between the expectations in some Jewish and Christian documents of a heavenly Jerusalem and the hope of a rebuilt earthly city. In both Jewish and early Christian writings, this hope of renewal was understood in a variety of ways, ranging from the faithful being taken up to heaven to the heavenly city coming down to earth. In his discussion of this topic, Wilken might have taken into account more fully the importance of the Platonic contrast between the temporal and the ideal, which is evident in the Letter to the Hebrews (p. 53) and in the thought world of Origen (chap. 4), in contrast to the apocalyptic world view of earthly renewal. But this is a minor criticism of a fascinating study that is important for understanding both Christian history and current sociopolitical issues, and that sheds new light on the historical antecedents of the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

HOWARD CLARK KEE
University of Pennsylvania

NUR MASALHA. *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought 1882–1948*. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies. 1992. Pp. iii, 235. Cloth $24.95, paper $11.95.

The idea that the Arab population of Palestine, and later Israel, would somehow disappear, leaving the country populated only by Jews, has been an enduring hope for an important component of the Zionist movement and for many of the country's Jews, and it still lives today. Nur Masalha traces this idea in his useful review of Zionist writings—mostly of the leadership but also of some of the fringe—and of various proposals put forward to implement it. He claims that "the Zionist concept of 'transfer' . . . has occupied a central position in the strategic thinking of the leadership of the Zionist movement and the Yishuv" (p. 1). This is true, but incomplete, for the history of the idea of "transfer" in Zionist thought and political life can be seen as a continuing tension between the desire to have Palestine/Israel rid of Arabs and the practical inability to bring about this goal.

That desire was never universal; neither was the evaluation that it was impossible to achieve. Opposition among Jews to efforts to remove Arabs from Palestine/Israel was based on both moral and political grounds: such a policy was wrong, because Palestine was a home to two peoples; nor were the Jews strong enough to implement it in the face of anticipated international opposition. Proponents of expulsion or transfer denied the Arab claim to the land and argued that in the last resort the international community would accept whatever "facts" were created on the ground. Most of the leadership of the Zionist movement would have been pleased to awake, and find the country emptied of Arabs, but they also realized that there was no chance of this happening.

This was true, until, of course, the 1948 war. Masalha claims that the general support transfer plans received, "particularly [by] those leaders who were to play decisive roles in 1948 . . . highlight the ideological intent that made the Palestinian refugee exodus in 1948 possible" (p. 165). I think this is correct, although Masalha's emphasis on "transfer plans" is misplaced. Those schemes were themselves the fruit of the more fundamental desire to create a Jewish, not a binational, state in Palestine. The weight of the argument within the *Yishuv* was always overwhelmingly in favor of increasing the number of Jews relative to the number of Arabs, either by raising the former or reducing the latter. War created the opportunity to approach the realization of what had hitherto been only an unlikely hope.

Masalha's main disagreement with recent historians of the 1948–49 Arab flight and expulsion lies in his belief that the expulsion was the result of a conscious, overall policy: "While it is true that military history is full of scorched earth tactics and expulsions to clear the theater of war, it is difficult—in light of the systematic nature of the 'clearing out' operations and the sheer magnitude of the exodus (not to mention the careful efforts to prevent the return of the refugees)—not to see a policy at work" (p. 180). Preventing the refugees' return was clearly the result of conscious policy. Masalha, however, has no more evidence than anyone else that the expulsions were centrally planned and encouraged. The general attitude toward Arabs that developed over the years among Jews in the *Yishuv* encouraged and facilitated the expulsion of Arab villagers during the war, and I do not think any additional explanation is required.

Masalha closes by noting that transfer is "a permissible if not entirely respectable subject of debate" in Israel today, and he rightly argues that it would be dangerous to dismiss it as "the wild ravings of right-wing extremists . . . [since] . . . the concept of transfer lies at the very heart of mainstream Zionism" (pp. 209–10). But it is important to remember that opposition to transfer lies there as well.

CHARLES S. KAMEN
University of Connecticut, Storrs

HENRY NEAR. *The Kibbutz Movement: A History*. Volume 1, *Origins and Growth, 1909–1939*. (The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. xvii, 431.

The kibbutz in Palestine and in Israel has been a continuing experiment in collective economic, political, cultural, and social life for over three-quarters of a century. Small in population size but of disproportionate influence in the formation of the Jewish community of Palestine, the kibbutz remains a fascinating movement for historical analysis. Henry Near's volume, the first of two, examines the historical roots of the kibbutz movement and its develop-

ment from the turn of the twentieth century through the beginning of World War II.

Focusing on the origins of the kibbutz movement during the first two decades of the twentieth century, Near outlines its economic and ideological bases, its expansion and consolidation, the development of the pioneering youth movements as a basis of recruitment, and its organizational structure. The political controversies, economic fluctuations, and the diversities of kibbutz developments are carefully documented, along with its demographic growth, geographic expansion, and ideological and organizational conflicts, in the changing political and economic contexts of Palestine. Each theme is followed over time in this comprehensive history of the kibbutz movement as places, persons, and events surrounding its origins and growth are constructed in detail.

The primary documents that Near uses are those internal to the kibbutz movement, the diaries and reports of the leaders, and contemporary organizational records and journals. There is every reason to accept the precision of the details that the author presents, particularly for those who do not have access to Hebrew sources and histories.

The origins and growth of the kibbutz movement are presented and evaluated primarily from the point of view of the kibbutz members themselves. Missing from this historical account is an analysis of the European intellectual sources of kibbutz ideologies and how other residents of Palestine viewed the kibbutz movement: the Arabs, the orthodox Jews of the old *Yishuv*, and the colonial British. The financial dependency of the kibbutz on the Palestinian Jewish community and on Zionist funds is examined and the reliance on Arab labor and markets is noted, but neither topic is systematically assessed. The implications of these dependencies for developments within the kibbutz, for ideological variations, and for kibbutz institutions are not analyzed. The fascinating kibbutz responses to issues of generational renewal are examined in the context of recruitment through youth movements and Jewish immigrants to Palestine. The importance of those strategies for family structural changes in the kibbutz and for the extension of family networks is not adequately investigated. More surprising is Near's failure to assess changes in gender roles among kibbutz members, as family life and work allocation directly challenged an ideology emphasizing gender equality. Too little attention is paid to the historical literature on family and gender roles in general or in the Jewish community of Palestine and the kibbutz.

Near reflects on some analytic issues in the concluding chapter and correctly identifies the kibbutz movement as an expression of the values of labor Zionism. He is on shakier grounds when he connects the kibbutz to "Jewish" social traditions, the spirit of the small town (Shtetl) of Eastern Europe, or biblical Judaism. Surely the kibbutz movement constructed its ideological views selectively but drew them most directly from the currents of European, not Jewish, thought. Its "successes" and failures cannot be understood without greater attention to the powerful financial and institutional supports the kibbutz movement derived from the Jewish community in Palestine and elsewhere.

CALVIN GOLDSCHEIDER
Brown University

SHLOMO ARONSON. *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960–1991; An Israeli Perspective.* Assisted by ODED BROSH. (SUNY Series in Israeli Studies.) Albany: State University of New York Press. 1992. Pp. xiii, 398.

Israel was the sixth nation to develop nuclear weapons, sometime in the 1960s, and the first to refrain from declaring that fact while nevertheless intimating it, adopting what Shlomo Aronson calls a strategy of "opacity." Why did Israel go that way? What elements of preference or compulsion determined its course? How did opacity serve its security over nearly three decades of relentless hostility with its neighbors? Would a declared nuclear strategy have served it better? Can Israel, or should it, switch strategies in the post–Cold War era? Can it, or should it, maintain a nuclear option in a context of peace? Addressing these questions requires an examination of applicable strategic theory and a close analysis of relevant historical developments in the interacting domestic, regional, and big-power arenas.

Reading this book with something like this agenda in mind, one could extract from it many nuggets of information and insight, but one would also feel the extent to which the book as a whole misses the mark. Aronson addresses those inevitable questions, but he does so in a stream-of-consciousness discourse that often goes astray, rather than through systematic analysis leading to firm conclusions.

Aronson claims to have started with only one preconceived assumption—the terrible importance of nuclear weapons—and otherwise to have followed an "empirical-historical and inductive" approach (p. x). But that one assumption leads him to look for the "nuclear factor" in everything that happened and did not happen, and to blame others for its absence when he could not find it. This distorts the "empirical-historical" inquiry, at times to the point of making a sham of it. For example, Aronson picks every thread to support the view that the nuclear factor was central to all but the first of the wars between Israel and its neighbors: it was behind Israel's attack of Egypt in 1956, Nasser's courting of war in 1967, Sadat's and Assad's attacks and campaign strategies in 1973, and even Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and its handling of the intifada. While doing so, however, he produces no coherent patterns for the entirety of those events and ignores masses of inconsistent and contradictory data.