Democracy and Colonialism[1]

Neve Gordon (bio)

For some time now I have been pondering the closely knit relationship between democracy and colonialism. Notwithstanding the widespread conception among democracy theorists that there is a contradiction between the two,[2] in this paper I contend that colonialism has served as a crucial component in the historical processes through which modern democracies were created and sustained.[3] Focusing on the production of "the people"—namely, those who are acknowledged as citizens and consequently have been granted the right to participate in political decisions—I maintain that colonialism has been deployed by democracy as a force that unifies, limits, and stabilizes the people within the metropole by employing violent forms of exclusion. And yet, unlike other forms of exclusion which have been deemed accidents or aberrations and regarded as symptoms of democracy's evolutionary development,[4] political scientists have often assumed that colonialism is totally alien to democracy and indeed antithetical to the two basic democratic principles: sovereignty of the people and equality.

I, by contrast, follow post-colonial theorists to argue that colonialism is a strategy employed by democracies (and, of course, other regimes) as a way of achieving not only geopolitical and economic goals, but also as a way of accomplishing social and political objectives within the metropole.[5] Colonialism, in other words, also has a strategic role at home and the different forms of power that manifest themselves in the colony can be readily traced back to the democratic metropole. Moreover, the series of exclusions that colonialism produces are, I claim, part of democracy's very logic and can operate in tandem with democracy's basic principles. Insofar as this is the case, the democracy/colonial relationship can teach us something important about democracy for it reveals, using Michael Mann's phrase, one of the dark sides of the so-called best possible regime. It underscores, for example, how democracy's universalist and inclusionary claims are always bound up in colonial exclusionary practices that are implemented through the deployment of violence. My objective in this paper, however, is to further complicate this relationship by suggesting that the colonial practices and mechanisms deployed by democracies to limit and stabilize the people tend to return to haunt the democratic colonizers. Colonialism ends up engendering processes that destabilize the notion of the people and, consequently, produces a double movement that both contracts and extends democracy. What begins as a project of subjugation, may, at times, acquire an unexpected edge of inclusion.

Israel and Colonialism

The peculiar or, more precisely, bewildering relationship between democracy and colonialism is exceptionally urgent for me because I live in Israel. To be

sure, according to the dominant worldview the Jewish state is the only proper democracy in the Middle East. Former President George W. Bush said as much when he appeared before the Israeli Knesset in 2008: “We believe that democracy is the only way to ensure human rights. So we consider it a source of shame that the United Nations routinely passes more human rights resolutions against *the freest democracy in the Middle East* than any other nation in the world.” [6] President Barack Obama made a similar point when he spoke to AIPAC: “Our job is to rebuild the road to real peace and lasting security throughout the region. That effort begins with a clear and strong commitment to the security of Israel, our strongest ally in the region and *its only established democracy*.”[7]

The notion that Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East is informed by the production of “the people” and the formation of the nation. Although one cannot conflate the people with the nation (after all, in Israel 20 percent of the citizens are Palestinians and accordingly not part of the nation), taking the nation into account is also, no doubt, crucial for understanding the connection between democracy and colonialism. Indeed, it is through the demarcation of the people and the careful configuration of the nation that Israel can be at one and the same time both a democracy and a colonizing state.[8]

There are numerous ways to conceptualize Israel’s colonial project depending on one’s historical and political perspective, but here I will discuss only the 1967 occupation and disregard the colonization project that took place before Israel’s establishment and the ethnic cleansing of 1948/49.[9] Israel, which celebrated its sixty-first anniversary last May, has occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem for over forty-two years.[10] Israel’s sovereignty currently extends throughout the area between the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean Sea. Within this region approximately 5.6 million Jews and close to 5.2 million Palestinians currently reside.[11] Out of this population, three and a half million Palestinians and almost half a million Jews live in the areas Israel occupied in 1967 (excluding the Golan Heights), and yet while these two groups live in the same area, they are subjected to totally different legal systems. The Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories are still stateless and lack the most basic human rights. By sharp contrast, all Jews—whether they live in the Occupied Territories or within the pre-67 borders—are citizens of the State of Israel and enjoy basic human rights.[12]

Israel, I maintain, is considered a democracy only because one third of the people residing within the borders it controls are not regarded as part of “the people.” So even if one adopts a foreshortened historical perspective, one that begins in 1967, it is fairly obvious that the so-called “only democracy in the Middle East” is simultaneously a colonizing state. All of which raises the question of the relationship between the colonial presence and the democratic state.[13]

It seems obvious that the democratic colonial project engenders and reinforces the distinction between legitimate national citizens and precarious colonized subjects. It can do so because in democracies "the people" is always an unstable signifier that is periodically redefined through the deployment of mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. Colonialism provides democracy a series of mechanisms which generate a twofold process: colonialism helps produce, demarcate and stabilize the national subject of democracy, while the nation then restricts or almost totally restricts citizenship to those who are deemed legitimate members. Israel's colonial project, in other words, assists the state in molding an otherwise disparate people who immigrated to Israel from numerous countries across the globe over a period of more than one hundred years into one unified national ethnic group (i.e., Jews).[14] This act of molding is dependent on daily practices of exclusion that manifest themselves through the domination of Palestinians as well as on inverse depictions of the self and other; the Jewish self is portrayed as progressive, civilized and civilizing and as having a rich history, while the Palestinian other is depicted as backward, uncivilized and lacking history. The Palestinians are also portrayed as extremely violent and incapable of real democracy.[15]

Because there has always been a sacrosanct relationship between nationality and citizenship, the colonial project then assists in the justification and legitimization of the uneven distribution of citizenship. The national subject receives citizenship automatically and is incorporated as part of the people, while the colonized subject is either totally or partially excluded. Etienne Balibar adds that the "dangerous classes" were allowed access to citizenship only on condition that they transform themselves into constituent parts of "the body" of the nation, and therefore into (real or imaginary) foremen of imperialist domination.[16] In other words, the inclusion of certain groups into the people was contingent on their willingness to participate in the domination of colonized populations. In Israel, some of the most marginalized groups—Mizrahi Jews, new immigrants and Druze—comprise the majority of the people making up the border police brigade, which is responsible for much of the ethnic policing in the Occupied Territories. Scholars have shown that the integration of these groups within the military has facilitated their upward mobility in Israeli society.[17]

The Israeli case helps clarify that the colonial project is not merely the *other* of democracy. On the one hand, Israel's colonial project is deployed to limit and unify the people and in this way helps manage democracy's precarious and unruly elements. On the other hand, Israel's truncated racialized democracy serves to preserve its colonial project since as indicated by the quotes of US leaders, democracy is incessantly utilized to extend, hide and legitimate a colonial regime based on violent domination. Democracy, we see, has deployed colonialism to circumscribe itself (i.e., by demarcating and stabilizing the people); colonialism has needed democracy to produce its legitimization.

The Historical Context

Israel, it is important to note, is a unique case only insofar as the democratic project and the colonial project coexist within a contiguous space.[18] Historically, the two projects have frequently co-existed, but within separate spaces, thus suggesting that space is very important since the non-contiguous spatial relation has helped conceal the intricate democratic colonial connection.[19] Even today one could point to Spain's relation towards Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco and Britain's relation towards Gibraltar. Wendy Brown notes that "liberal democracies in the First World have always required other peoples to pay—politically, socially, and economically—for what these societies have enjoyed, that is, there has always been a colonially and imperially inflected gap between what has been valued in the core and what has been required from the periphery."[20] Alice Conklin adds:

> Any historian in the field of modern European or American history sooner or later must confront one of the fundamental paradoxes of the last century: the acquisition and rule by force of colonies by the most advanced democracies, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Whatever the official claims, Western colonization during this period was in large part an act of state-sanctioned violence. On the crudest level, liberal regimes forcibly 'pacified' native peoples who resisted colonization. On a more subtle level, their rule rested on a set of coercive practices that violated their own democratic values.[21]

One way to clarify the first part of my inquiry is by asking whether Conklin's historical depictions do indeed illustrate a fundamental paradox, as she claims, or whether the colonization projects carried out by these democracies were part of the very exclusionary logic of modern and ancient democracy. We can say, with considerable confidence, that democracies were always invested in violent exclusionary practices deployed to limit and stabilize the people. There is, ironically, not much new about this claim. Discussing citizenship, for example, Balibar mentions the "permanence of a rule of closure ... where fellow citizens and foreigners are clearly distinguished in terms of rights and obligations." He adds that the "move from ancient to modern citizenship is marked by a continuity, that of the principle of exclusion, without which there would be no community and thus no politics...."[22] Hence, exclusion appears to be the condition of possibility of any community. Democratic communities are no exception, which leads me to suggest that exclusion is actually part of the democratic logic and not antithetical to it, and that colonialism is one of its pronounced manifestations.

The Double Movement

The historical relationship between democracy and colonialism raises a series of questions. One cluster of questions which post-colonial theorists have examined focuses on comparative research such as how the exclusionary practices employed within democratic colonial projects differ from other exclusionary practices operating in democracies like exclusions based on race, gender and class. Along similar lines, scholars have asked how democratic colonial

projects (e.g., France and Britain) differ from fascist or authoritarian colonial projects (e.g., Japan and Portugal). Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson show, for example, that:

> settler power and settler privilege coincided most intensely in territories under the authority of liberal or republican metropoles: in such instances—as with the *pieds noirs*, or Southern Rhodesia's secessionist farmers, or indeed the American founding fathers—democratic or republican ideology clearly served *less* as a restraint on the exploitation of indigenous peoples than as an important resource for settlers seeking to enhance their autonomy and privilege. By contrast, while authoritarian or antidemocratic regimes (those of Japan, Germany, and Italy in the 1930s, and of Portugal) often treated indigenous populations with unrivaled brutality (as in Ethiopia or indeed Poland), in some instances that very state authoritarianism could act, paradoxically, to attenuate formal settler power.[23]

In other words, settlers often exploited freedoms and civil rights which were conferred on them as citizens of their democratic state of origin in order to subjugate and oppress the indigenous population in ways that settlers originating from authoritarian regimes could not. The numerous reports dealing with settler violence suggest that this has also been the case in Israel.[24]

Another cluster of questions analyzes the closely knit relationship between democracy and colonialism, and ponders what this relationship teaches us about democracy. At what stage, for example, does a democratic colonial project end up undoing democracy itself, rendering it, as it were, a non-democratic regime? Perhaps more pointedly, does the colonial presence within democracies call upon us to rethink our immediate and—what has become—intuitive perception that democracy is the best possible regime? Finally, a third cluster focuses on how exactly democracy deploys colonialism in order to stabilize and limit the people, what the colonial mechanisms and practices of exclusion aim to achieve, and what their actual effect is. While I cannot address these questions here, I would like to explore, if only very briefly, one aspect of the latter cluster, examining one of the ways democratic colonial projects help shape our conception of the people. My claim is that these projects create a double movement—characterized by contraction and extension—which often yields unruly consequences.

Turning once again to the Israeli case, one finds that many on the political left currently claim that the two-state solution is passé.[25] In other words, the solution whereby Israel withdraws to the pre-1967 borders and a Palestinian state is created in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem cannot be implemented due to Israel's project of settler colonialism that has led to the intricate interweaving of the two people—so much so that they cannot be separated. In Meron Benvenisti words you simply "cannot unscramble that egg."[26]

The claim, then, is that the only possible way to undo Israeli colonialism is through the one-state solution. There are, of course, two very different possibilities for this one-state solution. The one that currently exists is an apartheid regime, which will only become more manifest in the next decade as the Pal-

estinian population becomes a majority within the territory Israel controls. The other is the bi-national democratic state, which entails the full incorporation of all Palestinians into the citizen body (including those from the Diaspora who wish to return), some form of power sharing on the federal level between Palestinians and Jews and the adoption of a parity of esteem – the idea that each side will respect the other side's identity, language, culture, and religion. In the context of our discussion, the bi-national one-state solution constitutes a radical extension of democracy by the dramatic broadening of the conception of the people.

It is unclear how events will unfold or how the situation will develop. One does know, however, that the bi-national one-state solution is gaining considerable grounds, so much so, that the *NYT* recently published an op-ed about it.[27] Furthermore, the bi-national one-state solution has become one of the possible solutions to the conflict only because Israel's colonial project has been so successful; over the past two decades, the Jewish settlers have penetrated so deeply into the Occupied Territories that in order to undo the colonization, Israel might indeed need to incorporate the colonized people.[28] From a different perspective, the official Israeli government line considers the bi-national one-state solution an existential threat because it will destroy the existing conception of the people, and, consequently, may put an end to the current formation and conception of the nation.[29]

All of this is not totally unique, since one can readily draw parallels between the Israeli case and other colonial projects carried out by modern democracies. Fredrick Cooper and Ann Stoler point out that "By the 1940s, the very idea of 'citizenship' was being extended to French subjects and the 'union Française,' not the French nation, was the supreme political entity."[30] The French and British colonial projects, we now know, are not over and done with. The once colonized people often return to haunt these modern democracies, demanding, as it were, to be incorporated into the citizen body and treated as equals. The specter of colonialism comes back to haunt the prevailing national model and by so doing problematizes the notion of what constitutes civilization, history, and citizenship. This, in turn, leads to the double movement I referred to earlier. On the one hand, the demands of the colonized people helps generate a xenophobic and reactionary mobilization that aims to further contract the democratic sphere through a variety of mechanisms whose objective, among other things, is to prolong and sustain the circumscription of the people. On the other hand, colonial democracies sometimes end up, amid great internal resistance mounted by the citizens of old, expanding both the nation and the people and in this way broadening certain democratic and national horizons. If one agrees with Balibar that all societies today are postcolonial, then this double movement likely appears in one form or another in every democracy.[31]

Surely, many questions still need to be addressed concerning the different global forms of post- and neo-colonial projects, and how exactly the specters of colonialism extend democracy as well as what regressive forces they awaken and confront. But I would like to conclude by asking, once again, what the paradox between democracy and colonialism is. Conklin suggests that a "fundamental paradox" is derived from the fact that democracies have colonial projects, whereas I have argued that colonialism is not antithetical to the exclusionary logic that informs all democracies. In my opinion the democracy/colonial paradox emerges not when democracies embark on colonial projects, but when they desire to end them. For while they begin as a form of domination and violent exclusion, colonial projects often return to haunt democracies. And when this occurs, the return and its haunting effects can lead to the expansion of both the people and of freedom.

Neve Gordon
Neve Gordon teaches politics at Ben-Gurion University, Israel. He is the author of *Israel's Occupation*, University of California Press, 2008.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Becky Kook, Catherine Rottenberg, Lynn Schler and Jacinda Swanson for their comments and suggestions.

2. See, for example, Ruby R. Paredes, ed. *Philippine Colonial Democracy*, New Haven: Yale Center for International and Asia Studies, 1988.

3. Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

4. Exclusions have manifested themselves within democracies in several ways such as exclusion of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, class, and, in the United States, past criminal offence.

5. Fredrick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, eds. *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1997.

6. Herb Keinon and Rebecca Anna Stoil, "Bush: Masada Will Never Fall Again," *Jerusalem Post,* May 15, 2008. Italics added. Online at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1210668643136 .

7. Shmuel Rosner, "Obama Supports Israel. Period." *Ha'aretzl,* March 2, 2003. Italics added. Online at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/rosnerBlog.jhtml?itemNo=832667&contrassID=25&subContrassID=0&sbSubContrassID=1&listSrc=Y&art=1 .

8. Oren Yiftachel defines Israel as an ethnocracy, which denotes a non-democratic rule for and by a dominant ethnic group, within the state and beyond its borders. Ethnocracy, more precisely, is a regime in which ethnicity, not territorial citizenship, is the main logic behind resource allocation; state borders and political boundaries are fuzzy: there is no identifiable "demos," mainly due to the role of ethnic diasporas inside the polity and the inferior position of ethnic minorities; a dominant "charter" ethnic group appropriates the state apparatus and determines most public policies; Significant (though partial) civil and political rights are extended to minority members, distinguishing ethnocracies from Herrenvolk or authoritarian

regimes. Israel is not a democracy, in Yiftachel's view, because the dominant ethnic group (Jews) excludes the Palestinians. This exclusion manifests itself in the distribution of space and resources; it can be detected in the exclusion of Palestinians from decision-making processes; and it is apparent in several policies and a number of laws that discriminate against Palestinians due to their ethnicity. I totally agree with Yiftachel's empirical analysis. My disagreement with him arises because his conclusions are based on a comparison between Israel and an ideal type of formal democracy that has never existed and will never exist. In other words, my claim is that democracy can readily incorporate the exclusions Yiftachel describes, while Yiftachel argues that these exclusions render it non-democratic. Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

9. For an analysis of the pre-state colonization project see Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. For the ethnic cleansing during 1948/49 see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

10. As Lisa Hajjar puts it, "For Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza, there is little basis upon which to accord Israeli rule any kind of political or ideological legitimacy because it amounts to a colonial—albeit changing—arrangement in which their collective/national rights are denied and their individual rights are minimal and sorely restricted."Lisa Hajjar, *Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005: 39.

11. Motti Bassok, "Israel at 61: Population stands at 7.4 million, 75.5% Jewish" *Ha'aretz,* April 27, 2009. Toni O'Loughlin, "Census finds Palestinian population up by 30%" The Guardian, February 11, 2008.

12. Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, *Lords of the Land: The Settlers and the State of Israel 1967–2004 (*Israel: Kinneret Zmora-Beitan, Dvir, 2004). In Hebrew. Neve Gordon*, Israel's Occupation*, Berkeley CA: California University Press, 2008.

13. For more on colonial presence see Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.

14. Shlomo Sand, *The Invention of the Jewish People*, London: Verso 2009.

15. M. Neiger, E. Zandberg and I. Abu-Ra'iyeh, "Civil or Ethnic Media? – An Evaluation of the Coverage of the October 2000 Violent Clashes between the Police and Israeli Arab Citizens," Tel-Aviv: Keshev, 2000; M. Kubti, J. Farah, H. Zu'bi and K. Shkirat, "The Israeli Media and the Intifada," Haifa: LAW, The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment, 2000; D. Dor, *Newspapers Under the Influence,* Tel-Aviv: Babel, 2001 (In Hebrew). For a more wide-ranging study about the Israeli media vis-à-vis the first Intifada consult A.A. Cohen and G. Wolfsfeld, eds., *Framing the Intifada: People and the Media,* Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1993.

16. Etienne Balibar, "Propositions on Citizenship," *Ethics,* 98 July 1988: 723–730. 726

17. Yagil Levy, "The Linkage between Israel's Military Policies and the Military's Social Composition: The Case of the al-Aqsa Intifada," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 51 No. 11, July 2008 1575–1589. This, by no means, is unique to the Israeli case. Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, p. 24.

18. Non-democratic regimes have launched colonial projects in spaces that were contiguous with the core state. Russia is a case in point. Alexander Etkind, "Internalizing Colonialism: Intellectual Endeavors and Internal Affairs in Mid-19th Century Russia," in *Convergence and Divergence: Russia and Eastern Europe into the Twenty-First Century*. Edited by Peter J.S. Dunkan. London: SSEES, 2007, 103–120.

19. In *The Dark Side of Democracy*, Michael Mann discusses the idea that sovereignty of the people, one of the central principles of democracy, is curbed and curtailed by and through the limitation of the people. He distinguishes between two different conceptions of peoples -- stratified and organic – in order to underscore two fundamental ways through which the restriction is achieved. Mann maintains that if the people are conceived of as stratified, "then the state's main role is to mediate and conciliate among competing interest groups. This will tend to compromise differences, not try to eliminate or cleanse them.... Yet if the people is conceived of as organic, as one and indivisible, as ethnic, then its purity may be maintained by the suppression of deviant minorities, and this may lead to cleansing" (55). Mann argues that while both carry out exclusions, ethnic cleansing of a group that was excluded took place only in democracies where the conception of the people was organic. He contends that in Northwestern European regimes the conception of the people was stratified and therefore they developed liberal forms of democracy; radically different interest groups and class conflict were accepted within the citizen body. By contrast, democratization struggles in Central and Eastern Europe pitted local ethnicity against minority populations and at times led to ethnic cleansing (69).

The problem with Mann's analysis is that it does not take into account the colonial project. England and France, for example, are portrayed as countries which relate to the people as stratified and therefore do not underscore ethnicity, a portrayal that might be convincing if one ignores English and French colonialism. Once their colonial projects are taken into account then Mann's analysis and conclusions need to be altered, since it appears that England and France did conceive "the people" as organic, but did so vis-à-vis the colonized populations. Taking colonialism into account allows us to see an oversight in Mann's analysis, and to complicate the relationship between democracy and the people. If for Mann democracy relates to the people either as stratified or organic, adding the colonial dimension reveals that the same democracy can simultaneously conceive the people as stratified in one context and organic in another.

20. Wendy Brown, "Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy," *Theory and Event*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2003.

21. Alice L. Conklin, "Colonialism and Human Rights, A Contradiction in Terms? The Case of France and West Africa, 1895–1914," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 103, No. 2 Apr., 1998: 419.

22. Etienne Balibar, "Is European Citizenship Possible," *Public Culture,* Vol. 8, 1996 355–376. p. 358.

23. Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, eds., *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Routledge, 2005: 7 (emphasis added).

24. Lior Yavne, *A Semblance of Law: Law Enforcement Upon Israeli Civilians in the West Bank*, Tel Aviv: Yesh Din, 2006; Yael Stein, *Tacit Consent: Israeli Policy on Law Enforcement toward Settlers in the Occupied Territories*, Jerusalem: B'tselem, 2001; Eitan Felner and Roley Rozen, *Law Enforcement on Israeli Civilians in the Occupied Territories,* Jerusalem: B'tselem, 1994.

25. As'ad Ghanem, "The Bi-National State Solution," *Israel Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 Summer 2009: 120–133; Leila Farsakh, "Time for a bi-national state," *Le Monde Diplomatique,* March 2007; Virginian Tilley, *The One-state Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005. See also Jeremy Pressman, "The Best Hope–Still?" *Boston Review*, July/August 2009.

26. Sixty Minutes, "Time Running Out For A Two-State Solution?" CBS, January 27, 2009. Online at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4752349n&tag=related;photovideo .

27. Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "The Two-State Solution Doesn't Solve Anything," *New York Times*, August 10, 2009. Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/opinion/11malley.html .

28. In 1980 there were 13,500 settlers in the occupied West Bank, by 1987 there were about 60,000, on the eve of Oslo about 100,000 and currently there are 267,000 residing in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem in which an additional 200,000 Jewish settlers reside. Gordon, Israel's *Occupation*, 139.

29. Stephan Walt, "The Treason of the Hawks," *Foreign Policy,* April 28, 2009. Online at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/28/the_treason_of_the_hawks .

30. Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, p. 24.

31. Etienne Balibar, "Europe, an 'unimagined' frontier of Democracy," *Diacritics,* Vol. 33, Fall 2003: 41. I disagree, however, with Balibar who maintains that "modern societies have put colonization behind them." Israel, I think, suggests that this claim is too hasty.