

FUTILE DIPLOMACY

Early Arab-Zionist Negotiation Attempts
1913-1931

Neil Caplan

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Volume 1

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NEIL CAPLAN

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Futile Diplomacy

VOLUME ONE

EARLY ARAB-ZIONIST NEGOTIATION ATTEMPTS 1913-1931

Neil Caplan



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For Mara, Benjie and Hanna

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Those who grab for everything, who forget
that politics is the art of the possible,
in the end may lose all.

Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (1979)

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List of Abbreviations

Ac. – Arabic

A.E. – Arab Executive

CAHJP – Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People*

CO – Colonial Office

C.S. – Chief Secretary, Palestine Government

Ctee. – Committee

CZA – Central Zionist Archives*

*DBFP – Documents on British Foreign Policy**

doc. – document

*DPNM – Documents of the Palestine National Movement**

*D.Z. – Dissenter in Zion**

Eng. – English

FO – Foreign Office

H.C. – High Commissioner for Palestine

Heb. – Hebrew

*HH – History of the Hagana (Sefer Toldot ha-Hagana)**

J.A.(E.) – Jewish Agency (Executive)

J.B. – Joint Bureau of Jewish Public Bodies in Palestine

J.N.F. – Jewish National Fund

*LCW – Letters of Chaim Weizmann**

M.C.A. – Muslim-Christian Association

MEC – Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College*

M.N.A. – Muslim National Association

OETA(S) – Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South)

*PCW – Papers of Chaim Weizmann**

PRO – Public Record Office*

P.Z.E. – Palestine Zionist Executive

RH – Rhodes House Library, Oxford*

S.M.C. – Supreme Muslim Council

tgm. – telegram

transl. – translation

V.L.(E.) – Vaad Leumi (Executive)

V.Z. – Vaad Z'mani

WA – Weizmann Archives*

ZAC – Zionist Actions Committee

Z.C. – Zionist Commission to Palestine

Z.E. – Zionist Executive

Z.O. – Zionist Organisation

* – For details, see Bibliography.

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Preface

The present study is an offshoot of an admittedly “one-sided” dissertation which dealt with the attitude of Palestinian Jews to their “Arab question”. Making the jump to a topic dealing with both sides has not been an easy one, especially in view of the highly-charged emotions which continue to plague the Palestine-Israel conflict.

Despite my best efforts at treating the parties in dispute even-handedly, the fact remains that I am a Canadian Jew who has had previous research experience primarily with Zionist sources. But, whatever their personal background, historians in pursuit of fairness and equilibrium in this field are bound to encounter obstacles which are inherent in the subject-matter itself. First of all, there are many people involved in the conflict who still hold passionately to the exclusive rightness of their side. For these people, “fairness” is a false objective in such studies, the only “valid” history being that version which further justifies their partisan claims. In this sense, I hope that those committed single-mindedly to the Arab or Zionist cause will find little satisfaction from the present volume.

A second difficulty seems to be inherent in the different ways in which Arab and Zionist leaders have approached history. While both have tended to record their history in a personalized way, filtering it through justificatory hindsight,

Zionists seem to have had a more Western, "businesslike" approach to the keeping of contemporary written records: i.e., correspondence, diaries, minutes of meetings, notes of conversations, etc. Hence, we find a built-in imbalance in the sheer quantity of documentary source-material for researchers to sift through on subjects related to the Palestine-Israel problem.

This general imbalance of written evidence is accentuated in the case of the specific topic of this book: contacts and attempts to reach an agreement. The matter itself seems to have been considered an important one only to a limited number of people between 1913 and 1931; these individuals were almost exclusively on the Zionist side. Zionists, furthermore, would have had more of a vested interest to keep records on this subject, for it was necessary, whether for internal morale or for external propaganda, to find as much evidence as possible that there were Arabs who might, one day, come around to accepting Zionism on given terms. Since, for Arabs, contacts with the other side often constituted a breach of nationalist "discipline" or consensus, there would have been a decided disinclination to keep written records of any meetings with Zionists.

A fourth related imbalance for the researcher stems from contemporary differences in the organization and accessibility of historical documents. Most individuals and groups on the Zionist side have come to accept the principle that their political and private papers should ultimately become public property, and they have deposited them in public or semi-public archives which are obliged to provide access to all "serious" researchers. Arab private papers seem to be, on the whole, more difficult for researchers to consult, with access dependent on the consent of individuals and families who are cautious and selective in granting such access. The Institute for Palestine Studies and the Palestine Liberation Organisation Research Centre in Beirut are seeking to become, like their Zionist counterparts in Israel, central repositories for those private and group collections which exist. As the Institute for Palestine Studies has informed me that it had "nothing in the way of private papers, diaries or unpublished memoirs which would be of use" to me for my research, I

have had to rely, for purposes of this study, on only published works in Arabic.

Notwithstanding the above obstacles to "balanced" research, I have done my best to provide as complete and as dispassionate an account as possible. I have tried to leave to others the tasks of advocating claims and counterclaims, and of ascribing moral qualities of good and evil to the historical actors and their behaviour. For I do not believe that this conflict is one between heroes on one side and villains on the other. Nor do I wish to portray the history of negotiation attempts as a long, tragic series of missed opportunities, peace agreements that might or ought to have been.

*

This book, which will be followed by one dealing with the period 1931 to 1948, is divided into two parts. In the first part, I have provided an analysis of selected episodes and have placed each in its historical context. The bargaining tactics, motives and goals of the protagonists have been emphasised.

I have left to others the sort of close textual analysis which might usefully be done of the documents which are reproduced, in chronological order, in the second part of this volume. Many of these documents appear here for the first time, and they should provide raw material for other researchers to develop their own hypotheses about the early development of the Arab-Zionist conflict and about the negotiating process as it applied to that conflict.

*

In the course of preparing this study, I have been fortunate to have had material and moral support from several quarters. I was enabled to take time off from my teaching duties and to undertake research trips in 1975, 1977 and 1981 thanks to grants from the Vanier College Professional Development Fund, the Government of Québec, and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I am also grateful to have benefitted as a Lester Martin Fellow at the Harry S. Truman Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (1977) and as a Visiting Scholar at the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies (1981).

No less important has been the practical and professional assistance received from individuals. I am grateful to Marie Syrkin and Ben Halpern, who gave the original spark to this project. The help received from a number of individuals was especially appreciated when it was accompanied by their friendship and invaluable encouragement, and in this regard I am happy to acknowledge my debts to: Elie Kedourie, Walter Laqueur, Yehoshua Porath, Emmanuel Sivan, Moshe Mossek, Bernard Wasserstein, Kenneth Stein, Philip Mattar, Ann Lesch, Nazmy Mobarak, Michael Heymann, Arieh Goren, Nehama Chalom, Gillian Grant, Ian Black, Yosepha Tislitsky, Reuven Koffler, Michael Plotkin, Shawkat Shibly, Elyakim Rubinstein, Eli Shaaltiel, Jane Lawless, Andrew Lawless, Hugh Armstrong and Hal Shuster.

Having spent much of my time in Israeli and British archives, I want to express my warmest thanks to their Directors and staffs for treating my requests with efficiency and me with such kindness. The archives are: the Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People (CAHJP), Hebrew University, Jerusalem; the Central Zionist Archives (CZA), Jerusalem; the Israel State Archives (ISA), Jerusalem; the Private Papers Collection, Middle East Centre (MEC), St Antony's College, Oxford; the Public Record Office (PRO), London; the Rhodes House Library (RH), Oxford; and the Weizmann Archives (WA), Rehovot, Israel.

I thank Dr Michael Heymann of the CZA, Nehama Chalom of the WA, Sabri Jiryis of the PLO Research Centre, Beirut, Mai El-Kadi of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, and Gillian Grant of the MEC for kindly making available photographic material for the illustrations.

Most of all I thank Mara for her limitless support and patience.

N.C.
Montréal
March 1983

Introduction

Most students of the history of Arab-Jewish relations have come to take for granted the stubborn resistance of the continuing dispute to any form of lasting and "reasonable" solution. The explanations and interpretations of the conflict offered by these men and women will vary with their initial assumptions. One common assumption is that this conflict, although difficult and seemingly intractable, is like all other conflicts and ought to be resolvable in the end. From this starting-point many writers have been tempted to explore the history of the conflict by concentrating on the missed opportunities for peace. Some have singled out the extraneous third-party interference which has apparently prevented the main protagonists from settling their differences. Others have chosen to admonish one or more of the parties involved, either for its lack of foresight and wisdom, or else for its evil or misguided intentions.¹

Another frequently-advanced explanation of the Arab-Zionist conflict is presently being tested in the international political arena: namely, that the conflict has persisted because of an absence of communication and contact among the major interested parties. This, in turn, is attributed to the Arab refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign state on a territory considered to be stolen Arab land.

Since 1973, we have been witness to the beginnings of a whittling down of the psychological barriers of non-contact, a process highlighted in November 1977 by the historic visit of Egypt's late President Anwar el-Sadat to Jerusalem. The Egyptian-Israeli peace process which followed has had its ups and downs, and analysts of the conflict have begun examining different dimensions than those previously focused on. One question often addressed in this new era of Arab-Israeli relations is: Can the accumulated effects of wars and the hardening of attitudes on both sides be overcome through diplomacy and renewed contacts?²

Although the present study is concerned with the past, and not the present or future scenarios, it has been undertaken on the assumption that early Arab-Zionist negotiating experience has direct relevance to our understanding of the possible outcomes of diplomatic approaches to resolving this conflict.

The discussion of selected episodes and the reproduction of historical documents is not meant to provide a single, definitive explanation of the persistence of the Arab-Zionist conflict. Neither is it an attempt to provide authoritative evidence to vindicate the partisan claims of one side or another. Its main purpose is to assemble and discuss some of the raw material which may help us to focus more clearly on the origins of this conflict, and perhaps to eliminate some recurring fallacies about its development and the prospects for its resolution.

An examination of the period 1913 to 1931 reveals a wealth of previous negotiating experience which is today not well known or, at least, not very well remembered. Increased information about the actual "quantity" of such previous experience may prevent some contemporary observers from jumping too quickly to the conclusion that the communication and interaction which were lacking after 1948 have always been absent. It may also cast some doubt on the thesis that misunderstanding and/or ignorance of the other party's "true" aims and peace-terms are at the heart of the present impasse, and that an expansion or a re-opening of contacts will automatically remove misunderstanding and lead to peace. As Yehoshafat Harkabi warned in May, 1973,³

The day negotiations start will indeed be a great occasion for celebration. Yet let us remember the lessons psychologists teach – that direct contacts between human groups do not always draw them together, but may make them realize how far apart they are and thus lead to further estrangement.

Apart from the “quantity” of negotiating experience, the evidence examined during our period also indicates that there was little or no movement of any of the parties in the direction of modifying its basic minimum demands and aspirations. The major protagonists seem to have come, at an early stage, to rather pessimistic conclusions regarding the possibility of reconciling their conflicting interests and the future of Zionist-Arab relations. In 1919, David Ben-Gurion perceived the situation in these “inconvenient” terms:⁴

Everybody sees a difficulty in the question of relations between Arabs and Jews. But not everybody sees that there is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can fill that gulf. It is possible to resolve the conflict between Jewish and Arab interests [only] by sophistry. I do not know what Arab will agree that Palestine should belong to the Jews – even if the Jews learn Arabic. And we must recognize this situation. If we don't acknowledge this, and try to come up with “remedies”, then we risk demoralization. . . . We, as a nation, want this country to be *ours*; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be *theirs*. . . .

The Palestinian nationalist leader, Awni Abd al-Hadi, also saw the conflict in similar terms. “Some time ago”, wrote Moshe Shertok (Sharett) in his note of a conversation between Awni and Hayim Arlosoroff in early 1932,

he [Awni] had come to the definite conclusion that there was no point whatever in negotiations or attempts to reach a mutual understanding. The goal of the Jews was to rule the country, and the aim of the Arabs was to fight against this rule. He understood the Zionists quite well and respected them, but their interests were fundamentally

opposed to Arab interests, and he saw no possibility of an agreement...⁵

What place, then, can negotiations have in the settling of Arab-Zionist differences when important leaders on both sides have agreed on their basic futility? By negotiation, we commonly mean a procedure by which parties in conflict engage in debate and dialogue and – in the classic situation – “gather round a table and, at the cost of mutual concessions, attempt to define the terms of an agreement which will take their respective interests into account”.⁶

If we want to appreciate the record of negotiation in the on-going Arab-Zionist conflict, we must look beyond this somewhat formalistic notion and focus on the intricacies and nuances of the process. In this way, we may discover how negotiations were utilized in the service of the Zionist and Arab causes.

Rather than looking at each encounter as a missed opportunity and seeking to apportion blame for its ultimate failure, we shall be discussing, whenever appropriate, one or more of the following aspects:

1. The motives for negotiating.
2. The timing of contacts.
3. The status of the negotiating partners.
4. The rôle and interests of third-parties.
5. The proposed terms of agreement.

Placing these considerations into the context of Zionist and Arab leaders operating between 1913 and 1931, we may imagine the following sorts of questions suggesting themselves to would-be negotiators. Is it worthwhile to go into talks with the other side? Do we have a chance of gaining more than we will be asked to concede? What do we stand to lose by remaining aloof? Will our opponents be bargaining in good faith? Assuming the latter, will our negotiating partners have the necessary authority and stature to implement their share of the bargain we may work out? What concessions are we prepared or able to offer (without being repudiated by our followers or allies), and what concessions do we expect or insist the other side should make in return? What impression

will be created on important third-parties, or on public opinion, by our participation in, or abstention from, these proposed talks?

In this sense, much of our concern will focus on the tactics and strategies employed by both sides. It is hoped that this survey, with accompanying documents, will add something to our understanding of the nature of this particular conflict and of the process of conflict-resolution where the gap between the ostensible vital interests of the parties is so deep and wide. For, if our examination reveals much about how parties *used* the negotiating process for their own ends, there is little evidence, during the period 1913-1931, of any imaginative and realistic formulae being seriously explored in an attempt to harmonize the goals of the parties in conflict. During this period, neither side felt that the growing conflict required any re-evaluation and/or reduction of its exclusive national goals.

It would be only in the period after 1931 that some innovations and possible compromises would be discussed more seriously. Some of the negotiation attempts and personalities involved during the 1930s and 1940s are perhaps better known than those discussed in the present volume: e.g., Ben-Gurion's talks with Arab leaders (1934-1938); the attempt by "the Five" (G. Frumkin, J. L. Magnes, M. Smilansky, P. Rutenberg, and M. Novomeyski) to break the Arab general strike of 1936; the Jewish Agency's dealings with Lebanese and Syrian groups; the Jewish Agency's relations with the Amir Abdallah; the "Hyamson-Newcombe" proposals, discussed by Magnes, Izzat Tannous and Nuri al-Sa'id; and the St James ("Round-Table") Conference of 1939.⁷ Yet, as we shall show below, the earlier attempts at a negotiated settlement – although equally futile in the end – provided leaders on both sides with valuable experience for their later encounters. Also, reciprocal attitudes and patterns of interaction between Arabs and Zionists became firmly rooted during the period discussed in this volume.

CHAPTER 1

First Attempts

NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-ZIONIST RELATIONS IN PALESTINE, 1882-1914

The first real attempts to find a “diplomatic solution” to the budding Arab-Zionist conflict date back to 1913 and 1914. In order to understand the context of these moves, we must go back to the year 1882, which may be taken as a convenient starting point for any discussion of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. This year marked the beginning of the first of several modern waves of Jewish immigration (“*aliya*”, literally meaning “ascent”; pl. “*aliyot*”) to those provinces of the Ottoman Empire which later became Palestine of the British Mandate, and subsequently the Jewish state of Israel. The net result of the first two “*aliyot*” prior to 1914 more than tripled the number of Jews in the area, from an estimated 23,000 (1882) to 85,000 (1914). The Arab population during the same period grew less strikingly, from roughly 500,000 to 600,000, with emigration detracting from the natural increase.¹

Perhaps more important than these numerical changes, the new *type* of Jew in Palestine contributed to a striking change in Arab-Jewish relations. The Jews of the “old *yishuv*” (the Jewish community prior to 1882) had been accustomed to a self-contained and subservient life in the predominantly Muslim society around them. Not so the new Zionist settlers. Contrary to popular misconception, relations between the native Arab population and these new settlers were not idyllic.² It is only by comparison, or for propaganda purposes, that Jews or Arabs in later years would look back with nostalgia on a period of relatively peaceful and “brotherly” relations. Serious research into the 1882-1914 period now

shows us that "the trend of subsequent developments in Palestine was already set" before 1914,³ that is, that the seeds of today's Arab-Israeli dispute were sown before that date.

One of the practical results of the application of Zionism in the daily lives of Jewish settlers in Palestine was the social and economic segregation of the new *yishuv*. Local Jewish leaders became preoccupied with the task of building up an autonomous and self-sufficient community. Even men like Dr Arthur Ruppin—whose colonization work led him to stress the need to improve relations with the Arabs—realized at an early stage that the practical business of Jewish settlement had to be carried out systematically,

by not permitting ourselves to be scattered at random throughout the country, but by concentrating on a few points.... It is only in this fashion that we can, within certain limits, achieve today [1913] the objective we have in view, namely, the creation of a Jewish milieu and of a closed Jewish economy, in which producers, consumers and middlemen shall all be Jewish.⁴

Such autonomy was fostered both symbolically and in practical ways. National symbols were actively promoted: star of David, Zionist flag and anthem ("*ha-Tiqva*", The Hope), Jewish National Fund (JNF) stamps. Much effort went into the organization of "national-communal" institutions: e.g., schools, local self-governing councils, a Jewish watchmen's association (*ha-Shomer*), land-purchase and banking facilities.⁵ In fact, most of the socio-economic infrastructure of today's Israeli society was already being developed before 1914.

GROWING AWARENESS OF A CONFLICT

This preoccupation with internal organization may, in part, help us to understand the frequent criticism (usually made with hindsight) that early Zionists were naively "unaware" of the Arab population residing in Palestine. Caught up in the redemption of their own people, many, indeed, did not perceive the Arabs as constituting a rival "nation" in Palestine.

The settlers did see, of course, that there were Arabs living in the country, and no one would have denied that good-neighbourly relations were important. But beyond the avoidance of unnecessary friction and disputes, it seemed natural to almost all Jews that their principal energies would be devoted to building up their own separate society, and not to integrating themselves into what was, for them, another foreign (i.e., Arab) cultural and social milieu.⁶

But soon it became evident that there was a national/political dimension involved, and some perceptive observers began to suspect that a larger clash of interests was involved. Indeed, prior to 1914 a number of spokesmen were already predicting an inevitable clash of destinies. Najib Azouri, a Christian Arab who had served as an Ottoman government official in Jerusalem, prefaced his book, *Le Réveil de la nation arabe* (published in Paris in 1905), with remarks concerning not one, but two, relatively unknown movements in Turkish Asia, namely:

the awakening of the Arab nation, and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute, on a very large scale, the ancient kingdom of Israel. These two movements [he went on to predict] are destined to fight continually until one is victorious over the other. The fate of the entire world will hinge on the final outcome of this struggle between two peoples representing two contradictory principles.⁷

Reviewing the pre-War experience from the Zionist side, Y. Radler-Feldman (who was later, under the pen-name of "Rabbi Binyamin", to fight the official Zionist leadership in the name of Jewish-Arab rapprochement) made no secret of the fact that the Jews had been unable "to establish friendly relations with the Arabs".⁸

At the moment [March 1913] their hatred against us is being fanned by the press and animosity is becoming more frequent. Altogether, it must be accepted that two nations such as the Jews and the Arabs can only live side by side either in friendship or in enmity. A third relationship, one of indifference, does not exist.

During the first decades of Zionist land-purchase and

settlement, contacts between the "new Jews" and the local population provided several areas for tension and friction.⁹ In the towns, too, the native merchant class came to look on the new Jewish arrivals as an unwelcome challenge to their traditional social and commercial predominance.¹⁰ When outlying Jewish colonies began to abandon the practice of hiring local Arabs in favour of having Jews as watchmen (soon organized into a country-wide quasi-militia, *ha-Shomer*), this gave rise to some Arab fears and complaints that the Jews were arming in order to seize control of the country.¹¹

All of the above areas of friction might have been regarded as normal in circumstances of immigrant-vs-native or infidel-vs-Muslim. A tactful and conciliatory attitude on the part of the newcomers might, normally, have been enough to remove native suspicion and to promote better relations. In fact, a number of Zionist observers¹² did dwell on this aspect and felt that much would be achieved by a less contemptuous or a less oblivious attitude on the part of the new settlers. Long before 1914 these observers were actively campaigning for a deliberate Zionist initiative to promote good-neighbourly relations. To some extent these exhortations did contribute to improved relations. Settlers themselves came to realize the practical wisdom of encouraging good relations by allowing Arab *fellahin* to take advantage of free Jewish medical services, or by inviting some Arabs to send their children to study in Jewish educational institutions. Another, more natural, impetus for positive relations came through commercial dealings, which often produced patterns of mutual gratitude, dependence and/or friendship.

But increasing the volume of personal contacts between the two peoples was not necessarily a one-way street leading towards mutual trust and friendship. Intimacy with Zionist thinking or institutions, for example, could also lead to heightened Arab fears, resentment or jealousy with regard to the Jewish newcomers.¹³ Whatever the beneficial effects of early Zionist public-relations efforts, they were fragile enough to be shaken by inadvertent misunderstandings, Zionist indiscretions, or deliberate incitement by anti-Zionist elements. In sum, during the 1882-1914 period, few concerned and informed observers could be really satisfied with the

development of Zionist-Arab relations in the country.

If their internal preoccupations made Zionists play down the external reality of the Arabs, there can be little doubt that in certain Arab circles there was growing uneasiness and concern over the Zionist activity and development in their midst. As early as 1910, articulate voices were denouncing the "exclusiveness" and aloofness of the Jewish settlers. In that year, Shukri al-Asali, the Governor of Nazareth, complained at length of Zionist aims and separateness as expressed in their habits, symbols and institutions.¹⁴ Similar denunciations were made one year later in the Turkish parliament.¹⁵ In April 1914, Nahum Sokolow's tour of the Middle East and his explanations of Zionism to the Arab press evoked the following rejoinder from Rafiq al-Azm, one of the leaders of the Arab Decentralist Party:

Quite the contrary [to Sokolow's assurances], we see the Jews excluding themselves completely from the Arabs in language, school, commerce, customs, in their entire economic life. They cut themselves off in the same way from the indigenous government, whose protection they enjoy, so that the [Arab] population considers them a foreign race. This is the reason for the grievance of the Arabs of Syria and Palestine against Jewish immigration. The Arabs have as yet made no steps on the road to their national renaissance.... they, therefore, see their very existence threatened by the Jews. Many also see a political danger in that the Jews retain foreign nationality and in this way conquer the country for foreign states.¹⁶ ... The youth of Palestine is already inspired with the idea of assembling in order to take up the struggle against the Zionist movement. We do not think that the educated Jews and Zionists will mock at the defence movement of the Arab youth and intelligentsia.¹⁷

THE TURKISH FACTOR

This hostility to Jewish immigration and settlement must be seen in the context of the "awakening" which was then affecting intellectual and political leaders in the Arabic-

speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ Originating in secret societies and literary clubs in the late 19th century, a movement was growing for a "decentralization" of the Empire which would have allowed the Arabs greater regional autonomy and self-government. The Turks resisted these "separatist" tendencies, as they did all other threats to the unity of the Empire. The 1908 revolution by the "Young Turks" was followed by a centralizing policy of "Turkification" of the ethnically-diverse Empire, and this had the effect of strengthening the Arab movement's desire for decentralization.

In this Turkish-Arab tug of war, the Arabs became a powerful factor. In the new parliament the Arab bloc held 60 of the 245 seats. Complaints against the indifference of the authorities in the face of the Zionist "danger" became one of the main issues in Turkish-Arab relations and in the election campaigns.¹⁹ Protests received from Palestinian notables and pressure inside parliament periodically led the authorities to tighten the regulations (some restrictions dated back to 1881) concerning Jewish immigration.²⁰

Completing the triangle were the Zionists, who since 1882 had been using whatever pressure they could muster (e.g., through foreign consuls) to obtain from the ruling Turks conditions favourable to Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine. In response to such pressure, and in the hope of securing Jewish financial assistance, the Turks would periodically relax or overlook restrictions.²¹ But Arab nationalists resented Zionist reliance on the Turks, and in their overtures to the Zionists their outstretched hand seemed to imply an anti-Turkish alliance. This was sometimes reflected in the "friendly" advice that the Zionists should be careful—that governments (i.e., Turks) come and go, while the native population (i.e., Arabs) were a permanent factor.²² But even those Zionists who appreciated the urgency of coming to terms with the Arabs were reluctant to engage in any activities which had anti-Turkish undertones. Thus any development of Arab-Jewish relations had to involve the Turkish factor.

Following the first World Zionist Congress at Basle in 1897 and the publication of Azouri's *Réveil de la nation arabe* in 1905,

a growing number of Arab nationalists and Zionists became increasingly preoccupied with each other's existence and aims. At first, most Zionists who gave the matter any attention tended to discount the strength of the nascent Arab movement, and some engaged in what proved to be wishful thinking when they supposed that this movement would confine its appeal to Arab lands outside Palestine. For their part, some Arab observers went to the other extreme of fearing that they were facing imminent domination by a new Zionist kingdom which would stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates.²³ Whatever the exaggeration or underestimation in the perceptions of both sides, the possibility of a showdown grew as each came to understand some of the contradictions between its own position and that of its rival.²⁴

It was after 1908 that an anti-Zionist campaign gained real momentum in and around Palestine.²⁵ After several years of escalating verbal threats and warnings in the Arab press, leaders in both camps were beginning to give serious thought to the option of attempting to reach a formal accord. The Zionist inclination for talks with Arab leaders came in direct reaction to the unfavourable climate being generated by the press. Much energy went into answering hostile articles and trying to create a more favourable image of Zionism in the newspapers of the Arab world.²⁶ Zionist contacts were extended beyond the original circle of Arab notables who had been important simply from the point of view of land purchase; Zionists now began to devote more attention to cultivating the goodwill of individuals with political influence or press contacts. As Yaacov Ro'i has summarized his study of the situation after April 1909,²⁷

Arab attacks on individual Jews in the towns and villages or on the roads, the violation of Jewish fields and plantations and the molestation of livestock, and a number of vehement articles in the Arab press, and speeches in the Ottoman parliament could not help but make Zionists everywhere conscious of the need to come to terms with the local Arab population.

Another factor influencing Zionists in the direction of paying more attention to the Arabs was related to the

growing Arab-Turkish estrangement. Zionists valued their good relations with the Turks, who after all controlled the gates of Palestine and regulated land sales.²⁸ While Zionists felt that they could not contemplate any alliance with the Arabs which would alienate Turkish sympathy, they were attracted by Arab overtures because an accord with the Arabs—if it could be reached within the framework of continued loyalty to the Turks—had the advantage of solidifying Zionist-Turkish relations. For, if Arab anti-Zionist protests could be minimized through such an accord, then the Turks would have little excuse for denying the concessions which the Zionists were seeking.²⁹ In fact, it was the Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey, who advised the Jews in September 1913 that they “must first of all come to an understanding with the Arabs; we shall do the rest”, by which he meant improving conditions affecting Jewish immigration and settlement.³⁰ Thus, an Arab-Zionist accord had, for the Turks, the possible attractions of keeping the Arabs off their backs, while allowing them to earn Zionist gratitude. For the Zionists, an accord with the Arabs stood to further better relations with the rulers of Palestine.

Arab motivation for talks with Zionists was not unmixed. The “decentralist” and “reformist” groups were always searching for allies in their struggle with the Turks. As early as 1911, Muhammad Rashid Rida, a founder-member of the Decentralist Party and a leading Muslim thinker, pointed out that the “Arab awakening” would require European know-how, the support of the Western press and large sums for economic development. Since, in his analysis, the Jews controlled the European press and bank(!), the Syrians were obliged to consider the option of an accommodation with the Zionists over Palestine. Rida was certain that the Zionists desired “to take possession of the Holy Land”, and consequently the Arabs would have to proceed with utmost care so as to avoid the likely dangers of the local population or government falling into debt, and/or the Zionists gaining a foothold in Palestine through land purchase.³¹ As Arab fears continued to grow that “Zionist power” might soon overrun the Fertile Crescent, Rida advised Arab leaders in 1914 that they were confronted with a clear-cut choice:

Either make an agreement with the Zionist leaders in order to resolve the differences between the interests of both parties... or else gather all their [i.e., Arab] forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first by forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed gangs who will oppose [the Zionists] by force.³²

FIRST NEGOTIATION ATTEMPTS, 1913

Such were the motives and the mood of Zionist and Arab leaders in 1913 and again in 1914 when steps were taken for the first time to try to resolve their differences through diplomacy. Since this episode is the first recorded instance of Zionist-Arab political negotiation, let us examine its course in detail.

In early 1913, as the columns of Cairo's *al-Ahram* heated up with anti- and pro-Zionist articles, the arguments seemed to climax in the suggestion for a joint meeting to resolve the contradictions once and for all.³³ On April 11, 1913 Salim Najjar, on behalf of the Cairo Decentralist Committee, contacted his former employer, Sami Hochberg, the Jewish editor of *le Jeune Turc*, a paper subsidized by the Zionist Organization in Istanbul. Najjar proposed to Hochberg that Dr Victor Jacobson, the official Zionist representative in Istanbul, be impressed with the need for the Jews to come to an agreement with his Party. In his letter Najjar claimed to have the Zionists' best interests at heart, and he suggested that by joining with the Decentralists they would rid themselves of the growing Muslim and Christian animosity. Jacobson responded by charging Hochberg with the mission of travelling to Arab capitals to investigate the possibilities of an accord.

Hochberg's trip was quite successful.³⁴ He spoke with twenty leading members of the Cairo Decentralist and Beirut Reformist committees, including Rafiq al-Azm, Salim Najjar, Haqqi al-Azm, Iskandar Ammun, Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum, Rizqallah Arqash and Ahmad Tabbarah. Hochberg reported that there were only two men who declared themselves firmly opposed to any Jewish immigration. With the

rest he was able to formulate a preliminary "entente verbale", according to which the Cairo Committee—"being in principle favourable to Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine and in favour of an agreement with the Zionists"—agreed to work for an Arab-Jewish rapprochement through oral propaganda and through the Arab press. In exchange, *le Jeune Turc* committed itself to supporting the Arab cause ("insofar as it remained compatible with the unity and integrity of the Empire") in its columns and through its contacts with the European press. Although this limited agreement in effect obligated only Hochberg and his paper (and not the Zionist Organization), the atmosphere between Zionists and Arabs improved considerably during the following months. Several series of articles favouring an alliance were published, while the Arab press generally displayed a more moderate tone on the Zionist issue.³⁵

A "full accord" was foreshadowed in Hochberg's preliminary talks, but this had to await the results of the First Arab Congress, which was held in Paris in June 1913.³⁶ Hochberg attended as an observer and lobbied on behalf of his rapprochement scheme, winning the support of the Congress' chairman, Abd al-Hamid az-Zahrawi. The Congress passed no resolution hostile to Jewish immigration, and some favourable statements were obtained in press interviews. But the Paris Congress turned out to be the high-point of the 1913 rapprochement attempts. Two days after the conclusion of the Congress, moves towards a Zionist-Arab alliance were virtually frozen with the arrival from Istanbul of a draft *Turkish-Arab* agreement for reforms within the Empire. While at first Hochberg felt that a three-sided understanding was imminent, the next few weeks proved that most Arabs in Paris, Istanbul and Beirut considered that their anticipated agreement with the Turks made any further negotiations with the Zionists unnecessary.³⁷

RENEWED CONTACTS, 1914

For a while it seemed as though the initiative taken toward a Zionist-Arab accord was being dropped in favour of less ambitious moves toward mere "cordial relations". But the

Cairo Decentralists were soon dissatisfied with this situation. The group's annoyance was reflected in bitter press articles against the Zionists;³⁸ the tirade against Jewish exclusivism quoted above (page 14) is but one example. "Nice words" from Zionist leaders were challenged, and the latter were accused of not living up to their professed desire for an agreement with the Arabs.

These accusations were among the stimuli for the preparations which were made in 1914 for a "round-table" conference of Arab and Zionist representatives. Other trends and events combined to promote the idea of such a conference. Apart from the more radical Cairo group, other Arabs returned their attention to the Zionist factor once it became clear that the promised Turkish reforms would not be satisfactorily implemented. Contacts in Istanbul, which had lapsed since January 1914, were resumed by Dr Jacobson and Richard Lichtheim in April. Conversations were held with Ahmad Bayhum, Najib Shuqair, Shukri al-Husaini, Sa'id al-Husaini, Raghīb an-Nashashibi, Sa'id Shahin, Asad Dagh-ir, Faris al-Khourī and others.³⁹ During his visit to Syria and Palestine in April 1914, Nahum Sokolow of the Zionist Executive spoke with a number of Arabs, including Nasif al-Khalidi, Muhammad Kurd Ali, Abd ar-Rahman ash-Shahbandar, Georges Fakhuri, Shukri al-Asali and Muhammad al-Inglizi.⁴⁰ In his attempts to reassure them about the compatibility of the two movements, Sokolow discussed the possibility of convening a round-table meeting to clear up any persisting misunderstandings. On May 27th and 29th, an unnamed "Zionist leader" in Istanbul (probably Dr Jacobson) contributed a pair of articles to the ongoing Cairo press debate, also calling for a joint meeting. Meanwhile, Nissim Malul, a Palestinian Jewish member of the Decentralist group, had to reassure his Arab colleagues that the Zionist leaders were indeed sincere in their desire for an agreement. By late May 1914 it appeared that a conference would soon be organized, and in anticipation the Cairo press closed its columns to any further discussion of the Zionist question.⁴¹

As negative as these motivations were for the Zionists to resume formal talks with Arab representatives, the situation in Palestine provided more negative, and more compelling,

reasons. Since July 1913 the Palestinian press (*al-Karmil* of Haifa and *Falastin* of Jaffa)⁴² had been denouncing the apparent leniency of their Syrian and Egyptian "cousins" on the Zionist question. During the winter of that year three Jews were murdered in Northern Palestine. Anti-Zionist clubs were formed in several towns,⁴³ and by April 1914 the local press had reached such heights of anti-Zionist incitement that the Turkish authorities intervened to order the closure of *Falastin*.⁴⁴ The elections to the third Turkish parliament also gave vent to local anti-Zionist campaigning and sentiments.⁴⁵

Thus, by May 1914 a meeting between Arab and Zionist representatives seemed essential in order to de-fuse a potentially explosive situation.⁴⁶ The actual mechanics of organizing the conference rested with Nasif al-Khalidi, a Jerusalemite working as chief engineer in Beirut; Hayim Margaliut Kalvaryski, a land agent of the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) stationed in Rosh Pina in Northern Palestine; and Dr Yaakov Thon, who worked with Dr Ruppin in the Zionist Jaffa office. The conference, tentatively set for July at Brumana, Lebanon, was first postponed by Khalidi, who needed more time to assemble an Arab delegation. Following this first postponement, Zionist leaders found their own reasons to seek further postponements, as they had reached the conclusion that the conference was doomed to failure.⁴⁷ In fact, the meeting never took place; the outbreak of war on August 4th put an end to any further moves in that direction.

FAILURE OF THE 1914 CONFERENCE

In order to appreciate the reasons for the failure of the 1913-14 attempts at an agreement, it would be useful to focus on the following areas: (a) the status of the negotiators, (b) third-party considerations, and (c) the proposed terms of agreement. Specifically, the questions which need to be answered are: Would the delegates to the proposed conference have been able to execute their respective parts of any agreement arrived at? What effects would this Zionist-Arab accord have had on relations with the Turks? What could the Zionists have offered to the Arabs for the sake of an

agreement? Could the Zionists have made those concessions which appeared necessary to win Arab assent?

(a) *Status of the Negotiators.* Among the obstacles which made a successful accord highly unlikely we may begin with the proposed agenda and the personnel involved in the aborted conference of 1914. The general Zionist scepticism about the chances of a real and lasting entente resulted in the leaders designating "lesser" personalities as delegates. They did not wish to accord too formal a status to talks whose likely failure would have been harmful to their cause and their credibility. The Zionist delegates were instructed to avoid any commitments and to keep the talks at the "exploratory" level only.⁴⁸ The Arabs, on the other hand, were expecting a completely different kind of meeting, best described as a "showdown" with the official Zionist leadership. The agenda which they proposed read as follows:⁴⁹

1. [The Zionists] should explain, as far as possible by producing documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism and the colonization of Palestine connected therewith.
2. Thereafter the Arabs will formulate their demands, acceptance of which would determine whether the [Zionist] Movement could be considered harmful to the Arabs or not.

Such an agenda clearly put the Zionists on the defensive; little wonder that efforts were made to secure an honourable postponement of the conference.

The choice of Arab delegates to the conference also pointed to the unlikelihood of a successful accord. In the past, Zionist negotiators had found it difficult to ascertain the status of their various Arab counterparts. As Dr Jacobson complained, every Arab leader "claimed that it [was] he who [was] the real, the only real, the important one. . . . There is no way of knowing what truth there is in what they say, what is behind them. They do not have a *single* organisation."⁵⁰ A slightly different problem faced the Zionists with regard to the 1914 talks. Some of the Arab delegates selected by Nasif al-Khalidi were known only too well. Zionists would have found themselves face to face with four of their most articulate and bitterest enemies—Muhammad Kurd Ali (of the paper,

al-Muqtabas), Yusuf al-Isa (of *Falastin*), Abdallah Mukhlis (of *al-Karmil*) and Jamal al-Husaini (later Secretary of the Palestine Arab Executive and a power behind the Arab Higher Committee); four possible "friends" (Ahmad Bayhum, Rizqallah Arqash, Abd ar-Rahman ash-Shahbandar and Nasif al-Khalidi); and two unknown quantities. Nasif had evidently had some difficulty in assembling ten Arab leaders with both stature in Palestine and an "accommodating" attitude towards Zionism.⁵¹ Little wonder, then, that Zionists saw little point in continuing to plan for a conference once the list of Arab delegates became known.

(b) *Third-Party Considerations.* The Turkish attitude provides yet another ill-omen when assessing the failure of the 1914 conference. One of the organizers of the ill-fated talks, H. M. Kalvaryski, in later years severely criticized the Zionist leadership for poor judgement in acceding to Turkish advice, at the cost of alienating Arab opinion.⁵² For, if the Turks had earlier been encouraging a Zionist-Arab accord, they made a quick about-face as the Brumana conference drew near. At a meeting with the Vali of Beirut, the Zionists were influenced by the clear disparagement of the Turks. Kalvaryski became fond of recalling Nasif al-Khalidi's words to Dr Thon following that meeting: "Gardez-vous bien, messieurs les sionistes: un gouvernement passe mais un peuple reste".⁵³

While Kalvaryski's critique makes too much of Zionist deference to Turkish wishes, it is to Dr Thon that we must look for a fuller and more balanced assessment. While the Turkish attitude was an additional reason to shy away from the proposed conference, Thon had seen only "great obstacles" in the way of a successful Zionist-Arab agreement:⁵⁴

The Arabs will not let themselves be played off with simple phrases, while we can hardly consent to such concessions as they would in fact demand from us: restriction of land purchase, the partial restriction of Hebrew in favour of Arabic in schools and in public life, and living together with them in the exclusive Jewish quarters. . . .

(c) *Proposed Terms of Agreement.* Dr Thon's analysis brings

us to the most serious reason for the failure of the 1913-14 negotiation attempts. It is important to take a closer look at the terms and conditions being offered by both sides in the course of the attempted rapprochement. The "entente verbale" (above, page 19) is one example of the kind of "give-and-take" that suited certain Arab leaders. There were a number of other conditions which other Arabs attached to proposals for an alliance with the Zionists. The ones most frequently mentioned at this time may be summarized as follows:⁵⁵

1. Zionists must renounce their foreign citizenship (and special protection enjoyed under the Capitulations) to become Ottoman subjects.⁵⁶

2. Under any agreement, the Zionists would have to undertake to guarantee that no *fellahin* would be dispossessed of their lands.

3. Zionist schools must be open to Arab children, and Zionist funds and skills should be applied to the improvement of Arab education.

4. Zionist efforts at the revival of Hebrew should not be so intensive as to detract from Arab efforts to revive Arabic as the national language of the future Arab state.

5. Zionists must open their local economic institutions for Arab use and benefit.

6. Zionists must find large capital sums to finance public works and other development projects in the Arab countries.

7. Zionists should use their political influence and their press connections in the West in support of the Arab movement.

8. Zionists should settle in all Arab countries, rather than concentrate themselves exclusively in Palestine.

What were Arab spokesmen willing to give in exchange for Zionist agreement to the above kind of terms? Here the Arabs were less explicit. Nothing was said about a "national" existence, or internal autonomy for the Jews.⁵⁷ The terms being offered by the Arabs at this time were to give their

blessing to continued but controlled Jewish immigration into what they regarded as *their* lands. This, they felt, was big enough a concession: they were offering to cease their hostile clamours, but wished to exercise control over future Zionist development so as to benefit from anticipated material advantages but without exposing themselves to potential political risks.

Against this, Zionist leaders found themselves in a most uncomfortable bargaining position. The Arab approval of controlled immigration was being offered in anticipation of the supposed power of the Jews in the European press and financial community, and the application of Jewish "brains" to the development of Syria and Palestine.

It is not difficult to see why the possible terms of such a Zionist-Arab "marriage" were hardly appealing to the Zionists. They indeed wanted to see an end to the mounting hostility. But they did not believe that this desire was enough to assure a successful accord. On the one hand, the Zionist "bride" was being courted for her imagined riches, riches which she knew she did not really possess; on the other, her persistent Arab "suitor" was already anticipating her possible infidelity and was laying down stringent conditions. In the eyes of the Zionists the guarantees being sought by the Arabs would have stifled the *raison d'être* of Zionism, and an alliance at this time and on these terms seemed doomed from the start.

Quite apart from their assessment of what the Arabs could and would deliver as their part of the bargain, Zionists were also troubled by their *own* "total inability ... to fulfil Arab demands both in the cultural and financial fields".⁵⁸ In this connection, the seemingly harsh appraisal of Richard Lichtheim, who had been through many long discussions with Arab leaders in Constantinople, should not strike us as unduly negative. Although he continually stressed the primary importance of working towards improved relations with the Arabs, he was, as Y. Ro'i concludes, "not very hopeful that they could be permanently established".⁵⁹ "The Arabs", Lichtheim wrote in November 1913,

are and will remain our natural opponents. They do not care a straw for the "joint Semitic spirit"... The Arabs do

not require a Semitic revival. They want orderly government, just taxes and political independence. The East of to-day aspires to no marvels other than American machinery and the Paris toilet. Of course the Arabs want to preserve their nation and cultivate their culture. What they need for this, however, is specifically European: money, organization, machinery. The Jew for them is a competitor who threatens their predominance in Palestine.... In such a situation we must naturally make every effort to hold back Arab animosity.

From what we have seen of the period 1908-1914, it appears evident that Zionist moves towards an entente with the Arabs were made largely under duress. Zionists had a sufficiently accurate picture of Arab motives and strategy. They knew that the Arabs wished to save Palestine from the imminent "dangers" of Zionism, and they met no Arab leader who came close to understanding Zionism and accepting it on its own terms. And it is this gulf between the aims and interests of the two parties which was probably the most important reason for the failure of the 1913-14 attempts at rapprochement. This is also evident from the tactics used. Both parties looked on an entente more as a defensive manoeuvre than as a positive step involving substantial mutual concessions and leading to the utopia of "semitic brotherhood". Through an accord the Arabs hoped to exploit "Jewish power" without being harmed by it, while the immediate objective of the Zionists was the limited one of deflecting anticipated threats and obstacles. Many Zionists felt, like Lichtheim, that "holding back Arab animosity" was the most they could have expected to gain through an accord with Arab leaders.⁶⁰

In summary, then, there was a variety of reasons—basic contradictions, proposed agenda, choice of delegates, disapproval of the Turks—why the 1914 conference fell through. It was the Zionists in this particular case who felt their interests would be better served by pulling back from the talks proposed by the Arabs. But it should appear obvious that, even had the conference gone ahead, it would have ended in bitter failure. Similarly, had the 1913 talks not been halted by

Arab disinterest, they too might well have floundered on the same basic incompatibility—Zionist inability to provide what the Arabs would have demanded in exchange for continued Jewish immigration and settlement. Even if all other conditions had been favourable, the proposed terms of an agreement were not attractive or workable.

Three and a half years later, towards the end of the First World War, a variety of new circumstances would combine to push Zionists and Arabs once again towards talking about rapprochement. These talks form the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

Post-War Diplomacy, 1918-1920

AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I¹

Although several informal Jewish-Arab meetings took place during World War I, uncertainty regarding the anticipated changes led both parties to behave with extreme caution. The next major round of contacts was to take place in the closing stages of the war, with the advent of British troops to the Middle East. This chapter and the following one will focus on the intense diplomatic activity of the period 1917-1922, mainly involving the emerging leader of the Zionist movement, Dr Chaim Weizmann. We will deal with Zionist relations with the Amir Faisal, his brother Amir Abdallah, Palestinian notables, and Syrian nationalists.

Before discussing the actual negotiations of the period, let us outline briefly some of the important changes in the Middle East situation at the close of the war. Most significant among these changes were the replacement of Turkey by Great Britain as the ruling power over Palestine, and the new, greatly inflated, expectations of both Jews and Arabs. Turkey's entry into the war on the side of Germany in 1914 foreshadowed an all-out European penetration of the area. At the same time, the Decentralist Party in Cairo and the nationalist clubs of Beirut and Damascus saw new opportunities for the realization of their hopes for Arab autonomy or independence. British representatives in Cairo established secret contacts with Arab leaders—most notably with the Sharif of Mecca, Husain ibn Ali—and sought their aid in the form of an anti-Turkish revolt. In exchange, Britain committed herself to support some form of Arab "independence" within defined areas. The exact terms of the under-

standing reached between Sir Henry McMahon (British High Commissioner to Egypt) and Husain—still a source of unresolved controversy among historians—were embodied in an exchange of letters between July 14, 1915 and January 30, 1916. In June 1916, what became known as the “Arab Revolt” was launched, and the Arabs became allies of the British in an anti-Turkish military campaign which was to result, two and one-half years later, in the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab Middle East.

Meanwhile, by May 1916, Great Britain and her allies France and Russia had devised a plan for control and spheres of influence in the territories to be conquered from the Turks. Georges Picot and Mark Sykes were the French and British signatories to a soon-to-be-famous agreement which would have seen (a) direct French and British rule in what was later to become Lebanon and Iraq, respectively; (b) nominally “independent” Arab states under French and British spheres of influence in the future territories of Syria and Transjordan, respectively; and (c) Palestine under an international condominium.

A third major wartime commitment made by Great Britain—the Balfour Declaration—also involved Sir Mark Sykes, who lent his considerable influence and energy to Zionist lobbying for British support. Early in the war, Herbert Samuel, one of the most prominent Jews in British politics, had presented his cabinet colleagues with a plan for a British protectorate over and sponsorship of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Beginning in February 1917, meetings involving Sykes, Dr Chaim Weizmann and other leading British Zionists prepared the ground for the issuance, ten months later, of the Balfour Declaration, on November 2, 1917. By its terms, Great Britain committed herself to using her “best endeavours” to facilitate “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”.

Publication of the Balfour Declaration was timed to coincide with a major military offensive in the Middle East. General Allenby's troops moved through Gaza and northward to capture Palestine south of a line drawn between Jaffa and Jerusalem. The General's entry into Jerusalem in December 1917 marked the beginning of the 31-month

military rule of Palestine under O.E.T.A.(S)—Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South). In a second and final major offensive in September 1918, the northern part of Palestine was taken by British forces. On October 1, 1918 Damascus to the east fell to a force of Australian and Arab units, the latter under the leadership of the Amir Faisal, third son of Husain of Mecca. The armistice signed by Turkey on October 30th marked the end of the war in the Middle East.

ARAB-ARMENIAN-ZIONIST ENTENTE

The post-war situation left Great Britain in control of former Turkish territory, and with both Arabs and Jews expecting British support for the speedy realization of their respective goals. Political discussions at the time were further complicated by the ascendancy of a new credo—the doctrine of national self-determination.² Ideally, according to this doctrine, each recognized “nation” was entitled to be the master of its own destiny, and to enjoy statehood, sovereignty and national dignity in harmony with other recognized nation-states. This principle, which has today become an “absolute” in international politics, was given strong American moral backing, and was expected to guide the post-war settlement. Both Arabs and Zionists presented their cases to the world in terms of this doctrine, and in the Middle East (as elsewhere) it was going to be difficult to justify any form of rule that was considered “foreign” or imposed against the will of the local inhabitants.

Powers, great and small, soon adapted their activities and interests to the rhetoric of the new slogan. Sykes, at an early stage, had recognized the need to reconcile Arabs and Jews to each other's desires within the context of a British presence, and he even tutored Dr Weizmann to operate with this in mind.³ Expanding his ideas to include Armenians, Sykes began promoting an “Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente” soon after publication of the Balfour Declaration. Needless to say, a scheme in which native Middle Eastern peoples would be appearing before the Peace Conference unanimously in favour of a British presence in the area could only have reflected well on Great Britain and promoted her interests

vis-à-vis rival European powers.⁴ Supporting the slogan "Armenia for the Armenians, Judaea for the Jews, Arabia for the Arabs", Britain would be seeking to appear as the patron of the simultaneous and harmonious revivals of these three previously oppressed peoples.

While Sykes was setting up an Arab-Armenian-Zionist committee in London, Sir Gilbert Clayton (Chief Political Officer) in Cairo was urged to do the same. Despite the latter's initial scepticism, both men used every opportunity in the winter of 1917-1918 to encourage Arabs and Zionists to consider mutual co-operation under the auspices of this three-sided entente.⁵ Although this intended alliance never became a real political force in the post-war settlement, the scheme was nevertheless an important channel through which Zionist and Arab representatives learned more about each other's intentions. More significantly, British support of the scheme eventually developed into the Weizmann-Faisal negotiations, which will be discussed later in this chapter (pages 36f).

FIRST LOCAL CONTACTS: CAIRO AND PALESTINE

In the wartime climate of uncertainty, the news of the Balfour Declaration was received with some apprehension in Arab political circles. This was especially true in Palestine, where the exuberance and inflated expectations of the local Jewish population (the *yishuv*) contributed to Arab uneasiness. Anti-Zionism became a rallying cry and a focus for uniting Christian and Muslim elements of the local population in branches of what soon became the "Muslim-Christian Association" (MCA).⁶

The first major disappointment for the Jews in Palestine was the decision of the military authorities to prohibit official publication of the Balfour Declaration, a ban which was to remain in effect until after the San Remo Conference in April 1920. This was part of a concerted effort on the part of O.E.T.A.(S) to dispel exaggerated Arab fears. The authorities encouraged, and expected, responsible Zionist leaders to assist them in pacifying and reassuring the Arab population that the true aims of Zionism did *not* include the three things

which the Arabs seemed to fear most, viz. (1) the immediate imposition of a minority Jewish government, (2) the expulsion of Arab inhabitants to make room for massive Jewish immigration, or (3) Jewish desecration of Muslim or Christian holy places.⁷

The burden of this public-relations campaign fell on members of the "Zionist Commission to Palestine" (Z.C.), a visiting delegation of Zionist representatives from several allied countries, conceived at the British Foreign Office as a body to advise the authorities in Palestine "in all matters relating to the Jews, or which may affect the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in accordance with the [Balfour] Declaration". Ranking fifth among the Z.C.'s seven enumerated tasks was "to help in establishing friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities".⁸ Dr Weizmann headed the Commission, which soon became the most authoritative Zionist body in Palestine, having its own departments parallel to those of the British administration.⁹

The early diplomatic activities of the Z.C. followed the general spirit of the "Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente", and included meetings with representative Arab leaders. In the attempt to dispel anxieties and pave the way for future co-operation, Weizmann and the Z.C. held Cairo talks with Faris Nimr, Sa'id Shuqair, Sulaiman Nasif, Kamil al-Qassab, Abd ar-Rahman Shahbandar, Rafiq al-Azm and others.¹⁰ These meetings were cordial enough, and some of the Arabs involved prepared a draft outline for "the desired policy of mutual understanding, co-operation and alliance between Palestinians and Zionists".¹¹ The main points of the plan were: (1) inviolability of the holy places; (2) "... a system of government based on even-handed justice and equality of rights between the different elements irrespective of their comparative numbers ..."; (3) Arabic as the official language; (4) suspension of land sales until after the war; (5) establishment of a government agricultural loans bank; (6) framing of a law "similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt"; (7) "honest opportunity" for Zionists to purchase State lands, but leaving "a reasonable share to the other elements"; and (8) establishment of an arbitration commission of Muslims,

Christians and Jews to examine disputes and to promote co-operation. The Z.C. chose not to reply to the proposals, finding the terms "quite unacceptable even as a basis for discussion". The Zionists had their doubts about the motives and the status of the Arab personalities involved in the talks, but perhaps more importantly they recognized these terms as falling short of their expectations for the new régime.¹²

Upon arriving in Palestine from Cairo, the Z.C. held formal and informal meetings with local leaders, including Kamil al-Husaini (then Mufti of Jerusalem), Musa Kazim al-Husaini (Mayor of Jerusalem until 1920; thereafter President of the Palestine Arab Executive), Ismail al-Husaini, Abd ar-Rauf Bitar, Amin Tamimi, al-Hajj Tawfiq Hamad, Shibli Jamal and others.¹³ Despite the superficial cordiality shown in many (but not all) of these encounters, the contacts were hardly satisfying to either side.¹⁴

There is ample evidence of Zionist frustration in dealings with local Palestinian notables. During his first meeting with Kamil al-Husaini, Dr Weizmann found the Mufti "extremely guarded" and demonstrating a spirit "which was unyielding"; the Zionist leader had asked the Mufti for a public fraternal message, but the latter "refused". Relations between the two men somewhat improved following the gift of a Quran (and, it was rumoured, a financial consideration); yet, one month later, Zionists found the Mufti taking a hard line during further discussions.¹⁵

Even more revealing is the account of a later meeting involving another Zionist leader, Menahem Ussishkin, who became chairman of the Z.C. in late 1919. Almost immediately after his arrival in Jerusalem in October, Ussishkin paid courtesy visits to the Mufti and to the Mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husaini. In both cases Ussishkin reported his reception as being marked by "that superficial warmth so common in the East"; both conversations turned on a single point—"the 'burning question' of Zionists, Arabs and their relations"; and both men, concluded Ussishkin, were leading opponents of the Jews.¹⁶

Weizmann, Ussishkin and others had discovered for themselves one of the lessons learned during the pre-war period by Lichtheim (above, pages 25f.) and others: namely, that there

was an important distinction to be made between those Arabs residing in Palestine and those from Egypt, Syria or elsewhere. The former were more difficult to deal with, and yet any agreement reached would ultimately have to win the approval of these "stubborn" local leaders.¹⁷

Zionist strategy was to adapt to this difficult situation by trying, in the first instance, to reach an understanding with *non-Palestinians* and then, with their help, hoping to convince the Palestinians to co-operate for the mutual benefit of all three elements.¹⁸ Thus, Dr Weizmann would soon look to a possible entente with the Amir Faisal ibn Husain as a way to overcome the unpleasantness and the difficulties of negotiating directly with local Palestinian leaders.

THE BRITISH FACTOR

In interpreting these local encounters, as well as the Weizmann-Faisal meetings, we must not overestimate the seriousness with which each party took the other. For, it was usually with one eye fixed firmly on their British advisers that both Zionist and Arab spokesmen operated, with the knowledge that, ultimately, British "say" would prove more decisive than any "understanding" reached with the other party.

Even though most British officials were pleased with Weizmann's first meetings with Arab representatives, Weizmann himself was far from satisfied. He was especially annoyed with the stubbornness shown by local Palestinians, while expressing contempt for the "merely financial" interest shown by non-Palestinian landowners. After three weeks of talks, the Zionist leader turned on the British with complaints (which were to be echoed by Zionists for decades afterwards) that negotiations were greatly hindered by the fact that the British were not making it "clear" enough to the Arabs that Zionism was there to stay. "It is very desirable", Weizmann wrote to Balfour,¹⁹

that the Arabs of Palestine should be brought to realize the actual position and the intentions of the Government, and that this work of education can be carried out only by the

Authorities themselves. It is of no use for us to attempt it, mainly because the Arabs, so far as we can tell, are not in a frame of mind in which any explanations offered by us would receive serious attention. What is necessary is ... that it should be made perfectly clear to them that [the Balfour] declaration represents the considered policy of H.M. Government, and that it is their duty to conform to it.

Whether this was an attempt to evade Zionist responsibility for facing Arab opposition head-on, it is clear that many Jews in Palestine were becoming increasingly suspicious of British attitudes and activities in perpetuating, or even exciting, Arab opposition, rather than actively disarming it.

Whatever the justification for these suspicions, it is difficult to discuss Arab-Zionist negotiations without taking into account the British factor. Another example of British influence stems from the British position as intermediary. Much of the Arab-Zionist interaction of 1918-1920 was influenced by the fact that neither party was viewing the other directly, but rather through the eyes of its British advisers. Thus, Arab and Zionist perceptions of each other were very often coloured by British prejudices of one kind or another. Sykes' and Clayton's advice to Arabs who were being encouraged to support the "Arab-Armenian-Zionist Entente" held out the carrot of fabulous Jewish wealth, political connections and determination which, if properly treated, would have been shared with the Arabs in their search for international recognition and national renaissance. Similar images were conveyed to King Husain, in the Hogarth message which reassured him that the Balfour Declaration offered no cause for alarm.²⁰

Zionists, likewise, learned from the British to regard the Arabs according to certain fixed stereotypes. Thus, for example, William Ormsby-Gore, while serving as British liaison officer attached to the Z.C., frequently expounded his contempt for the degenerate, "Levantinized" elements of Palestine and Western Syria, while romanticizing the "real men" of the desert. Zionists accepted and echoed his distinction between the "so-called Arabs of Palestine", on the one hand, who were "dishonest, uneducated, greedy, ... unpatriotic",

and the "pure" Arabs of the "real Arab national movement" under Faisal, on the other.²¹

WEIZMANN-FAISAL NEGOTIATIONS

Perhaps the most famous of all Zionist-Arab negotiations is the episode concerning Dr Weizmann and the Amir Faisal. It was their secret agreement of January 1919 which sought to harmonize the interests of Arabs and Zionists (and the British) at the Paris Peace Conference, and which might have become the basis of a long-term accord.

The significance of the agreement, and the reasons why it was never fully consummated, have been the subject of much comment and interpretation. The standard Arab view is that Faisal was faithfully advancing nationalist aspirations throughout, and that any alleged agreement with the Zionists was—at best—based on misunderstandings and misinterpretations, or—at worst—a product of British/Zionist pressure, deception and/or forgery.²² Most Zionists have viewed Faisal as a well-intentioned but weak leader, who fully understood the terms of his agreement with Dr Weizmann but who was unable to satisfy the Zionists largely because the Great Powers were unwilling to grant him full independence in Syria.²³ The truth, no doubt, lies somewhere between these two extremes, although there is certainly enough ambiguity in the historical evidence to allow each of these one-sided interpretations to appear credible to its respective proponents.

In the remainder of this chapter, our purpose is to situate this episode in the context of the situation in Palestine, British-Arab-Zionist relations, and Anglo-French relations, with special emphasis on the motives of the two leaders and their ability to "deliver the goods" in an agreement. As suggested above (page 34), it was just at the point where Dr Weizmann was reaching a dead end in his talks with Palestinian Arabs that British plans for a meeting with Faisal (first suggested in February by Gen. Clayton) took shape. This offered Weizmann a convenient way out of the impasse which had been reached locally, and he proceeded to dismiss the "problem of our relations with the Palestinian Arabs" as

“an economic problem, not a political one”, while looking forward to a “real political entente” with Faisal at their proposed first meeting in early June 1918.²⁴

Faisal, for his part, would soon be encouraged, both by his British advisers and by Weizmann himself, to look upon the Zionists as potential powerful allies. Although Faisal was extremely guarded at their first meeting, their British interpreter claimed that both leaders had understood quite clearly the lines of a future “exchange of services” and the mutual advantages to be expected.²⁵ This preliminary understanding was elaborated further in meetings held in London in December 1918 on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference and following the installation of Faisal’s Arab administration in Damascus.²⁶ The terms of their agreement were ratified in the historic treaty dated January 3 1919.²⁷

Some of the short-term objectives of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement were easily put into effect during the Peace Conference. In his February 6th appearance before the Council of Ten, Faisal claimed full Arab independence, but was reported to have left the question of Palestine “on one side”, in deference to its “universal character”.²⁸ For his part, Dr Weizmann continued to argue, in their joint interest, for the abolition of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Zionist delegation to Paris was able to arrange an interview for Faisal with President Woodrow Wilson. Still in the future lay the prospect that the soon-to-be independent Arab state would benefit from Jewish capital investment and loans.²⁹

Taken together, the British and Zionist records of their meetings and agreement would suggest that the interests and strategies of Weizmann and Faisal on the eve of the Paris Peace Conference were as follows:³⁰

(1) Both Weizmann and Faisal felt their respective causes to be greatly dependent on British goodwill and diplomatic support. Both were prepared to go to great lengths to please their British patrons by signing the agreement, which was being encouraged by the energetic T. E. Lawrence.

(2) Both leaders saw in the Sykes-Picot agreement a serious obstacle to the realization of their respective aims. By

reaching an accord of their own—under British guidance and inspiration—they might be helping to undo the objectionable Anglo-French agreement. (This would have coincided neatly with Britain's own attempts to evade fulfilment of that agreement.)

(3) Weizmann, for his part, would have obtained the assent of the most prestigious Arab leader of the period to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and the exclusion of Palestine from the broader claims for an independent Arab state. In a practical sense, Faisal would have been called upon to use his influence to moderate the cries of the more militant elements in Damascus and in Palestine.

(4) For the Arabs, Faisal would have obtained Zionist technical, organizational and financial support for his young administration, plus political/diplomatic assistance from influential Zionists in Western capitals, especially in Paris, where difficulties were anticipated.

(5) Faisal clearly saw his agreement with the Zionists as another weapon which would be needed to counter French pretensions to Syria—thus his important reservation that he would not “be bound by a single word” of the agreement should his demands for an independent Arab state not be granted.

THE UNDOING OF THE WEIZMANN-FAISAL AGREEMENT

February 1919 seems to have been the high-point of the usefulness and the credibility of the Weizmann-Faisal accord. Despite persistent Zionist hopes during the next year that the essentials of the agreement might still be put into effect, a series of internal and external contradictions began to undermine both men's ability to “deliver the goods” which each had promised. The March 1, 1919 letter from Faisal to Felix Frankfurter of the American Zionist delegation to Paris—usually cited as an additional proof of the Amir's commitment to Jewish-Arab brotherhood and co-operation—must really be recognized as a *démenti* hastily extracted for the purpose of undoing some of the harm caused by Faisal's hostile comments given in an interview to a French newspaper.³¹ The

publicity given to this letter (the January agreement with Weizmann remained secret for several years) in turn provoked sharp Arab suspicion of the Amir, beginning a pattern which was to be repeated during the coming months. Several local Syrian and Palestinian leaders went on record as denouncing the concessions which Faisal appeared to be making to the Zionists.³²

In fact, within weeks of the signing of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement, members of Faisal's own entourage were already working at cross-purposes to the lines of its compromise. Awni Abd al-Hadi, a Palestinian nationalist then serving as Faisal's secretary in Paris, approached a member of the Zionist Delegation there in late January 1919. Reacting to the official Z.O. proposals to the Peace Conference, Awni explained that the Arabs were "troubled on the point of Zionist claims to British Trusteeship for Palestine as they believe[d] that such claim would strengthen the French claim for Trusteeship of Syria".³³ What the Arabs really wanted, Awni claimed, was that "Syria should be an independent state under Arab rule", and that Jews and Arabs should "arrange matters between themselves in the most favourable way for both", i.e., putting aside the European powers. Within a proposed federation of Arab countries, he suggested, "all rights and liberties would be given to the Jews in Palestine on equal terms with the Arabs". The Zionist representative noted that such a scheme fell short of the Zionist programme, but promised to communicate Awni's views to Dr Weizmann.

It is difficult to tell whether Awni was speaking unofficially for Faisal. In any event, no confederation scheme was formally proposed by Faisal to the Peace Conference. A reflection of the difficult position Faisal found himself in in Europe, the "Arab question" remained ambiguous enough for British, French and Zionists all to believe that Faisal would ultimately be able to harmonize his interests with their own. After Faisal's return to Damascus in the summer of 1919, the ambiguities of his position persisted, leading one British intelligence officer to evaluate his agreement with Weizmann as being "not worth the paper it [was] written on or the energy wasted in the conversation to make it". On the other hand, he continued,³⁴

if it becomes sufficiently known among the Arabs, it will be somewhat in the nature of a noose about Faisal's neck, for he will be regarded by the Arab population as a traitor. No greater mistake could be made than to regard Faisal as a representative of Palestinian Arabs ...; he is in favour with them so long as he embodies Arab nationalism and represents their views, but would no longer have any power over them if they thought he had made any sort of agreement with Zionists and meant to abide by it. But it seems that he is capable of making contradictory agreements with the French, the Zionists and ourselves, of receiving money from all three, and then endeavouring to act as he pleases. This is an additional reason why his agreement with Weizmann is of little or no value.

Soon it became very difficult for Zionists to ignore the evidence of Faisal's inability to win his followers over to the proposed Zionist-Arab *rapprochement*. The Syrian Congress meeting in Damascus (July 2, 1919) declared its opposition to "the pretension of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine", and to any "Zionist migration to any part of our country": "For we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view".³⁵ Despite British satisfaction with Faisal's own moderation at this time, Dr Weizmann felt that the Amir's testimony before the King-Crane Commission was "not fair" and in flagrant violation of their understanding.³⁶

When Faisal returned to Europe in the fall of 1919, he had considerably less room for manoeuvre.³⁷ Once it became clear that the French expected the implementation of at least part of the Sykes-Picot provisions, the British, in effect, abandoned Faisal and Syria to French wishes. Weizmann and Faisal met again in London in September, but the Zionist diplomatic support once promised for the Arab cause amounted to nothing. Lacking British backing for the purpose, and themselves lobbying for French sympathy, Zionists were in no position to take up Faisal's claims against the French determination to occupy all of Syria.³⁸

In an interview with the *Jewish Chronicle* of London in early

October 1919, Faisal had kind words for Dr Weizmann's "moderate" Zionist aims. But, when pressed by the interviewer, he stated that he regarded Palestine not as an autonomous Jewish domain, but rather as a province of his future Arab kingdom.³⁹ During one of several meetings sought by Zionists to obtain favourable "clarifications" to what they considered the "unfortunate impressions" left by this interview, Awni Abd al-Hadi again spoke up for his version of Arab and Palestinian rights.⁴⁰ He denounced the Balfour Declaration as a serious obstacle to Arab-Jewish understanding, and "advised the Zionists, in their own interests to stop all talk of a Jewish Palestine":

This manner of speech was very offensive to the Palestinian Arabs, who regarded Palestine as their country, having lived there for so many centuries... Today the Jews were still in a very small minority, and it was to him unthinkable that the Arabs could renounce their claim to Palestine in favour of the Jews.

Completing his arguments, Awni further

advised the Zionists in their own interests not to put blind faith in the British Government. He absolutely failed to understand why they had so much confidence in and friendship for Great Britain... [T]he Zionists asked for the friendship of the Arabs, but what had they done for the Arab cause?

In reply, the Zionist representatives proceeded to elaborate the historical and contemporary reasons for their loyalty to Great Britain, and asked what sort of help Awni was seeking for the Arabs. Awni then repeated his earlier proposal that the Z.O. support a settlement of the Eastern question in which Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia would be united in an "independent confederation with an Arab king, under the League of Nations", leaving only spheres of economic influence to England and France. The Zionists emphasized that this suggestion could "not be entertained for a moment" and reaffirmed their preference for a European-backed Zionist programme:

[T]he promise of a Jewish Palestine ... was made by all the Great Powers, and it was on the strength of that hope that the Jews would put forth all their energy and enthusiasm. If that hope were removed, ... the Near East would not be able to attract those Jewish elements [i.e., capital, technical expertise, etc.] which were indispensable.

With these and other negative undercurrents to his dealings with Europeans and Zionists, Faisal's ability to "say nice things" to the latter in public—as he had done in an interview with the *London Times* and in his letter to Frankfurter⁴¹—was now reduced to almost nil. One of the reasons, as Faisal himself confessed to Nahum Sokolow, was his deference to "the feeling among Arabs in Palestine".⁴² In private, however, Zionists and Faisal kept up their cordial relations, maintaining the evident discrepancy "between Faisal's public utterances and his readiness to bargain with the Zionists behind the scenes—where he was safe from possible detractors".⁴³

Faisal soon found himself unable to provide the Zionists with the requested calming influence over the mounting anti-Zionist campaign waged by the Palestinian Club and other nationalist circles in Damascus. In January 1919, Sir Mark Sykes had personally intervened to scold Damascus politicians not to interfere in Palestinian affairs;⁴⁴ notwithstanding his efforts, anti-Zionist agitation there increased throughout 1919 and the first half of 1920. Anti-Jewish riots and a general uprising were feared in March 1919; northern Palestine experienced insecurity and raiding in late 1919; peaceful demonstrations were followed by full-scale rioting in Jerusalem in the spring of 1920.⁴⁵

Whatever his earlier intentions regarding an agreement with the Zionists, Faisal was soon at the head of an anti-European and anti-Zionist wave of nationalist feeling in Syria and Palestine. In an attempt to pressure the European powers with a *fait accompli*, the Syrian Congress in early March 1920 proclaimed Faisal King of an independent and united Arab Kingdom, which included Palestine, and declared its strong opposition to Zionist aims.⁴⁶ Most British reports during this period portrayed Faisal as a moderate

being swept along by radical forces, while Zionist reports indicated that the new King was still secretly hoping for Jewish financial and political support in the context of an Arab-Zionist agreement.⁴⁷

But it is difficult to believe that anyone could have seriously contemplated a successful Arab-Zionist agreement at this time. Despite British reports of Faisal's professions of continued friendship and of the likelihood of his not opposing the Jewish national home if certain concessions were granted to him,⁴⁸ Faisal's public pronouncements on the Zionist question were categorical enough. He protested the appointment of Sir Herbert Samuel as first High Commissioner for Palestine as a step leading to the formation of a "Jewish government" there.⁴⁹ He called for an Arab government in Palestine, to be linked with Syria in a decentralised relationship, with an end to Jewish immigration and land-purchase.⁵⁰ For the purposes of "calming the people who [were] in a most agitated state of mind and spirit", he requested the British to issue a "satisfactory declaration" to the effect that no British-Zionist commitments stood in the way of Palestine being considered a part of greater Syria. And, as for the question of his alleged "acquiescence in the creation of a national home for Jews in Palestine", he explained in a letter to General Allenby:

I believe there is some misunderstanding. All that I have admitted is to safeguard the rights of the Jews in that country as much as the indigenous Arab inhabitants are safeguarded and to allow them the same rights and privileges.

The Arabs of Palestine, both Christians and Moslems, have repeatedly availed themselves of every opportunity to protest against any agreement or pledge that would make their motherland a national home for the Jews.⁵¹

Notwithstanding the "correctness" of Faisal's official pronouncements on the Zionist question, Arab nationalist suspicions were aroused by persisting ambiguities. Reacting to rumours that some Syrian officials were in fact holding secret talks with Zionists in June 1920 (cf. pages 67-8 below), a Palestinian representative in the Syrian Congress made the following declaration:⁵²

in the future we will be unable to be silent and will not agree to Palestine's being sacrificed on the altar of [Syrian] independence.... The Government must deny the reports which have spread ... and deliver specific instructions to its emissaries to reject all the rumours connected with the Zionist question.... The Palestinians have been silent until now because of the honour of the Syrian state; but wretched Palestine has been devastated.

Throughout this episode it was not only Faisal who proved unable to "deliver the goods" foreshadowed in the tentative agreement. Dr Weizmann, as we have noted, was unable to apply any pro-Arab pressure on the French; when one Zionist made the suggestion that American Jews might assist Faisal by influencing their government not to recognize the French claim to Syria, his idea was considered too dangerous to Zionist-French relations to be acted upon.⁵³ The financial support anticipated by Faisal also came to naught. On the one hand, Zionist funds were not easily forthcoming for purely Zionist purposes in Palestine. Given its instability and bankruptcy, the declining Arab administration at Damascus offered little attraction for Jewish investors, who could not fail to notice the hardening anti-Zionist line which animated political circles there.⁵⁴

The final act in the undoing of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement coincided with the French military advance and Faisal's downfall in the summer of 1920. Although Dr Weizmann seems to have been tempted momentarily to accept an invitation to meet with Faisal at this time, he was discouraged from doing so by a combination of several factors. It is likely that he was influenced by British advice that a visit to the independent Damascus régime might have implied "recognition", while his own personal appraisal could not have doubted Faisal's real impotence to carry out an agreement. At the same time, the decision of the powers at San Remo, which had accorded the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain under the terms of the Balfour Declaration (and the Syrian Mandate to France), was a major political victory for the Zionists; this, no doubt, made an agreement with Faisal seem less urgent than previously.⁵⁵

When their one-time ally was expelled from Syria on July 24, 1920 by the French, Zionists seemed relieved rather than disappointed. From their point of view, Faisal had proved incapable of providing a minimum of order and stability, whatever his intentions or goodwill; the arrival of the French, at the very least, would mean an improvement of the security situation in the north. The extent of Zionist sympathy for Faisal on his expulsion comes out clearly from the record of the meeting which took place in Haifa on August 6th between the deposed King and Dr M. D. Eder of the Z.C.⁵⁶ Dr Eder took the opportunity to scold the Amir for having tried to be "too clever" and suggested that he might have been more successful with a "straightforward policy". Faisal, for his part, was already thinking ahead to his return to Syria and was enquiring about political support from Zionists in Western capitals, and from "the Jewish press, which was so powerful". Eder replied that any future collaboration would take place only on condition that Faisal (a) win uncontested recognition as the leader of "a united Arab nation, outside the limits of Palestine", (b) "use his influence with the Arabs to stay their anti-Zionist propaganda", and (c) "recognize fully the Zionist influence in Palestine, stopping all cries of United Syria".

On this note ended the famous Weizmann-Faisal negotiations. Despite their ultimate failure, Dr Weizmann would look back, in 1930, to his relations with Faisal and describe them as "a landmark of the ground which has been lost in these ten years".⁵⁷ Indeed, the unconsummated Weizmann-Faisal agreement was to become a model for future Zionist suggestions for solving the Palestine problem, as well as a formative experience for Dr Weizmann's own personal diplomacy with Arab leaders.⁵⁸

The episode was also valuable in providing some immediate lessons in the processes of Arab-Zionist diplomacy:

(1) It underscored the distinction between the local Palestinian, and the wider pan-Arab, dimensions of Arab-Zionist negotiations.

(2) Given the tenuousness of the pan-Arab ideal, the inability of a single Arab leader to consolidate an effective leadership over all Arabs (including Palestinians), and the

“hard line” adopted by local Palestinian leaders on the Zionist question, there was little real chance for a successful Zionist-Arab “exchange of services” along the lines of the Weizmann-Faisal agreement.

(3) Even if the above handicaps had been overcome, it was essential for any Arab-Zionist agreement to coincide with the interests and plans of the great powers in the area—i.e., both Great Britain and France at this time. Neither Arabs nor Zionists could be considered free bargaining agents. A major attraction of an agreement for Zionists and Arabs alike lay in the positive effect that each side felt an accord would have on its relations with one or both of the great powers.

(4) Neither Arabs nor Zionists were really capable of providing what the other needed most at the time. Just as Faisal had proven unable to “deliver” his part of the agreement, so too had Dr Weizmann. Both parties found that the European powers were the effective donors or withholders of what each was seeking. The Zionists wanted nothing less than the application of the Balfour Declaration policy to Palestine, while the Arabs sought a maximum degree of independence in most of the Fertile Crescent. Only the British and the French were in any position to assure these goals for either party.

(5) In a sense, a full political entente between Arabs and Zionists was of incidental importance, both to the principal antagonists and to the great powers. The latter lent their support to the lofty ideal of an accord only when it was considered useful to their more urgent pursuits.

CHAPTER 3

High-Level Meetings in the Early Twenties

ANOTHER PALESTINIAN-ZIONIST ENCOUNTER

As we have already noted, the first results of the post-war settlement announced at San Remo were much to the satisfaction of the Zionists, and hardly to the satisfaction of the Arabs, least of all to the Arabs of Palestine. Negotiation attempts in 1921-1922 were situated primarily in this context. Apart from the serious rioting of May 1921, Zionists were faced with the nuisance value of Arab opposition and the possibility that unfavourable Arab reaction might adversely affect the terms of the draft Mandate for Palestine, which was to receive final approval from the League of Nations in July 1922. Lobbying for European support was thus accompanied by Zionist diplomatic activity aimed at disarming or muting Arab opposition, while the Arabs tried to use negotiating opportunities to reverse some of the gains of the new European mandatory powers and of the Zionists.

The consolidation of Zionist success after San Remo seemed to be well under way when Sir Herbert Samuel was named Palestine's first High Commissioner (H.C.), putting an end to the military administration, whose relations with the *yishuv* had become strained to the breaking-point. Following Samuel's arrival in Palestine on June 30, 1920, significant improvements in the atmosphere were felt throughout the country, while the fall of the Arab régime in Damascus added to the new feeling of peace and security.¹ By March 1921 Palestine appeared as the only Middle Eastern country where England had no worries. When the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, visited there, he received a memorandum from the Jewish community, expressing profound gratitude to Great Britain, singing

the praises of Sir Herbert Samuel, and ringing with optimism about a peaceful and prosperous future. In contrast, the Executive Committee of the Arab Congress held in Haifa (December 1920), known as the Arab Executive (A.E.), presented a lengthy catalogue of Arab objections to the Jewish National Home policy on legal, historical, moral, economic and political grounds. Neither Mr Churchill nor the H.C. had any hesitation in dismissing the memorandum (inspired by "The Jewish Peril") as an exaggerated portrait of gloom and doom.²

The rioting³ which erupted five weeks later (May 1st) in Jaffa and which spread to neighbouring settlements came as a shock to Jews and British alike, but especially to Sir Herbert Samuel. Samuel's reaction—based on a new conviction that the Zionists had to prove by their deeds (economic development) and by their words (conciliatory statements) that they had no intention of harming Palestinian Arab interests—quickly lost him the esteem of the Zionist camp, which looked upon him as lacking the backbone needed to stand up to Arab violence and political blackmail.

Although it did heighten Zionist concern for, and produce deeper analyses of, their "Arab question",⁴ the crisis of May-June 1921 did not lead to any direct Arab-Zionist talks. As in the case of the previous rioting of April 1920 in Jerusalem,⁵ the aftermath of such an event was hardly the proper "psychological moment": any rapprochement, declared one Zionist observer, was "forbidden alike by Jewish self-respect and by Arab self-confidence".⁶

Sir Herbert Samuel, aware of Zionist disappointment in his chosen policy of conciliation, nevertheless insisted that "Unless there [was] very careful steering it [was] upon the Arab rock that the Zionist ship may be wrecked."⁷ Largely in response to this kind of urging, the Zionist Congress meeting in Carlsbad in September 1921 passed a resolution solemnly declaring its

determination to live with the Arab people on terms of concord and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing Commonwealth, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development.⁸

Also in response to Samuel's pressure, a meeting was arranged between members of the Palestine Arab Delegation visiting London⁹ and Dr Weizmann of the Zionist Organisation (Z.O.) at the Colonial Office. Neither Weizmann nor Musa Kazim al-Husaini, who headed the Arab Delegation, seemed enthusiastic about the meeting, but neither was in a position to resist the pressures being exerted by the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, and the Head of the C.O. Middle East Department, Sir John Shuckburgh.¹⁰

We have three sets of minutes of the meeting of November 29, 1921, and all illustrate the frustrations and futility of the discussions.¹¹ According to the British record, Dr Weizmann began his statement in a conciliatory tone, offering to discuss with the Arabs the two main points proposed by the British as a basis for discussion: (a) Arab fears of Jewish immigration, and (b) Arab fears of Jewish political ascendancy. He "professed to disregard all the events of the last six months [i.e., Jaffa riots] and the pin-pricks of earlier periods". Although the point could have had little, if any, positive effect on the Palestine delegation, Weizmann justified his position by recalling "that his views had been completely understood by the Emir Faisal and had been accepted by him as the representative of the Arab world".

Musa Kazim, speaking for the Arab Delegation, seemed to ignore Dr Weizmann's statement, and went directly to an attack of the proposed British Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. It was as though he did not wish to recognize the Z.O. as a party to his dispute with Great Britain. Perhaps he was offended by Dr Weizmann's tone during the encounter, which was described by one British observer as "unfortunate", as though he were "a conqueror handing to beaten foes the terms of peace".¹² Indeed, Weizmann's attitude was offensive enough to become legendary, and was recalled (forty years after the event) by Jamal al-Husaini in the following terms:

Dr Ch. Veitzman [sic] said to the Delegation ... that they should better take heed of the power of the Jews. He said because Russians had pogroms against Jews, the Jewish people were able to destroy Russia and that anyone who

stands against their interests will similarly be destroyed. In protest against this threat, the delegation withdrew from the meeting.¹³

From the Zionist leader's point of view, the meeting had been "rather humiliating"; he saw the Arabs as being "in a very strong position" and "exceedingly well coached by their British advisers".¹⁴

Thus ended this rare British-sponsored meeting which aimed at a direct conciliation between Zionist and Palestinian leaders. A few private meetings were subsequently held between Zionist representatives and individual members of the Arab Delegation who were considered to be more "moderate". Weizmann himself met with Mu'in al-Madi, while other meetings included one with Ibrahim Shammas, where a possible trade-off between the Arab demand for a "national government" and the Zionist insistence on non-interference with immigration was considered. But none of these meetings produced any breakthrough to an accord on the proposed Mandate or the future constitution of Palestine.¹⁵

It seems that by this time the tactic of boycotting the Zionists was already a cornerstone of the Palestinian Arab approach.¹⁶ This was reflected in (a) the firm and repeated rejection of the Balfour Declaration or any document (Palestine Mandate, Palestine Constitution) which incorporated it; (b) the successful Arab boycott of the elections for the first Legislative Council (1922-1923); and (c) the rejection of the successive British proposals to create an Advisory Council (summer 1923) and an "Arab Agency" to be considered parallel to the Jewish Agency (November 1923).¹⁷

The official Arab position at this time, as defined by the Haifa Congress resolutions of December 1920, included the annulment of the Balfour Declaration and the creation of a representative "national government".¹⁸ There was no possible deal with the Zionists, on terms acceptable to the latter, which could have helped to advance these goals. The Palestine Arab Delegation left London in mid-1922 after rejecting the new Statement of British Policy (Churchill White Paper, June 1922) and, subsequently, the Mandate

approved by the League of Nations.¹⁹ The Zionists, on the other hand, accepted these two documents as the basis of continuing their activities in Palestine, and turned increasingly to the British for sympathetic implementation of their obligations to the Jews, if need be without the desired Arab assent.²⁰

EARLY RELATIONS WITH AMIR ABDALLAH

At this stage there appeared to be no common ground on which Zionist or Palestinian leaders could meet with a view to a political entente. Meetings such as the last one described no doubt confirmed the Zionist tendency to put aside the Palestinians as a political factor in favour of "pan-Arab" diplomacy. Since 1918, Zionist Arab policy seemed to prefer maintaining social and economic relations with certain amenable Palestinian Arabs, while shunning any political dealings with M.C.A. or Haifa Congress leaders—i.e., boycotting, in effect, a significant sector of the local leadership. This tactic neatly complemented the weapon being perfected by the latter Palestinian leaders, to produce the now-familiar pattern of mutual non-recognition.

Happily for the Zionists, relations with Arab leaders outside Palestine had not yet reached this point, and in the post-war period important talks were held with Abdallah Ibn Husain, as well as with Syrian nationalists. While Zionists had forsaken Faisal's sinking ship in 1920, they were nevertheless reluctant to abandon completely the quest for good relations with the "one great leader" who could be considered representative of the Arab world as a whole. As early as November 1919, Dr Weizmann had come to the conclusion, on the basis of his experience with Faisal, that the "main difficulty" in the Arab question was "the fact that there [was] no responsible head of the Arab nation with whom one can deal".²¹ Other Zionists shared this view, which implied that an agreement with the Arabs was dependent less on their own willingness or on the possible terms, than on internal conditions within the Arab world. In order for any negotiations to succeed, Zionists felt, the Arabs would have to present a common front under a single, undisputed leader whose diplomacy was unlikely to be repudiated.²²

While on several occasions (1922, 1925 and 1930) Dr Weizmann did entertain some hope of reviving his "exchange of services" with Faisal, who became King of Iraq in 1921,²³ more serious attention was soon devoted to Abdallah, Faisal's elder brother, who was installed in Transjordan by Winston Churchill in March 1921. Contacts which began later that year were to continue until Abdallah's assassination by a Palestinian in July 1951. By looking at the early phases of Zionist-Abdallah relations, it is not difficult to see a resemblance to the Weizmann-Faisal episode, both in terms of the mutual expectations and the seeds of failure.

The creation in 1922 of the Emirate of Transjordan, separate from Palestine west of the Jordan River and excluding the application of the Jewish National Home provisions of the Mandate, was a blow to all Zionists. But, ironically, it gave them and the Amir Abdallah a common interest: the reunification of Transjordan with western Palestine—although each party had a distinctly different vision of the nature of the reunited country. For Abdallah it was to be the first step toward his dream of ruling a united Arab kingdom which would include Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Iraq.²⁴ For Zionists it was to be a return to the original scope of the land "promised" at the time of the Balfour Declaration.

Abdallah's ambitions were evident when, in late October 1921, he made friendly overtures to Zionist representatives in Palestine, seeking a loan and helping to spread rumours that the French might consider having him rule at Damascus. The suggestion was made that if the Zionists would help him win French approval, then the Amir would be "well disposed" to Zionism in Palestine. Zionists expressed relief when nothing came of these "fantastic" rumours.²⁵

A year later Abdallah travelled to London to negotiate a new treaty with Great Britain. While in London, the Amir held at least five secret meetings with Dr Weizmann. Although the precise details of these talks are not known,²⁶ it seems likely that the two leaders explored the possibility of Zionist financial assistance for Transjordan, and Abdallah's recognition of the Jewish National Home in exchange for his becoming the ruler of a reunited Palestine.

The Weizmann-Abdallah talks appear to have been preliminary only, but once word had leaked out that they had taken place, both leaders found themselves facing strong internal criticism. A number of Palestinian leaders found this the first of many occasions to suspect the motives and manoeuvres of their new Hashemite neighbour, who seemed all too willing to advance his own personal projects at their expense.²⁷ On the Zionist side, rumours of Abdallah's "expansionist" ambitions caused much alarm.²⁸ Suspicion, hostility and cries of "sell-out" were directed at Dr Weizmann when press reports implied that official Zionist circles favoured a strong Arab state under Abdallah. David Ben-Gurion led the critics of this "secret diplomacy", declaring that only a Zionist Congress was empowered to take such an important step; Dr Weizmann, he warned, having already "failed once with Faisal ... must be careful not to do the same this time" with Abdallah.²⁹ In defence of Weizmann's position, Col. F.H. Kisch of the Palestine Zionist Executive (P.Z.E.) explained that, in all their negotiations, Zionist leaders were insisting on terms which would leave Palestine one day "qualitatively and quantitatively Jewish". As for their attitude to Arab unity proposals, Kisch saw "diplomatic sympathy" as a small price to pay for the likely advantages of Arab goodwill and, in British eyes, "the credit for having shown ... good-will towards the Arabs".³⁰

Whatever had been Weizmann's first assessment of the real possibilities of a deal with Abdallah when they talked in October 1922, the Zionist leader had reached a decidedly negative conclusion following a visit to Palestine. It was, he reported in February 1923, "very doubtful whether the Emir carries any weight in Palestine or even in Trans-Jordania itself, and whether his promises and guarantees do represent an asset of any real value". Furthermore, Dr Weizmann was forced to admit that "Jewish opinion in Palestine and in the World generally ... would no doubt resent such a project", i.e., Abdallah enthroned over a reunited Palestine.³¹ Despite the fact that British officials were never attracted to the idea,³² the rumour-mill periodically suggested that Abdallah was on the verge of winning British support for his reunification scheme,³³ which had the predictable effect of exciting

Jewish suspicion of British intentions and accusations of lack of vigilance directed against their own leaders.

In their future dealings with Abdallah, Zionists would often find the Amir's dream of reuniting Palestine lurking behind his friendly smile. But, owing to Jewish public opinion and the uncertain authority of the Amir, there were no further serious negotiations with Abdallah until the 1930s. Good relations were continued, however, on an informal, non-political basis, marked by ceremonial visits and exchanges of friendly greetings,³⁴ and undaunted by the occasional anti-Zionist public statements by the Amir.³⁵

SYRIAN NATIONALISTS

Although the Zionist leadership would have much preferred to deal with a single respected Arab leader, they could not afford to exclude other options, such as lesser politicians or nationalist circles. While a number of overtures were easily sidestepped once the status or motives of the Arabs proved doubtful, there was one group which in 1922 appeared worthy of serious consideration and Dr Weizmann's personal attention. In November 1921, while the Palestine Arab Delegation was in London, meetings were arranged between Dr Weizmann and Riad as-Sulh, the exiled son of a former minister in Faisal's Damascus government and a future Prime Minister of the Lebanon. Riad was also a personal friend of two *yishuv* activists, H.M. Kalvaryski and Ittamar Ben-Avi (editor of the paper, *Doar ha-Yom*), and had hoped to serve as a go-between for talks between Palestinians and the Z.O. in London.³⁶ While failing to serve any useful function between the two principal antagonists, Riad did take part in private discussions with Dr Weizmann, James de Rothschild and Ittamar Ben-Avi.³⁷

The basis for these discussions was a document drafted by Ben-Avi, entitled "Proposed Arab-Jewish Entente"³⁸ and framed in the spirit of the recent "common-home" resolution passed by the Zionist Congress (page 48, above). The proposed entente had the following provisions: (1) an endorsement and interpretation of the Balfour Declaration; (2) equal recognition of Jewish and Arab nationalities in Palestine,

with respect for minority rights in mixed areas; (3) support for the development of self-government; (4) the gradual introduction of native Palestinians into all but the highest civil service posts; (5) Jewish immigration limited only by the economic absorptive capacity of the country; (6) a law of citizenship and nationality; (7) Zionist "moral and material support" for Arab states and "the Arab people in its efforts to realize its legitimate national aspirations", with Arab support for the Jews in establishing their national home; (8) mutual respect for religious rights, customs and holy places; and (9) Arab participation in Zionist economic undertakings in Palestine.

Everyone seemed pleased with the draft, with the exception of Riad's desire to include a clause specifically repudiating any future Jewish state. Dr Weizmann preferred to "let sleeping dogs lie", and suggested that Riad reconsider his reservations. Contacts were resumed in Cairo in March 1922, with Dr Weizmann unable to attend. The Zionist delegation was headed by Dr Eder of the P.Z.E., and included Baron Félix de Menasche (an Egyptian banker) and Ascher Saphir (Ben-Avi's colleague on *Doar ha-Yom*). Riad as-Sulh was joined by Rashid Rida (above, p. 17), Kamil al-Qassab and Emile Khouri, who represented themselves as the Executive Committee of the "Syrian Union Party".³⁹

The Arab and Zionist negotiators opened their March 18th meeting by recognizing each other as "a power with whom it was highly desirable and particularly useful to reach complete understanding". The Arabs went further to accept the Jews as a "nation, originating in the East ... historically related to the Arabs", and as "the agents of the external civilisation of which the Arabs are in need". The Arabs suggested that neither party should invoke the Balfour Declaration or the McMahon-Husain correspondence, but insisted that "Arabs and Jews must discuss today, as nation to nation, make mutual concessions and must recognize one another's rights". They also made it clear that "it was not their intention to ask the Jews to declare themselves against any foreign power".

In reply to the Arabs' opening statement, the Jews set out their position clearly. What they required was:

- (1) Peace and tranquillity in Palestine.
- (2) The cessation of all hostilities against the immigration and settlement of the Jews in Palestine, within the scope of the economic capacity of the country.
- (3) The cessation of anti-Jewish propaganda by the Arab press and the Arab Committees in Palestine [i.e., the M.C.A.] and abroad [i.e., the Palestine Arab Delegation].

In exchange for this, the Jews will place at the service of the Arabs all the resources of a political, economic and propaganda nature which are at their command. In a word, they will collaborate sincerely with the Arabs towards the realisation of the final object....

This "final object" was given the following definition during the second day of talks:

Complete independence of the Arab countries, with Palestine as the Jewish National Home where Jews and Arabs will constitute a Palestinian national unit with equality of rights and obligations. Jewish culture and civilization will develop freely in Palestine for the common good.

Discussion then turned to the guarantees which each party would require, and the proof of the authority of each to sign and execute an agreement.

It is easy to understand the attractiveness of the proposed entente, particularly for the Jews. Dr Eder, reporting to Dr Weizmann on these meetings, was fired with new hope for an honest and far-reaching accord with the Arab world. He regarded the proposed exchange of services as similar to the Weizmann-Faisal agreement. The Jewish delegates were impressed with the sincerity of the Arab representatives, and obviously flattered to be negotiating as "equal nations". "They would like us to recognize the Arabs as the power in the Near East", wrote Eder, "and receive a Balfour Declaration from them." Finally, Eder was pleased that the entente under consideration was "on [the] lines of [the "common-home"] Congress resolution—which did not call for Jews alone in Palestine".⁴⁰

Three lessons of the Faisal affair were quickly apparent to those who were subsequently informed of the secret talks.

Eder himself immediately raised two questions with regard to the Arab committee: "Will Palestine [Arabs] recognize them?" and "Can they deliver the goods?" Other Zionists raised a third, and perhaps more decisive, question: Would an agreement with this group be compatible with Zionist loyalty to British and European interests in the Middle East?

At the March 26th meeting of the P.Z.E.,⁴¹ no one expressed outright hostility to continuing the talks, but all were emphatic on the need to ascertain very carefully how "representative", responsible and sincere these Arabs were. Dr Arthur Ruppin (p. 11 above), while welcoming the new *orientation* as corresponding to his own views, was nevertheless opposed to signing any specific *agreement*:

if the Arabs wished to make use of this diplomatic step for their own ends ..., then the whole thing would be not only valueless, but actually fraught with danger, for we would under such circumstances not only not get the sympathy of the Arabs, but we would most likely lose the confidence of the British. . . .

David Yellin, one of the few *yishuv* leaders to be taken into the confidence of the P.Z.E. on these talks, felt "doubtful about" the Arab representatives for a very specific reason:

The Palestinian Arabs had not wished to start these negotiations fearing that they would have to make compromises. The Arabs in Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt could achieve some positive results with the support of the Jews and were not afraid of losing anything. It was therefore necessary, before coming to a decision, to find out to what extent these Arabs could wield influence upon the Arabs of Palestine.

After receiving Dr Weizmann's approval,⁴² the Cairo talks were resumed on April 2nd. At this meeting the Zionist representatives pressed the Arabs for more specific proofs of their authority to speak on behalf of the Arab world; for the inclusion of a Palestinian in future talks; and for a renewed assurance that the proposed entente would be consistent with "a policy of friendship towards the Great Powers". In reply, the Arab delegates willingly offered to provide all necessary

documents to prove their authority, and referred the Jews to their explicit assurances already given on the question of the Great Powers. But they rejected the Zionist suggestion for altering "the constitution of our Executive", i.e., for the inclusion of a Palestinian. In a personal message to the April 4th meeting, Dr Weizmann (who was then in Rome) invoked his own negotiations with Faisal as proof of his desire to collaborate with the Arabs and expressed his eagerness to sign a suitable agreement as soon as possible. A Joint Commission was to continue meeting to work out details, and the delegates parted amid words of mutual esteem and good-will.

COLLAPSE OF THE CAIRO TALKS

Zionists were thus continuing the Cairo talks, but with some uneasiness on at least three points: (a) uncertainty as to the authority and influence of the Arab negotiators; (b) the unwillingness (or inability) of their negotiating partners to invite Palestinian representatives into the discussions; and (c) concern about endangering the Zionist-British connection. The lack of Palestinian involvement may well have reflected the Syrians' wish to avoid a scandal; for, indeed, when word of the talks subsequently leaked out, the Haifa newspaper, *al-Karmil*, reacted violently:⁴³

There is a group of Syrian Arabs who believe that moderation on the problem of Palestine will evoke the affection of Britain and the Zionists with respect to the problem and especially the Syrian problem.... Anyone who thinks that the sacrifice [of Palestine] is likely to help save another spot is suffering from a repugnant brain disease and should stay out of the world of Arab politics until he gets well.

But the most serious reservations held by the Zionists were related to their "British connection". None of the Zionist leaders doubted for a moment that some form of "green light" from the Colonial Office would be indispensable for the continuation of the Cairo talks.⁴⁴ While there seemed to be some justification for optimism after initial consultations with British officials in Jerusalem and Rome,⁴⁵ subsequent advice

from Sir John Shuckburgh at the Colonial Office effectively dampened the original Zionist enthusiasm for the proposed entente. In a personal and private letter to Dr Weizmann, Shuckburgh explained the reasons why he "felt very dubious about the whole business". These reasons included the questionable status of the Arab representatives, and the distinct possibility of arousing French criticism and wider European resentment: "There would be much talk of a Jewish intrigue to rob the Western powers of the fruits of victory."⁴⁶ From Jerusalem, too, came Chief Secretary Wyndham Deedes' more pointed analysis of the anti-European dimensions of the talks:

If England could be represented as secretly encouraging the Jews to co-operate with those who desire to be quit of French rule in Syria, it may be hoped, by these Syrian Nationalists, that a breach between England and France might be effected and, consequently, that French and English co-operation and mutual support in regard to local Nationalist movements may be weakened.

As for *Zionist* interests (with which he was sympathetic), he felt that these were "unlikely to concern [the Syrians] very deeply except insofar as [they] may be made temporary use of in the attainment of what is sought".⁴⁷

Largely as a result of such warnings, Eder was soon given the order to "temporise" as much as possible, and by June 1922 the negotiations had reached a standstill. Although he was most unhappy about the reasons for the suspension, Eder was of course aware that the contradiction between European and Arab interests was becoming a serious one. He himself admitted that the Syrians "intend[ed] to do everything to make the French Mandate difficult to obtain", and as part of their mutual understanding he had seen no objection to the Arab suggestion that the Zionists abstain from supporting any Mandate other than the one for Palestine.⁴⁸

But the mere fact of maintaining contact with these Arabs was beginning to put the Zionists in the anti-French "camp", and a choice soon had to be made. In spite of his commitment to a global Zionist-Arab agreement, Dr Weizmann felt emphatically that "on no account" could the Zionists do

anything which might be interpreted as anti-French.⁴⁹ Thus, by June 1922, the openly anti-French propaganda of the Syrians had the effect of forcing the Zionists to keep their distance.⁵⁰

Once again, Zionists found themselves caught between maintaining their "British (and/or French) connection" and responding to overtures from the Arab side. The situation in the summer of 1922 recalled the Zionists' talks with Awni Abd al-Hadi in 1919 (above, pp. 39f). The final nail in the coffin of the Cairo talks came from Nahum Sokolow. Then in the United States, Sokolow had been kept informed of the progress of Dr Eder's negotiations. His correspondence reveals the same ambivalence expressed by Dr Rupin and others. While warning of the anti-European implications of the talks, Sokolow nevertheless encouraged Eder to "use every opportunity for talking friendly with the Arabs", but without being "too hasty" about signing agreements.⁵¹ He well appreciated that any public Zionist support for the French mandate over Syria would be considered by the Arabs as "an act of hostility".

But Sokolow soon found that ratification of the French Mandate was "an indispensable condition for the confirmation of the Palestinian Mandate." By mid-July, press reports reached Palestine describing Sokolow's active role as a lobbyist in the U.S. on behalf of the French claim to Syria. Dr Eder cabled for an official denial of the report, which had produced "fresh unnecessary ill-feeling" among the Arabs with whom he was still in contact. He subsequently reported angrily on the "very disastrous" results which Sokolow's American activities had had in Palestine.⁵²

Despite the suspension of these talks in summer 1922, Dr Weizmann did resume contact with Riad as-Sulh and others in December, while Kalvaryski and Saphir held other meetings with Ihsan al-Jabiri, Shakib Arslan, Habib Lutfallah and others in Europe.⁵³ But the same three drawbacks encountered in earlier talks—viz., uncertain ability of the Arabs to "deliver the goods", exclusion of Palestinians, and Zionist fear of alienating British opinion—were still present. "In any case", comments Ben Halpern, "by the end of 1922 the division of the Middle East into distinct political entities was

too final an act for Jewish-Arab negotiations to be conducted with a view to reversing it." In Professor Halpern's analysis, there were a number of clear-cut reasons for the failure of the 1922 negotiation attempts:⁵⁴

If the creation of a federal Arab state, covering both the French and British mandated territories, were to be a condition of Arab acceptance of the Jewish national home [cf. page 56, above]—as it had been in the case of the Faisal-Weizmann agreement—it was a condition that the Jews had no power to meet. On the other hand, the Jews could hardly accept the suggestion that they abandon legal titles like the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate ... for a still-to-be-defined title to Jewish autonomy in Palestine that depended on Arab success in establishing a single federal state from Palestine to Mesopotamia. Finally, the authority of the Arab negotiators to speak for a united pan-Arab national movement was not beyond question.

CHAPTER 4

*Grass-Roots Contacts during the Twenties*¹

After the initial flurry of postwar Arab-Zionist negotiation attempts, the confirmation of the Mandate brought a halt to any further efforts to tackle any large political questions. Neither the Arabs nor the Zionists had it in their power to provide what the other was really after. The Palestinian Arabs' campaign to subvert, or at least freeze, the implementation of the Jewish National Home policy confined itself to protests and pressure directed at the British authorities and the League of Nations Mandates Commission. For their part, the Zionists now concentrated their efforts on obtaining from the British a firm attitude toward any possible unrest, and a sympathetic approach to Zionist immigration, land-purchase and settlement. With the Arabs it now appeared sufficient for Zionists to have "normal", friendly day-to-day relations in an atmosphere of peace and prosperity, while touchy political issues would be best left to one side. The Arabs, too, found limited intercourse with the Jews tactically or materially useful.

Given the absence of official Zionist-Arab negotiations after 1922, an examination of the grass-roots contacts during the 1920s may help to shed additional light on the nature and quality of Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. For the Zionists, this lower-level "diplomacy" often had very practical purposes.

(1) "*Preventive Diplomacy*". For the Zionists, the violence of April 1920 and May 1921 gave rise, predictably, to heightened concern for *hagana* and for a firmer attitude on the part of the British. But, beyond this, contacts with Arabs in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries were also considered important for the purposes of better "public-relations"

and, more urgently, intelligence-gathering.² Such contacts usually fell short of full-fledged "negotiations" with authoritative Arab spokesmen, but even political negotiations were sometimes seen as a device for forestalling an expected calamity.³

(2) *Press and "Public-Relations" Work.* Another frequent Zionist motive for contacts in the 1920s was the work of gathering signatures on petitions ("mazbatas") in support of Zionism. These signatures were obtained from villages for small sums, and were then used for external propaganda to show that the Arab population was not unanimously hostile to the Zionist presence in Palestine.⁴ In the struggle for a favourable public image inside Palestine itself, Zionists found themselves attempting to counteract hostile newspaper commentaries by encouraging the appearance of "friendly" or "moderate" Arab statements on the Zionist question.⁵ After more than eight years of direct (and frustrating) experience, Col. Kisch of the P.Z.E. described the situation as follows:⁶

This is a simple matter of money. No single Arabic paper pays its way and all are subventioned from one hostile source or another. Whatever else we may do for improving relations, ... the first essential is that we should stop this incitement wherever we can, and the way to stop it is to acquire an interest in as many of the papers as possible by a contribution to their monthly budget. This is a perfectly legitimate step—in fact I think that to neglect it is a crime. With the regular expenditure of £100 a month, the whole tone of the Palestinian press would be changed.

If only such funds were made available to him, Kisch argued, he felt sure he could get "results".

Such results would not only mean the reduction of incitement to crime, and consequently less crime, but would also make it much easier for well-disposed Arabs to favour reconciliation and understanding.

But, even when the required funding was available, the subsidizing of editors or writers almost never brought satisfactory, enduring results.⁷

Another project which was designed to contribute to good

relations with the Arab population was the sharing of Jewish medical services with neighbouring Arab villages. Gratitude and respect were the expected rewards, and this helped to cement good social and economic relations, but only so long as thorny political questions were kept to one side. Likewise, Hadassah medical work and anti-malarial efforts had a positive effect. Suggestions were often discussed in Zionist circles for the extension of Jewish credit, social or educational facilities to Arab friends, or for involving individual Arabs in specific Jewish economic undertakings.⁸

(3) *Support for Arab "Moderates"*. Beginning with the premise that the vast unorganized majority of the Arab population was a neutral factor subjected almost exclusively to the "negative" influence of political agitators, Zionists quickly saw the need to devote special efforts to winning the friendship of this neutral factor. What was required, it was felt, was that the Zionists and the Government should provide the proper organizational tools and political support for the creation of a party or association which would make its "positive" influence felt in Palestinian politics.⁹

During the 1920s, the P.Z.E. attempted to create and/or support three such parties: the Muslim National Association (M.N.A.), the Palestine Arab National Party and several regional "Farmers' Parties".¹⁰ These organizations suffered from many liabilities, chief among which were: (a) their reliance on Zionist funds, which were not always available in ample supply; (b) the widespread public knowledge that they had been "established largely owing to Jewish influence";¹¹ (c) the failure of the British authorities to show these groups any signs of favour¹² (largely owing to (a) and (b)); and (d) the dubious level of dedication of their members to the ideal of Arab-Zionist co-operation. Despite much Zionist fostering, none of these associations emerged as a strong "Moderate Party" capable of dominating the local political scene and of destroying, once and for all, the power of the "extremists". Instead, Zionists had to measure the success of such ventures in terms of the fact that the activities of the "extremists" were devoted to "defending themselves against the ["moderate"] party rather than attacking us."¹³ Indeed, from late 1923 onwards, the hold of the Muslim-Christian Association

(M.C.A.) over the Palestine Arab community was visibly weakened, owing mainly to internal feuding with rivals, many of whom had received moral and material support from the P.Z.E.

LOCAL ZIONIST PROPOSALS FOR AN AGREEMENT

As we have indicated above, local contacts initiated by Zionists were usually of a limited or defensive variety, aiming chiefly at keeping Arab animosity from developing too far, but without attempting to define the terms of a specific entente to be signed by the recognized leaders of each side. There were, however, exceptions to this rule, and our discussion of four exceptional cases will reveal several difficulties which would recur throughout the Mandate period: (a) the problems associated with appealing to the so-called "materialistic instincts" of the Arabs; (b) the official Zionist leadership's difficulty in controlling the unauthorized peace attempts of persistent individuals; and (c) the limited nature of even the short-term benefits which either side could offer to the other. With respect to the latter, the situation was already like the one which Arthur Ruppin was to describe in 1931: "What we can get (from the Arabs) is of no use to us, and what we need we cannot get from them."¹⁴

I. Let us begin with a detailed account of one of the few far-reaching attempts to reach a global agreement. In July 1919, H. M. Kalvaryski outlined before the *Vaad Zmani* (V.Z.: Provisional Council of the Jews of Palestine) a seven-point plan. Kalvaryski sought that body's official endorsement of the plan, which he had already begun discussing with Arab notables in Syria and Palestine.¹⁵

His Programme for an Arab-Jewish Entente—which was the first of several similar versions he was to elaborate over the next twenty years—contained a faint embryo of later "bi-nationalist" proposals, starting from the premises of Jews and Arabs being semitic kin and of Palestine being the homeland of all its inhabitants, whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish. Free Jewish immigration and the principle of a Jewish National Home were to be recognized by the Arabs, in

exchange for the opening up of Jewish economic and other institutions (under Arab suspicion of being “exclusivist”) to all members of the population. Hebrew and Arabic were to be taught as compulsory languages in state-run schools, and civil-service recruitment would favour bilingual candidates.¹⁶

Several V.Z. members were quick to pounce on the obvious contradictions between this programme and the *yishuv*’s own “National Demands”.¹⁷ Some reacted sharply to the criticism, expressed or implied by Kalvaryski and his supporters, that the Jews were treating (or might treat) the Arabs unjustly in the pursuit of Zionist aims. Several speakers saw in this an “exaggerated” concern for Arab interests and a corresponding weakening of the Jewish national position, and they replied to Kalvaryski’s ideas by stressing that it was important to “let the Arabs know” the situation clearly. Since Arab nationalists were then demanding a greater Arab kingdom which was to include Palestine, Yosef Sprinzak urged his colleagues to avoid misleading the Arabs:

The “agreement” must be clear, with no nonsense. We must receive Palestine without limitation or restriction.... We must receive Palestine within defined boundaries.... There is room for half a million Arabs in a greater Jewish Palestine, but there is no room here for an Arab kingdom. It is best that this conflict be sharp from the start, so that the matter will be clear to Arab psychology, and to all human psychology.

The V.Z. thus clearly opposed any Jewish initiative to try to win over the Arabs, and rejected Kalvaryski’s programme for an entente. Looking back with some bitterness twenty years later, Kalvaryski attributed the decision to

the same reason that [had] foiled the first attempt in 1914: [the Yishuv’s] contempt for the Arab national movement and the Arab people (which were dismissed as unimportant), and an exaggerated appraisal of our own strength and the [anticipated] help from Europe and America.¹⁸

There is certainly some truth in this assessment, for at this time the Yishuv did explicitly choose to put aside any “peace offensive”, preferring instead to “win over” the

Arabs by a combination of the anticipated long-term economic benefits of Zionist development and a firm endorsement of the Balfour Declaration policy by the Powers. This reluctance about embarking on a peace offensive, however, reflected more than a low estimation of the importance of the Arab factor; it also reflected a significantly pessimistic appraisal of the *possibility of ever winning Arab assent*, whatever its desirability or importance.

Undaunted by such rebuffs from within his own camp, Kalvaryski nevertheless went on to present his proposals to Arab leaders in his name alone. But what, we may ask, was the Arab reaction to Kalvaryski's overtures of 1919 and 1920, and was he justified in singling out *yishuv* attitudes as the cause for his failure to produce an Arab-Zionist entente at this time?

A close look at the evidence seems to point to the conclusion that—notwithstanding Kalvaryski's claims to the contrary—his programme did not win any significant Arab support. The programme appears to have been presented to Arabs on at least three occasions: (1) prior to the V.Z. debate discussed above; (2) soon after that debate (August 1919); and (3) in the last days of Faisal's reign at Damascus (June 1920). We have only Kalvaryski's own accounts of a positive reception on the first two occasions.¹⁹ But for the third there are several independent sources which tell a different story.

Kalvaryski's own reminiscences (1937) of the June 1920 meetings refer to discussions organized by Mu'in al-Madi (a Palestinian) and Riad as-Sulh (Kalvaryski's Lebanese friend; cf. pp. 54f above), with the participation of three Syrians (Ihsan al-Jabiri, Adil Arslan, Hashim al-Atassi) and another Palestinian (Rafiq Tamimi). After "long discussions", Kalvaryski claims that his programme received Arab approval.²⁰

From the Hebrew press of the period and the despatches of another Zionist agent in Damascus, it appears that talks with Palestinians there broke down on the issues of Jewish immigration and Arab recognition of the Jewish National Home.²¹

A rare Arab report of a meeting between Kalvaryski and S. Felman (representing the Zionists) and Rafiq Tamimi, Mu'in al-Madi and Amin al-Husaini (the future Jerusalem mufti) gives a detailed account of the Arabs' rejection of the

Kalvaryski programme.²² After dealing with the programme point by point, the Arabs insisted that any further negotiations be carried out on a more official level, by the "authorized representatives of the Jewish institutions" in Palestine, and under the following conditions:

No Arab would negotiate ... unless [the Z.C.] agreed to the following conditions: 1. Palestine is a part of independent Syria. 2. The idea of the Jewish National Home is unacceptable. 3. Hebrew cannot be an official language. 4. Jewish immigration is not acceptable.

The hostile tone of the above report, submitted to the Syrian Congress, may well have been exaggerated for "nationalist" consumption. According to Zionist sources, talks did continue in utmost secrecy. But when news of the ongoing negotiations leaked out, Rida as-Sulh was forced to resign his ministry in Faisal's cabinet because of his son's involvement. When the contacts were finally broken off, the Arab delegates had still not agreed to recognize the principle of the Jewish National Home.²³

Thus, our examination of the Kalvaryski programme and the reactions it received from both sides would seem to reveal how distant Kalvaryski was from the mainstream of political thinking in both the Zionist and the Arab camps. Unfortunately, his conviction regarding the *need* for an agreement, and his persistence in trying to persuade both parties of this, were not enough to bridge the gap between the strongly-held positions of Zionists and Arabs.

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II. Simultaneous with Kalvaryski's efforts in Damascus, a similar Zionist-Arab agreement was actually concluded on March 6, 1920 between Yehoshua Hankin (a land-purchase agent and Arab "expert") and three Lebanese politicians: Najib Sfeir, Dr Rashid Karam and Yusuf Mu'azzin (who claimed also to sign on behalf of Najib Hashim and Dr Antun Shihade).²⁴ The Arabs presented themselves as the "Nationalist Group in Syria and Lebanon", and sought to pave the way for fruitful tri-lateral relations between the

future independent states of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. The tone and contents of the agreement were quite similar to Kalvaryski's plan, giving perhaps more stress on Arab recognition of the status of the Jewish National Home. Such an agreement, had it been discussed by *yishuv* representatives, might have proved slightly more palatable than Kalvaryski's programme. But the entente was, in fact, never discussed publicly or revealed. It remained an inoperative piece of paper, largely because of the lack of authority of the Arab signatories, who would surely have been denounced by the advocates of a "Greater Syria" in Damascus. One Jewish observer further suspected that these Arabs were insignificant journalists "eager to milk the Zionist cow".²⁵ Indeed, one concrete requisite of the agreement was to have been the setting up of an Arabic newspaper, for which purposes the Zionist Organization was solicited to subscribe LE. (Egyptian pounds) 6000.²⁶

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III. Two further Zionist initiatives serve to illustrate the limited usefulness of reaching an understanding built on a "bridge of silver". The first case was Kalvaryski's relations with Musa Kazim al-Husaini, the President of the A.E., and, in the mind of most Jews, the symbol of Palestinian "extremism" and "intransigence". In November and December of 1922, Kalvaryski met with members of the Palestine Arab Delegation in Lausanne, during the latter's futile mission to reverse some of the diplomatic results of the peace settlement. While Kalvaryski had indeed found members of the Delegation unyielding, he was able to report that their leader, Musa Kazim, had indicated in a private conversation that "his attitude towards us is in our hands". After underlining this phrase in a letter to London, Kalvaryski continued: "I understood what his words were hinting at. I believe that if we know how to get on with him we can bring him over to our side. . . ."²⁷

Kalvaryski's hunch was indeed correct. Upon receipt of a sum of money from the Zionist Central Office in London, Musa Kazim reportedly pledged to use his influence to prevent bloodshed in Palestine. For a time, Kalvaryski

accepted various minor proofs of Musa Kazim's new "moderation", and hoped that this would be the first step in eventually winning over the entire M.C.A. leadership. But there were soon too many inconsistencies in Musa Kazim's behaviour for Kalvaryski to ignore, and when confronted by the latter in mid-1923 the Arab leader proudly claimed that he was still a patriot and had not sold himself or his people over to the Zionists.²⁸

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IV. Another similar deal between Zionists and Arab notables in Palestine revolved around the British attempt to set up an appointed Advisory Council, to provide for Arab participation in the administration. The P.Z.E. took an active interest in helping Government officials to register a victory over the M.C.A., which attempted to block the formation of the Council by pressure and threats against nominees. Col. F. H. Kisch of the P.Z.E., together with Kalvaryski, held several meetings with some of the Arab nominees and attempted to convince them to resist the public campaign being mounted against their participation on the Council.²⁹

But both Zionists were quick to realize how ineffective they were by using verbal arguments alone. At a cost of £800, they obtained the temporary "moderation" of two prominent Arabs: Arif Pasha ad-Dajani and Raghیب Bey an-Nashashibi.³⁰ But this was not enough to have the Government's Advisory Council established. Once it became clear that the required number of willing Arab nominees could not be found, the scheme had to be dropped.³¹

ARAB INITIATIVES FOR AN AGREEMENT

In most of the preceding pages, we have concentrated on the Zionist view of Jewish-Arab contacts. Arab motives for certain kinds of co-operation with Zionists have been touched on in the context of Arab reactions to, and participation in, endeavours initially proposed by the Jews. An examination of several Arab-inspired schemes for some sort of Jewish-Arab "agreement" on limited issues will help to complete our

picture of Arab motives and attitudes in their contacts with the Jews.

I. We have already seen evidence of the mercenary interest of some Arab leaders, and the first case under discussion here illustrates this aspect even more clearly. In late 1920, a local Jewish committee was given the task of "seeking an understanding with the Palestinian Arabs".³² Its efforts seemed to be rewarded in early 1921 when several leaders of the Haifa Congress (December 1920) approached its members (H. M. Kalvaryski, S. Tolkowsky and M. Dizengoff) "with the intention to come to a definite understanding between Arabs and Jews". Unlike some previous approaches, the personalities now involved were influential leaders. While the exact terms of the proposed "understanding" are not known, constitutional issues and land-sales to Jews were discussed. The financial angle of the talks, however, seems to have been the predominant one. The *yishuv* committee urgently requested the London Zionist Executive to grant it £5000 for "expenses", and to arrange facilities with the Anglo-Palestine Bank for granting loans up to a total of £10,000 "which may be in part lost".

But this opportunity of coming to an "understanding" with the Haifa Congress leaders, described at the time as "a new situation ... rich in the greatest possibilities", came to nothing, because (as Dizengoff complained bitterly after the May 1921 riots) the committee's urgent request for funds had received no reply from London.³³ All along, members of the committee had been working almost entirely at their "own private expense", and the "scope and effectiveness" of their work had been "greatly restricted", owing partly to the fact that conditions had "not been favourable for important political work, but chiefly owing to the lack of financial resources".

Although written evidence of opinions on this delicate subject is understandably rare, we may be sure that Tolkowsky, Kalvaryski and Dizengoff were not the only Jews who based their activities on the belief that Arab "materialism" held the key to many difficulties in Arab-Jewish relations.³⁴ Very few Arabs or Jews took a moralistic approach to this question. For the Zionists, at least, the

matter was an eminently practical one: on the one hand, they were faced with an apparently obstinate and noisy group of opponents, whose motives and representativeness seemed to them doubtful, while, on the other hand, there appeared to be no shortage of Arabs who were ready to sell their loyalties or their services to the highest bidder, or to profit from land-sales to Jews, however unpatriotic.³⁵ Under such circumstances, the buying-off of opposition appeared a natural and effective way of dealing with that opposition.

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II. In the three remaining cases to be discussed in this chapter, the ulterior motive of the Arab initiators was purely political: in two cases, Jewish-Arab agreement was broached in manoeuvres vis-à-vis the British regarding the Legislative Council, while in the third the Husaini clan proposed an electoral alliance with the Jews of Jerusalem in an attempt to defeat rival candidates of the Nashashibi family. In none of the three cases was the ultimate objective a lasting agreement with the Zionists.

Following the successful boycott of the elections to the proposed Legislative Council (February-March 1923) and the refusal of Arabs to accept nomination to an Advisory Council (June-July 1923), the British had proposed the establishment of an "Arab Agency", to be considered parallel to the Jewish Agency. In regretfully acknowledging the Arabs' rejection of this third proposal, the British Government then announced that no further attempts would be made to involve the Arabs in the constitutional government of the country. Palestine would be ruled by the High Commissioner and an Executive Council of senior British officials. Practical consideration of any new proposals regarding self-government would be resumed only when the Arabs themselves took the initiative and expressed their "readiness to participate".³⁶

Although the Palestinians' rejection of proposals which would have implied their recognition of the Jewish national home policy was ideologically linked with their basic demands, it was not so blindly adhered to as is sometimes suggested. Members of the A.E. were quite capable of tactical manoeuvres on this issue, and a few of them soon began

working for the re-opening of discussions on the question of representative government.³⁷ The rejected Legislative Council proposal, with all its inadequacies, had been, after all, closer to the desired form of "national government" than government by an Executive Council of colonial officials, which began operating in December 1923.

Thus, in late 1924, Jamal al-Husaini discussed constitutional questions with H. M. Kalvaryski, and made the following suggestion: the A.E. would withdraw its demand for complete "national self-government" in favour of a Jewish-Arab agreement on a bi-cameral Legislative Council, with a lower chamber elected on a proportional basis and an upper chamber formed along the lines of the British proposal of 1923 (i.e., 10 officials, 8 Muslims, 2 Christians, 2 Jews). The upper house would have to confirm all decisions of the lower, and an immigration committee of 2 Jews, 1 Muslim, 1 Christian and a British chairman would be formed. As a further safeguard to Jewish interests, Jamal was reportedly willing to agree that the High Commissioner could maintain a right to veto any legislation.³⁸

Kalvaryski enthusiastically reported his conversations to the P.Z.E., and proposed that Col. Kisch meet with Jamal. Kalvaryski himself found the terms quite generous, and was anxious not to lose this opportunity for an accord with the A.E.³⁹ But Kisch received the plan coolly. Whatever the motives of the A.E. in making these proposals, he saw such a bi-cameral situation leading to an inevitable clash between an appointed upper house and a popularly-elected, and ultimately more legitimate, lower chamber. Jewish public opinion in Palestine was even more hostile to any revival of discussions regarding a legislative assembly, and rejected the suggestion out-of-hand. Kalvaryski also discussed the plan with Sir Herbert Samuel, but the High Commissioner was sceptical for his own reasons (see below). In the end, this Arab initiative was dropped from lack of response.

It is interesting to speculate on the motives of the A.E. in its secret approach to the Jews with such a plan. On the surface, it seemed to indicate a shift from attempts to turn back the clock, at one go, to the pre-Balfour Declaration days. While not signalling any change in the basic Palestinian goals, this

overture to the Jews was evidence of a pragmatic approach: accepting and working with whatever tools were available to thwart, and perhaps contain, the growth of the Jewish national home.

But why did Jamal need to approach the *Zionists* for this, when it was the British who had the power to create the desired self-governing institutions? One possible explanation is that it was important for the prestige of the Arab Executive to make it appear that renewed suggestions for a Legislative Council were coming from the Zionist and/or British sides, and were not the result of the Arabs giving in to conditions dictated by the Government. Hence, Kalvaryski and others were in fact used by Jamal to test the reactions of the High Commissioner. The interviews which Kalvaryski and Sulaiman Bey Nasif (a recognized "moderate") had with Samuel were, in fact, the result of Jamal's suggestion, and the latter afterwards tried to create the appearance that it was the British who were initiating discussions for a Council—a false impression which Samuel was eager to remove.⁴⁰

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III. The next instance of a local Arab overture to make a deal with the Jews involved the Jerusalem municipal elections of 1927.⁴¹ The peculiar nature of the 1926 Municipalities Ordinance provided for proportional representation for the Muslim (5 seats), Jewish (4 seats) and Christian (3 seats) communities of Jerusalem, but did not provide for separate communal ballots. Each voter could cast a vote for all twelve posts, and thus each community had the opportunity of affecting the results of the other communities. Both the Jews and the Husaini faction had opposed this arrangement, preferring separate communal lists, but their objections had not been heeded by the British.

The incumbent mayor, Raghīb an-Nashashibi, who had been appointed by the military authorities in 1920, had developed among the Jews the reputation of being a poor administrator. But, despite the fact that he had drawn frequent criticism from the Jews of Jerusalem for his poor treatment of their community, it seemed likely that he would profit against his Arab rivals from Jewish votes, simply

because he belonged to the anti-M.C.A., anti-Husaini camp—and was, therefore, dubbed a “moderate”. The Husainis set out to prevent the election of their hated rival, and were prepared to do almost anything—even make a deal with the Jews—to accomplish this end.

Jamal al-Husaini met with Col. Kisch of the P.Z.E. in January 1927 and attempted to persuade him of the advantages of encouraging the Jewish electors of Jerusalem not to cast any votes for Arab candidates.⁴² Jamal had little concrete to offer, apart from the veiled threat of incurring the wrath of the Husainis, coupled with the vague incentive that, although “any understanding now reached for the purpose of the elections should not be assumed as implying an understanding on other points”, it would nevertheless be “regarded ... as a sign of good-will and as a step towards co-operation”.

Shortly afterwards, the Jewish judge and native Jerusalemite, Gad Frumkin, was honoured by a surprise visit from no less a personage than Hajj Amin al-Husaini, the Grand Mufti, accompanied by two members of the Supreme Muslim Council, Abdallah Dajani and Hajj Sa'id Shawa.⁴³ On this occasion, Frumkin was also urged to persuade the Jerusalem Jewish community to co-operate in blocking the election of Raghib Nashashibi. This time two advantages for the Jews were more clearly spelled out: (a) more favourable treatment for the Jewish community by the future (Husaini) administration of the municipality, and (b) a concession in the A.E.'s official demand for national self-government—namely, that the subjects of immigration and land-purchase might be excluded from the competence of a Legislative Council.

Whatever the attractions of a Zionist-Husaini alliance for some people, the majority of Jerusalem Jews decided to use their votes to prevent the Husaini/M.C.A.-backed candidates from gaining a foothold in their municipality. The Jerusalem Jewish Community Council succeeded in organizing a single slate of candidates, who were acclaimed, while giving the *mot d'ordre* to Jewish voters to work for a Nashashibi victory. Given the choice, they clearly felt their interests better protected by voting for “Raghib al-Nashashibi's wretched

administration and not for their national enemies".⁴⁴ Ragh-ib's personal victory was supplemented by the election of five supporters and two Husaini candidates, including Jamal al-Husaini. As many interpreted it at the time, "the result was that the Husainis never forgave the Jews for helping their biggest rival, Ragh-ib Nashashibi, while Ragh-ib was not at all happy that they had brought his greatest adversary, Jamal, into his municipal council as a watchdog".⁴⁵ But, belying this exaggerated appraisal of "Jewish power", the Jewish vote had had, in fact, no real impact on the outcome of the election.⁴⁶

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IV. Prior to the outbreak of riots in August 1929, some Palestinian leaders were again working to have the British re-open the question of self-governing institutions.⁴⁷ At this time, Zionist opposition to any form of legislative council was as clear and unanimous as ever, and several Arab leaders felt it advantageous to couple their pressure on the British with an attempt to soften the Zionist stand on this question. Thus, when the Syrian nationalist, Ihsan al-Jabiri, was in Jerusalem in 1928, he and H. M. Kalvaryski held talks together with Palestinian leaders, including Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim and Awni Abd al-Hadi.⁴⁸ As a step towards ending the Jewish-Arab feuding, the Arabs offered to phrase the resolutions of their forthcoming Congress in such a way as to avoid explicit denunciation of the Mandate or the Balfour Declaration. The offer was duly implemented, as the resolutions of the VIIth Palestine Arab Congress (June 20, 1928) merely re-affirmed previous Congress decisions in general terms.⁴⁹

According to Kalvaryski, this gesture was to have been followed by Zionist-Arab talks. Indeed, in the wake of the Congress, the Arab leadership, through its official organs, sounded a note of "moderation" and taunted the Jews to abandon their opposition to representative government.⁵⁰ But the P.Z.E. was reluctant to pick up the challenge, leading Kalvaryski to blame the Zionist leadership for another "missed opportunity" for an accord with the Arabs.

In point of fact, the P.Z.E. was quite determined to avoid

re-opening the question of representative institutions, wishing neither to negotiate with the Arabs on this issue, nor to give the impression to the British that the Zionists were softening their opposition to an elected assembly.⁵¹ In any case, the build-up in tension over Jewish rights at the Western Wall after September 1928 (cf. Chapter 5, below) pushed any prospect of Zionist-Arab negotiations even further into the background.

ARAB AND JEWISH MOTIVES FOR CO-OPERATION

The foregoing overview of the various episodes of Jewish-Arab grass-roots contacts in the decade after World War I reveals a variety of motives for local co-operation. As we have seen, the search for a global peace agreement was not a primary motive for local Arab-Jewish contacts during this period. Nevertheless, there were real forces operating to bring Jews and Arabs into contact with each other. Zionists still needed to have "normal", friendly day-to-day relations with their neighbours in an atmosphere of peace and prosperity. Arabs, too, found limited intercourse with Jews tactically or materially useful.

The major objective of the Zionists appears to have been "preventive diplomacy"—the buying of a temporary peace, while hoping for the continued growth of the Jewish National Home through immigration, land-purchase and economic development. In their attempts to find Arab "friends" who would overpower their Arab "enemies", the Zionists found internal divisions within Arab society of distinct advantage. In the clan rivalry between Husaini and Nashashibi, Zionists leaned towards the latter. Inherent Muslim-Christian rivalry, which was partially submerged in the anti-Zionist M.C.A. coalition, usually led the Zionists into tactical alliances with Muslims, discreetly fostering the latter's suspicions of the powerful Christian minority.⁵² On other occasions, local "friends" were found through the promotion of relations with minority non-Muslim sects, such as Samaritans, Druze and Circassians.

Similarly, Zionists found a basis of co-operation in the countryside notables' resentment against the townfolk.

Whether Jewish workers supported "fellahin" against "effendis", or whether *yishuv* "capitalists" sought good relations with the latter⁵³— in all cases, the Jews found, at best, only small pockets of "friends" in the Arab community.

Invariably, the Jews sought to prove to the Arabs that—at least from an economic point of view—the coming of Zionism to Palestine was in their interests as well. In deference to what they considered to be a "natural instinct" of the Arab, Zionists employed subsidies, gifts and easy loans for selected individuals. As much as they may have wanted to believe otherwise, Zionists knew that the distinction between "moderate" and "extremist" Arabs was a dubious one.⁵⁴ The need for baksheesh to buy moderation, whatever its short-term advantages, indicated to many that the relationship between Arab and Jew in Palestine was fast becoming one based on mutual contempt. More significantly, the fact that baksheesh was often the *only* way of winning "friends" was a telling indication of the slim chances of the Arabs ever coming to accept Zionism in a way that could be embodied in an enduring political agreement.

Most co-operation evinced by Arabs towards Jews in Palestine could not be equated with any form of acceptance of the basic goals of Zionism. It was usually for some short-term economic or political advantage that we find Arabs willing to co-operate in one of the various activities initiated by Jews. The Arab desire for western education or training, or for an administrative post, was often behind the expressed interest in collaboration with the Jews. Even so prominent an adversary as Musa Kazim al-Husaini, who was almost "bought" by the Zionists in 1922-23, had apparently offered in 1920 to "be friendly to the Zionists" in exchange for a post in the Waqf administration.⁵⁵

The quest for financial backing for the publication of a newspaper was another frequently recurring Arab motive for co-operation, while land-owners sought purchasers, and *vice versa*, on the open market. The myths of Jewish power, Jewish wealth or Jewish international connections also played their part in attracting Arab interest. In addition, politically-astute Arabs learned how certain dealings with Zionists could be

useful in attempts to outflank the British on given occasions, or to outmanoeuvre an Arab rival on others.

When looking at the period after 1928, we shall see how the same Arab and Zionist motives reappear, both at the level of grass-roots contacts and in the cases of higher-level diplomacy.

CHAPTER 5

Relations in the Wake of Crisis, 1929-1931

NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITIES AND THE WAILING WALL DISPUTE

The riots of August 1929 provided a security and political crisis which put into question the very foundations of Zionist-Ab-British relations in Palestine. On Yom Kippur, 23-24 September 1928, an apparently trivial incident touched off a chain of events which was to result in rioting and bloodshed in August 1929.¹ The sensitive question of maintaining the *status quo* with respect to Jewish rights of worship at the Muslim-owned Western ("Wailing") Wall in Jerusalem² unleashed a public controversy, which was fanned primarily by the leading Muslim authorities in Palestine—the Supreme Muslim Council (S.M.C.) under the Presidency of Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem—and by Revisionist Jews, who combined to elevate the controversy from one involving religious rights to one of national prestige.³

On paper, at least, there existed provisions for the mediation of religious disputes in Palestine through the "good offices" of the British. But this particular conflict quickly took on passionate national and political dimensions. The situation progressively worsened without any mediation procedures being either applied by the British or pressed for by Muslim or Jewish authorities.⁴

Neither is there, during the eleven months of mounting tension, any evidence of either Jewish or Muslim leaders (religious or lay) seeking to de-fuse the situation through direct contacts or negotiations with their counterparts. A few isolated Jewish suggestions to settle the question by "friendly

talks" with Muslim leaders⁵ were soon buried beneath the emotional propaganda and counter-propaganda issued by the committees which were launched in defence of their respective Holy Places. Each party turned to the British not to mediate, but rather to vindicate its own exclusive claim by denouncing the pretensions of the other side.

There was, however, one futile attempt at Zionist-Arab negotiation, under the guise of British "mediation", with a view to preventing the rioting which was to erupt on August 23, 1929. This was an eleventh-hour meeting, called by the Officer Administering the Government, Harry Charles Luke, acting on a suggestion made several days earlier by a member of the P.Z.E.⁶ The style of the meeting was a familiar one in Palestine, one which had been used, for example, to calm passions after the outbreak of the Jaffa riots in May 1921.⁷ On the evening of August 22nd, six local notables met at Luke's house: Awni Abd al-Hadi, Jamal al-Husaini and Subhi al-Khadra, members of the A.E., and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Isaiah Braude and Dr Yitzhak Levy, representing the Jewish side.

The meeting began with a discussion of two parallel declarations of intent which had been drafted; these were to be published in an attempt to calm the two excited communities. After some thought, the Jewish representatives decided that they could not sign their half of the proposed statement on the grounds that the ambiguous wording might have prejudiced Jewish claims which were still to be decided. Instead, the Jews then proposed a second draft communiqué—a single proclamation, to be signed jointly, which stated that

at a joint meeting between us we came to the conclusion that the present excitement among Moslems and Jews is chiefly due to misunderstanding. We are convinced that by goodwill the misunderstanding can be cleared up and for this purpose we demand of both Jews and Moslems to do their utmost to endeavour to attain peaceful and quiet relations. We all deprecate any acts of violence to each other, and we appeal to everyone to assist their supreme

institutions in the sacred work of obtaining peace between both nations.⁸

This draft the Arab representatives refused to sign. It was finally decided that the matter should be postponed for several days, during which time, the Arabs assured their Jewish counterparts, the Arab community would be urged in the direction of peace and restraint. Despite the "friendly feeling" with which one Jewish representative left the meeting, rioting broke out in Jerusalem the next day.

Despite the conclusions of the Shaw Commission that the "disturbances" were not premeditated, it seems likely that there were forces working towards a violent outbreak—whether at the behest of the Mufti or in spite of his efforts at pacification.⁹ The three Arab spokesmen, if we accept their sincerity in wanting to maintain law and order, were probably in no position to reverse the scheduled course of events. Even had the six local leaders been able to agree upon the text of a pacifying communiqué, it is doubtful whether its publication would have done much to prevent the violence which erupted on August 23rd.

News of the Jerusalem riots—usually in the form of rumours that Jews had bombed or attacked the mosques¹⁰—sparked off attacks on Jews in other parts of the country, including the brutal massacre of sixty orthodox men, women and children in Hebron on August 24th, and the ransacking of the Jewish quarter of Safed (with the loss of 18 lives and 80 wounded) on August 29th.¹¹ During these troubled events, one successful local Arab-Jewish encounter did result in the publication of parallel proclamations urging peace and restraint in Tiberias.¹² Partly because of this, Tiberias was one of the towns which were spared during the week of unrest and which were less subject to the agitation which continued for several months after the actual rioting.¹³

Just as the negotiating process had done little to prevent the outbreaks of August 1929, so too was its role negligible in settling the religious dispute over rights at the Wailing Wall. Several offers to mediate the dispute came from prominent

non-Palestinian Muslims and Arabs,¹⁴ including some general suggestions for resolving the wider Palestine dispute from King Faisal of Iraq.¹⁵ But none of them was taken up seriously by any of the parties in deadlock. In Palestine, Zionist representatives sought to encourage Arabs who opposed the Mufti to issue a conciliatory statement which would have softened the official Muslim stand on the Wall issue;¹⁶ but this plan came to nothing, as did all attempts to resolve the matter amicably through secret face-to-face negotiations.¹⁷

The question of the Holy Places, which had been turned over to the League of Nations, became the subject of a special Commission which visited Palestine and received submissions from religious leaders in June and July of 1930.¹⁸ The Report of this special Commission (June 1931), although not well received by either party, did nevertheless contribute to the removal of the issue of religious rights from its provocative prominence.¹⁹

UNCERTAINTIES OF BRITISH POLICY

The riots of 1929 had, of course, raised more than the question of rights at the Holy Places of Jerusalem. The whole question of Zionism and Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine remained in abeyance in the years following the riots. How were "normal" relations to be resumed? And, were there to be major changes in British policy?

While events certainly convinced Zionist leaders of the need for improved security and for greater activity on the "Arab front",²⁰ feeling was near-unanimous that *overtures for negotiation* with their erstwhile assailants were out of the question at this time.²¹ "Even those Jews who held advanced pacifist views", noted Dr Leo Kohn (later a senior official in the Jewish Agency Executive [J.A.E.]), felt that any approach to the "momentary spokesmen of the Palestinian Arabs"

would inevitably be interpreted as a sign of weakness: negotiations would necessarily involve concessions and the natural inference would be that if the killing of one hundred Jews could yield such results as would now be

obtained, the killing of one thousand might yield the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration and that of a few thousand more perhaps the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine.²²

Likewise, the context was not ripe for any Arab-sponsored moves towards an accord with the Jews. The riots were followed not by reconciliation, but by a vigorous Arab campaign for boycotting all contacts—commercial and social, as well as political—with the Jewish community.²³

This unfavourable climate for direct Arab-Zionist negotiation continued beyond 1929, largely owing to the uncertainty of British policy in the wake of the riots. With both Arab and Zionist leaders looking towards the British for “favourable” clarifications of government policy, there seemed little incentive for direct contacts. Dr Judah Magnes, President of the Hebrew University (see below, pp. 87f.), was among those who had expected a more positive British role during this period. By mid-1930, he was “at a loss to understand that it was beyond the power of the British Government to insist upon a [Jewish-Arab] meeting”. What was equally distressing, in his view, was “the fact that even individuals of the two sides here hardly meet for an exchange of views”.²⁴

The hearings of the Shaw Commission of Inquiry in late 1929 had served as a sounding-board for Arab and Zionist grievances, with each party hoping for a report which would vindicate its case.²⁵ From March to June 1930, a Delegation of Palestine Arabs visited London to press demands at the C.O. While this visit might have afforded an opportunity for secret talks with Zionists, as in 1921,²⁶ there is no record of any such meetings taking place at the C.O. or elsewhere. Jamal al-Husaini informed a British member of the J.A. Administrative Committee that the Arab Delegation would meet the Jews only if forced to do so by H.M.G., and later reported that the Delegation had refused to meet Dr Weizmann because “they did not recognize that [he] or any other non-Palestinian Jew had anything to do with Palestine”.²⁷ Awni Abd al-Hadi also made it plain that he would not meet with Zionist leaders, whether out of pique (at Zionist

attempts to embarrass him during the Shaw Commission hearings)²⁸ or, as he later claimed,²⁹ out of his recognition that Arab and Zionist interests were fundamentally irreconcilable. Since the Prime Minister had offered to invite Arab and Zionist delegations together only if he felt sure, in advance, of "a prospect of an amicable conversation",³⁰ the Arab Delegation's efforts were aimed exclusively at British policy-makers.³¹

The publication, in April 1930, of the Shaw Commission's Report severely disappointed the Zionists and was welcomed by the A.E. as "unobjectionable and in [their] interests".³² But before Arabs or Zionists could settle down to the new status quo, the British asked both parties, in effect, to await a further authoritative report, that of Sir John Hope Simpson, who had been appointed on May 6th to investigate the land question. The accompanying temporary suspension of immigration further depressed the Zionists,³³ adding to the reasons for a "wait-and-see" attitude which held little incentive for Arabs or Zionists to approach each other.³⁴

The expected "final" word on British Palestine policy seemed to come on October 21, 1930, with the publication of the Hope-Simpson Report and the accompanying Passfield White Paper.³⁵ The Report and White Paper were, for the Zionists, the worst shock they had yet received at the hands of the British. The unfriendly tone, the proposed restrictions and the prospect of a Palestinian Legislative Council contained in these documents led to an anti-British uproar among world Jewry and to the resignations of Dr Weizmann and others at the head of the Jewish Agency.³⁶

Because their full official demands had not been met, most Arabs were less than pleased with what was, in effect, their greatest political victory to that date.³⁷ One exception appears to have been the Jerusalem Mayor, Raghib an-Nashashibi, who approached Col. Kisch two days after publication of the White Paper, "intoxicated with joy", taunting the Zionist representative with the following words: "How do you do—Kisch, my brother! When you have finished your protests, which are of course necessary, will it not be better to sit down together?"³⁸ But most Arab reactions were cautious and restrained, tempered with fears of a reversal of the White Paper by Zionist pressure in London.³⁹

In contrast to official Zionist attacks on the Passfield White Paper, Col. Kisch was able to note that it was having at least one salutary effect: namely, that it caused some discussion in the Arabic press "of the possibilities of coming to an understanding with the Jews".⁴⁰ But such public discussion remained theoretical, as it was not followed by any concrete overtures from Palestinian Arab politicians.⁴¹ Noting the impossibility of "induc[ing] the two parties to meet", the H.C., Sir John Chancellor, commented: "After the disturbances the Jews naturally enough would not meet the Arabs, and now the Arabs will not meet the Jews until the Balfour Declaration has been cancelled and the Mandate withdrawn."⁴²

For their part, Zionist leaders in London directed all their energies at securing, through a Cabinet Committee, a reversal of the severe set-back they had received from Lord Passfield.⁴³ These Zionist-British negotiations finally resulted in a letter sent by the Prime Minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald, to Dr Weizmann, dated February 13, 1931, purporting to clarify the meaning of the White Paper.⁴⁴ In effect, the letter undid much of the damage caused to the Zionist position by the White Paper, and became known as the "Black Letter" to the Arabs, whose disappointment became a watershed in the development of a more concerted anti-British orientation of Palestinian Arab politics in the 1930s.⁴⁵

The publication of the MacDonald Letter provided yet another uncertain context for possible Arab-Zionist negotiation. Dr Weizmann, who visited Palestine within weeks of the Letter's publication (see below, pp. 105f), sought to make the most of what he felt was a most propitious time for talks with Arab leaders.⁴⁶ The A.E., on the other hand, did everything possible to avoid Arab-Zionist meetings in order to underscore their displeasure with the "Black Letter".⁴⁷ Only a few Arab personalities seemed to feel that this was a good moment "for the Jews to take a bold step and open their arms to the Arabs", and that such a move "would be received with a great heart, because the Arabs [felt] very much hurt by the British government".⁴⁸ The general view, in the opinion of the British Administrative Officer in Nablus, was that the MacDonald Letter had resulted in "[r]acial animosity ...

again becom[ing] acute and the possibility of establishing better relations between Arab and Jew [being] further off than ever".⁴⁹

Thus, the period from late 1929 until early 1931 offered few fruitful opportunities for direct Arab-Zionist diplomacy. Despite the crisis created by the riots and the serious attention given to the problem by all sides, the very fluidity of British policy at this time did much to prevent any sustained attempts at a negotiated solution.

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION: H. ST. JOHN PHILBY

Having sketched above the generally unfavourable political context for direct Arab-Zionist talks, we may now proceed to deal with those negotiating episodes which did, nonetheless, take place in the aftermath of the 1929 riots. The first came, in late October 1929, in the form of a mediation offer from H. St.-John Philby, a former British Representative in Transjordan (1921-24), and a man who was to figure in later attempts to mediate between Zionist leaders and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud.

Philby enjoyed a reputation and self-image somewhat similar to T.E. Lawrence, with whom he shared a strong belief "that an injection of Jewish brains and money into the Arab world would improve Arab chances of successful independence".⁵⁰ While en route back to Arabia from London he visited Damascus, Jerusalem and Cairo. Acting purely on his own initiative,⁵¹ and probably hoping to impress the C.O. with his achievement, Philby discussed with Syrian and Palestinian leaders in Damascus the lines of a possible settlement of the Palestine question. As a result of his suggestions, the Arabs prepared a list of their demands, in their most "moderate" form, which Philby communicated privately to Lord Passfield.⁵²

When Philby arrived in Jerusalem, he met not only with the Mufti and other leading Arabs, but also with a correspondent of the *New York Times*, who subsequently introduced him to Dr Judah Magnes. The latter was very impressed with Philby's ideas on an Arab-Zionist agreement,⁵³ with the result that Philby spent a day "in vigorous discussion" of a peace

plan, dashing back and forth between Dr Magnes, on the one hand, and the Mufti, on the other. His efforts were crowned with success when he felt he had secured the agreement of both sides to a ten-point plan for the future of Palestine.

According to Philby's plan,⁵⁴ the country was to be governed "on a democratic constitutional republican basis", with a Legislative Council and a Council of Ministers in which Jews and Arabs would be represented "in proportion to their numbers in the population". The H.C. would have a veto power over acts of these two bodies to guard against anything "inconsistent with the proper exercise of [Britain's] international obligations ... or detrimental to the rights of minorities or foreigners or injurious to the peace and prosperity of the country". Immigration would be free, "especially to Arabs and Jews", subject to the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Provision was also made for the continuation of the Jewish Agency as a "public body competent to advise and co-operate with the Palestinian Government in all matters affecting the interests of the Jews in the country", with the right of the Muslim and Christian communities in Palestine to set up similar agencies.

Philby's last act in this scenario was to send a copy of the plan to Lord Passfield, "in the conviction that an offer by the British Government on these or similar lines [had] a very good chance of acceptance by all concerned".⁵⁵ Lord Passfield, however, showed no interest in Philby's scheme and chose not to reply to his letters. Philby thereupon left to Dr Magnes the thankless tasks of getting the "Jewish extremists ... to recognize what is practicable and what is not", and of persuading the H.C., Sir John Chancellor, to force both sides into discussions.⁵⁶

ZIONIST REJECTION OF THE PHILBY MEDIATION

We have only Philby's word that his scheme would indeed have been endorsed by the Arab leadership, if properly put forth by the British government.⁵⁷ But it soon became clear enough that Philby had not found a *locutor valable* in Dr Magnes. There were a number of reasons why Magnes failed utterly in his attempt to rally Zionists to support these

proposals for an agreement. These may be summarised under the following headings:

(a) *Timing.* The predominant feeling in the *yishuv* and among Zionist leaders was, as we have noted, that the morrow of bloody rioting was not the right moment even to offer to discuss political questions with the Arabs. First of all, the Jews felt, the proper punishments for lawbreaking had to be imposed and nothing be done which might be interpreted as a reward for violence.⁵⁸ In the atmosphere prevailing after the riots, Jews saw no sign of remorse or humility in the Arab leaders, but rather an inflated self-confidence which seemed to threaten further violence—not exactly their view of conditions for successful negotiations. Furthermore, the Shaw Commission of Inquiry had just begun hearing evidence—evidence which the Jews were hoping (in vain, it turned out) would produce a report sympathetic to the Zionist position and critical of the Arabs. Negotiations would be more opportune, it was felt, after the publication of such a report.⁵⁹

(b) *Status of the Negotiators.* The J.A.E., for its part, insisted that political negotiations could be conducted only by its own officials, or by persons working under their close supervision. Dr Magnes was not only unauthorised by the J.A.E., but was considered too much of an individualist to be trusted by the elected officials.⁶⁰ At this time, any contacts with Arabs were either the personal portfolio of Dr Weizmann (below pp. 103f.), or to be organized through the Joint Bureau (below, pp. 96f.).

(c) *Terms of Agreement.* Not only was Magnes acting as a “lone wolf”, but he was already well-known, as a *Brit-Shalom* sympathiser, to be too ready to compromise on points on which the J.A.E.—representing the Zionist movement—felt there was no room for compromise. In particular, Magnes was deviating from the official stand by agreeing to direct proportional representation, the limitation of the competence of the Jewish Agency from *world Jewry* to *Palestinian Jewry*, equal status of Arab and Jewish immigration, and the implication that the Jews were merely a religious group, along with Muslims and Christians.

But Magnes' deviation was perhaps greatest in his willingness

to discuss the question of representative institutions—the principal Arab demand. This was the last question Zionists wanted included in any discussions at this time.⁶¹ It had been dropped in 1923, by virtue of Arab rejection, and since then the Zionists had been hoping that the British would not re-open formal consideration of the subject until the Jews became much stronger in the country, or until there emerged an Arab leadership willing to work within the terms of the Mandate.

If the Zionists had objected to the resumption of discussions on constitutional questions before the riots,⁶² they now felt they had new and stronger proof that the Arabs were not “ready” for self-government. At the very least, they argued, the introduction of self-governing bodies at this time would aggravate, rather than improve, Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine.⁶³ Magnes’ very willingness to discuss this delicate subject at this time was out-of-step with official Zionist tactics vis-à-vis the British.⁶⁴

(d) *Third-Party Considerations.* Effective mediation requires the confidence of both parties in the chosen mediator. The fact that this mediation was undertaken by H. St-John Philby was, for some Zionists, enough reason to want the whole affair dropped as soon as possible.⁶⁵ Although he had, at one time, been considered a friend,⁶⁶ some of Philby’s actions as Abdallah’s adviser in the early 1920s had earned him the reputation of being a schemer against good relations between the Amir and the Zionists.⁶⁷ It was, therefore, with great relief that Zionists learned that Philby had no backing or encouragement from official British circles in London or in Jerusalem.⁶⁸ In fact, the Colonial Secretary considered that Philby’s “past record of consistent hostility to British policy in the Middle East would clearly disqualify him” as a trustworthy mediator.⁶⁹

SPLIT IN ZIONIST RANKS

The Philby mediation attempt thus came to nothing, thanks to a determined refusal of both British and Zionist leaders to have anything to do with it. But the affair did highlight some of the problems which Dr Magnes was to continue to have

with the Zionist establishment until his death. His "irresponsible and unauthorized" negotiations with Philby made Magnes extremely unpopular with *yishuv* public opinion.⁷⁰ Yet, like H. M. Kalvaryski had been doing since 1919 (above, pp. 65f), Magnes would remain independently active in the search for a political breakthrough, defying the discipline imposed on the Jewish community by its leaders, and apparently unmoved by the occasional pronouncements of Arab scorn for his efforts.⁷¹

Dr Magnes' activities had indeed exemplified the recurring problem of Zionist discipline and co-ordination in the pursuit of a single "Arab policy". This need for co-ordination in dealings with Arabs would later be underlined in a Zionist Congress resolution (1933) which declared that "in special cases the Executive has the right to demand that ... special political activities [sic] ... which enter the sphere of the Executive's activities should be permitted only after receiving its consent".⁷²

But, apart from disagreements over timing, discipline, tactics and the contents of negotiations, there were also more fundamental differences which emerged between Dr Magnes and the Zionist leadership at this time. Dr Magnes' starting assumptions had been enunciated to Dr Weizmann immediately following the shock of the August riots.⁷³ He rejected what he called "militarist, imperialist, political Zionism" in favour of "pacific, international, spiritual Zionism". For him,

a Jewish Home in Palestine built up on bayonets and oppression [was] not worth having, even though it succeed, whereas the very attempt to build it up peacefully, co-operatively, with understanding, education and good will, [was] worth a great deal, *even though the attempt should fail.* [my emphasis, N.C.]

For Magnes, Zionist policy had to be based on "inner conviction", and not on "political necessity":

It must be our endeavour first to convince ourselves and then to convince others that ... Moslems, Christians and Jews have each as much right there, no more and no less than the other.⁷⁴

If the Arabs were not capable of rising above chauvinistic talk

of "war a la victoire integral [sic]", then "we Jews must be, else we are false to our spiritual heritage and give the lie to our much-vaunted high civilization".

After Philby arrived and the text of a programme was actually formulated, Dr Magnes found himself alone among Zionists in his promotion of the scheme as the "only possible honourable way [to] peace and [the] avoidance of bloodshed".⁷⁵ He further earned the resentment of Zionist leaders and Jewish public opinion by using the Hebrew University as a platform for the propagation of his views,⁷⁶ and by maintaining private contacts with the High Commissioner regarding the scheme.⁷⁷ By early December, even Dr Magnes' most influential supporter expressed regret that the Arab camp was "crowing" over the evident split in Jewish ranks.⁷⁸

David Ben-Gurion defined his differences with Dr Magnes in the following terms:⁷⁹

I disagree with Magnes not only on the final goal of Zionism [i.e., Jewish vs. bi-national state], but also on the way to a solution to the Jewish-Arab problem, which will not come about all-at-once or by means of a winning formula. The improvement of relations is an extended process of progressive co-operation... Only with the growth of our strength in the country and with our efforts at co-operation with the Arabs will we find, in due course, a solution to the problem: not on the basis of political formulae about final goals, but on the basis of day-to-day interests.

Along with the labour-Zionists, who appealed for an "Arab policy" based on joint work with the "broad Arab masses",⁸⁰ other Zionists at the time also derided the idea of searching for a political formula. What they did stress was the need for improved security ("*hagana*") and "practical work"—accelerated immigration, settlement and economic development, combined with quiet but steady attempts at rapprochement at the grass-roots level.⁸¹ As Col. Kisch explained during his last months as the head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department:⁸²

In my view it is entirely futile to seek today [April 1931] any agreement based upon a political formula, while our

own minimum aspirations and the minimum aspirations of the Arab politicians are still poles apart. In these circumstances, the only thing to do is to pursue all ways and means for developing social, economic and intellectual cooperation in order gradually to break down the prevailing atmosphere of antagonism which is a bar to progress towards a political understanding.

A further basic difference in approach between Magnes and other Zionists lay in the relative importance they attached to an agreement with the Arabs, and the chances they gave of ever reaching such an agreement. Men like Magnes and Kalvaryski took it as a basic "given" of the situation that an accord, however difficult it seemed, was indeed possible. In his more pessimistic moments, Dr Magnes felt that even the *effort* shown in abortive attempts had redeeming moral value.

But, whereas Magnes and Kalvaryski tended to see an agreement with the Arabs as an absolute imperative for Zionism, most decision-makers in the Zionist camp saw the importance of an Arab-Zionist accord in *relative* terms.⁸³ In fact, the concern felt in official circles after 1929 for an understanding with the Arabs was motivated in large part by the need to lessen the dangerous strains which were developing in Zionist-*British* relations. As Hayim Arlosoroff was to remark several years later:⁸⁴

the estrangement between us and the British authorities has been growing apace. The riots of 1929 came and, in their wake, the waves of resentment and bitterness from the Jews to the English and from the English to the Jews. We are today [November 1932] even farther away from a possibility of an agreed and co-ordinated policy between the Mandatory Government and the Jews than we were twelve years ago.

DANIEL OLIVER: QUAKER MEDIATOR

It is interesting to contrast the mediation attempt of H. St. John-Philby with the mission undertaken by an American Quaker long-resident in Lebanon, Daniel Oliver. In early

1930, apparently on Oliver's own urging, members of the Society of Friends in the U.S.A. and in Britain began soliciting their governments and local Jewish personalities to support the idea of engaging Oliver

to act as a conciliator between the Arabs & Jews, bringing them together in conference, during which their troubles could be thoroughly discussed, and an endeavour made to promote in each a sympathetic understanding of the difficulties of the other.⁸⁵

His plan of action called for the winning of sympathy and support from: (1) Arab leaders ("and their agreement to sit in conference with Jewish leaders"), (2) Jewish leaders ("and their agreement to sit in conference with Arab leaders"), (3) the press, (4) the British government ("and its agreement to non-interference in the negotiations so long as the course of negotiations was not at variance with British policy in Palestine"), and (5) American and British Jewry.

In April and May, Oliver seems to have met with some success in implementing the second and fifth points of his plan, and even took some steps towards the fourth.⁸⁶ In America, Felix Warburg welcomed the affiliation with the Quakers, who were "so well known for their impartial Christianity".⁸⁷ After meeting with Dr Weizmann in London, Oliver proceeded to Geneva, where he sought to give effect to the first point of his plan. Exploiting his much-vaunted close connections with "influential friends in the Arabic speaking countries", Oliver renewed his "intimate" acquaintance with Shakib Arslan, who directed the Syro-Palestinian Committee there.⁸⁸

During a four-hour talk, Oliver reported that

I told him that I wanted to bring together the Arabs and the Jews... I said that the thing has got to be; you have got to meet Dr Weizmann and you have got to talk this situation over, and you have got to find a basis for agreement.

Arslan was careful to reply that he would "try" to do as Oliver requested, but that a final decision rested with the Palestine Arab Delegation's Secretary, Awni Abd al-Hadi. But Awni, as Oliver reported, was very unlikely to agree to

meet with Dr Weizmann "for personal reasons" (cf. above, p. 84f).

In July 1930, while the Western Wall Commission was in Palestine, Oliver came to Palestine at Col. Kisch's invitation in an effort to develop fruitful contacts with some of the prominent Muslim personalities who were then in the country.⁸⁹ In these, as in subsequent,⁹⁰ meetings, Oliver was cautious and modest in his expectations. His thinking was close to that of the Zionist leadership, both on the inappropriateness of striving for a far-reaching political formula *à la* Philby/Magnes, and also in his appraisals of Arab politics and society. A formal Arab-Zionist conference, he felt, could not take place for at least another year,⁹¹ and in the meantime he urged Zionists to help in the creation of a better atmosphere.

On the methods to create such an atmosphere, Oliver's recommendations seemed to dove-tail perfectly with Col. Kisch's approach. Press activity was needed; in particular, a subsidy to obtain the services of an influential Arabic newspaper which would urge reconciliation between Arabs and Jews (*al-Muqattam* was being considered). A more drastic suggestion was the "elimination", "by suitable inducement corresponding to the financial loss entailed", of the activity of "a few persons who live upon the maintenance and extension of anti-Jewish agitation". Only if these steps were taken could any serious hopes be attached to winning "the support of the real leaders in Arab public life".⁹²

Nothing seems to have been done to put any of Oliver's suggestions into effect. In early 1931, when Dr Weizmann visited Palestine (see below, pp. 105f), he met with Oliver and their discussions still centred on the need to set up "a high-grade Arabic journal which could combat the hostile propaganda conducted by the extremists".⁹³ Both Kisch and Oliver remained convinced at this time that economic co-operation had to precede any political *rapprochement*, and, further, that the British attitude of respect for the "extremists" was a major stumbling-block.⁹⁴

After Hayim Arlosoroff replaced Kisch as Head of the Political Department of the J.A.E., Oliver would again put forward suggestions for increased propaganda with a possible role for himself:⁹⁵

I have felt for a long time ... that you ought to have a man who would be free to travel about in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, lecturing and getting in touch with the leading people, and dispelling suspicion and fear and making the Jewish position clear to the Arabs.

But, as Oliver recognized, such activity required sums of money, and these sums were not readily available.⁹⁶ It also appears that, after making a favourable impression on Warburg, Weizmann and Kisch, Oliver came to be regarded rather negatively by other officials in the J.A.E. Political Department.⁹⁷ Finally, another factor damaging to his mediation chances was the British attitude to Oliver, whom they regarded as "a well-meaning busy-body ... unlikely to achieve anything".⁹⁸ This opinion, conveyed to the F.O. by its representative in Beirut, led to a certain coolness of almost all British officials towards his efforts—a coolness which often left Oliver discouraged.⁹⁹

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY: THE JOINT BUREAU

One very practical Zionist response to the 1929 riots was the creation, in December 1929, of the "Joint Bureau of Jewish Public Bodies in Palestine".¹⁰⁰ The activities of the Joint Bureau (hereafter: J.B.) were the official resumption—with a pretence of broader consultation—of the "Arab work" which the P.Z.E. had allowed to stop in early 1928.¹⁰¹

To use the Bureau's own terminology and retrospective assessment, the climate for its "positive" work was not very favourable throughout 1930; yet, some limited success was achieved in the realm of its "negative" activities—or, what we have described in the preceding chapter as "preventive diplomacy".

While steering clear of the question of representative institutions and avoiding high-level talks on broad political issues, the J.B. set about restoring grass-roots contacts between Jews and Arabs on the basis of the following principle:¹⁰²

The improvement of relations is to be sought primarily in persistent and progressive efforts to promote Jewish-Arab

co-operation in those spheres in which such co-operation can find a natural and disinterested basis. These are: (i) Intellectual Co-operation; (ii) Social Co-operation; (iii) Economic Co-operation.

This orientation, which closely reflected Col. Kisch's personal approach, was later endorsed (even as the J.B., as such, was being dissolved) by the Executive elected at the Zionist Congress of July 1931.¹⁰³

In practical terms, the main work of the Bureau was focused on (a) press and propaganda work—e.g., refuting accusations of Jewish designs on the Holy Places, promoting Arabic press criticism of "extremist" stances, helping in the preparation of the Zionist case before the Shaw Commission of Inquiry; (b) intelligence-gathering—the monitoring of trends and plans in the Arab community; (c) economic rapprochement—e.g., breaking the Arab boycott, helping Arab "friends", especially fellahin and workers; and (d) support for the creation of would-be moderate political groupings.

As the memory of the riots faded, there was some evidence of the gradual resumption of "normal" peaceful relations at the grass-roots level.¹⁰⁴ Jews insisted, when concluding local accords with Arab villages, on the careful observance of Palestinian customs so as to provide for the best possible guarantees for future stability.¹⁰⁵ The Arab boycott against contacts with Jews also broke down after several months, evidenced by a resumption of friendly (if not always substantial) conversations between Arab leaders and Jewish representatives.¹⁰⁶

But the record of local efforts at re-establishing peaceful relations with Arabs was a modest one. The local contacts and activities initiated by the Bureau showed no marked departure from those undertaken in the previous decade, despite the self-criticism and the quest in some quarters for a really new and effective plan for work among the Arabs.¹⁰⁷ The nature and quality of grass-roots relations and the motives for Arab-Jewish contacts were, in the wake of the 1929 riots, very similar to what has been described in the preceding chapters. No Arab or Jewish representative, with the exceptions of Magnes and Kalvaryski (see below, pp. 99f), was aiming at a long-term peace accord.

The principal area for potential co-operation was, as in the 1920s, the creation and strengthening of Arab groups who would challenge the existing "extremist" leadership, at this time personified in the Mufti of Jerusalem. One colourful episode may be recounted here to illustrate the general limitations of this sort of work. In March 1930, Tahir al-Husaini, nephew of Hajj Amin and the son of the previous Mufti, Kamil al-Husaini, took advantage of his uncle's absence in London to conspire to declare himself the "true" Grand Mufti.¹⁰⁸ Tahir secretly contacted the Jews and claimed to have open or tacit support from Hajj Amin's many rivals and enemies in Palestine: he also expected the H.C. to endorse his intended "coup". What he wanted from the Jews was the provision of an impressive house and expenses with which to entertain the notables who, he claimed, would flock to Jerusalem to welcome his appointment. He also wanted Col. Kisch to sound out the H.C. for his reaction to the scheme. In exchange, Tahir offered to make any declarations advocating peace with the Jews which the P.Z.E. would dictate, and he promised an amicable resolution to the dispute over the Wailing Wall. Although it may have seemed tempting to Zionists to see their arch-enemy replaced by a "moderate" Mufti, they refused to become embroiled in this likely fiasco, partly owing to appraisals of Tahir al-Husaini's mental stability.¹⁰⁹

The work undertaken by H. M. Kalvaryski, who headed the J.B., and others in the sphere of promoting "moderates" displayed the same difficulties as were encountered in the 1920s, despite attempts at frugality and greater efficiency.¹¹⁰ For example, after a year of Jewish "fostering" and an investment of more than £P.2150, a group of Arab "moderates" in Jaffa had still "not found it possible to fulfil their pledges and to execute the plan which they had set for themselves. And even if they did undertake a few sporadic actions, it must be admitted that these attempts brought little success compared with their original expectations."¹¹¹

By late 1931 the J.B., as such, had ceased operations and its functions were absorbed into the Political Department of the J.A.E.¹¹² Those responsible for administering the J.A.'s Arab policy never really entertained any high hopes for the

“so-called Moderate leaders who seek only to use us against the Mufti’s party”.¹¹³ Instead, as in the 1920s (above, p. 64), they continued to measure their success in negative terms, viz., the apparent disunity which returned to the Arab camp following the high-point of solidarity which Palestinian politicians had achieved in 1929.¹¹⁴

KALVARYSKI’S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

During the tense months following the 1929 riots, H. M. Kalvaryski showed the same eagerness to find a dramatic breakthrough with Arab leaders that we witnessed in 1919-1920 (above, pp. 65f). In January 1930 he met with Awni Abd al-Hadi, who refused to discuss an accord seriously, but instead used the opportunity to harangue Kalvaryski on the importance of the land question, and to heap scorn on the latter’s pleas for Jewish-Arab understanding:

As for me, I’ll tell you frankly that I’d rather deal with Jabotinsky or Ussishkin than with you. I know that those men are sworn enemies who want to crush us, take our lands and force us to leave the country, and that we must fight them. But you, Kalvaryski, seem to be our friend, while deep-down I don’t see any difference between your goal and Jabotinsky’s. You, too, stick firmly to the Balfour Declaration, the National Home, unrestricted immigration and the uninterrupted acquisition of lands occupied by the Arabs.¹¹⁵

More amenable to discussion was the Jerusalem lawyer, Omar Salih al-Barghuthi, who was to figure in several other Zionist-Arab meetings during the coming decades. In February, Kalvaryski attempted to reassure Barghuthi that the Jews would agree to safeguard the rights of Arabs affected by Jewish land purchases. In response, Barghuthi declared that he would be willing to renounce exclusive Arab sovereignty over Palestine “if there were a possibility of achieving a true Jewish-Arab co-operation in all spheres of activity”. But, he went on, “no human being consents willingly to extend his neck so that he might be strangled”.¹¹⁶

Although it appears that Kalvaryski was genuinely hoping

that his talks would lead to a full-fledged Zionist-Arab entente, his Arab interlocutors could only have had more limited, tactical considerations in mind. For at that time a delegation was being assembled to press Arab claims in London,¹¹⁷ and Arab hopes were confidently turned towards the British for a favourable change in policy. It was hardly the moment for any responsible Palestinian leader to consider making any binding or serious concessions to the Jews. The key interest of Barghuthi soon became clear: Zionist financial support for the creation of a new party dedicated to the overthrow of the Mufti. Col. Kisch overruled Kalvaryski's recommendations and decided not to invest in such a venture.¹¹⁸

But the return of the Palestine Arab Delegation in June 1930—disappointed in terms of the far-reaching hopes with which it had set out—did provide a temporary incentive for Arabs to talk more seriously with the Jews.¹¹⁹ Kalvaryski soon reported an invitation from Awni Abd al-Hadi to present the A.E. with his ideas for a Jewish-Arab accord. Kalvaryski submitted a "Platform for Judaeo-Arab Accord" on August 10th, "with the knowledge of the Zionist Executive, but without its official endorsement".¹²⁰

The document began by outlining the historic background of the two "ancient Semitic tribes" and their aims and encounters in modern times. In the nine points of the proposed minimum platform, we can see many similarities with the plan advocated by Kalvaryski in 1919-1920 (Doc. 12). Its terms were, however, more explicitly "bi-nationalist", contained a mutual "non-domination" pledge, and made more specific reference to two contemporary Arab concerns: fear of economic dispossession, and hopes for the creation of a federation of Arab states. The rest of the document was replete with assurances of Jewish good intentions vis-à-vis both fellah and effendi, and of Jewish sympathy for legitimate Arab aspirations—even for a Legislative Council, "if it conducts its work in a manner beneficial to all the people of the country".

The Arabs accepted the Platform as a basis for continuing negotiations, but only on the condition that it receive the J.A.'s official endorsement.¹²¹ There was obviously no point in

engaging in further negotiations if the plan represented only one man's views; furthermore, given the gap between the Platform and the known position of the J.A., the Arabs no doubt welcomed the opportunity to pressure the latter to move in Kalvaryski's direction.

But official endorsement of the Platform was not, as Kalvaryski had hoped, forthcoming. Col. Kisch had to point out to Kalvaryski that he had gone too far, notably: (1) in implying, through insufficient disclaimers, that official Jewish bodies might feel bound by his purely private memorandum; (2) in declaring that the Jews would have no objection to Palestine joining an Arab confederation and would claim no special status therein; and (3) in the extent to which he emphasized that the Jews would welcome a Legislative Council.¹²² The tone of Kisch's letter was carefully supportive of Kalvaryski's continued contacts with Awni Abd-al-Hadi, but only after amendment of the Platform on these three points. Kalvaryski appears to have ignored these suggestions, and instead waited—in vain—for either the J.A.E. or the A.E. to move beyond the deadlock which had developed.¹²³

RUTENBERG PROPOSALS

As indicated above, the riots of 1929 caused Zionists much concern in the area of their relations with the British. After the publication of the Shaw Report (April 1930), Dr Weizmann co-opted Pinhas Rutenberg—an influential Palestinian industrialist then serving as President of Palestine Jewry's *Vaad Leumi*—to carry on Zionist-British negotiations at the C.O. Like Judah Magnes, Rutenberg had his doubts about the wisdom and the abilities of the duly-elected Zionist leadership, and sought to supply his own ideas and initiative in London in mid-1930. But unlike Magnes or Kalvaryski, Rutenberg was given a free hand to put forward a series of proposals¹²⁴ to British officials and he began his activities with Dr Weizmann's blessing.¹²⁵

With the disappointments of the Shaw Report as his negative inspiration, Rutenberg presented a plan to the C.O. which contained provisions to curb the powers of the Mufti and to reorganise the Palestine administration so as to

include only those officials who were "in sympathy with the Jewish National Home policy". Strict censorship was to be enforced to prevent any incitement to racial or religious strife. The Prime Minister would be called upon to issue a public statement in solid support of the Zionist programme. Other aspects of the plan included: separate, democratically-elected institutions to deal with internal matters of the two communities; immigration limited only by the absorptive capacity of the country; Government supervision of land sales to protect displaced fellahin; credit facilities to ease the burden of fellahin debts to money-lenders;¹²⁶ a development loan for Transjordan; and the involvement of individual Arabs in Jewish undertakings.

Unlike Magnes or Kalvaryski, Rutenberg directed his plan at the British, and apparently held no direct or indirect dialogues with any Arabs on the subject.¹²⁷ The style of his intervention was, in effect, a request for an "imposed solution" to be handed down by the all-powerful masters of the country. Rutenberg's hope was that such a plan, coming from the British, would have had the effect of breaking Arab solidarity and of winning the support of the Nashashibi and other opposition factions, thus isolating the "extremists" and rendering them powerless.¹²⁸

For a brief moment, Lord Passfield seemed interested in re-orienting British policy along the lines suggested by Rutenberg. The Colonial Secretary was particularly impressed because the proposals "represent[ed] [a] considerable advance on anything with which the Zionists [had] hitherto shown themselves willing to be associated".¹²⁹

But, in fact, official Zionist backing for Rutenberg's negotiations at the C.O. soon became clouded with reservations. Members of the Executive both in London and in Jerusalem were taken aback at Rutenberg's secretiveness and failure to consult them, and they expressed grave concern over his proposal to give the Arab community its own separate elective body.¹³⁰ In the end, ironically, it was the strenuous intervention of the H.C., Sir John Chancellor—a man "none too friendly to Zionism"—which saved Zionists from what Col. Kisch considered "a political catastrophe of our own creation".¹³¹

It was Chancellor's telegraphic advice in early June and personal meetings in July which put an end to any C.O. movement in the direction of supporting Rutenberg's proposals.¹³² While Rutenberg had been willing to assume responsibility for the economic clauses of his plan, it was the British government alone which could have provided—but which chose not to provide¹³³—the vital and coercive political component of the proposed policy. The formulation of British policy in the second half of 1930, as we have seen, followed a completely different course, the results of which gravely shocked the Zionists and which was reversed in February 1931 only after further intensive Zionist-British negotiation at the C.O.

WEIZMANN'S PERSONAL DIPLOMACY

It would be wrong to assume that mavericks like Magnes and Kalvaryski completely monopolised the field of contacts with Arabs in the months following the 1929 riots. In addition to the network of grass-roots contacts established by Col. Kisch and the J.B. in Palestine, Dr Weizmann secretly engaged the services of a number of individuals who maintained links with Arab personalities. One of these, the journalist Ittamar Ben-Avi (above, pp. 54f.), reported frequently on his meetings with Arabs in Palestine, Egypt, London and Europe during 1930.¹³⁴ While his reports made for interesting reading, his persistent optimism regarding an imminent breakthrough to serious negotiations was never rewarded by any actual meeting involving Dr Weizmann.¹³⁵

A British-based German-Arab, Rudolphe Said-Ruete, also served secretly as one of Dr Weizmann's personal emissaries. Said-Ruete developed contacts with Awni Abd al-Hadi, Jamal al-Husaini and others,¹³⁶ and travelled to the Middle East to sound out Arab opinion for the Zionists. His reports, closer in tone to those of Daniel Oliver than to Ben-Avi's, underlined Arab resoluteness and were not optimistic about the prospects of face-to-face meetings.¹³⁷ While appreciating his honesty and devotion to the cause of Jewish-Arab reconciliation, Weizmann and Kisch gradually came to doubt the usefulness of Said-Ruete's efforts.¹³⁸

During August 1930, attempts were made to arrange a meeting between Dr Weizmann and King Faisal of Iraq, during the latter's visit to Europe. In the end, no meeting took place, owing to incompatibilities in the two leaders' time-tables.¹³⁹

Through the efforts of a French-Jewish journalist, Ovadia Camhy, contacts were established later that year between the former Egyptian Khedive, Abbas Hilmi II, and Zionist officials. Following a suggestion of a member of Abbas' World Islamic Council,¹⁴⁰ Dr Weizmann met the ex-Khedive in Paris in mid-November and some general principles were outlined. The two men discussed the common origins of the two peoples and their fundamental compatibility, and Dr Weizmann evoked his post-War agreement with Faisal. They agreed upon the desirability of convening a round-table conference, of setting up a prestigious mixed Jewish-Arab committee, and of having an Arabic newspaper in Palestine to foster the idea of co-operation.¹⁴¹ But the talks remained without any serious follow-through—to Camhy's and apparently to Abbas' chagrin¹⁴²—largely because the Zionists doubted the extent of the ex-Khedive's influence in Palestinian Arab circles.¹⁴³

As an outgrowth of this episode, Camhy worked closely with Mahmud Azmi, an Egyptian journalist who would later serve as a useful link between Zionist and Arab leaders.¹⁴⁴ During 1931, Camhy was forced to realize the futility of political talks and instead directed his energies, together with Azmi, towards "intellectual co-operation" between Arabs and Jews. But the funds required to launch their proposed journal were not forthcoming from the J.A.E.¹⁴⁵

Dr Weizmann also attempted to win over the Indian Muslim, Shawkat Ali, to act as a moderating influence among his Palestinian co-religionists. Weizmann, Kisch and Oliver each met with Shawkat, and were independently impressed by his straightforwardness.¹⁴⁶ But after a few days in Palestine, on the occasion of his late brother's burial in the Haram ash-Sharif, Shawkat Ali quickly came to share the Mufti's attitude to resolving the Arab-Zionist problem.¹⁴⁷

Another dimension of official Zionist concern for better relations with Arabs was the effort to cultivate friends in the

countries surrounding Palestine, particularly Egypt and Transjordan.¹⁴⁸ In February 1931, for example, Col. Kisch made a relatively high-profile visit to Amman to strengthen the Zionists' "Hashemite connection".¹⁴⁹ The timing of the visit—immediately following publication of the MacDonald Letter—had the deliberate purpose of "reduc[ing] the likelihood of support being afforded from Amman to the fresh anti-Jewish agitation inaugurated by the Palestine Arab Executive".¹⁵⁰ The visit also helped prepare the ground for Dr Weizmann's proposed visit the following month.

The climax of Dr Weizmann's personal diplomacy after 1929—but by no means a triumph—was the Zionist leader's open attempt to meet Arab leaders during his visit to Palestine in March 1931. Undeterred by threats against his life or by advice from close associates, Weizmann was intent on capitalising on the publication of the MacDonald Letter, which he felt gave him new strength with which to approach the Arabs.¹⁵¹ Despite reservations of some C.O. officials,¹⁵² Lord Passfield asked Sir John Chancellor to "do everything in [his] power to assist [Dr Weizmann's] efforts towards so desirable an end", i.e., an accommodation with Arab leaders. To this the H.C. loyally agreed.¹⁵³

Anticipating Weizmann's visit only five days after the MacDonald Letter, *Falastin* reacted:¹⁵⁴

We ... want to make it clear to Weizmann that there is no hope for cooperation unless the black interpretation of the White Paper is withdrawn. Therefore let him, if he likes, save himself the trouble of coming here for the purpose of cooperation.

Some Arabs, interpreting the MacDonald Letter as "expressly authoris[ing] the Jews to boycott the Arabs", regarded their boycott of the Zionist leader as a retaliatory measure.¹⁵⁵

Editorials which greeted the Zionist leader on his arrival were scornful and taunting. The A.E., in a proclamation dated March 24th, reminded the nation not only of Dr Weizmann's deviousness and seductiveness, but also of the larger issue involved:¹⁵⁶

The mere negotiation of Arabs either officially or semi-officially with the foreign Zionists, apart from its being not

profitable to the political interests of the Arabs, constitutes in itself a recognition of the Balfour Declaration, of the Mandate in which the Declaration is embodied, and of the Zionist policy which is based upon it.

Feeling against Dr Weizmann became sufficiently worked up as to cause an almost complete refusal of Arabs to meet with him.¹⁵⁷ It even resulted in a leading *Jewish* businessman begging to be excused from visiting the Zionist leader, since he wished to avoid the "serious risk of arousing the suspicions of those Arabs with whom [he was] working" and to whom he had promised to keep a low political profile.¹⁵⁸

While the "boycott Weizmann" movement was gaining momentum inside Palestine, Col. Kisch (with the assistance of Mahmud Azmi) went ahead with plans for the Zionist leader's visit to the Amir Abdallah.¹⁵⁹ But even the friendly Amir, who had initially appeared eager to receive Dr Weizmann in Amman, bowed to the pressure and called off the meeting, offering diplomatic excuses.¹⁶⁰

When Dr Weizmann met with the H.C. in Jerusalem, he was forced to admit the failure of his attempts to open a dialogue with Arab leaders. Trying to sound an optimistic note, Weizmann suggested that those few meetings he did hold were an indication that grass-roots feeling for an understanding "would grow and that in eight months or a year's time it would be possible to bring about co-operation between the Arabs and the Jews".¹⁶¹

Chancellor's reaction was characteristically cool. All along, he had felt it prudent to defer to Arab sentiment, and not to exert any pressure on Dr Weizmann's behalf. He was sceptical about Weizmann's optimism, and suggested that Arab-Zionist meetings would be more promising in London than in Palestine.¹⁶² Although he did not press the point with British officials, Dr Weizmann felt that the failure of his "peace initiative" was at least in part due to the absence of positive support from the H.C.¹⁶³

DEVELOPMENT SCHEME NEGOTIATIONS

We conclude our discussion of post-1929 negotiating opportunities with a brief mention of one of the few positive

features of British Palestine policy at this time: the consideration of a scheme for the economic development of the country and the re-settlement of Arabs who had been displaced by Jewish land-purchase.¹⁶⁴ The preparation of such a development scheme, being a constructive and ostensibly "non-political" question, seemed to offer a reasonable hope for quiet Zionist-Arab co-operation, and even for tri-lateral British-Arab-Zionist negotiations.¹⁶⁵

But the issue was, indeed, a "political" one for the A.E., which was still feeling the effects of the MacDonalld Letter. In response to the British invitation to send a delegation to London, the A.E. set out the following conditions for Arab participation:¹⁶⁶

1. That the Arab representatives' participation in the discussion shall not be interpreted as meaning that they adhere to the Jewish National Home policy.
2. That the discussion shall not be based upon the MacDonalld letter or any other statement confirming that policy.
3. That the discussion shall take place in Palestine through an accredited representative and not in London, because the programme which will be the objective [sic] of the discussion will be applied to Palestine.
4. That the Arab representatives shall not participate in the discussion together with the Jewish delegates.

Privately, however, it was rumoured that the Arabs would likely forego the third condition—especially as Sir John Chancellor was offering to defray the delegation's transportation costs to London.¹⁶⁷ Also, Col. Kisch believed that there was some chance, once the Arabs did reach London, that "they might be induced to depart from" their fourth condition.¹⁶⁸ But, in the end, such optimism proved unwarranted, and the Arabs refused to go to London.¹⁶⁹

The intended "round-table" style of discussion was consequently abandoned in favour of parallel British-Zionist and British-Arab talks in London and Palestine, respectively.¹⁷⁰ Once again the Zionists were disappointed in the British rôle. As Col. Kisch noted:¹⁷¹

I cannot but think that with a little more patience and

encouragement the Arabs here could have been brought to change their minds about sending a delegation to London. . . . This is another case of the absence of persistence on the part of the Government when it is a matter of bringing Jews and Arabs together.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the riots of 1929 were serious enough to provide new incentives for reassessments of the whole question of Jewish-Arab relations and British policy in Palestine. In particular, it caused some people to reconsider, for the first time since 1922, diplomatic solutions to a conflict which had just displayed its dangerous potential for getting out-of-hand.

On a formal level, at least, official Zionist circles displayed a heightened concern for their "Arab problem"; the new Executive elected by the 1931 Zionist Congress declared that one of its main goals was "to take active measures in the economic, social and political spheres with a view to furthering friendly relations and establishing a rapprochement between Jews and Arabs in Palestine".¹⁷² Even at the level of Jewish public opinion, Col. Kisch was "glad to say that since the riots of 1929 a considerable advance [had] been made. . . . It is now [February, 1931] at least possible for us to discuss the issues with Arab leaders without being accused of treachery".¹⁷³ There were also brief moments when, as we have noted, the Arab press spoke of the possibilities of an Arab-Zionist understanding.

Yet, looking at actual cases of attempted negotiations, we saw few radical departures from the patterns which had been established before the riots. The period following the riots was highly fluid and uncertain politically; as a result, there was no single moment when both sides simultaneously felt convinced about the need to find an immediate solution through compromise and Arab-Zionist negotiations. Most of the time, each party appeared to be working towards inviting the British to impose a settlement which was favourable to its exclusive national interests.

Conclusion

Looking back over the period surveyed in this volume, we can see that each party had had, by 1931, a fairly rich experience of contact and negotiation with the other. Our examination included a dozen serious attempts at an agreement: episodes which took place in periods of calm, of uncertainty, of tension and of violence; episodes which involved individuals at various levels within the hierarchies of each camp.

In none of these episodes did we find the necessary conditions and incentives for the successful conclusion of an Arab-Zionist entente. The interest in an accord shown in 1913 and 1914 by both parties was soon overtaken by doubts and hesitations relating mainly to the realization of a real gap separating their respective positions and the disruptive effect of shifts in Turkish interests. The post-War period of uncertainty and exaggerated expectations was a period during which, despite the intensity of diplomatic activity, the true object of Zionist and Arab attention was the new British masters of the area.

Once the Jewish National Home policy of the British Mandate was in place, the goal of Arab nationalists in Palestine was to subvert that policy, while the Zionists directed their efforts at maintaining a satisfactory level of British sympathy and firmness in applying that same policy.

After 1922, neither side felt that a full-blown entente with the other was necessary for the achievement of its national goals. Nor was there any *ad hoc* incentive or pressure on either side to initiate serious negotiations with the other. Those political and quasi-political encounters which did take place were motivated, as we have seen, by considerations other than the desire to conclude a total peace agreement.

The riots of 1929 and their aftermath provided a strong incentive to explore diplomatic solutions to the Arab-Zionist conflict, but in the immediate wake of the crisis there were no radical departures from the patterns or approaches of the 1920s. Despite a brief flurry of negotiating activity, both sides were primarily interested in ensuring that the reformulation of post-1929 British policy did as little damage as possible to their original, irreconcilable goals.

LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE

Although they produced no workable entente, the early Arab-Zionist contacts surveyed above did provide a rich experience for negotiators and would-be negotiators on both sides. Some of the common lessons learned by both sides may be summarised as follows:

(a) *Appearances*. Since we tend to praise, almost automatically, any party which seems to want to negotiate (and to condemn, in advance, a party which is reluctant or refuses to sit down to talks)¹, both Arab and Zionist leaders recognised the need to give the appearance of being interested in holding talks. On given occasions, leaders found themselves faced with the tactical necessity of contributing to the external impression that negotiations were possible, or actually underway.

Despite their profound scepticism about the successful conclusion of a satisfactory accord, Zionists were frequently in the position where they had to demonstrate to the British that they were, indeed, making every effort at being reasonable and conciliatory in their attitude to the Arabs. Likewise, they saw the advantage of fostering Arab "moderates", whose existence and occasional pronouncements helped create the impression, for British eyes, that there existed Arab spokes-



1 Chaim Weizmann and Amir Faisal (near Aqaba, June 1918)



2 *M. David Eder*



3 *Ittamar Ben-Avi*



4 *Col. Frederick H. Kisch*

5 *H.M. Kalvaryski*





6 *Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Musa Kazim al-Husaini, Salim Ali Salam, Raghib an-Nashashibi (Jerusalem, January 1930)*



7 *Jamal al-Husaini*



8 *Omar Salih al-Barghuthi*



9 *Awni Abd al-Hadi*



10 *Judah L. Magnes*



11 *Daniel Oliver*



and Jewish only accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories.

ARTICLE II.

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

ARTICLE III.

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's declaration of the 29th of November, 1917.

ARTICLE IV.

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through direct settlement and intensive cultivation

His Royal Highness the Emir Faisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz, and Mr. CHAIR OULIEMER, representing and acting on behalf of the Jewish population.

mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realizing that the utmost means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations, is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them,

have agreed upon the following Articles:-

ARTICLE I.

The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding and to this end Arab

of the soil. In doing such surveys the Arab people and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in formulating their economic development.

ARTICLE VI

No regulation or law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with the free exercise of religion; and further the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

ARTICLE VII

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

ARTICLE VIII

The Zionist Organization proposed to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organization will place the aforementioned Commission

at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organization will use the best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing its natural resources and economic possibilities to reach.

ARTICLE VIII

The parties hereto agree to act in complete accord and harmony on all matters mentioned herein before the Peace Congress.

ARTICLE IX

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at LUGA, SYDNEY, the THIRD DAY OF JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY.

[Handwritten signatures and text in Arabic script]
Abbas Pasha

Preservation of the Faisal

If the Arabs are satisfied with
the new order in the world, I am
at the disposal of the Faisal
affairs. I will carry out what
will be the interest of the
Arab world.

If changes are made, I am
not to be considered for fault
to carry out the program.

Faisal ibn
Hussein

be referred to the

arab world. I am at the disposal
of the Faisal affairs. I will carry
out what will be the interest of
the Arab world. If changes are
made, I am not to be considered
for fault to carry out the program.

Chaim Weizmann

14 Reservation, in Arabic, by Amir Faisal
accompanying signature to agreement with
Weizmann

15 Handwritten Translation of Faisal's Arabic
Reservation, by T. E. Lawrence

DÉLÉGATION HEDJAZIENNE

PARIS

Dear Mr. Frankfurter 1. 3. 19.

I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideals ~~at the same time~~ together.

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organisation to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann we have had, and continue to have the closest relations. He has been a great helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness.

We are working together for a reformed and revised Near East, and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is national, and not imperialist: our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours, ^{ignoring} of the need for co-operation of the Arabs and Zionists have been trying to exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them here, I am afraid ~~are~~ misrepresent your aim to the Arab peasantry, and our aim to the Jewish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been able to make capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail such as must inevitably occur in every contact of neighbouring peoples, and as are easily adjusted by mutual goodwill. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their place in the comity of the civilized peoples of the world.

Believe me,

yours very sincerely
Chaim Weizmann

Les soussignés, Mr Joshua Hankin, représentant de l'orga-
 nisation sioniste, et Mr Nadjib Sfeir, Junuf Abuzein, Et Raschid
 Karam, Nadjib Harchem et M Anton Schuchade, représentants du
 Parti Nationaliste en Syrie et en Liban, en voyant la gravité de la
 situation politique en Syrie, Liban et Palestine et en désirant coordonner
 leur activité politique pour le bien de ces trois pays, se sont entendus
 après un entretien sur les bases principales suivantes:

1. Les gouvernements de la Syrie et du Liban reconnaissent l'indépen-
 dence de la Palestine dans les limites qui seront fixées par une
 commission formée des délégués des deux parties (Syrie et Liban d'un
 part et Palestine d'autre part) et le droit de l'organisation sioniste
 d'y construire un foyer national pour le peuple juif, en organisant
 une immigration en masse des juifs de tous les pays en Palestine et
 en obtenant les privilèges politiques et économiques nécessaires pour
 assurer le développement calme et libre du foyer national.
2. Le Parti Nationaliste en Syrie et en Liban fait tout le nécessaire
 pour préparer l'opinion publique du peuple arabe à cette reconnaissance
 et pour l'habituer au peuple juif comme à un voisin.
3. L'organisation sioniste garantit de ne pas dépasser en aucun cas les frontières
 de la Syrie et du Liban qui seront fixées selon l'article 1.
4. L'organisation sioniste se charge de respecter les rites religieux et
 ne pas intervenir dans les questions des lieux saints des musulmans et
 chrétiens en Palestine.
5. L'organisation sioniste se charge de venir en aide aux gouvernements de
 la Syrie et du Liban pour le développement de leurs pays. Elle contracte
 des emprunts d'argent, dont les conditions seront fixées à temps.
6. Tous les habitants de la Palestine sans distinction de religion jouiront
 de l'égalité civile et économique complète.

Jerusalem, le 26 mars 1920.
 pour Nadjib Harchem

Joseph Loucazzou
 Y. Hankin

Raschid Karam
 Nadjib Harchem

ان الهدية اسماء اراءه سموه مشرعاً لما كلفه من تجميع الهجوع
في طائفة واحدة وتجميعهم ولعباً بملأه وكانوا يجتمعون
في بيوتهم وكانوا يترددون في سبيلهم وكانوا يترددون في سبيلهم
ولما لم يكن لهم في ذلك حيلة الا ان يسكنوا في بيوتهم
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في ٢٦ اذار ١٩١٤
محمد
محمد

- ١- تدار فلسطين بواسطة حكومة جمهورية دستورية .
- ٢- يتوهم بالتشريع بمسبة نياي منتخب جهسه يتوليه العرب واليهود بنسبة عدوا ساكنين الفلسطينيين وهو بعباده على الدستور .
- ٣- السلطة الاجرائية تقوم با حكومة وطنية مسئولة امام المجلس النيابي يتوليا العرب واليهود الفلسطينيين .
- ٤- المندوب اساس حد المراد لكل قرار . اذ قانون يتألف من قرارات بريطانية المتعلقة بقرود الامتيازات ووجوب الامور الدينية والعراقية . وفي حال الخلاف يرجع الى عصبة الأمم لعله .
- ٥- يجب للمندوب ان يصب ساعدنا بعبادته في برسته .
- ٦- لا يوسع الاجانب عن الهجرة الى فلسطين خصوصا العرب واليهود . وانا يجب حكومة فلسطين ان تحدد العدد المستطاع قبوله سنويا وحفظاته . حسب استعداد اليهود والاقتصاد ووجوبناي .
- ٧- لا مانع من بناء التوالة اليهودية رجما استنادا في المعايير التي تقود لليهود . ولا يظلموا لغيرهم الاخرى ان يثبتوا دكالات مساوية لها في الحقوق .
- ٨- يجب المندوب ان يسلط عن الامم وتمام ان تعيد الحكومة الوطنية قاندة على المسؤولية الامم العام . ويكون الجيش تحت سلطة المندوب اساس ونفقائه على بريطانيا وتكون قوة البوليس تحت سلطة الحكومة الوطنية ونفقائنا علىا .
- ٩- يتم الخط الحيزن الممتد في اراض فلسطين لادارة الامم ان الاستوائية في فلسطين الى ان تجري تسوية عادلة في الامم المتحدة بين المظلمة الاخرى وان يتقبل المندوب الامم بتوحيه اوارته .
- ١٠- تسيير الحكومة الوطنية بحرية الامم .
- ١١- تسيير الحكومة الوطنية بالمديون العامة وبالامانات والامم عدالت التي دامت بين حكومة فلسطين والامم المتحدة .
- ١٢- بعباد انظر في عدة المواد كقوله سنين مرة .

men who were interested in an Arab-Zionist accord on Zionist terms.

As we shall see below, Palestinian Arab leaders were no less sceptical than the Zionists about the chances of reaching an acceptable accord. But, despite this, and despite the official Palestinian strategy of boycotting contacts with the Zionists to deny their legitimacy as a partner in determining the fate of the country, some members of the A.E. did see the tactical advantage of creating the impression (again for British eyes) that Zionists and Arabs were capable of agreeing on defined political issues. Thus, for example, we saw Jamal al-Husaini and others making friendly overtures to the Jews between 1924 and 1928 in order to show the British that the Jewish community was not as solidly opposed to a Legislative Council as the Zionist leadership professed—an important requirement for the Arab campaign to reopen public discussions on representative institutions for Palestine.²

(b) *Tactics and Timing.* During the period prior to 1931, leaders in both camps had ample opportunity to develop a keen sense of timing and a sensitivity for tactics: when to initiate contacts; when to abstain; how to create, or avoid, the appearance of being interested in political discussions, etc.

The delicate question of seizing the right moment for successful negotiations was often under cautious scrutiny. Some general rules of the negotiating process became readily apparent. For example, “don’t negotiate from a position of weakness” was a dictum which applied to Zionists in the wake of the riots of 1920, 1921 and 1929; these were obviously not the right “psychological moments” for talks. Likewise, for the Arabs it meant refusing to meet with Zionist leaders following the publication of the pro-Zionist MacDonald Letter of February 1931.

Perceptions of the relative strength of one’s own side vis-à-vis the “enemy” were, thus, important determinants of the willingness to enter into talks, or to hold back from participating. Finally, we may note that periods of great political uncertainty, such as during the post-War Military Administration period or following the appointment of the Shaw Commission, dictated caution and hesitation to leaders

on both sides, since any tentative commitments likely to be made through Arab-Zionist negotiation might easily be overtaken by outside events.

(c) *Tactical Alliances.* A frequent motive for Arabs or Zionists to make overtures to each other can be understood by the dictum, "my enemy's enemy is my friend". Thus, to the extent that Zionists found themselves deadlocked with the recognised Palestinian Arab leadership—the A.E., the Mufti, the S.M.C., and their supporters (*al-majlisiyyun*), they found it useful to cultivate good relations with opponents of these groups (*al-mauridun*).³ The former were almost automatically dubbed "the extremists" by the Zionists, while the latter became known, by default, as "the moderates"—a distinction which exaggerated the differences between the two on the question of coming to a real compromise with the Zionist enterprise in Palestine.

Zionist support for the creation of political clubs and parties (e.g., the M.N.A., Farmers' Parties), subsidies to certain newspapers, and underwriting of loans to selected individuals helped build a shaky "marriage of convenience", based on temporary practical and political interests. But there was no serious chance that the "moderates" would have displaced the "extremists", or that—once having done so—they would thereafter have been interested in (and capable of) concluding a lasting accord with the Zionists for the reconciliation of their basic national aspirations.

If Zionists found ample scope to build alliances which capitalised on internal divisions in the Arab community, Arab leaders likewise attempted to exploit intra-communal rivalries within the *yishuv*. Thus, there were occasional appeals for solidarity with their Sephardi or native-born Jewish "brethren", or threats to exploit the rift between the general Jewish community and the ultra-orthodox organisations.⁴ Although neither side was able to sustain any long-enduring and useful relationships based on such alliances, it must be said that the Zionists were more successful than the Arabs in the sowing of discord in the "enemy" camp.

The most potentially significant—but also the most unlikely—tactical alliance was the Arab suggestion for a joint

anti-British front. At times, Arab-Zionist cooperation was only implicitly connected to anti-British possibilities, as in the 1922 Cairo negotiations (above, pages 55-61). At other times, the anti-British implications were more obvious, as in discussions with Awni Abd al-Hadi in 1919 (above, pp. 39f).⁵

Another, more subtle, formulation of the same idea was that the success of any Arab-Zionist agreement depended on the Zionists receiving an Arab "Balfour" Declaration—either in addition to, or in place of, the original British pledge. Some of the suggested candidates for the role of "Arab Balfour" were the Syrian Committee in Cairo (1922), the Amir Abdallah, King Fuad of Egypt and Riad as-Sulh.⁶

At no point were principal Zionist leaders tempted to consider such alliances; in fact, they occasionally invoked their rejection of such overtures as proof of their continuing loyalty to Great Britain.⁷ Although many Zionists appreciated that the British presence was temporary while the Arab population was a permanent factor to be reckoned with,⁸ they were quick to avoid dealings which had anti-British or anti-European overtones. Most Zionists—including the internationalist and "anti-imperialist" spokesmen of the Jewish labour movement⁹—calculated that, when a choice had to be made between such Arab overtures and maintaining British goodwill, the benefits to be had from their "British connection" far outweighed anything the Arabs seemed willing or able to offer.

The dictum, "My enemy's enemy is my friend" could not produce a tactical Arab-Zionist alliance simply because the Zionists and British were not "enemies". Despite frequent Zionist complaints about the imperfect sympathy and support coming from British officials in Palestine, and despite suspicions that some officials were indeed playing Jews and Arabs against each other,¹⁰ the Zionist-British connection remained firm. The connection was further tightened by the riots of 1920, 1921, and 1929, which effectively pushed farther into the future the day when the Jews would feel safe "alone" in the country with their Arab neighbours. As Col. Kisch noted in May 1923: "It is ... clear that we do emphatically need the Mandate to-day, while we number only 11% of the population of which the remainder are ranged almost to

the last man behind the banner of a hostile organisation [i.e., the M.C.A.].”¹¹

Likewise, in their rejection of the idea of having the Jewish National Home under the British Mandate replaced by guarantees in a re-united Palestine under the friendly Amir Abdallah, Zionists felt that “political stability was hardly to be expected of the Arabs as a whole and ... little confidence could be felt in their ability to guarantee security either of life or property”.¹² Even in 1924—a year marked by tranquillity in Palestine and Zionist self-congratulation that their “Arab problem” was on the way to being solved¹³—Col. Kisch proclaimed to a “moderate” Arab spokesman: “We desire that the Arabs should recognize our rights, *and also* [my emphasis, N.C.] the right of the Mandatory Power to guarantee them.”¹⁴

In response to those who have cited the British-Zionist connection as an impediment to the chances of reaching an Arab-Zionist agreement,¹⁵ it must be asked whether such an agreement would have been successfully consummated even if there had been no British-Zionist connection. In the episodes we have seen above, the absence of positive Palestinian involvement and the doubtful ability of Arab negotiators to “deliver the goods” were, in themselves, serious enough obstacles to cause the failure of those negotiation attempts.

(d) *Status of the Negotiators.* From their experience of contacts prior to 1931, Arab and Zionist representatives made assessments of their opposite-numbers in terms of background, family or communal connections, ideological positions, and the authority which they commanded within their respective political communities. The Zionists were quite systematic in this respect, and by late 1931 the J.A.E. Political Department had a detailed card-index of some 800 Arabs in Palestine and in the neighbouring countries.¹⁶

By this time, Arabs already knew that any deal arrived at with people like H. M. Kalvaryski or Dr Judah Magnes had little chance of bearing fruit. Even though these two personalities went further than other Jews in the direction of meeting their demands, Arab leaders did not expect much from their relations with these Jewish “moderates”—either because they

suspected that they were "extremists" in disguise, or because they knew that only Z.O. officials, like Dr Weizmann or Col. Kisch, had the real power to "deliver the goods" for the Zionist end of any bargain. The frequent use of men like Kalvaryski, Ben-Avi and others by the P.Z.E. or by Dr Weizmann as semi-official go-betweens only complicated the problem of the status of Zionist negotiators.

For their part, Zionists began to realize—despite their recurring pleas to the British to support the "moderate" Arabs and not to curry favour with the "extremists"—that only negotiations with their committed opponents could eventually lead to a worthwhile peace accord. Accumulated Zionist disappointments in the political strength and conviction of so-called Arab "moderates" prior to 1931 made it clear that the latter could not be counted upon to "deliver" their end of any political deal. This lesson was to be one of David Ben-Gurion's starting-points after 1933, when he would deliberately seek to negotiate with the "genuine" patriots who could not be bought.¹⁷

PALESTINIAN AND NON-PALESTINIAN ARABS

Another lesson learned by Zionists regarding the status of Arab negotiators relates to the important distinction between Palestinians and non-Palestinians. Experience soon taught them how difficult it was to reach a political agreement between themselves and the Palestinians on a purely local basis. Hence Zionists developed a two-pronged strategy: *political* relations would be reserved for leaders of the wider "pan-Arab" movement, while within Palestine they would strive to establish healthy day-to-day social and economic relations with the Arab population.¹⁸

It was at a relatively early stage that Zionists realized that, for an agreement with the Arabs on Zionist terms, the problem needed to be considered in a wider frame of reference than Palestine alone. Hence they sought out credible, strong non-Palestinian leaders who could be expected to view the issue as a regional question. In his talks with Arabs before World War I, Richard Lichtheim suggested to them that the "Arab question" was

more extensive than the Palestine question. If the Arabs allow us to buy land in Palestine and to colonize (in the process of which the fellaheen must somehow be cared for), they will be able to win through our agency the goodwill of the European press and eventually of Jewish financial circles for the development of Arabism.¹⁹

A distinctly local Palestinian patriotism, reinforced by a hard-line local opposition to Zionist development, was already an element in the conflict before the First World War²⁰ and continued into the period covered in this volume (and down to the present day) to be an obstacle to a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to the Zionists. When the latter dealt with the Arab Decentralists (1913-1914), with the Amirs Faisal or Abdallah, with Riad as-Sulh, or with other non-Palestinian pan-Arabists, they were able to find some common ground on which to discuss the ingredients of an exchange of services. For this exchange of services to be implemented, however, the acquiescence of the local Palestinian leadership was essential. In the end, no combination of Zionist inducements and pan-Arab urging would be strong enough to win this acquiescence. In fact, it may be argued that the very process of repeated attempts to solve the Zionist-Palestinian conflict through the offices of non-Palestinian politicians only stiffened local loyalties and suspicions of outsiders.

Although, in ideological terms, Palestinians also shared the hopes and dreams of Arab unity, most of them were not so devoted to the ideal of pan-Arabism, or so loyal to an individual pan-Arab leader, as to be willing to sacrifice the option of an independent Palestinian-Arab state. Whenever Palestinians felt that their participation in pan-Arab confederation or unity schemes might further the prospect of real independence from the British or Zionists, they were ardent pan-Arabists. But once this hope appeared to fade, and especially when a deal to accommodate Zionist interests was rumoured, their pan-Arab orientations became secondary to defence of narrower local interests.²¹ The activities and attitudes of Awni Abd al-Hadi offer a vivid illustration of this Palestinian point of view.²²

Thus, (a) the mutual non-recognition of Zionists and Palestinians as legitimate partners for serious political negotiations, (b) the Zionist preference for dealing with non-Palestinian leaders, and (c) the Palestinians' suspicions of the latter were becoming, by 1931, an enduring pattern of Arab-Zionist diplomacy and a formidable obstacle to the successful conclusion of a negotiated accord.

THIRD-PARTY CONSIDERATIONS

It is sometimes said that a solution to the Arab-Zionist conflict would have come about more easily if only Arabs and Jews had been left to themselves to settle their differences without outside interference. Such speculation seems based on wishful thinking and is almost beside-the-point, given the evidence we have seen of the rôle played first by the Turks and then by the British. The point is not that Turks and Englishmen have subordinated Arab and Zionist interests to their own; true enough, both Arab and Zionist leaders have had to take into consideration the wishes and interests of these powerful outsiders. The crucial point to note here is that both parties—despite frequent lip-service to the notion that the two parties ought to negotiate directly in order to arrive at an understanding between them²³— have *deliberately chosen to invite the involvement of these outside powers* whenever they felt it would help them advance their respective national interests. Given the situation in which neither party was a sovereign, independent factor, but rather dependent on the great power which controlled Palestine, Arabs and Zionists looked first, in almost all the episodes discussed above, to the Turks or British for what they wanted most. They approached each other only when it appeared that such a move was necessary to further their respective causes.

This is not to say that the contribution of third-parties to the worsening conflict has been, on balance, benign, or even neutral. That contribution, it must be concluded, has indeed been a negative one, but not in a way which would support the simplistic thesis that peace-efforts of Arabs and Jews have been sabotaged by evil, machiavellian imperialists. What is evident from the episodes we have surveyed is that the

conflict was aggravated by ambiguities of British policy and by fluctuations in Arab and Zionist perceptions of British intentions. This uncertainty allowed (and sometimes encouraged) one side or the other to inflate its expectations to the point where frustration and disillusionment were inevitable. Uncertainties of British policy also influenced Arab and Zionist tactical decisions on whether to negotiate with each other, or—more often—when to abstain from meetings.

We must also avoid viewing the British position in the Arab-Zionist-British triangle as that of impartial umpire or disinterested mediator between two rival parties. It is true that the British did, on several occasions, seek to present themselves as arbitrators, going through the motions of joint consultations in an attempt to hammer out a set of terms acceptable to both sides (e.g., the 1922 White Paper; talks to resolve the Wailing Wall crisis). But, given the drastically unequal power as between the “mediator”, on the one hand, and the parties in conflict, on the other, this so-called mediation was in reality a process in which pressure and incentives were employed in order to coax one or both parties to accept, “voluntarily”, the inevitable.²⁴

Arab and Zionist leaders, for their part, certainly did not perceive the British as “honest brokers”. More often than not, they viewed the British as unfairly favouring the other side and as the cause of the other party’s unreasonable expectations and behaviour. Zionist-Revisionists were most eloquent on this point, although they were by no means alone in the Zionist camp when they argued that improved Arab-Jewish relations would come about

only as a result of a firm [British] attitude calculated to convince the Arab population that the Jewish National Home policy, and especially the active encouragement of Jewish immigration, is the guiding principle of the Administration, a principle from which it will never depart.

Such firmness, they claimed, was

the only means to discourage the extremist section among the Arabs and to strength[en] the influence of their moderate circles—circles willing to negotiate with the

Zionists on the basis of an unequivocal acceptance of [Zionist rights in Palestine].²⁵

Arab spokesmen, for their part, found it "impossible to think that Britain with her splendid tradition of Justice and Fair Dealing should in Palestine continue a policy not only against the wishes of the people, but rousing their deepest resentment". As far as they could see, the British government had "placed itself in the position of a partisan in Palestine of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept because it means his extinction sooner or later". The Arabs repeatedly professed their disbelief that the British could give their backing to Zionist demands which, they felt, would result in the injustice of Jewish political ascendancy and the consequent "smother[ing of] their national life under a flood of alien immigration".²⁶

Such Zionist and Arab views of the British rôle led, not unnaturally, to requests for what may be called "imposed solutions" to the conflict. Zionists consistently urged the British to apply the Balfour Declaration policy so firmly that the problem would be "solved" by the Arabs being forced to accept the *fait accompli* of a permanent and flourishing Jewish majority. The Arabs, for their part, submitted demands, issued protests, and resorted to violence in their efforts to convince the British to abandon the Balfour Declaration policy, and thereby pave the way for what *they* felt was the only just solution to the conflict: "the Arab people of Palestine cannot and will not tolerate the Jews except on the pre-war system of equal rights and privileges with themselves founded on a numerical basis".²⁷

TERMS OF AGREEMENT

On the basis of pre-1931 negotiation attempts, one is tempted to conclude that, if there was ever the faintest hope of a successful Arab-Zionist agreement, its terms would have been those of a pan-Arab exchange of services: for the pan-Arab leader(s), Jewish development capital, technical assistance and international political support for the broad "Arab cause"; for the Zionists, Arab recognition of some form of

Jewish national existence in Palestine, including pressure on the Palestinian Arabs to moderate their hostility to the Zionist programme.

Quite apart from the near-impossibility of a pan-Arab leader being able to "deliver" the Palestinian acquiescence required for such a bargain, there were difficulties even at the level of the apparently ideal terms being proposed. Although they were never fully put to the test, Zionists were not really capable of providing either weighty pro-Arab political lobbying or substantial economic assistance for the Arabs. To the extent that the Amir Faisal's expectations had been aroused, he found that the Zionists were unable to deliver even a sample of the "goods" which he required.²⁸

The apparently generous terms offered to Zionists by pan-Arabists also proved less substantial than the former would have wished. From their point of view, the agreement with Faisal (Document 8) was the most that could be expected. In its text, Zionists had won the Arab ruler's implicit recognition of a separate, "Jewish" Palestine, and his explicit acceptance of the Balfour Declaration (Art. III) and of the need to encourage Jewish immigration to and settlement in Palestine (Art. IV).

Within months of the signing of the agreement, however, Faisal claimed that he had agreed only to a Jewish national enclave within his future united Arab kingdom (Document 13). In 1925, he informed Dr Weizmann that no agreement would be possible unless Jewish immigration were restricted, so as to assure the Palestinians that the Jews would never become a majority in the country (Document 28). In 1929, he added his voice to the Palestinian Arab demand for the setting up of "a national government ... in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants" (Document 33).

Likewise, the terms of agreement proposed to Zionists by other pan-Arabists, however attractive at first on paper, usually amounted to placing the *yishuv* under the suzerainty of an Arab ruler, with some autonomy for the Jews in the areas where they had already settled, and limited immigration to all parts of the proposed Arab federation.

If we wish to look only at the possible terms which Zionists and *Palestinian* Arabs were prepared to consider as a basis for

agreement, we must first review their respective national-political aims and demands. Despite the vagueness of the expression, "national home", the Zionist movement was indeed aiming, through the upbuilding of this "national home", at radically changing the demographic-political status of Palestine. The Jews were to become the majority; the Arabs, the minority.²⁹ Immigration was the vital key to such a transformation. (The Jewish population, which amounted to 7% of the population in 1918, rose only to 17% by 1931.) The Balfour Declaration pledge of the British government, enshrined in the League of Nations Mandate of 1922, was the cornerstone of the Zionist position, and Zionist demands consisted of pleas for the maintenance of British policies faithful to their interpretation of these two texts.

Palestinian-Arab demands and aims were defined partly in reaction to the Zionist claim. Before World War I, Palestinians had participated with other Arab nationalists in a movement which sought a decentralization of the Ottoman Empire. The immediate post-War goal was a single Arab state, but this aim was revised as soon as the European powers set about dividing the Middle East into separate mandated territories. Once the Palestinians' hope of independence as "Southern Syria" under Faisal was lost in 1920, their spokesmen invoked, in fine legal detail, wartime pledges and the post-War doctrine of national self-determination in order to establish a claim for an independent Arab-Palestinian state.

Official Palestinian demands underwent no major changes during the 1920s. These were: (a) "creation of a National Government ... responsible to a Parliament elected by those natives of Palestine who lived in the country before the War";³⁰ (b) revocation of the principle of the Jewish national home under the Balfour Declaration, whose two clauses ("establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people"; "nothing ... done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine") were seen to be mutually contradictory;³¹ and (c) the stoppage of Jewish immigration until such time as a National Government were formed to establish its own immigration policies and regulations.³²

Given this wide gap between the stated positions of the two parties, one may wonder on what possible basis an agreement between Zionists and Palestinian Arabs could have been built. Could the Zionists have incorporated into their programme provisions allowing Palestine to retain its Arab national-political character? Could Palestinian nationalists have reconciled themselves to the existence of a Jewish majority within their "Arab" Palestine?

While agreeing to respect the "civil and religious" rights of the Arab population of Palestine, Zionist leaders argued that there was room for only one set of "political" rights in the country: viz., their own rights to establish a Jewish national home.³³ Given this stance, and notwithstanding the conciliatory spirit of Zionist Congress resolutions referring to the "common home" of the two peoples, the only "agreement" which Palestinian Arabs could have had from the Zionists during this period, had they so desired, would have been one along the lines of the Weizmann-Faisal treaty, at the cost of abandoning their local national goals: within the future Jewish Palestine, constitutional-legal guarantees would have safeguarded the existing civil, religious and economic rights (the future "minority rights") of the Arab population, while the commercial interests and national-cultural needs of the Palestinians would have been satisfied through their participation in the regional confederation.

This option was, as we have seen, categorically rejected by Palestinian nationalists. Even for Palestinian pan-Arabists, like Awni Abd al-Hadi, the guiding principle remained that Palestine was "an Arab country and must remain as such"; any policy calculated to "give a different political status to Palestine [was] doomed to failure".³⁴ Given this position, the only "agreement" which Zionists could have had from the Palestinian leadership, had they so wished, was one under which the status of the Jews—and their actual numbers in the country—would have reverted to what they had been before the War, with none of the privileges which had been instituted since 1917.

"The Arabs have always lived on peaceful terms with the Jews in all previous centuries", wrote Awni Abd al-Hadi in his Memorandum on the Passfield White Paper,³⁵ "and were

in accord with them in every matter which was in the interest of the country and its prosperity." But, he warned, the Arabs were "unable to resume their former relations with the Jews so long as the Jews adhere[d] to the colonizing policy ... and so long as their aspirations conflict[ed] with the national aspirations of the Arabs". The Arabs were "willing to accept any policy which tend[ed] to further the interests of this Arab country", but, unfortunately, the A.E. believed that "the Zionist Jews will never abandon their policy as regards the creation of a majority of Jews in Palestine". And this, Awni concluded, the Arabs were "in no circumstances, prepared to accept".

In discussing these terms, it may be asked: should these incompatible, maximalist positions be taken at their face value? Were these not formal political stances, stated for public consumption, deliberately exaggerated and worded in their most "extreme" form? Was there not, behind this ideological façade, a pragmatic and realistic appreciation that, one day, for the sake of an agreement, such terms would have to be scaled down to more "moderate" dimensions? And, is it not natural for participants in bargaining situations to open with tactically maximalist positions, from which subsequent retreat would be possible?

Unfortunately, the historical record shows that official spokesmen on both sides have not maintained the classic negotiator's dichotomy between "opening" and "final" bargaining stands.³⁶ Essential, "final" negotiating stances have often been disclosed from the start, and, whenever actual discussions did take place, negotiators found themselves with little or no room for manoeuvre—few "disposable" items which could have been given up in exchange for concessions from the other side. Thus, in his reply to Dr Judah Magnes' enquiry whether there might be a possible basis for Arab-Jewish understanding within the terms of the above-quoted Memorandum, Awni Abd al-Hadi further elaborated his idea of the only kind of "agreement" which was possible. "The Arabs", he wrote,³⁷

do not at all refuse that the Jews shall enjoy in this country the same rights as the Arabs, both politically and economi-

cally, and it will not harm them that the Jews shall work in Palestine for reviving their original Hebrew language and for developing it and their literature.

But the political problem could be solved only by the Jews "accepting the Arab national political aims". "I hope", he went on,

that the Zionists who are following today in Palestine a policy contrary to the Arab national wishes, will realize tomorrow the futility of such a policy which will bring to the country no good, and that they will not prevent the Arab countries from acquiring unity and independence including Palestine, in which the Arabs do not refuse that the Jews shall live and shall work for the development of their language, literature and sciences with complete freedom.

If the Zionists would "give up altogether the idea of creating a Jewish National Home with political aspects", then, Awni concluded, "there will remain nothing which will prevent an agreement between both parties".

During the period up to 1931, neither party had to reconsider and redefine its fundamental aims and the possible terms of agreement with the other side. Only outside of leadership circles did a few individuals dare to depart from the official "line", but their willingness to compromise on basic goals was not enough to produce an agreement which could command majority support in either camp. Although there are, before 1931, some scattered hints that recognized leaders were beginning to consider the need for some basic compromises in order to reach an Arab-Zionist accord,³⁸ it would be only several years later that more imaginative terms of agreement would be actively considered: e.g., the non-domination principle, parity formulae, bi-nationalism, cantonization, limitations on Jewish immigration or on the Jewish population ratio, and partition.

LOW PRIORITY OF AN ARAB-ZIONIST ACCORD

Early Arab-Zionist encounters were, as we have suggested,

sufficiently numerous to provide leaders on both sides with a wealth of vital experience. They came to know leading personalities on the other side, their ways of thinking, the constraints acting on them, and the terms of agreement which were available. Ignorance or misunderstanding of the other side's position could not, as is sometimes suggested, be counted among the real obstacles to a settlement. On the contrary, knowing the other side's aims and terms only *too well* should be more accurately listed as an important explanation for the absence of success. While it is easy to dismiss as hyperbole or distortion many of the statements coming from official Arab and Zionist protests and complaints, even Zionists had to admit that a man like Awni Abd al-Hadi had well understood the motives behind Zionism when he wrote:³⁹

Whether moderates or extremists, they all have one purpose, namely, the creation of a Jewish majority in Palestine. They are unable to conceive of any National Home which does not secure this object. Should they ... remain at all times a minority in Palestine, their position ... would in no way differ from that in any other country in which they are also a minority. Their object is, therefore, to have in Palestine a National Home in which the 16,000,000 Jews scattered all over the world, would be represented by a majority and exercise a national ascendancy.

Likewise, when Zionist leaders like Frederick Kisch and David Ben-Gurion stressed quiet co-operation and non-political grass-roots relations with Arabs, this was in recognition of the impossibility of satisfying the national-political demands of the Palestinians.

There can be little doubt that Arab and Zionist leaders did not, prior to 1931, direct their major energies towards reaching a mutual accord. Each party was dedicated to the achievement of its own exclusive national goals, and an agreement with the other side was not given high priority. Given the assessments which each made of the position of the other side, there was little hope that an acceptable entente was possible. Jamal al-Husaini believed that it was

a gross error to believe that Arab and Jew may come to an understanding if only each of them exchanges his coat of extremism for another of moderation. When the *principles* [my emphasis, N.C.] underlying two movements do clash, it is futile to expect their meeting halfway.⁴⁰

Even whenever it was felt that some effort in pursuit of an accord was nonetheless worthwhile, the likely results were usually considered an incidental benefit rather than an urgent requirement. Many of the negotiating episodes which did take place, as we have seen, were motivated by considerations other than a real hope of resolving the Arab-Zionist problem, once and for all. For Zionists, it was often "preventive diplomacy" to de-fuse threatening situations; for Arabs, it was often a tactical alliance to outmanoeuvre rival politicians; for both, on other occasions, it was the need to influence the British.

It is not difficult to understand why Palestinian Arab leaders felt no need to come to terms, through a negotiated agreement, with the newly-politicised Jewish minority in the country. Despite their real fears for their future if the Zionist enterprise were allowed to develop apace with British support, Palestinian Arabs still constituted the overwhelming majority of the population and would protect their interests best by continuing their attempts to reverse British policy. Growing pan-Muslim and pan-Arab solidarity for the Palestinians at the beginning of the 1930s seemed to augur well for the Arab case,⁴¹ while the common stereotype of the weak, despised Jew no doubt contributed to Arab self-confidence.⁴² If the militaristic Crusaders had once come and gone, the Arabs saw little need to make compromises for the anticipated temporary presence of the Jewish minority, with its new-found pretensions to sovereignty.⁴³

Zionists, likewise, were only temporarily and superficially disturbed, for the most part, by the overt expressions of Arab hostility to their presence in Palestine. The pressure to consider the need for an agreement with the Arabs was mitigated by three interrelated beliefs: (a) that the economic blessings which Zionism would bring to the country would ultimately win Arab appreciation; (b) that local anti-Zionist

feeling was not very genuine, but was manipulated by a handful of self-seeking and corruptible politicians; and (c) that anti-Zionist solidarity among the Palestinians was a fragile thing, easily offset by family and communal divisions.⁴⁴ The heavy religious undertones to the serious 1929 riots were seen by some Zionists as proof that they were not dealing with a "genuine" nationalist opposition.⁴⁵ Although greatly outnumbered in Palestine, Zionists felt confident in the ultimate success of their venture by the "qualitative" difference which they believed existed between themselves—modern Europeans—and the Arabs—"primitive" natives.⁴⁶

In summary, the period 1913-1931, although rich in Arab-Zionist encounters, brought no positive results in the form of a negotiated settlement to the worsening conflict. The gap between the basic national-political demands and the perceived "vital" interests of Palestinian Arabs and Zionists was so wide as to be virtually unbridgeable. No outside party, British or non-Palestinian Arab, had the resolve or the ability to impose terms of a settlement on either or both of the local adversaries. At no single moment were there internal or external pressures strong enough to force both sides, simultaneously, to perceive the urgency of reducing their respective national demands for the sake of coming to terms with each other. At any given moment, at least one of the parties felt that it had to—and that it could afford to—hold out for something very close to its own full claims; hence, it either abstained from negotiations, or else caused their ultimate failure.

We have seen not only the futility of the negotiating process as a means of ending the Arab-Zionist conflict, but also the skilful use of diplomacy by both parties as a tactical weapon in their determined struggle to control Palestine. In effect, Arab and Zionist leaders have inversed the famous dictum of von Clausewitz: for them, diplomacy and negotiation have been an extension of their basic war by other, non-violent, means.

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Documents

Note: The documents reproduced in this section are in chronological order, and not necessarily the order in which they are discussed in the preceding section.

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Document 1

*Extract of Report by S. Hochberg to V. Jacobson, 17 May 1913
(Mission to Cairo and Beirut)*

... it is certain that the majority of the members of the Cairo and Beirut committees are favourable to Zionism and would even like to conclude an *entente* with the Zionists with a view to joint action. I gave them my opinion, according to which the Zionists would probably not enter into such an *entente* before the Arab organization adopts as its own the demands of the Zionists. In other words, not until it accepts the Zionist programme as part of its own programme. Otherwise, the Zionists would probably not wish to contribute, naturally and logically, towards the formation of a force which might turn against them.

It goes without saying that neither the Cairo nor the Beirut committee, nor the two together, has the authority to make it (i.e., an agreement with the Zionists). It would require a congress at which delegates from all the committees of Syria and Palestine would take part. But the convening of such a congress will not be possible until after the completion of the organization of the movement, which will take place after the Paris Congress.

After a lively exchange of views on the subject with the Cairo committee, I concluded with them the following *entente verbale*:

- 1) The Cairo Committee, being in principle in favour of

Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine and of an *entente* with the Zionists, will make it its duty to work for a *rapprochement* of the Arab world to the Jewish world, and to dissipate, through oral propaganda and the Arabic press, all the prejudices which have been current until now in the Arab world on the subject of Jewish immigration and which have impeded an Arab-Jewish *rapprochement*.

2) In exchange, *Le Jeune Turc* [the Istanbul paper of which Hochberg was the editor] will make it its duty to support the cause of the Arab movement so long as it remains compatible with the unity and integrity of the [Ottoman] Empire. *Le Jeune Turc* will do everything possible so that the European papers (especially in Germany) with which it has dealings should do the same.

This *entente verbale* is, in our view (both mine and the members of the Cairo Committee), nothing more than an exchange of services destined to prepare the ground and, above all, to enlighten Arab public opinion, which has until now been poorly informed on the aims and goals of Zionism, with a view to a full accord in the future.

This *entente* was completed by a decision of the Committee (inscribed in the minutes) concerning its attitude towards Ottoman Jews and by some statements by Rafiq Bey al-Azm, Chairman of the Committee, destined for publication in *Le Jeune Turc* and in the Arabic newspapers, concerning Jewish immigration and the restrictive measures of the Government. These statements were read and approved by other influential members of the Cairo Committee.

Here is the text of the statements by Rafiq Bey al-Azm:

“Our Party is determined to safeguard the rights of the Jewish nationality and to accept no law, no restrictive or exceptional measures, against them. *As Ottomans, the Jews ought to enjoy the same rights as all Ottomans; as foreigners, they ought to enjoy the same rights as all foreigners. Any exceptional measure taken against them on account of their nationality is anti-constitutional and contrary to the liberal principles of our Party.*

“You are aware that there is a wave of Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine. Unfortunately, our Party has not yet

had the time, given the short length of its existence, to study this question in depth, but I am sure that the day when this question will be brought up for discussion, it will be resolved by a common accord for the good of both interested parties: the Jews and the Arab population. *We understand too well the valuable assistance that Jewish capital, manpower and intelligence can bring us for the rapid revival of our provinces for us to commit the error of rejecting them.* Certainly, regulations as exist in all civilized countries regarding immigration, whether Jewish or other, will perhaps be necessary. *But there is an enormous difference between a reasonable and just regulation and exceptional measures such as those enacted under the old régime and maintained under the new régime."*

In order to be able to make the most of the press campaign which will be undertaken, I have asked Mr Najjar to write a series of articles in the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian papers. These articles will carry the signature of one or another of the members of the Cairo Committee.

Ahmad Mukhtar Bayhum Bey, an influential member of the Beirut Committee who came to Cairo at the same time as I did, took part in all the discussions and the *entente verbale* which followed. He communicated it to several influential members of the Beirut Committee, and has promised to go there to get me into contact with that Committee. . . .

The *entente verbale* was also accepted by the Beirut Committee, and was completed by a statement from Rizqallah Arqash, an important member of the Committee. Here is the text:

"Our *entente* with the Muslims also includes the Jewish element, which we like because it is hard-working and educated. It follows from our very programme that its interests as a nationality must be safeguarded to the same extent as those of all other elements living in the Arab provinces.

"As for Jewish immigration into Syria and Palestine, we can only be favourable to it. This Jewish immigration, by virtue of the level of culture of the immigrants, the capital which they introduce into the country, the new methods of

work which they practise, constitutes one of the most powerful factors for the upbuilding of these provinces. It would be a crime against the fatherland [*patrie*] to impede such immigration.

“Those among us who are opposed are only interested parties who think they can thereby extort money from the Jewish companies involved, or are usurers whom Jewish immigration, by enriching the fellah and improving his condition, will prevent from practising, as before, large-scale usury with a view to despoiling the fellahin of their goods and reducing them to slavery. Honest and intelligent people can only wish to encourage this immigration. The Government should realize this and abolish the restrictive measures taken under Abdul Hamid against an immigration which is useful and harmless.”

The practical results of my mission can thus be summarized as follows: 1) a complete study of the state of the Arab movement, as well as its attitude towards Zionism, 2) first contacts made with the members of the movement with a view to an *entente*, 3) clarification of certain points which facilitate an accord, 4) a first accord aiming at enlightening public opinion, and 5) statements of several leaders in favour of Zionism....

*

Source: CZA, Z3/114. Reproduced in P. A. Alsberg, “The Arab Question in the Policy of the Zionist Executive Before World War I” (in Heb.). *Shivat Zion* IV (1956-57), 190-193. Above is my translation of the original French text.

Document 2

*Jacobson Proposals, as transmitted to Cairo by Assad
Daghir (? May-June) 1914*

1. The Arabs and Jews are from one stock, and each

[people] possesses attributes complementary to the other. The Jews have knowledge, funds and influence; while the Arabs have a vast land, awesome power, cultural treasures and inexhaustible material wealth. Therefore a reconciliation between both [peoples] will be to the good of both and to the good of all the Orient.

2. The Arabs will receive the Jews in Arab lands as their brethren, on condition that the Jews become Ottoman subjects and that Palestine will not be exclusively theirs.

3. In exchange, the Jews pledge to put their cultural and material power at the service of the Arab cause; they will support the Arab groups and place at their disposal three million guineas.

4. An Arab-Jewish conference will be held in Egypt when the Syrian and Iraqi deputies return from Constantinople [during parliamentary recess] to their lands.

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Source: Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (London/Berkeley, 1976), 198.

Document 3

Notes of a Conference held at the Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo, between the Zionist Commission and Sa'id Shuqair Pasha, Dr Faris Nimr and Sulaiman Bey Nasif, 27 March 1918

Dr Nimr informed the commission that the conversations which Major Ormsby-Gore had held with him the previous day have assured him that there was nothing inimical to the Arabs in the Zionist Aims and aspirations. As far as he personally was concerned, he was very glad to meet Dr Weizmann and the members of the Commission, and hoped that they will be able to work together in harmony and understanding.

Dr Weizmann expressed pleasure at meeting the Arab leaders who were present. He then stated that he had been informed of the conversation which Major Ormsby-Gore had held with Dr Nimr the previous day, but, for the sake of perfect frankness, he wished to say that one of the main tasks of the Commission was to prevent land speculation in Palestine. It was at his instigation that Mr Balfour had arrived at this decision and had communicated it to the Authorities in Egypt and Palestine.

It was the earnest wish of the Zionists to live on friendly terms with the Arabs. We were not putting forward a claim to monopolise the whole of the administration of Palestine, which he understood was their main fear. He certainly wished to clear away a misconception which seemed to be very common amongst the Arab leaders, viz., that the Zionists wished to establish a Jewish State in Palestine immediately after the War. The Zionists desired to see as the result of the War a British Palestine which would act fairly and justly to all groups which inhabit the country. He wished the Arabs to appreciate that whatever the Jews had in mind would be to the benefit and prosperity of the country as a whole.

With regard to the Holy Places, the maintenance of which he understood was causing anxiety to the Arabs, he wished to say that the Jews did not put forward any claim to control the Holy Places. Of course, the Jews have their own Holy Places, over which they desired to have control.

Suliman Bey Nassif and Shoucair Pacha expressed their complete satisfaction at this statement. Suliman Bey Nassif added that, as far as Palestine was concerned, there was room for a million more people without affecting the position of the present inhabitants.

Major Ormsby-Gore pointed out that the British Government had not put forward a claim for a British Palestine. It was a matter which would have to be decided by the Peace Conference.

Mr Aaronsohn discussed the position of the Arabs in the Jewish colonies, the burden of his remarks being that with the growth of the Jewish colonies the Arab population had increased in number and prosperity.

In concluding the interview Dr Weizmann again expressed his pleasure at meeting the Arab leaders and, in reply to Major Ormsby-Gore's remarks, stated that no matter what the British Government thought on the question of Palestine, the Zionists wished to see such a solution as a result of the War.

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Source: CZA, Z4/483.

Document 4

*Memorandum drafted by the "Palestine Committee",
Cairo, as a basis for discussion with the Zionist Commission,
early April 1918*

1. The inviolability of Holy Places and their retention as in the past in the hands of their respective owners with the free exercise of their rights and privileges.
2. The institution of a system of Government based on even-handed justice and equality of rights between the different elements irrespective of their comparative numbers (majority or minority of votes).
3. The laws of the country to apply equally to all the elements of the population without distinction.
4. The official language to be the language of the country viz. Arabic, the teaching of which to be compulsory in Government schools.
5. All persons coming into the country as colonists, whatever may be their nationality, be subject alike to the laws of the country.
6. In view of the general impoverishment of the population through the war, which affords a wide field for merciless exploitation, it would be necessary to suspend, during the war, any transaction of purchase or sale of property, whether rural or urban.

7. The institution at the earliest possible opportunity of an agricultural bank under government control to afford impartial financial help to the people.
8. The advisability of framing a law similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt, in Palestine.
9. The offering of honest opportunity to Zionist colonization by facilitating their purchase of State lands, especially in the first rush of immigration, leaving a reasonable share of these lands to the other elements.
10. The institution of a mixed Commission composed equally of three elements and independent of the Government, whose functions are to examine any cases of aggression or injustice in economic or moral matters that may arise between the different elements, to take the necessary steps under government auspices with a view to their settlement and non-recurrence. The permanent duty of this Commission would be to study and devise all such means as are calculated to strengthen the ties of friendship between the different elements, promote a good feeling of neighbourliness, inculcate the principle of union and solidarity, and inspire in all a public spirit and the unselfish desire for the common weal.

*

Source: Appendix "A", Wm. Ormsby-Gore to Balfour, Report No. 1 on Zionist Commission, 7 April 1918 PRO 371/3394, file W44/83691/11053.

Document 5

*General G. F. Clayton's telegraphic report of Weizmann's
visit to Faisal, 4 June 1918*

Weizmann has returned from his visit to Feisal and is much pleased with the result. He is very favourably impressed with Feisal's personality and they appear to have

established excellent personal relations. The general results of the meeting are as follows:

(1) After cordial exchange of greetings Weizmann stated he had been sent by British Government to enquire into developments of Jewish interests in Palestine and that the most important of his duties was to gain touch with Arab leaders and endeavour to cooperate with them.

(2) After alluding to historical traditions of both races Feisal expressed his opinion of necessity of close cooperation between Jews and Arabs especially at present time.

(3) Feisal pointed out inability to express definite opinions on political questions as he was merely his father's agent in such matters, but he considered that interests of Jews and Arabs must be closely Allied.

(4) Weizmann pointed out that a Jewish Palestine would assist the development of an Arab Kingdom and that an Arab Kingdom would receive Jewish support.

(5) Weizmann explained the Zionists did not propose to set up a Jewish Government, but wished to work if possible under British guidance in order to colonize and develop the country without encroaching on other¹ legitimate interests.

(6) Feisal stated he was unable to discuss the future of Palestine either as a Jewish state² or a country under British guidance as these questions were already the subject of much German and Turkish propaganda and would be misinterpreted by the³ Bedouins if openly discussed. When Arab affairs were (more) consolidated profitable discussion might take place. He personally accepted the possibility of future Jewish claims to territory in Palestine but could not discuss them publicly⁴ as he was not representing an Arab Government and was greatly afraid of enemy propaganda. He again emphasized necessity of close cooperation between Jews and Arabs for mutual benefit of both.

(7) Weizmann explained he was proceeding shortly to America and that Zionists influence⁵ in that country and elsewhere would be used in favour of Arab movement and

necessity for an Arab country.⁶ This statement afforded Feisal great satisfaction.

(8) The interview ended with cordial expressions of mutual sympathy and an invitation from Feisal to renew the meeting after Weizmann's visit to America.

Colonel Joyce who was present throughout the interview gives as his private opinion that Feisal really welcomed Jewish cooperation and considered it essential to future Arab ambitions though unable to express any very (?definite) views in absence of authority from his father. It is Colonel Joyce's opinion that Feisal fully realizes the future possibility of a Jewish Palestine and would probably accept it if it assisted Arab expansion further north.⁷

I am of opinion interview has had excellent results in promoting (?mutual) sympathy and understanding between Weizmann and Feisal. Both are frank and open in their dealings and nothing but good can result from a personal interview such as has now taken place.

Notes below indicate some of the minor differences between Clayton's telegram and the handwritten draft report of the meeting by Col. P. C. Joyce, in MEC/F(A).

1. For "other", read "anybody's".
2. For "state", read "colony".
3. After "the", add "uneducated".
4. After "publicly", add "officially".
5. In place of "Zionists influence", read "influence of the Jews".
6. In place of "necessity for an Arab country", read "formation of an Arab Kingdom".
7. (Joyce continues:) They have both one great point in common and which I think they both understand—and that is that outside the Jews and Arabs no one else has any territorial claim on Syria. On that point they are a strong combination. Dr Weizmann was very diplomatic and pressed for no question or opinion that might be afterwards brought up in statements. . . .

*

Sources: Clayton to Foreign Office, 12 June 1918, PRO, FO 371/3398, file W44/105824/27647.

Document 6

*Dr Weizmann's report of his meeting with Amir Faisal,
as given to the 17th meeting of the Zionist Commission,
16 June 1918*

...

Dr Weizmann informed Faisal that he was the Chairman of the Commission sent by H.M.G. to study the conditions in Palestine, to lay plans for the future and to get into contact with the representatives of the Arab nation. Up to then he had been trying to do his best to get into contact with the Arabs in Palestine and Egypt, and he was now very pleased to see the representative of the Hedjaz... [Faisal] generally hoped that there would be an intimate collaboration between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine and elsewhere, as this was essential for the progress of both nations. But, he added, it was of course very difficult for him to deal with political questions, as all political affairs [sic] were concentrated in his father's hands, as it was his father who decided all such matters.

Dr Weizmann replied that ... he was also aware that he had been nominated the agent of his father and Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Army. He, Dr Weizmann, attached particular importance to this interview.

He wished Faisal to understand that, should the Jews settle in Palestine, and should they realize their aspirations, they were ready to co-operate with the Arab nation. He added that we did not wish to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, but were willing to live under the suzerainty of Great Britain. There was no intention of ousting anybody out of the country. There was quite enough room for everybody. On the other hand, the Jews would come to Palestine to stay and develop freely. Faisal replied that he quite realised the value of the Jews to Palestine, and that he himself was quite sympathetic to Jewish national aspirations. He, however, had to be very guarded in his public utterances, as Turkish and German agents were only too ready to make capital out of every act which might affect Arab interests in Palestine,

especially in view of the fact that the Palestine Arab population and Bedouins exaggerated all that was said. One had to be very careful. He, however, emphasized the absolute necessity of an intimate collaboration between the Jews and Arabs.

Dr Weizmann pushed the idea of collaboration a little further. He said that Jews and Arabs had parallel interests, and thus it was possible for the Jews, who were a great force, to help him realize his great ambitions [deleted: "which were very laudable"] ... [to] help him towards Damascus and the territory to the North, which ought not to be encroached upon by the powers who had really no interests there. By encroachment he meant France. Faisal seemed very pleased at this sign of goodwill and remarked that the support of the Jews in this connection would demonstrate a sincere desire for co-operation. He added that the great political questions could not be settled now, but he would help us and would be glad of our cooperation and assistance.

The question was raised as to whether Dr Weizmann should see his father King Hussein now or after his return from America, but no decision was arrived at.

....

Dr Weizmann expressed the opinion that the interview was a very cordial one and would result in a considerable amount of good. He added that Faisal himself gave the impression of an honest and fearless man. There was something definite in his character. All the others seemed to be fluctuating people who would cry out and complain when they thought their interests were affected and from whom we could never expect any real co-operation.... he, together with Colonel Joyce, had drawn up a report which was to be transmitted to General Clayton. Colonel Joyce himself had been very satisfied with the interview....

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Source: Cancelled version of minutes of Zionist Commission meeting CZA, Z4/483.

Document 7

*Dr Weizmann's report of his interview with Amir Faisal,
Carlton Hotel, London, 11 December 1918;
Col. Lawrence acting as interpreter*

The Emir produced a map showing a plan of the Sykes-Picot agreement, and expressed his indignation with the arrangements contemplated by that agreement, which, in his opinion were equally fatal to Arabs and to Jews. He had no hope of arriving at any understanding with the French who he considered were not in any way amenable to reason.

He explained to me that the present position of the Arabs was extraordinarily dangerous. If the Sykes-Picot agreement held, they would be pushed back into the desert. The Arabs had set up some form of government centred at Damascus, but it was extremely weak. It had no money and no men. The Army was naked and had no ammunition. His great hope was in America, which he thought would be able to destroy the agreement.

I replied that I was aware of the agreement as long ago as 1915, and that whenever I could, I had protested against it. I had an interview on the subject with Lord Robert Cecil in 1916 and I had also referred to it in my letter to Mr Balfour written from Palestine on 17th July, 1918. In that letter I said that in my opinion the Agreement was as bad for the Arabs as for the Jews. We had asked our American Zionists to point out to the United States Government the meaning of the Agreement, and whenever possible, to act against it. In that our policies were absolutely identical. I informed him that a strong delegation of American Zionists was on its way to London, which saw eye to eye with us on this matter, and would use its influence in favour of both Jews and Arabs.

I had also heard that the French had been trying to create trouble between ourselves and him (Feisal) but I quite understood their motives. At that point Feisal interrupted me and stated that there was no need to dwell on this point, as he saw through these French attempts at once. He thought that

the trouble in Palestine at the present time was fomented by Turkish and pro-Turkish propaganda. The Turks always ruled by trying to divide the races under their sway. The Arabs in Palestine are still used to the methods of Turkish propaganda, but he was quite sure that he and his followers would be able to explain to the Arabs that the advent of the Jews into Palestine was for the good of the country, and that the legitimate interests of the Arab peasants would in no way be interfered with. He then expressed a desire to learn some details of our programme. I gave him the following details:—

- (1) We expect the Peace Conference and Feisal to recognize the national and historical rights of Jews to Palestine.
- (2) We should ask for the appointment of Great Britain as the Trustee Power, which would set up a Government in Palestine in which the Jews would expect to take an adequate share.
- (3) We should demand reform of the Land Laws in Palestine of such a nature as would render the land now in the hands of the Effendis and Usurers available for colonisation.
- (4) We should then be able to carry out public works of a far-reaching character, and, I added, the country could be improved that it would have room for four or five million Jews, without encroaching on the ownership rights of Arab peasantry.
- (5) Jews would be prepared to render him every assistance in brain and money, so as to help to revive his country.
- (6) Questions of Boundaries and Wakuf could be left until after the larger Political Settlement, and would be the subject of arrangement between them. (Zionists and Feisal).
- (7) As for the Moslem Holy Places, the Jews considered themselves insulted by the French insinuations that there was a desire to interfere with them. They rejected with scorn all such allegations. The Jews have never made proselytes and did not intend to interfere with the religious interests of anybody.

At this point Feisal remarked that it was curious that there should be friction between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. There was no friction in any other country where Jews lived together with Arabs. He was convinced that the trouble was promoted by intrigues. He did not think for a moment that there was any scarcity of land in Palestine. The population would always have enough, especially if the country were developed. Besides there was plenty of land in his district.

As for Sursuk and similar Effendis, he did not trouble his head about them. He assured us on his word of honour that he would do everything to support Jewish demands, and would declare at the Peace Conference that Zionism and the Arab movement were fellow movements, and that complete harmony prevailed between them. He would try his best to obtain the British Government as Trustee Power for Arabia, and if he did not succeed he would try to get America to act. He hoped we would help him in his efforts. If he failed, he would have to fight for the existence of an Arab State.

*

Source: PRO, FO 371/3420, file W44/207372.

Document 8

Text of Agreement between Amir Faisal and Dr Chaim Weizmann, 3 January 1919

[See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111]

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, and Dr Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming

the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles:

ARTICLE I

The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding, and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories.

ARTICLE II

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

ARTICLE III

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.

ARTICLE IV

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.

ARTICLE V

No regulation nor law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with the free exercise of religion; and further the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or reference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

ARTICLE VI

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

ARTICLE VII

The Zionist Organisation proposes to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will place the aforementioned Commission at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will use its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

ARTICLE VIII

The parties hereto agree to act in complete accord and harmony on all matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

ARTICLE IX

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at London, England, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.

[signed:] Chaim Weizmann
Faisal Ibn Husain [in Arabic]

[Reservation, in Arabic, by Amir Faisal:]

Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

*

Source: CZA, Z4/2989.

English translation of Faisal's reservation taken from George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1946), 439.

Document 9

Notes of meeting between unnamed Zionist representative [A. Hyamson?] and Awni Abd al-Hadi and Ahmad Qadri, Hotel Meurice, Paris, 25 January 1919

Abdul Hades [sic] — Ahmed Kadry medecin particulier de S.A.R. Emir Feysul called to-day (Jan. 25th) at the Meurice. They told me that they had seen the Zionist proposals (I do not know who showed them the proposals) and that they are troubled on the point of the Zionist claims to British Trusteeship for Palestine as they believe that such claim would strengthen the French claim for Trusteeship in Syria. Their point of view is that Syria should be an independent state under Arab rule. They say that the Jews and the Arabs could arrange matters between themselves in the most favourable way for both whilst on the other hand British Trusteeship in Palestine and French Trusteeship in Syria would create an endless source of friction and intrigue. They said that if a British Trusteeship could be obtained for all Arab countries in the Near East they would consider such solution as most desirable. But as this cannot be attained they think the best way would be to establish a great federation of independent countries and to enter into close relations with Great Britain in order that all the essential functions of Trusteeship [be executed?] without the formal proclamation. On my question whether they represented the Arab Syrian public opinion and if Shukri Ganem Dr Samne [sic] had any following in Syria they replied that these gentlemen were quite isolated and were supported only by an insignificant group of Syrian business men living in Paris who depended on little favours of the Quai D'Orsay[.] Re Zionist aspirations both declared that all rights and liberties would be given to the Jews in Palestine on equal terms with the Arabs etc. I explained to them that such rights and liberties would not cover our Zionist programme which was a national movement in order to make Palestine a Jewish Country and that we would not be satisfied with emancipation or guarantees of national minority which we claimed in other countries, to which they replied that they would even go further in their

concessions but that this must be an arrangement exclusively between Jews and Arabs, who had common interests etc. I asked whether they represented Feysul's views, they said they spoke unofficially, nevertheless I had the impression that they were sent by Feysul. There is even some reason to believe that there is some connection with conversation which Feysul had yesterday with President Wilson. I gave them no assurances except promised them only to examine their views and to communicate with Dr Weizmann on the matter.

...

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Source: CZA, Z4/56.

Document 10

*Letter, in Lawrence's handwriting, signed by Amir Faisal,
addressed to Felix Frankfurter, Paris, 1 March 1919*
[See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111]

Dear Mr. Frankfurter,

I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideals [deletion] together.

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organisation to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann we have had, and continue to have the closest

relations. He has been a great helper in our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness.

We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is national, and not imperialist: our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for both of us. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours ignoring the need for co-operation of the Arabs and Zionists have been trying to exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them have, I am afraid, misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jewish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been able to make capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail such as must inevitably occur in every contact of neighbouring peoples, and as are [sic] easily adjusted by mutual goodwill. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their place in the comity of the civilised peoples of the world.

Believe me,
yours very sincerely
[in Arabic] Faisal

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Source: CZA, Z4/25001.

Document 11

Felix Frankfurter reply to Faisal, Paris, 5 March 1919

Allow me, on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, to acknowledge your recent letter with deep appreciation.

Those of us who come from the United States have already been gratified by the friendly relations and the active cooperation maintained between you and the Zionist leaders, particularly Dr Weizmann. We knew it could not be otherwise; we knew that the aspirations of the Arab and the Jewish peoples were parallel, that each aspired to reestablish its nationality in its own homeland, each making its own distinctive contribution to civilisation, each seeking its own peaceful mode of life.

The Zionist leaders and the Jewish people for whom they speak have watched with satisfaction the spiritual vigour of the Arab movement. Themselves seeking justice, they are anxious that the just national claims of the Arab people be confirmed and safeguarded by the Peace Conference.

We knew from your acts and your past utterances that the Zionist movement—in other words the national aims of the Jewish people—had your support and the support of the Arab people for whom you speak. These aims are now before the Peace Conference as definite proposals by the Zionist Organisation. We are happy indeed that you consider these proposals “moderate and proper”, and that we have in you a staunch supporter for their realisation. For both the Arab and the Jewish peoples there are difficulties ahead—difficulties that challenge the united statesmanship of Arab and Jewish leaders. For it is no easy task to rebuild two great civilisations that have been suffering oppression and misrule for centuries. We each have our difficulties we shall work out as friends, friends who are animated by similar purposes, seeking a free and full development for the two neighbouring peoples. The Arabs and Jews are neighbours in territory; we cannot but live side by side as friends.

Very respectfully,

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Document 12

*H. M. Kalwaryski, Programme for a Judeo-Arab Entente
[May-June?] 1919*

I. Palestine constitutes the homeland [*patrie*] of all those who inhabit it: Jews, Muslims and Christians are citizens on an equal footing [*de même degré*].

II. The Jewish People, of Oriental semitic origin, is in need of a territory in which to develop its national culture. Palestine, its country of origin, forming a sort of isle in the midst of a very large sea of territory and of peoples equally of semitic origin and stretching from the Taurus to Gibraltar through North Africa, constitutes the *Jewish National Home*.

III. *Freedom of Worship*. There is no state religion in Palestine.

IV. *Administration*. Everyone, without distinction of race or religion, will be admitted. When recruiting civil servants, only the abilities of the candidates will be taken into consideration. In the public interest, it is necessary for civil servants to know the two languages of the country: Hebrew and Arabic (not to mention English, the language of the Mandatory Power). But, since it is difficult to find at present people who do know the two languages, both among the Jews as among the Arabs, a period of 5, 10 or 15 years will be fixed, at the end of which the knowledge of these two languages will be compulsory for civil servants.

V. *Schools*. In state-run schools, especially in secondary schools, the teaching of the two languages, Hebrew and Arabic, is compulsory. The two languages complement each other. Beyond the moral advantages (better understanding and closer unity among the two elements, the development of a Hebrew-Arabic literature which will recall the Golden Age of the Arab Caliphs, etc.) there will result economic advantages. All doors will be open to state employees who know both [languages] (not to mention English, the language of the

Mandatory Power). In finance and in industry preference will always be given to an employee who knows the two languages. As for private schools, I have advised my political friends to impose the Arabic language [in Jewish schools]. I hope that our Arab friends will appreciate their interests and will act in like fashion regarding Hebrew in their schools.

VI. *Abolition of all Exclusivism, whether Jewish, Muslim or Christian.* Until now the Jews of Palestine, forming only a religious community, had their charitable works and their public institutions, while the Christians and Muslims had theirs. With the formation of the *Jewish National Home in Palestine* some duties of state fall upon them. They are obliged to think of everything and everyone without distinction of religion. There will no longer be poor Jews and poor Muslims and poor Christians. All the poor will have the right to the same care. We shall open up schools, orphanages and hospitals for all. We shall create agricultural [loan] and industrial banks for all, and shall come to the aid of the fellah.

VII. *Freedom of Immigration.* The affluence of Jewish capital and manpower in a poor and underpopulated country like Palestine can only be very profitable to the country, and complete freedom should be accorded to Jewish immigration.

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Source: CZA, A113/13. My translation from the French text.

Document 13

*Extracts from "The Emir Faisal on Palestine and the Jews",
Interview in The Jewish Chronicle, 3 October 1919*

... "Let me tell you with all goodwill," continued His Highness, "that Jews make a vast mistake to use the language that extreme Zionists do in respect to Palestine. After the Balfour Declaration, some Jews in Palestine already began to

lord it over the Arabs and to boast that the country was theirs. . . . I need not tell you that this sort of thing greatly incensed and disconcerted the Arab population, and if it had not been that I exercised a strong restraining influence, I am afraid there would have been considerable active resentment against the Jews there.

"Let me be quite frank with you," went on the Emir; "the Arabs have inhabited the country for many centuries continuously. They did not expel the Jews. The Romans expelled the Jews, and the Arabs won the land from the Romans. It is theirs. It is to them a sacred land. Its associations are part and parcel of the Arab's life. And, moreover, Palestine is and must remain part and parcel of Syria. There is no natural boundary, no frontier, between the two countries. What affects one must affect the other. If there is disorder in Palestine there will be disorder in Syria. From the point of view of the Arab, Palestine is a province, not a country, and our intention is to build up an Arab Empire which must consist, as a minimum, of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine. From that we cannot recede. There is not an Arab throughout the world who would not resent any whittling down of this our minimum claim. The Arabs are solid in regard to Palestine, and I do not think," added the Emir with just a soupcon of the ironical, "that you can claim such a united opinion in regard to Palestine on the part of the Jews.

"I have had several conferences with Dr Weizmann, the able leader of the Zionist movement," proceeded His Highness. "He showed me only within the last few hours his proposals, and to those proposals I raise no objection. You seem surprised," continued the Emir, as he noted the puzzled look of our representative, "and you think that there is something inconsistent in my agreeing to Dr Weizmann's proposals and in what I have said in regard to Arab aspirations respecting Palestine. But I found Dr Weizmann's proposals quite moderate and practical. As I understand, he is working for a regulated immigration into the country, for conditions in which the Jew will have equal rights with the Arab, shall take part in the government of Palestine, shall have full control of Jewish schools, shall have the means of establishing there a Jewish cultural centre, and shall have free

use of the Hebrew language. There is nothing to object to in that. Indeed, we would welcome the assistance which an immigration of Jews could give us in developing the country. We naturally would prefer an immigration of Jews than of any other people, not only because Jews have vast resources by which the land can be developed, but because they are Semites like ourselves. They are cousins, and we would willingly make them brothers. But when some Zionists speak about Palestine becoming as Jewish as England is English, because of the claim which Jews have to the country, they are really talking unreasonably. . . . ”

Our representative explained that practically the whole of Jewry imagined that the Balfour Declaration meant that the Jews were to be assisted by cultural, economic and political measures for the setting up in Palestine of a National Home which would ultimately become a Jewish State. And he asked the Emir frankly to say whether Zionist aspirations of this nature clashed in any way with Arab ideals.

“To be sure they do. In the first place, as I have said, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Syria are inseparable; and although we cannot legislate for the far future, still we Arabs cannot yield Palestine as part of our kingdom. Indeed, we would fight to the last ditch against Palestine being other than part of the Kingdom and for the supremacy of Arabs in the land. I have seen statements made that when the immigration of Jews is sufficiently large, then the predominance of Jews would be established as, for instance, when there was a majority of Jews there. But I do not trouble much about that because, in my view, the number that you can possibly settle in Palestine for years to come cannot be more than a thousand or fifteen hundred per annum. . . . [I]f you mean a Jewish population, self-supporting, industrious, I am quite sure that no larger immigration than I have mentioned is possible. . . . So we need not bother our heads about the time when the Jewish population will exceed that of the Arabs, and until it does, there surely can be no right on the part of Jews to ask that the country shall be taken away from the Arabs and given to them. . . .

“... you Jews,” urged the Emir, “can do a great work if you would co-operate with us in the formation of this [Arab]

kingdom. Instead of our relying upon any of the great Powers for means of development, for material help, we should like to have the co-operation in these things of the Jewish people. You have the means, and we have the numbers, and when our Arab Kingdom is built up and set upon firm foundations of Right and Justice and constituted with the most modern ideas of a State, then it may be that there would be a concentration of your people in Palestine and that you would make of Palestine a sub-province of the Arab Kingdom. But that always presupposes that there shall be equal rights, equal opportunities, equal privileges and an absolute non-differentiation between Arab and Jew. . . . The Jewish people can get everything they desire, such as a Jewish cultural centre, and the Jewish population in Palestine can live its own Jewish life. But regard must be paid not alone to Arab [sic, for "Jewish"] sentiment which, of course, is extremely strong and has been strengthened by the Balfour Declaration; regard must be paid also to justice and right where the Arab is concerned. . . . Up till the time of the Balfour Declaration, the question as between Arabs and Jews in Palestine never arose. Although we do not ask the country to be called Arab, and although we are content to let it remain Palestine, still Palestine in effect is the Land of the Arabs, and must remain an integral portion of the new Arab State. So far as Jews are concerned they can come into the country with equal rights, equal privileges, a share in the government proportionate to their population, the control of their schools, and the use of their language.

"I appreciate quite fully," said the Emir in conclusion, "Zionist aspirations, even extreme Zionist aspirations. I quite understand the desire of Jews to acquire a country, a homeland. But so far as Palestine is concerned, if they have made up their minds that it shall be Palestine or nothing, then it must be Palestine subject to the rights and aspirations and the sentiments of the present possessors of the land.

"Of course, if Jews had chosen for their National Home a land, possession of which they could gain undisputed—but then that is a matter for the Jewish people. I can only say, and would ask you to impress upon all your people, that we wish Jews to co-operate with us in perfect amity and

friendship, for Jews, like ourselves, are Semites. I cannot put it stronger than by repeating: we are cousins; we wish to be brothers. But that involves a brotherly feeling on the part of Jews for Arabs, as well as of Arabs for the Jews."

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(Reprinted with permission.)

Document 14

Extracts from M. Ussishkin, Visit to the Head of the Town Council [i.e., Mayor] of Jerusalem [Musa Kazim al-Husaini], 8 October 1919

[The conversation began with Musa Kazim asking Ussishkin about the latest news from Paris regarding the peace settlement. Ussishkin noted that the general situation was still unclear. He continued:]

However, with regard to our country there is one thing that is clear, and that is that Palestine is to be separate from Syria; Syria is to be under the protectorate of France and Palestine under that of England.

Musa Kazim: But we do not agree to this. We asked for the protection of America, and England only enters into the second degree of our considerations. We demand no separation from Syria, with no changes in the internal situation, and with no special privileges for anybody.

U.: I have already told Your Worship that there is no longer any doubt on this question. Palestine is separated from Syria, and this has become a fact. There is no going back now. With regard to the "privileges" to which you refer, you mean of course the Jews. I can say that we have already spoken to the Amir Faisal on this matter, and we have come to an agreement. You have read of this in the newspapers, I presume?

M.K.: Indeed, we read the newspapers. But we do not submit to the Amir Faisal with regard to our political demands. Nor do we rely on him in this matter. We are opposed to any special rights for the Jews. We cannot consent to language rights, immigration rights, etc. I speak not only

for myself, but for all my Arab brothers. We have already repudiated the concessions made by the Amir.

U.: But the British government has also promised Rights to the Jews, and they have issued a special declaration on this matter, the famous Balfour Declaration about which you have heard, no doubt. And if England gave a promise, she knew what she was promising and without doubt will know how to keep her promise.

M.K.: Yes! We heard that the British government has given a promise, but that promise was given *for the present only* to the Jews, *and not to us*. It is therefore impossible for us to agree with their exaggerated and premature demands which follow one upon the other. Wait until the official announcement is made by the British government, and then. . . . And, generally speaking, the demands of the Jews are just the beating of a hollow drum and arise mostly from lack of knowledge of the conditions of the people of the country, their habits, and their outlook. They are therefore very annoying to the Arabs. And this is not the right and proper thing for you to do. Indeed, the Jews are superior to us in knowledge, culture, wealth and capabilities—in everything related to their economic concerns, etc. But just as the mind of the European Jew is sharp and thoughtful, the mind of the Oriental is not so dense that he cannot see what is before him, and what is in store for him in the near future from the Jews, i.e., from the mass immigration of the Jews. I may also mention that we have nothing against the Jews who are citizens of this country. These we know and they know us. We have lived together with them and are doing so now, and will continue to do so in peace and friendship. There is no quarrel or outcry except that we shall oppose the immigration of Jews with all our might. For they have no tact and their aims are quite clear and well known to us. They want—and they have had the impertinence to announce it publicly in the newspapers and in public speeches—they want to drive us out of the land and to take possession of our houses and estates. They were not ashamed to state clearly that they wish to put us upon the backs of camels and send us off to the Hejaz. According to them—and these are words which have been quite frank—there is no room for two men in one chair; and Palestine,

according to them, will serve only as the seat of honour for the Jews and the Arabs will have no share in it. This will never be! And generally the Jews lack tact and are not at all diplomatic. The Arabs differ from them in this respect. The Arabs are by nature charitable and generous and disburse charity to the limit of their ability. But it is obvious that they must be treated politely—their friendship must be encouraged and you must enter into relations with them and visit them, so that over coffee and cigarettes they are bound to forget everything and will compromise in every way. The welcome of guests is a quality in which the Arab goes too far. But this cannot be so when they are approached with claims and demands one after another. If you do this you will not succeed. The Arabs know how to oppose these demands.

U.: As regards the demands of the Jews, I must say that there is no exaggeration, but indeed the reverse. For the present they are *minimum demands, based upon right and justice upon which there can be no compromise whatsoever*. If there is room for compromise at all, it is particularly with regard to tact and details, if we find that it is as you say that we have made mistakes in this direction. No doubt mistakes were made on your side also. . . .

*

Source: CZA, Z4/1392/I-b. Eng. translation with my modifications based on Hebrew original. Ussishkin, acting Chairman of the Z.C., was accompanied by Yosef Meyuhas of Jerusalem, who presumably acted as interpreter (Hebrew-Arabic).

Document 15

*Sh. Levin, Ben V Cohen, S. Landman, Memorandum of
Interview with Amir Faisal and Awni Abd al-Hadi,
Carlton Hotel, London, 19 October 1919*

[Levin extended invitation to Faisal to attend Balfour Declaration anniversary celebrations.] He stated that he hoped that the Emir would on that occasion make a statement favourable to Zionism, so as to show the Jewish

people that they could count on him as a friend, and with the more important object of effacing the unfortunate impression created by the interview with the "Jewish Chronicle" [of 3 October]. The Emir expressed his regret that he could not accept the flattering invitation, because he was leaving for Paris the next morning, and did not know whether he could return in time. [They agreed to work out the text of a message to be sent by Faisal for the occasion.]

[After Faisal withdrew, Awni remained and asked in what way the *Jewish Chronicle* interview was unsatisfactory.] It was pointed out to him that the statement attributed to Faisal, asking for Palestine to be a province of an independent Arabia, was contrary to the aspirations of the Zionists. Further, the objection to the phrase of Dr Weizmann viz. "that Palestine was to be as Jewish as England is English" could not fail to evoke disapproval among the Zionists. Finally, the restriction of immigration to very small numbers was especially likely to arouse Zionist dissatisfaction.

Mr Hadi replied very fully, elaborating the following standpoint:—

Mr Balfour's declaration was very unfortunate, in that it aroused the opposition of the Palestinian Arabs against the Jews. This opposition had been aggravated by the statements of the Zionists, especially in Palestine, in which they talked of Palestine as "Eretz Israel" the Jewish Land. This manner of speech was very offensive to the Palestinian Arabs, who regarded Palestine as their country, having lived there for so many centuries during which time Jews had been far away. Today the Jews were still in a very small minority, and it was to him unthinkable that the Arabs could renounce their claim to Palestine in favour of the Jews.

He advised the Zionists, in their own interests to stop all talk of a Jewish Palestine, and limit themselves to colonisation and development of their own culture and institutions, with a maximum of self-government in internal matters and a certain degree of representation in the Government of the country.

When it was pointed out to him that Great Britain was likely to accept the mandate on the terms of the Balfour Declaration, he said nothing was yet settled, but advised the Zionists in their own interests not to put blind faith in the

British Government. He absolutely failed to understand why they had so much confidence in and friendship for Great Britain. It was pointed out to him that Great Britain had been the traditional friend and protector of the Jews, and that the Jews intended to be loyal to Great Britain. He said that the Zionists asked for the friendship of the Arabs, but what had they done for the Arab cause? When asked what he would desire them to do, he suggested the following:— he had seen a member of the American Peace Delegation recently, in Paris, and had discussed with him the position regarding Arabia and Palestine. He gathered it would not be very difficult to persuade America to insist that Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria should become an independent Confederation, with an Arab King, under the League of Nations, England to have commercial predominance in Palestine and Mesopotamia and France in Syria. He thought the Zionists would be more likely to satisfy their aspirations by supporting such a settlement than by asking for a British Mandate. He had heard from a very high French authority [that France?] would under no circumstances allow the British to colonise Mesopotamia with Hindoos or Palestine with Jews.

The Zionist representative replied that such a proposal was entirely at variance with the demands made at the Peace Conference, and could not be entertained for a moment. The Zionists were anxious to work side by side with the Arabs in the restoration of the Near East.

Dr Levin stated that such restoration was impossible without Jewish experts and Jewish capital, which they were prepared to devote freely to this purpose. As regards the promise of a Jewish Palestine, this was made by all the Great Powers, and it was on the strength of that hope that the Jews would put forth all their energy and enthusiasm. If that hope were removed, as it would be if the course of action suggested in the interview with the "Jewish Chronicle" as being satisfactory to the Emir Feisal were adopted, the Near East would not be able to attract those Jewish elements which were indispensable.

Mr Hadi said that the Arabs would prefer to develop their country, their railways, their roads, with Jewish capital and Jewish experts, rather than French or English.

Dr Levin replied that if they invited Jewish experts, they would be only too pleased to come, provided always that the proposals of the Zionists were not departed from.

Reverting to the message from the Emir Feisal for the 2 November Demonstration, Mr Landman emphasised the necessity of a very clear message from the Emir, so as to undo the effect of the "Jewish Chronicle" interview.

Mr Hadi promised to do his best to find a satisfactory formula.

This ended the interview.

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Source: CZA, Z4/1392/I-b. Dr Levin spoke in Hebrew; Mr Landman translated into French for Awni; Awni translated into Arabic for Faisal.

Document 16

*Treaty between Zionist representative and
"The Nationalist Group in Syria and Lebanon",
26 March 1920*

[See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111]

The undersigned, Mr Yehoshua Hankin, representing the Zionist Organisation in Palestine, and Messrs Najib Sfeir, Yusuf Muazzin, Dr Rashid Karam, Mr Najib Hashim and Dr Antun Shihade, representing the Nationalist Group in Syria and Lebanon, in view of the gravity of the political situation in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and desirous of co-ordinating their political activity for the good of these three countries, have agreed after discussion on the following basic principles:—

1. The Governments of Syria and Lebanon recognise the independence of Palestine within boundaries to be fixed by a committee with representatives of both sides (Syria and Lebanon, on the one hand; Palestine, on the other), and the Zionist Organisation will have the right to build there a National Home for the Jewish people, by organising a mass

immigration of Jews from every land into Palestine, and by obtaining political and economic privileges necessary to ensure the calm and free development of the National Home.

2. The Nationalist Group in Syria and Lebanon will do everything necessary to prepare public opinion among the Arab people for this recognition, and to accustom the Arabs to [look upon] the Jewish people as neighbours.

3. The Zionist Organisation undertakes in future not to go beyond the borders of Syria and Lebanon as will be determined in accordance with paragraph 1.

4. The Zionist Organisation undertakes to respect the religious rites and customs of Muslims and Christians in Palestine, and not to interfere in questions affecting the holy places.

5. The Zionist Organisation undertakes to assist the Governments of Syria and Lebanon in the development of their countries, and to arrange for capital loans on terms to be agreed.

6. All the inhabitants of Palestine without distinction of religion will enjoy complete civil and economic equality. [Signed and dated at Jerusalem; text in French, Arabic and Hebrew. Karam signed also for Shihade; Sfeir signed also for Hashim.]

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Source: CZA, S25/9907. Above text is my translation from the French.

Document 17

*Proposed Arab-Jewish Entente: Note of Conference at 34,
Park Street, London [Home of James de Rothschild]
7 November 1921*

Present:- Mr James de Rothschild, Dr Weizmann, Riadh Eff. El Sulh, Mr I. Ben-Avi, Mr Leonard Stein, Mr Wolfenson.
Mr de Rothschild submitted to Dr Weizmann and to Riadh Eff,

a draft basis for discussion, of which a copy is attached [follows]. (Note—This draft was based on a draft prepared by Mr Ben-Avi, in consultation with Riadh Eff and on an alternative draft prepared by Mr Stein.)

Dr Weizmann said that he was disposed to accept Mr de Rothschild's draft, though 'he reserved the right to suggest certain changes of form, if such should appear desirable on further consideration.

It must be understood that he was speaking in his personal capacity and that he had not yet consulted his colleagues, without whose concurrence he could, naturally, not commit the Zionist Organisation.

At the request of Riadh Eff, *Mr de Rothschild* then proceeded to translate the draft into French.

Riadh Eff accepted the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 2 (a) and (b). With regard to article 2 (c), he took exception to the words "when the time is ripe". He pointed out that Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations recognised the independence of territories under "A" Mandates, of which Palestine was one. This was a point on which the Arabs laid great stress. They would also require an express repudiation of the idea of a Jewish State.

Dr Weizmann demurred to an express repudiation. This was a matter in which it was best to let sleeping dogs lie. He could not bind his children and his children's children.

Riadh Eff said that he was convinced that *Dr Weizmann* really envisaged a Jewish state and, indeed, he personally would not respect him if he did not.

After some discussion, it was agreed that Riadh Eff should further consider the draft and should formulate counter-proposals on points on which the draft was unacceptable.

Dr Weizmann suggested, and it was agreed in principle, that negotiations should proceed in London, with a view to the conclusion of a formal agreement at a Conference to be held in Cairo or Jerusalem next February or March.

Mr de Rothschild emphasised the importance of bringing the negotiations to their final stage before the proposed conference was convened.

77 Great Russell Street [Z.O. London Office]

8 November 1921

Arab-Jewish Entente
Draft Basis for Discussion

The following resolution was passed at the Twelfth Zionist Congress held in Carlsbad:—

“We do hereby reaffirm our desire to attain a durable understanding which shall enable the Arab and Jewish peoples to live together in Palestine on terms of mutual respect and to co-operate in making the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which will assure to each of these peoples an undisturbed national development.” In the spirit of this resolution the following notes have been drafted:

Taking note of the Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, and of its subsequent reaffirmation by His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Principal Allied Powers: Deploring the misconceptions which still exist as to the manner in which the Balfour Declaration is to be construed:

1.

The promise of a national home in Palestine made to the Jewish people by His Britannic Majesty's Government (and concurred in by the Principal Allied Powers) is to be interpreted as a promise to secure the international recognition, under the guarantee of the League of Nations, of the right of the Jews to constitute themselves in Palestine as a national unit;*

2.

(a) The Jews on the one hand and the Arabs on the other are to be regarded as living side by side on a footing of perfect equality in all matters, including the official use and recognition of their respective languages.

(b) In areas in which there is a mixed population, the rights of the minority are to be fully guaranteed, including the right of representation on the local administrative bodies.

(c) The existence in Palestine of the Jewish National Home is not to be a bar to the recognition of Palestine, when the time is ripe, as a self-governing commonwealth.

* The words “distinct nationality” have been added, to appear parallel with “national unit”.

3.

The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine will support the demand for the development of self-governing institutions on a representative basis, it being clearly understood that the terms of this agreement will remain binding and inviolable, as will also the provisions of the Mandate, so long as the Mandate is in force.

4.

The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine will support the demand that non-Palestinian officials, with the exception of the High Commissioner, the Civil, Financial and Legal Secretaries, and the heads of the principal Departments, shall be gradually replaced by Palestinians, due regard being had, in the case of District officials, to the Arab or Jewish character, as the case may be, of the population concerned.

5.

Jewish immigration is to be limited by the capacity of Palestine, from time to time, to absorb it, but not otherwise. It is declared ** that there is not nor has there ever been any desire or intention to disturb the existing Arab population or any part of it. The right of the Arab inhabitants and their descendants to the secure enjoyment of their homes and prosperity is unequivocally recognised and guaranteed.

6.

(a) It is agreed that the Law of Nationality should recognise as citizens of Palestine all persons who being presently resident in the country at a date to be subsequently fixed, do not decline such citizenship, provided that no person owing allegiance to another state shall become a citizen until he has renounced such allegiance.

(b) It is further agreed that facilities should be provided for the acquisition of citizenship by persons who take up their permanent residence in Palestine, the qualifying period to be settled by common agreement with the Mandatory Power.

7.

The Zionist Leaders* and the Jews of Palestine will give all

* The word "Leaders" is replaced by the word "Organisation".

** The words "It is declared" are replaced by "The Zionist Organisation declares".

the moral and material support in their power to the various Arab States which have been constituted or are in the process of constitution and will, in general, co-operate wholeheartedly with the Arab people in its efforts to realise its legitimate national aspirations. The Arabs, on their side, will loyally work with the Jews in all matters appertaining to the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

It is the ardent desire of both parties to lay the foundations of a generally Arab-Jewish understanding to the advantage of the Jewish people and the Arab world as a whole and in the interest of the fruitful development of the Near and Middle East.

8.

The Zionist Leaders* categorically re-affirm their repeated assurances that they do not contemplate and have never contemplated the smallest interference with the religious rights and customs of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, for which they undertake to show the most rigorous and scrupulous regard. In particular, do they recognise the Moslem and Christian Holy Places as inviolable and formally repudiate the injurious and wholly unfounded suggestion that it is desired, directly or indirectly to trespass upon them.

The Arabs, on their part, undertake to show an equal regard for the Holy Places and the religious rights and customs of the Jews.

9.

All the various Jewish Organisations,** which have in view the economic reconstruction of Palestine on an extensive scale, will welcome the co-operation of the Arab inhabitants and undertake to afford them a full opportunity of participating in such economic endeavours as they may initiate.

*

Source: PRO, CO 733/16, file 56020. Changes indicated are those which appear in a version of the draft, dated 4 December 1921, in Zionist files. (CZA, S25/3070.)

* The word "Leaders" is replaced by the word "Organisation" (verb and pronoun agreements adjusted as a result)

** "All the various Jewish Organisations" is replaced by "The Zionist Organisation" (verb agreement adjusted accordingly)

Document 18*Meeting between the Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation at the Colonial Office, 29 November 1921*

[Present	<i>Colonial Office:</i>	Mr Shuckburgh (in the chair) Colonel Meinertzhagen Mr Clauson Mr Mills
	<i>Arab Delegation:</i>	Musa Kazim Pasha al-Husaini Mr Shibli Jamal Mr Ibrahim Shammas and three other members
	<i>Zionist Organisation:</i>	Dr Weizmann Dr Feiwel Mr Halpern Mr Stein Mr Shertok

Three sets of minutes are presented below: (a) Colonial Office; (b) Arab Delegation; (c) Zionist Organisation.]

(a)

Mr. Shuckburgh represented the Secretary of State [Mr Churchill].

1. It was agreed at the outset that the proceedings were of an informal nature and were not to be made public.

2. Mr Shuckburgh stated five general propositions concerning Palestine of a non-controversial nature as an indication that there were common grounds

(b)

Shuckburgh, representing the Colonial Secretary, spoke:

1. We would all like Palestine to be happy and in full prosperity.
2. We would all like there to be religious

(c)

Mr Shuckburgh assumed general acceptance of certain assumptions, e.g. all present desired welfare of Palestine, inviolability of Holy Places, etc.

between the two parties.

equality.

3. The Holy Places will remain in the hands of their guardians.

4. We want Palestine to progress in its agriculture and its economy, and it needs money for that.

5. Fourthly [sic], we want Palestine to advance politically.

6. Until, one day, it becomes advanced, it will take its place among the nations and will be politically well-behaved.

7. Until we achieve those wishes, it will definitely have the support of the English government.

7. [sic] England's support for Palestine will be accorded only in special conditions. The most important required condition is that she carry out her pledges which she gave during the war; firstly, the Balfour Declaration.

8. The declaration has two parts: (1) establishment of a Jewish national home; (2) safeguarding the rights of the Arabs.

Again, all agreed that in the initial stages Palestine needed the support and guidance of Great Britain.

(Both sides indicated assent.)

Great Britain could give that support, etc. only on the basis of engagements entered into during the war.

He referred especially to the Balfour Declaration which was incorporated in the Treaty of Seves and in the draft Mandate: note/especially Article 2.

* * *

The declaration was incorporated in the Treaty of Sèvres,

which has not been signed until now. It was mentioned again in the terms of the draft Mandate.

The draft Mandate (article 2) states that the English government is responsible for the establishment of a national home [... gap in original] The English government will assist in the implementation of this work.

The text of the Mandate will no doubt be approved by the Council of the League of Nations. It has not yet approved it.

The League of Nations meeting in August did not examine it, but the matter is no longer as it was at first. The President of the Council of the League of Nations wrote a letter to the Prime Minister here. The Council expects the English government to administer the Mandate in the same existing spirit as the draft mandate until it is finally confirmed. This event will happen immediately, and the government will act in accordance with it.

The [Balfour] Declaration has two parts; it is evident that two

Mandate reiterates the pledge and engages G.B. to take steps to carry it out.

True, approval of League of Nations not obtained. But after last session of League, President of Council wrote to Prime Minister saying (inter alia) "Confident H.M.G. would continue administration of country in spirit of draft mandate until position regularised".

This is what H.M.G. intend to do.

parties are connected in this case. For that reason, the Colonial Secretary [... meaning unclear] leaders of both sides to meet and negotiate about this matter.

With everything he had said, he found fears and misunderstanding.

3. He suggested that both parties should leave the region of abstract politics and discuss concrete realities and he offered two points upon which he invited the parties to give their views:—

The way he suggested: Let us leave high policy aside and leave aside texts of unrealistic explanations. Let us bring up real, practical issues. Let us see what are the frightening things which would happen under British policy in Palestine. Even this meeting makes it possible to bring in measures to eliminate those fears. He did not want to enter into details; rather he wanted to hear from the two sides only, and would mention two important points:

(a) The real fear with which the Arabs regarded the idea of Jewish immigration.

(1) They say that the people are afraid of Jewish immigration. They say that immigration will take away the people's jobs.

He bore in mind that the Pasha had said that we would not object to immigration to the extent that the people could bear it

Suggested that in approaching the question they should begin by getting away from high policy and abstract definitions.

What are the terrible things people are really afraid of?

Two important points.

A. Jewish Immigration. The idea that this means thousands of Jews pouring in like locusts and eating up the land. Nothing of the kind. At recent luncheon at which Secretary of State was present, the Pasha himself said, "No objection to Jewish immigration in itself, so long as it

(he had said it at breakfast) [... meaning unclear] and he didn't know what the Zionists wanted, on the other hand?

When politicians come to find a form of solution, they negotiate and find the form of solution, such as 5, 10, 15, and they find ways to so solve the problem.

[2] Many times the real fear is not the existence of the Jews in Palestine, but rather Jewish supremacy and Jewish domination. Sovereignty and domination are very much [unclear word in original] here, but let's not assume that all our intentions are evil.

If the fears exist, precautionary measures would be taken to remedy them and to make their effects disappear.

We certainly will know the proposals for the creation (of constitutional law) on the question of representation. They are now looking into it in Palestine. The High Commissioner over there is continuing to negotiate with leaders on both sides, and he will not decide anything

did not outrun capacity of country to absorb it". That, to the best of belief, is the policy. I do not imagine Z.O. contemplates anything else.

B. Sometimes suggested that what Arabs really afraid of is setting up of Jewish political ascendancy. No intention of introducing 'Ascendancy' (an ill-omened phrase) into Palestine, cf. Carlsbad Resolution No. 5.

If there were really risk of this, would not remedy be to set up suitable constitutional safeguards?

Proposals for constitution now under consideration, including proposals for introduction of representative elements in Government.

High Commissioner is consulting representatives of various interests and will not submit proposals to us until he has their views.

But still intended

(b) The real fear with which they regarded the contingency of Jewish political ascendancy in Palestine.

Safeguards for the former were already provided by the enunciation of the principle that immigration should depend upon the ability of the country to support the immigrants. Safeguards for the latter were being provided by a Draft Constitution now under consideration whereby the creation and establishment of an elected Legislative Assembly was contemplated.

Could not these two subjects be matters now of frank and open discussion to provide eventually for a *rapprochement* between the two parties?

4. Mussa Kazim Pasha el Husseini stated that the Arab Delegation had already forwarded their idea of a proper solution to the problem of Palestine.

before submitting it to the government here. When the proposals arrive here, it will be possible for them to take our ideas about them into account.

[... meaning unclear] Now he requested the Pasha or Dr Weizmann to listen closely.

The Pasha: Our demands are:

1. The formation of a National Government, with a Representative Assembly elected by the people, who will keep an eye on the Government.
2. The present policy should be nullified and the matter of immigration should be under the control of the National Government.
3. The Holy Places should be in the hands of their guardians.
4. The British Army is unnecessary, and should be replaced by a National Gendarmerie.

later to consult Arab Delegation, if still in London, and also Z.O.

Musa Kazim invited to offer observations said:—

“We have already put forward a solution”. (It should be observed that *Musa Kazim* invariably spoke through *Shibly Jemal* and as a rule apparently on the latter’s promoting.) Pressed to explain what he meant by the solution he referred to the Delegation’s letter to the Colonial Office of (? October 28th).

After some delay, explained Delegation came to confer with Government on following demands:—

- (a) National Assembly, elected by pre-war residents.
- (b) Zionist policy to be rescinded.
- (c) Immigration to be controlled by National Assembly.

5. Mr Shuckburgh pointed out that the solution in question could not be the basis of discussion because His Britannic Majesty's Government insisted on adherence to the Balfour Declaration.

Mr Shuckburgh: As for the National Government, Mr Churchill has said that the country is not ready for the creation of an elective representative assembly. He would only consider any government establishing a Legislative Council, the majority of whose members represent the country and the minorities would be represented (proportional representation). As for executive power, it would be in the hands of the British Government, with the High Commissioner.

The Assembly would have the rights of legislative councils: to enact laws, to implement them, to criticise the government, to ratify the budget. But some powers must remain in the hands of the High Commissioner. It would be possible to discuss the subject of the powers of the High Commissioner later. The High Com-

(d) Holy Places to remain in hands of present guardians.

(e) British Army to be replaced by Gendarmes to be paid out of Palestinian revenue.

Mr Shuckburgh. They must take it that for the present Executive power would be in the hands of H.M.G. acting through High Commissioner.

Musa Kazim. What will be the powers of the Assembly?

Mr Shuckburgh. It will have power to introduce and pass Ordinances, criticize Government, pass Budget, and other such functions as usually exercised by Legislative Assembly. But certain powers would have to be reserved to High Commissioner, — exactly how was a matter for discussion. Probably High Commissioner

missioner had the right to stop their implementation, just as in the dominions the King had the right to veto any law whatsoever. But he did not see this as the time [to discuss] this issue in detail.

Our aim today at this meeting is to bring together the two parties so that we might reach an agreement in principle for work in Palestine.

6. Dr Weizmann made a statement in which he professed to disregard all the events of the past six months and the pin-pricks of earlier periods.

Dr Weizmann: He thanked the representative, of the British Government for putting before us clearly the purpose of this meeting. He was sure that the work of the British Government was very difficult, and it appears that the goal of the two parties was to facilitate the business of H.M.G. in the execution of their aim. He wanted, in a brief word, to divert attention from the events of the last six months. He declared, with sorrow, that the events of the first half-year had caused pain for all who hold dear the honour of Palestine.

In spite of the great distance which exists between the two parties, he had a hope

would have power of reserving for S. of S. Ordinances on particular subjects. This was a common practise, but it would be best to await written draft of Constitution. Object today is to arrive at basis for discussion between Jews and Arabs with view to common action.

Dr Weizmann. I will disregard what has happened in last six months. It is deplorable and I am sure everyone who cares for good of Palestine deplores it.

Still hopeful solution will be found which will unite both forces which are necessarily

that some form of solution would be found for the administration of the country.

He wanted to remind His Grace, the Pasha, that he had been the first man to receive him when he set foot on Palestinian soil. On that occasion His Grace, the Pasha, had explained to Dr Weizmann that he was striving for the restoration of Palestine and for the up-building of the colonies there.

[... gaps in original]

He and his responsible colleagues had attempted many times to make an agreement with the Arabs. It appears that he had succeeded many times to meet one of the great leaders, the Amir Faisal (he might possibly have done so), who strove to resolve the Arab question at the time of the war and was authorised [to do so]. Some Palestinians were with him, like his Secretary, Awni [Abd al-Hadi]. On every occasion Dr Weizmann and his colleagues strove to explain that their aims in Palestine were to make Palestine prosperous.

working for the up-building of Palestine.

On my first arrival in Palestine the Pasha told me that long ago he had been working with Jews for up-building of Palestine and especially for up-building of Jewish Colonies.

At that time (April 1918) we repeatedly tried to come to an understanding with the Arabs. The one important representative of the Arab nation who was acceptable to us was Feisul. We were in contact, not only with him, but with many of his entourage, who included a number of Palestinians.

We made it clear what we aimed at.

He argued that his views had been completely understood by the Emir Feisal and had been accepted by him as the representative of the Arab world. The two nations kindred in blood and language could hope for a prosperous and happy country through the agency of mutual good-will.

Before the end of the war he met Faisal in Ma'an, and after that in Paris. Before they presented their demands to the Peace Conference, the Amir negotiated with his organisation. He wanted to remind us of the text of the statement which the Amir Faisal had made: [... meaning unclear] These are the principles on which he and his associates had agreed with Arab leaders. Among these leaders were "the late Mufti and Awni Abd al-Hadi". His colleagues in Palestine have had contacts on various subjects.

Awni is a Palestinian. With leaders in Palestine [gap in original]. He didn't give their names now: Nashashibi and others, whom he did not identify.

He had written a note requesting a meeting with the Delegation, and the moment of this joint meeting now is a solemn moment.

He believed the interests of both sides deserved a speedy agreement.

He did not trouble himself to know what

During war I visited F. at Maan, and subsequently in Paris. Before we submitted our proposals to Peace Conference, F. and his colleagues were informed of them, and F. public approved of them.

(Reads Feisul's letter to Frankfurter)

An Arab representative.
Did Dr W. negotiate with Arabs of Palestine[?]

Dr Weizmann.
Yes - e.g. with the late Mufti [Kamil al-Husseini and with Faisal's secretary, who was a Palestinian, - [Awni] Abdul Hadi.

(Arab representative still presses for names of Palestinians)

Dr Weizmann,
proceeding. - When Arab Delegation arrived, I wrote them a letter. I received no reply[.] However, I disregard that.

This is a solemn moment, and we are both interested in coming to a practical understanding.

the British Government would do in Palestine.

When the drafting of the basic law is concluded, they will submit it to us, for each party to state its observations. However, he wanted to make clear something that was said at Carlsbad, and that is: "The Balfour Declaration does not impose any harm on the legitimate rights of the country" [... gap in original] He did not want a quarrel. One of the widespread views on the matter of immigration is that the Jews will evict and dispossess the Arabs of their lands. [meaning unclear ...] He had not found one evicted from his lands. He wanted to declare that the Jews had in Palestine [enough] land for colonisation plans for five or six years and would not need more. According to the opinion of experts who are authorised, [we have] a capability of settling 300,000 Jews. But we are not thinking of carrying out emigration on this scale for at least ten years. Therefore, he did not find the slightest harm has

When draft constitution shown to us, we shall have opportunity of offering our remarks.

We only like to repeat what was said at Carlsbad, - carrying out of Balfour Declaration does not mean infringement of legitimate interests of Arab population.

Desired to give one illustration. One of principal Arab grievances is that if Jewish immigration goes on, Jews will evict Arabs from their land.

Not a single Arab has in fact been evicted by a Jew. Not only so, but I would like to say that we have enough land in P. now to go on colonising for next five or six years without buying another square inch.

According to opinion of qualified experts, we can eventually settle on lands we have now about 300,000 Jews.

But we do not contemplate an immigration anything like that within next ten years. We can go on

touched the rights of the Arabs. On the contrary, the Jewish people are paying more than £1 million sterling each year. At least half this amount enters the pockets of Arabs in legitimate ways. These are the facts. He did not find propaganda which refuted these facts. He believed that it was enough that the amount of taxes which the Jews paid was far greater than their numbers [warranted]. [... meaning unclear]

He did not want to enter into details. The Arabs had grievances. He was not aware whether they were in the right or not – and he would not claim that the truth was always with the Jews.

There was one way to a solution: we should agree on this basis that the two parties shall build up the country with joint efforts. It was possible for him to have proposed a form of solution. Look at this map. Let us suppose we proceed along these lines. The obvious thing would be to form the Jewish community having special interests, and

without in slightest degree encroaching on Arab interests.

On contrary Jews now spend over £1,000,000 in P. a year, and at least half of this goes (quite legitimately) into Arab pockets.

Look at taxable capacity of Jews and you will find they contribute out of all proportion to their numbers.

As for Arab grievances, I do not pretend we are always right. But whatever grievances both sides have, we can only deal with them by accepting principle that we have got to build up P. together.

I could have proposed easy solution. (Shows map)

Look at this Map. We could proceed on lines there indicated, and built up a strong, self-sufficient Jewish Community surrounding ourselves with an iron wall and

He insisted that Zionism meant no encroachment upon the legitimate political aspirations of the indigenous Arabs.

He might, if he had chosen, have concentrated upon measures which would have resulted in Palestine being divided into two – one half purely Jewish the other purely Arab. But that solution was not to the advantage of

Palestine and he preferred to treat the future Palestine as a country where the two nations could live in political harmony and related reciprocally as Palestinian citizens. He also stated that he had been in touch with many Arab leaders who were in sympathy with this view.

this community would not have the remaining section.

It was possible to encircle themselves with a wall of iron. That would be like King Solomon's Judgment.

But this is not our intention. Every loyal patriot does not even want it. The Government certainly does not want it; neither does the League of Nations. Our intention is to live side by side and that we help one another. If we have grievances, which is natural and always inevitable, let us clarify these grievances openly without exaggeration, and their solution will not be possible except on the basis of respect of the two parties for each other. He did not want to accuse anyone. He believed a policy of riots and killing would be ruinous for the country, and he wanted [to say that] this would turn against it. This policy did not destroy the Jewish nation in Germany and elsewhere. The policy has destroyed Russia and Germany. He did not accuse anyone and [... meaning unclear] that we all regretted

leaving rest of Palestine as it is. That would be a judgment of Solomon: it would be cutting the child in two. That is what we do not want, and what every Palestinian patriot does not want and certainly what H.M.G. does not want nor the League of Nations.

We must go forward side by side, helping one another, and if, as is natural, grievances arise, they should be clearly formulated without exaggeration face to face and settled on the basis of mutual respect.

One more word. A policy of pogroms in P. will be ruinous for P. It will be a boomerang. Pogroms have destroyed many greater nations. They have never destroyed Jewry in Russia and they will certainly not destroy it in P. They *have* destroyed Russia.

I accuse no one. I hope we all deplore these outbreaks.

In any case he took his stand on the Draft Mandate the principles of which were unalterable. He offered to open discussions with the Arabs on the points mentioned by Mr Shuckburgh.

these incidents.

If the Delegation (his final words) would agree, on the foregoing basis, to the Draft Mandate, it would be possible for us to negotiate about the grievances which we could settle here or in Palestine, among ourselves or through the mediation of the Government. Precious time has been lost until now.

It would be better for everyone if we carry on these talks, and unite in coming to the English Government and present our thoughts to it.

He did not want to enter into a theoretical discussion: did we have the right to share in the restoration of Palestine[?] But he repeated that the restoration would have a good effect on the two nations. In this spirit he requested the gentlemen [to negotiate].

* * *

Mr Shuckburgh: We have heard pleasing words. He [Dr Weizmann] had officially invited us to enter officially into negotiation with him. The Minister wants this thing and would feel great disappointment

If gentlemen on other side would accept principle of mandate and formulate their grievances, my colleagues and I would be ready to discuss those grievances, whether here or in Palestine, whether among ourselves or under Presidency of a representative of H.M.G.

Too much time has been lost already. It will be easier for all of us if we unite in coming to H.M.G. and expressing our wishes with regard to the future of the country.

I have not entered upon an academic discussion as to whether we had the right to build national home in P. That is for us beyond discussion. I repeat that this upbuilding will be to the advantage of both nations and in this spirit I invite my friends opposite to enter into discussion.

Mr Shuckburgh. Dr W. has made conciliatory speech and given definite invitation. Speaking for S. of S., I should be much disappointed if that invitation rejected. It has always been view of H.M.G. that

if we refused.

The view of the Government [... gap in original]

There always existed two parties who had important interests in Palestine. The best way was for these two parties to come together, to negotiate, and to place before the Government a form of solution which results from the negotiation. It was the intention and the desire of the English Government to hold the balance equally between the two parties and to carry out the two parts of the Balfour Declaration justly and honourably. He knew that it was said that the two parts were inconsistent, with no reconciliation between them. But the Government believed that an accommodation was possible between the two, and it was the task of the Government to reconcile the two parties. Of course it was possible for the English Government to force an agreement upon the two parties by saying that this is what it wants and this must be carried out. But every one of us believes that an

best course is for both interests to endeavour to come together and place before us something in the nature of agreed proposals.

It is the desire and intention of H.M.G. to hold balance equally and to carry out both parts of B.D. honourably and fairly.

H.M.G. has never accepted the view that the two parts of B.D. are inconsistent and irreconcilable.

H.M.G. could, of course, impose a settlement on both parties; but everyone must agree imposed settlement cannot be compared with one based on agreement of both parties concerned.

agreement which is imposed on the people from outside should not predominate over the other [kind of agreement].

The first [kind of] agreement would be a military solution. It does not mean an increase in the armed forces, but it would be military [in the sense that] it would not be with the approval of the two parties involved in this issue. We ask the members of the Delegation to accept Dr Weizmann's intention regarding negotiations on this question.

He hoped that we would not enter into theoretical questions.

He read to us the Carlsbad Resolution: 'It is the aim of the Jews to come to Palestine and to share

I appeal to my friends of the Arab delegation to consider Dr W's invitation to discussion in a conciliatory spirit.

Musa Kazim. Will discussion be based on acceptance by us of B.D.?

Mr Shuckburgh. Discussion must be based on acceptance by both sides of both parts of B.D.

Musa Kazim. What is the B.D.?

Mr Shuckburgh. You will remember earlier in afternoon I begged you to get away from definitions and abstractions.

Musa Kazim. We want to know on what basis Jews are coming in.

Mr Shuckburgh reads Carlsbad Resolution (Political) No. 5.

7. *Mussa Kazim Pasha el Husseini* replied that the Delegation had already informed His Britannic Majesty's Government that the Draft Mandate was unacceptable, and had also protested to the League of Nations against its terms. They did not understand the meaning of the Balfour Declaration. Why could not His Britannic Majesty's Government give a clear interpretation so that Arabs might know where they were? In the present circumstances they were unable to discuss anything at all since they knew not what to discuss.

with the Arabs in making it prosper in such a way that each of the two parties will promote its nationality without oppressing the other'. He repeated [these] words and hoped we would enter into negotiations: We both understood that the Government wants us to work out a statement. Mr Churchill believes, above anything, that we should agree together and reach a solution, which he will submit to the Government.

Musa Kazim. We had hoped H.M.G. would make statement on its policy in Palestine and that that would be preliminary to any further discussion.

Mr Shuckburgh. Mr Churchill, as intimated at recent luncheon, subsequently thought it better to proceed on more informal lines.

Musa Kazim. We did not come here to come to an understanding with the people whom we consider as aggressors but to negotiate with H.M.G. to save us from injustice which is being done.

We do not recognise right of anyone in Palestine, except that of people who live there.

We have sent in our demands to H.M.G. and we ask H.M.G. to reply to them.

Mr Shuckburgh. Am I to take it that the offer of discussion is declined?

Musa Kazim. Yes if it is to be on basis of B.D.

At any rate we must

begin with an interpretation of the B.D. Dr Eder has stated that Arabs are not to have equal rights.

Dr Weizmann. Issue has now shifted from rescinding of B.D. to its interpretation.

Look at Mandate. Mandate says H.M.G. to encourage Jewish immigration consistently with interest of population and with its position, which includes its political position.

We cannot recede from claim to right, subject to limitations of Article 6, of Jews of whole world to enter Palestine. We are attached to it by religious and historic ties which no force in the world can break.

[Dr Weizmann:] He said that Jews all over the world had the right to enter Palestine and that no power and no right would stop them from [doing] that. This way is mentioned in the draft Mandate.

We did not want to rule over the Arabs. If there are some people who want to rule, it is the English. A League of Nations exists, [but] all the declarations it issues are without benefit.

What we do want is to form and establish a national homeland in Palestine for the Jews. There also exists, now, an Arab national homeland as well, and we want them to participate with each other to

We do not wish to rule over the Arabs. If we did, we should be prevented by H.M.G., by League of Nations, and by the conscience of the world.

What we want to create is Jewish national home in P. There exists an Arab national home there. We want these two national homes to work together to create a flourishing P. and perhaps our chil-

make Palestine happy. It would be possible, in fifty years, [for] our children [to discuss the position].

* * *

The Pasha: We recognise only one Arab homeland. We have protested against the draft Mandate to the League of Nations and we don't recognise anyone else's right in our country.

* * *

Shuckburgh: If there were an acceptable explanation [of the Balfour Declaration], were we prepared to negotiate with the Zionists [?]

8. Mr Shuckburgh informed the Delegation that the Draft Mandate must stand but it might be possible to offer a new formula in regard to the substance of the Balfour Declaration and its legal corollary the Draft Mandate. Supposing that it were possible to draw up a formula of this kind as a basis of discussion, would the Arabs be willing to enter discussion again? At one time they had demanded the complete rescission of the Declaration: now it appeared that they would be willing to negotiate upon an interpretation of that Declaration other than those already advanced.

9. The Delegation

dren in fifty years will re-discuss the position. That is all, but that is enough.

Musa Kazim. We cannot recognise Palestine as home of any people but the Arabs. As to terms of Mandate, we have protested against them both to H.M.G. and to League of Nations. We think best solution is to leave the matter to H.M.G.

Mr Shuckburgh. If you did know what B.D. meant would you be prepared to enter into a discussion?

[Musa Kazim:] No.

Musa Kazim. Yes-

replied that they would welcome another interpretation: it might form the basis of discussion but the Government were to remember that the Draft Mandate was quite repugnant. (The implication was that the new formula might still be unacceptable and would lead them again to demand the rescission of the Balfour Declaration and its *sequelae*).

(Initialed:)
E[ric] M[ills]
30.11.1921

*

SOURCE: PRO, CO 537/855. Note: The comments of E. Mills, which compensate for the relative brevity of the C.O. minutes, are given below.

Only with the Government.

* * *

Mr Shuckburgh said: The thinking of the Minister was not to present an interpretation different from the first one. He would put [it] before the Minister and obtain an interpretation.

* * *

[The meeting] terminated after lasting approximately two hours.

*

SOURCE: Hand-written notes taken by member of Arab Delegation during the meeting, as reproduced in *DPNM*, 184-86. My translation from the Arabic. Asterisks appear in the original text. Order slightly readjusted.

- with H.M.G.
Mr Shuckburgh. But not with Z.O.?

Musa Kazim. Let us have interpretation first then we will see.

Mr Shuckburgh. If chance of further formula leading to useful discussion I would be prepared to submit to S. of S. that we should be authorised to prepare such a formula. But it must be understood that the formula will be in accordance with the Mandate, which will not be departed from.

*

SOURCE: WA.

Comments by Mr Mills on proceedings at joint discussion with Arab Delegation and Zionists.

1. Dr. Weizmann, while his speech was conciliatory, adopted an unfortunate manner in delivering it. His attitude was of the nature of a conqueror handing to beaten foes the terms of peace. Also I think he despises the members of the Delegation as not worthy protagonists – that it is a little derogatory to him to expect him to meet them on the same ground.
2. The unanimity of the Arab Delegation is, I am sure, artificial. They are forced to adopt an uncompromising attitude because:—
 - (a) they know they are discredited in Palestine.
 - (b) they know that if any one of them weakens the remainder will attach to him all ignominy when they return to Palestine.
3. In Palestine itself the Arab population shows signs of weariness of political strife, but their feelings will run high if provocative action be taken by the Zionists or the Govt. Probably they will accept with resignation the situation when the mandate is definitely granted.
4. It seems to me that it is quite hopeless to expect Arabs and Zionists to meet on common ground when that ground is already occupied by H.B.M. Government on the Balfour Declaration, no matter what be the interpretation of that Declaration and no matter in what form its substance is embodied.
5. I am inclined to think that there are only two modes of action:—
 - (a) Allow dilatory measures with the Delegation to continue until either their funds are exhausted or until the people in Palestine express a desire that the Delegation should no longer profess to represent them. (N.B. The Delegation are now said to be feeding at Slater's Restaurant, although it is possible that funds may be expected from Syrians in America).

(b) Summon both parties before the Secretary of State and tell them firmly that *we* are going to govern the country and that we shall tolerate no more provocation by the Zionist publicists and no more activity from a small band of not disinterested Arabs.

This course is to be recommended if the mandate can be granted in the immediate future and after that mandate is granted.

6. In Palestine we may have to face disorders, but it is more likely that we shall have to prepare for non-co-operation by Arab officials and municipalities, (provided always that both the Palestine Government and Zionists do not openly give the impression of tending to encroach upon Arab rights). In time it would be seen that the policy of non-co-operation did not hurt the Jews and did not break up the Government machinery altogether (many Arabs could be found to occupy existing posts should the present occupants decide to carry out the policy of non-co-operation).

(Initialled) E.M. 30/11.

*

Source: PRO, CO 537/855.

Document 19

*Letter from Dr Weizmann to Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office, 1 December 1921*

I have given careful consideration to the proceedings at the Colonial Office on November 29th, when I had the advantage of meeting members of the Palestine Arab Delegation for the purpose of an informal exchange of views. I desire now to draw attention to certain conclusions which appear to me to emerge.

2. After refusing, at the outset, to recognise the Balfour Declaration, the Arab representatives shifted their ground

and ended by pressing for its re-interpretation. This indicates, to my mind, a certain weakening and suggests that the Arab Delegation is conscious of the futility of a frontal attack.

3. On the other hand, I am convinced that the Delegation will never come to grips with concrete realities, so long as it has any hope, however illusory, of securing by a side-wind what could at least be represented as a change of policy. Before any progress can be made, it is essential that the Delegation should realise that the Mandate is regarded by His Majesty's Government as *chose jugée*. Any suggestion of a re-statement, as distinct from a reiteration, of British policy in Palestine could only have the effect of gravely impairing any prospect there may be of a working agreement on issues of practical importance. It would at once weaken very seriously the bargaining-power of the Zionist Organization and encourage interminable debates of an abstract character, from which no practical advantage could result.

4. I venture to suggest, therefore, that before any progress can be effected, it must be made clear to the Arab Delegation, beyond any possibility of doubt, that the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate are intangible [sic] and that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to embark upon an analysis of them in the abstract. Faced with an unambiguous intimation to this effect, the Delegation, which appears, as I have suggested, to be already weakening, will doubtless see the expediency of descending into the region of practical politics.

5. The Zionist Organization remains, on its side, fully prepared to enter into the discussion of a working agreement. I desire only to reiterate my conviction that no such discussion can be fruitful, so long as the basis on which alone it can be conducted appears, to the Arab eye, to be shifting.

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Source: LCW X, 304f.

Document 20

*First Meeting between Zionist Delegation and representatives
of the "Executive Committee of the Congress of Parties
of the Confederation of Arab Countries",
Cairo, 18 March 1922*

On the 18th of March 1922, at 5:00 p.m., two delegations, one representing the Zionist Organization and the other the "Executive Committee of the Congress of Parties of the Confederation of the Arab Countries" met in Cairo with the purpose of reaching, after an exchange of views, an understanding which would make it possible for both parties to collaborate in the development of Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and other Arab countries on a footing of equality of rights and interests.

In holding that meeting both parties were actuated by their reciprocal desire to inaugurate a new era of peace and understanding and in order to put an end to the dissensions and misunderstandings which divide them and which, if continued, would only react to the detriment of their interests, both common and individual, and would retard the realization of the legitimate aspirations of both parties.

Having recognized this necessity, each of the two parties declared that it is cognisant of the other party as a power with whom it was highly desirable and particularly useful to reach complete understanding.

The Arab delegation declares that their countries, after several centuries of destructive and corrupt administration, are finding it impossible to reconstitute themselves in order to take their assigned place in the world once again without the close collaboration between the nationals of these countries and the agents of civilization [which] are divided into two categories:

- 1) well-established European peoples, in other words, colonialist powers, whose presence in relatively backward countries constitutes a particularly grave danger to the independence and political unity of these countries; [and]

2) the Jewish nation, originating in the East, whose members dispersed around the world constitute one of the best forces on which modern civilization and progress are based.

Taking into consideration the ancient origin of the Jewish nation which, without doubt, is historically related to the Arabs; and considering, on the other hand, that Jewish colonization does not present any political peril, since the Jews who settle in a country become attached to it, make it their fatherland [*patrie*] and as a result do not colonize [it] for the benefit of a specific foreign power; the Arab delegates declare that in order to advance their countries towards modern civilization and progress they give all preference to the Jews, and would be particularly happy to collaborate with them to the end that the Jews may become, to the greatest possible extent, the agents of the external civilization of which the Arabs are in need.

In reply to this declaration, the Jewish delegates, expressing happiness at the confidence shown to them, and insisting for their part on the old relationship, declared their readiness to collaborate [with the Arabs] in the inauguration of an era of peace and work and to be the factor of peace and progress in the above-mentioned countries. On the other hand, they drew the attention of the Arab delegates to the specific legal interests and aspirations which the Jews have in Palestine as their historical and national cradle [*berceau*].

While recognizing these aspirations, the Arab delegates asked that the discussion should not have as its basis either the Balfour Declaration or the accord entered into between the British and King Husain [the McMahon-Husain correspondence]. The accord to be reached between the two parties must not be influenced by either of those two political documents. Arabs and Jews must discuss, today, as nation to nation, make mutual concessions and recognize each other's rights.

The accord to be reached should comprise two parts: (1) the object, (2) the means of execution.

The goal is the complete and final independence of the above-mentioned countries joined in confederation.

On this occasion, the Arab delegates clearly specified that it was not their intention to ask the Jews to declare themselves against foreign governments, just as they did not intend, for

their part, to begin their political work by a show of hostility towards these same governments.

The work which should unite Jews and Arabs in close collaboration will be a long process, and the two parties appreciate full well that the object towards which they are jointly striving is not one which can be attained overnight. But it is agreed that from now on they would work together, by harmonious and systematic preparation in all spheres of activity and by every legal means, towards shortening the term of the mandates.

This will constitute the basis of an accord between the two parties in which all the means of execution will be specified in detail.

After approving the Arab declaration, the Jewish delegates specified their immediate demands and presented them in this form:

- 1) Peace and tranquillity in Palestine.
- 2) The cessation of all hostilities against immigration and settlement of Jews in Palestine within the scope of the economic capacity of the country once the accord is signed.
- 3) The cessation of anti-Jewish propaganda by the Arab press and by Arab committees in Palestine and abroad.

In exchange for this, the Jews would place at the service of the Arabs all the political, economic and propaganda resources at their disposal. In a word, they will collaborate sincerely with the Arabs towards the realization of the final goal already determined. As for the guarantees which the Arabs would have to give the Jews, the Jewish delegation insisted, in particular, on the rioting which could erupt in Palestine during the month of April on the occasion of the holidays [Nebi Musa and Easter] as a result of the excitement of mob feeling.

The Arab delegation was quick to recognize that the demand was well-founded and, wishing to give the Jews a first tangible proof of the sincerity with which they intended to cooperate with them, suggested that it would undertake as soon as possible the pacification of spirits in Palestine with a view to preventing the troubles in question. It declared that it has now decided to delegate one of its members in Palestine to bring to the organizations in that country a message of

peace in the name of the congress. For their part, the Jewish delegates must devote themselves to preventing any provocative demonstration on their side.

As regards the guarantees which the Arabs requested from the Jews, the Arab delegates felt they had to confer with other members of their Congress, and thus stated that they would present their demand for guarantees at a subsequent meeting to be held the next day, March 19th, at 3:00 p.m.

*

Source: PRO, FO 371/3773, file E3559/65/65. My translation from the French, in conjunction with A. Saphir's translation and texts as submitted to the Peel Commission (1937), in CO 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. Some parts of the minutes in FO 371 are erroneously combined with those of the meeting of 19 March (below, Document 21) and have been correctly reassembled here.

Document 21

Minutes of Second Meeting, Cairo, 19 March 1922

The two parties met again for a second session on the 19th of March at 3:00 p.m. The Jewish delegates asked for clarifications regarding the rights and interests which the Arabs would be granting them in Palestine.

The Arab delegates went over the principles which would have to constitute the basis of a common programme for the two parties with the following formula:

Complete independence of the Arab countries, with Palestine as the Jewish National Home, where the Jews and the Arabs shall constitute a Palestinian national unit with equality of rights and duties. Jewish culture and civilization will develop freely in Palestine for the common good.

As for the guarantees, whatever they are they can in no way have any real value unless both parties execute them with sincerity. To this end, the two parties commit themselves to use all their honesty and the honour of their word in the service of the said programme.

The Arabs, while recognizing the difficult character of the

execution of this programme, will begin working immediately after the signing of the entente towards the pacification of spirits and to prepare the [population], carefully and surely, to accept these new principles.

The delegate whom they promised to send to Palestine to bring the word of peace on the occasion of the [Nebi Musa and Easter] April holidays will leave during the coming week.

The Jewish delegates, for their part, will devote themselves, as was agreed at the previous session, to preventing any provocative demonstrations on the part of their coreligionists.

The Arab delegates were not asking the Jews to declare themselves against the British Mandate for Palestine, but they insist that the Zionist Organization should refuse to support the obtaining of other mandates in other Arab countries of the Arabian peninsula. As for the position which the Arabs will have to take on the Palestine Mandate, this will be the subject of an entente between the two parties through the setting up of a joint committee.

This joint committee, the establishment of which was proposed by the Arab delegates, will consist of the members of the Arab Executive Committee [of the Cairo Congress] and any Jewish members who will be delegated for this purpose by the Zionist Organization (a maximum of four, equal to the number of Arab delegates).

This joint committee will elaborate the programme and its execution in all its details, will agree on the means to take to bring the efforts of the two parties towards the common goal. The Arab delegates declare that they have already been provided with the necessary powers to sign any entente and to work out any programme, as well as [to decide] the composition of the said committee.

The Jewish delegates, while accepting in their private capacities all the principles already enumerated, declare that they must confer with the head office of their organization before they can definitely sign the accords.

The signatures will be forthcoming once the Jewish delegates have obtained the necessary full powers for this purpose.

*

Source: See source of preceding document.

Document 22

Minutes of Third Meeting, Cairo, 2 April 1922

The two parties met for the third time on the 2nd of April, 1922 at 4:00 p.m.

The Zionist representatives stated that they were officially instructed to communicate the contents of a telegram from Dr Chaim Weizmann, President of their organization, who was presently in Rome. The telegram read as follows:

After having read the documents approve entirely your negotiations. We accept in principle projected accords. We nominate Sokolow, Eder, Menasche, Kalvarisky as our delegates on the joint committee to continue to negotiate and establish the text of an accord. If our presence necessary, will come. If not, will sign accord in Geneva. This latter course will be preferable. Try to precise more clearly Palestine question.*

The Arab delegation took note of this communication and manifested its desire to see the joint committee constituted and commence work as early as possible. However, they drew the attention of the Jewish representatives to the fact that the presence of Mr Sokolow in America and the presence of two other members in Palestine did not seem to permit commencement of the work of the joint committee with as much speed as they had wished to proceed in the general interest. They asked that, if it was impossible for the four members nominated by Dr Weizmann to arrive within a very short time, other delegates be nominated in their place to proceed with the work as quickly as possible.

*The wording of this telegram seems to have been embellished by the Zionist delegates. The two recorded telegrams from Weizmann authorizing Eder to pursue the negotiations read: (1) "Yours Cairo. Fully agree; wire further progress..." (21 March) and (2) "Agree proceed fully informing High Commissioner. Treaty must emphasize our priority Palestine. Form mixed committee. Suggest Eder, Kalvarisky, Menasche, Sokolow. Could final signature [be] arranged Rome, or [is] my coming necessary?" (30 March). See *LCW* ix, 75.

The Jewish delegates took note of this suggestion and said they wished to have the following points elucidated:—

- 1) whether the Arab delegates were in a position to produce documents certifying as to their authority,
- 2) whether the organization which delegated them was favourable to His Majesty Faisal, King of Mesopotamia, as well as to His Majesty Husain I, King of the Hejaz,
- 3) whether the Arab delegates were not of the opinion that it would be advantageous to have one or two Palestinian members join in the negotiations, seeing that the latter will, in any case, be the most directly affected [*les principaux intéressés*] by all questions pertaining to that country,
- 4) whether the Arab organizations had among their members representatives of the Christian Arab community,
- 5) whether the Arab delegates were not in full accord with the Jews as to a policy of friendship towards the Great Powers, it being understood that this friendship was not to be of a nature to hinder in any way the final object to which both parties look forward.

The Arab delegates replied:—

As to the FIRST POINT, when we decided in principle upon mutual collaboration we had no desire to ask the Jews to give any guarantee, but wished, on the contrary, to offer them one. With regard to the authority of our organization, this could not be better proved than by facts and tangible proofs.

In addition to the document attesting to our authority, which we shall produce to the Jewish delegates on their producing their own credentials, we propose to annex to the treaty of accord a clause providing that, in the event of our not being able to prove our authority for the execution of decisions which will be taken by the joint committee, such accords shall be deemed to be null and void.

As to the SECOND POINT, Their Majesties Faisal and Husain are two soldiers in the Arab cause. Like all the sons of Arabia, they work in harmony with the Arab organizations. In case of necessity we shall be able to obtain documents from

Their Majesties attesting to this truth and/or get Their Majesties to make a verbal declaration to the Zionist delegates, thereby proving their complete approbation of our policy in this matter.

As to the THIRD POINT, no one can influence our decisions concerning the constitution of the members of our Executive. Nevertheless, we shall be able, if necessary, to put the Jews in touch with such Palestinian personalities as they may desire to confer with.

As to the FOURTH POINT, the Arab organizations do not desire that there should be any difference between Christian and Moslem Arabs. All are considered equal and brothers, but if the Jews so desire, we shall be able to demonstrate to them that the Christian element is widely represented in our organization.

As to the FIFTH POINT, we desire to bring to mind the minutes of our two preceding meetings when it was categorically stipulated on our side that we desired under no circumstances to manifest any hostility against any of the Allies. We wish to add that we count upon the friendship of the Allies, who themselves desire the realization of our national aspirations.

The Jewish delegates rendered homage to the precision and the frankness of this declaration.

In view of the fact that the Jewish special envoy who went to Italy [S. van Vriesland] to convey the documents relative to this question to Dr Weizmann was due to arrive the following morning at Alexandria, the meeting was adjourned to the next day without fixing the hour, so as to allow the Jewish delegates to acquaint themselves with the instructions sent to them by Dr Weizmann.

*

Source: CO 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. Text follows A. Saphir's translation, with modifications in accordance with the original French text.

Document 23*Minutes of Fourth Meeting, Cairo, 4 April 1922*

The meeting opened on the 4th of April, 1922, at 11:00 a.m. in the presence of the envoy who carried Dr Weizmann's instructions.

The protocol of the preceding meeting having been read and certain corrections having been made in the text, the special envoy conveyed Dr Weizmann's anxiety to see the Joint Committee constituted and commencing its work as early as possible. This desire was confirmed by the suggestion of the Arab delegates as noted in the protocol of the preceding meeting, and was accepted with satisfaction.

It was therefore decided that the Joint Committee should meet at the end of next week. Meanwhile, the Jewish delegates who were to have returned to Palestine on the same day would prepare their own draft agreement as a basis of the accord. The Arabs for their part would draw up their own proposals.

The envoy added that Dr Weizmann was delighted to learn of the result of the Jewish-Arab negotiations and would be very happy to see them reach a complete accord. It had always been his desire to reach an understanding with the Arabs. His duties presently kept him in Rome, but as soon as he was free he would come to Cairo to take part in the negotiations and, if unavoidably prevented, he would be happy to meet the members of the Executive somewhere in Europe in order to countersign the agreement. Nothing could prove better his desire to collaborate with the Arabs than his negotiations with Faisal when His Majesty was in London.

The President of the Arab Executive [Rashid Rida] replied by thanking Dr Weizmann and declaring that he had no doubt of the sincerity of his desire to collaborate with the Arabs. They were aware of his negotiations with His Majesty King Faisal. The road to accord and collaboration was today opened. We must proceed with frankness and confidence.

There were some Moslem and Christian Arabs who claimed that the Jewish reign was condemned never again to

see the light of day. We believe and wish to the contrary. So far as I am personally concerned, I have given expression to that wish through my commentaries on the Koran.

The Jewish delegates asked for a copy of that part of the commentaries in which reference was made to them and were given the assurance that they would be provided with such a copy as soon as possible.

At the end of the meeting the Arab delegates expressed their desire that the Jewish delegates who had hitherto conducted the negotiations with them and who, thanks to their tact and sincerity, had won all their sympathy, might be asked not to withdraw from the negotiations, and might continue to lend their valuable support and put their knowledge of men and affairs at the disposal of the Joint Committee until such time as an agreement had been reached.

*

Source: See source of preceding document. The minutes of all four meetings were taken by Emile Khouri. No draft proposals for the text of an agreement were found in Zionist files.

Document 24

General Lines of Preliminary Propositions of an Understanding between Arabs and Jews, 7-8 September 1922

As a result of the two conversations which took place on Thursday and Friday, 7th and 8th September, 1922, between the Syro-Palestine Delegation on the one hand and Mr A. Saphir on the other, the following succinct summary was drawn up in common accord.

The conversations are to constitute in principle the basis and the general lines of a Draft Agreement between Arabs and Jews. The said conversations resulted in the following:—

- 1) Arabs and Jews consider themselves mutually as a force which must be taken into consideration. These forces have

the possibility of siding with one another in an effective way with a view to realizing their aspirations. By working together rather than apart or one against the other, they could achieve very satisfactory results for both parties.

2) To facilitate the negotiations of detail to reach this understanding, and to avoid dissatisfaction, it would be convenient that the Jewish organization which would negotiate that accord should not use as an argument, in the course of negotiations, either the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, or the terms of the Mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. During these negotiations, the Arabs would also refrain from using as an argument the Treaty between Great Britain and the Hejaz of 1915.

3) The two parties shall discuss the conditions of an accord basing themselves on the reciprocal aid of united collaboration for the welfare of all the Arab countries, Syria, Mesopotamia, as well as Palestine.

4) Arabs and Jews shall devise the modus of a declaration to be made concerning the particular links of the Jews with Palestine. Such declaration shall be drawn up in a form which, while making clear the attachments of the Jews to Palestine, shall equally establish the rights of the Arab inhabitants of the country and shall be based on the complete equality of all the inhabitants without any distinction of race and religion.

5) The Jews, for their part, shall help the Arabs of the said countries, economically and politically and by such other means in their power as will be deemed useful to employ, to obtain by legal and constitutional means the realization of the final aspirations of these countries.

6) The two parties shall find a common ground of understanding which will unite them in the mutual cause of the union of the two peoples, Arabs and Jews, who belong to one race and speak nearly the same language and who both carry the banners of the same civilization, viz., the civilization of the East. The goal of the two parties must be to restore to its ancient splendour that Semitic and Oriental civilization which

has given everything to the world in the interest of that same civilization, for the specific happiness of these countries which have been abandoned, neglected and ruined during so many centuries. The two parties shall employ all possible and conceivable means to avoid dissatisfaction and dissensions in the course of the negotiations, and to arrive once and for all at a definite and cordial accord between the two peoples, the interests of whom—common as well as individual—moral as well as material—are so closely bound.

7) The two parties shall use all the means at their disposal to find a way to regulate and limit the question of immigration into Palestine or into any other neighbouring Arab country in a manner that will satisfy the two parties concerned.

8) In order to achieve this end and to facilitate the negotiations and the enforcement of the agreement, it is proposed to take immediately into consideration:—

- a) a truce as regards the cessation of anti-Jewish agitation in Palestine must immediately be proclaimed. The intrigues and political antagonism and the machinations of one side against the other, Arabs and Jews in different countries outside Palestine, must cease;
- b) There shall be constituted forthwith a Joint Committee consisting of representatives of the delegation or of the Syro-Palestine Congress as well as authoritative representatives of Palestine (Moslems and Christians) on the one hand, and of representatives of the Zionist Organization which may, if it deems necessary, co-opt other influential personalities in the Jewish world, on the other side. This Joint Committee shall work out all the details of a Draft Agreement on the basis of the principles enunciated above;
- c) When the text of the Draft Agreement has been definitely settled in all its details and accepted by both parties, a new Joint Committee representing the two parties shall be constituted and shall be responsible for the enforcement of that Agreement. When agreement has been reached, the form and the constitution of this Joint Committee, to be known as the Executive Committee,

mittee, shall be prescribed in detail by the Joint Committee charged with the preparation of the Draft Agreement referred to above;

- d) It is well understood and agreed that in order to make it possible for the Delegations to reach a satisfactory conclusion, all negotiations and conversations between the two parties shall be kept secret, except insofar as concerns the persons directly interested, until such time as the text of the Agreement has been definitely settled and accepted.

*

Source: CO 733/343, file 75550/9/A32. The text follows Saphir's translation of the French original, with slight modifications in accordance with the French.

Document 25

*Extract of Letter from H. M. Kalvaryski
to Dr Weizmann, Geneva, 21 September 1922*

[Reports meeting with Shakib Arslan and others; discussions on points drawn up between Saphir and Arabs (Doc. 24).] These preliminary propositions are the same, or nearly the same, as the ones we elaborated before Easter in Egypt, and they present the same disadvantages (paras. 3 and 5). But what is above all inadmissible is the "limitation of Jewish immigration", especially as these gentlemen understand it. The Amir Shakib told me clearly that by the *limitation of immigration* he means that we, on our side, commit ourselves to the assurance that the Arabs will always be a majority in Palestine, that immigration will be regulated in such a way that the Jewish population will not outnumber the Arab, and not even become equal to it. They want the Jews to remain forever as a minority. I told them that here was a point which was unacceptable. They also are insisting on our renouncing the article in the Mandate concerning the creation of a Jewish Agency. Without being quite sure that these two points are accepted by us, they don't want to undertake anything. What do you think? You know how much I desire a Jewish-Arab entente, but the sacrifices which we are being

asked in exchange for their intervention with the Palestinian delegation to make them stop their "intrigues" seem to me too great. I don't deny that the intervention of Shakib Arslan and Ihsan al-Jabiri could have some effect towards pacifying spirits in Palestine, but can we renounce the most precious and most essential things in the Mandate? ...

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Source: WA. My translation from the French.

Document 26

*Extract of Letter from Palestine Zionist Executive
[Col. F. H. Kisch] to the Secretary, Zionist Executive, London
[L. Stein], 12 December 1922*

1) *Arab Negotiations*: Immediately upon arrival at Cairo, Dr Weizmann entered into negotiations with the Group of Arabs who will hereafter be referred to as the "Amour Group", with a view to reaching an understanding on the following basis:—

The Zionist Organisation to recognise and support the Arab desire for a confederation of Arab States comprising in the first instance Palestine, Irak, Transjordan and the Hejaz.

The Arabs to allow the Zionist Organisation a free hand in Palestine and in its dealings with the British Government in regard to Palestine, with the ultimate aim in view that Palestine should become quantitatively and qualitatively Jewish.

A number of interviews took place in Cairo with regard to the above proposition, in the course of which Dr Weizmann was asked whether it would be possible for him in regard to Arab aspirations outside Palestine to cooperate with the Arabs in political action directed against England and France. Dr Weizmann made it clear that such a course would be impossible, which declaration was understood and accepted.

Dr Weizmann explained, however, that he would, in the event of a complete understanding being arrived at, be able to assist the Arabs materially in their political negotiations with England and France.

The negotiations have been continued in Palestine and have reached a stage which justifies the hope that definite cooperation with the Arabs in question, on the above lines, is assured.

To make such cooperation effective as regards our own interests, it is necessary to do everything possible to strengthen the position of the Representatives of the Amour Group in Palestine. This needs money which is at present not available, but without any assistance from us the Amour Group has already made considerable progress in the country within the last few months. Four members of the Group have been elected as Palestinian Representatives at the forthcoming Arab Congress to be convened the 15th of this month at Cairo, and the leaders of the Group hope to be able to command a preponderant voting power at the Congress. The Congress will sit about ten days and Dr Weizmann will be present at Cairo during the later sessions, the results of which will be communicated to you in due course.

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Source: CZA, ZA/4113.

Document 27

*F. H. Kisch, Note of Conversation with
Musa Kazim al-Husaini, 23 October 1923*

The conversation took place at the residence of Dr Helen Kagan. Mahmud Effendi Husseini acted as interpreter. It should be mentioned that this is the first occasion on which I have met Musa Kazim, who has in the past declined the attempts of friends to arrange a meeting, while I would not risk a rebuff by calling on him or inviting him to see me.

I brought the conversation to the question of Palestine by venturing the remark, after a medical discussion, that when a patient is sick it is necessary for all the doctors who are treating him for different ailments should consult together. Musa Kazim replied that when a patient has been reduced to his death agonies, the doctors should leave him alone. I disputed of course his appreciation of the state of the patient in question. Subsequently the conversation was developed in more direct terms and Musa Kazim stated that our programme and his (which he claimed to be representative of the views of the country) were so widely different that consultation would be useless. He stated that the Government was aware of the two programmes, and it was for the Government to decide between one or the other.

He asked on what our claims to Palestine were based. I gave him the reasons on which our claims *to return to Palestine* were based. I explained to him the spirit in which our people return to Palestine, how it is the desire to give to the country all we can and to take nothing from it. He replied we had given nothing, that we had taken the bread out of the mouths of the Arabs. I asked him to explain and he only referred to the employment of Jewish workmen on the roads whereas Arab workmen should have been employed. I told him that in the first place only a small proportion of Jewish workmen were employed by the Government, while the Government paid for the roads out of taxes collected from both communities. I emphasized that the roads were used by the whole population, and that whoever built roads in a country, the opening up of the country invariably tended to increase general economic activities and prosperity.

In connection with my views on the historical biblical argument as constituting one factor in the basis of Jewish claims in Palestine, Musa Kazim stated that if God had placed the children of Israel in Palestine, He had also driven them out and given the country to the children of Ishmael. I pointed out that if He had driven them out, He had also promised that they should return, and that the statement that He had given the country to the children of Ishmael was not in accordance with the Scriptures.

Musa Kazim asked what money we had brought to the

country. I told him that in the last four years some eight million pounds of Jewish money had been spent in Palestine, of which he feared the greater proportion was by now undoubtedly in Arab hands. If large sums had been taken out of the country it was mainly by absentee Arab landlords, but in any case Jewish activities had tended vastly to enrich the Arab population. I also said that I was surprised at [sic] Musa Kazim, who is a Moslem, should measure sacrifice by gifts of money.

However it was on the subject of money that the conversation finished with Musa Kazim stating that the money had mostly gone into the pockets of certain Zionist leaders. To this I replied with some violence stating that I refused to continue the conversation with him if he intended to use such arguments which he knew perfectly well to be false. I told him that such arguments were unworthy of a man who claims to speak on behalf of the Arabs of Palestine. He did not withdraw his remark, but stated that he had merely quoted from some newspaper which he had seen and that he supposed it was true.

Note: In this conversation Musa Kazim showed what the Americans call "a one-track mind" and I would add, a mind of a very narrow track, also much pettiness: somewhat the temperament of Poincaré without any of his ability. I do not think that any further discussions are likely to arise from this conversation, or that discussion with such a man can produce any useful result.

Before leaving the room Musa Kazim asked that the conversation should be treated as absolutely secret and that this secrecy should be maintained even as regards the fact that he had met me privately. He is evidently afraid of his entourage.

[Extract from cover letter to Dr Weizmann, 24 October 1923:]

I have nothing to add to what I have recorded in the note, except that Musa Kazim gave the impression of a man who feels that he is slipping from power and that I think it was this feeling that prompted him to see what would transpire at

a conversation with me. The conversation once launched however, his temperament took control with the result that the discussion never showed any signs of producing any useful results.

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Source: CZA, Z4/16050.

Document 28

Dr Weizmann's Report of Two Meetings with King Faisal, 6 October 1925

Conversations with Faisal (strictly confidential)

I have had two conversations with Faisal, lasting altogether 6 to 7 hours. The subject of these conversations was as follows:

Faisal said to me: You would be astonished if I told you how many Arabs from Palestine have come to me with the wish that I mediate between Zionism and the Arabs.

I replied to Faisal that we do not know who really represents the Arabs in Palestine, and asked him to tell me on what basis, in his opinion, we could come to an agreement with the Arabs.

Faisal replied that at present the Arabs were much more capable of negotiating than they had been three years ago. The sole fear of the Arabs is that they will be dominated by a Jewish majority. He gave as an example the speeches that were made at [the Zionist] Congress, which made the Arabs extremely uneasy, and demanded a limitation on immigration.

I replied that, as far as we were concerned, this condition was not negotiable. I then explained to him quite frankly that we desired a Jewish majority in the country, but that we were at the same time ready to guarantee that such a Jewish majority would not oppress the Arabs. This was the platform on which we could negotiate. I asked Faisal not to answer Yes or No right away, but to think it over.

Whereupon we had a further conversation with Faisal, who

declared that I should come to Palestine; he would then announce the platform on which we could negotiate.

Faisal asked why Jewish capital was not coming to Baghdad as well [as Palestine]. I answered that the reason for this was that the Jews always feared difficulties from the Arabs. Faisal then declared that the Jews who came to Baghdad would be under his personal protection.

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Source: ZAC minutes, 21 October 1925, CZA, Z4/271/3. Translation from the German by Dr T. H. Zeiber. My division into paragraphs differs from the original.

Document 29

*Letter from H. St. John Philby to Lord Passfield
[Colonial Secretary], Damascus,
21 October 1929*

I arrived here two days ago and have been in close touch with certain leaders of the Nationalist Party, whose attention is at present focussed on developments in Palestine. I think therefore that it may interest you to have a private appreciation of the situation and I am taking advantage of your kind permission to write to you.

As you will doubtless have heard from official sources the Nationalists here had arranged a monster demonstration for yesterday in protest against the latest regulations issued by the H.C. in respect of the Wailing Wall. The French disallowed the projected processions to the various Consulates and the demonstration was confined to a meeting in the great mosque, a minor procession which was broken up by the police, and an almost complete closing of all shops. There was no disturbance, but in the evening there was an important private meeting of the leaders of the Nationalists to discuss the policy to be pursued in view of the Arab congress arranged for the 27th. This meeting was attended by delegates from the Palestine Supreme Moslem Committee and may therefore be

considered representative of all important elements.

Before these occurrences I had met some of the leaders and had impressed on them firstly the necessity of conducting their case peacefully and constitutionally and, secondly, the inadvisability in their own interests of making demands which the British Govt could not possibly consider. I put it to them that the British Govt was perfectly sympathetic towards the Arabs and suggested that their best policy now would be to frame their demands with due regard to the other commitments of H.M.G. Their demands should represent a *sine qua non* minimum and not a mere bargaining position; and I assured them that, if their demands were practical and reasonable, H.M.G. would never refuse to discuss them.

This morning a small deputation of leaders, including the chief delegate from the Palestine Committee, came to see me as the result of their discussions of last night. They explained to me that the coming Congress at Jerusalem could scarcely do otherwise than adopt certain resolutions of an extremist character if only as a sop to the multitude; and it would probably demand the abrogation of the Balfour Declaration, the abolition of the Zionist Agency and the modification of the Mandate, etc. They assured me however that such demands need not be taken too seriously if the British Govt is prepared to discuss a reasonable settlement in the future interests of general peace and prosperity.

They then handed me a written draft of what they consider a reasonable settlement might be. They had considered it very carefully and had excluded everything possible in their desire for a swift and permanent settlement. I cannot do better therefore than give you a literal translation of the document and I think you will agree that it provides a basis for serious consideration and it certainly represents the opinion of the best elements among the Arab leaders. An offer by the British Govt to discuss a settlement on this basis can safely be guaranteed a favourable reception. The document runs as follows (it must not of course be treated as an official proposal by the Arab leaders):—

- (1) Palestine to be ruled by a constitutional, republican Govt.

(2) Legislative power shall vest in a representative assembly elected by direct or indirect voting and comprising Arabs and Jews in proportion to their numbers residing in the country, excluding absentees both from reckoning in the population and from the right of voting.

(3) The executive administration shall vest in a Govt responsible to the representative assembly and comprising Jews and Arabs in proportion as above.

(4) The British High Commissioner shall watch all acts of the Legislature and Executive, and shall have a right of veto in respect of any decision inconsistent with the undertakings assumed by the British Govt in the Mandate for Palestine relating to the rights of minorities and of foreigners and contrary to the interests of the country.

(5) The High Commissioner shall have the right to maintain a staff of officials to assist him in the carrying out of his mandatory duties and functions.

(6) The immigration of foreigners (particularly Arabs and Jews) shall not be forbidden, though the Palestine Govt may limit the numbers of immigrants to the capacity of the country to absorb them in agriculture and industry.

(7) There shall be no objection to the continuance of the Zionist Agency acting in an advisory capacity to the Palestine Government in matters affecting the interests of the Jews; and the Arabs shall have the right to set up a similar agency to protect the rights of the Arabs.

(8) The High Commissioner shall remain responsible for the administration of public security until the national Govt becomes fit to assume that responsibility; and he may transfer such responsibility to the national government in instalments from time to time at his discretion.

(9) The organic law shall be subject to revision and modification once every five years.

Such is the document. I hope it may help you in the

problem which confronts you, and you may be sure of Arab goodwill towards any proposal on such lines.

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Source: PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411.

Document 30

*Draft of Points Presented to Philby by Arabs at Damascus,
21 October 1929*

[See photocopy between pp. 110 and 111]

1. Palestine to be ruled by a republican, constitutional government.
2. An elected representative assembly, composed of Arabs and Jews in proportion to the numbers of Palestinian residents, will enact legislation and will approve the constitution.
3. A national government, responsible to the representative assembly and composed of Palestinian Arabs and Jews, shall exercise executive power.
4. The High Commissioner has the right to veto any regulation or law which conflicts with Britain's international obligations concerning the rights of minorities and foreigners and religious and civil matters. In case of disagreement, the whole matter will be submitted to the League of Nations.
5. The High Commissioner has the right to hire assistants to help him in his functions.
6. Foreigners, especially Arabs and Jews, will not be forbidden to immigrate to Palestine. However, the Palestine government has the right to limit the number which can be admitted annually and [to define] qualifications in accordance with the social and economic possibilities of the country.
7. There is no objection to the continuation of the Jewish

Agency as a consultative authority for the interests which affect the Jews. The other groups have the right to establish agencies equal to it in their rights.

8. The High Commissioner will continue to be responsible for public security until the national government becomes capable of bearing responsibility for public security. The army will be under the control of the High Commissioner and its expenses will be [borne] by it. The police force will be under the control of the national government and its expenses will be [borne] by it.

9. The Hejaz Railway running through Palestinian land will be handed over to the Islamic *waqf* administration of Palestine; however, it must find an equitable settlement for the existing equipment among the other areas. The [Supreme] Muslim Council agrees to amalgamate its administration.

10. The national government pledges itself to freedom of religion.

11. The national government is bound by the public debts, expenses and agreements signed between the Palestine government and the neighbouring countries.

12. These articles shall be revised once every five years.

*

Source: Undated, untitled list of points in MEC/P, X/1. My translation from the Arabic and conjectural identification of the origin and date of the document.

Document 31

Basis of an Arab-Jewish Understanding in Palestine
[Magnes proposals], October 1929

(1) Palestine is a land where both Arabs and Jews live of right and not of sufferance.

(2) Palestine is to be recognised as an independent government as in Transjordan. The government of Palestine is to be

democratic and representative. The British High Commissioner occupies the position of head of the State in a manner similar to the Governors General of the Dominions. He appoints and dismisses the Cabinet of Ministers who are responsible to the Legislative Assembly. The Cabinet includes Ministers for Agriculture, Education, Health, Commerce and Industry, Transport, Finance, Justice, Interior, and for Jewish Affairs. The last named is to cooperate with the Jewish Agency and to represent the interests of the Jewish National Home in the Cabinet.

(3) Before Palestine's independence is to be declared, a treaty is to be made with Great Britain and a constitution is to be worked out. Both are to be ratified by the Palestine Legislative Assembly by a three quarter majority and by the League of Nations. The constitution can be amended only through a vote of three quarter of the Assembly and with the concurrence of Great Britain and the Council of the League of Nations.

(4) The Assembly is to be elected by secret and equal vote of the citizens of Palestine over 20 years of age. All questions of the law of election are to be decided by a special commission. Palestine citizens above the age of 30 who can read and write can be voted for. One representative is to be chosen for each 15,000 of the settled population. A suitable representation of minorities is to be guaranteed in the electoral law as it is in the law of Transjordan. The High Commissioner is to appoint the representatives of the non-settled Beduin population according to their numbers.

(5) In the British Palestine Treaty and in the Constitution it is to be laid down that free immigration to Palestine of Jews and Arabs is to be granted dependent upon the economic capacity of the country. The regulation of Immigration is to be in the hands of a commission composed of 4 Arab and 2 Jewish members of the Assembly together with 3 non-Palestinian immigration experts to be appointed by the League of Nations.

(6) Every immigrant has the right after a residence of two years within the last three years to acquire Palestinian

citizenship. The granting of citizenship is not to be dependent upon the arbitrary decision of the authorities, but is a legal right of the applicant. In case of refusal he has a right of recourse to the courts and then to the High Commissioner.

(7) The Arabic and Hebrew languages are the official languages of Palestine. Both languages have equal rights in the Assembly and in all Departments of the Central Government. In the District and local administration both languages are to be used, if there be in the district or community a minority of at least ten per cent. Both languages are to be used by government bureaus, for transactions by public bodies and in the courts and as a language of legislation and of all public declaration.

(8) The Arabic and Jewish people in Palestine are to have cultural autonomy which extends over the whole school system and cultural life. The school system of each people is administered by a national Education Board. The Ministry of Education having only the right of coordination and technical supervision. Local communal School Boards are to maintain the elementary schools, while secondary schools are to be maintained by the National Education Boards. The State makes the necessary financial grants in aid. The object of the school system is to give free compulsory education to all boys and girls between the ages of 6 and 14.

(9) Arabic and Jewish Palestinians are to be employed in all grades of the Government Service in proportion to their numbers in the population. Due regard being had to their qualifications. Non-Palestinians are to be employed on contract for only a given period and preference is to be given to British subjects. Every Minister and every District Administrator is to have a British Advisor who is to have a five years contract which can be renewed for periods of five years thereafter.

(10) The conduct of foreign affairs, the representation of Palestinian interests abroad, public security within the country and at its frontiers are to be under the absolute and direct control of the British High Commissioner without the right of interference by the Legislative.

(11) The British Palestine Treaty is to define the additional

rights of Great Britain. They concern among other things the exclusive control of the Airways, the control of transport by rail and road and their proper repair, the control of harbours, the control of financial policy and the granting of concessions.

(12) All laws require the signature of the High Commissioner before they become effective. This signature must be withheld if the law contravenes the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or the British Palestine Treaty. The Palestine Legislative has the right of appeal to the British Cabinet and from there to the League of Nations.

(13) Similar to the Lebanon Palestine has no State religion. There is to be full religious freedom. All religions and all citizens have equal rights before the law and enjoy equal protection in all their legal transactions.

(14) The sacred places of Christians, Mohammedans and Jews in Palestine are to be extraterritorialized. They are to be exclusively under the High Commissioner who is to be responsible for their administration to the League of Nations with the aid of definite religious bodies created for this purpose.

(15) The entrance of Palestine into the League of Nations or its union with neighbouring States are to be determined by a 3/4 vote of the Legislative with the consent of Great Britain and the League of Nations. In case of the Union the above mentioned constitutional principles will continue to remain in force as a constitution of the autonomous Palestinian Administration.

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Source: PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411.

Document 32

*Letter from H. St. John Philby to Lord Passfield,
Cairo, 1 November 1929, enclosing Final Draft*

Since writing you my letter of October 21st from Damascus I have had a busy and interesting time at Jerusalem where I

arrived on the 25th. It may be of interest to you if I give you the results of my sojourn there and I may say that I am the more encouraged to do so by the tenour of Mr Lunn's recent statement on your behalf in the House of Commons to the effect that you are contemplating the calling of a round table conference of Arabs and Jews for the purpose of working out an agreed settlement. That seems to me to be the only method which holds any promise of success, and it seems essential that as a preparation for such a conference both parties should be induced by their friends to shed the extreme features of their respective claims. It is at any rate on those lines I have tackled my Arab friends, and an accident has intervened which bids fair to make my sowing perhaps more fruitful than I could have dared to hope.

On October 26th I spent the whole morning at the offices of the supreme Moslem Council in conversation with Haji Amin al Husaini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and a number of his chief lieutenants. I spoke to them on the lines of the draft proposals I sent you from Damascus, and the result was very encouraging. I found them fully disposed to meet the British Government half way by whittling down their extreme public demands (which of course for the time being they dare not publicly withdraw) to a practicable minimum. And in effect I found them quite prepared to consider something on the lines of the Damascus draft. That was all to the good and, as Jamal Bey al Husaini was on the point of going to England to represent the Arab Executive there in case of need, I gave him a letter of introduction to you and other friends in England and impressed upon him and the Grand Mufti the urgent necessity of adopting a moderate and reasonable attitude in discussing matters in England. Furthermore the Damascus draft was discussed in detail and certain modifications proposed, which I would have sent to you had it not been for the accident above referred to.

That same evening at my hotel I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of the Near East correspondent of the New York Times, Mr Joseph Levy, and of discussing the Palestine situation with him. We found ourselves substantially in agreement as to the practical steps now necessary for the

permanent solution of the Palestine problem; and as a result of our talk he asked me to prepare a statement of my considered views for publication in his paper. To this I agreed and, as I was leaving next morning for Cairo, I sat down to the task at once and had completed my statement in the early hours of the morning. I handed it to him at 8 p.m. before leaving for the station, and the same evening I reached Cairo with no further thought of the matter and fully intending to leave for Jidda at the first opportunity. I merely assumed that my article would duly appear in the N. Y. Times in a day or two.

Mr Levy however was apparently so impressed with the possibilities of my scheme for a settlement that, without my consent and indeed without consulting me in any way, he showed my article to Dr J.L. Magnes, the Principal of the Hebrew University; and he in turn showed it without disclosing its authorship to various friends of his among the leading Jews of Jerusalem. The result was apparently sufficiently satisfactory to encourage Dr Magnes to take up the matter seriously; and on the night of the 28th I was called up on the telephone from Jerusalem by Mr Levy, who suggested that if possible I should at once return to Jerusalem for a discussion with Dr Magnes. To this I agreed, and I left Cairo the following day, arriving at Jerusalem on the 30th and leaving again the day after.

The whole if [sic] the 30th I spent in vigorous discussion of a possible solution by agreement, partly with Dr Magnes and Mr Levy and partly with Haji Amin al Husaini and his friends. The result of discussion with Dr Magnes was a draft scheme; and this I later submitted to Haji Amin for consideration and revision. The result is a final draft which I enclose herewith for your perusal in the conviction that an offer by the British Government on these or similar lines has a very good chance of acceptance by all concerned. I have no time at present to develop the matter further but am anxious that you should have our proposals without delay. I am leaving Cairo for Jidda in half an hour's time.

Hoping that some practical result may ensue [...]

[Text of enclosed Final Draft (dated 31 October), with

insertions based on a comparison with the Arabic text done for Dr Magnes by Dr Goitein, 20 March 1940:]

(1) Palestine shall henceforth be administered on a democratic constitutional republican basis.

*(2) Immigration to Palestine shall be free, especially to Arabs and Jews, subject to due regard for the interests of the country and its economic capacity to absorb such immigrants.**

(3) All legislative authority shall vest in a representative assembly elected by persons of Palestinian nationality resident in Palestine and comprising Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews [*A.c. text:* comprising Muslims, Christians and Jews] in proportion to their numbers in the population.

(4) Any person who has resided continuously for a period of not less than two years in Palestine is entitled to adopt Palestinian citizenship.

(5) Executive authority shall vest in a Palestinian council of ministers comprising Arabs (Muslims and Christians) and Jews [*A.c. text:* comprising Muslims, Christians and Jews] in the same proportions as above and responsible to the representative assembly for the administration of the country and adequate provision shall be made for the enlistment of Arabs and Jews [*A.c. text:* Muslims, Christians and Jews] for both senior and junior grades of the administrative services with due regard to their numbers and qualifications.

(6) The High Commissioner shall remain responsible for the public security of the country until such time as in the opinion of the League of Nations the Palestine Government [*A.c. text:* the National Government] shall be capable of discharging such responsibility; and the armed forces in the country shall be under his direct control provided that the Palestinian Government may raise police forces for the purposes of the local administration, and such forces shall be composed of Arabs and Jews [*A.c. text:* of Muslims, Christians and Jews] in proportion to their numbers and qualifications.

(7) The High Commissioner, on behalf of the League of

Nations, shall have a right of veto over any executive or legislative act of the Palestinian Government or representative assembly [*A.c. text:* over any executive act of the National Government or legislation of the assembly of representatives] which is inconsistent with the proper exercise of its international obligations of the British Government or detrimental to the rights of minorities and foreigners or injurious to the peace and prosperity [*A.c. text:* progress] of the country; provided that the representative assembly or Government [*A.c. text:* the Palestinian Government or the assembly of representatives] shall have a right of appeal to the Council of the League of Nations for the solution of any dispute.

(8) The Jewish Agency shall continue to be recognised as a public body competent to advise and cooperate with [*A.c. text:* to advise and assist] the Palestinian Government in all matters affecting the interests of the Jews in the country; and the Muslim and Christian communities shall have the right to set up similar agencies with similar status and functions.

(9) The Palestinian Government shall assume full responsibility for all debts and international treaties heretofore contracted.

(10) These arrangements shall be subject to review and revision by the Council of the League of Nations at intervals of five years; and no basic alteration shall be made in them otherwise than by an unanimous vote of the Council of the League.

*

Sources: PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411; MEC/P, X/2; CZA, S25/2993.

*Note:**An earlier draft, consisting of 12 points, had the following clause (no. 2) preceding clause 2, above:— "Throughout Palestine there shall be absolute freedom of religious belief and practice."

** The earlier draft had the following clause (no. 4) following clause 2, above:— "Freedom of cultural expression shall be guaranteed to all inhabitants of Palestine, and Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the country."

The clauses were dropped in deference to Arab wishes. See Philby to Passfield, 10 November 1929, MEC/P, X/2.

Document 33*King Faisal's Suggestions for Solving the Palestine Problem,
Baghdad, 8 December 1929*

I wish first of all to express my sincere thanks to His Majesty's Government for their having so kindly asked for any observations that I may have regarding Palestine, in view on the one hand of the strong friendly relations which bind me with His Majesty and His Government and people and the considerable interest which we hold in common, and on the other hand of the racial and religious traditions and relations which bind me with the Arabs of Palestine.

.....

4. It appears to me that any possible solution should be sought for in the actual pledges made, or more correctly in a definition of these pledges, the determination of the extent and limit of their application, and the manner and possibility of giving effect thereto.

I believe that, but for the pledge made to the Zionists, there would have been no need for a discussion of the pledges given to the Arabs, because the latter are natives of the land and the Declaration of 1918 can bear no misconstruction or argument. In this question, there is no difference between the people of Palestine and those of Syria and 'Iraq where the Arabs are urging England and the Allies to give effect to that declaration which was the last pledge made to them, and reject any other action.

As regards the Zionists, they claim that the Balfour Pledge makes Palestine a national home for them. While claiming this the Zionists declare, notwithstanding their being a minority, that the object of that (pledge) is the establishment of a purely Jewish Government in which nobody else shall participate. We find that they take no account of any other race even a race which possesses a crushing majority, and has been settled in the country for hundreds of years and holds the same sacred promises and pledges as they themselves claim to hold.

In short, the Arabs deny that which the Jews possess and

the Jews deny that which the Arabs possess, and each party gives the widest interpretation possible to what it has received, and His Majesty's Government find themselves confronted with two conflicting claims. Extrication from this impasse can be effected only by reversion to the pledges responsible for the creation of this troubled situation and by interpreting it [sic] in such manner as will enable the determination of its [sic] scope and of the manner of giving effect to it [sic].

5. His Majesty's Government have on many occasions declared that by using the expression "National Home", they did not intend to expel the Arabs, at once or gradually, from their home and replace them by the Jews, with the object of establishing a purely Jewish Government in Palestine, but that they only intended to find a place of refuge for the Jews who were despised in the various countries of the world, in order that if any Jew wished to emigrate he might find for himself a place in which he could take shelter and reside.

If the object of the Declaration, both in spirit and letter, be as indicated above, I can see no great obstacle to prevent an understanding.

6. Assuming the case to be as above, what are the solutions that may occur to the mind for dealing with this new situation?

In the first place, the Arabs should not call upon His Majesty's Government to cancel the Balfour Pledge, as this is not easy for His Majesty's Government to do. Similarly His Majesty's Government should not call upon the Arabs to recognise the Balfour Pledge, as this is likewise not easy for the Arabs to do. The Arabs believe that such recognition will doom their future to destruction.

Therefore, Britain should give the Jews plainly to understand that they should not claim more than is contained in the British declaration together with the interpretation to be appended to that declaration; and the Jews should accept this whether they are satisfied or not.

7. I may now set forth the solutions which occur to my mind. They are three in number, viz:—

First. Syria, Palestine and 'Iraq to be unified and made a national home for the Semitic race, both Arab and Jew, with due regard, from the international political point of view, to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, as far as circumstances will permit.

I admit that this solution is very far reaching and complicated (or difficult) but it is based on a lofty principle which may prove very beneficial for humanity if minds and efforts, coupled with good intention, cooperate in preparing the way for it and in its realisation.

Second. Transjordan and Palestine to be unified and a treaty concluded on the basis mentioned in the third solution. This is less difficult than the first.

Third. A National Government to be set up within the present boundaries of Palestine. This I think is the nearest approach to an ideal solution and the most easy of accomplishment. It should not prove difficult to bring about an understanding in this way; provided that an Anglo-Palestine Treaty is concluded on the following lines:

- (a) A national government to be set up in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants.
- (b) Both parties to be silent as regards the Balfour Pledge.
- (c) Immigration to be restricted and a maximum fixed thereto subject to the extent to which economic conditions may permit.
- (d) The nationality of immigrants not to be stated. Acquisition of Palestinian nationality and the enjoyment of "public rights" to be made conditional on residence for a period of one or two years as necessary.
- (e) Following naturalization an immigrant should sever relations with the country from which he has emigrated.
- (f) The Holy Places of the various religions to remain under the control of the representative of His Majesty's Government.
- (g) Certain reservations (or safeguards) to be provided for on the lines of those contained in the Anglo-'Iraq Treaty.

8. The foregoing is a summary of my views regarding future policy in Palestine. As regards the remedying of the present

situation arising from the Wailing Wall question, I consider it advisable that His Majesty's Government should create an opportunity for directly interested Moslem nations, especially the Arabs, to send representative to give their opinions on the solution of this question. In any case, I myself would not fail to render any service for the purpose of facilitating what has been mentioned above, should His Majesty's Government find that agreeable.

*

Source: Letter to Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, PRO, FO 371/14485, file E444/44/65.

Document 34

*H. M. Kalvaryski, Note of Secret Accord Proposed by
Omar Salih al-Barghuthi, 25 February 1930*

Omar Salih, who was formerly one of the leaders of the National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani), who fought the Supreme Muslim Council, and who has been called upon to play an important rôle in the new Arab party (that of the youth) now being organized, has made me the following proposition:

That a secret accord be concluded between himself and us, according to which:

- 1.) he and his party will fight the Mufti tooth and nail, until he is overthrown;
- 2.) he will wage, with his group, an energetic campaign inside the Arab Executive and in the press against the [Arab] boycott and against all forms and acts of violence against the Jewish population;
- 3.) if his party predominates over the others, he will come out in favour of a régime similar to the Swiss one; in other words, recognition of the existence of two equal nations in the country;

- 4.) he would accept a reasonable (moderate) [level of] Jewish immigration;
- 5.) he would not object to land purchases by Jews, so long as the fellahin did not suffer;
- 6.) he would ask for (Palestinian) Home Rule, [but] would agree that the policy of the Mandate should be beyond the competence of the local administration;
- 7.) we would commit ourselves to support his party financially and morally, whenever necessary. (Financial aid would consist of a single payment of £1000. and a monthly subsidy of £100.)

Note: Bulos Shihadeh, who was present during the interview, agrees with Omar Salih on this proposal.

*

Source: CZA, S25/3466. My translation from the French.

Document 35

Proposals Submitted to the Colonial Office by Pinhas Rutenberg, May 1930

1. Complete separation of religious functions from the economic and political functions of any institution, Government official or public servant.
2. (a) Separate Jewish and Arab democratically elected national institutions to deal each with their [sic] own business under Government guidance and control.
(b) For matters concerning both Jews and Arabs—a Joint Advisory Committee consisting of two Jews and two Arabs under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary. In case of disagreement the High Commissioner to decide. Right of Appeal to the Secretary of State to be given to both the Jewish and Arab institutions.
*(c) The matters of competence of the two national institutions to be:

- | | |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Labour | 7. All other matters which |
| 2. Agricultural Credit | the High Commissioner will |
| 3. Education | deem necessary and advisable |
| 4. Health | 8. Right of taxation for the |
| 5. Social Welfare | carrying out of the |
| 6. Supervision of
religious institutions | above purposes.* |
3. Immigration only to the extent of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. Decision by the High Commissioner only.
4. Land (agricultural): No Deed of Sale to be executed without authorization of the Government previously satisfied that tenants or owners (if Fellahin) adequately provided for, either by land, money or otherwise.
5. The Palestine Administration to be reorganized on the principle of the personnel to be in sympathy with the Jewish National Home Policy, in particular:—
- A new Chief Secretary
 - A new Chief of Police ...
 - Censorship of Press with severe punishment of any attempt at incitement of racial and religious strife
 - Thorough and immediate clean sweep of Communists, both Jews and Arabs
 - Assist Arabs in their required development of Transjordan with a loan (one million pounds) on reasonable terms to be agreed.
6. Credit arrangement (£50,000) under Arab-Jewish Management for repayment of fellahin [sic] debts to money-lenders, in sums up to £50, at the current rate of interest. When experiment successful, the Government to take over control, increasing the capital if necessary.
7. Getting individual Arabs interested in existing Jewish undertakings.
- *8. H.M.G. to convey to the Arab Delegation and the Jewish representatives their policy as above, dealing only with the following points:—
- (Para. 2. Constitutional questions)

(Para. 3. Immigration)

(Para. 4. Land)

From Para. 5 only the sub-clauses (c) and (d) i.e. censorship of press and ridding the country of Communists.*

9. The proposed scheme concerns only the affairs of the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and cannot affect in any way the rights and functions of the Jewish Agency under the Mandate.

10. The Prime Minister to make a public statement confirming the Jewish National Home Policy, announcing the measures to be taken and expressing appreciation of the Jewish achievement in Palestine (this to counter-balance the depressing effect of the Shaw Report on Jewish public opinion).

*

Source: Initialled draft, dated 26 May 1930, sent to Dr J. L. Magnes, CAHJP, P3/2426.

Note:— Earlier drafts (12th May, PRO, CO 733/192, file 77255, and 21 May, CZA, J1/22) do not contain the sections marked *——*. Clause 2(c) in these drafts read as follows: "The Chief Secretary to have one assistant for Jewish affairs and one for Arab affairs." See also: Passfield to Chancellor, tgm. 151, 31 May 1930, PRO, CO 733/183, file 77050/B.

Document 36

*H. M. Kalvaryski, Platform for Judaeo-Arab Accord,
4 August 1930*

[The Platform begins with a lengthy historical survey of the origins and encounters of the "Semitic tribes and races"]

I therefore propose a general Judaeo-Arab Covenant on the following foundations:

1) The two Semitic races, Jews and Arabs, undertake to

help one another in all spheres of human endeavour, economic, social and cultural.

2) The Arabs welcome their Jewish brethren returning to the East, their ancient Homeland, and throw open the gates of their extensive territories to Jewish immigration.

3) In consideration of this Jews will do their utmost in giving their resources, energy and experience towards the development of the Semitic East, and towards its progress to a great future.

4) In all the Oriental lands where Jews will reside, they will have the same rights accorded to national minorities in the more advanced European [countries], e.g. Czechoslovakia, etc.

5) In view of its past and its association to the two Semitic peoples and to the three faiths, Palestine will form an autonomous unit with a special Constitution. That Constitution will postulate the formation of Palestine into a uni-racial but not uni-national Territory, which will belong not to one or another of the Semitic races, but to both of them jointly and equally irrespective of which of them forms the majority and which forms the minority at any given time.

6) Within the boundaries of this Territory the Hebrew language shall have equal rights with the Arab[ic] language. Jewish culture and Arab culture shall develop side by side in perfect and undisturbed harmony.

7) The Jews shall declare that they have no intention of dominating anyone in Palestine nor of hampering the development of Palestinians other than Jews, but they will desire that no one shall dominate them or hamper their own development.

8) The Jews shall undertake not to dispossess their Arab Fellah nor prejudice the rights of the Arab workman. So far from their entertaining any such intentions, the[re] will be a great cultural effort, [an] endeavour to improve the deplorable conditions of the Fellah and [they] will offer the Arab workman employment where he has had none before. So far,

the country at large and the Arabs in particular have benefitted directly or indirectly from Jewish Immigration. In future, Jewish organisations will have to be established with a view to enhancing the indirect interests of the Arabs in Jewish activity.

9) The Jews undertake not to oppose [the] National aspirations of the Arabs. Should a Federation of Arab States be formed in the Near East, Palestine could form part of this Federation because nothing will add more happiness to the Jew than the glory and regeneration of the Semitic race.

The above are the main clauses of an Accord upon which the Judeo-Arab Covenant must be based. They form only a nucleus Covenant to which other clauses may be added but from which nothing may be deducted.

The dangers to which the Arabs are allegedly exposed as a result of Jewish work is imaginary, not real. The penetration into Semitic countries in general and into Palestine in particular of a Semitic race will result in no danger to the Arabs. On the contrary, it will contribute to its vigour and add to its inherent strength. We Jews shall not thrust ourselves an alien growth upon the body politic of the Arabs, as many extreme nationalists believe, but we shall form a beautiful ring in the chain of the United Arab Confederation. The Arab Confederation does not alarm us. Therefore, the sooner the Covenant is signed between us, the better for all of us, for us Jews as well as for you Arabs.

The present fraternal strife now [r]aging between us is ruinous to us as well as to you. Our heart goes out to the many innocent victims [who] fell last year on both sides. Will there be an abatement of this bloody strife? In my view the time is ripe for a truce to be declared, for a hand of peace to be extended by one side to the other. Some of the friends of the Arabs protest that the Jews stand in the way of Arab Constitutional development and prevent them from securing a Legislative Assembly, a handicap which is prejudicial to the interests of the people. To these protestations I shall counter by saying that time was when we Jews were anxious to have a Legislative Assembly and you the Arabs refused to have it for various reasons. Now the tables have been turned. Is it any

wonder? I think that in the present circumstances there is little wonder that the Jews have grown apprehensive. But I believe that even on this issue an agreement may be reached provided there is mutual understanding. I admit that a Legislative Council may prove of considerable benefit to the country if it conducts its work in a manner beneficial to all the people of this country, to its present as well as to its future population, but it can be a dangerous instrument if it conducts its work in a manner beneficial to one section only of the population. It can prove of invaluable benefit if it admits a full equality in the rights of the two races, but it will result in considerable injury if its promoters live up to the statement of one of their leaders before the Shaw Commission: "We have not protested at the Seventh Congress [1928] at the Balfour Declaration, neither have we asked for its cancellation, because we have insisted on the establishment of a Parliament, which amounts to the same thing." The Arabs had better know that no Jew could concur in a Parliament which would invalidate the Balfour Declaration. But the truth is that those who have recommended at the Seventh Congress that the Arabs should neither protest against the Balfour Declaration nor ask for its cancellation have not sought to deceive anyone. I know them well as [men] of honesty and integrity. They have deplored and bemoaned the internecine strife that has been going on between the two parties and are anxious to form a bridge between the two Semitic races. It is with regret that I have to state that neither party was quick to seize the extended hand of peace, and meanwhile we have had the Wailing Wall issue which has resulted in many innocent casualties on both sides. The time has come for a proper appreciation [of] the situation and for each party to declare openly [what] it believes. I say: Jews are not opposed to a Legislative Council. In our present situation as a minority in the country, we are not unmindful of the many handicaps of such an Institution to the Jews. Nevertheless, we should not oppose it if we are given adequate guarantees that it will not be abused with a view to hampering the Development of the National Home in Palestine. That is—for the time being. And if after the lapse of a certain period of cooperation in the legislative Forum

and in the political life of the country we are satisfied that you have no intention of restricting our development and we are convinced that the Legislative Assembly will prove of benefit to the two races alike, I am confident that we shall aim at an even greater measure of political cooperation with a view to widening the platform of joint political endeavour in the country.

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Source: CZA, A113/13. From the polycopied English text; spelling and typographical errors have been corrected in the above.

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Notes

Introduction

1. These various tendencies are illustrated, in one form or another, in the following, now-standard, works: Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel, 1917-1948* (Bloomington/London, 1973), Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (New York, 1970), Gil Carl Alroy, *Behind the Middle East Conflict* (New York, 1975), Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (London/New York, 1979).
2. E.g., Yehuda Amir, 'Interpersonal Contact between Arabs and Israelis', *Jerusalem Quarterly* no. 13 (Fall, 1979), 3-17; Alouph Hareven, 'Can We Learn to Live Together?', *ibid.*, no. 14 (Winter, 1980), 8-17.
3. *Palestinians and Israel* (Jerusalem, 1974), 209.
4. Speech to *Vaad Zmani* [V.Z.], 10 June 1919, Central Zionist Archives [C.Z.A.], J1/8777. Cf. Elyakim Rubinstein, 'An Outline of Zionist Positions on the Jewish-Arab Conflict before 1936' (Heb.), in Sh. Ettinger *et al.*, *Zionism and the Arab Question* (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1979), 60, 63, 65.
5. 12 February 1932, CZA, S25/3051. Cf. Sharett, *Political Diary* (Heb.), vol. I (1936) (Tel Aviv, 1968), 135f.; W. Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (London/New York, 1972), 258f.
6. M. Duverger, *The Idea of Politics* (London, 1966), 169f.
7. A companion volume to the present one, dealing with 1931-1948, is now in preparation.

Chapter 1 – First Attempts

1. See Neville J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I* (Berkeley/London, 1976), xxi, xxiv; Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918-1929* (London, 1974), 16-17; Neil Caplan, *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925* (London, 1978), 6, 220-21 (n. 8).

2. Mandel, *op. cit.*, xviii-xix; Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, 211f.
3. N. J. Mandel, 'Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914', in *St. Antony's Papers*, no. 17 (Oxford, 1965), 108 and his *Arabs and Zionism*, 231.
4. *Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers* (Jerusalem, 1936), 62; cf. Flapan, *Zionism and Palestinians*, ch. 6.
5. S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (London, 1967), 19-24.
6. See, e.g., *Arab Bulletin*, no. 64, 27 September 1917, 389f.; Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, 217, 230; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 14.
7. My translation from the French. The excerpt is quoted in Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 52, Porath, *Emergence*, 26, and elsewhere. On Azouri, see Mandel, *op. cit.*, 49-52.
8. Quoted in Yaacov Ro'i, 'The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs, 1908-1914', *Middle Eastern Studies* IV (1968), 235. On Rabbi Binyamin, see Hans Kohn, 'Zion and the Jewish National Idea', in *Zionism Reconsidered*, ed. M. Selzer (London, 1970), 206-208.
9. For accounts of these first contacts, see: Mandel, *op. cit.*, ch. 2; Porath, *op. cit.*, 20-30; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 211-33; Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 45-69; Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 202-27; Michael Assaf, *Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1860-1948* (Heb) (Tel Aviv, 1970), 9-83.
10. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 224-25; Mandel, *op. cit.*, 39-40; Porath, *op. cit.*, 26.
11. Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 222.
12. E.g. Yitzhak Epstein (see Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 215f.), Arthur Ruppin (see Ro'i *op. cit.*, 222f.), the philosopher-essayist Ahad ha-Am (see Kohn, *op. cit.*, 195f.), Hayim Margaliut Kalvaryski (see Caplan, *op. cit.*, 4, 14, 36-37, 40-45), and the American Zionist Harry Friedenwald (see *ibid.*, 39).
13. For positive examples, see Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 228f. For the negative instance involving Hajj Amin al-Husaini, later Mufti of Jerusalem, see Ittamar Ben-Avi, *With the Dawning of Our Independence* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv?, 1961), 419; other negative instances alluded to by Yosef Meyuhav in Caplan, *op. cit.*, 202. Cf. Amir, *op. cit.*
14. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 88-92.
15. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 225; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 79-80.
16. By retaining their foreign passports, Jewish settlers could benefit from privileges enjoyed by foreign nationals under the Capitulation agreements and from consular protection.
17. *al-Muqattam*, 14 April 1914, in Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 218. For similar views, see N. J. Mandel 'Attempts at an Arab-Zionist Entente: 1913-1914', *Middle Eastern Studies* I (1964-65), 243, 253-54; P. A. Alsberg, 'The Arab Question in the Policy of the Zionist Executive Before the First World War' (Heb.), *Shivat-Zion* IV (1956-57), 200-201; Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* (London, 1946), 53; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 214f.
18. See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938); C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism* (Chicago/London, 1973); Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 148f.; Porath, *op. cit.*, 20-30.
19. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 64-66, 119-20, 182-85, 230; Porath, *op. cit.*, 27.
20. Mandel, *op. cit.*, chs. 4-5 and pp. 136f., 209; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 223.
21. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 142f., 165f., 172; Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 208-9, 226-27.

22. Mandel, 'Attempts', 260; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 226.
23. Mandel, 'Attempts', 263-65; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 233; Porath, *op. cit.*, 27-28; Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 213.
24. See, e.g., Mandel, 'Attempts', 252; Richard Lichtheim, *A Remnant Will Return* (Memoirs; Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1953), 256.
25. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 203, 205, 226f.; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 214f., 221.
26. Y. Ro'i, 'Attempts of the Zionist Institutions to Influence the Arabic Press in Palestine, 1908-1914' (Heb.), *Zion* XXXII (3-4), (1967), 200-27.
27. 'Zionist Attitude', 205. Cf. *ibid.*, 210, 220, 226-30, 234; Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 214-17; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 250; A. W. Kayyali, *Palestine: A Modern History* (London, 1978?), 24-30.
28. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 208, 226-27. Cf. Cohen's critique of the Zionist attitude, *Israel and the Arab World*, 99-101.
29. Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 251; Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 208-209.
30. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 213; Mandel, *op. cit.*, 168; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 102-103.
31. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 153-54, 188. Cf. Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 254-55.
32. 27 March 1914, quoted in Mandel, *op. cit.*, 188. On Rida, see *ibid.*, 45-49, 213-14; Sylvia G. Haim, *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1964), 19-25; Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1789-1939* (London, 1962), Ch. 9.
33. This section follows Mandel, 'Attempts' and *Arabs and Zionism*, 149f.
34. His Report to V. Jacobson is reproduced, in part, below (Document 1). Cf. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 154-58; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 91-95.
35. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 158-59.
36. See *ibid.*, 159-62; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 30-31; Alsberg, *op. cit.*, 195-206; Hourani, *op. cit.*, 283-84; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 96f.
37. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 162-64, 169.
38. *Ibid.*, Ch. 9 and 'Attempts', 253-54.
39. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 195, 206; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 254-55.
40. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 216-18; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 108.
41. Mandel, 'Attempts', 254-55.
42. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 172f., 204f.; Porath, *op. cit.*, 26-27; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 31-33.
43. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 217-20; Porath, *op. cit.*, 28-29; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 33-36.
44. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 179-80; Ro'i, 'Attempts', 209; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 253; Assaf, *op. cit.*, 76; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 38-39.
45. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 182-85; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 37-38.
46. Mandel (*Arabs and Zionism*, 203f.) notes that two separate sets of arrangements were being undertaken, one centred on Cairo and the other on Syria. The latter only is discussed below. On the former, see Document 2, below.
47. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 202-203.
48. *Ibid.*, 195, 200; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 108.
49. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 202-203, 205.
50. 3 May 1914, quoted in Ro'i, 'Zionist Attitude', 219. Cf. Lichtheim, quoted in Mandel, *op. cit.*, 196.
51. Mandel, *op. cit.*, 202, 205-206. Cf. *ibid.*, 151, 195.

52. E.g., his speech to the V. Z., 10 June 1919, CZA, J1/8777; *At the Parting of Our Ways* (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1939), 39; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 110.
53. See, e.g., Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 41. On Turkish disparagement of the talks, see Mandel, *op. cit.*, 201-202.
54. Quoted in Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 231-32.
55. Taken from Mandel, *op. cit.*, 190, 198, 206-207; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 251, 255; Eisenberg, at meeting of 1 July 1914, CZA, L2/44; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 109, 106.
56. While Zionists did not rush to do this in order to win Arab sympathy, they did make such efforts on two other occasions: (1) In 1908, to increase the number of eligible voters in the Turkish elections, and (2) after the outbreak of World War I, to avoid expulsion from Palestine as 'enemy aliens'.
57. Only Ascher Saphir's 1911 reports spoke of Arabs who were willing to grant some form of national-cultural autonomy to the Jews. His 1913 reports refer to Arab expectations that the Jews would become 'good Syrians'. See Saphir, *Unity or Partition?* (Jerusalem, 1937), 16-17; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 85; Mandel, *op. cit.*, 187.
58. Ro'i *op. cit.*, 219. Cf. *ibid.*, 214, 219-20; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 98, 109; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 255; Mandel, *op. cit.*, 198, 207.
59. *Op. cit.*, 214. Cf. Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 251; Laqueur, *op. cit.*, 229.
60. Ro'i, *op. cit.*, 219-20; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, 255; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 101.

Chapter 2 – Post War Diplomacy

1. For various views of this turning point, see: Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine* (London, 1978), chs. 1-3; Ann Moseley Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939* (Ithaca/London, 1979), 32-35; Porath, *Emergence*, ch. 1.
2. On the place of national self-determination in the post-war discussions, see Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies* (New Haven, 1947), I, 213f.
3. M. Sykes to Graham, 8 May 1917, Public Record Office [hereafter: PRO] FO 371/3053, file W44/93349/84173; same to Clayton, 16 November 1917, Middle East Centre, Private Papers Collection, St Antony's College [hereafter: MEC], S (Sledmere Papers); *Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, series A: Letters [hereafter: LCW] vol. VII, 344f., 407, 453, 489; Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, 23f.
4. Flapan, *op. cit.*, 45. The French, for their part, were not idle, but were stimulating anti-Hashemite Arab factions in support of a French-sponsored Arab confederation which would have left Faisal and the British out in the cold. In the end, however, it would be the British-sponsored Hashemites who would win the battle for status and credibility in early 1919.
5. Flapan, *op. cit.*, 23-24, 35f.; Eliezer Livneh, *Aaron Aaronsohn: The Man and His Times* (Heb.) (Jerusalem, 1969), ch. 15. The Sledmere Papers and the papers of Captain William Yale are drawn upon by these authors.

6. Porath, *op. cit.*, 31-39, 123-25; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 43-59; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 84-88; Wasserstein, *op. cit.*, 36.
7. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 17.
8. *Ibid.*, 16-17.
9. In 1921, the Z. C. became the Palestine Zionist Executive (P.Z.E.) which itself was reconstituted as the Jewish Agency Executive (J.A.E.) after 1929.
10. See Document 3, below; meeting of ca. 1 April 1918, CZA, Z4/538; Ormsby-Gore to Balfour, 7 April 1918, PRO, FO 371/3394, file W44/83691/11053; *LCW VIII*, 111; Antonius, *Arab Awakening*, 269f.; Aaron Aaronsohn, *Diary 1916-1919* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1970), 384; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 24, 40; Jon Kimche, *Palestine or Israel* (London, 1973), 166. Cf. Sulaiman Nasif to Yale, 15 February 1939, MEC/Y, 1/6.
11. See Document 4, below.
12. CZA, L4/392/I. Cf. *LCW VIII*, 102, 137f.; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 40, 56; Caplan, *op. cit.*, 18; A. L. Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914-1921* (London, 1978), 266f.
13. Z.C. meeting, 13 April 1918, CZA, L3/285; Weizmann speech, Jerusalem Governate, 27 April 1918, in *Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann*, series B: Papers [hereafter: *PCW*], vol. I, doc. 42; Ormsby-Gore to Military Governor, Jaffa, 7 May 1918, CZA, L4/58/I; Ormsby-Gore to Balfour, 19 April 1918, PRO, FO 371/3395, file W44/86912/11053; Clayton to Balfour, 16 June 1918, *ibid.*, file W44/130342/11053; Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms* (London, 1943), 341; Moshe Perlmann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918-1922", *Jewish Social Studies VI* (1944), 131-32; Walid Khalidi (ed.), *From Haven to Conquest* (Beirut, 1971), 189-90; Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 137f.; Kimche, *op. cit.*, 168-73; Tibawi, *op. cit.*, 269-71.
14. *LCW VIII*, 171; Tibawi, *op. cit.*, 270-71.
15. Z.C. meeting, 13 April 1918 (n.13); Kimche, *op. cit.*, 172-73.
16. See Document 14, below, for an extract of the notes of the meeting with Musa Kazim, 8 October 1919.
17. See Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 152f., 199, 206-207, below, pages 115f.
18. *LCW VIII*, 202, 205; Caplan, *op. cit.*, ch. 9; D. E. Knox, "Weizmann's First Visit to Palestine", *Wiener Library Bulletin XXVIII* (1975; new series nos. 33/34), 11-12; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 56f.
19. *LCW VIII*, 130 (16 April 1918). Cf. Neil Caplan, "Britain, Zionism and the Arabs, 1917-1925", *Wiener Library Bulletin XXXI* (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 6-7; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 56-57, 59-60.
20. Sykes to Clayton, 14 November 1917, MEC/S; same to Arab Committee (Cairo), 16 November 1917, *loc. cit.*; same to Clayton, 1 December 1917, PRO, FO 371/3054, file W44/234304/86526; Hogarth message to King Husain, 4 January 1918, quoted in Esco, *Palestine I*, 191; Sykes to Syrian Welfare Committee, 15 February 1918, PRO, FO 371/3398, file W44/27647/27647; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 34f.
21. *LCW VIII*, 202; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 167-68; Wasserstein, *op. cit.*, 12-13; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 32f., 36f., 38f., 55-56; Weizmann, Memo of Appointment with Sykes, 9 March 1917, W.A.

22. Rustum Haidar (one of Faisal's Secretaries at the Peace Conference), quoted in *Documents of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918-1939: From the Papers of Akram Zuaytir* [hereafter: *DPNM*] (Beirut, 1979), 520-22; S. Musa, *T. E. Lawrence: An Arab View* (London, 1966), 228-31 (quoting Awni Abd al-Hadi, another of Faisal's Secretaries); A. L. Tibawi, "T. E. Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann", *Royal Central Asian Journal* LVI (1969), 156-63. Cf. Porath, *Emergence*, p. 89.
23. C. Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (London, 1949), 294, 306-09, Perlmann, "Chapters", 132-48; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 31-55. Cf. N. Caplan, "Faisal Ibn Husain and the Zionists," *International History Review* (forthcoming).
24. *LCW* VIII, 205. Cf. Knox, *loc. cit.*; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 33; Kimche, *op. cit.*, 166.
25. Document 5, below; cf. *PCW* I, doc. 44. For another version of the June 4th meeting, see Document 6, below.
26. Meeting of 11 December 1918, Document 7, below; cf. *LCW* IX, 69-71. See also Faisal's interview in *The Times*, 12 December 1918, and his banquet speech of 21 December 1918, CZA, Z4/56.
27. Document 8, below.
28. D. H. Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, vol. XIV (New York, 1924), 230. Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 298f.; J. Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920* (London, 1969), 113; Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East* (London, 1956/1978), 152; Esco, *Palestine* I, 138.
 For the view that Faisal did *not* set Palestine aside from his global demands, see: Musa, *op. cit.*, 224f.; Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, 342f.
29. On Weizmann's efforts to annul the Sykes-Picot agreement, see *LCW* VIII, 230 and IX, 4, 63, 70.
 On arrangements for an interview between Faisal and President Wilson, see: Aaronsohn, *Diary*, 471, 475; Nevakivi, *op. cit.*, 134(n); Flapan, *op. cit.*, 45.
 On the possibility of a loan, see: Clayton report, Document 5, below; *LCW* IX, 12-13, 15; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 42f.
30. Cf. Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 133-41; Musa, *op. cit.*, 230f.
31. Documents 10 and 11, below; Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 139; Frankfurter to Weisgal, 3 December 1929, CZA, S25/3142; *LCW* XIV, 138, 146f.; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 46; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 143f.; Musa, *op. cit.*, 229f. (quoting Awni Abd al-Hadi); Tibawi, *Anglo-Arab Relations*, 348f; Esco, *op. cit.*, 204f.
32. Porath, *op. cit.*, 88f.; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 133; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 68; Esco, *op. cit.*, 142f.; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 47, 59; Musa Kazim al-Husaini, quoted below, Document 14.
33. Document 9, below. For other evidence of Faisal's uneasiness about British and French intentions at this time, see: Yale-Faisal interview, 13 February 1919, MEC/Y, 1/4; Faisal reception of *yishuv* Delegation, 15 April 1919, CZA, J1/8791 (Eisenberg report, 28 May 1919).
34. J. N. Camp, "Arab Movement and Zionism", 12 August 1919, in *Documents on British Foreign Policy* [hereafter: *DBFP*], First Series, vol. IV, ed. E. L. Woodward and R. Butler (London, 1952), 364-65.
35. Abu Khaldun Sati al-Husari, *The Day of Maysalun*, transl. S. Glazer (Washington, 1966), 136. Cf. Cohen, *op. cit.*, 157; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 69.

36. *LCW IX*, 199f.
37. On the increasingly "false position" Faisal found himself in at this time, see Yale interviews with Rustum Haidar (30 September) and Faisal (2 October 1919), MEC/Y, 1/5.
38. *L IX*, 222f., 230; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 48f.; *DBFP IV*, 421f.
39. Document 13, below. Cf. Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 143-45; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 49.
40. The interview discussed here (19 October) is reproduced below, Document 15. Other episodes include: Herbert Samuel-Faisal interview, 15 October 1919, CZA, L3U/27; Hyamson to Weizmann, 18 October 1919, Z4/16015; same to Sokolow, 30 October 1919, *loc. cit.*; Faisal to Sh. Levin (Balfour Day greetings), 31 October 1919, Z4/25001/I; Sokolow-Faisal meetings, 14 and 15 November 1919, Z4/25002; Faisal to Samuel, 23 November 1919, Z4/25001I; same to same, 10 December 1919, ISA 100/5. Cf. Z.O. Political Ctee meetings, 6 and 7 November 1919, CZA, L3/310; Cohen, *op. cit.*, 161f.; Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 143ff47; Caplan, "Faisal Ibn Husain".
41. See notes 26 and 31, above.
42. Sokolow-Faisal interviews, 14-15 November 1919 (n.40).
43. Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 147.
44. Tibawi, "T. E. Lawrence", 160f.
45. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 33f., 48f., 55f.; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 70-77; Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 200-04.
46. al-Husari, *op. cit.*, 138-40; Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (Beirut, 1960), 138.
47. *DBFP XIII*, ed. R. Butler and J.P.T. Bury (London, 1963), 221, 223, 224f., 233; S. Felman reports, 23 April, 10 and 28 June 1920, CZA, Z4/16078.
48. *DBFP XIII*, 223, 231, 233f.
49. *Ibid.*, 284f.; cf. draft (mistakenly? dated 8 May) in EC/F(S) and *ibid.*, 255f.
50. Undated draft tgm., in Faisal's hand, MEC/F(S).
51. *DBFP XIII*, 257f. and draft in MEC/F(S). Cf. *ibid.*, 285; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 36.
52. Izzat Darwaza, quoted in Porath, *Emergence*, 89.
53. Eder to Weizmann, 14 March 1920, CZA, Z4/16078.
54. *Loc. cit.*; Felman report, 22 January 1920, *loc. cit.* and those cited in n.47, above; Hoofien to Weizmann, 15 March 1920, *loc. cit.* Cf. Ben-Avi, *With the Dawning*, 443; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 50f., 53, 60; Kedourie, *op. cit.*, 158f.; al-Husari, *op. cit.*, 128; Zeine, *op. cit.*, 159.
55. Felman reports (n. 47); *LCW IX*, 350, 355; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 54.
56. Eder to Weizmann, 9 August 1920, CZA, Z4/16031; Eder-Samuel interview, 9 August 1920, L3/222. Cf. Cohen, *op. cit.*, 162; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 54.
57. *LCW XIV*, 207.
58. Below, pages 49, 52, 58, 103f.; sources cited in n.23 to Chapter 3; Document 28, below; *PCW II*, docs. 22 and 39; D. Ben-Gurion, *My Talks with Arab Leaders* (Jerusalem/New York, 1972), 4f., 208f.

Chapter 3 – High-Level Meetings

1. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 64-72.
2. *Ibid.*, 79-83; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 64-72; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 91-94.
3. On the riots, see: Caplan, *op. cit.*, 85-87; Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 204-07; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine*, 101f.; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 72-76; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 95-97.
4. Caplan, *op. cit.*, 98-105.
5. *Ibid.*, 63f.
6. Leonard Stein, quoted in *ibid.*, 97f.
7. Samuel to Weizmann, 10 August 1921, CZA, Z4/16151.
8. *Report of the XIIth Zionist Congress* (London, 1922), 150. Cf. Caplan, *op. cit.*, 114-17.
9. On the activities of the Arab Delegation in London, see: Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 88-97, 105-57, 173-92, 196-241, 247-49, 274, 284-348; Porath, *Emergence*, 137-47; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 158-64; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 101-4.
10. On the confused circumstances surrounding the preparation of the meeting, see: Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 123, 125f., 128, 131, 178, 183; *LCW X*, 295; M. Mossek, *Palestine Immigration Policy under Sir Herbert Samuel* (Cass, London, 1978), 54f.; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 161f.
11. Documents 18(a), 18(b) and 18(c), below.
12. Eric Mills comments, Document 18(a).
13. Letter to William Yale, 9 February 1962, MEC/Y, 1/6. It should be noted that Jamal's coloured account was second-hand, as he had not personally attended the meeting.
14. *LCW X*, 328. Cf. his report to Z.E., London meeting, 29 November 1921, CZA, Z4302/6; *PCWI*, doc. 65; below, Document 19.
15. *LCW X*, 318; notes of conversations with members of the Arab Delegation, 16 January and 2 February 1922, WA. In Palestine, Dr Eder had been active in contacting Arabs to prepare the ground for a possible breakthrough in London. See his letters to Weizmann, 13 November 1921 (CZA, Z4/2701/V) and 11 December 1921 (WA); Ben-Avi, *With the Dawning*, 416f.; Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, 62f.
16. Porath, *op. cit.*, 64-67; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 125f., 131, 178; below, pages 105f. For the pre-War roots of this approach, see Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 207.
17. Porath, *op. cit.*, 147-58, 169-78; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 179-87; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 309-13; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 111-23; Caplan, *op. cit.*, ch.8.
18. Porath, *op. cit.*, 108-10; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 87-90; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 90f.; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 118-20, 145-47; below, page 121.
19. Cmd. 1700 (British Statement of Policy, and correspondence with Palestine Arab Delegation and with Z.O.), reproduced in part in *The Israel-Arab Reader*, ed. Walter Laqueur (3rd ed., New York, 1976), doc. 12; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 271-74, 289-94, 296-306.
20. Cf. below, page 121.
21. *LCW IX*, 256. Cf. Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, 294.
22. Stein to Kisch, 12 June 1923, CZA, Z4/16061; Jabotinsky to Kisch, 31

- December 1922, S25/2073: Jacobson, quoted in Ro'i, "Zionist Attitude", 219.
23. Weizmann-Shuckburgh interview, 10 January 1922, Z4/16145; Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 7 February 1922, PRO, CO 733/18, file 4804; *LCW XII*, 409, 412f., 425; *ibid.* XIV, 307, 361, 364f.; *ibid.*, XV, 53; below, page 104; below, Document 28. Weizmann became fond, in later years, of referring to his "lifelong friendship" with Faisal. See: *Trial and Error*, 294; *LCW XVI*, 45f.; Ben-Gurion, *My Talks*, 208f.
 24. Joseph Nevo, *Abdallah and the Palestinian Arabs* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1975), 11-26, and his "Abdallah and the Arabs of Palestine", *Wiener Library Bulletin XXXI* (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 51f.
 25. Caplan, *op. cit.*, 172, 246; W. Kazzuha, "The Political Evolution of Transjordan", *Middle Eastern Studies XV* (1979), 250.
 26. I have found no records of the Weizmann-Abdallah talks in the CZA or MEC/P. What follows is pieced together from the following sources: Z. E., London meeting, 26 October 1922, CZA, Z4/302/7; Weizmann-Shuckburgh interview, 9 November 1922, Z4/16135; Stein-Philby conversations, 4 and 27 December 1922, Z4/1392/II-b and Z4/16135; *LCW XI*, 193f.; *Falastin*, 13 February 1923, Eng. transl. in Z4/1392/II-b; *ha-Aretz*, 27 February 1923; M. Medzini, *Ten Years of Palestine Politics* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1928), 233f.; Esco, *Palestine I*, 570f.; Perlmann, "Chapters", 152; Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 190f.; Nevo, *Abdallah*, 13; Elizabeth Monroe, *Philby of Arabia* (London, 1973), 125f.
 27. *Falastin*, 13 February 1923 (n. 26); Anis Sa'igh, *The Hashemites and the Palestine Question* (Ac.) (Beirut, 1966), 124.
 28. Caplan, *op. cit.*, 172-78.
 29. V.L. Meeting, 2-3 January 1923, CZA, J1/7226.
 30. Kisch to Weizmann, 9 January 1923, Z4/16049. Cf. *LCW XI*, 237f., 240; Kisch letters to Stein (9 January) and to Weizmann (10 January 1923), Z4/16049; Kisch to Z. E., London, 12 December 1922, Z4/4113; Kisch remarks, V.L. meeting, 9 May 1923, J1/7226.
 31. Report on Visit to Palestine, 15 February 1923, PRO, CO 733/62, file 9354. Cf. Stein to Philby, 26 March 1923, CZA, Z4/16135; Sharett, *Political Diary I*, 211; below, page 114.
 32. Weizmann-Shuckburgh interview, 9 November 1922 (n.26); Stein-Shuckburgh interview, 19 January 1923, Z4/16135; Samuel conversations with Palestinian leaders, 11 and 15 February 1923, PRO, CO 733/43, file 10145. H. St. John Philby seems to have been the only British backer of the scheme. See: first two sources cited in this note; Perlmann, *op. cit.*, 152f.
 33. Nevo, *Abdallah*, 13f.; Caplan, *op. cit.*, 173f.
 34. F.H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (London, 1938), 93-100, 103-06; Sa'igh, *op. cit.*, 125f.; Caplan, *op. cit.*, 179-81; Kisch to Z. E., London, 6 February 1924, CZA, Z4/Z421; Jacobs to Kisch, 18 March 1924, *loc. cit.*; Kisch to Stein, 15 April 1926, Z4/4112; below, pages 105f.
 35. E.g., Abdallah to Chancellor, 5 October 1929, a "private" letter which

- the Amir allowed to be published in the local press. See: Chancellor to Passfield, 24 November 1929, Rhodes House, Chancellor Papers (hereafter: RH/C), 11/4; *al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 14 October 1929, Eng. summary in CZA, Z4/4112.
36. Riad seems to have been among the Arabs who took part in talks with Zionist representatives as early as 1911. Ben-Avi held a very high opinion of him (*With the Dawning*, 417, 451; Diary, Oct. 1922, CZA, S25/905), while Chief Secretary Wyndham Deedes regarded him as a "very slippery customer" (according to Eder to Weizmann, 27 November 1921, Z4/16151). P. Z. E. Treasurer, S. A. van Vriesland, considered Riad to be only "financially interested in friendly relations" (letter to Weizmann, 22 November 1922, WA), while Ben-Gurion apparently included him among the true Arab patriots who could not be bought (*My Talks*, 18). Cf. Kisch to Weizmann, 3 January 1923, CZA, Z4/16119; van Vriesland to Kalvaryski, 3 May 1923, S25/10296.
 37. Weizmann report, Z. E., London meeting, 24-25 October 1921, CZA, Z4/302/6; PCW I, doc. 65; Ben-Avi, *op. cit.*, 417f.; A. S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World* (Baltimore/London, 1970), 198f.; Porath, *op. cit.*, 112.
 38. Document 17, below.
 39. Documents 20, 21, 22 and 23, below. Cf. Cohen, *op. cit.*, 184-88; Esco, *Palestine I*, 564-70. On the Syrian Union Party, see: Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 222, 227f.; Sulaiman Nasif to Yale, 15 February 1939, MEC/Y, 1/6; Porath, *op. cit.*, 113, 115f.; Philip S. Khoury, "Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists during the French Mandate", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* XIII (1981), 443-52.
 40. Eder to Weizmann, telegram and letter dated 19 March 1922, CZA, Z4/16056. Cf. Eder to Z. E., 6 June 1922, Z4/1392/II-a.
 41. CZA (no file no.).
 42. *LCW XI*, 75, 80, 83. Cf. Document 22, below.
 43. 5 July 1922, quoted in Porath, *op. cit.*, 114.
 44. *LCW XI*, 83-84, 87, 106; Eder to Weizmann, 26 April 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-a.
 45. Eder report, P. Z. E. meeting, 26 March 1922, CZA (n.41); R. Graham to Curzon, 29 March 1922, PRO, FO 371/7773, file E3559/65/65; *LCW XI*, 83.
 46. Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 18 April 1922, CZA, Z4/16056. Cf. same to Stein, 11 April 1922, *loc. cit.*; Stein to Weizmann, 6 April 1922, WA; same to same (tgm.), 18 April 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-a.
 47. Deedes to Churchill, 8 June 1922, ISA 2/145.
 48. Eder to Weizmann, 20 May 1922, CZA, Z4/16056. Cf. same to same (tgm.), 21 March 1922, *loc. cit.*; same to same, 26 April 1922, Z4/1392/II-a; same to Z. E., 6 June 1922, *loc. cit.*; same to Weizmann, 21 June 1922, WA.
 49. *LCW XI*, 106.
 50. Stein to Eder, 1 June 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-a; Stein to Kisch, 2 January 1923, Z4/16049.

- A further complication was the pan-Islamic propaganda alleging a Jewish threat to the Muslim holy places of Palestine. See: Porath, *op.cit.*, 264; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 138; Caplan, *op.cit.*, 123.
51. Sokolow to Stein, 5 May 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-a; same to Weizmann, 6 June 1922, WA. Cf. Wormser's fears regarding the November 1921 preliminaries to these talks (letter to James de Rothschild, 12 November 1921, CZA, Z4/16055); Sokolow to Weizmann, 8 April 1922, Z4/16145; Ben-Gurion, *My Talks*, 50.
 52. Eder to Z. E. (tgm.), 22 July 1922, Z4/1053. Cf. Eder to Z. E., 23 July, same to Stein, 26 July, and same to Z. E., 30 July 1922, *loc.cit.*; Stein to Eder, 7 July 1922, S25/4782, Sokolow to Weizmann, 14 July 1922, Z4/16145.
 53. Documents 24, 25 and 26, below. See also: *LCW XI*, 166-68, 174; Kalvaryski to Weizmann, 4 August 1922, WA; Saphir to Weizmann, 21 September 1922, CZA, Z4/16145; Kalvaryski to Weizmann, 29 November 1922, WA; same to Sokolow, 30 November 1922, CZA, S25/10295; same to same, 2 December 1922, Z4/1392/II-b; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 46f.; Perlmann, *op.cit.*, 151; Cohen, *op.cit.*, 188f.
 54. Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, 1961), 331.

Chapter 4 – Grass-Roots Contacts

1. A more detailed version of this Chapter appeared as “Arab-Jewish Contacts in Palestine After the First World War”, *Jnl. of Contemporary History XII* (1977), 635-68, with a Hebrew version in *ha-Mizrah ha-Hadash XXVII* (1977), 18-45.
2. Z.C. meeting, 7 December 1919, CZA, L4/65/V; *History of the Hagana* [hereafter: *HH*], ed. Benzion Dinur et al. (Tel Aviv 1964), vol. I pt. 2, 664; E. Dekel, *Shai: The Exploits of Hagana* (London, 1959), chs. 1, 5 and 6.
3. E.g., S. Felman, Damascus report, 28 January 1920, CZA, Z4/25082.
4. ISA, file 2/30; *Zionist Bulletin* (London), 21 April and 6 August 1920; V.L.E.-Z.C. joint meeting, 23 March 1921, CZA, J1/6282; petition to Churchill, 29 March 1921, PRO, CO 733/2, file 21698; Porath, *Emergence*, 227-28; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 130.
5. See, e.g., Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 29, 47, 52f., 74. At one time or another during the Mandate period, *al-Akhbar*, *Lissan al-Arab* and *Mirat ash-Sharq* were receiving Zionist subsidies. See also Kayyali, *Palestine*, 85.
6. Kisch to Weizmann, 23 April 1931, WA. Cf. same to Warburg, 7 July 1930, CZA, S25/3053; below, page 95.
7. For details, see Caplan, “Arab-Jewish Contacts”, 639.
8. Details in *ibid.*, 640; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 136-40; Chancellor-Rutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, RH/C, 14/2; Rutenberg proposals, below, pages 101f. and Document 35; material on Palestine Potash Works in Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People [hereafter: CAHJP], file P3/2426; van Vriesland to Kalvaryski, 20 May 1930, CZA, A113/47.
9. E.g., L. Stein, “Situation in Palestine, August 1921”, PRO, CO

- 733/16, file 52260; Y.H.Castel, "Re: The Solution of the Arab Question in Palestine", 16 August 1921, WA; S. Tolkowsky, "The Arab Problem in Palestine", 24 August 1921, WA; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 98-104, 127-33; *LCW XI*, 232-35; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 49f.
10. See Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 641-47.
 11. Samuel to Churchill, 18 November 1921, PRO, CO 733/7, file 59565; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 106; Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 51-52, 93-94, 97; Porath, *op.cit.*, 220.
 12. *LCW XI*, 221; Caplan, "Britain, Zionism and the Arabs", 12-13; Porath, *op.cit.*, 220-21.
 13. Kisch to Weizmann, 5 December 1923, CZA, Z4/16050. Cf. same to same, 16 November 1923, *loc.cit.*; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 87.
 14. *Memoirs, Diaries, Letters*, ed. Alex Bein (London, 1970), 258. Cf. Amos Elon, *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (New York, 1971), 179; Moshe Dayan, in *The Israel-Arab Reader*, 440.
 15. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 635-37.
 16. Document 12, below.
 17. For a fuller account of V. Z. reactions, see Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 650-51, and *Palestine Jewry*, 41-43.
 18. *At the Parting*, 33. Cf. Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 157.
 19. V. Z. meeting, 10 June 1919, CZA, J1/8777; Kalvaryski to Yellin, 25 and 31 August 1919, A153/149; same to Eder, 28 August 1919, *loc.cit.*
 20. *At the Parting*, 33; Cohen, *op.cit.*, 174.
 21. S. Felman, Damascus report, 28 January 1920 (n.3); M. Assaf, *The Arab Awakening in Palestine* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1967), 89.
 22. Report to Syrian Congress, 17 June 1920; Hebrew translation made by Eliahu Sasson, who obtained a copy of the original Arabic report in July 1941, CZA, S25/3115.
 23. Felman reports, 20 and 28 June 1920, Z4/16078.
 24. See Document 16, below.
 25. Felman to Eder, 21 February 1920, L3/278.
 26. Sfeir to Weizmann, 3 May 1920, Z4/16078; Eder to Weizmann, 17 May 1920, Z4/16033; *LCW IX*, 359-60. Weizmann later referred to Sfeir as "intelligent, has ideas, very neurotic, always wants lots of money and becomes very unpleasant if he cannot get it." *LCW XV*, 222.
 27. Kalvaryski to Sokolow, 2 December 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-b. Cf. sources cited in n.53, ch.3, above.
 28. Sokolow to Kalvaryski, 4 December 1922, S25/10320; Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z.E., 12 April 1923, Z4/1392/II-b; same to same, 26 April 1923, S25/10296; Kisch to Stein, 30 April 1923, Z4/16049; Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z.E., 18 July 1923, S25/10296. Cf. Document 27, below; Porath, *op.cit.*, 67-69; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 52; *LCW XI*, 250f. Kayyali (*op.cit.*, 130) describes Musa Kazim's attitude in late 1923 as "moderate".
 29. Kisch to Weizmann, 20 June 1923 ("Very Secret"), CZA, Z4/16050; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 60-67; Kisch-Sulaiman Nasif interview, 8 June 1923, WA; Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z.E., 11 June 1923,

- CZA, S25/10296; Kisch to Stein, 13 June 1923, Z4/16035; Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z.E., 3 August 1923, Z4/1392/II-b; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 185-86; Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 655.
30. Kisch to Weizmann, 20 June 1923 (n.29); Kalvaryski to Political Department, Z.E., 24 June 1923, S25/4793; same to same, 26 June 1923, Z4/2421; Kisch to Stein, 27 June 1923, Z4/16035; same to same, 5 October 1923, Z4/16050; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 65, 67.
 31. Porath, *op. cit.*, 169-72.
 32. Tolkowsky, Kalvaryski and Dizengoff to Z.E., 4 March 1921, CZA, Z4/1366. See also Tolkowsky to inner Executive, Z.O., 7 July 1921, *loc. cit.*
 33. V.L. meeting, 16 May 1921, J1/7224; Z.E., London meeting, 22 March 1921, Z4/302/6.
 34. E.g., Aaron Aaronsohn, *Arab Bulletin*, 27 September 1917, 391; Moshe Smilansky, quoted in Ben-Gurion, *My Talks*, 77-79; Rutenberg, quoted below, n.127 to ch.5; Weizmann, in interview with Chancellor, 20 March 1931, RH/C, 14/4; *LCW IX*, 257, 359f. Cf. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 656-58.
 35. E.g., *LCW VIII*, 137f. and *XIV*, 329; M. Miller to Kisch, 11 April 1923, CZA, S25/518; Porath, *op. cit.*, 67-69 and "The Land Problem in Mandatory Palestine", *Jerusalem Quarterly* no. 1 (Fall, 1976), 23-25.
 36. Cmd. 1989; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 309-13; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 179-87; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 161-64.
 37. Kisch report, 25 July 1926, CZA, S25/3252; Chancellor diary, 15 November 1929 (reporting conversation with Musa Kazim al-Husaini and Yaqub Farraj), RH/C, 16/3; Kayyali, *op. cit.*, 136f.; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 187-90; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine*, 152.
 38. On Jamal al-Husaini's suggestions, see: Kisch to Stein, 7 November 1924, Z4/2421; Kalvaryski to Rothschild, 4 February 1925, A113/25/1; Kalvaryski report, V.L.E. meeting, 16 April 1925, A153/152-a; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 188.
 39. Kalvaryski later claimed that he had *opposed* the proposals. See E. Rubinstein, "The 1928 Questionnaire on the Arab Question", in *Essays in the History of Zionism* (Heb.), ed. Y. Bauer *et al.* (Jerusalem, 1976), 329.
 40. Samuel, note of interviews with Kalvaryski and Sulaiman Nasif, 17 March [1925], ISA 100/10.
 41. See: Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 234; Kisch to Stein, 1 December 1926, CZA, S25/668; 2 memoranda on municipal elections [April 1927], *loc. cit.*
 42. Kisch, note of meeting with Jamil al-Husaini and Jamal al-Husaini, 11 January 1927, *loc. cit.*
 43. G. Frumkin, *The Way of a Jerusalem Judge* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1954), 280f., 287-90. Cf. Porath, *op. cit.*, 238-40.
 44. Porath, *op. cit.*, 239.
 45. Frumkin, *op. cit.*, 289.
 46. Raghil received 1152 Arab votes (plus 1196 Jewish votes), against Jamal's 1032 Arab votes (plus 33 Jewish votes).

47. Porath, *op.cit.*, 247, 253, 272-73, 308-309; Wasserstein, *op.cit.*, 154-56; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 188-91.
48. See Kalvaryski, *At the Parting*, 34f.; Cohen, *op.cit.*, 265; Porath, *op.cit.*, 253, 365.
49. Congress resolutions in Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 321f. On the Congress, see: Kalvaryski report, [June/July] 1928, CZA, S25/4210; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 137; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 99-101. It should be noted that the resolutions of all previous Congresses were clearly anti-Zionist. Cf. below, page 121.
50. *Falastin*, 13 July 1928 (Eng. translation in S25/4210); *ibid.*, 31 July 1928 (Eng. summary in S25/3004). Cf. *Isra'il* (Cairo), 20 July 1928 (Engl. summary, *loc.cit.*); Kisch memo, 15 August 1928, S25/3050.
51. Kisch memo, *loc.cit.*
52. Caplan, "Arab-Jewish Contacts", 643; Hoofien to van Vriesland, 6 June 1928, S25/3004. Cf. Kisch to Weizmann, 10 March 1930, WA.
53. Caplan, *op.cit.*, 647-49.
54. E.g., V.L. meeting, 14 February 1923, J1/7226. Cf. Caplan, *op.cit.*, 662.
55. S. Felman to Weizmann, 30 January 1930, WA.

Chapter 5 – Relations in the Wake of Crisis

1. On the riots, see: *HH* II(1), ch. 19; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine*, 221-35; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, 208-12; Sykes, *Cross Roads*, 108-12; Esco, *Palestine* II, 595-609.
2. On the legal and religious status of the Wall and the *status quo* policy of the Administration, see Porath, *Emergence*, 258-62.
3. *Ibid.*, 266-67; Sykes, *op.cit.*, 100-02; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 208-10; Wasserstein, *op.cit.*, 225-31.
4. Luke to Amery, 19 October 1928, PRO, CO 733/160, file 57540/I; Shuckburgh to Chancellor, 1 January 1929, CO 733/163, file 67013/-29/I; Chancellor to Shuckburgh, 12 January 1929, *loc. cit.*; Porath, *op.cit.*, 258f., 265; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 139.
Zionists felt that one possible solution lay in the purchase, through the delicate intermediary of the Government, of the property giving access to the Wall. See: Kayyali, *loc.cit.*; *LCW* XIII, 506-08, 519.
5. *ha-Aretz*, 27 September 1928, Eng. summary in PRO, CO 733/160 (n.4); H.A. Goodman to C.T. Foxcroft, 14 December 1928, *ibid.*, file 57040/III; Ruppin, *Memoirs*, 243. Cf. Kalvaryski, "Open Letter to Our Muslim Brothers", *al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 26 October 1928, reproduced in *ha-Olam*, 23 November 1928, in CZA, A113/13.
6. Details from: *HH* II(1), 309-11; Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929, *Evidence Heard ... in Open Sitings* (London, 1930; Colonial No. 48), vol. I, 270, 316, 320, 356, 482 and vol. II, 598, 887 and Exhibits 47 and 47(a) (hereafter cited as: Shaw, *Evidence*); Luke, *Diary of Events*, 16-25 August 1929, RH/C, 12/2. Cf. Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 143; Wasserstein, *op.cit.*, 231.
7. Y.E. Chelouche, *Story of My Life* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1930/31), 382f.; *HH* II(1), 83.

8. Shaw, *Evidence* I, 356. Cf. Ben-Zvi report, V.L. meeting, 8 September 1929, CZA, J1/7232.
9. Sykes, *Cross Roads*, 113; Ben-Zvi, note of talk with Tahir al-Husaini, 1 April 1930, S25/3006 (cf. below, page 98). These two sources accept the view that the Mufti had indeed engineered the violence, while other sources maintain that spontaneous popular excitement and exaggerated rumours led to a situation which the Mufti was powerless to control. See: Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 143f; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 210f.; P. Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem: Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, a Founder of Palestinian Nationalism" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1981), ch.III.
10. Chelouche, *op.cit.*, 415f.; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 262, 445.
11. *HH* II(1), chs. 20-22.
12. Shaw, *Evidence* II, 1079, Exhibit 82; *HH* II(1), 334. A similar attempt to issue a joint pacifying statement was made by Moshe Smilansky. See Shaw, *Evidence* II, 756, Exhibit 117.
13. Kisch, *op.cit.*, 253; Chelouche, *op.cit.*, 419.
14. Prince Muhammad Ali to Chancellor, 29 August 1929, PRO, CO 733/163, file 67013/II; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 25 September 1930, WA, and Kalvaryski to Kisch, early October 1930, CZA, S25/4142 (both re: Riad as-Sulh); Kisch, *op.cit.*, 317-18.
15. Document 33, below. Cf. Passfield to Humphreys, 22 January 1930, PRO, FO 371/14485, file E444/44/65.
16. Joint Bureau (hereafter: J.B.) Council meeting, 23 July 1930, CZA, S25/3066.
17. Drafts for voluntary agreement of Wailing Wall dispute (n.d.), Bentwich file, MEC; Kisch to Weizmann, 19 August 1930, CZA, S25/3066; Awni Abd al-Hadi to Bentwich, 10 September 1930, A255/622; Magnes to Bentwich, 15 October 1930, A255/594; Chancellor diary, 5, 8 and 24 (= 25?) October 1930, RH/C, 16/3 (see Bibliography); Chancellor to Williams, 22 October 1930, PRO, CO 733/182, file 77050; Kisch, *op.cit.*, 328-43, 392f.; Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1929-1939* (Cass, London, 1977), 7.
18. Porath, *op.cit.*, 6-8.
19. British Order-in-Council, dated 8 June 1931. Esco Foundation, *Palestine* II, 614. For reactions to the Report, see: Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 354-58; E. Samuel to Bentwich, 14 June 1931, CZA, A255/607; Porath, *op.cit.*, 12; U. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council 1921-1937* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, 1978), 387f, 403; Kisch, *op.cit.*, 362, 424f.
20. Kisch memo, 17 November 1929, CZA, S25/9115; D. Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs* (Heb.), vol. I (Tel Aviv, 1971), 362-66; Ben-Gurion memo, 23 October 1929, S25/6; Kisch to Ben-Gurion, 13 November 1929, *loc.cit.*; *HH* II(1), ch.25.
21. Chancellor, note of interview with Sacher, 8 November 1929, PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411/III; J.A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929, CZA, S25/3050; Kisch memo, 17 November 1929 (n.20); V.L. Resolutions, 13-14 November 1929, encl. in Rutenberg to

- Chancellor, 22 November 1929, PRO, *loc.cit.*; LCW XIV, 65, 77f., 99, 123. Cf. below, page 89.
22. Kohn, note of conversation with J. Horowitz, 28 October 1929, WA.
 23. Vaad Leumi, *Documents* (Heb.), ed. M. Attias (Jerusalem, 1963; 2nd enlarged ed.), 164; *Davar*, 16 September 1929, Eng. summary, MEC/L; M. Beilinson, in *Jews and Arabs in Palestine*, eds. Enzo Sereni and R. E. Ashery (New York, 1936), 161; Chancellor tgm., 12 October 1929, in CP 343, November 1929, PRO, *loc.cit.*; Chancellor, minutes of interviews, 9 and 17 October, 15 and 21 November, and 5 December 1929, RH/C, 14/1 and 2; Kisch memo, 17 November 1929 (n.20); Kisch to Tidhar, 22 November 1929, CZA, A153/162; Report of Activities of J.B. for 1930, S25/4141; Ruppin, *Memoirs*, 248.
 24. Magnes to Philby, 19 May 1930, MEC/P, X/2.
 25. Porath, *op.cit.*, 3; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 156f.; Kenneth W. Stein, *The Land Question in Mandatory Palestine, 1929-1936* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976), ch. 4. Cf. below, page 89.
 26. Cf. above, pages 49f., 54f. On hopes for such secret talks in 1930, see: Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 14 January and 23 March 1930, WA; Kisch to Weizmann, 20 March 1930, CZA, S25/3478; Porath, *op.cit.*, 24.
 27. Chancellor interview with members of Palestine Arab Delegation, 18 June 1930, RH/C, 14/3. The meeting between Jamal al-Husaini and Major Nathan led to published reports that Dr Weizmann was making overtures to the Delegation and was being rebuffed. The Z.O. took pains to deny these reports. See: Kisch to J. A. E., London, 5 May 1930, CZA, *loc.cit.*; Namier to Kisch, 15 May 1930, *loc.cit.*; LCW XIV, 275.
 28. D. Oliver to B. Hubert Cooper, 2 June 1930, WA; Shaw, *Evidence II*, 572f., 741. The two points which the Zionist counsel, Sir Boyd Merriman, and P.Z.E. member, Harry Sacher, brought up were (a) Awni's legal case-work on behalf of a land-owning family proceeding with the eviction of tenants, and (b) Awni's suggestions for an Arab-Jewish anti-British alliance. On the former, see CZA files S25/3472 and S25/9783; Hankin to Palestine Land Development Company, 3 December 1929, Z4/3444/III (I am indebted to Prof. Kenneth Stein for these references). On the latter point, see above, pages 39, 41 and below, pages 112f.
 29. Above, pages 7f. See also draft of interview of *al-Ahram's* special correspondent with Awni, datelined Jaffa, 27 February 1932, ISA 66/box 159.
 30. Weizmann note, Luncheon conversation with Ramsay MacDonald and others, 28 March 1930, WA.
 31. R. Said-Ruete to Weizmann, 30 April 1930, WA; Magnes to Philby, 19 May 1930 (n.24); Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 29 May 1930, WA; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 167-69.

Some informal Arab-Jewish meetings nevertheless took place. These involved Awni Abd al-Hadi, I. Ben-Avi, B. Rubinstein, I. Sieff and Dr Kohn. See: Ben-Avi to Weizmann, *loc.cit.*; Shiels-Goodman interview, 30 December 1930, PRO, CO 733/183, file 77050/VI. Cf. G. Sheffer, "Intentions and Results of British Policy in Palestine: Passfield's White

- Paper", *Middle Eastern Studies* IX (1973), 49, 57-58.
32. Porath, *op.cit.*, 4. For Zionist reactions to the Report (Cmd. 3530), see: V. L., *Documents*, 169-71; Stein, *op.cit.*, 231-34; *LCW* XIV, 302, 305, 306.
 33. Magnes to Philby, 19 May 1930 (n. 24); Rutenberg-Brodetsky-Passfield interview, 18 July 1930, CZA, J1/22.
 34. Magnes to Philby, 19 May 1930 (n.24); Stein, *op.cit.*, 235-38, 243f., 254f. An isolated suggestion to use Hope Simpson's visit to Palestine as an occasion for an Arab-Jewish round-table conference for the discussion of economic questions came from Dr Arthur Ruppin of P.Z.E. See his letter to the Z. E., London, 4 June 1930, CZA, S25/3091.
 35. Cmd. 3686 and Cmd. 3692, respectively.
 36. *LCW* XIV, 387-91 and XV, 8f.; V. L., *Documents*, 174f.; Sykes, *op.cit.*, 117f.; Stein, *op.cit.*, 259-80, 287-97; Esco Foundation, *Palestine* II, 636f. Cf. Rutenberg to M. MacDonald, 16 October 1930, WA.
 37. Chancellor diary, 22 October 1930, RH/C, 16/3; Chancellor to Passfield, 4 November 1930, PRO, CO 733/182, file 77050; Ajaj Nuwayhid to Oliver, 24 October 1930, WA; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 170; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 160; Sykes, *op.cit.*, 119; Stein, *op.cit.*, 289-91; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 358.
 38. Diary entry, 23 October 1930, CZA, Z4/5042/I. Cf. his *Palestine Diary*, 358.
 39. Chancellor diary, 14-15 November 1930, RH/C, 16/3; Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 333-54; A. W. Kayyali, *Documents of the Palestinian Resistance against the British Occupation and Zionism* (AC) (Beirut, 1968), 190-228; Porath, *op.cit.*, 31; Chancellor to Passfield, 13 and 19 November 1930, PRO, CO 733/183, file 77050/D/A; Lesch, *loc.cit.*
 40. Kisch to J.A.E., London, 12 December 1930, CZA, S25/3121. Cf. *LCW* XV, 9, 24-25; *New Judaea*, November 1930.
 41. Kisch to Z. E., London, 24 February 1931, WA; Said-Ruete to Weizmann, 31 October 1930, WA. The overture by Abbas Hilmi (below, page 104) was apparently triggered by the Passfield White Paper.
 42. Chancellor diary, 24 (= 25?) October 1930, RH/C, 16/3. Cf. his letter to Williams, 22 October 1930, PRO, *loc.cit.*
 43. *LCW* XV, 34-113 *passim*; Stein, *op.cit.*, 305-15; V. L. *Documents*, 177.
 44. Text in Laqueur, *Israel-Arab Reader*, doc. 13. Cf. Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, 413-15; Kisch, Diary entry, 16 February 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I.
 45. Esco Foundation, *Palestine* II, 659, 765, 769f.; Porath, *op.cit.*, 33f.; Kayyali, *Documents*, 228-31, and *Palestine* 162f.; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 170f.; Kisch to Z. E., London, 24 February 1931, WA; Chancellor diary, 16-21 February and 12 March 1931, RH/C, 16/3.
 46. *LCW* XV, 111-12, 120, 122-23.
 47. Kisch to Z. E., London, 24 February 1931, WA; Kisch, Diary entry, 2 March 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I; Lesch, *loc.cit.*; Porath, *op.cit.*, 34-36.
 48. Musa Alami to Magnes, 28 February 1931, CAHJP, P3/2426.
 49. M. Bailey to C. S., 11 March 1931, PRO, CO 733/197, file 87050. Cf. Chancellor diary entries cited in n.45, above.
 50. Monroe, *Philby of Arabia*, 103. Cf. *ibid.*, 138-39, and Philby to Passfield, 10 November 1929, MEC/P, X/2.

51. To Magnes he appears to have presented himself as acting on behalf of Lord Passfield, while to the Anglo-American Committee he claimed to have been invited to mediate by Jewish circles in Jerusalem. See: Magnes testimony, Committee on the Arab Question, 10 April 1940, CZA, S25/2993; Philby memo to the Anglo-American Committee, 11 March 1946, MEC/P, X/2; Chancellor diary, 4 November 1929, RH/C, 16/3.
52. Documents 29 and 30 below. Cf. Monroe, *op.cit.*, 160f.; Susan Hattis-Rolef, "The Zionists and St. John Philby", *Jewish Social Studies* XXXIV (1972), 110-12; Magnes testimony (n.51); Porath, *op.cit.*, 21f.
53. *New York Times*, 24 November 1929. Cf. Magnes' response ("An International Enclave"), *loc.cit.*; reproduced in A. A. Goren, *Dissenter in Zion: From the Writings of Judah L. Magnes* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), doc. 66 (cited hereafter as *DZ*).
54. Document 32 below. See also Document 31 for a draft of Magnes' proposals.
55. Document 32. Cf. Philby to Passfield, 10 November 1929 (n.50).
56. Philby to Magnes, 20 February 1930, MEC/P, X/2.
57. I have not seen any Arab sources which discuss this episode. Cf. Porath, *op.cit.*, 21-22; Sacher memo, 11 November 1929, CZA, S25/3050; Weizmann remarks, J.A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929 (n.21).
58. Weizmann speech, Albert Hall, 1 September 1929, in *The Position in Palestine* (London, 1930), 8-9; V.L., *Documents*, 157-61; Ctee. of Hebron Refugees to Chancellor, 5 September 1929, MEC/L; *ha-Aretz*, 1, 16 and 17 October 1929, *loc.cit.*; Chancellor meeting with Jewish representatives, 17 October 1929, *loc.cit.*; *LCW* XIV, 77, 119.
59. Melchett remarks, J.A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929 (n.21); *LCW* XIV, 69, 82, 109, 126; Weizmann speech, 2 December 1929, in *Position in Palestine*, 24-27.
60. Kisch to Weizmann, 6 November 1929, CZA, Z4/16134; Chancellor-Sacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.21); Sacher memo, 11 November 1929 (n.57); Melchett remarks (n.59); V.L. resolutions, 13-14 November 1929 (n.21); Sacher remarks, Z.E. meeting, London, 13 January 1930, Z4/302/17; Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs* I, 404; *LCW* XIV, 78.
61. Chancellor-Sacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.24); *LCW* XIV, 77, 105, 344, 347; Weizmann speech, 23 June 1930, quoted in Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs* I, 404.
62. Symes to Amery, 24 June 1927, PRO, CO 733/142, file 44602; Kisch memo, 15 August 1928, CZA, S25/3050; Kaplansky to Passfield, 11 July 1929, CO 733/174, file 67372; summary of views expressed in reply to Z.E. questionnaire, 1929, CZA, A113/22/2. Cf. above, pages 76f.
63. *ha-Aretz*, 1 and 28 October 1929, Eng. summaries, MEC/L; World Union of Zionist-Revisionists, memo, November 1929, ISA, 68/46; Kisch to .E., London, 10 November 1929, CZA, S25/3050; Sacher memo, 11 November 1929 (n.57); Rutenberg to Chancellor, 22 November 1929 (n.21); P.Z.E. resolutions, 29 November 1929,

- S25/4165; *LCW XIV*, 347-48, 350; Kisch to J.A.E., London, 10 June 1930, S25/6297.
64. Only during 1930 would men like Sacher and Kisch put themselves on record, in Zionist forums, in favour of a more positive approach to the constitutional issue. See, e.g., Z.E., London meeting, 13 January 1930, Z4/302/17; Kisch to Z.E., London, 12 December 1930, S25/3121.
 65. Weizmann remarks, J.A. Political Ctee. meeting, 11 November 1929 (n.21); *LCW XIV*, 64, 65, 69, 78-79; Hattis-Rolef, *op.cit.*, 108, 112.
 66. *LCW IX*, 349; Stein to Philby, 23 June 1924, MEC/P, X/1; Hattis-Rolef, *op.cit.*, 107-08.
 67. van Vriesland to Weizmann, 3 October 1922, CZA, Z4/16139. Likewise, Philby was later feared to be poisoning Ibn Sa'ud's attitude to Zionism. See Report to the A.C. on the work of the Political Dept., 4 June 1926, A137/93.
 68. *LCW XIV*, 65-66, 79; Kaplansky to P.Z.E., 28 November 1929, S25/3050.
 69. Passfield to Chancellor, 25 November 1929, PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411/III. Cf. Shuckburgh to Chancellor (private), 18 November 1929, RH/C, 16/4; Monroe, *op.cit.*, 161; Hattis-Rolef, *op.cit.*, 111.
 70. American Jewish Congress, press release, 22 November 1929, CZA, S25/3050; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 313-14, 327; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 151.
Magnes, defending himself before the V.L., insisted that "there had been no negotiations between myself and anybody. In my opinion the time for negotiations has not yet arrived. But, prior to negotiations we need to clarify where things stand. The period of negotiating should be preceded by a period of debating, a period of preparation, a period of educating the public and preparing public opinion ..." V.L. meeting, 13 November 1929, J1/7233.
 71. "Like All the Zionists?" *Falastin* (Eng. ed.), 1 February 1930; Magnes to Weizmann, 3 June 1930, in *DZ*, doc. 68; "A New Intrigue", *al-Yarmuk*, 14 December 1930, summary transl. in CZA, S25/3050; *LCW XIV*, 344; "Magnes More Dangerous Zionist than Ben-Gurion", *Davar*, 21 March 1946 (quoting Ahmad Shuqairi).
 72. Susan Lee Hattis-Rolef, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times* (Haifa, 1970), 66. This particular resolution was likely motivated by the independent negotiations undertaken by H. Farbstain and E. Neumann with the Amir Abdallah in late 1932. The "separatist" tendencies of Jewish labour circles caused similar concern. See: Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 134-35; Kisch, *op.cit.*, 374; Kalvaryski memo, 5 May 1930, CZA, A113/25/2.
 73. Magnes to Weizmann, 7 September 1929, *DZ*, doc. 64.
 74. Magnes to Warburg, 13 September 1929, *ibid.*, doc. 65. Cf. A. Kedar, "Brith Shalom", *Jerusalem Quarterly* no. 18 (Winter, 1981), 67.
 75. Same to same, tgm., 1 November 1929, PRO, CO 733/175, file 67411/III. Cf. Magnes to Weizmann, 6 November 1929, WA.

While Warburg seems to have agreed, initially, with Magnes, he soon joined ranks with those who deprecated his independent activities. See: Warburg to Weizmann, 4 and 6 November 1929, WA;

- Kaplansky to P.Z.E., 28 November 1929 (n.68); *Davar*, 13 September 1929, Eng. summary, MEC/L; Aguda Israel to Chancellor, 4 December 1929, PRO, *loc.cit.*; H. Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1949, 2nd ed.), 293; Hattis-Rolef, "Zionists and Philby", 111f.; Porath, *op.cit.*, 21.
76. Convocation address, 18 November 1929, in *Addresses by the Chancellor of the Hebrew University* (Jerusalem, 1936), 98-99 and 102-03. Cf. J. L. Magnes, *Like All the Nations?* (Jerusalem, 1930); *New Judaea*, March-April 1930, 148; Kisch to Weizmann, 10 March 1930, WA; Hattis, *Bi-National Idea*, 66f.
 77. Chancellor diary, 4 November 1929, RH/C, 16/3; Chancellor to Passfield, 2-4 November 1929, PRO, *loc.cit.*; Chancellor-Sacher interview, 8 November 1929 (n.24); Kisch to Weizmann, 20 May 1930, WA; Hattis-Rolef, "Zionists and Philby", 111.
 78. Warburg to Magnes, 4 December 1929, CAHJP, P3/2394. On the continuing split – which tended to separate London and Palestinian Zionists (anti-Magnes) from American "non"-Zionists (pro-Magnes) – see: Kisch to Weizmann, 10 March 1930, WA; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 23 March 1930, WA; Resolutions of the Palestine Jewish Bar Assn., 16 May 1930, CZA, S25/3050; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 313f., 327, 349; Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs I*, 404f., 413.
 79. Ben-Gurion, *op.cit.*, 491. Cf. *ibid.*, 337-41 and *My Talks*, 22.
 80. Beilinson, in *Jews and Arabs* (n.26), 171f., 178f.; Ben-Gurion, "Planning Zionist Policy", in *ibid.*, 148f.; Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs I*, 490f.
 81. Ben-Gurion, "Planning Zionist Policy" (n.80), 130; Beilinson, *op.cit.*, 167f.; Ben-Gurion, memo, 23 October 1929 (n.20); Kisch memo, 17 November 1929 (n.20); Weizmann speech, 2 December 1929 (n.59), 26; J.A. memo, May 1930, PRO, CO 733/192, file 77275; Kisch, *op.cit.*, 272-73, 283, 429-30; Kisch, Letter to the Chairman, Political Commission, XVIIth Zionist Congress, June 1931 (copy in PRO, CO 733/207, file 87286), 5-7.
 82. Kisch to Hoofien, 30 April 1931, ISA, 103/658/8. Cf. Hattis, *op.cit.*, 58; Kisch to Vilensky, 26 May 1931, CZA S25/3136.
 83. E.g. Kisch to Vilensky, 26 May 1931, CZA, S25/3136.
 84. Arlosoroff to Weizmann, 21 November 1932, WA. Cf. his *Jerusalem Diary*, 30, 188-89, 342-51; Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs I*, 405 (Sacher remarks) and 521; Sykes, *op.cit.*, 122; Ben-Gurion, "Planning Zionist Policy" (n.80), 148.
 85. "Notes Re: Arab-Jewish Situation in Palestine", 2 and 4 April 1930, WA. Cf. Cooper to Watson, 7 May 1930, PRO, FO 371/14486, file E2688/44/65; Watson to Lindsay, 8 May 1930, *loc.cit.*
 86. Memo of a Quaker Proposal for Peace in Palestine, enclosed in Adler to Warburg, 22 April 1930, WA; Cooper to Watson, 7 May 1930 (n.85); Watson to Lindsay, 8 May 1930 (n.85); Oliver to Cooper, 2 June 1930, WA; Watson, Memo on Oliver-Cooper correspondence (25 May – 10 July), 27 July 1930, PRO, *loc.cit.*, file E4274/44/65.
 87. Warburg to Weizmann, 6 May 1930, WA. Cf. *LCW XIV*, 295; Cooper to Watson, 7 May 1930 (n.85).
 88. Oliver to Cooper, 2 June 1930, WA; Watson memo, 27 July 1930 (n.

- 86). Cf. "Notes Re: Arab-Jewish Situation" (n.85); *LCW XIV*, 337; Cooper to Watson, 7 May 1930 (n.85).
89. Kisch, Diary entries, 3 and 5 July 1930, CZA, Z4/5042/I; *Palestine Diary*, 320f.; *LCW XIV*, 358; Watson memo, 27 July 1930 (n.86).
90. Oliver apparently met, at this time, with the Mufti, King Faisal, Shawkat Ali (see below, page 104), and had hopes of travelling to meet King Ibn Sa'ud. See: Ajaj Nuwayhid to Oliver, 24 October 1930, WA; Oliver to Kisch, 18 February 1931, WA; same to same, 27 March 1931, CZA, S25/3053; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 345.
91. See note 86, above.
92. Kisch, Diary entry, 5 July 1930 (n.89); Kisch to Warburg, 7 July 1930, CZA, S25/3053; *Palestine Diary*, 320f.; Watson memo, 27 July 1930 (n.86). Cf. above, page 63.
93. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 394-5; Oliver to Kisch, 27 March 1931 (n.90).
94. Oliver to Kisch, *loc. cit.*; Kisch to Oliver, 5 April 1931, CZA, S25/3053.
95. Oliver to Weizmann, 20 June 1932, WA.
96. Kisch, Diary entry, 24 March 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I; *LCW XV*, 321f.
97. Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary*, 269; Sharett, *Political Diary I*, 215, 224; E. Epstein to B. Joseph, 25 January 1939, S25/3054/A.
98. Satow to Monteagle, 1 June 1930, PRO, FO 371/14486, file E2838/44/65.
99. Kisch, Diary entry, 24 March 1931 (n.96); *Palestine Diary*, 395; Kisch to Weizmann, 6 November 1931, WA; Williams-Brodetsky interview, 15 October 1931, PRO, CO 733/198, file 87054.
100. The following account draws extensively on Elyakim Rubinstein, *The Zionist and Yishuv Leadership in Palestine and the Arab Question, 1928-1930* (Heb), unpublished M.A. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Cf. Rubinstein, "An Outline of Zionist Positions", 52-53; Kisch, circular letter to Members of the Z.E., 13 May 1930 [K/824/30]; Report on Activities of the J.B. during 1930, n.d., CZA, S25/4141: Report on Work of the J.B., in Kisch, Letter to the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81), 22-35.
101. Kisch to Franck, 12 January 1928, CZA, S25/10320; same to Stein, 16 October 1929, S25/3101.
102. Conclusions of discussion of J.B. Council, quoted in Kisch, Letter to the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81), 34-35.
103. Sokolow statement, quoted in Esco Foundation, *Palestine II*, 749.
104. E.g., Kalvaryski memos, 5 May 1930 (n.72) and 3 October 1930, CZA, S25/4142; Kisch to Weizmann, 19 August 1930, S25/3066; Kisch, Letter to the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81), 26, 30-31, and *Palestine Diary*, 393, 407, 411, 421-22; E. Samuel, "The Improvement of Jewish-Arab Relations in Palestine", n.d. (late 1931), ISA, 103/658/8; same to N. Bentwich, 6 May 1931, CZA, A255/607; Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary*, 99, 119, 272.
105. Kisch to Weizmann, 23 April 1931, WA; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 301-02, 406-07; Arlosoroff, *op.cit.*, 250-51.
106. Between October 1930 and September 1932, Kalvaryski reported numerous talks with Arabs, including Omar Salih al-Barghuthi,

- Jamal al-Husaini, Subhi al-Khadra, Hasan Khalid, Awni Abd al-Hadi, Musa Kazim al-Husaini and Riad as-Sulh. See CZA, S25/4142. Cf. below, pages 99f. and sources cited in n.110.
- On Kisch's meetings with Arabs, including Raghīb an-Nashashibi, Hasan Sidqi ad-Dajani and Taysir Dawjah, see CZA, S25/3052; his letters to Weizmann, 7 December 1929 (Z4/16137) and 20 March 1930 (S25/3478); his *Palestine Diary*, 303, 314, 342, 411 and 413-14.
107. E.g., Beilinson's critique of Zionist Arab policy in "Problems of Jewish-Arab Rapprochement", in *Jews and Arabs* (n.23), 167-94; H. Arlosoroff, "An Attempt at Summing-Up", in *Writings* (Heb.) vol. I (Tel Aviv, 1934), 101-40.
 108. Laniado to Kisch, 30 March 1930; Ben-Zvi, note of meeting with Tahir al-Husaini, 1 April 1930; Kisch, note on Tahir al-Husaini, 2 April 1930; all in CZA, S25/3006.
 109. Perhaps less sensational, but more practical, from the Zionist point of view was the attempt to obtain from Tahir some documented evidence that the Mufti had indeed organised the 1929 riots. Such evidence was not, in the end, provided, despite Tahir's promises.
 110. Constitution of Nazareth Agricultural Party, CZA, S25/4141; Kalvaryski reports in files S25/4142 and S25/3466; Kalvaryski memo, 5 May 1930 (n.72); Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary*, 33, 93, 130, 219; Porath, *op.cit.*, 50-54, 70-71; *LCW XV*, 58, 92, 222, 322; Kalvaryski-Ahdab correspondence, September-October 1930, S25/4142 and A113/47; Kisch to Kalvaryski, 7 January 1931, A113/25/2; Kisch, Diary entry, 14 April 1931, Z4/5042/I.
 111. Report on J. B. Activities during 1930 (n.100). Cf. Kalvaryski memo, 5 May 1930 (n.72); "Negotiations with the Jaffa Opposition", 16 January 1931, S25/4141; Porath, *op.cit.*, 70-71.
 112. Kisch to Weizmann, 23 April 1931, WA; *Report of the Executive* submitted to the XVIII Zionist Congress, Prague, 21-29 August 1933 (London, 1933), 250.
 113. Kisch, Diary entry, 13 March 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I. Cf. M. Shertok to Kalvaryski, 25 November 1931, S25/4142.
 114. Kisch to Weizmann, 19 August 1930 (n.104); Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 1 October 1930, WA; Rutenberg to M. MacDonald, 16 October 1930, WA; Shertok, note of talk with Abd al-Qadir Shibal, 17 February 1932, CZA, S25/3051; Kalvaryski to Arlosoroff, 25 February 1932, S25/3070; Porath, *op.cit.*, ch. 3; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 163, 165, 167; Y. Arnon-Ohana, *The Internal Struggle within the Palestinian Nationalist Movement, 1929-1939* (Heb.) (Tel Aviv, 1981), chs. 1-5.
 115. Kalvaryski, note of meeting of 20 January 1930, CZA, S25/3051. Cf. Porath, *Emergence*, 68.
 116. Kalvaryski, note of meeting of 14 February 1930, *loc.cit.*, Cf. Hattis, *Bi-National*, 272.
 117. Porath, *Palestinian Arab*, 23f.; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 157f.; Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 167-69. Cf. above, page 84.
 118. Document 34, below. Cf. Kisch to Stein, 9 March 1930, CZA, S25/3466; Kisch, note of questions submitted by a member of the A.E.

re: government's likely attitude to formation of new anti-Mufti party and Kisch's reply (26 January 1930), Z4/4004/1.

Barghuthi's new Istiqlal Party proclamation, dated 7 March, declared that it was independent of the important Palestinian families and of Jewish connections. Arnon-Ohana, *op.cit.*, 163.

119. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 304f, 330f; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 29 May 1930, WA; *LCW XIV*, 281, 294; Porath, *op.cit.*, 26f.; Kayyali, *op.cit.*, 158; Chancellor diary, 6 June 1930, RH/C, 16/3.
120. Document 36, below (dated 4 August 1930).
121. Kalvaryski to Magnes, 6 August 1930, CZA, A113/25/2; *At the Parting*.
122. Kisch to Kalvaryski, 21 August 1930, CZA, *loc.cit.* Cf. Kisch, note of talk with Taysir Dawjah, 12 May 1931 (n.106); *Palestine Diary*, 328.
123. Kalvaryski's retrospective allocation of responsibility for the failure of his initiative lacks consistency. In November 1932, he wrote: "No person and no institution, a fortiori no official institution, empowered me to take this step. Whatever I did in this regard was done upon my own responsibility; and that, in my opinion, is the weak point in the document. For this reason it awoke no powerful echo in the Arab circles which were anxious to learn the stand of official circles with regard to the matter. It clearly follows that all responsibility for this step falls on me." (Letter to *She'ifotenu*, 27 November 1932, CZA, A113/13). Yet, in a May 1937 speech, Kalvaryski complained that the J.A.E. had been responsible for the failure because it had indefinitely postponed its endorsement of the plan "until the patience of the Arabs gave out and they broke off the negotiations". To this coloured recollection, Kalvaryski went on to add the even more dubious claim that his Platform had been endorsed by the Mufti, Jamal al-Husaini, Awni Abd al-Hadi, Adil Arslan, Riad as-Sulh, King Faisal, Amir Abdallah, and Dr Weizmann! (*At the Parting*). The latter version is accepted at face value by Cohen (*Israel and the Arab World*, 266).
124. Document 35, below. Cf. Rutenberg, note of interview with Shuckburgh, 21 May 1930, CZA, J1/22; Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, 69. Rutenberg was again to show his initiative and concern for resolving Arab-Jewish difficulties in later years.
125. Z.E., London meeting, 21 May 1930, Z4/302/17; *LCW XV*, 291, 316, 318, 335, 351.
126. This proposal was put to the Z.E. in London, but was not acted upon. Meeting, 13 May 1930, *loc.cit.*
127. Chancellor noted in his diary, 5 November 1929: "I told him he would be doing much more valuable work if he would get into touch with some of the Arab leaders ... [Rutenberg] said that he would do so but I am afraid he dislikes and suspects the Arabs so much that he will not succeed. He thinks the only way of dealing with an Arab is to bribe him, and he thinks that they can all be bribed ..." RH/C, 16/3.
128. Passfield to Chancellor (private and most secret tgm.), 31 May 1930, PRO, CO 733/183, file 77050/B; Rutenberg to M. MacDonald, 16 October 1930, WA.
129. Passfield to Chancellor, 2 tgms., 31 May 1930, PRO, *loc.cit.* Cf. Sheffer,

- "Intentions and Results", 50, 59; Flapan, *op. cit.*, 93.
130. Z.E., London meeting, 27 May 1930, Z4/302/17; Kisch to Z.E., London, 10 June 1930, S25/6297; Kisch, Diary entry, 8 July 1930, Z4/5042/I; *LCW XIV*, 381 and XV, 51-52, 66.
 131. Diary entry, 8 July 1930 (n.130).
 132. Chancellor to Passfield, 5 June 1930, PRO, *loc.cit.*; Chancellor diary, 1 June 1930, RH/C, 16/3; note of Passfield-Chancellor meeting, 18 July 1930, PRO, *loc.cit.*; Rutenberg to Ben-Zvi, 3 August 1930, CZA, J1/22; *LCW XIV*, 319, 330, 335, 360; Sheffer, *op.cit.*, 50.
 133. Rutenberg/Brodetsky, note of interview with Passfield, 18 July 1930, J1/22; Rutenberg to Weizmann, 21 July 1930, *loc.cit.*; *LCW XV*, 66.
 134. See, esp., his reports to Weizmann, dated 14 January, 23 March, 29 May and 25 September 1930, in WA.
 135. The only concrete results of Ben-Avi's efforts seem to have been the sowing of some discord among rival Arab politicians. See his reports to Weizmann, dated 14 January and 1 October 1930, WA. It is possible that Weizmann sought to terminate Ben-Avi's services once the latter reported that his Arab contacts wanted the Jews to join in "a common Judeo-Arab front against the British mandate". Letter of 25 September (n.134). Cf. below, pages 112f.; *LCW XIV*, 99f.
 136. Said-Ruete to Weizmann, 30 April 1930, WA; same to Awni Abd al-Hadi, 31 May 1930, ISA, 66/box 152; same to Jamal al-Husaini, 5 February 1931, WA. Cf. *LCW XIV*, 71, 94, 185f, 230, and XV, 200.
 137. Said-Ruete to Weizmann, 9 and 20 December 1929, CZA, Z4/16137; same to same, 30 April and 31 October 1930, WA; *LCW XIV*, 126 and XV, 200.
 138. Kisch to Weizmann, 28 January 1930, CZA, S25/3064; *LCW XIV*, 99, 185 and XV, 121, 200.
 139. Kisch to Rosenbleuth, 24 July 1930, CZA, Z4/4004/I; Rosenbleuth to Weizmann, 13 August 1930, Z4/305/14A; Vilensky to Kisch, 11 October 1930, S25/3136. Cf. *LCW XV*, 53.
 140. Camhy to Weizmann, 30 October 1930, WA. A little more than a year later, Abbas Hilmi visited Palestine and his name became associated with a scheme for an Arab-Zionist round-table conference and the cantonisation of Palestine.
 141. Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 193-94. Cf. Camhy to Weizmann, 24 November 1930, WA.
 142. Cohen, *op.cit.*, 194; Camhy to Weizmann, 7 September 1931, WA. Cf. Camhy to Weizmann, 4 March 1931, WA; Arlosoroff, *Jerusalem Diary*, 161.
 143. Sacher to Weizmann, 29 December 1930, WA. Cf. *LCW XV*, 76.
 144. Camhy to Weizmann, 13 December 1930, WA; Cohen, *op.cit.*, 193. Cf. below, page 106 (n.159). Azmi's connections with the Zionists began in 1924, in his capacity as editor of *as-Siasa* newspaper. See: Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 117-19; Kalvaryski to Azmi, 15 December 1926, CZA, S25/10299.
 145. Camhy to Weizmann, 7 and 16 February, 13 and 28 April, and 7 September 1931, WA; Weizmann to Camhy, 14 April 1931, WA;

- LCW XV*, 114; Kisch to J.A.E., London, 29 May 1931, CZA, S25/3064.
146. *LCW XV*, 87-90; Oliver to Kisch, 18 February 1931, WA; Kupferschmidt, *op.cit.*, 332-34.
147. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 381; Diary entries, 9 February and 24 March 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I; Oliver to Kisch, 27 March 1931, S25/3053; Chancellor diary, 11 February 1931, RH/C, 16/3.
148. E.g., N. Vilensky to Kisch, 18 April 1931, S25/3136; Vilensky memo, 6 May 1931, *loc.cit.*; *LCW XV*, 133; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 338, 344f., 361, 363, 374, 391f., 404, 408, 422, 431; Notes for Col. Kisch's Successor (Arab Affairs in Neighbouring Countries), n.d., S25/3489.
149. Kisch, Diary entries, 19 and 20 February 1931, Z4/5042/I; *Palestine Diary*, 386-87; Note of Interviews at Amman, 20 February 1931, L9/351; Letter to the Chairman, June 1931 (n.81). Cf. Kisch's 1924 visit to Amman: *Palestine Diary*, 93-98; Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 179-81.
150. Kisch to J.A.E., London, 23 February 1931, L9/351. Cf. Notes for Col. Kisch's Successor (n.148).
151. Exchange of cables between Jerusalem and London Executives, 18 and 19 February 1931, S25/1717; Kisch, Diary entries, 1 and 2 March 1931, Z4/5042/I; *LCW XV*, 91, 97, 105, 120, 127; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 391; Chancellor diary, 28 February 1931, RH/C, 16/3. Cf. above, page 86 (n.46).
152. Shuckburgh note, 6 February 1931, PRO, CO 733/197, file 87050/I.
153. Passfield to Chancellor, 6 February, and Chancellor to Passfield, 13 February, 1931, *loc.cit.*; Chancellor diary, 14 February 1931, RH/C, 16/3.
154. 18 February 1931, quoted in Kisch to J.A.E., London, 24 February 1931, WA. Cf. Chancellor diary 18 February 1931, RH/C, 16/3.
155. Chancellor diary, 16-18 February 1931, RH/C, 16/3.
156. *al-Hayat*, 26 March 1931, Eng. transl. in CZA, S25/1717; *al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 26 March 1931, Kayyali, *Documents*, 231f. Cf. *Falastin*, 19 March 1931, Eng. transl. in S25/1717; *LCW XV*, 132.
157. On the boycott, see: Kisch, note of interview with H.C., 26 February 1931, *loc.cit.*; resolutions of a meeting of the A.E., quoted in *Report of the Executive of the J.A.*, July 1931 (London, 1931), 39; Chancellor to Passfield, 3 March 1931, PRO, CO 733/203, file 87139; Kisch to Weizmann, 13 March 1931, CZA, S25/1717; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 391, 394, 396; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 170f. Cf. sources cited in n.47, above.
- On apparent breaches of the boycott, see: Note of offers from Arab notables to meet Dr Weizmann, 10 February - 5 March 1931, S25/3070; Chancellor-Weizmann interview, 30 March 1931, RH/C, 14/4; Kisch to Weizmann, 23 April 1931, WA; Weizmann to Kisch, 7 May 1931, WA; *LCW XV*, 132f.; Porath, *op.cit.*, 35, 70; Stein, *op.cit.*, 319f.
158. Tolkowsky to Kisch, 24 March 1931, CZA, S25/1717.
159. Abbas Hilmi to Abdallah, 27 February 1931, WA; Camhy to Weizmann, 4 March 1931, WA; Kisch, Diary entries, 11, 15 and 24 March 1931, CZA, Z4/5042/I; Kisch to Weizmann, 13 March 1931

- (n.157); Kisch to Azmi, 22 March 1931, S25/1717; Kisch to Cust, 24 March 1931, *loc.cit.*; *LCW XV*, 128f.
160. Abdallah excused himself on the basis of a prior commitment, but the more likely reasons were: (a) pressure of the Arab boycott, and/or (b) fears for Weizmann's security in Transjordan. See: Kisch, Diary entries, 24 and 27 March 1931 (n.159); Fuad al-Khatib to Weizmann, 24 March, and Kisch to Fuad al-Khatib, 25 March 1931, S25/1717; Kisch to Warburg, 8 May 1931, WA; Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 396; Cohen, *op.cit.*, 195; Sa'igh, *Hashemites*, 128.
 161. Chancellor, note of interview with Weizmann, 20 March 1931, PRO, *loc.cit.* Cf. *LCW XV*, 132f.; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 162f.
 162. Chancellor-Weizmann interviews, 20 and 30 March 1931, RH/C, 14/4.
 163. Weizmann to Kisch, 7 May 1931, WA; *LCW XV*, 128, 131, 171f.
 164. Stein, *op.cit.*, 326-35; Sheffer, *op.cit.*, 51-54; Porath, *op.cit.*, 36; *LCW XV*, 103, 105, 111, 131, 141f.
 165. Chancellor-Weizmann interviews (n.162); Brodetsky, note of interview with Shuckburgh and Williams at the C.O., 14 April 1931, WA; *LCW XV*, 111.
 166. Resolutions of meeting of A.E. (14 April), quoted in *Report of the Executive* (n.157), 39. Cf. *LCW XV*, 145; Porath, *op.cit.*, 36-37; Brodetsky-Shuckburgh-Williams interview (n.165).
 167. Stein, *op.cit.*, 326-27.
 168. *Palestine Diary*, 406. Cf. Ruppin, *Memoirs*, 256; Said-Ruete to Jamal al-Husaini, 5 February 1931, WA.
 169. Shuckburgh to Weizmann, 18 April 1931, WA.
 170. On the Zionist-British discussions, see *LCW XV*, 141-44, 165-70.
 171. *Palestine Diary*, 406. Cf. *LCW XV*, 24f.
 172. Esco Foundation, *Palestine II*, 749. See also: Z.E., London meetings, 24 September and 19 November 1929, CZA, Z4/302/16; D. Avissar memo, November 1929, S25/3101; Ben-Gurion memo, 23 November 1929, in *Memoirs I*, 406f; Ernst Simon memo, 12 March 1930, S25/3122; Z.E., London meeting, 16 March 1930, Z4/302/17.
 173. Kisch to Vilensky, 24 February 1931, S25/3136.

Conclusions

1. F. C. Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York, 1964), 53f.
2. Above, pages 72f. and 76f., and sources cited in notes 37 and 50 of ch. 4. For additional sources, see: Porath, *Emergence*, 245-47, 254-57 and *Palestinian Arab*, 22; Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 100, 102; Wasserstein, *British in Palestine*, 220f.; A.M. Hyamson, *Palestine: A Policy* (London, 1942), 139f.
3. On the *majlisyyun-muavidun* distinction, see: Esco, *Palestine I*, 468f.; Lesch, *op.cit.*, 95-101; Kayyali, *Palestine*, 116f., 122f., 130-37; Porath, *Emergence*, ch. 5.
4. On the first point, see: Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 223; Porath, *op.cit.*, 61f; cables and petitions, 9 August-10 September 1921, CZA Z4/1250; V.L. meeting, 10 August 1921, J1/7224; V.L. meeting, 21 January 1922, J1/7225. On the latter point, mention should be made of Jacob de

Haan, an outspoken anti-Zionist Aguda personality in Jerusalem who maintained contacts with Arabs. See, e.g., Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 119f., 135f.; E. Marmorstein, "A Martyr's Message" (London, 1975), 9f.

On the occasion of the 1927 municipal elections in Jerusalem (above, page 75), Jamal al-Husaini had threatened that if the Jews voted for the Nashashibis against the Hussainis, the latter would lend their votes to an Aguda slate against the mainstream Jewish candidates. In the end the Jerusalem Jewish community presented a single unified slate, nullifying any such possibility.

5. See also: note of conversation with Yusuf Bek and Tawfiq Bek (?al-Ghussain) 27 April 1919, CZA, Z4/16004; Chancellor-Rutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, RH/C, 14/2; Sacher, *Shaw Evidence II*, 791f.; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 25 September 1930, WA.
6. Above, page 56; Eder to Z.E., London, 6 June 1922, CZA, Z4/1392/II-a; Dr Y. Epstein, V.L. meeting, 5 April 1922, J1/7225; Ben-Avi diary, 26 October 1922, S25/905; Hoefler to Weizmann, 14 July 1924, WA; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 25 September 1930, WA. Cf. the subtitle of Tibawi's article on the Weizmann-Faisal negotiations (ch.2, n.22): "The 1919 Attempt to Secure an Arab Balfour Declaration"; Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 195.
7. Notes of meeting at Mr. Balfour's house, 22 July 1921, CZA, Z4/16151; R. Meinertzhagen, *Middle East Diary*, 1917-1956 (London 1959), 105f; R. Crossman, *A Nation Reborn* (London 1960), 131f.; Rutenberg remarks to Chancellor, 23 October 1929 (n.5).
8. Kalvaryski's recollection of the words of Nasif al-Khalidi (above, page 23) has become the most frequently-quoted expression of this idea; but Kalvaryski was by no means unique in invoking this distinction. Yellin, Thon, Remez and even a "hard-liner" like Menahem Ussishkin shared this view. See, e.g., V.Z. debate, 10 June 1919, CZA, J1/8777; Medzini, *Ten Years*, 81; Nordau to Weizmann, 2 June 1920, Z4/16078.
9. E.g., Ben-Gurion, *My Talks*, 12, 20.
10. E.g., Saphir's view of the failure of the 1922 Cairo talks. See Esco, *Palestine I*, 569f.
11. Kisch, Political Report: Internal Arab Policy, 31 May 1923, CZA, Z4/16050. Cf. Lesch, *op.cit.*, 20, 47, 199f., 227.
12. L. Stein, report of conversation with Philby, 4 December 1922, Z4/1392/II-b.
13. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 185-88.
14. Kisch to Weizmann, 21 March 1924, CZA, Z4/16028, reporting conversation with Hasan Sabri. Cf. his note of conversation with Sulaiman Nasif, 25 January 1923, WA.
15. Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians*, 30f., 55; Medzini, *op.cit.*, 232f.; Perlmann, "Chapters", 152; Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World*, 184, 189; Esco, *loc.cit.*
16. CZA, S25/3013 contains a list of 71 names selected from this card index in 1931.
17. *My Talks*, 15, 78f. Cf. the contrary opinion of M. Milson: "Choosing partners for negotiations according to the implicit assumption that

- more extreme means more authentic is a sure formula for damaging the chances of a peaceful settlement." For Milson, "the extreme radical personalities and groups among the Palestinians" were "not necessarily the 'authentic' representatives" of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza territories in the early 1980s. *Commentary*, May 1981, 35.
18. Perhaps the clearest single statement of this approach was made by Dr Weizmann in his letter to Balfour, 30 May 1918, *LCW* VIII, 205. Cf. above, page 34, and sources cited in note 18 to chapter 2.
 19. Letter to Z.A.C., 28 May 1914, quoted in Ro'i, "Zionist Attitude", 220.
 20. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, xxii, 79, 128, 152f., 172f., 185, 199, 206f. and 231.
 21. On this point, see the work of Yehoshua Porath: *Emergence*, ch. 2; "The Palestinians and the Negotiations for the British-Hijazi Treaty, 1920-1925", *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem) VIII (1972), 20-48; "The Palestinians and Pan-Arab Nationalism", *Wiener Library Bulletin* XXXI (1978; new series nos. 45/46), 29-39.
 22. Above, pages 7f, 39, 41, 76, 99-101, and below, pages 122-4. Cf. Porath, *Emergence*, 331 (n).
 23. E.g., *LCW* XV, 111.
 24. Such a rôle for the British would be more accentuated during the period November 1938 - May 1939 (St James Conference, MacDonald White Paper).
 25. World Union of Zionist Revisionists, memo, November 1929, ISA 68/46. Cf. the same organisation's critique of the MacDonald Letter, 25 February 1931, PRO, CO 733/197, file 87050/4; Caplan, "Britain, Zionism", *passim*.
 26. Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 288, 294, and 217.
 27. *Ibid.*, 97.
 28. Above, pages 44 and 49, and sources cited in note 54 to chapter 2. Faisal's continued interest in Jewish investment capital was shown in 1925 and in 1930. See: Document 28; Vilensky to Kisch, 11 October 1930, CZA, S25/3136.
 29. Dr Weizmann had to remind Faisal of this point at their 1925 meeting (Document 28). Cf. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 28, 42, 44.
 30. Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 118. Cf. *ibid.*, 72, 145, 180, 184, 201, 321, 340f., 354; Statement by the Palestine Arab Delegation, 19 May 1930, RH, Palestine volume (905.17.s.9(1930)). On this and the following demands, see the excellent summary of official "Palestinian-Arab ideology" in Porath, *Emergence*, 39-63.
 31. Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 72, 119, 129, 131, 146, 174, 180, 191f., 202, 206, 354.
 32. *Ibid.*, 72, 119, 122, 124, 132, 180, 184.
- In the early 1920s, two further demands frequently appeared: (1) that Palestine should not be separated from her "sister states", and (2) that there should be a return to the legal *status quo ante bellum*. *Ibid.*, 72, 119f., 147, 202.
33. See, e.g., Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 46; Eder evidence to Haycraft

- Commission, 22 July 1921, CZA, Z4/2701/V; *David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer*, ed. J. B. Hobman (London, 1945), 164f.; Crossman, *op. cit.*, 127f.; Esco Foundation, *Palestine I*, 272f. and II, 619f.
34. Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 334f.
 35. *Ibid.*, 333-54 (quotations are from p. 339).
 36. Iklé, *op. cit.*, 207-10.
 37. Both letters dated 12 February 1931, CAHJP, P3/2426.
 38. E.g., Weizmann's Berlin speech, 27 August 1930, alluding to bi-nationalism. See: Hattis, *Bi-National Idea*, 89. Cf. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 340; Ben-Avi to Weizmann, 25 September 1930, WA.
 39. Zuaytir, *DPNM*, 338. Cf. above, pages 7f.
 40. *Ibid.*, 321.
 41. See, e.g. Lesch, *op. cit.*, ch. 6.
 42. See, e.g. Mandel, *Arabs and Zionism*, 32f.; E. Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version* (London, 1970), 334f.; Porath, *Emergence*, 60f.; S. Abraham, "The Jew and the Israeli in Modern Arabic Literature", *Jerusalem Quarterly* no. 2 (Winter, 1977), 119f.
 43. W. L. Ochsenwald, "The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem and Israel: An Historical Comparison", *Middle East Journal* XXX (1976), 221-26; M. Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs* (Harmondsworth, 1968), 162; E. Sivan, "Modern Arab Historiography of the Crusades", *Asian and African Studies* (Jerusalem) VIII (1972), 109-49.
 44. Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 5f., 186-91, 199-203; Chancellor-Rutenberg interview, 23 October 1929, RH/C, 14/2; above, note 127 to ch. 5.
 45. Laqueur, *History of Zionism*, 257. Cf. the 1921 *yishuv* discussions about the existence of an Arab national movement in Caplan, *Palestine Jewry*, 94-98.
 46. *LCW* VIII, 130, 161, 201f, and IX, 105; Caplan, *op. cit.*, 14, 150; Lesch, *op. cit.*, 234; E. Said, *The Question of Palestine* (New York, 1980), 26-28, 79-86.

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Note on Sources

The sources listed in the bibliography have been divided into three sections.

(A) Primary Sources, to which researchers tend to attach relatively more value, on account of their originality and authenticity. Within the "primary" category, the most original and authentic materials tend to be those found in archives. But this should not lead the reader to minimise the importance of many of the primary published works listed below. These include volumes of documents, letters, diaries and speeches. With regard to these volumes, the simple page reference has been given in the notes for the sake of brevity. Thus, e.g., "*LCW* VIII, 205," is given in place of the fullest possible reference, which would have included the additional information: "Weizmann to Balfour, 30 May 1918".

(B) Autobiographical works and unpublished dissertations have been grouped in a middle category here. The former tend to straddle the dividing-line between primary and secondary sources to the extent that they tend to combine original material with *post facto* analysis and selectivity.

(C) Secondary sources are subdivided into (1) books and (2) articles.

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

A.1 Archives

- CAHJP Central Archives for the History of the Jewish People,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem
P3 Magnes Papers
- CZA Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem
J1 *Vaad Z'mani, Vaad Leumi*
L2 Palestine Office, Jaffa
L3 Zionist Commission, Jerusalem
L4 Zionist Commission, Jaffa
L9 Presidency, Zionist General Council, Paris
S25 Political Department, Jerusalem
Z3 Central Zionist Office, Berlin
Z4 Zionist Office, London
A113 H.M. Kalvaryski
A153 David Yellin
A255 Norman Bentwich
- ISA Israel State Archives, Jerusalem
2 Chief Secretary, Government of Palestine
66 Arab Lawyers (numbers given after this notation refer
to boxes, not files)
68 Leo Kohn Papers (numbers given after this notation
refer to temporary file numbers)
100 Herbert Samuel Papers
103 Edwin Samuel Papers
- MEC Private Papers Collection, Middle East Centre, St Antony's
College, Oxford
Norman Bentwich file
F(A) Faisal, Akaba file
F(S) Faisal, Syria file
L Harry Luke Papers, Palestine Disturbances (1929) file
P H. St John Philby Papers
S Sledmere Papers (Sir Mark Sykes)
Y William Yale Papers
- PRO Public Record Office, London
CO773 Colonial Office, Palestine
CO537 Colonial Office, Palestine (Supplementary)
FO371 Foreign Office, General Correspondence, Political
- RH Rhodes House Library, Oxford

C Sir John Chancellor Papers (mss. Brit. Emp. s.284)

Note: I have taken the liberty of treating Chancellor's letters to his son, Christopher, and to his wife (box 16, file 3) as a "Diary", which they very much resemble.

WA Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel
arranged chronologically

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DBFP—see: (1) Butler, (2) Woodward.

DPNM—see: Zuaytir.

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