War and Resistance: Israeli Civil Militarism and its Emergent Crisis

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> Anyone who experienced the things I went through, came in 1982 (the war in Lebanon) to the conclusion that you can't keep living in a schizophrenic existential situation: on the one hand, you complain, you say that you strongly and conscientiously oppose such deeds, like the Peace Nowniks[1] usually do even today, and on the other hand, when you are summoned to your military service, you sort of create a barrier, and you are transformed into a different person, or at least you are two different persons. And I could not continue living with the gap between what I think (as a citizen) and what I do as a soldier. …

This excerpt from an interview with a conscientious objector to Israel's war in Lebanon (1982–1985), unfolds the story of the break-up of the taken for granted association between citizenship and military service in Israel. To paraphrase Charles Tilly, the excerpt encloses questions of citizenship and social identity as well as struggles over the practices and meanings of citizenship.[2]

The association between citizenship and military service has been the subject of research on the relations between war-making, state-making, and nationalism.[3] Reflecting on the experiences of the American and French revolutions, Janowitz claimed that "participation in armed conflict has been an integral aspect of the normative definition of citizenship."[4] This thesis, however, emphasizes the ideological aspects of the revolutions and puts the weight of explanation on the formal definition of conscripts as citizens. Janowitz underestimates the weight of war preparation and state-expansion that brought about the extension of conscription and its concomitant association with citizenship. He tends to disregard the complex processes and institutional practices involved in the formation of modern nation-states, as well as the new and sophisticated ways in which the latter have extended their power over groups and individuals.

The association between citizenship and military service has been analyzed from a different perspective which stresses war preparation and the expansion of military activity as well as state expansion. Tilly, relying on the French case, claims that expanded conscription and its association with citizenship was precipitated by the military needs of the revolutionary French state.[5] Expanded conscription facilitated both the expansion of the state and the transition from indirect to direct rule. This process of preparing for war as well as the increased penetration of the state into communities created the ground for popular resistance as well as processes of bargaining that created citizenship.[6] Thus the association between citizenship and

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military service was not harmonious and enthusiastic; its constitution was, from the very beginnings, rift by contestation, resistance, and struggle.[7]

The expansion of conscription, as well as increased impingement of the state's administrative apparatus on communities and social groups, accelerated homogenization, i.e., the creation or imposition of uniform standards and rules over the territory of the sovereign state.[8] Homogenization implied, among others things, defining the populations over which the state claimed sovereignty in terms of a common linguistic, ethnic, or historical tradition, or what is commonly called nationalism.[9] Thus war preparation and expanded conscription not only enhanced state penetration and citizenship, but also shaped the definition of the citizenry as a nation.[10] It may be concluded that in the European framework mass armies and war management enhanced nationalism, and in turn nationalism was highly instrumental in the pursuit of war and military mobilization. Thus, as Posen claims: "schools, military training, and the newspapers spread the idea that the group has a shared identity and fate that can only protected by the state."[11] The construction of the nation for the purposes of conscription and war-making forged links between citizenship and nationality and even blurred the distinction between them.

Access to citizenship and to the nation was enhanced through war mobilization. Military service carried the promise of progress through the nation, and war participation was exchanged for citizenship rights.[12] Envisioning progress through the nation mainly through war participation made war an integral part of society, thus shaping the interests of different groups and social classes,[13] or what Mann has termed civil militarism.[14]

This perspective discloses the conditions underlying the association between citizenship and soldiering. However, it tells us less about the how soldiering and citizenship were experienced by social actors, how they were publicly represented, and what narratives or stories underlay this public representation.[15] One remaining question is how conscription as the main test of active citizenship constituted the subjectivity of individuals and geared them again and again to the enhancement of state power. A concomitant question is how this subjectivity comes to be subverted: how and under what conditions it is resisted and what are the terms of resistance?

In this essay I examine the ways in which war and military service has constituted the social identity of a particular group of Israeli-Jewish males (conscientious objectors to Israel's 1982–1985 war in Lebanon) and how this identity, which involved an intimate association between soldiering and citizenship, was resisted and contested. This study is based on the interpretative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted with 66 reserve soldiers who refused their tour of duty during the war in Lebanon.[16]

War, Citizenship, and Military Service in Israel

Zionism, a national project that sought sovereign political representation for Jews, took shape within the framework of a colonizing enterprise. The Zionist colonization

and settlement of Palestine was characterized by a protracted state of conflict between Jews and Palestinians, a conflict that some have identified as a feature of settler or frontier societies.[17] The management of the conflict shaped the institutional make-up, infrastructural capacity, and legitimacy of the Jewish community in Palestine.

War and routine conflict management, and their construction in terms of a struggle for survival, have been central to the consolidation and enhancement of the power and autonomy of the Israeli state since its establishment in 1948.[18] War and routine conflict management played a central role in the shaping of the community of citizens as well as the organization of membership and participation in the political community. Moreover, war and the army (based on universal conscription) have been the main mechanisms for the construction of what Ben-Eliezer has conceptualized as the ethnic nation;[19] they have been instrumental to imagining and constructing the solidarity between Jewish settler-immigrants in terms of a common project, the defense of Jewish sovereignty. Within the boundaries of the ethnic nation, full and effective citizenship has been constructed in republican terms, i.e., with an emphasis on the individual's contribution to the fulfillment of collective goals.[20] Therefore, the republican project, the defense and preservation of Jewish sovereignty, gave rise to different, hierarchically ordered forms of membership and participation.

Participation in war and military service was identified as the ultimate token of political obligation as well as the highest contribution to the achievement of collective goals. The institutions of war-making, especially the military, became the prime arenas of political integration and the signifiers of full and effective membership in the Israeli political community.[21] Thus, civic virtue was constructed in terms of and identified with military virtue. However, military virtue was differentially distributed throughout society. This differential allocation of civic and military virtue reflected the ways in which the state, through military service, reshaped the links between gender, class, ethnic origin, nationality, and citizenship. The ultimate carriers of civic virtue "naturally" came to be Ashkenazi-Jewish males, whereas Mizrahi Jews (males and female) were relegated to the periphery of civic virtue, thereby strengthening through the idiom of a mass and egalitarian army their already peripheral position in society.[22]

Whereas military service was mandatory for both men and women, the equation of civic and military virtue was gendered, and applied exclusively to men.[23] Women, despite being drafted, were accorded a different mission within the national project. The defense of Jewish sovereignty was also conceived in terms of the continual growth of the Jewish population, to counteract the presence of a different national-ethnic community (the Palestinian citizens of Israel) within the framework of the settler-state.[24] Whereas Jewish men were "military defenders of the nation," Jewish women were "physical reproducers of the nation."[25] Thus citizenship for Jewish women meant their inclusion within the boundaries of the community as mothers.[26]

The ethnic-cultural understanding of nationhood, as well as the constraints and imperatives emerging from the settler-colonial character of the Israeli state, brought about the inclusion within the republican project of categories that did not comply with the equation civic virtue = military virtue. In particular, ultra-orthodox and religious groups ranged from opposition to ambivalence in their stance towards the State of Israel. In order to incorporate them within the nation-building project, the state created special legal arrangements that postponed military service for ultra-orthodox males and exempted religious Jewish women altogether.[28] The pattern of incorporation of religious men and women into citizenship was constructed in terms of their role in preserving the "cultural survival of the collectivity." The religious sectors of society provided the legitimation needed by a settler-state and society in a condition of protracted conflict with its geopolitical environment.[28]

Whereas religious and ultra-orthodox groups were incorporated into the community by exempting them from military service, the same principle led to the exclusion of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Their exclusion from military service, as well as from the access to the institutions that were signaled as furthering the collective good, shaped their membership and participation in the community. As Palestinian citizens of Israel are barred from furthering collective goals, they have different access to the rights of citizenship.[29] Practices such as differential treatment by welfare agencies,[30] differential access to the labor market,[31]and military and political surveillance[32] were legitimized by Palestinians' exclusion from military service. In contrast to the republican citizenship characteristic of Jews, the Palestinian citizens of Israel are accorded what Peled has termed liberal citizenship – political rights on an individual basis only.[33]

Thus, the republican principle gave rise to a stratified community of citizens. The relative importance assigned to its different missions differentiated between men and women, and between Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews. The ethno-cultural framing of the enhancement of the common good, in turn, differentiated between Jewish and Palestinian Israelis.[35]

The next two sections of this essay engage in an interpretative analysis of military service as the main signifier of the nation as well as the ultimate obligation of citizenship. I investigate how those singled out as prime carriers of civic virtue experienced the association between citizenship and military service. What kind of social identity resulted from the way they were incorporated into citizenship and interpellated?[36] What narratives framed the construction of this type of social identity?

Military Service: Bounding the Israeli Community

Determining eligibility for military service, i.e., defining who can be included within the boundaries of conscription,[36] is more than a formal, legal practice. It

involves an implicit and explicit definition of the value the state ascribes to individuals, signifying who may be considered a candidate for enhancing the "collective good" and for whom the "collective good" is conceived. This statement of value both constitutes individuality and creates a sense of belonging to a homogeneous body engaged in the pursuit of the common good.

The enclosure of individuality within the framework of the collective is reflected in the words of Izhar, a reservist in the artillery corps and history teacher. Izhar stresses the elite character of his education. Moreover, he identifies elitism with collectivism, pointing time and again to the ways in which socializing frameworks "produced" individuals who conceive of personal self-fulfillment in collectivist terms.[38] The ultimate consummation of personal self-realization is embodied in participation in a military combat unit:

> Today I consider myself as an individualist, but I must declare myself as the genuine product of the pre-1967 educational system, a bit elitist, Ashkenazi, and bourgeois … a [collectivist] educational regime. It may sound contradictory, but that was the way I was. The group with whom I joined the army … we were programmed, I would dare to say. We were very much alike; we were produced by the same assembly line, and an excellent assembly line it was. Guys with high moral standards who were ready to join elite combat units … it couldn't have been better. I'll say it again: if and when I come into power, I will produce people like me… . It will be wonderful.

By defining Izhar and his fellows as members of an elite, the state drives them to fulfill the tasks that eventually bring about the aggrandizement of its organizational frameworks. How well he perceives this process to work is evident from his cynical final statement.

The "naturalness" of a life cycle that equates personal self-fulfillment with the realization of collective goals is also a principal them of Doron, a kibbutz member and infantry soldier:

> It [military service] was the next step after membership in the youth movement. I grew into it; it was natural to join the army and then to continue in the reserve service. I know that people born abroad look at it differently. It was natural in my time and in the same natural way I went to the reserves. As I grew up, I hesitated, I doubted, but all in all it was natural. I can't say that one day I woke up and I asked myself 'Why?'

While Doron closes with an expression of retrospective doubt, implying that things could have been different, his statement also emphasizes the constitutive power of educational practices. They were so "natural" that Doron never doubted his path or considered alternatives to it.

The perception of military service as the natural order of things brings Chanoch, a soldier in the aerial reserve corps and student, to claim that everybody goes to the army and joins the reserves:

> [It] is a direct continuation of high school. You join the army with a group, then you go to a kibbutz … well, the kibbutz is superfluous now, and then you go to the reserves for a month each year… . Everybody does it… .

"Everybody" is exposed to the same frameworks and experiences and, as a consequence, "everybody" goes to the reserves. "Everybody does it" becomes a justification of the rule and an index of normality.

At the same time, this feeling that "everybody does it" symbolizes an imagined community. The subject is able to identify himself with others through assumed engagement in the very same practices. The construction of the life cycle and of identity in such a way that subjects conceive of military service not only as the natural order of things, but also as enclosing everybody, points to the homogenization of subjects, to the perception that "everybody" is of the same human nature.

Yet, exposure to and engagement in the same field of practices (i.e., regular military service and the reserves) not only homogenizes, but also differentiates and creates hierarchies. Eli, a reserve soldier in the infantry corps and university professor, repeatedly emphasizes his feeling of difference from others and how he identifies himself as an individualist. Nonetheless, he acknowledges his immersion in Israeliness mainly as the latter is constituted by military service and participation in wars:

> Most people I identify as Israelis (but [there are] those I do not consider as Israelis, such as the ultra-orthodox Jews), all of us were in the army. The army is an integral part of our culture. Your age cohort is defined by this. Our war was the Six-Day War [1967]. During the Yom Kippur War [1973] we were considered old people.

Eli's participation in the common field shaped his capacity to recognize others, as exemplified by his statement that the people he identifies as Israelis have all served in the military. Participation in army service and war amalgamates personal and historical time, thereby creating a classificatory scheme amongst participants (thus, the Six-Day War was the war of Eli and his cohort). Yet, at the same time, all participants in military service and war are of the same human nature, sharing the same qualities. Those who do not participate are automatically driven outside the boundaries of the community; they are not of the same "human nature" and therefore cannot be identified as true Israelis. [38]

Despite a deep ambivalence towards military practices and a sense of alienation from soldiering, Avi also talks about military service as an integral part of being an Israeli and saw opting out as placing oneself beyond the boundaries that define normalcy:

> Army life is part of our being an Israeli … it is the price you pay to be an Israeli. To be an Israeli means to be in the army and then you go to the reserves, whether you want to or not. If you opt out, you are out of this kibbutz called Israel and you are different, a deviant.

Avi equates Israel with a kibbutz, a small, intimate, and demanding community, the symbol of the dominant Israeli elite. The minimal requirement for belonging to the kibbutz is abiding by its rules and norms. Participation in military service and the reserves is the minimal requirement to belong to Israel. Thus, to be an Israeli is to be a soldier, whether the individual consciously accepts or rejects this definition of Israeliness.

We may conclude that being included within the boundaries of conscription signifies the homogenization of individuals. This process of homogenization is the cornerstone of an imagined community. Thus, the experience of common bonds and solidarity between anonymous individuals, which develops during the process of producing "national security" and engaging in military activities, gives rise to the perception of the military sphere as a community[39] – a community interpreted by its members as embodying and defining the very essence of Israeliness. This community is experienced by its members as overlapping with society as a whole, even though it is defined along national-ethnic lines (its participants are mainly Israeli-Jewish), it is gender exclusive (its members are only males), and its constituent activities are military. Furthermore, although this community is constituted by the Israeli state and embodies its organizational and cultural logic,[40] it is perceived and experienced by its members as autonomous from the state.

Common engagement in the routine military practices gives rise to a perception of simultaneity,[41] meaning that different individuals are engaged in the same recognizable practices. This perceived simultaneity creates bonds between individuals who are anonymous to each other and demarcates the boundaries of the community. This in turn creates perceptions of the community as bounded, thereby establishing a sharp boundary dividing those within from those without.

Military Service: Notions of Contribution and Belonging

How are the notions of duties on behalf of the community framed? What kind of discourses and public narratives frame the construction of military service as the prime obligation of citizenship?

Izhar,[42] a history teacher and reserve soldier in the artillery corps, portrays citizenship and its contents in strictly legal terms. He mobilizes his wide knowledge of history and philosophy to denote the institutional arenas in which the practices of citizenship are embedded, defining citizenship mainly in terms of obligations and the duty to obey the law and subjecting rights to the fulfillment of obligations:

> In my classes, I constantly emphasize that citizenship consists of military service, paying taxes and obeying the law. Paying taxes and going to the army both mean obeying the law, they are the stuff of citizenship. That is what makes you a citizen and makes you eligible to enjoy the defense that [the state] equally distributes. There is nothing emotional in citizenship; citizenship is a technical concept. The basis rule in this soccer game is that the referee gives the final verdict. You may

> argue, play games and even make all kind of gestures, but in this case the referee can kick you out the game with the red card and you are out of the game. I mean, the law establishes the final verdict. Why? Because this is the agreement upon which we entered the game.

According to Izhar, fulfilling obligations is the prime criterion of civic value and an essential prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the political community. Therefore, who is a citizen and who is considered a "person" or a competent member of society, is contingent upon legal codes or laws that establish and interpret the obligations of individuals towards the state, and wider socio-cultural narratives that equate civic value with the fulfillment of obligations. The "agreement" to join the political community implies that the individual surrenders to the state the interpretation of his obligations towards the community.

While Izhar discusses citizenship in general, emphasizing what he terms its "technical" character, other interviewees examine their obligations in greater depth. With an emphasis on the ideology of contribution and belonging, they play down the compulsory nature of military service, transforming its conception as the paramount obligation into almost a matter of personal choice. Take the case of Yotam, a psychology student and officer in the parachute corps, who discusses his obligations to the state in a rational and reflective manner:

> First of all, let's talk about the formal aspect: it is an obligation, because if I don't go [to the army], I may end up in jail. Well, that's the way it goes in this country. The second thing is … that I think that the army is necessary for the security of the country. I am willing to participate, and I think that it is my duty to participate. It is my duty as a member of society. I would say [it is] my duty not only as an Israeli, but also as member of any community. As a member of a community, I receive something and I am ready to give something in return. I think it is very important to be in the army – the army is a locus of power in Israel. I don't conceive of my military service only as a formal duty. But as a duty as a member of a community in which I live and which I want to influence.

Although Yotam mentions the compulsory aspect of his obligations first, he does not elaborate on it. In fact, he plays down its centrality by emphasizing the importance of the army and of each individual's military service for national security. Yotam understands the centrality of the army in Israel, and this very centrality brings him to regard fulfilling his military duties in terms of his loyalty and contribution to society, or, in his words, to the community. Moreover, his very being and recognition by others are bound up with his military service, for "the army is a locus of power in Israel." By casting the legal compulsory aspects of military service in terms of contribution and influence upon the destiny of the community, Yotam fills the position created for him by the hegemonic discourse – the pursuer of the common good, which is embodied in the Israeli army as an arena that incarnates collective goals.

The discourse that emerges from the interviews constructs military service as the paramount duty of the individual to the state, a duty justified by a protracted

state of war. As the war situation endows obligations and their fulfillment with an existential meaning (i.e., the survival of the community), the compulsory aspect of military service is blurred. Indeed, service in the armed forces becomes the ultimate criterion of membership and participation in the socio-political community. War-making and war participation thus constitute the boundaries of the Israeli-Jewish community: the discourse on war shapes the interpretative, cognitive, and emotional orientations of individuals and groups.

The extent to which this discourse constructs the reality of Israeli-Jews is evident in what Arnon, a kibbutz member and reserve soldier in the infantry corps, calls the "moral law":

> The 'moral law' means that the army is beyond [partisan] debate. … It means that when you are summoned, you go [because] it is your country, and you must fight for it whatever the consequences. [It means] that in war and in distress we cooperate, we are together. And that we fight when there is no other choice … right … that our army is strong enough to cope with this lack of choice. And that we [the army] are ready to accept you [as you are], because you are part of this system, and because it is necessary for victory. And these codes are agreed upon even by the extreme right. … I haven't said anything deviant; it is agreed upon by [both] the extreme right and extreme left.

The mobilization potential of this "moral law" must be interpreted within a cultural universe structured around war and threats to sovereignty. Within this universe, the contribution of each individual to the common war effort is deemed vital. Moreover, the army is the main constituent of a brotherhood that transcends differences in political outlook. This brotherhood embodies the exemplary community of citizens, a community composed of all those who contribute to the common good.

This brotherhood of highly motivated men is constructed in cultural discourse as Israel's most powerful weapon and the explanation of its superiority on the battlefield. By constructing the army and war-waging as the embodiment of the common good, both are de-politicized. Furthermore, the "non-political" character of the army and war-waging extends to the whole area of national security, and contributes to its construction as beyond and above narrow partisan interests.[43]

Michael, an infantry reserve soldier and a student of engineering, states it clearly: "In our country the army is a popular army. We are the army. We don't have militias. When everybody joins the army, your particular political outlook fades away." Within this cultural construct, the army is freed from narrow partisan interests and presented as embodying the broadest interest of the national collectivity in its struggle for survival. Each individual must suspend his particular political judgment while participating in military activities. The perception of soldiering, and in particular of combat soldiering, as the epitome of "good citizenship" strengthens this conception by transforming each individual into a carrier of the general will.

The surrender of the soldier's personal or partisan political outlook does not deny him the possibility of interpreting the common good. On the contrary, individuals are required to take initiative (e.g., taking over for their commander when he is killed in the line of duty, excelling in military tasks) in order to enhance the common good. This remains true even though the state and its agents claim a monopoly over the definition of the army's goals and activities. In other words, participation and involvement are conditional upon obedience to the state's demands and the terms in which these demands are formulated. Yet, because the fulfillment of obligations is articulated in a discourse that emphasizes participation and involvement (albeit within distinct boundaries), individuals are placed in a position that enables them to evaluate critically the deeds of the army, and through them the practices of the state.[44]

This leads to my next question: when and under what circumstances are the rules, practices, and narratives constructing soldiering as the paramount expression of citizenship questioned? Moreover, when and how do the roles of citizen and soldier come to be perceived inconsistent, their respective rules, practices, and narratives colliding?

The Split between Citizenship and Soldiering

As a rule, the definition of Israel's interests in military terms was not questioned until the beginnings of the 1970s. The occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War engendered divisions in Israel around issues of national security. The decline of Labor party hegemony and the rise to power of the right-wing Likud party in 1977 and the peace treaty signed with Egypt in 1978 furthered disagreements over issues of national security, and promoted the crystallization of protest groups (left and right, doves and hawks). The emergence of organizations (such as Peace Now and the Block of the Faithful) that openly questioned the state's policies in the area of national security represented a shift in state-society relations. These protest groups organized around the issue of how to enhance the defense of Jewish sovereignty and offered different discourses – the republican and the ethno-national (mixed with a strong religious and even messianic component) – legitimating the State of Israel.[45] These different interpretations of the legitimating principles of the state revealed controversies over the role of the state, its boundaries (social and physical), and the criteria for distributing rights and obligations.[46] This challenge to state-society relations was not matched by a significant change in the patterns of political obligation expressed in military service. Moreover, the republican principle – as it applied to the intimate relationship between military service and citizenship – preserved its hegemonic position.

The war in Lebanon, which broke out in 1982, represented a qualitative change in patterns of political protest and of political obligation. The sectors constituted as prime carriers of civic virtue, the very sectors that gained their ascendance in

Israeli society through their allegiance to different national missions and war policies,[47] interpreted this war differently than previous ones. They dubbed it a "war of choice" (*milchemet breirah*, the Israeli equivalent to the "unjust war"), waged as a political instrument rather than in response to a threat to Israel's survival. Their dismay was increased by the fact that the government waging the war was not "theirs." It was the first war conducted under a Likud government, headed at that time by Menachem Begin.

The war was a landmark in the relationship between the home front and the battle-front; from its first week, small demonstrations were staged, and as the war progressed, massive waves of protest, swept the country. The massive demonstrations of summer 1982 were unprecedented in Israel, a country that has experienced five wars in its short history. Each war was accompanied by expressions of solidarity and social cohesion from the home front. The rallies that took place from the first week of intensive fighting, contradicted a tacit but firmly established agreement in Israel: as long as there was active warfare, the home front expressed solidarity with the battle-front and abstained from criticism or undertaking any action that may undermine that solidarity. The 1982 demonstrations' motto, that the war in Lebanon was a war of choice, openly questioned both the legitimacy of the war and the authority of the state elites. Moreover, the protest against the war also challenged the right of the state to command its male citizens to kill and be killed under any circumstances.[48] As the war was perceived as a war of choice, the link between the citizens-soldiers sacrifices and the needs of national security was called into question.

The very questioning of this taken-for-granted linkage hinted at a significant change in the relations between social groups and the state, and between individuals and the state. The protest against the state's right to command its male-citizens to kill and be killed, as the ultimate token of their political obligation, was translated from a slogan into what unfolded into a movement of selective conscientious objectors, i.e., individuals who refused their call of duty to this specific war. This phenomenon was unprecedented in Israel, and disclosed the tensions and contradictions that developed within the social identity of the citizen-soldier. Conscientious objection is not interpreted in this article as a clash between identities, between citizenship and other "public" or even private identities, but rather as a result of contradictions that unfolded within the social identity of those constituted as prime carriers of civic virtue.[49]

From War Participation to War Resistance

The story of the redefinition of political identity began with the war in Lebanon when the future conscientious objectors were drafted. Reporting to their respective units may be intepreted as the identification of the interviewees with the positions they were summoned to.[51] Reporting to their units and mobilizing for war they became a performative effect of the interpellating demand. Yair, a reserve

soldier in the infantry corps, related the automatic way he reported to his unit and went to the war in Lebanon:

> The reserve service warrant surprised me. I was not ready for it. On the other hand, I did not have any objection [against the war], though I knew what I was being drafted for. During the first three weeks of intensive fighting, I did not have any serious doubts or I did not feel any opposition or something like this… .

Yair's surprise is related to his being abroad in the months preceding the war. He expressed neither surprise nor opposition concerning the goals of the war. Moreover, he reported that he felt no contradiction between the goals of the war and his political outlook. His words reflect an unconditional readiness to participate in every task he was drafted to.

The interviewees' stories about their whereabouts in the first stages of the war in Lebanon expose not only mobilizing power of war, but also their deep identification with the interpellating demand. This identification with the positions they were summoned to was possible because the context in which they performed their identity was taken for granted. And indeed, during its first stages, the war in Lebanon was perceived by most of the interviewees, as well as by wide sectors in the Israeli public, as an extended military operation and not as a full-fledged war.[51]

The automatic response to the reserve warrant was also characteristic of interviewees who emphasized that they knew in advance the goals of the war. Ishai's story is typical of this type of response:

> We spoke about the war well before it began. We had all kinds of information, rumors, about what they were planning to do. When they spoke about 40 kilometers we knew that there is not such a thing. But all kinds of things worked, basic things, there is something about war, at least [as it was] at that stage, a basic anxiety, a general joining of forces, there is not much time to think and you drift in the stream. And all of a sudden you are no longer sure that you are right, and even if you are right you don't believe that these things are going to happen. We knew what Sharon is planning, but I thought I was completely paranoid. And at the end you go, most people went to the war in Lebanon.

Ishai's story begins with a split between we and they. We knew, he says, about the foretold character of the war. However, this foretold character is very rapidly portrayed with delusion and paranoia, and the split between we and they disappears. War mobilization wipes out the split, and is portrayed as a huge wave sweeping away what was known beforehand, and mainly the already-known end of the war. This huge wave sweeps Ishai and brings him to join his fellow soldiers and to retrospectively justify his step by saying: everybody went to the war (in Lebanon).

The interviewees' stories disclose a basic norm constitutive of political identity. This norm, which I dub "we will do and then we will listen," encloses an

unconditional consent to and performance of the commands of the army. This norm is part and parcel of the "regime of the person" constituted by war-making and conflict management.[52] In this regime of the person, social identities and selves are constituted by institutional, symbolic, and social practices that gear individuals to the performance of military practices.[54] The fighter or warrior is in this regime the epitome of good and active citizenship and the carrier of the general will. The public narrative that is the exemplar for the practices constituting the 'warrior' is formulated in terms of the very survival of the political community and the vital importance of the contribution of each individual to the common war effort.

The disclosure of the ways in which war-making is constitutive of subjectivity allows us to understand the automatic and unconditional compliance with the reserve warrant. As one of the interviewees said: "You are called up, and you go, because we only fight when there is no choice." The unconditional consent to the reserve warrant not only produces again and again the social identities of the interviewees but also grants legitimacy to the political and military elites. This legitimacy is granted through the very consent to reproduce through the practices of soldiering the war policies of the Israeli state.

Even when the interviewees told stories that hint of the changed conditions of action, of the mounting construction of the war in Lebanon as a different kind of war, a war of choice, by the very act of joining their units they become the performative effect of the norm. The doubts they express, and attempts to hint at strong opposition to the war, are mainly retrospective narrative devices serving as an apology for their war participation in light of their objection in the months to come.

From War Resistance to Political Dissent

How was political identity resisted in the course of its very production, and how was the constitutive norm turned into a source of performances that changed its very meaning?[54] How was the public narrative constituting and framing political identity turned into a source of resistance and contestation?

Political identities are resisted when individual subjects do not identify with the positions they are summoned to – in other words, when a gap is created between the interpellating demand and the identification of the subject with that demand. It is this gap that endows individuals with the capacity to appropriate the symbolic and social practices that routinely reproduce them as subjects and to redirect these practices to redefine their social identities. However, the refusal to identify with the interpellating demand takes place within the regime of subjection itself, and in the very process of producing the subject. Judith Butler, elaborating on Foucault's theory of resistance, claims that:

> the subject who is produced through subjection is not produced at an instant in its totality; it is in the process of being produced, it is repeatedly produced (which is

> not the same as begin produced anew again and again). It is precisely the possibility of a repetition which does not consolidate that dissociated unity, the subject, but which proliferates effects which undermine the force of normalization. The term which not only names but also frames the subject, is the name that mobilizes a reverse discourse against which the very regime of normalization is spawned.[55]

The possibility of resistance is then premised on the performance of identities. In accordance with this premise, the resistance to an identity and its redefiniton are contingent upon the reiteration of the constitutive norm. It is this reiteration in a different context (historical and spatial) that creates the possibility of resistance.

Resistance against identifying with the position of the citizen-soldier began with the construction of the war in Lebanon as the "other" of Israel's wars. This construction of the war in Lebanon as the moral, political, and military opposite of Israel's earlier wars created the context which altered the meanings of soldiering. Therefore, the attempt to produce the citizen-soldier in a context already constructed as unnatural enhanced the emergence of an alternative practice, refusal to participate in the war.

The refusal to participate in the war in Lebanon was discursively framed through a narrative of crisis. This narrative of crisis drew on the public and cultural narratives of the "just war" and the citizen-soldier. By virtuously engaging in a symbolism of purity,[57] the interviewees could appropriate both narratives, and claim that they are the true bearers of their ethics. Moreover, this appropriation allowed them to launch a frontal attack against the political and military elites, and to portray them as the true and sole violators of the rules of the game. But this appropriation served also to justify the redirection of the norm in support of an alternative course action that ultimately questioned the main tenets of the narratives of Israeli civil militarism.

This narrative crisis displays features of what Victor Turner has termed a social drama.[57] Its central theme is the otherness of the war in Lebanon. The stories told by the interviewees contain events that are mobilized to exemplify the otherness of the war, and the way it violated the ethics of the just war (*milchemet ein breirah*, or no-choice war). The defilement of the combat effectiveness of the Israeli army and as a consequence of its soldiers was especially prominent in statements such as: "I remember the kidnapping of the soldiers; it was a demonstration of the situation the IDF reached there and the meaninglessness of our staying in Lebanon." Another interviewee related: "I saw how the IDF advanced like a drugged dog to all kinds of places, without any direction or meaning whatsoever." These short excerpts disclose the ways in which the changed conditions of action, an "unjust war" slowly erodes the army's effectiveness and courage. Moreover it irretrievably affects the motivation of its soldiers.

Events that symbolize the transgression of the norm of the "purity of arms," a leading ethos in the narrative of the Israeli version of the just war, were also prominent in building the otherness of the war in Lebanon. This ethos states that weapons should be used only under circumstances of "non-choice," under severe

threats to existence. The most prominent story was that relating how an artillery battery bomb-shelled a site in Beirut: "They bombed Beirut for the reporter of Israeli TV to have footage, and in order that we could watch ourselves in the evening news, that knocked me down." The shelling for entertainment purposes is represented as a paradigm of the ways in which the war in Lebanon undermined the cherished values of the Israeli army and first and foremost that of the purity of arms.

Stories about violations of cease-fires and misinformation, of detention camps for Palestinians, as well as the massive bombing of refugee camps, all converge and crystallize into a mosaic portraying the otherness of the war.[59] Furthermore, each event indicates the changed conditions of action and the ensuing crisis.

The construction of the war as an unnatural context allows the interviewees to portray a situation in which the rules and practices constructing soldiering as the paramount expression of citizenship collapse and prevent them from identifying with the positions they are summoned to. Thus, the attempt to reproduce the identity of the citizen-soldier in an alien context gave rise to an alternative practice, refusal to participate in the war. This practice split the intimate and even symbiotic link between soldiering and citizenship. In so doing, it also challenged the public and cultural narratives of Israeli civil militarism.

Conclusion: Crisis and Alternative

The refusal to identify with the subject positions constituted by war-making and conflict management is indicative of the crisis of Israeli civilian militarism. It was within the framework of this kind of militarism that an intimate and even symbiotic relationship between citizenship, nationalism, and military service was created. This strong relationship not only prioritized the obligations of citizenship – mainly military service – over other ties and loyalties in which individuals were engaged,[59] but also left no room for them. By overruling other identities and loyalties it precluded the emergence of challenges to war policies of the Israeli state and to its monopoly over the definition of active citizenship. War-making and military service were therefore de-politicized, and surrounded by a halo of sanctity. This halo of sanctity was instrumental in gearing individuals and groups time and again to the pursuit of the war policies of the Israeli state.

Military service as the main test of active citizenship, as well as the public and cultural narratives that framed it, turned into an almost exclusive socio-political identity for Israeli-Jewish males (albeit differentially distributed and rewarded). Military service was not only the main test of active citizenship, but also a necessary antecedent to political opposition.

The practice of refusal challenged first and foremost the halo of sanctity surrounding war and military service. This challenge was conducted through the mobilization of the "war of non-choice" narrative to question the war in Lebanon. However, the questioning of this specific war signaled the emergent crisis of

Israeli civil militarism and cracked the conception that geopolitical problems could and should be solved only by military means. Refusal also signified the emergence of processes of democratization around national security policy by promoting the idea that each individual is entitled to dispute the war policies of the Israeli state and to promote alternatives to them.

The practice of refusal challenged the symbiotic fusion between citizenship and soldiering and promoted the possibility of a split between them. Embodied in this split was an open questioning of the formula equating civic to military virtue. As a consequence, the practice of refusal represented a challenge to military service as the ultimate consummation of political participation and membership in the Israeli political community.

The act of refusal also embodied a claim for recognition of alternative forms of participation in the public sphere, forms that in themselves constituted an open challenge to the hegemonic model of membership and participation and of the discourse legitimating it.

The conscientious objectors acted as demobilized soldiers and capitalized on this position. They refused to be mobilized again, or refused to identify with the positions they were summoned by placing themselves in the public narratives of Israeli civilian militarism. However, the skillful and virtuous usage of the narratives of Israeli civilian militarism should not be interpreted as an attempt to restore the latter to its pure form. To the contrary, by engaging in the symbolism of purity, the interviewees were justifying the adoption of an alternative practice of citizenship.

NOTES

* I would like to thank Nitza Berkovitch, Andre Levy, and Uri Ram for their fruitful comments on previous versions of this article. My deepest thanks to the interviewees who shared with me their thoughts and experiences. They taught me an unforgettable lesson in civic courage.

1. Peace Now, established in 1978 in the wake of the peace accord between Egypt and Israel, is a major protest movement in Israel. However, like most smaller peace movements in the country, Peace Now is not pacifist. Members adhere to the distinction between just and unjust wars and back up their opposition to the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and to what they consider unjust wars, such as the war in Lebanon, with their own military decorations. Peace Now strongly opposed conscientious objection.

2. Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," *International Review of Social History* 40, supp. 3(1995): 223–236.

3. Maury Feld, *The Structure of Violence* (London: Sage, 1977); Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); James B. Jacobs and Leslie Ann Hayes, "Aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces," *Armed Forces and Society* 7.2 (1981): 187–208; Morris Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Dandeker, Christoper, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990); Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power," *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, ed. John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995), 135–185.

4. Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," *Armed Forces and Society* 7.2 (1976): 107–208.

5. Charles Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere."

6. See also by Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe," *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, ed. John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern (Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Publishers, 1995), 187–204; *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1992).

7. Cf., Nigel Young, "War Resistance, State and Society," *War, State and Society*, ed. Martin Shaw (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984): 95–116.

8. Anthony Giddens, *The National-State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

9. Tilly, "States and Nationalism in Europe."

10. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

11. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power," *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, 135–185.

12. Michael Mann, "War and Social Theory: into Battles with Classes, Nations and States," *The Sociology of War and Peace*, ed. Martin Shaw, and Colin Creighton (London: MacMillan, 1987), 54–72.

13. Yagil Levy, *Trial and Error: Israel's Route from War to De-Escalation* (Albany: SUNY, 1997); Michael Mann, "Capitalism and Militarism," *War, State and Society*, 95–116.

14. Michael Mann, "The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism," *New Left Review* 162 (1987): 35–50.

15. Charles Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History," *International Review of Social History* 40, supp. 3 (1995): 1–17.

16. The interview consisted of broad questions covering subjects such as the interviewee's military service, reserve service, war participation, the story of his conscientious objection, his understanding of citizenship, and his understanding of the war in Lebanon. The interviews were analysed according to the interpretative approach, which assumes that the contents of interviews are individual and subjective expressions of intersubjective reality. In other words, it conceives of "ontological narratives" as subjective interpretations of public and cultural narratives. See, Margaret R. Somers, "Reclaiming the Epistemological 'Other': Narrative and the Social Constitution of Identity," *Social Theory and Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994): 37–99.

The entire population of conscientious objectors included 130 individuals who were court-martialed and imprisoned for periods ranging from 21 to 35 days. Conscientious objectors to the war in Lebanon can be characterized as belonging to the dominant or elite group in Israel. Most of them were of Ashkenazi origin (81.8%), residents of major cities (Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem) or kibbutz members (25%), and former members of youth movements. They comprised a highly educated group: 36% held a bachelor's degree, 23% a master's degree, and 7.5% a Ph.D. (mainly in the natural and exact sciences); the rest were undergraduates or high school graduates. Their military service was in combat, sometimes elite units. After their period of conscientious objection, most (86%) continued their yearly tour of duty in the reserves. Most of the interviewees belonged to the center-left of Israeli politics (Labor Party and the Citizens Rights Movement); a minority belonged to the radical left (the Communist Party and Trotskyist organizations).

17. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983); Guershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict, Cambridge Middle East Library* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 20; Yoav Peled and Gershon Shafir "The Roots of Peacemaking: The Dynamics of Citizenship in Israel, 1948–93," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28 (1996): 391–413. Following Lamar and Thompson, Peled and Shafir characterize conflicts typical of colonial frontier societies as conflicts over land resources and the control of the land.

18. Yagil Levy, *Trial and Error: Israel's Route from War to De-Escalation* (Albany: SUNY, 1997). Israel is not the only state that defined war and conflict management in terms of survival.

See also, Elaine Unterhalter, "Women Soldiers and White Unity in Apartheid South Africa," *Images of Women in Peace and War*, ed. Sharon MacDonald, Pat Holden, and Shirley Ardener (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988): 100–121.

19. Uri Ben-Eliezer, *The Emergence of Israeli Militarism 1939–1956* (Tel Aviv: Dvir Publishing House, 1995) [Hebrew].

20. A. Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1990); Yoav Peled, "Strangers in the Utopia: The Civic Status of Israel's Palestinian Citizens," *Theory and Criticism, An Israeli Forum* 3 (1993): 21–38 [Hebrew]; Herman van-Gunsteren, "Four Conceptions of Citizenship," *The Condition of Citizen*, ed. Bart van Steenbergen (London: Sage, 1994), 36–48.

21. Dan Horowitz and Baruch Kimmerling, "Some Social Implications of Military Service and the Reserves System in Israel," *European Journal of Sociology* 15, no. 2 (1974): 262–276; Baruch Kimmerling, "Determination of Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription: Two Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 14 (1979): 22–41.

22. One of the main indications of the marginalization of Mizrahi Jewish males from military virtue is their absence from the higher echelons of the Israeli army's high command. The research branch of the Israeli army does not (as a policy) release data concerning the ethnic origins of soldiers in different units. However, as Levy has established for the 1950s, elite military units are also today heavily staffed by Ashkenazi youngsters, most of them of middle and upper middle class backgrounds. See: Yagil Levy, "War Politics, Interethnic Relations and the Internal Expansion of the State: Israel 1948–1956," *Theory and Criticism – An Israeli Forum* 8 (1996): 203–223 [Hebrew].

23. Dafna N. Izraeli, "Gendering Military Service in the Israeli Defense Forces," *Israel Social Science Research* 12, no. 1 (1997): 129–166.

24. Nitza Berkovitch, "Eshet Hail Mi Imtzah: Women and Citizenship in Israel," *Israel: From a Mobilized to a Civil Society*, ed. Yoav Peled and Adi Ofir (Jedrusalem: Van-Leer Institution, 1997), [Hebrew].

25. Sylvia Walby, "Woman and Nation," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 33, no. 1–2 (1992): 81–100; Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London: Sage, 1997).

26. Berkovitch observes that Palestinian women were silenced, and therefore no reference to their role as mothers can be found in the different laws establishing special rights to women as mothers, nor in the different debates at the Israeli Parliament.

27. Menachem Hofnung, *Israel: Security Needs vs. The Rule of Law* (Jerusalem: Nevo Publishers, 1991); Kimmerling, "Determination of Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription."

28. Baruch Kimmerling, "Religion, Nationalism and Democracy in Israel," *Zmanim* 13 (1994): 116–131 [Hebrew].

29. Azziz Haidar, "Social Welfare Services for Israel's Arab Population," International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1987; David Kretzmer, "The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel," International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1987.

30. Zeev Rosenhek, "The Origins and Development of a Dualistic Welfare State: The Arab Population in the Israeli Welfare State," doctoral dissertation, Jerusalem, 1995.

31. Noah Lewin-Epstein and Moshe Semyonov, *The Arab Minority in Israel's Economy: Patterns of Ethnic Inequality* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

32. Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State, Modern Middle East Series No. 6* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980).

33. Peled, "Strangers in the Utopia."

34. Ibid.; Peled and Shafir, "The Roots of Peacemaking."

35. The term interpellation is drawn from Louis Althusser, *Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays* (London: New Left Books, 1971).

36. Kimmerling, "Determination of Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription."

37. Socializatory frameworks such as schools and youth movements have been of prime importance in nurturing the "fighter's role" and in the socialization towards national missions. Edna Lumski-Feder, *As if there was no war, Eshkolot* (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1998) [Hebrew].

38. Israeliness connotes Jewishness, thus only Jews can be candidates to be included in the

framework of the Israeli nation. For that reason, the interviewee does not consider religious orthodox Jews as Israelis, while completely ignoring the Palestinian citizens of Israel. However, military service is the main symbolic divide between Israeli Jews and the Palestinian citizens of Israel. By being excluded from the boundaries of conscription, the latter are constituted as individuals of a different human nature.

39. Benedict Anderson's image of the community bears no resemblance to Janowitz and Shils' conceptualization of military units as primary groups in which combat effectiveness depends upon the relations that develop between soldiers. The present usage of "community" refers to a cultural and symbolic construction of common links and solidarities among individuals who remain anonymous to one another. Their sense of belonging, solidarity, and commonality is constructed by their being subject to the same practices or by their very inclusion in a field of practices, and not by the close interaction or the primary ties created between them. See: Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the *Wehrmacht* in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948): 280–315.

40. Baruch Kimmerling, "State Building, State Autonomy and the Identity of Society: The Case of the Israeli State," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 6, no. 4 (1993): 396–428.

41. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

42. All names are fictitious. Izhar was the first reserve soldier to be jailed for refusing to fulfill his military duty in the war in Lebanon in August 1982.

43. See, e.g., Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Defense Forces; a Civilizianized Army in a Partial Militarized Society," *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats*, ed. R. Kolkowitz, and A. Korbonski (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1982), 77–106.

44. This expectation is by no means universal in the Israeli army. Participation and involvement are required mainly from soldiers in elite combat units. One of the many unintended consequences of this expectation is to strengthen the elite status of soldiers in these units.

45. Kimmerling, "State Building, State Autonomy and the Identity of Society."

46. Baruch Kimmerling, "Between Priomordial and Civil Definitions of the Collective Identity," in *Eretz Israel* or the State of Israel," *Comparative Social Dynamics*, ed. Erik Cohen, Moshe Lissak, and Uri Almagor (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985): 262–283.

47. Yagil Levy, "War Politics, Interethnic Relations and the Internal Expansion of the State: Israeil 1948–1956," *Theory and Criticism – An Israeli Forum* 8 (1996): 203–223 [Hebrew]; Levy, *Trial and Error*.

48. Thus in a newspaper ad published by Peace Now (see note 1), the following slogan could be found: "What are we killing and getting killed for." This slogan was unprecedented in Israel in 1982.

49. Conventional analyses of conscientious objection conceive it in terms of a conflict between preconstituted individuals and the imperatives of the state. See, Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). These analyses adopt a minimalist version of what Turner (1997) has conceptualized as the political definition of citizenship, and disregard the broad sociopolitical context within which the phenomenon develops. Individuals are conceived as bearers of moralities and identities that in specific situations, such as war, may collide with the imperatives of the state. However, conscientious objection in the twentieth century developed mostly after the extension of citizenship to different groups and strata and not prior to it. For analyses that take into account the social character of conscience and assume the uneasy coexistence between citizenship and identities constituted in civil society, see: Chaim Gans, *Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Michael Walzer, *Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War and Citizenship* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

50. Althusser, *Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays*; Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity,'" *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996): 1–17.

51. In Israeli military discourse an operation connotes a short-duration military activity targeted against a defined goal. War, on the other hand, has been constructed as the deployment of large

scale military forces against other armies. Moreover, an operation is usually intended to solve problems of routine security (*bitachon shotef*), i.e., problems that do not pose an existential threat to the existence of the state, whereas war is meant to counteract a threat the may endanger the existence of the state.

52. Nikolas Rose, "Identity, Genealogy, History," Questions of Cultural Identity.

53. Lumski-Feder, *As if there was no war, Eshkolot.*

54. Judith Butler, "Subjection, Resistance, Resignification: Between Freud and Foucault," *Identity in Question,* ed. John Rachman (New York and London: Routledge, 1995): 229–249.

55. Butler, "Subjection, Resistance, Resignification: Between Freud and Foucault."

56. Michael Hertzfeld, *Cultural Intimacy, Social Poetics in the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 1997).

57. Victor Turner, "Social Dramas and Ritual Metaphors," *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society,* 6e, Symbol, Myth, and Ritual Series (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990): 23–59.

58. Sara Helman, "Conscientious Objection to Military Service as an Attempt to Redefine the Contents of Citizenship," doctoral dissertation, Jerusalem, 1994.

59. See Tilly, "The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere," for an analysis of the way in which what he terms strong nationalism conflicts with other ties and solidarities. In this sense the Israel differs insofar as its strong version of nationalism succeeded in shaping society and the interests of different groups.