenhower's remarks of 16 July 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with Dulles. *FRUS* 11: 310. On the same day, CIA Director Allen Dulles proposed that Israel be requested to rescue Jordan from its fuel shortage and to supply it with emergency fuel. Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', p. 148. In his meeting of 24 July 1958 with President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles defined Israel as 'a key Western bastion' in the region, 'the independence and well-being of which must not be compromised' (quoted by Tal, 'Israel and the 1958 Crisis', p. 147).
23. Dulles's remarks of 8 August 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with the British Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Lord Samuel Hood. *FRUS* 11: 445. See also Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 81–3; Eshed, *One Man Mossad*, pp. 271–3.
24. Deputy Under Secretary Murphy's remarks of 6 August 1958. Memorandum (prepared on 8 August 1958) of his conversation with President Nasser. *FRUS* 11: 442. See also Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 82.
25. Dulles's remarks of 14 August 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with Egypt's Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi. *FRUS*: 469. See also Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 154–7.
26. Dulles's remarks of 31 October 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with British Ambassador in Washington, Harold Caccia. *FRUS* 11: 623.
27. Memorandum of 22 August 1958 from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, William M. Rountree, to Dulles. *FRUS* 13: 90. See also Dulles's message of 1 August 1958 to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. *FRUS* 11: 420; Eshed, *One Man Mossad*, pp. 270–1; Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 134–5; Tal, 'Israel and the 1958 Crisis', pp. 147, 149.
28. Quoted from Dulles's letter of 1 August 1958 to Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 13: 78–9. See also, in this connection, Michelle Mart, 'Tough Guys and American Cold War Policy: Images of Israel, 1948–1960', *Diplomatic History*, 20, 3 (1996), pp. 358–80; Charles A. Kupchan, 'American Globalism in the Middle East: The Roots of Regional Security Policy', *Political Science Quarterly*, 103, 4 (1988–89), pp. 588–600; Eshed, *One Man Mossad*, pp. 279–80; Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 154–5.
29. Dulles's message of 1 August 1958 to Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 13: 78. For a clear exposition of the traditional American arms sales policy in the Middle East see Dulles's remarks of 2 October 1958. Memorandum of his conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir. *FRUS* 13: 96. See also Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 83; Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 96; Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', pp. 307, 309; Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 149–51. See, on the theoretical implications of this approach, Lawrence S. Falkowski, 'Predicting Flexibility with Memory Profiles', in Lawrence S. Falkowski (ed.), *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1979), pp. 55–60.
30. Memorandum of 22 August 1958, from Rountree to Dulles. *FRUS* 13: 88. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', pp. 310–11. For an analysis of the Israeli arms request of July 1958 see Tal, 'Israel and the 1958 Crisis', pp. 152–3.
31. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Friends in Deed: Inside the US–Israel Alliance* (New York: Hyperion, 1994), pp. 88–9; Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Every Spy Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p. 143; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*,

pp. 132–3; Bialer, *Between East and West*, p. 251; Kollek, *For Jerusalem: A Life*, pp. 98–101; Shmuel Cohen-Shany, *The Paris Operation: Intelligence and Quiet Diplomacy in a New State* (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1994), pp. 143–4 [in Hebrew]; Uri Bar-Joseph, *Intelligence Intervention in the Politics of Democratic States: The United States, Israel, and Britain* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 154–6.

32. Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, G. Lewis Jones. Memorandum of his 16 February 1959 meeting with Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman. *FRUS* 13: 266. See also, in this connection, Yemima Rosental (ed.), *David Ben-Gurion: Selected Documents* (Jerusalem: ISA, 1997), p. 394 [in Hebrew].
33. Quoted from Rountree's message of 17 January 1959 to Dulles, by Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 98. See also Douglas Little, 'The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and Israel, 1957–68', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25, 1 (1993), pp. 563–85; Eshed, *One Man Mossad*, pp. 267–8; 274–6; Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 142, 145; Rosental, *Ben-Gurion*, pp. 394, 397.
34. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 98. Although the Egyptian–Syrian union – the United Arab Republic (UAR) – was established in February 1958, this work – for the sake of continuity and coherence – uses the name 'Egypt,' since part of it deals with developments that took place either before the establishment of the UAR, or after it was dissolved in September 1961. See also, in this connection, Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 358.
35. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 98. See also Rosental, *Ben-Gurion*, pp. 396–8.
36. Quoted from a memorandum that was sent on 12 February 1960, from Jones to Herter. In this memorandum, the Assistant Secretary of State summarized the Israeli arms request (which had been submitted earlier in the day). *FRUS* 13: 264. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 311.
37. Quoted from an internal memorandum which was drafted on 23 September 1959 by General Weizman. IDF Archives, File 705/60/88: 1. See also the IAF internal memoranda on the subject from 7 October 1959, 8 October 1959 and 8 November 1959. IDF Archives, File 705/60/88. For additional data on Weizman's views, see Stuart Cohen, 'Who Needs Surface-to-Air Missiles?: How were the Hawk Missiles Purchased?' in Zeev Lahish and Meir Amitai (eds), *A Decade of Disquiet: Studies in the History of Israel Air Force, 1956–1967* (Jerusalem: The Ministry of Defense's Publication House, 1995), pp. 252–3 [in Hebrew]; Ezer Weizman, *On Eagle's Wings* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 183–6. According to Cohen, Israel was also motivated in its desire to obtain the Hawk missile by the need to defend the Dimona nuclear reactor, which was under construction (p. 258). For an analysis of the views and recommendations of the IDF General Staff in support of the Hawk missile, see the message which was sent, on 23 September 1959, by Aharon Nachshon, head of the Procurement Division in the IDF General Staff, to IAF Commander Weizman. IDF Archives.
38. Levey, *Israel and the Western Powers*, p. 137. In 1960 Mapai, the Israel Worker's Party, was the dominant and ruling party in the Israeli political system, to which most political leaders, including Ben-Gurion, belonged.

39. For evidence, from December 1958, which illustrates the desire of the General Staff of the IDF to pursue 'the American option' in the field of arms procurement (on the basis of both military and political considerations) see the remarks of Chief of Staff Laskov in the General Staff meeting of 17 December 1958. IDF Archives, File 847/62/79: 2.
40. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 10 March 1960. Memorandum of his conversation with Eisenhower. *FRUS* 13: 287. In the memorandum, which was submitted to the President, Herter summarized his 13 March 1960 meeting with Ben-Gurion without raising any objection to the Israeli request. White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–1961. International Series, Box 8: Israel (2), March–August 1960. DDE Library: 1. See also Cohen, 'Who Needs Surface-to-Air Missiles?', p. 263. See also, in this connection, Avner Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 10. See also Bialer, *Israel between East and West*, pp. 14–17; Shlomo Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960–1991. An Israeli Perspective* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 41–60.
41. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 10 March 1960. Memorandum of his conversation with Eisenhower. *FRUS* 13: 287–8. It is interesting to note that on the eve of this meeting, the Israeli Foreign Ministry was highly skeptical regarding the prospects of obtaining arms from the US. In a memorandum, which was prepared on 3 March 1960, entitled: 'The American Attitude Toward Israel', the Head of the North American Division in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Gershon Avner, reconstructed at length the traditional American policy of refusing to sell arms to Israel as it had unfolded since the establishment of the state and predicted that the Eisenhower Administration would 'remain committed to [this] policy.' ISA. Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 6.
42. Eisenhower's remarks of 10 March 1960. Memorandum of his conversation with Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 13: 288. See also Rosental, *Ben-Gurion*, p. 397.
43. Herter's remarks of 13 March 1960. Memorandum of his meeting with Ben-Gurion. White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–61. International Series, Box 8: Israel (2), pp. March–August 1960. DDE Library: 1–2.
44. Herter's remarks of 13 March 1960. Memorandum of his meeting with Ben-Gurion. White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952–61. International Series, Box 8: Israel (2), pp. March–August 1960. DDE Library: 1.
45. Herter's remarks of 13 March 1960, to Jones. Quoted from a memorandum of their meeting, which followed Herter's meeting with Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 13: 299–300. For a comprehensive exposition of the bureaucracy's thinking and continued opposition to the sale, see the remarks of Ogden R. Reid, the American Ambassador in Israel, which were made on 5 July 1960, in the memorandum of his conversation with Mordechai Gazit, Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington (who met Ambassador Reid in Israel). ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 1. In his remarks, Ambassador Reid suggested to Gazit not to 'have any illusions' regarding the prospects of obtaining the Hawk missile from the US. Despite the fact that the Israeli request was still under consideration in Washington the Ambassador – according to Gazit's account – was unequivocal and emphatic in reiterating that the traditional American position on selling arms to Israel 'would not change in the near future.' Gazit's claim that the imminent supply of the MIG-19 fighter to Egypt

would pose a serious threat to Israel's security 'failed to impress' Reid, who remained confident that the administration would ultimately reject the Israeli request. By comparison, in his meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Meir, which took place on 27 June 1960, Secretary Herter refrained from making any predictions regarding the American response to the Israeli request, maintaining that the issue was 'under review.' See memorandum of Herter's conversation of 27 June 1960, with Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 1. See also Herter's message of 4 August 1960, to Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 13: 358–61.

46. Herter's remarks of 27 July 1960. Memorandum of his meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Parker T. Hart, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Armin H. Meyer and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, T. Livingston Merchant. *FRUS* 13: 356. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 312 and Cohen, 'Who Needs Surface-to-Air Missiles?', p. 270.
47. Meyer's remarks of 17 July 1960. Quoted in *FRUS* 13: 356–7.
48. Memorandum of 14 June 1960, from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, John A. Dabney, to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political affairs, Raymond A. Hare. *FRUS* 13: 336–7.
49. Meyer's remarks of 27 July 1960. Quoted in *FRUS* 13: 356–7.
50. Quoted from the 27 July 1960 memorandum (which was drafted by Meyer). *FRUS* 13: 356. For an earlier illustration of a sharp intragovernmental debate, in which the bureaucracy supported an uncompromising line toward Israel whereas the President was willing to consider a softening of the American arms sale policy, see *FRUS* 15: 260–1. Although Eisenhower stated, in his telephone conversation of 1 March 1956, with Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr, that 'he was a little worried that perhaps we were too tough with the Israelis with respect to arms,' he ultimately accepted the position of the Department of State, which argued that 'any indication of a departure from our present position might seriously jeopardize our ability to bring the two parties together.' Memorandum of the conversation, of 1 March 1956, between Eisenhower and Under Secretary Hoover. *FRUS* 15: 260–1.
51. Memorandum of 7 July 1960, from Jones to Merchant. *FRUS* 13: 344–5.
52. Ibid., 345. For earlier illustrations of the same perceptions, see Kollek, *For Jerusalem: A Life*, p. 97; Bialer, *Between East and West*, p. 261; Bialer, 'Ben-Gurion and Israel's International Orientation, 1948–1956', p. 223; Aaron S. Klieman, *Israel and the World After 40 Years* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), pp. 189–97.
53. Quoted from the 27 July 1960 memorandum. *FRUS* 13: 357.
54. For the text of Herter's message of 4 August 1960, to *Ben-Gurion*, see *FRUS* 13: 358–61.
55. Ibid., 359. See also Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement,' p. 93; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, Vol. 3 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975) p. 1320 [in Hebrew]. On the Israeli reaction to the American decision, see Harman's message of 19 August 1960, to Avner. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 1–2.
56. Hart's remarks of 26 July 1960. Memorandum of his meeting with Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 2.

3

The Sale of Arms to Israel, January 1961–August 1962: Perceptions and Policies

As we have witnessed in the preceding pages, the American arms sale policy toward Israel remained unchanged during the entire Eisenhower era despite the changing strategic landscape of the region in the aftermath of the Jordanian Crisis of July 1958 and Secretary Herter's willingness, in 1960, to approve the sale of the Hawk missile to Israel. Clearly, the abandonment of the administration's initial image of Israel as a strategic liability to core American objectives and designs in the Middle East did not lead President Eisenhower to reconsider his approach toward the logical corollary of this perceptual shift and thus agree to sell advanced weaponry to Israel.

Against the backdrop of this continued adherence of the Eisenhower Presidency to its initial posture despite the changing circumstances (and its own perception of Israel's role and strategic value in this revised setting), the decision of the Kennedy Administration, less than two years after it had been inaugurated, to revise what had been a traditional and central tenet of American diplomacy for more than a decade, appears at first glance puzzling. Did the regional strategic environment witness – during the period which had immediately preceded the decision to sell Israel the Hawk short-range, anti-aircraft missile – changes of such magnitude as to dramatically change, or threaten to change, the balance of military capabilities between Israel and its protagonists; or did the Hawk decision reflect a belated recognition of the significance of the strategic developments that had unfolded during the late 1950s? Indeed, did this about-face or swing derive exclusively from changes in the strategic developments that could have called into question the validity

of the long-standing and pervasive American belief concerning the overall qualitative superiority of the IDF over any Arab military force (or combination of forces); or was it primarily and inextricably linked to a different cluster of beliefs and proclivities that had evolved around the President's innate desire to set in motion a process of confidence-building and accommodation in the Palestinian sphere? Furthermore, was the decision of August 1962 to supply the Hawk missiles to Israel at least partially motivated by a complex of domestic political considerations – for example, the desire to strengthen President Kennedy's infrastructure of Jewish support on the eve of the congressional elections and reassure American Jewry that the recent American overtures toward President Nasser did not entail turning back the clock of American diplomacy to the early 1950s; that is, to an era in which Israel had been viewed as an impediment and obstacle to the effective promotion of the omnivorous goals and imperatives of containment? In other words, was the President motivated, in his decision to cross the Rubicon and modify the traditional American arms sale policy, by his desire to secure the continued support of the American-Jewish community, which had been an integral part of the ethnic Democratic coalition forged by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the early 1930s and which shared many of President Kennedy's domestic priorities and concerns?

In attempting to address these questions it is clear that the formation of a new Democratic Administration, which differed from the Eisenhower Presidency in terms of its ideology as well as some of its derivative regional policies, did not lead to any immediate reassessment of the premises upon which the American arms sale posture had been shaped and delineated for more than a decade. Seeking to integrate and channel the forces of Arab nationalism into a pro-Western orientation, President Kennedy was reluctant – during the first 18 months of his Presidency – to initiate policies and measures within the American–Israeli framework that would be perceived as incompatible with the goal of improving Washington's relations with the Arab world in general, and with Egypt in particular.[1] An analysis of the views expressed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his Middle East experts, as well as by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, indicates that they remained continuously opposed to the sale of advanced weaponry (including the Hawk missile) to Israel up to the very eve of the Presidential decision, of August 1962, to conclude the Hawk deal with the Ben-Gurion Government. By comparison, Pentagon

officials became increasingly predisposed, from May 1961, to support the renewed Israeli request for the missile.

Whereas the Eisenhower Presidency witnessed – during its last year in office – a sharp intradepartmental debate between Secretary Herter, who was prepared to deviate from the traditional parameters of American policy in view of the changing dynamics of the strategic landscape of the Middle East, and all of the Department of State's regional experts, who remained invariably and irreconcilably opposed to any change in the American position, no such intramural controversy permeated or divided the Department of State during the first 18 months of the Kennedy Administration.

As early as on 30 January 1961, only ten days after the Kennedy Administration had been inaugurated, in a memorandum which Secretary Rusk submitted to President Kennedy, Rusk reiterated the standard, long-standing and unchanged departmental view concerning the supply of the Hawk missiles to Israel. As he pointed out:

> We have declined [last year] an Israeli request for an elaborate and costly ground-to-air missile system on the ground that [Egypt] would undoubtedly seek similar weapons from the USSR with the resultant introduction of a burdensome and dangerous missile era in the Near East. Our decision was consistent also with our policy ... of not becoming a supplier of significant types or amounts of arms to nations of the Near East.[2]

Shortly thereafter, on 16 February 1961, faced with a renewed Israeli request for the Hawk missile, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy remained unimpressed with Ambassador Harman's arguments.[3] In the course of their meeting, the Israeli Ambassador vehemently argued that the recent acquisition by Egypt of the MIG-19 fighter, 'which by a large margin is a better plane than anything the Israelis have,' posed a grave danger to Israel's security in case Egypt opted to launch 'a sudden air attack' against the Jewish state.[4] In such an eventuality, Harman warned, 'Israel's jet fighter capacity could be knocked out immediately and the country's communications system destroyed, thus creating great difficulties for manpower mobilization, which depends on quick communications with a large reserve to augment a small standing army.'[5]

As was the case in the course and aftermath of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's meeting, of 10 March 1960, with President Eisenhower, the

Ambassador's plea – which was closely patterned on his Prime Minister's presentation during that meeting – failed to precipitate any change in the traditional American posture. Despite the leadership change at the White House (and the NSC), Harman's allusion to the Hawk missile as a panacea and an ultimate solution to Israel's security problem which – as such – was 'ideally adapted to the purpose of defending Israel's airfields,'[6] did not provide the impetus for reassessing – let alone modifying – the premises upon which the American arms sale policy was continuously based. Maintaining that 'the United States did not wish to introduce offensive equipment to the Middle East,' the recently appointed Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs advised Israel – as Secretary Dulles and his subordinates in the Department of State had done on numerous occasions during the previous decade – 'to seek its major requirements from traditional sources, principally the French and the British.'[7]

Although Bundy's remarks fully accorded with the course of action continuously advocated and pursued by the Department of State, the fact that he had just been recruited by President Kennedy and thus lacked intimate acquaintance with all facets of the American approach to the issue prompted the Department of State to send him a detailed exposition of its basic views, which augmented and supplemented Bundy's cursory and general comments during his 16 February 1961 meeting with Ambassador Harman. Using the verbatim memorandum of the conversation as its point of departure, the message to Bundy (which was drafted on 24 February 1961 by the Department of State's Executive Secretary, Walter J. Stoessel Jr) offered a most emphatic and unequivocal rebuttal to all the points raised by the Israeli Ambassador.[8] Stoessel's message to Bundy was accompanied, as an additional part of his socialization process, by a memorandum entitled: 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles,' which comprehensively articulated the entire cluster of formal, political and strategic considerations, on the basis of which the traditional American arms role posture was formed.[9]

None of the developments that, by the end of the 1950s, had dramatically transformed the entire strategic landscape of the Middle East and sealed the fate of Washington's initial plan of forging a broadly based regional security alliance, were recognized in this memorandum. Instead, focusing on the formal and procedural requirements of American arms sale policy, 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles' insisted that the need to maintain coherence, continuity and consistency

should take precedence over any other competing consideration in the shaping of the American posture.[10] Accordingly, any deviation from the established parameters of American diplomacy in this sphere had to be avoided, since 'setting a new precedent' would make it exceedingly difficult for the administration to refuse 'future Israeli requests by referring to "our traditional policy".'[11]

Turning from the procedural to the political and the strategic, the document was equally unequivocal and clear. Not only would the introduction of 'spectacular missile weaponry into the Near East' set in motion a new and dangerous 'spiral in the Middle East arms race' by prompting Egypt to 'importune the Soviets for similar weaponry,' but it would be fundamentally incompatible with the overriding American desire to maintain 'the appearance of impartiality in the Arab–Israeli dispute.'[12] Thus, in addition to precipitating an acutely menacing arms race that could lead to a regional conflagration (and possibly to a direct superpower confrontation), the supply of the Hawk missile to Israel was bound to adversely affect Washington's margin of influence and maneuverability as a Superpower and mediator by 'driving the Arab countries into closer dependence [upon] the Soviets.'[13]

Clearly, the desire to maintain regional stability converged with, and was further reinforced by, the administration's determination to avoid any move that, in its view, was destined to further alienate and infuriate the Arab world, while driving the remaining pro-Western strongholds in the Middle East into the Soviet sphere of influence:

> It is axiomatic that if we provide Israel with missiles, there will occur ... an emotional uproar against the United States in the Arab world ... With many other problems besetting us elsewhere in the world, we would not wish to enlarge our burdens by stirring up further outcry against us in the Middle East.[14]

And while the prospects of mitigating or resolving the Arab–Israeli predicament in general, and of promoting a settlement to the 'Arab refugee problem' in particular, were viewed in the document as 'dim at best,' a decision to supply the Hawk missile to Israel was bound, according to the 24 February 1961 assessment, to abort any peace initiative that the new administration contemplated, thus aggravating and exacerbating a situation already permeated with tension and fraught with emotion in the Arab–Israeli sphere. As the memorandum predicted:

> It is worth noting that we are currently undertaking a new approach to the Arab refugee problem [the Johnson Plan] ... We would not wish to extinguish the prospects for success by violent outbursts against us in the Arab world, which would certainly occur if it became known that we are providing the Israelis with missiles.[15]

Yet another tenet in the American thinking, which was fully incorporated into its vision of the Hawk missile as the prescription and precipitant to regional instability and imbalance, was inextricably linked to a set of earlier perceptions of Israel that had permeated the thinking of the bureaucracy of the Department of State during Eisenhower's first term as President. In the same way that the Eisenhower Administration initially believed that the supply of American arms to Israel would make it 'over-aggressive, over-insistent on what it wants and too eager to achieve immediate goals without regard to the impression it makes on world opinion,'[16] so did 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles' remain fully wedded to the view that the supply of missiles to Israel was bound to make it aggressive, irreconcilable and intransigent toward its Arab neighbors. By virtue of bolstering its self-confidence, such a move could well foster an illusion of invincibility and invulnerability, leading Israel to predicate its posture on the Arab–Israeli front exclusively upon the premises of coercion and intimidation.[17] Thus, 'protected by the Hawks, and assuming that the Arabs have not obtained missiles, the Israelis could, with relative impunity, launch aggressive measures with respect to the Jordan water diversion or, for that matter, to other issues still in contention with the Arabs.'[18]

Contrary to the emerging view of President Kennedy, who believed (but did not initially insist that his belief be translated into congruent and fully compatible policies) that the sale of arms to Israel could well provide – by virtue of reducing its feelings of insecurity and vulnerability – the necessary impetus for progress by inducing the Ben-Gurion Government to pursue a more accommodative peace-making posture (which would entail a willingness to make concessions from a position of strength),[19] the Department of State continued to predicate its policy exclusively upon the deeply held and long-standing conviction that the supply of missiles to Israel would make its leadership more belligerent and militant rather than more pragmatic and conciliatory in approaching the dispute with its neighbors, especially *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian conundrum. Since Israel already enjoyed, according to this assessment,

a clear military superiority over its protagonists, it was all the more incumbent upon American diplomacy to oppose such a development. In other words, not only was the idea of selling the Hawk to Israel incompatible with American interests and policy goals, but it was divorced, according to the memorandum that was forwarded to McGeorge Bundy on 24 February 1961, from the actual dynamics of power relationships in the region.[20]

Notwithstanding the growing conviction of the Department of Defense (which modified, in early 1961, its assessment of the regional military balance and its policy recommendations in view of the recent supply of the advanced Soviet MIG-19 fighters to Egypt) that Israel had become 'vulnerable to surprise air attack,' and that – consequently – there was no military justification 'to deny the Hawk to the Israelis,'[21] the 24 February 1961 memorandum remained fully and irreconcilably committed to the Department of State's pre-existing, fixed and immutable vision of an overall asymmetry in the balance of military capabilities in the Middle East favoring Israel:

> Israel has a splendid air force, which can – for the foreseeable future – cope with the Egyptian airforce ... According to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the French have agreed to supply Israel with 40 Mirages. When these planes become available to the Israelis in late 1961, the Israeli Air Force will have an aircraft which ... is far and away superior to the MIG-19.[22]

In the highly unlikely eventuality that President Nasser – oblivious to the balance of power favoring Israel – would nevertheless decide to launch 'a flagrant attack' against Israel, the document remained equanimous and serene regarding the prospects of its survival in such dire circumstances:

> On the ground, Israel appears to have the ability to handle the Egyptian forces quite successfully ... Were Israel subjected to a flagrant attack of the type pictured by the Israelis in requesting the Hawks, there is little doubt that Israel's friends would be quickly at Israel's side. Just this past week President [Charles] de Gaulle is reported to have pledged France to come to Israel's assistance ... No doubt our country would quickly swing the Sixth Fleet and other ... forces into action were Israel to be subjected to an unprovoked attack.[23]

Far from comprising the idiosyncratic articulation of the opinions of

one unnamed official in the Department of State, this complex of internally consistent, mutually reinforcing views that were incorporated into 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request' can be seen as the prism or lens through which the traditional American position would continue to unfold and be shaped during the following 18 months. That this complex of beliefs, assessments and policies was ultimately abandoned by President Kennedy in the summer of 1962 is, of course, a different matter which should not obfuscate or obscure its durability and viability for more than a decade.

Still, during the year and a half that followed the distribution of the 24 February 1961 memorandum, American arms sale policy toward Israel continued to be closely patterned on its basic premises and logic – a fact which makes the 'Hawk decision' all the more intriguing, as it was completely decoupled and divorced from the pervasive patterns of thinking and behavior that were adhered to continuously and tenaciously by the Department of State in defiance of the highly dynamic and volatile regional strategic landscape.

A clear illustration of the continued reliance (until August 1962) of American diplomacy upon the premises of the 24 February 1961 document, is provided by the administration's actions on the eve, and in the aftermath, of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's 30 May 1961 meeting with President Kennedy. On the eve of the meeting, and in anticipation of Ben-Gurion's renewed effort to secure the Hawks, the Department of State sent the President a series of memoranda and 'talking outlines,' which were fully compatible with the views, assessments and recommendations outlined in 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request.'[24] Although these 'talking outlines' did not rule out the possibility of a future change in the American arms sale posture (the 24 February 1961 document did not address this contingency) in view of 'new circumstances that could arise,' they still asserted that such circumstances 'did not prevail at the present' despite the recent acquisition, by Egypt, of 20 MIG-19 fighters.[25] Indeed, despite being superior 'to the French Super-Mystere fighter, which the Israelis already have,' the MIG-19 – according to the 25 May 1961 'talking outlines' (as well as the 24 February 1961 memorandum) – 'will be outclassed when the Israelis receive the Mirage [3] fighter now on order from the French.'[26]

Invariably committed to the strategic assumptions that pervaded the 24 February 1961 blueprint, this set of policy guidelines forcefully reiterated the administration's belief that the supply of the Hawk to Israel

could further destabilize a region already fraught with tension, rivalry and suspicion by 'ushering in a new and more dangerous phase of an already desperate arms race.'[27] Similarly, in addressing the overall military balance of power, the 25 May 1961 documents scrupulously followed the footsteps of the traditional American approach by arguing that 'Israel's defense forces are superior to those of the Arabs, singly or collectively,' and that 'its own arms production industry is developing so rapidly that arms are being exported to Germany and certain African communities.'[28]

While the predisposition of the Department of State to continuously adhere to a central tenet of its long-standing traditional Middle East posture was only to be expected – since this belief comprised a core cognitive construct that, as such, tended to persevere despite the changes that had taken place in some of the components of the regional environment (such as the supply to Egypt of the advanced MIG-19 fighter)[29] – what was surprising in the approach of Washington's high-policy élite on the eve of Ben-Gurion's visit was the attitude of one of Israel's strongest and most determined supporters in the administration, the President's Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman who, as the President's political liaison to the American-Jewish community, would play a crucial role in modifying the American posture on the sale of the Hawk missile more than a year later. Despite his reputation as a staunch and avowed advocate of the Israeli point of view, who invariably tended – according to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Carl Kaysen – 'to take only the Israeli side of the problem into account,'[30] Feldman's recommendations to President Kennedy on the Hawk issue – which were submitted on 26 May 1961 – fully and quintessentially accorded with the Department of State's concurrent 'talking outlines.' Specifically, in a memorandum entitled: 'Subjects for Discussion at the Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion,' Feldman's suggested answer to the Prime Minister's 'probable request for ... the supply of ground-to-air missiles' did not even marginally deviate from the course consistently advocated and pursued by the Department of State.[31] Relying heavily – both in content and terminology – upon Secretary Rusk's memorandum of the previous day, Feldman (who similarly accepted, for the moment, the Department of State's extremely skeptical view regarding the Israeli request for formal security guarantees from the USA) advised the President to turn down the Israeli request on the familiar ground that the sale 'would introduce a new, dangerous and very costly phase in an already desperate arms race.' Reiterating Rusk's

assessment of 25 May 1961, he added that not only would the Hawk deal be politically unwise and strategically dangerous, but it would also be unnecessary in view of Israel's capacity 'to successfully cope with any future threat to its security.' When Israel obtains the French Mirage fighter, Feldman concluded his analysis, 'it will have a combat plane superior to the MIG-19.'[32]

Against the backdrop of this convergence between the views of the Department of State and the leading supporter – in official Washington – of Israel's interests and concerns, it is hardly surprising that despite the increasingly supportive position of the Department of Defense, the 30 May 1961 meeting between the American President and the Israeli Prime Minister did not provide the impetus for softening the American opposition to the sale of the Hawk to Israel.[33] And indeed, as was the case in his 10 March 1960 meeting with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's warning (which was closely patterned on his presentation during the 10 March 1960, Presidential meeting) that the 'growing quantitative gap' in military capabilities between Egypt and Israel favoring Egypt could ultimately induce Egypt to seek a military solution to the Arab–Israeli dispute,[34] failed to impress the American President.

Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's claim that this quantitative asymmetry[35] could tempt the Egyptian President into trying to translate into reality his unabated and 'declared aim ... not just to defeat Israel but ... to do to the Jews what Hitler did,'[36] President Kennedy – who used 'the briefing book that he had at hand'[37] as a constant reference source whenever the regional military balance was addressed – remained unmoved. Invariably committed to the course recommended by both Secretary Rusk and Deputy Special Assistant Feldman, he rejected Ben-Gurion's argument that the sale of the Hawk missile to Israel would constitute 'the best way to avoid this danger [to Israel's security].'[38] Far from deterring Egypt from initiating another round of hostilities and thus of stabilizing the Arab–Israeli zone, the delivery of missiles – defensive or offensive – 'into the Middle Eastern area,' the President argued, could instantly trigger a new and dangerous arms race which, in turn, could result in an uncontrolled escalation and a regional conflagration.[39]

In response to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's repeated assertion that the Hawk missile was a purely defensive weapon and that, consequently, it was 'in the best interest of the United States for Israel to have defensive weapons,'[40] President Kennedy (who remained oblivious to his visitor's veiled threat that a desperate and vulnerable Israel could ultimately

decide to launch a preventive war before the balance of military power was completely disrupted) continued this dialogue of the deaf by reaffirming the basic and unchanged premises of the traditional American posture. In the President's words:

> The problem, as we see it, is that while the Hawk is a defensive weapon, it is also a missile and ... if it were introduced into Israel, military weaponry will escalate fast ... and the next development on the other side might be an air-to-ground or ground-to-ground missile ... [While] we do not want to see Israel at a disadvantage ... we are reluctant to introduce missiles into the Middle East.[41]

Indeed, while reiterating his desire to maintain 'close and harmonious' relations with Israel, President Kennedy remained adamant in his refusal to deviate from the traditional parameters of American arms sale policy.[42]

During the period which immediately followed the 30 May 1961 meeting, and in order to eliminate any trace or residue of ambiguity regarding the American position, Secretary Rusk and Deputy Assistant Secretary Armin H. Meyer – in a series of meetings with the Israeli diplomatic mission in Washington – most emphatically and unequivocally restated and further reinforced the President's arguments against the Hawk deal. Fully aware of the impact which former Secretary Herter's encouraging words to Ben-Gurion (in the course of their 13 March 1960 meeting) had upon his thinking and initial bargaining strategy in the course of the Prime Minister's 30 May 1961, meeting with the President,[43] the Deputy Assistant Secretary was particularly blunt – and occasionally even scornful – in rejecting all the strategic premises, upon which the Israeli request for the Hawk missile was based when he met Israeli Ambassador Harman on 16 June 1961.[44] Similarly, in his meeting of 9 August 1961, with the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Mordechai Gazit, Deputy Assistant Secretary Meyer consistently downgraded Egypt's military capabilities, insisting that he had no doubt that 'should hostilities between Israel and Egypt break out, the IDF would handily and comprehensively defeat the Egyptian Army ... which was lacking both planning capacity and intellectual ability.'[45]

In a direct rebuttal of Ben-Gurion's extremely menacing vision (articulated in the course of his 30 May 1961 meeting with President Kennedy) of an undiminished and unwavering Egyptian hostility toward Israel, and of President Nasser's unabated desire 'to annihilate it,'[46]

Meyer presented a far less threatening picture of Egypt's innate, long-standing intentions *vis-à-vis* Israel, which undercut the very essence of the Israeli plea for reinforcements and military assistance.[47]

Maintaining that President Nasser never seriously contemplated 'the destruction of Israel,' Meyer pointed out that, distracted by a multitude of pressing domestic problems, the Egyptian President was not 'particularly concerned' with the continued Arab–Israeli predicament.[48] Furthermore, as early as in 1943, Meyer further reminisced, he had become fully convinced that while they were clearly 'unenthusiastic about the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine,' the Egyptians were never intrinsically or inherently opposed to the idea of Jewish statehood and were ultimately drawn into the Arab–Israeli conflict by the leaders of other Arab states.[49] More recently, he added, he was 'discretely informed by the Egyptian President himself that, in his efforts to focus on his domestic agenda (and aware of 'Egypt's relative military weakness'), he decided to forego the military option and 'to put the Arab–Israeli conflict on the back burner.'[50]

Less than a week later, in his meeting with Ambassador Harman, which was held on 15 August 1961, Secretary of State Rusk was equally irreconcilable in challenging the theoretical (as well as operational) basis of the Israeli arms request, asserting that the supply to Israel of any kind of weaponry (including strictly defensive systems) was unlikely to reinforce Israeli deterrence and help stabilize the situation along the Arab–Israeli front. Instead, he argued, by virtue of intensifying Egypt's fears and sense of vulnerability, such a posture could well exacerbate President Nasser's security dilemma and thus trigger a new and 'highly dangerous arms race.'[51]

The Secretary's reluctance to offer Israel even marginal positive inducements and thus to allay Jerusalem's fears 'concerning the growing dangers to Israel's security,'[52] left the Israeli Ambassador disappointed and discouraged. As he reported to the Head of the North American Division in the Foreign Ministry, Gershon Avner, on 15 August 1961, shortly after his meeting with Rusk had been concluded:

> I have tried [in this message] to determine whether or not Rusk's answers and statements included any new elements but ... as far as the issue of the supply of the Hawk was concerned, there were none. Rusk tenaciously clung onto the line adopted by the previous administration, which was similarly articulated by President

> Kennedy [in the course of his 30 May 1961, meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion].[53]

During the remaining part of 1961 and the first half of 1962, this continued and unwavering reliance of the Department of State upon the basic premises of its traditional arms sale posture continued to be manifested in numerous memoranda and position papers. For example, in a memorandum entitled: 'Israel's Military Security', which was submitted – on 21 November 1961 – by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot, to Secretary Rusk (in response to Rusk's oral query about 'the continuing acquisitions of advanced equipment by [Egypt]'),[54] the Assistant Secretary (using 'informal advice from the Pentagon' as the source of his assessment) reported that, notwithstanding the recent increase in Egyptian and Syrian military capabilities, Israel still enjoyed 'a considerable overall advantage' that was likely to increase following the deployment 'of the Mirage aircraft.'[55] 'In terms of leadership, morale, organization, training, logistics, maintenance and intelligence ... mobilization capacity, massive financial and material support from abroad, scientific know-how and skilled manpower,' Talbot argued, 'the Israelis enjoy clear superiority,' which was unlikely to evaporate in the foreseeable future.[56] The recent disintegration of the Egyptian–Syrian union (UAR), he further observed, made 'the likelihood that all Middle Eastern Arab forces will in the near future unite under one command and operate according to one master plan ... too remote to be discussed seriously.' Indeed, 'the deep internal Arab cleavages,' which 'the split-of the Egyptian–Syrian union' has recently exposed:

> ... enhanced Israel's security. Lebanon and Jordan have no intention of engaging in another round with Israel, and Syria will be slow again to divest itself of command of its own army. Egypt alone cannot possibly cope with Israel, and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen are incapable of bringing effective force against Israel.[57]

In conclusion, implying that Israel's security concerns were exaggerated and divorced from the actual distribution of military capabilities, Talbot noted:

> Whereas perhaps a large majority of Arabs would like to destroy Israel by military means, they show no ... intention (not to mention

> capability) of trying to do so despite the Israeli claims that the Arabs plan a major attack in 1963. No Arab leader can run the risk of sustaining a serious military defeat, nor is the domestic situation of any Arab state so desperate as to drive it to foreign aggression.[58]

More than two months later, in a memorandum submitted by the newly appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, James P. Grant, to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State, George C. McGhee, the corollary of Talbot's 22 November 1961 assessment was succinctly and unequivocally stated: 'We believe we should not significantly modify our [arms sale] policy ... We believe it would be unwise for the United States to endeavor to place itself in the position of a principal supplier of weapons to Near Eastern countries.'[59]

It was only in the spring of 1962 that a window of opportunity was opened for Israel in its enduring quest to engender change in the administration's arms sale policy. Indeed, as we shall soon witness, one year after Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had tried in vain to modify the American position on supplying to Israel the Hawk missile (and more than two years after his abortive effort to influence President Eisenhower's approach had taken place), the visit to Washington, in late May 1962, of Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres provided a major impetus for reopening the intradepartmental debate on the issue – a debate that would culminate, three months later, in a dramatic reorientation of the administration's policy.

During the period immediately following the Deputy Defense Minister's visit the Department of State remained fully and invariably committed to its traditional view. However, it quickly lost its centrality and dominance in the decision-making process, having been confronted by the combined power of the regional experts in the Department of Defense and the NSC as well as the President's Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman.

President Kennedy's decision, of August 1962, to lend his support to this newly formed coalition, effectively concluded this intragovernmental 'decision game' and resulted in a major watershed in the history of the American–Israeli alliance. While the Department of Defense's supportive position – which was predicated upon its assessment that there was 'a valid military basis for [Israel's] concern and for [its] selection of the Hawk as an item of key importance in [its] military posture'[60] – had

already emerged more than a year earlier (but was outweighed by the dominant view of the Department of State), it was this growing convergence between the respective views of several members of the NSC and Deputy Special Assistant Feldman (which surfaced for the first time in the aftermath of Deputy Defense Minister Peres's visit of May 1962) which established a new intragovernmental balance of power and thus laid the bureaucratic groundwork for the Hawk decision by virtue of affecting the President's calculations and predilections.[61] Faced with this powerful coalition, the Department of State was ultimately forced to acquiesce and thus readjust its position in accordance with the President's newly established preferences, objectives, and order of priorities.

Although Peres's arguments in support of the Hawk were confined to the military-strategic level and were largely patterned on familiar Israeli claims, the intragovernmental debate that surfaced in the aftermath of the visit reflected not only different interpretations of the significance and impact that Israel's continued vulnerability to an Egyptian surprise air attack was likely to have upon regional stability, but incompatible political assessments of the likely outcomes and ramifications of the Hawk sale in terms of promoting certain highly desired American objectives, such as the resolution of the Palestinian predicament.

In renewing its quest for the Hawk missile, in May 1962, Israel was concerned not only with the continued strengthening of the Egyptian Air Force, but with the changing political and strategic dynamics in its regional landscape, and especially with the imminent termination of the Algerian War, which made the prospects of a swing in French policy in the Middle East at the direct expense of the French–Israeli special relationship highly likely, and thus intensified the Israeli search for an alternative arms supplier and patron.

Concerning the military balance with Egypt, while the Department of Defense continued to believe that 'the Israeli Air Force [remained] qualitatively superior to [the Egyptian Air Force],'[62] it could not remain oblivious to Deputy Defense Minister Peres's claims that Egyptian pilots were undergoing training in the Soviet Union on the advanced MIG-21 fighter that the Soviets were about to supply to Egypt; also, that Egyptian technicians were 'being trained in the Soviet Union in the operation of [SA-2 surface-to-air] missiles;' that 'it could only be a question of a short time before some form of missile was in the hands of Egypt, most probably the SA-2 surface-to-air missile'; and that 'Egypt had in its possession many IL-28 light bombers.' Reiterating that there was 'a valid

military basis for [Israel's] concern,' (and that Israel's continued vulnerability might ultimately lead it to launch a preventive war), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy informed Assistant Secretary of State Talbot, in his memorandum of 23 May 1962, that the data provided by Deputy Defense Minister Peres 'on the question of the Egyptian missile acquisition' were basically compatible with the assessments of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).[63] In Bundy's words:

> As to the question of ... missiles, we have no clear-cut intelligence as to when the Soviets will deliver [them] but there have been reports pertaining to site preparation in the Sinai. DIA believes that the missiles to be furnished to Egypt and Iraq will be primarily surface-to-air, but that some surface-to-surface types might have been ordered.[64]

Whereas Peres's extremely menacing vision of a rapidly changing balance of military capabilities within the Israeli–Egyptian dyad – and call for the immediate supply to Israel of the Hawk missile 'as a convincing deterrent to an [Egyptian] attack'[65] – confirmed and further reinforced the strategic assessments of the Department of Defense, it did not immediately affect the thinking of the Department of State, whose high-policy élite continued to oppose the sale, albeit with an ever-diminishing vigor and vehemence. Thus in his meeting of 21 May 1962 with the Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, George C. McGhee, repeated almost word-for-word President Eisenhower's statement of 7 March 1956,[66] and questioned the logic inherent in Israel's exclusive reliance upon the premises of unilateral deterrence and coercion of its neighbors. The proximity of Israel's centers of population to its borders, he observed, made Israel perpetually vulnerable to a surprise air strike regardless of the quality and sophistication of its defensive capabilities.[67] Hence, the only way for effectively deterring President Nasser was not by engaging in a potentially explosive arms race, but rather by resorting to accommodative policies in the Israeli–Egyptian zone, while 'encouraging the administration' to continue its own effort to exert 'some restraining influence on [Egypt's] policies by creating a vested interest on Nasser's part in good relations with the US,' thus inducing him (through the incentive of generous economic assistance) 'to turn his revolutionary fervor inward toward the settlement of Egypt's chronic weaknesses.'[68]

McGhee's assertion that 'the best interests of Israel would be served by healthier, friendlier American–Arab relations' rather than by the establishment of military ties between Washington and Jerusalem – which was closely and quintessentially patterned on Secretary Dulles's perception of the appropriate American approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict as articulated in the course of his 14 May 1953 meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion[69] – was augmented by a series of more conventional and traditional arguments. These arguments included the assessment that notwithstanding its vulnerability to an Egyptian air attack, the IDF continued to enjoy 'a considerable overall military superiority over the combined power of all the Arab forces,' and the prediction that, in view of the incessant and chronic disunity and cleavage in the Arab world (combined with the continued weakness of the 'Arab military power and fighting capability'), there was but a low probability that the Arabs would launch a major offensive against Israel in the coming years.[70]

In conclusion, maintaining that 'any drastic increase in Israeli armament, particularly to more sophisticated weapons, would likely result in a corresponding increase in [Egyptian armament], possibly leading to an uncontrolled escalation, which might add to rather than decrease instability in the region,'[71] McGhee's analysis (which was further reinforced, two days later, by the assessment of the Director of the Office of the Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, Robert C. Strong, who similarly discounted the possibility that Egypt would initiate 'a potentially disastrous war' with Israel),[72] fully incorporated most of the traditional arguments, to which the Department of State had remained irrevocably committed for more than a decade. However, whereas on numerous previous occasions the perceptions and views of the Department of State concerning the supply of arms to Israel were invariably translated into reality and formed the basis for the policy which was continuously implemented, this pattern was broken during the spring and summer of 1962. Increasingly isolated and confronted by a powerful 'majority coalition,' Secretary of State Rusk and his staff had to accommodate themselves to the new reality and ultimately to abandon at least some of the premises upon which their advocated course had been shaped for so long, while still hoping that by resorting to tactics of procrastination, they could prevent an early decision to sell the Hawk to Israel.[73]

In this context, the renewed Israeli Hawk initiative of May 1962 can indeed be viewed as a major impetus or precipitant which transformed –

for parts of the administration – what had previously been largely residual, amorphous and unobtrusive predispositions and predilections, into explicit and fully manifested policy preferences and recommendations. Specifically, the renewed debate over the administration's arms sale policy, which was inaugurated by Peres's request, quickly disrupted the pre-existing intragovernmental balance of power and equilibrium by providing an exquisite opportunity and platform for such individuals as Robert W. Komer of the NSC and the President's Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman, to express their respective opinions in support of the Pentagon's position (albeit not exclusively on the basis of the Pentagon's premises and assessments) in defiance of the traditional and long-standing American approach.

In challenging the Department of State and the very essence of its arms sale policy, Komer and, in particular, Feldman were acutely sensitive to the domestic political context, and most of all to the need to maintain – and preferably broaden and solidify – the base of Jewish support of the administration on the eve of the November 1962 congressional elections. In Feldman's view, the fact that the Kennedy Presidency had embarked – from its inception – upon an increasingly accommodative policy toward Egypt (and, in 1962, seriously considered inviting President Nasser for an official visit), underscored 'the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel.'[74] Anxious to avoid 'the exacerbating of the already sensitive domestic Jewish feelings'[75] in an elections year, Feldman and Komer became increasingly supportive, in the wake of Deputy Defense Minister Peres's visit, of the idea that 'any new [accommodative] initiative toward Nasser' would be 'accompanied by compensatory gestures toward Israel'[76] without insisting on any built-in and necessary linkage between this proposed gesture and any other concurrent and reciprocal Israeli move along the Palestinian front, which could vastly complicate, or even abort, the entire initiative.

In this respect, Peres's demand – which was repeatedly and forcefully made in the course of his May 1962 visit – that, in view of Israel's growing security problems, the administration '*make a compensatory gesture on Israel's behalf*,'[77] quickly became the major rhetorical weapon with which both Komer and Feldman set to challenge the defiant foreign policy machinery. As Assistant Secretary Talbot observed on 7 June 1962, when describing the growing challenge to the Department of State's position that was precipitated by the visit of the Israeli Deputy Defense Minister:

> We believe that the recent visit of Israel's Deputy Minister of Defense, Shimon Peres, has brought into focus the true Israeli objectives ... A principal argument used by ... Peres was that the US, having worsened Israel's position by aiding [Egypt], *should now make a compensatory gesture to Israel.* We believe that considerable pressure will be mounted against the administration domestically in the context of the President's campaign references to the Near East and in terms of US assistance to [Egypt], but that Peres's objectives are what Israel will really seek ... It seems reasonable to assume that in this election year another 'college try' will be made by Israel and its supporters here [to obtain the Hawk missile system] and that a serious effort will be made to show that Israel faces a situation of unusual peril in the next two or three years.[78]

In other words, whereas the Department of Defense was motivated in its support of the Hawk deal by purely military considerations (such as its assessment of the balance of military capabilities between Israel and its neighbors, and its concern that, feeling vulnerable, Israel might initiate a preventive war), the views of its emerging coalition partners – Feldman and Komer – were largely shaped and delineated by a cluster of domestic political and electoral considerations. These considerations were inextricably linked to the perceived need to arrest the dangerous drift of American Jewry into reticence and disengagement as a result of the administration's pursuit of an increasingly accommodative posture toward Egypt.

Thus although Komer and Feldman tended on occasion to explain their about-face in strategic-military terms by underscoring the need 'to take measures [that would] sustain a balance between the Arabs and Israel (for example, Hawk air defense missiles),'[79] they were largely preoccupied with the political developments that were shaping the domestic American scene rather than with the strategic developments that were unfolding on the Middle Eastern front. And while the Department of State remained, for a while, unwavering in its opposition to the intrusion of domestic considerations into the sphere of national security in the formation of the American strategic posture in the Middle East, insisting that it was 'important not to give in to Israeli and domestic pressures for a special relationship in national security matters,' it was ultimately left empty-handed, isolated and marginalized as its efforts to prevent the reorientation of the administration's long-standing arms sale policy completely collapsed.[80] Reduced to impotence, the Department of State (as was the case on numerous

occasions during the Kennedy era) had no choice but to acquiesce and thus follow from the sidelines the intricate moves and maneuvers which culminated, in August 1962, in Feldman's mission to Israel, during which the Hawk missiles were formally offered to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.

In conclusion, while the Department of State remained, in its consideration of the Hawk issue, largely oblivious to the complex of political forces and factors operating on the domestic American scene, Komer and, in particular, Feldman were continuously sensitive to the needs and requirements of the domestic political environment. In the spring of 1962, fearing that President Kennedy's increasingly accommodative policy toward Egypt might have serious electoral repercussions by reducing his infrastructure of support among Jewish voters, these two officials set to redirect the course of American diplomacy in the hope that the offering of a 'compensatory measure'[81] in the form of the Hawk missile to Israel on the very eve of the congressional elections (without making it contingent upon potentially problematic preconditions) would help the President to resolve his 'Jewish predicament.'

Still, notwithstanding the growing propensity of Komer and Feldman to deal with this potentially damaging domestic dilemma by initiating compensatory moves, measures, or gestures toward Israel,[82] and notwithstanding the growing readiness of the Pentagon and the intelligence community to endorse the Hawk deal (based upon their recognition of the danger to Israel and to regional stability from 'an Egyptian surprise attack by jet bombers'[83]), this convergence between the political and the strategic (or between the perceived requirements of the domestic environment and those originating in the shifting balance of military capabilities between Israel and its adversaries) could not in itself guarantee that the road toward selling the Hawk missile to Israel would be completely free of obstacles. Indeed, using its bureaucratic skill and resources, the Department of State, in June 1962, reacted to the mounting threat to its deeply-held convictions and policies in the Arab–Israeli zone by adopting a sophisticated containment strategy, by which it sought to thwart the challenge by seemingly accepting part of Komer's and Feldman's game plan while attaching to it an entirely new operational meaning. Seeking to avoid a direct and frontal confrontation with the combined forces of the NSC, the Pentagon and the President's political entourage, the Department of State predicated some of its moves upon the premises of its bureaucratic adversaries while attempting to

implement them in a way which would be fully compatible with its own preconceived convictions and preferences.[84] This effort of the besieged Department of State to use its opponent's terrain as the basis for its own blocking operations surfaced most clearly in June 1962. It followed Komer's suggestion (which amounted to nothing more than a convenient alibi for justifying the Hawk sale) to make the Hawk deal contingent upon the prior failure of 'an effort to sell mutual (though tacit) arms limitations [between Egypt and Israel].'[85]

In entertaining the idea of an arms limitation agreement within the Egyptian–Israeli framework, Komer did not plan or envisage – in June 1962 – any serious or comprehensive effort to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles into the Middle East of the sort which would unfold in the spring of 1963, following the appointment of John J. McCloy as the President's Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation. Instead, convinced that 'Nasser would not bite at this point,' he viewed this prerequisite to the sale of the Hawk as merely a short-term tactical device, designed to prove and demonstrate to American public opinion and the Arab world that the administration has exhausted all other policy options and alternatives for 'restoring the [Middle Eastern] balance of power.' Indeed, as it was conceived exclusively as a means of legitimizing the impending sale and thus as an advance notice to President Nasser of 'our plans to help Israel' in the hope of 'making him more cautious about further Soviet arms deals,' Komer's arms control 'initiative' was not preceded by any analysis of the regional and global factors which were likely to affect its prospects of implementation.[86] Nor did Komer – or the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy – consider this precondition significant and viable enough at this juncture to involve the President (who was profoundly and continuously interested in the issues of arms control and nuclear proliferation between East and West) in their thoughts and calculations.

It was only in the spring of 1963 that the President – who became even more sensitive to the dangers of nuclear proliferation in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis – instructed the Department of State to form a working group for the purpose of developing 'a plan of action to obtain an Israeli–Egyptian–American agreement on nuclear technology and missile limitation.'[87] Notwithstanding the American efforts, President Nasser's irrevocable opposition sealed the fate of the arms limitation plan which emerged from the discussions of this working group. In view of

this irreconcilability, John J. McCloy, the President's Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation, opted to cancel his scheduled visit to Israel and, in July 1963, suspended his mission.[88]

Contrary to Komer's expectations, it quickly became evident that the Department of State did not share his vision of 'an arms limitation proposal' as merely a legitimizing prelude to the imminent sale of the Hawk missile to Israel. Instead, anxious to prevent the impending collapse of its arms sale posture, it instantly seized upon Komer's arms control stratagem as the means of transforming what had originally been construed as a purely tactical, short-term and formal springboard en route to finalizing the Hawk deal into a crucial lever and trigger for promoting the Department's newly formulated course of delay and procrastination. Faced with a broadly based interdepartmental coalition that became, in the aftermath of Deputy Defense Minister Peres's May visit, increasingly supportive of the Hawk sale, the Department of State – despite being highly skeptical regarding the feasibility of any arms limitation enterprise – still focused on the need to thoroughly explore this option while 'delaying the decision on the sale of the Hawk ... for approximately two years.'[89] Such a delay, it was further surmized, would prevent 'further complications' in the administration's relations with 'the Arabs' during a period (namely, the years 1962–64) that was expected to be fraught with tension and permeated with controversy over such matters as the 'Palestinian refugees and the Jordan waters.'[90]

In essence, then, whereas Komer envisioned his arms control endeavor as nothing more than a single 'approach to President Nasser' that was 'highly unlikely' to precipitate an agreement,[91] the Department of State, which sought above all to gain time in the hope that the coalition facing it would disintegrate before the decision to sell the Hawk was reached, defined this initiative as 'a serious attempt,'[92] which necessitated 'that the decision on the sale of the Hawk to Israel be deferred for about two years.'[93]

It was only in August 1962 that these interdepartmental maneuvers and bureaucratic games over the nature and scope of the arms limitation initiative and over the Hawk decision came to an end. President Kennedy's growing interest in the Hawk issue (which, in the summer of 1962, became inextricably linked to the Johnson Plan for resolving the Palestinian predicament), and his growing willingness to support the position advocated by Komer and Feldman (albeit in a revised form), sealed the fate of the Department of State's desperate efforts to prevent

an immediate tilt in the American traditional arms sale policy or – at the very least – to link the Hawk decision to concurrent and specific Israeli concessions in the Palestinian sphere. It is indeed to this final phase in the process that we now turn.

NOTES

1. David Rodman, 'Patron-Client Dynamics: Mapping the American–Israeli Relationship', *Israel Affairs*, 4, 2 (1997), pp. 27–8; Barry Rubin, 'Reshaping the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, 69, 3 (1990), pp. 131–46; Mordechai Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy Towards the Arab States and Israel* (Tel Aviv: The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1983), pp. 42–3; Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship*, pp. 78–81.
2. Memorandum of 30 January 1961, from Rusk to Kennedy. Papers of Kennedy (hereafter PPK), National Security Files (hereafter NSF), Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston (hereafter JFKL), pp. 1–2.
3. McGeorge Bundy's remarks of 16 February 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Israeli Ambassador Harman. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 2. See also *FRUS* 17: 26–29. See also, in this connection, Eliezer Cohen, *Israel's Best Defense: The First Full Story of the Israeli Airforce* (New York: Orion Books, 1993), p. 179.
4. Harman's remarks of 16 February 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 2.
5. Ibid., 2–3.
6. Ibid., 3.
7. McGeorge Bundy's remarks of 16 February 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Harman. PPK, NSF. Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 3.
8. Memorandum of 24 February 1961, from the Department of State Executive Secretary, Walter J. Stoessel Jr, to McGeorge Bundy entitled: 'Ambassador Harman's Call on February 16.' PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 1–2. Harman's meeting of 16 February 1961 with McGeorge Bundy was followed by a detailed message reiterating the Israeli position, which was sent by Harman to Rusk on 27 February 1961. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 23.
9. See the memorandum entitled: 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles', which was attached to Stoessel's message of 24 February 1961 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 1.
10. See, in this connection, the analysis of the role which the principles of formalism and formulism have continuously played in the shaping of American foreign policy in Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 126–8. See also, for an analysis of the American negotiating style and tradition, Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), pp. 30–1; Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The Rules of the Game* (London: Longman, 1981), pp. 33–4.
11. Quoted from 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request': 1.

12. Ibid., 1–2. For similar arguments see the remarks of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot of 5 May 1961. Memorandum of his meeting with Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 1.
13. Quoted from 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request': 2.
14. Ibid., 3.
15. Ibid., 3.
16. Secretary Dulles's words of 8 October 1953. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Abba Eban. *FRUS* 9, part 1: 1341.
17. Quoted from 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request': 3.
18. Ibid., 3.
19. See, for example, Senator Kennedy's address, of 23 March 1960, at the Jewish Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. PPK, Presidential Papers, Senate Files, Speeches and the Press, Box 9007: Speeches Files, 1953–60, JFKL: 14; John F. Kennedy, *The Strategy of Peace* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 107; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, pp. 69–70; Douglas Little, 'A Fool's Errand: America and the Middle East, 1961–1962', in Diane Kunz (ed.), *The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 288; Anthony Rusonik, 'Israeli Defense Doctrine and US Middle East Diplomacy: From Suez to the Loan Guarantees/Settlements Dispute', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 14, 2 (1992), pp. 44–68; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 131, 155.
20. 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request': 1–2.
21. Remarks of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, William P. Bundy, of 8 May 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Ambassador-designate to Israel, Walworth Barbour. *FRUS* 17: 102–3.
22. Quoted from 'Considerations Bearing on Israel's Request': 1.
23. Ibid., 1. See also Harman's message, of 23 March 1961, to Avner. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/19: 2; and a memorandum entitled: 'Security Issues in American–Israeli Relations,' which was drafted in April 1961 by the North American Division in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 1–4.
24. Memorandum of 25 May 1961, from Rusk to Kennedy entitled: 'Your Meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.' The memorandum included specific talking outlines and 'supporting discussion papers' on a variety of regional and bilateral issues, including the sale of the Hawk missile. PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 5, 8.
25. Quoted from a discussion paper entitled: 'Security Problems,' which was attached to Rusk's memorandum, of 25 May 1961, to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 1.
26. Ibid., 1.
27. Ibid., 1.
28. Ibid., 1.
29. See, for an analysis of core cognitive constructs and their resistance to change, Yaacov I.L. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-making* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 113, 118–23; Robert Axelrod, 'The Analysis of Cognitive Maps',

in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of Decision: The Cognitive Maps of Personal Elites* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–64.

30. Undated note from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Carl Kaysen, to Kennedy. PPK, President's Office Files (hereafter POF), Box 119a: Israel Security, 1961–63, JFKL: 1. Kaysen's remarks were made in the context of a discussion of the Israeli critique of the Johnson Plan for resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Notwithstanding Feldman's growing influence (and input into the Hawk decision), the Kennedy Administration did not hesitate to confront AIPAC and – in 1962 – launched a comprehensive investigation into its funding. See, on the administration's efforts to constrain, monitor and occasionally intimidate AIPAC, Isaiah L. Kenen, *Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington* (Buffalo, WI: Prometheus Books, 1981), p. 109.
31. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Subjects for Discussion at the Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion,' which was submitted on 26 May 1961 from the President's Deputy Special Counsel, Myer Feldman, to Kennedy. PPK, POF, Box 119a: Israel Security, 1961–63, JFKL: 1. For additional and congruent evidence concerning Feldman's position, see Meyer's remarks to Harman in the course of their 16 June 1961 meeting. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 1.
32. Quoted from 'Subjects for Discussion at the Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion': 1. See also *FRUS* 17: 129.
33. Memorandum of the 30 May 1961 meeting between Ben-Gurion and Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 134–41. For the Israeli transcript of the meeting see ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/28: 1–8.
34. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. Memorandum of his meeting with Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 135–6. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 315; Rosental, *Ben-Gurion*, p. 397.
35. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. Memorandum of his meeting with Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 136. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 316; Rosental, *Ben-Gurion*, p. 397.
36. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. Memorandum of his meeting with Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 136.
37. Quoted from the memorandum of Kennedy's 30 May 196, meeting with Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 17: 136.
38. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. *FRUS* 17: 137.
39. Kennedy's remarks of 30 May 1961. *FRUS* 17: 136–7.
40. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. *FRUS* 17: 136.
41. Kennedy's remarks of 30 May 1961. *FRUS* 17: 136–7.
42. *FRUS* 17: 141. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', pp. 316–17. According to Urofsky, the President told Ben-Gurion, in the course of the meeting, that he 'would like to do something for the Jewish people' because 'he was elected by the Jews of New York' (Urofsky, *We Are One!*, p. 333). However, the memorandum of the 30 May 1961 meeting does not include this statement, nor did Ben-Gurion subsequently refer – in his requests for arms – to this assumed Presidential desire to reward Israel for the support given to his candidacy in the 1960 elections by Jewish voters in such crucial states as New York and Illinois.
43. As has already been indicated, Ben-Gurion's visit to the US in March 1960 exposed a major disagreement between President Eisenhower, who remained committed to

the traditional American position of refusing to sell Israel advanced weaponry and Secretary of State Herter, who was prepared to review the Israeli request for the Hawk missile 'sympathetically and urgently.' In the course of his 30 May 1961 meeting with President Kennedy, the Israeli Prime Minister alluded to his meeting of 13 March 1960 with Secretary Herter and defined Herter's approach as 'a commitment' to sell the Hawk to Israel. President Kennedy rejected this interpretation and commented 'that he had not found records which permit a firm conclusion about what had been committed to the previous administration' (quoted from the memorandum of the 30 May 1961 meeting between Ben-Gurion and Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 136).

44. In response to Harman's request to send personnel to the United States 'for training in the operation and maintenance of the Hawk,' Meyer pointed out sarcastically that he did not believe 'that the IDF needed pre-school preparation before attending school.' (Quoted from the memorandum of the 16 June 1961 meeting between Meyer and Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 1). For earlier indications that Secretary Herter was reluctant to openly confront the bureaucracy over the issue of the Hawk sale, see Harman's memorandum, of 29 June 1960, to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/3: 1–2.
45. Meyer's remarks of 9 August 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Mordechai Gazit. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 4 (part 2). Armin H. Meyer was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in March 1961. Previously he served as Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State.
46. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. Memorandum of his meeting with Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 136.
47. Memorandum of the 9 August 1961, conversation between Meyer and Gazit. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 4 (part 2).
48. Meyer's remarks of 9 August 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Gazit. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 3 (part 1). See also, in this connection, Michael E. Latham, 'Ideology, Social Science and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress', *Diplomatic History*, 22, 2 (1998), pp. 199–239; John S. Badeau, *The Middle East Remembered* (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1983), p. 177; Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle Over US Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Robert D. Kaplan, *The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite* (New York: The Free Press, 1993).
49. Meyer's remarks of 9 August 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Gazit. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/7: 3 (part 1).
50. Ibid.
51. Rusk's remarks of 15 August 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/2: 1. For a slightly different transcript of the conversation see ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/1: 1–4. See also, on the theoretical implications of Rusk's remark of 15 August 1961 to Harman, that 'deterrence is not necessarily a deterrent' (ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/2: 4); Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence*, pp. 31–65; Ben-Zvi, 'Threat Perception and Surprise: In Search of the Intervening Variable', in Frank P. Harvey and Ben D. Mor

(eds), *Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War and Peace* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 241–72; Robert Jervis, 'Perceiving and Coping with Threat', in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds), *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), pp. 1–33; Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', *World Politics*, 31, 2 (1979), pp. 287–324; Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, p. 57; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 57–97; Richard Ned Lebow, 'Transitions and Transformations: Building International Cooperation', *Security Studies*, 6, 3 (1997), pp. 159–65; Uri Bar-Joseph, 'Variations on a Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking', *Security Studies*, 7, 3 (1998), pp. 145–51; Jack Levy, 'When do Deterrent Threats Work?', *British Journal of Political Science*, 18, 4 (1988), pp. 485–512; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 574; Elli Lieberman, *Deterrence Theory: Success or Failure in Arab–Israeli Wars?* (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), passim; Elli Lieberman, 'The Rational Deterrence Theory Debate: Is the Dependent Variable Elusive?', *Security Studies*, 3, 3 (1994), pp. 384–7; Zeev Maoz, 'Resolve, Capability and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27, 2 (1983), pp. 195–229; Zeev Maoz, *Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990), p. 66; Frank C. Zagare, *The Dynamics of Deterrence* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 7; Paul Gordon Lauren, 'Theories of Bargaining with Threat of Force: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy', in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 198–200; Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, pp. 1–12; Korina Kagan, 'The Failure of the Great Powers to Coerce Small States in the Balkans, 1875–1877 and 1914: Situational Versus Tactical Explanations', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.), *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 86–107.

52. Quoted from Harman's message of 15 August 1961 to Avner, in which he tried 'to analyze his [15 August] conversation with Rusk and to draw conclusions from the Secretary's attitude.' Entitled: 'The Conversation with Rusk', the message was attached to the memorandum of the 15 August 1961, conversation. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3294/2: 2–3.
53. Ibid., 2.
54. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Israel's Military Security,' which was sent, on 22 November 1961, from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot, to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 432. The background to this memorandum was the accumulating data indicating the recent strengthening of Egypt's Air Force and ground forces and the intelligence reports, according to which Egyptian pilots were undergoing training in the Soviet Union on the MIG-21 fighter, which the Soviets were about to supply to Egypt. (See, in this connection, Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 316).
55. Quoted from Talbot's message of 22 November 1961 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 342.
56. Ibid., 342–3.
57. Ibid., 343. The Egyptian-Syrian Union (UAR) was dissolved in September 1961.

58. Ibid., 343.
59. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Arms Policy for the Near East' that was submitted, on 10 February 1962 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, James P. Grant, to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; George C. McGhee. *FRUS*: 18–21 (Near East, Africa, Microfiche Supplement), p. 4. Grant was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary in October 1961.
60. Quoted from the memorandum entitled: 'Conversation with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres' that was submitted on 23 May 1962 from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, William P. Bundy, to Talbot. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3. In supporting the Hawk sale, the Pentagon was also motivated by a desire to promote stability in the Arab–Israeli sphere by precipitating a 'shift' in the strategic doctrine of the IDF 'away from building a large air-striking force.' According to Yaniv, in such an eventuality:

> The Jewish state might gain a nearly foolproof defense against any Arab attempt to launch a disarming first strike, but the corollary ... would be that Israel would then be denied the most important instrument with which to launch a disarming first strike of its own. (*Deterrence Without the Bomb*, p. 101.)

61. On Peres's meeting with Kennedy on 23 May 1962, which Feldman attended, see Shimon Peres, *David's Sling* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 98–100. According to Peres's account, the meeting was arranged by Feldman. For additional evidence on the role which Feldman played during Peres's visit, see Harman's message of 23 May 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/2: 1. For Israeli reviews of the role which Peres's visit to Washington – in May 1961 – played in precipitating the Hawk decision, see Harman's message of 17 October 1962 to Shimshon Arad, Head of the North American Division in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 2, and Gazit's message of 1 May 1963 to Arad. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/1–2.
62. Quoted from 'Conversation with Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres' (of 23 May 1962), pp. 2–3.
63. Ibid., 3.
64. Ibid., 3. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', pp. 316–17. For an analysis of Egypt's procurement efforts and the evolution of its nuclear policy during this period, see Shai Feldman, *Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), pp. 130–1.
65. Peres's remarks of 23 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with William Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3.
66. Eisenhower's press conference of 7 March 1956. Quoted by Gazit, 'Israeli Military Procurement,' p. 11.
67. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2. McGhee – who, in 1961, served as Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State – was appointed as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in January 1962.
68. Ibid., 2. See also, in this connection, the memorandum which was submitted, on 15 January 1962, from Robert W. Komer, a senior staff member of the NSC, to Kennedy. *FRUS* 171: 402. See also Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 538.

69. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2–3. See also Dulles's remarks of 14 May 1953. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Ben-Gurion. *FRUS* 9 (part 1), p. 39.
70. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2–3. See also the memorandum of Peres's conversation of 23 May 1962 with the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, Robert C. Strong. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2.
71. McGhee's remarks of 21 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2–3. See also *FRUS* 17: 676.
72. Strong's remarks of 23 May 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his meeting with Peres. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4317/1: 2.
73. Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, p. 349. See also Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence*, p. 7; Margaret G. Hermann, 'Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy', in Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann (eds), *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 50–3; Allison, *Essence of Decision*, p. 162. The Hawk decision was not the only instance in which the policy recommendations of Secretary of State Rusk were not heeded by President Kennedy. As Brauer observes: 'Kennedy was his own secretary of state. Dean Rusk, who held the title, was an intelligent, loyal and diffident ... spokesman for the administration ... but never established the kind of personal relationship with Kennedy that might have won him the hearing he wanted' (Carl M. Brauer, 'John F. Kennedy: The Endurance of Inspirational Leadership', in Fred I. Greenstein (ed.), *Leadership in the Modern Presidency* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 130–1). See also, on the peripheral role which Rusk played in the shaping of several decisions of great magnitude during the Kennedy era, Francis L. Loewenheim, 'Dean Rusk and the Diplomacy of Principle', in Gorden A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds), *The Diplomats: 1939–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 524–6. It is interesting to note that Brauer's analysis is fully – and occasionally even verbally – patterned on Komer's retrospective review of the way in which foreign policy decisions were made during the Kennedy era. As he points out in his first oral history interview: 'One of the great things about the New Frontier was the President's own personal handling of the affairs in which I was involved. He really was the Secretary of State' (Oral History Interview with Robert W. Komer, 18 June 1964, part 1: JFKL: 2).
74. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Action Program for the UAR,' which was submitted on 15 January 1962 from Komer to Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 403. In referring to the need to make 'gestures' toward Israel, Komer relied upon Feldman's assessments and recommendations. According to the memorandum:

> Feldman regards such gestures [toward Egypt as inviting Nasser] for a state visit ... as quite important to enable us to defend what will appear to many as an endorsement of the Nasser regime ... He also emphasized the importance of parallel gestures toward Israel. You will want Mike [Feldman's] own views but he seems to regard domestic problems as manageable if above conditions are met. (*FRUS* 17: 402–3)

See also, on the administration's accommodative posture toward Egypt, Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 100–3; Nadelmann, 'American Policy Toward the Middle East, 1961–1966', p. 438; Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 102; Douglas Little, 'The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser and Arab Nationalism', *Journal of American History*, 75, 1 (1988), pp. 505–9; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, pp. 132–3; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, pp. 73–7; Bernard Reich, *Quest for Peace: United States–Israel Relations and the Arab–Israeli Conflict* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1977), pp. 39–40. The administration's expectations and hopes *vis-à-vis* Egypt were most clearly articulated in: the memorandum that was submitted on 23 January 1962 from Komer to Kennedy (*FRUS* 17: 438); in the memorandum that was submitted on 10 January 1962 from Rusk to Kennedy (*FRUS* 17: 384–389); and in the memorandum that was submitted on 15 January 1962 from Komer to Kennedy (*FRUS* 17: 402). See also, on the administration's policy toward the Third World and its approach to economic aid, Morton A. Kaplan, 'United States Foreign Policy in a Revolutionary Age', in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), *Great Issues of International Politics: The International System and National Policy* (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1970), pp. 204–13.

75. Quoted from a memorandum that was submitted on 11 May 1962 from Komer to McGeorge Bundy. *FRUS* 17: 667. The memorandum followed a conversation with Feldman, which evolved around the plan to invite Nasser for an official visit. For additional evidence concerning President Kennedy's domestic agenda and 'sensitivity to the Jewish vote' see Gazit's memorandum, of 2 October 1962, to Haim Yahil, Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/7: 1. On the domestic ramifications of Peres's visit, see the memorandum entitled: 'Israel and United States Policy,' which was submitted on 7 June 1962 from Talbot to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 713. The memorandum alluded to Peres's visit in May 1962 as a major impetus for renewing the Israeli quest for obtaining from the administration 'compensation' for any accommodative move initiated toward Egypt.
76. Quoted from Komer's note of 1 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. See also Talbot's memorandum of 7 June 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 713. It is interesting to note that as early as 1 May 1962, in his message to Talbot, Komer stated that 'whatever form it might take, some kind of satisfactory reassurance to Israel is the essential obverse of our policy toward Nasser' (PPK, NSF, Box 407: Robert W. Komer, Arab–Israeli Relations, 1961–63, JFKL: 1).
77. Quoted from the telegram that was sent on 24 May 1962 from the Department of State to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, briefing the Embassy on Peres's meetings in Washington. *FRUS* 17: 676. Emphasis added.
78. Quoted from Talbot's memorandum of 7 June 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 713–14. Emphasis added.
79. Quoted from Komer's message of 31 May 1962 to Feldman. *FRUS* 17: 692.
80. Quoted from Talbot's memorandum of 7 June 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 714. For an analysis of earlier historical cases in which the Department of State was unsuccessful in its efforts to shape American foreign policy, see Harold L. Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 50–7; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956), p. 173; Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of*

Deterrence, pp. 104–7; Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 50–5; Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 31–70; David W. Welch, 'The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms', in G. John Ikenberry (ed.), *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, 2nd edn (New York: Harper-Collins, 1996), pp. 478–84.

81. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 28 May 1962 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. See, for another illustration of the role, which domestic political considerations played in the shaping of crucial strategic decisions, Leon V. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 19–25.
82. For the term 'compensatory moves' see Komer's 28 May 1962 memorandum to Kennedy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. For the term 'compensatory gestures' see Komer's note of 1 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. See also, in this connection. Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish*, pp. 154–5, 220.
83. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'National Intelligence Estimate Number 5-61: The Outlook for Israel,' which was drafted on 5 October 1961 by the US Intelligence Board. *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), p. 6.
84. See, in this connection, Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, pp. 139–73. See also Alexander L. George's analysis of the tactic of procrastination in Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 35–6.
85. Quoted from Komer's note of 1 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. See also, on McCloy's mission, Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 149; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 243–57.
86. Quoted from Komer's message of 1 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1. See also, in this connection, Little, 'From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed', p. 158; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, p. 155; William J. Burns, *Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955–1981* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 123.
87. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 119. See also pp. 99–118. See also Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1981), p. 48; Little, 'The Making of a Special Relationship', p. 572; Aronson, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East*, p. 79; *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), p. 74 (summary); Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, pp. 50–4. The plan which emerged from the discussions of this working group was conveyed to Nasser on 26 June 1963 by John J. McCloy, Kennedy's coordinator of disarmament activities, who was appointed as the President's Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation. It evolved around a trade-off:

> ... between an Israeli agreement to an international supervision of the Dimona nuclear reactor and an Egyptian agreement to freeze its missile program (combined with the offer to assist Egypt in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes). However, notwithstanding the American intensive efforts and willingness to explore various variants of the plan, the Egyptian President remained unimpressed and flatly rejected all of McCloy's proposals. (Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, pp. 52–3)

For an early illustration of Kennedy's sensitivity to the issue of arms limitations in the Middle East, see his article of 11 November 1960 in the *New York Post* (quoted in ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 21–2).

88. On the cancellation of McCloy's visit to Israel and the suspension of his mission, see Komer's message of 19 July 1963 to the President. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel: Security Guarantees, 1963, JFKL: 1. See also Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 156; Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, p. 53.
89. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Israel and United States Policy,' which was sent on 7 June 1962 from Talbot to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 716–17. See also Grant's memorandum of 17 June 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 734. On the Department of State's innate pessimism regarding the prospects of any arms control initiative to engender a process of conflict reduction between Israel and Egypt, see Meyer's remarks of 27 January 1961 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3293/3: 1–2.
90. Quoted from a memorandum entitled: 'Hawk Missiles', which was drafted on 5 July 1962 by Robert C. Strong, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State. *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), p. 2. See also Talbot's memorandum of 7 June 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 711.
91. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 22 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. *FRUS* 17: 748.
92. Quoted from a message that was sent on 15 June 1962 from Talbot to Grant, which summarized the Conference of Chiefs of Mission to Near Eastern and North African countries. The Conference was held in Athens from 12 June to 15 June 1962. *FRUS* 17: 729. See also the memorandum that was sent on 7 June 1962 from Talbot to Rusk. *FRUS* 17: 711. See, for an analysis of similar instances of calculated procrastination, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 162.
93. Quoted from Talbot's memorandum of 7 June 1962. *FRUS* 17: 711. It was only in the spring of 1963 that a serious, albeit futile, search for arms limitations arrangements in the Middle East was inaugurated. See also, for similar forms and stratagems of manipulation, Zeev Maoz, 'Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings', *World Politics*, 43, 1 (1990), pp. 88–90.

4

Essence of Decision: Missiles and Refugees

As we have seen, in June 1962 President Kennedy was faced with two incompatible recommendations concerning the Hawk. The first was supported by Komer and Feldman and largely derived from their perceptions of the domestic political landscape on the eve of the November 1962 congressional elections, while the second – advocated by the Department of State – reflected its visions of the Middle Eastern strategic and political landscape. In these 'action games,' although it shared some of the visions and concerns of the Department of State, the Department of Defense reached conclusions from its analysis of the balance of military capabilities in the Middle Eastern theater which fully converged with the course advocated by Komer and Feldman. Motivated by fundamentally different perceptions and considerations, these individuals and organizations nevertheless agreed on the policy to be pursued, thus depriving the Department of State of much of its traditional base of support within the administration and leaving it increasingly isolated and vulnerable when the drama reached its final act. Confronted with a powerful coalition comprising the NSC and the Department of Defense (and ultimately the President himself), the Department of State had to finally acquiesce in a decision which was incompatible with the posture it consistently advocated and pursued.[1]

Notwithstanding these developments, the President was still reluctant in the spring of 1962 to forcefully intervene in this intramural dispute. Acutely aware of the need to retain his Jewish base of support on the eve of the November 1962 congressional elections (and unwilling to risk the Hawk deal by making it contingent upon the prior pursuit of a comprehensive arms control initiative), he still searched for a 'creative formula' that would enable him to approve the Hawk sale without humiliating

Secretary of State Rusk and without blatantly defying his foreign policy élite.[2]

The emerging formula, which came to a head in early August 1962, was to link the Hawk issue to the Johnson Plan for resolving the Palestinian predicament.[3] Thus, although in the thinking of Komer and Feldman as it unfolded in May and June, the Hawk sale had been initially viewed strictly as compensation to Israel for the accommodative measures which the administration implemented *vis-à-vis* Egypt (which included a vast increase in the level of economic aid in the form of the PL-480 surplus wheat program), the administration now became in July and August 1962 increasingly predisposed (together with the President, who became increasingly involved in the issue during the summer of 1962) to look upon the Hawk deal as both compensation and incentive for Israel to soften its positions on the Palestinian front.

Despite this growing perception of the Hawk as an inducement, there remained – up to the very eve of the President's decision to sell the missiles to Israel – the question of the precise form of the linkage between the desired Israeli behavior in the Palestinian zone and the sale of the Hawk. Did the proponents and architects of the linkage strategy envisage an automatic and concurrent trade-off between Washington and Jerusalem (with the required Israeli concessions depicted as a formal prerequisite for receiving the missiles), or was their advocated strategy based upon a considerably more amorphous form of linkage, one lacking concreteness and immediacy and confined strictly to the level of expectations? In other words, was Israel *required* to reciprocate by softening some of its positions pertaining to the Palestinian refugees, or was this reassuring measure initiated in the hope (but without any guarantee) that Israel would indeed reciprocate in kind and embark upon a more accommodative posture in the Palestinian sphere?[4]

It was precisely over this issue of the appropriate form of linkage between Israel's code of conduct within the Israeli–Palestinian framework and the sale of the Hawk missile that the debate over the course and direction of American policy in the Middle East reached its climax in August 1962.

Ultimately, then, in the summer of 1962 the Hawk issue became intertwined with, and inextricably linked to, the cluster of questions related to the efforts of Joseph Johnson to promote a Palestinian settlement. These culminated in early August 1962 in the submission of his recommendations (termed 'the Johnson Plan') to the White House as the

prelude to their presentation to the parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN).

President Kennedy's willingness to use the sale of the Hawk missile as an inducement to Israel to soften its stance on the parameters of an acceptable Palestinian settlement reflected his strong conviction (which clearly surfaced as early as in February 1957 during Kennedy's tenure as US Senator) that 'the impoverished and tragic existence [of the Palestinian refugees] in makeshift camps near Israel's borders offers a constant source of national antagonism, economic chaos and communist exploitation of human misery.'[5]

As for the means of resolving this predicament, Kennedy – both as Senator and as President – insisted that the principles of repatriation, resettlement, and compensation should be the essential components of any American or multilateral initiative. As Senator Kennedy pointed out in his 24 February 1957 Cleveland address:

> Let those refugees who are sincerely willing to live at peace with their neighbors [and] to accept the Israeli Government with an attitude of *civitatus filia* be repatriated to Israel at the earliest practical date. Those who would prefer to remain in Arab jurisdiction should be resettled in areas under control of governments willing to help their Arab brothers ... to live in peace and dignity. Those who suffered actual losses of property or bank accounts in flight should be compensated by Israel.[6]

Four years later, these principles resurfaced in a considerably more specific and operational form as the three major tenets of the administration's intensive drive to resolve the refugee issue under the auspices of the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC).[7] Closely patterned on the traditional parameters of American diplomacy as articulated by Senator Kennedy in his 24 February 1957 address, this initiative was based on the twofold belief that 'a genuine Israeli move to accept the principle of repatriation of Arab refugees was both feasible and absolutely essential,' and that, on its part, the administration had the moral duty to actively act for the implementation 'of the recommendations of the General Assembly [of the UN] concerning the Palestinian refugees in a way most beneficial to the refugees.'[8]

Notwithstanding Ben-Gurion's unwavering opposition to any idea or plan which incorporated the principle of the repatriation of a large

number of Palestinian refugees as one of its central components, and notwithstanding his conviction that 'any commission would be likely to fail' in its effort to resolve or mitigate the Palestinian problem,[9] the Kennedy Administration remained fully committed to its desire to tackle the issue head-on. And indeed, in August 1961, Secretary of State Rusk succeeded in persuading Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (and a former official in the Department of State), to become the special representative of the long forgotten PCC. While operating formally under the auspices of the PCC (which was composed of representatives from the US, France and Turkey), Johnson worked closely with both the White House and the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, and in the process 'spent more time negotiating with US officials than with Israel or the Arab states.'[10]

The outcome of these negotiations (as well as Johnson's two trips to the Middle East) was the formulation of a plan that sought – at its core – to repatriate 'a relatively small number of refugees.'[11] Although Israel was highly suspicious of the plan – fearing that, in the absence of adequate safeguards, a large number of refugees would seek repatriation – Johnson remained irrevocably committed to the principle of repatriation as an integral tenet of his overall design. Repeatedly, he insisted that Israel should 'consider taking back 100,000–150,000 Arab [refugees] if the Arab countries are cooperating in resettlement of the remainder ... and there is assurance of generous United States support in meeting costs of repatriating and settlement in Israel.'[12]

In early August 1962, oblivious to the Israeli claim that the repatriation of at least 100,000 Palestinian refugees to Israel was bound to create a major security problem, Johnson submitted the final draft of his plan to the White House. This outlined the procedures for implementing the principles of repatriation and compensation. It was expected that 'after quiet approval by the US ... the special representative [Johnson] would personally deliver the text of the proposal to the Arab host governments and Israel.'[13]

It is precisely at this crucial juncture, on the very eve of the release of the Johnson Plan, and in an effort to secure Israel's acquiescence (while helping the Department of State to save face), that the President opted to link Johnson's Palestinian initiative to the Hawk issue in the hope that this strategy would help him to successfully cope with most of the domestic, bureaucratic and external constraints that confronted his

administration against the backdrop of the approaching congressional elections.

Having been continuously and vehemently opposed to the idea of the Hawk sale as a short-term contingency, the Department of State was initially predisposed to reject the linkage notion that incorporated this eventuality as one of its central tenets, albeit in a qualified form. Thus in his message of 28 July 1962 to Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Talbot was unequivocal in repudiating the basic premises and logic upon which the linkage concept was based. In the thinking of Komer and Feldman, the sale would solidify the President's infrastructure of Jewish support on the eve of the congressional elections, and would be a confidence-building and reassuring mechanism that was bound to make Israel feel more secure and, consequently, more prepared to accept the risks inherent in the pursuit of an accommodative posture in the Israeli–Palestinian zone (while reducing the danger of an Israeli preventive strike). the Department of State, however, feared that a considerably less benign form of cross-issue linkage would emerge in the aftermath of the sale, and maintained that it would adversely affect the administration's relations with the Arab world and, more specifically, 'limit our effectiveness in ... seeking implementation of the Johnson Plan without necessarily modifying the Israeli approach to it.'[14]

In other words, while proponents of the deal thought that an intrinsically positive linkage was likely to be established between the sale of the Hawk and the formation of a pragmatic and conciliatory Israeli approach toward the Johnson Plan, the critics of the linkage strategy – concentrating on American–Arab side of the equation rather than on the American–Israeli dyad – insisted that this approach would inevitably reduce Washington's margin of maneuverability in its quest to influence the behavior of the Arab patrons of the Palestinian refugees (without necessarily inducing Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to even marginally soften his vision of the requirements and parameters of an Israeli–Palestinian settlement).[15] Motivated by different perceptions and expectations, and sensitive to different facets of the Arab–Israeli predicament, the individuals and organizations competing for influence and power within the administration remained deeply divided in their respective assessments of the linkage idea and its likely ramifications.

Acutely sensitive to the dynamics of the domestic political scene and, in particular, to the need to maintain the traditional electoral alliance between the Jewish community and the Democratic Party, Komer,

Feldman (and later President Kennedy) were anxious to provide Israel with an inducement of such magnitude as to outweigh any other component of American policy in the Middle East and thus profoundly impress American Jewry. However, they searched for a formula that would promote this objective without totally alienating or humiliating the Department of State (while at the same time minimizing the adverse repercussions of the sale in the Arab world).

In this context and against this backdrop, the non-binding linkage strategy was conceived as a vital connecting link not only between the Hawk and the Palestinian refugees, but between the desired and the feasible outcome, as it promised to provide the necessary impetus for revitalizing and accelerating the effort to resolve the Palestinian conundrum that had continuously preoccupied the Department of State (as well as the President) since the inception of the administration. Indeed, by integrating the Hawk deal into a broader strategic context and by linking it to a cluster of regional American objectives (though without making it contingent upon any precondition that could have aborted the entire enterprise), Komer and Feldman could now obfuscate their domestic agenda and thus avoid the accusation that they were prepared to sacrifice the national interest for the sake of promoting crude, partisan and sectorial political objectives (without jeopardizing the sale itself).[16]

There remained, of course, *en route* to the effective marketing of the linkage strategy as a legitimate and viable means of accomplishing the objective of resolving – or at least mitigating – the Palestinian problem, the question of the administration's ability to convert the sale of the Hawk missile from merely compensation or a reward to Israel into a powerful confidence-building tool, which was capable of altering, with one stroke, Israel's threat perceptions and risk calculations. To advocates of the deal, however, this was hardly a major obstacle on the road to the imminent implementation of their intricate strategy of positive cross-issue linkage. Indeed, irrevocably committed to their innate belief in the power of positive sanctions to induce the recipient to respond in kind by moderating its positions on key strategic issues – which surfaced most clearly and consistently in the accommodative policy, which the NSC advocated toward Egypt in 1961 and 1962 with the active support of Deputy Counsel Feldman – Komer and Feldman predicated their approach in the summer of 1962 upon the vision of the Hawk as no less than a panacea or a sorcery that could well entice the Israeli Prime Minister to instantly adopt a more pragmatic and accommodative posture in the Palestinian sphere.[17]

Oblivious to the possibility that the 'unconditional cooperation by one side' might not be effective 'in getting the other side to cooperate,' they remained wedded – at this stage – to their pre-existing conviction that the reward offered would instantly induce the recipient to reciprocate by softening even deeply held core attitudes and positions.[18]

None of these beliefs, considerations and arguments permeated the thinking of the Department of State. Continuously opposed to the Hawk sale, Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Talbot were predisposed to view the deal as a serious impediment that was bound to vastly complicate Johnson's marketing efforts in the Arab world. Extremely skeptical of the ability of the sale to induce Israel to abandon the basic tenets of its Palestinian posture, they were convinced that it would be highly detrimental to American interests in the Middle East, eroding 'the considerable [American] prestige ... in the Arab world and thus ... seriously jeopardizing the *rapprochement* policy, which the administration consistently pursued toward Egypt.'[19] Whereas the repercussions of the Hawk sale were viewed by the Department of State as certain, imminent, and unequivocal (and as bound to abort, or vastly complicate, a broad spectrum of core strategic objectives, including the promotion of the Johnson Plan and the desire to continue its posture of *rapprochement* with Egypt), the benefits inherent in the move in terms of its presumed impact upon Ben-Gurion's code of behavior within the Israeli–Palestinian framework were downgraded by the Department of State's high policy élite and relegated to the level of the opaque and hypothetical.[20]

Notwithstanding these deep reservations and the initial conviction of the Department of State that the risks inherent in the pursuit of positive cross-issue linkage far outweighed its anticipated advantages, it quickly shifted gears and opted to support the linkage scheme, but insisted on specific and simultaneous trade-offs between the sale of the Hawk and Israel's acceptance of the Johnson Plan.[21] Faced with President Kennedy's growing willingness to approve the Hawk deal without any prior attempt to reach an arms control agreement between Israel and Egypt, the Department quickly recognized the advantages for American diplomacy inherent in the pursuit of a linkage strategy predicated upon a *quid pro quo* of an automatic, built-in trade-off between two reciprocal and concurrent actions – that is, between Israel's 'cooperation with the Johnson Plan' and 'the very important' reward for its cooperation in the form of the Hawk missile.[22]

While the 'strategy of reciprocity' was predicated upon the willingness

of one side to take a unilateral cooperative initiative in the hope, but not the certainty, that 'it will encourage the other side to take a conciliatory action in return,'[23] the *quid-pro-quo* strategy – which formed the basis for Secretary Rusk's behavior toward Israel on the eve of the Hawk decision – made the sale contingent upon a concrete, specific and binding Israeli pledge to cooperate with the Johnson Plan. By virtue of its insistence upon an explicit exchange that must be carried out by the parties simultaneously, this bargaining approach became attractive to the Department of State on two grounds. First, by insisting on a simultaneous trade-off between the two issues, it hoped that the Hawk sale could still be suspended indefinitely as a result of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's unwillingness to acquiesce in some of the provisions of the Johnson Plan (particularly those pertaining to the repatriation issue). Fully aware of the fact that the Israelis were 'deeply apprehensive over the implications for their security of the repatriation of any significant number of Palestinian Arabs,' Secretary Rusk and his subordinates may have expected that Israel's 'inflexible attitude' toward the Plan would persist even in the face of the inducement offered, thus sealing the fate of the Hawk deal.[24]

Alternatively, and more realistically, the Department of State now envisaged the tight linkage strategy as a means of significantly moderating Israeli policy in the Palestinian sphere and thus of establishing at least some of the regional preconditions for the effective implementation of the Johnson Plan (which it desperately sought to promote), while limiting the damage that the sale of the Hawk missile was expected to cause to Washington's relations with the Arab world. Thus, concurrent with its growing willingness (which came to a head in early August 1962, and which reflected its assessment that the die was practically cast with regard to the President's desire to sell the Hawk missile) to accept the inevitable and acquiesce in the Hawk deal, the Department of State still hoped that this 'concession' on a key issue would become fully and inextricably integrated into another – and no less vital – tenet of its advocated Middle East policy pertaining to the Palestinian issue. In this respect, the effective implementation of the Johnson Plan was perceived as the means of preventing, or at least minimizing, the regional repercussions which the Hawk sale was bound to precipitate. In the words of Assistant Secretary Talbot:

> Our resolve on the *quid pro quo* [between the Hawk sale and Israel's acceptance of the Johnson Plan] is firm ... Unless [Ben-Gurion] is

> convinced that we are not bluffing about withholding [the missile] if he does not cooperate [with] the Johnson Plan, he will be more likely to feel he can risk non-cooperation in, or sabotage of, the refugee plan. Ben-Gurion is a hard bargainer and can be dealt with successfully only on the basis of hard bargaining.[25]

In addition to their newly established desire to predicate the administration's behavior upon the principle of concurrent, built-in reciprocity, Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Talbot – who were aware that their original proposal to thoroughly explore the arms limitation option over a period of two years, as the prelude and precondition to the sale of the Hawk, had no chance of winning the support of the President (whose timetable and agenda differed markedly from the concerns and priorities of the Department of State) – still resorted to a last-ditch effort to prevent the imminent conclusion of the Hawk deal (regardless of its specific form and type of linkage to the Johnson Plan). Thus in his message to the President of 7 August 1962, Secretary Rusk recommended that before an 'offer to sell the Hawk to Israel' was made, the Department would be assigned the task of examining 'the prospects of an arms limitation arrangement ... within the next two months.'[26]

However, Secretary Rusk's last-minute effort to gain time and thus retain at least a minimal margin of maneuverability, proved abortive. Ironically, the meeting with President Nasser, during which the American Ambassador in Cairo, John S. Badeau, conveyed to his host President Kennedy's 'urgent interest in arms control,'[27] took place not *before*, but five days *after* Deputy Special Counsel Feldman had informed the Israeli leadership of the President's decision 'that the Hawk missile should be made available to Israel.'[28] Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Egyptian President's 'response [was] gloomy and unenthusiastic,' and 'in view of [the] past record, he would not trust any arms agreement to be effective against Israel.'[29]

Thus the stage was set in early August 1962 for the final encounter between the politically-motivated Komer and Feldman, on the one hand, and the Department of State, on the other, over the question of the desired form of linkage between the sale of the Hawk and the Johnson Plan.

Among the bureaucrats who sought to influence the President's views and thus 'to capture the central decision-maker for his coalition,'[30] Deputy Special Counsel Feldman quickly emerged as the dominant

figure, who ultimately managed to gain the full support of President Kennedy for his advocated course of action. Using his access to the President as a stepping-stone for pressing his case, Feldman forcefully demanded that the administration predicate its linkage posture upon the premises of the strategy of expected reciprocity rather than that of the strategy of required reciprocity. In other words, Feldman forcefully demanded that the Hawk sale should not be dependent upon the Johnson Plan. More specifically, Feldman sought to ensure that the decision to sell the Hawk missile to Israel was made (and implemented) quickly, regardless of Israel's *modus operandi* in the Palestinian zone. The sale of the Hawk was to be a unilateral accomodative action, with Israel expected – but not required – to take conciliatory action in return for the missiles; an inducement (and a 'compensatory gesture') rather than a pre-condition.[31]

Faced with Assistant Secretary Talbot's demand – incorporated into his 9 August 1962 memorandum to Feldman – that the administration rely upon the *quid-pro-quo* strategy as its central bargaining tool *vis-à-vis* Israel,[32] the Deputy Special Counsel, on the following day, recommended to the President that 'we should not defer for too long our offer to Ben-Gurion' regardless of the Israeli reaction to the Johnson Plan. As Feldman stated in his 10 August 1962 message to President Kennedy: 'I should like to be in the position of notifying [Ben-Gurion] that we will provide Hawks at the time we *request* his acquiescence in the Johnson Plan.'[33] Not only would an immediate and unconditional decision to sell the Hawk missile to Israel help the President to win the Jewish vote in the November 1962 congressional elections, but it would – according to Feldman – enable the Department of Defense to deliver the missile to Israel on the eve of the November 1964 Presidential elections, after the 'training of crews and technicians' (which, according to this timetable, would begin in 1963) was completed. 'Obviously,' he reasoned, 'an offer to provide the Hawks in 1966 would be worse than no offer at all ... from the standpoint of both [the] desired reassurance to the Israelis *and the optimum political impact before the 1964 US elections.*'[34] Instead, Feldman argued (in a memorandum submitted on 13 August 1962 to McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) that 'our best bet would be to grab off the first uncommitted training period (January 1964–July 1965) *but arrange matters so that the equipment arrives in Israel by October 1964 or, if this is unfeasible ... before mid-1964.*'[35]

In a series of conferences that were held in mid-August 1962 between President Kennedy, Feldman, Rusk and Joseph Johnson, the Deputy Special Counsel was equally uninhibited in articulating the cluster of domestic considerations and constraints that made it imperative, in his view, to confine the linkage between the Hawks and the Johnson Plan strictly to the level of expectations without making the deal contingent upon progress, or the commitment to progress, in any other policy context.

For example, in a conference that was held at the White House on 14 August 1962 (during which considerations pertaining to the balance of military capabilities in the Middle East were hardly mentioned), in response to Johnson's reference to his efforts to gain the support 'of Jewish [American] leaders' for his plan, Feldman remarked that 'if we could tie in the Hawk, it might work.' Later in the meeting, when Secretary Rusk argued that the Hawk deal should be 'tied into other matters,' Feldman interjected by stating that any such linkage should not prevent the administration from 'telling Ben-Gurion *ahead of time* that he gets the Hawks.'[36] And while President Kennedy did not challenge – in the course of the meeting – Feldman's recommended strategy, he did not directly and explicitly inform his foreign policy entourage (at the end of this conference or at any other meetings with Secretary Rusk that preceded Feldman's mission to Israel) of his preference for decoupling the sale of the Hawk missile to Israel from any binding, compulsory linkage to any other policy framework.

Concurrently, in a series of private meetings with the President (which paved the way to Feldman's mission to Israel), Feldman was relentless in advocating his preferred strategy of expected rather than concurrent reciprocity. National pride, the requirements of the domestic political scene, and the limits of the administration's latitude of choice and margin of maneuverability were the main components that were incorporated into Feldman's argument for the immediate conclusion of the Hawk deal without making it contingent upon, or subject to, specific Israeli actions *vis-à-vis* the Johnson Plan. Alluding to Secretary Rusk's desire 'to make acceptance of the [Johnson] Plan a condition for getting the Hawks,' he criticized this *quid-pro-quo* strategy by claiming that 'you cannot get a proud nation like Israel to accept something that they consider against their national interests by promising them ... something they need in the way of military equipment because they just [would not] bargain for their sovereign rights.'[37]

According to Feldman's retrospective account, it was this unwavering opposition to any 'bargain' with Israel – on the ground that 'any self-respecting government is going to resent it' – that ultimately decided the issue and convinced the President to send his Deputy Special Counsel to Israel in order to conclude the Hawk deal without insisting on a concurrent Israeli pledge to accept the main provisions incorporated into Johnson's report.[38]

Thus, at the end of the day, President Kennedy was induced to lend his unconditional support for the strategy of expected reciprocity, which was advocated so enthusiastically and persistently by Feldman, in defiance of the *quid-pro-quo* strategy recommended by the Department of State. The fact that Feldman's approach fully and quintessentially converged with President Kennedy's innate, deeply held, beliefs concerning the moderating power of economic and military incentives (in addition, of course, to its anticipated electoral advantages and benefits for the President), was a major component in Kennedy's decision to overrule Secretary Rusk and thus to ultimately approve the Hawk sale without insisting on any binding preconditions or prerequisites. In addition to his tactical, politically-motivated calculations and considerations, the President – who was convinced that Israel could be induced to make concessions only from a position of security and strength – applied the very same cluster of assumptions and derivative policy lines to the American–Israeli framework that characterized his accommodative attitude toward Egypt. These assumptions underscored the need to reassure Prime Minister Ben-Gurion by addressing Israel's security problems in the hope that Jerusalem would reciprocate by softening its posture on such core issues as the refugee question.

Thus, whereas President Eisenhower initially attempted to coerce Israel into acquiescence, his successor opted – as was demonstrated in the Hawk decision – to abandon the stick in favor of the incentive in the hope that the supply of arms to Israel would reduce Israel's feelings of vulnerability and insecurity while increasing American influence and leverage on its behavior. Furthermore, while Eisenhower's policy-makers had originally believed that the incorporation of reassuring measures into their policies toward Israel would instantly alienate the Arab world and thus jeopardize their entire regional designs, President Kennedy's approach was far less dichotomous, being predicated upon the assumption that American diplomacy could simultaneously maintain close relations with both Israel and its neighbors.

Feldman's oral history account of his meetings with the President that took place in August 1962, vividly describes how President Kennedy became increasingly receptive to the idea that the Hawk sale could provide the impetus – by virtue of allaying Israel's security concerns – not only for softening the Israeli approach to 'the refugee problem,' but for moderating Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's positions on a broad complex of core issues, including 'the inspection of the reactor at Dimona,' and Israel's strategy of retaliatory raids.[39] As was the case on numerous other occasions in the course of Kennedy's tenure as President, a major decision was ultimately made in defiance of Secretary Rusk and the entire foreign policy apparatus, with the President becoming increasingly predisposed to rely upon 'the group of people around him [at the NSC], whom he could use increasingly as his own instruments.'[40] In this respect, President Kennedy's intervention in the interdepartmental Hawk debate can be viewed as only one manifestation of his general propensity for giving priority to the views, assessments and recommendations of the NSC (in which Robert Komer played a central role when Middle Eastern issues were discussed) over the positions and preferences of the Department of State. This originated from the fact that he 'did not have great admiration for the Department of State bureaucracy.'[41]

Notwithstanding Feldman's strategic victory, there still remained within the administration a residue of ambiguity regarding the precise terms of his mission to Israel. Specifically, as late as on 18 August 1962 – namely, only one day before Feldman's meeting with the Israeli leadership was scheduled to take place – Secretary Rusk was still convinced that the Presidential envoy 'was in no sense attempting to close a Hawk deal.' According to McGeorge Bundy's report to the President concerning Secretary Rusk's meeting on 18 August 1962 with the British Ambassador to Washington, Lord Samuel Hood, the Secretary of State informed the British Ambassador that Feldman had been authorized 'not to go beyond indicating' that the administration was 'willing to consider in principle the sale of the Hawks to Israel, subject to the possibility of arms control arrangements in the area,' and that 'a message has gone to Feldman to make sure that he sticks to his instructions.'[42]

Despite the remaining hopes of Secretary Rusk and his subordinates that the sale could still be postponed or made contingent upon certain preconditions or specific trade-offs with other frameworks and issues, it became abundantly clear on 19 August 1962 that it was indeed Feldman's recommended approach that would become the source of the official

American strategy of expected – rather than required – reciprocity. In his 19 August 1962 meeting with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, Feldman quickly moved to implement his preferred stratagem of expected reciprocity, pointedly avoiding any built-in, organic linkage between the Hawk sale and the Johnson Plan. At first, the incentive was duly offered to the surprised and elated Israeli leadership. 'The President had determined,' Feldman solemnly announced, 'that the Hawk missile would be made available to Israel,' adding that the administration 'recognized Israel's need for a ground-to-air missile system in the absence of arms limitations.'[43]

Contrary to the widespread claim that the nuclear issue comprised an integral part of Feldman's formal negotiating agenda in the course of his August 1962 mission, an analysis of the transcripts of the envoy's conversations with the Israeli leadership indicates that he never referred to Israel's nuclear activities in Dimona in the entire course of his visit, nor did he seek to establish a direct and explicit trade-off between the Hawk sale and any facet of Israel's emerging nuclear posture. As Cohen acknowledges, ' ... the nuclear issue was not mentioned even in passing during Feldman's conversations with Ben-Gurion and Meir.' Hence, he concludes, 'there is no basis for the rumor that Israel received the Hawk missiles in return for its permission for regular US visits at Dimona.'[44]

Still, while no formal or explicit linkage was established between the two issues, it is clear that President Kennedy 'believed' and expected that 'through allaying Israel's fears about the long-range threat to its existence,' the Hawk sale would help to 'forestall a possible Israeli preventive warfare' and to 'prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons' and thus encourage Israel to make 'concessions which will have positive benefits for the Arabs.'[45]

Furthermore, although Secretary Rusk continued to demand – up to the very eve of Feldman's mission – that 'a serious' (and time-consuming) arms control initiative should precede any arms deal with the Ben-Gurion Government, the 19 August 1962 commitment to sell the Hawk missile to Israel was made, as we have already witnessed, before a formal request to President Nasser to consider any form of 'arms control arrangements' had been made. Against this background, Feldman's reference to the 'absence of arms limitations' as the basis for, and justification of the sale, may have reflected President Kennedy's innate skepticism regarding the prospects of reaching such 'arrangements' in the emotion-laden, highly-charged Middle East, but was not based even

on a preliminary or cursory exploration of the regional strategic landscape and of the specific components and dimensions of the Egyptian approach (as would be the case in 1963).

After Feldman had presented the deal as a *fait accompli* without making it contingent upon any preconditions or prerequisites, and after he had discussed with Ben-Gurion 'the terms of payment' for the Hawks, the conversation shifted to the expected Israeli part of the equation, with the American envoy merely requesting that Israel cooperate 'in good faith' with the Johnson Plan. Seeking to reassure the skeptical Prime Minister, Feldman repeatedly asserted that the initiative did not call upon Israel to repatriate all the refugees 'who opted for repatriation,' but merely 'to examine such repatriation applications in good faith,' and thus 'to let [the implementation of] the plan begin.' Reiterating the President's commitment to Israel's security and well-being, he emphasized that the phased implementation of the plan (combined with a package of American assurances and guarantees to Israel) would not even marginally infringe upon core Israeli interests.[46]

Although, according to Feldman's report of his 19 August 1962 meeting with the Israeli leadership, the 'initial reaction of the Prime Minister and his Foreign Minister [Golda Meir] to the Johnson Plan was negative,' he was nonetheless encouraged by the fact that 'Israel's leaders ... have apparently not found in [the] plan sufficient hazards to Israel to justify its immediate rejection.'[47] Indeed, notwithstanding the Foreign Minister's undisguised skepticism (articulated most forcefully in the course of her 21 August 1962 meeting with Feldman) and insistence 'upon some evidence of [Arab] good faith' *vis-à-vis* Israel as a prerequisite for any Israeli willingness to cooperate with the plan,[48] Feldman remained convinced that all the Israeli concerns and preconditions could still be satisfactorily and quickly met.

Contrary to Feldman's guarded optimism, the Secretary of State had little hope that the strategy of expected reciprocity would ultimately succeed in moderating the Israeli mode of conduct along the Palestinian front. Deprived of influence in the actual formation of the Hawk decision, and completely outplayed and outmaneuvered by Feldman in the course of the interdepartmental bureaucratic games which led to the establishment of a 'majority coalition' supporting the deal (without integrating it into the framework of the *quid-pro-quo* strategy), Secretary Rusk's only remaining option was to portray, from the sidelines, a vivid and highly disturbing picture of the regional repercussions that were likely to result

from the Presidential decision to decouple the Hawk deal from any tight and concurrent linkage to the Johnson Plan.

A clear illustration of the Secretary's state of mind in the immediate aftermath of the Hawk decision is provided by his message of 20 August 1962 to Feldman, which was permeated with skepticism and doubt regarding the likelihood that the strategy of expected reciprocity would indeed engender a mutually beneficial and rewarding process of attitude change and accommodation in the Palestinian sphere. As the Secretary of State pointed out in his message to Feldman: 'It would be most unfortunate if the Israelis were to end up with the Hawks ... while being responsible for derailing the Johnson Plan before it could even be given a good try.'[49]

Exactly one month later, in a message to Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary Talbot echoed and further reinforced the Secretary of State's concerns and frustrations by portraying a picture of a negative cross-issue linkage between the Hawk decision and the subsequent hardening of the Israeli attitude toward the Johnson Plan: 'Having now received assurances of the Hawk missile, the Israelis feel free to take a hard line [toward the Johnson Plan] in the hope of obtaining more benefits in the pre-election period.'[50]

Ten days later, Talbot was no less explicit in outlining the essence of his preferred bargaining strategy, claiming – in his message of 30 September 196, to Secretary Rusk – that 'Israel has recently obtained from us all that it now wants, e.g., water assurances, Hawks, etc., *and now feels it can safely be adamant on the one issue [the Johnson Plan] on which we seek its reciprocal cooperation.*'[51] And, indeed, despite Feldman's initial hope that Israel would ultimately acquiesce in the Johnson Plan and its basic principles, it became increasingly evident in subsequent weeks and months that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Meir remained highly suspicious of the initiative, and in fact intensified and sharpened their criticism of Johnson for incorporating – in the final draft of his plan – changes which they viewed as infringing upon Israel's sovereignty prerogative 'to have the final word on admitting any refugees,' and thus to be 'the final arbiter' concerning the number of Palestinian refugees to be repatriated to Israeli territory.[52]

Unwilling to deviate, even marginally, from their preconceived convictions regarding the necessary parameters of a Palestinian settlement, the Israeli leadership – despite (or because of) the incentive offered – remained irreconcilably and invariably committed to its initial belief that

'even if the administrator of the [Johnson] Plan [were] as pro-Israeli as possible, the pressures which the Arab governments were in a position to exercise ... [were] such that half or more of the first group of refugees polled would opt for repatriation.'[53] In the words of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion (quoted from his 17 September 1962 message to Ambassador Harman), which most clearly and quintessentially illustrate the recalcitrant and uncompromising attitude of Israel's high-policy élite toward the final draft of the Johnson Plan:

> The crux of the matter is that Israel will regard this plan as a more serious danger to its existence than all the threats of the Arab dictators and kings and ... all the Arab armies ... Obviously, this plan will not be implemented. If necessary we shall fight against it to the last man, as we fought against the Arab invaders in 1948 ... There is no ... doubt in my mind that these proposals are far more dangerous to the existence of Israel than Nasser's missiles ... MIGs and the other offensive weapons that Nasser, as well as the Syrian and Iraqi Governments, are receiving from the Soviet Union ... Dr Johnson does, indeed, add that Israel – like any other state – has the right to decide who will enter its territory and who will not, but with a masterful twist he determines that in the event of Israel opposing the return of any number of refugees, there will be established a decisive body, whose impartial opinion will override the decisions of the Government of Israel.[54]

Nine days later, in his meeting with secretary Rusk, Foreign Minister Meir was equally irreconcilable and adamant in alluding to the acute dangers to Israel, which were embedded in the Plan. According to the memorandum of the 26 September 196, meeting:

> Meir said she always had nightmares that the Arabs might wake up some day and abandon attacks on Israel for the simple expedient of pushing the refugees across the border into Israel ... In the case of the Johnson Plan, how could the UN guarantee that thousands [of refugees] who might have asked for repatriation would not merely be pushed across the borders by Arab leaders whose first objective was to destroy Israel?

Highly skeptical about the Secretary's reassurances that 'a maximum of 10 percent [of the Palestinian refugees]' would seek to repatriate whereas

'at least 90 percent would be settled in the Arab countries,' she reiterated her fears that 'the individual refugee ... would face a terrible political pressure to say that he wants to go back to Israel [lest] he would be branded as a traitor by the Arab state in which he lives.'[55]

The Israeli campaign against the Johnson Plan – which was accelerated and intensified during the period immediately following the Hawk decision – was a keen disappointment not only to Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Talbot, but also to Robert Komer and Carl Kaysen (the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs). Although the strategy advocated by members of the NSC (and primarily by Komer) on the eve of the Hawk decision was portrayed as compensation to Israel (and to Jewish voters) and, as such, was devoid of any *formal* preconditions or demands, Komer and Kaysen still expected Israel to respond to this 'gesture' by softening its attitude toward the Johnson Plan in the aftermath of the Hawk sale. Hence, they became increasingly frustrated and incensed when it became evident that the sale did not have any moderating influence upon Israel's behavior in the Palestinian zone but, in fact, encouraged it to defy with impunity Washington's preferences by insisting upon a comprehensive Arab–Israeli settlement as a prerequisite for any discussion of the Palestinian predicament.

Faced with Ambassador Harman's assertion that the plan was 'non-negotiable' and 'totally unacceptable to the Government of Israel,' Robert Komer – whose advocated strategy of expected reciprocity quickly receded into the background and did not precipitate the desired process of regional accommodation – was uninhibited in his criticisms of Israel's growing intransigence and unwavering reluctance to even marginally reassess its Palestinian posture in the aftermath of the Hawk deal. As he pointed out in his 22 September 1962 message to McGeorge Bundy's deputy, Carl Kaysen:

> As I see it, Israel – having gotten the Hawks – is making an all-out effort to sink the Johnson Plan ... In their concern over appearing to show weakness, the Israelis are ignoring the fact that this is the best chance in years for at least a start toward an overall Arab/Israeli settlement.[56]

Komer's message further reinforced Assistant Secretary Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Secretary Rusk, and clearly demonstrated that only one month after the Hawk decision had been made, one of its major

proponents had already decided, in view of Israel's recalcitrance, to shift alliances and join the Department of State in its criticism of the sale. Asserting that Israel remained in fact irrevocably opposed to the 'repatriation of any refugees' despite its earlier pledges to cooperate with the Johnson Plan, both the Department of State and the NSC joined hands, at long-last, in condemning Prime Minister Ben-Gurion for 'making an all-out effort to scuttle the plan ... while there is a possibility that the scuttling can be accomplished without public onus for Israel,' and in coordinating strategies in order to inject new life into the Johnson Plan.[57] In the words of Robert Komer, whose numerous position papers, memoranda and messages from late September and early October 1962 to the President, as well as to McGeorge Bundy and Carl Kaysen, were all invariably permeated with undisguised anger and frustration with the growing Israeli opposition to the very essence of the Johnson Plan in defiance of its earlier promises:

> *It is the Israelis who have changed their position on the Johnson Plan as we understand it.*
>
> When the President talked with Ben-Gurion last year [on 30 May 1961], Ben-Gurion said that Israel was willing to go along with an attempt at repatriation and resettlement, though it did not expect any results. Then the Israelis [led] Johnson to believe that they were not rigidly opposed [to the Johnson Plan], despite their skepticism [sic] as to the Plan's feasibility ... Sometime between August 19 and early September, Israel decided it could not afford to accept the Johnson Plan ... Whatever the cause, the Israelis seem scared to death of the Johnson Plan and are unwilling to assume the risks which it involves, despite the possibility that it would mark a major step forward toward a Palestine settlement. Only by dint of considerable pressure ... could we get a full reversal of the Israeli position.[58]

Feldman believed that – in view of the difficulties surrounding the efforts to implement the Johnson Plan (which was greeted with harsh criticism by both Israel, Egypt and Syria, albeit for completely different reasons) – the administration should start 'to quickly disengage' from it.[59] Komer, however – who was quite outspoken in criticizing 'the pro-Israeli bias' of his former coalition partner – demanded now, in his 22 September 1962 message to Kaysen, that the administration accelerate its drive to

promote the Johnson Plan in defiance of Israel's opposition. Komer maintained that the unconditional offering of the Hawk to Israel (which he had originally supported) was 'a pro-Israeli move' of such magnitude that it was bound to favorably 'affect US Jewish opinion just before the elections' regardless of any other component of American diplomacy in the region or initiative which the administration sought to promote. He was also (with the full and enthusiastic support of Talbot and Rusk) unequivocal in insisting that the President intensify his efforts to 'persuade' Israel to abandon its opposition and acquiesce in the plan. Having established unassailable, ironclad pro-Israeli credentials as a result of the Hawk deal, Washington could now proceed apace, according to this line of argumentation, toward the accomplishment of its objectives in the Palestinian sphere without fearing that its unmitigated support of the Johnson Plan would alienate Jewish voters:

> I further doubt that the US determination to continue the low-key exploration of the Johnson Plan possibilities (though without pressing the plan any further) will seriously complicate our relations with Israel or adversely affect the US Jewish opinion just before the elections. *The reason is that the Hawk offer ... is so pro-Israeli a move (and will be so blasted by the Arabs)* that it will largely blanket the Johnson Plan.

For the administration to acquiesce in Israel's recalcitrance and defiance, and thus 'to cave [in] too precipitously under Israeli pressure ... after just offering the Hawks,' Komer concluded his analysis, would prove to the Arabs that 'the US is exclusively pro-Israeli' and that Israel 'can lead us around by the nose.'[60]

Three days later, these indications that the initial congruence and compatibility between the respective views of members of the NSC (particularly Komer) and of the President's Deputy Special Counsel – which had enabled them to form a 'majority coalition' for their advocated strategy of expected reciprocity – had by now completely evaporated in view of Israel's irreconcilable reaction to the Johnson Plan, became even more explicit and unequivocal. Whereas, in Komer's opinion, the only way by which the administration could 'avoid the blame' for the imminent failure of the Plan was 'to hold firm a little longer,' Feldman – who insisted that the revisions incorporated into the last version of the Johnson Plan were clearly incompatible with his earlier promise to the Israeli leadership that 'it would have the final word on admitting refugees' – recommended

that the administration 'retreat' and simply 'recognize that the plan is a non-starter.'[61] At the same time, in an effort to reap the maximum political benefits from the Hawk deal, on 13 September 1962, Feldman briefed about 60 leaders of the Jewish community on the decision, and repeatedly underscored its significance and value as 'the most important policy move initiated by an American administration toward Israel since 1948.' In the course of the briefing – which took place at the White House – 'the President came in, shook hands with the participants and spoke ... to the group.' Like Feldman, he regarded the Hawk decision as 'an unprecedented, highly important step, which was indicative of the ironclad and immutable American commitment to Israel's independence.' Insisting that Israel was 'the cornerstone of American Middle East policy,' President Kennedy explained the sale in terms of the American national interest.[62]

Thus it is clear that, despite the defection of his close coalition partner, and despite Komer's repeated demand that the administration 'force the Israelis to cooperate with us more ... on the Johnson Plan, the Jordan Waters, and border policy,'[63] Feldman once again had emerged victorious from this renewed bureaucratic infighting. The fact that President Kennedy remained preoccupied with the overriding need to secure the Jewish vote despite the Hawk decision, sealed the fate of the joint efforts of the Department of State and the NSC to continuously support the Johnson Plan as 'the *only* plan that has any chance of progress now or, probably, in the next several years,' and thus 'to make it very clear [to] the Israelis ... that our objective is still the Johnson Plan.'[64] As Assistant Secretary Talbot complained to Secretary Rusk in his message of 20 September 1962: 'The President telephoned me [on 19 September] to explore means of reassuring Israel, to request that we do not press forward urgently, and to explain that he does not want to have trouble with American Jewry at this time.'[65] This sheds light on President Kennedy's perspective, namely, on his continued preoccupation with the perceived requirements of the domestic American scene.

Indeed, faced with the President's determination to continuously engage in a two-level game by seeking to manipulate not only the international sphere but the domestic arena as well (and thus to ensure that the political benefits inherent in the Hawk decision are not jeopardized by any intervening initiative, including the Johnson Plan), advocates of the plan had little choice but to follow his specific recommendations that 'we should not get way out front on this one, especially between now

and the elections,' and that 'the Department of State should not shower the Middle East with telegrams in praise of the Johnson Plan.'[66]

Thus, notwithstanding the disintegration of the 'Hawk coalition' in the immediate aftermath of the decision, and the growing convergence between the respective assessments and policy recommendations of the Department of State and the NSC, the fact that the President (with the full support of Feldman) adamantly refused to either embark upon a more assertive and determined course in seeking to implement the Johnson Plan or to reopen the Hawk decision, guaranteed that the initiative would indeed be abandoned without even marginally contributing to defusing the Palestinian predicament. Hoping to use the Hawk sale as the means of eliminating, or at least changing, the character of some of his domestic constraints, President Kennedy remained invariably committed to his desire to establish a 'synergistic issue linkage,' which Putnam defines as an international deal that creates 'a policy option ... that was previously beyond domestic control,' without injecting into the equation any residue or trace of coercion *vis-à-vis* the recipient of the August 1962 deal.[67]

Against this backdrop of Presidential predispositions, preferences and unabated electoral needs, Assistant Secretary Talbot's demand that the administration 'actively press the Israelis to accept the Johnson plan' (which was based on his conviction that the recent adoption by Israel of 'a hard line' *vis-à-vis* the Johnson initiative was the direct outcome of the Hawk sale[68]), had no chance of actually shaping American diplomacy, or of providing the impetus for an invigorated and assertive posture in support of the Johnson initiative. Nor did Kaysen's warning (which was issued in the course of his 2 October 1962 meeting with Ambassador Harman) that the acceptance of the asymmetrical outcome of the 'Hawk transaction' would 'give the appearance that we had contributed to an increase in Israel's military capabilities without some *quid pro quo* from Israel in the shape of an attempt ... to contribute to the conciliation of the refugee dispute,'[69] precipitate even a marginal change in the Israeli *modus operandi* along the Palestinian front. Indeed, Foreign Minister Meir depicted the Palestinian conundrum as an intrinsic core issue and an integral part of the overall Arab design to destroy the Jewish state. She asserted, in her 27 December 1962 meeting with President Kennedy, that the acceptance of even 'a very small number of Arabs' could pose a mortal threat to Israel's security and well-being, and that, in the absence of a fundamental change in the overall Arab attitude toward Israel, 'the entire concept of repatriation was unacceptable.'[70]

The fate of the Johnson Plan was thus sealed. The Kennedy Administration was confronted by a defiant, uncompromising Israeli posture (which was most clearly manifested in the unanimous decision of the Israeli Government on 16 September 1962 to reject the Johnson Plan as 'the worst of all plans dealing with the refugee question ... lacking integrity and realism'), and by an equally adamant Syrian opposition to the initiative (which was based on its claim that the Johnson Plan imposed too many restrictions upon the full implementation of the principle of repatriation), in addition to a highly skeptical Egyptian and Jordanian reaction. It was thus ultimately forced to abandon the entire enterprise. As a Department of State memorandum from 20 October 1962 pointed out:

> The Arab's response puts them superficially in parallel with Israelis, Each side now demands a prior assurance it knows the other side cannot give. The Arabs ask that Israel agree in principle that all refugees who opt for repatriation will be permitted to go back, and they express concern regarding the treatment of those who return. The Israelis, *inter alia*, call for Arab recognition that repatriation will be possible, at most, for no more than one refugee in ten.[71]

Since President Kennedy did not attempt in the aftermath of the suspension of the Johnson Plan to reopen the issue of the Hawk sale for further review, and since the original linkage between the two matters had never transcended the level of the opaque and amorphous, it is hardly surprising that they were ultimately destined for opposite fates: the Johnson Plan faded into the background as a transient and insignificant episode, while the Hawk deal was set for implementation. Despite Komer's conviction, articulated in his 22 December 1962 message to the President, that 'now, just after the 1962 elections and the Hawk offer, is the time when we can exert maximum leverage on Israel at minimum political cost,' and thus adopt 'a tougher line toward Israel ... which will ... restrain [the Israelis] when necessary,'[72] no such coercive posture was in fact forthcoming. Nor did Assistant Secretary Talbot's suggestion, incorporated into his 20 September 1962 message to Secretary Rusk, that the administration inform Israel that 'continued intransigence will force us to reduce the priority we had planned to give Israel for training on the delivery of the Hawk and to be "tough" in other ways,'[73] precipitate any reassessment of the August 1962 decision and the original delivery

schedule. Hence, on 30 January 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara formally advised the Senate Armed Services Committee of the Hawk sale, insisting that 'depending upon future Soviet arms shipments or other actions that tend to disturb the precarious stability in the area, we may find it necessary to increase our military aid to still other Near Eastern States.'[74]

Indeed, notwithstanding the formation of a new and cohesive bloc (composed of the Department of State and of the Middle East experts of the NSC) that was highly critical of the asymmetrical outcome of the Hawk decision and of the President's excessive sensitivity to 'domestic political calculations ... just after the election ... when he has fairly large freedom of maneuver,'[75] President Kennedy remained determined to sell the Hawk missile to Israel without delay or procrastination regardless of its behavior in the Palestinian sphere. Oblivious to the Department of State's repeated and desperate warnings that to acquiesce in 'the present Israeli ploy would ... put our overall Near Eastern policies in jeopardy,'[76] the President – with Feldman's enthusiastic support – continued to assign priority to the cluster of domestic-political considerations over any other competing calculation, and thus refused to inject any trace or residue of coercion into his *modus operandi* within the American–Israeli framework. Furthermore, in his 27 December 1962 meeting with Foreign Minister Meir (which took place just five days after Komer had pleaded with the President to exert pressure upon a recalcitrant Israeli government), President Kennedy went so far as to issue an unprecedented *de-facto* defense commitment to Israel by stating that 'it is quite clear that in case of an Arab invasion, the United States would come to the support of Israel.' 'We have that capacity,' he added, and 'it is growing.'[77]

Komer made a last-ditch plea in a comprehensive memorandum to McGeorge Bundy dated 14 January 1963, 'not to let the Johnson Plan die at this point' and thus to impress upon Israel the need to take 'certain short-term risks' for the sake of promoting a Palestinian settlement now that it is 'sufficiently confident of the US interest in [its] security'[78] in the wake of the Hawk decision; but this was equally futile. Faced with the President's abiding determination (both before and after the congressional elections) to maximize the domestic benefits inherent in the Hawk decision regardless of Israel's behavior on the Palestinian front, Komer was left to witness the collapse of his initial posture, which had been predicated – as he himself belatedly recognized – upon an overly naive and optimistic cluster of premises and expectations. In Komer's own words:

> We have promised the Israelis Hawks, reassured them on the Jordan waters, and given a higher level of economic aid ... In return, we have gotten nothing from our efforts ... In fact, the Israelis have visibly retreated from Ben-Gurion's ... statements to Mike [Feldman] last August. They are unwilling even to talk about the Johnson approach ...
>
> In my frank opinion, our tactical handling of the [Johnson] Plan has been poor. We should not have launched it in August, nor have given the Hawk assurances beforehand ... We have to do something we have never done before, except briefly at Suez. We have to pressure Israel to come around.[79]

And, indeed, a letter which Secretary Rusk sent to Prime Minister Ben-Gurion on 29 January 1963 formally recognized the inevitable, acknowledging that the Johnson Plan 'cannot be implemented,' and that 'we have no intention of trying to push it further with the relevant parties.'[80] Apparently, the intensifying crisis in Yemen and President Nasser's decision to dispatch, in October 1962, regular Egyptian troops in support of the republican forces there, dramatically altered the Middle East strategic landscape and distracted the Kennedy Administration from the cluster of issues related to the Arab–Israeli predicament. Against the backdrop of growing regional tensions (particularly between Egypt and Saudi Arabia), the Johnson Plan quickly subsided into the background, having been outweighed by more pressing and immediate issues.

Could American diplomacy have indeed been more successful had it attempted to link the two issues to one another by insisting on a concurrent trade-off rather than merely expecting Israel to reciprocate for the Hawk sale? Although the purchase of the Hawk missile was a long-standing, much-desired Israeli objective that comprised a central part of its overall strategic thinking and planning, there can be no doubt that the complex of issues integrated into the refugee problem constituted for Israel a highly charged, acutely sensitive set of core existential questions. Convinced that the Palestinian refugees 'would repatriate only with the support of [the] Egyptian army,' and that 'with repatriation, Nasser will send his army into Israel behind the refugees,' Israel envisaged the implementation of the Johnson Plan – unless it was accompanied by a fundamental change in basic Arab attitudes toward it – as a prelude to the extermination of 'the two million Jews of Israel' and thus to the annihilation of the Jewish state.[81]

This perception of the Johnson Plan as posing a direct, immediate and mortal threat to Israel's very existence was converted into a formal Knesset resolution stipulating 'that the Palestinian refugees should not be returned to Israeli territory [but] settled in Arab countries.'[82] This made it highly unlikely that – in the absence of a radical change in the basic structure of the Arab–Israeli conflict – any American compensation, inducement or incentive that entailed an Israeli acceptance of the Johnson Plan could have been of sufficient magnitude to lure Israel into acquiescence.

Thus, while the pursuit by the Kennedy Administration of a bargaining strategy consisting of a concurrent trade-off between Israel's attitude toward the Johnson Plan and the Hawk sale would have undoubtedly aggravated Ben-Gurion's predicament by forcing upon him the necessity of choice, the ultimate strategic outcome in terms of Israel's behavior in the Palestinian zone would have most likely remained unchanged. And although Prime Minister Ben-Gurion would have conceivably attempted to maintain a margin of maneuverability and ambiguity regarding the plan, in the final analysis he would not have compromised a basic tenet of Israel's traditional Palestinian posture, which was viewed as inextricably linked to its very survival as an independent and viable entity. With Israel having a far greater stake in the outcome than the Kennedy Administration, it consistently and adamantly refused to adjust its policy in the Palestinian sphere in accordance with Washington's preferences. The memorandum of the conversation which took place on 2 October 1962 between Carl Kaysen of the NSC and Ambassador Harman, comprehensively summarized the irreconcilable Israeli approach. In Kaysen's words:

> Ambassador Harman indicated that the [Johnson] Plan was totally unacceptable to ... Israel. He said that the actual control of the refugee camps was in the hands of the Arabs. That even if ... the choices of the individual refugees made were as if in the confessional booth, and the administrator of the plan was as pro-Israeli as possible, the pressures which the Arab Governments were in a position to exercise through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees [UNRWA] are such that half or more of the first group of refugees polled would opt for repatriation.[83]

Although, in January 1963, the administration formally recognized the failure of the Johnson mission and did not seriously attempt, in subsequent months, to inject new life into it by replacing its strategy of

expected reciprocity with a more forceful approach predicated upon a simultaneous trade-off, this inability of the incentive offered to even marginally moderate the Israeli approach toward the Johnson Plan did lead several officials (primarily Komer) to retrospectively reassess their strategy. Rusk, Komer and Kaysen believed that the promise of a major inducement without any complementary, built-in demand as an integral and organic part of the bargain had enabled Israel to defy the President with impunity and contributed to its recalcitrance; and they emerged from 'the Hawk/refugee episode of last year' with the conviction that, in dealing with Israel, 'we want to avoid giving if possible *before* we have taped down the *quid pro quos*.'[84]

As Komer pointed out in his 30 April 1963 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, which analyzed the growing internal turmoil in Jordan that had been inspired by Nasserist sympathizers in the wake of the establishment of a federal union between Egypt, Syria and Iraq on 17 April 1963: 'We cannot commit ourselves to Israel's defense without making sure that we have not given it a blank check ... Therefore I would argue against our giving new assurances to Israel without tying them to movement on the arms issue.'[85] Secretary Rusk was equally frustrated with Israel's behavior, repeatedly criticizing Prime Minister Ben-Gurion for refusing 'to acquiesce in proposals' which would not have endangered its security, while predicting that 'this position of rejection' was bound 'to create stresses in our relations with Israel,' particularly if the administration decides – in future crises – 'to lean on Israel to gain its acquiescence.'[86]

Against this backdrop of Komer's recently formed insistence on '*quid pro quos*' with Israel, and of Talbot's persistent demand that, in dealing with Israel, a 'firm' and 'determined' course should be adopted, it is clear that the failure of American diplomacy to induce the Ben-Gurion Government to respond to the Hawk decision by moderating its attitude toward the Johnson Plan had ramifications far beyond the ideographic, intrinsic and delimited context in which this episode originally unfolded. By exposing the weaknesses inherent in the exclusive reliance upon accommodative premises, this débâcle (and the learning experience it generated) led the architects of American Middle East policy to adopt – on several occasions in subsequent months and years – considerably more assertive bargaining methods *vis-à-vis* Israel, and to predicate their behavior within the American–Israeli dyad upon the premises of either coercive diplomacy or the q*uid-pro-quo* bargaining approach.

In this respect, the 'nuclear crisis' that came in the spring of 1963 to increasingly cloud the scene of American–Israeli relations – which was manifested in President Kennedy's growing reliance, in May and June 1963, on harsh, uncompromising and threatening rhetoric *vis-à-vis* Prime Minister Ben-Gurion as a means of securing Israel's acquiescence in the demand for periodic and comprehensive inspections of the Dimona nuclear reactor – can be at least partially traced to the Hawk experience. In particular, the apparent failure of the accommodative strategy of expected reciprocity to induce change in Israel's behavior both in the Palestinian sphere and in the nuclear field (where it continued to oppose, in the immediate aftermath of the deal, the American demand for 'visits at intervals of six months ... which would enable American scientists to thoroughly inspect all areas of the Dimona site and ... any related part of the complex,[87]) profoundly influenced President Kennedy's thinking and precipitated a reassessment of the American operational code in the American–Israeli sphere. Indeed, in the President's mind, the Hawk episode acquired significance far beyond the intrinsic and delimited parameters of the conventional balance of power or the Palestinian predicament. While focusing initially on the need to implement the Johnson Plan as his most immediate objective, President Kennedy still expected – according to Assistant Secretary Talbot's account – that 'through allaying Israel's fears about the long-range threat to its existence,' the Hawk deal would help 'to forestall a possible Israeli preventive warfare' and to 'prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.' Consequently, he was keenly disappointed and frustrated when these expectations failed to materialize and when it became clear that his accommodative strategy did not in fact encourage Israel to reciprocate by making concessions in any context or framework, including the nuclear sphere.

In his message of 15 June 1963 to the Israeli Prime Minister (which was returned to Washington undelivered by the American Embassy in Tel Aviv because of Ben-Gurion's resignation on the following day), the President made the continued American commitment to Israel's security contingent upon the immediate opening of the Dimona nuclear reactor to periodic and comprehensive inspections by American scientists. This clearly illustrates the new American insistence upon direct and binding forms of linkage that came to increasingly pervade the thinking of the Kennedy Administration in the aftermath of the Hawk deal.[88]

And, indeed, as a result of this learning experience, and regardless of the specific strategy pursued, Washington's high-policy élite largely

refrained (particularly during the period which immediately followed the Hawk decision) from providing weapons systems or such incentives as bilateral security arrangements or guarantees to Israel on an unconditional basis and without explicitly linking them to an advance or concurrent political or strategic payment. In addition, the sale of arms to Israel was occasionally preceded by the supply of comparable weapons systems to Arab countries. This was the case with the sale, on 29 July 1965, of 210 M-48 Patton tanks to Israel as compensation for the sale, in February 1965, of 250 M-48 Patton tanks to Jordan, and for Prime Minister Eshkol's compliance with the American demand that Washington should be able to reassure President Nasser that Israel did not intend to develop a nuclear weapons capability in Dimona.[89]

Paradoxically, while the Hawk decision eliminated, in a single stroke, an entire cluster of psychological and political inhibitions about, and impediments to, the sale of arms to Israel, and thus paved the way for the institutionalization of strategic ties between Washington and Jerusalem, this crossing of the Rubicon did not imply that the new posture would be pursued uninterruptedly and according to the ground rules that had been manifested in August 1962.

In other words: Israel would – in the aftermath of the decision – have to pay a political price for the arms requested. The price it so vehemently refused to pay in the summer of 1962 in return for the Hawks would be extracted from successive Israeli governments in various forms, with the conditional offering of arms gradually becoming a convenient lever for modifying at least some of Jerusalem's positions (and bargaining tactics) *vis-à-vis* its protagonists and its American patron.

Clearly, with the strategy of expected reciprocity quickly subsiding into the background in the wake of its failure to precipitate a mutually beneficial process of conflict-reduction in the Palestinian realm, new – and more direct – forms of linkage (patterned on the premises of specific and concurrent trade-offs) came to dominate the American–Israeli scene. Indeed, rather than seeking any longer to persuade Israel – with the advance supply of military incentives – to modify certain tenets of its operational code and *modus operandi* during the years which followed the Hawk sale, American diplomacy became largely predisposed to rely upon denial, suspension and procrastination as the preferred means of coercing Israel into acquiescing in painful trade-offs.[90]

The fact that – by virtue of having been decoupled from any intrinsic and compulsory linkage to the Johnson Plan – the Hawk decision may

have at least partially contributed to this development and to the growing reliance of successive administrations upon the premises of tight and concurrent linkage (occasionally reinforced by coercive principles) as their principal bargaining tools *vis-à-vis* Israel is, of course, quite a different matter and should by no means downgrade or minimize its significance as a major turning point in the history of the American–Israeli alliance.

Ironically, during the period immediately following the Hawk decision a sequence of regional crises (such as the outbreak of a civil war in Yemen and the renewed menace to the very existence of the Hashemite Kingdom) threatened to escalate into highly-menacing conflagrations and the value of Israel as an invaluable stabilizing force and an asset to American interests was underscored. However, although Egypt became increasingly perceived in Washington as a disruptive power by virtue of both its escalatory moves in Yemen and continued challenge to King Hussein,[91] this growing strategic convergence could not eliminate the lingering tactical dispute within the American–Israeli framework, and this would adversely affect the bargaining over the terms of future arms sales to Israel.

Still, by establishing new norms and patterns of behavior, the Hawk precedent (combined with the regional strategic developments which unfolded in 1963), made it considerably easier for future presidents to cope with the remaining pockets of bureaucratic resistance to the sale of arms to Israel. With the strategic debate over the pros and cons of this posture largely subsiding into the background in the aftermath of the August 1962 decision, and with the policy of selling arms to Israel quickly becoming a viable and legitimate option against the backdrop of a rapidly changing regional landscape, what was left for the US and Israel was to agree on the specific terms and conditions attached to each proposed deal.

Indeed, with Israel increasingly depicted by all branches of the administration as the only remaining regional power capable of deterring and containing the forces of radicalism and instability, and thus of preventing 'a change in Jordan which might bring Nasser into a more threatening position,'[92] (particularly in the wake of the April 1963 Jordanian Crisis and the expansion into Saudi Arabia of the civil war in Yemen) the road was cleared for Israel – despite the immediate repercussions of the aborted Johnson Plan – to become a major recipient of American weaponry during the years which followed the August 1962 decision.

The administration's growing support of the Israeli positions in the Jordan water dispute – which came to a head in 1963 – can be viewed as yet another demonstration of the emerging political and strategic convergence and compatibility between Washington and Jerusalem. This compatibility became even more evident in April 1963, when new and unprecedented forms of strategic cooperation (which included the exchange of intelligence and the joint preparation of contingency plans) were inaugurated between Washington and Jerusalem against the backdrop of the acutely menacing Jordanian Crisis.[93] In the words of President Kennedy, which were closely patterned on Secretary Dulles's remarks of July and August 1958, and which reflected the administration's conviction that the threat of military intervention by Israel in Jordan constituted the key for restraining Egypt and thus for mitigating the acutely menacing Jordanian Crisis of April 1963:

> [American Ambassador to Cairo John S.] Badeau should tell Nasser we were sure he was not interested in an Arab–Israeli war at this point but indicate that the Israelis might well be interested in [launching a] preventive war before the Arabs were ready. Therefore Nasser ought to do what he could do to prevent such a confrontation.[94]

Indeed, faced with the possibility that Jordan would soon fall 'under an Egyptian umbrella,'[95] American diplomacy resorted in April 1963 –as it had done in July 1958 – to the threat of an Israeli intervention in Jordan (without actually supporting such a move) as a major leverage in its last-ditch efforts to prevent President Nasser from engineering a coup against the besieged King Hussein. Insisting that they were unable to exert much pressure upon Israel's behavior when the issue at stake was perceived by Ben-Gurion's Government as directly and inextricably related to core security interests, the President and his entire foreign policy entourage based their crisis-management strategy within the American–Egyptian sphere upon the belief that the Israeli threat to occupy the West Bank in the event of the collapse of the Hashemite Kingdom constituted the most effective means of restraining President Nasser and thus of minimizing the danger that the Jordanian Crisis would escalate into an extremely menacing regional conflagration.

On 27 April 1963, this recognition 'of the usefulness of the Israeli threat [*vis-à-vis* Egypt] in guaranteeing Hussein's survival'[96] came to a

head when Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, in accordance with the President's specific instructions, ordered Ambassador Badeau to warn the Egyptian President that any Egyptian involvement in such a coup, or the dispatch of Egyptian troops to the 'Israeli-Jordanian frontier,' was likely to precipitate 'a sudden [Israeli] military action with little or no chance of prior detection.'[97] As Under Secretary of State Ball further elaborated in his message to Ambassador Badeau: 'It is desirable to get word to Nasser ... that while the US has cordial relations with Israel and presses for restraint, we cannot count on restraining Israel when it considers that its vital interests are at stake. We are not relaying an Israeli threat. We recognize reality.'[98]

Two weeks later, on 10 May 1963, in an effort to guarantee that the crisis would indeed subside, Ambassador Badeau was instructed by Under Secretary Ball to deliver an oral message to President Nasser from President Kennedy, which was designed to add clarity and precision to his earlier warning. The message stated:

> I know you recognize as well as I that situations may arise in which we cannot effectively influence Israeli policies any more than those of the UAR. If Jordan ... became a cockpit of struggle, there is a real danger that the Israelis might ... intervene, regardless of what external pressures could be brought to bear. If this compelled you and other Arabs to react, a major conflict might ensure – and one in which the Arab forces might be at a considerable initial disadvantage. Thus we see it in your interest as well as ours to avoid a possibly uncontrollable blow-up in Jordan.[99]

Although Under Secretary Ball's messages to Ambassador Badeau were the direct and quintessential reflection of the President's views and preferences, a review of numerous Department of State's memoranda (some of which were drafted soon after the onset of the Jordanian Crisis) indicates that it had no qualms or reservations in supporting all other branches of the administration in their unanimous reliance upon the threat of an Israeli onslaught on the West Bank as the optimal means of restraining Egypt from openly intervening in the intensifying civil strife in Jordan. As an internal Department of State memorandum from 18 April 1963 stated: 'Israel is interested in the *status quo*, and this is known to the Arabs. This fact is a better deterrent to efforts to topple Hussein than anything we ourselves might do.' Both in style and substance, this

memorandum fully accorded with the comprehensive position paper which was drafted by Robert Komer on 13 April 1963 that argued: 'We have evidence that Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad are worried over the Israeli reaction if Hussein falls; let's keep playing this deterrent theme. Let's remind them too of our special interest in Israel.'[100] And, as the President himself pointed out in his 27 May 1963 message to President Nasser, which sought to further reinforce the administration's earlier deterrence threats *vis-à-vis* Egypt by alluding once again to the possibility of an Israeli intervention in Jordan as a most likely outcome of the fall of the Hashemite Kingdom:

> I am deeply troubled [by the possibility] that Jordan will become the cockpit of an inter-Arab struggle ... Peace in the Middle East might well be destroyed by an Israeli intervention in Jordan, using the argument of her own security interests. We might be faced with a *fait accompli*.[101]

Unlike President Kennedy's numerous earlier messages to the Egyptian President, which were all permeated with sympathy and friendship, his letter of 27 May 1963 was fraught with suspicion and anxiety in the face of what was perceived as an unabated effort by Egypt to disrupt the regional balance of power by precipitating and engineering the downfall of King Hussein's regime. For its part, the Israeli Government – both in its public statements and in numerous messages to President Kennedy and the Department of State – was unequivocal in reiterating its intention to send troops into Jordan if the Hashemite Kingdom was overthrown, unless the West Bank was completely demilitarized 'under suitable international supervision.'[102]

This plethora of private American warnings, which were communicated to the Egyptian leadership by Ambassador Badeau throughout the crisis, was further augmented by a series of public statements which were fully compatible with the more blatant and explicit threats of intervention issued by Israel. In their numerous public references to the Jordanian Crisis, members of Washington's high policy élite were careful to maintain a margin of ambiguity when alluding to the possibility of 'an Israeli attack on the West Bank' resulting from 'an externally-inspired revolution in Jordan.'[103] They consistently refrained from openly reaffirming or endorsing the 1950 Tripartite Declaration which guaranteed the post-war frontiers or armistice lines between Israel and its neighbors. In

the numerous private messages to the Israeli Government issued by the administration in the course of the crisis, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was unequivocally and strongly urged to refrain from intervening in Jordan under any circumstances. However, in their private and public messages to President Nasser President Kennedy and his foreign policy advisers adopted a fundamentally different tone, and the threat of military action by Israel in Jordan was continuously portrayed as an almost inevitable outcome of the disruption of the political and constitutional *status quo* in the Hashemite Kingdom regardless of American predilections or objectives. In a message to George McBundy, dated 30 April 1963 (which became the base for the official American position toward Egypt), Robert Komer recommended: 'Let's think twice before reiterating the old Tripartite Declaration ... If it is read as guaranteeing the present armistice lines, it might just lead Nasser to think that if he ran a coup in Jordan we would do a Suez by keeping Israel from the West Bank.' 'To the extent that the fear of an Israeli attack ... acts as a deterrence,' Komer added, 'such a statement [reaffirming the 1950 Tripartite Declaration] tends to undercut it.'[104]

Just as the 1958 Jordanian Crisis consolidated the image of Israel as an indispensable asset to American and British strategic plans and objectives, so the no less acute threat to the very existence of the Hashemite Kingdom that unfolded in April 1963, can be thought of as the major trigger event that laid the groundwork to the eventual establishment of institutionalized and formal security ties between Washington and Jerusalem. In particular, such *ad-hoc* forms of strategic cooperation as the exchange of intelligence (especially about Egypt's military capabilities) and joint military planning that were initiated during April 1963 in the delimited and constrained context of the imminent threat to King Hussein, set new ground rules within the American–Israeli framework and paved the way to the inauguration – on 13 November 1963 – of a comprehensive and formal American–Israeli strategic dialogue on regional security issues.[105] Although the November 1963 dialogue exposed major differences between Washington and Jerusalem on such issues as the military significance of Egypt's missile development program, the magnitude of the Arab military threat to Israel and the nature of the American commitment to Israel's security,[106] it did precipitate an understanding regarding the Israeli need to modernize its tank force (which established the groundwork for the eventual sale to Israel, in 1965, of 210 M-48 Patton tanks).[107] And while the administration remained

opposed, both before and during these discussions, to the idea of granting *formal* security guarantees to Israel[108] (which would reinforce and institutionalize the President's pledge on 27 December 1967 to Foreign Minister Meir to come to Israel's rescue in case of an Arab attack), it indicated a willingness to periodically examine, with Israeli representatives, 'Israel's security situation.'[109] It also sought on numerous occasions (both before and after the November 1963 round of discussions), to strengthen and reinforce the 27 December 1962 *de-facto* security commitment by emphasizing the undiminished American 'will and intention'[110] to come 'to Israel's assistance if [it] were the victim of aggression.'[111] As Deputy Special Counsel Feldman pointed out on 5 May 1963 (in addressing AIPAC executives):

> First and foremost, we are committed ... to the integrity of Israel. We do not intend to sit on the sidelines if there is any threat. We have demonstrated this in a great many ways, the most recent of which was the new departure in American policy when we agreed to furnish [Israel] with Hawks, one of the most sophisticated of modern weapons.[112]

A memorandum of the conversation that took place on 31 October 1963 between Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell W. Harriman, and the President of the American-Jewish Committee, Jacob Blaustein, further elaborated:

> Harriman stressed both the determination and capability of the United States to come to Israel's aid if Israel were attacked. He said that there should be no doubt on either of these points. The United States kept a close watch on military developments in the area and felt that its military power in being in the Mediterranean was adequate to meet Israel's requirements for the foreseeable future ... The Sixth Fleet and United States forces in Europe could respond within 24 to 72 hours in the event of an attack against Israel and this in itself was a deterrent.[113]

President Lyndon Johnson's tenure as President witnessed a further consolidation of this perception of Israel as a power capable of safeguarding and promoting a broad range of American security interests in the Middle East. Viewing the region through the lens of the omnivorous,

all-encompassing superpower confrontation, President Johnson tended to perceive President Nasser 'as an instrument of the Kremlin,' while depicting Israel as a reliable bulwark against the recalcitrant and radical forces of pan-Arab nationalism. Indeed, during the Johnson era, 'a full-fledged patron–client relationship between the United States and Israel,' emerged. This relationship was the outcome of the 'deterioration of relations between the United States and Egypt and the growing Soviet penetration of the Middle East,' as well as – on the domestic American front – President Johnson's desire 'to obtain American-Jewish support for his policy on Vietnam, and his quest to secure the Jewish vote in the 1964 and 1968 presidential elections.'[114] In other words, what had been largely (albeit not exclusively) depicted, in August 1962, as a means of overcoming a cluster of domestic constraints and obstacles, later became a broadly based and legitimate posture, with its political and strategic components merging into a mutually reinforcing and coherent American course that combined the politically expedient with the strategically required.[115] In the words of Douglas Little:

> Even such Kennedy holdovers as Rusk, Talbot, and Komer had begun to have second thoughts about the even-handed policies they had helped design a few years earlier. Worried by growing Soviet support for wars of national liberation in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World, the Johnson Administration would work hard to convert Israel and other pro-Western states into strategic assets.[116]

This shift in the manner in which Israel was perceived by the architects of American diplomacy – which was accelerated in the aftermath of the Hawk deal – was fully recognized by Israel's Foreign Ministry and formed the basis for several policy initiatives that were to unfold in subsequent years. The remarks of the Minister of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Mordechai Gazit, which were made in the course of his meeting with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on 30 August 1963, clearly indicated that Israel was keenly aware of the opportunities inherent in this revised American perspective. Asserting that there was 'a growing compatibility between ... Israeli interests and an entire cluster of global and regional American interests,' Gazit proposed to Eshkol that this perceived compatibility should be exploited by Israel in order to extract from the Kennedy Administration certain formal long-term commitments as security guarantees.[117]

In the final analysis, then, and against the backdrop of this accelerating process of strategic convergence between Washington and Jerusalem, the 'other Arab–Israeli conflict' was largely, although not exclusively, waged around the issues of the level of linkage between the offer of American weaponry to Israel and the specific nature, magnitude and timing of the payment, or the reciprocal move that Israel would be called upon to make. This conflict would continue to be waged over the course of the years and decades that followed President Kennedy's decision to sell the Hawk missile to Israel.

NOTES

1. For a similar case in which a group of policy-makers advocated an identical policy line despite the fact that some of its members differed widely from one another in terms of their respective images of the world, see Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence*, p. 114. On the growing power of the NSC in the decision-making process during the Kennedy era, see Robert W. Komer's Oral History Interview of 22 December 1969, part 4, JFKL: 18–22; part 5: 1–47.
2. For an analysis of the President's thinking on the issue of the sale of the Hawk missile as it unfolded during the summer of 1962, see Feldman's account in Oral History Interview with Myer Feldman, 29 July 1967, part 11, JFKL: 535–8. On the political significance, for the President, of the congressional elections, see Oral History Interview with John S. Badeau, 25 February 1969, JFKL: 23–4.
3. Quoted from Komer's note of 1 June 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, May 1962–June 1962, JFKL: 1.
4. For an analysis of these linkage strategies in different historical circumstances and contingencies, see Alexander L. George, 'Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation', in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin (eds), *US–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 693; Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 27–8; Susan Peterson, *Crisis Bargaining and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 1–2; Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven, MD: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 28–84; Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 82–92; John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 215–24; Kalevi J. Holsti, 'The Study of Diplomacy', in James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson and Gavin Boyd (eds), *World Politics: An Introduction* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), pp. 299–306; Fred C. Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), chapter 4, pp. 43–58; Jack Sawyer and Harold

Guetzlow, 'Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations', in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 474; Maoz, *Paradoxes of War*, p. 43; Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 409–10; Janice Gross Stein, 'Reassurance in International Conflict Management', *Political Science Quarterly*, 106, 3 (1991), pp. 431–5; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 13; Richard Ned Lebow, *The Art of Bargaining* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 72–90; Richard Ned Lebow, 'Transitions and Transformations: Building International Cooperation', *Security Studies*, 6, 3 (1997), pp. 154–79; Shmuel Sandler, 'Linkage and Decoupling in American Foreign Policy', in Nissan Oren (ed.), *When Patterns Change: Turning Points in International Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 155–66; William Zartman, 'The Negotiation Process in the Middle East', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), *The Arab–Israeli Search for Peace* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 63, 65.

5. Quoted from Senator Kennedy's Cleveland address of 24 February 1957. John F. Kennedy, *John F. Kennedy on Israel, Zionism and Jewish Issues* (New York: Herzl Press, 1965), p. 26. See also Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 110.
6. Kennedy, *Kennedy on Israel*, p. 26. See also p. 49.
7. On the initial recommendations of the PCC from 1949 and the initial Israeli approach toward resolving the Palestinian predicament, see Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, pp. 311–15.
8. Quoted from a memorandum entitled 'Arab Refugees,' which was submitted on 25 May 1961 from Rusk to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Israel, General, 1961, JFKL: 1. See also Harman's message of 11 April 1961 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/1: 1–2; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 111–12; Ziad abu-Amr, 'Historical Cases of US-Soviet Conflict Management in the Middle East: The Palestinian Question', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 273–4; Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, p. 7; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, p. 73.
9. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 30 May 1961. Memorandum of his 30 May 1961 conversation with Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 140. See also the memorandum of 28 April 1961 from Acting Secretary of State Chester B. Bowles to Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 140. See also, in this connection, Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, p. 13.
10. Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 113. On the original terms of reference and the early activities of the PCC, see Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 80–6.
11. Johnson's remarks of 14 March 1962. Memorandum of his conversation with William R. Crawford of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. *FRUS* 17: 526. See also the memorandum, which was submitted from Rusk to Kennedy on 7 August 1962. Entitled: 'Dr Joseph Johnson's Proposals on the Palestine Refugee Problem,' the memorandum included the complete Johnson Plan as well as recommended 'courses of action' for American diplomacy. PPK, NSF, Box 118:

Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–7.

12. Quoted from 'Dr Joseph Johnson's Proposals on the Palestine Refugee Problem': 5. See also Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars: US Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine studies, 1995), pp. 80–1.
13. Johnson's remarks of 7 August 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Talbot. *FRUS* 17: 709. See also Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, pp. 112–13; Little, 'From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed,' p. 164.
14. Quoted from Talbot's message of 28 July 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18-21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 1. For a retrospective Israeli analysis of the position of the Department of State concerning the linkage strategy, see Gazit's memorandum of 2 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/7: 1.
15. Quoted from Talbot's message of 28 July 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18–21: 1–2. See also, in this connection, Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence and Perception,' *International Security*, 7, 3 (1984), pp. 3–11; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 82; Charles Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 85–99; George, 'Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation', pp. 693–4.
16. See, in this connection, Talbot's message of 28 July 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 2. For an analysis of similar legitimizing strategies, see Alexander L. George (ed.), *Managing US–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 25–7; Alexander L. George, 'Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in US Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy', in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander L. George (eds), *Changes in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. 235; B. Thomas Trout, 'Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War', *International Studies Quarterly*, 19, 3 (1975), pp. 253–61; Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, 'Peace as a Significant Change in Foreign Policy: The Need for Legitimacy,' *The Journal of International Relations*, 19, 3 (1990), pp. 18–19.
17. On the use and effectiveness of positive sanctions, see George, 'Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation', p. 693; David A. Baldwin, 'The Power of Positive Sanctions', *World Politics*, 23, 1 (1971), pp. 23, 31; Fred H. Lawson, 'Positive Sanctions and the Management of International Conflict: Five Middle Eastern Cases', *International Journal*, 40, 4 (1985), pp. 628–9; Martin Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation?* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 261–71; Janice Gross Stein, 'International Cooperation and Loss Avoidance: Framing the Problem', in Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds), *Choosing to Cooperate: How States Avoid Loss* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 4–5; Richard Rosecrance, 'Reward, Punishment and Interdependence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 25, 2 (1981), pp. 31–46. For illustrations of this accommodative approach see Komer's memorandum of 8 December 1961 to McGeorge Bundy. *FRUS* 17: 362; and Komer's message of 30 June 1961 to the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt W. Rostow. *FRUS* 17: 173.
18. Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, p. 268.

19. Quoted from Talbot's message of 28 July 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 1.
20. See, in this connection, Jervis's review of the cluster of motivational (rather than cognitive) biases influencing perception in Jervis, 'Perceiving and Coping with Threat', pp. 570-597, passim. See also Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence Theory Revisited', *World Politics*, 31, 2 (1979), pp. 306; Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds*, pp. 61, 117–25, 132–3, 345. Contrary to their earlier assessments, officials in the Department of State refrained from arguing – in the summer of 1962 – that the Hawk sale would make Israel aggressive, irreconcilable and intransigent toward its Arab neighbors.
21. For another illustration of this strategy, which is termed by George: 'bargaining strategy,' see George, 'Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,' p. 693. See also Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 8–9; George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, 'Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control', *World Politics*, 39, 3 (1987), pp. 300–1; Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, pp. 264–5; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 14; David A. Baldwin, 'Power Analysis and World Politics: New Tendencies versus Old Tendencies', *World Politics*, 31, 2 (1979), p. 192.
22. Memorandum of 9 August 1962 from Talbot to Feldman. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2.
23. The basic premises of the 'strategy of reciprocity' were most comprehensively presented by Robert Axelrod. In the context of a simulation game called 'Prisoner's Dilemma', Axelrod found that the player following this strategy (which is termed by him 'tit for tat') on the first move of a sequence, induced the other player in the game to reciprocate in kind and thus to set in motion a mutually beneficial and reassuring chain of cooperative interactions. See Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, pp. 27–54. See also, for additional illustrations of this strategy, Robert Axelrod, 'The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists', *American Political Science Review*, 75, 2 (1981), pp. 306–18; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions', *World Politics*, 38, 1 (1985), pp. 239–40; Robert O. Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 40, 1 (1986), pp. 5–10; Kenneth A. Oye, 'Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies', *World Politics*, 38, 1 (1985), pp. 14–16; Ralph A. Johnson, *Negotiation Basics: Concepts, Skills and Exercises* (London: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 81–4; Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 113; Helen Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses', *World Politics*, 44, 3 (1992), pp. 470–3; Deborah Welch Larson, 'Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty', *International Organization*, 41, 1 (1987), pp. 30–1; Deborah Welch Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity in International Relations', *Negotiation Journal*, 4, 3 (1988), pp. 283–5; Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, pp. 280–5; Gilbert R. Winham, 'Practitioner's View of International Negotiation', *World Politics*, 32, 1 (1979), pp. 120–2; Gideon Doron and Itai Sened, *Political Bargaining: Theory, Practice and Process* (London: Sage Publications, 2001), pp. 57–9.
24. Quoted from a paper that was prepared on 30 June 1962 by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Department of State. *FRUS* 17: 763.
25. Quoted from Talbot's memorandum of 9 August 1962. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2.

26. Quoted from Rusk's message of 7 August 1962 to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 31–2.
27. Quoted from Ambassador John S. Badeau's telegram of 24 August 1962 to the Department of State. *FRUS* 17: 75.
28. Quoted from Feldman's telegram of 19 August 1962 to Rusk. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1.
29. Quoted from Badeau's telegram of 24 August 1962. *FRUS* 17: 75.
30. Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, p. 352. See also, for illustrations of similar bureaucratic games, Ben-Zvi, *The Illusion of Deterrence*; Roger Hilsman, Jr, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974); Irving M. Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organization Reform* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman (eds), *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish*, pp. 23–5.
31. See, in this connection, George's analysis of the 'strategy of reciprocity,' which is fully compatible with Feldman's advocated linkage strategy. George, 'Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation,' p. 693. For similar bargaining strategies in a 'natural alliance' see Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 191–2. For an Israeli analysis of the Hawk sale in terms of the strategy of reciprocity, see an internal Foreign Ministry memorandum which was drafted on 28 November 1963 by Arad. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 2.
32. See Talbot's memorandum of 9 August 1962 to Feldman. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2.
33. Quoted from Feldman's message of 10 August 1962 to Kennedy. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 2. Emphasis added.
34. Ibid. Emphasis added. For an Israeli assessment of Kennedy's approach toward Israel, which underscored the role of electoral considerations and the need to secure the Jewish vote, see Harman's message of 17 August 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/7: 4. In the 1960 Presidential elections, Jewish precincts gave Kennedy a plurality of more than 800,000 in New York (which Kennedy carried by 384,000 votes). In Illinois, which went Democratic by 9,000 ballots, Jewish votes gave Kennedy an edge of 55,000 (Urofsky, *We Are One!*, p. 333).
35. Quoted from Feldman's memorandum of 13 August 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2. Emphasis added. Contrary to Feldman's politically-motivated expectations, the first Hawk battery was deployed in 1965 (and not in 1964) around the Dimona nuclear site. For an analysis of the Hawk's deployment in the context of Israel's nuclear strategy, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 246, 269. See also, in this connection, Janice Gross Stein, 'Deterrence and Reassurance', in Paul Stern, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Axelrod, Robert Jervis and Charles Tilly (eds), *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 8–72, passim; Robert O. Keohane, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', *International Organization*, 40, 1 (1986), pp. 1–27.
36. Memorandum of the White House Conference on the Johnson Plan, which was held on 14 August 1962. *FRUS* 18: 56. Emphasis added.

37. See Oral History Interview with Myer Feldman, 20 August 1966, part 9. JFKL: 408–10, 431–3. See also Oral History Interview with Myer Feldman, 29 July 1967, part 11, JFKL: 534–42.
38. Ibid, part 9: 536–7. See also, on Feldman's success in persuading the President to accept his recommended strategy of expected reciprocity, *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 73 (Summary). On Feldman's success in persuading the President to grant Israel convenient loan arrangements for purchasing the Hawk missiles, see Urofsky, *We Are One!*, pp. 334–5. See also, in this connection, Gazit's message of 26 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1; and Harman's message of 7 November 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 1.
39. Oral History Interview with Feldman, part 11: 535–6. See also, in this connection, Kennedy's remarks of 27 December 1962 to Foreign Minister Meir. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 5 and Anthony Rusonik, 'Israeli Defense Doctrine and US Middle East Diplomacy: From Suez to the Loan Guarantees/ Settlements Dispute', *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 14, 2 (1992), p. 52. On Kennedy's belief in the power of such accommodative measures as economic and technical aid 'to channel Arab nationalism into constructive directions,' see James N. Giglio, *The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (Lawrence, KS: The University press of Kansas, 1991), pp. 230–1.
40. See Oral History Interview with Robert W. Komer, 22 December 1969, part 4, JFKL: 18. See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp. 274–5.
41. Oral History Interview with Robert W. Komer, part 4, JFKL: 18.
42. Quoted from the memorandum which was sent on 19 August 1962 from McGeorge Bundy to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 63–4. In the memorandum, Bundy summarized Rusk's meeting – of 18 August 1962 – with the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Hood. The meeting with Lord Hood took place against the backdrop of the growing tension between Washington and London over Britain's growing suspicions that the Hawk deal was on the verge of being finalized without providing Britain with an adequate opportunity to offer Israel the Bloodhound ground-to-air missile (which was comparable to the Hawk). See also, in this connection, Rusk's telegram of 18 August 1962 to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1; Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 317.
43. Quoted from the report which was submitted on 19 August 1962 from Feldman to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. For evidence that the Israeli Embassy in Washington was utterly pessimistic, during the period immediately preceding the sale, regarding the prospects of obtaining the Hawk missile, see Harman's message of 1 June 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/2: 1. See also the memorandum that was sent on 27 August 1962 from Gazit to Yahil. In the memorandum, Gazit summarized his conversation, of the same day, with Joseph J. Sisko, Director of the Office of UN Political and Security Affairs in the Department of State, in which Sisko alluded to Washington's 'expectations' – but not demands – that Israel 'cooperate with the Johnson Plan.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 1. It is interesting to note that in his

personal message to Ben-Gurion, in which Kennedy informed the Israeli Prime Minister of his plan to dispatch to Israel 'a special emissary in the next day or two,' the American President – on 15 August 1962 – did not elaborate on the specific terms of Feldman's mission, nor did he refer to his decision to sell the Hawk missile to Israel. In addressing the Johnson Plan and the Israeli request for the Hawk, Kennedy merely stated that these matters were 'of such significance ... as to justify dispatching [Feldman] to discuss them with you in the necessarily detailed manner impossible in the form of letters.' (Quoted from Kennedy's message of 15 August 1962 to Ben-Gurion. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/7: 1). See also, on the evolution of the Department of State's posture toward the sale, Gazit's message of 3 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1–2 and Gazit's message of 16 October 1962 to Yahil. Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/16: 2.

44. Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 111. Although no direct and explicit linkage between the sale of the Hawk missile and Israel's nuclear program was established, it is interesting to note that on 26 September 1962, approximately one month after the Hawk missile had been offered to Israel, the second visit of American scientists to Dimona took place (Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 112).
45. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 May 1963 to Ambassador Badeau, which reconstructed the President's views and expectations. *FRUS* 18: 545–6. See also, in this connection, Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, p. 101; Amir Oren, 'Rabin at the Firing Line', *Ha'aretz*, 24 October 1997, p. 5B [Hebrew]; McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 510; Little, 'The Making of a Special Relationship', pp. 568–9, and Gazit's memorandum of 2 October 1962 to Yahil, which referred to the Pentagon's fear of an Israeli preventive strike as a major consideration in its support of the Hawk sale, in ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/7: 1. In their respective works, Bundy and Little mistakenly claim that Feldman established a direct and explicit linkage between the Hawk deal and the Dimona nuclear reactor by demanding that Israel suspend its nuclear activities as a precondition for obtaining the Hawk.
46. Quoted from the report that was submitted on 19 August 1962 from Feldman to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2. See also Feldman's report of his 19 August 1962 conversation with Ben-Gurion, which was sent to the Department of State on the same day. *FRUS* 18: 64–6; Yahil's message of 19 August 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 1–2; and the Foreign Ministry's summary from 23 August 1962 of Feldman's meetings with the Israeli leadership. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 1–5.
47. Quoted from Feldman's report of 19 August 1962 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 2. See also memorandum of Feldman's conversation of 24 August 1962 with McGeorge Bundy and Ambassador Barbour. *FRUS* 18: 73. On Ben-Gurion's basic approach to the Palestinian issue, see Uri Bialer, 'Ben-Gurion and Sharett: Two Perceptions of the Arab–Israeli Conflict', in Benyamin Neuberger (ed.), *Diplomacy and Confrontation: Selected Issues in Israel's Foreign Relations, 1948–1978* (Tel Aviv: Everyman's University, 1984), pp. 190–5; Shabtai Teveth, *Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), passim.
48. Quoted from Feldman's report of 21 August 1962 to Rusk, concerning his

conversation with Meir. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1.

49. Quoted from Rusk's telegram of 20 August 1962 to Feldman. *FRUS* 18: 68. For additional evidence concerning the position of the Department of State on the eve and aftermath of the Hawk sale, see Gazit's memorandum of his 2 October 1962 conversation with Robert C. Strong, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/7: 1–4. It should also be pointed out that, in its public announcements, the Department of State sought to minimize the significance of the Hawk sale and to present it as nothing more than a temporary deviation from the largely unchanged traditional American arms sales policy. See, for example, Gazit's message of 3 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Policy Files, Box 3377/8: 1. See also, in this connection, Gazit's message of 4 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/5: 1–3.
50. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 113.
51. Quoted from Talbot's message of 30 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 146. Emphasis added. For additional evidence concerning the Department of State's growing frustration in the aftermath of the Hawk decision, see Gazit's message of 3 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1–2.
52. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 14 September 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. *FRUS* 18: 96. See also, in this connection, Ben-Gurion's message of 17 September 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1–4; Harman's memorandum of his meeting of 12 October 1962 with Talbot. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 5–7; Harman's memorandum of his meeting of 1 November 1962 with Talbot. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1–6; Ben-Gurion's message of 17 November 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1–3; the Prime Minister's note of 17 November 1962 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1 and *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 73 (Summary).
53. Quoted from Harman's remarks of 2 October 1962. Memorandum of his conversation with Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. In his analysis of alternative bargaining strategies, Patchen refers to this possibility by stating that 'in some situations ... national leaders will feel no moral pressure to reciprocate a rewarding action or promise by another nation' (Patchen, *Resolving Disputes Between Nations*, p. 265). See also Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity', pp. 283–5. It is interesting to note that this outcome contradicts Axelrod's findings concerning the effectiveness of the strategy of reciprocity (or tit for tat) in precipitating a mutually beneficial process of cooperation. However, these findings (as presented in Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*) did not reflect the actual world of international negotiations but rather the considerably more controlled dynamics of a Prisoner's Dilemma simulation game. See also Harman's message of 25 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1–2; and Harman's message of 1 November 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 1.
54. Quoted from Ben-Gurion's message of 17 September 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1–30. On the hardening of the Israeli position *vis-à-vis* the Johnson Plan in the immediate aftermath of the Hawk sale, see *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), pp. 73–4 (Summary). See also,

on the fate of the Johnson Plan, Henry W. Brands, *Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945–1993* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), pp. 88–9.

55. Meir's remarks of 26 September 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of her conversation with Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 132–3. For similar remarks see the memorandum of Meir's meeting of 28 September 1962 with Rusk. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/12: 1–8; and Ben-Gurion's message of 17 November 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 1. In his 17 November 1962 message to Harman, Ben-Gurion instructed the Israeli Ambassador to inform the administration that 'as long as the Arab states persist in their opposition to the existence of Israel, we shall not negotiate a Palestinian settlement' (p. 1). For a comprehensive review of the diplomatic moves, which were initiated by the Israeli Embassy in Washington in order to guarantee that the Johnson Plan 'is buried,' see Gazit's message of 24 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1–2 and Harman's message of 5 October 1962 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 2–6.
56. Quoted from Komer's message of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen. *FRUS* 18: 122–3. Notwithstanding the belief that the strategy of expected reciprocity could have induced Ben-Gurion to acquiesce in the Johnson Plan (in return for the Hawk missile), Ben-Gurion was unequivocal in categorically rejecting any trade-off between the two issues, insisting that Israel 'was fully prepared to suspend the Hawk deal if the cost entailed a partial or a complete acceptance of the Johnson Plan.' (Quoted from Ben-Gurion's message of 17 November 1962 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 4312/1: 2).
57. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 113. For evidence on Komer's efforts to forge a coalition with the Department of State for the purpose of preventing the immediate abandonment of the Johnson Plan see his message of 25 September 1962 to Kaysen in PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1; his message, of the same day, to the President in PPK, NSF Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1; and his note of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen, in PPK, NSF, Box 408: Robert Komer, Arab Refugees, 1962, JFKL: 1.
58. Quoted from Komer's message of 28 September 1962 to Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. Emphasis original. It is interesting to note that the Israeli diplomatic mission in Washington fully recognized the fact that Israel's recalcitrance in the face of the Johnson Plan was bound to adversely affect American–Israeli relations. See, for example, Harman's message of 5 December 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 3.
59. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 113. For additional evidence concerning Feldman's 'tendency to take only the Israeli side of the problem into account' see Komer's message of 9 August 1962 to McGeorge Bundy, in PPK, NSF, Box 407: Robert W. Komer, Arab–Israeli Relations, 1961–63, JFKL: 1; Komer's memorandum of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen, in *FRUS* 18: 123; and Komer's memorandum of 14 September 1962 to McGeorge Bundy, in PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, September 1962–October 1962, JFKL: 1–2. See also Feldman's own recollections in his Oral History Interview of 20 August 1966, part 9. JFKL: 431–5. For evidence indicating that this view of Feldman's position was fully shared by

Israel's representatives in Washington, see Gazit's message of 15 August 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 1.

60. Komer's message of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen. *FRUS* 18: 122–3. Emphasis original. For an identical view, see Talbot's memorandum of 30 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 146.
61. Quoted from Komer's note of 25 September 1962 to Kaysen. *FRUS* 18: 126. The references to Feldman's views are quoted from Harman's memorandum of 14 September 1962 concerning his 13 September 1962 conversation with Feldman. According to Harman's memorandum, Feldman observed that the fate of the Johnson Plan was sealed and that it would ultimately be 'buried' in the PCC. Harman's memorandum was incorporated into his message of 14 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 1–2. See also Harman's message of 13 September 1962 to Yahil. Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1–3.
62. The description of the 13 September 1962 meeting, is quoted from Feldman's Oral History Interview of 29 July 1967, part 11. JFKL: 540–2. For another report of this meeting, see Harman's message, of 14 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1–2. The 13 September 1962 meeting was not an isolated episode. It followed a similar meeting, which took place on 12 August 1962 between Feldman and 13 Jewish leaders at the White House, which the President partially attended. In the course of the meeting, Feldman predicted that the administration would improve Israel's military situation before the congressional elections of 1962. For a summary of this meeting see the message that was sent on 12 August 1962 by the Israeli Counsel General in New York, Catriel Katz, to Ambassador Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/5: 1–3. See also Katz's message of 13 August 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/5: 1–2 and Harman's message of 6 September 1962 to Yahil, in which he alluded to the meeting. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/5: 1. It should also be pointed out that in late September 1962, Feldman briefed Jewish leaders in New York and Boston of the Hawk decision. For evidence of these meetings, see Harman's message of 24 September 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1.
63. Quoted from Komer's message of 29 September 1962 to Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. See also Komer's message of 28 September 1962 to Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–3; Komer's message of 14 September 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, September 1962–October 1962, JFKL: 1; and Komer's note, of 25 September 1962 to Kaysen. *FRUS* 18: 126.
64. Quoted from Talbot's message of 30 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 149. Emphasis original. This growing gap between the positions advocated respectively by the White House and the Department of State was fully recognized, in September 1962, by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. In his message of 17 September 1962 to Harman, Yahil pointed out that it was abundantly clear that 'the Department of State was pursuing a fundamentally different course [concerning the Johnson Plan] than the one advocated by the White House' (ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1). For a similar assessment from 21 November 1962 see Meir's message to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/8: 1.

65. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. See also, in this connectin, Yahil's message of 17 September 1962 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1; and Gazit's message of 2 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1–3.
66. Quoted from McGeorge Bundy's message of 20 September 1962 to Komer, in which he articulated the President's views and recommendations. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. See also, in this connection, Edward Tivnan, *The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 58. For analyses of the two-level games approach see Robert D. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization*, 42, 3 (1988), pp. 427–60 and the essays included in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), passim.
67. Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics', pp. 444–5. See also Andrew Moravcsik, 'Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining', in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, p. 15; and Peter B. Evans, 'Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: Reflections and Projections', in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, p. 397.
68. Quoted from Talbot's message of 30 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 147. See also Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 113.
69. Kaysen's remarks of 2 October 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3. For a similar statement, see Komer's message, of the same day, to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 152–4; the memorandum of Komer's conversation of 17 October 1962 with Gazit. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3 and Komer's message of 28 September 1962 to Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–3.
70. Foreign Minister Meir's remarks of 27 December 1962. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 4.
71. Quoted from the memorandum that was sent on 20 October 1962 by William D. Brubeck, the Department of State's Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 408: Robert W. Komer, 1962, JFKL: 1–2. For a review of the Israeli decision of 16 September 1962 to reject the Johnson Plan, see editorial note, *FRUS* 18: 118–19. For evidence on the position of the Arab states concerning the Johnson Plan see Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, pp. 115–16; Komer's note of 9 October 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 408: Robert W. Komer, 1962, JFKL: 1; Oral History Interview with Dean Rusk, conducted on 21 August 1970, part 8, JFKL: 356.
72. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 22 December 1962 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1. See also Rusk's memorandum of 12 November 1962 entitled: 'The Johnson Plan and Consideration for the Forthcoming General Assembly Debate,' which he sent to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 214.
73. Quoted from Talbot's message of 20 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 114. For similar views see Kaysen's note of 5 December 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK,

NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1; Rusk's memorandum that he sent to Kennedy on 12 November 1962. *FRUS* 18: 214; and Rusk's telegram of 21 November 1962 to Ambassador Barbour. PPK, NSF, Box 148a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1–2.

74. For an assessment of Secretary McNamara's formal announcement of the Hawk sale (30 January 1963), see Gazit's message of 4 February 1963 to Shimshon Arad, Head of the US Section in the Israeli Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1–2. See also Gazit's message of 13 February 1963 to Arad. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1.
75. Quoted from Kaysen's message of 5 December 1962 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Palestine Refugees, General, 1962, JFKL: 1.
76. Quoted from Talbot's memorandum of 30 September 1962 to Rusk. *FRUS* 18: 146.
77. Kennedy's remarks of 27 December 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Meir. PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 6. See also, in this connection, Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, pp. 46–7.
78. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 14 January 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, JFKL: 1. See also Komer's memorandum of 5 December 1962 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 1.
79. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 5 December 1962 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 3–4. See also, in this connection, Harman's message of 14 May 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 3.
80. Quoted from Rusk's letter of 29 January 1963 to Ben-Gurion. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1. In a meeting with Johnson that the President held on 6 February 1963, it was mutually decided to indefinitely suspend his mission. See the memorandum of their conversation in PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1963, JFKL: 1; also Komer's memorandum of 5 February 1963 to Kennedy informing him that 'Johnson's call on you tomorrow marks the end of his mission – and its failure', in PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Palestine Refugees, General, 1963, JFKL: 1. Notwithstanding this decision to acquiesce in Israel's opposition to the Johnson Plan, the administration refrained from publicly acknowledging the failure of the Johnson initiative and thus continuously maintained a margin of ambiguity concerning the outcome of the mission. Fearing that a public acknowledgement would strain Washington's relations with Egypt, it embarked – in early 1963 – upon a posture of ambiguity and ambivalence, while seeking to obfuscate – at least momentarily – the fact that it was no longer committed to the Johnson Plan. For evidence concerning the administration's reluctance to publicly disengage from the plan in January 1963, see Harman's message of 28 January 1963 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 1–2. See also Harman's message of 28 January 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/3: 2.
81. Ben-Gurion's remarks of 2 June 1961. Memorandum of his conversation with Adlai E. Stevenson, the American Ambassador to the United Nations. *FRUS* 17: 150. See also the Prime Minister's message of 24 June 1962 to Kennedy. *FRUS* 17: 573.
82. On 6 November 1961 the Israeli Knesset adopted 'a refugee resolution,' which ruled out the possibility that some of the Palestinian refugees would be permitted into Israeli territory. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, p. 120. See also the memorandum the conversation between Harman and Talbot on 14 November 1961. *FRUS* 17: 327–9.

83. Harman's remarks of 2 October 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Kaysen. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, general, 1962, JFKL: 1.
84. Quoted from Komer's message of 16 May 1963 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF, Box 119a: Israel, general, 1963, JFKL: 1. Emphasis added. Earlier, in his comprehensive memorandum of 5 December 1962 to President Kennedy, Komer had already alluded to the lessons which should be drawn by the administration from its unsuccessful effort to induce Israel – through the inducement of the Hawk – into acquiescing in the Johnson Plan. In Komer's words:

> In my frank opinion, our tactical handling of the [Johnson] Plan has been poor. We should not have launched it in August, nor have given the Hawk assurances beforehand ... We have just promised Israel Hawks, it needs our support on the Jordan waters and it might well be susceptible to a combination of pressures and further reassurances on our part. (*FRUS* 18: 256)

   For a theoretical analysis of the limits and shortcomings of the strategy of expected reciprocity (which is equivalent to the tit for tat strategy) see Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity', pp. 283–5.
85. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 30 April 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. *FRUS* 18: 504. For an analysis of the regional background to Komer's memorandum, see Spiegel, *The Other Arab–Israeli Conflict*, p. 105; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, p. 163. An earlier illustration of this post-August 1962 insistence on concurrent trade-offs within the American–Israeli dyad can be seen in Kennedy's remarks to Foreign Minister Meir in the course of their meeting on 27 December 1962. As the President pointed out when addressing Israel's security concerns and needs: 'We are asking the cooperation of Israel in the same way that we are cooperating with Israel to help meet its needs ... We believe that Israel should consider the interests of the United States' (PPK, NSF, Box 118: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 6–7).
86. Quoted from Rusk's message of 18 March 1963 to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 437–8. See also Talbot's message of 20 May 1963 to Ambassador Badeau. *FRUS* 18: 546. See also, in this connection, Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity', pp. 283–5.
87. Quoted from Kennedy's 15 June 1963 letter to Ben-Gurion. As a result of Ben-Gurion's resignation of the following day, the message was delivered to his successor, Levi Eshkol, three weeks later, on 5 July 1963, with minor modifications. *FRUS* 18: 592–3. See also, on the 1963 'nuclear crisis' and its ramifications, Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 113–36; Shai Feldman, *Israel's Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 218; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 137; Zaki Shalom, 'Kennedy, Ben-Gurion and the Dimona Project, 1962–1963', *Israel Studies*, 1, 1 (1996), p. 9; Zaki Shalom, 'The Kennedy Administration and its Attitude Toward Israel's Nuclear Activity, 1962–1963', *Studies in Zionism, the Yishuv and the State of Israel*, 5 (1995), pp. 133–4 [Hebrew]; Douglas Little, 'Gideon's Band: America and the Middle East Since 1945', *Diplomatic History*, 18, 4 (1994), pp. 513–40.
88. For the text of Kennedy's undelivered message to Ben-Gurion of 15 June 1963, see *FRUS* 18: 592–3. See also Talbot's message of 20 May 1963 to Ambassador Badeau. *FRUS* 18: 545–6; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 133–4.

89. For analyses of the sale of 210 M-48 tanks to Israel on 29 July 1965, see Douglas Little, 'Choosing Sides: Lyndon Johnson and the Middle East', in Robert A. Divine (ed.), *The Johnson Years, Vol. 3: LBJ at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), pp. 162–5; Warren I. Cohen, 'Balancing American Interests in the Middle East: Lyndon Baines Johnson vs. Gamal Abdul Nasser', in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds), *Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World: American Foreign Policy, 1963–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 290–6; Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, p. 106; Schoenbaum, *The United States and the State of Israel*, p. 145; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 205. According to Avner Cohen's analysis, the sale of 210 M-48 tanks to Israel – which was preceded by the sale of American armor to Jordan – was not merely a compensation to the Eshkol Government, but a direct outcome of the 10 March 1965 Komer–Eshkol Memorandum of Understanding. According to this Memorandum – which was signed by Eshkol, Komer and the American Ambassador in Israel, Walworth Barbour – a direct linkage was established between the conventional and the nuclear spheres, with the administration agreeing 'to supply Israel with conventional armaments,' and with Eshkol promising 'that Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the region' (Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 207).

    For evidence of the administration's effort, from December 1966, to reopen its decision of February 1966 to sell to Israel 48 Skyhawk bombers – in view of the Israeli retaliatory raid that took place on 14 November 1966 on the village of Samo'a – see Amir Oren, 'Yellow Peril, Black Box,' *Ha'aretz*, 5 May 2000: B7 [Hebrew]. For evidence of Rusk's abortive attempt to make the Skyhawk sale contingent upon an Israeli promise to freeze its nuclear activity at the Dimona reactor, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, p. 211. For an analysis of the actual linkage 'between security and atoms' (to which both the US and Israel agreed and which was far less explicit and drastic than the linkage envisioned by Rusk), which paved the way to the Skyhawk deal, see Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 212–13.
90. For analyses of coercive strategies within the American–Israeli framework, see Ben-Zvi, *The Limits of the Special Relationship*; David Pollock, *The Politics of Pressure: American Arms and Israeli Policy Since the Six Day War* (Westport, MD: Greenwood Press, 1982); Nitza Nachmias, *Transfer of Arms, Leverage and Peace in the Middle East* (Westport, MD: Greenwood Press, 1988); John Sislin, 'Arms as Influence: The Determinants of Successful Influence', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38, 4 (1994), pp. 665–89; Thomas Wheelock, 'Arms for Israel: The Limits of Leverage', *International Security*, 3, 2 (1978), pp. 123–37; Oren, 'Yellow Peril,' p. B7. See also Larson, 'The Psychology of Reciprocity', pp. 285–7; Milner, 'International Theories of Cooperation', pp. 472–3.
91. For evidence of the growing tension between the Kennedy Administration and Nasser as a result of the escalation of the war in Yemen and the Egyptian bombardment of strategic targets across the Saudi border, see Komer's message, of 9 November 1963, to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, November 1962–December 1962, JFKL: 1; Komer's message of 8 January 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, January 1963–February 1963, JFKL: 1; Komer's message of 22 February 1963 to Kennedy.

PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, January 1963–February 1963, JFKL: 1; Komer's note of 28 February 1963 to Talbot. PPK, NSF: Box 446: Robert W. Komer, UAR, General, 1963, JFKL: 1; Kennedy's message of 16 October 1963 to Nasser. PPK, NSF, Box 446: Robert W. Komer, UAR, 1963, JFKL: 1; Rusk's message of 6 September 1963 to Nasser. PPK, NSF, Box 446: Robert W. Komer, UAR, 1963, JFKL: 1–2; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 160–4. In analyzing the deterioration in American-Egyptian relations, Gerges observes:

> There was a growing awareness in some Washington circles of the inherent limits to a close US–UAR relationship. In particular, Kennedy was upset at Nasser's unreadiness to execute the terms of the April 1963 disengagement treaty agreeing to a phased withdrawal of troops from Yemen, pending the termination of external support to the royalists ... In his last letter to Nasser, in October 1963, Kennedy's exasperation was quite apparent, [and] he accused Egypt of failing to carry out its part of the Yemen disengagement agreement. (*The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 160–1)

For illustrations of the growing strategic convergence between Washington and Jerusalem see the memorandum that was submitted on 23 August 1963 from Major General A.H. Manhart, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. *FRUS* 18: 668. On the Israeli perspective of the growing strategic ties see Yahil's message of 19 January 1963 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1. The message refers to Rusk's proposal to initiate a strategic dialogue 'at the highest level' with Israel and Harman's message of 25 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1. See also, in this connection, Steve Posner, *Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 156–61. On the origins and background of the 1963 Jordanian Crisis, see Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, pp. 38–104, passim.

92. Quoted from Komer's message of 1 May 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel, 1963, JFKL: 1. The Jordanian Crisis of April 1963 was precipitated by the joint declaration by Egypt, Syria and Iraq of their intention to set up a federation which would form the basis of Arab unity. This declaration provided the impetus for a series of violent demonstrations in the West Bank, which were ultimately suppressed by the Jordanian army (Zak, 'The Shift in Ben-Gurion's Attitude', pp. 159–61). For a similar statement, which underscored the growing 'strategic convergence' between Washington and Jerusalem in the immediate aftermath of the Jordanian Crisis see Talbot's comments of 13 May 1963 to Gazit. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 3.
93. On the establishment of new forms of strategic cooperation between the US and Israel during the Jordanian Crisis see, for example, Komer's 13 April 1963 position paper, in PPK, NSF, Box 322: Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, March 1963–April 1963, JFKL: 2; Komer's message of 2 May 1963 to Kennedy, in PPK, NSF, Box 429: Jordan, General, 1963, JFKL: 1. See also, in this connection, Komer's memorandum of 22 March 1963 to Kennedy. PPK, NSF: Meetings and Memoranda: Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, March 1963–April 1963, JFKL: 2–3. On the Israeli perspective of this

growing strategic cooperation, see an internal memorandum of Israel's Foreign Ministry which was drafted on 9 September 1963, entitled 'American Security Guarantees to Israel.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 28–9. See also Gazit's message of 25 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2; Harman's message of 26 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1; Harman's message of 30 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/9: 1–6; and Yahil's message of 5 May 1963 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2.

94. Kennedy's remarks of 27 April 1963. Quoted from the memorandum which was prepared by Komer of his meeting with the President, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Komer and Feldman. *FRUS* 18: 485–6. See also Komer's message of 1 May 1963 to McGeorge Bundy, PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel, 1963, JFKL: 1.
95. Rusk's words of 27 April 1963. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Harman. *FRUS* 18: 489.
96. Quoted from Gazit's message of 30 April 1963 to Yahil, which was based on a conversation with 'a reliable American source.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3378/10: 1.
97. Quoted from the telegram that was sent on 27 April 1963 from Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, to Badeau. *FRUS* 18: 488. See also Harman's message of 27 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3977/9: 1.
98. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 27 April 1963 to Badeau. *FRUS* 18: 507; Komer's remarks of 1 May 1963 in the course of the daily White House staff meeting. FRUS 18: 506; and Ball's remarks of 29 April 1963 to McGeorge Bundy (quoted from the memorandum of a telephone conversation between them). In the course of this conversation, Under Secretary Ball observed that 'one of the restraining elements on Egypt now ... is the danger of the possibility of an Israeli move' (*FRUS* 18: 497). On the evolution of the Israeli doctrine of 'red lines' *vis-à-vis* Jordan see Micha Bar, *Red Lines in Israel's Deterrence Strategy* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1990), pp. 97–9 [Hebrew].
99. Quoted from Ball's telegram of 10 May 1963 to Badeau. PPK, NSF, Box 446: Robert W. Komer, UAR, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–2. For a similar message, which was sent on 8 May 1963 from Ball to Badeau, see PPK, NSF, Box 168a: UAR, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–2. In this message, the American Ambassador was instructed to impress upon Nasser the need 'to avoid giving [the] Israelis any opportunity [to] justify [a] military move in self-defense, a development that would be destructive of both UAR and US interests' (p. 2).
100. Quoted by an internal Department of State memorandum that was drafted on 18 April 1963 by Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, p. 169 (n. 70). In alluding to this deterrence posture, Shalom maintains that British officials shared the American awareness 'of the strategic benefits resulting from the Israeli threats to intervene militarily in Jordan,' believing that the Israeli threat 'to intervene in Jordan in the case of a change in the *status quo* there [was] an important stabilizing factor.' In addition to deterring Nasser from intensifying his involvement in Jordan, these threats – according to Shalom's reconstruction of the British thinking – could be effective 'in restraining Palestinian factions within Jordan from enlarging and intensifying the upheaval.' 'Palestinian leaders,' these officials stated,

'were certain that should the Hussein regime fall, they would come under Israeli control. Such a development, they knew, was disastrous for the Palestinian cause' (p. 92). For Komer's 13 April 1963 position paper, see PPK, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, Box 322: Staff Memoranda: Robert W. Komer, March 1963–April 1963, JFKL: 1–2. See also, in this connection, Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, pp. 104–5.

101. Quoted from Kennedy's message of 27 May 1963 to Nasser, by Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, p. 94. Earlier, in his 11 May 1963 meeting with Canadian Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, Kennedy observed that he thought 'Nasser was sensitive to the possibility of an attack by the Israelis' (PPK, NSF, Box 436: Robert W. Komer, The Middle East, 1961–1963, JFKL: 1).
102. Ben-Gurion's message of 12 May 1963 to Kennedy. Quoted by Shalom, *The Superpowers, Israel and the Future of Jordan*, p. 81. See also pp. 83–4.
103. Quoted from Komer's message of 1 May 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 429: Robert W. Komer, Jordan Waters, 1962–1963, JFKL: 1.
104. Quoted from Komer's message of 30 April 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 125a: Jordan, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–2. See also Komer's message of 1 May 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 429: Robert W. Komer, Jordan Walter, 1962–1963, JFKL: 1; also Ball's telegram of 1 May 1963 to Badeau, in which he instructed the American Ambassador to warn Nasser of the repercussions which were likely to result from an 'external provocation' in Jordan. Maintaining that 'Israel was not a US satellite [and was not] subject to control,' the message stated that, faced with continued 'turmoil in Jordan, Israel might move to occupy the West Bank on the basis that the current military balance was more favorable now than possibly in the future' (PPK, NSF, Box 125a: Jordan, General, 1963, JFKL: 1). For illustrations of the concurrent American deterrence posture toward Israel, see Kennedy's remarks of 27 April 1963, which were converted into the administration's policy in subsequent days. The remarks were made in a meeting with Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Komer and Feldman. *FRUS* 18: 485–6. See also Harman's message of 30 April 1963, to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 2–3.
105. On the concept 'trigger event' and its behavioral ramifications see Saadia Touval, *Domestic Dynamics of Change from Confrontation to Accommodation Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 17. See also Jervis, *The Logic of Images*, p. 18; Barbara Rearden Farnham, *Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-making* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 37–8. On the exchange of classified military intelligence see the message, sent on 30 April 1963, by Harman to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/16: 1.
106. For a review of some of these differences see, for example, Gazit's message of 18 November 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2; Gazit's message of 15 November 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2; and Harman's message of 22 November 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–3. In several messages, the Israeli representatives in the dialogue reiterated their disappointment with the American reluctance to provide Israel with formal security guarantees. See, for example, the memorandum of the conversation that was held on 18 November 1963 between Gazit and Feldman.

ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2; and Gazit's message of 18 November 1963 to Meir. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2.

107. For an analysis of the November 1963 strategic dialogue see, for example, Little, 'From Even-Handed to Empty-Handed,' p. 176; Gerges, *The Superpowers in the Middle East*, p. 194; Cohen, *Israel and the Bomb*, pp. 172–3; Gazit, *President Kennedy's Policy*, pp. 45–6. See also Komer's memorandum of 19 November 1963 to McGeorge Bundy. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–8. For a slightly different summary see Komer's memorandum, which was drafted on 22 November 1963. In the memorandum Komer discloses that the strategic dialogue involved 'giving the Israelis more of our intelligence estimates on the UAR than at any previous time' (PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel, 1963, JFKL: 2). On the Israeli expectations of the dialogue, see Yahil's message of 1 October 1963 to Harman. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1; and Harman's message of 1 October 1963 to Yahil. In this message Harman advocated 'a step-by-step approach' *vis-à-vis* the administration as the most appropriate means of securing Israel's security interests and needs. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/10: 3.
108. For an illustration of the persistent American reluctance to give Israel formal security guarantees see, for example, Harman's message of 15 May 1963 to Yahil (in which he summarized his meeting, of the same day, with Kaysen). ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2; Harman's message of 16 May 1963 to Yahil, in which he alluded to the administration's strong opposition to the idea of an American–Israeli 'security pact.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1. See also the message that was sent on 24 June 1963 by Yaacov Barmor, the Israeli Counsel General in Chicago, to Yahil, in which he summarized 'recent conversations' between Philip Klutznick, President of B'nai B'rith and several members of the President's entourage. According to Klutznick's analysis, Kennedy remained adamantly opposed to any formal commitment to Israel's security, insisting that his oral pledge to Foreign Minister Meir (from 27 December 1962) to come to Israel's defense if it were attacked constituted a sufficient *de-facto* guarantee. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/6: 1; Gazit's message of 18 May 1963 to Yahil, in which he expressed pessimism concerning the prospects of persuading the Department of State, the NSC or the Congress to support 'the guarantees option.' ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2. In his message of 16 May 1963 to Yahil, Gazit quoted Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, James P. Grant, who said that in view of the regional balance of military power favoring Israel, the provision of American security guarantees to Israel was not needed. Grant further argued against overemphasizing the importance of formal treaties, maintaining that what actually guaranteed American action in support of Israel was not the existence of an agreement, but the President's willingness to act. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2. See also, in this connection, Harman's message of 14 October 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/10: 1.
109. Quoted from *FRUS* 18–21 (Near East, Africa Microfiche Supplement), p. 76. See also Harman's message of 14 May 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 4–5. On the American commitment (which fell short of a formal guarantee) to come to Israel's rescue in case of 'a direct threat to its security and

well-being,' see the remarks of Aryc Levavi, Deputy Director General of Israel's Foreign Ministry, which were made on 13 May 1963 in the course of a discussion of American–Israeli relations held at the Foreign Ministry. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 2–3, and Gazit's message of 15 November 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2.

110. Quoted from the statement which was made – on 8 May 1963 – by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell W. Harriman, to a group of American Jewish leaders. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel: Security Guarantees, 1963, JFKL: 2.
111. Quoted from the statement which was made on 11 September 1963 by Rodger P. Davies, Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, to Gazit. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel: Security Guarantees, 1963, JFKL: 2. See also, in this connection, Gazit's message of 17 October 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2.
112. Quoted by Harman, from Feldman's address of 5 May 1963. See Harman's message of 24 June 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 6. In this message (on p. 3), Harman quotes a similar statement that was made by Talbot on 23 April 1963.
113. Quoted from the memorandum of the conversation between Harriman and the president of the American-Jewish Committee, Jacob Blaustein, which took place on 31 October 1963. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1963, JFKL: 1–2. See also the memorandum of the conversation between Davies and Gazit, which took place on 11 September 1963. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel: Security Guarantees, 1963, JFKL: 2; and Gazit's message of 16 May 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1–2.
114. Bar-Siman-Tov, 'The United States and Israel since 1948,' p. 237.
115. For an analysis of institutional transformation in terms of the shifting bases of legitimacy, see Anat Kurz, 'The Institutionalization of Popular Struggles: Between "Terrorist Organizations" and Social Movements' (PhD dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 2001), passim. For an illustration of this perception, as well as Washington's growing willingness to commit itself to Israel's survival if attacked by its neighbors, see Harman's message of 30 April 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 1.
116. Little, 'A Fool's Errand,' p. 292. On the growing cooperation between the Kennedy Administration and the Israeli Government in matters concerning military assistance programs to developing nations, see the message which was sent on 23 November 1963 by Jonathan D. Stoddart, Deputy Director for the Near East, South Asia and Africa at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Komer. PPK, NSF, Box 427: Robert W. Komer, Israel, 1963, JFKL: 1.
117. Gazit's remarks of 30 August 1963. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation, of the same day, with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/4: 1–2.

5

Epilogue

In reconstructing the process by which the Hawk decision was made in the summer of 1962, the preceding analysis underscored the role which Myer Feldman, the President's Deputy Special Counsel (and liaison to the American-Jewish community), played in convincing President Kennedy to decouple the sale of the missile from any precondition or built-in, concurrent linkage to the Johnson Plan, and in forming the 'majority coalition,' which supported his strategy of expected, but not required, reciprocity. And indeed, the documentary material available at the Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston unequivocally indicates that both before the Hawk decision and in its aftermath, Feldman was a dominant bureaucratic player in the intragovernmental debate over the sale and its terms, using his access to the White House as a convenient lever to outmaneuver the Department of State (and later, in the wake of the deal, members of the NSC as well).

Motivated by an unabated desire to help the President win the Jewish vote in the approaching November 1962 congressional elections, Feldman was relentless, both in his drive to remove from the Hawk package any binding trade-offs or qualifications which could have jeopardized its implementation, and in his later 'all-out effort to sink the Johnson Plan' in view of Israel's vehement opposition to its final draft.[1] His oral history interview of 29 July 1967 makes it abundantly clear that, in Feldman's eyes, his meeting on 13 September 1962 with Jewish leaders (which the President briefly attended), in which 'the significance of the [Hawk] decision' was fully explained, represented the highly gratifying culmination of his endeavor to reassure the Jewish leadership that the Middle Eastern policy of the Kennedy Administration 'did not shift toward the Arabs.'[2]

Notwithstanding Feldman's contribution to the Hawk decision, and especially his success in persuading the President to accept his definition

of the linkage notion as exclusively confined to the level of expectations,[3] the fact that his advocated strategy converged with President Kennedy's domestic needs and foreign policy expectations, as well as with the strategic assessments of the Department of Defense, should not be overlooked.

In this respect, Feldman's insistence that the Hawk deal should not be subjected to any 'bargain' that any 'self-respecting government [was] going to resent'[4] did not reflect merely the predilections and domestic concerns of the leading representative of the special relationship in the Kennedy Administration, but was fully compatible with the Pentagon's recommendations, which were patterned on its cold and unsentimental assessment of the regional balance of military capabilities. As Tal points out, while 'DIA officials were well aware of the motives behind Israel's alarmism,' they 'found it militarily justified.'[5] Thus, despite the belief of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William Bundy that 'one can read into the present [Israeli] insistence [on the Hawk missile] all sorts of collateral political motives,'[6] he still argued, in his 23 May 1962 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Talbot, that there was 'a valid military basis for [Israel's] concern and for their selection of the Hawk as an item of key importance in their military posture,' particularly in view of the DIA assessment that the Soviet Union intended to provide Egypt (and Iraq) not only with surface-to-air missiles, but with 'some surface-to-surface types.'[7] And Minister Gazit clearly and comprehensively underscored the twofold origin of the Hawk decision:

> There can be no doubt that the timing [of the decision] was related to the forthcoming November [congressional] elections. It is also conceivable that the President's willingness to approve the sale reflected his sensitivity to the Jewish vote in view of his narrow margin of victory in the Presidential elections of 1960 ... *Still, it is absolutely essential to emphasize that the president would not have made the decision had he been confronted with the opposition of his advisers in the Pentagon, the Department of State and the NSC.* No president (unless he is corrupted) has the right to make such a decision when faced with the warning that this decision is incompatible with the national interest.[8]

Thus it is clear that, in August 1962, this convergence between the complex of domestic-electoral considerations (which were predicated

upon the need to win the Jewish vote) and the cluster of external strategic assessments (which underscored Israel's vulnerability to an Egyptian air-strike), ultimately tipped the scale in favor of the group supporting the *de-facto* unconditional sale of the Hawk missile to Israel. And while different members of this 'majority coalition' were motivated by different concerns and sets of considerations, the sphere of domestic politics and the strategic realm were perceived by them not as mutually exclusive, incompatible and irreconcilable aspects, but rather as mutually reinforcing and fully complementary components or facets, which could be harmoniously incorporated into the Hawk decision.

Far from representing a victory for the hard-core supporters of the domestic, politically oriented-paradigm over the representatives of the national interest orientation, the Hawk decision was viewed by the Pentagon as a stabilizing measure, which was called for in view of the growing asymmetry in the regional balance of anti-aircraft capabilities. And while the Department of State differed from the Pentagon in its view of the measures required due to the asymmetry in some of the military capabilities between Israel and its neighbors, it fully accepted the DIA assessments concerning Israel's 'vulnerability to a surprise air attack by low-flying aircraft.'[9]

Ultimately, then, considerations based on the realist paradigm converged with – rather than contradicted – the cluster of considerations predicated upon the domestic political orientation, thus ensuring that the strategy of expected reciprocity – that is, of selling the Hawk missile to Israel without insisting on any built-in, concurrent linkage to the Johnson Plan – would be translated into reality as the administration's official policy.

Yet another factor that further contributed to the President's decision to approve the Hawk deal as an inducement to modify Israel's mode of conduct in the Palestinian sphere, was President Kennedy's own operational code and, more specifically, his innate belief in the power of 'positive sanctions' in fueling a mutually beneficial process of conflict reduction, with the recipient of the incentive becoming increasingly prepared to abandon deeply held, irreconcilable dogmas and convictions for the sake of adopting more pragmatic and accommodative positions.

Clearly, the President's willingness to endorse Feldman's strategy of expected reciprocity did not exclusively derive from domestic electoral considerations, but fully and quintessentially reflected the very core of his cognitive map, which evolved around his belief in the capacity of

political and economic inducements to engender change from the pole of animosity and suspicion to the extreme of reconciliation and trust.[10] In the same way that the President was convinced that the use of economic incentives was capable of altering the 'internal structure' of 'foreign societies' such as Egypt and thus of mitigating, or altogether removing, the conditions that made them susceptible to 'revolutionary change,'[11] so did he (and several of his advisers) believe that the supply of American weaponry or technology to Israel could provide the impetus for modifying Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's behavior along the Palestinian front by encouraging him 'to take a little less rigid attitude toward the risks [inherent in the renewed effort to resolve] the refugee problem.'[12] The President expected that economic inducements *vis-à-vis* Egypt – such as the PL-480 wheat program and long-term development loans and stabilization credits – would encourage President Nasser to reciprocate in kind and embark upon conciliatory and accommodative actions on such matters as Egypt's foreign policy orientation.[13] Likewise, he believed that such military inducements *vis-à-vis* Israel – such as the Hawk missile – would encourage Prime Minister Ben-Gurion to reciprocate in kind and thus soften at least some of Israel's traditional positions on such issues as the Palestinian predicament.

Against this backdrop, the Hawk decision can be viewed as the reflection of a basic and generic component of his belief system rather than as a purely expedient and opportunistic measure that was exclusively precipitated by short-term electoral motives and considerations in defiance of the American national interest. In this respect, the President's stated desire 'to get over ... the different views [concerning the sale of the Hawk] without hurting anybody's feelings,'[14] can be seen as representing not merely his specific predilections and preferences within the unique and idiosyncratic parameters of the Hawk episode, but Kennedy's far more general and basic predispositions, beliefs and expectations concerning the potential inherent in the provision of economic or military incentives for softening the recipient's *modus operandi* and thus for channeling his actions into a benign and constructive process of economic development and political moderation.[15]

In other words, the President was not induced – in the Hawk decision – into functioning in a way that even marginally contradicted his overall approach and bargaining style in seeking to mitigate protracted international disputes. Viewing the Hawk decision as fully compatible with a broad cluster of highly desired regional goals, President Kennedy was

convinced that it would also resolve the problem of his domestic constraints without any trade-off between the requirements of the external and internal environments.[16]

That the situation proved to be far more complex than the one envisioned by President Kennedy, and that his expectations failed to materialize during the weeks and months which followed the August 1962 decision, is, of course, quite a different matter and can be attributed to his relative inexperience or excessive optimism, but not to his lack of sincerity, nor to any deliberate and conscious subordination of American strategic interests in the Middle East to domestic needs and constraints.

NOTES

1. Quoted from Komer's memorandum of 22 September 1962 to Kaysen. *FRUS* 18: 122.
2. Oral History Interview with Feldman, part 11: 540–2.
3. Ibid., 536–7.
4. Ibid. See also, in this connection, Sigal, *Fighting to a Finish*, p. 155.
5. Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 316.
6. Quoted from William Bundy's memorandum of 23 May 1962 to Talbot. *FRUS* 17: 674.
7. Ibid. See also Tal, 'Israel's Campaign to Acquire Hawk Missiles', p. 316. For evidence that Israel shared the view that the Hawk sale was based on regional balance of power considerations, see Harman's message of 7 May 1963 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3377/9: 2.
8. Quoted from Gazit's message of 2 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 1. Emphasis original. See also pp. 2–4.
9. Quoted from Rusk's memorandum of 7 August 1962 to Kennedy. *FRUS* 18: 31. See also Gazit's message of 2 October 1962 to Yahil. ISA, Foreign Ministry Files, Box 3379/3: 2.
10. See, for illustrations of this belief, Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, pp. 72–3; Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles*, p. 151; Malik Mufti, 'The United States and Nasserist Pan-Arabism', in David W. Lesch (ed.), *The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 167–86; Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, pp. 147–8; Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman and Clinton*, 2nd edn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 120–1; Herbert S. Parmet, *JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dial Press, 1983), passim.
11. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 223, 225; Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 224–5; Burton

I. Kaufman, *The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), pp. 31–6.

12. Komer's remarks of 17 October 1962. Quoted from the memorandum of his conversation with Gazit. PPK, NSF, Box 119: Israel, General, 1962, JFKL: 2.
13. Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 102–4; Lenczowski, *American Presidents in the Middle East*, pp. 76–7.
14. Kennedy's words. Quoted from Feldman's Oral History Interview, part 9: 446–7.
15. The corollary of this belief in the effectiveness of 'positive inducements' was the President's equally pervasive belief that by providing economic or military assistance, American diplomacy would be provided with powerful leverage over the recipient. Unwilling to risk the interruption of the much-needed economic aid or weaponry from the US, Egypt and Israel were therefore expected to become more susceptible and receptive to American influence (Ben-Zvi, *Decade of Transition*, pp. 103–4).
16. For additional historical examples of similar cognitive processes see Jack L. Snyder, 'Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence', *World Politics*, 30, 3 (1978), pp. 354–65; Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 149–81.

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