

THE EVASIVE PEACE

A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem

JOHN H. DAVIS

Foreword By
EUGENE R. BLACK

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THE EVASIVE PEACE

John H. Davis

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First published in London by John Murray, 1968
with four subsequent printings
First American revised edition, 1970 (sixth printing)

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Second American revised edition, 1976 (seventh printing)
published by
DILLON/LIEDERBACH, INC.
14591 Madison Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44107
by special arrangement with
John Murray, Albermarle St., London

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Translated and printed in
German
Finnish
Polish
Arabic

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Library of Congress card Catalog Number 79-142227
International Standard Book Number 0-913228-16-8

Foreword

The Honorable Eugene R. Black

I recommend *The Evasive Peace* as "must reading" for any American desirous of understanding inter Arab-American relationships.

John Davis and I met some years ago when our work brought us together in the Middle East, he as Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and I as President of The World Bank. Since then our paths have continued to cross frequently, and with this our friendship has deepened.

While working in the Middle East John became so concerned over the lack of understanding in America of our vital interests there and the failure of the United States government to formulate a wise foreign policy consistent with these interests that he took leave from his pressing duties to study the problem in depth. *The Evasive Peace* is the result.

The Evasive Peace presents in straight forward terms an American viewpoint, stated by a man who has had long and broad experience as an economist, university professor, government official, and international administrator.



Preface

to the Second American Edition, 1976

The Introduction and the eight chapters that follow appear in this volume exactly as in the original edition published by John Murray of London in 1968 and in the four subsequent printings by the same firm.

The first American edition, published in paperback in 1970 by the New World Press of New York, contained an additional chapter at the end titled *Postscript*—the purpose of which was to assess and interpret the events that transpired between 1968 and 1970. In the current edition—the second American, published by Dillon/Liederbach, Inc., of Cleveland—this chapter has been rewritten to cover the entire period from 1968 through 1976.

The author chose this approach to updating the book because in his judgement the contents of the original eight chapters are as valid and pertinent now as when written in 1968. To be sure, certain statistical changes have taken place—the number of Palestinian Arabs increased by approximately a million persons, the number of refugees registered with UNRWA by some four hundred thousand, and the number of Jews in Israel by three quarters of a million. Not one of these developments alters the validity of the basic analysis and presentation contained in the first eight chapters, as originally published.

This is not to say that nothing worthy of note has happened since 1968. The civil strife in Jordan in 1970 and the War of

October 1973 and subsequent developments have indeed brought far-reaching changes. But these are consistent with the analysis of the original text.

In Chapters Six and Seven, relating to *Taking Stock* and *The Future*, the reader must bear in mind they reflect the way things looked to the author in 1968. In the *Postscript* of this edition the author undertakes to assess and interpret the far-reaching changes brought about after 1968 and particularly by the war of October 1973.

John H. Davis

Washington, D.C.

May 1976

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* *Radio Times Hulton Picture Library*

† *United Nations Relief and Works Agency*

Introduction

This book is an attempt to probe and evaluate the forces and factors that will determine the future of Arab-Israeli relations, in quest of a solution to conflict. It is based on the author's decade of direct involvement in the affairs of the Middle East – five years as Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the balance with the American University of Beirut and in a concentrated study of the question of Arab-Israeli relations looking towards the future.

As Commissioner-General of UNRWA, the writer found that the world's understanding of the Palestine refugee problem was at variance with the truth; in several important aspects even the opposite of the truth. Then, as he began to study the broader aspects of the problem of Arab-Israeli relations he found the same thing to be true – particularly in regard to the cause of conflict.

Chapters 1 to 4 and Chapter 6 were written before the fighting of June 1967 and have been little changed except to bring Chapters 4 and 6 up to date. Chapters 5, 7 and 8 have been written entirely since June. In the portion that relates to the past, the emphasis is on those facts, factors and forces from the past that seem to have significance and meaning for the future; which means, of course, that in no sense has an attempt been made to write a comprehensive history of the problem. The chapters that focus on the future present the author's own views, which are the product of study and reflection and of extensive observation and discussion.

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The author is aware that certain of his findings and conclusions are at variance with prevailing world beliefs – particularly those found in the Western nations – and that many may even find his ideas for a solution startling. Knowledge of this has caused him to explore the subject with greater care than he might otherwise have done and particularly to ponder and check the major points of difference. It is reassuring to have discovered that among thoughtful and informed persons with wide experience and varied background he is not as much alone in his conclusions as he had anticipated.

Be that as it may, this book is written in the hope that it will prod others, particularly policy makers, to re-examine the subject in terms of factors and forces that are shaping the future and with a sense of deep urgency; realizing the dangers inherent in continuing the stalemated policy structure of the past.

The author is deeply indebted to the many experts, Arab, Jewish, British and American, who have given him invaluable advice and suggestions during the preparation of this book. He wishes to take the opportunity of expressing his sincere gratitude for their generous assistance.

The Seeds of Conflict – 1897–1917

A logical starting point in understanding the circumstances and forces that today generate hostility between Arabs and Israelis is to identify that force most responsible for the start of this hostility; and then to examine its nature and its motivation. It is not difficult to identify such a force in the case of Arab-Israeli conflict. It is Zionism, World Zionism. This, of course, is not to say that Zionism has been the only force responsible, or that it has acted alone. There were antecedent forces that brought Zionism into being, and they were important ones. Inevitably Zionist initiative has engendered powerful counterforces. Together, these have produced conflict.

While the roots of Zionism run back through many centuries, the modern movement took vital form and life at the First Zionist Congress, held at Basel, Switzerland, between the dates August 29–31, in the year 1897. At that congress, in which 197 delegates participated, the World Zionist Organization was established.

Theodor Herzl is commonly referred to as the founder of the Zionist Movement. Herzl was born in Budapest, Hungary, in the year 1860. He was brought up in a reasonably affluent home and received a legal education in Vienna. In due course he turned his talents to journalism, where he attained a considerable reputation.

Neither as a child nor as a young man had he encountered bitter hostility towards Jews. He was not a practising Jew and, until almost middle age, took little active part in Jewish affairs, as such. Then in 1894 he covered the Dreyfus trial in Paris as a

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representative of the *Neue Freie Presse*, a leading Vienna newspaper. The treatment of Dreyfus at the trial and the attitude of the military, the courts and the public to him made a profound impression on Herzl. He immediately became conscious of anti-Jewish feelings and persecutions. Moreover, he became convinced that hostility towards Jews was an innate characteristic of Gentiles, that it was virtually universal and would so continue through time, and therefore that Jews living among Gentiles as minority groups could not expect to escape persecution.

In February 1896, he set forth his ideas in a small book of less than one hundred pages, which was printed in Vienna under the title *Der Judenstaat – The Jewish State*. Immediately it gained prominence and in time became the 'Bible' of the Zionist movement. When the World Zionist Organization came into being at the Basel congress in 1897, Herzl became its President – a position he held until his death in 1904.

Herzl's theme was that the only satisfactory escape for Jews from Gentile persecution was for them to form a state of their own and move to it. This idea is vividly set forth in his own words:

' . . . The Jewish question exists wherever Jews live in perceptible numbers. Where it does not exist, it is carried by Jews in the course of their migrations . . . This is the case in every country, and will remain so, even in those highly civilized – for instance France – until the Jewish question finds a solution on a political basis. The unfortunate Jews are now carrying the seeds of Anti-Semitism into England; they have already introduced it into America.'¹

In the same section of his book he goes on to explain: 'We are one people – our enemies have made us one in our respite, as repeatedly happens in history. Distress binds us together, and, thus united, we suddenly discover our

¹ Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, pp. 14–15.

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strength. Yes, we are strong enough to form a State, and, indeed, a model State. We possess all human and material resources necessary for the purpose.’¹

Two paragraphs farther on, Herzl gives his answers to the problem, as follows:

‘Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves.

‘The creation of a new State is neither ridiculous nor impossible. We have in our day witnessed the process in connection with nations which were not in the bulk middle class, but poorer, less educated, and consequently weaker than ourselves. The Governments of all countries scourged by Anti-Semitism will be keenly interested in assisting us to obtain the sovereignty we want.’²

From 1897 until he died in 1904, Herzl worked diligently on the idea of a Jewish State. In 1901, and again in 1902, he sought to persuade Abdul Hamid, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, to designate Palestine as a home for the Jews. When this came to nought, he negotiated with the British and, after an abortive attempt to obtain desert land in Egypt, was successful in securing British agreement to assign territory in Uganda, at the time a British protectorate. At the Sixth Congress of the World Zionist Organization, in August 1903, Herzl pressed hard for the acceptance of the Uganda proposition. However, the opposition was strong, and the vote, while favourable, was indecisive. The delegates from Russia were particularly opposed to the proposition on the grounds that the homeland should be Palestine. In the following year Herzl died. The idea of an East African home for the Jewish people was definitely rejected in the Seventh Congress, held in 1906.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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While Herzl did not live to see fulfilled his idea of a Jewish Homeland or State, he probably had done more than he knew to set in motion forces that, in time, would bring this about. He had been author of the basic pronouncement, *Der Judenstaat*, that served to crystallize sentiment for action to this end. He had played a dominant role in the formation of the World Zionist Organization – an institution that was to prove decisive in bringing his dream to reality, half a century later, in the form of the State of Israel. Herzl, also, by placing before the Sixth Congress the proposition of a state in Uganda, had injected into the Zionist movement, at an early date, a catalyst that was to cause Zionist sentiment to solidify, resolutely and uncompromisingly, behind the concept that the Jewish State must be in Palestine. By the same token, he had set in motion forces that would lead to Arab–Israeli conflict: even make such conflict inevitable.

At the time when the World Zionist Organization was making its decision to press for a Jewish Home in Palestine, the 50,000 Jews who lived there resided for the most part for religious reasons in the four ‘holy cities’ of Jerusalem, Safed, Tiberias and Hebron; but among them were also some Zionist enthusiasts who had come as young men to settle in agricultural colonies, largely under the patronage of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Palestine at that time was a land of basic religious tolerance and tranquillity. In fact, for several centuries, religious peace had been the rule, and animosity the exception. The Moslem majority of the inhabitants and the small Christian and Jewish minorities lived together in amity and had long accepted and tolerated their differences.¹

¹ According to Turkish sources, quoted by the Government of Palestine in *A Survey of Palestine*, 1946, Volume I, page 144, by 1914 the population numbered 689,000, of whom some 70,000 were Christian Arabs and 84,700 Jews.

The Seeds of Conflict - 1897-1917

When Herzl's book was printed in 1896, proclaiming the need for a Jewish State, there were no marked repercussions in the Holy Land. Nor was any serious reaction registered there when, in 1905, the World Zionist Congress turned down the British offer of territory in Uganda and resolved that it intended to create a Jewish Home in Palestine. In general, the Jews of Palestine were as inert to this proclamation as were the Moslems and Christians - few regarding it with either anticipation or alarm.

The turn of the century, however, did find the Arab Middle East in a mood of restlessness for change and progress, commonly referred to as the Arab Awakening.¹ While Antonious traces this restlessness on the part of Arabs as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century, its first great upsurge on the political front came about 1908, and was in phase with the so-called Young Turk Movement of the same period. This political upsurge among Arabs was soon engulfed in the more universal philosophy that emerged during World War I for the right of self-determination on the part of subjected peoples, a sentiment that ultimately found articulate expression through President Wilson.

The British, who had their finger sufficiently on the pulse of the Arab world to note this political upsurge, approached the Arabs to test their willingness to break their political ties with Turkey, which had joined the War on the side of Germany. Their point of contact was the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali. The Arab world at that time had no central government, as such, and hence no recognized spokesman - having been ruled for some four hundred years by the Ottoman Empire. While up to this time most activities relating to the Arab Awakening had been taking place in political clubs and societies along the Mediterranean and the Nile, the British chose to

¹ See George Antonious, *The Arab Awakening*; Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence*.

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make their enquiry through a desert leader, some one thousand miles from those places.

Sherif Hussein was a unique point of contact for such a purpose. He was a direct descendant of Mohammed, and, shortly before the time of British contact, he had been designated by the Sultan of Turkey, ruler of the Ottoman Empire, as the Sherif of Mecca, a position of honour and respect, even reverence, among Moslems. Prior to this honour he had spent about fifteen years in Constantinople, at the request of the Sultan. With him was his family, including his four sons, who also received their education in Constantinople.

The British official who conducted negotiations with Sherif Hussein was Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan. After several exchanges of letters, McMahon attempted to summarize the terms of understanding in a letter dated October 24, 1915. The letter noted that: 'The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits' of the dominant provisions of the agreement. This excluded area would be under the supervision of Britain's ally, France. The letter then continued:

1. Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.
2. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.
3. When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.
4. On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have

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decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.'

The letter then provided that Britain would establish 'special administrative arrangements' for the districts of Baghdad and Basra 'in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population and to safeguard our mutual economic interests'.

In subsequent correspondence the Sherif took exception to the areas set aside for French and British rule – particularly the former. On January 1, 1916, he stated:

'... We find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from today) for what we must now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts... Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.'

In a reply of January 30, 1916, McMahan allayed the Sherif's concern about the coastal area by stating the British determination 'that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. However, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting in the cause of right and liberty...'¹

Although not all differences had been reconciled through this

¹The McMahan correspondence was not published by the British Government until the time of the St. James's Palace Conference in 1939 (see Chapter 3). It was published as British White Paper Cmd. 5957. See also Antonious, Appendix A and Zeine, Appendices A and B.

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exchange of letters, yet it appears that by early 1916 each party had attained sufficient confidence in the other's word to act – in the urgent circumstances – on the basis of the understanding, as it then stood.

There followed the Arab Revolt, in which Sherif Hussein and his four sons, Ali, Abdullah, Feisal and Zaid, were dominant in organizing and leading Bedouin tribes and other Arabs, including many of the intelligentsia, in combat against the Turkish forces; and in which T. E. Lawrence emerged as one of the most romantic and controversial figures of the Allied war effort. While the story of this struggle lies outside our study, it should be noted that the Arab army did make good its commitment to Britain by declaring independence as the Arab goal and by releasing from its Turkish rulers a territory some one thousand miles in diameter, extending from the Persian Gulf as far westward as Aqaba and Damascus. It was at Damascus that the Arab forces joined the British forces that had already defeated the Turkish army from there to the Mediterranean.

The Arabs now felt that they had fulfilled their part of the McMahon-Hussein Agreement with the British. They therefore expected full and prompt independence. Even though Sherif Hussein had had no constituted authority as spokesman for all Arabs, still for the most part they had united behind him because they, too, wanted independence. The principal exception was a relatively small group of Maronite Christians in the vicinity of Beirut, who were strongly pro-French and desired that their district be placed under a French protectorate.

However, Arab hopes were premature. For, unknown to them, at about the same time that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence was taking place, another agreement was being negotiated between Britain, France and Russia, certain provisions of which were in conflict with the British-Arab understanding. This agreement, in which Sir Mark Sykes, for

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Britain, and Monsieur Georges Picot, for France, played leading parts, had been consummated in secret through an exchange of confidential diplomatic notes during the spring of 1916.¹ It indicated mutual understanding, in advance, as to the portions of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire that each country intended to claim at the end of the war. Our concern here is with the inconsistencies between this agreement and the terms of the McMahon–Hussein correspondence in regard to Middle East territory. Whereas the latter was interpreted by the Arabs as placing Palestine and the interior of Syria in the territories that would become independent (though the British negotiators claimed that the Sherif himself had always understood that Palestine was to be excluded), the Sykes-Picot Agreement recognized as valid the claim of France to most of Syria, including northern Palestine, and provided that southern Palestine would be placed under an ‘international administration’.² These conflicting promises, and the ambiguity of the language in which some of them were couched, were to become in later years a source of bitter controversy and of acute embarrassment to the British Government.

Meanwhile, the War had seen the achievement of rapid strides forward by the Zionist Movement which, as we shall see, was to make its greatest progress during periods of global strife and in the aftermath of wars. The significant progress during World War I was in England, under the leadership of Dr. Chaim Weizmann. Weizmann had been born in Russia. As a boy, he was more subjected to anti-Jewish feelings and actions than was Herzl; still, he had many opportunities, and at a relatively young age went to Pinsk, where lived a large Jewish

¹ The Sykes-Picot Agreement became public when a copy was found by Russian revolutionists and was published under Trotsky’s direction in November 1917. See Zeine, p. 20.

² For the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Volume II, page 19.

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community. From there he proceeded to Germany and studied chemistry – a field in which he later gained considerable renown.

By the time Weizmann was mature he had gained recognition among Zionists in the communities in which he lived. Moreover, he was uncompromisingly dedicated to the proposition that the Jews were a *People*: that they must have a *State* and that the *State* must be *Palestine*. From this belief and commitment he did not falter or retreat during his long and active life. To him, more than to any other single individual, goes credit for the creation of the State of Israel.

Weizmann, who had moved to England about the time of Herzl's death, at once became active in Zionist circles there, and in due course became President of the British Zionist Federation. He was dynamic and persuasive and soon became acquainted with many influential persons, both Jewish and non-Jewish. He particularly learned to know and gained the confidence of such political leaders as Lloyd George, Balfour, Churchill, Samuel, Grey, Cecil, Milner and of key members of the Rothschild family.

Weizmann always concentrated his efforts on the ultimate goal of the movement – the creation of a Jewish State. His technique was to appeal to a widening number of governments and groups, skilfully emphasizing with each areas of mutual self-interest. In his contacts, he made effective use of his wide international circle of acquaintances and of his growing reputation. He sought to establish a relationship between the Ottoman rulers in Constantinople that would improve Jewish status in Palestine, to avoid offence to Germany, where the headquarters of the World Zionist Organization was located, or to Russia, where Zionist activities were illegal and where many Jews were active revolutionists against the Czar's régime; and to avoid the hostility of Arabs in the Middle East.

Shortly after he had assumed a role of leadership in the British

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Zionist movement, Weizmann hit upon the approach of relating the Zionist goal to British interests and ambitions in the Middle East. To this end he sought an official statement by His Majesty's Government, pledging its support of a Jewish Home in Palestine. In building towards his objective, Weizmann and his associates worked on a broad front. Among other things, they had to win the support of the Jews of Britain, who at that time totalled about 300,000 and of whom only 8,000 were Zionists.¹ Initially, he found that many of the most prominent and influential Jews of the country were opposed to the idea and resisted the work of the Zionists.² Weizmann not only sought to win support in Britain, but also in other countries, particularly in the United States. His most effective American contact was Justice Louis Brandeis, who, in turn, willingly undertook to seek the support of his close friend, President Wilson, for the concept of a Jewish State.³

Finally, after several years of arduous effort, Weizmann realized his objective of formal British support of a Jewish Home in Palestine. This took the form of a letter written on November 2, 1917 by Arthur James Balfour, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and addressed to Lord Rothschild. This now famous letter reads as follows:

Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917

My dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

'His Majesty's Government view with favour the

¹ Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, pp. 66-67.

² Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, Chapter VIII.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 260-262.

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establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours

(signed)

A. W. James Balfour

The story of the Balfour Declaration is an intriguing one with many interesting facets that are not sufficiently germane to our purpose for inclusion here. Suffice it to explain that, at the time of its issue, the World War had entered its fourth year. The British were concerned not only with the value of a propaganda document to rally the support of American Jewry but, even more, with the hope that the influence of Russian Jewry would prevent the military disaster of a surrender by the Kerensky Government. They also feared that if the declaration were to be unduly delayed, the Germans might forestall it. The declaration had gone through numerous drafts and conferences in which its ideas, its scope, its phrasing and even the meaning and choice of specific words, had been debated, weighed and decided. The resulting document was ambiguous, doubtless expressly so. Its terms lacked precision in either a legal or a literal sense. Did the phrase 'view with favour' carry with it an obligation for overt action? Was 'national home' to be understood to mean a community, a settlement, a state or something else? Even the term 'Palestine' did not describe a known political unit with definite boundaries. Moreover, the letter was addressed to an individual, Lord Rothschild, who

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at the time held no position either in the British Government or in the Zionist Organization.

Despite its unusual attributes and its ambiguities, the Balfour Declaration was to become, as we shall see, for thirty years the foundation of British policy towards a Jewish National Home in Palestine and a formidable instrument in the hands of World Zionists in their efforts to establish a Jewish State. Its strength and significance were to lie in the strength of the forces that would be mustered behind it.¹ Measured by British interests alone it has been termed one of the greatest mistakes of her Imperial history.²

Thus, by the end of 1917, a menacing political conflict between two communities had already begun to take shape within the confines of one small country. On the one side stood the Palestinian Arabs, who had lived in the country for over a thousand years, who were supported in spirit by almost the whole Arab world, and whose claim to self-determination and independence Great Britain had pledged to recognize; on the other side were the Zionist Jews, basing themselves on ancient history and burning zeal, strengthened by the sympathy not only of influential statesmen in many countries but also of large sections of Christian opinion, and armed with the formidable weapon of the Balfour Declaration. Meanwhile Britain herself had contracted obligations to work towards conflicting and mutually contradictory ends. As the War drew to a close, she would be called upon to honour not only her commitments to Arab independence and to a Jewish Home in Palestine, but also to the administration by France of northern Palestine and the interior of Syria.

¹ Before its publication, the Balfour Declaration had been submitted to, and approved by, President Wilson; early in 1918, it was publicly endorsed by the French and Italian Governments.

² Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*, p. 43.

The Corner-stone of a Jewish State

When news of the Balfour Declaration reached the Arab world, it prompted anxious enquiries and strong protests, but on no sustained basis. The British emissary who had been despatched from Cairo to explain matters to Sherif Hussein reported the Sherif to be 'quite unperturbed' and in sympathy both with international control in Palestine and with the encouragement of Jews to settle there.¹ In the spring of 1918, T. E. Lawrence used his influence with the Sherif's third son, the Emir Feisal, to arrange a meeting near Aqaba with Dr. Weizmann to discuss the idea of a Jewish Home in Palestine. This was followed by other meetings in Europe, and early in January 1919 Feisal and Weizmann signed an agreement which pledged good faith in 'carrying into effect the British government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917'. The document then went on to provide that:

'All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.'

However, on signing the agreement, Feisal qualified his position by adding in his own handwriting and in Arabic the following proviso:

¹ Monroe, pp. 34-35.

The Corner-stone of a Jewish State

'Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made I shall not be bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity . . .'¹

There is little doubt that Emir Feisal signed this agreement as the result of strong British influence administered through friends whom he trusted. Although neither party represented a body sovereign in Palestine, and, as things worked out, the agreement was to serve little purpose, it does bear evidence of the tolerance with which the Arab leaders approached the idea of Jewish immigration when it was first put forward. Also, it reflects the great confidence that these leaders placed in British statesmen at that time.

Some two months earlier, Arab hopes had been raised and confusion worse confounded by a joint Anglo-French Declaration of November 7, 1918, which defined the Allies' war aims in the Middle East and promised 'administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations, in Syria and Mesopotamia'.² The Arabs, whose common term for Palestine was 'Southern Syria', naturally regarded the declaration as applying to Palestine, and further assumed that it superseded, or at least qualified, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This was to render even more difficult the task of General Allenby, who with his army had entered Damascus on October 3, and who was under instructions to adhere strictly to the terms of the

¹ Antonious; see Appendix F, pp. 437-439 for text of agreement. The letter to the Foreign Office, referred to, insists on the fulfilment of the promise made to his father by Sir Henry McMahon.

² For text of the main passages, see *History of the Peace Conference* (ed. Temperley), Vol. VI, p. 141.

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Sykes-Picot Agreement, in so far as future claims and counter-claims on Syria were concerned.

Allenby had been preceded three days earlier by the Emir Feisal at the head of his Arab Army of Liberation. On September 30, 1918, Feisal commanded that the flag of King Hussein of the Hejaz be hoisted over the city's administration building. Four hundred years of Turkish rule over Arab peoples were at an end. The native populace was jubilant and their joy soon spread to the Arab world. Feisal next proceeded to establish a formal government by making appointments and issuing orders. The French Government strongly protested to both Feisal and the British Government. Allenby lost no time in proclaiming that, as head of the Allied Army of Occupation, he was in command of all occupied territory and that he would remain so until a peace treaty was negotiated with Turkey.

The story of how Syria's political status was resolved lies mostly outside the scope of this study.¹ Noteworthy, however, is the fact that France largely had her way in so far as territorial claims and administrative authority were concerned.

World War I had been fought in an era when colonialism was at its zenith, and was still respected as a political and economic institution. As the war ended, Britain, whose extent of empire was without parallel, stood unchallenged as a world power. London, therefore, was accustomed to granting colonial peoples less than they demanded. Hence it would appear that on this occasion Britain did not find it too difficult to resolve the Arab-French dispute over Syria in favour of France. Regarding her attitude towards the Arabs, Zeine observes:

'At the time of Turkey's collapse, Great Britain and to some extent France were in full possession and control of

¹ For a well-documented presentation, covering the war years and the immediate post-war period, see Zeine.

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the Arab Near East. This crucial fact alone was perhaps more important than all the commitments and pledges given during the war'.

Furthermore, many Englishmen intimately concerned with policy-making at the time believed that by such measures as placing Feisal and Abdullah on the thrones of Iraq and Trans-jordan, and leaving Arabia independent, the British had fulfilled their undertakings to the Arabs, except in so far as Syria was concerned, and were 'out of the Arab affair with clean hands'.¹

Meanwhile in Paris the Peace Conference had opened on January 18, 1919. There were grounds to hope that the promises to Jews and Arabs could be implemented simultaneously. The Zionist Organization, of which Dr. Weizmann had been appointed President, presented a conciliatory memorandum; and Feisal, who went to Paris as representative of the Arabs, informed the Conference that:

'In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country.'²

Not all Arabs shared Feisal's views, however, and, sensing

¹ *The Letters of T. E. Lawrence*, pp. 345-346.

² Memorandum by the Emir Feisal, quoted in Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. IV, p. 297.

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this, President Wilson proposed that an international commission should go out to Palestine to ascertain the wishes of the people. The other Allies were unwilling to join in, and Wilson accordingly sent a private and purely American commission, consisting of Mr. H. C. King and Mr. C. R. Crane, who received petitions and interviewed delegations all over Palestine and Syria in the summer of 1919. They reported serious opposition to Zionist proposals, and strong desire for complete independence for a united Syria (including Palestine): but if supervision or assistance were necessary, the United States was preferred, then Great Britain.¹ Balfour indeed was anxious to avoid British responsibility for Palestine and favoured American supervision.² The United States, however, was not prepared to take on the task and the King-Crane findings remained disregarded.

The Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn up by the Peace Conference and signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919. It established the mandates system, the guiding principle of which was that the 'well-being and development' of the inhabitants should be a 'sacred trust for civilization' under the tutelage of a Mandatory on behalf of the League. Article 22 of the Covenant specifically singled out 'certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire', declaring that these had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative assistance and advice by a Mandatory until they were able to stand alone, and that the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

The views of the Arabs on this last point having been swept aside when the King-Crane report was shelved, the proposals

¹ H. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission*, Khayats, Beirut, 1963. See especially Chapters IV and V.

² Christopher Sykes, *Cross Roads to Israel*, p. 20.

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of the Zionist Organization received all the more prominence. They told the Conference:

‘We ask that Great Britain shall act as Mandatory of the League of Nations for Palestine. The selection of Great Britain as Mandatory is urged on the ground that this is the wish of the Jews of the world and the League of Nations, in selecting a Mandatory will follow, as far as possible, the popular wish of the people concerned.’¹

This identification of ‘the Jews of the world’ with the handful of their co-religionists then living in Palestine, was to have far-reaching implications, apparently not widely realized at the time.

The actual allocation of the Palestine Mandate proved to be a slow business and was delayed notably by long-drawn-out negotiations concerning arrangements for the other ex-Turkish territories. It was not until April 25, 1920, that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, meeting in San Remo, allocated the Mandate to Great Britain, adding a rider to the effect that the Mandatory was to be responsible for giving effect to the Balfour Declaration.

Agreement on the actual terms of the Palestine Mandate gave rise to prolonged controversy and the final draft was not approved by the Council of the League of Nations until July 1922.

The Mandate for Palestine entered into force on September 29, 1923. Its key provision (Article 2) laid down that:

‘The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions and also for safeguarding the civil

¹ *Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 13.

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and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.’

The second paragraph of the preamble reproduced the text of the Balfour Declaration. Its third paragraph read:

‘Whereas recognition has thereby been given (through the Balfour Declaration) to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their National Home in that country . . .’

The United States legally became a party to the Balfour Declaration through its signature of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924, which sets forth in its preamble the entire text of the League of Nations Mandate.

World Zionism had thus scored one of its most notable triumphs. Moreover, as Weizmann foresaw, the value of the Mandate to the Zionists lay above all in the fact that it provided them with a basis for seeking international recognition of the concept of the Jewish people.¹ From now on, as we shall see, their efforts would evolve around a fundamental objective – the creation of a Jewish State, with a united Jewry behind it.

¹ Goodman (ed.), *Chaim Weizmann, Tribute in Honour of His Seventieth Birthday*, pp. 175, 179 (Address, Carlsbad, August 25, 1922).

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In December, 1917, about four weeks after the Balfour Declaration had been issued, General Allenby, advancing with his troops from Gaza, had entered Jerusalem on foot, as a token of respect for the Holy City's consecrated soil. A British Military Administration of Palestine had been inaugurated, which was to last for two and a half years.

It soon became clear that there was more persistent Arab resistance to the establishment of a Jewish Home than had been foreseen. As early as January 1918, Arab suspicions concerning the political objectives of Zionism had been sharpened by the arrival in Palestine of a Zionist Commission, which numbered Dr. Weizmann among its members and came with the authority of the British Government to pave the way for the National Home. Arab resentment was particularly provoked by the Commission's demands for Jewish participation in the Military Administration and for the right to train Jewish military defence forces. In March 1920, fighting broke out in Jewish settlements in northern Palestine as Arabs opposed the adding of more Jews to these communities. A few weeks later, a riot erupted in Jerusalem, in which several Jews and Arabs were killed and over two hundred injured. The official commissions of enquiry set up after significant 'disturbances' invariably reported their cause to be Arab disappointment at the non-fulfilment of British wartime promises of independence, and fears lest the National Home would lead to massive immigration and thus to the Arabs' economic and political subjection. By the time the Military Administration was replaced in July 1920

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by a Civil Administration, the gulf between the two communities was already wide: and in that same month, the news of the Emir Feisal's deposition and the establishment of Syria as an area under French administration exacerbated still further Arab resentment over British bad faith.

The Zionist home had become such a thorny issue that in June 1922 Winston Churchill, at the time Secretary of State for the Colonies, issued a policy statement which, while it re-affirmed the Balfour Declaration, announced that the British Government had no intention that Palestine should become 'as Jewish as England is English'; that it did not contemplate the subordination of the Arab population, language or culture; that immigration would not exceed the economic absorptive capacity of the country; and that the special position of the Zionist Executive did not entitle it to share in any degree in the government of the country. Churchill's statement, however, did nothing to lessen the Arabs' hostility to what they regarded as a blatant invasion of their country. Replying to the statement, they insisted that nothing would safeguard Arab interests in Palestine but 'the immediate creation of a national government which shall be responsible to a Parliament all of whose members are elected by the people of the country – Moslems, Christians and Jews'.¹

The record of operations under the Mandate for Palestine between the years 1923 and 1940 is one of almost constant tension. The British were caught in a cross-fire in terms of policy and justice, and their task of administration was complicated by the fact that their local employees, both Arab and Jewish, did not share their view point, and that many British officials working in Palestine had small sympathy for the goal of the National Home. Moreover, the British had to relate their responsibilities in Palestine with their broader imperial and global responsibilities and had to answer at regular intervals

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 1700.




Theodor Herzl
Arthur James Balfour

Chaim Weizmann
The Emir Feisal



UNRWA camp for Palestine Arab refugees in North Lebanon, 1952



UNRWA camp in South Lebanon today

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the searching criticism and comments of the League's Permanent Mandates Commission in Geneva. The Zionists, on the other hand, operated on a small and resolute policy-front and with personnel of a single mind. Therefore, their pressures on Britain and the Mandates Commission could be pointed, determined and persistent.

Under the circumstances, time was not to prove a factor that could resolve the issues and bring conciliation and co-operation. On the contrary, because the irritants of disputed Jewish immigration rights and of Jewish statehood policy continued, hostilities increased with time. More and more as time passed, the Arab people, as a whole, identified themselves with the Palestine Arab position.

Tension rose and fell in the country in almost direct relation to the ebb and flow of Jewish immigration. In 1922, the first census showed that the population stood at about 649,000 persons, of whom some 486,000 were Arab Moslems, 79,000 Arab Christians and 'others', and 84,000 Jews.¹ The table that follows, taken from the same source, shows how these figures changed between that year and 1940:

Year	Moslems	Christians and others	Jews	Total
		(thousands)		
1924	533	82	95	710
1928	616	89	152	857
1936	796	120	384	1,300
1940	881	133	464	1,478

Whereas the total population of Palestine increased by about 128 per cent between 1922 and 1940, the Jewish population increased by 452 per cent. This contrasts with a Moslem

¹ *A Survey of Palestine*, Volume I, p. 141.

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increase of 81 per cent. Had the Jewish population increased on a par with the Moslem population, largely through births, the Jewish numbers in 1940 would have been about 152,000, instead of 464,000 – the difference being accounted for by the Zionists' effective programme of immigration.

The years 1924–1928 were comparatively peaceful in Palestine. Jewish immigration temporarily slowed down because of an economic crisis in Poland, from which country most of the immigrants came at that time, as small capitalists. But in late August 1929 further hostilities between Arabs and Jews broke out over an incident at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem that began with an anti-Arab demonstration by young Jewish enthusiasts and involved the stabbing of a Jewish youth. In a few days the unrest spread to Hebron and other towns and villages, where fighting ensued. 'By the time order was restored, 249 persons had been killed – 133 Jews and 116 Arabs – and 571 persons had been wounded.¹ A month later a Government Commission of Inquiry, headed by Sir Walter Shaw, visited Palestine and once again reported that the disturbances were fundamentally due to Arab animosity towards the Jews, resulting from the non-fulfilment of the Arabs' political aspirations and their fears for their economic future. The Shaw Commission called, among other things, for a clear policy-statement by the British Government on land tenure and immigration, and demanded that the eviction of Arab peasant cultivators from their lands should be checked, and that Jewish immigration should be controlled, and non-Jewish interests given some voice in discussions thereon.² Shortly thereafter a companion report to the British Government, filed by Sir John Hope Simpson, found that, with methods then being used, there was no margin of land available for new immigrants, and recorded the author's 'personal belief'

¹ Sykes, pp. 246–250.

² British White Paper, Cmd. 3530.

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that when development schemes were in full operation, about 100,000 immigrants could be admitted, only half of whom should be Jews; if suitable Arab workmen were unemployed, Jews should not be imported to fill existing posts.¹ From these findings the Government issued the Passfield White Paper of 1930, which clarified its policy in the following blunt terms:

‘Attempts have been made to argue, in support of Zionist claims, that the principal feature of the Mandate is the passages regarding the Jewish National Home, and that the passages designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish community are merely secondary considerations qualifying, to some extent, what is claimed to be the primary object for which the Mandate has been framed. This is a conception which His Majesty’s Government have always regarded as totally erroneous.’²

On its publication the White Paper encountered strong opposition in Britain, not only on the part of Zionists but of other prominent figures who had played an active part in the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration; so strong in fact, as to cause the Labour Government then in power to modify the White Paper by means of a letter from the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald to Dr Weizmann. While in form the letter undertook to interpret the White Paper, in effect it repudiated the policy measures that were under attack.

The intensity of the Zionist reaction at the time is reflected in the fact that at the 1931 Congress of the World Zionist Organization Dr. Weizmann was so sharply criticized for having accepted the MacDonald letter as being a satisfactory modification of the Passfield White Paper that he resigned as President of the Organization. Nineteen thirty-one marked a

¹ Sykes pp. 144-145. The report was issued as British White Paper, Cmd. 3686.

² British White Paper, Cmd. 3692.

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general turning point in the attitude of Zionists towards the British Government; sentiment began to shift away from the belief that by working with the Mandatory they could achieve their objective of a Jewish Home, towards a conviction that the British Mandate for Palestine would have to be brought to an end in order that that goal could become a reality.

Article 4 of the Mandate specifically provided that 'an appropriate Jewish agency' should advise and co-operate with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as might affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine. It further provided that this agency should consult with the British Government 'to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish National Home'. It also specifically recognized 'The Zionist organization' as the agency for this purpose.

The World Zionist Organization itself functioned in this capacity between 1922 and 1929. In the latter year a special conference, representing both the Zionist Organization and non-Zionist groups, agreed that a new entity should be created, known as the Jewish Agency for Palestine, with headquarters in Palestine. It was also agreed that the President of the World Zionist Organization should be, *ex officio*, the president of the Agency and that the two groups should have equal representation on its governing organs.

In practice, as the Agency began to function, the Zionist representatives on the governing organs were appointed by the World Zionist Organization, mostly from the members of its own administrative or legislative organs. In contrast, the non-Zionist Jews had no world organization. Hence, they undertook to appoint individuals after consultations, with the result that vacancies were frequent. Moreover, their appointees had little alternative but to act as spokesmen of separate non-Zionist groups, whose policies had not been co-ordinated, or even to

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act on the basis of their individual judgement. The result was that the Zionists, knowing what they wanted and fighting hard to get it, dominated the Agency from its beginning. Gradually, in fact, non-Zionist participation withered, and in time the membership of the governing boards of the Agency became exclusively Zionist. Moreover, in due course the membership of Agency organs became identical with that of the World Zionist Organization, making them two parts of a single organizational structure.¹

The World Zionist Organization also actively promoted and brought into being national Zionist organizations in numerous countries, of which the American and British units became most influential. By mutual agreement the national units were obligated to adhere to policies that were consistent with those of the World Organization; and in the event of conflict, the latter would take precedence. In addition, these agreements committed the national organizations to the actions of the World Zionist Organization (including those of the Agency for Palestine) whether or not the local units, in turn, adopted corresponding resolutions. Thus, progressively, the World Zionist Organization attained effective control over the entire Zionist movement.

In contrast to the resolute front and orderly political organization of the Zionists, both in Palestine and in the world outside, the Arab community of Palestine did not succeed in creating a solid nationalist organization. The British Government was often taken to task by the League's Permanent Mandates Commission for having failed to set up an Arab Agency to match the Jewish Agency. The Mandatory Government had, at the outset of the Mandate, made three successive attempts to associate the Arab community with the administration of Palestine, all of which terminated in deadlock. In reality, the local autonomy promised in the Mandate was itself a victim of

¹ Moses Lasky, *Between Truth and Repose*, p. 15.

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conflict. At the heart of the problem was the fact that the Arabs at the time constituted more than four-fifths of the total population of Palestine. Their concept of self-government was independence as it had been envisaged by Arab leaders in 1915, at the time of the British promise to Sherif Hussein. Moreover, they made it clear that under self-government they would use their majority to stop Jewish immigration and to block the establishment of a Jewish Home. As one would expect, the Zionists totally opposed any move towards self-rule that would result in majority rule by Arabs. The British could not bring about both self-government, and the fulfilment of their commitment under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate to facilitate immigration.

Gradually, the attitudes of the Palestine Arabs hardened as more of them began to rally behind Haj Amin El Hussein, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, for leadership. The Grand Mufti, who had been appointed by the Government to the post of President of the Supreme Moslem Council (a body principally concerned with administering religious property and appointing judges to religious courts) had for some time been playing a controversial role by taking an extreme stand against Zionist objectives and advocating a resort to force, if necessary, to block Zionist progress; a position, which, in time, was to lead to his flight from Palestine. A by-product of the strife of this period was the publicity given to Palestine in the Arab press of other Arab countries and the resultant greater sympathy and support that this engendered in these countries.

This, of course, was a period of growing nationalism, and the three-sided antagonism between the Arabs, the Zionists and the British had the effect of strengthening the forces of both Arab nationalism and Zionist political nationalism and of bringing the two into confrontation. Thus, by 1930 the lines of conflict between the Arabs and the Zionists had become firmly drawn, with the British caught in the cross-fire. From then on,

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accord between the factions was never possible, and the British found themselves with an increasingly thankless and a virtually impossible task to perform in the name of the League of Nations.

In the early nineteen-thirties tension reached new heights in Palestine. Hitler's persecution of the Jews in Europe led to a rapid increase of Jewish immigration from 1933 onwards. In 1936 the Arabs, in exasperation over this, and despairing that their claims and demands would ever be met by the British, launched a series of violent disorders all over the country, directed as much against the British Administration as the Jews, and culminating in a general strike. This prompted the Government to send out the most famous of its eight official commissions of inquiry, the Royal Commission (Peel Commission), which reported in 1937. For the first time, an official report recognized the British promises to Arabs and Jews as irreconcilable and the Mandate as unworkable, and defined as a British objective the establishment of a Jewish State and an Arab State through partition.¹ The Government itself endorsed the Royal Commission's findings and appointed a technical commission to work out the details of a partition plan. Instead, this commission, which found the country in the throes of full-scale Arab rebellion, reported that no practicable plan of partition could be devised. The next step was the convocation of the Round Table Conference at St. James's Palace in London, to which not only the Palestine Arabs and the Jewish Agency were invited, but also the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen. However, it proved impossible to get the two sides to agree to meet together, and the conference ended in complete deadlock. Thereafter, the British Government issued what came to be known as the White Paper of 1939. The British objective was stated to be the establishment of an independent Palestinian State within ten

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5479.

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years; meanwhile, Palestine would move progressively towards self-government. Over the first five-year period, Jewish immigration would be limited to a maximum total of 75,000, following which there would be no immigration, except with the acquiescence of the Arabs of Palestine. This meant in effect that the Arabs would constitute two-thirds of the population of the State and be represented proportionately in the Government. Restrictions, and in some areas, prohibitions, were placed on Jewish acquisition of Arab land. The White Paper categorically stated: 'His Majesty's Government now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become part of a Jewish State.'¹

The 1939 White Paper was the result of an extensive review by His Majesty's Government of their commitment and policies in Palestine, against the background of the gathering clouds of World War II. Some six months before its publication, Chamberlain had held his famous meeting with Hitler in Munich; shortly thereafter, Germany occupied part of Czechoslovakia and Italy invaded Albania. The British were under no illusion that they could face the prospect of imminent war against Nazi Germany with tens of thousands of their troops tied down in Palestine.

The White Paper was a major defeat for World Zionism. Commenting on its effect on the policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, Weizmann observed:

'Actual nullification came with the White Paper of 1939. It was a classic technique of step-by-step sell-out of small nations which the great democracies practised in the appeasement period.'²

The Permanent Mandates Commission, for its part, subjected Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, at the time Secretary of State for

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 6019.

² Weizmann, p. 477.

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the Colonies, to a severe and lengthy examination in Geneva and declared that the White Paper was not in accordance with the interpretation of the Mandate which the Commission itself, the League of Nations and the British Government had hitherto adopted.¹ As for the Palestinian Arabs, although on the surface it would appear that by 1939 they were well on their way toward winning their battle to block the creation of a Jewish State, they in fact, under the direction of the Grand Mufti, rejected the terms of the White Paper; preferring to stand on principle, while seeking total victory, to accepting a gain as a step towards the ultimate goal.

At this point the turbulent forces of World War II entered the picture. The Council of the League of Nations never met to consider the Mandates Commission's comments or the British Government's reply to them. When, a year after the publication of the White Paper, the Chamberlain Government fell and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, the attention of the world was centring on survival. With Churchill heading the Government, the Zionist leaders sought to get the White Paper of 1939 rescinded. Churchill sympathized with their aspirations, as he made known to Dr. Weizmann, but the larger considerations of the War made impracticable any withdrawal of the White Paper.² The War was having a direct repercussion in the Middle East: General Rommel's German Army was in Africa, pressing towards Egypt from Libya; Germany, acting through the Vichy Government, was seeking air bases in French mandated territory in the Middle East; and Palestine, itself, was being made a base for British war operations. In due course North Africa and portions of the Middle East became a major and decisive theatre of the war. At the time, Britain's involvement and her responsibilities in

¹ Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of Thirty-sixth Session, Annex (Report to Council of the League of Nations)*, p. 275.

² Weizmann, pp. 536-537; see also Sykes, pp. 246-250.

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the region were both huge and complex. She was bearing a heavy war-load for the free world; she was still carrying out formidable responsibilities of Empire in such countries as the Sudan, Egypt, Iraq and along the Persian Gulf. The population of these countries sided overwhelmingly with the Arabs of Palestine, in regard to a Jewish Home; moreover, the British had to take into account the strong pro-Arab sympathies of the millions of Moslem subjects of their Empire. Churchill thus found it impossible to set aside the White Paper of 1939, as did his successors; with the result that it remained in effect until 1948 when His Majesty's Government ended their Mandate in Palestine.

Despite the major setback of the White Paper, the World Zionist Organization, as we have noted, entered the decisive years of World War II in effective control of the world-wide Zionist Movement. As the War spread and continued, a factor of far-reaching significance for the ultimate future of Palestine became Hitler's brutal programme to liquidate the Jews in Europe. It was the kind of tragedy that invoked an almost universal emotional desire for remedial action. The Zionists already had the facilities for rapidly making such a story known throughout the world. Moreover, they had a solution to propose; to send the escapees to Palestine and make it a Jewish State in order to facilitate their rehabilitation and settlement.

In Palestine itself, the British Government meanwhile found themselves under heavy attack. In addition to political pressure, a terrorist campaign by illegal armed Jewish groups developed against the British. The largest of these groups was the Haganah, which took directions from the Jewish Agency for Palestine. More daring and more ruthless were the Stern and Irgun organizations that functioned largely 'underground', using guerilla tactics.

Arab leaders, while generally recognizing the need to help the

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troubled Jews of Europe, saw no valid reason why their resettlement should be achieved largely at the expense of Palestine Arabs. They thus strongly opposed a policy of bringing them to Palestine, contending that the countries of the world should open their doors to admit homeless Jews. The Grand Mufti further antagonized the British Government, first by supporting an unsuccessful revolt in Iraq with the aim of removing the British from Palestine, and later by proceeding to Germany, where he spent much of the War period.

By 1940, the centre of gravity of Zionist activity was already shifting from the United Kingdom to the United States. As Mr. Ben Gurion, at the time Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, noted:

‘Aside from the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) itself, we had no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish Community and Zionist movement.’¹

In May 1942, under the sponsorship of the Emergency Council of the American Zionist Organization, a conference was called at the Biltmore Hotel in New York. It was a large meeting, attended by some six hundred Americans – for the most part Zionists but including some non-Zionist representatives – and numerous distinguished foreign Zionists, among whom were Weizmann and Ben Gurion. This conference passed the now famous Biltmore resolution, the action section of which demanded:

‘That the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands and that Palestine be established as a Jewish

¹ *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* (London), January 31, 1964.

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Commonwealth integrated into the structure of the new democratic world.¹

The resolution was a clarion call for action; action that not only would repudiate the policies of the White Paper, but that had as its main objective the ending of the Mandate and the creation of a Jewish State. In effect, it constituted the adoption of the tougher and more aggressive of two approaches that had been put before the conference, championed by Ben Gurion in opposition to counsel of restraint by Weizmann, who believed that the conference should stop short of action which would repudiate British Mandate leadership. Behind the resolution as adopted was a strategy of overturning entrenched British policy by introducing aggressive Zionist leadership from America.

Recognizing that the ultimate significance of the Biltmore Programme would depend on the strength rallied behind it, the Zionists of America moved quickly into action. The approach was a 'grass roots' one, organizing action groups in each State, in each Congressional District, and in all major cities. In short order these action units began to deluge Congressional offices and the White House with letters, telegrams and other propaganda demanding that the American Government go on record as favouring open immigration of Jews into Palestine and the establishment of Jewish autonomy in Palestine.²

While in general the story of the Zionists' activities in America lies outside the scope of this book, the effectiveness of their efforts may be illustrated by the fact that during the 1944 election year, they succeeded in getting planks inserted into the platforms of both the Republican and Democratic Parties

¹ Jewish Agency for Palestine, *Book of Documents submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations*, May 1947.

² Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (1942-1947), Chapters II through VI.

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calling for 'the opening of . . . Palestine to unrestricted immigration' and the establishment there of a 'free and democratic commonwealth'; also, by their success in December 1945, in getting resolutions passed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, calling for the United States to use its good offices to open Palestine for immigration and to establish a Jewish Home there.¹ In addition, they inspired scores of public statements by mayors and governors, and by prominent businessmen, entertainers, editors, professors and churchmen, urging a similar course.

A large proportion of the world, including the Western world, knew little about modern Palestine or the struggle that had been taking place there over the immigration of Jews and efforts to found a Jewish State. In so far as the American public was concerned, most people had never heard the Arab side presented. The result was a widespread acceptance of the Zionist point of view. Not only that, but the public, Gentile as well as Jewish, responded generously to Zionist appeals for funds to finance their programme. Americans, also, were generally unaware of the problems that confronted Britain in the Middle East in her effort to administer the Mandate. Hence, with easy conscience they could acquiesce in President Truman's call for the immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 more Jews, taking little note of the minority voices of opposition in the Government. The President's initiative was, however, greeted with consternation in Britain and particularly incensed Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, who was infuriated by such a demand from the United States Government, which had no responsibility for law and order in Palestine and no intention of permitting massive immigration of the remnant of European Jewry to America. The same demand, however, was made shortly thereafter by a joint Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry set up in 1946 by the two Governments.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-57 and 116.

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This Commission also called for the abolition of restrictions on Jewish acquisition of Arab land. But it declared that Palestine should be, for the foreseeable future, neither a Jewish nor an Arab State and urged instead a period of United Nations trusteeship, with Britain as administering authority. The British refused to carry out the Commission's recommendations unilaterally, and called in vain on the Americans to share responsibility for action. One more report on Palestine remained a dead letter.

The scene now shifted once again to an international setting. Britain, exhausted by her war effort and recognizing America's dominant role in post-war affairs, finally concluded that she could no longer carry the burden of administering the Palestine Mandate. On April 2, 1947, she asked that the question be placed on the agenda of the next regular session of the United Nations General Assembly, and that a special session be convened to appoint and instruct a special committee to prepare the ground for the Assembly's study of the future government of Palestine. At the end of August 1947, the eleven-member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which had meanwhile visited Palestine and the displaced persons' camps in Europe, recommended to the General Assembly the termination of the Mandate at the earliest practicable date. UNSCOP also submitted two proposals: a majority proposal for partition into a Jewish and an Arab State, with economic union and a United Nations trusteeship for Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and a minority proposal for an independent Federal State. The majority proposal assumed that the British would implement partition and remain in Palestine for a transitional period of two years.

The UNSCOP proposals were debated at length by the General Assembly in an *ad hoc* committee and numerous sub-committees and working parties. The Arab Higher Committee spoke for the Arabs of Palestine; the views of the Jews of

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Palestine were put forward by the Jewish Agency. It was soon clear that the crucial problem was that of carrying out any recommendation; for at an early stage, the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Arthur Creech Jones, informed the General Assembly that his Government would only be prepared to implement a proposal acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, and that they planned to withdraw their troops from Palestine by August 1, 1948.¹

As the date of the vote in the General Assembly approached, all parties having direct interests in the outcome worked diligently to protect those interests. The Arabs strongly opposed the partition proposal on the ground that the whole of Palestine should become an independent Arab State. The Zionists, on the other hand, were resolute in their efforts to get the partition plan adopted. Finally, the *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted the UNSCOP majority proposal by a majority of only twelve votes, with amendments that transferred responsibility for partition to the Security Council and established a United Nations Palestine Commission to whom, in the interim period while the two States were being established, the administration of Palestine would be progressively handed over by the Mandatory. The Assembly was presented with details of boundaries, responsibilities, procedures, delegations of authority and guidelines for the function of the new States and the International City of Jerusalem.

The vote came in the plenary session of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. The partition plan was approved by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions. The United States had exerted heavy pressure on a number of delegations to persuade them to vote for the plan – and thereby had undoubtedly determined the outcome. The Soviet Union

¹ The British Government later announced that they would terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948. The last British troops left the country shortly after that date.

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voted for partition: Britain was one of the countries that abstained.¹

The reaction in the Arab world was immediate and violent. Demonstrations and protests were reported even from as far away as Aden. In Palestine itself the situation deteriorated with alarming rapidity. It became clear that the partition plan could only be put through by force of arms. The newly formed United Nations Palestine Commission, marooned at Lake Success, since the British had not allowed it to enter Palestine, warned the Security Council on February 16, 1948, that:

‘the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestine force. Otherwise the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine . . . This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory.’²

On the basis of this report, the Security Council asked that a second special session be convened to consider once again ‘the future government of Palestine’. The United States took the lead in proposing a United Nations Trusteeship, following the

¹ The vote was as follows:

In favour: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela;


Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Yemen;

Abstentions: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia.

² United Nations Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine, S/676.



Twenty-four years ago: a school on the sand for Palestine refugee children
An UNRWA—Unesco school in the Gaza Strip as it was in 1968.



Settlement in Israel: a basic cause of conflict

Vocational training school for Arab refugees in Lebanon

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end of the Mandate. As May 15, 1948, approached – the date set for its termination – President Truman, aware of substantial opposition within the United States governmental departments to the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine, shifted responsibility for Palestine affairs within the Department of State so as to make the Department more responsive to the White House.¹ Then, on April 23, he sent word to Dr. Weizmann, through Judge Samuel Rosenman, a mutual friend, that if the Jewish State were to proclaim its independence following the end of the Mandate, the United States Government would immediately recognize it.² On May 13 Weizmann wrote Truman that the State of Israel would be proclaimed the following day. Acting against the advice of most of his intimate advisers, the President on May 14 announced that the United States recognized Israel as an independent State.³ News of this action came as a bombshell even to the American Ambassador to the United Nations, who was still working under the policy of trusteeship for Palestine.

Thus, fifty-two years after Theodor Herzl had published his book *Der Judenstaat*, and fifty-one years after he had taken the lead to found the World Zionist Organization, his dream of a Jewish State became a reality. For the Zionist Jews, May 14, 1948, was a day of triumph and jubilation. For the Arabs, it was a day of bitter humiliation and of determination to reclaim the precious soil of Palestine.

¹ Sykes, p. 426.

² *Ibid.*, p. 427.

³ Arnold A. Rogow – *James Forrestal*, p. 181, and Sykes, p. 420.

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Armed conflict in Palestine broke out almost as soon as the first news of the General Assembly's partition decision reached the Middle East. From Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and even from the Arabian Peninsula word came of riots, with bloodshed and loss of both Jewish and Arab lives; in Cairo the Ulema (professors) of the al Azhar University proclaimed a Holy War;¹ while in Palestine itself disorders broke out on the very day following the United Nations vote and a three-day general strike, starting on December 2, was ordered from Damascus by the Arab Higher Committee. On the first day of the strike, Arab rioters burned a Jewish shopping-quarter in Jerusalem; violent reprisals and counter-reprisals followed, and the disorders degenerated rapidly into country-wide and rampant civil war. Meanwhile, the machinery of the Mandate remained ostensibly in position and the British security forces, bitterly accused by both sides of partiality, doggedly struggled amidst rising turmoil to carry out their orders to achieve a gradual withdrawal of men and munitions with the least possible dislocation of their timetable or danger to themselves.

Early in the New Year, the first Arab irregulars entered Palestine and by the beginning of March 1948 an estimated five thousand such volunteers from the Arab countries had arrived there. Their entry, and the influx of arms from Arab sources, coupled with the British blockade of the Palestine coast, told heavily against the Jews; by the beginning of April,

¹ George Kirk, *The Middle East 1945-1950*, Royal Institute of International Affairs (*Survey of International Affairs*), p. 251.

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the Arabs even appeared to be gaining the upper hand. It was a short-lived advantage. As Musa Alami, a prominent Palestinian statesman and humanitarian, has pointed out,¹ the Arab forces in Palestine had no clear idea of total warfare and sought to repeat the methods of previous revolts, every unit acting independently of others. Meanwhile arms, paid for largely by American Zionists, began to reach the Jews in Palestine from Czechoslovakia, in defiance of the British ban, and at the beginning of April Zionist armed strength was further unified by action that brought the terrorist group Irgun Zvai Leumi under the command of Haganah and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. During the weeks that followed the Jewish forces swept forward to defeat the Arab irregulars in two decisive battles, break the back of the Palestinian Arabs' resistance, and capture in quick succession Tiberias, Haifa, the Katamon Quarter of Jerusalem, Safed and Beisan. Simultaneously the Zionist leaders resorted to measures (described in the following chapter) to frighten Arabs from their homes. Summing up the Arab débâcle, Musa Alami declared:

'The Jews took full advantage of our disunity and the anarchy of our set-up, when the time was opportune they collected all their forces and directed them to one point chosen by them and dealt us heavy concentrated blows. The victims bore the full brunt of the blow alone, without receiving help or any attempt to lighten it, until they weakened under the impact and fell . . . Thus the country fell, town after town, village after village, position after position, as a result of this fragmentation, lack of unity and of a common command.'²

On May 13, the Arab port of Jaffa signed surrender terms.

¹ Musa Alami, 'The Lesson of Palestine', *Middle East Journal*, October 1949.

² Musa Alami.

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Next day, Israel was proclaimed as a State, and the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria entered Palestine. The second phase of the Palestine war had begun.

The Zionists had long been preparing for this day, both politically and militarily. During the chaotic months before the end of the Mandate, the Jewish Agency for Palestine became the provisional 'instrument' through which governmental machinery was quickly established and the already existing fighting units, dominated by the Haganah, were converted into the army of Israel. The realization on the part of the people of the new State that they now had to fight with all their might to survive provided motivation for unity of purpose, sacrifice, perseverance and daring of the type that comes with a crisis of great magnitude.

The Arab situation was quite different. The partition vote had brought grave shock to the Arab world, but it had not created there a climate of crisis comparable to the sense of emergency that existed in Israel. Several Arab States were still in the throes of developing self-government following full independence. Some of them still chafed under the presence of foreign troops on their soil; and two of them, Syria and Lebanon, had only received their independence two years earlier. A multiplicity of dividing forces had evolved in the twenty-five years of mandate rule, including the arbitrarily established political boundaries which tended to isolate the Arab peoples from one another, to give birth to provincial and vested interests of varied types and to tie the local States to their respective parental governments.

At the head of the armed forces of Transjordan, known as the Arab Legion, was a distinguished British soldier, General John Bagot Glubb, who had been commissioned to this post by King Abdullah.¹ Administratively the Legion was almost totally dependent on the British Army. Even up to May 14,

¹ Sir John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier With the Arabs*, p. 19.

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1948, the Legion procured its supplies from British military depots, fed its soldiers with British mobile field equipment, used British-made armaments which were repaired in British workshops, and operated on the basis of a small munitions inventory, which was backed up by British-controlled reserves. Palestine and Transjordan had no air force of their own, depending entirely on Britain for air support. Similarly, the Legion relied on the British Army for medical services, transport and general administration.

Suddenly, on May 29, 1948, the Legion found that the British military supplies and services, on which it depended, were no longer available. The United Nations in calling for a truce had asked all its members to refrain from sending war material to either side. Britain had interpreted this not only as prohibiting the provision of stores and auxiliary services provided under a military treaty to the Legion, thus leaving it without reserves of repair parts and ammunition, but also as requiring the withdrawal of the British officers serving with the Legion.¹

Before the outbreak of hostilities, there had been no adequate advance planning or preparation by the Arab armies involved, in terms of a unified staff or command. The basic Arab weakness in 1948 was that an effective united force – adequate in size, trained, disciplined, equipped, provisioned, mobile and under an integrated higher command – never came into existence.² In large measure this reflects the fact that the Arab Governments were new and in the hands of politicians who had never before experienced war and, hence, were inexperienced in the arts of mobilizing men, arms and

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 91–93 and 133–134. For a general discussion on the Legion's dependence on the British Army, see Chapter V, pp. 89–101.

² A joint military command was not created by the Arab States until 1964 in response to Israel's action in beginning to draw off water from the Jordan River.

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resources for combat emergency and in making effective a joint command that could weld together separate units into a united fighting force.

General Glubb has estimated the manpower strength of the Arab and Israeli forces ready for field combat on May 15, 1948 as follows:¹

Arab forces

Egypt	10,000	
Arab Legion	4,500	
Syria	3,000	
Lebanon	1,000	
Iraq	<u>3,000</u>	
Total		21,500
Israeli forces		65,000

Commenting on the strength of the Arab forces, General Glubb states:

‘ . . . it is common practice to add up the total strength of all Arab armies at home, and compare this with the Israeli forces, taking no account of distance.

It is not realized that the distance from Baghdad to Haifa is seven hundred miles, as far as from Calais to Vienna, or London to Berlin. Moreover, by far the greater part of this distance is across waterless desert.

. . . The Jews, on the contrary, were operating on a tiny area, itself criss-crossed by a network of excellent roads built by the British. Most units were operating at only ten or fifteen miles from their depots and homes. This gave ideal conditions for the rapid transfer of forces from one front to another, to strike different enemies in succession. The fact that the Arab armies were converging from different directions and from far countries would in any case have made close liaison difficult.’

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

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On June 11, 1948, the Security Council succeeded in bringing about a four weeks' truce, followed after a brief period of intense fighting by a renewed truce of indefinite duration, imposed under threat of sanctions, and described by the United Nations Mediator as subject to frequent minor and occasional major infractions.¹ Among the latter was an offensive launched by the Israelis in Southern Palestine in October, which dislodged the Egyptians from three of their principal strongholds. The 'shooting truce', as it came to be known, lasted until the conclusion, in 1949, of the four Armistice Agreements.² These permitted Israel to hold the territory she had occupied, thus giving her an area roughly one-third larger than that granted her under the United Nations Partition Plan.³

The Armistice Agreements were designed as interim measures, pending a peace settlement. Accordingly, they made clear that the terms set forth did not constitute a political settlement and that the Armistice demarcation lines were not to be regarded as permanent territorial boundaries. The central theme of the Agreements was that the signatory parties were to keep the peace and respect the right of one another to security and freedom from attack.

As this is written, the Armistice Agreements have still not been superseded by a peace settlement, and one can add that, as a basis for interim peace, they have never been satisfactory. From the beginning, the terms of the Agreements were

¹ United Nations document A/648. The Mediator had been appointed by the General Assembly on May 14, 1948, in a resolution [186/S-2] which also relieved the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of its responsibilities. Count Folke Bernadotte was nominated to the post of Mediator. Four months later, he was assassinated in Israeli-held Jerusalem.

² The Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement was signed on February 24, 1949; the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement on March 22, 1949; the Jordan-Israeli Agreement (by which Iraq considered herself governed) on April 3, 1949; and the Syrian-Israeli Agreement on July 20, 1949.

³ See maps facing pages 62 and 63.

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opposed by strong forces in the Arab World; forces which in due course overthrew Governments in countries heavily involved with the refugee problem, and united the Arab people behind a policy that refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate State, and that pledged the restoration of the rights of the people of Palestine. Israel, on the other hand, was determined to survive. Out of this conflict over the right of Israel to exist emerged an arms race of ever broadening proportions; one that has led to innumerable border incidents and two wars. The Arabs, in due course, also initiated boycotts against Israel, and the United Arab Republic closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and progressively tightened its control over the movement of Israel-bound cargo through the Straits of Tiran and into the port of Eilat.

In 1956, Israel, always eager to reinforce her standing as a nation, allied herself with Britain and France when these two powers decided to take action against Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal. On October 29, Israel, in phase with prior joint planning with Britain and France, invaded the Sinai Peninsula,¹ ostensibly to discourage, if not end, Arab sniping and raids along the Gaza border. The next day, Britain and France presented Egypt and Israel with a stern demand that each should pull back its forces from the Suez Canal and that Egypt should permit an expeditionary force to occupy the Canal Zone. On October 31, British and French air units demolished strategic military targets in Egypt, particularly airfields, to which Egypt reacted by sinking ships to block the Canal.

The details of this story and what followed lie outside this study, but it is pertinent to note that world opinion reacted quickly, both nationally and through the United Nations, to frustrate Britain, France and Israel in the attainment of their

¹ For verification of collusion and for a detailed discussion, see Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, pp. 90-109.

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objective, with the result that by March 1957 the former demarcation lines had been re-established – but only after some half-dozen resolutions demanding withdrawal of forces had been passed by the United Nations. A significant new development at this point was the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the borders between the Gaza Strip and Israel, and between the Egyptians and Israelis in the Sinai Peninsula; a Force which functioned with singular success until withdrawn at the request of the United Arab Republic in May 1967.

The crisis of 1956, while failing to secure the objectives of the three nations that precipitated it, produced certain noteworthy by-products. It largely brought to an end the so-called *fedayeen* raids against Israel along the Gaza Strip and Jordan borders, elevated Colonel Abdul Nasser to world prominence, and further eroded such influence and prestige as Great Britain still retained in the Middle East.

But the crisis of 1956, and subsequent measures and actions, did little to alter the basic feelings between the Arab people and Israel. Thus, the period from 1957 to midyear 1967 was one of continuing border tension, without effective progress towards peace. Although it was marked by a fair rate of general economic progress in the region as a whole, this was uneven and accompanied by frequent changes of government in certain strategically important countries, notably Syria. It was also a period during which an arms build-up on both sides progressed at an alarming rate, and Western influence in general waned and Soviet influence increased; but in varying degree as between countries and with a tendency to ebb and flow with changes on the political front.

During the years 1965 and 1966, the newly organized Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and its affiliated unit the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), became increasingly active in promoting border disturbances and raids against Israel.

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It was against these, particularly, that Israel responded by taking retaliatory measures with increasing vigour. In July 1966, Israeli aircraft and artillery attacked the Baniyas water-diversion installation in Syria, seriously damaging it. In November of the same year, she impulsively demolished the village of Samu, Jordan, where she alleged that PLA commandos had been hiding – an action for which she was condemned by the Security Council. Then, in April 1967, Israel was roused by an incident of alleged Syrian firing on Israeli farmers, who were attempting to cultivate the contested border area, to attack Syrian gun emplacements with artillery and planes, silence the guns, and shoot down six Syrian MIG aircraft.

In mid-May of 1967, word spread in Arab capitals and beyond that Israel was concentrating armed forces on the Syrian border, with the intention of attacking Syria on May 17. This rumour, whatever its origin, was taken seriously in Cairo and Damascus. Speaking on May 22, President Nasser stated that on May 13 'we received accurate information that Israel was concentrating on the Syrian border highly armed forces of about 11–13 brigades. . . . On May 14 we took action, discussed the matter, and contacted our Syrian brothers. The Syrians also had this information.'¹ The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO),² in its report of May 18, observed that it had detected no such action, but this seems to have made little impact in Arab capitals.

In any event, the Arab response to the rumoured build-up of Israeli forces was rapid. On May 14, General Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic, flew to Damascus for military co-ordination and planning. On the following day, Iraq pledged help to bordering Arab States.

¹ *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), May 23, 1967.

² The Security Council had set up a truce supervision mechanism in 1948; by 1949 it had become known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

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On May 16, the United Arab Republic proclaimed a state of emergency and asked the United Nations to remove the UNEF contingents from her territory. On May 17, Iraq and Jordan placed their armed forces on the alert, and Lebanon cancelled a courtesy visit by the American Sixth Fleet; next day, UNEF received orders from U Thant to withdraw. From this point on, events moved rapidly towards war. Israel and the United Arab Republic ordered limited mobilization on May 21; UNEF forces left Sharm-el-Sheikh on May 23, and *Al-Ahram* (Cairo) reported next day that the Straits of Tiran had been closed to Israel by both guns and mines. On the same day, Mr. Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, speaking in the Knesset, demanded that the Western Powers should now make good their assurance of passage through the Straits, given in 1957 when Israel withdrew her forces from Sharm-el-Sheikh.

The major Western powers responded with a number of proposals, including an international naval patrol of the Gulf of Aqaba, a joint declaration by a maritime community of nations that the waters of the Gulf were international, and a testing of the blockade by a maritime community. These ideas, which never got beyond the discussion stage, were accompanied by almost frantic appeals to Israel to give time for diplomacy to work. Simultaneously, efforts were made through various channels, including the Moscow-Washington Hotline, to prevent an outbreak of fighting. But it was too late; events leading to war could not then be blocked. On June 5, Israeli planes struck all major Arab airfields, rendering both runways and planes inoperative. Six days later the war was over, with Israel's army triumphant and the Arab armies prostrate. Israeli forces were occupying the West Bank area of Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights of south-western Syria. For the third time in less than twenty years, Israel had fought and defeated Arab forces; this time

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with far greater decisiveness and in a manner deeply humiliating to the Arabs.

The Israeli campaign of June 1967 was by no means limited to the land, air and sea fighting in the Middle East, but was vigorously waged via the communications media of the world – particularly the Western world. Through her far-reaching and closely-welded links with World Zionism, Israel was able to flood the press, radio and television with almost instantaneous headlines, stories, pictures and official statements interpreting events as seen from Israel. In contrast, the Arab States possessed no comparable facilities for telling their story to the world as events took place. To make things worse for themselves, they placed difficulties in the path of reporters wishing to enter Arab countries, in contrast to Israel's policy of inviting them to come. Certain of their major radio-stations, particularly early in the war, put out fanciful stories of sweeping Arab victories, gave bloodthirsty accounts of the alleged destruction by bombing of Israel, and uttered threats towards her population. There can be no doubt that these broadcasts not only helped to augment the one-sided reporting of the war, as international press, radio and television representatives lost confidence in Arab sources of information, but also alienated much of the natural sympathy for the Arab plight felt in the Western world.

The result was that Western world sympathies were decidedly with Israel, not only during the fighting, but subsequently at the United Nations and in most Western capitals, as the world moved to face the question of peace in the Middle East. The degree to which this has been true is further reflected in the almost unprecedented response of the people of Europe, Canada and the United States – particularly the latter – to the Israel-Zionist appeal for funds immediately following the war.

As soon as the fighting ended, the policy lines of Israel and the Arab States began to harden, as before, along lines that

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were conflicting and irreconcilable; however, this time the two sides were backed to a greater degree than ever by opposing positions on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The central issue became the question of Israel's withdrawal from the land she had seized during the war, i.e. the West Bank area of Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, The Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights of Syria. Following the cease-fire, the Arabs took the position that Israel should immediately withdraw, and asked the United Nations and the major powers to demand such action, as they had done in 1956. Israel, on the other hand, stated that any withdrawal had to be preceded by direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries directly involved.

In early June, the Soviet Union hurriedly requested an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly and at once introduced a resolution that would have branded Israel as an aggressor, and demanded her immediate withdrawal to within the borders of June 4.

The United States, since the early 1950s, had consistently pledged to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all countries in the region. This policy, first set forth by President Truman, had been restated by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. President Eisenhower, in 1956, acting in harmony with it, demanded that Israel should withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, which, after several resolutions by the United Nations and strong urging by several major powers, she did. While in June 1967 the United States insisted in principle on Israel's withdrawal, she did not press for it immediately, as she had done in 1956. Rather, she pressed for action on five points:

That each State accept the right of others to live,
That there be justice for the refugees,

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That the political and territorial integrity of all States be respected,
That the arms race be curbed,
That there be free passage for all nations through international waterways of the region.¹

The discussions in both the Special Session of the Assembly and in the Security Council in the summer of 1967 came to nought in regard to withdrawal or peace terms, because of the opposing positions taken by America and Russia, as well as by Israel and the Arab States. Finally, on November 22 the Security Council, on British initiative, passed a resolution calling for withdrawal; the recognition of the right of all States in the area to exist in peace within secure boundaries; guaranteed freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; a just settlement of the refugee problem; and the appointment by the Secretary-General of a special representative to expedite a peace settlement.² It would seem accurate to say that this resolution was adopted because its wording was sufficiently flexible to permit each party to interpret it as being consistent with its own position. However, the resolution had hardly been passed before Israel stated that it would co-operate with the representative of the Secretary-General only if his aim was to bring about direct talks between the two sides. President Nasser restated the principle that withdrawal must take place before any peace talks could begin. In addition, by the time this resolution was passed, America was more closely identified with Israel than ever before and Russia was becoming progressively more active in the affairs of the Middle East. Thus, conflict continued, still with no end in sight.

¹ *New York Times*, June 20, 1967, reporting a speech by President Johnson on June 19.

² United Nations document S/RES. 242 (1967).

The Palestine Refugee Problem

A tragic by-product of the creation of the State of Israel has been the emergence of a Palestine refugee problem of sizeable proportion, for which no solution has been effected. In December 1949, the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East reported that an estimated 726,000 Palestinians, who had fled from their homes during the 1948 conflict, were now refugees because their return home was being blocked by Israel. Of these, 652,000 were in need.¹

The working definition of a refugee eligible for assistance used by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)² has, from the beginning, been a restricted one which excluded more than 200,000 needy persons from among the permanent residents of the Gaza Strip, the frontier villages of Jordan and certain Bedouin tribes: persons who had lost their means of livelihood, but not their actual homes. In general, the economic status of these people has been just as precarious as that of the refugees cared for by UNRWA.

By May 31, 1967, the number of refugees registered with

¹ United Nations document A/AC.25/6, Part I, p. 22. Israel has contended that the number of refugees was about 400,000: see *The Arab Refugees: Arab Statements and the Facts*, Jerusalem, 1961.

² This definition is 'a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and his means of livelihood'. It has been extended to cover the children of such persons.

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UNRWA totalled 1,345,000, of whom 846,000 were full ration recipients. Of this total, 723,000 lived in Jordan, 317,000 in the Gaza Strip, 161,000 in Lebanon and 144,000 in Syria.¹ Fifty per cent of them were 17 years of age or younger, 70 per cent came from rural, and 30 per cent from urban backgrounds, and 93 per cent were of the Moslem faith, the remainder being mostly Christians. At that time an estimated 75 per cent of the male population were physically fit for strenuous work.

Palestine in 1948 had been among the most advanced areas of the Arab world, particularly in terms of general economic growth, an emerging middle class, and literacy. As late as 1954, Don Peretz estimated that 350 of the approximately 400 Jewish settlements created after 1948 were on refugee property, and that two-thirds of the cultivated land acquired by Israel had been refugee-owned.² Although the United Nations, with the almost unanimous support of its members, has annually reaffirmed that the Palestine refugees should be repatriated or compensated for their losses, neither action has been taken, with the result that the number of refugees has grown through natural increase year by year.

The question of the cause of the Arab flight from Palestine at the time Israel was created has been much debated, often with more heat than light. The United Nations Palestine Commission informed the Security Council that, as early as January 1948, the British High Commissioner had reported a 'steady exodus' of Arab middle class families, who could afford to leave the country and who took with them their household possessions.³ By March 1948, according to Zionist sources, some 40,000 Arabs had left the Arab town of Jaffa and the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Haifa. In so doing, they

¹ United Nations document A/6713, tables 1 and 2, pp. 59-60.

² Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*.

³ United Nations document A/AC.21/9.

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were repeating a behaviour pattern pursued during the disordered years of the so-called 1936-1939 Arab rebellion when, it is calculated, a similar number temporarily left Palestine, the majority to return as soon as calm was restored. But in 1948, the more well-to-do were soon followed by the fellahin and villagers. The flight gathered strength, and after the massacres of Deir Yassin and Katamon, it became a stampede. By May 15, some 250,000 refugees had left Jewish-occupied territory.¹

Deir Yassin, an Arab village to the west of Jerusalem, was attacked on April 9, 1948 by the two Jewish terrorist groups, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang. According to the eye-witness account of the International Red Cross Representative, 254 men, women and children were slaughtered and many of their bodies stuffed into a well.² Writing of the consequences of this act, the commander of the Irgun, Menachem Beigin, subsequently wrote that the Arabs throughout the country

‘were seized with limitless panic and started to flee for their lives. Thus Kolonia village which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated overnight and fell without further fighting. Beit-Ikso was also evacuated. Those two villages overlooked the main road and their fall, together with the capture of Kastel by the Haganah, made it possible to keep open the route to Jerusalem. In the rest of the country, too, the Arabs began to flee in terror even before they clashed with Jewish forces.’³

Once the second phase of the war commenced on May 15

¹ For a full discussion of the Arab flight from Palestine and its causes, see Rony E. Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study)*, Chapter I, Librairie E. Droz, Geneva, 1959.

² Jacques de Reynier, *A Jerusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu*, Neuchâtel, 1950, pp. 71-78.

³ Menachem Beigin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun*, New York, 1951, p. 164.

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1948, after Israel became a State, the Arab exodus gained momentum. Whenever the Israelis advanced into Arab areas, the population fled before them towards the Arab lines or frontiers. By the time the second truce began on July 12, only 170,000 Arabs remained in Israel.

The causes of the panic flight of nearly three-quarters of a million men, women and children from their homes have been obscured by veils of propaganda. It is only recently that careful sifting of the evidence has helped to clarify the picture. For long, a widely publicised view was that the refugees left voluntarily or because the Arab authorities themselves ordered them to leave, to clear the way of the advancing armies of the Arab States. As General Glubb has pointed out, voluntary emigrants do not leave their homes with only the clothes they stand up in, or in such hurry and confusion that husbands lose sight of wives and parents of their children.¹ Nor does there appear to be one shred of evidence to substantiate the claim that the fleeing refugees were obeying Arab orders. An exhaustive examination of the minutes, resolutions and press releases of the Arab League, of the files of leading Arabic newspapers, of day-by-day monitorings of broadcasts from Arab capitals and secret Arab radio stations, failed to reveal a single reference, direct or indirect, to an order given to the Arabs of Palestine to leave.² All the evidence is to the contrary; that the Arab authorities continuously exhorted the Palestinian Arabs not to leave the country. Thus, on March 7 and April 4, 1948, Damascus radio broadcast an Arab Higher Committee communique urging all government employees and police to remain at their posts. On May 4, in a message relayed by the *Sharq el Adna* radio station, King Abdullah of Transjordan

¹ Glubb, *op. cit.* p. 251.

² Walid Khalidi, 'Why Did the Palestinians Leave?', *Middle East Forum*, July 1959. See also Erskine Childers' article in *The Spectator*, May 12, 1961, and subsequent correspondence.

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appealed to all Arabs who had left Palestine to return there, while Beirut radio reported a general call-up of all Palestinian males between the ages of 18 and 58 for military service. On May 15, the Arab radio stations reiterated these appeals and called also on religious functionaries to carry on their duties. At this point, even the Haganah radio repeated Arab announcements that visas were to be denied to departing Arabs and levies made on refugees moving from district to district. What now seems clear, however, is that the Arab Governments, by inept and exaggerated publicising of Jewish atrocities in press and radio in an effort to justify to the world the impending arrival of their troops in Palestine to 'restore order',¹ in fact unwittingly added to the panic and confusion in a population that had for years witnessed the spectacle of Jewish terrorists holding the armed might of the Mandatory Power to ransom and therefore had cause to fear the ruthless efficiency of their tactics.

Panic and bewilderment thus played decisive parts in the flight. But the extent to which the refugees were savagely driven out by the Israelis as part of a deliberate master-plan has been insufficiently recognized.

With hindsight, it seems improbable that it should have been otherwise. The partition boundaries approved by the United Nations in November 1947 had left the Jewish State with a total of 495,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin, as compared with 498,000 Jews. Through subsequent armed conquest and as a result of the Armistice conditions, Israel received a further 3,496 square kilometres, which contained an Arab and a Jewish population of 397,000 and 157,000 persons respectively - bringing the Arab numbers in the larger area to 892,000, in contrast to a total of 655,000 Jews. Had the Arabs remained in

¹ See cables of the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments to the Security Council, United Nations documents S/743 and S/748 of May 15 and 17, 1948.

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their homes, they would thus have outnumbered the Jews by a ratio of roughly four to three. Significantly, this would have placed the Arabs in a decisive majority position in a newly established Jewish State. For tactical reasons, the Zionists had accepted at the United Nations the huge Arab minority envisaged by the partition plan, just as they had accepted the equally distasteful internationalization of Jerusalem. But, in fact, the little State had overwhelming reasons, over and above ordinary considerations of Arab enmity, for wishing to get rid of its Arab minority. As we have seen, the whole Zionist concept, from the days of Herzl onwards, rested on the basis of a State existing in Palestine for the benefit of a Jewish population. How could the new State of Israel fulfil this role unless the Jewish population constituted a strong majority?

In the first months after the United Nations vote on November 29, 1947, however, the Jewish official line was to make no overt attempt to drive the Arabs from Palestine; its aim, quite obviously, being that of showing the world that, as envisaged in the partition plan, a Jewish State with Jews and Arabs living side by side could actually work. Accordingly, in daily broadcasts, the Haganah mobile stations admonished the Arab population to remain quiet; but added such stern warnings as 'Haganah values the co-operation of peaceful Arabs but is resolved to tame the wicked.'¹ This policy did not change until March 1948, when United States support for partition at the United Nations wavered and all but flickered out, and when the Zionists rallied their full strength to ensure that their State could nevertheless be proclaimed as a *fait accompli*. It was then that they shifted to a policy of deliberate pressure on the Arabs to flee, ranging from expert psychological warfare to ruthless expulsion by force.

That this was a deliberate and organized campaign to motivate Arab departure was clear to neutral observers on the spot.

¹ A Haganah broadcast on January 20, 1948, quoted by Gabbay, p. 67

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The representative of the Red Cross, impeded for days in his attempts to investigate the Irgun's butchery at Deir Yassin, reported that it had all the evidence of a 'deliberate massacre' by a band 'admirably disciplined and acting only under orders'.¹ When Reynier returned to Jerusalem, the Jewish authorities expressed horror and disgust at his report, but on that very same day ratified an agreement, which had been concluded several days before the massacre, subordinating Irgun forces to Haganah control within the official army of the emerging State.²

Evidence that the wholesale clearance of the Arab population from areas allotted to the Zionists, or seized by them, was no coincidence, but the result of an overall preconceived Zionist plan, has now been put on the record (and in English) by Professor Khalidi in a published account of the Zionist 'Plan Dalat' taken from official Zionist sources.³ This was the Zionist High Command's general plan for military operations in April and early May 1948, entailing the destruction of the Palestine Arab community and the expulsion of the bulk of the Arabs living in areas which were to form the State of Israel. 'Plan Dalat', or 'Plan D', for short, visualized a series of operations which, if the regular Arab armies had not intervened and the United Nations had not succeeded in imposing truces, might have resulted in a Zionist occupation of the whole of Palestine – this being its goal. Among the operations that were successfully carried out were the capture of Haifa and the rout of its Arab inhabitants (half of the city's population); the capture of the Arab city of Jaffa and the expulsion of its population; the clearance of eastern Galilee of Arabs, and the destruction of the Arab villages connecting that area with Tiberias; the occupation

¹ Reynier, p. 71–74.

² Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

³ Walid Khalidi, 'Plan Dalat – The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine', *Middle East Forum*, Beirut, November 1961.

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of Beisan, and the ejection of the semi-nomadic Bedouin communities in the neighbourhood; the occupation of the Arab residential quarters of the New City of Jerusalem and the occupation of Acre and the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants of Western Galilee (allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan). Yigal Allon, head of the Palmach (the striking force of the Haganah), referring to the tactics used in the Galilee campaign, subsequently wrote:

‘There were left before us only five days before the threatening date, May 15. We saw a need to clear the inner Galilee and to create a Jewish territorial succession in the entire area of upper Galilee. The long battles had weakened our forces, and before us stood great duties of blocking the routes of the Arab invasion. We therefore looked for means which did not force us into employing force in order to cause the tens of thousands of sulky Arabs who remained in Galilee to flee . . . I gathered all of the Jewish mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs that a great Jewish reinforcement has arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all of the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time . . . The tactic reached its goal completely. The building of the police station at Halsa fell into our hands without a shot. The wide areas were cleaned . . .’¹

The result of ‘Plan D’ and of the equally ruthless expulsions which followed during the later course of the war was that, by September 1948, hundreds of thousands of Arab people had lost their homes, their possessions and their means of livelihood.

On September 16, 1948, the United Nations Mediator,

¹ Yigal Allon, *Ha Sepher Ha Palmach*, Vol. 2, p. 268. (Translation quoted in Professor Khalidi’s article, *op. cit.*)

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Count Folke Bernadotte, declared – one day before his assassination – that

‘the right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes should be affirmed and made effective.’¹

On the basis of Bernadotte’s initiative, the General Assembly, on December 11, 1948, adopted resolution 194(III) which, among other things, called for action designed to assist the Palestine refugees through a combination of programmes that would provide repatriation, compensation and resettlement. The pertinent paragraph of the resolution reads as follows:

‘The General Assembly . . .

II. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation . . .’

As yet, no significant progress has been made under this policy to assist the refugees of 1948. Nor has any effective programme of implementation yet been launched by the United Nations. The Arab Governments have consistently supported the Palestine Arabs in their refusal to accept compensation for property unless it were accompanied by the opportunity freely to choose repatriation. In addition, the

¹ United Nations Document A/648.

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Arab Governments have requested that an annual rental equivalent be paid to the refugees for the full period during which Israel has occupied their properties. Israel has consistently refused repatriation – except to unite individuals with families still living within her borders, under which concession some 40,000 Palestine Arabs have returned home, mostly during the period 1948–1950 – and has rejected payment of a rental equivalent.¹ The result is that for almost twenty years the people of Israel have occupied and used the properties that belong to these refugees, without payment of rentals, indemnities or compensation, and without granting the refugees the right of repatriation.

The fact is that the Palestine refugee problem has never been well understood in the Western world. One common belief, even among responsible persons, is that the refugees have remained unsettled and unemployed largely because the Arab Governments have inhibited their settlement or have even held them as hostages by not allowing them to settle or go to work. Supposedly, their motivation has been the desire to keep alive the Palestine issue in the eyes of the world. The evidence is quite to the contrary. Following the upheaval of 1948, virtually all able-bodied male refugees who possessed skills needed in Arab countries or, for that matter, elsewhere, found jobs almost immediately and became self-supporting and have never been dependent on international charity. This group comprised some twenty per cent of the total working force which left their homes in Palestine in 1948–1949; for the

¹ This figure is disputed by certain Arab experts. For example, Sami Hadawi contends that 35,000 of this number were Palestine Arabs who left their homes during the height of the 1948 conflict but remained within the area that is now Israel; some of them were for a while lost to their families and others blocked from returning home and forced to settle elsewhere. Reference is made later in this chapter to arrangements made for the return to Israel-occupied areas of some of the persons who fled or were displaced during the hostilities of June 1967.




Arab State





Jewish State



City of Jerusalem



-  Israel territory from 1948
-  Territories occupied 1967



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most part they were persons from the urban sector of Palestine, their good fortune being that the world needed the skills which they possessed.

In contrast, the farming sector of the refugee population, which comprised about 70 per cent of the total refugee numbers in 1948, did not fare so well. Their problem has been, and is, that as refugees they became surplus farm workers in an era when the world at large, and Arab countries in particular, already had a surplus of people in their rural sectors. In fact, in the Arab countries as a group rural youth is still reaching maturity at a rate per generation more than three times that required to replace the farm parents; a situation that is further aggravated by the fact that the typical rural holding is already too small adequately to support a family of eight to ten persons, or use modern equipment efficiently. Hence, it was the rural refugees from Palestine who, for the most part, became dependent on international charity. The reason they became dependent was not that they were held as hostages, but that they were unemployable under the competitive employment conditions that then prevailed, and for that matter prevail to this day.

But the problem of the initial refugees was only the beginning. Since 1948, an average of about 30,000 children from dependent refugee families have grown to maturity each year. This means that, during an interval of almost two decades, a total of over 500,000 young refugees have reached maturity. To understand their plight, one has merely to consider that in the Middle East, as in all developing areas of the world, well over 95 per cent of all youths learn work habits and skills by working beside their fathers. Because, in general, rural refugee fathers have been unemployed, their sons have had but limited opportunity, if any at all, to learn even the self-discipline of work or the skills of their fathers. Therefore, in competition with other young people, particularly the indigenous rural

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boys, who are migrating from farms to urban centres in vast numbers, the maturing refugee boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage. This is not, however, because he is being held as a hostage, or because he does not want to work, but because to a serious degree he, too, is unemployable in the existing labour market. The greater tragedy is that these young people, as well as their fathers, are not just unemployable in the countries where they reside, but in the world at large, and it is for this reason, above others, that they continue to be forced to live the life of dependent refugees.

Most particularly those refugee youths who have reached maturity during the past decade will never be strong competitors for jobs as farmers because they did not grow up working on the land and did not otherwise receive agricultural training. (Since land was not available for them, little purpose would have been served by giving them such training.) Furthermore, the indigenous rural population in all Arab countries, and throughout the world, is producing far more strong candidates for agricultural work – candidates who have had farming experience – than available farm land can possibly accommodate. Even today, one frequently hears the argument that all able-bodied Palestine refugees might readily be employed on the soil in Syria and Iraq, if land development were accelerated in those countries. This is, of course, not true, and will not be true in the future; nor would it be true if one were able to set aside all political considerations, including the fact that the Arab Governments, starting from the premise that the refugees have a right to return to their homeland, do not give them priority over their own citizens for land and jobs. The point is that the indigenous sons of the rural sector of these countries are, and will continue to be, stronger candidates for employment in agriculture than the young refugees, who have not had the advantage of growing up working the land with their fathers.

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Yet, even against this background, it can be stated categorically that the Palestine refugee problem has always been, and remains today, capable of gradual solution. The essential ingredients are the presence of jobs, mostly urban, and the provision of appropriate training for the young people. These factors, together, hold the key to making the Palestine refugees both employable and employed.

It is in the field of education that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has made its most significant contribution towards solving the refugee problem. Set up by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949, UNRWA has, through the years, provided food, shelter, health and welfare services for a refugee community which now numbers well over a million persons. It has also provided education for a school population of more than a quarter of a million young people, including general education, vocational and teacher training, and university education. Virtually all of the more than 6,000 young men and women who have passed through its training centres have found employment. In addition, some 1,500 of the 5,000 refugee teachers employed in UNRWA schools are now annually being given in-service training for the purpose of improving teaching standards, up-grading student performance, and enabling UNRWA teachers to become accredited in the respective host countries – all of which contributes further towards making the refugees employable. Parenthetically one might add that these services provided by UNRWA have added materially to the stability of the region – a factor often overlooked in assessing the work of the Agency.

In carrying out its task, UNRWA has enjoyed good co-operation with other United Nations agencies, such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and has been assisted by the valiant efforts of the numerous voluntary

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agencies that work in the region, some of which carried, with United Nations financial assistance, the full burden of refugee relief during the months immediately following the 1948 conflict, before UNRWA came into being.

The refugee host countries of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Lebanon have themselves been generous and hospitable to the refugees. In terms of direct assistance, they have spent more than \$100,000,000, mostly for education, health services, camp sites, housing and road improvement, and the maintenance of security in the refugee camps. In addition, the people of these countries have borne with courage the economic, social and other sacrifices and hardships resulting from the presence of large numbers of refugees within their borders. Contrary to much Western thinking, the Arab host Governments have also helped qualified young refugees to obtain employment, both within the host countries and elsewhere. The result is that today tens of thousands of young Palestinians – mostly men, but an ever-growing number of women – are employed outside the host countries, thousands even in Western countries, particularly in Europe. In 1963, Sweden accepted, at her expense, fifty selected graduates from UNRWA vocational training schools for a year's factory experience and advanced training in Sweden. This experiment proved so successful that in each subsequent year Sweden has taken a similar new group of UNRWA graduates for training. In addition, Sweden has financed, through UNRWA, the building and equipping of an advanced technical training institute in Lebanon, where selected individuals from amongst the young men who have had a year's experience abroad can have a further year's training to qualify them as vocational training instructors or industrial foremen. This work is now well established and has had the support of Arab Governments. Recently other countries, notably Federal Germany, Switzerland and France, have begun taking UNRWA graduates for

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employment or for advanced factory experience and training; all of which has taken place without opposition from the Arab Governments. In general, the young men who go abroad to work, help to support their families at home.

For more than a decade UNRWA has also awarded from 600 to 800 university scholarships per year to outstanding refugee candidates – mostly for undergraduate studies in Arab countries. This means that each year some 200 young refugees sponsored by UNRWA graduate from universities. In addition, a significant number of refugees have found it possible to get advanced education under the sponsorship of Arab Governments or international voluntary organizations, or through grants from business firms, individuals or other members of their own family already gainfully employed.

In general, the Arab people and Governments have looked favourably on education for the refugees, as evidenced by their co-operation with UNRWA and their own investment of tens of millions of dollars for refugee education. Education for refugees is regarded by most Arabs as essential, regardless of the way in which Arab-Israeli conflict is ultimately resolved; they recognize that young people must be made employable, wherever they may live, even in the case of those who might at some future date be repatriated.

This belief in education is further evidenced by the fact that when UNRWA decided to support advanced secondary education, it was able to negotiate with the host Governments to provide the facilities and schooling, with UNRWA merely compensating them on a per student basis for the services rendered. When UNRWA, because of budgetary limitations, rigidly limited the number of secondary students it could support, the Governments proceeded to admit additional refugee students at their own expense. This happened to such an extent that in certain countries the total enrolment of

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secondary refugee students has become more than twice the number supported by UNRWA.¹

Considering that the number of young refugees who have reached maturity since 1948 is now in excess of half a million, whereas the number of persons who have received assistance towards vocational, teacher or university training is about 10,000, it is not difficult to see why the number of refugees receiving assistance from UNRWA has grown steadily, year by year. Had the world community or, for that matter, the major powers, from 1950 onward launched a vital programme in support of education and general economic development, with appropriate emphasis on specialized training in the host countries, the refugee problem would by now be well on its way to solution. Had this been done, it is probable that UNRWA would not have found it necessary to enter the educational field as extensively as it has done, if at all. The strongest evidence in support of this conclusion is the Agency's success in securing the agreement of the host Governments to provide upper secondary education for the refugees, with UNRWA merely subsidizing part of the cost. With such an approach, had it worked, the education programme for refugees could have become merged with that of the host countries. This, combined with appropriate international assistance for development, would have done much to raise the level of economic progress throughout the Middle East, giving employment to both refugees and others. Despite UNRWA's failure, on several occasions, to settle refugees on the land or through special works projects, there is solid reason to believe that emphasis on a broad education effort, coupled with a general development programme, would have succeeded.

In general, opposition to UNRWA's land settlement projects, which have been by far its largest undertaking, arose

¹ United Nations document A/6713, p. 72, table 14.

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because these projects involved the award of land to refugee settlers, in preference to the thousands of indigenous farmers' sons who were eager for land; a type of opposition one would expect to find in any developing area where arable land was scarce. Thus, the widespread Western belief that the Arab host Governments have opposed the settlement of the refugees as part of a policy of holding them as hostages in their struggle against Israel is mostly a myth. So, too, is the assumption that a solution to the refugee problem would have brought to an end Arab hostility towards Israel. As will be explained subsequently, the refugee problem is but a side aspect of a more complex and basic cause of conflict.

In the aftermath of the war of 1967 and of Israel's occupation of the West Bank area of Jordan, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights of Syria, a critical new refugee problem emerged. By December 1967, an estimated 245,000 persons had fled from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into the area of Jordan East of the river; 116,000 had left the Israeli-occupied area of Syria, and some 61,000 persons, including 11,000 from Gaza and 50,000 from the Sinai Peninsula had taken refuge in Egypt. Of this total, about 145,000 were UNRWA-supported refugees, who had been uprooted for a second time.

At the Special Session of the General Assembly, convened in June 1967, a resolution was adopted calling on Israel to permit these new refugees to return to their homes in the occupied areas. Although some 85 per cent of those who had fled to the East Bank filled out applications asking to return, as of January 1, 1968, only about 15,000 had been admitted by Israel. Meanwhile, additional refugees continued to flee from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank area to East Jordan – the total number moving in that direction during the months of September, October and November exceeding the total number of refugees re-admitted to the West Bank area by Israel.

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On January 1, 1968, there lived within Israel and the areas under her occupation an estimated 2.5 million Jews and 1.6 million Arabs. Of these, almost all the Jews and about 300,000 Arabs lived in Israel itself, and 1,400,000 Arabs resided in the occupied areas. Thus, of the combined population only about 60 per cent were Jews and the remaining 40 per cent were almost entirely Arabs.

Israel's desire for land, and for minimizing the Arab population on that land, is also reflected in her policy of land seizure and occupation following the fighting of June 1967. Prime Minister Eshkol, in a statement on October 30, 1967, opening a session of the Knesset, said: 'It is our intention to continue to develop East Jerusalem [the former Jordanian section] . . . A special team is preparing a comprehensive master plan for the eastern city. It will include about 1,000 to 1,500 housing units.'¹ In the same address, commenting on other occupied areas, the Prime Minister said: 'I must add that the area that was under Jordanian occupation, and the Gaza region, which the Egyptians ruled, were held by them not of right but by force, as the result of military aggression and occupation.' The strong implication is that Israel now has acquired a right to hold these areas by 'military aggression and occupation' and even without reference to the wishes of the 1.4 million indigenous Arabs who live there.

In an interview carried on the Columbia Broadcasting System's programme 'Face the Nation' on June 11, 1967, General Moshe Dayan replied as follows to a question as to Israel's ability to absorb the Arab population in the newly occupied areas:

'Economically we can; but I think that is not in accord with

¹ *New York Times*, October 31, 1967 – article datelined Jerusalem October 31, carrying statement 'Following are excerpts from a speech by Premier Levi Eshkol in the Knesset today'.



Young Israelis at work on land which the Arabs of Palestine also claim, 1968.



More land projects in Israel, 1968:
Girls on a collective farm (kibbutz)
A co-operative agricultural settlement

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our aims in the future. It would turn Israel into either a bi-national or poly-Arab-Jewish state instead of a Jewish state, and we want to have a Jewish state.¹

Israel's insistence that peace talks must take place directly between herself and the Arab States and before she withdraws her forces from any of the occupied areas, places her in the position that she can argue over territorial boundaries and even claim land in addition to that held on June 1967. Thus, it would seem that Israel's decisive action to hold occupied territory is motivated by a combination of a desire for land for settlement, a belief that the new boundaries provide greater security, and an intention to be in a strong bargaining position at the conference table, if and when negotiations take place.

Any attempt to examine the Palestine refugee problem in its various aspects would be incomplete unless some thought is given to the refugees as people. As one would expect, basically they are much like people everywhere – particularly rural people, since, as already mentioned, most of the dependent refugees were farmers and peasants in Palestine. By nature the Palestinian Arabs are a friendly and an orderly people. They are also an inately industrious people – notwithstanding the impression to the contrary that a casual observer might gain from visiting a large refugee camp today. This is borne out by the fact that all refugees who could find jobs in 1948, and all who have acquired specialized skills since, have taken jobs and become self-supporting. Almost universally, refugee parents want their children to receive an education that will make them independent. Whereas in 1950 only a limited number of refugee girls – particularly those from rural areas – received formal education, and most of these only for two or three years, by 1966–67 the enrolment of girls in schools was

¹ Quoted by I. F. Stone in 'From a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab Conflict', *The New York Review of Books*, August 3, 1967, p. 3.

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approaching that of boys and extending increasingly to the lower secondary level.¹ Also noteworthy is the fact that the refugee camps and the host countries have never been harrassed by hooliganism or unruly bands of youth with idle hours on their hands – not even in the Gaza Strip, where employment opportunity is minimal. The life of the refugees has been hard and full of bitter disappointments. Even greater than the physical privation has been the lack of hope – hope that for years was nurtured by the annual passage of unfulfilled resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly calling for repatriation or compensation by Israel.

If and when the refugee problem moves towards solution, there will still be several hundred thousand older refugees who will remain as welfare cases, unless an extraordinary effort of rehabilitation is undertaken. This group includes both older refugees who have been mostly idle since 1948, and younger ones who have had inadequate opportunity to learn work disciplines and habits before reaching maturity. Looking back, it is regrettable that a greater effort has not been made by the world community to make the Palestine refugees employable through rehabilitation programmes and education in skills.

¹ United Nations document A/6713, tables 13 to 16, pp. 71-74.

The State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization

Israel, since its creation in 1948, has adhered for the most part to the general objective and basic policies proclaimed by Theodor Herzl in his now famous book *Der Judenstaat*, published a half century earlier. The new State has operated on the premise that the Jews of the world constitute a distinct people, i.e., the 'Jewish People Nationality', and that as such they must have a Jewish State in order that they may avoid persecution at the hands of non-Jews and that they may fulfil the spiritual and moral destiny that they believe is theirs as a People.

Today, it is estimated that the world contains some 15 million Jews, of whom about 2.5 million are in Israel. From the date of its founding in 1897, the World Zionist Organization has considered that the Jewish State for which it was striving should include most of the Jewish population of the world; and the new State of Israel has conceived this to be its mission. This was, of course, to be expected, since the first Government of Israel was launched from the base provided by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, which, as we shall see later, is synonymous with the World Zionist Organization. Chaim Weizmann, who for over twenty years was the President of the World Zionist Movement, was elected the first President of Israel; David Ben Gurion, who was for years head of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, became its first Prime Minister; and Abba Eban, who had been the Jewish Agency's liaison officer with the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, became Israel's first Ambassador to the United Nations.

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The interim legislative body of the new State was improvised from the legislative mechanism of World Zionism; and the armed units, which for the most part had been operating illegally during the latter years of the Mandate period, became the core of the first army of Israel.

However, at the time Israel achieved statehood, the territory it occupied contained only about five per cent of the Jews of the world. How then could it, in fact, be a State for the Jewish People of the world? Zionist leaders improvised an answer by deciding to keep alive the World Zionist Organization, including its *alter ego*, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and making it an adjunct of the State of Israel, in a manner that created a governmental superstructure that could undertake to represent and act on behalf of the Jewish population of the world. The technique was to utilize the State of Israel in a dual role, i.e., as a conventional Government for her own residents, and as the nucleus of a larger and more comprehensive global, state-like structure, which would function on behalf of the Jews of the Diaspora, linking them to Israel.

Although our interest is largely in functional relationships, these can probably best be seen by a cursory examination of the basic documents through which this relationship was established. The basis for the representation of the Jewish People by the Government of Israel and the World Zionist Organization is the *Status Law*, which was developed jointly by the Government and the Organization and was adopted by the Israeli Knesset – the legislative branch of the Government – on November 24, 1952. The term ‘Status’ in this context denotes the status of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine in relationship to the State of Israel. This document contains twelve paragraphs, the first three of which affirm that the State of Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish People and that its gates are open to all Jews; and that the World Zionist Organization, which carried

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the main responsibility for the establishment of the State, is charged with immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State. Paragraphs 4 to 7 of the law read as follows:

‘4. The State of Israel recognizes the World Zionist Organization as the authorized agency which will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants from the Diaspora and the co-ordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields.

5. The mission of gathering in the exiles, which is the central task of the State of Israel and the Zionist Movement in our days, requires constant efforts by the Jewish people in the Diaspora; the State of Israel, therefore, expects the co-operation of all Jews, as individuals and groups, in building up the State and assisting the immigration to it of the masses of the people, and regards the unity of all sections of Jewry as necessary for this purpose.

6. The State of Israel expects efforts on the part of the World Zionist Organization for achieving this unity; if, to this end, the Zionist Organization, with the consent of the Government and the approval of the Knesset, should decide to broaden its basis, the enlarged body will enjoy the status conferred upon the World Zionist Organization in the State of Israel.

7. Details of the status of the World Zionist Organization – whose representation is the Zionist Executive, also known as the Executive of the Jewish Agency – and the form of its co-operation with the Government shall be determined by a Covenant to be made in Israel between the Government and the Zionist Executive.’¹

The Covenant between the Government of Israel and the

¹ *Israel Government Year Book*, 5714 (1953–54), pp. 243–244.

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Zionist Executive, referred to in paragraph seven of the *Status Law*, was in due course formulated and issued in 1954.¹ The first section of this document is explicit in setting forth specific functions to be performed by the Jewish Agency for Israel, namely:

1. The organizing of immigration abroad and the transfer of immigrants and their property to Israel.
2. Co-operation in the absorption of immigrants in Israel.
3. Youth immigration.
4. Agricultural settlement in Israel.
5. The acquisition and amelioration of land in Israel (held by certain established Jewish and settlement organizations).
6. Participation in the establishment and expansion of development enterprises in Israel.
7. The encouragement of private capital investment in Israel.
8. Assistance to cultural enterprises and institutions of higher education in Israel.
9. The mobilization of resources for financing these activities.
10. The co-ordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations acting within the limits of these functions by means of public funds.

In practice, the functions of the Jewish Agency in its relationship to the new State of Israel became far broader than those it had exercised in relationship to the Mandatory Power. Particularly noteworthy is that fact that, in effect, the two are partners in a common effort, in contrast to the subordinate role of the Agency in the British Administration of Palestine and the frictions that for the most part characterized its relationship with the Mandatory Power.

The importance of the Agency in the eyes of the Government

¹ W. T. Mallison, Jr., in *William and Mary Law Review*, vol. 9, Spring 1968, pp. 626-628.

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of Israel is evident from the fact that at ceremonial functions the Chairman of the Agency Executive and the Chairman of the Council are given protocol status just below that of the Members of the Government, the Members of the Executive a place equal to that of the Members of the Knesset, and Members of the General Council of the Agency a rank just below the Knesset. For lack of a better term to describe the super-national government comprised of the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organization, we shall hereafter use that of the Israel-Zionist condominium.

Another piece of legislation, companion to the *Status Law* and the *Covenant*, is the *Law of Return*, the more pertinent paragraphs of which read:¹

‘1. Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an *oleh*.²

3. (a) A Jew who has come to Israel and subsequent to his arrival has expressed his desire to settle in Israel may, while still in Israel, receive an *oleh*’s certificate. . . .’

In addition, of course, Israel has an immigration law by which any acceptable person, Jewish or otherwise, may become a citizen through a process of naturalization. But the *Law of Return* applies only to Jews, and it is by virtue of this law that Jewish immigrants, who comprise most of those who have moved to Israel since 1948, have become citizens.³ The important point, however, is that under the laws of Israel all of the approximately 13 million Diaspora Jews of the world have an

¹ Joseph Badi (ed.), *Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel*, Twayne Publishers, New York, pp. 285–286.

² *Oleh* means a Jew immigrating into Israel.

³ Under this Act a person may qualify as a Jew if at the time of his birth his mother was a Jewess under the religious regulations that pertain, or if he himself has fulfilled the requirements of conversion to Judaism.

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inherent right to citizenship in Israel, if and when they choose to enter the country.

The real purpose and significance of the Israel-Zionist condominium is reflected today in the far-reaching programmes which the condominium has formulated since it came into being. Significant insight into these programmes is provided in a recent official document of the Israeli Government which bears the title *Basic Principles of the New Government Programme of Israel*.¹ Here the Government's programme is set forth in ten chapters, each of which pertains to a major aspect of a total effort. Chapter A of this document, entitled 'Central Task', defines that task as follows:

'1. Perseverance in the creation of the social, economic and spiritual conditions for the realization of the central mission of the State of Israel: the ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish people in its homeland; speeding up Aliya from all countries and all classes, encouragement of Aliya from the countries of prosperity, stimulation of pioneering Aliya.'²

Chapter D of the *New Government Programme*, entitled 'Israel and the Diaspora', develops the concept of the 'central task' of the State of Israel in terms of an operative programme, as follows:

'1. The Government will constantly work for the establishment of Israel and all communities of the Jewish people in the Diaspora. The Government will co-operate with the Zionist Movement and other Jewish organizations in its effort to foster the unity of the Jewish people and safeguard its continued national survival and deepen the devotion of the people to its historic Homeland, the State of Israel.

¹ *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5726 (1965-1966). (This is an insert, not bound into the volume.)

² Aliya means immigration of Jews.

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‘The Government will give constant aid for the strengthening and expansion of the Zionist Movement and the fulfilment of its tasks; to increase aliya, to foster the pioneering movement and the aliya of children and young people: to expand settlement on the land; to encourage young people from the Diaspora to come to Israel for education and training, and to secure more voluntary financial aid. The Government will help the Zionist Movement in its Zionist educational activity, so as to deepen the consciousness of the Jewish people’s unity, to foster the devotion of Diaspora Jewry to the State of Israel, to strive against every manifestation of indifference to the nation, against assimilation and abandonment of the Jewish fold and to preserve the Diaspora’s support for Israel in her efforts to consolidate her position on the international scene.’

The above quotations taken from the *Status Law*, the *Covenant*, the *Law of Return* and the *New Programme of Israel* speak for themselves and make it quite clear that Israel is no ordinary or conventional State. Its unique aspect is that it undertakes to exercise responsibility for Jews living throughout the world, as well as those living in Israel, to make them all conscious of Israel, to bring Diaspora Jews to Israel, and to promote the interests of Israel generally. To this end, as we have noted, Israel has joined hands with the World Zionist Organization for the purpose of reaching out to Jews in other countries – working largely through voluntary and often philanthropic, educational and cultural organizations functioning within such countries, and whose Jewish members and officers are citizens of these countries. The spanning arms that undertake to link Jews in other countries with Israel are the World Zionist Organization and its numerous affiliates. Both legally and functionally, the World Zionist Organization is a tightly-linked federation in which the policies of subordinate

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units are made subject to those of superior units, in the sense that in the event of conflict the policy of the superior unit will take precedence. The basic provision that establishes this relationship is contained in Article 7 of the Constitution of the World Zionist Organization, which reads as follows:

‘1. The instructions issued by any superior authority (the Executive or governing body of any Federation or Separate Union) within the scope of its power, are binding upon the authorities subordinate to it.’

Any subordinate Zionist unit must agree to accept directives from above if and when it becomes a member of a Zionist organization that is superior to it in the hierarchy. The fact that this procedure applies from the top to the bottom of the World Zionist hierarchial structure means that in a showdown all other units become subservient to the Israel-Zionist condominium. A further device for strengthening the hierarchial control is that of automatically making all members of a subordinate Zionist unit members, as individuals, of the World Zionist Organization. Thus, the Israel-Zionist condominium constitutes the apex of the whole far-flung World Zionist Movement – one that exerts influence in all parts of the world where Jews live in significant numbers and where their voluntary organizations can function with reasonable freedom; which is to say that they are particularly active within the Western world.

A second significant aspect of this super-national structure is that by virtue of the *Law of Return* in Israel every Jew in the Diaspora is deemed by the condominium to hold latent citizenship in the State of Israel – a citizenship that will become active on the simple act of entering Israel, unless it is overtly rejected. Juridically the condominium has tried and is trying to get recognition in international law of the citizenship rights in Israel of Diaspora Jews on the grounds that collectively the

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Jewish People of the world constitute a nationality – a nationality that carries with it an already existent but latent right to citizenship in Israel for any Jew who may enter that State.¹

As one might expect, the effort on the part of the Israel-Zionist condominium to establish a Jewish People Nationality has raised questions of dual nationality and even dual citizenship for Diaspora Jews. While this subject lies beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that on April 20, 1964, in a letter to Dr. Elmer Berger, Executive Vice-President of the American Council for Judaism, Assistant Secretary of State Phillips Talbot stated that 'it should be clear that the Department of State does not regard the "Jewish People" concept as a concept of international law'.² Commenting on this letter as it pertains to the United States, Mallison concludes that 'there is no constitutional alternative to official rejection of this juridical concept, since it is fundamentally inconsistent with the constitutional prohibition against discrimination upon religious grounds'.³

A third unique aspect of the Israel-Zionist condominium is its declared intention and extensive plan for involving itself in the affairs of Jews who are living in, and are citizens of, other sovereign States. Although this attribute of the condominium has already been noted in passing, it deserves further attention here, particularly with reference to the far-reaching provision proclaimed in the *Basic Principles of the New Government Programme of Israel* (1965–1966) quoted earlier in this chapter.

Here the 'Central Task' of the *Programme of Israel* is defined as 'the ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish People [Jews

¹ For a thorough discussion of this subject, see W. T. Mallison, Jr., 'The Zionist-Israel Juridical Claims to Constitute The Jewish People Nationality Entity and to Confer Membership in Its Appraisal in Public International Law', *The George Washington Law Review*, Vol. 32, No. 5, June 1964.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1075.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1067.

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living in the Diaspora] into its homeland . . .'. As we have seen, the techniques for doing this involve the speeding up of 'immigration (Aliya) from all countries and all classes' with special regard to 'the countries of prosperity' and for 'pioneering Aliya'. To this end the Government of Israel 'will co-operate with the Zionist Movement and other Jewish organizations in its effort to foster the unity of the Jewish People and safeguard its continued national survival and deepen the devotion of the people to . . . the State of Israel'. Noteworthy in this last quotation is the use of the words 'its' and 'national' when referring to the term 'Jewish People', which obviously pertains to the concept of a Jewish People Nationality.

Other techniques set forth in the *New Programme of Israel* are projects for the immigration of Jewish children and young people from the Diaspora, expanded settlement on the land, the bringing of young people to Israel for education and training, and the solicitation of more voluntary financial aid for Israel. The Government of Israel also 'will help the Zionist Movement in its Zionist educational activities, so as to deepen the consciousness of the Jewish People's unity . . .' In addition, the Government of Israel will 'strive against every manifestation of indifference to the nation, against assimilation and abandonment of the Jewish fold and to preserve the Diaspora's support for Israel in her efforts to consolidate her position on the international scene'. From the complex structure of the Israel-Zionist condominium there flows a constant stream of information, augmented by personal contacts, to all accessible communities for the purpose of generating Israeli and Jewish nationality consciousness. Coupled with this is an almost unending appeal to Diaspora Jews to move to Israel in fulfilment of the objective of a Jewish Homeland and a constant appeal and drive for Diaspora funds. Without doubt, the Zionist-Israeli fund-raising effort of the past twenty years has far outstripped in effectiveness any voluntary fund-raising

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programme that has ever existed. Finally, the development of a global *Judenstaat* in the form of the condominium, with Israel as its hub, has provided Israel with a unique mechanism to strengthen her defences against neighbouring States whose peoples, as we have seen, she has antagonized to the point that they oppose her very existence as a State.

Looking back, it seems logical, even inevitable, that the Zionist Movement should retain the structure of the World Zionist Organization, even after it had been successful in establishing a physical Jewish State in Palestine. If Israel had become a State merely in the conventional sense, it would have busied itself basically with the people who resided in it in May 1948. Logically, it would have accepted back the Palestine refugees and have undertaken to make a home for them. But this was not the concept on which Israel was founded. Nor was it the concept of Herzl when he laid the foundation for modern Zionism in his famous book *Der Judenstaat*. Furthermore, it has never been the concept of any prominent Zionist leader during the past seventy years. In 1948 a State of Israel, limited to a part of Palestine, actually would have had little real meaning in Zionist terms. In fact, it could not have survived alone against the forces that opposed it. But the Zionist goal was a state that somehow could reach out and encompass all the Jews of the world. Since this could not take place through the media of a conventional State, and particularly a struggling new one that was surrounded by forces hostile to it, a supplemental device had to be invented. This device, then, is the Israel-Zionist condominium which today purports to be the State of the Jewish People of the world, with Israel as its hub.

The significance of the super-national structure that inter-relates Israel with the World Zionist Movement was articulately and forcefully set forth by David Ben Gurion, who was one of its foremost architects during its formative period.

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Speaking of its central concept, the *Law of Return*, and the policy of 'ingathering the Diaspora', he said:

'... It (Israel) is not a state for its citizens alone, but for the whole Jewish people, for every Jew wherever he be, who chooses to live in his homeland, who chooses Israeli independence in preference to life in the Diaspora. The peculiar sign that singles out the State of Israel and fixes its central mission, the Zionist-Jewish mission, is the "Law of Return", the foundation scroll of the rights of the Jewish people in Israel. This law has its origins in the Declaration of Independence of 14th May, 1948, which says: "The State of Israel shall be open to immigration and to the Ingathering of the Exiles". It may be said that for that purpose the State was founded. The Law of Return establishes that it is not the State that confers upon the Jew abroad the right to settle in Israel, this right being inherent in his being a Jew, if he only has the desire to join the population of the State.'¹

Speaking on the integral and reciprocal relationship between the State and the Movement, Mr. Ben Gurion explained:

'But the advantage of the State is also a source of restriction. For the sovereign authority of the State is confined within its own borders, applying only to its own citizens, while over 80 per cent of the Jewish people are still to be found – and who knows for how long? – outside the borders of the State. The State of Israel cannot intervene in the internal life of the Jewish communities abroad, cannot direct them, or make demands upon them. However unique is the State of Israel in the manner of its emergence and in its task, it is obliged to operate like every other State, and its capacity outside its borders is restricted. It is the Zionist Organization, built upon the voluntary association and

¹ *The Jewish Agency Digest*, August 24, 1951 (Vol. III, No. 49), p. 1890.

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activity, which is able to achieve what is beyond the power and competence of the State, and that is the advantage of the Zionist Organization over the State.

Hence the Zionist Organization has not been rendered useless by the establishment of the State but, on the contrary, its responsibility and mission have become incalculably greater. The State and the Zionist Movement complement each other, need each other and with joint effort can and must activate the Jewish people to realize the ideal of its redemption.¹

The ingenuity and farsightedness of the architects of the Israel-Zionist condominium have been apparent from its beginning, but its full effectiveness, resilience and strength was not demonstrated until the fighting of June 1967. The teamwork and interplay of forces and action between the Israeli and the Zionist-Movement arms of the condominium enabled Israel quickly to rally Western opinion in her support, recruit supplemental manpower, and release to the world a running commentary, complete with statements and pictures, of the fighting as seen from Tel Aviv. Since the war ended she has been able to use this super-national structure to highlight her viewpoint and give to the world her interpretation of events and developments in the Middle East. So extensive has been this operation that Tel Aviv has rivalled the capitals of the major powers in headlines, front-page articles and feature stories, and in news items and behind-the-news documentaries for radio and television. Both before and after the war, this structure has also served Israel well in her appeals for funds and armaments, and in diplomacy. In brief, it has enabled Israel to speak largely with one voice and in a manner that has done much to build for her a favourable image in the world.

The Arabs have had nothing comparable in the way of a

¹ *Ibid.*, May 16, 1952 (Vol. IV, No. 30), p. 1061.


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super-national entity to serve their cause. The League of Arab States, a regional inter-governmental organization, has, for a variety of reasons outside the scope of this book, so far been ineffective in presenting the Arab viewpoint on Palestine or in rallying world support for it. Even worse for the Arabs, the world communications media seem to be so structured as to highlight Arab differences and weaknesses, and even, at times, to fill in missing gaps with speculation and commentary that have little basis in reality.

This is not to say that none of the things that has been reported about Arab weaknesses or mistakes has been true. However, the general view that has emerged of the Arab people, their actions, their motivation, their philosophy and thinking, and even the nature of their leadership, does not do them justice.

From Israel's standpoint, the condominium has served its purpose well. Looking back, it seems clear that had it not been for the World Zionist Movement, the State of Israel would never have existed. Moreover, from May 18, 1948, onwards, Israel would never have survived without the sustaining strength and support of the Zionist Movement, working as a strong component of the Israel-Zionist condominium.

However, strength and influence as potent as that possessed today by the condominium must go hand in hand with responsibility to use it justly. What Herzl and other early Zionist leaders did not foresee with realism was the problem of dealing with the Arab people who already inhabited Palestine. In the long run, Israel's ultimate fate is likely to be tied to her success in solving this problem – a subject to which we will return in a later chapter.



Jordanian tanks move westwards from Amman to the Jordan-Israel border, May, 31, 1967



Pipeline bringing the waters of the River Jordan to Israel; a source of conflict



Israel's Tank Corps parades in the Sinai Peninsula, 1967

June 1967, Arab refugees flee eastwards across the River Jordan

Taking Stock

In this chapter the purpose is to single out and place in perspective certain basic considerations that need to be weighed and taken into account in any effort to build a foundation for peace in the Middle East. More specifically, the objective is to find, if one can, a solid underpinning upon which a policy that will lead to peace can be built, rather than to formulate such a policy in itself. Since, for the most part, this entails dealing with considerations that emerge from matters discussed in previous chapters, the presentation will be confined to an attempt to highlight conclusions and facts without repeating details with which the reader is already familiar.

A fundamental fact is that today the State of Israel exists in the Middle East. It is a member of the United Nations and, as such, it has existed for two decades, during which time it has become involved in and has survived three wars with the countries that border it.

The State of Israel exists because the Zionist Movement wanted it to exist, and was able to persuade the Governments of major world powers also to want it to exist; even to the point that they themselves worked, first to establish it, and later to sustain it. A particularly potent factor contributing to Israel's success has been the unique union between her and the World Zionist Movement to form a super-national, government-type structure that could effectively rally world support on behalf of Israel. In fact, it would seem fair to state that had Israel been without the benefit of this arrangement, she would have foundered in her early years. While existence does

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not guarantee permanence, still Israel's statehood stands today as a fact in the Middle East.

A second basic fact is that, in the circumstances that have prevailed, a Jewish State could not have come into being except by resort to pressure and force against the indigenous Arab population, who opposed the idea of such a State from its inception.

A third basic fact is that conflict between Israel and the Arab States has been, and is, a consequence of this use of force. For once the Zionists gained sufficient support from major powers to bring Israel into being, it became inevitable that the indigenous Arab people would be driven from their homes, their return blocked by force, their property seized and awarded to immigrants; and that a new Government would be created under which immigrants would be citizens, and Jews throughout the world be made potential citizens, whilst the exiled native Arabs would be relegated to the status of refugees and foreigners. These consequences had to follow, because Israel could never have fulfilled the purposes for which she was created by the Zionist Movement unless she could become a country controlled by Zionist-minded Jews, and operated for the purpose of fulfilling the Zionist concept that the Jews of the world constitute, collectively, the Jewish People Nationality. But, as we have seen, Israel when she came into being did not have a strong Jewish majority, and when boundaries were established Jews were actually a minority. Hence, it became necessary, even imperative, for the Zionists, helped by their supporters, to move hundreds of thousands of Jews into Palestine and to push most of the Arabs out of the area that constitutes Israel. Because the Zionist Movement, acting alone, would have been utterly incapable of creating a Jewish State in Palestine, an important part of its mission became that of activating major powers to perform on its behalf; a mission which Britain and America have fulfilled with much dedication,

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even when their own interests were not being served. By these actions, they have made themselves responsible, together with the Zionist Movement and Israel, for the grave injustices that were committed against the Arab people and for the miscarriage of justice reflected in the fact that these wrongs have gone unredressed.

A fourth basic fact is that Israel, once established, has shown an alarming attitude of aggressiveness towards the Arab people – a factor which has added materially to the magnitude of the conflict. This was in evidence in 1948 when she seized and held territory awarded to the Arabs under the United Nations partition plan. At that time, however, the Arab Governments, which had entered Palestine in response to pleas from the local Arab population, were in Israeli eyes the aggressors. But in 1956 Israel seized and attempted to hold on to the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, and relinquished them only after repeated resolutions at the United Nations and direct intervention by the United States, Russia and other nations. But the strongest evidence of her aggressiveness has been her behaviour during and following the war in June 1967: her annexation of the Old City of Jerusalem; her continuing occupation of the West Bank area, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and adjacent area of Syria; her refusal to permit most of the West Bank refugees to return home across the Jordan river; and her heavy reprisals in response to border incidents.

Against the background of these general considerations, attention will now shift to taking stock of the factors that influence and shape the present positions and that will probably condition alternatives open to the Arab States, Israel and the two major powers in the future.

The Arab States in their dealings with Israel have fallen far short of their objective. This objective has been somehow to restore Palestine, which would mean doing away with Israel

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as a Jewish State, and then to redress the wrongs that have been committed against the people of Palestine. Theoretically, at least, the combined Arab position is potentially strong. Measured in terms of land area, manpower, resources, potential economic strength to support a military operation and vulnerability to bombing, it is much superior to that of Israel.

However, the Arab States have never yet mobilized this potential strength in their dealings with Israel. Rather they have tended to think and plan in terms of attaining their goal either in action taken in a moment of crisis, such as war, or by letting time achieve it for them, in the belief that time is on their side. Their trouble is that they have never really planned jointly to the extent of formulating a well-delineated and concrete policy and programme for the attainment of their objective; i.e., one that begins with the containment of Israel within a given boundary and then proceeds step-by-step towards an objective. The result has been that each Arab State has tended to pursue its own policies, co-ordinated only loosely through the League of Arab States, or summit conferences. Noticeably lacking in this approach has been a pooling of strength and the presence of a central command entity that possessed both responsibility and authority. In particular, the Arab leaders have tended to underestimate the capability of their adversary.

By becoming involved in wars, and losing them, the Arabs have facilitated Israel's occupation of more land, which, of course, has been the opposite of their goal. In addition, they have added to Israel's military strength by allowing their own equipment to be captured. In the war of June 1967, they also became the victim – partly through their own fault – of an alienated public opinion in the West. This has substantially handicapped them in their subsequent efforts to gain international support, as they did in 1956, for compelling Israel to withdraw her forces to the boundary that existed prior to the

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start of fighting. The recent war has also had adverse effects on the economies of certain Arab States, notably the United Arab Republic and Jordan, both of which have lost heavily in terms of land, tourism, and valuable resources. In addition, the heavy loss of military hardware has forced these countries to allocate to rearmament resources much needed in national development.

Despite the adversities suffered in the June war, the Arab States collectively are still in a strong position to withstand Israel's insistence on recognition as a State and her demands for direct negotiation of peace terms as a pre-condition to withdrawal. As they are showing by their actions, they still have the alternative of permitting Israel to occupy the territory she seized, while they concentrate on other means of persuading her to withdraw. In so doing, of course, the Arabs run the risk that in the event of another showdown, Israel may again win and occupy still more territory. But Israel cannot ignore the fact that additional territory would involve adding still more Arab people to her population, a subject to which we will return.

Even though the world has taken little cognizance of the significance and implications of Israel-Zionist super-national activities in regard to Arab-Israel relations, the Arab leaders have done so. They clearly recognize that Israel's dominant interest is not the welfare of the whole people of the Middle East, of which geographically she is a part, but is focussed on the Jews of the world, trying to weld them together into a Jewish People Nationality, with Israel serving as its hub and centre. They also see that with assistance from certain major powers she is making headway, and it is largely this that frightens them. This concern, coupled with resentment over wrongs committed when Israel came into being, is a major source of Arab opposition to Israel's existence. In these circumstances, it is difficult to foresee when, if ever, the Arab

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States will accept Israel as a sister State, as long as her nature and status are unchanged. Moreover, it is difficult to foresee a likely set of circumstances that could force them to do so.

In the case of Israel, the fighting of June 1967 demonstrated a prodigious will for survival, a farsighted preparedness policy that had skilfully integrated reservists with the regular army, an ability to mobilize the whole nation for war at short notice, an aptitude for gaining advantage through surprise tactics, technical efficiency of a high order, and a strong national unity in time of emergency. The war left Israel with a wealth of captured equipment, and in control of an area several times the size of her former territory. In addition, she ended the war with the acclaim and support of virtually the whole Western world. The world saw, as never before, a demonstration of the effectiveness of the Israel-Zionist condominium for mobilizing and shaping international public sentiment, raising funds, and otherwise building up support for Israel.

But the war in June has not solved Israel's major problem; it has not brought peace. Israel's victory, instead of forcing the Arabs into submission, has apparently added to their bitterness. Instead of recognizing Israel as a sovereign State, agreeing to end belligerency and entering into direct peace talks, as Israel has demanded, the Arab States are insisting that she withdraw from all conquered territory as a pre-condition to peace talks, and that these then be carried out through an international medium, rather than bilaterally. Israel's victory, as dramatic and far-reaching as it was, has not placed the Arabs in a position in which they must accept her terms. They have the alternative of accepting Israel's occupation while they attempt to devise other means of securing her withdrawal; a policy they have chosen to pursue.

Meanwhile, Israel's victory and her continuing occupation of conquered Arab territories is presenting new problems for her. A major one is that of administering the occupied areas.

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Because basically the people in these areas are hostile to Israel, administration must involve the presence of armed units, which, in turn, is a drain on her industrial and agricultural manpower, as well as her resources, since, for the most part, her army is a reserve army.

Among the Arab people under occupation are some 750,000 Palestine refugees from 1948. While these people still receive assistance from UNRWA in the form of food, health, education, welfare and shelter services, Israel, as the occupying power, has duties towards them – a fact that adds to her administrative responsibility. Israel has talked of a comprehensive scheme for resettling these persons and giving them employment. In its broadest version, it suggests an economic arrangement that would include Israel, West and East Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. In view of the bitterness that now separates the two sides, it is probably worse than useless for Israel to even make such a proposal; particularly if she is not offering repatriation of refugees within her borders. Should Israel actually incorporate the new territories into her borders, then she would face a problem of a limited and a gradually decreasing Jewish majority. In fact, in time the Arabs would become a majority, owing to the fact that their birthrate is about half as large again as that of the Jewish population. Israel, of course, might attempt to offset this by stepping up the rate of Jewish immigration. However, should this succeed, it would, without doubt, kindle Arab bitterness to still greater heights if, at the same time, the repatriation of the remaining exiled Palestine refugees continued to be blocked.

To date, Israel has demonstrated skill and ingenuity in keeping the occupied areas under submission; resorting at times to harsh reprisals in the form of rapid execution of alleged saboteurs, the blowing-up of houses in settlements said to have sheltered saboteurs, the destruction of an Egyptian refinery in retaliation for the sinking of a destroyer, and the extensive

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shelling of a refugee camp in Jordan, including the killing of a group of girls just coming out of school.¹

Israel also faces the questions of whether she can somehow make the occupied areas bear the cost of administration, and whether investments in these areas, if made, will be remunerative. In addition, there is the problem of dealing with Arab commandos and saboteurs; a problem that reprisals are not likely to stamp out as long as deep Arab bitterness remains.

In any event, Israel faces a far more serious and fundamental problem than any of these. This is the one that emerges from the fact that she has never been willing to admit the wrongs and injustices committed against the Arabs of Palestine when Israel was created, or to take steps to redress them. The skilful propaganda and manoeuvring of the Israel-Zionist condominium has so far been successful in preventing any massive indictment of Israel by world opinion. No doubt contributing notably to this success has been a desire on the part of certain other Governments, particularly America and Britain, not to have the question raised as to their own involvement and responsibility for these wrongs and injustices.

But, as already indicated, serious acts of wrong and injustice have been committed, and year by year they are being compounded by the unresolved plight of the Palestine refugees. One can be sure that in time the world will become conscious of what has happened, and that when this takes place there will follow condemnation of those who perpetrated these deeds, and a corresponding demand that matters be set right. Important in bringing this about will be the inability of the Arab

¹ For report on several such incidents, including the shelling of Karameh refugee camp in Jordan, see *The Economist*, December 9, 1967, pp. 1042-45, 'Unquiet Flows the Jordan', which explains that 'The carnage at Karameh was reprisal for the fact that some miles up the river the Jordanian Army had given fire-cover to saboteurs escaping from Israel.' The author, in a visit to Jordan in September 1967, heard reports similar to these from refugees, Government officials and staff of the United Nations.

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people as a whole – a hundred million of them – to forget what has happened, and their insistence that the world should become conscious of it. To date, the Israel-Zionist super-national mechanism has largely succeeded in leading the world to believe that there is something abnormal about the Arabs in that they do not recognize her, have not ceased to be belligerent, and have not made peace. It is probable that history will record that the Arabs have reacted very normally to Israel, considering that their land was seized by force, most of the indigenous population expelled and exiled, the land settled by immigrants, and the indigenous people regarded as foreigners.

Even now, it would seem to be in Israel's enlightened self-interest to come forward, admit her injustices, and offer redress in the form of generous repatriation and compensation. The same admission, of course, applies in the case of the nations whose support made possible the creation of Israel. In return for the redressing of wrongs, Israel could then insist that peace be established, and it probably could be.

However, it is most unlikely that Israel will ever voluntarily act in this way. To do so would compel her to denounce and give up her Zionist role, which is the purpose of her existence, the reason she came into being. All of which highlights the point that a Zionist State does not fit into the Middle East. This is true because her purposes and actions are not compatible with those of the Middle East. As early as 1947, the philosopher Martin Buber, writing in Jerusalem, warned that instead of relating the aims of the Jewish people to the geographical reality, wherein these aims had to be realized, the political leaders saw these aims only against the background of international events and in their relation to international problems. 'Thus, Palestine was embedded into international entanglements and attempts towards their solution, isolating it from the organic context of the Middle East, into the awakening of which it should have been integrated in accordance with a

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broader spiritual and social perspective.¹ As we have seen, Israel's interest is in fact dominantly outside the region; a further important factor in keeping alive Arab bitterness towards her. Hence, when it comes to negotiations between Arabs and Israelis, the latter are not in a position to think primarily of the interests of the people of the region as a whole. Israel's dominant interest is the welfare of the 15 million Jews of the world, rather than that of the 100 million people who comprise the population of the Middle East, 97 per cent of whom are Arabs. The crux of the matter is that it is Israel, and not the Arab States, whose behaviour is different from the norm.

Since Israel does not fit into the Middle East, as it is constituted, and since she herself is powerless to alter her ways in order to fit in, it follows that it is futile to expect Israel and the Arab States to come to peace terms through direct negotiations and without assistance from a third party. In fact, the only way that, left to their own devices, they can ever arrive at peaceful terms is through a war in which one side eliminates the other as a political entity, or at least alters its nature in a manner which makes it compatible with the whole. The persistence with which hostilities have continued during the past twenty years and the intermittent wars that have erupted bear out the truth of this statement.

By fighting wars and winning them, Israel has been able to gain nothing towards peace on the terms she seeks. Rather, she has merely moved a hostile border from one place to another; but it is still hostile, possibly more hostile than before.

There has to be, and is, a limit to Israel's ability to fight such wars, win them and occupy more territory. In fact she may already have approached that limit – possibly exceeded it, time will tell. The fact is that about the only thing that Israel

¹ Martin Buber, *Towards Union in Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1947.

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can expect to gain from a war she wins is an improved holding position for an interim period; i.e., a period while the Arab States are rearming. Nor can one expect, as Israel and the Western nations seem to assume, that in time the Arabs will tire of war and submit to peace on Israel's terms. The rapidity with which they have sought to rearm and the rigidity of their policy position following the war of June 1967 bear witness to the contrary.

Thus, Israel faces a dilemma. She is in conflict with the Arab people because, as a State, she does not fit into the Middle East. Also, she is powerless to adapt herself, by her own action, so that she will fit in to the region; because she is not a free agent, but an agent of Zionist nationalism, and her interests, therefore, are not those of the Middle East. To exist, she has resorted to wars which she has won, but this procedure can never bring her peace. Furthermore, in fighting bigger and bigger wars, she runs the grave risk of alienating the support of nations on which her very existence depends. Finally, in the background is the haunting realization that in time the world is bound to regard the acts committed against the Palestine Arabs, at the time of the creation of Israel and subsequently, as constituting grave injustices which must be rectified in the name of humanity and in the interest of peace.

In the future, as in the recent past, Arab-Israel relations seem certain to be conditioned by the positions and actions of the two major world powers with reference to the Middle East. A fundamental principle behind the policy of the United States was emphasized by President Johnson on June 19, 1967, in the following words:

‘To the leaders of all nations of the Near East I wish to say what three Presidents have said before me – that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all of the nations

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of the area. The United States strongly opposes aggression in the area in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents – President Truman, President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and myself – as well as the policy of both of our political parties.¹

But, in the crisis of June 1967, President Johnson did not follow the precedent set by President Eisenhower in 1956, by insisting on the immediate withdrawal of Israel to within the boundaries that had existed on June 4. Instead, as we noted in Chapter 4, American policy became centred on working for peace in the Middle East, on the basis of five points set forth as essential by President Johnson; i.e., the right of every nation to exist, justice for the refugees, respect for international maritime rights, averting of dangers inherent in a renewed arms race, and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all States in the area. Hence, despite President Johnson's several pronouncements on safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of Middle East States, the United States undertook to press for only such action on this front as could be in phase with progress towards a general understanding that included all of the President's five points.

It is difficult to see how anyone could have been optimistic about such an approach as a basis for prompt action. For one thing, these five points were America's view only; they had never been agreed by any responsible United Nations body, or by the Arab States and Israel. Even more pertinent, perhaps, this approach would raise some of the very issues on which peace negotiations had hung fire for twenty years, and there was little evidence to indicate that basic viewpoints had so altered as to render agreement more possible.

¹ *New York Times*, June 20, 1967.

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In sharp contrast to the American approach, the Soviet Union insisted that Israel be 'vigorously' condemned for 'aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan . . .' and demanded 'that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all troops from the territories of those states and withdraw them behind the armistice lines. . . .'¹

With the two major powers thus divided, no effective action was possible in the Security Council or the General Assembly.² This, in effect, has given Israel virtually a free hand in such matters as holding and occupying the territory she had seized, annexing the Old City of Jerusalem, and refusing to permit the refugees who had crossed to the East Bank of the Jordan to return to their homes in the West Bank area or the Gaza Strip. Thus, a policy of no action except so far as co-ordinated progress can be made on the five-point front, has become, in effect, a policy favourable to Israel, at least in the short run, in that it has turned out to be a permissive policy.

Immediately after the cease-fire, the Soviet Union undertook a vigorous programme of helping the United Arab Republic and Syria to rearm; an effort that reportedly had restored most of the losses in an interval of a few months.³ Be this as it may, it seems clear that an ominous arms race is again underway; one that, if permitted to continue, will build up to another outbreak of war.

¹ United Nations document S/7951/Rev. 2. These excerpts from a draft resolution introduced by the USSR are representative of her consistent policy.

² As explained in Chapter 4, the resolution passed in the Security Council on November 22 (S/Res/242 (1967)) holds forth little promise of being effective.

³ *New York Times*, November 24, 1967. Thomas F. Brady reporting from Cairo on President Nasser's speech in Cairo on November 23, relates that 'he said the army now was stronger than it was on the eve of the June hostilities . . .'

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Viewed in retrospect, it would appear that the position taken by the United States in the recent crisis, while drawing her closer to Israel, has further alienated America from the Arab States and Arab people, with the result that Russia's opportunities have been made all the greater. Thus, for America, which has played an active part in the search for a solution, the developments subsequent to the June fighting have not been very rewarding; no end to conflict, no solution in sight, an arms race in train, the alienation from America of the Arab people, and an enhancement of Russian opportunity and activity in the region – none being things which America would have sought or wanted.

Noticeably absent from United States policy has been any recognition that conflict stems from the fact that a Zionist-dominated Israel does not, and cannot, fit into the Middle East, and that conflict from 1917 onward has been the result of a determined effort to impose such a State on the region through the use of external force, and against the strong and almost universal opposition of the indigenous population. America's role in this respect runs counter to her whole history in that it violates the concept of the rights of people to basic freedoms and to self-determination – concepts of which the United States has been a leading champion. Noteworthy is the fact that even in the face of fifty years of Arab-Zionist conflict and twenty years of Arab-Israel conflict, the United States has never seriously approached the problem of the treatment of Jewish people from the standpoint of finding alternative means of ending Jewish persecution and assuring Jews the right to freedom of worship, in order to avoid a violation of basic Arab rights and the persecution of Arab people.

In June 1967, the West viewed Israel's victory as a major defeat for Russia in the Middle East, expecting that Arab reactions would be strongly against her because she had not intervened directly on their behalf. Also, it was expected that

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Russia would resent the fact that more than 1,000 million dollars worth of Russian equipment had been destroyed or abandoned, much of it falling into Israel's hands. But this has not been the case. With America taking no direct action to get Israel to withdraw, and with Russia strongly demanding withdrawal, the Arabs were drawn towards Russia. Instead of taking offence at the heavy loss of equipment, Russia rushed in with repair parts and replacements, and placed a sizeable naval fleet in the Mediterranean, with units stationed in strategic Arab ports. Thus, Arab-Israeli conflict now is not only a contest between these two opponents, but involves the United States and the Soviet Union being drawn to opposing sides, as never before. This, of course, does not mean that either major power wants war – their action last June confirms the fact that they do not. However, the conflict with which they are associated has three times led to war and there is every reason to fear it will do so again, if no preventive measures are devised.

As one then contemplates the complex of divergent and deadlocked factors and forces that have for so long blocked a solution, one fact stands out above all others; that the key to a solution is to find a way to make Israel fit into the region, rather than to persist in the discredited policy of trying to force the Arab people to accept a State that does not fit.

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As a basis for considering how Israel can best be fitted into the Middle East, the setting forth of certain guide-lines seems in order. The policy adopted must hold forth real promise of bringing an end to conflict, which means that it must be both equitable and possible of implementation; it must bring justice to the Arab people for the grave wrongs that they have endured that Israel might exist, and protect their rights and their way of life for the future; and it must protect the people in Israel against wrongful acts and persecution and, in so far as possible, preserve for them their traditional way of life. Also, it is imperative that the welfare of people be put above that of institutions and States when the two are in conflict. As a general guide, past United Nations resolutions should prove helpful, since their weakness has never been their content but their lack of implementation. Furthermore, the members of the United Nations have already reached agreement on them.

For the purpose of analysis, it is useful to divide the task of fitting Israel to her environment into two basic phases; adapting her to the appropriate role of a State in the region, and rectifying wrongs and injustices – both those already committed and any that might arise as necessary future adjustments take place.

Turning first to the question of adapting Israel as a State in the Middle East, we have already identified this task as one of dealing with those unique attributes of Israel, arising out of her Zionist mission, which have been and are offensive and harmful to the native people of the Middle East. Search for the source of these attributes leads one quickly to the very heart of the

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Zionist philosophy, that together the Jews of the world constitute a Jewish People Nationality. It is from this premise that has emerged the drive for a Jewish State and the insistence that all Jews, regardless of where they live, should be a part of that State. As we have seen, the Balfour Declaration, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, the creation of Israel and the decision, after Israel came into existence, to retain the World Zionist Organization and merge it with Israel into a super-national government entity, all have had their origins in the concept that the Jews of the world constitute a Jewish People Nationality. Moreover, it is in fulfilling this concept that Israel and the Zionists (and those that have supported them) have brought injury to the Arab people, and so antagonized them that conflict has become unending.

The crux of the matter is that to end conflict in the Middle East Israel must be made to function as a conventional State – one whose first concern is for the welfare of the people who belong within it; and whose second concern is for those within the region of which its territory is a part. In brief, Israel must become an integral part of the Middle East. Particularly this will mean that the Zionist principles which have motivated Israel to acts that provoke conflict must be modified, and that her role as hub and centre of the Israel-Zionist condominium must be curbed, if not eliminated. In addition, it will mean that past wrongs committed against the Arab people must be rectified. As these things take place, the incentive for an arms race will disappear, bringing peace to the Middle East.

But today Israel, herself, is powerless to give up or greatly modify her mission – the Zionist forces that created her having ‘locked her on course’, their course. Furthermore, the leaders of Israel do not want to alter her mission, many of them having been Zionist officials before they became Israeli leaders. Hence, any initiative that is to challenge and decisively alter Israel’s Zionist mission must come from outside the condominium.

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The Arab States, of course, constitute an outside force that not only has a will to end Israel's Zionist mission but has been attempting to do so for two decades. Their approach has been to deal with Zionist aggressiveness towards Arab people by ending Israel's status as a State. In considering this policy one needs to bear in mind that the Arab people see Israel as the agent of Zionist nationalism, which has done them injury, and for this reason they want the State eliminated. But Arab insistence on eliminating Israel does not mean that Arab people would be hostile to Jews as individuals, or to Judaism as a religion, if these were to exist in the Middle East in the political context of a conventional state. The history of the Arab people, as well as statements by some of their responsible leaders, bears evidence to the contrary. However, the Western nations, led by Britain and America, have given the Arabs little choice but to oppose Israel's very existence as a means of ending the excesses of Zionist nationalism. For it was they who supported Zionist aims for fifty years before Israel ever came into being and by so doing made the State of Israel possible; and it was they who, after her creation, supported Israel, even when she began functioning as the centre of the condominium and in a manner that was reducing half of the Palestine Arab population to a status of exiled refugees. Western supporters of Israel have never seriously tried to limit her functions to those of a conventional State as a means of avoiding conflict. Thus, they have become to an ever greater extent responsible for Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, it has been the supporters of Israel who all along have held the real key to peace in the Middle East but have never used it. This key has existed in their ability to refuse to sustain her in her Zionist role, particularly in actions that were harmful to the indigenous population. Ironically, had Israel's hostility-provoking attributes been curbed and had she been forced to perform the role of a conventional State, this would have gone far towards what the

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Arabs have had in mind when they speak of eliminating Israel as a State. Nor would such action have deprived the Jewish people of the fundamental rights that should be the common heritage of all people. Significantly, it would have given them peace – something they can never know as long as Israel, as at present, attempts to function as the hub and centre of a super-national condominium. Ironically, this right to live in peace will now come to Israel and her people only as she restores to the Arabs of Palestine and adjacent occupied areas the basic human rights that are inherently theirs as human beings and which she, herself, has taken from them by force.

The supporters of Israel, by upholding her despite her wrongful acts against the Palestine Arabs, have, in effect, contributed more to conflict than to peace and in so doing have largely forfeited their potential as mediators.

It is not surprising, in these circumstances, that the Communist nations, in their confrontation with the West, would find it advantageous to move more and more to the Arab side, and that the Arabs would seek greater help from the Soviet Union and her allies. The Communists not only gain political and economic advantage, but they can, with some merit, even justify their actions on the moral grounds of rectifying past wrongs. Be this as it may, the strong Western support of Israel and the increasing Communist support of the Arab States has had the effect of arraying the two great powers on opposite sides to an increasing degree. This trend towards bipolarization has, in turn, rendered the United Nations more impotent than ever in dealing with the problem. By the same token, these developments now make more urgent than ever the need for a prompt solution to Arab-Israeli conflict as a means of heading off a major war, even a global war with the possible use of nuclear weapons.

Thus it is the nations that support Israel that still hold the key to peace, for it is they who can most influence her behaviour

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by means short of war. Their potential influence is great, for Israel's very existence still depends on their support, and will do so for the foreseeable future. These nations can exercise their influence by making future support contingent on Israel's performance of prescribed actions, designed to end conflict.

Initiative leading to this end can best be taken by the United States, by long odds the country on whose support Israel's existence is most dependent.

A starting point for the United States, in this undertaking, would be for her to clarify her own position with regard to the concept of the Jewish People Nationality, with its many implications regarding dual loyalty, dual citizenship, the immunity from income-tax of money raised for Israel in America, the use of such funds to finance the political activities of the Israel-Zionist condominium, and the far-reaching effectiveness of the condominium in influencing American foreign policy and in conditioning public opinion through communications media, including the American press, television, radio and movies.

Having carefully reconsidered her own policy, a logical next step for America would be the holding of exploratory talks with the Soviet Union, the Arab States and Israel. Of these, the talks with Arab representatives would be of prime importance, for it is into an Arab world that Israel has to be made to fit. One should even expect co-operation from the Arab people, if and when they become convinced that the new quest for a solution to conflict was *bona fide* and would deal with the objectionable attributes of Zionism and undertake to make restitution for wrongs committed under its influence. This convincing of the Arabs as to the genuineness of the new approach may not be easy, in view of decades of mistrust and disappointment on their part; but it is so fundamental to progress towards peace that patience and perseverance must be exercised until it is attained. In regard to Israel, one must

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accept the fact that her agreement to this approach is most unlikely, at least in the planning stage, since the idea of de-Zionizing the 'Jewish State' will run counter to the concept on which she was founded. In the end, one must even be prepared to impose corrective measures on Israel against her will.

It is possible that Russia, who has made it quite clear that she does not want a major war, would even co-operate in, or at least go along with, a well-defined effort led by the United States to convert Israel into a conventional-type State, as long as this had Arab support, or acquiescence, and did not run counter to vital Soviet interests; conditions which it should not be impossible for America to meet. America, also, should logically be able to count on broad world support as long as the objective was clearly one of curbing the excesses of Zionist nationalism and not an attack on Jews as people, or on Judaism as a religion. In this respect, it is imperative that the world understand that the one hope for ending Arab-Israeli conflict quickly and without war is for many nations to align themselves behind an American initiative to cause Israel, even force her if necessary, to divest herself of the Zionist attributes that cause conflict, and to make appropriate restitution.

At the point of implementation, the major powers, hopefully working through the United Nations, must assume the responsibility for seeing that measures imposed on Israel are equitable and just and in the interest of peace. One can at least hope that as the new approach would get underway the United Nations could play an active and increasingly constructive role. This should be feasible, particularly if the two major powers are in basic agreement.

Admittedly, it will not be easy for America to play the role here outlined for her. For she will need to act against the strong opposition of the formidable Zionist mechanism she has permitted to build up within her borders - one that today can

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rally not only strong Jewish support for Israel, but Gentile support as well. Moreover, American public opinion today is not conditioned for this role, particularly since the war of June, 1967. However, even this can change, and no doubt will in time, as more and more people come to realize the cause-and-effect relationship that exists between Israel's super-national responsibilities and her conflict with the Arab people. Israel's propensity for enlarging her responsibilities through such acts as annexing the Old City of Jerusalem, occupying captured territory and assuming a 'host government' role over the refugees, may serve to attract world attention more quickly to this relationship and its inherent threat to peace than would otherwise be the case.

The support given to President Eisenhower by the American public in 1956, when, resisting strong Zionist pressures, he forced Israel to retreat from captured territory, indicates that the White House actually can exercise considerable latitude in setting national policy in regard to Israel, as long as it is made clear that America is dealing with the excesses of Zionist nationalism, and doing so in the best interest of all peoples; including World Jewry.¹ Also, American leadership could probably count on a gradual build-up of highly valuable backing from Jews who do not support Zionism. This would include both anti-Zionist Jews, such as the members of the American Council for Judaism, and those who may become disillusioned with a Zionist-dominated Israel which has shown by its record that it has a strong propensity for engendering conflict through acts of injustice committed against the native Arab population.

The adjustments inherent in adapting Israel to the Middle East would be greatly facilitated if they could take place within

¹ President Eisenhower carried New York State by a larger margin in 1956 than in 1952, despite his initiative in forcing Israel to withdraw to within her former boundaries.

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a climate of accelerated general economic development for the region as a whole. Also important would be the sequence in which the respective phases of adjustment are introduced and the timing of each.

We turn now to the question of redressing past wrongs and injustices, keeping in mind that as Israel is made to adjust to the role of a conventional State, new questions of compensation would be apt to arise, as individuals adjust to the change. From the outset, all parties would need to realize that the task of rectifying past mistakes and injustices, and adapting to a changing future, is a momentous undertaking – one that cannot mean putting the clock back by twenty years. Too many of the changes that have taken place, including births and deaths, are irreversible. The goal, therefore, would have to be that of doing justice in so far as possible to people as individuals and as groups – all persons who have been or will be adversely affected, including both the refugee Arabs and the Jews in Israel. In this connection, one must also take into account the fact that half the Jews now in Israel, as well as half of the Palestine Arab refugees, have been born since 1948. It is the leaders of the World Zionist Movement, the leaders of Israel, and the responsible persons in countries that have supported them, that must be held accountable for mistakes and injustices, and not the generation of Arabs and Jews born there since 1948; nor, for that matter, the destitute Jewish immigrants who actually had no place to go but Palestine to escape persecution. This, of course, refers to those persons as groups and does not mean that individuals, from among them, may not have assumed responsibility for such acts.

No better principle for redressing past wrongs and injustices can be found than that offered by the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, and incorporated in General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, calling for repatriation of, or compensation for, the refugees (see

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Chapter 5). Eligibility should include not only UNRWA refugees, but persons who lost their means of livelihood but not their homes (frontier villagers, Gaza poor, and displaced Bedouin families), and even those who have been self-supporting. Compensation, in the case of *bona fide* claims, should include appropriate adjustments for changes in value and for lost earnings, and should be available to all claimants, both rich and poor. In regard to repatriation, it would be imperative that the boundaries of Israel be opened to permit entry of any or all Palestine Arabs who have been exiled from their homes in Israel and now choose to return and live in their native communities. This should be their right under law. Even so, individuals could not expect to go back and immediately claim and reoccupy their former dwellings, on demand, if they still existed, without first appropriately proceeding through a properly constituted process of law. However, by the same token such a recourse would have to exist and work judiciously and expeditiously, and be accessible to all persons with *bona fide* grievances. Where claims cannot be met in full, adequate compensation should be provided. The task of rectifying past mistakes and injustices would also be facilitated if it could take place within the context of a comprehensive policy and programme of development for the whole Middle East.

A special programme may need to be considered for assisting Jewish families who might want to move from Israel and live elsewhere; each family being assisted to make the adjustment of its choice. Once the old causes of conflict are eliminated, Jews choosing to live in an Arab-dominated Middle East should expect to do so without serious difficulty; it being easier, perhaps, for those who had a Middle East background to continue to live there than to go elsewhere. Fortunately, the Arab people continue to distinguish between Judaism and Zionism, and Jews and Zionists. Judaism and Jews they accept and respect, whereas Zionism and Zionists they reject, and

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Israel they equate with Zionism. This fact can provide an important base on which to build understanding between the two peoples in the future, once injustices have been rectified. Much of the cost of adjustment and rectification should and must be borne by the international community – particularly by the nations which have supported Israel. The aggregate financial requirements, counting assistance for general development as well as the cost of repatriation, rehabilitation, adjustment and indemnities would, no doubt, run into tens of thousands of millions of dollars.

A vital question, and one which will evoke much emotion, will be that of the future status and government of the area that is now Israel. Somehow, the basic rights of the Palestine Arabs must be restored and in a manner that no longer leaves them scattered against their will throughout the Arab world and beyond. They must again have a homeland – the people of Israel should understand this need even better than other people. Whatever form of government may emerge, it must recognize the claim of Palestine Arabs to full citizenship in the area that was Palestine, and on a basis that provides for self-rule – probably in an Arab-Jewish State. For centuries, Arabs and Jews have lived peacefully side by side, not only in Palestine itself but in many other parts of the Arab world; and there has always been in Israel a nucleus of people keenly alive to the need for Arab-Jewish co-operation and for just treatment of Palestinian Arabs. Despite the fifty-year record of conflict over Palestine, therefore, the two peoples should be able to arrive at a workable understanding, once the force of Zionist nationalism has been eliminated from the region. At that point, not only should exiled refugees be able to return to their native communities in Palestine, but Jews should expect to have access to travel and to do business in Arab countries.

No group of people anywhere has as great an interest in ending conflict between the Arab States and Israel as World

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Jewry – even if this means sharply curbing Israel's Zionist attributes and stripping the World Zionist Movement of much, if not all, of its super-national influence and power. For unless these things are done, it will be World Jewry whom the world will in all probability ultimately hold responsible for Zionist mistakes in Palestine.

As one looks ahead, the prospect of immediate peace in the Middle East is only as bright as the prospect that the United States will act promptly and decisively to bring about a de-Zionization of Israel. In the event that she does not do so, the best that one can hope for will be a prolonged period without a major war, during which time the forces that will shape the future will bring adjustment towards peace. In that case, one might still expect that a de-Zionization of Israel would become the eventual basis for peace. The point is that the conflict would become an endurance contest which Israel could never hope to win as long as she is Zionist-dominated – such domination being the very factor that engenders and perpetuates Arab hatred on a scale that renders the whole Arab world antagonistic. With Arab opposition thus perpetuated, Israel, with her 2.5 million Jews arrayed against 100 million Arabs, cannot expect to achieve peace on her terms by the use of force. In such a contest, the world, and in time probably even the people of Israel, would come to see Zionism as the cause of conflict, and as this took place the external support, on which a Zionist Israel must depend, would wane. Israel, then unable to sustain her Zionist role in an Arab-dominated Middle East, would by force of circumstance gradually become a conventional-type State, and as this took place peace would come to the Middle East.

One other possibility exists, that the endurance contest would be cut short by a further war in which the Arabs would decisively defeat Israel – a possibility that remains ever latent by virtue of the inherent military advantages which the Arabs

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possess. In such an event, also, peace would follow the disappearance of Zionist irritants from the Middle East. If this should happen, one would hope that the price paid in terms of human lives and suffering would not be great.

Even though the United States may not immediately exercise its latent capacity to initiate steps that can end conflict without war, she may still be stirred to do so before an arms race plunges the region into war on a devastating scale. In fact, an ominous threat of war on a massive scale, and a rising anxiety over the Soviet Union's expanding involvement in the Middle East, may yet prove to be the stimuli that finally motivate America to take the initiative to de-Zionize Israel, despite formidable Zionist opposition.

In any event, peace will eventually come to the Middle East as the Zionist-based cause of conflict is eliminated, either by peaceful means or by war. It would seem that there is still time to prevent a major war from being sparked by Arab-Israeli conflict, provided the nations on whose support Israel's existence depends take quick and decisive measures to remove the Zionist-implanted irritants that cause conflict. In this, heavy responsibility rests on the United States, since it is she who must take the initiative to resolve conflict by means other than war.

Postscript

It is clearer today than ever that Israel, as now constituted, is a state that does not fit into the Middle East and that in its present form it cannot exist there permanently. Israel's fundamental weakness is that the intensely nationalistic Zionist leadership that has dominated the country since its creation, and still dominates it, is steering it on a course of unending hostility. This is so because Zionist leadership in order to make Israel a Jewish state for Jewish people has had to seize Arab land by force, hold it by force, by force expel a native Arab population and then settle this "cleared land" with Jewish immigrants recruited on a global basis. In harsh but accurate terms Israel by applying the "Law of Return" to immigrating Jewish people and denying equivalent rights to the expelled and exiled native Arab population is becoming more and more a state based on apartheid principles which the Arab people characterize as racist in their application to the native Arab population.

Israel's policy of refusing to permit the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes—a policy now rigidly adhered to for more than twenty-five years—does not rise primarily from a fear that they would be "fifth columnists" with intent to destroy the state from within. More basic is the fact that a Jewish state exists for Jews and for no one else. Hence, Arabs in larger numbers are not wanted; they do not fit into the exclusive Zionist master plan. Israel will not have them.

Another point that is emerging with clarity: the Palestinian Arabs are becoming a cohesive people who now demand a

homeland of their own and a voice in future peace negotiations that affect them. They are increasingly aroused by the fact that the circumstances which surrounded the creation of Israel have bereft them of their country. Today there are more than three million Palestinian Arabs in the world—a number equal, at least, to the number of Jews now in Israel. These three million Palestinians are all living as exiles in someone else's country, or as subjects under Israeli occupation, or as disadvantaged citizens of Israel.

The common denominator of statelessness, humiliation, and repression that now overshadows the Palestinian Arabs is uniting them in a movement, the most visible aspect of which is a liberation crusade that includes commando units. Palestinian passion for "liberation" and for identity and statehood has mounted rapidly since June 1967, and has now intensified to the degree that this generation is willing to sacrifice even life itself in order that the Palestinian people may have a future with status and dignity.

There can be little doubt that time will be with the Arabs and not with Israel. Any remote possibility that an exclusivist Jewish state might have endured in Palestine came to an end when Israel decided in June 1967 to occupy and govern the land she had conquered by force. This, more than any other factor, awakened the Palestinian Arabs and caused them to create a liberation movement. It also motivated the people of Syria and the Arab Republic of Egypt to work with the Palestinian liberators, since now they, too, have become victims of Israeli aggression and land occupation. Moreover, increasing unity has emerged in the entire Arab world, with its population of more than one hundred million in contrast to Israel's three and a half million. The oil-producing states have decided to use their resources and bargaining power to back the "Arab Cause." Finally, the moral support of most of the

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world, other than the United States, has gravitated toward the Arab side, as evidenced by decision after decision at the United Nations in recent years.

American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has been terribly wrong morally, diplomatically, and in terms of human rights and justice. American policy makers can not justify, now or to posterity, the act of risking Great Power confrontation and global devastation to preserve in the Middle East a state that was imposed on a region against the wishes of the native population and that violated the basic human and legal rights of that population. It was wrong from the beginning to attempt to end the persecution of Jews in the Western world in a manner that could only inflict persecution upon the Arabs of Palestine. It is still wrong.

In addition to pointing up the conclusions stated above, the fighting in 1973 dispelled numerous myths which much of the world, the Western world in particular, had come to accept—myths which heretofore had contributed to wishful thinking and spurious conclusions. To be specific, the October war dispelled the myths that Israel was invincible, that Arabs would not fight, that Arabs were incapable of effectively using sophisticated military equipment, and that Arab states could not plan and work together, even in time of an emergency. It demonstrated that the two Great Powers could no longer polarize the Middle East without running the grave danger of direct major power confrontation on a scale that could escalate into nuclear warfare. The rapid exhaustion of arms and munitions by both Israeli and Arab forces during the October war and the resulting, unprecedented airlift of war supplies and equipment by both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. revealed to the world how Great Power confrontation could take place, and how helpless the Great Powers themselves might be in stopping it once it had moved to an

advanced stage. The frightening build-up towards Great Power confrontation in October 1973 led the USA and the USSR to unite behind a cease-fire effort that became a reality in less than seventy-two hours.

As a result, the state was set for a peace effort of greater intensity than before. The leadership role for this effort fell to the United States by virtue of the fact that both the Arab states and Israel preferred the United States to the Soviet Union. But United States leadership at this point could not bring itself to press toward a truly even-handed policy, since to do so would have reduced its support of Israel at a time when Israel had no other significant power to turn to. Most of all, the United States out of deference to Israel sought to avoid, or at least delay, consideration of the crucial issue of justice for the Palestinian Arabs.

The United States then embarked upon a “step by step” peace effort under the leadership of the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger. This brought forth limited adjustments on both the Sinai and Golan Heights fronts, leading to the opening of the Suez Canal and the return of oil wells to Egypt. This was done at the price of costly concessions by the United States to Israel on a bilateral basis—concessions having to do with military aid, economic aid, security assurances, and commitments to confer unilaterally with Israel in advance on important matters. Little was accomplished to further peace in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the area most vital to the Palestinian Arabs.

Meanwhile, with the help of certain Arab and non-aligned states, the Palestinians became active at the United Nations in an effort to forestall the “step by step” approach and to force peace negotiations on a broader scale, including consideration of the Palestinian issue. Largely as a result of this effort the General Assembly adopted resolutions pro-

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claiming the right of the Palestinian Arabs to be at the peace table and declaring that the philosophy of Zionism, when translated into *political action*, is a form of racism. In early December 1975 the Security Council invited representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which the Arab states had designated as the official spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs, to participate in a special session convened to consider a massive attack launched by Israel into Lebanon. Also Arab leadership got approval of PLO participation at a special session of the Security Council, scheduled for early 1976, at which a general discussion of the Middle East conflict would take place.

Israel's attitude towards these actions was one of scorn and defiance. In general the United States supported Israel, but not to the point of refusing to participate in conferences that included the PLO. Thus the "step by step" approach, including shuttle diplomacy, was found to be inadequate to the task of bringing peace to the Middle East because it failed to come to grips with the thorny problem of justice to the Palestinian Arabs.

Since 1967 the American position regarding the Middle East conflict has been based on Security Council Resolution 242, passed in November 1967. This was true of the Rogers peace effort, and it is true of the Kissinger peace effort. This resolution calls on all Middle East states to recognize the right of each state there to exist, and to recognize the rights of all parties to use the public waterways; it asks all states to work for peace; it requires that Israel withdraw from territories occupied in 1967; it calls for just settlement of the Palestine refugee problem, and it calls for the placing of international security forces at the re-established 1967 borders.

The two most difficult provisions of Resolution 242 to

implement are those that require Israel's withdrawal from occupied territory and the just settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. The Israeli government has been adamant in its refusal to withdraw. The United Nations has been ineffective in forcing her to do so; and the United States, which could force Israel to do so, has taken no direct measures. As a matter of fact Israel has established some fifty-five new settlements for Jews within the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967—American financial support of Israel having made this possible.

The United States is the one and only country that can bring sufficient pressure on Israel to make her withdraw. President Eisenhower with support from the USSR successfully forced Israel to withdraw to former borders when she with Britain and France invaded the Sinai in 1956, but no President since then has had the courage or disposition to do likewise. In fact, since 1967, in defiance of our stated policy requiring Israel's withdrawal, the United States has consistently reinforced Israeli occupation by providing enough arms and economic support to sustain her on those same captured lands. Now, if Israel is to be made to withdraw, the United States must begin at once to condition all future military and economic assistance to Israel on her fulfillment of terms set forth in Security Council Resolution 242. America must firmly adhere to this policy until Israel complies.

The terms of reference regarding justice for the Palestine refugees as set forth in Security Council Resolution 242 are inadequate in that justice for the individual refugees now needs to be approached in terms of justice for the Palestinian Arabs as a people. This is necessary so that proper consideration may be given to their aspirations for a state of their own, as well as to restoration of basic human and civil rights and the adjudication of property claims and rights.

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
Palestinian leadership has sought a solution that would unite the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel into a single secular state in which Jews, Christians, Moslems, and other groups living there would be equal.

A strong case can be made for this proposal on grounds of logic and justice. But presently much of the world, particularly the Western World, is not prepared to grant this; the United States in particular is not prepared to take this step. If the Palestinians insist on a state established only on these terms as the sole solution, it is apt to be a long time in coming.

On the other hand, a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip probably is not beyond the realm of peaceful accomplishment in a much shorter time. This might be supplemented by peace terms that appropriately provide for repatriation of refugees on a phased basis and for just compensation for properties not repossessed. In fairness, these measures should apply to all displaced Palestinian Arabs without regard to their present economic status or residence.

It is my conviction that if the Palestinian Arabs were to accept, for the present, a state consisting of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the evolutionary forces that will shape the future of the Middle East will make of the whole a secular state that would provide equality for persons of all creeds, beliefs, and ethnic backgrounds. Israel, as an increasingly isolated Jewish state, cannot hope to be viable indefinitely unless she identifies with a Middle East that is ninety-seven percent non-Jewish. The history of Palestine gives reason for optimism that Jews and Arabs can again live in peace together, once the apartheid practices that have emerged in Israel are brought to an end.

Peace in the Middle East is a matter of urgency. For if all



Palestine Refugee children in Arroub camp: West Bank of Jordan, 1973
UNRWA Photo by Sue Herrick Cranmer

Marka emergency camp for Palestine refugees, East Jordan, 1972

UNRWA photo



Dheisheh Camp, Bethlehem, 1974

UNRWA Photo by Sue Herrick Cranmer

Askar camp, West Bank of Jordan, 1974

UNRWA photo by George Nehmeh

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peace efforts fail, the Middle East can be expected to move progressively towards war. War as an arbiter is terrifying, for to resolve the conflict that war must end either in regional devastation or in the defeat of Israel by Arab forces. This is not idle speculation, since Israel is not capable, now or ever, of defeating the whole Arab people—one hundred million of them—on a scale that will force them to accept peace on her terms.

The fast-moving events of October 1973 show how the Great Powers can become involved in confrontation. The danger is that suddenly the struggle will cease to be a contest between the Israelis and Arabs and become one between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Great Powers do not control the day-to-day actions of either the Arabs or the Israelis, and if one combatant shows signs of being overpowered, the power most concerned may intervene, thus causing the other power to take countermeasures.

America's propensity to over-arm Israel constitutes a wrong approach because this does nothing to resolve the basic cause of conflict. Rather, it gives Israel false confidence that she can have peace and security without reckoning with the Palestinian issue. Moreover, for the United States to assure Israel of countervailing arms without reference to the injustice that has been committed against the Palestinian Arabs and without reference to their rising aspirations for a state of their own runs counter to the basic principles on which the American Republic itself was founded.

Looking to the future, fortunately a formula for peace exists—one that holds forth considerable promise and one in which America can take the initiative better than any other country. The basis for this initiative is Security Council Resolution 242.

The world is fortunate that this resolution exists. It is a remarkable document; it was formulated by and has been

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adopted by the countries of the world; it has the support of the Great Powers, it has the support in principle of Israel and most Arab state; and, most important, it is a workable document and has within it qualities of equity and justice. Security Council Resolution 242, like many major documents, is expressed in generalities, a characteristic that helped materially in rallying support for its adoption in November 1967. It is on these indefinite subjects, among others, that negotiation and bargaining should center at the peace table.

In order for America to assume the role of leadership in this setting, she must promptly recognize the Palestine Arabs as a people and pledge to work towards justice in their behalf. Recognition of the Palestinian Arabs does not mean that the United States must abandon Israel. However, support of Israel must be aligned with an Israel that is prepared to redress wrongs committed by her against the indigenous Arab people.

Once the United States appropriately recognizes the existence and rights of the Palestinian Arabs, and assuming she can then work out a satisfactory understanding with the USSR, the next basic step will be to work out an adequate international security arrangement for the total length of the border, as re-established along the boundaries of pre-June 1967. This security must be adequate, dependable, impartial, and committed to exist for as long as necessary, and not subject to change except on action taken by the Security Council. Security that is adequate will provide protection for both the Arabs and Israelis and should enable both sides to get on with economic development.

The next step will be the withdrawal of Israeli forces and citizens from the occupied areas into the boundaries of Israel, pre-June 1967. For Israel to move in this direction will force her to deviate from established Zionist policy, and one can

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expect resistance, even bloodshed, as irreconcilable factions within the state oppose such a move.

Hence, action with a firm hand will be essential on the part of the Great Powers, backed by the world community of nations; for without this, war may again break out on an ominous scale.

Finally, once Israel has withdrawn from occupied areas, it is imperative that funds for development be made available to both sides on a generous scale. The scope of this development must be comprehensive, filling in the infrastructure where necessary, training the labor force for new work opportunities, giving support to prospective entrepreneurs, and providing suitable education both for the oncoming generation and for adults who need further training. The development policy must be well planned to effect a balanced productivity and realistically set a priority on enterprises having a comparative advantage. Above all, the policy must generate jobs rapidly, particularly at the beginning when the greatest problem will be to combat mass unemployment and, in the case of the new state, to transfer persons from dependent refugee status to the working force. A fast-developing economy will stabilize the new Palestinian state, and reestablish it among other states in the region.

These, in my judgement, are the steps to be taken in the Middle East if Security Council Resolution 242 is used as the basis for peace.

There will, of course, be many problems to be resolved as the peace effort settles down. But peace will permit attention to be focused on such problems in a way that has been impossible during the past when preparation for war took top priority. If such a peace effort succeeds without war, the exclusivist aspects of a Zionist-dominated Israel will gradually erode and ultimately disappear, as Israel to survive is forced

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to identify economically, politically, and socially with a Middle East that is ninety-seven percent non-Jewish.

If America hesitates for too long in recognizing the Palestinian Arabs as a people and in taking positive steps of leadership within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242, another war will become inevitable. The nature of this war—who strikes first or whether it starts in a blitz as in 1967—is hard to foresee. But one thing seems certain; it will be bloody and produce many civilian casualties on both sides, as rockets and other new means of mass destruction are put into use. Moreover, such a war if confined to conflict between Arabs and Israelis will be no more conducive to peace than were those of the past.

If another war does start, the Great Powers, who for years have been feeding war with armaments, must assume responsibility that it does not escalate into a threat to mankind, either on a regional or global scale. To prevent this they might act together to impose a cease-fire, as in 1973, to be followed quickly by an imposed peace, based on Security Council Resolution 242. Justification for this would be that the Israel-Arab conflict had become too dangerous to tolerate any longer; therefore it must be brought to an end even if the only feasible means is *via* an imposed peace. In fact, peace imposed with close adherence to the principles of Security Council Resolution 242 need not differ significantly from that envisioned above by means of an American initiative. Even if under an imposed peace Israel still remains an exclusivist Zionist state, behind the borders of pre-June 1967, the apartheid principles of exclusiveness will erode and ultimately disappear, for reasons already explained.

Israeli and Zionist spokesmen have often contended that America needed a strong Israel in the Middle East as a bulwark against Communism. The record does not support this

viewpoint. The Arab people have a strong cultural, religious, and political aversion to Communism; this has been demonstrated consistently and strongly underscored by Egyptian policy since 1970. The fact is that it is the presence in the Middle East of an exclusivist, Zionist-dominated Israel that has made possible most of the Soviet penetration into the Arab Middle East that has occurred as Arab states have reluctantly turned to the USSR for military and financial support to counteract the strong support that the United States was giving Israel. In my judgement, no single step would do more to close the door to Communist penetration of the Middle East than for America to recognize the existence of the Palestinian Arabs as a people and to pledge her support of justice in their behalf.

In evaluating approaches to peace in the Middle East, one must consider whether leadership in America can be expected to act in decisive opposition to the Zionist-Israeli lobby. The record of the past twenty-seven years is far from encouraging on this point. Much, of course, will depend on the man in the White House at a given time and on the trend in American public sentiment *vis-a-vis* Israel during the months ahead. However, if American leadership does not recognize the Palestinian Arabs as a people and does not take an initiative for peace in time to forestall another war, then an imposed peace may prove to be the only road to peace in the Middle East. An advantage of the imposed peace route is that public fear and passion in a moment of crisis may give leaders the courage to take measures at that time which they would not take in more tranquil times.

There is the danger that the Great Powers may fail to work together at the point of crisis, with the result that they will miss the opportunity to impose either a cease-fire or peace. The best assurance against this happening is that their

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people, too, will suffer heavily in the catastrophe which would follow confrontation between the Great Power. Thus one is driven to conclude that it is imperative that the Great Powers now work in harmony in the Middle East while there still is time. Today, America in particular carries a heavy responsibility in this respect.

What is to happen to the Jews living in Israel? Their fate will depend in large measures on the politics pursued in the future by Israel and international Zionism, particularly Zionist organizations in the United States. Specifically, it will depend on whether the policies of Israel continue to be dominated by political Zionism, as at present, or by the teachings and principles of Judaism. We have already seen that the exclusivist principles of political Zionism do not lead to peace and never will. If the people of Israel want peace, they can find it in a wise application of the teaching and principles of Judaism. Moreover, America can help the people of Israel most by helping them to pursue such a course.

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