POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH

A PALESTINIAN CASE STUDY

JANETTE HABASHI

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To my beloved sister, and to the memories of my brother and father

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My interest in studying children and youth political socialization started earlier than my doctoral research. I was in awe of the varied knowledge youth have regarding local and world politics and how youth use this knowledge, with or without realizing it, and *act*. This led me to embark on a journey that will add more questions than answers. I learned that political knowledge is not an issue of access to information or voting, but rather it is extremely complex and requires understanding, creating new viewpoints, and reframing discourse.

I started this project in 2006, and at the onset never thought it would continue to exist as long as it has. It is the support and the encouragement of a lot of people that this project has reached this level. My gratitude goes first and foremost to the participants who surprised me sometimes and enlightened me other times. I thank the participants that allowed me to be part of their lives and thoughts. I would not have written this book without their interest and insight. I appreciate their commitment in the face of their doubts that anyone would be interested in their lives or existence. I appreciate each one of them and will be forever grateful for their agency. In addition to the children and youth participants, I am thankful for local Palestinian leaders who helped me in my research endeavor. I would also like to thank the translator for being accurate and committed to this large work.

Another person whom I would like to express my thanks is Kendall Craft. Her friendship, support, and intellectual engagement made this writing journey pleasurable. I am grateful that Kendall Craft not only served as an independent researcher and engaged in every part of the project, but was

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Political Socialization and Its Processes

Introduction to Palestinian Youth Journaling Project

One night in my lifetime of nights, the electricity went out and I tried to find my way in the dark by touching to find candles. I found none, but I did find a pen and notebook in the corner of the house despite the total darkness. I opened the notebook and out of it came the fragments of dried roses and with it the fragrance of memories. I started writing, I wrote about literature, poems, critiques, eulogy, and love. I wrote about tributes and critics. I wrote about short stories, grammar, math, biology and chemistry. I wrote about medicine. I wrote about happiness, sadness, hope and despair. I wrote about Marx. I wrote about Yahya Ayyash. I wrote about Che Guevara. I wrote about Asia, Palestine, Africa, Morocco, the Pacific, and the Americas. I wrote about Native Americans, about Europe, Greece. I wrote about the city of sadness and deprivation. I wrote about arches, triangles, circles, squares and rectangles. I wrote about shoes, socks, clothes, doors, books, chairs. I wrote about Mars and I wrote about France in November. I wrote about the sky and the light in the City of Pride. I wrote about Eve and I wrote about the Virgin Mary. I wrote about belonging and wisdom. I wrote about despair and oppression. I wrote about singing, theater and music. I wrote about love and bitterness. I wrote about the mind, the heart, the eyes and the soul. I wrote in blood. I wrote in mind. And I wrote in stupidity. I wrote about Naji Al-Ali. I wrote about Ghassan Kanafani. I wrote about Mahmoud Darwish. I wrote about Abu Amar. I wrote about friends, enemies, Haifa, Jaffa, and Rammallah. I wrote in drawings, in colors, and in the sun. I wrote in the moon and in space and I wrote in watermelon and honey. I wrote on skin and iron and on peace. I wrote about normalization. I wrote about work, and the past and present. I wrote about betrayal, separation, death and

time. I wrote about basketball, football. I wrote about fathers and mothers. I wrote about Gandhi. I wrote about Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. I wrote about Said Kutop. I wrote about Shahik Ameen. I wrote about freedom and independence. I wrote about national struggles. I wrote about heroes of the Intifada. I wrote about Iraq. I wrote about history that memories the child heroes. I wrote about my story without hope. I wrote about the Hunchback of Notre Dame. I wrote about the making of a man. I wrote about Matez, the hero of the heroes. I wrote in every area, forgetting nothing. And the sun began to rise; the lights came on and I started opening the notebook to see how I had written in the darkness. I was surprised that the pen was not working. There was no ink. All of my memories collapsed. It is not only my memories. The past was gone. In my anguish, my body temperature became hot. I left the house and started shouting, "No, no. no, no." There were random bullets that hit my head and made me sleep until now. I could not move or talk; I became like any Arabic person—silent. And I have written you from my tomb: life.

The world is puzzled by youth's ability to transform geopolitics and their everyday lives and connect with each other regardless of borders, nationalities, or religions. Youth have the capacity to influence government stability, growth, and their community's future. It is youth and their political agency that alter values, perspectives, and interactions within and between communities. Therefore, it is not surprising that youth energy is *always* a concern, as government is constantly on the move to control or shape their values and ensure their compliancy to the system; hence, such attempts are not always successful. In fact, such efforts tend to lack insight about youth agency while being mainstreamed with a narrow focus that creates disconnect between their political reality, resources, and agency, leading to government instabilities, movements, and activism. Youth are forging social, economic, and political "movements" to alter the current state of the stagnated and exclusive political structure. Global or local citizenship and community engagement programs are no substitute to capture or reflect an understanding of youth political agency. To appreciate youth political agency, governments, political structures, and regimes have to provide alternative views about engaging youth within the political process. The strategy of continuing to assume that the top-down, adult-directed model of political socialization is not conducive to truly understanding children's and youth's political socialization, as this methodology negates to include a plethora of facets impacting political development. While the top-down model is seen as a somewhat

universal model of human development and used around the globe, the argument can be made that children and youth are affected by much more than those factors in the top-down model; for example, peer-to-peer inter-action is a huge component of children's and youth's political socialization. Furthermore, a universal paradigm to socialization is faulty, particularly when looking at societies that are at the center of conflict. Children and youth living in conflicted or war-torn areas do not always have the same liberties of participating in the structural political system (such as growing up to be able to vote in a democratically held election). Hence, it is shortsighted to assume change in youth programs should be exclusive to non-democratic countries and by default pretend youth political agency in democratic governments, in this case Western countries, is enacted. It is naïve to serve or promote such perspectives, as youth around the globe are subjected to, and subjugated within, similar neoliberal ideological apparatuses that simply cannot be followed, but with different conditions and limitations that deny agency and resistance to change. Given these structural constraints, research should capture the meaning, processes, and potential of youth political agency and pave the way to restructure the adult-directed (or top-down) model of political socialization.

Now more than ever, it is crucial to understand youth political socialization utilizing a new analytic lens that captures the multiplicity of contexts and dimensions. The exciting research in the area of youth political social-ization is in the early stage of reconceptualization. Traditionally, studies on this topic had little variation in terms of emphasis and methodology, but overall they tend to focus on human development compartmentalization within a narrow theoretical and methodological approach. Some research focuses on family interaction as a primary political orientation and other research on school curriculum as the foundation of political knowledge. These studies primarily utilized positivistic methodology that viewed chil-dren and youth as being an empty vessel subjected to the adult-directed model as the source of political socialization. Recently, the emphasis of this traditional approach proved to be insufficient, not only because the increase in cross-cultural studies of human development, or the interest in under-standing youth and children agency, but also because of the discrepancy between the goal of the adult-directed model and the outcome of political socialization and the increased exposure of children and youth in politics outside the home and school environment. Therefore, the focus in this area of study expanded to include the impact of peers, media, and community on political socialization, but with the similar approach of children and youth

being an empty vessel. Hence, the inclusion of different variables of studies on children and youth political socialization continue to be insufficient because they do not parallel any understanding and contextualization of youth political agency, nor do they include an analysis of the interactions and interconnectedness between different contents as part of the process. It seems the tendency is to treat each context (such as family, media, school, etc.) as a separate entity, or some variables in correlational terms without conducting the research on the interactions between these contexts and their relations to youth agency. Therefore, it is not surprising the result continues to be insufficient in explaining youth political socialization. The lack of understanding of the core aspect of political socialization resulted in emphasizing youth political apathy over youth political empathy, whereby it fosters individuals from different locations and nationalities. It seems the anticipated outcome of the traditional political socialization model (top-down) is for youth to engage in the political process and any disengagement is deemed to be apathy that is viewed as a generational stagnation. This conclusion is the immediate result of the top-down model of political socialization that forces a dual outcome of the process: apathy/stagnation or politically engaged within the assigned processes. This approach will not allow for alternative perspectives or identify youth political agency. Therefore, the objective of the study at the heart of this book is to understand youth political socialization that is not exclusive to the top-down model or to the examination of different elements, but to the understanding of youth political socialization within the ecological structure while the local/global discourse subjects and subjugates youth political agency. *Although the research is based on a longitudinal study of Palestinian youth in the Israeli Occupied Territories, the analysis framework can be transferable from one location to another and can provide an insight into youth political socialization regardless of the location.* The implication from this research should not be only limited to youth living in political upheaval or unstable situations, like in the Palestinian community, but should also include youth all over the world. This study provides an extensive analysis of the interactions and intersections of youth agency that can be duplicated in other contexts regardless of the political circumstances. The importance is the approach toward viewing youth's political agency explores all the interactions an individual might experience, and the approach does not undermine or dismiss the impact of location, resources, national narrative, or ideological discourses.

Background of the Research

This study emerged from a series of research projects about Palestinian youth and political engagement outside the designed peripheries of human development and political socialization that did not reflect the reality of their agency. As expected, such limitations paved the way for researching and examining an alternative perspective to understanding youth political development and knowledge. Initially, the research posited a string of questions about what is appropriate for children to *know or not to know* without the consideration of what children actually *know and can know*. It became clear these questions are an instigation of the normative paradigm of human development that coincides with the perspective children and youth are empty vessels without consideration of the paradoxical situations of children's political realities. It seems *what is appropriate for children to know or not to know* is a call for the normalization of childhood in general, including their political socialization. Hence, throughout my research, it became apparent that outcomes embedded in youth agency and its relation to political socialization does not always correspond with the onset provision of having a normal (or abnormal) childhood. The gap is not in children having "normal" childhoods and engaging in the top-down model of political socialization or the other way around, but it is found in the lack of having constant correlations between these two variables. The empirical methodology did not provide an insight into the existing interactions of youth agency. Apparently, this is because children and youth have intrinsic political abilities and are political creatures that do not correspond with the top-down model of political socialization and it is not defined by "normal childhood." This was reflected in the findings of my first research in 2004 on Palestinian children's political socialization. The research was based on a mixed methodology: the qualitative portion of the study arose from the interviews of 12 children (six boys and six girls) ages 10–13 in semi-structured interviews. The quantitative data stemmed from 1187 participants completing the survey, with children's and youth's year in schools ranging between grades 5 and 7 and ages ranging from 10 to 13 years. The significance of this study is it not only provided the foundation of understanding political socialization of Palestinian children on the onset of the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, but also the multiple elements engaged in this process. The utilization of mixed methods and the inclusion of multiple variables showed that children's and youth's political socialization is not based on correlations of a few variables or on a top-down model.

Rather, the findings indicated children's agency is framed within local and global discourse, and the political socialization is based on constant interactions between multiple variables including the global discourse. The surprising factor of this research is the relationship between agency and national identity is demonstrated in multiple dimensions of national and historical narratives of self and the other. The other surprising factor is found in the interaction between a child's agency with the local and global discourse. The existence of findings of previous research forges a new consideration for this current study, especially in relation to the concept of time and whether the fact of time can change youth agency or interaction. It became clear from the onset of this longitudinal research there is a need to explore and identify the characteristics of youth political agency in relation to political socialization within the ecological structure, and whether the impact of children and youth political socialization interactions and processes changes over time. These inquiries have led to the design of this current longitudinal study of examining Palestinian youth political socialization, in which a few factors alone do not provide a cohesive framework of the interface of children and youth agency within the ecological structure of political socialization. It is the interaction of educational institutions, family, community, local and global politics, national discourse, media, economic resources, peers, and policies that shapes political socialization and agency. This study provides an insight into this complexity by Palestinian youth journaling about their lives for over 5 years.

STUDY DESIGN

The conceptualizing of youth keeping journals began in late 2006 in brainstorming the best way to obtain data overtime, and whether youth would document their everyday lives over a period of time. After completing the international review board (IRB) review and ensuring confidentiality in coding, I needed an adult liaison in place to address the concerns of whether the participants revealed information that might harm him/herself or the community. This process set the stage to start recruiting in 2007 youth participation for the project. A snowball sampling strategy was utilized in which I identified an initial group of participants and then asked them to recommend or identify others who might be interested in joining the project. In most cases, participants encouraged friends, family members and community members to take part in the project. Also, some community leaders got involved

and recommended to contact some children. From some adults' perspectives, the encouragement was based on the fact children's involvement in the study will improve their learning experiences in school and communication in their personal lives. Hence, the only criterion to join the project was that the participants needed the ability to articulate their living experiences in writing (handwriting or typing), drawing, or any other medium. At the onset of the recruitment process, the participants were between the ages of 12 and 15 years and the number of the participants varied between 15 and 30 with a mix of males and females until the end of 2011. The participant demographics captured different locations in the West Bank, as well as villages, refugee camps, and cities. To facilitate the writing process, I provided the below guidelines and recommended the participants write at least twice a week. These guidelines are also published in Habashi (2013, p. 18).

- Describe your daily life and routine. What are the local and political issues that may disrupt that routine?
- Describe the responses of community, friends, peers, and teachers on political and local events and your responses to these reactions.
- Describe the political situation that impacts your daily activity and learning. How does it affect you?
- What are your views on what is happening in your local community?
- Describe the highlights of the week in the community.

The outline proved to be useful for a short time; however, the participants changed the focus and emphasis. I realized after checking with the participants on a monthly basis over the phone they wanted to write about what their lives were like, which I realized was the appropriate approach to reflect their agency. The guidelines were still used by some, but the participants' writings became much more varied, and the children's approach was more effective since it gave them ownership over the project and allowed them to reflect their thoughts and feelings in a more fluid way. In addition to participants' writings, I called each of them once a month to check on their progress and keep them motivated. For every communication over the phone I kept a log and immediately documented the conversations in English. I also visited as much as was permitted to check on their progress. Also, one of the participants became the liaison in which she also called the participants once a month. These communications are part of the data collection and are included in the data analysis. However, to make sense

of the data, there was a need to translate this rich and thick data from Arabic to English.

Translation of the Data

A local bilingual translator preformed this task, where the focus was on the literal translation without taking away the cultural meaning. In many instances, the translator expressed astonishment of the materials and the handwritings. She kept some of the writing material, especially the poems and self-reflections in Arabic because she felt some of its essence would be lost in translation. Then, I read these documents and conducted personal translation with a verification of a third person if needed. This process set the stage to analyze the data and make meaning of the narratives.

Data Analysis

The journaling project over time produced thick and rich data; to facilitate the analysis process of the data (translated journals and the phone calls), NVivo qualitative software was utilized. This software organized the data and coding process. To ensure transparency in the coding and categories, an independent researcher and I read the material several times and created separate coding systems before merging them into one cohesive structure. The participants' writings assisted the coding system by emphasizing on one aspect. The grounded theory guided the coding and analyzing of the data (Creswell, 2003). This theoretical framework also aided in identifying patterns and relationships by facilitating the coding procedures. Cross-reference checking of the coding structure between journal entries was conducted to verify the analysis and the construct of the themes (Glaser, 2002). The data reveal two main distinct structures: processes of political socialization and outcomes of political socialization, and each embedded different interactions and dimensions that facilitated the structure of each chapter. Hence, even if each chapter focused on a distinct aspect of the process of outcome of political socialization, the themes are interconnected by youth political agency. The structure of the agency is embedded in each theme, as it is the by-product of the processes.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

The book is divided into two parts—(1) political socialization and its processes and (2) the outcome of political socialization. Different chapters are included to discuss each section. Throughout the subsequent chapters, the ecological theory will be used to analyze the themes that emerged within the Palestinian youth journaling study, and portions of the youth's journals will be intertwined within this analysis to show concrete examples and narratives of youth's political socialization and agency.

The outline of the book is as follows:

Part 1: Political Socialization and Its Processes
Chapter 2: Reconceptualizing Youth Political Socialization: A Theoretical Framework

This chapter discusses the conventional views of youth political socialization that tend to be limited to the school and family environment. This approach dismisses youth agency and other interactions in the ecological theory and emphasizes the adult-directed approach of political socialization. The alternative method of the traditional model of political socialization is based on the ecological theory of political socialization and the reconceptualization of the concept of age. The ecological theory captures the interaction not only in the immediate environment of the youth, but also in the relationship between local and global discourses that assist in forming youth's perspectives and actions. The interactions are within and between contexts that youth experience in everyday life, which are integrated in political socialization. The reconceptualization of age is an integral part of framing the alternative approach since it redefines age as part of intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life course of an individual. To standardize the meaning of age is to miss the interactions entailed in each individual that is exemplified in different world experiences among youth. These two theoretical frameworks set the stage to create meaning of youth political agency and diffused the exercise of compartmentalizing youth experiences that do not serve in understanding youth political socialization but rather underscores their political agency. In summary, this chapter discusses the existing literature of youth political socialization, the ecological model of political socialization, and the construction of political agency.

Chapter 3: Community Contribution to Political Socialization: The
    Global is Local

Youth live in multiple realities that are multifaceted and connected. The
global is local and politics is not an isolated matter. It is no longer adequate
to study youth experiences without considering the impact of the commu-
nity narrative and the larger discourse. Community is the larger system in
youth's daily experiences after family. Family is part of the community and
considered the basis for children's political socialization; however, to con-
sider one more significance than the other is to miss the connection and
political interaction between these two entities that contribute to youth
political agency and create tensions between the top-down model and the
trickle-up model in political socialization. Indeed, to distinguish between
the impact of the macro and micro in political socialization does not reflect
the processes, interrelations, and interactions among different contexts of
youth political agency entailed in the ecological theory. There is a dialectic
relationship between youth political agency and community processes of
political socialization presented in the family and the local/global discourse.
To understand such interactions, Chap. 3 discusses the impact of commu-
nity on political socialization, the effect of the micro on children's political
socialization, and the reconceptualization of parents' affect in the process
within examples provided by the Palestinian youth agency.

Chapter 4: Social Identifiers: Making Meaning of Intersectionality

The contextualization of the social and political conditions is associated
with demographic factors such as ethnicity, religion, race, education level,
geographic location, gender, and more. These social identifiers are impor-
tant to describe the research subjects but do not demonstrate the meanings
that are created in the interaction with events and different contexts. Social
identifiers serve in understanding the different intersectionality and
intergenerationality between youth agency and how they become part of
social and political interactions. The social identifiers are indicated because
youth agency is formed by multiple social identifiers that shape the interac-
tions and relationships with events and social issues. Therefore, the contex-
tualization of any study should not only be based on the characteristics
of the issues but should also be related to the participants' identifiers.
For example, experiences differ between men and women, Muslims and
Christians, and so on. However, gender or religion alone is not sufficient to

explain the multiple identities of youth agency. This chapter discusses the multiple social identifiers that shape youth political socialization, which is seen in the intersectionality of the cultural/political environment and class (as a social identifier), in addition to gender and geographic location.

Chapter 5: Geopolitics of Religion and Its Role in Youth Agency

In recent studies, religion is considered a factor in youth political socialization, even though there is an assumption that in western countries there is a separation of church and state. However, existing research shows that religion is part of the school system; in addition, some western countries fund religious schools and programs. The connection between religion and political socialization is seen in extracurricular programs and community engagements. Hence, to assume that religious values enhance the behavior of citizenship or community engagement is to ignore that youth transform views. However, the discussion of the impact of religion on youth in non-western societies is framed within the global discourse and constructed with a power struggle that is framed with neoliberal agenda. Therefore, Chap. 5 discusses religious affiliation as an identifier, the politicization of Islam's interaction with imperialism in Palestine, and Islamic movements and Palestinian youth political agency.

Chapter 6: Limitations of the Educational Structure in Political Socialization

Education is the venue to dictate and implement the top-down model and to make sure that the political structure of society is perpetuated by civic or citizenship education. This assumption is enhanced by the learning theories that emphasize that children's political comprehension is no match to political concepts, and, therefore, learning should be incremental with hands on experiences. Hence, research focused on this area provided different results on the trajectory of civic education after school years that did not always carry on the fundamental of civic engagement. Most have argued that the impact of such curricula is contiguous on ethnicity, school systems, and class. Moreover, the top-down model does not view children as active in their learning, yet the focus on community engagement continues to be the focus in civic education. Chapter 6 discusses both formal and informal educational institutions and political socialization, the impact

of intersectionality within education systems, and the Palestinian example of structured civic programs.

Chapter 7: Media and the Neoliberal Agenda Within Political Socialization

It seems that media is central to youth political socialization because it interacts within the top-down model and trickle-up model of youth political socialization. Hence, to truly understand media's impact, there is a need to deconstruct it in terms of ideology, and how the neoliberal ideology frames political socialization and emphasizes particular value systems to condemn or reward certain behaviors. It is no longer accurate to view media as a direct influence without considering the ideology embedded in the programs or the network itself. To counteract such ideological impositions, youth use their agency to create alternative media venues to communicate and combat such perspectives. Youth are no longer only a consumer of media but actual critics. Chapter 7 discusses the presentation of media and political socialization, neoliberal values and the media.

Part 2: The Outcome of Political Socialization
Chapter 8: The Evolvement of National Identity: A Never-Ending Process

Research on national identity has related culture, collective narratives, and religion to the construction of identities. Although national identity is a production of modernity, it is not static and is evolving with time and by discourse. The formation of national identity is due to the interface between collective discourse and individual experiences or contributions to such narratives. These interactions are part of political socialization that form youth agency within the larger community narrative that creates "us" and the "other." *Us* is the inclusive section of imagined community, and the *other* is part of the exclusive group. National identity is formed by multiple dimensions within these two dominant categories; for the construction of Palestinian national identity on the part of youth, there are multiple dimensions that interact with political socialization, which allow for new possibilities to emerge. Chapter 8 discusses perspectives on the foundation of

national identity, national identity and community, and the history of Palestinian identity.

Chapter 9: Youth Agency/Activism: The Hidden Outcome

Youth are the engine of the future while shouldering the present and past. With such a perspective, there is an emphasis by the top-down model of political socialization for youth to engage in the political structure to ensure community continuity. Hence, youth that do not engage in the process are categorized as suffering from apathy and governments have to encourage its youth population to participate. This perspective is limited in understanding the impact of both the top-down model and the trickle-up model of political socialization. Youth's lack of engagement in the political process is not apathy because they do not necessarily suffer from lack of political interest, but do have a lack of interest in the political structure. Youth have forged alternative methods for community participation that is articulated in three main categories: resistance, solidarity, and activism. To understand the outcome of political socialization, it is important to understand the political agency of youth. Chapter 9 discusses youth agency filtered by political activity, youth political agency within activism, resistance, and solidarity, and forms of activism.

Chapter 10: The Normalization of Youth Political Agency

The existing research provided an insight into the theoretical tension between the top-down model and trickle-up model of political socialization. Although the traditional approach espouses a linear progression of human development, it does not explain youth or children's agency and does not empower youth to be an active part of society. There is a continuous push for the normalization of childhood and youth that endorses the top-down model. This is readily apparent in the Palestinian case, regardless of the oppressive reality. Youth created normality by making meaning of their living paradoxes while constructing their agency. It is these examples that show that political socialization is due to the constant interaction of multiple contexts within the intersectionality of youth agency. This chapter discusses the normalization of human development and the importance of youth agency.

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Reconceptualizing Youth Political Socialization: A Theoretical Framework

Today I met one of my classmates. Her father is in an Israeli jail as are many Palestinians. She has many brothers and sisters. I asked her about her life, she said: I miss my father. Sometimes I listened to the prisoners' families when they talked on the radio and TVs. Families do that to assure prisoners, and it is a type of communication because they can't visit them. In my opinion this is all invalid; a phone call couldn't replace a mother seeing and hugging her son. Or could not replace a married father seeing his wife and children. Israel deprived those children from their fathers. And they deprived youth from building their own future. Palestinian youth's fight for their homeland is perceived by Israel as a threat to its security. I want all prisoners to be free, because freedom is wonderful. I wish everyone to be free.

– 15-year-old female from a city

YOUTH POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION

The conventional views of political socialization of youth have been largely limited to the impact of immediate family and what is learned within school curriculum (Gordon & Taft, 2011; van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2011). Traditionally, it was held that children will almost always duplicate their parents' or caregivers' political views, especially as related to political party affiliation, voting patterns, and political involvement (Allen & Bang, 2015; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; Schulman & DeAndrea, 2014).

However, this conventional or "traditional" model of youth political social-
ization is antiquated, as research has shown that there are several other
factors at play. Political socialization is in fact a dynamic process and youth
respond to it by forming their agency. Youth are part of multiple realities
and influenced by a variety of factors, including family, community, and
location in which they live; education, schools, and peers; gender; religious
elements; and media (all of these are discussed more in depth in subsequent
chapters). Youth are not passive recipients of political stimuli but play an
active role in shaping their own political perspectives as they are "reflective
agents growing up within specific and historical contexts..." (Yates &
Youniss, 1998, p. 496). This chapter will deconstruct the traditional
model of political socialization that mutes youth political agency and illus-
trate the different ways youth are politically socialized, with particular focus
on the multiple agents, realities, and relationship between local and global
discourses that assist in forming youth's perspectives and actions, keeping in
mind that all of these elements are closely interrelated.

In the Palestinian case, political socialization of youth is complicated by
the geopolitical reality of Israeli occupation and the local/global forces that
are complacent in oppression. This occupation adds a layer to other agents
of socialization and meanings of political realities as youth act as part of the
resistance, resilience, and reworking in everyday living and the fight for their
homeland. A huge part of the political socialization for Palestinian youth is
the ways in which they internalize (and act upon) the everyday living reality
of occupation, including Israeli checkpoints, lack of access to education and
healthcare, and limited freedom of movement, among other things. All of
these elements show that political socialization of youth moves much
further beyond immediate family, or even education. A 15-year-old male
youth participant from a refugee camp discussed Israeli checkpoints within a
journal entry and wrote, "Israeli soldiers [were] holding weapons and
stopped us at a checkpoint, they examined the car and then let us go. We
smiled, and our smiles [acted as] shouts to them." This quote illustrates the
local political reality as not only a source of political socialization but also as
a source of youth political agency.

YOUTH POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

It is imperative to the future of our children to shift the conventional approach of understanding political socialization of children and youth around the globe. The adult-directed approach conceptualized in the top-down model of political socialization is considered the dominant method of understanding youth political socialization. This approach is manifested in media, family formal educational systems, and other authority figures. Scholars such as Youniss et al. (2002) and Gordon and Taft (2011) echoed the concern of many researchers who evaluated this model, which excessively emphasizes the role of these institutions in youth political socialization while intentionally excluding an in-depth contextualized account of children's and youth's political agency within the processes. The conventional focus is on the evidence of the adult-directed approach to children's and youth's political socialization that is conceptualized in the top-down model and could provide a factual measurement of their political competence ingrained in knowledge presented in civic education, history, and social science as it is enhanced by the parent's shaping youth's political orientation and interactions (Dinas, 2013; van Deth et al., 2011). However, studies found that school, family, and media complement each other in preparing the children to transcend their political learning in school and in home into the expected actions of electoral and community participation, as well as to comply with the expectation of citizenship (Sandell & Ostroff, 1981; Warren & Wicks, 2011). School curricula provide knowledge about government structures and civic education to engage youth in community; meanwhile, parents enrich children's political orientation and values (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009). Therefore, some studies that were focused on the adult-directed approach described the interrelation between school and families as vital in shaping children's political socialization (Allen & Bang, 2015; Mortimore & Tyrrell, 2004). It is these societal institutions founded merely on the top-down hierarchy that children's and youth's political socialization is expected to be based upon and renew their consensus of political processes and participation in society (Sapiro, 2004). Media has been studied as an unequivocal part of the process of studying the top-down model and as a crucial entity that is similar in influence to school systems and families on children's and youth's political socialization (Östman, 2014). Van Deth et al. (2011) noted that "media should not simply be regarded as a separate socialization influence, but as one that

exists in relations to other main influences" (p. 158). The role that media plays in the political socialization of youth and children is equal to that played by school and family, and all these will be further discussed and analyzed in subsequent chapters.

While previous research on youth's political development has focused on the top-down approach and how institutions such as school and family affect youth's socialization, more recent research has suggested that children and youth are in fact capable of transforming the dialogue surrounding the political system that makes them an agent in their socialization process (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; Sapiro, 2004). Rather than children learning by a direct top-down transmission of information, a "social interaction approach" is a more inclusive model. In the social interaction approach, children and youth are active participants in the discussion of politics and the reciprocity between individuals involved is paramount; this approach posits that children and youth can provoke a change in political development in others *and* themselves (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002, p. 284). Moreover, youth are politically socialized in alternative forms of the main institutions found in the top-down approach; for example, children and youth are influenced by peers and friends within the school system. As one 14-year-old male study participant from a village mentioned, "I'm in ninth grade, a member of the daily school podcasting. I talked about Saddam [Hussein]'s execution and if you were with it or against it…and political and internal conditions." Apart from being influenced by those in positions of authority such as teachers or administrators, youth are also active participants in the political discussion (Youniss et al., 2002). Further, researchers such as Gordon and Taft (2011) have questioned whether the top-down model of political socialization is an effective tool to engage children and youth into the society, as political socialization and development can help frame the practices of children and youth within the political system (Sapiro, 2004).

Gordon and Taft (2011) looked at a report by the United Nations that favors the top-down model. The report studied the youth in Latin America and found that they were disenchanted with the political system. Recommendations included that government should encourage youth to engage in community and political processes to combat the increasing trend of youth apathy. According to the report, youth lack interest in aspiring to take part in the political process, which is imbedded in the top-down model; therefore, youth are considered disconnected from society (United Nations, 2007). An important assumption in the top-down model is that youth

sanction the current political status quo or at least the processes that their parents/caregivers, schools, and media enforce; however, youth are found to be "apathetic" toward even these models (Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010). Moreover, the same observations about encouraging youth to engage in civic activities and electoral voting were also reported in the United States (Levine, 2003). It seems that concern crosses governments regardless of their economic development or democratic aspirations. The focus on encouraging youth to participate in the community is not only on the agenda of *some* countries but also a focus of almost *all* governments (Cammaerts, Bruter, Banaji, Harrison, & Anstead, 2013). The working proposition is that youth should endorse the top-down model, while governments are the engines to produce a successful outcome of youth participation within the society. This is not a unique proposal to ensure youth engagement in the political process because data and research support the assumption that unsuccessful outcomes correlate with youth apathy (Ostrown, 2014). Historical events have shown youth apathy could result in the political instability in a society, or an irresponsible generation reflected the mistrust in the government, including its institutions and leaders (Harris et al., 2010). To have a generation that lacks confidence in the political system might render low community engagement as defined by the adult-directed political socialization model (Manning, 2014). The low outcome of youth participation in voting or any other form of societal participation challenges the adult-directed political socialization paradigm and its effectiveness. The correlation between this political socialization paradigm and youth engagement in the society has been the focus of governments' youth programs and their leaders. Nonetheless, youth detachment from the designated political processes embedded in the top-down model, such as voting in elections, should not be perceived as an act of indifference and should be considered as statistically apathetic. A 14-year-old male study participant from a village, when writing about daily life, briefly touched on the political parties of the Occupied Palestinian Territories: "I'm detached to any party; I only care of the school trip on Tuesday." While this participant notes his indifference to the established political system in Palestine and his lack of party affiliation, it is not indicative of his feelings toward the political situation and Israeli occupation as a whole. Throughout his journal, the participant often wrote of political events and his opinions and perspectives on them, particularly when discussing a conflict between the two emergent political parties (Hamas and Fatah): "In my opinion, what happened between Fatah and Hamas in

Gaza and Beirut is useless. . ." He goes on to say that "sometimes [he] goes to school to hear the teachers' and students' opinions about what happened with Fatah and Hamas." It is clear that while the participant does not identify himself with a political party, he is very much engaged in the political process and an alternative form of political socialization in learning and framing his perspectives through his peers rather than only adults. The paradox is that the adult-directed political socialization model assumes that it has the ability to continue to encourage youth to participate in the government designing political programs (Ostrown, 2014) and that to correct the failure to engage youth and its apathy is to increase community programs to do what they failed to do originally (Harris et al., 2010). While the top-down (or adult-directed) model has been perpetuated by research and governmental reports, it has failed to be inclusive of children's and youth's political agency and their political aspirations (Kallio, 2008; Sapiro, 2004). To ignore their agency is to continue emphasizing community engagement conceptualized in civic education. The expected outcome of civic education is based on the growing number of youth involved in the political process and community participation. Hence, if the adult-directed model is successful, young generations should have limited apathy and limited alternative political activities. Thus far, there is no evidence that investment in decreasing youth apathy through additional similar programs found under the top-down model has produced expected outcomes.

Not every scholar accepts the binary perspective that apathy is in opposition to community participation or absence of interest in the public good because this notion lacks the analysis to identify the nuances of youth participation preformed and concentrated independently from government programs. Youniss et al. (2002) perceived the low youth participation concept in political processes as embracing two distinct notions that do not endorse the binary of apathy and participation. The first notion that low youth political participation is part of the top-down model is a sign that youth can disturb the premise of this paradigm. This in a way reflects their agency that is contrary to the adult model of denying youth the ability to become active in their own political socialization. Hence, to interrupt the model connects to the second notion that youth have their own agency. Youth might be disenchanted by the system and refuse to engage in the expected political process, while simultaneously engaging in alternative political environments. Youth are able to conceive alternative community engagements; therefore, what the majority sees as apathy is in fact not detachment from the society. On the contrary, it is often the engagement

that implements a "different" political agenda (Harris et al., 2010). This analysis challenges the binary perspective embedded in the top-down model by emphasizing youth agency. It is notwithstanding that the rejection of the top-down model and its goals to mute youth's political abilities has been one of the methods to voice their political agency. Therefore, to understand youth political socialization, there is an urgency to identify an alternative model to the top-down paradigm that highlights youth agency and to nurture it in the political process as it is attempted to be shaped by adults (and adult-run institutions like schools, media, etc.). Youniss et al. (2002) conceptualized the alternative approach in the analysis that "political social-ization is not that adults do to adolescent, it is something that youth do for themselves" (p. 133). The center of such a proposition is that the youth have agency in their political socialization and that their political participa-tion could be manifested in *not* complying with the adult-directed model of government programs and parents' political orientations. Consequently, the emphasis should be on deconstructing the act of youth apathy in relation to children's and youth's agency in political socialization (Gordon & Taft, 2011) rather than on reiterating the same practice of a top-down model.

Ecological Model of Political Socialization: An Alternative

The essence of the ecological model is in the unpacking of apathy with agency that would challenge the assumed practice of the top-down model of political socialization. It is important to consider the two notions (apathy and agency) as integrated concepts rather than parallel acts. Youth apathy in this context is not a disconnect from the society; on the contrary, it is an indication of rejecting the assigned methods and issues of political engage-ment while simultaneously engaging in alternative political activities and demonstrating alternative political values. Therefore, the act of youth apa-thy is an act of political agency as it is contextualized within children's political and cultural experiences (Gordon & Taft, 2011; Youniss et al., 2002). The rejection by the youth of what they see as typical methods of political participation is a form of political agency that is invariably active in selecting the political interests and processes (Kallio, 2008; Sapiro, 2004). Even though some youth may not be participating in the "traditional" models of the political process such as voting or identifying with a political

party, they form alternative methods of participation such as protesting; for example, a 14-year-old male journal participant from a village noted that "University students in the West Bank are demonstrating against what is happening in Gaza." This form of political expression is not included in the top-down, or adult-centered, model of political socialization and participation. Therefore, youth apathy should be reevaluated and positioned in terms of political youth agency that reshapes the top-down model of political socialization. Gordon and Taft (2011) argued that there is variability in youth political socialization and that even youth who are socialized in the top-down model have agency and participate in alternative political engagement. The authors stated, "although not denying the value of adult-sponsored programs or the significance of adults in young people's live, our analysis examines the experiences and perspectives of youth activists to add a needed dimension, that youth-led political socialization, to the existing insights of the youth civic and political engagement" (p. 1504). Youth might engage in either the top-down, or "adult," model, as well as an alternative model, as they recognize that in order to be heard it is oftentimes necessary to be part of the system. Youth have recognized the significance of alternative participation as a tool to bring attention to the status quo. Therefore, to understand the multiple dimensions of youth's and children's political socialization, it is important to recognize that the top-down model is insufficient and an understanding of political development from children's and youth's perspectives is crucial, as both are related to the contextualization of elements of local and global discourse of geopolitics, cultures, class, and gender. It is this perspective that is pressing scholars in the field to recommended substantial reassessment of the top-down, adult-oriented paradigm of youth political socialization studies (Bloemraad & Trost, 2008; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2015; Sapiro, 2004; Youniss et al., 2002). The alternative theoretical proposition that is embedded in the ecological model encompasses the multi-faceted reality of political socialization, whereby it addresses children's agency in several contexts and processes over time. Amna, Ekström, Kerr, and Stattin (2009) conceptualized this theoretical approach with the consideration of children and youth as active political agents that roam various contexts that are implicitly connected with each other. Agency is the foundation to youth's and children's political socialization. The analysis of the ecological approach is central to understanding youth political development and agency even if there are individual differences in biological, intellectual, and cultural abilities. This premise of agency in an ecological framework is supported by the research of Spellings,

Barber, and Olsen (2012), which contextualized ninth grade Palestinian students' political activism to the ecological systems embedded in the family, community, and cultural status of gender. Youth political agency is connected to time spectrum over generations and to the interactions of multiple contexts. To capture the processes and contexts of children's political agency, Amna et al. (2009) asserted the need to broaden what constitutes political engagement and issues that are beyond the top-down model embedded in civic engagement and voting. The ecological approach captures both youth political behaviors and values that are less institutionalized while simultaneously recognizing the adult-directed, or top-down, model. The assessment of political engagement and agency should not be defined solely on the government blueprint programs because it limits the identification of children's political agency that exists as alternative political interactions (Kallio, 2008; Youniss et al., 2002). The combination of formal and informal political contexts allows the understanding of youth agency in multiple contexts as they interconnect (Habashi & Worley, 2008). Bloemraad and Trost (2008) discussed a case of high school student participation when the students protested on the streets for the rights of immigrants. In 2006, students mobilized peers and their community, media, and other institutions to advocate for the naturalization of immigrant families and children. The youth in this case realized that political participation is not confined to one situation, and they needed to operate in different contexts and dimensions to achieve political change. Harris et al. (2010) discussed that youth political participation is beyond the formal blueprint design of electoral office, as they participate in political campaigns through changing personal behavior as in consumption and lifestyle. Youth are demonstrating several political behaviors that reflect interest in the public good in the community by altering individual behaviors to engage in a public campaign. This illustrates the diverse youth political behaviors and agency between context and process. Children and youth are practicing their agency outside the traditional political map of voting and assigned community engagements (Gordon & Taft, 2011). Some are practicing it within the expected form of civic engagement. Hence, widening of the spectrum of political interaction allows for the distinct analysis of diverse political behaviors that can be contextualized within class, gender, location, culture, and others. Spellings et al. (2012) emphasized that gender is a social marker and should be considered as such in agency. Since female agency differs across cultures and encompasses a wide range of political possibilities and limitations, it is critical to contextualize agency within specific cultures.

Habashi (2013) further showed that contextualization should be part of collective memories. First-generation refugees have different local/global discourses that form the construction of the collective memories compared with second-generation refugees.

The more we understand the interconnectedness embedded in ecological theory, the more we are able to value youth agency and their engagement in political activities. Seemingly, this perspective does not deny the role of institutions such as family and education in the top-down model. Amna et al. (2009) emphasized that due to the complexity of the ecological theory, research should adopt a multi-disciplined approach, whereby sociology, social psychology, political psychology, political science, anthropology, mass communication, education, and other fields should take part in studying the children's and youth's political socialization. This area of research is being investigated from different fields to keep up with the changes youth are exploring in political spheres. Another emphasis by Amna et al. (2009) for those researchers using the ecological approach is the factor of time; they recommend that studies of children's political socialization should be longitudinal in nature, such as the journaling study of Palestinian children and youth—the basis for the current research. The Palestinian longitudinal study has been conducted over several years and has involved journaling on the behalf of the participants, face-to-face interviews, and phone interviews over an extended period of time. The longitudinal nature of the study provides an explanation about the progression of processes, accumulation of knowledge, and individual experiences that are necessary to show the interconnectedness of contexts and contents of political socialization. It is challenging to identify research that has adopted the ecological approach, since it requires continuous commitment by both scholars and participants. Studies that are framed in specific time or cross-sectional design cannot provide an in-depth analysis of children's and youth's political agency and its processes. Examples of cross-sectional studies are found in the work of Harris et al. (2010), Hörschelmann (2008), and Spellings et al. (2012). The critical factor of the current journaling study is that it captures all the above, especially the longitudinal aspect that is hard to fulfill. This study will give the opportunity to examine the value and insight of ecological theory that it is expressed in the interaction between multiple contexts and dimensions. The contextualization of the ecological theory will enhance our understanding of youth political agency and its never-ending reinvention of dealing with adult-controlled future aspirations and recourse. It is the presentation of youth political agency that will require

governments to pay attention to the multiple contexts of the politicization youth experience in daily living.

POLITICAL AGENCY

More recently, scholars are highlighting children's agency, as it enhances the examination of children's and youth's living reality and development. Traditionally, models of understanding children focused on the adult-centered construct of the universal model of children's development (James, Jenks, & Prout, 1998). The approach was forged with intensive research to articulate theoretical perspectives of children's agency that is framed within the cultural, social, and geopolitical contexts. Interdisciplinary studies enhanced the understanding of child's/youth's agency with examples of children's multiple realities presented in cultural, location and socioeconomic, and geopolitical contexts (Aitken, 1994; Habashi & Worley, 2008; Kallio, 2008; Katz, 2004). The emerging literature of children's agency did not focus on one field, as it ranged from sociology, anthropology, childhood studies, and others (Habashi, 2013; Kallio & Häkli, 2011). The outline of early studies of children's agency was rooted within children's own lives that formed the foundation to examine their agency in multiple layers and contexts in relation to adult structures as well as other social and political realities. Children's agency is no longer expressed in one social setting; on the contrary, it is observed in geopolitical as well as local/global interactions (Habashi, Katz, An. Habashi, Aitken). Habashi (2013) and Hörschelmann (2008) conceptualized children's agency, whereby children are subjects and subjugated within their social-economical and geopolitical contents. However, children's agency is inherently subjected to power structures as embedded in adults and government's institutions, and subjects as actors in the intersection of different realities. Children's agency is not truly independent or autonomous but can experience *moments of freedoms or independence* that are drawn from patterns manifested within social, cultural, and geopolitical experiences. These moments of "independence" are exerted to show children's responses to the surrounding subjugation (Hörschelmann, 2008). The main reason children only experience *moments of independence and freedom* is due to their social and political positioning in the society. Children lack similar privileges as adults due to the construct of their age that focuses on physical independence and lack of social and economic power (Hopkins & Pain, 2007). Hörschelmann (2008) argued that "age, as an aspect of social

positioning, influences how people relate to others across multiple scales and form political opinions" (p. 590). This notion also includes children as a group that is considered as a separate class due to the adults' tendency to correlate age with maturity. The working assumption is that chronological development of children to adulthood provides maturity and increases the understanding of the complex relationship of adults' world (Kallio, 2008), as well as strengthens the physical capacity. The lack of economic and social privileges compared with adults positioned children as a separate social class with limited independence to interact in social and political activities. Watts (1999) argued that youth are "social location" and treated differently, and some behaviors of youth are inherently deviant and should be considered criminal including some political activities. He asserted that some political behavior should be parallel to criminal behavior in terms of the *style*, but maybe not in terms of content, especially if the content is a form of political expression. The examples of youth political behavior that Watts portrayed as aggressive or deviant were related to Palestinian children throwing stones ("the downtown was closed because boys were throwing stones on the soldiers..."), rioters in Northern Ireland, the Red Guards of China, and the males during Khomeini, who enforced the expected Islamic behavior of that period. The proposition of his argument is that children's and youth's actions are based on ignorance and that they do not have the ability to understand their right to have a political expression. Consequently, any response that is not accepted by the adult-directed model of political socialization is considered an aggressive act. In the case of children having the awareness to adopt political expression, the top-down model recommends that they use the adult-directed model of community engagement or wait until the age of voting. The notion is that time will provide children with the experience to utilize the political process installed in the society as a mean to their political views. This assumption of inexperience is implicitly cemented with the concept of age. Children are synonymous with young humans that lack experience, knowledge, and insight due to their age. Theories of psychosocial development also enforced these perspectives with little consideration to the interaction of different realities and their profound impact on children's agency (Kallio & Häkli, 2011).

Age is a Western imperial construct that argues for a universal expectation of the nature of age regarding childhood. The concept of age tends to focus on the length of time as a factor in the biological, social, and cognitive development of a child. The assumption is that the concept of age should be measured without the influence of socioeconomic, political, physical, or

psychological factors but according to the predicate stages of psychosocial and physical development (Hopkins & Pain, 2007). This perspective tends to essentialize what entails growth as a factor of age while simultaneously running in opposition of children agency and further mutes children's political agency to enforce adults' model of political participation associated with age. Hopkins and Pain (2007) challenged the view on age as associated with capacity, social status, and expectations by providing an alternative framework that conceptualized age in terms of children's social identity. The reconceptualization of age is associated with two elements: (1) viewing children as members of society and not as an isolated social class awaiting integration at the age of consent and (2) analyzing age as part of children's social identity. These two elements are the foundations that are connected to the three premises of the reconceptualization of age according to Hopkins and Pain (2007). The first premise is *intergenerationality*, which extends the concept of age and the expression of children's social identity within the interactions between generations, community, and family members. The intergenerational interaction allows perceiving age differently according to each setting, but not as separate from interaction. For example, a child can interact in the family as the youngest child, third cousin, and in school as an oldest student in class, and a street vender, or a customer, and more. Children's social identity is interactive within different generations and could manifest in conflicts, relationships, cooperation, and others among range of people, "identities of children and others are produced through interactions with other age/generational groups and are in a constant state of flux. . .and so are more than children alone" (p. 289). It is the interactions between generations that add to children's social identity and therefore form a meaning to their age. Habashi (2013) highlighted Palestinian children's collective memories as they are constructed between generations. Children are able to author Palestinian collective memories due to the relationships and interactions with the family, community, and national discourse. Palestinian children and youth are living the shared experiences of their community, as is seen in the following narrative from a 14-year-old female study participant from a village:

> 60 years ago, Israel has stolen our land, they expelled hundreds of Palestinians from their own lands, and they killed hundreds too. They committed many massacres, the whole world has forgotten. When I see refugees in diaspora holding their homes' keys and they still have the hope to return, even though they know that their lands were demolished, and Israel established settlements

instead. Still they have hope and we people in Palestine pray for them to return to their lands. Today we had a celebration of Al-Nakbeh [Palestinian catastrophe, 1948], and we all agreed to wear the Palestinian's Hattah [Keffiyeh] and we hold banners which we hung later on the school walls, and we dressed shirts inscribed with the right of return. This is how we remember our case by writing phrases on our hands or on the chalkboard.

The interactions within these contexts and personal experiences with Israeli oppression enforced their roles of authorship of collective memories. It is not only the historical narrative but also their living identity that is framed by different interactions. These situations of intergenerational interaction enhanced children's social identity and meaning of age, as it is associated with more than one generation. The diversity of social identity of children is exemplified in non-structured and structured interaction, which yields an analysis of age that is not based on micro-level interaction or predicate stages of development.

The second premise in reconceptualizing age according to Hopkins and Pain (2007) as associated with children is to understand *intersectionality*, which emphasizes the multiple social markers of children's social identity; social makers add complex meanings to age. Examples of social markers are religion, ethnicity, culture, location, race, class, disability, political status, class, and gender, and each social maker should not be treated as a separate unit of analysis. Children have multiple social markers that impact their social identity. The work of Bloemraad and Trost (2008) showed the youth activism of immigrants living in California as a variable in mobilizing the community for the rights of the immigrants. Another example is the work of Spellings et al. (2012), which described gender and culture as a social maker in Palestinian female political activism. It is the intersectionality between different social markers that allows better understanding of the construct age, "the ways in which age is lived out and encountered are likely to vary according to different markers of social difference; the everyday experiences of people belonging to particular age groups are diverse and heterogeneous" (p. 290). The social markers provide an insight into the manifestation of age within children's social identity. Within this perspective, studying the age meaning of children should be within the intersectionality and how each one is connected to the other. The intersectionality contextualizes the social identity of children and would challenge the universal expectation of being a child in a particular age. Hörschelmann (2008) stated that intersectionality is important especially when examining Muslim youth;

we should segment their social identity by being Muslim and then youth. The third premise of the reconceptualization of age as related to social identity is related to the life course notion. Life course entails focusing on life dynamic that is not predicated on changes as expected in the stages of theories of human development. Life course is full of unpredictable events that create experiences engraved over life course. Within this perspective, transition between stages from childhood to adolescent to adulthood and so on can be more complex and entail more events than is predictable in human development theories. Life course notion contests the characteristics of the previous stage of development and the one after it, especially when transition from one stage to anther is contingent upon life events and individual's gender, social, economic status, and others. Life events such as loss of parents, homelessness, school dropout, pregnancy, and others will impact the intersectionality and intergenerationality and therefore the meaning of age. In a way, one manifestation of such a dynamic is that a child might be an adult in one aspect but remain a child in another even if the individual has passed the adulthood stage.

The three aspects of intergenerationality, intersectionality, and life course provide alternative views on age as manifested in the social identity of children and, in turn, can provide an analysis of children's political agency. The linear perspective on the nature of age has to be reformed, especially when studying children's political socialization to incorporate dimensions, processes, and contents. This alternative analysis of children as a construct of age complements the ecological theories of political socialization and can be integrated to enhance the political agency of children in the Palestinian case and others. However, to capture the dynamics of children's agency, it is essential to recognize the interaction between local and global politics and the impact this interaction has on children forming agency. Katz (2004) and Habashi (2013) suggested that children demonstrated their agency as a response to the local/global interactions. Global politics is not remote from a child's community (Secor, 2001). Kallio and Häkli (2011) argued that global politics is local politics and the production of global politics is revealed locally. The local/global interaction is intensely observed in children's daily realities, as adults are not the only ones impacted by geopolitics and children experience the same effect. Although the tendency is to shield children from wars, violent conflicts, and any other hardship, their realities and political agency are affected by these very issues (Hörschelmann, 2008). However, the outcome of sheltering does not necessarily produce a free or excited group of children. On the contrary, studies have provided evidence

that children interact with their social and political environment in spite of adults intending to conceal. It is within the local/global interaction that children agency is also expressed while intersecting with multiple social and political discourses (Habashi, 2013). The geopolitical contexts of children add another layer to their political agency formation. One 14-year-old female study participant from a village mentioned going to a demonstration "to support the old city, but the Israelis' occupied forces prevented it and threw tear gas bombs…" Children and youth are deeply affected by current events and political processes, including local and global geopolitics. Children and youth are not only exposed to just local discourse, as the global politics is weaved into the social and economic fabric of their realities. Hörschelmann (2008) and Secor (2001) argued the line between local and global is fuzzy and it is constantly overlapping in realms such as commerce, media, education, technology, and others. Bloemraad and Trost (2008) and Habashi (2013) noted that this overlap and interrelatedness are particularly seen in social identity, especially with refugees and immigrants. The analysis of agency should include how children's agency is related to global discourse and the impact of this discourse on their local environment. Children's agency, whether religious, political, or social, does not manifest in one specific way. To expect a singular presentation of children agency is, in fact, to deny them agency. Habashi (2013, 2011, and Habashi & Worley, 2008) studied children's agency as it relates to religion; within this study, children demonstrated their agency in acts of resistance, reworking their resources, and resiliency. The intersection in the form of agency is a response to political oppression presented in their daily living. The political context subjugate children's agency to be active against the geopolitical discourses.

Children are not an empty vessel but, while needing protection, are active participants in their own lives with unique needs, desires, opinions, and perspectives, and deserve to have their voices heard and a say in what happens to them. It is important to emphasize not only children's vulnerability, especially in relation to war or other hardships, but also their strength found in their agency. Children are born with the capability to analyze different situations and interpret complex ideas, which allows them to be active in their own political socialization and expression. Location, political status of the countries in which children and youth live, and other markers provide the understanding of how age in agency is relative; therefore, maturity by proxy is an extension of agency and ecological context. It is important to keep in mind that children and youth participated in this

project and that their experiences and perspectives will teach us how to understand their agency and the way their agency interacts with and impacts political socialization. This chapter discusses in depth the multi-faceted aspects of ecological theory that impact Palestinian youth's political agency as it is intertwined in the local and global political web.

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Community Contribution to Political Socialization: The Global is Local

Since I begin to come here (to the Community Center) I improved in expressing myself, reclaiming my rights, and I know many things about my future and my present. I wish to become a famous artist in the camp, Jenin, and in Palestine.

—12-year-old female from a refugee camp

The Impact of Community on Political Socialization

The family is considered a primary source of political socialization for youth, although research has shown that it is not the *only* source of political socialization. Youth political socialization is complex and is influenced by a variety of factors, including youth agency. Traditionally, the family was the primary resource to understand political socialization, and this linear analysis neglected to capture the dynamic interaction between family, community, and the state. While the family can be an important contributor to youth's political development, for the purpose of the book, more attention will be paid to other community interactions of youth political socialization in an attempt to reconceptualize the discussion of youth political agency. Given this, the community structure where youth live is an influential element of political socialization that is (at times) closely related to immediate family. This chapter discusses the political socialization elements of the community structure as they pertain to the living reality of youth.

Children live in multiple realities and are inherently interconnected and affected by multifaceted local/global, economic, and cultural discourses. It is no longer adequate to study a child's agency in a singular social context without understanding their experiences in relation to other contexts. Amna, Ekström, Kerr, and Stattin (2009) emphasized the significance of opting out of compartmentalizing children's experiences because it underscores the ecological framework whereby the examination of children's political agency and political socialization are related to several contexts and processes over time. The significance of this theory lies in the way that its contexts and processes explicitly interconnect with intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life course discussed previously in the reconceptualization of the meaning of age (Hopkins & Pain, 2007). These three elements focus on factors such as socio-economic status, culture, gender, location, and other social identifiers of agency as an individual experiences dialogue, conflicts, collaboration, and growth among different generations in a range of situations over time. The integration of intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life course with the ecological foundation is manifested in the evolution of children's and youth's agency as individuals experience moments of freedom and evolve over time. Both the ecological theory and reconceptualization of age theory are pertinent to the discussion of children's and youth's political socialization. Essentially, the ecological theory is unequivocally intertwined with the three premises of the age reconceptualization theory: intergenerational connectedness, intersectionality of social identifiers, and the impact of the entire life course on perspectives and living realities. Participants in the Palestinian journal research study demonstrated the complexity of such an integration of both theories as they experience multiple contexts as well as the interconnectedness among processes. Different chapters will tackle different contexts: for example, the school system as examined in relation to other informal educational activities. Gender, class, race, and political status are discussed in Chap. 4. However, for the purpose of this chapter, the focus of the ecological theory is on the interaction between the large concepts of family and community as they relate to youth political agency. The tendency in literature is to discuss youth agency of political socialization along the lines of the macro and micro, where family and community do not share the same context (Ludden, 2011; Sapiro, 2004; Warren & Wicks, 2011). Community is the larger system in children's life after family. Family is included in the community and is considered as the basis of children's political socialization. Hence, to separate the community from the family and the family from the community in youth political

socialization is invalid, since youth political agency is subjugated not only by family but also by other agents such as the community, media, peers, and others (Godfrey & Grayman, 2014; Lee, Shah, & McLeod, 2013; Wood, 2012; Zaff, Malanchuk, & Eccles, 2008). Indeed, the distinction in the macro and micro of political socialization does not reflect the processes, interrelations, and interactions among different contexts as entailed in the ecological theory (Eid, 2015). Children's and youth's political agency is contextualized in the community process of political socialization presented in the family and community dialectic relationship. Therefore, macro intersects with micro; as a result, family and community are contextualized in space and processes over time (McLeod & Shah, 2009; Sullivan, 2002). Hence, to understand the overlap of the macro and micro in children's and youth's political socialization, it is important to unpack and identify the parties involved in the intergenerationality interactions, and the purpose is to show the multiple layers of the relationship between the parties and youth political agency since some community interactions do not necessarily filter through family context but are directly connected with youth agency.

THE EFFECT OF THE MICRO ON CHILDREN'S POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Research on parents being an agent of children's political orientation does not illustrate children's political agency. Children's political agency can provide an insight into parents' political views, communication style, and other peripheral contents to the family political socialization. Traditionally, the interactions of political socialization between family, community, and location were discussed under separate headings with little elaboration on the interactions and relationship between one content and the other (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Shulman & DeAndrea, 2014). Initially, research focused on family, particularly on parents' role in children's political orientation and socialization. It is not surprising that family/caregivers are considered the cornerstone of children's political socialization since they are at the frontline in caring for children's well-being and development (Rico & Jennings, 2012). Family structure and resources are key determinants for children's future outcomes. The family plays a tremendous role in children's learning and growth and in providing them future opportunities (Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2014; Pacheco, 2008). For such significance, scholars focused on the family and its impact on children's

political socialization, as it is considered the foundation in providing political orientations and values for children (Jennings et al., 2009; Achen, 2002; Wolak, 2009). Allen and Bang (2015) highlighted family political orientation and its role in shaping children's future political beliefs and behavior. Hence, the intense concentration on family forming children's political beliefs is based on western culture. Parents, particularly in America, aim to protect their children from contrary political values that they do not endorse (Shulman & DeAndrea, 2014). Parents' political objective is to streamline political messages according to their own views, as it corresponds to their political values (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009; Rico & Jennings, 2012). It is with this Western perspective that family/parents are considered to be the governing entity of children's political orientation. This cultural view of parents being the gatekeepers in children's political orientation is defused in the political socialization line of research in which the primary examination of children's political socialization is the family. This assumption has been perpetuated in identifying the political patterns within the family with little consideration to the interactions of the multiple contents of the child. In this notion, parents are the engines of children's political orientation; this perception is examined through political value similarity between parents and children (Beck & Jennings, 1991; Diemer, 2012). Parents' political views are seen as a proxy to their children's political view (Bloemraad & Trost, 2008). Brady, Veba, and Schlozman (1995) argued that it is a myth to assume that parents shape their children's political orientation. McDevitt and Kiousis (2014) unpacked this notion and suggested that "parents do not directly shape political orientations; instead, they share with children environments that reinforce parent attitudes in diffusive orientations such as trust in institutions" (p. 20). The living proximity of parent–child enhanced in similar social, economic, and political experiences grants dissemination of parents' political views to their children. The medium of transmission of political views is the learning behavior from the parents to the child. Parent–child political similarity is due partly to learning behavior that parents demonstrate to children and conducted through modeling supported by the shared political and social experiences. The shared experiences with modeling create a conducive environment for children to adopt parents' political orientation. To test the extension of political similarity between family members, Jennings et al.'s (2009) study covered three generations. The first generation was studied in 1973 and their children were surveyed in 1982, and the offspring of the third youngest generation completed the survey in 1997. The data revealed that the

first two generations have similar political views, and their production of political concerns was comparable. However, the third generation did not continue with the same line of political views of the first and second generations. The reason presented for such political disruption is the peripheral family environments embedded in national political circumstances, the changes in family structure, and the impact of media. In a way, the findings showcase the intergenerationality component of reconceptualizing age and the impact of the relationship between generations in adopting political similarities. Apparently, parents and children endorsed similar political orientation as long as both generations experienced relatively the same social and political circumstances. This is exemplified in many of the journaling participants' writings; for example, one 14-year-old female from a city, in discussing Al-Nakseh with her father, said:

> ...today is Al-Nakseh Day [when Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967], and the anniversary of the Arab-Israel war. I asked my father about it, he was 18 years old at that time, and he said Israel's forces entered our city in 6/6/1967, they expelled many people, and they took Kariat Arba'a [the current name of an Israeli settlement near Hebron] and built a settlement on their land. At that time my uncles were studying abroad, all people who studied abroad didn't get an ID so they couldn't enter Palestine. Then I turned to my mother she told me that everyone took his belongings and escaped, her family were preparing to leave when her father said: no, whatever happens I will not leave my home and my land.

Another participant, a 15-year-old female from a city, mentioned:

> I asked my grandma to tell me about Tomb of the Patriarchs' massacre [the Tomb of the Patriarchs is a mosque, and the massacre took place in 1994]. I love her stories and when she tell me about her childhood. In the dawn they woke up on the sounds of rockets and bullets, and klaxons, also there were many people screaming. They went outside to know what happened. People told them that a settler did a massacre in Tomb of the Patriarchs, the killer name is Gold Shtaien, and he killed all the people who were praying in the Tomb of the Patriarchs. Ambulances came to move injured to the hospital. Israel's forces besieged the hospital and shot the people there, so the numbers of martyrs increased. Mosques called everybody to donate blood. Many children were crying because they were afraid. Palestinians suffered, and will suffer again. We are sure the victory will come one day.

Both these participants share the same (or at least similar) socio-political climate with their parents and grandparents regarding the Israeli occupation. The 14-year-old participant, only a couple of journal entries after the one above, said, "I hope that one day when I turn on the news channel I will not hear news of death…the whole world is silent, and is not even condemning Israel for what it has done in Palestine, particularly Gaza," while the 15-year-old participant, only a month later, wrote, "we spent two classes out to speak about Gaza in the school radio…so many people were killed, the martyrs number reached 64…I felt like I'm in a war." This shared historical narrative across generations within Palestine may be somewhat unique to regions experiencing prolonged conflict and oppression but serves as a powerful example of the effect of both the micro (family) and macro (community and environment) and an individual's political socialization. Moreover, while generations in Palestine do share the same historical contexts in terms of the occupation, certain events and experiences may differ across generations, as the same 15-year-old female participant noted, "My mother told me when she was at university she was able to take a taxi, while now Israel prevents us from going out because they closed the road. There is news to reopen it but this is impossible."

Focusing on external elements without investigating the political communication in the family as an element for parents' shaping children's political orientation might eliminate other dynamics in the process and the connection of intergenerationality outside the family setting. Dinas (2013) in his research disputed the partisan identification between parent–child and argued that there might be a tendency for adolescents to adopt their parents' political views, but this similarity is dispersed with the child's experience. However, Dinas (2013) and Jennings et al. (2009) emphasized that the lack of consistency in the political environment over generations is one of the variables of children shifting their political views, especially those who were raised in highly politicized household. Apparently, the home sphere of political discussion has facilitated future children's views on political issues. Palestinian youth's political agency interacted with the intergenerational narrative that is rooted in the historical oppression by the Israeli colonization, as seen in the above quotes from two separate journal participants.

Shulman and DeAndrea (2014) suggested to further unpack the parent–child political similarities notion and questioned whether the communication of political messages constitutes an endorsement of the parents' political orientation of a shift. This raises the issues whether there is a specific

style of communication that supports political transmission from parent to child (Sapiro, 2004). Does a particular style of political communication allow children to continue adopting parents' political views for longer duration compared to another? Shulman and DeAndrea (2014) suggested that communication style of parents may be a unit of analysis to understand parents forming children's political orientation. McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) suggested that children, especially immigrant children, who are raised in an authoritative family structure tend to endorse parents' political views. Seemingly, the examination of communication of political message grants the emphasis of reevaluating parents' role in children's political orientation (Diemer, 2012; Ekström & Östman, 2013; McFarland & Thomas, 2006; McIntosh, Hart, & Youniss, 2007; Östman, 2013; Sapiro, 2004). This proposition is significant since the results of Jennings et al.'s (2009) study yield that the second generation of highly politicized families were susceptible to their parents' views and inclined to adopt them to a certain point of time to change to another political orientation compared with less politicized families who did not change their political affiliations from their parents. The political alteration is expected in highly politicized groups that immersed in the political change; therefore, this group corresponds to the political realities. Conversely, the explanation of the *lack* of children's political shift from parents' political views might be due to "low levels of parental politicization, however, may foster more affect-laden partisan orientations" (Dinas, 2013, p. 849). Evidently, varieties of political communication can render a different outcome in which parents' political views are not the only disposition in children's political orientation. Children's political similarity with their parents is due to shared socio-cultural and political experience among families; this political similarity is enforced by the imposition of communication style. In addition, consistently emphasizing the assumption that parents are the engines of children's political orientation is to not only denying children their agency, but also endorsing a singular model of family that is nuclear, while denying the diversity of family structure(s) in cross-cultural political environments.

REIMAGINING THE PARENTAL EFFECT

The enormous emphasis on family as part of the children's political orientation should be evaluated (Arnon, Shamai, & Llatov, 2008; Ekström & Östman, 2013; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2011; McDevitt & Kiousis, 2014; Shulman & DeAndrea, 2014 and more); children's political

orientation is no longer solely shaped by parents' political views (Brady et al., 1995; Habashi, 2013, others). Other elements influence children's political socialization that is embedded in the dialectic relationship of their agency with classroom, peers, medial, community, socio-economic environment, and global/local discourse that might correlate negatively with parents' political views. The alternative understanding of parents shaping children's political orientation is through appreciating children inherent political agency and its constant interactions with multiple contexts and generations (Andolina, Jenkins, Zukin, & Keeter, 2003; Pacheco, 2008; Taló, Mannarini, & Rochira, 2013). The affirmation of children's political agency allows for observing and identifying children's political views. However, children armed with contrary political values from their parents might alter family's political orientation. McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) argued against the traditional perspective that parents form children's political orientations, as it ignores the "trickle-up influence" whereby children contribute to parents' political orientation and behavior. The notion that the influence is unidirectional in the top-down model does not recognize children's agency role to render adults' political orientation. Wong and Tseng (2008) argued that children of low-income immigrants tend to influence their parents' political views. The "trickle-up influence" was also supported by Pinquart and Silbereisen (2014) findings, but in regard of knowledge filtered by technology. Young generation tends to be familiar with technology more than their parents, and technology is a medium of political learning in that it can enhance communication of children's political views to parents. In 2006, children mobilized their parents in California to engage in political activities after learning about the political status of immigrants from peers in high school. Parents joined with children in rallies calling for immigrant rights and encouraged their parents to take part too (Bloemraad & Trost, 2008). Terriquez (2015) interviewed individuals ranging in age from 18 to 26 years who attended California high school and came from immigrant families that did not promote political engagement. The results show that parents' lack of engagement does not correlate with their children's political engagement. The lack of parents' political interest was not the supposition or children's political engagement. On the contrary, children's political activities altered parents' political outlook and they joined the former in their political activities. This research is the evidence of the gap in the top-down model embedded in parents directing children's political socialization but an affirmation of the trickle-up influence. Hence, the top-down or the "trickle-up influence" does not deny

parent's role of political orientation; on the contrary, it allows for dynamic political conversations that are traditionally denied. The acknowledgment of children's agency and its contribution to parents' political orientation is due to children's attentiveness to the public discourse and to the political stimuli that are shared with the family (Dinas, 2013). Bloemraad and Trost (2008) stated, "adolescents are viewed as especially ripe for political socialization because they are becoming increasingly aware of the political world around them as they develop their sense of self and identity" (p. 511). Conversely, it positions youth agency as active in parents' political socialization. It is this perspective that framed the dual political socialization (Bloemraad & Trost, 2008; Martinez, 2010; Zaff et al., 2008). Children have innate political ability that situates them to be political agents; this is evident when they engage in local/global discourse. McDevitt and Kiousis (2014) studied families of four counties in the USA (Maricopa County, Arizona; El Paso County, Colorado; and Palm Beach and Broward Counties, Florida) over 3 years with a 491 set (982) of parents and children in 11 or 12 grade in 2002, 288 set (576) of respondents in 2003, and 187 set (374) of respondents in 2004. Fifty-seven percent of them were females. Half of the parents reported they had completed a college degree and the range of ethnicity gauged 64 % white, 12 % of Hispanic descent, 7 % Black, 3 % of Asian descent, and 13 % "other." The purpose of this was to measure the contribution of youth to active parenting throughout the election campaigns, and how attention to the media inside of the home and class discussion about political matters affects this measurement. The results yielded evidence that the youth behaviors throughout the election campaign motivated active political parenting in the home during these elections, provoking a parental response and, therefore making the parent and child "agentic partners" in the political socialization process. The "agentic partners" for the Palestinian political agency is the community and family narratives and daily experiences of political oppression that is a continuous reality through generations. Habashi (2013) cited that Palestinian youth learned about collective members through family narratives that illustrated history, generational hope, and oppression. The family narrative cements youth political agency as a 15-year-old female from a city indicated the following:

> Today I will write about Palestinian history, a history I didn't live in but can write about this subject because I know many details about it, as if I was part of it because many people talk about that subject, and it has many affects in our

daily lives. We are Palestinians, they call us displaced people sometimes, and sometimes they call us refugees, all this as a result for what happened in 1948 and 1967. When Palestinians displaced from their own lands because of the Jewish gangs. These gangs did psychological warfare for our citizens, they slaughtered and killed many people. Also many people fled, they thought they would return to their villages and cities in a few days. So they took their home keys, some people put the keys on the door's edge, or in the flower pots. Unfortunately, we didn't return, but still we have hope. We will return from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and we will fight and serve our homeland.

Children are inherently exposed to multiple political issues and realities that vary from parents' experiences and can present alternative perspective to children's political orientation. This is coupled with non-static social and cultural structures, as well as local/global political interaction that deemed parents' political orientation as obsolete. It seems the top-down model sanctions homogenous parental views and assumes a static family social structure, and any change in child's political orientation is due to outside political and economic factors. The disparity in this perspective is the random discussion of the diversity of the parents' views of political orientation (Fitzgerald & Curtis, 2012). It is critical to embrace the notion that in families parents do not always share the same political views and, therefore, children are conferred with a singular political orientation. In addition, intergenerational relationships that children experience within the family and outside challenge youth agency and political similarities with the parents (Healy & Malhotra, 2013). Homogeneity of political views in the family is not always the case, not because both parents might not have the same political views but because the concept of family has changed over time, as there are many one-parent households, cross-generational families, mixed cultural and ethnic families, and extended family households (Randall, Coast, & Leone, 2011) that have impacted the formation of youth political agency. In return, the diversity of family structures as part of intersectionality tends to deeply influence diverse political views surrounding children. Intersectionality is embedded in family and youth ethnicity, socio-economic status, education, location, political status, and other identifiers. Multiple social markers are reflected in the children's agency and their responses to social and political issues (Arnon et al., 2008; Owens, Rochelle, Nelson, & Montgomery-Block, 2011; Taló et al., 2013). It is this interaction that intersects with the life course premise of reconceptualizing age that impacts youth agency. Allen and Bang (2015) identified diversity in

political views and interactions within families living in France. The researchers identified whether the mother or father was of European descent and how likely they were to participate in conventional politics; the family's ethnicity impacted the children's views, particularly of the daughters. For example, if the father had European background and the mother was from another ethnicity, the daughter tended to be more politically active than if the mother and not the father was European. The intersectionality is in the social identifier of what is considered "mainstream" and how the mainstream interacts with the local political structure. When the "household" belongs to the mainstream culture, children are encouraged to participate in conventional and electoral politics compared to children whose household is not part of the mainstream. The intersectionality of ethnicity as a social identifier cannot facilitate conclusive interactions with the political structure. Children from minorities tend to be politically active in different ways such as in rallying, petitioning, boycotting, and so on (Gordon & Taft, 2011). Social identifiers impact youth agency and its interactions with intergenerationality and over the life course. For example, ethnicity can position political status occupied by youth, parents, and endorsement of political activity. The lack of conventional participation by the parents does not reflect lack of children's political interest—but on the contrary. The family homogeneity on political views might not be always the case due to intermarriage, political status of a parent, and ethnicity. It is this diversity that interacts with children's and youth's political agency. The family, culture, and political structure position the response in which the youth process political socialization and demonstrate their agency. The discrepancy is in the assumption that parents are directing children's political agency. Youth agency should be examined in relationship to other community contents. The interaction between community and family is congruous on political processing of the local/global community, as it is no longer filtered by the family or parents (Habashi, 2013; Kallio & Häkli, 2011; Katz, 2004). Community politics is extended in family dynamics and family is the mirror of the community (Pacheco, 2008). Conversely, the politics and culture are equally presented in the community and family. Spellings, Barber, and Olsen (2012) explained how family politics mirror community politics in their study of the political activism of a large sample of Palestinian youth during the time of the first Intifada (1987–1993). The study explained the interconnectedness of community socio-economics with family resources and the same with cultures and youth political agency. Youth agency is subjected and subjugated by the

socio-economic status of the micro/macro, Israeli occupation, and culture. It is the interface between family and community that transpires into youth political agency.

IMPACT OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT

The complexity of community political socialization of children and youth is presented in the interconnectedness and connection over multiple environmental contexts. Community is not a single sphere that can be narrowed to a separate analysis; instead, it has multiple entities with vast interactions of organizations, street politics, ideologies, cultures, families, national identity, and narratives, as well as government institutions and legislations (Weise et al., 2008). It is these interactions that make it essential to conceptualize the intertwined effect of youth political agency and participation and community activities. Youth political agency is constantly subjected and subjugated through these structures and interactions (Habashi, 2013; Hörschelmann, 2008). Jian and Jeffres (2008) research focused on parents' workplace efficacy and its spillover on political process, community participation, voting, and campaigning. The findings revealed that "it is possible that participation in decision making at work cultivates a pattern or habit to involvement in collective events" (p. 46). The spillover is exclusive to the individual but can include family political outlook. It is the interaction with intergenerationality that facilitates the connectedness of several community contexts. One example that illustrates such connectedness is found in understanding Palestinian youth narratives of the community, family, and agency through people rallying for rights of other individuals, as a 14-year-old female participant from a village wrote, "Today there was a demonstration in Hebron because the decision of closing the orphanages. Foreigners gathered to support these orphans and there were many speeches. There were many demonstrations to support 4000 orphans. Also they did interviews with many children to see their reactions. I remembered when my cousin who studies in Al-Shari'a School saying that there are many orphans who don't have shelters so they sleep in the school, so when the school closes, where will the orphans sleep?" Another example of the interactions of youth and community is embedded in the response to the community members' activities that do not necessarily align with youth agency's views, as is seen in the same female youth's following writing, "Today was a comprehensive strike in universities and schools in the West Bank and

Gaza. Unfortunately, students were so happy because of the strike, and they didn't know the reason for it, the strike was because of the atrocities by the occupation in Gaza. It was not a holiday, but a strike, for the students." The community's role in shaping youth political agency is not merely a top-down model, though it is perceived this way by governments and the United Nations to form future generations and citizenship in global world (Bank, 2008; Davies, 2006). Also, children's political agency in the community is not merely a "trickle-up" affect. Community shapes youth agency by providing political opportunity to become leaders of public institutions while agency injects community with youth concerns and objectives. Intergenerationality and intersectionality are evident in the relationship between community and youth political socialization. The interaction is based on each one refining the other through their political interest. Youth can transform institutions and political structure to address current political and social issues (apathy reference). Conversely, there is a dual effect of the community political socialization and agency whereby they are impacting each other, as they are explicitly shaped by the relationship of political structure and volatility over time (Ginwright & James, 2002; Jarrett, Sullivan, & Watkins, 2005).

Children, youth, and community who are experiencing a warlike situation differ in political agency participation and interaction with the community and public institutions compared with their counterpart living in modern democracy with relative stable political structure (Rabaia, Saleh, & Giacaman, 2014; Spellings et al., 2012; Wadsworth, 2013). However, it is difficult to implicitly endorse such distinction since some communities in modern democratic society have warlike conditions. Hence, the distinction in this discussion is based merely on youth living in a stable political structure such as in Western democracy or those living in a political upheaval and colonization such as Palestinian–Israeli occupation. The interaction of youth agency in a warlike situation is manifested in linear and nonlinear interactions and processes. This complex reality requires urgency to examine the community as evolving dynamics that is shaped by youth agency, culture, poverty, political discourse, geopolitics, and national narratives as well as violence. Habashi and Worley's (2009) work delineated the interaction of the community as it is formed in the global and local politics. Youth are not sheltered from the Israeli occupation. Israeli oppression is present in their daily experience as it shapes their youth political agency. Katz (2004) found that global politics is a constant interaction on youth agency and community, as one 15-year-old female participant from a city

related the American election to the Palestinian cause and other regional conflict by writing:

> The American's election has ended and the result is Obama won. We Palestinians were so happy, and we hope that he will have a positive attitude toward us and Iraq. I was with Obama because he will stop the war, he wants peace in the world. I was against the other candidate because had he won, the war would have continued for a hundred years, and that would have been unfair. America committed many atrocities in Iraq; they killed many scholars, and imprisoned them without charges. Also, children were made orphans.

The global/local discourse is embedded in the community resources that interact with different local and international narratives. The intergenerationality embedded in the local/global discourse is manifested in Palestinian community as it expresses a global dimension. Streets, neighborhoods, and space mirrored the community in the local/global discourse and its relationship with youth agency. Bayat (2013) argued that during the Arab spring, streets were the community centers where youth leaders mobilized other groups from different generations while focusing on the message. Streets are used as a medium of communication that connects with other organizations and local/global politics. For the Palestinian youth, streets reflected the local/global discourse that inflected oppression as one 14-year-old female participant from a village described community life over time, "Then, we went to the old city and there was a small party as part of the activities, the old city streets were empty, I remembered when I was five or six years old, the streets were full of markets and people were so happy, but now it is like a ghost city: there are no human voices and no sounds, the mice are under our feet, there are mosquitos, and the smell of sewage fills the streets. Regardless, the streets and buildings are beautiful, archaeological sites. This is God's wisdom." Another example where youth expressed the reality of the Israeli apartheid policy in Hebron in the streets is found in the following quote from a 15-year-old female participant, "We found a clearing to play football. Other boys used to play football on the street, but this street is empty because only Jewish settlers can cross it. My mother told me when she was at university she used that road, now Israel prevents us from using it, because it is closed. There is news to reopen it, but this is impossible. They will never leave Tal Al-Rmidah, Al-Shalalah and Al-Shohada streets. Because these streets are the main streets to their settlements." Streets and roads reflect the community narrative, but they

can also reflect the youth's political aspiration, as they want to reinvent the street with their agency.

Another 14-year-old female participant from a city noted, "The vacation has come and I have participated in Partners for Sustainable Development (PSD) in a project as a volunteer, this year was not like the last years because it was community-based initiatives. They divided us into 5 groups, each group has one week to bring up an initiative, and our initiative was to plant olive trees in the old city. The initiative's name was (A large tree, a great Solidarity), after a long time of discussion we persuaded them of our idea and we told them that this initiative was so important for the old city residents, this is to tell them that we didn't forget you." Community interaction with agency is extended to spatial dimensions that expressed political messages and space for political discourse.

The interactions of youth with the community are contiguous on resources and processes. Political structure of the community influences institutions, activities, and youth political agency outcome. For example, Allen and Bang (2015) researched the ecological premise and youth political engagement in modern democracy whereby community encompasses youth participation in formal and informal civic engagement embedded in the teaching, voting, and tolerance of differences while engaging in community activities. This notion of youth participation in community is examined through voting, decision-making, and volunteerism (Christens & Dolan, 2011). Youth are considered a valuable social capital and to shape such recourses, the community builds a network of economic resources and increases access to knowledge and cultural capital (Duke, Skay, Pettingell, & Borosky, 2008). The implementation of programs emphasizes a needed partnership of youth and community, as youth respond as active, empowered members inside of their community by engaging not only in civic behaviors such as voting and participating in school-related activities but also in leadership-related behaviors such as volunteering and donating time to community service as a means of taking personal responsibility for social issues in the community itself (Camino & Zeldin, 2002; Duke et al., 2008). This approach is focused on the top-down model of political socialization to shape youth political socialization that parallels the government's ideology (Eagles & Davidson, 2001; Watts & Flanagan, 2007) to ensure continuity and support without measuring and considering youth political agency outside the parameter of the community program. The interactions are linear and not dynamic. Hence, the most dominant approach for measuring youth political participation is through the electoral

process (Fisher, 2012). This focus limits the scope of youth political agency and fails to highlight the political work of agency especially if youth are younger than the age of voting (Gordon & Taft, 2011). Christens and Dolan (2011), Yates and Youniss (1998), Diemer (2012), and Jarrett et al. (2005) provided examples of successful young youth engagement in community that is founded on strategies and advocacy for social change. One 14-year-old female participant from a village wrote of her time visiting a local Palestinian non-profit center and how being active in the community has positively impacted her outlook by saying, "Since I began coming here (to the Community Center) I have improved in expressing myself, reclaiming my rights, and I know many things about my future and my present. I wish to become a famous artist in the camp, Jenin, and in Palestine." This is achieved through training youth to participate in decision-making and community organization to promote youth concerns. These organizations are galvanized to drive momentum about an issue that might not be on a government agenda (Gonxales, 2008; Terriquez, 2015). The notion is to instill youth with community methods such as campaigning and decision-making that can be used to achieve their agenda. This approach is contrary to the traditional youth community engagement that only endorses an adult agenda (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Ødegård, 2007). Examples around this exercise are highlighted in mock election, youth council, and leadership programs (Ludden, 2011) that ignore youth agency but assume that these trainings will ensure high voting trajectory in future election and intense community engagement (Gutierrez, 2001; Mainieri & Anderson, 2015). On the other hand, programs that are based on youth political agency are working with the community on issues related to youth concern such as with immigration, schools, equality, and others by showing their future electoral power in councils and rallies (Gonxales, 2008; Terriquez, 2015). Youth interface in community activities infuses behavior associated with political process such as facilitating meetings and decision-making that is required in public. It is this interaction that forms the dual conception of community and political agency. The interaction is based on each one refining the other through their political interest.

Youth agency in this context is subjected and subjugated to community resources. Hence, youth are evolving with community organizers by utilizing resources to rework the system to achieve their agenda. It is this form of youth agency embedded in reworking methods employed traditionally by adults that is identified to achieve their political aspirations. In a way, youth agency prescribed to adults' political methods but not agenda. Youth used

the adult methodology but argued for their view as one 15-year-old female participant from a city stated:

> The school principal chose girls to participate in a project. Its name was Student Partnership, and this project will last for 2 years. This was the first meeting with the project manager to set goals and to know our duties. We had many suggestions and all of them were good, but we all agreed on the cinema for children project. They disagreed because some people will object, but we insisted to on doing it. One week passed, and we had elections. I hoped to be the president of the forum, but the difference between my friend (Shirin) and me was 5 voices, so I became the officer of the human resource department.

No doubt are youth part of the community and have the ability to be active members with a distinct agenda. Therefore, it is important to be cautious about concluding that youth participation would correlate with future voting or community belonging. Taló et al. (2013) emphasized the need to mystify the assumption that youth who participate in community civic program would have a high level of community satisfaction because youth who are contented with the political structure do not necessarily correlate to youth who overwhelmingly participate in community programs. Since there is no relationship between youth participation, Fisher (2012) aimed to identify community elements to bridge between community youth activism and voting behavior. This lack of correlation is echoed in Terriquez's (2015) research in which there is no evidence of translating youth participation in organized community programs and civic curricula activities into future political participation–or electoral. However, the intention of such programs is to achieve high participation in government structure. The [lack of] interaction between community advocacy and engagement in government political structure is explained by Gordon and Taft (2011), who found that youth, especially minorities, who engage in political advocacy, express lack of trust in the system because the system does not make any adjustments to their social justice concerns, thus impacting the outcome of the election. The disconnect in youth participation in different community processes is actually a reflection of the comprehension of the continuous interaction between policies and realities. Youth political agency realized that political structure in the community and nation does not serve youth's concerns, as a 14-year-old male participant from a village discussed using a two-dimensional approach, "In my opinion what happened between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza and Beirut is useless, I am afraid of a Palestinian civil war, they do not pay

attention to public concerns. They are fighting to get the chair." The political structure interacts with the internal affair of the Palestinian community and youth agency recognized that fight between Hamas and Fatah is destructive to their lives. The disconnect might be seen in lack of agency participation in such communities. Hence, to perceive it as a lack of participation is not accurate because youth rejection is a method of participation and an evidence of reflecting on political knowledge of community structure to their everyday living. Youth are able to comprehend the interactions between power structure, social policies, and their realities to which they do not always correlate positively (Chan, Ou, & Reynolds, 2014; Diemer, 2012; Eagles & Davidson, 2001; Flanagan, Syvertsen, Gill, Gallay, & Cumsille, 2009; Yates & Youniss, 1998). Amna et al. (2009) emphasized the understanding of youth political socialization by conceptualizing the relationship between community processes and contents of subjugation and subject of youth agency over time. The interactions are embedded in youth agency as it is carried from one context to another. In addition, these interactions between youth agency and community over time alter the static notion of political structure. Experiences gained by youth throughout the political interaction about the limitation of community processes and the impact on their lives might stimulate an alternative political participation that is not prescribed by the community structure (Berry, 2008; Cammaerts, Bruter, Banaji, Harrison, & Anstead, 2014; Ginwright & James, 2002). Fisher (2012) articulated activism outside the prescribed community political structure and recommended that the youth energy can be demonstrated by voting. The notion is to validate the culture of youth participation within the system, without considering the agency's political urgency. The proposition is that there is a culture for change through the electoral process and linking the community concern with policies and therefore these processes should reflect the ecological interconnectedness and youth interaction. Hence, this might not be equally endorsed by youth agency because they recognized that political and social change does not materialize merely by supporting community processes. Evidence of the youth agency is in comprehension of the interaction between their concern, policy and reality, and the lack of transformation in community structure. Youth's experience(s) with the community shaped their agency and, in return, they want to shape the community structure by participating in activism. However, youth activism is a reinvention of structural processes that correspond with the limitation of political structure and aim to constitute social change (Godfrey & Grayman, 2014; Watts & Flanagan, 2007). Agency activism can take several forms that reflect different concerns and the interconnectedness of the process. Chapter 9

aims to elaborate on several forms of youth activism and its relationship with several power structures. Seemingly, the interaction between community structure and youth political agency in a warlike situation is not as persuasive as in a stable community. One of the common dominators is that youth political agency is subjected to, and subjugated by, the community structure; hence, youth living in a community experiencing war has to emerge with sheer entanglement of social, cultural, and political propositions.

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Social Identifiers: Making Meaning of Intersectionality

I want to share an example: a girl goes out at night. If the family needs bread at night, what is the problem if the girl goes and gets it from the supermarket. In my opinion, there are a lot of people against that [girls leaving the house on their own at night] and even during daylight she should go with her brother, why [do they] restrict her; this will lead to her [getting angry and resisting] and she will not listen to her parents. This happened here, 30 girls from Hebron fled from their houses monthly, this was expected because of [the restrictions imposed]. If they give girls freedom and trust them, they [the girls] will be trustworthy.

—15-year-old female from a city

Many Palestinian women were killed as a reason due to family honor. This is without hearing the victims' perspective, these innocent women. These actions are still [part of] the Palestinian traditions as part of shame-washing and cleansing the family. A man in Gaza killed his daughter because her breach of family honor. He strangled her… then he called the police. After an investigation the police proved that she is virgin, she was innocent. This is one story, there are many stories of innocent women who were killed without any sin.

—15-year-old female from a city

THE ROLE OF SOCIAL IDENTIFIERS AS A POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION ELEMENT

The contextualization of the social and political conditions of the environment in social studies has been a tradition that necessitates the understanding of the issue at hand. Demographic factors such as ethnicity, religion, race, education level, geographic location, participant age, gender, sexuality, and cognitive ability are social identifiers significant to describing the research subjects. Providing information about individual identifiers is considered a standard exercise that serves in framing the research. Data on social identifiers is no longer part of any specific academic field; rather, they are also incorporated in hard science. The information on social identifiers is included because an individual and his or her agency has multiple social identifiers that shape the interaction and relationship with events and social issues. Linkedin and O'Loughin (2015) emphasized that "Political behaviors such as voting decisions, conflict about territorial control, political boundary delineation and demarcation, and public good provision and allocation are a function of constellation of influences and mix aggregate and individual factors at scale ranging from the locality to the national and international" (pp. 189–190). Therefore, the contextualization of the mutable environment characteristics perceived in poverty, war, school safety, access to nutrition, health, education, geopolitics, and others is to recognize how participants experience the local and global environmental conditions according to their social identifiers (Caughy et al., 2013; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; Habashi & Worley, 2014; Marshall, 2014; Netland, 2012). The different layers in an individual's environment coupled with the unique, varied social identifiers particular to that individual create a diversity of experiences that can lead to multiple reactions and ways in which that individual uses his or her agency. Social identifiers embedded in the intersectionality of the nature of age make us *who we are* while interacting with the environment, events, and intergenerationality (Hopkins & Pain, 2007). Political agency is predicated on the interaction between different social identifiers with the diverse environments/events settings and with different age groups in each context. The ecological theory suggests that youth political agency is shaped by the environment, by which youth are subjugated; (Hörschelmann, 2008); however, the relationship is contingent on individual social identifiers (Habashi, 2013). The interaction between the environment and *who we are* is dynamic and dialectic in nature, as one shapes the other. Social identifiers interact with events and create meaning

dependent on responses of environment and the connotation associated with each social identifier. For example, political agency of minority youth differs in accessing the power structure compared to youth belonging to mainstream culture (Allen & Bang, 2015; Gordon & Taft, 2011; Lay, 2005). However, the outcome might also be different if the youth is a minority that belongs to upper middle class. Each youth constitutes multiple social identifiers that provide nuances of meaning to the subject and subjugated political agency. Alternatively, the dynamic relationship between social identifiers, intergenerationality, and events in the ecological theory creates a complex meaning of youth political socialization; thus, social identifiers and the interactions in the ecological theory challenges homogeneity of youth political agency. Therefore, this chapter focuses on several social identifiers (gender, social class, location, and culture/ethnicity) as they help to define the evolution of youth agency and its interaction with the environment. It is critical to show the multiple layers of social identifiers to understand how youth interact with their socio/political/cultural environments and how this impacts their agency. This would decode political socialization and provide an alternative view of youth political agency.

Intersectionality of the Cultural/Political Environment and Social Identifiers

Gordon and Taft (2011), Allen and Bang (2015), Lay (2005), Quintelier (2009), and Attar-Schwartz and Ben-Arieh (2012) argued that ethnicity, political and socio-economic status, culture, a country's political structure, and gender are social identifiers and have a significant impact on children's and youths' political agency. Social identifiers craft the interactions within the community's different contexts. A social identifier is a disposition that is integrated within an individual's agency and identity and therefore forms different interactions. Therefore, it is important to look at individuals considered as minority, as minorities' political agency has to embrace two acts simultaneously: combatting cultural discrimination while ensuring their voice is heard. Flanaga, Syverten, Gill, Gallay, and Cumsille (2009) researched the impact of prejudice on minority adolescents as it is related to cultural awareness and national identity in the USA. The study found that minorities' youth embrace their cultural identity regardless of whether having individual experience of prejudice or not. The assumption that minority youth become aware of their cultural heritage only if they

experience prejudice is inadequate. In addition, the research found that some youth did not view government as being fairly equal to all minorities due to personal and family experience of prejudice. Cultural awareness strengthened youth identity, but prejudice hindered the positive view about the government. African American and other minority groups indicated that US government does not treat all groups equally due to ethnicity. This notion was also echoed by the work of Chong and Kim (2006), who hypothesized that social and economic mobility of minorities might enhance equal status and political participation. Individuals who were permeable in the economic opportunities tend to have racial identity as a secondary compared to economic success. Race as a social identifier represented a unique interaction with the political structure. The analysis supported that "racial and ethnic group interests is strengthened by the failure of society to equality of opportunity and weakened by favorable experiences of economic status" (p. 348). If race constrains economic opportunities for minorities, it equally limits political opportunity. Structural barriers hindered minorities' mobility, by which political participation tend to be based on group solidarity for a collective interest. The intersectionality of race frames political agency and aspiration. For example, African American political agency as practiced in the Civil Rights movement shows how a community with the same social identifier comes together to challenge the political system's discrimination against them based on that identifier. Political participation is subjected and subjugated by the systemic racism embedded in the system and the collective experience of solidarity (Chong & Kim, 2006).

The social identifier embedded in ethnicity framed youth political agency and its possibilities and limitations within the society and political socialization. Hopkins and Pain (2007) articulated that these social markers characterize the intersectionality and the intergenerationality interactions between children's agency and different contexts. This is evident in the work of Bloemraad and Trost (2008), in which minority children mobilized parents' generation to partake in the right of immigration rallies. The social identifiers of minorities' youth are embedded in the understanding of the systematic discrimination they face and of the dos and do nots early in their life compared to children who enjoy the privilege of the system (Fridkin, Kenney, & Crittenden, 2006; Quintelier, 2009). The disposition of this identifier is in the structural barriers that created the foundation of political agency and expectations of community involvement. Habashi (2013) identified refugee status as one social identifier of Palestinian political agency.

Palestinian history is rooted in a collective expulsion and displacement and the establishment of the State of Israel. The status of refugee is not associated with one generation; on the contrary, it is an identifier for third and fourth generations similar to the earlier generations, and this is due to youth utilizing their political agency to integrate the family narrative of their political status. The structural barrier of Israeli occupation is in the static and continuing oppression and frames youth as co-authoring historical memories. One 15-year-old female participant from a city notes, "Today I will write about Palestinian history, a history I didn't live in but can write about this subject because I know many details about it, as if I was part of it because many people talk about that subject, and it has many affects in our daily lives."

The narrative of refugees is part of the national discourse as inscribed in historical oppression and the first displacement of Palestinians in 1948, known as Al-Nakbeh, a 14-year-old female from a city noteed, "Today we had a celebration of Al-Nakbeh Anniversary [Palestinian catastrophe, 1948], and we all agreed to wear Palestine's Hattah [Keffiyeh] and we hold banners which we hung later on the school walls, and we dressed shirts inscribed with the right of return. This is how we remember our case by writing phrases on our hands or on the chalkboard." Being a refugee with a family narrative that passes on from one generation to another engraved a social identifier that impacted youth agency and interaction in the Palestinian community. Political status of refugees renders similar intersectionality of social identifiers as social and political status of minorities. Fridkin et al. (2006) argued that youth awareness of their ethnicity influences their understanding of politics and therefore political agency, "the power of children's experiences as represented by the crude of measures of ethnicity and race, appears to be related to several measures of engagement, even in the face of controls for family and school resources" (p. 619). Political awareness of their ethnicity is related to the structural barriers that tend to engage mainstream culture. Hence, it is a limited perspective to conclude that youth agency does not engage in politics. An example of such a political alienation embedded in the local/global political barriers is demonstrated in the reflection of a 14-year-old female participant from a village discussing a visit to her brother who is in Israeli jail for security reason. This participant exemplified political agency experiences that is shaped by daily life and interacts with the socio-political narrative:

I heard news about George Bush's visit to Palestine, and I was disappointed; how can he visit our holy land after he has killed killed thousands of Iraqis, and millions of Iraqi children have become orphans as a consequence. I was preparing for my brother's (Bashar) visit in the Israeli security jail; he was waiting for us. Today I went to school and I did two exams; one of them was supposed to be tomorrow. When I went to school, my friend (her father also is in Israeli's jail) told me that the visit was postponed because of Bush's visit. I was so upset because I couldn't visit my brother; I want to see him. We all Palestinians are disappointed with his official visit.

The political status of children from marginalized cultures tends to shape their participation in politics that is not conventional in its nature, as "students who tend to gravitate towards unconventional participation are also those who feel alienated" (Allen & Bang, 2015, p. 42). The social identifier, "Palestinian," alienated the previous participant from the political process and interacted with placing her brother in Israeli jail, while the global discourse of the Bush visit and its relation to Iraq also interacted with the participant's reality. Hence, social identifiers as associated with mainstream Western culture are embedded with youth that reflect their history, politics, and privilege (Fridkin et al., 2006). Family and youth that belong to such mainstream groups tend to participate in voting, civic engagement, and other political activities such as sending letters, petitioning, and others (Godfrey & Grayman, 2014; Hart & Kirshner, 2009; Talo, Mannarini, & Rochira, 2014). In a way, it corresponds to lack of minorities' participation with the mainstream politics and political process as they lack access to power structure (Gordon & Taft, 2011). Minorities are at a disadvantage compared to those who belong to the "mainstream," which defines their interactions with intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life course (Hopkins & Pain, 2007).

IMPACT OF CLASS AS A SOCIAL IDENTIFIER

Although there is an assumption that every individual can participate in the political process as a political right, this view might not correspond to reality as is evident in the class structure. Socio-economic status as a social identifier interacts with youth political agency, and tends to negatively impact families and children who are positioned in a lower socio-economic status, as they

are marginalized in the political process. Fisher (2012) perhaps best summarizes the general role that socio-economic status plays in political engagement: "for each kind of participation, affluence and activity go together" (p. 122). Leveling the process of youth political agency is not detectible because social identifiers of youth agency with political structure can be observed in relation to parents' income and level of education. Class is an integral part of youth agency as it is interrelated to other social identifiers. The class structure is an account of the state structural system, "the state system exists as a means through which class advantage may be reproduced" (Jeffrey, 2012, p. 64). To capture the influence of communication between state political structures, socio-economic status, and youth agency is to identify the government as a key player in youth political socialization. School curricula of civic engagements are employed as a tool to replicate the state ideology and political structure (Hart, Donnelly, Youniss, & Atkins, 2007; Levinson, 2010). This relationship is not disconnected with the premise of income, social class, and socio-economic status of youth. Pacheco and Plutzer (2008) conducted research on the relationship between students in disadvantaged schools, neighborhoods, and community and the impact of social politics set by the state in political mobility. They note, "neighborhoods characterized by high levels of poverty are unlikely to provide positive stimuli that might spur participations" (p. 576). The assumption is that government tools intended to disrupt the reproduction of poverty are perpetuating the same conditions of class system. The lack of poor people participating in elections tends to evoke the idea that the middle class and upper middle class are designing politics that preserves the cycle of maintaining the status quo (Fisher, 2012; Nall, 2015). It is apparent that the interrelationship between events and structure exemplifies the ecological theory's notion of the interconnectedness within the process of youth political socialization (Amna, Ekström, Kerr, & Stattin, 2009). The discussion of the agency of youth in a disadvantaged position should be contextualized in an ecological perspective whereby school, family, neighborhood, and community resources or lack thereof are social identifiers for youth's interactions with political structure. An example of such interactions is the experience a 15-year-old female participant from a city shared about unemployed parents:

> One month ago I heard a story of an unemployed father who lives in Jenin, and he borrowed 7500 NIS to release his son who is in one of the Israeli security jails, the father said that his son Ahmad, who is a prisoner, is 12 years old and scared. The Israeli government imposed a bail payment of 15,000 NIS; the

father promised to return the rest of money. But, until now, he hasn't paid back the rest of the money and has asked the international organizations and Palestinian Authority to support and help him to pay back the money for the lenders because he doesn't have money, he doesn't even have one shekel because he is unemployed and he added that his son is underage.

It seems that in this case, lack of income and low socio-economic status correlated with a lack of political access and further marginalization. On the other hand, a high-income family would have been able to pay without such hardship. Further, research has shown that higher income families tend to have political discussions at home that reflect the interconnection between school, family, neighborhood, and politics (Fridkin et al., 2006). van Deth, Abendschon, and Vollmar (2011) argued that children's political knowledge is associated with class structure; children from upper middle class show more concern about the environment compared to immigrants and minority children. The authors concluded that this stems from family political discussion due to their high level of education. This shows that another layer to the social identifier of class is education. Youth from highly educated families tend to be active in mainstream politics by prescribing to the system that is transmitted into youth agency. Class and education can facilitate political mobility whereby rich individuals who are educated have access to political power (Mankiw, 2013). Nguyen and Garand (2009) argued that partisan identification among Asian Americans regardless of the length of residence is founded on family income and political engagement. Education level is a factor but is tied to income and therefore political engagement in the mainstream. These findings mirror the relationship among the larger community. Pacheco and Lutzer (2008) showed that children from middle class and above tend to show competence in political process. Hence, they also argued that economic mobility could provide access to the power structure regardless of education. This notion complements Sapiro's (2004) assertion of "cues about citizenship norms depending on the predominant socioeconomic class of the students" (p. 16). It is worth noting that some scholars argued that class as a social identifier and its political implication is usually based on cultural bias because Gordon and Taft (2011) found that youth in disadvantaged communities can also challenge the political structure but not always through the prescribed political structure. The implication of such conclusions for

youth political agency is that socio-economic class is more impactful compared to education. The significance of socio-economic status as a subject of youth agency is echoed in the findings of Chong and Kim's (2006) work on the intersectionality of ethnicity and class, as they state, "economic status fails to diminish the salience of race and ethnicity among those who encounter frequent discrimination" (p. 348). An example would be that African American social identifiers associated with education and poverty produce different patterns of agency. Discriminatory criminal justice propositions against African Americans had an immense bearing on the community voter turnout, according to Bowers and Preuhs (2009). On the other hand, post-secondary education of Black youth enhances their engagement in political and civic activism in their community (Pacheco & Plutzer, 2008). There is an intergenerational effect from the intersectionality and interaction between different environment contents. Class and other cultural social identifiers tend to impact political expectations between cultural groups of political agency, as it is evident in the work of Gordon and Taft (2011). Their works show that it is hard for disadvantaged and/or minority youth who are exercising their political agency to politically mobilize white middle-class peers in social movements because these peers are insulated from the problems affecting the disadvantaged compared to peers in the working class who have experienced first-hand violence, poverty, and racial injustice. These socio-economic and cultural identifiers intersect with youth agency and their political knowledge and aspirations. This example for youth agency with low-income background is based on their perspectives, contrary to programs that are founded on the top-down model that perceive youth with such backgrounds lacking agency and needing programs to instill personal responsibility and teach collective participation (Lelieveldt, 2004). Ravensbergen and Vander-Plaat (2010) argued that social policies are barriers for change and individuals within the community have to prompt political change. Arab Americans became politically mobilized to vote especially after September 11; however, the increase was associated with high level of income and education. However, living in well-to-do areas that reflect high education level tend to correlate positively with voting registration compared to individuals living in immigrant neighborhoods (Cho, Gimple, & Wu, 2006). This research exemplified the interactions of intersectionality, intergenerationality, and community events including the general politics. The intersectionality of socio-economic status, education, and location was also discussed in the interconnectedness of immigrants in youth in Belgium. Quintelier (2009) analyzed immigrants on several social

identifiers such as income, education level, languages, gender, and ethnic identity in relation to political participation. The findings revealed that increased income led to an increase in political participation for immigrants. Furthermore, young women tend to participate in politics and a strong ethnic identity correlated positively with political participation. Language was not a factor in youth political agency. The purpose of Quintelier's (2009) research was to find out if immigrants are integrated in society. It is worth noting that the political implication of the socio-economic status identifier should not be based on cultural bias because it constantly intersects and interacts with other social identifiers to produce a range of outcomes contingent on events. It is important to note that the socio-economic structure as it is embedded in the political system can limit disadvantaged or minority youths' political agency, as they oftentimes do not promote the status quo.

The Intersectionality of Gender

Almost all political power, legislative bodies, party politics, and national political aspirations are gender specific. The conventional thought is that males have an innate and inherent characteristic to dominate political circles. Fluri (2015) argued that gender intersects with state ideology that "both physically and socially positioned women as reproducers rather than productive or political active" (p. 236). Women are encouraged to reject political life because it is assumed that women do not have the biological and intellectual capacity or interest (Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers, 2009; Paxton & Hughes, 2016). This focus excluded the structural barriers of not encouraging women in society to engage in public speaking or leadership. This is also enforced by policies, culture, workplace, and institutions (Segal, 2005), thus creating limited opportunity for women to engage in politics and encouraging women to engage in services that complement childcare and family (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004). Thus, the masculine political structure is a barrier with a cultural variation between Western and non-Western countries in which the status quo ignores women's engagement in politics as part of the norm but promotes it as an exception. The discussions of women in politics tend to be presented as an evolution that requires an awareness about gender equality without discussing the masculinity of the ideological structure (Gray, 2003; Krook, 2006) as one 14-year-old female from a village summarized, "All my problems are because I'm a female." Quintelier (2009) argued that women are not represented in the political

structure, though they tend to pay more attention to policies during elections compared to men (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004). Gender as a social identifier has been used as a political tool to enforce the masculine state and ideology and the dichotomous practice between genders by identifying which group identifies with which political party. The argument is that the social status of women is no longer defined in traditional patterns of domestic conventional roles but more in the experiences seen in being unmarried, divorced, or single parent or economically independent. These contemporary roles governed the direction of women political endorsement in which their alliance is based on comparable social policy (Edlund & Pande, 2002). Masculine political structure does not complement women's perspectives or needs and therefore women tend to not have a strong partisan identification compared to men (Hooghe & Stolle, 2004; Nguyen & Garand, 2009).

Traditional gender roles are crafted by masculine ideology and designed in dichotomy patterns of females and males socialization, including political socialization. This is evident as many countries with the support of global powers are moving toward changing the political culture by creating quotas to engage women in the political landscape. The quota strategy is to promote women's interest even in the face of the critique that there are not enough qualified women for such positions, or this quota structure is undemocratic (Gray, 2003; Htun, 2004). Hence, this practice is emerging to increase the presentation of women in legislation body and policies. The spread of adopting the quotas across nations is enhanced by the ideological connections and international politics that are defused in local debate (Jones, 2008; Krook, 2006). Jad (2010) described that the quota electoral structure was molded with combination of the conflict of the occupation in Palestine and cultural oppression that defines gender roles. Richter-Devroe (2008) argued that the Israeli occupation and daily oppression redefine the traditional role of gender in which female agency is equal to male agency even if it is different in some acts but not intention of liberation. The same 14-year-old female participant who discussed her problems as arising from her gender also articulated the significant role of women by naming women activists and explaining women's role:

> The importance of women's education [is that] women are half of society, it is the most important part of society, and society is like the bird and women are like its wings. So it can't fly without its wings. Women are the society and school. As Hafith Ibrahim said new generations should graduate from school,

so if the women are uneducated the society will be uneducated. Arab societies now recognize the importance of the woman and her role in life so they allow her to work and be a leader. Actually, women can be excellent if the conditions are right to help them. Many women have important roles in sports, politics, and arts, such as Helen Keller, Nawal Al-Sadawi, Huda Sharawi, and Fadwa Tuqan, and tens of other women.

Palestinian women's agency engaged in resisting Israeli occupation that reframed the gender roles. Holt (2003) argued that "Palestinian women are victims of violence, they are also agents, in the sense that they make choices and frequently act on their own behalf" (p. 224). Palestinian women agency is affected by violence even though women are discouraged to engage in fighting face to face against the Israeli occupation, yet violence is aimed against the Israeli occupation through imprisonment, torture, and harassment. Palestinian women's agency is dealing with the intergenerationality, events, and lifespan elements whereby they adhere to the cultural beliefs and exhibit political agency. For example, Palestinian women demonstrated suspension from retraining cultural norms as in wedding celebrations or social entertainment to show control over the immediate context and to participate in local politics against global and Israeli discourse (Habashi, 2013 and Jean-Klein, 2001). Women are still struggling to find the balance between *tradition* and *modernity* roles, as both the traditional ideologies in the community and Israeli occupation of violence are capitalizing on governing women through the discourse of family honor and religion. This struggle is demonstrated also in the relationship with the legislative body in the Palestinian Authority and grassroots leadership in the community. Hence, Holt (2003) concluded that Palestinian women's agency cannot be dismissed due to the experience and empowerment again during the intifada.

Depending on gender constructs and cultural norms, individuals living in different areas, regions, or countries may be socialized in different ways. Thus, the examination of gender as a social identifier needs be through unpacking the prescription of gender roles identified by state and cultural parameters (Traft, 2006). Therefore, analysis of gender as a social identifier should be not through an orientalist lens by enforcing cultural stereotype of Middle East women as *victims* that are waiting to be saved, but rather through a complex lens of identifying the interaction between political systems of global and local discourse and the national narrative that is contextualized in culture, geopolitics, and locations (Abu-Lughod et al.,

2001). In Palestinian society, gender constructs are framed within political oppression even if the perception is that males tend to take more active roles in the political sphere than females. Palestinian women have been politically active in the community and the resistance movement against Israeli occupation that has contributed to reconstruction of gender roles. While females and males may be politically socialized in different manners, both groups are socialized within the Israeli occupation. This leads to both females and males acting as resistant forces to the occupation, although the political actions might differ in nature (Marshall, 2015). Therefore, focusing on cultural perspectives, the prevailing discourse, it does not provide the understanding of the masculine structure that is embedded in roles, expectations, and leadership while engaging in a dialectic relationship with contents, space, and time. This non-linear perspective provides a nuance in assessing the gender discourse, and it complements the understanding of gender interactions and intergenerationality. A 14-year-old female from a village discussed the gender factor over time, as the participant explained how gender and age intersect with her visit to her brother in Israeli jail. Giacaman and Johnson (2013) stated that females, especially wives and sisters, are mediators between Palestinian male prisoners and their family. In February 2008, she wrote, "Yesterday my parents and my brother went to Ramallah to my brother's (Bashar) trial. I was so worried, how many years they will sentence him? I couldn't focus during school. I was thinking of him." Later the same month, she wrote,

> I woke up at dawn, at 4:30 am. Shatha and I will go to visit Bashar in the prison, I was so sleepy, I wanted to continue sleeping, but I woke up. My eyes were very red, what can I do? He is my lovely brother. I love him and I can't lose his visit because Shatha and I are the only ones who can visit him. The bus moved at 6:15 am, there was a bus going to Nafha prison and another to Al-Ramleh prison. We entered the bus, and the Red Cross employee came to check the birth certificates, IDs, and permissions. We forgot ours so we called my father to bring them. When my father brought them, the bus moved. The whole way I was sleeping until we reached Tarqumia checkpoint. As usual, they [the Israeli army] stopped us and checked everything. Then I slept. It was so hot, Al-Ramleh city is warm. In our city it was so cold and it was raining. We waited for the first group to visit. We were in the second one. Then we gave them the clothes which Bashar required. They refused most of the clothes. We entered to see Bashar, we were so happy, the visit was for 45 minutes, and then we waited for the rest of the people to visit, and finally we went to our homes.

In October 2008, she documented her second visit:

> At 6:00 am Shatha and I went out to visit Bashar (my brother) in al Naqab desert jail. Today I should have studied for my management exam, but I didn't. But this situation is more difficult; we waited 3 hours at the checkpoint, and we had many things for Bashar, each visit we showed our birthday certificates, and they inspected us. Also, they forced us to wait until they checked all prisoners' families. We arrived to the jail and gave the soldiers Bashar's clothes. I had a severe headache. Then we saw Bashar. Shatha and I talked with Bashar til the visit ended. We arrived home at 8 pm. I was so tired and sleepy.

In November 2008, the participant wrote:

> Today, Shatha and I went to visit Bashar, this is the last visit for Shatha because she will be 16 years old in January 30, 2009, and she will get the Palestinian's ID, then she will be prohibited by the Israeli government for security reasons. As always the visit was exhausting, we were at the end of the queue. Then they allow us to pass to write our names, after that we visited Bashar, we told him everything about Hebron, without warning jailers as always hushed our voices to end the visit. Then we say goodbye to him from behind the dirty glass. Then we went home after a long day of suffering.

Later in her entries, she only described her visits alone. Israeli occupation has reshaped the experiences of women, which requires an alternative lens of understanding traditional gender roles. Gender as a social identifier should be analyzed in a complex framework, as it intersects with political socialization. Cicognani, Zani, Fournier, Gavray, and Born (2011) posit that the political agency of youth is deeply embedded in the gender roles and facilitated by social and cultural patterns, social learning theories, and gender roles. Adults assist in gender discrimination in political socialization, as they encourage entirely different political behaviors for girls and boys, whereby boys are encouraged to take on public and leadership roles as well as show autonomy and self-reliance. These behaviors are not encouraged for girls; rather, the message is that women should be passive, compassionate, and private in a way to complement the masculine structure. The cultural political behaviors enforce gender-specific political participation and community engagements. However, other research findings have indicated that parents' participation in politics and civic engagement is correlated positively with female participation (Cicognani et al., 2011). Moreover, girls' role in politics was highlighted in the Palestinian journaling study as a

12-year-old male participant from a city discussed his observation of female youth's political agency: "It was lightning and thundering today. I heard bad news about Alnabi Saleh village, there was a demonstration there and the Israeli forces threw tear gas on the demonstrators. Then they threw stones and the soldiers beat the girls and took some to Israeli jails. This is so bad to beat the girls and imprison them. I wish to die as a martyr. I'm wounded but I want to be a martyr, this will be the life."

Research indicated that males are more interested in politics, and one of the reasons is that the political organizations are masculine and that complements the cultural political behavior patterns. The notion that boys are interested in leadership in politics is also found in the research of Hooghe and Stolle (2004), who studied eighth grade students in 124 schools in North America in which 1392 were girls, 1375 were boys, and the rest did not report any gender identification. The purpose is to evaluate the civic education and relation to future political engagement. Girls showed more interest in participating in 4.55 out of 7 political activities compared to boys, who expressed interest in 4 activities. While this indicated more interest among the female participants, girls' interest was around political activism, community engagement, and political campaigns. Girls expressed interest in activities that had social benefit. However, boys expressed interest in electoral activism, leadership, and seeking office and radical change, using violence if needed. Although there is difference between intention and implementation, the finding was that boys who showed interest in radicalism tended to have a weak relationship with school. In a way, the finding echoes Rosenthal, Rosenthal, and Jones' (2001) work that confirms the "gender difference in political socialization emerge prior to adolescence" (p. 636) embedded in women that they should be passive, compassionate, and private with little interest to be a public figure because male socialization is engulfed with masculinity and aggressiveness. Women are deterred to embrace these characteristics and therefore denied to participate in the male political sphere. Hence, radicalism is not always associated with the lack of education or intellectual abilities. Pfaff (2009) argued that adolescent males who identify as leftist rejected the limited meaning of citizenship in Germany because it does not hold the government accountable. The leftist participants call for equality and more transparency in the political structure. The Israeli occupation and the events following the Oslo Agreement of 1993 marked a defining change in the role of Palestinian women. It is the intersectionality of gender as a social identifier that youth agency should be analyzed in the interactions of time, events, and the lifespan. To narrow the

discussion on the traditional roles and argue about them within the masculine structure of male and female eliminate the power of female political agency.

SPATIAL IDENTIFIERS AND POLITICS

Certainly, spatial location is a social identifier of youth political agency. Location is not only the articulation of geography but also a signature of social, economic, and political status. Location, whether in the city, suburban area, rural area, countryside, city, or refugee camp, brings together the interaction between the micro/macro and local/global into youth agency. Location as a socio-geographic identifier contextualizes the processes of intersectionality and intergenerationality in the context of youth political agency. Social, political, and economic resources interact with youth agency; this interaction frames the distinction of communities (ethically, economically, and politically). Also, the discrepancy of resources articulated in location translates into political networks, political aspirations, and agency. The familiarity of location as a social identifier of youth agency emerged from different contexts and interactions with the individuals that encapsulate the spatial dynamic. Hopkins and Williamson (2012) asserted that the specific design of neighborhoods exists as a structure barrier to prohibit people in politics. Neighborhoods, especially in the suburbs, are designed to reduce any political participation by the community. This is contrary to the design of urban settings where the space is designed for aggregation of municipality, communities, commercial centers, and others. The contention is that "different spatial contexts vary in the extent of which they facilitate political communication and political organizing" (Hopkins & Williamson, 2012, p. 93). Subsequently, design provides location with political stimuli and activities. Individuals who rely on commuting to urban settings tend to not engage in rallies or public meetings. The location design is a form to maintain the political status quo. Local influence within political activities is evaluated according to resources. The familiarity of this notion is also noted in the work of Nall (2015), who studied the spatial divide of urban–suburban as a political partisan. The argument is that the political divide embedded in location is designed to enforce the economic and racial segregation line. Construction of highways facilitated the continuing division along the economic and racial pretexts, in a way that "highways enable mobile residents to express residential preferences linked to their partisanship" (p. 404). Context and place are fundamental elements for human

behavior, and the spatial analysis should be measured by different matrix of "locals and administrative units, including the linkage among individuals living in those place" (Linkedin & O'Loughlin, 2015, p. 202). The analysis will provide an insight into the different reality of each location. Lay (2005) argued that rural and urban areas suffer from economic deprivation; hence, this social identifier does not provide a trajectory of community political activities, as other factors should be considered. Communities living in poverty in urban setting have complex dynamics of social identifier that varies in presentations compared to people in poverty who live in rural areas. Access to social services, ethnicity, quality education, and structural system can hinder the political participation, as "the characteristics of many poor, urban neighborhoods, and thus the social interactions within them, often do not facilitate the kind of environment in which individuals can come together to achieve common goals" (p. 322). Hence, this notion is not supported by Fisher (2012) because community organizations are empowering youth to be politically active. Perhaps, the assessment of youth agency is not recognized because it is developed according to the top-down model of political socialization and is a true reflection of the interaction of environment, intersectionality, and intergenerationality. The reality is that other social identifiers are equally significant within the spatial analyses that complicate the intersectionality with other identifiers and interconnectedness with other ecological events. Walsh (2012) explained the relationship between geographic location and political beliefs by studying 37 groups of people from 27 different Wisconsin communities with varied municipality, partisan leaning, agricultural affiliation, and local industry. It revealed the importance of rural consciousness, a concept that includes a set of ideas specific to a geographic location that is associated with power and resources. The findings indicated that individuals in rural areas perceive themselves as powerless, and government resources are directed to urban settings. Hence, the finding revealed that regardless of poverty in the community, individuals are reluctant to vote for the party that would tax the rich because they are clinging to the hope that one day they will be rich. The spatial factors are part of social identifiers that intersect with agency and dynamics of political socialization. Therefore, youth political socialization is important in that individuals growing up in different areas (urban vs. rural, suburbs vs. urban, etc.) may experience different specific political nuances while experiencing the same national political realities. Within the Palestinian society, youth living in different areas and community structures may have different perspectives on everyday life, but all youth

in the journaling project discuss the national Palestinian political landscape in much the same way. One overarching theme relating to the political landscape and location entails the youths' thoughts on Israeli checkpoints. Several journal participants discuss how the checkpoints impact their daily lives. One 14-year-old male from a refugee camp says, "[C]heckpoints are all over Palestine to represent this Israeli occupation...these checkpoints are hurting us. [A]s an example: the city of Nablus, since the beginning of the occupation, is surrounded by many checkpoints which don't allow anybody to enter without inspection... These obstacles make it hard to defend our land. All reasons are bad; teachers can't reach their schools so students [can't use] their right of education... There are checkpoints where people wait hours to pass... These checkpoints should be removed because this is our land." These checkpoints can impact youth directly, as they relate to location, as a 15-year-old female participant from a city mentions, "[The] checkpoints imposed the Palestinian students to go to specific universities even if these universities don't have the suitable facilities which they need." The intersection of the political landscape of Palestine and the Israeli occupation and the location of youth in this example exemplifies how the social identifier of spatial location can heavily impact an individual and their political perspectives and agency. It is clear that Palestinian youth, whether they live in a refugee camp, city, or village, are actively engaging in the political discourse as a response to not only location/community factors but also the Israeli occupation, as another 14-year-old male participant from a village writes, "Yes, there are many Israeli checkpoints in the Palestinian cities such as the Surda checkpoint in Ramallah, which prevents the arrival of students and teachers to schools and universities." A 15-year-old female participant from a city expresses her frustration about the lack of access to visit Jerusalem or Palestinian areas prior to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, "I wish this trip was to Haifa, Jaffa, and Akko—these were the places our parents went to—or to Jerusalem, but they don't give us permission to enter. With that occupation everything is impossible. We will resist to get Palestine back and to see its nature." However, the political situation affects day-to-day life a little differently within different parts of Palestine, meaning that political socialization elements that youth are exposed to are not static in each location, as a 14-year-old female states the complication of part of the Hebron old city in West Bank and its Israeli political administration, "A 17-years-old guy beat my cousin, and my uncle called the Palestinian police, but because they live in H2 area no one can help them (H2 area is under Israeli control and the Palestinian authority can't enter this area). The

Israelis were happy because the fight happened between the neighborhood citizens." Palestinians living in Jerusalem are provided with blue identification (ID) cards compared to orange and green ID cards for those living in West Bank and Gaza. The blue ID provides a relative mobility not exclusive to checkpoints. Jerusalem as a location and political and religious symbol embedded a political upheaval and the aim of Israeli government to depopulate the Palestinians from this area (Bardi, 2016). This was acknowledged by a 14-year-old female youth from a village, who wrote, "lately Israeli forces made many atrocities to expel the Palestinians who live in Jerusalem, to Judaize it, they withdraw the Israelis' IDs from Arabs to give them Palestinian IDs, and if you have a Palestinian ID you can't enter Jerusalem. Also, they demolished houses and unfairly taxed them to expel them indirectly. Recently, the excavations under Al-Aqsa Mosque led to demolishing a school of UNRWA, this is to steal the mosque, Jerusalem, and eliminate Palestinian identity." Location has a political ramification as well as economic status. Indeed, location within the community frames the social, economic, and political markers of youth agency as the local and global discourses evolve. Hart (2002) examined Palestinian refugee children living in a Jordanian refugee camp and the historical narrative of focus on a school and peers content and process that contributes to youth political agency. The narrative has a different shape for children living in West Bank or in Palestinian villages in Israel (Attar-Schwartz & Ben-Arieh, 2012). Location is a reflection of the geopolitics, community, family political structure, and economic discourse. The lack of symmetry in the political interaction is reflected upon youth political agency; this symmetry is also embedded in their living reality. The discrepancy in social identifiers of ethnicity, class, political status, location, socio-economic status, and others translates into political networks, political aspirations, and agency. To have a systematic understanding of the intersectionality of social identifiers, it is crucial to document each one and to analyze its interaction with local and global content. Hopkins and Pain (2007) discussed social identifier as a method to understand the chronicle age of a child that is not solely framed by physiology alone; intersectionality is an essential component that explains why some children behave more like adults compared to others. Social identifiers are part of the construction and meaning of the political agency that interacts with both top-down model and trickle-down model of political socialization. In a way, to assume each youth in one country has the same political perspective is to eliminate political identifier of youth political agency. In other words, social identifiers challenge the inherent

notion that civic curricula across one country can produce the same result of a citizenship.

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Geopolitics of Religion and Its Role in Youth Agency

The [political] parties have an effect on people, and because each person belongs to a different party, students too are affected. Otherwise some people don't belong to any party. In my opinion, the Palestinians should go back and stick to the Islamic faith.

—14-year-old male from a village

The Lebanese children were killed because they stick to Islam, and we will fight so we do not disappoint them. There will be no Jews in our land. We will fight to the end.

—12-year-old female from a city

THE GEOPOLITICS OF RELIGION

As part of reconstructing political socialization methods, it is important to analyze the effect of religion. Traditionally, children and youth were thought to gain the majority of their political viewpoints through their parents or caregivers whose perspectives could be influenced by religious beliefs and affiliations. Along the same lines, religious socialization of children and youth has largely focused on the same top-down methodology; that is, a child or youth becomes affiliated with the same religion as that of his or her parents/caregivers. It has been argued that an individual's religious beliefs will affect his or her political affiliation and ideology; hence, if a youth's political socialization is dependent on his or her parent/caregiver,

then he or she would also share the same religious belief system. While this is sometimes the case, religion plays a much more pervasive role within the system of political socialization for youth. Moving beyond only a parent/caregiver's religious beliefs, youth are influenced by the way they perceive religion in the community at large. In addition, the politicization of religion cannot be ignored and its relation to the practice of religion is as important to youth as political socialization. As part of reconstructing the traditional methodology of political socialization, one of the most important processes is to unpack the politicization of religion and religious affiliation since global politics do not distinguish between religion and political affiliation of youth. In the case of Palestine, youth take religious courses at school and many of the political parties endorse religious idioms, while the local/global political reality is affected by the politics of religion. Hence, youth demonstrated their political agency by integrating the politicization of religion. Due to this interaction, religion and its politicization are significant factors in the political socialization of Palestinian youth, as a 14-year-old male journal participant from a village simply stated, "I became one of Hamas supporters because it is [an] Islamic party."

Religion occupies a position in the political socialization of youth through the interactions of schools, peers, religious institutions, and community; however, the discourse of religion as a central component of youth's political socialization is rarely discussed in Western nations. It seems the relationship of religion within the top-down model of socialization is invisible and denied, especially on the part of Western governments since there is a public endorsement of secularism and a proclamation of separation between the state and church. On the other hand, the discussion of religion within national discourse and youth political socialization is illuminated in non-Western societies. Seemingly, the implied feature of secularism is highlighted in Western government that forge the assertion of no place for religion in public institutions and, therefore, religion is not included in the government's top-down model of youth political socialization. While there is this implied assertion that religion does not have a place in public institutions within the West, this notion is not without its detractors, as Soper and Fetzer (2002) argued that there is an inherent relationship between the State, church, and education in Europe, which constitutes an interaction with youth political socialization. Religion has shaped the relationship between the state and church that provided the framework of politicization of religion and its association to education, minority's status, and government intervention. For example, in Germany, some of the

government taxation is allocated to Christian and Jewish religious institutions including schools, but such funds are not equally distributed to Islamic establishments though Muslims are considered the third largest group after Catholics and Protestants. In England, there are reserved seats in the House of Lords for the Church of England to maintain the influence of church over national legislations. In addition, individuals from the upper class that are active in the church tend to vote for the conservative political party that influences the discourse surrounding youth political socialization, while individuals who joined the church for religious reasons are increasingly leaning to conservative political views. Thus, this relationship at the legislative level is reflected in education, thereby religion does in fact impact youth's political socialization, at least in part, through the distribution of funding within the school system. The British government funds religious schools affiliated with Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish educational institutions but denies equal funds to all Muslim schools due to the presumption that Islamic schools do not comply and promote liberal values. In France, secularist ideology is used to deny the cultural rights of Muslim minorities in schools, resulting in minority students being denied the right to express their cultural identity. It seems that Judeo-Christian values in Western countries are synonymous with liberal secularism even though the discussion is based on the separation of the two concepts. The relationship between these two notions is not consistently contested even though "secularism purports to stand outside the contested territory of religion and politics, it does not. Secularism is located in the spectrum of theological politics" (Hurd, 2004, p. 237). Hence, secularism's claim of freedom from religion is without the full disclosure of its association with Judeo-Christian values. The paradox is that other religions especially Islam are considered a threat to Western countries, even while Christianity is the central premise for common values within secularism (Dijkink, 2006; Nyroos, 2001). This intertwined association with Christianity and state is constantly denied in Western societies, while its interaction continues to be central in the macro and micro ecological system that shapes youth political socialization through governments' discretion that facilitates the ideology of secularism as a foundation of political knowledge in schools and through its subjugation of youth political socialization. To assume that there is no relationship between religion and state in Western governments is to continue emphasizing and valuing the discourse of Judeo-Christianity and its extension of secularism. The lack of recognizing the impact of Judeo-Christian beliefs on youth political socialization in Western countries is to deny its interactions

within the ecological contexts and youth political agency. Indeed, religious discourse and its political implications in Western governments implicate the fact that there is no separation between church and state. Hence, to characterize Western countries as secular with limited religious discourse on youth political socialization is misplaced and insufficient to provide an insight into the role that religion plays in youth and children's political socialization. Religion in reality is not on the periphery of youth political agency in Western countries, but it is the focus in non-Western societies.

FAUX SECULARISM: IMPACT OF RELIGION ON POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN THE WEST

Religious institutions are policy organizers and actively invite adults and youth to engage in specific political agendas. Paradoxically, this is not frequently recognized, since there is an assertion of a "secularist" discourse, even while organizations locate public funding for some religious activities as is seen in the crafting of civic engagement programs and placement. Religious institutions such as the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Girls and Boys Scouts contribute to youth political socialization in Western countries through the partnership of schools' civic engagement projects and extracurricular programs without challenging the separation of church and state or the impact of religion on youth political socialization (McFarland & Thomas, 2006). It seems the partnership is focused on providing youth with civic opportunity without recognizing the role of religion in such process. Frisco, Muller, and Doson (2004) described the influence of religious and non-religious after-school programs for adolescents and youth on early voting behavior after Californians approved Proposition 49, "The After School Educational and Safety Program Act of 2002." This act provides funds to organizations that enhance community membership such as the Boys Scouts of America (BSA), the YMCA, sport clubs, and other non-religious programs. The outcome of Frisco et al.'s (2004) study showed that all youth benefited from membership within after-school organizations, but religious organizations had a negative impact on early voting behaviors of low-income students while having a positive impact on early voting behaviors on students with higher socio-economic status. Indeed, religious institutions' civic work does not eliminate the marginalization of youth and minorities even if there is an assumption that religion and religious organizations constitute a vital role in

providing youth with moral references for community participation by moving toward a common ideological goal. A relatively large segment of civic activities and extracurricular programs are housed in churches, and placement of such programs has a religious overtone with little thought of its intersectionality and interaction on youth political socialization. Although there is an assumption that religious civic engagement programs including schools' religious affiliations tend to invest more in the community, yet there is no consistent data to support that students who graduate from such institutions volunteer more than students from public schools. Dill (2009) argued that the trajectory of private students compared with public students is on the differences in voting or volunteering. Youth participation in civic engagement through religious contexts tends to provide a moral framework about social issues that impact their trajectory in volunteerism in the future but not necessarily in voting (Zaff et al., 2011). Yet, children's church attendance is considered a major factor in civic engagement (Warren & Wicks, 2011). Another finding indicated that students who participate in civic engagement and extracurricular activities through school and community centers continue engaging in community activities and voting after graduating regardless of race, age, citizenship, or socio-economic status. The only significant difference is that wealthy students attend church more often than students from blue-collar families or backgrounds, thus religion is not a factor in civic engagement as much as having the experience of church affiliation (McFarland & Thomas, 2006). It seems that findings vary about the impact of religious institutions on youth community engagement. Hence, the interaction of religion or lack thereof with civic engagement is present in shaping political socialization even though the future trajectory of community engagement is not conclusive since there are other interactions and intersectionality that impact the outcome. The multiple implications of religion and lack of divisive conclusion emphasize the need to document religious affiliation at least as a demographic variable while continuing to research the influence of religious practices on the direction of future civic involvement and its processes.

Religious Affiliation as an Identifier

Religious affiliations tend to be documented as a demographic identifier that merely provides correlation analysis with little insight into its meaning and interaction of civic education and youth political socialization. A factor analytic study conducted by van Deth, Abendschön, and Vollmar (2011)

studied more than 700 children during their first year of primary school on whether religious practice was related to civic virtues. When administrating the questionnaires immediately after their enrollment in first year of primary school, the study found that correlation between religious practice and civic engagement was .46. Later the value decreased to .19 at the end of the second testing at the end of the same academic year. In other words, there is reason to believe that the relationship between religious practice and civic engagement decreases across time. There is a need to explore the change in the relationship between religion and civic virtue of children especially since religion is a consideration for women and politics. Moore (2005) researched whether religion impacted women's political aspirations. The findings of Moore's study is that religion is associated with political ambitions; White conservative women are not ambitious to be part of the government political structure compared with White men even though they are engaged in more school councils and other community activities compared with White men. It seems that religion is part of the civic engagement but creates a ceiling for women to continue serving the larger community. Certainly, there is a need for further investigation to explain the relationship between religion and political aspirations rather than indicating the correlations between these two even though there are analyses that highlight the impact of traditional socialization of girls, including the role of religion on political aspiration (Kucinskas, 2010). However, to posit such explanation limits the nuances on this issue. Religion characterizes youth political socialization, and it is more complex due to its interaction with political, social, and educational structures and its form within the political discourse. Research on the relationship between religion and youth political socialization has been directed in understanding the impact of religious educational institutions on youth's community engagement. For example, some research has focused on unpacking the impact of religious ethos and structure, as it is encompassed in Catholic schools, on youth citizenship. A major critique of religious schools is that students are politically and religiously socialized with a specific ideology that limits their perspectives of civic engagement and narrows their community interactions. The community services are focused on particular missions. Dill (2009) argued that the religious impact on youth political socialization is more complex and indicated that the effect of private and religious schools on citizenship, voting, and volunteering is more complicated. Students from such institutions have positive results in community participation but poor on tolerance to other belief systems. Also, community participation does not always persist after high school

into adulthood. Therefore, to assume a linear perspective of religious institution on youth political socialization is to deny the interaction between contexts within the ecological theory and most importantly to exclude youth political agency. Moreover, the youth agency of lack of tolerance within religious schools is challenged. Godwin, Godwin, and Martinez-Ebers (2004) revealed the notion of intolerance of youth politically socialized in religious schools might be truth, but it changes over time, specifically during high school, as some students become more tolerant of differences and diversity. This does not mean that religion is no longer part of an individual's identity or political socialization. On the contrary, tolerance to differences does not negate the religious, cultural, and national identity even in Western societies, and maybe these two concepts are not exclusively mutual (Nyroos, 2001). Hence, religion as embedded in education and therefore in youth political socialization does not transcend inclusiveness because of the public discourse of "others"; communities that do not endorse Judeo-Christian values are perceived as inferior, which is enhanced with biases and misconceptions (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). Therefore, the interactions of religion and religiously affiliated schools and programs in the community shape the process of youth political socialization, as youth are subjugated to and the subject of such ideology in both Western and non-Western countries. Within this analysis, secularist discourse should neither be the banner to dismiss the religious impact on agency of youth political socialization nor be perceived as the sole aspect in non-Western societies. Religion plays a role in the political socialization of youth (as is seen in the politics of Islam), as religion tends to be the focus in non-Western countries. Islam's role in youth political activities is complex and accorded to interaction with political structures and global discourse. To recognize Islam in the context of youth political socialization is to contextualize it in the geopolitics of local and global discourse in which religion is politicized and no longer merely manifested in the conventional manner of religion. The politics of Islam is the discourse that interacts with the process of religious political socialization, the youth agency, and the interaction of the macro and micro ecological system. The politics of Islam within youth political socialization is evolving to accommodate political vacuum and address the failure of secularism, especially in the Middle East. The interaction within the politics of Islam constitutes a pragmatism that is not only directed from the top-down model of political socialization but also evident in youth agency of redefining the meaning and utilization in the process of youth political agency. The understanding of the politics of

Islam and youth political socialization emphasizes the interaction of the local and global political discourse.

POLITICIZATION OF RELIGION

Religion is not merely a moral convocation; it is an expression of political views that is an integral part of youth political agency and social identity (Habashi, 2008; Hurd, 2004). Throughout history, religion has been part of the political structure, and it is not unique to our contemporary time. The current focus is on the impact of Islam on political socialization. The politicization of Islam is employed in the local politics and enflamed through globalization whereby it interacts with youth political socialization through structural and non-structural socio-political contexts. Such phenomenon has historical roots, whereby the relationship of religious ideologies and their political extension are encompassed in diverse convictions: Catholicism and Protestant in Christianity, Kach in Judaism, and Hamas and Hezbollah in Islam, as well as the military arm faction in Buddhism (Nyroos, 2001; Sturm, 2015). Religion in this context is not merely a faith or rituals that are confined to a private practice with family and religious communities, but rather it is a form of response to the political space in a globalized world. The politicization of religion is intertwined with social, cultural, and political interactions that are not conclusive to a singular outcome of youth political socialization. Living realities shape the politicization of religion and transform national discourses to challenge the status quo of the power structure. Religion is utilized to accomplish social change by galvanizing the masses with a political narrative that secularism failed to achieve. To claim political space with religious connotations allows dispersing political and social views that are not restrictive to the elite and the establishment. The essence of the politicization of religion is in it multiple dimensions and interactions with both the macro and micro systems; thus, it is not exclusive to a singular form or context. The religious discourse provides a space to connect with everyday living as one 14-year-old male participant from a refugee in the West Bank conceptualized work ethic and personal honesty in religious terms to challenge traditional influence of social structure of tribe by using religious quotes:

> The most striking verse from our prophet is: 'The most honorable of you with Allah is the (believer) who has At-Taqwa [faith] (Al-Hujraat Verse No: 13)'. This measurement is to judge people according to religion and values and it is

objective. In our daily life the only standard should be: how one commits one's work. If one is committed to one's work, then one should be respected. People who visited Japanese companies said: when they [the workers] enter these companies they feel that they are in temple and they do their best and master their work and believe in this verse. We as Middle Eastern people make a judgment depending on other standards: we judge others depending on their looks and family. Also, if he is rich, we didn't care about his work and commitment. Umar Ibn Al-Khattab [the second caliph, and Prophet advisor] said: 'If I see a man and I like him and he says I have no profession I no longer respect him.' This means that Omar was focused on his work, there is no need for work where there is no perfection in it. We need to spread out this idea, we should teach people to master their work. If we have qualifications to evaluate others' work this would be better than referring to tribes and families rules because this will take you back to Middle Ages where there were many bad values and traditions. This must be abandoned because it affects society badly.

Religious discourse not only provided insight into everyday living but also provided political meaning, as a 12-year-old female participant from a city indicated in her journal:

> [W]e went to school, the teacher asked us how we spend the break, and then she asked us to write about the problems of nature and our homeland. I wrote about the poor children who I watched on TV and as a title I put ("We Laugh and They Cry"), and I asked some questions at the end of the essay and these questions were: Why they haven't got the right to live safely? How can we help them? What did they do wrong? I read these questions to my teacher and she said: safety and love can be achieved in unity among our people. Now I'm so happy because I know how to help them, but the last question [What did they do wrong?] remains unanswered but, personally, I think it is because of the children's faith and their adherence to the Islamic faith.

It seems that the participants viewed religion as part of the Palestinian discourse.

The integration of religious discourse in everyday activity is also manifested in the geopolitics and local and global politics. Sturm (2015) emphasized that religious discussions within geopolitical and global contexts should be considered part of the power structure, and to deny this interaction is to omit the interconnectedness of politics and people. As expected, this perspective is more significant now than any time in history, especially in the discussion of the politicization of Islam that seems to threaten the "common values" of Western society (Hurd, 2004). To

deconstruct Islam as part of the power structure is to dismiss the rival views of orientalism that attempt to essentialize Islam, to conceptualize it as primitive, and to associate it with violence without recognizing the intersectionality and interaction of religion and politics (Arkoun, 2003). The dominant perspective of Islam is positivistic and imperialistic in nature, as its interpretation is based on selective events and perceptions. In addition, such positivistic evaluations fail to understand that throughout history religion has been an inherent connection with national movements, whereby it pronounced the transformation of convocation to claim political space as any other political discourse (Hurd, 2004). This is the case with Islamist movements as they integrated religion idioms in political expression to address alienation and oppression (Habashi, 2013). Hence, the appropriation of Islam in politics is to provide an alternative political structure, but such notion is partially considered in the studies of politics and Islam or Islamism, as other views are circulating to undermine such perspective. According to Kazemzadeh (1998), there are three distinct schools of thoughts that study Islamic movements. The first perspective is embedded in cultural relativist views that centralize the analysis of the politics of Islam in a negative light. This perspective is rooted in fear and cultural differences, whereby Christianity is superior to other religions without distinguishing between the politics of Islam and the religion of Islam. One of the leading authors in such thought is Samuel Huntington with the thesis of clash of civilization. This view considers Islam as the ultimate threat to Western cultures, and it is essential to stop its spread before it invades the Western society. The second view is framed within the neo-cold warriors' perspective that considered the Islamist movements as similar to other religious movements throughout history, and that all religions abuse their power. It also considers that transformation of Islam in politics would be similar to that of Christianity. The third perspective is entrenched in the politics of global power and its proposal to view the Islamist movement as part of the class analysis whereby there is a tension between the powerful and the powerless. This perspective emphasizes that the politics of Islam is fighting to claim a voice and bring power to the people (Habashi, 2011). These three perspectives are not emphasized equally due to the dominant perspective of the cultural relativist in public sphere that enhances fears and cultural differences. The analysis of the Islamist movement tends to be central on the relativist views with the dismissal of the other two perspectives. It tends to see "Islam as a wounded civilization and Islamism in all its forms as a pathology and potential threat to the west" (Lockman, 2010, p. 222).

The second perspective is vowing that the current politics of Islam mirrors a period in Christianity that eventually transformed to accommodate a stable political structure. This perspective embraced religions as part of the political structure regardless of its affiliation. Islam and Christianity were considered important as a buffer zone against the Soviet invasion, and states' political power capitalized on such a role during the Cold War era, as Chamberlin (2008) indicated on whom Sadat and Nixon made deals with the religious right part. "Muslim Brotherhood and Evangelical Christianity defied simple categorization and promised to strengthen the legitimacy of the state against global rebellion. As he reflected on the struggle for the Middle East years later, Nixon cited Whittaker Chambers's argument that communism thrived where religious faith was lacking" (p. 467). The argument that parallels the politicization of Islam with other religions throughout history stops short of emphasizing that political Islam is attempting to fight against global power. Within this context, Islam is embedded in the third perspective that emphasizes the politicization of Islam and its movement as a form of power struggle within local and global discourse (Wiktorowicz, 2004). In truth, the dynamic relationship of these perspectives posits youth political socialization in the local/global interactions that impact youth agency and politicization of Islam in daily contexts and expressions. Such views are prevalent in giving meaning to the role of religion in the Arab world and in Palestinian youth political agency. Hence, to understand the relationship, it is significant to unpack the daily interaction of religion in youth's and community's daily living.

Islam's Interaction with Imperialism in Palestine

Religion occupies a prominent space in public discourse, including local and global contexts and in private rituals in the Arab and Muslim world. The religious expressions are accommodated in the social, cultural, economic, and political domains in which Islam is emerging as a reference in state governance and public debates. One of the slogans that framed the politics of Islam is summarized in the statement, "Islam is the solution," which reflected the engagement of Islam in local and global discourse and attracted followers from young and old, common and elite, and literate and illiterate people to partake in the political narrative of liberalization. To perceive Islamic ideas as a political structure, some questioned whether Islam is competitive with modernity and democracy (Tessler, 2002). However, to understand the Islamic movement, it is significant to opt away from

the orientalist views that depict Islam and Muslims as primitive, fundamentalist, and monolithic. These views identify Islamic notions as a "resurgence" of traditions and a "return" to the original meaning of Islam without considering Islamism as a product of modernity even if it invokes traditions as any other nationalist movements while radically breaking from the past (Lockman, 2010). Islamic movements are rooted with individual meanings, history, locations, and cultures that have local meanings of Islamism to respond to unique local and global challenges. For example, the case of Islamic national movements specifically in the Palestinian occupied territories is a response to the failure of different secular discourses to achieve liberation from Israeli occupation (Tamimi, 2007). The emergence of the Islamist movement in Palestine is part of the continuous national movements that started prior to colonization by Israel in 1948 or the British mandate in the early nineteenth century. Hence, the seed of Palestinian national identity has been developing since the 1830s even though community membership was based on religion, family, and location more so than a large collective discourse (Jung, 2004). The progress of nationalism in the Middle East is part of the extension of the European experience of modern states, while Palestinian national movements, including Islamism, have evolved to respond to colonization by the West and Israel at the same time that these entities framed Palestinian national movements as terroristic:

> Official Israeli insistence on depicting the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian nationalist movement it led as about nothing but terrorism was a way of deflecting attention away from the deeply rooted grievances and aspirations that motivate the Palestinians, including even those who perpetrated clearly immoral and reprehensible acts of terrorist violence, and from the conditions which had lead them to adopt such a repugnant tactic. This portrayal thus served to bolster both Israel's self-image as the victim of the irrational hatred and middles violence and its campaign for international sympathy and support (Lockman, 2010, p. 225).

The paradox is in the double standard of framing national movements that adopted religious meaning to justify a political goal. Israel was founded on the Zionism movement that integrated Jewish religious idioms and connotations to frame the political movement to colonize Palestine. During the British colonization of Palestine, Jewish paramilitary organizations adopted terrorism through the assassination and kidnapping of British officials and soldiers in addition to bombing innocent Arab civilians, all of

which were considered brutal acts. The Jewish leaders of organizations such as Menahem Begin, and Yitzhak Shamir were considered patriots rather than terrorists and later held political leadership positions after the establishment of the State of Israel. This relationship between political movements and religion is not recognized by the global power in regard to the Islamic movements; on the contrary, global discourse, with the support of the Israeli government, has framed Palestinian movements, including the Islamic movement, with a singular perspective that says that Israeli people have been fighting for centuries against terrorism. The one-sided perspective engaged with the denial of political rights to Palestinians, as one 14-year-old female participant from a village indicated, "How the Palestinian children will call for peace while Israel is killing their families in front of them. Of course they will be terrorists." The omission of the reality of military occupation is also adopted by the West in which it does not recognize the continuous grievances against the Palestinian people by the Israeli government but only focuses on rendering Islamic ideas as primitive and a threat to Western democracy. Neo-orientalism and the Israeli government is framing Islamic movements in the Middle East as backward movements without the capability to govern. This assertion serves the hegemonic strategy of colonization and the practice of military expansion in the region (Tuastad, 2003). To describe the people as submissive, fatalist, and violent is to constitute the connotations of backward culture that is perceived to be rooted in Islamic ideas. The religious association with the Islamic movement is also depicted with violence and irrationality. Religious discourse was adopted in President George Bush's rhetoric after September 11, 2001, when he associated "war on terrorism" as a "crusade" with the assertion of Christianity as superior. To silence the Islamic movement, he endorsed a secularist Iraqi government while enforcing Western religious views (Hurd, 2004). In a way, global interactions and policy-framing embedded in Western political agenda of hegemony and Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories enforced the cultural relativism. The continuing oppression of Palestinians and the suffering of Iraq against sanctions imposed by United Nations and later the invasion of Iraq ignited many Muslims around the world to foster sympathy and to denounce the USA, and, by extension, the Western world including Israel as the enemy of Islam. The basis of the argument is the USA's international policy that aims to achieve a hegemonic agenda in the Middle Eastern region as is seen in the unequivocal support for Israel without challenging its oppressive practices against Palestinians. The Islamic movements have evolved to resist the

imperialistic invasions and resonated with some Muslims around the world (Lockman, 2010). Solidarity under Islam is seen in the following quote by a 12-year-old female journal participant from a refugee camp: "The organization of Islamic conference appeals to the international community to intervene to stop the Israeli aggression on the Palestinian people of Gaza." Indeed, the connotations of religion in the Islamic movement created a sense of community that is not only confined within nation-states' borders. The expansion of the movement identified the relationship between local and global interactions as Islamic movements call for the Muslim community to come together against the global injustice. Any resistance to imperialism and Israel is framed by the West with neo-orientalist images that blame the Middle Eastern people for the violence and conflict (Tuastad, 2003). In addition, Israel aligned with Western values and framed Palestinian resistance and all Islamic movements, regardless to whether or not they are violent or non-violent, as an attack on the West. Therefore, any attempt to show the other perspective is considered biased because it does not enforce the backward images. Thus, the global anti-Islam views explicitly align with Imperialism and the colonial agenda with the support of policy makers and social scientists who refused to recognize the oppression inflicted on people in the Middle East. The dynamics of the global power and Islamism does not negate the local discussion about the effectiveness of the Islamic movement within the Arab world, in particular, among Palestinian youth and their political agency. The sheer ubiquity is that these interactions are not linear in nature, as it is contextualized in the intergenerationality and intersectionality of the Palestinian local and global discourse.

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AND PALESTINIAN YOUTH POLITICAL AGENCY

The discussion of political Islam among the Palestinian community is manifested in everyday activities. Religion is part of the national discourse and has a dimension in national identity, collective actions, and resisting Israeli occupation (Habashi, 2013). Jung (2004) argued the global interaction in the Palestinian–Israeli conflict contributed to the discourse of local Islamism, since the other national movements had failed to achieve the goal of political change and the creation of a Palestinian state. To be sure, the interaction of the Palestinian local context with the global discourse,

including the Israeli oppression, conceptualized the approach of national movements, political parties, and Islamic movement in Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The seed of the Islamic movement in Palestine was sowed during the 1970s when the first chapter of the Islamic Brotherhood from Egypt was established in Gaza. Although Hamas is an extension of Egypt's Islamic Brotherhood, the focus was on liberating Palestine without spreading the movement to other Muslim or Arab countries. Palestinian Islamic Jihad also evolved out of the Islamic Brotherhood movement in Egypt. These two parties are considered part of the regional Islamist movement, yet the central political agenda is nationalism in nature and addresses public concerns of social and educational services (Malka, 2005; Tamimi, 2007). Hamas provided education, health, and social services that not only covered the Gaza strip but also the West Bank. Islamic movements in Palestine are not under the umbrella of the political structure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its membership parties. Hamas and Islamic Jihad took on the act of resisting Israeli occupation, which increased their popularity in the community, thereby considered terrorist organizations in the West (Turner, 2006) without identifying the nuances of differences among the parties as a 12-year-old female participant from a refugee camp illustrated in a journal entry that "Islamic Jihad holds Hamas responsible for the killing of Al-Amodi and Daya martyrs and the violation of the sanctity of Rabat mosque"; even so, the overarching theme of Palestinian liberation unites the two movements. A 12-year old male participant from a city stated "Israel starts to demolish houses, and expels people in Jerusalem... I'm Fatah and I'm against what is happening, as all Palestinians are." As a holy place, Jerusalem is not associated with Hamas' or Islamic Jihad's political agenda only, Fatah and other Palestinian parties also consider it as part of the Occupied Territories.

The popularity of the Islamic movement did not translate into their integration in the PLO political structure. Klein (2007) and Malka (2005) argued that there was some speculation that Hamas would be integrated into the political structure since it is a national arm of resistance and wants to liberate the historical Palestine to include the land prior the creation of Israel and to establish a Palestinian state based on Islamic principles. However, such assumptions did not translate into reality because Hamas is a pragmatic national movement and accepted the establishment of the Palestinian state within the border of 1967 with a long-term truce with Israel and temporarily halted the attack against Israel. Moreover, Hamas rejected that sentiment that "Islam is the solution," though it stated that Sharia should be a

major source for the Palestinian legislation. The perception that Hamas wanted to establish a religious state is seen in a 12-year-old female participant's (from a refugee camp) journal entry that "Ramadan Shallah demand [ed] Hamas to reassure the public that it does not want to establish an Islamic State in Gaza." It seems that one objection with Hamas from the Palestinian community is the rejection of the religious implementation in society. However, the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority (PA) was strained as Hamas continued resisting Israeli occupation and at the same time undermined the PA, while the PA arrested Hamas leaders with the support of the Israeli government and the USA. There were several clashes between the PA and Hamas. The goal was to marginalize Hamas throughout the Israeli–Palestinian negotiation. However, Hamas continued its commitment to the national cause and attempted to avoid any clashes with Fatah, the political part of the PA. This did not pave the way for Hamas to integrate with the political structure after Hamas' win in the 2006 national election (DeFronzo, 2007). The PA, with the support of Western countries—including Israel—did not allow Hamas to govern in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Hence, in 2007, Hamas forces took over Gaza with military clashes with Fatah and the PA, which resulted in blood shed on both parts. Hovdenak (2009) argued that the political differences between Hamas and Fatah changed the political map within the Palestinian community, "ending with a five-day battle and the subsequent military takeover of the entire Gaza Strip by Hamas forces in June 2007...deradicalization on the Hamas-Israel frontier was accompanied by a radicalization of Hamas's position towards a long-term rival, Fatah" (p. 63). Although Hamas asserted that they would not cross the line for civil war, Hamas ended up creating a separate political structure in Gaza without the support of the PA or any Western government. "The grim reality is that the Palestinians now have two political systems that are moving further away from each other, and neither seems to have a viable strategy for realizing its vision or building a better future for the people it purports to lead" (Brown, 2010, p. 35). The political friction between Hamas on one hand and Fatah and the PA on the other hand led to the division within the Palestinian community in Gaza and the West Bank. The global power enhanced the division by supporting the PA despite the people's calls for reconciliation. The PA continued working as the representative of the Palestinian people by negotiating internationally and ignoring the division. The PA invested economically in the West Bank, which resulted in higher living standards compared with the Gaza Strip, while Gaza has to face several Israeli military invasions throughout the years

that have killed several thousand Palestinians and further deteriorated the living conditions, as a 14-year-old female youth from a village stated, "in Gaza there is no electricity and there is a scarcity of water and medicine. Why is there no solution for electricity and water in Gaza? Gaza people can't tolerate it. Would Israel retaliate? Take over Gaza as a result of Palestinians choosing Hamas in Gaza Strip. Why does Egypt allow this?" In addition, the PA ensured a political strong hold through security apparatuses and the coordination with the Israeli government. Hamas-affiliated programs or civil society was shutdown, Hamas' people who worked within PA institutions were fired, and any opposition to the PA, regardless of its political party, was linked to a campaign of political destruction. These local/global political interactions impacted the youth political socialization and the integration of religion as 14-year-old female participant from a refugee camp wrote of the division between Fatah and Hamas, and the impact it has had on Palestinians. Her writings indicate her political leanings and the way that the local and global context has shaped her political socialization; she said, "I write because I'm sad by what happened in Gaza, because many families were killed because of Israel and the split between Hamas and Fatah. I think what happened in Gaza is too complicated to solve. I wish for unity between the two parties in order to expel the occupation." This shows that even though the local context of the conflict between Hamas and Fatah is a significant factor in daily life, the local/global context of the Israeli occupation of Palestine is the larger picture that needs to be addressed. The same participant discussed the wider community's goal of unification by saying, "Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian [PFLP] calls citizens to raise the Palestinian flag over their homes instead of parties' banners." Although democracy is not the strong political attribute of the PA, authoritarianism with the support of the Western government including Israel is pursued under the banner of security and the Palestinian interest. This further enhanced the separation between the two political structures in Gaza Strip and the West Bank and made the division permanent between Hamas and the PA. In addition, Fatah portrayed Hamas as standing against the Palestinian national interest. The winning of Hamas in the national election complicated the presence of the Western discourse in the occupied territories and resulted in meddling with the local democratic process. The European Union negotiated with Hamas secretly prior to the election, yet it joined the USA after the election to cut the financial aid to the PA and refused to work with Hamas-led government until it acknowledged Israel's right to exist. Even though Hamas has

acknowledged such premise in a long-term truce, it was not enough. The pressure of the West including Israel is on the pretense of the growing friction between the two political parties and on the argument that Hamas' religious affiliation is subsiding as it is becoming the symbol of resistance and resilience while the PA is dissenting into corruption (Turner, 2006). The local/global discourse includes the politicization of Islam, which manifests in youth political socialization as a complex interaction with multiple dimensions and intersectionality. Religion and religious affiliations of different national movements, including Hams and Fatah, play a significant role in the political socialization of youth that is not necessarily identical to the faith itself. Political Islam is not Islam and does not stands on its own, the local and global context as well as youth's perceptions of the different movements' allegiances impact youth's political agency, as is seen in the following writing of a 14-year-old male journal participant from a village: "…I hate Fatah because they ruined Hamas' Establishment Anniversary Celebration, and they walk through the mosque without taking off their shoes, they don't have religion, they don't know God." However, this same participant goes on to say a few journal entries later that "All people talked about politics because it seems we will have a civil war between the two parties [Hamas and Fatah]… In my perspective, the civil war is not a solution, harmony is, so is Islam—they [Hamas and Fatah] have to compromise with each other." This participant seems to recognize Islam as a religion, that the politics of Islam are embedded in the larger picture of Palestinian liberation from Israeli oppression, and that the two more important factors of resisting hegemony, which is facilitated by Islam as a religion, unity and solidarity. In this case, Islam [as a religion] is what unites Palestinians. Yet, paradoxically, Islam is also being used as a political strategy by Israel and the West to further divide the community and to gain supporters. In this case, Islam [as a religion] is what unites Palestinians. Yet, paradoxically, Islam is also being used as a political strategy by Israel and the West to further divide the community and to gain supporters. It is the intersectionality of politics of Islam within different contents that youth political agency shapes its construct with the recognition that the ultimate goal of the Islamic movement is liberation from Israeli oppression. Therefore, the presentation and interaction of religion within youth political socialization is contentious on the ecological interactions and its intersectionality with youth agency that is embedded in the constant associations of religion in globalized hegemony and other local institutions.

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Limitations of the Educational Structure in Political Socialization

Today was the first day in the second semester, and it was like other days. I went to school early, and they gave us new books, also I took some marks from my teachers. My friends and I were talking about what happened in Gaza and how we felt when school was over.

—14-year-old female from a village

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

While unstructured educational systems are pervasive in all aspects of daily life, this chapter will concentrate on structured educational systems because they are an important influential factor on children's and youth's political socialization; however, it is imperative to note that this concentration on structured education does not negate the importance of unstructured education; in fact, both are intertwined and affect children's and youth's socialization. For example, impacts made by schools, and/or civic education programs, typically spearhead the structured educational systems. On the other hand, unstructured education in schools such as dialogue among peers also impacts children's and youth's political socialization. One 14-year-old male journal study participant from a village mentioned, "I'm in ninth grade [and] a member of the daily school podcasting. I talked about Saddam's execution and if you are with or against it, the Homeland Day, occasions and feasts, massacres, the external conditions, political and internal conditions." This podcast takes place in a school setting; however, this

participant makes it clear that the dialogue and discussion come directly from him rather than the school authority. To understand this interaction of youth political socialization, this chapter analyzes the structured educational systems, civic curricula, and programs to engage youth in the community.

Along with the family, schools are considered a central avenue for political socialization in the top-down model and perpetuate the political structure of the society through civic or citizenship education (Donnelly, 2009; Habashi & Woley, 2009; Linimon & Joslyn, 2002; van Deth, Abendschon, & Vollmar, 2011). Curricula of civic education significantly contribute to students' political knowledge (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). The focus of research concerning political socialization of children and youth has been mainly on the understanding of adults' provision of political knowledge provided in the school curricula, family, and media interaction (Gordon & Taft, 2011; Youniss, 2011). Top-down political knowledge has been assumed to be the foundation of children's political socialization whereby governments appropriate political knowledge and community engagement through school curricula. This assumption is accompanied by the belief that children and youth are empty vessels without the cognitive ability or agency to deconstruct or comprehend political knowledge associated with national discourse, political processes, and civic engagement. This top-down model highlighted in the school curricula has been the singular measured framework of children's political socialization studies in which adults and policy makers and researchers are emphasizing political socialization without considering youth agency. The foremost critique of the top-down model stems from the lack of understanding regarding children's ability to comprehend ideas associated with politics, governments, public discourse, and other abstract concepts. Therefore, the top-down model view is that children are unable to truly understand complex ideas related to political structure (Muldoon, McLaughlin, & Trew, 2007; Peterson-Badali & Ruck, 2008). This notion is based on the proposition of learning theorists such as Piaget and Kohlberg, who concluded that political concepts are no match to children's cognitive ability. The suggestion is that age is the benchmark for children to unpack complicated abstract concepts of politics, thus cognitive development is the milieu of competence. Such theoretical assertion is based on linear perspectives that ignore the ways intersectionality, intergenerationality, and experiences over the life course influence children's perspectives and agency (Hopkins & Pain, 2007). In addition, these theoretical perspectives narrow down the appreciation of children's and youth interactions and interconnectedness with multiple events found

in the ecological theory of political socialization (Amna, Ekström, Kerr, & Stattin, 2009). van Deth et al. (2011) rebuffed the notion that children are not capable of understanding politics by studying the political knowledge, orientation, and political attitudes of children between 5.5 and 7 years of age in 17 primary schools in a German city. Pictographic images for 100 questions were the medium of communication. The findings revealed that children have an understanding of the country's political structure and several political issues. Some children emphasized political issues over others due to their socialization through intersectionality and intergenerationality. For example, children from high-income brackets acknowledged global warming as a political issue compared to other students. Children are innately political and their political behavior and knowledge are refined through the relationship with various people and environments (Habashi & Worley, 2014; Kallio & Häkli, 2011). Hence, such evidence does not negate the central discussion of age and political knowledge, especially when it does not enforce adult-directed political socialization. Age as an inherent marker of chronicle progression of political understanding limits our understanding of children's and youth political agency. This emphasis is merely based on the top-down model embedded in governmental institutions that aim to perpetuate a political structure through adult-directed political socialization (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; Warren & Wicks, 2011). The paradox is that adults' presumption of children's cognition and age is concerning the understanding of public discourses but does not entangle the practice of presenting political information to children through civic and social science curricula (McFarland & Thomas, 2006; Youniss et al., 2002). The consensus is that children are unable to comprehend processes of government and political concepts, yet these same concepts are introduced at an early age to mainstream their future political prospects and engagement (Hart, Donnelly, Youniss, & Atkins, 2007; Hart, & Kirshner, 2009). Formal political socialization aims to ensure future compliance of young generations within the state-assigned channels and values (Donnelly, 2009). The practice manifested in school curricula and civic education attempts to govern the outcome of political knowledge and limit children's political agency (Habashi & Worley, 2014).

The top-down model of directed political socialization is intertwined with the formal political socialization in the school systems, whereby the civic education attempts to govern the outcome of political knowledge and scaffold children's political development (Donnelly, 2009; Habashi & Worley, 2009; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). Formal political socialization

is founded on the reciprocal assumption that children who are training in civic education in school systems will respond by promoting specific political behavior as in voting, participating in government, and being a good citizen to ensure the continuity of a stable structure of the country. Political knowledge is part of the curricula that enhance the endorsement of the societal political structure. Formal political socialization is promoted in civic education designed to prepare a competent and responsible citizen. Levinson (2010) articulated the expected outcome of the US civic education in four major skills. First, individuals should appreciate the country's history, democracy, and community issues and be able to engage in a constructive dialogue of different perspectives. Second, students and citizens should be active members by working on their community's concerns and interests. Third, members of the community should be able to act politically to enhance the public discourses through voting, petitioning, protesting, and solving problems. Fourth, citizens should endorse civic virtues such as social responsibility, tolerance, and respect for all. In a way, civic education should cover three areas: (1) civic knowledge that entails political knowledge and an understanding of government function and structure; (2) civic attitude such as community participation, tolerance, and respect to others; and (3) civic action such as participating in democracy via voting (Hart et al., 2007; Hart & Kirshner, 2009; Youniss, 2011). To ensure the outcome of civic educational curriculum, schools should provide learning experiences about current events, history and government, community challenges, and strategies to respond. The learning climate of civic learning should foster open discussion, simulant engagement, and give students experience of interacting with service learning because high or low grades do not necessarily produce the expected outcome of civic education (Feldman, Pasek, Romer, & Jamieson, 2007; Gimpel, Lay, & Schuknecht, 2003; Kahne & Middaugh, 2009; McFarlnd & Thomas, 2006). Students need to have the opportunity to engage in voting, public discussion, and community engagement because political knowledge is not a predicator for community engagement (Hart et al., 2007). The assumption is that school civic education is more effective with a practical component. Social councils, Kids Voting, Student Voice, and other leadership programs and extracurricular activities such as music groups or drama clubs are considered to support the tenants of civic education and enhance the expected outcome of the curricula (McFarland & Thomas, 2006). It was found in the current journaling research study that Palestinian youth participated in several extracurricular and leadership activities including

music, sport, team building, and after-school educational programs that related to school, as a 14-year-old male participant from a village stated, "Thursday, 5/4/2013, is Child's Day and it will be a beautiful day because I'm part of the event organizing team." The notion of civic education being implemented in schools was seen in students' participation, as another 14-year-old male from a refugee camp stated, "One day the school's parliament and the school's team vowed to keep the school clean, so they told the boys to not throw rubbish in the playground and in the classrooms and the one who does this will be punished. Because of this, the school is clean and they will give awards to students who keep the school clean to encourage them and to punish the students who don't. I want my school to be the cleanest school ever." Another example that echoes the role of Palestinian schools in civic engagement is through participating in competition, as another 12-year-old male study participant from a city indicated, "School chose me to participate in the Chemistry Olympiad contest, so in the holiday I am supposed to study two books. Today is Monday, I wish to win in this contest to travel to Tunisia Insha'Allah [God willing], I will go and I will be the winner." The assumption is that students, regardless of political status, income, or gender, benefit from such programs and curricula. Civic education benefits students personally as it acts as a buffer from risky behavior, improves school grades, self-esteem, and communication with peers (Limber & Kaufman, 2004; Perez, Espinoza, Ramos, Coronado, & Cortes, 2010). Further, Feldman et al. (2007) indicated that civic programs such as Student Voices equalized the interest in community engagement of diverse student groups, knowing that minority students lagged behind their White counterparts in political knowledge and interest. A similar assertion is indicated in the research of Perez et al. (2010), which revealed that undocumented students have high rates of civic participation. A major premise of the civic engagement in schools is to translate these behaviors, knowledge, and skills into adulthood. Hart et al. (2007) indicated that students who participated in community service in school years tend to have a high rate of voting during adulthood. In addition, students who participated in extracurricular activities have a high rate of volunteering in adulthood. However, many have argued that students' engagement with the community while at school does not indicate continuity during adulthood (Flanagan, 2009; Hart et al., 2007). There is no consensus regarding the relationship of civic engagement, adolescence, and adulthood. Hartley (2009) disputed the premise that community engagement in adolescence or youth would lead to increased community engagement in adulthood. The

argument is based on students in higher education since some courses require in-service learning and reaching out to the community. Students' engagement in the community is valuable as it connects knowledge with hands-on experiences. Hence, students should "never be asked to grapple with the socio-political forces that cause the problem to begin with or to imagine how a problematic status quo might be effectively challenged. Disciplinary preparation and democratic participation are potentially complementary ends but each requires a purposeful strategy" (Hartley, 2009, p. 25). Within this perspective, even though students are not demonstrating radical changes, they are achieving the goals of top-down model of political socialization by maintaining the status quo of the political structure. The measurements of youth agency within the civic education are to cultivate civic knowledge, attitude, and action experience during adolescence and carry them on during adulthood. Students are expected to interact with community and school contents to showcase their agency in community participation within the parameters of society. To achieve such expectations, schools should provide experiences of open discussion about current problems and government process as well as community engagement and extracurricular activities to ensure students' civic engagement beyond school years. These resources should be appropriate to build community trust, exercise freedom of expression, and accept dissent (Youniss, 2011).

THE IMPACT OF INTERSECTIONALITY WITHIN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

Schools and the structured educational system do in fact matter, as they can theoretically provide similar educational opportunity to the majority of students. Schooling years are associated with positive citizenship and community participation (Youniss, 2011). The intense focus on civic education is based on its potential to connect adolescents with the community and its trajectory to foster civic experiences to adulthood, as the above discussion demonstrates. School provides the opportunity for extracurricular activities, community engagement, and political knowledge to achieve these goals. There is evidence of a positive impact of civic education in youth on adulthood engagement in the community (Flanagam, Cumsille, Gill, & Gallay, 2007). However, an issue arises in looking at the correlation of civic education in youth translating to adult engagement across different groups of people: Why do civic education and programs not equally

produce adulthood participation in the community among all groups? The premise of civic education and programs is valid, as it engages youth with the community and political structure; however, there are some variables that hinder its application, as the society is no longer homogenous politically, ethnically, and economically. Therefore, civic programs should not be evaluated without examining the school climate, students' social identifiers such as socio-economic status, gender, political status, and so on, and the larger political structure. This is important because learning experiences are not equal for all, even though the top-down model expects that all students will produce similar civic outcomes regardless of the social identifiers like socio-economic status or ethnic backgrounds (Levinson, 2010). According to Torney-Purta, Barber, and Winlkenfed (2007), African American and Latino students tend to have less civic educational content such as discussions and courses of government and current event or open discussion and decision making. Asian students tend to participate more in extracurricular activities and decision making than Whites but less in open discussion. Socio-economic status is also a factor in which students with higher socio-economic status tend to have more opportunities to engage civically and participate in extracurricular activities than other students (Kahne & Middaugh, 2009). The intersectionality of socio-economic status and civic education is profound as students from low-income families and on free lunches have 75 % less political knowledge compared to students from high-income families and certainly less opportunity for civic engagement (Hart & Kirshner, 2009). The intersectionality of an individual's social and cultural identity is not confined to the micro system as the micro and macro systems coincide within interactions. Childers (2012) provided examples that contextualize the intersectionality and impact of economic evolution on some community engagement programs particular to school journalism and volunteerism. School newspapers are no longer widespread as most schools suffer from financial shortages, though it was a tool for students to participate in the school and the larger community. Students' engagement in such activities mirrored their future engagement in society; in addition, youth perceive their agency as consistent interaction with the community. Another community activity that is disappearing is community volunteerism though it is considered part of the school structure. Volunteerism does not continue after the expected school requirement, in part due to the economic structure of the government. Neoliberal market values are grooming youth to become consumers rather than citizens as "surplus capitalism and mass production have negated the individual's need to have functional

knowledge of how things work, to understand the political process" (Childers, 2012, p. 114). The economic structure is entangled with the political structure; thereby, students are more interested in having the "next thing" than learning about the community's needs. The interactions of liberalism values with the educational systems created financial crises in schools while these values encouraged consumption and individualism over community engagement (Giroux, 2006; Schugurensky & Myers, 2003). To perceive civic education in a vacuum is to assume that youth and children are living in isolation and are not subjects or subjugated by different events and discourses. The intention of civic education is to arm students with the political knowledge that would help and guide them toward engaging in the community and participating in the society. Political knowledge can vary between students due to personal and school resources, yet Gimpel et al. (2003) argued that students' experiences in school influence their views on the larger political system. If students are evaluated fairly by teachers and the school system, they tend to have a more positive view of authority and the political structure. Flanagam et al. (2007), in their research on minority students and school structure, indicated that minority students with positive experiences with school authority believed America as a just society and engaged with civic expectations compared to White students. To recognize that interactions in schools are a factor in civic development is important because minority students tend to have less civic opportunities and skills than majority students (Hahn, 2010). The sentiment of positive school experience is imperative for developing community social trust even if all factors are in place in terms of civic opportunity, action, and attitude. Social trust is the foundation for students to develop a sense of solidarity and identification with others, which are essential to join together for a common goal. Schools' capacity to reflect social trust is predicated on its practice of showcasing social trust and the interactions with policies, parents, and the larger community (Flanaga, Stoppa, Syvertsen, & Stout, 2010). The interaction between intersectionality and intergenerationality within the society is a part of building social trust. Community members and family are factors in enforcing school ties to civic behavior; adults' behavior outside the school contributes to the implementation of the civic curricula and school environment (McIntosh, Hart, & Youniss, 2007). However, the relationship between civic education and community is also contextualized in local political discourse, "adolescents living in environments where there are vigorous political stimuli may become good citizens in spite of the fact

that they may dislike civics coursework, have no plans for higher education, and may express doubts about the justice fairness of the school systems" (Gimpel et al., 2003, pp. 147–148). The emphasis on the interaction between youths' school experience and political participation is excluded as the discussion is focused on middle-class resources and perspectives of civic education (Ladson-Billings, 2006). To ensure the perpetuation of societal, political, and government structures, civic education in schools and governmental policies should provide equal opportunities to gain political knowledge to all students, regardless of social identifiers, as this will allow for the most political and community engagement among all people. The interactions exist and civic engagement can be measured by only resources to support the curricula without the community perspective on the condition of the society.

The Palestinian Example of Structured Civic Programs

Educational structures are an important conductor of political socialization. Civic programs and extracurricular activities help develop children and youth and can lead to increased community and societal participation. Even daily activities within the schools that are not directly tied to civic programs impact the socialization of children and youth and interact with the intersectionality of social identifiers and identities. Educational systems and structures are an important part of all societies; however, special attention must be paid to how they impact children and youth living in conflicted areas as well as how they are impacted by socio-political realities. Education is a key contributor to the way individuals and communities react to conflict. Values, politics, and ideologies placed in education can reproduce a conflict or create a humanitarian society (Murray, 2008). School curriculum including civic education is a vision for a nation's future. This is extremely significant, especially for conflicted or post-conflict nations whereby civic and history curricula are the interventions to break the cycle of violence and plan for society potentials. A 15-year-old female participant from a city recalled: "through my school I participated in a citizenship project that discussed local problems and their causes, solutions, reasons, negative and positive effects. I love the subject..." This exemplifies that it is important to include historical as well as current socio-political narratives in curricula. However, educational institutions are considered the beacon of underscoring oppression and community loss of rights. Teachers are

considered the frontline to address oppression with students as their role encompasses counseling and comforting students. This skill is increasingly highlighted after national deserters or terrorist attacks (Felix et al., 2010). This is the case with Palestinian teachers, as the same 15-year-old female participant indicated, "At 8:30 am while we were listening to the radio the teacher asked me to write a composition to express my feelings and to describe the current situation to preserve in the school records, I feel like I'm in a war. Children are being killed, and the number of people with injuries continues to increase. What's next?"

In the Palestinian case, educational systems and structures are particularly complex. On one hand, you have a lack of access to education because of the Israeli occupation, and on the other, you have educational systems that are disjointed due to Palestinian children and youth receiving extracurricular education that refuses to adhere to oppression. Regarding lack of access to education, Davies (2010) states, "Israel has repeatedly displayed a pattern of symbolic violence against Palestinians, including the destruction of research centers, and prohibitions of fine arts degrees" (p. 492). This targeted destruction of education centers denies Palestinians the right to engage civically and denies the community's and students' aspirations. Further, Palestinians are studying in unsafe schools, as a 14-year-old female youth from a village reflected on her fellow students in Gaza during the Israeli invasion of 2008. "I heard that the Israeli forces invaded Gaza and they cut the electricity off and the fuel was stopped, they claim that Hamas shot rockets from Gaza. Gaza students have exams and I wonder how they can study while they don't have electricity, and how they will be warm during winter?" The unsafe learning environment of students reflects the political upheaval of the education system. Prior to Oslo, Palestinian schools in the West Bank incorporated the Jordanian curricula and those in the Gaza Strip adopted the Egyptian one. This disconnect is also observed for Palestinians living in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon (Mazawi, 2000). The politics of Palestinian citizenship is also contested in Israeli schools. More than 20 % of the Israeli population are Palestinian and their national narrative is excluded in the national Israeli curricula (Davies & Hogarth, 2004). The attempt to partially integrate Palestinian narrative is faced with a lack of respect on the part of teachers to the material at hand (Golan-Agnon, 2006). Even though this structure of inequality creates a gap in learning about the national narrative, education for the Palestinians has been the tool to resistance and interrupt Israeli strategies of regulating the outcome of education. An example of education being a tool of resistance is found in

one 15-year-old city-dwelling female participant's experience: "We spent two classes on the school radio to speak about Gaza." The Palestinian school system can be used as a method of learning about the occupation, although the structured curricula may not. Even so, the emerging curricula are not without political challenges. Israeli government is targeting the Palestinian education ideologically by influencing the post-Oslo curricula (Adwan, 2006). Israelis campaigned against the emerging curricula arguing on the claim that it incited hate and anti-Semitism (Murray, 2008). Brown (2001) analyzed the Palestinian curricula and concluded that such claims are exaggerated since there is an increased international pressure from neoliberal donors to develop *curricula of peace* in the absence of peace. This was reflected in the learning experience of a 14-year-old female living in a refugee camp, who said, "Now I'm working with Panorama Institution and we talk about special issues such as civil peace, an issue we are the first to talk about, I didn't hear about it before and I'm happy to know these things so that I can help everyone in my society." This was also emphasized by another 15-year-old female participant from a village, who does not share the same location and school as the previous participant, in her description of a meeting with the same Panorama institution:

> We started our discussion and it was about civil peace and it goes as follows: 1) Raise the youth awareness of civil peace and Human Rights to be active members in their society to help resolve conflict. 2) Skills building to make youth more reliable and help make civil peace in Palestine. 3) Promoting dialogue, critical thinking, and creativity through teamwork to be an active party in solving the internal conflicts. They said that the target audience is the school student from 13–16 and the period time of this project is for one year, also the target areas are 10 provinces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and they are Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Hebron, Talkarem, Rafah, Gaza, Khanyounes, and Gabalia.

Palestinian educational curriculum is a battleground between donors such as the European Union and United Nations and the Palestinians, who perceive that the curriculum lacks the national expectations (Abu-Sadd, 2006; Halstead & Affouneh, 2006). Most of the post-Oslo Palestinian curriculum is a copy of the Jordanian and Egyptian curricula. This means that not much has changed from the previous curriculum (Murray, 2008). The paradox within this practice is in the assumed inconsistency of the interactions between global and local contexts. On one hand, the

assumption is that post-Oslo curricula might create harmony between education and global citizenship (Bank, 2008) and, on the other hand, that schools and curricula are disconnected and not influenced by the community's political realities of Israeli oppression. Global citizenship education embraces neoliberal values of individualism that are supported by institutions like multinational corporations, World Bank, World Trade organization, and the International Monetary Fund (Armstrong, 2006). Hence, these unparalleled assumptions affect children's learning, whereby school curriculum is needed to successfully complete grades and school but is not necessarily a reflection of the political reality. Gimpel et al. (2003) argued that students living in highly politicized geopolitical contexts are not disconnected from the larger community; on the contrary, these youth are intersecting and interacting with other community members and local/global geopolitics. The disconnect is found in the assumption that youth's living reality does not question the learning content of the curricula. Schools are promoting civic education as a method of change and inclusiveness, while students' families and community members are discriminated against and oppressed. It is not enough for the top-down model of political socialization to provide knowledge and attempt to shape attitudes and actions within civic education if that very content does not coincide with the reality. Youth must participate civically in the community to really grasp the school's civic curriculum. In a way, this reiterated Childers' (2012) suggestion that the immediate disconnect in civic education is not only theory and practice but also between youth experiences and curricula expectations. The political turmoil in the daily living experiences of youth transcends curricula and enforces that oppression directly interacts with pedagogy and learning content. A country's learning expectations of students embedded in civic curriculum should concur with the political sphere. Finkel and Ernst (2005), in researching post-apartheid South Africa, posited that students must experience actual democracy to truly integrate the premise of civic values highlighted in school curricula. Political chaos and unrest influence the way youth behave and participate in the society. Therefore, the interaction of political reality, students' learning, and the hegemony of global citizenship is not aligned in outcome and processes.

Gimpel and Pearson-Merkowitz (2009) emphasized that there is a need for interactions between community, police departments, charities and religious institutions, and students because youth have to build trust in the top-down structure to carry on the civic duties beyond the school years. This is especially important because there is a tendency by youth to

not carry on civic education expectations beyond the school years. Hence, there is a conceptual fragmentation with such a proposal of the community working together to ensure positive outcomes. It not only denies youth the political agency to identify political engagement but also ignores the contrary living experience of the community in relation to the national politics. There is no doubt that the notion of positive achievement of civic curricula should be complementary to national and community political reality, but this might not be the case for contested regimes as the one in Palestine. Learning about alternative perspectives, civic actions, and vision is not limited to schools, as streets, families, and community organizations are participating in the informal curricular perspectives for youth (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003). There is no lack of Palestinian community coming together to achieve civic engagement; on the contrary, Palestinian youth have been part of community civic engagement through volunteerism in spite of the political fragmentation between neoliberal expectation of civic education and the political reality of Israeli oppression. Youniss and Hart (2005) argued that social and community organization are crucial for civic engagement even if such activities are not part of the school system. Ginwright and Cammarota (2007) discussed how youth civic activities outside the school create a sense of belonging to the community and in political discourse. A 14-year-old female participant from a city talks of a play she acted in about Israeli forces demolishing a Palestinian girl and her family's house, killing her parents. The participant noted, "This was a real Palestinian story. At the end [of the play] many people were weeping. I did this play in front of 700 people." Civic movements engaged youth with community services to embrace the struggle and provided civic competence for youth. It is these extracurricular activities that provide academic and leadership programs and highlight the interactions across different community contexts and also the intersectionality with other youth agency. The interactions also entail street politics, community aspirations, and everyday living. Youth recognize the significance of such interactions, and in some geopolitical conditions, the relationships between these contexts do not coincide with civic education. Hart (2002) discussed the interactions of such contexts on Palestinian children living in refugee camps in Jordan. The United Nations adopted the Jordanian curricula for the schools in the camps in which civic education and history are focused on the Hashemite crown. The surrounding contexts do not always explicitly support such narrative. At home and in the camp, youth encounter Palestinian dishes, family narratives, and views about their history. Citizenship curricula and

social science material integrate religious views in which "students are encourage to demonstrate their feeling for family and nation through obedience in the home, care for their schools buildings and concern for the environment. In this way citizenship, loyalty to the nation and religious devotion are drawn together and mutually reinforced" (p. 40). Palestinian youth in the refugee camp complied with the expected curricula; however, they learned about alternative views from the daily interactions. Youth agency has multiple learning contexts about civic education within schools and outside schools that not always correspond accordingly with actions and skills expected in civic education.

Teachers have a role in enhancing the civic educational experience and negotiating the political agency of youth, as a 14-year-old male participant from a village indicated, "In the school today we wanted to go on strike but the teachers refused because they needed to teach. We painted many wallpapers and hung them on the school's walls to show the brutality of the occupation: their killing innocent children, women, and the elderly. While I was walking into school I saw a doll covered in red paint; the paint represented blood. Also, the Palestinian's flag was painted on and there was a phrase written in English ("Please save us")." It is due to youth's and children's multiple interactions and contents that Finkel and Ernst (2005) indicated that teachers of civic education should be equipped with the pedagogy that complements the values promoted in civic education. Teachers are the bridge between learning and action of civic education. Teachers should be committed to imbibe students with civic value that requires specific pedagogy. In the Palestinian case, teacher pedagogy is entangled with the political dilemma that students and the community are experiencing at the same time, as a 14-year-old female participant from a refugee camp stated, "The demonstration today was for patriotic forces, students, and teachers in Jenin. It was very crowded and they all were calling against the split between Fatah and Hamas, reunion, free Palestine, and end Gaza war; some of these slogans said one people Fatah and Hamas and one homeland." The political division between Palestinian parties has an impact on student learning and community cohesiveness. In this case, teaching civic education should not be approached as other learning content (Davies & Hogarth, 2004; Schugurensky & Myers, 2003). The pedagogy of civic education is not similar to other school topics; thus, it interacts with multiple dimensions and political elements. In addition, teachers should be able to model the values entailed in the civic education. Teaching the content material is part of students' trust of schools. Gimpel et al. (2003)

argued that students embrace civic learning, especially if teachers are engaged and supportive. Therefore, teachers should be equipped with the methods and content to facilitate youths' learning experiences within the school's extracurricular clubs or outside (Youniss et al., 2002). This is evident as many youth describe the impact of Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2008 as part of the learning calendar, as a 15-year-old female participant from a city stated, "It is the sixth day of the continued massacre in Gaza, the martyrs' number reached 400 and 2000 injured until this morning, who accepts that?" The local/global discourse and the living reality of the Israeli occupation challenge the role of teacher's impartiality while both youth political agency and learning become an absolute within the community, as one 15-year-old female youth from a village described the transformation of both teacher and learner, "The school principal said we will not take any class today because of the situation in Gaza (we will take 4 classes). Then she told us we should demonstrate. I asked her if I could go home and bring the Palestinian flag and she allowed me to go. We went to the boys' school and we made a big demonstration." Competence of civic education is posited in the pragmatic relation with local politics, being a member of the community, and solidarity. Palestinian teachers' role in this learning area is complicated, as the topic intersects government policy, community politics, national narratives, and Israeli occupation. There are direct interactions between the micro and macro level of local/global politics. Teachers engage in civic participation in strikes and protests and community services. In 1925, teachers participated in protests against the Balfour Declaration and joined the national strikes in 1936 to revolt against the Balfour Declaration to build a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Although Palestine was under the British Mandate, it was not a question about loyalty. Teachers were activists and did not teach but organized extracurricular organizations for students to critique the educational system and help in mobilizing the community (Brownson, 2014). Palestinian youth agency also documented teachers' strikes in which they demanded the PA to pay, as one 15-year-old female youth from a city reported, "I watched a program about the teachers' strike, and the reporter asked teachers and students to participate in that discussion, one of the teachers said: living cost has increased and the economics condition has deteriorated, what is the solution? And how are they going to feed their children? Then a student called and said this situation has bad effects on the students."

Post-Oslo, teachers are monitored and only allowed to adhere to the curricula that do not reflect the Palestinian narratives or aspirations (Yair &

Alayan, 2009). Hence, Palestinian teachers always find a way to pass on the narrative (Pinto, 2014). Teachers' interaction with the political reality impacts their teaching. Halstead and Affouneh (2006) indicated that teachers encounter multiple obstacles in teaching in the Occupied Territories. In addition, they are monitored in keeping teaching material within the post-Oslo curricula. This not only impacts students but also teachers. Palestinian schools have been the target of Israeli military, and this affects the pedagogy and students' learning. To assume a disconnect with everyday political reality is to deny the intersectionality and interaction of the politicization of Palestinian curricula and individual national identity.

The practice manifested in school curricula and civic education attempts to govern the outcome of political knowledge and limit children's political agency (Habashi, 2008). This effort is parallel to other adults' institutions, as adults outside the formal education are also enforcers of this political socialization structure. This approach of the top-down model of political socialization is not successful to mainstream the political outlook of youth and children especially in contested regime. Habashi and Worley (2009) stated, "schools and parents are no longer the teachers; rather children have become the arbiters in political issues" (p. 45). The reality as Youniss et al. (2002) articulated is that "political socialization is not something that adults do to adolescents, it is something that youth do for themselves" (p. 133). Apparently, the adult-run institutions of political socialization explicitly focused on promoting one approach to civic engagement whereby it failed to examine how youth reinvent the meaning of political socialization, as one 15-year-old female youth from a city echoed another youth's construction of political agency:

> Today my classmate's father is in the Israel's jail, as are many Palestinians. She has many brothers and sisters. I asked her about her life, she said: I miss my father. Sometimes I listen to the prisoners' families when they talked on the radio and TVs. Families do that to assure prisoners, and it is a type of communication because they can't visit them. In my opinion this is all invalid; a phone call couldn't replace a mother seeing and hugging her son. Or could not replace a married father seeing his wife and children. Israel deprived those children from their fathers. And they deprived youth from building their own future, Youth fight for their homeland, what Israel calls security. I want all prisoners to be free, because freedom is wonderful. I wish everyone to be free.

The notion of youth "doing" political socialization among themselves while at school is reflected from another 15-year-old female youth from a city on the same issue, "The English exam was very easy. Today was the prisoner's day so we all remembered our cousin in the Israeli's jail. I wish for him and for all the prisoners to be free. All the schools go out to demonstrate and show their solidarity with the prisoners." Youth "doing" political socialization is extended in demonstrating agency, as one 14-year-old female who participated from a village insisted that political agency precedes education by stating, "While I'm going home I heard a song about relieving the old city. Then I arrived home. Shatha called me to go with her to the old city of Hebron to support this campaign. My mother said no you have to study for your math exam but I insisted on going. Then she accepted but not to be late. Then we went to the old city and we raised up posters of (relieve the old city of Hebron), we stuck posters to the streets and cars." Youth agency results in taking actions, as another 12-year-old female participant from Jenin Refugee camp shared an experience about youth doing political socialization, "The school students make demonstrations everywhere. In the school the students went out in a demonstration and one of the settlers ran over a student. Another episode happened, an 18-year-old student carried the Palestinian flag and they shot him and he died. What he has done? Also, he was young."

Youth are innately positioned to engage in political socialization in educational structures, although it might be under the purview of the top-down approach that enforces specific civic engagement. However, it is essential to examine the political conditions that surround youth before concluding the effectiveness of the school requirement of civic engagement. Youth lack opportunities for political engagement or political voice available for adults under the proposition of cognitive development. Children and youth are previewed as an age cohort that does not have the cognition or power to challenge the overall societal and/or political structure. Hence, this perspective limits the analysis of the intersectionality and interaction of the youth political agency within the ecological environment and focuses on the top-down model embedded in the school curricula of political socialization that frames youth with narrow linear interactions with future trajectory of voting and volunteering. Youth agency within the educational system is connected with other interactions in the community and government that might contradict or complement their political agency. Therefore, it is critical to realize and recognize that children and youth do indeed have political agency that can impact their own political socialization due to

the intersectionality and interactions with events outside the school in the top-down model.

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Media and the Neoliberal Agenda Within Political Socialization

I woke up in the morning of January 15, 2009 and was hoping that the Gaza sorrows had ended, and a new day full of hope [had] begun. But unfortunately, while I [was] watching TV I noticed that the situation [had] worsened. [T]he news was that the martyrs of 17 citizens and the injury of 65 citizens during the air strikes on al-Zaytoun neighborhood . . . children are dying every day. We are silent, [we] wait, and cannot do anything. I hope that someday I wake up and I see no grieving in Gaza.

<div align="right">14-year-old male from a village</div>

While I [was] watching TV with my family, I saw the famine in Africa. Africans as well as Palestinians are deprived of everything. As an example: American children have everything. We are not greedy, all we want is to free Palestine because we want to know our country and its landmarks, especially Jerusalem—many children dream to visit it, and there are many that [have been] born, grew up, and died without seeing Jerusalem.

<div align="right">12-year-old female from a city</div>

THE PRESENTATION OF MEDIA AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The presentation of media, both in formal and informal manner, affects youth political socialization and agency. Media can include a wide range of elements, such as television, the Internet, social media, graffiti, and

literature. Media can be very influential in the way youth view and perceive their world and reality. Historically, media has been discussed in a linear way, such as including only dominant news sources, without considering alternative media in the community. The multiple narratives of media have been ignored, especially when considering youth agency and political socialization. This chapter will focus on the interaction of the effect of media, both formal and informal, that is shaping the national narrative, community political discourse, and the interaction of youth political socialization. For example, one 12-year-old female participant from a city wrote about watching TV with her father and seeing children crying. The youth asked her father why the children were crying and her father responded, "the occupation expelled them from their own country, and now they don't have water, food, or homes to sleep in." Media as a source of political information can impact Palestinian youth's political socialization interactions and communications.

The concentration of this chapter is on media and its effect on youth political socialization and attempts to conceptualize its interactions with youth political agency. Media is ultimately a pragmatic medium of communication that currently manifests in multiple social and technological dimensions and interactions that youth explore in the process of political socialization. When looking at media and its role in youth political socialization, it is important to recognize that there are two distinct discourses that impact youth socialization regarding media: (1) the adult-directed media that means to politically socialize youth by emphasizing and portraying political values that complement the top-down model of socialization and the political status quo and (2) the youth-focused discourse in which youth use media to engage with others on alternate views of political processes and issues that may not be endorsed by the adult-directed (top-down) model of political socialization (McChesney, 2001; Pickard, 2007; Xenos, Vromen, & Loader, 2014). The immediate availability of media for both youth and adults allows for the competition of these two distinct discourses of youth political socialization. These two discourses might virtually collide in political discourse and methods of social and political change. The contested discourses of adults and youth within the media transcend micro interactions of intergenerationality as media from the adult-directed model is utilized to disperse political messages of compliance or specific changes within macro local/global discourse (Giroux, 2011). Media, especially social media from youth perspectives, provides interactive venues to discuss political issues and connect with other groups that traditionally was

challenging. In a way, media expands the discussion between generations and family members to include mainstream or alternative views. The interactions between youth and media regardless of the direction are consistent, as they reach different social and political contexts. To explore these two parallel but distinct perspectives of media, it is essential to analyze media's approximate relationship with political socialization and youth agency. From the youth-focused discourse, media is associated with redefining political knowledge and processes to create political spaces for social change (Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012). This interactive youth agency aims to produce alternative views of the status quo. Hence, from the adult-directed discourse, media is part of the production and reproduction of the top-down model of youth political socialization, whereby it is mainly perceived as a medium of communication to enforce the expectations of political socialization within civic engagement, voting, and maintaining the political structure (Mellor, 2014; Vitak et al., 2010). Within this perspective, media expression of political information adheres to adult's premises of youth political socialization (Pickard, 2007). Mainstream media serves as a proxy to the adult-directed model of youth's and children's political engagement in the society. This is not to conclude that media is the major contributor to youth political socialization or to deny the other variables involved in this process. Educational institutions, families, communication avenues/media, community organizations, social economic programs, and political policies are integral contributors within the top-down model of youth political socialization and can be considered commodities and subjects of neoliberal policies (Giroux, 2011).

NEOLIBERAL VALUES AND THE MEDIA

The foundation of neoliberalism is in allowing the force of market to regulate the economy and social services. Within neoliberalism, governments should serve the corporations through creating policies that complement such aim. In addition, governments should privatize social and health services in which the market regulates benefits and limits collective power. A main tenet of neoliberalism is that personal responsibility remains the core for mobility without the intervention of the government (McChesney, 2001). Hence, the central piece of neoliberalism and media is found in the market-regulating media and the adoption of its values. Media, especially mainstream networks, is central to neoliberal values that emphasize and portray social ills as individual and family responsibility. Youth who are

protesting against globalization as a cause of social inequality and the economization of social problems and censorship of collective goods are considered criminal, since humanity, according to neoliberalism, is equated with commodity and consumption (Giroux, 2011). The media expressions of top-down youth political socialization are in the provision of neoliberalism values of consumption, individual subjectivity of social problems, reframing from challenging political authority, and consenting to the moral obligation for public caring (Conway, 2003). Media appropriate youth political socialization to the top-down model by highlighting images of civic engagement and individual responsibility as well as condemning youth collective actions (Kennelly, 2011). Therefore, the relationship between media and neoliberal politics is in its interactions with political, social, and economic messages, "neoliberalism is a political orientation hospitable to global free market capitalism and international media conglomeration. Predicated upon the priorities of free trade (including privatization, social-spending cutbacks, deregulation, deficit reduction, and economic globalization), neoliberal policies promote the profit making capacities of markets" (Bradford, 2006, p. 8). Therefore, the integration of neoliberal values in various institutions is to minimize the non-market ideas and public good, whereby networks integrate such approach through mainstream media's programs and political discourse. Media is a tool, product, and the embedment of neoliberalism that aims to commercialize and underscore a singular political ideology while censuring dissents (Evans, 2011; Fenton, 2011). The media's rhetoric of neoliberalism is to facilitate economic growth while explicitly convoluting social and community struggles. One example of this is found in Chicago, where the neoliberal urban governance of Chicago and its political culture and institutional processes, with the support of the media and in the name of economic growth, utilized military tactics to control public resistance of community displacement while framing the moral discourse to criminalize poverty, discipline immigrants, and outcast minorities. The media rhetoric and neoliberal social regulations met the global standing to bring in international corporations. The discourse used by the media in this case portrayed Black youth as aggressive, on welfare, associated with gangs, and fatherless. These images facilitated the neoliberal policies of detentions, replacement, and uprooting of communities (Wilson, 2004). Images in the media explicitly mirrored social and structural values that supported neoliberal values of economic growth and the criminalization of poverty. In such situations, youth who

have alternative moral compasses to neoliberalism are deemed to be unruly and aggressive without the consideration of their plea for social change.

Within the top-down model of youth political socialization, media encompasses three exclusive functions of neoliberalism that conceptually and practically overlap with each other. First, media is a commodity that is evaluated according to the market value practiced in ratings. Networks and digital media are part of neoliberalist commodities where monetary value is based on ranking with other comparable entities. Youth are participating in assessing the market value of media by endorsing or rating such entities. A program or digital media can close down if it does not generate the expected revenue. In a neoliberal economy, media is not only considered a communication medium but also part of the global market. For example, Facebook and Twitter are considered an investment opportunities and featured on the exchange stock market, and their value is determined by prospect growth (Chakravartty & Schiller, 2010). Media in this context is a consumption entity like any other commodity that is valued based on its market growth. For media to reach such a multi-faceted status is through the adoption of neoliberal market principles, which McChesney (2001) demonstrates in a discussion on television: "with neoliberal values, however, television, which had been a noncommercial preserve in many nations, suddenly become subject to transnational commercial development. It has been at the center of emerging global media system" (McChesney, 2001, p. 5). The transformation of the government's economic structure has allowed for the evolvement of media as a function of commodity.

The second function of media within the top-down, or adult-directed, model is in its way to communicate to the masses. Media operates as a vehicle in socializing individuals and communities with neoliberal values. Media rhetoric and reporting emphasize certain values over others; for example, the media will raise stories that are based on consumption and individual responsibility, while criminalizing calls of collective interest/acts (Maki, 2011). These messages intersect with youth political agency in which it highlights the appropriate method to engage in society. For example, youth protesting and questioning the impact of globalization are depicted as undisciplined, while youth who engage in consumption or acts of individual responsibility nature are praised. Giroux (2013) and Conway (2003) argued that media is used to deter youth from participating in protests against the tuition hike in Quebec through the militarization response of the police. Media corresponded with such perspectives by focusing on youth activities and ignoring the disproportional responses of the police. The protest

questioned profit before people and the concentrated wealth of some individuals that are the beneficiaries of globalization. Another case in which the emphasis on particular values over others as a means of political socialization is prominently found in the media discussion of Islam. The political views portrayed are based on orientalism with medieval connotations that reflect the imperialist discourse. To essentialize Islam is to present it as a threat to others, especially the West (Saeed, 2007). The tendency to use media to draw on stereotypes was evident in the Israeli depiction of Palestinians. The orientalist views asserted by global media portrayed Palestinians as liars and untrustworthy because they do not exist in Judeo-Christian culture and therefore cannot be partners in peace (Bishara, 2008). Media provides the communications and the skills to politically socialize youth with specific values. Neoliberalism extensively relies on media to propagate certain political beliefs; because of this, media in the top-down model ignores objectivism and transparency, which are cornerstones to unbiased reporting.

The third and final function of the media within the top-down model is the embodiment of neoliberalism and the practice of free market within the media networks, thus the interchangeability of neoliberalism and media and the emergence of neoliberalism and media as a single entity. Neoliberalism as media filters the selection of reporting and interpretation of events according to ideology; conservative and liberal reporting interpretation of local and global events are framed by respectable values system. Therefore, network reporting is not purely informative or "objective" in delivering news. On the contrary, media as neoliberalism adheres to network ideology in order to maintain the shareholders, with less consideration to the facts. The variety of network ideologies provides polarizing reporting, but services in retaining viewers. Facts and transparency become secondary compared to the enforcement of ideology (Bishara, 2008). Evans (2011) indicated that media is no longer a tool to promote democracy but more of partisanship of political views. An example from the Palestinian case is found in the representation of religion by Israeli media; by clashing two distinct ideologies, fundamental religion and secularism, the media is serving as an extension of political parties by perpetuating an "us vs. them" mentality. A 15-year-old female youth participant from a city wrote of watching a reporter on an Israeli television station say offensive things about other religions and asked, "Why do they flout things about other religions while we respect them?" This practice in biased reporting bolsters the status quo in a society. Furthermore, the practice enhances omission of facts, insertion of facts, and

misrepresentation of reality. The interruptions of the same event from various networks ideologies, be it news outlets or newspapers, convolute public understanding and are deemed to be bias and subjective. This fragmented information aims to preserve current viewers while attracting new audience including youth. Media frames political, social, and economic discourse within a biased analysis to serve the ideological characteristic of viewers, "As a result, rather than contributing to social cohesion, today's media often accentuates differences between various groups. The greater the conflict, the greater the likelihood that members of different groups will turn to segregated media outlets" (Evans, 2011, p. 249). Market competition among networks is fierce and network outlets should cater to reviewers' prejudices to maintain and grow (Mullainathan & Schleifer, 2005). To satisfy readers or viewers, networks have to enforce these biases over facts to maintain the market share (Iyergar & Hahn, 2009). Therefore, reviewing news from a conservative or liberal outlet might provide different ideology in interpreting events, but both are responding to the viewers' political dispositions to continue competing in the free market. There is no doubt that different ideological reporting appeals to specific groups, hence ideology becomes a tool to the embodiment of neoliberalism in media. Therefore, ideology might distinguish networks but not in the practice of neoliberalism. There is a difference on ideological spectrum of conservative to liberal in mainstream media networks, but there is no difference between the ideologies on the practice of neoliberalism spectrum. Evans (2011) indicated that some international media outlets are based on ideological outlook, but they do not necessarily engage in the neoliberal market. Nonetheless, the crux of interactions between neoliberalism and the top-down youth political socialization is to prompt the values that coincide with free market enterprise without the consideration of democracy. Giroux (2011) argued that neoliberal values are threating the practice of democracy through the dispersing of collective issues, valuing corporations' interest over public good. Media within the interaction of neoliberalism provides continuity and stability of its political and economic structures (Pickard, 2007). Irrespective of the complex relationship between media and neoliberalism, adult-directed model of youth political socialization is interacting with neoliberalism and media. Hence, some studies focus on the specific relationship between media and youth without recognizing the existence of interaction of neoliberalism and media (Gordon & Taft, 2011). The focuses evaluate the impact of adult-directed model of youth political socialization

in the media and civic outcome manifested in community engagement and political knowledge.

THE INFLUENCE OF MEDIA ON YOUTH AGENCY

Media is considered a proxy of the top-down model of youth political socialization, and its potential within socialization is in the crux of communication that is contingent on its relationship to people's everyday reality (Sapiro, 2004). To be plausible within the top-down model of youth political socialization, media should support the civic education values embedded in the school curricula. Media is proposed as a positive mediator of youth political socialization to enhance democratic practice and civic engagement. Political socialization is concerned with communication activities that maintain democratic practices, including media (McLeod & Shah, 2009). Pasek, Kenski, and Romer (2006) suggested that media could bring in young people to be interested in public issues to increase civic skills. Media serves as a bridge to community needs and encourages youth to participate in civic engagement, while providing political information about the issues. According to Hoffman and Thomson's (2009) work, adolescent viewers of late TV shows tend to have an increased political knowledge, and viewing the shows positively predicted civic engagement, even though these late shows tend to be cynical. This positive notion is also echoed by Bennett's (2008) work in which media does not only emphasize specific civic skills to maintain the political system but also develops the essential civic capacities for democratic engagement. Lee, Shah, and McLeod (2012) found out that media, in its multi-faceted tools such surfing the Web, blogging, texting, social media, and watching television is significant in engaging youth in the political process, even though traditional media such as television seem to be traditional due to being less interactive compared to blogging and Facebooking or Tweeting. Digital interactions and utilization of such communication tools enhance political discussion in the classroom and among peers. Media intersect with school, peers, and politics to generate a new venue for citizenship, in which it might alter the traditional model of political socialization. Hence, McLeod and Shah (2009) argued that the focus on studying youth political socialization with innovative communication should be allowed to focus on the processes not the outcome because it provides an insight into how community and government institutes can produce civic and political participation. The intersection of media is centered on the continuity of interactions with

different agents of the top-down model of political socialization. Civic education can increase the use of media among students. Some civic programs tend to expose students to watching news and reading newspapers. This integration of media should increase political knowledge and structure (Kiousis, McDevitt, & Wu, 2005). However, Hooghe (2004) argued that the interaction of media and the political process is not conclusive and might result in a negative correlation between media and community engagement. The reliance on mass media to obtain political information might be a hindrance for political engagement. However, there is no evidence to support this skepticism, as this was the same concern in the early age of television (Dimitrov, Shehata, Strömbäck, & Nord, 2011; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010). Media does not result in community fragmentation or members' isolations. The empirical evidence indicates that the more political the communication via various means of media is, the more political are the behaviors; "the communication mediation model has provided evidence that interpersonal networks of political discussion and informational uses of media result in increased community integration and civic participation" (De Zuniga, Puig-I-Aberilp, & Rojas, 2009, p. 558). Seemingly, there is a positive relationship between media and civic engagement, but this might not transcend to political engagement. The relationship between media and at least the engagement of youth's political thoughts is evident in the participants' journals; in discussing watching television with her father, a 12-year-old female participant from a city noted that "I saw little children crying because they were hungry and poor. I asked my father why they were crying, and he replied because the occupation expelled them from their own country. . . I was so sad because of them I couldn't sleep that night." Hence, political knowledge via media or civic engagement does not necessarily mediate or predict political participation. Rather, lack of confidence in the government and processes is associated with lack of political participation (Bakker & deVreese, 2011; Zhang, Johnson, Seltzer, & Bichard, 2010).

Community sites are geared toward relationships that encourage citizens to participate in civic engagement. Perhaps the constant attempt to understand the interaction between media and civic engagement should be through evaluating the analysis of the coding of civic engagement in technology. Research focused on the relationship identifying the impact of media on civic education utilized the traditional definition of civic engagement repertoires that are based on dutiful model of engaging in community, joining political parties, and becoming politically informed. Maybe the lack of identifying civic engagement is due to the lack of compatibility of modern

society that engages in technology, individualist expression of political thought, and acts. The contemporary style of civic engagement does not totally intersect with the measurement of traditional civic engagement (Bennett, Wells, & Freelon, 2011). Technology has facilitated political networks as well as the individual political initiative; thus, young citizenship has become a producer and consumer of media. Sometimes digital political networks are more sustainable to enable large activists to join in the cause as the case in 2008 in South Korea. High school students were 50 % of the Candlelight campaign that protested against the unfair US–Korean beef trade agreement that lasted more than 100 days and more than 3.5 million participated. Teens mobilized other youth through digital media and networks to attend the protest. They also collected more than 1.39 million signatures in a month's time. Digital media connected and mobilized other youth to emerge as a political generation (Seongyi & Woo-Young, 2011). The integration of media in youth's everyday living might be for entertainment and communication purposes, but it can also lead to civic actions (Lin, Cheong, Kim, & Jung, 2010). Rock stars and movie stars are leading the way to champion a political cause. For example, Oxfam partnered with a rock star to put pressure on the Bush government to stop distributing subsidized exports to poor countries where it might have resulted in the demolition of the local farming economy (Bennett, 2008). The top-down assumption is that youth are consumers of entertainment and not interested in the community and suffer from a community withdrawal (Quintelier & Vissers, 2008). MTV commissioned an ethnographic study of 1200 youth between ages 12–24 years to figure out if young reviewers are interested in the community. The result was that more than 70 % believed in the importance of the community and 68 % are supporting a cause on a monthly basis (Rheingold, 2008). To understand the relationship between media and youth political socialization is through reinvention of the learning process of citizenship and politics. Youth found the top-down model of political socialization unappealing and untrustworthy (Sloam, 2014).

Governments must learn about youth citizenship and communication preference. Another point that Bennett (2008) argued for and might consider to be challenging is "educators and other youth workers who design civic education programs, often based on unexamined assumptions about what citizenship should be, can benefit from learning how generational social identities and political preference formation are changing so they can design more engaging civic education models" (p. 12). The notion of integrating media literacy into civic education is echoed by Kubely (2004);

however, the approach is limited to adult perspectives of exposing students to newspaper and websites that are designed by adults and to mimicking elections. The approach does not capitalize on youth's interest because it does forgo on the importance of digital media as a network that forms generational identity and solidarity (Bennett, 2008; Holt, Shehata, Stromback, & Ljungberg, 2013). Digital media eliminated the authority figure in teaching civic engagement and widened the conventional definition of community. It is an equalizer that levels the playing field on the interaction between the perspective of youth on political and social issues and adult-directed model of political socialization. It is no longer one way that is dedicated by teachers, parents, or news networks. The skill set required for the alternative civic engagement is not provided in formal education but through peers. Surfing the web and talking to peers on the Internet is mentioned often in the journals of Palestinian youth, with one 15-year-old female participant from a city stating "at 2am I chatted with my friends on the Internet" and another one discussing surfing the Internet and emailing the British Council. An additional 15-year-old female youth participant from a village discussed the connection between using the Internet and politics in an example regarding former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon [former Prime Minister of Israel]: "One day I was sitting at home, then I went to my uncle's home to surf the Internet. I saw Sharon's photo—he looked like the Pharaoh, he is so scary and God punished him for what he has done to the Palestinians." It is that interaction that Youniss et al. (2002) articulated that youth political socialization is an act that they do it themselves. Peer networks and online community is part of the generational shift in the youth agency in which it opens up to new models of citizenship and redefine community engagement. Peer network is centered on specific niche that cultivates youth from all over and does not only engage with specific location. Media allows for youth to tune in, as more youth are aware of social scandals than the previous generations. Peers are encouraged to spread the word and inspire people through media that mobilizes youth to act. Digital media provided a platform for diverse individual expressions and a forum to engage in social issues and controversies. Bennett (2008) argued that these digital spaces could be counted as social protests, as they can forge into offline actions. McLeod and Shah (2009) echoed that the top-down model is behind the curve in understanding media beyond TV networks on youth political socialization: "Internet widens opportunities for selecting diverse sources of content not found in traditional news media informational use and assess effects on cognitive processes and structures" (p. 8).

Hence, the interpersonal communication competences are no different from traditional civic engagement or within media (Shah, McLeod, & Lee, 2009). Youth who demonstrated strong civic engagement with the support of home and school also engage in networking and discussion, fostering the skill necessary for communication competence offline and online. The top-down model institutions have to catch up with the new generation of media competence and alternative civic engagement; if adults fail to reach out, youth will descend into political cynicism and apathy. Adults should not focus on mainstream media that is inherent in the traditional definition of political engagement, but they need to widen their understanding of youth's method of interactions (Barnhurst, 2011). It should also be noted that there are other methods of communication that affect youth political socialization, which is seen in the following quote by a 15-year-old female youth participant from a city in discussing Mahmoud Darwish: "Today, we buried the poet Mahmud Darwish in Ramallah Cultural Palace. Mahmud Darwish died, he is one of the best poets in Palestine. He linked poetry with homeland and freedom issues, he represented us in the USA." Media, such as television and radio, along with less traditional methods such as the Internet work alongside other types of communication to affect children and youth and the way they perceive their everyday realities.

PALESTINIAN YOUTH POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND MEDIA

The significance of media is in its dynamic and multi-faceted medium that is utilized across generations within different local/global contents that challenge the top-down model of political socialization. Palestinian youth and children's political socialization has unique circumstances that contest the top-down model. Mazawi's (2013) analysis indicated that political socialization of Palestinian children and youth is partly manifested in dissent citizenship, whereby they participate in acts of resistance, activism, and solidarity against the Israeli occupation. The paradox of Palestinian top-down model of political socialization is in the political dispositions. Schools are teaching civic education and Palestinian authority is promoting the exercise of transferring civic skills in the community with the denial of the existence of Israel oppression. Palestinian authority is attempting to control any response to Israeli occupation, in part to combat the media bias of the Palestinians. Negative images about the Palestinians are misrepresented in global media and this is accompanied with extensive rejection of the Palestinian narrative (Ismail, 2008). Media reporting in

contentions political reality is contested due to the multiple narratives and information. The advancement of media should be compatible with the accuracy and fact-finding of political discourse because media can facilitate addition fragmented in contested region (Bayat, 2010). International media and journalist reporting privileged the Israeli narrative without mentioning that Palestinian community is under Israeli military occupation. Journalists endorse network and political partisanship and are instructed not to report on any stories that expose this imbalance discourse. This approach to reporting on the Middle East is the norm that is propagated in orientalism ideology (Bishara, 2008). Palestinians are portrayed in negative images that make it impossible to know the basic facts of the local/global politics in the regions. For example, one 15-year-old female youth from a city mentioned opening Facebook and chatting with friends, including a boy from the United Kingdom. The participant went on to say that they "talked a lot about Palestine and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. All the Europeans misunderstand us and our issues, they consider us terrorists and criminals." The struggle with the Palestinians is extended to consistently explain their discourse and narrative (Ayish, 2011). The perspectives of the region were always filtered through Western biases that limited the contextualization of narrative. Hence, since 1996, Western media outlet had to compete with Al-Jazeera, an Arab global media. Locals in the Arab world shifted from BBC Arabic and CNN and local channels to the new global network that corresponds to the Arab issues and its correspondents are Arabs. Besides being an Arab pride to reach a global standard of reporting, it quickly gained the credibility of the people. Al-Jazeera raised sensitive political and social issues, engaged the audience, reported life with videos and images, and critiqued Arab regimes, which was not traditionally the practice of any Arabic news channel (Bahry, 2001). Al-Jazeera provided a venue for the locals to voice their views about the government and pose challenges to foreign politics. The Al-Jazeera reporting contested the Western media and cultivated the transitional identity of the region that tested the American foreign policy. Two youth participants relayed information about watching Al-Jazeera and other local channels and their coverage of former US president Bush at a conference, with one 14-year-old female youth from a city mentioning, "My family was watching TV when my father changed the channel to Al-Jazeera to hear the news. The news flash was about President George Bush, and someone threw a shoe at his face." Further, the second youth (a 15-year-old female from a city) brought up an Iraqi journalist covering the news of the shoe throwing and noted that the journalist said,

"he (who threw the shoe) did what we all wanted to do to George Bush."
The participant continued writing that "the channels repeat this part of the
conference many times because they mocked George Bush, [who] deserves
this and more because what he has done to us, the Arabs." There is a need
for an open discussion about politics in the region and the interference of
American policy with Arab governments to oppress Middle-Eastern people
without considering the transitional identity in the region that is based on
solidarity (Nisbet & Myers, 2010). Hence, this "freedom of expression"
comes with a price tag, in which big companies from Saudi Arabia will not
advertise in Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera inspired other Arab companies to
become players in the media in the region. The accessibility of media allows
for instantaneous interaction with macro and micro perspectives that chal-
lenge political realities and national rhetoric while providing alternative
perspective. The impetus of media in politically contested region redefines
perspectives and ideas and mobilizes people, as the case in the occupied
territories.

   The act of rejecting global media to acknowledge Israeli oppression is
part of Palestinian resistance to the occupation, with Palestinians using
media to equalize the narrative and provide alternative views about
thesocio-political reality of the occupation and their political struggles
(Norman, 2009). Journalism and disseminating of the Palestinian narrative
is a template of political agency. Youth recognized media prevailing power
in constructing political knowledge and in providing people with alternative
perspectives about the Palestinian struggle (Kennelly, 2011). Media is used
as a tool for youth in Palestine to learn more about the occupation and
political struggles, with a 15-year-old youth from a village writing, "I saw on
television a young man from Ne'leen who was killed while he was talking to
the soldiers; he didn't expect that they would kill him." This young man the
youth spoke about is one of her brother's friends, and she goes on to say,
"After one week I saw my brother's friend's funeral on the Internet, and
something inside me occurred... I experienced a similar feeling when my
uncle was killed—my heart was torn that day." However, while different
media within Palestine is put forth by the Palestinians, the Palestinian
community recognized that the global media does not reflect their political
reality of occupation and have to comply with global reviewers' ideological
orientations, yet they continue to be eager to engage with any global media
opportunity (Bishara, 2008). The awareness stems from acknowledging
that the subjective reporting of portraying Palestinians as perpetrators of
violence shapes everyday living. Such images outside the political context

interact with global and local politics to justify Israeli oppression (Asthana & Havandjian, 2016). Any media network that challenges the Israeli discourse of the Palestinian narrative is deemed to be biased without acknowledging the inherent subjectivity of the Israeli perspective. In addition, international networks are complying with Israeli demand to limit the Palestinian perspective. For example, Apple has removed an App "Third Palestinian Intifada" out of the request of Israeli government (Wulf et al., 2013). Palestinians are recognizing that there is no equal opportunity to compete with global bias and Israeli hegemony; yet, Palestinians, and youth in particular, are utilizing media to provide alternative perspectives. Palestinian youth are learning how to document oral history, training in radio broadcasting, and video documenting Israeli oppression (Asthana & Havandjian, 2013). One 14-year-old female youth from a city mentioned "[holding] a meeting with the kids' council and the small Journalism team, which I became a member of. We agreed to make a monthly magazine, and I have chosen to be one of the designers. This magazine will be free distribution for children, and we went to many institutions for fundraising." A 14-year-old male youth from a refugee camp discussed the following:

> The first show of the cinema for children was in January of 2010. This show was *Ice Age 3*, we printed many advertising labels and tickets for the show, and in the radio, and we all were worried because this is the first time we hosted such an event. I was the one who was responsible for distributing roles on stage, the children looked so nice from the studio room, and I wish we had a real cinema to act in. Then I went to make handmade popcorn because it is cheaper. When we finished we collected 2700 shekels from the tickets; this was a great achievement.

Youth agency realized that the prevailing power of media is not only in serving evidence of the current problem but also as witness on history. This is especially achieved through the effort of archiving collective memories through oral history. Youth are also taking part in workshops organized by the community to write in newspapers and magazine. Palestinian youth agency express a range of views that center on their everyday living. Access to media did not only empower them as individuals but also provided them with the tools to contest the dominant discourse being a Palestinian. For example, the conflict in Gaza is prominently discussed in youth journals, as the youth participants discuss the conflict in relation to the media portrayal.

One 14-year-old female youth from a city, in discussing why his sister turned on the news, said, "there [were] 33 martyrs. I was shocked, and quickly went to watch TV. I saw martyrs, demolished houses, and injuries. There were a lot of children and infants . . . many mothers and children were crying. There was a father shouting: they killed my sons, they killed all [my] family." Access to media is allowing individuals to see more aspects about the conflict and Israeli occupation than what has been dictated from the Israeli media.

The political reality and personal experiences of youth agency constitute an alternative perspectives of civil dissent that does not necessarily coincide with the Israeli discourse of oppression (Habashi & Worley, 2014). The ubiquitous nature of media, especially digital media, provided youth agency with means to connect with others and forge on collective cause. Hence, media cannot substitute direct action and creating political pressure. Media is a means for youth to express their political agency through activism, resistance, and solidarity. A 14-year-old male participant from a village noted that he "watched in the TV demonstrations in many countries such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, and Jordan asking to stop the war in Gaza. Young and old came out and yelled to stop the siege on Gaza. Also in Khartoum, university students donated blood and medicine for Gazans due to the decrease of medical equipment in hospitals." Media is playing a huge role in bringing people together in solidarity against the oppression of the Palestinian people, as well as calling youth (and others) to action. The integration of direct action of protesting the apartheid wall and the indirect action through social media is part of the weekly demonstrations. Israeli government wants to expend the illegal settlement through the confiscation of Palestinian land and building a separation wall between the Palestinian villagers and Israeli settlements. Palestinian activists are organizing a weekly demonstration in resistance to the occupation plan of land confiscation and building the wall. Hence, activists realized the significance of accessing digital media to help in spreading the reality of Israeli oppression and to reach out to people around the global. The lack of WiFi infrastructure in the West Bank, and Israel control hindered access to 3G, activities acted on identifying other resources. The village activists organized 3G Internet through an Israel mobile company through linking a 3G antenna and a router to the village hilltops. The WiFi cannot sever every house, only four families and a community center. The monthly fee was higher compared to the European standards but with slower speed (Wulf et al., 2013). Activists created Facebook accounts to share video and

photos about the weekly demonstration and to engage people from all over the world to join in solidarity. With time, activists gained media skills and are now providing weekly press releases in addition to the video and photo documentations. To communicate with a wider audience, it is a must to have a digital print (Coleman, Lieber, Mendelson, & Kurpius, 2008). Media's purpose is to communicate with others for support and solidarity while providing immediate information about different political events (Bayat, 2010). The potency of media in political socialization is in leveling the ground between adult and youth, and from information to action. Media has the power to empower youth to action, as a 15-year-old female journal participant from a village who wrote several journal entries about watching television, saying that her uncle asked her to turn on Al-Jazeera because Israel had started shelling Gaza, and once he did state, "I saw a 3-month-old who was killed…no one cares about Gaza. I have felt this before and still I'm suffering." The participant goes on to say two entries later that "we left the boy's school and made a big demonstration [in which] we all cheered for Gaza." Media is a bridge that does not necessarily result in progressing information to action, but it can present the global politics within the local interactions and daily living of youth agency even if the information is framed with deception or neoliberal values. Media's power of connecting and spreading messages transformed both the construct of top-down model of youth political socialization and the media actions youth agency can utilize. Indeed, media impacts political knowledge, but youth political agency is juxtaposing this information with their interactions. It is naïve to assume that youth political knowledge is one-dimensional and lacks deconstruction with intersectionality. Youth ability to adopt media as a strategy to spread messages for political and social change that will transform not only media, but also the lens of political agency and political socialization.

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The Outcome of Political Socialization

The Evolvement of National Identity: A Never-Ending Process

Days, weeks, months, and years. Days passed and we still long [for] our homeland, we [are] lost between our dreams and reality. Unfortunately we know our reality but we still dream, maybe someday our dreams will come true [through] hard work. Our dreams as Palestinians, [we] need resistance and unity to fight the Israeli's forces which [have] ruined our lives.

—14-year-old female from a refugee camp

Political socialization of youth can have a significant effect on the formation of national identity. In some homogenous countries, national identity has not been a widely studied phenomenon, while in other cosmopolitan, multi-cultural, and conflicted places, such as Israel, it is a "more common political socialization theme" (Sapiro, 2004, p. 6). It should be noted that national identity is not static and has multiple dimensions and presentations over time. It is the notion of immutable national identity that posits a constant analysis and examination of its construct and processes. In communities where national identity is complicated by socio-political realities, political socialization, top-down model, or trickle-up model, it has a powerful effect on the processes (Muldoon, McLaughlin, & Trew, 2007). McGlynn, Niens, Cairns, and Hewstone (2004) discussed the political socialization approach of integrated schools other than the Catholic- and Protestant-segregated educational structure. This attempt is to forge an alternative national identity, and to reconcile and build a united collective

narrative in Northern Ireland. Also, in conflicted regions, national identity has significant implications to individuals and groups, as it is a shield of resistance to the occupier/oppressor whereby individuals have an agency within such constructs (Habashi, 2008). In Palestine, for example, national identity is at the forefront of a collective narrative that challenges Israeli military occupation and is a reflection of Palestinian youth's ecological interaction, as they form political agency within the local/global political reality. While Palestinian youth may hold allegiance to different political ideologies for liberating Palestine, their political socialization lays the foundation for the formation of national identity as Palestinian. Indeed, there is a dialectic interface between youth political socialization and national identity. It is this interlacing that provides insight, as a 12-year-old female journal participant from a city described national identity as a form of unity of the Palestinian people, "safety and love can be achieved in unity among our people." This chapter analyzes the formation and nuances of national identity as it is related to political socialization.

Social scientists have studied social, cultural, political, and collective identities as they relate to the formation of national identity and how these entities contribute to the never-ending evolvement of the construction of national identity (Smith, 2002; Yu & Kwan, 2013). While each individual person is multi-faceted and contains multiple social and psychological identities, national identity is seen as one of the most basic social constructs an individual may develop (Edensor, 2002). National identity as a form of modernity has enhanced individuals' consciousness of being part of a group's social and historical narrative that frames the belonging to such a group (Guibermau, 2007; Lee & LiPuma, 2002). Smith (1991) and Anderson (1991) suggested that national identity is composed of an imagined community and that people tend to share a sense of belonging as they live in the same territory, with an appropriate similar history, and enacting common memories, myth, and cultures. Yu and Kwan (2013) and Smith (2002) furthered this assumption in discussing the construct of nations as imaginary; rarely, if ever, will individuals in a country know most others living in that same country, but all are quick to assume camaraderie in the name of nationalism articulated in national identity. In addition, the operation of the imaginary community is through the members' compliancy to the same legal, social, and economic structures. Though the imagined community is abstract and, as mentioned, the members of the community do not know each other and have no intention of meeting one another, they are the foundation that supports the collective history and narrative. Also,

community members are the engines of continued reconstruction of such national narratives. The essence of imagined community is to commit to the general narrative that brings people together and fosters national identity. It is the manifestation of this imagined community that enhances and leads to the establishment of contemporary nation-states around the world (Penrose & Mole, 2008). Within such perspectives, national identity is inclusive and exclusive of others—inclusive of individuals and group members that share similar history, rituals, values, and others, and exclusive of others that do not share similar attributes (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Libhart, 2009). It constitutes the collective sentiments based on beliefs, culture, and belonging to a singular group. Indeed, sharing the same national identity strengthens the shared values of the collective. It is this dialectic interaction that constantly restructures the inclusion and exclusion memberships within the collective (Guibemau, 2007).

PERSPECTIVES ON/OF NATIONAL IDENTITY FOUNDATION

In the discussion above, surrounding nation-states being framed as part of an imagined community, scholars have looked to shared knowledge and experiences as main unifiers in national identity (Yu & Kwan, 2013). Eriksen (2001) argued that national identity can be fluid and relational to different environments, but is sure to point out that "[collective identities] have to be connected, in credible ways, to people's personal experiences" (p. 61). Moreover, he mentions that "[political identity] is based on a sometimes ambiguous mix of kinship and locality; it has well developed myths of origin and myths of past suffering; and it distinguished clearly between 'us' and 'them'" (p. 61). Shared knowledge and experiences can encompass a number of elements that contribute to the formation and strengthening of national identity. The everyday political reality cements the relationship between individual experiences with the collective narrative as it is articulated in national identity (Habashi, 2013). It is this relationship between the individual experience and the collective narrative that allows for national identity sustainability and changes overtime. Some researchers discuss the formation of national identity in terms of political experiences, although (Wodak et al., 2009) argued that there are nuances of national identity that might be viewed in a religious and cultural lens, rather than from a political perspective. National identity has multiple dimensions that can be viewed in religious, culture, location, politics, ethnicity, and history. Taking into account all elements that lead to the construction of national

identity, it is safe to assume that the formation of national identity encompasses the reality of an "us vs. them" construct. That is, the formation of national identity as an imagined community with others living in the same nation-state can lead to an emphasis on the differences between nations that do not share the same community (Yu & Kwan, 2013). This focus on differences plays an integral part in conflict between countries, whether the focus is on religious, cultural, or religious nuances. Furthermore, Rivera (2008) argued that there is a tendency to attribute some conflicts to ethnic and cultural elements. Eriksen (2001) analyzed case studies that were presumed to be ethnic conflicts to show that these cases should be understood under the concept of imagined community. He rebutted the premise that ethnic conflict is based on purely cultural principles using the examples from conflicts occurring in Yugoslavia, Fiji, and India. Using these examples, Eriksen (2001) argued that ethnic conflicts should be reframed from conflict over cultures to conflict over territories, resources, economic power, and rights. To simplify the argument to ethnic identity is to deny the collective identity that is deeply committed to the moral narrative that might be manifested in religion, place, or territory. To argue that ethnic conflicts are merely cultural wars is to explicitly dismiss the meaning of political identity that inspires national movements. The findings of Eriksen show that political identity based on religion or territories is almost akin to national identity than to ideological identity of liberalism or Marxism. The imagined community enacts a collective narrative that is appropriated in group and individual experiences, and inspires a national discourse. The variations and the continuous rendering of a national narrative ensure the evolvement of national identity outlooks. The changes over time in geopolitics, group structure, and national aspiring and collective narratives constitute the reinvention of national identity (Smith, 2002). The overtime aspect allows for the visitation of a national narrative, the appropriation of historical presentation and interpretation, the restructuring of cultures and institutions that embodies an alternative manifestation of national identity for different generations.

National identity is not static, but it is necessary to make meaning of the world, especially within the ongoing globalization effect. Globalization is about the increase of trade, spread of communication, flow of people, and cultures. Penrose and Mole (2008) argued, "the fact that nation-states are the only legitimate geopolitical unit in the current world order means that national identity has a key means for regulation access to resources. Thus, on a global scale, association with specific national identity is a key to

inclusion with in the space and resources defined by that nations" (p. 277). Within this perspective, national identity is associated with citizenship to access resources but is not monolithic. Transnational immigration and the coexistence of religious and ethnic diversity are the hallmarks of globalization. The assumption is that such mobility of people and interaction among different cultures and ethnicities might deteriorate the notion of nation-state, the power of government and therefore national identity. However, Smith (2007) asserted that the globalization would not diminish national identity and would not replace it, despite the fact diversity is on the increase and homogeneity is on the decrease; however, this "very process they are also being strengthened, as the members of nations reflect upon and argue among themselves about the meaning and role of their national identities" (p. 26). Tomlinson (2003) argued that globalization actually strengthens individuals' cultural and national identity. Identity is not a concern while living with others who share the same culture and locality, but it is a central concern within diverse communities. Therefore, the perspective of identity being demolished within a globalized world is misleading. On the contrary, globalization produces a range of identities with different dimensions, as attachment to locality becomes an existential to one's identity. Lechner (2007) affirmed the role of globalization played in altering the characteristic of modernity national identity, in which the territory element of boundaries is not a necessarily compound. Thus, people are not bound to a territory to develop a national identity associated with that space. Instead, they can experience a "third space" or "global assemblage" or "*inter*national culture" in which national identity is bound to the original country even if their members are living in a different country. Refugees, for example, might exile to a foreign country, or "a third space," and within a different culture, but their national identity is associated with their original country and over time can develop a parallel national identity of the host country. This cultural mix does exist with individuals that do not necessarily travel or are not uprooted, or by expats returning home. Different localities experience mix cultures through the exchange of music, news, technology, and consumption of traditions, food, or media. Volk (2009) studied a group of students of Lebanese returnees who wanted to settle back or wanted their children to know their homeland by arranging for them to stay with a relative. The subjects were enrolled in an American secular school and embraced elements from both Western and Middle-Eastern identities. However, they struggled not only with the dominant sectarian views of the Lebanese community, but also with being open-minded and adopting

Western family practices, which are considered to be lacking in values and morals. This is an example of which Smith (2007) asserted as a process of reflection and reshaping of national identity. In a way, for some the boundaries as mapped by cartography are no longer a fundamental for national identity, and therefore, binary exercises of us versus them are no longer clearly defined. Hence, this does not mean that it is a "happy hybridity" of cultures that can get along. The coexistence of various cultures might not only create a backlash and disturbance of the status quo but also create new dimensions of national identity that speak to contradictory and complex realities with blurry lines of national identity binaries. Habashi (2008) argued that the binary framework of "self and other" in Palestinian children's national identity was the evidence of the alternation of an imagined community in which the other was not explicitly expressed as merely an enemy with no shared experience with the self nor the self was inclusive to being the pure-self and committed to the collective narrative. Instead, the process of national identity is no longer distinct because of the constant reinvention of national discourse by the collective group/government, local/global politics, and the individual/agent. This ever-changing dynamic requires an understanding of the individual role in this construct.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE COMMUNITY

Modernity provided a distinct conceptual analysis of identity in which the national narrative is no longer the dominant perspective of national identity analysis. Individuals drive to be members in a social or political group, as their political agency constitutes a response to the collective discourse (Penrose & Mole, 2008). Individual agencies are embedded in intersectionality and intergenerationality within the ecological context, which emphasizes the individual experience and provides insight into the collective discourse. Identity, especially national identity, is a process that is fluid and pragmatic as individuals deconstruct and engage with new realities as a response to the non-static political reality. This approach recognizes the larger political and social context of the agents, which might serve as the larger matrix of understanding national identity. Furthermore, individuals' construction of national identity is grounded in the government support and the institutionalization of behaviors such as voting, engaging in public discourse, and commerce (Lee & LiPuma, 2002). The process of the government to partake in shaping national identity is conceptualized in the top-down model of political socialization as individuals experience

different narratives while an individual agency allows for subjectivity within national identity. The institutionalization of national identity is revealed in national anthems, artwork, flags, and other items while providing ideological framework within the curricula and civic engagement (Edensor, 2002). This unit of analysis is not complete without individual agency contribution to national identity. It is apparent that individuals respond to the national discourse through the constructing political agency; thus, they are an important part of shaping national identity. Hammack (2010) stated that the contemporary youth notional identity is divergence and convergence from the master national narrative regardless of governments' attempts to develop several methods of political socialization for installing a particular national ideology to frame a unique nation identity (Penrose & Mole, 2008). Different strategies of the top-down model are employed to reach the masses and to ensure individual narratives correspond with the national identity (Barton & Mccully, 2007). Therefore, national identity becomes objective and subjective whereby the individual self is reflected in its construct. From the anthropology perspective, collective narrative is rendered within an individual agency and the individual as an agent is subjected and subjugated to the collective narrative (Habashi, 2013). Malešević (2011) elevated the discussion of the relationship of the micro and macro interactions on national identity to another level. Aside from his rejection of the examination of national identity as a part of the micro/macro, he also rejected the notion that individual contribution is a proxy to the collective narrative. The argument is that there is no such national identity construct before or after modernity, as this proposition is ambiguous and impossible to empirically measure compared to concept of nationalism. The recommendation is to shift the non-empirical studies of national identity to the understanding of ideology and solidarity. However, to serve nationalism, individuals are engaged in ideology and solidarity that is not based on imaginary community. The shared experience is based on a close contact rather than on imaginary community. This alternative proposition is for understanding the individuals' experience in relation to the collective through deconstructing the processes of ideology and solidary, whereby ideology is the articulation of individual behavior and belief that is rendered in the existing national ideological discourse and structure; "so ideology is a process that incorporates thinking and action whereby our behavior is dependent on (but not determined by) ideological articulation cognitive maps" (p. 283). The concept of solidarity is based on individual experiences with others; it is not based on imaginary community. Individuals stand in

solidarity due to micro-interactions, kinship, and locally based narrative. Solidarity "naturalizes and normalizes nationhood as the self-evident and only legitimate way of comprehending the world in which we live ... the idea is to explore how this ideological process of making nations emotionally equivalent to families operates" (p. 283). It is solidarity that is framed within a particular ideology, evoking nationhood. This requires constant personal connection and interaction with the group to affirm bonds of solidarity. It is the small scale of solidarity that achieves the collective attachment and becomes the "precondition of their existences" (p. 285). For nations to achieve solidarity, governments need to depend on different large organizations to elicit such individuals' response. For this to happen, states should organize and install a "central ontological role" through the galvanization of media and educational system in order for national ideology to become an individual ideology that is operated within solidarity. He envisions the relationship between ideology and solidarity:

> Even though social organisations embrace the discourse of kinship in an attempt to project solidarity beyond the micro-groups, this is not a straightforward process that guarantees success. Instead, this ideologisation of solidarity requires long-term work: it relies on the existing atoms of genuine micro-solidarity that is generated on the local level. When successful, ideologisation operates as a giant fishing net that catches highly diverse and heterogeneous forms of micro-solidarity generated by a variety of small-scale social networks, and in this process articulates its catch as a singular, homogeneous 'national identity'. Ideologisation appears as a structural replacement for genuine solidarity; it is a process through which social organisations attempt to forge something that resembles real kinship bonds. (p. 287)

The paradox of Malešević's (2011) proposition is that he denies the existence of imaginary communities while at the same time stating that national ideology is merely based on "the people and for the people" as solidarity of "beyond the micro-groups," in which both actually do correspond with the "imaginary community." Put in another way, Malešević (2011) denies that an imaginary community exists, but for this premise to work, an imaginary community should exist. In a way, ideology and solidarity, individual or national, are grounded within the imaginary community that does engage on constant individual contact. Hence, this alternative to studying national identity should be tested as a proposition as it is still grounded within an individual perspective and an interaction with the group and relies on the

support of the government that creates structural stability for ideology. The challenge with such proposition is not the method of studying national identity but the assumption that individuals and government agree on a singular cohesive ideology. This is definitely not the case for communities, and individuals who are living within a conflicted political zone; perhaps, if they do, it will totally limit their agency. Also, this notion ignores individuals' and the group's ability to serve and transform the collective narrative without the government structure, though Malešević (2011) acknowledged that social movement's ideology can be a substitute to a government one. As expected, this premise does not provide a cohesive alternative to the complexity of a national discourse and its multiple dimensions embedded in the construction of national identity. National identity, therefore, is rendered in the local global discourse and youth political agency, and this is more evident as in the Palestinian case. Palestinian national identity that has not been completely institutionalized with the PA yet is engrained in historical and colonized experiences (Said, 1993) and in youth political agency interaction in contemporary events of continual dispassion and oppression that constantly alter its dimensions.

History of Palestinian Identity

Palestinian identity emerged during the twentieth century in response to the universal notion of nationalism; many of the countries arising from the devastation of World War II with the development of an explicitly nationalistic discourse (Khalidi, 1997). An important takeaway from this discussion is that Palestinian identity has been evolving throughout history, though it might be perceived and studied only as a by-product of Zionism invasion and the establishment of Israeli state (Kelman, 1999). Currently, there is not a clear, concise way that Palestinians construct their national identity, and this is due mainly to the ambiguous geographical sphere and history that constitute Palestine. Because of the Israeli occupation and, in direct response, the disjointed places of Palestine, the rendering of national identity is diverse and scattered throughout the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the East Jerusalem zone; Palestinians also live in Israel as well as in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere. For Palestinians living outside of what is considered historical Palestine, their exodus was a result of Al-Nakbah in 1948 when the Zionist army colonized 80 % of historical Palestine and the 1967 Six-Day War when the Israeli military further occupied the rest of the Palestinian territories that were

previously under Jordanian and Egyptian control (Carey, 2001; Pappe, 1992; Smith, 2001). The formal expression of Palestinian national identity came to the forefront in the 1960s when the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established, whose main goal was to liberate the Palestinian people from Israeli oppression, and which later became the representative of the Palestinian. PLO continued to grow and today it includes seven major political parties that represent the different spectrum of political views in the Palestinian community. Hence, not all Palestinians' political parties are part of the PLO apparatus; Hamas was established in the 1980s and was not part of the PLO due to the political disagreement of the positioning of religion and what constitutes the current board of Palestine. PLO is considered a secular entity, while Hamas wanted to transform with emphasis on religion. In addition, Hamas refused to accept the United Nation division of historical Palestine, which includes the state of Israel. Hamas' Charter is considered problematic as it aims to liberate historical Palestine from Israel. Over time these issues were modified to reach common grounds with the PLO body but did not result in including Hamas to the organization (Hroub, 2006). Indeed, the rivalry between Hamas and PLO is not based solely on religion or ideological difference but more on power struggle (Baumgarten, 2005). Hamas would like to be the alternative representative of the Palestinian people, but it is hard to dismiss the entrenched role of PLO in the community. This diversity in the established political parties has led to highlight national identity dimensions that include both secular and religious ideologies within the liberation of Palestine from Israeli oppression as well as the characteristics of what constitutes being a Palestinian (Link, 1996). Hence, these elements and others of national identity are not static as they evolve and alter over time within the local/global discourse. Palestinian national identity developed from more than an interpretation of historical and contemporary experiences; it developed from the existence of the state of Israel that has affected the very creation of the current Palestinian national identity. The expression of Palestinian national identity is exceedingly complicated to identify. History, along with contemporary geopolitical implications, has aided in the development of a fragmented national identity (Khalidi, 1997). However, while the national identity is imprecise and fragmented, the overarching center is the creation of a national discourse endorsed by scattered Palestinians living throughout various regions and geopolitical locales (Abu-Lughod, 1993). It is not the borders or the historical consciousness of Palestine but rather a national narrative that is inclusive to different

locations and experiences of Palestinian people. Chatty (2010) stated that while Palestinians share the same history and similar experiences prior to their displacement in 1948, there is variation in their contemporary living circumstances that is reflected within their identity, albeit the diversity of ideologies over time and political conditions (rights or lack of) have led to the demonstration of many expressions of national identity that aligned with a narrative embedded in history and personal experience. Palestinians' endorsement to national identity is due in part to their personal contribution and interaction with such a narrative. Historical narrative is transmitted by family members and enforced by political reality. Youth and children are subject and subjugated by the historical narrative and contemporary political reality that shape their national identity and political agency (Baumgarten, 2005; Habashi, 2008). This interaction is the locus of non-static national identity as youth's political agency is shaped within the diverse local/global discourses and the response to different contexts of political socialization. In a study of Palestinian Children Crafting National Identity, Habashi (2008) asserted that "children become agents not only to a territorial state per se, but also to the global hegemony in relation to local politics. Therefore, to understand children's geopolitical agency, first it is critical to study children's conceptualization of national identity" (pp. 12–13). In this study, Habashi identifies that children's national identity is categorized on "self and other" but each has multiple dimensions that allows for the crossover of some element of us to them and vice versa. The "other" category has four dimensions that participants constructed: (1) the *oppressive other* which is a dominion that described Israeli practice of oppression against the Palestinian people; (2) The *scattered other* in which the Palestinian perceive the Jew people as a fragmented group from different countries and cultures that colonized historical Palestine; (3) The *religious other* which showed the impact of Judaism on creating the other and how politicization of religion aided in the colonization of Palestine; (4) The *allying other* which focused on the Jewish people who do not ally with the policy of colonization historically and currently. The "self" category of national identity discussed the views about being a Palestinian in six dimensions: (1) The *historical refugee self* rooted in history that not only focused on the experience of 1948 of displacement by the Zionist military but also a historical narrative that described the Palestinian origin thousands of years ago; (2) The *ennoble self* that described the virtue of being a Palestinian; (3) The *traitor self* in which children identified that some Palestinian are supporting Israeli oppression; (4) The *religious self* as the Palestinian people

are from different faith and belief systems; (5) The *resistance self* that focused on the Palestinian people resisting Israeli oppression; (6) The *geographic self* that described the different geographic locations of Palestinian diaspora and Palestinian living in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The insight provided into these two categories of the *self* and *other* is not only embedded in the silver lining of the *ally other* and the *traitor self* but in the complexity of the discussion of the national identity that over time can provide more elements due to contemporary experiences and reality of youth political agency and its interactions with different facets of political socialization.

EXAMPLES OF THE "SELF" AND "OTHER" WITHIN PALESTINE

Within the (1) "self" and (2) "other" categories, it seems that a few constant dimensions emerge. Below is a discussion on these dimensions that have emerged within each of these categories. The discussion on these dimensions exemplifies the importance of the historical narrative and how it impacts the everyday reality of individuals. History is not something that has been removed from aspects that affect political socialization or the development of agency; rather, it is at times a driving force for development and socialization. The dimensions discussed in-depth below include the following breakdowns by the categories of "self" and "other." Within the "self" category: (1.1) the *historical refugee self*, (1.2) the *resistance self*, (1.3) the *divided self*, and (1.4) the *expressive self* (within the "other" category): (2.1) the *oppressive* other and (2.2) the *ally other*.

1.1 The *historical refugee self* is a repeated dimension of Palestinian youth's national identity. History is not of the past, it is part of the community's daily living experience as Israeli oppression is a constant variable in occupation that helps to form youth political agency. This dimension is described in the journal writings of a 14-year-old female participant from a village, as she wrote:

> 60 years ago, Israel stole our land, they expelled hundreds of Palestinians from their own lands, and they killed hundreds too. They committed many massacres, the whole world has forgotten. When I see refugees in diaspora holding their homes' keys and they still have the hope to return, even though they know that their lands were demolished and Israel established settlements instead. Still they have hope and we people in Palestine pray for them to return to their lands.

A few days later in her journal, the same participant continued to elaborate on the same topic, "Today we had a celebration of Al-Nakbeh Anniversary, and we all agreed to wear the Palestinian's Hattah [Keffiyeh] and we hold banners which we hung later on the school walls. And we dressed shirts inscribed with the right of return." The focus on history continued, but instead of writing about the 1948 Nakbeh, the participant wrote of the 1967 Naksh, the Six-Day war that resulted in another Palestinian refugee exodus. Though history is contested and taught in distorted interpretation in schools, youth's learning is based on family experience and narrative (Chatty, 2010) as is seen in the following quote from the same 14-year-old female participant:

> I asked my father about that, he was 18 years old at that time, he said: Israeli's forces entered our city in 6/6/1967, they expelled many people, and they took Kariat Arba'a and built a settlement on their land. At that time my uncles were studying abroad, all people who were studying abroad didn't get Palestinians IDs so they couldn't enter Palestine. Then I turned to my mother she told me that everyone took his belongings and escaped, her family was preparing to leave when her father said: no, whatever happens I will not leave my home and my land.

The historical refugee self is reiterated with connection to the future as explained by another participant, this time a 15-year-old female from a city:

> Today I will write about Palestinian history, a history I didn't live in but can write about this subject because I know many details about it, as if I was part of it because many people talk about that subject, and it has many affects in our daily lives. We are Palestinians, they call us displaced people sometimes, and sometimes they call us refugees, all this as a result for what happened in 1948 and 1967. When Palestinians displaced from their own lands because of the Jewish gangs. These gangs did psychological warfare for our citizens, they slaughtered and killed many people. Also many people fled, they thought they would return to their villages and cities in a few days. So they took their home keys, some people put the keys on the door's edge, or in the flower pots. Unfortunately, we didn't return, but still we have hope. We will return from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and we will fight and serve our homeland.

The historical refugee self is a dimension of national identity and is discussed and emphasized in the journal entries as it seems participants have a personal connection to national historical events. Though these participants might

be considered the third or fourth generation of refugees, this does not decrease the impact of colonization and political implication on their lives (Chatty, 2010). Everyday living under Israeli occupation only enforces the historical narrative of displacement, colonization, and oppression by the Israeli military and government (Sa'di, 2010). There are more than 16 % of registered Palestinian refugees in the West Bank, and more than 23 % in the Gaza Strip (Bocco, 2009). United Nation's school structure, healthcare, jobs, and others are designated only to refugees, in which it reflects the Palestinian historical experience. This is enforced through family narratives about their displacement and the continuing personal relationships with the Palestinians living as citizens of Israel. Some Palestinian families are divided between Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip due historical displacement and policies. Historical symbolism is everywhere in the community especially in naming streets, stores, and centers. Therefore, any historical distortion with the new creation of Palestine within textbooks does not reshape historical refugee self. Indeed, the top-down model of historical interpretation does not comply with Palestinian youth political agency.

1.2 The *resistance self* was also a central dimension of Palestinian youth national identity construction. Resisting Israeli occupation is an intriguing part of the Palestinian national discourse that varied over time from violence and non-violence methods. Youth participate in resisting occupation because they are not sheltered from Israeli oppression, land confiscation, or lack of access to healthcare, education, or dignity. Participants discussed several forms of resistance and its personal relation to the homeland and other Palestinians who are in jail because they stood up to occupation. A 12-year-old female participant from a refugee camp discussed her personal resistance by stating, "I love my country even if I will die I will not give up. Defending the country brings me pride, dignity, and freedom. Our solidarity with the prisoners gives them strong determination and consistency." Another entry from a 15-year-old female from a city described the daily relationship between Israeli occupation and resistance. Even in the face of retaliation by acting as a resistor, resistance is an important part of self as it is a method of individuals to act on their own agency to stand up for their dignity. The participant wrote:

> In the evening we heard a newsflash that said that the Israeli forces made a curfew on Al-Jelda area, and Ein Dir Bha. They besieged a house there because in it there was a freedom fighter, and they wanted him. They shot at the house, and they called him using microphones to get out of the house.

But he didn't reply so they brought his father to pressure him. But he refused to give in so they demolished the house room by room and he flew from one room to another until they demolished the whole house. The next day 27/7/2008 we heard the news that the freedom fighter became a martyr. In the evening during the discussion I heard that the boys were throwing stones because they made a curfew. We lost that freedom fighter as well as other fighters, these fighters who sacrificed their lives for Palestine. All I can do is to congratulate this hero.

The *resistance self* of national identity is interlaced with the historical self as youth experience oppression. Resistance is a faction of youth political agency as it is a response to the global and local political discourse. Hence, this element of national identity is extended to include resisting the suppression from not only Israel but also the Palestinian Authority and its policies, as a 15-year-old male from a refugee stated over a phone conversation:

I checked on his studies. He is stressed and especially the PA [Palestinian Authority] have put out the schedule for the Tawjihi [government high school test] and they put two difficult subjects back to back with no days to study between them. He said now we are organizing ourselves (students) to protest this schedule to the Ministry of Education. I called several students from the Bethlehem district and on Monday we are going to the educational office in Bethlehem. I know other students from different districts are doing the same. Now we need to pick someone to be the spokesperson to present our perspective.

Høigilt (2013) argued that Palestinian youth are suffering from double suppression: the Israeli oppression and the PA suppression. To expect a youth to refrain from resisting the PA suppression and focus on resisting the Israeli oppression is to deny their political agency and their interaction with local and global discourse. The reality is that youth are not offered the opportunity to resist Israeli occupation; the paradoxical is that the PA is assisting Israeli oppression by attempting to stop any Palestinian resistance against oppression. Resistance is a form of agency speaking up to power, and it is part of the Palestinian narrative of liberation. Youth have continued to resist both Israeli occupation and PA policies to stand up for their rights. Therefore, the *resistance self* of national identity is not associated with only Israeli oppression.

1.3 *The divided self* dimension of national identity is related to the friction between two political parties (Hamas and Fatah) that are fighting for

political power in the Palestinian community. Because Hamas won the election of 2006, the divide between Fatah and Hamas intensified as the PA, headed by Fatah, refused to hand over the government to Hamas and resulted in public fights that positioned youth to question if this disagreement should be part of the national discourse or focus on the interest of the community. A 14-year-old male participant from a village expressed such in the following journal entry:

> Everyone has a reaction and opinion toward something, my classmates are against what happened with Hamas in the West Bank. They [Fatah] killed Hamas members, and looted and stole homes. When the attack on Abd AL-NASER mosque happened during the celebration of the anniversary of the establishment of Hamas, they killed the elders, citizens, and children. Also, they didn't pay the salaries for the teachers, and the students don't know anything about that.

The same participant continued discussing the division and its extension on the street, "I talked about the burned shops such as Daraghma's store [clothing store in Ramallah], the clothes were totally burned nothing fit for sale. Fatah party did this because Daragmah store only employs the veiled women they consider it for Hamas." The *division of the self* was rejected because it might be considered as deterioration from the fight against Israeli occupation, as a 12-year-old female participant from a city-states:

> I heard what President Mahmoud Abbas said about the reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. The two parties did not agree on it. Our problem is not Hamas and Fatah, but they are confused about how to defend Palestine. We will never give up and we will not allow Israel to take the rest of our land.

The connection between the internal fight of Palestinian political parties and Israeli occupation is emphasized, as many participants perceive this internal fight as a distraction from liberating Palestine, as a 14-year-old female participant from a refugee camp states, "I'm sad because of what happened in Gaza, because many families were killed because of Israel and the split between Hamas and Fatah. I think what happened in Gaza is complicated to solve. I wish to reunite the two parties in order to expel the occupation." The expression of the dimension of *divided self* in Palestinian national identity is due to the contemporary implication of the local/global discourse. Though the Western and donor countries supported the path for

democracy in the Palestinian community, this changed because there is an assumption that Hamas will not fulfill the neoliberal agenda (Hroub, 2006). For youth agency to recognize the division is to recognize its implication in the national discourse and its relationship with Israeli oppression. This dimension is another example of the rendering of Palestinian national identity.

1.4 The *expressive self* is a contemporary dimension of national identity that includes art, literature, and music. Different mediums of visual arts and literature are staples of the Palestinian community that are associated with national identity. The expressive self is the voice of national identity as the work of Palestinian novelists, poets, and musicians interlaced with the national struggle and continued to be the icon of struggle and defiance (Gandolfo, 2010). Murals, especially on the apartheid wall, tell the Palestinian story. Parry (2010) documented the different images depicted in mural that show the suffering, struggle, and resistance of the Palestinian. Sa'di (2010) argued that one of Israeli goals is to change the cultural landscape of the Palestinians including literature and art in the anticipation of demolishing historical memories and restructuring national identity. In a way, Israeli oppression not only aims to silence the Palestinians but also aims to exterminate their imagination. Ghassan Kanafani, a Palestinian a fiction writer, was assassinated in 1972 by the Israeli government because his stories described the Palestinian experience and his work reached world recognition. His work was translated into different languages and taught at school and higher education (Collins, 1996). Ashcroft (2004) argued that the significance of literature and art is in its ability to transform orientalism representation and communicate an alternative perspective. To be sure, this medium serves to challenge the stereotype and orientalism views enforced by the Israeli narrative about the Palestinian community. Another contribution to the *expressive self* is Naji al-Ali, a Palestinian cartoonist who was assassinated in 1987 by the Israeli government for his critique of the Arab states politics and Israeli occupation. His work was censured and he was expelled and jailed in different Arab countries for his blunt political views. Naji was killed but his cartoon character Handala lives on and became the symbol of Palestinian defiance. Handala is a 10-year-old boy barefooted with ragged clothes and spiky hair, and his back is always turned toward the audience. Naji named Handala after a Palestinian plant that will grow back even if it is cut (Woznia, 2014). Gandolfo (2010) stated that Handala "succeeded in portraying war, resistance, and the Palestinian identity with astounding clarity" (p. 60). The art and literature in the *expressive self*

connects with youth agency and engages with a national narrative that speaks to the community oppression, as a 15-year-old female participant from a city stated:

> Olives dream is a Saudi cartoon movie about the refugees' return. Usually at the end of any movie which represents the Palestinian case is an old man who kept his house key. While this movie ends in Ein Karem village after a long search for the lost key, the director preferred the positive ending, not the negative ending. However, in reality, the Palestinian endings are bad. This movie is about a Palestinian family who was displaced from Ein Karem into Jenin. Maybe this movie will be the case-key and will set off alarm bells.

Art is not abstract; rather it is a form of communication that everyone can relate to and reflect on. The Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish's work spoke to youth and adults as both are experiencing occupation. A 14-year-old female participant from a village expressed her views about his work:

> When I heard the bad news about Mahmoud Darwish's illness I was so sad and I was afraid that I might die. Then I knew about his death, I loved him and his poetry. When I was a child I attended a poetry symposium for him, the whole day I was reciting his beautiful poems, especially Taqadmo I remembered two years ago when my family went to one of his poetry symposium, and I didn't go to stay with my grandma, I regret not going, I loved him and after his death I hung his picture on my room and I bought all his poetry collections. He was a Palestinian poet who suffered a lot in his life, and he represented Palestinians everywhere.

The same participant writes about Mahmud Darwish and his significance to the presentation of the Palestinian community:

> Today, we buried the poet Mahmud Darwish in Ramallah Cultural Palace. Mahmud Darwish died, he is one of the best poets in Palestine. He links poetry into homeland and freedom, he represented us in the USA. He died on Saturday, 9/8 after an open heart surgery. Our President Mahmud Abbas announced 3 days of mourning. We did many outdoor banners, also many channels announced mourning, this lasts for few days but his poetry will last forever.

The art and literature in the *expressive self* connect with youth agency and engage with a national narrative that is timeless and not defined to

generation or location. The relationship between art, individual self-expression, and the Palestinian narrative is featured in the community, and as the same participant noted:

> At the end of last week we ended the midterm exams and we entered a new month. My sister, cousin, and I went to the Al-Rabee event, which was a gallery show held in the university lounge. This event was so beautiful and expressive; the painters showed off their skills. It was simple and represented our capital (Jerusalem), and the sow had the Palestinian map, and in the middle there was our flag, which decorated the whole show.

Another 14-year-old female participant from a village noted her experience with the expressive self:

> Today I went to the theater, there was a celebration held because this is the sixty first year of Palestinian Al-Nakba [the Palestinian catastrophe of 1948]. At 4 pm I went with my sister and friends, in the beginning it was so boring because there were many speeches, then Liali Al-Andlus band sang and the songs were so nice, then came a Palestinian folklore dance (Dabkeh), finally al-Thawra Al-Sawdaa rap band sang for Palestine, Jerusalem and Al-Nakba and this was the most beautiful part of the whole celebration, then we saw posters and beautiful paintings which were done for Al-Nakba.

Nasser (2006) stated art is part of cultural hybridity that provided a space or a moment of freedom for Palestinian under occupation. Art as an expression of national identity shows the spectrum of views as its engagement with the local/global discourse, but it does not guarantee protection from Israeli oppression. Art can reach out to others and communicate the issue to the public in different forms that undermine orientalist view about the Palestinians. Participants' journals noted engaging in school theaters, reciting poems and songs, writing self-reflections, and short stories. For youth agency to include the *expressive self* is to show that the Palestinian community is not one-dimensional but includes a plethora of facets regarding national identity and individual expression; in addition, the *expressive self* shows that there are numerous ways Palestinian youth contribute to the national identity.

2.1 Israel continues to be the *other*, especially in the youth expression of the Palestinian national identity. Habashi (2008) identified four forms of other: the *oppressive other*, the *scattered other*, the *religious other*, and the *ally other*. The *oppressive other* seems to be a continued feature about Israel as

youth experienced the war against Gaza, the checkpoints, the confiscation of Palestinian land, settlement, closure, and others. The daily reality of oppression is affecting everyone in the community: "For young people, violence is embodied in countless 'checkpoints', 'closures and having to take long roads on mountains to reach places', 'having to pay more money for short distances when this money could be used for other needs' and 'seeing people get shot at'" (Nguyen-Gillham, Giacaman, Naser, & Boyce, 2008, p. 392). This view is expressed is the writing of a 14-year-old male participant form a village:

> Yes there are many Israeli checkpoints in the Palestinian cities such as Surda checkpoint in Ramallah which prevents the arrival of students and teachers to schools and universities. Also the situation in Palestine is bad, as is the massacre in Bait Hanun and Dair yasin.

The suffering of the Palestinians was linked to the oppressive other and participants discussed its extension of Israeli aggression on Gaza. Bisharat, Crawley, Elturk, James, and Mishaan (2009) argued that the invasion on Gaza is against the international laws and the human cost is not only associated with the tragic killing of children and civilians but also by the impact on infrastructure, as a 14-year-old female youth participant from a city recounted:

> While I'm watching TV, I didn't do anything except watch TV; I turned to Al-Jazeera. I read the flash news and the main one was about four students' martyrs and their teacher, this news attracted me so I waited to know more about that, they were killed in their school in Gaza, I felt sad toward them; no one in Palestine doesn't hurt by Israeli forces. Fathers, mothers, teacher, students, children, and infants we all are victims. Where are the Arabs, and the world to see what happens here, students in Gaza were killed while carrying their bags to school and were killed in school. What did they do to deserve to be killed, they are our future, we learn to be able to understand the world, they went to school (is that their fault?), where is the world, where is the world? No one answers just God Al-Rahman [the Graceful], we entrusted in God.

The impact of suffering in Gaza is observed by many of the participants, as a 12-year-old female youth from a city indicated:

Meanwhile Israel was shelling Gaza, Gaza was destroyed, and they killed and injured many children, elderly, women and adults. A two-day-old newborn child was killed in his mother's lap, and they demolished many houses.

Israeli settlement in the West Bank is another act of violence against the Palestinian people. They not only have the upper hand in controlling local resources but their violence is supported by the Israeli military and their activities is funded by the government (Newman, 2005). Settlement divided the communities by denying Palestinians to enter areas and neighborhood. A 15-year-old female participant from a city discussed Israeli settlers attacking Palestinians, which helps to show that settlements not only divide the Palestinian community but also cause great harm to the Palestinian people:

Settlers attacked Hebron, the old city of Hebron, Tal Al-Rmedeh, and Alshalalah Street. They attacked the old houses a few days ago, but this attack was the worst because they planned for it.

Another representation of the *oppressive other* is in the imprisonment of family members. Bornstein (2010) noted that Palestinian prisoners do not have rights and are intimidated and humiliated. In 2005, there were 4000 Palestinian detainees in Israeli jail for security reasons that affected more than 100,000 families. The impact of such oppressive exercises is seen in the writing of a 12-year-old female participant from a refugee camp:

Today was so terrible because my cousin's trial is on Sunday and his friend has been sentenced to 8 years [in the Israeli prison for security reasons]. Tomorrow is his visit. We are afraid of the court ruling. His trial will be on June. we hope they will decrease the sentence, not increase it.

The oppressive other is reflected in each journal, and it covers the spectrum of everyday living. The challenge with this dimension is its consistency over time, as Israeli colonization and occupation is a generational narrative and to change such youth perceptions about Israeli violence and aggression the behavior should change.

2.2 The *ally other* is constituted in the reality that some Israelis sympathize with the Palestinian suffering and are standing against their government aggression. Arat, Chazan, Shamas, and Tarazi (2004) describe the challenges of Israeli groups to support the Palestinian cause; however, it is

evident that there are Israeli citizens who are against the oppressive Israeli politics, as is recognized by a 14-year-old female participant from a village, "Demonstration in Tel Aviv against what is happening in Gaza." The *ally other* was a focus but in the form of call for help; the same participant stated, "Gaza still under siege, it calls us to help it, it is a part of our land. We want to help, but how? All we can do is solidarity." The *ally other* dimension is significant as it bridges between the self and the other. Though participants did not frequently mention it in their journal entries, it is because it might not have been the first experience they have had with the other. Hence, national identity is not static; there is an opportunity for this dimension to evolve or be replaced. Indeed, national identity evolves and is in constant rendering with old dimensions emphasized and new dimensions appearing. It is this change in national identity that reflects the interaction of the local/global discourse and the subject and subjugating of youth agency within political socialization. The formation of national identity is not static and relies on a number of factors, ranging from the historical narrative to the local and global discourse. Further, national identity can be built from the solidarity of a people under oppression, even if those people will never meet. The formation of national identity is an important part of an individual's notion of self, which is exemplified by the Palestinian youths' journal writings.

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Youth Agency/Activism: The Hidden Outcome

On Thursday, 21-2-2008 there will be a demonstration in Jenin for Gaza, students and leaders of the all parties will participate in it as objection to what is happening in Gaza, and the human rights abuse on Gazans.

—14-year-old female from a refugee camp

...many Palestinians went to demonstrate and another 20-year-old adult from the same camp was killed. The youths started to throw stones as a reaction toward what happened. On the third day I went to Ramallah and I saw many Palestinian adults throwing stones at the entrance of Beit El settlement and there were many soldiers but no one get hurts.

—15 year-old female from village

YOUTH AGENCY FILTERED THROUGH POLITICAL ACTIVITY

As an outcome of political socialization, political activity is dependent on a wealth of factors. Gender, educational factors, location, religion, education, and local/global socio-political landscape all influence individuals' political activity. According to McFarland and Thomas (2006), youth's extracurricular activities can influence later political activity. This is one example of political socialization having a significant effect on political activity, as extracurricular activities are part of youth political socialization within the

educational and peer interaction sphere. In addition, political activity takes different forms among youth, such as writing in journals, coordinating community activities, and protesting or rallying. This chapter discusses the political activity of youth as an agent of their political socialization. For youth living in conflicted regions, political activity as a result of political socialization can be demonstrated as resistance, activism, and solidarity, as is clear from the narratives of Palestinian youth. Thus, much of the political activity of the Palestinian youth is a direct response to the Israeli occupation.

Youth are shouldering the present and future political system through the endorsement of political structures, or the creation of alternative political activities that do not necessarily complement or comply with the formal political terrain. Some of the alternative political participation is beyond the traditional practices of electoral voting and community engagement. Deviation from engaging in conventional political processes is due to the current political structure's marginalization of youth perspectives (Cammaerts, Brute, Banaji, Harrison, & Anstead, 2013; Harris, Wyn, & Younes, 2010). The conventional political structure is not inclusive, and for youth to participate politically is by creating alternative political commitments that are not considered part of the mainstream politics. Throughout history, high school youth and youth in colleges have participated in social movements that are strongly contested in society. Youth emerged as political leaders in Civil Rights Movement, Feminist Movement, and Chicano Movement (Bloemraad & Trost, 2008).

Within this context of creating alternative political participations, youth are preforming three distinct acts of political agency: (1) *moving* away from conventional forms of political participation, as youth emphasized that the alternative community for change is outside the government (Traft, 2006), (2) *protesting* different issues of political injustice such as global/local inequality, poverty, censorship, unemployment, and political structures and other issues (Giroux, 2011), and (3) *creating* alternative political, economic, and social activities to support their causes (Conway, 2003). These three tenets are not mutually exclusive, as some youth agency might engage in one activity or other and some in all. In our contemporary societies, youth are engaging in a variety of local and global social and political causes that are not endorsed by societies (Habashi & Worley, 2014; Hörschelmann, 2008; Kallio & Häkli, 2011). Inherently, governments ignore these political engagements of youth agency by categorizing youth's rejection of the political structure as apathetic behavior and criminalizing their act of creating alternative political space and structure

(Giroux, 2013; Youniss et al., 2002). Youth agency distinguished their political views from politics by "demonstrating that the refusal of politics is primarily a rejection of government" (Traft, 2006, p. 338).

Framing youth political agency as apathetic does not convey the construction of agency, and its outcome is a direct refutation of the formal political socialization. Gordon and Taft (2011) indicated that youth rejected the notion that their political activism is an exception or extraordinary. Youth argued against this narrative because it is a form of adult inability to accept their agency. This discourse hinders not only the youth in their political commitment but also adults to recognize youth's political interest and power. Youth political agency rejects the notion that their "political engagement is the exception to the rule, and they contest the way in which this adultist discourse normalizes crisis: the implication being that the baseline, "normal" youth state is the crisis of youth apathy, and the exceptional state is youth engagement or non crisis" (p. 1507). Refusing to prescribe to the top-down model of political socialization and the political structure does not simply conclude that youth are apathetic or apolitical, or in crisis. This dual perspective serves to enforce the adult-directed model of political socialization. Contemporary youth political agency is contesting the top-down model of political socialization and the societal power structure embedded in the dominant neoliberal political structure that only aims to perpetuate free market values and denies the rights of unprivileged citizens by promoting the elites' interest (Conway, 2003; Kennelly, 2011). Giroux (2013) and Ostrow (2014) argued that neoliberalism has been successful in expanding due to the endorsement by complementary political structure. Hence, any discontent or challenge to perpetuate the political structure by citizens and youth is criminalized. This structural barrier of lack of inclusiveness disenfranchises youth and reiterates their mistrust in government and its apparatuses, which tends to result in detachment in the political structure (Howe, 2010). Government's constant interpretation of youth disengagement is by viewing mistrust or lack of conventional political engagement as an act of apathy without acknowledging the contribution of such structures to youth political agency. Neoliberal structure appropriates youth mistrust as apathy as long as it does not present an alternative to the structure; thus, it denounces any group or individual who might challenge the status quo. Paradoxically, neoliberal governments emphasize and advocate individual freedom but effectively criminalize group and individual political freedom that does not adhere to its economic and political structure. Within this political structure, the contemporary

sphere of neoliberalism policies frame the ecological interactions among different contents and subjugate as well as subject the intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life experiences of youth agency. To explore these interactions and interconnectedness, it is vital to recognize multiple facets of individual youth political agency of activism, resistance, and solidarity.

Youth Political Agency: Activism, Resistance, and Solidarity

Youth have an innate political agency and tend to demonstrate their agency in multiple forms of activism and resistance while building networks with similar political orientation to contest the neoliberal political structure (Bradford, 2006). It is in these contexts that youth interaction illuminates beyond the microenvironments as micro and macro interconnected and become intertwined in everyday reality (Conway, 2003; Giroux, 2011). Youth activism, resistance, and solidarity highlight the relationships and interactions between youth agency intersectionality and intergenerationality over time and different contexts in the ecological system. The acts of activism, resistance, and solidarity are due to the interaction between and within ecological contexts that shapes youth agency over time. Hence, intersectionality posits specific social identifier experiences that occur within local and globe discourse. These acts are manifested in different contexts as Habashi (2008) indicated that youth resistance is included in language usage, while solidarity tends sometime to be identified as a separate category or integrated with activism (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). The three acts of resistance, activism, and solidarity are perceived as one attribution of youth political agency. The act of resistance is in essence a rejection of submission, and an act of activism against such power structure is to stand up in solidarity with others. Franklin (2014) argued the three acts in the effect of activism are part of the interaction between local and global politics and its intersectionality on youth political agency; "youth-based activism, or movement activities and popular mobilization campaigns involving and coordinated by youth, students, and young adults... some of which are affiliated with national or federated youth organizations; multigenerational or intergenerational organizations; and network –affiliated groups or coalitions" (pp. 28–29). Therefore, to deconstruct youth political agency is to understand individual political activism in the community as a form of

solidarity and a dissent of the government policies. It is the interlock of resistance, activism, and solidarity that parallels the interlock of the individual within the community, even though these elements are not mutually exclusive and each can be perceived and discussed on its own merit. After all, without community and community *political rights*, individual youth is further marginalized while living in a climate of uncertainty and despair (Franklin, 2014; Habashi & Worley, 2014). Hence, neoliberal political structure embedded in its market values promotes individualistic policies of freedom over all collective rights but does not necessarily foster individual youth political participation outside the conventional political parameters. Therefore, the provision of the neoliberal political structure constitutes a limited individual activism that is considered the foundation to build group youth agency (Kennelly, 2011). On the other hand, individual activism/ resistance does not constantly translate to the embracing of collective solidarity or vice versa, which, in neoliberal sphere, enhances youth individual activism that does not challenge the status quo (Harris et al., 2010). The paradox is that individual's activism is the necessary foundation to form collective solidarity and activism to resist different forms of oppression (Kennelly, 2011), but it is also the individualism culture that is considered to be the reason for youth not participating in the conventional political processes (Howe, 2010). Nonetheless, neoliberal political structure consents to individual youth political activism that inherently adheres to the political structure but criminalizes the activism that becomes a group activism that challenges the political status quo.

In 2012, students in Québec protested the neoliberalism government proposal of tuition hike that aimed to redefine the purpose of higher education mission by replacing learning with "casino capitalism" model, whereby it transforms classrooms into revenue production and learning into training to perpetuate business values. The government's initial response to students' streets protests is to vote on a law to limit students' freedom of expression and political mobilization. Businesses and bankers welcomed the notion by giving more power to police to suppress students through the criminalization of freedom of speech that ensured protection of the elites and corporation. This initiative did not create a climate of fear as expected; on the contrary, faculty, community, and ordinary citizen sympathizers joined the demonstrations to protest against the new law. Solidary from unions, indigenous groups, and environmentalists elevated the protest to include multiple economic and social issues that neoliberal policies support.

In a way, neoliberal political structure consents to youth political activism that inherently adheres to the political structure. Youth political agency in this content was intertwined in three parallel simultaneous paths, activism and solidarity from youth and community members and resistance to the neoliberal structure (Fournier, 2014; Martin & Marceau, 2013; Palacios, Hampton, Ferre, Moses, & Lee, 2013). These paths of youth agency coincided with the interaction of macro and micro contents and were presented in the tuition hike (Begin-Caouette & Jones, 2014; Lemay & Laperrier, 2012). Youth engage in alternative political activism because it is tangible and impacts their everyday living; thus, the tactic used is pragmatic, as it responds to the local/global discourse. Conway (2003) discussed the different resistance methods utilized by activists of social movement during global political events. However, the turning point happened after the event of 9/11, which transformed the perspectives of civil disobedience and direct action tactics. The use of some of the direct action methodology after 9/11 permitted the over use of power by police forces to de-legitimatize social movements across the globe regardless if its aim is to challenge globalization, wars, or global climate. Prior to 9/11, the notion of being inclusive to diversity methods of civil disobedience and direct action tactics was on the table, but later more solidarity groups have been pushing for non-violence tactics to bring more people to the cause. This proposition acknowledges the paradox that although the social movements embrace non-violent resistance and activism, the larger political contexts of neoliberal politics are rooted in violent practices (Giroux, 2011). Hence, activism and resistance of youth agency are not monolithic and static, as they evolve within geopolitics of local/global discourse. Norman (2009) argued that there is no distinction between activism and resistance in Palestinian youth political agency. Activism is embedded in resistance and being a witness is a form of resistance and activism. The nuances of such interactions of resistance and activism are described in relation to Israeli settlers. According to International Law, Israeli settlement in the West Bank is illegal even though they are backed by the Israeli government and military. A 15-year-old female youth from a city described resistance and activism as follows:

> Settlers attacked Hebron, the old city of Hebron. They attacked the old houses few days ago, but this attack was the worst because they planned for it. They attacked Tal Al-Rmeded where my grandpa lives, so they tried to go out from the home because my grandpa is sick and we are afraid to lose him, so they wanted to come to our house, but when they opened the door they saw

the settlers gathering at front of the house. When we called my grandpa he said settlers are around the home and he was trembling. My uncle who lives in Jerusalem came to take my grandparents, and he described the situation to the soldiers, they replied: we can't protect you because settlers are angry and the Israeli court has ordered them to evacuate Al-Rajabi's house. Settlers burned the houses near Qariat Aba'a settlement and we saw that on Aljazeera. Also we heard in Sawt Al-Hurriah radio people appealing to rescue them from the wild settlers. My grandpa was able to go out and he arrived in the evening with my uncle to our house, my uncle said that settlers are now in the market and downtown and they have broken into Palestinian stores. I wonder if this is human or monster behavior. Palestinian citizens say they will stay in their homes, regardless of what has been done to them. I feel ashamed because, although we live in the same city, I cannot help them. People are expecting the worst to come because tomorrow is Friday and Palestinian citizens will react if settlers provoke them.

The everyday living reality of oppression with the interaction with global discourse shapes forms of resistance and activism of Palestinian youth. Acts of resistance, activism, and solidarity evolved over different national movements. Community activists organize the community in non-violence tactics to resist Israeli occupation and militant activist previously adopted violence tactics but opted to use non-violence proxies in the second intifada. Hence, regardless of youth activism/resistance forms, both challenged the Israeli oppression that led to the prospect of imprisonment as an outcome.

Youth agency of activism and resistance is also engaging in extending networks to build solidarity. The act of solidarity is being vigilant for people's rights that aim to transfer power to the people (Franklin, 2014; Sundberg, 2007). Youth activism, resistance, and solidarity are individual acts for a collective cause, even if the youth agency acts on its own (Sharoni et al., 2015). An interesting initiative regarding this is found in the following narrative written by a 15-year-old female participant from a city:

Today was the last day of the summer camp. We ate and drank from Palestinian national product. I attended only 4 days of this camp because I went to Jerusalem. My sister told me that they went and checked groceries and they asked about the sales percentage of the Israeli's products and the Palestinian's products, and that they [store owners] promised to reduce selling of Israeli's products and to make a campaign to boycott Israel's products to reduce Israeli's income.

Palestinian youth have recognized that solidarity is a significant part of their cause for liberation, but the acknowledgment is asymmetric, as a 14-year-old female youth from a village stated, "Gaza still under siege, it calls us to help it, it is part of our land. We want to help, but how? All we can do is participate in solidarity." People across different nations stand in solidarity with the Palestinian cause, but governments and neoliberal politics stand against the cause since 1948 (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). Solidarity is not only from other international groups but also within the Palestinian community. Being an active vigilante for people's rights echo and coincide with resistance and activism. Feixa, Pereira, and Juris (2009) explained the intertwining of activism, resistance, and solidarity as part of anti-globalization movement. In the 1960s, the movement members were primarily White middle-class males, but it changed in 2000s to include members from different race, ethnicity, class, age, gender, and sexuality. The inclusiveness allowed students, non-profit organizations, women, farmers, international activists, religious networks, unions, and other groups across the globe to establish World Social Forum as an alternative to the World Economic Forum, and later other movements were conceived. Different movements adhered to resist the global power, stand with the oppressed, and create an alternative political space. Consequently, youth political agency of activism, resistance, and solidarity demonstrates the interactions if multiple contents embedded in intergenerationality, intersectionality, and life course.

Forms of Activism, Resistance, and Solidarity

Since youth are subjected to and subjugated by the interactions of structural barriers embedded in the macro and micro, youth agency is redefining activism, resistance, and solidarity with innovative forms and praxis. Constraints of neoliberalism political structure reinvented pedagogy of youth agency activism, resistance, and solidarity, which are sometimes perceived interchangeably especially considering the endorsement and campaigns of academic boycotting, consumer activism, theater, and hip hop. Boycotting is one of the contemporary most instrumental political activism/resistance, and solidarity uses marketing strategies embedded in neoliberalism to resist the power of "casino capitalism" (Giroux, 2013). Buyers use their purchasing power as a vote of confidence in the ethos of company's practice. Individuals are expressing their political and social concerns through their purchasing power (Fisher, 2012). This strategy provides the individual with

a sense of making a difference (Klein, Smith, & John, 2004), as it aims to taint the brand image and change the business behavior. Companies are realizing that consumers care about businesses' values, and individuals are using their purchasing power to modify business practice and show solidarity with the workers or the oppressed (Carrigan & Attalla, 2001). Showing collective action by using individual power against big companies is the foundation of activism. Big companies such as Nike and Shell have suffered economically and politically from such campaigns. Boycotting is a strategy of political agency that intersects with different contents of youth agency across the globe while interacting with different facets of populations (Bakan & Abu-Laban, 2009). Boycotts should be considered in relation to the interaction of the micro and macro spheres, which is a form of economic behavior that is in place to challenge geopolitics and a micro as an act of individual that resists cultural imperialism or globalization (Fischer, 2007). Youth have shared that boycotts should be directed to several governments, as one 14-year-old male participant from a village stated, "calls for a boycott of U.S. goods because it supports Israel and Qaradawi calls for a boycott of companies that fund Israel." Cultural and religious institutions are endorsing boycotting strategies (Barghouti, 2011; Nadeau & Sears, 2010). Palestinians are endorsing boycotting Israeli products as a form of activism/resistance, while other groups are joining with solidarity to boycott Israeli products on the global market and pushing specific labeling to empower the individual to use his/her purchasing power to make a difference (Kennelly, 2011). The financial impact is tied with rebranding by changing business ethics. The premise of product boycott is adopted in academia. Some academic institutions and individuals are using business-boycotting models to practice academic boycotting (Di Stefano & Henaway, 2014; Sharoni et al., 2015; Srikanth, 2015). This approach has been used in South Africa to fight apartheid and is currently adopted around some global academic institutions against the Israeli academic and art institutions in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

There are many other forms of activism/resistance that exemplified political agency, as one 15-year-old female youth from a city described the Israeli response to resistance:

> They shot at the house, and they called him using the microphones to get out of the house. But he didn't reply so they brought his father to pressure him. But he refused to give in so they demolished the house room by room and he flew from one room to another until they demolished the whole house. The

next day 27/7/2008 we heard the news that the freedom fighter became a martyr. In the evening during the discussion I heard that the boys were throwing stones because they made a curfew. We lost that freedom fighter as other fighters, these fighters who sacrificed their lives for Palestine. All I can do is to congratulate this hero.

Ankori (2006) discussed that resistances are interlaced in the Palestinian public discourse that is perceived as a form of keeping the discourse alive. This view is observed to be different from or resistance such as hip hop, graffiti, education, and strengthening the community that youth are embracing within their agency (Al-Saber & Taylor, 2014; DeGarmo & Wrobbel, 2015; Gould, 2014; Hamdi, 2011; LeVine, 2015; Salih & Richter-Devroe, 2014). Although some strategies of youth resistance are local by nature, they are adopted by other groups around the world. Youth are providing innovation and training to resistance such as claiming the street through carnival and plays and theatrical protest, as well as creating temporary web pages, discussion forums, and creating media (Juris & Pleyer, 2009). However, other resistance tactics are still compelling such as the practice of sits-in, strike, hungry strike, and throwing stones or martyrdom. Juris (2005) argued that regardless of the diverse method of resistance, governments and politicians have focused on the violence strategies over the dissent. Martyrdom is not a strategy of resistance, but it is a method to engage the Arab and Muslim in solidarity about the Israeli oppression (Whitehead & Abufarha, 2008). Eddy (2012) argued that some resistance tactic can be perceived as both violent and non-violent, as is the case Palestinian children throwing stones. The violence aspect is that a stone might hurt someone, but it is considered non-violence because a stone does not stand a chance against Israeli military (Qumsiyeh, 2015). To reference some resistance tactic as violent and non-violent is to neglect the local geopolitics framing the youth political agency. Hence, it is essential to have a clear interpretation of resistance and its context, as it attracts diverse activists to develop praxis for a specific cause. Solidarity as youth agency discourse is not only local but global. Youth are rising up to the neoliberalism that appeals to fundamentalists, austerity, and political tyranny (Giroux, 2013). Solidarity is the corner stone in youth agency of resistance and activism. Networking locally or transnationally to achieve solidarity is usually connected with religious institutions, Human Rights advocates, non-profit organizations, and grassroots movements

(Barghouti, 2011; Nadeau & Sears, 2010). Constant coordination with other activities and international political and legal entities is essential for networking and campaigns (Sharoni et al., 2015; Srikanth, 2015). Solidarity with social movements, anti-globalization, indigenous rights, and others implies that solidarity is a project of shared responsibilities, awareness advocacy, keeping vigilance, and changing the asymmetry of power structure. Solidarity is about interconnectedness and relationship that challenge forms of oppression and transform uneven power structure that other than oneself is impacted (Koopman, 2015). Pfaff's (2009) research is based on how youth solidarity is beyond the prescribed political values of a political structure. Civic education does not provide the process needed for solidarity across youth agency. The act of solidarity shows the relationships between different individuals and groups to stand for a cause. Youth political agency is part of this interaction, as youth participate in solidarity in rallying for anti-globalization, war, and colonization (Conway, 2003; Habashi, 2011). The overlap of activism, resistance, and solidarity forms is integrated in youth political agency while corresponding with the multiple contents of global/local discourse. The neoliberal structural provision for youth agency to engage in resistance, activism, and solidarity is limited not because it is not part of the top-down political socialization but because of its potential to challenge the inherent perpetuation of the political structure. In a way, youth agency shouldered present political issues to redefine future political structure.

Hörschelmann (2008), Habashi (2013b), and Kallio and Häkli (2011) analyzed youth agency as subjected to and subjugated by the interaction of local/global politics of neoliberalism and its implication on local reality. Neoliberalism's central ambition is to promote market values and generate profit regardless of nation, group, and community status. Country borders are not a consideration for neoliberalism policies, as there is no distinction between global and local reality (Katz, 2004). Therefore, it is significant for neoliberal governments to create political situations that limit any possibilities to challenge the perpetuation of the free market. It is the interactions of the global/local discourse of neoliberalism that drive youth political agency to inscribe alternative political commitment observed in resistance, activism, and solidarity. For Palestinian community, youth political agency is framed within Israeli occupation that has been evolving over time, whereby methods of community resistance and activism corresponded with the geopolitics of the local/global discourse (Habashi, 2008). Palestinian youth recognized that resistance to the Israeli occupation is accompanied

by resistance to the global hegemony; hence, it is not always natural symmetry. The global/local discourse infuses political reality that creates paradoxical responses from community and youth. To breakdown the international and local solidarity of resistance and activism for the Palestinian cause, it was essential for Israeli colonization and neoliberalism policies to defeat the Palestinian ambition for liberation and silence their voices against oppression. The way this goal was achieved was by creating an intricate neoliberal economic and political politics in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Khalidi & Samour, 2011). The strategy is to encourage the Palestinian community to adopt neoliberal practices to substitute the national movement for liberation from Israeli colonization. Hence, the silencing of the national sentiment for freedom is through the replacement of the national movement for liberation with an establishment of the PA and the development of civil society sector. In a way, the Oslo Accord provided the Palestinian people with a superficial non-sovereign national-state entity that might be perceived as fulfilling some national aspiration, yet its creation is to serve the Israeli oppression (Schugurensky & Myers, 2003). The formation of the PA supported by Western governments was not founded on the Palestinian liberation principles, rather it was an entity that acts as a caretaker of Israel occupation interest with the support of international donors (Habashi, 2013a). The top-down model of local/global Palestinian politics and the advent of PA is the major impediment to youth agency (Hoigilt, 2013). Palestinian people including youth recognized the double edge of having a PA that might be perceived as protector of the right of the Palestinian people, but in actuality, it is attending to the Israeli political interest by allocating the majority of the national budget to security, ensuring security coordination, and transforming the public interest from Palestinian liberation to an exercise of good governance. Hoigilt (2015) reinitiated that Palestinian youth activists are experiencing "double repression inflicted on Palestinian grassroots activists by Israeli and Palestinian authorities has led them to devise innovative, non-violent practices. These practices succeed in challenging the occupation by pacifying or bypassing the Palestinian elite" (p. 2). Grassroots organizations and activists are essential part of youth political agency (Kwon, 2013; O'Donoghue, 2006; Stovall, 2006). It is an essential space that provides critical resources for networking and support to voice their political agency. For that reason, it was necessary for liberal Western government to redefine Palestinian civic societies' role in order to complement the replacement of national movement with the PA and muting any national aspiration. The interaction of the

ecological discourse of local and global granted the neoliberalism principle to penetrate the community through international aids programs. The neoliberal financial support to civic organizations conflicted with the local culture and economic and political circumstances (Merz, 2012). Civil societies known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been the tool of neoliberal international donors to destroy the collective ambitions for Palestinian liberation by "encouraging self-help or empowerment, which reflects the neoliberal dogma of individualizing risk and responsibility, and foster the privatization of social services and institutions" (p. 53). The ethos of individualisms in community work intended to substitute the collective solidarity with personal responsibility that allows neoliberal politics for "indirect control" over community work and political movement. An example of such an impact was discussed by a 15-year-old male youth from a refugee camp over the phone as he stated, "He used an interesting expression and described the situation in the camp. Now we don't want Israel to control us militarily or economically but now they control the people who control us. He gave an example about an ill person in the camps and going to ask for help from NGO [Non-Governmental Organization] and this NGO will go ask a western NGO, so that the western one will control the local one and therefore control us." Hence, some local civil societies and grassroots organizations continue their work as community activists by organizing unions and women and youth programs and refusing to endorse the neoliberal professionalization of civic societies (Hammami, 2000). After the Oslo Accord, some local NGOs were recognized as service delivery entities that housed elite interest, embraced neoliberal values, and professionalized community focus by promoting Human Rights seminars as well gender equality. A 15-year-old female participant from a village narrates an example of such group:

> My cousin came to my room to tell me that panorama center called us and there will be a meeting on Saturday, 6/1. On Saturday I went to the meeting but many participants were late and we waited till they came. Then we started our discussion and it was about civil peace and it goes as follows: 1) Raise the youth awareness of Civil Peace and Human Rights to be active members in their society to help resolve conflict. 2) Skills building to make youth more reliable and help make civil peace in Palestine. 3) Promoting dialogue, critical thinking, and creativity through teamwork to be an active party in solving the internal conflicts. They said that the target audience is the school student from ages 13 to 16 and the period time of this project is for one year, also the target areas are 10 provinces in the west bank and Gaza Strip and they are (Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Hebron, Talkarem, Rafah, Gaza, Khanyounes, Gabalia.

> The project's activities within the first year are: 1) Make training manual about concepts which related to the civil peace and 2) Make ten groups dealing with different topics. This is how the meeting is done, and we will start the training on 18/1/2008.

The paradox with some programs is emphasized in the education of Human Rights and Democracy knowing that Palestinian people are denied both, but neoliberal aid made is part of the political agenda in order to support the normalization with Israelis and to engage the community with the PA (Dana, 2013; Merz, 2012; and more). Palestinian women and youth are the target of such programs that are not necessarily based on local needs or concerns rather on global agenda of containment (Merz, 2012). The focus, at least for the Palestinian youth, is to govern their political agency and deviate their resistance, activism, and solidarity (Hart, 2007). Although the initial observation coincides with such intentions, since some Palestinian youth are suffering from political fatigue due to the lack of political progress and high community sacrifice and an increased Israeli oppression (Habashi & Worley, 2014). Yet, Hoigilt (2013) argued that this is not the case. Palestinian youth agency is still enacted with activism, resistance, and solidarity against the Israeli oppression and believes it has power to impact the political landscape, even the local/global discourse is to suppress youth agency. A 14-year-old male participant from a village stated, "The war between Fatah and Hamas is continuing until now in Gaza and Beirut. Tomorrow (Tuesday) the President Mahmud Abbas will meet Ismail Hania (Hamas prime minister) in Mecca under the auspices of the Saudi King to solve the problems between them. I'm against what Fatah and Hamas are doing because it supports Israel and makes it stronger and to build the apartheid wall." Palestinian youth are not repressed in post-Oslo even though some youth NGOs complied with the neoliberal local/global policies; however, responses to such politics were not consistent across the spectrum of civil societies. Neoliberal influence did not infiltrate trade unions, political councils, and popular committees, and some of the local NGOs that worked with constituencies to resist Israeli occupation. The fragmentation of local Palestinian NGOs and the violent repression from Israel occupation as well as the PA authoritarian political model did not totally constrain youth agency in resistance, activism, and solidarity. Grassroots young activists proved to be resilient by mobilizing collective action that extended members of different political party affiliations. In addition, youth activist network did not look for support from the Palestinian

Liberation Organization, rather it relied on local support of people who are on the frontline of land confiscation, imprisonment, home demolition, and other oppressive acts by Israeli settlers or government (Hoigilt, 2015). Palestinian youth are the frontline of resistance against the Israeli occupation and their activism has evolved within the local/global discourse (Habashi, 2013b). Barbar (2001) indicated that the majority of Palestinian children and adolescents during the first intifada were engaged in the national resistance movement while being oppressed by the Israeli army. The study focused on whether youth's experience of Israeli political violence weighs negatively on their activism. Youth activism was "related positively to current levels of civic involvement and psychosocial well-being in both males and females" (p. 276). Moreover, youth activism created a sense of independence and personal freedom as virtues of being part of the movement. This is evident among youth who participated in a street demonstration against the Israeli invasion of Gaza, as a 12-year-old female participant from a city wrote:

> Meanwhile Israel was shelling Gaza. Gaza was destroyed, and they killed and injured many children, the elderly, women and adults. A two- day-old new-born chiild was killed in his mother's lap. They demolished many houses. Where is the Arab conscience? Mahummd Abbas didn't do anyhing for therm; I hate him. As a Palestinian girl I participated in a demonstration against what happens in Gaza; in the rallies where all the schools are gathered. I was in a difficult situation because I didn't ask my parents to go. I tried to call them from the school's phone but it doesn't call cellphones. I had to make the decision; I went and cheered.

Essentially, the positive meaning of Palestinian youth agency is associated with the national movement for liberation and the betterment of the community. Gordon and Taft (2011) and Traft (2006) argued that many youth perceived their political agency as a dissent and activist within the community and grassroots organization to achieve political change alternative to focusing on the mainstream politics. Youth activism is part of the collective narrative that does not complement the neoliberal politics or the Israeli occupation; however, it has changed over time from arm resistance to civil resistance (Hoigilt, 2015) since the focus is on the resistance tactic and not the ongoing colonization of the Palestinian people. The orchestration of Oslo accord required a new strategy of civil resistance to continue shedding light on the Palestinian oppression by Israeli colonization and

the PA. Youth agency mobilized non-violence tactic that challenged the Israeli discourse about Palestinian resistance, while attached media attention frustrated the political elite in PA (Norman, 2010). Youth innovative non-violence resistance and activism resonated with local and international solidarity groups. The boycotts, divestment, and sanction campaign against Israel that comply with international law gained momentums and provided space for individual and groups to be activists (Barghouti, 2011; Nadeau & Sears, 2010). Local and international support showed the conflicted parallel of the local and global discourse between political structures (PA, neoliberal global politics, and Israel) and local and global people. These inconsistent local/global responses subjugated and subjected youth agency of resistance, activism, and solidarity. Hence, it does not negate the fact that the support for youth agency is not symmetric to local/global neoliberal colonial discourse that it seemingly involves Arab governments. Some Arab and Western governments support Israeli oppression, as one 15-year-old female participant from a city stated, "Gaza people are exposed to physical and moral death, this means that what happened to Palestinians in west bank and Gaza Threatens the national security of all the Arab. The Arabs didn't pay much attention of Arab League because it is failed to achieve its goals after World War II when the United Kingdom allowed the establishment of the Arab League. Egypt stopped the war with Israel in 1973, and split from Syria to make a peace treaty with Israel." The creation of neoliberal Arabic government as non-supporter of the Palestinian causes is juxtaposed with the description of the Turkish government and people, as one 12-year-old male youth from a city narrated the Flotilla:

> Today I will not write about myself, I will write about a new Israeli's crime, and the victims are not Palestinians, they are Turkish, gulf, Egyptians, and other nationalities. Early in the morning after they said the dawn prayer, the Israeli's forces attacked the Freedom Flotilla which came from Turkey, also killed 19 people, and arrested all the passengers. Why? The Israeli forces were frightened that this ship contains weapons to help Hamas, as they claimed. The Turkish reaction was strong and Erdogan showed his outrage and vowed to respond. Also the Arab's reactions were strong too, especially the demonstrations in front of the Israeli Embassies, and demanded the expulsion of ambassadors. Although what happened, the activists did not stop and have begun processing a new flotilla from Turkey, and Erdogan will be one of the passengers. We will wait and see.

Youth political agency considered the action of resistance, activism, and solidarity as integral part of the local and global politics. Such actions do not stand alone without the political discourse of government and people. The non-static approach of youth agency in resistance, activism, and solidarity is subjugated and subject against neoliberal politics is embedded in the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian territories (Barghouti, 2011; Kennelly, 2011). An example that participants constantly mentioned is the war on Gaza that describes the interaction of several contexts within local and global discourse as a 15-year-old female participant from a city stated:

> The number of martyrs reached 565 and thousands of injuries as a result of Israeli bombardment on Gaza; this is the eleventh day of war. We heard this morning that Hamas attacked and 3 Israeli soldiers were and 30 were injured. Today my mother's phone was ringing when my mother replied there was an Egyptian lady calling, she thought that we are from Gaza and she wanted to help us, but we told her that we are from Hebron, but we all suffer from Israel. In the evening the IDF bombed one of the UNRWA's schools in Gaza, 40 civilians were killed in this bombing, they left their houses and went to that school to take shelter, and they claimed that many rockets were fired on this school. I heard Israeli army spokesperson, he said: we don't want to kill children and we don't kill anyone. On all of the channels children, and only children, are dying. What did they do wrong to deserve death?

Resistance, activism, and solidarity are pronounced in relationship to the political situation in Gaza, as the same participant noted:

> This is the twentieth day of war on Gaza, this new massacre started this morning with the random bombing on Gaza, and they bombed the UNRWA's stores to eliminate civilians. They bombed Al-Shouroq tower, near Al-Jazeera headquarter, even the press and reporter got a hurt. In the afternoon my friend came to my house and we painted the Palestinian flag in solidarity with Gaza. This evening Israeli achieved victory when they bombed the house of Saed (one of Hamas leaders) brother and they killed his brother and his son to reach 1070 martyrs in this war. We will be steadfast, and we will fire rockets into Israel, while the Arabs hold summits vain. What they are waiting for, they [Israelis] threw the phosphor bombs, which is internationally prohibited.

Youth political agency of resistance, activism, and solidarity was transferred to deconstruct the power structure of their daily lives. The PA is seen as oppressive and youth utilized similar skills to respond to Israeli oppression

to protest elements of the PA legislation, as is noted in a conversation over the phone with a 15-year-old male participant from a refugee camp regarding the new educational structure for high school students. In this conversation, the youth noted that he was stressed out as the PA had put forth the schedule for the Tawjihi (government high school exam), and they put two difficult subjects back to back with no dates to study between them. The participant mentioned that the students were organizing a protest against this schedule to the Ministry of Education. The youth said he had called several students from Bethlehem district and they were planning to go to the Educational office in Bethlehem. He went on to say:

> I know other students from different districts who are doing the same. Now we need to pick someone to be the spokesperson to present our perspective. Also, I can't focus on my studies and my sister and mother are stressing me out. The tests are on June 12 – July 1st. I participate in music workshop with children in the camp, but I didn't tell my family because they would say no and I have to study. Also, I attended another workshop. The organizers are from Holyland, and I had to translate from English to Arabic although they were older people but I did a good job and felt very good and special. I am not narcissistic but felt good. The music workshop was about music, and I want to learn to play an instrument.

Youth political agency is part of the ecological interactions, as it is a response to the Israeli occupation and elements of the local and global government. Indeed, youth political agency of resistance, activism, and solidarity is not on the periphery of political socialization, as Youniss et al. (2002) described it, "Families, schools, service activities, and involvement in political events provide raw material—knowledge, models, and reflective matter—and various forms of feedback, but it is ultimately youth themselves who synthesize this material, individually and collaboratively, in ways that makes sense to them" (p. 133). This is a crucial perspective supported by empirical evidence that challenges the presumption of embedment of top-down model of youth political engagement and the narrow perspective of their contribution to disturb neoliberal policy of governing. The interactions and intersectionality of youth political agency deviate the linear progression of political activism that fails to capture the interfaces of their activism, resistance, and solidarity.

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The Normalization of Youth Political Agency

Today was a local meeting in Ramallah with Al Naizak Institute as part of the little researcher project. We had a lot of fun, and we played with each other, then we had many lectures, some were interesting and some were boring, but the special moment was when we sat together and introduced ourselves, some I knew and some I didn't, but we are now friends and we play with each other. On our way back, Israeli soldiers stopped us at the checkpoint between Ramallah and Hebron, I took my brother Yousef with me to Ramallah and he didn't have his birth certificate, then the soldiers asked all the people in the bus to go out of the bus to check our IDs, we [were] all [children] and we didn't have IDs yet, they say you will stay here until we recognize your identities, then they let us go to the bus. All they do [is] upset us, we are little children and we don't have IDs but I felt sorry for the adults who had to be undressed and were standing on the wall.

—14-year-old female journal participant from a city

NORMALIZATION OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUTH AGENCY

Youth in general and youth in specific who are living in politically unstable, war-like areas are acutely aware of the local and global situations regarding the conflict. It is clear in reading the narratives of Palestinian youth that they are not passive recipients of the top-down model of political socialization.

Given that youth agency is in fact active of their own perspective, it is imperative to discuss the fact that even though they are growing up and living in an area that is being occupied, they are still able to experience daily life with its complexity and (im)possibilities just like any other youth. Such "normality" is constructed according to their local/global discourse and youth agency interaction and intersectionality. Palestinian children's and youth's experiences have some similar interactions as other individuals not living in a conflicted area. A 12-year-old female Palestinian youth from a refugee camp wrote, "We took our midterm certifications; I felt so happy because I got high marks, then I went home and when my mother saw my marks she felt happy and wished for me continued success." Another participant, a 12-year-old male from a city, wrote about worries at school, "I was so stressed because I am awaiting the results of the exam to see if I passed, I tried to calm down but it was in vain." While the political situation of the Occupied Palestine Territories and the living reality of youth is one of political conflict, it is clear that this reality does not negate the everyday living experience and the right to live in stability within unstable circumstances.

The attempt to normalize human development seems to be the standard practice among positivistic researchers who emphasize the Western perspective of childhood adolescence (Burman, 2007; Greene, 2006). This approach frames the social, psychological, and cognitive expectations of children's development whereby any circumstances associated with culture, social, and political environmental interactions are excluded, because these elements are considered at the periphery of the universal childhood growth (Jenks, 2009). This universal positivistic perspective of social cognitive and psychological development is linear in progression, and the interactions that account for several dimensions including facets of culture, politics, and economic resources are *not* viewed as an integral part of an individual's learning, socialization, and interaction. Albeit human development is within the purview of the universal standard with positivistic measures that negate the multiple ecological dimensions and interactions, as well as children's social identifiers, this serves to enforce the universal perspective of childhood. Any deviations of human development are measured in relation to the positivistic variables of universal standards with the dismissal of the roles of intergenerationality, intersectionality, and the life course experiences of agency that are expressed in children's interactions with different ecological events. Indeed, the disregard of such interactions is a distortion to the understanding of children and youth agencies and the impact of local and

global discourses constituted in neoliberal ideology. To ignore the relationships of these interactions is to emphasize the compartmentalization of human development framed in the positivistic approach. Such exercise of standardizing human development creates an illusion of disconnect between human development and ecological interactions. This allows the continuing focus on specific variables of cognitive, social, and biological development. The studies that included ecological elements such as wars or poverty tend to examine children's development as a deviation from the normalization of universal human development without the consideration of their agency (Jones, 2006). The selective perspective of universal human development on children does not constitute the normalization of their everyday living. Therefore, to discuss human development in a dichotomy of universality or non-universality of children's growth is to neglect the nuances embedded in each child's development and the possibilities of providing alternative perspectives. Katz (2004) and Habashi, Driskill, Long, and DeFalco (2010) argued that children's development is not linear in progression, but rather it is render through the local/global discourse within each location; thus, children's development is integrated with the ecological interactions that are presented locally. In addition, these interactions of human development are part of the subject and subjugation of children and youth agencies whereby it has multiple dimensions that respond to the local and global discourse. Katz (2004) argued that children's agency is presented in resistance, resilience, and reworking that are part of their human development normalization. Therefore, children's development is the by-product of their individual agency's interactions with multiple contexts that are manifested differently according to the local/global discourse.

RESISTANCE, RESILIENCE, AND REWORKING: A PERSPECTIVE OF AGENCY

Alternative perspectives on human development have multiple facets that reflect children's and youth's available potentials, which are not highlighted in the universal framework. Katz (2004) argued that universal perspectives of human development do not reflect children's agency that is presented in three forms: resistance, resilience, and reworking. Children achieve moments of freedom to resist power while performing resilience to hardship circumstances as they rework the accessible resources to survive (Habashi, 2008).

These forms of children and youth agency are the response of the local and global discourses and are expressed within unique circumstances. Hence, these forms of agency do not negate that children can be traumatized from abuse or war, or suffer from malnutrition, or lack emotional support, or cognitive stimulus. Children and youth agencies are subjected and subjugated within power structures and the resources available. Children and youth can execute more than one agency, and these agencies are not exclusive to one or the other. Within this perspective, an agency does not complement the top-down model of political socialization, which is contrary to the universal perspective of human development that can serve the adult-directed model of political socialization. Therefore, to discuss the normalization of children and youth development, it is important to convey that human development is rendered within the ecological interaction and intersectionality. A powerful representation of children and youth development is articulated in the three forms of agency (resistance, resilience, and reworking) and can be exuded in the non-violent, grassroots level. In 2010–2011, Palestinian youth from the West Bank and Gaza joined forces to flood the streets in peaceful protest, demonstrating resistance to Israeli occupation and resilience by organizing social resources to reject the political pressure to normalize the relationship with Israeli occupation, and reworked resources by joining forces with Palestinians from all generations to showcase united leadership (Høigilt, 2015). The result of this movement has been a challenge of not only Israeli occupation but also a confrontation to the leadership of Palestine. Power structures, regardless of affiliation, do not celebrate children and youth agencies; rather, these structures opt to enforce the linear perspective of human development, socialization, and political learning (Earls, 2011; van Deth, Abendschön, & Vollmar, 2011). Participants in the current journaling project expressed their agency of resistance, as one 14-year-old female from a village stated: "Gaza is still under siege ... we want to help, but how? All we can do is [remain] in solidarity ... we painted many papers and hung them on the school's walls to show the brutality of the [Israeli] occupation." The same participant discussed Israel and the occupation by writing of resistance, "No matter if they are all against us, we will resist until we free Palestine." Palestinian youth also use language as a form of resistance with the emergence of Palestinian hip hop, a medium that is also used as a binding agent of resilience to form solidarity among children of other marginalized communities (Maira, 2008). Another example of youth showing resistance is found in Yun and Chang's (2011) work in which a high school student in Korea

demonstrated resistance by sparking an online protest that ended in a collection of 1.39 million signatures in a month's time, which was considered one of the most influential citizen demonstrations since the Democratic Movement of 1987 and was the first civil movement led by teenagers to have ever happened in the country's history. This was an example of resistance from Korean youth, as they had primarily been excluded from political activity in Korea until this youth-initiated movement. Moreover, children and youth have showcased their agency in resilience in which "resilience can be understood as an ability to mobilize personal and social resources to protect against risks" (Kidd & Shahar, 2008, p. 163). Thorpe and Ahmad (2013) showed agency of resilience among Palestinian youth in Gaza through the sport of *parkour*, which is an "act of running, jumping, leaping through an urban environment as fluidly, efficiently and creatively as possible-among youth living in the Middle East" (p. 2). Palestinian youth in Gaza are mobilizing personal and social networks despite Israeli oppression that has resulted in closure of infrastructure and institutions, bombardment, and occupation. Though sport might offer relief for a short time, youth were really demonstrating more than relief. Family members discourage them to play because of its high risks; Israelis attacked the area close to the training space while it was initially challenging to register for the international parkour online network since Palestine was not listed. After showing their work online and featuring it on Facebook and getting thousands of likes, the youth received offers to perform internationally and network outside the Gaza Strip. Youth's resilience through sport did not have only psychological benefits but also served in educating other youth about their oppression and the circumstances they have to cope with each day. Resilience is also echoed throughout the participants writing on different topics. The same participant as before (a 14-year-old female from a village) wrote of the harsh circumstances living under Israeli oppression while at the same time writing of the happiness she experiences in daily life. This is a prime example of the resilience of youth living in contested areas. A 15-year-old female youth from a village proved this dichotomy of living in a conflicted area and experiencing oppression while at the same time showing how one remains resilient by seeing the positive: "Now I'm in Al-Ain area which has many springs and vegetables; I'm so excited in this area because I'm seeing the beauty of nature. I'm sitting beside a water spring, the green mountain is next to me, unfortunately on its top there is Jewish settlement. My country has everything, but the Israelis stole it and changed it to private property." A 12-year-old male participant from a city showed another

example of the resilience of Palestinian youth by stating: "Yes I'm sick of my daily routine but I have to cope with my society. I want to be happy despite these situations and to be ambitious to achieve my goals." In the face of conflict, and a society that is heavily oppressed by the Israeli occupation, this youth recognizes that to succeed they must be resilient.

In addition to the resistance and resilience of youth, in their agency they demonstrate the reworking of resources for the purpose of survival. Youth in Nairobi, Kenya, supported by an NGO and a private company, have reinvented the economically depressed circumstances and the lack of government attention paid to sanitary services by creating jobs for youth (Thieme, 2010). Youth from impoverished neighborhoods made sanitary waste removal and trash collecting an entrepreneurial opportunity by going to surrounding, more advantaged neighborhoods where there are more pristine bathrooms available for use on a small fee by local residents. They also utilize their time creating a social network by meeting other people from more privileged areas. The kids also used their jobs of trash collecting and waste removal as a means of subversion and expedience by dumping the waste in public areas where they were not allowed to and using their work to critique the pitiful amount of government-paid attention to the community conditions (Jeffrey, 2012). A 14-year-old female participant from a city described the reworking of resources in regard of teacher strike. She mentioned that her mom is a teacher and she was on strike the first semester but now she won't strike even if she is not getting a salary. She is concerned about the students. Other examples demonstrated resilience and reworking of agency as the youth example of a penurious community in Ethiopia, where although material resources and security are scarce, the reports on child well-being are high because children show resilience regardless of hardship through building relationships with the social resources that are available to them, depending on one another to eat and go together to school, creating a high morale for the community overall (Camfield, 2012). Indeed, to recognize these forms of resistance, resilience, and reworking, it is crucial to conceptualize human development within the interface of the local and global interactions and the tensions that neoliberal policies are rendering to "normalize/universalize" human development, therefore, ignoring children's agency and their contribution to the community and beyond. The normalization of human development within neoliberalism is a return on investment that can be measured and calculated within market transaction. The irony within the relationship between neoliberal values and universal human development is that neoliberal organizations support

universal human development to emphasize a linear progression of growth with a disconnect with local discourse while using global/local interaction through charity, loans, and international donor organizations to achieve the perspective.

HIDDEN CONNECTION: NEOLIBERALISM, INTERNATIONAL AID, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Children and youth agencies are subjected and subjugated to the local and global political structures (Habashi, 2008; Katz, 2004) that do not constitute a linear perspective of human development. Such interactions between human development and ecological content are not usually recognized within the universal approach of studying childhood development due to its contextualization, constant change, and multiple dimensions within ecological contents. Hence, there is an exception whereby the relationship between universal human development and ecological systems is recognized under the purview of civilization. Brandstater, Wade, and Woodward (2011) amplified such relationships between standardized human development and civilization: "civilization was the precondition for political citizenship as the epitome of universal human development" (p. 172). To embrace civilization, government should modernize with free market values, individual responsibility and freedom, as well as endorsing positivistic approach of universal human development. Crossely (2008) argued that neoliberal policies are rendered in positivistic educational research to increase hegemony on small states through international programs. In a way, this would facilitate the normalization/modernization of citizenship and universal human development that sanction neoliberal values. Apparently, this inherent relationship is encapsulated and enforced in the agenda of international donations. Habashi (2013) showed the transformation of early childhood education in the Palestinian Occupied Territories from locally driven education that engages child's development with cultural knowledge to neoliberal values through international donors' apparatus. Neoliberal values presented within international donors' agenda articulate the goal of providing educational access to each child with similar educational content regardless of community political aspirations, local resources, and cultural context in order to compete in the globalized world (Childers, 2012). In this approach, international donors do not only prepare individuals to engage with free market values but also aim to silence the cultural

knowledge and national heritance embedded in the local educational curricula. Palestinian early childhood education was transformed from a cultural practice prior to Oslo Accord in 1993 to a universal human development enterprise, and its vision is articulated by neoliberal international donors (Habashi, 2014). Local experiences with children are dismissed to be replaced by the universal approach of human development that can be measured and enforced. To resist the international donor agenda, advocates of early childhood education would compromise the opportunity for funding, thus, endorsing human development within universal standards, market values, and globalized citizenship (Rubenstein & Adler, 2000). Therefore, the juncture of neoliberal values and positivist approach in human development is governed in international donors' agenda (Habashi, 2014). Another example of this relationship is also observed in the Palestinian schooling of the United Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), whereby education is "constructed on Western, secular, liberal model, instituted to produce well-socialized, compliant future subject-citizens for modern state" (Bocco, 2010, p. 254). Meanwhile, the World Bank is investing in educational programs, though its initial emphasis was solely centered on economic growth; however, it changed to include financing education in order to support the economic structure based on neoliberal values of a free market that enables us to deregulate public policy and privatize public services. The emphasis of neoliberal values and education is also observed in United Nations Organization's enterprises such as the UNICEF and the UNDP to connect education with free markets. To achieve such outcomes, educational programs are spearheaded by economists rather than educators to measure the return on investment of education. The notion to include free market values in education is also encouraged by private donors (Torres, 2009). Saltman (2009) discussed a philanthropy case that aims to change the leadership of education from teacher and higher education to private company, and perceive education as an investment that is measured with neoliberal market values, individual mobility, and future citizenry. Therefore, the achievement of human development normalization is embedded in the international donor investment in education, civic society, and community development with neoliberal values to weaken the collective resistance to Israeli occupation with the support of the PA (Merz, 2012). It seems neoliberal values are framing the local/global interactions that manifest in multiple facets in local education, the economy, civic programs, and others to the normalization of human development and community development. As expected, the interaction of

neoliberal values as a foundation to universal human development shapes the structure of community engagement, individualistic values, and the expectation of citizenship. Wheeler and Byrner (2003) argued that to succeed in creating a sustainable economy a government should fulfill modern human needs through universal human development. Hence, the problem is that these values are not compatible with political conditions to produce the expected outcomes or provide resistance that cannot enforce the neoliberal values. This is the case within the Palestinian Occupied Territories, whereby the neoliberal discourse is attempting to control education, civic society, and political structure but does not necessarily assure a citizenry that would enforce such values (Giroux, 2006). In conflicted areas such as the Palestinian Occupied Territories, everyday life is not conducive to prescribing by the same neoliberal values valued elsewhere. When things like checkpoints are enforced by an occupier, or healthcare and educational infrastructure is not readily accessible and available, children and youth tend to utilize their agency in acts of resistance, resiliency, and reworking, which is not always a great fit with the neoliberal values and agenda set forth by international organizations and the such.

UNEXPECTED OUTCOME: HEGEMONY OVER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The consensus of the universal notion of human development with the endorsement of neoliberal values is explicitly entrenched in the top-down model of political socialization, whereby children and youth will be introduced to community engagement with the appropriation of political structure early in the process while expecting to demonstrate full citizenry at the ballet box at the age of 18 and onward. This does not posit a challenge to the adult-directed model of political socialization in general but rather assumes that youth will pursue participation in voting as an exercise of endorsing the top-down model, and the neoliberal agenda in education and civic society without recognizing the inherent injustice of such structures. Within such interactions, the expected outcome is for youth to engage in the political process through engaging in the political structure designed by and in political parties. Indeed, this expected normalization of children and youth political socialization ignores children and youth political agencies. Merz (2012) argued that the international aid embedded in neoliberal values is a tool to mute Palestinian resistance and allows the

country to be governed by others, rather than the Palestinian people. This notion is also evident in the time after the Palestinian election in 2006 that resulted in Hamas wining the majority of the national election vote. Hence, Fatah, the "secular" political party that heads the PA denied Hamas to govern due to its lack of international recognition (Hilal, 2010). The international community, with the support of Israel, pressured the PA to withhold aid and funding if Hamas governed the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Zweiri, 2006), which resulted in Hamas ruling the Gaza Strip and Fatah the West Bank (Usher, 2006). The irony of such experiences is the significance that is placed on the ballot box within the top-down model, as this expectation provides for youth the opportunity to demonstrate and endorse the official political socialization. The top-down model expects children and youth to grow up and be politically active and engaged citizens, all the while pressuring them to vote and act in a certain way. This experience was not completely implemented within the Palestinian political structure, whereby the wining party did not govern and the voice of many was silenced. In a way, the process of the top-down model of political socialization proved to be contrary to its premise and might be considered invalid, particularly if the will of the people does not complement the goals of international donors' political agenda. This political experience of the local and global interactions assented Merz's (2012) views in which neoliberal policies will govern the Palestinian people instead of the Palestinian people governing themselves. Hilal (2015) indicated that the neoliberal agenda is nurtured in the PA with the support of the World Bank, European Union, and International Monetary Fund; "the free market economy was made binding in Palestinian Basic Law, as approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)" (p. 355). This raises the question of whether the top-down model of youth political socialization is achieving the goal of producing civic-minded youth, especially if the product of an election that these individuals participated in contradicts the global political interest and the results are thrown out, or if something else is changed in the process. One can argue that when the top-down model embraces neoliberal values, the expected outcome is that the political discourse of a nation or region should in fact parallel the global discourse and neoliberal values, even if citizens vote or act in a way that contradicts these values and discourse. Samuels (2004) argued that this was the case in the 2002 election of Brazil's president, in which Lula's Worker Party (Larido dos Trabalhadores; PT), which traditionally stands for progressive ideas and national programs, had to embrace neoliberal programs from the previous conservative government

so that it does not alienate leaders in the community. To endorse neoliberal ideas is to adjust the political agenda even if it does not parallel the result of the top-down model of political socialization. Høigilt (2015) argued a similar case for Palestinian youth as political socialization lacks compatibility with the political structure and youth agency. Palestinian youth are suffering from a double oppression, one from the PA and other from the Israeli occupation. The PA is suppressing its resistance to the Israeli occupation by demobilizing non-violent activists. The PA is the caretaker of Israeli occupation and any community that attempts to resist occupation undermines international funds to its structure (Hilal, 2010). In a way, youth are not only doubly oppressed but also doubly deprived: deprived from agency in the case of resisting Israeli occupation and deprived from engaging in the top-down political model as the PA dismissed the national election results of 2006. Such a situation and its impact on youth political agency are understood through deconstructing the agency that is subject and subjugated within the local and global discourses. Youth political agency is fluid even if political circumstances do not sync with the voting exercise and the ultimate practice of top-down model of political socialization. Palestinian youth have made a cohesive response of such local/global interactions with alternative provisions. Habashi and Worley (2014) revealed that Palestinian youth endorsed a transnational regional political party, Hezbollah, that was not part of the Palestinian community. The study surveyed 1187 Palestinian students in Grades 5–7 in the West Bank to examine students' political party preference in which the results showed discrepancy between local political party and the projected preference of future political party. Participants' political party preference was not dominant in the local political structure but was part of the local and global political discourses. The preference is based on participants' political knowledge of Hezbollah defeating the Israeli military in Lebanon that was an exception to their historical knowledge of Palestine constantly being defeated by the Israeli military. Hence, the legacy of Hezbollah continues in the current journaling study, as one 14-year-old female participant from a village indicated: "Today I heard news of the martyrdom of a great fighter of Hezbollah Imad Mughniyeh. This great leader who fought the Zionists to defend his land and Palestine to have freedom and safety, and to return the Shebaa Farms to Lebanon. This fighter trained people of Hezbollah in July war 2006 and they won. When he died he was disguised, no one knows him. His destiny is to be a martyr in that place and time."

The notion that Hezbollah is a powerful political party comes from the fact that it not only defeated Israel but also stands in solidarity with the Palestinian rights against Israel (Khalili, 2007). In addition, Hezbollah attempts to stand militarily equally with Israel, as it is constantly preparing for the next Israeli invasion which also puts Israel government on an alert (Høigilt, 2007), as one 14-year-old male participant from a village indicated: "Israeli intelligence chief expected that Israel will be attacked by Hezbollah." The interest in regional political party, especially Hezbollah, is due to its ability to demonstrate strength in resisting Israeli oppression. Hamas as a Palestinian political party initially encapsulated similar views of resisting Israel, while the Fatah leadership presented in the PA is taking the role of a care keeper of Israeli interest (Høigilt, 2015). Therefore, the perception of these political parties varies as the politics of religion and the integration of political Islam changed over time. The fluidity of local/global politics is reflected in political party preference over another and it is expressed in everyday reality and not necessarily at the ballot box, as a 14-year-old male participant from a village vented in his journal writings, "On the political level I was a pro-Fatah because it is strong, it is coura-geous, and it fights the enemy. Then a disaster happened between Fatah and Hamas, and Fatah killed many citizens and children. I became one of Hamas's supporters because it is an Islamic party." On the other hand, other participants celebrated being part of Fatah, as a 14-year-old male youth from a refugee camp stated,

> 1/1 is a Fatah establishment anniversary celebration and it is the New Year Eve. It was so funny because a quarrel occurred between Dura (a village) and Jalazone (a refugee camp); the New Year begins with this problem. I watched the New Year predictions (2009). The prediction of a new person will govern Palestine in 2010. My dad said: this person could be Marwan Al-Barghouti [Fatah Leader who is in Israeli jail] and he will participate in the Palestinian elections.

Identifying the political parties and the disagreement associated with each is significant in expressing the preference and the youth political agency. The rivalry between Palestinian political parties is demonstrated in the commu-nity and neighborhood that narrates not only the difference but its relation with religion, leadership, and political agenda, as a 12-year-old female participant from a refugee camp noted, "Yesterday, Fatah members stepped up to the Mosque's minaret and removed Hamas' flags from the top and replaced it with Fatah flags, then they threw the flags into the rubbish."

The multiple political parties in the Palestinian Occupied Territories are an assertion to the diverse political discourse and its interaction with the global discourse. Hilal (2010) found that outside funding is a factor in shaping Palestinian political parties. However, this was not a consideration for the youth agency in the journal study because most participants saw Palestinians as one people, but as a 15-year-old male participant from a refugee camp witnessed and reacted to the conflict between Palestinian political parties, he stated, "Brothers' conflict divided my homeland." The closest political exercise next to the ballot box endorsed in the top-down political socialization model is for youth to express interest in one political party over another or to provide a critique of the political structure that does not challenge chaotic outcome. However, the expression of youth political agency regarding political parties in particular or the political situation in general does not necessarily parallel the progression of universal human development, as children's and youth's opinions and perspectives do not always correspond to the top-down model or neoliberal values espoused by the global discourse. Indeed, it is important to further analyze universal human development and the top-down model of political socialization and how the two are not consistent with the argument of children and youth political agencies.

The Missing Element in Constructing Youth Agency

The universal paradigm of children and youth development neglects to include numerous factors that impact development and socialization such as the local/global discourse, the intersectionality of different social identifiers, intergenerationality, and the life course experience among other ecological factors. However, while the normalization methodology to looking at and examining human development is not inclusive to all, it does not negate that each and every child and youth deserves the right to normality. Even though, as in the Palestinian journaling project, some children and youth around the world are living in heavily conflicted and war-torn areas, they still have daily lives in which they practice living beyond resiliency, resistance, and the reworking of resource. The moments differ from having a good day in the school or disagreeing with their peers of family members. Participants highlighted moments of beauty in their lives that added another dimension to their agency, as a 14-year-old female participant from a village stated:

We woke up today and prepared ourselves to go to school (my mother, Shatha, and I). As always my mother and I got dressed and Shatha was sleeping, when she looked through the window she said it's snowing, the ground is white, I want to go to school but my mother said we should wait to know if there will be school or not, then the education minister announced that there will be no school because of the weather. I was so happy and I changed my clothes into warm ones, and listened to Fairuz song TaljTalj [means snow in Arabic], we usually listen to that song in snowy days. This day was beautiful despite all obstacles we had, such as when the electricity went off, and the firewood heater (fireplace) was run by electricity, so we fired up the gas heater, and we felt cold. Then when the electricity went on again we turned on the TV but unfortunately channels didn't work because of the weather, so we gathered and spoke with each other.

The same participant continued to describe happiness in her life in the face of living under oppression in a journal entry a few weeks after the previous:

Today was one of the most beautiful days of my life. I spent it with my best friend Haya. Every Thursday after school we go to somewhere because after it will be Friday and it's our day off from school. This day we chose to go to swings and we played. The weather was cloudy then it rains. We sit with each other and had many conversations. Then we walked until we met my sister Shatha with her friends. They told us there is an exhibition and its name is Spring (Alrabee in Arabic) so we went with them because I love exhibitions and paints. I liked most of the paintings and I read Ali Ashour's name on most of them. I was so happy and I told them this is my teacher. I knew him when I saw him there. Then we left. On our way home we saw an ancient house. It was an Arabic house, and grass and trees were around it. I wanted to enter but couldn't, so I took photos of the garden. Then I bought a hot drink because the weather was so cold, but the rain fell into my cup and I didn't drink it. Finally we reached home, we played, watched TV, played on my computer, and I did many things such as painting and writing; this is how my day ended.

Another 15-year-old female participant from a city described her time running errands:

Today my mother and I went to the market to purchase some needs. Then we went home. After that I went with my little brothers to play in Is'ad Al-Tfoleh park, this is the only park in the downtown. It has a beautiful garden for people in Hebron, we go there in summer camps to play. I played with my brothers and I returned as a child. The park was crowded today, and usually

I met my friends there. We walked to our home because the weather was nice and on the way we bought ice-cream. We all slept when we arrived home because we were so tired.

After a few days she wrote:

We went to a museum and we walked under the sun. Then we went to a monastery; they call it Irtas Monastery. At the door we talked with the nun; then she allowed us to enter it. Green lands are around this monastery; Masha Allah, I had never seen something so beautiful in my whole life. Then we entered the Monastery and we toured it; this was the first time I went to a church and the nun talked with us in a good way. After that we went to the nativity church which always has visitors, this is the first visit to the Nativity Church. Raed Al-Hamouri our guide started to explain about it, and why the door is so small? And that is because the Knights were not allowed to enter the church with their horses and the door was shortened to prevent any animal to enter this holy place. We also went to the place where Jesus was born and the palm tree from which Mary had eaten. Then we left to let other visitors enjoy these views. Then we went to Talitha Kumi College where Sir Simmon Awwad was waiting for us and he told us about different kinds of plants and how they're living in Palestine, and about the different kinds of birds. Also he told us about the collage. Then we went to the exhibition where they mummified many animals, there I discovered that I didn't know any of the Palestinian's animal, nature, and plants. Then we went to the recycle department and Sir Simmon showed us some of the schools work and the colleges work in that field, they recycled papers of the school to make a school wallpaper, also some of them recycled water by collecting it in barrels then they recycled it to be used in irrigation. The school protected doves from the unwanted immigration and got new nests for them after the people demolished their nests so they put a lot of wood boxes as nests for the birds. We talked about one kind of bird which is called the flightless bird. It exists in the old city of Hebron, after the restoration of old buildings and they closed the holes, this bird was searching for its nests, Simon Mikhail said: there were many birds that died, conversely, these birds were searching for their nests which were closed to cover the holes. Then we went to Murad resort and we sat outside then we went to the coffee shop to take our lunch, then they gave us the certifications and the education minster in Hebron (Nisreen Amer) was with them so we sat with her after that and girls complained about the curriculum and I asked her to change the subject and she accepted it and said this will be better. After that we went to the park and we did many activities there, then we went back to Hebron, it was useful and joyful trip.

For participants to be acknowledged, moments of normality in their lives speak to the fact that even children and youth living in heavily conflicted areas under an oppressive occupation can have what would be considered "normal" everyday experiences from going to the grocery store to talking about and playing with friends. These participant quotes on everyday life and the happiness that they experience add a further dimension to their agency and individual narratives. In their journals, the participants would describe *all* facets of their lives fluidly: setting up of checkpoints by the Israeli military, attending school and fretting over their final exams, visiting a brother or relative member in Israeli jail, visiting a community center and playing games, and watching the destruction of Gaza on TV, a relatives beautiful wedding, the conflict between Hamas and Fatah and its impact on Palestinians, and a love interest, among so many other different, unique experiences. Their agency includes all of these narratives and provides insight into how they make meaning of their living situations. The 14-year-old female participant from a village recounts celebrating Mother's Day, while also describing the effect on her family of her imprisoned brother who is in Israeli jail:

> It was a beautiful day and we went to the market because yesterday was the mother's day and I was so busy with my homework so I didn't buy her anything. My brothers and I agreed to collect our money and buy her something, but when I went home they were gone. When they came back they brought her golden necklace and ring, she liked the gift and started to cry because she remembered my brother Bashar [who is in the Israeli jail], he has the largest share of money and he advised to buy this gift. Then we went to my grandma's home to give her gifts, and all the family were there, we all were happy, and when we went back home I didn't want to leave my grandma's home.

This narrative in particular shows that while the participants (and all children/youth living in conflicted areas) have the right to normality and do in fact experience happiness in their lives, the conflict and/or oppression is often in the background of their daily experiences. The same participant engaged in another dimension of normality of Palestinian youth, as she described the Prisoner Day that commemorates Palestinians who are jailed for resisting Israeli occupation and oppression. It is an unfortunate reality that the occupation is a normal part of daily life:

Today is Friday, the Palestinian Prisoner's Day, every year I go to this celebration, except this year I didn't go to the demonstration. My dad and my brother went to the celebration while I listened to (Al-Thawra Al-Sawdaa means the Black Revolution) band while they were singing for the eleventh prisoners who are in Israeli's jail. I was so happy because they cared for the prisoners and I remembered when my father was in jail, one day we made a celebration in the school and I was in the fourth grade, they called my father in jail and he spoke on the school's radio about the Palestinian Prisoner's Day, I was so happy because I'm proud of my father. Previously we all remembered that day but lately no one cares except the prisoners' families.

The following quote written by a 15-year-old female participant from a city also expresses this dichotomy of living under occupation but finding beauty in life:

Now I'm in Al-Ain area, this area has many springs and vegetables; I'm so excited in this area because I'm seeing the beauty of nature. I'm sitting beside a water spring, the green mountain is next to me, unfortunately in its top there is a Jewish settlement (Bait Eil). My country has everything, but the Israelis stole it and changed it into private property.

The normality of Palestinian agency is embedded in its paradoxes and its inconsistency whereby moments of celebration are within the inevitable local and global discourses. This is that case, as a different 15-year-old female participant from a city stated:

Two days ago the ministry of education announced the Tawjehi results. Alhamdulillah all our relatives have passed it. Today we were invited to go to one of our relatives' party her name is Dana and she got 96.8, she was an excellent girl in the school, and the party was so nice. In the evening we heard a newsflash said that the Israeli forces make a curfew on Al-Jelda area, and Ein Dir Bha, they besieged a house there, because in it there is a freedom fighter, and they want him. They shot the house, and they called him using the microphones to get out of the house. But he didn't reply so they brought his father to pressure him. But he refused to give in so they demolished the house room by room and he flew from on room to another until they demolished the whole house. The next day 27/7/2008 we heard the news that the freedom fighter became a martyr. In the evening during the discussion I heard that the boys were throwing stones because they made a curfew. We lost that freedom fighter as other fighters, these fighters who sacrificed their lives for Palestine. All I can do is to congratulate this hero.

The same participants shared a story of the Palestinian community that acutely reflects what life is like under Israeli occupation:

> I read in the Al-Quds newspaper of 25/8 that in Gaza they sell donkey's meat as well as they said this meat is in many of Hebron's restaurants. There were different opinions about that; some said this is because the Israeli siege on Gaza, from the commercial side, they prevent them of export and import, but in my opinion it is just one of the Israelis rumors to destabilize the Palestinian's economic as a new destruction and new way of indirect violence. Also, I read Omar Abu Eram's message to Salam Fiad, who is the Prime Minister, to collect Al-Ehsan Charity Association dues; he said that because to lack of resources of providing their financial needs, 100 disabled children will be in the streets after they leave this Association; also, local and international donations have stopped, and the children will lose their future. Another flash news was that the Jewish settlers were uprooting olive trees of Al-Mayadeen, Wadi Qana, Salfiet. This was under the Israelis Forces protection, who always claim that they are committed to Geneva Convention. Was this obvious in their actions? Also they prevent the farmers and agriculture ministry delegation of Salfiet to arrive to that place. For why? What is the reason behind doing this? Nothing, this is just to trouble us, but we don't care. Also the Israeli forces announced these areas are closed military area, while this land is for Haitham Mansour and Said Zaidan. Citizens appealed to the Palestinian President and the Prime Minister to prevent settlers' attacks on their land. In my opinion no one can help them, this is not to insult them or to reduce their abilities but because if they can do anything they already done it before, this is most important and serious dilemmas.

A 14-year-old female participant from a village shared her joy and disappointment in celebrating birthday. This shows the paradoxical nature of growing up in a conflicted area; while growing older is generally considered a way in which an individual obtains more rights, Palestinians are continuously denied their rights over the life cycle:

> Today I went to do my ID card. Today is Sunday and my mother is at her work so I went with my father to do my ID card. I had a strange feeling of independence, I grow up and I can go wherever I want and I will take an ID, when we arrived to the interior affairs I went to a women to take a picture, I wasn't beautiful but the picture was good, I wanted it to be beautiful because it will stay with me my whole life. After we finished the women told me your picture is beautiful, then a young boy came back because they refused his picture so he has to take another one. His father shouted at him and said take a

good picture, do you came from the cows land, I laughed when I heard this, and he stayed 15 minutes until he got a good picture, I don't know why? When we submitted the application they told us to come back after one week, this was a nice day for me, although I can't now go to Jerusalem because now I need a permission from Israel.

To call for a universal normalization of youth socialization and development is to deny agency. Instead of denying that youth have agency, it is important to recognize that youth development is predicated on a number of factors and intersections of contexts, identifiers, narratives, and so on, especially as youth use their agency to forge normality and meaning-making in everyday life. Even when living in conflicted areas, youth are able to use their agency to create meaning of their paradoxical situations; for example, a Palestinian youth visiting a brother imprisoned in an Israeli jail followed by going back to school shows that even in doing everyday tasks, there is a reality of oppression.

Conclusion

This longitudinal study provided an example of how to consider the dialectic interaction between the processes and the outcomes of youth political socialization. For adults to assume within the top-down model of political socialization that children and youth are influenced by only certain factors is to ignore that there is a multitude of interactions within socialization processes that produce a variety of outcomes. As the findings from this study revealed, youth and their agency are impacted by the local and global discourses, social identities, community narratives, and a plethora of other facets; in short, the factors at play in youth development are not, and should not be, limited to a few contexts or approaches that are found in the top-down model. Rather, it is much more appropriate to utilize the ecological methodology and approach when analyzing children and youth political socialization and how their socialization affects the way they express agency. The interactions that affect youth development, including the effect of the global ideology on the local political reality, must be examined to truly understand youth political socialization. The fact that youth can correspond to such interactions and create moments of freedom to correspond to global/local discourse is truly the ultimate manifestation of agency. The theoretical framework for studying political socialization, proposed by Amna, Ekström, Kerr, and Stattin (2009), captured the interactions between and within contexts and, most importantly, the interaction of

global hegemony on youth agency over time. Moreover, youth's development is conceptualized by intersectionality, intergenerationality, and life course that contribute to youth agency. It is these two theoretical foundations that assisted in reconceptualizing youth political socialization in this study and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the linear approach embedded in the conventional adult-directed (or top-down) construct of political socialization. This study reveals that the interactions of different discourses within various contexts underestimated the construct of youth political agency, and its role in reforming, recreating, and redirecting political agendas. The contemporary tendency with the support of the neoliberal lifestyle and the free market is to extend childhood to 21 years old or more, with the claim that youth are immature and lack experience in the real world. This attempt is not only to limit their agency in the name of science and brain development but to dismiss the relationship between neoliberal thought promoted in specific paradigms of development and personal growth and agency. The current Palestinian journal study shows that children and youth do in fact have political agency and should not be seen as empty vessels waiting to be filled with ideas. Therefore, it is a shortcoming to assume that human development is separate from the interactions of culture or the larger ecological system. It seems the impact is far more integrated in youth agency than the perspective of normalization based on universal perspectives that limit the agency. One can argue that the process of political socialization can and is shaped by cultural realities that are in turn shaped by the global/local discourse and historical narratives. Particularly for Palestinian youth in the journal study, the socio-political reality of their everyday lives was the driving force in their individual political socialization, which impacted their agency and allowed them to rework and reshape daily facets of life, resist the Israeli occupation, and show resiliency in the face of oppression.

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