the Israeli Palestinians

an Arab Minority in the Jewish State

EDITOR

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The Israeli Palestinians:

An Arab Minority in the Jewish State

Editor

Alexander Bligh

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Preface

The Palestinian issue has captured worldwide interest, appearing repeatedly in international media headlines since the signing of the Oslo accords in late 1993. However, most aspirations and analyses have focused on the possibility of reaching an historical reconciliation between Israel and the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This approach overlooked a key element of the Palestinian question: the Arab citizens of Israel who had begun a process, which by now has peaked, of building their own national identity—Palestinian, yet Israeli citizens; identifying initially with the plight of Palestinians in the West Bank, and eventually in the Palestinian Authority. In spite of their Palestinian identity, however, they do not regard the PLO as their own representative.

The idea of dedicating a special volume of articles to the historical, social and political development of Israeli Arabs (or Israeli Palestinians) was first raised after the 1999 Israeli parliamentary elections. At that time, 11 Arab members of the Knesset were elected, signifying a milestone in Israeli Arab presence and participation in Israel's political system. Today, in light of the post-October 2000 chain of events, conflicts within Israeli society, mass Arab abstention from the 2001 prime ministerial elections, and finally, the decline of Arab representation to just eight members after the 2003 parliamentary elections, it is clear that the issue of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel is one of the dilemmas which will shape the political and social future of the country.

The 14 articles in this volume deal with a variety of issues and are divided into five main parts. The volume opens with a current analysis of the political arena. This is followed by a study of the three social issues that are the core of Jewish and Arab approaches to mutual relations. The third section deals with history and nationalism, analysing through three more articles the foundations of current national claims within the context of the 1948 war and its implications on the political narrative. The next part focuses on media documentation, highlighting mutual perceptions that Israeli Arabs are not only part of the State of Israel, but also members of the larger pan-Arab community. And finally, the last section looks at the hopes and expectations of this segment of Israeli society—should a feasible solution to the Palestinian issue be found. The volume ends with an attempt to lay the groundwork for more peaceful conditions in the region.

The writers of the articles are all Israeli scholars, Jews and Arabs, who have studied various perspectives relating to the main issue of the new position of Israeli Arabs, or Israeli Palestinians. Together, they present a compelling effort to try and separate this question from its daily political and media attention and provide the readers with a well written, well documented body of research to help us all better realize the complexities of the current situation and the main elements of a potential solution in the future.

In sadness, I would like to commemorate the memory of Avi Shabat. Together with Abigail Fraser, he co-authored the article 'Between Nationalism and Liberalism: The Political Thought of Azmi Bishara'. A post-graduate student of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, Avi passed away prematurely while this volume was being prepared.

AFTER OCTOBER 2000

Israeli Arab Members of the 15th Knesset: Between Israeli Citizenship and Their Palestinian National Identity[1]

ALEXANDER BLIGH

One of the outcomes of the Arab nations' struggle for independence from Western powers during the first half of the twentieth century was the division of the Arab National Movement into sub-ideologies, and, as a result, the establishment of separate nation states with their respective specific ideologies. At the start of the twenty-first century, it looks as though this split did not end with separate Arab national entities. The Palestinian National Movement is likely to witness yet another split: in spite of common Palestinian ideological and emotional obligation and commitment, the Palestinians now face quite a number of political and geographical constraints, which may lead to the emergence of several new national Palestinian movements. Perhaps the first indication of such a trend is the political behaviour of Israeli Arab members of the 15th Israeli Knesset (the Israeli parliament), who have demonstrated since the October 2000 violence inside sovereign Israeli territory a new kind of Palestinian nationalism: Israeli Palestinian, unique to them.

Residents of the West Bank (in this article, 'the territories'), former Jordanians, are separated physically and by Israeli authorities from residents of the Gaza Strip. Both groups are developing along similar, yet also different, political lines. East Jerusalem residents carry the documents of Israeli residents although they identify with the West Bank. Moreover, such duality and complexity does not end here. In at least one case, which was exposed in August 2002, Palestinians living in Jerusalem took part in a violent struggle against Israeli authorities. Beyond all of this, there is still another Palestinian population—Israeli Arabs, citizens of the state, who regard themselves as Palestinians in terms of their national identity, but different by virtue of their Israeli citizenship, as to how they regard the Israeli authorities' attitude towards them, and their

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perception of the need to resort to terror. Their commitment to the overall Palestinian concept is similar, to a certain extent, to the differences among Arab populations in the Middle East over 50 years ago when Israel was fighting for its independence. This comparison and a close look at the specific lines of political development of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens, and in particular, their leadership, can lead to the conclusion that the state of Israel is beginning to recognize the development of a new Palestinian People—a segment of the Palestinians, with unique characteristics and a strong emphasis on its uniqueness *vis-à-vis* other Palestinians, the state of Israel and its policies regarding the Arab community.

The wave of terror in Israeli-controlled territories, followed by violence in the Palestinian Authority (PA), and their combined, accumulated effect on Palestinian Israelis have contributed to and strengthened the development of this process, which began before October 2000.

The uprisings in the territories (from 1987 to 1992, and then from October 2000 until the present) and the resulting political developments, have had a major, inestimable impact on the formulation of Israeli-Palestinian relations. This fact is represented by the start of the Oslo process and a string of agreements between Israel and the PLO that had a dramatic influence on the political position of Israeli Arabs within the Israeli political system and the Palestinian political system as well. Afterwards, in October 2000, the Oslo process fell apart—to the disappointment of the Palestinian public in Israel and the PA. The *intifada*—the uprisings of 1987 to 1992, and the current one—are an expression of the direct confrontation between Palestinians from all demographic and geographic groups, including the leadership itself, and the state of Israel. These events have crystallized the feeling of Palestinian identity on an emotional and ideological level, and have placed Israeli Palestinians-or Israeli Arabs—in a new context of challenges and problems, and have affected their political behaviour, patterns of activity and methods of protest.

Growing solidarity with residents of the territories and the PA has created a widespread protest movement that has several different expressions. The conflicted, complex attitude of Israeli Arabs towards the state of Israel on the one hand, and their attitude towards their own people—Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—on the other, form the basis for a substantial change in the political behaviour patterns of Israeli Arabs. The change has both immediate as well as long-term repercussions.

The uprising is not the only reason for this change. Since the mid1980s, and perhaps even earlier on, Israeli Arabs paved a distinct path for themselves. This combined traditional symbols, such as clothing, strict adherence to religious rituals and the importance of family relations, with at the same time adoption of national values in the form of identification with alternative symbols. Concurrent with this process was participation in Israel's educational frameworks and the development of professional connections between Arab and Jewish business communities in Israel. All of the above leads to the question whether the

political trends of recent years—particularly because the Israeli Arab October riots coincided with the start of the *intifada al-Aqsa* in the territories—indicate parallel and coordinated patterns of activity between Israeli Arabs and Palestinians living in the territories in order to achieve complementary goals. In other words, have Israeli Arabs, together with their political leadership, developed for themselves a unique identity? Is it still relevant to study 'Palestinization' (integration with the Palestinians) as opposed to 'Israelization' (Israeli Arabs' complete integration into the Israeli system)—since, by combining the two—by pre-planned design and also to some extent spontaneously—this population created a new identity and patterns of activity that provide it with new importance and impact between the state of Israel and the Palestinian population.[2]

One way to examine this dilemma is through an analysis of the parliamentary functioning and the role of Arab members of the 15th Knesset via a comparison of activities during Knesset sessions before and after the October riots. As the main focus of this article concentrates on this aspect, we will not delve into extra-parliamentary activity in which members of Knesset (MKs) used their rights and privileges in order to advance a variety of Palestinian issues. The data that indicate substantial changes in the perception of how Arab MKs regard their roles stem from October 2000 events. For the purpose of this research, a quantitative approach has been adopted in looking solely at Arab members' actions in the Knesset. The analysed data cover proposals for private member bills, queries that have been addressed, oral queries and calls to order.

The 15th Knesset, whose members were elected in May 1999, is in session during one of the most difficult periods in relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The riots in the territories were followed immediately by clashes between the Israeli police and Israeli Arab citizens. During the incidents, 13 citizens were killed. These clashes have been investigated by a special committee of inquiry—the Or Committee—headed by a Supreme Court judge. This fatal confrontation signifies a milestone in the history of Israel's majority-minority relations. The dimensions of this turning point could probably be clarified by the publication of the Investigating Committee's conclusions, as well as by the possible continuation of a still small but growing number of incidents in which Israeli Arabs have participated one way or another in acts of terror against Israeli citizens, in conjunction with the continued struggle with the PA. The result of the ongoing fighting between Israel and the Palestinians in the PA has been extensive human suffering and economic deprivation among their fellow Palestinians, which has presented Israeli Arabs with a steadily growing dilemma. How, as citizens of Israel, can they continue to identify with the state that oppresses their brothers while providing as much assistance as possible to their brothers without violating acceptable norms of civil behaviour?

Perhaps the main reason for this dilemma, as analysed here, is connected with the similar yet also substantially different ideological and political development of the political and violent behavioural patterns of Israeli Arabs and the PA leadership. This topic should be addressed by taking into account two central

issues: the involvement of Israeli Arab leadership in the Israeli political establishment; and the development of an independent political system, separate from the Israeli one, that pursues an independent foreign policy—mainly with the PLO, the PA and the Palestinians in the territories. The connecting links between both of these issues are the Arab MKs, particularly Tibi[3] and Bisharah[4] —who speak in a similar language when referring to the state of Israel and its institutions, but actually prefer different allies. For Tibi the Palestinian Authority and Arafat are at the top of the list; for Bisharah it is Syria as the bedrock of Arab nationalism, which indeed indicates a major difference in their respective political orientations. Although Tibi tries to present his Palestinian solidarity and nationalism as a particularly national Palestinian trend, Bisharah presents his views regarding the national standing of his people as stemming from a larger pan-Arab ideology reminiscent of Nasserite ideology of the 1950s and 1960s. However, both present the Israeli Arab Palestinian ideology as unique: similar to the larger ideology, Palestinian or pan-Arab respectively, and yet entitled to its own national attributes.

HOW DID ARAB MKs BECOME LEADERS OF THE ISRAELI ARAB COMMUNITY?

Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the ascent of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, Israeli Arabs have undergone four stages of leadership development, which have had a vast and steadily increasing influence on internal and external political discussions concerning their Palestinian identity:

1. 1974—Establishment of the Committee of the Arab Municipalities.
2. 1982—Establishment of the Monitoring Committee.
3. 1988 and afterwards—Development of a two-pronged informal leadership: the established institutions, led by the Committee of the Arab Municipalities and the Monitoring Committee; and—over it: the practical leadership, in which it was possible to discern competition between the national-political leadership (MK Darawshe was for a certain period of time the dominant figure) and the Islamic leadership (Abdullah Nimr Darwish from Kafr Qasim was the leading figure in this category). At the start of the 1980s, the political structure was initially based on independent Arab parties, which were not just another branch of the Zionist parties as used to be the case during the first generation of the Jewish state. When MK Darawshe left the Labour Party in 1988, his act symbolized a split from old political patterns. The new leadership, from the early 1980s, was rooted in a continually developing system of internal and external relations. Along with civil society activities, different organizations appeared on the scene, which focused on various aims; in retrospect, these were humanitarian in nature, such as, for example, committees engaged in activities for unrecognized villages, or student organizations with their militant objectives.[5] However, these organizations

did not try to hide the national Palestinian message inherent in their activities.

4. 1993—Since the signing of the Interim Agreements with the Palestinians, the emphasis in leadership activity shifted, even if undeclared, to questions related to the political process and its long-term effects on the position of Israeli Arabs. The political leadership, that is: MKs, highly experienced in the political system, and having relations with Israel, undisputedly took the leading role in matters concerning their constituency. The various committees became tactical tools in the bigger picture whose lines were drawn during the ongoing competition between MKs for higher recognition and leading roles in their own community. At the same time, changes in ideological leadership development characterized the moral realm as well, contributing to the legitimization of the Israeli Arab leadership as the prime provider, within Israel's political system, of political support for the national aspirations of Palestinians in the territories. Other organizations were established throughout this period too. Their activities and aims also focused on achieving clear-cut political objectives (one example is Adalah (meaning 'justice'), an organization whose policy is to represent legally all legal issues relating to the Israeli Arab sector, among them: to react in the UN to Israel's positions and to Israel's responses to the organization).[6]

The 15th Knesset has 11 Arab Knesset members, nine of whom belong to parties whose majority constituents are Israeli Arabs. One MK resigned in 2002 from the Labour Party, having run in the most recent elections on its slate of candidates. Another MK represents Meretz (a left of centre party). Eleven is the largest number of Arab MKs that do not belong to the ruling parties, or to parties traditionally connected with them. For more than half of the current MKs, this is not their first term of office. In other words, this group is made up mainly of experienced parliamentarians, leading a clear political line since the start of the December 1987 uprising: a combination of the advantages provided by entitlement to Israeli citizenship, together with a constant demand for full equality, and an attempt to advance Palestinian national demands and create in Israel the basis for full equality and perhaps cultural autonomy. This approach, probably shared by all Arab MKs for the past 15 years in spite of their affiliation with three distinct parties, preserved a clear and complete separation from the political aspirations of the Palestinians in the territories for an independent state, which was and is supported by every Arab MK, while emphasizing the status and allegiance of the Israeli electorate—through an attempt at change from within. From an Arab perspective, this is entirely fair—to call for providing Israeli Arabs with their legitimate rights in their country, without alienating the Jewish majority, which has no interest in a confrontation with the Arab minority.

These approaches were at the core of Israeli Arab MKs' parliamentary activities during the 15th Knesset up until the eruption of the October 2000 riots. Contrary to the current approach, most pre-October 2000 parliamentary activity

was directed at citizenship issues regarding the position of Israeli Arabs in the country. A look at private member bill legislative proposals at the early readings in the Knesset plenary shows a split that is more civil than national.[7] Approximately 40 per cent centred on questions relating to the socio-economic position of Israeli Arabs, such as issues of discrimination and the development of municipal infrastructures in most Arab municipalities. Among the bills proposed were those regarding equal opportunity in the workplace (al-Sana, February 2000), which prevents an employer from requesting details about military service, or an amendment to a civil law that would make it easier for a husband or wife of an Israeli citizen to be entitled to citizenship (Mahamid, December 1999). The next category of proposed legislation—accounting for about 30 per cent— concentrated on topics with importance for every Israeli citizen, Jews and Arabs alike. This composition of draft bills enabled the MKs to demonstrate their connection to Israeli society and Israeli citizens at large. These legislative proposals included, for example, a law encouraging citizens to donate their organs (Bishara, March 2000), free higher education (Dahamshe, March 2000), and retirement payments for teachers (Bahamshe, March 2000). Only in the third instance, accounting for about one-quarter of the legislative proposals for private bills, were there topics that focused on the national aspirations of Israeli Arabs, some of which identified with the Palestinian struggle. For example: Repeal of Certain Laws, which emphasize the Zionist dimension of the state—Keren Kayemet Le'Israel 1953, Keren Hayesod 1956, Status of the World Zionist Union and the Jewish Agency 1953 and 1999—a draft presented by Bishara (November 1999); or, a draft basic law relating to full equality for the Arab population (May 2000, a group of nine MKs: five Arab, one Druze and three Jews). It is important to point out that, before the events of October 2000, only a small number of legislative proposals were submitted regarding Islamic issues, in spite of the presence of MKs from the Islamic Movement. No legislative proposals whatsoever were raised regarding the status of the Palestinian population in the territories or the PA.

Clearly, the October riots caused a shock wave for Arabs and Jews alike, creating mutual suspicions among both populations and a gap that may widen and prevent any future civil cooperation. This suspicion is reflected in a substantial change in Arab MKs' legislative attempts following the October events. In view of the fact that the chances of Arab MKs advancing or promoting legislation are usually slim, it was reasonable to assume that post-October attempts would turn into a series of political demonstrations reflecting the frustration and anger of their electorate. This was not the case. The most substantial difference in legislative proposals was the clear and decisive move to topics relevant to the Israeli public at large. Two-thirds of all legislative proposals from October 2000 until May 2002 dealt with general Israeli political and social topics, which of course also represent the interests of Israeli Arabs - but are not of exclusive interest to this population. Within this context, there are, for example, legislative proposals regarding the issue of traffic penalties (Tibi,

May 2001); a draft limiting the tenure of hospital directors and chief nurses (Tibi, July 2001); other drafts along these lines dealing with disability pensions (Bakara, December 2001), payment for participation in municipal bodies meetings (Bakara with two MKs, March 2002); and other general social issues.

With this increased involvement in issues that express Israeli Arabs' connection and belonging to Israeli society, there was a decrease in involvement in social issues characteristic to Israeli Arabs—from about 40 per cent prior to the October riots to about 25 per cent afterwards. Furthermore, Israeli Arab national and religious topics almost disappeared from Arab parliamentary priorities. In spite of the riots and the national Palestinian mood, there were no pro-national Palestinian legislative proposals raised by Israeli Arab MKs. In other words, PA rhetoric did not penetrate into the legislative efforts of Israeli Arab parliamentarians in spite of their alienation *vis-à-vis* the Jewish majority.

The legislative process is by nature long, and it is impossible to reap its rewards in real time. This is not the case with queries, most of which receive a response within a reasonable period, very soon after being raised. Oral queries receive an even quicker response. This format enables a rapid process in practical matters, in the form of an immediate report or accounting, which receives media coverage. This difference expresses the change in the nature of the queries. Prior to the October riots, 92 per cent of the queries dealt with Israeli Arab topics, with a focus on the civil aspect of Israeli Arab identity, such as socio-economic deprivation and topics relating to discrimination. The remainder dealt with issues concerning Palestinians in the PA and the territories. With the outbreak of the current uprising, this division changed: only 80 per cent of the queries (October 2000-May 2002) deal with Israeli Arab civil topics, while 20 per cent focus on Palestinian issues with a strong emphasis on the national Palestinian element and the confrontation with the state of Israel, including even the fate of individuals involved in clashes with Israeli soldiers in the PA. An example is MK Bisharah's query about the Orient House and other offices in East Jerusalem (May 2002), which were closed by order of the domestic security minister; and, at another opportunity, three MKs posed a query into the fate of two Palestinians from the Jenin area involved in clashes with Israel's defence forces (Dahamshe, Mahul, Bisharah—July 2001). Other queries reflect the official PA line—in a very clear manner, leaving no room for misinterpretation. To give an example: in May 2001, MK Baraka submitted a query on the topic of 'dispensing poisoned candies from aircraft flying over the Gaza Strip'.

While these queries take time, oral queries are more spontaneous and their coverage in the electronic media (Israel Channel 33) and the press is more timely. This massive media exposure creates for all MKs in general, and Arab MKs in particular, an audience of Jewish MKs in the Knesset waiting patiently for their turn to question—while the media is looking for short and catchy headlines. In this format, the Arab parliamentarians' target audience widens, including not only their constituents at home but also the entire Israeli public, who need to be convinced about the Palestinian side of the ongoing struggle since Israeli Arabs

are part of Israel's socio-civil fabric. These considerations have a direct influence on how the topics of the oral queries are divided: following the events of October, one-quarter of Arab MKs' oral queries were about general Israeli issues, topics that had never been raised before the riots. The appearance of a new topic was at the expense of Islamic religious matters, which constituted approximately one-quarter of all oral inquires prior to October 2000, and since then have practically vanished.

The last item representing the change in the Arab MKs' outlook regarding parliamentary activity as a connecting link between identification with Israeli citizenship and solidarity with the national Palestinian cause is the issue of Knesset proposals. Success in having a topic transferred to a committee gives it and its subject matter a certain parliamentary legitimization, while removing the subject supports the oftrepeated claim that Jewish MKs all join hands when it comes to their actions concerning the legitimate interests of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens—although these same MKs differ substantially in their opinions on other matters. This phenomenon presents the clearest picture in comparison with other formats available to MKs: 51 per cent of all Knesset proposals focus on a variety of Palestinian issues—including Israeli-PA relations, the deprivation of the residents and the desire among Israeli Arabs to contribute to the political process—now or in the future. One-third of the proposals concerning Israeli Arabs deal with every aspect of life in Israel and only 15 per cent are on general issues affecting all Israeli citizens.

There is no doubt that the events of October 2000 were a watershed, expressed in the parliamentary activity of Arab MKs. Two key issues captured the political centre stage:

1. On the national level—the overall Palestinian issue. For example, in the absence of institutions representing Palestinians in the territories *vis-à-vis* the Israeli authorities, the MKs act as representatives of this community and serve as its mouthpiece in every sense—from comprehensive political issues to individual cases of Palestinian distress in which Israeli did not act appropriately, in their opinion.
2. On the civil level—the overall Israeli issue. For example, the finding and identification of common denominators in the civil sphere so that Jewish Israeli citizens will be convinced through a long but deliberate process that despite the national difference, Israeli Arabs are an inseparable part of the state of Israel.

The focus on both of these issues was at the expense in the Knesset of Israeli Arab topics. The process is represented by direct activity in relation to relevant government offices and the ministers involved in the needs of the Arab sector. This is not all. Judging solely by parliamentary activity, it is clear that the power of radical political Islam in Israel is on the wane since October 2000 so that involvement in religious aspects of the lives of Muslim Arabs in the country as

reflected in the Knesset has become inconsequential if not non-existent. That is, in spite of the participation of members of the Islamic Movement in the activities of the Knesset since 1996, one can assume that within the framework of the struggle to bridge the Jewish-Arab gap, MKs refrain—in every political aspect—from raising issues that have the potential for confrontation with the Jewish majority. The raising of Palestinian national issues, in comparison, is obligatory from a Palestinian point of view—particularly in view of the ongoing dialogue in Israeli society concerning an appropriate permanent solution. Accordingly, radical Islam opinions are very dangerous in that they can create among the Jewish public the wrong impression of identity with Hamas, while the promotion of some sort of solution for confrontation with the Palestinians is certainly within the Israeli consensus.

The political behaviour of the Israeli Arab leadership therefore corresponds to the model of political behaviour that was developed at the end of the 1980s during the first uprising: the political channel and the formulation of pro-Palestinian public opinion, under the responsibility of Israeli Arabs; and the combined diplomatic-violent channel, under the leadership of Arabs from the territories and later on, the PA. Both leaderships see eye to eye on pursuing the same goal: the establishment of an independent Palestinian state through a change in the very nature and character of the state of Israel and a total abrogation of its Jewish Zionist characteristics.

Within this political leadership model, a special place has been reserved in the Israeli democratic system for utilization by the Israeli Arab leadership: the Knesset, the media and public forums. Thus, democracy offers legitimate avenues of public debate—helping to develop in Israel public sympathy for matters related to legitimate claims (such as civil services, which are in need of substantial improvement owing to the size of this population sector) together with radical political claims that parade under the guise of purely humanitarian interests.

The use of these channels began in the wake of the uprising in 1987. Since the early 1990s, they have become part and parcel of Israel's media and political system. In addition, there is the sometimes almost total ideological identification with the Palestinians (in the PA and Lebanon as well). The clear expression of the emotional commitment of Israeli Arabs to the Palestinians can be translated into practical terms by the activities that their immunity allows MKs to undertake. Apart from one recent exception, they enjoy access to every site in Israel and in the territories, free passage and routine meetings with PA leadership.

Offshoots of the change in Israeli Arab representation, aside from panPalestinian representation, which took root at the end of the 1980s, ripened after the October riots. Since then, most Arab MKs in their Knesset proposals, calls to order and queries on Palestinian issues, encourage appeals to the Supreme Court, and dedicate a small, but growing part of their parliamentary activity to questions focused solely on Israeli Arabs. Beyond the feelings of solidarity and identification that have already been mentioned, their particular interest in

political processes since the signing of the declaration of principles in September 1993 will be touched upon. It appears that since then, Israeli Arabs from all levels of society feel that their status will change once there is a solution to the Palestinian problem. This perception is what drives their need to lift the political issue to the highest priority, as opposed to past precedents.

Whatever the status of Israeli Arabs will be once some form of settlement has been reached concerning the Palestinians, the struggle has already begun over the format of the settlement within the state of Israel between Jews and Arabs in political terms and indeed the very character of the Zionist state. Since absolute support of the *intifada* is now regarded among Israeli Arabs as a fact taken for granted, it is vital to build on this fact and to define the relationship with the state of Israel in clear, unambiguous terms. No doubt should remain as to hostility for Zionist values. In this vein, Israeli Arab public opinion spokesmen continue ongoing, scrupulously careful examinations of the limits of free expression. The alleged remarks of MK Bisharah in Damascus regarding the right of organizations fighting in Israel exemplify the attempt to expand the limits of free speech. The absence of a decisively clear reaction on the part of law enforcement authorities in other similar cases is compounded by the absence of a clear policy regarding violence, which encourages—albeit indirectly—the growing trend of aggression among the Israeli Arab sector. However, the legal difficulties in proving such offences leads—at the end of the day—to their being disregarded and at the same time to the expansion of the definition of freedom of expression in directions that are far from the perception shared by the majority of Israel's Jewish citizens. What's more, the fact that the Hebrew and the Arab media are constantly engaged in controversies over these issues obviously does not hurt the cause of MKs making use of freer expression. In fact, this enhances their status as they play on the heartstrings of most Israeli Arabs without in any way risking a legal confrontation or endangering their legitimization among the majority of Jewish Israelis.

THE LEADERSHIP'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A FOREIGN RELATIONS INITIATIVE

Stretching the borders of free expression within Israel takes its place alongside another pattern of activity, indicating the growing attempt to represent Israeli Arabs as a national entity, separate and different, within the country by building an infrastructure of international legitimization in order to grant national minority status to Israeli Arabs. Within the framework of non-parliamentary activities, Arab MKs have been in the past and are currently engaged with this topic, albeit with extreme caution in order not to alienate the Jewish public. During the first half of 1999, former MK Darawshe recommended[8] that Israeli Arabs receive representation that reflects their status in the Arab League— another illustration of the move to separate representation as a separate national minority group. Towards the end of the violence in Israel in October 2000, MK

Bisharah[9] appealed to the UN Secretary-General calling for protection of the national Palestinian minority in Israel.

Since 1987, and during the two uprisings, questions were raised regarding political, national and personal identity connected with Israeli Arabs. At the same time, the leadership totally abandoned the passive characteristics of the past. As part of the Israeli Arab separate identity building process (Palestinians living in Israel, or Arabs of '48'—the term used more and more frequently now) —in recent years there has been a substantial development of a political system that parallels the official Israeli political system. The senior leadership maintains an independent political line, which is un-Israeli in that it vehemently and publicly opposes the Jewish Zionist nature of the state, but is not Palestinian as it does not consider Arafat as the political leader but rather a national figure who does not enjoy the legitimacy necessary to lead Israeli Arabs politically. In fact, the PA is not looked upon as a place for Israeli Arabs to live in, but as a source of inspiration, owing to its political success in persuading the state of Israel to retreat from some of its land. The Israeli Arab leadership's political uniqueness in this aspect is expressed in its internal and external relations—in contacts and connections with the government of Israel, the PA and Arab nations. Through this, an infrastructure is built of broad-based recognition of Israeli Arabs' political differences. This movement is still growing and is gaining momentum with the expanded attempt on the part of Arab political parties to gain legitimacy in the Jewish political realm. The massive abstinence from voting for the prime minister in February 2001 is a display of power that no doubt serves as a foundation for an attempt to achieve political goals after the next Knesset elections.

These processes affect the will to belong and the desire to be separate. These paradoxes exist in parallel: while Israeli Arabs have not yet maximized the potential inherent in Israeli democracy, they will continue to fortify their hold in governmental bodies, will try to be full partners in governmental coalitions, will strive to elect the first Arab minister in the history of Israel, and will deepen their penetration into the decision-making circles of foreign affairs and security. All of these are obvious signs of their connection to the current political structure of the state of Israel. At the same time, long-term waves of violence will be avoided, as they can disrupt the foundation for gaining maximum advantages from the political system. In this sense, the methods of the Israeli Arab leadership are similar to some Islamic movements in the Middle East, which undertake cooperation with the ruling bodies until the achievements of this cooperation can be used to undermine the legitimate government. In the light of these practices, the primary aim of the leadership is to exploit political achievements in order steadily to gnaw away and grind down the very nature and characteristics of the country by causing a change in the formal status of the Arab minority in Israel and granting it status that exceeds its scope as a minority. The secondary aim is to help achieve overall Palestinian objectives, as well as those of the PA and the PLO as the legal, and sole, representative of the Palestinian people.

All of the above defy the interests of the country, in which every Israeli citizen strives solely to achieve the country's interests. Arab Israeli leadership achievements will serve as the foundation of their involvement with their population in the process of seeking a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian issue. This solution will have to take into consideration the growing political influence of Israeli Arabs who see themselves as an inseparable part of the Palestinian people. The events of October 2000 in the Israeli Arab sector were not just some emotional, random outbreak. These events were a milestone, if not a turning point, in a process with clear, and recognized, political aims that began long before the year 2000. The only random aspect was the timing of the wave of violence—which was set off by the *intifada al-Aqsa.* The process of increasing Israeli Arabs' awareness of their still unfulfilled power potential comprises their campaign to change the character of the state of Israel, through a simultaneous use of political and violent means. The vast majority of Israel's political and educational networks are fully convinced that the struggle will be sophisticated, ongoing and aimed at identifying legal loopholes that enable a most problematic struggle in the fight to destroy the very existence of the state of Israel in its present form.

NOTES

1. This article is based on my written testimony for the Or Committee and it represents an improved version of a paper delivered in September 2002 at the First World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies in Mainz, Germany.
2. Cf. Alexander Bligh, 'The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli Arab Leadership', *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol.35, No.1 (Jan. 1999), pp. 134–64.
3. Dr Tibi's activity together with Arafat is known and there is no need to elaborate here. It is relevant, however, to present a characteristic quote of his: There's no doubt that we have a problem with the anthem. How does the Jewish soul of 'Hatikva' relate to Taibe?', *Ma'ariv,* 13 Feb. 1995.
4. Bisharah does not hide his opinions. He grants numerous interviews and writes many articles for the local and international press. See two examples that exemplify his opinions: *Ha'aretz,* 23 April 1999; 'Arab Citizens of Palestine: Little to Celebrate', *Tikkun,* Vol.13, No.4 (1998), pp.14–15, 65.
5. See for example the article under the headline 'The Taste of Vast Discrimination', on the subject of Arab student activities, *Ha'aretz,* 23 April 2000.
6. Adalah represented all Arab figures who appeared before the Or Commission of inquiry. See also Adalah's reaction on Israel's report to a UN committee on economic, social and cultural rights, 2 May 2001: http://www.adalah.org/news2200l.htm#l.
7. All data taken from the official site of the Israeli Knesset: http://www.knesset.gov.il/ index.html.
8. http://arabicnews.com, 1 July 1999.
9. http://www.addameer.org/september2000/pressre leases/monday9october.html#azmi.

Between Nationalism and Liberalism: The Political Thought of Azmi Bisharah

ABIGAIL FRASER and AVI SHABAT

INTRODUCTION

Dr Azmi Bisharah, a Christian Arab, was born and raised in Nazareth. As a professor of philosophy at Bir Zeit University, his academic research focuses on the philosophy and history of political thought. Among others, he has studied and written on such subjects of interest as Islam and democracy, democratic theory and civic society. In March 1996 he founded the Balad party (Democratic National Alliance—al-Tajma—al-Wattani al-Ademocrati), which called for recognition of the Arab minority in Israel as a national and cultural minority and the formation of the Israeli state into a 'nation of all its citizens'. Prior to the 1996 elections Balad joined forces with Hadash and formed a new party, five of whose members were elected for the Knesset, among them Dr Bisharah.

During the 1999 elections Bisharah ran for the office of prime minister, although he declared from the start that his candidacy was to be but a means of achieving certain goals and not a true attempt to win the elections. Those goals included focusing public attention on the needs and problems of the Israeli Arab population, signalling to larger parties that the Arab vote was not to be taken for granted, and the promotion of a national Arab movement.[1] Indeed, Bisharah withdrew from the race—not before making his point, but his party Balad received only two seats in the 15th Knesset, after having run without any additional partners.

Bisharah's works will be reviewed while addressing some of the main topics with which he deals: the Palestinian national problem and its preferred solution according to Bisharah, his views on the status of Israeli Arabs, and his criticism of the Israeli Arab population. Although the above seem clearly defined, a close relationship exists between issues in the empiric sphere, in everyday life as well

as in Bisharah's works. Thus it is possible that there will be some repetition between topics, when various points are relevant to more than one issue.

Bisharah describes himself as a liberal, a humanist, and a neo-Nasserite nationalist all at the same time.[2] One of the main aims of this article is to reveal how the tension between two ideologies, liberalism and nationalism, which are based on opposing principles, exists in the writings of Bisharah and in his political ideas. Another central point to this discussion will be the examination of the changes in Bisharah's thoughts during the years in an attempt to discover whether these changes stem from an inner change in Bisharah's thought or from the significant changes that have occurred in the political map of the region.

In concluding this article we will try to discern whether any problems or inner ambiguities were uncovered during its discourse, or whether the friction between Bisharah's liberal and nationalistic views does not hinder defining his thoughts and viewpoints in a consistent fashion, without any inclinations in one direction or another.

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL PROBLEM

In an article published in 1992, Bisharah challenged the 'stages strategy' as a way of resolving the Palestinian problem. This strategy, which was embraced by the Palestinians themselves, received their wider acclaim during the Gulf War. The first stage was to be the founding of a national authority in 'all the liberated or evacuated areas of the national territory', the second one that of the founding of a state in this territory. At a later point the option of founding a state in Gaza and the West Bank was raised and finally the option of autonomy as a first step towards the founding of a Palestinian state.[3]

Bisharah was opposed to this strategy, not because of his disapproval of the end product, a Palestinian state, but because of his view that as long as the balance of power in the region is asymmetrical in favour of Israel (which does not favour this sort of solution either), forming a Palestinian state would be impossible, as would fulfilment of all the earlier steps that were designed to bring this about.

Bisharah was opposed to the idea of autonomy, which was supported by Israel, and to the American offer of an entity 'more than an autonomy and less than a state'. His opposition was for two reasons. The first was Bisharah's fear that such an agreement would neutralize the nationalistic issue and transform the Palestinian question solely into a question of territory, thus excluding Palestinians from all over the world from the definition of the problem and leaving the Palestinians under Israeli rule as the only population relevant to the problem and

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to its solution. The second reason was that for Palestinians living in the occupied territories, 'autonomy' would mean turning them into a minority within Israel, while transforming Israeli rule into a rule of apartheid.[4] Autonomy cannot replace sovereignty. This is why, in Bisharah's view, the Palestinians must demand equality and not autonomy. If, on the other hand, the Palestinians are regarded as a nation, and not as a national minority within Israel, it is imperative that their right to self-rule be respected. Only when this stage is reached can there be any talk of the stages towards achieving this right, such as autonomy. Bisharah claims that progress in the stages strategy can be made only if the two sides agree on their status. There is no point in these discussions, Bisharah argues, if the Palestinians alone see autonomy as a step towards self-rule since this will turn the temporary situation into a permanent one.[5]

This reasoning led Bisharah (before the Oslo accords) to the conclusion that there can be two solutions to the Palestinian problem: independence as part of a 'two states for two nations' solution or equality between Israelis and Palestinians in the framework of a single democratic and secular or binational state. In any case, argued Bisharah, it was better to choose one solution and stick to it.[6]

Bisharah's opposition to the Oslo accords was consistent, before and after they were signed. He claims that as part of the accords Israel recognized the existence of the PLO but not the Palestinian people's right to self-rule. The process generated in Oslo was not based on equality or on the mutual recognition of its final goals. Thus, claims Bisharah, the purpose of the process was overlooked, and instead of a just peace treaty being signed it became the continuation of the process itself.[7] A situation such as this goes hand in hand with Israel's historic position, which rejects the ideas of retreat from the occupied territories or annexation of them, with the PLO becoming Israel's proxy to solving the *intifada*.[8]

Bisharah claims that this is the whole essence of the autonomy to which he is opposed. It is autonomy for those who are not citizens, and it is a form of continuing Israeli rule. In the framework of such autonomy the Palestinians agree to run their own affairs and accept their status of non-citizens. This in fact means the end of PLO nationalism, which existed in the pre-Oslo period, since after signing the accords the Palestinian problem no longer concerns the Palestinian refugees abroad but only the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[9]

Bisharah's opposition to the Oslo accords also derives from the reality he perceives in everyday life, a reality that will not necessarily lead to a Palestinian state.[10] Bisharah claims that Israel has announced its intentions to duplicate 'the Gaza Strip model in the West Bank. Bisharah defines the Gaza model as bantustanism—an area devoid of sovereignty that is not part of the state of Israel and whose inhabitants have no right to travel into neighbouring countries. Thus Gaza has become a separate entity, yet one that is totally dependent— economically and politically—on Israel. Copying this model on to various regions of the West Bank does not constitute, in Bisharah's view, a basis for statehood. Moreover, it will allow Israel to achieve its historic goal, according to

Bisharah: separation without withdrawal.[11] This is why, in the reality following the Oslo accords, striving for separation—impossible because of the settlements —has turned into a racist slogan. It legitimizes Israel's rule over a conquered nation and the idea that the Palestinians constitute a demographic danger.[12]

Founding a Palestinian state as a solution to the Palestinian problem of self-rule is no longer relevant, in Bisharah's view. A state that is nothing but a collection of bantustans cannot solve the refugee problem and will always exist in the shadow of Israeli military hegemony. The bantustan solution may postpone solving the Palestinian problem, but it cannot be a final solution to a conflict between two nations.[13]

Bisharah is convinced that when it is understood that an independent and democratic Palestinian state cannot be founded in the whole of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank within the next generation or two, the time will have come to examine new alternatives and other directions in the Palestinian national struggle. Because of the problem posed by the settlements, a way to achieve equality between Jews and Arabs must be found, while constantly fighting the impossible separation between Jews and Israeli Arabs as well as Palestinians from the occupied territories.

The solution favoured by Bisharah is a binational state based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and coexistence.[14] A binational state, as opposed to a democratic and secular one, may take two forms: one of a federation or confederation formed of a Jewish political entity and a Palestinian Arab political entity, each with its own legislative body and with a common parliament; the other of two separate democratic entities with close ties on issues such as borders and passports.[15]

It is interesting to note that in 1992 Bisharah spoke of a binational state *or* a democratic and secular state in all the areas of Israel and the occupied territories; while in 1997–98 he stressed that a solution *must* take the form of a binational state.[16] This change may be the result of Bisharah's belief that the state of Israel is gradually becoming less and less secular.[17]

It seems that the shift in Bisharah's position, from one in support of a Palestinian state as a possible solution to the Palestinian problem to one of vehement opposition to the Oslo accords and of classifying a Palestinian state as irrelevant, stems from the changing atmosphere following Oslo and from his opposition to the nature of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians and its possible outcome. Yet a deeper examination of his statements and of other aspects of the subject at hand uncover some problems in Bisharah's thoughts.

One of Bisharah's reasons for opposing the Oslo accords stems from his view that the agreement constitutes a 'Kurdization of the Palestinian national question', meaning it confines the problem to those Palestinians living in the occupied territories, while viewing the Palestinians abroad, as well as the Israeli Arabs, as minorities living in different countries.[18]

In Bisharah's view the Arabs in Israel are an inseparable part of the Palestinian Arab nation. He specifically states that a solution based on the model of 'two countries for two peoples' is not a solution to the problems of the Israeli Arabs. That is why he concludes that the only alternative that may be taken into account by Israeli Arabs is one of a binational state, since this will mean an end to the Arab national minority in Israel.[19]

But is a binational state a real possibility? Avnery believes that it is not. He claims that a binational state in which the Israeli entity holds the advantage in almost all spheres of life will turn the Palestinian minority into a downtrodden class with no power of any kind. Avnery opposes the view that, with time, the Palestinians will for demographic reasons attain some political power. He claims it will have the opposite effect and create a situation similar to the one in South Africa during apartheid. Avnery also notes that the enormous differences between the two peoples who are nationalistic in character will make harmonious coexistence impossible.[20]

Taking Bisharah's world view a step further we encounter another problem. Bisharah does not believe in the existence of a separate Palestinian culture because the Palestinian nation is the outcome of the Sykes-Pico agreement; one must speak of one Arab nation. His hope is that this nation will someday find a way of governing itself under one entity, and he even describes himself as a neo-Nasserite.[21] One cannot but wonder whether the Jewish Israeli nation, whose right to self-rule Bisharah acknowledges, has a place in this scenario.[22]

As well as stating that a binational state is the appropriate answer to the Palestinian problem, Bisharah demands recognition of the Arab minority in Israel as a national minority, as a collective with rights of its own, and as having the right to run its cultural activities independently. Bisharah, it seems, supports a cultural and personal autonomy for Israel's Arabs, based on complete civic equality. An elected council of Israeli Arabs within this autonomy will be in charge of all issues concerning the Palestinian national minority, among them the education system and the Arab media, and the same council will run all development programmes in the Arab sector. Cultural autonomy, says Bisharah, will support the struggle against the conquering entity in an active way, alongside passive solidarity.[23]

It is hard to shake off the feeling that there are some discrepancies in Bisharah's words. If the Israeli Arabs are part of the Palestinian nation and he is opposed to 'Kurdization' of the Palestinian problem, how can Bisharah demand cultural autonomy for Israeli Arabs while reckoning that this will aid the struggle against the occupation? All this followed by his claim that the only solution to the problem of the two nations is a binational state. Surely such a demand further disconnects the issue of Israeli Arabs from the problem of the Palestinians in the occupied territories? Furthermore, a solution such as this totally ignores the large population of Palestinians living abroad.

One possible explanation is that since the article in which this discrepancy occurs was written in 1993, before the nature of the peace negotiations came to

the public's attention, Bisharah hadn't yet fully defined his opposition to the peace process and was willing to accept the possibility of two states. But as the details of the accords and the true features of the process came to light, Bisharah's criticism of them grew, along with his support of a binational state. But this explanation cannot be accepted, since the political agenda of Balad during the 1999 elections included a promise to promote the recognition of the Israeli Arab minority as a national and cultural minority. So even in 1999 Bisharah hadn't set aside the possibility of autonomy for Israeli Arabs.

A second possible explanation that might help us understand, even partially, Bisharah's support of a binational state (support that has grown in the light of what he sees as the failure of the peace process) is to assume that even if a binational state is Bisharah's preferred solution, the small chances of its formation force him to search for alternative solutions, even less preferable ones. In other words, the solution of two states and cultural autonomy based on civic equality for Israeli Arabs is conceived by Bisharah as much more pragmatic and realistic, especially since the additional progress made in the Oslo process.[24] Hints in support of this explanation may be found in some of Bisharah's writings.

Bisharah writes—in a critical tone—that 'the fact that the Palestinians have entered the peace process while accepting all of Israel's preconditions has helped strengthen the position which states: "every nation stands alone". The Arabs in Israel are the weakest link in the process of turning the Palestinian national question into a question of national minorities.'[25] Moreover, Bisharah says that for the Israeli Arabs 'a binational compromise in one country…takes them into account, but a compromise of two states must include them as well: recognizing the fact that they are a national minority in a country which is a nation of all its citizens'.[26] In other words, even though a binational state may be the solution preferred by Bisharah, a compromise that is also acceptable, although not preferred, is one of two states with cultural autonomy for the Arab citizens of Israel.

This explanation is strengthened by Bisharah's pragmatic approach to the peace process that began in Oslo. Even though he shows strong opposition to the nature of the process, Bisharah has admitted on several occasions that this is the reality at hand, which must be accepted and adapted to.[27]

Even if this explanation is true, we must not forget that the solution to the problems of Israel's Arabs through autonomy and the founding of a state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is still not an overall solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, a point that Bisharah does not dwell on. Furthermore, Bisharah does not elaborate (at least not at this stage) on how cultural autonomy may aid and support the struggle against occupation in the territories held by Israel, except for claiming that this will 'clarify the options' on this subject.[28]

MK Bisharah actually stated that this explanation formed the basis of his views during an interview that he gave, when asked to clarify this problem. When asked to comment on the issue of Palestinians living abroad Bisharah said he hoped that should a Palestinian state be founded, it would be able to take in

those refugees who asked to become a part of it. As mentioned earlier, this solution is a compromise that is far from ideal in Bisharah's view.

The third explanation that might enable us to settle the contradiction between Bisharah's views on the Israeli Arabs as an inseparable part of the Palestinian nation and those saying they should be granted cultural autonomy within the framework of 'a state of all its citizens' is one that states that this is a temporary solution that will set in motion the process to bring about a permanent solution in the form of a binational state. Indeed, Bisharah states that a solution in the form of two countries may only be a temporary one.[29]

This explanation, as opposed to the first one given here, negates the contradiction between a binational state and cultural autonomy for Israel's Arabs. It is possible that Bisharah sees autonomy and civic equality for Israeli Arabs as a stage of his preferred solution: a binational state comprising all of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. This explanation also helps us understand why Bisharah writes that a state of autonomy clarifies the options concerning the occupied territories. Although there is a difference between the first and third explanations, they are one and the same: after what Bisharah sees as the failure of the Oslo accords comes his growing support for a binational state (explanation one) as well as his support for cultural autonomy for Israeli Arabs in addition to full civic equality as a stage in the process leading towards a binational state (explanation three). The Palestinian leadership seems to think the same, and it too does not look kindly on Bisharah's attempts to turn Israel into a 'country of all its citizens', for fear of weakening Arafat's demand for a Palestinian state.[30] In other words, Bisharah's demands are seen as an attempt to sabotage the peace process.

To conclude: this section of the article has dealt with Bisharah's views on the Palestinian problem and its possible solutions. Naturally, given the nature of the problem, the solution's basis will affect the Palestinian minority in Israel. If a solution in the form of a binational state is to be reached, Israel's Arabs will become part of the Arabic Palestinian entity in this state. If a solution in the form of two states is reached, Bisharah will demand recognition of the Palestinian minority in Israel as a national minority within the framework of cultural autonomy based on civic equality.

The next part of the article will deal mainly with the Arab Israeli population. We will discuss further the nature of cultural autonomy while addressing the constant friction between nationalism and liberalism in Bisharah's writings on this issue and the third explanation given in this section.

ISRAELI ARABS: NATIONALISM OR LIBERALISM?

In June 1990 Azmi Bisharah explained he was in favour of the principle of personal-national autonomy for Israel's Arabs, and not just cultural autonomy.[31] The difference between the two lies in the existence of an elected representative body.

> The main category for Israeli Arabs is that of foreignness, not even that of alienation…they need to think about their future without sticking to clichés of equality and of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. Equality will be achieved only through the formation of a binational state or a state of all its citizens, where no preference for the Jewish sector exists. But as this is not feasible, Israeli Arabs will have to run their affairs by themselves. The correct model is one of personal autonomy. Israeli Arabs will be elected into the autonomy's council and into the central government.[32]

Yet in 1993 Bisharah wrote that the logical model to use would be that of a cultural and individual autonomy. It would seem that Bisharah has moderated his demands from those for an individual-national autonomy to those for individual and cultural autonomy. Bisharah writes that it is his intention merely to outline option in principle, and that he does not believe in developing theoretical models and in attempts at forcing these models upon reality.[33]

Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem describe two kinds of group autonomy, as opposed to territorial autonomy: political group autonomy and cultural autonomy. The difference between the two lies in the authority held by the autonomy (in cultural autonomy the authority is restricted to cultural issues), and in the existence of separate political institutions (which do not exist in a cultural autonomy).[34] It seems that if Bisharah declares that the autonomy must include an elected council that is authorized to deal in matters of land, it is possible that he is referring to an autonomy that is more than a cultural autonomy, even if he does not state this clearly.

Whether Bisharah means cultural autonomy or cultural autonomy having some political authority, according to Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem's definitions, he stresses that autonomy must be accompanied by civic equality. The equality that must be demanded, claims Bisharah, is equality that is defined in a positive not negative manner (such as lack of discrimination). This type of equality means transforming the state of Israel from a Jewish state into 'a state of all its citizens'.

It would seem, however, that there is in this demand a contradiction in terms. While cultural autonomy is based on the differences between the nations, 'a state of all its citizens' is a liberal idea that focuses on the individual and does not give meaning to the nation. Bisharah himself differentiates between a multinational state and a state of all its citizens, when he claims that Israel is neither one nor the other. Even though he does not, at this point, use these phrases and prefers to speak of consociational democracy and integrative liberal democracy, respectively, it seems that the meaning is the same.

A consociational democracy is a democratic state that, in addition to its role as mediator between individuals, acts as a mediator between national groups having a collectively assembled will and a right to veto. It combines liberal democracy with consent and balance between autonomous national groups with varying

authorities.[35] An integrative liberal democracy 'treats its citizen as a citizen according to the definition of one and nothing more …it defines the nation through the definition of citizenship'.[36]

We see that Bisharah himself speaks of two kinds of state: a state that is comprised of more than one nation in which each nation is regarded as a national minority, and a state of all its citizens. It is clear from his writings that these are not the same. The former accepts the differences between the nations that make up its population and takes its shape according to those differences, while the latter is 'blind' to the nation and does not differentiate between nations.

Bisharah, we must note, does not see any contradiction between these two kinds of democracy. In his view, 'the forming of a liberal democracy in a nation state must, in our times, include recognition of national and cultural groups that are different, and Arab and Jewish democrats have no other model to strive for'.[37]

The Israeli Arabs' struggle for equality cannot, in Bisharah's view, be restricted to the element of citizenship, while the component of nationality 'is thrown over the Green Line'.[38] Without the element of nationality, the demand for equality becomes a question of budget. It may be argued that mere autonomy is not the answer, but if total citizen equality is attained, the need for it ceases to exist.[39] Bisharah does not accept this argument on the grounds that an attempt at attaining total equality of identity between cultural groups is bound to fail.[40]

In the case of the Arabs in Israel, the national issue cannot be separated from the civic one, and vice versa. Preserving the national element in the identity of the Israeli Arabs is related, in Bisharah's view, to forming a state of all its citizens, a civic demand 'in every liberal meaning of the word', where the only criterion for attaining equality is citizenship, not ethnic background.[41]

Autonomy can exist only in a state that is a state of all its citizens. In other words, autonomy itself is not a solution, in the same way that autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied territories is not satisfactory. Autonomy, says Bisharah, cannot replace equality or self-rule. It is part of a solution, as in the case of the occupied territories, a step in the direction of an independent state, as in the case of Israeli Arabs.[42] Bisharah even criticizes Claude Klein's offer of autonomy for Israel's Arabs, since, in his view, the offer was meant to prevent the struggle for equality, not to satisfy it.[43]

This is why Bisharah offers a double solution to the status of the Israeli Arab minority: complete civic equality in addition to cultural autonomy. This seems to enable Bisharah to settle the internal inconsistencies in his thought: liberal beliefs that demand full civic equality for Israel's citizens on the individual level, and nationalistic views that maintain that the Arab minority must be recognized and that the Palestinian memory and national identity must be free to exist—on the collective level.[44]

Yet there is another way to interpret Bisharah's support for cultural autonomy for Israeli Arabs within the framework of a state that is a state of all its citizens, an interpretation already mentioned in the previous section. Bisharah writes that

'while striving to further the ultimate solution (a binational state) the Palestinian aim must focus on strengthening ties between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, and on support of the Israeli Arabs' demand that Israel become a state of all its citizens. Today this is the only real plan and it is closest in nature to the basic principle which forms the basis for the binational state.'[45] In other words, Bisharah sees the autonomy solution, coupled with positive civic equality, as a move designed to further the binational state, which is Bisharah's favoured solution both for the Palestinians of the occupied territories and for Israel's Arab citizens.

This explanation is further strengthened by criticism expressed by Bisharah against Israeli Arabs for not collaborating with the Palestinian authority. In a situation in which the option of forming a Palestinian state ceases to exist, as Bisharah believes will happen, Palestinians and Israeli Arabs will discover once again that they are one people, and it is advisable to form joint institutions as soon as possible.[46]

Bisharah himself denies having any sort of 'stages programme'.[47] In his view it is advisable to discern between his belief that a Palestinian state is not a realistic solution, meaning that a binational state is the solution that must be sought, and his view that since two states exist, autonomy for Israeli Arabs must be attained. This means that Bisharah claims to speak on two levels: the somewhat utopian level (which includes his wish to see a state comprising all the Arab nations) and the more realistic level. In order to understand the friction between the two we must momentarily set aside the main discussion of this article and briefly mention a system of definitions that Bisharah offers his readers in an article entitled: 'Between Nationality and Nation: Thoughts on Nationalism'. In this article Bisharah demonstrates the difference between nationality, nation and nationalism.[48] A nation is a political entity defined as 'all citizens forming the national sovereign framework, or at least those wishing to belong to a sovereign state, i.e. to be a nation'.[49] Nationality, on the other hand, is an ethnic framework, while nationalism is a mood, an ideology striving to unite the parts of the nationality into one nation.[50]

Bisharah claims that 'every attempt to force the nation into a state of nationality alone…is anachronistic and a-historic, and its only outcome will be the forcing of nationalistic ideas on "the masses"'.[51] In other words, Bisharah is vehemently opposed to nationalism. The ideal society is a modern one, a civic society on the inside and a nation on the outside. When a nation is inclusive on the inside, it is a civic society. When it is exclusive on the outside, it is a nation. Only when the inclusive tendency of the civic society is not restricted to a nation is it possible to discern between a nation and a nationality.[52]

A nation can exist in countries comprised of more than one nationality only if the national groups are preserved. The uniting of national groups into one nation is possible, of course, only if it is their wish to attain separate sovereignty. If this condition is met one must distinguish between belonging to the nation and holding of the nationality.[53] In situations such as these, the civic society's power

to turn the chasm between the nation and the nationality into a legitimate public sphere is put to the test. The civic society must be defined solely by the concept of citizenship, and not by the national 'we', since this would constitute a failure to function properly.[54]

If we use this system of definitions to examine Bisharah's writings on Israeli Arabs, we can say that he calls for the recognition of the differences between nation and nationality in Israel, for the abolishment of the *defacto* unity (if not the formal one, since Israeli Arabs enjoy citizen status) between the Israeli nation and the Jewish nationality (and not the other way round, since there are Jews living outside of Israel), and for the recognition of another nationality, that of the Israeli Arabs, within this nation. As long as the Hebrew nation keeps up its Zionist ideology, which continues to insist on the definition of the nation under the question 'who is Jewish?',[55] and as long as it defines equality in a negative manner and the Israeli civic society refrains from fulfilling its normative mission, the separation between nation and nationality will not exist. In a situation such as this the national Arab minority cannot actually form an integral and equal part of this nation.

Yet the question is whether it is even possible to bring the Arab nationality into the framework of the Israeli nation, thereby creating a new Israel based on civic equality where Israeli Arabs stop living on the fringes of Israeli society and become an integral part of it. Bisharah's answer is a resolute 'yes'.[56]

This point constitutes the third possibility concerning the future of Israeli Arabs, which has not been discussed until now: the process of individual integration or 'Israelization' in the collective sphere will be discussed in the next section.

THE ISRAELI ARAB

One of the main characteristics of the Arab citizens of Israel, says Bisharah, is that of the foreigner. This foreignness is doubled, since it originates both in the Arab citizens themselves and in the way the state views them. It stems from the fact that the Arab citizen lives in a country that is Jewish in nature and that clearly defines itself as a country that 'is not the country' of the Israeli Arab.[57] Bisharah claims that sociological models that do not take this strangeness into account when attempting to comprehend the structure and political behaviour of the Israeli Arab population cannot be accurate. Although he accepts Smooha's theory of the double process of 'Israelization-Palestinization', which explains the complexity of the Israeli Arab's identity, Bisharah claims that this theory too ignores the fact that Israel, even if it is the Israeli Arab's state, is not his motherland.[58]

Bisharah does not restrict his criticism of sociological theories and models to their lack of discussion of the Israeli Arab's sense of not belonging. The modernization theory, which examines the discrimination of Arab citizens as stemming from the gulf between the modern society of the Jewish settlers and

that of the 'natives', ignores the fact that the Israeli process of modernization cut short that of the Palestinians, which began before 1948, according to Bisharah. In 1948 the Palestinian nation lost its economic, political and cultural elites, its cities and even its villages, while its agriculture was subdued by Israeli modernization and later swept away by it.[59]

Another theory that is offered as an explanation of the Israeli Arab minority's situation focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict as the starting point for viewing Arabs in Israel as citizens whose loyalty to the state of Israel is questionable. Bisharah attacks this theory and claims it is antiliberal: why is loyalty a precondition for equal rights (and how can it be measured)? How can loyalty be demanded by a state that symbolizes the destruction of Israeli Arabs' identity?

Bisharah views the 'loyalty to the state' discourse as an adoption of the Zionist discourse and criticizes the approach that claims that 'a sort of emotional and personal relationship exists between the state and its citizens, a relationship which goes beyond obeying laws and paying taxes'.[60] The question remains whether Bisharah himself sees the relationship between state and society as one totally devoid of any emotional components. It hardly seems so, since he himself states that Israeli Arabs cannot feel any loyalty to the state of Israel, not because this is not a part of any state-society relationship, but because this particular state is responsible for the destruction of their national identity. In other words, there is a basis for the lack of loyalty and for the existence (possibly) of other emotions. Furthermore, nationalism and national identity are surely deeply rooted in the emotional world. Bisharah even criticizes Israeli Arabs who accept the rules of Zionist discourse. In doing so they hurt not only their own Arab identity, but also their liberalism.[61]

Bisharah goes on to criticize Smooha's 'ethnic democracy' model, which claims that the state is a tool in the hands of the national, ethnic or cultural majority, which is why there can be no talk of a civic nation. Still the model accepts the fact that members of minorities, as individuals, enjoy civic rights and may, theoretically, strive for collective rights as well. Bisharah's criticism of this model takes a number of forms. First, he claims that this model is the most dangerous of all, since it turns reality into a model while discarding the critical aspects of the theory, instead of looking to fulfil the democratic model.[62] Second, Bisharah does not accept the dichotomy of this model, between a multinational state and a liberal democracy. As mentioned earlier, he claims there is no friction between these two types of democracy. The third mistake inherent in the ethnic democracy model, in Bisharah's view, lies in the fact that the model cannot be applied elsewhere, beyond Israeli borders. Finally Bisharah criticizes the model's claim that the unequal attitude of the state may be balanced against individual and collective rights. Criticism of the model states that experience has shown how comprehensive discrimination against national minorities unavoidably leads to explosion, especially when the side discriminated against consists of people who see themselves as the original masters of the land, as opposed to an immigrant minority.[63]

Bisharah does not claim that foreignness is the only explanation for the situation of the Israeli Arabs, and he does not deny that Israeli modernism has influenced this population or that the Zionist 'loyalty' discourse has had a part in forming Israel's attitude towards its Arab citizens. Thus it is hard to avoid the thought that the essence of his disagreement with the aforementioned theories is his opposition to the situation itself, and not simply his disagreement with their content. As was seen, his disagreement with the ethnic democracy theory is based, among other things, on the fact that it perpetuates the existing, unwanted situation. If so, what exactly is the Israeli Arabs' status according to Bisharah?

The element of foreignness, whose roots stem from the fact that the Israeli Arabs live as a national minority in a state that defines itself as 'Jewish', has already been mentioned. To this we must add the fact that the Israeli framework of Israeli Arabs is dual. On the one hand, Israeli Arabs reap the fruits of the process of growth taking place in Israel since 1967; they are affected by the large investments, the improvement in education, the rise of consumption, etc. Yet on the other hand, the gap between them and the Jewish population as well as the discrimination, seen in the distribution of public funds, their placing on the ladder of social preferences and in their lack of collective rights, continues to exist.[64] The process of Israelization, which Bisharah criticizes, takes place within this Israeli framework.

Bisharah claims that the conventional political discourse, the by-product of a hegemonic culture, accepts the model of ethnic democracy, as do Israeli Arabs, thus strengthening the model. Israeli Arabs' acceptance of their status as a national minority within an 'ethnic democracy' is expressed in their lobbying for further rights while agreeing to the 'Jewishness' of the state and the loyalty to it. This acceptance, which seems pragmatic, is a way in which the Israeli Arabs deal with their situation, and this makes it a cultural issue, not a natural one. Bisharah calls this method of coping 'Israelization', meaning 'a process of cultural and psychological preparation for the acceptance of the status of semi-citizen on one hand, and semi-group on the other'.[65]

It seems, therefore, that the Israeli Arab views his own Israelization as something that is more than merely a tool. Bisharah claims that 'in any long social process, the tool changes its wielder, affects him and his culture and is influenced by him'.[66] To this dialectic process we must add a number of concrete processes: a gradual rise in Israeli Arabs' standard of living without the creation of an independent Israeli Arab market; increasing attempts for realization of rights as Israeli citizens; growing understanding of the Israeli Arabs' race for Israelization as political support for the peace process; growing consumption of Israeli media; the opening of new Middle Eastern countries to Israeli Arabs, as opposed to Palestinians from the occupied territories, a situation that leads to the understanding that there are worse things than being an Israeli citizen. This combination has made the Israelization process a formative element for the Arab citizen.[67]

Bisharah even criticizes what he calls de-politization of the Israeli Arabs' problem. This phenomenon is formed by encouraging economic initiatives and professional excellence as options for personal mobility, and it is supported not only by the government but also by the new Arab intelligentsia. This phenomenon also enables the Arabs to be pushed to the fringes of Israeli society and is in effect 'imaginary integration which goes hand in hand with the waiving of collective identity'.[68] The de-politization phenomenon, in addition to the political actions crisis among Israeli Arabs, leads to an identity crisis and to moral crumbling, claims Bisharah.[69]

Therefore, the process of Israelization is not enough to form a whole identity, and collective frameworks are added such as the village clan or the national community, which can be seen to draw feelings of loyalty, pride and emotional ties, which the Israeli identity does not. Furthermore, these do not contradict the Israeli side of the Israeli Arabs' identity, as was the case with the Palestinian national identity.[70] In this phenomenon, one aspect of which is the larger percentage of votes cast for regional councils than for national elections—symbolizing a striving for frameworks other than the national one[71]—lies, in Bisharah's view, the 'tragedy of twisted identity' that does not balance its contradictory elements but subordinates one to the other.[72] Therefore, adopting the Zionist discourse as a basis for demands for equal rights is actually, in Bisharah's view, integration in theory and self-annulment in practice.[73]

Bisharah claims that the perpetuation of the status quo will bring about a situation in which the contradictory elements in Israeli Arabs' identity will cause an explosion within the span of a generation or even earlier. Yet this explosion will not come about because of the friction between the Israeli consciousness and the Palestinian one, but because of the dead end to which the Israeli civic consciousness has come, following the definition of Israel as a Jewish state and the Israeli Arabs' search for collective rights.

At this point it is important to note that Bisharah himself claims that an explosive process of national consciousness will not necessarily take place.[74] Furthermore, the process of Israelization is also not seen as a done deal. Yet Bisharah claims it will not cease by itself and will not be affected by the internal frictions of Israeli Arabs' identity, unless 'they are politically translated into democratic discourse combining the national aspect and the civic aspect… without the growth of a political power that will translate its consciousness into political goals which criticize reality and its fragmented consciousness the contradictions will continue to exist in an Arab Israeli frameworkx'.[75]

Bisharah's firm stand on the issue of the Israelization process may be seen in his work as a politician and in his political career. The Balad party that he heads was formed as a national Arab movement within Israel and as a reaction to the Israelization process, the pushing of Israeli Arabs to the fringes of Israeli society and their ever-growing participation in Zionist parties, all signs of the identity and political crisis within the Israeli Arab society. Balad's aim is to stress the national nature of the Israeli Arabs, not as a religious minority group but as a

national minority, and to strive for a solution to their problems based on this conviction.

In addition to his political actions against the Israelization process, Bisharah calls for structural changes in Israeli Arabs' national leadership. Israeli Arabs today lack national leadership. The Arab leadership is mostly of a local nature: heads of councils, mayors, various prominent local figures and few members of Knesset. Bisharah claims that in order for this leadership to become national or nation-wide in nature, the nation-wide parties must be given a larger part in the superior surveillance council and the status of the forum of heads of Arab regional councils should be lowered.[76]

It is interesting to note that one of the aspects of the Israelization process, in Bisharah's view, is portrayed by Arab parties. In this field, too, the process is dialectic, since the growing effect Israeli Arabs have on politics goes hand in hand with the effect Israeli politics have on them.[77] If so, has Bisharah remained true to himself when deciding to form a party running in the Knesset elections?

If we examine his decision to take part in Israeli political life as part of the dialectic he himself uses, we find certain irregularities. Bisharah chooses his words carefully: 'political Israelization occurs when Arab parties support the coalition from without and when they accept the basic conventions of the political game…in order to create an effective political discourse in Israel, from within the political map of Israel and not from without…the discourse must stem from an Israeli starting point'[78]—as opposed to a Zionist one, for example. Still, as long as Israel is not a state of all its citizens, any participation in its political arena affects the participants and contributes to the Israelization process.

It must be noted that Bisharah's firm stand on the issue of subordination of the Palestinian identity to the Israeli one was not manifest in his earlier writings. In an article written in 1990 Bisharah actually accepts the theory of the double process of 'IsraelizationPalestinization'. In 1993 he notes that this double process has an inherent contradiction.[79] Yet in 1996 he not only speaks of the subordination of the Palestinian identity to the Israeli one, he hardly even mentions the former. It is possible that the lack of serious discourse on the Palestinian Arab aspect in the identity of Israeli Arabs stems from the fact that Bisharah's starting point is that this element is obvious. On the other hand, it may be that Bisharah himself is still wrestling with this issue.

Bisharah, as was mentioned earlier, sees himself as a Palestinian Arab and claims that his status as a Palestinian does not come before his status as an Arab. In addition to this, he does not believe in the existence of a separate and unique Palestinian culture. One of the strongest proofs of this outlook is his admiration for Egypt's late president, Gamal Abed-El Nasser. When Bisharah was asked how it is possible to demand self-rule for the Palestinians, he answered that the Palestinians may be members of the Arab nation in theory, but history has dictated a reality that has formed a group with a separate narrative that must have its national outlet.[80]

Furthermore, it is important to note that in 1990 Bisharah wrote that 'a closely knit relationship of joint existence within the state and with the state was not formed',[81] and optimism could be identified in Bisharah's attitude to the option of strengthening the Palestinian component of the Israeli Arabs' identity. However in 1996 it seems that Bisharah was less optimistic, believing under the existing circumstances the balance was tipped towards the Israelization process, especially because of the 'breakdown of the final illusion of the Arab option that since Gamal Abed-El Nasser promised to constitute an external solution but faded away during the Gulf War; the breakdown of the Palestinian national liberation movement which has been defeated and has accepted the Israeli terms'.[82]

The change in Bisharah's stand on the future of the Palestinian element in the identity of the Israeli Arabs is also seen in the context of the effect of the peace process on this identity. While in 1990 Bisharah stated that it was not clear whether the founding of a Palestinian state would strengthen the Palestinian or the Israeli element in the identity of the Israeli Arabs,[83] he stated in 1996 that there is no doubt that a move such as this would enable the strengthening of the Israelization process since 'in order for the Palestinian Arab, who is a citizen of Israel, to fulfil his Israelity within a broader framework, he must be able to convince himself that the Palestinian question has been settled, or is in the process of being settled'.[84]

It is interesting that having stated his opinion on the effects of the peace process, Bisharah does not take into account the possibility that cultural autonomy coupled with full civic equality could have the same effect. In other words, it is possible that solving the problem of the Israeli Arabs' collective identity within the framework of autonomy will enable the Israelization process to continue with the Israeli Arabs' conscience clear, while resting assured that the collective identity is safe. Furthermore, the question remains whether cultural autonomy is indeed the key to saving Israeli Arabs from existence on the fringes of Israeli society while creating a new Israel, as Bisharah claims.

The 1996 elections were, in Bisharah's view, the turning point in correcting the Israelization process. This change is reflected not only in the number of seats Arab parties received in the Knesset, but also in the new political thought that has emerged, combining the civic and national elements in Israeli Arab identity. Furthermore, Bisharah was sure that the Likud party's rise to power would raise the national consciousness of Israeli Arabs. At the same time he hoped that changing the election system would enable Israeli Arabs to express their Israelity as well as their identity as members of a national minority.[85]

What remains to be done, in Bisharah's view, is to find the balance between Israeli Arabs' existence as members of the Arab nation and their existence as Israeli citizens.[86] This change can be brought about only by transforming Israel into a state of all its citizens and by granting cultural autonomy to Israeli Arabs.

In Bisharah's view, the Israelization process cannot be a political-cultural option. This is so because it would mean the loss of Israeli Arab identity and its existence on the fringes of society in a state that does not condone the existence

of a nation on the basis of civic rights alone. Thus, Israelization or integration on an individual basis does not constitute a third option for solving the problem of the Israeli Arabs as a whole.[87]

CONCLUSIONS

First, we would like to summarize Bisharah's main points of view on the issues with which this article has dealt: the solution to the Palestinian national problem, the status of Israeli Arabs and the Israeli Arabs' persona.

Regarding the Palestinian question, Bisharah is in favour of forming a binational state in all areas of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank, since establishing a Palestinian state is not possible owing to the nature of the Oslo process. Yet since the solution of two separate states is the one that seems to be evolving, Bisharah calls for granting cultural autonomy to Israel's Arab citizens and for transformation of Israel into a nation of all its citizens. The processes of individual integration or Israelization are not real options in his view.

At first glance it would seem that these statements are sufficient, since Bisharah himself would certainly agree with them. These statements would also settle the friction between liberal and nationalistic ideas in Bisharah's writings. Founding a Palestinian state and granting full autonomy to Israel's Arabs within the framework of a nation of all its citizens is a solution that does indeed bridge the differences between these two ideologies. But as already shown, it is hard to leave things at that since it would make it necessary to divide Bisharah's writings into two levels or elements: the utopian one, which includes his striving for founding a binational state and its integration into the larger political framework of an Arab nation, and the pragmatic level, which includes his accepting the Oslo process (without actually being in favour of it), his call for cultural autonomy for Israel's Arabs and for transforming Israel into a nation of all its citizens. The latter actually form the basis for his political work.

To accept this division or coincident existence of two planes of thought is not possible because Bisharah himself offers a practical programme for fulfilling the so-called utopian goals. This programme includes granting autonomy to the Israeli Arab minority and transforming Israel into a state of all its citizens, steps that are meant to promote a binational state.

Bisharah may claim that his words should not be interpreted as a call for the adoption of this stages programme, yet when he criticizes the Israeli Arabs for not having kept alive their ties with the Palestinians on the other side of the Green Line, when he clearly states that the former are an inseparable part of the Arab nation, when he states that cultural autonomy can be a temporary solution at best, it is hard not to do so.

Therefore it seems that tension exists between two aspects in Bisharah's thought: liberalism and nationalism. Yet if we adopt the interpretation, which is in our view unavoidable, according to which a solution in the form of cultural autonomy for Israel's Arabs in addition to civic equality is a step on the way to a

binational state, there is no escaping the conclusion that the liberal idea of civic equality is being used in the service of the Arab Palestinian national ideal.

Still, it is important to note that after reading Bisharah's writings on the subject, it seems that the will to deal with the tension that exists between the two ideological poles—nationalism and liberalism—is real. This tension seems so real that were a binational entity to arise or a Palestinian state to be founded, Bisharah would most certainly stick to his liberal ideals. Yet as long as this is not the case, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the nationalistic element is stronger than the liberal one in Bisharah's thought. This is not to say that Bisharah would set aside his liberal ideals in favour of nationalistic fulfilment, or to claim that Bisharah has some hidden agenda. Yet we believe that the separation Bisharah tries to make, which stems from the very real tension between his liberal and nationalistic views, fails to offer a real solution to the problem of the opposing ideas meant to fulfil the aims of Palestinian nationalism and liberalism in Bisharah's writings.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

NOTES

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2. A.Shavit, 'Azmi the Citizen', *Ha'aretz,* 29 May 1998, p.23 (in Hebrew).
3. A.Bisharah, 'Palestine in the New Order', *Middle East Report,* Vol.22, No.2 (March-April 1992), p.4. Avnery argues that it is Palestinian stubbornness, the 'all or nothing' attitude that is responsible for the Palestinian tragedy. It would be more effective to advance step by step, according to the stages strategy. Furthermore, the balance between the Israelis and the Palestinians, which is still in favour of the former, will not change soon. U. Avnery, 'A Binational State? God Forbid!' *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Vol.28, No.4 (Summer 1999), p.55.
4. According to Bisharah this situation exists (a speech in the Knesset—26 Oct. 1998).
5. Bisharah, 'Palestine in the New Order', p.8.
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7. 'Bridging the Green Line: The PA, Israeli Arabs, and Final Status: An Interview with Azmi Bisharah', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Vol.26, No.3 (Spring 1997), p. 67.
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19. Ibid., p.7.
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30. D.Rubinstein, 'Why Azmi Bisharah Annoys Arafat', *Ha'aretz, 5* April 1999 (in Hebrew).
31. Territorial autonomy is not a viable option because of the geographical decentralization of Israeli Arabs and the existence of 'mixed cities'. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.17.
32. S.Ozacky-Lazar and A.Ghanem, *Autonomy for Arabs in Israel,* Givat Haviva, 1990, p.10 (in Hebrew).
33. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.19.
34. Ozacky-Lazar and Ghanem, *Autonomy for Arabs in Israel,* p.4.
35. Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies of a Split Political Discourse', pp.315–16.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid., p.316.
38. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.16.

39. It should be noted that this argument differs from the one stating that there is an inherent controversy in the double demand for autonomy and positive civil equality, at the same time.
40. Ibid., p.18.
41. Ibid., p.17.
42. Ibid., p.19.
43. Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies of a Split Political Discourse', p.317.
44. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.20.
45. A.Bisharah, '4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not To Declare?' *Journalof Palestine Studies,* Vol.28, No.2 (Winter 1999), p.16. Uri Avnery even claims that Bisharah's opposition to the founding of a Palestinian state (the aforementioned issue) is a by-product of his support for a binational state. Avnery, 'A Binational State? God Forbid!', p.57.
46. 'Bridging the Green Line: the PA, Israeli Arabs, and Final Status', p.79.
47. Interview with Bisharah, Oct. 1999.
48. Bisharah, 'Between Nationality and Nation: Thoughts on Nationalism', p.19.
49. Ibid., p.30.
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71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., p.321.
73. Ibid., p.332.
74. Ibid., p.327.

75. Ibid., p.337.
76. 'Bridging the Green Line: the PA, Israeli Arabs, and Final Status', p.75.
77. Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies of a Split Political Discourse', pp.330–31.
78. Ibid., p.331.
79. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.8.
80. Interview with Bisharah, Oct. 1999.
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82. Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies of a Split Political Discourse', p.326.
83. Bisharah, 'Arab Society in Israel—A Different Viewpoint', p.85.
84. Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies of a Split Political Discourse', p.336.
85. 'Bridging the Green Line: the PA, Israeli Arabs, and Final Status', pp.75, 80.
86. Ibid.
87. Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', p.16.

SOCIAL ISSUES

Fertility Transition in the Middle East: The Case of the Israeli Arabs

ONN WINCKLER

INTRODUCTION: THE ARAB DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

During the twentieth century, similar to other developing countries worldwide, Arab populations have moved through three major demographic stages, in line with the 'demographic transition theory'. The first stage, which lasted until the 1940s, was characterized by high rates of both fertility and mortality, leading to low natural increase rates of less than two per cent.[1] However, during the 1950s, the second stage began, characterized by a rise in the natural increase rates resulting from a steady decline in the crude death rates. This drop in the crude death rate was due to both increasing life expectancy and sharp reductions in infant and child mortality rates. By the mid-1980s, the crude death rate was less than 10 per 1,000 for most Arab countries, except for Yemen and Sudan, as compared with 25–30 per 1,000 during the early 1950s. At the same time, fertility levels continued to be very high, amounting to crude birth rates of more than 40 per 1,000, and in some countries, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia, even close to 50 per 1,000, while the total fertility rates varied between five and seven births per woman.[2] Thus, during the 1980s, the natural increase rate in the Arab countries skyrocketed to approximately three per cent, and in some countries, mainly those of the rich oil-exporting Persian/Arabian Gulf, even reached four per cent (see Table 6).

However, during the latter part of the 1980s and more so in the 1990s, the third stage began to appear throughout almost all of the Arab countries. This stage was characterized by a steady decline in fertility levels, leading to an overall reduction in the natural increase rates. In Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, the natural increase rate dropped to two per cent during the second half of the 1990s, as a result of the continuing decline in fertility rates.[3] In all of the other Arab countries, except for Yemen, fertility levels have considerably declined during the past decade, albeit less than in Egypt and Tunisia (see Table 6).[4] This transition from one pattern of low natural increase rates due to high values of both crude birth and death rates, to another pattern of lower natural increase

rates, but in much lower values, is the outcome of 'modernization'.[5] It must be noted, however, that despite the significant decline in fertility levels throughout almost all Arab countries during the past decade, none of these countries, except Tunisia, is even close to the Western modern trend of 'below replacement-level fertility'.[6]

The aim of this article is to examine the changing fertility trends among the Israeli Arab population. While a considerable number of articles and books on the demographic developments among the Israeli Arab population are available, these are written, in most cases, within the context of the Arab-Jewish comparison and the overall Israeli demographic trends (mainly by Roberto Bachi, Calvin Goldscheider, Dov Friedlander and Uziel Schmelz). This study, on the contrary, concentrates on the examination of Israeli Arab fertility trends within the context of the changing overall fertility patterns among Arab societies during the past two generations.

RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF THE ISRAELI ARAB POPULATION

Among the Israeli Arabs, the largest group consists of Muslims, almost all of whom are Sunnis except for a small number of Shi'is in the north of the country and Ahmadis in Kababir near Haifa.[7] According to the latest available figures, the Muslims numbered 970,000 by the end of 2000, and they constituted 81.8 per cent of the total Israeli Arab population. The second largest group among the Israeli Arabs is comprised of Christians, including mainly the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics. By the end of 2000, their number was 114,400, constituting 9.4 per cent of the Israeli Arabs.[8] The third group is that of the Druzes, who numbered 103,800 by the end of 2000, representing 8.8 per cent of the Israeli Arabs. The term 'Druzes and others' is sometimes used in official Israeli publications. The term 'others' includes mainly the Bahais and the Sameritans, as well as those whose religion is unknown.

POPULATION GROWTH OF THE ISRAELI ARABS

One of the most prominent demographic characteristics of the Palestinians since the late Ottoman period is rapid population growth: from approximately 350,000 at the beginning of the 1870s to 1.294 million in 1947, amounting to an increase of almost fourfold. This growth rate, in comparison to those of other Arab societies, was unique. Although there was a substantial immigration of Arabs to Palestine at that time, the major factor contributing to the rapid growth of the Arab population in Palestine during the late Ottoman period and under the

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British Mandate was the high natural increase rates.[9] During the 1948 war, a large-scale exodus of Arabs took place from the areas that later became the state of Israel. While no official statistics of this exodus are available, according to the various estimates, between 630,000 and 670,000 Arabs were uprooted from their place of residence and became refugees during the 1948 war.[10]

According to the first Israeli population census, conducted in November 1948, the total Arab population in Israel numbered 156,000.[11] By the end of 1949, following the signing of the armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan, which included the absorption of some additional areas with Arab populations to Israel (mainly The Little Triangle'),[12] the total Arab population in Israel numbered 160,000,[13] constituting 13.6 per cent of the total Israeli population. During the 1950s and until the June 1967 war, the Israeli Arab population increased rapidly, owing to very high natural increase rates, amounting to more than four per cent annually. However, their percentage of the total Israeli population sharply declined to only 11.8 per cent, owing to the massive immigration of Jews to Israel (see Tables 1 and 2).

Following the June 1967 war, 75,000 Arabs were added to the Arab population of Israel, including 68,600 in East Jerusalem and 6,400 in the Golan Heights.[14] By the end of 1967, the total Israeli Arab population numbered 392, 700, constituting 14.1 per cent of the total Israeli population. During the 1970s and 1980s, the percentage of the Israeli Arabs within the total population continued to rise considerably, owing to their much higher natural increase rates than the Jews, on the one hand, and a sharp decline in the immigration of Jews, on the other (see Tables 2 and 3). By the end of 1988, the Israeli Arabs numbered 817, 800, representing 18.3 per cent of Israel's total population (see Table 1).

In 1989, a massive immigration of Jews to Israel from the republics of the former Soviet Union and later from Ethiopia began. In contrast to the years 1983–89, when the net migration balance among the Jews was 27,700, this number increased to 709,700 during the period 1990–2000. During these years, the net increase (including the natural increase) of the Jews in Israel was 1.266 million (see Table 2). By the end of 2000, nonJews constituted 22.2 per cent of Israel's total citizenry (see Table 1). Overall, during the period 1948–2000, while the Israeli-Jewish population increased by 591 per cent, the Israeli Arab population increased by 660 per cent (see Table 1).

THE ISRAELI ARAB FERTILITY TRENDS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Arab population of Israel has been through tremendous demographic changes. Within a relatively short period of time, this society has achieved some sociodemographic characteristics of a developed society, particularly those of infant and child mortality rates and life expectancy. During the Mandatory period, fertility levels of the Palestinians were very high, as in other Arab societies. However, already

during the Mandatory period, there were considerable fertility gaps between the various Arab populations in Palestine, namely, much lower fertility rates among the Christians than among the Muslims and the Druzes. By 1945, while the crude birth rate of Muslims in Palestine was 53.2 per 1,000, it was only 32.7 among the Christians.[15] This dichotomy greatly accelerated following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

Since 1948, the fertility history of the Israeli Arabs can be traced through three major stages. The first stage, lasting until the late 1960s, was characterized by increasing fertility levels among both the Muslims and the Druzes, while the trend of declining fertility among the Christians, which had started during the Mandatory period, continued. During the years 1955–59, the highest crude birth rates in Israel were measured among the Druzes at 48.0 per 1,000, followed by the Muslims at 46.3, and 34.4 among the Christians.[16] During the 1960s, the crude birth and total fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs were even higher than those of the 1950s. During the years 1960–64, the average crude birth rate among the Muslims was 51.5 per 1,000, and was slightly lower among the Druzes at 46. 7 per 1,000. As in the previous decades, the lowest crude birth rate at that time was found among the Christians, at 34.9 (see Table 3).

The fertility rates of the Muslims and the Druzes during the 1950s and 1960s, it must be noted, constituted one of the highest rates not only in comparison with other Arab societies, but worldwide as well. In Jordan, by comparison, according to the 1961 census, the crude birth rate was 47.5 per 1,000 and the total fertility rate was 6.8 births per woman. In Syria and Egypt, in 1960, the crude birth rates were 47.9 and 42.9, respectively (see Table 6). Also in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the crude birth rates were considerably lower than among the Israeli Arabs, amounting to 43.9 and 42.0, respectively, in 1968.[17]

In considering the reasons accounting for the increasing fertility levels among the Israeli Arabs during the 1950s and 1960s, it seems that there were four main factors contributing to this trend:

1. The improvement in the standard of living, including increased life expectancy, caused a substantial increase in the probability of pregnancy and an extension of the reproductive period. Thus, the immediate result was higher fertility rates. Overall, the phenomenon of rising fertility levels in the pre-decline period (see below) is not unique to the Israeli Arab society alone, but also prevailed in other developing countries as well, such as in Latin America during the 1960s.[18]

2. Although a rapid expansion of the labour force in the Arab villages, as an outcome of the high natural increase rates, took place in parallel to the introduction of advanced agricultural technology, causing a decline in labour demands, this situation did not create an increase in employment pressures. The potential imbalance was offset by the growing work opportunities in the Jewish urban industrial and service sectors.

3. The Israeli pro-natalist policy, particularly the payments of Hamosad Lebituh Leumi (the Institution for Social Security), reduced the economic burden of having a large number of children (see below).

4. The low educational level of women is known to be significantly associated with higher fertility rates worldwide. It was only in 1949 that the Israeli government enforced the Compulsory Israeli Educational Law, covering pupils aged 5–14.[19] Thus, it is not surprising that during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the vast majority of Israeli Arab women, particularly in the villages, who were married and in their reproductive years, remained illiterate.[20] Most of these women were of educational age during the Mandatory period, at a time when most of the Muslim villages were lacking schools. In 1935, for example, only 20 per cent of the Muslim children were attending school, as compared to 78 per cent among the Christians.[21]

In the early 1970s, the second stage began, characterized by considerable fertility decline among both the Muslims and the Druzes, with the decline among the latter being much sharper. During the period 1970–74, the crude birth rate was measured at 49.5 per 1,000 among the Muslims and 42.7 among the Druzes. Among the Jews and the Christians, by comparison, the crude birth rates were 24. 3 and 26.9, respectively. During the second half of the 1970s, the trend of fertility reduction continued, and during the years 1975–79, the crude birth rates among the Muslims and the Druzes were 44.5 and 41.8, respectively (see Table 3). The trend of fertility reduction was strengthened to a large extent during the 1980s. During the years 1985–89, the crude birth rate among the Muslims was measured at 34.9 per 1,000 and 30.8 per 1,000 among the Druzes. Although fertility rates among the Christians were also relatively low in the 1960s and 1970s, they further declined in the 1980s, reaching a total fertility rate of only 2.5 births per woman on average during the years 1985–89, even lower than that of the Jews (see Table 4).

In other Arab societies during the 1980s, particularly in the latter half of the decade, one can find a similar trend of decreasing fertility rates. According to the *1990 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey,* the total fertility rate in Jordan was measured at 5.6 births per woman, down from 6.6 in 1983.[22] Also in Egypt during the second half of the 1980s, fertility rates substantially declined, reaching a crude birth rate of 32.5 per 1,000 in 1990,[23] as compared with 37.5 per 1,000 in 1980 (see Table 6).

What were the factors accounting for the sharp reduction in fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs, particularly among the Muslims and the Druzes, and why did this decline occur precisely during the 1980s? This question is even more striking when one considers that, in contrast to Jordan, Egypt and Syria, during the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the Israeli government continued to enhance its pro-natalist measures (see below). It seems that four main factors can be offered to account for the sharp reduction in fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.

1. Prolonged Reduction of Mortality Rates

This occurred particularly among infants and children.[24] Among the major factors accounting for high fertility rates in pre-industrialized societies were high mortality rates of infants and children, as well as relatively low life expectancy.[25] Under Ottoman rule, there were no organized public health services in Palestine. Such services began only under the British Mandate with the establishment of the Health Department, which concentrated in the initial years on the urgent task of controlling epidemics and infectious diseases. Later, the department expanded its activities to general health services.[26] This led to a steady decline in the crude death rates and an increase in life expectancy.[27]

Following the establishment of the state of Israel, the government took direct responsibility for health services, including the extended network of hospitals and public health clinics. This led to a further reduction in mortality rates (see Table 3). Overall, during the 1950s and 1960s, the Israeli Arabs reached the lowest crude death rates in the entire Middle East and North Africa region. In Egypt, Syria and Jordan, by comparison, the crude death rates in 1960 were 16.9, 17.7, and 19.9 per 1,000, respectively (see Table 6). The combination of a young age pyramid, resulting from prolonged high natural increase rates, advancements in Israeli public health services, sharp improvements in the standard of living, and marked increases in the educational level, particularly among women, led to continuing reductions in the mortality rates among Israeli Arabs. By 2000, the crude death rate was measured at 2.8 per 1,000 among the Muslims and 2.9 among the Druzes. This rate was higher, at 4.5, among the Christians, owing to an older age pyramid resulting from prolonged lower fertility rates (see Table 3). Naturally, and in line with the demographic transition theory, following a prolonged reduction in mortality rates, particularly among infants and children, fertility rates also decline as families reach the 'desired' number of children earlier and their confidence regarding the survival chances of their children to adulthood increases correspondingly.

2. The Establishment of the Israeli Social Security System

Given a low per capita income, which prevents substantial saving for old age, combined with the absence of a pension system, having a large number of children is one of the most fundamental requirements for the parents' survival in old age ('insurance births') in developing societies. However, the existence of a national social security system, in parallel with a pension system for a large segment of the Israeli labour force, eliminates the necessity of having a large number of children to ensure the parents' financial security in old age.

3. The Transition from Agriculture to Industry and Services as the Major Source of Income

In 1920, with the beginning of the British Mandatory rule, Palestine was predominantly an agricultural economy, with approximately 75 per cent of the Arabs living in rural areas.[28] In spite of the tremendous changes occurring in the

economy during the Mandatory period, as well as during the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, the main source of living of the Israeli Arabs remained agriculture.[29] Since the 1960s, however, the occupational characteristics of the Israeli Arabs have rapidly changed, and by 1972, only 28.0 per cent of the Israeli Arabs still found their livelihood in agriculture. This percentage further declined to as low as 5.5 per cent by 2000.[30] In traditional societies where agriculture constitutes the main source of living, a large number of children is necessary for meeting labour requirements from the time of early childhood. In industry and advanced services, however, children lose their economic advantage and become an increasing economic burden, in line with the rising standard of living.[31] It must be noted, however, that the changing employment pattern among the Israeli Arabs did not bring about parallel changes in their place of residence, namely, migration from rural areas to the larger cities, as it has in most other Arab societies.[32]

4. The Sharp Improvement in Women's Educational Level

All the demographic surveys and population censuses conducted in Arab countries, as well as in other developing countries worldwide, with almost no exception, point to the significant differences in fertility levels between educated and non-educated women. Generally, the higher the women's educational level, the lower the fertility rates. Thus, for example, the results of the *1997 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey* indicated that the mean number of children ever born to Jordanian women in the age group 40-49 with no formal education was 8.1, as compared with 6.4 children for women with a secondary education and 4.2 for women with higher education.[33] Likewise, the 1993 *Syrian Maternal and Child HealthSurvey* reported the total fertility rate among women without any schooling as 5.3 births per woman, whereas the rate among those with secondary and higher education was only 2.6.[34] The results of the 2000 *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey* indicated that while the total fertility rate for the period 1997–2000 among Egyptian women without any formal education was 4.1 births per woman, it sharply declined to 3.2 among women educated to secondary level and above.[35]

The same trend can also be found in the Israeli Arab society. According to the 1983 census results, while the total fertility rate among Muslim women without any formal education was measured at 7.0 births per woman, this number sharply declined to 3.4 among those with 13 years of education and more. Overall, according to the 1983 census data, whereas the mean number of children ever born to non-Jewish women, married 25–29 years, with 0–4 years of schooling, was 7.85, this number dropped to only 2.70 for those with 16 years of schooling and more.[36]

The establishment of the Compulsory Education Law brought about a rapid improvement in the educational level of the Israeli Arab population, including that of women. In 1954, among the Israeli non-Jewish women (14 years and

above), 79 per cent had not attended school at all, while only 0.2 per cent had higher education.[37] Whereas the percentage of the total Israeli Arab population (including both males and females) not attending school at all was almost 50 per cent in 1961, it dropped to less than 7 per cent in 1998. Among the Israeli Arab women in the age group 18–24, almost 70 per cent had more than 10 years of schooling by 1998, as compared with only 14 per cent for those in the age group of 65 and over (see Table 5).[38] According to the 1983 census results, only 8 per cent of the Israeli Arab women who were married during the years 1964–68 had 9 years of schooling or more. However, this percentage increased to 31 per cent among those who were married during the years 1974–78 and reached 45 per cent among those who were married during the period 1979–83.[39] Thus, it is clear to see that fertility levels declined as a result of the sharp improvement in the educational level of the Israeli Arab women.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors accounting for fertility reduction among the Israeli Arabs during the 1970s and the early 1980s, other factors, albeit less decisive ones, also contributed to this trend. These factors include closer connections with the Jewish population, who have relatively much lower fertility levels,[40] as well as changes in living patterns, namely, from extended family to nuclear family. In the nonagricultural nuclear family, unlike the agricultural extended family, having a large number of children not only loses its economic advantage but also is no longer effective in strengthening the position of the mother within the family.[41] In addition, the transformation from living within the framework of the extended family to a separate nuclear family pattern is very expensive. Thus, the desire for a higher standard of living, combined with the loss of the economic role of the children, lowers the parents' incentives to have a large number of children, despite the pro-natalist measures implemented by the Israeli government.

The mid-1980s marked the third stage in the demographic history of the Israeli Arabs, characterized by an increasing dichotomy in fertility patterns between the Muslims, among whom the fertility level remained stable, and the Christians and the Druzes, among whom the trend of fertility decline continued. By 2000, the crude birth rate of the Christians was 21.2 per 1,000 and 26.4 among the Druzes, while the total fertility rate was 2.6 children per woman among the former and 3.1 among the latter. In contrast, the crude birth rate of the Muslims was 37.5 per 1,000, and the total fertility rate was 4.7—similar to the rates in the mid-1980s (see Tables 3 and 4).

It seems that three factors are responsible for the continuing high fertility rates among the Israeli-Muslims. First is the increasing fertility rate among the Bedouin in the Negev. For example, the average total fertility rate in Rahat during the period 1993–97 was 7.2,[42] increasing from 6.7 on average during the period 1990–93.[43] This represents the highest rate in any Arab society apart from the Gaza Strip.[44] Overall, according to the 1995 census, 13.0 per cent of the households in the seven recognized Bedouin localities in the Negev consisted of more than 10 persons, as compared to an average rate of 4.5 per cent among the

total Muslims in Israel. Thus, it is not surprising that in 1995 the natural increase rate in Rahat was tremendous, at 4.5 per cent.[45]

The second factor is the increasing fertility rate among the Arab population in East (Arab) Jerusalem, of whom 90 per cent are Muslims.[46] From the early 1970s until the onset of the first Palestinian *intifada* in December 1987, there was a steady fertility decline among the Arabs of East Jerusalem. Whereas in 1972 the crude birth rate among the Arabs of East Jerusalem was 50.4 per 1,000, this rate declined to 29.8 in 1988— much lower than the average crude birth rate of the Israeli-Muslims at that time.[47] Since then, however, the crude birth rate of the East Jerusalem Arabs started to increase again, reaching 37.6 per 1,000 in 1999—similar to the overall average crude birth rate of the total Israeli-Muslims.[48]

The third factor is that in many major Muslim localities, the fertility levels have not declined, and in some have even somewhat increased, since the mid-1980s, while in the others the fertility decline has been only minor. For example, in Umm al-Fahm, the largest Arab city in Israel, where almost 100 per cent of the residents are Muslims, the crude birth rate increased from 29.9 per 1, 000 in 1987 to 39.0 in 1997. In Baqa al-Gharbiyye, the crude birth rate increased from 30.0 to 34.1 during the corresponding period. These are only two examples, but the same trend can be found in other places, such as Tayibe and Tamra. In Judeide-Makr, Sahnin and Tayibe, however, fertility levels have somewhat declined.[49]

In contrast to the Israeli-Muslims, a reduction in fertility levels has prevailed since the mid-1980s in almost all of the Arab countries, with the exception of Yemen and Sudan—the two poorest Arab countries. In Egypt, the crude birth and total fertility rates decreased from 37.5 per 1,000 and 5.2 births per woman, respectively, in 1980 to 25.4 and 3.4, respectively, in 1998. Even in the Gulf oil-exporting countries, which have adopted explicitly pro-natalist policies, the crude birth and total fertility rates have sharply reduced during the past decade and a half. In Bahrain, for example, these rates dropped from 45.0 per 1,000 and 5.9 children per woman, respectively, in 1975 to 25.2 and 3.4, respectively, in 1998 (see Table 6).

The timing of the fertility reduction during the 1980s, particularly in the latter half of the decade, or in the early 1990s in the case of other Arab countries, such as Syria and the Gulf oil-exporting countries, was not accidental. Rather, it was expressly connected to the political changes occurring in most of the Arab countries during the 1950s and 1960s. The ascendancy of young army officers in Egypt, Syria and Iraq during these two decades brought about massive changes, not only in the political arena but also in the realm of socio-economic policy. These changes were most evident in the public provision of social services, particularly healthcare and education, and most notably higher education, which was offered free of charge to the entire population. The education of women received high priority and was seen as a highly desirable objective for the social development of these socialist regimes. In the Gulf oil-exporting countries as well, the increasing oil revenues of the 1960s and more so during the 1970s,

following the October 1973 'oil boom', enabled the Gulf governments to provide comprehensive social services free of charge to their citizenry. The results of these changes were a sharp reduction in infant and child mortality rates in parallel to a considerable increase in life expectancy, as well as a marked improvement in the educational level of the entire population, particularly women. For example, by the academic year of 1997/98, there were 1,030,930 students in the various Egyptian universities and other academic institutions, as compared to 33,000 in 1950.[50] In almost the entire range of other Arab countries, one can find a similar trend.

Two other major factors have contributed to fertility decline in the Arab countries since the mid-1980s. First is the adoption of family planning policies, either official or unofficial. Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco had already adopted national family planning policies in the mid-1960s. Since the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, owing to the advancing socioeconomic devastation, resulting first and foremost from the rapid population growth, family planning measures were also adopted by other countries, such as Syria, Jordan and Yemen. The second factor was the changing economic policy in many Arab countries during the past decade and a half, including reductions in the subsidies for basic foodstuffs, healthcare and education, which increased the cost of raising children. Thus, the combination of family planning measures and reduced subsidies, together with lowered infant and child mortality rates, substantial improvements in women's educational level, an increase in women's labour force participation rates,[51] and a steady rise in the percentage of the urban population, brought about the sharp reduction in fertility rates throughout almost all of the Arab countries.

Thus, the fertility decline in most of the Arab countries occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s as a result of two combined factors. First, the generation benefiting from the universal services during the 1960s and early 1970s entered into the reproductive cycle during the 1980s and early 1990s. Second, family planning efforts in many Arab countries were greatly enhanced during that period. Even in the countries that adopted explicitly pro-natalist policies, fertility rates declined, albeit slowly, during the 1990s[52] as a result of the socio-economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s, especially following the October 1973 oil boom. Naturally, the pace of fertility decline was highly correlated with the level of socio-economic change as well as the extent of family planning effort in each country.

Among the Israeli Arabs, the process of fertility decline started a decade and a half earlier than in most of the other Arab societies, in parallel with the beginning of the major socio-economic changes responsible for fertility decline, mainly the sharp reduction in infant and child mortality rates and the sharp improvement in women's educational level. However, whereas in almost all of the Arab countries the process of fertility decline continued, and even accelerated, during the 1990s, an increase in fertility levels took place among many of the Israeli-Muslim communities. This process, it seems, is strongly connected to the Israeli pro-

natalist policy and structure, as well as the poor socio-economic condition of the Israeli-Muslims.

THE ISRAELI PRO-NATALIST POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE ISRAELI ARAB FERTILITY TRENDS

Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been an explicitly pro-natalist state. In the first stage, this policy entailed a unique award of 100 LS (Israeli Pound) for each woman bearing her tenth child. In September 1959, this was replaced by a monthly allowance from the fourth child and above until the age of 14. In 1965, the law was expanded to provide allowances until the age of 18. In April 1970, the allowances were also granted for the third child of salaried workers, and in October 1972 to the self-employed as well. Since July 1975, following the adoption of the tax reform, children's allowances are paid for each Israeli child directly from the Institution for Social Security until the age of 18.

However, during the period 1970–96, the law gave higher allowances to families in which 'one of them served in the army'. The aim was to give higher allowances to Jewish families. During the period of the second Rabin government, the extra child allowances for veterans were abolished, and since January 1997, children's allowances are equal for all Israeli citizens regardless of army service.[53] In addition, large families are entitled to discounts in municipal taxes, as well as other financial benefits, such as higher subsidized mortgages and assistance in rent payments. Each of these benefits is dependent upon the number of children.[54]

In November 2000, the Knesset passed the 'law for assistance for blessing families'. The law was initiated by MK Samuel Halpert, from the ultra-Orthodox Jewish party, Yahadut haTora. The law was passed in the Knesset through the support of Yahadut haTora, Shas, haMafdal, 'AmEhad, Hadash, the Likud and the Arab parties, including Arab MKs from other (Jewish) parties.[55] According to the new law, the children's allowances will substantially increase from the fifth child and above.[56] In addition, the new law includes a substantial reduction in municipal taxes, a sharp increase in birth allowances from the fifth child and above, and other benefits as in the previous law.[57] The new law did not increase the allowances for the first four children.

Two main factors can account for the initiation of the Israeli pronatalist policy. The first factor is the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs, considered as one of the most decisive factors determining the outcome of the Jewish-Arab struggle, initially in Palestine and later in Israel. Thus, since the 1920s the Zionist leadership encouraged rapid Jewish population growth in Palestine through both immigration and higher fertility rates. As noted by Jacqueline Portugese, 'the first and most influential force that has contributed to the formation of fertility policy in Israel is Zionism… In order to accomplish their goal, the leaders of the Zionist movement realized that the number one

priority was to populate the land with as many Jews as possible.'[58] At the beginning of the 1970s, Dov Friedlander wrote as follows:

> For decades one of the more important aspects of Zionist ideology has been to maximize population growth, and this was pursued by activities of the Jewish internal authorities before the foundation of the State, and by the State of Israel after its establishment.[59]

Since the early 1940s, David Ben-Gurion regarded the 'demographic issue' as one of the 'highest importance', and on many occasions called upon the Jewish people in Palestine to fulfil their 'demographic duty'.[60] Although there was a massive immigration of Jews to Israel following the establishment of the state and throughout the 1950s, the pace of immigration slowed considerably during the 1960s.[61] In contrast, the fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs during that time were extremely high—almost three times that of the Jews. This imbalance, combined with the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict and the high labour demands of the IDF (Israel Defence Forces) and the other security establishments, made higher fertility rates the only option for achieving significant Jewish population growth in Israel.[62]

The June 1967 war was a turning point not only from a political point of view, but also from a demographic point of view. In addition to absorbing 75,000 Arabs into the Israeli population, Israel started to take direct control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With an additional population of 985,600 (595,900 in the West Bank and 389,700 in the Gaza Strip, according to the September 1967 census),[63] the context of the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs was now extended to include these additional areas. This new demographic situation strengthened the 'demographic panic' among both the rightist and the leftist Israeli political parties, particularly during the 1980s, when there was no massive immigration of Jews to Israel[64] and the fertility rates of the Arabs were still much higher than those of the Jews.[65]

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, owing to the massive immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel, the 'demographic panic' has diminished to a large extent. However, the concept that the rapid growth of the Jews in Israel serves the basic Zionist aim has not been entirely rejected. Thus, for example, when Yossi Beilin expressed his opposition to the 'law for assistance for blessing families' while serving as the minister of justice, he was attacked by many senior Israeli politicians, not only from the ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties, who accused him of acting against 'the demographic strength of the Jewish people'.[66] Following the 'October 2000 events', the Jewish-Arab demographic balance has once again emerged as a critical issue, at least according to some Jewish scholars and politicians.[67] Overall, the concept of a rapid increase in the Jewish population in Israel serving the Zionist aim is still a prevailing one among many senior Israeli politicians, as well as among some

parts of the public.[68] It is held that this rapid increase should be achieved through both pro-natalist policies and promotion of the immigration of Jews to Israel.

The second factor for the Israeli pro-natalist policy is the shrinking in the number of Jews in the world. The steady decline in the number of Jews in the world during the past two generations has been caused not only by the Holocaust, but also by prolonged low fertility rates and high rates of mixed marriage and assimilation among the Jews abroad, particularly in Western countries.[69]

Although many suggestions have been made as to how Israel should maintain a Jewish majority,[70] the Israeli authorities have never attempted to implement direct or explicit measures in order to reduce fertility levels among the Israeli Arabs. Such policies would clearly be in violation of the Israeli democratic political system. Thus far, the only active measure adopted by the Israeli authorities to maintain a Jewish majority in the state has been through the 'Law of Return'.

It is critical in this regard to consider the influence of the pro-natalist measures on the Israeli Arab long-term fertility rates. In the late 1970s, Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider predicted that: 'fertility among the Arab population in Israel is likely to decline rapidly in the future'.[71] This prediction became real among the Christians and the Druzes, but not among the Muslims, and the main question to explore is the reason for such a phenomenon.

In retrospect, it seems that the pro-natalist measures constituted a major role in maintaining the high fertility levels among large segments of the Israeli-Muslim population, particularly during the past decade. Since the tax reform of 1975, the children's allowances increased rapidly in real terms. In 2000 prices, the children's allowance for the fifth child was 845 shekels ($200) in June 2001, as compared with 296 shekels in 1980 and only 69 shekels in 1965. For the sixth child, the children's allowance increased from 81 shekels in 1965 to 844 shekels in June 2001. As a percentage of the average salary of salaried workers, the monthly children's allowance for six children increased from 8.1 per cent in 1960 to 18.2 per cent in 1970 and reached as high as 43.4 per cent in June 2001. In June 2001, the monthly children's allowance for seven children was $930, much above the minimum wage in Israel, which was approximately $770 at that time.[72]

Thus, in contrast to other Middle Eastern countries, Israel has not only maintained its pro-natalist policy, but has enlarged it to a great extent during the 1990s. Naturally, the pro-natalist measures have had the greatest impact on the lowest strata of society, without religious distinction. In other words, the increasing children's allowances and other financial benefits given to large families have 'tempted' the lowest strata to increase or maintain their high fertility rates. For these classes, a large number of children only helps to improve their overall economic condition, as the children's allowances are significantly higher from the fourth child and above. Therefore, the children beyond this point serve to 'subsidize' the earlier ones among the poorer classes.

Indeed, a close examination of the fertility patterns in Israel clearly reveals that only three groups have increased their fertility rates during the past two decades: the ultra-Orthodox Jews, on the one hand; and the Muslim population of East Jerusalem and the Bedouin in the Negev, on the other hand. The high correlation between the socio-economic condition and fertility levels among both Muslims and Jews provides support for the basic assumption that fertility patterns are an outcome of socioeconomic conditions and fertility policy. Since the onset of the first Palestinian *intifada* in early December 1987, the socio-economic condition of the Arab population in East Jerusalem has been greatly damaged.[73] According to the 1995 census results, the poorest socioeconomic condition in Israel was in Rahat, followed by Kfar Manda—the two Muslim localities with the highest fertility rates. Among the Jews, one can find the same correlation with the Orthodox city, Bene Barek, which is the poorest large city (more than 100,000 people) in Israel.[74]

While many argue that high fertility rates, by themselves, are the main cause for poverty among the lowest strata, it is my contention that the high fertility rates among the lowest classes, both Jews and Arabs, function as a major tool for economic survival. For a poor family with two children, the only option for achieving subsidized governmental housing is to have at least two more children. Thus, paradoxically, owing to the various pro-natalist measures that increase subsidies and allowances in line with the number of children, the overall economic condition of a poor family with six children and above is much better than that of a poor family with only two or three children.

EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Despite the fertility decline of the Israeli Arabs during the past two decades, the group of newcomers to the labour force, namely, those in the 20–24 age group, continues to grow, owing to the high fertility rates of the 1970s. Whereas in 1980 this age group among the Muslims numbered 45,000, it increased twofold within two decades only, amounting to 90,000 in 2000. Among the Druzes, the increase in this age group was even sharper—from 4,700 to 10,700 during that period.[75] According to the forecasts, the potential labour force of the Muslims, Druzes and Christians in Israel is expected to grow by 4.1 per cent, 3.5 per cent and 2.9 per cent, respectively, on annual average during the period 1990–2005.[76] Moreover, owing to the improvement in the educational levels of both males and females, parallel to the steady increase in female labour force participation rates, the overall demand for employment has increased by high rates, particularly in 'white-collar' occupations.

However, the increasing professional aspirations and expectations of the young Israeli Arabs raise some crucial dilemmas. First, owing to social and mainly political barriers, the employment options for the educated Israeli Arabs are limited to a large extent. Many occupations, not only in the governmental sector but also in the private sector, are not available to them because one of the

primary conditions is 'army service'.[77] Second, the options for absorption in the educational system, which currently constitute the most important employment channels for Israeli Arab university graduates, are also narrowing because of the reduction in the percentage of the young population. Whereas the Muslims age group 5–19 increased by 56.6 per cent during the 1970s, this rate dropped to only 25.2 per cent during the 1980s.[78]

Third, while agriculture has gradually declined as a major source of employment, the industrial and service sectors in Israel are concentrated almost exclusively in the Jewish cities and settlements, leading to an increased dependency of the Arabs on the Jewish economy. According to a study conducted in 1999 by Majid al-Haj from the University of Haifa, 30 per cent of the Israeli Arab university graduates are working as teachers, in comparison to 15 per cent among the Israeli-Jews; 10 per cent among the former are working as waiters, drivers and in other unprofessional occupations, as compared to only 3 per cent among the latter.[79] In the early 1990s, Calvin Goldscheider noted in this regard as follows:

> A new generation of Israeli Arabs is growing up, with higher levels of education, lower levels of occupational opportunities, increasing Palestinian national identity, growing up in small families with higher levels of consumption and aspirations but nowhere to go and little to do, with fewer outlets of social, cultural and political expressions.[80]

Thus, it seems that one of the major challenges of the Israeli government in the near future is substantially to increase the employment opportunities for educated Arabs. In fact, supplying appropriate work opportunities for the educated young, particularly graduates of higher education institutions, constitutes a major challenge common to all Middle Eastern governments. During the past two decades, the supply of graduates has outpaced the demands of the labour markets in all of the Arab Middle Eastern countries, even in the Gulf oil-exporting countries.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

From a historical perspective of two generations, one should ask some crucial questions regarding Israel's fertility policy. First and foremost, did the policy succeed? It seems that no one can answer affirmatively to this question because despite the aim to increase fertility rates among the Jews, fertility levels actually declined sharply. The only exception is among the ultra-Orthodox, who in any case do not tend to serve in the army and many of them regard themselves as non-Zionists. Among the Christians, the fertility rates were the lowest among the Arabs in Palestine during the Mandatory period, and continued to decline following the establishment of the state of Israel. By 2000, their total fertility rate was the lowest in Israel, even lower than that of the Jews. As for the Druzes,

although their fertility rates were higher than those of the Muslims during the 1950s and early 1960s, they started to decline thereafter. By 2000, their total fertility rate was 3.1 children per woman, less than half of the rate in the 1960s.

However, among the Muslims, following a sharp fertility decline during the 1970s and early 1980s, fertility rates started to increase in some major localities, particularly among the Arabs in East Jerusalem and the Bedouin in the Negev. These increasing fertility rates represent the failure of the Israeli authorities to promote the socio-economic conditions of these sectors of society. For them, the children's allowances and the other financial benefits given to large families constituted an incentive for increasing their fertility. Thus, it is not likely that either the Christian or the Druze populations will again increase their fertility levels, owing to increasing children's allowances and other financial benefits given to large families. Still, these benefits may continue to preserve the current high fertility levels among poorer Muslim families, particularly among the Bedouin in the Negev and the Arabs of East Jerusalem—unless, of course, their economic situation should greatly improve.

Regarding the future of the balance between Jews and non-Jews in Israel, it must be noted that despite the massive immigration of Jews to Israel during the past decade, the percentage of non-Jews within the total Israeli citizenry considerably increased, amounting to 22.2 per cent by the end of 2000, as compared to 18.3 per cent in 1988 (see Table 1). This increase is the outcome of two factors. First, despite the decline in the fertility rates among the Israeli Arabs, their natural increase rates still remained much higher than among the Jews. Second, whereas almost the entire population of immigrants in the former migration waves to Israel consisted of Jews, considerable percentages of the immigrants in the current migration wave from the former Soviet Union are not Jews, at least not in line with the Orthodox Jewish definition. There are no official Israeli data—either from the Ministry of Interior or from the Jewish Agency—regarding the percentages of non-Jews among the total population of immigrants to Israel since the late 1980s, because of the sensitivity of this issue from a political point of view. However, according to unofficial sources, of the 800,000 who have immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union since the late 1980s, between 250,000 and 300,000 are not Jews.[81]

The future of the balance between Jews and non-Jews in Israel remains unclear owing to three main factors. First, we cannot predict the future of the fertility patterns among either the ultra-Orthodox Jews or the Muslims because their fertility patterns are highly dependent on the future of Israel's pro-natalist policy. Second, it is not possible to predict, at the current stage of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whether the Arab population of East Jerusalem, which currently represents approximately 18 per cent of the total Israeli Arab population, will remain as Israeli citizens or will become citizens of the future Palestinian state. Third, the future of the balance between Jews and non-Jews is highly dependent on the immigration scale of Jews, which naturally cannot be predicted in advance, even in the short term. In any case, it should be emphasized that the future of the demographic balance in Israel is almost entirely dependent on the Israeli socio-economic and political policies.

TABLE 1 ISRAEL'S POPULATION ACCORDING TO RELIGIOUS GROUP, 1948–2000 (end of year—thousands)

Year	Total	Jews	%	Total Non-Jews	%	Muslims	Christians (Arabs)	Druzes
1948 (a)	872.7	716.7	82.1	156.0 (c)	17.9	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.
1949	1,173.9	1,013.9	86.4	160.0	13.6	111.5	34.0	14.5
1950	1,370.1	1,203.0	87.8	167.1	12.2	116.1	36.0	15.0
1953	1,669.4	1,483.6	88.9	185.8	11.1	127.5	41.4	16.8
1957	1,976.0	1,762.8	89.2	213.2	10.8	146.8	45.8	20.5
1961 (b)	2,234.2	1,982.7	88.7	252.5	11.3	174.9	51.3	26.3
1966	2,657.4	2,344.9	88.2	312.5	11.8	223.0	58.5	31.0
1967	2,776.3	2,383.6	85.9	392.7	14.1	289.6	71.0	32.1
1970	3,022.1	2,582.0	85.4	440.1	14.6	328.6	75.5	35.9
1972 (b)	3,225.0	2,752.7	85.4	472.3	14.6	360.6	73.8	37.8
1975	3,493.2	2,959.4	84.7	533.8	15.3	411.4	80.1	42.2
1980	3,921.7	3,282.7	83.7	639.0	16.3	498.3	98.9	50.7
1983 (b)	4,118.6	3,412.5	82.9	706.1	17.1	542.2	95.9	68.0
1988	4,476.8	3,659.0	81.7	817.8	18.3	634.6	105.0 (d)	87.1
1990	4,821.7	3,946.7	81.9	875.1	18.1	677.7	114.7 (d)	82.6
1993	5,327.6	4,335.2	81.4	992.5	18.6	751.4	151.8 (d)	89.3
1995 (b)	5,612.3	4,522.3	80.6	1,024.0 (f)	19.4	811.2	101.4	92.2
1996	5,757.9	4,616.1	80.2	1,057.8 (f)	19.8	839.9	103.3	94.5
1997	5,900.0	4,701.6	79.7	1,198.4 (f)	20.3	867.9	104.8	96.7
1998	6,041.4	4,785.1	79.2	1,256.3 (f)	20.8	899.8	106.6	99.0
1999	6,209.1	4,872.8	78.5	1,336.3 (f)	21.5	934.1	108.6	101.2
2000 (e)	6,369.3	4,955.4	77.8	1,413.9 (f)	22.2	970.0	111.4	103.8

n.d. No data available.

(a) 8 November 1948: date of population registration.

(b) Census year.

(c) Total Arab population, including all religions.

(d) Until 1994, the Christians included those who were not classified by religion in the Ministry of Interior.

(e) Total population and Arab population include 3,500 Lebanese.

(f) Including all the non-Jewish Israeli citizens.

Source: State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), *Statistical Abstract of Israel—2001,* No.52, Jerusalem, 2001, pp.2.9–2.10, table 2.1.

FIGURE 1

in 1,000s

FIGURE 2

TABLE 2 SOURCES FOR ISRAELI POPULATION GROWTH, 1948–2000 (thousands)

Period	(1) Popn. at start of period	(2) Natural increase	(3) Migration balance	(4) Total growth (2 + 3)	(5) Popn. at end of period (1 + 4)	(6) Yearly % of growth (4:1) (a)	(7) % migration balance out of total growth (7=3:4)
Total Population							
1948–2000	805.6	3,018.4	2,178.8	5,197.3	6,041.4	4.1	41.9
1948–60	805.6	475.4	869.4	1,344.8	2,150.4	8.2	64.6
1961–71	2,150.4	562.0	339.8	901.8	3,120.7(b)	3.2	37.7
1972–82	3,115.6	752.7	183.5	936.0	4,063.6	2.4	19.6
1983–89	4,033.7	494.8	31.1	525.9	5,559.6	1.8	5.9
1990–95	4,559.6	465.9	593.5	1,059.4	5,619.0	3.5	56.0
1996–2000	5,612.3	460.8	296.2	757.0	6,369.3	2.6	39.1
Jews							
1948–2000	649.6	2,132.4	2,060.1	4,186.1	4,785.1	4.0	49.2
1948–60	649.6	392.3	869.3	1,261.6	1,911.2	9.2	68.9
1961–71	1,911.2	412.9	337.9	750.8	2,662.0	3.0	45.0
1972–82	2,662.0	532.5	178.6	711.0	3,373.2	2.2	25.1
1983–89	3,349.6	339.7	27.7	367.4	3,717.1	1.5	7.5
1990–95	3,717.1	291.7	540.7	832.4	4,549.5	3.4	65.0
1996–2000	4,522.3	278.4	169.0	433.1	4,955.4	1.8	39.0
Non-Jews							
1948–2000	156.0	886.1	118.6	1,010.8	1,256.3(b)	4.2 (b)	11.7
1948–60	156.0	83.1	0.1	83.2	239.2	3.6	0.1
1961–71	239.2	149.1	1.9	151.0	458.7 (b)	4.5 (a)	0.3
1972–82	453.8	220.3	4.8	225.1	690.4 (b)	3.7 (a)	2.1
1983–89	684.1	155.2	3.1	158.2	842.5	3.0	2.0
1990–95	842.5	174.2	52.8	226.9	1,069.5	4.1	23.3
1996–2000 (c)	1004.9	173.1	9.9	183.8	1,188.7	3.4	5.4

(a) Excluding the additional Arab populations of East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Golan Heights in 1982.
(b) Includes the additional Arab populations of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.
(c) Only Arabs.

Source: ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel—2000, pp.2.9–2.10, table 2.2; 2001, p.2.11, table 2.2.

TABLE 3 NATURAL INCREASE OF THE ISRAELI CITIZENRY, 1955–2000

Period	Total	Jews	Muslims	Christians	Druzes
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 people)					
1955–59	27.7	25.6	46.3	34.4	48.0
1960–64	25.4	22.5	51.5	34.9	46.7
1965–69	25.4	22.5	51.0	30.4	43.6
1970–74	27.4	24.3	49.5	26.9	42.7
1975–79	26.4	23.6	44.5	24.5	41.8
1980–84	23.9	21.8	37.2	20.4	35.9
1985–89	22.8	20.6	34.9	21.5	30.8
1990–94	21.5	18.7	37.1	19.6	30.0
1995	21.1	17.9	37.9	22.5	28.8
1996	21.3	18.3	37.3	22.3	28.7
1997	21.4	18.5	36.7	21.8	26.7
1998	21.8	18.7	38.3	21.1	26.3
1999	21.5	18.5	37.6	21.2	25.8
2000	21.7	18.7	37.5	21.2	26.4
Crude death rate (per 1,000 people)					
1955–59	6.2	5.9	8.0	7.3	8.2
1960–64	6.0	5.8	6.4	6.9	6.8
1965–69	6.6	6.7	6.1	5.9	5.3
1970–74	7.1	7.3	5.8	7.0	5.3
1975–79	6.9	7.2	5.0	6.3	5.0
1980–84	6.8	7.3	3.9	5.9	4.1
1985–89	6.6	7.2	3.5	5.4	3.3
1990–94	6.3	6.9	3.2	4.4	3.4
1995	6.4	7.1	3.0	4.5	3.0
1996	6.1	6.8	2.9	5.5	3.0
1997	6.2	6.9	3.1	4.4	2.9
1998	6.2	7.0	2.9	4.2	2.9
1999	6.1	6.8	2.9	3.9	3.0
2000	6.0	6.7	2.8	4.5	2.9
Natural increase rate (per 1,000 people)					
1955–59	21.5	19.7	38.3	27.1	39.8
1960–64	19.4	16.7	45.3	28.0	39.9
1965–69	18.8	15.8	44.9	24.5	38.3
1970–74	20.3	17.0	43.7	19.9	37.4
1975–79	19.5	16.4	39.5	18.2	36.8
1980–84	17.1	14.5	33.3	14.5	31.8
1985–89	16.2	13.4	31.4	16.1	27.5
1990–94	15.2	11.8	33.9	15.2	26.6
1995	14.7	10.8	34.9	18.0	25.8
1996	15.2	11.5	34.4	15.7	25.7
1997	15.2	11.6	33.6	16.8	23.8
1998	15.6	11.7	35.4	17.1	23.4
1999	15.4	11.7	34.7	17.2	22.8
2000	15.7	12.0	34.7	16.7	23.5

Sources: ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel—1999, pp.3.5–3.8, table 3.1; 2001, pp.3.6–3-12, table 3.1.

FIGURE 3

Total Israel

Per 1,000

←△— Crude birth rate   —■— Crude death rate

Jews

Per 1,000

Muslims

Per 1,000

Christians

Per 1,000

Druzes

Per 1,000

TABLE 4 GENERAL AND TOTAL FERTILITY RATES IN ISRAEL, ACCORDING TO RELIGION, 1955–2000

Period	Total Israelis		Jews		Arabs Muslims		Christians		Druzes	
	Gen.	Total	Gen.	Total	Gen.	Total	Gen.	Total	Gen.	Total
1955–59	117.6	3.9	105.3	3.6	250.1	8.2	143.8	4.6	225.1	7.2
1960–64	111.4	3.9	96.6	3.4	277.9	9.2	150.5	4.7	233.8	7.5
1965–69	109.2	3.8	94.5	3.4	283.8	9.2	133.0	4.3	219.4	7.3
1970–74	115.3	3.8	99.5	3.3	257.1	8.5	117.6	3.7	214.0	7.3
1975–79	112.5	3.5	98.7	3.0	221.4	7.3	96.5	3.1	204.7	6.9
1980–84	102.6	3.1	92.3	2.8	173.3	5.5	77.6	2.4	168.5	5.4
1985–89	95.8	3.1	86.3	2.8	151.6	4.7	80.7	2.5	134.7	4.2
1990–94	86.7	2.9	75.3	2.6	153.4	4.7	69.4	2.2	122.1	3.8
1995–99	85.4	2.9	73.4	2.6	156.3	4.7	79.5	2.6	106.5	3.2
2000	87.2	3.0	75.7	2.7	157.5	4.7	78.7	2.6	101.5	3.1

Source: ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel—2001, p.3.31, table 3.12.

FIGURE 4

TABLE 5 EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE ISRAELI ARAB POPULATION (15 YEARS AND OVER), 1961–98 (in percentages)

Year	0	1–4	Years of Schooling 5–8	9–10	11–12	13–15	16+	Total
			Total Israeli Arabs*					
1961	49.5	13.9	27.5	7.6			1.5	100.0
1970	36.1	13.7	35.1	13.0	1.7		(0.4)	100.0
1980	18.9	10.0	33.9	16.0	13.5	5.5	2.2	100.0
1990	13.0	6.5	30.8	17.4	23.2	6.1	3.0	100.0
1998	6.9	5.6	21.1	18.5	28.2	12.2	7.5	100.0
			IsraeliArab Women*					
Age Group (1998)								
15–17	(1.5)	(0.9)	9.4	47.0	41.2			100.0
18–24	2.3	(1.3)	13.4	15.3	40.6	22.5	4.6	100.0
25–34	2.4	2.5	21.9	16.9	33.3	14.4	8.6	100.0
35–44	7.1	7.2	34.6	13.9	17.2	12.2	7.8	100.0
45–54	18.7	15.6	31.6	9.0	10.0	11.0	4.1	100.0
55–64	42.1	19.8	18.2	(5.0)	(5.8)	(5.4)	(3.7)	100.0
65+	54.7	11.5	15.5	(4.3)	(4.7)	(5.6)	(3.8)	100.0

Notes: Data in parentheses are based on estimates or on relatively high sampling error. *=Including 'others'.

Sources: ICBS, Statistical Abstract of Israel, various issues.

TABLE 6 NATURAL INCREASE RATES IN SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES, THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THE ISRAELI ARABS, 1960–98

Year Country	1960				1970				1980				1998			
	CBR	CDR	NI %	TFR	CBR	CDR	NI %	TFR	CBR	CDR	NI %	TFR	CBR	CDR	NI %	TFR
Israeli Arabs																
Muslims	49.9	6.7	4.3	9.3	50.2	4.3	4.6	9.0	38.9	4.2	3.5	6.0	38.3	2.9	3.5	4.8
Christians	35.8	7.3	2.9	4.6	23.5	4.9	1.9	3.6	22.1	6.1	1.6	2.7	21.6	4.6	1.7	2.6
Druzes	50.0	8.7	4.1	7.9	43.0	5.5	3.8	7.5	39.1	4.5	3.5	6.1	26.3	2.9	2.3	3.1
Palestinians – Occupied territories																
West-Bank	—	—	—	—	43.9(b)	21.7	2.2	7.6	42.1	10.4	3.2	7.0	38.4	5.7	3.3	5.4
Gaza-Strip	—	—	—	—	42.0(b)	19.5	2.3	6.9	47.6	10.1	3.8	7.3	47.6	5.4	4.2	7.3
Arab countries																
Egypt	42.9	16.9	2.6	6.1	35.1	15.1	2.0	5.2	37.5	10.0	2.8	5.2	25.4	5.7	2.0	3.4
Syria	47.9	17.7	3.0	7.3	47.8	15.6	3.2	7.6	45.8	8.1	3.8	7.3	29.9	4.7	2.5	4.0
Jordan	47.5(a)	19.9	2.8	6.8	47.5	15.7	3.2	7.1	46.9(e)	10.5	3.6	7.3	34.3	4.7	3.0	4.7
Saudi Arabia	48.9	22.5	2.6	7.2	47.9	18.1	3.0	7.3	45.9	14.4	3.2	7.3	33.5	4.3	2.9	5.0
Kuwait	44.4	9.7	3.5	7.3	48.2	5.7	4.3	7.2	48.3	6.1	4.2	7.2	38.8	2.4	3.6	5.2
Bahrain	46.3	14.8	3.2	7.1	42.8(c)	8.0	3.5	6.7	45.0	7.0(d)	3.8	5.9	25.2	4.3	2.1	3.4

(a) = Related to 1961. (d) = Related to 1975.
(b) = Related to 1968. (e) = Related to 1979.
(c) = Related to 1971.

CBR = Crude birth rate per 1,000 people.
CDR = Crude death rate per 1,000 people.
NI = Natural increase (%).
TFR = Total fertility rate.

Sources:: ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various issues; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Demography of the Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Current Status Report Series, No.1, Ramallah, Dec. 1994; idem, *Health Statistics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Current Status Report Series, No.4, Ramallah, July 1995; idem, *The Demographic Survey in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, Final Report, Aug. 1997; The World Bank, *WorldTables, 1984–93*, various issues, Baltimore and London; World Bank, World Development Report, 1978–1999/2000, various issues, Oxford and New York; UN, *Demographic yearbook*, 1970–98, various issues, New York; ECWA/ESCWA, *Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets forCountries of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia*, 1978–99, various issues, Beirut, Baghdad and Amman; *Statistical Abstract of theECWA/ESCWA Region*, 1970–2000, various issues, New York, Baghdad and Amman; UNICEF, The State of the World's Children, 1984–2000, various issues, Oxford and New York; UNDP, *Human Development Report*, various issues, 1994–2000, Oxford and New York; Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics), *Statistical Yearbook*, 1984–99, various issues, Cairo; The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics, *Statistical Yearbook*, 1970–99, various issues, Amman; Syrian Arab Republic, Central Statistical Organization, Directorate of Statistics, *StatisticalAbstract, 1967–2000*, various issues, Damascus; State of Bahrain, Central Statistical Abstract, 1966–99, various issues, Manama; State of Kuwait, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Abstract, 1966–99, various issues, Kuwait.

NOTES

1. For example, according to the 1937 population census, the natural increase rate in Egypt was 1.63 per cent (with a crude birth rate of 43.4 per 1,000 and a crude death rate of 27.5 per 1,000): A.M. Abdelghany, 'Evaluating the Application of the Stable Population Model to the Population of Egypt', *Population Bulletin of ECWA,* No.21 (Dec. 1981), p.109, table 3. In Syria, the natural increase rate during the period 1938–47 was estimated at 2.27 per cent on annual average: Syrian Arab Republic, State Planning Commission, *Composition and Growthof Population in the Syrian Arab Republic,* Damascus, Sept. 1979, p.3, table 1.2.

2. UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), *The State of the World's Children— 1999,* Oxford, 1999, p.127, table 8. UN ESCWA (UN Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia), *Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA Region-1986,* New York, 1987, p.172, table 12.1.

3. According to the *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey—2000,* the total fertility rate in Egypt was 3.5 children per woman, as compared with 5.3 reported in the 1980 Egypt Fertility Survey: Egypt Arab Republic, Ministry of Health and Population, National Population Council, and ORC Macro, *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey—2000,* Cairo, 2001, p.47, table 4.3. In Tunisia, the fertility decline was even sharper than in Egypt. According to the UN, Tunisia's total fertility rate was 2.3 children per woman on average during the period 1995–2000, and it is expected to reach the desired replacement-level fertility in the first half of the current decade: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision,* New York, 2001.

4. On the overall changes in the Middle Eastern natural increase rates during the twentieth century, see Abdel Rahim Omran and Farzaneh Roudi, 'The Middle East Population Puzzle', *Population Bulletin,* Vol.48, No.1 (July 1993), pp.4–11; Philippe Fargues, 'Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval?', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy Without Democrats?The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim Word,* London and New York, 1994, pp.156–79.

5. See in this regard e.g. Steven E.Beaver, *Demographic Transition Theory Reinterpreted,* Lexington, Toronto, and London, 1982, pp.4–13.

6. This refers to a level below 2.1 children per woman, which currently characterizes most of the industrialized countries. See e.g. United States Bureau of the Census, *International DataBase,* electronic database (www.census.gov); UN, *World Population Prospects: The 2000Revision,* pp.27–30, table 2.

7. Uziel Schmelz, 'The Demographic Structure of the Arabs and Druzes in Israel', *HamizrahHehadash* (The New East), Vol.28 (1979), pp.244–6 (in Hebrew).

8. Until 1994, the non-Jews who immigrated to Israel under the later definition of the Law of Return were also included in the official Israeli statistics along with the Christians (see Table 1).

9. Gad G. Gilbar, 'Trends in the Demographic Development of the Palestinians, 1870– 1987', *Occasional Papers,* No.108, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, Sept. 1989, pp.3–9 (in Hebrew); Roberto Bachi, *The Populationof Israel,* Jerusalem, 1977, pp.31–56. On the demographic developments of the Arabs in Palestine during the late Ottoman period and under the British Mandate, see Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine: Population*

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10. Gilbar, 'Trends in the Demographic Development of the Palestinians', p.17. Regarding the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the PalestinianRefugee Problem, 1947–1949,* Tel Aviv, 1991 (in Hebrew).

11. State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), *Statistical Abstract of Israel— 1991,* No.49, Jerusalem, 1991, p.42, table 2.1.

12. Avshalom Shmueli, Itzhak Shnell and Arnon Soffer, *The Little Triangle: Transformation of aRegion,* Monograph Series on the Middle East, No.3, Haifa, 1985, p.30 (in Hebrew); Avraham Cohen, The Arab Population of Israel, 1950– 1980', *New Outlook* (Oct./Nov. 1984), p.44.

13. Uziel O.Schmelz, 'Vital Statistics and the Population Growth', in Aharon Layish (ed.), *TheArabs in Israel: Continuity and Change,* Jerusalem, 1981, p.38 (in Hebrew).

14. Ibid., p.39; idem, 'Demographic Trends of Jews and Arabs in Israel', *Hamizrah Hehadash,* Vol.37 (1995), p.4 (in Hebrew).

15. Majid al-Haj, *Education and Social Transformation among the Arabs in Israel,* Tel Aviv, 1991, p.4, table 1.1.

16. Among the Jews, by comparison, the crude birth rate during that period was only 25.6 per 1,000.

17. ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel—1991,* p.712, table 27.1.

18. Beaver, *Demographic Transition Theory,* pp.146, 159, table A-4.

19. In 1978, the government decided to expand the range of compulsory education to include the 15–16 age group, while free education was expanded to include the entire secondary educational level. See Aziz Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population,* Boulder, CO, 1991, p.65.

20. See on this regard: Zvi Eisenbach, 'Trends and Variations in Moslem Fertility in Israel', PhD thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1978, ch.6, pp.116–41. See also Table 5 in this article.

21. Al-Haj, *Education and Social Transformation among the Arabs in Israel,* pp.22–6. See also Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948,* Austin, 1985, p.97.

22. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics and Ministry of Health, *JordanPopulation and Family Health Survey (JPFHS), 1990,* by Abdallah Abdel Aziz Zou'by, Sri Poedjastoeti and Mohamed Ayad, Amman, Aug. 1992, p. 22, table 3.1.

23. Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics), *Statistical Yearbook, 1952–1992,* Cairo, June 1993, p.28, table 1–18. See also in this regard Azza Mohamed Hassan Yehia, 'The Effect of Family Planning Program on Fertility in Egypt, 1980–1991', in Cairo Demographic Center (CDC), CDC *23rd Annual Seminar on Populationand Development Issues in the Middle East, Africa and Asia,* Research Monograph Series, No.23, Cairo, 1994, p. 715, table 1.

24. Overall, the infant mortality rate among the Muslims declined from 61 per 1,000 live births on average during the period 1955–59 to 17 on average during the years 1985–89. Among the Druzes, the decline was from 54 to 16 in the corresponding period. On the reduction in the infant mortality rate among the Israeli Arabs, see ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel2001,* pp.3.8–3.12, table 3.1.

25. See in this regard e.g. Michael P.Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World,* 5th edn, New York and London, 1994, p.199.

26. Bachi, *The Population of Israel,* pp.230–31. See also Nira Reiss, *The Health Care of the Arabsin Israel,* Boulder, CO, 1991.

27. See Allan G.Hill, 'Population Growth in the Middle East Since 1954 with Special Reference to the Arab Countries of West Asia', in John I.Clarke and Howard Bowen-Jones (ed.), *Change and Development in the Middle East,* London and New York, 1981, p.132, table 8.1.

28. Majid al-Haj and Henry Rosenfeld, *Arab Local Government in Israel,* Boulder, CO, 1990, p.9.

29. Noah Levin-Epstein, *The Arab Economy in Israel: Growing Population—Job Mismatch,* Discussion Paper No.14–90, Tel Aviv, 1990, pp.2–3. See also: Majid Ibrahim al-Haj, 'Family Lifestyles among Groups and Sects in an Arab Town in Israel', PhD thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1983, pp. 123–42 (in Hebrew).

30. Levin-Epstein, *The Arab Economy in Israel,* p.37, table 1; ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel-2001,* p.12–26, table 12.11.

31. On the reasons for high fertility levels in pre-industrial societies, see e.g. Calvin Goldscheider, *Population, Modernization and Social Structure,* Boston, 1971, pp. 79–101, 135–81.

32. On the changing employment patterns and the Middle Eastern urbanization process, see e.g. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Urbanization in the Arab World: The Need for an Urban Strategy', in Saad Eddin Ibrahim and Nicholas S. Hopkins (eds.), *Arab Society: Social Science Perspectives,* Cairo, 1985, pp.123–47.

33. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of Statistics and Macro International Inc., Calverton, Maryland, USA, *Jordan Population and Family Health Survey (JPFHS), 1997,* Amman, Dec. 1998, p.26, table 3.1. See also 1990 - JPFHS, p.24, table 3.3.

34. Syrian Arab Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, Central Bureau of Statistics and Pan Arab Project for Child Development, *Maternal and Child Health Survey in the Syrian ArabRepublic (SMCHS),* Principal Report, Damascus, 1999, p.169, table 12.11.

35. *Egypt Demographic and Health Survey, 2000,* p.46, table 4.2.

36. ICBS and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, *Fertility of Marriage Women According to the Population and Housing Censuses of 1961,1972 and 1983,* 1983 Census of Population and Housing Publications, No.25, by Uziel O. Schmelz and Nurit Yaffe, Jerusalem, 1994, p.135, table 40. See also *Ha'aretz,* 29 Nov. 1984.

37. ICBS and Ministry of Education and Culture, *The Level of Education of the Population inIsrael,* Special Series, No.604, Jerusalem, 1979, p.64, table 18.

38. See also ICBS, *Level of Education of the Population of Israel: Selected Findings from theSample Enumeration,* 1995 Census of Population and Housing Publications, No.10A, Jerusalem, April 1999, pp. 125–6, table 2.

39. Zvi Eisenbach, 'Fertility Changes of the Muslim Woman in Israel during Recent Years', *Hamizrah Hahadash,* Vol.32 (1989), p.82 (in Hebrew).

40. See in this regard the interview conducted in March 1996 with Sheikh Kamal Khtib, one of the prominent leaders of the Islamic Movement in Israel, *Ha'aretz,* 19 March 1996.

41. On the transformation in living patterns among the Israeli Arabs, see: al-Haj, 'Family Life Styles', pp.198–213.

42. ICBS, *Health and Demographic Profile of the Localities in Israel, 1993–1997,* Publication No.1,144, Jerusalem, Nov. 2000, p.202.

43. ICBS, *Health and Demographic Profile of the Localities in Israel, 1990–1994,* Publication No.1,059, Jerusalem, 1997, p.194.

44. By 1996, the total fertility rate in the Gaza Strip was 8.0, the highest rate worldwide. Source: ESCWA (UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia), *Demographic and RelatedSocio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of Economic and Social Commission for WesternAsia as Assessed in 1996,* No.9, Amman, 1997, p.134, table 3.

45. Center for Bedouin studies and Development and Negev Center for Regional Development, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, *Statistical Yearbook of the Negev, 1999,* Beer Sheva, Dec. 1999, p.33, table II/7, p.36, table II/13.

46. By 2000, the Arab population of Jerusalem numbered 208,700: The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS), *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends, 2000,* by Maya Choshen and Michal Korach, Jerusalem, 2001, p.44, table c/1.

47. Ibid., p.11; idem, *Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, 1999,* Jerusalem, 2000, p.96, table d/1.

48. JIIS, *Jerusalem: Facts and Trends, 2000,* p.91, table d/4.

49. ICBS, *Vital Statistics, 1986–1988,* Special Series, No.945, Jerusalem, 1993; ICBS, *Health andDemographic Profile of the Localities in Israel, 1993–1997.*

50. UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook—1998,* Paris, 1999, pp.3–269, table 3.1; *1971,* p. 354, table 2.14; ESCWA, *Statistical Abstract of the ESCWA Region, 2000,* New York, p.102, table II-1. See also in this regard Rodney Wilson, *Economic Development in the Middle East,* London and New York, 1995, pp.54–64.

51. On female labour force participation rates in the Arab countries, see UN, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, *The World's Women, 1970–1990: Trends andStatistics,* New York, 1991, pp. 104–7, table 8; idem, *The World's Women, 1995,* pp.141–5, table 11.

52. Except in Saudi Arabia, where there are severe institutional obstacles to women's participation in the labour force; and in Yemen and Sudan, where the socio-economic changes during the past generation were very limited.

53. The Institute for Social Security, *Statistical Quarterly,* Vol.31, No.2 (April-June 2001), Jerusalem, July 2001, p.85. By mid-1999, the monthly children's allowances in Israel were: $41.2 for the first two children, $82.4 for the third child, $166.5 for the fourth child, $140.0 for the fifth child, $154.4 for the sixth child, and $140.0 for every additional child. See an article on this subject in *Ha'aretz,* 6 July 1999.

54. On the overall Israeli pro-natalist measures, see Ilana Brosch, 'Family Size in Israel —Causes and Consequences: Social, Economic and Cultural Aspects', PhD thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1995, pp.22–5 (in Hebrew).

55. The 147th Session of the 15th Knesset. www.knesset.gov.il.

56. According to the new law, the monthly children's allowance for a family with four children is 1,377 shekels ($322), increasing to 2,235 shekels ($523) for a family with five children, and 3,091 shekels ($724) for a family with six children. From the sixth child and above, the monthly allowance increases by 856 shekels ($225) for each child.

57. The data was provided by the Research Department of the Hamosad Lebituh Leumi, which I would like to thank.

58. Jacqueline Portugese, *Fertility Policy in Israel: The Politics of Religion, Gender, and Nation,* Westport and London, 1998, pp.20, 22.

59. Dov Friedlander, 'Family Planning in Israel: Irrationality and Ignorance', *Journal of theMarriage and the Family,* Vol.35, No.1 (Feb. 1973), p.117.

60. Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel,* New York, 1979, pp.121–2.

61. During the period 1961–71, the total migration balance of Jews to Israel was 337, 900, as compared with 869,300 during the period 1948–60 (see Table 2).

62. In this regard, see the recommendations of the report submitted in 1966 to the Israeli prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, by the National Population Committee headed by Prof. Roberto Bachi. Source: Dov Friedlander, 'Israel', in Bernard Berelson (ed.), *Population Policy inDeveloped Countries,* New York, 1974, pp.44–5, 58–9.

63. ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel—1991,* p.710, table 27.1.

64. During the period 1983–89, the total migration balance of Jews to Israel was only 27,700 (see Table 2).

65. See e.g. Arnon Soffer, *On the Demographic and Geographic Situation in Aretz Israel: The Endof the Zionist Vision?,* Haifa, 1988 (in Hebrew); Charles D.Smith, *Palestine and theArab-Israeli Conflict,* New York, 1992, p.107; *Yediot Ahronot,* 23 Oct. 1987.

66. *Ha'aretz,* 11 April 2000.

67. See e.g. Arnon Soffer, *Israel, Demography 2000–2020: Risks and Options,* The National Security Studies Center, University of Haifa, 2001, pp.21, 32. See also: *Ha'aretz,* 26 Oct. 2001.

68. See e.g. *Ha'aretz,* 14 April 2000.

69. On the concern about the steady reduction in the number of Jews in the world and the inevitable conclusion that higher fertility rates among Jews, particularly in Israel, should be encouraged, see for example the speech of MK Professor Joseph Rom in the Knesset on 23 Nov. 1981 (the 23rd Session of the 10th Knesset, p.531); the decisions adopted by the Eighth Plenary Assembly of the World Jewish Congress from Jan. 1986 regarding the decreasing number of the Jewish population in the Diaspora. Source: Israel's Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, *News of the Demographic Centre,* No.10 (April 1986), p.4 (in Hebrew); the decisions of the Israeli government on 11 May 1986, including the ratification of the pronatalist policy adopted in April 1967. Source: ibid., No.11 (Aug. 1986), pp.1–2; and an article by Professor Roberto Bachi in *Ha'aretz,* 1 June 1986.

70. See for example the suggestion of MK Jack Amir (the Labour Party) that the Jewish Agency should grant $5,000 to every Jewish family in Israel for the third child, *Yediot Ahronot*, 6 July 1987.

71. Friedlander and Goldscheider, *The Population of Israel,* p.159.

72. The Institute for Social Security, *Statistical Quarterly,* Vol.31, No.2 (April-June 2001), p.90, table 6.4.

73. On the economic consequences of the *intifada* on East Jerusalem, see e.g. Sara Roy, 'Dedevelopment Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo', *Journal of PalestineStudies,* Vol.28, No.3 (Spring 1999), pp.69–78.

74. ICBS, *Health and Demographic Profile of the Localities in Israel,* 1993–1997; idem, *Socio-Economic Characteristics of Population and Households in Localities with 2,000 Inhabitantsand More and In Statistics Areas,* 1995 Census of Population and Housing Publications, No.8, Jerusalem, May 2000, table C.
75. ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel—2001,* p.2–58, table 2.20.
76. Raymond Jubran, 'Characteristics of the Arab Population in Israel', *Kalkala ve'Avoda* (Economy and Labour), (Oct. 1994), p.227, table 10 (in Hebrew).
77. On the obstacles of the Israeli Arab graduates to find suitable jobs in accordance with their educational level, see al-Haj, *Education and Social Transformation among the Arabs in Israel,* p.11.
78. ICBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel—1998,* p.2–46, table 2.21.
79. Majid al-Haj, *Higher Education among the Arabs in Israel,* Haifa, June 1999, p.16, table 2. See also *Ha'aretz,* 20 July 1999.
80. Calvin Goldscheider, 'Arab Israelis: Demography, Dependency, and Distinctiveness', *Asianand African Studies,* Vol.27, Nos.1 & 2 (March/July 1993), p.84.
81. *Ha'aretz,* 23 July 1999. See also *Yediot Ahronot,* 11 Nov. 1999.

Social and Educational Welfare Policy in the Arab Sector in Israel

KHAWLA ABU BAKER

Social welfare is customarily defined as 'all institutionalized policies designed to meet social needs'.[1] The state of Israel, which is acknowledged to be a welfare state, bases its welfare policies on the principle of redistribution of private and collective resources. Indeed, this principle has remained at the heart of Israel's welfare programmes, notwithstanding policy differences among Israel's governments from the establishment of the state until the present day.

Studies about Arabs in Israel usually focus on polito-historical issues and on legal discrimination. Little attention had been paid to social and psychological welfare discrimination that directly and intensively influences the quality of life of all Arabs in Israel. This matter is not a pure social-work or psychology-related issue. A series of interviews with Arab professionals in top positions—whose voices are not often heard—reflects the strong influence of the political affiliation and orientation of Jewish officers on the welfare of the Arab population in Israel. When researching Arabs' lives in Israel, every matter appears highly politicized.

Israel's welfare policy towards the Arab sector is difficult to ascertain for several reasons.

1. By its very nature, welfare is very broad in scope and encompasses several government ministries other than the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, including Health, Education and Culture, Construction and Housing, and National Infrastructures.
2. Many government ministries as well as local governing authorities in cities with mixed Arab/Jewish populations do not report on specific funds allocated annually to the Arab population for welfare purposes.[2] Thus, it is difficult to assess what percentage of the general budget in these offices and settlements is allocated specifically to the Arab population.

The first comprehensive study of welfare services in the Arab sector was published in 1991. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study, the researcher was forced to contend with insufficient documentation of government ministry policies towards the Arab sector as well as with a lack of information regarding the minimal services that did exist at the time.[3] This present article

examines the impact of government welfare policies on the Arab sector from the point of view of key Arab administrators in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education. While the article does not elaborate on other ministries that directly or indirectly affect the welfare of the Arab population, it does take an interdisciplinary approach in its overall analysis of the welfare situation and its influences on Arab society. In conclusion, the article proposes changes in social welfare policies towards the Arab population.

PRE-STATE SOCIAL SERVICES IN THE ARAB SECTOR

Prior to 1948, in most of the Arab world, including Palestine, the prevailing social structure was a symbiotic relationship between an extended family structure and agrarian society on the one hand and the *zakat*[4] laws of Islam on the other. This symbiotic social order ensured basic social support for those who were elderly, sick, alone or homeless. By providing this support, the benefactor was guaranteed social status as well as spiritual peace and religious fulfilment.

Beyond this individual social support, collective social welfare services in the Arab sector during the 1920s were limited to the following: (a) institutions, primarily educational, funded by the Islam *waqf* and the annual *zakat* taxes; (b) Christian churches and institutions devoted to caring for orphans and the needy and to developing educational services; (c) a limited number of philanthropic Muslim and Christian women's organizations that helped the indigent and orphans.

British Mandatory authorities opened the first social services department in Palestine in 1944. The department focused on education and health, and it served as a nucleus for social welfare services after the state of Israel was established. Most of these social services were provided to city dwellers, and since the majority of Arabs lived in villages, they did not benefit from these services.

The 1948 war gave rise to a multitude of problems, both for those who became refugees and for those whose villages were transformed into shelters for those same refugees. All at once, these internal refugees lost everything. Suddenly, they found themselves unemployed, indigent, physically and mentally broken. Whole families were dismantled: many people died, while others fled across the borders. Overnight, the villages of refuge absorbed more than 30 per cent of their original population and had no time to make any physical or economic provisions whatsoever. Thus, the standard of living in these villages significantly decreased.

During this period, Arabs in Israel were governed by the Martial Law Administration and by the Minority Office. These two bodies did nothing to solve the psychological and social problems stemming from the war and the

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Palestinian refugee situation. In fact, the unemployment problem was exacerbated by limitations placed on the movements of Arabs. Special transit licences were neither granted on a regular basis nor to all those who applied.[5] Meanwhile, the Arabs had lost the communal institutions that prior to the war had handled their social welfare needs. The state of Israel and the United Nations Refugee Commission made sure that basic food needs were supplied monthly. The *waqf* committees in the Arab cities and a few church and other charitable organizations and women's groups provided limited and perfunctory services to the needy. No solutions were provided for other basic social needs or for the trauma of the war, and these problems only intensified.

POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

In every form of government, there is a strong relationship between the political policies and the social welfare policies of the ruling administration.[6] The state of Israel determines its welfare policies on the national level. In addition, a number of active voluntary organizations, such as the Jewish Agency, the Histadrut Labour Union Federation, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO), and Hadash, also play a role in the country's social welfare policies. Not one Arab organization has had any impact on determining welfare policies for the Arab population.[7]

Since the establishment of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (formerly the Ministry of Welfare), no special branch has been set up for Arabs, though a position of 'special adviser for Arab affairs' was created. So far, two people have filled this position, one a Jew and the other a Druze; neither was professionally trained in the field of social welfare.

By 1958, 15 welfare bureaux had been set up in the Arab sector, staffed by 32 social workers.[8] In the wake of political decisions made by senior ministry officials, the trend towards developing these services in the Arab sector was halted. In 1978, the director of the Northern District of the Ministry of Social Affairs convinced a number of Arab mayors to agree to set up collective welfare bureaux instead of local offices. His argument was that local offices would drain most of the budget that the local municipalities received from the Ministry of the Interior. The mayors, already suffering from a lack of funds, feared the negative impact that local welfare offices would have on their meagre budgets. These false allegations prevailed upon the Arab mayors, and four collective welfare bureaux were subsequently set up, in Acre, Nazareth, Hadera and Haifa. It is important to note that setting up these collectives was in direct violation of the Welfare Services Law of 1958, which expressly states that 'a local authority will set up a welfare bureau to provide social services and aid for the needy'. During the late 1970s, only 11 Arab villages and towns had welfare bureaux directly connected to local government authorities.[9]

Husni al-'Aabid, chair of the Follow-Up Committee on Welfare in the Arab Sector, claims that setting up the collective welfare bureaux was a purely political move whose primary purpose was to find ways to circumvent the law and to strip the Arabs of their rights to develop their villages and towns in all areas, particularly welfare. He maintains that from the time the Ministry of Social Affairs was established, its policies toward the Arabs were influenced by the political status of the National Religious Party (NRP), whose members had staffed the most senior positions in the ministry since its establishment.[10]

The decision to set up the collective welfare bureaux has had a far-reaching effect on the general development of the Arab sector in Israel. These bureaux limited the development of welfare services in all the Arab towns and villages and served to widen and institutionalize the welfare gap between the Arab and Jewish sectors. This resulted in impeding the general development and advancement of the Arab population and had a negative impact on the professionalism of Arab social workers.

Based on the assumption that Arabs are entitled to a portion of total welfare funding equal to their percentage in the general population,[11] studies of the Follow-Up Committee on Welfare concluded that by 1992 the Arab sector had received only 20 per cent of the total budget that should have been allocated to it by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.[12] This shortfall resulted from the failure to establish welfare offices in each Arab town by 1978 and the subsequent establishment of the collective welfare bureaux. According to studies conducted by an Arab economist, 12 per cent of the ministry's 1998 budget was allocated to the Arab population. This figure is one-third lower than the percentage of Arabs in the general population and does not take into consideration the general destitution of the Arabs.[13]

The 1983 'Paradise formula' calls for one social worker per every 1,000 inhabitants. This formula has been implemented in most of the Jewish settlements and communities and, as of the late 1990s, in a number of Druze villages as well. In 1987, the Arab population numbered 680,000, while the number of Arab social workers totalled 116, representing a shortage of 564 Arab social workers according to the formula. The number of Arab social workers actually serving the Arab population was minimal: in the Galilee and part of the Triangle,[14] there was one social worker for every 11,000 residents, and in other areas, one social worker for every 7,000 residents. During this same period, 122 out of 23 8 ministry positions for the Arab sector went unfilled. According to a formula proposed by Ram Can'an, one social worker position was allocated for every 2,000 Jews, while only one-third of a position was allocated to the same number of Arabs.[15]

Once the collective welfare bureaux had been set up, a village such as 'Araba, population 16,000, was served by one half-time social worker stationed in the welfare bureau in Acre. Needy residents of many villages had to travel up to 75 kilometres (round trip) to reach the office. It goes without saying that people requiring welfare services are usually poor and often have physical limitations.

Two part-time social workers served the Bedouins in the South. This population, numbering 43,000, is spread over a large geographical area. The welfare bureau handled only 263 cases. This small number does not reflect a lack of welfare problems among this group, but rather the difficulties presented by the distance between the welfare clients and the social workers stationed in the bureau.[16] Thus, the welfare bureaux became a nuisance for the client population and a burden for the professionals who staffed them.[17] Government officials and Bedouin representatives have warned that cutting government budgets intended for development of Bedouin settlements constitutes a time bomb.[18] The problems of the Bedouins in the Negev, those living in the seven new villages established by the government and those living in their traditional villages (including some villages that have not been officially recognized), require the recruitment of a large number of professionals who have been specifically trained to understand, respect and help this special cultural group.

Despite the importance of formulas such as that of Paradise in devising a master plan for the Ministry of Social Affairs, they should be regarded only as an initial index and not as a compulsory prescription. The social problems in the Arab sector are many and varied: unemployment, family violence, displacement, lack of housing, juvenile vagrancy, illiteracy and teenage marriages, to name just a few. These problems require special treatment; accordingly, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs should regard the Arab population as a particularly needy group.

In 1992, after five years of intensive activity on the part of the FollowUp Committee on Welfare, Ora Namir, then minister of labour and social affairs, ordered that the collective welfare bureaux be phased out gradually, to be replaced by welfare offices in the Arab towns and villages. This decision improved services considerably.[19] That same year, the ministry allocated 100 positions to the Arab sector for the coming five years, to be filled gradually. Minister Namir also began privatizing services in the Arab sector, particularly institutional services for retarded children and troubled girls. This trend towards expanded development continued despite changes in government. In 1998, there were 80 welfare offices in the Arab sector: 48 in Arab towns and villages, 11 in Bedouin villages in the Negev and the north, 14 in Druze and Circassian villages, seven in regional councils, and an additional seven local welfare bureaux in mixed cities.[20] This is not to say that the quality of welfare services in the Arab sector is satisfactory or that it meets all the immediate needs of the population.

By 1996, after the collective welfare bureaux had been closed and the local offices opened, the number of social worker positions in the Arab sector reached 320. Despite this apparent increase, the gap between demand (for services) and supply was not eliminated because, in addition to handling family socio-economic problems, the welfare offices were also supposed to solve other social problems, such as unemployment, troubled teens, alcoholism, drugs, family violence, inadequate housing and school dropouts. According to Haidar's

study,[21] since 1948, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has not managed to solve even one of the above problems among its Arab citizens. Indeed, it can be claimed that the establishment of Israel to a large extent *caused* these problems, or at least exacerbated them. For example, evicting the Arabs from their villages led to housing problems in the mixed cities and the many villages that absorbed these internal refugees. Other factors that contributed to disintegration, alienation, crime and deviation within Arab society included the traumatic urbanization and artificial and sudden modernization that were forced on Israel's Arab population by economic, social and political changes, as well as intensive intercultural contact with the predominantly Western Jewish population and its government institutions. The welfare services operating in the Arab villages were not able to meet the demand. On the contrary, these services offered false expectations, which frustrated the client population and the professionals as well.

Gid'on 'Abas, Ministry Adviser on Arab Affairs,[22] believes that the Jewish district directors in the Ministry of Social Affairs advocated setting up collective welfare bureaux in the Arab sector as a convenient way to administer their operations. Setting up these bureaux eliminated the need for the directors to visit remote Arab villages that often had no easy access. Moreover, 'Abas claims that Follow-Up Committee pressure did not influence the ministry's eventual decision to close the collective bureaux. He believes that the change ensued from internal ministry developments resulting from his correct assessment of the actual situation and his recommendations.[23]

'Abas believes that the relative gap in social services between the Arab and Jewish sectors resulted from the fact that the Arabs themselves, as well as their mayors, leaders and *mukhtars* (traditional village leaders) are ignorant. He does not claim that the ministry discriminated between different groups, but rather that services were granted only to those who requested them. For example, he thinks that Bedouins in the Negev did not receive any allocated positions or welfare projects because they did not demand any special funding. Haidar[24] concluded that Arab ignorance regarding welfare rights is one of the reasons that the state of Israel has not solved even one social welfare problem in the Arab sector. Arabs should not be penalized for ignorance regarding social welfare rights. Rather, the state of Israel, as a welfare state, should be expected to educate all sectors of the population regarding their needs and their rights.

After his appointment in 1986, 'Abas set out to equalize the services provided to Druze and Bedouin communities whose residents serve in the army. This policy conformed to the Likud government's policy regarding equality among all groups doing military service. During his tenure in office, 'Abas established institutions, increased jobs and positions, and preferentially infused funds, especially to Druze villages. For example, in 1993 and 1994 Druze villages received funds representing 25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively of the total ministry budget intended for the Arab sector, even though the Druze population constitutes less than 10 per cent of the total Arab population of Israel.[25] This

example indicates the direct relationship between ministry policies and the political orientation of decision-makers and key position-holders.

Another example of the political nature of this relationship is that the Ministry Welfare Advisory Bureau provided welfare services to Arab youth in order to control them politically rather than to implement the basic intentions of ministry services. In an internal ministry document, Mr 'Abas states that proper services must be provided for Arab youth to prevent them from joining hostile organizations such as Abna al-Balad, the Islamic Movement, the Communist Party or the Arab Democratic Party.[26]

In summary, it is impossible to disregard the degree to which politics have affected the professional policies and decisions of the ministry towards Arab citizens.

GAPS IN WELFARE SERVICES

1992 marked a turning point in the level of welfare services in the Arab sector, as acknowledged by those working in the field. Nonetheless, despite the drastic improvements in the number of welfare offices, the number of positions and the type of services offered, the Arab sector still suffers from the discriminatory budgetary policies of the ministry. Welfare services are closely tied to the budgets of the village councils. Since 25 per cent of each welfare project is funded by the local government, in many cases Arab government authorities postpone implementing or completing projects because of internal budgetary problems.

When faced with a choice between extending their services horizontally (to a large number of clients) or vertically (comprehensively but to a limited number of clients), many welfare offices prefer the first alternative. This less intensive option often results in treating the source of the problem only superficially at best, with no chance of providing in-depth treatment and certainly not preventive treatment. For example, a novel programme in Nazareth set up special clubs for children from violent homes. According to the less intensive option, children would attend these clubs three times a week so that a large number of needy children could benefit from the project. The more intensive model would dictate that fewer children would be able to attend the club—but five times a week, where they would be served a hot meal and have more hours of supervision.

Amal al-Far, director of the Nazareth Welfare Office, which is the largest and oldest welfare facility in the Arab sector, claims that such a policy decision is very difficult from a professional point of view even though budgetary constraints do not leave her much choice. For example, in the project for children from violent homes, she was forced to choose the less intensive model in order to serve the greatest number of children. She was aware that children not given the opportunity to participate in the project would have no alternative at all. While al-Far would like to be able to operate according to purely professional considerations, budgetary constraints have forced her, and the staff of other

welfare offices as well, to make do with superficial rather than comprehensive professional performance.

Professionals such as al-Far who are responsible for carrying out welfare policy also have to mediate between the laws of the nation and ministry policies. She claims that despite her obligation as bureau head to implement laws such as the government Welfare Services Law, the government does not provide the Arab sector with dedicated funds to implement the law, so that she finds herself busy persuading the government to provide the necessary funds instead of concentrating on developing projects in accordance with the Welfare Law.[27]

A major impediment to narrowing the welfare gap is the shortage of public buildings in the Arab sector. In addition to its public bomb shelters, the Jewish sector also has sufficient public buildings to house its welfare projects. In the Arab sector, in contrast, each welfare project must confront the problem of finding an appropriate building or of raising money for rental costs. A large percentage of the funds provided by the local government authorities goes to renting these buildings. Most of the local government authorities in the Arab sector still do not have a master plan or a blueprint outlining programmes to erect public buildings that could serve welfare clients in the Arab sector.

Another problem facing welfare services in the Arab sector is that some types of welfare services are provided only via voluntary organizations, such as those that help the elderly, rehabilitate released prisoners, provide support for former alcoholics or assist the handicapped. Since there are no such organizations in the Arab sector, the Ministry of Social Affairs sees it as necessary to train the public to establish, organize and run such organizations. Thus, the local welfare bureaux have devoted part-time positions to this purpose, positions that are deducted from the total number of allocated positions required for the welfare client population served by that welfare bureau. This need demonstrates that the Paradise formula does not always apply in the Arab sector. If the laws of the state necessitate the establishment of voluntary organizations in order that a sector may receive welfare funding, then the state must supply additional funded social worker positions to those groups whose social and economic conditions preclude setting up these organizations on their own.

Even though the number of social worker positions in the Arab sector has risen, the level of services provided is still poor. One reason is the poverty level among the Arabs as compared to the Jews.[28] All of the Arab towns and villages in Israel with the exception of the village of M'alia are in the bottom five percentiles on the socio-economic scale, and are concentrated particularly in the two lowest percentiles.[29]

Poverty in the Arab sector is concentrated especially among the weakest groups in the population, such as children and the elderly. Figures indicate that since the 1960s, between 40 per cent and 60 per cent of Arab children live below the poverty line.[30] This statistic is particularly grave in view of the fact that the Arab local governing authorities are themselves distressed financially as a result of budgetary inequities. Thus, they cannot be expected, either now or in the

foreseeable future, to run projects designed to reduce poverty among children or to deal with the immediate sociological and educational results of this poverty.

It appears, then, that the ministry is not interested in getting to the root of the social problems in the Arab sector. Without comprehensive, fundamental and wide-ranging solutions, social, familial and psychological problems are only exacerbated. The minimal and superficial efforts made to solve only the most pressing difficulties simply means that the basic problems continue to disrupt individuals and society at large. Thus, this partial funding actually goes down the drain, and no real results can be seen. For example, in 1998 the welfare bureau in Nazareth proposed a master plan for all matters under its jurisdiction with a budget totalling five million shekels. The ministry's response: 'Be reasonable. Set feasible priorities.' The budget was cut to 900,000 shekels, and the head of the bureau, Amal al-Far, was forced to relinquish fundamental elements of the project. Regarding the bureau's regular annual budget for that year, she stated, 'I assume that this year's budget will have a discrepancy of 100,000 shekels. I have written several letters to the ministry, and they've authorized 10,000 shekels. I must continue to fight this battle. A great deal of my time and energy is devoted to administrative matters of this type.'[31]

POPULATION DIFFERENCES AS REFLECTED IN WELFARE POLICY

The Arab and Jewish populations of Israel differ in many areas, including family structure, culture, religion, existing social institutions, and demographic structure. Thus, it might be expected that the Ministry of Social Affairs would adapt its goals, work methods and staff training to the particular needs of the client population. Without such adaptation, welfare policies are likely to constitute a detrimental intrusion on the unique nature of the society and culture. What were intended as welfare solutions become problems in themselves for the individual and for the society as well. For example, in cases of sexual abuse of minors within a family, the law requires that the abuser be imprisoned and that the victim be given shelter and emotional counselling. Experience with actual cases, however, has shown that imprisoning the abuser (who is usually a close relative) leads to the family being ostracized by the community. Thus, the victim is abused many times over: first by the original attacker; then by her family, which accuses her of breaking up the family circle and disgracing the entire family; and finally, by society as a whole, which spurns her and her family and blocks off all possibilities for rehabilitation. In such cases, the police and the social worker usually extract a commitment from the family not to harm the girl physically; nonetheless, they cannot protect the girl either psychologically or socially. In handling such cases, the ministry would better serve this population by adapting its treatment to the social structure, the values and the religious principles of Arab society. This adaptation could be implemented if Arab sociologists,

anthropologists and mental health professionals were to examine ministry laws and propose a set of laws whose intentions are suited to Arab society.

Another example from the field of welfare also illustrates how ministry policies are not suitable to the Arab sector. According to the Welfare Law, those who are sick and confined to their homes can receive help at home for a fee. This assistance usually amounts to a limited number of hours per day, or sometimes only a few hours a week. This law does take the needs of the Arab elderly into consideration. However, according to Arab social norms, a family member living with or near an elderly person must help with the person's daily care, even if this assistance constitutes a hardship. Because of these norms, family members will do everything they can to avoid sending the helpless old person to an institution. Thus, this extended family structure directly reduces the necessity for government budgetary spending. The law, however, forbids immediate family members, such as sons and daughters, to be paid for any help they give to their elderly relative even if the care of this relative has forced one of them to stay home and lose a source of income. In such cases, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Joint Distribution Committee of Israel have not adapted existing laws to the social and cultural structure of Arab society.

Halfway houses for troubled teenage girls are yet another example. Girls are transferred to these houses if, after several months in a shelter with appropriate counselling, they refuse to return to their families. In halfway houses in the Jewish sectors, groups of four to five girls live together and work to support themselves. In the one halfway house for such girls in the Arab sector, two counsellors and a social worker supervise the girls 24 hours a day. In Arab villages, it is not acceptable for young girls to live on their own. Thus, the expenses incurred by the Women Against Violence organization are much higher in the Arab sector. The Ministry of Social Affairs does not take this cultural reality into consideration in determining the annual budget for shelters and attendant projects in the Arab sector.[32] Consequently, the money allocated for halfway house counsellors is at the expense of other psychological and social programmes, so that the level of services provided to these distressed girls is decreased through no fault of those running the project.

As of 1998, the ministry had demonstrated no flexibility towards the special situation and unique conditions of Arab welfare clients. The ministry has never funded a basic study to ascertain the needs of Arab society. Moreover, it has not seen fit to train Arab social workers to adapt themselves to the special needs of Israel's Arab residents, including Druzes and Bedouins.[33]

Arab social workers who treat problems such as family violence and alcoholism cannot rely on theories that apply to families in Western society, nor can they make use of the state's existing treatment facilities. Unique programmes devised by the ministry are not at all appropriate for the Arab sector because of differences in familial and cultural structure.[34] Arab social workers have submitted a proposal to the ministry for creating their own programme and adapting it to the needs of the target population. For such a programme to be

created effectively, the ministry must fund a staff of Arab professionals from various disciplines (including a social worker, a social psychologist and a sociologist or anthropologist) and back up their work with appropriate assessment to determine the programme's effectiveness. This programme has not been implemented because it would require considerable funding. Similar programmes, however, have been regularly implemented in the Jewish sector, particularly among new immigrants.

The Israeli academic community has also disregarded the differences on all levels between the dominant Jewish population and the Arabs. Schools training social workers have not seen it necessary to offer even a single academic course focusing on Arabs. They do, however, offer special courses about immigration and Ethiopian and Russian family structures, and have trained cadres of professionals to deal with these special groups.[35]

Israeli professional literature on welfare services also mainly ignores the existence of the Arabs and does not devote any special sections to enlightening professionals or decision-makers regarding the special welfare needs in Arab society. The Ministry of Social Affairs has never funded studies on the welfare situation in the Arab sector, nor have other government institutions. In contrast, in recent years the ministry has funded dozens of studies on immigration and immigrant absorption and on other ethnic minorities.[36]

WELFARE SERVICES IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

There is an intimate relationship between the type and quality of welfare services provided to a particular group and the educational achievement level of its students. The declared policy of the Israeli Ministry of Education is to promote weak students and to narrow scholastic and social gaps between social classes.[37] The Ministry of Education believes that weak population groups require special assistance in order reach appropriate levels of achievement and, in fact, to conform to the Compulsory Education Law. To achieve this goal, the ministry allocates special funds for the social and mental welfare of all students, and particularly for those students living under difficult social conditions. An examination of welfare activities within the Arab school system in Israel reveals a shortage of three types of resources: (1) appropriate educational centres; (2) funded positions; and (3) tools and materials necessary for proper functioning.

1. Shortage of Appropriate Educational Centres

Figures show that between 75 per cent and 85 per cent of Arab three-yearolds and close to 50 per cent of four-year-olds are not enrolled in any educational centre whatsoever. In comparison, 96 per cent and 98 per cent respectively of Jewish children are enrolled in appropriate centres. The Follow-Up Committee for Educational Affairs in the Arab Sector feels that this failure to enforce the law requiring compulsory education from age three stems from the fact that such

enforcement would primarily benefit the Arabs. Thus, they believe that the Education Ministry's undeclared policy in the field is to institutionalize the existing gap between the two population groups.[38]

The dropout rate in Arab schools is constantly rising. Until the year 2002, no sincere and comprehensive effort has been made to treat the source and scope of this problem. In 1984–85, the dropout rate in the Arab sector was 40.55 per cent of all students in grade 12,[39] compared to a dropout rate of 55 per cent in 1996.[40] In 1998, the dropout rate in the Jewish sector among a comparable student group was 18.4 per cent. Since the establishment of the state, there have not been sufficient programmes provided for Arab student dropouts, such as Industrial Development Centres for Youth.[41] These special centres provide a solution for students who reach junior high school with only minimal reading and maths skills. These children do not suffer from mental retardation but rather from environmental deprivation. There are five Industrial Development Centres for Youth in the entire Arab sector, one in the Negev. According to Haidar's survey, around 20 additional centres are needed. The centres in the Arab sector serve only boys; there is no parallel programme available for Arab girls. Since the dropout rate has increased almost 11 per cent over the past ten years, we can assume that the number of programmes required for these dropouts in the Arab sector should also be increased. One such centre is under construction in a Druze village, while the minister's adviser on Arab affairs has estimated that an additional three centres are needed immediately.[42]

Note, too, that special programmes for dropouts, such as vocational training schools or vocational courses offered by the National Insurance Institute, do not exist in the Arab sector, though they are available to the Jewish population. In summary, the Arabs suffer from acute social, educational and economic deprivation because of a shortage of programmes geared to Arab school dropouts who are not employed.[43] Such a problem is not evident in the Jewish sector for three main reasons: (a) a relatively low dropout rate; (b) availability of appropriate educational centres for dropouts; and (c) mobilization into the Israel Defence Forces, where social, educational and vocational guidance is provided to marginal youth.

If close to 55 per cent of Arab students drop out of school before completing the 12th grade, it is reasonable to assume that most of them have joined the workforce, even though some are as young as 14.[44] These youngsters work under dreadful conditions and illegally; they are exploited, both in the number of hours and the type of work allowed for this age group, and they are not given the opportunity to complete their educational or vocational training.[45] This type of employment only broadens and institutionalizes the gap between Jews and Arabs. Added to this grim picture is the shortage in educational and cultural centres geared to this age group, such as community centres, sports centres and youth clubs.[46] These young people constitute the nucleus of the next generation of Arab adults, a generation that is uneducated, unskilled, economically powerless, and lacking in firm cultural and social ties to the society in which they live.

Moreover, from a sociological point of view, it can be expected that the percentage of these young people likely to deviate from social norms exceeds their actual percentage in the general population. Because of a shortage in funded positions for social workers and counsellors to handle street gangs in Arab villages, no preventive measures are taken in respect of these problems.

There is also a shortage in protective custody institutions for Arab juvenile delinquents. Some are tried and sentenced to serve in prison alongside adult criminals; others must wait to serve their sentences until a place in an appropriate correctional institution is found for them.[47] Today the trend is towards privatizing the protective custody service in order to meet the needs in the field.

Special education in the Arab sector has also been hit hard by a lack of funding and appropriate institutions. From year to year, the gap between growing needs and limited services widens, thus exacerbating the problem. In 1994, at least 215 five-year-olds were supposed to be placed in special educational centres; however, these centres could not be set up, so the children remained in the regular school system. In 1997, at least 5,232 Arab children from first to ninth grades who had studied in regular classes were to be transferred to special classes; this transfer did not take place. That same year, an additional 1,373 Arab children were to receive special education services in their regular classes; these services were also denied them. Moreover, by 1997, no funding was available to open special classes for at least 3,029 Arab children targeted for such classes.[48] The Action Committee for Special Education in the Arab sector wrote a letter to the late minister of education, Zevulun Hammer, reminding him of the conclusions of the 1994 master plan to implement the Special Education Law issued jointly by the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Pedagogic Administration and the Special Education Division. This letter, however, as well as subsequent committee activities, did nothing to change the special education situation in the Arab sector. As of 1997, there was a shortage of paramedics, aides and professional supervisors to work with special groups such as the blind, the deaf and the mute, to say nothing of a lack of special schools for these groups. Moreover, institutions such as vocational junior high schools geared to special education needs were also lacking. There was also a shortage in adequate educational programmes and after-school enrichment programmes in Arabic. And, as in other welfare areas, there were not enough public buildings targeted for special education needs.[49]

In addition to services provided by the Psychological Counselling Service (PCS), a variety of other programmes are available that offer welfare services to children and youth. Some are government programmes, such as those under the auspices of the Education and Social Services Division, or quasi-governmental, such as those sponsored by the Histadrut Labour Federation. Other programmes are sponsored by private organizations, including Na'amat (organization of working women and volunteers), WIZO, the Zionist Federation, and the Islamic Movement.[50] Following is a summary of the services provided in the Arab sector by some of these organizations.

Education and Social Services Division. Through 1997, the services of the Education and Social Services Division were not made available to Arabs based on the claim that the organization was funded by Jewish donors from abroad. That year, the Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education threatened to petition the High Court of Justice and, indeed, carried out this threat. The division presents its budget as a government budget funded by the state. Its annual report states: The Education and Social Services Division uses government allocated resources to bolster and empower weak groups in the population by developing new initiatives'.[51] Furthermore, the division does not claim to be a service exclusively geared to the Jewish population. The goal of The Education and Social Services Division is to develop *all* students from weak groups who are studying in academic tracks, in classes geared to partial matriculation, in guidance classes and in youth centers, in order to help them find a way to fit into society.' (Emphasis in original.)

As of the mid-1990s, some elements of this programme are being implemented partially and in a limited way in a number of Arab villages. Most are run under the auspices of the urban renewal programme and are not available to Arabs. Funds granted to these restricted operations are also limited, thus precluding an effective and fundamental attack on educational problems.

Na'amat. Na'amat began its operations in the Arab sector at the end of the 1960s. By 1998, Na'amat ran a relatively limited number of projects in the Arab sector in comparison to the Jewish sector. These include three vocational schools and 30 guidance classes for female dropouts and for women in 11 Arab villages. A programme to help female dropouts complete their matriculation certificates was offered in a number of schools. In all, these programmes have helped 700 girls. In addition, Na'amat, in cooperation with the National Insurance Institute, offers courses in Arabic for single mothers (especially widows), as well as a course in business entrepreneurship and clubs for around 300 businesswomen. Na'amat provides legal assistance through two Arab attorneys (as opposed to 20 Jewish attorneys who serve the Jewish sector). The organization also offers assistance to women who are the victims of family violence and has allocated four of the 15 beds in its battered women's shelter for Arab women. In the field of pre-school education, Na'amat set up 18 daycare centres in the Arab sector (compared to 330 in the Jewish sector), in addition to one mixed daycare centre in Jaffa and five nursery schools.[52]

Na'amat has reduced its operations in the Arab sector because of financial difficulties within the organization and also in the Histadrut Labour Federation. What's more, the small number of daycare centres founded by Na'amat also reflects the fact that the minimal fee, after Ministry of Social Affairs subsidies, still constitutes an economic burden on large families in the Arab villages. The ministry is not willing to grant these families a special fee different from that charged in the Jewish sector.[53]

WIZO. The few women's centres set up by WIZO specifically to serve Arab women can be found in Haifa, Nazareth and Acre. These centres offer activities

for women and programmes for children. The organization also runs a centre for single mothers, which plans on developing a special programme for Arab women in the Haifa area. WIZO has also set up a centre for Circassian women, three centres for Druze women, and one centre in a Bedouin village. These centres all offer similar activities.

WIZO plays an active role in one Arab community centre in the village of Tarshiha, particularly in activities geared to children and youth. The centre serves 350 children. In contrast, in the Jewish sector, WIZO has 22 centres, 30 clubhouses, 16 play centres, five educational centres, and a hotline for children at risk.

In mixed cities, many Arab children are enrolled in WIZO daycare centres. In Tel Aviv, WIZO has set up three multipurpose daycare centres for Arab children from troubled families. WIZO also has a daycare centre in Jaffa. In the Jewish sector, WIZO runs 167 nursery schools and three daycare centres. Several Arab students study at WIZO's vocational schools, which have an open admissions policy.[54]

WIZO does not provide services for the elderly in the Arab sector, while in the Jewish sector, it operates close to 100 centres for the elderly, one senior citizens' home, and a hotline for the elderly.[55]

In summary, the two most influential women's organizations in Israel are not eager to set up centres in Arab villages for budgetary reasons. The three WIZO centres operating in Druze villages are run on a voluntary basis.

Arab Voluntary Organizations. Two serious studies have attempted to estimate the number of local organizations and associations that provide welfare services in the Arab sector: a 1991 study conducted by the Jaffa Research Center and a 1993 study conducted by the Givat Haviva Jewish-Arab Center for Peace. The 1991 study reported on 186 local organizations, committees and associations in the Arab sector operating in 36.84 per cent of all Arab towns and villages.[56] Of these, the 5.4 per cent set up before 1948 are primarily Christian charitable organizations; close to 75 per cent of the remaining organizations were established between 1980 and 1990. The few groups set up before 1960 (around three per cent) are usually committees or Islam associations organized in the mixed cities. Recently, an important feature of such groups has been their focus on social, cultural and political development. This ideological thrust has probably been influenced by intercultural contact between Palestinians living in Israel and those living on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and in the Arab Diaspora. Another contributing factor is the rise in the number of college-educated Arabs as well as the increased ideological power of the Islamic Movement. Note that until 1990, 18.3 per cent of all voluntary Arab organizations in Israel belonged to the Islamic Movement. The authors of the 1991 study assumed that this percentage was much higher but that the actual figure was difficult to assess because many of these organizations centred their activities in the mosques. Moreover, within the Islamic Movement, it was difficult to isolate social welfare activities from other Movement activities. Furthermore,

most of the organizations and associations were either overtly or covertly affiliated with political parties or other political or religious organizations.[57] The 1993 study revealed that up to 36.84 per cent of the centres in the Arab sector belonged to the Communist Party and 14.73 per cent to the Islamic Movement; almost 10.52 per cent of all the Arab villages had centres run by local women's organizations. The Histadrut ran centres in 72.63 per cent of the Arab villages; activities of other groups such as Na'amat or WIZO were extremely limited and, in some places, negligible.[58]

Not all the organizations reported on provide the expected level of activity. At least 40 per cent operate on a temporary or seasonal basis. Functioning organizations usually focus on services for young children, such as running private nursery schools, providing training centres, and introducing computers to the Arab villages. Most of these organizations are financed by outside funds, and their ongoing services are dependent on continued outside support. They have no way of becoming financially independent.

These voluntary organizations played a significant role in the Arab communities and provided welfare services that other institutions, such as the local government, were unable to establish in the Arab sector.[59] On the other hand, the very existence of these organizations, centres and associations is another example of the degree to which social and educational welfare in Israel has been politicized.

2. Shortage of Funded Positions

The mental and social well-being of students within the school system directly affects their school performance. Therefore, the Ministry of Education employs psychologists and educational counsellors to serve the system and the individual. Their duties can be summarized as follows: (1) screening students for various educational settings; (2) matching school services to the specific needs of the students; (3) providing the children, as individuals and as a group, with emotional and social support; and (4) directing and advising the system regarding students or issues that affect the mental and social well-being of a student or a group of students.

In 1996, psychologists were employed in only 32 per cent of Arab schools, compared to 75 per cent of Jewish schools. This gloomy picture is even worse than it appears on the surface when we consider that all of the psychologists and counsellors in the Arab sector hold meagre part-time positions that are not sufficient to meet the needs of the students they are supposed to be serving. For example, a city such as Acre, with an Arab student population of almost 2,700, has one half-time psychologist. The required ratio, according to the Psychological Counselling Service, is one full-time psychologist for every 600 students.[60] The situation in Acre is not an anomaly; rather, it represents the norm in the Arab school system. Under such circumstances, psychologists and educational counsellors work mainly to solve immediate and pressing problems

and do not have the luxury to develop educational and psychological welfare programmes or to devise preventive strategies that would meet the needs of every institution or community.

There is a serious shortage of psychological counselling services in the Arab school system. When asked about the quality of services in their schools, 97 per cent of Arab principals employing a school psychologist requested that the PCS increase the psychologist's job percentage. A report issued by the PCS indicates that:

> …when measured by the make-up of counseling services in a school, the gap between the Jewish and non-Jewish sectors is extreme. Only 3% of schools in the Jewish sector have no PCS personnel whatsoever, while in the non-Jewish sector, 51% of schools have neither a counselor nor a psychologist. 58% xof schools in the Jewish sector have two mental health professionals, as compared to only 7% of non-Jewish schools.[61]

3.Shortage of the Tools and Materials Necessary for Proper Functioning

Diagnostic tests. The PCS has chosen to adapt and standardize psychological tests that have proved effective in Western countries. Since the establishment of the state, the PCS has not seen fit to fund development of a battery of diagnostic tests and tools geared specifically to the language and the social and cultural structure of the Arab sector. Arab psychologists responsible for screening children and assigning them to special educational institutions have testified that the locally developed tools available to them do not adequately measure the real status of Arab students.[62] Needless to say, the fate of a student is often sealed for life as a result of these tests. In the Ministry of Education's five-year plan, the PCS has promised to correct this injustice.

Professional literature. Since 1948, the Ministry of Education's Staff Programmes Department and the PCS have issued hundreds of books and pamphlets geared to educational counsellors, psychologists and special education teachers who work with schoolchildren of all ages. Fewer than five have been issued in Arabic, and all were published during the last five years of the 1990s. Thus, Arab professionals are forced to work without necessary reference materials or, alternatively, must translate existing materials into Arabic. This literature does not always meet the needs of the Arab school system. Moreover, translation consumes precious work hours, leaving a part-time counsellor or psychologist without sufficient time to treat all problem areas.

In summary, cumulative shortages in the school system can be attributed to the following omissions on the part of the Ministry of Education: failure to adapt its policies to the needs of the Arab sector; failure to carry out its five-year plans; failure to allocate funds according to the actual needs of the Arab sector and not according to percentages in the total student population; and failure to construct permanent buildings. These shortages have led to serious injustices, both for welfare clients within the school system (namely pupils requiring special

education) as well as for ordinary students who may be harmed by having to study alongside these problematic students.

PROFESSIONAL FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEES

In democratic countries, it is very common for professionals to organize themselves into professional associations. Generally, the purpose of such organizations is to ameliorate employment conditions and advance professional status. People active in such organizations usually try to modify the economic policies of various government ministries in order to enhance their own professional status and improve the terms of their employment. Arab mental health professionals, in contrast, have organized themselves with the express purpose of effecting changes in government policy regarding civil equality, equal opportunity, equal allocation of resources to Jews and Arabs, and improvement of services granted to the Arab sector. Such changes would eventually improve conditions for Arab professional workers as well. These professionals are battling for the most elementary goals, such as opening special education classes, rather than for expanding programmes in such classes or for improving the employment conditions of special education teachers.

One sign of Arab professional political involvement is the establishment of professional follow-up committees. These committees developed naturally in the wake of professional conferences in education (since 1984) and social welfare (since 1987). Key academics, professionals and fieldworkers saw the importance of making the entire Arab population and, in fact, the whole country aware of their individual frustrations with the level of services. Intellectuals, political figures and other Arab leaders gather at these conferences, which are held every four years. Conference activities take place across the country, in Arab communities in the Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev, and in the mixed cities, in order to ensure public support and enthusiasm.

The Follow-Up Committee for Education in the Arab Sector in Israel is composed of representatives from the following groups: teachers' organizations, education professionals, the Head Follow-Up Committee, parent associations and university students. The declared purpose of the committee is to supervise education in the Arab sector and to seek educational equality between the Arab and Jewish sectors.[63] Arab schools report to the committee about every problem that the Ministry of Education does not adequately handle. In actuality, the committee supervises and speaks for educational services in the Arab sector.

The Follow-Up Committee on Welfare in the Arab Sector was set up following the first Arab welfare conference held in 1987. Its members are social workers, psychologists, educational guidance counsellors, economists, and representatives from the Head Follow-Up Committee. The committee set its goal as improving services and economic conditions in the Arab sector by pressuring responsible government ministries for funds and positions.[64]

The two follow-up committees mentioned above believe in the importance of surveys and studies as a bargaining point in the professional debate over budgets and services and as a means of pressuring various government ministries. Recently, the Follow-Up Committee on Welfare in the Arab Sector proposed establishing a centre for applied research in order to implement committee decisions.[65]

Despite the perceptible influence of these two committees, and despite the top professional level of their staffs, not one government ministry has officially recognized them as representative bodies. Over the years, the committees have met with education and welfare ministers from various political parties, but each of these ministers explicitly related to them as individuals rather than as representatives of official organizations. Following this same policy, welfare district managers have tried their best to delegitimize the follow-up committees. They warned both Arab and Jewish ministry employees not to participate in follow-up committee conferences because the ministry does not recognize the committee's existence and does not agree to release its social workers to attend workshops organized by the committee.[66]

Arab expectations on the one hand, and the political response of government ministries on the other, served to enhance the trend towards politicizing the follow-up committees. Nevertheless, the two committees continued to declare their political neutrality. Dr Sami Jaraysi, the first chairman of the Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, tried to underscore the nature of the gap that the committee was trying to close, as well as the committee's political neutrality:

> …we have no solutions. Changing policies, circumstances and positions that have existed for dozens of years is not easy. It is difficult to expect that an organization lacking in political or partisan strength can correct what has gone wrong for generations. Nevertheless, neither we nor you (Arab population as a whole) have ever believed that it would be simple or easy to make the necessary changes. We have been and will continue to be a moral, social, humanitarian, nonpartisan, and unofficial force striving from faith to achieve full equality in all areas.[67]

The working conditions of Arab educational and welfare professionals have forced almost all of them, at some point in their professional careers, to spend time confronting 'the powers that be' rather than focusing solely on personal development and professional undertakings. The experience of Dr Mahmud Saleh, a senior psychologist in the Psychological Counselling Service, provides one illustrative example. In order to influence the PCS to include standardization of psychological tests for the Arab sector in its five-year plan, he had to canvass members of Knesset who would be willing to apply pressure in order to mobilize resources and funds. The extent of political involvement required and the difficult work conditions lead to rapid professional burnout. Moreover, limited resources are quickly exhausted, and precious energy is dissipated on political

wheeling and dealing and on seeking budgets, activities that have no direct connection to the ethos of their profession. Such an atmosphere ultimately leads to a drop in the level of services and harms the client population.

IS THE STATE OF ISRAEL A WELFARE STATE FOR ITS ARAB CITIZENS?

The state of Israel takes pride in being a relatively young country whose progressive social legislation surpasses that of more established Western nations. Yet one must consider the information outlined above, as well as other data that points to large gaps in the level and quality of welfare services provided to Israel's Arab population compared to its Jewish population.[68] In view of all this evidence, the question becomes: is the state of Israel a welfare state for its Arab citizens as well?

According to Shahar, 'welfare policies are those policies whose goals are to ensure freedom from want and from unemployment, social security and well-being for all the nation's citizens.'[69] He also outlines the following conditions defining social distress:

1. Low per capita income.
2. Inferior living conditions.
3. Large percentage of families subsisting on welfare.
4. High unemployment rate.
5. Many marginal and disenfranchised young people.
6. High crime rate.
7. Low-status occupations.[70]

In the following discussion, I will attempt to examine the extent to which each of these conditions exists in the Arab sector in Israel.

1. Low Income

Seventy-six per cent of all employed Arabs are in the bottom three to five percentiles on the poverty scale and constitute the majority in the four lowest percentiles.[71]

2. Inferior Living Conditions

The immediate causes of housing problems in the Arab sector are as follows: expropriation of Arab lands; limitations on the jurisdiction boundaries of Arab villages so that they cannot develop and build new neighbourhoods for young couples; serious housing problems and slums in the mixed cities caused by the influx of internal refugees starting in 1948; and a large discrepancy between mortgages granted to eligible Arabs and housing costs in Israel. As a result of these factors, housing has become one of the most acute problems facing Arabs

today. Land for construction in Arab villages has become a rare commodity. The villages can be developed and expanded only by allowing them to annex government lands and sell them to young Arab couples at subsidized prices and by improving mortgage terms.

3.Welfare Payments

In cities in the Jewish sector, only two per cent of families on average receive welfare payments; among the Arabs, this number is 20 per cent. Figures provided by the National Insurance Institute indicate that in 1997 in Nazareth, for example, the percentage of those on welfare was 12 times the national average. In 1996, a quarter of the Arab population lived below the poverty level even after receiving social welfare allowances. This figure is half for Jews.[72]

4. Unemployment

The highest unemployment rate is found in the Arab villages, particularly in Druze communities. It often reaches 11 per cent of the workforce in a given community. The actual unemployment rate is much higher than the official rate for the following reasons: the unemployed often do casual labour in the village or on family land; women who don't work outside the home are not registered as unemployed; some people fail to register at the Unemployment Bureau, either because the bureau is too far away from home or because unemployment is considered a shame for Arab men.[73]

5.Problems of Youth

Almost 50 per cent of Israeli Arab youngsters under the age of 18 are not in any educational environment whatsoever. No Arab community in Israel offers any comprehensive local or regional solutions for dropouts, disenfranchised youth or troubled youth.

6. Crime Rate

The crime rate in the Arab sector among young people and adults is disproportionately higher than the percentage of Arabs in the general population.[74] This is the result of a shortage of welfare institutions for young people as well as a lack of preventive and treatment programmes.

7.Occupational Status

Twenty per cent of the Arab workforce are employed in white-collar jobs, while 41.9 per cent work in agriculture, industry, mining, construction and transportation and 10.5 per cent work in unskilled labour.[75] Thus, the Arabs do most of the country's manual labour.

According to Shahar's criteria,[76] then, most of Israel's Arabs live under conditions of social distress. Moreover, if we disregard subsidy allowances granted to children, to widows, widowers and orphans, and to the elderly, which

are equal among all population groups,[77] figures attesting to the quality and scope of actual welfare services indicate that the state of Israel does not provide its Arab citizens the same welfare services as it does its Jewish citizens.

There are those who would contend that Israel has done well by its Arab citizens in the area of social welfare. This contention is based on a comparison between the conditions of Arabs living in Israel and those living in Arab countries. Such a claim serves to embellish the little that the state actually does for the welfare of its Arab citizens. Arab citizens live and work and pay taxes in Israel and must conduct their daily lives according to conditions in Israel. Accurate and effective comparisons can be made only with other sectors within the country and not with other nations and societies living under different conditions and having different relationships with their governments.

There is a close and inevitable relationship between the political line of the ruling administration and its welfare policies.[78] Allocation of welfare budgets is based on ideological, humanitarian and moral motives. These motives lead the government to take responsibility for social matters by allocating budgets and developing services.[79]

It is evident, then, that the state of Israel itself played a role in producing and establishing the social distress now experienced by the majority of Arabs. The state of Israel was responsible for uprooting numerous Arabs from their communities and confiscating their property, leading to psychosociological problems characteristic of immigrants. Employment and housing shortages have stemmed from the 18 years of Martial Law (1948–66) as well as from laws prohibiting Arabs from congregating on and working their own lands, which had been designated as closed military areas. The refugees who flooded to the cities and villages drastically increased the local population, and communities had no time to prepare for this influx or to provide appropriate services. The consequences of all this are still being felt today and are reflected in almost every aspect of economic and social life within the Arab community.

Furthermore, the state expropriated the Arabs' right to manage and make use of funds belonging to the Muslim *waqf,* which had played a central role in charitable undertakings in the Arab community. Before the establishment of the state of Israel, the *waqf* funded a variety of projects whose goal was the well-being of the individual and of society as a whole. Since 1948, the Arab community of Israel has not been able to regain its control of *waqf* property,[80] nor has it managed to establish any philanthropic organizations of the same order and economic magnitude.

During the 1948 war, many Arab educators fled to Arab countries, leading to a serious shortage of qualified professionals. This shortage was a blow to Arab society, and particularly to the educational system. The fact that unqualified persons gained entry into the system until such time as new cadres of professionals could be developed can still be felt in the Arab school system. Moreover, employment of Jews as teachers and school principals and as

developers of educational programmes and philosophies only served to increase Arab lack of confidence in the educational system.

Current official policy is to increase welfare services to the Arab sector. Those who have been appointed to execute this policy, however, do not necessarily agree with this political line. They have no wish to further the welfare of Arab communities and often find various ways to deter funding or to block the execution of ministry decisions. For example, the Ministry of Social Affairs has approved a nationwide programme geared to children at risk. A high-ranking official in the ministry's Northern District has decided to enforce this project only in communities with over 50,000 inhabitants. Based on this decision, almost all the Arabs of the region, with the exception of those living in Nazareth, have been excluded from the project.[81]

PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE

Despite the change in government policies towards Arabs, particularly those policies backed up by legislation, there are no assurances that funds earmarked for Arabs will reach their destination. These funds can be blocked at a number of levels: by government officials who don't necessarily approve of progress for Arabs; by budgetary problems in the Arab local government authorities, which have a tendency to swallow up funds dedicated for other purposes; and by problems of budgetary inequality between Jews and Arabs living in the mixed cities. Consequently, I propose the following steps for changing this existing situation. These steps can be directed, implemented and supervised in the future by follow-up committees, professional organizations, Arab leaders and representatives in the Knesset, and others as well.

1. A. In order to neutralize the power of government officials who are hostile to the Arabs, a separate Authority for Welfare and Education should be set up in the Arab sector. This authority should be funded directly by the government and run by Arab officials and professionals. Budgetary allocation should be according to designated projects needed to develop the Arab sector and not according to the percentage of Arabs in the general population.

   B. An Arab public steering committee, made up of public leaders, academics and professionals, should determine the policies of this authority. Its staff appointments should be according to their professional skills and qualifications for the job rather than upon their political affiliation. The steering committee should find an appropriate formula to tie the activities of the authority to the needs of local Arab government authorities and should determine the type of cooperation and financial and executive responsibility for each party.

   C. The Authority for Welfare and Education would hold special courses for mental health workers in order to train them to meet the special needs of

the Arab population. This training would place particular emphasis on the special cultural circumstances of Druze and Bedouin groups. The courses would provide instruction on the unique culture of the Arab family and the importance of the community in the life of the individual and the Arab village as a whole. Professional workers should also be trained to adapt Western theoretical treatment issues to the special needs of Arabs.

    D. The authority would research the special needs of the Arab population. It would develop and standardize diagnostic and intelligence tests that conform to the needs of Arab schools. It would also modernize the reference library by acquiring books and materials geared to the experience and needs of Arab pupils and professionals. Moreover, it would develop preventive programmes and use them to educate the community.

    E. The authority would strive to provide channels to educate Arabs about their rights to welfare services.

2. The government should formulate budgetary five-year plans or three-year plans for bridging the education and welfare gaps between the Jewish and Arab sectors. Until complete equality has been established, extensive affirmative action policies must be enacted in order to compensate for the injustices of the past 50 years. Such extensive projects are already being implemented for other minority groups, such as immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia.

3. The state should compensate the Arabs for losses incurred through mismanagement of *waqf* funds. This could be accomplished by establishing special funds for social and educational development, welfare and charity. These funds would not constitute compensation for *waqf monies.* Such compensation will apparently be included in the final settlement negotiations with Arab representatives from Israel and abroad regarding peace in the region.

4. The state must make special funds available so that the authority can train its professional staff to handle emotional and social problems that have arisen among Arabs who lost their homes, properties and family and were transformed into refugees. These professionals should treat the social problems of those still considered refugees as well as of the original residents. These special funds could be considered as initial compensation for loss of life and well-being in the wake of the 1948 war.

5. The Arabs must be given the opportunity to recruit donations from Christian and Muslim Arabs living in Arab countries or other locations abroad, just as the Jewish Agency, WIZO, Hadash and other organizations solicit funds for education, welfare and charity from Jewish donors worldwide. Similar charitable organizations organized in the Arab sector wiould develop educational, mental health and welfare programmes.

Establishing a separate Authority for Welfare and Education in the Arab sector would make it possible to provide extensive and in-depth services that can meet

the special needs of Arabs. This authority, together with other organizations in the field, could develop preventive programmes and strive to equalize welfare services in the Arab sector with those available in the Jewish sector.

SUMMARY

The relationship between Jews and Arabs within Israel is by its very nature political and is characterized by a dominant majority and a dominated national and cultural minority. This political reality is reflected in every interaction between the two groups. The general policies of any modern country make their mark on its welfare policies as well. The state of Israel is a welfare state and has always placed social welfare as one of its foremost national priorities, particularly during extraordinary times, such as the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia in the 1990s. The state of Israel, however, has not applied the welfare principle of redistributing resources to its Arab citizens. With the exception of equal subsidy allowances granted to children, to widows, widowers and orphans, and to the elderly, the welfare situation for Arabs does not resemble and is not equal to that for Jews. This inequality is the result of political motives as well as general policy decisions regarding welfare and other issues made by all of Israel's governments. Despite the dramatic improvements in welfare services in the Arab sector since 1992, the percentage of the welfare budget that actually reaches the Arab welfare bureaux is only 12 per cent of the total budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs. This figure is one-third lower than the actual percentage of Arabs in the population and significantly lower than the actual welfare needs of the Arab population. It is impossible to separate welfare problems in the Arab sector from political policy. Thus, any proposed solution for improving welfare conditions must take this actuality into consideration. Judging from past experience, it appears that the most effective way to improve welfare services for Arabs is to set up a separate and independent Authority for Welfare and Education in the Arab sector.

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NOTES

1. Avraham Doron, *The Welfare State in a Changing Society,* Jerusalem, 1992, p.42 (in Hebrew).
2. Aziz Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population,* San Francisco, 1991.
3. Ibid.
4. The *zakat* is a system of taxes on property, land, animals, capital and jewellery. The *zakat* is considered a religious commandment and constitutes one of the five fundamental pillars of Islam.
5. Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and thePolicies towards Them,* Jerusalem, 1992 (in Hebrew).
6. See Doron, *The Welfare State in a Changing Society,* chs.1–3.
7. The activities of several organizations in the Arab sector will be described below.
8. See Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*
9. Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Conference on Social Services for Arabsin Israel,* Nazareth, 1987 (in Arabic); Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of theSecond Conference on Social Services for Arabs in Israel,* Nazareth, 1991 (in Arabic).
10. Husni al-'Aabid, interview, 26 Feb. 1998; Amal al-Far, interview, 19 March 1998; Harb Amara, interview, 26 Feb. 1998; A'aida Tuma Suleiman, interview, 6 April 1998.
11. This assumption applies to similar population groups. In the case of Arabs, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs should allocate funds according to development needs and problems specific to the Arab population. Thus, while the percentage of Arabs living in Israel ranges from 16 to 18 per cent of the total population, the welfare funds allocated to meet their needs should range from 40 to 50 per cent of the total annual welfare budget until the gaps between the two groups have been bridged.
12. Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Conference on Social Services for Arabsin Israel* and *Proceedings of the Second Conference on Social Services for Arabs in Israel.*
13. Amin Faris, personal communication, 1998.
14. Triangle: concentration of Arab villages in the centre of Israel.
15. Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Conference on Social Services for Arabsin Israel.*

16. Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, internal documents, 1990.
17. For more information on the level of services, see Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Conference on Social Services for Arabs in Israel* and *Proceedings of theSecond Conference on Social Services for Arabs in Israel.*
18. Alouph Hareven and As'ad Ghanem, *Retrospect and Prospects: Equality and Integration,* Jerusalem, 1997 (in Hebrew).
19. Jihad S'ad, a member of the Follow-Up Committee and the National Association for Social Workers, points out that the National Association supported the decisions of the Follow-Up Committee, thus playing a major role in spurring this change. The Association even called for studies in order to verify the authenticity of the demands of the Arab sector at that time: interview, 19 March 1998.
20. Ministry Welfare Advisory Bureau, internal document, 18 Jan. 1998.
21. Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*
22. The official title is Ministry Adviser on Non-Jewish Affairs.
23. Interview, 16 May 1998.
24. Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*
25. 'Abas, internal documents, 1996.
26. 'Abas, *The Arabs in Israel 1948–1990,* internal booklet, p.9.
27. Amal al-Far, interview, 19 March 1998.
28. For more details, see 'As Atrash, *Days Go by: Unemployment among Arabs in Israel,* Institute for Israeli Arab Studies, Beit-Berl, 1995 (in Hebrew); Amin Faris, *Beyond the Pitta-Bread:Poverty and Economic Gaps among the Arabs in Israel,* Institute for Israeli Arab Studies, Beit-Berl, 1993 (in Hebrew). See also Hareven and Ghanem, *Retrospect and Prospects.*
29. Central Bureau of Statistics, Publication No.1082, Jerusalem, 1996, pp.39–40.
30. Ahmed S'adi, 'Poverty among Arab Children in Israel: A Question of Citizenship', in Johnny Gal (ed.), *Children Living in Poverty in Israel: A Multidisciplinary Study,* Jerusalem, 1997 (in Hebrew).
31. Amal al-Far, interview, 19 March 1998.
32. A'aida Tuma Suleiman, interview, 6 April 1998.
33. For more on the significance of adapting professional training to the needs of the population, see Marwan Dwairy, *Cross-Cultural Counseling: The Arab-Palestinian Case,* New York, 1998.
34. Harb Amara, interview, 26 Feb. 1998.
35. One exception was the Central School for Social Workers that offered Arab social workers a one-time special orientation training session on violence: Husni al-'Aabid, interview, 26 Feb. 1998.
36. Husni al-'Aabid, interview 26 Feb. 1998.
37. See introduction by Avi Levi in Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, *Work Plan of theEducation and Social Services Division for the Academic Year 1997–98,* Jerusalem, 1998, p.ii (in Hebrew).
38. Follow-up Committee for Arab Education in Israel, *Report on the Status of Arab Educationin Israel,* internal document, Feb. 1998.
39. Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*
40. Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education, *Report on the Status of Arab Education in Israel.*
41. Hebrew acronym *Maptan* (Industrial Development Centres for Youth).
42. Ministry of Social Affairs, internal documents, 1997.

43. Husni al-ʿAabid, interview, 26 Feb. 1998.

44. According to Faris, *Beyond the Pitta-Bread,* 71.4 per cent of the Arab population in the 15–17 age group worked full time, while close to 26 per cent of Jewish youth in the same age bracket worked full time.

45. For more details on work conditions for Arab girls, see Barbara Swirski, 'Israeli Women on the Assembly Line', in Annette Fuentes and Barbara Ehrenreich (eds.), *Women in the GlobalFactory,* trans. Shlomo Swirski, Haifa, 1987 (in Hebrew), pp. 69–126.

46. Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*

47. Ibid.

48. Jaber ʿAsaqla, personal communication, 18 Feb. 1997.

49. Hareven and Ghanem, *Retrospect and Prospects.*

50. Exact figures on the involvement of the Islamic Movement in welfare services in the Arab sector were impossible to obtain, despite numerous inquiries. It is common knowledge that the Islamic Movement runs organizations and institutions that provide services to single-parent families, families of prisoners, students, the poor and the needy, and others as well.

51. Ministry of Education, *Work Plan,* p.2.

52. Carmel Eitan, Naʿamat spokeswoman, personal communication, 2 Sept. 1998.

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58. Asʿad Ghanem, *Israel's Arabs at the Onset of the 21st Century: A Basic Survey,* Givat Haviva Jewish-Arab Center for Peace, 1993 (in Hebrew).

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61. Rahel Arhard, *Guidance Counseling and Psychological Services in the Educational System,* Jerusalem, 1996, p.41 (in Hebrew).

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63. Follow-Up Committee for Arab Education, *Report on the Status of Arab Education in Israel.*

64. Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Second Conference on Social Servicesfor Arabs in Israel.*

65. Harb Amara, interview, 26 Feb. 1998.

66. Follow-Up Committee on Welfare, *Proceedings of the Conference on Social Services for Arabsin Israel,* Nazareth, 1991; see also Information Committee, *Operations,* Nazareth, 1991 (in Arabic).

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71. Faris, *Beyond the Pitta-Bread;* see also Alouph Hareven, *Retrospect and Prospects: Full andEqual Citizenship?,* Jerusalem, 1998.

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74. Haidar, *Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population.*

75. Benziman and Mansour, *Subtenants.*

76. Shahar, *The Welfare State of Israel*

77. In 1997, for example, child allowances were equal in the two sectors—for details, see Hareven and Ghanem, *Retrospect and Prospects.*

78. Doron, *The Welfare State in a Changing Society.*

79. Center for Social Policy Research in Israel, *Resource Allocation for Social Services,* Jerusalem, 1997 (in Hebrew).

80. The scope of this article is too limited to provide a detailed explanation of the history of the struggle of the Palestinians in Israel over the right to manage *waqf property* or to outline the extent of this property and its importance toward improving the welfare situation in the Arab sector.

81. Husni al-'Aabid, interview, 26 Feb. 1998.

A Binational Society: The Jewish-Arab Cleavage and Tolerance Education in the State of Israel

DAN SOEN

> We do a lot—perhaps too much—to prepare our students and to train them for tomorrow, which might be a time of war. We do hardly anything, and certainly not enough, in order to prepare the students and to train them for that same tomorrow which might bring Peace, at least in our region—for which we must bear direct responsibility.[1]

ISRAEL—A MULTI-CLEAVAGE SOCIETY

In 1998 the 50th anniversary of the state of Israel was celebrated. A year earlier, in 1997, was the 100th anniversary of the First Zionist Congress. The state of Israel itself was founded about 51 years after Theodor Herzl wrote in his diary, at the time of that historical Congress on 3 September 1897 the dramatic sentence, which, in retrospect was seen as a prophecy, and which was read at that time either as joke or an over-optimistic vision: 'If I summarize the Basel Congress in one phrase—which, to be cautious I would not venture to say in public—it would be this: In Basel I have founded the Jewish State.'[2]

From a minuscule beginning of the 25,000 immigrants who came to this country in the 'First Aliya' (the first wave of immigration) between 1881 and 1903, of which about 40 per cent departed or emigrated again according to some estimates, the state of Israel reached a situation in which, in 2002, 37 per cent of all of the Jews in the world were concentrated within its borders.[3]

From this viewpoint there is no doubt that the state of Israel is a major success story. At the same time, alongside this significant success, one should bear in mind the fact that Israel is defined by both sociologists and political scientists as being a multi-cleavage society. A society very often riven by tension.

The main cleavages are five in number; they are interconnected and merge into a sort of 'Hungarian Cube' of combinations and complications: the national

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cleavage, the ethnic cleavage, the religious-secular cleavage, the social status-stratification cleavage and the political or ideological cleavage. As so aptly stated by Prof Michael Weltzer, 'This is a society which is segmented in more aspects and deeper ways than any other society I know of in the Western world'.[4]

The most difficult and complicated of these cleavages is the national cleavage, or the Jewish-Arab cleavage. It is the most difficult of all of the cleavages that dominate Israeli society, since it is characterized by the clearest diagnostic dichotomy, namely each of the national components of Israeli society clearly and objectively belongs to this camp or another. The definition is clear: either I am Jewish or I am Arab. There is no place for graduated diagnosis of 'belong more or less' or 'don't really belong'. And this cleavage is the most serious one also, owing to the fact that it is the most loaded from a sentimental point of view, and the emotional assertion is one of the strongest indicators for the dimension of the social cleavage.[5] Apart from which, this cleavage also divides Israeli society into two distinct sub-cultures: that of the majority national group, and that of the minority national group.[6]

ISRAEL—A BINATIONAL SOCIETY

At the beginning of November 1999 the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics concluded that the population of Israel numbered 6.169 million souls, an increase of 154,000 compared to 12 months prior to that date.[7]

The rates of population growth in Israel were different—the highest rate of growth was among the Muslims, at 3.7 per cent. The rate of growth of the Druze population was 2.3 per cent; whereas that of the Jews was 1.8 per cent. It should also be taken into account that the rate of population growth has slowed during the past years, and that 35 per cent of the general growth in the Jewish sector is a result of immigration!

Whichever way, at Independence Day, 2002 Israel's population amounted to about 6.5 million people, out of which there were 5.3 million Jews and 1.2 million Arabs.[8]

According to the forecast of the Central Bureau of Statistics, there will be 7.2 million inhabitants in Israel in the year 2005, and in the year 2020 there will be 9 million inhabitants. According to that same forecast, about 77 per cent of the population will be Jewish.

Two conclusions of highest significance may be drawn from this data, even when considered superficially. First, the state of Israel is already now a binational society in which the size of the minority group is just about one-fifth of the population; second, within less than one generation the minority group is expected to reach nearly one-quarter of the general population, thanks solely to natural growth.

In this connection it appears proper to draw attention to an important comment, which was made at the time by Professor Ze'ev Ben-Sira, according to whom a certain measure of ethnic pluralism is generally perceived as being

legitimate and even desirable. At the same time, while under certain conditions ethnic pluralism contributes to the existence and the development of society, one should bear in mind that beyond that boundary it could become destructive![9] Since pluralism denotes diversities found in the study of religious and ethnic groups, and since pluralism means in effect 'a state of affairs in which each ethnic group maintains, in large measure, a separate way of life, with its own customs, its own supplementary schools, its special organizations and periodicals, and perhaps even its favored secondary languages',[10] it is clear that whenever the cultural breach between the groups is very deep and wherever there is no will of mutual accommodation it might threaten the overall social unity.

THE NATIONAL CLEAVAGE—SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The above-mentioned facts are of more than mere demographic significance. The political-cultural implications that result from them are of the highest importance in the context of social solidarity and the Israeli identity of all of the inhabitants of the country; not to mention the ethical aspects that arise from them in everything concerned with the majority-minority relationships in Israel.

The social implications that stem from the national cleavage arise first from the pre-eminence of solidarity, as a precondition for social stability and for proper social functioning.

A variety of schools have developed within the sociological discipline. Social analysis can be made from various starting points, and sometimes even from different basic assumptions. The sociological schools examine the world with the help of various eyeglasses. At the same time, the interpretation of social order and social solidarity are the foci of all of the sociological schools of thought, and no matter what the starting point may be, all of the sociological paradigms perceive in social solidarity a barometer by which it is possible to measure the strength and the stability of society.[11]

The assumption is that solidarity is one of the central mechanisms for social integration. At one time the prevailing interpretation was that overall social solidarity reflecting the identification of those individuals of whom society is composed, as a result of the fact that they are very similar to each other in their interests as well as in their behaviour, is characteristic of a simple or 'primitive society'. Emile Durkheim, one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, termed it 'mechanical solidarity'. The assumption was that in a modern, complex and heterogeneous society, mechanical solidarity diminishes, since identification and the similarity between the individuals that make up the society also diminish. Instead, another type of solidarity comes into being. Durkheim termed it 'organic solidarity'. This solidarity, according to him, 'photographs' the functional reciprocal connection between those of whom society is comprised: that is, identification and similarity are exchanged for cooperation based on certain interests. At the same time, modern sociology asserts that even a complex

and technological society requires a minimum of identification, or 'mechanical solidarity' according to Durkheim's definition, otherwise the basic connection for fixed norms of social reciprocal relationships will be missing.

Among social scientists there has been a wide consensus for quite a long time that the absence of basic solidarity and the absence of a minimum of identification between the components of society might lead to conflicts between the various groups within society and cause a deep cleavage. It might also bring about what could be termed 'anomie' (that is to say, a situation where there is a lack of clarity in so far as the objectives of society and the validity of its norms are concerned) and, eventually, will lead to a disintegration of society.[12]

The social implications ensuing from the national cleavage result also from the importance that is placed on collective identity as 'social glue'. In this connection Dr Azmi Bisharah has already stated in concise and flowing language that there is no doubt that modern man has a basic need to search for meaning, and identity. Moreover, the most important modern collective identity is undoubtedly national identity.[13]

Collective social identity is perceived by sociology as one of the most important characteristics of society, and it is this that distinguishes one society from another.[14] Collective identity turns the relationships between groups into the main source of integration in society. Coleman, an important American sociologist, who has been active for decades, asserted during the 1950s that when people do not identify with their society, grave internal conflicts may erupt. They may threaten the very existence of society.[15]

All that has been stated above supports the theory that 'identity' is central to the existence of society. As asserted by Ben-Sira (mentioned above), it is possible to use people's identification with their society as an indicator that testifies to the importance of society for them.[16] One of the foundations of a healthy society is, therefore, a public that identifies itself as belonging to this society.[17]

The key to fostering identity is to create conditions that cultivate it. Since solidarity is a precondition to cultivating identity, identity might result from different backgrounds: when lifestyle is a common denominator that creates solidarity, it is possible to say that lifestyle is also the key to creating a sense of identity. When ethnic origin is the common denominator that causes solidarity, it is expected that identity will also be a result of this background. When religion or language are the factors that are at the root of solidarity, then religion or language are also the root of the identity. Since this is the case, it could be said that in a multicultural or multinational society the more one speaks of formulating a national identity so the seeds of potential calamity are sown. The obstacles in formulating this identity might be numerous and varied.

The tensions and the struggle between the various identities have for a long time threatened social unification in Israel, since Israeli society is, as has already been said, a most heterogeneous society and hence also a multi-identity society. These various identities also mean various interests, different objectives, varying

values and different patterns of behaviour, from which the different identity marks are ordained.

The national cleavage and the dichotonic division of the population of Israel into Jews, on the one side, and Arabs on the other, is therefore also one of the most serious threats to social unity and also to the civil identity in Israel.

The fact that Israel is by definition both Jewish *and* democratic is liable to entail an inferior status for the Arab citizens unless arrangements are made to safeguard the minority's rights.[18]

Looking at it from the Israeli point of view, the Jewish majority group should recognize it has a great interest in imbuing the Israeli Arabs with Israeli identity. In the long run this is the only way to ensure coexistence beneficial to both groups. This is the only way to bridge the existing national cleavage between the two groups.

THE NATIONAL CLEAVAGE—THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

So far we have looked at the socio-political implications arising from the national cleavage. They are not the only implications. In addition there are ethical implications of the initial obligation that the founding fathers of the state took upon themselves, with their statement that the state of Israel will be at one and the same time both a Jewish state and a democracy. This dual obligation seems to many to be a contradiction in terms, since on the one hand it presupposes the preponderance of the Jewish component of the population; on the other hand it promises equality to all. From an ethical point of view it is a 'no win' situation.

Major ethical implications stem from the same section of the 'Declaration of Independence'—the historical document containing the declaration of the 'People's Council' during the festive meeting at the Tel Aviv Museum regarding the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948—which specifies the future character of the state. In that same section the state of Israel defined itself as a democratic country. And while in the Declaration there was no mention of the reference to that document by the courts, as time went by the Supreme Court has started to treat it as a binding document according to which the various laws, decreed by the British Mandatory authorities or the Knesset (Israeli parliament), should be interpreted.

The relevant portion to the subject of this article, therefore, is the paragraph that determines, specifically, that:

The State of Israel…will be based on the foundations of liberty, justice and peace…*ill provide full equality of social and politicalrights* for all of its citizens, without differentiation of religion, race and sex; will ensure freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture, will preserve the religious sites of all religions, and will remain faithful to the principles of the proclamation of the United Nations' (emphasis added).[19]

As already said, despite the fact that the Declaration of Independence does not have the status of a constitution, it serves as guideline for the nature of legislation in the country. This has been aptly summed up by Judge Agranat, who served as the President of the Supreme Court of Law:

> The constitutional system according to which the political establishment in Israel has been established and operates testifies to the fact that this is a country whose foundations are democratic. Also, things which were declared in the Declaration of Independence-especially regarding the establishment of the country on 'the basis of liberty', and the guarantee of freedom of conscience—mean that Israel is a country that upholds freedom. Although the Declaration is not a constitutional law which rules on theory and practice on the matter of upholding orders and various laws, or canceling them, yet to the extent that it expresses the vision of the nation and its credo of belief, it is our obligation to pay attention to the things which were declared in it, while we are interpreting and elucidating the laws of the State.[20]

The question of whether the state of Israel fulfilled the declaration of intent regarding the Arab minority during the 50 years and more that have passed since its establishment is a complicated matter.

There are those who would give a forceful negative response, such as, for example, Azmi Bisharah: 'all governments in Israel until now have perpetuated discrimination of the Arab minority, as well as their control and supervision of this demographic group, while using the government mechanism to serve the Jewish majority or for the benefit of the Jewish majority…'.[21]

There are those who break down the question into a number of secondary questions[22]—are relations between Jews and Arabs undergoing a crisis? Is the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state of Israel in contradiction with the essence of a democratic regime? Do Arabs enjoy full rights as citizens, including the right to disagree with the Jewish majority on the subject of Zionism on the one hand, and Palestinian nationality on the other? Do the Arabs have a status of national minority with collective rights? Can Israeli Arabs join the political system and integrate into it in a meaningful way?

These secondary questions have also been discussed and expanded on by a number of Israeli investigators.[23] It is only natural that the answers that are given to them are not as unequivocal as the statement made by Azmi Bisharah quoted above. At the same time, there is a wide consensus between investigators that it is possible to define the Arab population as being very much deprived and discriminated against.

THE NATIONAL CLEAVAGE—STEREOTYPES AND
NEGATIVE GROUP ATTITUDES

Despite the obvious national interest in fostering mutual respect and a sense of partnership and belonging, the social reality reflects negative stereotypes prevalent among the Jewish majority.

As mentioned by Dr Avraham Stahl of the Hebrew University School of Education in 1979, the phenomena of real social deprivation that can be examined and measured quantitatively are only the upper tip of the iceberg that marks the social tension in Israel.[24] The larger portion of this iceberg is hidden under the water—in the field of negative stereotypes denoting the various groups. These stereotypes might be expressed secretively or indirectly, sometimes even through ridicule or by means of jokes and riddles. However, negative stereotypes can be found both on the behavioural level and in social research. They are expressed not only when referring to the various negative characteristics of an entire ethnic group, but also by implication in references to specific individuals, references that are apparently charitable in respect of a specific person, by 'excepting' him from the inferior group to which he belongs. Thus, for example, the response quoted by Peres in connection with the willingness to rent a room to an Arab, 'If I know him personally as an honest person I would be prepared to rent to him'. Or the response given to the question that was presented to a youngster regarding the willingness to make social contact with Arabs: That depends on his level, I don't think that I would get friendly with just anyone who was around. If he has 'class' I would be prepared…'.[25]

On the wide range of negative stereotypical attitudes that are rampant among both Arabs and Jews regarding the other side, it is possible to learn from an interesting conversation that took place about 25 years ago between two authors, the Egyptian San'a Hassan, and the Israeli Amos Elon. The following quotation from the book summarizing the conversation speaks for itself.

Hassan: An Egyptian farmer returns to his village from the 1967 war. He boasts that he has just repelled a French invasion. The village peasants protest against him: 'Which French invasion, you fool? This is not the 1956 war. In this war there were only Israelis.' 'No, no,' the farmer objects, 'I'm telling you I fought against the French.' 'How did you know that they were French?' 'Because they were tall, blonde and honest, while the Israelis are short, black, hunchback, with crooked noses and awful to look at.'

Elon: Similar stereotypes exist on our side too. In Israel we often go from one extreme to another. If we do not perceive you as sons of Satan, monstrous Nazis, we tend to see you as sub-human and worthless creatures [remember the disgraceful reference of the late departed Menachem Begin about Arafat as 'a two-legged animal'— author]. An accepted expression in Hebrew for work that is sloppy and poorly done

is Arab workmanship'. When one wants to tell someone 'don't be stupid' or 'don't be strange' one says to him 'don't be an Arab'.[26]

But these examples are unfortunately not the only ones. Thus, for example, it becomes clear from a survey commissioned by the Van Leer Institute of Jerusalem regarding the perceptions of the Jewish majority towards the Arab minority in 1980, that 36 per cent of the people researched held the opinion that Arabs are dirty and 33 per cent believed that life is insignificant to the Arabs.[27] These negative stereotypes surfaced time and again in many surveys carried out over the years. A recent survey among middle-class Jewish children aged 10–12 found that 40 per cent of those interviewed regarded the Arabs among other things as dirty and foolish.[28]

Some maintain that after all only a minority group within the Jewish sector holds a negative attitude towards the Arabs. In the 1980 survey mentioned above, the group that ascribed only negative characteristics to the Arabs accounted for merely 14 per cent of the respondents.[29]

Moreover, the survey from 1980 apparently painted not such a gloomy picture of what the sociologists define as 'social distance', a term that came into use by the American sociologist Bogardus in the 1930s, and was intended to indicate a position of sympathy or aversion on the part of the individual towards other groups.[30] Thus, for example, Alouph Hareven said at the time that one of the most encouraging findings of the 1980 survey was the willingness of the Jewish majority to have social contacts with Israeli Arabs.[31] Forty per cent of those surveyed expressed readiness at that time to live in the same building as Arabs; about 60 per cent expressed willingness to work with Arabs; over half of the respondents expressed willingness for social contacts with Arabs. In light of all this, even Hareven was infected with optimism and determined, 'The high rate of willingness for close social contacts is proof, so it seems, of a potential for proper relations, which have not yet been realized'.[32]

Recent findings tend to corroborate this tentative conclusion. Thus, a recent survey, carried out just before the grave disturbances of October 2000, found out that 45 per cent of the Jews surveyed professed readiness for Arab-Jewish coeducation in the kindergartens; 42 per cent of those surveyed did not object to living in the same neighbourhood with Arabs.[33]

Yet these data are not as unequivocal as they appear. In Sammy Smooha's survey of 1988, which has already been quoted above, 74.8 per cent of the Jews sampled stated that they are not prepared to work under an Arab supervisor. Moreover, the answers usually displayed negative and very discriminating attitudes towards Arabs. Thus, for example, 73.8 per cent of the Jewish respondents contended that they would prefer Jews to Arabs in the country; 42.8 per cent of the respondents held the opinion that Arabs should be prevented from having the right to vote in elections *[sic!]* whereas 39.9 per cent believed that Israel should seek any way to encourage Arabs to leave the country. Only 23.2 per cent indicated an objection to the policy that is called by the Israeli people

'transfer'.[34] This anti-Arab attitude has had ups and downs. Recent surveys reflect a stronger negative attitude. Thus, a 2001 survey found that 31 per cent of the respondents in the sample were in favour of a 'transfer policy', whereby the Israeli Arabs would be transferred to other countries. Sixty per cent of the respondents favoured a policy encouraging the emigration of Israeli Arabs.[35]

From the Six Day War until the end of the 1980s there was, therefore, a situation that was summarized in a very pessimistic way by Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak as follows:

> The growth and variegation of the meeting situations between Jews and Arabs—primarily in the field of economics—far from changing the inclination towards social segregation between the two national communities in principle, rather contributed to an increase of hostility on both sides. Sample researches conducted among Israeli youth indicated an increase of negative attitudes and negative stereotypes in the Jewish sector.[36]

These things were true, unfortunately, not only in the past; they are also true today, as mentioned before.

Thus, for instance, it appears from a comprehensive survey that was conducted by Ben-Sira in the 1990s among Jewish high school students, that the decisive majority (81 per cent) had not met at all with any Arab youth in the two years preceding the survey. Among those who had met, nine per cent met once only, and seven per cent took part in a small number of meetings.[37] To the question 'When you participated in this meeting-what did you feel?', a mere 22 per cent of the respondents out of 1,728 replied. Eight per cent of them had negative feelings, which were anywhere between discomfort and anger. Only 14 per cent enjoyed themselves in one way or another.[38] To the question To what extent do you support or object to encouraging social meetings between Jews and Arabs?', 46 per cent responded negatively in one form or another. To the question To what extent do you support or object to creating a joint school for Jewish and Arab youth?', 70 per cent (!) responded negatively in one way or another; and to the question 'To what extent do you support or object to establishing joint settlements for Jews and Arabs?', again, 70 per cent responded one way or another with objections.[39]

All of these findings testify to a wide social gap prevailing between Jewish youth and Arab youth in the 1990s, and to the distinct tendency for segregation.

A small survey, encompassing 32 students in the 11th grade of a municipal high school in Nazareth, apparently indicated that there is greater openness among the deprived minority group towards the majority group. This accords with the theories that deal with analysing the relations between majority and minority groups. In research conducted in 1998 under my guidance and supervision it was shown that about 56 per cent of the students participated in meetings with Jewish students in Tel Aviv and Neve Shalom.[40] Three of 18

students who participated in these formal meetings maintained informal social contacts afterwards, too.

To the question To what extent are you willing to accept Jewish students in your class and Jewish teachers in your school?', 62.5 per cent answered positively, and only 15.6 per cent answered negatively; the remainder did not commit themselves.[41]

There is an indication that the social distance that prevails among those Arab high school students who were investigated towards the Jewish sector is much smaller than that found among the Jewish student population. It should be pointed out that this finding has to be treated carefully, since what we are referring to is not a representative sample but rather a small ethnographic research sample.

Particularly interesting are short comments added by some of those willing to absorb Jewish students in their classes, such as:

'The classroom is like a microcosmic country. We are expected to live together in peace, and this should start from the classroom.'

'This is part of the coexistence which we want.'

This should be the initiative to break down the wall which divides the two nations, and for better integration between them.'

This should be done in order to give the other side more correct information about ourselves.'

'Also among the Jews there are schools in which Arabs study; they also have joint schools for both nations.'[42]

On the other hand, the intense distress at discrimination is expressed in the feeling of stalemate; the following comment was added in handwriting by one of the students being researched: The Arabs in Israel are not accepted by Arabs outside of Israel and are also not accepted by the Jews in this country [Israel]. We do not find anyone who will help us. We do not know if we are still a part of the Palestinian nation, or if we have become part of the Israeli nation…'.[43]

The differentiation in the relationship between Arab students and the two different sectors in the Jewish population—the secular sector and the religious sector—is expressed in a comment that was added in handwriting by another student being researched, in answer to the question 'Did you have any negative stereotypes regarding the Jews?': 'In the meetings between Arabs and Jews it was difficult for us to talk with religious Jews. Whereas the secular Jews sat with us quite naturally and there was no shouting…the 'hot' issues [meaning difficult —author] related to Jerusalem and were raised by the religious Jews.'[44]

This asymmetry between the two national groups is clearly shown also from the research commissioned by the Ministry of Education and Culture in 1994 encompassing a representative sample of 3,700 high school students from all religions. The most shocking finding that emerged here was that 37 per cent of the Jewish youngsters stated quite definitely that they hated Arabs. Two-thirds of

the Jewish students expressed a clear position, according to which 'Arabs should not be allowed to have full and equal rights'.[45] From the research one could also deduce that only 43 per cent of the Jewish high school students supported Arab service in the Israel Defence Forces, and this compared to 50 per cent of the Arab high school students who were interested in having military service for Arabs as an obligation or voluntarily. Seventy-five per cent of the Arab students indicated a willingness to serve in civilian national service![46]

A somewhat better—though still very discriminatory—picture emerged from a survey conducted among Jewish youth aged 13–18 early in 2000.[47] Thirty-seven per cent of those surveyed were in favour of limiting the rights of Israeli Arabs. It also served to show that discrimination among Jewish youth is differential: 46. 9 per cent of the religious youth discriminated against the Arabs as against a mere 26 per cent of the secular youth.[48]

The gravity of the situation in everything relating to the position of the Jewish majority towards the Arab minority repeats itself and is expressed in a number of other surveys and research projects that were conducted in various samples during the 1990s. Thus, for example, research conducted among a sample of 418 Jews during the Gulf War indicated that only 50 per cent agreed with the situation according to which Israeli Arabs have the right to vote for parliament; 36 per cent held the view that Israeli Arabs should be encouraged to emigrate out of the country.[49]

Another survey conducted in the 1990s among a sample of 1,287 Jews showed that merely 26 per cent held the view that both nations have personal and national rights in the land of Israel; 38 per cent believed that the state of Israel belongs solely to the Jews, and only they have the right of immigration.[50]

Once again, in another survey from the 1990s, which was based on a sample of 2,200 Jews, it was found that only 51 per cent held the view that Israeli Arabs have the right to vote for parliament. Thirty-four per cent totally objected to this privilege.[51]

In a survey conducted among Jewish high school students in 1994 and based on a sample of 1,488 youngsters, the respondents were even more blunt. Thirty per cent of the youngsters admitted incontrovertibly that they have no small measure of racial prejudice.[52] Seventy-two per cent of the respondents held the opinion that equal representation for the Israeli Arabs will endanger the security of the state, and 63 per cent held the view that such representation will harm the Jewish character of the country.[53]

All these findings have a direct bearing on the Israeli social balance and harmony, particularly the fact that even *perceived* violation of equality can lead to conflict between ethnic groups.[54]

In this context Rouhana's reference to the theoretical foundations of the basic human needs theory is worthy of consideration. As argued by this theory[55] if the need for equality, equity and identity is not fulfilled, the question becomes not *whether* a crisis will emerge, but rather *under whatpolitical circumstances* will it emerge.[56]

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM AS A SOCIALIZATION
AGENT AND AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE TO CORRECT
RELATIONSHIPS

This brings us to the matter of the role of the formal education system as a socialization agent. Social sciences perceive in socialization a means by which individuals/society internalize the accepted values and adapt themselves to patterns of behaviour commensurate with the norms devised by their culture. This process actually enables the continued existence of society, and it is also used to transfer culture and tradition from one generation to the next, by incorporating these or other modifications.[57]

Talcott Parsons, one of the most important American sociologists of the twentieth century, has recognized three levels of socialization: the primary socialization, which takes place within the family; the secondary socialization, which takes place in the educational system; and the tertiary socialization, which encompasses the processes that an adult person undergoes, and the 'plugging-up of holes' that were not dealt with during the primary and the secondary socialization.[58]

School therefore has had imposed upon it a most important social role - administering the ideological basis that reflects the beliefs and the ideals that constitute the culture according to social consensus, as well as the norms that are supposed to translate it into reality terms.

Furthermore, as an important socialization agent school is not just supposed to *transfer* the normative ideological basis rooted in a wide consensus; it is also supposed to contribute, itself, to *formulating* the consensus and social integration and thus to help in perpetuating the existence of society and culture; for as has already been mentioned, no society is capable of surviving unless it achieve the minimum of solidarity and agreement with its central values.

As has been explained elsewhere[59] there are no modern complex societies enjoying cultural homogeneity. Thus, many modern societies are divided on subjects of values and ideology, and contain differing perceptions regarding their objectives and goals. For this reason, education too is immersed in conflict, since imparting culture involves struggles between beliefs and values, competing in establishing the nature of the desired society. Yet as far as values and perceptions based upon a wide consensus are concerned, there is no conflict regarding the weight of the educational system, although it is difficult to estimate reliably to what extent these cultural messages are really effectively transmitted.[60]

In a binational society such as Israel the formal education system is by definition entrusted with a formidable task. We are discussing the task of expanding consensus within a fractured society, by increasing cooperation between the marginal sectors in society and the ruling sectors, while strengthening accord, identification and honouring of the values and the norms that emanate from them.[61]

When the question of *collective identity* is at stake there is no doubt that, as an agent of socialization, the school is not entitled to evade its part in the process that it is supposed to help. All the more so since identity of itself imparts meaning to the sense of belonging, as stated by Azmi Bisharah.[62]

The role of the school as a socialization agent is all the more important when it is expected that at the same time as it imparts norms and culture it will also contribute to and generate the desired changes in everything relating to equality of rights and equality of opportunities, thus facilitating a decrease in the gap between the ideological perceptions of democracy, which are supposed to be a candle to light the way for the Israeli society, and the practices that in fact prevail —as reflected by all the attitude surveys quoted above.

On this matter it is proper to state the words of David Glass, previously a member of Knesset for the National Religious Party and currently a consultant for the spiritual leadership of Shas (the Orthodox-Sepharadi political party): 'The decisive factor is the social climate in the country, a spirit of tolerance towards individuals and communities, even those whose beliefs and even their deeds do not conform to the beliefs of the majority. This is the most important mark of a true democracy.'[63]

As for the urgent need that exists for democratic education—beyond everything stated above, it also stems from the accepted assumption that democratic leadership is not an inborn quality, and should not be taken for granted. People need to be educated to recognize the need for the existence of the principles of democracy, and of the accepted 'rules of the game' in a democratic country.[64] For this purpose two American social scientists state that school is one of the most effective and efficient tools as an agent of political socialization.[65]

In the Israeli case multiculturalism should be the natural banner as long as real equality is the target of the educational system, since one of the main principles of multiculturalism is the emphasis on diversity and the right to be different.[66] However, one should be cognizant of the fact that disputes have developed between different students of multiculturalism. The principle was criticized by both conservatives and the radical left.[67]

How is school supposed to cope with this mission? This is a separate question. One thing is clear, that we are discussing a course of integrated means, and not just one method, whatever it is.

Furthermore, at the start of the 1960s, Coleman pointed to the connection that exists between the ideological climate in the school and the opinions of the students. Yet he himself was one of the first ones to notice that the influence of the primary socialization agent—i.e. the family—is much stronger than the school in anything connected with imparting values.[68]

The accepted assumption is that between the years 1953 (the year in which the national education law was passed, which determined that, among other things, 'education in Israel will strive for the creation of a society founded on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual help and love of mankind') and 1984, democratic education was managed along three parallel routes: (1) the study of civics in one

form or another in high schools; (2) educational experience of democracy during so-called education hours, student councils, complementary educational activities, and so forth; (3) extra-curricular educational activities of various organizations.[69]

In 1985 a Division for Democracy and for Coexistence was created within the Ministry of Education and Culture. It has conducted advanced education courses for teachers[70] and educational activities for students. It has also operated training centres for students, and distributed among them a lot of material. Among other things the Division also encouraged the activity of various voluntary organizations in this field, and various exclusive programmes in schools.

Last but not least, a variety of model programmes—such as To Live Together —To Know the Other'[71]—were introduced into the school system in order to foster better understanding between the majority and minority groups.

TEXTBOOKS AS A TOOL FOR IMPARTING TOLERANCE AND BREAKING-DOWN OF STEREOTYPES

At the same time, one of the missed opportunities within the values curriculum in the Israeli education system is the host of primers, standard readers and textbooks printed for and used by the Israeli schooling system.

Books are recognised as one of the main vehicles for 'cultural programming', owing to the very fact that they are products of their culture. In the sociology of literature one finds three different schools of thought: two of them regard literature as a means for social control and shaping of attitudes; the third, the so-called reflection theory, maintains that literature reflects the existing value-system of society.[72] No wonder, then, that it is possible to perceive children's books as 'social documents' reflecting the *Zeitgeist* and the accepted values.[73]

As already said, these things are true regarding literature in general, and children's literature in particular. In ancient Greece Plato pointed to the fact that children's literature is used to transmit the desired values and is intended in fact to maintain and to strengthen the existing values.[74] O'Dell, who examined Soviet literature from the sociological point of view, claimed that Plato's approach was in fact adopted by various societies that are as different as east and west, for the length of documented human culture.[75]

Already back in 1972 Weitzman, Eifler and associates insisted that even picture books for toddlers are an obvious tool for transmitting the values of society to the innocent.[76] Cartoons also were posited to be a 'rich cultural source of material' owing to the medium's unique blend of caricature, humour and political commentary.[77]

In other words, books should be seen as agents of cultural transmission. It is a double-sided mirror: on one hand books are used as socialization agents; on the other they serve as a cultural indicator, reflecting the society in which they were written.

Not only that, elsewhere Regev draws attention to the fact that reading is known to have a considerable influence on shaping the intellectual and emotional image of the young reader, and certainly also on his value-system.[78] It opens up to the young reader new worlds and expands his horizons; it instils in him a deeper insight into the world and society in which he lives. It helps the child to become a mature person, influencing the formulation of his attitudes in those areas relating to the individual, society, culture and the arts.

The simplest thing to do, therefore, would be to take advantage of the readers as a tool for transmitting democratic messages, creating tolerance and open-mindedness in so far as interrelations between Jews and Arabs are concerned and in so far as changing attitudes and negative stereotypes are concerned.

Readers, primers and compulsory textbooks are potentially a very effective tool in the formative years of the child. It is possible to load them with literary pieces and visual aids that will facilitate transmission of the value-system advocated by society.

THE PARTIAL FAILURE OF READERS IN ISRAEL— MARGINAL QUANTITATIVE EXPRESSION AND MEDIOCRE QUALITATIVE EXPRESSION FOR TOLERANCE AND OPEN-MINDEDNESS

Since study programmes and textbooks are considered to be a most reliable source in so far as society's socialization goals are concerned, their content analysis has made great strides in development during the twentieth century.[79] There is a quantitative aspect and a qualitative aspect to content analysis: the basic assumption underlying this method is that the number of times a certain item is mentioned in a certain context attests to its importance in the eyes of the author.[80] At the same time, analysing the content relates also to the *substance* and not just to the quantity, and this is the root of the formula of Professor Na'ama Tsabar Ben-Yehoshua, who maintained that analysing the content is more similar to art than to science.[81]

Be this as it may, in view of the fact that readers are in fact a standard effective tool for transmitting social messages to students, under my guidance an attempt was undertaken to examine to what extent this potential was actually being taken advantage of during the academic year 1994.[82]

For this purpose a representative sample was chosen, which included nine readers from among all of the readers that appear on the list recommended by the Ministry of Education and Culture (no reader is allowed in the Israeli schools *unless* it is recommended by the Ministry): *New Israel Readers* C, D, E, F; *Ten Stops and One More* D, H, *Meetings* C; *I and We* A; *Connections* D.

Three questions were posed as the basis for the research:

1. What place is allocated to relationships between Jews and Arabs in the readers? What is the relative weight of this subject compared to other subjects discussed in the readers?
2. Is positive emphasis placed in the readers on cooperation between Jews and Arabs?
3. What is the image of the Arab as reflected from the material presented in the readers?[83]

For the purpose of quantitative weighting of the stories and poems included in the readers two criteria were devised. They were meant to assist in pinpointing the relevant material for the subject:

1. Does the story or poem deal with the relationship between Jews and Arabs? Alternatively—is the background for the central theme of the literary piece a relationship between Jews and Arabs?
2. Is there at least any significant reference to the Arab as a person?

In order to examine the contents of the stories, use was made of a number of central guiding questions, on which each of the stories received a marking grade that eventually enabled quantitative weighting of the content matter:[84]

- Does the story deal with the relationships between Jews and Arabs as the central theme?
- Is the context in which the relations appear a peaceful one?
- Are the interpersonal relations or the relations between the two nations in the story friendly?
- Is there cooperation between the two sides?
- Is the name of the Arab mentioned, or does he remain an anonymous figure?
- Is the image of the Arab presented in a positive light? Is the role that the Arab plays in the story a positive one?

Every relevant detail from the literary material included in the readers was examined and analysed according to the guiding questions that were meant to provide uniform, objective and reliable analysis of the individual content units. A careful examination of the readers, using the above-mentioned criteria and questions, indicated a number of conclusions of considerable significance, both positive and negative.

The first of these is that in all of the nine readers there were only 12 stories that matched the target-definition of the research. And this from among 1,036 stories and poems that were included in them. In all, these stories comprise 1.16 per cent of all the literary titles contained in the readers. In other words, the obligation that the editors felt to illustrate the relationships between the two national groups living in Israel was expressed in only a very small number of the stories.

TABLE 1 THE REFLECTION OF JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS IN READERS IN THE 1994 SAMPLE

The reader	Number of stories dealing with the subject	Number of stories and poems in the reader	% relevant stories and poems
New Israel Reader C	2	154	1.30
New Israel Reader F	1	121	0.82
New Israel Reader D	1	125	0.80
New Israel Reader E	1	143	0.70
Meetings C	1	92	1.08
Connections D	2	125	1.60
Ten Stops and One More E	2	102	1.96
Ten Stops and One More D	1	84	1.19
I and We A	1	90	1.10

This would therefore indicate that the quantitative weight given to one of the focal questions of internal conflict in which the Israeli society is embroiled is negligible. The full details appear in Table 1.[85]

This is a sad situation in itself. It serves to show that so far as fostering tolerance by education is concerned, declaration of intent is one thing, reality is another. Is this fact the result of an unintended failure or omission, or is it deliberate? This is an interesting question that definitely deserves further examination. Nevertheless, the fact remains as it is.

The conclusion that should therefore be drawn from the findings regarding the first question posed is not a pleasant one.

Yet the marginal weight devoted to the question of relations between Jews and Arabs in the readers is just one facet of how the educational system copes or rather does not cope with the subject.

As already said above, in the nine readers that were included in the examined sample, 12 stories were found in which Arab figures had a significant role. The central question that should be examined in this connection is what is the image of the Arab that is illustrated in these stories?

An investigative reading of the dozen stories serves to show that, unfortunately, it is precisely the negative stereotype—widely held by the public— that is noticeable in two of them. The story *Revealing the Truth* revolves around a Jew in Baghdad, who is swindled by an Arab seller of cattle who took a deposit from him, which he afterwards denied doing. The Arab is represented as a scoundrel devoid of any conscience.[86]

In the story *The Scattered Balls* the Arab is represented as the enemy, who should be avoided. The heroine of the story is a Jewish girl, Hila, who achieves her objective when she succeeds in tricking an Arab youth. The relationship between the two Jewish girls, Hila and Zvia, on the one side and between the Arab youth on the other side is characterized by two basic elements—the

tremendous fear that the Jewish girls feel for the Arab youth and, as has been mentioned, the fact that one of them eventually manages to trick him.[87]

In the third story *The Border Line in the Heart* there is a clear element of alienation and strangeness between the two sides, the Jewish and the Arab. The final section of the story speaks for itself:

> Now not just strangeness separated the two nations, but the border was what separated and buffered. Our fields touched the Jordan from this side, and theirs—from the other side. We worked on our land a few metres apart from theirs—but the distance remained: a distance of years of enmity and alienation, to which the insult of war had now been added.[88]

In other words, 25 per cent of those stories dealing with the relationships between Jews and Arabs might be regarded as a missed opportunity if not worse than that. They made no attempt to negate the prevailing negative stereotypes, rather they contributed to strengthening them. In other stories the possibilities for breaking down barriers between the two national groups and creating positive social relations have indeed been expressed.

Yet, despite the fact that the general message of nine of the stories was basically positive, a quantitative examination of the contents serves to show that the marks given to the stories are not very high.

Two different aspects were examined and quantified in this context. The first, the nature of the relationships between Jews and Arabs, was examined by means of four different criteria. The maximum possible mark was 100. The second, the image of the Arab, was examined by means of five criteria. Here too it was possible to attain a maximum mark of 100.[89] Only three stories attained the maximum mark of 100 when sketching the figure of the Arab. The average weighted mark of all of the dozen stories here was only 67.75.[90] So far as relations between Jews and Arabs were concerned, only one story achieved a grade of 100. The average grade for all of the dozen stories was a mere 59.17.[91]

Needless to say, these marks are very low. At the same time, if the three problematic stories, which we have already elucidated, are removed from the weighting, the average grade for sketching the figure of the Arab is 73.9 and the average grade in the matter of relationships between Jews and Arabs increases to 85. What is most important is the fact that about half of the very small number of stories that do touch the Jewish-Arab issue fail to serve the message of democracy and equality.

In summing up it is therefore possible to say that the picture that one gets from analysing the contents of the readers and primers is not a happy one. It is not happy since, in the spirit of what has already been said above several times, in modern society the school is considered not just as a tool by which to achieve an equal level of universal knowledge for all; rather, it is supposed to be an important tool for more than that—a social tool that is meant to achieve collective goals about which there is a wide consensus.

It has been discovered that tolerance, equality, and the breaking down of negative stereotypes about Arabs receive a poor and negligible treatment in the existing Israeli readers and primers. If these are viewed as tools, which are supposed eventually to contribute to creating a collective Israeli civic identity centred upon basic lines acceptable to both of the national groups residing within the boundaries of Israel, then there has been an even bigger failure on the part of the study's 'lukewarm' readers and primers.

The collective identity upon which every stable and healthy society rests is based on consensus regarding the answer to the question 'who are we?'. As some of the modern researchers dealing with the question of national identity have asserted, this is the identity that is acceptable to a large number of people, belonging to a real or virtual collective. It is an identity that defines both the boundaries of their collective as well as the rules that exist within it.[92] Those dealing with collective identity usually agree on four components, without which this identity does not exist. One of the components is the development procedure of collective identity, which is expressed in bonding with the in-group on the one hand and excluding or marking off out-groups on the other hand (that is to say, establishing clear indicators defining who *belongs* and who *does notbelong* in the collective).

Most unfortunately, the overall picture of the current Jewish-Arab relationship is such that even the chances of forging a *civic* collective identity are open to debate.

The educational system must do a lot more than it is doing in order that it can be at peace with itself in anything related to attaining the objectives of tolerance, application of full equality and breaking down of negative stereotypes about Arabs—all of these being preconditions to creating a collective civic identity, which, in itself, will become a framework of social solidarity ensuring that society will function properly.

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HISTORY AND NATIONALISM

The Arabs in Haifa: From Majority to Minority, Processes of Change (1870–1948)
MAHMOUD YAZBAK

THE BEGINNINGS: PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL CONSOLIDATION

As part of their overall policy to develop the northern ports of Palestine, in response to the increasing European demand for Palestinian cotton in the early eighteenth century, the Ottomans considered ways of strengthening and refortifying Haifa and its harbour so as to stimulate commercial activities. In order to increase settlement and security, the state adopted and promoted a scheme for demographic expansion and called on some of the best-paid officeholders, who were commanders in the Ottoman cavalry in the Lajjun area, to make their home in Haifa, offering them special privileges. Since it was predominantly Christians who engaged in commerce and had established commercial connections either as traders or as agents of European companies, they were offered similar incentives to move to Haifa. Owing to the endeavours of Dahir al'Umar (1762–75) in the second half of the eighteenth century, the town continued to develop without interruption until it became the most important settlement in northern Palestine.[1]

The fertile plains of northern Palestine under Dahir al-'Umar and then Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (1775–1804) rapidly increased the cultivation of cash crops: cotton, cereals and olives. While most exports from northern Palestine were still routed through Acre, Haifa was gaining in importance. Thus, Dahir al-'Umar decided to rebuild Haifa on a site three kilometres to the south east and had his soldiers demolish the ancient town. The new site had all the advantages of the bay and none of the disadvantages of the original settlement. While the new dock was protected from the winds by Mount Carmel, as the old dock had been, the city built alongside it was no longer situated on the plain, but rather on a narrow strip of land directly at the foot of the mountain, which made it much easier to protect on the land side. The new town was called al-'Amara al-Jadida or, in the vernacular, Hayfa al-Jadida—'New Haifa'.[2]

Dahir's tolerant attitude towards non-Muslims encouraged the Christians, who constructed two churches in his day and also received his authorization to build a new Carmelite monastery on top of Mount Carmel.

Haifa began to see serious development only after 1830, when Acre was heavily shelled and partly destroyed by the Egyptian forces led by Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad 'Ali. During Ibrahim's rule (1831–40), European vice-consuls began setting up residence in Haifa for the first time.[3] Their move from Acre to Haifa is further evidence of the rise in Haifa's commercial position, which attracted many local merchants as well as Acre's native population.[4]

The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of growing economic development for Palestine. Although cotton was traditionally a favourite export item, this was largely replaced by wheat and barley when Russian grain exports stopped reaching Europe during the Crimean War. Cotton exports picked up again during the 1860s when the American Civil War raised English demand. However, by the 1870s, sesame and olive oil, together with wheat, barley and *dura* (a local variety of maize), made up the bulk of the agricultural surplus that Palestine was now exporting to such neighbouring countries as Egypt and Lebanon and, increasingly, to Europe through its main harbours of Jaffa, Acre and Haifa.[5] Important wheat shipments from the Hauran went largely through Haifa, and steamships came to play a crucial part in the town's economic development as its harbour proved far better suited to accommodate them than did Acre's. By the end of the 1890s, Haifa had become the main trade and export centre for northern Palestine and the Hauran, a position which was further reinforced when, in 1905, the Hijaz railway connected the town and its harbour with Dir'a and Damascus.

Haifa's growing importance prompted well-known merchant families from other towns in Palestine, as well as from Syria and Lebanon, to relocate or to set up branches in the town. Many of them being Christian Arabs, they brought with them the useful commercial connections that they had already established with European merchants and consuls. The collaboration of the Christians with Ibrahim Pasha prior to his conquests in Syria, and further during his occupation of the region, strengthened their position in Haifa, as it did in other parts of the country. The Carmelite monks expanded their monastery and influence in the town and consolidated their position, while the Greek Orthodox built their church as well.

In 1840, when the Ottomans resumed their hold over Palestine, Haifa's administrative standing improved as well. It became a centre of a *qada'* (sub-district), headed by a *qa'imaqam* (district governor) and assisted by an administrative council *(majlis idara),* which was made up of Muslim and non-Muslim local members. In 1887, all of the former *liwa'* (district) of Acre, along

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with the Haifa *qada',* was cut off from the *vilayet* (province) of Syria and made part of the newly formed *vilayet* of Beirut for various reasons, not the least of which was Haifa's rising importance as a centre for foreign trade activities. This was followed by a growing presence of Western consular agents in the town, who exercised much influence over the local society and authorities. Originally, this influence derived from the traditional protection that they were allowed to extend to the non-Muslims in the 'Holy Land' whose religion they championed. In dispatches to their own governments, foreign vice-consuls often depicted Muslim notables and officials who did not readily suffer their intervention as 'fanatics', a term clearly meant to imply that they formed a threat to the Christian minorities under European 'protection'.[6] Owing to its growing importance as one of Palestine's main harbours and centres for foreign trade, Haifa was soon caught up in these developments. It was clear to Muslims and non-Muslims alike that the social and economic realities as they had known them prior to the intervention of the West were now changed for good.

The Ottoman reforms policy, including the Vilayets Law introduced in 1864, was part of their overall drive for centralization and entailed a reorganization of the administrative structure of the provinces. The administrative system, with its many different functions in government institutions, together with economic changes, offered influence and social mobility that affected the town's various communities and the relationships between them during the coming decades. While the Muslim elite formed the only administrative and social leadership of Haifa until the 1870s, the reforms in the sphere of local administration after then gave access to non-Muslims to represent and serve their communities in the highest local administrative offices. Available sources contain information on many Christians who were elected as members of the administrative council, as well as the judiciary and municipal councils, during this period.[7] These members had a number of features in common, first and foremost that they all belonged to the elite. Most were primarily involved in commerce and owned a good deal of real estate in the town and in the district. Their families usually counted among their members others who were important public figures, either within their own community or in similar administrative positions in the district. It was their firm economic base that enabled them to build up their positions of power and from there reach their administrative appointments. The political dimension accompanying their status thus strengthened their position of authority within their own community and in the eyes of the general public.

The reconstruction of the Haifa district bureaucracy revealed how and to what extent non-Muslims began taking up positions of influence in the town's administration. This coincided with the immigration into Haifa of ever-growing numbers of Christians, who were attracted by the economic opportunities found there. Sources reveal a marked growth in the size of Haifa's population during the period 1870–1914, from 1,200 to approximately 20,000, and show its rate to be higher than the Palestinian average for the time.[8] This also indicates a rise in

the importance of Haifa as an urban centre, attracting increasing numbers away from the rural areas as part of the regional trend towards urbanization.

The coastal towns of Jaffa, Haifa and Gaza expanded at a rate three times the overall annual rate for Palestine in the nineteenth century.[9] Of these, Haifa's rate of expansion was the highest. Between 1879 and 1912, Haifa enjoyed an annual growth rate of 4.58 per cent. When the construction of the Hijaz railway reached the town in 1905, the pace of increase was even more dramatic, rising to 6.6 per cent by the beginning of World War I. Natural growth was one cause for this expansion, but the more important reason was immigration, accounting for an estimated five per cent of the annual expansion in the years 1904–14.[10] These quantitative changes, due mainly to immigration, affected the composition of the population to such an extent that by the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslims made up no more than 50 per cent of the population. The general tendency was a rise in the proportion of Jews (from 1,000 in 1875 to 3,000 in 1915) and Christians (from 1,800 in 1875 to 8,000 in 1915), especially as of the 1880s, and a decline in the Muslim sector to half or less than half of the overall population.

The resulting change in the composition of Haifa's population was significantly to affect the city's administration and fabric of society when Christian elite families proved increasingly successful in translating their material gains into political power. Competition between the Christian and Muslim communities became a defining feature of the town's social and economic development. At first, serving as mediators between the local market and European merchants, well-known Christian Arab merchant families, who had moved to or set up branches in Haifa, began redirecting the *fallahin* (peasants) to cultivate those commodities that were most profitable in European markets and even furnished them with advances on their crops in the form of loans. However, before long, they were buying up large tracts of land, even entire villages, and accumulating enormous wealth in the process. In parallel, they succeeded in their bid for political power by using the opportunities created by the Tanzimat (Ottoman reform policy) for non-Muslims to obtain government posts in the local administration.

Muslim notables became aware of the looming threat to the hegemony that traditionally had been theirs. In order to shore up their position, not only *a'yan* (notables) but also *'ulama'* (Muslim scholars of religious functionary) families followed the lead of the Christians and increasingly turned to commerce, establishing trade relations with European or Syrian and Egyptian merchants and expanding their holdings of land and real estate. While this competition between Muslim and Christian elites of bureaucrat-landholders was often portrayed in consular reports as being religious in nature, in reality it was aimed at control of the economic and political power structure.[11] However, as a newly developing town, Haifa represented a highly dynamic situation: the opening up of the government administration to non-Muslims, rapid population growth, agricultural commercialization and growing European interference, all of which, among

TABLE 1 MUSLIM SAMPLE POPULATION BY PLACE OF ORIGIN

	%
Haifa	26.2
Rural Haifa	10.2
Urban Palestine	16.1
Syria and Lebanon	14.3
Anatolia and non-Arab regions	10.8
Unknown	22.4
Total	100

other things, enabled outsiders skilfully to ride the tide to success and inclusion in the elite within a generation.

Social Integration and Disintegration

As shown in Table 1, 73.8 per cent of the Muslim elite in our sample population came from outside Haifa.[12] Even when we include the rural area around the town, Haifa-born Muslims still form a small minority of only 36.4 per cent. Within the territory of Palestine as a whole, we find only 52.5 per cent of native-born Muslims. This means that about half of the people who left their mark on local society were immigrants. On the other hand, 85 per cent of the most prominent figures of the *qada'* centre of Haifa, whose origin is known, came from the *vilayet* to which the *qada'* of Haifa belonged, that of Beirut.

Haifa, as previously noted, became attractive to outsiders upon the decline of Acre, when its economy and administration began to expand and, even more so, when the Hijaz railway reached the town in 1905. Many of the Muslims in our sample population were sent to Haifa in the first place by the *qada'*, the *liwa'*, the *vilayet* authorities or those in Istanbul to take up a government post, and then remained in Haifa once their term in office was over.

It would seem that Haifa's social elite remained closed to foreigners— foreign officials, whether Arab or Turk, on the whole did not succeed in entering it. This is especially curious in view of the fact that the town's society was still in a state of flux, since what was then its populace had not made Haifa their home much before 1870. None of the foreign officials, no matter how high in rank, managed to attain the same social standing as natives of the same functional rank. Again we find that foreign officials, even of the highest ranking, did not affect or leave any mark on existing social structures, though Haifa was by then a thriving port town used to having foreigners play a part in all aspects of its social and economic development.[13]

The highest social order, that is, those to whose names we find appended the highest social honorary titles,[14] included in its ranks the large landowners and merchants. The majority were natives of Haifa and the rest came from the town's

rural vicinity and other Palestinian towns, all of whom were already well known for their great wealth and vast real estate holdings before coming to Haifa.

Thus, they had no difficulty in combining their government posts with their successful economic activities, thereby successfully reinforcing their increasingly influential positions in their new social environment. That this group contained virtually no immigrants from outside Palestine seems to indicate that foreign officials did not have the necessary economic means to qualify for the *mallakin* (landowners) class or enough leisure from their administrative duties to try their hand at commerce.

Thus, while the highest government officials were neither Arab nor indigenous, Haifa's elite consisted of four tiers with origins, in order of importance, as follows: (a) natives of Haifa; (b) villagers from the vicinity; (c) immigrants from cities of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon; and (d) immigrants from Anatolia and non-Arab regions.

Among Haifa's elite families, those with members carrying such social honorary titles as *wajih, mu'tabar* and *dhat* formed, so to speak, the cream of society and were the only indigenous families with access to positions in the administration of the town and *qada'*. In addition, they were also prominent in the trading community and the business of real estate. This means that the notables dominated the largest portion of the sources of influence and livelihood in Haifa, in addition to holding government posts. Such economic, social and political advantage made the following families the elite of Haifa during the Ottoman era and throughout the Mandate period.

The al-Khatibs[15] were regarded locally as the head of Haifa *'ulama'* families. Traditional *'ulama'* functions were handed down from father to son. All sons were sheikhs and fulfilled most of the religious functions in town. In addition, some of the family members filled important posts in the civil administration. Through the management of the *waqf* (Muslim pious foundation), which was made their responsibility in 1775, the al-Khatibs soon came to dominate the religious establishment in Haifa. This enabled them to extend their power and authority into other spheres as well.

The al-Sahlis were the oldest *ashraf* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) family in Haifa. The founder of the family, sheikh Suhayl, lived in Balad al-Shaykh during the time of Sultan Selim I (1517). He was considered a *walliyy*, that is, a holy man, and had been given as *waqfdhurri* (family endowment)[16] the villages of Balad al-Shaykh and Rushmiya, near Haifa, by the sultan. Some members of the family continued to live in Balad al-Shaykh, while others moved to nearby Haifa. During the nineteenth century, many members of the family filled important posts in the religious and civil administrations.

The al-Khatibs and the al-Sahlis were the most important *'ulama'* families in Haifa, as well as the oldest *ashraf* families. As such, the competition between them for the religious appointments in town kept them at loggerheads to the extent that no marriage alliance was ever contracted between them. In opposition to local *'ulama'* families, the Mallahs[17] were an immigrant family from Aleppo

and Tripoli who succeeded in attaining more positions in the local religious establishment than did many other locals. This was at least partially due to the consequences of the revolution of the young Turks in 1908 for traditionally powerful families, such as the al-Sahlis, the al-Khatibs and others, who had shown no sympathy for the young Turks' attempts to depose the sultan and to introduce their reform policies. The *'ulama'* families found themselves bypassed when the revolutionaries showed preference to such lesser-known families as the Mallahs in their appointment to important positions in the religious administration.

Although the formal standing of the al-Khatibs and al-Sahlis in the religious establishment diminished, their social standing did not. The government-backed upstarts never succeeded in usurping their social position even while replacing them in their official capacity. Strife and competition over positions and *awqaf* (Muslim pious foundations) continued until the end of the Ottoman period and separated the smaller families into coalitions. These coalitions were to have repercussions on the social structure during the Mandate period by dividing the population in Palestine at large into supporters of the Husaynis, on the one hand, and the Nashashibis, on the other—a division that would play a critical role in the years to come.

An analysis of the data concerning *non-'ulama'* elite families shows that in order to qualify as a notable *(wajih)* in the 1870s, one had to have an important family history, with top official positions, property, trade and good marriage alliances. The al-Salahs, al-Madis, Jarrars and Abd alHadis had a history of controlling large regions or holding top government positions prior to the middle of the nineteenth century.[18] All of the *wujaha'* (notable) families found in town were described as *mallakin,* that is, people of property and means. Besides their property and government appointments, most of the *wujaha'* families were also involved in commerce, among other reasons in order to guarantee economic stability and consolidate their influence. It was not uncommon that loss of wealth meant loss of status as well.

Together with ongoing immigration, Haifa's rising economic importance and expanding opportunities of employment created an elite of newcomers. By the end of Ottoman rule, some of them had managed to attain social honorary titles, which meant that the town's established traditional elite had accepted them. During the Mandate period, this group, prominent among them the Nablus-born Qaramans, was to gain importance, both economically and politically.

When one compares the social honorary titles attained by Christians with those carried by Muslims, one finds that for Christians the variety of titles was much smaller, that far fewer of them attained such titles, that frequently the title was restricted to their own community, and that often it was personal and did not extend beyond the bearer to other members of the family.[19] One may conclude that since in Ottoman society titles were traditionally a reflection of an individual's social standing, the Christians, as a group, were not in this respect considered as equals by the end of the Ottoman period. However, as new

upstarts, they had succeeded in winning for themselves solid economic positions in government. It was this success, together with their European connections, that made them better placed to face and, in the end, benefit from the often dramatic changes that characterized the final decades of the Ottoman world. Still, whereas their bases of power and influence partly resembled those of the Muslim elite, the main difference always remained that most of the Muslim *wujaha'* belonged to old and established families who had been leaders of the community and had enjoyed economic and political power for decades or sometimes more than a century. In contrast, as relative newcomers, albeit even with recognition as *wujaha'*, the Christians were never able to equal the Muslims in their position in society.

Thus, we find that the Tanzimat, which intended to do away with communal separatism and make all Ottoman subjects equal before the law, could achieve only so much. Even after the other ethnic-religious communities had successfully acquired their share of the sources of power, particularly economic power, society at large and government institutions continued to look upon the Muslims as the natural centre for leadership. Therefore, as a Muslim town in transition, Haifa, during the final years of the nineteenth century, mirrored both the vision and the apprehension that inspired the Ottoman reforms in the continuing effort to shore up the fortunes of the empire against the encroachment of the West.

THE MANDATE PERIOD (1918–48)

Following World War I, Britain and France carved up the Arab provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire and created new states which they governed through mandates.[20] The British had given a promise, in the form of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, to the Zionists, incorporated into the 'Mandate for Palestine' (Article 2), meaning that:

> The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home…and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.[21]

Article 6 furthermore stated that:

> The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage…close settlement by Jews on the land.

Palestine had long been important for Britain's interests in the Middle East: for the defence of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and more so after the

discovery of oil in Iraq and the laying of the pipelines through northern Palestine. Although Palestine did not promise material gains, it was essential that the country achieve a viable economy in order not to become a financial liability to Britain. British economic policy complemented the British Mandatory administration's political commitment to the Zionists and the establishment of the Jewish National Home (JNH), which saw the aims of the Zionist movement as compatible with and complementary to its own. The function of the Zionist Organization was seen by the Mandatory administration as an extension of British policy to strengthen the government and to establish the JNH.[22]

Haifa ranked high in British and Zionist plans during the Mandate rule. It was to be the starting point of alternative routes, by land, by sea and by air, to India. Its geographic position and topography held great promise for future development into a major transportation hub. In fact, it became the headquarters of the Palestine railway, the location of a harbour for ocean-going ships, the terminus of the pipeline for oil from Iraq, and the place for storage and refinery of the oil. For the Zionists, Haifa's major attraction was in its proximity to the multiplying number of settlements in the newly acquired agricultural plains of Marj Ibn 'Amir. In addition to being the potential distribution centre for the agricultural products of these settlements, it was also envisaged as the location for the major heavy industries whose products could be easily distributed from the Near East to the West. In fact, the largest Zionist industrial projects-the Shemen and Nesher factories, the Grands Moulins mills and the Rutenberg electrification plant—were concentrated in Haifa, and Jewish labour settlements were a direct corollary to these enterprises. Thus, Haifa provided the means to fulfil three main aims of Zionism: the conquest of the labour market; the acquisition of land for eternal Jewish ownership and settlement; and the creation of economic opportunities in order to attract Jewish immigrants.[23]

As previously mentioned, Haifa's Arab community, prior to World War I, included a large number of Christian and Muslim merchants, entrepreneurs and wealthy landowners who had made considerable investments in commerce with European firms and with Arabs in the towns and villages. They had been the main participants in a process of economic development and social change that had been taking place since the 1870s. While this process continued under the Mandate, it was deeply affected by the Mandatory policies and Zionist aims, notwithstanding the growth of the wealthy Arab stratum through the migration of affluent Muslims and Christians from Beirut, Damascus and the Palestinian towns in the 1920s.[24] Despite these developments, investments in fields other than the traditional mercantile activities were rendered practically impossible, except in a very few cases. The industrial field was monopolized by the Jewish sector, which financed it as part of a national Zionist economy. It became impossible for the Arab entrepreneurial class to compete in the new economic fields conquered by Zionist capital. Only the few wealthiest Arabs were able to consolidate their economic base and initiate a few industrial projects or accumulate real estate holdings.[25]

In addition to the expanding Arab mercantile class, other elements in Haifa's Arab population, especially the Muslim working class, noticeably grew during the 1920s and 1930s. Government employment provided a living for a substantial number of Arabs in the civil service and in the more menial jobs of the municipality, the harbour and other government projects. The building boom, in both the private and public sectors, attracted large numbers of labourers, mostly from the economically distressed peasantry of the northern districts.[26] The concentration of such a proletariat in Haifa was unprecedented; the town was unprepared and the Mandatory administration unwilling to deal with the problems resulting from congestion. For the Arab community, this influx altered the social structure of the society and intensified the gap between the social classes.

Losing Majority Status, Social and Economic Power

Haifa's population growth, from approximately 22,000 in 1918 to more than 50,000 in 1931 and to more than 140,000 by 1947, dramatically changed its demographic character.[27] The most phenomenal change during the Mandate period was in the Jewish community. While Jews made up approximately one-eighth of the population in 1918, their number grew to one-quarter in 1922, to one-third in 1931,[28] and to over one-half of the total inhabitants of Haifa in 1947. This dramatic increase can only be explained by the number of Jewish immigrants that flooded the country in successive waves. Official Zionist sources in Haifa put the increase in the Jewish population between 1931 and 1938, due mainly to immigration, at 239 per cent, inflating the Jewish population of the city from 15,923 to 54,118.[29]

The Arab population had also grown tremendously during the 1930s as a result of natural increase and immigration. It is estimated that the Arab population of Haifa increased from 34,148 in 1931 to more than 50,000 in 1938.[30] Both the British Mandatory administration and the Zionists initiated a number of projects that attracted Arab workers, both skilled and unskilled. Haifa had become a haven of employment for Palestinians, as well as for opportunity-seekers from the neighbouring Arab regions. A study of the Muslim court records *(sijill)* indicates that 75 per cent of Arab immigrants into Haifa during the Mandate period were of Palestinian origin, of whom only 32 per cent came from towns and cities.[31] Hence, what had been a relatively small town at the beginning of the Mandate period had become one of the largest cities in Palestine over the course of 30 years. The population growth changed the balance of the town's communities, stripping the Arab community of the social and psychological power it had previously enjoyed in its majority status.

Demographic change was accompanied by economic development. While industry had played a minor part in the economy of Haifa prior to World War I, industrialization during the Mandate period became important in the programmes for national development and independence.[32] Clearly, these plans could only be

realized with the assistance of the British Mandatory administration. However, instead of providing protective tariffs and financial support, the Mandatory power rested on its traditional view of dependent economies as suppliers of raw materials and importers of British manufactured goods.[33] This left the door open for Western Jewish immigrants to take the industrial initiative in Palestine, initially by means of private Jewish enterprise and capital. The Zionist Organization pressure for protective tariffs was met with the administration's acceptance and opened the gates to the emergence of a full protection policy, which adjusted the Mandate policy to support the concept of the Jewish National Home. As early as 1921, however, the administration evinced its support for the Jewish industrial sector, with the intent to impress upon the Arab population the benefits that the sudden influx of Jewish immigrants could bring in terms of modernization and improvement for the whole economy.[34] Against that Arabs argued that the government's policy was directed to protect only Jewish capitalists 'at the expense of higher cost of living to the majority of the population [the Arabs]'.[35] Arab manufacturers claimed that they were unprotected, both regarding the import of the same articles free of duty and regarding the imposition of tariffs on the raw materials for their production.[36]

Haifa was deliberately chosen by the Zionists as the future centre of large Jewish industrial concerns, and by 1936, heavy industry—including the electrification plant, the Shemen oil factory, the Grands Moulins flour mills and the Nesher cement factory—was concentrated in it. These enterprises were supported by heavy capital investments and managed by corporate structures which adhered, in varying degrees, to Zionist principles; they produced commodities essential for establishing a national entity and were established under protective laws.[37]

Owing to practical financial considerations, these Zionists hired Arab workers and exploited their cheap labour when necessary. On the other hand, customs exemptions and protective tariffs to assist Zionist undertakings sharply hit both Arab agricultural and urban sectors. The items exempted from duty in the interests of the major industrial concerns were also items crucial to the livelihood of the Arabs: wheat and flour; oil and oil seeds; and building machinery. By 1930, when a Jewish industrial nucleus had taken shape, its corollary was a deteriorating Arab agricultural sector.[38] In 1926, the Director of Agriculture complained that customs concessions were undermining the efforts of his department to encourage the production of olives and sesame. The fall in their prices on the local market, because of imports, impoverished the *fallahin* and was instrumental in creating the influx of seasonal labour into the cities. Even the High Commissioner recognized the seriousness of the situation and, in view of the worsening conditions of the *fallahin* because of tax exemptions on agricultural imports, strenuously demanded amendments.[39]

In the Arab sector, scarcity of large amounts of capital was an obstacle that delayed the development of large industries. The government too did nothing to facilitate such developments; on the contrary, it promoted an anti-industrial bias

among Arabs by deliberately refraining from encouraging industrial training and refusing to modernize existing enterprises in the Arab sector.[40] The main Arab industry in Haifa was the cigarette factory established by Qaraman, Dik and Salti, which was to become the largest in Palestine.[41] This was the only Arab factory that enjoyed governmental protection. Like all smaller Arab workshops in the city, this industry too depended on the Arab market.[42] During the 1920s and 1930s, Arabs made numerous attempts at small industrial projects in Haifa, such as ice, oil, shoes, beds, ceramics, pipes, etc, which often ended in financial loss. Arab appeals to the Mandatory administration to protect and help such factories fell on deaf ears and left the Arab population exposed to the influences of imported industrial development and an inflated economy.[43] The nature of Jewish industrial interests and the operational framework providing for its growth cancelled the chances for similar attempts in the Arab sector, relegating its industrial projects to a peripheral status.[44]

In the sphere of commerce, Mandatory administration policies had also a deleterious effect on the major traditional branch of Arab commerce, the cereal trade, as well as on many of the families and villages that depended on this trade in one way or another. Before 1920, the cereal trade in Haifa was controlled by various powerful families who derived their income from landholdings in Marj Ibn 'Amir, the villages around the city, and exports from Hauran. In 1920, when Palestine was separated from Hauran and put under French Mandate, French authorities facilitated the exporting of cereal from Hauran via Beirut, thus detracting from Haifa's importance as the principal import-export centre for Damascus and Hauran.[45] Furthermore, the merchant community of Haifa was hit even deeper by the British administration's decision in the autumn of 1920 to prohibit the export of Palestinian cereals in order to provide for the expected flow of Jewish immigrants.[46] This setback, combined with an overall fall in world prices, forced cereal merchants to sell at a loss.

Throughout the 1920s, the situation of the Arab cereal merchants steadily declined. Not only had they to contend with British policies that depressed prices, but they were also faced with the challenge posed by the Jewish land-purchasing policy in the fertile plains and Marj Ibn 'Amir, which saw many of the cereal-producing villages pass into Zionist hands. Crops from these new settlements, especially wheat, were sold directly to the Zionist Grands Moulins mills in Haifa, bypassing the traditional Arab wholesale merchants. *Al-Karmil* summed up the new reality by writing that: 'The Arab trade in grains has died because of the transfer of the Marj villages into Zionist hands. All products are sent to the Jewish mill which thus places the peasants at its mercy'.[47] During the 1920s, most of Haifa's traditional Arab traders registered a decline, and trade was proving to be inadequate as a means for providing a livelihood. This growing realization created a depression among the merchant class that spread to other levels of Arab society, and which was recorded both officially and by individuals and organizations of the commercial community.[48]

The influx of both Arab and Jewish immigrants to Haifa stimulated some traditional merchants to diversify their activities. Certain established importers had taken the first opportunity to expand their businesses by catering to the tastes of the wealthier strata of the Arab, Jewish and British populations. Growth in the building industry brought some cereal exporters to turn their attention to importing building materials.[49] In comparison with the large Jewish trading initiatives, Arab entrepreneurs were usually frustrated by lack of capital. In order to tackle this problem, some wealthy Arab merchants formed business partnerships in new lines of trade, such as transport, textiles and building materials.[50] These merchants and firms also succeeded in adopting European marketing techniques and managed to benefit from Haifa's general prosperity. Nevertheless, Arab importers and firms lacked the financial backing needed to compete with the Jewish mercantile sector, and by 1933 Jewish firms outnumbered the Arab firms.[51] In fact, the Arab trading sector had been losing ground ever since the initial blow to its main item of exchange, namely cereal exports. When this loss was compounded by overwhelming competition with Jewish industry, Arab purchasing power was, in the final analysis, reduced to dependence on employment by the Jews.

Arab Immigration: From Fallahin to Workers

The economic depression of the *fallahin,*[52] especially in northern Palestine, started prior to the establishment of Mandatory rule. From the 1870s, following the expansion of ties between the Palestinian and the global economy, the penetration of urban merchants into the village economy gathered impetus. The merchants, as the owners of capital, swiftly assumed the role of financiers for the growing needs of the *fallahin.* Owing to the inability of many *fallahin* to repay their loans, entire villages soon became the property of urban merchants.[53] The acquisition of agricultural land, in one way or another, by local merchants or by Lebanese and Syrian capitalists or other notables did not cause the dispossession of the *fallahin* from their villages or their land towards the end of the Ottoman rule. However, this situation changed drastically with the onset of Mandatory rule, chiefly as a result of the transfer of agricultural land from the merchants and major landowners to the Zionist settlements.[54]

Following World War I, the *fallahin's* economic conditions and living standards markedly declined, and the cycle of poverty in which they were caught deepened still further. The Mandatory administration, despite being aware of the potential political consequences from its first years, did nothing of significance to improve the situation.[55] However, by adopting a typical colonial policy in Palestine, the Mandatory administration was anxious to maintain its strategic presence at as low a cost as possible.[56]

In contrast to rural areas that suffered from worsening hardships, Haifa was the scene of intense labour activity during the 1920s and 1930s, attracting a continuous flow of impoverished immigrants from the countryside. These

masses of unskilled and unorganized labourers were exploited by employers in both the private and public sectors. Furthermore, the official position laid down by the 1928 Wages Commission, which continued until 1948, set the Jewish minimum wage at least 30–50 per cent higher than that of the Arabs because of the informally accepted dictum that the Jewish workers were accustomed to a higher standard of living.[57] The Palestinian Arab Workers Society (PAWS), founded in 1925, was merely nominal and unable to provide any real assistance, mainly due to the composition of its own leadership, who came from the elite ranks.[58] The Arab entrepreneurial class, as the public and Zionist commercial sectors, took full advantage of the defenceless condition of Arab labour. Champions of Arab labour in the Arab community were few, and the Arab press, which led the political campaign against Zionism, was reluctant to support the demands of Arab workers. Under such conditions, Arab protests and strikes were condemned to failure.[59] In contrast, the ranks of the Jewish labour in Haifa had attained a high degree of organization and a firm ideological base, compelling the Mandatory administration to acknowledge its responsibility and to commit itself to assurances of a Jewish share in government projects.

The harbour project clearly displayed the ineffectiveness of the Arab workers organization. The harbour had to be built as cheaply as possible by making full use of cheap Arab labour, while employing a fair share of expensive Jewish labour at the same time. Whereas the Zionist lobby had already started discussions in 1926 with the Mandatory administration to ensure Jewish labour allocations and wage rates and to set the framework for the employment policy on the harbour project,[60] Arab leaders did not even think about similar issues until it was too late. In fact, the large numbers of Arab migrant workers were severely exploited even by the administration itself. Up to 1930, unskilled Arab labourers in the Atlit quarries were hired by the administration at wages below its own minimum stipulation of 150 mils per day and even below the Wages Commission's living wage of 120 mils per day.[61] Unlike daily Arab workers, Jewish labourers in the unskilled work of the harbour construction were mostly hired on the basis of piecework, which enabled them to earn substantially higher wages than their Arab counterparts.

The government recruitment practices in the 1930s, which gave Jews 30–33 per cent of all employment in government projects together with higher wages, widened the gap between the Arab and Jewish working classes and intensified the struggle for employment, especially with unemployment on the rise. When the harbour construction was completed in late 1933, the modern port provided new labour opportunities, particularly for porters, a branch primarily dominated by Arab labour.[62] In addition, a Jewish and Arab construction boom continued to flourish in Haifa until late 1935. Contrasted with the adverse conditions in the countryside and Arab towns,[63] Haifa held great attraction for increasing numbers of Arab migrant workers. Widespread unemployment in the northern countryside and the large influx of migrant Arabs into Haifa flooded the ranks of unskilled workers and altered the character of the city.[64]

A serious slump in the building industry in the spring of 1936 seriously affected both Arab and Jewish unemployment. The Arab strike, which started in Haifa in April 1936, resulted in a take-over by Jewish labour in areas of work that had previously been purely Arab. Following the strike and the coming three years of the rebellion, Arab building and its allied industries came to a total standstill, which further deepened unemployment among the Arabs. These were mostly daily workers who were unorganized and quickly lost their jobs to the Histadrut, which was fighting to capture such areas of work. In its battle to capture the work in the port, the Histadrut subsidized the low wages paid by the Mandatory administration to the newly employed Jewish workers.[65] Quarries and Jewish building contractors who had employed mostly Arab labour before the strike now hired Jewish labour instead, leaving many unskilled seasonal Arab workers to return to their villages and the all too familiar cycle of poverty.

Immigration and Social Marginalization

Among Haifa's rural immigrants were those who were at least somewhat acquainted with the ways of the city and others who were complete strangers to this style of life. In most cases, immigration to Haifa did not cause a total separation of the immigrants from their villages. On the one hand, Haifa's numerous elements—Muslims, Christians, Jews, villagers and urbanites—made the rural immigrants' social absorption difficult and forced them to remain separate from the established urban community. The heterogeneous urban society, as opposed to the homogeneous village society, gave good cause for the immigrants not to sever their ties with their birthplace, which provided a counterbalance for their position of exclusion in the city. In his search for a job and a place to live, an immigrant *fallah* typically addressed himself first to a relative or someone from his village, who had already gained a foothold in town.[66]

The meagre wages earned by rural immigrants in the city were a further incentive for preserving their ties with the village. This was particularly true when the villager had left behind a parcel of land, which entitled him to receive a part of the harvest from his family who worked the land. The produce that the immigrant *fallah* received from his land would reduce his expenditure on food. This interdependence between the village and the immigrant *fallah* limited his separation from the village atmosphere and prompted him to continue his village lifestyle within his home in the city. Seasonal migration from villages, both near and far from Haifa, also helped to maintain the immigrant's ties with his village. A great many *fallahs* migrated to Haifa to seek employment during the 'dead' season between sowing and harvest.[67] This kind of migration is exemplified in the records of the Muslim Court *(sijill),* in cases of men wishing to return to their villages when opportunities for employment in Haifa diminished or when it came time for the harvest. In such cases where they had married a local Haifa woman who did not agree to leave, husbands complained before the Qadi (Muslim

judge) that their wives refused to follow them and therefore requested that he give them an 'obedience' order.[68]

The development of social relations among the immigrants themselves, as well as between the immigrants and the veteran residents of Haifa, is both relevant and interesting. The data concerning marriages in the *sijill* serves as a key to revealing these interpersonal relations. The *sijill* sample shows that there were very few immigrant men of urban origin who married immigrant women of rural origin. Only 11.4 per cent of all immigrant men of rural origin were married to women of urban origin, who were not natives of Haifa. In contrast, the relations among themselves of immigrants of urban origin, as well as those of rural origin, were very strong. The *sijill* data show that 43.5 per cent of the male immigrants of urban origin married urban women (not from Haifa), and similarly, 67.8 per cent of the male immigrants of rural origin had rural wives. These figures indicate that in Haifa the process of fusion between immigrants of rural origin with those of urban origin was very slow. Social barriers continued to exist despite the proximity of urbanites and ruralites living in the same city.

Another important question is: what was Haifa's position towards the urban and rural immigrants? Data found in the *sijill* shows the following results: 43.6 per cent of the male immigrants of urban origin married native Haifa women, and 23.7 per cent of the male immigrants of rural origin married native Haifa women. In my opinion, the figure representing the marriages of men of rural origin to native Haifa women should be lowered, because in many cases the woman's surname shows that she was not a native of Haifa, but the *sijill* lists her as: 'of the residents of Haifa'—*min sukkan Haifa*—without designating her origin, possibly because her family had emigrated to Haifa a long time before.[69] As opposed to this, the *sijill* often lists a person as *min-ahali wa-sukkanHaifa,* in order to emphasize that this person is a native of Haifa.[70]

The social separation between immigrants of rural origin and immigrants of urban origin can also be observed by examining a smallerscale segment of the *sijill* on cases regarding permission for marriage (cases in which the boy or girl request the Qadi's permission to marry, despite their being under the age of 17, the legal minimum age for marriage). There are 56 cases involving immigrants under this heading, showing that marriages of male immigrants of rural origin to female immigrants of urban origin was only two per cent, and marriages of male immigrants of urban origin to female immigrants of rural origin was approximately 5.3 per cent.

The above results show that there was hardly any social interaction between urbanites and ruralites in Haifa's newly evolved society. Each group continued to operate within a closed social framework. This division into separate closed groups is also evident among the rural immigrants themselves. A study of the *sijill* data concerning marriage permissions reveals an interesting phenomenon: the marriage relations among the rural immigrants themselves were based upon the single village. Approximately 84 per cent of the marriage licence requests in which both partners were rural immigrants involved men and women from the

same village. Only 16 per cent of the male rural immigrants wished to marry rural immigrant women from a different village.

This social clique of immigrants from the same village can also be observed in their loyalty to leaders from their village. Loyalties based upon common village origins even led at times to mass brawls between immigrants from different villages. A case in point was the mass brawl that erupted in 1935 in the Qaraman, Dik and Salti cigarette factory. Two candidates sought election as president of the workers' union, one from the village Tira, and the other from Nablus. A heated argument between a worker from Tira and a worker from Nablus led to a fist fight. This in turn led to a mass brawl in which some 100 workers were involved and five people were injured.[71]

In order further to preserve social frameworks based on common village origin, the immigrants formed charitable committees to help needy immigrants from the same village, as well as family clubs.[72] These committees and associations emphasized ties with the village itself, and reestablished a kind of village community within the town.

The system used for employing new workers at some of the larger workplaces, such as the quarries, oil companies and private contractors, further strengthened this phenomenon. The employers would order the number of workers that they required from the *Mukhtar* (head) of a village. These workers would then move to their new workplace in the city as a group, working together.[73] The problem of housing was solved in a similar way, with people from the same village coming to live in certain streets and neighbourhoods. As a result, certain neighbourhoods became known by the origin of the residents, such as *harat al-Ghazazwih* (neighbourhood of those who came from Gaza), or *harat al-Tayarnih* (those who came frrom Tira), etc.[74]

The reaction of Haifa's native or veteran residents to the growing Arab population of immigrants was not positive. There is evidence to the effect that Haifa's native residents tended to discriminate against the immigrants and did everything in their power to keep them from attaining key social and leadership positions in the city. The supremacist and conservative attitude adopted by the native residents of Haifa was most strongly directed against Christian-Orthodox immigrants, particularly those who were learned or were in liberal professions, and who sought acceptance into the leadership circles of the community in Haifa. Christian-Orthodox immigrants were not allowed to participate in elections within the community until 1941, 'because of the veteran residents' fear of losing power'.[75]

This separation between veterans and immigrants was also expressed in the Christian-Orthodox unions and clubs throughout the city. The immigrants were called 'the opposition' *(al-mu'aradah)* and formed their own unions such as *al-nahdah* (the Revival Union), whose members were almost all from liberal professions: lawyers, doctors, businessmen and senior clerks.[76] When immigrants joined the Orthodox Arab Club, which was founded by native residents, the natives reacted by abandoning the club and forming a new club for

themselves, named the Young Orthodox Charity Union.[77] Coincidentally, the immigrants founded a club for themselves under the name the Young Orthodox Club'[78] The division between Christian-Orthodox immigrants and natives grew to such an extent that the immigrants appointed their own priest and held their religious ceremonies separately.[79]

The immigrants' struggle for leadership positions in the Christian-Orthodox organizations and their demand for the right to vote and to be elected to the community's council led them to file a complaint in 1941 in the Haifa regional court, charging the community's council with mismanagement of the *awqaf* of the community. The struggle between the immigrants and natives within the community finally came to an end in May 1941, after a Christian-Orthodox delegation with members from Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nazareth, Acre and Ramle came to Haifa in order to end the crisis. The result of the delegation's mediation was considered a victory for the immigrants. The council's charter was revoked, and in its place came a new charter which included the following clause:

> Clerks and other members of the Orthodox community who do not belong to the Haifa community are hereby granted the right to vote for and be elected to the community's council, under the condition that the clerk or member of the community voting had been living in Haifa for five consecutive years. The right to be elected to the community council and high offices is granted to members living in Haifa for ten consecutive years.[80]

The immigrants also succeeded in attaining the right to join the Orthodox Arab Club as members with equal rights.[81]

The struggle within the orthodox community was along the same lines as that caused by the lack of solidarity of Haifa's various factions. The unions operating in the city all worked for the specific interests of their members. There was no Islamic-Christian union operating in Haifa, as there were in most other cities throughout the country. In contrast, there were many religious unions, such as the Young Muslims' Union founded by 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam in 1928, whose members were mostly Muslim immigrants and the leadership of which was held by Haifa's wealthiest natives, such as Rashid al-Haj Ibraim.[82] In addition to this union and the Orthodox union, there was also the Latin-Christian Union, founded in March 1941,[83] and the Armenian Charity Committee, which worked towards preserving Armenian folklore, literature and traditions.[84] The Druzes also had a union of their own: Help for the Poor Druze Committee.[85]

Women's organizations, such as the Muslim Women's Charity Union, were also founded on a sectarian basis and were aimed at helping the needy of the community, who were very often immigrants. The members of the directing committee defined themselves as daughters of the best families, whose role was to collect charity for the needy and conduct educational activities among the poor.[86] A parallel, predominantly Orthodox-Christian women's organization was

founded, called the General Charity Union of Haifa's Women.[87] It was headed by Bajjaly, the wife of a member of the Christian-Orthodox council, who actively opposed accepting immigrants to the council.[88]

With the growth in Haifa's Arab population, the Christian part of the total Arab community in the city diminished as the Muslim part increased. The percentage of Christians in the total Arab community of the city declined from 48.5 per cent in 1922 to 39 per cent in 1938. In contrast, the Muslim part of the Arab population rose from 51 per cent in 1922 to 60.7 per cent in 1938.

The decrease in the relative portion of Christians in Haifa's Arab population did not, however, affect their employment patterns. Haifa municipality's employment figures show that there were 753 Arab labourers under its employ in 1945, of whom 77 per cent were Muslims and 23 per cent Christians.[89] A large share of the Muslim labourers were immigrants of rural origin who were willing to take any odd job that the municipality had to offer, even at low wages. For example, in November 1938, the records show that the municipality wanted to hire 25 sanitary workers at the low wage of 140 mills per day. Fifty candidates responded to the offer, almost all of whom were Muslim immigrants from a rural background.[90] Christian immigrants who sought employment in the municipality usually emphasized their education and were subsequently considered for clerical jobs.

The mass Arab immigration to Haifa taxed the city's sources of employment, lowering the pay rate in the public sector. The workers' demands for higher wages were refused by the employers who could easily find many takers for the low-paying jobs. This situation was demonstrated in the wage negotiations between the sanitation workers and Haifa's municipal council in 1929. Haifa's vice-mayor, Ibrahim Sahyun, was of the opinion that 'a labourer who refuses to accept his pay can be fired and a replacement can then be found to work in his place'.[91] Similar reactions were received from some of the city councilmen, one of whom added: 'There are always workers for whoever seeks them, and they will accept work willingly for the wages paid by the municipality.'[92] Those wages were 70 mills per day for a sanitation labourer, equal to half the average daily wages of an unskilled construction labourer. Only when faced with a shortage of sanitary workers, resulting from the workers' strike in August 1936, did the municipality raise the daily wages to 200 mills per day,[93] which was more than the average daily wages of an unskilled construction labourer.

The rapid growth of Haifa's population also created a large demand for housing in the city. While 82 per cent of Haifa's residents rented their homes, only 18 per cent were homeowners.[94] Since most of the rentals were comprised of only one room, the municipality based the house rental rates on the price per room, per month.[95] A new phenomenon appeared as a result of the residential housing shortage in the city when landlords began erecting tin shacks on the roofs and in the courtyards of buildings to serve as rooms for rental to the immigrants streaming into the city.[96] The tin shack phenomenon had appeared earlier in Haifa's development. As early as 1926, the governor of the northern

district instructed Haifa's municipal council to see to it that the 'tin shanties', which posed a sanitary threat, be destroyed.[97] Despite the municipality's attempts to clear away the tin shanties, they grew in parallel to the level of immigration.

The high rents demanded by homeowners for rooms provided further incentive for building tin shacks. The 1934 report of Haifa's rental-rate commission noted that the rents were disproportionate with the income of the tenants. Later, in 1945, the rent for a single room set by the municipality was £.P2.5-3.5, equal to half of the average worker's monthly wages. Likewise a lawyer, whose monthly wages came to £.P12, paid £.P6 for rent.

As a result of the lack of affordable housing, hundreds of labourers could be seen sleeping in sacks in the streets at night, and as many families made their homes in the caves of Wadi Rushmiyya under the worst sanitary conditions.[98] A report made by the municipal engineer in 1947 warned of buildings in the old city that should be sealed off as unfit for human habitation. This was particularly true of the buildings used to house labourers who had come from outside of Haifa.

Approximately 50 per cent of the Arab population in Haifa were reported to be living in slums, characterized by overcrowded living conditions, poor sanitation, and low-income residents.[99] Newly erected Arab neighbourhoods rapidly deteriorated into slums, as the residents added rooms made of tin, straw mats or burlap upon the roofs of the buildings. Of the 20,000 inhabitants of the Eastern neighbourhood, for example, 3000 were defined as very poor and received aid from the Eastern Neighbourhood Redemption Committee.[100] In 1945, the Neighbourhood's Committee allocated the sum of £.P1,140 as aid for needy families. In contrast, the entire municipal welfare budget for this neighbourhood was £.P45 per year. In the same neighbourhood, there were approximately 2,000 people living in the Wadi Rushmiyya caves, with three or four families to a cave. These families paid a rental fee for their cave to the owner of the land in which it was situated.[101]

From time to time, the tin shacks and sub-standard housing were discussed by the city council, but its members did nothing to solve the problem. No request was made by the council for either aid or intervention from the government until 1934, as most of the city council members were the very same landlords who were benefiting from the inflated rents.[102] In addition, any attempts made by the government to eliminate the tin shack shanty towns failed, with the residents simply rebuilding following demolition.[103]

CONCLUSION: THE WAY TO 1948

The economic distress of the *fallahin* population, which constituted about two-thirds of the Arab population at the beginning of the Mandate period, deepened over time, and its sources of livelihood continued to shrink. Urban economic pull forces were unable to supply long-term solutions. During economic recession, as happened in the mid-1930s, many *fallahin* were discharged from their jobs in

town and were forced to return to their villages so as to resume life in the same vicious cycle of poverty that they had endured for so long.

The ground was ripe for social ferment. On the one hand were deepening poverty, dwindling sources of income, lack of integration of the migrant *fallahin,* and their growing discontent; on the other was a tense political atmosphere, with pressure from young, radical Arab circles, and an inability of the national Arab leadership to indicate any gains on the issue of rising Jewish immigration. Violence could erupt at any moment, and any leader who comprehended the dismay of the disaffected migrants and the resentful *fallahin* could incite them against the existing order. Sheikh 'Izz alDin al-Qassam, a cleric and charismatic leader, who worked and flourished among the urban poor and won the trust and adulation of the rural immigrants in Haifa, was just this kind of figure. His armed activity, first evidenced in November 1935, set a precedent based on understanding the readiness and ability of the embittered *fallahin* to carry out a rebellion.[104] For them it would be a release of the social pressure and perpetual economic hardship. The mass support for al-Qassam's activity was seen as the start of a process of shaking free from the prolonged distress. The huge crowd that attended al-Qassam's funeral, of a size previously unknown in Haifa, was an expression of massive support for the man and his social and political ideas. The long-simmering social and political agitation reached boiling point with al-Qassam's death. His disciples and friends, who understood this well, lit the spark that caused a three-year rebellion (1936–39) by killing two Jews travelling on the Tulkarm-Nablus road. The slaying, the Jewish response, and the tense atmosphere fuelled the flames of the rebellion.[105] The traditional Arab leadership followed the crowds when it could no longer postpone joining the mass movement. The protest movement of the masses against their economic and social distress, bound up with feelings of national frustration, could turn against the traditional Arab leadership itself should it stand in the way.[106] While leadership was forced for a while to lead the mass protest movement and to steer it towards the British Mandatory government and the Zionist movement, it played as marginal a role as possible during the three-year rebellion. It was actually the *fallahin* in the cities and villages who revolted and who dictated the pace of events throughout that period of time.[107]

As the situation of the rebels in early 1939 grew more difficult, owing to government and Zionist attacks and lack of funds and arms, their violence was increasingly directed against the most vulnerable elements— the Arab civilian population and those considered to be the cause of their plight. Their attacks reflected the bitterness of the peasants and poor immigrants in a state of lawlessness.[108]

In Haifa the end of the revolt, irrespective of its negative aspects, was a triumph for the Mandatory administration and the Jewish National Home policy. It was also a minor victory for the mercantile and upper-class Arabs, who could now resume their business and their residence without concern for what the future might hold. However, it was a moral and political defeat for the rest of

Arab society. In Haifa, the balance, as Seikaly put it, 'had now tipped in favour of the Jewish character of the city, and it was set on a course which was dramatically achieved with tragic expulsion of the Arab population in 1948'.[109] If by the end of World War I the Arab population stood at roughly 17,000 and the Jews numbered approximately 3,000, in 1946 there would be 70,910 Arabs and 74,230 Jews living in the town. Hostilities broke out in Palestine when on 29 November 1947 the United Nations accepted Resolution 181, which envisaged the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. When, less than six months later, on 15 May 1948, the Zionists proclaimed their state in those parts of Palestine of which their army had taken control by then, there were barely 2, 000 Arabs left in Haifa.

NOTES

1. Cf. Amnon Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century, Patterns of Government andAdministration,* Jerusalem, 1973.
2. About developments of Haifa in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Mahmoud Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period, 1864–1914, A Muslim Town in Transition,* Leiden, 1998, pp.7–27.
3. Bulus al-Khuri Qarali, *Futuhat Ibrahim Pasha al-Misri fi Filastin, Naqlan 'An Taqarir AntwanKataku, Qunsul al-Namsa fi 'Akka wa-Sayda* (Occupations of Ibrahim Pasha the Egyptian in Palestine, as Reported by Antwan Katafaku, the Austrian consul in Acre and Sydon), Bayt Shabab, 1937, p.54. British, French, Austrian and Sardinian vice-consuls could be found in Haifa during the Egyptian occupation.
4. The Sayqalis, prominent Acre merchants, moved to Haifa in the first years of the Egyptian occupation. *Sijill of the Shari'a Court of Haifa* (1306 AH/1890 CE), case nos. 224, 353 (hereafter *Sijill*).
5 . Alexander Schölch, *Palestine in Transformation 1856–1882, Studies in Social, Economic andPolitical Development,* trans. William C.Young and Michael C.Gerrity, Washington, DC, 1993, pp.80–81; idem, The Economic Development of Palestine, 1856–1882', *Journal ofPalestine Studies,* Vol.11 (1981), p.36.
6. Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period,* p.27.
7. Ibid., pp.64–87.
8. Ibid., p.109.
9. Ruth Kark, 'The Rise and Decline of Coastal Towns in Palestine', in Gad G.Gilbar (ed.), *Ottoman Palestine 1900–1914, Studies in Economic and Social History,* Leiden, 1990, p.73.
10. Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period,* p.111.
11. For similar situations developing in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt, see Engin Akarli, *The LongPeace, Ottoman Lebanon, 1861–1920,* London, 1993, p.149; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali,* London and New York, 1984, p.13.
12. The sample's data is based upon information culled from the *Sijill* volumes from the Ottoman period.
13. Cf. Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period,* pp. 112–62.

14. On the social honorary titles and their social indications, see ibid., p.118.
15. On the al-Khatibs, see ibid., pp.127–32.
16. Ibid., p.133.
17. On the Mallahs, see ibid., pp.137–9.
18. On *non-'ulama'* elite families, see ibid., pp.139–53.
19. Cf. Mahmoud Yazbak, 'Jewish-Muslim Social and Economic Relations in Haifa (1870–1914), According to Sijill Records', in Amy Singer and Amnon Cohen (eds.), *Aspects of OttomanHistory,* Jerusalem, 1994, pp.93–114.
20. 'The assignment of territory under the mandate system was little more than a thinly disguised title deed, enabling the overseer to promote political, strategic, and economic metropolitan interests': Barbara J.Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine; British Economic Policy,1920–1929,* Syracuse, 1993, p.4.
21. For a complete text of the 'Mandate for Palestine', see e.g. Palestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Commission), Cmd. 5479, London, 1937, pp.34–7, 398–400.
22. For a study of Britain's economic policy during the Mandate and the contribution of that policy towards the establishment of Jewish National Home, see Smith, *The Roots ofSeparatism;* B.Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and theArab-Jewish Conflict 1917–1929,* London, 1979.
23. May Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society 1918–1936,* London and New York, 1995, p.5; Mahmoud Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the MandatePeriod,* Nazareth, 1988, pp.21–8; Nahom Gross, 'Haifa be-Reshet Hati'us ha-Yhudi be-Aretz' (Haifa at the Beginning of the Jewish Industrialization in Palestine), *Riva'on le-Kalkala,* Vol.27, No.106 (1980), pp.308–19.
24. Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp.24–5.
25. Ibid., pp.24–6.
26. For a study of emigration into Haifa during the Mandate period, see Yazbak, *Arab Migrationinto Haifa during the Mandate Period.*
27. Government of Palestine, Census Office, *Census of Palestine 1931,* Alexandria, 1933; Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp.37, 43; Aba Hushi Archives, file no. 1057.
28. *Census of Palestine 1931.*
29. Aba Hushi Archives, file no. 34.
30. Aba Hushi Archives, file no. 34.
31. Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* p.13, 75, 119.
32. Z.Y.Hershlag, *Introduction to the Modern Economic History of the Middle East,* London, 1964, p.166.
33. For a detailed discussion, see Smith, *The Roots of Separatism,* pp. 162–7.
34. For a discussion of the Mandatory administration's attitude towards Zionist policy and its persistent attempts at reconciling the Arab population to the Mandate policy, see Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine.*
35. Israel State Archives, 65/1, Arab Higher Committee files/560. Memo of the Arab Chambers of Commerce to the HC, Dec. 1929.
36. The Arab press explored the issue of tariffs and their effect on the Arab economy and society; see *al-Karmil,* 9 Oct. 1929, 26 March 1930, 23 March 1932.
37. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.87.
38. Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp.45–82.

39. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism,* p.174; Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report onImmigration, Land Settlement and Development,* Sir John Hope Simpson, Cmd. 3686, London, 1930, pp.69–70; Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.90.

40. R.Taqqu, 'Arab Labour in Mandatory Palestine, 1920–1948', PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1977, p.61.

41. For a thorough study of the tobacco industry of Palestine, see M.Seikaly, 'The Arab Community of Haifa 1918–1936: A Study in Transformation', DPhil. thesis, Oxford University, 1983, pp. 120–27.

42. For listing of Arab industrial projects, see Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during theMandate Period,* pp.24–5.

43. A.L.Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine,* London, 1956, pp.79–80.

44. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.94.

45. *Al-Yarmuk,* 9 Oct. 1924; *al-Karmil,* 18 Feb. 1933.

46. *Al-Karmil,* 21 Dec. 1920, 19 Nov. 1927, 22 Nov. 1930.

47. *Al-Karmil,* 11 March 1925.

48. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.108.

49. Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp.25–6.

50. Ibid., pp.24–5.

51. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.111.

52. For a thorough study of the economic depression of the *fallahin,* see Yazbak, *Arab Migrationinto Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp.45–71.

53. Yazbak, *Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period,* pp.140, 142, 159.

54. Ilan Pappé, *The Making of the Arab Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951,* London, 1992, p. 2.

55. See, for example, Report by E.Dowson, 'Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in Palestine', 1924, ISA., 35711/I; Great Britain, Cmd. 3530, *Report of the Commission on the PalestineDisturbances of August 1929* (Shaw Report), Hope Simpson Report: Lewis French, *FirstReport on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine,* Palestine, 1931.

56. K.W.Stein, 'Huki ha-Haganah 'al-Zikhuyut ha-Arisim ve-'Akifatam be-Eretz Israe haMandatorit' (Tenants' Protection Laws and their Circumvention in Mandatory Palestine), *haMizrah ha-Hadash,* Vol.29 (1980), pp.67–88.

57. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.134.

58. J. 'Asfur, *Palestine: My Land, My country, My Home,* Beirut, 1967, p.102.

59. *Al-Karmil,* 10 Oct. 1925, 11 Nov. 1928, 20 Aug. 1932.

60. Central Zionist Archives, Z4/3469, from Merkaz Avoda, Haifa to secretary, ZE, 7 Sept. 1928.

61. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.140.

62. Aba Hushi Archives, file no. 19.

63. S.Brown, 'The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920–1948', in Roger Owen (ed.), *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the 19th and 20th Centuries,* London, 1982, p.151.

64. Prior to the 1936 strike, Arab unemployment was very high, and administrative measures for alleviating only Jewish unemployment further exacerbated the situation. The outbreak of the 1936 strike seemed a predictable result. G.Mansur, *The Arab Worker under the Mandate,* Jerusalem, 1937, pp.38–9.

65. *Davar,* 2 Nov. 1936.

66. Among the 'applications for employment' found in Haifa's Municipal Archives, there are many instances in which villagers sought municipal jobs through residents of Haifa who had immigrated from their village, requesting that the reply be sent to the Haifa address of their former neighbour or relative. Municipal Archives of Haifa, 'Applications for Employment', see files 319, 1,000, 1,287.

67. Data culled from the *Sijill* shows that *fallahin* have immigrated to Haifa from 211 Palestinian villages. For a list of these villages, see Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate* Period, pp.149–51.

68. *Sijill,* see, for example, Vol.29, pp.72, 42, 190; Vol.38, pp.268–76.

69. See for example, Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* appendix 2, p.152.

70. See for example, ibid., appendix 3, p.153.

71. *Falastin,* 4 Oct. 1935.

72. For more details about the immigrants' charitable committees, see Yazbak, *Arab Migrationinto Haifa during the Mandate Period,* pp. 112–17.

73. R. Taqqu, 'Peasants into Workmen: Internal Labour Migration and the Arab Village Community Under the Mandate', in Joel Migdal (ed.), *Palestinian Society and Politics,* New Jersey, 1980, p.270.

74. Yazbak, *Arab Migration into Haifa during the Mandate Period,* p.119.

75. Hanna Naqarra, *Muhami al-Ard wa-alSha'b* (Lawyer of Land and People), Acre, 1985, p.86.

76. Ibid., p.87.

77. *Filastin,* 1 May 1941.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. *Filastin,* 30 April 1941.

81. Naqarra, p.105. [???]

82. *Filastin,* 25 May 1929.

83. *Filastin,* 17 May 1941.

84. *Filastin,* 2 March 1934.

85. Y.Shim'oni, *Arvii Eretz Israel* (Palestine's Arabs), Tel Aviv, 1947, p.374.

86. *Filastin,* 9 March 1934.

87. Ibid.

88. *Filastin,* 1 May 1941.

89. Protocol of the city council, 17 Feb. 1945.

90. Municipal Archives, file no. 987.

91. Protocol of the city council, 26 Sept. 1929.

92. Protocol of the city council, 26 Nov. 1929.

93. Ibid., 14 Aug. 1936.

94. Municipal Archives, file no. 1285.

95. Ibid.

96. Naqarra, *Lawyer of Land and People,* p.117.

97. Protocol of the city council, 4 Oct. 1926.

98. *Filastin,* 1 July 1934.

99. Government of Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January1946, for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,* Vol.1, Palestine, 1946, p.691.

100. Municipal Archives, file no. 839.

101. Ibid.
102. *Filastin,* 1 July 1934.
103. *Ha'aretz,* 11 Sept. 1938.
104. About the strategy and the history of al-Qassam see, A.Schleifer, 'The Life and Thought of Izz al-Din al-Qassam', *Islamic Quarterly,* Vol.23, No.1 (1979), pp.61–81; Samih Hammudah, *al-Wa'iyy wa-al-Thawra: Dirasa fi Hayat wa-Jihad al-Shaykh 'Izz al-Din alQassam* (The Consciousness and the Revolution: A Study of the Life and Sacred War of Shaykh Izz-al-Din al-Qassam), Jerusalem, 1985; 'Atif 'Idwan, *al-Shaykh al-Qassam:Muhawala lifahm Haraki* (The Shaykh al-Qassam: An Attempt of a Movement Understanding), Gaza, 1990; Bassam al-'Asali, *Thawrat al-Shaykh al-Qassam* (The Revolution of Shaykh al-Qassam), Beirut, 1991; Abd al-Sattar Qasim, *al-Shaykh al-Mujahid'Izz al-Din al-Qassam* (The Sacred Warrior Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam), Nablus, 1984; Nahman Tal, 'Hashaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam' (The Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam), MA thesis, Haifa University, 1995.
105. About the developments since al-Qassam's death until the breaking out of the rebellion in April 1936, see Y.Porath, *Mimhumut la-Meredah: ha-Tnu'ah ha-Le'umit ha-'Arvit haFalastinit 1929–1939* (From Disturbances to Revolt: The Palestinian Arab National Movement), Tel Aviv, 1978, pp. 156–75.
106. Issa Khalaf, 'The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* Vol.29, No.1 (Feb. 1997), p.107.
107. Madeleine Tress, 'The Role of the Peasantry in the Palestine Revolt, 1936–1939', *PeasantStudies,* Vol.15, No.3 (Spring 1988), pp.161–90.
108. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.255; A.Khalifa (trans.), *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra fi Falastin, 1936–1939: Al-Riwaya al-Israeliyya al-Rasmiyya* (The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939: The Official Israeli Narrative), Beirut, 1989, pp.155–72.
109. Seikaly, *Haifa, Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society,* p.256.

Jewish Settlement of Former Arab Towns and Their Incorporation into the Israeli Urban System (1948–50)

ARNON GOLAN

INTRODUCTION

The 1948 war resulted in a brutal and abrupt transformation of the settlement system in the territory included within the boundaries of the state of Israel. The majority of the Palestinian Arab population that resided in this area had either fled or been expelled by Jewish troops, leaving behind villages and agricultural lands, built-up and open urban areas, and infrastructure systems. Forthwith, different groups among the Jewish community such as war refugees and newly arrived immigrants replaced the uprooted Arabs.

Re-use of Arab dwellings began as early as January 1948 in Jerusalem consequent to the need to find shelter for Jewish refugees who had fled from frontline and isolated neighbourhoods. Almost all available vacant houses were in Arab enclaves in the Jewish western part of Jerusalem, abandoned shortly before by their panic-stricken residents. Similar measures regarding former Arab enclaves were taken by the authorities in other mixed-population areas such as the Tel Aviv, Jaffa and Haifa regions and the town of Tiberias. Most of the 72, 000 Jewish 1948 war refugees found shelter in former Arab urban areas, and among them almost 30,000 remained there permanently.[1]

Extensive repopulation of former Arab urban areas continued through the war until the spring of 1949, in consequence of swelling waves of Jewish immigrants. These were Holocaust survivors, followed by political refugees from Arab and Muslim states, who entered Israel from its establishment in mid-May 1948. Of the 690,000 Jewish immigrants who streamed into Israel during the so-called mass immigration wave that lasted until the end of 1951, about 125,000 were housed in former Arab urban areas, mostly during the wartime emergency that lasted until the spring of 1949.[2] Israeli wartime and post-war policy of resettlement of former Arab areas did not derive from housing needs alone; it

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also intended the 'Jewification' of Israeli space through blocking the return of uprooted Palestinian Arab refugees to their homes in former Arab areas.[3]

Housing in former Arab urban areas and some of the larger depopulated villages induced the process of transforming the pre-state urban system of Palestine into the urban system of the emerging Israeli nation-state. This clashed with the government's post-war population dispersal policy, which sought to develop a balanced and healthy modern Jewish urban system in the territory of the newborn Jewish state.[4] The spatial contours and the social, economic and cultural characteristics of the Israeli urban system are largely the outcome of a set of compromises between the conflicting attitudes of wartime emergency and post-war planning concepts.

The aim of this article is to examine the 'Jewification' of former Arab towns in Israel's peripheral areas that occurred in the first half of 1949. This period was the initial phase of the emergence of the state of Israel. Understanding its outcome is essential for a grasp of the social, economic and cultural structures that arose in the Israeli urban system. The two case studies presented below depict different ramifications of the repopulation of former Arab peripheral towns by Jews.

JEWISH URBAN SYSTEM OF PALESTINE/ISRAEL: FROM A 'COLONIAL' TO A NATIONAL FORM

Like other concentrations of European immigrants in colonies such as in the American and Australian continents, in the colonial circumstances of the late Ottoman and British Mandatory periods, most of the Jewish immigrant population of Palestine lived in big cities.[5] On the eve of the outbreak of the 1948 war about 400,000 of the 650,000 Jews (62 per cent) living in Palestine were residents of the three major urban centres. About 225,000 lived in Tel Aviv (including Jewish neighbourhoods of Jaffa), almost 100,000 lived in Jerusalem, and about 75,000 lived in Haifa. Towns outside these centres were much smaller, and were mainly located in the Tel Aviv periphery, constituting the foundation for the development of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.[6] The largest of these was Petah Tikva, with a population of 20,000, while others such as Ramat Gan (about 15,000), Rehovot (11,000), and Rishon Letzion (10,000) were even smaller. The only remote urban centres that had a Jewish population were the mixed towns of Tiberias where 6,000 of its 10,000 residents were Jews, and Safed (2,000 Jews out of 12,000 residents).[7]

Data of the 1961 Israeli population census might suggest that the shape of the Israeli urban system had undergone some considerable changes during the first decade of independence. The three big cities still dominated, but the number of medium-size and small towns was much higher. Tel Aviv-Jaffa's population was about 386,000, that of Haifa was about 183,000, and that of Jerusalem 167,000; together they accounted for about 33 per cent of the total Israeli population. The most noticeable urban population growth occurred in the Tel Aviv periphery, principally in Ramat Gan, whose population had risen to 91,000 by 1961, and

Petah Tikva, whose population had risen to 54,000. The total 1961 urban population of the incipient Tel Aviv metropolitan area was about 550,000, constituting about 25 per cent of Israel's population.

Urban growth in national peripheries could not balance that of the core areas, although about 30 new towns were established in the state's periphery, and some small urban settlements established before 1948, such as Nahariya in western Galilee, grew rapidly. The foremost example of a successful new town was Beer Sheva, the regional centre of the Negev periphery, whose 1961 population was about 44,000. Other peripheral regional centres, such as Tiberias (21,000) and the new towns of Ashkelon in the southern coastal plain (24,000), Kiryat Shemona in the upper Jordan Valley (12,000), and Kiryat Gat in the Lakhish region (10,000), were far smaller.[8]

It seems that the government's population dispersal policy was not a great success. Major urban population growth occurred in the fast-growing metropolitan areas of the three major cities, while the size of urban population in the periphery remained small. Moreover, focusing on population growth rates of peripheral urban centres alone is quite misleading, as it fails to reveal harsh social and economic realities and cultural alienation prevalent among most peripheral urban concentrations. The formation of the new urban system, mostly populated by post-1948 immigrants, widened economic and social gaps in core areas and peripheries and intensified cultural alienation between pre- and post-1948 populations and between European and eastern Jews.[9]

As mentioned above, the realities of war and the post-war periods hindered the execution of a rather ambitious spatial policy. The following paragraph deals with the anti-urban concepts that had been prevailing within the Israeli planning system, which formed another significant obstacle for the implementation of the population dispersal policy.

THE ORIGINS OF ISRAELI NATIONAL PLANNING CONCEPTS

Zionist leaders and planners considered the pre-1948 structure of the Jewish urban system in Palestine inappropriate for the nation-building venture. They resented the persistent Diaspora lifestyles of the city and took the village to be the locus for the national renewal and social transformation of the Diaspora Jew. They envisaged a link between modern social and cultural norms and modern physical forms. The most outstanding examples are of course the *kibbutz* and the *moshav,* both meticulously planned cooperative settlement forms, considered the epitome of the Zionist venture. Aware of the limits of the agricultural system and concerned about the persistence of the colonial situation, Zionist leaders and planners initiated cooperative neighbourhoods such as Kiryat Haim on the outskirts of Haifa, with the aim of transferring some modern social concepts from the village to the city.[10]

While the latter were planned and built by socialist Zionists, modern urban neighbourhoods, such as those of northern Tel Aviv, Hadar Ha'Carmel in Haifa, or Rehavia in Jerusalem, were planned and built by the Jewish private sector for middle-class Jewish immigrants from Europe. In some cases Zionist institutions assisted the founders of such neighbourhoods in land purchase and planning matters. The founders considered these neighbourhoods also a part of the modernist Zionist venture.[11] However, large sectors of the three big cities were densely populated by lower-middle-class and poor residents, living in structures without modern amenities, that formed a nucleus for the development of social maladies.[12]

The Zionist movement, controlled by socialist parties since the early 1930s, lacked the funds to purchase land and build modern public housing projects for populations of poor urban areas. The situation had worsened during the late 1930s and World War II, because of the grave economic crisis of the late 1930s and the wartime shortage in building materials. During those years (1936–45) the Jewish population of Palestine rose from about 400,000 to 580,000, of which 75 per cent lived in urban settlements.[13] The plight of residents of poor urban areas, which in Tel Aviv alone included more than half of the population,[14] encouraged a shift in Zionist planning priorities.

In 1938, with the growing prospects for the foundation of a Jewish state according to plans drawn by the Peel and Woodhead inquiry committees, the architect Eliezer Bruzkus introduced to the Zionist leadership an initial plan for a national Jewish settlement system. In view of the inclination of the majority of immigrants of the 1930s to live in urban areas, he proposed the establishment of new towns. The urban poor and newly arriving immigrants would be directed to towns designed according to modern town-planning and architectural concepts, while the rapid growth of the three major cities, a breeding ground for social problems, would be restricted.[15]

Bruzkus's modern regional and town-planning concepts originate in many respects from the ideas of social utopians such as Peter Kropotkin and Ebenezer Howard.[16] These among others laid the foundations for the development of rural and town-planning practices in the inter-war period and after World War II.[17] Utopian concepts were the source for Zionist-socialist rural planning as well, and were easily adopted by the Zionist-socialist leadership.[18] They also underlay the social reforms introduced by European governments, thereby proving their worth, and they subsequently became the cornerstone of Israel's national development policy from 1948.

National planning concepts met their first challenge with the establishment of the state of Israel. The Jewish population had more than doubled in less than four years, rising to 1,414,000 by the end of 1951.[19] The dwindling of vacant space in former Arab urban areas in the spring of 1949 forced the Israeli authorities to house growing numbers of immigrants in temporary immigrant camps. Living conditions in tents and shacks with only the barest amenities were harsh, and they sparked social unrest among the immigrant population. This impelled the

Israeli government to give high priority to planning and construction of permanent public housing projects.[20]

After the establishment of the state of Israel, housing matters came under the jurisdiction of government planning and housing branches operating within the Ministry of Labour.[21] Among their management and staff were many architects and planners educated in Western and Central European universities, who were adherents of modernist concepts of town planning and architecture and were deeply influenced by their application in the post-World War II reconstruction of European urban systems.[22] Many of them were members of the informal regionalist circle organized by Bruzkus in December 1947, which demanded that the newborn state initiate a wholesale reform of the spatial structure of the Jewish settlement system through population dispersal and the founding of new planned modern regions, including new towns and cooperative settlements, in the periphery.[23]

The objective of the population dispersal policy was twofold: to strengthen the Jewish hold on national territory on the one hand, and to 'normalize' backward immigrant masses, degenerated by centuries of living in the Diaspora, through integration into a modern invigorating Jewish-Zionist Israeli society on the other. The Zionist utopian modernist spatial imperative became official policy. Plans were prepared for establishing tens of meticulously planned public housing projects and new towns. The first national master plan completed by the planning branch in June 1949 named the size and location of 72 cities and towns. Among them 20 were new towns planned to be established in new sites, 26 were new towns planned near or in former Arab sites, while the rest were extensions of pre-1948 urban settlements.[24]

The implementation of such an ambitious plan met many obstacles. The experts of the planning branch became divided over issues such as the location and size of new towns. They overlooked the need for reciprocal development of industrial and commercial ventures in new towns to provide employment and income sources for their populations. The views of planners and economic experts within and outside the planning branch who were sceptical of the ability of the new state to accomplish such ambitious plans were rejected.[25]

Eventually, 30 new towns were established during the first decade of Israeli independence.[26] Of these, eleven had an old Arab core, another seven were established near sites of demolished large former Arab villages that had been regional centres for surrounding Arab rural populations before being uprooted, and another two were established near existing towns. Only ten were established at new sites: six in the sparsely populated southern part of the country, two on the margin of the Tel Aviv periphery, one in the Jerusalem corridor, and one in the north.

As predicted by those opposed to the ambitious population dispersal policy, government expenditure on housing left no resources for economic development, while the Israeli private sector was too small to promote economic development in peripheral areas. Lacking the development of new industrial areas, most of the

labour force in new towns was employed as seasonal workers by neighbouring rural settlements. Instead of becoming the industrial and commercial centres for surrounding rural areas, most new towns turned into suppliers of cheap labour.[27]

I would like to add another explanation for the very limited success of the population dispersal and urbanization project, based on the location of the new towns, especially the 13 towns established between 1948 and 1950, all of which had been former Arab towns and large villages. Their array followed the lines of the Arab pre-1948 settlement system, so development was directly linked both to their site's features and to their location near the Jewish settlement system. Two case studies depict different problems and development prospects for former Arab towns repopulated by Jews and considered as new towns turned 'development towns' by Israeli establishment. One is the former Beisan, which became Beit Shean, a regional centre in the northern periphery, and the other is the former al-Majdal, the basis of the Israeli Ashkelon, the urban centre for the southern coastal plain.

BEIT SHEAN: A NEW TOWN IN THE MIDST OF A JEWISH PRE-1948 SETTLEMENT AREA

The former Arab town of Beisan is located in the north east of Israel, in the centre of the Beit Shean valley, which is a part of the Jordan valley, near an important road junction on the route from former Transjordan to northern Palestine. During British Mandatory rule Beisan was the urban regional centre of the Beisan sub-district, with 19 Arab villages. In 1948 the Arab population was estimated at about 5,700 in the town and 12,900 in surrounding villages.[28] From 1936 onwards the valley had been an objective for Jewish Zionist settlement. By 1947, 12 *kibbutzim* had been established, with a total population of about 3, 100.[29]

Jewish troops took over the town and its environs in fighting in April and May 1948. Most of the Arab population fled at that time, while the handful of remaining residents were expelled following the town's surrender on 13 May, after which it was placed under military government.[30] As early as June 1948 the Israeli authorities initiated a new settlement venture in the Beit Shean valley, which established three new *kibbutzim* by March 1949. To block any possible return of former Arab residents, the local military government began the demolition of the town's built-up area; this was halted only by the intervention of the Israeli agriculture minister, Aaron Ziesling, who opposed the demolition policy on ideological grounds.[31]

Most of the town's 28,000 dunams (4.4 dunams=1 acre) of surrounding agricultural land was leased to nearby Jewish *kibbutzim* through the summer of 1948. The Israeli authorities considered that the prospects for housing newly arrived immigrants in the abandoned built-up area of the town were slight, owing to the lack of sources of employment for an urban population.[32]

The rapid growth in numbers of immigrants brought about a modification of immigrant absorption and settlement policies. The repopulation of Beisan began in April 1949, although it was not decided whether the 200 families settled in the former Arab houses would form an agricultural or an urban settlement.[33] The fiercest resistance to repopulation of the former Arab town was made by the Department for the Development of Beit Shean Valley (DBSV), operating within the Ministry of Agriculture. Established as early as July 1948 for the distribution of government-owned land and water resources among Jewish agricultural settlements, the DBSV argued that settling inexperienced immigrants and granting them arable lands would impede the development of the area.[34]

The government planning branch also had their reservations about the development of a new town at the site of Arab Beisan. The first national master plan of June 1949 recommended the establishment of a new town near the site of the abandoned small Arab village of al-Murassas to serve as the regional urban centre for the Beit Shean valley. Located on the heights of Sirin, about seven kilometres west of Beisan, this site was considered by planners more appropriate for urban development owing to its better climate and in order to avoid wasting good arable land on urbanization. However, the absence of roads connecting the al-Murassas site to the Beit Shean valley raised doubts about the implementation of this idea.[35]

The al-Murassas plan won the solid support of the DBSV, and the Beit Shean Valley Regional Council, the municipal organization of the rural settlements, determined to prevent further urban development in their vicinity. The regional council suggested turning the Beisan site into its own centre, the location for a cooperative industrial zone and administrative, cultural and education institutions. The immigrants already settled in the former Arab site would form a small cooperative urban settlement, whose population would earn their living working in the prospective economic and cultural institutions.[36]

The pressure exerted by the immigrant absorption and national housing authorities overpowered the demands of the regional leadership. The government decided to build 1,000 new apartments in Beisan and to restore 600 former Arab dwelling units for immigrants. In April 1950 the Jewish population of Beisan, renamed in Hebrew 'Beit Shean', numbered 2,000, all of them newly arrived immigrants.[37]

In a last attempt to block the establishment of Jewish Beit Shean, the regional leadership referred to the Histadrut, the general Jewish trade union and headquarters of the rural cooperative settlement system. Under pressure by the Histadrut leaders, the government decided to revert to the concept of the cooperative town. Until further economic development could be achieved, the residents of Beit Shean would be organized in agricultural cooperatives; however, no available land could be found as most former Arab tracts were already cultivated by rural settlements, which refused to concede any of them to the residents of the former Arab town.[38]

This abortive effort caused the demise of the urban cooperative concept. A committee of government, Jewish Agency and Histadrut officials was appointed to decide the fate of the town, but it could not reach any conclusions. The indecision surrounding Beit Shean is reflected in the second master plan for the development of Israel presented by the planning branch in June 1951, in which the sites of both al-Murassas and Beisan were suggested for urban development.[39]

The resistance by the pre-1948 rural settlement system impeded the development of Beit Shean. The unwanted immigrants settled in the town were excluded from the development process of the area and became a source of cheap labour for the flourishing agricultural system. Further population growth of the town ensued with the establishment of two *maabarot* (immigrant transit camps), while the government invested little in housing and employment. Skilled labourers among the immigrants, many of whom were European Jews, left the town for gainful employment in urban concentrations of the central parts of Israel, leaving behind those who remained dependent on insufficient government support. These were mostly eastern Jews: namely immigrants from Middle Eastern and North African Arab and Muslim countries. Implementation of plans for permanent public housing began only in 1954, but no prospective economic development ventures were initiated. During the 1950s the town remained a small poor urban concentration of post-1948 immigrants, suffering from a frail economy and an inadequate urban infrastructure. It seems as if the town was forgotten by the Israeli authorities on their way to create a modern national society.[40]

The marginalization and exclusion of the town from the Zionist venture are evident in a book on the Beit Shean valley, by one of the founders of Israeli academic geography.[41] In a comprehensive 200-page overview of the geography and history of the region, including an account of Beit Shean from prehistory to the Mandate period, the modern Israeli town is hardly mentioned. The 22-year history (1936–58) of the Jewish Zionist rural settlements in the Beit Shean valley takes up a quarter of the book.

Beit Shean formed a typical Israeli (under)development town. The government's modern master plan for urban development, based on new concepts developed in Europe, could not be implemented because of the needs of the wartime emergency, post-war spatial conflicts over the allocation of former Arab areas, and lack of sufficient economic resources.

The case of Beit Shean is typical of the histories of other (under)development towns. One such was Kiryat Shemona, established in the upper Jordan valley on the site of the former Arab village of Khalsa. Others were former Arab towns such as Acre in western Galilee, Ramla, Lydda, Yahud (former Arab Yahudia), and Or Yehuda (the former Arab villages of Saqia and Kafer Ana), located in the Tel Aviv periphery. These former Arab urban settlements deteriorated into poor urban areas, contrasting and contesting the Zionist-Israeli development modernist ethos of the 1950s and 1960s. The stronger elements among their

population migrated to pre-1948 cities and towns in search of fresh opportunities, while those left behind, mainly eastern Jews, were doomed to be included among the lowest strata of the Israeli society.[42]

ASHKELON: THE FIRST DEVELOPMENT TOWN

The post-1948 development of Israel's southern areas was different in some respects from that of its northern and central parts. The number of Jews living in Palestine's southern periphery before 1948 was meagre, accounting for less than two per cent of the total Jewish population. Most Jewish settlements of the south were established in the 1940s; their population was small and they suffered from isolation, lack of sufficient arable land, and the harsh climate of the semi-arid zone. Many of them were badly damaged and in some cases captured by the Egyptian army during the 1948 war and demolished.[43]

The southern coastal plain of Palestine was the theatre of some of the fiercest battles between the Israeli and Egyptian armies during the 1948 war. Only in the last phase of fighting, in October and November 1948, did Israel win full control of most of the area, excluding the Gaza Strip. Most of the local Arab population either fled or was expelled by victorious Israeli troops; only about 2,400 remained in the town of al-Majdal.[44] The Egyptian government, which from November 1948 was holding informal negotiations with Israel over a peace agreement, demanded control of the southern coastal plain.[45] The Israeli government, denying the right of Egypt to annex any part of Palestine, wished to strengthen its grip on the area through its repopulation by Jews. However, wartime shortages in human and economic resources impeded the establishment of a significant number of new settlements in that area.

Another alternative for reinforcing the hold of the area was repopulation of the strategic town of al-Majdal, located near a vital road junction on the route from Egyptian-controlled Gaza to the Tel Aviv area and to Jordanian-controlled Hebron. The Israeli aim could be achieved through repopulation of former Arab built-up areas of the town and leasing surrounding arable lands to Israeli settlements. The latter endeavour was initiated just weeks after the capture of the town and environs. Most lands were leased to remote *kibbutzim* from the northern and central parts of Israel as the existing Jewish rural system of the area was sparse. Subsequently, at the end of December 1948 the government decided to enlarge the number of Jewish residents of the area by the repopulation of the town.[46]

The number of Jews living in al-Majdal grew very slowly through the first half of 1949, including no more than 200 families who were intended to establish an agricultural settlement, and therefore living in the town temporarily. Following the decisive victory over the Egyptian army in the battles of December 1948 and January 1949, the need to tighten the hold on the al-Majdal area became less essential. No further effort was made to establish a permanent Jewish community in the town before deciding the fate of its remaining Arab

population. Repopulation of the town remained mainly the interest of both immigrant absorption authorities and the military governor of al-Majdal. The absorption authorities wished to lower the number of immigrants living in poor conditions in immigrant transition camps, while the military governor sought to balance the size of the Arab population, considered hostile to the state of Israel, living in the area bordering the Gaza Strip. Their demand was strengthened by the first national master plan of June 1949, which designated the site of al-Majdal a town of 20,000 residents intended to serve as the regional urban centre for the southern coastal plain.[47]

The mass repopulation of former Arab structures by Jews began in July 1949, and in December the 2,500-strong Jewish population outnumbered the Arabs. By the following month the Jewish population of al-Majdal numbered 3,000, among them about 2,000 newly arrived immigrants. Others were either demobilized soldiers, among them many immigrants as well, or members of the pre-1948 Jewish population of Palestine. As the Jews were housed the Arab residents were evacuated from different parts of the town and concentrated in a neighbourhood surrounded by barbed wire, officially for security reasons.[48]

The main concern of the new Jewish population was unemployment. Most of the settled population were impoverished immigrants dependent on institutional support for their living. During the initial months of settlement many were employed by the government to repair the former Arab buildings. Others were taken on as daily workers by contractors who rented former Arab lands and orchards from the government Custodian for Abandoned Property. In both cases the work was temporary and could not serve as the economic basis for the development of the town. Location in the far southern periphery precluded any possibilities of employment in the Tel Aviv and Haifa core areas, which afforded a partial solution to unemployment in Acre and the former Arab settlements of the Tel Aviv periphery.[49]

At the beginning of 1950 al-Majdal constituted another (under)development town, like Beit Shean, Kiryat Shemona, Ramla and other former Arab towns and large villages that had undergone a wartime urbanization process. This situation was about to change, when the government decided to give high priority to the development of the town. Lacking sufficient resources to accomplish the ambitious national development plans of the planning branch, the Israeli government settled on a piecemeal urban development process, deciding on sites considered the most promising; one was al-Majdal, and for several reasons it was the first to be developed.

One reason was its strategic location, in view of a possible renewal of the Egyptian demands in resumed peace negotiations for control of the town and its environs and to repatriate the former Arab residents who found refuge in Egyptian-controlled areas. The proposed new town and its adjacent rural periphery were intended to strengthen the Israeli hold on the area, to block repatriation of refugees, and to serve as a buffer zone between Egyptian controlled-Gaza Strip and the Tel Aviv core area.

The second reason was the good prospects for further economic development of the town and its environs. The Israeli authorities assumed that the fertile agricultural lands, rich water resources, and considerable amounts of rainfall would allow the construction of a sustainable Jewish rural settlement system. The prospective urban centre based on alMajdal would serve as its regional commercial and administrative hub, including an industrial zone based on products of nearby agricultural settlements. The position of al-Majdal on the Mediterranean coast opened up additional prospects for economic growth through tourism and fishery. From the economic viewpoint al-Majdal was ripe for urban development.

The third reason was the distance between al-Majdal and the main areas of pre-1948 Jewish settlement. The nearest of the Jewish *kibbutzim* were Yad Mordechai, Nir-Am, Gevar-Am and Negba, all of which had suffered badly during the 1948 war. The additional 12 Jewish settlements established between February 1949 and June 1950, among them four *kibbutzim* and eight *moshavim,* were busy with stabilizing their own fundamental elements. They did not yet constitute a powerful rural regional organization, like the Beit Shean valley settlements, and could not block or hinder the establishment of a new town.

The absence of a strong pre-1948 rural pressure group afforded the Israeli authorities an opportunity to allocate land for further urban development in the al-Majdal area. During the summer of 1949 Israeli planning and housing authorities decided on the development of a new neighbourhood of 1,000 dwelling units on the south-eastern outskirts of the former Arab town. A 'film city' and a luxurious neighbourhood were planned for the lands of the nearby former Arab village of al-Jora, located west of the town, at the initiation of a Jewish businessman from South America. The ruins of the ancient Philistine city of Ashkelon on the seashore near al-Jora and the beach itself were earmarked for the development of resorts and tourism sites.[50]

The Israeli government decided to give high priority to the development of the new town named after biblical Ashkelon. Golda Meir, then minister of labour, convinced the leaders of the South African Zionist Federation to invest 750,000 Israeli Lira (then equivalent to 750,000 pounds sterling) in the construction of housing projects in Ashkelon. To encourage the South Africans, Golda Meir guaranteed government investments in the development of urban infrastructure for the proposed town, including a new road system and new sources of employment.[51]

Although allocation of land for the development of Ashkelon did not meet fierce resistance by an organized agricultural lobby like that of the Beit Shean valley, some institutions engaged in rural settlement of the area had reservations about the lands of al-Majdal and the adjacent villages. It took almost eight months to settle institutional disagreements between urban and rural settlement authorities, but these did not involve any attempt to block the fundamental idea of developing a new town in the bounds and vicinity of the former Arab town. An arrangement reached in June 1950, including the allocation of 35,000 dunams of

land for the development of Ashkelon, was considered reasonable by all sides. The planning branch intended to develop it as a regional urban centre for 30,000 residents and drew up a plan to allocate the area for housing projects, industrial and commercial zones, and tourism and leisure sites.[52]

In 1961 Ashkelon had a population of about 24,000, ranking 18th among Israeli urban centres.[53] Flourishing industrial areas were the foundation for the rapid economic development of Ashkelon, which by the early 1970s ceased to be considered a 'development town', by different government ministries.[54] Unlike Beit Shean, Ashkelon had its history written by a distinguished Israeli scholar. In a book published in 1963 by the local municipality, the author and Ashkelon's leaders placed the town firmly within the historical Zionist narrative.[55]

The decision to turn Ashkelon into a development town spurred the Israeli government to resolve on the transfer of al-Majdal's Arab population to the Gaza Strip. From the start of mass settlement of alMajdal by Jews, the Israeli authorities had considered the Arab population an obstacle, occupying houses and jobs that could have been given to Jews. A recent study on the fate of al-Majdal's Arabs estimated that the main reason for their expulsion lay in their being considered a security risk, as they retained their connections with relatives who had found refuge in the Gaza Strip and used to infiltrate Israeli territory.[56] Yet the decision to develop Ashkelon seems to have been at least as important in respect of the fate of its Arab population. The Israeli government had no intention of including Arabs in a major development project while many Jewish immigrants lived in anguish at immigrant transit camps and former Arab (under) developed towns and neighbourhoods. In the second half of 1950 most of the Arab population was transferred to the Gaza Strip. Only a small minority were allowed to stay in Israel; they were moved to the (under)developed town of Ramla, expelled from the boundaries of the first Israeli development town.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Israeli leaders and planners considered a modern meticulously planned urban system the backbone of their population dispersal policy. New towns were intended to serve as rural regional centres and loci for the absorption of tens of thousands of immigrants into an emerging healthy national Israeli society. Wartime and post-war realities dictated a different urbanization policy. The influx of immigrants outnumbered any pre-1948 assessments, while high government expenditure in pursuing the war did not leave much for immigrant absorption, housing and urban development. Abandoned former Arab areas became the only available source for supplying housing for immigrants, most of whom were impoverished refugees dependent on the Israeli establishment. The location of most former Arab urban settlements, the source of most available dwelling units, as well as their inner structure, did not always comply with Zionist modernist social concepts and preliminary government plans for population dispersal and urban development.

Moreover, the uneasy proximity of former Arab areas to pre-1948 Jewish areas sparked off a whole set of spatial conflicts, resulting in marginalization of the post-1948 immigrants and turning former Arab urban concentrations into nests of social and economic ills. Repopulation of peripheral towns and large villages evolved into the emergence of (under)development towns, places of exclusion and poverty of immigrants rather than of their inclusion into a developing national society. The Israeli establishment represented them as development towns, disguising poor living standards, unemployment, poverty and other social maladies typical of poor immigrant areas.

The case of Beit Shean depicts the collapse of the Zionist myth of the melting pot into the harsh reality of an (under)development town. The pre 1948 rural cooperative settlement system refused to take part in the absorption of the newly arrived immigrants. The veteran settlements demanded the arable lands of the area of former Arab Beisan, resisting their allocation for the development of Beit Shean or even their use as the temporary economic base for the immigrant population. Wartime and post-war hardships prevented the government from developing Beit Shean into an independent urban settlement, as lack of financial resources hindered the development of industry, commerce and tourism. While the surrounding rural system flourished during the 1950s, Beit Shean remained a poor small town whose population supplied cheap labour to nearby rural settlements. The fate of other former Arab (under) development towns in the northern and central parts of Israel corresponds to that of Beit Shean.

Exceptions were former Arab towns in the south of Israel, such as alMajdal/Ashkelon. The absence of a firm pre-1948 Jewish settlement system provided the opportunity for uninterrupted urban development. The Israeli government preferred to allocate its limited resources to an area where development and immigrant absorption policies did not meet fierce resistance by pre-1948 population groups. With the allocation of a considerable tract of land suitable for urban development and with the support of the South African Zionist Federation, Ashkelon enjoyed a much better starting point than Beit Shean, and it can be considered as the first Israeli development town.

The development of the two other main urban centres of southern Israel, Beer Sheva, the most successful Israeli development town, and Kiryat Gat, the centre of the Lakhish region, is quite similar. Two preconditions appear to have been necessary for the foundation of a development town: coordinated effort by the Israeli establishment and location at a considerable distance from concentrations of the pre-1948 Jewish population. Otherwise, new towns deteriorated into (under) development towns. Not that the development of Ashkelon did not meet other obstacles; still, present-day Ashkelon is a city of 90,000 residents, second only to Beer Sheva as a peripheral regional centre. Beit Shean, on the other hand, retains the status of a small peripheral (under)developed town of 15,000 residents.[57] The distinctions originate in the stage of their foundation in 1949 and the terms of the incorporation of both former Arab towns into the emergent Israeli urban system.

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Ethnicity or Nationalism? Comparing the *Nakba* Narrative among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

HILLEL FRISCH

In his book *Minorities at Risk,* Ted Gurr included the Arab citizens of Israel.[1] In the minds of many Jewish Israelis, however, the non-Arab majority also feels its own existence is at risk. This predicament where the majority within a state is a minority regionally is known elsewhere, for example, in Northern Ireland. The relationship between Israel's binational reality and security/insecurity is often overlooked in today's fashionable post-modern discourse on identity, which treats ethnic problems as a normative issue confined to the domestic arena. But it generated one of the most intense and protracted debates in Israeli Jewish academic circles regarding the one million-strong Arab minority in Israel's midst.[2] It posed the question whether Israeli Arabs were politicizing—improving their mobilizing capabilities through participation in Israeli politics to ensure greater equality in the allocation of resources but otherwise accepting what Amos Oz described recently as the iron wall of the Jewish state (which unlike the revisionist version comprises the state within 1967 borders), or radicalizing— developing opposition towards the state by linking up with outside forces of Palestinian nationalism and thus posing a potentially secessionist threat. If 20 years ago when the controversy began most were inclined to believe that Israeli Arabs were radicalizing, two decades later there was growing consensus that as much as one can think in dichotomous terms over such a complex and relational issue (by which I mean that in any bicommunal situation there must be change not only within one community regarding the state, but change in the other as well), Israeli Arabs were increasingly working within the system and accepting at least tacitly the fact that it was a Jewish and democratic state.[3]

The question this article poses is whether this greater participation in Israeli society and politics, at the expense of direct involvement in the liberation and state-building Palestinian national enterprises, has moved upstream from political behaviour to identity issues. Israel's celebration of its 50th year and the

commemoration of the *Nakba* (disaster) it engendered presented an opportunity to compare the way Arabs in Israel commemorated and narrated the *Nakba,* with the way they commemorated it across the Green Line under the Palestinian Authority (PA).

The study is based on the assumption that the Israeli Arab narrative would portray the *Nakba* as an event related to the past, that its tone and style would be softer in the portrayal of the 'other' than found in the Palestinian press across the Green Line; that the 'official' distinction between the Palestinians across the Green Line and Arab citizens would be maintained by using different terms for each of them; that the demand for return would be limited to the *muhajjarun* (internal refugees) rather than applied also to refugees from outside; and that Israeli Arabs would develop more than their counterparts in the PA the theme of 'tragedy to state rebirth' rather than linking the *Nakba* commemoration to individual return *('awda)* and to the demand for a state for all its citizens. Were this not the case, it would suggest that the emerging partition between Israel and Palestine might not be the last in the historical transition from the multi-ethnic Ottoman empire to a system of sovereign territorial states, or at the very least not the end of the struggle to change borders or the identity of such states after formal partition between Israel and the PLO/PA.

The article is divided into three parts. It begins by analysing first the origins and nature of the politicization/radicalization debate; second, it analyses its findings and tentative conclusions; and then third, it proceeds to compare the two narratives and examine the implications for this debate.

THE ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE

When the debate emerged in the late 1970s it seemed that both the Jewish majority and the Arab minority were mobilizing to erase the Green Line for diametrically opposed reasons. Like the rabbinical imagery of Rachel's womb bearing Jacob and Esau, the Jews were agitating to extend the state into historical Eretz Israel and the Arabs to assert their historical presence and rights to the land they felt they lost individually and collectively in 1948. The prediction was based on three political facts established within the course of just over one year; on 'Land Day' in March 1976, Israeli Arabs stood steadfast against what they perceived as expropriation and 'Jewification' of the Galilee at the cost of six lives; in the 1977 elections just over 50 per cent voted for the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE)—the communist non-Zionist front. The Jewish majority meanwhile brought Begin and the Likud to power. *Mamlachtitut,* the veneration of the republican state enterprise was to be replaced by an ethno-national Eretz Israel ethos—a view incidentally that disregarded the liberal-constitutional nature of the pre-Mandate Ezrahi camp—as the name implies.[4]

Twenty years later, most researchers come to the opposite conclusion, namely that Israeli Arabs have politicized rather than radicalized. Ironically, while a

substantial segment of the Jewish population attempted to erase the Green Line to realize its state-building project in the territories, Israel's Arab citizens, it was felt, recreated the Green Line, in part to aid the Palestinians in securing their independence across it. The following are some of the most important indications that Israel's Arab-speaking citizens have limited their role to the Israeli arena at the expense of direct participation in Palestinian nationalism and in this sense made sharper the distinction between Arab Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians across the Green Line.

National Politics

Substantial electoral participation in Israel's national elections is one of the most prominent indications of acceptance of the state. While it dropped from a high 80 per cent in the 1960s to 65–70 per cent participation in the following decade, lower than Jewish participation rates, it was nevertheless very high by Western standards. Moreover, in 1996 it increased to 77 per cent—just below the level of Jewish participation.[5]

Lustick has noted that Arabs in Israel have moved from protest to strategic voting.[6] In the 1981 elections, only 31 per cent of Israeli Arabs voted for the DFPE, preferring instead to bring to power a Labour government interested in curbing settlement in the West Bank and Gaza rather than registering the traditional protest vote. In 1996, 95 per cent of Arab votes went to Shimon Peres to prevent Netanyahu's victory despite their vociferous opposition to the 'Grapes of Wrath' offensive in Lebanon and what they perceived to be the premeditated attack on Kafr Kannah in Lebanon during the offensive.[7]

Contrary to political organization patterns in the territories, the PLO failed, if it ever had the intention of doing so, in establishing Arab or predominantly Arab political parties in its image. The party most closely linked to a distinctive Palestinian national identity, Muhammad Mi'ari's Progressive List for Peace established in 1984, disappeared in 1992 after failing to pass the electoral threshold.[8] By contrast, the more moderate Arab Democratic Party (ADP) headed by 'Abd al-Wahhab Darawshe, which emphasizes a more Arab identity, continues to exist. In a previous article, I have attempted to show the lack of correlation between the official endorsements and positions taken by the PLO and election results.[9]

A larger swath of the Arab political spectrum has also decided to contest elections. In the 1996 elections, the moderate wing of Islamic Movement joined the ADP to form the United Arab List and the electoral alliance between the National Democratic Rally (NDR) and the DFPE. The NDR was composed of at least one group that opposed participation in national elections.[10]

Extra-parliamentary activity similarly reflected the existence of the Green Line. In the *intifada,* Israel's Palestinian citizens demonstrated solidarity *(tadammun)* rather than participation with the *intifada.* This indeed was the role allotted to them by the United National Command, which consistently

distinguished between the call to Palestinians across the Green Line to participate in civil disobedience and violence on the one hand, and the role of Israel's Arab citizens on the other, which it limited to showing solidarity including urging their participation in Israeli elections to vote for 'parties of peace'. While 'Land Day' was transformed in the territories into a day of violence, in Israel it became a day of ritual, peaceful and increasingly poorly attended processions. Even the two recent violent incidents in 1998—house demolitions in Umm Sahili, one of the 40 villages unrecognized by the state, and the violence generated by protests in September against areas closed by the military near Umm alFahm and feared to be a first step in the process of expropriation-remained isolated incidents.

The civic-territorial demarcation is reflected most palpably in a comparison of the content of the Palestinian newspapers that are brought out in Ramallah and (East) Jerusalem on the one hand, with the newspapers brought out in Haifa and Nazareth, on the other.[11] The contrast is striking; there is probably more coverage in the Palestinian newspapers in the territories devoted to Egypt than there is to Israeli Arabs. The page devoted to Israeli news is usually preoccupied with Israeli high politics even though Israeli Arabs frequently live only a stone's throw away from Palestinians across the Green Line. When mentioned, however, they are perceived as an integral part of the Palestinian people.

There is only slightly more coverage of Palestinian affairs in the newspapers read by Israeli Palestinians published in Haifa and Nazareth. The difference may simply be the fact that Palestinians across the Green Line are a much more salient political issue.

The greatest proof of this territorial-civic demarcation lies in the coverage of sports events; the Palestinian press in the territories cover mainly the soccer league in the West Bank and Gaza, to a minor degree Arab and international soccer, and Israeli or Israeli Palestinian soccer not at all. Similarly, the Israeli Palestinian press does not cover the Palestinian league. It is important to emphasize that Israeli Palestinian soccer is Israeli soccer. It is only on the lowest levels that there is any kind of geographic basis to Israeli Palestinian soccer. Even more surprising is that this civic-territorial demarcation also extends to advertising and probably signifies that the demarcation of items covered reflects a highly demarcated readership: Israeli Palestinians read their own newspapers as the Palestinians in the territories read theirs. It is important to note that though there is usually a high correlation between standard of living and reading newspapers, the Israeli Palestinian population of one million supports only one daily which few read; by contrast, the three million but poorer Palestinians in the territories support at least four daily papers. The reason is simple: Israeli Arabs read Israeli Hebrew newspapers, which only should serve to reinforce politicization patterns—a reinforcement of their civic Israeli identity.

Two caveats must be made: the distinction between politicization and radicalization might be substantive but it is also relative and relational. Politicization might turn into radicalization if the gap between positions and

expectations adopted by the minority and majority groups grows. One reason why Israeli Arabs have politicized is the greater awareness and acceptance of Arabs in their midst by the Jewish majority as Smooha has rightly pointed out.[12] One indication of greater Israeli tolerance over the years is the toleration of groups such Abna al-Balad, the Islamic Movement, and the National Democratic Rally, compared to the way the Israeli establishment treated the al-Ard group and its electoral offshoot in the mid-1960s.[13]

Incipient radicalization, however, may be seen in the changes adopted in the official election platform of the DFPE in the 1996 elections, when it called for a state for all its citizens including a change of national flag and anthem. The DFPE, with which the NDR allied, drew by far the most votes: 37 per cent compared to 25.4 per cent for the second largest party.[14]

That the radical wing of the Islamic Movement that has refused to participate in elections is also by far the most formidable extra-parliamentary political organization to have emerged among Israel's Arabs since the creation of the state, is another caveat in the politicization process. A clear indication is the fact that 30,000 attended their commemoration of the Isra' wal-Awda (nocturnal ascent and return) where they combined a religious with a political event while only several thousand attended the main *al-Nakba* event organized by the Higher Committee of the Nakba and Steadfastness.[15]

ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE *NAKBA* COMMEMORATION

Despite these caveats the civic participation in state institutions and cultural and social demarcation between the two populations over the Green Line have been substantial. The question is whether this politicization has fed upstream into the deeper identity-related narratives such as the recent commemoration of the 50th year of the *Nakba* in May1998?

Even the organizational aspects of the *Nakba* commemoration—a process whose organization took much thought and effort—emphasized this civic-territorial demarcation. The Higher Committee of the Nakba and Steadfastness (al-Lajna al-'Ulya lil Nakba wal-Sumud) was composed entirely of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel and was an offshoot of the Higher Follow-up Committee for the Affairs of the Arab Masses (alLajna al-Mutaba'a al-'Ulya li-Shu'un al-Jamahir al-'Arabiyya).[16] The latter was set up after the *intifada* by the Arab members of Israel's parliament and the Higher Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Governments and is considered at least unofficially the highest body among Israel's Palestinian citizens. The phrase 'Arab Masses' suggests that they want to distinguish themselves from their Palestinian counterparts.

In the territories, by contrast, the Higher Popular Committee for the Commemoration of Fifty Years to the Nakba (al-Lajna al-Sha'biyya al'Ulya) headed the mobilization process. Each announced a different day of commemoration; in the territories the major commemoration events were to take

place on 14 May; in Israel, they were to take place on 15 May. This was without doubt deliberately intended.[17]

The territorial demarcation was also reflected in the communiques and advertisements which appeared urging people to attend. The official communiqué of the Israeli committee was addressed 'to the Arab masses' (lil-Jamahir al-'Arabiyya), an expression that if found in political discourse in the West Bank and Gaza, is used only by the left-wing or pan-Arab factions such as the Popular Front for Liberation or the Arab Liberation Front but never by either the Fath movement or by the Palestinian Authority.[18] The announcements by the Popular Committee in the territories, which appeared consistently for over a week in all of the dailies, calling on inhabitants to participate in 'the march of the million' *(masirat al-million),* was addressed 'to all the provinces', a specifically territorial-administrative demarcation which weds identity to territory either controlled or administered presently by the PA, or territory which it perceives as part of the future state of Palestine.[19] There are seven of them demarcated among other places in the Elections Law of the Palestinian Authority of 1995. It never refers to Arabs living in Israel.

Another indication of politicization lies in the mobilizing patterns the *Nakba* commemoration events engendered. In Israel, they were poorly attended and peaceful; in the territories, participation did not live up to expectations but were very violent; the Palestinian press reported eight killed and over 400 wounded during 'the march of the million'.[20]

Another operational aspect of the *Nakba* narrative along similar lines needs to be mentioned. Before turning to the analysis of the narrative it should be pointed out that none of the newspapers (*al-Ayam,* representing the press in the territories; *al-Sinnarah, al-Ittihad,* and *Kull al-Arab,* published within Israel), whose relevant content form the basis for this comparison, used each other's material. This might be self-evident as regards the latter three since they are in competition, but it is not selfevident in the case of *al-Ayam.* And even more significantly, while the Israeli Palestinian newspapers published recollections or material on refugees related to the territories as well, there was no *Nakba-related* material in *al-Ayam,* which mentioned how the *Nakba* affected Palestinians living within the Green Line, particularly the *muhajjarun*-the internal refugees residing in Arab villages and mixed Jewish-Arab towns who were prevented since 1948 from returning to their original villages and lands. The council that defends their interests estimates their numbers at around 200,000 persons or one-fifth of Israel's Arab citizens.[21]

ANALYSING THE *NAKBA* NARRATIVES

What then is reflected in the coverage of the commemoration regarding politicization or radicalization? I am concerned in this article to analyse the distinctiveness of the Israeli Palestinian narrative in respect of their Palestinian counterparts and how this relates to future relations with the Jewish majority

within Israel, rather than the way the commemoration facilitates the crystallization and development of Palestinian identity per se.[22] I decided to compare the articles, speeches and personal recollections on the *Nakba* along five dimensions:

1. The temporal orientation of the narrative: is the *Nakba* portrayed as being in the past or the present continuous?
2. The references to identity which appear in the narrative. The possibilities are varied: refugees which include *lajiyun,* referring to refugees living outside borders of former Mandatory Palestine, *nazihun-*those who left in 1967–68 soon after the Six Day War, mostly from the West Bank and of whom the majority today reside in Jordan or are Jordanian nationals, and *muhajjarun;* individuals, *ahl* (folk), *sha'b,* people, *umma* (nation) and the appropriate adjectives such as Palestinian people, the Arab or Islamic nation. It quickly became evident that all the newspapers are secular in their discourse on identity.
3. How they view the 'other' or the enemy. I also refer to tone and style in the portrayal of facts.
4. What is the objective of the narrative of commemoration? They may be collective return *('awda),* individual return, collective compensation, individual compensation or any compensation, creation of the state, self-determination, and a state for all its citizens or any combinations of these objectives. And finally:
5. Are there overall themes in the recounting or portrayal of the narrative, especially in the discourse of the officials? Such themes could be righting an injustice—from national tragedy of a people to resurrection as a nation-state, triumph over the enemy or any combination of these themes.

I assumed that there would be a match between behavioural patterns and narrative. The Israeli Arab narrative would portray the *Nakba* as an event related to the past; the tone and style would be softer in the portrayal of the 'other' than found in the Palestinian press over the Green Line; the 'official' distinction between the Palestinians across the Green Line and Arab citizens would be maintained along lines such as the Arab masses, citizens. Return would be limited to the *muhajjarun* rather than refugees from outside; the Israeli Arabs would develop more than their counterparts in the PA the theme of 'tragedy to state rebirth' rather than the commemoration of individual *awda'* and the relationship of the *Nakba* to the demand for a state for all its citizens, which would be more radical to Israeli Jewish ears than the etatization of the *Nakba* or *'awda.*

A BENCHMARK FOR A COMPARISON

To compare the two narratives, I have chosen as a benchmark an article on the *Nakba* by Ahmad Qurai (Abu 'Ala'a) entitled 'Lessons of the Fiftieth [Commemoration]: The Possibilities and the Future', which appeared in *al-Ayam,* the Palestinian daily published in Ramallah.[23] The piece was chosen mainly because as a member of the PLO Executive Committee, speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council and former Oslo track negotiator, he was by far the most senior person in the PLO/PA to have written in commemoration of the event in the local Palestinian press covered for the purposes of this analysis.

The article begins on an ironic but caustic note:

> Fifty years to the existence of the state of Israel on Palestinian land, fifty years since the formation of one of the gravest political issues in the twentieth century, the problem of the Palestinian people against whom was committed one of the most massive acts of terrifying mass expulsion in modern times. And fifty years have gone by since the announcement of international declaration of human rights which contains an article that emphasizes the right of the individual *[alinsan]* to leave and return to his land whenever he wants!
>
> What makes for so terrible a contrast is that the publication of this humane declaration came at the same time as the horrifying massacres were perpetrated by the Zionist terrorist gangs across the length and breadth of Palestinian land, that huge transfer operations were enacted against the Palestinian people, and the complete devastation of its towns and villages and its economic and social infrastructure occurred.

Through juxtaposition of a lofty act and a terrible political process, Abu Ala'a weaves two themes together; the destruction of the Palestinian people as a nation and the right of individual return even after the PLO/PA has achieved some form of entity on the basis of partition.

BETWEEN THE LOSS OF ANDALUS SPAIN AND PALESTINE

The Palestinian *Nakba* is not, according to Abu Ala'a, confined to the Palestinians alone but a historical event of major importance to the Arab nation. It reflects the decline and subsequent contraction of Arab conquest and political glory since the Arab nation's golden age—its partial conquest of Western Europe and the establishment of Arab kingdoms in Spain. He writes:

> …fifty years and the bitter memory calls for comfort…or for weeping even though our history reminds us of the tears of small Abu Abdullah whose tears profited neither him nor Arab history one iota when he delivered the

key of Andalus (Muslim Spain) to Ferdinand and Isabella, at the time his raped mother shouted out a stanza from a poem whose echo is repeatedly heard throughout the nights of Arab defeat since that historical event.

This anachronism, portraying Muslim rule as Arab and then connecting it to the loss of Palestine, echoes a major theme of early pan-Arab scholarly and political literature on the *Nakba* written in the first decade since the event. By stressing this point, Abu Ala'a might be expressing the ideas of his generation which grew up when Arabism was at its zenith. The broader historical implications of the Palestinian disaster were hardly expressed by others recollecting the *Nakba.* What he did hold in common with other commentators, particularly Israeli Palestinians writing in *al-Ittihad,* was the Marxist-inspired notion that Zionism was a 'historical deviation', a perception he notes twice in the course of the article including in the final paragraph.

AL-TARHIL—EXPULSION

The article then moves on to explain the major elements of the *Nakba* narrative. One of them is the expulsion. He is convinced that the principal reason is due 'most of all to the atrocities committed by the [Zionist] gangs…in cold blood, indeed it extended to inventing forms [of torture] unknown in the history of the most bestial of invaders since the beginning of history as told by the historian Thomas Katiling, including the raping of some schoolgirls whom the terrorists slaughtered afterwards.'

Charging the Israelis with rape is uncommon in the literature on the *Nakba.*

ISRAEL CREATED ON THE RUINS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

A major related theme in the recollection of the *Nakba* is the idea that Israel was created on the ruins of Arab Palestinian society, as the opening of Abu 'Ala'a's article pithily describes. The author makes the point forcefully with a play of words when he describes the transformation from Mandatory Palestine to the creation of Israel as a *mashru' ihtilali-ikhlali,* a project of occupation and eviction, which he claims the British abetted. The process proceeded along three axes: '(1) the continuation of Jewish immigration…out of a desire to overcome the vast discrepancy in the demographic balance which continued to lean overwhelmingly in favour of the rightful owners of the land, the Arab Palestinian people right up to May 1948; (2) the continuation of the building of settlements to absorb them; (3) the strengthening of the military capabilities of the terrorist Zionist organizations like the Haganah, Etzel and Lehi, the development of their offensive effectiveness with the initiation of terrorist campaigns against civilian Palestinian locations which led to the creation of confusion among a semi-isolated Palestinian people who had lost faith in the Mandatory authorities which

controlled their villages and towns…'. Meanwhile outside Palestine, Jewish capitalism was being put to effective use in spreading the Zionist cause.

FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY

Having banished the Palestinian people from their land, the Zionists preceded 'to lead world consciousness astray based mainly on a land without a people ready to receive a people without land' *(Suwirat Filastinka-ard bila sha'b muhaya'atan li-istiqbal sha'b bila ard).*

   The Zionists fabricated not only history but also the religion upon which their claim to the land was based, by:

> the revival of mythological sources and their reinterpretation in a manner consistent with Zionist aspirations and desires for Palestine land as was exemplified in the circulation of the false claim concerning the return of the Jews to the land promised to them after 2,000 years, linking the contrived heavenly promise with the claim of a historical right of the Jews to Palestine, when in fact it is the land of banishment for Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Israel) [parenthesis in original] as it is so often repeated clearly in the Torah.

For Abu 'Ala'a obviously Ur Kasdim is home while Kna'an (Palestine), the land promised by the Almighty according to most Jewish versions, is exile.

   Abu 'Ala'a is convinced that 'the falsification of facts and the omission of embarrassing historical events is a temporary process at the best of times' and credits the new historians among Israel's academics for exposing the premeditated expulsion of the Palestinian people even within Zionist circles.

FROM TRAGEDY TO RESURRECTION

For Abu Ala'a, recollecting and studying the *Nakba* is not only an academic exercise related to the past, important as that exercise may be, but a means for building a more secure future for the Palestinian people as the concluding paragraph of the article makes clear:

> If the dreams of the other side, which defy the course of history had been realized after 50 years after its feverish take-off, the dreams of our Palestinian people continue to draw strength and legitimacy from its basic right to its land and country, its legitimate right of return, self-determination, the establishment of its independent state on its national soil…and its human right to life.

PAST AND PRESENT

Having established Abu Ala'a as a benchmark one is now ready to analyse the Israeli Palestinian response to the *Nakba.* If for Abu 'Ala'a the *Nakba* is an event rooted in the past, the stress in the Israel Palestinian newspapers is the present implications of the *Nakba.* The *al-Sinarah* weekly supplement of 15 May 1998 devoted to the recollection of the *Nakba* made this clear with its opening article entitled 'Another Episode in the Nakba Series—Threatened with Uprootment'. The author of the article interviews members of nine families who lost land in Lifta, Romema and Sarafand in 1948 and who eventually after many tribulations arrived at French Hill, Jerusalem near the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University. Their land, according to the reporter, has been expropriated to build dormitories for the Hebrew University and the nine families are now faced with eviction.

The article begins with the following statement in bold and enlarged letters:

This is a quick abridged reflection of the unnatural predicament in the life of our Palestinian people which nine Palestinian families faced and all they had to bear in terms of deceit, subjugation, injustice and oppression. The slogan remains steadfastness and defiance. Who are the members of these families? Where do they live? What do they think? Where will they emigrate? What is the 'sin' which they committed? We will try clarifying their humanitarian and legal predicament in the following report—another episode in the 'Nakba' series.

It is clear to the reader that the *Nakba* is not an event that occurred 50 years ago but an ongoing process in which the Israelis who evicted Palestinians in the past are continuing to do so in the present.

There is, however, hope and salvation, for the ramifications of the *Nakba* are also related to 'the return' in the future, as evoked in the second item in the same supplement, a translation of a speech in English by Hisham Sharabi, entitled 'The Palestinians Fifty Years Later' delivered on 25 March 1998 in Georgetown University where Sharabi teaches and heads a research institute on studies of the Arab world. After taking note that his grandfather and others like him kept their keys in their pockets, wishing to go home but never seeing Palestine for the second time, he states: 'But their grandchildren today are pining for the day they will be returning to their homeland. You hear them say, if the Jews could wait 2, 000 years to demand a country they had never seen, then all the more so the Palestinians are willing to wait five or twenty years more but inevitably they will return.'

For Sharabi, the *Nakba* is an event in the past, a state of existence in the present—the fathers, he implies, will die holding the keys—but the children will bring salvation in the future by returning to Palestine. Regarding the past, his historical account of the *Nakba* is very similar to that of Abu 'Ala'a.[24]

THE NATURE OF THE 'OTHER'

In the narratives in the press on both sides of the Green Line, the references to Jewish Israelis and Zionism are on the whole extremely negative, where the 'other' is clearly an enemy. Ironically, perhaps the most virulent is an article written by a Palestinian Israeli, relating the *Nakba* to the Holocaust, which appeared in *al-Ittihad,* the organ of the Israel Communist Party which is formally a Jewish-Arab party represented by a Jewish member of Knesset despite the paucity of Jewish voters. The article's author goes unnamed—the only article of over 60 items covered in the research without an author—no doubt because of the sensitivity of the subject, its vitriolic nature and the fear of retribution.[25]

In the article entitled 'Personal Notes on the Nakba and the Holocaust', the writer says:

> The only statement embedded in Israeli consciousness is that the Holocaust should not be repeated…but is there no other lesson to be drawn in light of the situation in which we live in this country? This brings to mind the end of the film *Schindler's List:* the Jew now is able to give clemency to the good German [written in Hebrew—*hagermanihatov*] so that he can show up in the promised land to settle his accounts with roaches and scorpions to come four years after World War II to engage in murder and disembowelment *[baqar al-batn alhabali]* in Dir Yassin and to destroy the roach heaps in (417) [brackets in the original] villages; to wait for the workers coming back to their wives' embrace, who bore food for their children in order to butcher them [the writer is referring to the massacre at Kafr Kasm in 1956], to witness from afar on beautiful Lebanese hilltops the massacre of Sabra and Shatila [the massacre of Palestinians in refugee camps outside Beirut presumably in collusion with the Israeli forces that were occupying Beirut at the time]…

He goes on to write:

> The main lesson as I see it is the following: We are not at the point of comparing the Nakba with the Holocaust and we are not in competition with the Jewish people—a competition which consists in comparing tragedies or counting the numbers of the victims. Our conscience compels us to refuse this competition and it is incumbent upon the Jew to recognize the tragedy of the Palestinian people in order to preserve his humanity.

The author writes that in his many years in East Germany, he visited concentration camps several times. He demonstrates his 'Israeliness' not only by employing Hebrew but the word *Karitha* for the Holocaust as used by the official Israeli media rather than the word *mahraqa* employed in the Palestinian and Arab press across the Green Line and in Arab states.

The Jews fare little better under Sharabi's pen in the speech published by *al-Sinnarah:*

> You hear them [the youth living in Diaspora] say: if the Jews could wait 2, 000 years to demand a country they had never seen, then all the more so the Palestinians are to wait five or twenty years more but inevitably they will return. But they will not return like thieves in the night because they are the rightful owners of the land, a land they know and love and from which they will never emigrate.

A more intensely narrated account of a procession of return held in April in the Galilee evokes the same emotions regarding the 'other'.[26] The caption in *al-Sinnarah* reads as follows:

> 480 destroyed villages and only 400 protesters in the al-Awda march from Shaykh al-Danun to Ghabisiyya. They were expelled in 1952, several hundred of 200,000 forced emigrants in their own land. The goal was to have one flag bearer for every of the 480 villages which disappeared but there were not enough participants. The procession was led by a car-full of children waving Palestinian flags.

The procession's walk ends:

> in the midst of a grove of Eucalyptuses which were planted densely in order to wipe out the traces of the 1948 landslide. Fig, olive and Indian-fig trees soar towards the sky as if to say: we are here. If only the olive trees were mortal they would hear the tale of their produce turned into olive oil at the end of season borne by farmers who picked them joyfully year after year… These national trees quickly drew the attention of the people of Ghabisiyya whose expressions bespoke the whole story, the story of the person uprooted from his home whose land was stolen, who lost some of his relatives only to come back to his destroyed village as a visitor. All he can do is pick the za'tar and fennel (shamar) and eat them, and satiate his longing for the playgrounds of his childhood and youth. And if he is religious then he is forbidden from praying in the mosque because the Israel Land Authority surrounded it with the barbed wire of hatred and hysteria…

Wakim Wakim, a lawyer speaking for Committees of Forced Emigrants *(muhajjarun)* in their Homeland then addressed them, followed by a representative of the village's former residents, a minute of silence in memory of the martyrs of Filastin, and a greeting by the PLO. Closing remarks were made by Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, the head of the Higher Follow-up Committee for the

Affairs of Arabs in Israel. Representatives of the political parties could not address the procession because it began to rain.

> Then a youth from Ghabisiyya jumped over the fence of the mosque and raised a black flag alongside a Palestinian one on the top of dome which aroused the anger of the police who were amassed in the place in great numbers. They tried to arrest him for entering a place closed to visitors… This aroused the memories of pain and misfortune in the minds of the participants but it especially affected al-Hajj Salih Dawud Zeine who broke out in a state of emotional excitement. The scene led him to recall his youth 50 years before when his late father Daud Zeine raised the white flag only to be shot dead by members of the some of the Jewish gangs. Hajj Salih Zeine cast his eyes on the two raised flags of the forlorn mosque saying no more than that the objective was to gain control of the land without its residents.

The article ends by reprimanding the heads of local councils for not coming, asking whether the reason for their absence could be attributed their fear of Swissa (Eli Swissa, the Shas Minister of Interior) and his boys for punishing them by denying them the fistful of shekel? Immediately after the audience disbanded, Abd al-Malik Dahamshe (member of Knesset representing the Islamic Association in the United Arab List) led the midday prayers alongside the mosque.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The commemoration of the *Nakba* is a commemoration primarily of the Palestinian people in the press on both sides of the Green Line. If the term 'refugees' frequently appears in both the Israel Palestinian press and the press in the West Bank, and the term *muhajjaruni* specifically in the Israeli Palestinian press, they are all used almost exclusively in reference to the Palestinian or Arab Palestinian people. The article most sensitive to Jewish perceptions is a good indication of the salience of this national identity. In his article The Nakba and [the Celebration of] Independence', Faraj Salman writes:

> Israel has become a fact despite all the obstacles it came up against and despite being surrounded by dangers… Israel, whether we like it or not, has become a state like all other states…but no power in the world…can deny the Arab Palestinian people within the Green Line or outside the line from expressing its feeling of despondency of reviving the memory of the loss of this land in favour of the Jews, for Israel arose out of the ashes of a people exiled from their land…
>
> Both peoples, provided that reason and rationalism prevail, can live side by side…this one to celebrate the independence of his people and the other

[to commemorate] the disaster and just as the Jews cannot demand morally that Arabs dance on Israel's independence day so cannot the Arab demand morally that a Jew place ashes on his head in bereavement and tear his hair out [literally, 'pluck hairs off his beard'] in memory of the Nakba…this one will laugh while the other one will cry.[27]

The same terms of reference were found in the official communiqué of the Higher Committee of the Nakba and Steadfastness even though in addressing the public they wished to mobilize, they called them 'the Arab masses' to distinguish them from Palestinians across the Green Line:

> The fiftieth day of commemoration of the Catastrophe will fall on the fifteenth of May—this catastrophe which tore apart the Palestinian people, forced it to flee, and which brought about a turning point in the history of the region as a whole, imposed a tragic situation in which the Palestinian people were deprived of all rights to its land, and which prevented it from self-determination and a free and honourable life like the rest of the people of the world. At this moment of commemoration we do not only want to commemorate the pain and dispersion of our people, the fall of thousands of its people in defence of the homeland, and the destruction of 420 villages, but also to emphasize that this Nakba in all its ramifications continues to cast its yoke on the life of the Palestinian people wherever they reside.[28]

THE OBJECTIVES OF *NAKBA* COMMEMORATION

The same official text which gives greater importance to Palestinian nationality than to personal return also emphasizes the importance of Palestinian state-building across the Green Line over *'awda:*

> Only the realization of a full and comprehensive peace on the basis of self-determination for the Palestinian people, the establishment of the independent state with its capital of Arab Jerusalem, the execution of a policy of complete equality towards the Arab Palestinian people in Israel, and the guarantee of the right of return to local exile to muhajjarun and refugees *[lajiyyun],* will be able to put an end to the continuation of the Nakba and the pain and dispersal of the Palestinian people…

But the commentary by other Israeli Palestinians is more radical. 'Umar Ghazzawi from Iblin writes in *al-Ittihad:*

> We are, as mentioned before, part of this state striving at the same time to abolish the law regarding the exclusivity of its Jewishness. Let it be a state for all its citizens through the proclamation of the constitution. If Israel

were sincere in dealing with us on this basis, had it recognized the rights of our Palestinian people and ratified such a constitution and abolished the Jewishness of this state, we would have participated in its 50th year of independence…the absence of equality of our Arab masses and the lack of peace with our people, all of this forces us to recall the Nakba and to emphasize that Israel is a Jewish state only which will never make us dance happily in the independence [celebrations] of the Jews.

For Ghazzawi, only a state for all its citizens, the liberal constitutional state that is oblivious to the ethno-national origins of its citizenry, can efface the bitterness of the *Nakba*.[29]

While Israeli Palestinians are to beginning to emphasize changing the nature of the state in their discourse on the *Nakba,* Palestinian officials are beginning to use the *Nakba* for state-building purposes by developing a Palestinian version of *meshoa letkuma—*from Holocaust to resurrection, in which they expropriate an often intensely personal perception with a collectivity fulfilling the goal of building the Palestinian state.

Referring back to Abu 'Ala'a's article, which laid the basis for our comparison, he concludes it by writing:

If the dreams of the other side [the Zionists], which defy the course of history had been realized after 50 years after its feverish take-off, the dreams of our Palestinian people continue to draw its strength and legitimacy from its basic right to its land and country and its legitimate right of return, self-determination, the establishment of its independent state on its national soil…and its human right to life.

Note that 'its human right to life' is in the singular, obviously denoting the people and the state.

Arafat's address to the 'march of the million' on 14 May connected return and the creation of the state even more explicitly.[30] In his 1,000-word speech Arafat mentions the *Nakba* only twice, the first time to acknowledge the suffering and the second time to demonstrate the need and the remedy of forgetting it: 'We do not ask for the moon, we ask only to turn over the page on the Nakba forever, that the emigrant return to his homeland, and that we build our Palestinian state on our land.' Arafat uses the word 'emigrant' *(muhajir)* rather than *muhajjar*— one who is expelled: the return is to the homeland rather than to the particular birthplace of the refugee and the final objective is to build the state. He transforms personal tragedy into the basis for state-building.

This is clarified once again when he says: 'Here in the homeland, despite the varying conditions and changes in the situation, we announce to all that the homeland is more than rocks, more than trees, more than the open sky and more than the sea…it is sovereignty and freedom, and admission into the international community.' Arafat, by echoing many of the themes found in the traditional

personal *Nakba* narratives—often referred as the literature of 'longing' (*adab al-hanin* or *al-ishtiyak*) for 'the lost paradise' *(fidaws al-mafqud)*—belittles it in favour of the political facts of statehood.[31] For the Israeli reader the etatization of tragedy, its expropriation for the sake of state-building, should sound familiar. This is the beginning of an incipient *meshoa letkuma* theme that places the tragedy of the past behind in the hope that a better collective future awaits Palestinians in their state recognized by the international community.

No echo of redemption through state-building can be found among the Israeli Palestinians. The communiqué of the Higher Committee of the Nakba and Steadfastness, while acknowledging the struggle for a Palestinian state, does not perceive it as an act of redemption. Likewise for 'Umar Ghazzawi there is no redemption as long as Israel is a Jewish state. Only a state for all its citizens will make him not recollect the *Nakba.*

CONCLUSION

Despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the international system remains based on territorial states. On the normative level, sovereignty prevails over self-determination. Inductively, one can therefore assume that neither irredentism nor secession, which has succeeded only once since 1945, will succeed in the Palestinian case. Jordan and more certainly Israel will probably be powerful enough to fend off such pressures. But if ethno-nationalism is not strong enough to unravel states, it is certainly powerful enough to problematize the state as the breakdown of consociationalism demonstrates. Nor have we many examples in history of liberal democratic states based on ethnic groups. The relationship between the state and its Arab minority should therefore be problematic. That Arabs in Israel have politicized rather than radicalized is therefore to a degree surprising. The question I have attempted to address is how stable is this trend by exploring deeper levels of identity, such as the narrative of the *Nakba* as it was presented in the newspapers on both sides of the Green Line. The basic story as an event or series of events from the past is very much the same both stylistically and substantively. So are the basic terms of reference. The most important collective term is 'the Palestinian people'. The narrative on both sides of the Green Line portrays a suffering Palestinian people, in addition of course to telling the story of suffering individuals. There is, however, a small difference regarding the objectives of telling the story. In the Israeli Palestinian case, the *Nakba-'awda* narrative aims to realize personal return, to transform Israel into a state for all its citizens, in addition to demanding the establishment of the Palestinian state across the Green Line. In the case of the Palestinian press across the Green Line the narrative is more closely linked to the creation of the state. Ironically, its is the more 'civil' version that might in the future problematize relations between the Palestinians in Israel and the Jewish majority. For Palestinians in Israel commemorating the *Nakba,* the emerging partition

might not after all be the final partition from multinational empire to an area consisting of territorial states.

NOTES

1. Ted Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict,* Washington, DC, 1993.
2. Two leading articles on the Palestinization radicalization thesis are Gabriel Ben-Dor, 'Electoral Politics and Ethnic Polarization: Israeli Arabs in the 1977 Election', in Asher Arian (ed.), *TheElections in Israel* 1977, Jerusalem, 1979, and Oren Yiftachel, 'Debate: The Concept of "Ethnic Democracy" and Its Applicability to the Case of Israel,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol.15, No.1 (1992), pp. 127–8. On politicization see Sami Smooha, 'Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol.13, No.3 (July 1990), pp.389–417 and the introductory chapter to his *Arabs and Jews inIsrael: Conflicting and Shared Attitudes in a Divided Society,* Boulder, CO, 1989. Another classification relating specifically to the issue of national identity identifies three schools of thought. According to Ramzi Sulayman, director of Markaz al-Jalil lil-Abhath al-Ijtimaiyya and lecturer at Haifa University, the majority of scholars (Landau, Reiter, Reches, Tessler) believe that Arabs in Israel bear a dual identity as Israelis and Palestinians characterized by dissonance between the two. He and Nadim Rouhana feel that Arabs in Israel regard themselves almost exclusively Palestinian. Smooha represents the antithesis of the first school of thought. See, 'Interview with Dr Ramzi Sulayman on Identity and Belonging', *Kull al-Arab, 7* April 1995, supplement, p.7. Smooha's bifocal classification refers to real or expected political behaviour, in which case the first two perspectives can be elided easily into one. They should both lead to conflict between the ethnic group and the state. Needless to say, the present article focuses mainly on political behaviour rather than on identity.
3. Ian Lustick, 'The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel 1988,*. Boulder, CO, 1990, pp. 120–21; Hillel Frisch, 'The Arab Vote in the 1992 Elections: The Triviality of Normality: The Significance of Electoral Power', in Daniel J.Elazar and Shmuel Sandler (eds.), *Israel at the Polls, 1992,* Lanham, MD, 1995, p.122.; Hillel Frisch, The Arab Vote in the 1996 General Elections: The Radicalization of Politicization?, *Israel Affairs,* Vol.4, No.1 (1997), pp.103–20. For an excellent article that challenges the new orthodoxy, see Nadim Rouhana and As'ad Ghanem, 'The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case of Palestinian Citizens in Israel', *International Journalof Middle East Studies,* Vol.30, No.3 (1998), pp.321–46.
4. For a comprehensive discussion on this transformation, see Shmuel Sandler, *State ofIsrael-Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational Dimension of Foreign Policy,* Greenwood, CT, 1993.
5. Sara Ozacky-Lazar and As'ad Ghanem, *The Arab Vote for the 14th Knesset, 29 May 1996,* Givat Haviva, Jan. 1996, p.12 (in Hebrew).
6. Ian Lustick, 'The Changing Political Role of Israeli Arabs', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel,* Boulder, CO, 1990, pp. 115–31.
7. Ibid.

8. See Hillel Frisch, 'If Things Are So Much Better, How Come They Are So Much Worse: The Political Fragmentation of the Arab Vote and the Marginalization of Arab Politics', in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler (eds.), *Who's The Boss in Israel: Israel at the Polls, 1988–89,* Detroit, 1992, p.133.

9. Hillel Frisch, 'The PLO and the Palestinians in Israel: Politicization or Radicalization?', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,* Vol.2, No.3 (1997), p.457.

10. Frisch, 'The Arab Vote in the 1996 General Elections', p.109.

11. The following is based on a systematic reading of *Kull al-Arab, al-Ittihad and Al-Sinnarah,* the three Israeli Arab papers, and *al-Ayam* published in Ramallah, between the period of 15 April to 16 May 1998.

12. Smooha, 'Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy'; Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel,* introductory chapter.

13. On the Abna al-Balad, see Aziz Haidar, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Taqaddumiyya-Abna'a alBalad: Dirasa fi al-Qawmiyya wa al-Wataniyya fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi bayna al-Falastiniyyin fiIsrael* (The National Progressive Movement: Abna'a al-Balad: A Study of Nationals and Patriotism in Political Thought among the Palestinians in Israel), Bir Zeit, 1995.

14. Frisch, 'The Arab Vote in the 1996 General Elections'.

15. *Al-Sinarah,* 4 April 1998.

16. Ibid.

17. *Al-Ayam,* 2 May 1998.

18. *Al-Sinnarah,* 4 April 1998.

19. *Al-Ayam,* 8–14 May 1998.

20. *Al-Ayam,* 15 May 1998.

21. Interview with Wakim Wakim, Secretary-General of Committee for the Defence of the Rights of the Expelled, in the *al-Nisf al-Akhar* supplement of *Kul al-Arab,* 15 May 1998.

22. I do not deal with narrative and Palestinian nation-building, as does for example the narrative of Samih al-Qasim childhood in an article commemorating the Nakba in Ibid. Qasim, arguably the second best-known Palestinian nationalist poet is a Druze from the mixed Druze-Christian Galilee village of al-Rama. The narrative deals with accusations of Druze complicity with the Zionists, looting of the Christians when the latter were forced out by the Israelis (he blames the looting on the Jews), and accusations of cowardice of those who fled.

23. *Al-Ayam,* 13 May 1998.

24. Sharabi, a former member of the Palestinian National Council, visited Israel in 1993 for the first time since his departure in 1947, soon after the signing of the Declaration of Principles. His visit, where he was accompanied by the Israeli author Amos Oz, was filmed by the BBC.

25. *Al-Ittihad,* 6 May 1998, p.15

26. *Al-Sinnarah,* 3 April 1998.

27. *Kull al-Arab,* 8 May 1998.

28. *Al-Ittihad,* 3 May 1998.

29. 'Umar Ghazzawi, 'Nakba and Independence', *al-Ittihad,* 3 May 1998.

30. *Al-Ayam,* 15 May 1998.

31. On this literature, see Danny Rubinstein, *Hibuk HaTeena: Zehut Hashiva shel HaFalastinim* (The Caress of the Fig Tree: The Right of Return of the Palestinians), Jerusalem, 1990.

THE MEDIA AND THE ISRAELI ARAB CITIZENS

The Israeli Newspapers' Coverage of the Israeli Arabs During the *Intifada*

ILAN ASYA

The deplorable acts carried out in the occupied territories on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, which began in December 1987 and led to the Arabs' adoption of the name *intifada,* placed the Israeli Arab citizens of the state of Israel in a difficult position. Israeli Arabs are those Arabs who remained within the borders of the state of Israel, as determined by the armistice between Israel and the Arab states after the 1948 war. These Arabs, who became Israeli citizens, were in fact severed from the rest of the Palestinian population who lived west of the Jordan River and until 1967 were under the rule of Jordan or Egypt. Only after the Six Day War and Israel's capture of what is defined as Judea, Samaria (West Bank) and the Gaza Strip (thereafter referred to as 'the territories') was there a reconnection of both sectors of the Palestinian people.

The events of the *intifada* deepened the conflict of loyalties to which the Israeli Arabs were subject: loyalty to the state of Israel of which they are citizens, and loyalty to their conception of a Palestinian nation and their identification of themselves with a people who lived under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This article reviews and analyses the Hebrew Israeli newspapers' coverage of the Israeli Arabs' reaction to the *intifada* during its first three years—from December 1987 to December 1990.

Researchers of the Israeli media's coverage of the *intifada* mostly describe the way it treated those events whose focal point was the *intifada* in the territories held under Israeli authority. They do not deal with the media coverage of Israeli Arabs. Tamar Liebes describes how the Israeli media is controlled by a Zionist hegemony; a situation that influences the coverage of the *intifada* and of the Arab conflict in general.[1] The effect of the Zionist hegemony on journalists and editors operates, according to Liebes, on two levels. First, the technical influence —relying heavily on authority sources—makes for coverage that is biased in favour of the Israeli side; second, the journalists and editors see themselves as part of the Zionist movement, a condition which precludes coverage that is

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detached and free of bias. In Israel the army is a symbol of anti-exile, which makes criticism of it or anything to do with it difficult. Accordingly, Israeli newspapers place restrictions on the extent of criticism of the establishment. This is also consonant with the Israeli media consumer, who will not tolerate any transgression of these accepted restrictions. Liebes argues that the Israeli coverage of the *intifada* objectified Arabs as violent mobs lacking a human face. The tendency to depersonalize while reporting on the *intifada* is also highlighted by Roeh and Nir, who maintain that the Israeli coverage constructed a 'them-and-us' scenario.[2] Their finding that only six per cent of the Arabs who appeared in reports on the *intifada* were referred to by their names, compared to 44 per cent in cases of Jews who appeared in reports, serves as a stark example.

Arabs in the occupied territories, asserts Liebes, were initially perceived as a factor that lay outside the orbit of Israeli society, a fact which facilitated the objectification/distancing of them. Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, presented a much more difficult problem; they shared characteristics with the external enemy, yet also with Israeli society of which they made up a part of the fabric.

Liebes assumes the Israeli Arab perspective. The subject of her analysis is how the *intifada* impacted upon them, rather than how they were treated in the media. The same subject is addressed by Eli Reches, A.Bligh, N. Rouhana and M. al-Haj.[3] This research, however, aims to shed some light on the position which the Israeli newspapers took towards the phenomenon of Israeli Arabs identifying with the Arabs in the occupied territories.

On 9 December 1987 four Palestinians from the Gaza Strip died when their car collided with a lorry driven by an Israeli. This incident was to spark off the *intifada,* which can be dated from the following day. Rumours to the effect that the accident had, in fact, been a reprisal for the murder of the driver's relative in Gaza's central market induced widespread rioting.[4]

Any observer would have felt during this time the build-up of tension before it exploded into the *intifada.* The level of animosity towards the occupation had been escalating throughout Palestinian society. In the course of 1987, up until the *intifada,* violations of the law increased by 100 per cent.[5] Before the *intifada,* the Gaza Strip had been considered a dangerous area and, owing to the increasing hostilities, access to it was periodically blocked. But in spite of these indications, Israel's security and political systems, as well as public opinion, were taken by surprise when rioting broke out. The shock was increased when it came to light that the rioters came from all walks of life, and that children and youths—in so far as they also constituted the largest demographic group—were the most active among them.

The impact of the *intifada* on Israeli Arabs was immediate. On 21 December 1987 their leaders called a general strike which met with unequivocal consensus. Strikes and demonstrations, however, did not provide a sufficient outlet for the pitch of anger and discontent, and the violent forms of protest seen in the territories were adopted on the same day. The main highway connecting the central region of Israel to Emek Yezreel—Wadi Arra—was blocked by residents

of Arab settlements that lie along the route. The uprising in the territories led to a 100 per cent increase in subversive activities and Israeli Arab expressions of nationalism, according to Eli Reches. These took the form of rioting, burning tyres, blocking roads, stoning cars, daubing nationalistic slogans, waving Palestinian flags, damaging property and agricultural produce, and setting fire to forests. Most severe were violent terrorist acts, which increased sharply. Reches counts 208 terrorists attacks in 1988, in contrast to 69 attacks in 1987. According to official Israeli estimates, some 80 per cent of the terrorist attacks in 1988 were perpetrated by Israeli Arabs. The attacks consisted of 170 petrol bombs, 12 stabbings, 20 incidents involving explosive packages, and three involving hand grenades.[6]

The tumultuous events unfolding in the territories and the hundreds killed and injured attracted large-scale media attention. But it was only when Israeli Arabs took to the streets that coverage of the Israeli Arabs' activities began.

The following analysis will refer to newspaper coverage of five events, which focused on the connection between the Israeli Arabs and the *intifada:*

1. The Israeli Arab general strike in sympathy towards Arabs in the territories was the first episode showing the *intifada's* impact on Israeli Arabs. This took place on 21 December 1987, ten days after the first riots in the territories began.
2. The second event took place on 30 March 1988, during the Israel-Arab 'Land Day'.
3. The third event was the 1989 'Land Day.'
4. The Israeli Arab reaction to the murders of seven Arab workers from the Gaza Strip by an Israeli soldier was the fourth event. The murders occurred on 20 May 1990 in the city of Rishon Letzion, near Tel Aviv.
5. The fifth event was the Israeli Arab reaction to scenes of rioting by thousands of worshippers at the holy site of the Temple Mount, which occurred on 8 October 1990. Nineteen Arabs were shot and killed by Israeli security forces.

The analysis also includes the sporadic coverage from the years 1988 to 1990 that does not focus on specific events but which relates more generally to the impact of the *intifada* on Israeli Arabs.

This analysis of the Israeli-Hebrew newspaper coverage is qualitative, and textually examines the commercial newspapers—*Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv,Yediot Ahronot,* and the papers affiliated with political parties—*Davar* and *al-Hamishmar. Davar* represented the ideology of the then Labour Party and *al-Hamishmar* was the journal of the left-wing party Mapam. Both were closed down a few years ago.

Several main conclusions spring from the analysis. The position of Israeli Arabs with regard to the *intifada* was referred to in the Israeli Hebrew newspapers mainly when they were actively involved in extreme

demonstrations, rioting or acts of sabotage of various degrees. In other words, analysis and commentary in these newspapers normally followed coverage of those events that were initiated by Israeli Arabs and that had violent effects or the fear of such effects.

From an analysis of the events as reported, the Israeli newspapers emerge as agents of the Israeli government and of the Israeli Jewish establishment, serving to transmit on their behalf messages to Israeli Arabs. In other words, the major findings of Liebes, Roeh and Nir concerning the ideological hegemony are valid: the works of journalists and editors reinforce the consensus and instruct the coverage of the Israeli Arab protest. However, the *modus operandi* adopted by the newspapers when reporting on Israeli Arabs was rather sophisticated. The fact that it was Israeli citizens who were involved here, rather than the occupied population, had turned the newspapers into an educational tool with the purpose of bringing Israeli Arabs back into line. Most of the newspapers here under review, employing the classic method of threats and inducements, were mobilized by the government to diminish militant forms of Israeli Arab participation in the *intifada,* or to prevent the *intifada* from spilling over into Israeli territory. Analysis of various publications that focused on the violent events of the *intifada* supports this conclusion.

The newspapers carried out this role in several ways:

1. By emphasizing in their news pages government messages that were intended to act as a deterrent—at times these amounted to open threats.
2. By producing analyses and commentaries by in-house writers which transmitted overt and implicit threats. Sometimes threats were transmitted by commentaries contributed by experts on Arab affairs.
3. By producing sympathetic articles intended to mollify Israeli Arabs through the expression of empathy towards them and for their feelings.

It should be noted at this juncture that on many levels Israel functions as a democracy of consensus. Its social structure is heterogeneous, Israeli Arabs making up a large minority—18 per cent of which arrived during the *intifada.*[7] The Jewish population is not homogeneous, comprising people of European, North African and Middle Eastern origin. Crossing ethnic lines, there is-also a religious-secular divide, between which there is constant tension. Neither is the Arab population homogeneous, comprising Muslims, Christians, Druzes, Bedouins and rural and city dwellers.

Operating within a consensual democracy, the Israeli media assumes contradictory roles. The tensions and divides in Israeli society create a multiplex of bitter dispute and public argument that involves large segments of the population. This situation is exploited by the media, especially the commercial media, which often has the effect of perpetuating the social tensions and divisions, which assists in expansion of both distribution and ratings. Conversely, the Israeli newspaper industry is conscious of its essential role in the

Israeli consensual democracy. It is especially sensitive to issues that appear seriously to threaten public order, national security or the foundations of democracy, society and state. Where these are at stake it is possible to discern the process by which newspapers, following directives from the political administration, will mobilize to ease tensions or reduce dangers.

The *intifada's* intrusion into Israeli borders was perceived as one such threat to national security and to the social equilibrium—a situation that, naturally, activated mobilization of editorial boards.

The political stance of the newspapers had a substantial influence on the coverage of Israeli Arabs during the *intifada.* For instance, the relatively right-wing editorial board of *Ma'ariv* expressed the most extremist position in relation to Israeli Arabs. But even *al-Hamishmar,* the mouthpiece of the left-wing Mapam party, also railed against the possible intrusion into Israeli borders of the *intifada* (see below). *Al-Hamishmar* employed different devices for transmitting messages to the Arab public, which they did via Arab members of Mapam who were also *al-Hamishmar* subscribers. *Al-Hamishmar's* dovish stance along with the potential for negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were considered by the Mapam leadership as seriously threatened by the possibility of Israeli Arab loyalty to the PLO. A situation in which Israeli Arabs chose this kind of loyalty over loyalty to the state of Israel would undermine the basis for Jewish public faith in them and would provide justification for the stigma of 'Fifth Columnists' which Israeli Arabs were subjected to. It can be assumed that this reality would have had a detrimental effect on the Jewish public's acceptance of the dovish stance of the 'peace camp'. *Al-Hamishmar* expressed positive and understanding views as to peaceful and quiet actions of support and of demonstration that were taken by the Israeli Arabs. It strongly rejected, however, all expressions of violent action and riots and, in fact, it used even overt threats in order to prevent Israeli Arabs from resorting to such action.

THE GENERAL STRIKE—21 DECEMBER 1987

On the day before the general strike, the popular and commercial *YediotAhronot* and *Ma'ariv* issued a forceful message warning against the *intifada* spreading into Israeli borders. The moderate newspaper, *YediotAhronot,* published on its front page Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's warning to Israeli Arabs and to Arabs in the territories, not to follow agitators.[8] The more nationalistic and right-wing *Ma'ariv* published on the same day a more heavily loaded item, under the headline, Arab Sector to Strike Tomorrow—PLO Urges Spreading of Riots over Green Line'.[9] The article said that, according to Israeli security sources, direct pressure was put on leaders of the Israeli Arab public through telephone calls and through the Israeli Communist Party, the majority of whose membership and leaders were Israeli Arabs. Only at the end of this article is it mentioned that violence was shunned during a rally of Israeli Arab activists who termed the day of the strike a 'Peace Day'. *Ma'ariv* points to links between Israeli Arabs and the

PLO, in an attempt to depict the general strike as an outcome of Arafat's prompting. In more explicit terms, *Ma'ariv* in fact suggested that Israeli Arabs were a 'Fifth Column'. It must be borne in mind that before the Oslo accords in 1993, the PLO was regarded by Israelis—because, of its activities—as a terrorist organization responsible for the deaths of many innocent civilians. The above headline has another, perhaps predominant, intention of conveying to Israeli Arabs that the stigma of 'Fifth Column' will seriously damage their credibility and undermine their efforts to demonstrate loyalty to the state. Accompanying the news item is an appeal from a right-wing Jewish member of Knesset (MK) to Prime Minister Shamir, demanding that Shamir should not recognize heads of local Arab authorities within Israel as representatives of the Israeli Arab community.

The front page of *Ma'ariv,* on the day of the strike itself, is entirely taken up by a banner headline, serving as a thinly veiled threat to the Israeli Arab public that 'Police and Army Forces Are on the Alert as Sympathy Strike Begins'. A sub-headline, intended to soften, reads: 'Government instructs security forces to act with restraint and avoid friction with strikers'.

The purported objectivity of the reporting is somewhat belied by the editorial of this issue, which makes very plain the newspaper's position. This position is assumedly that of the Israeli establishment towards a possible Israeli *Arab-intifada* connection. The editorial declares that it is too early to tell whether the strike planned by heads of Arab city councils is a one-off event or the start of a major breakdown in order. According to the author, the sympathy strike sets a precedent: never before have Israeli Arabs identified so closely with Arabs in the territories. This precedes the following threat:

> There is no point preaching to, or reminding those who have already joined the strike that their socio-economic situation is much better today than it was when the state was established—better even than that of their brothers in the other Arab states.
>
> But their attention should be drawn to the dangers that ensue from the course they are currently taking. At this juncture, we can only hope that the Arab citizens of Israel will choose not to dance to the tune of the PLO's pipe in participating in these futile acts of protest. Such actions can only increase the tensions and violence, and will jeopardize the region's chances of finding a political solution.
>
> If the citizens of Nazareth, Shefar'am and the 'small triangle' really want to influence the fate of the citizens of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, they would do well to remember that, as citizens of Israel with the right to vote, they could achieve their ends more successfully by exercising that and other rights, without burning the bridges of understanding.
>
> These bridges are essential for Arabs of the occupied territories, Israeli Arabs, Israel, and the Middle East. We can only hope that those heads of

Arab councils, who decided on today's strike, will do their utmost to ensure that bridges will not be damaged.[10]

A cartoon by Dosh, Israel's foremost nationalistic cartoonist, features on the same page. It depicts a personification of Israel, walking on a path that will shortly split. He is watching with some concern a figure who represents the Israeli Arabs. This figure holds a tyre in one hand, while his other hand holds the hand of a hooded terrorist carrying a bomb—in other words the PLO. The cartoon clearly depicts the Israeli Arabs as standing at a crossroads, faced with a choice between siding with the Jews or joining the Arab terrorists in the territories.

In contrast to the hawkish *Ma'ariv, Yediot Ahronot* is less ideologically orientated; it is Israel's most popular paper among both the Jewish and Arab readerships. *Yediot Ahronot* was less geared to representing the hawkish position of the predominant right-wing elements of the then coalition. The day before the general strike, *Yediot Ahronot* published an article expressing the attitude of the Israeli Arab leadership. Its title posed the question: 'Are We To Sit Here in Silence While Throughout the World There Are Demonstrations on Our Behalf?' The subtitle runs: 'Head of Sakhnin Council: "We are torn and we are hurting", Head of Shefar'am Council: "We have family in Nablus"'.[11]

This article created a forum in which Israeli Arabs could express the complexity of their predicament as they saw it; they are Israeli citizens, yet they are a part of the Palestinian people—often with relatives in the territories. In offering a channel for public discourse the paper gave vent, at least in part, to the mounting frustrations of Arab leaders and the Arab community. *Yediot Ahronot* provided here a platform for the moderate section of the Israeli Arab leadership; the more extremist views are presented only at the end of the article. In this way, the paper brings to the fore moderate views to an Arab public which, we can reasonably assume, is more exposed to extreme messages, which are by nature more easily assimilated.

Despite its more sensitive tone, *Yediot Ahronot* also issues threats. A cartoon on the opinion page depicts a pile of burning tyres. Upon each is written the name of an area that has risen against the occupation. The last tyre being thrown on to the pile displays the name 'Israeli Arabs'. The opening article beneath the cartoon is by Zvi al-Peleg, an expert on the Middle East who served for many years as a military governor of Arab areas and, later on, as ambassador to Turkey.[12] This article, which gives an analysis of the Israeli Arabs' relationship with the state of Israel, also contains concealed threats. For example, al-Peleg explains why, since the establishment of the state, Israeli Arabs have exercised restraint when other events in the Middle East before the *intifada* were potentially more explosive. Al-Peleg explains that Israeli Arabs usually refrained from overt expressions of protest for fear of upsetting the precarious coexistence maintained with the Jewish population. Later, however, he writes: 'Another factor that contributed to the state of equilibrium is the attitude to the Israeli Arab minority by the Jewish majority. This attitude made it clear to all that the Jewish majority

will not tolerate nationalist expressions from the Israeli Arab minority.' The article closes with a direct address to Israeli Arabs: 'In these difficult times it can only be hoped that within the Arab community reason will prevail over the recent outbursts of emotion. Relations with the Arab minority have to be a two-way thing: the state has obligations to its citizens, and likewise, citizens have obligations to their state.'[13]

The paper placed this article at the top of the articles page. This underlined the paper's efforts—probably made in consort with government bodies—to reduce the scale of protest, and to subdue Israel's Arab minority. This, while in the territories the uprising and the military response claimed the lives of many victims each day. It should be noted that these were the early days of the *intifada,* a time when the Israeli government had no understanding of the events unfolding, or of the direction they were taking. The uprising was wrongly assessed to be temporary only, as had been previous disturbances in the territories.

As it turned out, the 'Peace Day', declared by Israeli Arab leaders, turned into 'War Day', and threats in the Israeli press came to no avail. An article in *Yediot Ahronot* on 22 December 1987 (the day after the strike) cried: 'Black Day of "Peace" from Nazareth to Jaffa', which clearly expresses the shock felt in the wake of the nationwide, violent protests. A sub-headline ran: 'Expressions of nationalism in the Israeli Arab sector send shock waves through the political system'. The main headline issued a blatant threat: 'Rabin: We Will Impose Order Even If It Means Hurting'. This headline is in fact inaccurate and misinforming, in that it distorts the information in the body of the article, which quotes Rabin as saying that he will maintain order in the *occupied territories.* But the headline implies that Rabin threatened to clamp down on Arabs within Israeli borders as well, when in fact, as minister of defence, Rabin had no authority or power over areas within the Israeli borders; these fall under police control. His authority to enforce order extended only over the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip where Martial Law was in effect. The article's author makes no mention of Arab settlements in Israel, but *Yediot Ahronot* took the liberty to extend Rabin's threat also to the Arab citizens of Israel. This, we can assume, was done by *Yediot's* editors not only to reflect their own opinion, but also to express the pressure and panic that were felt in the political and professional elite who were responsible for the defence of the state. Panic can also be discerned in the sub-headline, which speaks of the shock felt by the political system on witnessing the level of disorder created by Israeli Arabs.

The severe shock to the authorities and to the political system is attributable to the many disturbing precedents set by the riots on 'Peace Day'. One of the foremost journalists in Israel, Danny Rubinstein, reporting from the occupied territories for *Davar,* anticipated the authorities' assessment that the events taking place in the occupied territories were part of a unique process, beyond previous experience. In an article on 25 December 1987 he claimed that the two weeks of

rioting in the territories, the general strike, the protests, and the blocking-off of roads by Israeli Arabs had set a number of precedents in the life of the state of Israel.[14] This fact is also hinted at by the main headline—'Not Since 1948'. The high death toll of Arabs from the occupied territories constituted the first precedent—according to official reports, 12 were killed. Although most of the victims were young men, Rubinstein lists among them 'children aged 11 and women up to the age of 51'. The presence of women and children among the victims was a new phenomenon. Violent riots prior to the *intifada* had been composed mostly of young men. Three further precedents that Rubinstein highlights directly concerned the Israeli Arabs: first, the general strike encompassed Israeli Arabs as well Arabs in the occupied territories; second, the blocking of roads; third, the extensiveness of the riots. Violent events occurred in Jaffa, Lod, Acre and Shefar'am. 'We haven't seen anything like this since 1948', remarks Rubinstein. He also relates his impressions of meetings with army officers and Israeli politicians, among whom, he says, the reaction was one of bewilderment and dismay. Such reactions are conveyed again in the leading article.

The participation in the riots by Arabs living in mixed cities also gave cause for extreme consternation. In Jaffa, for example, the main street was blocked and four Jewish students were injured by stone-throwers. Previously, citizens of Tel Aviv had felt distanced from violent events in areas with high Arab concentrations—the Galilee and the Triangle. In Israel, Tel Aviv is regarded as the most Jewish Israeli of cities, yet this did not make it immune from Israeli Arab rioting. Rubinstein does not mention all the precedents set on 'Peace Day'. *Al-Hamishmar,* 25 December 1987, widely reviews another precedent in an article which notes that for the first time Bedouins from the Negev took an active role within the general scope of the Arab protests. This included stoning vehicles carrying Jews on Negev roads.[15] Yet another precedent is discussed in *Ma'ariv.* Journalist Menachem Talmi, under the headline: 'Riots in Jaffa; Stone-Throwing in Abu Ghosh', sharpens the paper's right-wing message by drawing a comparison between the recent violence in Jaffa and the bloodshed and 'pogroms' against the Jewish minority that took place in the 1920s and 1930s.[16] Talmi cites the words of a citizen of Bat Yam, an outlying suburb of Tel Aviv and bordering Jaffa. His words are emphasized in large print within the body of the text:

> Arabs have blocked off Jaffa. What, pogroms here in Israel?—It must be a bad dream. My own brother Binyamin was nearly killed in 1921 when Arabs were massacring Jews just near the building for immigrant affairs. Good God what's happening to us? The last thing we need now is for the British to return.

As if this emotionally charged message aimed at reinforcing anti-Arab feeling among the Jewish readership were not enough, Talmi brings up a fourth

precedent. This was also set on 'Peace Day' when cars *en route* to Jerusalem were stoned in the Arab village of Abu Ghosh. Talmi points out that, in contrast to Arab villages that up to 1948 had surrounded it, Abu Ghosh never participated in activities against Jews: 'Abu Ghosh has never been witness to stone-throwing or shooting. Not in 1921, in 1929, nor in 1936.' In the War of Independence this island of peace offered refuge to Jews under attack by surrounding Arab villages. These villages were razed after the war. Only Abu Ghosh was left intact, but now, 'even in Abu Ghosh it rains stones'. This issue serves a dual function: first, by emphasizing Abu Ghosh as the least likely scene of violence, Talmi suggests the extreme level of intensity and ubiquity which Israeli Arab militancy has reached. Second, by distinguishing Abu Ghosh from other Arab villages, Talmi delivers the implicit warning that if it continues on the militant path, Abu Ghosh, like its one-time neighbours, will also be eliminated.

The shock caused by the 'Peace Day' violence was followed by severe censure from the more moderate elements of the political spectrum. On 23 December 1987, *Davar*—journal of the Labour Party, which was then part of the coalition government—printed an article, taking a strong stand against elements of the Israeli Arab leadership that condoned the rioting.[17] The warning addressed to the Arab leadership is, in this instance, explicit rather than implicit. Again a parallel is drawn between the stoning of Israeli vehicles on 'Peace Day' and 1948, which saw Arabs cut off transport routes by shooting at vehicles. The writer asks ironically if the Arab leadership intends to resort to the measures of 1948. This is followed by a rhetorical rejoinder: 'But will Israel tolerate the blocking of her main routes and big cities?'

Another important point is posed for the left. Ten years before the *intifada* the Labour Party's monopoly of power had been broken, the culmination of an increasing shift to the right in the Israeli public, owing especially to demographic changes in the Jewish population. Since this defeat the Labour Party had lost two further elections, and now that the riots had played into the hands of the right, who could assert the legitimacy of their opposition to a settlement with the Arabs —how was there room for negotiations when even the Arab citizens of Israel have become enemies? It is suggested here that the violent Israeli Arab protests sabotaged the attempts of the left to improve conditions and to secure equality for them, also that the violence undermined Israeli Arab support from the left while assisting their enemies on the right.

More blatantly, *Yediot Ahronot,* on 22 December 1987 (one day after the strike and riots), states in its report on the 'Black Day of Peace' that there is no difference between Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the occupied territories. Alongside the report is a large map indicating all the areas that saw rioting. The map demonstrates the extent of the turmoil from the Golan Heights in the north to the Negev in the south. Details of each disturbance are given by area. In Jaffa, for example: 'Four female Jewish students aged eleven were injured. Nineteen Arabs were arrested and one policeman severely beaten.' The areas of Shefar'am, Acre, the Golan Heights, Nazareth, Umm al-Fahm, the Triangle, Lod and the

Negev all appear on the map, but in order to illustrate the extent of the participation of both Israeli Arabs and Arabs from the occupied territories, the events which took place in Judea and Samaria and Gaza (occupied territories) are also included. The newspaper omits to draw in the 'Green Line', representing the border between Israel and the occupied territories, which serves to give the impression that the rioting is taking place all over the land of Israel.

The weekend papers from 25 December 1987 began assuming a new and completely different role. Warnings and threats ceased, and the focus shifted to the Israeli Arab population itself, revealing their distress and their difficult predicament. Meanwhile the media, consciously or not, allayed some Israeli Arab frustrations. Placing them at the centre of public agenda and media discourse, and allocating a platform in the media for the expression of their views, provided an outlet for some of the anger, and in this way helped to reduce the tension. The two most popular papers, *Ma'ariv* and *Yediot Ahronot,* devoted articles to this purpose.

Amos Levav, in *Ma'ariv,* interviewed Arabs from all parts of the country, wherein each interviewee expressed his feelings and attitudes. In these interviews the plight of the Arabs is emphasized by editorial subheadlines. A businessman: 'Financially I'm not too badly off. I can't complain. But the lack of freedom is a problem—I feel like an alien in Tel Aviv.' A student: 'No doors are open to me. I can't fulfil my dreams. I'm not dispirited, just very frustrated.' A teacher: 'There is both Palestinianization and assimilation. The Jews don't understand that we are already a part of this state.'[18]

Yediot Ahronot, on the same day, published an article under the headline: The Arabs Support a State, But Want to Live in Israel'.[19] It seems the Israeli Arabs were an enigma to the Israeli leadership and media alike. In the opening, the journalist Eli Tavor reiterates Yitzhak Shamir's speech where he summarizes his response to the riots: 'We, the Israeli people, were surprised and shocked'. Tavor claims that this surprise derives from ignorance and negligence. The Israeli Arab sector, according to Tavor, had up to that time hardly been researched—even in the last ten years research has been mostly confined to the academic sphere. It has yet to be taken up by executors of government policy or, so it seems, by the media. The media has also over looked the Israeli Arab factor by its neglect of Israel's social peripheries and margins—where the Arab communities have been placed, and where their populations have increased.[20] Tavor mentions the very surprising finding that Israeli Arabs want to form closer ties with Jews much more than do Jews with Israeli Arabs.

It is possible to trace in these articles how the media operated as a factor that served to create conformity and widen the national consensus to encompass the problematic sectors. The media tried to reconcile opposing groups by searching for common ground between them. A good example is presented by the picture accompanying the article by Eli Tavor in *Yediot Ahronot,* 25 December 1987. The picture shows a group of Arab-Israeli girls giving the Churchillian 'V' sign, a gesture which had been adopted by Arafat. The caption below reads: This week

in Arab streets: The attitude towards a Palestinian state resembles the pride of the American Jew in Israel'.[21]

In that same weekend Shlomo Nakdimon, one of *Yediot Ahronot's* political writers, emphasized yet another factor which might have served to divert Israeli Arab anger and frustration from the streets to more democratic forms of political action.[22] Quite possibly, this wasn't Nakdimon's intention. But, by focusing on the political power that Israeli Arabs wielded within a democratic framework, he could indeed have opened a window of hope. The article reviews the political achievements of the Israeli Arabs, and stresses the number of Arab parliamentary representatives since the establishment of the state. Nakdimon estimates their voting strength at ten potential parliamentary seats. Out of 120 seats ten does not appear very significant, but it is enough to swing the balance in the political stalemate between right and left. Nakdimon's reference to the Israeli Arabs' parliamentary option thus exposes their potential as a substantial force. MK Amnon Lin assumed, in this article, that when Arabs gain nine or ten seats, they would aspire to become the factor that would tip the scales in the coalitions' composition. This would enable the Labour Party to form a coalition without the Likud, but only 'in exchange for far-reaching steps in the direction of Arab nationalism'. According to Nakdimon, MK Lin fears that the Labour Party might be tempted to pursue this course. Lin's forecast was proved correct some years later by the Rabin-Peres government, which between 1992 and 1995 carried out far-reaching external and internal policies in respect of Palestinians, made possible by relying on the support of Arab MKs to break the impasse. The Oslo B agreement is one such political step that ran against the Jewish parliamentary majority.

The position of moderate Jews towards the riots is summarized in *Yediot Ahronot* by Avishi Margalit, on 27 December 1987.[23] He claims that some Israeli Arabs come to the demonstrations not only to identify with the suffering of their people—'a thing that is their moral duty, and their civil right'—but also to shift the uprising's sights to the Green Line: 'to exchange the ballot box for fire. To them and to ourselves it is time say "there is a limit"'.

'LAND DAYS' 1988 AND 1989

While memories of the 'Peace Day' rioting were still fresh, the media began to turn its attention to the possibility of similar outbursts on the approaching 'Land Day'. 'Land Day', commemorated by Arabs in Israel and in the territories, marks the bloodshed of 30 March 1976 when six Arabs were killed and tens of police and Arab residents injured during violent protests against land expropriations. On this annual event violence was predicted as a matter of course. The newspapers under review here, principally the leftist *Davar* and *al-Hamishmar,* began to speculate and to transmit pointed messages to the Israeli Arab population, two weeks prior to the anniversary.

As the mouthpiece of the Labour Party, *Davar* found itself in the awkward position of having to negotiate the fact that the defence minister charged with quashing the *intifada* was labourite Yitzhak Rabin. On 18 March 1988, *Davar* published an interview with Eli Reches, a senior researcher at the Dayan Center,[24] who is one of the few experts on Palestinian affairs. The following was emphasized by the editor at the opening of the interview: 'Due to the hostile activity of Israeli Arabs targeted at areas within the Green Line, the discussion on them as a security threat has been renewed.' Alongside the apparently factual information of the text, the perception of Arab Israelis as a security threat serves as an unequivocal warning to the Israeli Arab public. The implication is clear: a return to Martial Law in Arab villages and towns within Israel. This entails nightly curfews and especially the obligation for residents to carry a permit when exiting villages. In the body of the interview Reches remarks that since 1948 Israeli Arabs have been treated as a security threat and as a 'Fifth Column', manifest in the imposition of Martial Law. However, since over the years it has become obvious that Israeli Arabs do not constitute a security threat, the treatment of them as such has gradually ceased. Reches discerns a change that runs even deeper than the events of the 'Peace Day' would suggest. His perception is based on the number of sporadic outbursts of violence against targets within the Green Line since the 'Peace Day'. This, Reches claims, is what has reopened the discussion of the Israeli Arabs as a security threat. Further on Reches discusses the anticipated events of 'Land Day' and forecasts the possibility of violence, if Israeli Arab leaders call a strike on the same say. Again the editor stresses those sentences that send a message to the Israeli Arabs, for example: 'We are witness to a partial duplication of the uprising in the occupied territories by certain Israeli Arab elements. If a strike does take place on "Land Day" it may well lead to violent confrontation.'

This sub-headline transmits a clear message that violent outbursts on 'Land Day' will not be perceived as a domestic affair, as were previous Israeli Arab outbursts, but as an extension of the *intifada* into Israel. In simple terms, Israeli Arabs pose a very real threat to security, which means the necessity of a return to Martial Law. These messages should be viewed in light of the fact that Israeli Arabs, as distinct from Arabs in the occupied territories, had something to lose. Continued provocation would jeopardize all the gains that they had made over 40 years as Israeli citizens.

Al-Hamishmar—which represented the sector that carried the flag of coexistence —transmitted unequivocal messages in support of that cause. The editorial that appeared on the front page of the issue of 21 March 1988 attacked the decision by the Israeli Arab leadership to call a general strike on 'Land Day', claiming that it could 'seriously damage Jewish-Arab coexistence'.[25]*Al-Hamishmar* asserted that the violent events of 'Peace Day' played into the hands of the Israeli right, which now painted the Israeli Arab minority as an 'internal enemy'. The paper added: 'Right-wing voices already predominate and are trying to

exploit the opportunity created by an anti-Arab atmosphere to undermine Israeli Arab rights-Martial Law in the Galilee has already been suggested.'

A conciliatory proposal in *al-Hamishmar* that the Arab leadership refrain from violent measures was probably of some assistance to the defence. The message made it clear that if the proposal were not accepted the right wing would be in a stronger position to carry out the threat of Martial Law. On 24 March 1988 *al-Hamishmar* transmitted another 'educative' message, this time in an article by Arab journalist Kassem Zaid.[26] The sub-headline is in especially large print: The stand taken by the residents of Israeli Baqa El Gharbiya and Barta'a against the attempts of their Palestinian brothers to drag them into the uprising can set an example to all the Arab villages in Israel.'

The next day, 25 March 1988, two articles appeared in *al-Hamishmar,* one in the newspaper itself, the other in the weekly journal *Hotam.* The first article's headline constitutes a clear threat: '1936, 1948, 1988'.[27] Journalist Amiram Cohen proceeds to give a detailed list of disturbances within Israeli borders (we can assume that at least a portion of these was attributable to Israeli Arabs). Cohen also relates the experience of a 'kibbutznik friend' from the north of Israel and concludes that it would appear from the story that, owing to Arab harassment, travelling in northern Israel is a perilous undertaking. The father of this friend was apparently attacked while in his car near the village of Dabburiya by children throwing stones: 'All that Saturday my father, who is a Mapan veteran with many Arab friends in the Triangle, was depressed. He predicts that the tragedy of 1948 will be repeated.' To bring the message home the mysterious friend adds:

> I've decided that I won't live in my country enclosed. To this purpose I am willing to join Rafial [Rafial Etan] and Geola Cohen. As 'Land Day' nears, I call upon my Arab friends to restrain the extremists, otherwise there will be a conflagration. If you cannot distinguish between Israel and the occupied territories, or if you do not comprehend the difference, I predict that we will see more refugee camps. Do not put us in a position where we have no other alternative.

In other words, the left-wing party Mapam, friend of the Arabs, threatens that unless peace returns to the roads, it will join up with the extremists on the right—Geola Cohen and Rafial Etan, and it will also take an active part in the transferral of Israeli Arabs to refugee camps.

Al-Hamishmar's weekend supplement *Hotam* of the same day, 25 March 1988, contained an article called 'Land Consumed by Fire', which deals with the preparations for 'Land Day'.[28] This article contains a direct appeal to Israeli Arabs written by Zvi al-Peleg. Under the sub-headline 'My brothers, the Israeli Arabs' he urges Israeli Arabs not to sever the bond between Jew and Arab in Israel. The appeal is made with civility, and by a writer who presents himself as working for the Arab causes, namely assisting Muslims in regaining *waqf*

property, or helping refugees from the village of Ikirit return to their home. Al-Peleg lays before Israeli Arabs what he believes are the two alternatives open to them: 'We are brothers, not of the same people but of the same state; a state from which we will not expel you and from which you will not expel us. These options do not exist. The choices before you are—return to the path of coexistence, or resort to the gun, the stone and the Molotov cocktail.'

Al-Peleg makes it clear that expulsion is not an option. However, because Israeli Arabs knew him as a former military governor and orientalist researcher it is clear, reading between the lines, that the option of a return to Martial Law is very real.

'Land Day' passed, in the main, without incident. *Al-Hamishmar's* front-page editorial, 31 March 1988, praises Israeli Arabs for their relative restraint.[29] The editorial board also credits itself: 'It seems that the anxieties and preparations for the "Land Day" had a calming and moderating effect'. The paper claims that moderate and extreme forces in the Israeli Arab population are in a state of conflict, a fact also true for the Jewish population. The moderate factor constitutes the majority, which understands, Violence will bring them more harm than it will to Arabs in the occupied territories who have nothing to lose'.

On the eve of the following year's 'Land Day' 30 March 1989, the newspapers again mobilized to deter Israeli Arabs from violence. Shmuel Segev, *Ma'ariv's* expert on Arab affairs, wrote articles in the opinion section and the editorial.[30] The paper transmitted an extreme threat. Segev bluntly points out that, 'this is the first time since 1948 that Israeli Arabs have assisted those trying to undermine the stability of the state'. Segev disagrees that Israeli Arabs identify with Arabs from the territories as American Jews do with Jews from the USSR. According to Segev, the state of war between Israel and the Arab states as well as the PLO creates a distinction. Segev does not regard Israeli Arab protests against Israeli policy in the territories as legitimate, and he claims that Israeli Arabs exploit the law in order to express an emotionally felt identification with state enemies.

The main editorial, which appears on the front page, asserts even more threateningly that since the start of the *intifada* 'seeds of insurrection, lawlessness, and nationalistic crime have been revealed'. While acknowledging the slow pace of improvement in the conditions of Israeli Arabs, the article attributes this improvement to the feeling of Jews that Israeli Arabs' loyalty to the state was unquestionable. However, the recent display of nationalism and the active participation of 'a number of Israeli Arabs in terrorist organizations begins to create some strong antidotes amongst the Jewish population'. In order to eliminate hopes of a split in Jewish opinion the editorial makes it clear that 'there is a broad Jewish consensus, which encompasses the spectrum of Jewish society. This consensus is closer to Tzomet [Hawkish party extreme right] than it is to Ratz [Dovish liberal party]'.

On 'Land Day' *Ma'ariv* published an article with a headline which for the first time highlighted the Islamic Movement's appeal not to break the law on the

impending 'Land Day'.[31] The Islamic Movement was then a new and rising force. It would seem that *Ma'ariv's* editorial board (and perhaps governmental factors) influenced the Islamic Movement's appeal, seeing the Islamic leadership as an effective means of averting violent activity on 'Land Day'. The whip is raised, however, by the banner headline that informs readers that more than 5, 000 policemen are on the alert to suppress any disorder. Here also, an additional message is conveyed by the paper: that police will not enter villages where disorder does not break out.

In the event, 'Land Day' protests did not break the law and once again *Ma'ariv* praised Israeli Arab leadership. The headline of an article by Amos Gilboa (prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, 1986–88), asserts that the orderly protests on 'Land Day' are proof of the Arab leadership's control.[32] The paper also credits itself for having published the right headline on the previous day. The article goes on to say that on the Israeli Arab side, the Islamic Movement was the most instrumental factor in averting disorder on 'Land Day'.

The period between the 'Land Day' of 1988 (30 March), and the murder of seven Arab workers by a Jew, 20 May 1990—the fourth significant event—is characterized by a small number of isolated articles which deal with the *intifada's* encroachment into Israel. The articles refer to Arabs in the Galilee,[33] the residents of Taiybe,[34] and the Bedouin of the Negev.[35]

Unequivocal messages continued to be transmitted to the Israeli Arab population. For example, journalist Avner Regev in *al-Hamishmar,* 25 September 1989: 'If the Israeli Arabs intend putting their words into actions they ought to consider the sharp response of the Israeli public and government'.[36] To illustrate the point, Regev cites the speech of Labour Party agriculture minister, Avraham Katz-Oz in which he called for 'a kind of transfer' of Israeli Arabs from the Galilee to the central region and for the settling of Jews in their place, the objective of such a measure being to prevent the creation of a large concentration of Arabs in the area. The head of Naharia city council, Jacki Sabag, from the right-wing Likud Party, announced at this time that he would not permit Arabs to live in his city. Along with the 'stick' Regev also invokes the 'carrot' with the hope of inducing Israeli Arab conformity. He commends the political integration of Israeli Arabs: 'One should see this as a positive development…because it may serve to put a break upon the separatist notions which have recently taken root in certain sectors of the Israeli Arab population'. The integration of the Israeli Arabs into the political arena should be facilitated, according to Regev.

The leading article of *Yediot Ahronot's* weekend supplement, 28 July 1989, The Intifada Encroaches into the Galilee', presents a plethora of disturbing facts, figures and expressions of Arab nationalism:

In 1988, 655 records were opened in the Galilee: 162 cases of arson, 119 incidents of stone-throwing, 31 cases of blocking roads, 205 cases of daubing slogans and hanging Palestinian flags, 131 acts of sabotage. The first half of 1989 shows similar statistics. Also: the emergence of Intifada

summer schools and Intifada weddings; the distribution of nationalistic, anti-Israel videos in Western Galilee; 'In blood and in spirit we will free Palestine'. 'From Dir Hanna to Jenin' (We all of us are Palestine); the Galilee Arabs are forging the tools of a nascent state: a monitoring committee that includes Arab MPs, sub-committees, and activities to revive the Arabic language.[37]

Even more distressing was the announcement of the article's main argument:

> Tomorrow, in the face of the new threat, we will be sweating; the Intifada is creeping into the Galilee; Palestinian nationalism, Palestinian flags, terrorist attacks, and a form of Arab autonomy.
>   Jewish Galilee is dead. As a clear Arab majority prevails and flourishes the political establishment buries its head buried in the sand…296 thousand Israeli Arabs settled in the Galilee during the 1980s. 375 thousand in 1987—an increase of 27%.

This extract, which does not focus on a specific event, is the bluntest and most severe that our research revealed. It lays bare the facts to both Jews and Arabs alike, yet behind this particular construction of an Israeli Arab reality the article harbours another purpose. Employing the words of Arab leaders interviewed for the article, it suggests the expediency of setting up a Palestinian state. The Arab leaders' claim is that the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel will bring peace to the region.

   This climactic display of extremism, which was part of the process of Palestinianzation, was followed by other articles that suggested opposite trends. These articles also try to represent and encourage the conformist elements of the Israeli Arab population. *Yediot Ahronot,* 23 June 1989, published an article by Uzi Machnyemi about the prevailing atmosphere among Israeli Arabs.[38] The article served as a platform for the presentation of the Israeli Arabs' position and especially for the expression of their sense of discrimination and injustice. In this respect, we can concede that the article probably helped let off much pent-up steam that might otherwise have burst out in a much more violent manner. Next to the 'carrot', however, there was also the 'stick'. Under the headline '500 Subversive Acts', at the bottom of the same page, police data of subversive activity by Israeli Arabs is presented. The combination of the statistics and headline of the main article transmits a clear message to the Israeli Arabs. It should be stressed that at least part of the Israeli Arab population identified these messages in the Hebrew newspapers as emanating from the government.[39]

   The tendency to refute the belief of an encroachment of the *intifada* on to Israeli soil increased towards the end of 1989. In November *Ha'aretz* published an article containing the conclusions of six senior Israeli researchers, which argued that the *intifada* did not have an impact upon the willingness of Israeli Arabs to integrate with state institutions.[40] The headline, 'We Are Israelis First',

highlights the claim that the Israeli Arabs use their 'Israeliness' as a tool in their struggle for equality in Israel. A sub-headline within the body of the article asserts (citing one of the researchers) that the Israeli Arab modes of operation following the outburst of the *intifada* and the rise in extremism are 'precisely that of conformity'.

One month later, *al-Hamishmar* published an article by Arab journalist Kassem Zaid. Zaid conveys his impressions of interviews and researches, which are defined in the following sub-heading: 'The facts on the ground show us that the Israeli Arabs are not taking an active part in the Intifada, in fact, they see the preservation of the Green Line as fundamental to their national interest'.[41]

According to Kassem Zaid there is little fear of the *intifada* encroaching over the Green Line. This belief, he concludes, is grounded mainly in the fact that no distinct changes in the voting patterns of Israeli Arabs have occurred.

THE MURDERS IN RISHON LETZION OF SEVEN ARAB WORKERS

The optimistic assessment of the Israeli Arab position did not stand up to the trials which the Israeli Arabs had to face following the murders by Ami Popper, an Israeli soldier on leave. On 20 May 1990, Popper approached a site where Arab workers from the territories in search of work in Israel were congregated. He opened fire, killing seven and injuring eleven. The murders ignited the occupied territories and Arab settlements in Israel. The severity of the riots (and especially the fear that both Israeli Arabs and Arabs in the territories might use firearms) occasioned a state of alert, unprecedented within the Green Line.

The blatant threat of mobilizing soldiers rather than policemen against the citizens of Israel is again carried in *Ha'aretz,* 22 May 1990, by the main headline: 'Army Forces on Alert to Keep Order in the Green Line', and the sub-headline: 'Extensive riots in Israel's Arab settlements. Four Arabs killed and 166 injured in the occupied territories, according to Arab sources'. An analysis by *Ha'aretz's* military reporter, Ze'ev Schiff appears, in an exceptional case, on the front page of this issue, 22 May 1990.[42]Schiff transmits a direct message, from the defence establishment to Israeli Arabs, that the government and the defence establishment view with severity the prominence of Islamic elements among those responsible for the breakdown in order. Although reluctant to mobilize defence forces, the government will undertake to do this if Israeli Arab rioting continues. He emphasizes the fact that Israeli Arabs' support of the *intifada* only serves to affirm to their brothers in the occupied territories, and especially to the PLO leadership, the contribution made by Israeli Arabs to the *intifada.* On behalf of the defence establishment Schiff attempts to deter violent reactions to the murders by reminding the Israeli Arab public that 'Over the last two years PLO leadership has displayed caution by not encouraging Israeli Arabs to adopt the *intifada'*. Schiff concludes that the extremist voices have predominated among the Israeli Arab public and have been followed by many. In

contrast to his conclusion, however, Schiff elsewhere makes the assumption that although Israeli Arabs identified entirely with the *intifada,* 'only a few were willing to join the stream of violence'.

An analysis by another expert, Shmuel Toledano, in the same publication expresses his amazement at the restraint exercised by Israeli Arabs over the last two years.[43] The violence in the wake of the murders is not perceived by Toledano as an Arab-Israeli *intifada,* but rather as a one-off outburst. This drew a distinction between violent reactions to one event or other and the *intifada* itself.

Some days after this publication, Schiff brought out another article titled 'The Israeli Arabs Are No Longer a Bridge to Peace'.[44] A sub-headline in the body of this article expresses Schiff's stance, while at the same time representing *Ha'aretz's* dovish editorial board: The continued occupation and bloody confrontation in the occupied territories will eventually bring a violent uprising to areas within the Green Line; this will mean a confrontation between the state of Israel and its Arab minority'. Herein we find a revealing editorial alteration, for in the main text Schiff does not use the phrase 'to areas within the Green Line' but the phrase 'to within Israeli borders'. Apparently the editor saw fit to express his or perhaps the editorial board's position by reviving the term 'Green Line'-a term which the Israeli government had sought to adopt since the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following the Six Day War.

This article also transmits a clear message to the Israeli Arab leadership:

> If the Arab minority is persuaded by those attempting to incite an Intifada on Israeli soil, those voices will be heard which seek to block Israeli Arab progress, and damage their rights, including their electoral right. Up to now, democracy has defended Israeli Arabs and opened up new opportunities for them. They must be very cautious, therefore, that their activities do not break the democratic frame.

Schiff adds that if the *intifada* is duplicated in Israel the right wing would claim that the struggle is over the whole, including Haifa and the Wadi Arra and that, therefore, giving up the occupied territories is pointless. Schiff's purpose here is to steer Israeli Arab activities back into legal channels. Two threats are applied to this end: that continued violent activity will damage Israeli Arab gains, and that violent activity will play into the hands of the right and damage the chance for the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the occupied territories. This second threat operates according to the same principle—if the struggle is over the whole, giving up a part is pointless. Thus, if Israeli Arabs continue violent activity that reinforces the claims of the Israeli right, they damage rather than assist the interests of their brothers in the occupied territories.

The response to Schiff's argument can be found in an article published by Sofian Cabha about a month later.[45] The writer argues that an Israeli Arab *intifada* does not exist, and that only on the day of demonstrations against the murder of the seven Arab workers did the Israeli Arabs identify completely with

the Arabs in the occupied territories. On this day the existence of the Green Line was, erased from the Israeli Arab consciousness. The next day, however, it was built anew. According to Cabha, the Israelis themselves are responsible for inviting the *intifada* into the Green Line, although it was born in the occupied territories and will continue until peace prevails. Israeli Arabs are continuing a twofold struggle: on an external level they are assisting in the establishment of an independent entity in the occupied territories, and on an internal level they are fighting for equal rights in Israel. Of these two, Israeli Arabs tend to view the struggle for equal rights in Israel as more crucial, says Cabha. In his opinion, the Israeli authorities' response to the demonstrations in Arab streets is expressed in threatening language: 'We will bring back Martial Law, we will clamp down hard'. Cabha's insights as an Israeli Arab confirm that the threats transmitted in the newspapers were understood and absorbed by the Israeli Arab population.

THE RIOTS AT TEMPLE MOUNT

Another significant event (the fifth), on 8 October 1990, brought severe Israeli Arab rioting in its wake. During the rioting, unprecedented at the holy site of the Temple Mount, 19 Arabs were killed and 140 injured by the Israel Defence Forces. One of the victims was an Israeli Arab. The next day, 9 October 1990, *Ha'aretz* came out with the following headline: After Temple Mount, Wave of Rioting and Rage among Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the Occupied Territories Feared'. The sub-headline reads: 'Large police and army deployment. Jewish taxi driver murdered by gunshot near Abu Ghosh; findings of police examination are to be filed tomorrow'. Appearing only in small print, another sub-headline informs readers that 'According to police data, ten Arabs killed and 140 Arabs and twenty Jews injured in yesterday's bloody scenes'. The newspaper's decision to express fears of rioting, rather than focusing on the violent events of the previous day, can be attributed to the fact that the major facts surrounding the events had already been transmitted to the public by the electronic media. The editorial board perhaps wanted to pre-empt the electronic media by anticipating further rioting on the following day—that is, the day of the paper's publication. A second possibility is that the newspaper, rather than sensationalizing the Temple Mount incident, preferred to play it down. The newspaper may have chosen to serve the interests of the defence establishment by emphasizing fears and the possible scenarios in the event of further rioting. If so, the newspaper was fully justified in devoting most of the item not to a description of the Temple Mount violence, but to the information relayed by the defence establishment on the deployment of police and army in the territories and within Israel.

This style of journalism, we can assume, attempted to deter at least moderate Israeli Arabs from violence and disorder. In the body of the main news item we read that:

Police fear further violent outbursts among Israeli Arabs—more severe even than that seen after the murders in Rishon Letzion. Police are preparing for a nationwide state of emergency, army leave is cancelled, and recruits are being sent to reinforce police. Since the morning forces have been mobilizing and a state of alert has been declared. Border patrols and terrorists combat units have been stationed in the Jerusalem vicinity, the North and the Triangle where severe rioting took place after the murder in Rishon Letzion.

The day after the rioting and demonstrations, 10 October, the vice-mayor of Nazareth, Ramez Jarasi, was interviewed.[46] Jarasi expresses his opinion about the riots on Temple Mount and the Israeli Arab disorders. He takes the opportunity provided by this platform to attack government policy, which he claims led to the Temple Mount incident.

A similar accusation appears in an article in *Davar,* 19 October 1990.[47] Here too, Muhamed Chalilia, an Israeli Arab, attacks government policy, not only that which led to the Temple Mount incident, but also that which neglects the Israeli Arab population. Chalilia also heavily criticizes Israeli TV for, he claims, its inaccurate reporting of the events at the Temple Mount. Jordanian broadcasts, which transmitted a lot of live footage of the event, were much more accurate in his opinion. Chalilia claims that live footage, censured by Israeli TV, was broadcast by Jordanian TV: The Jordanians broadcast repeatedly footage of a police officer throwing tear gas between the legs of the old Mufti of Jerusalem, Alshech Saed Aldeen Alalame. Not surprisingly it is often possible to see film of the assistant chairman of the Islamic council, Sheik Muhammed Algamel, being led to the courts that were to prolong his trial'. However, Chalilia's criticism that 'the Jordanian TV was, this time, a much more reliable source for news' is a severe one, since Israel claims—to Israeli Arabs and Arabs of all the Middle-Eastern countries—that it is the only democracy in the region and the only country that supports a reliable and free press, thus also the only reliable source of news in the region.

On 14 December 1990, *Davar* published an article that was a kind of summary of the processes undergone in the Israeli Arab population during the three years of the *intifada.*[48] The article's principal claim is that rather than bringing about a transition among Israeli Arabs, the *intifada* sped up processes which had already begun. Researcher Eli Reches illustrates Israel's duality and uncertainty towards Israeli Arabs and to their relationship to the *intifada:* 'The intifada is only a prompt. The political system of the Arab sector in Israel is in the midst of an organizational shake-up, in which it is trying to find its way wrestling with things unconnected to the intifada'.

Running contrary to Reches' conclusion, the article itself includes another story, which represents the Israeli Arab public as one acting on behalf of, and giving vast amounts of support to, their brothers in the occupied territories: 'the tightening of ties between Israeli Arabs and Arabs of the occupied territories is

one distinct phenomenon prompted and reinforced by the intifada. This closeness is not insignificant'. This article provides a reliable illustration of what occurred among the Israeli Arabs during the *intifada*. It can be assumed that Israeli Arabs who read the article were encouraged to continue their conformist activities.

SUMMARY

From an analysis of the publications in Hebrew-language newspapers during the first three years of the *intifada* it is possible to trace the shift in stance taken by the papers. This is especially so during times and events in which there was fear of losing control over the Israeli Arabs. It is possible to identify strong ties between the defence establishment and the newspapers' editorial boards, which collaborated by transmitting its messages to the Israeli Arabs. It is also possible to discern the recurring pattern of this role. The distinct component of this pattern is the transmission of warnings to Israeli Arabs that they act and protest only within a legal framework. Added to these warnings are other messages and threats, which aim to make it clear to Israeli Arabs that they stand to lose what gains they have made since the withdrawal of Martial Law from their settlements in the early 1960s. Usually, after each event, the newspapers also provided a platform for the presentation of the Israeli Arab position in respect of the issues surrounding the event. This served to assuage frustrations. Except in those moments of crisis, dealt with in this article, the Israeli Arabs did not receive significant media coverage during the period covered by this research.

NOTES

1. T.Liebes, *Reporting the Arab-Israeli Conflict: How Hegemony Works,* London and New York, 1977.
2. I.Roeh and R.Nir, 'Reporting the Intifada in the Israeli Press: How Mainstream Ideology Overrides "Quality" and "Melodrama"', in A.A.Cohen and A.Wolfsfeld (eds.), *Framing theIntifada: People and Media,* Norwood, 1993, pp. 176–91.
3. E.Reches, 'The Arabs in Israel and the Intifada', in R.O.Freedman (ed.), *The Intifada: ItsImpact on Israel, the Arab World and the Superpowers,* Miami, 1991, pp.343–69. A. Bligh, 'The Intifada and the New Political Role of the Israeli Arab Leadership', *Middle EasternStudies,* Vol.35, No.1 (Jan. 1999), pp.134–64. N.Rouhana, 'Palestinians in Israel: Responses to the Uprising', in R.Brynen (ed.), *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of thePalestinian-Israeli Conflict,* Boulder, CO, San Francisco and Oxford, 1991, pp.97–117. M. al-Haj, 'The Impact of the Intifada on Arabs in Israel: The Case of a Double Periphery', in Cohen and Wolfsfeld, *Framing the Intifada,* pp.64–75.
4. Z.Schiff and El Yaari, *Intifada,* Tel Aviv, 1990, p.12 (in Hebrew).
5. Ibid.
6. Reches, 'The Arabs in Israel and the Intifada', pp.346–7.

7. Population count in Israel in 1987 was 4,368,900. Non-Jews were 781,700, or 17.89 per cent: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Israel Statistical Annual Report,* Jerusalem, 1988.
8. *Yediot Ahronot,* 20 Dec. 1987.
9. Dan Caspi and Yechiel Limor claim that *Ma'ariv* exhibited a more nationalistic tone 'closer to that of the Likud', and followed its own ideological notions which were not in tune with the Zionist line. On the other hand, *Yediot Ahronot* was more pluralistic and open to a variety of opinions. D Caspi and Y. Limor, *The Mediators: The Mass Media in Israel 1948–1990,* Tel Aviv, 1992, pp.60, 62 (in Hebrew).
10. Editorial article: 'The Israeli Arab Strike', *Ma'ariv,* 21 Dec. 1987.
11. A.Kizel, *Yediot Ahronot, 2* Dec. 1987.
12. Z.al-Peleg, 'Where Will the Tyres Burn?', *Yediot Ahronot*, 21 Dec. 1987.
13. Ibid.
14. D.Rubinstein, 'Maybe This Is the Next War' *Davar,* 25 Dec. 1987.
15. S.Yechimovitch, 'We Have Succeeded, Now They Too Hate', *al-Hamishmar, 25* Dec. 1987.
16. M.Talmi, 'Riots in Jaffa, Stone in Abu Ghosh', *Ma'ariv,* 25 Dec. 1987.
17. Unsigned article, 'The Map Has Been Changed', *Davar,* 23 Dec. 1987.
18. E.Levav, 'The PLO Represents the Palestinian People on Both Sides of the Green Line', *Ma'ariv,* 25 Dec. 87.
19. A.Tavor, *Yediot Ahronot*, 25 Dec. 87.
20. See A.Avraham, 'Developing Cities in the Newspaper', and 'Media and Reality', in *TheMedia in Israel: Central and Peripheral,* Tel Aviv, 1993, pp.27–60, 131–6.
21. See also H.Margalit, 'We Are from Jaffa', *al-Hamishmar,* 27 Dec. 1987.
22. S.Nakdimon, 'Equal To Ten Mandates', *Yediot Ahronot,* 25 Dec. 1987.
23. A.Margalit, 'Crossing the Border', *Yediot Ahronot*, 27 Dec. 1987.
24. D.Avidan, 'One Dead in Tul-Karen; Wake in Castle', *Davar,* 18 March 1988.
25. 'A Wrong Decision', *al-Hamishmar,* 21 March 1988.
26. K.Zaid, 'Separated Only by the Wadi', *al-Hamishmar,* 24 March 1988.
27. A.Cohen, '1936, 1948, 1988', *al-Hamishmar,* 25 March 1988.
28. G.Cogen, 'Land Consumed by Fire', *al-Hamishmar—Hotam,* 25 March 1988.
29. Editorial article, 'Land Day: Positive Sign', *al-Hamishmar,* 31 March 1988.
30. S.Segev, 'Unveiling the Disguise', *Ma'ariv,* 29 March 1989. Editorial article: 'Land Day', *Ma'ariv, 29* March 1989.
31. 'Heads of the Islamic Movement Appeal Not To Break the Law', *Ma'ariv,* 30 March 1989.
32. A.Gilboa, 'Calm as Proof of Islamic Leaders' Control over the Arab Sector', *Ma'ariv,* 31 March 1989. Amos Gilboa was prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs in 1987 and 1988.
33. A.Ringle Hoffman, 'The Intifada Encroaches into the Galilee', *Yediot Ahronot,* 28 July 1989.
34. E.Benziman, 'Behind the Sandscreen', *Ha'aretz* , 9 Sept. 1988; A. Rabinovich, 'The Intifada Encroaching into Tibes', *Ma'ariv,* 4 April 1990.
35. E.Lipshits, 'The Bedouin Intifada, Blue and White', *al-Hamishmar,* 26 May 1989.
36. A.Regev, 'Pushed into the Corner', *al-Hamishmar,* 25 Sept. 1989.
37. Ringle Hoffman, 'The Intifada Encroaches into the Galilee'.

38. A.Machnyemi, 'The Fear of Losing Gains, Overrides Rage', *Yediot Ahronot,* 23 June 1989.

39. Personal interview with Dr Mustafa Cabha, 10 July 1999.

40. A.Nir, 'We are Israelis First', *Ha'aretz,* 10 Nov. 1989.

41. K. Zaid, 'The Keepers of the Green Line', *al-Hamishmar,* 10 Dec. 1989.

42. Z.Schiff, 'Israeli Arabs Support the Intifada', *Ha'aretz,* 22 May 1990.

43. S.Toledano, 'The Surprising Restraint Displayed by Israeli Arabs over the Last Two Years', *Ha'aretz,* 22 May 1990.

44. *Ha'aretz,* 25 May 1990.

45. S.Cabha, 'There Is No Intifada in Israel', *Ha'aretz,* 29 June 1990.

46. G.Allon, 'Discussion of the Day with Ramez Jarasi', *Ha'aretz,* 10 Oct. 1990.

47. M.Chalilia, 'The Israeli Arabs Blame the Government But without Legal Recourse', *Davar* 19 Oct. 1990.

48. Miri Paz, 'When It Hurts Them It Hurts Us—The Intifada and the Israeli Arabs', *Davar,* 14 Dec. 1990.

The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel: The Arab Media Perspective

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The Arab citizens' status in the state of Israel demands clarification both in respect of definition of terms and by a review of issues arising out of a chronological sequence of events. The phrase Arab media' also requires definition for the parameters of the discussion in this article. The main intention of this article is to deal not only with continuity and change within a certain sector of a given society, but also to try to analyse how this continuity and change have been perceived by the Arab media, over a period of about 50 years (since 1948). The lines of these two main strands of discussion are not necessarily parallel. Most of the insights from the media are retrospective, and the Arab media itself has gone through tremendous changes in various respects.

Arab citizens of Israel are defined as those Arabs who remained within the boundaries of the newly born state of Israel in 1948, and their descendants. After the 1948 war they were recognized as Israeli citizens, holding Israeli identity cards and passports. Under the heading 'Nationality' in the ID card is written 'Arab', while Jews are described as 'Jew'. Over the years there have been many changes in the self-determination of Arab citizens in Israel, both in the way they see themselves as well as how they are seen by others. Most of the time, scholars like to focus on the identity problem,[1] but there are of course other issues too. The decision of a state, which was just recovering from a bitter war of independence (against five Arab countries), and had just started absorbing Holocaust survivors (only a few years back), to adopt as its citizens a big Arab population whose own brothers were fellow Arabs living around Israel's borders in countries that were in a perpetual state of war with Israel, was based on two Israeli assumptions:

1. The Arabs in Israel would be loyal to the state in spite of the fact that they had relatives (sometimes brothers and sisters) across the border in a state of war with their own country (where most of the population was non-Arabs).

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   2. Arab citizens would go through a process of integration with Jewish citizens, which would enable them in time to be a living bridge for peace with the state's neighbours.

Those assumptions dictated the relationship between the state and its Arab citizens from then on. From the Arabs' point of view it was strange to be part of a Jewish state that was in a permanent state of war with their Arab neighbouring brothers. At the same time, the Arabs across the border were very suspicious of their brothers who had stayed under the Zionist regime. These intense inter-Arab feelings had ups and downs during the years and underwent many changes on both sides. The Arab media has dealt extensively with such issues, as has other literature. Later on, this article will elaborate on the role of culture in the Arab media.[2]

   The identity problem is emphasized because it cannot be considered in the usual majority-minority paradigm but rather in the 'circle system': namely, a minority (Arab citizens in Israel) inside a minority (Jews of Israel inside the Arab Middle East) inside a majority (Arabs in the entire Middle East). Culturally, this phenomenon is extremely important because it impacts directly on the inner minority as well as the outside majority while the bigger minority (the Jews of Israel) are in between. There are two main implications:

   1. The Arab minority within Israel is influenced by the outer 'circle' of the region *(vis-à-vis* political-cultural-social affairs) and not only by the immediate circle (Israeli domestic affairs).
   2. The Arab majority (outside) relates to the Arab minority (inside) according to their mutual interests, which are not necessarily based on relations with the state of Israel as such.[3]

There is a historical sequence of events that the Arabs in Israel consider as crucial (or at least very important) from their point of view. First, there was the *Nakba* ('disaster') of the 1948 war, which brought them to be a minority in a Jewish state. In their eyes the elite ran away or were expelled and therefore they were left without leadership. Between 1948 and 1956 they had to stand firm in order not to lose their houses and lands and to cooperate with the government in order to preserve their rights. From the Israeli point of view there was a humane element in not forcing the Arabs to join the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) as the Jews (and later on Druzes and Cherques) are required to do, since it would put Arabs in an impossible position, with relatives on the other side of the border during a state of war in the area. Because of these circumstances there was Martial Law in the heavily populated Arab areas (Galilee, the Triangle) until 1966. By that date the economic situation and educational developments had enabled the Arabs to be more integrated into Israeli society; moreover, they were cut off from their fellow Arabs across the border.

Then came the tumult of the Six Day War (1967). The major Israeli victory over three leading Arab countries, and the occupying of new territories, opened up the possibility for Israeli Arabs to revisit ties with their Palestinian Arab brothers. But the period between 1948 and 1967 is very significant in the relations between the Arabs inside and those outside, a significance that was expressed in the Arab media and literature. The 'Outsiders' view of the 'Insiders' was that they were cowards who were afraid to leave in 1948 and remained as traitors and collaborators with the Zionist authorities, or (in the kinder interpretation) ignored them.[4] According to Sahlieh's terminology, these were 'the decades of indifference and neglect'.[5]

The Insiders felt very uncomfortable with their Outsider brothers' attitude. Because of this embarrassment, the so-called '48-Arabs developed ways to persuade fellow Arabs from outside that they *had* to 'play the game' as a minority and to be considered by the Israelis as 'the moderate camp'.[6] One way of achieving this was to emphasise their links with the land and to write about this. This genre of writing came to be called 'the land literature'.[7] The more extremist Insiders had founded the political group known as al-Ard ('the Land') in the late 1950s. Later on some of this group's leaders became well known: Muhammad Mi'ari—member of Knesset (MK); Sabri Jiryis—the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) research centre in Beirut. In the early 1970s the Insiders developed other ways to deal with their situation: they retaliated against the criticism of the Outsiders, or even attacked them for their lack of criticism.[8]

One criticism by Outsiders against the '48-Arabs or 'Israeli Arabs' (Arabs *fi-dakhil*—from within) was that they lacked leadership. During the 1950s and 1960s that situation created some local leadership, such as the organization known as Abna al-Balad ('Sons of the Village') as well as al-Ard and other '48-Arabs, based on their deep links with the land. That was the beginning of new leadership-building by poets, writers and intellectuals.[9] The process of leadership-building came into political being in the mid-1970s.[10]

After the end of military rule in 1966, as the Arabs came to know their role in the Israeli democracy, they saw the possibility of expressing their views. The events of 1967, the war and its results regarding the relationships between Arabs within and outside, increased the self-confidence of the '48-Arabs. There was a burgeoning of writers, poets, journalists and political leaders.[11] When Emile Habibi, a communist activist, a writer and for many years MK, established the literature section of the daily *al-Ittihad* newspaper, which he called *al-Jadid,* all the leading writers got their first chance to publish there. Besides Habibi himself there were Mahmoud Darwish, Samih al-Qasim and others.

The combination of great talent in literature and the commitment to the Arab cause created an important showcase for national journalism with a high quality of writing. Habibi himself edited *al-Ittihad* for many years. Since the Communist Party was considered an 'Arab national' party (by both Jews and Arabs) and *al-Ittihad* was affiliated to the party, it was considered the Arab national newspaper

of the Insider Arabs.[12] (It is still the only daily in Arabic affiliated to the party, but is no longer the authentic representative it was till the mid-1970s.)

Fouad Ajami's analysis pays careful attention to the special symbiosis between culture and journalism in the Arab world.[13] According to Ajami this symbiosis is not merely a utopian ideal, but part of the reality that existed in the media patterns of the Arab world. It's vital to be aware of these patterns in order to understand how this particular media operates. Ajami gives some interesting examples, for instance the sharp criticism and protest by the famous poet of Syrian origin, Nizar Qabani, against the Arab world as a consequence of the death of his beloved wife Balkis in an explosion at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut, where she had worked.[14] Another example is the Kuwaiti poet, Dr Suad al-Sabah, who protested on several occasions in the Arab international daily *al-Hayat* (4 December 1990, 4 January 1991 and 6 February 1991).[15]

Ajami goes into details describing the implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which involved Arab families with members on both sides of the border. Majdi Abu-Warda, who was blown up in a bus in Jerusalem (25 February 1996), was the uncle of Fatima Abu-Warda, a poet—who lives near Wadi Qelt (West Bank), the family originating from Haifa. In that regard he mentions also Fawaz al-Turki from Wadi Nisnas (Haifa), the Jewish-Arab terror network (with the Israeli Udi Adiv),[16] and the overall perception of inter-Arab relations by the Arab media in a new light, totally different from the one of the 1960s and 1970s.

In this article, instead of describing in detail the events since the mid-1970s, we will concentrate on some milestones that are significant to our discussion.[17]

The new element that started to penetrate in the early 1980s was the Islamic factor.[18] The terminology of the 'land' (poets of the land—like Muhammad Nafa' or the al-Ard group) reached its peak in the 'Land Day' on 30 March 1976. At the beginning of the 1980s, identity issues were emphasized, and by the 1990s the leading slogan was 'peace and equality'—peace with the Arab neighbours outside and equality for the Insider Arabs with the Jews.

The main chronological milestones since 1967 are: the War of Attrition; the 1973 War; the 'Land Day' 1976; Sadat's visit, 1977, and the peace with Egypt; the invasion of Lebanon, 1982; the *intifada* since 1987; Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait; and the peace process since the early 1990s.[19] The last stage and a significant one is the *intifada al-Aqsa* which started in October 2000, and has had dramatic influence on the Insider Arabs. The fact that there were 13 Arab victims in Israel during the events of October 2000 has had a major impact on the Arab-Jewish discourse in Israel. All these events were covered very closely by the Arab media.

Apart from the 'Land Day' all the events listed above are the impact of the 'outside' circle on the domestic Arab sector in Israel. From 1967 onwards the '48-Arabs were concerned with their own issues within the state and focused on identity issues; demands of equality *vis-à-vis* the Jews;[20] and protests against Jewish immigrants—a subject which later on became an overall Arab issue.[21] Here

we find the Arab media represents the various Arab opinions regarding the Insider Arabs.

For the purposes of this article the Arab media is categorized into four groups that contain all components of the media—electronic, broadcast and written—in the Arabic language. They are all considered mass media:

1. The domestic media—all communications that operate within Israel's borders.
2. The Palestinian media—the immediate media ring around the Arab citizens of Israel.
3. The Arab media—the media in the Arab neighbouring countries in the Middle East.
4. The Arab international media—Arab media that is based outside the Middle East but originated first and foremost for the Middle East media consumers.

THE DOMESTIC MEDIA

The oldest newspaper published in Israel (founded before the state's independence) is the daily *al-Ittihad.* As stated above, this Arabic-language newspaper has always been identified with the Israeli Communist Party (under all its names during the years: Maki, Rakah, Hadash, etc), and its platform is mainly political-social-economic. The principle focus at first was the domestic problems of Arabs in Israel. Since the Communist Party was considered an Arab national party (both by Jews and Arabs in Israel) this newspaper was a very authentic representative of these Arab national views till the mid-1970s.[22]

The development of mass media in Israel during the 1980s brought the establishment of two new papers: *al-Sinarah* and *Kul al-Arab,* both published in Nazareth. Alongside a big improvement of the Israeli economy, these newspapers covered factual information with interpretations that emphasized Arab sector issues, namely political, social and economic. An important dimension was the Arab world and its connection to the Arabs in Israel.

The commercial side is important. Both papers play a large part in publicizing all types of products to consumers—*al-Sinarah* has its own publicity section while *Kul al-Arab* works with the *al-Bustani* office in Tel Aviv. Their approach, which is to be both commercial and profitable as well as put forward the newspapers' opinions, is different from that of *alIttihad* which—being affiliated to the Communist Party—is committed to a well-defined editorial viewpoint. Since the mid-1980s *al-Sinarah* has taken the lead by providing truly informative 'freedom of expression' within the Arab sector, which has provoked many people in that sector as it has dealt with delicate political-social issues.[23] Most Arab readers read at least one or more Hebrew newspapers on a daily basis or listen to Israeli radio and watch Hebrew TV In that way, the Arab reader or viewer in Israel receives his information from both Jewish and Arab Muslim sources with all their ideologies. The nature of papers such as *al-Ittihad* is

different from *al-Sinarah* and *Kul al-Arab* in the sense that the latter two want to succeed and be profitable, while *al-Ittihad* always follows the party line—whatever political situation the party faces.

The openness of, and easy access, to, the Hebrew media caused the Arab newspapers continually to update their perspectives in order to deal with somewhat delicate issues, even somewhat sensationalist ones. This, together with the commercial side, might make Arab readers feel that those two *(Kul al-Arab and al-Sinarah)* papers could get to a point of 'yellow' journalism. The Arab reader in Israel, who is basically highly educated with a very sharp political and social awareness, does not like seeing the newspapers deal with scandals that revolve around sex or corruption merely for the principle of 'the right of the public to know'.

As stated earlier, part of the criticism of the Arab minority came during the 1950s and 1960s when they lost their political-cultural leadership. Only during the 1970s did the Arabs *fi-dakhil* (from within) or '48-Arabs start to build their leadership.[24] Usually editors and leading writers were intellectuals or leading figures in the cultural field, mainly writers and poets. When Emile Habibi established *al-Jadid,* all the leading forces in literature, including Samih al-Qasim, Mahmoud Darwish, and later on the poet Siham Da'ud and others, contributed articles.[25]

The combination of great talent in literature and the commitment to the Arab cause had created an important showcase for national journalism with high-quality writing. As well as Habibi editing *al-Ittihad* for many years, Samih al-Qasim still edits the newspaper *Kul al-Arab*.[26] These circumstances help explain why two established newspapers, *al-Yawm* and *al-Anba'a* discontinued publication at the end of the 1970s. Party pamphlets also ceased after their writers' political activity ceased (either in the Knesset or extra-parliamentary) for example *al-Watan* of the 'Progressive Movement for Peace' led by Muhammad Mia'ri or *al-Sirat* of the Islamic Movement during the 1980s. The same is true of a very small fraction of the Islamic groups like *al-Wa'i* centred in Jat village.

During the 1990s the communications market in Israel was opened to cable TV, satellite and local radio stations. Since Israeli TV has a few hours in Arabic (according to the Arabs too little and too biased against them) every day (including news) and Israeli radio has a special broadcast in Arabic, the new Arab consumer can choose his favourite source (in Arabic, as well as in Hebrew). Through the cable system, the viewer can gain access to the channels of the Syrian, Egyptian, Lebanese or Jordanian TV and newspapers. (There used to be local radio in Arabic, 'Radio 2000', which, however, closed down owing to a failure to fulfil the requirements of the local radio authority in Israel.)

Intellectuals who are political leaders and play a role in the field of media have been influenced by the example of the newspaper *Fasal alMakal.* This newspaper was established by Dr Azmi Bisharah (later on MK) as a cultural-political pamphlet that later formed his political platform's mouthpiece. It was intended to be a newspaper for the intelligent Arab reader, dealing with daily life

issues and the socio-political arena as well as inter-Arab relations in the pan-Arab tradition. Bisharah is still one of its supporters.[27] The growing success of the Islamic Movement in neighbouring societies was felt across the spectrum, from the Rakah Communist Party to the Islamic Movement in Israel. During the 1980s *alSirat* was their representative newspaper. However, since the 1980s *Sautal-Haqwa al-Huriyya* has become the formal mouthpiece of the Islamic Movement in Israel.[28] There are few other small Arab papers with a local character, such as *Panorama,* but none of them is daily.

Having stated that the status of the Arabs has changed during the last 50 years or so, and also the status of the Arab media, it would be interesting to look at a central issue for the Arab sector in Israel, through the eyes of the media: the behaviour of the Arabs in Israel during the *intifada.*

As the only daily newspaper, *al-Ittihad,* the mouthpiece of the Israeli Communist Party—pictured in the consciousness of Israeli citizens (both Jews and Arabs) as an 'Arab' party—has been an authentic representative for the socio-political platform of the Arab citizens, expounding their agenda and expectations.[29] The mid-1970s was a watershed for Arabs with regard to fundamental issues such as identity and their role in the state, as well as with regard to the process of Arabs moving from marginality to influence.[30] Such a process cannot be ignored by the media. 'Palestinization' grew stronger,[31] and had consequences for Arabs' relations with the Palestinians.

The coverage of events such as the *intifada* or the 'Land Day' demonstrates well the workings of the Arab media in its different categories. Having dealt with the Arab media within Israel (the first category), this article now turns to the three other categories of Arab media.

THE PALESTINIAN MEDIA

Traditionally, in the past, the Palestinian media has consisted of periodicals such as *al-Hadaf, Filastin al-Thawra, Dirasat Filastiniya* and *Shu'unFilastiniya.* During the 1980s the leading newspapers were *al-Fajar* and *alQuds* (which is still being published today). The newspapers affiliated to the Palestinian Authority are *al-Ayam* and *al-Hayat al-Jadida.* In addition there are the Palestinian radio and TV stations and the Palestinian news agency WAFA.

The Palestinian media used to be a 'recruited' one,[32] serving national goals. When the decision was made to view Insider Arabs as part of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian media urged the Insiders to exercise their voting rights in order to increase their parliamentary representation in the Knesset.[33]

The events of the 'Land Day' (30 March 1976) had demonstrated the link, which grew stronger, between Arabs from both sides of the 'Green Line'.[34] That was the time when the Palestinian media started to become very involved in 'domestic' Arab issues. The Palestinian *Filastin al-Thawra* called on its readers 'To prepare our people in the Galilee, in the Triangle and in the Negev, in order to incorporate them into the national effort and in the struggle of the National

Palestinian Revolution to free the lands of the occupied homeland' (28 March 1976).

In return, the first category (domestic Arab media within Israel) supported the Palestinians in 1980 after the explosion involving the three mayors who were part of the 'Committee for National Guidance'. The '6 June' document quoting Israeli Arabs as 'a live, conscious and active organism of the Palestinian People', was published fully in *al-Ittihad* (13 June 1980). The most significant role of the Palestinians is in initiating and carrying on the *intifada al-Aqsa.* All categories of the Arab media cover this *intifada* and comment not only on the '48-Arabs, but also on the direction of the Arab-Israeli peace process that started in the early 1990s.

THE ARAB MEDIA IN NEIGHBOURING ARAB COUNTRIES

When 12 Arab members of the Knesset visited Cairo in October 1998 they were on the front pages of all the Egyptian newspapers. This is the way the third category, namely the Arab media in the Arab world, seeks to influence the Arabs in Israel. The editor of *al-Aharam,* Ibrahim Nafa', published his editorial based on data from the Tami Shteimnitz Center at Tel Aviv University, emphasizing Arabs' feelings towards the Palestinians and the establishment of a Palestinian state. His conclusion states that '48-Arabs or the Insider Arabs are truly the same Arabs as they were at the time of the establishment of the state of Israel and during the years since then.

Al-Akhbar (21 October 1998), also discussing the same topic, praised the Arabs for keeping their national identity in spite of all the difficulties. Ali al-Din Hillal was amazed at the ability of the Israeli Arabs to give their children this proud inheritance. *Al-Gumhuriyya* (22 October 1998) carried interviews with Abd al-Malik Dahamshe and Azmi Bisharah, who were described as Arab representatives in the Israeli Knesset. *Al-Mussawar* (22 October 1998) carried the following headline: 'Israeli Arabs Have Asked President Mubarak to Break the Isolation that Has Been Placed on Them'. Hassan Fuad in *al-Aharam* quoted Abd al-Wahab Darawshe (23 October 1998) when describing their visit, and included the following lines in an article he wrote: The Arab countries as well as the state of Israel punished us for decades for sticking to the land (Samidun) and not leaving it, and they are still doing so. But we represent the missing line of the Arab nation and we are not the agents of Israel but we are 'Samidin' to the land, to the identity and to the homeland.'[35]

In a way this view is quite similar to that of the status of the Arab citizens in the Israeli Hebrew media. Most of the time, the Arab issue is not a central one (as it is in Egyptian media) but in certain circumstances it now has more prominence, for example, the 'Land Day' in Israel, or the visit of the Arab MKs to Egypt. The view of the Insider Arabs in the Israeli Hebrew media is a perspective from a different angle—a multicultural one. From research of the image of the Insider Arabs in the Israeli Hebrew media,[36] it is notable that they

are perceived as different from the Jews, and have the stereotype of the 'other'. Category four of the Arab media (see below) is the most interesting in regard to the Arab citizens of Israel. On the one hand it is the Arab leading media in terms of quality (recruiting the best writers, TV and radio personnel) and facilities, and on the other hand its centre is outside the Arab world. Although culturally and in terms of language this category is purely Arab,[37] it is heavily influenced by the immediate media it faces, namely the Western one.

The Jordanian media is heavily involved in Israeli Arab affairs. Newspapers such as *al-Ray, al-Dustur, the Jordan Times* (in English), *al-Arabal-Yawm,* in addition to the Petra news agency, are constantly reporting on the '48-Arabs, while also writing opinion and interpretation columns on the same issue. The Jordanian angle concentrates not only on the ideological aspect but also on practical matters regarding the mutual relations. There is a small fraction within Jordanian public life that totally respects normalization with Israel (including its Arab citizens) but this tendency, to overcome the feelings against the '48-Arabs during the 1950s and 1960s and see them as full partners of the Arab cause is, however, against the general trend within the Arab media as a whole. *The Jordan Times* carried a story of the 'Committee of Labour Unions' which has an agenda of opposition to normalization, considering Israeli Arabs as traitors who might be a bridge for peace and normalization between Outsider Arabs and Jews in Israel and therefore they, the '48-Arabs, are collaborators.[38] In July 1999 at the Mo'ta Festival, the organizers succumbed to pressure not to invite one of the prominent Palestinian (and also Israeli) poets, Samih al-Qasim, owing to his being a collaborator with the Jews.[39] Muhammad Bakri, a '48-Arab, very successful in both Israeli and Palestinian theatre in Israel, was also banned from entering Jordan for the same reason.

In 1996 an Arab citizen of Israel was nominated to be a freelance reporter for the *al-Sharq al-Awsat* international Arab daily newspaper. The man, Nazir Magali, was the editor of the Arab daily *al-Ittihad* and as such was the first to report from Israel within its boundaries about domestic Israeli affairs. This was the first direct link between the first (domestic) category of the Arab press in Israel with the fourth category, the Arab international media. When the Arab entertainment media, which comments on the other categories of the Arab media, decided to give the floor to a journalist who is an Arab citizen of Israel, it meant that their coverage was fully recognized in the Arab surrounding world. (There are reports from the Arab journalist that there is a demand from the newspaper to refer to strictly Israeli domestic news, but that is beyond the scope of our research.)

Finally, the Arab satellite TV company MBC, based in London, sent a special team to interview Jews and Arabs in Nazareth after the Hebron agreement, and broadcast this interview during prime time, thereby allowing Israelis to demonstrate their point of view through meetings with Insider Arabs.[40]

THE INTERNATIONAL ARAB MEDIA

This media is located mainly in Europe. Most of the leading newspapers, radio and TV stations operate from London. MBC satellite TV broadcasts to the entire Middle East, Asia, Europe and the USA.

The best quality is found in the Arab international daily *al-Hayat,* also based in London, with branches all over the Arab region and in the main centres elsewhere in the world. Intellectuals, writers and poets have their opinions and editorials printed when an important issue arises. This includes leading Palestinian figures too: Mahmoud Darwish (who used to work at the Israeli daily *al-Ittihad* till the beginning of the 1970s) had some of his sharpest poems against the Oslo accords printed in *al-Hayat.* When Edward Sa'id commented on political-national Palestinian issues, pointing out the mistake of connecting the Holocaust to the Arab-Israeli conflict, his article was published in *al-Hayat.*[41]

The tendency of Arab journalists in the international Arab media to work according to the same liberal standards as their British (or other European) colleagues and neighbours has helped shape a special kind of journalism, one that reflects on the Arab world as a whole: this can be seen not only in *al-Hayat,* but also in *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* MBC TV, *al-Waset* and others. Israeli issues and particularly issues dealing with Israel's Arab minority are high on the agenda of the fourth media category; some of their reporters and writers are '48-Arabs who work side by side with Palestinians. In a way these liberal Arab media representatives are truly interested in the Insider Arabs. The editorial of *al-Hayat* on 15 August 1999 was about the necessity of peace for the Arabs.[42] The editorial clearly stated that the highest price for this status quo situation is being paid by the Palestinians ('including Insiders'). This explains the slogan 'Equality and Peace'.

An issue that is analysed in all four categories is the 'right of return': a basic demand and a Palestinian myth about the right of the refugees to return to their homes. Abu Ala' from the Palestinian Authority quoted in *al-Hayat al-Jadida:* The Palestinian right of return is based on UN Resolution 194, from December 1948' (21 December 1998). Asad Abu alRahman, the chairman of the refugees committee, said the same thing (*alAyam,* 16 August 1997). A book review column in the Egyptian paper *alAharam* reviewed Salman Abu Sata's book on the right of return. The book expresses strong opinions regarding Israeli responsibility for Arab refugees and their mutual relations with Israeli Arabs.[43]

The fact that the international Arab media has flourished since the mid-1990s has several consequences. The first is the creation of a common Arab language that is understood by Arabs everywhere. The second is that the predicament of those who are illiterate (in pretty high percentage in Egypt and Morocco, for example) is ignored. A mediating Arabic *(Wusta)* has been created, which is not 'High Arabic' in terms of literature *(Fusha)* and not a local dialect—*(Amiyah).*[44]

CONCLUSION

The perspective of the Arab media within all four categories is different from that of the Israeli media on the issues of Israel's Arab citizens. Naturally the first priority of each media representative is its own loyalties, with its second priority being its own stand (emotionally or otherwise) towards Insider Arabs. The various media categories are clear but contain some exceptions. *Al-Hayat* is generally more liberal and demonstrates relatively brave attitudes considering its readership. This newspaper is in the process of having a reporter (or at least a freelancer) within Israel, unlike the neighbouring newspaper *al-Sharq al-Awsat,* which has one journalist (Nazir Majali) covering the Arab society in Israel.

The second exception is the Qatrain TV station 'al-Jazzira'. This station demonstrates a special phenomenon in the Arab media (and the Arab world) in the way it covers all kinds of issues. Since it is state-run Qatari TV—and it has ambitions to create new criteria for journalism in the Arab world—it has been criticized by most of the governments in the Arab world as it has created political tensions (with Egypt, Iran, the Palestinian Authority and others), owing to its free criticism of events. It gives full coverage to '48-Arabs. The senior reporter on al-Jazzira is Walid al-'Umari, a '48-Arab from the Palestinian Authority who works for an international Arab TV station.

The third exception is MBC TV and radio. MBC is an international radio and TV station that covers '48-Arabs through its journalist in the West Bank. Being an international media representative, MBC has a basic tendency to be fair in its coverage of the Insiders as well. The head of the MBC office in Jerusalem is Nabil al-Khatib, a Palestinian who works for Arab international TV and covers also Israel and particularly the Insider Arabs.

The importance of the above three examples is that they demonstrate the ethics and the values of freedom of expression on the Arab media stage. Another example is Sa'id's article on the implications of the Holocaust.[45] The complexity of the issue illustrates the daily difficulties that the Insiders are faced with. Sa'id, a bitter opponent of the Oslo accords and their implementation, tries to explain what brought him to deal with the Jewish Holocaust in the Arab arena *(al-Hayat):*

> In the West where many Arabs live, a lot of material is distributed on the issue and therefore, we are referring to it. I've read many articles on Nazism, on World War II and on the Holocaust and I feel that every Jew, anywhere in the world, is connected somehow to it.

Referring to the Holocaust denial:

> As someone who knows the inconsistent history of Garudi (a French Holocaust denouncer) who shifted from Catholicism to Communism,

returned to Catholicism and then became a Muslim, it is hard for me to see
him as a protector of Arabs.

An Insider Arab who lives within Israeli—mostly Jewish—culture is experiencing it daily. In that regard the Insider feels closer to the full Outsider, sharing his views through the more remote fourth (international) category, rather than the closer Palestinian media category, and alienated by the dissension of the Jordanian media who denied the invitation of the Insider poet Samih al-Qasim to the Mo'ta Festival (later on the organizers apologized for this rebuke in the *Jordan Times*[46]). The Egyptian media for instance is largely supportive and tends to identify itself with Insider Arab problems.[47]

The complexity of the Insider issue, which is epitomized in the famous saying 'My country is in conflict with my people',[48] has sharply become the focus of the overall Arab media in the last decade and a half.

During the 1950s and 1960s the identity problem had started to emerge and, alongside their uncertainty about their future, the Insiders were almost totally ignored by their Outsider fellow Arabs (a fact that was reflected in the Arab media—in all its categories). Apart from the Insiders themselves (mainly via the *al-Ittihad* daily newspaper) nobody really cared about their status within the state of Israel.

Since that time the Insiders' growing integration within Israeli society on the one hand, and their increasing self-confidence on the other—both a consequence of historical developments (mainly moving from a state of war to a state of the regional peace process) since the late 1970s—has caused a big change. There was huge interest by Outsiders as well as Insiders in seeing the Insiders as the 'head of the bridge' in any development between the Arab world and Israel.

One of the interesting signs of the tighter linkage and growing cooperation between Insiders and Palestinians was the establishment of a common newspaper. This newspaper will be published in conjunction with the Palestinian daily *al-Ayam* (in Ramallah) and will be called *Ayam al-Arab* ('Days of the Arabs').[49] It will be published simultaneously in the Palestinian Authority and Israel. At the moment the offices are located in Shfar'am (Israel). The main editor will be Salim Salama (an Insider who worked until recently at *al-Sinarah* from Nazareth). The director-general will be another Insider, Faisal Jbeili, who was until recently the director-general of *al-Ittihad.*

Both *al-Ittihad* and *al-Sinarah* congratulated the new newspaper, while the editor of *al-Sinarah,* Lutfi Mashur, was reported in *Ha-aretz* as saying: 'I hope the newspaper won't be financed by the same sources in the Palestinian Authority that had tried to bribe more than one Arab journalist and various newspapers in Israel to support the goals of the senior officials of the Palestinian Authority.'[50] As a response, the same paper[51] denied any linkage (financial or otherwise) between the Palestinian Authority and the newspaper. During the *intifada al-Aqsa* the relations between Arabs on both sides of the 'Green Line' became closer. If the Insiders' 'Land Day' was adopted for the overall

Palestinian symbol, then the events of October 2000 represented a much more active involvement of the Insiders with the representatives of the Palestinian Authority. For example, al-Jazzira correspondent Walid al-Umari (an Israeli citizen) read the list of 'Shahids' on satellite TV The Arab Israeli radio station, 'Radio 2000', broadcast the list of wounded and dead in Israel (in Nazareth, October 2000). These phenomena reflected directly on the identity issue of the Insiders. It became a more Palestinian issue- one of nationality—and more protesting in terms of equality *vis-à-vis* the Jews in Israel. There was more readiness to attack verbally the Jews and identify with 'others', sometimes the enemy. (The fact that a matter which is strictly Arab creates an interest in an Israeli Hebrew paper has its own significance, but that is a matter for further study.)

The line that has been taken within all media categories ('48-Arabs who work at international Arab press, Arab journalists who cover domestic Arab issues in Israel), brought the attention of the Arab media to '48-Arabs. Unlike 50 years ago where '48-Arabs were ignored, the situation today is quite different and illustrates a tendency towards Arab integration and solidarity.

NOTES

1. Much has been written about this identity issue. See for example Sammy Smooha, 'Minority Responses in a Plural Society: A Typology of the Arabs in Israel', *Sociology and SocialResearch,* Vol.67, No.4 (July 1984), pp.1–21; idem, *The Orientation and Politicization of theArab Minority in Israel,* Haifa, 1984; Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Controlof a National Minority,* Austin, 1980; J.E.Hofman and B.Beit Halahmi, 'The Palestinians Identity and Israel's Arabs', *Peace Research,* Vol.9 (1977), pp. 13–22; Nadim Rouhana, 'Accentuated Identities in Protracted Conflicts: The Collective Identity of the Palestinian Citizens of Israel, *AAS,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.97–128; Y.Peres and N.Yuval Davis, 'Some Observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arabs', *Human Relations,* Vol.22 (1969), pp.219–33; Aharon Layish (ed.), 'The Arabs in Israel between Religious Revival and National Awakening, *Hamizrah Hahadash* (The New East), Vol.32 (1989), pp.1–9 (in Hebrew).
2. Ami Elad-Buskila, *Arab Literature in Hebrew Dress,* Jerusalem, 1995, pp.38–45 (in Hebrew); Eli Reches, Arabs in the Jewish State: Images and Realities', *Middle East Insight,* Vol.7, No.1 (Jan./Feb. 1990), pp.4–5; Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity—The Construction of ModernNational Consciousness,* New York, 1997, pp. 119–44.
3. Eli Reches, 'Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza', *AAS,* Vol.23 (1989), pp. 120–21.
4. Elad-Buskila, *Arab Literature in Hebrew Dress,* pp.38–40; Reches, 'Israeli Arabs', p.120.
5. Emile Sahlieh, The PLO and Israeli Arabs, *AAS,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.85–6.
6. Reches, 'Israeli Arabs'.
7. Elad-Buskila, *Arab Literature in Hebrew Dress,* p.42.

8. For example, Emile Habibi, *Al-Mutashai'il,* trans. Anton Shamas, Tel Aviv, 1995 (in Hebrew).

9. See George Kanazi, 'Ideological Bases in the Arab Literature in Israel', *Hamizrah Hahadash,* Vols.25–8 (1989), pp.129–38.

10. For details, see Majid al-Haj and Henry Rosenfeld, 'The Emergence of an Indigenous Political Framework in Israel: The National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities', *AAS,* Vol.23 (1989), pp.205–44.

11. Benjamin Neuberger, 'The Arab Minority in Israeli Politics 1948–1992: From Marginality to Influence', *AAS,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.5–7, 144–70.

12. For details, see Eli Reches, 'Between Communism and Nationalism—Rakah and the Arab Minority in Israel', PhD thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1986 (in Hebrew).

13. Fouad Ajami, *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey,* New York, 1998.

14. Ibid., p.316.

15. Ibid., p.318.

16. Ibid., p.264.

17. For more details, see Joseph Ginat, 'Israeli Arabs: Some Recent Social and Political Trends', *AAS,* Vol.23 (1989), pp.183–204; Sahlieh, 'ZThe PLO and the Israeli Arabs', pp.85–94; Alexander Bligh, The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position of the Israeli Arab Leadership', *Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 35, No.1 (Jan. 1999), pp.134–64.

18. Eli Reches, The Resurgent Islam in Israel', *AAS,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.189–206; Thomas Mayer, 'The "Muslim Youth" in Israel', *Hamizrah Hahadash,* Vol.32 (1989), pp.10–20 (in Hebrew).

19. See specifically, Bligh, 'The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue', p.136, who defines the stages of the Arab leadership emergence as follows: 1974—the Council of Arab Mayors was established; 1982—the Monitoring Committee was established; late 1980s-90s—during the *intifada* a two-tier leadership began to develop: an established leadership, based on the Monitoring Committee; and a pragmatic leadership lead by MK Darawshe. This two-tier political structure was supported by a burgeoning set of internal and external relations. As with the established leadership, pragmatic leadership also developed ideologically and, ultimately, Israeli Arab leaders were acknowledged as the main reservoir of political support for Palestinian national aspirations.

20. Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and thePolicies towards Them,* Jerusalem, 1992 (in Hebrew). For a Palestinian view on equality, see 'The Educational Committee of 1948 Threatens to Strike', *al-Hadaf,* 8 April 1990 (in Arabic).

21. See for example 'The Palestinians of 1948 Demand the Cessation of the Emigration of the Soviet Jews', *al-Unsurt al-Huriyyah,* 4 March 1990.

22. For details on the party, see Reches, 'Between Communism and Nationalism'.

23. See for example on the issue of establishing autonomy for '48-Arabs in connection with the Palestinian *intifada,* statements that Dr Azmi Bisharah made in *al-Sinarah,* 3 Jan. 1992. *AlIttihad,* keeping to the party line, emotionally described the activities of the IDF in the territories as 'barbarous, bones breaking' (4 Jan. 1988) and in an editorial called upon its readership not to put Palestinian flags in the Galilee and the Triangle villages. In contrast *alIttihad* also included a condemnation of Abna al-Balad for encouraging the Israeli Arabs in the Galilee

and the Triangle villages to copy the conflict patterns of the territories inside Israel. This *al-Ittihad* (Rakah) line was condemned for example by *al-Quds* (Palestinian) 13 Feb. 1988.

24. For details, see Majid al-Haj and Henry Rosenfeld, 'The Emergence of an Indigenous Political Framework in Israel: The National Committee of Chairmen of Arab Local Authorities', *Asianand African Studies,* Vol.23 (1989), pp.205–44.
25. On this phenomenon see Elad-Buskila, *Arab Literature in Hebrew Dress,* pp.42–5.
26. On the role of writers and poets in politics, see Menahem Milson, 'Najib Mahfuz and Jamal Abd al-Nasir: The Writer as Political Critic', *AAS,* Vol.23 (1989), pp.1–22.
27. Interview with Bisharah, *Ha'aretz,* 29 May 1998 (in Hebrew).
28. Background in: Aharon Layish, 'The Status of the Sharia in a Non-Muslim State: The Case of Israel', *AAS,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.171–88 and Reches, The Resurgent Islam in Israel', pp. 189–206.
29. For details, see Reches, 'Between Communism and Nationalism'.
30. Neuberger, 'The Arab Minority in Israeli Politics', pp. 149–70.
31. See Reches, 'Israeli Arabs', pp. 119–54.
32. For example, at Arafat's speech in Stockholm on the issue of Jerusalem, the headline in *al-Hayat al-Jadida,* 6 Dec. 1998, was 'Jerusalem—Open and Individual City'.
33. For example, Ahmad Said, 'The Zionist Racist Practices in Occupied Palestinian, 1948', *Shu'um Filastiniya,* 18 Oct. 1988 (in Arabic).
34. See for example, *Filastin al-Thawra,* 22 March 1986, p.4: 'The Message of Revolution: Land Day is a Shining Land Mark And a Turning Point' (in Arabic). Arafat referred to the Palestinians' external rights on the land 'in the time of intense Arab darkness' in 'Risalat alQa'id a-am', *Filastin al-Thawra,* 7 April 1984. For an explanation of the issue, see M.A. Tessler, 'Israel's Arab and the Palestinian Problem', *The Middle East Journal,* Vol.31 (1977), pp.313–29.
35. It is interesting to compare this quotation from the end of the 1990s with the writings of Emile Habibi in his *al-Mutashai'il* during the mid-1970s. The Arab media (including category three) accepted the main claim of the '48-Arabs regarding the ignorance of the Arab world about them. See my 'Reflection of Social and Cultural Aspects of the Arab in the Palestinian Authority in the Arab Media', *Judea and Samaria Research,* Vol.10 (2001), pp.273–82.
36. Isam Abu-Raya, Gadi Wolfsfeld and Eli Avraham, *The Way of Representing and Imaging theArab Population in Israel in the Written Newspapers,* Beit Berl, 1998 (in Hebrew).
37. For example, Walter Armburst, *Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt,* Cambridge, 1996.
38. *Jordan Times,* 24 Oct. 1999.
39. See above for background on Samih al-Qasim (who is also the editor of the newspaper *Kulal-Arab).*
40. 12 Dec. 1998.
41. See for example, Edward Sa'id 'Bases for Co-Existence', *al-Hayat,* 18 Dec. 1997.
42. Salah Bashir and Hazim Serayah, Editorial, *al-Hayat,* 15 Aug. 1999.
43. *Al-Aharam,* 11 Dec. 1999, p.6.
44. Koren, *The Arab Media in the 90s* (forthcoming in Hebrew).
45. *Jordan Times,* 27 July 1999.

46. *Jordan Times,* 27 July 1999.
47. See for example, *al-Aharam,* 23 Oct. 98.
48. Attributed to former MK and Deputy Minster (Labour Party), Abd al-aziz Zo'abi from Nazareth.
49. *Ha'aretz,* 1 Nov. 1999, front page (in Hebrew).
50. Ibid.
51. *Ha'aretz,* 7 Nov. 1999 (in Hebrew).

POLITICAL STANDING IN A JEWISH STATE: PRESENT AND FUTURE

Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: Is There a Basis for a Unified Civic Identity?

ILANA KAUFMAN

INTRODUCTION

On 23 March 1999 a piece written in the political column of *YediotAhronot* called for its readers to vote for Azmi Bisharah, the Arab Palestinian candidate for prime minister. It read as follows: 'the basic principles of the Left are freedom and equality…the Left demands more equitable distribution of profit and equal rights and participation of all citizens. In Bisharah's platform the state has to be a state of all its citizens'. The writer was Tanya Reinhart, Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University. The phrase 'Israel as a state of all its citizens', which was raised by a few Arab intellectuals and politicians a decade ago, has become salient in the Jewish public discourse. It refers to a demand to change the legal, political and cultural definition of the relations between the state of Israel and its Jewish and Arab citizens, and to make it resemble the relationship between citizen and state in the Western states. The major argument made in favour of this modification with regard to the Arab-Jewish cleavage is that the 'Jewish and democratic' formula is an oxymoron: Israel cannot be both, and the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel cannot, and will not for long accept second-class citizenship. The state should therefore turn into a liberal civic state, which could express the multicultural reality of Jewish and Arab existence.

But what do we mean by a liberal 'civic state'? The purpose of this article is to outline some of the major implications of adopting a formula of a 'civic nation state', which is prevalent in the West, and the likelihood of their acceptance by the Arab Palestinian and by the Jewish communities. This will be done (1) through a brief outline of the theoretical models of a civic nation state to be found in the West; (2) by pointing to ideas in this direction that have been publicly aired in Israel in the past; and (3) by assessing their possible impact.

The argument that I will make is that although the concept of a Jewish state is a major issue in the political debate, its resolution in the direction of a civic nation state is far in the horizon. The significant neutralizing of cultural-national components entailed in this change rule out under current conditions any significant support for it among both Jews and Arabs. Certain indicators,

however, point to the possibility that under conditions of peaceful stability in the area, some version of the multicultural civic nation state model may evolve in the future.[1]

THEORETICAL MODELS

Under the influence of the French revolution, the ideal of the liberal nation state is a state that protects and promotes the rights and welfare of the *individual* members of a self-governing *nation.* The crucial question is what are the criteria for belonging to the nation: does the nation consist of all the citizens who live within the territory of the state, or only of those who meet certain social or cultural criteria, such as language, religion and tradition? Among states that consider themselves to be committed to liberal values and democracy this question received a variety of different empirical and ideological answers. Each set of answers form a particular ideal model for dealing with cultural differences within the population of the state and for the ties between the individual and the state.

I distinguish first between three models: the ethnic state, the multination state, and the civic nation state. In the civic nation state model the government and the legal system are based on the explicit principle that the state is culturally 'neutral'. The nation consists of the citizens of the state of whatever cultural identity, and the criteria governing inclusion in it are universal: anyone who fulfils the necessary criteria may join. In contrast, in the ethnic model there is one culturally defined nation with which the state is culturally identified, and the state is expected to nurture the cultural-national character of that nation. In the multination state, there is more than one nation. The state is culturally neutral, but is organized as a confederate to enable cultural autonomy to its constituent national parts.

However, if we look closer at the *actual* civic nation states we can see that this model itself consists of various sub-models or versions: the liberal night-watch state (as in the USA), the republican visionary state (as in France or Quebec) and the multicultural state (as in Anglo-Canada or Australia). The two sub-models that are relevant for the discussion of Israel are the republican version ('the visionary state'), which is closer to the ethnic end of the scale, and the multicultural version, which is close to the multinational end of the scale. Unlike the individually oriented 'night-watch' state, in republican and multicultural sub-models, officially recognized and sustained cultural identity is considered necessary for solidarity, and part and parcel of democratic rights. The two sub-models differ

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from each other, however, in the extent to which this recognized identity should be homogeneous; the demand for homogeneity in the republican version is all-encompassing; here the policy of the 'melting-pot' for creating a common nationality and common civic values is pursued with vigour. In the multicultural version, the degree of homogeneity that is considered desirable in the public domain is minimal, and there is no expectation that all will adhere to liberal values, except for the principle of tolerance.[2] The policy of the 'melting-pot' is therefore only minimally applied. Furthemore, the state is identified with the multiplicity of values, and specialized groups are granted special rights, either as compensation for past discrimination and mistreatment or in order to correct the imbalance inherent in their weakness as a cultural minority.

How does this apply to Israel? There is an ongoing controversy among academics in Israel on how Israel should be described: an ethnic state that is neither liberal nor democratic;[3] an ethnic state that is democratic but not liberal;[4] a problematic liberal democracy;[5] or an ethno-Republican democracy.6 I tend to support the latter formulation. But this is irrelevant for my discussion. In none of those formulations is Israel 'a state of all the Israeli citizens' in the same way that 'France is a state of its French citizens', as was put by Chief Justice Shamgar.[7] The reason is simple: there is no identity between nationality and citizenship. And when nationality is a supra criteria for rights, there is alienation and potential conflict on the part of the excluded.

Before proceeding to discuss two possible versions of the civic nation state in the Israeli context, it should be pointed out that unlike the question of *Israeli* nationality, the official definition of the *Jewish* national identity has been the subject of prolonged debate and crises in Israeli politics. Although the official distinction between the Jews and Arabs was indirectly the cause for these crises, the crises themselves, and the questions they raised, focused on internal Jewish self-definition, and did not refer to relations between Jews and Arabs. The classification by law of individuals according to their nationality and religion, and its registration on an identity card, was done explicitly to grant special immigration rights under the Law of Return to Jews, and to bar Arab Palestinians from enjoying the same right.[8] The desire to discourage as much as possible Jewish-Arab intermarriages and to keep in place the monopoly of religious marriages was another reason for such registration. These rules and regulations have been challenged, but not from the Jewish-Arab angle. The state has been repeatedly called upon to distinguish between the religious and the national components of Jewish identity, and to curtail the Orthodox monopoly on Jewish matters. These challenges are so far unsuccessful in the political and judicial arena.[9] The recent pressure to change the official mode of registration, and even the wording of the Law of Return, has come from two quarters: from the non-Orthodox Jewish religious movements based in America, and from the political parties representing the 100,000-strong non-Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, who were granted citizenship under the Law of Return.[10]

APPLYING THE CIVIC NATION STATE MODEL TO ISRAEL

The Israeli Hebrew Version and Its Supporters

The Israeli Hebrew version combines components of the republican visionary state with the American type of 'night-watchman' state. It therefore involves privatization of certain aspects of social life that are currently considered part of the state's business. This version also has close affinity to ideas put forth by the Canaanite movement that developed among the Jewish population of Palestine in the 1940s within the so-called Committee for Solidifying the Hebrew Youth and, after 1948, the Young Hebrews Group. The Canaanites supported the establishment of a territorial Hebrew nation state, consisting of Hebrew-speaking inhabitants in the territory where ancient Hebrew civilization was moulded. The Arabic-speaking inhabitants of the land were considered to be the descendants of the Hebrews, who had been conquered by Islamic and Christian forces and forced to adopt a foreign culture. The mission of the future state was to bring back the inhabitants of the land to their original authentic Hebrew culture. It was expected to impose the Hebrew language as a language common to all, to maintain a strict separation between religion and state, and to grant full equality to all its citizens. The Canaanite ideology thus called for severing all ties with existing national and religious cultures outside the borders of the state, whether Jewish or Arab, secular or religious, and for replacing these with a Hebrew Canaanite identity.[11]

The Israeli Hebrew version of a civic nation state that will be presented below is based not on the ancient Hebrew past, but rather on the anticolonial struggle of the Jews against British rule in Palestine. Israel's Declaration of Independence is therefore seen as the event that forged the nation.[12] This version aspires to integrate the state of Israel into its surroundings and to consider its Jewish and Arab citizens as belonging to one nation. According to this version the Jews living in Israel belong to a different nation from the Jews in other parts of the world and those Arab citizens of Israel who wish to do so may become part of that nation and cease from being defined as a national minority. By defining all citizens of Israel as belonging to one nation—the Israeli nation—by virtue of their citizenship, this version has the aim, among others, of eliminating the present discrimination and social and political differentiation between Jews and Arabs in Israel. The basic premise of this version is that in this day and age Judaism as a religion is not identical to Judaism as a culture and a nationality. The carriers of Jewish culture and identity, whether religious or not, are an ethnic group whose members belong to various nationalities. Those among them who chose self-determination and established a sovereign nation are members of the Israeli nation. The culture of the nation is secular Hebrew Israeli culture, the culture of the national nucleus of Jews who established the state and determined its way of life. According to this version the Arab culture of the Arab citizens of

the state will thus become limited to the private sphere, and greater assimilation into Israeli Hebrew culture will take place. The Israeli Hebrew culture will also be defined rather narrowly: religious culture, whether Jewish, Muslim or Christian, will become secondary.

This version differs from the Canaanite one in that it does not call for a complete severance from Jewish culture and religion, but rather considers the Hebrew culture that developed during the period of Jewish settlement in Palestine and after the establishment of the state of Israel as the heir of historical Jewish culture.[13] Jews in the free world who are citizens of their states and choose of their own free will not to participate in the sovereign life of Israel are not part of the nation. The Zionist movement is seen as the liberation movement of the Jewish people, who justly demanded a place of their own under the sun, and indeed fulfilled their right to self-determination in a national territory. However, the Zionist movement's role ended with the establishment of the state and the absorption of the great waves of immigrant Jews fleeing from Europe, Asia and North Africa. Adherence to Zionist ideology even after it has fulfilled its aim represents a grave distortion of the normal development of nation states; it has been the major reason why no normal national consciousness has developed, why peace has not come to the region and why the country's Arab citizens feel alienated from the state.[14]

During the 1940s ideas of this kind were expressed by members of the Irgun delegation in the United States, particularly by Shmuel Marlin and Hillel Kook who formed the 'Committee for the Liberation of the Nation' in 1944.[15] Because he wished to mobilize the support of American Jewry for the Irgun's plan for a Jewish state without raising the spectre of 'double loyalty' (and perhaps also because he understood that mass immigration from the United States was unlikely), Kook differentiated between 'Jews' and 'Hebrews'. For Kook this tactic became an ideological principle, according to which American Jews belonged to the Jewish religion, but to the American nation, and not to a non-existent Jewish one. The Jews in Palestine as well as stateless Jews in Europe and those being persecuted in other countries, who wished to work towards national sovereignty in Palestine, belonged to the 'Hebrew nation'. Thus American Jews could feel solidarity for and support their Hebrew co-religionists without belonging to the same nation. In a letter that Kook sent to Chayim Weizmann in April 1945 he criticized the Zionist movement for not making the distinction between Jews who were citizens of other states and those who intended to become citizens of the Jewish state. In the letter, he questioned the future roles of the Zionist movement's institutions and raised casuistically the question of the future status of 'the Muslims and the Christians in the Jewish republic'.[16] However, the rest of the Irgun delegation, as well as members of the organization in Palestine, rejected this approach[17] and were unhappy even with the tactics. After having been elected to the Constituent Assembly on the Herut party list after the establishment of the state of Israel Kook continued, together with others of the 'La-Merhav' group (such as Ari Jabotinsky), to adhere to this

position and deplored the lack of a constitution proclaiming in formal terms the existence of the nation.

Ideas similar to Kook's were expressed also in Palestine, by former members of the Irgun and Lehi (the Stern Gang) who formed the 'Maavak' (Struggle) group before independence, and 'Semitic Action' a decade later.[18] The members of Semitic Action published their principles in 1957 under the title of 'The Hebrew Manifesto'.[19] This time the impetus for giving public expression to these ideas was not the relations with American Jewry but rather the lack of a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the Arab world and, in particular, Israel's participation in the Sinai Campaign together with Great Britain and France, the former colonial powers. Israel's cooperation with these powers was seen as being in blatant conflict with the interests of the state and as demonstrating that Israel was independent and sovereign in name only. According to the 'Manifesto' true independence necessitated not only changing Israel's international and regional orientation but the introduction of far-reaching social and political changes as well. The major changes that had to be implemented in this view were the abolition of the official status of the Jewish Agency, the severance of religion from the state and the introduction of absolute equality among all citizens of the state. Thus it demanded, for example, that Israel's Arab citizens become 'integrated as full partners in every aspect of the state'. According to this approach the school curriculum should be uniform (with an emphasis on Hebrew), while religious instruction should be given as an extra-curricular activity subsidized by the state.[20]

Many of these ideas were promoted by the 'Ha'olam Haze' movement founded by Uri Avneri in 1965, which achieved representation in the Knesset following the elections of 1965 and 1969. Among the movement's demands were the legislation of a constitution that would authorize the Supreme Court to abolish the Emergency Laws, the abolition of military rule over the Arab population, an end to land confiscation and a complete separation of church and state.[21]

From the 1970s on, it is possible to discern between 'dovish' and 'hawkish' versions of this approach. The hawkish version absorbs the successes of the Palestinian national movement in awakening the national consciousness of the Palestinians in the area, and uses it to differentiate between the Palestinian and Israeli nations. In 1975, following the interim agreements signed by Israel and Egypt and the emergence of the proposal for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, Kook and Marlin republished their programme for political and constitutional reform.[22] During the 1980s several other developments contributed to further exposition of this version: the increasing power of the Kahana movement and religious extremism among Jews, the adoption of an amendment to Basic Law— The Knesset, section 7a (1985) defining the state of Israel as 'the state of the Jewish people' and proposals for a constitution that would retain that definition among its basic premises.[23]

At this point in time it was Professor Yosef Agassi who formulated a detailed version of the Israeli Hebrew option based on Kook's ideas.[24] Its basic assumption is that Israel should react to the beginnings of the formation of a Palestinian nation by recognizing that nation and its right to a sovereign state. However, the state of the Palestinian nation should replace and be located on the present territory of the Kingdom of Jordan (where, in his opinion, no Jordanian nation has evolved) and in other parts of Mandatory Palestine as would be agreed upon by such a state and the state of Israel.[25] At the same time the Israeli nation will have to undergo a process of 'normalization' in the spirit of Kook's ideas. This would require of the Jewish state that it make its citizens undergo a change of consciousness, which would involve severing the right to self-determination both from the Jewish religion and from the ideology of Zionism; the former could bring about the establishment of a theocracy, a regression to a pre-modern state of affairs, a deterioration in the civil rights of both Jews and non-Jews and an identity crisis that could cause large-scale emigration; the latter is based on the delusion of an 'ingathering of the exiles' and the concentration of all Jews in Palestine. This delusion is also one of the causes of discrimination against Arab citizens and incites the Arabs against 'the Zionist threat'; instead of creating a place of refuge for Jews who are citizens of their countries it exposes them to accusations of lack of loyalty to their countries. The state of Israel's commitment to the interests of the Jewish people is detrimental to the interests of the nation residing in Zion and deprives it of its right to demand of the state that it promote that nation's happiness and welfare.

An alternative basis for the right to self-determination is the emergence an Israeli nation. This is a process that has reached an impasse, and is in need of an active constitutional operation. Therefore this version calls first of all for declaring that Israel is a 'secular Israeli republic' rather than the 'state of the Jews' or 'the state of the Jewish people'. The solution to the first problem, that of the danger of a theocracy, lies in a constitution that would ensure that the institutions of the state and those of religion be separated. The Knesset would engage in legislation on national secular matters and desist from clerical legislation, leaving that task to religious institutions. All denominations will receive some state support for their institutions. In order to deal with the delusion of 'ingathering of the exiles' the Law of Return would have to be amended. Instead of granting automatic citizenship to any Jew, the state would only grant automatic asylum to Jews who were suffering persecution. They, and other Jews who wish to emigrate to Israel, would not be granted automatic citizenship: their cases would be considered according to laws of immigration and citizenship that did not discriminate on the basis of origin, race or religion, and taking into consideration the ability to absorb them and the sense of social justice of the members of the nation. While the majority of immigrants would naturally be Jews, non-Jews who are able to make a significant contribution to society will be able to immigrate and join the nation. Anyone having Israeli citizenship would perforce have Israeli nationality and this fact would be registered in one's

identity card, with no mention of religious or ethnic affiliation (just as it is today with respect to passports). The state and its symbols would still have a distinctly Hebrew cultural flavour, but mainly in the linguistic sphere.

What classifies this version as hawkish is the solution it offers for the question of how to deal with the national identity of the Arab citizens. Kook and Marlin supposedly adopt the liberal formulation that 'we must aspire to it that within the Israeli nationality every citizen of the state, be he Jewish, Druze, Muslim, Christian, etc., will be equal before the law not only in theory but also in fact; such equality would include also an equal right to employment—including the civil, diplomatic and military services', and that 'an Israeli Arab, as any other citizen of the state, can adopt the Israeli nationality if that is his wish'.[26] However, they propose, as does also Moshe Sharon, formerly the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, that in order to prevent Israel from becoming a binational state, it is necessary, in addition to providing 'truly full civil equality', to compel the Arabs to become an integral part of the Hebrew national state, in which Hebrew will be the sole official language and the main language of education.[27] Agassi explains that after the state becomes a civic nation state, the stateless Palestinians living under Israeli control and the Palestinians with Israeli citizenship will have to decide whether they wish to join the Israeli nation. Those who shall choose Israeli citizenship and nationality will be able to preserve their ethnic identity as Arabs, Muslims, Christians and Druzes, but only as individuals. In other words, they will have to choose between resident status (i.e., loss of their Israeli citizenship) and full citizenship with all privileges and obligations, including military service.[28] Such an act of revoking citizenship on a large scale is unprecedented in liberal states. There are those who propose an even more extreme form of the Israeli Hebrew option, one that marks a complete break with liberal principles (and directed toward ultraOrthodox Jews and Arabs). According to this proposal a new citizenship law would be formulated, one 'which does not endow automatic citizenship through birth or immigration, but takes into consideration the services which the citizen renders the state'.[29] The political movement that seemed to be closest to adopting this option in recent years is the now defunct Tzomet party.

The dovish version of this approach, on the other hand, excludes the Palestinians living beyond the 1948 armistice lines (who are considered to have the right to self-determination and a state of their own), and does not propose revoking the citizenship of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. It is based on the assumption that many Arab citizens 'have become acclimatized into the country's cultural life…and have adopted Hebrew as their cultural language', and were thus capable of identifying with a state that was free of any ethnic or religious connotations.[30] Since the disappearance of the 'Ha'olam Haze' movement (whose principles have been mentioned above) from the political arena, no political movement has openly adopted this version. However, the Meretz movement, and in particular the Ratz component of the movement, shows an affinity to some of these ideas.[31]

A Multicultural Israeli State and Its Supporters

The multicultural version of this approach also involves officially relegating ethnic and religious identities to the private sphere. However, unlike the Hebrew version, it does provide for the cultivation of multiculturalism by the state, according to the demands of the various groups. Thus the state would, in this version, reflect the Israeli Jewish majority culture and, to a certain extent, also the minority Israeli Arab culture, but not through any formal legal definition. As in the Israeli Hebrew version, the state would not entirely abandon the cultivation of a 'nation' with a common civic culture and common myths, but unlike that version, this would not be a homogeneous Hebrew culture but rather one that provides some support for the cultural heterogeneity of the population. In this version greater emphasis would be placed on cultural variety itself as a source of social cohesiveness. Still, in the long run the multicultural option also contains within itself the potential for the spontaneous evolution of a new and homogeneous culture.

Support for such a multicultural version of an Israeli state has come only from such people as *Ha'aretz* editor-in-chief Gershon Schocken and writer Anton Shammas. In 1985 Schocken published an article in response to statements made by some rabbis who were opposed to meetings between Jewish and Arab youth because of the danger of intermarriage.[32] Schocken claimed that the opposition to such meetings was a relic from a time when the Jews constituted a religious community, not a sovereign people living in its homeland. The Jews must, as did other conquering people in history, begin the process of fusing the two people so that 'through a process of mutual influence the conquered people gradually accept the culture and the way of life of the dominant people'. Schocken points out that 'this is not an entirely unidirectional process' and does not expect secondary ethnic identities to disappear entirely; however, he does believe that the elimination of prohibitions and prejudices will pave the way for an inevitable process of 'the gradual formation of a unified Israeli nation' that would encompass every ethnic in the country.

At the same time a Palestinian writer, who writes in Hebrew, Anton Shammas, published a newspaper article criticizing the fact that Israel's Declaration of Independence defines Israel as a Jewish state; it opened a heated debate in the Jewish public opinion.[33] Shammas favoured an Israel that was 'democratic' and not 'Jewish', in which nationality and citizenship would be equivalent and all of whose citizens would have the same rights and obligations irrespective of ethnic background. Unlike the Israeli Hebrew option, this version's historical starting point is Israel within its pre-1967 borders, and therefore the Israeli nationality-cum-citizenship would automatically be issued to those living within these borders. The Law of Return would be rescinded in its entirety, and no provision would be made for persecuted Jews. The fact that Shammas writes in Hebrew would seem to indicate that this language would be adopted by Israel's Arab citizens as a communicative tool at a mothertongue level, even though he does

also support giving the Arab language an equal *de facto* status. The fact that he is in favour of intermarriage also indicates that he favours the creation of a new Israeli nation.

Another version of the Israeli option that has an affinity to the multicultural model, although it is not identical with it, is the 'leftist-Marxist' version. The Israel Communist Party, and other left-wing groups that broke away from it in the 1960s such as the 'Matzpen' group came out in favour of a secular Israeli state as the expression of the right to self-determination of the Jewish nation created in Palestine.[34] This version evolved under the influence of Marxist ideology and Soviet policy (after May 1947). According to this model the Israeli state was to have served the interests of the Jewish and Arab proletariat, while remaining neutral with respect to religious and ethnic questions. Thus it was to have been a state that rejects the Zionist ideology and its perception of Jewish interests, while serving also as the object of patriotic identification by the Arab citizenry. However, this model, in keeping with the Soviet model of dealing with national minorities and in contrast to the liberal model, does not require doing away with the cultural differences between the (Jewish) majority and the (Arab) minority. True, this version assumes that the state will reflect the culture of the majority, whose language will be the dominant one, but will not discriminate against the minority, either individually or collectively. Therefore the platform of the Israel Communist Party in the 1950s, and that of the New Communist List in the 1960s, demanded a secular constitution, separation of religion and state, equal rights and the abolition of all legal and practical differences between Jews and Arabs. The party was committed to communist rules of organization, which demanded that it reflect the ethnic composition of the population of its territory, and the New Communist List did indeed act accordingly until the 1980s; its leadership was predominantly Jewish and the party considered itself to be patriotic and exhibited the symbols of the state at its ceremonies and conventions. Until the mid-1950s both Jewish and Arab members of the Israel Communist Party demanded that Arab men be included in Israel's system of compulsory military service.[35] The Communist Party was always careful to refer to Israel's Arab citizens as 'the Arab masses' and not as 'Palestinians', and its demand for 'equal civil and national rights' referred mainly to the cultural sphere and was couched in terms of the protection of private property, such as opposition to the confiscation of land.[36] Although the political discourse of the Communist Party has since been 'Palestinized' to a great extent, this political position remained unchanged in the 1990s; in the words of the head of the party's list in the Knesset (since May 1999), Muhammad Barake: The State of Israel should indeed express the right of the Jewish people to self-determination, but at the same time it must also be the state of all its citizens, in which ethnic and religious groups live under conditions of civic equality'.[37]

The idea to transform Israel from a Jewish state to a 'state of all its citizens' lies on the theoretical borderline between a multicultural nation state and a binational state. (The latter model, as may be recalled, is not discussed in this

article, for it involves a different set of governmental and political principles.) The political history of the phrase, 'a state of all its citizens' and its current political usage demonstrate the possibility of different interpretations. However, the tracing of the ideas of its most ardent advocates suggests that what they have in mind is a binational state, rather than a multicultural nation state.

The state of all its citizens' as a legal-political term has its roots in the aforementioned change proposed by the Progressive List for Peace (PLP) members of Knesset to the amendment to the Basic Law adopted on 31 July 1985. According to the amendment, Israel is defined by law as 'the state of the Jewish people', and any list to the Knesset that does not recognize it in its platform could be banned from running. The proposal of the PLP (that was rejected) was either to drop the phrase referring to Israel as 'state of the Jewish people' or, to add to it, 'and its Arab citizens'. In giving his reasons MK Mati Peled of the PLP specifically referred to the need to recognize the existence of the national Palestinian minority 'as an equal partner in the state.'[38]

This theme was picked up by Azmi Bisharah, who on 11 April 1992 founded the Alliance for Equality. The group put out a manifesto declaring its basic ideas. The first topic in the group's manifesto was entitled 'Israel as a State of its Jewish and Palestinian Citizens', and it suggests a multicultural conception. It stated that:

> the alternative to the definition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people is not the creation of a unified and a homogeneous collective, which cancel the uniqueness of its components, but the creation of equality among those who are different. It should be recognized that the society in Israel includes different sub-groups, that their unique development is a condition for the development of the collective as a whole. In this collective not only Jews and Palestinians need to have full expression, but also women and men, Mizrahim and Ashkenazim Orthodox and secular and those of other religions and beliefs. All would sustain their uniqueness on the basis of equal partnership.[39]

But another topic in the manifesto entitled Autonomy for the Palestinian Minority' demanded 'cultural self-rule' and placed the groups' agenda closer to the binational model. These two demands alongside the demand to grant recognition to the Arab population as a national minority became the hallmark of the Balad party, which Bisharah's group set up with others before the 1996 elections.[40] The three principles were included in the official goals of the party when Balad ran for the first time as a separate party in May 1999. In a series of articles before the 1996 elections explaining his ideas concerning these demands, Bisharah expressed his lack of trust in the ability to form a civic Israeli nation state, because 'even if (the definition of) nationality would be restricted in a manner that would not include the rest of the Jews in the world, it would still apply only to the Jewish Israelis, and would exclude the Arabs… Israelization negates the

Arab Palestinian identity, and includes the eradication of (its collective) memory'.[41]

<div align="center">CONSEQUENCES FOR MAJORITY-MINORITY
RELATIONS</div>

Theoretically, the Israeli civic nation state model in either one of its two versions constitutes a perfect solution to the problem of the relation between the 'majority' and the 'minority' in the civic domain, for it entails the abolition of the structural distinction between the two, and a blurring of the social distinction. However, many of its implications are such that at the moment it is far from acceptable to the majority in both communities.

The major consequence of either version would be a significant reduction in the perceived inequality of the Arabs *vis-à-vis* the Jews in a variety of areas. Limiting the scope of the Law of Return or abolishing it outright, as well as the abolition of Zionist institutions or extending their scope to the entire population, would remove many of the manifestations of superiority and preferential treatment that the Jewish population enjoys at present as a consequence of Israel being defined as a Jewish state. Prohibiting by law any discrimination for the purpose of furthering the interests of the Jewish community alone (such as the expropriation of land, unequal public appropriations and investments, etc.)[42] would do away with current practices and prepare the ground for promoting the equality of Israel's Palestinian citizens. In the same way, removing the limitations on the purchase of national (Jewish) land by Arabs and prohibiting discrimination in housing would bring about a certain decrease in the current social and geographical separation between Jews and Arabs. Rigid social barriers will also weaken thanks to the possibility of civil marriage and personal cultural coexistence, without the necessity of 'crossing the lines', culturally and religiously, by means of religious conversion. A prohibition on discrimination in the job market on irrelevant grounds would tend to increase the equality of opportunity among Arabs on a personal level.

However, the two versions also differ significantly in their consequences, on both instrumental and social-symbolic levels. The Israeli Hebrew option in fact forces the Arab minority to become assimilated into the culture of the majority, even if the assimilating Hebrew culture is not equivalent to Jewish culture. There is no guarantee that even pressure to assimilate such a culture will not arouse violent resistance on a religious basis, because of the affinity between 'Jewish' and 'Hebrew' cultures.[43] One can of course claim that the socialization of the Arabs through the Hebrew language, and even more so their inclusion in the army, will have the effect of removing one of the main means (the demand that applicants be 'army veterans') for discriminating against them, and will make it more difficult to mark them in the job market or in public.[44] However, forced mobilization into the army or denial of citizenship are patently non-liberal actions, which would create a large public that refused to serve in the army and

was denied political and social rights, like the Palestinians who came under Israeli rule in 1967. If that were to happen, the chances of irredentist tendencies and an uprising would be considerable. The implementation of this option would also entail a certain withdrawal of the state from social and developmental functions that are now performed for the Jewish Zionist community; instead, the state would transfer the responsibility for resource allocation to market mechanisms. The result would be that social mobility among Arabs would be selectively determined by means and special skills, thus not operating on a scale sufficient to close the huge gaps between Arabs and Jews that exist at present.

While the Israeli multicultural option cannot ensure that such a scenario will not occur, it does contain within itself the means for ameliorating it, by mechanisms of affirmative action and allocation of resources for narrowing the gaps. Such resources could to a certain extent be allocated by autonomous bodies within Arab society, similar to the autonomy that the Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews have with respect to their educational system. That way the minority will enjoy greater power. However, here too the logic of the capitalist-liberal paradigm would limit the change in the socio-economic gap between Arab and Jews. Israeli society will be more clearly divided along a social axis that crosses cultural and ethnic lines. As the Arab middle class grows, two contradictory developments in relations are to be expected: the Jewish and Arab middle classes will become physically closer and experience greater social contact and, all things being equal, social stereotypes on both sides will become weaker.[45] But tensions are also to be expected at this level, because of affirmative action. Furthermore, affirmative action does not solve the asymmetry in blue-collar professions: it is probable that a great part of the Arab population will continue to be represented disproportionately at the lower socio-economic levels and that the struggle over resources will create competition and tensions between Jews and Arabs, which could result in the appearance of radical racist movements such as the Kahanist movement.[46]

Still, opening the army to everyone and providing the choice of alternative national service, as is the case in this version, should do away with one of the main instruments for excluding Arab citizens from the community on both symbolic and instrumental levels. The adoption of national symbols that are not specifically 'Jewish' and the integration of Arab citizens into the national political, judicial, executive and academic systems should also help in reducing the feeling of alienation and in increasing the identification of the Arab population with the state.

Once the Arabs are clearly perceived as Israelis the present tension resulting from their marginality with respect to both the Israeli and the Palestinian arenas would diminish, and their ties with their Palestinian brothers and with the Arab world would probably become less crucial. On the other hand, they may again be perceived by the Arab world (as they were before 1967) as having abandoned their Arab heritage and the Arab nation. In the multicultural version this drawback would be less noticeable: Arab culture would not fade away, because

cultural and educational organizations dedicated to the preservation of Arab Palestinian language and heritage would coexist with the Israeli culture common to all. The state would provide material and moral support for disseminating local Palestinian culture (for example, the traditions of the Galilee, the 'Triangle', the Negev) and the Arabic language to those who want it (as it would for other sub-cultures, such as Russian and Amharic). Their ties with the Arab world would not be interfered with, although they would not be considered authentic members of the Arab people. Nevertheless, either version is certain to provoke widespread fear of the loss of Arab identity. In order to overcome this the state could permit its Arab citizens, in cooperation with the Palestinian state, to hold dual citizenship, Israeli and Palestinian.

IS SUCH A CHANGE FEASIBLE?

The idea of transforming Israel from a Jewish state to a civic Israeli nation state will be vehemently resisted by some sections of the Jewish public (notably the Orthodox public), and opposed in various degrees by the rest.[47] This is reflected in the wide support for the 'Jewish and democratic' formula, however interpreted, as the legal legitimization of the relations between state and society. Even those in the Jewish public who are in favour of constitutionally curtailing the power of Orthodox Jewish parties[48] and those who favour 'the complete integration of the Arabs' in the state, have not abandoned Zionism in favour of the idea of an Israeli civic nation.[49] Only a minority of Jews are willing personally to intermarry with Arabs, and only a minority believe that Arab citizens' loyalties would be to the state of Israel, rather than to a neighbouring Palestinian state.[50]

The Arab Palestinian citizens, being a minority, would probably demonstrate a greater ability than do the Jewish citizens to make the distinction between their citizenship and their nationality and religious faith. Therefore, a liberal state that would remove social barriers and promote mobility through mixed communities, personal friendships and integrated schools, would be welcomed by many.[51] This will probably reflect also on Arab willingness to perform national or military service.[52] Others would have reservations and prefer the existing separation between the communities, particularly in housing and education, as long as these are of a high quality, as is the case today in Nazareth, for example.[53] However, if pressure were to be applied on the Arab population to adopt a civic national Israeli identity, it would probably result in a bitter reaction and cause tensions between the various Arab Palestinian sub-communities. The multicultural model would probably be acceptable to many of the Christians, to a minority of secular Muslims[54] and to the Druze community as well, although the latter would have reservations (owing to the fear of intermarriage); however, it would probably be vehemently resisted by religious Muslims and by those with an accentuated national orientation.[55] The religious Muslim conception, similar to the Jewish Orthodox one, does not distinguish between the national and religious identity,

and demands that the public and private spheres be conducted according to the rules of the Sharia (Muslim religious law). The implementation of liberal policies such as equality between the sexes, induction into the army and developing loyalty to an Israeli identity at the expense of their Islamic identity and their attachment to the Arab Islamic world would be rejected outright as constituting an existential threat.[56] Those with an accentuated Palestinian consciousness would also react with an adamant refusal to the possibility of becoming integrated into an Israeli Hebrew identity that would replace the Palestinian one. The argument would be that the loss of the Palestinian identity would in fact perpetuate Arab inferiority. They would also reject the multicultural version as unrealistic and as something that would distort the Palestinian national consciousness, which is the sole means, in their opinion, of enabling the Palestinian minority in Israel to extricate itself from a fate of structural inferiority.[57] The majority (81 per cent) in the Arab community, as is the case in the Jewish community, reject the idea (on a personal level) of integration through intermarriage between Jews and Arabs.

CONCLUSION

The probability that Israel in the near future will transform from a Jewish state to a to a civic nation state in which Jews and Arabs will share a national identity is low. This is true with regard to either the Hebrew civic version or the multicultural versions of the model. The international recognition that has been accorded to the existence of a 'Jewish state', and the high degree of legitimacy that the concept still enjoys among its Jewish majority are the primary reasons for this assessment. In addition, Zionist ideology and practice have been bolstered over the past decade by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the immigration of nearly a million people to Israel under the Law of Return. Since 1976 the Arab Palestinian minority have gradually raised their protest against the Zionist structure of the state. They are defending their land rights, demanding equal appropriations, and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But these protests were on the whole through legal means, making this minority one of the most quiescent national minorities in the twentieth century.[58] Even if protest should become more militant, the indicators are that this minority would prefer change in the direction of a binational state rather than in the direction of an Israeli civic nation state.[59] Any attempt to implement the Israeli Hebrew version, which would mean forcing the Arabs to become assimilated into Hebrew culture and language, can be expected to lead to violent resistance, particularly on the part of the Islamic movements.

   Would the attainment of a stable settlement with the Palestinian people and the other Arab states increase the chances for changing the paradigm of Israel to a civic nation? In the short term, probably not. The Palestinian state with which a settlement would be reached will be an ethnic Palestinian state with many of the same features that characterize the ethnic Jewish state. The Jewish majority will

probably feel that with the creation of such a state it has done its share in solving the Palestinian national question, and thus there would no longer be any moral validity to the demands of the Palestinian minority within Israel to change Israel's ethnic Jewish definition.

But in the more distant future, it is possible to foresee the change of the Israeli state to a multicultural civic nation state model. The growing internal tensions in Israeli society in the last decade have focused to large degree on the question of collective identity. The conception of Israel as a Jewish nation state that was in the past treated as a 'given', is under strain. A number of interconnected factors have served as a catalyst for this development: the ebbing chances of an all-out war with the Arab states and the face-to-face conflict in the *intifada* with the Palestinians; the ideological and structural changes in Israel from a collectivist, mobilized society to a more individualist, secular, and globalized society; and finally, the absorption of large-scale, relatively less assimilating migration from Russia and Ethiopia.

All these had an effect on the suppressed Jewish-Arab cleavage. Its criss-crossing with the religious-secular cleavage resulted in the engraving into law in 1985 the formula of 'Israel as a Jewish and democratic state', and set off a chain reaction. The growing protest against the formula from within the Arab community resulted in increasing uneasiness of the liberally inclined Jewish public with the contradiction between the ethnic ('Jewish') and the civic ('democratic') principles of legitimization. So far it only led to the appropriation of the phrase 'Israel as a state of all its citizens' as a complementary phrase to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.[60]

But if the discourse on individual rights grows stronger, and informal autonomous communities (such as separate neighbourhoods for ultra-Orthodox, religious and secular Jews, and for secular and religious Arabs) grows further apart, the demand for an overall change of the relationship between the state and the citizens will become stronger. The early signs of process that we are witnessing point, unfortunately, to an illiberal or an uncivil multicultural reality. The mission may therefore be to find a way to turn it into a more civic and liberal one.

NOTES

1. It must be stressed at this point that what is under discussion here is *not* a consensual binational structure in which the country's resources are officially divided between two ethnic groups, or an autonomy granted to a national minority within a state which is officially defined as 'belonging' to a different, majority, nationality; rather, what is discussed here is a liberal civic *nation* state.
2. See, Yossi Yonah, 'Fifty Years Later: The Scope and Limits of Liberal Democracy in Israel', *Constellations,* Vol.6, No.3 (Sept. 1999), pp.411–28.

3. Oren Yiftachel, 'Israeli Society and Jewish-Palestinian Reconciliation: "Ethnocracy" and Its Territorial Contradictions', *Middle East Journal,* Vol.51, No. 4 (1997), pp.505–19.

4. Sammy Smooha, 'Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol.13, No.3 (1990), pp.389–413.

5. Benjamin Neuberger, 'Democracy with Four Flaws', *Panim,* No.9 (Spring 1999), pp.104–8 (in Hebrew).

6. Yoav Peled, 'Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State', *American Political Science Review,* Vol.86, No.2 (1992), pp.432–43.

7. *Neiman v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Twelfth Knesset,* 1988, Piskei Din 42:4 (in Hebrew).

8. See Ben-Gurion's letter to the Sages of Israel in which he says that the registration could not be annulled because 'at times that on all borders there are people who are infiltrating into the country from the neighboring enemy countries, and are the source of severe danger to the well being of the state and its people, it is necessary that a legal resident in Israel would be able to identify himself with an official and authoritative document.' (quoted in Benjamin Neuberger, *Religion, State and Politics,* Tel Aviv, 1994, p.79, in Hebrew).

9. The move by the interior minister in 1958 to register the children of immigrant couples of mixed marriages as 'Jews' on the grounds of their subjective feeling was blocked politically by the Jewish Orthodox party in the coalition. In 1962 the High Court of Justice refused to accord rights under the Law of Return to a Jewish convert (*Roffaizen v. Minister of Interior,* 72/1962). In 1968, the court accepted the plea to register as Jews children of mixed couples on the basis of the subjective feeling (*Shalit v. Minister of Interior,* 58/1968), but the decision was overturned by legislation in 1970. Attempts by secular Jews to have the court order their nationality registration as either 'Hebrew' or 'Israeli' rather than 'Jewish' failed as well (*Tamarin v. The State of Israel,* 907/1970; *Shelah v:The State of Israel,* 653/ 1975).

10. Bills to erase the nationality classification from the identity card have been suggested, and failed in the 13th, 14th and current 15th Knesset. The two most recent bills were by Roman Bronfman and Yuli Stern (*Divrei Ha-Knesset,* 19 Jan. 2000) who represent Russian immigrants. This solution may eventually be accepted in order to avoid a pending ruling by the High Court of Justice on registrations of non-Orthodox conversions. Calls for amending the Law of Return to limit non-Jewish immigration have been made by Orthodox politicians. See the above Knesset debate.

11. Yaakov Shavit, *From Hebrew to Canaanite,* Jerusalem, 1984 (in Hebrew); Boaz Evron, *TheNational Account*, Tel Aviv, 1988, pp.354–6 (in Hebrew).

12. Yosef Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality: Towards a New Israeli Identity,* Tel Aviv, 1993, p.108 (in Hebrew); Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism,* New York, 1971, pp.15–17.

13. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality,* pp.202, 208; Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism,* pp.174–7.

14. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality,* pp. 188–96.

15. Judy Baumel, *Between Ideology and Propaganda—the Etzel Delegation in the United States1939–48,* Jerusalem, 1999 (in Hebrew).

16. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality,* p.158. This wording echoes the language and approach expressed by Herzl in his fictional book *Altneuland* concerning the character of the future Jewish state. In a description of the festive Passover dinner (Seder) in the home of Jews who had come to Palestine from Galicia there appear as guests a Russian Orthodox priest from Zepphoris, a Franciscan monk from Tiberias and a 'venerable' Muslim from Haifa.

17. They probably identified with Ahad Ha-'Am's position that a Jewish state is valueless unless it is committed to developing Jewish culture. See his 'Jewish State and Jewish Troubles', in *Collected Writings of Ahad Ha-'Am,* Jerusalem, 1949 (in Hebrew).

18. Avnery, *Israel Without Zionism.*

19. 'A Model of a Different Israel—Forty Years to the "Hebrew Manifesto"', *Ha'aretz ,* 1 Oct. 1997 (in Hebrew).

20. Quoted from 'The Hebrew Manifesto', ibid.

21. Zikhroni, *The Versus 119: Uri Avnery on the Knesset,* Tel Aviv, 1969, p.16 (in Hebrew). The movement split before the elections of 1973; some of its activists founded a movement called 'Alternativa' in the 1980s, which entered parliament as part of the 'Progressive List for Peace'.

22. Hillel Kook and Shmuel Marlin, 'A Proposal for a National Debate', *Ha'aretz,* 18 April 1975 (in Hebrew).

23. Yoav Peled, 'Strangers in Utopia: The Civic Status of Israel's Palestinian Citizens', *Theory andCriticism,* Vol.3 (Winter 1993), p.30.

24. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality.* The first edition of this book was written in 1980 and published in 1983.

25. Ibid., pp.232–44.

26. Kook and Marlin, 'A Proposal for a National Debate'.

27. Moshe Sharon, 'Is the Middle East Ready for Peace?', *Nativ,* Vol.10, Nos.1–2 (1997), p.68 (in Hebrew).

28. Agassi, *Between Religion and Nationality,* pp.210–11.

29. Rafi Yisra'eli, 'A Company of Dodgers', *Ha'aretz,* 23 Feb. 1998 (in Hebrew). See also his book, *Arabs in Israel: Friends or Foes?,* Jerusalem, 2002, pp.2225–6 (in Hebrew).

30. Evron, *The National Account.*

31. See Shulamit Aloni, 'From Cradle to Grave: Why Does the Appellation "Israeli" Offend Them So?', *Politika,* Vol.17 (Oct. 1987), pp.11–13.

32. 'ZZThe Curse of Ezra', *Ha'aretz,* 29 Aug. 1985 (in Hebrew).

33. See the following articles by Shammas (all in Hebrew): 'A New Year's Day for Jews', *Ha'ir,* 13 Sept. 1985; 'We (Who is that?)', *Politika,* Vol.17 (Oct. 1987), pp. 26–7; The Russian Doll's Guilt', *Ha'ir,* 24 Jan. 1986; The Morning After: "Palestinians", "Israelis" and Other Imaginings', in Elie Rekhess and Tamar Yegnes (eds.), *Arab Politics in Israel at a Crossroads,* Tel Aviv, 1995, pp.19–31. The main rebuttal came from A.B. Yehoshua, *Ha'ir,* 31 Jan. 1986.

34. M.Vilner, 'Fifty Years of Struggle of Our Communist Party' (in Hebrew), *Fifty Years of theCommunist Party in Palestine/Israel,* Tel Aviv, April 1970, p.38; Nira Yuval-Davis, *Matzpen:The Socialist Organization in Israel,* Jerusalem, 1977, p.40.

35. Sara Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Interaction between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: The First Decade 1948–1958', PhD thesis, Haifa University, Department of Middle East History, 1996, p.33 (in Hebrew).

36. Maki, *The 15th Congress,* Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 6–8 Aug. 1965, 1968 (in Hebrew). The Central Committee, CPI (Rakah) *The 18th Congress,* Haifa, 15–18 Dec. 1976, p.43 (in Hebrew).

37. 'Panel, Jews and Arabs in the Peace', in Rekhess and Yegnes, *Arab Politics in Israel at aCrossroads,* p.96.

38. *Divrei Ha-Knesset,* Vol.42, No.30, pp.3906, 3899. This legislation was a direct result of the attempt to disqualify the Progressive List for Peace from running in the 1984 elections, for its allegedly anti-state platform. The attempt was foiled by a Supreme Court ruling (*Neimanv. Chairman of the Central Elections Commission for the Eleventh Knesset,* 1984, Piskei Din 39:2, 1985) which ruled that there was not sufficient evidence to disqualify. A second attempt to disqualify the PLP in 1988 on the basis of the new legislation also failed on the same grounds (*Ben Shalom v.* CEC, 1988, Piskei Din, 43:6–7, 1988) But the dissenting opinion saw in the PLP's demand to add the Arab citizens as 'owners' of the state as negating the basic principles of the state.

39. An undated manifesto.

40. Ilana Kaufman and Rachel Israeli, 'The Odd Group Out: The Arab-Palestinian Vote in the 1996 Elections', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel* 1996, Albany, 1999, pp.85–116.

41. Azmi Bisharah, 'The Revelation of Intentions', *Fasl al-Makal,* Vol.26, Nos.6–7, 1997 (in Arabic), pp.6–11.

42. On overt and covert institutionalized discrimination see David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status ofthe Arabs in Israel,* Boulder, CO, 1990; on inequality in welfare services see Zeev Rozenhak, *The Origins and Development of the Dual Welfare State: The Arab Population in the IsraeliWelfare State,* PhD thesis, Hebrew University, 1995 (in Hebrew).

43. That is precisely what occurred in Thailand when the Muslim Malay minority was declared to consist of 'Thais of Muslim extraction', who were then pressured into assimilating into the Thai Buddhist majority. See Eric Cohen, 'Citizenship, Nationality and Religion in Israel and Thailand', in Baruch Kimmerling (ed.), *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries andFrontiers,* Albany, 1989, pp.66–92.

44. On direct and indirect discrimination of Arabs in the job market see Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy,* Boulder, CO, 1993. Benjamin Wolkinson, 'Recruitment and Selection of Workers in Israel: The Question of Disparate Impact', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol.17, No.2 (April 1994), pp.260–81.

45. On the contradiction-ridden social contact between Jews and Arab professionals see Dan Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth,* Cambridge, 1997, pp.137–45.

46. On the relation between socio-economic distress and voting for Kahane see Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, 'Thorns in Your Eyes: The Socioeconomic Basis of the Kahana Vote', in Asher Arian and Michal Shamir (eds.), *The Elections in Israel, 1984,* Tel Aviv, 1986, pp.189–208.

47. Smooha and Ghanem found that none of the Jewish religious people they polled defined themselves as 'Israelis' first. In contrast, 60 per cent of those who defined themselves as non-religious chose 'Israeli' as their first identity. Sammy Smooha and As'ad Ghanem, *EthnicReligious, and Political Islam among the Arabs in Israel,* working paper no. 14, The Jewish Arab Center, University of Haifa, March 1998.

48. In the May 1999 elections the Shinui party, which ran under a radical anti-Orthodox banner jumped from two to six representatives.

49. The main reason for favouring territorial compromise, according to the Zionist political parties that favour such a policy, is the need to preserve the 'Jewish majority'. Indeed, in a 1996 Tami Steinmetz survey 68.6 per cent claimed that preserving a Jewish majority in Israel was more important than preserving the territorial integrity of the Land of Israel (Palestine). Ninety-seven per cent of those polled by Smooha and Ghanem expressed their explicit support of the Law of Return. The massive immigration from the former Soviet Union since 1990 has strengthened this trend, ironically, among the secular-leaning Jews. The majority of the immigrants are secular and a large proportion are not even Jewish. They are therefore seen as a demographic counter-balance to the Orthodox Jews.

50. In the Tami Steinmetz survey (above) only 10.5 per cent expressed willingness to marry an Arab. Twenty-two per cent believe that Arabs would be more loyal to Israel, 19 per cent they would be equally loyal both to states and 48 per cent that they would be more loyal to a Palestinian state.

51. According to the Tami Steinmetz survey (above) 90 per cent of the Arabs who were polled were willing to enter into such relations, as compared with 60–67 per cent of the Jews. On the reasons for preferring studying together with Jews see Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth,* p.84.

52. Surveys conducted after the signing of the Oslo accords showed that 42–54 per cent were in favour of civilian national service as a substitute for military service, while 21 per cent were in favour of military service: Issam Abu Rayya, *National Service for the Arabs in Israel?,* Beit Berl, 1994, p.25 (in Hebrew).

53. Rabinowitz, *Overlooking Nazareth,* pp.82–3.

54. Smooha and Ghanem found that 90 per cent of the Druzes and 60 per cent of the Christians (but only 48 per cent of the Muslims) define themselves as Israeli Arabs. Among the Arabs who were polled support for the main principles of the liberal model reached 40.4 per cent.

55. According to the survey of Smooha and Ghanem 45.6 per cent of all Arabs consider their religious identity to be the most important one, 31.4 per cent the civic Israeli identity and 23 per cent the national Palestinian one.

56. Rayya, *National Service for the Arabs in Israel?,* pp.15–16.

57. See Azmi Bisharah's article 'Equality and Communal Rights', in the Democratic National Alliance's organ *Fasl al-Maqal,* 10–16 July 1997 (in Arabic), as well as Azmi Bisharah, 'The Israeli Arab: Studies in a Split Discourse', in Pinchas Genosar and Avi Bareli (eds.), *Zionism in Today's Debate,* Center for Ben Gurion's legacy, 1996 (in Hebrew).

58. This observation was made before the October 2000 violent outburst. The participation in the outbreak of the *intifada al-Aqsa,* which resulted in the death of 13 Arab citizens by the police, no doubt opened a new chapter in the protest activities of the Arab citizens in Israel.

59. Smooha in his surveys has found this to be the case. See S.Smooha, 'Ethnic Jewish Israel as a Prototype', in R.Gabison and D.Hacker (eds.), *The Jewish-Arab Rift in Israel: A Reader,* 2001, p.96. The most recent version of this idea developed among Palestinian intellectuals, led by Edward Said is that binationalism on the whole of the contested territory should replace the Oslo approach for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. See, for example As'ad Ghanem, 'The Option of a Binational State

on the Whole Area of Eretz Israel/Palestine', in Sara Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappé (eds.), *Seven Roads: Theoretical Optionsfor the Status of the Arabs in Israel,* Givat Haviva, 1999, pp.271–303 (in Hebrew).

60. See the language of Supreme Court Judge, Misahael Heshin, *Myron Eizakson v. RashamHamiflagot ve hatnua ke shinui,* PD, 2316/96.

The Collective Identity of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace

MUHAMMAD AMARA

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli reality points to a number of deep divisions among the population (such as between Sephardi-Ashkenazi, Orthodox-secular, men-women, Arab-Jew), most of which, in my opinion, are progressively decreasing as time passes. As is known, the Arab-Jewish divide is the deepest of all, and there is still no solution, because of the hegemony of the Jewish state. The Jewish character of the state does not enable inclusion of the Arabs. Over the course of the years, therefore, the Arabs have consolidated an identity for themselves outside the hegemony of the Jewish state.

The significant differences of opinion currently extant between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in the state of Israel point to the rash of deep divisions in Israeli society that threaten, at one stage or another, to shake up the country's democratic foundations. These fissures are an expression of sectoralism that has existed since the establishment of the state of Israel. While it is true that Israeli society is today more heterogeneous than in the past, this heterogeneity presents a greater potential for conflict between Arabs and Jews. Over the years, a change has taken place in that the various sectors have become more visible in terms of their struggles in the public domain.

Unlike in the past, the Arabs are now battling, following the example of groups among the Jewish populace, for public spheres, in the hope of obtaining more resources and positions of strength, on the one hand, while, on the other, they are struggling to define the image of the country. In other words, the Arabs are struggling for that certain change in the country's identity that will result in a reasonable basis for creating a shared super-identity.

Recent years have seen significant changes take place in Israeli society, causing, among other things, a shake-up of the foundations of the hegemony. These changes have left the Arab citizens of the country outside the central public sphere, including the national symbols and feelings of belonging.

After five decades of the existence of the state of Israel, the question of collective identity of various discrete groups, particularly the Arab minority, still plays a central role in the life of the country. It is likely that, today more than

ever, we are facing a new period of defining the country's identity, as a result of the peace process with part of the Arab countries and the Palestinians. There is growing desire among the Arabs for achieving full egalitarian status with the Jewish majority, not only with regard to citizenship, but also on the national level. In addition, there is a need in certain circles among the Jews for reinforcement of and emphasis on Israeli identity as a way to bypass the inequities in certain sectors.

This article will examine two main questions:

1. Whether, in the era of peace, conditions will be ripe for building a mutual super-identity for Arabs and Jews together that extends over citizenship; i.e., a pluralistic country that belongs to all of its citizens;
2. Or, whether precisely this period of peace will strengthen the collective and particular identities as part of the process of reinforcing sectoralism in Israel.

THE JEWISH STATE AND THE ARAB MINORITY

In order to answer the two questions presented above, there is a need for an in-depth examination of the influences on the Arabs of Israel, today. Three groups of factors influence the formation of identity of Arabs: first, Israel's policies towards the minority (wherein the character and perception of the country as a Jewish state, the subject of security, and democracy are the important factors); second, external regional developments (such as the pan-Arabism of the 1950s and 1960s, the elevated status of the PLO in the international arena during the 1970s, the Iranian revolution in the 1970s, the Lebanon war in 1982, the Palestinian *intifada,* and, recently, the Oslo accords); and third, internal developments (demographic, socio-economic, educational and political). Based on this outline, I will address myself to the first group of factors: Israel and its policies toward the minority, because of the relevance to the subject raised here.[1]

The Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict and the perception of the state of Israel as a Jewish state (as indeed it defines itself) are comprised of two important elements that establish the character of relations between the Arab minority and the Jewish majority in Israel. These relations are frequently marked by tension and ongoing friction.

The need for increased security measures as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict represents an important factor in the evolution of relations between the two peoples. It has been an axiom since the establishment of the state of Israel that, as the Arabs in Israel are a national minority belonging to the Arab world and identifying with it emotionally and physically, they represent a security risk to

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Israel. As long as there is not an appropriate resolution of this conflict, they will continue to be a security risk.[2] What's more, Arabs are perceived as citizens whose loyalty to the state 'is in doubt and is a factor containing the potential for endangering the Zionistic nature (in the best case) or the very existence (in the worst case)' of the country.[3]

The security outlook resulted in the decision to relieve the Arabs in Israel of the obligation of army service and gave rise to the concept of 'conflict of loyalties'[4] or 'dual loyalties'.[5] According to these concepts, Arab loyalties lean towards the Arab people. While the question of loyalty relieved Arabs of serving in the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), it also placed them, via the central governing authority, in a disadvantaged position, for, as is known, many benefits are accorded only to army veterans. Arabs are, thus, ineligible for such benefits.

The issue of security *vis-à-vis* the Arabs was not the only factor that shaped the condition and status of the Arabs in Israel, but it did serve as a catalyst. The significant factor affecting their condition and status is the very essence of Israel's definition and perception of itself as a Jewish state. The Declaration of Independence clearly articulates that Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and many laws have been passed to reinforce this concept and definition.

Without a doubt, the intense preoccupation with the ongoing security question precluded genuine debate over the nature and identity of the country, thus marginalizing the issue of relations between the majority and the minority. The decision-makers in Israel did not definitively establish the policy that would be applied to the Arabs in Israel, for neither the short term nor the long term. Decisions were taken under the pressure of events.[6] It should be remembered, however, that these events were separate and scattered occurrences. There was, therefore, no active pressure on the decision-makers to take absolute stands on the subject. Solutions were generally devised in an *ad hoc* manner; i.e., as the results of strikes or violent protests, and particularly after the first Land Day demonstration in 1976.

Landau even speaks about lack of policy.[7] That is to say, decision-makers deferred addressing the problems of the minority because of the ongoing conflict and because of increasing domestic tensions among the Jews. Nissan goes even further in his contentions and explains that the policies of various governments totally bypassed the 'Arab problem', let alone confronted it directly. The main purpose of this avoidance was to lessen the number of points of friction with the populace, and this, according to Nissan, also reduces, of necessity, the 'full and complete realization of Zionism, as was the stand of Ben-Gurion, at the time'.[8]

It should not be inferred from the above that no improvements or changes took place in the condition of the Arabs in the state of Israel over the course of time. During the past decade, significant changes have taken place in the awareness of Israel's leaders that the gaps between the minority and majority must be diminished. This found expression in changes of outlooks and in conscious steps taken to reduce the gaps.[9] The changes were small and applied only to isolated points in certain areas, however. There is still no significant change with regard

to the status of Arabs in Israel. In other words, there is a preference for Jews over Arabs.

This poses certain questions. How is democracy[10] affected by the definition and perception of Israel as the Jewish state? How does the security question affect democracy? What are the influences and ramifications of these issues *vis-à-vis* Arab society in Israel?

Many researchers speak about the intensive processes of democratization Israeli society has experienced and continues to experience. When speaking of democracy, is it only equality with regard to tangible elements being discussed (i.e., allocations and resources)? Or, is the reference to more principled demands, such as the symbols of the 'playing field'? A country that defines itself as being of one ethnic group violates basic principles of democracy when the attitude towards a group that is not part of the dominant ethnic group, as in the example, finds open expression in the exclusive immigration laws (the Law of Return and other laws) and in the use of government lands. In a country such as Israel, therefore, equality is impossible, in principle, as long as the country does not change its characterization as a Jewish state.

While it is true that important democratic processes have been implemented, they have not brought about significant change in Israeli society, since a civil society built more on ideology and less on one's group affiliation has not evolved from these processes.

Israel is not the only country in the world that has such a conflict, but the security issue adds a unique aspect, differentiating Israel from others. In this context, Rouhana states, 'When tough steps are taken by a country, there is a likelihood that some of those steps will impinge on democratic principles and the rule of law.'[11] There is no doubt that this is what happened in Israel over the past 50 years. According to Lustick, Israel invoked military law as a means for controlling the Arab population.[12] The establishment carried out many actions under the overall cover of security needs that were unjustified and unseemly. For example, seizing Arab lands is one of the most glaring actions carried out in the name of security, reflected in the passage of laws and in the exploitation of protocols drawn up for periods of emergency. There also has been the disbanding of settlements under the cover of security needs, such as the well-known examples of Akrat and Bara'am. Similarly, Arabs have been discriminated against with regard to allocation of financial resources and certain payments, such as National Insurance for children (until recently) and tuition, as established by the Katzav Commission.

Having reviewed the policy of the Jewish state towards its Arab minority, I will return to the question set forth at the beginning of the discussion: in an era of peace, to what degree is Israel, the Jewish state, whose purpose is Zionist, prepared to advance in the direction of creating a mutual super-identity for both Arabs and Jews? That is to say, to what extent is Israel prepared to compromise its self-definition and perception as a Jewish state? How will this affect the

collective identity of the Arabs in Israel? The discussion that follows is addressed to these questions.

IDENTITY AMONG THE ARABS OF ISRAEL IN AN ERA OF PEACE

The nature of relations between Jews and Arabs has affected the formation of identity among the Arabs of Israel. Their identity has been a source of ongoing academic argument. One group of researchers maintains that the Arab minority is undergoing a process of 'Israelization'.[13] Theybelievethe Arabs in Israel are moving in the direction of integration into Israeli society and perceive themselves as Israelis. Their struggle is for a country of normal coexistence, with full and equal rights of citizenship. The fact that the Arabs in Israel limited themselves to only moral and financial support of the *intifada* reinforces this hypothesis, which is known as the Israelization approach. The other group maintains that the Arabs in Israel identify with the Palestinians of the territories, both politically and culturally.[14] This hypothesis, known as the Palestinization approach, holds that the reunification of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza since 1967 amplified, among the Arabs of Israel, the feeling of being strangers.

Amara and Kabaha suggest a combined approach.[15] They claim the choice of a dichotomy is overly simplistic. Paradoxically, the *intifada* reinforced both concepts: the Palestinian identity and the Israeli one. For the Israeli Palestinians, Israeli society is the source of modernization and urbanization. At the same time, Palestinization represents their desire to preserve their identity. At the same time that drawing closer to Israeli society enables them to achieve some of the aspirations of their daily lives as citizens with equal rights, drawing closer to the culture of their Palestinian brethren satisfies their aspirations for a national identity and cultural affiliation.

The primary dilemma *vis-à-vis* the identity of the Arabs in Israel is between nationhood and nationality. Therefore, this issue of relations between the Jews and Arabs in Israel revolves around the fundamental problems relating to the identity of the state of Israel and the affinity of its citizenry with regard to self-identity.

Lish claims that the self-identity of the Arabs in Israel is not static, but dynamic, and is influenced by the rewards in societal structure and political conditions.[16] In traditional Arab society, which is in a transitional period, various identities, old and new, can be found side by side: consciousness of belonging to a religious-ethnic clan next to a consciousness of nationalistic affiliation. In his opinion, the nationalistic identity is not uniform, either, and changes.

Kimmerling's opinion is that the very definition of Israel as a country for the Jewish people excludes the non-Jewish residents and citizens of the country from the collective.[17] The definition of the state's parameters of identity is very broad

and includes people who do not live within its territory and are found outside its political control, since the country belongs to the entire Jewish people.

The identity of the Arabs in Israel has gone through many incarnations and far-reaching changes since the establishment of the country.[18] This identity has been affected by many and varied factors, including some external to the community and some internal to it, deriving from economic and political changes Arab society has undergone since Israel was formed. These changes have resulted in processes of modernization and urbanization,[19] which contributed to the strengthening of certain components in their identity and weakening of others.

The various studies indicate changes in the order and significance of identities during different periods among the Arab minority in Israel.[20] This is briefly summarized as follows. During the first period, between 1948 and 1967, most studies establish that there was a delicate balance in the identity of the Arabs of Israel. This found expression in the development of systems for adapting and a desire to become part of the life of the country.[21] The Palestinian element in their individual and collective identity was extremely weak, owing to the defeat during the war of 1948, the lack of political and cultural leadership, and as a result of the disconnection of contact with the remnants of the Palestinian people. While they were deep in the process of adapting to their new status as a minority, the process of coming to terms with the contradicting factors in their identity commenced, all the time hoping the condition was only temporary and fleeting. They put emphasis on their Israeli identity more than any other. The reawakening of the Palestinian element in their identity began only after the Six Day War in 1967.

The second period is 1967–73. As indicated by most studies, the Six Day War —with the conquering of the territories and the military defeat of the Arab countries—amplified Israeli Arabs' fear of Israel and hatred for it and strengthened their identification with the Arab world. Renewed contact with the Palestinians of the territories put an end to the isolation and created direct contact with a population and leadership having a high sense of nationalistic consciousness. These contacts awakened the Palestinian components in the identities of the Arabs in Israel, which connected, anew, with consciousness of the Palestinian suffering. During this period, strong emphasis was placed on pan-Arabism, the Palestinian component was reawakened, and the linkage to Israel and Israeli identity became looser.[22]

The third period, from 1973 to the present, is characterized by the strengthening of the Palestinian component and weakening of the Israeli and the Arab in their identities—or, more precisely, consolidation of the Palestinian identity as the most significant one in the repertoire of identities. This period, characterized by a reawakening of Islam, was reflected in the placement of greater emphasis on the Islamic component in their identity, more than during any other period.[23]

The question that is asked is what can be learned from the studies on the identity of the Arabs in Israel? On the basis of various studies, and in spite of the

differing approaches of these studies, the main conclusions can be summarized as follows:

1. Very few Arabs who are citizens of the state of Israel define themselves only as Israelis.
2. There is a constant increase in the tendency of the Arabs in Israel to describe their collective identity as Palestinian.
3. The national identity steadily remains central in private life.
4. Religious identity became a silent one.

As noted above, the collective repertoire of identities of the Arabs in Israel arose from political conditions: Israel's attitude towards the minority, internal developments among the minority, and Zionistic developments. Rouhana reaches the conclusion that the collective identity of the Arabs in Israel is not complete, saying: The result was an incomplete collective identity in which the Palestinian component provided the sensitive path to the sentimental linkage, but not to the legal, the administrative, and the daily tools which the Israeli element provided them, but without satisfying the desire of the sentimental needs.'[24]

The identity repertoire of the Arabs in Israel that has developed in recent years —and that is not without contradictions—is feasible in the complex Israeli reality, in spite of the sharp conflict between the fact that they are citizens of a country that has long been in a state of war with the Arab world of which they are an integral part. It is therefore perceived as temporary, until a permanent solution is found for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In my estimation, peace will bring far-reaching changes to Israeli society and will have a direct effect on the Arab populace in Israel. The security question, which had been a dubious excuse for discrimination against Arabs, will disappear from the public agenda, and equality of the Arab minority will be the central issue that will establish their attitude towards the state. Among the Arabs, equality is perceived not only as equality in terms of their citizenship, but also equality in terms of their nationhood. Here, the state of Israel will have to cope with the deep internal contradiction that exists between the structure of the Jewish state (as an exclusive ethnic state) and democracy as a supreme value of real equality for all citizens. This contradiction will be more prominent in the central public sphere, among both Arabs and Jews, when the security issue, which has prevented realization of equality, disappears.

On this, if the state is to respond to Arab demands in the positive, it will have to 'go through a change from an exclusive ethnic state, in terms of law, to a national democratic state'. Alternately, the exclusive character of the country can become stronger, potentially via such acts as reducing the number of Arabs in the country and lowering their status.[25] It is my contention that, with the establishment of peace and in the short term following it, the chances for the first option are as unlikely as can be, and the possible strengthening of the exclusive nature of the country is more realistic.

In terms of the exclusive nature of the state of Israel, no common super-identity has developed among both Jews and Arabs. Israel has always emphasized its Jewish identity. Therefore, there is no true Israeli people in Israel, today. One can speak about Israeli citizens—Arabs and Jews—but there is no Israeli people or Israeli nationality that embraces both ethnic groups.

There are several strata to a collective identity: the level of emotional linkage and sense of belonging to a national system; the political level; and the cultural-social level. In Rouhana's study[26] and in studies by others, it was clarified to a very meaningful degree that the Arabs in Israel feel they are partners with the Palestinians, both from the standpoint of sentimental linkage/belonging as a people and from the political standpoint. On the social-cultural level, the results are different: the Arabs in Israel develop stands and social values in directions of modernity that are different from both the Israeli society and the Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza. In this dimension, they are closer to Israeli society. This fact is extremely important, because this is the only significant difference between them and the Palestinian populace in the West Bank and Gaza, finding expression in an emphasis on Israeli cultural aspects.

This fact can teach us two important things. First is that the Israelization of the Arabs in Israel is more a matter of internalizing cultural values that are influenced by Jewish Israeli society than identifying with it. The second is that there is not a sufficiently strong foundation for creating a mutual identity. This is true for the current reality. The assumption is that, in an era of peace, after permanent agreements are established with the Palestinians, there will no longer be significant differences on political subjects (such as Jerusalem and the refugees). From this, the central question that begs to be answered is will a reasonable basis be established for a common super-identity among Jews and Arabs in the state of Israel in an era of peace?

It is my contention that, in an era of peace and the period shortly following it, the peace will amplify the sectoralism in Israel and, with it, the particular identities. That is to say, the minority has high expectations and determined demands that peace with the Palestinians and the Arab states will also bring about changes in the character of Israel as a Jewish state. These very expectations and demands, however, will cause an intensification of the exclusive ethnic nature of the country and will strengthen the particular, separate identities.

A compromise with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will be accompanied by high expectations for full equality and ambitious demands by the Arab minority for changes in the character of Israel as the Jewish state. Many Israelis see the peace process with the Arabs as a battle over the collective Jewish identity.[27] Withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories will be accompanied by the crumbling of intra-communal solidarity among the Jews. The peace, in this event, will amplify the internal divisions among the Jews. Yet, determined demands to change the character of Israel as a Jewish state will lead to denying the stands with regard to the Arabs. There will be a need for unifying devices that will strengthen the Jewish identity of the state, and the issue of the

Arabs will be useful in enhancing the realization of this unity. The basic assumption is that Israel has made far-reaching concessions on the West Bank and Gaza, involving withdrawal from and reduction of the physical territory of the land of Israel. Among most of the Jewish Israeli population, withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be perceived as the maximum possible concession for peace with the Arabs and Palestinians. This concession will enable them to live in peace and in a state of normality in the Jewish state.

The state can take positive measures towards the Arabs by significantly improving services and allocating financial resources. The Arab people will not be satisfied with meaningful improvement only in their private rights as citizens; they will also vigorously demand a change in the character of the state as a Jewish state, something that will be perceived as an immediate threat against the country. Among many Jewish Israelis, this will appear to be a most serious problem. After the compromise with the Palestinians, the Israelis will think and feel they have made the maximum concessions that they can offer the Arabs, in order to live in peace in the Jewish state. The hard reaction to the Arab demands to change the character of the state is expected to come not only from the liberal Right, but also from the Centre and even from a significant part of the Left.

Simultaneous with the era of peace, the Arabs will have vigorous demands for full equality, including changing the character of the Jewish state to one which is a state for all of its citizens. The Jews will feel and will claim that the concession made in withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza is the end of Jewish concessions. In parallel, the Arabs in Israel will feel and will claim that the concession is a historic one: i.e., conceding more than 80 per cent of Mandatory Palestine will be perceived as the maximum concession that the Palestinians could have made. Therefore, they will have high expectations for full equality *vis-à-vis* receiving equal rights in the country, including collective rights, particularly their recognition as a minority people.

Since the 1980s and until today, we have witnessed a great rise in the expectations of the Arabs in Israel and their demands for change in their conditions and status. These expectations became even greater during the period of the *intifada*[28] and following the signing of the Oslo accords. A large portion of the Arabs believe their status and condition in the state of Israel will improve under the circumstances of lack of tension between Israel and its neighbours, particularly during an era of peace.[29]

Today, there are two opposing approaches to the status of the Arabs in Israel in the era of peace. One approach maintains that their conditions and status will improve:

> The general assumption over the years of the state's existence was that peace between Israel and the Arab world, particularly with the Palestinians and resolution of their nationhood problem, would better the status and sensitivities of the Palestinian citizens of Israel and their relations to the

state and the Jewish majority. Statements in this spirit have been made by Arab and Jewish interlocutors.[30]

Smooha also takes this approach, and he believes that, in the era of peace, and in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state, it will become easier for the Arabs to accept the definition of Israel 'as the state of the Jewish people'.[31] Their condition will improve when the state is compelled to answer some of their demands. This will be true on the condition that the Arabs are satisfied with improvement of their status as citizens and don't demand change in the character of the country.

The other approach, which opposes the first, claims that there is no certainty that the Arabs' condition will improve; rather, it will deteriorate. Lissak says:

> It is very likely that precisely with the arrival of a solution to the political conflict, the result of which will be the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the territories, the civil standing of the Arabs of Israel will deteriorate. In such a case, the test of loyalty of the Arabs of Israel will be more difficult and demanding than in the past.[32]

Shammas believes that the problem of the Arabs will remain unresolved, even after a Palestinian state is established.[33] Bisharah and Mana'a also express a similar opinion that peace will not necessarily improve the lot of the Arabs.[34]

In my opinion, improvement or deterioration of the standing of the Arabs depends on the types of demands they make. Vigorous demands for obviation of the character of Israel as a Jewish state will cause a worsening of the condition of the Arabs, for, in the short term, the state of Israel is not prepared to make concessions over its Jewish character as the state of the Jewish people. Even the political parties that are aligned with the Israeli Left are not prepared to accept this demand, and there is a risk that they would realign to the Right. More moderate demands, therefore, in the Mapam style—'a Jewish state and a state for all its citizens'—can contribute positively to their status.

In this type of reality, the Palestinian and Islamic identities will become stronger among the Arabs, and the Jewish identity will become stronger among the Jews. The Israeli identity will become much weaker, particularly among the Arabs.

Bisharah describes the process of Israelization among the Arabs as a split Israelization, since it not founded on equality.[35] Rouhana rejects the concept of Israelization, since this comprises such concepts as pride, loyalty, a sense of belonging, and an emotional connection to the country on the basis of being a Jewish state.[36]

The Israeli identity in the repertoire of identities of the Arabs in Israel will change to being very marginal; parties and movements will be formed, and leaders will speak about the absence of its realization. Marginal Israelization, in and of itself, doesn't preclude creation of identity; so, there is a need to fill in the

empty spaces of Israelization. The Palestinian identity will become even stronger, in parallel with a strengthening of religious identity. Here, it may be referred to as a renewal of identity, and there are already signs of this taking place.[37]

Similarly, the Jewish identity will become stronger among the Jewish populace. Currently, there is a broad consensus with regard to the body of basic authorities on the Jewish nature of the state of Israel, and only small groups, which are a small minority among the Jewish public, are outside this consensus, in the style of the Karaites or the 'post-Zionists'.[38] In a situation of peace, there is a need for a super-identity for the Jews. As explained above, peace amplifies internal divisions. There will be a need for unifying systems, in order to strengthen the Jewish identity of the country, and the Arabs can serve to increase the likelihood of such unification being realized. Strengthening the country's identity will require, among other things, strengthening the Jewish identity of the Jews.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Although the perception and structure of the various identities among the Arabs in Israel have undergone considerable changes, the central dilemma is still focused in the area between their identity as citizens, on one hand, and their Arab Palestinian nationhood on the other. Three factors influence their identity dilemma: the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict; Israel as a Jewish state; and the discrimination against Arabs in both the nationality and civil contexts. These factors can either ease or exacerbate the dilemma, as follows.

First, the Israeli-Arab peace process is likely to have a considerable effect on the definition of the identity of the Arabs in Israel. The status of the Palestinian minority is affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict, among others. Peace between Israel and the Arab countries is likely to speed up the integration process of the Arabs in Israel. The people of Israel will act to put an end to discrimination against its Palestinian citizens and will offer them full civil equality, contributing to broad integration of the Arabs in Israel. Broad integration into Israeli society will, without a doubt, bring about a strengthening of the Israeli identity within their repertoire of identities.

Second, the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel will contribute to strengthening the Israeli identity among the Arabs. This situation will be similar to that of the Jews living in the Diaspora; i.e., identifying with the country in which they live while simultaneously maintaining an identity with Israel.

Third, the people of Israel will be prepared to compromise over the definition and perception of the country as the Jewish state, and a model will be found that will satisfy the desires of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. This is likely to accelerate the process of the Arabs identifying with Israel, at the same time strengthening their Israeli identity. Meanwhile, the decisive majority of Jews is not prepared to change the definition and nature of Israel as a Jewish

state. Even in an era of peace, at least for the foreseeable period, most Jews will not be prepared to compromise in this area. In this and other matters, Arabs will have vigorous demands for full equality in an era of peace, both in the civil and national spheres: i.e., a country having two nationalities or a country for all of its citizens, which the Jewish majority actively opposes. Such a situation will contribute to strengthening of the particular collective identities and to a profound challenge to the development of a common Israeli super-identity.

NOTES

Author's note: The first draft of this article was presented as a paper at the Study Day 'Democracy and Sectorialism in Israel', at Tami Steinmetz Center, Tel Aviv University, May 1999.

1. For further details on the influence of internal and external factors, see Muhammad Amara and Sufian Kabaha, *Divided Identity: A Study of Political Division and Social Reflections in aSplit Village,* Givat Haviva, 1996 (in Hebrew), and Nadim Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens inan Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict,* New Haven and London, 1997.
2. Yitzhak Reiter, *The Civil Status of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace,* Position-Paper Series No. 3, Beit Berl, 1996 (in Hebrew).
3. Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and thePolicies towards Them,* Jerusalem, 1992, p.211 (in Hebrew).
4. Reiter, *The Civil Status of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace.*
5. Yaakov M.Landau, *The Arabs in Israel: Political Examinations,* Tel Aviv, 1971 (in Hebrew).
6. Benziman and Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel.*
7. Yaakov M.Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects,* Tel Aviv, 1993 (in Hebrew).
8. Mordechai Nissan, *The Jewish State and the Arab Problem,* Tel Aviv, 1986, p.164 (in Hebrew).
9. A number of examples demonstrate changes that have taken place: discontinuation of the seizing of lands (primarily in The Triangle' and the Galilee); resolution of the status of many buildings which were constructed without permits; reduction of the gaps between Arab and Jewish local authorities; elimination of the discrimination against Arabs with regard to child subsidies; acceptance of Arab academics into government service; allocation of more significant budgets to education, health, roads, construction and housing; establishment of funds awarding prizes to Arab writers; award of the Israel Prize to Arabs. In the political arena, the Arab bloc served to reinforce Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's second term of office/government, with two Arab political parties even signing political agreements in this context.
10. For the nature and characteristics of democracy in Israel, see Sammy Smooha, 'Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype', in Pinchas Ginosar and Avi Bareli (eds.), *Zionism: AModern Polemic: Research and Ideological Approaches,* Kiryat Sde Boker, 1996, pp.277–311 (in Hebrew).

11. Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State,* p.56.
12. Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority,* Haifa, 1985 (in Hebrew).
13. See for example As'ad Ghanem and Sara Ozacky-Lazar, *Green Line, Red Lines: Arabs in Israelin Consideration of the Intifada,* Givat Haviva, 1990, p.5 (in Hebrew); Yosef Ginat, 'Voting Patterns and Political Behavior in the Arab Sector', in Y.Landau (ed.), *The Arab Voice in the1988 Knesset Elections,* Jerusalem, 1989, pp.3–21 (in Hebrew); Sam Lehman-Wilzig, 'Copying the Master? Patterns of Israeli Arab Protest, 1950–1990', *Asian and African Studies,* Vol.27 (1993), pp. 129–47; Sammy Smooha, The Arab Minority in Israel: Radicalization or Politicization?', *Studies in Contemporary Jewry,* Vol.5 (1989), pp.1–21; Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel: Change and Continuity in Mutual Tolerance,* Vol. 2, Boulder, CO, 1992; and to some extent Majid al-Haj, 'Elections in the Arab Street in the Shadow of the Intifada', in Landau, *The Arab Vote in the 1988 Knesset Elections,* pp.35–49 (in Hebrew).
14. See for example Yaacov Landau, 'The Arab Vote', in D.Caspi, A.Diskin and E.Gutmann (eds.), *The Roots of Begin's Success,* London, 1984, pp. 169–89; Landau, *The Arab Vote in the1988 Knesset Elections;* Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State;* Raanan Cohen, *In the Thicket ofLoyalty: Society and Politics in the Arab Sector,* Tel Aviv, 1989 (in Hebrew); A. Regev, *TheArabs of Israel: Political Issues,* Jerusalem, 1989 (in Hebrew); Eli Reches, 'The Arabs of Israel and the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Political Ties and National Identity', *TheNew East,* Vol.32 (1989), pp.165–91 (in Hebrew); Arnon Sofer, The Territorial Struggle between Jews and Arabs in Israel', *Geographic Horizons,* Vols.17–18 (1986), pp.7–23 (in Hebrew); Arnon Sofer, The Arabs of Israel: From the Village to the Metropolis, and What Next', *The New East,* Vol.32 (1989), pp.132–8 (in Hebrew).
15. Amara and Kabaha, *Divided Identity.*
16. Aharon Lish (ed.), 'The Arabs of Israel: Identity Crisis', *The New East,* Vol.32 (1989), pp.1–9 (in Hebrew).
17. B. Kimmerling, 'State-Society Relations in Israel', in Uri Ram (ed.), *Israeli Society: CriticalAspects,* Tel Aviv, 1993, pp.228–350 (in Hebrew).
18. The various studies point to the existence of four primary identity circles among the Arabs of Israel: the Palestinian, the Arabic, the Islamic and the Israeli. In addition to these basic four, there are additional particular identities: regional, cultural-ecological (such as Bedouins), and local (like the clan), which are known to have great importance. (For further details, see Amara and Kabaha, *Divided Identity.)*
19. Lehman-Wilzig, 'Copying the Master?'.
20. For further details on identities by period, see Amara and Kabaha, *Divided Identity.*
21. See, for example, Yohanan Peres and Nira Yuval-Davis, 'Some Observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arabs', *Human Relations,* Vol.22, No.3 (1969), pp.219–33; Rafi Yisraeli, 'On the Problem of Identity of the Arabs in Israel', in Alouph Hareven (ed.), *OneOut of Six Israelis,* Jerusalem, 1981, pp. 179–84 (in Hebrew); Cohen, *In the Thicket ofLoyalty;* Sara Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Stands of the Arabs of Israel *vis-à-vis* the State, 1949–1967', MA thesis, Haifa University, 1990 (in Hebrew); Azmi Bisharah, 'On the Question of the Palestinian Minority in Israel', *Theory and Supervision,* Vol.3 (Winter 1993), pp.7–20 (in Hebrew).

22. See Yohanan Peres, *Relations of Ethnic Communities in Israel,* Tel Aviv, 1976 (in Hebrew); Eli Reches, 'The Arabs of Israel: Development in the Political Activism Sphere', in Hareven, *One Out of Six Israelis,* pp.141–8 (in Hebrew); M.Gabbai, *The Arabs of Israel: A Questionof Identity,* Givat Haviva, 1984 (in Hebrew); A.Shendahl, 'The Arab Population in Judaea and Samaria', *Monthly Survey,* 8.28 (1989), pp.3–19 (in Hebrew); Shmuel Eisenstadt, *IsraeliSociety and Its Values,* Jerusalem, 1990 (in Hebrew).

23. See Y.Hoffman, *Likenesses and Identity of Arab Youth in Israel,* Haifa, 1977 (in Hebrew); H. Tesler, 'Israeli Arabs and the Palestinian Problem', *Middle East Journal,* Vol.31 (1977), pp.313–29; R. Lazerovitz, *Identity and the Educational Environment,* Haifa, 1978 (in Hebrew); Smooha, 'The Arab Minority in Israel'; Sammy Smooha, 'Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution: National Security and the Arab Minority', in Avner Yaniv (ed.), *NationalSecurity and Democracy in Israel,* Boulder, CO and London, 1993, pp.120–24; Ramzi Suleiman, The Palestinian Identity and Citizenship among Educated Arabs in Israel', in Khalid Kalifa (ed.), *The Palestinians between 1948–1988,* Acre, 1983 (in Arabic); Kimmerling, 'State-Society Relations in Israel'; Muhammad Amara, 'The Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism in Israel', *Terrorism and Political Violence,* Vol.8, No.2 (Special Issue on *Religious Radicalism in the Middle East,* eds. B. Maddy-Weitzman and I. Inbar, 1996), pp.155–70.

24. Rouhana, *Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State,* p.151.

25. Ibid., p.203.

26. Ibid.

27. Yoram Perry, The Myth of Rabin and the Media: Reconstruction of the Collective Israeli Identity', *Dvarim Ahadim,* Vol.1 (1997), pp.51–65 (in Hebrew).

28. During this period, the demonstrations and strikes rose significantly. Ghanem and Ozacky-Lazar, *Green Line, Red Lines,* contend, for example, that strikes regarding social matters increased as a result of the *intifada.*

29. For further details, see Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Stands of the Arabs of Israel *vis-à-vis* the State, 1949–1967'; and As'ad Ghanem, 'Ideological Streams of the Question of Jewish-Arab Coexistence among the Arabs in Israel 1967–1989', MA thesis, Haifa University, 1990 (in Hebrew).

30. Sara Ozacky-Lazar and As'ad Ghanem, *Between Peace and Equality: The Arabs in Israel at theMid-point of the Labour-Meretz Government,* Survey No.16, Givat Haviva, 1995, p.17 (in Hebrew).

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The Status of the Palestinians in Israel in an Era of Peace: Part of the Problem but Not Part of the Solution

AS'AD GHANEM and SARAH OZACKY-LAZAR

INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the 1948 war and the establishment of the state of Israel, close to two million inhabitants lived in Mandatory Palestine—two-thirds of them Palestinian Arabs and one-third Jews. The vast majority of the Palestinians (nearly 940,000) and almost all of the Jews lived on the territory that later became Israel. As a result of expulsions and mass flight,[1] only about 160,000 Arabs, who accounted for ten per cent of the Palestinian population at the time, stayed in Israel at the conclusion of hostilities. Nearly 780,000 Palestinians became refugees in the 'West Bank' which was annexed to the kingdom of Jordan, in Gaza Strip, which was put under Egyptian military government and in neighbouring Arab countries.[2]

In 1952, the number of Palestinians was about 1.6 million, of whom 11 per cent lived in Israel (179,300), 18 per cent (about 300,000) in Gaza, 47 per cent (about 742,300) in the West Bank and nine per cent (150,000) in the east part of Jordan. The rest, about 380,000, lived in the neighbouring Arab countries: roughly 114,000 (seven per cent) in Lebanon, close to 83,000 (five per cent) in Syria, and about three per cent in other countries.

The dispersal of the Palestinian population disrupted and delayed social and political processes that had begun among the Palestinians before the war. Many villages and towns were wiped off the map; others were partially destroyed or some of their inhabitants fled the country or moved to other places within Israel and were later defined as 'internal refugees'.[3] Many families found themselves split, with some remaining in the territory of Israel and some in the neighbouring countries. The incipient industry in Arab towns and nascent social institutions of various sorts were also destroyed. Most seriously, processes that should have led

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to greater Palestinian national solidarity and could have led to the creation of a Palestinian political entity were disrupted or terminated.

In addition to the disruption and delay of these processes, the different concentrations of the Palestinian people who lived under different regimes suffered problems of various sorts, of which the common feature was that they were a consequence of the 1948 war. Taken together, they constituted the core of what has since been called the 'Palestinian problem', with its various corollaries.

The difficult situation of the Palestinians in Israel immediately after 1948 was a result of events during and after the war. The significant and immediate difference between them and other Palestinians lay in the fact that they had remained on their land and became citizens of the Jewish state of Israel. In practice, however, this fact, which is important in itself, did not help them very much. In the eyes of the Israeli authorities and various security agencies they were generally considered to be part of the Arab and Palestinian 'enemy' and Israel adopted a policy of harsh control as part of the steps to control and deter them.

The Palestinians who remained in Israel were confused by the shock of the Arab defeat by the Jewish army, and by the establishment of a state alien to them. They were weak, divided, and lacked a national political leadership to guide them. Most of them were poor, illiterate and unorganized. Their main concern at the time was to earn some living for their families and stick to their land in order not to become refugees like their brothers and sisters. The Israeli authorities employed diverse techniques that deterred many Arabs from political participation or even political discussions that were not to the taste of the authorities; this impeded the consolidation of a national leadership and encouraged 'accommodating' actors on the Arab side. Military government and economic policy helped the authorities control the Arabs and limit their activities.[4]

Until 1967, most Arabs did not have the leisure for political activity because of the harsh conditions of their life in Israel. This economic dependence meant that the authorities could threaten those who might be inclined to political activity with the loss of their jobs. In the second period, beginning in 1967, the gradual liberation from the shadow of the military government led to a significant change in the patterns of political activity and thought among the Palestinians in Israel. Still, their major political effort was devoted, until the early 1990s, to looking for a solution to the Palestinian problem in the form of the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the same time, they strove to improve their own standard of living and to modify the policy of the Israeli authorities towards them. Their leaders focused on putting forward demands for civic equality and invested their effort in bringing about changes in social and political aspects of Palestinian society in Israel.[5]

The Oslo accords of September 1993 marked a new stage in the political life of the Palestinians in Israel and in their aspirations. The direct contacts between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the declared intention to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict removed one of the two key

issues from the agenda of the Palestinians in Israel; in effect, it left the question of civil equality in the state as the leading item of their struggle. This acquired significant momentum in view of the idea, which emerged over the years, that a solution of the problem of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza would promote Arab equality in Israel and help realize their demands in this realm.[6]

Thus a solution to the question of the Israeli occupation in the territories was seen as advancing the discussion about the Arabs' equality in Israel. Similarly, recognition of the PLO, and Israeli negotiations with it, meant the start of a solution to the problem of the status and political situation of the Palestinian people as a whole, yet one link is still missing, namely, the political status and condition of the Palestinians in Israel.

Immediately after the signature of the Declaration of Principles by the government of Israel and the PLO, on the assumption that most of the Palestinians in Israel supported this agreement, the public and academic debate about the status desired by the Palestinian citizens of Israel received great impetus.[7] The preferred or possible status of the Palestinians in Israel, in confrontation with the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state, were discussed with greater frequency than in the past. Old and new ideas of broad or limited personal autonomy were raised, along with ideas of annexation of part of the Triangle to the future Palestinian entity in the West Bank or a more substantial integration than at present of the Palestinians in Israel, as individuals and/or as a group.

This article deals with the status of the Palestinians in Israel and potential future developments that the state of Israel and its Jewish and Palestinian Arab citizens will have to deal with and resolve in order to complete the settlement of the Palestinian problem, of which it is part. We shall relate the theoretical options available for the future status of the Palestinians in Israel and how the Arabs themselves perceive their future status.[8]

THE PALESTINIAN ARAB MINORITY IN ISRAEL: THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES

The status of minorities is an issue which many researchers and politicians in the free world are concerned with. There is a great deal of professional literature on the subject, dealing with both its theoretical and practical aspects. The ideal of the modern state, the liberal national state, which has evolved during the last two centuries, is based on the right to self-determination of national groups and the human rights of their members, recognizing them as a source of governmental authority. The state has become a means of safeguarding the security, rights and welfare of the individual belonging to a people or a nation. The key question is, therefore, what is 'a nation' or what are the criteria for inclusion within that concept? Are all the citizens living within a certain territory under the jurisdiction of the state to be considered 'the nation' or 'a people', or only those falling under specific social or cultural criteria such as language, religion and tradition? Do only the members of the majority cultural group deserve the status

of 'a people', or do other groups, living within the state's territories also deserve it? In answer to these questions, various models of states have developed:

- *The liberal multinational state* which grants to all the individuals within it equal individual rights, but at the same time makes it possible to promote, by various means, collective national identities. Such a state stresses the rules of shared citizenship, and the distribution of resources is shared and balanced. Switzerland and Belgium are examples of this type of state.
- *The ethnic national state* also grants equal individual rights to all its citizens, but its collective majority is composed of people of the same ethnic origin, the same religion or other cultural characteristics. Such a state seeks to create maximal overlap between citizenship and ethnic affiliation and promotes the advancement of the majority group. This creates tension with the minority groups that are not included in the majority culture. The tension is controlled by various means such as the representation of the minority in government institutions on a personal basis, by not imposing on the minority citizens all the duties nor granting them all the rights, and sometimes granting a limited autonomy in the cultural, educational and religious spheres. Examples of such a state are Israel, Malaysia, Germany and Latvia.
- *The civic national state* is a model adopted by most democracies. Although such a state reflects in practice the culture of the majority, its government and judiciary are based on the declared position that the state is neutral ethnically and nationally. The collective identity is based on the factor of citizenship which acts as a bridge, and not on ethnic origin, heritage, religion or any kind of cultural affinity. Citizenship is given the status of a kind of 'civil religion' and the state is multicultural.

In societies deeply split on an ethnic, religious, national or some other basis, there are various practices (or malpractices), creating the legal-institutional or non-institutional framework for dealing with the status of the various groups. On the theoretical level, researchers list mechanisms such as control, the development of majoritarian democracies, consociationalism or ethnic democracy, as means capable of ensuring stability in split societies.[9] The failure or success of these mechanisms determines the behaviour and aspirations of the minority communities. The demands raised by various minorities are mainly of three types:

1. *Irredenta and separation:* Many national and ethnic groups develop irredentist movements (wishing to detach themselves from one state and join another) or separatist movements (wishing to establish a new state). Such demands are usually accompanied by violence and sometimes lead to civil war between the minority group and the central government, controlled by the majority.

2. *Autonomy:* Minority groups sometimes demand autonomy in certain spheres of life. They may adopt the demand for extensive autonomy, which may actually turn the state into a binational or multinational one. Frequently it is a case of a limited autonomy, enabling a specific group to lead its own life in certain defined and limited spheres, with the consent of the majority in that state.

3. *Integration:* Other groups demand to become integrated within the life of the state of which they are citizens. The way this is done is a function of the attitude of the governments towards the minority and the degree of pressure under which the group is suffering. Extreme integration is total assimilation of the minority within the majority and the elimination of the differences between them.

The possibilities presented above are not clear-cut. Various types of arrangements can be found on a continuum, with separation and the establishment of a separate independent state at one end and assimilation or absorption on the other. This is also true of the variety of theoretical possibilities for the status of the Arab minority in Israel. As mentioned above, the need for this discussion stems from the dissatisfaction with the present situation and also the political changes taking place in the region, and especially the peace process. If a Palestinian state is established alongside Israel, the Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens will have to redefine their relationship to the state of Israel as well as to the Palestinian state. The discussion about the status of the minorities is inevitably linked to the question of the nature of the state, therefore this article is bound to deal with this issue as well.

We have identified seven theoretical possibilities known in political science literature, for the relations between a minority and a majority, which are also raised in a concrete way by groups, parties or individuals among Arabs and Jews in Israel. Each of the possibilities has its advantages and disadvantages for one of the two sides, and they have their supporters and opponents in the Israeli public.

1. The Status Quo: The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a JewishDemocratic State[10]

The status quo between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel has certain basic characteristics: all the citizens have rights, but the Jewish majority has preferential status. The state belongs to the Jews and not to all its citizens. The Zionist movement saw and continues to see Judaism as composed of three elements: nationality, ethnicity and religion. Zionism also demanded exclusive right to the land of Israel, as the sole homeland of the ethnic Jewish nation. The state tries to limit the number of non-Jews entitled to Israeli citizenship by means of the 'Citizenship Law', and expresses its preferential treatment of the dominant ethnic nation by means of a series of laws, granting preference to those belonging to it, the most salient being the Law of Return.

The state recognizes the Arabs as its citizens on principle, but because they do not belong to the Jewish nation, they do not enjoy full rights. They do enjoy human rights to a significant extent, also civic, political and certain social rights such as in the sphere of health and education, freedom of worship and expression. There is structural discrimination towards the Arabs which seriously impedes the implementation of their civil rights. Discrimination exists in many spheres, such as the classification of the settlements as to the budgets due to them; the transfer of state functions to Jewish institutions such as the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency, required to provide services to Jews only; the use of the criterion of army service (from which some 90 per cent of the Arabs are exempt) for a long list of benefits. On the labour market the Arabs are discriminated against by means of certain measures and procedures for the hiring of employees at industrial plants and companies closed to them, and by irrelevant demands being made with regard to certain jobs, in order to prevent Arabs from being employed. Government offices discriminate against them through budgeting, employment opportunities, allocation of job positions, in the sphere of building and development. There is official supervision of Arabs citizens: it is more difficult for them to receive permits to carry arms, 'sensitive' information is withheld even from Arab members of Knesset, and employment in the civil service, including the educational system, is conditioned by a security permit. This description of the status quo was described as the model of 'ethnic democracy'.

2. The Option of Improvement up to the Limit of the Zionist Paradigm: Personal Autonomy and Participation in the Jewish Democratic State[11]

This option entails a positive response to many of the group demands of the Arab minority and a significant improvement in their status. However, this improvement will be arrested before it disrupts the Zionist paradigm as the central characteristic of the state, that is, the Jewish-Zionist nature of the state of Israel will not be impaired, in spite of the changes in the status of the minority. The state will remain a national state of the majority, and changes will occur in the current form of ethnic democracy, such as: the increase of civil equality on the personal plane; greater representation of the members of the minority in the comprehensive social institutions; cultural autonomy; the setting up of institutions representing the minority, their recognition by the state and negotiations with them.

This option does not entail a change in the fundamental nature of the state, or a profound change in the political identities of the two communities. Nevertheless, the tension between the communities is expected to decrease and the component of shared civic identity to be strengthened. The rapport of the state to the Jewish people and the 'National Institutions' will continue to exist, but the socio-political significance of these institutions will decrease. They will be used far less for the selective allocation of resources for Jews only. The dominance of the majority will be maintained and will continue to act for the preservation of its demographic advantage.

The comprehensive change involved in this option will stem mainly from the power of the minority, its protection, and the degree of equality it will be granted. Most of the supervisory mechanisms still in operation with regard to the Arab minority will be removed, particularly in spheres such as the allocation of resources, licensing, the authorization of appointments and advancement in the civil service, the freedom of organization and of expression, and so on. This change will facilitate the emergence of cultural and institutional autonomy for the Arabs.

The status of the minority will be safeguarded by legislative measures, based on norms of equity that will strengthen the existing institutions of control and enforcement, such as the law courts and the labour tribunals, dealing with occupational equality of opportunity. Legislative measures will be introduced making prior consultation with the institutions representing the minority mandatory, as well as negotiations with it on general decisions affecting the fate of the minority. The combination of a change in the judicial sphere and in the atmosphere and the political culture will bring about a change in the status of the Arabs as part of the civil society, including an improvement on the private labour market.

3.The Option of Stricter Control: Substantial Deterioration in the Statusof the Arab Minority: Withdrawal from Democratic Dimensions andApproaching a Violent Outbreak[12]

This option represents an increase in the restrictions imposed on the Arab citizens and a strengthening of the ethnic components of the state at the expense of democracy, in a way that will bring the regime in Israel closer to '*Herrenvolk* democracy', or exclude it from the group of democracies. In this type of regime the state is not a neutral body: it is openly and significantly identified with the dominant ethnic group and does not concern itself with being perceived as legitimate by the minority, which is considered as a threat to the majority and to government rule. Inequality is blatant on the personal level, and even more so on the collective level. There are no effective mechanisms protecting the minority and it is confronted by serious restrictions in its parliamentary and extraparliamentary struggle.

In this option there will be clear structural subjugation of the minority by the majority, considerable restriction of the individual and the collective rights of the members of the minority, and an increase of surveillance. There will be no need for additional legislation to ensure the Jewishness of the state, since it is already guaranteed by the existing laws. The establishment will try to prevent the minority from becoming organized on an independent basis, will limit the resources vital for its development and will prevent it from participating in decision-making affecting it and the whole country. The hardening of its position will be felt in everyday life, in discrimination in the economic and social spheres, in the restriction of the rights of the individual and in making the granting of rights or budgets conditional on swearing allegiance to the state as

the state of the Jewish people, in military or public service, in the increased tax burden and curtailed budgets. The hardening will also be expressed in the Arab educational system through the increase in Jewish-Zionist content and restriction of Arab-Palestinian and Islamic subject-matter in the curriculum, similar to the situation which prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. This hardening will also be felt in the sphere of culture and language. The development of Arab culture will be limited and there will even be attempts at distancing the Arabs from their own culture and language. Arabic will lose its status as an official language and Jews will not be encouraged to learn it.

4. The Option of Separation: Irredenta, Independence or Transfer[13]

Among the drastic solutions to the arrangement of relations between a majority and a minority is the option of spatial separation, in three possible forms:

1. Territorial separation in the form of the detachment of the territories, settled by the ethnic minority, and their annexation by the neighbouring country where it will belong to the majority (irredenta).
2. The establishment of a new independent political entity in the territory in which the minority group forms the majority, with an independent administration.
3. Separation through coercion or by consent by way of an exchange of population—the transfer of the members of the minority to another country or political entity, nationally or religiously similar to them.

The implementation of any one of these three forms means the end of coexistence between the majority and the minority and total separation between them. The irredenta, the establishment of an independent state, and a transfer are thus extreme measures to the resolution of relations between a minority and a majority. Although these options are different, all involve separation, that is why they are included in the same discussion.

The option of separation may be raised when the Arabs despair of the possibility of coexistence and civic equity in the state. The growth of the Arab population, its growing economic strength and the emergence of a strong political leadership will increase the demands for political rights, for partnership in running the country, for a more equitable distribution of its resources. If these demands are not met, it may lead them to consider the option of separation. If this option is implemented, they will cease to be a minority and will join the majority in their new state, even if this will lead to a drop in their standard of living, a change in their political environment and competition with the elites already existing in the Palestinian state. Their status may therefore be inferior and they may even become another type of minority. Should the option of irredenta mean the setting up of an independent political entity, it will cover a small

area and have a weak leadership, no tradition of self-rule, poor economic conditions and it will be dependent on the surrounding countries. Such a situation will not lead to stability and may cause new ethnic conflicts.

5. The Option of an 'Israeli State'[14]

The option of an 'Israeli state' seeks to examine the significance of turning the state of Israel from a national ethnic state into a civic national state, a model to which most Western states today belong. Although in practice these states mainly display the majority culture, their government and the judicial system are based on the declared position that the state is culturally neutral and that it is homogeneous only from the point of view of citizenship. According to this option, the Israeli state would adopt the principle of citizenship shared by Jews, Arabs and others, detaching itself officially from the national/ethnic/cultural/ religious identity of the individuals living in it. In practice this would mean separating religious institutions from the state, turning Zionist and Jewish national institutions into state institutions or abolishing them, and ensuring the dominance of a shared Israeli citizenship and a homeland belonging to all the citizens, while granting liberal civil rights to all individuals and groups. This option is sometimes called 'a state of all its citizens' or 'a secular democratic state', although the interpretation of these concepts by Arab circles in Israel does not include all its components, since the Arab supporters of this option demand that the national differences between Jews and Arabs be preserved.

This option can be implemented in two different ways within Israeli reality: an Israeli Hebrew state and an Israeli multicultural state. In both cases the state will possess liberal features and will be committed to the participation of all its citizens in the national culture, whatever their ethnic origin or religion. The difference between them lies in the degree of affinity and the place allotted in the public sphere to the Hebrew culture on one hand, and to the Palestinian Arab culture on the other.

6. The Option of a Binational State within the Green Line[15]

This option involves a change from Israel as a Jewish state to a state of all its citizens, ensuring by law an equal status for both national communities living within it. The option is based on the assumption that if conflicts are to be avoided and stability attained in a divided society, the basic group and individual needs of the minority must be met. Equality for the minority group means equitable treatment and equal access to resources, bringing about a clear sense of identity, self-esteem, human dignity and self-respect. The second assumption underlying this option is that, owing to its ethnic character, it is today impossible in Israel to bring about total equality for non-Jewish citizens. The third assumption is that the present discrimination of the Arab minority in Israel will lead to a crisis within it, which is likely to develop sooner or later into a clash with the majority.

Binationalism means granting equal individual rights to all the citizens and a legal settlement that perceives the two national groups as equal. Government proceedings will be based on a wide coalition of both groups. All governmental institutions will be binational and both groups will have the right of veto on certain issues to be agreed upon. Public resources, political representation and civil services will be provided on a proportional basis to the members of both groups; the Law of Return will be replaced by comprehensive immigration and citizenship laws; land laws will be changed to enable both communities to possess 'national land'; the legal standing of the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Federation will be changed and the services they provide today to Jews only will be made available by the state to all the citizens; all the laws defining Israel as a Jewish state or the state of the Jewish people will be adapted to its definition as a binational state; changes and adjustments will be made in state symbols and in discriminatory laws granting preferential treatment to Jews; both languages and cultures will be given equal status; religious affairs will be totally separated from the state and will be dealt with by the religious communities.

7. The Option of a Binational State on the Whole Area of EretzIsrael/Palestine[16]

Most of the solutions proposed today for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are based on territorial and political separation between the two nations. Such a solution does not resolve the problem of the status of Palestinians who are Israeli citizens. The option of a civic binational state on the whole area of Mandatory Palestine (Eretz Israel) attempts to propose a comprehensive solution to all the problems between the two sides. This option is based on the assumption that separation cannot be implemented at all in view of the situation existing today and on account of the facts on the ground, and has ceased to be a relevant solution to the conflict. This option proposes an arrangement based on the equal status of the two national groups living in the country, abolishing the institutionalized dominance of the Jewish majority and the discrimination of the minorities. Such an arrangement would mean the creation of a liberal democracy, ignoring the group configuration, or a consociational democracy, taking group affiliation into consideration as a basis for the division of power and for government.

The option would be implemented by the establishment of joint institutions such as a parliament, a government, security services and a judicial system, with equal representation of the two groups. The state would form a single administrative entity and control of the territory would be redivided into small federal units, managing their internal affairs autonomously, under the central government, whose seat would be in Jerusalem. Every national group would be recognized as autonomous in dealing with its specific concerns. The implementation of this option calls for a fundamental change in the relationship between the two nations and in the nature of both national movements, including their relationship with their Diaspora. The Jewish group would have to give up

its dominant position and the resources would be redivided in a proportional and equitable way. Both communities would undergo fundamental changes in their educational, social and political approach. During advanced stages of the implementation of this option and the development of a binational regime similar to that in Belgium or Switzerland, it would be necessary to concentrate on achieving stability by the setting up of a strong coalition between large sectors of the elites and leading groups of both communities and by an agreement on rotation or the doubling of prominent functions such as those of president, prime minister and ministers. Both groups would agree on the type and scope of the internal autonomy each would have, and on whether it would be territorial, personal or combined.

THE CURRENT VERSUS THE DESIRED STATUS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL

An examination of the extent of personal and collective satisfaction requires a prior study of the political orientation of the minority and its attitude towards the political system of which is part, in order to understand the context in which it advances its demands. In our case it is important to understand the personal and collective satisfaction of the Palestinians in Israel with their situation as individuals and as members of a group in the Israeli context, as well as their perspective on the state. This examination can provide us with a better and more focused understanding of the group's self-perception in relation to its place in the system. This question is significant in light of the fact that we are investigating a minority that lives in a political framework, the state of Israel, that was established against its will. That is, the question of its members' recognition or non-recognition of this framework and how they see themselves as part of it—or not—is essential for clarifying their situation, demands and aspirations, within this state or outside it. This issue will constitute the centre of the first part of this section. In the second part we will consider the satisfaction of the Palestinians in Israel with their status, that is, the extent to which they are satisfied with their situation in Israel, and in the third part we will discuss the desired status of the Palestinians in Israel as they see it, while considering all spheres relevant to an individual or group belonging to a particular political framework.[17]

THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL

What is the situation reflected by an analysis of a survey Ghanem conducted in 1994 on the current and future political orientation of the Palestinians in Israel? How do they relate to the existence of Israel as a state? What is their attitude towards their life in this state or outside it? Who represents them?

    The vast majority the Palestinians in Israel recognize the state and its right to exist. To a question about recognition or non-recognition of the very existence of

the state, 81.8 per cent of the respondents replied in the affirmative ('absolutely' or 'yes'), while only 18.2 per cent replied in the negative ('no' or 'absolutely not'). That is, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians in Israel recognize the state's right to exist. Smooha obtained similar results in a survey he conducted in 1988, which found that the vast majority of the Palestinians in Israel (82.4 per cent) accept, without reservation or with certain reservations, the very existence of Israel.[18] Another index to confirm this figure can be extracted from the solution the respondents deem appropriate for the Palestinian problem or the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people. Only a small minority, 14.6 per cent, proposed a solution whose crux is the liquidation of Israel; the vast majority supported solutions that in practice mean a solution of the Palestinian problem that takes account of the present and future existence of Israel as a state in the region. Smooha's survey produced similar responses: only 13.1 per cent of the Palestinians in Israel supported a solution implying the liquidation of Israel.

Most of the Palestinians in Israel support a solution to the Palestinian problem, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. This position is reinforced by responses to a question about the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside Israel: 75.1 per cent replied that they favoured this, 18.6 per cent replied that they would agree only under certain conditions, and 6.2 per cent replied in the negative. Smooha's data are again astoundingly similar. In 1988 he found that 76.5 per cent of the Palestinians in Israel supported the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel with no reservations, 17.4 per cent expressed some reservations, and 6 per cent opposed the establishment of such a state.[19]

The preferred mode for achieving this goal is peaceful negotiations, entailing mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO; the majority supported both Israeli recognition of the PLO (79.6 per cent) and PLO recognition of Israel (68.1 per cent). Most respondents also support (89.4 per cent 'absolutely support' or 'support', as against 10.6 per cent 'opposed' or 'absolutely opposed') a continuation of the peace talks that have been under way since the 1991 Madrid conference between Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people in the territories, and since the middle of 1993 between official representatives of the PLO and official representatives of Israel.[20]

The data on questions relating to identity may also indicate recognition or non-recognition of Israel and whether the Palestinians in Israel feel that they are its citizens. Most Palestinians believe that the designation 'Israeli' is appropriate to both Arabs and Jews (67.5 per cent); only 28 per cent think that it includes only Jews. As for the definition of individual and collective identity of the Palestinians in Israel (they were allowed only to choose among predefined options), in both cases most chose an identity that includes 'Israel' in some form. With regard to their personal identity 75.2 per cent chose a definition that includes 'Israel'; when it came to the collective identity of the Palestinians in the country, the figure was 76.2 per cent. Similar figures were obtained by Smooha,

TABLE 1 DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY BY PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL (limited to choices proposed to respondents) (sample=768; in per cent)

	Individual Identity	Group Identity
1. Palestinian	4.9	4.9
2. Arab	11.5	9.9
3. Israeli	13.1	11.7
4. Palestinian Arab	8.4	8.9
5. Israeli Palestinian Arab	28.1	23.8
6. Israeli citizen Palestinian Arab	34.0	40.8
Total	100.0	100.0

who found that 74.4 per cent of the Palestinians in Israel thought that 'Israeli' applied to them to as well as to the Jews.[21]

Here we shall not get involved in the ongoing discussion about the personal and collective identity of the Palestinians in Israel and will not consider the problems of this definition.[22] Nevertheless, for us the very choice of definitions that integrate the two components, 'Palestinian' and 'Israeli', and the idea that 'Israeli' also applies to the Palestinians in the country, as well as to the Jews, indicates that the Palestinians in Israel take account of reality and accept the existence of Israel. In our opinion, this provides further evidence of Palestinian recognition of Israel as a country and their self-perception as its citizens today and in the future.

Where do the Palestinians in Israel see their future as lying? In a 1991 article, Smooha developed the model of 'divergent fate', based on the fact that in the future the Palestinians in Israel will continue to live in and be citizens of the state of Israel, distinct from the rest of the Palestinian people who live in the political entity that will emerge on the West Bank and Gaza Strip or in the Palestinian Diaspora.[23] In his analysis, Smooha also took account of the position of the Palestinians in Israel, who, according to his studies, see their future as distinct from that of the rest of the Palestinian people. The numbers to be presented below constitute a further test of Smooha's thesis and in general support it.

The key question relates to how the Palestinians in Israel see their future diverging from or converging with that of other Palestinians. The figures show that 84.7 per cent of the Palestinians in Israel see their future as distinct to some extent or a great extent from that of other Palestinians. This different perspective on the future is associated with support for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel (see above). Most respondents added the clarification that they preferred to remain citizens of Israel and did not wish, either individually (83.9 per cent) or collectively for all Palestinians in Israel (84.2 per cent), to move to a state created alongside Israel and accept its citizenship. This was despite the fact that half (51.3 per cent) of the Palestinians in Israel feel closer to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to the Jews in Israel, and

only 23.4 per cent feel closer to the Jews in Israel than to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Smooha's findings were similar.[24] Here the national-emotional affiliation is a decisive component in the feeling of affinity with or alienation from the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as opposed to the Jews in Israel.

Most of the Palestinians in Israel believe that the Palestinian state should not have to allow Arabs from Israel to move to it and become citizens (63 per cent), even though the state to be founded, in their opinion, should accept 'every Palestinian' who wishes to live there, whether unconditionally or with certain stipulations (74.1 per cent).

The view of the Palestinians in Israel that their future is distinct from that of other sectors of the Palestinian people derives in part from their position concerning important events relevant to the future of the Palestinian people, past and present alike. With regard to the *intifada,* which erupted in December 1987 against the continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, most Palestinians in Israel reject active participation; only 11.8 per cent believe that the Palestinians in Israel should have been actively involved.

Most of the Palestinians in Israel believe that their position during the *intifada,* expressed in moral or material support and advocacy of its objectives (the demand for an end to the occupation and establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank and Gaza District) was appropriate;[25] 53.7 per cent define this position as Very good' to 'somewhat good'. Even those (46.3 per cent) who answered 'disappointing' or 'very disappointing' did not necessarily think that the Palestinians in Israel should have been active participants in the *intifada.* Their disappointment may have connoted even greater support for the *intifada* or none whatsoever.

Even though about half the Palestinians in Israel believe that the agenda of the peace talks between the PLO and Israel should include their own problems with the state of Israel (47.2 per cent), a majority do not see the PLO as their representative (only 7.2 per cent see the PLO in this light). This sharply contrasts with their overwhelming consensus that it represents the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 'to a great extent' or 'to a certain extent' (95.7 per cent). The Palestine National Council (PNC) is the parliament of the Palestinian people and as such supposed to include representatives of all Palestinians. Today, however, it includes representatives only of the Palestinians in the Diaspora, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, since past attempts to include representatives of the Palestinians in Israel failed on account of the state of war between Israel and the PLO. An interesting question is whether the Palestinians in Israel today, when there is peace, believe that they should be represented in this body. Most of them are opposed (68.8 per cent), though a significant minority (31.2 per cent) support the idea.

In summary, the analysis presented above shows the Palestinians in Israel see their future as citizens of Israel, are not interested in moving to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and do not believe they are represented by

Palestinian institutions such as the PLO and PNC. We can say that they see their place, future and organization, as well as the bodies that represent them, as different from those of the Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Diaspora.[26] The self-orientation with regard to their condition, location and future is very clear: the Palestinians in Israel see themselves as citizens of Israel who will continue to live there; they are not interested in moving elsewhere, not even to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

THE SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL

The main approach of the scholarship about the situation of the Palestinians in Israel holds that the Palestinian minority in Israel experienced the shock and trauma of the results of the 1948 war, followed by processes of accelerated construction and consolidation which made them appear to be and develop as a normal group, both internally and externally.[27] According to this approach, the Palestinians in Israel acquiesce in their situation and aspire to moderate improvements in it. Below we shall present and analyse the survey findings that relate to the satisfaction of the Palestinians in Israel with their situation, living standards and rights in Israel. The analysis will relate to a level of aspirations and demands that characterize almost every ethnic and national group.[28]

The Situation of the Palestinians in Israel as Compared to the Jews, asseen by the Palestinians in Israel

In this section we shall attempt to sketch the extent to which the Palestinians in Israel are satisfied with the collective attainments of the Palestinians in Israel: how do they perceive the disparity between themselves and the Jews? How much importance do they attribute to making progress in key aspects of this issue? We shall also consider topics such as the degree of equality, integration, management of local authorities, the state of the countrywide Arab leadership, their ability to influence their future and decisions at the countrywide level, participation in the national government, and so on.

   For this purpose, respondents were presented with a series of issues relevant to the situation of the Palestinians in Israel and asked in each case to assess the gap on a scale of 1 to 4: a large gap, a moderate gap, a small gap, or no gap. Most respondents answered in all cases a 'large gap' (see Table 2). This expresses the general dissatisfaction of the Palestinians in Israel with their living conditions as a group and with their collective condition and status; the dissatisfaction is particularly high and relates to all substantive areas for the advancement of the Palestinians in Israel.

   The respondents, too, defined these spheres as essential and important when they were asked to rank various areas derived from those presented   in the table by their importance or lack of importance for enhancing the situation the

TABLE 2 PERCEPTION OF THE GAP BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS IN ISRAEL IN KEY AREAS (sample=768; in per cent)

	Large Gap	Moderate Gap	Small Gap	No Gap
Public services	75.3	18.2	4.5	2.0
Allocation of resources	79.9	15.1	3.8	1.2
Political representation	78.9	14.9	4.2	2.0
Civil service positions	73.6	20.1	4.5	1.8
Participation in government	78.2	15.8	4.7	1.2
Definition of the character of the state	79.8	14.1	3.4	2.6
Definition of the goals of the state	83.4	10.8	3.6	2.2

TABLE 3 THE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED TOPICS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL (sample=768; in per cent)

	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important
Achieving full equality in the state	74.6	19.2	5.7	0.5
Inclusion in government coalitions on an equal basis with the Jews	55.0	28.5	12.0	4.2
Parity with Jews in the civil service	61.8	26.7	8.7	2.8
Enhanced budgets and executive powers in Arab local government	68.7	22.6	7.5	1.2
Expanded authority for Arab local government	58.9	28.6	9.8	2.7
Planning their own future	54.4	31.9	11.1	2.5
Good leadership for the Arabs	59.4	25.0	11.7	3.9
Improving government policy towards them	56.2	29.4	15.0	5.5

Palestinians in Israel as a collective (see Table 1); these areas were generally designated as 'important' and 'very important'.

The Palestinians in Israel ascribe decisive importance to these areas: achieving full equality in the state; parity with Jews in the civil service; enhanced budgets and executive powers in Arab local government; expanded authority for Arab local governments; the ability to plan their own future; and improving government policy towards them. The Palestinians in Israel are not satisfied with their situation as a collective in these areas, nor in many other areas presented in the questionnaire.

An analysis of the data on the situation of the Palestinians in Israel in various spheres (defined as important by the respondents) and their perception of disparities in the power, influence and rewards allotted to citizens and relevant to the collective progress and change experienced by the Palestinians in Israel shows that they perceive their situation as a collective to be substantially different from that of the Jews in all these spheres. In their assessment, there are extreme disparities with regard to power and rewards as compared to the Jews. It goes without saying that the Palestinians in Israel are not happy with this situation.

In summary, from the perspective of the Palestinians in Israel and as can be seen from the survey data, the overwhelming majority of the Palestinians in Israel are not satisfied with the general level of advancement of the Palestinians in Israel as a collective, whether in terms of conditions, achievements, or the ability to influence their own future, make decisions, integrate on the countrywide level, and achieve a suitable collective status. The question that arises is what status the Palestinians in Israel aspire to and the direction of the changes needed to achieve this.

The Desired Status of the Palestinians in Israel, as They See It

Starting in the mid-1980s, a broad consensus began to take shape among the Palestinians in Israel about the need to solve the Palestinian problem by establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (including East Jerusalem as its capital), alongside Israel. There is also a consensus about the demand for equality within Israel.[29] The survey data indeed indicate that most of the Palestinians in Israel (74.7 per cent) believe that their struggle should focus on these two areas. Only a minority believe that they should focus only on advancing peace or only on attaining equality.

The majority of Palestinians in Israel call for the establishment of a Palestinian state not only because it could solve the problem of the other Palestinians, by providing them with a national home, but also because it is viewed as a catalyst to improving their own status in Israel.[30] To the question, 'how important is the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel for improving your personal situation?' 78.1 per cent of the respondents answered Very important' or 'important', 14.4 per cent answered 'somewhat important', and only 7.4 per cent believed that a solution of the Palestinian problem by the establishment of Palestinian state alongside Israel was irrelevant to their individual advancement. To the question, 'how important is the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel for improving the condition of all Palestinians in Israel?' most of the respondents (80.5 per cent) answered 'very important' or 'important', 14.1 per cent answered 'somewhat important', and again only a small number (5.4 per cent) believe that the establishment of the Palestinian state is not important for the advancement of the Palestinians in Israel.

The second significant area for the Arabs in Israel is that associated with the advancement of their individual and collective situation; in practice it is the entire field that scholars refer to as 'equality'. Here the   Palestinians in Israel express a strong desire for equality with the Jewish majority. The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians in Israel want full equality between the Jews and the Arab citizens of the country, while a small number choose 'almost full equality'; only a negligible fraction would be happy with 'partial equality' or believe that 'equality is not necessary'.

What is the substance of the equality that the Palestinians in Israel want to achieve? What is the nature of the individual demands and achievements that the

TABLE 4 THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN JEWS AND
ARABS IN ISRAEL, IN THE FOLLOWING DOMAINS (sample=768; in per cent)

	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important
Achieving full equality in the state	74.6	19.2	5.7	0.5
Inclusion in government coalitions on an equal basis with the Jews	55.0	28.5	12.0	4.2
Parity with Jews in the civil service	61.8	26.7	8.7	2.8
Enhanced budgets and executive powers in Arab local government	68.7	22.6	7.5	1.2
Expanded authority for Arab local government	58.9	28.6	9.8	2.7
Planning their own future	54.4	31.9	11.1	2.5
Good leadership for the Arabs	59.4	25.0	11.7	3.9
Improving government policy towards them	56.2	29.4	15.0	5.5

Palestinians in Israel consider to be important? The collective changes? We shall attempt to answer these questions below.

The question that arises here is, what do the Palestinians in Israel want for their collective? What do they see as the preferred status for this group? What sort of power do they want to hold in the Israeli system? And if, as has been stated, they seek equality with the Jewish collective and the Jews, what is the essence of this equality? What factors impede its attainment? How must the system or state be transformed so that these aspirations can be realized?

The Palestinians in Israel, as stated, want to achieve equality with the Jewish majority. For most of the respondents this must be full equality. In response to the question, 'how important is the achievement of full equality in the state for improving the collective situation of the Palestinians in Israel?', 93.8 per cent replied that it was Very important' or 'important'. This equality was emphasized when we presented the panel with a variety of areas where there are disparities between Jews and Arabs in the country: public services; the allocation of resources; employment in the civil service; participation in government; and equality in determining the nature and objectives of the state (see Table 6). Respondents were asked to rank a list of areas related to the achievement of equality in the order of their importance for advancing the situation of the Palestinians in Israel.

The Palestinians in Israel are not happy with the living conditions of their collective and want the state to serve them on an equal footing with the Jews, allocate equal resources, provide equal public services, distribute civil service positions on a fair basis, permit them to participate fully in government and parliamentary coalitions, and give them an equal voice in defining the nature of the state and its objectives. In their eyes the state must serve all citizens equally. In essence they demand that the state be 'the state of its citizens' and not a state

TABLE 5 ISRAEL SHOULD BE (sample=728; in per cent)

1. Only the state of the Jewish people	2.6
2. The state of the Jewish people and its Palestinian citizens in Israel	17.2
3. The state of its Palestinian citizens in Israel and the Jews	66.5
4. The state of its Palestinian citizens in Israel and of the Jews and the Palestinian people wherever they are	11.9
5. Other	1.6

that favours one group of citizens (the Jews) at the expense of others. All of this is expressed in their demand to modify the character of the state.

Questions that relate directly to the character of the state indicate that the Palestinians in Israel reject the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, manifested in the clear preference given to Jews in all areas related to the state, its future, society and citizens in general. The respondents are conscious of the fact that Israel serves primarily the Jews and not all its citizens; a majority (66.3 per cent) believe that 'the state of Israel, by its overt objectives and policy, manifests itself as only for the Jews'; only 33.7 per cent think that the overt objectives and policy of the state indicate that it is 'a state shared by its Jewish citizens and the Palestinians in Israel'.

In what way do the Palestinians want to revise the nature of the state? As stated, they believe that they should achieve equality, something they deem to be problematic and even impossible in an Israel that is a 'Jewish-Zionist state'. Even though their opinions are split on the question of whether Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state, about half (48.2 per cent) agree that 'Israel has no right to exist as a Jewish-Zionist state'. In response to another question, the vast majority (86.4 per cent) support the abolition of this character. In the eyes of most of them (58.6 per cent), the state has no right to intervene in order 'to preserve a Jewish majority'. This has a double implication. First, they do not believe that the state should intervene to preserve a Jewish majority in the state; that is, it should not encourage Jewish immigration. Among other things, this entails repeal of the Law of Return, which applies only to Jews, and an end to state activity in Israel and abroad that encourages Jewish immigration. Second, nothing should be done to impede or prevent a process whereby the Palestinian citizens of Israel, or any other group, could achieve a majority in the state; that is, the state should not be ethnic and an agency that intervenes in favour of one particular ethnic group among its citizens. In practice, this means the abolition of the ethnic-national character of the state and its conversion into a civil state with a liberal attitude towards citizenship and citizens. According to the survey data, a majority of the Palestinians in Israel (89.9 per cent) believe that is important to alter the current nature of the state and adopt a different one. Their preferred definition is 'the state of its Jewish citizens and the Palestinians in Israel' (66.5 per cent).

What change (in addition to abolishing the ethnic character, objectives and vocation of the state) must be made to express the essence of the collective equality that the Palestinians in Israel wish to achieve? What change must be made with regard to the collective status of the Palestinians to express the conversion of the state into 'the state of its citizens'?

In societies that are divided on an ethnic, religious, national or other basis it is possible to find a number of arrangements (or their absence) that provide an institutionalized legal framework (or an *ad hoc* and informal abstract framework) for the status of the various groups and guarantee the stability of these societies. Although in practice there is no limit to the number of such possibilities, one can nevertheless discern the general lines of three formats that have been described by theoreticians: irredentism and secession, involving independence or annexation to another country; cultural, political or territorial autonomy; integration and assimilation into a civil nation.

An analysis of their responses indicates that the Palestinians in Israel would like to develop a 'liberal democracy' with clear and distinct elements of the binational model. Such an arrangement is superficially unrealistic because it incorporates elements of two different models for solving the problems of minorities. But recent literature maintains that this is possible on both the theoretical and the practical level of daily life.[31]

The change that the Palestinians in Israel want for their collective is divided into two levels or dimensions: on the one hand, they demand full integration into the state and its institutions on the basis of parity with the Jews (including the allocation of budgets, jobs, the power to have equal influence on decision-making and the political process in the state); on the other hand, they seek institutional autonomy for the collective as another dimension of the equality they demand, as we saw above. Their replies emphasize the importance they accord to 'recognition of their collective as a national minority' by the state authorities as well as to areas that express their aspiration to achieve autonomy within the state; for example, educational autonomy manifested in 'the establishment of Arab university'; 'self-administration by the Palestinians in Israel of the educational system and cultural life' (buildings, employees, curricula, etc); and the establishment of a series of specifically Arab institutions to express the substance of institutional autonomy: 'the establishment of an Arab labour federation'; 'establishment of an Arab health fund'; 'turning over the *waqf to* Arab administration'; 'expanding the authority of Arab local governments'; and even 'official recognition by the authorities of the Supreme Monitoring Committee as the representative of the Palestinians in Israel'. The respondents emphasized the importance of direct popular election of the members of this committee, even though most of them are not happy with its functioning; a small number expressed great or very great satisfaction with the functioning of the Supreme Monitoring Committee (24.5 per cent) but less satisfaction with the operation of its affiliated commissions. Smooha also collected responses that confirm the desire of the Palestinians in Israel for

TABLE 6 THE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED ITEMS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ISRAEL (sample=768; in per cent)

	Important/ Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important
Official recognition as a national minority	79.5	15.0	5.5
Establishment of an Arab University	78.2	13.9	7.9
Administration by the Palestinians in Israel of their own educational system and cultural life	78.2	14.6	7.1
Establishment of an Arab labour federation	76.7	15.1	8.2
Establishment of an Arab health fund	62.9	19.9	17.2
Expanding the authority of Arab local government	87.5	9.8	2.7
Conveying the *waqf* to Arab administration	82.1	12.8	5.1
Direct countrywide election of the Supreme Monitoring Committee for Israeli Arab Affairs by the Palestinians in Israel	73.7	15.2	10.9
Official recognition by the authorities of the Supreme Monitoring Committee as the representative of the Palestinians in Israel	73.9	17.1	9.0

educational and cultural autonomy in surveys he conducted in 1976, 1980, 1985 and 1988.[32]

The figures show that most of the Palestinians in Israel are not pleased with their collective status and are interested in full integration in the state and its institutions, but also institutional autonomy—of course as part of the state and as Israeli citizens, and with full equality with the Jewish majority. In practice such autonomy within the state is a type of binationalism, which is a sort of arrangement and expression of the existence of two national groups in the country —the Jews and the Palestinians in Israel.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The discussion of the various options for the status of the Palestinians in Israel as a national collective must take account of a number of basic attributes of the Palestinians in Israel and of the Jewish majority in the state and which seem, at least to date, to be fundamental limits that constrain any discussion of this issue and will continue to be with us if there are no revolutionary developments in the state or in the Arab-Israeli and Jewish-Palestinian conflict.

1. Today the Palestinians in Israel have no clear and distinct status. This causes tensions in Jewish-Arab relations. This situation will continue to trouble the authorities in the state, the Jewish majority, and even the Palestinian minority itself if no formula is found that is acceptable to a majority on both sides. It is clear today that any solution will win at most a small majority on each side and continue to evoke fierce opposition, from both right and left, in both camps.

2. The Palestinians in Israel have acquiesced in their minority status and divergent fate from the rest of the Palestinians. The overwhelming majority of them accept Israel as a fact and a political entity and wish to continue being its citizens, to the point of waiving the right to self-determination. Most of them reject the Jewish-Zionist character of the state, or at least reject the actual current implementation of this concept, and want to be recognized as a Palestinian national minority with shared cultural, historical and national characteristics and their own leadership. On the Jewish side, most accept the fact that there is an Arab minority in Israel, but reject any recognition of it as a national minority and see the Zionist-Jewish character of the state as an existential need.[33] The implication of the situation is that both sides fundamentally accept coexistence between Jews and Palestinians in Israel but each side seeks a different format for this coexistence.

3. It is a basic datum that the Palestinians in Israel are fragmented in many ways: religiously, with 75 per cent Muslims, 15 per cent Christians and 10 per cent Druzes; geographically, with about 60 per cent in the Galilee, 20 per cent in the Triangle, 10 per cent in the Negev and 10 per cent in the mixed cities along the Mediterranean coast; and in a number of other social, political and economic aspects. Nevertheless, the majority of Palestinians in Israel, while making their peace with their minority status, have developed a complex identity, compounded of Palestinian nationality and Israeli citizenship, that divides them from the other citizens of the state on the one hand and from the majority of the Palestinian people on the other. As a minority that has not assimilated and differs from the Jewish majority in its culture, language, social customs and many other aspects, their total Israelization and surrender of their national distinctiveness is no real option. On the other hand, their Palestinian identity is unique within the Palestinian national movement.

4. The state of Israel is a centralized polity where power is concentrated in the hands of institutions or actors elected on a countrywide basis, such as the Knesset and the government; these are the institutions that must pass any future decision about special arrangements for the Palestinians in Israel. In such a situation it is unrealistic to expect that the Palestinians in Israel could carry the vote in the debate on the issue without the support of a large number of Jews, especially in view of the fact that the Palestinians in Israel constitute a disadvantaged minority that is located on the political, economic and social periphery of Israel. Hence the Palestinians in Israel must invest special effort in changing the Jews' attitude towards them and their demands.

5. The Jews view the Palestinians in Israel as hostile and affiliated with the enemy, because of their rejection of the Jewish-Zionist character of the state and its objectives and also because of the history of the Arab-Jewish conflict.[34] Any attempt by the Palestinians in Israel to modify their current

status without the assistance of a major Jewish group will merely reinforce Jewish perceptions of the Palestinians in Israel.

Any future resolution of the status of the Palestinians in Israel must take account of the basic features enumerated above. Such an arrangement must place at the top of its priorities the possibility of the development of 'a normal society' on two levels—the bond among citizens and the link between citizens and the authorities—where what counts is the civic affiliation and not the ethnic-national affiliation. This is what must prevail in the debate about Israel as the state of the Jewish people or as the state of its citizens. In an era of peace, when the Zionist movement and its representatives recognize the Palestinian national movement and the Palestinians' right to self-determination, there is room for thinking and doing in pursuit of a resolution of the status of the Palestinians in Israel and normalization of Jewish-Arab/Palestinian coexistence within the Green Line.

The emerging solution for the Palestinian problem, of which the current problems of the Palestinians in Israel and their status are part, opens the way for a fundamental discussion of the status of this minority within Israel and sets the stage for a comprehensive and meaningful discussion of the nature of Israeli society in general and in particular of the official ideology of the state-Zionism. Such a solution could lead to a tangible change in these questions; but it could also significantly exacerbate the crisis besetting the Palestinians in Israel in the three circles in which they live.[35]

A possible solution, which takes account of existing conditions, must be based on recognition of the Israeli citizen Palestinian Arabs as a national minority with collective rights and recognition of the individuals who make up this collective as full and equal citizens enjoying all the rights extended to the Jewish citizens of Israel and participating fully in decisions about the common good of the state —a role thus far reserved exclusively to the Jews. This would in practice mark the beginning of a binational Jewish-Palestinian system within the Green Line. Such a solution holds out the promise to the Palestinians in Israel of escaping the crisis in their relations with the Jews and the authorities in Israel. By the same token, escaping the crisis in their relations with the other Palestinians would require a solution in which the Palestinian national movement establishes umbrella institutions for all Palestinians, in which Palestinians in Israel are also represented.

In our opinion, such an option depends on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel and the success of peaceful relations between Israel and the PLO. The failure of such arrangements will reopen the conflict and invite other future scenarios that may affect the future status of the Palestinians in Israel. In other words, the failure of separation will lead to renewed thinking by the Palestinians in general and by the Palestinian citizens of Israel in particular about the binational option in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine. In this case, the Palestinians in Israel would be equal citizens belonging to the broader

Palestinian national collective that would be consolidated as part of the binational solution.

NOTES

1. There is an ongoing debate among scholars about the factors and motives that caused the Palestinians to leave their villages and homes, which focuses on whether the Palestinians fled as a result of the pressure exerted by the Arab countries and Jewish army or whether the Jewish army took deliberate measures that forced them to abandon their villages. There is also a comprehensive debate about the number of refugees who left the country around the time of the establishment of Israel. For more details on the subject, see Benny Morris, *TheBirth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947–1949,* Tel Aviv, 1989 (in Hebrew).

2. Charles Cayman, 'After the Catastrophe: The Arabs in the State of Israel 1948– 1950', *Notebooks for Research and Criticism,* Vol.10 (1984), p.6 (in Hebrew).

3. See Majid al-Haj, Adjustment patterns of the Arab Internal Refugees in Israel', *InternationalMigration,* Vol.24 (1986), pp.651–74; Majid al-Haj, 'The Arab Internal Refugees in Israel: The Emergence a Minority within the Minority', *Immigration and Minorities,* Vol.7 (1988), pp. 149–65.

4. For more details, see Sarah Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Crystallization of Mutual Relations between Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel, the First Decade 1948– 1958', Doctoral Dissertation, University of Haifa, Haifa, 1996 (in Hebrew).

5. Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and thePolicies towards Them,* Jerusalem, 1992 (in Hebrew); Sabri Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel,* Haifa, 1966 (in Arabic); Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Rule over a NationalMinority,* Haifa, 1985 (in Hebrew); Habib Qahwaji, *The Arabs in the Shadow of the IsraeliOccupation since 1948,* Beirut, 1972 (in Arabic); Sammy Smooha, 'Existing Policy and Alternatives towards the Arabs in Israel', *Megamot,* Vol.1 (1980), pp.7–36 (in Hebrew).

6. Sarah Ozacky-Lazar and As'ad Ghanem, 'Perceptions of Peace among Israeli Arabs', *Surveysof the Arabs in Israel,* Vol.11 (1993), p.8 (in Hebrew).

7. See, for example, the demands made by MK Ra'anan Cohen of the ruling Labour Party concerning the possible annexation of Arab districts of Israel within the pre- June 1967 borders to the Palestinian autonomy in the territories: *al-Sinarah,* 15 Oct. 1993. See also the debate on the status of the Arabs in Israel after the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Israel Television, 13 and 17 Oct. 1993. See also Aliza Wolloch, 'Tibi Yes and Taibe No?', *Davar,* 15 Oct. 1993; Avner Regev, The Dilemma of Israeli Arabs', *al-Hamishmar,* 17 Oct. 1993; 'Two Separate Societies in One Sovereign Entity', *al-Hamishmar,* 31 Oct. 1993; Eilat Negev, 'Israeli Arabs, Too, Are Likely to Fight for Autonomy', *Yediot Ahronot,* 19 Nov. 1993.

8. During 1998–99 a team of 13 Arab and Jewish scholars (Yossi Alpher, Prof. Ruth Gavison, Prof. Giora Goldberg, Prof. Kais Firro, Dr Ilan Pappé, Dr Muhammad Amara, Dr As'ad Ghanem, Dr Rassem Khamaisi, Ilan Saban, Prof. Sammy Smooha, Dr Ilana Kaufman, Prof. Nadim Rouhana and Dr Sarah Ozacky-Lazar) have participated in a long workshop that was that was organized by the Institute for Peace Research at Givat Haviva and funded by the Ford Foundation in New York. The workshop was about 'theoretical options for the status of the Arabs in

Israel'. The different options that were dealt with during the workshop are presented in the book: Sara Ozacky-Lazar, As'ad Ghanem and Ilan Pappé (eds.), *Seven Roads:Theoretical Options for the Status of the Arabs in Israel,* Givat Haviva, 1999 (in Hebrew).

9. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* Berkeley, CA, 1985. A.Lijphart, *Democracy inPlural Societies,* New Haven, CT, 1977; Ian Lustick, 'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consocianalism versus Control', *World Politics,* Vol.31 (1979), pp.325–44; Sammy Smooha, 'Control of Minorities in Israel and Northern Ireland', *Comparative Studies in Society andHistory,* Vol.22 (April 1980), pp.256–80; Sammy Smooha, 'Minority Status in an Ethnic Democracy: The Status of the Arab Minority in Israel', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol.13, No.3 (July 1990), pp.3 89–413; Sammy Smooha and T.Hanf, 'The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply Divided Societies', *International Journal of ComparativeSociology,* Vol.XXXIII, No.1/2 (1992), pp.26–47.

10. For the full explanation of the option, see Sammy Smooha, 'The Status Quo: the Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish Democratic State', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp.23–78 (in Hebrew).

11. For the full explanation of the option, see Ilan Saban, 'The Option of Improvement up to the Limit of the Zionist paradigm', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp. 79–122.

12. For the full explanation of the option, see Mohammad Amara, 'The Option of Stricter Control: Substantial Deterioration in the Status of the Arab Minority: Withdrawal from Democratic Dimensions and Approaching a Violent Outbreak' in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., SevenRoads,* pp. 123–54.

13. For the full explanation of the option, see Rassem Khamaisi, 'The Option of Separation: Irredenta, Independence or Transfer', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp. 155–200.

14. For the full explanation of the option, see Ilana Kaufman, 'The Option of an "Israeli State"', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp.201–42.

15. For the full explanation of the option, see Nadim Rouhana, 'The Option of a Binational State within the Green Line', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp. 243–70.

16. For the full explanation of the option, see As'ad Ghanem, 'The Option of a Binational State on the Whole Area of Eretz Israel/Palestine', in Ozacky-Lazar *et al., Seven Roads,* pp.271–303.

17. The statistical figures that are presented in the next two paragraphs were collected through a survey that Ghanem conducted as part of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Haifa, on 'Political Participation by the Arabs in Israel', under the direction of Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor of the Department of Political Science and Prof. Majid al-Haj of the Department of Sociology. The representative countrywide sample encompassed 768 respondents selected randomly using the Kish method. The sampling error was three-four per cent.

18. Sammy Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel,* Vol.2, Boulder, CO and London, 1992, pp.50–51.

19. Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel,* p.64

20. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted after the signing of the Oslo accords.

21. Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel,* p.83.

22. Nadim Rouhana, 'Accentuated Identities in Protracted Conflicts: The Collective Identity of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel', *Asian and African Studies,* Vol.27 (1993), pp.97–127; N. Rouhana, *Identities in Conflict: Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State,* New Haven, CT, 1997.
23. Sammy Smooha, The Divergent Fate of the Palestinians on Both Sides of the Green Line: The Intifada as a Test', paper presented to the conference, 'The Arab Minority in Israel: Dilemmas of Political Orientation and Social Change', Tel Aviv University, 3–4 June 1991.
24. Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel,* Boulder, CO, and London, 1992, Vol.2, p.84.
25. As'ad Ghanem and Sara Ozacky-Lazar, 'The Green Line-Red Lines, the Arabs in Israel in View of the Intifada', *Sekirot,* Vol.2 (1990), p.2.
26. This conclusion buttresses the thesis advanced by Smooha, 'The Divergent Fate of the Palestinians; Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel;* Majid Al-Haj, The Sociopolitical Structure of the Arabs in Israel: External vs. Internal Orientation', in John E. Hofman (ed.), *Arab-JewishRelations in Israel: A Quest of Human Understanding,* Bristol, IN, 1988, pp.92–123; Nadim Rouhana, 'The Political Transformation of the Palestinians in Israel: From Acquiescence to Challenge',Journal *of Palestine Studies,* Vol.18, No.3 (1989), pp.35–59.
27. Nadim Rouhana and As'ad Ghanem, 'The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States: The Case of the Palestinian Citizens in Israel', *IJMES,* Vol.30 (1998), pp.321–46.
28. T.R.Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict,* Washington, DC, 1993; T.R.Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics,* Boulder, CO and San Francisco, 1994; Will Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures,* Oxford, 1995.
29. Al-Haj, 'The Sociopolitical Structure of the Arabs in Israel'.
30. As'ad Ghanem, 'Ideological Trends on Question of Jewish-Arab Coexistence among Arabs in Israel 1967–1989', MA thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, 1990.
31. Kymlicka, *The Rights of Minority Cultures;* Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship,* Oxford, 1995.
32. Smooha, *Arabs and Jews in Israel.*
33. Ibid., pp.50–55.
34. Ibid.
35. Rouhana and Ghanem, 'The Crisis of Minorities in Ethnic States'.

The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position of the Israeli Arab Leadership

ALEXANDER BLIGH

One day in 1991 Mr Yitzhak Shamir, the then prime minister of Israel, instructed his Arab affairs adviser to cooperate with the political officer at the US embassy in preparing the annual report on human rights. That was an extraordinary instruction. For the first time ever Israel agreed to act jointly with a US representative preparing a report dealing with what had been hitherto an Israeli domestic affairs issue. Indeed, there was a price tag attached to that Israeli agreement: the American officer had to come to the office of the adviser in East Jerusalem, a rather unusual venue for a US-Israeli policy discussion. The sensitive nature of the meeting and the *quid pro quo* asked of both sides prevented them both from making it public. However, as of 1991 the US Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, includes a chapter on Israel *propre* which is not totally without some Israeli input. It also marks the first time that the government of Israel, no less than under the Likud bloc, recognized that the problems associated with the Arab minority in Israel are no longer only domestic. With that the leadership of the Israeli Arabs celebrated yet another political accomplishment. That success along with others, to be detailed later on, is an outstanding example of the use of humanitarian issues for political gain. The term 'the leadership of the Israeli Arabs' refers in the following pages to three layers:

1. Arab members of the Israeli parliament (Knesset), who represent at the moment two Arab parties, and Arab members of Zionist parties. Two self-proclaimed Arab bodies:

2. The Monitoring Committee—established in 1982 as a political leadership for the Israeli Arabs; its structure has never been clearly defined, and its members, though elected to other public positions, have never been elected to serve in the committee. It is a fluid body, which usually includes Arab members of Knesset (MKs), leading municipal figures and leading members of the trade unions. However, other participants have often taken part in the committee's deliberations with no clear criteria for their inclusion.

3. The committee of the heads of local councils—established in 1974 as a lobby on municipal issues, but it shortly afterwards adopted the Arab lands'

issue as its main banner, and began to use national slogans in support of more comprehensive Palestinian issues.

Members of these political bodies claim to be the national leadership of the Israeli Arabs and, concurrent with the activities detailed in this article, have established a foreign relations system, which has carefully bypassed the official Israeli system.

About the time the Palestinian uprising *(intifada)* began, more specifically in early 1988, the leaders of the Israeli Arabs realized that their contribution to the Palestinian cause would be mainly political, in contrast to the armed struggle of their Palestinian brothers in the territories. If during the first 40 years of the state of Israel all public strata in Israel used the term 'bridge for peace'[1] in the meaning of helping Jews and Arabs to find common ground, this concept was changed during the *intifada.* From that time on the Israeli Arab leadership emphasized its role as using its impact on the Israeli political system and other bodies in the international arena to promote Palestinian causes. This leadership, which refrained from claiming the right to participate in any Israeli foreign and security public or political discussion, very much in line with the policy of all Israeli governments since 1948, began to voice a public stand.

This article analyses the growing involvement of the leaders of the Israeli Arabs in the Palestinian dimension of the diplomatic process in the Middle East and their interests once a conclusion of the process is reached. The main thesis of the article is that the *intifada* in the territories reinforced the bond between the Israeli Arabs, who began to identify themselves as Palestinians living in Israel, and the Palestinians in the territories. This attachment grew stronger with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This symbol of the beginning of institutionbuilding processes placed the Israeli Arab leadership in the eye of the storm. However, in spite of the emotional relations and the political coordination, the Israeli Arabs have their own political agenda in relation to Israel and the Palestinian entity.

The national Israeli Arabs' predicament has several components. The creation of the PA was carried out in accordance with the political philosophy of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (as will also be the case, if it should happen, with the establishment of a Palestinian state). Its platform is as stated in the Palestinian National Charter, articles 1 and 2: 'Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab nation'; and: 'Palestine, with its boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit'.[2] This document, which has served as the ideological basis for any Palestinian political and military activity since 1968, is rather problematic for the Israeli Arabs.[3] Since they have identified themselves as Palestinians they are supposed to recognize the PLO as their representative, but with that they might renounce all their political leadership's political assets in Israel acquired during 50 years of intensive political struggle. However, considering the political and public relations advantages offered by the Israeli system a *modus operandi*

has emerged in the last decade. It consists of several elements, never declared, but apparently recognized: no violence would be used inside Israel and this leadership would do its utmost to influence the outcome of any regional diplomatic process, all that without recognizing the right of the PLO to represent the Israeli Palestinians. This determination of the Israeli Arabs to become part of the final settlement of the Palestinian issue, without asking for any PLO representation, dates back to the early stages of the *intifada.* This Israeli Arab approach concentrated mainly around their interpretation of the term the 'right of return'. In the years since the uprising the meaning of the term has been transformed, from the old idea of illegal building[4] and the capture of land by political and physical means, into the aim of eventually changing the nature of the Jewish-Zionist state into another Middle Eastern nation. The element of resisting any take-over of land by Israel, for whatever purposes, has already served in the past to unite the Israeli Arabs. During violent demonstrations against the confiscation of land in 1976, later known as 'Land Day', six Israeli Arabs were killed, and became the first national martyrs for land of the Israeli Arabs.

   The transformation of the 'right of return' from meaning the old struggle for land, into a new improved meaning, shows intensive use of the double meaning of language. A very common phrase, 'a country of all of its citizens', for instance, refers to the desire of many, if not all, Israeli Arabs to replace the current 'Law of Return' allowing all Jews to find a haven in Israel by a law allowing Arabs to emigrate to Israel and start a process which would upset the demographic balance. Within this context, the Arab Israelis' interpretation of the 'right of return' is a necessary step in implementing their vision for Israel. One way of bringing about some support from outside the Arab and Palestinian spheres for their political goals is through the usage of universal human values. Even if this tactic did not bring about that support it would embarrass Israel, lessen its international legitimacy and contribute indirectly to the Palestinian cause. This has also become the main weapon in the international arena, and is far from being exhausted. The US interest in the Israeli Arabs is only one early indication of the way the future lies if the Israeli Arab leadership have their way. One step, considered time and again, but kept as a weapon of last resort, involves calling on the United Nations to take care of the Arabs of Israel.

THE BEGINNING OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INPUT OF THE ISRAELI ARAB LEADERSHIP

In the wake of the 1991 US-Iraqi war all parties to the conflict in the Middle East began their preparations for the US-sponsored forthcoming peace negotiations. There are many indications of coordination meetings between the leaders of the PLO side in the Madrid negotiations and Israeli Arab MKs.[5] These preparations marked the first time that the PLO leadership and Israeli Arab

leadership began publicly to share responsibilities. The make-up of the participants in a symposium held in Nazareth and commemorating the 24th anniversary of the June 1967 war strongly suggests that it was used for that purpose.[6] The participants included Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, the would-be head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid conference, along with other Palestinian dignitaries on the Palestinian side. The leading figures on the Israeli Arab side included the heads of the New Communist List as well as the representatives of the Nazareth municipality (controlled by the Front for Peace and Equality, a communist organization). Israeli Arab leaders began their involvement in the process on both substantial and ceremonial levels all throughout the Madrid conference. On the eve of the conference the Israeli MK, Abd al-Wahab Darawshe[7] (Arab Democratic Party) met with Faysal al-Husayni, a leading member of the Palestinian side (even though, as he was a resident of Jerusalem, Israel objected to his inclusion as a formal member of the Palestinian delegation). Later, in December 1991 the Arab Democratic Party held a gala reception in Nazareth for the Palestinian delegation. These few examples, and others, serve to indicate the close intricate relations between the Israeli Arab leadership and their counterparts in Palestinian leadership positions, both inside the territories and within the PLO hierarchy. All Arab MKs, regardless of their political affiliation, saw themselves as true partners with the PLO in an attempt to influence the outcome of the diplomatic process.

The first instance when this leadership demonstrated to the general public its interest in influencing the final outcome of the diplomatic process was, obviously, the 1991 Madrid conference. The then MK, Muhammad Mi'ari[8] (Progressive List for Peace; the acronym PLP was intended to call the attention of the Arab voter to the similarity with the PLO) attended the conference on his own without being invited and without receiving any formal invitation from any of the parties. Mi'ari's participation in a conference relating directly to the final status of the Palestinians is extraordinary: his claim to publicity stems from being a former member of al-Ard. That movement was outlawed[9] in the mid-1960s by the Labour[10]-led government after the courts decided[11] that its activity endangered the Israeli democracy by using its own tools in order to bring about the downfall of Israel. Years later in 1984, after a long legal battle, his slate of candidates was approved by the Supreme Court and he along with another member of his party won their seats in the Knesset (out of 120).[12] In 1988, during the *intifada,* Mi'ari managed to be re-elected, this time as a single representative of his party, and served until 1992. Thus, his being removed from mainstream Israeli politics for his entire personal and political career, and his participation in activities considered hostile by Israeli courts, made for a total lack of any political significance while attending the Madrid conference. However, it signalled a change in the status of the Israeli Arab MKs: no longer silent dignitaries, but rather full participants representing the Israeli constituent of the Palestinian people.

THE POLITICAL GOALS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Within this framework, the leaderships of all political persuasions began discussing (mainly in private) the possible outcome of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. The issue was the need to redefine future relations between the Arab citizens of Israel and the government of the Jewish state once an agreement had been reached between the two peoples. About that time the term 'Israeli Arabs' disappeared almost overnight from their terminology to be replaced by the term 'Palestinians living in Israel'. The implications of this new term are crystal clear: as long as there is a Jewish state the Arabs are present on its soil, but definitely (without committing any criminal acts) using its political institutions for the benefit of the Palestinian people. Moreover, one day, under a different set of political circumstances, the Arabs of Israel would lead the way in changing the Jewish-Zionist nature of the country into something more acceptable to the Palestinians.

It is rather rare to find open expressions by leading Arab figures regarding their interests once the Palestinian issue is resolved. Clearly, there is a solid consensus among this one-fifth of the Israeli population that a Palestinian state must be established. Thereby, this minority in the Jewish state would pay back its dues to the large Arab population surrounding Israel. The Arabs at large have looked down on the Israeli Arabs for not participating in the long Arab-Israeli dispute. Still, no Israeli Arabs have ever publicly voiced a desire to move to such a Palestinian state once it is established. Thus, the most important question on their agenda is twofold: how to contribute to the accomplishment of this goal and how better to serve the Palestinian cause without giving away their actual presence in their current locations.

These goals have dominated the activities of the representatives of the Israeli Arab population since the beginning of the *intifada.* There are three overlapping elements:

1. Using all public Israeli forums to promote the just causes of the PLO.
2. Engaging in a very careful discussion of the final status of the Arabs in Israel; usually taking the form of autonomy within the 'Green Line' (pre-1967 borders of Israel).
3. Building a strong infrastructure for the implementation of a new version of the right of return into the territories of Israel.

The first element is beyond the scope of this article and will not be discussed here. However, the issue of autonomy connects very well with the notion of taking over land and territory. Obviously, the combination of a Palestinian state and autonomy for Arabs in Israel, based on taking over large parts of Israel, might prove crucial to the final settlement of the Palestinian issue in the way the PLO would like to see it. The notion of autonomy for the Arabs in Israel surfaced

for the first time in late 1989 during the *intifada,*[13] but the banner bearers were mainly silenced by other Arab figures.[14] However, although Arab leaders, with a few exceptions, would not profess their belief in the need for autonomy, they would try through a long and gradual process to delay any Israeli opposition to a future change in their status, whatever the formal name might be. This way, and without any public announcements, a phased solution, Israeli Arab style, has been introduced: acquiring maximum land and influence on the Israeli political system and public opinion so that no opposition to structural changes in the Israeli system would emerge.

In line with these tactics, the late 1980s saw the Israeli Arab leadership beginning the promotion of a new interpretation of the right of return. While enjoying the benefits of schools, running water and other basic humanitarian needs all over the Arab towns and villages in Israel, they began a public campaign alleging that these benefits were denied to some of the Arab citizens of Israel. A special Arab public body was established in 1988 calling for these basic needs to be met for Arabs living in what they termed 'unrecognized villages'. In reality these were small pockets of a few families, in many cases with no planning and no reason to claim these specific locations. However, in many of those 'villages' Arab villages had existed before 1948. This public demand put Israel in a painful situation in which distinguishing between cynical political exploitation of the misery of people and their true humanitarian needs was not possible. Under these conditions, granting the obvious universal rights in the demanded present locations would mean that those areas in which Arabs lived illegally would serve as the basis for the redrawing of the pre-1948 map in Palestine. In many cases the benign call for education and running water anticipated an attempt to reconstruct the pre-1948 villages, contrary to any Israeli political and planning thinking. On the other hand, these Arabs were Israeli citizens, and denying them their basic rights ran against all universal humanitarian values—especially those of a country established by victims of ethnic persecution. Thus, in the mind of the Israeli Arab leadership, whatever the result of their demands, Israel would be harmed and they would benefit. Either they would get, through a gradual process, the chance to rebuild Arab presence all over Israel, with the hope of eventually changing her very nature, or at least they would manifest the racist nature of the Jewish state in line with the PLO-advocated infamous 1975 UN Resolution.[15]

These political activities, begun around the 40th anniversary of Israel, are geared *inter alia* to demonstrate the anti-humanitarian nature of Israel and its continued defiance of the international consensus. Thus, a direct line connects these activities with past UN resolutions. Since the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 194 in December 1948 calling for the return of the Palestine refugees, all Arab countries have used it as a basis for their right to flood Israel with returning Arab refugees. All Israeli governments have resisted this demand for a radical change in the Israeli demographic balance.

No observer of the Palestinian issue has so far discovered that a new political reality has emerged under which the Israeli Palestinians have their own distinct role. Even the PLO, so long dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state, realized that it was impossible to demand the implementation of Resolution 194. Thus, since 1987 Palestinian activity towards the final solution has been for all practical purposes twofold: the PLO, in line with the phased solution attitude, would agree to a territorial solution in the territories and would mainly promote the cause of 1967 refugees, while the Israeli Arabs would take care of Israel *propre* and would concentrate on the 1948 issues. These two activities are closely connected, at least on the ideological level. The possible establishment of a Palestinian state would undoubtedly reinforce the activity of the Israeli Arabs in this respect.

Three processes have combined since 1987 to change the nature of the right of return in the eyes of the Israeli Arab citizens who identify themselves as Palestinians living in Israel in the following respects:

1. The gradual disappearance of the original generation of Palestine refugees.
2. The integration of Israeli Arabs into the Israeli political system.
3. The *de facto* division of responsibilities between them and other Palestinian players.

These processes have since 1987–88 reshaped the term 'right of return' to reflect the new division between vision and reality: Israel would never agree to the return of Palestinian refugees into its territory, but might be persuaded not to resist the reconstruction of their villages. This approach magnified the role of Israeli Arabs in the attempts to force the government of Israel to correct the 1948 Arab failure. Thus, a large part of the activity of Israeli Arab public figures since 1987 has been devoted to capturing territories within Israel, and an attempt to rebuild the villages abandoned in 1948. This way, the Israeli Arab leadership would not lose political influence, and would escape the fate of the local leadership in the territories upon the arrival of the PLO in 1993–94. Still, Israeli Arab dues to the overall Palestinian interest would be served by taking over areas in the Jewish state, legally or illegally. This redefinition of the term 'right of return' has manifested itself in the following ways:

1. An effort to take over strategic junctions and highways by massive illegal building activity.
2. Public campaigns in Israel and the use of international organizations to call for the reconstruction of villages abandoned in 1948.
3. Using universal humanitarian values in order to promote a right of return agenda. This is usually done in judicial forums and abroad with the aim of convincing them that denying Israeli Arabs water and education, wherever they live, is not acceptable. Every success in this respect is used to establish

an Israeli Arab presence in locations not approved by the Israeli governmental planning authorities.

The implementation of these policies has not been followed in most cases by violence, and therefore, unlike the *intifada,* has not attracted much Israeli public attention. However, this activity has been intensified since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, and is clearly intended to bring about the next stage of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, after the possible establishment of a Palestinian state. Clearly, such a Palestinian move would not answer the needs of the Palestinians outside the territories. The Israeli Palestinians are already taking care to address this by their plans for the next stage. Since it is obvious that Israel will continue to resist the return of the descendants of the original refugees, the Israeli Arabs would opt for the next best solution. Their task would be to make sure that Jews do not find enough territory for themselves in Israel, and that the Israeli Arabs have all access possible between their areas and the Palestinian areas.

It is clear that the uprising and the political developments that followed taught the Israeli Arab leadership several lessons to be implemented concurrent with the Israeli-Palestinian political process:

1. Since Israel failed to find a military solution to the *intifada* in the occupied territories it would be totally paralysed in responding to any violence inside Israel *propre* by Israeli citizens. The forceful response of the Israeli police to the late September 1998 events in Umm al-Fahm (see the following paragraphs) served to convey the equivalent Israeli official reaction: Israel would spare no effort in fighting for its domestic security. This lesson, so different from previous assessments by Israeli Arab leaders, was so shocking that Israeli Arab MKs intervened to put an end to the violence, and many spokesmen on behalf of the population called for the dismissal of the commander of the police forces and the minister in charge of internal security.

2. As long as the uprising was going on, the Israeli Arabs were the only players to have access to the Israeli media and to the government of Israel. The legitimacy granted by the Oslo accords to the PLO and the direct contacts between its leaders and the leaders of Israel made the Israeli Arab leadership redundant in this respect. Their services for the Palestinian cause were no longer necessary. Furthermore, as long as the PLO leaders could not speak to the Israeli leaders, the Israeli Arab leadership could hold out the prospect of becoming the accepted speakers for all Palestinians living west of the Jordan River. With the creation of the Palestinian Authority and the moving of all internationally recognized leaders of the PLO into territories in the former Mandatory area of Palestine, they successfully claimed their right of representation, once again, making the Israeli Arabs only a marginal element within the larger Palestinian people. All these developments caused

the old differences between the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians in the territories to resurface. From an Israeli Arab point of view, the PLO is very much interested in their fate, but would not act on their behalf, at least until the territories settlement is complete.

THE STRUCTURAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 'RIGHT OF RETURN'

All the processes discussed in the preceding pages once again focused the attention of the Israeli Arabs on the old issue of land and taking over areas. Thus, transformation of the old 'land' cause into an updated version of the 'right of return' involved three interwoven courses of action:

1. Establishing a body dedicated to the issue of 'recognizing the unrecognized villages'.
2. Enlisting support from Israeli Jewish figures who would protest against the humanitarian injustice done to the Israeli Arab citizens, but would by the mere fact of expressing their position contribute legitimacy to the idea that the 'unrecognized villages' be acknowledged. Apparently, another segment of the Jewish public opinion might subscribe to this approach: ideological socialists who believe that true equality between people should ignore religion and nationality and that it should be translated in this case into full human rights whatever the minor political outcome.
3. Petitioning the Israeli courts on borderline issues when the courts are asked to choose between the humanitarian aspect and the political damage.

Since the latter two moves are the result of the first, it is the idea of the 'unrecognized villages' that should be analysed. Indeed, the slogan: 'recognize the unrecognized villages' was first voiced in 1988 with the establishment of the Association of Forty. The name of the association is derived from the fact that by that time 40 years had elapsed since the signing by Israel of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[16] In the association's opinion Israel had failed to live up to its own commitments. The main claim of the association is that in 1988 there were about 40 'unrecognized villages' in Israel. The association claimed that they were Arab villages, which the government for discriminatory considerations had refused to recognize, and consequently these villages were entitled neither to financial support nor to any social services from the central government. The number of Villages' has grown during the years since to about 70, and the population increased from an initial estimated 10,000 people to 50, 000,[17] and is predicted to grow to about 70,000.[18] One source, not necessarily considered by Arab intellectuals as 'anti-Arab' or 'pro-government', is putting the phenomenon of 'unrecognized villages' in its right historical perspective.[19] It states that those villages are mostly offspring of known existing villages. Some villages began to spread before the establishment of the state; in some other

cases, this happened after 1948 with no official approval of their building plans. This phenomenon is only one element of a larger process of illegal building in Israel. This public and continuous violation of the Israeli law is strongly connected with Israeli Arab political considerations.

The case of the Ein Hud village provides a significant test case in studying the sources of the 'unrecognized villages' phenomenon and its possible effect on future land disputes within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. The original village of Ein Hud on Mount Carmel was destroyed during the 1948 war since it hosted armed people who threatened traffic on the main highway connecting Tel Aviv and Haifa, two major metropolitan centres. When the Association of Forty was established in 1988 by a resident of Ein Hud, the basic demand by him and his colleagues was that they would be allowed access to the old cemetery which had been abandoned in 1948 along with the rest of the village. Meantime, during the first years of the state the abandoned village was turned into an artists' and painters' village. Since the remains of the village were already reconstructed by the current residents, the former Arab residents who had not left Israel during the 1948 fighting took over parcels of land within a nearby national park, and began building a new Ein Hud. Since they had no building permits, and since that particular part of the old village was not allocated for new building, the illegal 'returning residents' had neither running water nor any electricity. In the late 1980s they began enlisting support for their cause claiming that the government of Israel was denying them their basic rights within their (illegal) settlement.

The call for provision of suitable living conditions for the people in Ein Hud did not receive a sympathetic ear from the Likud-led coalition government that was at the time in power. However, after the change in government in 1992 and the subsequent policy of making major political concessions for the Palestinian community, the issue of the 'unrecognized villages' was no longer ignored. There were two main reasons for the change in policy.

First, for years there have been symbiotic relations between the minister of interior and the Arab sector in Israel. This minister controls practically all governmental budgets allocated to the Israeli municipal sector. Usually, the party of this particular minister gets a high vote among the Arabs compared with other Jewish parties since most of the income of the local councils originates from the ministry (the municipal tax collection among Israeli Arabs is usually low). This tendency feeds in turn a more conciliatory approach to the needs of this population. Moreover, in Israeli coalition terms there are many similarities in the way the ultra-religious members of Knesset operate and the *modus operandi* of their Arab counterparts. Therefore, even while the Likud coalition was in power, the minister of interior—a member of an ultra-religious party-while realizing the pivotal role of the Arab vote promised to recognize some of these villages.

Second, the ideology of the new government (1992) called for greater openness in respect of the rights of the Arabs in Israel, ignoring altogether the Likud Party's point of view that it was the beginning of a new revised version of the right of return.

The illegal village of Ein Hud was eventually recognized in early 1995, at the exact location where the village existed until 1948.[20] By that recognition a precedent was set, and a notion of the 'internal right of return' was in effect established; in short: it was the first time ever that a village had been allowed to be reconstructed in its pre-1948 location. That act could not change the fact that the reconstructed village was built within the perimeter of a declared national park on state-owned land.[21] This village was not alone in being recognized by the 1992–96 coalition government. Eight villages altogether were recognized, none of them as result of a planned policy aiming at finding a historical reconciliation between Jews and Arabs in Israel in the wake of the euphoric days of the Oslo accords. Thus, the recognition given to all of the villages is living proof that, with the right political constellation, the advancement of the 'internal right of return' is possible. Moreover, even the coming of a new coalition to power in 1996, one which was dedicated to combating these Israeli Arab policies, did not cause a change in the official Israeli attitude. In spite of public desire to reverse the decisions of the previous government,[22] no coalition would dare do it for fear of losing even the insubstantial Arab votes for its member parties.

Similar considerations led successive Israeli governments to turn a blind eye to the widespread Arab illegal building all over Israel, mainly on state land. Only seven per cent of all land in Israel is privately owned. About four per cent is owned by Arabs, who account for about one-fifth of the total population, and three per cent by Jews. The remaining 93 per cent is managed by the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) for a variety of public owners, the largest of them being the state of Israel.[23] This concentration of land in the hands of the state enables Israel to plan for the future and to be able to implement large-scale planning schemes for the generations to come. Considering the small size of Israel any illegal building and taking over of state-owned or administered land is damaging to the idea of planning for all present and future citizens. It is extremely threatening when the take-over of land is in line with a different political agenda. This distribution of land makes no difference to the Jewish population of Israel since their violation of building regulations is usually on an individual basis, that is, adding a room or a fence to an already existing structure. In the Arab case it is mostly the take-over of state-owned land for the purpose of bridging over privately owned Arab land. In many cases this is land earmarked for planning purposes. Arab representatives usually justify such moves by their opposition to 'Judaization of the Galilee'. This expression is the 'red rag' provoking any Arab citizen of Israel into an emotional reaction. Whether the confiscation of land is for security purposes (see below the analysis of the September 1998 events in Umm al-Fahm), for the continuation of public building in Israel, or for the building of new roads, it is always something to resist since the decision is made by the Zionist government. Thus, it is typical that during the first visit of the (then) new deputy minister of agriculture, Walid Sadiq, in July 1992 at the Druze village of Yanuh he answered a plea by the Arab MK, Tawfiq Zayyad, and promised to give top priority to the issue of the expropriation of land.[24]

Illegal building by Arabs in Israel should be analysed in the same vein. Three inter-departmental committees, all appointed by Israeli cabinets, came to the conclusion that the phenomenon of Arab illegal building is widespread and continuing. The last of these, known as the Markovitch Commission after the name of its chairman, pointed out in its report the lack of enforcement agencies to act within the Arab sector in Israel.[25] It also underlined the lack of master plans for the future development of the Israeli Arab settlements. Clearly, the report did not condone the continued violation of laws in the Israeli Arab sector. However, the phenomenon of illegal Arab building continues to this day. Each attempt by Israeli law enforcement agencies to destroy such building is countered by local and national Israeli Arab leaders who remain steadfast on what they consider their national land. In their opinion, the government of Israel does not have the right to carry out court-approved eviction and demolition orders. This, in spite of their petitioning the courts on these same issues and the (obvious) insistence on the implementation of sympathetic decisions.[26] They believe, and so far rightly so, that the Israeli and world public opinion would deter the government from carrying out inhumane decisions, but simultaneously they send deeper roots into the land and by force, or the threat of using it, are already affecting the future of the land. This line of activity is usually the result of an individual encounter with the law, which results in full involvement of the Israeli Arab community.

Another avenue of resisting the central government, while promoting the idea of 'internal right of return' has to do with the 'Law of Absentee Property, 1950'. The law was passed by the Knesset in 1950, and has been amended three times since. Its main aim is to find a legal way to let the government of Israel use the land and other real estate abandoned by Arabs in the context of the 1948 war for an indefinite period of time. The main premise of the law is that the property would be held as collateral by the state of Israel until the final settlement of the financial claims of Jews against the Arab countries, which they had left in the context of the same war. Such a settlement would hopefully be found as a result of the multilateral talks resulting from the Madrid conference and devoted to refugee issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For years, but especially since the *intifada,* the leaders of the Israeli Arabs have called for the release of this property into their hands. In simple terms, they have got themselves into a position to claim the 1948 abandoned property. The property covered by the law is derived from three main sources:

1. Property of Arab refugees who left Israel in 1948, and never returned. The 'right of return' as recognized by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 refers precisely to these people. This property would in peacetime serve also as the Israeli payment for the resettlement of the Arab refugees in current locations, as much as the abandoned Jewish property in Arab countries would serve to compensate the state of Israel for their resettlement in Israel since 1948.

2. People living in the 'Triangle' area, namely residents of the areas east of the Israeli coastal section and west of Samaria. With the end of hostilities in 1948 they were under Iraqi control, but became Israeli citizens as a result of the April 1949 armistice agreement between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In many cases their land, which was found inside Israeli territory even before the end of hostilities, was taken over by Israel. Since the land was already owned, the government was in limbo, and thus declared these landlords 'present absentees'. This category is perhaps the only one that justifies a judicial solution, which has not been found since 1949.

3. Former religious endowments property *(waqf)* which used to be administered by the former *mufti* of Jerusalem until 1937. This property consists of thousands of acres all over Israel. The mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, a distant relative of Yasser Arafat, became the leader of the Arabs in Mandatory Palestine in 1922 with the blessing of the British Mandatory government. However, soon enough he began his uncompromising war against the British and the Jews in Palestine. In his activities, especially during the riots of 1936–39, he used the income from this real estate, previously endowed by the Muslim community in Palestine, for the well-being of their community. In the context of the *British-mufti* confrontation, a warrant for his arrest was issued in 1937 (but he fled Palestine without being apprehended), and the administration of the property was transferred to a committee of three. Since all three fled Palestine during the 1948 war, and became absentees under Israeli law, all former religious endowment property began to be administered by the state of Israel. Control over it would give any Muslim or Arab interested party access to a huge income and legitimacy in a bid for leadership among the Palestinians. Since some of the property consists of mosques and other religious sites a number of the very few in mostly Muslim areas have been released to the Muslim community in Israel. However, the demand to 'release' the property by Israeli Arab leaders means today *all* property, wherever it is located, and access in some cases to downtown Tel Aviv and Haifa where some of the property is located. Obviously, the public call for the 'release' of the property means the return of a Muslim presence to locations where it has long been absent. Accordingly, even the Labour-led coalition government, which in many cases preferred the humanitarian approach, compared with the Likud-led coalition, was not too sympathetic to these demands. This policy, consistent in every government since 1948, led the Israeli Arab leadership in recent years to carry out illegal annexations of former *mufti* property. In many cases they chose old mosques in areas which are no longer Muslim, since 1948, in order to claim freedom of religion and to prevent the government from any countermove. After all, whatever the legality of the claim, no Jewish authority would dare remove Muslims from a mosque. These policies by the Israeli Arab leaders and their following began with the early stages of the *intifada* and continue to this day. Still, considering the fact that

they are preparing for a rather distant eventuality, certainly after the final settlement of the Palestinian issue, they are patient and careful in claiming their alleged religious rights. It is clear that this is their main claim: the right to perform their religious duties, but the fact that they claim that right in areas devoid of Muslims for the last 50 years tells the whole story: another manifestation of the 'internal right of return'.

Two distinct organizations are active in promoting the 'internal right of return': the Association of Forty and the al-Aqsa organization. The former is demanding that the return to the unrecognized villages be legal; the latter promotes the return of former religious endowment property to the Muslims of Israel. These two demands are accepted by all Israeli Arab leaders and voiced in the Knesset by all Arab MKs. Accepting these demands would upset any planning and political considerations the government of Israel has; on the other hand, by returning these properties to Arab hands, especially in non-Arab neighbourhoods, a process of 'internal return' would commence.

PROGNOSIS AND THE FIRST GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE

During the last days of September 1998 violent riots broke out between the Arab residents of the town of Umm al-Fahm in the Triangle' area and police forces.[27] The immediate trigger was the evacuation of a protest tent of villagers near Umm al-Fahm on land confiscated a few months earlier to allow the Israel Defence Forces to carry on its training. The size of the land was about 125 acres, and compensation of about 625 acres was offered to the villagers by the government in an area less significant for military exercises. Moreover, a larger area was confiscated from Jewish villages for the same purposes. The Jewish settlers, though not too satisfied with the decision, went along with it. The Arab peasants, for less territory and larger compensation, refused any negotiations and took to the streets. In the clashes that followed scores of people, policeman and citizens, were wounded. Even more worrying were two phenomena; first, a major highway, going through Arab areas, was blocked for about two days; second, Israeli Arab citizens threw many petrol bombs at the police forces. This violent confrontation came to an end with an agreement between government representatives and the local leaders that the local peasants would be allowed to work the land until 31 December 1998, by which time the confiscation decree would take effect.

The (temporary) end to hostilities served as a reminder of past events between Israel and her neighbours, which reflected negatively on the Arab citizens of Israel. After the Israeli evacuation of Sinai in the context of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty Israel was forced to build a new airbase in the Negev desert. Local Bedouins claimed ownership of the land that was used for this purpose, but mostly could not provide any documentation for their assertion. All

attempts by the Israeli government to agree financial compensation failed. In late 1998 with the evacuation of parts of Judea and Samaria complete, and other areas discussed in the framework of the second withdrawal, Israel was continuously pressed for more training areas inside the pre-1967 borders of the country. The clashes and the refusal by Israeli Arabs to give up these areas served three Palestinian national goals:

1. To take over as much land as possible within Israel, legally or not, so that the area held by the government is smaller. In this respect, the Arab leadership adopted a long time ago the pre-state position of the Zionist leadership: giving up even one-quarter of an acre will be resisted.
2. To make manifest the potential threat of the Palestinians living in Israel in the event that any Israeli-Palestinian agreement were deemed unsatisfactory. During this conflagration the prime minister of Israel stayed in the US, addressing the UN and meeting President Clinton, and the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, for discussions on the next withdrawal in Judea and Samaria. These clashes definitely served the national Palestinian cause.
3. To ensure that the outcome of any territorial agreement between Israel and any of its neighbours is always an Israeli withdrawal from land and the elimination of training areas. Limitations on military training within the sovereign borders of Israel clearly inflict damage on the training routine of the Israel Defence Forces, and hence its preparedness for any future military confrontation.

With the advancement of any territorial agreement between Israel and the Palestinians all these elements will come into play in a more significant way. Clearly, this is only one of many Israeli Arab contributions to the overall Palestinian cause. The Umm al-Fahm event, and the subsequent wave of fires all over northern Israel, for which Israeli Arabs were blamed,[28] might mark a turning point in the consensus of Jewish thinking. In spite of several public expressions against police brutality by leading Jewish Israeli leaders none called for a special session of Knesset and none joined the demand by leading Arabs for the establishment of a committee of inquiry. There is obviously a clear line dividing political pleas voiced through the courts and the political system by members of known parties, from violence centred in a town led by Muslim radicals. The demands of the local residents might have gained a more sympathetic ear from all Jews who are predisposed to respond to the humanitarian despair had they been carried by other leaders.

CONCLUSION

Even at a time when the final outcome of the current political process in the Middle East is far from being clear, Israeli Arab representatives are far ahead

compared with the government of Israel. They have already begun a series of actions, which if successful would dramatically influence the outcome of the process. Yet, the government of Israel failed during the early days after the signing of the Oslo accords to declare and implement a coherent policy regarding the Arabs of Israel. Even the early beginnings of the 'internal right of return' could be presented within a larger framework as one element of a historic reconciliation between the return demands and the Israeli official policy. The lack of such policy and yet the accumulated concessions to the political demands of Israeli citizens is a bad omen.

On the Arab side, clearly they face a double challenge: how to identify themselves as Palestinians, contributing their share to their fellow Palestinians by using such political tools as are available to them, and yet not to acknowledge the supremacy of the PLO? Moreover, since no Israeli Arab is interested in moving into a Palestinian state, they are keen on preserving their unique identity in a way that would not cause any loss of their rights in Israel, and yet would make them trustworthy partners in deciding the future of the Palestinian people.

The arrival of the PLO leaders to the present Palestinian Authority areas might have made the Arab Israeli leadership redundant. Their direct access to the Israeli media and policy-makers became as much available to the leaders of the PLO. Consequently, the Israeli Arab leaders managed to put on the political agenda a new issue. On the theoretical level the main question they are posing now is the following: is Israel pursuing a solution of the 'territories problem', or is it interested in a comprehensive solution of the Palestinian issue? From this angle, Israeli Arabs should do their utmost to bring about the creation of a Palestinian state in order to provide for the beginning of resolving the Palestinian issue. Yet, their role only begins with the establishment of such an entity: at one end of the spectrum, there is the least promising scenario, that a much weaker Israel with a very active Palestinian minority will have to face an aggressive Palestinian state. The best scenario, on the other hand, speaks of the possibility that the establishment of a Palestinian state would add to the national pride of Israeli Arabs. Under this scenario their solidarity with their brothers in the territories would create relations similar to those which exist between Israel and the Diaspora. However, whatever scenario materializes, the Jewish state and its Arab citizens will have to redefine the nature of their relations, giving way to the national aspirations of the Arabs inside Israel.

The best scenario in the context of a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement in the eyes of most Israeli Arabs would be a close-knit Palestinian society ranging from the Galilee, through Judea and Samaria to the Negev desert in the southern part of Israel. That entity bound together by heritage and family ties would not have to be translated into one single Palestinian political entity, nor would it have to be recognized internationally. Its territory would. Another element of that national vision is that the Arab leadership in Israel, while not giving away any of the economic advantages of living in Israel, would become at least equal partners in running the ultimate Palestinian entity.

NOTES

1. Nadav Aner, 'The Arabs of Israel: Bridge for Peace between Israel and its Arab Neighbors', unpublished paper, Israel, National Security College, 1986.
2. John Norton Moore, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents,* Princeton, 1977, pp.1085–91, quoting the official PLO text of the Palestinian National Charter.
3. There was a major public debate in Israel prior to the 1996 national elections on the question whether the charter had been abrogated or not. It is clear now that since the National Congress of the PLO had never been called on a special session for the purpose of changing the charter according to its article 33, it continues to serve as the constitution of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
4. Uzi Benziman and Atallah Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and thePolicies towards Them,* Jerusalem, 1992, p.189 (in Hebrew).
5. See for example *al-Ittihad* (Israel, Arabic, daily of the Communist Party), 27 May 1991.
6. *Al-Ittihad, 27* May 1991.
7. Born 1943, member of Knesset continuously since 1984.
8. Born 1939, member of Knesset 1984–92.
9. Yaakov M.Landau, *The Arabs in Israel,* Tel Aviv, 1971, p.119 (in Hebrew).
10. More precisely: the Mapai-led coalition. Mapai is an acronym of the Hebrew words for the Party of the Workers of Eretz Israel, an earlier version of the current Labour party.
11. Landau, *The Arabs in Israel,* p.117.
12. Yaakov M.Landau, *The Arabs in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects,* Tel Aviv, 1993, pp.84–6 (in Hebrew).
13. *Al-'Arabi* (Israel, Arabic, weekly), 29 Dec. 1989, 26 Jan. 1990.
14. Yafa, MarkazYafa lil-abhath, *Nashrah Imarrah wahidah,* Nisan, 1991 (Jaffa Research Center, one-off publication, April 1991) (in Arabic); Salim Jubran's reaction to Dr Azmi Bisharah, *alIttihad,* 5 July 1991; two more recent expressions of Dr Azmi Bisharah advocating the idea: *al-Sinarah* (Arabic, weekly), 3 Jan. 1992; *Ha'aretz* (Hebrew, daily), 29 May 1998. Bisharah (b. 1956) is one of the most vigorous representatives of the Israeli Arab generation born into the Jewish state who made their career throughout the Israeli academic and political systems. He was elected MK in 1996 under the banner of the Democratic National Alliance, which he heads.
15. On 10 Nov. 1975 the United Nations General Assembly determined that Zionism is a form of racism. For the text of this resolution (3379, XXX) see Norton Moore, *The Arab-IsraeliConflict: Readings and Documents,* pp. 1236–7.
16. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution 217 A(III) of 10 Dec. 1948.
17. MK 'Abd al-Wahab Darawshe, *Knesset Chronicles,* Jerusalem, 6 Jan. 1993.
18. The Association of Forty, the association for recognizing the unrecognized Arab villages, *Memorandum,* Ein Hud, 1997.
19. Benziman and Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and the Policies towardsThem,* p.186.

20. Israel Kesar, minister of transportation in his speech in the Knesset, *Knesset Chronicles, 29* March 1995; the Likud-led coalition which returned to power in 1996 adopted this recognition in spite of its past objections to the move by the Labour-led coalition. The (Likud) minister in charge of minority affairs comments at the Knesset, *Knesset Chronicles,* 15 July 1997.
21. Roni Milo, deputy minister at the prime minister's office in his answer in the Knesset to MK Edna Solodar, *Knesset Chronicles,* 21 Jan. 1987.
22. Knesset debate on the status of the Arab minority in Israel, *Knesset Chronicles, 22* July 1996.
23. United Nations, CCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Distribution; General CCPR/C/81/Add.l3; 2 June 1998; English only/Human Rights Committee; Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant. Initial Report of States Parties due in 1993/ Addendum/ ISRAEL (9 April 1998); paragraph 849.
24. *Zafon* 1(local weekly, Acre, Hebrew), 21 Aug. 1992.
25. Benziman and Mansour, *Subtenants, the Arabs of Israel: Their Status and the Policies towardsThem,* p.186.
26. Typical petitions before the Supreme Court are cases 48/94; 7115/97; 4671/98 and others.
27. The description of these events is based on the following Israeli newspapers: *Ha'aretz,Ma'ariv, Yediot Ahronot* (all in Hebrew), *al-Sinarah, Kull al-Arab* (both in Arabic), 27–30 Sept., 2 and 4 Oct. 1998.
28. *Ha'aretz,* 15 Oct. 1998.

Abstracts

Israeli Arab Members of the 15th Knesset: Between Israeli Citizenship andTheir Palestinian National Identity

Alexander Bligh One of the outcomes of the Arab nations' struggle for independence from Western powers was the division of the Arab National Movement into subideologies, and, as a result, the establishment of separate nation states with their respective specific ideologies. At the start of the twenty-first century, it looks as though this split continues. The Palestinian National Movement is likely to witness yet another split: in spite of common Palestinian ideological and emotional obligations and commitment, the Palestinians now face quite a number of constraints, which may lead to the emergence of several new national Palestinian movements. Perhaps the first indication of such a trend is the political behaviour of Israeli Arab members of the 15th Knesset (the Israeli parliament), who have demonstrated since the October 2000 violence inside sovereign Israeli territory a new kind of Palestinian nationalism: Israeli Palestinian, unique to them. Perhaps even the State of Israel is beginning to recognize the development of a new Palestinian people—a segment of the Palestinians, with unique characteristics and a strong emphasis on its uniqueness *vis-à-vis* other Palestinians, the State of Israel and its policies regarding the Arab community.

Between Nationalism and Liberalism:The Political Thought of Azmi Bisharah

Abigail Fraser and Avi Shabat MK Professor Azmi Bisharah describes himself as a liberal and a humanist but as a neo-Nasserite nationalist as well. Bisharah's views on the solution to the Palestinian issue and the status of Israel's Arab minority will be reviewed while attempting to address any tension that might exist between these opposed ideologies. Changes in Bisharah's thoughts during the years will also be noted in an attempt to discover whether these changes stem from an inner change in Bisharah's thought or from the significant developments that have occurred in the political map of the region.

Fertility Transition in the Middle East: The Case of the Israeli Arabs

Onn Winckler The aim of this article is to examine the changing fertility trends among the Israeli Arab population, since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 until the present, within the context of the overall changing

fertility patterns among Middle Eastern Arab societies during the second half of the twentieth century. The main conclusion of the article is twofold. First, the fertility rates among Israeli Muslims have been stagnating since the mid-1980s, following an initial decline in the 1970s and the early 1980s—a decade-and-a-half before the decline in most other Arab Middle Eastern societies. This is in sharp contrast to both the Israeli Druze and Christian populations, as well as almost all of the other Middle Eastern Muslim societies, in which the fertility level has been steadily declining over the past 15 years. Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, the Israeli Muslim population's fertility rates were among the highest in the entire Middle East. The second conclusion is that the unique demographic pattern among the Israeli Muslims during the past two decades has resulted, first and foremost, from the unique Israeli pronatalist policy that provides substantial children's allowances and other economic benefits only from the fifth child and above. It is also attributable to the failure of the Israeli authorities to promote the socioeconomic conditions of the Muslims. For them, in sharp contrast to the Christians and the Druzes, the children's allowances and the other financial benefits given to large families have constituted an incentive for increasing their fertility and, in many cases, the best and most available option for family income.

Social and Educational Welfare Policy in the Arab Sector in Israel

Khawla Abu Baker Studies about Arabs in Israel usually focus on political-historical issues and on legal discrimination. Little attention had been paid to social and psychological welfare discrimination that directly and intensively influence the quality of life of all Arabs in Israel. A series of interviews with Arab professionals in top positions—whose voices are not heard often—reflect the intense involvement of political affiliation and orientation of Jewish officers on the welfare of Arab population in Israel. The article sheds light on the institutions of social welfare before 1948 and the influence of that war on the well-being of the Palestinian population. The article tries to highlight the policies and the politics in the ministry of labour and social affairs towards the Arab society. It narrates the history of the development of social welfare positions in the Arab society and the influence of political decisions on this process. A proposal for socio-political change is suggested.

A Binational Society: The Jewish-Arab Cleavage and ToleranceEducation in the State of Israel

Dan Soen This article focuses on the fact that Israel is a binational society with a Jewish majority constituting about 80 per cent of the population, and an Arab minority comprising roughly 20 per cent of the population. It then explains that the country faces a deep cleavage between these two sectors. The article tries to evaluate to what extent the ministry of education has really tried to facilitate tolerance between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority through subtle manipulation of the contents of readers and primers used in Israeli elementary schools in the 1990s. Various techniques of content analysis have been used in order to evaluate these primers and readers. The article reaches the conclusion

that the ministry failed in its mission to try and foster at least a common *civic* identity uniting Jews and Arabs living in Israel under an acceptable common denominator.

The Arabs in Haifa: From Majority to Minority, Processes of Change (1870–1948)

Mahmoud Yazbak Due to the endeavours of Dahir al-'Umar in the second half of the eighteenth century, Haifa developed without interruption until it became the most important town in northern Palestine. When in 1905 the Hijaz railway reached Haifa, the town became the main trade and export centre for northern Palestine, attracting growing numbers of immigrants, and continuously affecting the social fabric of the city. Haifa ranked high in British and Zionist plans during the Mandate rule. It became impossible for the Arab entrepreneurial class to compete in the new economic fields conquered by Zionist capital and protected by the Mandatory authorities bringing the Arab commerce and industry to a peripheral status. In contrast to rural areas that suffered from worsening hardships, Haifa was the scene of intense labour activity in the 1920s and 1930s, attracting a continuous flow of impoverished immigrants from the countryside. In 1946, there were more than 70,000 Arabs in Haifa. On 15 May 1948, when the Zionists proclaimed their state in those parts of Palestine of which their army had by then taken control, there were barely 2,000 Arabs left in Haifa.

Jewish Settlement of Former Arab Towns and Their Incorporation into the Israeli Urban System (1948–50)

Arnon Golan The 1948 war resulted in a brutal and abrupt transformation of the settlement system in the territory included within the bounds of the State of Israel. Housing of Jews in former Arab urban areas induced the process of transforming the pre-state colonial urban system of Palestine into the urban system of the emerging nation-state. The development of former Arab settlements was directly linked to their location *vis-à-vis* the pre1948 Jewish settlement system. Two case studies depict different problems and development prospects for former Arab towns repopulated by Jews. The first is that of the former Beisan, which became the Israeli town of Bet Shean. The second is the case of former Al-Majdal, the basis of the Israeli town of Ashkelon.

Ethnicity or Nationalism? Comparing the *Nakba* Narrative among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

Hillel Frisch This article compares how the Arabs in Israel commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the *Nakba* in 1998 with the Palestinian Authority's commemoration. It assumed that the Israeli Arab narrative would portray the *Nakba* as an event related to the past and that its tone would be softer in the portrayal of the other. Basically, the narrative is similar on both sides of the former green line. Amongst Israel's Arab citizens, however, the narrative emphasizes to a greater extent, personal return, the transformation of Israel into a state for all citizens, in additions to demanding the establishment of the Palestinian state across the green Line. Ironically, then, it was more radical than the narrative presented

by the Palestinian Authority that stressed a return to the homeland rather than specifically to the places from which the refugees came.

The Israeli Newspapers' Coverage of the Israeli Arabs during the *Intifada*

Ilan Asya The first *intifada,* which broke out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on 9 December 1987, had an immediate effect on the Arab citizens of Israel. They announced a general strike on 21 December, which soon assumed violent forms. Only when the Arabs of Israel took up such violent protest did the Hebrew press begin covering the link between this sector of the population and the *intifada.* The author highlights the 'conscripted' aspect of the Hebrew press during the *intifada*—the close link between the security establishment's demands and the editorial responses to them, particularly at moments when control over the Israeli Arabs appeared to be in danger. The press is shown to have been a willing partner on the effort to quell disturbances by means of warnings to the Arab population of Israel to use legal forms of protest only.

The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel: The Arab Media Perspective

Haim Koren The Arab citizens of Israel have a unique status. On the one hand, their sense of belonging refers naturally to the Arab civilization and they have a lot in common with other Arab communities. On the other hand the Arabs are citizens of the Jewish State of Israel, which to a certain point is not fully accepted in the surrounding Arab world. This creates a situation that was defined by one of the former Arab MKs as 'my country fights against my people'. In that kind of reality, the crisis of identity has grown over the years. Historical developments both domestic and regional have created enormous interest within the Arab world in the situation of Arabs in Israel. The revolution of the Arab media during the 1990s enabled a better focus on this, but this article attempts to give a perspective of more than 50 years because nothing has been written so far on this, and it reflects also on the cultural dimension within the Arab media.

Jews and Arabs in the State of Israel: Is There a Basis for a UnifiedCivic Identity?

Ilana Kaufman Critics of the current 'Jewish and democratic state' call for its replacement with the formula of a Western-type liberal civic state, which could express the multicultural reality of Jewish and Arab existence—'a state of all its citizens'. This article outlines the major implications of adopting one of the Western formulae of a 'civic nation state' in Israel. It points to ideas in this direction that have been publicly aired by both Arabs and Jews, and assesses the possible impact of such modification on majority-minority relations. The low feasibility of their adoption under current conditions should not rule out such modifications in changed circumstances.

The Collective Identity of the Arabs in Israel in an Era of Peace

Muhammad Amara After five decades of the existence of the State of Israel, the question of collective identity of various discrete groups, particularly the Arab minority, still plays a central role in the life of the country. It is likely that, today more than ever, Israel faces a new period of defining the country's identity, as a result of the peace process with some of the Arab countries and the

Palestinians. There is a growing awareness among the Arabs for achieving full egalitarian status with the Jewish majority, not only with regard to citizenship, but also on the national level. Add to this the need for certain circles among the Jews for reinforcement of and emphasis on Israeli identity as a way to bypass the inequities in certain sectors. This article will examine two main questions: whether, in the era of peace, conditions will be ripe for building a mutual super-identity for Arabs and Jews together that extends over citizenship (that is, a pluralistic country that belongs to all of its citizens); or whether precisely this period of peace will strengthen the collective and particular identities as part of the process of reinforcing sectoralism in Israel.

The Status of the Palestinians in Israel in an Era of Peace: Part of theProblem but Not Part of the Solution

As'ad Ghanem and Sarah Qzacky-Lazar After the signing of the Oslo accords in 1993 the issue of the possible status of the Palestinians in Israel, as a Jewish-Zionist state, have been discussed with greater frequency than in the past. Old and new ideas of broad or limited personal autonomy have been raised, along with ideas of annexation of part of the Triangle to the future Palestinian entity in the West Bank, or a more substantial integration than at present of the Palestinians in Israel, as individuals and/or as a group. This article presents theoretical options for the future status of the Palestinians in Israel, giving the perspective of the different sides regarding these options. The need for this discussion stems from the dissatisfaction with the present situation and also from the political changes taking place in the region, and especially the peace process. If a Palestinian state is established alongside Israel, the Palestinian Arabs who are Israeli citizens will have to redefine their relationship to the State of Israel as well as to the Palestinian state. This discussion is inevitably linked to the question of the nature of the state. In societies deeply divided on an ethnic, religious or national basis, there are various practices for creating the legal-institutional framework for dealing with the status of the various groups. On the theoretical level, researchers list mechanisms such as control, the development of majoritarian democracies, and consociationalism or ethnic democracy, as a means capable of ensuring stability. The failure or success of these mechanisms determines the behavior and aspirations of the minority communities.

The Final Settlement of the Palestinian Issue and the Position of the IsraeliArab Leadership

Alexander Bligh Even at a time when the final outcome of the current political process in the Middle East is far from being clear, Arab Israeli representatives are far ahead compared with the Government of Israel. They have already begun a series of actions, which if successful would dramatically influence the outcome of the process. Yet, the government of Israel failed in declaring and implementing a coherent policy regarding the Arabs of Israel. On the Arab side, they face a double challenge: how to identify themselves as Palestinians, contributing their share to their fellow Palestinians by using the political tools available to them, and yet, not acknowledge the supremacy of the PLO?

Moreover, since no Israeli Arab is interested in moving into a Palestinian state, they are keen on preserving their unique identity in a way that would not cause any loss of their rights in Israel, and yet would make them trustworthy partners in deciding the future of the Palestinian people.

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