

FROM HAVEN
TO
CONQUEST

*Readings in Zionism and the
Palestine Problem until 1948*

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION

BY

WALID KHALIDI

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*To all Palestine Arabs under
Israeli occupation*

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INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 1970, President Nixon of the United States outlined U.S. policy on Palestine. His only reference to the essential merits of the Palestine question was a declaration that the Arabs wanted to drive the Israelis into the sea. It is doubtful whether this declaration indicates the real opinion of the American President or the quality of information available to him in Washington. Less doubtful is that he considered it politically opportune to make it. That he should have done so reflects a peculiar and continuing state of mind on the part of the Western public vis-à-vis the realities of the Palestine problem, which has been both the cause and effect of such cynically inaccurate statements on it as the one made by President Nixon.

Of course the essence of the Palestine problem is something quite different. Nor is there any mystery about it. The Palestine tragedy, for that is what it is, did not unfold in some obscure era of history, in an inaccessible frontier area of the world. It has been enacted in the twentieth century, within the life-span and under the observation of thousands of Western politicians, diplomats, administrators and soldiers, in a country, Palestine, well within reach of modern means of communication. Nor was it the spontaneous outcome of fortuitous circumstances and uncontrollable forces. It was initiated by deliberate acts of will. The major decisions which brought it about were taken in two Western capitals—London and Washington—by constitutional leaders, including the predecessors of President Nixon himself. These decisions were taken in the teeth of the existing realities in Palestine, and against both the agonised appeals of the Palestine Arabs and the warnings and counsels of Western expert observers. As for the Zionists, they acted from the beginning according to a twofold strategy of propaganda and implementation. This strategy was multifaceted and carefully orchestrated and was dominated by a single ultimate political goal: the establishment of a Jewish state. The Zionists were the initiators. But they were also, as they still are, the protégés of their Anglo-American sponsors and the emanations of their power, resources, and will.

The Palestine tragedy—of which the current Middle East

crisis is but the latest chapter—has, unlike most great upheavals in history, a specific starting point: the year 1897. In this year an international European Jewish political movement, the World Zionist Organization, meeting in its constituent congress at Basle, Switzerland, resolved in a euphemistically phrased programme to work towards the establishment of a Jewish state on Palestinian Arab soil. At the time of the Basle Congress 95% of the population of Palestine was Arab and 99% of its land was Arab-owned. In excluding these realities from their ken, the Jewish leaders assembled at Basle were behaving in a spirit characteristic of their age and continent. This spirit was faultlessly captured in the recent remark of the American-bred Israeli Prime Minister Mrs. Golda Meir: "There was no such thing as a Palestinian people. . . It was not as though there was a Palestinian people considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist". Mrs. Meir's remark, which was in reference to the population of Palestine early in this century (for which see Map I, p. 94), should not, however, be taken literally. Her denial was qualitative. Properly construed, it underlines the capacity of European colonisers in the hey-day of imperialism morally to outflank the issue of the rights of the indigenous populations, in the name of the White Man's Burden, or Lebensraum, or whatever. The Zionist refinement of the day was, however, in justifying their ambitions by means of the brilliantly absurd slogans of Divine Promise and Biblical Fulfilment. All the poignant crises that have rent Palestine and the Middle East since then—the great Palestine Rebellion against the British in 1936-39, the Palestine War and Exodus of the Palestine Arabs of 1948, the Israeli invasion of Egypt in 1956, and the Arab-Israeli War since 1967—flow directly or indirectly from the Basle Congress of 1897. Behind the seemingly labyrinthine complexities of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict and the baffling maze of claims and counter-claims, there lies a continuous and continuing dual process. On the one hand, Zionist determination to implement, consolidate and expand the Basle "vision", irrespective of the Arab character and patrimony in Palestine and its hinterland; on the other, a corresponding development of Arab resistance to Zionist encroachment and self-fulfilment at Arab expense. This is the essence of the Palestine tragedy. All else is derivative. This process is continuing at the time of writing: overtly, in the brutal Israeli repressions coyly designated "environmental punishment" by Moshe Dayan, and best exemplified in the bulldozing of Arab villages and residential quarters in the

occupied territories, followed by the setting up of so-called socialist cooperatives for Jewish immigrants on their confiscated and blasted sites; more insidiously, in the cumulative impact of a spectrum of psychological, economic and legislative pressures designed to destroy Arab will and self-respect and subtly suggest that salvation lies in departure.

But if this is the case, how is it that the context of the Palestine problem can be presented in such topsy-turvy terms as was done, for example, by President Nixon? And, further, how can Western public opinion find such presentation persuasive, or palatable at all? This was the point raised in the first paragraph of this introduction. The answer on one level lies in political exigencies. But if these do indeed affect politicians to the extent implied, one is still left wondering why they should equally affect mass opinion in the open and democratic societies of the Western world, themselves typically sceptical of official versions. The customary rejoinder has been that Zionist obfuscation is as thorough as Zionist propaganda is effective. But even this answer is not quite satisfactory. For what one seems to be dealing with here is not mere gullibility in the face of expert public relations. Rather there would seem to characterise the Western public's attitude to the Palestine conflict a certain aversion to the task of identifying the roles of the protagonists and an almost grateful acceptance of the topsy-turvy versions put about. It would seem as if there was an almost conscious turning away from the merits of the case and a positive flight towards the image of the conflict presented by the Zionist propagandist and endorsed by the Western gentile politician. Without for the moment going into why this should be so, the foregoing analysis could, if true, perhaps explain the spontaneous anti-Arab verdict of the West on matters pertaining to the Palestine problem. It would explain why the Arab (Palestinian and other) is invariably seen as the initiator, whether or not he is reacting, the offender whether or not he is offended against, the impinger whether or not he is impinged upon, the aggressor whether or not the debris of his national and communal life (thanks to the Zionism of Jew and gentile) lies around for all to see, with the body's eye if not with that of the mind.

These are not, however, the morose broodings of the self-pitying or the obsessed. This Western purblindness is itself a hallmark of the Palestine problem. The Palestinians are not the first and will probably not be the last people to be dispossessed and banished; but so far they are, perhaps, in the unique position where not only is their catastrophe ruled out of the Western court as being irrelevant to their reactions against its perpe-

trators, but where these very reactions are held to incriminate them. For the Zionists the issue has also an eminently practical aspect. It is this selfsame Western purblindness that has been the indispensable environment for the actualisation of the Zionist venture. Its impact is direct and functional. It is preparatory and retroactive: it both paves the way and sets the seal of moral approbation on each new sophistication in the Zionist-Israeli piecemeal progression. As to why the Western mind should be so accommodating, a probable explanation lies in what might be described as the Bible Syndrome. The epicentre is the great dialogue between Christianity and Judaism. This has left in its wake throughout ancient, mediaeval, and more recent times, and with reason, a mounting burden of guilt on the Western Christian conscience. So brittle has this conscience become vis-à-vis Judaism that in self-defence and excruciating self-doubt it rejects, when we come to the Palestine problem, any train of thought, however warrantable, that might lead to placing the Zionists-as-Jews in the dock. This abdication of judgement is rendered easier by the hiatus in the historical memory of the West as to what happened in the Holy Land in the two thousand years preceding the Balfour Declaration. All this is undergone relatively painlessly—particularly when Western Christian fundamentalism adds its tonic of self-righteousness—because the Arab, like his fellow Afro-Asians, is hardly a three-dimensional phenomenon in popular Western consciousness. But if this explains, it does not justify. To put Zionism in the dock does no violence to any precept of decency; nor of logic, for Jewish past sufferings, however monumental, do not, *a priori*, preclude the infliction by Jews-as-Zionists of sufferings on others; nor of compassion, for true compassion is universal. Moreover while it may be true that, in problems that have assumed the proportions of the Palestine tragedy, solutions can only be edged towards, it is nevertheless true that a solution divorced from the context of its problem is a solution built on quicksand.

* * *

Any anthology is selective by definition. The items in this anthology have been selected to illustrate the central theme in the Palestine tragedy, which is the process by which Zionism has sought to wrest control of Palestine and its surroundings from the Arabs. This process passed through two main phases. The first ended in 1948. In this year the Zionists crushed Palestinian resistance, and created both the Palestinian Arab Diaspora and the State of Israel, the latter in the greater part of Palestine. The second phase is still with us. It has been

characterised respectively by the consolidation of the territorial conquests of 1948 through the systematic expropriation of Arab homes and farms, and the pouring into them of the Jewish Diaspora, the steady and successful probing into adjoining Arab territory beyond the Armistice lines in the years 1949-56, the abortive military bid for the vast Egyptian territory of Sinai in 1956-57, and the trebling of Israeli-occupied territory by the three-pronged invasion of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in 1967. This volume covers the first phase only. A second volume covering the period since 1948 is under preparation. The title of the present volume encapsulates the spectrum of modes resorted to by the Zionists on the verbal and implementational levels of action. At one end, the note is low-keyed, ingratiating, almost plaintive, as in the message sent in 1899 by Theodor Herzl, the founder of the World Zionist Organisation, to the Palestinian Arab mayor of Jerusalem (Chapter 9). At the other can be heard the arrogant accents of the military conqueror in 1948 (Chapter 71).

A word about the nature of the items chosen. First, this is not a documentary collection. Only a few of the items are documents in the strict sense. The bulk are chapters from books and memoirs or articles from periodical literature. Secondly, with one exception (Chapter 3) all the items have a non-Arab authorship. They are by British, Americans, Israelis, as well as by a Spaniard (Chapter 4), a Dutch authoress (Chapter 11), an Indian (Chapter 37), a Pakistani (Chapter 65), a Philippino (Chapter 66), a Frenchman (Chapter 72), and a Swede (Chapter 78). At least 30 of the 80 items which make up this anthology are by Jews. Of these 30 items of Jewish authorship, only two (Chapters 7 and 13) are by avowed anti-Zionist Jews. With perhaps one exception (Chapter 80) the other items of Jewish authorship are not even critical of Zionism. They are, indeed, by avowed Zionist Jews. Thirdly, the authors have been selected with an eye to the authority and experience from which they speak. They do not include lunatic-fringe apologists but expert people speaking from first-hand or eye-witness knowledge: university professors, diplomats, colonial administrators, soldiers, cabinet ministers and missionaries, all with intimate knowledge of the country, many with personal involvement in the decision-making process at the time; many, too, writing not in hindsight or *ex post facto* but contemporaneously with the events they describe. Fourthly, except for a few background chapters at the beginning, the anthology is organised chronologically, and the reader may perhaps find it worth his while, if he has the patience, to read it in sequence. Lastly, the editor hopes

that he may give the benefit of the doubt if he says that the intention of this anthology is not, at least primarily, polemical. The items have not been chosen flippantly nor is there any attempt at a specious mathematical balance between them. This anthology is based on wide reading in the subject and its items have been selected after much soul-searching and consideration that has lasted, according to some friendly sharpshooters, for far too long. Inevitably they contain much that the editor strongly disagrees with. But what links them together is the editor's sincere belief in their intrinsic worth and the contribution they make to the understanding of the central theme of the Palestine tragedy. The editor has also appended detailed notes of his own on selected subjects in Appendices IV and VI-IX-B to which, together with the other appendices, references are made in this introduction and in the footnotes, but which may also be consulted independently.

* * *

This anthology is divided into four parts: Part I, *Alchemy of a Myth*, covers the historical background of the problem and brings the story up to the end of World War I. Part II, *The British Shield*, covers the inter-war years 1920-39. Part III, *Green Light from the White House*, starts with the outbreak of World War II and ends in 1947 with the reference of the problem by the British to the United Nations. Part IV, *UN Fig Leaf*, covers the Zionist military onslaught on the Palestine Arab community in 1947-48 under the pretext of implementing the UN partition resolution. It will be noticed that the time-span of the four parts progressively narrows. Part I stretches over millennia, Part II over decades, Part III over some eight years while Part IV covers the six months between the partition resolution by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948. These few fateful months marked the climax of the first phase of Zionist encroachment on Palestine. The second phase, inaugurated by the establishment of Israel, is still with us today, and will be the subject of the second volume.

Underpinning the entire Zionist venture in Palestine is a myth which is the theme of Part I of this anthology. Stripped down to its barest essentials this myth may be presented as the two sides of a coin. The obverse carries the overriding Right of Return deriving from Divine Promise. The reverse carries implicitly, or even explicitly, the dismissal of the millennia-

old "Arab" presence in Palestine.¹ From the viewpoint of Zionism this myth had, as it still has, a key role. It beclouds the strategy of dispossession (as is illustrated by Western acquiescence in the Israeli *Anschluss* of Jerusalem after 1967). It aims at confusing its Arab victims. But above all it taps the vast reservoirs of mass emotion, not only among Jewish, but also of Western Christian audiences. Its currency among Christian audiences (due to the Bible Syndrome) confers a further bonus. It facilitates the task of sponsorship by Western politicians, since these, whatever the real motives for their support, can don the appearance of high-mindedness or, at worst, forgivable "Old Testament" sentimentality before their own publics in their pro-Zionist or pro-Israeli policies.

Historically, the great watershed in the transformation of this myth to an actual and ominous mode of action threatening the existence of the Palestine Arabs did not take place until 1917. It was only in this year, twenty years after the formal establishment of Zionism as a political movement (the Basle Congress of 1897) that a great power, Britain, through the notorious Balfour Declaration, incorporated Zionism as an integral part of its post-war imperial strategy for the Middle East. Although Zionist infiltration into Palestine had preceded the Balfour Declaration and even the Basle Congress of 1897, (see Maps 2, 4, and 5, pp. 95 and 222-223 respectively), the Jewish community in Palestine (the majority of whom were non-Zionist) formed in 1919 only 9.7% of the population and owned 2.04% of the land (see Appendix I, p. 841). The Balfour Declaration revolutionised Zionist prospects overnight, firmly placing the Zionist seeds within the imperial womb of the paramount power in the Middle East.

But to go back to the myth. Chapter 2 by Guillaume discusses the Divine Promise from the viewpoint of modern biblical criticism. The fundamentally secular colonial character of the Zionist programme is observable from the Basle Programme (Chapter 8), the researches of Leonhard into early Zionist attitudes (Chapter 11), the utterances of Weizmann in 1919 (Chapter 17), the *Realpolitik* of official Zionist neutrality during World War I described by Stein (Chapter 14), and the territorial ambitions of the Zionist delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919 (Map 3, p. 193). The antithesis, indeed, between Zionism and the liberal conception of Judaism is underlined by Berger and Montagu (Chapters 7 and 13 respectively). The early and deliberate obfuscation of the ultimate Zionist objective is

1) Compare p. xxviii below.

brought out by a comparison of the Basle Programme (Chapter 8) and early Zionist attitudes (Chapter 11) on the one hand, and Herzl's letter to the Arab Mayor of Jerusalem, in 1899, on the other (Chapter 9); as well as by the Delphic utterances of Weizmann in 1919, (Chapter 17).

As for the reverse side of the coin, the fact that "the Palestinians were there"¹ and had always been there is clear from Beatty (Chapter 1; see also Map 1, p. 94). The point is related to the premise of the Right of Return. The Palestinian Arabs in the twentieth century were not merely the descendants of the Moslem Arab conquerors of the seventh century, but the cumulative stock that included all the races that had entered and settled in Palestine since the dawn of history. They "preceded" both Jew and Moslem Arab, in addition to "incorporating" them. They were the true Palestinians. Unlike the Jews, they had never "left", to "return". They had been Arab in culture since the early centuries of the Christian era, but Jewish and pagan before that since primordial times. Fazari (Chapter 3) shows the depth and poignancy of Muslim Arab love for Jerusalem. Clearly there is no Jewish monopoly of attachment to this golden City. But the distinctiveness of Islam's involvement with it is that it reflects not only its own reverence but that of Judaism and Christianity as well. The intensity of this fascination is evident in the richness of Islamic mystical lore on Jerusalem by which, according to Asin, (Chapter 4) even Christian literature was inspired. Nor was Islam willing to be banished from the city, as is made clear by Lane-Poole (Chapter 6) in his account of the crowning mercy shown by Saladin—itsself an act of homage to Jerusalem—upon his reconquest of the city from the Crusaders.

That this was no passing mood is seen from the firm reply a thousand years later,² made in 1899 to Zionist approaches by the Arab Mayor of Jerusalem: "The Jews would be better to go somewhere else" (Chapter 9), and in the impressive rejection of the Zionist programme in the petitions of the inhabitants of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon received by the American Commissioners King and Crane, sent to the area by President Wilson

1) Compare Mrs Golda Meir's remark, p. xxii above.

2) The best account of early Palestinian Arab opposition to Zionism is Neville Mandel's article "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914." (St. Antony's Papers, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, ed. A. Hourani, Oxford University Press, 1965). The editor would have liked to include this in the anthology, but was unable to obtain the author's permission to do so.

in 1919 (Chapter 20). An ironical footnote is added by Roth (Chapter 5) who reminds us of the hey-day in pre-Zionist days of Jewish civilisation under the wing of the brilliant Islamic Spanish Caliphate, contrasting with the degradation of Judaism contemporaneously in Western Europe.

In Chapter 16 Jeffries focuses on the collusive phraseology of the Balfour Declaration, the document in which the Zionist myth became British policy and which constituted the first major step on the road to the Palestinian Arab Diaspora. For a full measure of Balfour's chicanery the analysis by Jeffries should, perhaps, be compared with Balfour's interview with Brandeis in 1919 (Chapter 18), as well as with his secret memorandum to the British Cabinet, in the same year (Chapter 19), no less than with his extraordinarily callous tongue-in-the-cheek statement in the House of Lords in 1921: 'I cannot imagine any political interests exercised under greater safeguards than the political interests of the Arab population of Palestine' (p. 225).

Behind the ostensible biblical sentimentality, there stood two decisive motives for Western sponsorship of Zionism: strategic evaluations and the pressure of Jewish immigration on Britain and the United States. Sidebotham (Chapter 12), himself an ardent Anglo-Zionist, and an architect of the Balfour Declaration, explains, in 1917, the need of Britain for a European population settling in the classical colonial fashion in a buffer region between Sinai and the Arab East for the protection of the Suez Canal and the imperial communications to India. Less known, perhaps, is the immigration issue as a determining factor in Western pro-Zionism. In Chapter 10 Rabinowicz gives a detailed background of the problem. The turbulence of life for the Jews of Tsarist Russia and Eastern Europe, the pressure of the rising middle classes against them, as well as the relative liberalism of Western European countries and the new opportunities offered by the Northern American continent, produced, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, successive tidal waves of Western-bound Jewish migration across the face of Europe towards Britain and the United States; but not, be it noted, more than a trickle to the Land of Promise in Palestine. By the turn of the century, the pressure of Jewish immigration from the Slavonic countries against Britain reached crisis proportions. There were riots in the streets of London and growing demands for restrictive immigration legislation. A Royal Commission was formed, before which Herzl propounded his Zionist thesis as a specific solution to this problem. An Aliens Bill was drafted and became the subject of prolonged debate in the House

of Commons in the years 1904-06 during the premiership of no other person than Arthur James Balfour himself. Defending the Bill in 1905 Prime Minister Balfour had unburdened himself as follows: "...a state of things could be easily imagined in which it would not be to the advantage of the civilisation of this country that there should be an immense body of persons who, however patriotic, able and industrious, however much they threw themselves into national life, still, by their own action, remained a people apart, and not merely held a religion differing from the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen, but only inter-married among themselves" (p. 112). Earlier, in 1903, in advising the British Government on the immigration question, Herzl had said: "If you allow me to say so, Mr. Chamberlain [J. Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary], I should prefer for England's glory that you do not make such a Bill. Drain them elsewhere, but don't make an Aliens Bill" (p. 102). Palestine, of course, was not under British control at the time, and at the subsequent Seventh Zionist Congress Balfour was roundly accused, after the passage of the Act, of "open anti-semitism against the whole Jewish people" (p. 112).

Substantially the same immigration problem faced the Wilson Administration in the U.S. Appendix VI (p. 853) contains a brief analysis of American immigration legislation in the period 1882-1929. The crux of the matter for American restrictionists was that racial purity, ethnic balance, and homogeneity were essential for the preservation of both nationalism and democracy in the U.S. The source of the threat to these values may, perhaps, be inferred from the annual National Origins quota system eventually adopted by the U.S. According to this system 81% of the total annual quota was allotted to Western Europe, 16% to Southern and Eastern Europe and 2.1% to non-Europeans. Now the bulk of the Jewish concentrations was not in Western Europe. Excluding Russia, (from which mass emigration was unfeasible after the Russian Revolution), the great Jewish population concentrations were in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland (3,050,000), Rumania (900,000), and Hungary (500,000). But the annual American quotas for these three countries were 6,524; 377; and 869 respectively: i.e. a total of 7,770.¹ This total annual quota was not, of course, at the exclusive disposal of the Jewish communities in these three countries but was available to their entire populations. But even if it

1) The population and quota figures refer to the year 1933, the eve of Hitler's assumption of power in Germany (See Appendix VI).

had been, it was hardly designed to "drain", in Herzl's word,¹ their Jewish communities into the U.S. This is the unmentioned and, presumably, unmentionable rock upon which the Anglo-Zionist and American-Zionist entente was established in the twenties and thirties of this century, long *before* the rise of Hitler.

That this Jewish immigration issue was very much on the mind of the Wilson administration and a determining factor in its Palestine policy is made clear during the famous interview between Balfour and Brandeis in 1919 (Chapter 18). Louis Brandeis, at the time, was the leading Zionist Jew in the U.S. and the first of a long line of Presidential advisers on Palestine.² The notes on the interview were meticulously taken by Felix Frankfurter, who succeeded Brandeis as adviser on Palestine: "Brandeis narrated his own approach to Zionism, that he came to it wholly as an American, for his whole life had been free from Jewish contacts or traditions. As an American, he was confronted with the disposition of the vast number of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, that were pouring into the United States, year by year. It was then that by chance a pamphlet on Zionism came his way and led him to the study of the Jewish problem and to the conviction that Zionism was the answer. The very same men, with the same qualities that are now enlisted in revolutionary movements, would find (and in the United States do find) constructive channels for expression and make positive contributions to civilisation. Mr. Balfour interrupted to express his agreement, adding: 'Of course, these are the reasons that make you and me such ardent Zionists.'"

Neither of the two Western powers had any illusions about what they were doing by endorsing Zionism. However glib his public utterances concerning the safeguarding of Palestinian Arab political rights,³ Balfour knew better. He made some particularly revealing comments in his secret memorandum to the British cabinet (Chapter 19) on the paragraph in the Covenant of the League of Nations which enshrined the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. It will be recalled that the Arabs had naively fought for this principle on the side of the Western allies against their co-religionists, the Ottoman Turks.⁴ The paragraph in question reads: "The wishes of

1) Compare p. xxx above.

2) Compare Chapter 15.

3) Compare p. xxix above.

4) For a detailed analysis of Western broken pledges to the Arabs, see G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1946).

these communities (i.e. the independent nations) must be a principal consideration on the selection of a mandatory". Balfour comments: "...Let us assume that two of the 'independent nations' for which mandatories have to be provided are Syria and Palestine. Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind...Are we going 'chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants' in deciding which of these [mandatories] is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind...So that whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They may freely choose; but it is Hobson's choice after all." Balfour goes on: "The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 'independent nation of Palestine'...For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country..."

In this same man-to-man talk with Brandeis, Balfour further explains that he "has great difficulty in seeing how the President [Wilson] can possibly reconcile his adherence to Zionism with any doctrine of self determination and he asked the Justice [Brandeis] how he thinks the President will do it" (p. 198). Brandeis' reply is that Balfour himself had "already indicated the solution". The reference by Brandeis is to an earlier remark in the conversation made by Balfour. Balfour had said that, following the decision by Wilson to send a Commission of Inquiry to the Middle East,¹ he (Balfour) had sent a memorandum to the British Prime Minister which he believed had also gone to Wilson in which he had asked that Palestine be "excluded from the terms of reference because the Powers had committed themselves to the Zionist programme, which inevitably excluded numerical self-determination". Balfour had further explained in his memorandum that in Palestine, "we are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to reconstitute a new community and definitely building for a Jewish numerical majority in the future". This was the "solution" that Brandeis had referred to; whereupon Balfour commented that he "supposed that would be the President's line". Of course, whether or not that was the American President's line is a debatable point. On the other hand it is difficult to dismiss the authority of Brandeis and Balfour that it was. But whether or not it was the President's line as explicitly as it was Brandeis' and Balfour's, his endorsement of the Balfour

1) Compare Chapter 20.

Declaration certainly made it his implicit position (Chapter 15).

One can easily imagine George Orwell doffing his hat to this rationalisation by Balfour and Brandeis. "*Numerical self-determination*" was to be "excluded". Did the faintest wrinkle cross the presidential or academic brow of the propounder of the principle of self-determination? What is the opposite of "*numerical self-determination*"? "*self-determination*"? or "*non-numerical self-determination*"? In fairness to President Wilson, he did seem, according to Manuel (Chapter 15), to drag his feet before his endorsement of the Balfour Declaration; perhaps because he was pondering over this puzzle, perhaps (less charitably) because he was too busy conducting the war. But the precise moment and manner in which the U.S. uttered its verdict against the Palestine Arabs might perhaps be recalled for the record. On 13 October 1917, exactly eighteen days before the Balfour Declaration was issued, President Wilson, fishing a paper out of his jacket (how long had he been carrying it around on his person and why?) wrote to his aide, Col. House: "I find in my pocket the memorandum you gave me about the Zionist movement. I am afraid I did not say to you that I concurred in the formula suggested from the other side. I do, and would be obliged if you would let them know it." (Chapter 15, p. 171). President Wilson's attitude to the Balfour Declaration has been treated at some length partly because a sub-theme in the Zionist mythology is that the Declaration enshrines the principle of self-determination, and partly because the ambivalence surrounding the presidential line at the time might help subsequent occupants of the White House to focus more rigorously on the essence of the Palestine problem.

Political scientists are increasingly concentrating on the decision-making process as a key to the understanding of international politics. The process leading to the Balfour Declaration is revealing in several other respects. Manuel (Chapter 15) brings out clearly the dynamics of the inter-governmental pressures between London and Washington in relation to the Declaration. The picture that emerges is that of one decision-making centre (London), being of two minds (see also Montagu, Chapter 13) with regard to a decision (support of Zionism). The official pro-decision pressure group in this centre uses the intermediary of a non-official pressure group (Weizmann and his Zionist circle), which is the potential beneficiary of the decision, to solicit the help of the counterpart of this pressure group (Brandeis and his Zionist circle) in the decision-making centre of another allied country (Washington). The object of this solicitation is to bring pressure through the counterpart

group on the foreign decision-making centre in favour of the contemplated decision, so that this foreign centre would throw its weight behind the official pro-decision faction in the first centre and so tip the scales against its own official opposition. In other words London, acting for reasons of her own, uses "British" Zionists to recruit American Zionists to pressure Washington to pressure herself in favour of Zionism. This interpretation indicates that, contrary to popular conception, the Zionists did not themselves set the pace, at the time, in either London or Washington. Nor was Washington the pace-setter as yet. This was indubitably, in the editor's opinion, London. What this interpretation also indicates is the metropolitan status of the Zionist pressure-groups in both London and Washington—a status which was to grow parallel to the growth of the Zionist venture in the field (Palestine), until it became a pace-setter in its own right, first in London, then in Washington and, finally, in both simultaneously and cumulatively. This metropolitan status of the World Zionist Movement has not been unique for a "white" lobby acting on behalf of settlers overseas; the French Algerian, British Rhodesian and Portuguese Angolan lobbies have had a similar metropolitan status. But the unique advantage enjoyed by the World Zionist Organisation was that it was an internationally organised movement based on the scattered Jewish communities of the world, and commanded incomparably vaster resources (see Appendix V, p. 850, for American Jewry's financial contributions to Zionist institutions in Palestine), and more diversified political leverage than any enjoyed by the others, in addition to the halo of morality, however meretricious, that it alone sported as well.

* * *

Part II of this anthology covers the period 1920-39, during which the infrastructure of the state of Israel was laid behind the shield of British protection and repression. No sooner had Britain (with the help of the Arabs) defeated the Ottoman Turks in 1918, than she began to implement her Zionist policy in contravention of international law, in the newly occupied territory of Palestine. It was not until 1922 that Britain's juridical position was "regularised" under the aegis of the League of Nations. She now became the Mandatory over Palestine with a Mandate from the League to administer the country, ostensibly in accordance with the Covenant. The whole Mandate structure after World War I was, of course, little more than a framework for the division of colonial spoils between

the victorious Western allies;¹ while the choice of Britain as Mandatory over Palestine had not only *not* been solicited by the Arabs, but had been categorically rejected by them. Britain's position in Palestine, therefore, was based on force of arms and continued to be so until the end of her catastrophic regime in 1948.

Nothing, perhaps, illustrates more clearly the *colon* status of the Zionists than the wording of the Mandate instrument itself. The preamble of this document incorporates the Balfour Declaration, while the bulk of its 28 articles are devoted to the modalities of its implementation. The four-letter word "Arab" occurs not once throughout the text, with the presumably unavoidable exception of the mention of "Arabic" in Article 22, where it is thenceforth declared to be one of three official languages, alongside Hebrew and English. The operative article is Article 2, which states: "The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions, as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions". As in the Balfour Declaration, there were several reasons why the euphemism "Jewish national home" was used instead of a "Jewish state". The Zionist movement represented only a tiny minority of the Jewish people, and there was deep concern among the Jews of the world as to the repercussions that such a concept might have on their standing in their respective countries (Chapter 13). The Zionists could not ignore this, since their success depended on winning Jewish support. Obfuscation had obvious tactical advantages also with regard to the Arabs. But perhaps the most important consideration was that it was much too premature to declare the ultimate aim, the objective conditions for which had still to be created. Article 2, just quoted, reflects the dilemma of its authors: on the one hand, specific authority is given to create these conditions, on the other, a bow, however sardonic, is made in the direction of the grandiloquent Wilsonian principles. We have seen what the line was with regard to the antithesis between the Zionist programme and the principle of self-determination noted by Balfour and Brandeis.² When it came to the implementation of the Zionist programme the reasoning behind this line was actually reversed. For implicit in Article 2 is that the Zionist goal is *reconcilable* with "the deve-

1) For the best analysis of the Mandate system, see W.E. Hocking, *The Spirit of World Politics* (New York, 1932).

2) Compare p. xxxii above.

lopment of self-governing institutions”.

This fiction of reconcilability between the Zionist goal and Arab aspirations for self-government became in fact the “moral” linchpin of British administration in Palestine in the greater part of the period covered by Part II of this anthology. It was only in 1937, some 15 years later, that a British Royal Commission was to fall upon the Archimedean discovery—this time, that the two objectives of Article 2 were not, in fact, reconcilable.¹

Meanwhile, the key operational mode of Anglo-Zionist action was Jewish “immigration”, since “numerical self-determination” was to become operative in Palestine only *after* the Jews had become the majority (p. 198). Blessing for this role assigned to “immigration” was forthcoming from Winston Churchill, who, as Colonial Secretary, laid down in an authoritative gloss on the Mandate in 1922, that for Palestine the sole criterion for Jewish immigration was to be the “economic absorptive capacity” of the country. The phrase has the resilience of Churchillian prose, and, by excluding political, psychological and social criteria by which all human societies (e.g. those of Britain and the U.S.) regulate even non-politically motivated immigration to their territories, Churchill’s ruling was a magnificent example of charity at some distance from home. His empathy with the Zionist *colon* is in intriguing contrast to the incomprehension, displayed throughout his life, of the hopes and aspirations of hundreds of millions of human beings living to the south of certain latitudes. Given this definition and role of Jewish migration to Palestine, it is obvious that “invasion” is the only word that accurately describes the process.

This, then, was the environment in which the Zionist myth began its translation to reality. In fairness, however, it must be mentioned that many British voices were raised at the time in protest and foreboding. The flavour of these early days is reflected in the forthright speeches of Lords Grey and Buckmaster (Chapter 21) as well as by Stirling (Chapter 22) and Ashbee (Chapter 23). As for the new Zionist design, we are indebted to the elucidations of Arlosoroff, written in 1932 (Chapter 24). He fixes his gaze, as Director of the Political Department in the Jewish Agency, on the one factor that matters to him, if Zionism is to succeed: the relation of forces between the Zionist *colon* and the indigenous inhabitant. He sees the need for a steady manipulation of this relation until Zionist supremacy is assured. This he characteristically calls the point

1) Compare page xl of the Introduction.

of “equilibrium”, a description which is not without contemporary echoes today in American declarations about maintaining the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel. He projects an escalatory ladder of power leading to the desired end, categorising the rungs already mounted and the mechanics of further progress. He is realistic enough to see a corresponding and inevitable increase in Palestinian resistance by which he is already impressed; as well as in tension between the Zionist *colon* and the British Metropolis. He is aware that these latter developments run counter to the Anglo-Zionist strategy of achieving Jewish domination through “immigration”. But he has an answer. In the last analysis there would have to be “a transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise organised revolutionary rule”—in other words a Rhodesian style Unilateral Declaration of Independence must be brought off, if need be. Arlosoroff’s strategic blue-print is Herzlian in inspiration, but the Founder’s legacy is also enriched by a remarkable adaptation of Leninist doctrine with a Clausewitzian *deus ex machina* in reserve. His intellectual brilliance is matched only by his prophetic accuracy.

Several chapters shed light on the more operational aspects of Zionist strategy. Sir John Hope Simpson (Chapter 27) analyses in 1930 the constitutions of the two principal colonising institutions of the World Zionist Organisation: the Keren Kayemeth, Jewish National Fund (founded in 1901), and the Keren Hayesod, Palestine Foundation Fund, (founded in 1920).¹ He notes that both these are based “on the principle of the persistent and deliberate boycott of Arab labour...” (p. 306), a situation which he describes as “not only contrary to the provisions... of the Mandate but... in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the country.” (p. 306). He concludes: “It is impossible to view with equanimity the extension of an enclave in Palestine from which all Arabs are excluded...” (p. 307). In Chapter 40, Granott places this expanding enclave in the perspective of total Zionist strategy. “Thus the various objectives—national policy, security, and strategy—were linked through land acquisition with the settlement objective, all being welded together in a united, systematic, purposeful and far-seeing policy...”. The reader can best follow this policy by comparing Maps: 1 (p. 94), 2 (p. 95), 4 (p. 222), 5 (p. 223),

1) Compare Appendix V for the contributions received by these institutions from American Jewry. These contributions were, as they still are, considered tax-deductible by the United States on the ground that they are intended for “charitable” purposes.

6 (p. 315), and 10 (p. 477), which speak for themselves, and for the thoroughness with which Palestine was being compartmentalised and trussed. A somewhat neglected aspect is also brought out by Granott. Land was acquired and even "settlement" thereon carried out "not from the viewpoint of agricultural development." This was the policy of acquiring land "reserves". He explains: "At the time the intent was not their immediate utilization but just maintenance even though they lay fallow, while title was preserved against all encroachment..." (p. 394). Chapter 26 deals with Zionist policy with regard to the holy places. The account is by Vincent Sheean, an eyewitness, of events in Jerusalem in 1929. The situation with regard to Palestinian holy sites was made more delicate by the fact that whereas Islam venerated many of the holy places of Judaism and Christianity, the reverse, partly for historical reasons, was not the case. At the same time the jealous claims of sects even within the same church produced at best a condition of precarious truce among them. If peace was preserved, it was because all parties (including Judaism) had come to recognise a *status quo* built over the centuries on tradition and prescriptive rights. Sheean describes his reactions to the assault tactics of Zionism with regard to the Wall of al-Buraq or the Wailing Wall. This was part of the site of the Prophet Muhammad's nocturnal flight to heaven as well as being the Western Wall of the sacred compound of the Mosque of the Dome of the Rock.¹ In Chapter 25 Ionides, in an illuminating study, analyses *inter alia* the operational role of Zionist propaganda in the thirties.

The full impact of all this on the Arab community in Palestine may, perhaps, be best followed in Appendix I. The figures on population and land ratios show the steady change in the relation of forces. Thus the Arab percentage of the population drops from 91.3% in 1919, to 83.2% in 1925, to 82.2% in 1930, to 71.4% in 1935, to 69% in 1939; while Jewish land ownership rises from 2.04% in 1919, to 3.8% in 1925, to 4.5% in 1930 to 5.3% in 1935 to 5.7% in 1939. These figures on Jewish land ownership are of particular interest in view of the ubiquitous Zionist propaganda theme that it was Zionist enterprise that made Palestinian soil productive, and its rider, that on the Mediterranean shores of Palestine trees grew only in kibbutzim. The Zionist proposition is proved false by the fractional size of Jewish land ownership up to the eve of the establishment of the state of Israel (Map 14, p. 673). And it is belied by the actual

1) Compare Chapters 3 & 4.

statistics on cultivation and agricultural production (Appendix II p. 844). The truth of the matter is that Jewish land settlement was qualitative; not only in the sense described above by Sir John Hope Simpson and Granott but, literally, in that it occurred in the richest and most fertile parts of Palestine e.g. the littoral plain between Jaffa and Haifa, the inland plain between Haifa and Tiberias and the Upper Jordan Valley.

Under the Mandate there was no constitutional redress for the Arabs. In spite of the fiction of reconcilability between the two sections of Article 2 of the Mandate,¹ British policy in practice, and for obvious reasons, was never to accept the principle of one-man-one-vote in Palestine, and no self-governing institutions were ever developed for the country at large. To be sure, the Arabs could air their grievances before the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, but the terms of reference of this Commission precluded the questioning of the provisions of the Mandate. The circle was Kafkaesque in its completeness. Arab resistance, therefore, escalated from delegations, petitions, demonstrations and strikes, to riots and violent clashes with the British security forces and the Zionist colonists. Invariably the British responded with the time-honoured and time-winning device of a commission of enquiry. Just as invariably these commissions reached the conclusion that the root-cause was Arab fear of creeping Zionist encroachment and ultimate Zionist purposes. Arab reactions to the Zionist attempts on the Wailing (Western) Wall in 1929 were particularly violent and bloody. It was in the aftermath of these disturbances that Sir John Hope Simpson (Chapter 27) had reported.² The British Colonial Secretary at the time was the liberal Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield). He could not ignore the evidence from the field and his was the first sincere British official attempt since 1917 to look into Arab grievances. Martin (Chapter 28) and Bullock (Chapter 29) tell us what he got for his pains. They also tell us a lot more. Clearly the metropolitan status of the Zionists had been vastly consolidated since the Balfour Declaration. Links forged with Anglo-Jewish constituencies and pressure groups enabled the Zionist leadership to bring direct pressure from within the nerve-centre in London and upon it. Weizmann goes into a sulk or two, opposition leaders are contacted, a letter published in *The Times*, a quiet horse-trading of pressure for votes in a timely British by-election; and the result? Sidney Webb is cut down to size,

1) Compare p. xxxv above.

2) Compare p. xxxvii above.

and the British Government swallows whole its White Paper endorsing the views of its royal commissioners and responsible minister. The moral of all this is that, at least in normal times, pressure from a non-*colon* community (the Arabs in Palestine) is peripheral and therefore taken in the imperial stride as a nuisance to be suppressed in the interests of law and order. But pressure from the autonomous metropolitan base of an overseas *colon* community is part of the balance of power system at the decision-making centre—a different story altogether. The Webb-Weizmann encounter was the prototype of many subsequent showdowns in more than one Western capital between the Arabs (Palestinian and other) on the one hand, and Zionists and later Israelis, on the other.

With the suppression of Webb, the Mandate machine could again grind forward. A new High Commissioner, General Sir Arthur Wauchope, whose political credentials seem to have included command of a Black Watch brigade on the Western Front, was despatched to Palestine with instructions that the Jewish national home policy should go into high gear. In the next few years Jewish “immigration” reached what can only be described as invasion proportions: 9,553 (1932), 30,327 (1933), 42,359 (1934), 61,854 (1935) a total of 144,093 in four years. Concurrently, for example, Jewish immigration into the US was: 2,775 (1932), 2,372 (1933), 4,134 (1934), 4,837 (1935), a total of 14,118 in the same period. In despair, the Arabs clutched at an offer for the establishment of a Legislative Council made by the Colonial Office in a fit of even-handedness in 1935. The formula for the Council could by no stretch of the imagination be said to be based on the principle of one-man-one-vote for the Arabs. But even this proposal was defeated in the British House of Commons on the grounds of unfairness to the Zionist *colon*. The Arabs of Palestine now braced themselves up for national revolt.

The great Palestinian Arab Rebellion, probably the boldest native challenge to Britain in her colonial empire in the first half of the twentieth century, fell into two main phases: from April 1936 to July 1937 and from late 1937 to the autumn of 1939. The first phase ended with the arrival of yet another commission of enquiry headed by Lord Peel. The second phase started as soon as Peel’s recommendations were published. It was Peel who made the discovery that the two objectives of Article 2 of the Mandate were not reconcilable.¹ Another of

1) Compare p. xxxv above.

his discoveries was that the "economic absorptive capacity"¹ criterion for immigration ignored fundamental political and psychological criteria. His solution? The partition of Palestine. He not only recommended the principle but promptly interpreted it in an impressionistic map appended to his report. The editor still recalls the breathless incredulity, with which he, as a boy, first saw the proposed map (Map 7, p. 337).² Ever since 1917 the Arabs had been saying that the "Jewish national home" was merely a euphemism for a Jewish state, only to be referred by London to the "safeguard" clause in Article 2 of the Mandate about "self-governing institutions". The Arabs, of course, were horrified at the very principle of partition, which they saw as the vivisection of their country. But they were equally horrified at its interpretation which gave the Jews 40% of Palestine at a time when their land ownership did not exceed 5.6%. The envisaged Jewish state included hundreds of Arab villages and the solid Arab bloc of Galilee north of Nazareth (Maps: 1, p. 94; 13, p. 672; and 14, p. 673). But the cruellest provision of all was that there should be, if necessary, "a forcible transfer of Arabs" from Arab lands allotted to the Jewish state. This was, indeed, a nightmare come true.

The partition proposals served only to fan the flames of Arab rebellion. In Chapter 33 Barbour traces the "Dark Path of Repression" followed by the British. Chapters 34-36 and Chapter 39 afford us glimpses of some of the techniques used: the blowing-up of residential quarters in Jaffa in 1936, in the name of "town planning", fearlessly condemned by McDonell and Manning, the British judges of the Palestine High Court (Chapter 34); the eye-witness account by Kirkbride, District Commissioner, of three Arabs hanged in Acre Prison early one morning in the spring of 1937, (Chapter 35); the "environmental punishment" visited on the Arabs of Mount Carmel in 1936-38 described by Newton (Chapter 36); and the terrorisation and murder of Arab villagers by special British-trained Jewish squads (in which Moshe Dayan was recruited) in 1938, in the account by Mosley (Chapter 39). In Appendix IV (p. 846 ff), the editor conservatively estimates Arab casualties during 1936-39 at about 5,000 killed and 15,000 wounded, out of a population of one million Arabs. Translated into British and American figures (populations 40 million and 200 million respectively)

1) Compare p. xxxvi above.

2) Plan A, so called in contrast to its variants, Plans B and C (Maps 2 & 9, pp. 420-421), devised in 1938 by a subsequent technical commission of enquiry.

this would amount to 200,000 British and one million Americans killed and 600,000 British and three million Americans wounded. These figures do not include the numbers of Arabs detained which reached 5,600 in 1939 alone, or, 224,000 and 1,120,000 in comparative British and American figures respectively. Accompanying this massive repression there were three other developments. First, the systematic disarming of the Arab population of Palestine, a process which continued well beyond the end of the rebellion in 1939 (Appendix III, p. 845). Secondly, the large-scale arming of the Jewish population, through direct British aid, as attested to by Ben-Gurion (Chapters 39 and 39 II), and indirectly (by Britain looking the other way), as can be inferred from Ben-Gurion also (Chapter 41). And, finally, the breaking-up of Arab political organisation (Appendix VIII, p. 858).

The British were taken aback by the violence of Arab reaction to the partition plan. This did not affect their military measures, as we have seen. But it did contribute to the shelving of the plan. A technical commission, sent to study the feasibility of partition in 1938, reported sceptically after considering both Peel's plan and two variants (Maps 8 and 9, pp. 420-421). In Chapter 43, Reid, a member of this commission, was more forthright than his colleagues in criticising partition on the grounds of absence of consent, of equity, of security, and of solvency as well as on those of the dismemberment of the country. Writing in 1938 he concludes: "In stating that partition is impracticable I am in accord with nearly 100% of non-Arab and non-Jewish persons in Palestine in direct contact with the problem, who by experience and impartiality are best qualified to judge... I am not a lonely recusant flying in the face of the facts or of the evidence..." (p. 431). The Arab struggle against partition also evoked the sympathy of Mahatma Gandhi (Chapter 37) who wrote in 1938: "Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their National Home" (p. 368), and again, "...according to the accepted canons of right and wrong, nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the face of overwhelming odds." (p. 369). But although the partition plan was shelved, the confrontation between the British and the Palestine Arabs in the years 1936-39 had a decisive impact on the future of the country. Until the mid thirties the British shield had had a deterrent effect on the Arabs. But the burgeoning Zionist entity behind the British outworks gradually eroded this effect and left the Arabs no alternative but to launch a frontal attack on the British themselves. The shield turned

into a battering-ram with which the Arabs, in Gandhi's words, were "reduced". The British now proceeded to conquer the country from its Arab inhabitants in 1936-39 as they had conquered it from its Ottoman rulers in 1917-18. This was partly the inexorable logic of a powerful military machine set in motion. It was also a function of the efficacy of the metropolitan Zionist lobby so clearly demonstrated in 1931 and, more recently, in the quashing of the Legislative Council proposals in 1935. But Peel's conception of a Jewish state in 1937 had also the same strategic and geo-political parentage as the ideas put forward by Sidebotham in 1917 (Chapter 12). The persistence of these ideas in the middle thirties is illustrated by Main (Chapter 30) writing only two years before Peel's partition proposals; and is perhaps best brought out in the chummily bantering tone adopted by Weizmann in his discussion of partition (Chapter 32) with Ormsby-Gore, the British Colonial Secretary, and the deferential alacrity with which every remark of the Zionist leader is conceded. Another consideration, already noted in the background of the Balfour Declaration, is the question of Jewish immigration into Western countries, including the British dominions. This question, of course, re-emerges with the rise of the Third Reich and the building up of pressures against Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland. Chapter 42 is perhaps as blatant a reflection of the mood on this subject on the eve of World War II as the Aliens Bill had been at the turn of the century.¹ Clearly Herzl's advice to Chamberlain² had not fallen on barren soil. But, whatever the British motivation, the Anglo-Arab confrontation in 1936-39 had a devastating impact on the power position of the Arabs in the country and constituted in effect a giant stride towards the "equilibrium" sought by Arlosoroff.³

The Zionist attitude to partition had been ambivalent. The official leadership (Weizmann and Ben Gurion) representing the actual centres of power inside Palestine were jubilant. This was the first time that the "Jewish national home" was being officially and publicly equated with a "Jewish state". The idea of Jewish sovereignty was being propounded by a great power who was itself the Mandatory. This was a telling argument to be wielded against the hesitant as well as the anti-Zionist Jews. It, incidentally, illustrates an interesting aspect

- 1) For Jewish immigration to the US in the late thirties see p. 41 below as well as Chapter 46 and Appendix VI.
- 2) Compare p. xxx above and p. 102 below.
- 3) Compare p. xxxvi above.

of the dynamics of Zionism. These are based on a triangular relationship between the Zionist leadership, the gentile great-power sponsors, and the Jewish masses inside and outside Palestine. The more the sponsors endorse or, better still, initiate pro-Zionist policies, the greater the leverage of the Zionist leadership on the Jewish masses. This was true in 1917 and 1937 as it was to be true later, and as it is still true today. Peel gave both respectability and ostensible practicability to the idea of a Jewish State. He made it morally respectable by successfully anchoring his recommendation of partition to a fallacy; under the guise of giving half a loaf to each protagonist he blurred the simple fact that the loaf already belonged in its entirety to one of them. This was in strict consonance with the Balfour Declaration, but Peel went further by supplying the idea of Jewish sovereignty with the ostensible practicability it desperately needed in the face of mounting Palestinian resistance. His plan presented a direct operational formula for the implementation of Zionist demands in which emphasis shifted from "immigration" (Churchill's formula) to territory; a shift, moreover, that was supremely adjustable to the piecemeal land strategy of the Zionists. It was therefore in its territorial aspects that Peel's plan constituted such a windfall. Sixty years of Zionist "pioneering" since the 1880s had succeeded in acquiring no more than 5.6% of the territory of Palestine. Now, with a stroke of Peel's pen, 40% of the land fell into the Zionist lap, with a bonus—that its Arab inhabitants could be expelled from it if necessary. This last recommendation showed the lengths to which Peel was prepared to go in ignoring the evidence of his senses—reflecting, no doubt, current British attitudes on the rights of natives versus those of white settlers in colonial overseas territories.

The ambivalence of the Zionist reaction to partition derived partly from Peel's generosity and partly from Britain's evident determination to shatter Palestinian Arab power. A new gargantuan appetite was stimulated. Hence the tension between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion on the one hand, and Jabotinsky, the leader of the numerically small Zionist opposition (Chapter 31), on the other. At bottom there was no fundamental difference between the three; or, for that matter, between them and Herzl. There is a direct line of thought linking Herzl's idea of working the poor population across the frontiers "unbemerkt" (unobserved) (p. 119) and Weizmann's remarks to Ormsby-Gore concerning the "transfer" of the Arab population in accordance with Peel's recommendations (p. 332). The differences with Jabotinsky were not on the ultimate aim. To Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, there was time enough to acquire

the rest of Palestine, a possibility that would indeed be facilitated by acceptance of Peel's frontiers.¹ To Jabotinsky, unwilling to let the opportunity slip by for outbidding his two political rivals, acceptance of Peel's Heartland was a betrayal of the vision of Greater Israel on both sides of the Jordan—a vision made more feasible with Peel's frontiers in the bag. In the event it was American Jewry, whose financial backing was essential, which hesitated on the brink of statehood. As an American Jewish wag put it: "...non-Zionists were alarmed that Jews had prayed 2000 years for a Palestinian Restoration and now *it had to happen to them.*"² The gentile sponsor was too far ahead of the Jewish masses. Nevertheless, the permanent breakthrough quality of Peel's recommendations lay in their very articulation. This made the wildest expectations of the official Zionist leadership seem matter-of-fact. It served to translate them, on levels both theoretical (concept of sovereignty) and cartographic (territorial), into a new acquired right, a new irreducible minimum, a new starting line. This in turn paved the way for the even more ambitious partition proposals of 1947 and to horizons of conquest far beyond.

Chapters 44-46 shed light on Zionist immigration policies in the late thirties. Kimche and Kimche (Chapter 44) deal with the delicate question of the Zionist policy of selective immigration. They produce irrefutable evidence from Zionist archives to show that this selective policy was persisted in, in the five years *after* the rise of Hitler and almost up to the outbreak of World War II. Ironically, it was to bring the Zionist authorities into headlong clash with Eichmann, the Nazi official in charge of Jewish "emigration" from Germany. Whereas Eichmann's emphasis was on numbers, that of the Zionists was on "quality". In other words, Zionist policy was not as preoccupied with the rescue of European Jewry as with the selection of suitable "pioneering" material among the physically fit and doctrinally amen-

- 1) Compare Ben-Gurion's remark on Peel's frontiers: "The Jewish state now being proposed to us is not the Zionist aim. But this will be a decisive step in bringing about the great Zionist aim. In the shortest possible time it will build up the real Jewish strength that will carry us to our historic objectives." (Michael Bar-Zohar, *The Armed Prophet*, (London, 1967), p. 61). Weizmann made a similar remark in reply to a criticism that the Negev should have been demanded for the proposed Jewish State, commenting that "it would not run away." (Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, (London, 1946), p. 185).
- 2) Author's italics: Samuel Halperin: *The Political World of American Zionism*, (Detroit, 1969), p. 119.

able Jewish youth of Central Europe. An even more poignant aspect is described by Briscoe (Chapter 45). The Rabbinical leaders of Poland in 1939 were adamantly hostile to mass Jewish emigration to *Palestine*, on the grounds that "All forms of Zionism are to us 'traif' (unclean)" (p. 449). If, in their obsession with *Realpolitik*, the Zionists had slowed down the process of Jewish emigration from Europe¹ in the crucial years 1933-8, and had failed to communicate with the Jewish leadership in Poland, which included the bulk of European Jewry outside Russia, it was this same obsession that inhibited them from making direct appeals, in time, to the conscience of vast Western countries with almost unlimited "economic absorptive capacities." This last point is brought out brutally in the moving, if abject, testimony of the leading American Zionist, Stephen Wise, before the United States Joint Congressional hearings on Immigration, in 1939 (Chapter 46). The inference is unavoidable from Chapters 44-46 that an accusing finger should be pointed as much in the direction of Western immigration legislation, as in that of official Zionist leadership. And the accusation is monumental. It is that the Herzlian advice to Chamberlain to "drain" Jewish immigration away from the West² seems to have been seriously taken up by the British and American governments. Reference has already been made to the Brandeis-Balfour talks of 1919, where the deflection of Jewish immigration from the U.S. was explicitly declared to be a foundation of American pro-Zionism. Subsequent restrictive Western immigration legislation, both American and British, indicates that a tacit understanding seems to have been reached between the West and the Zionists under which the Zionists would not embarrass the West with criticism of Western immigration policies, provided that the West lent support to Zionist plans for Jewish immigration to Palestine. Upon this tacit bargain the entire Zionist immigration policy towards Palestine seems to have been based in the period 1917-39. But whatever the Zionist achievement in Palestine, this surely is dwarfed when compared with humanitarian results that could have been obtained from a less politically oriented approach enabling the maintenance of more options for emigration before the embattled pre-World War II Jewish communities of Europe. It is intrinsic to this proportion that Western immigration policies in the twenties and thirties were functionally related to Zionist immigration policy and the Western-Zionist entente on

1) i.e. to *any* part of the world.

2) Compare p. xxx below.

the subject since 1917. And that callous as the Western response was at, for example, the Evian Conference in 1938,¹ this was the bitter harvest sown during the preceding decades by the Zionist leaders themselves in their collusion with the two leading Western capitals, Washington and London. Nor will it do to argue that, even if the Polish Rabbinate were willing, there was no possibility of mass emigration to Palestine at the time. This merely begs the questions eternally posed to the Zionist leaders both dead and alive: "Why Palestine?" "Why *only* Palestine?"

The British retreat from partition was not in itself a cause of concern to the Zionists, partly because of the ambivalence of the Zionist attitude to the proposal and partly because the proposal had been made at all. There could be no denying, however, that this retreat was related to the impact made on Britain by the desperateness and steadfastness of Palestinian Arab resistance to the dismemberment of their country, as well as to the rapidly deteriorating world situation. To the extent that British abandonment of partition, however temporary, was in acknowledgement of these factors, it reflected the potential of strain that existed in Anglo-Zionist relations. This was inevitable, since, irrespective of the origins and course of the Anglo-Zionist relationship, growing Zionist autonomy was bound to produce, eventually, the usual tensions between any two political entities. Far from negating the metropolitan-*colon* nature of the Anglo-Zionist relationship, the development of such tension is only too characteristic of it (e.g. Algeria, and Rhodesia). In the Palestinian context this strain has been noted in the Webb crisis of 1931 and to a lesser extent in the abortive Legislative Council proposals of 1935. It underlines the fact, which is not without its contemporary relevance today, in 1970, that the terms of reference of the metropolis are bound to be larger than those of the *colon*, if only because of the regional and global responsibilities and susceptibilities of the metropolis, particularly when it is a great power and more so in times of threatening international crisis. This fact was becoming increasingly evident in British policy in Palestine as the clouds of World War II began to gather. It explains Britain's next move—the calling of a Round Table Conference in London, in 1939, to which delegates from the neighbouring Arab countries, as well as Palestinian Arab and Zionist representatives were invited (Chapter 47). The moving spirit behind the conference was Malcolm Macdonald, the new Colonial Secretary. Mac-

1) Compare p. liii below.

donald's stand on Palestine was embodied in a White Paper issued at the inconclusive end of the Conference. The White Paper of 1939 said, in effect, that the blank cheque given to Zionism in 1917 had been honoured for some 22 years, but that neither equity nor expediency demanded an indefinite extension into the future of its time-limit. It was, therefore, time to start attending to Britain's other obligation of developing self-governing institutions. To this end there would be progress, after a transitional period of ten years, towards the independence of the country. The statement contained many loopholes, on account of which the Palestinian Arab delegates, in contrast to the delegates of the Arab countries, found themselves unable to accept it. The Zionists saw it as the most serious challenge to their maximalist ambitions since Webb. Macdonald was promptly dubbed an "appeaser", the dirty word of the late thirties—a fantastic designation, considering that Britain had just finished the systematic destruction of all organised Palestinian Arab political and military power. In the event, Macdonald was "banished" from the United Kingdom as soon as Churchill, an arch-Zionist, assumed the premiership. It was only after Britain had absorbed the facts of life created by World War II that he was called upon to regulate relations with the crumbling empire. But by then it was too late for Palestine.

* * *

Undoubtedly the most important development during the period 1939-47 covered by Part III of this anthology is the transfer by the Zionists of their main metropolitan base from London to Washington. The White Paper of 1939 had been a danger signal that saturation point in London's susceptibility to Zionist influence was being approached. This was certainly the view of the overseas Zionist establishment in Palestine represented by Ben-Gurion. But it was not shared by Weizmann, the metropolitan Zionist leader operating from London. This difference in the evaluation of London's future role between the two Zionist leaders has usually been interpreted as reflecting the moderation of the one and the extremism of the other. There is no evidence for the moderation of Weizmann. His reliance on London stemmed from the fact that as metropolitan leader his constituency *was* in London, whereas Ben-Gurion's was in the field, in Palestine. What we have here is not only estrangement between the Zionists as a whole and their gentile metropolis discussed earlier, but an estrangement also between the British Zionist metropolitan establishment and its overseas

extension, partly as a result of this more general estrangement with London, and partly on account of the growing confidence of the overseas Zionist *colons* led by Ben-Gurion. Overlying this there was the restlessness of these overseas *colons* at the remote control from London even though this was exercised by Weizmann. In other words there was also developing a struggle for the leadership of the entire Zionist movement between Ben-Gurion and Weizmann, with the former taking the offensive. Ben-Gurion's American orientation from 1939 onwards was therefore as much a reflection of his evaluation of future British policy as of his desire to establish a new power base without Weizmann's patronage. Conversely Weizmann's British orientation was as much a reflection of his style of operation, based as it was on *tête-à-têtes* with key British politicians, whom he had been indefatigably charming for the previous quarter of a century, as of his fear of losing the threads of Zionist control to Palestinian or American Zionist leaders. In the event, Zionism suffered little from these differences. While Weizmann continued to work on Britain, Ben-Gurion stormed the U.S.

The success of Ben-Gurion in his American venture is a striking illustration of the unique advantage possessed by the World Zionist Organisation as a *colon* system in having more than one metropolitan base and in its ability to exploit this fact to the full in response to pressures both external and internal. It also provides insights into the strategy of Zionism.

By 1939 the Anglo-Zionist entente had by no means come to an end; Churchill, the British war premier, was an unqualifiedly dedicated Zionist.¹ Such was Zionist influence with the British Labour Party during the war that the Party's National Executive in 1944, inspired by Peel² and almost certainly prodded by its mentor, Harold Laski,³ advocated: "Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out (of Palestine) as the Jews move in." Nevertheless the message conveyed by the White Paper of 1939 could not be ignored. Its most disturbing feature for the Zionists was that it was an index of the extent to which the leverage formerly enjoyed by British Jewry on Britain's Palestine policy had been eroded. As a result of growing tensions

- 1) Churchill even expressed worry about possible interpretations of the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter on the ground that these might obstruct Zionist settlement in Palestine. (See Churchill's letter to Roosevelt of 9 August, 1942, in *The Second World War*, Vol. IV, p. 786).
- 2) Compare p. xli ff above.
- 3) Compare Chapter 28.

between London and Tel Aviv, British Zionists, in the words of Kermit Roosevelt (Chapter 53 p. 518), "would seem to have been aware—as indeed, British citizens should be—to some extent, at least, of *British* as well as Zionist interests. . .". Chapter 48 by Ben-Gurion describes his deliberations in 1939 with the Zionist leaders Golomb and Shertok on precisely this issue. The account by Ben Gurion shows the role assigned to the metropolitan base in Zionist strategy and the desperate search for an alternative to the British one. All nationalist movements in overseas territories have tried to marshal public support for their cause in the metropolitan country. But no nationalist movement has, in degree or kind, needed or depended on a metropolitan base as, according to Ben-Gurion, the Zionists did. While to a nationalist movement public support in the metropolitan country is at best auxiliary, the entire strategy hammered out by the three Zionist leaders in 1939 seemed to hinge on the activation of American Jewry to replace the reduced influence of the Jews of Britain. This exclusive organisational link with similar ethnic groups in the metropolitan country also differentiates the Zionist *colon* system from nationalist movements whose links with favourably disposed groups in the metropolitan country are diffuse and ungoverned by considerations of ethnic solidarity. Moreover, whereas with other nationalist movements the relations with the favourably disposed metropolitan groups are usually of an *ad hoc* nature and contingent upon the existence of a state of confrontation between the metropolis and its overseas territory, the links forged between the Zionist *colons* and their metropolitan base and vice versa primarily reflect this ethnic common denominator between them. Other aspects of Ben-Gurion's deliberations in 1939 are also of interest. The "plan" to harness the U.S. was decided upon by him and his two colleagues consciously and deliberately. The decision was taken on Palestinian, not on American, soil. None of the three architects of the plan (Ben-Gurion, Shertok, Golomb) were American citizens or even residents of the U.S. The main asset that they possessed in the U.S. was their ethnic link with American Jewry. The principal feature of their plan was that American Jewry should be activated by the Zionist *colon* leadership in Palestine. The purpose of this activation was to use American Jewry to bring pressure to bear on the American Legislature and Administration so that the latter, in its turn, would pressure London into toeing the Zionist line. It will be recalled that in 1917 London had itself encouraged the British and American Zionists to use their leverage in Washington

to persuade herself (London) to adopt the Balfour Declaration.¹ But what was happening now was radically different. The initiative came not from London, not from the British Zionists, not even from the American Zionists but from the Zionist *colons* in Palestine. Listen to the appraisal of Shertok in 1939 as quoted by Ben-Gurion: "There are millions of active and well-organised Jews in America, and their position in life enables them to be most dynamic and influential. They live in the nerve-centres of the country, and hold important positions in politics, trade, journalism, the theatre and the radio. They could influence public opinion, but their strength is not felt since it is not harnessed and directed at the right target." That it took the planners only about five years to revolutionise the American scene indicates its extraordinary permeability in the face of the Zionist *colon* system. Of course, London had shown a similar susceptibility to Zionist pressure in the twenties and thirties—but with two principal differences. London's Zionist policy was based on a conscious evaluation of British national interests in the Middle East, however misguided it may have been. And the main pressure on London came from the British *metropolitan* Zionist base. But the most remarkable aspect of Ben-Gurion's performance in the U.S. is that it had an external origin in the Zionist establishment in Palestine and was carried through to success against the advice and policies of the specialised agencies in the U.S. Administration, i.e. the State Department and the Pentagon.

Ben-Gurion's task was not easy. American Jewry seemed indifferent. In the words of Golomb in 1939: "Dire tragedies have befallen the Jews of Europe. Did this arouse American Jewry to increase their material support? No, it did not. Quite the opposite. . . ." (p. 485). At the same time the Zionist Organisation of America was "disunited and incapable of action. It has no faith in its own ability to gain the support of the American Jewish masses, and to conduct any worthwhile activity." A specific index of this state of affairs is the level of contributions by American Jewry to the two leading Zionist colonising institutions, the Keren Hayesod and the Keren Kayemeth. In the four years 1939-42 these contributions showed little increase: \$ 3,500,000 (1939), \$ 3,700,000 (1940), \$ 3,500,000 (1941), \$ 4,200,000 (1942).

How to galvanise American Zionists, and through them American Jewry, into action was Ben-Gurion's problem. And the means he chose to do this was to define Zionist objectives

1) Compare p. xxxiii above.

in maximalist terms and to persuade and cajole American Zionist leaders to endorse them openly. Hence the so-called Biltmore Programme (Chapter 50) adopted by 600 American Jews in New York on 11 May 1942 in the presence of both Ben-Gurion and Weizmann. It is clear from Ben Gurion's memoirs that he considered the Biltmore Programme a principal achievement of his career which he probably viewed in the perspective of Zionist history as "cancelling out" Weizmann's role in achieving the Balfour Declaration. And it is intriguing that Weizmann in *his* memoirs makes no reference to the Programme at all, confirming the proposition that Ben-Gurion's drive towards this Programme was at least partly a function of the struggle for leadership between the two men. The operative paragraph in the Programme is the final one: "The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world" (p. 497). Behind the controlled language the intention is crystal clear: to take over the whole country. Not "a *national home* in Palestine" (the Balfour Declaration), not a Jewish state *in* Palestine (the Peel partition formula), but "Palestine... as a Jewish Commonwealth". The use of the word "Commonwealth" still betrays the Zionist predilection for happy euphemisms but there is no doubt about what it means, viz. undisputed control of immigration and land acquisition. When it is remembered what the roles of Jewish "immigration" and land "development" were, and when it is recalled that in the year 1942 Jewish land ownership in Palestine stood only at 5.9% of the total area of the country and the Jewish community at only 31.2% of the total population it is clear that what Ben-Gurion had really succeeded in doing was to secure the support of American Zionists for Arlosoroff's proposal for "a transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise organised revolutionary rule"¹—in short a Rhodesian-style Zionist Unilateral Declaration of Independence in the whole of Palestine. It will be noted that the Biltmore Programme wields Wilson's name for the benefit of the American public. The reader is best left to his own devices to scrutinise these credentials.

With the Biltmore Programme the American Zionist metropolitan base came into its own. It was no longer to be only the

1) Compare Chapter 24 and p. xxxvi above.

milch cow but the centre of political gravity setting the framework and the pace for decisions on Palestine taken in Washington, and, through Washington, in London. A repeat performance now took place on the American scene of the whole gamut of tactics and pressures exercised earlier during the twenties and thirties on the British Government. But the opportunities offered by the American theatre of operations were more conducive to Zionist success than the British, partly because of the peculiarities of the American political system, partly because of the vastly more significant potential power of the American Jewish community, and not least of all on account of the diverse repertory of Zionist skills in the strategy of political leverage acquired in the long rehearsals with Britain. But the announcement of the Biltmore Programme was only the first step. The supreme objective was that of harnessing the White House itself, to as much of this Programme as was feasible at any point of time. The developments of the Palestine Problem since 1942 to this very day of writing, in 1970, have been influenced by the graduated progress of Zionism in attaining this objective, more than by any other single factor.

The green light from the White House did not flicker until the accident of Roosevelt's death in 1945 brought Harry Truman to the presidency of the U.S. President Roosevelt's standing with American Jewry was very high indeed, partly because of his relatively liberal domestic policies and partly because of his leadership of the Western World against Nazism. From about the mid thirties onwards the vast majority of American Jews voted in his favour in presidential elections. On Palestinian matters he was sympathetic to Zionism, and he had intervened on its behalf with London during 1938-39. His support for Zionism was, however, measured. This was perhaps due to the strength of his personal position with American Jews, which made it difficult for the Zionists to mobilise them against him. But it was also due to the context in which he seemed to view the whole issue of Jewish migration from Europe. As early as 1938 he had called for an international conference, which had met at Evian to discuss the problem. To be sure, his instructions to the American delegates to the conference were that additional Jewish immigrants would be accepted in the U.S. but only within the annual quotas. This was hardly designed to bring dramatic relief to the problem, as has already been noted. On the contrary the American emphasis on the immutability of the existing quotas influenced the other delegates to the conference to tighten rather than liberalise their offers of help. What is, however, important about the Evian Conference

is its international character. And it is this international context, in which Roosevelt saw the Jewish migration problem, that is relevant to his attitude to Palestine. The gist of this attitude was that Palestine by itself (or presumably the U.S.?) could not provide the necessary relief for the problem of Jewish migration from Europe and this was an international responsibility in which all countries should share. Roosevelt became increasingly preoccupied with this problem after war broke out. He foresaw that the Jewish refugee problem would become a major issue at the end of the war. He also foresaw that there would be increasing pressures on Palestine (and the U.S.?), which the country could not meet. His new plan was to secure by private diplomacy specific commitments from individual countries to admit an agreed number of Jewish immigrants at the end of the war. His envoy on this mission was Morris Ernst, who tells us in Chapter 49 why this mission failed. Whether Roosevelt was primarily worried about the post-war flooding of the U.S. or Palestine by European Jewish refugees is, of course, a moot point. But he was certainly aware of the limitations of Palestine, a country of 10,000 square miles, as compared, for example, with the U.S. (3,600,000 square miles) Canada (3,850,000 square miles) or Australia (2,960,000 square miles). This awareness is perhaps exemplified in his serious discussion of the possibility of a "supplemental" Jewish National Home in addition to the one in Palestine to be located, mercifully, not in the Middle East. In addition to this scepticism that Roosevelt seemed to show with regard to the "absorptive capacity" of Palestine, his interest in the Middle East grew with the American military and political involvement in the area during the war and the development of oil and strategic interests in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile the pressures generated by the Biltmore Programme began to permeate the American political system. In Chapter 53 Kermit Roosevelt describes these pressures, while in Chapter 51 Hocking, an American scholar familiar with their implications for Palestine, records his reactions at the time. An index of the progress made by the Biltmore Programme in mobilising American Jewry is again the level of contributions to the Keren Kayemeth and Keren Hayesod. These are \$4,200,000 (1942), \$6,100,000 (1943), \$10,300,000 (1944), \$14,800,000 (1945). In February 1945, on his way back from the Yalta Conference, President Roosevelt met King Ibn Saud, to hear from him the Arab position on Palestine. In Chapter 52, Eddy, who acted as interpreter at the meeting, describes the impression made on Roosevelt by the Arab monarch. In a letter dated 5 April 1945, which President Roosevelt sent

Ibn Saud, the predecessor of President Nixon stated, according to Eddy (p. 511), that "(1) He personally, as President, would never do anything which might prove hostile to the Arabs; and (2) the U.S. Government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine, without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs." One week later, F.D.R. was dead, and Harry Truman President of the U.S.

Hardly had the new president eased himself into his chair at, presumably, the Oval Room, than he fired his first missive on behalf of Zionism in the direction of London. The letter was addressed to Churchill, the British Prime Minister who had been nagging Weizmann about the lukewarmness of Roosevelt on Zionism. The letter was dated 24 July 1945. But by 26 July the results of the British election had brought the Labour Party, headed by Attlee, to power. The first paragraph of the letter that Attlee read stated: "There is great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May 1939 continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in Palestine and the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions entrance into the land which represents for so many of these their only hope of survival." (p. 559). The focus on the immigration issue was not fortuitous. It was directly and explicitly aimed at the White Paper of 1939. The abrogation of the White Paper was the immediate Zionist objective. This was after all largely why the transfer of the metropolitan base to Washington had taken place.

With the White Paper out of the way progress could continue towards the Biltmore Programme objective of Zionist political domination of the whole of Palestine. And given the world climate of opinion aroused on behalf of Europe's Jews by Nazi barbarism, what better Zionist line could there be than to present the abrogation of the White Paper as the one available solution on humanitarian grounds? This line had already been adumbrated in the Biltmore Programme itself which had stated: "The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution." Now no less a person than the President of the U.S. was endorsing it. The lifting of the White Paper restrictions are equated by him with the "only hope of survival" available to the refugees. This is inexplicable in terms of logic and indeed of equity. The war had ended and Nazism had been crushed. The wretched inmates were removed from their horrible surroundings

into various relief centres. These were under the surveillance of Allied troops (including the American army and units of the Palestinian Jewish Brigade). They were organised by international teams including American Zionist and Palestinian Jewish organisations. Tragically, the number of Jews was small, about 300,000 in all, representing the pitiful remnants of the holocaust. Seared to the soul, these were unquestionably entitled to refuse "repatriation" to the scenes of their destruction in Central and Eastern Europe. Their plight was an indelible scar on the conscience of Western Christendom, crying for immediate and permanent remedy by the collective efforts of mankind. Nor would that have been beyond the human ingenuity and incomparable resources of the victorious powers. Even the Palestine Arabs were morally called upon in the circumstances to make their contribution, however modest, and irrespective of the background of Zionist machinations and ambitions in Palestine. But to exploit the plight of the European Jewish refugees for the political purpose of tearing the White Paper of 1939, itself the end-result of two agonised decades of Palestinian Arab struggle for national and communal survival, is to open to question the motivation of the White House. For an inkling of the extent of America's cynicism in her ostensibly humanitarian concern with the Jewish refugees the reader is referred to Chapter 57 in which Divine, the American authority on his country's immigration legislation, describes the actual attitudes of the Congress and various American pressure groups in the years 1945-47 on the question of admission of these very remnants of Hitler's gas-chambers into the United States itself. There is nothing basically new in Divine's revelations. They are in consonance with earlier American attitudes already described. What they do emphasise, however, is the persistence of these attitudes even in the circumstances created by World War II. As for President Truman, he had hardly chosen the road that winds uphill all the way. Not for him to lead the world by setting the example "at American expense"; nor the need to honour the commitments of his predecessor to Ibn Saud, nor the collective approach advocated by President Roosevelt, but the Churchillian "magnanimity" of 1922, far away from home.¹ The temptation, clearly, was too great for the Vice-President turned President. The terrible pressures on men in his predicament at the White House to vindicate themselves in their own right at the next elections (due in 1948) is now commonplace knowledge since Harvard ex-Kitchen Cabinet

1) Compare page xxxvi above.

members have taken to reminiscing about their experiences at the pinnacle of American power. In his letter to the British Prime Minister in July 1945 Truman, with sure awareness of the exigencies of political survival, scored several bulls-eyes. He allayed the fears of Congressional leaders and the American public that the U.S. would “alone” bear the brunt of this invasion by 300,000 miserable human beings; he relieved the leaders of American Jewry from the embarrassing task of seriously demanding access to the U.S. for thousands of their European co-religionists; he won the hearts of the Zionist leadership. And he did all this in the name of the most cherished values of his civilisation, to the loud applause of his public. On the debit side he brought himself into possible conflict with London. But with Lend-Lease abruptly terminated at the close of the war, Britain was down on her knees. He also propelled the Arab world on its journey of alienation from the West, but then, as he explained in October 1945 to his assembled American diplomats from the Arab countries: “I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.” One is at least grateful for the candour, which pinpoints one of the most unbalancing influences on developments in the Middle East since the 1940s—the role of the domestic factor in American decision-making on Palestine. This factor is never absent in any process of foreign policy-making, whatever the country, and its influence can be to the good or towards imbalance. It is the latter if domestic considerations operate in defiance of the merits of the case and at the expense of the regional realities of the issue in question. Truman’s posture falls squarely into the latter category. And to bring about just such a state of affairs was the basic intent of the strategy of Ben Gurion and his two principal colleagues in 1939.¹ This strategy had been tantamount to throwing a bait at the White House, which Roosevelt had dodged but which Truman firmly bit on. What was the anatomy of this bait? Two correlations to be made simultaneously by the incumbent American President: (1) between idealism and Zionism, and (2) between pro-Zionism and presidential longevity. In taking the bait Truman became a presidential prototype (compare in particular the policies of Presidents Johnson and Nixon on Palestine) by starting an ineluctable process. For as already noted there is a triangular flow between the gentile great power sponsor, the Zionist metropolitan establishment and the metro-

1) Compare p. xlix ff above.

politan Jewish community. The more the gentile sponsor's partiality for Zionism, the greater the self-confidence of the metropolitan Zionist establishment. The greater the self-confidence of this establishment, the greater its leverage against the metropolitan Jewish community. The more the metropolitan Jewish community is mobilised, the greater its leverage against the gentile sponsor. The greater the leverage against the sponsor, the greater the latter's partiality. Ben Gurion's achievement was in seeing early enough the limitations on the operation of this cycle in Britain and its feasibility in the U.S. An immediate indication of American Jewry's response to presidential partiality was the sudden unprecedented leap in the American revenue of the Keren Kayemeth and Keren Hayesod from \$ 14,700,000 in 1945 to \$ 26,800,000 in 1946.

President Truman's letter to the British Prime Minister of 24 July, 1945¹ was only a shot across the bows. It was followed by a series of escalating moves against Britain steadily nudging it in the direction desired by the Zionists. It will be recalled that the British Labour Party, now in power, was staunchly pro-Zionist. Bevin, the new Foreign Secretary, had a long working relationship with British Zionists that stretched back at least to 1931,² when his intervention on their behalf had been decisive in neutralising Webb. But Britain had by now some 27 years of first-hand experience of Zionism, and unlike the U.S. she also had a Middle Eastern policy of sorts. She needed some time to regain her breath after the war and was thinking out her next moves in the Arab World in the new conditions that now obtained. Aware of her own tergiversations on Palestine since 1917, and having no illusions about the sensitivity of the issue in the Middle East, she was, in short, taking her time. But it was precisely this that the Zionist leaders and their American Zionist allies could not stomach. There were many reasons for Zionist haste. The Zionist leaders were aware that immediate post-war international environments are generally characterised by fluidity and are therefore most propitious for territorial surgery. World public opinion, shocked to the core by the holocaust, was at the peak of its potential sympathy for Zionism, whatever it understood Zionism to be. President Truman and American Jewry were all keyed up and their momentum needed to be exploited before it flagged. Arab public opinion was being stung by the partisanship of the U.S. and in 1945 the Arab League had been established and had committed itself

1) Compare p. lv above.

2) Compare Chapter 29.

to the preservation of the Arab character of Palestine. But the most important consideration, in the editor's opinion, was of a different order altogether. The Zionists had claimed the leadership of "World Jewry" since 1897. After almost half a century of this leadership, the Jewish people suffered the greatest catastrophe in its history since that at the hands of the Assyrians. There is a definite correlation between this catastrophe and the axioms of Zionist doctrine in the inter-war period, which demanded the exclusive orientation of Jewish immigration towards Palestine and, as a corollary, Zionist silence towards immigration restrictions imposed upon Jews by the West.¹ In retrospect, (and any verdict on policies can only be made in retrospect) the chief Zionist miscalculation lay, as noted, in emphasising the political formula for the solution of the Jewish problem at the expense of the humanitarian one. This was becoming increasingly clear as the news of the extent of Nazi bestiality against the Jews began to percolate to the outside world. The timing of the Biltmore Programme reflects signs of early Zionist self-consciousness on this score. Hence, when the full extent of the Nazi horrors became known by the end of the war, the desperate need for the Zionist leadership to *vindicate* themselves and their old political formula. Hence their otherwise irrelevant and untypical equation of this formula with the far too belated "rescue" of the Jewish Displaced Persons. Hence the significance of Truman's acceptance of this line. As to the extraordinary lengths to which the Zionist leaders were prepared to go in the immediate post-war period to project this image of themselves, the reader is referred to Morgan (Chapter 54). Even more to the point than Morgan's account is that by Jon Kimche (Chapter 60) who, true to his other performances, lets the cat out of the bag.

Pressure through the White House represented the major thrust of the Zionist offensive against London. It also formed what the Americans would call the "backdrop" for the other arm of the giant pincer operation. This subsidiary arm was two-pronged. One operation was the lavishly financed and carefully orchestrated organisation of the illegal immigration of specially trained Jewish Displaced Persons "trying to reach" their "only hope for survival" in Palestine, described from somewhat different perspectives by Morgan and Kimche, already referred to. This, while ramming home the new image of the Zionist leadership, maximised the embarrassment of the British Mandatory. The second was the equally carefully orchestrated

1) Compare p. xlv ff above.

campaign of violence against the Mandatory (Chapter 59) based on the powerful Zionist military establishment in Palestine described in Chapter 58. The co-ordination between the three levels of action, the "diplomatic" (the White House), the "histrionic" (illegal immigration), and the "military" (the controlled violence in Palestine) was, of course, central, attesting to the transcontinental scope and resources of the World Zionist Organisation. But although action was on three levels, the fulcrum was in Washington's relations with London, not in the histrionic or the military "confrontation" with the British in Palestine. The sure awareness by both the Zionists and the British of where the fulcrum was, gave the former immense leeway against the latter and made the subsidiary histrionic and military operations devastatingly effective. And it is precisely the extent of this leeway which confirms the intrinsically *colon* character of the Zionist establishment in its two wings, metropolitan and overseas. For never in the history of truly nationalist struggle, either before or since the Anglo-Zionist "confrontation" in the years 1945-7, have any "rebels" enjoyed the immunity that the Zionists did. Never have the "security forces" faced with such immobilism the onslaughts of the violators of "law and order". Never has the ratio of casualties between the former and latter been so fantastically in favour of these latter. Never have the rebels emerged in their economic, political and military infrastructures literally unscathed from their confrontation with an imperial power as the Zionists did. Never was so much won at such little cost. To be sure, Britain was war weary and at her wits' ends as to what to do, but she had 100,000 crack troops in Palestine (one for every six Jews in the country). And if Britain's immobilism, in contrast to her handling of the Palestine Arab Rebellion (1936-39), and indeed to Israel's conduct in her occupied territories since 1967, points to any significant truth, it is to the apparent fact that some people are more "equal" than others and especially more so if shaded by a White House umbrella.

Just where the White House pressures led is related in Chapter 56. In this chapter, Williams records the account of London's dealings with Washington in the years 1945-46 as he heard it from Attlee the British Prime Minister. But a word of caution is due at this stage. It will not do to get too maudlin at Britain's plight, for importunate as Truman was, he was not without his uses as an alibi. Meanwhile American revenue to the Keren Kayemeth and Keren Hayesod doubled again from \$ 26,800,000 in 1946 to \$ 59,000,000 in 1947. The American Zionist lobby tightened the screws and Chapter 55 shows how these were applied

to key American Jewish Congressional members. In Chapter 61 we eavesdrop on Cabinet meetings in Washington. It is the autumn of 1947. One snatch of conversation helps to initiate us farther into the subtleties of American decision making. The notes are by Forrestal, the American Defence Secretary: "At the end of the lunch Hannegan (Postmaster General) brought up the question of the President's making a statement of policy on Palestine, particularly with reference to the entrance of a hundred and fifty thousand Jews into Palestine. He said he didn't want to press for a decision one way or the other but simply wanted to point out that such a statement would have a very great influence and great effect on the raising of funds for the Democratic National Committee..."¹ But the issue of immigration had long served its purpose. By August 1946 the Zionist leadership was spelling out its territorial conditions. To show how cooperative they were they would not insist on the Biltmore Programme. They would settle for three quarters of a loaf, i.e. the Peel frontiers² plus the Negev (See Map 12, p. 613). Truman promptly endorsed the new Zionist strategy.

The Biltmore Programme, it will be recalled, envisaged Zionist control of the whole of Palestine.³ What the Zionists seem to have had in mind, as already noted, was a Rhodesian-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) to take place immediately after the war. Zionist thinking and planning in this direction was far advanced. As an official publication explained in 1943, one year after the Biltmore Programme: "The Zionist authorities now feel that the Mandate has outlived its usefulness... *Now*⁴ the time has come for us to demand what we have been working for during the last twenty years."⁵ The same publication quotes Ben Gurion as saying: "The main readjustment... is a new regime—political, legal, and administrative—especially designed for the maximum development of the resources of the country and the absorption of the maximum number of immigrants in the shortest possible time... Only a Jewish administration can be equal to that task—an administration *completely identified with the needs and aims of the Jewish settlers*."⁶ The emphasis is on political control. This has an

1) p. 625.

2) Compare p. xli above.

3) Compare p. lii above.

4) Editor's italics.

5) *The "Jewish State" Idea in Zionism*, Zionist Federation of Great Britain & Ireland, 1943, p. 10.

6) *Ibid.*, p. 11. Editor's italics.

over-all priority over immigration. Indeed political control is seen as the *sine qua non* for massive immigration and settlement. Through political control the numerical Arab majority can be subverted "in the shortest possible time." Through political control again the juridical *status quo* with regard to the Arab ownership of the bulk of the land can be negated by legalistic stratagems of direct and indirect dispossession at which the Israelis have proved themselves to be second to none since 1948. This actual emphasis on political control contrasts with the public emphasis on immigration subsequently propagated through President Truman. At the same time the language used by Ben Gurion, viz. "an administration completely identified with the needs and aims of . . . the Jewish settlers" is an excellent example of *colon* disregard for the "needs and aims" of the indigenous majority. But what it does reflect most of all is the Zionist assessment that the relation of forces inside the country had at last shifted in their favour, irrespective of Palestinian Arab numerical superiority. This assessment stemmed partly from the fact that Palestinian Arab military strength had been shattered by the British during 1936-39, and partly from the immense development in the Zionist military establishment during World War II. This development took place on several levels. A total of 27,028 Palestinian Jews were recruited by the British Army (1,106 in the Royal Navy, 2,652 in the RAF and 23,270 in the Army). Towards the end of the war Churchill authorised the formation of a Palestinian Jewish Brigade Group which was 5,258 strong. The significance of this Brigade Group was not lost on the Zionists. In the words of Ben Gurion, this was "an independent unit with auxiliary forces (artillery, armour etc.) so that it can operate as a small division." Subsequently this formation became the model combat unit of the Israel army, just as the British-trained Jewish Palestinian officers and NCOs became its backbone. Expertise was also forthcoming from other sources. The British estimate, for example, that a total of 3,600 Jewish deserters from the Polish forces (many of them with their weapons) joined the Palestinian Jewish community during the war. But the most far-reaching development was in the vast expansion of the Jewish military industry. Jewish Palestinian industries were already producing mortars, together with their bombs, as early as 1939. During 1942-44 they supplied orders to the British military totalling £ 33 millions. These included 3,634,000 anti-tank mines, tank engines, small naval craft, parachutes etc. Zionist propagandists have been deliberately vague on Jewish military strength during those years. In Appendix IX-A (p. 86 ff) the editor analyses some of the

statistics they have offered. But for a general view of the Zionist military establishment in the years 1945-46, the reader is referred to Chapter 58. It was on this military establishment that the Zionists based their assessment of the feasibility of a UDI in the whole country. And indeed a General Military Plan known as Plan Aleph (Plan A) was drawn up in February 1945, precisely to implement this UDI strategy. Its premise was that the general situation in the Arab world was such that resistance to the UDI would come from the Palestinian Arabs only. Plan Aleph was designed to crush their resistance to a Zionist take-over.

Within a few weeks of the end of War World II the Zionists must have realized that a UDI on the scale planned was not immediately feasible. Hence the concentration of their fire on the White Paper of 1939. By early 1946 and thanks to Truman this had been torn to shreds by a joint Anglo-American Committee.¹ Ironically, this Committee recommended, *inter alia*, the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants into the country, but also pointed to the undesirability of the existence of illegal armies. The reference was to the Zionist military establishment described in Chapter 58, the disbandment of which the British made a condition for the admission of the 100,000 Jews. But the disbandment of the Zionist military establishment would have deprived the Zionists of the military means to implement their UDI when the opportunity presented itself. At the same time a joint Anglo-American team of experts studied various political formulae for the solution of the problem and reached unanimity on a plan for Arab-Jewish provincial autonomy (see Map 11 p. 575). Fearing that the American experts would win Truman's approval for this plan, the Zionists immediately changed their strategy. They would drop their insistence on a UDI in the whole country and accept a UDI in the greater part of the country. This new objective was suitably formulated in the phrase "a Jewish State in a viable area of Palestine." What they meant by a "viable area" was the Peel frontiers plus the Negev, as is clear from Map 12 p. 613. This proposal was promptly endorsed by Truman who, in August 1946, submitted it, in his turn, to the British, thus blowing sky-high the provincial autonomy plan of the Anglo-American team of experts.

Meanwhile the Arab League had shown growing concern. In December 1945 it had instituted a counter boycott of Zionist goods in belated retaliation for the discriminatory practices

1) Compare p. 565 ff.

against the Arabs of both the Keren Hayesod and Keren Kayemeth.¹ In May 1946, at the first Arab Summit meeting at Inshass in Egypt, the Arab heads of state pledged themselves to preserve the "Arab status" of Palestine. In June, at Bludan in Syria, the Arab League reaffirmed the Inshass pledge. In September the Arab delegates to a conference called by the British in London put forward their plan for Palestine. They envisaged a unitary Palestinian state, the citizenship of which would be Palestinian. Qualification for this citizenship would be ten years' residence in the country. Jews with Palestinian citizenship would have full civil rights equally with all others. Special safeguards would be provided to protect Jewish religious and cultural rights. These safeguards would be alterable only with the consent of the majority of the Jewish members of the Legislature. Jewish representation in the Executive and Legislative branches would be proportionate to their numbers on the principle of one-man-one-vote. Legislation on immigration and land transfers would require the consent of the majority of the Arab members of the Legislature. There were, incidentally, no provisions for throwing the Jews into the sea.² Perhaps the most important feature of the Arab proposals was the provision that citizenship would be Palestinian *not* Arab. On 4 October 1946 the President of the U.S. publicly announced his support for the Zionist UDI proposals of the previous August, killing this imaginative and positive Arab initiative in the bud.

President Truman's October endorsement of the latest Zionist map for Palestine was the most important event in Zionist history since the Balfour Declaration in 1917. It was directly responsible for starting the chain of events that led to the catastrophic climax of the British Mandate—the destruction of the Palestinian Arab community in the 1948 War and the rise of Israel. At the time when Truman made his October statement, Palestine was divided into 16 sub-districts, in only one of which (Jaffa sub-district, containing the all-Jewish city of Tel Aviv) the Jews constituted the majority, though even in this sub-district they owned only 39% of the land, as opposed to 49% owned by the Arabs. The Truman sponsored Zionist map envisaged the total incorporation into the proposed Jewish State of *nine* of these sub-districts. These were the sub-districts of Beisan (Arab population 70%), Tiberias (A. pop. 67%), Safad (A. pop. 87%), Acre (A. pop. 96%), Haifa (A. pop. 53%),

1) Compare Chapter 27, and p. xxxvii above.

2) Compare President Nixon's statement, p. xxi above.

Nazareth (A. pop. 84%), Jaffa¹ (A. pop. 29%), Gaza (A. pop. 98%), Beersheba (A. pop. 99%). In addition, the Jewish state was to incorporate the bulk of *two* other sub-districts viz. that of Tulkarm (A. pop. 83%) and Ramleh (A. pop. 78%) as well as portions of a *third* sub-district, that of Hebron (A. pop. 96%). The Arab rump state would include wholly only *three* out of the sixteen sub-districts. These were the sub-districts of Jenin (A. pop. 100%), Nablus (A. pop. 100%) and Ramallah (A. pop. 100%), as well as the remainder of Ramleh, Hebron, Tulkarm, and Jerusalem² (A. pop. 62%) sub-districts. In terms of territory the Truman-sponsored Zionist map would give 75% of the total area of Palestine to the Jews at a time when their land ownership constituted 7.0% of this area—an increase of more than 1000% at Arab expense. The number of Jewish settlements to come under Arab rule was *ten* with a total of some 2,000 inhabitants or $\frac{1}{3}$ of 1 per cent of the total Jewish population of the country. The number of Arab towns and villages to come under Jewish rule would be about 450, with a total of about 700,000 inhabitants, or 58% of the total Arab population of the country. The Arabs would lose *all* their richest lands including *all* their citrus groves, which latter produced their most lucrative export crop. They would lose *all* control of the vital headwaters of the River Jordan, and all contact with the sea except for a tiny corridor (See Map 12 p. 613) leading to the largest Arab city of Jaffa, which from a bustling prosperous city would become a waif dependent on Jewish mercy. For other aspects of Truman's map the reader should consult Maps 13 and 14 (pp. 672 and 673).

The endorsement by Truman of these Zionist territorial ambitions was as devastating in its implications for the Arabs as it was shameless in its timing. The day which Truman had chosen on which to make his public announcement, October 4th, was Yom Kippur—a Jewish holiday. The choice of this day carried the flagrant hint of a special presidential offering to his Jewish constituents on the occasion. The additional nuance of awaited reciprocity from these same constituents was implicit in the fact that the far-reaching scope of the announcement was specifically designed to pre-empt a political rival. This rival was Dewey, chief prospective Republican candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections in 1948, who on Yom Kippur was reported to be about to relieve himself of a sweeping

1) Except for the city of Jaffa.

2) The Zionists envisaged some special regime for the city of Jerusalem proper.

pro-Zionist pronouncement in his campaign for the governorship of New York. President Truman's own Yom Kippur statement was a crowning triumph for the strategy conceived by Ben Gurion and his two colleagues seven years before in 1939.¹ Commenting on Truman's statement, James Reston said: "The President went against his advisers on foreign policy and chose to follow the promptings of those who were primarily interested in retaining Democratic majorities in Congress. The general conclusion is that if the Palestine question is approached from the viewpoint of American politics it is not likely to be solved and America's prestige and authority in the world are likely to be impaired."² These words are as true and relevant today as they were twenty four years ago.

Truman's Yom Kippur statement had a decisive effect on the Zionists and British alike. To the Zionists, the green light from the White House was now a powerful beam lighting the road ahead. To the British the signal was equally clear. They were to lay their hands off the Hagana, the Zionist underground army, whose disbandment they had demanded,³ and to acquiesce to Zionist demands. American leverage against the British was particularly effective in the financial circumstances in which post-war Britain found herself. Already in August 1946 the balance of an American loan negotiated to replace Lend-Lease had been frozen. It was to remain frozen until British compliance on Palestine was forthcoming.⁴ Such were the privileges of the Zionist *colon* system in its "confrontation" with the British. The White House attitude also had a more subtle effect on the British. It gave them the opportunity to follow in the footsteps of Pontius Pilate and wash their hands of the whole affair. On February 18 1947, in an uncharacteristically self-effacing confession, His Majesty's Government declared that they had "no power under the terms of the Mandate to award (sic) the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews or even to partition it between them." They had therefore reached the conclusion that "the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgement of the UN." It has been suggested that the British believed that the UN would fail to reach agreement and that the problem would be returned to them. The new circumstances then obtaining would vastly strengthen their hands against all the other protagonists, particularly the

1) Compare p. xlix ff above.

2) *New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1946.

3) Compare p. lxiii above.

4) Joseph Alsop, *Washington Post*, Dec. 10, 1947.

U.S. There is evidence that the British did consider the possibility of such an outcome. But this could hardly have been the main motivation for the reference of the problem to the UN. With the White House virtual veto on military action against the Zionists, the British had indeed reached a dead-end. Meanwhile the Zionist military establishment was expanded still further. (See Appendix IX-A). In May 1947 a new General Military Plan was drawn up to replace Plan Aleph.¹ This new plan, Plan Bet (Plan B), was designed to take into account the increasing concern felt by the Arab countries and the new situation created by Britain's reference of the problem to the UN. In short, its purpose was to ensure the implementation of the UDI plan endorsed by Truman on Yom Kippur 1946, even if the Palestinian Arabs received help from the neighbouring Arab countries.

* * *

Part IV of the anthology deals with the terrible climax of the British Mandate over Palestine—the war of 1948. In response to Britain's request, the General Assembly met in special session in April 1947, only to send yet another commission of inquiry, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). The committee was composed of representatives of eleven member states: two were Asian (India and Iran), two British white dominions (Canada and Australia), three Latin American (Uruguay, Guatemala and Peru), three Western and Central European (the Netherlands, Sweden and Czechoslovakia), one communist (Yugoslavia). Of the eleven states represented on the committee one was Moslem; the rest, with the exception of India, were Christian. Iran and India were potentially sympathetic to the Arabs, while Sweden was at least potentially neutral. The others were, alike, potentially pro-Zionist. But uppermost in the minds of all must have been the knowledge that the U.S. had already committed itself to a particular "solution" of the problem. And in the last analysis the committee was not a juridical tribunal. In the event, and after a brisk tour of the Middle East the majority of the committee recommended a territorial solution substantially along the lines of the Yom Kippur statement by President Truman. The main difference from the Yom Kippur frontiers was the subtraction from the proposed Jewish state of the sub-districts of Acre, Nazareth and Gaza (Arab population, respectively,

1) Compare p. lxiii above.

96%, 84%, 98%).

The principal feature of the UNSCOP plan, like that of Yom Kippur was, of course, the incorporation of the Negev in the Jewish State. This has been usually justified on the grounds that since the Negev was a desert, it was only appropriate that it should be "given" to the Zionists who were adept at making deserts bloom. So much nonsense has been written about the subject that a digression will be made here to look more closely at it. The Negev is generally the area of Palestine South of a line drawn East-West through Gaza. This is a vast region totalling 12,577,000 dunums, almost half the total area of the country. Rainfall is poor, averaging 220 millimetres as compared to 550-611 on the coast between Tel Aviv and Acre. For centuries the area had been inhabited by beduin tribes. In 1947 these were seven in number: the Tarabin, Azazmeh, Tiyaha, Jebarat, Saidiyin, Hanajra, and Luhaiwat, themselves sub-divided into about 80 clans. Although the beduins are usually on the move, their movement is confined within a certain area which is jealously guarded against encroachment from others. These tribal areas contain focal centres of tribal life such as holy shrines, ancestral tombs, sites commemorating tribal memories etc. In addition, as in the case of the Negev beduins, these tribes were half-sedentary, deriving a considerable part of their livelihood from dry-farming. Indeed they grew most of the barley and much of the wheat produced in the country. Thus attachment to the tribal area was strengthened by the traditional and prescriptive rights acquired in the lands put under cultivation. The area actually cultivated by the beduins was vast. As early as 1935 this amounted to 2,109,234 dunums.¹ By 1946 the number of beduins in the Negev was 100,000. Now the year 1935 has just given because it precedes by five years the *first* Jewish settlement in the Negev. By October 1946 the number of Jewish settlements in the Negev was only *four*. These were the settlements of Beit Eshel, Gevulot, Beer Yitzhak, and Revivim. Their total population was 475, and their landholdings amounted to 21,000 dunums only. Plainly, and despite all the talk, the Jews simply did not make the desert bloom, nor were they indeed very interested in doing so. And if there *was* any blooming in the desert, this was the work of the wretchedly poor beduins. Perhaps more to the point is that the area put by the beduins under cultivation in the Negev was *three* times the *total* area cultivated by the *entire*

1) *The Area of Cultivable Land in Palestine*, Jewish Agency for Palestine, (Jerusalem, 1936) p. 13.

Jewish community in Palestine after more than sixty years of loudly trumpeted "pioneering".¹ It remains to note that in the *two weeks* immediately following the 4 October 1946 Yom Kippur statement by President Truman which endorsed the incorporation of the Negev into the proposed Jewish state, *thirteen* new "agricultural" settlements were established in the Negev. The occupants of these settlements were members of the Hanegev Battalion of the Palmach Brigade,² the shock-troopers of the Hagana. Nevertheless (or should one say "consequently"?) UNSCOP saw fit to "give" the Negev to the Jewish state.

Politics is the art of misnomers. The General Assembly was now seized of the Zionist plan in the form of a recommendation by the "majority" of UNSCOP. The name of the plan was the old one of partition. But whereas in 1937 partition had been recommended by the royal commission of an imperial power it was now the ostensibly disinterested verdict of an impartial international body. This endowed the concept with the attributes of objectivity and even-handedness—in short, of a compromise solution. But a compromise by definition is an arrangement acceptable, however grudgingly, to the protagonists. The "partition" of Palestine proposed by UNSCOP was no such thing. It was Zionist in inspiration, Zionist in principle, Zionist in substance, and Zionist in most details. The very idea of partition was abhorrent to the Arabs of Palestine and it was against it that they had fought their bitter, desperate and costly fight in the years 1937-39. Also, "compromise" implies mutual concession. What were the Zionists conceding? You can only really concede what you possess. What possessions in Palestine were the Zionists conceding? None at all. Again, a compromise implies that you concede what in the last estimate is expendable in order to preserve the substance of your position. We all know what the "concessions" demanded of the Arabs were in the UNSCOP plan, and what the residual Arab state in the country was to be after the concessions were made. Concessions of such a kind and scale are demonstrably alien to the very idea of compromise. It is surely utterly alien to this idea that one party should so revolutionise its position vis-à-vis the other, and at the latter's expense, that the relative positions

- 1) The area under cultivation by the Jews in the whole of Palestine was estimated in 1944 at 716,750 dunums, or about 60% only of their total landholdings. *Survey of Palestine*, Government of Palestine, (Jerusalem (1946) Vol I, p. 379.
- 2) Compare Chapter 58, and Appendix IX-A.

between the two would be actually reversed. It surely goes against the grain of human nature to expect the party that would suffer this reversal to enter into the transaction just because some third party, itself affiliated to the potential aggrandiser, chose to befog the issue by calling this transaction a “compromise”. One might say all this is very well except that it ignores the power factor. True enough, but if we are talking about power, then we should say so and not pretend that we are talking about compromise—except that UNSCOP and subsequently the UN General Assembly did talk about this process of dictation and blackmail as though it were indeed a genuine compromise transaction. It may be relevant in this context to quote Peel¹ himself. In the final paragraphs of his report in 1937, Peel addressed the Palestine Arabs as follows: “Considering what the possibility of finding a refuge in Palestine means to many thousands of suffering Jews, is the loss occasioned by partition, *great as it would be,*² more than Arab generosity can bear?” and later: “If the Arabs at *some sacrifice*³ could help to solve that problem they would earn the gratitude not of the Jews alone but of all the Western World”. We are not concerned with the hypocrisy of such an appeal from a country whose own record on the admission of Jewish immigrants even contemporaneously⁴ with these very words as they were being written by Peel bears little examination. Nor with the absurdity of an appeal by one people to another that they should, out of generosity, yield their homeland to a third party. What is relevant is that the author of the partition plan knew what partition was about long before the term had been neutralised to suit the purposes of its beneficiaries and sponsors. And the Peel frontiers, flagrant as they were, were still less so than those of UNSCOP.

On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved by a two thirds majority to endorse the partition plan of UNSCOP with minor modifications. In this way partition was elevated to the status of “the will of the international community”. Chapter 63 is a brilliant analysis of the various aspects of the UNSCOP plan and should be read in conjunction with Chapter 43 containing Reid’s reservations on the 1937 Peel partition proposals. The mechanics of bull-dozing employed by the White House during this session of the General Assembly are described by many observers. Eban, the South African-born

- 1) Compare p. xl above.
- 2) Editor’s italics.
- 3) Editor’s italics.
- 4) Compare Chapter 42.

Jewish Agency delegate, describes in Chapter 64 how President Truman's direct personal intervention in response to Zionist demands, but against American expert advice, ensured that the Negev was finally incorporated in the proposed Jewish state. In Chapter 65 Khan, the Pakistani delegate, discloses the procedural manipulation, (including the notorious postponement of the General Assembly vote on Thanksgiving Day), which was resorted to by the UN Secretariat under American pressure in order to channel proceedings in the direction of partition. Romulo, the Philippino delegate, relates in Chapter 66 the circumstances in which his country changed its vote in favour of partition. In Chapter 67 Kermit Roosevelt gives an account of an extraordinary web of intrigue and strong-arm tactics that operated from White House circles against the smaller UN members who were lukewarm on partition. In Chapter 68 Secretary of Defence Forrestal reveals what happens to an American cabinet member who tries to hold his ground against the fully-mobilised Zionist forces of the United States.

Three other specific aspects of the UN deliberations on partition are worthy of attention. The first aspect pertains to the legality of the partition resolution. The Arab delegates at the General Assembly requested, *inter alia*, that before further action by the UN a resolution should be adopted to consult the International Court of Justice. The draft resolution asked: "Whether the UN or any of its member States is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of the inhabitants of Palestine". The voting of the General Assembly meeting as an Ad Hoc Committee on this draft resolution was 21 votes to 20. Only 21 of the 57 members of the General Assembly considered that the UN had the necessary competence.¹ And yet the subsequent partition resolution was given overnight the sanctity and imperativeness of holy scripture—such are the ways of Democracy.

Secondly, the UNSCOP proposals had included a set of unanimous recommendations, one of which specifically pertained to the Jewish Displaced Persons. This unanimous recommendation urged that the UN General Assembly "undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an *international arrange-*

1) For the seven other legal questions that the Arabs wanted to put to the I.C.J. before any UN action on Palestine, but which the General Assembly refused to endorse, see pp. 691-92.

ment¹ whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews... will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine Problem.” In its unanimous comment on this unanimous recommendation UNSCOP pointed out that the distressed Jews of Europe were “a legacy of the Second War” and as such “a recognised international responsibility”. It further stated that “It cannot be doubted that any action which would ease the plight of the distressed Jews in Europe would thereby lessen the pressure of the Palestinian immigration problem and consequently create a better climate in which to carry out a final solution of the question of Palestine”. In the spirit of this unanimous recommendation and comment of UNSCOP’s, the Arab delegates proposed a draft resolution,² which would recommend, *inter alia*, “that those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who cannot be repatriated should be absorbed in the territories of members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, *per capita* income, population, and other relevant factors.” The result of the voting on this draft resolution in the General Assembly as an Ad Hoc Committee should by now occasion little surprise. It was 16 votes to 16 with 25 abstentions. In other words it was not carried. The closeness of this vote shows, however, how near to the marrow of Western pro-Zionism the Arab delegates had come: Jewish immigration to Palestine, even if it means flooding the Arabs out—by all means; but a modest contribution by each Western country to reflect the ostensibly humanitarian concern for Jewish refugees—nothing doing. Such are the ways of Charity.

Thirdly, the role of the USSR. As early as the special session of the General Assembly called in April 1947 to discuss Britain’s reference of the problem to the UN, the USSR had indicated its interest in “partition”. Earlier, the Soviet authorities had encouraged the movement of illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine from Soviet occupied East European countries. During the discussions by the General Assembly of the recommendation of UNSCOP, the USSR emerged as a staunch supporter of the idea of a Jewish state. The Soviet Bloc controlled four votes in the Assembly (those of the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, Poland, and the USSR),³ and all these were firmly cast

1) Editor’s italics.

2) For its full text see pp. 692-93.

3) Yugoslavia, although communist, had shown an independent attitude from that of the USSR. As a member of UNSCOP, Yugoslavia, together with India and Iran, had recommended federation as a solution.

in support of a Jewish state. But the influence of the Soviet attitude on the UN Palestine deliberations far exceeded its voting strength, since it allayed fears that a pro-Jewish state attitude by the United States might exacerbate the Cold War. What was the motivation for Soviet pro-Zionism? The question is of obvious relevance today. Now, if we are to believe W.Z. Laqueur,¹ the possibility cannot be excluded that Soviet endorsement of a Jewish state “was recommended by some Foreign Ministry adviser and approved by Stalin in a fit of absentmindedness.” The explanation is less of a tribute to Laqueur’s Kremlinology than to his public relations zeal vis-à-vis Western audiences on behalf of Zionism. There was nothing absent-minded about Soviet support of the Jewish state. The voting record of the Soviet Bloc during the crucial debate in the General Assembly leading to the partition decision on 29 November 1947 was determinedly pro-Zionist. It was to remain consistently so in the subsequent debates of all the UN bodies throughout the various stages of the Palestine War of 1948. Indeed, when, under State Department influence, and as a result of the increasing chaos in Palestine early in 1948, the US Government showed signs of wanting to reappraise its pro-partition policy, it was the USSR which insisted on its pound of flesh. Soon after the partition resolution, Soviet broadcasts to the Middle East, as well as the Soviet press, launched a campaign of abuse and psychological warfare against the Palestine Arabs and the Arab countries for opposing the establishment of a Jewish state. This campaign was sustained until the end of the fighting in 1949 and beyond. The fiercest attack on the UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte came from the USSR, for suggesting modifications in the partition plan in partial redress of its excesses.² Nor was Soviet policy confined to political support and propaganda. The largest single consignments to Palestine of specially trained illegal Jewish immigrants were released from Soviet controlled Black Sea ports during 1947-48. But the most important Soviet contribution to the establishment of the Jewish state came in the form of a massive supply of heavy arms, tanks, and planes through Czechoslovakia, after the Communist take-over in that country in March 1948. In Chapter 70 Kramer gives the details of this Soviet sponsored arms deal to the Jewish state, and it is as well to remember that this deal preceded the subsequent deal to Egypt by seven years. It was this Soviet

1) W.Z. Laqueur, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East* (New York, 1959), p. 147.

2) Compare Map 20 (p. 791) for Count Bernadotte’s proposals.

arms deal to the Zionists in 1948 that tipped the military scales against the Arab countries facilitating the fall of Palestine and the rise of Israel.

Everything about Soviet Palestine policy during 1947-48 indicates that it was the result of cold calculation and long-term planning. The immediate objective of USSR policy was to exploit Anglo-American differences on Palestine in order to oust Britain from the country. With the British expelled from Palestine, British influence throughout the area would be undermined. On the long-term view, and knowing the intense Arab opposition to Zionism, the USSR hoped that the creation of a Jewish State would produce a fluid situation in the Middle East which was bound to present it with more than one avenue of exploitation. Given its freedom from public pressure at home, its policy could shift from support of one side to the other. Such a shift would enable it to compensate for its earlier misdemeanour in supporting Zionism while polarising Arab opinion, itself cumulatively alienable from the West by the latter's unrestrained Zionist partisanship. The Russian *entrée* into the Middle East was therefore the direct result of the banal motivation of White House policy on Palestine. Nor is the predicament relieved by reacting to the Russian moves with yet more Western pro-Zionism. This would serve, as it has already done, to accentuate the polarisation and make the circle more vicious and unbreakable. If there is a moral to all this, it is the need for Western perception of the "causal flow", i.e. an identification of just what is cause and what effect.

In blunt terms the need is for the occupant, any occupant, of the White House, to look rigorously into his pro-Zionist motivation, no matter how easy it is to sell his posture to his public in terms of preventing "the Jews from being thrown into the sea", or of "countering Soviet penetration", and no matter how glittering the immediate rewards.

After the partition resolution by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 1947 the scene shifted to Palestine. The intentions of the British were a key factor. What were they? The British line was that they could not support a solution that was not acceptable to both parties. They would not oppose partition but they would not help implement it. They would give up the Mandate by 15 May 1948, but until then they would be the sole sovereign power in the country. After 15 May the UN would be free to supervise the transitional interregnum leading to the establishment of the successor regimes based on partition. This seemed to be good enough for the White House, for on 10 December 1947, the balance of the American loan

frozen since August 1946¹ was released.

What did the British attitude signify to the Zionists and the Palestine Arabs? To both, the most important feature of the rapidly developing situation was the *combination* of the partition resolution and the British withdrawal, to take place within a period of six months. Since the UN had not provided for an international force to implement its resolution, the British decision to withdraw was an invitation to both sides to fight it out. Given the balance of power inside Palestine,² which was crushingly in favour of the Zionists—a fact of which all parties were well aware—the British withdrawal was an open invitation for a Zionist military take-over of the country. But there was one imponderable which worried the Zionists—the possibility that help to the Palestine Arabs would come from the Arab countries. As we have seen, the Zionist General Military Plan of May 1947 (Plan Bet) had taken this into account.³ Nevertheless it was difficult to foresee precisely what the scale of outside Arab help would be, in view of mounting anxiety felt for Palestine by the Arab countries. The problem fell into two parts: external Arab help in the six month period *between* 29 November 1947 and 15 May 1948, i.e. *during* the remaining period of the British Mandate; and Arab help *after* the termination of the British Mandate on 15 May 1948. Obviously what happened in the earlier period *up to* 15 May 1948 would largely determine the situation after it. The British provided an answer to Zionist worries on this score. They would remain the sovereign power until 15 May. This meant that the entry before this day of the regular Arab armies, such as they were, would involve a confrontation with the British. This was enough to rule out this possibility. There remained the possibility of help by external irregular Arab forces. But since these would be militarily of lesser significance, would take time to organise to an appreciably effective level, and would still have to be well below the threshold of a confrontation between the Arab countries that sponsored them and the British, the British “sovereign” presence in the remaining six month period of the Mandate acted virtually as a shield against external Arab help behind which the Zionist military forces could conduct their business. Another feature of the British withdrawal plan played into Zionist hands, as it was expected to do. The Mandatory regime in Palestine was thirty years old. This had to be dismantled within six months.

1) Compare p. lxvi above.

2) Compare Appendices VIII & IX-A.

3) Compare p. lxvii above.

Obviously this could not be done in the twenty-four hours preceding 15 May 1948. Here the situation, as it evolved, was that the British yielded *de facto* authority in successive areas of the country while retaining *de jure* sovereignty over it as a whole against outside intervention. The general pattern of British withdrawal was away from the areas of Jewish concentration, starting with Tel Aviv and its hinterland, and towards those with Palestinian Arab concentration. Given the total absence of central Palestine Arab political and military control (thanks to British repression) and the existence of powerful, purposeful, multifaceted central institutional Zionist control (thanks partly to British immobilism in the face of Zionist provocation),¹ the pattern of British withdrawal, even when it affected areas of Arab concentration, merely *increased* the fragmentation of the Arab scene while it furthered the cumulative consolidation and extension of Jewish power. It is true that in certain localities individual British officials and soldiers showed favouritism to the Arabs, but these instances were balanced by corresponding individual instances in favour of the Jews, and were totally eclipsed by the over-all desire of the British not to clash with the Zionist central forces even under extreme provocation from them or from the so-called dissident military groups, the Irgun and Lehi.²

The immediate problem with which the Zionists were faced by the UN partition resolution and British withdrawal plans was largely novel. Until 1947 and since the 1880's Zionist land acquisition was based on purchase. Their land acquisition strategy had, of course, always been determined by politico-military considerations and there were numerous instances of thuggery and terrorisation of Arab tenants and neighbours during the take-over of particular sites. The "Operation Negev", as it was called, involving the establishment of thirteen new settlements after President Truman's Yom Kippur statement,³ was not the only such operation clearly military in nature which had been carried out before 1948. But all these instances of settlement followed in the wake of legal or at least legalistic transactions involving the change of ownership of the site to be settled from the original owners to the new ones. Almost seventy years of this activity since the 1880s had netted a mere 7% of Palestine by 1948. Now the partition resolution had "given" the Zionists about 55% of the country. What this signified

1) Compare p. lx ff above.

2) Compare Appendix IX-A p. 863.

3) Compare p. lxix above.

was that the Zionists were asked literally to move into these additional areas of Palestine involving an almost 800% increase of the territory that they actually held at the time. They were to move in gratuitously as occupiers and rulers, not as the legal owners of purchased real estate. But these additional areas were not empty. The frontiers of the proposed Jewish state included hundreds of Arab villages and scores of Arab towns and suburbs, (See Map 15 p. 699). To the Arab inhabitants of these towns and villages life under Jewish rule did not only mean life under foreign rule. It meant that, given Zionist ideology, their personal and communal property rights would be negated in the interest of the Jewish settler,¹ their status as a majority would be reduced to that of a minority in their own country, and the whole character of their society and communal life imperatively stamped with the stamp of an alien culture and alien values—not to mention the dismemberment of their country. These inhabitants had no option but to fight Zionist encroachment, UN resolution or no UN resolution. Militarily they were weak, but at least they were thick on the ground. Many of their villages occupied historically strategic sites astride the lines of communication of Jewish settlements. They would count on the help of the rest of the Palestinians who would fight partition for the same reasons as themselves. They could expect help from the neighbouring Arab countries. In short, the Zionists knew that the new phase of Zionist growth inaugurated by the UN partition decision would have to be based on a military take-over. But it was not so much the need for military action that presented them with a novel situation—their thinking along UDI lines had all along been based on the assumption of such action. What was novel in the circumstances was the need for military action within a definitely circumscribed time-table (the six months between 29 November and 15 May 1948) and on a scale commensurate with the task of occupying at least the area “given” to them by the UN.

Zionist military planning and organisation were superbly fitted to mesh in with British withdrawal plans. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 had given the following breakdown of the Zionist military organisation known as the Hagana.² There was (a) a static force of 40,000 settlers and townfolk (b) a field army trained in more mobile operations “based” (sic) on the Jewish Settlement Police with an estimated strength of 16,000 and (c) a full-time force (Palmach) with an

1) Compare Chapter 27.

2) Compare p. 596.

estimated peace establishment of 2,000 and a war establishment of 6,000. What this breakdown blurs is the role of the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP). This was an official British sponsored force created during the Palestine Arab Rebellion in 1936-38 (See Chapters 38 & 39). The British had not seen fit to disband this force, which was under their control, even after failing to secure the disbandment of the illegal Hagana in 1946.¹ The JSP was 15,410 strong in June 1947.² It served several purposes. Service in the JSP was known to be a preliminary step towards service in the field army of the Hagana, so that in effect the British continued to train and expand the Hagana's field army through the JSP while officially demanding the disbandment of the Hagana. In addition, as a recognised official force, the JSP had freedom of movement in the country. Since the command of the JSP was ultimately in the hands of the commanders of the Hagana, it was easy to move units of the Hagana's field army in the guise of the JSP. But the point to remember is that the JSP was a force separate in structure from the field army and additional to it. It is this point that is largely blurred by the breakdown given by the Anglo-American Committee. Another force not mentioned by the Anglo-American Committee was the Jewish National Guard. (See Appendix IX-A p. 863).

The breakdown of the main Zionist forces on 29 November 1947,³ was therefore as follows (a) the Home Guard (Mishmar Haam) (b) garrison troops (KHIM) referred to by the Anglo-American Committee as a "static force" (c) the "field army" (KHISH) (d) the JSP (e) the Palmach. These were not full-time forces in 1946. Also, they were all organised on a territorial basis, i.e. they were tied in small units at company or platoon strength to the places of residence or work of their members. But starting from May 1947, and in accordance with Plan Bet, (see pp. 73 & 86 above) the Zionist military planners set themselves the task of converting the KHISH and the Palmach to a war footing. This was to be done by (a) disconnecting the units of these forces from their *local* territorial base (b) regrouping them in larger units at battalion and brigade strength (c) assigning the new brigades specific theatres of operation to fit in with the British withdrawal plans and the requirements of the military take-over in the light of the partition decision. Meanwhile

1) Compare p. lxiii ff above.

2) Compare Appendix IX-A p. 862.

3) Excluding the so-called "dissident" groups (for which see p. 863) and various British sponsored Jewish police forces other than the JSP (for which see p. 862). For the strength of all these forces see Appendix IX-A.

the JSP operated as an excellent cover for (a) the movement of arms and men and (b) their protection *en route* to their new areas of operation. As the plan got into stride the Palmach, placed increasingly on a war establishment, was assigned the role of a general strategic reserve to spearhead operations in the various brigade areas and for other "emergency" tasks. Appendix IX-A gives an over-all view of the brigade structure of the KHISH and Palmach as it emerged in the spring of 1948.

Basing themselves upon this reorganisation, the Zionist military planners drew up in late 1947 two new general plans: Plan Gimmel (Plan C) and Plan Dalet (Plan D).¹ These were strictly operational plans. Plan Dalet was the master-plan for the military take-over of as much Arab territory as was feasible in the name of the partition resolution. Its overriding objective was the seizure and retention of territory. The minimum area to be seized was, of course, that assigned to the Jewish State. But certain Jewish settlements, e.g. in Upper Western Galilee (See Map 16, p. 701) lay outside the area of the Jewish state and these had to be "defended". The Jewish sector of Jerusalem² lay in the middle of the proposed Arab state and this was "undesirable". Jewish settlements in the plains were "dominated" by Arab villages on higher ground, and these villages, although in the proposed Arab state, presented a "security threat" to the Jewish settlements. The area of the Jewish state proposed by the UN partition plan had already been described by Zionist leaders as the "irreducible *minimum*". There was no telling what Plan Dalet would yield in terms of territory, since the Arabs were resisting partition and by so doing inviting "retaliation". But there was one constraint—the time factor. Plan Dalet should achieve its principal objectives *before or by* 15 May 1948. On that day, it will be recalled, the British Mandate would end and a juridical vacuum would be created in Palestine unless it was filled by the military *fait accompli* of the rise of Israel.

Plan Gimmel's role was to buy time for the mobilisation of the forces necessary to carry out Plan Dalet. It would seize strategic points vacated by the British, terrorise the Arab population and undermine its will to resist, destroy any Arab concentrations, keep Arab forces off balance, maintain lines of communication *through* Arab territory between Jewish localities. When would Dalet replace Gimmel? This depended on the

- 1) For a Zionist version of this plan see Lorch, Chapter 71.
- 2) Jerusalem and its environs were to become a UN supervised *corpus separatum* according to the UN partition plan.

pattern and pace of the British withdrawal, the mobilisation rate of the KHISH and Palmach brigades, but above all on the nature of Palestinian Arab resistance. Indeed Dalet might not be needed at all if the resistance of the Palestine Arabs collapsed under Gimmel. But it did not. How pitifully inadequate Arab Palestinian strength was is clear from Appendix VIII. But the Palestinian Arabs had no doubt why they had to fight, badly led and poorly organised though they were. Also, after endless verbal attitudinising and dithering by the Arab League, a force of irregulars—the Arab Liberation Army—was trickled into Palestine, and this, absurdly small as it was,¹ boosted morale and stiffened resistance.

Between 29 November 1947 and 15 May 1948 Palestine was plunged into all the horrors of civil war, with Britain, to be sure, retaining its sovereignty over the country. Although strained to breaking point, the Palestine Arabs held their ground throughout the months of December, January, February and March under the blow of Plan Gimmel, supplemented by the barbarities of the Irgun and Lehi. By mid-March Palestinian Arab steadfastness was making an impression on the UN. The U.S. State Department, in particular, began to reconsider its position and spoke of the need for a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the possibility of a UN trusteeship over Palestine.

At the news of this reappraisal by the U.S. of its attitude on Palestine, “a frenzy of rage and disappointment”, according to Eban, “rolled through the Jewish World”. In Chapter 69 he tells us how Weizmann put matters right again in a *tête-à-tête* with President Truman held on 18 March. The President, we are told, “gave his visitor a specific commitment. He would *work for the establishment and recognition of the Jewish state,*² of which the Negev would be a part.”³ (Many years later, in May 1967, Eban himself was to perform similar miracles at the White House). The way was now clear for Plan Dalet.

Zero-hour for Plan Dalet was 1 April 1948. Appendix VII lists the *thirteen* operations carried out within this plan and their objectives. There were only six weeks to go. Hence the merciless fury of the assaults. The greatest Arab asset was that they were there, on site, in their towns and villages. But this was the historic opportunity to de-Arabise the land of Israel, to negate Arab presence by simply removing it, to solve with a few crush-

1) Compare Appendix IX-B.

2) Editor's italics.

3) p. 740.

ing blows all the problems presented by the fact that, in the UN proposed Jewish state, the Arabs were equal in number to the Jews and owned the bulk of the land. Plan Dalet was conducted on two levels, the military and psychological. On the military level, the main strategy was of massive surprise attack against civilian populations softened by continuous mortar and rocket bombardment. On the psychological level, this was accompanied by intermittent announcements broadcast in Arabic from clandestine Hagana radio stations and from loudspeakers mounted on armoured cars in the target areas. The announcements threatened dire punishment, warned of the spread of epidemics, and named specific escape routes which the inhabitants could take to flee the carnage. Supplementing this dual strategy were carefully calculated acts of histrionic cruelty against small villages, designed to increase the credibility of Israel's might and induce an exodus from the countryside parallel to the exodus from the towns. For close-ups of some of these operations the reader is referred to de Reynier's account of the massacre of Deir Yasin on 10 April¹ (Chapter 72), Levin's description of the destruction of the village of Kolonia on 12 April² (Chapter 73), Wilson's account of the attack on the Arab population of Haifa on 21-22 April³ (Chapter 74), and Kimche's account of the rape of Jaffa on 27 April⁴ (Chapter 75).

The Palestinian Arabs broke under the full impact of Plan Dalet. The combination of military and psychological techniques produced a panic of mass proportions. The inhabitants of the coastal towns, Jaffa, Haifa and Acre, cut off from their hinterlands, were, for President Nixon's information, literally thrown into the sea.⁵ Hundreds of men, women and children were drowned in the scramble under fire for any vessel or fishing craft to take them to safety. A vast exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees was driven before the victorious Jewish brigades across the borders. Plan Dalet was supremely successful and the road was open for the restoration of the historical frontiers of Israel in the whole country.

Already by 23 April, and with the fall of Haifa, it was clear that Plan Dalet had achieved its purpose. On that day and according to Eban (Chapter 76) President Truman sent word

- 1) This massacre was part of Operation Nachshon, for which see Appendix VII p. 856.
- 2) Also part of Operation Nachshon.
- 3) This was Operation Misparayim, for which see *Ibid.*
- 4) This was part of Operation Chametz, for which see *Ibid.*
- 5) Compare Nixon's remark, p. xxi above.

to Weizmann in New York via Judge Samuel Rosenman "one of President Truman's closest political advisers". The President had told Rosenman "I have Dr. Weizmann on my conscience" (sic).¹ But the substance of the message was: "If a Jewish State was declared, the President would recognise it immediately". Incidentally, 23 April was Passover Eve. (Does the American President look at other calendars?).

With the President's renewed support, operation Dalet reached its climax. Eight new operations were mounted between 23 April and 14 May, four of which were outside the area of the proposed Jewish state.²

This anthology is not concerned with events after 15 May 1948. On 14 May a letter was sent to the White House by Eliahu Elath, representative of the Jewish Agency in the United States, as "representative of the Jewish state" *which had not yet been proclaimed*. The letter, sent in a taxicab, requested American recognition of the Jewish State. Before the cab reached the White House news arrived from Palestine that a Jewish state had been proclaimed. At 5.16 Truman authorised the recognition of Israel by the U.S. (The year 1948 was also a presidential election year.)

The fall of hundreds of Palestinian Arab villages and the towns of Tiberias, Safad, Acre, Haifa and Jaffa, as well as the threat to Arab Jerusalem, compounded by the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Arab refugees in the Arab countries, forced the Arab governments, under tremendous public pressure, to act, however belatedly. Units of some of the Arab regular armies went into Palestine on 15 May. This has been described in Zionist mythology as the invasion of Israel by overwhelming Arab hordes. Arab action was the logical and inevitable response to plans Gimmel and Dalet and the only means of *stemming* the tide of refugees and averting the complete loss of Palestine. For the balance of power between the Zionist and Arab regular forces on 15 May see Appendices IX-A and IX-B respectively.

Three chapters pertaining to events after 1948 are, however, deliberately included. Chapter 77 by Glubb intimates what would have happened to Arab Jerusalem in May 1948 if the Arab Legion had not intervened. Chapter 78 describing the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator, at Zionist hands, symbolises the transitory usefulness of the United Nations to Zion. Chapter 79 by Childers unmasks the fantastic fabrication by Zionist propagandists to the effect that the Arab exodus

1) Editor's interpolation.

2) Compare Appendix VII.

from Palestine in 1948 was due to orders given them by their leaders—an alibi with which the Zionists hoped to get away with the murder of a people and the conquest of their land.

A word about chapter 80 by Kohn. The editor strongly disagrees with the writer's analysis of the Zionist leaders, Ahad Ha'am, Herzl and Weizmann. The chapter is included because it is a sincere attempt at the criticism of Zionism by a distinguished Jewish scholar. It is a pointer to the only way out of the deepening tragedy of Palestine—the start of self-examination by liberal Jews through whom, in spite of all that has happened, a bridge may yet be built between perhaps the two closest peoples on earth—the Arabs and the Jews.

* * *

On 14 May, 1948, the Chief Secretary of the British administration called a press conference in his office in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. This was the last day of the Mandate. After a statement on the achievements of His Majesty's Government in the country and the unhappy circumstances of the termination of the Mandate, one of the assembled journalists asked: "And to whom do you intend to give the keys of your office?" The Chief Secretary, blushing, and valiantly forcing a smile, replied: "I shall put them under the mat"—a fitting epitaph to perhaps the shabbiest régime in British colonial history.

W. K.

PART I

ALCHEMY OF A MYTH : FROM THE CANAANITES TO BALFOUR

“But the Jew emigrates more readily since his creed is linked to a book, not to a *place*.”

Theodore Reinach, “Diaspora,”
The Jewish Encyclopedia, 1901,
Vol. IV, p. 561.

1

The Land of Canaan*

ILENE BEATTY**

Writers on Middle East history call Palestine the crossroads of the ancient world. This is no mere figure of speech. It was and is a real crossroads, and therein lay—and now lies—the root of the trouble.

Then, as now, the surrounding picture changed as old nations fell and new ones rose, but throughout the whole of ancient history the great and densely populated Egypt of the Pharaohs was on the south. Palestine's east line joined with a row of small neighboring countries—Edom, Moab, Ammon, and Gilead—while the great Arabian desert beyond was filled with countless thousands of nomadic tribesmen. And farther east, beyond the great desert, the rich nations of Assyria and Babylonia flourished throughout the centuries on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.¹ At times the Amorites on the immediate north in what is now Syria were powerful, and at one time Mitanni beyond sprang into prominence. For several hundred years the Hittites were northwest in Asia Minor. West lay Crete with its splendid culture, and across the strait of the Hellespont on the mainland of Europe lay the land later known as Greece, with its adjacent Isles of the Sea, their ships full of ripsnorting sea rovers who cruised the Mediterranean and could invade Palestine from that direction.

Palestine, the ancient Land of Canaan, was in the center, between all these—the corridor, the passageway, the sea outlet, the crossroads across which all the surrounding nations could

* From Ilene Beatty, *Arab and Jew in the Land of Canaan* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1957), pp. 27-49 and 50-52. The chapter from which these excerpts have been taken is entitled "Political Rights." Copyright © 1957, by Ilene Beatty McNulty. Reprinted by permission of Henry Regnery Company.

** Formerly member of the American School of Oriental Research, Jerusalem.

jump at each other, perhaps annihilate each other. By taking and holding the crossroads, any one of them could also bar all the others out of this highway intersection.

To gain control of Canaan, the vital four-way crossing, the surrounding nations invaded and conquered it in turn from the south, the east, the north and the west, the stronger nations succeeding the weaker in a continuous stream, sometimes surging back and forth in a tug-of-war, but flowing in from the earliest known times right down in an uninterrupted sequence to the present. Each nation, as now, tried to get a toehold, then complete control, then establish a political claim to Palestine and make the claim stick permanently.

Always, between foreign conquests, the settled inhabitants of the Land of Canaan, the Canaanites, tried to set up their own independent government and to stay free. They never succeeded, as we shall see. Always, *because they were a crossroads*, some of the neighboring Great Powers seized them and established sovereign rule. Throughout its long history, the *only* sovereign rule of any length or consequence was by conquerors from without who either ruled from without or moved in bodily onto the Canaanites.

Of all these various conquerors and sovereign rulers, which one established the best political right to Palestine?

As a preface, we state the position of the present civilized world: any dispute over property, whether individual or national, should be settled, not by one claimant taking it forcibly from the other individual or nation with a shotgun, but by due process of law, by civil litigation in a courtroom for the individual; and for nations, civil litigation before the International World Court, with the evidence presented in an orderly manner and the litigants, whether individual or national, abiding by the decision.

This evidence, like a real estate abstract, should show a complete history of the property's ownership from the beginning.

What is the story of Palestine's ownership? What does the abstract show?

Here, in the following pages, is a brief but complete historical record of Palestine from the earliest known times right down to and including the present. . . .

. . . Archaeologists tell us that the inhabitants of 50,000 to 20,000 years ago lived in the open during the warm, dry periods, and in caves during the cold, wet periods where their fossils and stone hand-axes have been found.²

Tools and utensils in the successively later levels of excavation indicate that the primitive peoples gradually became more

adept in their means of existence and survival as time went on. To their stone hand axes and fist hatchets they added other implements, flint arrowheads, as they learned to hunt effectively, flint sickle blades with hafts of bone as they learned to reap more expeditiously, pick-like hoes, pestles and mortars, bone pins and awls. From fossil bones we learn that the dog is indeed man's oldest friend, for it was the first animal they were able to domesticate.

At this now advanced stage, what kind of people were these primitives? Little fellows about five feet tall. Their skeletons and the shape of their fossil skulls indicate Semitic-Hamitic stock, so the experts tell us.³ This agrees well with the Biblical statement that the Canaanites were the first people in Palestine. Canaan was the son of Ham—and Ham and Shem were brothers with skulls probably as alike as two Palestinian pomegranates.*

So this country as history first knows it, was peopled by Canaanites and named the Land of Canaan. But the inhabitants were also known by the name of the town or valley in which they lived—just as Americans in Los Angeles are sometimes referred to as Angelenos, so were the Canaanites in the city of Jebus (Jerusalem) called Jebusites.

The Canaanites advanced in the arts and crafts and learned to build houses whose levelled clay floors were finished with lime plaster beautifully painted and polished.⁴ Of course the houses were clustered together near a water supply—a spring or a well, or on the banks of a stream.

We may be fairly proud of these and the other nearby originators of civilization, for with no previous knowledge to guide them, they discovered soft copper about 4,000 B.C.⁵ and within the next thousand years learned to combine it with tin to make the warmly rich and beautiful bronze, a discovery probably more important to the world at that time than the discovery of nuclear fission is to us now, for it introduced the science of metallurgy and gave these primitive peoples hard, sharp, and durable tools and weapons.

It also made them more dangerous to each other. Just as we erect an arctic radar screen against our potential enemies now, the ancients built massive walls to encircle and protect their towns—Beth-shan and Jericho, and Jebus (Jerusalem) and Megiddo—names heard with an odd sense of recognition dating from our childhood days in Sunday School class.

Archeological remains of the period in the form of goods

* Ham and Shem along with a third brother Yafith were the sons of Noah from whom, after the Flood, all mankind was descended.

traded show that commerce was brisk between Egypt and Babylonia via the Canaanite crossroads.

The importance of the intersection was recognized even at that early date. Egypt, like Mexico on our south, was the nearer, so the powerful Pharaohs of the First and Second Egyptian Dynasties extended their domain to include Canaan, which became a colonial possession.⁶ This was about 2800 B.C., and from this distance we can recognize the first colonial administrator to reach and take charge of the crossroads—he is a fine-boned, wiry, brown-bodied Egyptian in a white linen kilt.

But other points of the compass were to be heard from, and, as the years passed, nomads pushed into the Canaanite corridor, disturbing the peace and prompting thoughts of rebellion among the settled population.

Writing had been invented, and Egypt inscribed on vases and statuettes the names of potential colonial rebels in a set of inscriptions called the Execration Texts, names which included some of the peoples of Canaan.⁷

Historians believe the 20th and 19th centuries B.C. correspond to the Patriarchal Age of the Bible and that the Hebrew or Habiru tribesman named Abram may have come up from Babylonian Chaldea and drifted into the Land of Canaan at about this time.⁸

Although Egypt still claimed Canaan as part of her empire, some of the nomads from the north who were called Hyksos disregarded this and shifted south to enter the Land of Canaan.⁹ About 1710 B.C. they knocked the little Egyptian colonial governor on the head. If we may judge by a statue in the British Museum, the Hyksos administrator who took over the crossroads was long-nosed, thin-lipped and big-eared.¹⁰

The empire of the Hyksos lasted in Canaan from about 1710 to 1480 B.C. and left literally thousands of inscribed seals everywhere.

In 1480 B.C. the kilted, brown Egyptians, coming up from the south, drove the Hyksos out of Canaan and once again took possession of the crossroads to hold it this time for a well-authenticated 130 years.¹¹

Then the Pharaoh Akhnaten of Egypt lost the empire himself. He believed in only one God and not in the many Egyptian gods, which belief to the Egyptians was manifest heresy. The empire fell to pieces, and in the general confusion, Egypt's foreign colonies, including Canaan, got free. The date for this (Albright Chronology) is 1350 B.C.

But the city kings of Canaan, each too weak to stay free, were easy prey for the next attackers from another direction.

These aggressors were easy to predict, for they had a new and up-to-the-minute weapon of war, a cold and deadly killer, the last word, the latest discovery which would influence all subsequent history up to and including this modern stainless steel moment. It was iron. And up northwest, in Asia Minor, the peak-headed, barrel-bodied Hittites had it. In their mountain mine-caves they smelted it and worked it secretly by elaborate ritual formulas which would impart magical powers of strength and self-preservation to the owner of each and every sword and dagger.¹²

Armed thus, the Hittites set out and took most of the territory belonging to their neighbor Mittani. The Assyrians on the east took the rest of it, and Mittani disappeared.

The victorious Hittites then turned south and took Syria (the land of the Amorites). Then they took Canaan, and the crossroads administrator became a Hittite wearing a hood-like helmet and a broad belt fitting as snugly round his middle as a hoop around a barrel.

Egypt had gone to pieces temporarily, but she got hold of herself, and about 1290 B.C. (Albright Chronology), her most famous Pharaoh—Ramses the Great—roared up from the south to meet the Hittites head on in a mighty battle at Kadesh in Amor and succeeded in retaking the southern part of the Canaanite corridor. The victory was limited, for the iron-fisted Hittites still held Amor.

History then began to gather itself for a supreme effort, and events which would reshape the entire world of the ancient Mediterranean were now in the making. Fighting men and nations wanted not only the magic iron, but conquest—lands, wealth, trade routes. They swept forward.¹³

As the movements of peoples farther away began to affect Canaan, the perimeter of the crossroads was enlarged. Farther to the west and north, the Balkan and Black Sea peoples slid down into Greece, where the big, blond Achaean adventurers took to the sea, crossed the Hellespont, and attacked the Phrygians at Troy. Ripsnorters from all the islands of the eastern Mediterranean got out their oars, hoisted sail, and their war galleys swarmed all along the coasts and far to the southeast corner of the Mediterranean to attack Egypt.

On land, everyone began to move—a mass migration by two-wheeled wagon—and the world surged like a tide. Suddenly, about 1200 B.C., the Hittite Empire was wiped out (how is not known), with only its remnants surviving in Amor. The tide rolled south into that land, and the Amorites picked up and began to move too.

Egypt repulsed the attempted invasion, drove the invaders back, and it is thought that at this time the Habiru, or Hebrew, descendants of Abraham in bondage in Egypt, escaped in the general confusion and fled to the desert of Sinai.

Wandering there in the eternal search for pasture, the Hebrews grazed their flocks forward, and the desert tribes already there did the same, inching toward the grasslands of Canaan whenever possible.

Egypt had also defeated the sea-raiders and pushed them away. One contingent of these raiders, the Philistines, backed up along the coast of Canaan as Egypt chased them up from the south.

So Canaan had Egypt still trying to maintain its hold from that direction while the Amorites closed in from the north, the desert tribes (including the Hebrews) from the east, and the ripsnorting sea-raiders from the west—all making a rush for the crossroads!¹⁴ Often as the Canaanites had been caught in the middle, seldom had they been squeezed so hard.

Who won the race? Those who happened to be nearest: the Philistine warriors whose trademark was a crown-like circlet of feathers, from the west, by inundation; and the bearded Hebrews, or Israelites, as they now called themselves, from the eastern desert, by sporadic attack and infiltration.

It is believed by some authorities that the Israelites made their Exodus from Egypt about 1224 B.C.¹⁵ And that after wandering forty years in the desert, they, in the psychological moment when everything had gone to pieces, invaded Canaan about 1184 B.C. This was at exactly the same time Troy is believed to have fallen (an odd coincidence little noticed by historians).

Of the two foreign invaders, the feather-crowned Philistines¹⁶ were the stronger, for they defeated the bearded Israelites and even put them in bondage. ("And the Lord delivered them into the hands of the Philistines forty years", Judges 13:1.)

The Philistines also left a lasting mark, their name, on the crossroads. It ceased to be called Canaan and came in time to be known as Palestine. Now, 3000 years later, after many changes of allegiance and sovereignty, it is still most familiarly known as Palestine.

However, neither the Philistines nor the Israelites were able to establish control over the native inhabitants in their walled cities. Most historians list Egypt as the ruler until the end of the reign of Rameses III, about 1154 B.C., after which Egyptian rule seemed to become one in name only.¹⁷

Canaan was in a state of tug-of-war between the two

invaders from without, the Philistines and the Israelites, until about 1000 B.C. That is the date given for the Israelite King David's taking of Jerusalem.¹⁸ He defeated the Philistines, conquered Canaan, and went on eventually to conquer the row of small neighboring nations east of Palestine (Edom, Moab, Ammon, and Gilead). He set up an independent kingdom, and the crossroads ruler was now a cloaked and bearded warrior-poet.

David ruled, in all, forty years (seven as a city-king at Hebron and thirty-three years at Jerusalem after the establishment of the kingdom);¹⁹ and his son Solomon ruled for forty years,²⁰ giving the Kingdom of David and Solomon a complete life span of seventy-three years.

Then it ended. After the death of Solomon, about 927 B.C., the kingdom fell apart. The small neighboring nations on the east got free, and Palestine itself was split into two countries hostile to each other. The tribes of Judah and Benjamin formed the kingdom of Judah on the south, and the remaining ten tribes formed the kingdom of Israel on the north.

Each one was too weak to stand alone. Egypt came up, invaded Judah, and sacked Solomon's new temple at Jerusalem. Ben-Hadad of Syria on the north annexed part of Israel's territory, then formed an alliance with Israel against Judah. Desperately, Judah appealed to far-off Assyria.

The black-bearded and brutal Assyrians needed no second invitation but came over from the distant north-east, devastated and conquered the whole of Israel in 722 B.C. and carried the Ten Tribes away into captivity (Albright Chronology). Thus the section of the Hebrews known as Israel disappeared.

Judah tried to survive but was too small. Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon came up from the distant east, invaded Judah, and, in 586 B.C., destroyed Jerusalem,²¹ carried the Judeans also into captivity, and left a Babylonian star-gazer to manage the crossroads.

But in 538 B.C., the Babylonians themselves saw the handwriting on the wall at the feast of Belshazzar, as the conquering Persians from still farther to the northeast marched in and took over the Babylonian Empire. This included Palestine.²²

The lenient, light-worshiping Persians allowed some of the Babylonian captive Jews to return to Jerusalem and rebuild it. The Persians, who were of Aryan extraction, sat on their Persian carpets and administered the crossroads until the next invader came, this time from the west.

He was Alexander the Great, leading a victorious army of Greeks to conquer and take the Middle East as far as Persia,

including Palestine, which was taken in 330 B.C.²³

By far the most civilized people of the ancient world, the Greeks were sculptors and architects, scientists and mathematicians, poets and philosophers. And so the handsome athlete at the crossroads wore the *chlamys*²⁴ of the Greek soldier, but he probably wrote poetry as he watched the world go by.

From these newcomers, the young and eager of the Middle East learned to reason, to think along new lines, to realize that the world was full of dazzling ideas—and, consequently, to depart from age-old tradition—a departure which infuriated the Jewish elders.

Alexander the Great had taken Egypt and Syria, and when he died in 323 B.C. his Middle East Empire was divided between two of his generals: Ptolemy, who got Egypt; and Seleucus, who got Syria. And these generals quarreled over Palestine, which lay between them. Ptolemy of Egypt got it. But in 200 B.C. it fell to the Seleucids of Syria.

Division brought weakness and dissension, and the Jews of Palestine seized the opportunity to revolt under their High Priest Simon Maccabaeus in 142 B.C. However, this date for Maccabean independence is debatable, for the historian Josephus (*Antiquities*, XIII, x, i) says that Simon's successor, John Hyrcanus (134-105 B.C.), was the one who revolted. And the independence itself is debatable. At that time Judea was not only still claimed by the Seleucids but by one Diodotus Tryphon, a military adventurer who had set himself up as king, and the Jews were paying tribute to said Tryphon.²⁵

The Jewish attempt at independence was short lived, for in 70 B.C. they were overrun and conquered by a new and apparently powerful enemy, Armenia, coming down the north road.²⁶

It is hardly worth while describing the Armenians, for they proved to be only a flash in the pan when a real power, Rome, arrived from the west, the invader coming from across the sea, from farther afield than ever before.

The Roman Empire, based in what is now Italy, had by this time become the colossus of the ancient world and now proceeded to conquer most of that world. Roman citizens were go-getters with the technical knowledge to build and organize anything, anywhere.

In 63 B.C. the Roman general, Pompey, took Jerusalem,²⁷ and while a helmeted Roman legionnaire stood at the traffic intersection, Rome set up a puppet king, an Edomite named Herod, to rule Palestine, which in time became the Roman province of Judea.

The hated Herod levied confiscatory taxes, impressed labor, and, aping Rome, built enormous and costly public improvements, including new city walls and a great temple for the Jews at Jerusalem. It was into this world that Jesus was born.

Unfortunately, the Roman emperors of this particular period had little regard for traditional Roman justice and equity. Mostly they were brutal tyrants, and in two instances, actually madmen, while their local puppet kings and procurators in the provinces and colonies were often equally brutal and tyrannical.

As a result, the provinces of Judea fought two bitter and bloody, but unsuccessful, wars of revolt—the first in A.D. 70 and the second in A.D. 135.

The final Roman punishment was to destroy Jerusalem completely and thoroughly disperse the entire Jewish population to the far parts of the Roman Empire.²⁸

Rome rebuilt Jerusalem and renamed it Aelia Capitolina, and, at first, no Jew could live there or even enter the city (*Syrian Pageant* by W.T.F. Castle, page 73). Thus official Jewish connection with Palestine came to an end in A.D. 135 and was non-existent for the next 1800 years.

Roman rule in Judea continued for centuries, first from Rome (63 B.C. to A.D. 395);²⁹ then (A.D. 395 to A.D. 614) from Constantinople (Byzantium), the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, continued at the crossroads until A.D. 614, when the Persians from the east attacked and took Jerusalem. That is the convenient date usually given by historians for the Persian subjugation of all Judea.

The conquest was for only a brief 14 years until 628, when the Persians, in an exchange of conquests and prisoners, returned Palestine to Rome.³⁰

But both nations felt a chill wind creeping in from the wide Arabian desert. It brought clouds of dust from the thundering surge of thousands of nomad horsemen and the voice of the Arab leader Mohammed proclaiming in tones of doom: "The heavens shall be rent in sunder!" They were.

In A.D. 638, the Arab followers of Mohammed took the entire Roman Empire of the Middle East, the Palestine crossroads included.³¹ In time, they extended their rule far along both sides of the Mediterranean and even crossed the Strait of Gibraltar into Spain.

The brown man at the four-corners now wore a desert cloak and headcloth.

By the thousands, the desert Arabs settled in Palestine. They converted the Canaanites (who, through all the changing

sovereignties—although much diluted by foreign blood—still formed the backbone of the rural population) to the Moslem faith, intermarried with them; and the language and customs of the crossroads in time became Arabic; the architecture in time, Arabic; the population itself, partially Arabic.³²

The Arabic followers of Mohammed called themselves Moslems and their religious world Islam. From this time forward, until the end of World War I (with the exception of the relatively brief period of the Crusades), the crossroads was to be under Moslem domination—sometimes from one quarter, sometimes from another, depending on where the Caliph lived and whether he was one of the Omayyads of Damascus, one of the Abassids of Baghdad, or one of the Fatimates of Cairo.³³ Sometimes the rule was even by another race than the Arab. But from whatever quarter and by whatever people, the control remained Moslem.

Under the Arabs, religious persecution finally developed, and by A.D. 1000, the Christian followers of Jesus were obliged to carry ten-pound crosses, and the few scattered Jews still remaining in Palestine were required to wear black garments and bells round their necks.³⁴

About A.D. 1085, Malik Shah made Palestine a part of the empire of the Seljuk Turks which had risen to rule in the northeast in Persia, Iraq, and Anatolia.³⁵ The Turks were Moslem, as were the residents at the crossroads; so the change was merely an external one in which Arab desert architecture included the tiled domes of the Seljuks. Religious persecution continued.³⁶

This prompted Christians, still farther afield in Europe, to organize an army and try to free the Holy Land from Moslem domination. The movement was called a Crusade, and the army of Crusaders, coming from the west across the sea,³⁷ took Jerusalem in A.D. 1099. And now, oddly enough, the Crusader in chain mail who directed traffic at the crossroads was either a Dutchman, or a Frenchman, or an Englishman, or an Italian, or possibly a German.

By means of constant reinforcements through later Crusades, the Europeans maintained limited and uncertain occupation for almost two hundred years.

In the later part of this period, one of the most glamorous figures in history, Saladin, the brave and gallant leader of the Moslem armies, who had come down from the northeast out of the mountain of Kurdistan, dealt the Crusaders their death sentence. This was their defeat at the battle of Hattin, July 4, 1187.

But they did not expire finally until after Tatar hordes called Khwarizmians descended on the crossroads from the Aral Sea and took Jerusalem,³⁸ massacring thousands, and were followed close by Mongol hordes from still farther east under Hulagu Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan, who brought fire and horror and death and destruction to the Middle East.

This was something the Moslems had not counted on. Another contingent of them called the Mamelukes came up from the south, from Cairo in Egypt, and helped the Crusaders defeat the Mongols in A.D. 1260.³⁹

Eventually the Mamelukes turned on their erstwhile Christian allies and finally, in A.D. 1291, they expelled them from the Middle East for good and all, and the last remnants of the disorganized Crusader armies trickled back to Europe.⁴⁰

The Moslem Mamelukes from the south (Egypt, for the umpteenth time) now ruled the crossroads.

Next, down from the northwest came the Ottoman branch of the Turks to defeat the Mamelukes of Egypt and gain possession not only of Palestine but, via that corridor, to move on and conquer Egypt itself, then extend their rule along both sides of the Mediterranean, as the Arabs had done before them. This was about the time Columbus discovered America.

Suleiman the Magnificent took charge in Palestine and rebuilt Jerusalem, where his great walls stand to this day. The Ottoman Turk regime, 1517-1918, was a continuation of the Moslem, and the language of the country continued to be Arabic, as it had been since A.D. 638.

But Turkish rule became corrupt and tyrannical, and the local Arab population in Palestine was ready for revolt by 1914, when World War I began.

In the meantime, another element had been added to the crossroads picture. The Jews had had no part in the political history of Palestine since their final dispersion of A.D. 135, and historians estimate their maximum number in the whole of Palestine at the beginning of the 19th century at fewer than 10,000. Notwithstanding this, the movement called Zionism was organized in Middle Europe with the aim of creating a home in Palestine for the Jewish people, and Jewish immigration was activated in the latter part of the century with the largest settlement made at a village called Tel Aviv, near the Mediterranean.

World War I began in 1914. Turkey, the ruler in Palestine, joined with Germany against Britain and France and was defeated in 1918. The Turks lost Palestine; their rule came to an end and was replaced by a British Mandate, 1923, and the

man in the fez was replaced at the crossroads by a British Tommy.

The Arabs of all the Middle-East States—Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and Palestine—expected independence in return for their help to Britain during the war. The Zionists also, in return for their help to Britain, demanded an independent state in Palestine.

But if Palestine were wholly and independently Arab, the Israel demands could not be met; and if Israel demands were met, the Arabs' could not be. So the UN sawed the child in two. They decreed the end of the British Mandate in 1948, and the Palestine crossroads country was divided between the Zionists and the Arabs. The Zionists, who had infiltrated from the west, were awarded the west half, which they named Israel; and the east half was annexed by the small State of Trans-Jordan (beyond the Dead Sea), which renamed itself the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The United Nations declared Jerusalem an international zone.

The Palestine Arabs were enraged at having half their country taken from them and given to Israel; and the Israelis were enraged at not getting Jerusalem, which they demanded.

War broke out; the Israelis advanced, took additional Palestine territory, evicting almost a million Palestinian refugees, and tried to take Jerusalem but failed.

The United Nations finally succeeded in getting a cessation of hostilities and drew an armistice line along the battlefield. There the matter now stands, with the line being constantly violated in crisis after crisis and no peace settlement in sight.

To add to this stupendous record of multiple ownership and make the problem still more urgent, Palestine is today a crossroads to an even greater degree than ever before. The radius it draws from is enormously expanded, and the Middle East is now a four-way intersection for the criss-crossing airplanes of the world. Planes from the western nations fly in over the Mediterranean; Egypt and Africa come up from the south; Iraq and Iran, Pakistan and India from the east; and Turkey and Russia have a near approach from the north. All gravitate centripetally toward the crossroads vortex, and the avaricious among them scheme more subtly and psychologically than their ancient predecessors dreamed.

Should global war break out, the Great Powers would fight far more furiously for this spot, trying not only to reach the crossroads a jump ahead of each other, but to grab and hold it.

For this reason a permanent settlement is imperative, with some UN agreement among the World Powers to respect the crossroads and keep it inviolate.

Let us then evaluate the evidence we have collected and try to determine who really has a right to Palestine.

The political right to any territory is determined by such fundamentals as priority of occupation, length and continuity of rule, recent ownership, and the racial character of the present population.

After the original Canaanite city-states, Palestine was almost continuously occupied by outsiders. We may best grasp our facts if we reduce them to figures.

<i>Rulers of Palestine</i>	<i>Date of Rule</i>	<i>Length of Rule-Years</i>
	B.C.	
Canaanites	First settlers	?
Egypt	Indefinite	Indefinite
Hyksos	1710-1480	230
Egypt (authenticated)	1480-1350	130
Hittite	1350-1290	60
Egypt	1290-1154	136
Local (Canaanites, Philistines and Jews)	1154-1000	154
Jews (David and Solomon)	1000 - 927	73
Jews (Israel, Ten Tribes)	927 - 722	}
Jews (Judah)	927 - 586	
Jews (widest spread of dates)	1000 - 586	
Babylonia	586 - 538	48
Persia	538 - 330	208
Greece	330 - 323	7
Egyptians (Ptolemies)	323 - 200	123
Seleucids (Syria)	200 - 142	57
Jews (Maccabees, partial only)	142 - 70	72
Seleucids (Tryphon, partial only)	142 - 70	72
Armenia	70 - 63	7
Rome (Western and Eastern Empires)	63 B.C.- A.D. 614	677
	A.D.	
Persia	614 - 628	14
Rome	628 - 638	10
Arab (Moslem)	638 - 1085	447

<i>Rulers of Palestine</i>	<i>Date of Rule</i>	<i>Length of Rule-Years</i>
Turks (Seljuk: Moslem)	1085-1099	14
Crusaders (partial only)	1099-1291	192
Seljuk and Arab (Moslem, partial only)	1099-1291	192
Egypt (Mamelukes: Moslem)	1291-1517	226
Turks (Ottoman: Moslem)	1517-1918	401
Great Britain	1923-1948	25
Jews (Israel, partial, west only)	1948-1957	9
Arab (Jordan, partial, east only)	1948-1957	9

By a process of quick elimination, we weed out the defunct who left no known heirs (Hyksos, Hittites, Philistines, Seleucids, Seljuks); the brief (Babylonia, Greece, Armenia, Great Britain); the partial or divided rule (Seleucid-Maccabee, Crusader-Arab, modern Israel-Jordan); and the short-term second attempts (Persia and Rome).

Next we eliminate the one whose term of rule was not the first, nor the latest, nor long enough to compete seriously with the long-termers: Persia, 208 years.

This leaves us the long-termers, some of whom may also have priority of rule or recent possession and rule. One or two of their names may surprise us.

Egypt was the first outside Great Power to establish sovereignty over the crossroads. If we omit entirely her first long but indefinite terms of occupation as mentioned by Dr. Albright and add only her two early datable terms of 266 years to the later 123-year and the 226-year rule, we arrive at a total of 615 years for Egypt.

The length of the original Jewish rule in Palestine is usually reckoned by them from Saul to the Babylonian captivity. But Saul's early reign had no real sovereignty over the land, which was largely under the control of the Canaanites and Philistines, as it was during the 7 years of David's reign at Hebron before he defeated the Philistines, conquered Canaan, and took Jerusalem. The extended kingdom of David and Solomon, on which the Zionists base their territorial demands, endured for only about 73 years—from approximately 1000 B.C. to about 927 B.C.—which would put it in the short-term class. Thereafter,

neither Israel nor Judah had true independence, for both "paid tribute" to one or another outside Great Power, and each owed its continued existence to the protection of that Great Power. After the conquest of the Ten Tribes of Israel by Assyria in 722 B.C., the rump kingdom of Judah actually occupied an area of about 50 by 75 miles, a much smaller plot of ground than that now held by modern Israel, and equivalent in size to a 50-mile wide patch of our coast reaching from Los Angeles to Oceanside. But if we allow independence to the *entire life* of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, from David's conquest of Canaan in 1000 B.C. to the wiping out of Judah in 586 B.C., we arrive at a 414-year Jewish rule.

Rome's 677 years (63 B.C.—A.D. 614) was the longest continuous occupation by any outside Great Power, and also the most constructive; and about 15 years ago, Rome's heir, Italy, did in fact advance serious claims to the colonial possessions of the ancient Roman Empire.

The Arabs are apt to identify their 447-year rule (A.D. 638-1085) with the Moslem regime which prevailed continuously from A.D. 638 to the present, and claim 1300 years. But this 1300-year span was Arab only in its first 447 years. Thereafter it was successively Seljuk, Mameluke, and Ottoman Turk. However, the position of the Arabs in Palestine is unique, for unlike all the other foreign conquerors, they did not hold themselves aloof but, instead, made Moslem converts of the natives, settled down as residents, and intermarried with them, with the result that all are now so completely Arabized that we cannot tell where the Canaanites leave off and the Arabs begin.

The present Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan claims to re-establish the right-to-rule once inaugurated by their Arab ancestors, just as the present Israel claims to re-establish the right-to-rule once inaugurated by their Hebrew ancestors; but the two of them exercise divided control of Palestine, and neither can be considered stable, for both are and have been from the first either in a state of war or of armistice pending final decision. Until that decision is made, the status of both cannot but be in question,* and for this reason their brief nine-year terms have not been added to the ancestral rule but have been put in the short-and-divided category.

The Ottoman Turks of Turkey were the only recent Great Power long-termers, their 401-year rule beginning in 1517 and

* On December 1st, 1948, a Congress of 2,000 Palestine Arab delegates met at Jericho and acclaimed the then King Abdullāh of Trans-Jordan as "King of All Palestine."

extending down into our own era to the end of World War I (1918).

The list now reads:

<i>Conqueror</i>	<i>Priority</i>	<i>Length of Rule-Years</i>	<i>Recent Rule</i>
Egypt	Yes	615	No
Jews	No	414	No
Roman Empire	No	677	No
Arabs	No	447	No
Turkey	No	401	Yes

If judged strictly on the grounds of one-time political possession by their ancestors (on which they base their political claims), *neither Arab Jordan nor Jewish Israel can qualify*. The records of both the Arabs and the Jews are outclassed by Egypt, the prior Great Power conqueror; Rome, whose rule was longest; and Turkey, which had recent possession. If conquest and dominion ever give validity, then the claims of Egypt, Rome, and Turkey are valid, if they wish to make such claims. (The fact revealed by these statistics—that Egypt actually has a better right in Palestine than Israel—is surely one of the most sardonic in all history.)...

...Who, then, has the legal right to Palestine?

There is one people, almost unmentioned, ignored, and practically forgotten. But they must be named and considered, for they are the most important of all—the native Palestinians themselves.

So far as history knows, they originated in the Canaanites who were the first occupants of the land, the original settlers. When any of the conquerors of the crossroads took prisoners in ancient times, they took them from the cities they besieged and captured. They did not take the time and trouble to go out into the remote valleys and ferret out the inhabitants one by one. So we may be sure that from the beginning, the settled population in the rural districts and small villages remained the same. We may be equally sure that the original stock—the ancient Canaanites—remained where they were, and their descendants did likewise.

It is true that they received an admixture of blood from each of the invaders, especially from the Egyptians, who were the rulers so often and so long. The Hyksos, the Hittites, and the Amorites, as well as the ancient Assyrians and Babylonians must have added their quotas. There must be, even today,

some heritage from the feather-crowned Philistines, who settled in such numbers as to give the land their name.

Because of the disapproval of mixed marriages, the ancient Israelites probably contributed little. But there was Persian blood, and Greek and Roman, no doubt, as well as Turk, both Seljuk and Ottoman.

Among today's people in Palestine, blue eyes are attributed to the Crusaders. And, of course, there is probably a higher percentage of Arab blood than any other, for the Arabs flooded the country, settled down, intermarried, and stayed.

But all these were additions, sprigs grafted onto the parent tree to mingle its sap with theirs. And that parent tree was Canaanite. The Canaanites were first. And when we speak of "Palestinians" or of the "Arab" population, we bear in mind their Canaanite origin.

This is important, for their legal right to the country today stems—not as the Arabs seem to think—from the long period of Arab rule, but from the fact that the Canaanites were first, which gives them *priority*; their descendents have continued to live there, which gives them *continuity*; and (except for the 800,000 dispossessed refugees) they are still living there, which gives them *present possession*. Thus we see that on purely statistical grounds they have a proven legal right to their own land.

Even granting that this were not true, the modern democratic world—through various declarations of principle, including the Atlantic Charter—has stated its belief in a right which transcends any sovereignty of conquest—the right of the people of any country to govern themselves. This, too, would give the Palestinians a right to their own self-government in their own country, Palestine. . . .

NOTES

- 1 Wm. Langer, *An Encyclopedia of History*, section on Early Empires:
 - Crete. "c. 4000 B.C. The Bronze Age in Crete" (p. 46).
 - Canaan. "3200-2100, Early Bronze Age" (p. 29).
 - Greece. "3000-200 B.C. The Greeks, speaking a language belonging to the western division of the Indo-European family, began to spread southward from the northwestern corner of the Balkans" (p. 47).
 - Egypt. "c. 2900-2700 B.C. Dynasties 1-11 (capital, Thinis)" (p. 23).
 - Assyria. "c. 2600-2000 B.C. The city of Asshur, at first Sumerian" (p. 27).
 - Babylonia. "c. 1900-1600 B.C. The first Dynasty of Babylon" (p. 26).
 - Mitanni. "1580-1350 B.C.... Carchemish...and Aleppo remained under the rule of Mitanni." "—outside pressure (Hittites and Amorites in the north)" (p. 23).
- 2 W.F. Albright, *Archaeology of Palestine*, p. 57.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61: "typical early Mediterraneans, with slender bony structure, long-headed (dolichocephalic) and delicate features; the men averaged only a little over 5 feet in height. Since very similar human skeletons have been found in the Badarian of Egypt as well as in late chalcolithic Gezer and Byblus, it seems to follow that these folk belonged to the ancestral *Semito-Hamitic stock*, which had not yet become so sharply differentiated into linguistic and national groups as later."
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 62.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 74: "During the latter part of this period, Palestine and Phoenicia were exposed to strong Egyptian influence and the powerful kings of the Thinite period *seem to have extended their empire* into Asia.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 85: "Monuments attesting to direct connections with the Egyptian Court as far back as the early nineteenth century B.C., have been found far north at Ugarit and far east at Qatna, northeast of Hums.... The Execration Texts even enable us to draw the boundary of the direct sphere of *Egyptian control* across central Syria north of Damascus to the Eleutherus Valley in central Phoenicia."
- 8 Harry M. Orlinsky, *Ancient Israel*, p. 18: "There appears to be good reason for associating the Biblical Hebrews with some of these far-flung Habiru.... Hebrew origins begin essentially with Abraham the son of Terah (Genesis 11), whose origin is located in the region of Ur in southern Mesopotamia, less than thirty miles from Larsa, where Habiru were found about 1900 B.C." "—And after Terah died Abraham took his own immediate family and began the long journey to Canaan."
- 9 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 23: "Egypt...Foreign domination, (Dynasties XV-XVI) (Hyksos), 1680-1580."

- 10 Small ivory statue, "Hyksos king, (possibly King Khayan)," Fig. 178, No. 54678, Fifth Egyptian Room, Case F. British Museum, London.
- 11 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 23: "The great Thutmosis III (1501-1447) in 19 years (17 campaigns) conquered Palestine (through the victory of Megiddo in 1479)."
- 12 V. Gordon Childe, *What Happened in History*, p. 78: "All the practical science of the ancient smiths and miners was certainly embedded in an unpractical matrix of magic ritual. Assyrian texts, even in the First Millenium B.C., contain hints of what such rituals involved—foetuses and virgin's blood."
- 13 W.F. Albright, *The Biblical Period*, p. 18: "—the period of Egyptian decline which followed the death of Marniptah about 1225 B.C. For a decade three weak rulers held the facade of empire together, but the Egyptian dependencies, extremely restive under Marniptah, must have broken away almost entirely from their allegiance to the Pharaoh. After this decade, Egypt fell into complete anarchy for nearly a generation, as vividly portrayed in the preamble to the famous Papyrus Harris."
- 14 Harold Peake and Herbert John Fleure, *The Horse and the Sword*, pp. 2-3: "After 1200 B.C., an important crisis occurred throughout the greater part of the Old World. In 1169 B.C. the Kassite Dynasty suddenly came to an end.... About 1205 the death of Merneptah II was accompanied by the fall of the 19th Dynasty in Egypt.... About 1200 B.C. the Hittite documents suddenly cease.... In 1194 Troy was destroyed by the Achaeans.... After these crises we witness the rise of the Greeks, the Phoenicians, the Philistines, the Hebrews." *Cambridge Ancient History* (Macmillan, 1926), Vol. II, p. 472: "The end of the Bronze Age in the 12th century saw the coming of the Iron Age, the fall of ruling powers and the decline of Civilization.... Everything appears to have lost its stability, and confusion and invasion to have precluded any return to peace."
- 15 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 24: "Merneptah (1225-1215) under whom, probably, Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt."

The theory of the date of 1224 B.C. for the Exodus is considered probable by many historians. Their line of reasoning is as follows: Rameses II the Great must have been the Pharaoh of the Oppression for throughout his unusually long reign of 67 years he was the most monumental builder in that period of Egyptian history. The Bible states that the Israelites actually built a store city of his name. (Exod., 1:11) At his death in 1225 B.C. he was succeeded by his aging and ineffective son Merneptah. Immediately Moses, the Israelite fugitive in Midian, dared return. He spent some months in cowing Pharaoh by means of the plagues and in raising the Israelites, so that their Exodus occurred in the following year, 1224 B.C. If this is true and if the period of their wandering in the desert was 40 years, then

that would place the date of their entry into Canaan as 1184 B.C.

- 16 Some authorities erroneously believe this crown was of pleated leather.
- 17 W.F. Albright, *Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands*, p. 90, gives the date 1175-1154 B.C. for the reign of Rameses III. (The chronology of this particular period of ancient history is under almost constant revision as new archaeological evidence comes to light.)
- 18 Albright Chronology, *Recent Discoveries in Bible Lands* (loose leaf).
- 19 I Chron., 29:27.
- 20 II Chron., 9:30.
- 21 Wm. Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 31: "586-538 B.C. The Jews under Babylonian rule."
- 22 Albright Chronology: "538-330 B.C. The Jews under Persian rule."
- 23 Albright Chronology.
- 24 Funk & Wagnalls *Dictionary*: "chlamys (klemus) *Greek Antiquity*, A short cloak caught up on the shoulder, worn by hunters, soldiers and horsemen."
- 25 Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p. 54: "By 70 B.C. he (Tigranes the Armenian King) was ruler over an empire extending from Ararat to Sinai."
- 27 Albright Chronology.
- 28 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 111: "The suppression of the revolt all but depopulated Judea."
- 29 *Ibid.*, p. 32: "63 B.C.-A.D. 395, Palestine under Roman Rule" (from Rome). P. 120: "A.D. 395, Jan. 17. Theodosius died at Milan. The Roman Empire was divided between his elder son Arcadius, made Augustus in the east, and the younger son Honorius, made Augustus in the west."

From that time on, the Eastern Roman Empire, whose capital was Constantinople (Byzantium), ruled Palestine until that territory was lost to Persia in A.D. 614. Roman rule ended in Palestine with Persian conquest: Antioch, Apameia, Emesa, Kaisareia; Damascus (613), Jerusalem (614), Egypt (619).

- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 127: "A.D. 628-629 Kobad II (Persia) who made peace with Heraclius (Eastern Roman Empire) on the basis of an exchange of conquests and prisoners."
- 31 *Ibid.*, pp. 184-5: "A.D. 634-641. The Arab Conquests. Damascus (635); the Battle of Yarmuk (636) gained all Syria; capitulation of Jerusalem (638). The seacoast occupied."
- 32 Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, p. 17: "The cataclysmic conquests of the primitive Muslim Arabs seem to respond antistrophically in the rhythm of history, to the cataclysmic conquests of Alexander. Like these, they changed the face of the world in half a dozen years."

Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 90: "Arabisation...had two aspects—linguistic, by which the population of the conquered countries acquired Arabic as their mother tongue, and racial, by which masses of pure Arab

immigrants settled and intermarried with the Syrian population. Palestine and Trans-jordan received the largest proportion."

- 33 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 186: "The Omayyad Caliphate, 661-750. . . . Damascus." P. 188: "The Abbasid Caliphate, 750-1100. . . . Baghdad." P. 262: "968-1171. The Fatimid Dynasty. . . . Egypt."
- 34 Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
- 35 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 254f. A.J. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 28: "—the invasions of the Saljuq Turks which provoked the crusading counter-attack on our Western society."
- 36 Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- 37 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
- 38 Castle, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
- 39 *Ibid.*, p. 107.
- 40 Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

I wish to make it plain at the outset that my remarks are directed to one aspect of Zionist claims—the claim to fulfil scripture by the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine—and must not be interpreted in any other way or be taken to prejudice the claim of the Jews to be allowed to make a home in Palestine.

To a superficial reader it well might seem that a divine promise to give a land to a particular people made some four thousand years ago and often repeated constituted that people owners of that land by divine right. Now if this is the Jewish title to Palestine it must be carefully scrutinised. Accordingly I propose to examine a few texts which are familiar to all practising Jews, and which have profoundly influenced some Christian bodies, particularly in America.

The points which are of importance are (1) To whom were the promises made? (2) What was the extent of the land which was promised? And (3) Was the promise irrevocable or was it subject to any conditions?

(1) TO WHOM WERE THE PROMISES MADE?

The first explicit promise of Palestine to the descendants of Abraham was at Shechem (now Nablus) in Genesis xii, 7: 'Unto thy seed will I give this land.' Ch. xiii, 15, when Abraham is standing on a hill near Bethel, has the words: 'all the land which thou seest to thee will I give it and to thy seed for ever'. xv, 18 is more explicit: 'Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river

* Reprinted from *Zionists and the Bible* by the same author (Beirut, 1954).

** British orientalist (1888-1965); formerly Professor of Arabic, School of Oriental and African Studies, and Head of the Department of the Near and Middle East, University of London.

Euphrates'. The promises are repeated to Isaac; and to Jacob in xxviii, 12: 'the land where-on thou liest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed, and thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth, and thou shalt spread abroad to the west, and to the east, and to the north, and to the south; and in thee and in thy seed shall all the families of the earth be blessed'. When Abraham made a covenant with God through circumcision (xvii, 8) all the land of Canaan was promised to him as 'an everlasting possession.' Other passages might be quoted, but these are representative, and others add nothing that is relevant here.

Now it is generally supposed that these promises were made to the Jews, and to the Jews alone. But that is not what the Bible says. The word 'to thy seed' inevitably include Arabs, both Muslims and Christians, who can claim descent from Abraham through his son Ishmael. (Here we are not concerned with the Muslim tradition that Abraham was once at Meccah and left Ishmael there). Ishmael was the reputed father of a large number of Arab tribes, and Genesis records that Abraham became the father of many north Arabian tribes through his concubine Keturah. It cannot be argued that the words of Genesis xxi, 10-12, necessarily cancel the promises made to Abraham's seed as a whole: '(Sarah) said to Abraham, Cast out this bondwoman and her son: for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son Isaac. And the thing was very grievous in Abraham's sight on account of his son. And God said unto Abraham, Let it not be grievous in thy sight because of the lad, and because of thy bondwoman: in all that Sarah saith unto thee, hearken unto her voice: for in Isaac shall seed be called unto thee. And also of the son of the bondwoman will I make a nation, because he is thy seed'. It is true that henceforth among the descendants of Isaac 'the seed of Abraham' was taken to mean the Israelites; but from the beginning it was not so, and the descendants of Ishmael had every right to call and consider themselves of the seed of Abraham. . . .

Moreover, when the covenant of circumcision was made with Abraham (Genesis xvii) and the land of Canaan was promised as 'an everlasting possession', it was Ishmael who was circumcised: Isaac had not then been born.

From this brief study of the divine promise to the descendants of Abraham we see that the first promise necessarily included all the descendants of Ishmael; but that afterwards in the time of Isaac and Jacob the promise was narrowed to their descendants, though not in such a way as to exclude explicitly their Arab brethren; and it is well known that many Arabs accompanied Moses and Joshua into Palestine when the country

was partially occupied; and not a little of Moses' success was due to the kindness and hospitality of Jethro the Midianite, who was of course an Arab and Moses' father-in-law.

(2) EXTENT OF THE PROMISED LAND

The second question as to what was the extent of 'The Promised Land' is a little difficult to determine.* The passages quoted under (1) begin with a vague reference to 'this land' from the starting point of Shechem (Nablus), and go on to include all the area from 'the river of Egypt' to the Euphrates; the third passage speaks of Abraham's descendants spreading out in all four directions. Here, again, it is important to note that the promise of dominion from Nile to Euphrates was made before the birth of Ishmael and before the birth of Isaac, so that this territory was not to be necessarily and exclusively Israelite; *and save for the short period when Solomon's authority was recognised in this area (I Kings iv, 21) it has always been in the possession of the Arabs.*

Looking again at Genesis xiii, 15, it is clear that Transjordan was included in the promise to Abraham, because it would be plainly visible from the hill at Bethel; but this promise again predates the birth of Ishmael and Isaac, and so cannot be held to constitute an exclusively Israelite claim to the territory on the other side of the Jordan.

However, in the Book of Deuteronomy Moses told the people that God had commanded them to go in and occupy the country from the Mediterranean in the west to the Euphrates in the east, and from the Negeb in the south to the Lebanon in the north. These instructions the Israelites did not, or could not, carry out. They could not occupy the coast land which the Philistines held, and they never possessed the ports or the hinterland of Phoenicia. Some centuries later in the reign of David, they did gain possession of Damascus, and David entered into a treaty of friendship with Hiram, king of Tyre; so that when Solomon held a great service of dedication when the temple building was completed deputies came from as far north as the region of Hama and from the south as far as the modern El-'Arish. But before Solomon's reign had ended much of David's empire had returned to its former possessors. Everyone is aware that the process of attrition went on until the kingdom of Judea was confined to a few hundred square miles of land round

* See Beatty, pp. 5-9, on the ancient history of Palestine.

Jerusalem, and even this was lost to the Babylonians in 597 B.C.

(3) WAS THE PROMISE IRREVOCABLE?

It will have been observed that two of the passages quoted under (1) use the words 'for ever' and 'everlasting' of what is to be a future Israelite occupation of Palestine. The same word stands for both the English renderings in the Hebrew original; and 'everlasting' is not the proper meaning. The word (*'olam*) means 'a long time', 'antiquity', 'futuraity', and we read of 'days of old', 'waste places of old', 'gates of old', 'from of old', and similar expressions, all of which employ this word rendered above 'for ever', or 'everlasting'. Again, a psalmist says: 'I will sing for ever', an expression which the most literal interpreter of Holy Scripture can hardly suppose to be the literal meaning!

Thus, summing up the evidence so far adduced, one is forced to the conclusion that the land of Palestine was not originally promised to the Jews exclusively, and that the first promise was indefinite ('this land') and was subsequently enlarged to include Transjordan, Syria, the Lebanon, and the nomad's land as far as the Euphrates. Lastly we see that there never was an unconditional promise of an everlasting possession; though a long and indefinite period was intended.

We are now led to a stage of history and prophecy which bear more directly on current misunderstandings of Hebrew prediction. Had we no prophetic messages to guide us it would be apparent that these promises of possession of the land of Canaan were not unconditional: the covenant relation between Israel and God demanded loyalty from the people, and individual and corporate righteousness. Were the people to fail in these respects a terrible doom awaited them. The following words spoken by Moses in the 28th ch. of Deuteronomy apply in parts so easily to the sufferings of Jewry in the past few years that many have seen in them a prophecy of our own times: "It shall come to pass if thou wilt not hearken unto the voice of the Lord thy God to observe to do all his commandments and his statutes which I command thee this day; that all these curses shall come upon thee and shall overtake thee. . . . And the Lord shall scatter you among the peoples, from the one end of the earth; and there thou shalt serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou nor thy fathers, even wood and stone. And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, and there shall be no rest for the sole of thy foot; but the Lord shall give thee there a trembling heart and failing of eyes, and pining of

soul; and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee. . .”

Here it is clear that the divine promises to the patriarchs have been annulled by the national apostasy; and when the Assyrian captivity removed the population of Samaria, and the Babylonian captivity the people of Judah, the prophets saw in the disasters a vindication of the divine justice on a disobedient and gainsaying people.

But they taught their people that a remnant would return, and would restore the temple and the religious life of the community; and they looked forward to a time when the earth would be filled with the knowledge of the Lord. It is often forgotten that these men were inspired poets who mingled very practical matters like the Return from the Babylonian Exile with sublime pictures of the desert blossoming as the rose, the lion lying down with the lamb, men beating their swords into pruning hooks, and forsaking and forswearing war for ever. They also prophesied of the setting up of the kingdom of David.

Unhappily, the practical was fulfilled and the ideal remained an ideal. Owing to the fact that the things that religious men yearn for were not realised when the Jews returned to Palestine there has been a tendency in the past to interpret not only the eschatological passages in the prophets but also the practical and political prophecies, of some time in the future; and as all prophecies in the Old Testament necessarily and inevitably centre round the Jewish people and their relation to God, the Golden Age is inseparable from the Holy City inhabited by holy Israelites. It would seem to be the hope of some that if the Jews could be returned to Palestine and form a state the Golden Age would, in some mysterious way, appear on earth.

But such views are a distortion of the Old Testament prophecies which predicted a return from Babylon and from all the lands whither the Jews had been exiled. And these prophecies were fulfilled. The Jews did return to Judea, they did rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, and they did rebuild the temple; and after fluctuating fortunes they did secure a brief period of political independence and expansion under the Maccabees. Thus the prophecies of the Return have been fulfilled, and they cannot be fulfilled again. Within the canonical literature of the Old Testament there is no prophecy of a second return after the return from the Babylonian Exile; because (a) after the Exile all the Jews who wished to do so had returned to the Holy Land, though a great many more preferred to remain where they were and formed the Diaspora which afterwards became the backbone of the Christian Church; and (b) the last of the prophets died centuries before the destruction of Jerusalem in

A.D. 70.

It would be possible to criticise the claim that Scripture prophesies Jewish supremacy in Palestine from the point of view of the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament; but this has been intentionally ignored; and the Bible has been left to speak for itself.

Again, it would be possible to use the New Testament argument that the Church is now the Israel of God; but this seems inadvisable. This short study is in no sense a polemic; but a brief examination of what the Old Testament says on matters in which its authority has been evoked.

On the Merits of Jerusalem and Palestine*

BURHĀN AD-DĪN AL-FAZĀRI

... There will remain no believer, man or woman, who shall not go to Jerusalem. The treasure of the world is Jerusalem. Who prays in Jerusalem, it is as if he prayed in the nearer Heavens. All the lands shall be destroyed, but Jerusalem shall prosper. Allah shall assemble Mohammed and his people unto Jerusalem. The first thing that was disclosed from the waters of the Flood was the Rock of Jerusalem.** Allah shall assemble His creatures unto Jerusalem. Allah gathered the prophets unto His Apostle, and he prayed with them as their imām† in Jerusalem. The angels are in serried ranks round about Jeru-

* Excerpts from the Arabic original entitled, *Kitāb Ba'ith an-Nufūs*, (*The Book of Arousing Souls*) by Burhān ad-Din ibn al-Firkāh al-Fazāri, 660 A.H./1262 A.D.-729/1329, lecturer and preacher in the Omayyad Mosque of Damascus and leading geographer of his time; translated into English by Charles D. Matthews under the title, *Palestine—Mohammedan Holy Land*, Yale Oriental Series, Researches, Vol. XXIV (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949; London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 32-34. Copyright, 1949, by Yale University Press. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

The translator is currently Research Professor in Linguistics at the University of Texas, U.S.A.

** The sacred rock at Jerusalem on which the Temple was erected, is the place on which now stands the mosque of the "Dome of the Rock", built by Abd-al-Malik (647-705) but erroneously known as the "Mosque of Umar". This rock is said to have come from Paradise, and to be the foundation-stone of the world. Noah's ark rested upon it after the Deluge and Muhammed's footprint is inscribed on it. This he left behind on the night of his ascension to heaven on his steed. Next to the *Ka'bah*, this Rock is believed by Muslims to be the most sacred spot in the universe.

† An imām is the leader of congregational prayer.

salem. Allah forgives who comes to Jerusalem. The Apostle of Allah came with Gabriel and Michael* to Jerusalem. Hell-fire is heated in Jerusalem. A door of Heaven is open unto Jerusalem.

Allah shall assemble the muezzins** of the Sacred Mosque, and the muezzins of the Mosque al-Aqsa, and the muezzins of the mosque of His Apostle unto Paradise before the other muezzins, except Bilāl the muezzin of the Apostle of Allah.¹

Who performs the ablutions seven times,² and prays a prayer of two or four rak'ahs† in Jerusalem, there shall be forgiven him what was before that time. And who prays in Jerusalem shall be absolved from his sins as he was on the day his mother bore him; and he shall have for every hair of his body a hundred lights in the presence of Allah on the Day of Judgment; and he shall have a justifying and acceptable pilgrimage; and Allah shall give him a heart that is thankful, and a tongue that speaks His praise; and shall protect him from rebellious sins, and shall gather him with the prophets.

Whoever stays patiently a year in Jerusalem despite tiresomeness and discomfort,³ Allah shall come to him with provisions, in front of him, on his right, on his left, above him, and under him; he shall eat abundantly; and if Allah the Exalted will, he shall enter Paradise. . . .

* * *

. . . Allah looks in mercy every day unto Jerusalem. Moses' staff shall appear at the end of time in Jerusalem. Allah announced to Mary the good news of Jesus in Jerusalem. Allah showed unto Mary favor above all women in Jerusalem. Angels descend every night unto Jerusalem. Allah prevents the enemy of Allah, the Anti-Christ,⁴ from entering Jerusalem. He shall conquer all the lands except Jerusalem and Mecca and Medina. Allah turned (with acceptance) toward Adam in Jerusalem. Who gives alms to the amount of a loaf of bread in Jerusalem, it is as if he gave alms to the weight of earthly mountains, all of them gold. Who gives alms to the value of a dirham,‡ it will be his redemption from the Fire. Who fasts a day in Jerusalem, it will mean his immunity from the Fire.

* Gabriel is the angelic being who was the medium of the revelation of the Qur'ān to Muhammed. Michael, the Archangel, appearing frequently in Hebraic literature, is the angel of fertility and salvation.

** A muezzin is the caller of the *azān* or the "summons to prayer".

† A *rak'ah* (genuflexion) is a section of the five daily Muslim prayers.

‡ This was a silver coin of Muslim countries, first issued in the eighth century.

The choice of Allah of all His lands is Jerusalem, and in it are the chosen of his servants. And from it the earth was stretched forth, and from it shall be rolled up like a scroll. Allah directs his regard toward Jerusalem every morning, and showers upon its people His mercy and His benefits; then He showers them upon the rest of the lands.

The dew which descends upon Jerusalem is a remedy from every sickness, because it is from the gardens of Paradise. No one shall dwell in Jerusalem without there accompanying him seventy thousand angels unto Allah. Allah will say to him who is buried in Jerusalem, Thou shalt be My neighbor in My House; and is not My House Paradise! And only the generous and forbearing shall be My neighbors there. . . .

NOTES

- 1 A giant, mighty-voiced Negro servant of the Prophet, who served as the first to call the faithful to prayer, standing on the flat roof of a house in the simpler days of early Islam.
- 2 A fountain for ablutions, performed in a prescribed manner, is provided in the court of, or adjacent to, every mosque. In the desert away from water, clean sand may be substituted.
- 3 This is an honest echo of the severities of weather and other discomforts of Jerusalem! Compare the extravagant praises of the city and the land generally in the book.
- 4 Ad-Dajjāl; see J.E. Hanauer, *Folk-lore of the Holy Land*, London, The Sheldon Press, new edition, 1935, pp. 61 and 248.

...In the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to outline the story of the origin and evolution, within the world of Islam, of the religious legend describing the Nocturnal Journey and ascension of Mahomet to the realms of the after-life.† The different versions of the legend have been minutely examined and compared with Dante's poem; and the features of resemblance between the two tales have been demonstrated.

* From Miguel Asin, *Islam and the Divine Comedy*, trans. and abridged by Harold Sunderland (London: John Murray, 1926), pp. 67-76. Reprinted by permission of John Murray.

** Spanish Catholic priest and orientalist (1871-1944); formerly Professor of Arabic at the University of Madrid and Member of the Academia Española. His works include *Contribucion a la toponimia árabe de España* (Madrid: Impr. de E. Maestre, 1940) and *El Islam Cristianizado* (Madrid, 1931).

† Six hundred years before Dante Alighieri conceived his Divine Comedy there existed in Islam a religious legend narrating the journey of the Prophet Mohammed "to the abodes of after-life." The journey was in two parts: From Mecca to Jerusalem (*isra*) and from Jerusalem to heaven (*mi'raj*). This legend was based on a verse in the Koran (Chap. XVII, verse 1):

"Praised be He who called upon His servant (Mohammed) to travel by night from the sacred temple (of Mecca) to the far-off temple of (Jerusalem) whose precinct we have blessed in order to show him Our Wonders."

To this day the story of this journey is celebrated every year throughout the Moslem world on the 27th day of the month of Rejeb, the seventh of the Moslem Calendar. This legend attests to the special position of Jerusalem in Islamic and Arab consciousness, and as the following selection shows, was a source of inspiration to one of Christendom's greatest poets.

It would, then, be as well here to sum up the points that have thus been established.

Around a *verselet* in the Koran alluding to a miraculous journey of Mahomet to the realms beyond the grave, popular fancy wove a multiplicity of versions of one and the same legend. The myth found expression in the tales of the traditionists, who with a wealth of detail describe the two main parts of the journey—the visit to hell and the ascension to paradise. All these versions had become popular throughout Islam as early as the ninth century of our era; and even in some of the earlier versions the two parts of the legend are fused to form, as in the *Divine Comedy*, a single dramatic action.

In almost all these versions Mahomet, like Dante, as the supposed author, is made to tell the story. Further, both journeys are begun at night when the protagonists awaken from profound sleep. In an imitation of the Moslem journey a lion and a wolf bar the road to hell, as do a leopard, lion and she-wolf in Dante's poem. Khaytaur, the patriarch of the *genii*,* whom the Moslem traveller meets, is clearly a counterpart of Virgil, the patriarch of the classics who leads Dante to the garden of the limbo. Virgil appears before Dante exactly as Gabriel before Mahomet; and throughout their journey each guide does his best to satisfy the pilgrim's curiosity. The warning of the approach to hell in both legends is identical, viz., a confused noise and violent bursts of flame. In both stories again, the wrathful guardians of the abode of pain exclude the traveller, till their anger is appeased by an order invoked by the guide from on high. The fierce demon who pursues Mahomet with a burning brand at the outset of his *Nocturnal Journey* has his duplicate in the devil who pursues Dante in the fifth pit of the eighth circle; Virgil, by a brief word of command, disarms the fiend, just as Gabriel, by a prayer taught to the Prophet, quenched the fire of the glowing brand.

The general architecture of the *Inferno* is but a faithful copy of the Moslem hell. Both are in the shape of a vast funnel or inverted cone and consist of a series of storeys, each the abode of one class of sinner. In each, moreover, there are various subdivisions corresponding to as many subcategories of sinners. The greater the depth, the greater is the degree of sin and the pain inflicted. The ethical system in the two hells is also much alike, the atonement is either analogous to, or the reverse of,

* The *genii*, or *djinn*, have their origins in pre-Islamic religion as nymphs and satyrs. They gradually became associated with the use of magic, popularized in such literary works as the *Arabian Nights*.

the sin committed. Finally, both hells are situate beneath the city of Jerusalem.

Nor are instances of close resemblance between the torments in the hells lacking. For instance, the adulterers, who in Dante's poem are swept hither and thither by a hellish storm, are in the Moslem legend hurled upwards and downwards by a hurricane of flame. The description of the first circle of the Moslem hell exactly tallies with the picture of the city of Dis—a sea of flame on whose shores stand countless tombs aglow with fire. The usurers, like the souls in Dante who have been guilty of crimes of violence, swim in a lake of blood; guarded by fiends who hurl fiery stones at them. Gluttons and thieves are seen by Dante, tortured by serpents, as are the tyrants, the faithless guardians and the usurers in the Moslem hell. The maddening thirst of forgers in the Divine Comedy is also suffered by the Moslem drunkards; whilst the forgers with the swollen bellies have their counterpart in the usurers of another Moslem version. Again, Griffolino of Arezzo and Capocchio of Sienna scratch the scab off their leprous sores, as do the slanderers in the hell of Islam. The *barattieri*, held down in a lake of boiling pitch by the forks of fiends, suffer like the undutiful children in the Moslem legend, who, submerged in flame, are at each cry for mercy prodded by demons armed with forks. Finally, the awful punishment, dealt out in Dante's poem to the authors of schisms, of being knifed by demons and brought to life again, only for the torture to be repeated without end, is the grim torment appointed in the Moslem hell to murderers.

The Moslem traveller, heartened by his guide, toils up a steep mountain, even as Dante, encouraged by Virgil, ascends the mount of purgatory. Allegorical visions abound in both legends and, at times, they agree in symbol and signification. Thus, for example, the woman who, despite her loathsome ugliness, endeavours in the fourth circle of purgatory to lure Dante from his path is almost a counterpart of the hag who tempts Mahomet at the beginning of his journey. Moreover, Gabriel and Virgil agree that the vision is a symbol of the false attractions of the world. A river separates purgatory from paradise in both stories, and each traveller drinks of its waters. Nor is this all; after his visit to hell, Dante thrice has to submit to lustral ablution. Virgil, upon the advice of Cato, with his own hands washes Dante's face, and, upon leaving purgatory, the pilgrim is immersed by Matilda and Statius in the rivers of Lethe and Eunoe, the waters of which efface all memory of sin. In the Moslem legend, the souls are likewise purified three times in rivers that flow through the garden of Abraham

and whose waters render their faces white and cleanse their souls from sin. At the gates of paradise the Moslem traveller is met by a comely maid, who receives him kindly, and together they walk through the gardens of paradise, until in amazement he beholds the houris on the bank of a stream forming a court of beauty around the beloved of the poet Imru-l-Qays.* Dante, when he enters the earthly paradise, also meets a fair maiden, Matilda, and is walking by her side through fields rich with flowers, when on the banks of a stream he sees the marvellous procession of old men and maidens who accompany Beatrice, his beloved, as she descends from heaven to meet him.

The architecture of both the Christian and the Moslem heavens is identical, inasmuch as it is based upon the Ptolemaic system. As they pass through the nine heavens, the travellers meet the spirits of the blessed whose real home, however, is the last sphere or Empyrean, where they are ultimately found all together. The denomination also of the nine spheres is in some cases the same, namely, that of their respective planets. Occasionally, too, the ethical systems are alike; the souls are grouped in the spheres according to their different virtues. At times, again, their distribution in both legends is based upon astrology, or upon a combination of astrology and ethics.

In some versions of the Moslem legend, the description of heaven may be said to be as spiritual as the picture that has immortalised the Paradiso. The phenomena of light and sound are alone used by both travellers to convey their impression of the ethereal spheres. Both are dazzled by a light which grows in brilliance at every stage. In fear of blindness, they raise their hands to their eyes; but their guides calm their fears, and God empowers them to gaze upon the new light. Both travellers frequently confess their inability to describe the majesty of the sights they see. Both again, led by their guides, ascend through the air in flight, with a speed that is compared to the wind and the arrow. The duties of both guides are manifold; not only do they lead the pilgrims and comfort them, but they pray to God on their behalf and call upon them to thank the Lord for the signal favour He has shown them.

And, just as Beatrice leaves Dante at the last stages of his ascension, so Gabriel leaves Mahomet when the Prophet is wafted to the Divine Presence by the aid of a luminous wreath.

In each of the planetary heavens and in the different mansions the Moslem traveller meets many of the Biblical prophets,

* Imru-al-Qays was a famous sixth century pre-Islamic poet whose *Mu'allakat* is among the best known of old Arabic poems.

surrounded by the souls of their followers on earth. He also meets many personages famous in the Bible or Moslem lore. Into the literary imitation of the Islamic legend there is introduced a host of men and women who, although of all ranks and faiths, are nearly all writers of note in the history of Islam; many are contemporaries and even acquaintances of the traveller, and all are grouped in circles according to their school of literature. Thus it is that both the heaven and hell of this imitation are peopled by the same multitude of minor personages that forms so striking a feature of the *Divine Comedy*. Both authors, too, have resort to the same device for introducing new actors into their scenes: either the traveller inquires where a certain soul is to be found; or of a sudden the latter appears and remains unrecognised until the guide, or a soul at hand, makes his identity known to the traveller. In both legends the pilgrims converse with the souls in heaven and hell on theological and literary subjects, or on events in the lives on earth of the departed.

Lastly, in allotting the souls to the various regions of the world to come, the two writers—although at times influenced by personal feeling are in the main guided by the same spirit of tolerance. Both, as they behold the souls in bliss or in pain, give vent to feelings of joy or pity, although occasionally they gloat over the sufferings of the damned.

But it is not merely in general outline that the two ascensions coincide; even the episodes in the visions of paradise are at times alike, if not identical.

Dante, for example, in the heaven of Jupiter sees a mighty eagle formed of myriads of resplendent spirits all wings and faces, which, chanting exhortations to man to cleave to righteousness, flaps its wings and then comes to rest. Mahomet sees in heaven a gigantic angel in the form of a cock, which moves its wings whilst chanting hymns calling mankind to prayer, and then rests. He sees other angels, each an agglomeration of countless faces and wings, who resplendent with light sing songs of praise with tongues innumerable. These two visions merged in one, at once suggest Dante's heavenly eagle.

In the heaven of Saturn Dante beholds a golden ladder that leads upwards to the last sphere. He sees the spirits of the blessed descending by this ladder and, at the instance of Beatrice, he and his guide ascend by it in less time than "it takes to withdraw the hand from fire." Mahomet, in his ascension, sees a ladder rising from Jerusalem to the highest heaven; angels stand on either side, and by its rungs of silver, gold, and emerald the souls ascend; led by Gabriel, the Prophet rises by it "in

less than the twinkling of an eye.”

Dante meets in heaven Piccarda of his native city and Cunizza of Padua, women well known to him; and in like manner the Moslem traveller (in the literary imitation of the Mahometan ascension) meets two women, acquaintances of his, to wit, Hamduna of his own town of Aleppo and the negress Tawfiq, of Baghdad. In both legends the women make themselves known to the pilgrim, tell him of the troubles of their married life or leave him struck with admiration at their matchless beauty.

Like Dante, the same Moslem traveller meets Adam in heaven and converses with him on the subject of the primitive language he spoke in the Garden of Eden.

The examination of the theological virtues which Dante undergoes in the eighth sphere of heaven, is similar to that to which the soul of the departed is subjected in some allegorical adaptations of the *Miraj*.

The angels flying over the mystic rose of Dante's paradise, with faces of flame and bodies whiter than snow, have their counterpart in the angel, half fire and half snow, seen by Mahomet.

As they stand on high above the planetary heavens, both pilgrims are urged by their guides to cast their eyes downwards, and they see with amazement how small the created world is in comparison with the heavenly universe.

The apotheoses in both ascensions are exactly alike. In each legend the traveller, exalted to the Divine Presence, describes the Beatific Vision as follows: God is the focus of an intense light, surrounded by nine concentric circles of myriads of angelic spirits, who shed a wonderful radiance around. In a row near the centre are the Cherubim. Twice does the traveller behold the majestic sight of those nine circles ceaselessly revolving around the Divine Light; once from afar, before he reaches the end of his journey, and again as he stands before the Throne of God. The effects of the Beatific Vision on the minds of the two pilgrims are again identical. At first they are so dazzled by the brilliance of the light that they believe they have been blinded, but gradually their sight is strengthened until finally they can gaze steadfastly upon it. Both are incapable of describing the Vision and only remember that they fell into an ecstasy that was preceded by a wondrous feeling of supreme delight.

Nor does the similarity between the two journeys end here. A common spirit may also be seen to pervade the two legends.

The moral meaning that Dante sought to convey in his

Divine Comedy had previously been imparted by the Sufis,* and particularly by the Murcian Ibn Arabi.** The Moslem mystics, like Dante, made use of a dramatic story—which was alleged to be true—of the journey of a man, Mahomet, to the nether regions and his ascension to the heavens, in order to symbolise the regeneration of the soul by faith and the practice of the theological virtues. In Dante's conception, as in Ibn Arabi's, the journey is symbolic of the moral life of man, whom God has placed in the world to work out his destiny and attain to supreme bliss, as represented by the Beatific Vision. This he cannot do without the guidance of theology; for natural reason can only lead him through the first stages of the journey, which symbolise the moral and intellectual virtues. Those sublime mansions of paradise, which stand for the theological virtues, can only be reached by the aid of illuminative grace. Accordingly, the pilgrim in the imitations of the Mahometan ascension of Ibn Arabi and others, is no longer Mahomet, or even a saint, but merely a man and a sinner, like Dante; often, like Dante, he is a philosopher, a theologian or a poet. The minor characters too, even those appearing in heaven, are real men and sinners and often repentant infidels. Thus, like the Divine Comedy, the Moslem ascension combines in one story the antithetical elements of realism and allegorical idealism.

The same involved and enigmatical style characterises Dante's poem and the ascension of Ibn Arabi. Moreover, both authors seek to display their vast erudition by attributing to their characters lengthy and abstruse discourses on philosophy, theology and astronomy. If, in addition, it is borne in mind that the Moslem ascension, like that of Dante, had a host of commentators, who endeavoured to discover the many meanings conveyed by the slightest detail; that the poet Abu-l-Ala's† work was written with the definite purpose of handing down to posterity a masterpiece of literary art and that its rhymed prose presented technical difficulties as great as, or perhaps greater than, those of Dante's tercets, in view of the accumulation of evidence, the following facts must be accepted as undeniable:—

* Sūfis are Moslem mystics who first appeared in the seventh and eighth centuries. The word Sūfī is formed from the root *ṣūf* meaning "wool" and denotes "the practice of wearing the woolen robe;" hence the act of devoting oneself to the mystic life.

** Ibn al'Arabi (1165-1240) was a celebrated mystic born in Murcia whose principal work *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīya* gives a complete system of mystic knowledge and a defense of Sūfī thought against charges of heresy.

† Abu-al-'Ala' (973-1057) was a blind Arab poet born in northern Syria.

Six hundred years at least before Dante Aligheiri conceived his marvellous poem, there existed in Islam a religious legend narrating the journey of Mahomet to the abodes of the after-life. In the course of time from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries of our era—Moslem traditionists, theologians, interpreters of the Scriptures, mystics, philosophers and poets—all united in weaving around the original legend a fabric of religious narrative; at times their stories were amplifications, at others, allegorical adaptations or literary imitations. A comparison with the Divine Comedy of all these versions combined betrays many points of resemblance, and even of absolute coincidence, in the general architecture and ethical structure of hell and paradise; in the description of the tortures and rewards; in the general lines of the dramatic action; in the episodes and incidents of the journey; in the allegorical signification; in the roles assigned to the protagonist and to the minor personages; and, finally, in intrinsic literary value.

The interesting problems to which these coincidences give rise will be considered at a later stage; but to forestall any objections that might be made, a few words may be added on the origin of the Moslem legend.

The story of the Nocturnal Journey and the ascension of Mahomet is not autochthonous in Islam. Its real source is in the religious literatures of other and older civilisations. But the question of the origin of the *Miraj* is of secondary interest. Let it suffice to say that its genesis may have been influenced by many similar tales, Hebrew, Persian, and Christian. It is not difficult to find features common to the Moslem legend and the Judæo-Christian ascensions of Moses, Enoch, Baruch and Isaiah; or the fabulous journey of Ardâ Virâf to the Persian paradise; or finally, the descent of Our Lord Jesus Christ to the bosom of Abraham blended into one story with His glorious ascension and the uplifting of St. Paul to the third heaven.¹ None of these journeys and ascensions, however, was so fully developed or expanded in the literature to which it belonged as the Islamic legend. Appearing, as it did, after the others, the Moslem tale was able to draw upon them and mould into the form of one story both the diverse incident they offered and much new matter that was the spontaneous outcome of Arabian fancy. In Islam, moreover, the legend was the wider spread among both learned and illiterate, seeing that it was accepted as an article of faith. To the present day it is the occasion of a religious festival celebrated throughout Islam and of a national holiday in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco,² which proves how deep-rooted and widely disseminated is the belief of the Moslem people in the fabulous ascension of their Prophet.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. FRANCOIS MARTIN, *Le Livre d'Henoch*; EUGÈNE TISSERANT, *Ascension d'Isaïe*; R. CHARLES, *The Assumption of Moses*, R. CHARLES, *The Apocalypse of Baruch*. For the Judæo-Christian Origin of these legends Cf. BATIFFOL, *Anciennes Littératures chrétiennes; La Littérature grecque*, p. 56. HIRSCHFELD, in his *Researches into . . . the Quran*, p. 67, note 64, quotes a rabbinical legend of a journey through hell and paradise and points out certain analogies to a *hadith* of Bukhari. For the influence of the Persian ascension of Ardâ Virâf, see BLOCHET, *L'Ascension au Ciel du Prophète Mohammed*, and prior to BLOCHET, CLAIR-TISDALL in *The sources of Islam*, 76-81. Cf. MODI, *Dante papers; Virâf, Adaaman and Dante*, a work I have not been able to consult.
- 2 The festivity of the *Miraj* is celebrated on the 27th day of the month of *Recheb*, the seventh of the Moslem calendar. At Constantinople the Sultan attended with his court at the services held at night in the mosque of the Seraglio. LANE, on p. 430 of his book, *An account of the manners and customs of the modern Egyptians*, describes the processions and festivals held in honour of the *Miraj* at Cairo. Throughout Morocco, the *Miraj* is celebrated in the same manner; it is a day of fast and alms-giving for the stricter Moslems, and the Government offices are closed.

5

Influence of the Jews in an Arab Caliphate*

CECIL ROTH**

It had taken the Arabs somewhat less than a century from the date of the *Hegira* to sweep the Mediterranean world from end to end. In 711 an expedition under Tarik† crossed the Straits of Gibraltar, and the final conquest of Spain was a matter of only four years. Later ecclesiastical chroniclers maliciously ascribed the debacle of the Visigoths to the Jews, who, they alleged, invited as well as assisted the invasion. As we have seen, recent intolerance and bigotry had left no professing Jews in the country, and the truth of the charge is highly improbable. But the change of government ushered in a fresh age for Spanish Jewry. Mesopotamia, under Persian or Parthian rule, had hitherto been somewhat outside the orbit of the Mediterranean world, which was essentially Græco-Roman. But, with the Arab conquests, conditions changed. The great reservoir of Jewish population in the East now came under the same rule as the new fields of opportunity in the West. A man could travel from Bagdad almost to the foot of the Pyrenees without being hampered by any change of government, of culture, or of language. By the period of the conquest of Spain, moreover, the original fanaticism of the Arabs had subsided, and they were prepared to grant an ample toleration to all unbelievers, of whatever creed, in return for a slender poll-tax.

It seems therefore that the Jews, impelled by the same natural urge or by the same economic necessities, streamed

* From Cecil Roth, *A Short History of the Jewish People, 1600 B.C.—A.D. 1935* (London: Macmillan and Company Limited, 1936), pp. 155-57. Reprinted by permission of Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

** The author was Reader in Jewish Studies, Oxford University, 1939-64.

† Tārik ibn Ziyād was a Berber chief and lieutenant under Mūsā ibn Nuşair, governor of Africa. With seven thousand men, he crossed the Straits, beginning the Arab invasion of the Spanish Peninsula.

at the heels of the Arabs, as colonists, as traders, as artisans, as agricultural settlers. In consequence, the most important section of Jewry—numerically, geographically, and culturally—became Arabised. They adopted Arab names, spoke only Arabic among themselves, followed Moslem intellectual fashions and standards, used the vernacular for their literature and even, to some extent, for their liturgy, and considered Europe, north of the Pyrenees, as an outpost of barbarism. The ancient communities, which had continued a somewhat degraded existence under the Byzantine rule in Egypt and the adjacent countries of north Africa, were rejuvenated. Kairouan, the military camp founded in the neighbourhood of the ancient city of Carthage (subsequently to be the centre of government for the whole province), suddenly became known as a seat of learning, its scholars exchanging learned correspondence with the Babylonian Geonim even before the days of Saadia. Spain made headway a little more slowly, but with even more dazzling results.

From Abd-ar-Rahman I. (756-788) Spain was the seat of an autonomous Caliphate, free from all dependence upon Bagdad. The special conditions of the country, with its large proportion of Christian or Visigothic elements, made tolerance a cardinal point of policy, the Jews enjoying it in the same way as the other sections of the population. Indeed, it was only wise to favour them and thus foster their sympathies; for they constituted an important minority in a population a large part of which was perennially disaffected. They entered into every walk of life. There were peasants, farmers, craftsmen, merchants and artisans. For the purposes of diplomatic intercourse with the Christian states, both in the peninsula and outside it, the Jew, with his knowledge of languages, was the ideal intermediary; and, in consequence of this, many individuals attained great influence in affairs of state. Physicians, astronomers, and astrologers (the latter two arts were at the time all but identical), similarly obtained an *entrée* to court, and in some instances wielded a vast influence.

The outstanding figure of the period was Hasdai ibn Shabrut (c. 915-970), with whom Jewish life in Spain suddenly emerged from the comparative obscurity which had enveloped it for the past few centuries. He owed his political importance to two factors: firstly, to his knowledge of medicine, which had originally brought him into touch with the Caliph Abd-ar-Rahman III., who appointed him Court Physician; and secondly, to his acquaintance with the Latin tongue—at that time the international language of letters and of diplomatic intercourse

in the Christian world. From being simply a physician, Hasdai became, in consequence of this, the Caliph's confidant and adviser. Without bearing the title of vizier, he was in reality Minister for Foreign Affairs. Negotiations of the highest delicacy, both in the country and beyond its borders, were entrusted to him. In addition, he was made Inspector-General of the Customs for the port of Cordova—the income of which office he presumably enjoyed as a reward for his services. On the death of Abd-ar-Rahman (961), his son Hakam II. retained Hasdai in his service; and he appears to have continued to enjoy the royal favour until his death.

In 956, when the Holy Roman emperor Otto I. sent an embassy to Cordova, it was Hasdai who was empowered to treat with it, and whose adroit persuasion led to the satisfactory termination of the transaction. Abbot John of Görz, the Imperial Ambassador, frankly confessed that he had never encountered an equal intellect in diplomatic affairs. A couple of years later, Hasdai was sent to the King of the Christian state of Leon, Sancho IV., to cure him of his excessive corpulence and to exercise diplomatic influence upon him. He actually managed to persuade Sancho, together with the Queen Mother, to accompany him back to Cordova: and Abd-ar-Rahman had the satisfaction of seeing his most determined enemies at his feet as suppliants. Contemporary Hebrew poets celebrated the episode in exultant verses.

This activity did not divert Hasdai's attention from scientific studies. His name is still associated with a once-popular universal panacea which he discovered. On one occasion, when an Embassy from the court of Byzantium brought as a present to the Caliph an important Greek codex, embodying Dioscorides' work on botany, a monk was found who read off passage after passage in an extemporised Latin version, which the Jew turned into polished Arabic. It was through this polyglot channel that the work of the great Greek scientist became available to the Spanish Moslem medical schools, and ultimately to mediaeval Europe as a whole.

In his prosperity, Hasdai did not forget his own people. Every embassy sent to Cordova from foreign powers was interrogated by him as to the condition of the Jews in its native land. It was this which led to a famous interchange of correspondence with the kingdom of the Khazars—the independent state north of the Black Sea, the ruling classes of which had accepted Judaism in the eighth century. Hasdai used his influence to ameliorate the condition of the Jews in the south of France, and made representations at the court of Constantinople to avert a perse-

cution which seemed imminent in the Byzantine Empire. It was a strange anticipation, in a reversed direction, of what was to be the characteristic phenomenon of the nineteenth century—an influential Jewish worthy in a *Moslem* country exerting pressure, through diplomatic channels, on behalf of his persecuted brethren in a *Christian* land at the other end of Europe. But, unlike the majority of his imitators in a later age, Hasdai ibn Shabrut was also a munificent patron of learning, and it was under his aegis (as we shall see) that Spanish-Jewish scholarship burst upon the world.

To Save With Pity — Saladin Enters Jerusalem, 1187*

STANLEY LANE-POOLE**

...The Sultan was anxious to spare the Holy City the misery of a siege. "I believe," he told them, "that Jerusalem is the House of God, as you also believe, and I will not willingly lay siege to the House of God or put it to the assault." To obtain it "in peace and amity" he offered to leave the inhabitants free to fortify the city and cultivate the land for five leagues round, and even to supply them plentifully with money and food, until the following Pentecost, on condition that when Pentecost came, if they saw a prospect of being rescued, they should keep the Holy City; but if they saw no chance of succour, then they must surrender Jerusalem, and he would conduct them and their possessions safely to Christian soil.¹

The offer was chivalrous, even quixotic, when the notorious bad faith of the Crusaders is remembered, and the lack of any security for their keeping a promise. But the delegates from Jerusalem refused it without hesitation. If God pleased, they said, they would never surrender the city where the Saviour died for them. So Saladin, pleased at their devotion, promised them on his oath that he would never take it except in the honourable way, by the sword. The Sultan's chivalry is the more remarkable, since Jerusalem itself had lately presented a signal example of

* From Stanley Lane-Poole, *Saladin And the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Beirut: Khayats, 1964), pp. 224-34. The chapter from which this excerpt has been taken is entitled "Jerusalem Regained". Copyright by C. E. Lane-Poole. Reprinted by permission of Khayat Book & Publishing Co. S.A.L.

** British orientalist and historian (1854-1931); served the Egyptian Government in archaeological research, 1895-97; Professor of Arabic at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, 1898-1904. His works include *The Mohammadan Dynasties* (Westminster: A. Constable and Co., 1894) and *The Story of Cairo* (London: J.M. Dent and Co., 1902).

bad faith. After Balian of Ibelin had escaped from the field of Hittin,* he sent to Saladin, begging him to give him a safe-conduct to go to Jerusalem and bring his wife and children back to Tyre. The petition was at once granted, on the conditions that Balian should only stay one night in the city, and should never more bear arms against the Sultan. When he arrived at Jerusalem he was welcomed with delight as a deliverer, for there were no knights of rank there, and he was made commander and guardian of the city by universal acclamation. In vain he protested that he had given his oath to Saladin and could not honourably stay or help in the defence. "I absolve you," said the Patriarch, "from your sin and your oath, which it were a greater sin in you to keep than to break; for it were a perpetual disgrace upon you to leave Jerusalem in this strait and go away, nor should you ever have honour again whithersoever you went." So Balian stayed, and since there were but two knights in the place, who had also fled from Hittin, he knighted thirty burghers. The Patriarch opened the treasury for him, and the garrison went out and bought provisions for the siege.² Fugitives had come in from all sides, and there were reckoned to be 60,000 men in the city, besides women and children.

The patience of Saladin was not exhausted even after this dishonour. Perhaps he believed that Balian could not help himself; and far from showing rancour, he gave him a fresh proof of his confidence. Balian again sent to him at Ascalon to beg him to give another safe-conduct, to remove his wife and children to Tripolis; he explained that he was forcibly withheld from keeping his former promise. Instead of reproaches, Saladin sent an escort of fifty horse, who carried out his wishes.

On Sunday, the 20th of September, 1187, the Saracens at length appeared before the walls of the Holy City. In seventy-five days they had overrun and subdued the Kingdom of Jerusalem; now they must have the capital itself, the cause and motive of the Crusades, the object of the veneration of Christian and Moslem alike. Saladin first took up his position on the west side, facing the line of walls from the gate of David to the gate of Saint Stephen. He was amazed to see the battlements packed with countless defenders, who indeed could not find room in the crowded houses and churches. He soon discovered that the ground was ill-chosen, for the great towers of Tancred and David (or the Castle of the Pisans, as it was then called) commanded his batteries, and the frequent sallies of the Christians drove back

* At the battle of Hittin, which took place on July 4th, 1187, near Tiberias, the Franks were decisively defeated by Saladin.

his engineers and opposed the erection of his mangonels. Moreover, the sun was in the eyes of the Moslems, and they could not see to fight till the afternoon by reason of the glare. He therefore reconnoitred the other sides of the city, and after five days transferred his army to the east, overlooking the valley of the Kidron, where the walls were less strong. He moved in the evening of the 25th of September, and the inhabitants, seeing him depart, thought he had abandoned the siege, and ran to the churches to pour out their thanksgivings and indulge in transports of joy. But on the morrow weeping followed hard upon laughter: the Saracen standards were flying on Mount Olivet; already twoscore mangonels were in position, and the engineers, who had worked all night, were beginning to mine the barbican.³ Ten thousand Moslem cavalry masked the gates of St. Stephen and Josaphat, and prevented sallies, and the sappers pushed forward under a shield-wall, covered by the arrows of the archers and the stones and Greek fire discharged from the engines. It was impossible to keep a footing on the ramparts under the hail of stones and shafts, for "the arrows served as toothpicks to the teeth of the battlements";⁴ and the mining went on merrily, till in two days thirty or forty paces of the barbican wall were sapped; the mines were stuffed with wood and fired, and a great breach was made. The knights in vain attempted a sortie to cut off the engineers; Saladin's horsemen drove them in. Lamentation and despair fell upon the city. The people crowded to the churches to pray and confess their sins; beat themselves with stones and scourges, supplicating the mercy of God. The women cut off their daughters' hair, and plunged them naked in cold water, in the hope of averting their shame. The priests and monks paraded the city in solemn procession, bearing the *Corpus Domini* and the Cross, and chanting the *Miserere*. "But the wickedness and lewdness of the city stank in the nostrils of the Lord, and the prayers of the sinful people could not mount to the mercy seat."

At last the breach could not be manned; not for a hundred gold pieces would a citizen stand there for a single night. The common people were all for surrender. The leaders took counsel together, and resolved to sally forth and meet their deaths. But Heraclius the Patriarch showed them that they would thus expose their women and children to slavery—he had his private reasons—and they were persuaded to treat for terms. Balian went to Saladin's tent, but even whilst he was entreating him, the breach was carried and the Saracen flag appeared upon the barbican. "Doth one grant terms to a captive city?" scoffed the Sultan. Besides, he had sworn to take Jerusalem by the sword, and he

must keep his vow. The city, however, was not yet taken: the garrison once more plucked up courage and drove back the assailants. Saladin wished to spare the devoted inhabitants, and sought counsel with his divines, if there might be another way to keep his vow. Balian's last visit had filled him with horror, for the baron had plainly spoken of the desperate resolution of the garrison:

"O Sultan," he said, "know that we soldiers in this city are in the midst of God knows how many people, who are slackening the fight in the hope of thy grace, believing that thou wilt grant it them as thou hast granted it to the other cities—for they abhor death and desire life. But for ourselves, when we see that death must needs be, by God we will slaughter our sons and our women, we will burn our wealth and our possessions, and leave you neither sequin nor stiver to loot, nor a man or a woman to enslave; and when we have finished that, we will demolish the Rock and the Mosque el-Aksa, and the other holy places, we will slay the Moslem slaves who are in our hands—there are 5000 such,—and slaughter every beast and mount we have; and then we will sally out in a body to you, and will fight you for our lives: not a man of us will fall before he has slain his likes; thus shall we die gloriously or conquer like gentlemen."⁵

Balian's desperate threats, and the arguments of his own council, induced Saladin at length to modify his vow. It would be sufficiently kept, he announced, if Jerusalem surrendered at discretion, as though it had actually been taken by assault. In this case he would exercise his clemency and hold the population to ransom as prisoners of war. Each man should pay ten pieces of gold for his liberty, and two women or ten children should be reckoned as one man; whilst of the poor, who possessed not even a gold coin, seven thousand should be set free for the sum of thirty thousand besants, to be paid out of King Henry's treasure, the remnant of which was still hoarded in the house of the Hospitallers.* Forty days were allowed for the ransoming; after that, all that remained became slaves. The articles of capitulation were signed on Friday the 2nd of October, the Feast of St. Leger. By a strange coincidence, it was the 27th of Rejeb, the anniversary of the blessed Leylat el-Miraj, when the prophet

* The Hospitallers was a religious military order of Knights established in Jerusalem in the twelfth century in order to defend the Latin Kingdom and give armed protection to pilgrims making the crusade.

of Islam dreamed his wonderful dream, and visited in his sleep the Holy City which his followers had now recovered after ninety years of Christian occupation.

Balian returned to the city and announced the terms. They were accepted, with gratitude and lamentation. The people groaned and wept, and would not be comforted; they kissed the holy walls which they might never see again, and bowing their faces on the ground before the Sepulchre, watered the sacred spot with their tears. To leave Jerusalem was to tear the hearts out of them. But there was no help for it; the Moslem flag flew overhead, the keys were in the Saracens' hands, and in forty days the city must be delivered up. Never did Saladin show himself greater than during this memorable surrender. His guards, commanded by responsible emirs, kept order in every street, and prevented violence and insult, insomuch that no ill-usage of the Christians was ever heard of.⁶ Every exit was in his hands, and a trusty lord was set over David's gate to receive the ransoms as each citizen came forth.

Then began a strangely pathetic scene. First Balian brought the thirty thousand gold besants, and the seven thousand poor who were ransomed by the King of England's treasure were allowed to shamle out. There followed burgher after burgher, money in hand, with their families and sometimes with poor dependents who could not ransom themselves. Saracen soldiers and merchants thronged the city and bought the goods of the departing citizens, so that each might raise the price of freedom. Kukbury ransomed a thousand Armenians of Edessa, and sent them to their homes; and others were not less benevolent. There was cheating and deceit, of course, and some of the Moslem emirs falsely claimed lost servants and took their ransoms privately, whilst others smuggled Franks out of the city in Saracen dress, and sucked them dry as soon as they were clear of the guard.⁷ The Patriarch, who had neither morals nor conscience, carried off the treasures of the churches, gold chalices and monstrances, and even the gold plate of the Holy Sepulchre, besides a vast hoard of his own, which had been better spent on ransoming the poor who still remained. When the Saracen emirs urged Saladin not to let the old rascal make off with his plunder, he replied, "No, I will not break faith with him," and the Patriarch got off like the rest for his ten besants. It was left for the Mohammedan King to teach the Christian priest the meaning of charity.

For forty days the melancholy procession trooped forth from the gate of David, and the term of grace expired. Yet there still remained thousands of poor people whom the niggardly burghers

and religious houses had left to slavery. Then el-Adil* came to his brother and said: "Sire, I have helped you by God's grace to conquer the land and this city, I therefore pray you give me a thousand slaves from the poor people within." To Saladin's question, what he would do with them, he answered he would do as pleased himself. Then the Sultan gave him the thousand slaves, and el-Adil set them all free as an offering to God. Then came the Patriarch and Balian, and begged likewise, and Saladin gave them another thousand slaves, and they were set free. Then said Saladin to his officers: "My brother has made his alms, and the Patriarch and Balian have made theirs; now I would fain make mine." And he ordered his guards to proclaim throughout the streets of Jerusalem that all the old people who could not pay were free to go forth. And they came forth from the postern of St. Lazarus, and their going lasted from the rising of the sun until night fell. "Such was the charity which Saladin did, of poor people without number."⁸

"Then I shall tell you," says the Squire of Balian, "of the great courtesy which Saladin showed to the wives and daughters of knights, who had fled to Jerusalem when their lords were killed or made prisoners in battle. When these ladies were ransomed and had come forth from Jerusalem, they assembled and went before Saladin crying mercy. When Saladin saw them he asked who they were and what they sought. And it was told him that they were the dames and damsels of knights who had been taken or killed in battle. Then he asked what they wished, and they answered for God's sake have pity on them; for the husbands of some were in prison, and of others were dead, and they had lost their lands, and in the name of God let him counsel and help them. When Saladin saw them weeping, he had great compassion for them, and wept himself for pity. And he bade the ladies whose husbands were alive to tell him where they were captives, and as soon as he could go to the prisons he would set them free. (And all were released wherever they were found.) After that he commanded that to the dames and damsels whose lords were dead there should be handsomely distributed from his own treasure, to some more and others less, according to their estate. And he gave them so much that they gave praise to God and published abroad the kindness and honour which Saladin had done to them."⁹

* el-Adil (1145-1218), called by the Crusaders "Saphadin" or "Sword of the Faith," was the brother and chief lieutenant of Saladin.

Thus did the Saracens show mercy to the fallen city. One recalls the savage conquest by the first Crusaders in 1099, when Godfrey and Tancred rode through streets choked with the dead and dying, when defenceless Moslems were tortured, burnt, and shot down in cold blood on the towers and roof of the Temple, when the blood of wanton massacre defiled the honour of Christendom and stained the scene where once the gospel of love and mercy had been preached. "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy" was a forgotten beatitude when the Christians made shambles of the Holy City. Fortunate were the merciless, for they obtained mercy at the hands of the Moslem Sultan.

"The greatest attribute of heaven is Mercy;
And 't is the crown of justice, and the glory,
Where it may kill with right, to save with pity."

If the taking of Jerusalem were the only fact known about Saladin, it were enough to prove him the most chivalrous and great-hearted conqueror of his own, and perhaps of any, age.

NOTES

- 1 Ernoul, *Chronique* (ed. Mas Latrie, Paris, 1871), 185-86.
- 2 Ernoul, 175-76.
- 3 *Libellus de Expugnacione*, 243, where the writer says he was himself wounded in the siege.
- 4 See a bombastic account of the siege written by Saladin's minister, the Kady el-Fadil, to the Caliph of Baghdad, quoted in Ibn-Khallikān (1211-1282), *Wefayāt el-A'yān*: Biographical Dictionary (trans. de Slane, 4 vols.; Paris, 1843-71), IV, 520-28.
- 5 Ibn-el-Athīr (1160-1233), *el Kāmīl fi-t-tārīkh*; General History, written up to 1231 (ed. by Tornberg, 14 vols.; Leyden, 1866-76; *Recueil*, tome i., 1872; tome ii., I, 1887), 701; Abu-Shāma (ob. 1267), *Kitāb er-Rōdateyn*: History of Nūr-ed-din and Saladin (2 vols.; Cairo: 1870-71), 84.
- 6 Ernoul, 227.
- 7 Ibn-el-Athīr, 703; Abu-Shāma, 85.
- 8 This is the report of the Christian chronicler Ernoul, who was probably present (227-8). It is worth noting that, on the same authority, when the poor refugees whom Saladin released came to Tripolis, its Christian count shut the gates in their faces, and even sent out his troops to rob the burghers of the possessions which the Moslems had religiously respected. (*Ib.*, 234.) It is not to be understood, however, that Saladin freed *all* the poor; there was undoubtedly a large residue of young slaves, perhaps 15,000: so says Imad-ed-din, who himself received his share of women and children. Abu-Shāma, 89.
- 9 Ernoul, 229-30.

Emancipation was the fulfillment of the desires of ordinary human beings who happened to be Jews, to be free. This desire in all men antedated nations. Consciously or unconsciously, man has struggled to realize his fullest expression as an individual. To assist man in that struggle is the ultimate purpose of freedom. That is the meaning of our faith in the inalienable rights of individual men.

The preparation of man for freedom from controlling, corporate forms of state and church and for a world in which he might discipline and govern himself, is a long, historic process. In Europe it began in a discernible way with the Renaissance and reached a definitive though not final form in the great political revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

That process of preparation and realization took several centuries. During that time, Jews were isolated from the prevailing currents of life by ghetto walls and legal discriminations. But the will to be free lived on in their hearts. Only because of their isolation, the articulation of the desire came later in many countries for Jews than for other Europeans.

The expression of the wish for emancipation as a conscious program for Jews was first made by an eighteenth century German Jew, Moses Mendelssohn. The first tools to implement

* From Elmer Berger, *The Jewish Dilemma: The Case Against Zionist Nationalism* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1946), pp. 169-208. The part from which this excerpt has been taken is entitled, "For Free Jews in a Free World." Copyright, 1945, by Elmer Berger. Reprinted by permission of the Devin-Adair Company.

** Founder of the American Council for Judaism (ACJ) and Secretary of Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Inc. (JAZ). His works include *Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: The Alternative to Zionism* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957) and *Who Knows Better* (New York: Bookmailer, 1956).

that expressed wish were provided by an eighteenth century German Christian, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. Their friendship is a classical example of the process of emancipation. The story contains all of the basic ingredients of that process as the way by which men of good will, with faith in freedom, may meet and solve the problems they face.

Mendelssohn was born in Dessau "as insignificant and wretched an object as almost all poor Jewish children." His youth was spent in the accepted pattern for Jewish boys of that day, with its emphasis on the study of the Talmud. Early in life he was appalled by the degradation into which Jewish life had fallen. He was insistent that Jews were as good as other men and that what they needed was opportunity to move with the expanding freedom that was on the march through Europe. He was also insistent that Jews must prepare themselves to take advantage of freedom. They too would have to pass through processes resembling the changes that had come about in European life.

His first efforts in that direction were confined to a persistent attempt to improve his Hebrew style. Mendelssohn was determined to use a pure, classical Hebrew prose. He was distressed at the debased Hebrew used by his contemporaries.

Mendelssohn's efforts to urge self-improvement upon Jews did not go unnoticed. In another corner of Germany Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was preparing to dedicate his life to the enlightenment of Germany. Lessing "the first free-thinking man in Germany," was a dramatist to whom "the theater was a pulpit" from which to expound the liberal ideas that were to bring forth a new world. A mutual friend brought Mendelssohn and Lessing together because of common interest in chess. The two men became inseparable friends.

Both men believed that Jews were far better than their stereotypes, products of the oppression and degradation to which Jews had been subjected for a thousand years. Mendelssohn resolved to educate Jews to take their places in a more hopeful world. Lessing believed that all men should have greater freedom and that no society could be free in which any of its members were enslaved.

Mendelssohn, therefore, began with the conviction that there was nothing in the character of either the Jew or the non-Jew that prevented them from understanding each other and living with each other, as normal human beings. He proved this true by his own affection for Lessing and Lessing's increasing devotion to him. Mendelssohn sought constant self-improvement. Lessing was determined that what this man was able to create

would not be unnoticed because he was a Jew.

It is important that in his efforts for emancipation, Mendelssohn began with himself—even before he knew Lessing. All of his life he continued a conscious, persistent effort at integration, in its fullest, richest sense. Through Lessing's help he began to study German and became as much a stylist in that language as he had been in Hebrew. As Mendelssohn integrated his life into the Germany in which he lived, Lessing opened more and more doors in that Germany to him. And soon Mendelssohn was counting the finest minds of Germany as his friends and intellectual companions.

His natural interest was in philosophy. He participated in several of the essay contests sponsored by various centers of learning in Germany and in one such contest, sponsored by the Berlin Academy, competed with and emerged the victor over Emanuel Kant. It was probably this achievement that led Frederick the Great to confer upon Mendelssohn the "privilege" of a *Schutz Jude* (protected Jew); a guarantee that Mendelssohn would be protected by the crown and would not be driven from Berlin.

This privilege however was only Mendelssohn's *personal* emancipation. The fact that it was a privilege conferred upon him at the whim of an Emperor made clear the low estate in which Jews lived and the immensity of the problems confronting them in a struggle for equality.

Mendelssohn was aware of this. He accepted the award. His personal achievement merely proved to him that the determination with which he had approached his own problem was the pattern that would lead to the improvement of the status of all Jews.

In all of this process of self-improvement and integration, Mendelssohn sacrificed nothing of his religious faith. He stood forth in Germany as an outspoken defender of Judaism and, on occasions, pleaded for it certain distinctions over Christianity. In a heated controversy with a fanatical Christian minister, he used public letters, through which the debate was carried on, to criticize the Christian world for holding the Jews in a degraded position in civil life. He emerged from this controversy with the plaudits of many of the outstanding men of Germany.

But mere defense of Jews, he knew, was not enough. No advance was ever made simply by staving off attack. The way from the Ghetto was out; the restraints imposed upon them by a bigoted world must be removed and Jews would have to liberate themselves by adapting themselves to the emerging patterns of the world of which they hoped to become a part.

Moses Mendelssohn made one significant contribution to this inner emancipation of Jews. Because he wanted his children to understand the Bible in its purest and simplest spirit, he prepared a translation of the Old Testament for their use. He was prevailed upon to publish this German translation of the Biblical text for general use among Jews.

Its publication raised a storm of protest from "official" Jewry, a pattern that was to last until our own time. This was the conflict between the corporate Jewish community—"the Jewish people"—and people who were Jews. Here was the origin of the struggle that would determine whether Jews might be humans first, or whether they willingly accepted the consequences of artificial separation and segregation. In 1779 an interdict was issued against the Mendelssohn translation. "All true to Judaism were forbidden under penalty of excommunication to use the translation." Mendelssohn's opponents frankly admitted the fear that "the Jewish youth would learn the German language from Mendelssohn's translation more than an understanding of Torah."

Thus the historic issue was joined. In the joining there began to emerge the dilemma in which the average Jew was held. He faced a world that did not understand him. It did not understand him because it had isolated him centuries before in order to prevent the spread of Judaism as a universal religion. A more liberal world was slowly preparing to free itself from medieval, corporate controls. Somewhat more slowly—but surely—it was preparing to admit the Jew into that world. Upon the very threshold of his freedom, the Jew was halted by organizations with "vested interests of considerable magnitude." Those vested interests lay in keeping Jews different and segregated, in fostering a feeling of difference and segregation. "Official" Jewry spoke to the world that was preparing to welcome Jews and in effect said in their behalf, "We do not wish to come into this world you offer us unless we can do it unchanged, in the garb of our own medievalism, first as separate and segregated Jews and secondarily as free humans."

Mendelssohn was undeterred by this dogmatic insistence on a difference which he knew was artificial. In defiance of his opponents he set down a principle which later disciples of integration might have followed. "The more the so-called wise men of the day object to it [the translation] the more necessary it is. At first I only intended it for ordinary people, but now I find that it is much more needful for rabbis."

In a fanaticism that was almost unbelievable, the translation was publicly burned and condemned by Jews but neither the

men nor the institutions with vested interests in the status quo could stem the tide. The Mendelssohn translation was read everywhere openly or covertly. Jews hungered for the opportunity to be free human beings. Mendelssohn had shown them how they might be both free and Jews, even though the process he advocated meant a progressive dissolution of "the Jewish people." Judaism could survive though "the Jewish people" might disappear. Judaism was of the spirit of man. It was universal in appeal.

"Official" Jewry could not prevent emancipation, for freedom was in the air of the western world. But it could and did confuse Jews in their thinking about their religious traditions. It could and did confuse non-Jews in their estimates of what Jews wanted for themselves. It could and did hamper the process of growth and development toward freedom which I have called integration. All this was dramatized in "official" Jewry's reaction to the Mendelssohn translation of the Bible.

Thus, a conflict in Jewish life! Jews were prevented from appearing as ordinary people in the countries in which they lived and when opportunities for integration and emancipation came to them, later than to most, they were restricted by other Jews in their acceptance of the benefits. Baron, in his *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* is frank to admit that Jews had a "growing sense of inferiority throughout the emancipation era" and "were extremely sensitive to all signs of approval from outside." This tendency has been noticeable among Jews who have so obviously gloried in the achievements of Jews and are often too supplicatingly grateful for the equality that is their due. "Official" Jewry saw to it, by such acts as opposition to the Mendelssohn translation, that "Jewish enlightenment was, on the whole, much less radical than the European movement...."

Advocates of a "Jewish people" justified this braking of the process of emancipation and integration by making a high virtue out of early discrimination and persecution; by maintaining that without a "Jewish people" there could be no Judaism. Almost unconsciously, the men who wanted to preserve a "Jewish people" regardless of the fate of people who were Jews, differentiated between Jews and other human beings. They continue to do so, consciously or unconsciously today. "The European or American had his language, literature, state, etc., manifold expressions, conscious or unconscious, of his national life. The Jew had no such immediate substitutes for tradition." This utterly false and unjustified juxtaposition of "Europeans," "Americans," and "Jews" is an inevitable consequence of the concept of "Jewish peoplehood" as a national entity.

But Mendelssohn's translation, born of the emergent forces of freedom, was not to be denied. It "speedily resulted in a veritable renaissance of Jews.... The inner freedom of the Jews... dates from this translation."

This gradual, inner emancipation of Jews came face to face with the unyielding dogmatism of Jewish separatism and led to a new phenomenon in Jewish life, the philosophy of Jewish assimilation.

By Jewish *assimilation* is meant a conscious and willing attempt on the part of Jews to divest themselves of affiliations with Jewish life and to lose their identity in the non-Jewish world. This escape has been justifiably condemned by both Jews and Christians. I am not here referring to a transference of true religious conviction from Judaism to some expression of Christianity. By assimilation I mean the conscious efforts of Jews to dissociate themselves from Jewish life; attraction to another religion may or may not follow.

Assimilation was a direct result of this conflict between inner freedom in the lives of ordinary Jews and the stubborn resistance to that freedom maintained by advocates of the "peoplehood" of Jews. Mendelssohn pointed the direction in which humans who were Jews might find a normal status in the Western world. It was a natural, human desire that led Jews to follow that direction. Across the broad road to freedom, "official" Jewry placed the obstruction of dogmatic "Jewishness." They hampered the process of integration and inner emancipation. To get around the obstacle some Jews went out into the free world by removing Judaism from their lives. It was an inevitable development.

The charge of encouraging and desiring assimilation has been hurled at believers in emancipation. The truth is just the reverse. As the irresistible tides of freedom touched the lives of Jews, designers of Jewish life had the alternative of adapting Judaism to a new world. Where they failed to meet the challenge, freedom swept Judaism away. For the Jew was not to be denied his own fullest development by the dogmatics of reaction. That assimilation has failed as a solution to the Jewish problem may be true. That fact does not deny the logic out of which the impulse to assimilate was born.

Mendelssohn encountered the problem of assimilation in the lives of his own children, who as enlightened citizens of their day, turned away from an attachment to things Jewish when the obdurate leaders of Jewry hobbled the pace of integration.

While Mendelssohn was urging integration upon other Jews,

Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was providing the other, indispensable ingredient of emancipation. For no matter how strenuously Jews may exert themselves in preparation for freedom, there must be men of good will who out of enlightened self-interest see reason in securing freedom and equality for all men. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was the prototype of such men in every age.

His contributions to emancipation for Jews took two forms. First, he advanced the personal career of Moses Mendelssohn at every opportunity. He recognized in Mendelssohn an individual of great worth. Lessing was determined that his worth not be lost to the world because Mendelssohn was a Jew. As the foremost dramatist of Germany in his day, Lessing's acknowledged literary standing made his advocacy of Mendelssohn's literary contributions the most important element in Mendelssohn's career. It was Lessing who first had some of Mendelssohn's essays published; who introduced Mendelssohn to the circles of leaders of German thought; who opened the doors to the man who had prepared himself to enter a new, emergent world. Both the preparation and the opportunity to utilize it were important. They are the opposite sides of the coin of normal life patterns for Jews.

Lessing also exerted his great influence through his own writings. He wrote a number of plays, dealing with the problem. In the best of them, *Nathan the Wise*, Lessing drew the picture of the hero, Nathan, from the character of Mendelssohn and argued for the equality of the three great religions, Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedism.

Official Jewry had opposed Mendelssohn's efforts at inner emancipation of Jews. Christian prototypes opposed Lessing's attempts to win external freedom for the Jews whom Mendelssohn was preparing to be free. Thus reactionaries in both groups joined hands to prevent the fullest fruition of the efforts of these two men. But the force of emancipation was not to be denied. In the life-story of Mendelssohn and Lessing the pattern by which men who were Jews might be free was made clear.

Recognizing that Jews wish peace, security and opportunity in the places they have called home, it becomes obvious that emancipation and not Zionism is the liberal, modern world's answer to the so-called "Jewish problem." We find in the Mendelssohn-Lessing story then the following elements as indispensable to emancipation.

(1) Enlightenment among Jews to the point where they realize that freedom implies a reciprocal process. Unnecessary, antiquated and meaningless vestigial differences must be eliminated. The characteristics, so often described as peculiar to a

“Jewish race” or a “Jewish nation” or a “Jewish people” are really not Jewish at all. They are the caricatures of humans who are Jews, drawn by men who maliciously desired to enslave Jews in an age of darkness and superstition. They create divisiveness in a world where mutual understanding is increasingly necessary. And, as Mendelssohn accurately pointed out, these accretions of a distorted, ghettoized life are not the essentials of Judaism. Mendelssohn’s procedure was really simple in design. He went back to the first principles of Judaism. *Those first principles conceived of Judaism as a universal religion. In thus going back, he properly eliminated the corruptions of Judaism which were in the nature of a Jewish nationalism. They copied the medieval concept of a union of church and state. He stripped Judaism of its national limitations and brought it forth free and purified for a new world.* That was why he could, with impunity, teach the Bible to his children and later to other Jews in German. Its truths as religious truths were as valid in German as in Hebrew.

(2) Enlightened Christians such as Lessing, must secure acceptance of the truth that men who wish to be free in an interdependent society must free other men. There was nothing of condescension in Lessing’s labors in behalf of Jews. He did not plead for toleration of Jews. He was not even primarily interested in Jews. But he was determined on freedom for all. For his day as for ours, one of the leading problems was the establishment of the primary principle of justice—dealing with individual men for what they are, in and of themselves.

(3) The greatest opposition to emancipation derived from sources of reaction among both Jews and Christians. The two groups of reactionaries pursued a course that in effect constituted an alliance. Both insisted upon dealing with Jews as an entity known as “the Jewish people.”

(4) The alternative to emancipation of the Jew is complete assimilation in a free world; and oppression or persecution for differences needlessly maintained in an illiberal world. But in an illiberal world, even assimilation will not guarantee average Jews peace, security and opportunity.

(5) The artificial retarding of emancipation in order to preserve a “Jewish people” upon separatist grounds, produces a sense of inferiority in Jews and deprives them of the opportunities for normal living. Insofar as there is this abnormality, Jews present a problem to the world; and there are always charlatans who will exploit that circumstance.

(6) Jews, therefore, owe it to themselves and to the world to normalize Jewish life by dropping the medieval vestiges of “Jewish nationhood” and “Jewish peoplehood;” to accept the

inalienable rights and responsibilities of individual men who are free because they deserve freedom and have prepared for it and who will lose freedom when they ignore the responsibilities and expect only the rights.

Some will say that the Lessing-Mendelssohn saga proves nothing because neither Lessing nor Mendelssohn was an average person. True, they were both exceptional men. But the inference is false. One may as well say that ordinary Americans cannot live in freedom because they are all not George Washingtons or Thomas Jeffersons or Abraham Lincolns.

The Mendelssohn-Lessing formula was applied with differing degrees of enthusiasm and correspondingly varying degrees of success in most of Europe.

Emancipation, concerned as it was with human beings, had to take and work with human beings as they were. It had faith in human beings, as Mendelssohn and Lessing had faith in them. It had the kind of fighting faith that has led men in every age to challenge the stultifying formulas of slavery and to goad man forward. But since it worked with human beings, since it sought the release of human spirit rather than its compression into dogmatic artificialities, its development was as uneven as the development of man.

Despite these difficulties, a century before the despairing prophecies of Herzl, the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula proved it worked.

Mendelssohn had become known to practically all the Jews of Europe. Regardless of "official" Jewry's opposition to his attempts to prepare Jews for entrance into an expanding world, Jews turned to him—and not to "official" Jewry—for assistance in realizing that very human goal.

In 1781, for example, the Jews of Alsace found their condition intolerable. They decided to petition King Louis XVI of France for an alleviation of their tragic position. They turned to Mendelssohn to assist them.

Mendelssohn, in turn, employing the formula that worked so well with Lessing, turned to another friend and great Liberal spirit, Christian Wilhelm Dohm. With Mendelssohn's assistance Dohm composed one of the most comprehensive and penetrating analyses of "the Jewish question."

He decided not to write a specific appeal for the alleviation of the distressed Jews of Alsace. Using that tragedy only as a point of departure, Dohm fashioned an historic bill of rights in behalf of all Jews everywhere. His document, *Upon the Civil Amelioration of the Condition of the Jews* was finished in August, 1781.

The thesis of the document is important enough to consider in some detail; we need to be interested as much in technique as in results. Dohm departed somewhat from Lessing's approach. He made no sentimental appeal for Jews on the basis of their great religious heritage, as Lessing had done in *Nathan the Wise*. Dohm's appeal was directed to the heads of states. It was designed to appeal to the enlightened self-interest of rulers. It sought to apply the principles of the emerging social sciences: Wastage of any human resources was a crime against society, and human resources were being wasted in the prevailing blanket-legislation regulating a "Jewish people."

Dohm began with the assertion "that it was a universal conviction that the welfare of states depended upon increase of population. . . . Yet, despite this universally recognized principle, the same governments did all within their power to prevent Jews from maintaining even a minimum basis of life." Dohm then recited in sharp, incisive words, the long list of discriminations suffered by Jews.

What reasons could have prompted European states to fly in the face of their own best interests in pursuit of such policies? Is it possible that industrious and good citizens are less useful to the state because "they are Jews and are distinguished by their form of worship?" asked Dohm. "The chief book of the Jews, the Law of Moses, is regarded with reverence also by Christians."

Dohm reviewed the whole history of Jews in Europe, their enjoyment of full civil rights in the Roman Empire; their degradation and the loss of those rights at the hands of the Byzantines and the Huns of Germany and the Catholic Monarchs of Spain. "In Spain, amongst Jews and Arabs," Dohm reminded Christian Europe, "there had existed a more remarkable culture than in Northern Europe."

Finally, he concluded his arraignment of the Christian world with these words of strikingly comprehensive vision:

"These principles of exclusion, *equally opposed to humanity and politics*, which bear the impress of the dark centuries, *are unworthy of the enlightenment of our times* and deserve no longer to be followed. It is possible that some errors have become so deeply rooted that they will disappear only in the third or fourth generation. But this is no argument against trying to reform now; because without such a beginning, a better generation can not appear."

Dohm's argument was almost legalistic in design and scientific in spirit. In this it represented an advance over Lessing's

more poetic and romantic picture of Nathan. It was not alone for Jews that Dohm was concerned. The appeal might have applied to any oppressed group, by varying the specific historical references. The premise from which he argued was universal: Any society that wanted to realize its fullest potentialities must release the fullest potentialities of all its members. To the degree that humans were compressed within formulas that restricted their lives, society suffered.

This eighteenth century German Christian thus set down the working basis of freedom. In that basis, Jews were just an incident. They were to be neither above nor beneath the elementary premise. Because of the validity of the premise itself, Jews were to have full equality with all men.

Dohm, like Mendelssohn, realized that Jews had to undergo internal liberation before they could fulfill all the obligations and take advantage of all the privileges of equality. Four hundred years of evolution from the days of the Renaissance had passed them by in their enforced isolation. Because of this, Dohm believed Jews should not yet fill public offices. But in all other aspects of their lives they should be afforded opportunities to eliminate this lag and to prepare themselves for emergence onto the stage of a freer and more enlightened world.

To this end, he advocated

“equal rights with all other subjects. In particular, liberty of occupation and procuring a livelihood should be conceded them so that they would be attracted to handicrafts, agriculture, arts and sciences; all without compulsion. The moral elevation of the Jews was to be promoted by the foundation of good schools of their own, or by the admission of their youth into Christian schools, and by the elevation of adults in the Jewish House of Prayer. . . .”

Jews were to have

“freedom in their private religious affairs...free exercise of religion, the establishment of synagogues, the appointment of teachers, maintenance of their poor, if considered wise, under the supervision of the government. Even the power of excluding refractory members from the community should be given them.”

There was another and no less important part of Dohm's recommendation.

“...It should also be impressed upon Christians, through sermons and other effectual means, that they were to regard and treat Jews as brothers and fellow-men.”

Mendelssohn took exception to one point suggested by Dohm in his program. Dohm implied an attachment between Judaism and the state in his request that the state recognize Judaism's right to excommunicate unruly members of the community. Mendelssohn's personal experience with his translation of the Bible probably enabled him to see the hidden threat to freedom inherent in this alliance. In any event, it was contrary to his part of the emancipation formula—inner liberation of Jews.

Accordingly, he was moved to write a brief statement in March 1782, as a preface to a translation of a book by a seventeenth century Jew. Mendelssohn gave his preface the title of *The Salvation of the Jews*.

The statement was a majestic appeal for a pure Judaism, to which men would come in full freedom of conscience or not at all. The moral precepts of Judaism must attract men by their inherent worthiness. Men were not to be clubbed or intimidated by the power of excommunication into being Jews.

“Alas! my brethren, you have felt the oppressive yolk of intolerance only too severely; all the nations of the earth seem hitherto to have been deluded by the idea that religion can be maintained by an iron hand. You, perhaps have suffered yourselves to be meshed into thinking the same. Oh, my brethren, follow the example of love, as you have till now followed that of hatred!”

This was the ideological death-blow to “the Jewish people” and the exaltation of Judaism. Henceforth, Jews were bound to each other only by their voluntary acceptance of their religion—Judaism. Mendelssohn knew the way by which Judaism could recapture its once great glory. Let Judaism purge itself of the alloys forcibly smelted into it by the pressures of a dark and medieval age. Let it cleanse itself of all notions of restrictive, corporate power over the lives of men. Let it envision the hopeful pattern of the emerging world, in which church and state would be separated. Let Jews emancipate themselves so that as free and enlightened individuals they might take their places in a free and enlightened world.

Mendelssohn enlarged on this revolutionary idea in 1783 in a book which he called *Jerusalem or Upon Ecclesiastical Power and Judaism*. Here, Mendelssohn argued with nobility of thought and expression for one of the cardinal principles of the modern world—the separation of church and state.

Immanuel Kant was moved to remark in a comment on the work:¹

“I consider this book the herald of great reform.... You have succeeded in combining your religion with such a degree of freedom of conscience as was never imagined possible, and of which no other faith can boast. You have, at the same time, so thoroughly and clearly demonstrated the necessity of unlimited liberty of conscience in every religion, that ultimately our church will also be led to reflect how to remove from its midst everything that disturbs and oppresses conscience, which will finally unite all men in their view of the essential points of religion.”

In design and conception, the inner emancipation of Jews was complete. Had Mendelssohn's experience and thought been actively pursued by Jews; had Jews organized to promote such a conception of Jewish life, they would have been understood by the non-Jewish world, and would have emerged from the European chaos as human beings who wanted to be distinctive only in their religious faith; and they would have come to that faith in utter freedom.

What a contrast this majestic view of Mendelssohn's is, compared to the rigid dogmatics of Jewish nationalists who insisted upon preserving medieval forms of a “Jewish people” and “a Jewish nation” because they were afraid that, in freedom, Judaism would perish! Mendelssohn sought to attract humans to Judaism by constantly increasing the excellence of his religion. Jewish nationalists, “official” Jews, substituted coercion for excellence and insisted upon preserving a Judaism that maintained artificial barriers between Jews and other men. They demanded of the Jew that he carry a burden of extensive differences. And they sought to accentuate the differences, believing that only by preventing escape could they keep Jews as Jews.

Dohm's work was published in August, 1781. Its logic and power were not without practical results. In Austria, Emperor Joseph was impressed by the Dohm statement. It coincided with his own desires to liberalize Austria. He had already issued a Toleration Edict to Protestants. Improvements of the lot of Jews therefore followed naturally and Dohm's program pointed a way.

In October 1781, a series of laws were issued providing for instruction of Jews in “handicrafts, arts and sciences.” Universities, hitherto closed to Jews, were to admit them. Jewish primary and high schools were to be established and Jewish adults were “compelled” to know the language of the country because “in the future only documents written in that language

would possess legal force." Jews were to be considered fellow-men everywhere and "all excesses against them were to be avoided." The body-tax was abolished. Jews were to have "equal rights with Christian inhabitants."

These laws, of course, did not mean the kind of equality men think of today. Austria was not a democracy. These decrees were, in a way, an expansion of the kind of privileged status Mendelssohn had known in Berlin. But for a few exceptions, they were the same kind of precarious rights that all men knew in monarchies where the kingly power was only moderately checked or not checked at all. By and large, Jews were admitted to as much freedom as other men had.

There were discriminations in this imperfect and precarious freedom, for Jews were not permitted to live in a few cities. In Vienna, only a few Jews were welcomed. They were not allowed a synagogue in the capital city. But progress had been made! Nowhere, at anytime had men ever leapt headlong into complete freedom.

What was important was that the chains of a thousand years' forging had been broken. Thus, a century before Herzl wrote his *Jewish State*,* hoping to arouse interest in the "Jewish problem," liberal men were aware of the problem and were taking action designed in the pattern of the emerging, liberal world, to offer a solution. Jews were to become equal partners with their co-nationals.

Emperor Joseph's acts did not fail to arouse criticism. Not all of his subjects approved this extension of opportunity to Jews. But Joseph could withstand the criticism that came from reactionary Christian sources.

What was less understandable, was the unrestrained opposition of "official" Jewry. They vigorously protested against Jewish youth learning "natural sciences, astronomy, and religious philosophy." They were afraid "that through school education and partial emancipation, young men would be seduced from Judaism and that the instruction given at high schools would supercede the study of the Talmud." These considerations led "the rabbis and the representatives of tradition to oppose the reforming Jewish ordinances of Emperor Joseph."

But progress was not to be denied. Here and there the schools provided for in the Emperor's edicts were built and Jews took advantage of them. Especially in Trieste and Venice,

* Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) was the founder of modern political Zionism. He propounded the idea of a Jewish State in his *Der Judenstaat*, published in 1896.

Dohm's ideas, as carried out by the Emperor, took hold. While "official" Judaism was unyielding, Jews evaded the obstruction.

The stage was thus set in Germany and Austria for the complete assimilation of large numbers of garden-variety Jews, and "official" Jewry had only itself to blame, because it insisted that to preserve Judaism a separatist entity must be preserved. That was true only as "official" Jewry wanted to preserve a medieval Judaism. Thus it put Jews in an anomalous position. On the one hand, men like Mendelssohn and Dohm were fighting to have Jews accepted as fully equal citizens. On the other, the "official" Jews resisted every attempt to achieve integration. The average Jew was therefore caught in the dilemma. Some sought assimilation as the way out. Most, however, unprepared for free choice themselves, followed the "official" leaders. Mendelssohn represented "danger" and "heresy."

How different the recent history of Jews might have been had someone with the qualities of leadership, and with the resources to match those of reaction, organized an effective program to advance Mendelssohn's and Dohm's idea! How different the life of the Jewish John Does might have been everywhere, if his "official" leaders had had the faith in Judaism that Mendelssohn possessed, and had been willing to free Jews inwardly, trusting in the majesty of Judaism as a religion. How different history might have been had the "official" spokesmen designed a Judaism to meet the requirements of a new and promising age. All this, "official" Jewry failed to do. Because it failed, Jews emerged from the medieval world an ambiguous entity. They neither belonged to that old world, nor were they free of it. They were touched by the freedom of the new world and prevented from fully absorbing it. They were themselves confused—and the world was confused about them.

In a way, the average Jew gave the answer by emancipating himself whenever he had the opportunity. When his Judaism did not keep pace with emancipation, he assimilated. *Where it did, he proved that it was possible to be an integrated citizen and a faithful Jew.* But because no effective agency, down through the years, was ever created to foster integration as a solution to the Jewish problem, the average Jew was eclipsed by the vigorous, relentless pressuring of "official" Jewry, constantly reminding the world at the price of freedom that Jews were different and were to remain different and segregated. Half of the process of emancipation was "a Jewish problem" as the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula had revealed. Jews, like other men, had to prepare themselves for freedom. To the extent that they neglected their part of the process, the formula might be expected to fail.

If Jews themselves put obstacles in the way of equality, there was nothing much a world could do about it.

When Mendelssohn died in 1786, he left an unforgettable influence on the lives of Jews. He had demonstrated single-handedly that, given the opportunity, Jews could break out of enforced segregation into the emerging libertarian culture of the new world.

In Berlin, Mendelssohn left a large devoted following. Jews had become acknowledged leaders in Berlin's intellectual life. Dozens of literary salons developed that became the talk of the Prussian capital. In social and intellectual affairs, Jews met on a plane of equality with Christians. This did not mean that they possessed civil or political equality. But that was not a Jewish problem. Eighteenth century Prussia was not a democracy.

There were special discriminations against Jews: poll taxes, special business taxes, denial of right to fill public offices, even inequality in courts. In 1787-88, a group of Berlin Jews made an effort to have these discriminations removed and met with only meager success. Some individual Jews were singled out for equal status. The equalization, oddly enough, was not put in any positive way. It was simply stated that these "exceptional" Jews "were not to be treated as Jews" in public acts.

Nevertheless, the progress of an enlightened Jewry was noticeable. Civil and political equality was simply not an accepted principle in eighteenth century Prussia—nor was it really and genuinely accepted in *twentieth* century Prussia. The "problem" was basically not Jewish. It was Prussian.

The Mendelssohn formula had, however, worked. What was needed was the democratization of the middle European states, to establish the principle of equality in laws that would be above the whims of men. The realization of that goal is still one of the major problems of the world. This is the Christian half of the "Jewish" problem.

I have thus far dealt only with Germany and Austria. Farther to the east, in Poland and Russia, there was nothing at all of the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula applied. These states themselves and the Jews within them continued to live in despotism until the twentieth century. But in the years following World War I, when new states were in the process of formation, the equality of their Jews was taken for granted, as I have pointed out earlier. No one had to fight for equal rights for Jews. This, in itself, unmistakably reveals the tremendous progress made by emancipation. A century and a half ago, the idea of equality for Jews was revolutionary. In 1918-1919 it was an accepted

fact. History proved that emancipation works.

For a truly classical picture of the progress of emancipation of Jews in Europe, one must turn to France.

Here, a man by the name of Cerf Berr was the spear-head of the battle for equality. Berr, a friend of Mendelssohn, lived in Strasbourg where he seems to have engaged in the manufacture of arms. At least his occupation was such that it provided him with access to important officials of France.

From Louis XVI of France he secured the privilege of owning land and property. In his several factories he purposely sought to employ Jews, having in mind their withdrawal from the petty trading and usury to which the European world had forced them.

Using his personal influence and wealth, Berr put forth Dohm's bill of rights for Jews at court. He was, moreover, encouraged to press for the emancipation of French Jews by the favorable reception accorded Dohm's proposals by Joseph of Austria.

France had good intellectual precedent for the practical effort to grant Jews full citizenship. Montesquieu, whose thinking pointed the way for the whole concept of liberal democracy had said:

“You Christians complain that the Emperor of China roasts all Christians in his dominions over a slow fire. You behave much worse towards Jews, because they do not believe as you do. If any of our descendants should ever venture to say that the nations of Europe were cultured, your example will be adduced to prove that they were barbarians. The picture that they will draw of you will certainly stain your age, and spread abroad hatred of all your contemporaries.”

This was the kind of broad, slashing criticism which the whole world needed. When that world learned to think in terms of universal enlightenment, for its own preservation, as Dohm and Montesquieu suggested, the “Jewish problem” would be solved. There was no “Jewish problem” in reality. The titans of human thought, from whose free spirits a new intellectual climate was being formed knew that the plight of the Jew was an indictment of civilization. The degradation of Jews was to them symbolic of the evils that would have to be overcome before all men could be free.

It was against the background of such enlightened self-interest that Cerf Berr projected Dohm's proposals into the court of Louis XVI. The effort met with favorable reception.

Louis had convened a commission of Jews to make recommendations for the improvement of the status of their co-religionists. A number of reforms were instituted, among them the elimination of the hated and degrading poll tax.

Up to this point, the emancipation of French Jews followed the pattern that Dohm's proposals had suggested to Joseph of Austria; benevolences granted by a monarch to a group of his subjects. Except for the United States, no nation at that time could be said to be a fully effective democracy, and, in America, the Declaration of Independence was only a decade old. If there was an element of toleration and paternalism in these advances made by Jews toward freedom, it is because the freedom of all men, in these countries, rested upon precarious bases. History was relentlessly driving the monarchs of Western Europe to the wall, but it would require another half century of time before there was victory for the revolutionary doctrine of representative government.

In France, the Mendelssohn-Lessing process had its first full European opportunity, for France was the first of the continental states to try to establish a democracy. As a result, it affords us the first opportunity to observe emancipation in its natural habitat.

Two Christians supplied the Lessing content of the now proven formula: Count Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire.

Neither of these men was a special pleader for Jews. Both had their eyes set upon a more intelligent world. In the path to that world, the distressing condition of Jews stood as an obstacle. The elimination of this obstacle was an incident in a program of broader objectives. With these men, following the pattern of Mendelssohn and Lessing as interpreted by Dohm and Montesquieu, another principle emerges in the technique of emancipation.

The most satisfactory basis upon which emancipation of Jews can be built is a policy broader in scope than "the Jewish problem." Special pleading for Jews, as an end in itself, results in conditions as precarious as special discriminations. In fact, almost as uncompromisingly certain as the law of gravity, it is true that the very existence of special pleas for Jews results in special resistances against them. Only when the status of Jews is an inextricable part of the structure of democracy; only when the status of Jews is liberalized as an inevitable consequence of general liberalization, does the Jew become secure.

This truth is what makes the solution of "the Jewish problem" simple, if men of good will can but understand it. For in so approaching a solution, men perform a service for

themselves. Emancipated Jews ask only this: full equality of rights and responsibilities. No society can ever be free or secure that denies that demand.

It was upon this basis that Mirabeau and the Abbé Grégoire brought the "Jewish problem" to the attention of a France that was already on the threshold of a democratic revolution. While they spoke of Jews, their primary interest was in liberalizing France.

Mirabeau had been closely associated with Mendelssohn in Berlin, where he had been on a secret diplomatic mission in 1786. He was so inspired by what he had found in Berlin that he determined to begin the fight for the emancipation of the Jews of France. This was to be an integral part of his historic contributions to the French Revolution. Accordingly, he wrote a challenging exposition of the problem, *Upon Mendelssohn and the political reform of the Jews*.

Once again, the value of Mendelssohn's heroic efforts to integrate himself inspired a program that led to the emancipation of Jews in a whole nation.

Mirabeau could write, for all of France to read, "May it not be said that his example, *especially the outcome of his exertions for the elevation of his brethren*, silences those who, with ignoble bitterness, insist that the Jews are so contemptible that they cannot be transformed into a respectable people?"

Mirabeau penetrated to the very core of the problem with which this book is concerned. He knew what Jews wanted. They possessed no ineradicable yearning for a nationhood of their own—even in a Messianic sense. Their inclinations to such a pattern were a negative, defensive mechanism, product of the conduct of the Christian world. With any opportunity for freedom, as Mendelssohn had proven, Jews wanted only peace, security and opportunity as integral parts of the nations in which they lived.

Mirabeau's enormous influence in the pre-revolutionary days of France made the "Jewish question" one of national importance and an integral part of the larger problems facing a nation that was bankrupt from absolutist misrule and decadent feudalism, a nation whose intellectuals and generous spirited men and women looked to the American experiment for example in preparing for freedom.

Several years before Mirabeau's efforts, there occurred an interesting incident among the Jews of Bordeaux that illustrates the thesis of this book, although in no exemplary way. By and large, the Jews of Bordeaux were of Spanish-Portuguese descent. They had come to Bordeaux centuries before, after the expulsion

from Spain. And from the advanced culture of the Golden Age of Spanish Jewry,* they considered themselves superior in every way to German Jews. They even formulated prohibitions against inter-marriage with Jews of German derivation.

About the middle of the eighteenth century, some German Jews began to drift into Bordeaux. The native, Spanish-Portuguese Jews considered these German Jews "foreigners." They resented their presence.

What is important here is not the narrow-minded attitude of these natives of Bordeaux. In this aversion to "foreigners" they were simply children of their time. Our own world, two centuries later, is not yet free of this unjustified consciousness of "foreigners." We condemn the prejudice and understand it—particularly in eighteenth century Europe!

What is important in the attitude of these Spanish-Portuguese Jews is that as long ago as the middle 1700's, they had no sense of Jewish "nationality." Their motives were anything but commendable, but the historic truth is important. Later men would take the fact and with constructive and benevolent motives, use it for the emancipation of average Jews.

For the Bordeaux Jews made evident to King Louis, and the French, the nonsense of "a Jewish people." A man named Isaac Pinto assumed the leadership in the objective of the Bordeaux community, to obtain the power to "expel the foreign Jews. . . from the town within three days."

To secure this power, Pinto prepared a statement about Jews. It is an interesting coincidence that at the same time Voltaire was engaged in slandering the Jews. In charging that he had been cheated out of 25,000 francs by a London Jew, he considered himself justified in blaming and condemning the whole "people." Pinto's activities in behalf of the Bordeaux community's unworthy objective to banish "foreign Jews," oddly, became a further exposition of the character of ordinary Jews, and an answer to Voltaire.

Pinto's statement asserted that Jews "widely scattered, have assumed the character of the inhabitants of the country in which they live. An English Jew as little resembles his co-religionist of Constantinople, as the latter does a Chinese Mandarin; the Jew of Bordeaux and he of Metz are two utterly different beings."

Divorce statements from motives for issuing them: another step had been taken, in the Mendelssohn pattern, toward the

* See Roth, pp. 45-8, on the condition of Spanish Jews under the Caliphate.

liberation of the Jews. Before he could be liberated as an average human being, the Jew had to be liberated from the segregating concept of "a Jewish people." Pinto's statement, widely publicized in France, was a step in that direction.

The thesis that Pinto put forward is, moreover, indispensable to any intelligent approach to the whole "Jewish problem" commonly called "anti-Semitism." The cardinal premise of anti-Semitism is the concept that "a Jewish people" exists. Individual Jews were prevented from emerging out of that archaic pattern to participate as free individuals in a new world premised upon the inalienable rights of individual man. Thus à la Voltaire, a whole "people" could be charged with the traits of any individual and every individual bore the burden of collective characteristics.

Through his document, Pinto roundly attacked Voltaire for blaming a whole "people" for the real or imagined shortcomings of an individual. He might have written the same protest against ascribing virtues of individuals to a whole "people." What Pinto and most Jews have ever wanted, since emancipation dawned as a possibility, was a normal status as individual men. They wanted and want, neither collective sin nor collective virtue.

The truth is—that the Jew emerged from the ghetto, limping between two worlds. He did not boldly or completely follow the Mendelssohn half of the emancipation formula. He did not forthrightly renounce the feudal concept of "peoplehood." And so he had a share of guilt in fostering the world's misunderstanding.

Joined with Mirabeau in the effort to liberalize the position of Jews as an integral part of the emancipation of all of France was a young Catholic priest, Abbé Grégoire. Grégoire had won recognition and election to the national assembly through an essay which he had submitted to the Royal Society of Science and Arts in Metz, on the subject, *Are There Means to Make the Jews Happier and More Useful in France?*

The first days of the French Revolution were not auspicious for a bright future for Jews in France. In the excesses of the first days, Jews were paradoxically lumped together with the hated nobility that had once oppressed them, and the new spirit that prevailed, immediately following Bastille Day, made common enemies of both. Jews registered a strong protest with the National Assembly and in August 1789, Grégoire published a pamphlet *Proposals In Favor Of the Jews*.

Finally, on August 4, the first Republic was born.

Immediately, Jews petitioned for admission as full citizens

in the new-born republic. There was no unity in the demands they submitted. Jews from Bordeaux, Paris, Metz, communities from Lorraine, all offered separate and different petitions. The Jews of Bordeaux asked only that their equalization as citizens be sealed by law. The Parisian Jews sent a deputation of eleven men to the National Assembly, asking that their equal status be guaranteed by law and adding that "the example of the French people would induce all the nations of earth to acknowledge Jews as brothers." The community of Metz added the request that their "oppressive taxes be removed and the debts which they had contracted in consequence of the taxes be made void." The communities of Lorraine asked that "the authority and autonomy of the rabbis in internal affairs be established and recognized by law."

It was sometime before the assembly actually came to grips with the "Jewish" problem. It is important to observe that before it was seriously discussed, the fundamental principles of democracy were established as the law of France. Thus, "the Jewish question" was not one of separate privilege or distinction. Its solution came in the irresistible logic of events by which all of France was moving.

First the "Rights of Man" became the fundamental premise of the Republic. Included in these inviolable rights of men, as in the United States, was freedom of worship.

The importance of conceiving of Jews as a religious community, and not as a separate, national entity, was thus becoming clear. As a religious sect, the way was now free for the full participation of Jews in the life of France.

With freedom of worship established as a pillar of the Republic and with the principle of inalienable rights of individual men as the cornerstone of the whole structure, the basic principle of dealing with the "Jewish problem" was established. It was succinctly stated by the liberal Clermont-Tonnere,* "To the individual Jew everything; to the Jews as a nation nothing!"

And it was a fair principle. In a world in which men were to be judged on the basis of the inherent sanctity of the individual, Jews might not expect special dispensation for such a medieval hangover as "a Jewish nation."

There was, of course, opposition to the idea of complete, legal emancipation. Debates on the "Jewish question" commanded sporadic interest from August 1789 to January 1790.

* Clermont-Tonnerre (1757-92) was a French nobleman and a member of the States-General.

Finally, the Spanish-Portuguese Jews of Bordeaux, through Talleyrand,* petitioned for and received legal recognition as citizens of France. This was only a partial victory, but it established the needed precedent.

On January 29, 1790, the Jews of Paris petitioned for legally recognized equality. The halls of the National Assembly rang with eloquent support of the petition, not alone for the Jews of Paris, but for the Jews of all France.

A few reactionaries in the Assembly managed, by parliamentary maneuvering, to postpone a final decision on the hotly debated question. But the tendency was unmistakable. If the new and uncertain National Assembly was intimidated by a few reactionary members from a frontal attack on the status of Jews, it was not deterred from handling the question otherwise. In April 1790, it was declared that the Jews of Alsace were "under protection of the laws, and that the magistrates and National Guard were to take precautions for their security." In July, it was declared that "the Jew taxes should be remitted. . . and that every tribute, under whatever name—protection-money, residence-tax, or tolerance-money—should cease."

Finally, in September 1791, the long, complex deliberations over the details of the constitution drew to a close. No final disposition had yet been made of the status of Jews. As the story goes, the motion for adjournment was before the assembly when the deputy Duport arose to say:

"I believe that freedom of thought does not permit any distinction in political rights on account of a man's creed. The recognition of this equality is always being postponed . . . I demand that the motion for adjournment be withdrawn, and a decree passed that the Jews of France enjoy the privileges of citizenship."

Apparently, with the harassing details of the constitution settled, the true character of the liberal assembly emerged. Duport's speech was greeted with enthusiastic applause. It was suggested that anyone who spoke in opposition to the motion be called to order, since now he would be opposing the Constitution itself. On September 28, 1791, Jews awoke to their greatest day. A great power of the world had recognized them as full and equal citizens, free to maintain their distinctive religion and enjoy complete integration in the nation's life. Emancipated Jews might well memorialize that day!

* Talleyrand (1754-1838) was a French statesman and later Foreign Minister under Napoleon. At this time, he was the bishop of Autun.

One of the most prominent French Jews, who had been among the leaders in the struggle for emancipation, caught the significance of the event. Isaac Berr, in an open letter to French Jews, wrote:

“at length the day has arrived on which the veil is torn asunder which covered us with humiliation. We have at last obtained the rights of which we have been deprived for eighteen centuries. How deeply at this moment should we recognize the wonderful grace of the God of our forefathers! On the 27th of September we were the only inhabitants of this great realm who seemed doomed to eternal humiliation and slavery, and the very next day, a memorable day which we shall always commemorate, didst Thou inspire these immortal legislators of France to utter one word which caused 60,000 unhappy beings, who had hitherto lamented their hard lot, to be suddenly plunged into the intoxicating joys of the present delight. This nation asks no thanks, except that we show ourselves worthy citizens.”

Berr then went on to urge upon his fellow-Jews their responsibilities in the light of their new status. The Lessing part of the formula had reached its fullest development. It was now incumbent upon Jews to provide the fullest expression of the Mendelssohn half.

“...Let it be acknowledged, dearest brethren, that we have not deserved this wonderful change by our repentance or by the reformation of our manners....

“...Let us examine with attention what remains to be done on our part...and how we may be able to show in some measure our grateful sense....

“...The name of active citizen, which we have just obtained, is without a doubt the most precious title a man can possess in a free empire; but this title alone is not sufficient; we should possess also the necessary qualifications to fulfill the duties annexed to it. We know ourselves how very deficient we are in that respect....We must then, dear brethren, strongly bear this truth in our minds, that, till such a time as we work a change in our manners, in our habits, in short, in our whole education, we cannot expect to be placed by the esteem of our fellow-citizens in any of those situations in which we can give signal proofs of that glowing patriotism so long cherished in our bosoms.

“God forbid that I should mean anything derogatory

to our professed religion. . . . If during our tribulation we have derived some consolation from our strict adherence to our religion, how much the more are we bound to remain firmly attached to it now! . . . I shall not therefore address you on this head. . . . But I cannot too often repeat to you how absolutely necessary it is for us to divest ourselves entirely of that *narrow spirit, of corporation and congregation, in all civil and political matters not immediately connected with our spiritual laws. In these things we must absolutely appear simply as individuals, as Frenchmen, guided only by a true patriotism and by the general good of the nations.*"

We must. . . "avail ourselves of the resources offered to us, by sending them (our children) to share the advantages of national education in public schools. . . . By means of that union in schools, our children, like those of our fellow-citizens, will remark from their tender youth that neither opinions nor difference of religion are a bar to fraternal love; and that everyone naturally embracing the religion of his father, all may, in fulfilling their religious duties, fulfill also that of citizenship. . . ." (My italics.)

Jews were, of course, to be faithful to their religion. Had not the fight for emancipation been made for that purpose? But to the infant, modern state, the emancipated Jews owed the obligation of eliminating from their own lives the vestiges of feudalism. The Bible was to be translated into French. Their "youth was to be taught French, so that the barrier of language might not divide citizens of France from citizens of France." The corruption of German (Yiddish) which prevailed among the Jews of France as a symbol of isolation from the national culture was to be eliminated.

Together with the rest of France, Frenchmen of Jewish faith outrode the Reign of Terror. Finally in 1795, in the Constitution of the Directory, which was a refinement of the Constitution of the Assembly of 1791, "the adherents of Judaism" were "put on an equal footing" without question, with all Frenchmen.

A classical chapter in the drama of emancipation had closed. Henceforth, the fate of the Jews of France was the fate and destiny of French freedom.

Two crises in the history of French Jewry are worthy of study here. They have been exploited by Jewish nationalists to prove the ephemeral nature of emancipation. Any fair analysis of them proves the opposite.

The first of these crises occurred as part of the threat that

Napoleon represented to the freedom of Europe. Napoleon, as a part of his military campaign in the Near East in 1799, in typical Bonaparte manner, commanded the Jews of Asia and North Africa to march with him against the Turks. Napoleon promised to restore Jerusalem to its "original splendor" when Palestine was conquered. The romanticism of the idea, put forth as something desired by Jews, showed how completely the Corsican ignored the whole meaning and momentum of the liberal Revolution, but his dream of conquering Syria and becoming Emperor of the East failed, and with it, the idea of restoration of Palestine to the Jews.

However, Napoleon entered the continent still imbued with romantic ideas about Jews. He was, therefore, the victim of every Jew-baiter in the stubbornly class-conscious Germanic countries into which his armies moved.

Finally, in 1806, the befuddled Emperor was moved to place the "Jewish question" before the State Council. Napoleon "attached great importance to the matter."

The Council met twice. Staunch defenders of French liberalism advocated the cause of French Jews. Napoleon was "annoyed." He was not the kind of man to accept criticism of his opinions as "unfounded." On the other hand, he hesitated to take a step that would make him appear ridiculous. That this thought even occurred to the willful conqueror, only fifteen years after the emancipation of French Jews, is itself a mark of the progress made.

How to extricate himself from this dilemma? Napoleon finally hit upon a scheme: He would order a meeting of representative Jews from all of the provinces of his empire. To these representatives the Emperor would put such questions as: "Did Judaism exact of its followers hatred and oppression of Christians?" "Were Jews a nation within a nation or only a religion?" Thus, Jews, themselves, through the answers given by their representatives, would decide their fate.

The decree ordering the meeting of these representatives was couched in harsh terms. It began with the irrelevant order, "The claims of Jewish creditors in certain provinces may not be collected within the space of a year."

The second part ordered the assembly of Jewish notables because "certain Jews in the northern (Germanic) districts having by usury brought misery upon many peasants, the Emperor had deprived them of civil equality. But he had also considered it necessary to awaken in all who professed the Jewish religion in France a feeling of civic morality, which, owing to their debasement, had become almost extinct amongst them.

For this purpose, Jewish notables were to express their wishes and suggest means whereby skilled work and useful occupations would become general among Jews."

More than a hundred of the outstanding Jews of France, Germany and Italy met in the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, on July 26, 1806. They knew little in detail of what the tempestuous Bonaparte would put before them.

The day before the assembly was to meet, the official paper *Moniteur* carried a long and detailed, but somewhat distorted résumé of "Jewish" history, from the days of the end of the Babylonian exile to the current time.

The document is interesting, not because of its recitation of "history," but because it reveals the confusion already befogging emancipation as a result of "official" Jewry's opposition to emancipation and the dereliction of Jews in fulfilling the Mendelssohn part of the emancipation formula. Such questions as the following were suggested in this preview of the gathering called for the next day: "That the religious and moral separation of Jews from the rest of the world. . .if not prescribed, was at any rate tolerated by the Jewish law. How otherwise is the fact to be explained that those Jews who at the present time exhort high rates of interest, are most religious and follow the laws of the Talmud most faithfully? Had the distinguished Jews in Germany, such as their famous Mendelssohn, great reverence for the rabbis? Finally, are those men among us who devote themselves to the sciences, orthodox Jews?"

The inferences, were, in most cases, false. But Jews were here in jeopardy because of their failure to organize for integration, and their consequent victimization by the restrictive segregating policies of "official" Jews.

The Jewish nationalist will scorn all this as theory. He will say with Hess, Pinsker* and Herzl that it made no difference what Jews did, they would be persecuted anyhow; that anti-Semitism was an inevitable companion of Jews wherever Jews were a minority. Yet, history has proven him wrong. And these questions submitted by Napoleon indicate the source of confusion to be the unwarranted and unjustified maintenance of medievalism *within* Jewish life. Why was it that the world was not confused about Mendelssohn but was confused about "the Jewish people?"

Whether by design or not, I do not know, the first meeting

* Both Moses Hess (1812-75) in his *Rome and Jerusalem* published in 1862, and Leo Pinsker (1821-91) in his "Autoemancipation" published in 1882, preceded Theodor Herzl in their advocacy of a Jewish State as a solution to the "Jewish problem."

of the assembly was scheduled for a Saturday. The representatives were immediately plunged into a violent quarrel. Should they respond to the call, despite the fact that it was the Sabbath? Or should they risk having it said that Judaism was incompatible with the exercise of civil functions? Should they refuse to meet and go through the business of organizing themselves upon parliamentary lines? The lengthy dispute ended in the defeat of those who held out for defiance of the Emperor. An Italian Jew, Abraham Furtado, had led the fight to proceed with the business of the assembly and he was elected the presiding officer.

On July 29, with the formalities finished, the representatives of the Emperor submitted twelve questions for authoritative answers. It was a fearful moment. Upon the answers to those questions hung the future of Jews for a long time to come in many places of the world. For France's liberal attitude toward Jews had, as the Paris community had observed in its petition, inspired similar action in other countries. Besides, Napoleon's power was extensive.

Among the questions, officially put, were these: Did the French Jews regard France as their country and Frenchmen as their brothers? Did they consider the laws of the state binding upon them? Was the validity of a divorce granted by French law recognized by Judaism?

Most of the questions created no difficulty. In an enthusiastic affirmation, the assembly said that Jews considered France their country and Frenchmen their brothers. There was no difficulty about polygamy or divorce. The problem of inter-marriage presented a delicate situation. It was finally answered that Judaism allowed such marriages. The rabbis however, were opposed, just as Catholic priests were opposed, to inter-marriage.

In all particulars Napoleon was satisfied with the answers he received. It was announced that "His Majesty guarantees to you free practice of your religion and the full enjoyment of your political rights."

However, Napoleon the romanticist was not to be satisfied with so simple a status. Jews must offer some guarantee with their answers. At Napoleon's command they must convene the Great Sanhedrin*—which had gone out of existence long before the completion of the Talmud in the sixth century!

Thus, in the very face of the affirmation of emancipation, Napoleon sought to revive an institution that had been dead for over a millenium. A Sanhedrin was organized, largely under the

* The Great Sanhedrin was a term originally designating the assembly at Jerusalem that constituted the highest political magistracy of the country.

leadership of the determined Furtado, and denied its own power by declaring that

“Judaism consisted of two wholly distinct elements—the purely religious, and the political-legislative laws. The first mentioned are unalterable; the latter, on the other hand, which have lost their significance since the downfall of the Jewish state, can be set aside.”

Here, the Mendelssohn principle emerged in theory again. What Napoleon had envisioned as a “Jewish parliament” dealt a death blow to the concept of a “Jewish nation.” How different from Herzl’s self-instigated “parliament” that was to convene at Basle some ninety years later!

The Sanhedrin rendered emancipation one other service. It voluntarily turned over to the state the proper, civil functions of the state. It officially declared it was

“prohibited for any Jew to marry more than one wife; that divorce by Jewish law was effective only when preceded by that of the civil authorities; that marriage likewise must be considered a civil contract first; that every Israelite was religiously bound to consider his non-Jewish neighbors, who also recognize and worship God as the creator, as brothers; that he should love his country, defend it, and undertake military service, if called upon to do so; that Judaism did not forbid any kind of handicraft and occupation, and that therefore it was commendable for Israelites to engage in agriculture, handicrafts and arts, and to forsake trading; and finally, that it was forbidden to Israelites to exact usury either from Jew or Christian.”

How the medieval entity of “the Jewish people” was dissolving was attested by protests filed against the Sanhedrin by Jews in Germany and England. Not that they took issue with any of the pronouncements. But some of them saw the anomaly of any such group any longer speaking for “Jews.” An English Jew, for example, wrote, asking pertinently, “Has any one of our brethren in Constantinople, Aleppo, Bagdad, Corfu, or any one of (English) communities been sent as deputy to you, or have they recorded their approval of your decisions?”

At how many less justified “Jewish parliaments” since then would such a pertinent question have created consternation!

Napoleon, however, failed to keep his part of the bargain with the Jews as well as with the principles of the Revolution. And as he moved relentlessly toward his denouement, he carried

most of Europe with him into confusion. Jews suffered as an integral part of the jeopardy in which the Corsican had thrown the whole world. When Europe came to the task of creating order out of the Napoleonic chaos, the full rights of Jews in Western Europe were accepted as a matter of course.

There was another crisis in the life of the emancipated Jews of France. I have mentioned it before in connection with the history of Jewish nationalism: The case of Captain Alfred Dreyfus. Herzl seized upon this case as proving that emancipation could never succeed. Because the Dreyfus case touched off the movement of Zionism, the truth of that episode should be better known.

By 1894, France had lived through a century of precarious democracy. It had witnessed the birth of three republics. Its freedom had been under constant challenge by the military reactionaries and by the clerical party that was never reconciled to a permanent divorcement of church and state.

Captain Alfred Dreyfus was the first Jew attached to the General Staff of the French Army. At the time of his appointment, France's Third Republic was facing another serious crisis, in which the royalists, clericalists and the reactionary military caste were the leaders of a new attempt to destroy democracy.

The problem France then faced was the preservation of its whole structure of freedom in the face of reactionary attacks. "Jews, Freemasons, Protestants, financiers, republicans" were lumped together in the broadside attack.

The government constantly repudiated the slanders, particularly those that sought to discredit Jewish officers in the Army. Nevertheless, on November 1, 1894, one of the most scurrilous of the papers reported the arrest of Alfred Dreyfus on the charge of high treason: revealing military information to the Germans.

I need not review the details of the fantastic intrigue. But more important than Dreyfus as the victim was that all of France split over the Dreyfus case, divided into Dreyfusards and anti-Dreyfusards. Dreyfus was condemned but, finally, the government was forced to re-open the case and the whole ugly plot was revealed.

Not satisfied at their judicial defeat, the royalists then revealed their true intentions and attempted a revolution. This was put down with force. Dreyfus was pardoned—and much later completely acquitted. The people of France "recognized that they had been deceived and brought to the brink of revolution by a combination of royalists, nationalists, clericalists, and anti-Semites." Finally, in 1902, Clemenceau conclusively

proved the innocence of Dreyfus and the cabinet, led by Clemenceau, "in order to prevent recurrence of similar dangers, curtailed the rights of the Catholic congregations" and "the severance of State and Church was effected."

It was upon this scene—a struggle between democracy and its enemies in which democracy won—that Herzl looked down and hailed the *failure* of emancipation!

We have a right to re-evaluate his evaluation. A Jew had been unjustly accused, tried and found guilty of the crime of high treason. As a result a whole nation had been convulsed.

This was no crisis that was "Jewish" in character. The fundamental issue in France was democracy itself: and it survived the crisis. Emancipation had not failed—it had worked. The fate of the Jew, Alfred Dreyfus, was symbolic of the fate of French democracy and had roused the whole nation.

Where, in all the world, a century before, would more than half a nation have come to the defense of a Jew? Had Herzl possessed a knowledge of history he would have seen in the Dreyfus case a brilliant, heartening proof of the success of emancipation. A world that had treated all Jews as Pariahs for 1500 years, had, within the space of a century, come to see half of a nation concerned to redress an injustice to one Jew. The Dreyfus case is history's "Exhibit A" to prove that Jews are stronger as integrated Frenchmen or Americans or Englishmen of Jewish faith, than if they stand segregated and apart.

From the days of the Dreyfus case until our own times when the democracies of Europe staggered under the blows of Adolph Hitler's Third Reich, the position of Jews in France was never seriously questioned. The French Jews attained integration. They flourished under the Mendelssohn-Lessing formula. There were of course voices of defeatism and mistrust as there always are. But the liberation of the human spirit is not a one-time task. From the 60,000 Jews whose destiny was debated by the first National Assembly, the Jewish population of France grew to 250,000 before Hitler's legions broke through the Maginot Line.

I have told the story of the emancipation and integration of French Jews because it is a classical example of the application of the whole technique of emancipation. It is a story replete with difficulty, heartbreak and setbacks. But it is also the heroic story, in miniature, of man's conscious struggle to be free. In the world's better tomorrow, Frenchmen of Jewish faith will reap the harvest of freedom, in a France reborn out of the deathless hopes of all lovers of freedom.

The prediction made by the Jews of Paris that France's

liberation of Jews "would induce all the nations of the earth to acknowledge the Jews as brothers" contained a large measure of truth. The pattern inspired a more liberal attitude to adjust "the Jewish Question" on a much broader plane. The spirit of "liberty, equality and fraternity" permeated all of the continent except the Eastern corridor of barbarism. This surge of freedom for all men emancipated western Europe's Jew.

NOTE

- 1 Kant, like many Europeans of his days, seems to have been unaware of the religious toleration, freedom of conscience, and separation of church and state that had long been practiced in various American colonies, and at the time he wrote, prevailed in the new Republic.

30 August, 1897

Zionism strives for the establishment of a publicly and legally secured home in Palestine for the Jewish people.

For the attainment of this aim the Congress considers the following means:

1. The appropriate promotion of colonization with Jewish agriculturists, artisans and tradesmen.

2. The organization and gathering of all Jews through suitable local and general institutions, according to the laws of the various countries.

3. The promotion of Jewish national feeling and consciousness.

4. Preparatory steps for the attainment of such Government consent as is necessary in order to achieve the aim of Zionism.

* Translation of The Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS) from the original German after noting certain discrepancies between it and the published versions in Nahum Sokolow *History of Zionism, 1600-1918*, I (London, 1919), 268, (reproduced in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, I [Princeton, N. J., 1956], 209), and in *The Jewish Encyclopedia*. Sokolow erroneously gives the date as the 29th of August and seems to base his translation on the version of the Programme reproduced in the minutes of the 10th Congress of 1911, (*Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des X Zionisten Kongresses in Basel* [Beim Juedischen Verlag, Berlin und Leipzig, 1911], p. 365), which, perhaps, explains the discrepancies, noted.

The first Zionist Congress, which was held on August 29-31, 1897, in Basle, was organized by Theodor Herzl and attended by Jewish representatives from different parts of the world. At this congress the Zionist Organization was formally established on the basis of the above (Basle) programme.

Letter* from Dr. Theodore Herzl to M. Youssuf Zia Al-Khalidi**

Wien-Wahring
Carl Ludwigstrasse 50
19 March 1899

Excellency,

I owe to Mr. Zadok Kahn's † kindness the pleasure of having read the letter which you addressed to him. Let me tell you first of all that the feelings of friendship which you express for the Jewish people inspire in me the deepest appreciation. The Jews have been, are, and will be the best friends of Turkey since the day when Sultan Selim ‡ opened his Empire to the persecuted Jews of Spain.

And this friendship consists not only of words—it is ready to be transferred into acts and to aid the Moslems.

The Zionist idea, of which I am the humble servant, has no hostile tendency toward the Ottoman Government, but quite to the contrary this movement is concerned with opening up new resources for the Ottoman Empire. In allowing immigration to a number of Jews bringing their intelligence, their financial acumen and their means of enterprise to the country, no one can doubt that the well-being of the entire country

* United Nations, General Assembly, 2nd Session, Sept. 9, 1947, *Report of the Special Committee on Palestine*, Vol. II, A/364, Add. I, pp. 39-40.

** Y.Z. Khalidi, Member for Jerusalem of the Ottoman Parliament, 1877, Palestinian scholar and Mayor of Jerusalem in 1899. Herzl's letter, which was written in French, was received by Y.Z. Khalidi while on a visit to Constantinople.

† Zadok Kahn became Chief Rabbi of France in 1890.

‡ Selim III, the twenty-eighth Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, reigned from 1789-1807. His attempts at reform finally led to his deposition.

would be the happy result. It is necessary to understand this, and make it known to everybody.

As Your Excellency said very well in your letter to the Grand Rabbi, the Jews have no belligerent Power behind them, neither are they themselves of a warlike nature. They are a completely peaceful element, and very content if they are left in peace. Therefore, there is absolutely nothing to fear from their immigration.

The question of the Holy Places?

But no one thinks of ever touching those. As I have said and written many times: These places have lost forever the faculty of belonging exclusively to one faith, to one race or to one people. The Holy Places are and will remain holy for all the world, for the Moslems as for the Christians as for the Jews. The universal peace which all men of good will ardently hope for will have its symbol in a brotherly union in the Holy Places.

You see another difficulty, Excellency, in the existence of the non-Jewish population in Palestine. But who would think of sending them away? It is their well-being, their individual wealth which we will increase by bringing in our own. Do you think that an Arab who owns land or a house in Palestine worth three or four thousand francs will be very angry to see the price of his land rise in a short time, to see it rise five and ten times in value perhaps in a few months? Moreover, that will necessarily happen with the arrival of the Jews. That is what the indigenious population must realize, that they will gain excellent brothers as the Sultan will gain faithful and good subjects who will make this province flourish—this province which is their historic homeland.

When one looks at the situation in this light, which is the *true* one, one must be the friend of Zionism when one is the friend of Turkey.

I hope, Excellency, that these few explanations will suffice to give you a little more sympathy for our movement.

You tell Mr. Zadok Kahn that the Jews would do better to go somewhere else. That may well happen the day we realize that Turkey does not understand the enormous advantages which our movement offers it. We have explained our aim publicly, sincerely and loyally. I have had submitted to His Majesty the Sultan some general propositions, and I am pleased to believe that the extreme clearness of his mind will make him accept in principle the idea of which one can afterwards discuss the details of execution. If he will not accept it, we will search and, believe me, we will find elsewhere what we need.

But then Turkey will have lost its last chance to regulate


its finances and to recover its economic vigour.

It is a sincere friend of the Turks who tells you these things today. Remember that!

And accept, Excellency, the assurance of my very high consideration.


(signed) Dr. Theodore HERZL

Map 1
«The land without a people»



The main Arab towns and villages of Palestine on the eve of Zionist colonization.

Map 2
«The people without a land»



The first Zionist colonies in Palestine starting from top to bottom:
Rosh-Pina (1882), Zichron-Ya'acov (1882) and Rishon Letzion (1882).

The Aliens Bill and Jewish Immigration to Britain*

1902-1905

OSKAR K. RABINOWICZ**

I. THE ALIENS QUESTION

The influx of Jews from Russia and Roumania into Britain in the two decades beginning the early eighteen-eighties, when the first great anti-Semitic outbreaks in Russia and the discriminatory policy of the Roumanian Government drove the Jews to emigration, was bound before long to cause a reaction on the part of the British population. It was particularly after the Boer War that agitation against the admission of foreigners into Britain assumed serious proportions and led to the establishment of a number of anti-alien associations, the most important being the "British Brothers' League" founded by Major William Eden Evans-Gordon. Its agitation was based on the pleas that the aliens arriving in Britain included "criminals, anarchists and immoral persons", that they inundated the labour market with cheap labour and occupied the scanty living-space in London's already overcrowded East End. The aim of this agitation was to induce Parliament to enact legislation to control the hitherto unrestricted immigration. As a result of this ever-increasing campaign, the "Royal Commission on Alien Immigration" was appointed on March 21, 1902, consisting of the following members: Lord James of Hereford, Chairman; Sir Kenelm Digby, K.C.B.; Major William Eden Evans-Gordon, M.P.; the Hon. Alfred Lyttelton, M.P.; Henry Norman, M.P.; Lord Rothschild, and William Vallence (who for many years had acted as Clerk to the Whitechapel Guardians).

* From Oskar K. Rabinowicz, *Winston Churchill on Jewish Problems* (New York & London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), pp. 46-50, 64-72, 78-80 and 164-67. Copyright © 1956 by Oskar K. Rabinowicz. Reprinted by permission of Thomas Yoseloff Ltd. Cross-references have been omitted.

** Member of the Jewish Historical Society of England.

The terms of reference of the Commission were "to inquire into and to report upon the character and extent of the evils which are attributed to the unrestricted immigration of aliens, especially in the Metropolis; and the measures which have been adopted for the restriction and control of Alien Immigration in foreign countries, and in British Colonies". The Commission sat for many months in public, examined witnesses, and collected material for their report, which was finally published on August 14, 1903.¹ The most prominent witness to plead for restrictive measures before the Commission was Arnold White, one of the leaders of the "British Brothers' League" and chief protagonist of the anti-alien agitation. In his testimony he went beyond the question of alien immigration into Britain and dealt with the root of the general Jewish problem, basing his thesis on the biased assumption that Jews cannot be loyal citizens to the country of their adoption if they remain loyal Jews. He asserted that whatever was wrong with the condition of the people in Great Britain was a result of the presence of Jews, who drew for their increasing numbers upon alien immigration, and accordingly demanded that this influx should be halted by legislation. Most of the anti-alien witnesses followed a similar negative line. On the whole, reading this voluminous Report, one is astonished to find that none of the 175 witnesses who gave evidence had any practical proposal or positive solution to submit with the exception of Dr. Theodor Herzl, the founder and president of the World Zionist Organisation, who was invited to testify and who alone offered a policy. "Nothing will meet the problem the Commission is called upon to investigate and advise upon", he said, "except a diverting of the stream of migration that is bound to go on with increasing force from Eastern Europe. The Jews of Eastern Europe cannot stay where they are—where are they to go? If you find they are not wanted here, then some place must be found to which they can migrate without that migration raising the problems that confront them here. Those problems will not arise if a home be found for them which will be legally recognised as Jewish."

As was to be expected, the Royal Commission suggested some restrictive measures, especially with regard to the exclusion from entry into Britain of certain undesirable categories of immigrants. The Commission's recommendations for legislation made in the Report may be summed up as follows:

1. That the immigration of certain classes of aliens be subjected to State control;
2. That a Department of Immigration be established;

3. That correct statistical returns relating to Alien Immigration be secured;
4. That legislative power be obtained for the purpose (a) of making and enforcing orders and regulations, applicable to immigration generally, and (b) that immigration officers have the power to inquire into the background of "undesirable" immigrants, (c) to report on their findings to the Immigration Department, which (d) must act upon any information thus obtained. (e) Any alien immigrant who, within two years of his arrival, is ascertained "undesirable" or shall become a charge on public funds, except from ill-health, or shall have no visible means of support, may be ordered by a court of summary jurisdiction to leave this country.
5. Every effort should be made (a) to enforce with greater efficiency the law dealing with overcrowding, the existence of which (b) in any area be investigated, and (c,d,e) if it be found that the immigration of aliens has substantially contributed to any overcrowding, such area may be declared to be a prohibited area. (f) All alien immigrants on arrival to be registered, and change of residence during the first two years of stay in this country to be notified. If within that period (g) any alien shall be found resident within a prohibited area he shall be removed therefrom, and shall be guilty of an offence.
6. Upon conviction of any felony or misdemeanour, upon indictment, the judge may direct as part of the sentence that the alien thus convicted shall leave the country. If such direction be disobeyed, the alien may, on summary conviction, be punished as a rogue and a vagabond.
7. That further statutory powers shall be obtained for regulating the accommodation upon and condition of foreign immigrant passenger ships.

From these recommendations Sir Kenelm E. Digby, as well as Lord Rothschild, dissented. Both felt that the restrictive measures aimed at "undesirables" would unavoidably affect deserving and honest people; nor did the "overcrowding" demand such drastic legislative measures as the majority of the Commission suggested.

However, a study of this Report cannot leave the reader in doubt that, while the Commission was ostensibly inquiring into the general subject of immigration, it was in fact concerned only with the Jewish aspect of the problem, "for it is either incomprehensible blindness or the merest cant to deny that the

recommendations and the proposed legislation are directed against Jews.”²

(A) THE ALIENS BILL OF 1904

Whatever the merits or demerits of this Report, its recommendations were so specific and emphatic that the Government felt that it had to consider some measure to be brought before Parliament. Seven months later, on March 29, 1904, Akers-Douglas, the Home Secretary in Balfour's cabinet, introduced in the House of Commons a “Bill to make provision with respect to the Immigration of Aliens, and other matters incidental thereto”, which was “backed” by the Colonial Secretary (Alfred Lyttelton), the President of the Local Government Board (Walter Long) and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Home Office (Thos. H.A.E. Cochrane). The Aliens Bill of 1904, as it was subsequently to become known, was the cause of Winston Churchill intervening for the first time, and very prominently, in a problem affecting Jews. The Bill's numerous recommendations were inevitably based on the Report of the Royal Commission. In short, it provided that

(1) The alien arriving in Britain might be required to furnish a certificate and particulars with respect to his character and antecedents, to his proposed place of residence and to his identification;

(2) “Undesirables” might be refused permission of entry;

(3) The Home Secretary should consider and finally determine any case of detention and refusal to grant leave to land;

(4) Power (without details of its scope or limitations) should be given to the Secretary of State to exclude criminals;

(5) The dwelling or residence of aliens in a “prohibited area” (i.e. one overcrowded according to any sanitary authority) might be either prohibited or regulated.

The Bill was introduced under the ten minute rule, which only permits two short speeches to be made in the House, and was given a first reading without a division on March 29, 1904. On April 25, 1904, the Bill passed the second reading by a majority of 124. Winston Churchill, although still officially a Conservative, then abstained from voting as the division list shows. During the second reading, Walter Long, President of the Local Government Board, told the House that the Government were not foolish enough to ask that their proposals should not be subject to amendment. “We are quite ready”, he said,³

“to consider any suggestion which would have for its object the improvement of this Bill in order to secure the end that we all have in view”. Referring to this statement, the *Jewish Chronicle* in an editorial⁴ called the attention of the Jewish leaders to this fact and pointed out that “it is necessary to make the most of the Government’s accommodating disposition”. Nor did the leadership of Anglo-Jewry deal lightheartedly with the Bill and its possible anti-Jewish implications. All necessary preparations were made for the battle, the situation was surveyed, material (statistical, factual and other) was gathered and incorporated in a memorandum. On May 19, 1904, a deputation of the Board of Deputies, introduced by Lord Rothschild, was received by T.H.A.E. Cochrane, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Home Office, and it put before him the Jewish objections to certain parts of the Bill. On this occasion speeches were delivered by Lord Rothschild, Sir Samuel Montagu (later Lord Swaythling), David L. Alexander, K.C. (President of the Board of Deputies), Claude Montefiore (President of the Anglo-Jewish Association) and Stuart M. Samuel, M.P.⁵ Shortly after this, Winston Churchill participated publicly for the first time in the controversy on the Aliens Bill.* . . .

* * *

(B) THE ALIENS ACT, 1905

The heat of the war of words engendered by the deliberations in the Grand Committee on the Aliens Bill, 1904, made the ruling party blind to any suggestion emanating from the Opposition, however useful it may have been. Thus the Government’s refusal of the offer of the Liberal members, to pass a short measure providing that all foreigners found guilty of crimes in Britain should be expelled, made a wide and intensive propaganda possible. While it was felt on every side, without any exception, that criminal aliens should not be admitted to Britain, the failure of the Government to provide legislation for that limited contingency and their desire to extend the stringency upon the innocent immigrant as well, made the debate on the aliens problem a renewed subject for the Press and for public meetings. Small incidents such as the imprisonment of two burglars who had only been in England

* The Bill was subsequently withdrawn by the Prime Minister, A.J. Balfour, on 7 July, 1904, after heated debate and reintroduced in a modified form on 4 April 1905.

a few weeks⁶ were sufficient to add fury to the anti-alien propaganda. But the usual full head of steam was in the meantime raised by ministers as well as by leaders of the restrictionist movement. Joseph Chamberlain* set the ball rolling with a violent anti-alien speech at Limehouse in December, 1904.⁷ He spoke of the "unrestricted immigration of people" under which the inhabitants of the East End were suffering. "The evils of this immigration have increased", he continued, "during recent years. And behind those people who have already reached these shores, remember there are millions of the same kind who, under easily conceivable circumstances, might follow their track, and might invade this country in a way and to an extent of which few people have at present any conception. The same causes that brought 10,000 and 20,000 and tens of thousands, may bring hundreds of thousands, or even millions. If that would be an evil, surely he is a statesman who would deal with it in the beginning." But he did not only plead for the introduction of a Bill restricting alien immigration. He felt it his duty also to point out that the Jewish immigrants were "driven from their homes by the grossest and most brutal persecution", and he therefore advocated a solution in a passage full of warmth and respect for Theodor Herzl, whom he had met in connection with the suggestions for Jewish autonomous settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and in East Africa. Chamberlain proclaimed himself an adherent of the Zionist solution of the Jewish problem. Herzl's warning words uttered at the last meeting between the two statesmen on April 23, 1903, may still have resounded in Chamberlain's ears. For when he had informed Herzl of the possibility that an Aliens Bill might be introduced in England, the Zionist leader exclaimed:⁸ "If you allow me to say so, Mr. Chamberlain, I should prefer for England's glory that you do not make such a Bill. Drain them elsewhere, but don't make an Alien Bill." In the heat of the controversy about the alien problem only Chamberlain's anti-alien attitude with its exaggerated figures and implications, not his positive suggestions were remembered.

Soon afterwards the campaign for the by-election in the Mile End Division turned "chiefly on the aliens question".⁹ This constituency, situated almost in the heart of the aliens' area, was called upon to express its vote for or against restrictive immigration measures. The Unionist candidate Harry Lawson

* Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914) organized the Liberal Unionist Party, formed a coalition with the Conservatives, 1895, and became Colonial Secretary in Salisbury's cabinet.

(of Jewish descent),¹⁰ who favoured legislation on the pattern of the withdrawn Bill of 1904, was opposed by the Liberal candidate Bertram Stuart Strauss, a professing Jew. The greatly reduced majority of the Unionist candidate, which dropped from 1,160 to 78, came as a shock to the Government which, as the *Jewish Chronicle* pointed out,¹¹ with "no casuistry, however laboured or tortuous, can construe this as a mandate to proceed with a drastic measure of restriction next session".

Parallel with these events the *Standard* newspaper took the lead in publishing anti-alien articles. The most conspicuous series in that paper came from the pen of a special commissioner, R.H. Sherard, and aroused heated debates and a lively controversy in the general press and particularly in the columns of the *Jewish Chronicle*.¹² Other newspapers and magazines in those days also carried articles on this problem, and reported on meetings up and down the country calling for restrictions or opposing them.

Churchill kept mostly aloof from the actual controversy which followed the withdrawal of the Bill of 1904, and preceded the introduction of the new Bill. In reply to an inquiry by a correspondent at that particular moment, he said in a short note that he thought the Government were not so much concerned with the Bill, as with the problem of their own fortunes at the next election: ¹³

The Government did not want the Bill. They wanted the grievance. They were anxious not to legislate, but to electioneer.

This referred to the election then pending in Mile End. However, this evaluation of the motives underlying the propaganda round the Bill was later seen to apply also to the general election and strikingly demonstrates Churchill's foresight in political matters. Thus on the occasion of the second reading of the new Aliens Bill Sir Charles Dilke spoke¹⁴ of a "statement made in the country by a leading member of the Cabinet. He told his constituents that the Government could not dissolve yet, because it was necessary for them first to pass this measure." As it later turned out, soon after the Aliens Bill became the Aliens Act, the Government resigned and the general election took place.¹⁵ It was in connection with the Mile End election that Churchill, after some interval, took again a more prominent stand in the Aliens question. The *Westminster Gazette* carried the following "Note" on the subject:¹⁶

The Alien Immigration question is likely to be a

prominent and burning one in the coming election in the Mile End Division, and in view of this Mr. Winston Churchill has done good service by throwing some light on the question of the Government's Alien Bill of last Session. Mr. Churchill, writing in reply to a correspondent, points out that the Government could have carried the Bill without opposition if they had dropped the controversial parts and limited it to providing for the exclusion of criminal aliens. The Government, however, would have all or none, and the Bill was lost. To accuse the Opposition, therefore, of facilitating the influx of criminal aliens into this country is unjust, although we have no doubt the statement will be freely made. What the view of those who opposed the Bill in its entirety was is thus set forth by Mr. Winston Churchill: "Shut out the alien; if diseased, always; if immoral, when you can find out; if criminal, after you have convicted; but do not shut out persons merely because they are poor, and do not thrust upon police and Custom House officers duties which they cannot properly discharge." Undoubtedly the condition of affairs in Russia has induced an exceptional number of fugitives from military service to come here; but it seems, to judge from what one hears in certain quarters, to be deliberately "forgotten" that a large proportion of these immigrants are on their way elsewhere. We doubt whether many of those who were amongst the unemployed in the Trafalgar-square demonstration¹⁷ yesterday could trace their lack of employment, either directly, or indirectly, to alien immigration, but in any case we agree with Mr. Churchill that it would not be in accordance with British traditions to close the doors against the unfortunates who have fled to this country.

But, as was to be expected, the Government felt impelled to do something in the matter, particularly as its prominent members one by one spoke and wrote about a new Bill to be submitted to Parliament in place of the one withdrawn in the previous session. Thus A.J. Balfour, the Prime Minister, told his party friends¹⁸ that there would be no necessity "to trouble you and other London Unionist members to come to me on a deputation in order to urge upon the Government the necessity of proceeding with the Aliens Bill. The measure is one to which the Government attach the very greatest importance. It will be introduced on Tuesday, and I hope the second reading will be taken at the very earliest date after Easter which the general course of public business admits. You and your friends may rest

assured that the Government will use their best endeavours to get it passed into law." Accordingly the Home Secretary, Akers-Douglas, on April 14, 1905, moved under the ten minute rule, for leave to bring in the new Aliens Bill.¹⁹ It was also "backed" by Arthur James Balfour, the Prime Minister, Sir Robert B. Finlay, the Attorney General, T.H. Cochrane, Under-Secretary of the Home Office, and Bonar Law, Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade.²⁰ The motion for the Home Secretary was passed without a division and the Bill was read a first time.²¹

In his opening speech the Home Secretary outlined the objects of the Bill as follows:²²

"With regard to the actual provisions of the Bill, it deals with the prevention of landing of undesirable aliens; it provides that no immigrant shall be landed from an immigrant ship except at a port where there is an immigration officer appointed under the Act, and without leave of that immigration officer given after he has made an inspection in company with a medical inspector. In cases where leave to land has been refused the immigrant or the master of the ship may appeal to a board appointed at each port where immigrant ships may land immigrants and this Board is to consist of three persons of whom one shall be a magistrate and the others have acquaintance with Poor Law and administrative matters. We hope thus to obtain the co-operation of the Jewish Board of Guardians in order that the interests of that community, especially in London, where it is very large, may be properly respected. And we decide that an immigrant shall be considered undesirable, and, as such, may be refused permission to land, if he cannot show that he has—or is in a position to obtain—means to support himself in a decent condition; if he is a lunatic, or an idiot, or, owing to disease or infirmity, is likely to become a charge on the rates or otherwise a detriment to the public; and if he has been sentenced abroad for an extraditable crime, not being of a political character, or if he has been previously expelled under this Act. The landing of an immigrant, however, shall not be refused on the ground only of means if he proves that he is seeking admission solely to avoid prosecution for an offence of a political character. That is the first part of the Bill.

"The second part deals with the exclusion of undesirable aliens who are already in our midst. To secure this the Secretary of State may make an expulsion order requiring an alien to leave the United Kingdom within a time which he fixes, and afterwards to remain out of it, but the Secretary of State can only act on the certificate of a court of law, including the court of summary jurisdiction, if he is satisfied that the alien has been

convicted of an offence for which he can be imprisoned without the option of a fine, and that the court recommends the expulsion, either in addition to, or in lieu of, the sentence which he receives. Then, again, an alien may be sent out of the country if the certificate is given to the Secretary of State of a court of summary jurisdiction within twelve months of the last entry to this country of the alien, showing that the alien has, within three months from the time the proceedings were commenced, received parochial relief of such a character as would disqualify him from holding the parliamentary franchise, which is a condition that is well-known, or that he has been convicted of an extradition crime abroad. The Secretary of State, further, has power to pay the expenses of the departure of the alien, but such expenses he can recover from the master of the ship who brought the alien if the expulsion order is made on a certificate within the six months of his landing. Further, that liability will not only extend to the shipowner, or to the master of the ship, but to that particular line of shipping. Then the obligation which falls on the master of the ship at the present time to make a return will be continued, but these returns will have to be made in a very much more exhaustive and much more accurate way, than that in which they are now made. This, very shortly, is the Bill which I ask leave to introduce.”

The first reaction to this new Bill among the opponents of restriction and in the Jewish Press was one of comparison between the two proposals. No doubt was then left in the mind of readers that “the new Aliens Bill is an improvement upon its predecessor.”²³ At the same time, the positive differences were contrasted with the old provisions in the following main clauses:²⁴ (a) While the last Bill was throughout full of statements about overcrowding, the new Bill was completely indifferent to this problem. (b) It therefore did not include the absurd provision concerning prohibited areas. (c) There was no provision forcing an alien to furnish “prescribed certificates and particulars with regard to his character and antecedents, and with regard to his proposed place of residence in the United Kingdom, and to furnish the prescribed means of identification”. (d) Nor was the clause retained which required aliens to keep the police informed of all changes of address during the early years of residence in this country. (e) The new Bill also differed in matters of machinery from its predecessor. No longer would the inspecting officer decide provisionally whether or not an alien came within one or the other category of “undesirables”; this was now to be entrusted to an immigration officer accompanied by a medical inspector. (f) In the new Bill the alien had the right

to appeal to an Immigration Board as to his admission. It was suggested that the Jewish Board of Guardians be invited to cooperate on that Board.

After this first reaction to the Bill the debate on the second reading of the Bill brought to light a more elaborate analysis which was to guide the Opposition to a number of its provisions. The debate took place on May 2 and was opened by Sir Charles Dilke. He pointed out²⁵ that the whole Bill rested on the old fallacies and delusions and that the "misrepresentation which is going on is stupendous", particularly with regard to the numbers of aliens as produced by the Government. He moved an amendment²⁶ "that this House, holding that the evil of low-priced alien labour can best be met by legislation to prevent sweating, desires to assure itself, before assenting to the Aliens Bill, that sufficient regard is had in the proposed measure to the retention of the principle of asylum for the victims of persecution".

The amendment was, however, declared lost when the House divided and the second reading of the Bill subsequently agreed to without a division.²⁷

Churchill is neither recorded as having participated in the debate nor is his name mentioned in the division list.²⁸ From his later vehement opposition to the Bill we can conclude that he was not among those "leaders of the Liberal party, (who) frightened, apparently, by that appeal from the East End Liberal members and candidates, have abstained so far from opposing the Bill".²⁹ He was to become increasingly prominent in the fight the nearer the date for the Committee stage of the Bill drew.

The Bill having meanwhile been more closely analysed in the debate on the second reading and among Jewish leaders, it became apparent that, despite its improvements upon its predecessor, a number of amendments were called for to prevent the proposed new legislation becoming merely a measure against innocent immigrants. The Board of Deputies therefore met in special session on May 8, 1905, to discuss the Aliens Bill in the light of a memorandum specifically prepared for that purpose by the Immigration Committee of the Board. It constituted a detailed analysis of the new Bill and stressed the objectionable clauses simultaneously outlining suggestions for amendments.³⁰

During the debate the question was considered in what way the various amendments suggested should be brought to the notice of Parliament and eventually incorporated in the final text of the Bill. Herbert Bentwich suggested an approach through various congregations all over the country to their local

Members of Parliament³¹ and this form of conveying the memorandum to the Members of Parliament was agreed upon. Subsequently in every Jewish community in the British Isles addresses were submitted to local Members of Parliament to acquaint them with the defects of the Bill, and requesting them either to move or support an amendment in the House. In most cases the memorandum of the Board of Deputies was used, but a form of address proposed by the *Jewish Chronicle*³² also became very popular. It contained the following main points which called for amendments of the Bill:

1. The Bill does not make any exception in the case of victims of religious persecution.
2. No right of appeal to the ordinary courts of law is open to persons refused permission to land or who, having been allowed to land, are threatened with expulsion from the country; or to shipping companies to be burdened with the expense of their maintenance and re-shipment.
3. The Bill enables an expulsion order to be made on some grounds which are exceedingly trivial, for example, for "living under insanitary conditions due to overcrowding".
4. The Bill throws on the shipping companies the cost of maintaining and returning aliens, who, though having once been permitted to land, are subsequently expelled for reasons over which the shipping companies have no control. The effect of this would be to stop the whole of the steerage passenger traffic.

The amendment movement spread quickly and the pages of the *Jewish Chronicle* are full of enthusiastic reports about this political offensive which did "the greatest credit to the Jewish community"³³

. . . The debates on the Bill in the House of Commons lasted until July 20, when the third reading was carried by a majority of 90.³⁴ Only one of the amendments framed by the Board of Deputies, as mentioned below,³⁵ had been successful.³⁶ While the amendments submitted by the Opposition were lost, some alterations in the original text were finally made and incorporated in the Act.³⁷ These changes were the result of the arguments advanced during the debate by the Opposition speakers, who concentrated their attacks mainly on refuting the principles upon which the Bill was based, contrasting them with factual evidence derived from immigration statistics, and bearing on the housing problem, the labour market and other angles with the result

that the ground was knocked from under the proposed legislation. But the Government was set on having its way and carried the Bill with the help of its mechanical majority. The subsequent passage through the House of Lords was then only a formality. And so, on August 11, 1905, the 5 Edward VII, c. 13, was added to the Statute Book of the country in the form of the Aliens Act, 1905, to come into force on January 1, 1906. It was received by the Jewish community in Britain with deep disappointment for, as a contemporary chronicler pointed out, ³⁸ "Great Britain bowed its neck to clamour nurtured and fostered by racial prejudice, and for the first time for centuries, yielded up its proud privilege of rendering free asylum to the oppressed of all the world". But it was not only Anglo-Jewry that was disappointed. It was feared that this Act would also affect Jews in other lands, "for, every Jew hater and Jew persecutor will point to this Act as his justification, and argue with much plausibility that, if even England has had to legislate against the Jew, is it not proof that he is right in other circumstances to exercise towards him more violent methods?"³⁹

The Act as finally adopted⁴⁰ left some important clauses open to interpretation and thus made their implementation and application dependent on the goodwill of the governments of the day. It was particularly regretted that the Board of Deputies' suggestion with regard to an unambiguous definition of refugees to be admitted on grounds of religious or political persecution was only partly accepted by the Prime Minister. Thus one of the most important provisions affecting Jewish immigrants, namely whether to take a broader or narrower view in individual cases was to be left entirely in the hands and to the discretion of immigration officials.⁴¹

The very vagueness of the Act provided of course further ammunition for the Opposition in its continuing fight against the Government and in its appeal to the country to demand improvements of a number of provisions. Churchill took the opportunity of a visit to Manchester on October 9, 1905, to tell a meeting:⁴²

This Act is a sham. It contains absurdities which would make a deaf and blind mute roar with laughter. A poverty line is drawn for the first time, a few shillings make the difference between desirability and undesirability. The Act will not in any degree alter the situation in England. On the other hand, it may inflict hardships upon many deserving people, who seek a refuge of our shores, and it violates that tradition of British hospitality of which this

nation has been proud, and for the practice of which it has at more than one period reaped marked and permanent advantage.

As the Balfour Government resigned at the beginning of December, i.e. before the date of the coming into effect of the Act, it is impossible to know how that Government, having fought so ardently for this legislation and having succeeded in pushing it through Parliament, would have carried it out in practice. The subsequent general elections of January 1906 brought about one of the worst defeats the Conservative Party has ever suffered. . . .

* * *

II. ANTI-SEMITISM—GREAT BRITAIN

ALIENS

. . . The first anti-Semitic elements with which Churchill was confronted in this country appeared during the struggle for and against the Aliens Bills.⁴³ As a matter of fact, throughout his fight against the restriction of immigration into Britain of Jewish refugees escaping from Europe, Churchill—apart from marshalling economic, statistical, political and other arguments—referred to anti-Semitism as a motive for the introduction of restrictive legislation. Thus in his first public utterance on the Bill, 1904, he wrote that it

is expected to appeal to insular prejudice against foreigners, to racial prejudice against Jews, and to labour prejudice against competition.

But he warned the Government against using the danger of a Jewish influx into the labour market as an apology for the proposed legislation, stressing that the workers in this country

do not respond in any marked degree to the anti-Semitism which has darkened recent Continental history.

There is no doubt that anti-Jewish propaganda in the Press and at public meetings preceded the introduction of the Aliens Bills into Parliament and continued during the debates in the House of Commons. The incident in Grand Committee* when

* The incident refers to the accusation made by Major Evans-Gordon that Churchill was acting under instructions from the opposition Liberal Party to defeat the Bill.

Churchill was accused of having been "bought by Rothschild" is one typical instance of this attitude. The attack on him by Captain Rawson is another.⁴⁴ He himself once complained⁴⁵ of having

been subject to the foulest abuse and gross insults from all parts of the country for the hostile attitude he had thought fit to take against the Aliens Bill. Even charges of corruption had been made against him.

The situation assumed, however, more serious dimensions when important members of the Government ceased to mince words. There was, for instance, Joseph Chamberlain's speech at Limehouse in December, 1904;⁴⁶ or the remarks by the Attorney General, Sir Robert B. Finlay, which provoked this rebuke by Churchill in the House of Commons:⁴⁷

The right hon. gentleman [Sir Robert Finlay] seemed to be extremely anxious to make the ordeal of this unfortunate people as severe as possible, and apparently he came to the House with no other object than to put the screw on the most miserable members of the human family. If there was any means by which he could make their lot harder and their burden heavier, the right hon. gentleman did not hesitate to avail himself of it. It was obvious that whether before the immigration board or the immigration officer aliens were to have short shrift. The Prime Minister [A.J. Balfour] has stated that what was wanted was a rough-and-ready method of dealing with aliens, that it was a matter of administration and not of justice, and he certainly seemed to have got an Attorney-General [Sir Robert Finlay] who had thoroughly imbibed the principles of the Bill, and was ready to turn his legal talents to no better purpose than the finding of arguments to justify such a measure.

But the climax was reached in a statement by the Prime Minister himself, a passage of which was to shock the Jewish world. In his reply to Sir Charles Dilke during the Committee stage of the Aliens Bill, 1905, Balfour said:⁴⁸ "The right hon. Baronet [Sir Charles Dilke] had condemned the anti-Semitic spirit which disgraced a great deal of modern politics in other countries of Europe, and declared that the Jews of this country were a valuable element in the community. He was not prepared to deny either of these propositions. But he undoubtedly thought that a state of things could easily be imagined in which it would

not be to the advantage of the civilisation of the country that there should be an immense body of persons who, however patriotic, able and industrious, however much they threw themselves into the national life, still, by their own action, remained a people apart, and not merely held a religion differing from the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen, but only inter-married among themselves." Stuart Samuel, M.P., immediately attacked this statement in an extremely outspoken speech,⁴⁹ and the *Jewish Chronicle* characterised it⁵⁰ as a "declaration which we hardly expected from the lips of an English Prime Minister". Balfour—who twelve years later signed the famous Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, marking a historic Zionist victory—came under heavy attacks at the Seventh Zionist Congress by M. Shire, a delegate from England, who charged Balfour⁵¹ with "open anti-Semitism against the whole Jewish people". Neither subsequent denials by Balfour of any anti-Semitism, nor his insistence that he had a full understanding and feeling for the sufferings of the Jews and that therefore his Government had offered a territory in East Africa for a Jewish settlement, could dispel the deep disappointment which his statement in Parliament had caused. In the light of all this, Churchill's attacks on the anti-Semitic motives of the Bills were turned against the Government and the Conservative party who were both openly accused of using anti-Semitism for their own partisan ends. In his speech on A. Emmott's amendment Churchill felt that⁵²

We cannot resist a passing expression of contempt at the spectacle of a great Party trying to retrieve its shattered reputation by exploiting and aggravating the miseries of some of the weakest and poorest of mankind.

When Churchill, as Home Secretary, introduced some amendments to the Aliens Act in 1911 he recalled the reasons which had induced him to fight the legislation six years previously:⁵³

It is quite true . . . that, when the 1904-1905 Acts were passing through Parliament I opposed them, not only because I disliked the electioneering rancour by which they were characterised, but also because of the cheap attempt, for party purposes, to exploit the misfortunes of a poor and wretched class of people. . . .

NOTES

- 1 *Report of the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, 1902-1903.* (Cmd. 1741; *Minutes of Evidence, Cmd. 1742.*)
- 2 L. J. Greenberg, "Alien Immigration (1902-1903)", in *The Jewish Year Book, 1903-4*, p. 434.
- 3 *Hansard*, April 25, 1904, Vol. 133, col. 1106.
- 4 May 6, 1904, p. 7.
- 5 For full text of these speeches and the Under-Secretary's reply, see *Jewish Chronicle*, May 27, 1904, p. 10f.
- 6 *Jewish Chronicle*, January 6, 1905, p. 7.
- 7 The speech in full in *Jewish Chronicle*, December 23, 1904, p. 13.
- 8 Herzl's *Diaries* (German ed., Berlin, 1923), III, 414. Quoted in Herzl's own English.
- 9 *Jewish Chronicle*, January 6, 1905, p. 12.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*, January 20, 1905, pp. 8 and 21.
- 12 See for instance, *Jewish Chronicle*, January 20, 1905, p. 22; February 10, 1905, pp. 10, 11.
- 13 *Jewish Chronicle*, December 23, 1904, p. 14.
- 14 *Hansard*, May 2, 1905, Vol. 145, col. 688.
- 15 See p. 110.
- 16 of December 19, 1904, reprinted in *Jewish Chronicle*, December 23, 1904, p. 14.
- 17 A demonstration against unemployment was held on December 18, 1904, in Trafalgar Square, London, and passed resolutions demanding the provision of work by the local authorities and a special session of Parliament. (See *Annual Register, 1904* (Longmans, Green & Co.), London, 1905, p. 233.)
- 18 *Jewish Chronicle*, April 21, 1905, p. 9, where Balfour's letter to the Hon. W.F.D. Smith is quoted.
- 19 *Hansard*, April 18, 1905, Vol. 145, col. 464.
- 20 *Ibid.*, col. 473.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 *Ibid.*, April 14, 1905, Vol. 145, col. 466-468.
- 23 *Jewish Chronicle*, April 28, 1905, p. 8.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 7.
- 25 *Hansard*, May 2, 1905, Vol. 145, col. 689-699.
- 26 *Ibid.*, col. 768.
- 27 *Ibid.*, col. 808.
- 28 *Ibid.*, col. 806-808.
- 29 *Jewish Chronicle*, May 12, 1905, p. 7.—This refers to a resolution passed at a meeting of East End Liberal members and candidates on April 27, believing the present Bill to be satisfactory and expressing the hope that "the second reading of the Bill will not be opposed by the Liberal

- Party". (*Jewish Chronicle*, May 5, 1905, p. 25.)
- 30 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15, where the full report about the meeting and the memorandum are recorded.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p. 14.
- 32 *Ibid.*, June 16, 1905, p. 25, where a specimen of such an address is reproduced.
- 33 *Ibid.*, June 9, 1905, p. 7.
- 34 *Hansard*, July 20, 1905, Vol. 149, col. 1294.—Churchill's vote is recorded *Ibid.*, col. 1295.
- 35 See p. 109.
- 36 Statement by D.L. Alexander at the annual meeting of the Board of Deputies, held on July 16, 1905. (*Jewish Chronicle*, December 8, 1905, p. 11.)
- 37 A list of those improvements and changes are enumerated in *Jewish Chronicle*, July 28, 1905, p. 12.
- 38 L.J. Greenberg, "Alien Immigration (1904/1905)", in *Jewish Year Book*, 1905-1906, p. 464.
- 39 *Ibid.*, 465.
- 40 For full text of the Aliens Act, 1905, see *Jewish Year Book*, 1905-1906, pp. 472-477.
- 41 See *Jewish Chronicle*, July 21, 1905, p. 7.
- 42 *Jewish Chronicle*, October 13, 1905, p. 20.
- 43 See p. 97f.
- 44 *Jewish Chronicle*, December 2, 1904, p. 12.
- 45 Speech to the Achei Brith Society, Manchester, January 7, 1906. (*Jewish Chronicle*, January 12, 1906, p. 44).
- 46 See p. 102.
- 47 *Hansard*, July 3, 1905, Vol. 148, col. 875/876.
- 48 *Ibid.*, July 10, 1905, Vol. 149, col. 154/155.
- 49 *Ibid.*, col. 159-161.
- 50 *Jewish Chronicle*, July 14, 1905, p. 7.
- 51 *Protocol VII*, 85.
- 52 *Hansard*, July 3, 1905, Vol. 148, col. 860; see also p. 76.
- 53 *Ibid.*, April 28, 1911, Vol. 24, col. 2170.

Shlomo and David Palestine, 1907*

L.M.C. VAN DER HOEVEN LEONHARD**

A State of Israel—armed up to the teeth. Hostile Arab neighbouring states, boycotting and blockading it. Refugee camps of twelve years' standing along its borders. That is, in its simplest outline, the Palestine Problem.

Why these refugees? This hostility? Did not the Arabs or Islâm tolerate any Jews in Palestine? Was hostility inherent in the Arab attitude towards Jews?

Since the coming of the Arabs and of Islâm to Palestine in the 7th century A.D. the country, including Jerusalem, had been open to Jewish immigration and settlement.¹ At the time of the Arab Caliphate, Jews who were being persecuted elsewhere found refuge in Arab countries under Islamic rule,† including Palestine.² This Arab-Islamic tradition was continued by the Ottoman-Turkish Caliphate from the 16th to the 20th century.³ Islâm thus had no objection whatsoever to Jewish settlement in Palestine. And Arabs, "unlike some other peoples, have no inherent dislike of the Jew, certainly they did not have it. Jews lived among them in perfect amity before and during the war" (1914-1918).⁴ A change did indeed become noticeable after that first world war. But it resulted from a previous development.

Jewish immigration into Palestine had for centuries been inspired mainly by religious motives. Moreover, Palestine, unlike other Arab and Turkish Islamic countries in which the economic possibilities were much greater, was only able to

* From a translation of the article entitled, "Het Palestina-Vraagstuk in Zijn ware gedaante," published in *Libertas*, (Holland) Lustrum, number 1960, pp. 1-5. Reprinted by permission of the author.

** Mrs. Leonhard is a Dutch Orientalist. Her works include *Antar: Een oud-Arabisch Epos* (N. Kluwer. Deventer, 1950).

† On the conditions of Jews in Spain under the Caliphate, see Roth, pp. 45-48.

attract a small number of Jews. It is estimated that in 1523 less than four thousand Jews were living in Palestine,⁵ and five thousand in 1770⁶—a fraction of the total population. With the exception of an isolated village,⁷ this Jewish minority was not rooted in the country. Ever since ancient times Jewish emigration from Palestine had been taking place whenever conditions were unfavourable.⁸

The opposite was the case with the Arab native population. It consisted mainly of peasants—fellahîn. Investigation has shown that this population was to a large extent descended from the oldest, pre-Israelitic inhabitants of the country.⁹ Having been successively Judaized and Christianized, they were finally Arabized and for the most part Islamized by the large influx of Arabs who poured into the country in the 7th century and have in turn become rooted there for thirteen centuries. During the first centuries of the rule of these Arabs Palestine attained great prosperity.¹⁰ It was they who introduced, among other things, the orange-apple into the country.¹¹ However, this prosperity was not permanent. As a result of its geographical position and spiritual importance, Palestine has from of old been predestined to be an international battlefield. Its peasant population bore the brunt of this fate. But, right up to our own time, none of the country's numerous troubles: natural catastrophes, epidemics, famines, devastating armies, foreign occupiers and tax collectors, have driven this population from its native soil.¹² The Palestine-Arab peasant was intelligent, competent and hard-working;¹³ with his slender resources, he tried to recover from the various disasters that had befallen the country. The Jewish thinker Achad Haam* reported after a journey through Palestine in 1891 that it was difficult to find any still uncultivated farmland there.¹⁴ Other 19th century sources report on the cultivation of various fruits.¹⁵ In the plain of Esdraelon in 1883 "almost every acre was in the highest state of cultivation";¹⁶ this was still the case in 1914.¹⁷ Around Jaffa the Arabs grew oranges the exceptional size of which attracted attention as early as the 18th century.¹⁸

The rise of political Zionism in the course of the 19th century brought about a radical change in the Jewish attitude with respect to Palestine. This Zionism desired a Jewish state in Palestine (Zion) and surrounding areas,¹⁹ large-scale Jewish

* Achad Ha-'am (1856-1927), the pseudonym of Asher Ginsberg, a Russian Zionist who argued the necessity of a Jewish cultural awakening.

immigration and cultivation of the country by the Jews themselves.²⁰

From 1789 onward Zionist colonization was presented in turn to France and England as a foothold for their influence in these countries.²¹ The co-operation between Zionism and imperialism did not escape the notice of the Turkish sovereign over Palestine. When, in 1882, England occupied Egypt, Palestine—for the first time in the history under Islâm—was closed to Jewish immigration.²²

In the corruption of Turkish officials and in the Capitulations,* the Jews found ways of evading the prohibition.²³ Precisely at this time political Zionism was entering upon the stage of practical realization. With the help of Turkish officials, Arabs were expelled from their villages for the benefit of Jews.²⁴ Achad Haam concluded from Jewish behaviour towards the Arabs that the Jews had evidently learned nothing from their history. This history proved the necessity of avoiding disgraceful acts towards the native population. "Und was tun unsere Brüder in Palästina? Just das Gegenteil! Knechte waren sie im Lande ihrer Verbannung, und plötzlich finden sie sich selbst in einer Freiheit ohne Grenzen, in einer ungezügelter Freiheit, wie sie sich nur in der Türkei finden lässt. Dieser plötzliche Wandel hat in ihnen eine Neigung zum Despotismus entstehen lassen, wie das stets der Fall ist, "wenn ein Knecht zur Herrschaft kommt", und sie behandeln die Araber feindselig und grausam, verkürzen ihr Recht auf unredliche Weise, beleidigen sie ohne jeden genügenden Grund und rühmen sich solcher Taten noch; und niemand tritt gegen diese verächtliche und gefährliche Neigung auf". (And what are our brothers in Palestine doing? The very opposite! They were servants in the country of their exile, and they suddenly find themselves in a state of unbounded liberty, of unbridled liberty such as can only be found in Turkey. This sudden change has brought about within them a tendency towards despotism as is always the case 'when a servant becomes a master', and they treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, curtail their rights in an unreasonable manner, insult them without any sufficient reason and actually pride themselves upon such acts; and nobody takes any action against this despicable and dangerous tendency.)²⁵

Meanwhile, in Europe, an Austrian Jewish journalist, Theodor Herzl, gave Zionism its definitive ideological founda-

* The Capitulations were treaty provisions whereby Europeans and their nationals enjoyed extra-territorial privileges in the Ottoman empire.

tions and organizational structure.

According to him, anti-Semitism, which was at the root of the Jewish problem, was ineradicable; the Jews constituted a people in the sense of a nation, and the Jewish problem was consequently a national problem, which could only be solved by the gathering into one state of all Jews who wished to retain their Jewish identity, and by the complete assimilation and effacement as Jews of the remnant still scattered among the nations.²⁶ Essential parts of this concept were published by him in 1896 in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" (The State of the Jews). In the countries of the Emancipation Herzl's aspirations met with widespread Jewish resistance.²⁷ By various means, among which were extortion,²⁸ and stimulation of anti-Semitism,²⁹ he tried to gain Jewish support for Zionism.

It was by armed force that he would have preferred to conquer the country earmarked for his state.³⁰ In the absence of Jewish power he sought support among non-Jewish powers. His means for obtaining such support included the trading of Jewish influence in Press³¹ and Finance,³² and of the Jews themselves as being ten million secret agents;³³ the playing off of colonial ambitions against each other,³⁴ and the promotion of antagonisms:³⁵ Zionism, he believed, should make headway through the medium of jealousy between churches and between states.³⁶ A new European war could not harm Zionism, but could only urge it forward.³⁷ Herzl spent large sums on bribery;³⁸ together with the Zionist Actions Committee he had a notorious extortioner in permanent service.³⁹ Approvingly he quoted: "Qui veut la fin, veut les moyens" (He who desires the end, desires the means).⁴⁰

As he constantly alarmed Jews by representing anti-Semitism as ineradicable,⁴¹ so he tried to instil into non-Jews fear of the Jews, of their power, and especially of their revolutionary mentality.⁴² Wherever possible he forced European statesmen into the dilemma: Zionism or Jew-fomented revolution.⁴³ All who did not wish "dasz die Juden alles zersetzen" (that the Jews corrupt everything) had to support Zionism.⁴⁴

With respect to the non-Jewish population of the country in view it was suggested in "Der Judenstaat" that this population would have equal rights.⁴⁵ However, according to the project for this state in Herzl's "Tagebücher" (Diaries)—not published until 26 years later—the existing landed property was to be gently expropriated, any subsequent resale to the original owners was prohibited, and all immovables had to remain in

exclusively Jewish hands.⁴⁶

The poor population was to be worked across the frontier "unbemerkt" (surreptitiously),⁴⁷ after having for Jewish benefit rid the country of any existing wild animals, such as snakes.⁴⁸ This population was to be refused all employment in the land of its birth.⁴⁹

In March 1899 Herzl had a letter forwarded to him, addressed by a former Arab burgomaster of Jerusalem to the Chief Rabbi of Paris.* This letter contained warnings against the Zionist claims as being impracticable on account of Turkey, the Holy Places, and the resistance of the existing population. Herzl replied to this letter, asking who would think of removing the non-Jewish population? This population would, on the contrary, find excellent brothers in the Jews.⁵⁰

A few months later Herzl began to write a novel, "Altneuland" (Old-Newland): a future vision of a Jewish Palestine 20 years later, a model state, which would enrapture visitors. A distinguished Arab who appears on the scene of "Altneuland", shows these visitors a prosperous Arab village with happy inhabitants, and voices the love of the Palestine Arabs for the Jewish brothers to whom they owe so much.⁵¹

"Altneuland" was written by Herzl primarily for the world, not for the Zionists. It had propagandistic aims: Herzl wanted to win over non-Jewish opinion for Zionism.⁵²

In 1901, when "Altneuland" was nearly finished, Herzl tried in Constantinople to obtain a Charter for rights, duties and privileges of a "Jüdisch-Ottomanische Land-Companie zur Besiedelung von Palästina und Syrien" (Jewish-Ottoman Colonization Association for the Settlement of Palestine and Syria). In his archives the draft-Charter was preserved for exactly such an instrument of colonization. After his death the new leader of the Zionist Organization tried to obtain from Turkey a similar Charter.⁵³ Article III of Herzl's draft Charter gave the Jews the right to deport the native population.⁵⁴

Herzl did not succeed in getting his Charter approved by Turkey. In that same year, 1901, the 5th Zionist Congress founded, under his leadership, the Jewish National Fund. According to its by-laws, acquired land became inalienable

* For this letter, see Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," in *St Antony's Papers*, No. 17, *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, edited by Albert Hourani (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 89-90. For T. Herzl's answer, see above, pp. 91-93.

Jewish property and could no longer be sold or leased to non-Jews.⁵⁵ In 1907, three years after Herzl's death, began the exclusion of the native population from labour on Jewish land, contemplated by him. In that year the first kibbutz (collective agricultural community) came into being as a means to eliminate Arab labour and conquer the country by Jewish labour.⁵⁶

The exterritorialization of Palestinian soil, together with the boycott of Arab labour—supplemented by a boycott of Arab goods when the Jews themselves began to produce goods for sale⁵⁷—inaugurated the “*unbemerkte*” (surreptitious) ousting of the native population, which Herzl had planned. Intensive Jewish militarization, also intended by Herzl,⁵⁸ was introduced in the same year.⁵⁹ It was preceded by a discussion between two youthful Jewish pioneers in the settlement of Sejera. One of them, David, wished to establish a Jewish so-called self-defence. The other, Shlomo, opposed this. They had returned, he said, to the Land of the Book in order to lead a peaceful life. If they stirred up the Arabs, there would be no shalom, no peace, ever. David persisted—this was a world in which force and force alone won respect.⁶⁰

Shlomo departed, to Paris. David remained. David Ben Gurion.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. James Parkes: *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (London, 1949), p. 179; Jacob Mann: *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fâtimid Caliphs* (London, 1920-1922), Vol. I, pp. 43-47; Albert Champdor: *Saladin* (Paris, 1956), p. 188.
- 2 Albert M. Hyamson: *Palestine* (London, 1917), pp. 31, 38; H. Graetz: *Geschichte der Juden* (Leipzig, 1863-1874), *Sechster Band*, p. 305; Norman Bentwich: *Palestine of the Jews* (London 1919), pp. 15, 16.
- 3 Graetz: *op. cit.* VIII, pp. 201, 202; Cecil Roth: *A Short History of the Jewish People* (London, 1948), p. 279.
- 4 *Brandeis on Zionism. A Collection of Addresses and Statements by Louis D. Brandeis* (Washington, 1942), p. 152.
- 5 Albert M. Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate* (London, 1950), p. 13.
- 6 Norman Bentwich: *Palestine* (London, 1934), p. 64.
- 7 Parkes: *op. cit.* p. 182.
- 8 Salo Wittmayer Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, 1953, in the course of publication), Vol. II, p. 123-124; D. Emil Schürer: *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (Leipzig, 1901-1911), *Dritter Band*, p. 3; Hyamson: *Palestine*, pp. 37, 43; Frank E. Manuel: *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, 1949), p. 70; *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929* (Commandpaper 3530, 1930), p. 22.
- 9 Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate*, p. 74, note 1; see also Parkes: *op. cit.* pp. 244, 250. Remnants of foreign invaders, including Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, amalgamated with the original stock. Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.* pp. 205, 206, 245; George Adam Smith: *Syria and the Holy Land* (London, etc., 1918), p. 38; Fannie Fern Andrews: *The Holy Land under Mandate* (Boston, etc., 1931), Vol. II, p. 33, note 1, quoting a letter from Philip K. Hitti; George E. Kirk: *A Short History of the Middle East* (London, 1948), p. 224; Charles D. Matthews: *Palestine - Moham-medan Holy Land* (New Haven, 1949), p. XXIX.
- 10 Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.* p. 97; Guy le Strange: *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), pp. 15-17; Hyamson: *Palestine*, p. 15.
- 11 Maçoudi: *Les Prairies d'Or* (Paris, 1861-1877), *Tome Deuxième*, pp. 438, 439; S. Tolkowsky: *The Gateway of Palestine* (London, 1924), p. 178.
- 12 Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.* p. 245; Martin Noth: *Geschichte Israels* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 131, 178.
- 13 John Hope Simpson: *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (Commandpaper 3686, 1930), pp. 64, 66; cf. Claude Reignier Conder: *Heth and Moab* (London, 1883), p. 368; Arthur Ruppin: *Die landwirtschaftliche Kolonisation der Zionistischen Organisation in Palästina* (Berlin, 1925), p. 12.
- 14 Achad Haam: *Am Scheidewege* (Berlin 1923, *Erster Band*, p. 87; see also Richard Lichtheim in *Jüdische Rundschau* (Berlin) 28-II-1919, p. 118,

- and *Protokoll des XII. Zionisten Kongresses* (Berlin, 1922), p. 304; cf. Arthur Ruppin: *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel* (Berlin, 1919), p. 114.
- 15 C.R. Conder: *Palestine* (London, 1889), p. 63; John Murray: *Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine* (London, 1875), pp. 111, 112, 271, 278; Hyamson: *Palestine*, pp. 92, 93; Achad Haam: *op. cit.* II, p. 359.
- 16 L. Oliphant: *Haifa*; or, *Life in Modern Palestine* (London, 1887), p. 60.
- 17 Frances E. Newton: *Fifty Years in Palestine* (London, etc., 1948) p. 97.
- 18 Tolkowsky: *op. cit.* p. 144.
- 19 For the extent of Zionist territorial aspirations see notes 127-130 and corresponding text.
- 20 Adolf Böhm: *Die Zionistische Bewegung* (Berlin, 1935—Jerusalem 1937) I. Band, pp. 98, 111; Nahum Sokolow: *History of Zionism 1600-1918* (London, 1919), Vol. I, pp. 116, 120; Hyamson: *Palestine*, p. 104.
- 21 Sokolow: *op. cit.* II, pp. 220-222; Albert M. Hyamson: *The British Consulate in Jerusalem* (London, 1939-1941), Part I, pp. xlix, 42-46. For ensuring imperialist proposals and related Zionist interests see Israel Cohen: *The Zionist Movement* (London, 1945), pp. 44, 45; Manuel: *op. cit.* pp. 49, 51, 53, 58; cf. Moses Hess: *Rom und Jerusalem* (Wien und Berlin, 1919; first published in 1862), pp. 129-140, 149, 151, 158.
- 22 Cf. Manuel: *op. cit.* pp. 53, 55.
- 23 Chaim Weizmann: *Trial and Error* (London, 1949), p. 41; Hyamson: *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, II, pp. 534-535; cf. Manuel: *op. cit.* chapter II; S. Landshut: *Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East* (London, 1950), p. 19.
- 24 H.M. Kalvarisky: *Jewish-Arab Relations before the Great War* (Jewish-Arab Affairs, Jerusalem, June 1931, pp. 12, 13); see also Achad Haam: *op. cit.* II, pp. 397, 398, note 2; Eugène Jung: *La Révolte Arabe* (Paris, 1924), I, p. 17.
- 25 Achad Haam: *op. cit.* I, p. 107.
- 26 Theodor Herzl: *Gesammelte Zionistische Werke* (Tel Aviv, 1934), I. Band, pp. 25, 104, 112, 141, 143-145, 180, 186, 190; II, pp. 122, 131 (cf. 280); III, pp. 268, 273; V, p. 498; cf. Böhm: *op. cit.* I, Kapitel XII - XXII, in particular p. 279; Alex Bein: *Theodor Herzl, Biographie* (Wien, 1934), cf. in particular p. 693.
- 27 Böhm: *op. cit.* I, pp. 169-171, 173, 174; Alex Bein: *op. cit.* pp. 282, 360; Joseph Heller: *Geschichte des Zionismus* (Berlin, 1935), pp. 17, 18; Cohen: *op. cit.* p. 70.
- 28 Herzl: II, p. 537, in connection with p. 507; see also III, p. 69, and pp. 49-52 in connection with I, pp. 238, 239.
- 29 References on this subject include such statements, addressed to Jews, as were certain to reach non-Jews as well. See Herzl: I, pp. 39-41, 193, 209-215, 237-238, 313, 314, 398, 445; V, pp. 496-499, 515; see also notes 42, 43, 44.
- 30 Cf. Herzl: I, p. 114, and Christopher Sykes: *Two Studies in Virtue* (New York, 1953), p. 161. Military force was an essential component of Herzl's

- projects, cf. Herzl: II, pp. 50, 58, 78, 102; III, p. 526.
- 31 *Ibid.* II, pp. 415, 420, 630; III, pp. 460, 520.
- 32 *Ibid.* II, pp. 415, 420, 631, 632, 633; III. pp. 3, 312, 313, 387, 388, 406, 520, 541; IV, pp. 15, 35, 37, 525.
- 33 *Ibid.* IV, pp. 303, 304; see also I, p. 178.
- 34 *Ibid.* III, pp. 93, 94, 96; cf. p. 97; IV, pp. 96, 97.
- 35 *Ibid.* IV, p. 90.
- 36 *Ibid.* II, p. 380; III, p. 94; IV, p. 413; cf. II, p. 58.
- 37 *Ibid.* II, p. 73; cf. Herzl's considerations concerning the division of Turkey in I, pp. 153, 205; II, pp. 309, 387; III, p. 94; IV, p. 146.
- 38 See indexes of Marvin Lowenthal: *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (New York, 1956), and of Herzl: IV, both under Nevliniski, N(uri) bey, Lippay; cf. Bein: *op. cit.* pp. 461, 466; Herzl: *op. cit.* III, p. 341; Siegmund Münz: "Theodor Herzl and his Diaries" (*The Contemporary Review*, July-December, 1924, pp. 57-60). Herzl obtained his audience with the Pope through bribery (see Lowenthal: *op. cit.* pp. 416-419, 432, 433; Münz: *op. cit.* p. 59); cf. Herzl: III, p. 66; IV, p. 151.
- 39 See conjointly Münz: *op. cit.* pp. 57, 58; Lowenthal: *op. cit.* pp. 301-311, and Herzl: III, pp. 289-303.
- 40 *Ibid.* III, p. 77.
- 41 *Ibid.* I, pp. 25, 110, 111, 119, 125, 126, 145, 189, 190, 193, 235, 275, 376, 397, 425; II, p. 52.
- 42 References on this subject include such statements, addressed to Jews, as were certain to reach non-Jews as well. See Herzl: I, pp. 37, 40, 41, 180, 203, 233, 238, 239, 313, 398; II, p. 135; V, pp. 496-499; see also note 43.
- 43 *Ibid.* III, pp. 125, 274, 391, 394; IV, pp. 432, 467, 499; see also II, p. 70; III, pp. 38, 109, 110, 122, 158, 269, 364, 371; V, pp. 497-499.
- 44 *Ibid.* I, p. 314.
- 45 *Ibid.* I, p. 95.
- 46 *Ibid.* II, pp. 98, 99.
- 47 *Ibid.* II, p. 98.
- 48 *Ibid.* II, pp. 108, 109.
- 49 *Ibid.* II, p. 98.
- 50 Bein: *op. cit.* p. 558; Herzl: V, p. 484-486.
- 51 Herzl: V pp. 245-248.
- 52 Bein: *op. cit.* pp. 562, 564; cf. Cohen: *op. cit.* p. 78.
- 53 Böhm: *op. cit.* I, p. 387.
- 54 *Ibid.* I, p. 706.
- 55 *Ibid.* I, pp. 227, 619.
- 56 *Zionistisches Handbuch, herausgegeben von Gerhard Holdheim* (Berlin, 1923), pp. 235, 259, 382; cf. Böhm: *op. cit.* I, pp. 414, 430.
- 57 *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies.* Published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. (New Haven, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 559, 560, and Vol. II, pp. 1160, 1165; see also *Palestine. Disturbances in May,*

1921. *Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Correspondence relating Thereto* (Commandpaper 1540, 1921), p. 52; Bahaaddin Bey in *Hatsharat Balfur Vatoldoteha* by N.M. Gelber (Jerusalem, 1939), p. 190, as quoted by Nevill Barbour in *Nisi Dominus* (London, 1946), p. 53.

58 Herzl: II, pp. 78, 102; cf. pp. 25, 35, 44, 50, 58, 61, 64, 72.

59 Moshe Pearlman: *The Army of Israel* (New York, 1950), p. 12.

60 Robert St. John: *Ben Gurion* (New York, 1959), pp. 31, 32.

British Interests in Palestine*

1917

HERBERT SIDEBOTHAM**

It is assumed for the purpose of this chapter that we are victorious over Turkey, and by victory is understood the power to impose our will upon her in regard to those parts of her Empire in which we have especial interests, commercial, political and military. Our commercial interests are co-extensive with the whole of the Turkish Empire and are not here taken into account. Our military interests are dictated mainly by the defence of Egypt and India and our political interests include such a settlement of the provinces adjacent to Egypt and India as will secure their future and make our military burdens as light as possible. These provinces are Palestine and Mesopotamia. The ancient connection between Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia is thus revived. Mesopotamia was the cradle of the Jewish people and the place of its exile in the Captivity. From Egypt came Moses, the founder of the Jewish State. The wheel of destiny will have come full circle round if at the end of this war the extinction of the Turkish Empire in Mesopotamia and the need of securing a more defensible frontier in Egypt were to lead to the re-establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine.

The Turks are an alien oligarchy in almost all parts of their Empire, and even if their rule had been enlightened and progressive no violence would be done to the population in dispossessing them. Indeed the principle of nationality requires

* From Herbert Sidebotham, *England and Palestine: Essays Towards the Restoration of the Jewish State* (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1918), chap. x. Reprinted by permission of Constable and Company Limited. The chapter reprinted here was written before the Balfour Declaration was made.

** British author and journalist (1872-1940); his writings include *Pillars of the State* (London: Nisbet & Co., 1921) and *Great Britain and Palestine* (London: Macmillan Co., 1937).

their dispossession. Nor is there any indigenous civilization in Palestine that could take the place of the Turkish except that of the Jews, who, already numbering one-seventh of the population, have given to Palestine everything that it has ever had of value to the world. How far is the ideal of a Jewish State in Palestine consistent with the interests of the British Empire? Or, rather, let us first ask what these British interests are, and only then, if they are found to be consistent with the creation of a Jewish State, to admit these ideal considerations as the allies of our military and political interests. This procedure will insure us against the undue influence of considerations that may be under the suspicion of being sentimental. At the same time it is well to recognise at the outset, that the most uncompromising *Real-Politik* will not leave out of account the emotions and ideals which are the most potent springs of human action. These ideal considerations must, therefore, have their place in any calculations of British policy. But in this chapter their place will be as reinforcements to the argument, not as its basis.

The subject falls naturally into three divisions: (1) the defence of Egypt,* (2) the settlement and defence of the district east of the River Jordan, and (3) the military and commercial frontiers of Palestine towards the north. Of these three divisions, the first is the most important and the most urgent for an authoritative settlement. Even if the war ended in the complete defeat of Turkey—which, however, should still continue to exist as a political unit—it would still be necessary to take special measures of precaution for the defence of Egypt. For the keystone of our system of defence in the East hitherto has been the benevolent neutrality of Turkey, and this removed, the whole question will have to be reviewed afresh, and our position adjusted to the new conditions. In such a case the less has often to be sacrificed to the greater, and we might under certain circumstances have to forego the prospect of advantage elsewhere for the sake of satisfying the more elementary requirements of our policy. For example, brilliantly as the future of British rule in Mesopotamia may promise, even that might have to be sacrificed in the event of a victory which came short of completeness, rather than consent to conditions on the frontiers of Egypt which compromised its security in war, or gravely increased the political difficulties of its government in peace. Egypt is our master interest in the East. And to say that, is to say that Palestine is our master interest; for Palestine, now as always,

* The British had occupied and administered Egypt since 1882, only formally declaring the country a Protectorate in 1914.

is the key to Egypt.

On its purely military side the problem of defending Egypt on the line of the Suez Canal, difficult as it was, was solved, thanks to very favourable conditions, in the first eighteen months of the present war. But it must be recognized that the Turks are not very redoubtable antagonists in the attack, however stubborn they may be on the defence. Their attacks on the Suez Canal front were badly bungled, nor indeed were their natural resources or their preparedness in this war adequate to the task they set themselves. But there are in any case very grave drawbacks, as this war has shown, to the passive defence of a country along or in rear of its political frontier. However securely a house may be barred, the knocking at the door creates internal commotion and destroys the sense of security: damage may be done to the structure even though no permanent entry is effected. Further, Egypt is valuable to this country not only, or so much, for its own sake, as because it is the main channel of our communications with our Indian Empire. You can, it has been said, do anything with bayonets except sit on them, and communications which form the battlefront between two armies may be useful for many things but not for communicating. Nor are we, except in consequence of drastic political changes, ever likely to have such favourable conditions for the defence of Egypt as have prevailed in this war. If the next war finds our present frontiers unaltered, the enemy, whether he be the Turk or his more dangerous successor, will have behind him a country in which the communications have been well organized and enormous stocks of material accumulated for crossing the desert between Palestine and the Suez Canal. He will attack suddenly before we have had time to reinforce, and his object will be to overrun the whole of the desert between the Egyptian frontier and the Canal before we have had time to recover from the initial surprise. It will not be necessary for him to cross the Canal to accomplish his purpose, it will be sufficient for him to establish himself on one bank to destroy our communications through Egypt. We might meet these tactics by organizing the Sinai Peninsula as a great place of arms, but that would be a difficult and costly solution, for it would mean that the frontiers of Egypt would have to be manned on a scale hitherto unknown, except on the continent of Europe. Moreover, there are grave drawbacks to a campaign fought, as this campaign would have to be fought, on the far side of a desert. The existing frontier of Egypt, it must be remembered, is on the Palestine side of the desert, and whatever preparations we made, whether we held the political frontier of Egypt and fought with our backs to the

desert, or whether we abandoned the political frontier and our subjects who live on it and fell back on the lines of the Canal, the objections are equally serious. Lastly, India can no longer be counted on to help to supply the demands of the garrison, for if we were in possession of Mesopotamia the defence of this now cis-Indian Empire would exhaust all the conveniently available reserve of her military strength.

It is clear that whatever happens in this war, peace will bring with it new military problems of great difficulty and complexity. They are all typified by the problem of the defence of Egypt, whose position in the British Colonial and Imperial system is as unique as it was in that of Rome. Egypt has been called the Achilles' heel of the sea-Empire of Britain. Everywhere else, with two exceptions which are apparent rather than real, the British Empire is unconquerable except by a Power which has wrested from us the command of the sea. In Canada, it is true, we have an enormously long land frontier with the United States, but the United States is hardly as yet a great military Power, and in any case it is one of the firmest principles of our policy to cultivate its friendship by every possible means. India, too, has a great land frontier, but it is the best natural frontier that is to be found anywhere in the world, and the most easily defensible. Before any Power could get within striking distance of India we should have long notice and leisure to make all arrangements for its defence. It is not so with Egypt, where the most vital spot in our whole arterial system may be exposed to the attacks of a great military and unfriendly Power. The danger is not one that in the light of the experience of this war needs labouring now: the only wonder in most minds is that so few realized the magnitude of the danger before the war. The reason, of course, was that until within a few years ago it hardly occurred to any one to regard Turkey as an enemy. Egypt was not thought to be in any danger, nor was it generally realized what an anomaly our position there was in our whole system of Imperial defence, because Turkey was conceived rather as a buffer-state against aggression from the land side. The situation is now completely transformed. Between Turkey and Russia, our old rival in the East, there was no possibility of alliance. Between Turkey and Germany, our new rival, this alliance is an accomplished fact, and the alliance is so close that, for military purposes, Turkey is Germany. Whatever reality there was in the old nervousness for the safety of India which made the long political feud between Great Britain and Russia, is now trebled and quadrupled in its menace. Not only has our buffer-state of Turkey been lost as an ally and turned into an enemy, but it

is in a position to threaten us with a vital blow at the one joint in the armour of our sea power. The menace from Russia, no doubt, seemed real enough in the second and third quarters of last century, but by comparison with the danger from a Turkey under German influence, and backed by the enormous material resources of Germany, it is now seen to have been merely a turnip-and-candle ghost.

Germany at the outset of this war invaded Belgium to parry a danger which, even if it had been real, was not comparable to this. The danger was that Westphalia, the heart of her military strength, being on the west side of the country, was therefore exposed to attack through Belgium should the Allies use her territory as a way of approach. But whether Germany believed this to be a real danger or not, she based her whole plans for war on the theory that passive defence is bad, at any rate on her own frontiers, and is only tolerable when it is conducted on an advanced frontier well in the heart of her enemy's country. Rather than run any risk of having to fight a defensive campaign so near to the heart of things as her Westphalian front, she preferred even the certainty of having Britain's sea power against her. This same idea of fighting the war in a bastion well within the enemy's territory has governed the whole of her strategy. Belgium and Northern France are German bastions for the defence of Westphalia, Austria for the defence of Silesia, Bulgaria and Turkey for the defence of Austrian Poland, Courland for East Prussia, and so on. No doubt this military practice has also its political side, but that only means that with Germany politics and strategy are two aspects of the same reality, as they should be. The theory underlying it is familiar to Englishmen from the naval dictum that the frontiers of England at sea are not our shores but the shores of the enemy. What Germany has done is brutally to transfer to continental land war a doctrine appropriate to sea, and recognized in the legal institution of the blockade, and the successes gained by her in this war make a powerful body of argument against merely passive defence which will have a permanent effect on the politics of the world. Applied to the defence of Egypt, the military experience of this war would counsel us against attempting to hold Egypt again in war-time by a mere passive defence of the frontier, or of any line behind that frontier.

But neither in Egypt or elsewhere is it possible, and it certainly is not desirable, for us to interpret the German doctrine that the best defence is in offence, as the Germans have interpreted it in this war. The state of preparedness to carry out an offensive on the neighbouring hostile territory before the enemy

is in a position to forestall us, however natural it may be to a great military Power, is not natural to a Power like Great Britain whose whole system of defence is conditioned and based on supremacy at sea. At sea it is the last extra knot of speed in a steamer for which one pays, and it is the day's gain in readiness for war for which one pays on land. For us to cultivate this feline promptness to spring both in land and in sea warfare would change the whole character of our defence system, and might even infect us with the plague of militarism against which we are fighting in this war. Some fresh application of the doctrine that defence is in offence must be found to suit our own case. Perhaps it may be found in the system of buffer-states which this country has developed more completely than the Continental countries. Just as the German practice has been an application to land warfare of British naval doctrine, on its political side it may be paralleled and deprived of its viciousness by the British system of buffer-states. The difference between the two is that whereas the German doctrine leads to attacks on the neutral buffers, ours has led us to undertake their defence. That is the modern form of the eighteenth century doctrine of the Balance of Power, a form, moreover, which makes for the preservation of distinctive national types, and not for their destruction and levelling down to monotonous uniformity.

Whatever the results of this war, it is likely to leave us with a land frontier such as we have never had before in our history, and whether we make great acquisitions of new territory or not, will not greatly affect the increase of our responsibilities, which is certain. Even if we do not create a new province of Mesopotamia, we must at least keep our hold on the Persian Gulf and its coast-line, which in any case will be no light task, and for that matter might even be easier with possession of a considerable territory in the back country than without it. Similarly, the defence of Egypt is sure to be a greatly increased responsibility, even if we confine ourselves to its present frontiers. The fact has to be faced that the old formula of not increasing our military responsibilities by extension of our frontiers no longer stands in much relation to the facts. On the contrary, there is more to be said for the opposite contention, that only in an extension of our frontiers are we likely to find a relief from our increased military burdens. But that extension must be conditioned by sound political conceptions. It is common ground with all parties, whatever their views about the future size of the British Army may be, that it is to our interest to keep down the size of the army required for purely garrison duty. The most remarkable fact in the organisation of the British

Empire is that though this country rules over peoples of alien race far more numerous in relation to our own population than any other country has ever attempted to rule, it does it with an army much smaller. Two advantages have prevented the Indian Empire from being a military burden proportionate to its size. The one is its incomparable natural frontier. The other is the system of buffer-states on the one frontier of India, the North West, which is exposed to attack. Of these buffers the more important is, of course, Afghanistan. Neither Egypt nor the Persian Gulf has either of these advantages. But if we extend our frontier, we may at any rate on the side of Egypt acquire one of these advantages—a good buffer-state. A good natural frontier cannot be made by artificial means, but prescient policy may erect in front of Egypt an ideal buffer-state.

Clearly, then, on the Indian analogy what we would seem to require for the better and less burdensome defence of Egypt is a State to do for this frontier what Afghanistan has done for India. Without it our position in the south of what is now the Turkish Empire is going to be one of extraordinary difficulty, and whether regard is had to our political conditions, to the character of the British Empire as based mainly on supremacy at sea, or to the power of rapidly developing our military strength to meet a sudden emergency, it is most desirable that our happy experience in India should be repeated in the new cis-Indian region. For the buffer system has, on the whole, worked extremely well in India. There have, it is true, been conflicts in our frontier policy between the so-called “forward” school and the Lawrence* school, but these have never turned on the merits of the buffer policy but on the degree of independence that the buffer-state ought to be allowed to possess. The cause of the troubles with Afghanistan which led to the two Afghan wars was whether her relations, real or suspected, with Russia were such as could properly be allowed in view of her rôle as buffer-state to India. The great war on the Indian frontier, again, in 1897, turned on whether or not it was desirable that there should be a secondary buffer between the administrative frontier of India and Afghanistan, or whether the actual frontier of India should be extended up to the borders of the Ameer’s dominion. These problems would not arise in any political arrangements that we might make in Palestine the better to secure our defence of Egypt. When we acquired responsibility for India the buffer-states of Persia and Afghanistan already

* T.E. Lawrence of Arabia (1888-1935).

existed, and the exact determination of the limits of their independence was a somewhat delicate question. But in Southern Syria the buffer-state is, at present, non-existent, and would have to be artificially created, and being our own creation there could be no doubt about its international status. It would from the outset be in close political dependence on the British Crown, in fact an integral part of the British Empire. Whatever success, therefore, that the buffer system has had in India might be expected to be repeated in Syria; on the other hand, the causes of the trouble and friction to which it has led from time to time in India would never come into being in Syria.

Another and even wider outlook can be found on this question. It is a curious fact that no other nation in Europe, either now or in the past, has known our distinction between "Colonial" and "Imperial" policy. Colonial policy in the strict sense, meaning the government of a country inhabited by people of the same origin as the people at the central seat of government, is hardly known to Europe. What Europe calls colonies are either mere "plantations," as they used to be called in England, *succursales* of the central firm, or Imperial possessions, like India. We alone among nations have known how to combine the Greek idea of a colony, a daughter state, reproducing in other conditions the mentality of the mother state, with the Roman ideal of political unity. *Imperium cum libertate*, elsewhere a paradox, is with us so much a truism that the boldness and originality of the conception are rarely realized. But even England has only transformed the paradox into political commonplace in countries of a temperate climate which are colonized by men of her own race. In Asia the problem is still unsolved, and it is broadly true that while an addition to the territory administered by us and not actually peopled by us is an increase of our burdens, the acquisition of a colony is ultimately an increase of strength but not of responsibility. To extend the area of British rule into Southern Syria, which is the conclusion to which our argument would seem to be leading, would, if its government were to be like that of India, be a great increase of our burdens, though one that it might be necessary to assume. On the other hand, if this extension were to be on the colonial pattern and the new territory were to be inhabited by people at the same stage of political development as ourselves, the increase of territory, so far from being a burden would be a source of added strength. Again, great as has been the assistance of the colonies to Britain, they have taken comparatively little interest in the welfare of those parts of the Empire like India which are governed and do not govern themselves. The reason is partly difference of

race and political development, partly geographical remoteness. But a genuine colony or dominion in Southern Syria would associate a British dominion for the first time in the current work of Imperial organization and defence.

Nothing is more certain than that if Palestine became part of the British Empire it would never be colonized in any real sense by the sort of Englishmen who have made Canada and Australia. The only possible colonists of Palestine are the Jews. Only they can build up in the Mediterranean a new dominion associated with this country from the outset in Imperial work, at once a protection against the alien East and a mediator between it and us, a civilization distinct from ours yet imbued with our political ideas, at the same stage of political development, and beginning its second life as a nation with a debt of gratitude to this country as its second father.

So far, then, as the argument has gone, the conclusions reached are these: That on general strategical grounds it is exceedingly desirable that the present too contracted frontiers to the East of Egypt should be extended. That the German military practice in the present war, the settled British practice in war at sea, and the use of the buffer-state system of Indian defence, all point in the same direction. That the buffer-state in Southern Syria might be expected to work with equal effectiveness as in India, and with greater smoothness. That a buffer-state in Syria would remove many of the stock objections to an extension of our military liabilities, and that if this buffer-state became a dominion or genuine colony it would be a source of great strength to us in the Eastern Mediterranean, both political and ultimately military; and, finally, that the only possible colonizers on a great and worthy scale in Palestine are the Jews. It seems desirable now to approach the question from a somewhat different point of view, and to examine whether the geography and the history of Palestine throw any fresh light on the policy that would be best in the interests of Great Britain. In particular, if the argument for the creation of a buffer-state in Palestine holds, it is important to ascertain what general principles should govern the drawing of the new frontier.

As has already been observed, Palestine on the side of Egypt has three strongly marked natural divisions, the Maritime Plain, the Shephelah or Downs overlooking this plain from the east, and then, separated from the Shephelah by a rift, the Plateau of Judæa, the home of the Philistines who, because they lived on the easiest of the land routes between Egypt and Syria, between the civilization of the Nile and the Euphrates Valleys, and were, therefore, best known to the outer world,

gave their name to the whole country of Palestine.* The Jews might watch the clash of empires from their fastnesses in Judæa, but not the dwellers on the Plain. This country was the route followed by all the great invasions from Asia towards Egypt, and from Egypt into Asia. Egypt always attached very great importance to the possession, or at any rate the alliance of the cities, and especially of Gaza, whose possession was indispensable to an army marching either to or from Egypt. One principal fault of the present frontier of Egypt is that in assigning Gaza to Palestine it gives to the Turks the most famous bridge-head in history. The other end of the bridge may be put on the north side of the Vale of Ajalon where the Philistine plain ends and Samaria begins. It is one of the sorrows of their history that owing to the Philistine possession of the Maritime Plain, the Jews never, except for one very brief moment, gained access to the sea. As a buffer-state for Egypt and in close alliance with it, Palestine might even have resisted successfully the Assyrian invasions. As it was, the conditions for successful defence against the north were never fulfilled in the ancient Jewish state, and the Prophets, being mainly anxious to maintain the spiritual purity of the people, were all for the policy of isolation from the quarrels of Egypt and Assyria. A new Jewish State in Palestine would begin with two immense advantages which history denied to the old order. It would have access to the sea and the firm friendship of Egypt.

In possession of the Shephelah, with the Plateau of Judæa as a citadel on the land side, and supported by sea supremacy, and by an army from Egypt operating in the Philistine Plain, the Jewish State, if it were revived, could make an invasion of Egypt from the north impossible.

In Judæa the interest of Egypt in Palestine ends, and if our sole object in concerning ourselves with Palestine were to make a bastion for the defence of Egypt, we might well content ourselves with the Maritime Plain, the Shephelah and Judæa. But a colony so restricted would have no future of its own. Having found it necessary to interest ourselves in Judæa for the sake of Egypt, we are compelled, in order to raise a vigorous self-supporting colony capable of rendering real help to Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean, to go beyond the bare idea of Egyptian defence. Judæa was the home of high religious thinking, but to fill a modern state, Judaism cannot dispense with the wealthier and more fertile provinces of the north. So far the argument has concerned itself solely with the conditions

* On the ancient history of Palestine, see Beatty, pp. 5-9.

of a satisfactory military defence of Egypt. It is now necessary to lay down the conditions on which we might hope to build up a great Dominion of Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean. To rest content with securing the military safety of Egypt would, so far as the Jews are concerned, be to perpetuate the tragedy of the separation of Israel and Judah. It would be to use the Jewish national spirit selfishly for our own ends, and to make the Jews no adequate return for their services to Egyptian defence.

The larger problem that now presents itself of how we may hope to form a state worthy of the Jewish people has many aspects. The practical political problem of how such a state, if established, could best be organized in its early stages, is outside the scope of this chapter, which is concerned solely with the relations of the new Palestine to its neighbours. Its relations with Egypt have already been discussed. Palestine would be under the same, or at any rate under a closely sympathetic sovereignty, and would ultimately, after passing through the intermediate stages, hope to become a self-governing Dominion, under British or under international sovereignty. The precise delimitation of the frontiers between two provinces of the Empire would present no great difficulties. The other frontiers, however, might raise some delicate problems. Should the war not make an end of the Turkish State, Palestine on the north might march with a weakened but still very formidable Turkey. The complete success of the Allies, on the other hand, might give her a frontier with a French Syria, or even with the new Arabian State which Sir Stanley Maude's* recent proclamation at Bagdad seems to envisage, should that State include Damascus. In any of these alternatives, it will be desirable that Palestine should have a good national frontier, though in so far as the new Arab State was under the influence or suzerainty of its creator, England, the frontier towards Arabia on the north might matter the less, the more Arabia extended from the desert past Damascus into Syria proper. On the east again, Palestine would look towards Arabia, which after the extinction of Turkey would be the political, as well as the religious, headquarters of Mohammedanism. At the other end of this eastern frontier Palestine would again be in touch with the problem of the defence of Egypt, which is threatened not only from along the Mediterranean littoral but by the Hedjaz railway to the head of the Gulf of Akabah. At its northern end there might be difficulties over Damascus. Further, if the war ends in the estab-

* Sir Frederick Stanley Maude (1864-1917), Commander of the British army in Mesopotamia in 1916, captured Baghdad a year later.

lishment of the Lower Tigris and Euphrates valleys of a province of the new British Empire, it would obviously be of supreme importance on commercial and even possibly on military grounds too for us to retain land communications between our new possessions and the Mediterranean.

Samaria never resisted an invader, for, unlike Judæa, she lies open on every side. She was the earliest home of the Jewish spirit, and in her best days the centre of the greatest material power of the Jewish State. Her fertility is in singular contrast with the general barrenness of Judæa, and the contrast reflects itself in the history of the people. "Judæa, earning from outsiders little but contempt, inspired the people whom she so carefully nursed in seclusion from the world with a patriotism which has survived two thousand years of separation, and still draws her exiles from the fairest countries of the world to pour their tears upon her dust, though it be amongst the most barren the world contains. Samaria, fair and facile, lavished her favours on foreigners, and was oftener the temptation than the discipline, the betrayer than the guardian of her own" (Sir George Adam Smith).

The tragedy of the history of the Kingdom of Israel is the gradual contraction of her frontiers on the north under the growing pressure of Syria. Gradually Galilee of the Gentiles—the County Palatine, as we might call it—crept southwards until by the time of Isaiah it was as far south as the Lake of Gennesaret, and in the time of the Maccabees had reached the Plain of Esdraelon. So far did foreign infiltration go in Samaria that the Jews had "no dealings with the Samaritans." But the national revival under the Maccabees extended to Galilee, leaving Samaria as a Gentile enclave within the circle of Judaism. Galilee is an indispensable part of a Jewish State and a British Colony. Without it, indeed, the State would inevitably contract to Judæa, fit home for a theocracy, but not for a modern State achieving financial independence and capable of a thriving commercial life.

The natural frontier of Galilee is the Lebanon range. Its delimitation towards the sea and the question of how much of the Phoenician plain should be assigned to it is a question of detail rather than of political or military principle. In general, seeing that the new state would have the support of British sea power, wide access to the sea would be an advantage without any corresponding disadvantages. But the real port of Galilee would be Acre (Haifa), and if there were any prospect of the Jewish State gaining compensation on the east, she might well forego any claims to the southern end of the Phoenician plain,

provided that the Bay of Haifa were secured her. Haifa is now connected by railway with Damascus. The trade of Damascus may either go to Beirut by the road built by French engineers across the Lebanon, or some of it may go along the famous "way of the sea," over Jordan, by "Galilee of the Gentiles" to Haifa, but it will hardly take a middle route to the site of ancient Tyre between Haifa and Beirut. Galilee will, therefore, not compromise its future by sacrificing possession of the old Phoenician coast north of Haifa.

On the other hand, extension, commercial if not political, in the direction of Damascus is most important. If in the event of the partition of Turkey there is to be a French Syria, it is hard to conceive of it without the city which is the port of Syria on the side of the desert. On the other hand, the history of the ancient Jewish State is one of commercial and political failure largely because it was never able to establish itself firmly on the north. A Galilee in possession of Damascus would soon be the main channel of trade between the Persian Gulf provinces and the Mediterranean. Haifa would revive the glories of ancient Tyre and the Jews would succeed to the commercial greatness of ancient Phoenicia. Moreover, on political grounds, there is much to be said for the view that, if we hold the valley of the Lower Euphrates, we ought also to have some political control over a city which is as much the port of Mesopotamia on the west as Basrah is on the south. Damascus, on the edge of the desert, is the meeting-place of the roads from the Mediterranean and from Bagdad and Mesopotamia. On the south side, pilgrims leave Damascus for the pilgrimage to Mecca by the railway which will emerge at the head of the Gulf of Akabah. But not only French sentiment and the natural ambition of the new Palestine will have to be considered, but also the interests of the new Arab State or States that are to be set up. The new Arabia should have an outlet towards the Mediterranean as well as towards the Persian Gulf, and Damascus would be its natural capital in the west as Bagdad on the south. In this respect the interests of the new Arabia and of Great Britain are closely allied, for the chief value of Damascus, after all, to the Power that holds it is as a stage in the communications between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and in this value Great Britain, if its projects in Mesopotamia are realized, is mainly interested. There is, therefore, at this north-eastern corner of Palestine some risk of conflicting interest between Palestine, French Syria, and the new Arabia. But after all the greatest interest, and one that all three have in common, is peace and mutual co-operation in the immense work of developing the

country. The interest of Palestine and Great Britain in Damascus is not so much political as commercial, and if Damascus becomes a "free port" and amicable arrangements can be made for the free transit of trade, the political sovereignty of Damascus is for us a question of comparatively minor importance. The Jews in Palestine will have to co-operate with the Arabs. With friendly relations between them, everything is possible to the new Palestine. Without them, nothing but failure.

Two rival schemes for the development of Asiatic Turkey may be said to have emerged in the course of this war. There is the great scheme of Germany, represented by the Bagdad railway project, of developing the trade routes of Mesopotamia and the East overland towards Asia Minor, Constantinople and the Central European political system. It was a project which before the war this country was not particularly interested to oppose—at any rate in the view of the Foreign Office—provided that certain conditions (such as the control of the head of the Persian Gulf, which is necessary to the safety of our Empire in India) were secured. But now that the war has been joined and Turkey has entered it as an ally of Germany, we can no longer view it with equanimity. It must now be defeated politically and commercially. An alternative scheme, of which a beginning has been made in the Mesopotamian campaign, would seek to divert the commercial and political gain that Germany hoped to achieve by the Bagdad scheme from Asia Minor and Northern Syria to Southern Syria, Galilee and Egypt. The struggle is between the north-western and the western and south-western trade routes. We are interested in deflecting the trade to its southerly routes in any case, but directly interested if Palestine is to become a British Colony. The defeat of the Bagdad railway project and the assurance of a great commercial future to Palestine are thus different aspects of the one question. Haifa to the Persian Gulf is the British alternative to the German ideal of Bagdad to Berlin. That is one reason, amongst others, why Palestine is concerned so deeply with Damascus.

The just delimitation of the eastern frontier of Palestine is no less important than that of the north. The Jews themselves entered Palestine from the south-east after their long journeys in the wilderness of Sinai, and little would be gained by reviving the Jewish State and developing it into a British Dominion if the Jews were still to be left open to attack from the side by which the Jews first entered it. The hold of the Jews on the country east of Jordan was always somewhat precarious, and the only part which was definitely a part of the kingdom of Israel was Gilead between Moab and Hauran. Gilead remained part of

Israel after the rest of the country east of Jordan had been lost, because, being a hilly land between two plateaux, it was more easily defended, and also because it was in its physical features an essential part of Israel. Its isolation, moreover, and its exposure to raids from Syria and Arabia made it the strongest supporter of Jewish unity, the most loyal because the most exposed of provinces. But not only Gilead but as much of the country between Jordan and the desert as she can get without injustice to the new Arabia is an object of desire for Palestine. Nearly every traveller to Palestine has expressed his sense of the romance of the long range of hills which closes as with a straight rule the horizon to the east. On the plateau of which these hills are the sides are the best climate and some of the richest country in the whole of Western Asia. It is 150 miles from Hermon to the southern end of the Dead Sea; the average elevation is 2000 feet above the sea and more than 2000 above the Jordan valley. "Whether upon the shadeless plain of Hauran, where the ripe corn swayed like the sea before the wind, or upon the ridges of Gilead, where the oak branches rustled and their shadows swung to and fro over the cool paths, most of the twelve hours were almost as bracing as the dawn, and night fell not as in other parts of Palestine to repair but to confirm the influences of the day." "Eastern Palestine is a land of health. This was our first impression as we rose to Hauran by the steppes south of Pharpar, the wind blowing over from Hermon, and this was our last impression when we regretfully struck our tents on the pastures of Moab, where the dry herbage makes the breezes as fragrant as the heather the winds of our own Highlands" (Sir George Adam Smith). It is, moreover, a very rich agricultural country. Under the Greeks and Romans this country attained a quite remarkable degree of prosperity. The Decapolis, a league of Greek cities formed when it was the policy of Rome to leave the country east of Jordan to her Hellenized Semitic vassals like Herod, and only union could give protection against Arab inroads from the desert, was a Greek counterpart of Jewish Galilee on the other side of Jordan, and its ruins still attest the heights of its civilization and its ancient prosperity. Even more famous were the cities of Hauran when annexation to Rome had brought this district security against foreign invasion.

Nor was this civilized belt between Jordan and the desert a narrow one. It extended eastwards to Kanatha and Bosra, a hundred miles east of Gennesaret. Mommsen gives a glowing account of the prosperity of this region after Tragan's annexation. "Bosra," he writes, quoting Wetzstein, "has the most favourable position of all the towns in Eastern Syria. Even

Damascus, which owes its size to the abundance of water and to its situation protected by the eastern Trachon, will excel Bosra only under a weak government, while the latter under a wise and strong government must elevate itself in a few decades to a fabulous prosperity. It is the great market for the Syrian desert, and its long rows of booths of stone still, in their desolation, furnish evidence of the reality of an earlier and the possibility of a future greatness." Here the Jewish State might find consolation for Damascus, should that famous city be beyond its attainment, and from Hauran through Leja might run the railways connecting the new British Dominion of Palestine with the new British Empire in Mesopotamia, diverting the trade of the Turkish East from the orientation convenient to a Central European Confederacy to one more suitable to the Power which has command of the Mediterranean, and is the reversionary of the interests of the southern parts of the Turkish Empire. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this country east of the Jordan to the future of the Jewish State. Through it runs the railway from Damascus to the Gulf of Akabah used for the pilgrimage to Mecca. It cannot remain under foreign control. Should the new Arab State come into existence and fulfil the hopes that are entertained of it, this railway will have enormous political as well as religious importance. We should have to respect the sacred character of a railway built with the pence of pilgrims to Mecca, although Turkey undoubtedly encouraged the scheme with the object of riveting her unpopular rule on the Arabians in the Hedjaz, now in full revolt. It should not, therefore, be handed over to the keeping of British Jews in Palestine. Some sort of compromise would have to be effected east of Jordan, and provided that the relations between the Jews and Arabs are as friendly as they have usually been in the past, this compromise would not be far to seek. The main point is to preserve complete freedom of commercial access between Palestine across the desert towards Mesopotamia. There is between Judaism and Mohammedanism no such antagonism as there has often been between Mohammedanism and Christianity, and the project of reviving the Arab Power side by side with the Jewish State is the strongest of arguments for compromise and adjustment of their claims where they seem to come into conflict.

Finally, at the extreme southern end of the eastern frontier at Akabah the danger that this port might be utilized as a basis for hostile submarines points to the necessity of some direct political control there, either through the Dominion of Palestine or by the creation there of an Imperial naval station.

The survey of the future Jewish State under the British Crown has now been completed. The argument began with the consideration of what was necessary in the interests of Egypt, and reached the conclusion that no sound system of defence for our communications with the East was to be found on the line of the Canal. Military prudence made it necessary to advance beyond that line and to form a bastion in front of the desert in defence of the most vital and vulnerable spot in our whole Imperial system. On the analogy of our Indian experience, however, it seemed important that we should make of this bastion a buffer-state, and the only race capable of forming such a state was the Jews. But Southern Palestine alone is not sufficient to form a modern State such as could ultimately, after a period of pupilage, form a self-sufficing State as a British Dominion, and not only become responsible for its own government and its own local defence but even, like other Dominions, tender voluntary help to the Empire in its trials. Thus, the argument was drawn insensibly into considering the conditions on which such a State might be formed with some prospect of success, and in sketching the frontiers of such a State regard has been had to the political and military failure of the old Jewish State. Its failures to secure great political success were, it was found, due to its lack of access to the sea, to the want of a good frontier to the north and the west, and lastly to its friendlessness among the more numerous and powerful enemies who gradually encroached on the limits necessary to form a strong political and military unity. All these wants we are now in a position to supply. In return the new Jewish State may mediate between East and West, form a strong garrison of British power and sympathy in the Eastern Mediterranean and develop the communications between Palestine and our new Empire in Mesopotamia which it is hoped that this war will give us. The design is on an ample plan, for although the Jewish colonists would not for long enough be able to form a State capable of filling the frame, it is necessary, if the second Jewish State should avoid the fate of the first, that it should have room to breathe. More States, after all, have died of suffocation than of repletion and there would be no excuse for this country if, having taken up a great ideal, it were to execute it only in miniature.

Throughout the argument has concerned itself mainly with material arguments, but it is now free, after reaching the conclusion that a *Real-Politik*, a rational British egoism, would find its satisfaction in the creation of a new Jewish State under the British Crown, to acclaim as allies those ideals which, from caution, not from conviction, the argument began by excluding

from consideration. And these ideals are indeed the rods of Moses which swallow up all the other rods. We began this war on behalf of the conceptions of the international law and injustice whose most conspicuous violation at that time was the invasion of neutral Belgium. Even if Belgium were all, there would still be amongst British people no regrets, no doubts. But great as the ideal of relieving Belgium from the invader may be, the ideal of restoring the Jewish State to Palestine is comparably greater, as a new birth is a greater thing than a recovery from a sickness. Belgium is one of the youngest and smallest of States. But the Jews are the oldest of living races, their services to the welfare of the world have lain in the highest spheres, and their literature has come closer to the human heart than that of any other nation. The Belgian captivity has lasted three years, the Jewish exile from their nationhood has lasted nearly two thousand years, never free from suffering and humiliation and the age-long pangs of deferred hope. Before the magnitude of this war, most ideals seem to shrink in size. But one ideal is the peer even of this war in magnitude and grandeur. It is the ideal of the restoration of the Jews to a country which, small and poor as it is, they made as famous as Greece and as great as Rome. And lastly, there is no ideal so grand in its scope and so wide in its appeal, so simple and so assured of ready comprehension and sympathy, nor is there any achievement that would exhibit the contrast between English and German political ideals so favourably to us, and so eloquently vindicate our own, as the establishment of a Jewish State under the British Crown.

Edwin Montagu and Zionism
1917

I

MEMORANDUM OF EDWIN MONTAGU ON THE
ANTI-SEMITISM OF THE PRESENT (BRITISH)
GOVERNMENT—SUBMITTED TO THE BRITISH CABINET,
AUGUST, 1917*

I have chosen the above title for this memorandum, not in any hostile sense, not by any means as quarrelling with an anti-Semitic view which may be held by my colleagues, not with a desire to deny that anti-Semitism can be held by rational men, not even with a view to suggesting that the Government is deliberately anti-Semitic; but I wish to place on record my view that the policy of His Majesty's Government is anti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallying ground for Anti-Semites in every country in the world.

This view is prompted by the receipt yesterday of a correspondence between Lord Rothschild and Mr. Balfour.

Lord Rothschild's letter is dated the 18th July and Mr. Balfour's answer is to be dated August 1917. I fear that my protest comes too late, and it may well be that the Government were practically committed when Lord Rothschild wrote and before I became a member of the Government, for there has obviously been some correspondence or conversation before this letter. But I do feel that as the one Jewish Minister in the Government I may be allowed by my colleagues an opportunity of expressing views which may be peculiar to myself, but which I hold very strongly and which I must ask permission to express when opportunity affords.

* Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cab. 24/24, Aug. 23, 1917. Lord Edwin Samuel Montagu (1879-1924), Anglo-Jewish statesman, was British Minister of Munitions, 1916, and Secretary of State for India, 1917-22.

I believe most firmly that this war has been a death-blow to Internationalism, and that it has proved an opportunity for a renewal of the slackening sense of Nationality, for it has not only been tacitly agreed by most statesmen in most countries that the redistribution of territory resulting from the war should be more or less on national grounds, but we have learned to realise that our country stands for principles, for aims, for civilisation which no other country stands for in the same degree, and that in the future, whatever may have been the case in the past, we must live and fight in peace and in war for those aims and aspirations, and so equip and regulate our lives and industries as to be ready whenever and if ever we are challenged. To take one instance, the science of Political Economy, which in its purity knows no Nationalism, will hereafter be tempered and viewed in the light of this national need of defence and security.

The war has indeed justified patriotism as the prime motive of political thought.

It is in this atmosphere that the Government proposes to endorse the formation of a new nation with a new home in Palestine. This nation will presumably be formed of Jewish Russians, Jewish Englishmen, Jewish Roumanians, Jewish Bulgarians, and Jewish citizens of all nations—survivors or relations of those who have fought or laid down their lives for the different countries which I have mentioned, at a time when the three years that they have lived through have united their outlook and thought more closely than ever with the countries of which they are citizens.

Zionism has always seemed to me to be a mischievous political creed, untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom. If a Jewish Englishman sets his eyes on the Mount of Olives and longs for the day when he will shake British soil from his shoes and go back to agricultural pursuits in Palestine, he has always seemed to me to have acknowledged aims inconsistent with British citizenship and to have admitted that he is unfit for a share in public life in Great Britain, or to be treated as an Englishman. I have always understood that those who indulged in this creed were largely animated by the restrictions upon and refusal of liberty to Jews in Russia. But at the very time when these Jews have been acknowledged as Jewish Russians and given all liberties, it seems to be inconceivable that Zionism should be officially recognised by the British Government, and that Mr. Balfour should be authorised to say that Palestine was to be reconstituted as the "national home of the Jewish people." I do not know what this involves, but I assume that it means that Mahommedans and Christians are

to make way for the Jews and that the Jews should be put in all positions of preference and should be peculiarly associated with Palestine in the same way that England is with the English or France with the French, that Turks and other Mahommedans in Palestine will be regarded as foreigners, just in the same way as Jews will hereafter be treated as foreigners in every country but Palestine. Perhaps also citizenship must be granted only as a result of a religious test.

I lay down with emphasis four principles:

1. I assert that there is not a Jewish nation. The members of my family, for instance, who have been in this country for generations, have no sort or kind of community of view or of desire with any Jewish family in any other country beyond the fact that they profess to a greater or less degree the same religion. It is no more true to say that a Jewish Englishman and a Jewish Moor are of the same nation than it is to say that a Christian Englishman and a Christian Frenchman are of the same nation: of the same race, perhaps, traced back through the centuries—through centuries of the history of a peculiarly adaptable race. The Prime Minister and M. Briand are, I suppose, related through the ages, one as a Welshman and the other as a Breton, but they certainly do not belong to the same nation.

2. When the Jews are told that Palestine is their national home, every country will immediately desire to get rid of its Jewish citizens, and you will find a population in Palestine driving out its present inhabitants, taking all the best in the country, drawn from all quarters of the globe, speaking every language on the face of the earth, and incapable of communicating with one another except by means of an interpreter. I have always understood that this was the consequence of the building of the Tower of Babel, if ever it was built, and I certainly do not dissent from the view, commonly held, as I have always understood, by the Jews before Zionism was invented, that to bring the Jews back to form a nation in the country from which they were dispersed would require Divine leadership. I have never heard it suggested, even by their most fervent admirers, that either Mr. Balfour or Lord Rothschild would prove to be the Messiah.

I claim that the lives that British Jews have led, that the aims that they have had before them, that the part that they have played in our public life and our public institutions, have entitled them to be regarded, not as British Jews, but as Jewish Britons. I would willingly disfranchise every Zionist. I would be almost tempted to proscribe the Zionist organisation as illegal and

against the national interest. But I would ask of a British Government sufficient tolerance to refuse to endorse a conclusion which makes aliens and foreigners by implication, if not at once by law, of all their Jewish fellow-citizens.

3. I deny that Palestine is to-day associated with the Jews or properly to be regarded as a fit place for them to live in. The Ten Commandments were delivered to the Jews on Sinai. It is quite true that Palestine plays a large part in Jewish history, but so it does in modern Mahommedan history, and, after the time of the Jews, surely it plays a larger part than any other country in Christian history. The Temple may have been in Palestine, but so was the Sermon on the Mount and the Crucifixion. I would not deny to Jews in Palestine equal rights to colonisation with those who profess other religions, but a religious test of citizenship seems to me to be the only admitted by those who take a bigoted and narrow view of one particular epoch of the history of Palestine, and claim for the Jews a position to which they are not entitled.

If my memory serves me right, there are three times as many Jews in the world as could possibly get into Palestine if you drove out all the population that remains there now. *So that only one-third will get back at the most, and what will happen to the remainder?*

4. I can easily understand the editors of the *Morning Post* and of the *New Witness* being Zionists, and I am not in the least surprised that the non-Jews of England may welcome this policy. I have always recognised the unpopularity, much greater than some people think, of my community. We have obtained a far greater share of this country's goods and opportunities than we are numerically entitled to. We reach on the whole maturity earlier, and therefore with people of our own age we compete unfairly. Many of us have been exclusive in our friendships and intolerant in our attitude, and I can easily understand that many a non-Jew in England wants to get rid of us. But just as there is no community of thought and mode of life among Christian Englishmen, so there is not among Jewish Englishmen. More and more we are educated in public schools and at the Universities, and take our part in the politics, in the Army, in the Civil Service, of our country. And I am glad to think that the prejudices against inter-marriage are breaking down. But when the Jew has a national home, surely it follows that the impetus to deprive us of the rights of British citizenship must be enormously increased. Palestine will become the world's Ghetto. Why should the Russian give the Jew equal rights? His national

home is Palestine. Why does Lord Rothschild attach so much importance to the difference between British and foreign Jews? All Jews will be foreign Jews, inhabitants of the great country of Palestine.

I do not know how the fortunate third will be chosen, but the Jew will have the choice, whatever country he belongs to, whatever country he loves, whatever country he regards himself as an integral part of, between going to live with people who are foreigners to him, but to whom his Christian fellow-countrymen have told him he shall belong, and of remaining as an unwelcome guest in the country that he thought he belonged to.

I am not surprised that the Government should take this step after the formation of a Jewish Regiment, and I am waiting to learn that my brother, who has been wounded in the Naval Division, or my nephew, who is in the Grenadier Guards, will be forced by public opinion or by Army regulations to become an officer in a regiment which will mainly be composed of people who will not understand the only language which he speaks—English. I can well understand that when it was decided, and quite rightly, to force foreign Jews in this country to serve in the Army, it was difficult to put them in British regiments because of the language difficulty, but that was because they were foreigners, and not because they were Jews, and a Foreign Legion would seem to me to have been the right thing to establish. A Jewish Legion makes the position of Jews in other regiments more difficult and forces a nationality upon people who have nothing in common.

I feel that the Government are asked to be the instrument for carrying out the wishes of a Zionist organisation largely run, as my information goes, at any rate in the past, by men of enemy descent or birth, and by this means have dealt a severe blow to the liberties, position and opportunities of service of their Jewish fellow-countrymen.

I would say to Lord Rothschild that the Government will be prepared to do everything in their power to obtain for Jews in Palestine complete liberty of settlement and life on an equality with the inhabitants of that country who profess other religious beliefs. I would ask that the Government should go no further.

E.S.M.

23rd August 1917.

II

LETTER FROM EDWIN MONTAGU TO LORD ROBERT
CECIL ON ZIONIST SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE
SEPTEMBER, 1917*India Office
14th September, 1917.

My dear Cecil,

In the discussion which took place in the Cabinet between us on the subject of Zionism, both you and Lord Milner** suggested with such force that the views which I held were the views of a minority that I came to believe, and I think the Cabinet must have done so, that the views which I would remind you I only expressed on my own behalf, were almost peculiar to myself and a few other eccentric individuals. I have, therefore, taken steps to find out the exact situation so far as possible, and I give you the facts as I have ascertained them below.

I set myself to discover whether Zionists are in a majority, and, if so, in a large majority, as regards the Jews of the United Kingdom. I am not aware that any plebiscite among a religious community has ever been taken in this or any other country on any subject. I can therefore only take the indirect evidence which is available, that afforded by the voting on a resolution passed by a body which I understand fairly represents the community as a whole.

The Jewish Board of Deputies may claim, I understand, something approximating to a representative character. It consists of representatives of a considerable number of the synagogues of the United Kingdom. It is not completely representative, because some synagogues do not send members, some Jews do not become members of the synagogues which they attend and some do not attend them. Nevertheless, I am told that Zionists and non-Zionists alike would regard the Jewish Board of Deputies as the one body whose resolutions may be quoted as representing with some degree of correctness the opinion of the community as a whole.

* Great Britain, Public Record Office, Cab. 24/27, Sept. 14, 1917. Lord Edgar Algernon Robert Cecil (1864-1958) was British Minister of Blockade 1916-18, and Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918.

** Lord Alfred Milner (1854-1925) was High Commissioner for South Africa, 1897-1905.

On the 17th June a discussion took place at a meeting of this Board, followed by a division, and it is on this division that the best claim to a statement that the majority of British Jews are Zionists can be based. But I would remind you that the discussion and the division were not on Zionism itself, but on a side issue. There is in existence a conjoint Committee of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association. This conjoint Committee published in *The Times*, of the 24th May, a letter which argued in favour of the granting to Jews in Palestine of civil and religious liberty, of facilities for emigration, colonisation, &c., but opposed what the writers understood to be the two points of the Zionist claim, namely, that the Jewish settlers in Palestine should be (1) recognised as possessing a national character in a political sense; and (2) invested with certain special rights in excess of those enjoyed by the rest of the population. (I may say that these views are more or less my own.)

The letter was criticised on two grounds, namely, that it opposed the national idea which is the foundation of Zionism, and that the Joint Committee in issuing it on its own responsibility exceeded its rights as a mere executive committee of two parent organisations which should have been consulted before a large declaration of policy was given to the world.

This vote of censure obviously enlisted the support not only of Zionists, but also of those who felt the force of this latter criticism, and in the discussion the second point played a very large part. The vote was described in a Zionist newspaper, *The Jewish Chronicle* as "a revolt against the system which has been in vogue far too long in our community, the system of oligarchal repression."

This vote of censure, which is the only numerical test of the alleged majority of Zionists among British Jews, was passed by 56 votes to 51. It is to be remembered for the purpose which I have in discussing this matter that the issue of Zionism against non-Zionism was mingled with the questions arising out of an injudicious use of delegated power, but even if this is dismissed (and it ought not to be dismissed), all that can be said is that the views that I hold and expressed in the Cabinet were held by practically half the only representative body which has expressed an opinion.

I cannot, however, leave the subject, as I am about to leave England for some months without reminding you that Zionism had a foreign origin, that it was founded by Theodor Herzl, an Austrian, that his successor as leader of the Zionist movement was David Wolffsohn of Koln, who was succeeded

in turn by Otto Warburg of Berlin. In conformity with the foreign origin of Zionism as a whole, Jews of foreign birth have played a very large part in the Zionist movement in England. Among its best known leaders in England are Dr. Gaster, a native of Roumania, Dr. Hertz, a native of Austria, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who is, I believe, a native of Russia. Of course there are English born leaders of the Zionist organisations in England, and I cannot speak with certainty as to the proportion in which the rank and file of the movement in England consists of persons of English and foreign birth respectively, but it is the common belief among the Jewish community that persons of foreign birth form a very large proportion of the Zionists in England.

If a detailed enquiry were made as to the views on the Zionist question of those who are responsible for such great institutions as the Board of Guardians for the Relief of the Jewish Poor, the Anglo-Jewish Association (which deals mainly with questions relating to Jews in the East), the Russo-Jewish Committee (which dealt with the great problem of Jewish emigration from Russia), the Jews' Free School, &c., I think it would be found that the philanthropic work which represents the chief communal activity of Jews in England is to a preponderating extent done by Jews who have either expressed no sympathy with Zionism or who are actively opposed to it.

Now will you forgive me for saying that if I am right in thinking that Jews of British birth are in the main anti-Zionist, if I am right in thinking that Anti-Zionism is a belief held by at least half of the Jews of this country, what can be the motive for our Government, in the midst of its great preoccupations and perplexities, doing anything in this matter? To help the Allied cause in America was one of the reasons given in the Cabinet discussion. I did not see the terms of the telegram which you sent to America, but it is obvious that President Wilson does not wish for a definite statement conveying any real commitment at present. This motive then goes by the board, and therefore I am impelled to urge once more that no form of words should be used by any spokesman of the British Government which implies that there is a Jewish people in the political sense and that any Jew who happens now to live in England, France, Italy or America is an exile in belonging to the English, French, Italian or American people among whom he dwells at present. Such a declaration would be felt as a cruel blow by the many English Jews who love England, the birthplace of themselves and their ancestors for many generations, who wish to spend their lives in working for her, and whose highest

aspiration is to continue to serve her.

But I am particularly anxious to avoid a refusal to respond to Lord Milner's generous intention. There has been brought to my notice a body formed some years ago called "The Jewish Territorial Organisation," which adopted the following words to explain its object: "To obtain a territory. . . . for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they live at present." If it is desired to say anything, would this be any use? :-

"His Majesty's Government accepts the principle that every opportunity should be afforded for the establishment in Palestine for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they live at present, will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, and will be ready to consider any suggestions on the subject which any Jewish or Zionist organisations may desire to lay before it."

N.B. - I do not wish to limit the suggestions which are invited to the Zionist organisations.

I should of course prefer that the Government as a Government should say nothing, but I do hope they will not go further than this.

Yours sincerely,
EDWIN S. MONTAGU

Contacts Between German Zionist Leaders and the German Government During World War I*

LEONARD STEIN**

When Balfour spoke, on October 4th, of German efforts to capture the Zionist Movement, he was warning the War Cabinet that if it delayed much longer in authorising a pro-Zionist declaration, it would be playing the enemy's game. German competition for Zionist sympathies was a theme of which much was to be heard during October, and the belief that a German move might be imminent was to play an important part in expediting the War Cabinet's approval of the Balfour Declaration on October 31st.

President Wilson, as we have seen, was told on October 6th that it was because of reports that they were being courted by the Germans that the question of a British assurance to the Zionists was being re-considered by the War Cabinet. When, towards the end of the month, the Declaration was still hanging fire, the Foreign Office, in pressing for a prompt decision, pointed out that 'delay may throw the Zionists into the hands of the Germans.' In a memorandum of which more will be said later, even Curzon,† sceptical though he was about the practicability of the Zionist programme, conceded that the proposed

* From Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1961), chap. xxxvi. Copyright © 1961 by Vallentine, Mitchell and Co. Ltd. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. Cross-references have been omitted.

** British Zionist author; formerly Political Secretary of the World Zionist Organization.

† George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859-1925), British statesman, was Lord Privy Seal, 1915-16, Member of Imperial War Cabinet, 1916, Leader of the House of Lords, 1916-24, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-24.

declaration might well serve a useful purpose as a check on 'the sinister political designs of the Germans.' *The Times*¹ insisted that further procrastination would be disastrous, since Germany appreciated the importance of an understanding with the Zionists, 'and she has not been idle in attempting to forestall us.' How far were these anxieties well-founded?

The German Government's intentions seem to have been deduced mainly from articles in German newspapers of almost all political colourings² pointing out the solid advantages to be expected by Germany, and likewise by her Turkish ally,* from an understanding with the Zionists, and urging the Government not to let the enemy monopolise them. The leading exponent of these ideas was Major Franz Karl Endres, a former General Staff Officer, who had served under von der Goltz in Turkey and was now the military correspondent of the *Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten*. Endres—the German Sidebotham**—was the most persistent advocate of a pro-Zionist policy, but similar views were expressed, though usually from a rather different standpoint (for Endres had some appreciation of the idealist element in Zionism), by other writers in the German press—notably the influential Junker publicist, von Döbbeler. All this, it could be argued, could not have happened without the assent, if not the prompting, of the German Government, from which the inference could be drawn that the press campaign might well reflect a policy soon to be translated into action. Had it been a serious embarrassment to the Government, it would, no doubt, have been suppressed, but the deduction that Germany was on the point of aligning herself publicly with the Zionists can now be seen to have been erroneous.³

Something has already been said about the cordial relations, in the earlier part of the War, between the Berlin Zionist Executive and the German Foreign Office, and between the Zionist Agency in Constantinople and the German Embassy. In the middle of 1916, Richard Lichtheim,† writing from Constantinople, still felt able to report to the Zionist Committee in New York that the Zionists had firm assurances, supported by a good deal of practical evidence, of German goodwill.⁴ But these assurances had never been translated into a precise

* For the Turks' attitude toward Jewish colonization of Palestine, see the letter from Theodore Herzl, pp. 91-93.

** See Sidebotham, pp. 125-42.

† Richard Lichtheim, a German Zionist and an important figure in the Zionist Organization, was in Constantinople as a representative of the Berlin Executive, 1914-17.

undertaking—still less into a public commitment. In the days of American neutrality and divided sympathies the Germans had assiduously courted the American Jews but had even then stopped short of an open pro-Zionist declaration. Useful as this might have been to them in their political warfare, it would have cost them in Turkish irritation a higher price than they had been prepared to pay, and the Berlin Zionist Executive had pressed for such a declaration in vain.

By the spring of 1917 the incentive had become weaker and the objections more serious. The Turks were unreliable allies, and it was more important than ever that nothing should be done to antagonise them. On the other hand, once the United States had entered the War, the Zionist leaders in Berlin had lost their trump card in their relations with the German Government, and on the German side there was a perceptible cooling off.⁵

Not that all was lost. In the German-occupied parts of Eastern Europe—notably in Russian Poland—there was a large Jewish population which, both during the War and in the peace settlement, might be useful to the Germans, if it could be educated to regard them as its friends. An effective appeal to the Zionists might strengthen the pro-German elements in Russia. In the United States there were among the unassimilated Jewish masses many who had little interest in the War and might be impressed by German promises of sympathy with Zionist aspirations. Even though German hopes of total victory had not yet been finally extinguished, the War might end with a negotiated peace, and the Germans, with much at stake in the settlement of the Turkish question, had something to lose by standing by in silence while the Zionists moved into the enemy's orbit.

Hence, though its main motive for gratifying the Zionists had evaporated with the American declaration of war, the German Government still maintained friendly relations with the Zionist leaders with whom it had been so long in contact. It was always ready to give them a hearing and seems to have paid some attention to the case they made out for a public assurance of German sympathy with their cause. They had reason to believe that on this subject there was a sharp difference of opinion between the Information and the Political Branches of the German Foreign Office, the Information Branch—it was reported—favouring the proposal but being strongly opposed by the Political Branch on the ground that Germany was in no position to invite a quarrel with the Turks.⁶

The propagandists may well have been attracted by the idea, but it is easy to understand why the Political Branch should

have thought the objections insuperable. In deference to Turkish susceptibilities, the German Government had from the start had to move warily in its dealings with the Zionists. It had good reason to be still more cautious at a time when the Turks could no longer be counted upon as subservient and dependable allies, and when some of their leaders—notably Djemal Pasha*—were in sharp disagreement with the German General Staff about the handling of the combined force assembled under von Falkenhayn for the re-capture of Baghdad.⁷

In their hostility to Zionism and their veto on any encouragement of Zionist aspirations the Turks were as obdurate as ever. They had been incensed by Morgenthau's Cincinnati speech in May 1916, when he had announced that arrangements could be made after the War for the sale of Palestine by Turkey to the Jews. They had been still further antagonised by press reports that this had been agreed to by Turkey under German pressure.⁸ Lichtheim had done his best to appease the Turks and his explanations seem to have had some effect,⁹ but Turkish suspicions of the Zionists had not been allayed. When, at the suggestion of the German Foreign Office, Hantke and Lichtheim saw Djemal Pasha during his visit to Berlin in the summer of 1917, they came away empty-handed.¹⁰ They were told that the existing Jewish population of Palestine would be fairly treated but that no further Jewish immigrants would be allowed. The Jews could settle anywhere else in Turkey they liked, but not in Palestine. The Turkish Government, Djemal declared, wanted no new nationality questions, nor was it prepared to get into trouble with the Palestine Arabs, who formed the majority of the population and were to a man opposed to Zionism. The one grain of comfort that Hantke and Lichtheim carried away was Djemal's rather curious remark that it was conceivable that some future Turkish Government might take a different view or even that he himself might one day change his mind. The point of these cryptic observations was not very clear. For the present, at all events, it was evident that the Turks were not prepared to make any concessions to the Zionists—much less to be parties to a public pronouncement in their favour.

This discouraging interview took place at the end of August 1917. A few weeks later the Berlin Zionists found themselves in a still worse position when the Turks stumbled upon the Jewish spy-ring working in Palestine for the British under the direction

* Djemal Pasha (1872-1922), member of the Young Turk Triumvirate, was Military Governor of the Syrian provinces throughout the First World War.

of the Aaronsohns.* At a time when the Turks were in no mood to show indulgence to the Zionists, and when Turco-German relations were by no means cordial, it is no wonder that the Germans, tempted as they may have been by its advantages, shrank from committing themselves to a pro-Zionist declaration.

If the Berlin Zionist Executive failed to pin them down, it was not because it was backward in pressing its case. A memorandum handed to the German Foreign Office towards the end of June 1917 was followed a month later by a more elaborate document setting out at length the reasons why it was submitted that both Germany and Turkey would be well advised to give the Zionists some encouragement.¹¹ It was pointed out that Great Britain was showing a marked interest in the Movement in the hope of using it to her own advantage. The French, competing with the British for the mastery of Palestine, had lately begun to make friendly gestures to the Zionists. The Morgenthau mission, whose purpose, it was said, was to sound the European Powers on the Palestine question, was evidence of the extraordinarily favourable attitude of the American Government. The memorandum continued: 'We think it desirable to draw the special attention of the Foreign Office to the fact that the Entente Governments are exerting themselves in this manner to gain, for their own purposes, the sympathies and material resources of Jewry. In our capacity as the supreme governing body of the Zionist Movement we can give a most positive assurance that our adherents throughout the world never were, and are not now, willing to put the Zionist Movement at the service of any one Power or group of Powers. . . . The efforts of all Zionists in all countries are directed to one end only—that, with the aid of the European Powers, a sure foundation may be laid for the realisation of Zionism.'

The Berlin Executive went on to explain that, in approaching their respective Governments, 'the Jews of the Entente countries. . . are guided exclusively by Jewish interests. . . . Indeed, Zionist circles in England, America and Russia attach the greatest importance to its being shown by the Central Powers that they, too, view the Jewish effort with favour.' The Foreign Office was reminded that the Berlin Executive 'has throughout

* The Aaronsohns, a wealthy land-owning Jewish family in Northern Palestine, were supposedly allied with the Turkish ruling elite. During the war, however, Aaron and his sister Sarah developed a small espionage network with the code name "Nili," by which they aided the British until the Turks uncovered the ring in 1917.

the war done its best to calm Jewish public opinion when Turkey has taken action against the Jews, and so to guide the Zionist Movement as to prevent it from following in the wake of the Entente and keep it true to its original character.' It would surely be appreciated that in this the Executive could only hope to succeed if it could show that its decision to remain in Berlin was being justified by visible results.

All this led up to an appeal to the German Government to recognise that the time had come for Germany, in her own interests, to define her position on the Zionist question and to advise Turkey to do the same. 'We are well aware,' the Foreign Office was assured, 'of the difficulties standing in the way, but we believe that, in view of the public discussion of the question, this is the moment to work for the solution desired by us, by which Germany will gain an important measure of goodwill and Turkey economic advantages of the greatest value.'

This was the burden of the memorandum submitted to the German Foreign Office on 22 July 1917. A few days later came the curious incident of Boris Goldberg's visit to Copenhagen, where, together with Tschlenow, he discussed the situation with the three members of the Berlin Zionist Executive—Warburg, Hantke, and Jacobson. What was understood in London to be the purpose of Goldberg's mission was, as we have seen, to explain to Tschlenow the case for the London programme—a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine under British protection—and to bring him and his Russian colleagues into line. What actually happened was that, after Goldberg had explained in some detail what had been going on in London, Paris and Washington, and Tschlenow had reported on the situation in Russia, it was agreed that, side by side with what was being done in the Entente countries, a parallel effort must be made to enlist the support of the Central Powers both by direct approaches to their Governments and also by propaganda modelled on that of the British Palestine Committee.

Whatever reports may have been reaching Downing Street, it is clear that at this stage it was, in fact, the British and not the Germans who were making the pace in overtures to the Zionists, and that, as between the German Government and the Berlin Zionist Executive, the courtship was on the Zionist side. The Germans were keeping clear of any positive commitments and were not responding to the representations of the Berlin Executive, which, out of concern for the international character of the Zionist Organisation, for the security of the Yishuv,* and

* The *Yishuv* refers to the Jewish population of Palestine.

for its own status and prestige, and also, perhaps, for patriotic reasons, was desperately anxious that Germany should not stand aside while the Movement was being captured by the Entente.

The Berlin Executive was persistent. Soon after the Copenhagen meeting at the end of July, Lichtheim saw Dr. Goepfert, who was handling these matters at the German Foreign Office, and re-stated the case for a German move.¹² By demonstrating its goodwill, the German Government, Goepfert was assured, could strengthen the influence of the German-Jewish element in the Zionist Organisation and so do something to ensure the protection of German interests when the time came for the resumption of Zionist activities in Palestine. At the end of August, Hantke and Lichtheim had an interview in Berlin with Count Bernstorff,¹³ who, after leaving Washington on the American declaration of war, had been appointed German Ambassador in Constantinople. The Zionist spokesmen impressed on him how strongly the tide was flowing in favour of Zionism in the Allied countries and how anxious they were for some counter-demonstration on the German side, and, in particular, for a more helpful attitude on the part of the German Embassy in Constantinople. In Washington Bernstorff had, as in duty bound, interested himself in the Zionist question, but he was in no position to give any assurances about the present policy of the German Government, and his attitude, though friendly, was non-committal.

It was now becoming evident that no active German encouragement was to be expected. Major Endres had been induced to take an interest in the idea of a German-Palestine Committee and the starting of a German publication on the lines of *Palestine*. At an interview with Dr. Goepfert towards the end of September Lichtheim was told that the Foreign Office did not favour this scheme because the Turks would suspect that the German Government was behind it.¹⁴ A few days later, the Foreign Office, while making it clear that no official support would be forthcoming, relented to the extent of agreeing not to veto the project on the clear understanding that it would be carried out on the sole responsibility of the promoters.¹⁵ The embargo had been lifted, but, killed by so much discouragement, the whole plan was dropped, not to be heard of again until, in the spring of 1918, it was revived as part of Germany's rather feeble riposte to the Balfour Declaration.

At the time of the Declaration the German Government was still holding back from any commitment to the Zionists. On 23rd October 1917, a week before the Declaration was approved by the British War Cabinet, the German Minister to Denmark,

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, received a representative of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau, which had for some time been on friendly terms with the Legation. The Minister had just returned from Berlin, where the Foreign Office had discussed with him a memorandum in which Victor Jacobson, on behalf of the Berlin Zionist Executive, had once more pressed for a pro-Zionist pronouncement by the German Government. Brockdorff-Rantzau informed the Zionist spokesman, Martin Rosenblüth, that he had been told in Berlin that such a move would not at present be in German interests.¹⁶

It was not that the Germans no longer attached any importance to Jewish goodwill. On taking charge of the Constantinople Embassy in the summer of 1917 Bernstorff did his best to protect the Jews in Palestine from further maltreatment by the Turks. In reply to an invitation from Von Papen, then a General Staff Officer on the Turkish Front, to visit him in Jerusalem, Bernstorff wrote (21 October):¹⁷ 'I should much like to view the situation there at close quarters, and more especially to study the Jewish question, which so often gives us trouble.' He assured Georg Bernhard,¹⁸ who had written to him about the perilous position of the Jews in Palestine, that 'these questions are part of our daily bread here.'¹⁹ Bernstorff records in his memoirs²⁰ a discussion with Talaat Pasha²¹—apparently just before the Balfour Declaration—about 'the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine.' 'Talaat,' he writes, 'was ready to promise all I wanted, provided Palestine remained Turkish after the War, but he took every opportunity of saying: "I will gladly establish a national home for the Jews to please you, but, mark my words, the Arabs will destroy the Jews."' That Bernstorff should have tried to interest Talaat in the Zionist question is not surprising, but, if Talaat did give the impression that he would be prepared to gratify the Germans on this point, either he was not serious or he soon changed his mind. There was no sign of any weakening on the Zionist issue in the unhelpful statement which was the best that could be extracted from him when, disturbed by the British Declaration, the Germans were casting about at the end of 1917 for some means of neutralising its effect. In January 1918 a spokesman of the German Foreign Office made a statement about Palestine to a representative German Jewish deputation. He went as far as he could, but his guarded and inhibited language showed that this was a matter on which the Germans still felt obliged to take their cue from the Turks.

From what Brockdorff-Rantzau was told in Berlin on the eve of the Balfour Declaration it is evident that, whatever Talaat may have said half-seriously in conversation with Bernstorff,

the German Foreign Office knew well enough what was the real attitude of the Turks and was satisfied that any open pro-Zionist announcement would be damaging to German interests. Left to themselves, the German might well have been responsive to the arguments so persistently pressed upon them by the Berlin Zionist Executive. With the Turks in the mood in which they were in the autumn of 1917, such a move would have cost Germany more than it was considered to be worth.²²

NOTES

- 1 26 October 1917.
- 2 A notable exception was *Germania*, the organ of the Roman Catholic Centre Party.
- 3 What follows is based mainly on the Berlin and Copenhagen material in the (Zionist Archives, Jerusalem) *Z.A.* and on information for which the author is indebted to Mr. Richard Lichtheim.
- 4 10 July 1916: *Z.A.*
- 5 Mr. Lichtheim to the author, 16 April 1952.
- 6 Memorandum by Lichtheim, 10 August 1917, reporting confidential information which had reached him (apparently from inside the Foreign Office) concerning divisions of opinion as to the action to be taken in the light of a dispatch from the German Minister in Berne drawing attention to the growing importance of the Zionist Movement and its success in engaging the interest of the Entente Governments: *Z.A.*
- 7 Wavell: *The Palestine Campaign*, pp. 108-109; Djemal Pasha, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman* (London, Hutchinson, n.d.), pp. 189-190.
- 8 These reports are referred to in a letter of 26 July 1916 from the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau to the Zionist Committee in New York: *Z.A.*
- 9 This appears from a report to Berlin, dated 10 September 1916, from the German Ambassador in Constantinople: *D.G.F.O.*, K692/177837. (The reference used by the author here is to the files of the German Foreign Office and the numbers are those identifying the relative microfilm at the Record Office, London).
- 10 Note of the interview, stated to have been arranged by the Foreign Office, in memorandum dated 28 August 1917: *Z.A.*
- 11 Copy of the memorandum, dated 22 July 1917, in *Z.A.* There is a reference to an earlier memorandum, dated 24 June 1917.
- 12 Note of the interview, 5 August 1917, in *Z.A.*
- 13 Note of the interview, 28 August 1917, in *Z.A.*
- 14 Note of the interview, 20 September 1917, in *Z.A.* On September 16th Endres wrote to the Zionist Central Office in Berlin that he understood that, having regard to its relations with the Turks, the German Government was not in a position to associate itself with pro-Zionist propaganda: *Z.A.*
- 15 Lichtheim to Endres, 28 September 1917: *Z.A.*
- 16 Note by Rosenblüth of interview with Brockdorff-Rantzau, 23 October 1917: *Z.A.* Brockdorff-Rantzau said that, against the advice of certain Jewish friends of his, including, in particular, Max Warburg, he had done his best for the Zionists but had been plainly told at the Foreign Office that this was not the time for a pro-Zionist move. No record of Brockdorff-Rantzau's discussion with the Foreign Office has, up to the present (June 1959), come to light in *D.G.F.O.*

- 17 *The Memoirs of Count Bernstorff* (London, Heinemann, 1936), p. 171.
- 18 Editor of the *Vossische Zeitung*.
- 19 3 November 1917: *Memoirs*, p. 172.
- 20 p. 171.
- 21 The Turkish Grand Vizier.
- 22 On 12 November 1917 the Berlin Zionist Executive wrote to the Foreign Office drawing attention to the Balfour Declaration and asking for an interview with the Foreign Minister. The reply was that Kuhlmann was too busy to grant such an interview: *D.G.F.O.*, K/692/K179794-95 and 179796. In reply to a telegram, dated 30 December 1917, in which the German Minister at Berne asked for instructions in the light of a Havas Agency report that Germany would not oppose the creation of an independent Jewish State, the Minister was informed that the report was a complete fabrication; Germany was not in a position to agree to plans which would rob Turkey of a province: *D.G.F.O.* K692/180051 and 180052.

Judge Brandeis and the Framing
of the Balfour Declaration*

FRANK E. MANUEL**

During the war American Zionist leaders grouped around Brandeis were kept informed of the progress of the London talks between Zionists and the British War Cabinet. They accepted Weizmann's† *de facto* leadership in the negotiations, even though he had no official status on the Executive of the World Zionist Organization. Prior to April 1917 this American support bestowed upon Weizmann great worth in the eyes of the British hoping for participation of the United States in the war; even after American entry the development of enthusiasm in the United States for the European war was still a major concern of British leaders. The British valued and perhaps exaggerated the influence of American Jews in the formation of American public opinion. Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time, testified before the Royal Commission in 1937, that stimulating the war effort of American Jews was one of the major

* From Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949), pp. 164-70. Copyright, 1949, by Public Affairs Press. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Louis Dembitz Brandeis (1856-1941) was Chairman of Provisional Commission for General Zionist Affairs, U.S., 1914-16, and Associate Justice, Supreme Court of U.S., 1916-39. Arthur James Balfour (1848-1930) was Prime Minister of Britain, 1902-5, and Foreign Secretary, 1916-19; became Lord Balfour in 1922. The Declaration of the British Government with a view to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine was made by him on November 2, 1917.

** Professor of History at Brandeis University, Mass., U.S.A.

† Chaim Weizmann (1824-1952), a British chemist and Zionist leader, was a Russian born Jew who acted on behalf of Zionist interests in England to secure the Balfour Declaration. Later he became President of the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, and first President of Israel, 1948-52.

motives which, during a harrowing period in the European war, actuated members of the cabinet in finally casting their votes for the Declaration. The British were of course even more attracted by the notion that the grant of a Jewish homeland in Palestine would be effective in quieting defeatist propaganda against the war which was sweeping through Russia. The overthrow of the Czar had diluted the bitterness of the Jews against Russia; there were simplists in the British Foreign Office who believed that the issuance of the Balfour Declaration would swerve the Russian Jews from the path of the more extreme revolutionary elements who were plotting to seize power and would keep the Jews in the ranks of the Kerensky* war party. A cognate conception was held by Colonel House** who wrote Wilson of his plans for organizing the American Jews in an attempt to stem the defeatist tide among the Jews in Russia. T.E. Lawrence, when later ridiculing the Balfour Declaration in a conversation with William Yale, the American special agent in Egypt, referred to it as payment for the support of American Jews and Russian Jewish revolutionaries. Foreign Secretary Balfour himself may not have envisaged the role of Zionism in the Empire in such crass and limited terms but many of the other members of the British government interpreted his policy in that restrictive sense.

In the United States Brandeis had enlisted State Department officials in the complex diplomatic negotiations with all the belligerent powers which war relief in Palestine entailed. He had occasion to mention the London meetings of the Zionists and the British to American officials and to the President. But the extent to which he received from them verbal approval for the Zionist *political* aims as distinct from humanitarian relief for starving and persecuted Jews in Palestine remains highly conjectural. The full political import of the Balfour Declaration was not weighed in the Department prior to its issuance on November 2nd, whatever Wilson may have said in his private talks with Brandeis and Stephen S. Wise. Rabbi Wise reports a June 1917 conversation in which Wilson assured him that the Jews and the Armenians were two nations certain to be reborn after the war—facile promises. Wilson was born in the manse,

* Alexander Kerensky, a Russian socialist leader, became Prime Minister of the Provisional Government in July 1917, and was overthrown by the October Revolution.

** Col. Edward House (1858-1938) was a confidant of President Wilson and his Personal Representative to the European Governments, 1914-16.

the son of a Presbyterian clergyman, and on more than one occasion he described his feeling for the Bible as fundamental to his attraction to Zionism. Yet these sympathies alone do not constitute a policy. The record of Wilson's adherence to political Zionism is far more complicated.

While there are no written reports in the State Department files for this period on the meetings between the Zionists and the British government, there is one document describing high Zionist policy in London which was transmitted to the Department by Brandeis with a brief note in May 1917. "I think you will be interested in enclosed formulation of the Zionist program by Weizmann and his associates and which we approve." The document itself, written on stationery of the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, contains in embryo many of the formulae which later reappeared in various drafts of the British mandate.

"It is proposed that the following be adopted as the heads of a scheme for a Jewish re-settlement of Palestine in accordance with Jewish national aspirations:

"1. *Basis of Settlement.*

Recognition of Palestine as the Jewish National Home.

"2. *Status of Jewish Population in Palestine Generally.*

The Jewish population present and future throughout Palestine is to possess and enjoy full national, political and civic rights.

"3. *Immigration into Palestine.*

The Suzerain Government shall grant full and free rights of immigration into Palestine to Jews of all countries.

"4. *The Establishment of a Chartered Company.*

The Suzerain Government shall grant a Charter to a Jewish Company for the colonisation and development of Palestine, the Company to have power to acquire and take over any concessions for works of a public character, which may have been or may hereafter be granted by the Suzerain Government and the rights of pre-emption of Crown Lands or other lands not held in private or religious ownership and such other powers and privileges as are usual in Charters of Statutes of similar colonising bodies.

"5. *Communal Autonomy.*

Full autonomy is to be enjoyed by Jewish communities

throughout Palestine in all matters bearing upon their educational, religious or communal welfare.

“Summary.

“Palestine is to be recognized as the Jewish National Home. Jews of all countries to be accorded full liberty of immigration.

“Jews to enjoy full national, political and civic rights according to their place of residence in Palestine.

“A Charter to be granted to a Jewish Company for the development of Palestine.

“The Hebrew language to be recognized as the official language of the Jewish Province.”

As far as the State Department is concerned there is no evidence that this “scheme for a Jewish re-settlement of Palestine in accordance with Jewish national aspirations” was ever studied by officials. In the early summer of 1917 the policy of the United States was oriented far more in the direction of arranging a separate peace with Turkey than in espousing the causes of the various subject minorities of the Ottoman Empire.

During his trip to the United States in May 1917 Balfour had discussed Zionism and his proposed declaration with Brandeis. Both men were impressed with each other and Balfour pledged his personal support of Zionism. Palestine was not a part of the Balfour-Wilson negotiations on the conduct of the war except indirectly: in one of his private talks with Wilson, Balfour informed the President in a “personal,” not an official capacity, of the existence of secret treaties among the Allies. During the same period Brandeis again raised the subject of Palestine in conversation with Wilson. On May 15 he cabled Louis de Rothschild in London that he had had “satisfactory” talks with Balfour and with the President, but that this news was “not for publication.” Contrary to accepted legend, there is no evidence for a belief that Zionist aspirations had been discussed in detail by Balfour and Wilson, or that Wilson during their meetings on the conduct of the war, had committed the United States to acceptance of British policy with respect to Palestine.

Whatever discussions about a Jewish Palestine went on were arranged either directly between members of the Brandeis group and the President or through the intermediary of Colonel House, without the knowledge of Secretary of State Lansing. It was not unusual for Wilson to formulate international policy

without consulting his Secretary of State; nevertheless, this freezing out of Lansing had unfortunate consequences for the Zionists. The by-passing of Lansing was by no means the sole cause for his covert hostility towards Zionism, but it was a factor of no mean significance in his alienation.

In the months of September and October 1917, when the critical details of the final text of the Balfour Declaration were being debated in London, and the British were making attempts to draw Wilson in as an active partner in the venture Colonel House, not Lansing, carried on the consultations. It is difficult to know whether the British realized the extent to which this device kept the United States technically clear of any pledges on the settlement even in this tiny area of the globe. Lansing could later maintain with complete accuracy that the United States Government had never approved of the Declaration prior to its issuance; he for one had never signed any communications on the subject; and the off the record conversations of a Justice of the Supreme Court with Colonel House about a statement the British Government chose to publish were not in his province. A divided executive policy on Palestine, with the Presidency and the State Department often pulling in different directions, remained a characteristic of American foreign relations for three decades.

On September 4, Colonel House wrote Wilson that he had received the following cable from Lord Robert Cecil:* "We are being pressed here for a declaration of sympathy with the Zionist movement, and I should be very grateful if you felt able to ascertain unofficially if the President favors such a declaration." The casualness of this inquiry is hardly congruent with the protracted negotiations which the British had devoted to that one long sentence of the Declaration and the scores of drafts which by that time had been composed by Zionists and British officials.

President Wilson, organizing the nation for its first great foreign war, was not particularly preoccupied with what was, from the viewpoint of American overall interests, a mere detail. Three days after his query Colonel House came back again to prod, reminding Wilson of the Cecil message. This time House took occasion to express his personal misgivings about the whole idea. "Have you made up your mind regarding what answer you will make to Cecil concerning Zionist Movement? It seems to me that there are many dangers lurking in it, and if I were the British I would be chary about going too definitely into that question." Earlier in the year House had written ecstatically

* For Lord Robert Cecil, see above, p. 148, note.

to Rabbi Stephen Wise, "I hope the dream which we have may soon become a reality." For the President's Zionist friends Colonel House always had a pleasant mien.

British Jews were sharply divided over the issuance of the Declaration; there was one party represented in the War Cabinet by Edmund Montagu* who believed that, whatever the wording, "a Jewish national home" would pose for them the problem of dual allegiance. For many months the issue had hung in the balance and Wilson's final approval was considered crucial by the Zionists in London to outweigh the hostility of the assimilationist British Jews to the Declaration. British policy, they knew, was bending every effort to draw the United States into active participation in a world settlement and was seeking definite American pledges. Sanction for this one post-war plan in the Near East would be a reasonable commencement.

On September 19th Dr. Chaim Weizmann cabled Justice Brandeis a version of the Declaration tentatively agreed upon by the British along with the suggestion that it would be very helpful if both he and President Wilson supported the text. There was a real danger at this time that owing to the hostility of the assimilationist British Jews the solution of the knotty problem of the Declaration would be indefinitely postponed. Weizmann simultaneously wired the American Zionists de Haas and Levi-Epstein urging them to galvanize Brandeis and Frankfurter** into action. No specific written approval from Wilson was forthcoming. Instead, Brandeis cabled Weizmann on September 24th, apparently at Colonel House's suggestion, advising him to get the French and the Italians to make inquiry about the President's attitude. On the same day another more affirmative cable from Brandeis stated that on the basis of previous talks with the President and from opinion voiced by his close advisers he could say that "the President was in entire sympathy." This again was only a description, not specifically authorized, of what Wilson thought. The French and the Italians never did ask for Wilson's opinion.

On October 9th Weizmann described to Brandeis the formidable offensive which had been launched by those British Jews who were opposed to the Declaration and this time he called for more than Wilson's general assent; he needed the President's insistence on the specific text, buttressed by telegrams from important Zionists and other American leaders. None

* See Montagu's memorandum and letter, pp. 143-51.

** Felix Frankfurter, an Austrian-born American Jewish judge, was the Assistant to the Secretary of War in 1917. See also, p. 195, note.

arrived. By October 14th Weizmann had to send Brandeis a new formula of the Declaration, this one significantly watered down at the behest of the assimilationist, anti-Zionist English Jews. While the September version had laid down the principle that "Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home for the Jewish people," by October the Declaration referred only to the "establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people" (an emendation which formed the basis for Churchill's famous quibble in the White Paper of 1922). In September the British promised to "secure the achievement" of the homeland; by October they would only "facilitate the achievement."

More than a month after Colonel House's original note to Wilson, on October 13th, he received the following breezy reply from the President: "I find in my pocket the memorandum you gave me about the Zionist Movement. I am afraid I did not say to you that I concurred in the formula suggested from the other side. I do, and would be obliged if you would let them know it." On October 16th House dutifully wrote Wilson: "I will let the British Government know that the formula they suggest as to the Zionist Movement meets with your approval." In the meantime, of course, the "formula" had been basically altered, but it is highly dubious from the record whether Wilson was aware of what version he was approving. During this period he was troubled by the Pope's peace offensive and the course of the Russian Revolution; the Declaration was a minor incident. Under the circumstances it is rather far-fetched to consider Wilson one of the progenitors of the Balfour Declaration. The most that can be said is that he allowed it to happen. The British and many Zionists, in the nature of things, interpreted Wilson's agreement as an act of considered diplomacy, not being aware of the manner in which it was bestowed. Weizmann, in any case, considers the House note crucial in the final overriding of the powerful opposition of the Montagu group by the War Cabinet.

According to de Haas, American Zionists were responsible for a final revision in the text of the Declaration. British Jews, troubled about the problem of dual allegiance, had secured an alteration in the October version to the effect that nothing in the Declaration would prejudice "the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship." When the American Zionists received a copy of this text they objected to the last clause because it made of Zionism a mere product of discontent. On October 15th they proposed to Colonel House an excision to make it read simply, "the rights and political

status enjoyed by Jews in any other country,"—a change which was duly accepted by the British. At the insistence of Justice Brandeis there was another change—the award was made to the Jewish "people," instead of the Jewish "race" of an earlier draft.

Apparently Weizmann had envisaged the publication of a statement of formal approval in the United States almost simultaneously with the issuance of the Declaration. Brandeis disabused him of the prospect; Wilson was not disposed to make a public declaration in connection with the Balfour pronouncement because the United States was not at war with Turkey.

Analysis of the Balfour Declaration*

J.M.N. JEFFRIES**

There is a great deal which has to be said now concerning the Declaration which, like water seeking its source, came to the Zionist leaders on that 2nd of November in 1917. But the first thing of all to be said of the Balfour Declaration is that it was a pronouncement which was weighed to the last penny-weight before it was issued. There are but sixty-seven words in it, and each of these, save perhaps the Government's title and a few innocent conjunctions, was considered at length before it was passed into the text.

This too memorable document is not so much a sentence of English as a verbal mosaic. Drafts for it travelled back and forth, within England or over the Ocean, to be scrutinized by some two score draftsmen half co-operating, half competing with one another, who erased phrase or adopted that after much thought. At long last, out of the store of their rejections and of their acceptances the final miscellany was chosen, ratified and fixed. There never has been a proclamation longer prepared, more carefully produced, more consciously worded.

Commentators of all views agree upon this. In his *Zionism* Mr. Leonard Stein says, "The Balfour Declaration was by no means a casual gesture. It was issued after prolonged deliberations as a considered statement of policy." In Temperley's *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, it is stated that "before the British Government gave the Declaration to the world, it had been closely examined in all its bearings and implications,

* From J[oseph] M[ary] N[agel] Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1939), chap. xi. Reprinted by permission of Longmans, Green & Co. Limited.

** British author and journalist (1880-1960); his works include *Front Everywhere* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1935) and *London and Better* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1936).

and subjected to repeated change and amendment." M. Nahum Sokolov,* in his *History of Zionism*, another fundamental work, writes that "every idea born in London was tested by the Zionist Organization in America, and every suggestion in America received the most careful attention in London." "The Balfour Declaration was in process of making for nearly two years," writes Mr. Wise, who indeed was in a position to know. "Its authorship was not solitary but collective." Mr. Lloyd George himself, speaking in Wales in 1930, assured his hearers, in curious terms, that the Declaration "was prepared after much consideration, not merely of its policy but of its actual wording."

So there is one point upon which there is no doubt. Whatever is to be found in the Balfour Declaration was put into it deliberately. There are no accidents in that text. If there is any vagueness in it this is an intentional vagueness. If it is vague, the admiral is vague who orders his destroyers to emit a smoke-screen.

It is most important to have this established before more is said, for the reason that for some time past the controversy concerning Palestine, in so far as the Declaration is concerned, has been given a false turn. A secondary apologia has been evolved, which by-passes the *bona fides* of Lord Balfour's pronouncement to concentrate upon its terminology. It is described as "uncertainly phrased," or as "containing implications not foreseen when it was written," or as "not so definite as was thought;" or contrariwise it is said that "too much has been read into it."

Behind this apologia often enough there may have lain a good intention. The Balfour Declaration, alas! has been made by a series of our Governments the pedestal of British policy in Palestine. Because of this a number of persons have reasoned that the Declaration must be accepted as it stands, "with all its imperfections." Scrutiny of it might reveal that it was written in bad faith. But to expose bad faith in the Declaration would be the same as exposing it in the conduct of the country itself, since one Government of Great Britain published it and subsequent Governments have confirmed it. The people who have shrunk from scrutinizing it may not have put their thoughts to themselves as starkly as that, but it was thus they did think in their heart's recesses. Therefore, as they conceived, the only course which lay open to them, if the country's honour was to be saved, was to assume that the Declaration had been loosely

* Nahum Sokolov (1861-1936), a Polish-born Jewish writer and Zionist leader.

composed and to lead the controversy on to that ground. They made great show of riddling out what it meant, with a little deprecatory criticism thrown in.

In this way they could escape perhaps having to acknowledge that this nationally issued and nationally endorsed document was nothing but a calmly planned piece of deception. That is why for years past we have heard statesmen, publicists and politicians, and members of the public too, assert that the authors of the Declaration either did not mean what they appear to say in it, or did not succeed in saying in it what they meant. Other apologists have given their own interested versions of its meaning. In this order were the explanations of Mr. Winston Churchill, as intricate and as lasting as worm-casts in the sand.

Behind excuses and shifts of the kind there may lie, in this way, something of good intention. But it is an intention deplorably translated into practice, and I am not going to follow the example thus set. Since the Balfour Declaration was without excuse, I see no reason to excuse it. There is no pleasure in taking such a course (as I have said before now): there is no relish in exposing one's country or in exposing at least the men who spoke in her name. But the world of 1939 has no room for displays of patriotic cowardice. Nor is there any sort of advantage in them. We want an England which can confess her sins, and thereafter take her place at the head of the nations in the strength of her cleared conscience.

With this borne in mind, let us return to the Declaration. It reached the general public on the 9th of November, when Lord Balfour's letter was reproduced in the newspapers. It was given forth, of course, under the guise of an entirely British communication embodying an entirely British conception. Everyone concerned was made the victim of this false pretence. The British people were given to believe that it was an unadulterated product of their own Government. To the mass of Jews it was presented as a guarantee sprung of nothing but the conscience of the Cabinet—and thereby it served to allure them towards political Zionism. As for the Arabs, when it was proclaimed eventually upon their soil (which was not till much later), to them too a text in which Zionists of all nationalities had collaborated was announced as the voice of Britain. They were told that it was a pledge made to the Zionists: they were not told that the Zionists had written most of it. They were asked to respect it on the ground that it was given to the world by the British Government out of its native magnanimity, after the said Government had extended its profound, solitary and single-minded consideration to the "problem of Palestine."

Let me be quite clear about this. The onus of deception does not lie upon the Government of 1917 because before issuing its Declaration *it consulted* the Zionists. As far as the mere form of the proposed pronouncement went (leaving aside other considerations), the Zionists could have been asked quite reasonably to submit their ideas upon the species of "support and encouragement" for which they hoped. The Government could have examined whatever the Zionists submitted, and have consulted further with them, till both had agreed upon a final text. Had this text been published for what it was, an agreement between the two parties which the British Government was willing to sponsor, then the form of the Declaration would have been blameless. The form would have been honest, even if the policy was indefensible.

When however the bipartite Declaration—and to call it bipartite even is to swell the Governmental share in its drafting—was given out as the composition of His Majesty's Government alone, a plain deception was committed. In subsequent years too these synthetic *ipsisima verba* have been paraded with unyielding obstinacy to the Arabs as a sacred obligation of Great Britain to the Jews, even after it had been disclosed that all the time various Zionists had themselves framed the obligation to themselves. This makes later Governments partakers in the deception of the 1917 Cabinet, a deception only mitigated by culpable ignorance in the case of certain members of these Governments.

The Zionists themselves are in a better position in the matter than their British collaborators are. To do them justice, it was they who made known the real conditions under which the Declaration was composed. They did so after an interval which I cannot give exactly, since I have not read all Zionist publications and writings that ever were. But the Zionist Organization certainly had divulged its share in the Declaration within four years of its publication, and for all I know this may have been divulged earlier. I shall not say that the motives of the Zionist Organization were of the first rank. Everything seemed to be going swimmingly for their cause then and some members or other of the Organization staff could not resist gathering kudos in the eyes of the mass of Zionist supporters by disclosing the important part which their body behind the scenes had taken in the Declaration. Still, their statement was a frank one.

And now to analyse the text of the Declaration. "*His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people...*" This first clause is often printed with the words "national home" with capital

initials. But in the original copy, as reproduced in *The Times*, Lord Balfour used the discreeter apparel of what printers call "lower-case" letters for his protégé. Neither he nor his colleagues can claim the invention of this title, which has been imagined by Leon Pinsker* in Odessa thirty-five years before. Pinsker himself did not intend it to apply to Palestine. He said, "We must not attach ourselves to the place where our political life was once violently interrupted" (stein), though he did his best to establish colonies there as elsewhere. But Balfour and his colleagues adopted the title from the Zionist programmes and drafts, and made use of its ambiguity. For most people in 1917 "National Home," with or without capitals, was a new phrase. Naturally no one could give it a meaning, for it had no established meaning, and was put into practice in Palestine without one.

But in a formal document announcing the support of the British Government for this institution, it was indicated by all rules of statesmanship that ere committing itself to such support, the Government should define for the nation what exactly it was supporting. Not to do so was to pledge (without touching on the right to give a pledge) the aid of Great Britain for no one could say what. The same culpable lack of definition was to be found in the preamble, wherein the Declaration was described as "a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations," but no clue was supplied of these desires. What were Jewish Zionist aspirations? They were not identified. How could a British Government guarantee its sympathy to an enigma?

The truth of course is that these unfathomable phrases were employed just because they were unfathomable and could be interpreted to pleasure. They had the air of promising Government support of what the Zionists wanted in Palestine, a Jewish State, to be reached through a fictitious condominium of Jew and Arab. This was the meaning which the Zionists who helped to draw up the Declaration accepted in the end, and this was the meaning Zionists and Jews in general were given to understand the Declaration would hold. They were disappointed no doubt that they did not receive full ruling rights immediately. But they were confident that they could engender conditions in Palestine involving a more rapid finish for the transition period than might be expected. The Government on its part did mean to give as much of the Zionists' sense to the Declaration as was safe, from the very start. As the margin of

* For Pinsker, see above, p. 83, note.

safety grew, as its own hold on the land became stronger, as a menial prosperity enticed the mass of Arabs, and the opposition of the remainder had been measured and met, then the Government would increase its support of the Zionist establishment in widening degrees, till the Jewish State at last arose.

On the other hand, the Government kept a way of retreat open in case some formidable opposition, in Britain or outside, might make headway against official alliance with political Zionism. In that event, the Declaration was phrased so that it could be explained away as nothing but an expression of unengaged, friendly interest in the Zionist movement. If it came to that, what *did* "view with favour" amount to as a gage of support? Pretty little. It could be taken to signify no more than that the Government would cast a benign eye upon the "national home," pleased if the Zionist plans worked out, regretful but quite unimplicated if they failed.

To sum up: the paths of the Government and of Zionism had crossed: the Government had liked the wanderer's look: the pair had dallied, and then they had agreed to walk on together. So far so good. But if trouble arose on the way before home was reached, well, the path which the Government had crossed the Government, in a manner of speaking, could cross again. The final drafting of the Declaration was a great play of wits, in fact. The opposition to the previous drafts had brought it home to the Government that it must be more careful. So in the final draft, while still conceding everything to the Zionists in its own intent, the Government achieved a wording which would allow it an exit, if needs were, from any definite obligation of any kind. In this the Governmental drafters outwitted the Zionist drafters, who thought that they had the Government securely tied up. The Government was anxious for these ties, which it had invited, but it preferred now to draft so that even they could be slipped in the last resort. All first-class chicanery, but how far fitting in a Declaration by Great Britain is another matter.

In the succeeding clause the same dubious skilfulness prevails as in the first. The Government "*will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object.*" What is to be understood of this facilitation? To "facilitate" may signify to lend a hand, actively, but also it may just as well signify to put no hand in the way, passively. The sentence in fact is composed upon the same lines as its predecessor, that is, it covers the private intention of giving active help, provides a public screen of passive interest, and in the last resort contains a way out. As in the preceding sentence the situation of the Zionist drafters was that they

considered that the nucleus of their special intentions was contained in the words used.

However, it is not till we reach the third and final clause of the Balfour Declaration that its character is quite revealed, "... it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The first part of this clause is the supposed "safeguard" of the Arabs of Palestine which protects them from Zionist encroachment. As far as protection goes, I am reminded of the experience of a relative. When about to land from a ship in a lonely corner of some docks in a distant country, he was warned to take very little money with him and, above all, "to beware of the police." A similar warning applies to this "protective" clause.

At first sight it does not seem so craftily phrased as the earlier clauses. The will-to-deceive in it is so patent; the description of the Arabs as the "non-Jewish communities in Palestine" is so obviously slippery. At the time the Declaration was issued the population of Palestine was in the neighbourhood of 670,000. Of these the Jews numbered some 60,000. These are broad figures, but reasonable: there is no accurate census to quote: in an interim report to the League of Nations drawn up by the military administration the Jewish total was put at 55,000; in a note of the 1920 Government it was put at 65,000.

Deductions can be made from the pre-War Jewish population. Estimates of this vary from the caution of the official *Shaw Report*,* which says it must have been at least 60,000, to the futuristic 100,000 of Mr. Bentwich.** Mr. Stein says well over 80,000, and quotes Ruppin's† 1916 estimate of nearly 85,000. Accepting this last estimate, and allowing for a fall of 25,000 during the War, which tallies with the figures of those lost by death or exile (Arab wartime losses being infinitely greater actually and proportionately), a 60,000 total for 1918-19 is a fair assumption.

* A Commission of Inquiry under Sir Walter Shaw was appointed by the British Government to investigate the immediate causes of the Wailing Wall riots of 1929.

** Norman Bentwich, a British Jew, became Attorney-General in the British Mandate Government of Palestine, 1918-31.

† Arthur Ruppin, a German Zionist, assumed direction of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization in 1908, and supervised projects concerning Jewish colonization and agricultural planning.

Therefore we have Palestine with 91 per cent of its people Arab and 9 per cent Jew at the time of the Declaration. It was an Arab population with a dash of Jew. Half of the Jews were recent arrivals.

Before this unpalatable reality, what did the framers of the Balfour Declaration do? By an altogether abject subterfuge, under colour of protecting Arab interests, they set out to conceal the fact that the Arabs to all intents constituted the population of the country. It called them the "non-Jewish communities in Palestine!" It called the multitude the non-few; it called the 670,000 the non-60,000; out of a hundred it called the 91 the non-9. You might just as well call the British people "the non-Continental communities in Great Britain." It would be as suitable to define the mass of working men as "the non-idling communities in the world," or the healthy as the "non-bedridden elements amongst sleepers," or the sane as "the non-lunatic section of thinkers"—or the grass of the countryside as "the non-dandelion portion of the pastures."

But of course there is more than mere preposterous nomenclature in the use of the phrase "non-Jewish communities in Palestine" to describe the Arabs. It is fraudulent. It was done in order to conceal the true ratio between Arabs and Jews, and thereby to make easier the supersession of the former. It was as though in some declaration Highlanders and Lowlanders had been defined as "the existing non-Irish communities in Scotland" in order that the Irish colonies might be deemed the essential elements of the population north of the Tweed. The Scots themselves thus would appear to be nothing but sporadic groups dotted about the Caledonian soil. Upon which, dispossessive action against the Scots could be attempted more easily. It was a pity indeed that Lord Balfour was not forced to try in Scotland what he and his Zionist friends carried through in Palestine: one airily disingenuous statesman the less would have been left in power.

Just now it was stated that at first sight this phrase seemed not so crafty, because it was too manifestly deceitful. But on second examination it is perceived to be adroit in its mean way. It plays upon general ignorance. What in 1917 did the war-worn British public, what did the deluded Jews of Russia, what did any general body of people outside the Near East know about the composition of the population of Palestine? Nothing.

It was upon this, then, that the drafters of the Declaration played. They concealed the Arabs' very name and called them "existing communities in Palestine," as though they were packets of monks who had strayed into the country and here and there

had got a foothold in it. The qualification "existing" provides the finishing touch. The impression given is that these Arabs have just managed to survive, that an explorer has returned and reported to Lord Balfour that he has discovered non-Jews existing in the hills.

Consequently the average citizen, when he read the Declaration, concluded, if he gave the matter any further thought at all, that proper steps would be taken under its terms to safeguard the occasional remnants of other races than the Jews who might be found in the Holy Land. This was what it was intended he should conclude. As for any odd individuals who in the thick of war might have sufficient interest to question the phraseology employed, for them what may have been thought a neat reply had been prepared. "Community is the correct word to use since the population of Palestine is divided into the Moslem, Christian and Jewish communities." The Druses and Samaritans might have been added for effect: otherwise there is no more to say about this equivocation. It is enough to write it down to expose it. Words are wasted on it.

But the Declaration was not issued merely to falsify the status of the Arabs. It was also to offer them a spurious guarantee, in the phrase "*it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which shall prejudice the civil and religious rights*" of the aforesaid so-called "communities." That their religious rights should not be prejudiced, indeed, was satisfactory, though there was not very much in that. Happily, it could be taken for granted. Wherever Britain rules religious rights are preserved.

The crux arrives with "civil rights." What are "civil rights"? All turns on this point. If civil rights remain undefined it is only a mockery to guarantee them. To guarantee anything, and at the same time not to let anyone know what it is, that is *Alice in Wonderland* legislation. "I guarantee your civil rights," said the White Queen to Alice in Palestine-land. "Oh, thank you!" said Alice, "what are they, please?" "I'm sure I can't tell you, my dear," said the White Queen, "but I'll guarantee very hard."

If only the Declaration had been as innocent as the text of *Alice in Wonderland*. Its nonsense is deceptive nonsense, written with vicious intention. The Arabs were guaranteed civil rights, again because to the unalert ear it sounded as though they were being assured a man's normal rights, the freedom to choose the government of his country which every decent man should enjoy, the common political rights of a democratic regime.

But in fact the Arabs were not assured these at all. The effect, and the aim, of the clause actually was to withdraw from the Arabs (fighting or suffering for us at the time under promise

of independence) those very rights of independence for which they had contracted; to say nothing of their natural title to them. By sleight of tongue civil rights were substituted for political rights. If civil rights meant anything, which was uncertain and would take long legal proof (which was never offered) they meant most likely civic or borough rights, or such rights as a foreign householder can exercise in a country of which he is not a citizen. But this was untested theory. As practice went, "civil rights" was an expression which was left without any interpretation, and so had no existence as a surety or guarantee at all.

When in Jerusalem, once I asked a High Commissioner himself what were civil rights, and the answer of the High Commissioner was that "Well, they would be very difficult to define." Which is precisely why they were guaranteed to the Arabs. It was a triumph of draftsmanship, of course, to take everything away from them in terms which appeared to safeguard them. A skilful ruse of the drafters, if a knavish one.

There can be no doubt that the authors of this particular "guarantee" were the Zionists themselves, and that the phrase was introduced from America. The clause "it being clearly understood" and what follows has enough of a turn of its own to arouse attention. It is not automatic phraseology: it is no oft-employed cliché. If it were to be found in some previous document relating to the question, then obviously it was transferred from there into the Balfour Declaration.

It is so to be found, and it was transferred. When the September version of the Declaration was dropped because of the Magnus-Montagu* opposition, the Cabinet or the Zionist camarilla in it gave its own attention to finding a substitute. But this attention, as before, consisted largely in picking and choosing amidst the Zionist's suggestions. Baulked of the open mastership of Palestine which the September version would have given them, and driven to pay lip-homage to the Arabs, the Zionists, on one side of the Atlantic or the other, evidently offered a suitable formula drawn from the manifesto of the Jewish organizations of the United States, of the 2nd of October, 1916, a year or so before.

In this manifesto the said organizations, *inter alia*, had demanded full rights for the Jews wherever they lived. The manifesto went on to define these, and the definition was thus worded: "it being understood that the phrase 'full rights' is deemed to include civil, religious and political rights."

* For Montagu's attitude towards Zionism, see his memorandum and letter, pp. 143-51.

There most certainly is the source, the rough copy of the celebrated Balfour guarantee. The identity of words is not to be dismissed as a mere coincidence. The juxtaposition of "it being understood that" and of the table of rights which follows points unmistakably to reproduction.

Observe, though, what a difference occurred in the new use of the formula. In the United States the Zionist drafters had employed the formula to define their own rights. In the Balfour Declaration they had to employ it to define, for safeguarding purposes, their own rights, but also, so to speak, to undefine the Arabs' rights. They conceded therefore to the Arabs the notorious "civil rights:" for themselves they dropped this word "civil" altogether. They had seen from the beginning that it had no value, since in the manifesto they had taken care to demand religious and political rights *in addition* to civil rights. In the Balfour Declaration they took the same care.

But they improved the phraseology in the "Balfour Declaration." Not only was "civil" jettisoned, but with great agility the cardinal word "political" was shuffled from "rights" on to "status." To have granted in the same clause only civil rights to the Arabs but to the Jews political rights would have been too glaring a contrast. It might have drawn attention even from the indifferent eyes of 1917. Therefore, for the Jews their "rights" were left apparently unclarified but really expanded in principle through the removal of the constricting adjective while "political status" was brought in as something of another order peculiar to the Jews, and to do the work of a definite guarantee.

Let me halt for a space to explain why it was essential to have such a guarantee. Without it when Palestine became a Jewish State all Jews might be conceived as belonging to it. This might occur even during the preliminary stage, during the illusory period when Jew and Arab running in harness were building up a new Palestine together (or whatever mixed metaphor best describes this atrocious mixed metaphor of policy). Antisemitism spreads easily, and an agitation might arise in any country to dispatch Jewish citizens to Palestine, or if not to expel them, to catalogue them as aliens, citizens of Palestine, and to deprive them of the vote.

The insertion of the guarantee is further proof, besides, of the character of the regime intended under the Declaration in the Holy Land. If the "National Home" was to be something innocuous, a mere "national home from home" with a modicum of establishment receiving a stream of visitors, an institution without any political status, then there was no need to guarantee

hosts or guests against losing their overseas or overland political status in their place of origin. If "National Home" meant a State or quasi-State, there was every need for the guarantee.

The "guarantee" clause of the Declaration, then, with its deceptive text by which the Arabs were to be deprived of their citizenship, sprang undoubtedly from Zionist brains, though it was adopted of course by Balfour and the others and issued by him as though the British Cabinet had thought it out. Considering the joint authorship of the Declaration, this perhaps might have been expected. Its British drafters were mostly guided by expediency: the Zionist drafters were doctrinaires. The British thought it necessary to shut their eyes to Arab rights; the Zionists were convinced or convinced themselves that the Arabs had no rights as men, save those the Turks might have conceded them.

Mr. de Haas, the American drafter, proclaims their attitude very clearly. "We draw a distinction," says he, "between Jewish rights and Arab claims. Whether the Palestinian population in 1914 possessed any tangible political rights is for those versed in Turkish law to say. In practice we know that such rights did not exist, even though the young Turks had created a paper Parliament. Djemal Pasha* ruled in Palestine with an iron hand, as every Turk had done before him, though he too may have indulged [*sic*] the people in paper rights. The term '*Political rights*' [Mr. de Haas' own capital and italics] does not appear in the Balfour Declaration. The phrase used is civil rights, and as we have made abundantly clear every word of that document was weighed by more than a score of authorities."

From one of the principal drafters of the Declaration, who scissored its terms, this statement clinches the matter. Under the Declaration the Arabs were to get no political rights, whether they had them in principle or not. According to the Zionists' thesis, of which Mr. de Haas is such a notable exponent, they did not hold any in practice and it was very unlikely that they held any in theory.

A couple of pages later in his work, Mr. de Haas has the air of recoiling momentarily from this thesis, or else of having forgotten in the heat of writing that he had just developed it. He says, in passing, of the Arab case, "The Arab case, apart from the rights which inhere from living in a country. . ." But having mentioned this natural dower thus fugitively he does not allude to it again.

Mr. de Haas is not alone in this attitude, nor is it the attitude alone of the Zionists of the United States. The same point of view

* For Djemal Pasha, see above, p. 156, note.

prevails amidst British Zionists: it must so prevail, since to recognize that the Arabs have political rights is to recognize that the "National Home" cannot be imposed upon them. As an example of British Zionist opinion I may quote from Mr. Herbert Sidebotham,* amongst Gentiles the most assiduous apologist of the cause. His role in Manchester has been mentioned already. He is an absolute apostle of Zionism, and I think he might be described not too maliciously as the inside-out Paul of the movement.

It is very significant to see the effect which his gospel has upon him. Here is a man, very properly admired by his colleagues in journalism, and to be read with respect when he comments on other topics. But when he turns to the defence of Zionism and starts to justify its behaviour, he propounds the most extravagant theories as though they were founded in reason and matured in experience. This is no unusual phenomenon. A blind spot of madness seems to form in the outlook of everyone who succumbs to the Zionist germ.

Mr. Sidebotham differs from Mr. de Haas in that he concentrates on the status of Palestine rather than on the status of its inhabitants. But he reaches a similar result. He deprives the Arabs of any birthright. I quote from a memorandum of his, somewhat hurriedly entitled *British Policy and the Palestine Mandate: Our Proud Privilege*. This begins "We are in Palestine by a conjunction, made by the accidents of war and not designed, between the oldest national idea in the world's history and *certain political and moral interests peculiar to Great Britain.*" (I cannot refrain from italicizing the final phrase. Could anyone?)

At the close of his first chapter Mr. Sidebotham writes: "Palestine, in fact, had no separate national or geographic existence apart from that which the classic history of the Jews had given it, and this disappeared with Jewish independence. In assigning Palestine therefore as a national home, Mr. Balfour was not giving away anything that belonged to some-one else. It was a ghost of the past which two thousand years had not succeeded in laying and which could assume an actual physical existence only through the Jews. To the Christian, Palestine was the Holy Land. . . To others Palestine might indifferently be regarded as an appendage of Egypt or a part of Syria or Arabia. Only to Jews could Palestine be a country by itself. . ." Or again, "Palestine as a country did not exist before the Balfour promise. To the Turk it was a part of the vilayet of Beirut, to the Arab it was the southern part of Syria."

* See Sidebotham, pp. 125-42.

I fancy that it is a just description of the line of argument in the above quotation to say that it is pleasantly extravagant. It has a side to it which is so fantastic that it is almost entertaining. Palestine, declares Mr. Sidebotham, is not a country unless the Jews occupy it. Only their presence can make it one.

There is no reason on earth why Palestine *should* be a country. It is too small, its boundaries are artificial in the main, there is nothing to distinguish it from the territory just to the north, its sacred character has not the slightest national quality. The little province is in fact nothing but a section of Syria. Its existence for centuries has been provincial. Mr. Sidebotham recognizes this. In the eyes of the Arabs it is, he says, no more than "a part of Arabia," or is "only the southern part of Syria."

It is now that he becomes odd. Because Palestine is only a part of Arab territory he would take it from the Arabs' ownership. No doubt he allows that the Arabs have a right to a country somewhere, but to the parts of this country their right vanishes. If the Jews come along and propose to turn part of an Arab country into a whole Jewish country, then the Arabs lose that part automatically. As an entity the part is untenable. But by argument on these lines we might get so far as to find our claim to the whole of England unsound, if we lay claim to it as part of the inheritance of the British race, as part of the British Commonwealth. For that is the way in which the Arabs lay claim to Palestine, on the ground that it is part of the inheritance of the Arab race, part of the Arab commonwealth or nexus of lands in Arab occupation.

To return to the general issue, the situation laid down for the Arabs of Palestine by typical Zionist writers is that these Arabs are political slaves, persons not having the right of ownership of their place of birth, a place indeed which in their hands politically would not exist.

Let us go back to the Declaration. After it had been published an event occurred which is closely attached to this particular question of national prerogatives, and may serve to close the discussion of it. The Zionist leaders approached the chief Allied Governments with a request for pronouncements of encouragement and support similar to that which Great Britain had given them.

A deception awaited them. From the French, on the 9th of February, 1918, they received a note which was no more than adequate. Mr. Sacher, or any other of the Political Committee, would have turned out something much more attractive. It ran:

M. Sokolov représentant des organisations sionistes, a été reçu ce

matin au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères par M. Stephen Pichon, qui a été heureux de lui confirmer que l'entente est complète entre les Gouvernements français et britannique en ce qui concerne la question d'un établissement juif en Palestine.

Not really a satisfactory statement, it will be seen. The French evaded giving the Zionists any direct guarantee. They confined themselves to saying that they were in agreement with the British Government's policy. This left the onus of the policy upon the British, and the Quai d'Orsay spokesmen gave no pledge at all that they would continue in agreement with it as it developed. Moreover, the French note was sent with a covering letter in which M. Sokolov was complimented upon the "*dévouement avec lequel vous poursuivez la réalisation des vœux de vos co-religionnaires.*" A very back-handed compliment. It discounted the whole nationalist and not religious platform which the devoted M. Sokolov was straining to construct.

But it was when Italy was approached that this best-laid scheme really went a-gley. Here is the Italian pronouncement, given in London on the 9th of May, 1918, to M. Sokolov by the Marchese Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador, "by order of Baron Sonnino:"*

In relazione alle domande che gli sono state rivolte il Governo di Sua Maestà è lieto di confermare le precedenti dichiarazioni già fatte a mezzo dei suoi rappresentanti a Washington, l'Aja e Salonicco, di essere cioè disposto ad adoperarsi con piacere per facilitare lo stabilirsi in Palestina di un centro nazionale ebraico, nell'intesa però che non ne venga nessun pregiudizio allo stato giuridico e politico delle già esistenti comunità religiose ed ai diritti civili e politici che gli israeliti già godono in ogni altro paese.

[In connection with the requests which have been made to it His Majesty's Government is happy to confirm the previous statements made through its representatives in Washington, The Hague and Salonica, that is to say that it is prepared to take steps with pleasure in order to facilitate the foundation in Palestine of a Jewish national centre, on the understanding however that no prejudice shall arise through it to the legal and political status of existing religious communities and to the civil and political rights already enjoyed by Israelites in any other country].

The Italian Government in its pronouncement put in the missing words which made all the difference. Since the petitioners who had asked for a declaration had caused the Palestine

* Baron Sonnino (1847-1922) was the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1914-19.

population to be divided into "communities," the Consulta took care to signify that this division was a religious one. It spiked the guns of Lord Balfour and Dr. Weizmann who had used the religious idea to make the division into communities, but thereon had treated the communities as national divisions.

More important and more meaningful still was the insertion of the words "legal and political status." The Italian Government guaranteed that the National Home should not prejudice those very fundamental rights of the Arabs which the Balfour Declaration deliberately had excised. With entire politeness it indicated that it was not deceived by the terms of the Balfour document, and that it would not be party to the suppression of native rights.

It is impossible not to admire the neatness of the rebuke; the hoisting of the political Zionists with their own petard by rejecting their claims under guise of confirming them—just as they had drafted for the Arabs; the elegant assumption that Lord Balfour had intended a genuine guarantee and that Italy would make it more to his mind by making it watertight.

This Italian guarantee was given, need it be said, long before the days of Fascism, by the old Italian Kingdom, democratic and liberal, so that it cannot be ascribed to rivalry or spite or other such motive. It puts Italy in a strong position at present, it is simply an example of how honesty can indeed be the best policy. Not surprisingly, it has been kept rather quiet. The version of it with which Mrs. Andrews credits M. Sokolov in her *The Holy Land Under Mandate* is not exact. Mrs. Andrews quotes Italy as safeguarding only the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities or the legal or political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Italian Declaration is turned thus into another Balfour Declaration. The true version, given by M. Sokolov, in the original Italian just cited, is very different and stands to this day, with formidable implications attached to it upon which it is unnecessary to dilate.

Chaim Weizmann in Jaffa
and in Paris

I

STATEMENT BY CHAIM WEIZMANN IN JAFFA, 1918.*

I should first like to express my thanks to the Governor and to say how happy I am to meet the notables and religious leaders of this city. I am paying this my first visit to the Arab countries in my capacity as President of the Zionist federations of Great Britain, France and Italy. I have come specially to remove the misunderstanding that has arisen between the Jewish community on the one hand and the Moslem and Christian communities on the other. What I am about to tell you, I have already said twice before in Jerusalem and Egypt. I shall repeat for the third time here in Jaffa what I said on these two earlier occasions though I fear that so much repetitiousness will sound tedious and boring to you. What I shall say to you will explain, on behalf of 14 million Jews in the world, what our objectives are. I shall start with stating what are *not* our objectives. It is not our objective to seize control of the higher policy of the province of Palestine. Nor has it ever been our objective to turn anyone out of his property. The province of Palestine is rich in agricultural land and can absorb many times its present population while ensuring a life of happiness

* Speech made at 11 a.m. on 8 May, 1918, in the Government Serai at Jaffa. Those present included the British Governor, the Qadi of the city, the leaders of the Armenian, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Jewish communities as well as the members of the Christian-Moslem Association of Jaffa. The text printed here is the Editor's translation of the Arabic version of Dr. Weizmann's speech made at the time by the Christian-Moslem Association of Jaffa. The Arabic original is in the archives of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut.

and plenty for all. It remains to state the things that do constitute our objectives. Our objective is to exploit and develop the not inconsiderable lands and properties that we gained possession of during the last regime. It is to invigorate education and the sciences in Palestine through the establishment of public institutions for the spread of knowledge and learning. What we ask for is that we be given the opportunity to attain these objectives. It is also our objective to get together and work shoulder to shoulder for the sake of the development and prosperity of this country, sparing no effort to ensure the success of our endeavours.

We, the Jewish community, have suffered so much and have been subjected to so much persecution that we have learned how we must live with others. Palestine is the centre of our aspirations as a community and our sole homeland in which we wish to live as one lives in his home, warming himself at his own fireplace. I say all this without knowing what the ultimate political future of Palestine will be or who will have hegemony over it in the future. What is most needed immediately is the succession of a competent administration and a just government. As to the rumours and allegations contrary to this, they are nothing but lies and calumny inspired by our enemies who are also the enemies of Great Britain and the Allied Powers.

The Jews in this country may be small in number but the 14 million Jews in every part of the world give us their support and stand witness to our words. Our enemies who resort to mendacious rumours and cheap accusations can never stand up to us in free and public discussion and are themselves the aggressors.

Lastly I thank His Britannic Majesty's Government for ensuring the protection of all and facilitating the cause of justice. Thank you, gentlemen.

II

STATEMENT BY CHAIM WEIZMANN IN PARIS, 1919*


...Mr. Lansing** asked Dr. Weizmann to clear up some

* Excerpt from Secretary's Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3 p.m. U.S., Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, Vol. IV, Pubn. No. 1963 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 169.

** Mr. Robert Lansing was U.S. Secretary of State, 1915-20.

confusion which existed in his mind as to the correct meaning of the words "Jewish National Home." Did that mean an autonomous Jewish Government?

Dr. Weizmann replied in the negative. The Zionist organisation did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Association would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals. . . .



Based on the map published in William R. Polk, David M. Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, *Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 72. Copyright © 1957 by the Beacon Press. By permission of the Beacon Press.

An Interview* in Mr. Balfour's
 Apartment, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris,
 on June 24th, 1919, at 4:45 p.m.¹

Present: Mr. Balfour, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Lord
 Eustace Percy and Mr. Frankfurter**

Mr. Balfour expressed great satisfaction that Justice Brandeis came to Europe.† He said the Jewish problem (of which the Palestinian question is only a fragment but an essential part) is to his mind as perplexing a question as any that confronts the statesmanship of Europe. He is exceedingly distressed by it and harassed by its difficulties. Mr. Balfour rehearsed summarily the pressure on Jews in Eastern Europe and said that the problem was, of course, complicated by the extraordinary phenomenon that Jews now are not only participating in revolutionary movements but are actually, to a large degree, leaders in such movements. He stated that a well informed person told him only the other day that Lenin also on his mother's side was a Jew.

Justice Brandeis stated that he had every reason to believe that this is not so and that Lenin on both sides is an upper class Russian. He continued to say that after all this is a minor matter, that all that Mr. Balfour said was quite so. He believes every Jew is potentially an intellectual and an idealist and the problem is one of direction of those qualities. He narrated his own

* From E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds. *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, 1st Series, Vol. IV (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 1276-78. The interview was recorded in a memorandum by Mr. Frankfurter.

** Felix Frankfurter (1882-1925), Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, later Associate Justice, Supreme Court of U.S. 1939-62, and President Wilson's Consultant at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Lord Eustace Percy (1887-1958), British diplomat, later Conservative Member of Parliament, 1921-37. For Balfour and Brandeis. see above, p. 165, note.

† On Brandeis and the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72.

approach to Zionism, that he came to it wholly as an American, for his whole life had been free from Jewish contacts or traditions. As an American he was confronted with the disposition of the vast number of Jews, particularly Russian Jews, that were pouring into the United States year by year. It was then that by chance a pamphlet on Zionism came his way and led him to the study of the Jewish problem and to the conviction that Zionism was the answer. The very same men, with the same qualities that are now enlisted in revolutionary movements would find (and in the United States *do* find) constructive channels for expression and make positive contributions to civilisation.

Mr. Balfour interrupted to express his agreement, adding: 'Of course, these are the reasons that make you and me such ardent Zionists'.

The Justice continued that for the realisation of the Zionist programme three conditions were essential:—

First that Palestine should be the Jewish homeland and not merely that there be a Jewish homeland in Palestine. That, he assumed, is the commitment of the Balfour Declaration and will, of course, be confirmed by the Peace Conference.

Secondly, there must be economic elbow room for a Jewish Palestine; self sufficiency for a healthy social life. That meant adequate boundaries, not merely a small garden within Palestine. On the North that meant the control of the waters and he assumed that Great Britain was urging the northern boundary necessary for the control of the waters. That was a question substantially between England and France and, of course, must be determined by the Peace Conference. The southern and eastern boundaries, he assumed, raised internal British questions.

Mr. Balfour assented that that was so as to the southern boundary but questioned as to the eastern boundary.

The Justice added that, of course, the interests of the Hedjaz were involved, but after all, the disposition of questions between the Arabs and the Zionists was, in effect, an internal British problem. He urged on the east the Trans-Jordan line for there the land is largely unoccupied and settlement could be made without conflict with the Arabs much more easily than in the more settled portions of the North.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that in the East there is the Hedjaz railroad which can rightly be called a Mohammedan railroad.

The Justice replied that there is land right up to the railroad and Mr. Balfour stated that he thought that Feisul would agree to having an eastern boundary of Palestine go up to the Hedjaz railroad.

Thirdly, the Justice urged that the future Jewish Palestine

must have control of the land and the natural resources which are at the heart of a sound economic life. It was essential that the values which are being and will be created because of the cessation of Turkish rule and due to British occupation and Jewish settlement should go to the State and not into private hands.

Mr. Balfour expressed entire agreement with the three conditions which the Justice laid down. He then proceeded to point out the difficulties which confronted England. He narrated at length the Syrian situation and the appointment of the Inter-Allied Commission which finally terminated in the present American Commission. Feisul* was a comrade in arms with the British; he undoubtedly was of military help and by sheer force of events the British and the Arabs find themselves together in Syria. Feisul interpreted British action and British words as, in effect, a promise either of Arab independence or of Arab rule under British protection. On the other hand, are the old interests of France in Syria and the Prime Minister has given (and in Mr. Balfour's opinion, rightly given) definite word that under no circumstances will Great Britain remain in Syria. It would involve a quarrel with France which would not be healed. But Feisul prefers Great Britain to France, (at least, so he says), and all advices indicate that French rule in Syria will meet with the greatest opposition and even bloodshed on the part of the populace.

The situation is further complicated by an agreement made early in November [1918] by the British and French, and brought to the President's attention, telling the people of the East that their wishes would be consulted in the disposition of their future. One day in the Council of Four, when the Syrian matter was under dispute, the President suggested the despatch of a Commission to find out what the people really wanted. It began with Syria but the field of enquiry was extended over the whole East. Mr. Balfour wrote a memorandum to the Prime Minister, and he believed it went to the President, pointing out that Palestine should be excluded from the terms of reference because the Powers had committed themselves to the Zionist programme, which inevitably excluded numerical self-determination. Palestine presented a unique situation. We are dealing

* Faisal I (1885-1933) was the third son of The Sharif Hussein of Mecca and the leader of the Arab Revolt during World War I. After the War, he was proclaimed King of Syria by a Syrian national congress (March 1920) but was deposed by the French (July 1920). He then became King of Iraq until his death.

not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to re-constitute a new community and definitely building for a numerical majority in the future. He has great difficulty in seeing how the President can possibly reconcile his adherence to Zionism with any doctrine of self-determination and he asked the Justice how he thinks the President will do it. The Justice replied that Mr. Balfour had already indicated the solution and pointed out that the whole conception of Zionism as a Jewish homeland, was a definite building up for the future as the means of dealing with a world problem and not merely with the disposition of all [an]² existing community. Mr. Balfour stated he supposed that would be the President's line. He continued to point out the great difficulties that are now besetting Great Britain in the East, namely, the ferment in the whole Eastern world, the Mohammedan restlessness, the new Arabic imperialism and the relations with the French. Then there is also the Sykes-Picot Agreement;* that is dead, but its ruins still encumber the earth. He was anxious that the Justice should know these difficulties for they all bear upon the Palestinian situation. He expressed the greatest satisfaction that the Justice was going to the East to study the problem at first hand.

The Justice hoped that while he was away at least nothing would be done which would embarrass the fulfilment of the three conditions which he laid down as essential to the realisation of the Zionist programme.

Mr. Balfour then stated that he understood Justice Brandeis' request that no decision be taken as to the boundaries and the extent of control over the land in any way counter to his views until his return in about four or five weeks. He thought it was perfectly safe to give him the assurance that no decision will be taken on those matters during that time to embarrass the aims which the Justice indicated.

Mr. Balfour stated that he would be either in Paris or in London when the Justice returned and he hoped that he will report to him at once upon his return on the questions as they appear to him from a study on the spot.

No statesman could have been more sympathetic than Mr. Balfour was with the underlying philosophy and aims of Zionism

* The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had arranged that the Fertile Crescent would be divided into four areas, two to be directly administered by France and Britain respectively, while the other two would be administered by Arab Governments under the guidance of each of the two Western Powers.

as they were stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis, nor more eager that the necessary conditions should be secured at the hands of the Peace Conference and of Great Britain to assure the realisation of the Zionist programme.

F.F.

NOTES

- 1 No British record of this interview has been traced in Foreign Office archives.
- 2 The text here is uncertain. It would appear that a correction of "all" to "an" is imperfectly shown on this copy.

19 | Memorandum* by Mr. Balfour (Paris)
| Respecting Syria, Palestine and
| Mesopotamia¹, 1919

I

The effect which the Syrian question is producing on Anglo-French relations is causing me considerable anxiety—an anxiety not diminished by the fact that very little is openly said about it, though much is hinted. The silence which the French press maintains about the Prime Minister's declaration that under no circumstances will Britain accept a Syrian mandate, is itself ominous. All know it, none refer to it; and it has done little or nothing to modify the settled conviction of the French Government and the French Colonial Party that British officers throughout Syria and Palestine are intriguing to make a French mandate in these regions impossible.

These misunderstandings are no doubt in part due to the same cause as most misunderstandings—namely, a very clear comprehension by each party of the strength of his own case, combined with a very imperfect knowledge of, or sympathy with, the case of his opponent. In this particular instance, for example, I have never been able to understand on what historic basis the French claim to Syria really rests. Frenchmen's share in the Crusades of the Middle Ages, Mazarin's arrangements with the Turk in the seventeenth century, and the blustering expedition of 1861, lend in my opinion very little support to their far-reaching ambitions. I could make as good a case for Great Britain by recalling the repulse inflicted by Sir Sydney Smith on Napoleon at Acre, and a much better case by asking where French claims to Syria or any other part of the Turkish Empire would be, but for the recent defeat of the Turks by British forces, at an enormous cost of British lives and British treasure.

* From Woodward and Butler, eds., *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, pp. 340-47.

If, however, we start from the French assumption, that they have ancient claims in Syria and the Middle East, admitted as it has been in all the recent negotiations, then we must in fairness concede that they have something to say for themselves; and it is well to understand exactly what that something is.

Suppose, then, we were to ask M. Clemenceau to speak his full mind in defence of the attitude of resentful suspicion adopted almost universally by his countrymen, I think he would reply somewhat in this fashion:—

‘In Downing Street last December I tried to arrive at an understanding with England about Syria. I was deeply conscious of the need of friendly relations between the two countries, and was most anxious to prevent any collision of interests in the Middle East. I therefore asked the Prime Minister what modification in the Sykes-Picot Agreement England desired. He replied, “Mosul.” I said “You shall have it. Anything else?” He replied, “Palestine.” Again, I said, “You shall have it.” I left London somewhat doubtful as to the reception this arrangement would have in France, but well assured that to Great Britain at least it would prove satisfactory.

‘What, then, was my surprise when I found that what I had given with so generous a hand was made the occasion for demanding more. Mosul, it seems, was useless unless Palmyra was given also. Palestine was no sufficient home for the Jews unless its frontiers were pushed northward into Syria. And, as if this was not enough, it was discovered that Mesopotamia required a direct all-British outlet on the Mediterranean; that this involved, or was supposed to involve, the possession by England of Palmyra; so that Palmyra must follow Mosul and be transferred from the French sphere to the British.

‘All this was bad; but worse remains to be told. In the early days of the Peace Conference it was agreed that, speaking generally, conquered territory outside Europe should be held by the conquerors under mandate from the League of Nations. Who under this plan was to be the mandatory for Syria? This, perhaps, could only be finally settled when other Turkish problems were dealt with. But who was not to be mandatory could be settled, so far as England was concerned, at once. Accordingly, the Prime Minister took occasion formally to announce that under no circumstances would England either demand the mandate or take it; she valued too highly the friendship of France.

Nothing could be more explicit. Yet at the very moment when the declaration was made, and ever since, officers of the British army were occupied in carrying on an active propaganda in favour of England. Rumours were spread broadcast regarding France's unpopularity with the Arabs, and though the rumours were false everything was done to make them true. There could be but one object in these manœuvres, namely, to make the British mandate, which had been so solemnly, and doubtless so sincerely, repudiated in Paris, a practical necessity in the East. England's pledged word would be broken, because England had so contrived matters that it could not in fact be fulfilled. Syria would thus go the way of Egypt, and an incurable injury would be inflicted on Anglo-French relations.'

This, or something very like it, represents, I am convinced, the present frame of mind of M. Clemenceau. The French Foreign Office, the French Colonial Party, the shipping interests of Marseilles, the silk interests of Lyons, the Jesuits and the French Clericals, combine to embitter the controversy by playing on French historical aspirations with the aid of mendacious reports from French officials in Syria. Relations between the two countries on this subject are getting more and more strained, so that it does most seriously behove us to consider the method by which this cloud of suspicion can best be dissipated, and an arrangement reached which shall be fair to both countries and of benefit to the Eastern world.

It must be admitted, in the first place, that we have not 'staged' our plan—so far as we have a plan—with any notable success. We have made a dramatic renunciation, but it has fallen flat. We have made a *beau geste*, and none have applauded. This is, of course, in part due to the fact that we are not proposing to give the French anything which they do not believe to be already theirs, and that what it is proposed to give them now is less than what they would have obtained under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. But it is also due in part to the fact that, if I am rightly informed, the British officers in Syria have not always played up to the British Ministers in Paris. This is vehemently and most sincerely denied by General Clayton. But friends of mine from Syria confirm the view, and I know personally of one case in which a British officer, though well acquainted with the Prime Minister's pledge, thought himself precluded by his instructions from giving an Arab deputation, which came to ask for British protection, the clear and decisive answer which, by destroying all hopes, would have effectually

removed all misunderstandings. It is easy to guess what interpretation the French would put on an incident which must certainly have come to their ears, and is doubtless only one of many.

How came such things to happen? In the main, I have no doubt, owing to the loudly-advertised policy of self-determination preceded by a Commission of Enquiry—a Commission that began by being international, and ended by being American.* This Commission, by the very term of its reference, was to find out what the Arabs of Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia desired, and to advise the Powers accordingly. We gave it our blessing, and directed our officers to supply it with every assistance. But this obviously involved, as an inevitable corollary, that the whole future of these regions was still in the balance, and that their destiny depended chiefly on the wishes of their inhabitants. No British officer could possibly think otherwise; yet, if he thus spoke and acted, there is not a Frenchman in Syria—or elsewhere—who would not regard him as anti-French in feeling, and as an intriguer against France in practice.

II

This brings into clear relief what I fear is the unhappy truth, namely, that France, England, and America have got themselves into a position over the Syrian problem so inextricably confused that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them.

The situation is affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the ruler of the Hedjaz in 1915;² going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September 1916;** followed by the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918;³ and concluding with the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919; and the directions given to the Commission sent out to examine the Arab problem on the spot⁴—directions which, it must be observed, were accepted by France, Britain, and America, though the Commission itself was, in the end, purely American in composition. These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clear-cut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers; and yet, so far as I can see, none of them have wholly lost their validity or can be treated in all

* For the findings and recommendations of the American King-Crane Commission of Inquiry, 1919, see below, pp. 213-18

** For the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see above, p. 198, note.

respects as of merely historic interest. Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final arrangement about the Middle East.

These difficulties are well illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. What its authors aimed at was the creation of two clearly-defined areas, one carved out of Syria and the other out of Mesopotamia—the first which should be French, as Tunis is French, the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was to lie a huge tract occupied in part by nomad Bedouins, in part by a sedentary Arab-speaking population, urban and agricultural, who should be independent in the sense that they would live their own life in their own way, but who would be under the patronage, and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of England, according as they belonged to what in the agreement was described as area A or area B. The scheme was not thought out, it had obvious imperfections; but if honestly and sympathetically worked by the superintending Powers it might easily have proved a success. For, as I read history, such an overlordship is not alien to the immemorial customs and traditions of this portion of the Eastern world.

On the other hand, the scheme does seem to me quite alien to those modern notions of nationality which are enshrined in the Covenant and proclaimed in the declaration. These documents proceed on the assumption that, if we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice, if we protect them from external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and spontaneously organise themselves into a democratic state on modern lines. They will, in language borrowed from the declaration, establish 'a national government', and enjoy 'an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population'.

If by this is meant, as I think it is, that when the Turkish tyranny is wholly past the Arabs will desire to use their new-found freedom to set up representative institutions, with secret voting, responsible government, and national frontiers, I fear we are in error. They will certainly do nothing of the sort. The language of the Covenant may suit the longitude of Washington, Paris, or Prague. But in the longitude of Damascus it will probably get us into trouble, unless, indeed, we can agree to treat it with a very wide latitude of interpretation.

How, indeed, when dealing with this series of documents,

is latitude of interpretation to be avoided? Consider the following analysis:—

In 1915 we promised the Arabs independence; and the promise was unqualified, except in respect of certain territorial reservations. In 1918 the promise was by implication repeated; for no other interpretation can, I think, be placed by any unbiased reader on the phrases in the declaration about a 'National Government', and 'an Administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population'.

But in 1916 (Sykes-Picot) the independence even of the most independent portion of the new Arab State (*i.e.*, areas A and B) was qualified by the obligatory presence of foreign advisers; as, indeed it is under the mandatory system of 1919. Now, by an 'adviser' these documents undoubtedly mean—though they do not say so—an adviser whose advice must be followed; and assuredly no State can be described as really independent which has habitually and normally to follow foreign advice supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes, and tanks.

In our promises with regard to the frontiers of the new Arab States we do not seem to have been more fortunate than in our promises about their independence. In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia.

In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes-Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes-Picot Agreement the rough and ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced.

By implication, indeed, they have rejected them. The language of the Covenant assumes or asserts that in the regions we are discussing, as in other portions of the Turkish Empire, there are in the advanced chrysalis state 'independent nations' sufficiently 'developed' to demand 'provisional recognition', each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. Where and what are these 'independent nations'? Are they by chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the

Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of those who framed it. They started from the view that France had ancient interests and aspirations in Western Syria; that Britain had obvious claims in Bagdad and Southern Mesopotamia; that Palestine had a unique historic position; and that if these three areas were to be separately controlled, it was obviously expedient that none of the vast and vague territory lying between them, which had no national organisation, should be under any other foreign influence. In other words, when they made the tripartite arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing with three nations already in existence, ready for 'provisional recognition', only requiring the removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory, and a little time to enable them to 'stand alone.' It never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organisation (to say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. But this is a very different thing.

Now where the covenant of 1919 is in contradiction with the Agreement of 1916 it is presumably the Covenant which must be held to represent our policy. We are seemingly committed, therefore, to the view that the whole area we are considering already consists of an independent nation or nations; and that all we have to do, after having got rid of the Turk, is to supply every independent nation with one, but not more than one, suitable mandatory.

Without further considering whether the political picture drawn by the Covenant corresponds with anything to be found in the realms of fact, let us ask on what principle these mandatories are to be selected by the Allied and Associated Powers.

On this point the Covenant speaks as follows:—

'The wishes of these communities (*i.e.*, the independent nations) must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory.'

The sentiment is unimpeachable; but how is it to be carried into effect? To simplify the argument, let us assume that two of the 'independent nations' for which mandatories have to be provided are Syria and Palestine? Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind. According to the universally accepted view there are only three possible mandatories—England, America, and France. Are we going 'chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants' in deciding which of

these is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind. England has refused. America will refuse. So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They may freely choose; but it is Hobson's choice after all.

The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 'independent nation' of Palestine than in that of the 'independent nation' of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonised with the declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.

I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs; but they will never say they want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine it is not now an 'independent nation', nor is it yet on the way to become one. Whatever deference should be paid to the views of those who live there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them. In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.

III

Since the literal fulfilment of all our declarations is impossible, partly because they are incompatible with each other and partly because they are incompatible with facts, we ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And the next best thing may, perhaps, be attained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely the material interests but the hopes and habits of the native population; which shall take into account the legitimate aspirations of other peoples and races, in particular, of the French, the British, and the Jews; and which shall embody, as completely as may be, the essential spirit of the various international pronouncements, whose literal provisions it seems impossible in all cases to fulfil.

To this end I venture to lay down the following propositions:—

1. The fundamental conception underlying the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be maintained—namely, a French sphere centring round Syria, a British sphere centring round the Euphrates and the Tigris, and a home for the Jews in the valley of the Jordan.
2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should, however, be brought into closer harmony with the Covenant by the abandonment of the special privileges in the 'blue' and 'red' territories where France and England were given rights not easily distinguishable from complete sovereignty. These should be absorbed in the general body of areas A and B, as ultimately defined.
3. Moreover, the economic monopoly assigned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement to France and Britain respectively shall be abandoned, France and Britain will become mandatories, and the fundamental principles laid down by the Covenant for the Government under mandate of territories outside the Turkish Empire shall, as far as possible, be maintained.
4. The French zone of Syria shall extend in the direction of Anatolia at least sufficiently far to include Alexandretta and its hinterland. Whether France obtains more of Cilicia than this must depend on the arrangement of Armenian mandates and the claims of Italy under the Treaty of London.
5. The British zone in Mesopotamia shall extend at least as far as Mosul. Even if this general scheme be provisionally adopted as a basis of discussion, there evidently remains a large number of difficult questions of delimitation which still await solution. In solving them I think the following principles should be borne in mind.

In the first place I would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by economic and ethnographic considerations rather than strategic.

If other things are equal, by all means choose a good military frontier rather than a bad one. But do not let us further impede the already slow and difficult movements of diplomacy by providing needless safeguards against so remote a possibility as a war with France. It will probably never take place; if it does take place, it will probably be waged with weapons whose character and use we cannot foresee: in any case it will not be decided in Syria. Let us therefore for the moment forget these local views of strategy and take a more practical view of the position.

We have three coterminous areas to consider—Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Their frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core of each is disputed by no one. Syria includes Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, and the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean north of Palestine. Palestine is essentially the valley of the Jordan, with the adjacent coast and plains. Mesopotamia is essentially the region watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. What we have got to do is to make such international arrangements, economic and territorial, as will enable each region to develop itself to the best advantage without giving occasion for jealousies or disputes. The task ought not to be impossible, but it will require to be worked at by experts who have far more knowledge than I possess or can obtain. What follow are casual notes on such points as occur to me.

Palestine

If Zionism is to influence the Jewish problem throughout the world Palestine must be made available for the largest number of Jewish immigrants. It is therefore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water-power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north, or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southward flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value.

For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz Railway, which is too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests. . . *

* The rest of the memorandum deals with Mesopotamia.

NOTES

- 1 A copy of this memorandum was sent at the time to the Foreign Office on September 19, 1919 (received September 22).
- 2 See Cmd. 5957 of 1939, *Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca*.
- 3 See *Parl. Debs. 5th Series, House of Commons*, vol. 145, col. 36.
- 4 The instructions are printed in *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. xii, pp. 745-7.

The American King-Crane Commission of Inquiry, 1919*

I

SUMMARIES OF PETITIONS ON ZIONIST PROGRAMME
SUBMITTED TO THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION BY THE
INHABITANTS OF PALESTINE, LEBANON AND SYRIA**

<i>South †</i> (Palestine west of the Jordan line)	<i>No.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Total Number of Petitions Received	260	
1. For Complete Zionist program (Jewish State and immigration)	7	2.7

* At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, it was agreed between President Wilson, (U.S.), Mr. Lloyd George, (Great Britain), M. Clemenceau (France) and M. Orlando (Italy) to send an international commission of inquiry to ascertain the wishes and aspirations of the Near East peoples. After the failure of the other parties to the agreement to despatch their delegates on the commission, the American team composed of Mr. H.C. King, the then President of Oberlin College, Ohio, and Mr. C.R. Crane, American businessman and prominent member of the Democratic Party, proceeded to the Near East as an exclusively American Commission on behalf of President Wilson. They submitted their report to the Paris Peace Conference on August 28, 1919.

** From U.S., Department of State, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, Vol. XII, Pubn. No. 3009 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), pp. 758-62, *passim*.

† After the cessation of hostilities at the end of the First World War, the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire comprising the territories of what subsequently became Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan were put under temporary military administration officially designated as O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration). There were three major administrative units by geographic region as indicated in this table.

	<i>No.</i>	<i>Percent</i>
2. For Modified Zionist program	8	3
3. Against Zionist program	222	85.3

West

(Lebanon and coastal regions north to Alexandretta)

Total Number of Petitions Received	446	
1. For Complete Zionist program (Jewish State and immigration)	2	.45
2. For Modified Zionist program	0	
3. Against Zionist program	88	19.7

East

(All of Syria east of Jordan line and Lebanon boundary)

Total Number of Petitions Received	1157	
1. For Complete Zionist program (Jewish State and immigration)	2	.18
2. For Modified Zionist program	0	
3. Against Zionist program	1040	90.0

Syria Complete

Total Number of Petitions Received	1863	
1. For Complete Zionist program (Jewish State and immigration)	11	.59
2. For Modified Zionist Program	8	.4
3. Against Zionist program	1350	72.3

II

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KING-CRANE
COMMISSION*

We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.

(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what

* *Ibid.*, pp. 792-95.

had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to—favoring “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”, “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”—it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For “a national home for the Jewish people” is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”. The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918,¹ President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great “ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting:”

“The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantages of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.”

If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this.* To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the

* See above, pp. 213-14.

peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 percent—1350 in all—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests—those for a united Syria and for independence—had a larger support. This general feeling was only voiced by the “General Syrian Congress,”* in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of their statement:

7. We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compatriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibilities.

8. We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of Syria known as Palestine nor of the littoral western zone which includes Lebanon, from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

10. The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zionism in the southern part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annulment of these conventions and agreements.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist

* The General Syrian Congress was held in Damascus, 1919-20, and was attended by delegates from what later became Iraq, Syria, Trans-jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. The Congress, *inter alia*, elected Faisal King of a unified Syria which included all these territories except Iraq.

program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions, requiring armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to Christians—those having to do with Jesus—and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urged the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land".

In view of these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be

included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.

NOTES

- 1 *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supp. I, Vol. I, p. 268.

I

Statement* by Lord Grey**

A considerable number of these engagements, or some of them, which have not been officially made public by the Government, have become public through other sources. Whether all have become public I do not know, but I seriously suggest to the Government that the best way of clearing our honour in this matter is officially to publish the whole of the engagements relating to the matter, which we entered into during the war. If they are found to be not inconsistent with one another our honour is cleared. If they turn out to be inconsistent, I think it will be very much better that the amount, character and extent of the inconsistencies should be known, and that we should state frankly that, in the urgency of the war, engagements were entered into which were not entirely consistent with each other.

I am sure that we cannot redeem our honour by covering up our engagements and pretending that there is no inconsistency, if there really is inconsistency. I am sure that the most honourable course will be to let it be known what the engagements are, and, if there is inconsistency, then to admit it frankly, and, admitting that fact, and having enabled people to judge

* From Great Britain, Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon [His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt] and The Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916, *Report, 1939*, Cmd. 5974 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1939), pp. 18-19. This committee was set up by the British Government in 1939 under the chairmanship of Lord Maugham, Lord High Chancellor of England.

** Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933), Viscount Grey of Fallodon, was British Foreign Secretary, 1905-16.

exactly what is the amount of the inconsistency, to consider what is the most fair and honourable way out of the impasse into which the engagements may have led us. Without comparing one engagement with another, I think that we are placed in considerable difficulty by the Balfour Declaration itself. I have not the actual words here, but I think the noble Duke opposite will not find fault with my summary of it. It promised a Zionist home without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of the population of Palestine. A Zionist home, my Lords, undoubtedly means or implies a Zionist Government over the district in which the home is placed, and if 93 per cent. of the population of Palestine are Arabs, I do not see how you can establish other than an Arab Government, without prejudice to their civil rights. That one sentence alone of the Balfour Declaration seems to me to involve, without over-stating the case, very great difficulty of fulfilment. . . .

II

Statement* by Lord Buckmaster**

If those documents are accurate—and I am bound to say that, upon the face of them, they appear to me to be perfectly sound—they show unmistakably that there has not been, as the noble Viscount Lord Grey suggested, something in the nature of casual inconsistency between different announcements at different times, but that a deliberate pledge has been given on the one hand, which has been abandoned on the other. No amount of examination and no amount of comparison will ever enable the two things to be reconciled, because these documents show that, after an elaborate correspondence in which King Hussein particularly asked to have his position made plain and definite so that there should be no possibility of any lurking doubt as to where he stood as from that moment, he was assured that within a line that ran north from Damascus through named places, a line that ran almost due north from the south and away to the west, should be the area that should be excluded


* *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

** Lord Stanley Owen Buckmaster (1861-1934), British statesman, was Lord Chancellor, 1915-16.

from their independence, and that the rest should be theirs.*


I do not profess to have any knowledge of foreign politics. I have always believed that they can be summed up in two sentences. I believe that we ought to say what we mean, and I think we ought to do what we say. I believe it was because the noble Viscount, Lord Grey of Fallodon, took those simple phrases as his motto that he achieved the astonishing success which followed his discharge of the great and responsible duties of the Foreign Office. We certainly meant what we said in 1915. We did not do what we said in 1918. I would ask the Government even now to retrace their steps at the earliest moment, and go back to obedience to the promise that we gave at a moment when we were gravely beset by difficulties, to the relief of which the Arab help in no slight degree contributed.

* The correspondence refers to the exchange of notes between The Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, prior to the declaration of the Arab Revolt in 1916. The Arabs have always maintained that the British promise of independence included the area of Palestine. The British position has been that Palestine was excluded if not explicitly then by implication.



Zionist colonies in Palestine until 1904

Map 5



Zionist colonies in Palestine until 1920

PART II

THE BRITISH SHIELD

1920 - 1939

“The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. . . .”

Memorandum by Mr. Balfour,
August 11, 1919.
Woodward and Butler, eds.,
Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939, p. 345.

“I cannot imagine any political interests exercised under greater safeguards than the political interests of the Arab population of Palestine. . . .”

The Earl of Balfour, House of
Lords, June 21, 1922.
The Earl of Balfour, *Speeches on*
Zionism, ed. by Israel Cohen
(London, 1928), p. 47.

My administrative staff in Jaffa consisted of an Assistant Governor, a Chief of Police, one or two sub-Governors and the heads of the Arab and Jewish departments at headquarters. Palestine was officially a tri-lingual country and every public notice had to be issued in the three languages, English, Arabic and Hebrew; but since the bulk of the Jewish colonists did not understand Hebrew, they had to sit down and learn their supposedly native tongue. Our days off were dictated by the holidays observed by the three main creeds. Thus, on Fridays the Christians and Jews all worked, but not the Moslems; on Saturdays the Christians and Moslems, but not the Jews; and on Sundays the Moslems and Jews, but not the Christians. Consequently the Governorate was never closed and so the Governor himself got no day off at all.

My district comprised all the older Jewish colonies, as well as the growing town of Tel Aviv. I made a practice of making my official visits on horseback rather than in a car, so that anyone with a grievance had a better opportunity of meeting me and discussing his troubles in a friendly and unhurried manner. I was amazed to find how much could be settled on the spot and how quick decisions, however harsh, were always preferred to cases long drawn-out before the courts or to delays entailed by reference to Jerusalem.

The Jewish members of the Jaffa Municipal Council were mostly progressive Russians who found very irksome the

* From W[alter] F[rancis] Stirling, *Safety Last*, with a Foreword by Siegfried Sassoon (London: Hollis and Carter, 1953), pp. 112-23. Reprinted by permission of the Bodley Head.

** British army officer (1880-1958); Chief Staff Officer under T.E. Lawrence and Adviser to Emir Faisal in Damascus, 1918-19; Adviser to the Albanian Government 1923-31.

oriental inertia they met with in the municipality, particularly with regard to the layout of the new town of Tel Aviv. To deal with their complaints I got leave from the High Commissioner to divide the township of Tel Aviv from Jaffa and to create a separate municipality for it. The Arabs could then continue in their old-established ways in Jaffa while the more progressive Jews could experiment with the latest municipal theories in Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv then consisted of a few hundred houses lying to the north of Jaffa, divided from the sea by rough, scrubby sand dunes. I have ever since regretted not buying an acre of those dunes, which would have cost me then about £ 90 but which could be sold today for a sum in the neighbourhood of £ 300,000.

I found a good house for myself about a mile outside Jaffa on the Jerusalem road. The stables were by the entrance gates, and there was a drive up to the house, bordered by great trees whose interlacing branches made a tunnel of deep shade. The building itself was situated in the middle of an orange garden, where there were two great water tanks which I converted into swimming pools.

Immediately after my arrival a period of unrest and minor disturbances started. I found the trouble was invariably instigated by the French Consulate. Although they had received the mandate for the Lebanon and control over Syria, the French were jealous of our mandate for Palestine, and the clerical party, which had recovered some of its influence, claimed that France, and France alone, had an historical right to the protection of the Holy Places. Although I was quite certain in my own mind that the French Consul was implicated in the troubles, I had not sufficient evidence to produce in a court of law, and so could not accuse him. Fortunately he was soon afterwards replaced by a M. Bertrand, with whom I was soon on the best of terms, and the period of unrest came to an end.

In the beginning of the mandate our administration was scarcely organised and our officials had no proper uniform for official functions. When the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet put in to Jaffa, in duty bound I went to call on the Admiral; but I was dressed for the visit in breeches, boots and a tweed coat. The flagship gave me a thirteen-gun salute and as I came on to the quarter-deck I was met with a guard of honour of marines and a band playing "God Save the King." Standing to attention and taking the salute in those rat-catcher clothes was one of the worst experiences of my life.

The governorship of Jaffa was an expensive post, for a

certain amount of entertaining, both for the Jews and the Arabs, was absolutely essential, and no entertainment allowance was granted. In addition, some of the distinguished visitors staying at Government House in Jerusalem often wished to see something of the country, and I would be asked to put them up for a couple of nights and show them round the district—always, of course, at my own expense. These visits were sometimes most interesting, but they cost money which I could ill afford. A Government department trades on the goodwill and sense of duty of its officials and representatives when it expects them to provide official entertainment out of their own pockets.

It was fascinating to watch the first beginnings of the colonisation schemes of the Jews, who got down to work with a courage and determination which were beyond all praise. The first batches of immigrants were mostly from Poland and Galicia, lamentable specimens of the human race; yet these very same people, in the next generation, have produced fine examples of young men and women. But the impact on the Arab mind of Russian and Polish customs was disastrous. The Jews, who had little or no inhibitions, thought nothing of the practice of mixed bathing in the nude. The Arabs, with their strict rules of sexual conduct, regarded behaviour such as this as the very negation of elementary decency. How was it possible, they would ask, for the British, a Christian race, to inflict such people as the Jews on the country?

In the summer of 1921 my wife was at home for the birth of my son who, to our sorrow, died a few months later. During this time we had serious riots in Jaffa. Jews were shot and stabbed in the narrow lanes of the town, and Arab women joined in the attacks on Jewish colonies. Atrocities were committed by both sides, and some Arab women lying wounded in the fields were seen to have their breasts scythed off by Jewish colonists. Troops were eventually rushed up, and from the moment order was restored until I left the country calm and progress prevailed, with no further incidents to mar the relations between Jew and Arab.

I am convinced that, but for the Balfour Declaration, the Jews would have obtained all they wanted in the Holy Land with little or no opposition. The declaration, however, coupled with the attitude of the Jews, caused the Arabs to fear an eventual Jewish domination; for while it stated that the British Government favoured the creation of a Jewish national home *in* Palestine, the Jewish interpretation of it, which was openly preached, suggested that we favoured the conversion of the whole country into a national home for them. The Arabs, not

unnaturally, took alarm. Poor and inexperienced, they saw little chance of competing against their rivals, who were rich and clever, and who were also, as it seemed, being supported by the powerful British Government.

This fear of Jewish domination, which had never existed before, became the prevailing consideration. Had the Jews been really clever or had they followed the counsels of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, they would never have allowed it to gain ground and attain its eventual strength and importance. Individually, the Jews are intelligent and industrious; collectively, they are abysmally stupid.

The Postal Department in Palestine had prepared some large enamel notices for their offices in the various towns and villages. These notices read "Posts and Telegraphs," and the wording was in English, Hebrew and Arabic. The Jewish elders in one colony refused to put up their notices because they bore an Arabic inscription; in another they put them up, but only after effacing the Arabic wording. Had these collective bodies stopped to think they might have known what action I would take. Their stupidity angered me all the more since it afforded the Arab Press a golden opportunity to prove to the world that the Jew would never be made into a good citizen. I gave the colonies three days to replace the notices and told them that if they failed to put them back in that time they would have to go all the way to the head office in Jerusalem to collect their mail. The notices were put up at once.

We used to hunt with the Ramleh Vale hounds, whose kennels were between Lydda and Ramleh. The country was varied and a run might take us through olive groves, with their centuries-old gnarled and twisted trees, over cactus hedges and stone walls, and on to rolling downs of red soil similar to that of Devonshire. I also started gymkhana race meetings in the open country behind Jaffa, to which both Jews and Arabs flocked. A little sport and the chance of a small bet brought them together in complete oblivion of their political differences.

In the course of my tours through the country I sometimes spent the night at the Trappist monastery of Latroun, where I had probably the best dinner, certainly the best wine, to be had in all Palestine. Although belonging to a silent order, one of the monks would be detailed to keep me company and entertain me. He was usually the one who had special dispensation to go outside the monastery to do all the purchasing for the community. A Frenchman, he had taken his vows when quite a youngster. In 1914 he had left the monastery to join the French Air Force, and rose to be one of the most celebrated

French aces. The war over, he abandoned his uniform and again donned his monk's habit. He generally lunched with me on those days when he came into Jaffa to buy provisions, and I noticed that those days almost invariably seemed to coincide with a race meeting, so I used to drive him down to the course, where he thoroughly enjoyed himself. Since within the monastery silence was absolute, I don't suppose he was ever questioned as to how he had spent his afternoon.

Shortly after my arrival in Palestine I was offered two other appointments. One was to take command of all the Levies in Iraq. This I refused, as I had just got married and settled down and I did not want to move over to the bad climate of Iraq. Communications to Baghdad were still very bad: there was no Nairn Transport Service as yet across the desert and no planes to take one over. The only way of getting there was to go by boat from Port Said to Bombay, then to Karachi, up the Persian Gulf to Basra and then by train or river steamer to Baghdad. I often wished I had taken this job, as it offered great scope and would have been highly interesting.

The other post offered me was that of Resident in Trans-Jordania. This I refused as I was very happy where I was and, according to Sir Herbert Samuel, the job I was in was a permanent one. Also I did not feel that my Arabic was sufficiently polished to enable me to guide the administration of a purely Arabic-speaking country.

On my refusal it was offered to St. John Philby, who accepted but did not stay very long. As an Irishman, he was "agin" the Government, or indeed *any* Government, on principle. This was a pity, as he is a very brilliant man who has now made a name outside Government circles.

At the start of the Mandate the guidance, the power and the administration of the Holy Land lay in the hands of three men—the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary and the Attorney-General.

Sir Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner, was of course a Jew and, precisely because he was, he took great care to show no bias towards his co-religionists. He thereby made his personal position extremely difficult, for the Jewish world expected much of him. He was an essentially fair-minded man and tried to do what was best, but up to that time his political experience had been limited to the committee rooms of the House of Commons. He once told me that, until his appointment as High Commissioner in Palestine, he had only been out of England on two occasions, once to Boulogne for the afternoon and once

to Venice for the fortnight of his honeymoon. Yet this was the man who had been entrusted with what was perhaps the most difficult post in the whole of the British Empire. He knew nothing of the oriental mind and, sitting in council with him, I noticed again and again that he had no conception of what the Arab members sitting round the table were thinking, and no feeling whatever for the atmosphere engendered by what he fondly imagined to be his statesmanlike counsels. I could only feel sorry for him, since everything he said or did, however well-intentioned, was suspect to the Arab mind.

The Chief Secretary was a man of a different kidney. A soldier, an ascetic with a strong strain of religious fanaticism, Sir Wyndham Deedes brought great powers of concentration and industry to bear on his difficult administrative task. He was an ardent Zionist and once told me that he hoped that by as much as he could assist in the return of the Jews to the Holy Land, by so much would he hasten the second coming of the Lord. But his rôle, surely, was to hold the scales evenly between Arab and Jew, particularly in view of the fact that his own chief was a Jew.

Norman Bentwich, the Attorney-General, was a clever lawyer and the most open exponent of the Zionist faith. In this man's hands lay the making of the laws and the adjudication of concessions. His faith being what it was, how could he possibly be considered impartial by any Arab in Palestine?

These three men were good men in themselves, but that they should have been chosen by our Government for the posts they held blackened the good name of England in the Middle East, and led to the final downfall of our reputation for fair play.

The leader of the Zionist cause, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, was a great chemist and a great man. Where all the other Jewish leaders were hand-to-mouth politicians, Weizmann stood out as a statesman. He saw quite clearly that a Jewish State in Palestine could only be constructed gradually, by its own weight and momentum, and that any attempt to force the issue artificially would probably doom the scheme to failure. It was these moderate and conciliatory methods that finally lost him the support of the extreme Zionists. Weizmann was by no means moderate by nature, but he had the wisdom of a Cincinnatus and knew how to wait. His attitude at that time towards a Jewish State may be deduced from a letter which he wrote to Balfour at the time of the Versailles Treaty. In the course of it he observed:

The persistent misrepresentation in the French Press here,

the continued talk of a "Jewish State" when such a claim has been authoritatively repudiated, have likewise their disturbing reflex in the East.

In the development of the Jewish colonies it was interesting to compare the zeal and energy put into the new ones with the struggles the older ones had to keep their heads above water, for very few were economic propositions. Apart from the growing of citrus fruit, viticulture was practised on a large scale, especially at Richon-le-Zion, where the Jews claimed to have the largest caves in the world. Much of their surplus produce was exported for blending to Bordeaux, but far and away the best wine in the country was made and kept in the Trappist monastery of Latroun

. . . The Arab mind works in tortuous channels, but there is a certain underlying logic in its deductions. I was drinking coffee one day with a group of sheikhs, when an old grey-beard turned to me and spoke as follows:

"We are ignorant people, but we discuss things and we are always anxious to understand. We know that in the course of the war England became deeply financially indebted to the Jews. We also know that in order to pay off her debt she had had to cede India to this race" (he meant, of course, the appointment of Lord Reading as Viceroy) "but we had not realised that the debt was so great that she would have to surrender Palestine as well. This is troubling our minds and we would desire to know the truth."

In the early days there were many Jews in Palestine who were not Zionists, but the pressure applied by the Jewish Agency became so great, and its Gestapo methods so severe, that few Jews dared openly express any other faith. Just before I left Jaffa a very important Jewish farmer from Richon-le-Zion sent a message asking if he could come and see me. I accordingly invited him to come to my office the following morning, but he refused to do that and asked for an appointment at my house after dark.

When he arrived he told me he had come to ask for my advice on a personal problem. He explained how, as a small boy, he had been brought to Palestine by his father, one of the biggest landowners of his village. Growing up there, he had made numerous friends among the little Arab boys of his own age. On his father's death he had taken over the property and naturally continued to employ his boyhood friends as herdsmen, ploughmen and teamsters. That morning, however, the Jewish Agency had ordered him to dismiss all his Arab employees and to engage some newly arrived Jewish immigrants at a wage-rate

far in excess of the pay of his Arab workmen. What should he do? If he dismissed the Arabs in the summary manner suggested, such bad feeling would be created that, being a vindictive people, they might well burn his crops. Apart from this consideration, they also happened to be his friends. The Jews who had been proposed to him as labourers knew nothing about farming, and certainly nothing about the local conditions. The Arabs would work to all hours of the night if it were a question of getting a crop in before the rain; the Jews would down tools precisely at six o'clock, no matter what the weather. He now saw no possibility of working his land on economic lines, and he would inevitably go bankrupt.

I was put in a difficult position, for any advice I gave him would certainly be quoted and I should be denounced by the all-powerful Jewish Agency. After thinking the matter over, I told him to go to the Agency and tell it exactly what he had told me. He could then give it the choice of rescinding its order or of seeing him go bankrupt. I explained that many of the members of the Agency were business men, and all were politically minded. So the last thing they would want would be to see so prominent a farmer fail, which would be shockingly bad for their own prestige and propaganda. By presenting this ultimatum, he would transfer the burden of the decision on to other shoulders.

About this time Lord Northcliffe* visited Palestine in the course of the world tour which he made not long before he died. I was deputed to take him round the Jewish colonies in my district, and spent a most interesting day with him. He was a sick man, querulous and irritated by officialdom, but was quite obviously pleased to be taken round by someone whom he already knew. At Richon-le-Zion we were entertained to a grand Kosher luncheon, and speeches of welcome were delivered in Hebrew. Northcliffe, in reply, made a speech which left most of us gasping. He told the Jews of Palestine some home truths which no one hitherto had dared voice. He said that they should realise that they could not always be guarded by British bayonets, and that their future status in the country depended on how well they co-operated with the Arabs, whose guests, after all, they were. Judging from the faces of those who understood English, his speech was not very welcome, and Norman Bentwich, who had to translate it into Hebrew, had

* Alfred Charles William Harmsworth, Viscount Northcliffe, (1865-1922) was newspaper proprietor, founder of *Daily Mail* and *Daily Mirror*, Director of War Propaganda, 1918.

a hard time toning it down to render it less unpalatable to the audience.

Towards the end of 1922 I wrote a memorandum for the High Commissioner pointing out that unless the British Government came out into the open and declared what they really did mean by the Balfour Declaration, there would be mounting trouble between the Arabs and the Jews. If the Government did, in fact, mean to create a Jewish Sovereign State, now was the time openly to declare such a policy. If, on the other hand, it was the intention to abide by the wording of the declaration, a statement to that effect was urgently required to allay the fears of the Arabs and to counter the false interpretation being placed on the declaration by the Jewish Agency in Palestine and certain responsible Jews in America. The troubles which either course might entail would be nothing compared to the difficulties we should have to face later through failing to state our intentions. I finally pointed out how hard it was for the executive officials to give of their best when they did not even know what they were aiming at.

This memorandum was so unpopular that plans were immediately considered as to the best way to get rid of me without creating too much of a stir. It was eventually decided to reorganise the administration and reduce the number of governorates from five to three. This reorganisation naturally entailed the dismissal of two governors, and needless to say, I was one of them. Petitions poured in from all over the country requesting the Government to reconsider its decision; but these were of no avail and so, with the shedding of crocodile tears by the Government and expressions of profound goodwill from the High Commissioner, I took leave of Palestine in May 1923. . . .

. . . After giving a great deal of thought to the subject of the Jewish national home, and after three years of practical experience of the workings of the scheme, I came to certain conclusions, which I have not felt the need to modify either with the passage of years or in the light of recent events. It was clearly not right to inject a foreign sovereign state into the heart of a group of Arab countries; nor was it right to displace an existing population against its will in order to make room for migrants from abroad; but there was no objection to doing what we set out to do, which was to create a cultural and religious base or home for the Jews scattered throughout the world. In this all Arabs will agree with me, for it was they, it should be remembered, who during the past thousand years protected the Jews, while the Christians in Europe were oppressing them.

One of my friends, who appears now and again in these pages and has often helped me laugh over them, once challenged me to say what I really thought. From one who is an onlooker and has never been a player in the political game truth cannot be thus coaxed. But in reviewing these notes and in trying to give as honest an answer as I can, and in a kind of summary to a question that is perhaps not worth answering, this is how it looks to me now:

1. The policy of the Balfour Declaration is an unjust policy and Zionism as understood and as sometimes practised in Palestine is based upon a fundamental injustice and therefore dangerous both to civilization and to Jewry.

2. Our British attitude is unintelligent. Such plan as we have is not thought out. As a consequence our administrators risk lending themselves to something that is disingenuous and that will have to be reconsidered and revalued.

3. The motive force of Zionism, partly on the Jewish, wholly on the non-Jewish side, is Anglo-American Protestantism. It is the aftermath of that movement for personal religion and the sectarian study of the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, which captured Europe after the fall of the Mediaeval Church in the sixteenth century. And this motive force, though it may still have considerable weight, is unscientific and sometimes, where it manifests itself in Hebraistic form, unchristian.

4. To the motive force of Anglo-American Protestantism

* From C[harles] R[obert] Ashbee, *A Palestine Notebook, 1918-1923* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1923), pp. 267-77. The chapter from which the excerpt has been taken is entitled "Collect—1923." Reprinted by permission of William Heinemann Ltd.

** British architect (1863-1942); Civic Adviser to the Palestine Administration, 1918-22.

we have to add the intellectual and industrial drive of the Russian Jew, and the desire for emancipation in southeast Europe. This drive and this desire it is that draws the Jews from the pale, out of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Roumania, Germany, Czecko-Slovakia, to the United States and now to Palestine. In so doing it complicates the language difficulty, and introduces into an Arabic-speaking country German, Russian, Magyar, and Yiddish, with a more recently superimposed Hebrew, thus making the task of the administrator often impossible. I have had to conduct a business negotiation in seven different languages, though myself able to manage only three and a half.

5. There is always virtue in ideas, and all ideas work themselves out in other than the form in which they are first presented to the world. They may be great or little, time alone is the judge of their validity. Zionism has proved itself to be an idea of considerable vigour. Arguing on the analogy of history it is likely to be transformed or to work itself out into something else. Owing to the nature of the Jew as a ferment and germ, this may have consequences of great importance to the world and its reconstruction. Anti-Semites and those opposed to the Zionist policy do not take sufficient count of this. They are unfair to Zionism.

6. Some of the results—they have hardly yet got beyond the experimental stage—have been touched on, I hope without prejudice, in these pages. We see them in experiments at race fusion, at model legislation, at a Jewish state; we see them in agricultural and civic enterprises, in attempts at by-crafts, in economic ventures and so forth. The real interest in what survives of all this will be not to Palestine, but to the greater world outside, for Palestine is microcosmical, having sun, moon, and stars within itself; it has, more than any other land, with the exception of Greece, influenced Western civilization and may do so again.

7. The Administration, because of its momentary obsession with political propaganda, is half-hearted in regard to the two main things which in Palestine it ought to be doing and for which it may ultimately be judged, the life and quality of the peasantry, and the development of historical and archaeological research; one might add a third, the new city, but here more has been done because the Jew is essentially city-bred. Nor can the Administration be greatly interested in the peasantry of Palestine because, being committed to a policy of Zionist propaganda in a country where more than 85 per cent. of the peasantry are Moslem and Christian, it is primarily concerned in supporting and stimulating Jewish colonies, introducing

their fellow religionists from S.-E. Europe, and in demonstrating that the agricultural methods they practise are superior to anything that the indigenous peasant can put forth. This view I hold to be erroneous. But the error is often dangerous because it may lead to neglect and unfairness. To take an instance, sometimes quoted, a question often asked: Had the city of Gaza been a Jewish and not a Moslem agricultural centre, would it have remained in its condition of wreckage after the bombardment? The Administration indeed is often forced into the illogical position of adopting methods of constructive socialism where Jewish affairs are concerned, but of preaching a serene and cold *laissez faire* when the interests are non-Jewish.¹

8. An industrialized Palestine for which many ardent Zionists and some English officials hope is a questionable benefit and, I think, a futile hope. Some new mechanical processes may be introduced to the lasting good of agriculture, especially in the treatment of the vine and the olive, some mineral wealth may be extracted from the soil, some power got from the Jordan, but in the main the peasant's life is likely to remain for a long time unaffected. We ought, I think, to look at the structure of peasant society in Palestine as a whole and not as something from which a morsel can be sliced every now and again to satisfy the industrial need of some extravascular corporation. And may it not be better to leave as it is that peasant society, which still has so much dignity and beauty, if what we displace it with is the discontent and squalid ugliness of southeastern Europe Americanized? In exchange for the few benefits we introduce we may be doing infinite mischief. "New lamps for old" is an Eastern tale that still has value in the East, and Aladdin's mother, it is generally allowed, was a fond and foolish woman.

9. The same bias, or uncertainty of balance, which the Administration has shown in regard to the agricultural life, it has shown in its treatment of Palestine History, Archaeology, Arts and Crafts, Technical Education, and, in Palestine we ought to add, Comparative Religions. With the great questions here involved it has so far only trifled. Plans started with great hope, pomp, and puff, the Antiquities Ordinance, the Pro-Jerusalem Charter, the Town-Planning Ordinance, the Crafts and Industries Commission, have not been consistently carried through. The necessary money was not allowed for them. This it may have been difficult to do. But the alternative of an appeal to the sentiment and good will of the world, though accepted in principle, was not followed up, and, possibly, because the Administration felt itself unsure in the saddle. Any such appeal might be misjudged. The timid rider might fall off. Both his

seat and his conscience were uneasy.

In these matters that affect the future state, or where the greater world outside is concerned—the amenities, the people's higher life, where it is no question of trade concessions, or company promotion, or business returns—the old Liberal policy of doing nothing because it does not pay is unsound. The right and wise method is that adopted by the French or the Germans. Napoleon's Survey of Egypt remains a standard and guide to the administrator, and modern German building, craftsmanship, and technical education in Palestine are an open book. To take the former alone and what it established, I think it possible that when the credit accounts of the English and the French are added up, the spiritual, not political, contribution of France in historical research, scholarship, ethnology, comparative religions, and all that we connect with the names Champollion, Villotteau, Mariette, De Lesseps, Maspéro, Lacaut, may count for more than the more material contribution of England in railways, canals, and honest if rough-handed administration even with the names of Cromer, Scott-Moncrieff, Kitchener, Flinders Petrie, Lord Carnarvon, and Carter thrown in to weigh down the scale. We are risking the same error in Palestine, and without the spiritual guiding lines of France already laid to help us.

10. One great consideration remains—Pan-Islam. Even to those who know most of the East this is still obscure; but as far as I can see Pan-Islam is the result and the counterpart of our Western Nationalistic movement. As such it is a new form of the Moslem faith and it is bound increasingly so to become because of certain principles inherent in that faith itself. For Islam is more than a creed; it is a complete social system. Hence our Western nationalism and Pan-Islam must necessarily coalesce, and the latter will absorb the former because, in the words of the Aga Khan, "the theory of the spiritual and cultural unity of Islam . . . is the foundation of its life and soul."

If, then, Pan-Islamism is, as I believe it to be, a force fundamentally spiritual and humanistic, it will if rightly approached have a meaning and a purpose for us in the West. Two alternatives are before us: we can hold out the glittering bribe of our materialism or we can meet it with sympathetic recognition. The first has been our method in Egypt and elsewhere, and it has been a failure. To pursue this method to its logical conclusion in Palestine would mean the armed support of the Jew against Islam, an end unthinkingly horrible. The second has yet to be tried, but it involves a recognition of certain religious principles in the faith of Islam which so far the Christian nations have been unwilling to concede.

Yet Christian ethics have provided us with certain formulae which have still to be intelligently applied, and if it be true that Islam has carried on the religious evolution of the world a step further, it provides us with a new synthesis. "The principle of Islamic fraternity—of Pan-Islamism, if you prefer the word—is analogous to patriotism but with this difference: this Islamic fraternity, though resulting in identity of laws and customs, has (not like Western nationality) been brought about by community of race, country, or history, but has been received, as we believe, directly from God." Thus Mohammed Ali, one of the modern leaders of Islam. From the angle of the League of Nations and the peace of the world the Moslem antithesis of the *Dar-ul-Islam* and the *Dar-ul-Harb* has an intense significance for us. Islam means "surrender to God," but the *Dar-ul-Harb* as set against the *Dar-ul-Islam* is the "House of War." —

Yet the outlook is not without hope, and great hope, if we envisage it from the point of view of English history, and of what Palestine means to the rest of the world. The *if* is important. It is a fundamental principle of English policy that administration must be non-sectarian. Purchased with much blood and at the price of great suffering through many centuries, this principle is one of the fundamentals of Christianity as the Englishman understands it. The English Reformation, while it was a rebellion against Latin Theocracy, was as much neo-platonic and quietist as it was Hebraic. You shall go to Heaven in your own way, for the Kingdom of God is in the heart. We must keep in mind the qualifying *if*.

The policy, brilliant as many of us thought it at the time, of establishing in effect a Jewish administration in order to pare the nails of the Zionist Commission, can only be a temporary policy. However just and single-minded be any High Commissioner he cannot permanently be a practising Jew, nor a Roman Catholic, nor a member of any other religious communion suspect of divided allegiance. It is not possible to administer Palestine permanently in the interests of a group that is essentially sectarian or that will not render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.

What, then, should this Palestine venture mean to the English official, and to those who are keeping him there? What has English history taught? The English have swaggered round the world and in the last four hundred years brought certain things, first a spirit of adventure, then of trade, last of empire. Other peoples have done the same, but the English because of their peculiar position as an island people, a people of the sea,

have given to these three achievements a peculiar character.

The spirit of adventure first wakens to consciousness with the island of the Elizabethan drama—"this precious stone set in the silver sea." It runs as a flaming thread of gold through English history, in Raleigh, Drake, and Humphrey Gilbert, in Sidney, in Fanshawe, in Blake, Benbow, Rodney, and Nelson, in Clive, Hudson, and Cook, and right on through our own days in Cecil Rhodes and Captain Scott. One could cite hundreds of names in the Great War, English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish. In all these men there is a fire of poetry lived as well as felt, and felt rather than phrased.

Then came the spirit of trade, for the romantic pirate had to subsist, and that built up the British Colonies, the East India Company, the great merchant marine; it laid railways and cables all over the world, and ended by giving it the idea of free trade and the open door.

Last came the spirit of empire, often at conflict with the foregoing—and this has produced a civil service, a governing class, a tradition of even-handed justice and given the world the idea of government by consent, modelled more or less on English parliamentary methods and ending in what is sometimes called self-determination.

But there for the moment—there with the shock of the war, the historical sequence ends. Our island patriotism ends. Our nationalist ideal can carry us no further. It is to the wider ramifications that we must now look; where are we going in the world, whence came we ourselves? To me it appears, and I hope these pages have shown, that this outlook is in three directions: the League of Nations, a civic revival, and a reformed industrialism.

Through the first we must quench the fire of our own national enthusiasm which merely stimulates other similar nationalisms to the destruction of civilized life. We must through it build up the new order. We must sink our imperialism, become the Commonwealth, "suffer a sea change." By means of the second we must shape again something of that finer life which Athens first made conscious and which, in the Graeco-Roman civilization that followed, created the cities of a world in many respects nobler than our, the cities of the Mediterranean: Italy, Sicily, Provence, Palestine, North Africa, and those that later followed at long distance, the cities of the outer seas, of France, Spain, Flanders, the Hanseatic group, the Rhineland, the British Isles, America, Australia. The hope of civilization is largely in a new civic consciousness. There remains the third outlook, the reformed industrialism. The end here is less economic than

religious, we cannot achieve it without the help of the East. We have to discover the purposes to which mechanical power should be applied, and we have to guard from it the holier, the personal, the intimate things with which it must not be allowed to interfere. The question of machinery is no longer a question of economics, it is a question of ethics.

And so if we ask where in this idealistic sequence our Palestine venture fits in we find this: There is first the brilliant victory of Allenby* and the impulse given by it toward the ending of the Great War. There is then the effort of clearing up and rebuilding a country, and the city of Jerusalem—for here the part is always greater than the whole—a country which to all men has a strange unreal sanctity. Palestine for most of us was an emotion rather than a reality.

There was next the half-generous, wholly ignorant impulse that this, as we English thought, empty land, this no man's land, this land lost to us when we were last there in the days of Edward Longshanks, might as we had now conquered it of the Turk be tossed to the Jews. So we thought.

There was then—and here came the rub—a certain chivalrous reaction, and it came with greater knowledge. This country, it appeared, belonged after all to other people and they, too, had helped us win the war. Who were these other people? What right had we to mortgage their inheritance? Might it not be a breach of trust? We have recently begun to find out the truth, to answer some of these troublesome questions.

The greater knowledge, clinging round the word "self-determination," came as an eye-opener. It showed us two things: first, that we were after all, as far as Palestine was concerned, only a part of Christendom; Greek, Italian, French, German, Russian, also had a share in the Holy Land, perhaps a greater share than we, even as St. Bernard, St. Francis, and St. Louis did more for Palestine, and meant more for the world, than Richard Cœur-de-Lion or Edward Longshanks. It showed us next that there were also the Arab and the Moslem to be reckoned with, him to whom the Holy Land actually belonged, to whom the Holy Land was equally holy, and whose record and achievement in it—Amr, Abdul Malek, Al-Mamun, Saladin, Kalaoun, Kait Bey—were far greater than ours. We were learning a little history.

* Edmund H. Allenby (1861-1936) was Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine and Syria. He entered Jerusalem in December, 1917, and finally defeated the Turks at Megiddo in September, 1918.

The English administrator does not read much, he has little time to study history, or he might have noted a passage in George Adam Smith's "Historical Geography of the Holy Land" where he is told how Palestine, "formed as it is, and surrounded as it is, is emphatically a land of tribes. The idea that it can ever belong to one nation, even though this were the Jews, is contrary both to nature and to Scripture." The English administrator gets his history in the hard facts of life as he stumbles along, and so it has been with this verification of a scholar's forecast. He has kicked his shins against something that is both contrary to nature and to Scripture. And how he has come as a consequence to change his view these pages may help to show. . . .

NOTES

- 1 Another case in point is the disastrous Jerusalem drainage scheme already referred to, and here the policy of the Administration and the Zionist Commission has been one of hushing up.

The Stages of Zionism and Minority National Rule*

CHAIM ARLOSOROFF**

June 30, 1932

DEAR DR. WEIZMANN:

I am writing you once again without awaiting a reply to my long letter of some days ago. I am afraid that this letter will be a somewhat strange literary creation, and I hope you will not be annoyed at me for taking time with a letter that may justly be described as an abstract essay on Zionist policy. But the matter has been on my mind and the conclusions that I inevitably reach are of a sort that I would like to prepare the ground for oral discussions. I hope that it will be possible to discuss them if I come to London.

The Stages of Zionism

In my last letter I dealt with our present political policy. I noted that though for the present we have no choice in the matter our present policy must be viewed as a palliative and that it will be difficult, perhaps even impossible, to attain the political ends of Zionism in this manner. I would define this policy as synthetic and evolutionary. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate this definition in order to clarify my point of view.

I do not intend to start a debate on the nature of the aims of Zionism. I hold to my opinion that there are no significant differences of opinion about these in the various Zionist groups.

* From *Jewish Frontier*, October, 1948, pp. 7-11. This memorandum appeared in the *Jewish Frontier* under the title "Reflections on Zionist Policy."

** Zionist Labour leader, assassinated by a rival Zionist group in Tel Aviv, 1933. At the time of this memorandum he was Director of the Political Department in the Jewish Agency Executive.

It is evident that if we do not wish to reestablish Diaspora* conditions in Palestine we must strive toward the quickest possible settlement of hundreds of thousands of Jews in order to assure at least a rare equilibrium between the two peoples in the country. I am forced to the conclusion that with present day methods and under the present regime there exists virtually no opportunity for solving the problem of large-scale immigration and colonization.

This is so because our policy is based on the assumption that it is necessary and possible to attain our aims gradually, step by step. It is evident that this policy was the only correct one in the past. Any other method that we can think of today is based on the real strength of the Jewish community in Palestine, and this strength is the result of the method of gradualism we have followed. When I speak of "stages" of development, I do not refer to concrete situations that can be exactly defined statistically or by some diplomatic or legal formula. I do have in mind definite stages of development in the relationship of forces between the two peoples contending in the country. The strength of the two sides may be based on their social or economic development, on their technical or financial resources, or on the military organization and the military potential of the male population of the two peoples. The present "stage," which we have attained by means of gradual development, may be defined approximately as follows: The Arabs are no longer strong enough to destroy our position but still consider themselves strong enough to establish an Arab state in Palestine without taking into consideration Jewish political demands, whereas the Jews are strong enough to preserve their present positions without possessing sufficient strength to assure the constant growth of the Jewish community through immigration, colonization, and the maintenance of peace and order in the country in the course of this development.

The next "stage" will be attained when the relationship of real forces will be such as to preclude any possibility of the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine, *i.e.*, when the Jews will acquire such additional strength as will automatically block the road for Arab domination. This will be followed by another "stage" during which the Arabs will be unable to frustrate the constant growth of the Jewish community through immigration and constructive economic activity. The constantly

* Originally the term referred to the Jews' dispersion in the Greco-Roman world, but it has subsequently been used by Zionist writers to indicate contemporary Jewish "dispersion" outside Palestine.

growing strength of the Jews will influence the Arabs in the direction of seeking a negotiated accord. This will be followed by a "stage" during which the equilibrium between the two peoples will be based on real forces and an agreed solution to the problem.

The test of the evolutionary practices of Zionist policy within the framework of the British mandate consists in whether it will be possible to attain the next "stage" by means of this policy. Should that be possible, then it is the part of political wisdom and common sense to ignore all the hardships and interference, to overlook bitterness and disappointments, and to continue diligently to add one asset to another until the next "stage" is attained. But should that prove impossible, then all efforts in this direction would be wasted and it would no longer be feasible to cling to the evolutionary method of Zionist policy or to base on it the strength and the endurance of the Zionist movement. I am inclined to think that it is not possible.

The Limits of Mandatory Administration

In order to attain the next "stage"—and the exact annual number of immigrants and settlers is not important in this connection—the government of Palestine would have to exert efforts, and the mandatory government would have to provide us with financial means on a scale that we have no grounds to expect. The government would not only have to refrain from hindering our own efforts (as happened more than once in the present period) but it would also have to provide planned and active encouragement for our efforts to utilize constantly all opportunities inherent in the objective conditions of the country. It is my opinion that it would be too much to ask of any government that it should assume such a burden for the sake of settlers of a "foreign" people. This is one of the reasons why the recent Revisionist slogans regarding a "colonizing regime" appeared unrealistic to me. Hopes of this kind under present conditions are visionary. Even if the British administration should succeed in liberating itself completely from instinctive sympathies and antipathies, it cannot be expected to view the situation from our standpoint. It is in the nature of things that the administration should be considerate of the sensibilities of the Arabs and Moslems to such an extent as to prevent an active policy in our favor. The British administrators are accustomed to being guided by the principle of convenient and instinctive reaction, and it would be very hard for them to depart from this practice to the extent of becoming responsive to our demands. I have the

wonderful long letter you wrote to Lord Balfour during your first visit to the country together with the Zionist Commission. From it I learned that you foresaw the characteristic features of the present situation even at that time.

I want to add the following: Precisely at this time, when we deal with a High Commissioner who shows appreciation of our work and is capable of understanding our aims for the future, precisely now that our relations with the administration have improved and promise to improve still more, the limits of our opportunities under the present regime emerge very clearly. The High Commissioner no doubt thinks that he is exceedingly generous whenever he removes from our path obstacles arising from administrative routine. But how great is the distance separating such a benevolent approach from the planned and active policy that is required to advance our work

The matter of the percentage of Jews employed in public works is only one detail in a long list of activities upon which the Jewish National Home must be reared. In order to obtain an increase of a few thousand pounds from the government for Jewish education—an increase whose justification even the government admits on the basis of the present method of calculation (which is itself inadequate and unjust)—it is necessary to write memoranda upon memoranda over the course of years and even then the matter is not advanced one step forward. There are not enough Jewish officials in the district administrations. As a result of the retrenchments, a situation has arisen under which the district administrations can pass entirely into the hands of Arabs, should the high British officials be away, during an emergency. Jews did not enlist in the Transjordan defense force in any appreciable number, because Lord Plumer* promised us that this force would serve Transjordan only and would not be a Palestinian military unit. But now the Transjordan Frontier Force has in fact become a Palestinian force. It was used during the events of 1929. Its units are stationed in permanent structures on Palestine soil in Rosh Pinah, Beisan, and Gesher. But a change in its composition at this time would lead to great political repercussions in public opinion. It is impossible to discharge one third of the troops in order to make room for Jewish recruits. It is likewise impossible to add an appreciable number of Jewish soldiers, for that would involve great expense. All we are permitted to do is pay a large part of

* Lord Herbert Plumer (1857-1932) was High Commissioner for Palestine, 1925-28.

the taxes needed for the maintenance of this military force.

The entire system of immigration permits is becoming a joke. It is true that from time to time it is possible to obtain 2,000-3,000 permits (and we should be thankful even for this). But one cannot imagine that it would be possible to establish a daring and far-reaching immigration policy on the basis of tedious negotiations with the government immigration department. As far as the land problem is concerned, all the official institutions are agreed that there are no government lands available for Jewish colonization. All of them now regretfully admit that the Beisan lands were wasted, but at the same time we are asked to be reasonable and become reconciled to the wrong which, once done, cannot be corrected. We are soon about to witness the promulgation of a surprising number of regulations for the protection of tenant farmers, regulations covering land disputes, regulations guaranteeing family rights, regulations regarding land transfer, ownership rights, and who knows what else. In the end we will be happy if we succeed in overcoming the new legal restraints and in making the slightest step forward. But it is out of the question that there should be a constructive development policy to utilize all the financial and administrative resources of the government, to improve every dunam of land, to develop all industrial opportunities, and make use of all trade possibilities.

The Approaching Crisis

Of course, despite all these objections one may argue that lacking an alternative there is no choice but to continue the present policy—to advance step by step, to add one layer to another, to strengthen the few important positions in our possession and to await an opportunity that might arise from an unknown quarter. I would be prepared to follow this road without complaint, if I foresaw the likelihood of some decades of peace and more or less stable conditions in Palestine, during which we would have an opportunity to grow slowly. But unfortunately the world political situation is so upset and the tensions in the Middle East are growing at such a rate, that there exists but a tenuous basis for such an optimistic assumption.

The first fact to be considered is the liquidation of all Class A Mandates and the consequences thereof.* As far as Palestine is concerned, this process may last another three or five or seven years. But it is impossible to halt the trend in this direction.

* On the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see above, p. 198, note.

In addition we are witnessing a shift in borders in the Middle East which has not yet come to an end. Should Syria and Iraq unite under one ruler, the united state could exert upon us a greater pressure than if the states in the North were to remain apart. The question whether the Emir of Transjordan will succeed in extending his rule southward and annex parts of Arabia is now also more serious than it was six months ago. To these factors one must add the influence of such events on "Istiklal"* and especially on the youth. We must not forget that the Arab movement in Palestine has meanwhile learned all the political practices of Zionism, from Congresses and presidents down to banks and campaigns. It has succeeded to some extent in attracting the attention of the Arab and Moslem world to Jerusalem and Palestine. Any policy which aims at isolating the Arabs of Palestine will now encounter greater obstacles than it would have encountered ten or even five years ago. Moreover, it is scarcely necessary for me to remind you that the non-Jewish population of Palestine is increasing at a rapid rate. A decade ago a Jewish majority, or numerical equality, in Palestine was a matter of five hundred thousand additional persons. Today it is a question of eight hundred thousand. In another fifteen years it will be a question of a million and a quarter. But since the area of Palestine (even within its widest borders) is fixed, the pressure on the means of subsistence in the country will rapidly increase. I do not mean to say that it is impossible to overcome this pressure. It is definitely possible to overcome it, but to do so, great means and a government loyal to its tasks are required.

This array of circumstances may reach a climax if an international struggle in which Britain is a participant should break out. And can there be any doubt that we are nearing another world war? Five or ten years may pass before it breaks out and we cannot foretell exactly the form it will assume, whether it will be in the form of a concentration of forces against Soviet Russia (partly in order to halt the spread of Bolshevism) or the lines will be drawn some other way. Bismarck once said that "history does not permit us to look at its cards." But it is clear beyond all doubt whither we are going. Let us take for example the international policies of the Labor Government, which was originally pacifist. It is not at all important that

* The *Istiklal* was a group of Arab nationalists from Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon which centered originally around King Faisal immediately after World War I. This group was Pan-Arabist in its aspirations and emphasized independence, *istiklal*, from imperial rule.

Henderson presides over any number of disarmament commissions, while the Labor Government annually spends to no useful purpose 115 million pounds for rearmament. The members of the government are not insane, after all. And since they are sane it is just as certain that there will be war as that winter follows autumn. The day the war is declared the mandates system will collapse and the League of Nations will go on vacation. So far as Palestine is concerned it is possible that the precedent established in Egypt and Cyprus in 1914 will be repeated, and the country will be made officially a part of the British Empire. In any case, if we leave matters to develop along their present course, we will witness an open British-Arab alliance, or an Arab rebellion. Furthermore, if we postpone decisive action till that time, we might reach a point where we have been severed from world Jewry, which constitutes our reserve force so far as provision of manpower, money, and equipment is concerned.

Alternatives of Policy

I am sure that your patience has run out and you ask yourself: What is the purpose of all these words? What conclusions are to be drawn from them?

I see before me four possible conclusions. One possible way out is to declare that it is an ignorant prejudice to assume that every problem must have a solution, that all calculations must balance in the end. Actually, it is not so. We have no choice but to continue wandering along devious paths without knowing exactly where we will come out. We must carry on even though we stand before a seemingly unscalable wall. We must gather strength as best we can. We do not know what the future will bring. "Perhaps the 'poritz' will die; perhaps the dog will die," as the famous Jewish anecdote has it. New opportunities may be in store for us. Meantime we must hold our positions.

This is a characteristically Jewish attitude. It is the typically Jewish manifestation of courage—but it is definitely not a Zionist attitude. Should the Zionist movement adopt such an attitude, it would renounce political action (which implies a calculated policy and a constructive plan) and descend to the level of Jewish fatalism—the consequence of passivity during many generations. In this sense I have always looked upon Zionism as a rebellion against Jewish tradition. For lack of a better choice, we may have to return to this tradition. But it is clear that such a policy comes into consideration only for the small group of militant Zionists who have been through all the struggles

of the movement and who have no life outside it. I am certain that it does not come into consideration for the masses of the Jewish people and especially for the younger generation, which we still have to gain for the Zionist movement, the generation which looks at the twentieth century with the clear-eyed sobriety of post-war youth and demands unqualified direction.

The second possible conclusion is to declare that world conditions being as they are, we cannot put the Zionist vision into practice. The Zionist program is doomed to inevitable breakdown despite the vitality and the brilliance of the young Jewish community of 180,000. The Zionist analysis has been proved true throughout the world, from the Soviet Union to the United States. The truth of the Zionist remedy has also been demonstrated in those few manifestations of national life—labor, land, language—which the Jewish community has created in Palestine. But objective conditions in the world, among the Jewish people, and among the Palestine population today preclude progress toward the Zionist goal. Such a conclusion is inherent in all the recent attempts to reinterpret Zionism. It is the basis for the so-called Zionist and pseudo-Zionist programs, whether these be called “cultural Zionism” or “Brit Shalom.”

The third theoretical possibility is to cling to fundamental Zionist principles but to contract the geographic limits of their realization—instead of all of Palestine, only certain parts of the country. (This conception of the problem is the basis of the various cantonization plans, as well as of Dr. Jacobson’s* plan for a Jewish State in Palestine instead of Palestine as a Jewish State.) Despite all the tumult in the press, I believe that the desire to establish national sovereignty in a part of Palestine, to create within this zone all those opportunities for unhindered development which are dependent on state power, contains a core of sound thinking. In matters of administration, finance, and colonization, such a region could become a strategic base for potential future progress. Such a plan would contain the elements of territorial and political self-determination, which embody the basic truth of Zionism. But, in my opinion, all these plans are doomed to failure for the following reasons:

- a) The small area of Palestine.
- b) The problem of Jerusalem.

* Dr. Victor Jacobson (1869-1934), Russian-born with Ottoman nationality, was elected member of the Zionist Executive, 1911, and appointed Director of the Copenhagen Zionist Bureau, 1916.

c) The unfavorable geographic situation of the areas of Jewish colonization (the coastal plain, the valley of Jezreel, the Jordan valley, and Upper Galilee.)

d) The fact that even in these areas the Jews still constitute a minority, so that the basic problem would change quantitatively but not qualitatively.

The fourth possible conclusion is that under present circumstances Zionism cannot be realized without a transition period during which the Jewish minority would exercise organized revolutionary rule. It is impossible to attain a Jewish majority or numerical equality between the two peoples (or any other condition permitting the creation of a basis for a cultural center) by means of systematic immigration and colonization without a transition period of minority national rule during which the state apparatus, the administration, and the military establishment would be in the hands of the minority, in order to eliminate the danger of domination by the non-Jewish majority and suppress rebellion against us (it would be impossible to suppress such a rebellion unless the state machinery and the military forces were in our hands.) During this period a systematic policy of immigration, colonization, and development would be practiced. Such a conception of the problem might shake the foundations of many beliefs which we have cherished for a great many years. It might even resemble dangerously certain political states of mind which we have always rejected. At first it might even appear as impractical, visionary, and contrary to the conditions in which we live under the British Mandate. All these questions require discussion which I do not intend to inaugurate in writing. But there is one thing about which I feel very strongly—I will never become reconciled to the failure of Zionism before an attempt is made whose seriousness corresponds to the seriousness of the struggle for the revival of our national life and the sanctity of the mission entrusted to us by the Jewish people. Nor should you forget that any change in the world or in the Middle East, any emergency situation, might compel us to resort to a line of action which we would never choose of our own free will. We must bear this in mind when weighing our political policy, whether we like it or not.

I hope that I do not have to stress the fact that my way of thinking is as alien today as it always has been to that which is called Revisionism. Now, too, I consider that the tactics, the policies, and the educational principles of Revisionism are madness. If I had to invent an imaginary movement aiming at the prevention of the establishment of "a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan," I would endow it with the traits

characteristic of the Revisionists, their manner of speech, and their line of action. I mentioned above that the Revisionist conception of a "colonizing regime" under which the British are to pull our chestnuts out of the fire by suppressing the Arabs with their bayonets is completely unrealistic. The Revisionist press, with its wholesale provocations that are not backed by any real force, evokes aggressive reaction on the part of the Arabs and indirectly leads to the organization of forces which will rise against us on the day of trial. As a result of the toil of decades, we have slowly succeeded in educating our young people toward a degree of understanding of the seriousness of our position. And now the Revisionist propaganda again plants illusions in their minds and idle rhetoric in their mouths. Furthermore, what I want is based on the real strength of the Yishuv, while the Revisionists occupy themselves with a vain search for a strategic base somewhere between Paris, Warsaw, and Rome. It is possible that they, too, would prefer to have the Yishuv* as the base for their activities if there were any opportunity for them to gain the support of the organized labor movement, which is destined to be the "iron legion" of Zionism irrespective of the policy followed.

I hope you will not be displeased with me for writing you letters as long as the "galut,"** nor that you will think I have gone out of my mind. These thoughts have troubled me for many months and do not give me peace. To whom, if not to you, can I feel morally obliged to talk about them?

Yours,

Chaim Arlosoroff

* See above, p. 158, note.

** Diaspora or exile, see above, p. 246, note.

The basic aims of political Zionism were precisely defined by its founder, Theodor Herzl, more than half a century ago. They were:

- (1) The promotion of an organised, large-scale colonisation of Palestine,
- (2) The acquisition of an internationally recognized legal right to colonise Palestine, and
- (3) The formation of a permanent organisation to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism.¹

There is no evidence that these aims have ever been changed, though the readiness of Zionists to admit them or proclaim them has fluctuated according to circumstance and opportunity. When need for Jewish support in the First World War gave Dr. Chaim Weizmann his chance of getting formal British backing, the Zionist definition of Palestine crystallised; it was to be the territory of that name which came under British Mandatory control as a result of the war. That is, the territory which is now occupied by the State of Israel, the Kingdom of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip. The term "political Zionism" signifies the guiding doctrine of the permanent organisation set up for the purpose of securing the objectives. In this book I shall often use the short term "Zionist" to denote one who subscribes to these objectives.

By the accepted definitions, a Jew is not necessarily a Zionist; nor need a Zionist be a practising Jew in the religious sense. For that matter, the political aims of Zionism have been

* From Michael Ionides, *Divide and Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), pp. 39-56. Copyright © Michael Ionides, 1960. Reprinted by permission of Geoffrey Bles Ltd.

** British civil engineer; Director of Development in Trans-Jordan, 1937-39.

embraced by many Gentiles. The basic driving force of political Zionism is, in fact, the political aim of securing the territory called Palestine and converting it into a state. Zionism has always rejected the idea that Jews can be or should be assimilated in other countries. The first loyalty of all Jews ought to be, by Zionist theory, the promotion of the Zionist aim. Jews should feel that they belong to Israel, not to any other country. Even though Jews might be—as most were and still are—citizens of other countries, their first loyalty should still be to Zionism and Israel.

Conflict between the Zionists and the assimilationist Jews in the Diaspora* broke out at the beginning and persists today. The assimilationists insisted that to be a Jew was to be of the Jewish religion, whatever the nationality might be, that civil loyalty to the state of adoption must be absolute, not divided. Out of the conflict there came the compromise wording of the Balfour Declaration of 1917:**

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

There were thus two safeguards, one for the Arabs of Palestine and one for the assimilated Jews of the Diaspora whose position might be prejudiced if they were believed to place loyalty to the country of their adoption second in importance to the political aims of Zionism.

It was inherent in political Zionism that both safeguards must somehow be outflanked. If the territory of Palestine, occupied by Arabs, was to be converted into the Land of Israel occupied by Jews, the Arabs would have to move out, for these two peoples and two exclusive nationalisms could not occupy one country. In moving out, the Arabs must necessarily yield up their “civil and religious rights”, however defined. Similarly, if the Zionist aim of uniting all Jews in the cause of Zionism were to succeed, loyalty to Israel must necessarily come to rank higher than loyalty to the country of adoption. Therefore, from the very beginning, and now as much as ever, the full aims of

* See above, p. 246, note.

** For an analysis of the Balfour Declaration, see Jeffries, pp. 173-88.

political Zionism are incompatible with the interests of the Arabs, and prejudicial to the personal political interests of the assimilated Jews in other lands.

By the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine which gave it accepted international status, the Zionists achieved their essential if limited foothold. There was to be a National Home inside Palestine, and Jews were to have the right to go there. What was left uncertain was whether the "National Home" was to be a State or merely a religious, cultural community; how many Jews could be allowed to immigrate without infringing the clause which safeguarded Arab civic and religious rights; how much land was to be allowed to pass into Jewish ownership; and how fast it could happen.

Disturbed by the violence of Arab opposition, the British Government hedged. In his White Paper of 1920 Churchill (then Colonial Secretary) conveyed to the Arabs that they had nothing to fear, while using words which conveyed to the Zionists that the ultimate goal of a Jewish state was not necessarily excluded.²

Whatever the British Government might say, whatever the safeguards in the Balfour Declaration might mean, the Zionists had secured the essential right to immigrate into Palestine. It would be an irreversible process. Every increase in the Jewish population would be a step forward, every acre of land secured for the immigrants would be for ever inalienable. There could have been no doubt in Zionist minds that Arab opposition would recur, time and time again, as the pressure of Zionist colonisation came up against Arab opposition. "I believed—and still do so," wrote Ben-Gurion in 1959, "that Jewish-Arab co-operation holds enormous benefit for both peoples. But at the same time I realised that the battle of Tel Hai in 1920,* the slaughter of 1921, were as nothing compared to the blood-letting that was to come."³ He did not exaggerate. Zionist colonisation cost many thousands of lives, lives of the Jews who fought for the land and won, of the Arabs and Egyptians who fought to hold it and lost; and of the Gentiles who fought first to let the Jewish immigrants enter in fulfilment of the obligation to them under the Balfour Declaration and then to hold back the flood in fulfilment of the obligation to the Arabs.

In the early years, however, the rate of immigration was

* In March 1920, an engagement took place between Arabs and the inhabitants of the Zionist settlement of Tel Hai in which seven Jews were killed.

controlled by the British Government whose obligation to the Arabs could not be brushed aside. The British Government had to pay attention to opinion at home. Violent opposition by the Arabs would disturb British public opinion. Questions would be asked in Parliament and Ministers would have to give an account of their stewardship. More questions would come up at the annual review by the Permanent Mandate Commission which supervised the Mandate on behalf of the League of Nations.

Whenever Arab opposition flared up it was therefore necessary for the Zionists to convince public opinion in Britain and elsewhere that Arab interests were not being harmed and that they had no just cause for anxiety. Each step forward was thus a limited operation to convince the British Government and public that this particular step was justified. Often it would be three steps forward and two steps back. This gave the Zionists grounds on which to claim openly that the British were always forcing them back in favour of the Arabs, while leaving them the inner satisfaction of having secured a net gain against the Arabs.

Zionism is a nationalistic movement, and was a patriotism without a country in the years before Israel was established. Ordinary nations, occupying countries of their own, had armies with which wars could be fought and territories conquered. In wars, people get killed. Generals send their troops into battle in the knowledge that many of them will lose their lives, and the memory of those who fall is honoured because they died for their country. The Zionists then had no country and no army, but they were all soldiers in their national cause. In the struggle they were fighting for the country they claimed as their own, many of them had to die. If it helped their cause, they died well.

The strategy they had to follow was as unique as their situation. They could win only if public opinion in England and America could be convinced that it was right that they should win, and be willing to help them; only if that public opinion could also be convinced, at each critical point, that it was wrong for Arabs to resist. Other nations might fight total wars and could not afford to be squeamish about the things that had to be done if they were to win. The Zionists must do what others did, in their own way and for their own ends.

The Arabs had no doubts of ultimate Zionist intentions, nor of their resolution. British officials on the spot at the time saw it clearly enough. Even before the Mandate was announced, the Chief Administrator in Palestine wrote a report that the

Zionists "appeared bent on committing the temporary military administration to a partialist policy before the issue of the Mandate. It is manifestly impossible to please partisans who officially claim nothing more than a 'National Home' but in reality will be satisfied with nothing less than a Jewish State."⁴ In those early formative years the belief had to be sustained in England that a "National Home" did not mean an exclusive National State. The official British theory was that Arabs and Jews would live in harmony together, the Arabs benefiting from the infusion of ideas, knowledge, enterprise and capital, and grateful to the Jews who brought them in. They would get used to the Jews and accept them.

The Arabs were up against stiff odds. Officially, a Jewish State was not intended. The British Government had said so and the Zionists did nothing to remove that belief. The Arabs saw the tongue in the Zionist cheek, the British public did not. Why were the Arabs shouting and demonstrating? Were they accusing the British Government of acting in bad faith? The Zionist propaganda answer was obvious, easy and penetrating. The Arabs, proclaiming that the Zionists certainly did intend a National State, pitted themselves against official British policy and alienated public sympathy to the Zionists' benefit. The Arabs were in truth protesting against a colonising purpose which was officially supposed not to exist but did in fact exist—just as, in later years under the treaties, the Arabs in the other States were protesting against a dependence which was not officially supposed to exist but did in fact exist. In both cases, they could make no headway unless they could convince the British Parliament and public that what they said was right and that what the British Government said—or allowed to be believed—was wrong. It was not an easy situation for them to deal with and the more violently they objected the easier it was for the Zionists to win British public sympathy.

The ultimate seat of authority was with the British Government in London. It was here, not in Jerusalem, that the operative decisions were made, and it was in London that Zionist pressure could most effectively be applied. Pressure might reach the British Government in Whitehall through three channels. The Jewish Agency in Jerusalem could transmit pressure through the High Commissioner to the Colonial Office and thence, through the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the Cabinet. Secondly, the mechanism of what we now call "Public Relations" could be brought to bear upon public opinion in England, through Members of Parliament, and then to Ministers in general, among them the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Third, by similar means public opinion could be influenced in other countries, especially in the United States of America, so that pressure would be brought through Embassy channels on the Foreign Office and thus on the Colonial Secretary and the Cabinet.

Both the Arabs and the Zionists could use these channels of pressure according to their means, but their means were very different. In the House of Commons in 1938, Mr. Crossley said:⁵

“There are no Arab Members of Parliament, there are no Arab constituents to bring influence upon their Members of Parliament. There is no Arab control of newspapers in this country. It is impossible to get a pro-Arab letter in *The Times*. There are, in the City, no Arab financial houses which control amounts of finance. There is no Arab control of newspaper advertisements in this country. There are no Arab ex-Colonial Secretaries.”

Mr. Crossley summed it all up: “Only by violence can Arabs get a hearing.”

It was undeniable that the Zionists had means of reaching public and parliamentary opinion in England which the Arabs did not command and never learnt to create. Consequently, the main channel open to the Arabs was by pressure in Palestine itself, transmitted through the Administration to the Colonial Office. This would reach the Secretary of State for the Colonies. At times of crisis when Palestine affairs demanded the attention of the Cabinet as a whole, there was thus only one member who had direct contact with the full weight of Arab argument and pressure—the Colonial Secretary himself. The other Members, for the most part, had no direct knowledge of affairs within Palestine itself, but were open to the persuasive influence which the Zionist organisation was able to bring to bear through the press and Parliament and by personal pressure upon Ministers. The Zionists chose shrewdly when they decided that Great Britain should be entrusted with the task of bringing the State of Israel into existence. A democracy whose Government could be pushed by a public and parliamentary sentiment which is highly susceptible to propaganda was the best choice.

In literal terms, the Zionists were steadily changing Arab-owned land into Jewish-owned land and steadily increasing the Jewish population.* The Arabs were on the defensive against this continual movement. There could hardly be a case to which

* On Jewish land laws, see Simpson, pp. 303-4.

the word "defensive" applies more exactly. Yet by the nature of things, Parliament and the public in England only became conscious of what was going on when the peaceful and officially-supported growth of Jewish lands and population aroused violent opposition from the Arabs. The initiative in firing the first shot must always lie with the Arabs, and this would be an "offensive" action. It would be aimed not only at the Zionists but also at the British Administration. The British Government would necessarily have to resist the Arabs and defend the Jews. Arab action, although of an essentially defensive nature, therefore always appeared to be offensive in the eyes of the British public; and Zionist action, which was of an offensive nature in terms of Arab interests, always appeared as defensive.

This could go on working in the net favour of the Zionists so long as they could convince the British that there was plenty of land, so long as the "economic absorptive capacity" of the country justified further Jewish immigration. That was the decisive issue. In 1929 there were ominous signs. There were Arab protests, demonstrations, riots and blood-letting.*

Alarmed by these Arab outbursts, the Palestine Administration set experts to work to look into the land problem. Reports were made by five men of high standing. The Royal Commission of 1936 later examined all these reports and stated the general conclusions of them all, which will serve as an authoritative record for our present purposes: "Unless there is a marked change in the methods of cultivation, the land in Palestine is unable to support a large increase in the population."

This faced the Zionists with a critical danger. If that conclusion were accepted by the British Government and believed by the British public, it would be the end of Zionist aims. Public opinion could not support continued immigration if it was believed that Arabs would be pushed off their land. It was that ambiguity in the Balfour Declaration which was plaguing the Zionists, as Dr. Weizmann bitterly complained,⁶ that safeguarding clause on which the British Government had insisted, which said that nothing must be done (by way of Jewish immigration) which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of the Arabs. But for that, all would have been well. If the Arabs could now persuade the British Government and public that land hunger among Arabs as a result of Jewish immigration constituted a "prejudice to their civil and religious rights", the Zionist cause would be frustrated.

The main basis of the Zionist appeal—up to that time—

* On the 1929 riots, see Sheean, pp. 284-301.

had been on the return to the land, the essential argument being that there was plenty of it. And here were no less than five official reports by acknowledged experts all saying that there was not enough land after all. Then the worst happened, from the Zionist point of view. The British Government issued a White Paper⁷ which accepted the experts' findings of fact and drew the conclusion that Jewish immigration must be limited.

Dr. Weizmann hurried home from the Continent and got to work behind the scenes. The White Paper was published on October the 21st, 1930;* by February the 13th, 1931, Weizmann had persuaded the British Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, to send him a letter and get it on the record in Hansard by reading it out in the course of debate in the House of Commons. It contained the following sentence: "The considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations." Just that.⁸

Read at this distance of time, the words seem innocuous enough. Yet if Dr. Weizmann's satisfaction was justified, there must be much more in it than met the eye. And so there was, as Dr. Weizmann explained to indignant Zionists who demanded to know how a short personal letter to him from the Prime Minister could possibly remove the disastrous force of the White Paper.

The word "purely" was the key. Translating the cumbersome sentence into ordinary English, it meant that when the Administration in Palestine decided on the rate of Jewish immigration, they must take account of economic considerations only, and of none other. Translating it still more plainly, it meant that the Arabs would henceforth only have the right to object to Jewish immigration if they could prove to the Administration's satisfaction that it would affect their pockets. That was now the only kind of "civil or religious right" which must be safeguarded.

So far, so good, for the Zionists. The safeguard had been whittled down to money, and money talks. The Prime Minister had decided that the Palestine Administration must not take account of any political, religious, social, or any other objection the Arabs might raise against Jewish immigration. Only their pockets mattered. At the same time, the Zionists still had to prove a negative proposition each time they pressed for more immigration permits; they had to prove that it would not affect Arab pockets. How much better if the British could be convinced of the positive proposition that Jewish immigration would be *good* for Arab pockets! Then it could be argued that if some

* For the Passfield White Paper, see below, pp. 313-14.

Jewish immigration is good for Arabs, more will be better, and the utmost will be best of all. Pushed to its logical conclusion the argument implied that Arab interests would be most fully served if Jewish immigration tipped the electoral scales, with the Arabs a minority in a Jewish state.

The Zionists pulled it off. It was really quite simple, given that any means were justifiable to gain the Zionist end. They discovered that, after all, the thesis of the return to the land was not quite as sound economically as it had seemed (it had served its political purpose). On the contrary, a healthy economy in such a country could not—indeed should not—rest primarily upon agriculture. A ratio of industrial to agricultural population more like that of industrial nations would be appropriate. Of the total population at that time, which was about a million, 80% were agricultural and 20% industrial or city workers. An economically healthier proportion to aim at would be the reverse—say, four times as many industrial and city workers as agricultural. Now let us do the arithmetic. Of the million inhabitants, 80% are agricultural; that makes 800,000 out of the million. If these 800,000 are the 20% of a properly balanced industrial economy, the total population must be five times as much, i.e., 4,000,000. There are 1,000,000 there already. Therefore there is room for 3,000,000 more. Plenty of room for the Arabs! In fact with capital pouring in through the Jewish immigrants and factories developing fast, there will be more jobs than applicants, and no one will benefit more than the Arabs, with better pay, better working conditions, better education, better homes.* Indeed, perhaps the one-fifth ratio is too pessimistic. With a really intensive Anglo-Zionist-Arab co-operative drive all pulling together, industrialisation could go to say nine-tenths. That means $9 \times 800,000$ more, 5,400,000 in all. And all this assumes that Palestine is already agriculturally saturated, as these five experts say it is. But with really intensive farming, the land could certainly support far more. By such simple economic arithmetic it could be apparently proved that the Arabs had nothing they could reasonably complain about. Zionist propaganda impressed these ideas with such adroitness on the British public that there was a decisive tendency to regard them as propositions which ought to be accepted unless they could be disproved.

To the Socialists (who were in power at the time), the Arabs who talked most about civil and religious rights were

* For a discussion of the Jewish labour force in relation to the Arabs, see Simpson, pp. 303-7.

the politicians, the Pashas and the landlords. What did they care about the masses of the Arab people, the oppressed fellahin and the workmen? All they cared about was their pockets. Very well, if that was so, it was only their pockets that need be safeguarded, it could be argued. As for the Arab masses, their pockets and their bellies were both empty. The Pashas certainly would not fill them. The Zionists would, bringing with them capital and skill and economic development. The country needed firm, enlightened administrators too, for the benefit of the Arab masses as well as the rest. The Pashas were not interested. The Zionists were. Consequently it was not only good for the Arabs that the "considerations should be purely economic", it was a positive human duty that it should be so. If it was good for the Arabs, the Arabs ought to like it. If they ought to like it, they had a duty to like it. The British Government had an obligation to oppose Arabs who would not do their duty. Such question-begging arguments carried conviction.

Zionist ingenuity commands technical respect. Here was a safeguard, specifically put into the Balfour Declaration because obviously there was a limit beyond which further Jewish immigration must "prejudice the civil and religious rights" of the Arabs. Zionists had stood it on its head. They had found a formula which appeared to prove conclusively that there was no such limit, that on the contrary the Mandatory Power would be failing in their duty to the Arabs, betraying the Arab safeguards if they did not open the doors widely and freely to Jewish immigration. That disposed of the only objection the Arabs were now allowed to raise. Political, social, psychological or sentimental arguments, like wanting to keep their own land for themselves, were ruled out.

This guiding principle, that it was only money that mattered so far as Arabs were concerned, governed Jewish immigration into Palestine, unquestioned, until the accelerating rate of permits caused by Hitler's persecution brought its inevitable reaction from the Arabs; protests, demonstrations, riots, insurrection, sub-war. The Royal Commission appointed in 1936 reported in the spring of 1937.⁹ On this crucial question of the criterion which should govern Jewish immigration, they took note of the fact that:

"the administration, so far as immigration is concerned, have taken no account of political, social, or psychological considerations, and indeed estimates of any such matters would have been directly contrary to the instruction in the Prime Minister's letter that the 'considerations relevant

to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations'."

The Royal Commission did not approve. They thought that immigration "must be reviewed and decided upon all considerations and not on economic considerations only." They asked some sharply pointed questions:

"Can it be the duty of the Mandatory or indeed is it in the interests of the national home itself to allow immigrants to come into the country in large numbers without any regard to an increasing hostility which from time to time finds expression in violent disorder therein? Do the Jewish people really wish that Palestine should afford a refuge to the maximum number of Jews which can be economically absorbed if the result is constant rebellion and repression? And, determined as we believe they are to fulfil their obligations undertaken in the Mandate, do the British people really wish that British lives should continue to be sacrificed to that end?"

The Royal Commission recommended partition of Palestine; the separation of a Jewish enclave and the consolidation of the Arab remainder of Palestine with (Arab) Transjordan. Arabs would have to leave the Jewish part. They would have to move into the Arab part. Was there room for them? Could they be absorbed? The Royal Commission thought it likely that they could; otherwise the plan could hardly have been proposed. They wanted to make sure first, so they proposed that a "hydrographic survey" should be made as a check. The name does not readily convey the significance of the survey. The point was that resettlement of the displaced Arabs must obviously be on the land. No one could seriously imagine that an industrial economy could spring up overnight (though a very large number of people in England had already fallen for Zionist propaganda tacitly based on that assumption). The five reports following the 1929 disturbances, together with further knowledge, indicated clearly that although the rain-fed lands could be more intensively cultivated and therefore carry a limited increase in population, it would be a very slow job and quantitatively indecisive in itself. On the other hand, land can be made fruitful at short notice by irrigation, if there is water available. How much water was there? No one knew. Despite the fact that pressure on the land had been growing steadily for many years and was at the very root of the trouble, no one had measured the waters which were the only possible

key to the problem. So the Royal Commission recommended that it should now be done, by a "hydrographic survey".

The Treasury authorised a vote of £ 70,000 of which the Palestine Administration took £ 40,000 to survey their side of the river Jordan. Transjordan got the balance of £ 30,000. The money came to a small, new Development Department (which I had just been appointed to launch) with instructions to make the survey with all speed.

We very soon learnt that the propaganda with which the Zionists were filling the public mind in England about the "economic absorptive capacity" of Palestine was grossly misleading. Six years had gone by since the several experts had reported, in 1929 and 1930, that there was little more room on the land. Our investigations showed beyond doubt that irrigation in the Jordan Valley from the waters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk was the only hope. Without this, there would soon be a serious land shortage in Transjordan itself, through its natural growth of population, quite apart from any influx of displaced Arabs if a state of Israel were created.

The results of the "hydrographic survey" were put before the Palestine Partition Commission in 1938.¹⁰ In the event, they recommended against partition. One main ground was that the absorptive capacity of the Arab remainder was not enough to take in those Arabs who would have to leave the Jewish part. This further authoritative conclusion, based on specific surveys in both Palestine and Transjordan, was in itself embarrassing to the Zionists. The task of securing continued immigration till the balance of power was tipped in their favour still lay before them. They still had the old problem of convincing the British Government and public that there was plenty of room. Once again, as in 1930, authoritative reports showed there was not.

It was not so easy this time. The Royal Commission had uttered some direct home truths. In particular, they had examined minutely every scrap of evidence about the "National Home." Although they did not arrive at any very clear decision about what the term did mean, they were quite clear about what it did not mean.

"To foster Jewish immigration in the hope that it might ultimately lead to the creation of a Jewish majority and the establishment of the Jewish State with the consent or at least the acquiescence of the Arabs was one thing. It was quite another thing to contemplate, however remotely, the forcible conversion of Palestine into a Jewish State against the will of the Arabs, for that would clearly

violate the spirit and intention of the Mandate System. It would mean that national self-determination had been withheld when the Arabs were a majority in Palestine and only conceded when the Jews were a majority. It would mean that the Arabs had been denied the opportunity of standing by themselves; that they had, in fact, after an interval of conflict, been bartered about from Turkish sovereignty to Jewish sovereignty. It is true that in the light of history Jewish rule over Palestine was not to be regarded as foreign rule in the same sense as Turkish; but the international recognition of the right of the Jews to return to their old homeland did not involve the recognition of the right of the Jews to govern the Arabs in it against their will.¹¹

It was certainly not so easy for the Zionists this time, but they were never deterred by any obstacle, however great it might seem. There was always a way, provided the right formula was found for working on British and American public opinion. To the British public, the Arab method is like a man who jumps out into the road in front of your car every now and then, shouting and waving his arms. He may have the best of reasons for claiming your sympathy and earnest attention, but what are you to do with a chap who obstructs the highway and endangers life and limb? The Zionist's car just slides up on your left side as you go down the arterial road, and, with a courteous and engaging wave of acknowledgment, slips in front, and there he is.

Arab opposition before the Second World War became inevitably identified in the British mind with agitation and violence; the Zionist pressure with reasoned argument. This was the Zionists' great asset—the command of words. They had half a century of advantage over the Arabs in this because the movement was made by words, by things written and things spoken which gathered them together and made a movement of thought; words and ideas which had been planted deep in the British public mind.

Zionist propaganda was brilliantly and selectively adjusted to all sections of opinion in England. The public was divided in its sentiments, in favour of the Zionists or in favour of the Arabs, in several clearly identifiable groups. In favour of the Zionists were a body of Christians brought up to believe in the divine inspiration of the Old Testament and its promises to the Jews for the return to the Promised Land. To these, as to the Zionists themselves, the right of the Jews to return was

absolute, and temporal considerations such as the existence of a non-Jewish population in Palestine were irrelevant. These beliefs were to be found in all the political parties.

Furthering the Zionist cause also were many in the Labour Party who did not believe in the idea of a genuine popular nationalist movement amongst the Arabs against Jewish immigration. To these, the issue was a material one. They thought first of the hundreds of thousands of Arab workers who stood to gain if economic prosperity were brought to Palestine with the help of the Jews. It might cut across the privileges of the Pashas, the Sheikhs and the landlords; but the workers would benefit, and that was what mattered. To this school of thought, the problem of Palestine was mainly an economic one, and the way to win the Arabs away from irresponsible extremist influences was to give them means to develop their economic conditions. Jewish immigration, in their view, would undoubtedly help towards this end.

There was also, in all parties—but perhaps mostly in the Socialist Party—a deep and compelling human feeling for the sufferings of the Jews in Central and Eastern Europe, sympathy with their longing to be free from the shackles, free to express themselves in their own way in their own land, and admiration for the skill and courage with which they were developing their new home. It was argued that Palestine was only a tiny part of the great Arab world which the British themselves, with their allies, had freed from Turkish domination. Arabs must not selfishly exclude their suffering fellow beings, themselves of a Semitic race, from this small corner of the world.

Within the Conservative Party there was also the imperialist school. They saw Palestine as a country occupying a position of unique strategic importance in relation both to the Suez Canal and the junction of the air routes between the three continents of the Old World.* In their view, it was a vital British interest that Palestine should be a prosperous progressive state, bound to Great Britain by ties of goodwill and gratitude, able in the hour of need to furnish resources both of personnel and of material which only a densely populated, developed modern community could furnish. All this could be accomplished by Jewish immigration.

Opinions favourable to the Arab side were held mainly by those, of all political shades of opinion, who had lived or worked in the Middle East, and among those whose official responsibi-

* On the strategic importance of Palestine to the British, see Sidebotham, pp. 125-42, and Main, pp. 317-20.

lities in England brought them into close contact with the actuality. Among them were the "sentimental" pro-Arabs who formed close personal friendships with the Kings and Princes, Pashas and Sheikhs. There were also those who simply thought that the promises to the Jews were being strained beyond the limits of fairness, who believed that our own strategic and commercial interests were threatened by the loss of Arab good will.

Upon this diverse body of opinion, Zionist propaganda played with a repertoire adroitly selected and blended to make the best appeal to each segment of the audience. In every argument there was always an element at least of objective truth, from which an illusion of wholeness could be constructed. Both the imperialists and the socialists were open to the argument that the ordinary simple Arab folk ought to welcome Jewish immigration, *must* welcome it, were wrong to oppose it. To the socialists, it was because the Arab benefited from the knowledge, skill and dynamism which the Jews brought in to the economy. For the imperialists it was because the Arab thinks of his pocket first and likes firm, efficient rule under which he can profit. To those who believed on the one hand that the Arab population at large bitterly resented Jewish immigration, the Zionist argument was that this proved that it would be wrong to leave a minority of Jews in Palestine at the mercy of a hostile Arab majority; or alternatively, the exact opposite, that the Arabs did not really object but rather welcomed the Jews; the conclusion being the same either way, that there should be more immigration. To those who argued on the other hand that opposition from the Arabs was only the work of a few evil-intentioned agitators, in the pay of our adversaries, the Zionist line was that this proved the exact identity of interests between the British people and the Zionists to oppose this fanatical, unrepresentative minority. If Arabs sold their land to Jews, that proved that the Arabs were corrupt, that they only thought of monetary gain, and that Arab opposition must therefore be inspired by unworthy, morally contemptible motives and that it ought to be brushed aside. If on the contrary Arabs refused to sell their land to the Jews, that showed that they were not co-operating with British policy and that it was the duty of the British Government to oblige them to do so. If the Arab population was tranquil, that proved that all was well and that they had no serious objections to Zionist immigration. If they agitated, demonstrated or revolted, then they were endangering the security of the realm, seeking to frustrate the legal purpose and obligation of the Mandate, and threatening

imperial communications. When agitation or revolts subsided, that proved that feeling could not be very deep, for otherwise the agitation would surely have continued. While agitation or revolt was in progress it would be wrong to yield, for that would be appeasement; when agitation had ceased or subsided it could be said that the disorders had been put down with that firmness which all Arabs respect, and that it would now be wrong and unnecessary to make any concessions lest that should encourage further demands. If the Arabs were violent, that showed their savage nature and they deserved all they got; if they just talked but did nothing, that showed they had no guts and deserved all they got.

Dr. Weizmann complained bitterly in his book *Trial and Error* of the "hostility, or at best the frosty neutrality, of Britain's representatives on the spot", in the early years after the First World War. The Zionists, he said, had not displaced any Arabs, there was no overcrowding, and very few Jewish immigrants. "Why, then, were we damned in advance in the eyes of the official hierarchy? And why was it an almost universal rule that such administrators as came out favourably inclined turned against us in a few months?"¹²

The reason why the Zionists were "damned in advance" was because of the advance plans which everyone on the spot knew they had, but which were never uttered or recorded in public, and were officially supposed not to exist. British administrators "turned against" the Zionists because at home they had only seen the benevolent face of Zionism turned towards the British public, but now saw, in Palestine itself, that other face of Zionism which looked with contempt and hostility towards the Arabs.

NOTES

- 1 Alan R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947*—Philosophical Library, New York, 1959.
- 2 Cmd. 1700.
- 3 *Jewish Observer and Middle East Gazette*—8th May, 1959.
- 4 George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*—Methuen, London, 1948.
- 5 Hansard H.C.: Deb., 5th ser., vol. 347, col. 1967.
- 6 Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*—Hamish Hamilton, 1949.
- 7 Cmd. 3692.
- 8 Hansard H.C.: Deb., 5th ser., vol. 248, col. 756.
- 9 Cmd. 5479.
- 10 Cmd. 5854.
- 11 Cmd. 5479.
- 12 See 6.

For years before 1929 I had thought of making a journey to Palestine. I had long had an exaggerated admiration for the Jewish people, and invested them with all the characteristics of poetic insight, intensity of feeling, and loftiness of motive which seemed to me lacking in the generality of the so-called Christians. This attitude was a kind of anti-Semitism turned wrong side out, I suppose—a product, perhaps, of the extraordinary experience in which I first made the acquaintance of Jews as a freshman in college—but it was, whatever its nature, strong enough to make me gravitate towards the Jews of my acquaintance and submit with eagerness to the influences they (whether they wished to do so or not) could not help exercising.... . . . But the Palestine journey seemed as far off as ever in the winter of 1929. The only moderately interested person was the lecture manager, Mr. Alber, who agreed to supply some of the money I might need for the journey as an advance on a second tour. This would be nothing like enough, but it would be of great assistance if I could interest anybody else in the project.

It was my old friend Hillel Bernstein who solved the difficulty. He was not a Zionist himself, but he knew enough of the Zionist organization to be aware that it sometimes sent writers to Palestine to contribute articles to its own publications. It was Bernie's idea that I might get some such contract, with enough of an advance on it to make a stay in Palestine possible.

* From Vincent Sheean, *Personal History* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1935), pp. 333-39 and 341-68. Copyright, © 1934, 1935 by Vincent Sheean. Reprinted by permission of Curtis Brown Ltd.; and Houghton Mifflin Co.

** American author and journalist; his works include *Nehru: Ten Years of Power* (New York: Random House, 1959).

He pointed out that Zionism was a controversial question, even among Jews, and that it would be well to make some stipulation about it—that I would not write political propaganda, that a description of the country and the Zionist colonies would have to be enough.

I needed more money, much more money, if I was to carry out my plans; I knew nothing about Zionism in politics or about the Zionist Organization; opportunity and ignorance combined to govern the event. By an appointment made through Bernie I went to see the editor of *The New Palestine*, a Zionist publication, and told him what I wanted to do. I suggested that I could do a series of articles on life in the Jewish colonies (my plan being to live as a colonist for a while if possible), and that these articles would have to be noncontroversial and nonpolitical, as I could not bind myself in advance to adopt any particular attitude towards the larger questions. I added that so far as I knew the problems at issue I was already sympathetic to the Zionist views, as I had been for years; but that I could not engage future opinions.

The editor was friendly and polite, but he seemed to regard all this formulation of attitude as unnecessary. 'Don't you worry about that,' he said. 'We don't want people to write propaganda. Propaganda's no good anyway. How much do you want?'

The simplicity of the business delighted me. In fifteen minutes it was all arranged. There followed a delay of some weeks, caused by the deliberations of various persons and committees; but on May 10th I was given the first part of my agreed advance and sailed that night for England. I hoped to begin my acquaintance with Zionism and its organization there, by interviewing the benefactor of the movement, Lord Balfour, and its active president, Dr Weizmann, but I was disappointed. Lord Balfour was ill, very ill; Dr Weizmann was not in London. I waited in London three weeks for the rest of my advance from the editor of *The New Palestine*, but it did not turn up, and at last, on the skeleton of a sufficiency, I went on to Paris, Marseilles and Port Said. On the morning of June 25th (after another delay at Port Said) the Cairo express, containing a rather weary second-class passenger with as little money as possible, arrived in Jerusalem.

* * *

Jerusalem enchanted me from the beginning by the compactness and precision with which it fulfilled its physical tradition.... The Austrian Hospice, where I lived, had a flat

roof, and on hot nights it was a particular pleasure to lie there and inspect the floor of heaven, thick inlaid with patines of bright gold—thicker inlaid, and nearer to the view, than in other places.

The Hospice was deep-walled, silent and cool on the hottest days, peaceful in the midst of turmoil. There was a mosque just behind it, and the call of the muezzin used to wake me at unearthly hours until I grew accustomed to it. There were, in fact, mosques everywhere, and Islam's call to prayer haunted the still air of an evening, so that I could scarcely see a photograph of the roofs of Jerusalem afterwards without hearing the long cry of the muezzin as a part of it.

That was, probably, the first impression I received of walled Jerusalem in the early days: that it was an Arab city. It was as Arab as Cairo or Baghdad, and the Zionist Jews (that is, the modern Jews) were as foreign to it as I was myself. I had expected this, of course. I knew that the old city had not been changed, that the large Zionist population of Jerusalem (an actual majority) lived in new quarters outside the walls, and that Palestine was still predominantly an Arab country. But a fact on paper has not the same effect as its physical configuration. Two days in Jerusalem gave me a clearer perception of the fact than I could have received from a volume of statistics. I had enough political experience to realize that such things as these must determine feeling and action, and from my second or third day in Jerusalem I began to wonder if all was as well between the Arabs and the Jews as I had been led to believe. I knew nothing; but anybody could see, in half an hour, that here were the physical elements of a conflict.

I ignored the conflict as long as I could. I did a little exploring on my own, read what I could, talked to such people as I happened to meet. I had letters to the Palestine Zionist Executive, but most of its members had left the country for the summer. Gershon Agronsky, its press director, was still in Jerusalem, and intended to remain there until the Zionist Congress met at Zurich in August. He was intelligent and friendly, had been prepared by letters from America to receive me, and undertook to help me carry out my plan for studying the life of a Jewish colony. In the meanwhile he introduced me to the Zionist Club and to numbers of his colleagues; best of all, he gave me quantities of his own time and answered any question I had to ask.

I had only one letter to a non-Jew in Jerusalem. That was from E.M. Forster, introducing me to George Antonius.* Antonius was an assistant secretary in the Palestine government, and, as it happened, he lived in the Austrian Hospice. He was a Syrian Arab (Christian), educated in Alexandria and at Cambridge, and had been in the British government service for years, first in Egypt and then in Palestine. His rooms in the Hospice had been furnished by himself and his wife and differed sharply from anything else I knew in the country. A big room with high ceilings, hung and strewn with rugs, filled with books and music, was not a usual thing in my experience of Jerusalem, and it constituted, particularly in later weeks, when the atmosphere of the city grew murderous, a personal refuge: it was a connection with the outside world, a reminder that there still existed forms of life in which the miserable antagonisms of an unnecessary struggle could be forgotten. Antonius gave me the range of his books and his gramophone records: a gift of value anywhere; of inestimable value in that unhappy place.

His conversation, too, played an important part in my life in Jerusalem. His intelligence never seemed to be altogether harnessed to one subject, as was the case with everybody else I met in that part of the world. Even people of great gifts (the Grand Mufti, for instance) could not escape the influence of an obsession; even the pleasantest characters (like that of Gershon Agronsky) were somehow turned askew by perpetual concentration upon Palestinian affairs. Antonius was remarkable in many ways, but most remarkable because he kept an even keel, remained interested in the world outside the walls of the city, and remembered his obligation as an intelligent and cultivated human being not to lose his head. I needed some such buttress in my own efforts to retain control and was lucky indeed to find it in him.

It was afterwards suggested before the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry¹ that the process by which I came to my conclusions in Palestine was influenced by Antonius. That may be true, but if so it must have been by telepathy, for in my earlier weeks in Palestine we had an agreement not to talk Zionism or Palestinian politics. At the outset I had explained to him my exact status, and he had explained his. He believed the Zionist programme was unfair to the Arabs without offering any solution to the Jewish problem; he was convinced it would

* George Antonius (1892-1942) was an Arab scholar of Lebanese origin and senior civil servant during the early Mandatory days. He is the author of *The Arab Awakening* (1938).

lead to serious, recurring troubles. Having made ourselves so clear in that first conversation, we agreed that we must differ on the Zionist question, and dropped the subject until I had been some weeks in the country and had myself concluded that the situation was full of danger—until, in fact, I had veered towards his own view of the case. After I had broken my connection with the Zionists and had been made apprehensive by a dozen little incidents, the old embargo on political talk broke down, and we discussed Palestinian affairs by the hour. But in the first stages of my stay in the country I talked about Zionism only to Zionists. I was by this time, as anybody who has read the whole of this book must see, amply experienced in the kind of problem I faced in Palestine: the movements of ideas that brought groups or masses of men into conflict. I knew that such movements could only be judged upon their own showing, not upon what they appeared to be to their critics or opponents; and I needed no help, beyond that afforded by the Zionists themselves, in making up my mind about their cause. . . .

* * *

. . . When I came to Jerusalem the British had been in possession of the city for more than ten years. The Palestine Mandate, under which Britain was to administer the country in trust for the establishment of a Jewish national home, had been in operation for seven years. Arabs and Jews had often been at loggerheads during these years, but the Zionist immigration policy had slowly made progress, so that by the time I arrived in the country there were no longer ten Arabs to every Jew, but only about six—the figures given being, roughly, 750,000 Arabs to 150,000 Jews. Zionist hopes were particularly high in the spring and summer of 1929, for funds were plentiful then, the world was given over to optimism, and the British government, caught between the two fires, seemed on the whole more sensitive to Jewish than to Arab criticism. It was thought that the congress of world Zionists at Zurich, to which representatives of all the non-Zionist Jewish parties and groups had also been invited, would be memorable in the history of Zionism for the advance it would mark in the progress of the cause.

I was aware, as I have said, of the physical material for conflict; I had only to look out my window to see it. But for two or three weeks I made every effort to avoid the signs of trouble. I had come to Palestine to live in a Jewish colony and study its operation, not to write about politics, and I intended to carry out the plan as soon as I had familiarized myself in

some measure with the look and feel of the country as a whole. For a while I did all the usual things, visited Bethlehem and the Holy Sepulchre, went down to Jordan, bathed in the Dead Sea, looked at mosaics and was shown round the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus. I was greatly interested in the Hebrew Art Theatre of Moscow, called Habima, which was playing then in Jerusalem. I saw everything I could of their work and met a number of their leading players, some of whom I knew well in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The tone of the press, quarrelsome and vindictive beyond anything known in peaceful countries, was disturbing; there were occasional incidents that caused one to wonder what it was all coming to—every Friday evening at the Wailing Wall, for instance; and conversations sometimes took an unpleasant turn. But on the whole my first weeks in Palestine were calm. I absorbed what I could, listened to everybody, and wrote (on this subject, that is) nothing. I had no intention of writing a word about the country until I had had at least three or four months to observe it. I could not foresee how agitated those three or four months were going to be.

On July 9th I had my first mild jolt. An Arabic newspaper on that day announced that I had come to Palestine, and added, *carrément*, that I was in the pay of the Jews.

There were other comments, but this was the one I attended to carefully. Was I in the pay of the Jews or was I not? If not, why did the statement make me angry? And if I was, what then? It took me about half an hour to see that I must either make up my mind to be, as the Arabic newspaper said, 'in the pay of the Jews,' and to accept any comment that might be made on the subject, or else to break my connection with the Zionists altogether and go my own way.

My diary (which was kept very full, too full, in Palestine) records the results on Thursday, July 11th, in these words:

... Tuesday [the ninth] was distinguished for me by a thing I had never done before. I gave away fifteen hundred dollars. The way of it was this: that morning an Arab newspaper made a sort of attack on me, saying I was in the pay of the Jews. This gave me much food for thought. It depressed me chiefly, I decided, because there was truth in it. Although I've always said I would not allow my opinions to be influenced, how can I be sure? After all, I have already taken an advance of five hundred dollars and expect fifteen hundred more! All this appears under an entirely different light here. I finally decided that I couldn't do it. I wrote to Weisgal, both in New York and

in Zurich, and told him I didn't want any more money and would take no engagement for any Zionist subsidiary. I made it clear that I must write and speak as I pleased. This relieved my feelings somewhat, although God knows how I shall get along without that money. What's worse is that if I can't write a couple of articles that will suit the Zionists' book I'll have to give back the five hundred I've already received!²

I suppose that of all the journalists and writers who had been sent to Palestine by the Zionists in the decade after the war, I was the first who had balked at going on with the bargain. My friend Gershon Agronsky had some difficulty in seeing my point of view (he thought, I believe, that there was something more in this than met the eye—that I had been in some way turned against the Zionists); but he accepted it, at any rate, and a few days later I went down to Tel-Aviv with him to join his family. From Tel-Aviv we made a tour of the colonies, with the object of giving me a general idea of their style and differences.

My diary records at length the impressions of these days, describes all the colonies we saw, and concludes:

The most serious and important thing about the tour, to me, was my long conversation (argument? talk?) with Agronsky, beginning at Markenhof. It started when we saw those three babies in their screened cribs. I suppose Gershon saw that I was impressed. At any rate, he said: 'This is Zionism. Those who oppose us oppose this.' I said: 'What on earth do you mean?' He said: 'I mean that these are our standards. Those who oppose us want to see the children of this country brought up in filth and neglect, as you can see in any Arab village. This is the whole Zionism problem, right before you—those babies in their cribs.' I was irritated, but I could scarcely speak out just then. I said: 'You know perfectly well that this isn't the problem at all. When we get away I'll tell you what the problem is, if you really think I don't know.' When we had left Markenhof and got into the car again I said: 'The problem is not one of higher or lower standards. Any fool knows that higher standards of living are preferable to lower standards of living. Nobody could oppose Zionism if it meant simply the improvement of the conditions of life in Palestine. The opposition to Zionism, so far as I can tell—the only reasonable opposition, anyhow—is based upon the fact that Zionism proposes to settle or colonize a country that

is already inhabited by another people.' He began to argue that the Arabs had no feeling of nationalism or of resentment against the Zionists, that they were a mercenary people, with no race or nation principles; that they would not and could not oppose Zionism as long as they were paid. I said I had known Arabs in other countries, not Palestine, and that I simply did not believe it. I said: 'If you want to take those babies at Markenhof as the symbols of the Zionist problem, there is one way in which you can do it. Think of them as a problem of life and death. One fine day, if the Zionist programme continues, those babies will have their throats cut by some angry Arabs. It's happened in other countries, and it will happen here. Are you prepared for that?' He baulked at the question for a long time, denying that the Arabs could get so angry; denying that the colonies were weak or defenceless; denying that there was a state of conflict around them. Finally, when he couldn't deny any more, he said flatly, stubbornly: 'All right. If some have to die, they will have to die, Zionism cannot stop and cannot fail.' The argument went on for many hours and was resumed again today. I got rather excited, I am afraid. If he had not tried to make me believe that the Zionist problem was one of higher or lower standards, I should never have talked in that way. But I see it, more and more, every day, as a political problem, and I couldn't allow him to put it into such terms. I am coming, or have already come, to two conclusions: that the difficulty of Zionism is essentially one thing only, its attempt to settle a country that is already settled; and second, that the Balfour Declaration is a document that really guarantees only one thing, the permanence of the British occupation of Palestine.

It may be seen that in three weeks I had already acquired serious misgivings about the wisdom of the Zionist policy. I still knew nothing about the Arabs of Palestine, but I could see them all around me everywhere, and if my long experience in political journalism had taught me anything, it was that one people did not like being dominated or interfered with in its own home by another. These things seemed to me plain, beyond argument. What I wanted to hear was what the Zionists were doing about it; and instead I was given a large number of irrelevant statements about standards of living, etc., etc. Gershon Agronsky was intelligent and brave enough to face the problem when he had to, but I met few ordinary Zionists who were. Their

comments on the Arabs took a form that seemed to me invariably stupid, in Palestine or elsewhere: the form of underrating the opponent. Your ordinary Zionist would say, in so many words: 'We don't have to worry about the Arabs. They'll do anything for money.' I knew no Palestine Arabs, but unless they were far different from the Arabs I had known in Morocco, Iraq and Persia, this could not be the truth.

As I retrace, with the aid of my old diary, the steps by which I altered my first opinions of the Zionist experiment, I see that the thing presented itself to me throughout as a practical problem. The steps were small ones, each determined by a fact. For larger ideas—for a consideration of what the whole thing might mean—I had to wait until I had left Palestine behind; no 'long view' was possible in that embittered country. I had arrived on June 25th with a genuine sympathy, however ignorant or romantic, for the Zionist effort. Between June 25th and July 9th I was a little disquieted by the physical configuration of the problem, by the sight and sound of the Arab country in which Zionism was making its effort. On July 9th I received a jolt of a personal nature, and as a result broke my connection with the Zionists and resumed my freedom: all this without consciously turning against the Zionist idea. During the next week I went to Tel-Aviv and the colonies, talked, talked, talked, and listened even more. I saw Jewish islands in an Arab sea: that was what I saw. And on the whole the Jewish disregard for the Arabs seemed to me (from their own point of view) perilous in the extreme. I could not believe that the Arabs of Palestine were so different from other Arabs that they would welcome the attempt to create a Jewish nation in their country.

After July 17th, therefore, I made some attempt to find out what the Arabs of Palestine were like. I remained in touch with the Zionists, visited Tel-Aviv, continued to read Zionist literature and talk to Zionist friends. But I no longer tried to ignore the fact that Palestine was, by the overwhelming majority of its population, an Arab country. It seemed to me important to determine for myself what were the bonds between this population and the land it inhabited. If the bonds were slight—if the Arabs of Palestine had been mere squatters for thirteen centuries—it would still be feasible for the Zionists, by purchase, persuasion and pressure, to get the Arabs out sooner or later and convert Palestine into a Jewish national home. Zionists had pointed out, in conversation and in writing, that the Arabs had plenty of land to go to all around Palestine: Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Arabia Deserta were all Arab countries. What bound the Arabs of Palestine to Palestine?

My acquaintance with the Arab world in general suggested that the answer would be found in Islamic religious feeling. In the stage of culture represented by most Arab countries—feudal, pastoral or at any rate preindustrial—religious feeling still dominated the acts of life to an extent unknown in the West. I had never known an Arab who was not devout. I had known Moslems who broke the stricter dietary rules of the Prophet (indeed, many); but I had never known a Moslem who did not regard the central doctrines of the Islamic faith with fierce, exclusive devotion. I had to find the religious connection between the Arabs and Palestine—and found it, of course, at five minutes' walk from the Austrian Hospice, in the Haram esh-Sherif.

The Haram esh-Sherif, occupying the traditional Temple Area of the Jews, was one of the great holy places of Islam, ranking immediately after Mecca and Medina. It also contained, as I discovered to my delight, one of the most beautiful buildings in the world. I went there first on Thursday, July 18th. On that and succeeding days I had great difficulty getting beyond the one wonderful building, the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat es-Sakhra). The Dome of the Rock was built over the great black Rock of Abraham's Sacrifice, which once upheld the Altar of Burnt Offerings in the Temple of Solomon. From this rock the Prophet Mohammed ascended into Heaven. The Holy of Holies, in the days of the three Jewish Temples, stood somewhere beyond it. But what drew me back to the Dome of the Rock again and again was not its complicated interreligious sanctity, but the incomparable beauty of the structure and the glowing vitality of its ancient mosaics, the oldest of which were composed at the dawn of Islam, in the seventh century. I used to squat on the rugs against the circular walls of the building, stare up at those mosaic arches, and wonder not only at the genius that could have produced them, but at the contradiction between these lofty, exquisite forms and colours and the religious hatreds that clustered round them.

The Dome of the Rock (usually called the 'Mosque of Omar' by Western Christians, because of the mistaken belief that it was built by Omar the Conqueror) was not visited by Orthodox Jews because it was regarded by them as the holiest part of their Temple, and they feared to tread unwittingly upon their Holy of Holies. But Zionists—most of whom, in my experience, were without religious feeling—used to visit it as I did, out of an ordinary aesthetic interest. The Moslems made no objection to such visits. In this and in other respects the Moslems of Palestine were less jealous of their holy places than

Moslems elsewhere. I had never been allowed inside a great mosque in Morocco or Persia, but the Haram esh-Sherif, a far holier place to the Islamic world, was open to me or to anybody else all day long.

The same was true of the Mosque of el-Aksa, once a Christian basilica, and of the other parts of the Haram. It would be quite within the facts to say that the Haram esh-Sherif (Noble, or August, Sanctuary), in spite of the religious traditions that made it one of the three holiest spots in Islam, was treated as a public monument, like St. Peter's in Rome or the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. The more I learned about the tradition of the place, the more I was surprised at this. Not only did the Prophet Mohammed visit the place by night (miraculously translated there from Mecca), and ascend to Heaven from Abraham's Rock, but he will come there again on the Day of Judgment, when the Prophet Jesus and the Prophet Mohammed guard the ends of the bridge across the Valley of Jehoshaphat. These and other beliefs, some founded on the Koran and some mere folklore, invested the place with a significance stretching through time from the beginnings of the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic religion to the last moment contemplated for earthly existence in its philosophy. And nevertheless, so long as one took one's shoes off, it was all right to spend day after day in the place, and even to photograph it.

This being so, it was possible, at first, to assume that the Moslems of Palestine did not regard their holiest shrine with the extreme religious passion characteristic of Moslems elsewhere. The assumption fell in with the Zionist idea that the Arabs of Palestine were, on the whole, a careless and easy-going race. But I had strong doubts, just the same. I could not help remembering that unfortunate Mr. Imbrie, the American Consul in Tehran, whom I had once known: he was torn to pieces by the mob for photographing a much less sacred place than this. I remembered stories I had heard in Morocco, accounts I had read of Mecca. It seemed to me more likely that what had happened to the Haram esh-Sherif was due to the Westernized character of life in Jerusalem: this place had fallen under so many different kinds of rule, had experienced such a mixture of invasions and such an assimilation of cultures, that its Moslem leaders were constrained by Western taste and manners to open their great sanctuary to the visits of the infidel. I did not believe that underneath this Europeanization of taste and manners was any slackening of the ardour with which Moslems everywhere regard a place sanctified by the Prophet.

Such considerations—divorced, that is, from current

problems, and independently of the 'incidents' that filled the newspapers every week on the subject—would have led me in any case to examine the question of the Wailing Wall.

* * *

The Wailing Wall was a segment of the southwestern wall of the Haram esh-Sherif. It was called by the Jews 'Ha-Quotel ma-Aravi' (the Western Wall); by the Moslems 'El-Buraq' (from the name of the Prophet's horse, which was tethered there); and by Western Christians the 'Wailing Wall.' It was a short stretch of wall with a pavement in front of it and had been chosen by the Jews centuries ago as a place of lamentation.

The idea of the Wailing Wall was an ancient one, but I was never able to find out why the idea was attached to this particular segment of the wall and not to any other. The idea was, briefly, this: God has seen fit to exile His people from their Temple, and has condemned them to a long period of disaster, to be ended when the Messiah comes to restore them to their rightful place; therefore His people lament and pray before the Temple wall, particularly on the high holy days of the religion, the Day of Atonement and the Day of the Destruction of the Temple.

This idea of a place for lamentation outside the desecrated Temple grew stronger with the passage of centuries and the accretion of tradition. Most religious Jews believed that the old stones of the wall were actually the stones of Solomon's Temple. This was not archaeologically correct; the oldest stones in the wall of the Haram were Graeco-Roman, of the period of Herod; but the original facts made no difference in religious belief. During these centuries the Western Wall had stood as a representation, a symbol or relic, of the Temple itself. Jews throughout the world who were unable to go there on the Day of Atonement, for instance, paid other Jews to do so for them, and for hundreds of years there had been a small population of religious Jews living in Jerusalem on *Haluka* (sacred doles, for praying). Before the nineteenth century there was no record of trouble at the Western Wall; the Moslems made no attempt to prevent the visits of the Jews there, and a prescriptive right grew up, which was maintained under changing governments thereafter. The only records of an attempt to go beyond the original purposes of lamentation at the Wall were dated 1837 and 1912. In the first document the Egyptian Governor of Jerusalem forbade the Jews to pave the area in front of the wall or to do anything else beyond 'make their visits in accordance with the ancient custom.' In the second document the Jews

were forbidden to bring into the Wailing Wall area any of the 'tools or instruments of possession,' such as chairs, screens and the Ark (i.e., the furniture of a synagogue). The Moslem refusal to permit innovations was clearly based upon the fear that, if they did so, the Jews would soon have a synagogue at the wall of the Mosque.

The triumph of Zionism at the end of the war brought a new element into the question. The Zionist Organization was not itself religious, although it possessed a religious (minority and opposition) Right Wing. Its membership professed a wide range of belief in such matters, from agnosticism to orthodoxy, and even included some Jews converted to Christianity; but considered as a whole it was a modern, Western, secular, political body. Still, the advantages to political Zionism of making a test case of the Wailing Wall were obvious. If the Zionists could get new rights at the Wall—better, if they could get absolute possession of the area—they could count on the adherence of a large number of religious Jews who had always been cold to the movement.

An attempt was made in 1919 to buy the Wailing Wall outright. The Zionists offered (through Sir Ronald Storrs)* eighty thousand pounds; the Arabs refused to sell. From that time onward, at intervals throughout the period of the British occupation and the League of Nations mandate, there were 'incidents.' There were 'incidents' from the time I arrived in Palestine until I left, and the whole of the Palestine question (the national home for the Jews, the rights of the Arabs, the position of the British) came to be involved in them, so that the Zionist struggle was concentrated upon the Wailing Wall and the Arab resistance aligned before it. The question was no longer religious: it had become political and national as well.

It would be tedious indeed to recite these Wailing Wall incidents. Most of them were childish, considered by themselves; they had to be put all together before any sense emerged from them. But when the incidents were compared their tendency was apparent. The struggle, fundamentally, was conceived as being for ownership. The specific question might be whether the Jews could bring chairs and a table to the place or not; whether they could blow the ram's horn (*shofar*) there; whether they could put up screens to separate the women from the men; whether the Moslems had a right to walk through the place at

* Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1955) was Military Governor of Jerusalem, 1917-20, and later Civil Governor under the Mandate, 1920-26. His works include *Orientalisms*.

hours of Jewish worship; whether an Arab could drive a donkey through or not. Such details covered the basic facts of the situation: the Jewish desire to establish a fixed holy place at the Western Wall, with the rights of a synagogue, and the Moslem fear that they would succeed in doing so and go on to further encroachments on the Temple area.

Haj Amin el-Husseini,* the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, whom I did not know at that time, had been alive to the implications of the Wailing Wall question for years. There can be no doubt that some of the steps he took to emphasize the Moslem ownership of the place gave grave offence to the Jews, and on some occasions shocked the whole Jewish world, including sections of Jewish opinion that had never supported the Zionist policy. Haj Amin was convinced that the Jews would take the Haram area—the Temple—‘if they could,’ as he testified later on before the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry.³ The responsible Jewish authorities, particularly the Va’ad Leumi (Jewish National Council) and the Palestine Zionist Executive, had denied such an intention in official statements both in Palestine and abroad, but such denials, couched in elastic terms, could have little force in a conflict involving profound religious passions. The Grand Mufti was accused by the Zionists of making political capital out of the Wailing Wall question to consolidate his own position among the Moslems, but proofs of the contention were lacking. Even if it had been so—even if the Grand Mufti’s motives had been so improbably petty—the results would have been exactly the same: he undertook to emphasize the Moslem ownership of the place by a number of measures that gave offence to the Jews, and they reiterated their claims with renewed persistence. He restored an old *zawiya*⁴ in the Abu Madian Waqf, the Moslem charitable foundation on whose property the Wailing Wall area stands. Prayers and a noisy religious service called the *Zikr* took place in the *zawiya* and interfered, it was said, with Jewish prayers in front of the Wall. The Mufti also undertook various repairs to the property surrounding the Wailing Wall area and, among other things, opened a new door in the wall of the Haram itself, thus converting what had

* Hajj Muhammad Amin Effendi Al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem and Chairman of the Supreme Muslim Council for Palestine since the early 1920’s, leader of Palestinian Arab resistance to the British Mandatory policy and to Zionism, and President of the Arab Higher Committee comprising all Palestinian political parties as from 1936. He was exiled by the British from the country in 1937 and for the duration of the Mandate until 1948.

been a blind alley into a thoroughfare and giving the Moslem crowds from the Mosque an access directly to the pavement in front of the Western Wall.

Opinions might differ widely, and did, as to the Grand Mufti's reasons for making such a determined stand on the Moslem ownership of the sacred areas thereabouts; but for my part I never could understand how he, as the religious, political and judicial head of the Moslems of Palestine, could have done anything else. He had either to do as he did, it seemed to me, or else see the Jews take possession of the area and build whatever it was they intended to build there—a synagogue or place of prayer or holy courtyard.

That they did wish to obtain possession of the place was abundantly proved. As His Eminence the Chief Rabbi of the Ashkenazim said, they wanted to take it and 'make it beautiful.' As the young men of Tel-Aviv said: 'The Wailing Wall is ours!' As a friend of mine (Jewish but not a Zionist) said: 'What's the sense of a Jewish national home here if we can't even have the Wailing Wall?' As Mr. Sacher of the Palestine Zionist Executive said in his speech (not actually delivered, but circulated and given to the press) at the Zionist Congress in Zurich: 'Our rights under the Mandate are more complete and more extensive than those embraced within the principle of the status quo.'

There never was any question in my mind that the Jewish feeling about the Wailing Wall was profound and bitter. Jews who frankly confessed themselves to be without religious belief could not discuss the subject without getting excited. They did not themselves want to go there and pray or lament; they did not think they could put petitions into crevices of the Wall (as Orthodox Jews did) and get them received by the holy spirit of the Temple; they did not want the Wall for themselves at all. But they felt that the Jewish nation in Palestine (as they conceived these minority settlements to be) ought to have possession of one holy place, the relic of the Temple (the only relic, as they somewhat loosely believed), and that the genuinely religious Jews, for the most part not Zionists, should have Zionism to thank for it. The Arabs, for whom they had contempt as an 'uncivilized' race, to whom some of them referred as 'Red Indians' and others as 'savages,' were in possession of a place that signified a great deal to the Jewish world in general. The fact hurt the pride of all Jews, I believe, but oddly enough it was the young agnostics and unbelievers who were most bitterly offended and expressed themselves most loudly. What appeared in everyday talk in Jerusalem was what the *Jewish Chronicle*

in London summed up with admirable precision: 'The Wall has come to be regarded as a gauge of Jewish prestige in Palestine.'

But Arab feeling about the Wall was equally profound and bitter. I learned it not only by the evidence in print, the speeches of the authorities, and the fulminations of the press, but also because I had a good many opportunities to speak to Arabs on the subject later on in the year. The Prophet Mohammed had entered the Haram area, on his miraculous visit to Jerusalem, by the Western Gate (the gate in the Western, or Wailing Wall); he had tethered his horse, El-Buraq, at a spot said to be inside the thickness of the Wailing Wall itself. The Archangel Gabriel then conducted him from the Buraq (the Wailing Wall) to the Rock of Abraham, from which they ascended to Heaven. One could never get Jews to take these legends seriously, at least in conversation. In public utterances the Zionists treated Moslem susceptibilities carefully, but in ordinary discussion of these matters, in which the state of mind was most clearly shown, my Jewish friends said: 'The Buraq! What in the world is the Buraq? After all, it's only a legend, and a legend about a horse, at that. How can you compare it to our Temple?' It was no use pointing out that their Temple, in the sense in which the worshippers at the Wall understood it, was equally legendary. After all, the Wailing Wall contained no part of the Temple of Solomon, and there were no parts of the Temple of Solomon anywhere. There were three courses of very old masonry at the Wailing Wall, but those three courses continued for a great distance beyond (the whole southwestern and southern walls contained them). Therefore the idea that the *schechina*, the essential holy spirit of the Temple, was resident particularly in this segment of masonry called the Wailing Wall was just as legendary as the story of the Prophet's horse. Facts made no difference in either case. The Arabs believed one thing and the Jews another. But neither, so far as I could ever discover, made a sincere effort to feel what it was the other believed—to understand it with the imagination, the only instrument we possess for such difficult transactions.

With these beliefs held on both sides, and with neither side fully understanding or crediting the sincerity of the other, the incidents of 1928-29 were sure to make the Wailing Wall a crucial point in the struggle between Jew and Arab. It had become, as the *Jewish Chronicle* said, a 'gauge of Jewish prestige in Palestine.' By July, when the World Congress of the Zionists met at Zurich, the temperature had risen in Palestine to an alarming degree. The speeches and resolutions of that congress did nothing to reassure the Arabs; they did much to fortify

the Jews, at least in spirit. On August 6th the new door from the Haram esh-Sherif to the pavement before the Western Wall was opened, and the Jewish press and public in Palestine took on a more agitated tone than ever. Mr. Vladimir Jabotinsky's* 'Maccabees'—young men who followed the Zionist revisionist leader—vied with their favourite newspaper, *Doar Hayom* (the Hebrew newspaper with the widest circulation), in expressing their vehement dislike for the Moslem authorities, the Palestine government, and the more moderate authorities of the Zionist Organization. The Moslems were so angry that not a Friday passed without some kind of minor 'incident' at the Wailing Wall. The temperature rose throughout the first fortnight of August—you could stick your hand out in the air and feel it rising.

* * *

I come now to a curious incident. How curious (and, indeed, how horrible) will appear later on in the story. Before relating it I ought to say that the important parts of it were denied under oath before the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry by the person involved⁵ after I had offered them in evidence, also under oath.⁶

On the afternoon of Wednesday, August 14th, I was writing in my room at the Austrian Hospice when one of our ever breathless Tyrolean servants broke in to say that a lady was downstairs to see me. I threw on a voluminous dressing gown and clattered down the great stone staircase to the door. There, to my surprise, I saw a compatriot of mine whom I knew very slightly—a Jewish-American I had met in Zionist circles, chiefly with the Agronskys. What she had to say to me, and what followed that evening, are related baldly in my diary. I shall quote the entry written the next day (August 15th, in the morning), calling the young lady Miss X.⁷

Thursday, August 15. Yesterday was the Eve of Tisha ba'Av (the Ninth of Av), which the Jews of the Galut call Tishabov. Today is the actual fast itself: commemoration of the destruction of the Temple. The day is particularly associated with the Wailing Wall; and with the new Jewish Agency just formed, all the Wailing Wall propaganda going full tilt, the Arabs in a rare state of anxiety, the situation was ripe for anything. Trouble, trouble, and more trouble. There will be plenty. I knew nothing about it at all—didn't

* See Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30.

even know Tishabov was so near—when Miss X arrived at the Hospice at three in the afternoon, after yesterday's entry in this book was already written. Said she had to go to the Wailing Wall and write a telegram about it for the *Times* (as substitute for Gershon): would I go with her and help? I couldn't understand why, but she said there was going to be a 'bust up.' She had come up from Tel-Aviv especially for this, as Gershon is supposed to be correspondent for the *Times* here, and he is in Zurich. (Did he telegraph her to do this? Must ask). Anyhow, she said the word had been passed round and hundreds of Haluzim* were coming in during the afternoon and evening from the colonies and Tel-Aviv, ready to fight. I simply couldn't believe all this. She said the Haluzim would be armed—'three quarters of them'—and it would be a good thing if there was a row at the Wall, to 'show that we are here.' I didn't believe a damned word of it: too fantastic; but I told her I'd be ready to go along at five o'clock if she would come back. She said there wouldn't be any trouble until sundown, and five o'clock would do. I went along with her when she came back. She was inconceivably cynical and flippant about the whole thing; said a row would be a very good thing for the Zionist cause, arouse world Jews and increase contributions to the new Agency. Before we reached the Wall it was evident that the police were well prepared. There were little clumps of policemen, British and Palestinian, at every turning in the road, and a force of about twenty of them on duty at the Wall itself, half in front of the Grand Mufti's house and half at the other end. There was no excitement whatever, only about half a dozen religious Jews and Jewesses (Oriental) praying and weeping against the Wall. Towards six, a little before, we went away to the Hôtel St John for a glass of beer. Sat there a bit, talking; I couldn't understand her point of view at all, and tried to find out. When we returned to the Wall, a little before seven, everything had changed. There was a dense crowd, made up chiefly of Haluzim, in the little area in front of the Wall. A Yemenite Jew was chanting the lamentations, from the Book, while four other Yemenites sat around him, weeping and rocking themselves back and forth. These seemed to me to be the most sincerely religious manifestants present—they paid no attention to their surroundings, but only to their lament.

* "Pioneers" of the Zionist settlements.

The rest of that crowd was spoiling for a fight. The crowd I was in, that is. Farther off, at the end of the Wall before the Grand Mufti's house, the service was being read by a Cantor (Sephardic, I believe) who stopped and looked around angrily at the slightest noise. Since noises were continually being made, he was continually stopping, but always had to begin again, as he discovered that the sounds came from zealous but irreverent Haluzim. The number of Jews taking part in this Sephardic group was not more than sixteen. I counted them as well as I could from where I stood, and am pretty sure of the number. This was at the Mufti's house; the other group was at the other end, opposite the Wall itself, sitting on the steps that go down to one of the Moghrabi houses. All the people who choked the area seemed to be either people like myself, who had come out of curiosity or interest, and Haluzim, who were—as Miss X said—'r'arin' to go.' The Yemenites went on weeping and praying throughout; they noticed nobody and nobody noticed them. Strange scene.

Saw Halkin, the poet: very excited. So was everybody I spoke to (Warschawer was there, the most peaceful of people, and even he was angry). What seems to have upset them so is the new door in the Wall. I actually saw one revolver, but don't know who the man was who had it (hip pocket). There were only two actual 'incidents.' In the first a Christian Arab whom I did not see was accused of mocking at the services; I heard cries of 'Notzri!* and saw the Haluzim shoving, but the police took the man out safely. Then there was an Arab in white clothes who walked through the place three times—did nothing, simply walked. I believe he was unmolested the first time, although there were angry murmurs. The second time he came through the Haluzim started to leap on him, but the police took him through without difficulty. The third time he appeared, the police wouldn't let him go on—made him turn back. Very wise of them, for that crowd was in no mood to stand any kind of 'incident' without serious trouble. But in this incident the shouts of the Haluzim must certainly have been far more disturbing to the prayers of the religious Jews than the Arab's progress through the street would have been.

Both the Arabs and the police must have been warned of this invasion from the colonies, for there was evidence

* "Nazarene."

of preparation. For instance, the Arabs remained invisible; the Mufti's windows were closed and shuttered at about 7:30 so that he wouldn't have to look at the mob milling around; the police were in force and vigilant. The behaviour of this crowd at the wall of the mosque was, I consider, damned insulting. If I were an Arab I should be angry, very angry, and I don't for a minute think the thing is over....

Later in the same day I added another entry to this:

...Jews parading again today. Extreme provocation, but the Arabs are doing nothing. Small army of Haluzim—these precious Maccabees—passed half an hour ago, on their way to the Wall, with a flag, the Zionist national flag, I suppose, but I couldn't see it: it was furled. Shouts and cheers come from down there; the whole thing makes me very nervous. I wish Antonius were here. The young heroes who passed a while ago were guarded heavily by the police; mounted police officers in front of them and behind them, with policemen on foot marching alongside them. The material for an awful three-cornered fight. What an exhibition of imbecility the whole thing is! And if it weren't for the British police I think there would be terrible pogroms. My affection for Zionism has certainly reached the zero point. If this keeps up it will soon go below that and turn into an active antagonism....

* * *

If George Antonius had been in Jerusalem I should have gone straight to him with an account of the evening. But he left for Syria on August 10th on his annual holiday. I had met few officials in Jerusalem and felt sure that if I carried such a tale to them their reception of it would have been exactly like my own when I first heard it in the afternoon: flat incredulity. I learned years later that my information would not have been news to them, for there had been several warnings of the same kind. At the time I thought the danger was unknown or unappreciated by the government, as day followed day and the situation grew steadily worse. I wrote out a telegram to Antonius in Syria but tore it up; he was on holiday and would scarcely have welcomed such an agitated call for help. Finally, as there seemed nothing whatever for me to do, I did nothing: sat still and watched the catastrophe approach. The strangest element in the tragedy of August, 1929, is the refusal of persons in authority to believe that the worst would actually come to the worst.

I continue with my diary for the week.

Saturday, Aug. 17th. The Jewish holy day passed off without disaster, but now we are in the midst of a Moslem one, the Prophet's Birthday. Yesterday a big crowd of Moslems came into the Wailing Wall area and tore up the sacred books, pulled petitions out of the stones of the wall, etc. Might have been expected; was, in fact, inevitable. No Jews there; nobody hurt. Jews will be in terrible state of excitement, just the same. Fireworks last night in the Temple area—rather lovely from the roof of the Hospice. All the mosques were illuminated by the Franciscans' electricity, so our current at the Hospice practically vanished. Suffering badly from heat and nerves. Going down to Tel-Aviv tonight.

Sunday, Aug. 18th. Jewish boy hurt in a row between Jews and Arabs yesterday; feeling gets worse all the time. Down to Tel-Aviv last night: it was muggy, like a Turkish bath. Dined with Warschawer and went to Halévy's production of a Hebrew translation of Zweig's *Jeremiah*. This is the Ohel (Tent) players, all proletarian, scenes and costumes made in Tel-Aviv. Shows hard work, even though the players aren't up to Habima standards. Argument with Warschawer about the Wall.

Monday, Aug. 19th. (Long personal entry, about catarrh, omitted.) Letter from Weisgal today; seemed surprised at my decision to break off with the Zionists. Thank God I did it when I did! *Palestine Bulletin* says: (Quotation from *P.B.'s* account of Moslem demonstration at Wailing Wall on Friday is omitted.) The same issue of the paper contains a communiqué from the government as follows: 'Misleading reports are being circulated as to the events at the Wailing Wall on the 15th and 16th of August. On the 15th August, during the Fast commemorating the Destruction of the Temple, in addition to the large numbers of Jews who proceeded in the ordinary way to the Wall to worship, some hundreds of young Jews exercised their right of access for purposes not confined to the usual practise of prayer but were associated with the making of a speech and the raising of a flag. At about 1 P.M. on the 16th of August about 2,000 Moslems left the Haram, where they had been celebrating the Prophet's birthday, and proceeded to the Wailing Wall through streets lying in the Abu Madian Waqf, which also includes the pavement in front of the Wall. A wooden table that was standing on the pavement was overturned by the pressure of the crowd and was broken, and papers containing prayers and petitions lying in the crevices of

the Wall were taken out and burnt.'

Palestine *Bulletin* says: 'Moslems penetrated into the pavement of the Wall,' thus supporting the new Jewish contention that the pavement is a holy place, like the Wall itself. Government communiqué makes it clear that it's all Moslem property, and if it's holy, holy to the Moslem owners not to the Jewish visitors. This is what the Jews will never admit nowadays; Zionism makes them insist on more. All this supplies extreme provocation to disorder here, and can make very misleading and inflammatory Zionist propaganda abroad.

Tuesday, August 20th. (Long entry about matters unconnected with Palestine—specifically, a book by Balzac and a book by Tolstoy—omitted.)

Wednesday, August 21st. The Mizrachi boy, who was hurt in the row with Arabs at the Maccabee football field last Saturday, died yesterday. They are going to make a martyr of him, as sure as fate. Haven't yet heard latest developments; must go out and see. Antonius came back last night and I told him about what has been going on. He had heard nothing.⁸

Friday, August 23rd. The situation here is awful. Every day I expect the worst. It can't go on like this without an outbreak. The Mizrachi boy—Avrahm Mizrachi was his name—who was stabbed by an Arab after a row in the football field (it seems to have been a row started by the Jewish boys, or so they tell me), died on Tuesday. Wednesday morning was the funeral. Of course, the precious Maccabees had to seize the opportunity; fine chance to link up everything with the Wailing Wall and the general agitation. Two or three thousand of these heroes gathered in procession on the occasion of the funeral. They paraded with flags⁹ and tried to head their march through the Jaffa Gate into the Arab city. Feeling has been running so high among the Arabs since these fools raised their flag at the wall of the mosque that anything might have happened. Government apparently decided to keep the Jews out of the Arab town at any cost. Police barred the way, therefore, and the Jews made a rush at their cordon. Police beat them back with clubs. About twenty-five Jews were injured, none very seriously. Feeling all day Wednesday and yesterday intense. Police guard became very obvious all through the city. We even had two guards at the door of this hospice. I don't yet know what today's developments have been, but I am going out to see pretty soon.

During the next fortnight I had neither time nor inclination to write in my diary. The next entry I find was made at Nazareth on September sixth; and it was not until September 18th, in Jerusalem, that I was able to return to the book and write down fully what had happened in the meantime. Relying not only on my memory, but on the entries made in my journal two or three weeks later, I can establish the first sequence of events in something like their chronological order.

After I had finished the last entry in my diary I went downstairs to lunch and heard a new crop of disquieting rumours. At about half-past one I went out to get some cigarettes, and the old Arab porter at the Hospice told me the Grand Mufti had passed a short time before, going out to speak to the crowds around the city walls. Since the Mufti was not given to public appearance—I had never once seen him, although I lived within five minutes' walk of the Haram and his house—this seemed serious. I ran back into the Hospice for my hat, found a friend of mine (a British official), and went out with him to see what was to be seen. We walked up the narrow street, through excited or terrified groups of people, to the Damascus Gate. There we found ourselves in the midst of a mob of country Arabs, who seemed to be in a frenzy of excitement. Long yells of '*Islamiya!*' were going up. We got through these people without trouble—my companion spoke Arabic well—and reached the corner of the street called, I believe, the Street of the Prophet. The mob was gathering directly in front of us, and it was certain that somebody, somewhere, would soon be shedding blood. The houses on the other side of the mob, opposite us, belonged to a group of Georgian Jews, as I afterwards learned; the attention of the crowd was directed towards them. In front of the Jewish houses were ranged six policemen, armed only with short truncheons. The mob gathered with incredible speed—it could not have taken more than two or three minutes for them to get dense in front of us. The long yells that filled the air were enough to curdle one's blood.

A man dressed as a city Arab noticed us standing there and thrust us almost by force into a doorway. 'Stand here, stand here, for God's sake,' he said. 'These fellahin will kill you.' We stood in the doorway, and he took his place in front of us, shouting hoarsely at the mob, telling them to go back, that all was well. They paid no attention to him. They rushed towards the police, who laid about them valiantly with their truncheons; but what good were truncheons at such a time? The fellahin were flourishing sticks, clubs and knives, and, as is the way of mobs, they rushed on regardless of the efforts to stop them. Some

rushed under the horses' bellies, others squirmed through between the inadequate six; in another moment we heard smashing and a long scream. There was nothing we could do but run, which we did—up the hill towards the Italian Hospital, where there were British police. We found half a dozen bewildered young fellows up there who were trying to cover a whole area, but at least they had firearms. We told them what had happened, and *one* of them set off towards the Georgian houses; it was clear that the police were hopelessly inadequate. Where we stood, in the area at the top of the hill, a mob of Jews in all the stages of terror, fury and despair were assembled. They were held back by some of their own people, but a short time before one of them had thrown a grenade at some of the Arabs coming up the hill, and had killed two.¹⁰ The wretched half-dozen policemen on duty up there did not know whether to leave the mob of Jews and go down towards the mob of Arabs or not. One of the things I remember most clearly out of that agitated quarter of an hour is the appearance of a fat, earnest, anxious Jew in plain clothes, who was, I suppose, a police agent, going fussily up and down in front of the front line of the dense Jewish crowd, saying in Yiddish: 'Alles is fertig, alles is fertig! Sei ruhig, jetzt! Alles is fertig!'^{*} His broad, worried face was sweating, and he too obviously knew that *alles* was not *fertig*, but he did his best. The crowd, torn by furious emotions, paid no attention to him.

I returned to the Damascus Gate about a quarter of an hour after I had left it. When I got there the Arab mob had vanished (so little time is required to accomplish the most irrevocable acts); there were shattered glass and torn-up wood, débris of all sorts, in the street, and before the Georgian Jewish houses and on their stone doorsteps there was blood.

* * *

The Jews of Jerusalem outnumbered the Arabs two to one. It was a matter of common knowledge that the Jews possessed firearms; the Arabs did not. Under these conditions it seemed likely that the Jewish superiority in numbers and equipment, as well as their organization and centralization, would enable them to do great damage among the Arabs for a day or two if they so desired, and from what I had seen and heard the previous week I thought this was probably the wish of a good many among them.

Therefore, on the first day of these troubles the word

* "All is over. All is over. Be calm now. All is over."

'massacre' not only didn't occur in conversation, but never even crossed one's mind. The first casualties, we were told, had been Arabs killed by Jews; the Jews were an armed majority in the city; the Arabs were a minority armed only with sticks and knives. What it looked like, at about two o'clock on Friday afternoon, was an outbreak of murderous hatred between the two parts of the population—an outbreak that I, at least, had expected for some days; an outbreak caused by the long, exasperating controversy over the Wailing Wall, and precipitated, made inevitable, by the raising of the Jewish national flag at the wall of the Mosque of Omar. I expected the Jews and Arabs to behave more or less as Germans, Chinese, Frenchmen, Moroccans or Americans would behave under similar circumstances, only worse. In short, I thought we were in for a fight—a peculiarly revolting form of fight, in which the Jews would win in Jerusalem, Haifa and Tel-Aviv, and the Arabs would probably get the upper hand elsewhere, and in which neither side would respect the rules of Western civilized murder.

I did what almost any newspaper man or ex-newspaper man would have done: went straight to the post office to send a cablegram to my old office in New York. This was a mistake: my days of sending cablegrams were over, and I should have known it by then; I was no longer callous enough to go through scenes of horror and regard them merely as a 'story' for the papers. I was to learn during the next week, once and for all, that I was no longer a 'newspaper man'—that I couldn't do it and ought never to try to do it again. But on Friday it was my natural response to the situation. I sent a cablegram to the North American Newspaper Alliance, with whom I had a sort of standing agreement to 'cover' any genuinely important situation that might arise during my travels. In the cablegram, without giving details, I said the situation was grave and would get worse, and that I required an RTP (receiver-to-pay) arrangement to send press telegrams to the London office of the N.A.N.A. The RTP privilege had to be arranged at the London end; the Jerusalem post office could not accept press cables on a charge account without instructions. And, of course, it would have taken hundreds of dollars, which I did not possess, to send long press cablegrams and pay for them.

What followed with the New York office was a small irony in the great disasters of the week. The answer I received from New York was: '*How much do you want for articles. Can't you send them by mail?*' At the moment I received that cablegram the terrible murders at Hebron, in which sixty-four Jews, including some American youths, lost their lives, were actually taking

place; a crisis of the first magnitude was in progress; troops and ships were on the move; the 'story', considered simply from a newspaper point of view, as an event of interest, was the most important in the world. But I was asked to 'send it by mail'. I had been up a large part of the preceding night and was already getting into the state of nervous disorder that blotted out subsequent days and nights in Jerusalem. I replied: '*Pay what you like. You are wasting time. Demand RTP immediately*'—which was a peremptory way for a newspaper reporter to speak to his employers.

Eventually, on the third day of these disorders, the Jerusalem post office received instructions to accept my press telegrams on the RTP arrangement, and for three days I worked again as a correspondent. Even as it was, with all these delays and difficulties, mine were still the earliest full accounts of the trouble to reach the English and American newspapers. This was partly due to the difficulties under which my Jewish colleagues laboured—few of them dared circulate in the city, and at the beginning none of them went to the government for information—but also to the severity of the censorship established at the beginning of the outbreak. . . .

. . . The disorders of Friday resulted in many deaths among both Jews and Arabs (the Arabs including Christians as well as Moslems), and the impulse of murder continued for a week. At the end of the terror the official roll for Jerusalem was: 29 Jews and 38 Arabs killed, 43 Jews and 51 Arabs wounded. Here, as in Haifa, the Arabs got considerably the worst of it, but it seems clear (and seemed clear even at the time) that the casualties inflicted by Jews were chiefly in self-defence. The government had undertaken to disarm the Jewish police and the Jewish special constables, to avoid giving the Arabs a chance to say that they were being murdered by Jews with official approval; but no government could have disarmed the Jewish population. What surprised me in the roll of dead and wounded was not that Arabs outnumbered Jews, but that they did not outnumber them a great deal more.

The horrors of Friday in Jerusalem were followed by something much worse: the ghastly outbreak at Hebron, where sixty-four Jews of the old-fashioned religious community were slaughtered and fifty-four of them wounded. Hebron was one of the four holy cities of Judaism, and had had a small, constant Jewish population since mediaeval days. These were not Zionists at all; a more innocent and harmless group of people could not have been found in Palestine; many of them were Oriental

Jews, and all were religious. They had had nothing to do with the Zionist excesses, and had lived in amity with their Arab neighbours up to that day. But when the Arabs of Hebron—an unruly lot, at best—heard that Arabs were being killed by Jews in Jerusalem, and that the Mosque of Omar was in danger, they went mad.¹¹ The British police force at Hebron was inadequate—indeed, it could scarcely be said to have existed, for there was but one British officer there with a tiny native staff. In spite of the remarkable exertions and courage of this one officer (Mr. R.O. Cafferata), the Jewish houses were rushed by the mob, and there was an hour of slashing, killing, stabbing, burning and looting. Among the Jewish victims were some American boys who had arrived only a short time before to study at the rabbinical college. Eight or nine of them died at Hebron, and an equal number suffered severe wounds.

I cannot, at this late date, go through all the story of that week; it has been told over and over again. The horrors of Hebron were not repeated elsewhere, but an Arab mob attack on the religious Jews of Safad, on the following Thursday, was sufficiently terrible to be classified as another massacre. In Haifa, where the Jews were predominantly of the modern Zionist type and occupied an excellent strategic position at the top of the hill, the Arabs had much the worst of it. The same was true in some of the colonies; others were almost wiped out. At the end of the disturbances the official British casualty lists showed 207 dead and 379 wounded among the population of Palestine, of which the dead included 87 Arabs (Christian and Moslem) and 120 Jews, the wounded 181 Arabs and 198 Jews.¹²

* * *

The effort to be an efficient, unemotional newspaper correspondent was difficult to the point of impossibility. Living as I did, without sleep and without rest, eating little, and that at the weirdest hours, I should probably have collapsed in time simply from physical exhaustion. But there was a great deal more in it than that. I was bitterly indignant with the Zionists for having, as I believed, brought on this disaster; I was shocked into hysteria by the ferocity of the Arab anger; and I was aghast at the inadequacy of the British government. I knew that the Moslem authorities were trying to quell the storm, and that the British officials were doing their best against appalling difficulties; I also assumed that the responsible Zionist leaders (none of whom were in Palestine then) had done what they could. But all around me were the visible evidences of their failure. Although I had spent a good part of my life amid scenes of

violence and was no stranger to the sight of blood and dying men, I had never overcome my loathing for the spectacle even when it seemed, as in some of the conflicts I had witnessed, compelled by historical necessity. But here, in this miserable little country no bigger, in relation to the rest of the world, than the tip of your finger in relation to your body, I could see no historical necessity whatever. The country was tiny and was already inhabited: why couldn't the Zionists leave it alone? It would never hold enough Jews to make even a beginning towards the solution of the Jewish problem; it would always be a prey to such ghastly horrors as those I saw every day and every night: religion, the eternal intransigence of religion, ensured that the problem could never be solved. The Holy Land seemed as near an approximation of hell on earth as I had ever seen.

NOTES

- 1 Minutes of Evidence, Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August, 1929, questions 10,277-10,282. When I have occasion to refer to this report in future I shall call it Minutes of Evidence. It was published in 1930 by H.M. Stationery Office, for the Colonial Office, and contains the stenographic record of evidence taken by the Parliamentary Commission in forty-seven sittings.
- 2 This five hundred dollars, the original advance, I returned to the editor of *The New Palestine* when I got back to New York, as it was obvious I could never write articles that would be of any use to him.
- 3 Minutes of Evidence, question 12,903.
- 4 Minor shrine or place for prayer.
- 5 Minutes of Evidence, pp. 220-23.
- 6 Minutes of Evidence, pp. 205-10.
- 7 In view of the fact that the poor woman could not have foreseen what these events would lead to, I think I may suppress her name here. Anybody who is sufficiently curious can find it in the Minutes of Evidence containing my account of the incident and her denial of it.
- 8 The entries in my diary in Jerusalem were usually made in the morning, which is why they so often refer to the events of the day before.
- 9 It seems that this detail was untrue, but I had been told it on what I thought was good authority at the time.
- 10 The evidence as to time shows some conflict, but on the official showing it appears that my information that day was correct—that these Arabs were the first persons killed on Friday.
- 11 The Mosque of Omar was in no danger at any time during the troubles, but Arab rumours throughout the country made it the crux of the matter.
- 12 So far as the Arabs are concerned these figures may be assumed to be incomplete, as Arabs do not always report their dead and wounded.

On the Employment of Arab Labour*

SIR JOHN HOPE SIMPSON**

The effect of the Jewish colonisation in Palestine on the existing population is very intimately affected by the conditions on which the various Jewish bodies hold, sell and lease their land.

The Constitution of the Jewish Agency†: Land Holding and Employment Clauses.—The Constitution of the Jewish Agency for Palestine was signed at Zürich on 14th August, 1929. Article 3 (d) and (e) read as follows:—

“(d) Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and subject to the provisions of Article 10 of this Agreement, the title to the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.

“(e) The Agency shall promote agricultural colonisation based on Jewish labour, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed. . . .”

Keren-Kayemeth draft lease: Employment of Jewish labour only.—I have been favoured with copies of the draft of the lease which it is proposed to execute in respect of all holdings granted by the Keren-Kayemeth (Jewish National Fund). The following is Article 23 of this lease:—

“.... The lessee undertakes to execute all works connec-

* From Great Britain, *Palestine, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, Sir John Hope Simpson, 1930, Cmd. 3686 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), pp. 52-56.

** British civil servant (1868-1961); Vice-President of the Refugee Settlement Commission in Athens, 1926-30, and author of the above Report.

† On the Jewish Agency, see below, p. 309, note.

ted with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render the lessee liable to the payment of a compensation of ten Palestinian pounds for each default. The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labour shall constitute adequate proof as to the damages and the amount thereof, and the right of the Fund to be paid the compensation referred to, and it shall not be necessary to serve on the lessee any notarial or other notice. Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding, without paying any compensation whatever."

The lease also provides that the holding shall never be held by any but a Jew. If the holder, being a Jew, dies, leaving as his heir a non-Jew, the Fund shall obtain the right of restitution. Prior to the enforcement of the right of restitution, the Fund must give the heir three months' notice, within which period the heir shall transfer his rights to a Jew, otherwise the Fund may enforce the right of restitution and the heir may not oppose such enforcement.

Keren-Hayesod Agreements: Employment of labour.—In the agreement for the repayment of advances made by the Keren-Hayesod (Palestine Foundation Fund) to settlers in the colonies in the Maritime Plain the following provisions are included:—

"*Article 7.* — The settler hereby undertakes that he will during the continuance of any of the said advances, reside upon the said agricultural holding and do all his farm work by himself or with the aid of his family, and that, if and whenever he may be obliged to hire help, he will hire Jewish workmen only."

In the similar agreement for the Emek colonies there is a provision as follows:—

"*Article 11.* — The settler undertakes to work the said holding personally, or with the aid of his family, and not to hire any outside labour except Jewish labourers."

Zionist policy in regard to Arabs in their colonies.—The above-quoted provisions sufficiently illustrate the Zionist policy with regard to the Arabs in their colonies. Attempts are constantly being made to establish the advantage which Jewish settlement has brought to the Arab. The most lofty sentiments are ventilated

at public meetings and in Zionist propaganda. At the time of the Zionist Congress in 1921 a resolution was passed which "solemnly declared the desire of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people in relations of friendship and mutual respect, and, together with the Arab people, to develop the homeland common to both into a prosperous community which would ensure the growth of the peoples." This resolution is frequently quoted in proof of the excellent sentiments which Zionism cherishes towards the people of Palestine. The provisions quoted above, which are included in legal documents binding on every settler in a Zionist colony, are not compatible with the sentiments publicly expressed.

The same remark applies to the following extract from the Memorandum submitted by the General Federation of Jewish Labour to the "Palestine Commission of Enquiry" (i.e., the Commission on the Palestine disturbances of August, 1929):—

"The Jewish Labour Movement considers the Arab population as an integral element in this country. It is not to be thought of that Jewish settlers should displace this population, nor establish themselves at its expense. This would not only be impossible both from the political and economic standpoint, but it would run counter to the moral conception lying at the root of the Zionist movement. Jewish immigrants who come to this country to live by their own labour regard the Arab working man as their compatriot and fellow worker, whose needs are their needs and whose future is their future."

The effect of the Zionist colonisation policy on the Arab.—Actually the result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialised. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land. Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mort-main and inalienable. It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and good will on the part of the Zionists in view of the policy which the Zionist Organisation deliberately adopted.

Reasons for the exclusion of the Arab.—Attempts were made to ascertain the reasons for these drastic provisions directed

to exclude every Arab from the land purchased. The Executive of the General Federation of Jewish Labour were perfectly frank on the subject. They pointed out that the Jewish colonies were founded and established by Jewish capital, and that the subscriptions of which this capital is composed were given with the intention that Jews should emigrate to Palestine and be settled there—that these subscriptions would never have been given had it been thought that they would be employed to support Arab labourers—that it was the business of the Zionist Organisation to cause immigration into Palestine of as many Jews as possible, and that, if Arabs were employed, posts would thus be filled up for which Jews might have immigrated—that the position of agricultural labourer in the colonies, when occupied by a Jew, serves as a training for the immigrant and prepares him to take over a holding himself at a later date—and, finally, that if these posts were left open to the ordinary competition of the labour market, the standard of life of the Jewish labourer would be liable to fall to the lower standard of the Arab.

Policy contrary to Article 6 of Mandate.—All these arguments are thoroughly logical, and have a basis in fact. They are, however, irrelevant, in view of the provisions of Article 6 of the Mandate. The principle of the persistent and deliberate boycott of Arab labour in the Zionist colonies is not only contrary to the provisions of that article of the Mandate, but it is in addition a constant and increasing source of danger to the country. At the moment this policy is confined to the Zionist colonies, but the General Federation of Jewish Labour is using every effort to ensure that it shall be extended to the colonies of the P.I.C.A.,* and this with some considerable success. Great pressure is being brought to bear on the old P.I.C.A. colonies in the Maritime Plain and its neighbourhood—pressure which in one instance at least has compelled police intervention. As a symptom of that pressure may be cited the construction of a labour Kvutzoth (communal colony) on the outskirts of the P.I.C.A. village of Ness-ziona. It is certain that the employers of that village will not be able to resist the arguments of the

* The Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association incorporated the Jewish agricultural enterprises started by Baron Edmond de Rothschild in 1883 as well as the lands of I.C.A. (Jewish Colonisation Association) established by Baron Maurice de Hirsch in 1891. The settlement plans of P.I.C.A. were largely based on the principle of individual rather than communal ownership. See Granott, pp. 389-98.

General Federation, reinforced by the appeals of the vigorous labour colony at its gates.

That this replacement of Arab labour by Jewish labour is a definite policy of the Zionist Organisation is also evident from the following quotation, taken from "A Guide to Jewish Palestine", published by the Head Office of the Keren-Kayemeth Leisrael—The Jewish National Fund—and the Keren-Hayesod, at Jerusalem in 1930:—

"... up to the end of the war the old plantation settlements employed practically only Arab workers. The transfer of Jewish labourers into the old villages has been a source of constant care of the Zionist Executive, which latterly succeeded in placing approximately 6,500 workers in these centres, chiefly in the form of Havuroth, i.e., closely organised groups, which contract with farmers for specific pieces of work, and are themselves settled on small farms. Under this category come also the Yemenite settlements near the plantation villages...."

It will be a matter of great regret if the friendly spirit which characterised the relations between the Jewish employer in the P.I.C.A. villages and his Arab employees, to which reference has already been made, were to disappear. Unless there is some change of spirit in the policy of the Zionist Organisation it seems inevitable that the General Federation of Jewish Labour, which dominates that policy, will succeed in extending its principles to all the Jewish colonies in Palestine.

The present position, precluding any employment of Arabs in the Zionist colonies, is undesirable, from the point of view both of justice and of the good government of the country. As long as these provisions exist in the Constitution of the Zionist Organisation, in the lease of the Keren-Kayemeth and in the agreement of the Keren-Hayesod it cannot be regarded as desirable that large areas of land should be transferred to the Jewish National Fund. It is impossible to view with equanimity the extension of an enclave in Palestine from which all Arabs are excluded. The Arab population already regards the transfer of lands to Zionist hands with dismay and alarm. These cannot be dismissed as baseless in the light of the Zionist policy which is described above.

Harold Laski and Palestine*

1929-1931

KINGSLEY MARTIN**

On the one occasion before the war when he did become involved in the politics of Palestine, he was able to intervene with great effect. In August, 1929, the Jewish Agency† was opened in Zürich; Dr. Weizmann had at length succeeded in bringing together the Zionists and non-Zionists. The immediate answer to this Jewish move—or so the Jews interpreted it—was an attack by Arabs upon Jews in Jerusalem; a hundred and fifty Jews were killed and many more were wounded. Thereupon the MacDonald Government, in which Lord Passfield (Harold's old friend, Sidney Webb) was Colonial Secretary, after inquiry which established the fact that it was the Arabs who attacked the Jews,‡ intimated by way of remedy that fewer Jews would be allowed into Palestine. World Jewry was immensely alarmed.

* From Kingsley Martin, *Harold Laski (1893-1950): A Biographical Memoir* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1953), pp. 208-10. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "The Jewish Question." Copyright 1953 by Kingsley Martin. Reprinted by permission of Victor Gollancz Ltd. Harold Joseph Laski was British political theorist and Professor of Political Science at London School of Economics, 1926-50; he was also Member of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 1936-49, and Chairman of the Party, 1945-46. His works include *A Grammar of Politics* (4th ed.; London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1937) and *The American Democracy* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1949).

** British journalist; his writings include *The Press the Public Wants* (London: Hogarth Press, 1947).

† The Jewish Agency was provided for in the Mandate in order to cooperate with the British Government in matters pertaining to the Jewish National Home. Until 1929 the Zionist Organisation was itself recognized as this body, but in that year an "enlarged" Jewish Agency was established to include Zionist and non-Zionist members.

‡ See Sheean, pp. 273-301.

Were the Arabs to be rewarded for their violence by concessions at the expense of the Jews? The deduction was inescapable, and the Jews did not forget it twenty years later when they too won by armed resistance what had long been denied when reason was its advocate.

When the Permanent Mandates Commission met at Geneva in the autumn of 1929, strong criticisms were made of the administration in Palestine. A special meeting of the Commission was arranged for June, 1930. The British Government appointed Sir John Hope Simpson to inquire into the position of immigration, land settlement and development.* On June 13th we find Harold writing with some urgency to Felix** that it would be extremely unwise for him to come to London until Hope Simpson had reported. Until then Ramsay MacDonald would resent "nagging", especially from Americans. Harold was right in saying the time for maximum pressure would be when the Hope Simpson report was published. It was in fact issued simultaneously with what became known as the Passfield White Paper,† which announced the Government's intention to suspend Jewish immigration, restrict land purchase, and reduce the authority of the Jewish Agency. Weizmann and other leading members of the Jewish Agency at once resigned, and a fierce struggle began with the Colonial Office. In the fight against the Passfield White Paper the Jews were backed by such important non-Jewish personalities as Stanley Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Leopold Amery, General Smuts and Sir John Simon.

It was at this point that Harold Laski was able to intervene effectively. Ramsay MacDonald had expected that the Passfield White Paper would produce an outcry from the Jews, but the amount of support they received, more especially the public support offered them by Mr. Baldwin, upset all his calculations. On October 26th Harold wrote to Felix that he had been to see Arthur Henderson, then Foreign Secretary, who had also been kept in the dark about the publication of the White Paper, and afterwards called on Ramsay MacDonald, whom he found "very official and hard" and quite convinced that Harold was vastly exaggerating Jewish and American feeling. When the Baldwin letter appeared and the outcry was even greater than Harold

* See Simpson, pp. 303-7.

** Felix Frankfurter, see above, p. 195, note.

† On the Passfield White Paper, see Ionides, pp. 262-64, and Bullock, pp. 313-14.

had expected, MacDonald asked him to attempt to "assure his American friends that the Cabinet would do all in its power to act justly". Harold refused, saying nothing could—

"be done now unless he sacked Webb or withdrew the Declaration. MacDonald said he could not understand my bitterness, since I was not a Zionist. I said my views on Zionism had not changed, but that as a Jew I resented a policy which surrendered Jewish interests, in spite of a pledged word, to the authors of an unjustifiable massacre. No doubt when the Arabs killed the next lot of Jews, Webb would be allowed to expel all Jews from Palestine. He asked if a *modus vivendi* could be arranged. I said I saw no prospect of any at all so long as the Declaration stood."

It was, however, mainly as a result of Harold's activities that the Prime Minister was induced to invite the Jewish Agency to send representatives to a special Cabinet Commission on policy in Palestine, of which Arthur Henderson was Chairman and Malcolm MacDonald Secretary. After a prolonged fight, there was, on February 13th, 1931, as Dr Weizmann himself says, "an official reversal of policy". The White Paper was not withdrawn, because that would have meant a loss of face, but the Prime Minister read to the House of Commons a letter addressed to Weizmann, which was printed in *Hansard*. Though Weizmann was attacked for what was regarded in Zionist circles as a compromise, the result was a restoration of Jewish immigration, and the appointment of a High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope,* under whom the Jews made great advances in Palestine.

Harold's letters to Felix while this Cabinet Commission was meeting and drafting its recommendations to the Prime Minister show that he had been right in thinking that the Government would go a long way to satisfy the Jews about land and immigration if it did not involve eating too much dirt or arousing new fears in the Arabs. His positive recommendation was that "the whole character of personnel in Palestine" must be changed; if possible, the Mandate should be transferred to the Foreign Office; the British administrators were "impossible", and the Zionist officials often unwise. The economic problem was insoluble "unless the British Government uses Transjordan for Arab settlement". The Jews must agree on a programme of

* Sir Arthur Wauchope (1874-1947) was High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1931-38.

economic and social measures, but nothing could be achieved without "a large measure of Arab-Jewish co-operation".

A fortnight later Harold added with a sigh of relief that the job, as far as he was concerned, was done. "I finished off with Henderson the final draft of the document on Tuesday night. It will be formally ratified as soon as he is back from Geneva. I reckon that it has meant three hours a day for six weeks; and I hope that I shall have peace from Palestine for the next ten years."

The Passfield White Paper and the Politics of Whitechapel* 1930-1931

ALAN BULLOCK**

Harry Gosling was the first and only president of Transport and General Worker's Union Gosling's death left another vacancy, the seat in the House of Commons which he had held for Whitechapel. The Party was anxious to find a place in the House for Stafford Cripps, who had just been appointed to succeed Sir James Melville as Solicitor-General. The politics of Whitechapel, however, which would normally have appeared a safe constituency for a Labour candidate, were transformed by the publication of the Government's White Paper on Palestine. The Zionists were up in arms at reservations which Lord Passfield,¹ the Colonial Secretary and author of the White Paper, expressed on Jewish immigration into Palestine.† Only a few days before, the Labour Party Executive at Llandudno had accepted the resolution of the affiliated Jewish Socialist Labour Party re-affirming Labour support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Colonial Secretary found himself in the centre of a sharp political storm in which the Labour Government was angrily accused by the Zionists of betraying the Jewish people. With 7,000 Jewish votes in Whitechapel, the prospects of Labour carrying the by-election were greatly reduced and the Labour Party hurriedly withdrew the suggestion that Cripps, a member of the offending Government, should stand for election.

In view of the accusation subsequently made against Ernest Bevin that he had always been an anti-Semite, the later history

* From Alan Bullock, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Trade Union Leader, 1881-1940*, I (London: Heinemann, 1960), 455-57. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "The Second Labour Government, 1929-1931." Copyright by Alan Bullock, 1960. Reprinted by permission of William Heinemann Ltd., and Curtis Brown Ltd.

** Master of St. Catherine's College, Oxford University.

† On the Passfield White Paper, see Martin, pp. 309-12.

of this incident is of considerable interest. The Whitechapel constituency, which included Wapping, had a close connection with the London docks and the T.G.W.U. was bound to be deeply involved. Anxious to reassure the Zionists and placate the local Jewish vote, the Labour Party invited Bevin to stand. Henderson pressed him hard. Bevin's reply was unhesitating: it was impossible for him to carry out both his industrial and Parliamentary duties.

But that did not end the affair. The Union accepted the responsibility of finding a candidate for Whitechapel and put up H.J. Hall, a member of the Executive and a native of Wapping who had spent thirty years in organising the clerical and supervisory staffs in the London docks. Bevin in the meantime set to work to win back the Jewish vote. He kept in touch with Dov Hos, of Poale-Zion (the Jewish Socialist Labour Party) and met representatives of the Jewish organisations in Whitechapel. Once he discovered more precisely what was worrying them, he sent a memorandum to the Party saying bluntly that he shared their uneasiness about the White Paper and that, unless the Government were prepared to give reassurances, he would not be a party to the Union candidate standing for election.


Bevin's intervention, combined with equally emphatic protests from other friends of the Zionist cause, proved effective. With the agreement of the Jewish trade-union representatives Bevin put three specific questions to the Government to which he secured categorical answers. On 4th November, he issued a statement passing on the explicit assurance of the Government that they had no intention of altering the terms of the Mandate; no intention of stopping Jewish immigration and no intention of setting limits to the expansion of the Jewish National Home within the terms of the Mandate.

Jewish suspicions of Lord Passfield remained active, but towards Bevin their feelings were cordial and, despite the efforts of his three opponents to make trouble on the Jewish issue, Hall was returned to Parliament, although with a majority reduced from nine to one thousand.²

NOTES

1 Better known as Sidney Webb.

2 This account is based on correspondence preserved among Bevin's papers.



Zionist colonies in Palestine until 1930

...The present disposition of the Royal Air Force from the Mediterranean eastwards is as follows: †

Mediterranean Command: Malta.

Middle East Command:

(a) Egypt—Aboukir, Alexandria, Heliopolis, Helwan, Ismailia, Khartum;

(b) Transjordan and Palestine—Amman, Ramleh, Sarafand.

Iraq Command: Hinaidi, Basrah, Mosul.

India Command: Karachi, Lahore, Ambala, Peshawar, Kohat, Risalpur, Quetta.

Aden Command: Aden, Khormaksar.

Far East Command: Singapore, Kai Tak.

The R.A.F. "bridge" is thus strongly constructed, particularly as the desert is now not only fully surveyed, but is also studded with dumps and landing-grounds. Until recently the trans-desert motor communications were concentrated upon the Baghdad-Damascus route. Within the past year or so the British Government has been trying to develop the Baghdad-Amman-Jerusalem route, thus ensuring that the western end is under British control in Palestine instead of under French control

* From Ernest Main, *Iraq: From Mandate to Independence*, with a Forword by Lord Lloyd of Dolobran (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935), pp. 43-46. Reprinted by permission of George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

** British journalist and expert on Asian politics, author of *Palestine at the Crossroads* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937).

† On the strategic value of Palestine from the British point of view, see also Sidebotham, pp. 125-42.

in Syria. For there seems no early possibility that the Palestine Mandate will come to an end. Palestine thus is the western springer of the British arch from the Mediterranean to India. Whether from Egypt or from Cyprus, the new air and land route to the East starts from Palestine.

The other springer of the arch is the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf. Down that side of the Gulf British influence is now consolidated. The sloops of the Persian Gulf Division of the East Indies Squadron continue the century-old work of keeping order on the pearling banks, dispensing justice, and generally showing the flag in those inhospitable waters. It is no easy task. When one of the sloops was detailed to report on Elphinstone Inlet as a proposed permanent anchorage for naval ships, the visit of inspection was paid in the month of August, with the humidity such that the visibility was only about a hundred yards. Not a soul was to be seen on shore; even the native Arabs cannot live there in the summer and retire to their hot-weather villages in the hills behind. Many of the engine-room staff went down with heat-exhaustion, and the "survivors" brought the ship out at half-speed.

Such is the summer climate at the southern end of the Persian Gulf, where the British sloops for generations and the R.A.F. for five years have done magnificent service to British Imperial interests. For many years now the shaikhs of the key principalities of Kuwait, Bahrain and Muscat have been under British protection; but it is only within the last year or two that the shaikhs of the Trucial coast (Northern Oman) have been coaxed into the fold, with the result that British air communications between Basrah and India are now flanked by friendly Arab potentates, until the sea-jump from Sharjah to Gwadar in Baluchistan sees the fliers once again in British territory. The extension of this air route across India and farther has increased the Imperial importance of the Palestine-Basrah-Oman bridge.

Over all hangs the smell of oil. The Anglo-Persian Company renewed its concession in 1933, but a keen fight has been going on for the oil which is known to exist on the Arabian side of the coast. At Bahrain the concession—providing for royalties at the rate of just over five shillings per ton produced—has gone to a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company. On the Hasa coast the Standard Oil Company is busy. In Iraq, one small company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian, is now producing, while two much bigger concerns have yet to make a start. The Anglo-Persian Company, in which the British Government is a major shareholder, has a 23¾ per cent holding in the Iraq

Petroleum Company (with American, Dutch, and French interests equally represented, the balance of 5 per cent being held by the original concessionaire), and appears to be in complete control of the administration on the spot. Soon the pipe-line from Northern Iraq to the Mediterranean will be working, with one terminus, as insisted on by the French, on the Syrian and another on the Palestine coast. This latter terminus is at Haifa, which within ten years is bound to become one of the great ports of the Mediterranean, and in all probability an important British naval base. The other big company, the British Oil Development Company, is still prospecting.

There has been, for some considerable time, talk of a Haifa-Baghdad railway. Such a railway would greatly help in the consolidation of British influence in the Middle East, especially in the event of a hostile Russo-Turkish alliance. A Haifa-Baghdad-Basrah railway would tend to cut out the Suez route; it would open up the Iraqi and Persian markets to the West; it would become the new passenger route to India—once the Baghdad-Basrah railway was relaid on standard gauge. The projected railway would follow the line of the pipe-line—Haifa-Tiberias-Haditha—thence turning south-east to Baghdad. Already a great trans-desert telephone has been constructed under British auspices.

France, from her position in Syria, is showing a good deal of jealousy of these developments of British policy, some of which she did not foresee during the war-time negotiations. It is true that the French appeared to triumph when they drove Faisal* from Damascus in 1920, but his dynasty is now firmly established in Baghdad, and in so far as it owes the maintenance of its position to Britain, to that extent it is bound to carry Iraq in the wake of British policy. Of that policy a strong Iraq is a vital part—as a buffer between British Imperial communications and any possibility of pressure from or through Turkey or Persia—and in the nature of things no one will derive more benefits from a strong Iraq than the Iraqis themselves. Iraq's steady progress towards independence and strength added to the French difficulties in Syria. The Syrians rightly consider themselves a more advanced people than the Iraqis, and they did not understand why they should not be regarded as equally ready for independence. It may be that before long France will be willing to give up the Syrian Mandate on condition that she retains full control of the coast. Already French jealousy is apparent in the efforts she has made to attract Iraqi and Persian

* For Faisal, see above, p. 197, note.

transit trade to Beyrouth, where the French have promised both these Governments free port facilities—the implication being that the French fear the rise of Haifa.

Evidence Submitted to the
Palestine Royal Commission 1937

VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY*

...I have the profoundest feeling for the Arab case, in so far as that Arab case is not exaggerated. This Commission have already been able to make up their minds as to whether there is any individual hardship to the Arabs of Palestine as men, deriving from the Jewish colonization. We maintain unanimously that the economic position of the Palestinian Arabs, under the Jewish colonization and owing to the Jewish colonization, has become the object of envy in all the surrounding Arab countries, so that the Arabs from those countries show a clear tendency to immigrate into Palestine. I have also shown to you already that, in our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold the Arabs, their progeny, *and* many millions of Jews. What I do not deny is that in that process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that *that* is a hardship. It is not a hardship on any race, any nation, possessing so many National States now and so many more National States in the future. One fraction, one branch of that race, and not a big one, will have to live in someone else's State: Well, that is the case with all the mightiest nations of the world. I could hardly mention one of the big nations, having their States, mighty and powerful, who had not one branch living in someone else's State. That is only normal and there is no "hardship" attached to that. So when we hear the Arab claim confronted with the Jewish claim, I fully understand that any minority would prefer to be a majority, it is quite understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also prefer Palestine to be the Arab State No. 4, No. 5,

* Jewish Russian journalist (1880-1940); immigrated into Palestine during W.W.I., elected to the Zionist Executive, 1921, founded the Revisionist Party, 1925, and the New Zionist Organization, 1935.

or No. 6—that I quite understand; but when the Arab claim is confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is like the claims of appetite versus the claims of starvation. No tribunal has ever had the luck of trying a case where all the justice was on the side of one party and the other party had no case whatsoever. Usually in human affairs any tribunal, including this tribunal, in trying two cases, has to concede that both sides have a case on their side and, in order to do justice, they must take into consideration what should constitute the basic justification of all human demands, individual or mass demands—the decisive terrible balance of Need. I think it is clear.

I now want to establish that this condition was perfectly well known, perfectly realized, and perfectly acknowledged, by the legislators responsible for the act known as the Balfour Declaration and subsequently for the Mandate. The paramount question was Jewish distress. I was privileged myself to take part in our political negotiations with France, Italy, and England, from 1915 to 1917. I was also associated with others who conducted those negotiations. I can assure you that the main argument mentioned in every conversation with the Italian ministers, with M. Delcassé in France, with Lord Newton here, with Lord Balfour, with Mr. Lloyd George, and with everybody else, was the argument of the terrible Jewish distress, especially keen at that moment. England, France, and Italy, three Liberal countries, happened to be Allies of Tsarist Russia. I need not describe to gentlemen of your generation what it meant to any Englishman, whether Liberal or Conservative, when he read in the newspapers, especially in 1915 and 1916, certain information as to the fate of the Jews in the Russian sector of the war. It was the common talk everywhere—the feeling that something should be done to relieve that disaster, and the feeling that that disaster was only an acute expression of a deep-seated, chronic disease that was alive everywhere. And I claim that the spirit that created the Balfour Declaration was that spirit, the recognition that something should be done to save a people in that position.

My Lord and Gentlemen, here we come to the beginning of a very sad chapter. I will do my best to put it to you as moderately as I can. You will certainly use patience and perhaps more than patience with a man who has to tell you about a very great disappointment. I always thought before coming to England that if a civilized country, a civilized Government, assumed a trust, internationally, under *such* conditions, with *such* implications, dealing with a people who have so long suffered and who have so long hoped and whose

hopes are, after all, sacred to every Englishman—I expected that Government to sit down and prepare a blueprint, a plan “how to do it.” Under whatever interpretation of the “home” promise, there should have been a plan how to build it; what were to be the implications of “placing a country under such administrative, economic, and political conditions as might facilitate the establishment” of whatever you mean by the Jewish national home.

That was one condition—a Plan; and the second condition was letting it be clear to all that that was the trust they have accepted and “That is what we are going to do.” That blueprint or planning should begin with a geological survey of both sides of the Jordan in order to ascertain what parts of the territory are really reclaimable, cultivable; a scheme for their amelioration and reclamation; a scheme of a loan which should be launched and which the Jews would have to provide, to pay for the amelioration and parcellation, and for creating a land reserve on both sides of the Jordan, out of which both Jewish and Arab applicants for agricultural settlement could be satisfied. Further, a plan of industrial development calculated to provide sustenance for large-scale immigration; a plan of what tariff laws and customs measures should be adopted in order to protect that development; a plan for a taxation system, as in every country under colonization, adapted to assisting the new settlers and newcomers.

Finally, measures for guaranteeing security. A nation with your colossal colonizing past experience surely knows that colonization never went on without certain conflicts with the population on the spot, so that the country had to be protected; and as the Jew never asked to be protected by someone else, the Plan should embody the Jewish demand that they should themselves be allowed to form a protecting body in Palestine, or at least a considerable part of it. Especially there should be a very careful selection of Civil Servants. Such a work, unparalleled, unprecedented, certainly needs Civil Servants first of all sympathetic, and secondly, acquainted with the work. There should be some special examination, some new branch of the Service. That is what everybody expected. I need not tell you how totally disappointed we were in hearing, instead of all that, the expression “muddling through”—hearing it even mentioned as something desirable and commendable as a system; on more solemn occasions it was called “empiricism” and sometimes “going by horse sense.” I do not know if all this is good for the Empire; it is not for me to judge. I can only say that we have greatly suffered under this absence of system, this deliberate

aversion from making plans while undertaking something very new, very important, and very responsible. We have suffered terribly. Yet, whenever we complained, we got the strange reply: "The man on the spot knows better." May I submit most respectfully that the Mandate was granted to Great Britain by fifty nations because those fifty nations believed in Britain's collective experience and conscience, and especially in the fact of their close control over the man on the spot. The idea of control by a nation over its executives is an English idea. We Continentals learned it from the English. So, in our submission, the Mandatory Government cannot discharge its Mandatory duty by selecting even a genius and appointing him as the man on the spot. But that was practically always their reply: "We have appointed a man on the spot, let him do it, and we shall wait and see." Or sometimes we got another reply—"Probably the Government is administered quite satisfactorily, because both Jews and Arabs have grievances and complaints." We never could understand this. Is my duty, for instance, with regard to my children or with regard to my two clients, sufficiently discharged if I have managed to make myself obnoxious to both of them? I do not think so.

We were terribly disappointed by the absence of a system and plan. We were even more disappointed by the absence of the second requirement: clarity. The Arabs were never told what the Balfour Declaration was meant by Lord Balfour and all the others to mean. They were never told. Here again, My Lord, I am going to limit myself, as being perhaps a sufficient illustration of that attitude to truth, to recall a little story which has been told to this Commission in Palestine: that instead of writing on coins, etc., "Eretz Israel" they just write the two Hebrew letters for E.I. Why? What is the meaning of it? If the country is to be called Eretz Israel, Land of Israel, if that is the name avowed, then print it in full; if it is something which cannot be allowed, remove it. But the "way out" adopted in this case illustrates the whole "system," which is to hint that there is the Balfour Declaration, and perhaps there is something in it, but then again perhaps there is nothing in it. That has been the "system" from the beginning to the end. If questioned, I am prepared to support this reproach by many facts, but I believe the Royal Commission have already had sufficient information to form their own judgment.

A very important factor in implementing the Mandate is looking after security. I presume the Commission have already had time to draw their own conclusions as to that, but it is my duty to remind them of a few aspects of it. In Palestine we were

threatened with pogroms; we were telling so to the Government for years and years, but they went on cutting down and cutting down on the number of troops in Palestine. We said: "Remember that we have children and wives; legalize our self-defense, as you are doing in Kenya." In Kenya until recently every European was obliged to train for the Settlers Defence Force. Why should the Jews in Palestine be forced to prepare for self-defense underhand; as though committing a legal offense? You know what a pogrom means in Jewish history; we know what pogroms mean in the history of Mandatory Palestine. The Jews have never been allowed to prepare for that holy duty of self-defense, as every Englishman would have done. We had in our case to prepare by underhand methods, with insufficient equipment, with insufficient drilling, in an amateurish way. I really do not know how a Government can allow or tolerate such a state of things after three experiences, of which 1929 was a terrible one*.... I am sorry if I am getting excited and I apologize to the Commission and hope they understand the reason for it; but I do not think I have overstepped the boundaries of logic in submitting to this Royal Commission my case.

If you cut down the troops in Palestine far beyond the limit of safety, and the explanation is that the British taxpayer does not want to give his money nor his sons, that is quite natural, but we—the Jews of all parties—have for years been demanding: "Why have you disbanded the Jewish Regiment? Why not allow the Jews to take over: our men and our money under British command and under British military law?" I do not claim a "Jewish Army" before there is a Jewish State; we want the Jewish Regiment just as it existed during the War, rendering decent service. Why should the impression be created in this country that we want Johnny, Tommy, and Bobby to defend us? We do not. If, in the building of Palestine, sweat and gold have to be employed, let us give the sweat and let us give the gold; if blood has to be shed by the defenders of Palestine, let it be our blood and not English blood. But that suggestion has always been turned down.

As I said: I know the attitude of this Commission in refusing to dwell on the actual course of the riots, and I have to bow before it. On the other hand—here again I must ask, not about this Commission, but about the Colonial Office, about the Mandatory Government: Is there a plan, is there a line of action? Mr. Eden in Geneva, most formally, in so many words, promised the League's Council that "a Royal Commission" had been

* On the 1929 riots, see Shecan, pp. 284-301.

appointed to investigate the prevailing unrest, that they would investigate the facts; and the Permanent Mandates Commission was persuaded to abstain from asking questions until "a Royal Commission"—I do not say *this* Royal Commission—had investigated actual events. This Royal Commission is, of course, sovereign to refuse to do so, and I can understand their motives, but My Lord, where is then that Royal Commission which *will* investigate who is guilty? Because I claim somebody is guilty, I claim that a tremendous amount of ammunition for the Arabs has been allowed to percolate into Palestine both before and during the events, I claim there was neglect of duty in examining the first victims. I claim there is something I want to understand but do not understand in the fact that while a general strike in Jaffa was in progress, there was no general strike in Haifa. I want to understand whether it is true there had been some gentlemen's agreement, a "revolt by leave" in one part of Palestine, but no revolt where it was requested by somebody in office that there should not be revolt. I want to understand why Mr. Kawukji* was allowed to depart from Palestine in state; why the bands were allowed to disband; why there was no subsequent disarmament of the population. I want to know why it is that such things can happen in a country and nobody is guilty, nobody is responsible.

With this famous theory of the man on the spot, I want the man on the spot to stand before a Royal Commission, before a Judicial Commission, and I want him to answer for his errors. Sometimes even a humble man like myself has the right to say the words "*J'accuse.*" They are guilty. They are guilty of commission, omission, neglect of duty. If I am not mistaken, somebody has to answer to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations who gave you the Mandate. Who is going to answer? I am informed that, instead of by this Royal Commission, a report on the events will be presented in a general way in the report of the Palestine Government to the League of Nations—the party whom we accuse will present it. I submit to this Royal Commission: Among your recommendations as to remedies (because you are requested in your terms of reference to mention remedies) the first is to find the guilty ones and to punish them. Also inquire about the Supreme Moslem Council, or whatever is the official description of that group of persons headed by

* Fawzi Kawukji, a regular army officer of Lebanese origin, who after resigning his commission in the Iraqi army, joined the Palestinian resistance at the head of a small force of Arab volunteers and became guerilla leader in Palestine in the late summer of 1936.

His Eminence the Mufti* and the other gentlemen. The Government gave them a sort of diplomatic immunity. The Government negotiated with them. I submit most respectfully and humbly that some independent Commission, independent of the Colonial Office and independent of the man on the spot, should inquire and investigate into this question of guilt. I believe it is guilt, and I believe that the person guilty should be punished, and that is what I humbly demand.

As to the remedies, the main remedy in my opinion is the Plan and the truth. Arabs and Jews should be informed what the real implications of the Mandate are. To my way of thinking there is only one way of interpreting the Mandate. And a Scheme should be prepared. We call it a Ten-Year Plan. In our opinion it should embrace agrarian reforms, taxation, and customs reforms, a reform of the Civil Service, opening up of Trans-Jordan for Jewish penetration, and assurance of public security by the establishment of a Jewish contingent and by the legalization of Jewish self-defense.

At the same time, I think on the Jewish side too, reforms are necessary, for we have also committed many errors in our own systems. In my opinion it all culminates in the reform of the Jewish Agency. I was asked by Lord Peel whether we represented a body distinct from the Jewish Agency. Yes. We claim that the Jewish Agency *de facto* does not today represent the whole or even the majority of Zionist Jewry and we think the time has come when this body should be rebuilt, with the consent of the Mandatory, on the basis of universal suffrage, because the problem of Zionism today has really become the interest of practically everybody in Jewry, no longer only of adherents of a particular political group. We think that reform is quite timely and it might put an end to many abuses which I cannot deny. One of them will be brought to the knowledge of this Commission in the report of the "Betar"***—the British Trumpeldor organization—on the distribution of certificates, about which this Commission have received, to my great regret, misleading information from some other Jewish representatives.

CHAIRMAN: Are you going to tell us where it is misleading? What is the main point?

* For Hajj Amin, see above, p. 286, note.

** Brit Trumpeldor (Betar) was the Zionist militant youth movement founded by Jabotinsky in 1923, and called after Captain Joseph Trumpeldor who had died in an engagement with the Arabs at Tel Hai in Upper Galilee in 1920.

ANSWER: Yes, if you will allow me another ten minutes. There is a suggestion that when we are asking for what I am asking for, that we are trying to involve this Empire in formidable complications and obstacles. I deny it. To the best of my belief I affirm, and I am not the only one, that should Great Britain go this way and really help us to save the Jewish people as it was meant and promised in the Balfour Declaration, the course of this great experiment will be as normal as the course of any other great enterprise of social evolution. We utterly deny that it means bringing Great Britain into conflict with world Islam, we utterly deny that it means a real physical conflict with the neighboring states, we deny all this. It has been exaggerated beyond any recognition. It is not true. Given a firm resolve, made clearly known to both Jews and Arabs, all this would be performed with the normal smoothness of any other equally big colonization enterprise.

As to keeping the country quiet and avoiding disturbances: I have already submitted—try what has never been tried—try re-establishing the Jewish Regiment as part and parcel of the permanent garrison. Try legalizing Jewish self-defense. It is anyway almost inevitable. Jewish self-defense is “practically” legalized today; it is and it is not; it “should not” exist, but it does exist; it “should not” be armed, but if it is armed, well . . .and so on. Well, I think the decisive step should be made in the necessary direction.

You have, of course, heard of compromises and halfway houses which are being suggested, including cantonization, or the parity scheme, or the cultural rapprochement, or the Jews “giving in” and so on. Believe my sincerity, and it is the sincerity of the whole Movement, the sincerity of every Jew I am now trying to voice: We wish a halfway house could be possible, but it is perfectly impossible. We cannot accept cantonization, because it will be suggested by many, even among you, that even the whole of Palestine may prove too small for that humanitarian purpose we need. A corner of Palestine, a “canton,” how can we promise to be satisfied with it? We cannot. We never can. Should we swear to you we would be satisfied, it would be a lie. On what other point can we “give in?” What can the “concession” be on the part of Oliver Twist? He is in such a position that he cannot concede anything; it is the workhouse people who have to concede the plateful of soup, and there is no way out of it. We do not believe in any compromise on those lines. Cantonization is a dream and parity is a lie. It will never be enforced or believed by anybody; and trying it again and again means prolonging the state of things

which in my submission has led to the riots of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936, and it will lead again to the same result.

There is only one way of compromise. Tell the Arabs the truth, and then you will see the Arab is reasonable, the Arab is clever, the Arab is just; the Arab *can* realize that since there are three or four or five wholly Arab States, then it is a thing of justice which Great Britain is doing if Palestine is transformed into a Jewish State. Then there will be a change of mind among the Arabs, then there will be room for compromise, and there will be peace.

It is my very unpleasant duty to wind up by taking into consideration a melancholy pessimistic contingency: What will happen if what the Jews desire cannot be conceded by Great Britain? I wish I could omit mentioning that contingency for many reasons, personal reasons, Jewish national reasons, but to omit it is impossible. We are asked very often: "Whatever is meant by the Balfour Declaration was promised in 1917, but since then perhaps the British people have honestly come to the conclusion that they cannot do it." I deny it. I affirm they can; but when I am asked, when any Jew is asked: "What, are the Jews going to pin us down to the promise and to say—you have promised the pound of flesh, pay us the pound of flesh?" Gentlemen, here I answer you in the name of the most extreme of Zionist parties: "No!" If Great Britain really is unable to do it (not unwilling, but unable) we will bow to her decision, but we then shall expect Great Britain to act as any Mandatory who feels he cannot carry out the Mandate: give back the Mandate....

SIR LAURIE HAMMOND: To whom?

ANSWER: And do it in a way which will not harm the safety of the Jews who trusted you and came to Palestine on the chances of a Zionist future. This means letting a certain time elapse while the Mandatory together with the Jews will look for the alternative. I hope that time will never come. I am fully convinced that it will not be necessary. I believe in England just as I believed in England twenty years ago when I went, against nearly all Jewish opinion, and said: "Give soldiers to Great Britain!" because I believed in her. I still believe. But if Great Britain really *cannot* live up to the Mandate—well—we shall be the losers; and we will sit down together and think what can be done; but not that Great Britain should go on holding the Mandate and pretend it is "fulfilled" while my people are still suffering in the Diaspora and still only a minority in Palestine.

No, that cannot be done. That is not cricket. Therefore, Gentlemen, I submit it cannot be done, and it shall not be done.

I thank the Commission very much for their kindness and attention. I beg your forgiveness for having kept you for an hour and a half.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann's Conversation with Mr. Ormsby-Gore the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Partition of Palestine* 1937

Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked me what was my attitude towards the Royal Commission's proposals now that I had read the Report.** I said that I had come to see him to try and clarify a number of points. The Jews were perplexed, and a great many of them were against the Partition scheme. It would be my duty to explain my attitude in due course to the Congress.†

1. Sovereignty:

(a) I pointed out that this must be a genuine affair if this scheme were to be considered at all. I referred to the recommendation for the establishment of a joint port between Jaffa and Tel-Aviv, under British direction. Mr. Ormsby-Gore replied that it was unthinkable that this recommendation should stand; it was even inconsistent with the Commission's own views.

(b) I then took up the question of the temporary mandates over the four towns in the Jewish State. Mr. Ormsby-Gore agreed that these should be liquidated as soon as possible. He added that the only difficulty with regard to these would be

* From *Jewish Chronicle*, August 13, 1937, pp. 24-25. Reprinted by permission. This document which according to the *Jewish Chronicle* was initialled "Chaim Weizmann" and dated 19. 7. 37 was first produced by Mr. Meir Grossman, leader of the Jewish State Party in Palestine, at the 20th Zionist Congress at Zurich in August, 1937.

** The Palestine Royal Commission (Peel) Report, dated June 22nd, 1937, and published July 7th, 1937, Cmd. 5479. See also Ionides, pp. 264-66, and Reid, pp. 409-32.

† The Zionist Congress which met in Zurich in the summer of 1937, empowered the Zionist Executive to ascertain the "precise terms" of the British proposal for the establishment of a Jewish state.

the case of Acre, which for historical reasons was specially bound to England. He thought that Acre would be the last of the towns to be released. Mr. Ormsby-Gore went on to say that the Admirals had been after him with regard to Haifa. I replied that the Admiralty had unfortunately woken up four years too late. Ten years ago we had foreseen and tried to impress upon them the future value of Haifa. I went on to say that the Admiralty could get all they wanted from us by direct agreement, but not through the Government itself. If they tried to collar Haifa we should make things extremely unpleasant for them in Geneva.

(c) I then raised the question of the collection of Customs duties and of the annual tribute which it was proposed that the Jewish State should pay the Arabs. I said that it was conceivable that we might, for a consideration, enter into an agreement with the Arab State, but that this could not be imposed upon us by the Government. Mr. Ormsby-Gore agreed.

2. I then raised the question of the inclusion of the new Jewish Jerusalem quarters in the Jewish State. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he did not see any difficulty in such inclusion, and that it seemed to him a reasonable claim.

3. Transfer of the Arab population:* I said that the whole success of the scheme depended upon whether the Government genuinely did or did not wish to carry out this recommendation. The transfer could be carried out only by the British Government, and not by the Jews. I explained the reasons why we considered this proposal of such importance. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he was proposing to set up a Committee for the twofold purpose (a) of finding land for the transferees (they hoped to find land in Trans-jordan, and possibly also in the Negev), and (b) of arranging the actual terms of the transfer. He mentioned the name of Sir John Campbell, who had had much experience in connection with transfers of population between Greece and Turkey, and who knew all about the matter. He agreed that once Galilee was given to the Jews, and not the Negev, the position would be very difficult without transfer.

4. I referred to the statement in the Official Summary of the Commission's Report that approximately one-third of Palestine was to be allotted to the Jewish State. I suggested that either this statement should be corrected, or alternatively, we were

* The Royal Commission's partition recommendation had included the transfer, by compulsion if need be, of the bulk of the Arab inhabitants from certain areas allotted to the Jewish state—the first of several subsequent proposals to this effect.

owed 4,000,000 dunams. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that this showed that there was room for concessions. I remarked that the Jews were a logical people, who would follow with the closest attention every action and statement of the Government. It would be the greatest mistake to insult the intelligence of the Jews.

5. I referred to the exclusion of the Potash Works and the Rutenberg Electric Power Station from the Jewish State. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that Lord Lytton* and Mr. Rutenberg** had been sitting on him for the last ten days. He added that the matter would have to be adjusted.

6. Transition period. Mr. Ormsby-Gore gave Dr. Weizmann some idea of the Government's time table. They would go to the Mandates Commission and the Council at Geneva, and were hopeful of getting release from the Mandate, possibly by the beginning of October. Their first step thereafter would be the appointment of a Boundary Commission, which would in all probability be an international body. Next they would appoint a Finance Commission, these in addition to the Transfer Commission mentioned above. The Government would then undertake the negotiation of the treaties with the Arabs and the Jews. It would probably take about two years before these were concluded, and their conclusion would be followed by the immediate appointment of provisional Jewish and Arab Governments for the respective States. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that his statement in the House of Commons would be vague, and he expected he would have rather a bad time.

At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Ormsby-Gore turned to me and asked me what my own personal opinion was. I replied that if the points which I had raised in the interview were settled to our satisfaction, I personally would look with favour on the scheme.

I added that what I had told Mr. Ormsby-Gore and what he had told me I should repeat, naturally in confidence, to my closest friends in Zürich, and also to every member of the Permanent Mandates Commission.

* The 4th Earl of Lytton was at the time of the conversation Staff Captain at the War Office.

** Pinhas Rutenberg was a Russian Zionist who became Governor of Petrograd during the Kerensky regime. In Palestine, he is chiefly known for the formation of the Palestine Electric Corporation which obtained the concession for the development of hydroelectric services in the country and began operation in 1923.

The Dark Path of Repression*

1937-1938

NEVILL BARBOUR**

By the middle of September [1937] it was evident that the Government must choose between abandoning the Partition Scheme and advancing indefinitely along what the Royal Commission had described as "the dark path of repression" which has no light at the end.

Meanwhile the Administration was being subjected to tremendous pressure by the Agency, and by its supporters in the British Press and Parliament, to hold the Arab Higher Committee, and in particular the Mufti, responsible for the existing state of affairs.

The Arab Higher Committee for their part contented themselves with disowning any responsibility for the violence, without, however, displaying any zeal in endeavouring to put an end to it. It is no doubt true that they could not in any case have succeeded in doing so in view of the intensity of popular feeling, but, from the political point of view, they would have been well advised to try.

The climax came when the newly appointed District Commissioner for the Galilee district, Mr. L.Y. Andrews, was shot dead by four armed men outside the Anglican Church in Nazareth in September 1937.

Mr. Andrews had served in Palestine with the Australian Forces during the First World War, and had remained on in the service of the Government. He was a man of great energy,

* From Nevill Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy* (London: George G. Harrap and Company Ltd., 1948), pp. 188-93. Reprinted by permission of George G. Harrap & Company Limited.


** Author, orientalist, and former Assistant Head of British Broadcasting Corporation, Eastern Services. His works include *Morocco* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1965), and ed., *A Survey of North West Africa, the Maghrib* (2nd ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

who spoke colloquial Arabic fluently and was also learning to talk Hebrew. According to Jewish opinion, he was the only official who administered the Mandate as Zionists consider that it should be administered. While he had Arab friends, however, he never succeeded in winning the confidence of the fellahin.

It was one of the peculiarities of the Palestine Administration that there was no British official whose duty it was to act as intermediary between Arab opinion and the High Commissioner, and to whom Arabs could speak freely and confidentially. During the latter part of Sir Arthur Wauchope's* régime the position of adviser on Arab affairs was held unofficially by Mr. Andrews.¹ When the Royal Commission arrived he was therefore appointed as liaison officer between the Administration and the Commission. As a result of this he was, rightly or wrongly, widely considered to have been a principal supporter of the Partition Scheme. Thus when, some weeks later, he was appointed Commissioner of the newly created district of Galilee, it was supposed that this was in order that he might prepare the way for the transfer of this area to the Jewish state and facilitate the land sales and negotiations connected with the Huleh Concession. On hearing of this appointment those most familiar with the temper of the peasantry in the north and with the nature of the secret terrorist organization which had been known to exist in the northern district since 1935 openly expressed anxiety for his life. In the weeks that he was District Commissioner, as in a previous period in which he had been Special Commissioner for security, he succeeded in reducing the manifestations of disorder in his district; but on this occasion he fell in the end a victim to assassins. In all probability the murder was the work of one of the politico-religious secret societies founded by Sheikh Kassam and carried on later by Sheikh Farhan es Saadi² and others.

There appears, however, no reason to connect the crime in any direct way with the activities of the Arab Higher Committee. It could not serve their interests, and was, in fact, strongly reprobated by them in a communiqué issued on the evening on which the murder took place. One member of the Committee had, indeed, enjoyed such friendly relations with the late Mr. Andrews that he had been accused by extremists of acting as his agent. In view, however, of the constant campaign against the Committee, and of the latter's failure to defend itself by a clear and vigorous denunciation of violence, it was evident that the Government, if it was not prepared in any way to meet the Arab point of view, must now resort to further repressive

* See above, p. 311, note.



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measures. Of these the first step would assuredly be action against the Higher Committee.

The way was prepared, in the days following the murder, by the arrest and detention by administrative order of some two or three hundred notables, mostly known to be supporters of the Muslim Supreme Council. A week later the Arab Higher Committee and all the local National Committees were declared illegal and dissolved. Those members of the Committee who could be found were arrested in their beds and deported to the Seychelles; the most important member, Jamal Husseini, escaped to the Lebanon. Those who were abroad were forbidden to return to Palestine. Haj Amin el Husseini,* Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Arab Higher Committee, was declared deposed from the Presidency of the Muslim Supreme Council, but no attempt was made to arrest or deport him, presumably because this might have led to bloodshed in the mosque area. The reason given for the Government's action against the Arab Higher Committee was its alleged "moral responsibility" for the various acts of violence which had occurred.

As we have already stated, the identification of the Muslim Supreme Council with a particular political point of view, though the inevitable result of the Government's action in treating the Muslim majority as a religious community, was highly unsatisfactory, and had for a long time required reform. But the measures taken against the Arab Higher Committee on October 1 went far beyond this. They could be regarded by every Palestinian Arab only as a deliberate affront to national feeling and as an attempt to deprive the Arabs of their only political representation, and so prepare the way for the enforcement of the Partition Scheme. A new sullenness was apparent everywhere, together with a grim resolution to carry the struggle on to the end, cost what it might. Large deputations of peasants were seen in the streets of Jerusalem vainly seeking to lodge a protest with the Officer Administering the Government.

On the following night an isolated act of sabotage was reported on the railway-line. This was an ominous sign, for there had been no single case of sabotage since the termination of the strike a year before. Otherwise all seemed outwardly calm: one optimistic Jewish journalist went so far as to say that security could now be smelt in the air.

A fortnight passed in this way. Then, one night, it was rumoured that Haj Amin had escaped. It was soon ascertained that he had, in fact, made his way in disguise to the coast, taken

* See above, p. 286, note.

a boat, and, after an adventurous voyage, landed in Lebanese territory.

On the night of October 14 disorders in the style of 1936 occurred all over the country with a simultaneity which showed that they must have taken place on a prearranged signal.

The Government replied with severe measures. Fines up to £2000 were inflicted upon villages, and collected in kind and in cash. The houses of suspects were dynamited by administrative order and their families rendered homeless. In one case at least this form of vengeance was taken on the relatives of a man who had already expiated his crime by his death. In other cases the best houses in villages near which crime had occurred were destroyed without regard to the character of their owners. Wholesale arrests of notables and commons were made by administrative order, and soon the concentration camps housed six or seven hundred untried prisoners.³

Those persons who held that the disorders of 1936 were not the result of widespread popular feeling, but merely the work of a handful of agitators, headed by the Mufti of Jerusalem, confidently predicted that the new disorders would be over within a few weeks. When this prophecy was falsified by events it was suggested that the bands in the hills were composed of "professional" bandits hired with Italian or other foreign money and organized by those members of the former Higher Committee who had taken refuge in the neighbouring countries. It was, however, perfectly obvious from the description of those armed men who had been identified or tried that 90 per cent of them were Palestinian peasants; and from the language which some of them used as they went to the scaffold it was evident that they considered themselves to be volunteers fighting in defence of their country. Italian propaganda there certainly had been, but its influence on the troubles was negligible; there may have been Italian money, which helped to provide the means of the troubles, but was not their cause. A well-informed Jewish paper gave the following account of the "terrorist" movement, which it stated was derived from a "moderate" Arab source:

"How many terrorists are there, that they can so effectively terrorize the entire north?" I asked.

"No more than 300 or 400 full-time terrorists in the hills," he replied, "and a few scores in the cities. But these would never be able to maintain the terror without the co-operation of their confederates in the villages. How many there are of these is not know. Maybe 2000, maybe more.

But they are scattered everywhere, all of them have arms, join the gangs for short periods when needed, and keep them supplied with food and, above all, information about movements of the police and troops, about villagers who act or speak against the terrorism. They are the backbone of the gangs."

"What object have the villagers in helping the hillmen against their own people?"

"Some of them genuinely believe that this is a jihad (holy war), others have been intimidated, others, particularly the very young ones, are adventurers who are thrilled by the excitement of it, some are attracted by the rewards."

"And what are the rewards?"

"There is no rule. For some the possession of a gun and ammunition is enough reward. Others get part of the money from raids in which they help. And there are those who believe that the terrorists will win in the end, and then they will be given good jobs in the Wakf (religious endowments trust) by Haj Amin when he is brought back from exile."⁴

That there was some degree of organization of the troubles, and that the bands received funds and ammunition from Arab sources over the frontier, as well as from Palestine, seemed certain. It is, however, equally certain that the organization was rudimentary and the funds small. The courage of the bands was undeniable, for they had often seen their comrades killed, a dozen at a time,* by British machine-gun fire and bombs, and had yet returned to the fight a day or two later. Moreover, the bands were obviously without the elementary equipment or training which would enable them to inflict serious casualties upon the British troops, or even upon armed Jewish colonies. The arms which were captured from them were almost invariably found to be part of the stocks abandoned in the Near East at the end of the First World War.**

Throughout the early summer of 1938 the situation deteriorated. In June Jewish labourers were employed by the Government, at the cost of £ 100,000, to build a barbed-wire fence around the northern and north-eastern frontier of Palestine. This fence was intended to separate the Arabs of Palestine from the Arabs of the Lebanon and Syria, in order to hinder the importation of arms and the movements of insurgent bands.

* See Appendix IV.

** See Appendix III.

Whatever value its construction may have had as a police measure, it was certainly no contribution to a political settlement. A Christian Arab, one of the leaders of the so-called moderate party, when questioned on the subject by the present writer, expressed his feelings by quoting a passage from the Gospels. "When they had crucified Him," he said, "they parted His garments among them, casting lots; and they sat and watched Him there."

Such was the bitterness caused in the heart of a moderate Arab by the policy of cutting Palestine off from the rest of Syria. It did not augur well for the proposed partition of Palestine itself.

NOTES

- 1 In laying the foundation stone of the Andrews Memorial Hospital in the Jewish colony of Nathaniya Sir Arthur Wauchope, on Saturday, February 26, 1938, said, "He was a man who devoted his life to the good of the people, regardless of race or creed. No man was a closer friend, nor had I a wiser counsellor in all Palestine—justice and uprightness were the keys to his character."
- 2 Sheikh Farhan es Saadi, a man of seventy-five, was hanged in November 1937 after a summary trial by a military court on the charge of being in possession of a revolver. The sentence was inflicted not on account of this offence, but on account of worse crimes of which he was believed to be guilty. By the peasantry he was regarded as a martyr of the same calibre as Sheikh Kassam.
- 3 Some details of Government reprisals are in a pamphlet entitled *Searchlight on Palestine*, by F.E. Newton (Arab Centre, London, 1938). Miss Newton's account was largely confirmed by similar reports from other British witnesses. There were also cases of organized reprisals by Jews resulting on occasion in numerous deaths and other casualties.
- 4 *Palestine Review*, June 3, 1938.

The "Town Planning" of Jaffa, 1936* Judgments by

MICHAEL F. J. McDONELL AND R. J. MANNING**

I

In this case, owing to its seriousness and importance, my learned brother Manning and I have departed from the usual practice by which only one judgment is given as the judgment of the Court in High Court cases, and we have independently prepared separate judgments, which in fact concur in their decisions, and which will be delivered by each of us in turn.

This is a return to a Rule Nisi† issued by the High Court on the 27th June, directed to the Attorney General and the District Commissioner, Jaffa District, to appear before the Court, if they so desire, to show cause why they should not refrain from demolishing a house belonging to the Petitioner situated in the old city of Jaffa.

In the first place, there was placed before this Court, on hearing the Petitioner's application, the following Official Communiqué No. 115/36, dated 16th June 1936, which was issued by Government to the Press and published on or about that day:—

“The Government is about to initiate a scheme for opening up and improving the Old City of Jaffa by the construction of two roads, to the benefit both of that quarter and of the town as a whole.

The first steps necessary will be the demolition and clearance of certain existing buildings, which are congested

* George Mikhail el-Qasir V. The Attorney General and District Commissioner, Jaffa; Palestine, High Court of Justice, Judgment No. 44/36, July 3, 1936.

** Chief Justice and Senior British Puisne Judge of Palestine, respectively.

† A rule or order upon condition that it is to become absolute unless cause is shown to the contrary.

and insanitary, and advantage is being taken of the presence in Palestine of Royal Engineers to begin these operations.

The Government will pay compensation to property owners, individual cases being considered on their merits.

The process of demolition will start shortly, and the inhabitants of buildings that will be affected are being duly warned to evacuate them: they are required in their own interest implicitly to obey this warning.

This preliminary work of demolition will be punctuated by frequent detonations and crashes of falling masonry, and residents of Jaffa, Tel-Aviv, and the neighbourhood should not be surprised, misled, or alarmed when they hear these noises. Householders within the Old City and within a radius of a quarter of a mile of the Old City are advised to keep their windows open in order that the glass may not be broken by the detonations."

In the next place it was admitted that there were distributed in the old city of Jaffa by hand, and, so we were told by the Petitioner, by aeroplane, printed notices bearing no signature or address of which one, namely (Ex. A.) came into the possession of the Petitioner. The notice is in Arabic and runs as follows:—

"Government intends to proceed with a scheme to open roads and carry out improvements in the old city of Jaffa. This scheme includes the demolishing of several existing houses, for which appropriate compensation will be paid, that is to say, each matter will be dealt with on its merits. The Military Forces will carry out the demolishing.

The law abiding inhabitants of the old city will not be injured, but if any resistance takes place, the Military Forces will use force to carry out the work."

At the foot is the imprint, also in Arabic, which runs "Government Printing Press Jerusalem" which is the only hint this notice bears of its provenance.

Subsequently to his receipt of this printed Notice the Petitioner was, on June 26th, served with a typewritten notice (Ex.B.) which is typed in only two out of the three official languages, namely English and Arabic, and runs as follows:—

"To Hanna Michael Qasir and Bros.
Block 7040, Parcel 132, Jaffa.

In accordance with the scheme for opening up the Old City of Jaffa, your house may be demolished.

You are therefore required to vacate it before 7 p.m. on Sunday 28th June, 1936.

No claim for compensation in respect of furniture or effects left in your house after that hour will be considered."

Here again the document bears no signature or address to show from where it originated.

Counsel for the Petitioner stated before us, and it was not disputed by the Respondent, that the words rendered in English in this notice as "the scheme for opening up" the old city of Jaffa, are in the Arabic version "the town planning scheme" of Jaffa.

The Petitioner applied in his petition for an order directed to the Chief Secretary,* the Attorney-General, the District Commissioner Jaffa, the Inspector-General of Police and the Officer Commanding the Royal Engineers Jaffa.

The Order Nisi was directed against the District Commissioner of Jaffa and the Attorney General only, in as much as both notices, as also the Official Communiqué, concerned themselves only with the opening of roads, town-planning improvements, and such-like matters which, under the Town Planning Ordinance, are controlled by the Town Planning Commission, of which the District Commissioner is *ex officio* Chairman.

On the return day, Mr. Kantrovitch, the Acting Assistant Government Advocate, who appeared on behalf of both the District Commissioner and the Attorney-General, produced affidavits from the District Commissioner and also, for some reason, from the Chief Secretary, to the effect that the intended destruction of the Petitioner's building was not to be carried out by them or under their orders or instructions.

He produced, also, an affidavit from the Attorney-General to the same intent, with the further allegation that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the destruction of the said building was to be carried out under, and by virtue of the provisions of Art. V(5) of the Palestine (Defence) Order-in-Council 1931.

Finally, he produced an affidavit from Lieut. Col. F. Keith Simmons, Commander Southern Area, to the effect that the destruction of the building in question was intended to be carried out by military forces under his command, by virtue of instructions received by him from His Excellency the High Commis-

* The senior British administrative officer after the High Commissioner in the Mandatory Government.

sioner for Palestine.

The relevant part of Article V (5) of the Palestine (Defence) Order-in-Council 1931, which was brought into effect by the High Commissioner's Proclamation of the 19th April 1936, provides that "The High Commissioner may.... if he thinks it necessary for the purposes of the defence of Palestine, cause any buildings to be *pulled down* and removed."

It will be noted that it is only by *pulling down* that such demolition is authorised, and that it is only authorised for purposes of defence and not for carrying out improvements in the city as stated in the Official Communiqué, the printed notice and the typewritten notice respectively.

Article V(10) of the same Order-in-Council provides that "Every person.....whose property or goods are.....destroyed by virtue of the Order shall be entitled to receive by way of compensation, out of the public funds of Palestine, such sum only as may be determined in accordance with Regulations to be made by the High Commissioner"; while Article IV(4) (i) lays it down that the High Commissioner may make Regulations prescribing the manner in which compensation payable under Article V(10) of the Order is to be determined. No such Regulations have in fact ever been made.

I cannot agree with the suggestion of Petitioner's counsel that till such Regulations are made Article V(5) cannot be applied, but I would point out that since, in view of the provision of Article V(10) by which there is a right to compensation for the destruction of goods as well as of property, the last paragraph of the typewritten notice (Ex. B.) "No claim for compensation in respect of furniture or effects left in your house after that hour (viz. 7 p.m. June 28th) will be considered," is clearly one for which, even under the Order-in-Council, there is no legal authority.

The Acting Assistant Government Advocate somewhat surprisingly informed us in his argument that he was not aware and had no instructions as to who was responsible for the preparation or issue of either the printed or the typewritten notices, and after having said, as to the latter, that "the District Commissioner was responsible for the distribution thereof" he modified this and said "He may have been."

In the light of the affidavits before us, it seems to me clear that we cannot make the order against the District Commissioner or the Attorney-General absolute inasmuch as proceedings under Article V(5) of the Palestine Order-in-Council do not concern either of these officers.

The Petitioner, however, has done a public service in exposing, what I am bound to call, the singularly disingenuous lack of moral courage displayed by the Administration in the whole matter.

I am not surprised, in the circumstances, to find that no responsible officer of the Government would affix his signature to the notices under review. As to their origin, the Junior Government Advocate claims to have been kept in a state of ignorance, which is as remarkable as it is profound; and as to their distribution he declines to say with certainty who is responsible therefor.

It would have been more creditable if the Government, instead of endeavouring to throw dust in people's eyes by professing to be inspired with aesthetic or other quasi-philanthropic motives such as those concerned with town planning or public health, in the demolition which was contemplated, had said frankly and truthfully that it was primarily for defensive purposes which one may assume means enabling the forces of the military or police an easier means of access in the congested quarters of the town in question.

If this had been done, this High Court when presided over by my learned brother, would not have issued a rule nisi; and the *bona fides* of the Government, which cannot escape responsibility by hiding behind the anonymity of the notices, would not have suffered.

It would be a negation of justice if, in a glaring case of evasiveness such as that before us, this High Court did not speak its mind freely.

In the exercise of its powers by Government, at any time, frankness is always to be desired. In the exercise of any of the exceptional and drastic emergency powers such as are conferred by the Order-in-Council in question, the absence of such candour is peculiarly to be deprecated.

We are bound, on the grounds which I have stated, to discharge the order nisi, but, for the reasons which I have set out, we propose to mark our disapproval by doing so without costs.

Delivered this 3rd day of July, 1936.

(Sgd.) MICHAEL F. J. McDONELL

CHIEF JUSTICE

II

On the 16th June 1936, an Official Communiqué (No. 115 of 1936) was issued in Palestine. It began as follows:

“The Government is about to initiate a scheme for opening up and improving the old city of Jaffa by the construction of two roads, to the benefit both of that quarter and of the town as a whole.

The first steps necessary will be the demolition and clearance of certain existing buildings, which are congested and insanitary, and advantage is being taken of the presence in Palestine of Royal Engineers to begin these operations.

The Government will pay compensation to property owners, individual cases being considered on their merits.”

Then followed warnings to the inhabitants of this part of Jaffa to evacuate their buildings and to take certain other precautions.

During the same month a notice, in Arabic, was circulated among the inhabitants of Jaffa. It purported to emanate from the Government Printing Press, Jerusalem, and it is not denied that the Government was responsible for it. The translation of the notice is as follows:

“Government intends to proceed with a scheme to open roads and carry out improvements in the old city of Jaffa.

This scheme includes the demolishing of several existing houses, for which appropriate compensation will be paid, that is to say each matter will be dealt with on its merits. The Military Forces will carry out the demolition.

The law-abiding inhabitants of the old city will not be injured, but if any resistance takes place, the Military Forces will use force to carry out the work.”

Neither the Official Communiqué nor this notice contain any suggestion that the scheme was concerned with any purpose for the defence of Palestine. The words convey that the Government proposed to carry out what may be called a Town Planning Scheme in Jaffa and to utilise the presence of the Royal Engineers for that purpose. It has to be carefully noted that the Royal Engineers were not brought to Palestine for this purpose but advantage is merely taken of their presence to carry it out.

There are local laws with reference to town-planning in Palestine and for the purpose of this case their effect may be briefly stated to be that when land is expropriated for any

scheme, compensation has to be paid to the owner after negotiation, and if the negotiation lead to disagreement, the amount of compensation is fixed by a Land Court.

On the 26th June 1936, the petitioner in these proceedings was served with a notice in the following terms:

"In accordance with the scheme for opening up the old city of Jaffa, your house may be demolished.

You are, therefore, required to vacate it before 7 p.m. on Sunday 28th June 1936.

No claim for compensation in respect of furniture or effects left in your house after that date will be considered."

It is not denied that the Government was responsible for the serving of this notice. It does not contain any intimation that the opening up of the city had any connection with any purposes for the defence of Palestine.

From what has been said I think the petitioner was justified in concluding that a town-planning scheme was contemplated by the Government. No compensation having been offered him and there having been no attempt to negotiate, it is not surprising, therefore, that on June 27th, the day after being served with the notice, he applied to the High Court for a rule nisi. He named as Respondents, the Chief Secretary; the Attorney General; the District Commissioner, Jaffa; the Inspector General of Police; and the Officer Commanding the Royal Engineers, Jaffa.

The scheme being *prima facie* concerned with town-planning, the responsible officer was the District Commissioner of Jaffa. The order nisi was consequently refused against the Chief Secretary; the Inspector-General of Police and the Officer Commanding the Royal Engineers. It was granted against the District Commissioner, Jaffa, and against the Attorney General, as representing the Government.

On the 1st July, Mr. Kantrovitch appeared on behalf of the Respondents, to show cause against the rule. Affidavits were filed showing that the proposed demolition of petitioner's house had nothing to do with any scheme for opening up and improving the city of Jaffa, and that it was to be carried out, if at all, under instructions of the High Commissioner given under Article V(5) of the Palestine (Defence) Order-in-Council, 1931, which was brought into operation by proclamation on the 19th April, 1936. Neither the Attorney General nor the District Commissioner, Jaffa, were in any way concerned.

Mr. Kantrovitch found himself in an unenviable position.

He had to explain certain awkward facts which seemingly could be explained only on the assumption that the Government had entered on a policy of deceit. He artlessly said that the inhabitants of Jaffa would have been misled if they had been told that the demolition of their houses was to be carried out under the provisions of the Order-in-Council. They were therefore to be told that this demolition was in their own interest and for the improvement of the City of Jaffa. In effect he said "we would have misled them by telling them the truth, so we thought it better to tell them a falsehood." I am unable to follow this line of reasoning. I do not see how the inhabitants could have been misled by being told the truth. They might have been mystified if they were told that the destruction of their houses was necessary for the purposes of the defence of Palestine, and perhaps this is what Mr. Kantrovitch really means.

But it really turns out that they have been grossly misled; this is only one of a large number of similar applications to the Court, and the present petitioner and others would have been spared much expense if they had been candidly told that their houses were to be destroyed under the relevant article of the Order-in-Council. No notice was necessary under this article, but if any notice was given, it ought to have contained the truth.

The Article empowers the High Commissioner, "if he thinks it necessary for the purposes of the defence of Palestine" to "cause any building to be *pulled down*." It is clear that the sole discretion is with the High Commissioner, and that if he orders a building to be pulled down, one must assume that he thinks it necessary for the purposes of the defence of Palestine. But having regard to the Official Communiqué already set out, the notice circulated in Jaffa, and that served on the petitioner, there has been created an ugly suspicion that when the scheme was first mooted, there was no idea in the minds of its authors of basing its legality on the Order-in-Council.

In view of the affidavits filed, no useful purpose would be served by making this order absolute. I feel bound to accept the statement of the Government that the proposed demolition was always intended to be carried out under the provisions of the Order-in-Council and that this was concealed from the inhabitants of Jaffa because, not being lawyers, they might not have understood it. This is what Mr. Kantrovitch has said. In this particular instance I can conceive that the inhabitants affected might be bewildered by being told that the destruction of their houses was necessary for the defence of Palestine and that their houses might be *blown up* when there was power only to *pull them down*. At any rate the Government determined to sugar

the pill by telling them that the scheme was merely one for the improvement of Jaffa and thus succeeded in convincing a number of them that their proposed steps were illegal. And to crown all, it now transpires that the petitioner's house is not included in the scheme of demolition, although he was ordered to evacuate it at such a short notice.

It seems that the destruction of his house was never necessary for the defence of Palestine and the inference is that he was ordered to evacuate as his house might be in danger from falling debris from other houses. This stresses the point that there may be a considerable difference between a power to *blow up* and a power to *pull down*.

There is a well known work of fiction which describes a Government Department known as the Circumlocution Office. It specialised in the way how not to do it. Something similar seems to have found its way into Palestine, but its identity has been carefully concealed. Mr. Kantrovitch has no instructions as to who was responsible for the original blunder.

I agree with the President that the rule must be discharged but without costs.

Delivered this 3rd day of July, 1936.

(Sgd.) R. J. MANNING

SENIOR PUISNE JUDGE

‘...Until You Are Dead’,
(Palestine, 1937*)

SIR ALEC SEATH KIRKBRIDE**

When my wife awakened me earlier than usual and I looked out of the window on to the green and gold of a spring morning in Galilee, it seemed too fair a day on which, deliberately, to extinguish human life, whether by legal processes or otherwise. However, as District Commissioner of Galilee and Acre I was committed to playing a leading part in a triple killing by the fact that the Central Prison at Acre was in my district and no execution of a death sentence could take place there without my presence or that of a senior member of my staff. Executions in those troublous years of 1937 to 1939 were only too frequent in Palestine,† and I had deputed members of my staff to attend them until my conscience had driven me to say that I would take the next turn myself. Now, the next turn had arrived and it meant seeing three unfortunates hanged in one morning.

The journey from my headquarters in Nazareth to the prison at Acre was through an attractive and flowering countryside for the most part, but I was in no mood of appreciation that day. As my car followed in the wake of the police armoured car, which was intended to protect me from ambushes, or, as was more likely to be the case, to avenge me after the event, I won-

* From Alec Seath Kirkbride, *A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East* (London: John Murray, 1956), pp. 109-12. Reprinted by permission of John Murray.

** British diplomat and former District Commissioner, Galilee, Palestine 1937.

† The number of death sentences confirmed by the General Officer Commanding in Palestine was fifty-four and fifty-five for 1938 and 1939 respectively (Palestine, *A Survey of Palestine* [3 vols.; Dec. 1945-Jan. 1946], I, 46-49). For the total number of Arab casualties during the Arab rebellion, 1936-39, see Appendix IV.

dered what would happen if I did not go to Acre and so made the executions impossible that day. There was, however, no escape either for myself or for the condemned men. We arrived at the gate of the grim old Turkish fortress, now used as a prison, which emitted an aura of death and cruelty fifteen minutes before the first hanging was due at 8 a.m., and I stood for a few minutes on the bridge across the moat talking to the Governor of the prison and to the local Medical Officer who were there to receive me. As we spoke, the gate opened to let out a Moslem priest who had been to prepare the victims for death. The priest exchanged salutes with us and added a look of the blackest hatred. I, for one, felt guilty and mean; not that I, or anyone else in the group, bore any responsibility for the death sentences.

The execution chamber was a whitewashed vault in the interior part of the main wall of the keep and, with its loopholes as windows in the thick masonry, it looked medieval and horrible even without the wooden platform with its central trap door over which dangled already one of the three ropes which were attached to the heavy cross-beam above. I had hardly walked as far as a corner of the room when two warders led in the first victim, a young Arab in his twenties. The little group was followed by a single police officer who had been present at the man's trial and who had now to identify him literally at the foot of the scaffold. Next, the Governor read out to the condemned man the text of the warrant of death. In this instance, the man protested at the delay and said, 'I know that you are going to hang me. For God's sake get it over quickly!' He soon had his wish fulfilled. He came in with his hands handcuffed behind his back, then the warders pinioned his elbows and slipped over his head a hood of black cloth which not only blindfolded him but mercifully hid his face from us. They moved him on to the trap and, when his feet covered the right chalk marks, strapped his ankles together. As the warders stepped back, the Governor slammed over a lever and the man fell forward through the trap to be brought up short, when the rope ran out, with a shock that shook the whole platform.

People who are hanged may lose consciousness immediately, but their bodies live on, sometimes for about twenty minutes. So, we stood and watched this body twitch and the legs retract notwithstanding the bound ankles. A great gout of blood had come from beneath the hood and splashed on the whitewash of the wall. When I remarked on this fact, one of the warders said that the man had struck his face on the way down on the side of the trap. This statement was denied indignantly by the

Governor, who said that the haemorrhage was caused by the bursting of a blood-vessel in the nasal cavity. After a while the Medical Officer ripped open the man's shirt and listened to his heart, which, so he said, was beating still more rapidly than in normal life. Eventually, he pronounced life to be extinct and we were able to move out into the sunshine of the courtyard where the dank smells of humanity and disinfectant were not so overpowering. The next execution was not due until nine o'clock, so I accompanied the Governor to his quarters and found, to my surprise, that I could eat a breakfast.

The second hanging was a repetition of the first save that the victim nearly wrecked everything by fainting as they got him on to the trap. One of the warders managed, however, to hold him upright long enough to ensure that he fell through cleanly when the trap opened. This time we had to wait for nearly twenty minutes before the Medical Officer was satisfied that the man was dead; it seemed to be interminable.

Between the end of the second execution and the beginning of the last at ten o'clock, I filled in the time by carrying out an inspection of the prison. I do not like inspecting prisons at any time and on this occasion least of all, but anything was better than just waiting. As we passed the grille of one cell I saw an Arab youth in ordinary clothes pacing up and down restlessly. I stopped and asked who he was, only to find that he was our next victim who had no alternative to waiting. As we moved down the dismal corridors I was filled with an overwhelming feeling of pity mixed with the hope that I might be able to meet my end, whatever it might be, with the same courage and fortitude which was being shown by these men. The killing of men in battle was a familiar thing, but it never provoked the loathing with which I saw these men led like cattle to their deaths and hurled through a hole in the floor with their hands and feet trussed so that they could do nothing to save their necks from the cruel rope.

As we went into the large communal cell which housed both convicts and those awaiting trial, silence fell amongst the inmates and their eyes all turned in my direction. They knew why I was there, and the feeling that I was doing something shameful, which had bothered me the whole morning, grew more intense. In one of the large chambers leading on to the battlements were a score or so of Jews, segregated from the Arabs, who were accused of membership of a terrorist organization. They also glared their hatred but not because I was hanging some Arabs; the fact that I was British was enough. One only did not turn round; he was leaning out of an embrasure staring

out to sea, and I felt vaguely grateful for his disinterest.

When the Medical Officer released us for the third and last time I had one more duty to perform before I could get away from the place. As a coroner, I had to hold an inquest on the three bodies. This was little more than a formality but, as I inspected the three corpses lying on a stone slab, with their swollen faces suffused with purple, I felt that death sentences did not really solve any problem or answer any question. I also felt that it might do the judges who imposed the sentences a lot of good to be present to see them carried out. Finally, I signed a statement finding that the men had met their deaths through judicial homicide. I drove away hoping, without much conviction, that I would not have to play the part again.

When I got back to my quarters at Nazareth my wife greeted me with the words 'You look green.' I felt green.

Searchlight on Palestine*

1936-1938

FRANCES E. NEWTON**

I

THE HARD CASE OF RAFI' BEY EL FAHOUM, 1936

On the night of August 28-29, 1936, a military patrol was ambushed on the track of the Palestine Electric Corporation's High Tension Line near Tamra village, during which an Arab and two soldiers were killed and three were wounded. Police dogs tracked the scent from the scene of ambush to the village of Endor and some explosives were found in the houses there of Mohammed Mahmud el Abbad and Mohammed Ibrahim. The Assistant District Commissioner of the Northern District—with the approval of the High Commissioner—ordered the destruction "without compensation" of the houses of these two men and also of that of Rafi' Bey el Fahoum, one of the largest landowners of the district who possessed a big house in the village, on the ground of evidence having been given that the dead Arab had been seen "recently serving coffee" in his house.

As is well known to those familiar with Arab customs, every village has its guest-room where hospitality is dispensed, not only to travellers through the village, but also to all who wish—quite regardless of their having any connection with the village—to make use of it as a meeting-place. In other words, this guest-room or 'madafi,' is the focus of the life of the village in its relation to the outside world. In some cases the cost of the guest-room and its hospitality is borne by the village as a whole,

* From Frances E. Newton, *Searchlight on Palestine: Fair-Play or Terrorist Methods?* (London: The Arab Centre, 1938), pp. 15-18.

** Miss Newton became Dame of Justice of the Venerable Order of St. John in Jerusalem, in 1930 and spent most of her life in Palestine. Her writings include *Fifty Years in Palestine* (Wrotham: Coldharbour Press, 1948).

but where there is a notably wealthy and public-spirited resident it is often voluntarily borne exclusively by him as a privilege attendant upon his position. This latter was the case in Endor, Rafi' Bey el Fahoum being the sheikh (i.e., important man) who provided the guest-room; actually this was part of his own dwelling and his hospitality was so lavish that his name was a by-word throughout the country.

Rafi' Bey el Fahoum is a member of a family belonging to the old Moslem aristocracy of Galilee; he is a noted agriculturist who was invited by the Government in 1933 to be a member of the General Agricultural Council of Palestine then being formed. It is no exaggeration to say that hundreds visited his house month by month. Not least among his visitors were Government officials—from the High Commissioner and members of the various Commissions of Enquiry downwards—who made use of him and of his hospitality whenever occasion required, but his house was equally open to the humblest peasant.

The position in the public eye of such a man would naturally expose him at a time of unrest to the suspicion of the authorities of being concerned in nationalist activities, but it should call no less for the most scrupulous investigation of any evidence brought against him to that effect and make it unthinkable that hasty punitive action should be taken against him by the authorities. Nevertheless, such hasty punitive action was taken by the authorities, since the ambush in question took place on the night of Thursday-Friday, August 28-29, and the order for the demolition of Rafi' Bey el Fahoum's house was executed about three o'clock in the morning of Tuesday, September 1st. As well as having his house destroyed, Rafi' Bey el Fahoum was forthwith subject to a period of some months' imprisonment in the Acca Camp, and that such imprisonment was in the nature of further punishment is shown by the fact that it called for his subsequent resignation from the General Agricultural Council of Palestine—an indignity which could not be glossed over or softened by the honour of the following personal letter from the High Commissioner, regretting his resignation, which he received, a letter which leaves no choice but to draw the inevitable conclusion that the High Commissioner's right hand was unaware of what his left hand had done.

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE, JERUSALEM

20 July, 1937

A/119/36

Dear Rafi' Bey Fahoum,

I have learnt with regret that you have found it necessary to resign from the General Agricultural Council owing to the claims on your time of your other activities both official and private and I should like to take this opportunity of expressing the gratitude of the Government of Palestine for the services which you have rendered to the Government and to the agricultural community as a whole during your period of membership of the Council.

I am sorry that the Council will no longer have the benefit of your services.

Yours very sincerely,
Arthur Wauchope

The following is a copy of the order given for the destruction of Rafi' Bey el Fahoum's house in Endor:—

ORDER UNDER SECTION 19 (B) OF THE EMERGENCY
(Amendment Regulations)
No. 4. 1936.

WHEREAS on the night of the 28th-29th August, 1936, a military patrol was ambushed on the track of the Palestine Electric Corporation's High Tension Line in the vicinity of Tamra village and two soldiers were killed and three wounded by rifle fire WHEREAS another military patrol saw a party of Arabs leave the scene of the ambush and proceed in the direction of Tamra WHEREAS on the 29th August 1936 the police dog followed the scent of one of the Arabs first in the direction of Tamra as seen by the soldiers then to a house in Endor village WHEREAS a dead Arab holding a rifle and in possession of an identity card bearing the name of 'Sa'id Hussein' was found on the scene of the ambush WHEREAS the inhabitants of Endor refused to admit any knowledge of the said Sa'id Hussein until confronted with a photograph of him together with one of those who had been questioned about him WHEREAS certain of the inhabitants then admitted that the deceased was a native of Endor WHEREAS police and military witnesses have testified to me that they had seen the deceased recently serving coffee in the house of Rafi' Bey Fahoum

of Endor WHEREAS a cursory search of the village of Endor on the 29th August revealed explosive fuse and ammunition in the house of Mohammed Mahmoud el Abbad and Mohammed Khalil Ibrahim NOW THEREFORE I, K.W. Blackburne Assistant District Commissioner Northern District being satisfied that the inhabitants of Endor village have committed and aided these murders and woundings on the 28th-29th August 1936 and having obtained the prior approval of the High Commissioner do hereby appropriate on behalf of the High Commissioner the following buildings in Endor

The house of Rafi' Bey el Fahoum.
 The house of Mohammed Mahmoud el Abbad.
 The house of Mohammed Khalil Ibrahim.

And I hereby order that the above mentioned houses shall be forfeited to the High Commissioner without compensation and shall be demolished on the 31st of August 1936.

(Signed) K.W. BLACKBURNE,
 Assistant District Commissioner
 Northern District.

Issued at Nazareth this 30th day of August 1936.

The following translated extract from the Arabic press (viz., 'Falastin' of September 1st, 1936) shows how this order was carried out:-

“NAZARETH. At ten o'clock of the night before last, the authorities summoned the noted agriculturalist Rafi' Effendi Fahoum, and arrested him, and at about four o'clock yesterday morning they told him that his large house in Endor was to be demolished. They took him to the aforesaid village and allowed him one hour in which to evacuate the house.

At about three o'clock this morning the house was demolished. It was full of furniture together with the agricultural produce of his year's harvesting as represented by the work of fifty yoke of oxen. It is estimated that there were in the house 3,500 'kail'¹ of wheat, 800 'kail'' of barley, 80 'kail' of sesame seed, 400 'kail' of 'kursenneh' (i.e., cattle food), 300 'kail' of millet, 100 'kail' of lentils, 2,000 bales of hay, 200 'ruttle'² of 'semeni' (i.e., clarified butter which sells at about 8/- to 9/- per 'ruttle'), 400 'ruttle' of olive-oil, and 2,000 camel-loads of 'tibn' (i.e., crushed

straw). The house was a three story one comprising thirty-six rooms, of which sixteen were furnished in European style, the value of the whole being some £ 15,000.

As soon as the news was known in the district, large lorries were hurried to the scene carrying villagers with the necessary implements for retrieving as much as possible of the ruins.”³

Another result of the official haste with which punitive action was taken in this instance, was that one of the other two houses demolished was not mentioned in the order, the house of Yusuf Suru’ being blown up in mistake for that of Mohammed Mahmoud el Abbad.

II

THE STORY OF IGZIM* 1938

The murder of Squadron Leader Alderson caused universal consternation in Palestine. He was killed in a daylight attack which occurred between Jaba’a and Athlit. Extensive action to track the murderers was taken by the authorities. The “Palestine Post” of February 20th, 1938 reported as follows: —

“Immediately after receiving information of the outrage, the authorities sent a detachment of the West Kents which co-operated with the police, who remained overnight in the area. At 3.30 this morning the police dogs arrived from Jerusalem, and they are reported to have led to the village of Igzim, where two houses were ‘pointed’.”

The truth that has only just come to light is that a bandit who was caught has confessed that the people responsible for the murder of Dr. Alderson were from the village of Kufrin, so that Igzim has been an innocent victim of police haste and the punitive zeal of the troops.

WHAT I SAW IN IGZIM

I visited this village on Tuesday, February 22nd, 1938, three days after it had been searched by the troops and the police. The village presented an unbelievable scene of havoc.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 6-11. Igzim is a village situated near Athlit in one of the valleys on Mount Carmel.

The troops and police arrived early in the morning of the 19th February. After collecting the sheep and goats and driving them off, they proceeded to blow up two stone-built houses at the entrance of the village. One of them was two stories high and had five rooms; part of it was used as a shop. I entered many of the houses and can only say that the havoc which had been wrought was indescribable, and, unless seen with one's own eyes, unbelievable. In one newly built house, the good strong door, not yet painted, and the shutters had been bashed in. In others, the furniture—such as cupboards, etc.—was utterly wrecked. A large mirror on the wall had its glass smashed, a stained cupboard was overturned and the mirrors in the panels of its doors lay like bits of ice about the floor. The same scene met me in various houses. In one, a double arm-chair and its fellow upholstered chairs lay in fragments. There were four Singer sewing-machines in the village which were battered to bits. Clothing, bedding, etc., were all soaked with olive oil. Cereals of all sorts—corn, pulse, lentils, etc.—were all mixed up and scattered about the floor with broken glass. China, crockery, kitchen utensils, lay like a snowstorm everywhere. A huge vat of olive-oil was split open and its contents, worth some £ 6-7, had soaked into the mud floor. I was given a Koran to bring away which had been torn from its cover and of which the leaves were all loose and soaked with olive-oil.⁴

The leading man in the village told me that, taking things all round, the cost of the damage done might amount to about £ 50 in each house, or about £ 3,000 for the whole village. Not less than sixty houses were affected.

STORIES TOLD TO ME BY THE VILLAGERS OF IGZIM

These stories—as, indeed, all that I give in this pamphlet—have been put together from what many villagers have told me. They told them to me as to one whom they reckon, from my long residence among them, as one of themselves. The name by which I am known among the Arabs means “one who will lead us out of our difficulties,” and thus it implies one in whom they will freely confide and whose advice they are ready to accept. The word ‘askar’ was used without distinction between soldiers and police, as meaning men in Government uniform.

They said:—The troops and police came very early in the morning to our village. They first collected the goats and the sheep—some seven or eight hundred—and drove them off to Athlit, to be put on the train and sent to the Animal Quarantine Station in Haifa. They rushed through the village, collecting the men and searching both them and the houses.

ALLEGED SHOOTING OF ONE OF THE VILLAGERS

Mohammed Shambur was sitting in his house on the outskirts of the village, with his wife, in the early morning. The 'askar' entered and searched him. They found a purse on him with £ 25 in it. He refused to give it up. The 'askar' ordered him out of the house and he ran away from them to try to hide his money, and in doing so broke the cordon surrounding the village. He was called upon to stop but was shot by an 'askar;' some accounts say that he was shot in the chest. He staggered a few paces and fell dead. The Mukhtar⁵ was called to identify him, but found difficulty in doing so as the dead man's head had been split open by a British 'askar,' who was seen returning to rejoin his companions with the bayonet in his hand which he threw down on the ground. An eye-witness says he saw the bayonet glitter in the sun as it fell. Later in the day, permission was given for some of the villagers to go outside the cordon to pick him up. The order was given in writing, as follows:—"Eight men with the bearer are allowed to go to the cemetery to prepare a grave for the deceased." It is signed by what looks like "stokli" and is dated 19th February. Only these few men were allowed to carry him to the grave for burial. In preparing the body, they looked for the man's money, but it was gone, and so far it has not been returned to the relatives. One of those who helped to pick him up said, with a shudder—"His head lay in a great pool of blood and his scalp and his brain were scattered about outside his head. The bits were collected in a basket."

Mohammed Shambur leaves a wife and five small children, the eldest being about six years old and the youngest a baby at the breast. This makes El Abd Shambur, the dead man's old brother, the sole bread-winner for a family of seventeen—which includes his own wife and three children and an invalid brother with his wife and four children—with only his young son of fourteen to help him.

The dead man had six goats; these were redeemed from the Government at 8/- each and given back to El Abd Shambur, out of money sent for relief of distress by the British Red Crescent Society.

LOOTING AND THEFT

Complaints of looting and theft were many and bitter. One very circumstantial story was told me by a Moslem woman. She said:—"I was asleep with a small girl in my room on the upper floor of my house when I heard, and was wakened by,

the sound of tramping feet on the outside staircase and a banging on the door. I opened it, an 'askar' pushed roughly past me into the room, in spite of my calling out that no man was in it. Two of them stood with their rifles pressed against me, one behind and one in front of me, while the others searched and wrecked everything in the room. They smashed the door of the cupboard and turned out its contents, among which was a bundle of my jewellery. This they carried off." (She gave me a list of missing jewellery, the value of which amounted to £ 57 os. od.) "I went at once and told this to Inspector Cohen; all he said was, "Be thankful you are still alive." Inspector Khalid Effendi told the English officer in charge of the troops, but they gave me no answer. That was on Saturday. To-day (i.e., Tuesday) the Mukhtar brought me this"—and she produced her passport. "I had not missed it, for I had forgotten it was in the cupboard, but the 'askar' had taken it, and now they have sent it back by the hand of the Mukhtar." It was a Palestinian passport numbered 57025, issued in Jerusalem 10/8/1934 and expiring 10/8/1939—very precious to her.⁶

THE SHEEP AND THE GOATS

All the sheep and the goats were collected—some 900—from the village of Igzim and sent to the Animal Quarantine Station; they were seized as security for a collective fine put upon the village. Those of their owners who could afford to do so were allowed to buy them back from the Government at a price of 400 mils, or 8/- per head. Those who are too poor to do so had to lose them. They are either sold to anyone who will buy, or slaughtered. The man alleged to have been murdered by the 'askar' had six goats and their absence meant that his small children had no 'lebn'—the sour curd which is the equivalent in nutritive value of our milk. It seemed the best way to help the family was to buy back their goats out of money sent to me by the British Red Crescent Society, which I did. An order was given me to redeem them with five kids, and I took the dead man's brother with his son to the Quarantine Station, to fetch them.

Many of the families have fled the village. I saw a pitiful sight on the way home just outside the village—an old man on a donkey which was laden with household articles, carrying two tiny infants on his lap; behind walked a woman carrying what she could, together with a big goose; two quite small children toddled after her. True refugees!—but from terror at *British* barbarism.

I went again to the village on April 19th, having heard that all the people had fled from it, and found that this was true. As I walked through it, it was absolutely deserted: the doors were closed but some were unlocked, and I went into houses which showed every sign of hasty flight—an old rush mat on the floor, the planks of a divan of which the mattress and cushions had gone, a coat hanging in an otherwise empty cupboard.

The only men still living in the village were the Mukhtar, who is forbidden by the authorities to leave, and the school-teacher, who has been threatened that if he leaves he will be reckoned by the Government to have deserted his post. Only flocks of pigeons and starving dogs and cats are left, with no one to feed or water them.

The reason given for the flight of the villagers was that the Government had imposed a punitive police post on the village for three months at the expense of the inhabitants: first, fifteen supernumerary police were sent out, and then others till the total reached forty. Fifteen of them would mean a cost at £ 6 per head, or £ 90 per month, or £ 270 for the three months of their occupation. The people, knowing that if the money were not paid the Government would seize and sell their possessions, decided to take them away with them, and so left in a body. Some of them have come into Haifa, some have gone into near-by villages, and some are living in shelters of rush mats or sacking, etc., under the olive trees—"You can see them from this window," said one of the men.

As I walked through the deserted village, I saw a very old, lame woman hobble away down an alley. I followed into the courtyard into which she had disappeared, and pushed open one of the closed doors round it. A terrified voice called out, "Who are you? What do you want?" In the dim interior were three very old women, who replied to my questions—"Yes, we are here—where shall we go? We have no one to take us away and we can't even walk as far as the spring to fetch our water. Is *this* the mercy of the British Government?"

The police post has been withdrawn, yet the villagers tell me they are held responsible for three month's wages. They are asking to have this order withdrawn, failing which they will desert the village for good.

It is this kind of thing which drives the young men to join the "bandits" in the hills—driven from their homes and their daily occupations, they have nothing more to lose than their lives.

NOTES

- 1 1 'kail' = 1 large sackful of grain of the volume of wheat or barley.
- 2 1 'ruttle' = 6 lbs.
- 3 See note 4re the importance of cereal foods to the Arab peasant. In this case, Fahoum's house was also the depository of stores belonging to neighbouring villages which had been entrusted to him till they could be sold.
- 4 The magnitude of the disaster caused to the people by such destruction of food stuffs can only be realised when it is understood that in this country the people's staple food consists of raw materials such as olives, olive-oil, and grains of various sorts, which are harvested, stored, prepared, and used as need arises, actually in the village itself. The universal custom is that each village home stores the year's supply of these staple foods for the whole family.
- 5 The 'Mukhtar' is the man chosen to be the headman of the village and he acts always as liaison officer between the outside world, including the Government and the village.
- 6 This passport would be particularly precious to the woman, not only in itself but because of the religious sentiment attaching to it as proving that she has made the pilgrimage to Mecca and therefore has the right to the title of 'Hajji.'

The Jews in Palestine 1938*

MAHATMA K. GANDHI**

Several letters have been received by me asking me to declare my views about the Arab-Jew question in Palestine and the persecution of the Jews in Germany. It is not without hesitation that I venture to offer my views on this very difficult question.

My sympathies are all with the Jews. I have known them intimately in South Africa. Some of them became lifelong companions. Through these friends I came to learn much of their age-long persecution. They have been the untouchables of Christianity. The parallel between their treatment by Christians and the treatment of untouchables by Hindus is very close. Religious sanction has been invoked in both cases for the justification of the inhuman treatment meted out to them. Apart from the friendships, therefore, there is the more common universal reason for my sympathy for the Jews.

But my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of justice. The cry for the national home for the Jews does not make much appeal to me. The sanction for it is sought in the Bible and the tenacity with which the Jews have hankered after return to Palestine. Why should they not, like other peoples of the earth, make that country their home where they are born and where they earn their livelihood?

Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct. The mandates have no sanction but that of the last

* From M.K. Gandhi, *My Non-Violence*, comp. and ed. by Sailesh Kumar Bandopadhyaya (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1960), pp. 70-72 and 73-74. Copyright ©, The Navajivan Trust, 1960. Reprinted by permission of the Navajivan Trust.

** The Indian leader and statesman (1869-1948).

war. Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home.

The nobler course would be to insist on a just treatment of the Jews wherever they are born and bred. The Jews born in France are French in precisely the same sense that Christians born in France are French.* If the Jews have no home but Palestine, will they relish the idea of being forced to leave the other parts of the world in which they are settled? Or do they want a double home where they can remain at will? This cry for the national home affords a colourable justification for the German expulsion of the Jews.

But the German persecution of the Jews seems to have no parallel in history. The tyrants of old never went so mad as Hitler seems to have gone. And he is doing it with religious zeal. For, he is propounding a new religion of exclusive and militant nationalism in the name of which any inhumanity becomes an act of humanity to be rewarded here and hereafter. The crime of an obviously mad but intrepid youth is being visited upon his whole race with unbelievable ferocity. If there ever could be a justifiable war in the name of and for humanity, a war against Germany to prevent the wanton persecution of a whole race, would be completely justified. But I do not believe in any war. A discussion of the pros and cons of such a war is, therefore, outside my horizon or province.

But if there can be no war against Germany, even for such a crime as is being committed against the Jews, surely there can be no alliance with Germany. How can there be alliance between a nation which claims to stand for justice and democracy and one which is the declared enemy of both? Or is England drifting towards armed dictatorship and all it means?

Germany is showing to the world how efficiently violence can be worked when it is not hampered by any hypocrisy or weakness masquerading as humanitarianism. It is also showing how hideous, terrible and terrifying it looks in its nakedness.

Can the Jews resist this organized and shameless persecution? Is there a way to preserve their self-respect, and not to feel helpless, neglected and forlorn? I submit there is. No person who has faith in a living God need feel helpless or forlorn. Jehovah of the Jews is a God more personal than the God of the Christians, the Mussalmans or the Hindus, though as a matter of fact, in essence, He is common to all and one without a second and beyond description. But as the Jews attribute personality

* Cf. Weizmann's statement in Paris (1919), pp. 190-91.

to God and believe that He rules every action of theirs, they ought not to feel helpless. If I were a Jew and were born in Germany and earned my livelihood there, I would claim Germany as my home even as the tallest gentile German might, and challenge him to shoot me or cast me in the dungeon; I would refuse to be expelled or to submit to discriminating treatment. And for doing this I should not wait for the fellow Jews to join me in civil resistance, but would have confidence that in the end the rest were bound to follow my example. . . .

* * *

. . . And now a word to the Jews in Palestine. I have no doubt that they are going about in the wrong way. The Palestine of the Biblical conception is not a geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if they must look to the Palestine of geography as their national home, it is wrong to enter it under the shadow of the British gun. A religious act cannot be performed with the aid of the bayonet or the bomb. They can settle in Palestine only by the goodwill of the Arabs. They should seek to convert the Arab heart. The same God rules the Arab heart who rules the Jewish heart. They can offer Satyagraha* in front of the Arabs and offer themselves to be shot or thrown into the Dead Sea without raising a little finger against them. They will find the world opinion in their favour in their religious aspiration. There are hundreds of ways of reasoning with the Arabs, if they will only discard the help of the British bayonet. As it is, they are co-sharers with the British in despoiling a people who have done no wrong to them.

I am not defending the Arab excesses. I wish they had chosen the way of non-violence in resisting what they rightly regarded as an unwarrantable encroachment upon their country. But according to the accepted canons of right and wrong, nothing can be said against the Arab resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.

Let the Jews who claim to be the chosen race prove their title by choosing the way of non-violence for vindicating their position on earth. Every country is their home including Palestine not by aggression but by loving service. A Jewish friend has sent me a book called *The Jewish Contribution to Civilization* by Cecil Roth. It gives a record of what the Jews have done to enrich

* Lit. "insistence on truth": the Ghandian method of achieving reform by means of tolerance and goodwill coupled with firmness in one's cause expressed through non-violent passive resistance and non-cooperation.

the world's literature, art, music, drama, science, medicine, agriculture, etc. Given the will, the Jew can refuse to be treated as the outcast of the West, to be despised or patronized. He can command the attention and respect of the world by being man, the chosen creation of God, instead of being man who is fast sinking to the brute and forsaken by God. They can add to their many contributions the surpassing contribution of non-violent action.

Harijan, 26-11-1938

Britain's Contribution to Arming the Hagana*

DAVID BEN-GURION**

...After the outbreak of the disturbances in April 1936, when attacks by Arab terrorists were directed against both the Jews and the British Administration, legal Hagana† units—the *Notrim* or Supernumerary Police and the "Special Night Squads"—were set up. These worked in co-operation with the Army and the Police. Many of these were formed thanks to the effort and friendship of Orde Wingate.‡

This partnership was not wholehearted on either side. Many of the British officials did not like the establishment of Jewish fighting units and the entrusting of arms to the Jews. They knew that these were not under the sole authority of the Administration, but maintained close ties with the underground Hagana.

Nor were the Jews entirely happy. At the beginning of the British occupation, almost the entire Yishuv was prepared to place implicit trust in the regime, which was linked with the Balfour Declaration. In the two decades that had passed, however, we had learned from bitter experience that the British could not always be relied upon; the arms given to Jewish units could at any time be taken from them.

Nevertheless, the Yishuv's representatives spared no effort to increase the number of Jews serving in the Police, between 1935 and 1936 the number rose from 365 to 682. There were many more Arabs serving with the police, but their number

* From *Jewish Observer and the Middle East Review*, September 20, 1963, pp. 13-14.

** Formerly Chairman of Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1935-48, Prime Minister of Israel, 1948-53, and 1955-63.

† The Zionist military organization sponsored by the Jewish Agency.

‡ See Orde Wingate, pp. 375-87.

remained almost static during these years. It rose from 1,465 (1,187 Moslems and 287 Christians) in 1935 to only 1,487 in 1939 (1,198 Moslems and 287 Christians). During the same period the total strength of the British Police grew from 746 to 2,941.

At the end of June 1936, approval was given for the recruitment of 1,240 Jewish supernumerary police armed with military rifles; on September 1 the number had risen to 2,863. The appearance of thousands of Jewish young men with legalised arms immediately improved our defence position. The *Notrim* provided an excellent framework for training the Hagana.

When the Arab General Strike (which lasted six months and did much more harm to the Arabs than to the Jews) ended in October 1936, the heads of the Zionist Executive and its Political Department (myself and Shertok respectively) were summoned to the High Commissioner. He told us that the Government was prepared to let three thousand *Notrim* retain their arms in the Jewish settlements, provided that all illegal arms in Jewish possession were handed over.

A few days later, Shertok was summoned to see Hall, the Chief Secretary, and Spicer, the Inspector-General of Police. He was told that the Government intended to make special arrangements for defence in the Jewish settlements by recruiting special constables, who could continue their ordinary farm work but would have to devote a number of days a year to training in the use of arms. They would be paid for their services only on those days when they went out on operations. There was one small condition: the Hagana should be wound up and its illegal weapons handed over to the Government.

The Government's proposals were hotly debated in the Yishuv, but finally the views of Eliyahu Golomb and Shaul Meirov of the Hagana headquarters won the day. With all our appreciation of the importance of the weapons the Government was giving us—and they were good, modern weapons—there could be no negotiations on the winding up of the Hagana.

The Government, in fact, accepted the situation. The tension inside the Arab community, the known existence of many large Arab gangs, and the pressure of the Military (which did not always support the pro-Arab tendencies of the Administration and understood the difference between the Arab gangs and the Hagana) deterred the Government from pressing its demand for the abolition of the Hagana as a condition for the maintenance of the Jewish *Notrim*.

The *Notrim* became something like a permanent institution. In March 1937, when a new wave of terror broke out in Galilee,

they were allowed to leave the settlements and stand guard in the fields and plantations; later, they were also permitted to operate outside the bounds of the villages if they were "in hot pursuit" of bands, thieves and robbers.

In the summer of 1937 the force was named the Jewish Settlement Defence and thus recognised as a regular unit on a countrywide basis. Later, the name was changed to Jewish Settlement Police, and the Army Command agreed to help train the *Notrim*, as police training was not sufficient. Thus hundreds of Hagana members received partial military training, with the aid of the British Army, and the lessons were passed on in secret to thousands of others both inside and outside the ranks of the force which remained until the end of the British Mandate.

As the Arab terror grew in 1938 and 1939, so did the value of this force, and in 1938 it was reinforced by three thousand special constables (Hagana members from the towns), who did not receive Government pay but were sworn in and allowed to bear arms when they went out to protect villages and urban quarters under Hagana orders. These men played a great part in the suppression of the Arab terror, and distinguished themselves particularly in the defence of Tirat Zvi (in the Beisan District) on February 28, 1938.

The Hagana leaders made constant efforts to broaden the training of the *Notrim* in arms of various kinds. At the beginning of June 1938 the Army Command approved these efforts by issuing an order which stated that efficient defence was impossible without the use of all means of offence, and agreed that patrols and ambush parties were needed to locate the attackers and prevent their escape. Many Hagana leaders who afterwards became Israel Defence Force officers were trained in these courses, including Yigal Yadin,* Moshe Dayan** and Shimon Avidan.†

In July 1938, the Jewish Agency requested that the Government increase the numbers of *Notrim* and supply them with more arms. They insisted particularly on reinforcing the mobile patrols (we called them *Manin*, from the initials of the Hebrew

* Major General Yigael Yadin (b. 1917) held various senior positions in the Haganah, becoming Chief of Operations during the 1947-48 War.

** Major General Moshe Dayan (b. 1915) became Chief of Staff of the Israeli Army, 1953-58; Israeli Minister of Defence since May 1967.

† Lt.-Col. Shimon Avidan (b. 1911) was an officer in the Haganah, 1936-39, and Commander of a Palmach battalion, 1940-45.

terms, *Mishmarot Na'im*). At the beginning of 1939, the Government approved this request and according to the plan, ten companies of the Jewish Settlement Police were organised and given appropriate Hebrew names.

The *Kolpak* (the lambskin cap worn also by the Arab police) was replaced by the broad-brimmed Australian hat, a slight change which, however, had a great significance for the *Notrim* and the *Yishuv*.

In the ten batallions there were 14,411 men—1,289 on Government pay and 13,122 special constables. Each company was commanded by a British police officer, supported by a company commander nominated by the Jewish Agency. In addition, there were 700 special constables in Tel Aviv and about 1,000 in Haifa. All of these were members of the Hagana.

Special importance was attached to the mobile patrols. By the spring of 1939 there were 62, with 8-10 men in each. The authorities supplied them with uniforms, arms and ammunition, while transport costs were covered by the Jewish Agency.* There was a mobile patrol for each block of settlements.

With the further intensification of the Arab terror the Settlement Police were given the task of protecting the Haifa to Lydda railway, although the British civilian authorities objected on the ground that the despatch of Jewish police to an Arab area would be regarded as a provocation. But the Military Command insisted, and in June 1938, 434 Jewish *Notrim* were sent to guard the railway. Yosef Rochel (*Avidar*) was appointed by the Hagana to look after this unit. By the winter of 1938/1939, the railway guard had grown to a strength of 800.

The most successful and complete co-operation between the Jews and the British was achieved with the establishment of the Special Night Squads by a distinguished British Officer, Captain Charles Orde Wingate. This was a practical step towards the establishment of a Jewish military force within the framework of the British Army.

* See above, p. 309, note.

I

ORDE WINGATE AND MOSHE DAYAN*

1938

LEONARD MOSLEY**

The first occasion Wingate chose to take the Jews into action against the Arabs caused one of the biggest rows in the history of the Palestine Mandate, and nearly got him sacked on the spot.

It was early in 1938. A few days after he had taken Zvi Brenna and his companion for the long walk through the Northern Palestine scrub, an Arab slipped through the Hanita perimeter and reported to Zvi Ben Ya'akov, the defence chief. He was a spy paid by Hagana who brought information about Arab movements and intentions; a furtive old man with trachoma and a limp, but an informant who had proved reliable on two occasions in the past. On this particular day he had information of little or no importance, but the Jews made excuses to detain him. The local defence committee of Hagana had that morning decided to follow Wingate's advice and take the war to the Arabs instead of waiting for it to come to the settlements; and they had picked as the target of their offensive an Arab hill village they could see on a hill-top twenty miles across the valley. They were not, however, sure that, once they plunged

* From Leonard Mosley, *Gideon Goes To War* (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1955), pp. 55-64. The chapter (Chapter 4) from which this excerpt is taken has no title in the original. Reprinted by permission of Arthur Barker Ltd.

** British journalist; his writings include *The Last Days of the British Raj*. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) and *Hirohito, Emperor of Japan* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966).

into the valley, they would be able to find their way; the target would be obscured by the scrub and cactus, the goat-paths were labyrinthine and the night would be dark. But the Arab spy knew the way back to the village, and it was their intention to keep him in the settlement until dusk, and then force him to lead them to the enemy stronghold. Enemy stronghold indeed it was; it had been frequently used as a base for attacks on Hanita, and the casualties among the settlers had been many.

In the early afternoon Wingate arrived at Hanita. Zvi Brenna told him about Hagana's plan, and he was angry at once. "How dare you make your plans without consulting me?" he said. "You are bound to blunder into disaster."

He was told about the Arab and the scheme for using him as a guide to the enemy strong-point. He looked at them all with contempt and disbelief. "Though he was such a small man," recalls General Dayan,* "when he was disdainful he could make you feel as tiny as a mouse."

"Fetch me this Arab," said Wingate, and the spy was brought to him. He stepped very close to him, fixed him with his eyes, and began to question him in Arabic. Suddenly he stepped back and dealt the Arab a heavy blow across the neck which felled him to the ground.

"This man is planning to lead you to your deaths," he shouted, swinging round on the watching Jews. "Now let us stop all this nonsense. It is about time a soldier took charge of you, for you are babies. You wish to go on a raid against the Arabs to-night. All right. You shall go. But this wretch will not lead you. I will take you there."

Ben Ya'akov protested that they knew the countryside better than Wingate, and even they were unsure of finding their way. "That is because you have not had my training," replied Wingate, simply. "Now give me seven men, and we will make our plan." He picked his seven, Brenna and Dayan among them, and for three hours they squatted together, Wingate lying naked, brushing his crotch and belly with an old toothbrush, deciding on a plan of attack.

At dusk the expedition of revenge set out. It was a big moment for the Jews. This was the first time they had taken the offensive, and they were excited and uplifted by that fact. With a compass in one hand and a map in the other, he set off ahead of them into the wilderness of scrub, and he never seemed to make a mistake. They went straight into Lebanon territory to the west of the Arab village and then began to double back.

* For Moshe Dayan, see above, p. 373, note.

When they reached an Arab hut or evidence of habitation, Wingate would halt the column and go forward on his own. "Back at Hanita," said Dayan, "he had scoffed at military text-books as a way of teaching men how to fight. 'For instance, the text-books say you should always send two men out on a patrol. This is nonsense. All it means is that you get two different stories. Each man should be a unit on his own.' On this first sortie, and on all the others in which I took part, he proved it by always doing his patrols by himself. He would go ahead, 300 or 400 yards in front of us, and we would wait until he had the information he wanted. Then he would come back and make his plan."

By three o'clock in the morning, at the conclusion of the most strenuous thirty-mile walk even these earthy, hardened Jews had ever experienced, Wingate brought his column to the edge of the Arab village. His uncanny sense of direction and distance had brought him to the target at the exact point he had planned.

"I shall go forward and reconnoitre," he said. "If I don't come back, the decisions will be in your hands, Zvi. But don't attack, unless you are sure of success. Men like you are badly needed and you must not be lost on your first expedition. Instead, go home to Hanita."

He was very serious when he said this. "He was not like other British officers I have met," said Brenna. "He never made jokes or tried to pass off a serious moment with a smile or a shrug."

He went off into the darkness, and they waited for his signal. Soon they heard a shot, and they moved into the positions Wingate had mapped out for them. From the outskirts of the village there was another shot; after which there was a fusilade of fire, obviously from the Arabs, a firefly spray of lights in the distance, shouts, screams and wails. And then, straight into the trap which Wingate had laid for them, came the Arabs. Dayan and Brenna, nearest the village, let the Arabs pass; they had instructions to hold their fire until the Arabs could be surrounded. Only when the Jews farthest away opened fire did Brenna and Dayan begin to pick off their victims. They killed five and captured four.

Wingate came back, carrying a Turkish rifle over his shoulder. He looked calm and serene. "Good work. You are fine boys and will make good soldiers," he said.

He went up to the four Arab prisoners. He said in Arabic: "You have arms in this village. Where have you hidden them?"

The Arabs shook their heads, and protested ignorance.

Wingate reached down and took sand and grit from the ground; he thrust it into the mouth of the first Arab and pushed it down his throat until he choked and puked.

"Now," he said, "where have you hidden the arms?"

Still they shook their heads.

Wingate turned to one of the Jews and, pointing to the coughing and spluttering Arab, said: "Shoot this man."

The Jew looked at him questioningly and hesitated.

Wingate said, in a tense voice, "Did you hear? Shoot him."

The Jew shot the Arab. The others stared for a moment, in stupefaction, at the dead body at their feet. The boys from Hanita were watching in silence.

"Now speak," said Wingate. They spoke.

An hour later, as the cocks began to crow and the babies began to cry in the Arab village, Wingate and his men began the journey back to Hanita, carrying what rifles they could with them. The remainder they had smashed. They were all very tired now; but Wingate was still alert and watching. As they crept through the scrub along the frontier they had to lie up because they could hear Arab patrols in the vicinity. When they did so, Wingate went down on his knees and prayed, but in silence. When one of the Jews disturbed a stone and sent it slithering down the bank, Wingate asked who had done it, and then went over to the man and hit him across the face with the back of his hand.

They had come across one stream, and he stepped back while they all drank; but as the sun rose and they grew thirstier, they were forced to pick wild pumpkins and open them up and suck them for moisture. It was well into the morning when they got back, filthy, badly scratched, exhausted but triumphant. The Jews went off to tell of their achievements to Zvi Ben Ya'akov. Wingate went to the kitchen, emerged with a pile of onions, and disappeared into his tent; there, having stripped off his clothes, he began eating onions, scratching himself, and started to write a report of the night's work. When it was finished he sang in a tuneless voice, two verses of one of his favourite hymns, "To Be a Pilgrim." Then he brushed himself vigorously all over with his toothbrush, and settled back. Soon he was fast asleep, breathing onion fumes into the morning air. He did not wake again for twenty-four hours.

By that time, at British Army Headquarters in Jerusalem, furious staff officers were beginning to foam at the mouth. News of Wingate's raid had reached them; he had committed a cardinal sin against British policy in Palestine at that time: he had taken Jews into action and encouraged them to kill

Arabs, when the Administration insisted that they must only defend themselves inside their settlements. He had done it without asking permission. He had not even bothered to tell the area commander that he was in the district.

Wavell* sent out an order to Wingate to return to Jerusalem immediately, and made no secret of his anger. Hagana headquarters received a secret message. "Hayedid** is in trouble with the British over the raid," it said. "He has been ordered to Jerusalem to have his head washed."

From that moment on, every Jew in the Agency† and the secret army was prepared to trust him with their secrets and with their lives.

In the event, that first foray did Wingate no real harm. The rebuke was administered and taken with due humility. The Administration was seriously concerned, Wavell said, at the manner in which Wingate had exacerbated Arab-Jewish hatred by his rash acts. It was not to happen again.

Wingate lifted his head. "Not perhaps in that way," he said. "I have been thinking, and I have a more effective plan for coping with this situation. The Arab rebellion is growing worse, sir. Our regular troops have failed to protect either the pipeline‡ or the settlements. The Arabs have caused great damage and made the British Army look fools. I can stop all that. I will wipe out the gangs for you and see that the oil flows freely once more to the refinery at Haifa. If you will please listen. . ."

Wavell listened. He was always to listen to Wingate. It is one of the more fascinating games to map the career and fate of Wingate had there been no Wavell to remember him, save him and employ him in those moments when no one else, it seemed, was anxious for his services. Their relationship was never that of intimate friendship, and yet it had a special quality to it: rather like the warm regard of a simple, honest man who has picked up a waif from a doorstep and adopted him, and wishes sometimes he knew more about the child's sudden

* Sir Archibald Percival Wavell (1883-1950), a British army officer, was with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 1917-20, and Commander-in-Chief of British forces in the Middle East, 1939-41. His works include *The Palestine Campaigns* (1938), and *Allenby* (1940).

** Hebrew: "The Friend."

† For the Jewish Agency, see above, p. 309, note.

‡ Both the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Iraq Petroleum Company had secured agreements with the Palestine Government to construct oil pipelines to Haifa Bay.

outbursts, hereditary impulses, the curiously complicated workings of his mind. They were secrets that Wavell never extracted from Wingate; he never really got to know him. But time and again he reached over a helping hand and extracted him from disaster.

The upshot of the interview was that Wingate, to the fury of practically every British officer on Wavell's staff, was given permission to return to Northern Palestine and continue his experiments in fighting Arabs. He made several return visits to Hanita, but was also visiting other settlements in the area, particularly Ein Harod. He was officially posted as Intelligence Officer in Nazareth, but his second-in-command was an efficient and sympathetic officer, and Wingate rarely needed to attend at his office. Instead, he set about his unofficial task of taking out patrols to protect the pipeline from Arab attack. "I dare say the military in Jerusalem thought that all we did was patrol the pipeline and keep a lookout," said Brenna. "But what we were actually doing was going out and killing Arabs. He had taught us how to fight back."

Wingate increasingly concentrated his activities on Ein Harod. It was a convenient point in the Esdraelon Valley for reaching the frontier, the Arab strongholds around Mount Tabor, and the infiltration points in the Jordan valley. It had its spiritual attraction too: for here, under the lee of Gilboa, was Gideon's burial-place; and here, it is no exaggeration to say that Wingate felt like a soldier of the Old Testament too.

He was convinced once and for all that he was engaged in a divinely appointed task, charged like Gideon before him to "go in this thy might, and thou shalt save Israel."

There is no doubt that he was conscious of the power that was growing in his hands. Wingate believed in power, elemental power; which was one of the simple reasons why he was always anxious for rank in the Army. He knew that rank in military affairs meant power, and power was what he was always seeking: power with which, he said, he could win battles and right wrongs and do good. He seemed to be unconscious that many a dictator, from Hitler and Stalin and Napoleon, down through history, has said something of the same thing.

His rank in Palestine was still that of captain, but he was well aware of the magnetic hold he had achieved over the Jews. There was not a Jew in Palestine now who would not do anything he said; or so, at least, he thought. Certainly all the high officials of the Jewish Agency and the Hagana were ready to do his bidding. At his request, they ordered their best fighters from settlements all over Northern Palestine to report to him at Ein

Harod and fight under his orders. Through Wavell, though unofficially, he had been able to collect a number of British soldiers who volunteered to serve with him, and these he brought, together with some military lorries, to Ein Harod.

He made the British soldiers into N.C.O.'s and mixed them with the Jews. He dressed them all in blue shirts and linen trousers and gym shoes, the ordinary working clothing of a member of a settlement. He equipped them with rifles, hand grenades, a water-bottle and a pole on the end of which a torch could be tied. In this way the boys could signal to each other above the scrub without giving away their exact position to watching Arabs.

When he took them out on a raid they went first in military trucks. These, Wingate knew, were being watched and signalled by Arab spies; and therefore he trained his men to leap off the lorries while they were moving, and hide in the ditch until they had gone. Then the men would assemble and march on foot across country to their target. The Arab spies meanwhile would still be plotting the progress of the military convoy.

"After an Arab raid," said General Dayan, "he would muster us immediately and say: 'They must be in this village or this one or this one.' And then he would move us across country at a formidable rate, always walking ahead, halting us with a flash of his lamp while he went ahead to reconnoitre. He would approach the first village and fire a shot. If there was no reply he would move on to the next. When he got a shot back he would return to us and calmly make his dispositions: 'You two there under that scrub tree, you two in the wadi, you by the outcrop,' and so on. He would peer over the countryside, measuring the dark shadows of the hills, and say: 'They will move that way, and when they meet the two men I have put across the path, they will turn back and come this way—and here we will get them.' He was never wrong. Our two forward posts were always told to hold their fire until the Arabs had passed them and only to fire when the inner patrols opened fire. Then the Arabs had no way out.

"I never knew him to lose an engagement. He was never worried about odds. If we were twenty and the Arabs were two hundred, or if we were at the bottom of a hill and they were at the top, he would say: 'All right, there is a way to beat them. There is some way in which, with a decisive stroke, we can turn the situation in our favour.' There were many men who served with him from Ein Harod who later became officers in the Israeli Army which fought and defeated the Arabs, but they were not the only ones who benefited from his training. In some sense,

every leader of the Israeli Army even to-day is a disciple of Wingate. He gave us our technique, he was the inspiration of our tactics, he was our *dynamic*.”

II

OUR FRIEND: WHAT WINGATE DID FOR US*

DAVID BEN-GURION

Charles Orde Wingate was a Scot born in India. He was brought up in an atmosphere of rigid puritanism. He was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in an artillery unit and began to learn Arabic in preparation for a posting in the East. In 1928 he joined the Sudan Defence Force and was stationed on the Ethiopian border, where Arab raiders kidnapped children and young women for sale in the slave markets of Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. Here he gained his first experience in dealing with organised marauders. He completed his service, returned home and married Lorna Paterson.

The disturbances in Palestine brought him back to the East. In the autumn of 1937, Wingate was posted to an intelligence unit at Haifa. He sought contact with the Jews, and met Emanuel Wilenski, head of the Hagana's Intelligence Service. Wingate's candour impressed Wilenski and he introduced him to David Hacohen.** Together they set out to tour Galilee settlements. Hacohen was struck by Wingate's extraordinary familiarity with the Bible and by his military interpretation of its historic events "as if they had happened yesterday."

A short time later, Wingate met Dr. Weizmann, myself, Shertok (later Sharett) and Eliahu Golomb.† He told us of his plans for the establishment of a Jewish Army. At first we regarded Wingate with some suspicion, but his profound enthusiasm won our confidence. He began to study Hebrew and paid many

* From *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, September 27, 1963, pp. 15-16.

** David Hacohen (b. 1898), a Russian-born Israeli politician, who acted on behalf of the Jewish Agency and British Army authorities in Special Intelligence; became Israeli Minister to Burma, 1953-55.

† Eliahu Golomb was a founder of the Haganah and member of its High Command.

visits to Jewish settlements. In a letter to his uncle, Sir Reginald Wingate,* he wrote:

“I have seen Jewish youth in the kibbutzim, and I assure you that the Jews will produce soldiers better than ours.”

General Wavell, who replaced Dill** at the end of 1937, appreciated Wingate's unusual talents. When the disturbances were renewed in Autumn 1937, Wingate sent him a memorandum, outspokenly critical of the methods used by the British Army to fight the Arab bands, and Wavell instructed him to prepare a survey of Arab activities.

In the preparation of his report, Wingate sought the aid not only of the British Intelligence sources, but also of Eliahu Sasson† and the late Reuven Zaslani (later Shiloah) of the Jewish Agency's Department for Arab Affairs, who were with the Hagana. Eliahu Golomb provided Wingate with a letter of recommendation, which ensured the co-operation of all Hagana leaders.

He visited Hanita, which was only newly established and still under pressure from local Arabs in the neighbourhood, who were not prepared to acquiesce in its existence. From there Wingate went to the Jezreel Valley and Lower Galilee, where the oil pipeline passed on its way from Kirkuk to Haifa.

The pipeline was one of the principal targets of the Arab bands. A Hagana officer had worked out a plan for protecting it with a force of 200 men, using the static methods still customary in the Hagana, which tied down a relatively large force on protective duty and left the initiative with the enemy. Wingate's methods were radically different. He preferred small mobile patrols that would surprise the enemy in action.

An Oil Pipeline Defence Platoon was established at the

* Sir Reginald Wingate (1861-1953), a British army officer and administrator, was Governor-General of the Sudan, 1899, and High Commissioner for Egypt, 1916-19; author of *Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan* (1891).

** Sir John Greer Dill (1881-1944), a British army officer, was Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office, 1934-36.

† Eliahu Sasson (b. 1902), the Syrian-born “Arab expert” of the Jewish Agency, was Director of the Middle East Department in the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1948-50; Israeli Minister of Police since 1966.

kibbutz of Ein Harod. It consisted of eighteen British soldiers and twenty-four picked young Jews from the district Hagana. Avinoam Slutzki of Nahalal called it *Plugat Ha'esh*, the "Unit of Fire."

In June 1938, Wingate proposed to the Command at Nazareth that Night Squads be established to which Jewish Supernumerary Police would be attached. Together they would organise ambushes and execute night operations. His plan was accepted; 75 *Notrim** were trained for night operations according to the Wingate method.

These units were set up in Ein Harod, Ayelet Hashahar and Hanita, and trained by Wingate's officers and soldiers under his direction. In a month (the operations began in June 1938), the Squads carried out about a dozen operations against the bands and inflicted some 60 casualties.

In one of these operations, Wingate himself was wounded. He refused to go into hospital, but returned to Ein Harod with his unit, and it was only after receiving a direct order from Brigadier Evetts that he submitted and went to the Military Hospital in Sarafand. Moshe Shertok, who saw him in hospital, noted in his diary:

"I found him completely delirious, his cheekbones protruding and his eyes testifying to many sleepless nights, but the inner flame that possessed this extraordinary man burned with all its strength."

During the two weeks he lay in hospital, he prepared new operations, and when he came out he demanded that the authorities should recognise the Night Squads as an official force. He proposed the establishment of four platoons, with 48 men in each (36 Jewish *Notrim* and 12 British soldiers), armed with rifles and bayonets and eight machine-guns. In his opinion, this would be sufficient to pacify the whole of Galilee. The British G.O.C. agreed to accept the plan, and the High Commissioner approved of it.

Some of the Hagana objected to Wingate's methods, for fear that "an offensive against the terrorists might disturb the neighbourly relations between Jewish settlements and Arab villages." In some cases, representatives of settlements in Upper Galilee even complained to the authorities about Wingate's operations, and were severely reprimanded by Shaul Meirov.

These conflicts between the Hagana's methods of static defence and the principle of military attacks continued until

* For the *Notrim*, see above, pp. 371-74.

the establishment of the Israel Defence Forces during the War of Independence, but the best of the Hagana men, like Hayim Shturman, became devoted adherents of Wingate's methods, although they had been trained in static defence.

The members of the Night Squads were openly trained by British N.C.O.'s who were astonished at the rapidity with which the Jewish youths learned their job, not knowing that their pupils had spent years in training in the Hagana.

On the initiative of Pinhas Rutenberg,* an additional "Fire Company" was set up in the same summer (1938) to guard the Palestine Electric Corporation's high-tension line from Zichron Ya'akov to Rosh Ha'ayin in the Sharon. The company's fifty *Notrim* worked in full cooperation with the British Army stationed in Tulkarem.

All Wingate's units operated in opposition to the views of British military experts, who believed that night operations should be cut down to a minimum, on the ground that the Arabs could find their way in the night better than the British soldier. Wingate turned their theories upsidedown.

"Night is an offensive weapon," he wrote in his pamphlet on the special Night Squads. "The army has an advantage over the bands even by night, for its units are better disciplined and trained, and since the army is operating in unfamiliar territory it must create groups comprising soldiers and reliable local residents, who are registered as police. The only local residents who can be relied upon are the Jews. They know the area well and quickly absorb the necessary training. They are disciplined and brave in battle."

Wingate advocated his ideas of night combat in talks, lectures and demonstrated them with actual patrols and operations. His doctrine was to play an important part in Israel's War of Independence in 1948.

Wingate saw in the Night Squads a proof that the spirit of the Maccabees still lived in the Jewish youth of our day. He wanted to imbue the British Command with the same faith and show them that not only did the Jews have all the capacity and the will to defend themselves, but that in days of trial for Britain they could be loyal allies.

He did not find much sympathy for his views in Army circles, but as the international situation became graver in the Summer of 1938, and it became necessary to concentrate Britain's

* For Rutenberg, see above, p. 333, note.

military forces in readiness for war, Military Headquarters agreed to mobilise a considerable number of Jews for operations with the Army.

At that time, Israel Galili* wrote:

“It may be that, as a result of the expected complications in Europe, it will be difficult for the Government to transfer troops to Palestine and it will be prepared, in order to defend the country, to recruit men who have their roots in it. Although they are fighting the Government for their rights to immigration and settlement, they have no political interest in fighting British rule in Palestine.”

Wingate proposed that the Northern Command should mobilise and train a hundred more Jewish youths. The British accepted the proposal, but did not allocate the necessary funds, and the Jewish Agency undertook to cover the cost of a course to be organised in Ein Harod, under the name of “Course for Jewish NCO’s.” A hundred of the Hagana’s best young officers from all districts were chosen and on September 13, 1938, the course opened in the Ein Harod amphitheatre.

In charge on behalf of the Hagana was Yaakov Dostrovski (Dori),** and Wingate was the chief trainer. He opened the course in Hebrew:

“We are establishing here the foundation for the army of Zion. . . Difficult times have come, and all lovers of freedom must unite and prepare themselves to stand in the breach. Your people, whose friend I am, has suffered more than any other. If it fights, it will achieve its independence in its own land.”

Wingate began training his men, taking them out on patrols and exercises in the area. It was only a short time later, however—on September 29, in the same month that the Munich agreement was announced,—that Wingate’s dreams, as well as the hope of his trainees, were shattered on the rock of ugly reality. Wingate received home leave and, on October 12, left for England. The officers who had sympathised with his ideas and helped him to train the Jews were posted away from the Jewish units.

Wingate came back to Palestine in December—but was no longer permitted to return to his previous work. At his

* Israel Galili (b. 1911) was a Haganah commander and later Deputy Minister of Defence. He is presently a Minister without Portfolio.

** Yaakov Dostrovski was Chief of Staff of the Haganah.

parting meeting with his former pupils, near Mount Tabor, he said:

“I am being sent away because we are too good friends. They want to strike at me and at you. But I promise you I will come back, and if I cannot do it in the regular way, I will come back as an illegal immigrant.”

Zvi Brenner of Afikim, who reported these words, added: “And indeed, Wingate returned to us, in the shape of an illegal immigrant ship named after him.” (The *Orde Wingate* reached Palestine on March 23, 1946).

In Wingate's service file, his superiors wrote:

“Orde Wingate, D.S.O. A good soldier, but as far as Palestine is concerned he is a security risk, and not to be trusted. Places the interests of the Jews before the interests of his own country. Not to be permitted to enter Palestine again.”

The three Night Squads in Galilee continued to operate for some six months after Wingate's removal, as assault units of *Notrim*, together with the Army. They still received battle training, but the absence of Wingate and his colleagues was distinctly noticeable, and the level of command declined. As the political situation deteriorated in the first half of 1939, so did the attitude of the authorities and the Army towards the special Night Squads, and with the approach of war they were broken up one by one.

But Wingate's work was not in vain. The Hagana's best officers were trained in the special Night Squads, and Wingate's doctrines were taken over by the Israel Defence Forces, which were established twelve days after the birth of the Jewish State.

The Strategy of Land Acquisition*

A. GRANOTT**

In the period following the first World War of 1914-18, when a more orderly and systematic procedure was inaugurated, the objective of agricultural settlement held first place. Even then the settlement authority was not always able to operate according to its wishes, but nevertheless we can discern the lines of a specific land strategy. The British Occupation of Palestine facilitated more stable conditions, which permitted the consolidation of land policy, the determining of what was desirable, and what merited priority. Most important of all, the new political situation permitted the execution of that policy. At all events, following the first World War, the work became better organised, more efficient, and in accord with a settlement policy. As the Zionist Organisation was strengthened it became feasible to extend and speed settlement, which in turn called for more rapid land purchase. The capacity of the land purchasing institutions grew and in consequence the former splintered activity, when scores and even hundreds of land buyers abounded, was modified. Multiple buying had caused competition between buyers and middlemen, which often assumed a disorderly character, promoting an unrestrained, economically unjustified rise of prices, and very seriously impeding systematic and rational purchase. Thus greater concentration of land buying—even though it was only of a partial character—preceded the consolidation of land policy, and also favoured its implementation.

* From A[braham] Granott, *Agrarian Reform and the Record of Israel* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1956), pp. 30-39. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "Land as the Basis of the Upbuilding." Reprinted by permission.

** Israeli land expert and former Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Jewish National Fund.

In the meantime important changes occurred in the field of acquisition: the PICA* company, which for many years was the primary purchaser, and which, through extensive resources invested by Baron de Rothschild was able to become the largest Jewish landowner in the country, lost its pre-eminence, since it constricted, and finally altogether suspended, purchase. On the other hand, the significance of the Zionist bodies engaged in land acquisition, the Jewish National Fund** and the Palestine Land Development Company,† was enhanced. Unfortunately, their operations still suffered from the confusing actions of various buyers and brokers, who indeed hindered full centralisation of all purchases. Nevertheless, following a hard struggle, these institutions were able to overcome the unfavourable influence of the agents, and to operate on more systematic and efficient lines.

A rational and considered land policy was truly initiated when the Jewish National Fund began its extensive acquisitions. Its first steps were merely attempts and trials. Only as its resources accumulated, and its staff improved, was it able annually to increase its purchases, thus becoming the largest landowner in the country.‡ Not less than nine-tenths of the land yearly bought by Jews came into the possession of the Jewish National Fund. Hence, because of its scope, and its ability to formulate and determine the direction of land purchase, to study Jewish land policy in Israel is tantamount to becoming familiar with the methods and procedures of the Jewish National Fund. The settlement objective was still decisive, but it was attained in the course of a general far-sighted programme. The Jewish National Fund no longer confined itself just to taking advantage of such offers as appeared in the land market; from now on not only the seller, but also the purchaser, was a factor,

* For the P.I.C.A., see above, p. 306, note.

** The Jewish National Fund was established at the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901 in order to acquire land in Palestine for Jewish settlement. For its constitution, see Simpson pp 303-4, and p. 306, note.

† The Palestine Land Development Company was established within the Palestine Office in 1909 in Jaffa under the direction of Dr. Arthur Ruppin in order to centralise the acquisition of land in Palestine both for the Jewish National Fund and for private Jewish colonisation companies and individuals.

‡ The Jewish National Fund made its first purchases in 1905. By 1937, the land acquired totalled 385,048 dunums (one dunum equals a thousand square meters). See also, Maps 1-6.

selecting the type of land in accordance with his wishes and intentions. The Fund strove to avoid the isolation of villages, as this was liable to impair their secure and smooth progress. Hence, lots on which to establish additional points were bought in the vicinity of existing settlements; endeavours were made to create blocks of settlements, a sort of skeleton of Jewish Districts, and for this purpose settlement areas were widened, or separate and distant estates united to form larger blocks. Efforts were made to enlarge the veteran settlements, of which not a few had originally been established on a limited area and needed reinforcement. Inability to acquire more than a small tract for these villages was not uncommon at the time, which meant that the farmers were unable to establish the requisite planned number of holdings to safeguard their existence. In order to remedy this defect, considerable attempts were made to procure additional areas so as to complete the missing units in these older villages. Such supplementary lots amounted in the course of time to hundreds and thousands of dunams. But it was a basic principle that only by concentrating the maximum possible extent of territory, could we apply the essential impetus, in drawing up settlement blueprints and implementing them efficiently. It is, indeed, of the nature of a rational land policy that it should be involved with a planned settlement policy, for ultimately the one serves to facilitate the other.

Reciprocal relationships exist between land purchase and settlement, and the question was posed—which comes first, land or settlement? It is a fact that in the past, more particularly the distant past, land policy was not executed in accordance with a programme of upbuilding, but rather the reverse. Purchases largely determined the character of settlement programmes and the manner of their fulfilment. It is a universal custom that the settlement planner takes into account the qualities of the terrain which is at his disposal for carrying out his programme—site and area, structure and quality of soil, local quantity of water, security conditions, and so forth. But in Palestine reality dictated that land was not bought on the basis of a prepared settlement outline. On the contrary, it was only after purchase, that the manner of its utilisation and the planning of its settlement were taken up.

More correctly the reverse procedure should have been followed—to adapt land policy to the needs of settlement. It would have been convenient to set out in advance a project of settlement activities for a long or short period, as part of a wide scheme for national and regional development to solve future

problems. Then it would have been possible to examine, first and foremost, the territories to be embraced by the proposed programme, and to consider their value and usefulness for the settlement angle. When does land fulfil its purpose? When it constitutes a medium in agricultural areas for producing food, or when it is exploited in urban and suburban areas for erecting buildings for housing or industry? The purpose determines the economic value of the land, and to a certain degree also its money value. Thus the dominant components in every land purchase merge, namely, function of area in the settlement process, or the capacity of its exploitation for specific undertakings; number of persons for whom it can provide a livelihood; above all, its place in the evolution of the upbuilding and attainment of a Jewish majority. Hence flow several weighty conclusions—the vital necessity to acquire land in zones where there are prospects for agricultural, industrial or building enterprises, in the near or distant future; and to accumulate land reserves in all parts, to be at the disposal of the Movement whenever necessary. Demarcation of the areas in good time, well in advance of settlement, must be reconciled with the overall plan, which should be of as wide a range as possible in respect to both land and settlement.

The accumulation of large land reserves is a cardinal element in implementing land policy and in settlement planning. If those responsible can dispose of suitable terrain, in accord with increasingly expanding annual needs, then it is feasible to draw up imaginative and far-sighted, long-range plans; to take advantage with the utmost efficacy of both human and mechanical forces; to utilise the gains of science and technique; and to carry out such plans both efficiently and economically. The augmentation of land reserves was expedited to a large extent by the expansion of land purchase, due to increased funds becoming available to the settlement institutions, and more numerous offers of sale on the part of landowners. This resulted from a general improvement in the country's economic position, which led to Arab proprietors coveting capital which they could only obtain by the sale of a portion of their land. In this respect conditions subsequent to the first World War changed, as the country proceeded to develop in the wake of Jewish immigration and settlement. Our land reserves rose, for the gulf between the capacity for settlement and the potentialities of land purchase had widened; in other words the funds available to the settlement bodies no longer sufficed to cover the cost of settling all the purchasable land.

As a result the directors of our work were confronted by a

serious problem—should we continue to buy land in reserve for settlement in the days to come, or should we curtail purchase and confine ourselves only to lands exploitable with the money we then possessed? Or should purchase be suspended altogether, and renewed only when the prospects of financing fresh settlement became brighter? An interruption of land acquisition would have entailed a serious danger to the whole Zionist enterprise, deriving from the change of British policy towards the Jewish National Home. It would have meant being quite unable to secure any land at all, even when it became urgent and vital to do so. It was essential, therefore, to continue to stock-pile reserves while yet permissible, so that we should not be dependent upon the favours of landowners or the incidence of a buyers' market. Otherwise, we should once more be obliged to buy haphazardly, under all circumstances, and irrespective of the price. To hasten the broadening of the settlement land basis, we were obliged—to expend the monies at our disposal thriftily, and to procure lands as cheaply as possible. A real saving could be obtained only by purchasing large contiguous areas before prices shot up, that is, before their rural or urban settlement set in.

In the course of time there emerged alongside with the settlement objective, two other purposes—strategic security, and national policy. Each was valuable in itself, while at the same time of supplementary significance to the main goal. Following the first World War, the settlement aim assumed more importance, but several years later, in the fourth decade of the 20th century, the other purposes took primary place. At first there arose the strategic security factor, and its vital nature was emphasised all the more, as the Arabs' opposition to the National Home became more intense. The weakness of the small and isolated villages, which were unable to defend themselves against the oft-repeated attacks of their Arab neighbours, was exposed. Weighty security considerations involved increasing the number of villages, precisely in those parts where Jews had not sufficiently penetrated, or had a sparse Jewish population, or wherever development had been retarded. Hence to improve security, a network of settlements capable, at a time of danger and distress, of joining forces for mutual defence was needed. As disturbances spread, and friction increased between the two peoples, the strategic factor which, indeed, also bore the distinct aspect of a security consideration, was of more concern in both land redemption and settlement. We refer here to land purchase in places which bore a military value, either because they overlooked centres of Jewish activity,

already operated or likely to be so in the future, or the occupation of which provided control over communications, such as the area at the junction of highways, since the problem of communications was always of specific interest in the field of Jewish settlement. As an example, we may cite the village of Hanita, purchased when Jews penetrated into Western Galilee, where there were but few Jewish settlements, with the express purpose of reinforcing the Lebanese border, and to foil the design of isolating Galilee. At a later period Yechiam was also bought, overlooking the plains of Western Galilee, a kind of watch-tower facilitating constant security supervision.

Finally, the Jews were confronted by the national policy factor; that is to say, the acquisition of land which would be conducive to the attainment of specific political ends, arising from a given situation. In the decade preceding the establishment of the State, the decisive stage in the struggle for the future State, a number of land operations were carried out which were of supreme consequence in the Jewish War of Independence. The opposition to various schemes intended to prevent the further growth of Jewish forces in the country, was intensified. Land was acquired and even settlement thereon carried out, not so much from the viewpoint of agricultural development, but in apprehension of the threat of an emergency—the purchases were for needs foreseen in the future, and in certain cases, the more distant future. But whatever the compelling factors, they served to promote land reserves. At the time the intent was not their immediate utilisation, but just maintenance, even though they lay fallow, while title was preserved against all encroachment, awaiting the day when cultivation and production would again be feasible.

An illustration of national policy of this type is the daring penetration to distant and undeveloped zones, hitherto unknown to the settler, because it was essential to expand the framework of Jewish enterprise. There was anxiety lest the authorities in London and Jerusalem should withdraw these zones from the scope of Zionist activity, and, indeed, the fear was not misplaced. An obvious case is the district of Beersheba, measuring 12½ million dunams, where there was almost no trace of Jews. During decades not more than one solitary village had been established. So the Jews approached the South, up to the environs of Gaza, and in the course of time even to Beersheba; their advance did not cease till they reached the far ends of the Negev, in the direction of Eilat. These operations form a glorious chapter in the history of the re-settlement; Jewish ownership was extended to new zones, and, in a hazardous exploit, a net of new

settlements was created in the Negev, as far as Revivim. Another example of such penetration to the frontier was the Beisan District, with its fertile soil and abundant water sources. The fixing of the first stakes in this district was coincident almost with the first transfers of lands to the Jewish National Fund, whereas in the Negev a prolonged period ensued before it was possible to create new Jewish villages. In the course of time national policy became a cornerstone of Jewish land activity, in the desire to reinforce the determined antagonism to the hostile intentions of the Authorities, whose entire policy now was to retard the progress of the Jewish National Home. Amid the vacillations of British policy in the Near East, appeasement was practised towards the Arabs in order to dispel their fears of growing Jewish power in Palestine. So the Government drastically curbed Jewish immigration and land purchase, the two most sensitive items in the upbuilding. Of the three elements then in the country, Jews, Arabs, and the Mandatory Government, a close alliance emerged between the two latter to circumvent the advance of the first-named. Various designs were projected, of which the common denominator was a change of the prevailing status, to the express detriment of Jewish development. Since the bloody events at the end of the summer of 1929, a web of concealed and avowed intrigue, physical obstruction, legal disabilities, administrative hindrances—were all intended as a stranglehold on Jewish activity. Laws were passed restricting freedom of operation and curtailing its scope; express instructions, as well as delays on the part of the Administration, weighed down upon daily operations; there were hostile acts, resulting in destruction of property and life, on the part of the Arabs—all comprising a dismal and painful chapter of intent to founder Jewish development. From time to time diverse schemes were propounded, the ultimate effect of which was only to constrict in one form or another the range of Jewish effort. They varied in extent and degree—the partial closing of specific zones, even withdrawal of entire areas from the Mandatory orbit, and subsequently from the area of the State itself, once it had been translated from a mere hope into a subject of political deliberations.

In 1940 the White Paper* land restrictions were promulgated. They were but an attempt entirely, or for the most part, to seal off most important areas from Jewish settlement. In the struggle against the enforcement of these prohibitions, the organised land activity of the Jews was a perfect instrument.

* For a discussion of the White Paper, see Barbour, pp. 461-74.

Purchases were directed precisely to those parts of the country which were destined, by way of ban, to be closed to Jews. They were not influenced by suitability for settlement, or quality of soil, quantity of water, or even security. The decisive element was the expansion of Jewish property in the restricted or forbidden zones, so as to loosen the stranglehold. The estates bought at this time, without considering how or when they would be used, were dispersed throughout the whole country, for not less than 95 per cent. of all territory was closed to Jews in one form or another by Regulations. There prevailed, almost without any qualification, the national political motive, clear and quite unconcealed, just as the motivation of the restrictions, too, was unambiguous.

At the same time the Jews were bound further to pursue the safety objective. For security, both of property and life, deteriorated, and the Jews had to redouble the struggle for their very existence. In such conditions they were obliged to fortify their political and strategic positions, and assure protection for the centres of their activity. They decided to do this by establishing security settlements, a protecting chain alongside the borders. One example is the expansion on the slopes encircling the Huleh basin, on the Hills of Naphtali almost facing the Lebanon, to the West, and the ranges of Bashan, on the Syrian border, in the East. When the time came to decide the political fate of Israel, these efforts were reinforced in order to offset the designs of opponents. Land was bought in those parts where there was danger of a political change in favour of the Arabs, or of their being wrenched from the body of the imminent State. Purchases were made precisely on distant frontiers to the East and the North, and Jewish boundaries in the Negev were expanded with much energy and persistence. The course of events subsequently completely justified these activities, which called for great exertion and accurate foresight. When the great day arrived, and the United Nations decided to establish a Jewish State, those who were responsible for defining its boundaries were impelled by realities to include the lands bought by the Jews, together with the settlements thereon. The frontiers of the new State which march in so curiously winding a fashion, were largely determined by the success of the Jews in creating *faits accomplis*. All those parts to which the Jewish settler had penetrated were included within the State, whereas those where they were not strong enough, or did not have time to plant stakes, remained for the most part outside.

Proof of this is seen in a comparison of the two proposals

for the Partition of Palestine, of 1937 and 1947.* According to the former, that of the Royal Commission, the State only reached as far as Beer Tuvia in the south, and the entire District of Beersheba, the South and the Negev, remained beyond. In the same way in the east only a portion of the District of Beisan was incorporated. For at that time Beer Tuvia was, indeed, the most southerly Jewish point in the country, and in the Beisan District there were only a few Jewish points. On the other hand, the northern part of the country was included by the Commission, because, among other reasons, there existed in Eastern Galilee a number of veteran and also modern Jewish settlements. Developments during the ensuing ten years are reflected in the boundaries drawn in the United Nations' Partition plan of 1947; new settlements had arisen in the south, and Jews had even penetrated to the Negev; in consequence their claims to this wide area were substantiated.

Thus the various objectives—national policy, security, and strategy, were linked through land acquisition with the settlement objective, all being welded together into a united, systematic, purposeful and far-seeing policy, which served at the same time both defence and upbuilding.

Land policy demands from its directors a rational and orderly plan. In the period preceding the establishment of the State, such a plan was drawn up by the Jewish National Fund. To it was assigned by the Zionist Organisation the guaranteeing of the land basis of the enterprise, to provide the very foundation of the Jewish State. In blue-printing the principles of this plan, it was necessary to heed both the vital requirements of the target as well as the methods of reaching it, including the shortest and safest approach. Various considerations dominated the drafting of this programme.

The determination of priorities in execution, which applied to both land and settlement policy, required the study of all factors concerned in implementation. Basically there was the objective of settlement, which had been the inspiration of the Zionist enterprise from its inception, whereas other motives were involved, in different degrees, in the overall aim, in accordance with period and circumstances, political or economic, prevailing at any given time.

The second consideration was the concentration of the lands acquired, in various zones or in isolated places; or, on the

* On the 1937 proposal, see Weizmann, pp. 331-33, Barbour, pp. 335-42, and Reid pp. 409-32. On the 1947 proposal, see Part IV, pp. 645-729.

contrary, their dispersal as far as possible—all judged in the light of the predetermined purpose, as the directors perceived it at the time.

Both these principles have always been of signal import, and at different times, one or the other occupied the centre of our programme. For the most part, concentration was preferred to dispersal, both in respect of land acquisition and settlement. This greatly facilitated the objective sought—a Jewish majority. Implemented, it satisfied also the requirements of security, an aim which was decisive throughout all the years, while it made easier long-range settlement programmes, and even distinct economy in means and manpower and the more efficient execution of plans. But there were specific conditions, chiefly arising from political and temporary factors, when it was necessary to emphasise dispersal. Very often both principles were combined, and in one part of the country a dispersal policy, and in another part a concentration policy, parallel to each other, were carried out, subject to the period and the prevailing requirements.

There was a third principle—the accumulation of land reserves, which also assumed paramount significance and became prominent in planning, from the time it became practically possible to create such reserves. This, too, largely eased the implementing of land policy, being useful at all times and under all circumstances. Moreover, by this means an answer was given, as it were, to the question arising from the inter-linking of the various objectives. There is no room for a land and settlement policy worthy of the name, unless care is taken to obtain in advance the areas required for continuing settlement. Without reserves large-scale plans are impracticable, whether precipitated by the demands of the hour, or the result of much consideration for the far future. The mobilisation of land supplies is a condition precedent to planned activity for the immigration and absorption of the masses, the development of a diversified economy, and the attainment of a Jewish majority.

Rechesh and Ta'as : Arms for the Hagana* 1935-1939

DAVID BEN-GURION

The arms that were legally entrusted to the supernumerary police units** were of great value in those days; they were modern and of good quality, and supplied in growing quantities. But the Hagana leaders were well aware that continued supply depended entirely on the goodwill of others, and even the arms already handed over by the authorities to the Jewish settlements could be withdrawn. They therefore made great efforts to develop *Rechesh*—the illegal purchase of arms at home and abroad—and *Ta'as*—the manufacture of arms and ammunition in underground workshops.

After the discovery of the import of ammunition in barrels in November, 1935,† the activities of the British detectives were intensified, and the purchasing that had been carried on till then in Belgium was cut down. The disturbances emptied the Hagana's arsenals, and the shortage of ammunition was particularly serious.

Yehuda Tennenbaum (later Arazi) served as a Detective Officer with the British in Jerusalem while maintaining close ties with the Hagana. Through his initiative and adventurous spirit, he found a new source for purchasing arms and smuggling them into the country.

It happened one day that Arazi met and made friends with a Polish tourist who was travelling to Iraq to sell arms to that country. He tried to persuade him to sell arms to the Hagana

* From *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, September 27, 1963, pp. 17-18.

** On the supernumerary police, *Notrim*, see above, pp. 371-74.

† On October 16, 1935, a secret arms shipment from Belgium to the Haganah was discovered at Jaffa Harbour when one of the cement barrels in which the consignment was hidden broke open. The incident produced strong Arab reactions.

in Israel, and a few weeks later was invited by his friend to come and arrange the matter.

Arazi reached Poland in September, 1938, and, with the aid of his Polish friend, met a number of people in the Polish Army.* He submitted to the Polish Staff a memorandum on the Jewish underground, which aspired for independence, like the Poles when their country was partitioned between three empires. The attitude of the ruling circles in Poland, who wanted to get rid of as many Jews as possible, helped Arazi to get the arms. Only one condition was made: that the British should not find out.

So Arazi arranged his first purchase, twenty-five Mauser rifles, two machine-guns and ammunition, with the aid of a £ 300 loan. An unusual circumstance helped him to smuggle in the goods. Passing by a workshop, he saw a large crowd and a notice announcing the sale of the owner's property. The poor man was saying with tears in his eyes, in broken Polish: "I know why they don't let me live; it's because I am not a Pole but a Hungarian." Arazi immediately paid the man's debts and won a devoted ally. His name was Shpetle.

Arazi told him that he had been sent by the Emperor of Ethiopia to purchase arms to be sent to the Middle East to liberate his country from Fascist Italy. After consultation, the two agreed to send out the arms in steamrollers with hollow wheels. All through the week, these wheels were manufactured in the workshop, and on Sundays, Arazi and Shpetle would put in the arms and close them up, welding the seams, so that no one could see what was inside. The wheels were sent to Palestine through a Rumanian port or Danzig.

Shpetle's workshops became a factory turning out steam boilers, lathes and steam-rollers. The latter were particularly useful because they were heavy and could accommodate large quantities of ammunition. The staff of the workshop was joined by two pioneers from the Borohov training farm—Hillel Shehori and Zvi Kutscher, who packaged the arms at night, together with Arazi and Shpetle, and kept an eye on the Polish workers.

The operation continued with success until the outbreak of the Second World War. The steam-rollers, full of arms, were consigned to Arab merchants and Arabic newspapers from Palestine were used to wrap up the weapons, so as to deceive the British detectives in case a consignment was seized. The arms were purchased with the knowledge of the Polish authorities.

* On the Polish attitude toward Zionism, see Briscoe, pp. 445-49.

Israel Galili* was in charge of taking delivery in Palestine. From the port the containers were transferred to Givatayim, where they were opened and the arms taken out. Up to the outbreak of the Second World War, the Hagana's arsenals received, without a hitch, 2,750 rifles, 225 machine-guns, 10,000 hand-grenades, and some 700 tons of ammunition (two million rounds), as well as a large number of pistols, with their ammunition.

Arazi's contact with the Polish authorities was useful in obtaining military training for the Polish Hechalutz** and facilities for *Ha'apala*, which was growing from month to month. He also succeeded in acquiring two light planes and six gliders.

At the same time, there were attempts to secure arms in other countries, but these had little success. Contact was made with Arab arms smugglers, who agreed to sell their merchandise even to the Jews. The Druse community was particularly active in this trade. The Jewish *Notrim* were also a source of arms and ammunition. After the Arab attacks, they would report an expenditure of bullets much greater than what had actually been used, and the surplus was handed over to the Hagana.

Efforts were also made during the disturbances, to expand *Ta'as*, especially the manufacture of hand and rifle grenades. There was one centre in the leather factory of the brothers Ya'akov and Benjamin Lefkovitz on the Tel Aviv sea-shore, and a second was opened in the village of Na'an. With the aid of scientists from the Sieff Institute† in Rehovot, *Ta'as* succeeded in manufacturing a new explosive, cheaper than the same type made abroad.

The work was expanded after Israel Zablodowski (later Amir),† was appointed to take charge of *Ta'as* in September 1937. During his first year, 17,500 hand-grenades, 16,000 rifle-grenades, and 2,800 kilograms of explosive were manufactured, and a beginning was made with the production of three-inch mortars.

Difficulties arose in the use of the explosive common in the Hagana in those days. Gelignite, which used to be received from the quarries, spoiled easily and caused accidents during the

* For Israel Galili, see above, p. 385, note.

** "Pioneers."

† The Daniel Sieff Institute, a scientific research centre established by the English Sieff-Marks family in 1934, became known as the Weizmann Institute in 1948.

‡ Israel Amir (b. 1903) was an intelligence officer in the Haganah, 1942-46, and Director of the Armaments Department until 1952.

filling of the grenades. Professor Felix Bergmann, brother of Professor Ernst Bergmann, proposed using an explosive called pentaeritritol-tetra-nitrate—a name that the *Ta'as* people shorten to “ten”. “Ten” had many advantages over gelignite; it was convenient to keep, of high explosive strength, and suitable for filling hand or rifle grenades.

With the aid of the Sieff Institute, and especially through the work of the brothers Ernst and Felix Bergmann,* the *Ta'as* people in Rehovot succeeded in making five kilograms of the new explosive in the laboratory. After a number of successful trials, they set up a workshop for its manufacture, manned by eight members of the Hagana, under the management of Michael Schechter (later Shaham), in the old Rehovot wine-press. By the outbreak of war, they had manufactured several tons of this material, with which *Ta'as* succeeded in filling good quality hand-grenades in large quantities.

On October 21, 1938, the first trial of mortars was conducted in the grove beside Kibbutz Shefayim. During 1939, forty-eight hand mortars, with all their accessories, as well as 5,000 mortar bombs were manufactured.

In the spring of 1939, Hagana possessed some 6,000 rifles, a million rounds of ammunition, 600 light machine-guns, and sub-machine-guns, 24,000 handgrenades, and 12,000 rifle-grenades. To this we must add the legal arms in the possession of the *Notrim*, especially the Jewish Settlement Police. This equipment was sufficient to protect settlements against isolated attacks, but it was far from enough for the defence of the entire Yishuv in case of a general outbreak in Palestine.

*David Ernst Bergmann (b. 1903), Professor of Chemistry, and his brother Felix Bergmann (b. 1908), Professor of Pharmacology, both worked closely with Chaim Weizmann as Scientific Director and Senior Research Assistant respectively of the Sieff Institute.

We begin by endeavouring to describe the background of facts and ideas which must be taken into account in considering migration policy.

A.—INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

Throughout the world at the present time a keen interest is being displayed, both within and without the Empire, in the development of the more sparsely populated countries, and the opportunities of settlement therein. A sign of the increasing attention which the subject is attracting is to be found in the fact that certain questions relating to migration came up at the League of Nations Assembly last year and will be discussed at the International Labour Conference in 1938. The ventilation of these questions is the natural consequence of post-war conditions, and more particularly of the restrictions imposed since the war on entry into former countries of immigration and of the resultant pressure of population in certain countries of Europe.

We are faced to-day with the juxtaposition of two distinct

* From Great Britain, The Overseas Settlement Board, *Report 1938*, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), pp. 3-7. The section of the *Report* from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "The International and Sociological Background." The *Report* is the work of the Overseas Settlement Board first appointed in February 1936 "to consider and advise the Secretary of State upon specific proposals for schemes of migration within the Empire. . . ." In the greater part the Board was constituted of The Marquess of Hartington, Mr. E.G. Machtig and Mr. A.P. Waterfield who relinquished his membership to become member of the Palestine Partition Commission of 1938. See also, Rabinowicz, pp. 97-114, and Divine, pp. 577-93.

ideas. On the one hand, there is a tendency in certain countries towards extreme nationalism and economic self-sufficiency, and, on the other, there is a prevalent idea (which exists not only in these countries but in the United Kingdom itself) that there are unlimited vacant areas in the British Empire capable of easy and profitable development.

Actually, investigations undertaken in recent years go to show that the possibilities of extending the area of agricultural development in, e.g., Canada and Australia, are much smaller than is generally believed. Indeed, the absorption of additional population in primary industries in the oversea Dominions seems likely to depend rather upon the more intensive cultivation of areas already settled and proved suitable for cultivation. Nevertheless, the figures of density of population lend *prima facie* support to the prevalent belief: and we ourselves have assumed without question as a legitimate hypothesis that each of the oversea Dominions is capable of supporting a population substantially larger than at present.

It follows, in our view, from the considerations to which we have referred that the problem of migration and settlement within the Empire must be regarded from a wide international aspect as well as from that of the domestic interests of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is, from this point of view, a factor in the whole problem of the preservation of friendly international relations and as such its importance and urgency does not need to be stressed.

B.—IMPORTANCE OF BRITISH STOCKS AS A SOURCE OF INCREASED POPULATION IN THE DOMINION

Within a generation the British Empire has undergone a remarkable change in that the Dominions have attained a status of free and equal partnership with the United Kingdom and one another in a British Commonwealth of Nations and have reached a position of importance and influence in world affairs.

These developments open up new lines of thought, among which the following seem to us of special importance in relation to the subject of our enquiry:

(i) The Dominions share with the United Kingdom a parliamentary form of government, wholly British in origin and characteristic of the British peoples, which in a time of violent political upheavals throughout the world has shown itself to possess an inherent stability such as few other forms of government have displayed.

(ii) If, as we believe, the general methods and principles of international policy for which the members of the British Commonwealth stand deserve to exercise a continuing and increasing influence in international relations, it is well that they should be supported by nations which carry weight in the councils of the world because they are populous, prosperous, and united by a common outlook.

(iii) Both in the political and in the economic sphere the peace and prosperity of the world are becoming more and more dependent upon effective consultation and cooperation between nations. The British Commonwealth of Nations has established a new form of constitutional and political relationship which, without prejudice to the individual freedom of the component nations, produces active co-operation between them on matters of common concern. An important element in the success of this form of relationship is a community of ideals and aims, founded, in the main, upon a common origin.

(iv) Trade between the United Kingdom and the oversea Dominions plays a predominant part in the economy of the Dominions, and represents a substantial share of the total trade of the United Kingdom. If this trade is to be fostered and enlarged it is desirable that the ties of kinship between the United Kingdom and the Dominions should be developed and strengthened.

(v) From the point of view of the defence of the people and territories of the various parts of the Commonwealth, the importance of adequate and homogeneous populations in the oversea Dominions is manifest.

The above considerations strongly suggest not only the importance of developing the oversea Dominions to the fullest possible extent, but also the desirability of bringing about such development as far as possible by people of British stock. These arguments are re-inforced, in our view, as regards importance and urgency, by the present population trends both in the United Kingdom and in the Dominions which we proceed to discuss in the following paragraphs.

C.—POPULATION TRENDS

Birth Rate

In respect of the three factors which jointly determine the size and shape of the population, viz., birth, death and migration, the most significant event of modern times is the protracted fall which has occurred in the birth rate. In Great Britain the

rate, which had been maintained at a high level during the years prior to 1876, gradually but steadily fell from 36.3 per thousand of population in that year to a minimum of 14.7 per thousand in 1933. Since then there has been little change, though such as there is has been upward rather than downward. This is the first occasion since the onset of the decline when the rate has been more or less stable for as long a period as five years; but it is impossible to foresee whether the period is an unusually extended halt preceding a further fall or whether it is to prove to be a more significant turning point in the history of the rate. A falling birth rate has been a marked feature not only in most of the countries of Western Europe, but also in the United States of America and in the Dominions. In Australia the birth rate has fallen from about 27 per thousand in 1901-11 to 17.1 per thousand in 1936; and in New Zealand during the same period from about 27 to 16.6 per thousand. The birth rate in 1936 still remains relatively high in Canada at 20 per thousand¹ and in South Africa at 24.4 per thousand (white population only). These figures gain in importance if they are considered in relation to the "replacement" rate. We are advised that the birth rate equivalent to a full replacement rate² in Great Britain would be in the neighbourhood of 19½ per thousand at the present time so that the average rate actually experienced during the past five years (1933-7), viz., 15 per thousand, is only about 77 per cent. of the par value. In the case of Australia and New Zealand the corresponding figures appear also to be slightly below parity.

Estimates have been made of the future population of Great Britain (on the hypotheses that there is no change in the rate of mortality and that there is no migration), on two alternative fertility bases, viz.:—

(a) that the fertility rate will on average be maintained at the level which obtained in the years 1933-6;

(b) that the rate will fall gradually in the next 20 years to about 70 per cent. of the level assumed in (a) and thereafter remain constant.

It is estimated on basis (a) that the population of Great Britain (excluding persons temporarily abroad—mainly men in the Armed Forces and the Mercantile Marine), which was 45,600,000 in 1935 would reach a maximum of about 46,500,000 in 1950 and by 1970 would have fallen to 44,200,000. On basis (b) it is estimated that the population would reach a maximum by about 1942 and fall to a figure of 39,300,000 by about 1970.

Estimates on somewhat similar lines have been made for

both Australia and New Zealand. In the case of both of these countries it has been estimated that on basis (a) the populations would reach their maximum points about 1970, at figures estimated at 7,620,000 and 1,690,000 respectively, as against 6,730,000 and 1,490,000, in 1935. If the decline in the birth rate should continue, the population would, of course, in each case reach its maximum peak at an earlier date. It will be understood that all these figures are merely forecasts based upon the specified arbitrary hypotheses as to the fertility rate.

DEATH RATE

Concurrently with the fall in the birth rate in Great Britain there has been a considerable reduction in the death rate over the past sixty years, the present level being less than half that of the period prior to 1876, when allowance is made for the increased age of the current population. There is, moreover, little reason to suppose that the decline has necessarily reached its limit and though the influence of mortality upon the future population of the country would not be so enduring as that of fertility, the immediate effect of any further fall in the former would be to delay any ultimate decline in the population—such as that indicated by the forecasts of the preceding paragraph—and at the same time to increase the maximum population reached before the decline actually set in. Any such increase arising from a decline in the mortality rate would of course tend to consist of persons in the older age groups, and would not therefore materially affect the age groups from which migrants are normally drawn.

MIGRATION

The remaining trend in population is the fall in migration. This fall has come later than the fall in the birth rate, and the period immediately preceding the War was the period of most active migration from the United Kingdom. During the War, migration almost ceased and the inward movement was greater than the outward. When migration was resumed after the War it never reached the levels attained in the years immediately prior to 1914, and from 1931 onwards the inward movement has exceeded the outward movement. Since 1930 more passengers and migrants of British nationality have left than have entered Australia and New Zealand. And this is also true since 1931 of Canada.

NOTES

- 1 The comparatively high, although falling, rate of natural increase in Canada is almost entirely due to a high birth-rate in the French province of Quebec, the birth-rate in other Provinces, especially in the case of people of purely United Kingdom stock, tending to follow the general trends which have been noted in the cases of Australia and New Zealand.
- 2 By "replacement" rate, we mean in non-technical language the birth-rate which will maintain the population at a constant level.

Reservations on the Plans for the Partition of Palestine* 1938

THOMAS REID**

The scheme for confining the Jewish State to the part of the Maritime Plain indicated in plan C seems to be the least objectionable that can be devised under our terms of reference. We were directed to include as few Arabs and enterprises owned by Arabs in the Jewish State as possible and vice versa. Plan C, however, may be at variance with our terms of reference, inasmuch as 821,700 dunums† of land owned by Arabs is included in the Jewish State. This is nearly 70 per cent. of the total area of that state, 1,257,800 dunums. Incidentally, it is nearly double the area of land, 436,100 dunums, owned by Jews in this proposed Jewish State. Whether the inclusion of 54,400 Arabs in the Jewish State with its total population of 280,400, of whom 226,000 are Jewish, is in accordance with the terms of reference

* From Great Britain, Palestine Partition Commission, *Report, 1938*, Cmd. 5854 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1938), pp. 263-81. These comments of Mr. T. Reid appeared in the *Report* under the title of "Note of Reservations by Mr. Reid." The Palestine Partition Commission under the chairmanship of Sir John Woodhead arrived in Palestine in April 1938. It was a technical commission whose function was to consider "in detail the practical possibilities of a scheme of partition." The Commission considered three alternative schemes designated as Plans A, B and C respectively including the partition plan of The Royal (Peel) Commission of 1937 referred to here as Plan A. Although Mr. Reid's comments are largely concerned with Plan C they are applicable by implication to all plans for the partition of Palestine. For maps of the three partition plans, see Map 7 for the Peel Partition Plan, and Maps 8 and 9 for Plans B and C respectively.

** British civil servant (1881-1963); was Chairman of the League of Nations Commission on the Sanjak of Alexandretta 1937-38, and member of the Palestine Partition Commission, 1938.

† One dunum equals one thousand square meters.

referred to above is not easy to decide, as a definite formula was not laid down therein. In fact, it is not possible to set apart an area for a Jewish State which is Jewish both as regards population and enterprises. I was forced by our terms of reference to search for a Jewish area where the population at least was predominantly Jewish; and the only possible place to find such an area large enough to form the territory even of a miniature state, was that part of the Maritime Plain set aside as the proposed area of the Jewish State under plan C.

That plan of partition, however, is in my opinion impracticable, as is the scheme set out in plans A and B. The criticisms applicable to plan C apply also as a rule to them, but with greater force. We have devised and tested several plans of partition on communal lines and I cannot envisage any scheme which would not be even more defective and lead to stranger results than that set out in plan C, whatever formulae were laid down in our terms of reference.

Our task was to devise the best possible scheme of partition and then to state if, in our opinion, that scheme was practicable. In giving reasons for my conclusions on this subject I have deemed it to be my duty to state the relevant facts and opinions, my own included, necessary to enable the implications of the proposal to partition Palestine according to plan C to be realized.

ABSENCE OF CONSENT

In the Statement of Policy of July, 1937, His Majesty's Government expressed a hope that it would be possible to give effect to a scheme of partition which might secure "an effective measure of consent on the part of the communities concerned." This refers to the consent of both Arabs and Jews. In my opinion no plan of partition of the Government of Palestine into three administrations would be practicable without the consent of both Arabs and Jews. From the evidence, oral and written, placed before us by Jews, it is clear that many Jewish associations and individuals are opposed to partition of any kind. Even the views of those Jews willing to discuss partition, as expressed at Zionist assemblies, to us and elsewhere, indicate that Jews would not accept such schemes as those set out in plans B or C, which would reduce the area assigned by the Royal Commission for a Jewish State. If so, this would seem to make both impracticable. The Jews concerned are highly developed politically and otherwise, and it is not clear how partition could be justly imposed upon them.

From the statements placed before us, oral and written,

and judging by the violent opposition shown by the Arabs to partition since the policy of partition was announced, it is clear that the Arab community, who form about two-thirds of the population of Palestine, would not accept either of the schemes B or C proposed. This also makes both impracticable in my opinion and also any scheme of partition. Here again the people concerned are not primitive folk. A distinguished Jew, Lord Samuel,* speaking with a knowledge of Palestine such as only the holding of high office for several years in that country can give, said in the House of Lords in July, 1937, "The Arabs are intensely aware of their history—that they acquired great territory, built up a remarkable culture and gave to the world one of its greatest civilizations."

Proof of Arab opposition to, and of the probability that the Arabs would violently resist the enforcement of, any scheme of partition and that their resistance would continue even if the scheme were implemented, is afforded by the fact that no witness suggested that partition would be peaceably accepted by the Arabs. Below are given selections from views expressed to us in Palestine by persons whose opinions it would be rash to disregard, owing to the witnesses' impartiality and long experience or special knowledge of Palestine and of its communal problems.

One witness stated to us early this summer, "When partition goes through you will have to have a barbed wire right round it. . . . with pill boxes every half kilometre. . . . Hostility in our lifetime there will be." This witness also said that the Arabs would not submit to Jewish rule.

Another witness said, "There would be a violent reaction to anything which gives any part of Palestine to the Jews." He did not think that any of the plans of partition discussed by us with him would promote peace.¹ He gave as his own opinion and that of others whom he consulted, people like himself in intimate daily touch with political realities in Palestine, that the Arabs could not be conciliated as long as there was any question of setting up a Jewish State and that if a plan similar to plan C were implemented, anything up to open rebellion would occur. He thought that if Galilee were excluded from the Jewish State that would not prevent even its inhabitants from rebelling against partition. He envisaged strife between the Jewish and Arab States.

* Lord Herbert Samuel was a leading member of the British Liberal Party, a member of the Cabinet during World War One and first High Commissioner for Palestine, 1920-25.

Another witness, speaking as early as last June before the Arab rebellion had fully developed, said, "From the very moment a report in favour of partition, with His Majesty's Government's acceptance of that report, comes out, you will get in this country accelerated rebellion which will gradually rise to an absolute crescendo when you put your boundary commission on the spot to demarcate. If you include Galilee in the Jewish State I think it is certain to add more fuel to the flames." He said that all classes of Arabs oppose proposed Jewish rule and that they would oppose partition by "force of arms," and that, even if both Arabs and Jews got people to come forward to take up the task of governing, "it would not work properly."

Another witness said that even if only a small Jewish State were set up on the Maritime Plain, the Arabs "would just bide their time, that is all."

Another witness said, "There is really no hope in my view of the Arab ever accepting partition... any form of partition." Another said, "I think that the Arabs will oppose any scheme of partition." Another, speaking with prescience last June, said that the Arabs would not accept the *fait accompli* if partition were implemented and: "I believe the opposition will become more serious," and that the Jewish "State would be a disaster for the Jews rather than for the Arabs."

Another witness, when asked if the Arabs would not acquiesce after a period of forcible repression, said, "It is just like pressing down a rubber ball; when you take the pressure off, the rubber ball resumes its natural shape." Also—"It would be reasonable to say that any attempt to put any one of these plans (of partition) into execution against the wish of one or other or both parties would result in disorders of not less extent than at present and probably greater." Also—"Failing agreement between the parties, no plan of partition can materialize unless the Power implementing the plan is prepared to take the most sweeping and vigorous measures to enforce it, amounting to large scale and lengthy operations, in fact possibly to an occupation for a number of years." Again—"Unless there is a spirit of consent on both sides you cannot effect partition."

Some of these witnesses said that the C plan of partition would produce less resistance than others; only one suggested that after compulsion, but without force, "in the long run" the Arabs might acquiesce in it.

None of the witnesses in the above category suggested that the Arabs would consent to partition or accept quietly the *fait accompli* if partition were implemented. These statements give a balanced view of the written evidence referred to. They all

tend to indicate that partition would not produce peace, but that was the tenor of the evidence, while there was absence of evidence to the contrary.

Coming now to Jewish views, Lord Samuel said with prescience in July, 1937, in the House of Lords, "The Arab national movement . . . is not to be disposed of easily and lightly, simply by using the strong hand and applying methods of coercion."

In September, 1938, a group of about twenty leading anti-partitionist Jews holding responsible public and private positions in Palestine, sent us a memorandum in which they stated, referring to the hope that the policy of partition would restore peace—"This sanguine assumption has already proved to be baseless." Again—"Arab resistance to Jewish colonization will have a far wider scope for effective action following partition and will gravely threaten the tiny, new Jewish State from the very commencement." "The British garrison will be compelled to participate in the defence of the newly created frontiers." "The Jewish State will have to maintain an army which is estimated at a minimum of 30,000 men." The Jews generally recognize frankly that they must have armed forces and they envisage Arab hostility if a Jewish State is set up. A large association of anti-partitionist Jews from many countries sent us a memorandum stating, "The establishment of the sovereign States, a Jewish and an Arab one, is an utterly impracticable proposal, and would mean the perpetuation of murder and warfare on the holy soil, with the most tragic consequences for Jew and Arab in Palestine and elsewhere."

The predictions of the witnesses quoted, who spoke in May and June, 1938, have been generally vindicated by events. Their predictions might prove to be wrong in the future; but it is much more likely that they would prove to be right. I have quoted them at some length because their views coincide with mine and because I desire to show that my views are not merely those of a single individual equipped with the experience of a brief three months stay in Palestine. My views are similar to those held by persons best qualified by real knowledge to give sound advice on the subject. In my opinion the C plan of partition would not bring peace before or after its implementation. I cannot envisage any other plan of partition which would not be more defective than plan C in this respect.

Apart from opinions, it is a fact that the announcement of a policy of partition, whose main object would be to secure peace, turned the disorders which followed the rejection of the proposal to set up a Palestine legislative council, into a national

Arab rebellion in Palestine which was assisted by Arabs resident in certain countries outside Palestine. It would seem to be contrary to common sense therefore to imagine that the acceptance or implementation of the C plan of partition would restore peace, that the "wound" of partition, as the Royal Commission called it, would be healed by driving home the weapon that caused the wound. Our report states, "If a plan of partition is approved which brings under the political domination of the Jews large numbers of Arabs in an area where the Jews are not already in a substantial majority, the introduction of such a plan will be resisted by the Arabs. . . . by open rebellion." I agree, but I think that the Arabs would also resist by force partition according to plan C.

ABSENCE OF EQUITY

But, it may be urged, the Mandatory Power should not yield to, but should crush, internal rebellion and Arab resistance from outside Palestine as well, drive partition through and restore peace by force. If the scheme of partition set out in plan C were obviously just, there would be some grounds for the adoption of such a course. If not, and if the attempt is made to implement that plan, resistance is likely to be in proportion to the sense of national wrong felt by the rebels and the protracted sequel to be generally disastrous to Arab, Briton and Jew.

His Majesty's Government, moreover, has announced that it will not implement a scheme of partition until it is assured that such scheme is equitable and practicable. One responsible witness said that it was not a reasonable proposition to cut out the Maritime Plain and set up a Jewish State there regardless of the fact that the majority of the people in Palestine are Arabs, and that it was not fair to set up a small non-Arab State against the will of the population of the whole of Palestine. Another said that to force Jewish rule on Arabs in the Jewish State "is immoral."

From a respected Jewish source a memorandum came to us stating that sovereignty in a Jewish State "could not, unhappily, be said to be derived from the consent of the governed." It then quoted President Wilson's words, "Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels or pawns in a great game."

It is clear that no Arab, Jewish or other body in Palestine asked for partition. The Royal Commission did not submit their policy or plan of partition for the views of people in Palestine whose criticisms would have been invaluable. The Commissioners

themselves put forward the policy admitting that their scheme was tentative and not worked out in detail. We have now worked out in detail plan C, which appears to me to be the best possible geographical scheme of partition, and it seems likely that the people of Palestine, who never asked for partition, and have had ample time to think about the policy of partition, would reject this scheme.

Under the scheme a small part of Palestine would be set aside for the Jewish State; but it is the richest Arab and Jewish part, the area most favoured by nature, by reason of its fertile soil, good rainfall and abundant underground water resources. Land planted with citrus in bearing is most valuable being worth several hundred pounds per acre. In recent years the Arabs have increased their citrus-planted land six-fold and they own about half the citrus-planted land in Palestine. Almost forty per cent. of the total citrus land owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish State. Partition would deprive Palestine for ever of a large part of its best territory, with its wealth, revenues and population, Arab and Jewish. Abraham Lincoln denied the rights of States desiring partition to secede from a Federation; but here the proposed Jewish State would be abstracted from a unitary State, probably against the wishes of the whole people of Palestine. If their votes were taken on plan C, possibly the majority against the proposal, reckoning Arab and Jewish votes, would approach to 100 per cent.

The establishment of the Mandate and the validation therein of the national home or *foyer* is a *fait accompli*. It honoured a promise made in the stress of war. But the proposal to partition the country is quite another matter, a revolution that should not be carried out by trustees, without the consent of the people of Palestine, who are not primitive folk devoid of political consciousness, incapable of making a decision on this subject.

The Arab residents in this tiny Jewish State, which would be about as large as an English county, a little over 300,000 acres in extent, would, if the state were set up, be forced to change their nationality, or to leave their homes and occupations there, unless they became citizens of the State. There would be about 54,400 Arabs within the State and nearly a million in other parts of Palestine united in their detestation of Jewish rule. It would not appear just to these people whose ancestors have lived in Palestine for thirteen centuries, that 54,400 of their number should be placed by their trustees under the rule in the Maritime Plain of Jews, nearly all of whom immigrated from overseas into that Plain during the last eighteen years. Others besides Palestinian Arabs, Christian Arabs included,

and Jews might object to the proposed scheme of partition. Even if Great Britain were at peace with other nations, but still more at a time when she might be involved in war, the hostility of the people of Palestine created by partition and of sympathizers with them from outside Palestine might cause difficulties serious or otherwise.

The removal of part of Palestine from the rest cannot be justly carried out against the wishes of, and without consulting, the whole population of Palestine, merely because in that part there is a preponderance of Jews. The partition envisaged is not morally strengthened by the fact that Arabs own 821,600 dunums of land as against 436,200 dunums owned by Jews in the proposed Jewish State.

It was necessary to give a defensive boundary on the hills for the railway and for the proposed Jewish State. For this and other reasons the eastern frontier was pushed inland away from the coast where the Jews have settled, with the result that villages entirely owned by Arabs would be included in the Jewish State. Out of the many Arab villages included in this area, I have selected fourteen in one of which there are about thirty-one Jews. In it and the other thirteen there are about 6,000 Arabs. These villages, Arab according to the population or the property test, are to be included in the Jewish State.

As a further example of the strange results that would follow the adoption of plan C, the case of Tulkarm may be mentioned. It is a centre of Arab nationalism and, mainly for this reason, was excluded from the proposed Jewish State, though its exclusion would entail a diversion of the railway line costing the British taxpayer £100,000. But most of the land belonging to the townsmen of Tulkarm would be in the Jewish State and the town is the market-place for many Arab villages to be included in that state. When international boundaries separate the Arab people of these places from their village lands and from their political and social centres, the Arabs will not consider the procedure to be just. They would ask why their friends and fields should suddenly be placed in a foreign land.

On the eastern boundary of the proposed Jewish State this unavoidable separation of Arabs from their lands by the proposed frontier north of Tulkarm would frequently be caused. The Arabs who would thus be separated from their land will not see any justice in our demarcation of boundaries. These people would have the problem of living in one state with their little bits of land close by in another state. They would probably be compelled by force of circumstances to sell their land in the Jewish State.

The Arabs in the Jewish State will almost certainly not be an assenting contented minority, and one can imagine the political, social and economic results of partition for them. On the other hand, one can foresee the disastrous strife in store for the Jews, whether they finally subdue their Arab subjects and neighbours or not. Here, as in other parts of Palestine, the British are likely to be drawn into the conflict permanently or sporadically, under their treaty obligations with the two States. Hitherto the British have been what a witness called the "whipping boy" in politics between Arab and Jew. After partition, and indeed before it could be implemented, they would probably be unfortunate soldiers fighting in the communal war for one side or the other. The Arabs are very politically minded and the flaws in a policy which seems to them to be crudely unjust, would be exposed by educated Arabs who know how to think politically, to the League of Nations and to the Parliament and Government which will have to justify a policy of partition.

Reliable witnesses assured us that the Arabs to be placed in the Jewish State would fight and that they would be assisted by Arabs from outside that state. In my opinion this view can be safely accepted. If partition is to be implemented it will be necessary to provide for this contingency on the borders of the Jewish State as well as for similar contingencies elsewhere in Palestine from the time the policy is officially adopted till it is implemented by crushing resistance. Even if the military and police forces could crush Arab opposition, the trustees of Palestine, the League and British Government have to consider the cost in reputation to themselves and in lives and wealth to all concerned. In my opinion plan C is here again impracticable because the British people would not tolerate the injustice and waste of life and property entailed in driving through it or any more defective plan of partition.

Proceeding to other aspects of the subject, one notes that the Royal Commission gave great prominence to the aspirations of the Arabs to independence. These aspirations do exist and have been voiced by Arab political leaders. But in my opinion, based on that of persons with greater knowledge than mine, the chief incentive to Arab unrest is the fear of the economic and political domination of the Jews. They detest the idea of Jewish rule and therefore detest partition. Their economic fears require explanation.

The Jews are steadily purchasing, with funds donated gratis by world Jewry, the land of Arabs, even at the present time when an Arab risks assassination if he sells his land to Jews. We are

authoritatively informed that in future such land will generally be paid for from Jewish national funds. Arabs know from experience that land so purchased becomes Jewish for all time, that it cannot be leased to any non-Jewish tenants, and that a clause in the leases forbids the employment of non-Jewish labour on such land. Moreover, in non-agricultural industries owned by Jews, employers who might desire to employ cheap Arab labour, are persuaded, often very effectively, not to do so. And if the rates of wages for each community were effectively made the same by legislative enactment, the Arab worker might lose his main claim to obtain work in the majority of such Jewish concerns, save in Arab areas where it would be prudent to have a mixed labour force.

Probably nothing has produced more communal ill-will in Palestine than this Jewish system of economic penetration. It affects all classes, but especially the mass of Arab workers. The Jews tell us that there would be no economic discrimination against Arabs in the proposed Jewish State, but, even with the best intentions, they would be faced with the claims of the unfortunate, persecuted Jews of Europe seeking refuge, land and work in Palestine. The Jews candidly stated to us, "We should be untrue to our trust if we employed Arabs, because our primary purpose is to employ Jews." The laws of the state might be equitable, but it would be too much to expect a Jewish government to force Jews to employ Arabs at the same wages as those paid to Jews.

The Arab land owner who sells his land to the Jews generally secures a very high price. The Jews do not buy land for the extension of the National Home on commercial principles and need not do so. With loss of Arab ownership the right to work on the land even of Arab tenant or owner cultivator may disappear. The Arab or other tenant in the Jewish State could retain his right to work on a *lot viable* if he appealed to the provisions of the Protection of Cultivators Ordinance, assuming that this Ordinance were retained. But if he foregoes his right for a cash consideration or other cause, he quits the land also. The Arabs are at present, even under British rule, being slowly "squeezed out" of the land as the local phrase expresses it. Some witnesses predict that the Arabs in the Jewish State would sell their land and that Arab workers there would become a proletariat and try to drift into the Mandated Territory in search of a living.

The livelihood of thousands of rural Arab workers living in the hills outside the Jewish State would also be jeopardized by the creation of that state. A leading Zionist Jew with exceptional knowledge, speaking of the orange groves in the Maritime

or Coastal Plain in a large part of which it is proposed to set up the Jewish State, said to us:—


In the orange districts during the high season of harvests you will find tens of thousands of Arabs going in and earning a great deal; in fact it constitutes a very substantial part of their wealth.

We have also been authoritatively informed by Jews that once the Jewish State is set up no Arabs will be allowed to enter it from outside to work for wages. And it is not only in respect of the great citrus industry, but in other occupations also, that the Maritime Plain enables Arabs from the hills to eke out at present an existence by earning wages in that Plain.

There is grim competition in Palestine not only for land but for work; and the setting up of a Jewish State in the Maritime Plain would be a serious blow to the large Arab proletariat in the hills, for whom no system of unemployment benefit exists now, or would be possible after partition in the insolvent Arab State or Mandated Territories unless the British taxpayer met the cost. A scheme which threatens thousands of Arabs with destitution by removing from their native land one of its chief centres of employment is imprudent and would be difficult to justify.


Poverty is the root cause of much of the discontent in Palestine. An experienced witness said to us, "The most serious problem in Palestine is land hunger." In the Statement of Policy of His Majesty's Government in 1930 it was alleged that 29.4 per cent. of Arab families in the villages were landless. The accuracy of the figures was challenged and no reliable figures exist on the point. But it is certain that there is in town and country a large class of landless Arabs. There probably was even before the Jews began purchasing land on a large scale after the war. Moreover, the number of Arabs with holdings too small to support those dependent on them is large. With a rapidly rising population the economic problem of the future inhabitants of Palestine is a serious matter. The majority of us have decided that Haifa will be needed to supply work to some of the Arabs living outside that town. But the setting up of a Jewish State would be a serious blow to Arabs from the hills who now earn wages also in the area proposed for the Jewish State. In August, 1938, in the eighteen Arab towns for which rough, approximate statistics were kept, about 65 per cent. of Arab workers were unemployed. There were no figures available for the rural villages. The figure quoted referred to abnormal times, but it reveals a state of affairs which is most

Map 8
 Palestine Partition Plan B, 1938



Reprinted from Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish Arab, and British policies*, II, 867.

Map 9
 Palestine Partition Plan C, 1938



serious. There was Jewish unemployment at the same time, the figure for May, 1938, being 11,000 wholly and 9,000 partially unemployed. If a Jewish State were set up, the Arab proletariat might well be driven by want to seek food and wages in the Mandated Territory and thus become a burden on the British taxpayer. Some witnesses thought this would happen; others did not. Jewish enterprise in Palestine has increased the wealth of the country enormously. The Arabs have benefited thereby; but the two races are now in competition for land and labour, the needs of both being great in the extreme. Partition in my opinion would not solve this difficult fundamental economic problem of Palestine; it would possibly make the problem insoluble, except by continuous subsidies from the British taxpayer.

Continuing the examination of plan C, it will be observed that the majority of us propose that Haifa should be a Mandated territory. In my opinion no Mandatory could undertake responsibility for the security of Palestine, partitioned or otherwise, if this town, its environs and port were in the possession of a foreign State. If the Haifa town area be excluded from the rest of the Northern Territory, it transpires that in this area, north of the proposed Jewish and Arab States, there are 180,000 Arabs and only 29,000 Jews: 2,715,000 dunums of land owned by Arabs as against only 675,000 dunums owned by Jews. If the Galilee hill area be omitted, there would be left 83,000 Arabs and only 26,000 Jews, while the land owned by Arabs would be 1,375,000 dunums as against 639,000 owned by Jews. Yet, it is proposed to make the whole of this northern area, not part of the Arab State, but Mandated Territory. It is stated in chapter XI that the whole northern area could not be assigned to the Arab State without serious injustice to the Jews and a violation of the charge to include the fewest possible Jews and Jewish enterprises in the Arab State. I agree. But it is proposed to set up a Jewish State where there are 54,400 Arabs and 821,700 dunums of land owned by Arabs, as against 226,000 Jews and only 436,100 dunums of land owned by Jews. Surely what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

Even if the unique principle of disintegrating a country without the compelling necessity of *force majeure*, by selecting bits of it where the numbers of one community or its property exceed greatly those of another community of fellow citizens, without consulting the whole people, is to be adopted as a guide to dismemberment, it should be consistently followed. We are not dealing here with primitive people but with Arabs who can think politically and would almost certainly resist discriminating

and indefensible treatment, even in the detested parcellation of their native land.

Moreover, the Arabs will see, in the scheme of immigration proposed in this northern territory, the intention of establishing there in the future a Jewish State when the Jews by extending towns where they would be allowed to reside and by other settlement in the area become a majority. The clause stating that this cannot occur until most of the minority race agree to it, will not inspire any confidence in people whose native land would have been disintegrated by then, without consulting the people of Palestine, under a disruptive scheme of partition based largely on the counting of heads communally and the value and extent of property of each community in selected places.

Somewhat similar criticisms apply to the southern area, which is also to be Mandated Territory, though it is overwhelmingly Arab. It must not be thought that I am opposed to further Jewish immigration. What I urge is that, if the C plan of partition were adopted, it would be a great obstacle to the equitable settlement of this immigration problem. Immigration is one thing; immigration which may culminate in periodical additions to the Jewish State is quite another thing.

Passing now to an examination of the three administrations to be set up under plan C, the plain fact emerges that, granted peace, a solvent independent Jewish State could be set up at once. That would be an irrevocable act unless, owing to conquest of that state, or the consent of its Government, it ceased to exist. Mandated Territories rendered insolvent permanently by the abstraction of the area of the Jewish State from the whole, would be set up, financed by the British taxpayer. Lastly, on the unlikely assumption that the Arabs would co-operate in setting up their state, there would be an insolvent Arab State also living on the British taxpayer.

Our terms of reference requested us to devise Arab and Jewish States in which there would be "a reasonable prospect of the eventual establishment, with adequate security, of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States." But this Arab State would not be self-supporting even if peace were established in Palestine; it would probably become more and more insolvent as time went on owing to increase in population, natural poverty, and to the destitution caused in it by partition. This administration would not be a state as long as its existence depended on annual British subsidies.

It would be politically difficult to set up a Jewish state and to postpone the setting up of an Arab State till it could be self-supporting, that is, indefinitely. So, to get over this difficulty

a revolutionary departure from the ordinary, essential principles of granting British subsidies to an insolvent country is recommended. It is proposed to set up a quasi-independent, insolvent Arab State without control of its administration by the subsidizer.

The proposed Arab State would contain less than half the Arab population of Palestine. There would be in it some 9,000 unfortunate Jews under the rule of Arabs resenting partition. The Jewish State would contain little more than half the Jews in Palestine. Jewish and Arab minorities would be protected by the written undertakings suggested in chapter XVI.* It need not be assumed that these clauses would prove to be more effective than similar clauses have proved to be elsewhere. There are no sanctions for breach of them, nor could external sanctions be easily devised to curb the actions of sovereign Arab or Jewish States. Our terms of reference have indeed led to strange results. Any attempt to partition Palestine on communal lines is bound to lead to strange results.

Our terms of reference did not prohibit us from considering whether a scheme of partition were equitable or not. The equity of a scheme is a vital, relevant factor in testing its practicability. In fact, in chapter X our report applies the equity test to plans A and B. I, in turn, apply it to plan C. I am not trying to show that partition is in principle inequitable or bad. The partition of Scandinavia into Norway and Sweden was equitable as far as I can recollect, and it was carried out peacefully with the consent of the two peoples concerned.

Before passing to some concrete aspects of the problem I would quote here the words of Burke—

It is with the greatest difficulty that I am able to separate policy from justice. Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society; and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all.

In my opinion the C scheme of partition, and others more defective still, would be an eminent departure from justice, and therefore impracticable.

ABSENCE OF SECURITY

The problem of defence that would be created if plan C were implemented would be very difficult. A distinguished Jew,

* The chapter dealt with such safeguards as religious rights and properties, employment in the public services, pious foundations, etc. . . .

Lord Reading,* speaking in the House of Lords in July, 1937, said—

Of all the dangerous places in which to set up an unsupported, inexperienced State, I wonder whether at the present moment you could find a more perilous spot than the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The defence against a large Power or Powers of the new Jewish State, even if, as is unlikely, it were at peace within, and on its frontiers with the Arabs after partition had been implemented, would need the protection of naval, air and land forces. These could only be supplied in the main by Great Britain whose commitments overseas are already considerable.

Foreign policy and defence are interconnected and, while the sovereign Jewish State could create international conflict by its foreign policy, Great Britain would have to accept the military consequences. Great Britain has taken this risk elsewhere, but before taking it in the case of the proposed Jewish State, it would be necessary to ask why the risk should be taken and it would be difficult to give a satisfactory answer. If the Jewish State surrendered the control of its foreign policy constitutionally and in fact to the British Foreign Office, that state would become what the proposed Arab State would be, a state only nominally independent. Similar difficulties would be created in respect of the proposed Arab State, except that it would be a bankrupt depending for its very existence on the British Mandatory and therefore not likely to have an independent foreign policy.

Coming to the purely executive side of the defence problem, I quote some remarks made to us by witnesses whose views and knowledge cannot be brushed aside, views which I accept. The opinion reiterated was that the only defensive boundary for Palestine is the present one. Additional boundaries within Palestine would entail for Great Britain far more burdens than she can bear, in my opinion. The additional boundaries under plan C would exceed 300 miles. It seems to me that—

(a) Partition is impracticable, because it is not possible to set up a truly defensive boundary.

(b) No scheme of partition can be implemented militarily if the division of races is such that Great Britain would have to go and help both sides.

* Lord Reading (1860-1935), a British statesman of the Liberal Party, was Governor-General of India, 1921-26, and Foreign Secretary, 1931.

(c) Unless people are prepared to accept boundaries as a basis on which both parties try to live together, they are only boundaries topographically.

A group of Palestinian Jews holding very responsible positions wrote to us—

The complications resulting from the creation of at least three different kinds of administrative territory with numerous corridors and enclaves must immediately exercise a fatal effect on public security.

Our task was to propose the creation of two states possessing adequate security. As this is not feasible, in my opinion, partition is also impracticable on this ground.

In my opinion, Arab and Jew, in spite of the communal rancour roused by the proposed policy of partition, can cooperate in Palestine and live at peace with each other, but the first essential to the restoration of peace is the abandonment of all schemes for carving up the country by artificial boundaries, of plans for its dismemberment and the logical sequel thereto, removal of Arabs from their homes and occupations to make room for Jews. These schemes seem to me to be unjust, unwise and impracticable.

DISMEMBERMENT

Coming now to civil administration, it will be seen from the map illustrating plan C that that scheme would establish for the governance of the little country of Palestine an administrative labyrinth. The British Mandatory Government would control an enclave stretching from the Jerusalem environs to the sea. But it would also rule two additional blocks of territory in the north and the south from which it would be separated by the proposed Arab and Jewish States. The Jewish State is broken into two blocks by the Jerusalem enclave. The Arab State is also in two blocks, one of which, its chief town and port, Jaffa, is an enclave within the Jerusalem enclave. But these seven blocks of land are not the only sub-divisions under our plan. The Northern Mandated Territory is to be sub-divided administratively into three portions with regard to the vital problem of purchase of land by Jews, namely into the Haifa area, the Galilee hills and the Galilee plains. The Southern Mandated Territory is to be sub-divided into two areas, the occupied and the unoccupied, again with reference to the same vital problem. Furthermore, the Northern or Southern Terri-

tories or parts thereof may under the C scheme develop in future into additions to the Jewish or Arab States or into States neither Jewish nor Arab. This would involve the creation of further enclaves of Mandated Territory at places like Haifa and Nazareth. Truly, the disintegrating policy of partition would lead to strange results.

It is hardly necessary to explain in detail the administrative complications which the C scheme of partition would cause even if there were friendly relations between the peoples of the three administrations. There would be great difficulties created for people separated by state boundaries from their lands, those needing passports, border passes, or identity cards for journeys, especially in the case of poor and illiterate people. A person travelling from Haifa to the southern boundary of Palestine on the main coast line, in a railway journey of 133 miles, would pass through six blocks of territory, no two contiguous blocks of which would be ruled by the same Government.

The difficulty of preventing and detecting crime would be great, where escape across a state boundary near at hand to the criminal would be so easy, and an efficient system of inter-state extradition could not function unless there were inter-state accord.

If different customs duties, quotas, or bounties existed for different parts of Palestine, the customs administrative problem would be truly formidable if smuggling were to be prevented with tolerable efficiency. But it is proposed to overcome this difficulty by a customs union. I do not think that this is feasible.

A system of communications by rail, road, and wire exists which, like other branches of administration, was devised for all Palestine. To allocate equitably the thoroughfares, rails, marshalling yards, workshops, telephone and telegraph wires, and the capital and debts connected therewith, the staffs who would not, perhaps, desire to continue their service in foreign states and the pension rights of those staffs, between three administrations would be a most difficult task. If the division were carried out it would render administration most difficult and expensive. Incidentally, the Palestine railways, now running at a loss, would, save in the Jewish State, be insolvent after partition and would have to close down unless the British taxpayer met the deficit.

The administrative upheaval in all directions would be great; before initiating it the objective must be worth while and it does not seem to be so. However, the civil administration could, if peace prevailed, function, regardless of expense and exasperating inconveniences. But, why should this administrative

labyrinth be created? The answer is, the immediate object would be to set up a Jewish state, for the proposed Arab state would be a state only in name. In my opinion it is not a practicable proposal to break up the administration of Palestine into three units in the manner proposed in the C plan of partition for such an objective. The main object of partition was to secure political peace by setting up two sovereign states and Mandated Territory; its result, if the C plan were adopted, would almost certainly be the opposite of this. Partition, if so, would not only be an enormous obstacle to the efficient government of the small bits of territory concerned, but also, in my opinion, the chief obstacle to the restoration of peace. The problems of Palestine are too complex and intangible to be settled by carving out blocks of territory and population in the manner proposed.

ABSENCE OF SOLVENCY

Budget estimates for Palestine in the future can be of little value unless it be assumed that peace is restored. Rebellions have no respect for financial estimates, destroy revenue-producing activities, impede the tax collector and cause new and unexpected objects of expenditure. There are in chapter XVIII financial estimates for partitioned Palestine based on the assumption that peace were restored. In my opinion peace will probably not be restored until the policy of partition is abandoned. But, on the assumption that peace were restored and, in my opinion, it can be permanently secured, I put forward a possible average budget estimate for unpartitioned Palestine. It was made in consultation with competent advisers for average times, not for periods of boom caused by large imports of Jewish capital or otherwise, and allows for the economic havoc wrought up to August, 1938, by the rebellion. It assumes the absence of a catastrophic slump in industry. My figures are net, the gross figures include such items as gross Post Office receipts, etc.

<i>Average net revenue</i>	<i>Average net expenditure</i>
£ P.	£ P.
3,750,000	Recurrent 3,200,000
	Special 100,000
	Extraordinary 250,000
	To meet deficits on Railways, etc. 200,000
	<hr/>
	Total 3,750,000

These figures are obtained without allowing for enhanced taxation and without reducing any current service except that of police.² At present the cost of police exceeds £ 1,000,000 a year, a sum about twice the normal cost of this service before the recent disturbances began. Even in the troublous year 1936-7 the actual expenditure on police and prisons was only £P. 744,619. In my estimate I have allowed a sum of £P. 800,000 under this head; but further reductions would be possible if peace were permanently secured, while revenue, especially customs revenue, might considerably exceed my estimate in such circumstances. My estimate of average revenue is conservative for a peaceful Palestine. It thus transpires that if Palestine were not partitioned, and if peace were restored, the country could probably meet the full cost of its civil administration. Its military defence in normal times would probably cost about £ 300,000 per annum. It would not be excessively optimistic to hope that the country could meet that expense, too, if the Mandatory did not agree to meet it, by gradual reduction in expenditure on police and by increase in revenue if peace were permanently secured.

My colleagues in their estimates for partitioned Palestine do not allow for reduction in the police vote, but state that special expenses caused by partition would absorb any savings likely to occur in this item. Before adopting the C plan of partition it would be well to contrast the balanced budget set out above, omitting military expenditure with the budgets of the three administrations envisaged after partition which also omit not only British military expenditure but also the military expenditure of the Arab and Jewish States. The Jewish State, if peace prevailed, would have in respect of civil administration a surplus and the other two administrations would be insolvent, their combined annual deficit on civil administration alone being about £P. 1,000,000 a year. If Trans-Jordan were added to the Arab State the deficit would be greater still. Comparison of the unfortunate financial position of the Palestine Government to-day during rebellion with that of the three Governments to be set up under plan C, functioning in peace, on the assumption that rebellion had ceased, does not seem to me to serve any useful purpose. The proper comparison is between the finances of a peaceful Palestine undivided and a peaceful Palestine partitioned into three administrations. I have given the salient figures in each case. The figures given in our report for a partitioned Palestine are probably as reliable as any others that can be envisaged and they deal a staggering blow to the policy of partition. A huge annual deficit in the case of two

administrations would be created by partition and it would probably be permanent, for the taxable capacity of the proposed Arab State and Mandated Territories is poor and inelastic. The deficit might well increase in the future. Should this price be paid for partition in the hope that peace, justice and good government would be secured thereby in Palestine?

A customs union is proposed in our report as an economic necessity for the Jewish State and the need of free trade within Palestine is stressed. But if partition does not take place, existing free trade and fiscal union within all Palestine will continue. Before destroying this unity one must see some probable advantage and I can only see economic, fiscal and other disasters if partition under plan C is adopted. If the Jews or Arabs are to accept by treaty a customs union as a condition precedent to partition, it is unlikely that any Arab body would agree to this union, if by rejecting it, partition could be avoided. The Jews tell us that they would desire to have complete fiscal freedom in a Jewish State and they too would probably reject the idea of a customs union. Even if it were formed at the outset it would scarcely be permanent as the Jewish State's economic position would be quite different from that of the other two Governments.

But a further blow to the independence of the two states is proposed by the suggestion to set up a customs board selected by the three administrations whose decisions all three Governments would normally accept. It is difficult to see how any Government could surrender its responsibilities to a board composed of representatives of three Governments in a matter vitally affecting its economic welfare. Such an arrangement is not likely to be permanent. But combined with this is a proposal that the actual collection of customs revenue should not be carried out by each of the three Governments, but by the Mandatory. He is also to have the final voice in respect of Customs policy as long as Great Britain grants subsidies. And the customs revenue is to be pooled amongst the three Governments, not according to the region paying the duties, but on the principle of sharing according to needs, the Jewish State thus giving grants indirectly to the other two Governments. Finally, as all these devices would not make the budget of the Arab State balance, it is proposed that an additional sharing-out of the shares taken from the Jewish State should be made between the Mandatory Power and the Arab State, to the latter's advantage. These devices for reducing the deficit of the proposed Arab State at the expense of the Jewish State do not seem to me to be practicable. The Jews, in my opinion, would not consent to such a scheme, even if they were able to meet the cost of it

after providing for their own armed forces. The overburdened British taxpayer is also not likely to consent to subsidize two Governments doomed to insolvency without good reason. The immediate object gained would be the setting up of a puny Jewish State. It is not easy to see how this token state could be of any conceivable use to the Jews, while it is easy to realize that its existence might be a permanent source of fiscal and political discord in Palestine and in places interested in Palestine. In my opinion the establishment of such a state would prove disastrous for the Jews.

The British taxpayer would have to face the combined deficit in the civil administration of the Arab State and Mandated Territories. But he would also have to face the military expenditure involved in defending all three areas. In my opinion, protracted rebellion would be the sequel to partition. If so, the cost of defence would be enormous. One well-informed witness states to us on this point, "There might be no limit to the cost." In my opinion, on financial grounds alone any form of partition of Palestine is impracticable.

CONCLUSION

It may be said that one cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs, but it would not be easy to discover an omelette in any possible scheme of partition. Finally, in my opinion, if plan C were adopted, it would not and could not be implemented.

In stating that partition is impracticable I am in accord with nearly 100 per cent. of non-Arab and non-Jewish persons in Palestine, in direct contact with the problem, who by experience and impartiality are best qualified to judge. Probably most Arabs in Palestine and certainly many Jews in Palestine are of the same opinion. I am not a lonely recusant flying in the face of the facts or of the evidence.

I regret that I felt bound to disagree with the opinions of my colleagues and to write this lengthy memorandum; but the matter is of great importance and I had to place my dissentient views fairly fully on record. My conclusions are purely negative, but our terms of reference compelled us to devise a scheme of partition and then to state if it were impracticable. In my argument I have adhered strictly to the mission I undertook, made use of the freedom to judge which was a condition of acceptance of that mission, and have not put forward any solution as an alternative to partition.

19th October, 1938

T. REID

NOTES

- 1 Only certain officials were shown proposed plans for partition.
- 2 The figures given in chapter XVIII were based on the Government estimates for 1938-39, and anticipate a deficit for all Palestine of £ P. 365,000. But these estimates included provision of £ P. 1,022,068 for police and prisons.

Eichmann and the Selection
of Pioneers*

JON AND DAVID KIMCHE**

On one of the deceptively beautiful summer days of 1938, a tallish young man in his late twenties strode with firm step and confident air across the Berlin Street into the dreaded headquarters building of the Gestapo. He had come a long way. All the way from Palestine. His slightly staring eyes and his prematurely balding head gave him an air of unyouthful authority when he asked in a deep bass for the Supervisor of the Jewish Question.

Little did the black-shirted Storm-Trooper who politely conducted the young man to the "Supervisor" guess that his charge had come from a Jewish communal settlement in Palestine to make a deal with the Gestapo. The Supervisor received his guest with a shouted warning to keep his distance; Jews were not permitted to approach his desk. The Palestinian walked on and replied stonily in kind. The German was taken aback, and curious about this untypical Jew. What did he want? The Palestinian explained that he was an emissary from the Union of Communal Settlements in Palestine; he wanted a permit to stay in Germany for some months and to move about freely and seek contact with Jewish organisations. The German replied that he was not interested in this so-called cultural work of Palestinians; Germany did not need it.

The young Jew persevered. He was on a special mission; his work was what the Nazi Government wanted; his aim was

* From Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads: The "Illegal" Migration of a People, 1938-1948* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1954), pp. 15-19 and 28-38. Reprinted by permission of Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd.

** Jon Kimche, British Zionist publicist, formerly editor of the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, the official organ of the Zionist Federation of Britain. David Kimche, his brother, is an Israeli diplomat.

dissident Zionist group, the Revisionists,* right-wing activists, were engaged in illegal transports to Palestine. Bar-Gilad explained that Revisionists took primarily those Jews who could pay the heavy cost of illegal transportation, while his organisation was interested in young people who were prepared to become pioneers. Most of them had no means. His organisation would bear the entire cost. He wanted no financial help from the Gestapo; all he asked was that his work should not be obstructed.

Bar-Gilad could not know that the man he was talking to was the prime mover behind the plan of "Jewish Emigration for money." Eichmann's Central Bureau was designed originally for this very purpose. It would receive all Jewish applications for permission to leave Greater Germany. For those who could pay for his services—and his charges were adjusted to the anxiety of well-to-do Jews—Eichmann would sweep aside bureaucratic formalities and delays and issue passports and visas and provide the passage, often through the Revisionist or "private enterprise" transport agents. It was a lucrative business for the Gestapo.

But this was different. Eichmann listened with interest, continued to ask questions but did not commit himself. He promised to consider the proposal. He contacted Berlin and two weeks later, Bar-Gilad was called again to the Rothschild Palace. Eichmann told him that he would help in the provision of farms and facilities to set up training centres for intending emigrants, but the actual transportation must be left to the Revisionists, the dissident Zionists and to "private enterprise."

Now individual racketeers were reaping a rich harvest from the illicit transport business. The route was long, the hazards great, and the unfortunate passengers' opportunity to complain, or seek redress, was nil. Bar-Gilad would not agree to the exclusion of transportation from his province. But as regards training facilities Eichmann kept his promise. He supplied farms and farm equipment. On one occasion he expelled a group of nuns from a convent to provide a training farm for young Jews. By the end of 1938 about a thousand young Jews were undergoing training in these Nazi-provided camps.

On the face of it, this was a fantastic situation. By now the campaign against the Jews was reaching a new peak. What then were these Palestinian emissaries doing in Berlin and Vienna, arranging, training and transporting a few hundred at a time when hundreds of thousands were in peril? And what interest could the Berlin Gestapo and the Vienna S.S. have in this seemingly trivial operation? And yet in this odd paradox lies

* On the Revisionists, see Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, and p. 446, note.

the clue to much that follows. . . .

* * *

. . . Though the fact was for long to be hidden from the outside world, within the Nazi hierarchy there was at this time confusion on many subjects. These included the Jewish question—until Hitler himself stepped in and ordered in precise terms the encouragement of Jewish mass immigration to Palestine. The German Foreign Ministry had become intensely interested in the Palestine question when publication of the “Peel Commission’s” report* was anticipated by diplomatic “leakages” in the summer of 1937. These informed the Germans that the Royal Commission would recommend the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State in a part of the country. The Foreign Ministry thereupon made a series of attempts to define German policy on the Palestine question.

A memorandum by Schumburg, head of the “German Department” of the Foreign Ministry, explained that “the interest of the British Empire in a Jewish State in Palestine as the basis of British Mediterranean interests should be regarded as an essential factor in judging the future development of the Palestine problem.” On the other hand, Schumburg continues, Germany can have no interest in a Jewish State in Palestine. World Jewry would not be absorbed by a Jewish State, but would use it as an additional active political organisation (Jewish citizenship, diplomatic missions, international representation). The German interest in promotion of Jewish immigration to Palestine, Schumburg concludes, is therefore offset by the far greater interest in preventing the formation of a Jewish State.

At the same time, however, the Middle East expert of the Foreign Ministry, the head of Political Division VII, Otto von Hentig, also prepared a brief for Weizsäcker.** He argued that there were two great advantages for Germany in the establishment of a Jewish State. It would relieve the Reich of a large number of needy Jews, who had still to be looked after; it would also “make it possible, when we are attacked by Jewry, to deal with official representatives and not, as heretofore, with anonymous and therefore irresponsible elements.” He also expressed his conviction, after consulting the German envoys

* For the Peel Commission, see Weizmann’s conversation with Ormsby-Gore, pp. 331-33, and Barbour, pp. 335-42.

** Baron Ernst Von Weizsäcker was Permanent First Secretary of State to Ribbentrop; subsequently sentenced to six years imprisonment by the Nuremberg Court and died in 1951.

in the Middle East, that if the English were determined to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, the Islamic world, though opposed to a Jewish State, will "not quarrel with England over this question."

The Foreign Minister refused to take a decision. Months passed. The deadlock was complete. Hitler was pressing for faster emigration of Jews from Germany. He was anxious also that they should not settle on Germany's borders, in Switzerland, France, Sweden and Czechoslovakia; he wanted them forced out of Europe. It was decided therefore by the Ministers involved to ask Hitler for a final ruling. Hitler, in turn, asked Rosenberg* for a special report. After he had studied this document from his racial expert, Hitler's decision was communicated by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Nazi Party to all Ministries concerned. They were told that the Fuehrer had decided again that "Jewish emigration from Germany shall continue to be promoted by all available means. Any question which might have existed up to now as to whether in the Fuehrer's opinion such emigration is to be directed primarily to Palestine has thereby been answered in the affirmative."

There was nothing more to be said. And at that moment Bar-Gilad landed in Vienna and Pino in Berlin. They could not have better arranged the time of their arrival.

When Heydrich** heard of their proposition from Eichmann in Vienna and from the Gestapo in Berlin, it seemed to offer possibilities. He saw three possible benefits from this projected co-operation with the Palestinian emissaries: it would satisfy the Fuehrer's clamour for forcing the pace of Jewish emigration without rousing the fears of Goering† or Schacht‡ about possible economic consequences; it would embarrass the British in Palestine; and it would create difficulties between the British and Palestine Jewry, and with the Arabs, who were encouraged by the German Consul-General in Jerusalem and the German envoy in Baghdad, the notorious Grobba, to object to this

* Alfred Rosenberg, the notorious Nazi theoretician was Reich Minister of the Eastern Occupied Territories, 1941-45; he was hanged in Nuremberg Prison in 1946.

** Reinhard Heydrich, Head of the Security Police and SD (Information Service) and Deputy Protector, Bohemia-Moravia, was killed by the resistance in June 1942.

† Hermann Goering, *Reichsmarschall* of Germany and Supreme Commander of the *Luftwaffe* committed suicide in his cell at Nuremberg in 1946.

‡ Hjalmar Schacht was President of the *Reichsbank*.

German-assisted immigration of Jews.

The Jewish emissaries were not unaware altogether of these German calculations. But they did not care. Their end was to them far more important than the means which they were now compelled to employ; and though they could not see the future, nor imagine what it would bring, they had no qualms about the price they had to pay so long as they managed to get their Jews to Palestine. . . .

. . . Thus—when in the summer of 1938 Pino received permission from the Gestapo in Berlin to remain in Germany and to move about freely, he immediately set about reorganising the Zionist Organisation's H.Q. at 10 Maineckestrass. He found an organisation embracing many thousands of young Jews who, however, had been left virtually leaderless by the Gestapo policy of arresting the leaders of the Jewish community. Those heads of the Zionist Organisation and of the Jewish Community, the *Reichsvertretung*, who remained free were at first sceptical and even hostile to the idea of illegal immigration. They did not believe it could work; they suspected there was a hidden trick. The beginning was slow but the grim night of November 9th, 1938, during which the Nazis carried out their organised riot of arson and assault on German Jewry convinced the German Jewish leaders that emigration, by any means at their disposal, remained their only hope.

As this realisation dawned on the Jewish masses, Jews from all over Germany began to stream to Maineckestrass; applications for emigration flooded the offices of Hechalutz, the Zionist pioneering movement, which was Pino's H.Q. A feeling of despair swept across German Jewry, which added a note of pressing urgency to the work of emigration. The Palestine situation was forced into the background by the overall need of saving lives before it was too late.

The "Apparat"* in Paris had meanwhile decided that the German Jews en route for Palestine should be joined to the transports organised in Vienna. Therefore, the main job inside Germany was to organise those wishing to leave, to establish connections with the Nazi authorities, without whom there would have been no emigration, and to select those who would be sent to Palestine.

* The "Apparat" was the Zionist underground headquarters based in Paris but with a network spread into all the countries of Europe. It was composed of four departments: Immigration, Escape, Arms and Military Equipment, and Military Training.

By giving the Gestapo a guarantee that he would arrange their immediate emigration, Pino was able to save a large number of young Jews from the concentration camps. A certificate signed by him was sufficient to obtain their release. At the same time, he enlarged the training farms, which were bought with money provided by the Jewish *Reichsvertretung*; these farms became the starting posts for intending immigrants to Palestine.

But the Gestapo were not yet satisfied; Germany was not being cleared quickly enough of her Jews. Pino was called once more to the Gestapo headquarters. In a stormy meeting the Gestapo chief demanded that 400 Jews should sail every week in ships provided by a half-German Greek shipowner who was present at this conference. Fantastic sums of money were demanded for these ships which later turned out to be tumble-down and unseaworthy. The Palestinian replied that he was not there to receive orders from the Gestapo, but to work with them on this project. If they were not prepared for that, he would leave Germany. The storm subsided; Pino stayed on. He knew where the financial Achilles heel of these Nazis connected with Jewish emigration was to be found. They had other considerations than the purification of the Fatherland at heart.

For a travel bureau had meanwhile been established by Mueller and Eichmann, leading officials of the Nazi Security Service, through which all emigration activities of the Palestinians had to be directed, and which became a cover for taking huge sums of head-money for every transport leaving Germany. Pressure was put on the Jews to leave in every possible form. Many Jews were ordered to report to the Gestapo three times a week to give an account of what they were doing to arrange their emigration. Others were accused of working against the State and were given the choice of emigrating within a short space of time or of being thrown into the concentration camps. Many had their shops and their means of livelihood confiscated and were left destitute with no hope other than emigration. In all such cases it devolved on the Palestinians to save them, and their rule of selecting only young pioneers for the illegal transports was constantly waived in order to save such people from the concentration camps.

The biggest problem of all was financial. Here was no powerful international Jewish organisation, backed by rich Jewish financiers, as might have been supposed. No Rothschilds and no Rockefellers loomed behind the figure of the Palestinian, only the "Apparat" in Paris, the Haganah in Palestine and the Union of Communal Settlements, which certainly did not have

the funds for such operations.* The purchase of human lives was an expensive business, and the money was not always forthcoming. The *Reichsvertretung* itself rallied bravely to the cause and the German Jews saw to it that money was provided. But had there been more money, many thousands more Jews might have been saved from extermination.

In March 1939, the first transport of 280 German Jews organised by Pino, whose destination was ostensibly Zionist training farms in Yugoslavia, left Berlin. The Nazi authorities provided a special train and Nazi officials accompanied the train as far as Vienna, where the group joined another and larger transport of Austrian Jews which was accompanied by Austrian Nazis.

The Austrian part of the transport had been organised by Bar-Gilad, working in Vienna. Bar-Gilad had not agreed to Eichmann's proposal that he should content himself with establishing training farms and that the actual transports would be left to the Revisionists and to private agents. These had no organisation in Palestine to facilitate secret landings; the result was that many of their boats were caught by the British coastal patrols, and some of the immigrants were deported back to Europe.

Bar-Gilad, therefore, ignored Eichmann's decision, and set to with a will to organise the first transport. But here, once more, help was to come from where it was least expected—not from Eichmann's S.S. but from the Gestapo. On studying the Nazi institutions dealing with Jewish affairs, Bar-Gilad found that in addition to the S.S. Section headed by Eichmann, there was also a Gestapo office dealing with the Jewish problem, headed by the notorious Dr. Lange and by Kuchmann; while the S.S. were responsible for directing immigration to Palestine, the Gestapo office were responsible for the granting of visas to other countries. Bar-Gilad made it his business to get in touch with the Gestapo office—and succeeded with the aid of an Italian Gestapo agent named Metossiani whose wife had been a Jewess. Through him he obtained connection with an influential Nazi named Karthaus, who was to become one of his chief aides in organising emigration. Karthaus was an Austrian who believed in a "Greater Germany," but whose conscience was afflicted by the anti-Jewish policy of his party. He considered his help for Bar-Gilad as a form of absolution for the sins of the party, and he was throughout honest and sincere in the help he rendered.

* For Jewish contributions to Zionism, see Appendix V.

Strengthened by such allies, Bar-Gilad turned his attention to the next great problem, that of obtaining transit visas for a port of embarkation. The Revisionists had been using Rumania as their country of embarkation; Rumania, however, was expensive and risky; the journey took months, and the Danube boats were very expensive and had to be paid either in gold or in Swiss francs.

Yugoslavia was the only other possibility. But the Yugoslavs were difficult. It was Karthaus and his friend, an Austrian Stadthalter, and a leading member of the brown-shirted S.A., who finally obtained permission for Jews to cross Yugoslav territory. The Yugoslavs agreed on the condition that there would be a definable destination for the travellers, and that they leave by a proper passenger ship. A liberal distribution of bribes—a golden key which was to open many locked doors in the future—had softened the hearts of Yugoslav officialdom. In a similar manner, and for much less money, Mexican visas were obtained for the transports, thus giving the travellers' final destination which the Yugoslavs had requested.

In the meantime, the "Apparat" in Paris had hired an old Greek passenger ship, the *Colorado*, which was to await the transport in the Dalmatian port of Susak. The *Colorado*, being a passenger ship, satisfied the Yugoslav stipulations concerning emigration from her ports; she was, however, a slow and cumbersome vessel. The plan, therefore, was for the *Colorado* to take its passengers out to sea, where, in the vicinity of Corfu, it was to transfer them on to the faster and more powerful salvage-vessel, the s.s. *Otrato*, which, under the command of the same young Levi Schwartz who had organised the sailing of the *Vellos* five years earlier, had already made one successful landing in Palestine.

Thus, by March, 1939, the first large transport got under way. The train with the hundreds of singing pioneers, with the bored Nazi guards leaning out of the windows, must have been an incongruous sight as it rattled through the lazy countryside of southern Austria. The sailing went according to plan; several hundred young Jews landed secretly on the shores of Palestine where they disappeared at once into the communal settlements. The British had no knowledge of the landing, and the *Otrato* returned safely to Europe

. . . Back in Vienna, Bar-Gilad found himself involved in the familiar departmental rivalry; Eichmann and the S.S. were annoyed at his success, while the Gestapo, after receiving a formal assurance that the emigrants had, indeed, been bound for Mexico, were willing to help him, and gave him permission

to continue sending transports to "South America." The erstwhile member of a Galilee communal village was now learning the game fast, and he lost no time in using this rivalry between Eichmann and Lange to his best advantage. When, shortly after the first transport, the S.S. suddenly arrested a large group of pioneers and sent them to the dreaded Dachau concentration camp, Bar-Gilad persuaded the Gestapo to release them, and smuggled them out of the country in another transport with Gestapo connivance, before Eichmann had a chance to protest.

But this could not last. At the beginning of May a note was delivered in the office of the Zionist Organisation. It was from Eichmann. Bar-Gilad was to leave the country within 24 hours on orders of the *Sicherheitsdienst*, the Security Service, a special branch of the S.S.

Bar-Gilad was in the middle of organising his third large transport. His work was now going smoothly and he had great hopes of despatching this time a really large number of immigrants. With every new anti-Jewish outbreak in the streets of Vienna, Salzburg and Graz, his work took on a new urgency, and the offices of the Zionist Organisation were gripped with a new tension. Now came Eichmann's note. Instead of leaving Austria, Bar-Gilad went to the Gestapo and asked for their help. They told him it was a trick of Eichmann's and that he should go to Berlin to see the key man in charge of Jewish Affairs, Heydrich himself.

With Eichmann's order expelling him from the Greater Reich in his pocket, Bar-Gilad, feeling very much the proverbial Daniel, left for Berlin.

Heydrich gave him permission to return to Vienna; but Eichmann would no longer brook his presence there. Bar-Gilad now met the real Eichmann—without the façade of suave worldliness. "Sie verschwinden oder ich werde Sie verschwinden machen"—either you disappear or you will be made to disappear—he threatened and shouted across his office in the Rothschild Palace to which Bar-Gilad had been summarily ordered shortly after his return. So, with no alternative, he left for Switzerland, leaving the continuation of the work in Vienna to one of the leaders of the Zionist pioneer movement in Austria, Ehud Avriel, whom we shall meet often enough as this story unfolds.

With Bar-Gilad out of the way, Eichmann turned on the Revisionists, and ordered them to stop emigration. He had had enough of his too-independent aides. He was determined to take over himself. A new office to run illegal immigration was established—managed by the S.S. alone.

In order to carry out his new plan, Eichmann used an Austrian Jew, named Storfer, a wealthy non-Zionist with virtually no Jewish connection or interest, to carry out his instructions. His terms of reference were simple: with money provided by the Jewish community, Storfer was to hire ships and send illegal transports to Palestine. He should not waste his time selecting pioneers,* as Bar-Gilad had done before him; he should not have scruples concerning the conditions or the seaworthiness of the ships. Thus what must have been one of the most paradoxical episodes of the entire period of the Nazi régime began: the man who was to go down in history as one of the arch-murderers of the Jewish people entered the lists as an active worker in the rescue of Jews from Europe. The presence of this strange competitor in the shipping markets of Greece was soon felt by the Mossad

* Jewish immigration into Palestine, the so-called *Aliyoth*, was, well into the 1930's, composed of relatively young persons unaccompanied by their parents. This was partly due to sociological factors related to tensions between the different generations and partly to the deliberate Zionist immigration policy of selecting able-bodied pioneers.

The Polish Rabbinate and Jewish Emigration to Palestine* 1939

ROBERT BRISCOE**

In 1937 the British Government had proposed a second partition of Palestine between Jews and Arabs—they first split Palestine into Jordan and Palestine in 1922. You may imagine with what anger I heard that solution proposed for yet another country to which I was emotionally attached. Jabotinsky,† equally enraged, campaigned violently against it. However, many Jews supported it and the Zionist Congress in Zurich reluctantly accepted the idea.

Professor Selig Brodezký‡ came from England to see de Valera on this subject. He thought that partition was inevitable and that we must try to get the biggest possible slice of Palestine. I arranged an interview with de Valera for him, but begged him not to advocate partition of Palestine, explaining how the Chief would react to that word. After hours of argument, he agreed not to mention it.

The meeting took place. Imagine my horror then, when Brodezký began to urge de Valera to agree to partition when it came before the League of Nations. I remember Mr. de Valera's very wise answer. "Professor," he said, "I read the Old Testament many years ago. I am afraid I have forgotten many things I read; but one passage I recall clearly. It is the story of Solomon's judgment of the two women who claimed the same

* From Robert Briscoe with Alden Hatch, *For the Life of Me* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1958), pp. 266-70. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "Zion." Copyright, ©, 1958, by Robert Briscoe. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Co.

** Elected first Jewish Lord Mayor of Dublin, Ireland, 1956.

† For Jabotinsky, see above, p. 321, note.

‡ Professor S. Brodezký was elected in 1929 as one of the Zionist members of the first Executive of the enlarged Jewish Agency and for long was in charge of political affairs in the Agency's London Office.

baby. I remember how when Solomon ruled that the baby be divided the real mother screamed, 'No! No! Give the baby to the other woman!'

"This is my answer to partition. The rightful owners of a country will never agree to partition."

The idea of partition was given up in 1938. By that time the position of the Jews in Germany and eastern Europe had become even more perilous. It was quite obvious to me that war was inevitable, and with the war would come the mass destruction of the Jewish people. Try as I might I could not convince people of the terrible danger. Even after the conference at Munich when Chamberlain threw Czechoslovakia to the Nazi wolves to buy a little more time for England, they would not believe me.

Jabotinsky fully realized the threat hanging over our people. We believed one of the greatest danger spots was Poland, to which Hitler was now turning his attention. At Christmas time, 1938, I went to Warsaw with a plan that might yet save millions of Polish Jews.

There I sought an audience with Colonel Jozef Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs. We met in a great, cold, gloomy room in the Foreign Office where Beck received me surrounded by the gaudily uniformed colonels of his staff; for this government was basically a military dictatorship. Colonel Beck was a delicate-looking man with a high color and a barking cough that suggested tuberculosis. While he talked he clasped his fingers together and moved them nervously backward and forward. His manner of speech was typically Continental with shoulder shruggings and elaborate gestures. Despite his sickly appearance, he had great charm and the flash of humor in his eyes. While we talked through interpreters he never once took those eyes off me.

I began by saying, "Colonel Beck, you are soon to leave for London to negotiate a treaty of alliance with Britain (it was signed on January 30, 1939). On behalf of the New Zionist Movement,* speaking mainly for European Jews, not for those

* Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) founded in 1935 from dissident members of the Haganah. The Irgun became the military arm of the Revisionist Party led by Jabotinsky, which seceded from the Zionist Organization in 1935. See also Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, and the "White Paper on Violence," pp. 601-12. The Party formed its own world organization, the New Zionist Organization, whose objective was to "revise" the Mandate by which was meant the early and forcible establishment of the Zionist state on both sides of the River Jordan.

of England or America, speaking for them, I suggest that you ask Britain to turn over the mandate for Palestine to you and make it in effect a Polish colony. You could then move all your unwanted Polish Jews into Palestine. This would bring great relief to your country, and you would have a rich and growing colony to aid your economy."

When this was translated I could see that Beck was both amused and astonished at such a sudden peculiar proposal. Watching his face intently as he thought it over I saw the idea begin to appeal to him.

"I am sure the Jews would never leave Poland," he said thoughtfully.

"The Jews would never leave Poland?" I said. "There is one simple way to find out. Put an advertisement in your papers tomorrow asking all Jews who wish to leave Poland for Palestine to apply to you."

The Polish Minister smiled as he conceded my point. "We have not a sufficient staff to deal with all the applications we would get.

"But supposing we did what you suggest," he went on. "Think of the terrible impact it would have on our economy. Millions of Jews, many of whom have large possessions, properties, shares and bonds, throwing these suddenly on the market to realize cash. There would be so devastating a depression that no one could foresee where it would end. Almost certainly it would bring about the most terrible pogrom in history. Thousands of your people would be slaughtered."

"Do you suppose I have not thought of that?" I answered. "This is no half-baked plan of mine. You can deal with it in a very simple way. Get from the Jews a fair assessment of their property, their possessions. Give them government bonds in exchange for it. Then you can liquidate these assets properly according to your own best judgment. You can make the bonds long term, thus giving yourselves plenty of time. And you will be getting possessions of great value."

We discussed my plan at great length. Beck became more interested, even enthusiastic. However he had one final objection.

"But what is the attitude of the Jews of Poland?" he asked. "That we must find out. You know the system we have had for the representation of your people in our Parliament. Their rabbis represent them. Before we talk further you must go to see the Rabbinical Authorities of Poland and find out their reaction."

I was highly elated by Beck's reasonable attitude. If he gave his approval, my plan had a fair chance of success; for

Palestine was nothing but an expensive headache for England and she might well be glad to get rid of her mandate.

My Jewish friends in Warsaw arranged an interview for me with the most authoritative of the rabbis and came with me to interpret since I spoke no Polish. I did understand Yiddish, but that language as spoken in Poland was incomprehensible to me.

My friends took me to the Yeshiva—the House of Learning—where the rabbis sit together, study and teach. It was a large, dismal building in the ghetto of Warsaw. We passed through a gate into a cobblestone courtyard surrounded by tenement houses in which hundreds of families lived crowded together. The pavement was covered with stalls in which were all sorts of goods for sale—boots, clothing, hardware, housing materials and kitchenware. From the courtyard we came into a room in the house which was indescribably bare and cheerless. Its walls were white-washed plaster, and though it was meticulously clean, there were no decorations or comforts in the place; none of the shelves of books and writing materials which one expects to see in the house of a rabbi. The furnishings consisted of a plain wooden table and some straight chairs. It was cold, severe, ascetic, as perhaps one should expect of the habitation of people who were so devout in their faith that they wanted no material things.

Three men were seated around the table. The chief rabbi was a big man wearing a long black coat and a magnificent black beard. Glossy black side curls hung beneath his flat black hat. The other two rabbis were smaller, but identical in their somber garb.

To these men then I made my plea that they consent to a plan for large-scale emigration to Palestine. I spoke with an ardor and eloquence inspired by the terrible urgency I felt; and my friend translated with equal emotion. The three rabbis sat absolutely still. Even when they spoke to each other in low tones they did not turn their heads. Their rigidity was frightening, their features as frozen and expressionless as the ice-bound Vistula.

When I had exhausted every argument the chief rabbi said, "We must ponder your words. Return tomorrow for our answer."

The next day we went back. The chief rabbi received us alone. Standing like a figure carved in basalt on a Judean tomb, with Europe in flames around him and Azrael soaring on sable wings above his people, he gave this pronouncement, "We must wait for the Messiah to lead us to the Holy Land. All forms

of Zionism are to us *traif* (unclean).”

Perhaps nothing could have been done even had those words not been spoken. Perhaps too little time was left. But those words ended the last hope of life for three million Jews.

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and the Immigration of German Jewish Children to the United States 1939*

Senator KING. Proceed in your own way, Dr. Wise, to discuss the measure under consideration.

Dr. WISE. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I naturally have thought a good deal about this problem, as does every American citizen. I want to make it plain that, so far as I am concerned, there is no intention whatsoever to depart from the immigration

* From U.S., Congress, Senate and House, Subcommittees on Immigration, and on Immigration and Naturalization, respectively, *Admission of German Refugee Children, Joint Hearings*, on S. J. Res. 64 and H. J. Res. 168, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 155-60.

The Senate Joint Resolution 64, introduced by Senator Wagner on Feb. 9, 1939, and the House Joint Resolution 168, introduced by Representative Rogers, called for the issuing of 10,000 immigrant visas during each of the calendar years 1939 and 1940, in addition to visas under existing law, to children not over fourteen years of age who were resident then or at any time since Jan. 1, 1933, in territory incorporated into Germany. These resolutions stipulated that such visas would be granted only with satisfactory assurances that such children would be supported either by responsible citizens or by responsible private organizations of the United States, and would not become public charges. The statement by Rabbi Wise is an extract from the first session of the Joint Hearings held on April 20, 21, 22 and 24, 1939.

Rabbi Stephen S. Wise (1874-1949), organized the Zionist Organization of America in 1898, and the American Jewish Congress in 1917, over which he presided seven terms. He became co-Chairman with Silver of the American Zionist Emergency Council in 1943.

laws which at present obtain.* I have heard no sane person propose any departure or deviation from the existing law now in force. After all, this is a limited proposal. It is a proposal that deals with a rather limited number of children, 10,000 children each year for a period of 2 years. If there is any conflict between our duty to these children and our duty to our country, speaking for myself as a citizen, I should say, of course, that our country comes first; and if children cannot be helped, they cannot be helped, because we should not undertake to do anything that would be hurtful to the interests of our country.** I think we may assume that the members of the committee will clearly have that in mind, and would not consider any proposed legislation which would be hurtful to our country's interests in any wise whatsoever.

I got into Washington last night. I have been traveling in the Middle West in behalf of certain causes with which I am associated, and it may interest you to learn that I have been approached by numbers of people, well circumstanced, intelligent, well-mannered folk, who said to me: "Dr. Wise, is there any chance of our getting a child?" My invariable reply was: "Have you no child in your home?" "Oh, yes; we have a child in our home, but we would like to make room for another. We would love to have one of these homeless children. We believe it would be good for our child (or children) to have another, to have a child that needs what we can give that child."

Many friends of mine throughout the country, Christians as well as Jews, are more than ready and eager to house these children.

Those to whom I have talked, who are connected with this movement, assure me that no child will be placed in a home until that home has been thoroughly searched and investigated, and they are satisfied the people in that home can give the child what a small child should have in the way of ideals and training in our American way of life.

Mrs. Wise and I would feel ourselves privileged and consider it a sacred privilege to take such a child. Before we resolved to do that, I returned to my home lately, and in my bedroom I found a beautiful little fair head in my bed. I could not quite understand why that little fair-haired child should be in my bed

* For a survey of American immigration legislation, see Appendix VI.

** For Jewish immigration to the United States, 1932-43, see Appendix VI.

until she said: "Wer bist du!" ("Who are you?"). I said, "I am the father of this family." She said, "The mother told me you were coming, and I am so glad to see you." And she stretched out her arms to me. I had never seen her before. It was one more of those tragedies over there. The Child Adoption Committee succeeded in finding a beautiful home for that child in New Haven.

As you know, Senator King, when I was in London, there were conferences there dealing with the problems in Poland. I met the head of the British Government and Lord Halifax, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. My attention was directed over and over again to the large number of children coming into England at that time. Of course, as you know, children were also entering into Holland and Belgium as temporary refugees but day after day I was told of 50 or 75 or 150 coming into London, for whom the most wise and adequate provision was being made.

You have doubtless read of the 12th of November, when seven or eight thousand people, believed to be of Polish descent, were taken from their homes in the middle of the night, without even a chance to dress, and dumped into baggage cars and shipped to the border, what is known as no-man's land in Germany and Poland.* Poland would not let them enter. Many of them had not been in Poland for a generation. Children were dumped in there, with no tent, no home, no provision whatever made for them. Some of these children made their way in some way to England, after remaining some time in that Polish Corridor, called Polish Germany. One day in London Mrs. Wise went to see these children. There were 150 of them brought over. I am not sure whether this proposal touches the question of children outside of old Germany. I am not even sure that Austria is included.

Senator KING. Yes.

Dr. WISE. In any event, the bill deals with German children. I know there is objection to it on the part of some, on the ground of the added care which it will be necessary to give to these children. It is an extraordinary thing that these objections come not from people who know about children and who have devoted their lives to the care of children, but from folk to whom children are a nuisance, are strange and alien beings.

* While the annual American quota for Poland under the National Origin Law was 6,524 permits, the number of Jews in this country in 1933 was 3,050,000. Cf. Briscoe, pp. 445-49.

I confess that it has been a comfort to learn that this plan will be administered by people who know children, such as the gentleman who testified this morning, who know about children and what can be done for children. It will be an equally great comfort to me to learn that our country which always stands ready to help, will do this beautiful thing.

I listened with interest to the testimony of Mr. Beisser, who talked to you as one who knows children, and knows how to make professional provision for them, who knows how to do the things that bear upon their welfare and the welfare of our country and its political ideals.

I wish I could have brought to this room, madam and gentlemen, a little boy I knew named Hans. I wish he could tell of his experience. He came as a little refugee, half Christian, half Jew. That child was scarred as the result of wounds inflicted upon him, I am sorry to say, by children on the streets of Berlin. It took weeks before those scars passed from his back. He was trembling with fear. We could hardly get him to smile. When Mrs. Wise would say: "Come on; let us go out for a walk," he would say, "No, no, no; the children will hurt me. The children will fling stones at me." We learned that he had been dumped into an alley, and then taken in a truck to a concentration camp, and then was abused and struck and maltreated there. That is the fate, Madam and gentlemen, of thousands and tens of thousands of these children in Germany.

And so, Madam and gentlemen of the committee, I know perfectly well that the United States cannot ignore the situation over there, and cannot refuse to relieve and succor the multitudinous victims of European dictatorship. It seems to me we have no alternative.

But these children—after all, it is bad enough to damn a man because of his race; but how awful it is to damn a child because of its religious affiliations. How awful it is to damn a child because of race or religion, or because of political views held by its father or mother, which it cannot share because of its infancy.

I think we are facing, Madam and gentlemen, one of the most cruel things known to history, a rebarbarization of mankind. It has been said of a well-known Dutchman that he remembered these whom God seemed to have forgotten. God has not forgotten these children in the Fascist and Nazi countries. But dictators have decreed that they shall be victimized, their families broken up, crucified upon the cross of racial and religious differ-

ences, crucified upon the cross of differences of political opinion.

I confess, Madam and gentlemen, that I love my country, the only country that I have known save for the first 16 months of my life, the country in which I live, and I hope and trust that great country will accept the high privilege of saving those children whom the dictators have oppressed and victimized and crucified.

Of course, as you know, the first reference in Holy Writ to a child occurs in connection with that child whom the father was prepared to offer up as an offering to God, and the command of the angel rang out: "Lay not thine hand upon the child, neither thou do anything to him; neither thou do him injury, neither thou do him hurt."

Outside of Nazi-land, Madam and gentlemen, we have gone beyond that prohibition. It is not enough for us not to lay hand upon a child. It is for America, it is for our free and blessed land to stretch out its hands to a certain number of these children, to shield and to defend and to bless them, and bring them within the radiance of the freedom from oppression which is ours.

I opened my Bible this morning, as I do every morning and evening, and I read the Hebrew psalm: "Open unto me the gates of righteousness that I may enter therein." Madam and gentlemen of the committee, hear the voices of little children, little children who are crying to us today: "Open unto us the gates of righteousness and freedom and hope that we may enter therein." I have faith that America will hear their cry. You have the privilege of being the voice through which America will speak, hearing the cry of the children and saying: "Blessed be ye who enter."

I thank you.

Senator KING. How long were you in Germany the last time?

Dr. WISE. I have not been in Germany, for the very good reason that I could not get a visa into Germany, since the present regime has presided over the destinies of the German people.

Senator KING. When were you there last?

Dr. WISE. I was in London up to about 4 weeks ago. When was I in Germany last?

Senator KING. Yes.

Dr. WISE. Not since the present regime came into power.

I was there in 1932. I was a student there in my youth. I suppose I have been in Germany and Austria and Czechoslovakia perhaps 10 or 15 times. I studied in Heidelberg and Berlin and Vienna. I know Germany well, and I love it much, and I love its people much.

Representative MACIEJEWSKI. You said something about some children being sent to England from Poland.

Dr. WISE. Yes.

Representative MACIEJEWSKI. Were they German or Polish children?

Dr. WISE. They were German children, born in Germany. They had been driven out at night in those box cars and shipped to the frontier between Germany and Poland. There was an outcry throughout the world against the shame and horror of that deed. Many of these children, only 2 or 3 years of age, were dumped out on the frontier without clothing, without food. The English people succeeded, through the influence of Earl Baldwin, the late Prime Minister of England, in bringing over just a handful of them, about 150 of them. That single act had nothing to do with the general arrangement in process now, of bringing a maximum number of children out of Germany into England, there to remain, not to become a burden upon the state, but to be cared for in homes.

Representative KRAMER. Doctor, may I ask you a question?

Dr. WISE. Yes.

Representative KRAMER. I have dealt at different times with the question of whether this bill should be broadened to take care of such instances as you have illustrated. It has come to me from various sources in California that there are children whose parents have been separated, and some of the children have been sent to close relatives who reside in Poland, and others who reside in England, and some in Czechoslovakia, and that these children are in very desperate circumstances by reason of the fact that many of them were Jews that were forced out of Germany into Czechoslovakia and into Poland. Do you believe it would be a mistake if this bill were enlarged to take in those children? There may not be as many of them as there are in Germany, but whatever number there might be they are under the same conditions in Poland and Czechoslovakia and some of these other areas.

Dr. WISE. Hard as it may be to answer your question, Mr. Congressman, I feel that the country and the Congress

should not be asked to do more than take care of a limited number of children. The bill provides for 10,000 each year for a period of 2 years. After all, we cannot take care of all of them.* Germany has a population of 5 or 6 hundred thousand Jews.

Representative KRAMER. I do not mean to enlarge the number.

Senator SMATHERS. You mean to enlarge the territory?

Representative KRAMER. Yes.

Dr. WISE. I think, after all, that Nazi-land has the distinction, if it may be called such, of treating its children worse than any other country.

Representative KRAMER. I think I have not made myself clear.

Representative MASON. May I interject that this bill does cover all children that are now in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or any other country, and were forced out of Germany since January 1933, when the Nazi regime came into power?

Representative KRAMER. Suppose we differ about that.

Representative MASON. It is plainly stated, sir, in the bill.

Senator SMATHERS. I want to agree with Mr. Mason on one point and differ on another point. Germany took over Czechoslovakia, but this country has not recognized it. Therefore, it would not come under the bill.

Representative MASON. Those children who were forced out of Germany into Czechoslovakia come under this bill. It is only the Czechoslovakian children who would not come under the bill.

Representative KRAMER. Even though they should live in Poland now?

Representative MASON. Yes; or in Austria.

Representative KRAMER. Or in England?

Representative MASON. Yes.

Representative KRAMER. I hope the gentleman will stay with me on that.

Dr. WISE. It is the part of Congress to make that clear.

* From 1932-43, there were 170,883 Jewish immigrants to the United States and 232,524 Jewish immigrants to Palestine. For Zionist policy concerning the selection of these immigrants, or "pioneers," see J. and D. Kimche, pp. 433-44.

Senator KING. I suggest that Mr. La Roe give us the interpretation which his committee places upon the bill with respect to that matter.

Mr. LAROE. There is no doubt that the bill, as it is drawn, includes any children who lived in Germany at any time after January 1933, so that the Polish and Czechoslovakian situation and all others are covered, so far as the children have fled to those countries from Germany since that date.

Dr. WISE. Or have been expelled from Germany.

Representative MACIEJEWSKI. Following up what the Senator says about Czechoslovakia being taken over by Germany, would that include those children?

Mr. LAROE. This bill would include German children who have fled to Czechoslovakia, but would not include the reverse of that, Czechoslovakian children per se.

Representative MACIEJEWSKI. There is as much suffering there as in any other part of the country.

Senator SMATHERS. There would be.

Mr. LAROE. I have a simple amendment to cover that.

Representative KRAMER. I think the representative of the State Department will agree that, if a child is living in Czechoslovakia or Poland, it would not come under this bill as it now stands.

Mr. WARREN. A child who has been residing only in Czechoslovakia or Moravia or Bohemia since 1933 is not included unless the bill is amended.

Senator KING. If they had been driven out of Germany or expelled and compelled to go to Czechoslovakia after the date mentioned, then they would come under the bill, would they not?

Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Representative KRAMER. The doctor said they had been dumped into Poland. Have any of those been taken out of Poland into England?

Dr. WISE. Some have been permitted under a temporary agreement to return to Germany. Some have been welcomed into England. I think that is a careful statement of the disposition of the children up to this time. A goodly number still remains in no-man's land.

Representative KRAMER. It is possible that some of those

children, regardless of whether they were in that particular consignment or not, who are now in Poland, without a parent, do not know where their parents are, or perhaps the parents are deceased, or whatever the situation may be, so that it would be most difficult to learn from the child where he was born.

Dr. WISE. I think for the most part there is careful registration of the children, so that it would be possible to get a certificate of birth.

Senator KING. Thank you very much, Doctor.*

* For Congressional attitudes on the immigration of Jews to the United States, see Divine, pp. 577-93.

Partition Abandoned

As the summer of 1938 advanced, the rebellion in Palestine reached a new climax, far surpassing that of 1936. The building of the frontier fence was countered by redoubled activity on the part of the rebels. This in its turn was followed, during the month of July, by a series of frightful bomb explosions in the midst of crowds of Arab peasantry, men, women, and children, in the markets of Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem. These outrages, which were universally held to be the work of Jews, still further aroused Arab feeling, and one of their results was a horrible massacre of several Jewish families during a rebel raid on the town of Tiberias. The morale of the Arab police was shaken by these events, and they could no longer be relied upon to oppose any effective resistance to their compatriots in outlying districts.

In these circumstances the rebels gradually forced the civil authorities out of many towns and country districts, destroying the police stations and Government offices in Hebron, Jericho, Beersheba, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. They also succeeded in imposing certain of their decrees upon the entire Arab population. In Jerusalem, for example, shopkeepers were instructed to close their shops on Friday, the Muslim day of prayer, and the order was obeyed. Townspeople throughout the country were ordered to give up the Turkish tarbush and to wear instead the Arab head-cloth and cord, and they did so. During September, when troops had to be withdrawn from Palestine on account of the European crisis, the rebels filtered into the old city of Jerusalem and forced the Government to admit that their

* From Barbour, *Nisi Dominus: A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, pp. 194-206.

** For the author, see p. 335, note.

authority no longer extended over the holy sites situated in the Mandatory capital itself.

In the first days of October, just after the danger of the immediate outbreak of a European war had been averted, the High Commissioner flew to London for consultation with the Colonial Secretary.* Important decisions were taken at this meeting, and reinforcements were immediately dispatched to Palestine. The number of available troops was thus brought up to over 20,000. Military commanders took charge of the various districts, with the civil authorities as political advisers, and the rebels, instead of being the attackers, became the attacked. The old city of Jerusalem was rapidly cleared: in the course of the operation there were only a few civilian and military casualties, the majority of the rebels departing as unobtrusively as they had come.

In the next two months the smaller towns were also reoccupied, and military posts established in them. Villages all over the country were subjected to surprise searches, and some scores of rifles captured. Engagements between troops and bands continued to occur fairly frequently. In the course of these operations the latter were very severely punished, many being killed; the troops also suffered a number of casualties.**

By the beginning of December security in the towns was very much better than it had been during the summer. It appeared, indeed, probable that as long as troops were available in the existing numbers the rebellion could be maintained only at far greater cost to the rebels than formerly. Conditions were nevertheless in every way worse than they had been before the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee† in October 1937. The result of that action had been the destruction of all responsible political leadership in Arab Palestine. Incidentally, it had involved the complete eclipse of the National Defence Party, which had seceded from the Arab Higher Committee immediately before the publication of the Report of the Royal

* Sir Harold MacMichael and Malcolm MacDonald respectively.

** On the number of Arab casualties between 1936-39, see Appendix IV.

† The first Arab Higher Committee was formed in 1936, under the chairmanship of Hajj Amin el Husseini, in order to coordinate the work of the various national committees established throughout the country to organize resistance to the British. The five major Arab political parties were represented, including the National Defence Party, which was founded in 1934 by Ragheb Bey, Mayor of Jerusalem until that time.

Commission. The leaders of this party had the reputation, in Zionist circles, of being more moderate than the majority of the Arab Higher Committee. In reality the principal difference was that the Defence Party, composed largely of men of wealth and their retainers, hoped to combat Zionism by utilizing against the Jews such concessions in the form of representative institutions as could be extracted from the Government. The majority, on the other hand, saw no hope of saving their national future except by refusing any co-operation with the Government until such time as it should have given a proof of its goodwill by making some substantial concession. This view they maintained even when it became clear that the result would be violence and the loss of life. In fact, in the course of the year which followed the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee hundreds of lives, many of them Jewish, some English, but the overwhelming majority Arab, were lost. The railway service from Jerusalem to Lydda was suspended for months, while the line to Egypt ran only three times a week, and the main line from Haifa to Jaffa was subject to frequent interruptions. Postal and other administrative services in the country districts ceased to function: great damage was caused to the telegraph- and telephone-lines. Many Arab men of position who were suspected of lukewarmness in the national cause, who were unwilling to contribute indefinitely to the rebel funds, or who were thought likely to set their personal advantage before that of their nation were assassinated, had their property destroyed, or found it advisable to flee the country. Others fled from the Government. A number of criminals took the opportunity to satisfy private grudges or to extort funds for their private purposes. The Government budget for all services other than 'defence' had to be greatly reduced. This reduction seriously affected the already inadequate allowance for Arab education, which the Royal Commission had said ought to be greatly increased. In short, expenditure during the year exceeded revenue by about £2,500,000; rather more than half this deficit was borne by the British Treasury. The casualties during the first ten months of 1938 totalled more than 1000 Arab, 200 Jewish, and 40 British killed, and over 1100 wounded. Meanwhile nothing whatever had been done to fulfil the undertaking implicit in the leaflets which were showered upon the villagers during 1936, when they were urged to entrust the investigation of their grievances to the Royal Commission. Land, for example, was still being purchased, often over the heads of the tenants.

It is true that immigration was no longer officially regulated by the so-called economic absorptive capacity of the country,

but since the schedules which were issued appeared to be much the same as would have been given if the principle had been still applied, this change gave little or no satisfaction to the Arabs.

On the other hand, the Jewish unemployment which had resulted from the over-immigration of 1934-37 was greatly reduced by the construction of the Tel Aviv port, by the enrolment of thousands of Jewish supernumeraries, by the demands of the military for labour and for goods, by the use of Jewish workers to build the frontier fence, by the Arab transport and other strikes which led to a greatly increased demand for Jewish services, and in many other ways. It is, indeed, no exaggeration to say that only the disturbances saved the Jewish economy from a very serious crisis.

Meanwhile, however, events in Palestine had profoundly affected public opinion in England. The facts of the case became known directly, and no longer only through Zionist glasses. The proposal of the Royal Commission for the transfer of tens of thousands of Arab peasantry to a less fertile portion of the country appeared conclusive proof that a further development of the National Home on a great scale was not possible except as the result of the wholesale eviction of the existing population.* The subsequent investigations of the Government demonstrated that the possibilities of settlement in the Jordan valley, in the Beersheba district, and in Transjordan had been greatly exaggerated by the Royal Commission. Throughout the summer a number of British inquirers, many of them warm admirers of the Jewish people, visited Palestine in order to study the situation at first hand; most of them returned to England with the conviction that Palestine could never be the solution of the Jewish problem. Many were deeply distressed by the inevitable accompaniments of a policy of repression, and shocked at the hardships inflicted upon innocent people, often women and children, by collective punishments, by constant curfews and fines, and by the destruction of houses.

In the Arab countries the reaction was naturally more violent. In Iraq and Egypt anti-Zionist feeling developed rapidly, and only energetic measures by the Governments concerned prevented outbreaks of mob violence against the Jews. In October a Congress of Members of Parliament from the Syrian, Iraqi, and Egyptian chambers met in Cairo. A deputation from this Congress was received by King Farouk, and later proceeded

* On the transfer of the Arab population, see above, p. 332, note.

to London. Later a Congress of Arab women also met in Cairo for the purpose of protesting against Mandatory policy in Palestine.

It was therefore natural that the political, as well as the military, situation should be reviewed, in the light of the experience gained in the course of the previous three years, at the meeting of the High Commissioner with the Colonial Secretary in London at the beginning of October.

Immediately after this meeting the Iraqi Foreign Minister paid an official visit to London, where he had a number of meetings with the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers. At the same time the belief was widely held that the technical commission which had been sent to investigate the details of possible schemes for partition was about to report negatively. These two circumstances gave rise to a report that the Government had adopted the principle of the Arab proposal, supported by the Iraqi Minister, for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, bound to Great Britain by a treaty of alliance on the model of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty. This report caused great alarm in Zionist circles; and urgent appeals were sent to the Jewish and Christian supporters of Zionism in the United States of America begging them to bring pressure on the United States Government, in the hopes of thus forestalling any action unacceptable to Zionism on the part of the British Government.

At the end of October the issue of another six-monthly labour schedule removed the immediate anxieties of the Zionists, and produced corresponding despondency among the Arabs. It appeared, indeed, for the moment as if the Government were determined, after all, to continue to administer Palestine on the old basis for yet another indefinite period.

On November 9, however, a fresh statement concerning the future of Palestine was issued, accompanied by the publication of the Report of the Partition Commission.* The Partition Scheme was declared to be impracticable, and therefore rejected. In order to arrive at an alternative solution, the Government announced its intention of initiating discussions in London with representatives of the Arabs and of the Jews. Only in the case of this conference failing to reach agreed conclusions would it then announce and carry out a policy of its own. A striking innovation was that the Government announced that it would invite the participation in the conference of representatives of the neighbouring Arab states, as well as of Palestine itself.

* Cmd. 5854, London 1938.

As regards Palestinian representatives, the Government let it be understood that, while it would be unwilling to treat directly with the Mufti,* it was prepared to do so with persons representing him.

Zionist circles received the proposal coldly. Those who had opposed partition, though glad that the scheme had been abandoned, were not pleased at the manner of its abandonment. For the Commission based its objections to partition upon arguments advanced by the Arabs, rather than upon those advanced by the Jews. It declared, moreover, that it would be more practicable to reduce the area of the Jewish state proposed by the Royal Commission than to enlarge it. For the pro-partition Jews the blow, though anticipated for months past, was severe. Their leader, Dr Weizmann, had long ago made it clear that in his opinion the only alternative to partition was the "crystallization" of the National Home. It was to avoid this that the Jewish Agency had adopted its intransigent attitude on the subject of immigration, thus sacrificing every opportunity of coming to an understanding with the Arabs and subjecting both the Jewish community and the whole country to the ordeal of three years' civil war.

To the Arabs the abandonment of partition appeared a very belated recognition of the obvious, while their unfortunate experience during the previous twenty years made them profoundly suspicious of the Government's further intentions. Even the invitation to the neighbouring Arab states might, they feared, be merely a device to introduce Jewish immigrants into the rest of the Arab world, and so still further extend Zionist influence. By degrees, however, as the Government gave signs of a definite change of outlook, the Arab attitude became more favourable.

A great part in this process was played by a speech of the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons on November 24, during the course of a debate on Palestine. It is true that Mr. MacDonald on this occasion praised Zionist achievements in Palestine in language which the local Zionist Press itself described as "lyrical." At the same time, however, he made other statements which showed a marked approximation to the Arab point of view. He recognized, for example, that the majority of the rebels were actuated by patriotic motives, and went so far as to suggest that he himself, if he had been an Arab, would have felt as they did. He declared that Palestine, on account

* For Hajj Amin see above, p. 286, note.

of its limited area, could not be the solution of the Jewish refugee question. He recognized explicitly that the Arabs had never been consulted at the time when the Balfour Declaration was issued.

A few days later it was announced that the Arab leaders who had been exiled to the Seychelles* would be finally released, though not permitted for the present to return to Palestine. It was also made clear that the Mandatory Power would, if it thought necessary, propose changes in the text of the Mandate.

From these indications it was possible to draw certain inferences concerning the Mandatory's intentions.

The Government evidently thought that further development of the National Home by the methods hitherto adopted would render acute the problem which it had already created for the Jews of Iraq and Egypt, and, indeed, of non-Arab lands too, as, for example, Italy. In the latter country the doubt whether loyalty to a Zionist fatherland could be reconciled with loyalty to Italy had given rise to prolonged Press polemics, and prepared the way for subsequent Nazi-inspired anti-Semitic legislation. From this it followed that to pursue the present system further would be to violate the provision of the Balfour Declaration which was designed to safeguard the rights and political status of Jews in other countries. Even clearer was the fact that it would violently conflict with those provisions of the Mandate which direct that the rights and position of the other sections of the population should not be prejudiced by Jewish immigration or by Jewish close settlement on the land. The positive injunction of the Mandate to establish the National Home had, in fact, been accomplished. It was time to concentrate on the provisions that this should not be done in such a way as to harm either Jews outside Palestine or other sections of the population within it.

It would therefore seem natural to replace Articles II, IV, and VI of the Mandate,** which deal with the manner of establishing the National Home, by articles which would deal with the

* A British colony comprising an archipelago in the western Indian Ocean.

** Article II ensures that the Mandatory will create conditions favorable to the establishment of a Jewish national home and to the development of self-governing institutions. Article IV recognizes the Zionist Organization as the legal Jewish Agency. Article VI provides for the facilitation of Jewish immigration and land settlement in Palestine while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

manner of its maintenance. The Government of Palestine would thus be free henceforth to regulate immigration and land sales according to the interests of the nation as now constituted, as a whole, and no longer according to the interests of one section only. The Jewish Agency, having fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, would naturally disappear. Internal Jewish affairs and the relations of the Jewish community with the Government would conveniently be handled by the Vaad Leumi, or National Council of Palestinian Jewry.

Once the Jewish section of the population was no longer in a privileged position, economically and politically, it would no doubt come to terms with the Arab majority. An epoch of co-operation might be hoped to ensue, which would result in Palestine taking its place as one of the autonomous Near Eastern states. In the circumstances of the time it would, of course, have been expected to stand in a special treaty relationship with the former Mandatory state. The latter would have guaranteed the security of the Holy Places and the maintenance of clearly defined rights of internal autonomy to the Jewish community. In case of necessity it would have had the right to ensure these by the use of its armed forces. It would, of course, also have expected to receive facilities for the defence of its own imperial interests.

The Conference, which took the form of separate discussions between the British and the Arab, and the British and the Jewish, delegates, finally assembled early in 1939. It remained in session for more than a month. An Anglo-Arab committee, presided over by the Lord Chancellor, was appointed to consider the McMahon correspondence. At its conclusion the Lord Chancellor, while making it clear that he was acting as the advocate of the Government, and not in a judicial capacity, nevertheless stated that "the Arab point of view had been shown to have greater force" than had appeared hitherto. The same committee, moreover, reported unanimously that in 1918 His Majesty's Government had not been free to dispose of Palestine "without regard for the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of Palestine."

For the first time attention was officially called to the Hogarth Message delivered to King Hussein in January 1918. The importance of this document lay in the fact that it was an official interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, delivered by the Government which issued the Declaration, within a few weeks of the date of its final drafting and publication. Its significant passages are worth repeating here:

So far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that

no people shall be subject to another. . . .

(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and, further, as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realization of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realization of this ideal.

Having failed to reach an agreed settlement, the Government adopted a rather curious compromise. This was embodied in a Statement of Policy issued in May 1939.¹ The Statement began by reaffirming the principle, originally laid down in the Churchill White Paper of 1922,* that the Government had at no time contemplated "the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine." The Government now stated categorically that this meant that it was "not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state." Their ultimate objective was described as the establishment of an independent Palestine, a "state in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in such a way that the eventual interests of each are secured."

With regard to immigration, the statement laid down that, subject to the economic absorptive capacity, 75,000 more Jewish immigrants should be admitted during the next five years—10,000 annually on a quota, classed as immigrants, and 25,000 in all as refugees. After these five years no more Jewish immigrants would be admitted "unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it."

By these declarations the Government in effect declared that its efforts to establish a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, as envisaged by the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, could not as yet be considered to have been duly completed, but that they would be so considered at the end of another five years, provided that in that period 75,000 more Jews, or as many less as the economic absorptive capacity of the country necessitated, had been admitted.

* Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, in this policy statement gave an authoritative interpretation of the Mandate. The other principle, paradoxically established in this statement, was that of an exclusively economic criterion for permitting Jewish immigration into the country.

With regard to land sales, it promised that in certain unspecified areas, to be defined at the discretion of the High Commissioner, sales of land by Arabs to Jews would henceforth be regulated, and in certain cases forbidden.

The Government thereby with slight modifications maintained for the time being the former interpretation and validity of Articles II and VI of the Mandate, but anticipated their transformation at the end of a period of five years. The same inference could be drawn in the case of Article IV, which dealt with the position of the Jewish Agency. For while nothing was said as to the immediate abolition of this body, yet no provision was made for consultation with it when, in five years' time, the question of the future constitution of Palestine would come up for discussion among the parties concerned.

The Arab reaction was only partially favourable. The provisions concerning land sales were, from their point of view, quite inadequate. For they were based exclusively upon the possible dispossession of cultivators, as assessed by the High Commissioner. They ignored the fact that the rights and position of the Arab population were also being prejudiced by land purchases made by Jews avowedly for "political and strategical reasons"*—*i.e.*, with a view to dominating the whole country.²

Nevertheless the definite statement that there was no intention of setting up a Jewish state and the apparent determination to make Palestine an independent country in which the Jews formed not more than a third of the total population were very welcome to the Arabs. If there had been any substantial guarantee that Jewish immigration would, in fact, be limited to 15,000 a year, and that Jewish opposition would not be allowed to block indefinitely the establishment of a Palestinian state, at the end of the period of ten years suggested in the White Paper, the Arab leaders would no doubt have accepted the 75,000 further immigrants for the sake of the future settlement. It was, indeed, stated in the White Paper that

His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration,** and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

* See Granott, pp. 389-98.

** The number of illegal Jewish immigrants by April, 1939 in Palestine was estimated to be between 30,000 and 40,000.

But similar statements at intervals during the last twenty years had never yet been followed by a cessation of the illegal immigration, and the Arab delegates saw no reason to suppose that they would be on this occasion either, unless some substantial guarantee, constitutional or otherwise, accompanied them.

Unfortunately the White Paper of 1939 was vaguer on the constitutional question even than the White Paper of 1922 or the Legislative Council proposals of 1935-36. For, whereas both these had foreseen the speedy establishment of a Legislative Council, the 1939 White Paper stated only that

His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.

This multiplication of precautions, including "should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development" and "provided that local conditions permit," taken together with "adequate provision for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home," mentioned in another paragraph, seemed to the Arabs to suggest that Jewish opposition would still be allowed to block constitutional development indefinitely.

For these reasons the Arab delegation felt themselves compelled to reject the proposals. A certain limited recrudescence of Arab violence even manifested itself in Palestine. Arab opinion had nevertheless been greatly impressed. The Arabs felt that they had received an instalment of justice, and they longed for an end of the bloodshed and suffering. Little by little the Government was able to relax many of its repressive measures and to release large numbers of prisoners from the thirteen concentration camps.*

The reaction on the Jewish side was violent. Since the publication of the Report of the Royal Commission official Zionist opinion had moved a long way towards open adherence

* The number of Arabs detained in British concentration camps in 1939 was 5679. For Arab casualties during the rebellion of 1936-39, see Appendix IV.

to the Revisionist* faith that the aim of Zionism was the establishment of a Jewish state, in all Palestine and Transjordan, supported by a Jewish army. It was, therefore, a severe shock to the Zionist masses when they were summoned by the Government to return to the pre-Royal Commission faith of Zionism. This, it will be remembered, had been reiterated by the Zionist Congress of 1911 in the following words: "Only those suffering from gross ignorance, or actuated by malice, could accuse us of the desire of establishing an independent Jewish kingdom." It had been reaffirmed by Mr Sokolov, President of the Zionist Organization in 1918-19, a year or so after the giving of the Balfour Declaration. "The Jewish state," he said, "was never a part of the Zionist programme." "The determination of the Jewish people," said a resolution of the Zionist Congress of 1921, "is to live with the Arab people on terms of concord and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community." One might envisage from these declarations an association like that of the French Canadians with the Anglo-Saxon majority in Canada, or of the Scots and the Welsh with the English, or of the Italian-, French-, and German-speaking Swiss. On the strength of such declarations some Arab leaders at least had welcomed Dr Weizmann when he first visited Egypt in 1919.** After the mass immigration of 1934-36† and the Report of the Royal Commission, Zionist aspirations were no longer so modest. Had not the Royal Commission declared that the "primary objective of Zionism" was that some Jews at least should cease living a "minority life"?

The general lines of the Government's proposals became known before their official publication. It thus came about that the actual broadcasting of them on May 17, 1939, was delayed by Jewish sabotage, the connexion with the studio having been cut at the precise moment when the broadcast was timed to begin. Later, in the same night, bombs were exploded in the Department of Migration in Jerusalem, and the Government offices in Tel Aviv were assaulted and sacked.

On the next day the Grand Rabbi tore up a copy of the White Paper before the assembled congregation in the principal synagogue of Jerusalem. Street demonstrations in the same city

* For the Revisionist Party, see above, p. 446, note. For the closing gap between official Zionist and Revisionist Policies, see Kohn, pp. 807-40.

** See "Chaim Weizmann's statement in Jaffa(1918)," pp. 189-90.

† For Jewish immigration into Palestine, see Appendix I.

resulted in the death of a British constable from a Jewish revolver shot. Mass meetings of Jews throughout the country took an oath to observe a proclamation which contained the following passages:

Whereas the British Government has announced a new policy in Palestine. . . .

Now therefore the Jewish population proclaims before the world that this treacherous policy will not be tolerated. The Jewish population will fight it to the uttermost, and will spare no sacrifice to frustrate and defeat it.³

At the same time it was proclaimed that the Jewish population of Palestine would inaugurate a policy of civil disobedience and non-co-operation with the Government. It soon appeared, however, that the mooted project was merely intended to provide a temporary outlet for the heated feelings of the masses. For such a policy would have at once created chaos in the Jewish community. Jewish leaders knew that if the Government were to cease its active support of the National Home the latter's entire structure would be imperilled.* Faced with civil disobedience, the Government would be forced to exercise its right under Article IV of the Mandate and refuse any longer to recognize the Zionist Organization as an appropriate Jewish Agency "for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine." It would then be revealed that the National Home was after all a portion of the general structure of the country's economy, and not an entirely self-contained autarkic organism, independent of the Mandatory Government. By refusing contracts to the Histadrut** contracting agency, by withholding subsidies from Jewish municipal and educational bodies, by filling with Arabs the posts vacated by Jewish Government employees, by closing if necessary the economically redundant Tel Aviv port, by substituting British police or military for the thousands of Jewish supernumeraries,† the

* For the shift in Zionist strategy from dependence on British support to dependence on American support, see Ben-Gurion, pp. 481-88.

** The General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine, *Histadrut*, was formed in 1920 as an amalgamation of labour organisations that had developed in Palestine prior to the War. In combining its function as a socialistic trade union with Zionist ideals of building a Jewish national home, it became a strong political and economic instrument of the Jewish Agency.

† For the Jewish police forces (including the Jewish Settlement Police) sponsored by the Mandatory, see Appendix IX-A.

Government could immediately bring such economic pressure to bear as would force the Jewish community to realize its absolute dependence upon the aid which the Administration gives it.

The talk of non-co-operation therefore soon ceased. Instead steps were taken to strengthen the National Home as much as possible in the immediate future. This was designed to render the implementation of the White Paper, at the end of the five or ten years, more difficult. Meanwhile war might break out or a different Government come into power in England, and the position be in consequence radically changed.


NOTES

1 Command 6019.

2 "During 5699 [September 1938-September 1939] the Keren Kayemeth purchased land in practically all parts of Eretz Israel [Palestine]. But in former times the economic aspect dominated in the land-buying policy of the Fund. The emphasis has now shifted to the political and strategical importance of areas required. Purchases were aimed largely at strengthening our frontier positions in Upper Galilee, on the Syrian frontier, in the Beisan area, and along the sea coast."—C.Z. Kloetzel, in *The Zionist Review* of September 13, 1939. Cf. *Report of the Executives of the Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine submitted to the Twenty-first Zionist Congress* (Jerusalem, 1939), pp. 187-188.

3 Text in *The Palestine Post* of May 19, 1939.

Map 10
Zionist Colonies in Palestine until 1940



PART III

GREEN LIGHT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE

1939-1947

“I was convinced that the main arena for our efforts—outside Palestine—was not Britain but America. Aside from the *Yishuv* itself we had no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist Movement....”

David Ben-Gurion writing about
Zionist deliberations in 1939.

*Jewish Observer and Middle East
Review*, January 31, 1964, p. 16.

“I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”

President Truman speaking at
the White House to the American
diplomatic representatives from
Arab countries in 1945.

William A. Eddy, *F.D.R. meets
Ibn Saud* (New York, 1954) p. 37.

We Look Towards America*

1939

DAVID BEN-GURION

... In the five-man War Cabinet, the two Labour Ministers, in addition to Churchill, were pro-Zionist. Only Chamberlain and Halifax** could scarcely be counted among our friends. There were other pro-Arabs in the full Cabinet, but also some old sympathisers from all three parties, Tories, Socialists and Liberals. Shertok (Sharett) was right, however, when he wired me from Jerusalem that these changes in the British Government might lead to dangerous optimism in the *Yishuv*.

I was certain from the first that the more auspicious composition of the Cabinet would not do away with the White Paper policy.† There was no guarantee that even this Government was proof against Arab pressure and the anti-Jewish tradition prevalent in certain departments. It was, therefore, essential to mobilise all the strength and influence of the Jewish people, and this—apart from the *Yishuv* itself—was to be found primarily in America.

The Jewish community of Great Britain showed great moral courage in publicly opposing their own Government's policy, even after the outbreak of war, even when Britain was alone fighting for her life. At the time of the St. James's Palace Conference,‡ two months before the publication of the White

* From *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, January 31, 1964, pp. 14-16.

** Neville Chamberlain (1869-1940) was Prime Minister of Britain, 1937-40. Viscount Halifax was British Secretary of War, 1935, Foreign Secretary, 1938-40, and Ambassador to the United States, 1941.

† On the White Paper policy of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

‡ The London Conferences between the British Government and the Arab and the Jewish delegations which were held at St. James's Palace (Feb. 7-March 27, 1939) ended in failure as neither party accepted the British proposals which were subsequently incorporated into the White Paper in May.

Paper, the whole of British Jewry—even including aristocrats like Lord Bearsted and the Marquis of Reading, who had never been Zionists—supported the Zionist leadership against the British Government. And yet, though the British Zionist Movement did not flinch from opposition to the White Paper policy even during the most difficult months of the war, British Jewry's influence on its Government's policy was practically nil.

Soviet Jewry had been silenced since the Bolshevik Revolution; the Jewish communities on the European continent, whose importance on the world scene had never been great, were paralysed in the grip of the Nazis. Except for the *Yishuv*, which then numbered about half a million, only American Jewry could carry weight internationally, if they were willing and able to mobilise their entire strength and influence. For America, right from the outbreak of the war, played a most important role.

To a certain extent America had played a decisive role in the First World War, and American Jewry had a considerable part, knowingly or not, in the achievement of the Balfour Declaration. But President Wilson,* who made America the foremost world power, lived before his time. The people of the United States were as yet unprepared to emerge from their isolation. The U.S. Senate, with its decisive say in foreign policy, refused to allow American participation in the League of Nations, sponsored by Wilson to preserve world peace.

However, the very fact of a second world war opened the eyes of the American people. In 1940, the United States was still formally and legally neutral, but it was plain to all intelligent Americans that this war could determine the fate of America too, for an alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan might well undermine America's freedom and independence. During the last fifty years the world's largest Jewish community—perhaps the largest in our people's history—had grown up in this vitally important country. And although it was no more than some three per cent of the total population, yet, owing to its concentration in a number of key states, it had achieved great political importance.

* * *

This was the only Jewish community that could wield an important—perhaps decisive—influence upon Britain's Palestine

* On Wilson's involvement in the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72.

policy—if only it could mobilise all its strength in the struggle for the future of the Jewish people in its homeland. That was no small “if”. During my previous brief visit to America, before the St. James’s Palace Conference in February 1939, I had not found a Zionist movement organised, united, and capable of action. Nor had the attitude of the American Zionist leaders at the 21st Zionist Congress, a few months after the publication of the White Paper, been very encouraging.

At a discussion on political affairs held in Palestine on April 9, 1940, shortly before my departure for London, two responsible members expressed a very gloomy view about the Zionist Movement in the U.S. Moshe Shertok said at the time:

“I think everyone will agree that America will have a decisive influence at the end of the war, whether she joins in or not, and the question of our strength in America is a very real and important one. Weizmann [who had just returned from a visit to the U.S.] regards America as the only country in which Jews wield considerable power, but this power is not utilised to further Jewish policy.

“There are millions of active and well-organised Jews in America, and their position in life enables them to be most dynamic and influential. They live in the nerve-centres of the country, and hold important positions in politics, trade, journalism, the theatre and the radio. They could influence public opinion, but their strength is not felt, since it is not harnessed and directed at the right target.

“The Zionist Organisation of America is at a low ebb. It is rent by internal dissension and disrupted by personal and factional rivalries. The Jewish masses show deep feeling and a basic natural loyalty for our cause, but this feeling is not utilised and put to practical ends.

“There are many elements within the American community that demand cooperation and guidance. The various bodies can be united in one broad framework, and their activity directed to the good of our work in Palestine. Only if such an active Jewish body is created, which knows what it wants, and directs its efforts towards Palestine—only then will we be able to test whether the American Government can be induced to support us.

“So far we have not even been able to have this question put to the test. Whatever hopes are aroused in this respect from time to time are based on somebody’s personal acquaintance with Roosevelt or some other political figure. We have never yet got as far as the application of strong

public pressure in America, by using means which count in modern politics.

“Perhaps our chances of success are not great, but the effort must be made. From now on this is not only a question of American Jewish influence being brought to bear on the American administration (a weighty issue in itself), but of American Jewry’s influence being directed at the British Government. Until now this has never been done.”

* * *

Eliahu Golomb,* who had been in America from the beginning of the war until March 1940, was even more pessimistic. He said:

“Were I to tell you all I saw in Jewish and Zionist circles in America, I would paint a rather dismal picture. Moshe [Shertok] spoke of our hopes about America and of the Jewish strength that exists there, waiting to be girded for action. I must say that this strength today is neither willing nor able to fight for Zionism. This does not mean that American Jewry is devoid of Zionist feelings. On the contrary, Zionist feelings are much stronger among them than it would appear from the condition of the Zionist Organisation of America. A force can be crystallised from among American Jews for political action and practical aid for our cause. But so far it does not actually exist—it is only a potential force. To bring it into being much work needs to be done.

“The American Jew thinks of himself first and foremost as an American citizen. This is a fact, whether we like it or not. When the Jew—and the Zionist—goes to vote in American elections, it is not the candidate’s attitude to Zionism which will determine his choice, for he thinks of himself first as an American, concerned with America’s needs and problems. Loyalty to America is now the supreme watchword.

“True, this is a presidential election year, and the parties will pay a good deal of attention to public opinion in all segments of American life, but it is doubtful whether the Jews of America will *want* to throw their political weight into the balance, whether they will have the courage to link the interests of World Jewry and of Zionism with their political weight in America. This is a major question.

* For Eliahu Golomb, see above, p. 382, note.

“Were I obliged to answer this question now, on the basis of the present state of affairs in America, I would answer in the negative. And if you ask: is there any hope that we will find in American Jewry the support that our position demands, I would say that *today* the hope is slender indeed.

“Dire tragedies have befallen the Jews of Europe. Did this arouse American Jews to increase their material support? No, it did not. Quite the opposite: we suspect that the income of the United Jewish Appeal*—not only the Joint Palestine Appeal—will go down. The reason is a feeling of impotence, a feeling that nothing can be done to fend off the catastrophe which has befallen Jewry. This is a widespread feeling.

“This attitude leads many to pin their faith on miracles: perhaps a miracle will take place—perhaps the war will end in victory for the forces of justice, and the Peace Conference will change everything for the better. Or maybe things will just improve by themselves. This feeling is also shared by many American Zionist leaders. It seems superfluous to repeat that the Zionist Organisation of America is disunited and incapable of action. It has no faith in its own ability to gain the support of the American Jewish masses, and to conduct any worthwhile activity. I am not referring only to the General Zionists, but to *all* Zionist organisations in America.

“Still, I think that things can be changed. American Jews have a deep attachment to Zionism, and just as deep is their disappointment in all other solutions to the Jewish problem. Recent schemes for the settlement of Jews in other countries have registered disastrous failures. There were attempts at settlement in Brazil and Mexico—all fell to pieces. Plans for settlement in Alaska have long been abandoned, because of Alaskan opposition.

“Wide circles of American Jewry are imbued with strong Zionist feelings. The failure of American Communists generally, and Jewish Communists in particular, is a contributory factor. Communism has suffered severe defeats in America, and this, too, has made the Jewish intelligentsia more receptive. The young American Jew is an idealist. Now more than ever before the way lies open to inject new ideals into the Jewish community of America. There is

* On the United Jewish Appeal's financial support of Zionism, see Appendix V.

room especially for Jewish ideals. Out of the general American feeling of freedom, the young Jew, even if he is assimilated, also develops a feeling of pride in his Jewishness. If we could only convince the Jewish community of the *feasibility* of Zionist struggle, we could do great things.

"While I was in America two great world events took place: the fall of Poland and the Russo-Finnish war. It is worth noting that the Hitler-Stalin pact of war against Poland didn't hurt American Communists half so much as Finland's stand against Russia. The reason was simple: Finland *fought back*."

"On the basis of my experience in America and many discussions with Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists, I believe that the Jewish struggle in Palestine will arouse Zionist conviction and Zionist action among the Jews. The Jewish public—and perhaps the non-Jewish as well—will be won over either by *successful* Zionism, or by *militant* Zionism."

* * *

Golomb, who had also been in America during Weizmann's visit, told of Weizmann's success among non-Zionists. He argued, however, that "as far as it concerned strengthening the Zionist position in America, the visit was unsuccessful, for Weizmann, like Brandeis,* did not take the political events of the period into sufficient consideration. He continued:

"Brandeis remained true to his principle: the important thing is that we are right; justice is bound to emerge victorious, and so things can't be too terrible; for the time being we must register our protest, and that is the only political action that can now be taken. Weizmann also adopted this line: decisions are not being taken now; we must wait for the Peace Conference, which will change everything; at the moment there is no point in making trouble.

"This approach, of course, cannot rally the American Jewish community to the fight for Zionism. The position in America will depend largely on what happens in Palestine."

I knew that the description of condition in the American Zionist Movement given by Shertok and Golomb was generally correct as far as the present was concerned. I felt confident, however, that this state of affairs was not unalterable.

* On Brandeis and Zionism, see Manuel, pp. 165-72.

To a large extent it was due to America's distance from what was happening in the world, especially in England and Palestine.

I had spent three years in America during the First World War, having been expelled from Palestine by the Turkish Government—"never to return"—together with the late Itzhak Ben-Zvi.* After my election to the Zionist Executive I had visited the United States almost every year. I knew that there were two kinds of Jews in America: those who were in the first place Americans and had then come to Jewry, like Brandeis, Szold, Stephen Wise,** and some of the Hadassah leaders; and those who came from Jewishness to Americanism, like Lipsky, Silver, the leaders of Mizrahi and Poalei Zion and other leaders of Hadassah.†

All America then stood at the crossroads, historically speaking. Behind lay a hundred and fifty years of isolationist tradition, dating back to George Washington. But now—unlike the First World War—America faced a momentous struggle, in which not only was freedom in peril in Europe, but also in America itself. American Jews had not yet grasped the special character of this terrible war, and the danger it held for the very existence of the Jewish people, nor did the Zionist movement understand all the gravity of the White Paper policy.

But there were powerful forces latent in the American people, capable of arising in their might to save world democracy, and there were latent energies in American Jewry, too, which could render loyal service to the needs of European Jewry. Devotion to our work in Palestine was not the monopoly of the

* Ben Zvi (1884-1963) was President of the *Va'ad Leumi* (the National Council of the Jewish Community), 1931-48, and President of Israel, 1952-63.

** Robert Szold was Director of the Central Bank of Cooperative Institutions in Palestine Ltd., 1930-61. For Wise, see above, p. 451, note.

† The Hadassah was established in 1912 by Henrietta Szold for the purpose of teaching Zionism to the women of America and encouraging their active participation in Palestine in the fields of Jewish medical care and public health. The *Mizrahi*, formed in 1902 in Vilna by Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines and integrated within the Zionist Congress, is an organisation of Orthodox Jews who combined an emphasis on traditional and religious aspects of Judaism with a strong adherence to political Zionism. The *Poalei Zion* (Workers of Zion) is a small party of urban workers on the extreme left of Zionist politics. Although its views have much in common with communism, its acceptance of Zionist principles caused the party's rejection from the Third International. For Lipsky and Silver, see below, pp. 549, 550, notes, respectively.

Zionist Organisation of America. The Jewish masses, important organisations, such as the B'nai B'rith,* the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish labour unions, supported not only Palestine labour projects, but all our efforts for national revival in the homeland.

While the changes in the British Government doubtless improved our chances in Britain, I was certain that the centre of decision was shifting from Europe to America. It was up to us to make clear to the American Zionist Movement, and to all Jewish organisations, just how grim was our struggle for the fate of the entire Jewish people and the future of Palestine.

We had to explain to them our central tasks at this time: the struggle against the White Paper; recognition of the Jewish people as a partner in the war against Hitler, not as anonymous individuals, but under the flag of a Jewish army; efforts to ensure the establishment of a Jewish State immediately after the end of the war. We must tell them that the great task of immigration and resettlement, to save millions of Jews who would survive the disasters of the Nazi conquest, would not be accomplished by strangers; we alone could do it.

I admired the British people's brave struggle under the inspired leadership of Winston Churchill, in spite of the disappointments we had suffered during the first few months of the Cabinet's existence. But I was convinced that the main arena for our efforts—outside Palestine—was not Britain but America. Aside from the *Yishuv* itself we had no more effective tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist Movement. . . .

* An International Jewish Order (Sons of the Covenant) founded in 1843 by German-American Jews which provided considerable help in settling immigrant Jews in Palestine.

F.D.R.'s International Immigration Plan for Jewish Refugees*

MORRIS L. ERNST**

To develop dreams for F.D.R. was a joy. To have even a small proportion come to life at times years later was a great satisfaction and added, so my friends told me, to my conceit. Not all my chores were of such vast dimensions, but let me tell one other tale of exciting possibilities.

F.D.R. was, it seemed to me, always aware of the Palestinian tinder-box. He had one fixed idea: Hitler should not be allowed to win the war on any front, and particularly not one of a racist or religious nature. All those pushed around because of race, creed, color or political belief must be treated as special wards of the victorious Allies. Although today only twenty per cent of the displaced persons of Europe are Jewish, during the war it seemed as though eighty per cent were Jews and the thinking of our nation became concentrated on the Jewish problem. This does not mean that Freemasons, Catholics, Socialists and anti-Communists were not also to be given needed protection, for no dictator—Hitler, Stalin, Franco, or another—should be allowed to imprison people because of their political or religious affiliations.

From various sources there was an assumption that about a half million men, women, and children in Europe would want to leave the scenes of their misery. For many Jews there had developed over the years—even centuries—the understandable idea that they were beyond adjustment—unassimilable. The

* From Morris L. Ernst, *So Far So Good* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 170-77. Reprinted by permission of the author.

** American Jewish lawyer, sent by President Roosevelt during World War II, on various international missions. His writings include (with A.U. Schwartz) *Lawyers And What They Do* (New York: F. Watts, 1964).

homeland concept had been sold for years in an organized way. Palestine had been a kind of remittance society supported by the dollars of rich Americans of Jewish descent.* No one knew for a certainty what the suffering, beaten Jewish people of Germany would do if offered their free choice of entrance to any nation on earth. In the absence of a wide choice, the answer to the question, "Where do you want to go to live out your lives?" would be "Palestine." But what if Canada, Australia, South America, England and the U.S. were all to open a door to some immigration?*** Even today it is my judgment, and I have been in Germany since the war, that only a minority of the Jewish displaced persons would choose Palestine.

There was a time when people were allowed to roam their planet at will. Living standards in societies and nations did not vary too greatly. Hope of freedom from religious persecution was at one time the main reason people left their ancestral homes. At other times, people moved to gain material benefits, and not only for spiritual freedom or to escape a pogrom. Eventually as many as a million people came to the U.S. in a single year, for most of them "living was easier; gold was to be found on the streets." But, as our nation grew in wealth, it attained the highest per capita income in the world. In 1930, for example, when our per capita income was \$700, the U.S. held out a promise of almost twice as easy a life as that in Great Britain with a per capita income of \$409, four times that of France and seven times that of Italy, which had a per capita income of \$115. If we had not all but shut our doors, millions would have come to our lucky land each year. Today the difference in the average man's income between prosperous America and war-ravaged Europe is even greater. It's my guess that at least 45 million would seek entrance to our land if all barriers were let down. In a world of such wide discrepancies in living standards and freedom of individual living, the right to travel was curtailed. We are living in a world of embargoes on human travel to protect our own people. Of course I agree with Ernest Bevin,† who told me in May, 1946, that the ultimate aim of his foreign policy was that anyone should be able to go to Victoria Station and buy a ticket to any place on earth.

The President always seemed to come back to the underlying need to open up the immigration gates of all nations. He used

* On Jewish financial support of Zionism, see Appendix V.

** On the immigration policy of Britain, see above, pp. 403-8, and on American policy, see Divine, pp. 577-93.

† On Ernest Bevin, see Bullock, pp. 313-14, and Williams, pp. 557-74.

to talk of how we were a nation of immigrants and of how immigration had profoundly enriched our culture and economy. Logically, he felt we were less than forthright in demanding immigration concessions of the Arabs when we had our own tight little quota laws based not on citizenship, but absurdly enough on place of birth!*

I do not intend to discuss the Jewish-Palestinian problem other than to say that I am fearful of any racial-religious state. Even for those who desire such confrères of race and state, or for those who urge it for others, it seems less than the ultimate in the development of the brotherhood of man. Nor do I believe that the thousands of years of bitter persecution of the Jewish people ineluctably proves that the Jewish heritage will not ultimately fit into the conglomerate folkways of the nations of the world.

But the task I had from F.D.R. did not touch on Palestine except tangentially. Or, at least so I thought. The President painted a picture with a big brush. He proposed a world budget for the easy immigration of the 500,000 beaten people of Europe. Each nation should open its doors for some thousands of refugees. He told me that he could count on Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, Haiti, Canada, Australia, and others to take in a total of 150,000. I remember he put Venezuela down for a quota of 10,000; Haiti for 4,000; Chile for 5,000, and so forth. Canada, he thought, would come through for 30,000 to 40,000. He knew that the U.S. would be the toughest nation to persuade. The labor unions had for several generations fought the influx of foreign workers. The Legionaires and the bigot groups had built up a virtual psychosis against aliens, and employers were no longer intent on importing labor into our man-power reserves. They had learned that cheap labor through excess supply was not a boon to industry and did not spell low-cost production.

So he suggested that during my trips for him to England during the war I sound out in a general, unofficial manner the leaders of British public opinion, in and out of the Government. How many refugees would Great Britain accept as part of a world-wide program? We knew that the small impoverished island of Great Britain had opened its doors during the prewar years to more immigrants from Europe than we, with our vast rich acres; and F.D.R. felt less than proud of this fact.

* The controversial Immigration Act of 1924 established a yearly quota for immigrants from foreign countries computed on the basis of the ethnic composition of the total American population. See Appendix VI.

I posed the problem and the plans to many and came back with as much assurances as an unofficial outsider could acquire. The simple answer: Great Britain will match the U.S. man for man, in admissions from Europe. That island with its depleted capital, with shortage of food and fuel, would take in 150,000 more if we would do the same. It seemed all settled. With the rest of the world probably ready to give haven to 200,000, there was a sound reason for the President to press Congress to take in at least 150,000 immigrants after the war. (As a note for the record: Great Britain has received to date more refugees than all the other nations of the world combined.)

I was delighted. Not that I had done any job worth recording. Delight was embedded in the hope and vision of the new program. Surely, Congress would no longer dare to talk in isolated, stiff-necked terms of America for the Americans. Above all, we could then for the first time face the Arabs with integrity and decency and have no hesitation in saying: "Your share, as appraised against the Mandate and the historic miracles the Jews have performed in enriching Palestine, should be at least 150,000."

I am writing during the truce.* No matter what happens politically in Palestine, immigration will still be the nub of the problem. The Arabs' fears of minorization will not disappear overnight. The Jews will not be free of the peril of the day when they must reject immigration beyond the point of economic consumption capacity. F.D.R. saw this crux of the problem.

Such was the dream and plan of F.D.R. It still is a good plan. It is still not too late. Under the United Nations' Partition decree** it is more important than ever. It is still essential for our own integrity. It is still worthwhile for humanitarian reasons. Moreover, it would free us from the hypocrisy of closing our own doors while making sanctimonious demands on the Arabs. It is right, it is decent; and in our country we have learned that immigrant strains enrich our culture and aid in the development of the sciences and arts of living.

But it did not work out. I do not intend to quote F.D.R. or even to suggest that my appraisal of the defeat would agree in every detail with his. But to me it seemed that the failure of the leading Jewish groups to support with zeal this immigration

* The first United Nations Palestine truce, enforced on June 11th, 1948, was only effective until July 8th, when fighting broke out and continued until July 18th, 1948.

** On the United Nations' Partition recommendation, see Part IV, particularly pp. 645-743.

program may have caused the President not to push forward with it at that time. I talked to many people active in Jewish organizations. I suggested the plan. I made clear that no Jews or other people in Europe would be compelled to go anywhere and certainly not to any assigned nation. But surely it would be wholesome to give these beaten people of Europe a choice: "Do you want to go to Ecuador, or Newfoundland or Kansas or Nottingham? The doors of the world are open. State your choice. If it's Palestine, that will also be open. You who are Jewish have felt that you have had no choice. It looked to you like Palestine or nothing. Palestine or detestable Nazi Germany seemed to be your only choices."

I was amazed and even felt insulted when active Jewish leaders decried, sneered and then attacked me as if I were a traitor. At one dinner party I was openly accused of furthering this plan for freer immigration in order to undermine political Zionism. Those Jewish groups which favored opening our doors gave little more than lip service to the Roosevelt program. Zionist friends of mine opposed it.

I think I know the reason for much of the opposition. There is a deep, genuine, often fanatical emotional vested interest in putting over the Palestinian movement. Men like Ben Hecht* are little concerned about human blood if it is not their own. Palestine will necessarily continue to be a kind of remittance society supported in part by American donations. To raise millions is not too hard as long as solicitors can say, "These bedeviled Jews of Europe have nowhere else to go but Palestine." But imagine the difficulty in raising funds if the person approached is in a position to reply: "What do you mean, 'nowhere else to go'? They have a free choice of the whole world. Every nation has opened its doors—not to all but certainly to enough to provide a choice such as is not offered to the other people of the earth." Thus, I could see why the raisers of funds, the leaders of these movements, should feel that their pet thesis was endangered by the generosity and humanity of the F.D.R. program.

It is still the plan for Jews and Gentiles of the Displaced Persons camps for much of Europe. What of the poor devils Russia wants to return to Siberia? What of the 80 per cent—the 700,000 non-Jewish flopsam of Europe? Above all, if the UN exacerbates further difficulties in enforcing partition, is not the public opinion of the people of the world the final and only

* American Zionist film-scenario writer and co-Chairman of the extremist American League for a Free Palestine.

civilized weapon? The Arabs have been put in a favorable position by the closed door-open lip hypocrisies of other nations, including our own. Let's open our own doors joining with all other nations. I suggest that this would immeasurably reduce the heat of the Jewish-Arab controversy in the years to come. Even if other nations will not join us, we, for the sake of our own national integrity, should maintain our old-fashioned pattern of asylum for the oppressed and tortured. We should never forget that we are literally a nation of immigrants.

The Zionist (Biltmore) Program*

11 May 1942

1. American Zionists assembled in this Extraordinary Conference reaffirm their unequivocal devotion to the cause of democratic freedom and international justice to which the people of the United States, allied with the other United Nations, have dedicated themselves, and give expression to their faith in the ultimate victory of humanity and justice over lawlessness and brute force.

2. This Conference offers a message of hope and encouragement to their fellow Jews in the Ghettos and concentration camps of Hitler-dominated Europe and prays that their hour of liberation may not be far distant.

3. The Conference sends its warmest greetings to the Jewish Agency Executive** in Jerusalem, to the Va'ad Leumi, and to the whole Yishuv† in Palestine, and expresses its profound admiration for their steadfastness and achievements in the face of peril and great difficulties. The Jewish men and women in field and factory, and the thousands of Jewish soldiers of Palestine in the Near East who have acquitted themselves with honor and distinction in Greece, Ethiopia, Syria, Libya and on other battlefields, have shown themselves worthy of their people and ready to assume the rights and responsibilities of nationhood.

* The Conference at which this Program was formulated, held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York from the 9th to the 11th of May, 1942, was attended by six hundred American Jews and sixty-seven visiting Zionists including Weizmann and Ben-Gurion.

** On the Jewish Agency, see above, p. 309, note.

† The *Va'ad Leumi* (The National Council of the Jewish community), first elected by a constituent assembly in 1920, was primarily concerned with the internal affairs of the Jewish community in Palestine and adhered to the political policy of the Palestine Executive of the Jewish Agency. For the *Yishuv*, see above, p. 158, note.

4. In our generation, and in particular in the course of the past twenty years, the Jewish people have awakened and transformed their ancient homeland; from 50,000 at the end of the last war their numbers have increased to more than 500,000. They have made the waste places to bear fruit and the desert to blossom. Their pioneering achievements in agriculture and in industry, embodying new patterns of cooperative endeavor, have written a notable page in the history of colonization.

5. In the new values thus created, their Arab neighbors in Palestine have shared.* The Jewish people in its own work of national redemption welcomes the economic, agricultural and national development of the Arab peoples and states. The Conference reaffirms the stand previously adopted at Congresses of the World Zionist Organization, expressing the readiness and the desire of the Jewish people for full cooperation with their Arab neighbors.

6. The Conference calls for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration** and the Mandate which "*recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine*" was to afford them the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson,† to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939‡ and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes "a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." The policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied war effort.

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part

* For the exclusion of Arab labour from Jewish colonies, see Simpson, pp. 303-7.

** On the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72, and Jeffries, pp. 173-88.

† On Wilson and the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72.

‡ On the White paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

in the war effort and in the defense of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

Then and only then will the age-old wrong to the Jewish people be righted.

Arab Nationalism and Political Zionism*

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING**

The extraordinary pressure with which the question of Palestine is being urged on Congress would be disturbing under any circumstances. Are we being hurried into action before we see clearly what the issues are? In my judgment, the motives for the agitation are not fully realized by the public, nor some of the main facts which must govern our judgment.

It is natural that this agitation should put forward as its chief burden the humanitarian concern we all feel for the plight of Jewish refugees from Europe. The immediate political objective, of inducing the British Government to review the policy of its White Paper,† is presented as subsidiary to the problem of refuge. Senator Taft, speaking on March 9 at the annual meeting of the American Palestine Commission,‡ announced it as the primary purpose of his Bill "to find a place of refuge for the four million surviving Jews of Europe." In my judgment, Senator Taft and the American public as well, ought to weigh very carefully both the humanitarian and the political objectives, and consider to what extent the proposed means will serve the humanitarian end; and to what extent it will serve other ends.

* From *The Moslem World*, XXXV, No. 3 (1945), 216-23. Reprinted by permission of the Hartford Seminary Foundation.

** Formerly Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity, 1920-43, Harvard University, Mass., U.S.A. His writings include *The Spirit of World Politics: With Special Studies of the Near East* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1932) and *Strength of Men and Nations: A Message to the USA vis-a-vis the USSR* (New York: Harper, 1959).

† On the White Paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

‡ Robert A. Taft was a Republican Senator from Ohio and a zealous pro-Zionist. On November 2, 1942, the American Palestine Commission, composed of sixty-eight Senators and two hundred Representatives, issued a statement denouncing the White Paper of 1939.

On the humanitarian objective: a place or places of refuge for Jews driven from Europe must be provided: this is an imperative international responsibility. It is easy to run from this axiom to the conclusion that Palestine ought to be thrown open at once to immigration, and without the terminus proposed in the White Paper. This conclusion would follow if Palestine were the only place, or the best place, or even a possible place for more than a limited number of refugees; and if there were no opposing considerations. None of these things can be taken for granted.*

It is certainly not the only place now open. Nor purely from the standpoint of living possibilities is it the best place. And as for the four million refugees of Senator Taft's speech, the suggestion that this number can find livelihood in Palestine *in any near time* is fantastic. The "absorptive capacity of Palestine" has been a matter of heated debate, into which there is no need here to enter. Let me mention only what will be generally agreed upon. On the agricultural possibilities of that New Hampshire-sized country (about 10,000 square miles) about half the area is cultivable: of the 6,579,750 acres, estimates of the cultivable area vary from 3 million to 4 million acres.¹ Since as a matter of course, the best of this is already occupied, the question is how much of the remainder can be brought to fairly good condition, even with a wholly disproportionate investment: a third of this half would seem a fair estimate. No one doubts that if the Zionist-held area can be extended, processes of reclamation costly and slow can bring more acres under cultivation. For the refugees, however, the issue is not what can be done in 20 years, but what can be done soon. The answer has to be, nothing remotely adequate.

One hope now being urged for large increase in the capacity of Palestine is in a program of intensive industrialization. Each one must judge for himself the lasting value of a forced industrial development of a land so little favored by nature; and whether a Palestine with none but imported fuel, a rainfall too meager for even its present human uses, and an extremely limited water power is an appropriate center for an industry based on the resources of the wider Near East. But again, no one will doubt that such industrial building must grow *pari passu* with lines of supply and market outlets which can not be improvised on any considerable scale prior to or apart from a general world settlement. In such a settlement, the interests of the Arab lands for developing their own industries will require to be heard. In

* Cf. Ernst, pp. 489-94.

any case, the rate of Palestinian development could not be sufficient to meet the early needs of any important fraction of Europe's refugee Jews.

And since the ground upon which Palestine is chiefly claimed as a uniquely necessary place for a National Home for the Jewish people is not its economic advantage, but its religious association, it may be worth while to mention that a Palestine heavily industrialized is a Palestine defaced from this point of view for Jew, Moslem, and Christian alike.

Americans easily confuse the meaning of Palestine as a place of refuge with its meaning as a cultural or national home for the Jewish people. Not only are the two meanings distinct; they are in some measure at cross purposes. For the Jews in Palestine who are animated by a burning historical piety are not at ease with the more recent influx from Europe of Jews whose religion is rather that of a social goal than that of the Religious Law or of the Holy Land. If the emphasis is placed on the rights of religious association,* we have to remember that for the Moslems also Jerusalem is a sacred city.** And the very site of the ancient Jewish Temple is now occupied by the Great El Aksa Mosque (begun 690 A.D.); and so rooted in Moslem tradition as the scene of a miraculous event in the life of Mohammed that any attempt on the part of Zionism to return to its ancient spot of worship would—relations between Jews and Moslems being what they are now—have to be made by force. This is certainly not contemplated by anybody at this time; and the inference is that the importance of Palestine as a place of Jewish settlement cannot be based either on the needs of refugees or on the grounds of pious necessity, but rather precisely where the Balfour Declaration has put it, on the desirability of a national home for the Jewish people. What that declaration means is so much misunderstood, and unfortunately also so much misrepresented, that it must again be restated.

The Balfour Declaration,† issued November 2, 1917, used these words:

“His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that

* For Jewish religious claims to Palestine, see Guillaume, pp. 25-30.

** On Jerusalem and Islam, see Burhān ad-Dīn al Fazāri, pp. 31-34, and Asin, pp. 35-43.

† On the Balfour Declaration, see Jeffries, 173-88.

nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine. . . .”

What this Declaration *did not promise was the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jews.*

This latter formula, which is now being urged by certain pressure groups as the substance of the Declaration was in fact asked for by the British Zionists in 1917, and expressly rejected by the British Government. This rejection has been renewed at various subsequent times, as in the White Paper of June, 1922. There is a world of difference between a Home *within* Palestine, and *reconstituting* Palestine (making the whole place over) as *the* Home, or as a Jewish community.

It was precisely this “within” feature which made it possible for Zionists at Paris to win the apparent acceptance of the idea by the Arab Delegation there headed by Emir Feisal. The circumstances of the interchange between Mr. Frankfurter and Emir Feisal have been discussed at length since that time.* One thing that has become clear, in my opinion, is that Feisal at that time had hopes of an Arab Kingdom—hopes abetted by Great Britain—with himself as ruler of Syria in Damascus; and for the Arabs, Syria traditionally includes Palestine.² Thus Feisal’s approval of a Zionist community in Palestine was dependent on its enclosure within a dominant Arab state. It must also be said that Feisal’s signature to the famous and much questioned letter has never carried weight with the Arab world. Any representation that the Arab people of Palestine or elsewhere, either then or at any subsequent time, agreed to the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish community is false. . . .**

When therefore one of the groups now pressing for the abrogation of the White Paper announces that the Jews of Palestine “did not come to form a new minority”, they are in effect not appealing for the enforcement of the Balfour Declaration but for its replacement. Why do they wish to become a majority unless it is in order that (as the Shaw Report of 1930 put it) “under a democratic rule the Jewish view should always prevail”?

At present they are not too far from that goal as an effective working proposition. In 1919 (to use the figures of the Palestine Partition Commission of 1938)† there were in Palestine 58,000

* For Frankfurter’s activities on the behalf of Zionism, see above, pp. 195-200, and pp. 309-12. For Feisal, see above, p. 197, note.

** Cf. the findings of the American King-Crane Commission, pp. 213-18.

† For the Partition Commission of 1938, see Barbour, pp. 335-42, and Reid, pp. 409-32.

Jews and 642,000 Arabs (Moslem and Christian). Jews were then roughly ten per cent of the total. In 1937, there were about 402,000 Jews and 990,000 Arabs. Today we may estimate about 600,000 Jews and 1,000,000 Arabs. Allow some weight to the concentration of Jews in towns (only about 23% are on the soil) and their superior skill and practise in political action, and it would seem that a Jewish-controlled Palestine is within reach. It is this which the Arabs fear.

Putting these various items together, does it not appear that the animus of the present drive is not primarily humanitarian but political?

* * *

But why not? Why should not Palestine be made over into a new Jewish community? The case is not to be judged solely by existing documents and the rights thereby created. It has to be judged *de novo*, in the light of present world conditions.

The cultural progress of the Zionist colonies in Palestine has been remarkable in many ways. The great Hebrew University on Mount Scopus and its Library are monuments to the breadth and wisdom of its founders and builders. The large influx of Jewish capital into Palestine has furnished a basis for taxation (levied on the Arabs as well) which the British Government has used in part for public improvements,—roads, public health, etc.,—in which the Arabs have a natural share. At the same time, the Arab feels his total economic position less secure than before. Why this is the case, a single item relating to farm labor, will sufficiently illustrate:

It is especially the position of the Arab agricultural laborer that has to be considered, for most Arabs (and this is part of the traditional charm of the land) have gained their livelihood from the soil. What has been happening to him may best appear by quoting from a lease of the Jewish National Fund* as to Jewish settlers on Palestinian land:

“The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render the lessee liable to the payment of a compensation of ten Palestinian pounds for each default...Where the lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding, without paying any compensation whatever.”³

* For the Jewish National Fund, see above, p. 390, note.

The Jewish Agency provides in its Constitution that

“Land is to be acquired as Jewish property... title to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people.”⁴

On this arrangement, land bought by the Jewish Agency, let us say from an Arab landlord employing Arab labor, ceases automatically to be a place of possible residence or work to those laborers. As Sir John Simpson put the matter in his Report:*

“It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future... He is deprived forever from employment on that land... Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mortmain and inalienable.”⁵

There have been good reasons, from the standpoint of providing occupation for more Jewish immigrants, for such policies as these; but it is at least understandable that despite improvements in other ways, despite the fact that every step of the advance of Zionist ownership is legitimate, and paid for at high prices, the Arab masses as a whole have felt their relative position deteriorating. It is not a question of the number of persons dispossessed, and undisposed to accept compensation. It is a question of the attitude of the slowly advancing power. Its strength, intelligence, cash backing, splendid equipment, render it in Arab eyes the more formidable because of this attitude. Hence they have come to face the future with concern.

But why not override these feelings, which after all affect only a relatively few people on a very small piece of land? Why cannot the Arabs give up an insignificant fraction of their “immense domain”, and even accept the idea of an exchange of population with, let us say, Iraq, if it will make for the realization of the Jewish dream? This proposal is now being vigorously urged in some quarters and many Americans are impressed by its apparent reasonableness.

Those who are promoting this view do not explain what they propose to do with the extensive religious establishments of Islam in Palestine, including the great mosques and various schools. These establishments are not, like those of the Christians,

* See Simpson, pp. 303-7.

primarily of a memorial nature: they are important educational and devotional centers for a living religion, within the region of its central activity. To maintain such establishments a considerable local population is required and assumed: to deport the million Arabs to Iraq would be another way of strangling these institutions. They require also a flow of worshippers and pilgrims, both physically and morally free to come and go. The entire Moslem world is concerned in this. If we think the matter unimportant, they do not.

As for the "immense domain" of the Arab peoples, that is largely desert. The cultivable portions are chiefly strewn around the rim, whose northern arch is known as the Fertile Crescent. The value of Palestine to either Arab or Zionist does not derive from its size but from its situation, and the functions which that situation enables it to carry out.

The material and present-day advantages of Palestine come largely from its position on the Mediterranean coast. Commercially it belongs to the European Area. Palestine stands in an important strategic position between Europe and the budding industrial development, not so much of Palestine itself as of the lands behind Palestine, Arab lands which are entering on a new economic era. One Zionist proponent estimates the immediate background which Palestine might serve as 40 million in number, with a remoter region of 400 million people. All this region will need is outside financing; whose finance is it to be? And what control will go with the financing? If the future economic importance of Palestine is to be, as I surmise, commercial rather than agricultural or industrial, its prosperity will depend to a large extent on its relations to this growingly important hinterland. And vice versa, the prosperity of that hinterland might depend to a considerable extent on its relations with the financial powers, the warehouses, and the commercial lanes centering in Palestine and vicinity.

The significance of these facts is not obscure to the Zionist. It is also not obscure to the Arab, desirous of being master of his own industrial future; desirous therefore of keeping his direct front on the Mediterranean, and access on equal terms to the facilities of Palestinian harbors, roads and air stations. Cultural relations with Europe will also be important for the new life of the Arabian provinces. Surrender of Palestine to exclusive Zionist control would thus amount to acceptance of a barrier between them and Europe at the outset of their newer national career.

And when Zionist plans are extended, as they are by some, to bring Transjordan into the Jewish commonwealth, it must

not be forgotten that the Zionist land-bloc would then cut clear through the thin Fertile Crescent to the desert.* It would lie directly across the north-and-south lines of land travel and pilgrimage, including the railroad built chiefly for the convenience of pilgrims between the northern Moslem lands and Mecca. This would revive, within Arabian territory, that nightmare of European politics, the Corridor. To ask for Palestine and Transjordan as a minute percentage of the total Arab territory is thus like asking for a microscopic section across one wrist.

The disconcerting thing about these proposals, to which the United States is asked to become a party, is not so much the rivalry of interests, which is a usual thing in the world, as the silence of Zionist spokesmen about the existence of any such Arab interests. They do not mention the Arab political aspirations, which like their own, have the sanction and documentary support of Great Britain. They tend to blackwash the cultural achievements and interests of the Arab peoples, whom they prefer to represent as typified by the Bedouin rather than by members of the Arab Academy at Damascus or the scholars of Beirut, and whom they describe even in literature now being circulated among us as "nomadic", "backward", "half-civilized". Do they not know the new Arab university life, the new literature, the new history, the new economic prowess? Do they forget that it was the Arabs who for six hundred years preserved the classical culture of Greece for a dark Europe?

And do they not know that just as they themselves are making beginnings in Palestine, so the Arab peoples in far greater numbers are making *their* new beginnings, after four centuries of oppression by the old Turkish regime? Mr. Lowdermilk,** who will not be accused of over-enthusiasm for the Arab future, testifies to the rapid progress of an *unsubsidized* Arab agriculture⁶ and industry, about 2000 industrial plants having been started by them in recent years⁷ in Palestine alone. The young Arab world of today is living, as human beings should live, largely in the future. Its Nationalism has to win its own steadiness, self-control, and world-responsibility; but its substance is a justified faith in what is to be, rather than fixing its eyes on what is.

* See Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, and above, p. 446, note.

** Walter G. Lowdermilk is an American soil-conservationist who spent three months in Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1939. He wrote a politically motivated book, *Palestine, Land of Promise* (1949), in which he outlined a power and irrigation project professing the possibility of the settlement of four million Jews in the area.

If the Zionists do not know of these things, it is high time they learned of them. And if they do know of them, why do they so constantly speak and act as if they were not true? This failure on their part to appreciate what it is that they would push aside gives, I think, the clue to the emotional aspect of the Palestinian problem.

For given this temper of disparagement, can anyone explain to the American public why the Arabs should welcome the prospect of becoming dependent for their own progress in any degree on Zionist understanding and good-will?

It is not the bad *effendis**—who serve the Zionist spokesmen as the sufficient explanation of all opposition to their plans—it is not the landowners and the moneyed muftis alone, it is the entire Arab population of Palestine and the neighboring territories that cannot accommodate its mind to that prospect.

And we are asked to make a national commitment to the cause of political Zionism,—I fear with our eyes half shut,—a commitment whose consequences would be not alone an added tension in a situation already strained by the demands of war, but a revulsion against everything Anglo-American on the part of the Moslem world, already half inclined to seek the guarantors of its destiny elsewhere.

I speak with all consideration when I say that I believe the political Zionists at this moment as distinct from the cultural Zionists who have built the noble Hebrew University and who know what a National Home must be,—I believe the political Zionists to be the chief enemies of the cause of Zionism as well as of the Jewish interests in the world of tomorrow. What can they hope to gain by extricating their brethren from the prejudices of Europe only to build a community in Palestine which has to be protected by Western force (and if we intervene, then by American force also) because it is cradled in an environment of distrust and fear cultivated by their own methods of realizing a misplaced nationalistic ambition?

* A general Arabic honorific title.

NOTES

- 1 W.C. Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of Promise*, pp. 222 f.
- 2 The articles of agreement which Feisal signed with Dr. Chaim Weizmann carried the following rider:
“Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made, I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement, which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.”
George Antonius. *The Arab Awakening*, Supplement.
- 3 All quotations from *Simpson Report*, Cmd. 3686, 1930.
- 4 *Ibid.*
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of Promise*, pp. 158 f.
- 7 Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of Promise*, p. 109.

F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud: The Conference and its Anticlimax* 1945

WILLIAM A. EDDY**

Nothing has been published about the political conversations because nobody who was present has broken his silence. I am now breaking mine.

The King† steadfastly refused to use, quote or show his copy of the memorandum of conversation. He regarded the occasion as one where a personal friendship between two heads of state, and between two men, was established. In his simple Arab view, such friendship depends wholly upon good will and good faith. When these died with F.D.R.‡ and were not revived by his successor, they cannot be resurrected by producing a piece of paper.

As an Arab guest at the meeting, Ibn Saud initiated no topics. He waited for his host to propose subjects for serious discussion. It might be noted in passing that at no time did Ibn Saud even hint at economic or financial aid for Saudi Arabia. He traveled to the meeting seeking friends and not funds, in spite of the fact that, at that date, he had no reason to expect

* From William A. Eddy, *F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud*, Kohinur Series, No. 1 (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 1954), pp. 33-37. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "The Conference". The meeting took place on February 14, 1945 in Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal on board the U.S.S. Quincy. President Roosevelt was on his way back to the U.S. from the Yalta Conference. The sequel or rather anticlimax referred to here is the meeting in Washington in October 1945 between President H. Truman and the heads of the U.S. diplomatic missions in the Arab countries.

** American Marine Officer (1896-1962); was the first U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1944-46.

† Abdul Aziz Al Saud, known as "Ibn Saud."

‡ President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on April 12th, 1945.

that Arabian oil would be produced in quantity to multiply his national income but, on the contrary, ruled in 1945 over a pastoral land which could not produce enough to feed its population, and a land cut off by war from importing the necessities of life.

THE PRESIDENT

After discussing the progress of the war, and expressing his confidence that Germany would be defeated, F.D.R. stated that he had a serious problem in which he desired the King's advice and help; namely, the rescue and rehabilitation of the remnant of Jews in Central Europe who had suffered indescribable horrors at the hands of the Nazis: eviction, destruction of their homes, torture and mass-murder. He, F.D.R., felt a personal responsibility and indeed had committed himself to help solve this problem. What could the King suggest?

Ibn Saud's reply was prompt and laconic: "Give them and their descendants the choicest lands and homes of the Germans who had oppressed them."

F.D.R. replied that the Jewish survivors have a sentimental desire to settle in Palestine and, quite understandably, would dread remaining in Germany where they might suffer again.

The King said that he had no doubt the Jews have good reason not to trust the Germans, but surely the Allies will destroy Nazi power forever and in their victory will be strong enough to protect Nazi victims. If the Allies do not expect firmly to control future German policy, why fight this costly war? He, Ibn Saud, could not conceive of leaving an enemy in a position to strike back after defeat.

In a few minutes, F.D.R. returned to the attack, saying that he counted on Arab hospitality and on the King's help in solving the problem of Zionism, but the King repeated: "Make the enemy and the oppressor pay; that is how we Arabs wage war. Amends should be made by the criminal, not by the innocent bystander. What injury have Arabs done to the Jews of Europe? It is the 'Christian' Germans who stole their homes and lives. Let the Germans pay." Once more, F.D.R. returned to the subject, complaining that the King had not helped him at all with his problem, but the King, having lost some patience, did not expound his views again, beyond stating (with a note of irony in his voice) that this over-solicitude for the Germans was incomprehensible to an uneducated bedouin with whom friends get more consideration than enemies. The King's final remark on the subject was to the effect that it is Arab custom to distribute

survivors and victims of battle among the victorious tribes in accordance with their number and their supplies of food and water. In the Allied camp there are fifty countries, among whom Palestine is small, land-poor and has already been assigned more than its quota of European refugees.

THE KING

Ibn Saud, in his turn, asked F.D.R. for friendship and support. In the conversation the King never seemed to distinguish between F.D.R. as a person and as President of the U.S.A. To an absolute as well as a benevolent monarch, the Chief and the State are the same.

The King stated that his first desire for his land and his people is independence, for which he depends on Allah. Unlike some other Arab lands, his country had never been occupied nor "protected" as a dependent. Without this independence, he would not and could not seek an honorable friendship, because friendship is possible only with mutual and equal respect.

Next to independence, the King said, comes his desire for F.D.R.'s friendship because F.D.R. is known as the champion of the Four Freedoms and of every freedom. Furthermore, the King had found that the U.S.A. never colonizes nor enslaves. In very simple language, such as he must often have used in cementing alliances with tribal chiefs, Ibn Saud then asked F.D.R. for friendship.

The President then gave Ibn Saud the double assurance, repeated just one week before his death in his letter to Ibn Saud, dated April 5, 1945: (1) He personally, as president, would never do anything which might prove hostile to the Arabs; and (2) the U.S. Government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs.¹ To the King, these oral assurances were equal to an alliance; he did not foresee that Death was waiting in the wings to bear the speaker away before the promises could be redeemed. Now that Mr. Dulles has completed the first goodwill tour ever made by an American Secretary of State to the Near East,* Ibn Saud's son and successor, for long his father's closest counselor, may again hope that the promise will be revived.

* John F. Dulles toured the Middle East states in the spring of 1953.

MR. TRUMAN

The historic conference had an anticlimax at the White House which has never been reported.

The first week in October, 1945, the Secretary of State recalled four chiefs of U.S. Missions simultaneously to have them testify as a group to Mr. Truman regarding the deterioration of American political interests in the Near East: the U.S. Ministers in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (jointly), Saudi Arabia, and the Consul-General to mandated Palestine.

The four arrived for a White House appointment which had been scheduled for about October 10.

The four were kept idle in Washington four weeks, away from their posts and with no duties whatsoever, because the White House advisors, including David K. Niles,* persuaded the President that it would be impolitic to see his Ministers to Arab countries, no matter how briefly, prior to the November Congressional elections.

After the elections, the Director of the Near East Office of the Department of State was allowed to bring the four in for a private conference with Mr. Truman. The spokesman for the group, George Wadsworth,** presented orally an agreed statement in about twenty minutes. There was little discussion and the President asked few questions in the meeting whose Minutes have been carefully guarded in the Department of State. Finally, Mr. Truman summed up his position with the utmost candor: "I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."

* David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President and ardent Zionist, played an active liaison role between the White House and Zionist leaders during the Truman Administration, 1945-48.

** George Wadsworth, an American diplomat and expert on the Middle East, served respectively as United States Consul-General in Jerusalem, Minister to Lebanon and Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

NOTE

- 1 The double promise in this paragraph, contained in the letter from F.D.R. to Ibn Saud, April 5, 1945, is the only part of this conference which has ever been published. See *N.Y. Times*, October 19, 1945.

The U.S. and the Arab World* 1939-1945

KERMIT ROOSEVELT**

Prior to the entry of the United States into World War II, American interests in the Middle East were largely private interests privately advanced. The commercial relations and philanthropic activities which American citizens and organizations had developed were such as to win for the United States a unique regard and respect, especially among the peoples of the Arab world. Some Americans have also, since World War I, given extensive financial and moral support to the Zionist cause in Palestine. As with American activity elsewhere in the Middle East, this support was offered, until recently, for humanitarian rather than political ends, and with little concern for the national interests of the United States. The disinterestedness of the American Government was generally recognized, and only the highest motives were attributed to it.

During World War II the position of the United States in the Middle East changed in two respects. First, its economic and strategic interests in the area assumed obvious and increased importance. A national Middle East policy became for the first time an imperative necessity. Secondly, American support of Zionism grew more and more official in character, committing not merely groups of American citizens but the government as well. At the same time, the cause supported came to be a political rather than a purely humanitarian one: this dual development climaxed in the aggressive support given by the United States Government and private citizens at the United Nations General

* This excerpt is taken from the article entitled "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics," published in *the Middle East Journal*, II, No. 1 (1948), 1-13. Reprinted by permission. The rest of the article is reprinted in Part IV, see pp. 727-29

** American expert on Middle Eastern Affairs, author of *Arabs, Oil and History* (New York: Harper, 1949).

Assembly to the proposed partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish political state.*

Are these two processes—recognition of national interests in the Middle East and support of political Zionism—complementary or antagonistic? Almost all Americans with diplomatic, educational, missionary, or business experience in the Middle East protest fervently that support of political Zionism is directly contrary to our national interests, as well as to common justice. How then is our policy to be explained? Parts of the explanation—perhaps the most interesting parts—are still well-kept secrets. But enough is already clear to make an instructive, and disturbing, story.

II

In 1922, by Joint Resolution, the United States Congress proclaimed "That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."¹

This resolution differs in several respects from the Balfour Declaration.² For example, the American declaration fails to include specific protection of "the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country." The most significant difference is that while the British promised to "use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of that object" [the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people], Congress simply "favors" it.

The United States also concluded a convention with Great Britain concerning Palestine in December 1924, but its purpose was to assure to American citizens the same rights in Palestine as those granted to nationals of states belonging to the League of Nations.³ In conversations with British representatives and British Zionists, State Department officials made it clear that the United States Government considered Zionism as a private enterprise and nothing more.

In general this continued to be the position of the United States Government in the period between the wars. So long as Britain was strong in the Middle East, and so long as the political

* See Part IV, pp. 703-43.

leadership of Zionism remained with English Jews, all that Zionists required from the United States was financial assistance from private individuals and resolutions of support from the government.

However, Zionist need of United States support began to grow more acute during the nineteen-thirties as Britain's Palestine policy reflected a growing realization that full support could not be given the Zionists without damaging Arab interests and antagonizing not only Palestinian Arabs but the Arab states as well. In 1939, the British change in policy was expressed in a White Paper* placing a definite limit upon Jewish immigration into Palestine, and seriously restricting the land purchase program of the Zionists already there.⁴ What the Zionists wanted first of all appeared to be American pressure upon the British: British action, rather than direct American action, was still the main goal.** But as the course of war seemed to spell the end of Britain's imperial might, many Zionists decided Britain was too weak a reed on which to rely. Some turned to Russia, but the majority saw their greater hope in the United States. This trend became explicit in 1942 with the visit of Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency, Dr. Weizmann, and other Zionist leaders to the United States. On May 11, at an assembly of American Zionists in New York, the so-called "Biltmore Program"† was approved. It called for the recognition of a Jewish Commonwealth and a Jewish army, urged that responsibility for immigration into Palestine be removed from Britain and vested in the Jewish Agency, and denounced the White Paper of 1939.⁵ Although many Jews in Palestine and the United States opposed the Biltmore Program,⁶ a committee of the General Council of the World Zionist Organization finally endorsed it by a large majority in November 1942. From that moment on the Zionists' efforts were directed toward making use of the United States as, in the past, they had made use of Great Britain.

Zionist pressure to this end was exerted systematically and on a large scale. In 1942 and 1943 resolutions supporting Zionism were introduced in numerous state legislatures. There being no organized opposition, and also no commitment binding the states to any given action, most of these resolutions were passed in routine fashion. This concerted Zionist drive to commit the United States by sheer number of resolutions included also the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., as well as numerous religious and

* On the White Paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

** For the Zionist attitude towards America, see Ben-Gurion, pp. 481-88.

† For the "Biltmore Program," see above, pp. 495-97.

charitable bodies. Many Senators and Congressmen were induced to give public support to Zionism,* but a Congressional resolution on the subject was shelved in 1944 at the request of General Marshall. The Chief of Staff had inquired of our military attachés in the Middle East whether they thought its passage would damage the war effort. On the basis of their replies he concluded that reaction to the resolution would limit the military contribution which could be made from the Middle East to the invasion of France, for if it were passed British and other Allied troops, which could otherwise be used in establishing the Second Front, would be needed to maintain order there. The net result would be a greater drain on American troops and resources.

The proposed resolution stated that "the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."⁷ This was the first official resolution which would have involved expenditure of United States strength in support of Zionism. A few days after it had been shelved, President Roosevelt, following a visit from Zionist leaders, issued a statement supporting Zionist aspirations; but this, like the local state resolutions, involved no immediate action by the United States. Nevertheless, the President's statement marked a significant development. Hereafter, policy on Palestine began to be made in the White House, often against the express advice of the War, Navy, and State Departments, in which opposition to a policy committing the United States to support of Zionism continued, and perhaps increased.

The next step in the growing reliance of the Zionists on the United States was the substitution, in the Jewish Agency and World Zionist Organization, of American for British leaders. This was not a wholly peaceable operation. Britain had been, and was still, the active agent in Zionism—the power responsible under the League of Nations mandate for the administration of Palestine. However, aside from the fact that British Zionists were at a disadvantage in appealing to American Jews, it was becoming clear that American Zionists, through the United States Government, could bring more pressure on the British Government than British Zionists either could or were willing to do. British Zionists would seem to have been aware—as, indeed, British citizens should be—to some extent at least of

* See "Aspects of an American Lobby," pp. 549-56.

British as well as *Zionist* interests, and were frequently reluctant to urge their government to adopt courses of action advocated by the more aggressive Americans. It was becoming increasingly difficult for them to reconcile British over-all interests with the program of such extremists.

The result was that British Zionists became a moderating force in Zionism at a time when extremism was riding high. Their inhibitions as British citizens put them at a disadvantage compared to American Zionists, whose country had no such long established tradition of interests and policies in the Middle East. The climax of the struggle came at the Basle Conference in December 1946, when the conciliatory policy advocated by the grand old man of Zionism, British scientist Chaim Weizmann, was defeated. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver's promises of American support carried the day—and the final vote of the UN Assembly proved his ability to deliver what he had promised.

Whether the campaign to gain American support was good either for Zionism or the Jewish community in general is still a question. The trend it took has widened the gap between Zionist Jews and those considerable numbers of American Jews who fervently oppose setting their race apart as a national group. The extensive publicity attendant upon the Zionist struggle also has made non-Jewish Americans increasingly conscious of the presence of Jews among them and has raised the specter of increased anti-Semitism. So far as their position in Palestine is concerned, the Zionists exchanged the protection of Great Britain and the British army for a United Nations recommendation which the United States, although voting in its favor, may be unwilling or unable to implement.

The answer depends in large measure on the extent to which Zionist aims are beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the United States. For if the American public decides that Zionist pressure has forced this country into difficult straits, the reaction will be quick and unmistakable. The Zionists will then have lost their last powerful friend.

III

At the same time that American Zionist groups were assuming the lead in the fight for a Jewish state and endeavoring to commit the United States Government to its support, the pattern of American interests in the Middle East was being clearly outlined by the events of World War II.

The most dramatic of these was the near loss of the Middle

East by Allied forces to the Axis armies of General Rommel. The British victory at Al-Alamein was made possible in part by the American decision to send military supplies to Egypt at a time when MacArthur and the Russians were pleading for all we could send them. Both MacArthur and the Russians had powerful friends in Washington, but none could deny the tremendous importance of the Middle Eastern theatre to the war as a whole.

German strategy was at fault in not allocating greater forces and matériel to the desert drive. But the German General Staff cannot be accused of underestimating the significance of the area. Captured documents show that the Germans had planned an overwhelming spring campaign in 1943 which was to give them control of the Persian Gulf. The German plans went no further; the General Staff was confident that once Germany held the Middle East, it would have won the war as a whole. With plenty of oil, and its enemies effectively split, the futility of further resistance would be plain to all.

Other captured documents show that to gain the Dardanelles and a foothold in the Middle East, Russia was willing in 1940 to join the Axis and in 1943 to sign a separate peace with Germany. But even then, when the Nazi decline was well underway, Berlin found these demands too steep. Post-war developments make it clear, however, that the Russians have not abandoned the goal. They have tried in Greece, in Turkey, and in Iran to advance toward it. Only the most determined opposition by Britain and the United States has held them in check. It seems logical to conclude that the Soviet support of the partition of Palestine represents Russia's most recent move toward that long established end.

If this conclusion be correct, as many observers believe, the Russian decision on partition was calculated to achieve three objectives: to strengthen the Soviet Union among Zionists everywhere; to gain a military foothold in the Middle East, on the assumptions that partition must be imposed by force and that force used for this purpose by UN must involve Russian participation; and most important, to ensure chaos and confusion in the Middle East by creating, against Arab opposition, a Jewish State surrounded by Arabs. A further reason is suggested by the tone of Russian speeches at UN, which seemed bent on establishing the *principle* of partition. They pleaded the right of a minority to separate itself from the majority and form its own state. Application of this principle to Azerbaijanis and Macedonians, to Kurds and Armenians and other Middle East minorities would suit the Soviets well. The Iron Curtain could be drawn over the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean

by process of partition as well as by any other means.

That the State Department took Soviet Russia into account when considering the Palestine question was one of the accusations made by Mr. Bartley Crum in recounting his experiences as a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry* in 1946.⁸ Yet the seriousness of this offense is difficult to comprehend. Surely an important State Department responsibility is to warn our top officials of pitfalls which will endanger American interests abroad.

If a position in the Middle East was essential to winning the war against Germany, we are now learning that it is equally essential to winning the peace against Soviet Russia. The strategic importance of the lands embracing the eastern Mediterranean cannot be exaggerated, for the area provides a base of operations at the hub of three continents. If an aggressive power became dominant in it, whether by conquest in time of war or by infiltration and revolution in time of peace, the security of a far wider zone would be threatened. The United States can fight against such an eventuality by taking direct action, as it has attempted to do in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, to block the spread of Russian influence toward the Middle East. It can also fight against it by following a policy calculated to assure the political stability and social and economic advancement of the Middle Eastern peoples.

Among other factors which have assumed for the United States new and vital significance in the Middle East are its oil deposits. These deposits are generally recognized to be the greatest pool of oil in the world. If properly developed they could provide Europe with cheap power for the next century. Their importance in the Marshall Plan has been clearly implied but not emphasized. The plan provides for the expenditure of over a billion dollars to reconstruct and expand Europe's refineries and other oil installations. These had best be supplied in large measure with Middle Eastern oil, because oil from there can reach Europe more cheaply than from the Western Hemisphere, and because its use would enable the nations of North and South America to save their resources against a day when no other supplies might be available to them.

Alongside the newer considerations of strategic and commercial interests stands the long tradition of America's disinterestedness in the domestic political affairs of other peoples and its profession of democratic idealism, best expressed in the Middle East through the philanthropic work of private American

* See Williams, pp. 557-74.

organizations. It is very much in the national interest of the United States that the "reservoir of goodwill" engendered by such activity not be squandered. It is the very antithesis of American tradition to play a partisan role in fixing the political destiny of the Arab peoples, especially one in opposition to the expressed wishes of a population's majority. Millions of Middle Easterners regard our official sponsorship of a Jewish state in Palestine as "un-American"; persistence in such a policy will undermine the moral prestige of the United States in this area for years to come.

It is such considerations as these that are very much on the minds of American planners, and it is proper that they should be. They also pose a question which all Americans, Zionists or otherwise, should ponder: Will the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine jeopardize the position of the United States in the Middle East? When all factors are taken into account it is difficult to arrive at anything but an affirmative answer, for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine will disrupt the Arab world and ease the path of Soviet infiltration.

IV

By early 1946 it was clear that the United States had acquired many of the same broad national interests in the Middle East that Britain had had for generations. Peace and security in the area having become important to us, it followed that we should logically share responsibilities there as well. But whereas British Zionists, out of their longer experience, have both perceived and attempted to reconcile the divergence between the welfare of Britain and the advancement of Zionism, recognition of the new situation has not led to a moderation of Zionism in the United States. Quite the contrary.

The end of the war removed the military considerations which had blocked the 1944 Congressional resolution on Palestine. Universal sympathy for the distress and suffering of Europe's displaced persons heightened the emotional appeal of Zionism, although its opponents pointed out that only a portion of them were Jews. They questioned further whether Palestine, or such countries as Brazil, Australia, or the United States, could best provide homes for these refugees. They argued that there was no necessary connection between the humanitarian problem of succoring the displaced persons of Europe and the political problem of creating a new nationalist state in Palestine. Finally, they asked whether it was just to make the Arabs atone

for Europe's sins. However, the Zionists were not to be balked in their aims.

In May 1945 Zionist spokesmen at the San Francisco Conference, in furtherance of the Biltmore Program, urged that the United Nations immediately recognize a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. The UN did not place the item on its agenda, but in August 1945 a World Zionist Conference, meeting in London, endorsed the program and on August 31, President Truman wrote Prime Minister Attlee suggesting that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine at once to relieve the suffering in Europe. Attlee rejected the suggestion, but proposed that an Anglo-American Committee be appointed to study the entire subject.*

In April 1946 the Committee presented a unanimous report recommending the admission of 100,000 as suggested by President Truman and denying the exclusive claim of Arabs or Jews to a state in Palestine. The report rejected partition as a solution and proposed instead continuance of the mandate, "pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations," until existing hostilities shall disappear. The ultimate form of government was vaguely described: "Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew," and the religious rights of Christian, Moslem, and Jew were to be protected in Palestine.⁹

Taken as a whole, the report was an honest effort to grapple with a difficult problem. But almost no one took it as a whole. Zionists found it generally unacceptable except for the recommendation that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine immediately. It is interesting to note that President Truman's public comment singled out that particular recommendation for praise, together with two lesser aspects of the report also favorable to Zionism. Of the rest he remarked that it "deals with many other questions of long-range political policies and international law which require careful study and which I will take under advisement."¹⁰

Another aspect of the report is of great interest and, one hopes, of significance for the future. Certain American members of the Committee were reputed to be Zionist sympathizers before their appointment. Meeting as members of a responsible body representing the United States Government and, therefore, over-all American interests, they joined in approval of a report which went in many respects contrary to Zionist policy. As

* For Attlee's attitude on President Truman's Palestine Policy, see Williams, pp. 557-74.

responsible public officials, in other words, they determined *against* the creation of a Jewish political state in Palestine. Later, as private citizens exposed again to the pressures of political Zionism, they modified their stand. But this does not change, it rather underlines, the significance of the Committee's unanimous vote.

The British Government refused to discuss execution of only one of the Committee's proposals—the famous 100,000—apart from the rest. Another group of Americans and British thereupon assembled in London to discuss ways of carrying out the whole report. In August they came out with a report of their own providing for a complicated cantonal arrangement, which was promptly rejected by Arabs and Zionists and buried with little comment by the American Government. The White House obviously disapproved.

Yet 1946 was an election year, and some stand would have to be taken.* On October 4, President Truman issued a statement calling again for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine. He also supported the Jewish Agency proposal for "the creation of a viable Jewish state in control of its own immigration and economic policies in an adequate area of Palestine. . . ."¹¹

The story behind this statement is simple, and was partially reported at the time.¹² Messrs. Mead and Lehman, good Democrats, were waging a losing campaign for Governor and Senator respectively in New York State. Political leaders believe, though this has never been tested, that Zionists in New York would vote as a bloc and might win or lose an election. In the heat of the campaign, Mead and Lehman informed the White House that a statement favoring Zionism *must* be made immediately, for Dewey, Mead's opponent, was reported to be on the point of issuing one himself.¹³ The White House referred the matter for drafting to the State Department, but was not satisfied with State's first effort. Meanwhile New York called again: if President Truman did not issue a statement, Mead and Lehman would do so, publicly calling upon Mr. Truman to support it. Working under great pressure—domestic political pressure logically unrelated to Palestine—the October 4 statement was produced. It turned out to be one of the most disturbing and fateful ever made about Palestine.**

It was disturbing because it emphasized, more dramatically

* For United States congressional attitudes on Jewish immigration to America, see Divine, pp. 577-93.

** Cf. "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 625-29.

than ever before, but not for the first or last time, the blatant way in which local political concerns may determine American foreign policy. Even the timing was obvious—not only close to election day, but on the eve of an important Jewish religious festival. Many Jews deplored this appeal to deep religious sentiment for obviously political purposes.

It was fateful because of its effect upon the British, who were patiently conducting meetings in London trying to work out a solution and whose negotiations were thrown into confusion by the unexpected intrusion. Mr. Bevin expressed himself strongly at the time, and feeling lingers on. A recent *New York Times* dispatch reports: "The British Government appears to feel that Britain had been well on the way toward a solution of the crisis there [in Palestine] on a cantonal basis when President Truman upset the applecart by making his speech demanding the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews."¹⁴ The effort to win New York votes by promises on Palestine convinced the British that they could not rely on responsible American action in support of a solution there. Once they had reached that conclusion, their withdrawal from the scene was inevitable.

The statement was fateful also because, in President Truman's mind, it committed the United States to thoroughgoing support of partition. Its genesis also re-emphasized the role that was to be allowed the State Department in the formulation of Palestine policy. Shortly after the statement appeared, White House officials warned State that Department personnel must not criticize their government's position. Later, Secretary Byrnes was questioned on what he proposed to do about Palestine. He replied that he had nothing to do with it, he just carried messages.

NOTES

- 1 Text in Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies* (2 vols., New Haven, 1947), vol. I, p. 252.
- 2 Text in *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 107.
- 3 For text, see Department of State, *Mandate for Palestine* (Washington, 1931).
- 4 Great Britain, *Palestine, Statement of policy*, Cmd. 6019 (1939).
- 5 Text in Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1084.
- 6 It is not within the scope of this discussion to trace the development of dissenting groups among the Zionists. Mention might be made, however, of the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement, active in fostering the bi-national concept; the Ihud, founded in Jerusalem in 1942 under the leadership of Dr. Judah Magnes and committed to the same general principle; and in the United States the American Jewish Committee, following somewhat similar lines. At the opposite end of the Zionist scale were the Revisionist extremists: the New Zionist Organization and the Jewish State Party, both advocating the establishment of a Jewish state comprising Transjordan as well as Palestine. Opposition to a Jewish commonwealth, as outlined in the Biltmore Program, came also from anti-Zionist groups, notably the American Council for Judaism, which has consistently repudiated the concept of a Jewish political state in its entirety.
- 7 Text in Esco Foundation, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1115. A similar resolution was finally passed by Congress in December, 1945.
- 8 Bartley C. Crum, *Behind the Silken Curtain* (New York, 1947), pp. 7-8, 31 ff.
- 9 For text and pertinent documents, see Department of State, *Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: Report to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom*, (Washington, 1946).
- 10 *New York Times*, May 1, 1946, p. 14.
- 11 *Ibid.*, October 5, 1946, p. 2.
- 12 See the article by James Reston in *New York Times*, October 7, 1946, p. 4.
- 13 On October 6 Mr. Dewey called for the admission of "not 100,000 but several hundreds of thousands" of Jews into Palestine. *New York Times*, October 7, 1946, p. 5.
- 14 C.L. Sulzberger in *New York Times*, December 8, 1947, p. 12.

A "Displaced Person" in Post-War Germany, 1945-1946*

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK MORGAN**

... But all this and a hundred other puzzles of like nature were of the second order of difficulty when one was confronted with the affairs of Zion. For herein was not only an intolerably complicated political content involving the interests of every major nation but also a military content affecting primarily my own country. For the time being I was, on a temporary loan basis, the servant of forty-eight more or less United Nations, but my permanent status, so to speak, was that of a British General Officer of the Active List. There was every indication that U.N.R.R.A. was being used, more or less willingly, as a convenient agency for the promotion and sustenance of armed aggression by the forces of Zionism against the British garrison stationed in Palestine in fulfilment of the terms of the United Nations Mandate.†

It was fair enough to say that the British members of the higher offices in the Administration cared for none of these things. Their main preoccupation was, understandably, in the matter of supply wherein lay their past experience and aptitudes. To procure the goods and move them was their business. "No politics" enabled them, with no qualm of conscience, to devote, some said, up to 90 per cent of their effort to areas beyond the

* From Frederick Morgan, *Peace And War: A Soldier's Life* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), pp. 234-38 and 243-62. Copyright, © 1961 by Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Morgan K.C.B. Reprinted by permission of Hodder and Stoughton Limited.

** Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) 1943-44, Deputy Chief of Staff to Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944-45, Chief of U.N.R.R.A. (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) Operations in Germany, 1945-46.

† Cf. "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600, and "White Paper on Violence," pp. 601-12.

Iron Curtain. D.P.s and Refugees were to them a side issue that must not be allowed to become a nuisance.

But this was far from being the case in quarters other than British. In both U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. there were interested parties quick to perceive that U.N.R.R.A. by the very nature of its constitution, its hasty composition, its lack of organization or discipline offered a hell-sent opportunity for all kinds of mischief to their own advantages, which differed widely from the proclaimed objectives of those pure-minded, high-souled philanthropists whose brain waves had brought it into being.

I was, I suppose I should say, unlucky, in that I had as it were grown up over the past few years in the general international situation that now in 1945, existed throughout Europe. I was, moreover, by virtue of my cloth and calling, in touch with the elaborate information-gathering network that had been built up through the war so recently ended, with the security organization, such of it that survived the disruptive forces of demobilization. Which enabled me to build up in my mind's eye a picture of events taking place around me that had little appeal.

All who have experienced it know the loneliness of high command even when, as in the orthodox case, one is surrounded by a trusting and trusty staff of all grades working in one's immediate support. Here and now there was nothing of the sort, hardly an individual whom one could trust with information of which one could not disclose to them, being uninitiated, the sources, or who could, if indeed they would, understand what was at stake. On the contrary, there were many in my immediate entourage who could not fail to be actively implicated in what was nothing short of a skilful campaign of anti-British aggression on the part of Zion aided and abetted by Russia.

My information told me that organized from U.N.R.R.A. offices in Warsaw there were two collecting centres in Poland for Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, at Lodz and Katowice.* The refugees were transported to Berlin by rail or road and thence by similar means to Western Germany. The bulk of the traffic was by lorry convoy which arrived during darkness, the passengers mainly vanishing into the night. The convoys were said to be of American trucks driven by men in what looked to be American uniform. In the case of rail movement in many instances the passengers would dismount at wayside halts and disappear into the countryside. There were several U.N.R.R.A. camps exclusively for Jewish D.P.s and refugees of which it was

* Cf. J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23.

never possible to get any accurate census. Their populations fluctuated by no perceptible system. These Jewish camps were, with one notable exception, in the U.S. Zone of occupation, one near Frankfurt, the rest near Munich. The one camp in the British Zone was near the site of the notorious Nazi horror camp at Belsen. This latter had been bulldozed out of existence as soon as its rescued survivors had been removed. The accommodation given to D.P.s and refugees consisted of first-class German army barracks as good as any in Europe but, of course, the name Belsen had tremendous propaganda value. When bogus complaint making play with the name became too insistent, offer was made by General Sir Gerald Templar, on behalf of the British C.-in-C., of any alternative housing the inmates of "Belsen" might care to select in all the British Zone. The offer was at once refused, was, moreover, distorted into an attempt to inflict further hardship on these unlucky people. So Belsen remained for years as a staging post on the Zionist migration route and, further, was built up as the most efficient centre of every other form of illegal traffic with ramifications throughout Europe and many other parts of the world.

The camp at Zeilsheim, near Frankfurt, was skilfully used to reinforce points of Zionist propaganda of which the general object seemed to be to indicate to the world that those Jews who had survived the Nazi terror were being treated little, if any, better by the western conquerors who were now doing their utmost best for all, including Jews. If the propaganda of the moment alleged that Jewish D.P.s were being overcrowded in their camps then inspection of Zeilsheim would be invited, when it would be found full to the roof-tops. If the cry was one of starvation, the cookhouses of Zeilsheim would be found empty. If clothing were said to be short then the Zeilsheim population would be found shivering in rags. And so forth, with consummate skill.

Not only did one admire the skill of the Zionist propaganda campaign, but even more so the whole organization of the ceaseless movement of great numbers of these poor people across war-torn Germany, wherein legitimate movement was a highly problematical business, down into Austria into Italy and Yugoslavia for shipment, often in circumstances of terrifying danger, to Palestine.

The whole business was represented as being the spontaneous surge of a tortured and persecuted people toward their long-lost homeland. I fancy that, in reality, there were few among the travellers who, of their own free will, would have gone elsewhere than to the U.S.A. One could well appreciate the

urgent desire of most of them to get out of Europe, those who did not command the resources to exploit the confusion in which that continent now lay, wide open to the "entrepreneur". But from my post of observation I was able to perceive, as I fancy few others were, something of the immense driving force at the back of this whole migration. At my own Headquarters, among the staffs of the "Voluntary Agencies" was that of the American Joint Distribution Committee, so called, in effect an important element of the Zionist General Staff for Europe. The personnel of this staff were of an outstanding competence that would have been remarkable even against a much less turgid background than that afforded by U.N.R.R.A.'s own employees. In the Jewish Camps there was an iron discipline exercised by men who have, I am certain, since made names for themselves on the Levantine battlefields where Israel has now emerged as a military power out of all proportion to the number of its inhabitants. We of the West have tended to forget that Israel has a military history as remarkable as any. I met in the camps those who might well be lineal descendants of the Maccabees of old.

All of which put me in a position of inextricable difficulty. My task and that of U.N.R.R.A., as I saw it, was to care for D.P.s and Refugees temporarily in the camps in Germany pending their repatriation. At the outset there was no question of U.N.R.R.A. organizing any form of resettlement elsewhere than in their homelands of those who for any good reason refused repatriation. It was logical therefore that the camps should be set up on a racial basis, Poles here, Balts there, Ukrainians elsewhere and so on. Was one therefore to conclude that Jews were to be regarded as a separate racial group? In my innocence I asked my chiefs the question that was continually being put to me, "What is U.N.R.R.A.'s attitude or policy in relation to Jewish problems?" There was none such. No politics. I was left therefore to sort out as best I could the enigma presented by the evolution of a system of welfare that should appeal equally to Jewish Americans, British Jews, Palestinians, Israelis as suitable to those who, up till now, had been Russians, Poles, Balts or citizens of other European countries. There was not, there never could be, there were those who intended that there should not be, any solution.

Needless to say this whole confused picture did not disclose itself at once. It was built up as a result of my first weeks of experience in Germany during which, at every turn, new vistas of depressing confusion, incapacity and skulduggery came into sight.

How was I to celebrate Christmas, the festival of good will,

right there in the heart of the shambles that had been Europe? It seemed a good moment at which to sit back for a short period and tot up the score. What had been done, what did one aim to do next?...

* * *

...What seemed to me a good idea for the moment was put to me by my "public relations" adviser, one Leo Margolin of New York, a character of the type that I had always thought to exist only in the imagination of Hollywood script-writers. A ball of fire strung together with live wires is a fair enough description. His conversation consisted exclusively of Headlines and Stop Press Flashes punctuated solely with quotes and exclamation marks. But I am sure that even he, in his most sanguine moments, could not have anticipated the outcome of any acceptance of his suggestion.

It was at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 2nd January 1946, that, all unwitting, I rose to address my first Press Conference at the Park Hotel, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany. Someone had produced the usual "hand-out" that made no sort of sense except for a few tepid mis-statements. In my innocence I consented to answer questions, omitting to invoke the traditional safeguard, "off the record." Not, I fancy, that this would have had any effect in this particular instance, because I was chosen for sacrifice, as after events clearly showed.

The very skilful questioning concerned itself solely with the Zionist problem and I found myself giving the result of my several weeks of investigation of the business, summing it all up by saying that in my view we were witnessing an admirably organized "Second Exodus", this time from Europe.

As I afterwards discovered this phrase had been used earlier in American papers by various of their correspondents. It was later used again as a result of official enquiries by the British Foreign Office and others. But its use by me, here and now, apparently was the stuff of which journalistic "scoops" are made.

There was an ugly rush from the room to get the red-hot words on the way to the Presses. Whereafter two or three of the correspondents came back to assure me that if, as a result of what they had done, I found myself in any difficulty, they would be only too delighted to help me! All of which, I must confess, puzzled me considerably. If in any doubt, the principle was, one should tell the truth. I had told the truth as I saw it. The devil had surely been shamed.

But that was not how others saw it at all. Toward evening the London Headquarters of U.N.R.R.A. came on the telephone

in a mixed atmosphere of sorrow, anger and panic to ask me just what I had been at. I did my best to administer calm, but when there was read out to me a selection of the headlines in the London evening papers I must admit that there did seem grounds for a certain unquiet. And when, in a few hours, the New York headlines appeared it was obvious that my child-like endeavour to set the record straight had been used as the detonator to set off an explosion of some magnitude that must have been carefully prepared. The mildest of my detractors labelled me simply as brazenly anti-semitic. There was no upper limit to the villainy of which I was accused. To the extent that the great comedian who entertained us in our cinemas for so many years under the name of Eddie Cantor gave me his biggest laugh ever by announcing in a full-page spread of the *New York Times* that, in his opinion, I was no less than a reincarnation of the late A. Hitler!

But laughter was in short supply and I was obliged to devote my attention almost entirely for a period to countering the efforts of the craven who instinctively thought of nothing but precipitate retreat in the face of this old-fashioned Chinese attack full of sound and fury but signifying nothing.

It was assumed that I should immediately resign from U.N.R.R.A. and, to ease the passing, the London office very kindly composed a tear-jerking statement of abject humiliation and surrender, on grounds not precisely stated since none such existed, that they were prepared to issue on my behalf. This having been read to me, at dictation speed, over the telephone I was able to compliment the author but regret that he should have so far troubled himself since I had no slightest intention of resigning. Which was unfortunately too late to stop the announcement that I had resigned being given out on the American Forces radio network next morning. Attempt was then made to suborn my British Deputy to take over from me by telling him that I had been recalled to Army duty. A telephone call to the War Office proved this in the shortest of order to be an untrue statement.

It was not until long afterwards that I was able to figure out just what all the fuss was about. At the time and from where I was experiencing it, the whole episode amounted to considerably more than just a fuss. For my part I had been able to piece together a reasonably comprehensive picture of the way in which the U.N.R.R.A. set-up was being most skilfully used to promote what was nothing less than a Zionist campaign of aggression in Palestine. In defiance of the prohibition by the British Mandatory power, reluctant as ever to employ decisive means,

the admirably organized Zionist command was employing any and every means of forcing immigration into the country irrespective of the hardship and sufferings of the immigrants, few of whom seemed to have any spontaneous enthusiasm for the Zionist cause.

The whole project evidently had Russian connivance, if not actual support, since its success would conduce to the elimination of British authority in a vital area of the Middle East.* Running through the welter of chaos that was Europe there could be seen the Jewish network of communication and movement starting in Poland, through Berlin, to Hamburg, to Frankfurt, to Munich. Thence the line went through Southern France, through Austria to Italy and Yugoslavia and so by sea in chartered vessels, often of highly dubious seaworthiness, towards the goal which was any point on the shore of Palestine.

To the world at large the whole operation was presented as a spontaneous surge of the survivors of hideous oppression towards the peace and safety of the homeland so long and so wickedly denied to them. Seen from among the participants it did not look quite like that. Except for a few ardent devotees with the light of fanaticism in their eye I was never able to discover any great enthusiasm for the cause among the many to whom I spoke. In the camps all were subjected to ingenious and ceaseless propaganda. Admirable training was given in the organization and operation of the "Kibbutzim", the teams that would be charged with the duty of opening up, and maintaining, the new settlements in Palestine.

In spite of my temporary international status I could not exclude from my mind the thought that the ultimate aim of all this endeavour was death to the British.

To distract attention from all this subversive activity there was a fine show of charitable endeavour. Jewish charities poured out money and Jewish organizations were tireless in seeking preferential help for their people in all quarters. I fancy I first aroused animosity by refusing to support a plea to the U.N.R.R.A. high quarters that, as a suitable gesture, there should be presented an egg to each Jewish D.P. at the Administration's expense as a Passover gift. As I thought reasonable I said I would only do so provided that every non-Jewish D.P. were to receive an Easter egg. As is the unhappy custom in such dealings my attitude was roundly described as anti-semitic.

Powerful propaganda was at work to create the general impression that the vast majority of the victims of Nazi bestiality

* See Kramer, pp. 745-54.

had been Jews. As a result of which there came to be a widely held belief that all D.P.s. were Jews, that U.N.R.R.A. was a Jewish organization. The success of this propaganda, I believe, began to have a generally adverse effect on Zionist aims and it was to counter this adverse effect that the proceedings at my little Press Conference at Frankfurt were ripped out of their context and used as a means to keep the sorrows of Israel aflame in the eyes of the world.

There was little need, in all conscience, to add emphasis to the desperate plight of these wretched people. Millions of Christians must have shared the horrors of Nazi bestiality with them but they alone had been persecuted for racial reasons. These same reasons made it impossible for them to find even that queer companionship in misfortune that seemed to be generated among refugees of nationality groupings, even in the miseries of D.P. camps. In most camps one found efforts, often heartrendingly pathetic but still efforts, to recapture something of human dignity and decency. In the multi-national Jewish camps there was in general an all-prevading apathy towards such basic problems as those of hygiene and sanitation, of minor maintenance of living quarters or furniture. Partly it was of course that these people were for the most part used to standards of existence bordering on the primitive, but there was also the influence of their Zionist mentors urging them to do nothing to detract from the atmosphere of migration with loins constantly girt.

However it was, there was deemed to be need to bring the wrongs of Judah into the world's headlines again, and I was chosen as the victim of sacrifice. I have always subscribed to the principle that in normal circumstances one should neither solicit, nor refuse, nor yet resign a public appointment. I had certainly not sought the position I now held. Probably unwisely in this instance I had not refused to accept it. There could be no question of resigning under the form of attack that had developed against me with no charges formulated.

It was fortunate that I had had experience of the psychological atmosphere of a higher headquarters in battle, experience that had not been shared by those in the higher echelons of the U.N.R.R.A. command. I declined all invitations to visit London to discuss my situation, since no convincing reason could be offered for so doing. I insisted on referring my case to the Director General himself, in spite of being told that he was incapacitated by illness.

I felt I had to take this somewhat distasteful step—one has a natural dislike for projecting oneself into the forefront of

somewhat unsavoury public dispute—by reason of the fact that newspaper clamour had built me up into some kind of figurehead as defender of D.P.s against oppression. There seemed no sort of clarity or unanimity as to the source and character of such oppression but I was the recipient of many and often touching messages and gestures of "support" in my refusal to give way to the pressures being exerted to unseat me.

I was summoned to Washington D.C., as I had hoped might be the case, there to make report to Governor Herbert Lehmann, a man of considerable substance upon whom, though himself a Jew, I knew I could rely for balanced judgment. What his judgment would be I was already aware, thanks to kind friends, before setting out on my journey. It was now a matter of "face," a building a "golden bridge" whereon all concerned might meet and be seen to be in harmony.

This trip to the U.S.A. was a sharp contrast with my last, in 1943, when, as G.O.S.S.A.C.,* I had travelled virtually "incognito", carefully insulated from all forms of publicity. Things were now at the other extreme. The Fleet Street pack were in full cry and the chase was taken up in Canada, were there was a short halt, until I was followed "to earth", in New York, where the climax of the affair was to be reached. There was a fitness in this since New York is the home of Zionism and it was with the forces of Zionism that I had to contend rather than with those of U.N.R.R.A.—if, in fact, U.N.R.R.A. could be deemed to be capable of exerting any sort of force.

As is the way in such affairs, it all came down to the arrangements of words on a scrap of paper. I was supplied with a draft for publication of a joint statement by the Governor and myself which formed the basis of our discussion at his luxurious apartment on Park Avenue. He obviously hated the whole business as much as I did but he, poor man, had much more at stake than had I. Goodness knows what lay at the back of his mind, but looming large to him must have been the matter of Zionist voting power in relation to his senatorial ambitions. They order these things differently in the U.S.A. As we neared agreement, I became conscious of the unreality of the whole affair, of how little practical significance there was in any of it. First came powerful temptation to fling the whole thing in the poor little man's teeth and suggest to him what he might do with his paper, his U.N.R.R.A., himself and everything else. But I managed to remember the admirable precept to count ten, slowly, before committing myself to a course that would do no

* "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander."

good to anyone but might create widespread disappointment and unhappiness among the many who seemed to have seen in my mission so much more than was apparent to me. Instead, I was able to laugh—which seemed to disconcert my interlocutor more than a little—and to plagiarize the Duke of Wellington in telling him virtually that, so far as I was concerned, he could “publish and be damned.”

The relaxation of tension was immediate and dramatic and, as we parted, the Governor asked me to meet him in Washington as early as might be next day since he obviously had visions of the joint Press Release being illustrated with photographs of the two of us in attitudes of cordial embrace on the steps of his U.N.R.R.A. Headquarters in the Dupont Circle.

I regretted not being able to meet him on this since I was most anxious to keep a date for lunch next day in New York with ex-President Hoover. The simile for horrified recoil is often given as that of Beelzebub confronted by holy water. Comparable I found to the mention of the name of a Republican ex-President in the United States in the presence of an aspirant Democratic Senator. I took advantage of his stupefaction to withdraw and seek relaxation, ways and means of escape from the unwholesome atmosphere of U.N.R.R.A. The super-efficient American telephone service put me in immediate touch with many friends of former eras. The British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, who for a period in 1942 had been my “landlord” in Yorkshire when my Corps H.Q. had been billeted in one of his houses, promptly invited me to stay at the Embassy. I thought best to warn him that there seemed a possibility of my recent exploits putting me in the *persona non grata* class. He promised to consult “the more timid of his advisers” and to ring me back, which he kindly did. General Eisenhower, now Chief of Staff of the United States Army, would have me report to him at the Pentagon in Washington as soon as might be. I resolved to spend the rest of my stay in the States as nearly as possible on this super-V.I.P. level.

My tête-à-tête lunch with President Hoover next day did all that was necessary to restore my morale which, on reflection, I found to have been under considerable strain during my single combat with Zion that had gone on so long. His views on U.N.R.R.A. and all its works could bear no sort of reproduction, specially since it was he who had organized and conducted with such skill the great American Relief Operation in Eastern Europe at the close of the First World War. At the time when the setting-up of U.N.R.R.A. was in contemplation he had immediately volunteered for service once more together with some ninety

of those who had served on the job with him in 1919, to have his offer rejected out of hand by the Roosevelt Democratic administration. Who am I to comment upon the internal affairs of another country? U.N.R.R.A. might be, and probably was, the most ineffectual and inefficient outfit the world has yet known. Yet, as I have said, it had no politics. Or had it?

Reunion with General Eisenhower was even more joyful than I had anticipated. The Pentagon was swarming with good friends and as I walked into Ike's room there came the grinning welcome with the words, "Come on in, boy. The great thing about being in the dog-house is the good company you meet there." I forget what particular trouble he was in at the moment but we were most of us in trouble of one sort or another in those days. We had a happy hour fighting our battles over again.

I thought it only right to pay my respects to that great character Bernard Baruch* to learn, if possible, how my recent imbroglio with certain of his co-religionists looked from his great eminence. Rather to my relief I found it quite impossible to talk to him since he was wearing an old-fashioned-looking hearing aid which he kept almost permanently switched off. There was no need for any contribution from me, since he had obviously taken the trouble to inform himself through his personal grapevine of my current doings and misdoings. This was most flattering in one who, in some occult fashion, interests himself in the affairs of all the world. I was more than somewhat taken aback to hear him congratulate me on my conduct of the U.N.R.R.A. affair.

Not that there was much matter for congratulation. For in visiting the U.N.R.R.A. G.H.Q. in Dupont Circle I was astonished to sense at once the confused impotence reigning among the mob of Chiefs, Directors, Controllers, Counsellors, Special Assistants and bearers of many other high-sounding titles. Just one individual there was who made sense of a sort. This was Comrade Mikhail Menshikov, Soviet Citizen, who was dubbed Chief of Relief Services. Since, as I had learnt in Berlin, the U.S.S.R. had no interest in D.P.s and Refugees, one doubted if indeed they cared much about Relief or Rehabilitation. But U.N.R.R.A., as the Zionists were showing, constituted an admirable means of undercover evasion of all kinds of tiresome restrictions that, even in this era of postwar confusion, were hampering the efforts of the ill-intentioned. U.N.R.R.A. uniform, such as it was, and U.N.R.R.A. "travel documents", both of which were easily come by, were a form of international

* For Baruch, see below, p. 734, note.

passport and were freely used by many who had no least right to them. Part of the training of the export-type Russian official must be to control facial expression. The cold snake-eyes tell one no more than the forbidding rows of stainless steel teeth bared to simulate the "Western" smile. But it did just seem to me that Comrade Menshikov was finding it hard to believe that anything so inefficient as U.N.R.R.A. could exist, that his task could really be so easy of accomplishment. This task, I am sure, was to see that, in so far as U.N.R.R.A. was able to function at all, it did so to Russia's maximum advantage. A ridiculously small number of Russian officials sufficed for the purpose, all highly trained men with much experience of foreign trade. A couple in Washington, a couple in London, two Russian Chiefs of U.N.R.R.A. Mission, as one might expect in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Then, by some very adroit coup, two Russian provinces, Byelorussia and the Ukraine, were made recipients of U.N.R.R.A. largesse. I felt that had Menshikov been capable of human feeling he would have hugged himself with delight. From his U.N.R.R.A. success he had never looked back and has survived many years of service in Moscow in the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and other Soviet Ministries to become his country's ambassador to the U.S.A.

Any doubts as to whether I had got my picture of U.N.R.R.A. all wrong were put at rest during my short stay at the British Embassy. Here I was told unequivocally that, having closely watched the whole U.N.R.R.A. enterprise from its inception, the ambassadorial staff were firmly of the opinion that the world had never previously seen such universal incompetence as existed throughout the organization.

It was good to be quit of the U.N.R.R.A. atmosphere for a space, after a series of futile conversations with a vast variety of people none of whom seemed to have any contact with reality. A short but hectic stop-over in New York, which gave rise to a last snarl from those small sections of the Press that had not recanted in my favour, and I could relax during the flight eastward again with thoughts of what lay ahead now that I had been "reprieved".

On arrival in London I was bidden to the Foreign Office where the Secretary of State would receive me. I must admit to a certain feeling of apprehension as to the view that might be taken in Government circles of all these quaint goings-on of which I had been the storm-centre. I was not reassured by the attitude of the senior officials whom I was privileged to meet at their tea-break, during which they entertained themselves and each other with a flow of erudite and allusive badinage. When

eventually Ernest Bevin was free to see me I was escorted to the presence by two solemnities in such manner as to create in my mind the impression that either I was an errant schoolboy being led to execution by the Headmaster or a defaulter being marched before the Commanding Officer.

In the event it was much otherwise. As I entered his room Ernest Bevin* came to greet me with his broad grin and the welcoming words, "Well, General, I see you've been like me lately, 'ittin' the 'eadlines." I apologized if, by my antics, I had done anything to make his task any harder. With hearty laughter he assured me that such a thing would be impossible. After light-hearted exchange of comment on this and that he then told me to write to him if ever I wanted his help and to keep him in touch with what went on. I thought fit to remind him that, much as I valued this offer of help, the fact remained that I was for the time being the servant of many nations while he spoke for one only. "Never mind that," said he, "don't write officially or to the office at all, write to me personally, Ernest Bevin." Which was a good note on which to part, "with mutual expressions of good will," as they say. But in the event it did not work out. I don't know if he realized, as I certainly did not, the impenetrability of the bureaucratic insulation that surrounds a Minister of State. When, later, finding myself once more embattled, I tried to take advantage of Ernest Bevin's kind offer of help, all I got was the stereotyped Whitehall brush-off.

It was rather wonderful to be back on the job in Germany again, ostensibly purged of my offences, whatever they had been. Anyhow, that was how it seemed to appear at least to the non-Jewish elements of U.N.R.R.A. both on the Staff and in the camps. But personally I had few illusions. I felt in my bones that my number was up, that having miraculously withstood the first assault and in so doing upset somebody's plans, I was marked out as a target for a second attempt and that this time there would be no escape. There was intense fascination in watching and listening for the next onslaught.

But my personal affairs and prospects were of minor importance beside those of the D.P.s and Refugees, and I hastened to set about meeting more and more of them. First was the necessity to complete formal agreements with American and French commands, thus at last superseding the old S.H.A.E.F.** Agreement. There was an astonishing, though significant, difference between the two ceremonies of signature

* For Bevin, see Bullock, pp. 313-14, and Williams, pp. 557-74.

** "Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces."

at Frankfurt and Baden-Baden respectively. The American signature was that of the Chief of Staff of the Forces in Germany given in his room in the I.G. Farben building. So little importance was (quite rightly) attached to the affair that no duplicate copy of the script was provided and I accepted as mine the scruffy file copy with its many amendments and erasures.

Whereas the French ceremony in its elaboration rivalled the studios of Hollywood combined with the culmination of an international negotiation of the highest import. No less than twelve times did I sign my name, each movement of hand or pen being recorded by movie and still cameras, by commentators and correspondents. There was *vin d'honneur* to revive one, there was a magnificent guard of honour provided by the Foreign Legion, a platoon of spade-bearded cut-throats each of not less than twenty years' service, there was sumptuous *déjeuner*.

It was during the next few weeks that I was able, ignoring the feeling of doom that lay at the back of my mind, to travel widely over Western Germany from Berchtesgaden to Kiel, and verify by inspection the impressions built up in my mind by the over many hours spent at the higher U.N.R.R.A. Headquarters in conflict with the management. At last I was able to get among the management's victims and learn something from them, at first hand, of the resilience of the human spirit in ultimate misfortune.

There came a summons once more to Washington. At last there had been found a successor to Governor Lehmann as Director-General of U.N.R.R.A. This was the widely known character Fiorello La Guardia who, in some years as Mayor of New York, had acquired for himself a reputation at least as a colourful showman. As I had found out in the past years, it is not easy to make an assessment of a man's value solely by deductions from press reports. Specially would this be the case with American press reports of a Mayor of New York. So I was glad to be given opportunity for personal contact. And even more glad to be accompanied therefor by my American Deputy Chief in Germany, Major-General Philip E. Brown, retired at the War's end from the U.S. Army. Phil Brown had acquainted himself in some detail with the situation in Europe. He was the shrewdest of observers whose natural abilities in this direction had been sharpened by some years of duty as an Inspector-General. As such he had travelled widely on the war fronts, forming opinions and assessing situations and personal values on which to report to the Chief of Staff of the Army. It was of inestimable value to be briefed by such an expert on the shape

of things to come to us. Now all was sound and fury. Wisecracks were shouted into telephones. Here was the fabled "High-Powered Executive" in thunderous action. But one wondered. As Phil Brown had said, being Mayor of New York was pretty small beer in comparison with this world-wide assignment to the "Big League" of international strategy and politics.

It was quickly evident that rumours regarding the Mayor's dislike for all soldiers were true. It was further clear that he was well briefed as to my recent brush with Zion. The question that he had brought me over the Atlantic to ask of me was a shrewd one. "What in hell," said he, "are we doing in Germany anyway?" There was no convincing answer to that one other than that, as I told him, the D.P.s and Refugees in Germany would undoubtedly be better off without U.N.R.R.A. as an organization. All concerned would have been better off in care of the Armies of Occupation assisted, maybe, by certain of the U.N.R.R.A. Team personnel at work in the camps, provided always that these could be subjected to a considerable purge.

We were invited by Comrade Menshikov to attend a small meeting whereat we might inform those interested of the state of affairs in Germany. In the event what it came to was a vicious verbal assault upon us by the U.N.R.R.A. representatives of the U.S.S.R., "Warsaw" Poland and Yugoslavia charging us with deliberate obstruction of the flow of repatriation. There was refusal to accept the truthful statement that the existing means of transportation were fully adequate to convey the small numbers of those who wished to travel. It was evident that these communist characters had gone far to terrorize their non-communist colleagues into taking no part in discussion of this sort. It was left to Phil Brown and to me to do our best to withstand the assaults of those who were so plainly our enemies.

So back to Germany with the very distinct impression that our D.P. and Refugee business was marked down for attack from across the Iron Curtain and that we could expect no help from U.N.R.R.A. in defence of the wretched victims of such attack, namely the D.P.s and Refugees themselves.

The Director-General had announced his intention of visiting a number of U.N.R.R.A. Missions in the field to see for himself. A very right and proper course. His itinerary was set to approach Germany from Southward by way of North Africa and Yugoslavia. I much looked forward to showing him something of our problems on the ground in the short time that he could devote to what was, after all, in many ways a minor U.N.R.R.A. activity.

First account of the Mayor's arrival in Africa came to me

in a letter signed by the Camp Committee of a D.P. camp in Egypt housing Yugoslavs. It was, of course, none of my business, but it was symptomatic that these poor people wrote to me their bitter complaint of the way in which the Director-General had addressed them, rebuking them harshly for skulking in the camp and not returning home to help in the rebuilding of their country. They went so far as to assert that they had never been so reviled even by the Nazi enemy. No attention whatever had been paid to their vigorous assertions that they were King Peter's* people and wanted nothing of communism.

I was at a loss to know just what to do, and thought it best to regard the episode as a natural result of first meeting between a highly flamboyant Italian-American and a bunch of depressed expatriates who had hoped to hear of relief from the miseries of their D.P. years.

Then I heard and read of the considerable fraternization between the Mayor and Marshal Tito, shortly whereafter I greeted the Mayor at Munich, the focal point of the Jewish D.P. camps in the U.S. Zone and a key point on the Zionist illegal traffic to Palestine. Without any prompting from me, but greatly to my relief, the U.S. Army had taken elaborate precautions to counter any possible disturbance in the camps or in Munich itself. I vainly tried, during his short visit, to give the Director-General some account of what was going on both as a result of Zionist activities and of the infiltration of Russian agents, all under U.N.R.R.A. colours. He was not interested, so little interested that during our only tête-à-tête, whereat I could at last tell the whole story without having to make allowance for unknown listeners, he fell into a deep sleep.

It soon became evident that the Director-General was working to a plan, his plan. Chief interest lay with the Jewish camps. For the rest, among Poles, Balts and others there was thinly disguised impatience with these people who were not gladly hurrying back to their fatherlands. When asked their reasons for not so doing their answers were brushed aside as imagination based on propaganda stories. Until it came to a meeting with the wife of a senior Esthonian Army officer—might be the widow for all she knew since she had seen or heard nothing of her husband for seven years.

"My good woman," said the Mayor, "you cannot surely believe all this nonsense you have been telling me." Came the answer, under great emotion, "Not only do I believe it to be

* King Peter II of Yugoslavia succeeded to the throne in 1934. After his deposition by the Germans in 1941, he set up his government in London.

true. I know it to be so."

The tense atmosphere in which the whole affair was conducted was heightened beyond measure by the presence in the Director-General's suite of a Russian, one Feonov, addressed by his travelling companions with transparent false bonhomie as "Nikki". Care was taken by the Mayor to make this Russian presence known to all and sundry, whereupon the looks of frozen horror on the faces of the bystanders and their rapid withdrawal from his close vicinity were eloquent in the extreme.

It was abundantly clear now just what was afoot. The Director-General had obviously no sort of interest in the humanitarian side of affairs. All that mattered to him was that the resources of U.N.R.R.A. should be devoted as far as possible to the support of Zionist ambitions which should have beneficial results on his political campaign back in New York. Here again, as in other instances, was the impact of domestic United States politics upon affairs abroad—the counterpart, as it were, of the oft-repeated charges made against the British of attempting to shape their strategy with a view more to the political future than to the military present.

It was not until some years later that I got confirmation of the extremes to which Mayor La Guardia was prepared to go to further his personal interests. It seems that the true inwardness of the ostensibly cordial visit with President Tito in Belgrade in 1946 was not, as the publicity at the time would have had us believe, to fraternize over friendly games of chess. At the time Yugoslavia, in its state of desperate devastation, was largely dependent on supplies received through the instrumentality and at the cost of U.N.R.R.A. for the country's continued coherence. The Mayor was thus able to enlist President Tito's active support for the Zionist immigration project, from central and eastern Europe to Palestine, on the understanding that if such help were not given U.N.R.R.A. supplies would be withheld. It had not been my affair at the time but it brought confirmation, years later, of the general state of U.N.R.R.A. affairs that I had been able to build up in my mind in 1946.

The principal object of the Director-General's trip to North Africa and Europe was to preside over the meeting of the U.N.R.R.A. Council, the governing body of the organization composed of representatives of those countries who subscribed to its principles. Few did so in cash or kind, the vast majority doing so purely verbally for what they might be able to get out of it. U.N.R.R.A. had been regarded from its inception as a purely temporary expedient and it had come to be understood that it would die with the year 1946. Which idea was naturally

most unwelcome to the receivers of U.N.R.R.A. charity who were planning to raise spirited and heartrending protest at the Council meeting now in prospect. Which meeting was to be held in the full glare of the world's publicity at the Palais des Nations at Geneva, that great whited sepulchre of so many high hopes.

All "Heads of U.N.R.R.A. Missions" were bidden to the party, including of course myself. This, apparently to add to the dignity and importance of the occasion. So far as I was able to discover, not one of us was consulted in any way about our business. I suppose it was wrong of me not to do as others were doing, to let it ride and stand idly by and allow this mass of corruption that was U.N.R.R.A. to drift slowly into oblivion. It would all be the same, as the saying is, in a hundred years hence, so why butt in? A lot of people were doing very well out of it, few of whom had any right to do so, but business is, after all, business. In terms of cash the figures were impressive. I had met the unhappy individual who in May 1946 had taken on the task of preparing some sort of account. He had told me, at that time, that out of a total of some 2,900 million dollars so far subscribed, only 23 millions had been accounted for. It was up to him to chase the rest. I have often wondered how much, if any, of the rest he was able to catch up with.

But this side of the affair was of small concern to me. It was not even as if I was paid by U.N.R.R.A., who merely supplemented my British Army pay to bring it up to the rate I should have received as a Lieutenant-General in command, the War Office having most economically declined to do more than pay me at the minimum rate for my rank. My interests lay elsewhere. Primarily my sympathies were with the D.P.s and Refugees for whose welfare I deemed myself committed. The more I had seen of them and the better I got to know them the more had I come to resent the general attitude, both within and without U.N.R.R.A., that these were worthless pawns to be shuffled across the board until something should turn up that would dispose of them from among us. To our friends and colleagues from across the Iron Curtain it was a simple matter of "liquidation". Though the westerners could not quite go with this theory, their proposed methods of disposal did not do them much credit, to bribe all bribable with gifts of food, clothing and transportation to go back home where they would certainly find work which we could not organize for them. It was not tactful to mention the conditions of slavery to which they would be returning. Any who refused the generous terms offered could sit about in our camps at the mercy of the highly paid U.N.R.R.A. staffs while the question of their ultimate fate was

discussed by the world's politicians, each anxious to pass responsibility to the other.

It was, I suppose, presumption on my part to try to get the record straight, to try to indicate to the world at large that this U.N.R.R.A. was not quite what its powerful propagandists had made it out to be, all sweetness and light, all disinterested charity and loving-kindness.

I had sought guidance from the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, taking advantage of his generous offer that I write to him as man to man. As I feared might be the case, my letter was intercepted by his permanent staff and all I got in reply was the usual colourless, meaningless, bureaucratic memorandum. No help there, so it was up to me to do what I could on my own.

Remembering the electric effects of my famous Press Conference in Frankfurt in January it seemed to me that I should do best to conduct another such, but this time to make quite clear that my every word was to be strictly "off the record". To make doubly sure I had my excellent Public Relations Officer carefully select my audience from among those of the vast mob of correspondents in Geneva whom he reckoned to be trustworthy. But this was not enough. I altogether underrated my opponents who, in the absence of locks, bolts, bars and armed guards and similar appliances for the protection of freedom easily infiltrated the party.

I had plenty to tell them of activities within the U.N.R.R.A. organization that had hitherto received little or no publicity but that should, in my opinion, be taken into account when the question of the continued existence of the outfit was to be decided.

First one had to emphasize that, speaking generally, the U.N.R.R.A. "teams" were helping the D.P.s. and Refugees in their camps to withstand their misfortunes. There were, it was true, certain exceptions to this general statement. There had been instances in which the food supplied by the armies at the minimum necessary scales for the support of existence had been sold by U.N.R.R.A. camp staffs to the Germans in the neighbourhood to their considerable personal profit. There had been, too, a regular line of supply of U.N.R.R.A. goods from Germany, by air, to the Black Markets of Paris.

But such comparatively minor dishonesties were only to be expected in view of the U.N.R.R.A. recruitment methods, which lent themselves not only to the furtherance of the ambitions of enterprising individuals but to the promotion of projects of wide significance. The Zionist campaign was by now very well organized. Parties of immigrants to Palestine were

moving regularly southward through Germany, Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia, France and onward by sea often to make perilous beach landings at night. Those intercepted by the Royal Navy were encamped in Cyprus where their training for eventual settlement in Palestine was continued—to such an extent that Cyprus came to be known as the “Aldershot of Palestine.”

By now, under Zionist auspices there had been organized at Belsen a vast illegitimate trading organization with worldwide ramifications and dealing in a wide range of goods, principally precious metals and stones. A money market dealt with a wide range of currencies. Goods were being imported in cryptically marked containers consigned in U.N.R.R.A. shipments to Jewish Voluntary Agencies that were doing such magnificent relief work among their suffering people.

Goodness knows what smuggling was going on across the frontiers, not only of goods but of people. Concealed among the rest were certain packing cases suitably fitted to contain human beings in reasonable comfort. But such extremes were not always needed. There seemed little difficulty in acquiring all the advantages attaching to “membership” of U.N.R.R.A., however one defined that distinction. To the extent that when I was honoured with a visit by the late Rabbi Hertzog, Chief Rabbi of Palestine (a most charming old gentleman) he was escorted to my presence by a German American Rabbi from New York attired in U.S. service dress uniform carrying U.N.R.R.A. badges, who proceeded to give off, in a high-pitched yell, a general lamentation on the sorrows of Israel. The Chief Rabbi could stand this no better than I could and silenced the outpouring in very short order. I cross-questioned the man in the presence of the Chief Rabbi and it at once appeared that he had no justification for wearing his uniform, that he had no claim whatever to travel as he was doing all over Europe at U.N.R.R.A. expense, that he had no personal knowledge or experience of Europe nor of the D.P. and Refugee problems. The Chief Rabbi was good enough to express his regret at bringing this creature before me, but there seemed to be no way in which I could adjust the imposture, one, undoubtedly, among very many such.

The communist countries, to which so high a proportion of the D.P.s and Refugees were so unwilling to return, had at last got round to making use of the facilities open to them through U.N.R.R.A. for westward infiltration of their agents both for the purpose of terrorizing the D.P.s into “volunteering” for repatriation by threats of victimization of their relations back home and also for general espionage purposes. The U.N.R.R.A.

camps were sanctuary for such.

Military training of Jewish D.P.s was taking place in their camps, presumably in preparation for active participation in the war of liberation from the British Mandate on their arrival in Palestine. Instructors were found to be N.C.O.s from British and U.S. armies, in uniform, absent without, but I fancy sometimes with, leave from their units.

In fact there was a complicated design on the reverse of the U.N.R.R.A. medal that I estimated should be studied on both sides before decision was taken to prolong the life of the Administration.

Hardly had my "off the record" talk to the correspondents ended when a complete transcript of my words, spoken as I fondly imagined, in confidence, was placed before the Director-General. Whereupon the curtain went up on the last act of the tragi-comedy of my United Nations service. To one of my simple Army upbringing the sequence of subsequent events was of much interest.

The Director-General could not, of course, declare openly how the information had come into his possession since he was indebted therefor to a breach of convention on the part of some members of the journalistic fraternity. Instead he announced, with impressive solemnity, to a vast plenary session of the Council of the Administration that some traitorous employee thereof, meaning me, had been making slanderous and damaging statements to the vast detriment of the fair name of the Administration. He deplored the underhand manner in which this seemed to have been done and called loudly upon the perpetrator to step forward and substantiate his calumnies.

I was not present at the meeting, having already had more than enough of such affairs. There was a depressing sameness about them all. The "beggar" nations' representatives, skilled propagandists and "rabble rousers" to a man, would utter blood-curdling forecasts, even threats, of what would befall their countries if the wells of U.N.R.R.A. largesse dried up on them. The representatives of the few donor countries would thereupon try to make their point that more than enough had already been given away and that it was high time some of the recipients began to do something for themselves. These charming but utterly ineffectual gentlemen would unfailingly find themselves out-argued, out-manœuvred and shouted down by their pugnacious, shaven-headed toughs of opponents. It was a pathetic business.

Since the Mayor had not thought fit to send for me, as he could well have done, knowing me to be the cause of his trouble,

I saw no reason why I should advance upon him. I addressed him in writing telling him that all I had said, and the majority of what I was alleged to have said, was a statement of fact that had come to me by courtesy of the U.S. and British Army Intelligence services.

Meanwhile my personal Intelligence service reported to me that senior British officials, in a state of high dudgeon, were even now debating a suitable fate for me, whether I should be removed from U.N.R.R.A. by the Foreign Office or withdrawn from my Foreign Office assignment by the War Office. This, I thought, was too much, and I decided to force an issue by leaving Geneva. So I wrote again to the Mayor telling him of my intention to return at once to my H.Q. at Arolsen in Germany, there to await his further orders. As I had hoped, this brought a summons to the presence whereat we exchanged our last words in an interview that I found strangely enjoyable.

Mayor La Guardia, Fiorello the "Little Flower", was an intriguing character. I dare say there are such in England, but the English system does not permit of their emergence into wide prominence. I have always regretted that he died before we could meet otherwise than officially and compare notes on our joint experience of U.N.R.R.A. In his last note to me he was moved to hope that occasion might arise for us to do just that.

Now he wanted first to have me tell him just how I had come by the information that I had "unintentionally" broadcast. I had to tell him that I had informed myself through the Army Agencies, American and British that were controlled by the Commanders-in-Chief in Germany. Since to do so would compromise important secrets, I was unable to give him particulars, for which he would have to apply in person to those same commanders.

He announced his intention, as indeed was obviously necessary to reorganize U.N.R.R.A. in Germany so that my services would no longer be needed, summing the matter up by saying, "You know, General, I believe you were the wrong man for this job from the start." From certain points of view I most certainly was.

So back to Arolsen, to my Headquarters, to prepare for return to England and to await succession by the right man for the job. This, as one had expected, turned out to be a Jewish gentleman from New York.

I had every sympathy with the summing up by my excellent Public Relations Officer that "to serve such an outfit is degradation beyond description". In fact to have been rejected for such service I have always felt to have been a high honour.

I

*Letter of Louis Lipsky to Sol Bloom***

May 8, 1944

PERSONAL

My dear Sol:

I think I owe it to you (as a friend) to give you my estimate of how matters stand among Zionists and Jews generally with regard to the Palestine Resolution,† which now sleeps in Committee. It is very important that you give the conclusions I arrive at your immediate personal attention.

As to your personal connection with the Resolution: At first and more particularly during the hearings, the stand you took was admirable and evoked general Jewish approval. But since the putting away of the Resolution, there has been a growing resentment, especially as people are becoming aware of the fact that the action to defer was tantamount to killing the Resolution. Your own position has deteriorated.

The general impression now being circulated is that while you seemed to favor the Resolution, you were in fact working

* From Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1942-1947* (New York: Pageant Press, 1962), Appendices II, III, IV, pp. 212-19. Copyright 1962 by Richard P. Stevens. Reprinted by permission of Pageant Press, Inc. R.P. Stevens is presently the Chairman of the Political Science Department at Lincoln University, Pa., U.S.A.

** Louis Lipsky (1876-1963), the American Zionist leader, was at various times Chairman and President of the Zionist Organization of America. Sol Bloom (1870-1949) was a Jewish Democratic Member in the House of Representatives, U.S., 1923-49, and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee during 1940-47 and in 1949.

† On the Palestine Resolution, see K. Roosevelt, pp. 515-26.

all the while for its defeat. It is being said that while you made sure to have everybody believe that you were a great friend of the cause, you actually tried to force an amended resolution to the original one right from the very beginning, although the amended resolution would have practically nullified the original Resolution; and that you hastened a vote in Committee, which you had promised would not take place, because you were afraid that the Republicans would themselves bring the Resolution on the floor of the House. Your voting against the motion to defer in Committee was merely a formal gesture. In fact, you lent yourself throughout those difficult days to the crafty manoeuvres of the forces who were determined to kill the Resolution. Because of these impressions, a number of leading Zionists feel that you have misled them into a major defeat; and this feeling is shared by the rank and file.

I know it as a fact that a public attack on you would have been made at the Madison Square Garden Meeting last month had it not been for the restraining influence of Dr. Silver,* who held your critics in check.

Now, Dr. Silver feels very strongly about the situation. He feels that your vote in having a vote in Committee was particularly damaging, coming, as it did, only a few days after he and Dr. Wise** had succeeded in obtaining a satisfactory statement from the President, which went a long way toward neutralizing the intervention of the military. But the unexpected vote in Committee, coming a few days after that statement and before we Zionists had a chance to capitalize on it politically in London and in Jerusalem, almost nullified the great value of the President's utterance.

As matters now stand, the President's attitude on Palestine is more uncertain and beclouded than ever before, especially in view of the statement he made to the press a few weeks following the first utterance, when he commented on Palestine in such a way as to endorse the position of the military.

Naturally, the Zionist leadership cannot be expected to take a position of resignation in this situation. It cannot acquiesce in a situation which impairs every advantage we have gained in the past six months. Especially in view of the fact that the

* Rabbi Hillel Silver (1893-1963), a militant leader of the American Zionist movement, supported Weizmann's proposal for an extended Jewish Agency for Palestine in 1929, became President of the Zionist Organization of America, 1945-46, and Chairman of the American section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947.

** For Stephen S. Wise, see above, p. 451, note.

Administration is determined to give us merely gestures instead of action, and that the State Department is consistently playing the game of the British Colonial Office, and, more alarming, that the President himself seems to be unwilling to say anything definite, anything comforting, anything reassuring, on a matter which is so vital to our needs. Looking at the situation objectively, I am personally convinced that there will break out a veritable storm of criticism and indignation against the Administration, which, you can readily understand, both you and I would regard as being highly undesirable in the critical months ahead.

The Republicans know what is going on very well. They are preparing to use the issue to the utmost. They can afford to make liberal promises and they are going to make them.* Their most likely Presidential candidate has already issued two forthright pro-Zionist statements. There will be others. They will be used extensively among the Jews in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston, Cleveland, and elsewhere during the election campaign.

These developments have put Dr. Silver in a very difficult position. The President had won him over almost completely. For the first time in years, Dr. Silver issued a public statement sympathetic to and laudatory of the President. But he is being forced to the conclusion that as matters now stand, the probabilities are that the present Administration will do absolutely nothing to help the Jewish people achieve their just rights in Palestine, except to send what he calls Rosh Hashonah greetings to Jews from time to time; and nothing more. You know that Dr. Silver's voice is listened to by vast sections of our people. He is known to be a non-partisan in politics. In fact, he has never intervened in American political affairs. If he is persuaded definitely that our cause is being sacrificed in Washington, he will not hesitate to speak out on the matter.

I call your attention to the fact that an important conference is to be held in Washington on May 23-24. It is to be attended by the leaders of 300 American Jewish communities, who are engaged in the emergency work of the Zionist movement. Their last meeting was held just before the Palestine Resolution was introduced. They will now have to be given a report of what has happened since and what is now the attitude of our Government. As Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council, Dr. Silver will be called upon to give that report. I am deeply concerned as to what he is going

* Cf. "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 625-29, and pp. 731-36.

to say and what action may follow, if conditions remain as they are.

In my judgment, it is urgent that you persuade those in authority that some action be taken before the conference on May 23-24. The President gave assurances to Dr. Wise and Dr. Silver that he would issue a statement in his own name after consulting with Mr. Churchill. The President's friends should persuade him to make such a statement—clear and definitive as to the rights of the Jewish people under the Mandate, as to the relation of the American Government toward the promise that was made, as to the Jewish Commonwealth, free immigration, and so forth. When he shall have made such a statement, the green light could then be given to have the Resolution brought out from the Committee to the floor of the House, where it should be voted on. The American people have a right to express themselves on this subject. They are eager to speak and place themselves on record. No one has been taken in by the military argument. Nobody has been persuaded that the intervention of the military was justified in any way. To delay this action until after June would be fatal to all good relations between American Jews and the present Administration of Government.

I submit these impressions knowing that you will take them as coming from a friend—of yourself and of the Roosevelt Administration—and sincerely urge you to give serious thought to the suggestions I have made.

(signed)

Louis Lipsky

* * *

II

*Letter of Arthur Lourie to Senator Wagner**

November 3, 1945

Dear Senator Wagner:

As I indicated on the telephone, Dr. Wise and the members of my Executive Committee felt that the version proposed by the Foreign Relations Sub-Committee was open to serious objection and would be unacceptable.

In an effort to meet some of the views of members of the Sub-Committee, a revised version was drawn up, a copy of which I enclose. I attach, also, some comments on the Sub-Committee's draft and on the suggested revisions.

A small delegation on behalf of the Zionist Emergency Council will be in Washington on Monday morning, and will seek to get into touch with you.

(signed)

Arthur Lourie

Suggested Revised Draft

Therefore be it Resolved that the Senate (The House of Representatives concurring) approves of the interest shown by the President in the solution of these problems and recommends that the United States shall continue to use its good offices with the Mandatory Power to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for the free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum extent of its economic potentialities and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization and development so that they may reconstitute Palestine the National Home of the Jewish people, as a democratic Commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights.**

* Arthur Lourie is presently (1969) Director-General in the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs; he was member of the Jewish Agency delegation at the San Francisco U.N. Conference, 1945. Robert F. Wagner (1877-1953) was pro-Zionist Democratic Senator for New York, 1926-49, and Chairman of the American Palestine Committee.

** On December 17, 1945, the United States Senate adopted a modified form of the resolution of Senators Wagner and Taft, recommending unrestricted Jewish immigration "so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish national home and, in association with all elements of the population, establish Palestine as a democratic commonwealth."

1. "Approves of the interest shown by the President in the solution of these problems."

No objection is taken to the expression of approval of the President's recent actions provided this is limited to approval of the interest which he is taking in solving the problem. It is felt that a direct endorsement by Congress of the Joint Inquiry Committee which involves, at best, many months of delay before action is taken, would be harmful to the Zionist position.

2. "Good offices with the Mandatory Power."

This is suggested in place of "peaceful offices." The use of the word "peaceful" is objectionable as suggesting that there was some need to make specifically clear that no military intervention is sought. The alternative above proposed, which clearly implies diplomatic efforts, is free from any such objectionable connotation.

3. "Free entry of Jews into that country to the maximum extent of its economic potentialities." The phrase "to the greatest feasible extent" is very vague and dangerous and practically nullifies the provision for free entry. Almost anything can be read into this phrase by way of objections as a ground for drastically limiting Jewish immigration. We would regard its inclusion as injurious and prejudicial. If, therefore, it is insisted that there be some reference to the capacity of the country to absorb additional immigration, it should be made clear that the only criterion on grounds of which immigration might be restricted is the economic criterion. This is in accordance with the undeviating interpretation of the Permanent Mandates Committee throughout the existence of the Mandate. It should be made clear that there is no intention to construe these economic potentialities in any narrow way. For the same reason, it is suggested that after the words "full opportunity for colonization," there be inserted "and development."

4. The concluding clause "so that they may reconstitute Palestine a Jewish Homeland" and "so that Palestine may be established as a Democratic Commonwealth" is altogether unacceptable. Far from advancing the Zionist position, it is definitely a reversal even of the position taken in the 1922 Congressional Resolution as well as of that contained in the Wagner-Taft Resolution. It omits the word "National" which was contained in the Mandate and in the 1922 Resolution. But more than this, it implies the possibility of a Jewish Homeland as a conclave within an Arab state. Accordingly, either the wording contained in the Wagner-Taft Resolution remain unaltered, or as an alternative, it is suggested "so that they may reconstitute Palestine, the National Home of the

Jewish people, as a democratic Commonwealth in which all men, regardless of race or creed, shall enjoy equal rights.”

This last clause is, of course, the most important of all, and we should like to say, in general, however, that the above suggestions represent a great effort to meet the views of certain members of the Committee who do not favor the Wagner-Taft formulation.

* * *

III

Confidential Memorandum from Emanuel Neumann
to Senator Wagner*

March 14, 1947

In the opinion of many competent observers the failure of the United States Government to make any progress on the Palestine issue stems largely from the habit of treating this issue as an *isolated problem*, wholly apart from the rest of the Anglo-American relations and of Near-Eastern problems. The British Government is naturally aware of this tendency and therefore proceeds on the assumption that British intransigence in the matter of Palestine will have no serious repercussions and will in no wise affect its position vis-à-vis the United States in any of the many issues in which they seek American assistance or support. This, more than anything else, explains British obstinacy and their refusal to comply with the repeated requests of President Truman.

It appears likely that American efforts in the matter of Palestine will remain ineffective and fruitless unless and until the Department of State decides to include this matter as one of its objectives in the give-and-take negotiations which it conducts with Britain and other countries. This is a natural and normal procedure in international relations.

Countless opportunities of this nature have been neglected in the past. To mention but three: important concessions might have been obtained from Arab States, quite amicably, on a quid pro quo basis at the time when these States were trying to get on the band-wagon of the Western Allies, in the last year of the war. Concessions from the British Government might have been obtained on a quid pro quo basis when Britain desired American acquiescence, in the UN and otherwise, in the

* Leader of the American delegation to the Zionist Congress, 1946.

“independence” of Transjordan. And British agreement to open Palestine for the immigration of displaced Jews of Europe might again have been obtained at the time when Britain was anxious for an American loan to help her in her own rehabilitation. No advantage was taken of these opportunities, or of any similar opportunities in the past.*

A new opportunity for such a give-and-take approach has arisen now in view of the effort of the British Government to get the United States to shoulder foreign commitments in the Near East, hitherto borne by the British Empire. These requests are based on the idea that such American action is to get the United States to shoulder foreign commitments if necessary to assure international stability in the general as well as in the American interest. Assuming this to be the case, it is nevertheless true that the American action requested would in the first place serve to lighten Britain's burdens while safeguarding Britain's interests. Furthermore, the economic support to be granted by the United States to those countries would, through the trade and currency arrangements existing between those countries and Great Britain, become an important source of dollar exchange for Great Britain and thus directly contribute to the economic rehabilitation of Britain. . . .

In view of this, it seems entirely appropriate that the United States Government link the Palestine question with these current negotiations. This is the more appropriate since the commitments which America is asked to undertake relate to the Near East. As has been pointed out in the press, by Walter Lippman and others, the problems of the Near East are very intimately inter-related, and the American Government should not be content to deal with them piecemeal. It is not reasonable to ask our Government to take a decisive hand in stabilizing the situation in one part of that area while at the same time being compelled to tolerate in another part of the same area a state of affairs which it regards as deeply unsatisfactory. . . .

Should the United States Government raise the Palestine issue in this context—and in view of the new commitments we are expected to make—it is reasonable to believe that the British Government will prove far more amenable than heretofore.

The recent British gesture in referring the Palestine question to the United Nations** does not affect the validity of this argument. It is no more than a gesture for the moment.

* Cf. Williams, pp. 557-74.

** On February 14, 1947, Bevin announced that the British Government had decided to refer the Palestine problem to the United Nations.

Prime Minister Attlee on President Truman's Palestine Policy* 1945-1946

FRANCIS WILLIAMS**

...Palestine led to sharper disagreements between Attlee and President Truman than did any other issue.

Williams: How difficult was it to make the Americans see the British point of view?

Attlee: Very difficult. There's no Arab vote in America, but there's a very heavy Jewish vote and the Americans are always having elections. There was naturally a great deal of sentiment and very powerful lobbies, and, of course, immense sympathy, which we shared, for the Jews who'd been ousted from Europe. The Americans thought we should introduce a hundred thousand Jews into Palestine right away without the slightest consideration for the effect on the Arabs.† They had no obligations there. We had.

The President went completely against the advice of his own State Department and his own military people. The State Department would tell us one thing and then the President would come out with the exact opposite. The State Department's view was very close to ours, they had to think internationally, but most of the politicians were influenced by voting considerations. There were crucial elections coming up at the time, and

* From Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers: The War and Post-War Memoirs of The Rt. Hon. Earl Attlee* (London: Heinemann, 1961), pp. 181-201. This excerpt is from the chapter entitled "Danger for the Middle East." Copyright © by Francis Williams 1960 and 1961; © Thomson Allied Newspapers Ltd. 1960. Reprinted by permission of William Heinemann Ltd.; and the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office.

** British journalist and adviser on public relations to the Prime Minister (the late Lord Attlee), 1945-47.

† Cf. K. Roosevelt, pp. 522-23.

several big Jewish firms had contributed to Democratic Party funds. Domestic issues of that kind often affected American international thinking, one used to see it on Italian matters as well: their attitude was very much influenced by the Italian vote. They'd been remote from foreign affairs for the greater part of their history and the effect on domestic issues always bulked much bigger with them than with us. And some of the American Jews were very extreme and quite uninterested in any reasonable solution. Unlike Weizmann, who was a big man, not an extremist. But the pressure was enormous.

Williams: Did you ever think it possible to get a solution in Palestine without the violence that actually resulted?

Attlee: I think it was extremely difficult. We set up an Anglo-American Committee of Investigation, but a good many of them ran away from the real problem.* They had a sort of conception that you could get both sides to live in peace with the other. You couldn't.

Williams: There was a good deal of criticism, and still is in Israel itself, about the way we finally ended the Mandate and left.

Attlee: We'd held the Mandate and we couldn't get any agreement, and it was no good our holding the baby any longer with everybody gunning for us. The only thing was to pass the problem to the U.N. and agree to do what they said. It was one of those impossible situations for which there is no really good solution. One just had to cut the knot.

We'd started something in the Jewish National Home after World War One without perceiving the consequences,** it was done in a very thoughtless way with people of a different outlook on civilisation suddenly imported into Palestine—a wild experiment that was bound to cause trouble. True, at that time no one anticipated the driving out of the Jews in Central Europe, it was Russia that had the problems then, but the original idea wasn't so much the building of a regular State as giving the Jewish people a point on which they could rest; it was only later that the Jews came in large numbers. And you have to remember that even when the idea of a State got hold there were a large number of anti-Zionists among the Jews themselves who believed that the Jews should fit into whatever nation they were in.†

The interests of Arab and Jew in Palestine were quite irreconcilable. It's true the Arabs had a lot of land and not much

* See K. Roosevelt, p. 523.

** Cf. "Memorandum by Mr. Balfour," pp. 201-11.

† See Montagu, pp. 143-51.

development and you might think that an Arab struggling to keep alive on a bare strip of sand would jump at the chance of going to Iraq or somewhere else where there was more opportunity for a better life. But oh no. One patch of desert doesn't look very different from another patch of desert but that was the one they wanted—their own traditional piece. Even the Bedouins circle in the same area. They have this attachment to one place and nothing else will do.

Whether there's any hope of ending the hostility between Arab and Jew I don't know. Israel has an open door for all Jews and you can understand the Arabs being afraid it will burst at the seams. It is such a tiny narrow State that there is bound to be great danger unless one can get a genuine settlement. However, they're extremely clever, hardworking people, and they've got some useful mineral resources, so that if anyone can make a nation that size prosperous, they will.

Attlee found a memorandum from President Truman on Jewish immigration waiting for him the day he became Prime Minister. It had been addressed to Mr Churchill two days before the result of the Election was known. It read:

To: The Prime Minister.
From: The President.

The White House,
Washington.
July 24, 1945.

'There is great interest in America in the Palestine problem. The drastic restrictions imposed on Jewish immigration by the British White Paper of May, 1939,* continue to provoke passionate protest from Americans most interested in Palestine and in the Jewish problem. They fervently urge the lifting of these restrictions which deny to Jews, who have been so cruelly uprooted by ruthless Nazi persecutions, entrance into the land which represents for so many of them their only hope of survival.

'Knowing your deep and sympathetic interest in Jewish settlement in Palestine I venture to express to you the hope that the British Government may find it possible without delay to take steps to lift the restrictions of the White Paper on Jewish immigration into Palestine.

'While I realise the difficulties of reaching a definite and satisfactory settlement of the Palestine problem, and that we cannot expect to discuss these difficulties at any length at our present meeting, I have some doubt whether these difficulties will be lessened by prolonged delay. I hope, therefore, that you

* For the White Paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

can arrange at your early convenience to let me have your ideas on the settlement of the Palestine problem, so that we can at a later but not too distant date discuss the problem in concrete terms.'

At this stage Attlee replied only briefly:

Berlin

31st July 1945

Memorandum to the President from the Prime Minister.

'I have read your memorandum of July 24 about Palestine. You will, I am sure, understand that I cannot give you any statement on policy until we have had time to consider the matter, and this is simply to inform you that we will give early and careful consideration to your memorandum.'

By this time the breach between the President and the State Department on the Palestine issue had already begun to manifest itself. Within a few days of Truman's assuming office the then Secretary of State, Mr Edward R. Stettinius Jr had approached the President to warn him that Zionist leaders were likely to try to secure his support for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish State, and to urge him to avoid any such commitment in view of the continual tension in the Middle East. Subsequently Mr Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State while Stettinius was at the San Francisco Conference, forwarded a memorandum to the President pointing out that President Roosevelt had 'on a number of occasions within the past few years authorised the Department to assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments on his behalf that in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews,' and that at his meeting with King Ibn Saud earlier that year 'Mr Roosevelt promised the King as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.*' The State Department memorandum concluded by declaring that, as recently as 3 March, President Roosevelt had reaffirmed this policy for the guidance of the State Department and had 'told an officer of the Department that in his opinion a Jewish State in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force.'

This was followed by a further State Department memorandum in September stressing the difficulties which inevitably faced Britain as the Mandatory Power for Palestine during the

* Cf. Eddy, pp. 509-13.

interim period while a search for a viable long-term policy was being made: 'No Government', it concluded, 'should advocate a policy of mass immigration unless it is prepared to assist in making available the necessary security forces, shipping, housing, unemployment guarantees. In view of the foregoing the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large-scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period.'

The State Department view referred to in President Truman's memoirs, from which these quotations are taken, had been known to the Foreign Office for some time. It accorded with their own. Much of the bitterness that subsequently developed can be accounted for by the fact that those primarily concerned on the British side felt that this considered opinion, on which they had believed they could rely in trying to secure a reasonable Arab-Jewish settlement, had been set aside purely as a result of domestic political pressure.

The same view was taken by many within the U.S. Administration itself—a fact that, as it became known, did nothing to reduce British resentment.

Thus according to the published diaries of Mr James Forrestal,* U.S. Secretary of Defence, he, Byrnes, who had succeeded Stettinius as Secretary of State, Judge Robert P. Patterson, Under-Secretary of War, and John Snyder, Director of War Mobilisation and later Secretary of the Treasury, met on 26 July 1946, to discuss the situation arising from the fact that 'Jews are injecting vigorous and active propaganda to force the President's hand with reference to the immediate immigration of Jews into Palestine.'

Five weeks later he recorded that Robert E. Hannegan, the U.S. Postmaster General and one of the chief organisers of the Democratic Party machine, had raised at a Cabinet lunch the question of the President making an early statement demanding the entrance of 150,000 Jews into Palestine. This, Hannegan said, 'would have a very great influence and great effect on the raising of funds for the Democratic National Committee.' He added that 'very large sums were obtained a year ago from Jewish contributors and they would be influenced in either giving or withholding by what the President did on Palestine.' To this Forrestal himself replied that an earlier statement by the President 'prompted by Rabbi Silver of Cleveland' had not had the influence expected on the New York election but had had the net effect of making the British 'exceedingly angry, particularly when it was coupled with the rejection of the Grady

* Cf. "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 625-29, and pp. 731-36.

Committee Report which amounted to a denunciation of the work of his (the President's) own appointee,' and of making 'Secretary of State Byrnes wash his hands of the whole Palestine matter, which meant that it was allowed to drift without action and practically without American policy.'

Shortly after this Byrnes added his own testimony when he told Forrestal that he had dissociated himself from the President's policy because he considered his decision 'to criticise the British for their conduct of Palestine affairs had placed Bevin and Attlee in a most difficult position' and had been taken only because David K. Niles, the Administrative Assistant to the President, and Judge Samuel Rosenman 'had both told Truman that Dewey was about to come out with a statement favouring the Zionist position in Palestine and had insisted that unless the President anticipated this move New York State would be lost to the Democrats.'

Two months later, after Hannegan had again raised the issue at a Cabinet lunch and said that those who had contributed to the Democratic Campaign funds were pressing hard for assurance, and after Forrestal had been warned by Senator McGrath, the Democratic National Chairman, that 'Jewish sources were responsible for a substantial part of the contributions to the Democratic National Committee' and that these contributions were made with 'a distinct idea' that their views on the Palestine issue would be 'seriously considered', Forrestal himself saw Senator Vandenberg and Governor Dewey, the Republican leaders. He was hoping to get a non-partisan policy on Palestine by enlisting Republican support. However, he met with an unpromising response. 'There was', said Senator Vandenberg, 'a feeling among most Republicans that the Democratic Party had used the Palestine question politically and the Republicans felt they were entitled to make similar use of the issue.' Governor Dewey was equally uncompromising. He agreed in principle, he said, but the Republicans could do nothing because they knew 'the Democratic Party would not be willing to relinquish the advantages of the Jewish vote.'

It is against this background, and the British feeling that policies which both the Foreign Office and the State Department agreed were necessary to hold an equitable balance between Jewish and Arab claims were again and again repudiated because of domestic American pressures, that the exchanges between Attlee and Truman which follow must be read. It was one of the few occasions when the mutual understanding and sympathy between them which played so important a part in the development of Anglo-American relations in this period were put under

heavy—although fortunately not lasting—strain.

President Truman's proposal that 100,000 Jews should immediately be allowed into Palestine, which bedevilled both Anglo-American relations and the attempt to reach a settlement acceptable to the Arabs from the start, was first made in a letter to Attlee from the White House on 31 August 1945 addressed 'My dear Mr Prime Minister.'

With this letter the President forwarded a report he had received from Mr Earl G. Harrison, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and U.S. Representative on the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, whom he had sent on a mission to Europe to investigate the condition of Jewish refugees among displaced persons. After referring at some length to Mr Harrison's qualifications and to the scope of his inquiry among displaced persons in the American and British zones of Germany, President Truman continued: 'In view of our conversations at Potsdam I am sure that you will find certain portions of the report interesting. I am, therefore, sending you a copy.

'I should like to call your attention to the conclusions and recommendations—especially the references to Palestine. It appears that the available certificates for immigration to Palestine will be exhausted in the near future. It is suggested that the granting of an additional one hundred thousand of such certificates would contribute greatly to a sound solution for the future of Jews still in Germany and Austria, and for other Jewish refugees who do not wish to remain where they are or who for understandable reasons do not desire to return to their countries of origin.

'On the basis of this and other information which has come to me, I concur in the belief that no other single matter is so important for those who have known the horrors of concentration camps for over a decade as is the future of immigration possibilities into Palestine. The number of such persons who wish immigration to Palestine or who would qualify for admission there is, unfortunately, no longer as large as it was before the Nazis began their extermination programme. As I said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole, firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be closed, and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted to resettle there.

'I know you are in agreement on the proposition that future peace in Europe depends in large measure upon our finding sound solutions of problems confronting the displaced and formerly persecuted groups of people. No claim is more meritorious than that of the groups who for so many years have known

persecution and enslavement.

'The main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine. If it is to be effective, such action should not be long delayed.

Very sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN

To this Attlee telegraphed an acknowledgment, pointing out that immigration certificates available had not in fact been taken up and promising a fuller reply. A fortnight later he telegraphed at length:

'Prime Minister to President Truman. 16.9.45

'I am now in a position to give you a considered reply, which I am telegraphing in order to save time, to your letter of August 31 enclosing a copy of Mr Harrison's report.

'I am sure you will appreciate the very grave difficulties that have confronted our representatives on the Control Commission, and from my own investigation of the matter it is quite clear that they have endeavoured to avoid treating people on a racial basis. Had they done this, then there would have been violent reactions on the part of other people who had been confined to these concentration camps. One must remember that within these camps were people from almost every race in Europe and there appears to have been very little difference in the amount of torture and treatment they had to undergo. Now, if our officers had placed the Jews in a special racial category at the head of the queue, my strong view is that the effect of this would have been disastrous for the Jews and therefore their attempt to treat them alike was a right one. After all, the situation in Central Europe is appalling. The number of displaced persons, refugees from concentration camps, the violent driving of people from one territory to another, is one of the most horrible events in human history. So concerned are we about the starvation generally in that area that we have been taking steps to try and prevent epidemics arising and spreading to other countries. On this matter we shall be communicating with the State Department as soon as possible.

'With reference to immediate relief there is a camp at Philippeville, North Africa, capable of taking 30,000 and another one at Felada with a capacity of 5,000. I suggest that, in order to relieve immediate suffering, these two places be used. I understand that UNRRA have it under their control. It would of course involve our Commanders in the task of sorting them out. This, however, should relieve the situation.

‘In the case of Palestine we have the Arabs to consider as well as the Jews, and there have been solemn undertakings, I understand, given by your predecessor,* yourself and by Mr Churchill, that before we come to a final decision and operate it, there would be consultation with the Arabs. It would be very unwise to break these solemn pledges and so set aflame the whole Middle East. I know you realise that, as things are, the responsibility of preserving order with all the consequences involved rests entirely on this country.

‘As I mentioned in my earlier telegram, the Jews are not now using the numbers of certificates available and up to the present have not taken up the 1,500 available for this month which were offered them. Apparently they are insisting upon the complete repudiation of the White Paper and the immediate granting of 100,000 certificates quite regardless of the effect on the situation in the Middle East which this would have.

‘In addition to this problem we are engaged upon another related one and that is India. The fact that there are ninety million Moslems, who are easily inflamed, in that country compels us to consider the problem from this aspect also. Therefore, while sympathising with the views of Mr Harrison and weighing them very carefully, we believe that the suggestion which he has made raises very far-reaching implications, which would have to be most carefully balanced against the considerations which I have set out above. We have got the matter under urgent examination, with a view to the formulation of a long-term policy which we propose to refer to the World Organisation as soon as practicable. Meanwhile we are considering how to deal with the immigration problem in the interval and I shall be happy to let you know as soon as I can what our intentions are in this matter.’

On 25 October he followed this with a further short telegram advising Truman that the Cabinet had the problems of Palestine and of helping the Jews in Europe urgently before it, but pointing out that these two problems were not necessarily the same. He added that he hoped very shortly to be in a position to put a proposal to the President. This came three weeks later in a formal memorandum to the U.S. Government proposing an Anglo-American Committee of Investigation.

In line with the opinions Attlee had already expressed to Truman, the memorandum made it plain that the British Government could not accept the view that Jews in the European

* See Eddy, pp. 509-13.

areas under British and American administration were living under worse conditions than other victims of Nazi persecution, or that a major solution could be found by immigration into Palestine, which could, it was stated, be considered only as one among several possible 'countries of disposal.'

In Palestine itself, the memorandum argued, the main cause of the trouble in the past twenty-six years had been due to the dual obligation under the Mandate to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the community were not prejudiced as a result.

The document then continued, 'Every effort has been made by the Mandatory to devise some arrangement which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrangement acceptable to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The whole history of Palestine since the Mandate was granted has been one of continual friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in serious disturbances.

'The fact has to be faced that there is no common ground between the Arabs and the Jews. They differ in religion and in language; their cultural and social life, their ways of thought and conduct, are as difficult to reconcile as are their national aspirations. These last are the greatest bar to peace. Both communities lay claim to Palestine; the one on the ground of a millennium of occupation, the other on the ground of historic association and of an undertaking given to it during the First World War. The antithesis is thus complete.

'The repercussions of the conflict have spread far beyond the small land in which it has arisen. The Zionist cause has strong supporters in the United States, in Great Britain, in the Dominions and elsewhere; civilisation has been appalled by the sufferings which have been inflicted in recent years on the persecuted Jews of Europe. On the other side of the picture, the cause of the Palestinian Arabs has been espoused by the whole Arab world and more lately has become a matter of keen interest to their ninety million co-religionists in India. In Palestine itself, there is always serious risk of disturbances on the part of one community or the other, and such disturbances are bound to find their reflection in a much wider field. Considerations not only of equity and of humanity but also of international amity and world peace are thus involved in any search for a solution.'

Finally, after promising to consult with the Arabs to try to

avoid an interruption of Jewish immigration and to explore with both Jews and Arabs the possibility of other temporary arrangements pending the submission of a final plan to the United Nations, the memorandum concluded with a categorical statement that immigration could only be allowed for the time being at the current rate and with a sharp reminder of previous American assurances to the Arabs:

'In regard to the immediate future, His Majesty's Government have decided that the only practicable course is to maintain the present arrangement for immigration. The Government of the United States will realise that His Majesty's Government have inherited, in Palestine, a most difficult legacy and their task is greatly complicated by undertakings, given at various times to various parties, which they feel themselves bound to honour. Any violent departure decided upon in the face of Arab opposition, would not only afford ground for a charge of breach of faith against His Majesty's Government but would probably cause serious disturbances throughout the Middle East, involving a large military commitment, and would arouse widespread anxiety in India. Further, the Arabs have not forgotten the assurances given by the late President Roosevelt and by President Truman, to the heads of Arab States, of their desire that no decision should be taken in respect to the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. It can hardly be contended that a decision to depart from the present policy in respect of immigration would not constitute a decision in respect to the basic situation in that country.'

To this, Truman, who as soon as the idea of an Anglo-American Committee became known had received a telegram from American Zionist leaders urging him to reject it out of hand and insist on 100,000 immigrants at once, responded by saying that he would agree to American participation only if Palestine were made the focus of the inquiry instead of being considered as one among other potential places of settlement for European Jews. Attlee and Bevin at first resisted. However, at his Washington meeting with the President for the Atomic Energy discussions in November, Attlee finally agreed, as the only means of getting American participation, and the Anglo-American Commission set to work.

Its report, when it came, served only to deepen the division between Truman and Attlee. It 'expressly disapproved' that Palestine had in some way been ceded or granted as their State to the Jews of the world, laid down the principle that 'Jew shall

not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine' and that Palestine should be 'neither a Jewish State nor an Arab State,' ruled out as impracticable any early attempt to establish an independent State or States in Palestine and called on the Jewish Agency to co-operate in suppressing terrorism and illegal immigration.* But it did recommend the early issue of 100,000 Jewish immigration certificates and it was on this point that Truman concentrated to the exclusion of most of the rest of the report. Although prepared to accept the need for consultations with both Jews and Arabs before the two Governments determined their attitude, he proposed that both Jews and Arabs should be required to transmit their views within a fortnight.

Attlee at once sent an interim reply pointing out that the report had military and financial implications which required study and suggesting that this should be done as a matter of urgency by expert officials of both Governments. He followed this with a longer telegram in which he also drew attention to the British need not to upset negotiation with Egypt at this stage:

'For President from Prime Minister. May 10, 1946.

'I have now been able to consult the Foreign Secretary and the Cabinet on your message of 8th May concerning Palestine. We agree that the consultations with the Jews and Arabs, to which both our Governments are committed, should be initiated as quickly as possible. I hope, however, that in view of the delicate negotiations which we are at present conducting in Egypt, you will feel able to postpone any approach to the parties concerned until 29th May at the earliest.

'We also think that the suggested period of two weeks is too short for the Arab Government and Jewish Organisations to prepare and submit their views on the Anglo-American Committee's recommendations, and that it would be preferable to allow them one month.

'As I said in my previous telegram, we think it important that there should also be some provision for the study by expert officials of our two Governments of the implications of the Committee's Report, with particular reference to the military and financial liabilities which would be involved in its adoption. We would prefer these official discussions between experts to precede the consultations with Jews and Arabs, but if this suggestion does not meet with your approval they can be conducted either simultaneously with or after those consultations.

* See Part III, pp. 595-623.

'It also seems to us most desirable that, as a final stage in the consultations which we are contemplating, every effort should be made to convene a conference at which Arab and Jewish representatives would meet with representatives of our two Governments to consider the whole question of the basis of the Committee's Report and of the results of the preliminary consultations both between Arabs and Jews and between our own experts.

'Our two Governments would then be in a position to make known their decisions on the issues dealt with by the Committee of Enquiry, having had the fullest opportunity of bringing their own views into harmony and of promoting the largest possible measure of agreement between the other interested parties.'

At this stage relations were further strained when the President publicly endorsed the 100,000 figure without any prior notification to the British Government that he intended to do so. Attlee decided that the time had come to make two things plain. The first was that before taking any action on the Report we would ask the U.S. Government to share the additional military and financial responsibilities that would arise. The second was that large-scale immigration into Palestine would not in any event be resumed until illegal Jewish armed units were eliminated. This he did in a Parliamentary statement.

This British reaction Truman found 'unsympathetic.' Although anxious for large-scale Jewish immigration he had no intention of accepting military responsibility for what might follow from it. He was well aware, as he said later, that 'while there was much clamour in the United States that something should be done the country was neither disposed nor prepared to assume risks and obligations that might require us to use military force.' Moreover he had already received a report from his Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending that no U.S. armed forces should be involved in carrying out the Committee's findings and urging that the guiding principle should be that no action should be taken which might cause repercussions in Palestine beyond the capabilities of British troops to control.

Attlee, however, was by now determined that if the Americans wanted to press Zionist claims and lecture Britain on what she should do they must be made to realise that it was up to them to help foot the bill, both financially and militarily. He therefore again cabled Truman, on 26 May, this time setting out no less than forty-five points which he considered it necessary for the experts of both Governments to consider before any decision on the Report was reached. These included the cost

of transporting, housing and maintaining 100,000 immigrants, the measures needed to bridge the gap between Jewish and Arab standards of living, the steps needed to suppress terrorism and liquidate private armies, the repercussion in the Middle East generally of the adoption of a Palestine policy based on the Report, the additional military commitments that might follow, and the sources from which these commitments would be met.

Somewhat reluctantly the President agreed that their experts should meet. However, he continued to press for early action on the 100,000 immigrants, to which Attlee replied in a telegram of 10 June that this could only be considered during the general discussion on the Anglo-American Report. On 24 June he cabled to the President again, advising him of the composition of the British expert team. He added, 'I should like, however, to draw your attention again to the decision of H.M. Government, to which I referred in my telegram of June 10th, that we cannot determine our policy on any one of the Committee's recommendations until we have examined the results of the official consultations on the Report as a whole. More particularly, we cannot contemplate accepting the proposal to admit large numbers of Jews to Palestine without very careful consideration of the effects which such a decision, when announced, would have in the light of the other proposals we were making at the same time. Tension is mounting in Palestine and we are satisfied that precipitate action on the immigration question alone would provoke widespread violence. I am sure you will appreciate that H.M. Government cannot take this risk.'

When at last the experts were ready to meet it was against a background of mounting Zionist terrorism and violence in Palestine—much of it, in the British view, aided, inspired and financed by Zionist groups in America. On 29 June, therefore, Attlee sent a telegram to Truman informing him that the British Government could no longer refrain from drastic action.

'Prime Minister to the President. 29th June 1946

'In view of the continuance of terrorist activity in Palestine culminating in the recent kidnapping of six British officers, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that drastic action can no longer be postponed. The High Commissioner has accordingly been authorised to take such steps as he thinks necessary to break up the illegal organisations, including the arrest of any individuals against whom there is clear evidence that they are responsible for the present campaign of violence.

The authority does not extend to any comprehensive disarming of the whole of the civil population at this stage.

'I understand that the High Commissioner intends to take action early on the morning of Saturday 29th June. It is proposed to raid the Jewish Agency and to occupy it for a period necessary to search for incriminating documents. At the same time members of the Agency considered implicated directly or indirectly in Haganah outrages will be arrested. Similar action will be taken in the case of headquarters of the illegal organisations.

'I regret that such action should have become necessary while we are engaged in discussing the Report of the Anglo-American Committee; but we could not resist the conclusion that we could no longer, without abdication of our responsibility as the Mandatory Government, tolerate such open defiance and that, while the discussions regarding the future of Palestine are proceeding, law and order must be maintained. We shall make it clear that our action is not merely made necessary by recent outrages by the Jews, but is also a first step towards restoring those conditions of order without which no progress can be made towards a solution of the long-term problem. Our action will be directed, not only against the maintenance of existing private armies or similar illegal organisations, but also against their future creation by either community.

'You will remember that the Anglo-American Committee called upon the Jewish Agency to resume active co-operation with the Mandatory Government in suppressing these illegalities. I need not add how much we should welcome any statement you may feel able to make indicating your support of our determination to bring to an end violence and terrorism in the Holy Land.'

It was in this critical situation that the British and American experts met, with Sir Norman Brook (now Secretary to the Cabinet) as the British chairman and Mr Henry F. Grady as the American chairman. They worked quickly under constant pressure from both Attlee and Truman as tension mounted and in Palestine itself Jewish terrorism reached a new peak with the blowing up of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem. Their report when it came proved to be very close to the British view which Attlee had constantly put before Truman.

Representing not only the State Department and Foreign Office but also the Treasuries and Defence Departments of both countries, the experts unanimously agreed that the admission of another 100,000 Jews could only be peaceably carried through with the agreement of the Arabs and must be conditional on it.

As a longer-term solution a federal system of two autonomous states, one Jewish, one Arab, was proposed, with a strong central Government which would retain control of the cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in view of their importance as religious shrines and would also have reserved to it control over immigration and various other matters.

To Attlee and Bevin this plan seemed to offer a hope, however faint in view of the bitterness that had developed, of a solution that might ultimately enable Jews and Arabs to live in harmony together and help to promote what had been their greatest desire throughout, a situation in which the skill and intelligence of Jewish communities could play an active and constructive part in social and economic development throughout the Middle East. When set against the background of suspicion and hostility that existed it was a small chance only, and even this ended when, on 24 August, Truman decided to throw over his own expert advisers. On that date, as the British Government completed arrangements for a conference with Jews and Arabs to consider the British-American expert proposals, he telegraphed to Attlee informing him that he was not prepared 'to give formal support to the plan in its present form as a joint Anglo-American plan.' The opposition in the United States to the plan had, he declared, 'become so intense that it is now clear that it would be impossible to rally in favour of it sufficient public opinion to enable this Government to give it effective support.'

At the same time he instructed the American Ambassador in London to press upon the British Government an alternative plan put up to him by the Jewish Agency.

Attlee telegraphed back:

'Prime Minister to President Truman.

18.8.46

'It is, of course, a great disappointment to us that you should feel yourself unable to give support to the plan recommended by the Anglo-American Expert Delegations. The discussion of the summary of this plan which we recently presented to Parliament will form the first item on the agenda at the coming conference. We earnestly hope that, as a result of the conference, some solution will emerge which, even if not fully accepted by either Arabs or Jews, may be possible of implementation without too gravely endangering the peace of Palestine or of the Middle East as a whole. But you will appreciate that any such solution must, as matters stand, be one which we can put into effect with our resources alone.

'As regards the plan of partition submitted by the Jewish

Agency,* it is, as I have said, our intention to place the outlines of the provincial autonomy plan before the conference. On various matters, and in particular as regards the boundaries of the provinces and the degree of self-government to be conceded to them, we designedly refrained from committing ourselves in any way when presenting the plan to Parliament. While we are adopting the plan as the initial basis for discussion, we do not propose to take up an immovable position in regard either to the plan itself or to its constituent features in advance of the conference.


‘It is accordingly open to the Jews or to the Arabs, if they accept our invitation to attend the conference, to propose alterations in the outline plan as announced, to make recommendations as to its details or to submit counter-proposals. All such proposals and recommendations will be given due consideration.’

In fact, however, the conference was doomed. Conscious that they could rely upon American support however intransigent their attitude, the Zionists announced through their official organisation, the Jewish Agency, that they would not even sit down with the British to discuss their proposals. In reply the Arab States insisted that Palestine was and must always remain an Arab State. Bevin did his best to remain hopeful. There were separate meetings with Jews and Arabs. They were followed by private meetings between Bevin and leaders of British Jewry which seemed for a time to offer some prospects of success. But when proposals emerged from these discussions which seemed to Bevin to open the way to a possible settlement, they were at once repudiated by the American Zionists. And the American Zionists were in control. No voices but theirs counted.

It was in these circumstances and after the final collapse of the round-table talks that Attlee and Bevin recommended to the Cabinet that the problem should be passed to the United Nations and that, come what may, Britain should give up the Mandate and withdraw completely and finally from Palestine at midnight on 15 May 1948. They knew that this decision would arouse the most bitter controversy. They knew that it would almost inevitably mean war between Jew and Arab. But if that came it was for the United Nations to act. The future of

* In August, 1946, the Executive of the Jewish Agency, which met in Paris under the chairmanship of Ben-Gurion, drew up a partition plan which was more ambitious than even the Peel plan of 1937—see Map 12.

Palestine was an international responsibility. They were not prepared to sacrifice any more British lives in maintaining unaided what had been made an impossible situation.



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U.S. Displaced Persons Legislation: Enactment, 1945-1948*

ROBERT A. DIVINE**

... In the welter of confusion that characterized the months that followed the close of the second World War, the problem of displaced persons went virtually unnoticed in the United States. Not until the end of 1945 did the American government take the first tentative steps toward formulating a policy.¹ On December 22, 1945, President Truman opened the issue with a statement announcing a new program to govern the admission of displaced persons. Advising the American people that the United States could not ignore the sufferings of those uprooted by the war, the president outlined a plan to give displaced persons preferential treatment under the existing quotas.† By reserving half the quotas of European countries for displaced persons, Truman hoped to admit 40,000 a year.² In announcing the new program, Truman carefully attempted to placate restrictionist sentiment in Congress by stressing the limits of his plan. "I wish to emphasize," he wrote, "that any effort to bring relief to these displaced persons and refugees must and will be strictly within the limits of the present quotas as imposed by law."³ Thus the policy he formulated bore a marked resemblance to Roosevelt's prewar refugee policy—sympathy for the plight of distressed people, but practical help confined within the framework of the quota system.

Truman's cautious plan received a favorable reaction throughout the nation, but its inadequacy soon became apparent. In the first nine months of 1946 only 5,000 displaced persons entered the country under the quota system.⁴ Dissatisfied with his first

* From Robert A. Divine, *American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957; London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 112-28. Copyright © 1957 by Yale University Press, Inc. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

** Professor of History at Texas University, U.S.A.

† On the American quota system, see Appendix VI.

proposal, in October 1946 Truman told reporters he would ask the next Congress to admit displaced persons outside the regular quotas.⁵ This disclosure quickly removed the apathy surrounding the displaced persons issue. As long as Truman stayed within the quota system, there was no vital issue at stake, but a proposal to depart from this basic immigration policy made inevitable a showdown battle between the friends and foes of restriction. Both sides began preparing for the struggle in Congress and a controversy was soon under way that would end only after four years of heated debate.

By the end of 1946 the division of opinion over Truman's proposal was evident. Groups favoring the admission of displaced persons organized a Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons composed of many prominent Americans and headed by Earl Harrison, a former commissioner of immigration. This specialized lobbying organization was to be the spearhead in the drive for displaced persons legislation, spending over one million dollars in support of its program.⁶ In Congress forty-nine senators and representatives issued a statement pledging their support to a measure to open unused wartime quotas to displaced persons.⁷ Meanwhile opposition to Truman's proposal quickly developed in restrictionist quarters. National Commander Paul Griffiths of the American Legion issued a statement warning that the entry of displaced persons would deprive veterans of both jobs and houses in the difficult period of postwar adjustment.⁸ Strong opposition also developed in Congress. Following the Republican victory in the November elections, Senator Taft asked Senator Chapman Revercomb to submit a report on the displaced persons problem to the Republican steering committee. In his report Revercomb was very skeptical of the Truman plan to admit displaced persons, warning that it "would of course break down the quota system and completely do away with the present plan of allotments by countries and the policy of national origins."⁹ While Revercomb did not flatly reject Truman's plan, the tone of the report reflected a hostile attitude toward a liberal displaced persons program.

The formal launching of the campaign to enact emergency displaced persons legislation came with President Truman's state of the union message to Congress in January 1947. After describing the meager results of his attempts to admit displaced persons within the quotas, Truman continued, "I urge the Congress to turn its attention to this world problem, in an effort to find ways whereby we can fulfill our responsibilities to these thousands of homeless and suffering refugees of all faiths."¹⁰ Soon afterward Earl Harrison announced that the Citizens

Committee on Displaced Persons would sponsor legislation for the admission of 400,000 refugees over a four-year period.¹¹ To achieve this goal, the Citizens Committee collected over \$200,000, mainly from Jewish contributors, and by June was employing a staff of sixty-five to publicize its program.¹² On April 1, Congressman William Stratton of Illinois introduced the bill sponsored by the Citizens Committee in the House. The Stratton bill proposed the annual admission of 100,000 displaced persons as nonquota immigrants for four years. The bill was very simple in form, requiring only that the displaced persons meet the existing immigration standards and granting preference to close relatives of citizens and war veterans.¹³

The introduction of the Stratton bill placed the issue of displaced persons before Congress for the first time. In the early summer the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the bill which aired the conflicting viewpoints on this controversial question.¹⁴ A great majority of the witnesses—representing the administration, the three major religious groups, and organized labor—urged the enactment of the Stratton bill. The testimony of Secretary of State Marshall, Secretary of War Patterson, and Attorney-General Clark lent great weight to the displaced persons cause. The strong position taken by organized labor was equally significant. William Green, President of the AFL, reversed the traditional restrictionist stand of his organization by a forthright declaration favoring the admission of displaced persons beyond the quota limits. Green apparently believed that the emergency nature of the displaced persons problem justified a temporary departure from his regular quota policy. The defection of the labor unions left only the veterans' organizations and the patriotic societies to uphold the restrictionist viewpoint. Officers of both the American Legion and the American Coalition set forth their vigorous opposition to the displaced persons program, but they were greatly outnumbered by the sponsors of the plan.

The testimony at the hearings revealed that two basic issues were in dispute—the effect of the admission of displaced persons on American society and the extent to which the United States was obligated to help these stateless people. On the first point, the proponents of the Stratton bill argued that the displaced persons were able, freedom-loving people who would make good citizens. Representative Stratton presented a strong case for them, asserting, "Most of them represent a survival of the fittest, having escaped and endured what millions of their kinsmen could not survive." Both William Green and officials of the Department of Labor assured the committee that the nation

could easily absorb 400,000 additional immigrants without depriving American citizens of jobs. The restrictionists, however, sharply dissented from these views. The representative of the American Legion declared that veterans "should not be forced into competition with hundreds of thousands of the very people for whose liberation they made such sacrifice." The opponents of the bill placed the greatest emphasis on the security argument. Warning that Russia had planted espionage agents among the displaced persons, one witness asserted that in addition "there are bound to be numerous and important carriers of the kind of ideological germs with which it is the aim to infect the public opinion of the U.S.A."¹⁵ Thus the committee was presented with two wholly conflicting estimates of the potentialities of displaced persons as future citizens of the nation.

On the second point, the obligation of the United States to the displaced persons, there was even greater divergence. The advocates of the Stratton bill argued that the United States had a moral obligation to accept its "fair share" of displaced persons. This view was based on both humanitarian and international considerations. Several witnesses invoked the asylum ideal in pleading for humane treatment of the problem, as Lehman did when he asserted, "The time is long overdue for us to become mindful with renewed intensity of America's proud tradition of asylum and hope and opportunity for the oppressed." Secretary of State Marshall put the issue in blunter terms. "The tasks that are imposed by a declaration of war are not completed when the guns cease fire. This is one of the tasks which we have not completed." Marshall emphasized the American decision to oppose the forcible repatriation of the displaced persons and warned, "You cannot assert leadership and then not exercise it." Many other witnesses took up this theme of the responsibilities of leadership in a divided world. Admitting that the United States could not solve the problem alone, they urged that this country set an example by taking a generous portion of the displaced persons.¹⁶

The restrictionist witnesses flatly rejected the concept that the United States owed any obligation to the displaced persons. Rather, they argued, the displaced persons should remain in Europe to partake in the reconstruction of that continent. John Williamson, speaking for the Veterans of Foreign Wars, asserted that the displaced persons, "delivered from bondage at the cost of the blood of American youth, now seek to avoid their share in the responsibility for creating a new freedom and civilization in Europe." The opponents of the Stratton bill held that the only obligation was to protect the American people. "Displaced

veterans, displaced Americans have first claim upon America's conscience," declared the American Legion spokesman. John Trevor, President of the American Coalition, was particularly concerned with the effect of this legislation on the over-all immigration policy of the United States. Charging that the Stratton bill was "the spearhead of a drive by the foreign blocs to ultimately abolish the national-origins quota system," Trevor warned that to upset the ethnic balance established in 1924 "would accentuate and gravely embitter international racial dissension, and thereby constitute an ever-growing menace to national unity."¹⁷ Thus the restrictionists replied to the world leadership argument by asserting that the admission of displaced persons would weaken the nation internally and thereby endanger America's leadership of the free world.

The chief result of the hearings was the revelation of the same polarity on the displaced persons question that had characterized previous immigration debates. The restrictionists viewed the problem from the domestic standpoint, maintaining that the protection of American society and the American economy should be the sole determinant of policy. This was basically an isolationist outlook which ignored the relationship between displaced persons and American foreign policy. On the other hand, those advocating the admission of displaced persons believed that the scope of the issue was fundamentally international. Tending to gloss over the impact on the nation of the admission of displaced persons, they based their argument on the necessity for the United States to take the lead in solving a critical problem which, if left untouched, might destroy American prestige in Europe. These differing viewpoints, clearly defined at the hearings, lay at the heart of the bitter controversy that was to rage in Congress for three years.

Though the hearings had been held promptly and seemed to promise a swift decision, Congressional action was delayed throughout 1947. Despite a special message to Congress by Truman urging haste, the judiciary subcommittee failed to take any action on the Stratton bill. A speech by Representative Ed Gossett of Texas, a restrictionist member of the subcommittee, indicated some of the reasons for the delay. Entitling his remarks "A New Fifth Column or the Refugee Racket," Gosset bitterly denounced both the displaced persons and their sponsors in the United States. "The camps," he charged, "are filled with bums, criminals, black-marketeers, subversives, revolutionaries, and crackpots of all colors and hues." In the Senate the opposition to displaced persons was more subtle but

just as real. When a group of eight Democratic and Republican senators introduced a modified version of the Stratton bill, Senator Revercomb countered with a motion to authorize a thorough Senate investigation of all immigration problems, including displaced persons, before discussion of any legislation. Those favoring admission of displaced persons assailed Revercomb's resolution as an inhumane delaying tactic, but after a sharp debate the Senate authorized the investigation and instructed Revercomb to report by January 10, 1948.¹⁸ Thus the restrictionists, fearful of defeat on a showdown vote, succeeded in postponing displaced persons legislation until 1948.

When Congress reconvened in January the outlook for legislation was much brighter, for two events of the fall of 1947 had greatly improved the position of those advocating admission of displaced persons. In late October the American Legion reversed the stand it had taken at the hearings. After a favorable report by National Commander Paul Griffiths, who had toured the camps in Europe during the summer, the National Executive Committee announced that the Legion would support the admission of a limited number of displaced persons for humane reasons.¹⁹ And the next month a special subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee which had investigated the problem of displaced persons in Europe for several weeks reported to Congress that after reviewing the whole problem, its conclusion was that resettlement was the only feasible solution, and it accordingly recommended that the United States exert its leadership by calling a conference of the free nations to decide on what share each country should take. Meanwhile, Congress should set the example for other nations by authorizing the admission of displaced persons on an emergency basis.²⁰

On January 7 President Truman again urged the adoption of his program, asserting that "the admission of these persons will add to the strength and energy of this nation."²¹ The following week the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America adopted a strong resolution in support of the president. Charging that the delay in the last session of Congress "placed upon the conscience of this nation a great moral burden," the resolution urged Congress "to act favorably and quickly on the Stratton bill." Catholic groups also expressed approval of the administration's program and formed a new organization, the National Catholic Resettlement Council, to coordinate plans for the reception of Catholic displaced persons.²² Finally, the Citizens Committee continued its activities, both by lobbying in Washington and by stimulating public opinion throughout the country. The Committee's expenditures reached a new high

of nearly \$ 300,000 for the first half of 1948.²³

Faced with this steadily mounting pressure, the Senate Judiciary Committee finally reported out a displaced persons bill on March 2, 1948. The new measure was embodied in the report of the Revercomb subcommittee, which had investigated the displaced persons problem in Europe during the summer and fall of 1947. In the report the subcommittee came to the conclusion that the displaced persons should be resettled and recommended the admission of a moderate number into the United States under a carefully regulated plan. In the course of this report, the subcommittee revealed considerable skepticism over certain of the claims made on behalf of the displaced persons. The subcommittee regarded the movement of Jews and other refugees from eastern Europe after 1945 as falling outside the scope of the main problem and implied that this exodus was a planned migration organized by Jewish agencies in the United States and in Europe. The report also expressed considerable doubt about the ideology of the displaced persons. Though stating that there were few active Communists in the camps, the subcommittee warned that there might be many "in a dormant state." The subcommittee, furthermore, was skeptical of the assertion that all displaced persons would be persecuted if they returned to their native lands. The report stated that this fear was probably well grounded for the people from the Baltic states and from that part of Poland east of the Curzon line, territory which had been annexed by Russia, but not for those from Poland proper and the Balkan countries.²⁴

The bill submitted by the subcommittee reflected the doubts expressed in the report. Adopting the basic principle of admitting displaced persons, the proposed measure contained four restrictive features that were to become the center of controversy in the Senate. First, the bill limited the number to 100,000 over a two-year period, only one-fourth the total in the Stratton bill, on the grounds that a greater number would be harmful to the American economy. In the second place, the subcommittee limited the program to those people who were registered as displaced persons on December 22, 1945, the date of President Truman's directive. This early cut-off date excluded some 100,000 people, mainly Jews, who had entered the camps in 1946 and early 1947.* The subcommittee justified this provision on the grounds that help should be extended only to those people

* For President Truman's insistence during 1946-47 that 100,000 Jews from Europe immediately enter Palestine, see K. Roosevelt, pp. 515-26, and Williams, pp. 557-74.

who had been directly displaced by the war.²⁵ Fifty per cent priorities for people from the areas annexed by Russia—the Baltic states and eastern Poland—and for agriculturalists formed a third restrictive feature. The Baltic priority was advocated in the belief that these people would suffer most if repatriated, while the agricultural preference was designed to achieve an even distribution of displaced persons in the United States as well as to meet a shortage of farm labor. Finally, the subcommittee bill required that sponsors of individual displaced persons guarantee both employment and living quarters for the newcomers.²⁶

The formulation and approval of a bill by the Senate subcommittee opened a new phase of the displaced persons issue. After nearly two years of delay, Congress now had the opportunity to enact legislation. More important, the new measure indicated a significant shift in the nature of the controversy. The reversal of the American Legion position, the favorable report of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, and the heavy pressure from religious and humanitarian organizations convinced the restrictionist groups that the nation favored the admission of displaced persons. As a result, they changed their tactics from outright delay to an attempt to circumscribe the legislation as far as possible. The early cut-off date, the Baltic and agricultural priorities, and the housing and job requirements were all restrictive features designed to limit admissions to a few select groups. With these limitations, the great majority of restrictionists, led by Senator Revercomb, advocated this legislation as the wisest solution to the problem. Caught by the sudden shift of the restrictionists, the original advocates of the displaced persons legislation were put in a difficult position. They were forced to accept the bill in general and concentrate their attack on its restrictive features. Under the leadership of Homer Ferguson of Michigan, a group of eastern and midwestern senators offered a series of amendments designed to liberalize the measure. Though a small group of southern senators objected to the bill in its entirety, the crucial debate concerned the liberal amendments. The question was not whether the Senate would pass a displaced persons bill but whether the bill would be a liberal or a restrictive measure.

In the course of the long and often confusing debate on the Senate floor, the controversy centered about two basic points—the extent of the displaced persons program and the method of selection. On the first point the restrictionists argued that their bill represented a wise program because it reconciled American

obligations to the displaced persons with the best interests of the American people. Senator Revercomb, along with Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, presented the case for the committee bill. Both men vigorously defended the numerical limit of 100,000 and the restrictions concerning employment and housing. They constantly reminded the Senate that their first obligation was to the American people, warning that a large influx of displaced persons would intensify the housing and employment problems faced by the returning servicemen. Senator Wiley summed up the nationalistic viewpoint when he asserted, "We should not, in our zeal to fulfill our humanitarian responsibilities, forget our responsibilities to our own land and to our own people." In sharp contrast, the senators favoring a liberal displaced persons measure stressed the humanitarian and international aspects of the problem. Dismissing the housing and job requirements as the result of "a shallow emotionalism" and an unreasoning dislike of foreigners, Senators McGrath and Ferguson warned that unless several hundred thousand displaced persons were accepted, the future peace of Europe would be endangered. The United States must lead the way, they contended, by taking its fair share of people, which they calculated a minimum of 200,000. If this were done, "one of the greatest humanitarian efforts in American history [would] be consummated in the spirit of the great American tradition."²⁷ Nationalism versus internationalism, self-interest versus humanitarianism: this was the crux of the debate.

The disagreement over the method of selection was even greater. The basic points of controversy were the Baltic priority and the cut-off date of December 22, 1945. The advocates of the bill defended these provisions on the grounds that certain displaced persons had suffered much greater hardships than others and therefore were more deserving of American help. Supporting the early terminal date, Senator Revercomb pointed out that the truly displaced people were those whom the Nazis brought into Germany during the war. Minimizing the Polish pogroms in 1946 which caused many Jews to flee to the west, Revercomb contended that a majority of the recent refugees had migrated for economic reasons and not out of a fear of persecution: "the real, basic reason why we should stick to an earlier date is that we will give the preference to the really displaced persons," he asserted. Revercomb presented much the same argument for the Baltic priority, with strong backing from Senators Taft and Knowland. Stating that many displaced persons could return to the satellite countries without genuine danger of persecution, Revercomb declared that the Baltic people and the

eastern Poles faced certain punishment if they went back to their homes in Russian territory. Well aware that these provisions tended to exclude Jewish refugees, Revercomb vehemently denied any intent to slight any racial or religious group: "there is no distinction, certainly no discrimination, intended between any persons because of their religion or their race, but there are differences drawn among those persons who are in fact displaced persons and have been in camp longest and have a preference."²⁸

The opposing senators warmly contested the restrictionist contention that there were valid distinctions between different categories of displaced persons. In particular the supporters of a liberal program advocated a later terminal date, April 21, 1947, and a provision to provide for a cross-section method of selection. Senator Smith of New Jersey condemned an early time limit, asserting that the problem "involves those who were displaced because of conditions resulting from the war just as much as those who were displaced forcibly during the conduct of the war." The general argument was that a humanitarian measure of this type should be governed by a spirit of tolerance which avoided any favoritism toward specific groups. The advocates of a liberal bill were particularly concerned over the effect of the restrictive provisions upon Jewish displaced persons, who formed about 20 per cent of the total and yet were largely outside the preferred categories. While refraining from charges of intentional bias, several senators pointed out that the bill would in effect discriminate against Jews, particularly those postwar refugees from eastern Europe who were victims of anti-Semitic campaigns begun by Hitler. Senator Pepper of Florida stated this charge in the bluntest terms when he exclaimed, "Mr. President, I say that if not by design at least by effect the bill discriminates against the Jews."²⁹

After six days of debate, the restrictionists achieved very nearly a complete triumph. Except on their first amendment, dealing with numerical limits, the senators attempting to liberalize the committee bill met with frustration. On May 27 the Senate voted 40 to 33 to double the number of displaced persons to be admitted, thus authorizing a total of 200,000 for a two-year period. On the next amendment, to eliminate the Baltic priority, twelve Republican senators who had voted for the numerical increase shifted to the restrictionist side. This change, led by Senator Wherry of Nebraska, the majority leader, swung the balance to the supporters of the committee bill, and as a result all the remaining liberalizing amendments were defeated.³⁰ The Senate did adopt one further amendment, proposed by Senator Langer of North Dakota, which opened 50

per cent of the German and Austrian quotas to the *Volksdeutsche* born in the small-quota countries.³¹

The final vote on the bill came on June 2. The two opposing sides in the debate joined together to pass the measure by a margin of 63 to 13. Twelve of the negative votes were cast by southern senators who, except for Senator Eastland of Mississippi, had kept silent during the debate, evidently hoping that the opposing sides would be unable to reach final agreement on the bill. Before the final tabulation the advocates of a liberal displaced persons program made it clear that they would vote for the committee bill with great reluctance. They expressed hope that the House would pass a more liberal bill which would lead to a modification of the Senate measure in the conference committee.³² Thus the first debate on displaced persons legislation came to an equivocal ending with the passage of a bill which failed to satisfy those who had first called for action on this issue.

The controversy over displaced persons now shifted to the House. In May the House Judiciary Committee reported out a bill framed by its subcommittee on immigration. The Fellows bill, named for the chairman of the subcommittee, Representative Frank Fellows of Maine, represented a compromise between the original Stratton bill and the restrictive Senate measure. Setting the number of displaced persons to be admitted at 200,000 the Fellows bill contained no special priorities but instead provided for the selection of displaced persons in proportion to the composition of the total number in Europe. Furthermore, this measure set a terminal date of April 21, 1947. To balance these concessions to the supporters of a liberal displaced persons program, the authors of the bill added one highly significant limitation, the mortgaging of quotas. Rather than permitting the displaced persons to enter as nonquota immigrants, the House measure allowed them to enter immediately but charged them to future quotas of their country of origin, limiting the mortgage to 50 per cent of the quota for any one year.³³ This new feature strongly appealed to the restrictionist members of the House, for it meant that displaced persons could be admitted in reasonable numbers without violating the principle of the quota system.

In contrast to the debate in the Senate, House discussion of the Fellows bill centered on the basic question of admitting displaced persons. A great majority of the representatives rallied around the bill as a reasonable compromise of a controversial issue. The antirestrictionist sponsors of the Stratton bill supported

the House measure because they felt it was superior to the Senate version, while many lifelong restrictionists were attracted by the quota-mortgaging feature. Only the most extreme restrictionists, mainly from the South, voiced opposition. Consequently the debate was brief, with the result a foregone conclusion.

The arguments advanced in the discussion of the Fellows bill revealed the compromise nature of the measure. The moderate restrictionists confined their remarks largely to the mortgaging feature. Representative Fellows pointed out that the great merit of the bill was its preservation of the national origins quota system, while several other speakers bluntly stated that they would only support the measure on this basis. On the other hand, the opponents of restriction kept silent on the quota mortgaging provision and focused their remarks on the liberal features of the legislation. Describing the Senate measure as "a travesty of justice," they advocated passage of the Fellows bill as the best legislation obtainable. The southern spokesmen, however, bereft of support from many of their restrictionist colleagues, resorted to invective in attacking the bill. Representative Gossett of Texas assailed the displaced persons as "human refuse" and warned that their admission would only serve "to inject more poison into the national bloodstream."³⁴ Other opposing speakers were more temperate in their remarks, but the tenor of their statements indicated that they objected not just to the Fellows bill but to all immigrants and aliens.

The debate ended on June 11 with the passage of the bill by an overwhelming margin. The final tally was 289 to 91, with nearly two-thirds of the negative votes coming from southern representatives.³⁵ A crippling amendment which would have postponed the operation of the bill until other nations had contracted to accept their share of displaced persons was defeated by a close vote, 88 to 82. The House approved two other amendments. One authorized the entry of 2,000 recent Czech refugees fleeing from Communism, while the second provided for the admission of 3,000 displaced orphans.³⁶ Thus the Fellows bill, changed only by the inclusion of 5,000 additional people, went to the conference committee for an attempt to frame a measure satisfactory to both houses.

A few days later this committee reported a final bill which represented a complete victory for the restrictionist viewpoint. The measure was essentially the Senate bill, with the only restrictive feature of the House version, the mortgaging of quotas, grafted on. The early cut-off date of December 22, 1945, the housing and employment requirements, and the special priorities were retained, though the Baltic priority was reduced to 40

per cent and the agricultural preference to 30 per cent.³⁷ Four of the twelve conferees, two senators and two representatives, refused to sign the report, while three other representatives signed with great reluctance. Representative Chelf of Kentucky explained to the House the reasons for the surrender to the Senate restrictionists. "However, we had a gun barrel at our heads. That gun barrel was the element of time. . . . I repeat, it was either this compromise or nothing."³⁸

The submission of the conference report in the two bodies touched off brief but stormy debates in which the more extreme advocates of a liberal program charged the Senate restrictionists with deliberate intent to discriminate against Jewish displaced persons. In the House, Jewish representatives led the assault, with Emanuel Celler stating that the early cut-off date "would deliberately discriminate against the Jews." Senators Pepper of Florida and McGrath of Rhode Island reiterated these charges in the upper chamber, the latter exclaiming, "Mr. President, the date of December 22, 1945, was deliberately written into this bill because that date prohibited Jews from taking part in this program." Senator Revercomb replied to these charges by stating that there was neither intentional nor accidental discrimination in the bill. Several Republican senators who had supported a liberal displaced persons program defended Revercomb. While deploring the early cut-off date and the Baltic priority as tending to exclude Jews, they vigorously denied that the framers of the bill had deliberately discriminated against any minority groups.³⁹

The imminent adjournment of Congress presented the opponents of the bill with a difficult decision. If they succeeded in defeating the conference report, all hopes for displaced persons legislation in 1948 would be lost. The opposing senators finally decided to accept the conference report in order to extend some measure of relief to displaced persons. However, they stated that they would press for amendment of the law in the next session. In the House the extreme antirestrictionists refused to concede without a struggle. Representative Celler moved to send the bill back to the conference committee. Though the two extremist factions supported this motion, the House voted 266 to 113 to defeat it and then accepted the conference report by a voice vote.⁴⁰ The Celler motion marks the only occasion in the history of modern immigration legislation on which representatives from the metropolitan districts of the North voted in harmony with southern restrictionists. This situation indicates that the final bill was a conservative compromise which embodied the views of a moderately restrictionist majority in Congress.

The passage of a displaced persons bill so far removed from his original proposals placed President Truman in a dilemma. On June 25 he signed the bill "with very great reluctance" and at the same time issued a statement condemning the restrictive features of the measure. "In its present form," Truman stated, "this bill is flagrantly discriminatory." Though he criticized all the limiting provisions in the bill, the president concentrated on the early cut-off date as the main source of discrimination. Truman asserted that the 1945 terminal date "discriminates in callous fashion against displaced persons of the Jewish faith," and he also contended that this provision excluded many Catholics. The only reason he could surmise for the choice of this date was "upon the abhorrent ground of intolerance." The President concluded his statement by calling for speedy amendment of the measure. "I have signed this bill, in spite of its many defects, in order not to delay further the beginning of a resettlement program and in the expectation that the necessary remedial action will follow when the Congress reconvenes. . . ." ⁴¹

NOTES

- 1 During the war, there had been one small-scale attempt to aid displaced persons. In June 1944 President Roosevelt authorized the temporary admission of some 1,000 displaced persons liberated in the Italian campaign. This was done as a wartime gesture to hearten those uprooted by the war. Though the admission was designed to be only temporary, in early 1946 President Truman issued orders allowing these displaced persons to become permanent immigrants. *New York Times* (June 10, 1944), p. 1; "Study of Immigration Laws and Problems," *Hearings before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization*, 79th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1945), p. 64; T.B. Shoemaker, "New Responsibilities of the Service," *Monthly Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, 3 (February 1946), 259. (This is footnote 11 in the original text. Renumbering due to exclusion of pp. 110-12).
- 2 *Interpreter Releases*, 23 (February 28, 1946), 50.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 54.
- 4 *Ibid.* (November 19, 1946), 285.
- 5 *New York Times* (October 5, 1946), p. 1.
- 6 *Interpreter Releases*, 24 (January 21, 1947), 25. Among the sponsors were Eleanor Roosevelt, James Farley, William Green, Philip Murray, Herbert Lehman, and Charles Taft.
- 7 *New York Times* (November 21, 1946), p. 16.
- 8 *Ibid.* (November 1, 1946), p. 17.
- 9 *Congressional Record* (March 25, 1947), p. 2520.
- 10 *Ibid.* (January 6, 1947), p. 139.
- 11 *New York Times* (January 31, 1947), p. 15.
- 12 *Congressional Record* (October 15, 1949), pp. 14, 647-54. This material comes from the lobbying reports of the Citizens Committee submitted to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and made public by Senator Langer of North Dakota during the later stages of the debate.
- 13 *Ibid.* (April 1, 1947), p. 2968; *New York Times* (April 2, 1947), p. 11; *Interpreter Releases*, 24 (April 8, 1947), p. 118.
- 14 "Permitting Admission of 400,000 Displaced Persons," *House Hearings* (1947). Under the Congressional Reorganization Act of 1946 the House and Senate immigration committees were eliminated and all immigration matters were assigned to the judiciary committees of the two branches.
- 15 *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 164, 167, 322, 383, 445-8, 459.
- 16 *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 19, 130, 137, 141, 160-1, 175, 190, 282, 384, 497, 504-6.
- 17 *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 107, 314, 330.
- 18 *Congressional Record* (July 2, 1947), pp. 8173-6; (July 7, 1947), pp. 8329-30; (July 23, 1947), p. 9807; (July 26, 1947), pp. 10, 350-2.
- 19 *New York Times* (November 1, 1947), p. 5. The Legion recommendation did not state any specific number of displaced persons to be admitted.

- 20 "Displaced Persons and the International Refugee Organization," *Report of a Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 80th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1947), pp. 81-4.
- 21 *New York Times* (January 8, 1948), p. 4.
- 22 *Interpreter Releases*, 25 (February 9, 1948), 40-1; (January 14, 1948), 16.
- 23 *Congressional Record* (March 7, 1950), p. 2903. The exact sum was \$286,466.
- 24 *Senate Report No. 950* (1948), pp. 15-16, 20-1, 50-2.
- 25 *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 56. Under the Truman directive, the cut-off date originally had been December 22, 1945. However, in February 1948 the administration changed the date to April 21, 1947. *Interpreter Releases*, 25 (February 19, 1948), 52.
- 26 *Senate Report No. 950* (1948), pp. 52, 55, 57.
- 27 *Congressional Record* (May 25, 1948), pp. 6402-4; (May 26, 1948), pp. 6446-7, 6454-5; (May 27, 1948), pp. 6568-9, 6576.
- 28 *Ibid.* (May 26, 1948), p. 6793; (June 1, 1948), pp. 6805-8; (June 2, 1948), pp. 6864, 6866.
- 29 *Ibid.* (May 25, 1948), p. 6403; (May 26, 1948), p. 6458; (May 27, 1948), pp. 6579, 6585-6; (June 2, 1948), pp. 6859-63, 6914.
- 30 *Ibid.* (May 27, 1948), p. 6576; (June 1, 1948), pp. 6810-11. Of these twelve, six were from the Midwest, four from the Far West, and two from the East.
- 31 *Ibid.* (June 2, 1948), p. 6894. The committee bill accepted the IRO definition of displaced persons, which specifically excluded persons of German ethnic origin. This amendment, though added to a displaced persons bill, actually dealt with a regular immigration problem under the quota system.
- 32 *Ibid.* (June 2, 1948), pp. 6900, 6913, 6916.
- 33 "Emergency Displaced Persons Admission Act," *House Report No. 1854*, 80th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, 1948), pp. 2, 20.
- 34 *Congressional Record* (June 10, 1948), pp. 7731, 7733, 7737, 7740, 7742-5, 7747, 7759, 7774.
- 35 *Ibid.* (June 11, 1948), p. 7887. The sectional breakdown on this vote was as follows:

<i>Section</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Northeast	106	4
Midwest	88	28
South	51	57
Far West	44	2

- 36 *Ibid.* (June 10, 1948), pp. 7763-5; (June 11, 1948), pp. 7868-9, 7883.
- 37 "Authorizing for a Limited Period of Time the Admission into the United States of Certain European Displaced Persons for Permanent Residence," *House Report No. 2410*, 80th Congress, 2d Session (Washing-

ton, 1948), pp. 1-6.

38 *Congressional Record* (June 18, 1948), p. 8859.

39 *Ibid.* (June 18, 1948), p. 8861; (June 19, 1948), pp. 9004-6, 9012-15.

40 *Ibid.* (June 18, 1948), p. 8863; (June 19, 1948), pp. 9005, 9011, 9014, 9020.

41 *Interpreter Releases*, 25 (July 21, 1948), 252-4.

1. Palestine is an armed camp. We saw signs of this almost as soon as we crossed the frontier, and we became more and more aware of the tense atmosphere each day. Many buildings have barbed wire and other defences. We ourselves were closely guarded by armed police, and often escorted by armoured cars. It is obvious that very considerable military forces and large numbers of police are kept in Palestine. The police are armed; they are conspicuous everywhere; and throughout the country there are substantially built police barracks.

2. We do not think that the conditions in Palestine since the Mandate have been fully appreciated throughout the world, and accordingly we have thought it right to set out in Appendix V a list of the main incidents of disorder. It will be seen that up to the year 1939 the Jews exercised very great restraint.** It is in recent years that the threat to law and order has come from them.

3. A revival of the illegal immigration traffic has occurred since the end of the war in Europe. During the summer of 1945

* From Great Britain, The Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine, Lausanne, 20th April, 1946, *Report 1946*, Cmd. 6808 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946), pp. 39-42. The chapter from which this excerpt is taken is entitled "Public Security". The committee formed at the suggestion of the British Government (in November 1945) had an equal number of British and American members under a rotating chairmanship. It included Joseph C. Hutcheson (American Chairman), John E. Singleton (British Chairman), Frank Aydelotte (U.S.), Frank W. Buxton (U.S.), W.F. Crick (U.K.), Bartley O. Crum (U.S.), Frederick Leggett (U.K.), R.E. Manningham-Buller (U.K.), James G. McDonald (U.S.), Morrison (U.K.) and William Phillips (U.S.).

** See Ben-Gurion, pp. 371-74, Mosley and Ben-Gurion, pp. 375-87, Granott, pp. 389-98, and Ben-Gurion, pp. 399-402.

there was an influx on a substantial scale by land over the northern frontier. More recently there have been successive cases of entry by sea. The Jewish organisations are actively engaged in these operations, carried out latterly by the purchase or charter of ships for voyages from southern Europe, in the absence of effective control of embarkation. Armed clashes are liable to arise from the efforts to prevent interference; a number have arisen from the search for illegal immigrants and arms. Moreover, as recent incidents directly concerned with illegal immigration, may be cited the sabotage of patrol launches, and attacks on coastguard stations.

The present scale and method of illegal immigration by sea can be seen from three recent cases.* Two ships arrived towards the end of our stay in Palestine, and one a few weeks previously. All three were intercepted and, in accordance with the usual procedure, the illegal immigrants taken to a clearance camp where, subject to check, they were released, their numbers being deducted from the immigration quota. The first of these ships sailed from northern Italy. It was her maiden voyage. She carried 911 immigrants, 554 men and 357 women. Practically all were young people. The second carried 247 immigrants, of whom 89 were women. With one exception, all were young people. The third, which arrived on the day of our departure from Palestine, was reported in the press as coming from a French Mediterranean port and carrying 733 immigrants.

The second ship, according to press reports, was expected to land the immigrants at Tel-Aviv, and the plans for screening the immigrants were evident in the sporadic incidents which occurred in that area. Apart from firing on the police, there were incidents of mining and blocking of access by road and rail which could only be designed to isolate the approach to the beach.

4. A sinister aspect of recent years is the development of large illegal armed forces. The following is the structure as stated to us by the military authorities.

The general organisation is the "Haganah." It is an illegal development of the former organisation, in the days of Turkish rule, of armed watchmen who protected Jewish settlements. To-day it is completely organised, under a central control and with subsidiary territorial commands, in three branches, each of which includes women, viz.:-

a static force composed of settlers and townfolk, with an estimated strength of 40,000;

* See J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23.

a field army, based on the Jewish Settlement Police* and trained in more mobile operations, with an estimated strength of 16,000;

a full-time force (Palmach),** permanently mobilised and provided with transport, with an estimated peace establishment of 2,000 and war establishment of some 6,000.

It is known that the Haganah has been procuring arms over a period of years.† Vast quantities have been obtained from the residue of the campaigns in the Middle East. Arms and ammunition are kept and concealed in specially constructed caches in settlements and towns. The following are particulars, furnished to us by the military authorities, of a search which was conducted at Biriya Settlement about the time of our arrival in Palestine.

During the night of 27th/28th February, 1946, shots were fired at a sentry of the Arab Legion at his post, distant some mile or mile and a half from Biriya. Although wounded in the thigh, he returned the fire. Next morning blood stains and bandages were found and police dogs carried a line direct from there to Biriya.

Biriya is situated in a commanding position on the hills of Northern Galilee. It can only be described as a fort.

The population of Biriya were detained. They consisted of 25 men. Their identity cards showed that they came from other parts of Palestine. It was apparent that they were a platoon undergoing training.

A search in the neighbourhood revealed two arms caches. They contained, among other equipment, one Sten gun, one Bren, four modern rifles, one wireless set and grenades.

Numerous documents were also discovered in the caches. Their substance connected the caches with Biriya, and a police dog taking scent from the documents identified one of the men in the building at Biriya. The documents included standing orders for the camp, notes on the structure and duties of the Haganah, training manuals, notes on neighbouring military and police camps.

5. Something in the nature of conscription is in force, as is shown by two press notices of the 6th of November, 1945:—

* See Ben-Gurion, pp. 371-74, and Mosley and Ben-Gurion, pp. 375-87.

** Abbreviation for *Plugat Machats*: "Striking Force".

† See Ben-Gurion, pp. 399-402.

Palestine Post

“A year’s national service in communal settlements will now be required from all Jewish senior school children aged 17-18; till now it was obligatory only to those who had already left school.”

Haboker.* (In this case a translation from Hebrew.)

“The national institutions have decided to widen the scope of the year’s service duty, which up to now has been imposed on graduates of the secondary schools, and to impose it on all girls and boys aged 17-18.

“The Council of Youth Organisations decided, at its session on 31st October, 1945, immediately to begin fulfilment of the order given to the Youth. The Council assumed the responsibility of enlisting immediately all members of the Movements who were born in 1928. The enlistment of the pupils of the secondary and trade schools will be carried out at a time which is to be specially fixed. Before 11th November, 1945, every Movement must submit to the Jewish Agency’s Recruiting Department in Tel-Aviv a roster of its members, male and female, who must enlist.”

A useful adjunct for training purposes is provided from the Jewish Settlement Police, a supplementary police force originally formed in 1936 for the close protection of Jewish settlements. The minimum term of service is six months, during which period they are paid by the Government. We were informed that it often happens that they leave the police force after a short period of service and thereafter serve in the Haganah.

6. Apart from the Haganah, two further illegal armed organisations exist, both having cut away from the parent body. One is the “Irgun Zvai Leumi,”** which was formed in 1935 by dissident members of the Haganah. The other is the “Stern Group” which broke away from the Irgun early in the war when the latter announced an “armistice.” The Irgun operates under its own secret command mainly in sabotage and terrorism against the Mandatory; its strength is estimated at from 3,000 to 5,000.

* *Haboker*, the daily newspaper of the *Brit Zionism Klaliim* (Union of General Zionists), a right wing party which adopted the maximalist Biltmore Program.

** For the Irgun, see above, p. 446, note.

The Stern Group* engages in terrorism; its strength is said to be between 200 and 300.

7. It seems clear that the activities of all these bodies could be greatly reduced if there was any co-operation with the authorities by the Jewish Agency and its officers, and by the rest of the population. Unfortunately the Jewish Agency** ceased to co-operate with the Government, or at least reduced the measure of their co-operation as from the end of the war.

We set out in the form of an extract from the *Palestine Post* of 30th December, 1945, the attitude of the Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency after the murders of the 27th December, 1945. In the course of his evidence before us Mr. Ben Gurion said that he took responsibility for giving this statement to the press:-

“Following upon the outrages which occurred on Thursday night, His Excellency the High Commissioner† summoned Mr. D. Ben Gurion and Mr. M. Shertok to see him at Government House on Friday morning, it was officially stated yesterday.

It is learned that during the interview, Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Shertok declared that the Jewish Agency completely dissociated themselves from the murderous attacks on Government and army establishments perpetrated on Thursday night. They expressed their profound sorrow at the loss of life caused by the attacks.

But, they stated, any efforts by the Jewish Agency to assist in preventing such acts would be rendered futile by the policy pursued in Palestine by His Majesty's Government on which the primary responsibility rests for the tragic situation created in the country, and which had led in recent weeks to bloodshed and innocent victims among Jews, Britons and others.

The Jewish Agency representatives added that it was difficult to appeal to the Yishuv to observe the law at a

* The Stern Gang, *Lochmei Herut Israel* (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), was organized within the Irgun in October, 1939, by Abraham Stern. This group refused any cooperation with the Mandatory power during World War II, and their terrorist activities reached a climax with the murder of Lord Moyne in Cairo, 1944.

** For the Jewish Agency, see above, p. 309, note.

† Sir Alan Cunningham became High Commissioner of Palestine on November 21, 1945.

time when the Mandatory Government itself was consistently violating the fundamental law of the country embodied in the Palestine Mandate.”

So long as this kind of view is put forward by the leaders of the Jewish Agency it is impossible to look for settled conditions.

All three organisations to which reference has been made are illegal.

We recognise that until comparatively recently, efforts were made by the Jewish Agency to curb attacks; we regret that these efforts appear to have ceased. We believe that those responsible for the working of the Jewish Agency—a body of great power and influence over the Jews in Palestine—could do a great deal towards putting an end to outrages such as we have described, which place the people of Palestine as well as British soldiers and police in constant danger.

Private armies ought not to exist; they constitute a danger to the peace of the world.

The information which was in the possession of His Majesty's Government when they undertook their recent action** in Palestine led them to draw the following conclusions:—

(1) That the Hagana and its associated force the Palmach (working under the political control of prominent members of the Jewish Agency) have been engaging in carefully planned movements of sabotage and violence under the guise of "the Jewish Resistance Movement"; †

(2) that the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Group have worked since last Autumn in co-operation with the Hagana High Command on certain of these operations; and

(3) that the broadcasting station "Kol Israel", which claims to be "the Voice of the Resistance Movement" and which was working under the general direction of the Jewish Agency has been supporting these organisations.

The evidence on which these conclusions are based is derived in the main from three sources—

(i) Information which has been obtained showing that between the 23rd September, 1945, and the 3rd November, 1945, seven telegrams passed between London and Jerusalem, and a further telegram on 12th May, 1946. Copies of these have been interpreted and are here set out;

* The complete text of a British White Paper which appeared under the title: Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Palestine: Statement of Information Relating to Acts of Violence*, July 1946, Cmd. 6873 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946).

** Arrest of some members of the Jewish Agency following upon the blowing up on July 22nd, 1946, of the southern wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in which over ninety people, British, Arab and Jewish, mostly civilians, were killed.

† See "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600.

(ii) various broadcasts by "Kol Israel" between 31st October, 1945, and the 23rd June, 1946, referring to specific acts of violence and sabotage; and

(iii) information on various dates derived from the pamphlet *Hamaas* (the publication of the Stern Group), from *Herut* (the publication of the Irgun Zvai Leumi) and from *Eshnav* (the publication of "the Jewish Resistance Movement"). Examples from these pamphlets are set out in this Paper.

This evidence relates to the three widespread sabotage operations of the 31st October/1st November, 1945; 20th-25th February, 1946, and 16-18th June, 1946. All three para-military organisations participated in these actions which not only caused very serious destruction but also loss of life.

I. — ATTACK ON RAILWAYS, POLICE LAUNCHES AND HAIFA REFINERY—31ST OCTOBER—1ST NOVEMBER 1945.

Note.—The Palmach carried out widespread attacks on the Palestinian Railway system. The line was blown in 153 places in all, completely disrupting it. Other charges, though laid, did not explode. Three police launches were destroyed by explosives, two at Haifa and one at Jaffa. The same night, the Irgun Zvai Leumi attacked Lydda Station and Yards causing damage to three locomotives, the destruction of one signal box, and the burning of an engine shed. Several casualties were inflicted, including the death of one British soldier. A further attempt was made on the same night by the Stern Group to blow up the Oil Refinery at Haifa.

This incident was carefully planned in advance as part of a deliberate policy. It was intended as a warning to His Majesty's Government of the consequences that would follow if they did not comply with the wishes of the Yishuv (the Jewish Community in Palestine). The Jewish Agency Executive was not prepared to wait for a declaration of Government policy, but decided to cause "one serious incident" in order to influence that policy. These facts can plainly be seen from the following telegrams.

Telegram No. 1

To London from Sneh* in Jerusalem—23rd September, 1945.

"It is suggested that we do not wait for the official announce-

* Moshe Sneh, born in Poland, 1909, was editor of the Communist daily *Kol Haam* and Commander-in-Chief of the Haganah, 1940-46. Currently (1969) he is a member of the Israeli Parliament.

ment but call upon all Jewry to warn the authorities and to raise the morale of the Yishuv. If you agree ask Zeev Sharef* for statistical material about the absorptive capacity and if you do not agree tell him that this material is not yet required. *It has also been suggested that we cause one serious incident.* We would then publish a declaration to the effect that it is *only a warning and an indication of much more serious incidents* that would threaten the safety of all British interests in the country, should the Government decide against us. Wire your views with the reference as before but referring to statistical material about immigration during the war years. *The Stern Group have expressed their willingness to join us completely on the basis of our programme of activity.* This time the intention seems serious. If there is such a union we may assume that we can prevent independent action even by the IZL. Wire your views on the question of the union referring to statistical material about Jewish recruitment to the Army. Sneh.”

N.B.—Sneh is Security member of the Jewish Agency Executive. IZL is the Irgun Zvai Leumi.

That the Agency Executive agreed to the above action is clearly shown in the following telegrams:—

Telegram No. 2

To London from Bernard Joseph in Jerusalem—10th October, 1945.**

“Eliezer Kaplan basing himself on a word from Hayyim via Nwbw† says that we should undertake nothing before you give us instructions to do. He is opposed to any real action on our part until we hear from you.

Other members, however, are of the opinion that it is necessary to back your political effort with activities which do not bear the character of a general conflict.

It is essential that we should know at once whether such actions are likely to be useful or detrimental to your struggle.

Should you be opposed to any action whatever, wire that we should wait for the arrival of Wlsly.

* Zeev Sharif, born in Russia, 1897, is currently (1969) Israeli Minister of Commerce and Industry.

** Later Finance Minister of Israel.

† Hayyim most probably stands for Chaim Weizmann and Nwbw probably stands for “Nebi”, the nickname of Viscount Edwin Herbert Samuel, a pro-Zionist ex-British colonial official and Director of the *Jewish Chronicle* in London since 1951.

Should you agree to isolated actions, wire that you agree to sending a deputation to the dominions.

If Hayyim meant us only avoid a general conflict not isolated cases, send greetings to Chill for the birth of his daughter.”

N.B.—Bernard Joseph is legal adviser to the Jewish Agency and a member of its Executive. He acts in Shertok’s absence as Head of the Political Department. Eliezer Kaplan is Head of the Agency’s Financial Department and a member of its Executive.

Telegram No. 3

From Moshe Shertok* in London to Bernard Joseph in Jerusalem—12th October, 1945.

“David** will not leave before fortnight. Meanwhile probably revisit Paris. Regarding Dobkin† written. David himself favoured delegate dominions. Please congratulate Chill on birth of daughter. Signed Shertok.”

N.B.—(1) Moshe Shertok is Head of the Agency’s Political Department and a member of the Executive.

(2) A reference to telegram No. 2 will show that the phrases about “delegate dominions” and “greetings to Chill” meant that it was desired, whilst avoiding a general conflict, to indulge in isolated actions.

Telegram No. 4

To London from Jerusalem—2nd November, 1945.

“The Executive refuses to give authority to the political department to act within the limits of Ben Gurion’s instructions. Gsbr argues that he will oppose this as soon as Ben Gurion and Shertok return. I declared that I will act according to the instructions which I have received until an authoritative message is received which cancels Ben Gurion’s instructions. They did not

* Moshe Shertok, later Sharett, (1894-1965) born in Russia, was the Head of the Political Department of the Mapai (Palestine Jewish Labour Party), Political Secretary of the Jewish Agency, 1931-33, Member of the Jewish Agency Executive, 1933-48, Director of its Political Department in 1946, Foreign Minister until 1954, and Prime Minister, 1954-55.

** David Ben-Gurion.

† Eliahu Dobkin, born in Russia, 1898; at this time Director of the Jewish Agency’s Department of Immigration and subsequently Chairman of the Central Committee of the United Israel Appeal.

dare to cancel the instructions but insisted that we inform the Executive in advance of each action and that they should have the right of veto. *We received agreement for the police boats and for the railway.* All activities may thus be spoiled owing to pressure from the party on Bernard Joseph and on Eliahu.”

N.B.—David Ben Gurion is Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive.

For the operations of the 31st October-1st November the Agency sought and obtained the co-operation of the “dissident organisations.”

Telegram No. 5

To London from Jerusalem,—1st November, 1945.

“*We have come to a working arrangement with the dissident organisations according to which we shall assign certain tasks to them under our command.* They will act only according to our plan. Sneh, Shaul Meiroff,* Kn’ny and Bernard Joseph consider such an agreement as most desirable, but it is not being put into effect because the Party is delaying it. Some of them are opposed to any sort of activity and especially to any agreement with the dissidents. Information on the operations follows:—

The following activities were carried out on Wednesday night. Two boats were sunk in the Haifa harbour and a third at Jaffa. The boats had been used to chase immigrants. Railway lines were blown up in 50 centres, in all 500 explosions. Railway traffic was stopped from the Syrian frontier to Gaza, from Haifa to Samakh, from Lydda to Jerusalem. In all the activities no one was hurt, stopped or arrested.

The same night the IZL attacked the Lydda station causing serious damage and some casualties. During the same night the Stern Group caused serious sabotage at the refineries at Haifa and one man was killed. *The dissidents had previously informed us of this and we did not object to Lydda but were opposed to the refinery job.* Had the agreement come into effect we could have avoided victims at Lydda and prevented the refinery operation. I regard the fact that the Party and the Executive are withholding their approval as a crime.

The activities have made a great impression in the country. The authorities are bewildered and have proclaimed a curfew on the roads at night. They are waiting for instructions from London. We are apprehensive of a general attack against the Hagana. We have taken the necessary security measures and

* Shaul Meiroff was a Haganah Commander.

are prepared for sacrifices. Confirm by telegram to Ada enquiries about the health of her children."

"Hamaas", the publication of the Stern Group in referring to the above operation, stated:—

"The events of 1st November have given a striking expression of the firm resolution of the Jews to fight for the freedom of their homeland. The scope of the attack has proved that the Jews are capable of acting under the most difficult conditions.

However, the most significant achievement on that night was that for the first time the attack was co-ordinated and concentrated. The Jewish Resistance Movement has embraced all the Jewish resistance forces with a view to their being guided by a single authority which would control the common fight." ("Hamaas" Issue No. 2 of November, 1945.)

These operations were widely publicised by the Jewish illegal broadcasting station, Kol Israel, as follows:—

"The paralysing of the Railways all over the country through cutting the lines in 242 places serves as a warning to the Government of the White Paper.

The nights of heroism since Athlit¹ are an expression of our strength and decision. We lament the British, Arab and Jewish victims who fell in the attacks on the railways and ports of Palestine. They are all victims of the White Paper. All our men returned safely with their equipment. None of our men is missing." (2nd November, 1945.)

As proof of the fact that Kol Israel station was working with the agreement of the Jewish Agency, reference may be made to the following telegrams. (See also telegram No. 8 on page 600).

Telegram No. 6

To London from Sneh in Jerusalem—12th October, 1945.

"With effect from 4/10 the broadcasts of the 'Voice of Israel' have been renewed. Two broadcasts were successful. Eliezer Kaplan and Bernard Joseph were invited to see the High Commissioner this morning.

The agreement for the renewal of the broadcasts and the Athlit¹ undertakings have been obtained with difficulty. In future I shall not enquire but decide in conjunction with Shaul Meiroff and Kn'ny."

Telegram No. 7

To London from Jerusalem—14th October, 1945.

“The Voice of Israel started to function as the broadcasting station of the Jewish Resistance Movement three days before we received your letter and your telegram.

We also have had the same doubts and we voiced them before the broadcasts were started but the expert says that there are no grounds for anxiety from the technical point of view.”

N.B.—The phrase “grounds for anxiety from the technical point of view” probably refers to apprehension that the station, which is a mobile one, might be located.

II.—ATTACK ON HAIFA RADAR STATION, PALESTINE MOBILE FORCE CAMPS, AND AIRFIELDS—20th–25th FEBRUARY, 1946.

Note.—On 20th February, 1946, the Palmach attacked the R.A.F. Radar Station, Haifa, blowing it up and seriously wounding two R.A.F. N.C.O.s and inflicting lesser injuries on six others.

Two days later the Palmach carried out co-ordinated attacks on Palestine Mobile Force Camps at Shaffa Amr, Kfar Vitkin and Sarona. At Shaffa Amr serious damage was caused. One police officer suffered head injuries. Three British women and one child suffered from shock.

On 25th February, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Group followed this up with attacks on airfields at Lydda, Petah Tikvah, and Qastina, destroying seven aircraft and damaging eight others.

These incidents seem to have been intended as a “second warning”, as the “first warning” on the 31st October/1st November, 1945, had been “disregarded.” These incidents were described in a Kol Israel broadcast of the 3rd March, 1946.

“This last fortnight has seen a renewed intensity in the struggle of the Jewish people against the forces which aim to throttle them and their natural aspirations for normal nationhood in their National Home.

The attack on the Radar Station on Mount Carmel was aimed at destroying one of the principal agents of the Government in its hunt for Jewish refugees. The sabotage of the airfields (i.e., by Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Group) was the sabotage of a weapon which has been degraded from its glorious fight against the evil forces of Nazism to the dishon-

ourable task of fighting against the victims of Nazism.

Those three attacks are symptomatic of our struggle. In all cases the onslaught was made against the weapon used by the White Paper in its despicable battle to repudiate its undertaking to the Jewish people and the world, and not against the men who use this weapon. It is not our object to cause the loss of life of any Briton in this country; we have nothing against them because we realise that they are but instruments of a policy, and in many cases unwilling instruments."

In addition to the above broadcast, Herut, the publication of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, and Eshnav, the pamphlet published in the name of the Resistance Movement, made the following allusions to these extensive operations:—

"Heavy tasks were imposed on all the Forces of the nation. The soldiers of the Hagana were ordered to attack the forces in their lairs (i.e. the Palestine Mobile Force). No less difficult was the task imposed on the members of the National Military Organisation² who were sent to attack the Military airfields at Qastina and the central airfield at Lydda; and on the members of the Fighters for Freedom of Israel³ who were ordered to attack the aerodrome at Kfar Sirkin. The importance of this week's events lies in the fact that this was the first time that the military bases of the British rulers were shaken." ("Herut", Issue No. 55 of February, 1946.)

"A Big Week.

The actions of this glorious week have been carried out with the support of the entire, united Jewish youth. This is a political achievement.

The Palestine Mobile Force has been attacked by the Haganah; at two camps considerable damage has been inflicted. At Sarona the fighters retired after a continuation of the attack had proved useless. Here four of them fell.

Lydda and Qastina airfields have been attacked by Irgun Zvai Leumi whilst Lohemei Herut Israel (Fighters for Freedom of Israel) men chose as their aim the airfield at Kfar Sirkin." ("Herut", Issue No. 56 of February, 1946).

"*The first warning on 1st November, 1945, by the Jewish Resistance was disregarded, and the whole Yishuv was compelled to carry out a second warning during the last fortnight expressed in the attacks on Palestine Mobile Force Stations and Airfields.*" ("Eshnav", Issue No. 116 of 4th March, 1946.)

III.—ATTACKS ON ROAD AND RAIL BRIDGES, RAILWAY WORKSHOPS AND KIDNAPPING OF BRITISH OFFICERS—
16th to 18th JUNE, 1946.

Note.—During the evening of 16th June, 1946, Hagana carried out attacks on road and rail bridges on the frontier of Palestine causing damage estimated at £ 250,000. Four road and four rail bridges were destroyed or damaged during the night, and one road bridge across the Jordan was destroyed by a delayed action mine, while attempts were being made to remove the charges. One British officer of the Royal Engineers was killed by the explosion.

The following evening the Stern Group carried out an attack on the Haifa Railway Workshops.

On 18th June, 1946, five British officers were kidnapped while lunching at an officers club in Tel Aviv and a sixth British officer was kidnapped in a main street of Jerusalem.

Indication that a further series of incidents might be imminent was given on 12th May, 1946, when Kol Israel broadcast a warning which it considered “desirable” to “lay before His Majesty’s Government.” The text of this broadcast was as follows:—

“The Jewish Resistance Movement thinks it *desirable to publish the warning it intends to lay before His Majesty’s Government.* Present British policy is executing a dangerous manœuvre and is based on an erroneous assumption: Britain, in evacuating Syria, Lebanon and Egypt intends to concentrate her military bases in Palestine and is therefore concerned to strengthen her hold over the mandate, and is using her responsibility to the Jewish people merely as a means to that end. But this double game will not work. Britain cannot hold both ends of the rope; she cannot exploit the tragic Jewish question for her own benefit as mandatory power, while attempting to wriggle out of the various responsibilities which that mandate confers. *From the Zionist point of view, the tepid conclusions of the Commission bear no relation to the political claims of the Jewish people,* but even so, in the execution of these proposals, the British Government is displaying a vacillation at once disappointing and discreditable. We would therefore warn publicly His Majesty’s Government that if it does not fulfil its responsibilities under the mandate—above all with regard to the question of immigration—the Jewish people will feel obliged to lay before the nations of the world the request that the

British leave Palestine. The Jewish Resistance Movement will make every effort to hinder the transfer of British Bases to Palestine and to prevent their establishment in the country."

This broadcast is of particular significance by reason of the fact that it was given at the express request of Moshe Shertok, Head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department and a member of its Executive Committee, and had also been passed to David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Executive Committee. This is made clear in the following telegram:—

Telegram No. 8

To "Daniel" in London from Sneh in Jerusalem—12th May, 1946.

"Please pass on to Ben Gurion the text of the broadcast of Kol Israel sent herewith; with a note that the broadcast was made at the request of Shertok."

The telegram then repeats textually the broadcast message of the same date.

There followed on the night of the 16th June, 1946, the widespread and carefully planned attacks on vital communications and on the following night the attack on railway workshops. Kol Israel accepted full responsibility on behalf of "the Resistance Movement for the renewal of its activity as a result of the delaying policy of the British Government."

Kol Israel Broadcast.
18th June, 1946.

"The action of blowing up the bridges expressed the high morale and courage of the Jewish fighters who carried out the attack. They had to pass long distances and to carry a large quantity of material for that purpose. The withdrawal was most difficult since all the police and army were on their feet and aircraft were looking for the attackers; despite all this the operation was executed and all objectives were reached according to plan without causing any loss of life to the guards. There were some casualties among the attackers in the North owing to an unfortunate accident which was caused by the fall of a rocket directly on to a lorry loaded with explosives and the whole load blew up and the persons there were killed. Honour to their memory! The Army and Police became furious and started to discharge their wrath on the peaceful people of the nearby settlements; many settlers of Beth Haareva, Matzuva and Eilon were arrested and taken to Acre.

Many messages of heartfelt appreciation were sent by various personalities and journalists to the Resistance Movement for *the renewal of its activity as a result of the delaying policy of the British Government*, the recent Bevin speech* and the known announcement of Attlee. These objectives were chosen to disturb British bases and communications, to prevent the Arabs of the neighbouring countries who talked so much about coming to fight the Jews in Palestine, and to mark the closing up of these frontiers before Jewish immigrants."

23rd June, 1946.

"This is the Voice of Israel, the voice of Jewish Resistance. Last week we had to destroy the bridges—these bridges are just as much use to us as the authorities but they had to be destroyed to show our feelings."

CONCLUSION

The evidence contained in the foregoing pages is not, and is not intended to be, a complete statement of all the evidence in the possession of His Majesty's Government.

Nor are the specific instances herein referred to by any means a complete list of all the incidents of violence and sabotage which have taken place in recent months.

The fact is that in the first six months of 1946 there were nearly fifty separate incidents involving violence, and in many cases loss of life: material damage to a very great extent has been done to railway installations, police and R.A.F. stations, and coastguard stations. Roads have been mined and vehicles have been blown up.

The above operations were widespread in character and caused very extensive damage. When they were almost immediately followed by the kidnapping of British officers, it was no longer possible for His Majesty's Government to adopt a passive attitude. Unless the Government were prepared to yield to threats of violence and to abandon all hope of establishing law and order, they were bound to take active steps against any persons or organisations who had made themselves responsible for the planning and carrying out of the outrages which are dealt with in this Paper.


* On June 12, 1946, Bevin addressed the Annual Conference of the Labour Party, asserting that the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine would cost the British £200m. He had, therefore, suggested to the U.S. Government the appointment of a joint committee to consider the problems involved.

NOTES

- 1 On 10th October the Palmach released over 200 illegal immigrants from Athlit Clearance Camp. A British police tender was ambushed during the subsequent search for the escaped persons and one British policeman and two Palestinians were wounded.
- 2 Irgun Zvai Leumi.
- 3 The Stern Group.

Map 12

Jewish Agency's Proposals for a Jewish State, August 1946



Reprinted from George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East, 1945-1950*.

The Mossad Machine—Con- founding Military Intelligence* 1946-1947

JON AND DAVID KIMCHE**

While the special section attached to General Headquarters of the British Army in the Middle East was stepping up its measures to counteract the growing menace of illegal immigration, the Chief of the Mossad and his aides, in Paris, were developing their organisation on an ever-larger scale.

The Chief had arrived with no funds, no organisation.† At that time, late in 1945, the thought of organising an illegal transport of 80 or 100 Jews was still considered something tremendous, an aim almost impossible to achieve. Now less than a year had passed; the grim reality of Europe had thrust aside previous considerations and calculations, and the Mossad had emerged, in the words of the British Government's statement on Palestine on August 12th, 1946,‡ as a "widely ramified and highly organised movement, supported by very large financial contributions from Zionist sources... (whose) organisers maintain a closely knit network of agents in the countries of eastern and southern Europe, by whom considerable numbers of displaced Jews are moved from points of departure as far distant as Poland down to the Mediterranean seaboard."

How had this metamorphosis taken place? How had the Chief succeeded in forming a "widely ramified and highly organised movement" out of the meagre beginnings with which work was started immediately after the war in 1945?

The arrival of the first emissaries to Europe while the war was still in progress, Ruth Klieger to Paris, Yehuda Arazi and

* From Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads: The "Illegal" Migration of a People, 1938-1948*, chap. XIII.

** For the authors, see above, p. 433, note.

† For Zionist funds, see Appendix V; see also Morgan, pp. 527-48.

‡ See "White Paper on Violence, 1946," pp. 601-12.

Shmarya Zameret to Italy, has already been mentioned. Their job at that time was neither defined, nor simple; theirs was mainly to sound out the situation, to do whatever they felt they could do, without directives from central headquarters and without help. Thus it was that the first sailings organised by Ruth and by Arazi were arranged with the aid of the American Occupation forces in Germany and the large-scale use of British military supplies in Italy. When later these two sources of help had been effectively shut off from the Mossad emissaries by official British representations in Europe and by the change in Italy caused by the Spezia affair,* the Mossad had already found its own feet. It was able to direct the mounting stream of "illegal" immigrants without interruption.

The change in the Mossad's fortunes began early in 1946 when large Welfare Organisations, mostly American, who were financially responsible for the upkeep of the large D.P. camps covering the face of Europe like an endless mass of sores, realised that there existed a complete unity of interests between them and the Mossad. Some of the Welfare Organisations were vitally interested in reducing the swollen numbers of refugees in the camps, which were becoming a staggering financial burden; the Mossad and the Bricha** were the only ones who were taking practical steps to reduce the numbers.

The welfare organisations were also interested in a solution to the hundreds of thousands of homeless refugees who had come tapping on their doors; again it was only the Mossad that offered any practical solution and was taking steps to carry it out. The result of this identification of interests, if for divergent reasons, was that early in 1946 a deal was made between the Mossad and the representatives of the welfare organisations which altered the entire scope and methods of the Mossad's activities; the organisations now declared that they were prepared to pay the Mossad a certain sum of money for each refugee taken out of the camps.

The fact that, from the British point of view, the immigrants would be sent illegally to Palestine did not interest the heads of the welfare organisation. They were under the impact of the

* In April-May, 1949, a Mossad ship, the *Fede*, carrying about 1,000 illegal immigrants was detained at the Italian port of Spezia. A histrionic hunger strike on board the ship, organized by the Haganah and widely covered by mass-media, forced British authorities to give the immigrants entry into Palestine.

** The Bricha was the Zionist underground organisation in charge of the movement of Jews within Europe for their immigration to Palestine.

flux and flow of the largest movement of peoples in modern history: the laws and regulations of that other world, the civilised world where there were no refugees and no displaced persons, seemed peculiarly out of place and unreal among the horrors of Belsen or the extermination furnaces of Theresienstadt. Thus such a deal which, when judged by the standards of ordinary times might have seemed unethical and even shocking, was easily justified by the code of law applying to the refugee world of 1946: the Mossad was lightening the administrative and financial burden of the welfare organisations by emptying the camps; the Mossad was, moreover, finding a practical solution to those displaced persons it took by transporting them to a country where they could set up home again; therefore the Mossad should be encouraged in its activities and helped financially. The legality or illegality of these activities, from the point of view of the outside world, just did not seem to matter.

Together with the backing which these new and powerful allies provided, the Mossad also received help from another quarter. The news of the terrible plight of the remnants of European Jewry had galvanised the large and influential Jewish community in the United States into action. Mossad emissaries, the veteran Ze'ev Shind and the popular Teddy Kollek,* founded the "Friends of the Haganah, Inc." and contributions poured in from all sides, from both Jews and Christians. Sympathy for the Jews in Germany coupled with intense anti-British feeling brought the income of the Haganah Inc. up to fantastic sums; much of it was used for the acquisition of arms and other needs of the Haganah, but a large part of it found its way to the coffers of the Mossad.

Thus by the summer of 1946 the large funds of which General Morgan had inaccurately spoken six months earlier were streaming in. Pino,** the tall Palestinian who had begun his work for the Mossad in Berlin many years ago, now took over the supervision of these funds, and proved himself an able financial director, using the money in the most efficient and capable way possible. The most suitable country for large-scale money transactions was Switzerland, an island of sanity and prosperity in the midst of Europe, and Pino accordingly set up office in Geneva from where his dealings, both for the Mossad and for Rechesh,† the Haganah section for the acquisition of arms, often ran into tens of thousands of Swiss francs. The fact that the immigration

* Teddy Kollek is currently (1969) Mayor of "unified" Jerusalem.

** For Pino, see J. and D. Kimche, pp. 433-44.

† For the Rechesh, see Ben-Gurion, pp. 399-402.

was illegal, and therefore entailed the liberal distribution of bribes, special preparations, etc., made the entire operation much more expensive, and, by the end of 1946, Pino had to reckon that each immigrant shipped to Palestine cost the organisation between 80 and 100 dollars.

The deal made with the welfare organisations was immediately reflected in the work of the Mossad H.Q. in Paris. Whereas in 1945 the largest single consignment had been 252 immigrants sent on the *Hannah Senes*, an event hailed as a great victory by the Mossad, the Chief now turned his eyes on bigger ventures. The turning-point came with the acquisition of the s.s. *Assipa*, a stoutly-built Turkish vessel which took on 750 refugees from the south of France. Its successful sailing, made easy by the help given by French officialdom, made the Chief realise how great his opportunities were, and from that moment he never looked back; immigration figures showed a steady increase until the great crescendo reached by the Mossad in the last days of 1947.

The dour but determined head of the Mossad realised that only questions of finance, and British interference, could prevent more and larger ships from being sent. The financial problem had become much less acute owing to the deal made with some of the welfare organisations. In order to counter British interference, he endeavoured to spread out the sailings over as wide a range as possible. He knew that he could organise at least one sailing successfully from any one area before the British Intelligence agents got on his tracks and put pressure on the authorities to prevent further sailings. It was for this reason that ships sailed from points as far apart as Sweden and Algiers, Portugal and Yugoslavia, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Bulgaria and Rumania. The Chief was astute enough to realise that he could not expect to plan and direct such a far-flung organisation from his office in Paris; he knew that the Mossad stood or fell with the men he left in charge in each country.

He therefore concentrated on finding suitable men and women for the various jobs and on removing those not working effectively. Once an emissary had taken up his post, the Chief and his assistant, Ehud Avriel,* left them with maximum freedom of action, contenting themselves with supervising and confirming the actions of their colleagues, supplying necessary funds and information, settling any differences arising among the various branches of Haganah in Europe and generally co-ordinating their actions. At a later stage, the Paris H.Q. also provided the

* Ehud Avriel, born in Vienna, 1917, was Israel's Ambassador to Ghana 1957-60, and is currently (1969) its Ambassador to Italy.

Mossad emissaries in the various countries with ships, bought in the U.S. by Ze'ev Shind, who had by now become the Mossad expert on shipping and acquired all of the larger Mossad ships.

There was also the "diplomatic" side of the Chief's and Ehud's work. Contact had to be maintained with those all-important Consuls who were prepared to provide as many entry visas into their countries as were required—for extra payment. These block visas enabled the Mossad to receive transit visas into France, Rumania, Bulgaria or Greece without difficulty, thus to a certain extent solving the problem of border crossings. The problem was more difficult in Italy because of the presence of British troops; in Yugoslavia the relations between the Mossad and the *Utbah*, the Political Police, were so cordial that the refugees were in effect allowed in the country without any visas at all.

It was obvious, however, that as the activities expanded, an efficient and smoothly-running system of communications had to be put in operation to enable the Paris H.Q. to keep in constant contact with its far-flung offices and its numerous agents, who now embraced many hundreds of workers. Arazi's radio transmitters with which a radio network embracing Holland, France, Italy, Greece and Palestine was established, was the first step taken; in addition, however, the various emissaries kept in daily telephone contact with the aid of a simple and comprehensive code, and, with the aid of the 300 workers of the Bricha, the soldiers of the Brigade* and permanent Haganah courriers, for all of whom borders were of no consequence whatsoever, a complex network of communications was set up which encompassed the furthestmost Jewish communities of Poland in the east to the Mossad emissaries in France, the Low Countries, and England, from where a large contingent of young English Jews were also sent to Palestine on Mossad ships.

Thus not without reason did a *New York Times* dispatch from American H.Q. in Germany in January, 1946, state that "the Jews moving from Poland to Germany seem to have a better system of communications even than the American Army." The efficiency of the communication system of the

* During the years 1939-45, 27,028 Jews from Palestine were recruited by the British to serve in the war. On the 20th of September, 1944, the British War Office created a purely Jewish Brigade under a Jewish flag. This Brigade joined the British forces in the final stages of the Italian campaign, and although it saw little fighting, it became, perhaps, the most effective Zionist organisation in Europe immediately after the War, working closely with the Mossad and Bricha.

Mossad and the Bricha became famed in the capitals of Europe.

Once the Director-General of one of the Czech Ministries summoned Elkanan Gafni, the chief Bricha agent in Prague, to an immediate interview. Gafni was worried by the summary call; could it be that something had gone amiss? But once in the Ministry's offices he was soon put at rest. The Director-General had an aunt in Germany for whom he had already been searching for many weeks. He had asked the help of all the international organisations concerned—U.N.R.R.A., the Red Cross, as well as the American Army itself, but with no success. None of them had been able to find a trace of the aunt, who had disappeared from her home in Munich. Now, as a final resort, he turned to the Bricha, of whose exploits he had heard, but only half-believed. Gafni promised he would do all he could. Within three days the aunt was in Prague.

The real heroes of this remarkable organisation were the couriers themselves, youngsters of 17 or 18 years who had been schooled in the concentration camps or in the partisan hideouts in the forests of the Balkans, and who could pass every border in Europe, from Rome to Munich and on to Paris, or from Warsaw through the Military Zones of the four Occupying Powers down to Marseilles, without a single legal document in their hands and without a coin in their pockets.

They had their own moral code which, fashioned as it was in the concentration camps, might not stand scrutiny in the cold light of England or America. When Ephraim Deckel, head of the Bricha, once received a complaint that one of his couriers was smuggling cigarettes across the border in addition to refugees, he replied: "If I took a Rabbi to be a courier, I could be certain that he would not smuggle cigarettes. But I would be equally certain that the Rabbi would not know how to smuggle people across the border either." The Bricha youngsters were tough and often unscrupulous; but the same courier about whom the complaint was made would think nothing of going through the concentrated fire of border guards in order to get some refugees through. Neither would he or his colleagues flinch from carrying sick people or children on their backs for many miles through difficult Alpine passes or down slippery mountainous slopes in their often nightly illegal crossings of borders.

But it was not from plucky youngsters alone that the organisation gained its remarkable efficiency and internal strength. Had the organisation of the Mossad been based only on its own agents, it could never have succeeded in directing a stream of 300,000 Jews across Europe and in transporting well over 100,000 to Palestine in the face of such strenuous opposition.

There was another factor involved: the pioneering youth movements of the Zionist Organisations throughout the world. It was they who supplied many of the tough courriers and guides; their emissaries who selected the refugees for the illegal transports; through their offices and farms that the organisation developed its lines of communication. Every member of a pioneering youth movement, no matter to which particular Zionist party it adhered, knew that it was his duty to obey any instruction he might receive from the local Mossad or Bricha agent without asking any questions.

The Chief of the Mossad, therefore, was not only chief of the Haganah emissaries in Europe; he was, in effect, commander of thousands of young Zionists, each one of whom would without hesitation fulfil any order whatsoever emanating from him. This was the secret behind the Bricha's great success; this was what made it into the "most widely-active underground movement ever to have been known," to use a phrase from a Reuters dispatch written in August, 1946.

While the various Zionist parties offered an essential framework within which to organise such large masses of refugees, some party emissaries later abused the enormous responsibilities in their hand in order to further the interests of their particular party. It was largely because of this pressure from the political parties that the efficiency of the work declined somewhat in its last stages. Friction developed between the purely Haganah men, such as Yehuda Arazi, and some of the party emissaries, who sought to carry on political propaganda in the refugee camps and to have a decisive say in the selection of the refugee camps. But throughout the critical year of 1946 and the most part of 1947, this form of party strife was kept completely in the background, largely because of the strong personality of the Mossad's Chief. Complete mutual understanding and trust existed among his agents.

There was one additional factor which completed the set-up of the Mossad and the Bricha. These were the dozens of Palmach* boys, soldiers of the crack commando force of the Jewish paramilitary underground in Palestine, who were sent to Europe to implement the decisions of the Mossad. While the refugees working for Bricha dealt exclusively with the job of directing and transporting the thousands to the Mediterranean seaboard, the Palmach took over from there, carrying out the actual work involved in the sailings.

* For the Palmach, see "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600.

They manned the wireless stations, supervised the preparation of the ships; kept guard over ships and supplies; and took complete command of the ships the moment they left the shores of Europe. Although the Palmach in Europe took their orders from the Chief, they were also in constant connection with Palmach H.Q. in Palestine, and worked in constant unison with the "home" forces whose job it was to supervise the safe landing of the refugees and their subsequent dispersion.

Parallel to the Mossad and the Bricha were the two other Haganah branches operating in Europe at that time, the one for the acquisition of arms and supplies for the Palestine underground, and the other organising military training for prospective Haganah members. Thus Arazi, who had spent many of his years in gun-running for the Haganah, made good use of his fictitious Army unit in Milan; the unit would drive up to one of the arms-dumps which in those days were dotted all over Italy, present fictitious papers, load up their vehicles and disappear. The following night they would transport the arms to a lonely part of the coast, where a fast schooner, which Arazi kept specially for the purpose, would be waiting to take them on to Palestine. In France, too, arms and ammunition were acquired in devious ways. Much of it was purchased at very low prices from the Resistance Movements, and from the stocks of captured German weapons which were still being guarded by men of the Maquis.

The French authorities obligingly shut their eyes to these transactions, and often even gave active assistance. Once when Ehud Avriel was leading a large arms convoy down to the French Riviera for trans-shipment to Palestine, he found the road near one of the towns blocked by large numbers of French Police. It seemed as if the British representations had at last had effect and that they had finally been caught. But the French were not looking for Haganah; it transpired that a group of prisoners in the nearby town had broken out of gaol, and all traffic was being searched for them. When the Police Commandant heard of the identity of the arms smugglers, he apologised profusely and volubly, and waved them on.

This incident was typical of many others; the fact that the arms and the military training were all destined to cause trouble for the unpopular British, and that that trouble was to be on the coast of the Levant, where British intervention in what the French considered their internal affairs in Syria and the Lebanon still rankled deeply, was enough for the vast majority of the French, whether they were anti-imperialist Communists or die-hard Catholic Conservatives. They lent a willing hand to

all of Haganah's activities in France, by allowing the ships to sail without obstruction, by helping in arms transactions, and by "lending" the Haganah military camps and enormous villas in the south of France, where refugee assembly points and Haganah training camps could be established without fear of outside obstruction.

Another country where help in the acquisition of arms was given on a large scale was Yugoslavia, where Ehud Avriel was sent to direct this operation, later jokingly termed their "private Marshall Aid" by the Yugoslav authorities. This fascinating story, however, falls outside the scope of this book.

This, then, was the organisation behind the immigration ships, the underground against which the combined forces of British intelligence and the British diplomatic representatives throughout Europe pitted their strength. The fight had begun in earnest by August, 1946, when the first deportation to Cyprus took place.* It was now to reach its climax in the summer of 1947 when the *President Warfield*, better known as the *Exodus*, slipped out of a French port despite all the British attempts to prevent its sailing, and began a new and final chapter in the story of illegal immigration, which was to end in the dramatic manner of which Arazi had dreamed: in the final engulfing of the Mandate in a flood of immigrants.

* In August, 1946, the British announced that they would transfer 7,200 illegal immigrants who had arrived in Palestine between May and July to Cyprus, to await their turn for admission under the legal monthly quota. The British Government came under heavy Zionist attack for detaining 7,000-8,000 men of "military age" in Cyprus until January 1949.

Palestine Perspectives of a U.S. Cabinet Member, 1947— The Forrestal Diaries*

1. 29 August 1947

Cabinet

Lovett** reported on the foreign situation....On the negative side he placed the increasing complexity of the Palestine situation....He said that the tendency in the General Assembly toward taking decisions by majority vote could constitute a danger to the United States. There was some indication of a lash-up between the Asiatic peoples and those of the Middle East on a color-versus-white basis. He said while much emphasis had been placed upon the distress and commotion among the Jews, there was an equal danger of solidifying sentiment among all of the Arabian and Mohammedan peoples against us....

2. 4 September 1947

Cabinet Lunch

At the end of the lunch Hannegan (Postmaster General) brought up the question of the President's making a statement of policy on Palestine, particularly with reference to the entrance of a hundred and fifty thousand Jews into Palestine. He said he didn't want to press for a decision one way or the other but simply wanted to point out that such a statement would have a very great influence and great effect on the raising of funds

* From Walter Millis, ed. with the collaboration of E.S. Duffield, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 306, 309-10, 322-23, 341-42 and 344-45. Copyright 1951 by New York Herald Tribune Inc. Reprinted by permission of W.C.C. Publishing Company, Inc.; and Princeton University Library.

James Vincent Forrestal (1892-1949) was U.S. Under Secretary of the Navy, 1940, Secretary of the Navy, 1944, Secretary of Defence, 1947-49. The editor is an American military historian and journalist; his writings include *An End to Arms* (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

** Robert A. Lovett was U.S. Under Secretary of State, 1947-49, and Secretary of Defence, 1951-53.

for the Democratic National Committee. He said very large sums were obtained a year ago from Jewish contributors and that they would be influenced in either giving or withholding by what the President did on Palestine. . . . I pointed out that the President's remarks on Palestine of a year ago did not have the expected effect in the New York election.* [It was added] that the President was prompted to make the statement by Rabbi [Abba Hillel] Silver of Cincinnati [actually of Cleveland], who was neither a Democrat nor friendly to Truman, and said that the net effect of the President's observation was to make the British exceedingly angry, particularly when it was coupled with the rejection by the Grady Committee Report.** It amounted to a denunciation of the work of his own appointee. It also resulted in Secretary of State Byrnes washing his hands of the whole Palestine matter, which meant that it was allowed to drift without action and practically without any American policy. . . .

3. 29 September 1947

Cabinet Lunch

. . . I asked the President whether it would not be possible to lift the Jewish-Palestine question out of politics.

The President said it was worth trying to do although he obviously was skeptical. Anderson asked me what I would do if I were in the other party. I said that if I were in the other party I would listen patiently to the impact of this question on the security of the United States, and if it was dangerous to let it continue to be a matter of barter between the two parties, I felt confident that I would try to put it on a national and bipartisan basis.

[This last idea was one that had evidently been growing on Forrestal. He had opened it, in a more general way,

* Mead and Lehman, candidates for Governor and Senator respectively in New York, felt that the Zionists in that state would vote *en bloc* and could win or lose the election for the Democrats. These candidates urged the White House to issue immediately a pro-Zionist statement. On October 4th, such a statement was issued. See also K. Roosevelt, pp. 524-25.

** After the publication of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee, differences on interpretation arose between the American and British Governments. See also Williams, pp. 557-74. As a result, each of the two Governments appointed a special committee to reach agreement on the subject. Henry F. Grady, a San Franciscan businessman, later American Ambassador to India, served as Chairman of the Deputies who conducted the actual negotiations with the British.

to the President after the November election; the latter still seemed as dubious of it as he had been on the earlier occasion, but Forrestal at least had his implied permission to try it. For months he was to pursue, with the greatest earnestness and persistence and at considerable cost to his own standing, the hope of taking Palestine "out of politics." Unfortunately the hope was vain; Palestine was "in politics" on both sides of the party line and (as had already been made evident) in the most direct material way]. — note by Millis.

4. 6 October 1947

Cabinet Lunch

...Hannegan brought up the question of Palestine. He said many people who had contributed to the Democratic campaign fund in 1944 were pressing hard for assurances from the administration of definitive support for the Jewish position in Palestine. The President said that if they would keep quiet he thought that everything would be all right, but that if they persisted in the endeavor to go beyond the report of the United Nations Commission* there was grave danger of wrecking all prospects for settlement. Hannegan tried to press him on this matter but he was adamant.

[There is much about Palestine in the later pages of the diary. In evaluating Forrestal's position, it must not be forgotten that he had a very immediate sense of official responsibility in the matter. Three days after this Cabinet lunch he appeared before the Senate Committee on Small Business. At a time when American small businessmen were clamoring for steel, the administration had licensed the export of twenty thousand tons to build a pipeline in Saudi Arabia, and the committee had questioned the decision. Forrestal's testimony showed one major consideration which lay behind his whole attitude on Palestine]. — note by Millis.

5. 7 November 1947

Cabinet

... Marshall** referred to the present status of China as one of critical instability; it is a situation with which we shall have to deal as best we can, maintaining the American interest to the best of our ability. The Middle East he referred to as another tinder box. I repeated my suggestion, made several times previously, that a serious attempt be made to lift the Palestine

* For UNSCOP, see below, p. 645, note.

** George C. Marshall (1880-1959) was U.S. Secretary of State, 1947-49, and Secretary of Defence, 1950-51.

question out of American partisan politics. I said that there had been general acceptance of the fact that domestic politics ceased at the Atlantic Ocean and that no question was more charged with danger to our security than this particular one.

Marshall stated that the objective of our policy from this point on would be the restoration of balance of power in both Europe and Asia and that all actions would be viewed in the light of this objective. . . .

[Forrestal went on to a luncheon the same day with Loy Henderson of the State Department and others; and here, in a kind of footnote to Marshall's presentation, he heard of certain British views of the subject. Bevin,* he was told, "was thoroughly aware of the vital importance of the Middle East to the existence of Britain and would make every effort to cooperate with us in maintaining its integrity. . . . There were four countries the independence of which from Russia was vital to our joint security: Greece, Turkey, Iran, Italy. . . . The fall of the Middle East would virtually mean the end of England as a power"; and Henderson was inclined to agree. The British, it was said, "did not want to stay alone in Palestine; they didn't want to engage in a war with either the Jews or the Arabs. . . ."] —note by Millis.

6. 26 November 1947

Lunch—Senator McGrath

Lunch today with Senator McGrath.** Prior to it I had him read the secret report on Palestine prepared by CIA.

I said to McGrath that I thought the Palestine question was one of the most important in our American foreign policy, and that if we were talking about lifting foreign affairs out of domestic politics, there was nothing more important to lift out than Palestine, with all its domestic ramifications. I said the Palestine-Jewish question was similar to the Eire-Irish question of forty years ago and that neither should be permitted to have any substantial influence on American policy. McGrath answered that he realized how serious the situation was and said he would like to come back and read more carefully the CIA documents.

[Forrestal derived several points from McGrath's conversation. In the first place, Jewish sources were responsible for a substantial part of the contributions to the Democratic National Committee, and many of these contributions were made "with a distinct idea on the part

* For Bevin, see Bullock, pp. 313-14.

** J. Howard McGrath (1903-66) was a junior Senator from Rhode Island, 1946-49, and Attorney General, 1949-52.

of the givers that they will have an opportunity to express their views and have them seriously considered on such questions as the present Palestine question.” There was a feeling among the Jews that the United States was not doing what it should to solicit votes in the U.N. General Assembly in favor of the Palestine partition.* (To this Forrestal objected that it was “precisely what the State Department wanted to avoid; that we had gone a very long way indeed in supporting partition and that proselytizing for votes and support would add to the already serious alienation of Arabian good will.”) McGrath said that “beyond this the Jews would expect the United States to do its utmost to implement the partition decision if it is voted by the U.N., through force if necessary”; and he was considering suggesting to the President that, in the event of partition, the President should invite a group of leading Jewish citizens to form a committee to go to Palestine “and work out a peaceful and effective arrangement with the Arabs.” As to the use of force, McGrath thought “it might be worth while to have the Gallup Poll or some other opinion-reporting agency make a spot check” as to whether American opinion would favor supporting a partition decision with American troops, either alone or as part of a U.N. force. “I said,” Forrestal’s note continues, “I hoped that Senator McGrath would give a lot of thought to this matter because it involved not merely the Arabs of the Middle East, but also might involve the whole Moslem world with its four hundred millions of people—Egypt, North Africa, India and Afghanistan. . . .”] —note by Millis.

* See Part IV, pp. 703-43.

Palestine is a little country. But what is being done in Palestine is symptomatic of the entire state of the world. It is the methods of settlement being used in Palestine, rather than the particular settlement which may be reached, to which I wish to direct attention. These methods, I will try to show, are disastrous; and if we persist in using them elsewhere in the world—and there is every indication that we shall—the result can only be violence and war.

So far as World War II had a moral issue, it concerned the question whether international relations are to be governed by force or by law. Law means the application of principles of justice to disputes. So the issue is really between force and justice. We have swung out of the war, and we suppose that justice has defeated force. But are we, now in peacetime, pursuing the methods of justice or the methods of force? On the answer depends the future of the world, the issue of war or peace. It is better to take a particular current case and analyze it in detail, to find out what the trend is, than to make general statements. Palestine is an excellent testing ground.

Men's opinions on political and international questions are almost always formed on the basis of their emotions and partisan feelings, and scarcely at all on the basis of reason. This is the prime cause of the wars and bloodshed which fill the world. For emotion and partisan feeling, untempered by reason, issue necessarily in violence. Reason is the principle of democracy and justice. It weighs the issues impartially in the balance. A competent judge reaches a decision by arguing the case, not by flying off the handle about it. Reason, not emotion, much

* From *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1947, pp. 82-86. Reprinted by permission of the author.

** Formerly Stuart Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University, U.S.A., 1935-55; his writings include *Mysticism and Philosophy* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1960).

less self-interest, must be his guide. Not until men learn to govern their opinions and actions in international affairs by unbiased and impartial justice, based on reason, will wars end.

Palestine is a case in point. Not only are Jews and Arabs inflamed by passions, which they call patriotism, but the greater nations concerned, who at least ought to be impartial, are making no attempt to judge the dispute between Jews and Arabs impartially. Instead each of them is concerned with self-interest, and they have made of the question either a struggle for national power or, worse still, a catch-bag for votes for a particular domestic party.

Any attempt to apply to Palestine the rule of justice is fraught with grave difficulties. In the first place, it is met with a solid wall of prejudices. Apart from that, the very attempt is decried. Since justice is a moral concept, one cannot consider it without raising questions of "right" and "wrong." Then the cry is raised that one is talking academically, that one is trying to settle practical questions by "abstract" moral rules which have no application and are not "realistic." But how else is the world ever to advance to any sort of international justice—an avowed aim of the UN inserted in its charter at the instance of Americans—except by applying to concrete situations principles which are in themselves abstract? The principles which law courts apply to men's actions are, as stated in lawbooks and statutes, abstract; and further, they are, in the last analysis, the product of "moral" ideas.

The scene in Palestine shifts so rapidly that it may seem impossible to say anything about it which will not become out of date in a month. But the principles of law and justice do not change, or at least change very slowly. Now the main principle of international justice is that which was laid down in the Atlantic Charter. Nations should have the right of determining their internal affairs without aggression from outside nations. This is nothing new, invented by Roosevelt or Churchill. It was implicit in Wilson's policy and pronouncements. It was the idea on which the League of Nations was supposed to be built. It has always been, for that matter, the fundamental idea of democracy. For the self-determination or democracy of a nation means that its affairs are governed by the wishes of its own people. And since the wishes of a people are never unanimous, it means in practice that they are governed by the wishes of the majority.

That one nation should by force or threats compel another nation to act contrary to its own will, or contrary to the wishes of the majority of its people, is "aggression." It is contrary to the principles of justice, democracy, and self-determination in their

external or international application. That a minority within a nation should forcibly impose its will on the majority—this is likewise aggression, but is generally called “tyranny.” It is the negation of the principles of justice, democracy, and self-determination in their internal or domestic application. This is the only “abstract” or “moral” principle which is needed for the adjudication of the Palestine controversy. And no changes in the local scene, nothing in the kaleidoscope of shifting events, will alter it. It will not be outdated a year from now or in fifty years. How does it apply to the controversy between Jews and Arabs?

The Arab case is in essence, this. The Arabs constitute a large majority of the inhabitants of Palestine.* This is not only true now, but it has been true since somewhere near the beginning of the Christian era—that is to say, for nearly two thousand years. The Arabs in Palestine are opposed, rightly or wrongly, to any mass immigration of Jews. Therefore the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine are opposed to such a mass-immigration. But according to the principle of self-determination, which is the accepted principle of international justice, the affairs of a country must be governed by the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants, and any attempt of an outside country to override by force the wishes of such a majority is “aggression.” Therefore the actions of Zionists, of Great Britain, and of America, in seeking to force on Palestine a mass immigration of Jews contrary to the wishes of the Arab majority, constitute acts of aggression and are contrary to the principles of international justice, self-determination, and democracy.

It will not do to answer that the Arab majority in Palestine is acting “wrongly” in objecting to Jewish immigration, or that, owing to the sufferings of the Jewish people, the Arabs “ought” to welcome them. For according to the principle of justice quoted, it is the majority of the people of Palestine themselves who are entitled to decide what they ought to do. That is the essence of the principle. Our attempt to tell them what they ought to do, and to impose our opinion in the matter by force or threats, constitutes aggression.

We can see this principle more clearly if we apply it in a case nearer home. The majority of the inhabitants of the United States object to the mass immigration of non-Caucasian peoples, and they exclude such peoples by law.** Suppose some outside nation were sufficiently powerful to try to force the United States

* For population statistics of Palestine, see Appendix I.

** See Appendix VI.

to admit non-Caucasian immigrants in hundreds of thousands against our will. We should certainly regard this as an act of aggression, notwithstanding that a good case might be made out for saying that our objection to non-Caucasian peoples is "wrong." We must therefore allow to the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine the same right of determining such questions of right and wrong for themselves as we claim for the majority of the inhabitants of the United States.

It might be argued that although the democratic doctrine of majority rule applies very well to a country with a reasonably homogeneous population, like England or the United States, it cannot be applied in a country in which a permanent religious or racial minority is faced by a hostile and permanent racial or religious majority, as is the case in Palestine, and also in India. It is true that such a situation creates grave difficulties for democratic government. It may be used as an argument for partition or for what has been called in India "communal representation." It shows that in applying democratic principles to such a country some special arrangement must be devised to protect the minority from oppression. But I do not see how these considerations, though they may prove the necessity of special constitutional devices, can affect the question before us. It cannot be argued that since majority rule is difficult in the absence of a homogeneous population, therefore minority rule ought to be allowed to apply, at any rate in some particular cases such as immigration laws. And this is what the argument we are considering would amount to. This objection to the Arab case must therefore be dismissed.

Thus it will be seen that the Arab case rests squarely on the admitted principles of international justice. It is a direct application of them to Palestine. And the logic of the argument appears on the face of it conclusive and unanswerable. Let us see, however, what case the Zionists can make against it.

The Zionist case rests upon five main arguments. They are not usually tabulated and kept distinct. They are, like most arguments on most subjects, often presented to the public mixed together in a confused heap. But if they are to be properly analyzed and assessed, they must be kept separate and taken up for consideration one by one. Any other procedure can only result in muddled thinking.

The first argument is that Palestine was a Jewish land in ancient times. It was for long ages the national land and home of the Jews. It may reasonably be said to have "belonged" to the Jews. Moreover, they did not leave it of their own free will. They were forcibly dispossessed. And this gives them a claim to

re-enter it now and to make of it again a national home.

What force, if any, is there in this contention? The question can only be answered after we have first decided what are the grounds of right by which any nation can claim the country which it occupies. The answer is clear. No nation has any right to the land it occupies except long possession. What right have Americans to live in, occupy, and control these United States? No right whatsoever except the fact that they have actually lived here for two or three hundred years. It is true that there were cases of so-called purchase from the Indians. But no one will claim that the general right of the American people to occupy this country is founded on such purchases. By and large we just seized the land by any means that seemed at the time most convenient. The Indians were, in most cases, forcibly dispossessed. The American claim is thus based on what lawyers call long possession or "prescription."

The same is true of every other people in the world. In most cases there was not even the pretense of purchase which we find in America. The British, the French, the Germans, the Japanese, the Zulus, have no claim to the countries in which they live except long possession.

Judged by this principle, which is the only possible principle to apply, the Arabs have a far better claim to Palestine than the Americans have to America. For they have effectively occupied the country for nearly two thousand years. There may have been always a small Jewish minority in Palestine, just as there has been in America a small Indian minority from the time of its white occupation until now. This would give the Jews in Palestine a right to vote and to proper treatment, just as it gives the same rights to Indians in America. But that is all.

These considerations make it clear that the fact that Palestine was a Jewish land in ancient times cannot possibly give Jews a right of mass entry there now. No matter how a people came originally into possession of a country, whether by aggression, war, or in any other way, we have in the end—that is to say, after a sufficiently long period—to admit their exclusive right to it, which means of course that all prior claims are extinguished. For that is the only basis on which any people can ever claim the country which it inhabits. What is a "sufficiently long period"? Certainly two thousand years is. Thus the first Zionist argument is entirely without force.*

The second argument is that Palestine has for the Jews a peculiarly sacred religious significance. Can we admit religious

* See Beatty, pp. 3-23.

feelings as giving any sort of claim to mass immigration into a country? Would we allow such a claim in any other case? Obviously not. Thailanders could not assert a right to migrate into India because they are Buddhists and India, where the Buddha was born and lived, has a special religious significance for them. And Britishers and Americans, who are Christians, could not claim a right of mass settlement in Palestine on the ground that it has for them, just as much as for the Jews, a deep religious significance. "Oh, but Thailanders, Englishmen, and Americans have already national homes of their own, whereas the Jews are homeless. And therefore the cases are not parallel." But this is an example of the muddled thinking which comes of mixing distinct arguments together. The question whether the homelessness of the Jews in any way alters the case is a separate question which I will consider in its place.

The third Zionist argument is that the British Government in 1917 promised the Jews that they should have a national home in Palestine. A moral claim is here based on the general principle of the sanctity of promises. On this ground the Arab claim to self-determination and the Jewish claim under the Balfour Declaration have been described by a British commission as "fundamentally a conflict of right with right."* This is a very interesting piece of muddleheadedness. It admits, in the first place, that moral criteria of "right" and "wrong" should have application to the controversy. This is correct. It admits, secondly, that the Arab claim is based on the principle of self-determination and is therefore "right." This is also correct. It implies, thirdly, that the Zionist claim, based on the British promise, gives the Jews a moral right. But all this last suggestion proves is that the royal commissioners were grossly incompetent as ethical analysts. The position here taken is widely accepted because neither the average Zionist, nor the average man of any sort, nor—it now appears—the average royal commissioner, is capable of making more than the first step in such an analysis. They think "promises ought to be fulfilled, and the recipients of promises have a moral right to demand their fulfillment. Therefore the Jews in this case have such a right."

* "Such a conflict in a land consecrated to three world religions, Judaism, Islam and Christianity, is tragic enough in itself; but it is the more tragic because, while in the actual disturbances one side put itself, not for the first time, in the wrong by resorting to force, whereas the other side patiently kept the law, it is *fundamentally a conflict of right with right.*" (Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission, *Report*, 1937, Cmd. 5479 [London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937], p. 2).

This is a crude piece of ethical analysis. Wrong and unjust promises ought not to be carried out and give no rights to demand that they be executed. For instance, you cannot claim a moral right to enforce a promise to steal. And if you do, you are an accessory to the theft. Therefore the question which has now to be asked is whether the British had any right to make promises about the disposal of Palestine contrary to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of that country. It is plain that, according to the principles of democracy and self-determination, which are the accepted principles of international justice, they had not. Their action in doing so was an act of aggression. Therefore the Balfour Declaration gives Zionists no moral claim, and if they insist on its fulfillment, they are accessories to aggression.

We now come to the question whether the homelessness of the Jews, to which we must add the frightful sufferings which they have undergone and are undergoing, the persecutions, the pogroms, and all the other horrors, can be made the basis of a claim to mass immigration into Palestine. We may list this as the fourth Zionist contention.

No humane person can view these facts without profound feelings of pity and shame—pity for the victims, shame for the cruelty and wickedness of our human kind. But we have to ask what moral claims can be founded upon it. There arises, most certainly, a claim to generous treatment by every country in the world. But just because the facts yield an equal claim against all civilized countries (except that the claim is stronger against those countries which have been most responsible for the sufferings), they cannot yield any special claim against Palestine. The claim is against England, America, Russia, France, and Palestine too (if Palestine is a humane and civilized country), but not more against Palestine than any other country.

In domestic law we should at once admit this principle. If an individual citizen of a country is homeless, oppressed, and starving, he has a claim to be rescued from these conditions. But the claim is against the community as a whole, not against any individual private citizen (unless it is this citizen who has wrongfully caused his misery). His condition does not give him a claim to make his home in the house of Mr. Smith or Mr. Jones or to demand food from them. Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones have indeed duties and responsibilities in the matter, but only as members of the community, along with and equally with all other citizens. Thus too humanity at large has a plain duty to find a solution to the Jewish problem and to put an end to the persecutions and misery of the Jews. But the solution is not

Palestine. What the proper solution is I shall discuss later. What the considerations which have just been adduced show is that the fourth argument of the Zionists has no more force than the others. It is what lawyers call a "plea ad misericordiam."

The last argument commonly put forward for Zionism is the fact that Jewish immigrants into Palestine have already enormously improved the country, and that further immigration will result in further benefits to it.* This fact is to be admitted, and it is unnecessary to go into any details here regarding the economic and cultural improvements made in Palestine by the Jews. They are well known. The question to be asked is whether they constitute a valid argument for Zionism.

The hole in the argument is that it can be used to justify almost any aggression whatever—at any rate, any aggression by an advanced and highly civilized nation against a more backward one. Hitler might have argued that he would run France, England, and even America more efficiently than the present rulers of those countries. And the claim might not be entirely lacking in truth. He might have argued—and indeed did—that his conquests would in the end benefit the world. And if we consider such claims in this case fantastic, consider some others. The British have always justified their position in India by the benefits which they have brought to it. And this claim to have improved the country is, in spite of Congress Party propaganda, true in some respects even if it is not true in others. Mussolini justified his conquest of Ethiopia by claiming that he would abolish slavery and introduce in general more civilized modes of life. And there can be little doubt that he would in fact have done so, given time.

These are all no doubt highly controversial cases. But the principle is clear. A highly civilized people, by conquering a backward people, will nearly always improve their country. And therefore, if this argument justifies Zionism, it will justify any aggression of a more civilized against a more backward people. And this we cannot admit without undermining and in the end destroying the conception of international justice to which we profess to adhere. Moreover, if we accept that conception, we cannot deny that peoples (which means in fact the majorities in any people) have a right to run their own affairs badly and to resist all attempts by foreigners to run them well.

There is indeed a danger of becoming academic here. Perhaps it was "wrong" for Caesar to subjugate the Gauls. But

* For comparative statistics regarding agricultural production, see Appendix II.

can we really regret that the *Pax Romana* civilized Europe? Perhaps we did "wrong" to rob the Indians of their country. But would it have been "right" for a sprinkling of half-civilized people to exclude forever from this vast continent those who were more competent than they were to make use of its opportunities?

Nevertheless it seems to me that the principle that a people have a right to force an entry into another country if they can show they are improving it—which is the real basis of the Zionist contention, though this is not the way they put it—is so dangerous in the present state of the world that it ought not to be allowed. It is better to err on the side of overzealousness against aggression, and to refuse to countenance even what might be regarded as a sort of justifiable aggression—what a dangerous phrase!—than to adopt into our philosophy of international relations a principle which can be so easily twisted to justify any aggression or any war whatsoever.

The analysis of the case for Zionism and the case against it which has been given seems to me absolutely indisputable on any ground of logic. Minor mistakes may have been made in the presentation of the matter. And it is always possible to catch at sentences or expressions and find fault with them. But the logic of the case as a whole is too clear for any error in the general conclusion that, in the dispute between Jew and Arab, the Arab claim is correct and the Zionist claim is without any foundation. This is the inevitable conclusion to which an impartial judge would come.

Of course, it will be violently disputed, but disagreement will be based on prejudice, emotion, or partisan feeling. Let the Zionist who is angered, or contemptuous, at what has been said examine his own mind and ask himself whether he is free from prejudice, emotion, and partisan feeling, whether his own opinions have been based on an impartial analysis of the two sides to the case. And if he asks how he can be expected to be impartial in a matter in which he and his own people are concerned as in a matter of life and death, one must answer with what is no doubt a hard saying: impartially as between oneself and another, as between one's own claims and those of another, is the essence of justice and morality, is the only way in which one can act justly towards others in this world.

But the unhappy condition of the Jews in Europe gives them, as we have seen, an equal claim on all the civilized nations of the world. Hence the true solution of the problem stares one in the face. All the underpopulated countries in the world—Australia, Canada, parts of the United States, Palestine itself, and others—ought to amend their immigration policies so as to

take, each one, its proper share, according to available empty space, of those who need asylum.* This is obviously the only solution which is just to all parties, which no one can say is a violation of their rights. Why then is this solution not being adopted by the statesmen of the world? Why, though the obligation of all countries to take in the refugees if they have empty spaces is recognized in the recent Anglo-American report, is it soft-pedaled there and the immigration of Jews into Palestine played up? Why has it received almost no attention and no discussion?

It is true that President Truman expressed his intention to ask the Congress to increase the immigration quota for refugees, including Jews. But this is not accompanied by any recognition that along these lines alone lies the only just solution of the Jewish problem.** It is not accompanied by an abandonment of the policy of injustice in Palestine. It does not fundamentally alter the situation. And we have to repeat our question why, though we give this grudging and doubtful recognition to the claims of the just solution, we throw all our weight on the side of the unjust solution. If we find the true answer to this question, we put our finger on what is rotten in the world today, on what is certainly destined to make the future of the world a nightmare of war, on what makes nonsense of all our peace efforts. The answer is that we, the inhabitants of the United States, of Canada, of Australia, of Great Britain, of the rest of the countries concerned, do not want to admit our own plain moral obligations in the matter. We do not want to take our fair share of the burden. We have found a small country, Palestine, and a remote and defenseless people, the Arabs, on whom we can unjustly shove the burden of our duties.

It is often said that the Jews themselves hunger to go to Palestine and do not want, most of them, to go to other countries. True enough. But we must not suppose that this is any argument for the justice of the Zionist claim. Since when has it become a principle of justice that in a dispute regarding property or anything else the strong desire of the parties to have whatever is in dispute gives him a claim to it? What people want proves only that they want it, not that they are in justice entitled to have it. And if the nations concerned make it plain that Palestine will be asked to take only its proper share of refugees, along with the other nations of the world, and stand firmly by this decision, the Jews in Europe will go gladly enough to America, Canada,

* See Ernst, pp. 489-94, and Divine, pp. 577-93.

** See Williams, pp. 557-74, and Divine, pp. 577-93.

or any country that will treat them decently. And if these countries give the passionate wish of the Jews to go to Palestine as a reason for not lowering their own immigration barrier, this is no more than a hypocritical excuse.

The real cause of the reluctance of these countries to lower their immigration barriers lies elsewhere. When Mr. Bevin said that America was pressing Britain to allow more Jews into Palestine because we do not want to allow them into America, his remark was greeted with a howl of execration. Naturally, since the truth hit home and exposed our wickedness and hypocrisy! But his observation is just as true of the British Empire as it is of the United States. We have to face the plain truth, however unpleasant it may be—however shameful if you like,—that none of the great nations want these refugees, and they are therefore attempting to thrust them on a little Arab country. And the reason why America in particular tries to force the pace, while Britain hangs back, is simply that the Jewish vote is powerful in America while Arab influence is important to the British Empire.

But this whole line of thought, it will be said, is not practical politics. It is not "realistic." The United States and the British Empire refuse to lower their barriers sufficiently to solve the problem and it is not of the least use trying to persuade them to do so or to adopt the solution of the Jewish problem here recommended. Therefore the only solution left is Palestine. It may be so. The practical politicians ought to know. But what I want to point out is that their "practical" and "realistic" kind of politics is what leads to war and what will inevitably lead to war again, not only in Palestine but throughout the world.

Do we want peace or don't we? If we do, then there is only one way to get it. We have to cease deciding international issues by considerations of vote-catching, self-interest, power, greed, prejudice, passion, and more or less base emotion disguised under the name of patriotism. We have to begin to decide them impartially by reason and the principles of justice.

This is the real lesson of Palestine. It is not an isolated issue. It touches the future of the whole world. Just as Guernica was a good testing ground for German and Italian methods of war so Palestine is the testing ground of our peace policies. Our methods there, our whole emotional and irrational approach to the problem, expose the hollowness and futility of our protestations about peace.

PART IV

U.N. FIG LEAF

1947 - 1948

“But on the 8th question, i. e., whether the United Nations had any legal authority to do what they were proposing to do, the resolution to the effect that it had the authority was passed by 21 votes to 20. It is interesting to analyse these figures. In all, the members of the [*Ad Hoc*] Committee were 57. Only 21 who gave a positive vote were satisfied that the United Nations had the authority to do what they were proposing to do and 36 were not satisfied....”

Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan,
Palestine in the U.N.O. (Karachi,
1948), p. 16.

I. LEGAL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

1. The problem of Palestine involves certain legal issues which it is essential to decide authoritatively before any solution consistent with international law and justice can be reached. The problem of Palestine necessitates a proper interpretation of the claims of Arabs and Jews to Palestine. The solution of the problem also raises various legal points as to the legality of any proposal for the future of Palestine, as well as the competence of the General Assembly to make and enforce recommendations in this regard.

Failure of the Special Committee to consider certain legal issues

2. The claims of Arabs and Jews to Palestine are examined in paragraphs 125 to 180 of chapter II of the report of the Special Committee.** That Committee, however, failed to consider and

* The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was formed by the General Assembly in May 1947. It was composed of representatives of the following countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The Committee presented two alternative plans: one for partition with economic union supported by seven of its members: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay; and the other for a federal state supported by India, Iran and Yugoslavia. On 23 September the General Assembly established itself as an Ad Hoc Committee to consider the UNSCOP plans. This Ad Hoc Committee established 2 sub-committees for this purpose. Sub-Committee 1 was to study the UNSCOP partition plan. Sub-Committee 2 was to study alternative proposals. The text that follows is the report of the latter committee completed by 11 November, 1947 (A/AC. 14/32 and Add. I).

** See *Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine* (Official Records of the 2nd session of the General Assembly, 1947, Supplement No. 11).

determine some issues and juridical aspects of the Palestine question, and came to wrong and unjustified conclusions in relation to other matters which it did consider. The Special Committee did not consider the validity of the Balfour Declaration,* nor the meaning of the term "Jewish National Home", nor the validity and scope of the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine relating thereto. It also evaded the issue of the pledges made to the Arabs. It is apparent from the report of the Special Committee that the basic premise underlying the partition plan proposed by the majority of the Committee, and set forth in chapter VI of its report, is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and the Jews both possess validity.** This pronouncement is not supported by any cogent reasons and is demonstrably against the weight of all available evidence. These facts take away a good deal from the reliability and authoritativeness of the Special Committee's report, and vitiate some of its most important findings.

3. A number of speakers who took part in the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee laid stress on the legal and constitutional issues connected with the problem of Palestine and on the powers and competence of the General Assembly to deal with the problem and to recommend and enforce any specific solution. Proposals were also submitted by three delegations suggesting that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should be sought regarding some of the legal issues connected with the problem of Palestine. The Sub-Committee has therefore considered it necessary to review the main legal issues involved, and to state the points on which the opinion of the International Court of Justice should be obtained before a solution just to all parties can be evolved.

Pledges made to the Arabs during the First World War

4. The claim of the Arabs to Palestine rests upon their centuries' old possession and occupation of the country and their natural right to determine their own future. This claim is further supported by the pledges given to the Arabs by the British Government during the First World War.† These pledges were set out in the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif Hussein of Mecca, followed and explained by the

* For the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72, and Jeffries, pp. 173-88.

** See Stace, pp. 631-41.

† For the texts of these pledges, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (1938), Appendices A, B, C, D, E.

Hogarth Message, the Bassett Letter, the Declaration to the Seven, General Allenby's communication to Prince Feisal and the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918.

Palestine was included within the territories which Sherif Hussein claimed should become independent at the end of the war. It has subsequently been alleged, however, on behalf of the British Government, that the Government intended that Palestine should be excluded from those territories and that that intention was made known to Sherif Hussein. But that contention is negatived both by the wording of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and by the subsequent communications and assurances communicated to Sherif Hussein on behalf of the British Government. There is a passing reference to this question in the report of the Special Committee, but the Committee failed to examine it in detail or to record its considered views on it. This Sub-Committee feels that the controversy regarding the interpretation of the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and the subsequent declarations can be satisfactorily settled only by obtaining the opinion of an authoritative and impartial judicial tribunal such as the International Court of Justice.

Validity and scope of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate

5. The Jews, on the other hand, rest their claims regarding Palestine on the Balfour Declaration, which was subsequently embodied in the Mandate for Palestine. The Balfour Declaration has been attacked by the Arabs as being invalid on several grounds, *inter alia*, that it was made without their consent or knowledge, that it was contrary to the principles of national self-determination and democracy and that it was inconsistent with the pledges given to the Arabs before and after the date it was made. Although the question at issue regarding the legality, validity and ethics of the Balfour Declaration was specifically raised by the Arab Higher Committee at the special session of the General Assembly as the first issue to be inquired into, the Special Committee neither inquired into it nor expressed any opinion on it. It did not even mention it as being part of the Arab case. It is therefore essential that the question of the validity of the Balfour Declaration should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an opinion.

6. The next question that arises is the proper connotation of the term "Jewish National Home", as used in the Balfour Declaration and subsequently in the Mandate. No definition of that term was contained in either of those documents. It is, however, clear that the Mandatory Power has never interpreted

this expression as meaning the setting up of a Jewish State. If the term "Jewish National Home" means no more than a cultural centre which does not affect or diminish the rights and position of the indigenous population of Palestine, then no insurmountable difficulties arise regarding the interpretation of the Mandate. On the other hand, if the term "Jewish National Home" is to receive a retrospective interpretation which would derogate from the rights and position of the indigenous population, or result in the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, various questions regarding the validity and legal interpretation of the Mandate would have to be resolved. These issues may be summarized as follows:

(a) The incompatibility of the two main objectives of the Mandate as expressed in article 2, as well as the inconsistency between the provisions of the Mandate regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and those of the Covenant of the League of Nations regarding the preservation of the rights and the advancement of the indigenous population of the country;

(b) The effect of the dissolution of the League of Nations on the Mandate;

(c) The extent to which the undertaking regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine may be said to have been carried out;

(d) The legal consequences arising from the declared intention of the Mandatory Power to withdraw from Palestine at an early date.

Views of the Sub-Committee on the legal issues

7. The Sub-Committee carefully considered the issues enumerated above and its conclusions are set out below.

(a) Article 2 of the Mandate required the Mandatory Power to ensure the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and at the same time to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants and to develop self-governing institutions in that country. Article 6 required the Mandatory to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and to encourage Jewish settlement on the land while ensuring that the rights and position of the other sections of the population were not prejudiced. The experience of the working of the Mandate for twenty-five years has shown that these objectives are incompatible, and the Mandatory Power has reached the conclusion that it is not possible to give effect to the conflicting obligations imposed by the Mandate. That

was made clear by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 15th meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Committee held on 16 October 1947.

Moreover, the Mandate must be considered in the light of and subject to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to Article 22 of the Covenant, the people of Palestine were one of the communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire whose existence as an independent nation was provisionally recognized by the League of Nations, subject only to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by the Mandatory Power until such time as it was able to stand alone. The Covenant emphasized that the well-being and the development of the indigenous population of the country formed a sacred trust of civilization and the primary responsibility of the Mandatory Power. *In other words, the only limitation upon the sovereignty of the people of Palestine was the imposition of a temporary tutelage under the Mandatory Power.* It cannot be suggested that the entry of an unlimited number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, or the creation of a Jewish State against the wishes of the majority of the people of that country, was in accordance with the aims and objectives of the Mandate and the principles embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant.

(b) In accordance with the preamble of the Mandate, Great Britain undertook "to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations". The provision was also in accordance with the principles embodied in paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant. The operation of the Mandate was further made subject to a periodical review by the Permanent Mandates Commission. With the dissolution of the League, the principal party of the transaction has ceased to exist, and with it has disappeared the legal basis for the Mandate. The fate of Palestine must therefore be settled by the people of Palestine.

(c) The possible interpretations of the term "Jewish National Home" have already been mentioned in a preceding paragraph. In the view of this Sub-Committee, the only interpretation consistent with the objectives of the Mandate and the principles of the Covenant is that the Jewish National Home is a cultural home for a limited number of Jews and that it cannot imply any grant of sovereignty to them over any part of Palestine, or a derogation from the civil, economic, political and religious rights of the indigenous population of the country. This is borne out by several statements of the Mandatory Power, which itself issued the Balfour Declaration. In this connection, reference should be made to paragraph 15 of the statement of policy issued

by the British Government in 1939,* in which it declared:

“His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population”.

The *Ad Hoc* Committee will also recall the statement made by Mr. Creech-Jones, the representative of the United Kingdom, at its 15th meeting on 16 October 1947, in which he declared that, in spite of various difficulties, a National Home for the Jews had been established in Palestine.

(d) It has already been pointed out above that, with the dissolution of the League of Nations, the legal basis for the Mandate has disappeared, and that the United Kingdom is exercising *only a de facto authority in Palestine*. With the recent declaration of the Mandatory Power, re-affirmed by its representative at the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, that it intends, in the very near future, to withdraw from Palestine and relinquish the Mandate, there is no further obstacle to the conversion of Palestine into an independent State. In effect, this would be the logical culmination of the objectives of the Mandate and the scheme for the development of non-self-governing territories embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant.

8. In the preceding paragraphs, an indication has been given the views of the Sub-Committee on the principal legal issues connected with the interpretation of the Mandate and the Covenant of the League of Nations but, having regard to the fundamental importance of this question and to the fact that the Sub-Committee has already recommended that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should be obtained regarding the pledges made to the Arabs during the First World War and the validity and scope of the Balfour Declaration, it is suggested that the International Court of Justice should also be requested to advise on the interpretation, the scope and the validity of the Mandate.

Mode of termination of the Mandate

9. The next question which arises is the constitutional method for the termination of the Mandate. This might be viewed from three angles:

(a) The termination of the Mandate in accordance with

* For the White Paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

its own provision as read with the principles of the Covenant, assuming that the League of Nations had continued to exist;

(b) The termination of the Mandate having regard to the dissolution of the League of Nations; and

(c) The termination of the Mandate in the light of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

10. The Sub-Committee considered all three aspects of this important question and its views are given below.

(a) It will be recalled that the object of the establishment of Class A Mandates, such as that for Palestine, under Article 22 of the Covenant, was to provide for a temporary tutelage under the Mandatory Power, and one of the primary responsibilities of the Mandatory was to assist the peoples of the mandated territories to achieve full self-government and independence at the earliest opportunity. It is generally agreed that that stage has now been reached in Palestine, and not only the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine but the Mandatory Power itself agree that the Mandate should be terminated and the independence of Palestine recognized. The only proviso deserving mention is that, under article 28 of the Mandate, the League of Nations was empowered to make such arrangements as might be deemed necessary for safeguarding the rights secured by articles 13 and 14 regarding the Holy Places in Palestine, and for using its influence to ensure that the government of Palestine would fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the administration of Palestine during the period of the Mandate.

The Mandate for Iraq was terminated in 1932 when the League of Nations was still in existence. The procedure followed was for the Mandatory Power to negotiate a treaty with a government representing the people of Iraq, and to secure the formal confirmation of the Council of the League of Nations, and the subsequent admission of Iraq as a Member of the League. This precedent, however, is not applicable to the case of Palestine, as the League of Nations and its Council are no longer in existence and there is no international body which has inherited its powers and functions.

(b) It has been explained that, with the dissolution of the League of Nations, the legal basis for the Palestine Mandate has also disappeared, and that the Mandate must be considered to have come *ipso facto* to an end. But even if it is assumed that the Mandate is still technically in force, the appropriate manner of its formal termination would be by way of transfer of power from the Mandatory Power to a government representing the people of Palestine. The Mandatory Power would thus be

following the recent precedents of Syria, Lebanon and Trans-jordan.

(c) Before considering the effect of the provisions of the United Nations Charter on the Mandate, it should be pointed out that the United Nations Organization has not inherited the constitutional and political powers and functions of the League of Nations, that it cannot be treated in any way as the successor of the League of Nations in so far as the administration of mandates is concerned, and that such powers as the United Nations may exercise with respect to mandated territories are strictly limited and defined by the specific provisions of the Charter in this regard.

Competence of the United Nations

11. A study of Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter leaves no room for doubt that unless and until the Mandatory Power negotiates a trusteeship agreement in accordance with Article 79 and presents it to the General Assembly for approval, neither the General Assembly nor any other organ of the United Nations is competent to entertain, still less to recommend or enforce, any solution with regard to a mandated territory. Paragraph 1 of Article 80 is quite clear on this point, and runs as follows:

“Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any States or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties”.

12. This view is further confirmed by resolution 9 (1), adopted by the General Assembly on 9 February 1946, and by the fact that the General Assembly is not able to take any action or to give any directions with regard to the Mandate for South West Africa unless and until the Government of the Union of South Africa submits a trusteeship agreement for that territory.

13. In the case of Palestine, the Mandatory Power has not negotiated or presented a trusteeship agreement for the approval of the General Assembly. The question, therefore, of replacing the Mandate by trusteeship does not arise, quite apart from the obvious fact alluded to above that the people of Palestine are ripe for self-government and that it has been agreed on all hand that they should be made independent at the earliest possible

date. It also follows, from what has been said above, that the General Assembly is not competent to recommend, still less to enforce, any solution other than the recognition of the independence of Palestine, and that the settlement of the future government of Palestine is a matter solely for the people of Palestine.

14. The Palestine question was brought on the agenda of the General Assembly as a result of a reference from the Mandatory Power asking the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine. Article 10 provides as follows: "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter . . . and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters." Mandated territories are within the scope of the Charter but, as explained above, the United Nations can assume jurisdiction with regard to them only when the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter are applicable and the formalities laid down therein have been observed. These limitations apply to the powers of the Security Council as well as to those of the General Assembly.

15. The position with respect to the consideration of the Palestine question by the General Assembly has changed radically since the receipt of the original request of the United Kingdom. The representative of the United Kingdom informed the *Ad Hoc* Committee, at its second meeting held on 26 September 1947, that in the absence of a settlement between the Arabs and Jews of Palestine, the Mandatory Power had decided to terminate the British administration in Palestine and to withdraw its officials and forces from the country. Mr. Creech-Jones also emphasized, and this was re-affirmed in his statement to the *Ad Hoc* Committee at its 15th meeting on 16 October 1947, that the British Government was not prepared to assume responsibility or even to take a major part in the enforcement of any solution for Palestine which had not been accepted by the Arabs and Jews and which required the use of force for its implementation. In these circumstances, this Sub-Committee is of the opinion that no further action is required of the General Assembly on the original request of the United Kingdom.

To sum up, the dissolution of the League of Nations, and the consequent removal of the legal basis for the Mandate, and the more recent declarations by the Mandatory of its intention to withdraw from Palestine, open the way for the establishment of an independent government in Palestine by the people

of the country, without the intervention either of the United Nations or of any other party.

16. In view of the opinion expressed above, no further discussion of the Palestine problem seems to be necessary or appropriate, and this item should be struck off the agenda of the General Assembly. In case, however, the *Ad Hoc* Committee or the General Assembly take a different view of the matter, and in view of the serious doubts entertained by this Sub-Committee regarding the legal competence of the General Assembly to make any recommendations or to enforce any scheme in Palestine not acceptable to the majority of its population, it would be essential to obtain the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this issue. The opinion of that Court would also have to be sought as to the powers which may be exercised under the Charter by the General Assembly, or by any other organ of the United Nations with respect to the future government and administration of Palestine, with particular reference to some of the recommendations of the majority of the Special Committee.

*Legal implications of the plan recommended by the
majority of the Special Committee*

17. During the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, grave doubts were expressed by several representatives regarding the legality of a number of the steps recommended by the majority of the Special Committee and the competence of the General Assembly to recommend or enforce them. Those steps include, *inter alia*:

- (a) The partition of Palestine;
- (b) The creation of an Arab and a Jewish State;
- (c) The establishment of a permanent international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem;
- (d) The establishment of an international economic trusteeship for a period of ten years, in the first instance, for the whole of Palestine, in the guise of an economic union.

18. The Sub-Committee considered the legal implications of the plan recommended by the majority of the Special Committee as enumerated above, and its views are summarized below.

The question of the partition of Palestine has to be considered in the light both of the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine, as read with the general principles embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and of the provisions of the Charter. The United Kingdom took over Palestine as a single

unit. Under article 5 of the Mandate, the Mandatory Power was responsible "for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the government of any foreign Power". Article 28 of the Mandate further contemplated that at the termination of the Mandate, the territory of Palestine would pass to the control of "the Government of Palestine". So also by virtue of Article 22 of the Covenant, the people of Palestine were to emerge as a fully independent nation as soon as the temporary limitation on their sovereignty imposed by the Mandate had ended.

The above conclusion is by no means vitiated by the provisions for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. It was not, and could not have been, the intention of the framers of the Mandate that the Jewish immigration to Palestine should result in breaking up the political, geographic and administrative economy of the country. Any other interpretation would amount to a violation of the principles of the Covenant and would nullify one of the main objectives of the Mandate.

19. Consequently the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee that Palestine should be partitioned is, apart from other weighty political, economic and moral objections, contrary to the specific provisions of the Mandate and in direct violation of the principles and objectives of the Covenant. The proposal is also contrary to the principles of the Charter, and the United Nations has no power to give effect to it. The United Nations is bound by Article 1 of the Charter to act "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law" and to respect "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". Under Article 73, concerning non-self-governing territories and mandated areas, the United Nations undertakes to "promote to the utmost... the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories" and to "take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples". The imposition of partition on Palestine against the express wishes of the majority of its population can in no way be considered as respect for or compliance with any of the above-mentioned principles of the Charter.

Moreover, partition involves the alienation of territory and the destruction of the integrity of the State of Palestine. The United Nations cannot make a disposition or alienation of territory, nor can it deprive the majority of the people of Palestine of their territory and transfer it to the exclusive use of a minority in the country.

20. The proposal of the majority of the Special Committee

that separate Arab and Jewish States should be created is as invalid as its proposal for partition. The United Nations Organization has no power to create a new State. Such a decision can be taken only by the free will of the people of the territories in question. That condition is not fulfilled in the case of the majority proposal, as it involves the establishment of a Jewish State in complete disregard of the wishes and interests of the Arabs of Palestine.

21. The proposal for the establishment of a permanent international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem cannot be justified under any provision of the Charter. The trusteeship contemplated under Chapter XII of the Charter is, by its very nature, temporary in character, and is intended to assist the people of non-self-governing areas to develop progressively towards self-government or independence as speedily as possible. There is no justification for departing from the original intention of the Mandate for Palestine and of the Covenant, that the whole of Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem, should in the course of time become fully self-governing. The only qualification imposed by the Mandate was that under article 28, the independent government of Palestine was required to agree to certain arrangements providing for the protection and maintenance of the Holy Places in Palestine, but it was never intended that that proviso should be used to limit or impair in any way the authority of the government of Palestine over the capital of its country.

22. The same objection attaches to the proposal for an economic union between the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem, to be administered by a joint economic board consisting of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The net effect of this proposal is not only to give the Jewish State a considerable say in the affairs of the Arab State against the wishes of the people of that State, but also to authorize the United Nations to take a direct part in the administration of the economic life of the country. In the absence of any trusteeship agreement duly negotiated, there is no provision in the Charter enabling or empowering the United Nations to exercise such authority in any territory.

23. The plan of the majority also provides that the Arab and the Jewish States shall be granted independence only after they have adopted the constitution proposed by the majority, in particular only after they have signed the treaty of economic union. Apart from the intrinsic defects and impracticability of the constitutional proposals of the majority, which have been

mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the Special Committee did not possess nor does the General Assembly possess the power to grant to or to withhold from the people of Palestine their right to complete independence, or to subject such independence to any conditions or limitations. Even the Mandate and the Covenant of the League of Nations contained no such reservations or permanent limitations on the ultimate sovereignty of the people of Palestine. The object of the Mandate, as read with Article 22 of the Covenant, was to render administrative advice and assistance to the people of Palestine until they were able to stand alone. There was no question of imposing any conditions on them when they were able to stand alone or to take away from them any part of their territory.

Views of the Sub-Committee on the enforcement of the plan recommended by the Special Committee

24. The Special Committee assumed that its proposals for the future government of Palestine would be put into effect by the Mandatory Power. It is quite clear, from the statements issued by the leaders of the Arabs of Palestine, as well as by the representatives of the Arab States at the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, that the Arabs of Palestine will not be a willing party to this scheme and will oppose its introduction with all the means at their disposal. It follows, therefore, that the proposals can be put into effect only by using force on a large scale and for a considerable period of time. The Mandatory Power declared as far back as 1939* that it could not contemplate a policy such as that of further expansion of the Jewish National Home by Jewish immigration against the strongly expressed will of the Arabs of Palestine, since such policy meant nothing less than rule by force. It was further pointed out in paragraph 13 of the White Paper of 1939 that such a policy seemed to the British Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to the specific obligations to the Arabs in the Mandate for Palestine. That view was reiterated by the United Kingdom delegation before the Special Committee as well as before the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

25. If the Mandatory Power found it illegal and impractical to use force to give effect to a policy contrary to the rights and against the wishes of the great majority of the people of Palestine, still less is there any justification for the United Nations to

* For the White Paper of 1939, see Barbour, pp. 461-75.

embark on such a programme. It must not be forgotten that the primary purposes of the United Nations, under Article 1 of the Charter, are "to maintain international peace and security", to "develop friendly relations among nations" and "to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

Having regard to the publicly declared views of the various interested parties, the enforcement of the proposals of the majority of the Special Committee can have no other result than to embitter relations between the Arabs and the Jews and to give rise to serious conflict in Palestine. Far from solving the Palestine problem, the solution proposed by the majority would merely tend to create another problem of greater gravity and dimensions.

26. There is another aspect of this case which needs to be emphasized. The forcible creation of a Jewish State within the heart of the Arab world, would not only constitute a serious factor of disturbance within the boundaries of Palestine, but would also jeopardize peace and international security throughout the Middle East. The Jewish State would come into being against the bitter opposition of the Arabs of Palestine and of the inhabitants of the adjoining countries, and would thus create and give rise to an outbreak of hostilities which it may become extremely difficult to check and bring under control. The United Nations would not be promoting the interests of peace and international security by assisting in the creation of a Jewish State, however small.

27. Even were it permissible under the Mandate and the Covenant, or under the Charter, to enforce any particular solution on the people of Palestine, there is no provision in the Charter which could enable the United Nations Organization itself, or some of its Members, to assume power to maintain law and order within Palestine. There is therefore no legal basis for the proposal of some representatives that a voluntary constabulary or police force should be established for the avowed object of maintaining peace and order within Palestine during the transitional period pending the formal establishment of the Arab and Jewish States. Presumably this force would also be utilized for putting down the opposition that is bound to arise to the imposition of the scheme proposed by the majority of the Special Committee. Neither the General Assembly nor even the Security Council can raise a police force of this type for the purpose of enforcing a constitutional settlement, or for maintaining internal law and order, and any such arrangement, by whomsoever it might be sponsored or administered, would be

a usurpation of authority and would have no validity in international law.

28. The same remarks apply to the use of regular forces of Members of the United Nations. The General Assembly is not competent to make any recommendations as to the use of such forces, and cannot embark on a programme which would lead inevitably to the use of military force.

As regards the Security Council, while it possesses certain powers for the use of force to maintain international peace or to settle disputes between sovereign States, there is no provision in the Charter to enable it to use its own forces or those of Members of the United Nations with a view to enforcing a particular policy of the United Nations, or to intervene in the internal affairs of any country, whether on the plea of maintaining internal law and order or for any other reason.

29. Before the Sub-Committee concludes the consideration of the legal issues connected with the solution of the Palestine problem, it is necessary to examine, in somewhat greater detail than has been done hitherto, the draft resolutions submitted by the delegations of Iraq, Syria and Egypt providing that some of the legal issues should be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Iraq (A/AC. 14/21) asks for the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice as to whether or not Palestine was included in the Arab territories which were to become independent at the end of the First World War, and were to be recognized as such by Great Britain. This question has been put in the forefront of the Arab case all through the Palestinian controversy, and was prominently raised in the discussions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It is imperative that before that Committee proceeds to record any recommendations on the Palestine question, it should arrive at a satisfactory reply with regard to this claim. If the British pledges did include Palestine—and on the available evidence there appears little doubt that they did—the United Nations must respect the pledges, more particularly as the British pledges were repeated in the Anglo-French declaration after the fall of Damascus and Aleppo.

This is a question which involves investigation, both of fact and of law. So far, it has not been pronounced upon by any impartial tribunal. The Iraq draft resolution is eminently fair. During the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, no cogent reasons were given to contest the Arab interpretation of these pledges, though it is possible that some members of the Committee might feel some doubt concerning it. The only way

of resolving this doubt authoritatively would be to obtain upon this question the opinion of the International Court of Justice. If the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the General Assembly were to proceed to make recommendations on the merits of the Palestine question, disregarding or brushing aside the Arab claim regarding the pledges, it would give the impression that the United Nations was anxious to record recommendations in accordance with the preconceived notions of a majority of the representatives, and was not anxious to arrive at a just and fair decision.

30. The Sub-Committee, while lending its support to the draft resolution of the delegation of Iraq, would further recommend that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice should also be obtained on the validity, the interpretation and the precise scope of the Balfour Declaration.

31. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Syria (A/AC. 14/25) raises four distinct issues which may be summarized as follows:

(a) Whether the provision in the Mandate for Palestine for the creation of a Jewish National Home by means of admission of immigrants into Palestine against the wishes of the indigenous population is or is not consistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations, particularly with paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant, and with the fundamental right of the people of Palestine to self-determination;

(b) Whether the majority plan for the partition of Palestine is consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Mandate;

(c) Whether that plan is consistent with the principles of the Charter;

(d) Whether the adoption and forcible execution of the plan is within the competence and jurisdiction of the United Nations.

32. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Egypt (A/AC. 14/24) deals with more or less the same issues and provides that the opinion of the International Court of Justice should be sought on the question whether the General Assembly is competent to recommend either of the solutions proposed by the majority and by the minority respectively of the Special Committee, and whether it lies within the power of any Member or group of Members of the United Nations to implement any of the proposed solutions without the consent of the people of Palestine.

33. The Sub-Committee examined in detail the legal issues raised by the delegations of Syria and Egypt, and its considered views are recorded in this report. There is, however, no doubt

that it would be advantageous and more satisfactory from all points of view if an advisory opinion on these difficult and complex legal and constitutional issues were obtained from the highest international judicial tribunal.

34. In amplification of the issues mentioned by the delegations of Syria and Egypt, the General Assembly might, with advantage, seek the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on whether the United Nations is competent to partition Palestine with the object of setting up two States; to impose certain conditions in connexion with the attainment of the independence of the proposed Arab and Jewish States; to set up a permanent international trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem; and to administer an international economic trusteeship for the whole of Palestine by means of the proposed joint economic board.

35. It is a well known dictum that justice must not only be done, but must also appear to be done. One of the surest means of securing acceptance of a decision on the part of the parties to a controversy is to create confidence in the minds of both sides that the decision has been arrived at impartially after full investigation of all relevant matters. That the legal issues summarized in the preceding paragraphs are very relevant to the settlement of the Palestine problem will not be denied. An impartial and authoritative decision upon this matter is therefore a necessary and essential preliminary before the *Ad Hoc* Committee and the General Assembly proceed to make any recommendations on the merits of the Palestine problem. A refusal to submit this question for the opinion of the International Court of Justice would amount to a confession that the General Assembly is determined to make recommendations in a certain direction, not because those recommendations are in accord with principles of international justice and fairness, but because the majority of the representatives desire to settle the problem in a certain manner, irrespective of what the merits of the question or the legal obligations of the parties might be. Such an attitude will not serve to enhance the prestige of the United Nations, and this Sub-Committee earnestly hopes that the *Ad Hoc* Committee, as well as the General Assembly, will agree to refer all the legal and constitutional issues connected with the problem of Palestine to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.

II. RELIEF OF JEWISH REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

36. The question of the relief of Jewish refugees and displaced persons is not strictly relevant to the Palestine problem, but the Sub-Committee has found it desirable to refer to it in view of the misconceptions which are entertained in certain quarters about this matter, and also in view of the fact that it has unnecessarily complicated the Palestine issue and rendered more difficult the reaching of a just and satisfactory settlement.

The recommendations of the majority of the Special Committee envisage the admission into that country of 150,000 Jewish refugees. In the course of the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, certain delegations based their support for those recommendations on the persecution which the Jews had undergone in Europe and on the presence in the European displaced persons centres of a large number of Jews.

In these circumstances the problem of refugees and displaced persons, its alleged connexion with the Palestinian question and its possible solution must be studied in the light of the documents available and the decisions taken by the General Assembly or the various other organs of the United Nations.

Facts concerning refugees

37. From the documents placed at the Sub-Committee's disposal by the Secretariat, a number of facts can be ascertained.

In the first place, according to statistics published by the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization, 656,831 refugees and displaced persons were in September receiving care and maintenance from the Preparatory Commission.

Secondly, the number of Jewish refugees and displaced persons in assembly centres is about 200,000.

Thirdly, the national origin of the above-mentioned Jewish refugees is as follows:

(a) About 75 per cent are of Polish nationality; a large number entered Italy and the western zones of Germany and Austria during the summer of 1946;*

(b) About 8 per cent are of Romanian nationality;

(c) About 6 per cent are of Hungarian nationality;

(d) About 11 per cent are of Czech, German, Lithuanian and Yugoslav nationality.

* Cf. Morgan, pp. 527-48, and J. & D. Kimche, pp. 615-23.

Fourthly, the Jewish refugees and displaced persons are distributed among the centres in the following proportions:

<i>Germany</i>	
United States zone	118,000
British zone	14,900
French zone	1,500
<i>Austria</i>	31,500
<i>Italy</i>	11,000
Total:	176,900

To this total should be added the Jewish refugees living in Shanghai and Cyprus, in the following numbers:

<i>Shanghai</i>	10,000
<i>Cyprus</i>	18,900
Total:	28,900

Fifthly, a resettlement programme has been prepared by the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization through agreements concluded with a certain number of governments. These agreements envisage resettlement of some 135,000 refugees and displaced persons. In addition, individual resettlements processed by the organization are anticipated to amount to a monthly average of about 1,000 persons.

Sixthly, other countries are carrying out resettlement plans of their own without having concluded formal agreements with the Preparatory Commission. These plans envisage a total resettlement of some 165,000 refugees and displaced persons. Furthermore, voluntary agencies are expected to process individual immigrants at the rate of about 1,200 per month.

38. The study of the problem of refugees and displaced persons was begun in 1946 by the Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons set up under resolution 3 (I) of the Economic and Social Council, and the Committee's report was considered by the Council at its second and third sessions. The outcome was the adoption by the General Assembly, on 15 December 1946, of its resolution 62 (I) providing approval of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization and of various annexes thereto.

The following guiding principles emerge from the discussion of the refugee problem as a whole and from the decisions adopted by the United Nations:

(a) Genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute a problem which is international in scope and character (see first paragraph of preamble to the Constitution of the IRO);

(b) Refugees and displaced persons should return to their countries of origin (see second and third paragraphs of preamble and article 2, paragraph 1 (a));

(c) Only in cases where refugees cannot be repatriated should steps be taken to resettle them elsewhere than in their countries of origin (see article 2, paragraph 1 (b));

(d) In the performance of its functions, the IRO should act in accordance with the purposes and the principles of the United Nations, in particular as regards the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons in countries able and willing to receive them (see article 2, paragraph (1));

(e) In addition, the IRO should carry out the functions set forth in its Constitution in such a way as to avoid disturbing friendly relations between nations (see annex I to the Constitution, paragraph 1 (g));

(f) The IRO should exercise special care in resettling refugees or displaced persons either in countries contiguous to their respective countries of origin, or in non-self-governing territories, and should also give due weight to any evidence of genuine apprehension and concern felt in regard to such plans, in the former case by the country of origin of the persons involved, in the latter case by the indigenous population of the non-self-governing territory in question (see annex I, paragraph 1 (g)).

*Comparative figures of Jews admitted to Palestine
and other countries*

39. In considering the connexion of the Palestine problem with the question of refugees and displaced persons, it must be remembered that Palestine, though a small country and possessing very limited resources, has made a contribution to the relief of Jewish refugees far beyond its capacity, falling little short of the total contribution of practically all other countries taken together. The following figures, supplied by the secretariat, give the number of Jewish immigrants admitted during the years 1933 to 1946 by the principal countries which have accepted them:

United States	188,048
United Kingdom	65,000
Argentina	26,000
Brazil	23,500
Chile	14,000
Bolivia	12,000
Canada	12,000

Australia	8,500
Union of South Africa	8,000
Uruguay	7,000
	Total:
	364,648
Palestine	287,063

The figure for Palestine does not include the 118,378 Jews admitted to Palestine during the years 1920 to 1932.

These figures speak for themselves and are sufficient comment upon the genuineness of the concern felt by many states for Jewish refugees, and upon the patent unfairness of the demand that Palestine should absorb more Jewish immigrants.*

International responsibility in the matter of refugees

40. In its comment on recommendation VI, contained in chapter V of its report, the special Committee emphasizes two important aspects of the problem of refugees and displaced persons in relation to Palestine. The first is that the problem of refugees and displaced persons is a "recognized international responsibility"; and the special Committee recommends that the General Assembly should undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews would be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency. The second is that a programme of international action for the relief of Jewish displaced persons is "a vital prerequisite to the settlement of the difficult conditions in Palestine".

41. Apart from the fact that the specific problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons is an international responsibility, Palestine cannot provide the solution for it. On the contrary a perusal of the reports of the debates in the Economic and Social Council and in the Third Committee of the General Assembly would show that no proposal presenting Palestine as a solution for the problem of Jewish refugees was taken into consideration by those organs. Moreover, recommendation VI, which was unanimously adopted by the special Committee, confirms this view implicitly but nonetheless clearly.

42. In addition, there exist legal, political and economic obstacles and objections to any attempt to solve the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons by further immigration

* On Jewish immigration, see Rabinowicz, pp. 97-114, "The Immigration Policy of the British Dominions, 1938", pp. 403-8, and Divine, pp. 577-93.

into Palestine. The main political ground is that Jewish immigration into Palestine is opposed by the large majority of the population. There can be no justification for recommending any immigration into any country against the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants.

Legal objections to further Jewish immigration into Palestine

43. The legal objections to any further Jewish immigration into Palestine rest on the considerations enumerated below.

(a) Article 6 of the Mandate for Palestine laid down that Jewish immigration into Palestine was to be subject to a number of safeguards and restrictions.

In the first place, the administration must ensure that "the rights and position" of other sections of the population were not prejudiced.

The word "rights" must be interpreted as covering the civil, economic and political rights of the Arabs of Palestine. Again, the word "position" must necessarily cover their economic, social and political position. The position of the Arabs at the time of the institution of the Mandate was that of a majority of 93 per cent of the total population. The reduction of that majority from 93 to 90 or 85 per cent as a result of immigration might not have seriously prejudiced the position of the Arabs, but its reduction to 66 per cent, as it stands at present, certainly amounts to prejudicing that position.

Secondly, Jewish immigration was to be allowed only "under suitable conditions".

Thirdly, such immigration was to be controlled by the administration of Palestine. It was the duty of the Mandatory Power to set up such an administration which, under article 2 of the Mandate, was to become self-governing. In fact, the Mandate contemplated two constitutional governing bodies in respect of Palestine, namely, the Mandatory and the administration of Palestine. The basic idea of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as of the Mandate, was that there should be a government of Palestine to which the Mandatory Power would render "administrative advice and assistance". The terms of the Mandate distinguished between those two bodies and assigned different functions to them. Thus it appears from article 6 that the question of immigration was to be within the competence of the administration of Palestine, as distinct from the Mandatory, and that the said administration, developed on self-governing lines and representative of the country, would receive "administrative advice and assistance" within the

meaning and according to the objects of Article 22 of the Covenant. This view is in accord with the general principle that no immigration should be allowed into the territory of any nation against the wishes of its inhabitants or without their consent.

(b) The following observation appears in paragraph 150 of chapter II of the special Committee's report:

"To contend, therefore, that there is an international obligation to the effect that Jewish immigration should continue with a view to establishing a Jewish majority in the whole of Palestine, would mean ignoring the wishes of the Arab population and their views as to their own well being. This would involve an apparent violation of what was the governing principle of Article 22 of the Covenant".

The special Committee thus conceded that the creation of a Jewish majority by immigration in the whole of Palestine would amount to ignoring the wishes and well being of the Arab population and would involve a violation of Article 22 of the Covenant. Yet the majority of the Committee, in formulating its recommendations, did not pause to consider that the creation of a Jewish majority in a part of Palestine would also disregard the wishes and well being of more than half a million Arabs. An injustice would not cease to be an injustice merely because, instead of affecting 1,300,000 Arabs, it affected only half a million.

(c) In 1939 the British Government officially declared in its statement of policy that its obligation under the Mandate to encourage and develop the establishment of a Jewish National Home by immigration had been fulfilled and that further immigration could not be allowed to continue if it was desired not to affect or prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish communities, the rights and position of which the Mandatory was required to protect.

(d) The imposition of any Jewish immigration into Palestine would further constitute a breach of the guiding principles adopted in General Assembly resolution 62 (I) to which a brief reference has been made in paragraph 43 above.

Objections on economic grounds to further Jewish immigration to Palestine

44. Palestine is a small country, having limited resources, practically no raw materials and no unoccupied cultivable land available for settlement. This is amply borne out by the report of the Special Committee, from which extracts are quoted below.

Palestine is already over-populated. Excluding the desert area of Beersheba, it has a density of 324 persons per square mile (see chapter II, paragraph 20). The natural rate of increase of population is very high and leaves no scope for artificial increase by means of immigration.

Palestine is poor in economic resources and far from self-sufficient (see chapter II, paragraphs 27 and 54). Most of the land capable of cultivation by present methods is under crops (see chapter II, paragraph 27), and the prospect of further development of the semi-desert area of the Negeb is problematic (see chapter II, paragraph 38). In chapter II, paragraph 9, it is observed that "in the physical resources which are typically the basis of modern industrial development, Palestine is exceedingly poor, having neither coal, iron nor any other important mineral deposit", and in chapter V, paragraph 3, Palestine is described as "a country that is arid, limited in area and poor in all essential resources." With regard to industry, it is stated in chapter II, paragraph 43, that "Palestine is not very favourably endowed for industrial production" and that "it has no raw materials of any consequence apart from the Dead Sea minerals". Industry is on a small scale, and the labour costs are relatively high. Although, during the war, industry received a great stimulus owing to abnormal demands and the closing of outside sources of supply, it would find it difficult to survive post-war competition from the highly industrialized countries of the West.

The report of the Special Committee also draws attention to the adverse balance of trade existing in Palestine, the excess of imports over exports in 1946 being over 45 million pounds.* It points out that a remarkably large proportion of the balance of imports over exports is financed by import of capital consisting mainly of funds—or gift capital—coming from world Jewry (see chapter II, paragraph 54). It is obvious that this situation is unhealthy and uneconomic. In regard to future prospects, it is stated in chapter II, paragraphs 55 and 56, that "the further economic development of Palestine depends to a considerable degree on increasing its trade with other Middle East countries", and that the boycott of Jewish products in Arab countries "could seriously hamper industrial development in Palestine if it were indefinitely maintained". It is further mentioned that should there be a fall in military expenditure "a period of economic depression and unemployment would be the natural consequence" and that therefore "the Palestine economy may be

* All reference to pounds in this report are to Palestine pounds.

expected in the near future to have to adjust itself to the double effect of increased industrial competition and a fall in income as a result of reduction of military expenditure" (see chapter II, paragraph 66).

In view of the facts observed and recorded by the Special Committee itself regarding the economic resources and absorptive capacity of Palestine, and its bleak future economic prospects, it is astonishing that the Special Committee, in disregard of all these facts, should have recommended the admission into Palestine of 150,000 Jewish immigrants. It is obvious that there is no room for more immigrants in Palestine, and that it is necessary to look elsewhere for the resettlement of such Jewish refugees and displaced persons as cannot be repatriated to their countries of origin.

Solution for the problem of refugees

45. The resettlement plans envisaged by the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization in agreement with a certain number of governments, together with individual resettlement plans carried out by other countries, would, by absorbing about 300,000 persons, be calculated to simplify the task of the United Nations very considerably, if they were carried out in full. This sub-Committee deplors the fact that very few Jewish refugees seem to be included in this substantial quota.*

46. In this Sub-Committee's opinion, the question of refugees and displaced persons is indivisible in character as regards its possible solution, and there can be no question of discrimination in favour of any particular category of refugees or displaced persons.

Whatever the category of refugees concerned, the solution found must, in this Sub-Committee's opinion, be based on the following two principles:

(a) It is the duty of the governments concerned to make provision for the return of genuine refugees and displaced persons to the countries of which they are nationals;

(b) Where such repatriation proves impossible, the solution should be sought by way of resettlement in the territories of the Members of the United Nations which are in a position to absorb a proportion of the persons concerned.

47. With regard to persons who are not repatriated to their countries of origin, a special committee of the General

* Cf. Ernst, pp. 489-94.

Assembly should be set up to recommend for the acceptance of the Members of the United Nations a scheme of quotas of refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories. The special committee should, as far as practicable, work in consultation with the International Refugee Organization or its Preparatory Commission. In drawing up this scheme, the committee should be guided by the principles of the United Nations enumerated in paragraph 43 above. It should, in addition, take into account the national income of each country as indicated by the state of its industry, trade and developed resources, the *per capita* income of its population, and the area and possibilities of future development, subject to the consideration that the surplus territory of each State must in the first place serve the interests of the normal and natural increase of its own population.

In allocating quotas of refugees and displaced persons for resettlement, account must also be taken of the legitimate apprehensions of some countries with regard to their national unity or their social and economic equilibrium. This is an important consideration not only for the populations of the countries in question but also for the refugees themselves, who have a vital interest in not incurring the resentment or hostility of local populations.

48. In this Sub-Committee's opinion, a solution on these lines, making each country responsible for a moderate number of refugees, should prove acceptable to the great majority of the Members of the United Nations and will go far towards carrying out recommendation VI of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

III. PROPOSALS FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

49. The Sub-Committee was requested to draw up a detailed plan for the future government of Palestine in accordance with the basic principles expressed in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by the delegations of Saudi Arabia (A/317) and Iraq (A/328), and the draft resolution submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the delegation of Syria (A/AC. 14/22). The Sub-Committee, however, considers that it would also be necessary to review some aspects to the plan recommended by the majority of the Special Committee and to take into consideration some of the salient points brought out in the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee relating to the

basic principles applicable to the constitution and future government of Palestine.

*Analysis of the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq and
of the Syrian draft resolution*

50. The proposals submitted by the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Iraq to the General Assembly on 9 and 16 July 1947 respectively are couched in identical terms and read as follows:

“Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and recognition of its independence as one State.”

The proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq raise three distinct issues:

- (a) The termination of the Mandate;
- (b) The recognition of the independence of Palestine, and
- (c) The preservation of Palestine as one State.

The Sub-Committee considered all three issues and its conclusions thereon are set forth below.

In the first place, in chapter I of this report, concerning the legal issues connected with the Mandate, it is pointed out that the Mandate was invalid *ab initio*, that on the dissolution of the League of Nations the Mandate lost its legal basis, that, with the declaration of the British Government of its intention to withdraw, the *de facto* basis of the British administration in Palestine is also on the point of disappearing, and that the only action now outstanding is the manner of the transfer of power to the government of the people of Palestine. The last matter will be considered in a later part of the Sub-Committee's report together with the Sub-Committee's proposals regarding the constitution and future government of Palestine. All that need be said at this stage is that even on the assumption that the Mandate continues to have some legal basis or validity, it has been agreed by all concerned, including the Mandatory Power, that the Mandate should be terminated as early as possible.

Secondly, there is also general agreement as to the recognition of the independence of Palestine. The Sub-Committee would recommend further that for the reasons adduced in chapter I of this report, the recognition of the independence of Palestine should not be qualified or retarded by the imposition of any conditions.

Thirdly, the Sub-Committee is in entire agreement with the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq that Palestine should continue as a single, undivided State. This is in accord with the wishes and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the

PALESTINE

DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY SUB-DISTRICTS

WITH PERCENTAGES OF JEWS AND ARABS

(including the smaller minorities)
(Estimated, 1946)



REPARTITION DE LA POPULATION PAR SOUS-DISTRICT

AVEC LE POURCENTAGE DES JUIFS ET DES ARABES
(y compris les minorités de moindre importance)

(Evaluation, 1946)

(Prepared on the Instructions of Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question)
(Préparée sur les instructions de la Sous-Commission 2 de la Commission ad hoc chargée de la question palestinienne)

SCALE OF POPULATION
ECHELLE DE POPULATION



SOURCES

Data for settled population from SUPPLEMENT TO SURVEY OF PALESTINE, prepared for the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Jerusalem, June 1947, pp. 12-13. Data for Bedouin population (estimated at 127,000) supplied by the United Kingdom delegation to the United Nations. N. B. The given combined estimate of 9,500 Bedouin for Jaffa and Tulkarm is distributed as follows: 5,000 for Jaffa, 4,500 for Tulkarm.

Les renseignements sur la population sédentaire sont tirés du SUPPLEMENT TO SURVEY OF PALESTINE, préparé pour la Commission spéciale des Nations Unies pour le Palestine, Jérusalem, Juin 1947, pp. 12 et 13. Les renseignements sur la population bédouine (évaluée à 127.000) ont été fournis par le délégué du Royaume-Uni auprès des Nations Unies. N.B. Le chiffre de 9.500 Bédouins, évaluation fournie pour Jaffa et Tulkarm a été réparti de la manière suivante: 5.000 pour Jaffa et 4.500 pour Tulkarm.

PALESTINE

LAND OWNERSHIP BY SUB-DISTRICTS REPARTITION DE LA PROPRIETE AGRAIRE PAR SOUS-DISTRICT (1945)

(Prepared on the Instructions of Sub-Committee 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question)
(Préparée sur les instructions de la Sous-Commission 2 de la Commission ad hoc chargée de la question palestinienne)

PERCENTAGES
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
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SOURCES

VILLAGE STATISTICS, Palestine Government, Jerusalem, 1945

STATISTIQUES RURALES, Gouvernement

1945



people of Palestine, the objectives of the Covenant and the provisions of the Mandate, and is essential for the orderly political evolution of the country and maintenance of its economic life and prosperity.

51. The draft resolution submitted to the *Ad Hoc* Committee by the delegation of Syria was also considered by the Sub-Committee. It is unnecessary, however, to examine it in detail here, as on the one hand some of its aspects are dealt with in chapter I of this report, and on the other hand its remaining aspects are taken into account in the formulation by the Sub-Committee of its own recommendations regarding the future constitution and government of Palestine.

Examination of the partition plan recommended by the majority of the Special Committee

52. Before indicating the basic principles underlying the constitution of a unitary State in Palestine and formulating proposals regarding the future government, the Sub-Committee considers it necessary to examine critically the recommendations of the majority of the Special Committee for the partition of Palestine and the establishment of an Arab and a Jewish State and of a special administration for the City of Jerusalem.

During the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee, conflicting views were expressed regarding the plan of the majority of the Special Committee. Its legal implications are pointed out in chapter I of this report, and it has been mentioned that the Mandate, as well as the Covenant, definitely contemplated the retention of Palestine as a single unit under one government. It has been stressed that the United Nations has no authority under the Charter to partition Palestine or in any way to impair its integrity against the wishes of the majority of its people. It might also be pointed out that the proposal for the partition of Palestine is contrary to the repeated assurances given to the Arabs during the last thirty years by the Mandatory Power. As late as May 1939 the British Government stated in paragraph 4 of its White Paper on Palestine that:

“His Majesty’s Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will”.

Political objections to partition

53. The political objections to the partition of Palestine are no less important than the legal and constitutional objections referred to in the preceding paragraph.* Palestine has been administered during the last thirty years as one political, administrative and economic unit. All the measures taken by the Mandatory Power for the government and administration of the country and for the provision of essential services have proceeded on the basis of that unity. The partition of the country would, in the opinion of the Sub-Committee, render the establishment of an efficient administrative machinery in either of the two States impossible.

54. The partition scheme proposed by the majority of the Special Committee must also be rejected on grounds of security, since it divides each of the two States into three separate parts connected by points of intersection, and makes it impossible for either State to defend its frontiers or to develop a workable defence plan.

55. This question must also be considered from the wider angle of the peace and security of the Middle East as a whole. Palestine is the centre of communications of the Arab world and it has common frontiers with four Arab States. There is no doubt that the forcible creation of a Jewish State in the heart of the Arab world would introduce a new, highly disturbing threat to peace and security in the Middle East. The proposed Jewish State, if it were set up at all, would come into being against the unyielding opposition, not only of its own considerable Arab population and of the proposed Arab State of Palestine, but also of the inhabitants of the surrounding Arab countries.

Objections to partition on grounds of distribution of population

56. The next important consideration relating to the partition scheme is the distribution of the population in Palestine as a whole and in the two proposed States. According to the report of the Special Committee, the total population of Palestine on 31 December 1946 was 1,845,559 consisting of 1,237,332 Arabs and 608,225 Jews (see chapter II, paragraph 19). These figures are not based on census returns, as no census was held in 1946. The last census took place in 1931. The population figures quoted by the Special Committee are in fact based on estimates made by the Palestine administration, and do not

* Cf. paragraphs 53-78 inclusive with Reid, pp. 409-32.

necessarily represent the exact position with regard to the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine.

57. A more serious omission relates to the total exclusion from these figures of Arab Bedouin. According to the footnote to paragraph 12 of chapter II of the Special Committee's report, the estimated number of Bedouin in Palestine is 90,000 and, under the majority the plan, most of these would be included in the proposed Jewish State (see chapter VI, part II, section 5). That estimate of the Bedouin population is, however, inaccurate and it will be seen from the note submitted to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom on 1 November 1947 (see appendix C to this report) that, on the basis of the latest investigation carried out in the Beersheba sub-district by the Palestine administration, the Bedouin population of Palestine is now estimated at approximately 127,000.

58. In formulating its proposals, the majority of the Special Committee left out the Bedouin population on the assumption that the Bedouin were nomads and should not be counted among the settled population. This assumption is unwarranted. It is generally true to say that the Bedouin of Palestine are settled on the land, some of them living in houses and others in tents. The bulk of them live in the northern and north-western parts of the Beersheba sub-district, where they are responsible for the cultivation of the greater part of the 2 million dunums of cereal land. Aerial photographs of this area taken recently by the Royal Air Force show the existence of 3,389 houses and 8,722 tents (see appendix C, paragraph 4). A certain proportion of the Bedouin tribes, consisting mostly of shepherds, do move with their flocks to adjacent districts in order to obtain better grazing for their sheep, but this practice is not different from that of shepherds in other parts of the world, and does not justify their exclusion from the settled population of Palestine. These Bedouin have lived in Palestine for centuries and have as much right to be taken into account as any of the other original inhabitants of the country. While they still maintain some of their special customs and usages, they are settled on the land and derive their livelihood from agriculture and grazing. This view is confirmed by the concluding paragraph of the note presented to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom which reads as follows:

"It should be noted that the term 'Beersheba Bedouin' has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there

and their historic association with it.”

59. According to the plan of the majority of the Special Committee, the distribution of the settled population in the proposed Jewish and Arab States and in the City of Jerusalem would be approximately as follows (see chapter VI, part II, section 5 of the report):

	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Arab and others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Jewish State	498,000	407,000	905,000
Arab State	10,000	725,000	735,000
City of Jerusalem	100,000	105,000	205,000

These estimates must, however, be corrected in the light of the information furnished in the note submitted to the Sub-Committee by the representative of the United Kingdom regarding the Bedouin population. According to paragraph 5 of that note, 22,000 Bedouin “may be taken as normally resident in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the plan proposed by the majority of the Special Committee”, and the balance of 105,000 as resident in the proposed Jewish State.

It will thus be seen that the proposed Jewish State will contain a total population of 1,008,800, consisting of 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews. In other words, at the outset, the Arabs will have a majority in the proposed Jewish State.

60. It is even more instructive to consider the relative proportion of Arabs and Jews in the three regions comprising the area of the proposed Jewish State. In its southern section—the Beersheba area—there are 1,020 Jews as against an Arab population of 103,820. In other words, the Jewish population is less than 1 per cent of the total. It is surprising that the majority of an international committee such as the Special Committee should have recommended the transfer of a completely Arab territory and population to the control of the Jews, who form less than 1 per cent of the population, against the wishes and interests of the Arabs, who form 99 per cent of the population. Similarly in the northern section of the proposed Jewish State—eastern Galilee—the Arab population is three times as great as the Jewish population (86,200 as against 28,750). Only in the central section of the proposed Jewish State—the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon—have the Jews a majority, the respective population figures being 469,259 Jews and 306,760 Arabs (these figures do not include Bedouins, as separate estimates are not available for this area). Even in this region, the majority is more apparent than real because almost half the Jewish population is located in the Jewish towns of Tel Aviv and Petah Tiqva. (For

further details, see appendix A to this report).

61. It is also interesting to examine the distribution of Arab and Jewish populations in the proposed Jewish State according to the administrative sub-divisions shown in appendix B. Ten sub-districts, in whole or in part, are incorporated in the proposed Jewish State. In nine of these sub-districts, the Arabs have a clear majority over the Jews. Only in one sub-district, namely, Jaffa, have the Jews a majority over the Arabs. This is due to the heavy concentration of Jews in the urban area of Tel Aviv.

This is further reinforced by statistics furnished to the Sub-Committee by the United Kingdom representative, showing the percentage of Arabs and Jews in the population of the various sub-districts of Palestine. The statistics are reproduced below:

<i>Sub-district</i>	<i>Percentage of total population</i>	
	<i>Arabs and others</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Safad	87	13
Acre	96	4
Tiberias	67	33
Beisan	70	30
Nazareth	84	16
Haifa	53	47
Jenin	100	—
Nablus	100	—
Tulkarm	83	17
Ramallah	100	—
Jerusalem	62	38
Hebron	99	Less than 1
Jaffa	29	71
Ramle	78	22
Gaza	98	2
Beersheba	99	Less than 1

Distribution of land

62. Closely connected with the distribution of population is the factor of land ownership in the proposed Jewish State. The bulk of the land in the Arab State, as well as in the proposed Jewish State, is owned and possessed by Arabs. This is clear from the following statistics furnished to the Sub-Committee by the United Kingdom representative, showing the respective percentage of Arab and Jewish ownership of land in the various sub-districts of Palestine.

<i>Sub-district</i>	<i>Percentage of ownership</i>	
	<i>Arabs and others</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Safad	68	18
Acre	87	3
Tiberias	51	38
Beisan	44	34
Nazareth	52	28
Haifa	42	35
Jenin	84	less than 1
Nablus	76	less than 1
Tulkarm	78	17
Ramallah	99	less than 1
Jerusalem	84	2
Hebron	96	less than 1
Jaffa	47	39
Ramleh	77	14
Gaza	75	4
Beersheba*	14	less than 1

Note: The balance represents waste land and lands under public ownership, consisting mainly of grazing lands attached to villages.

It will be seen that there is not a single sub-district in which

* The figure of less than 1% for the extent of Jewish land ownership is accurate since the Zionists have published statistics on the number of Jewish colonies in Beersheba sub-district. The figure of 14% for land ownership by Arabs and its implication that the balance of 85% was under public ownership or waste land is misleading. In the first place, the Beersheba sub-district (the Negev), unlike the remainder of the country, never came under the operation of the Mandatory Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance. It is therefore impossible to state with certainty the percentage of public, or for that matter, of private ownership in the sub-district. Secondly, the category of "public ownership" under the British Mandate derived from that known as *miri* under the Ottoman system of land tenure. Under this latter category, however, there were subsumed in addition to state domain in the strict sense, many other sub-categories which admitted a whole range of private and communal usufruct and leasehold. But unless this point is made an impression could be created that the public ownership in question in the Negev was of the kind which precluded private and communal usufruct. It is not inconceivable that such an impression was intended by the original compilers of these percentages for the Negev at a time when it was envisaged to include the entire region (for whose Arab population see p lxviii of the Introduction) in the proposed Jewish state.

the percentage of Jewish land ownership exceeds 39 per cent, and that in nine of the sixteen sub-districts the percentage of Jewish ownership is less than 5 per cent.

63. The village statistics for 1945 prepared by the Palestine administration and showing the position as at 1 April 1945 furnish interesting data regarding land ownership in Palestine. The total Arab land ownership is given in dunums (4 dunums equal approximately 1 acre), as being 12,574,774,* as against a total Jewish ownership of 1,491,699. This statement also gives details of the land ownership of Arabs and Jews according to the various categories. The following figures are of particular interest:**

<i>Category of crops</i>	<i>Ownership by dunums</i>	
	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>
Citrus	135,368	139,728
Bananas	1,843	1,079
Plantations	1,052,222	94,167
Taxable cereals (categories 9-13)	5,653,346	869,109
Taxable cereals (categories 14-15)	823,046	67,839

64. The above statistics of population and of land ownership prove conclusively that the Arabs constitute a majority of the population of the proposed Jewish State, and own the bulk of the land.

Expedients for reducing or disguising the injustice of partition

65. It might be suggested that the injustice to the Arabs might be reduced and the proposal for partition rendered less open to objection by excluding from the Jewish State the predominantly Arab populated areas; or that such injustice might be disguised by increasing the Jewish population of that State by means of fresh immigration.

With regard to the latter expedient, it has already been explained that Palestine has taken more than its due share of immigrants and that it cannot take in any more without serious detriment to the interests and position of the existing population. In any case, it would be unfair to the Arabs of Palestine if, in an area in which they have a clear majority and in which they own the major portion of the land, they were to be artificially reduced to a minority and subjected to the rule of the Jews by means of the introduction of a large number of fresh immigrants.

* Exclusive of Beersheba sub-district for which see p. 679, note.

** For a comparative survey of Jewish and Arab agricultural production, see Appendix II.

Such a proposal would be utterly undemocratic and would amount to a complete denial of the rights of the Arab majority. The United Nations cannot, without doing violence to the principles of the Charter, and without serious damage to its prestige, be a party to such manipulation and juggling with the fate of a whole people. This artificial "processing" must be condemned as arbitrary and unjust.

66. The other expedient suggested, namely, the revision of the boundaries of the proposed Jewish State so as to exclude predominantly Arab populated areas, is entirely impracticable. As has been explained, in nine of the ten sub-districts, or parts thereof, proposed for inclusion in the Jewish State, the Arabs have a clear majority, and it is only in the tenth sub-district, which includes the town of Tel Aviv, that the Jews have a majority.

Inextricable intermingling of population

67. There is an additional difficulty, arising from the fact that throughout Palestine the Arab and Jewish population is inextricably interwoven. There are no territorial frontiers between Arabs and Jews. The bulk of the Jewish population in Palestine is located in towns and only a small proportion, about one-fifth, is settled in rural areas. Apart from Tel Aviv, which is a totally Jewish town, in practically all the other towns such as Haifa, Tiberias and Safad, the Jewish population is completely intermixed with the Arab population and it would be impossible to draw boundaries separating them from each other. The unity of the country and of its population cannot be broken up by any scheme of partition without entailing grave and disastrous consequences. Partition, in the case of Palestine, would amount not to the setting up of two self-contained entities, but to the dismemberment and mutilation of a living body.

Partition no solution for minority problem

68. It has been argued that the establishment of a Jewish State would solve the problem of the Jewish minority now existing in Palestine. In the whole of Palestine, the Jews are less than 31 per cent of the total population, whereas in the proposed Jewish State the Arab population will, at the outset, be in excess of the Jewish population. The proposal of the majority of the Special Committee would therefore solve the problem of the Jewish minority only by creating in its place the graver problem of the proportionately larger Arab population in the Jewish State. If minority status is an evil, it would not be fair to cure

one evil by the creation of another, and a greater, evil.

Result of detailed study of partition scheme by the Mandatory

69. The intermingling of the population in Palestine is such that it would be impossible to devise a partition scheme which would overcome the objections mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. This is fully confirmed by the detailed inquiries carried out on the spot by the Woodhead Commission in 1938.* The Commission was charged with the duty of making concrete recommendations for the implementation of the proposal of the Royal Commission of 1937 for the partition of Palestine. The Woodhead Commission, after detailed investigation, arrived at the conclusion that no partition scheme could be evolved which did not leave a very substantial Arab minority in the territory to be allotted to any possible Jewish State. The British Government upheld the findings of the Commission, and the proposal for partition was abandoned as impracticable. There is nothing in the report of the Special Committee to invalidate this conclusion, and the proposal of the majority of the Special Committee is more impracticable and unjust to the Arabs than any of the various partition schemes considered by the Woodhead Commission.

Minority status of Jews does not justify partition

70. The existence of a Jewish minority does not invalidate the establishment of a unitary State in Palestine. There have been, and there still are, minorities in many countries. Some minorities existed originally as part of the indigenous population, while other minorities were created by immigration. The United Nations cannot subscribe to the principle that a racial or religious minority, whether arising from natural development or created as a result of immigration, can insist upon the breaking up of a homeland or shatter the political, geographical and economic unity of a country without the consent and against the wishes of the majority. The acceptance of such a principle would constitute a dangerous precedent which might be adopted by dissident elements in many States and thus become a source both of internal conflict and international disorder.

71. The Jews who have migrated into Palestine have done so with the knowledge that they were going to live in one country,

* For the Woodhead Commission, see Barbour, pp. 335-42, and Reid, pp. 409-32.

where they would intermingle with the existing population. At no time were they led to believe by the Mandatory or by the Arabs that a part of Palestine would be set aside for their exclusive occupation. On the contrary, all Jewish immigration was made on the basis of the Mandate which provided in very clear terms for its termination and replacement by a single government of Palestine. The most that the Jewish minority in Palestine can ask for is to be safeguarded against discrimination and unfair treatment. The Arabs of Palestine have repeatedly expressed their willingness to co-operate in devising a practicable scheme for the safeguarding of the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities, and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. Any other demand by the Jewish minority would be undemocratic and untenable.

Main reason underlying partition proposal

72. It would appear from the plan of the majority of the Special Committee that the main reason for recommending partition and the creation of a Jewish State was to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine. Paragraph 8 of chapter VI, part I, of the Special Committee's report reads as follows:

"Jewish immigration is the central issue in Palestine today and is the one factor, above all others, that rules out the necessary co-operation between the Arab and Jewish communities in a single State. The creation of a Jewish State under a partition scheme is the only hope of removing this issue from the arena of conflict".

No argument could be more fallacious.* It is quite true that the Arabs are firmly opposed to further Jewish immigration into Palestine, but there is nothing to show that the opposition would diminish with the establishment of a Jewish State. On the contrary, the removal of the restrictions on immigration hitherto imposed by the Mandatory Power in the interest of the indigenous population and the economic and political welfare of the country would tend to intensify such opposition. It is a matter for regret that the Special Committee, instead of finding ways and means to ensure greater co-operation between Arabs and Jews in a single State, should have evolved a scheme which would, in fact, destroy whatever prospects still exist of friendly co-operation between the two communities and lead to most tragic consequences.

* See Part II, pp. 335-66.

*Economic objections to partition: indivisibility
of Palestinian economy*

73. It has been shown that partition is neither legally justifiable nor politically defensible or expedient. Consideration of the economic aspects of the scheme of partition shows that it is even less worthy of acceptance. There are two vital points involved in the economic aspect of partition that establish its basic impossibility.

As has been observed, Palestine has hitherto been administered as one political and administrative unit. Economic factors also make it one indissoluble unit. The economy of all parts of Palestine is interdependent. Roads, railways and communications and public services have been provided on the basis of a unitary Palestine. Large funds have been spent on the development of the port of Haifa to serve the commercial needs of the whole of Palestine. An example of the common and indivisible services is the fact that the source of the water supply of the City of Jerusalem is located in the proposed Jewish State and the water will have to pass through the Arab State before it reaches the City. Similarly, the electric supply of almost all the main towns of the proposed Arab State will have to be obtained from electric installations situated within the proposed Jewish State.

74. The Special Committee fully realized the interdependence of the economy of Palestine and observed that under the Mandate there had been internal freedom of trade, a common transport system and a single currency. Its report lays great stress on the economic unity of the country and its unanimous recommendation IX reads:

“In appraising the various proposals for the solution of the Palestine question, it shall be accepted as a cardinal principle that the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its peoples.”

The plan of the majority of the Special Committee accordingly recommends the establishment of an economic union and its operation through a joint economic board. The majority failed, however, to realize that it is impossible to combine economic union with political division. Economic unity implies consent and cannot be imposed; in fact, it necessitates a treaty and involves a joint administration. In view of the unwavering opposition of the Arabs, that arrangement would be impossible.

The emphasis laid by the Special Committee on the economic unity and interdependence of all sections of the population

in Palestine leads inevitably to the conclusion that economic unity must necessarily be preserved. This can be achieved only by maintaining political unity.

Viability of the proposed States

75. The next economic consideration which equally rules out partition is the essential requisite of viability. The proposed Jewish State is to be allotted the best part of the country and might therefore be viable. The Arab State, however, would be so lacking in resources as to be definitely not viable. The facts set forth below establish these contentions:

(a) It is recognized that citriculture is the most important industry in Palestine and that citrus constitutes the main item of export. According to chapter II, paragraph 28 of the Special Committee's report, "citrus is the main export crop; before the trade was interrupted during the war, it accounted for 80 per cent of the total value of exports". Again, paragraph 27 of chapter II contains the following statement: "Palestine is still mainly an agricultural country since about 65 per cent of the population gain a living directly from agriculture. Nevertheless, the country is not self-sufficient in food and is especially deficient in cereal production, about 50 per cent of its cereal being supplied by imports." In paragraph 29 of chapter II it is stated that citrus production "is approximately equally shared between Jewish and Arab cultivators". Paragraph 53 of chapter II contains the following statement: "During the war, the virtual cessation of citrus exports had a great effect on the structure of exports. This, however, was a purely temporary phenomenon, and it is evident that citrus exports will again become a dominant element in total exports."

In part I, paragraph 13 of the plan of partition, set forth in chapter VI of the Special Committee's report, it is stated that "the Jews will have the more economically developed part of the country, embracing practically the whole of the citrus producing area, which includes a large number of Arab producers."

It is thus an undisputed fact that the basic industry in Palestine, which largely pays for imports of food, especially wheat, meat and cattle fodder (see chapter II, paragraph 54 of the Special Committee's report), and of which the Arabs own approximately 50 per cent, would be almost entirely included in the proposed Jewish State.*

* On 30 January, 1948, the *Zionist Review* in its Jewish National Fund

(b) In addition to the citrus industry, the proposed Jewish State is allotted under the partition plan the best agricultural lands in Palestine, while the Arab State is left certain mountainous regions, largely uncultivable. The maritime plain running from Gaza to Acre, the plain of Esdraelon and the valley of Jezreel, which together comprise the best agricultural areas, are all included within the proposed Jewish State. To quote again from the Special Committee's report (see chapter II, paragraph 3): "Apart from these inland plains in the north and portions of the desert area in the south, the interior of the country is very mountainous, with the hills of Judea and Samaria in the centre and the hills of Galilee in the north."

Thus in addition to citrus, the plan of the majority of the Special Committee would endow the Jewish State with the most substantial agricultural resources of the country.

(c) Under the partition plan, the two ports of Palestine, Haifa and Jaffa, which are both predominantly Arab, are included in the Jewish State. The Haifa port was developed with public funds at considerable cost. The partition plan includes it, with all its possibilities of future development, within the Jewish State, despite the fact that the port serves as the terminal of the Iraq oil pipe line and is the point of entry of international trade into Palestine, Transjordan and other parts of the Arab world.

76. Attention may now be drawn to some other aspects of the future economy of the proposed Arab State as disclosed in the plan of the majority of the Special Committee.

In the first place, in chapter VI, part I, paragraph 12, it is observed "that, at any rate during the early years of its existence, a partitioned Arab State in Palestine would have some difficulty in raising sufficient revenue to keep up its present standards of public services."

Secondly, the Arab State would, in effect, have to subsist on international charity. Thus paragraph 14 of part I of chapter VI reads:

"As the Arab State will not be in a position to undertake considerable development expenditure, sympathetic consideration should be given to its claim for assistance from international institutions in the way of loans for expansion of education, public health and other vital social services of a non-self-sup-

plement, stated that of the 7,500,000 dunums of cultivable lands in the area allotted to the Jewish state by the UN partition resolution of 1947, only 1,500,000 was Jewish-owned, the rest being owned by Arabs.

porting nature.”

77. The majority of the Special Committee recognized that viability is an essential prerequisite to any scheme of partition, but made no attempt to consider it or study it. This important matter was apparently left to the Secretariat, and the note prepared by the Secretariat was incorporated in the report.* This note shows that the Arab State can be made viable only on the basis of a subsidy from the Jewish State.

To sum up, it is certain that the proposed Arab State cannot be viable. It would have no cultivable lands of any importance. Such cultivable lands as it would have would not supply a small fraction of the cereal requirements of its population. It would have no other economic resources, no raw materials, no industries, no trade, and would have to subsist on subsidies or loans.

78. It would thus appear that the partition proposal is legally objectionable, politically unjust, and economically disastrous; in short, it is utterly unworkable. The Sub-Committee is therefore compelled to reject partition as a solution of the Palestine problem, and considers that the constitution and future government of Palestine must be based on the fundamental principle of a unitary State.

*Principles underlying the constitution of a unitary
State in Palestine*

79. The Sub-Committee examined the proposals of the Arab States regarding the future constitution of Palestine made in the British Government in 1946 and early in 1947, and took into account the statements made during the general debate in the *Ad Hoc* Committee. The basic idea underlying those proposals, and which is in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter, is that the future constitution and government of Palestine must be based on the free consent of the people of that country and must be shaped along democratic lines. In other words, the constitution of Palestine should be framed by a representative body, namely, an elected constituent assembly. The basis and conditions of franchise, the qualifications of electors and numerous other complex questions connected with the setting up and working of the constituent assembly would have to be decided before the constituent assembly could be convened.

* See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 11. Volume I. pp. 55 and 56.

80. While the task of framing a constitution must naturally be left to the constituent assembly, the Sub-Committee feels that it should indicate in general terms the main principles on which the future constitution should be based. These are summarized below.

(a) Palestine shall be a unitary and sovereign State.

(b) It shall have a democratic constitution with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to the legislature.

(c) The constitution shall provide guarantees for the sanctity of the Holy Places covering inviolability, maintenance, freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the *status quo*.

(d) The constitution shall guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and freedom of religious belief and practice in accordance with the *status quo* (including the maintenance of separate religious courts to deal with matters of personal status).

(e) The constitution shall guarantee the right of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and inspection.

(f) The constitution shall recognize the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority.

(g) The law of naturalization and citizenship shall provide, among other conditions, that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the constituent assembly.

(h) The constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength.

(i) The constitution shall also provide for adequate reflection in the executive and the administration of the distribution of representation in the legislature.

(j) The constitution shall authorize the legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education, health and other social services.

(k) The constitution shall provide for the setting up of a supreme court, the jurisdiction of which shall include, *inter alia*, the power to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of all legislation, and it shall be open to any aggrieved party to have recourse to that tribunal.

(l) The guarantees contained in the constitution concerning

the rights and safeguards of the minorities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the legislature.

*Establishment of a provisional government and mode
of transfer of power*

81. The next matter that calls for consideration is the setting up of a provisional government and the manner of transfer of power from the Mandatory to the provisional government. The Sub-Committee recommends that a provisional government shall be set up without further delay and that it shall be representative of all important sections of the citizenry in Palestine in proportion to their numerical strength. The representation of Arabs and Jews in the provisional government shall be without prejudice to their representation in the future government of Palestine.

82. The legislative, executive and administrative powers and functions of the present administration of Palestine shall be vested in the provisional government as soon as the latter is constituted and thereupon the Mandatory Power shall begin the withdrawal of its forces and services from Palestine. The plan of withdrawal shall be settled by the Mandatory Power in consultation with the provisional government, and the withdrawal shall be completed within one year. This would ensure an orderly transfer of power, and would at the same time enable the provisional government to organize its police and security forces and to build up a sound administrative system on national lines.

83. The provisional government shall as soon as practicable enact an electoral law for the setting up of the constituent assembly, and take steps to complete without delay an electoral register on the basis of that law. The electoral law shall provide for the adequate representation in the constituent assembly of all the important sections of the citizenry in accordance with their numerical strength. This shall be without prejudice to their representation in the future legislature.

84. As soon as the electoral register is completed, elections shall be held for the constituent assembly. The constituent assembly shall then be convened and shall proceed to draw up the constitution of the independent unitary State of Palestine in the light of the basic provisions outlined in the preceding paragraphs. The constituent assembly shall also act as a legislature until the first elections under the new constitution have

been held, and during the interval the provisional government shall be responsible to the constituent assembly.

85. It is essential to add that until the independent State of Palestine legislates otherwise, immigration into Palestine shall be suspended, and the existing land transfer restrictions shall remain in force.

86. The Sub-Committee is persuaded that a constitution evolved on the lines mentioned above is the only practicable solution of a difficult and complex problem, consistent with the principles of justice and democracy and in accord with the best interests of all communities in Palestine.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

87. The conclusions of the Sub-Committee are embodied in the following three draft resolutions, which the Sub-Committee recommends for the acceptance of the General Assembly.

I

DRAFT RESOLUTION REFERRING CERTAIN LEGAL QUESTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The General Assembly

Considering that the Palestine question raises certain legal issues connected, *inter alia*, with the inherent right of the indigenous population of Palestine to their country and to determine its future, the pledges and assurances given to the Arabs in the First World War regarding the independence of Arab countries, including Palestine, the validity and scope of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate, the effect on the Mandate of the dissolution of the League of Nations and of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intention to withdraw from Palestine,

Considering that the Palestine question also raises other legal issues connected with the competence of the United Nations to recommend any solution contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Charter of the United Nations, or to the wishes of the majority of the people of Palestine,

Considering that doubts have been expressed by several Member States concerning the legality under the Charter of any action by the United Nations, or by any Member State or

group of Member States, to enforce any proposal which is contrary to the wishes, or is made without the consent, of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine,

Considering that these questions involve legal issues which so far have not been pronounced upon by any impartial or competent tribunal, and that it is essential that such questions be authoritatively determined before the United Nations can recommend a solution of the Palestine question in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,

Resolves to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion under Article 96 of the Charter and Chapter IV of the Statute of the Court on the following questions:

(a) Whether the indigenous population of Palestine has not an inherent right to Palestine and to determine its future constitution and government;

(b) Whether the pledges and assurances given by Great Britain to the Arabs during the First World War (including the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918) concerning the independence and future of Arab countries at the end of the war did not include Palestine;

(c) Whether the Balfour Declaration, which was made without the knowledge or consent of the indigenous population of Palestine, was valid and binding on the people of Palestine, or consistent with the earlier and subsequent pledges and assurances given to the Arabs;

(d) Whether the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine regarding the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine are in conformity or consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations (in particular Article 22), or are compatible with the provisions of the Mandate relating to the development of self-government and the preservation of the rights and position of the Arabs of Palestine;

(e) Whether the legal basis for the Mandate for Palestine has not disappeared with the dissolution of the League of Nations, and whether it is not the duty of the Mandatory Power to hand over power and administration to a government of Palestine representing the rightful people of Palestine;

(f) Whether a plan to partition Palestine without the consent of the majority of its people is consistent with the objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and with the provisions of the Mandate for Palestine;

(g) Whether the United Nations is competent to recommend either of the two plans and recommendations of the

majority or minority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, or any other solution involving partition of the territory of Palestine, or a permanent trusteeship over any city or part of Palestine, without the consent of the majority of the people of Palestine;

(h) Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competent to enforce or recommend the enforcement of any proposal concerning the constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, any plan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without the consent of, the inhabitants of Palestine,

Instructs the Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the International Court of Justice, accompanied by all documents likely to throw light upon the questions under reference.

II

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON JEWISH REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The General Assembly,

Having regard to the unanimous recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, that the General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressed European Jews will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem,

Bearing in mind that genuine refugees and displaced persons constitute a problem which is international in scope and character,

Considering that the question of refugees and displaced persons is indivisible in character as regards its possible solution,

Considering that it is the duty of the Governments concerned to make provision for the return of refugees and displaced persons to the countries of which they are nationals,

Being further of the opinion that where repatriation proves impossible, solution should be sought by way of resettlement in the territories of the Members of the United Nations which are willing and in a position to absorb these refugees and displaced persons,

Considering that Palestine, despite its very small area and limited resources, has absorbed a disproportionately large

number of Jewish immigrants and cannot take any more without serious injury to the economy of the country and the rights and position of the indigenous population,

Considering that many other countries with much greater area and larger resources have not taken their due share of Jewish refugees and displaced persons,

Having adopted its resolution 62 (I) of 15 December 1946 calling for the creation of an International Refugee Organization with a view to the solution of the refugee problem through the combined efforts of the United Nations, and

Taking note of the assumption on 1 July 1947 by the Preparatory Commission of the International Refugee Organization of operational responsibility for displaced persons and refugees,

Recommends

1. The countries of origin should be requested to take back the Jewish refugees and displaced persons belonging to them, and to render them all possible assistance to resettle in life;

2. That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who cannot be repatriated should be absorbed in the territories of Members of the United Nations in proportion to their area, economic resources, *per capita* income population and other relevant factors;

3. That a special committee of the General Assembly should be set up to recommend for acceptance of the Members of the United Nations a scheme of quotas of Jewish refugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories, and that the special committee should, as far as possible, work in consultation with the International Refugee Organization or its Preparatory Commission.

III

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE CONSTITUTION AND FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

The General Assembly,

Taking note of the declaration by the Mandatory Power of its intention to withdraw from Palestine,

Considering that Palestine is a mandated territory whose independence was provisionally recognized by virtue of paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,

Recognizing that the only solution in consonance with the

objectives of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations is one that is acceptable to the majority of the people of Palestine,

Being satisfied that the partition of Palestine is unjust, illegal and impracticable and that the only just and workable solution is the immediate establishment of a unitary, democratic, and independent State, with adequate safeguards for minorities,

Believing that peaceful and orderly transfer of power from the Mandatory to the government of the people of Palestine is necessary in the interest of all concerned,

Recommends

1. That a provisional government, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength, should be set up as early as possible in Palestine;

2. That the powers and functions of the present administration of Palestine should be vested in the provisional government as soon as the latter is constituted;

3. That the Mandatory Power should begin the withdrawal of its forces and services from Palestine as soon as the provisional government is installed, and should complete the withdrawal within one year;

4. That the provisional government should, as soon as practicable, enact an electoral law for the setting up of a constituent assembly, prepare an electoral register, and hold elections for the constituent assembly;

5. That the constituent assembly should also function as a legislature and that the provisional government should be responsible to it until elections for a legislature are held under the new constitution;

6. That while the task of framing a constitution for Palestine must be left to the constituent assembly, the following basic principles shall be strictly adhered to:

(a) Palestine shall be a unitary and sovereign State;

(b) It shall have a democratic constitution, with an elected legislature and an executive responsible to the legislature;

(c) The constitution shall provide guarantees for the sanctity of the Holy Places covering inviolability, maintenance, freedom of access and freedom of worship in accordance with the *status quo*;

(d) The constitution shall guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, and freedom of religious belief and practice in accordance with the *status quo* (including the mainte-

nance of separate religious courts to deal with matters of personal status);

(e) The constitution shall guarantee the rights of religious bodies or other societies and individuals to maintain, in addition to educational establishments administered by public authority, educational institutions of their own, subject to normal government supervision and inspection;

(f) The constitution shall recognize the right of Jews to employ Hebrew as a second official language in areas in which they are in a majority;

(g) The law of naturalization and citizenship shall provide, amongst other conditions, that the applicant should be a legal resident of Palestine for a continuous period to be determined by the constituent assembly;

(h) The constitution shall ensure adequate representation in the legislature for all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength;

(i) The constitution shall also provide for adequate reflection in the executive and the administration of the distribution of representation in the legislature;

(j) The constitution shall authorize the legislature to invest local authorities with wide discretion in matters connected with education, health and other social services;

(k) The constitution shall provide for the setting up of a supreme court, the jurisdiction of which shall include, *inter alia*, the power to pronounce upon the constitutional validity of all legislation, and it shall be open to any aggrieved party to have recourse to that tribunal;

(l) The guarantees contained in the constitution concerning the rights and safeguards of the minorities shall not be subject to amendment or modification without the consent of the minority concerned expressed through a majority of its representatives in the legislature.

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF PALESTINE AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1946

	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Druses and others</i>	<i>Bedouin</i>	<i>Total number of Arabs and others</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Arab State</i>							
Western Galilee	88,150	26,390	9,260		123,800	3,040	126,840
Samaria and Judea	466,390	18,660	300		485,350	5,020	490,370
Gaza	166,570	1,290			117,860	1,460	119,320
TOTAL	671,110	46,340	9,560	22,000	749,010	9,520	758,530
<i>Jewish State</i>							
Eastern Galilee	81,060	3,700	1,440		86,200	28,750	114,950
				13,000			
Plains of Sharon and Esdraclon	252,450	49,960	4,350		306,760	469,250	776,010
Beersheba	11,600	210	10	92,000	103,820	1,020	104,840
TOTAL	345,110	53,870	5,800	105,000	509,780	499,020	1,008,800
<i>City of Jerusalem</i>	60,560	44,850	130		105,540	99,690	205,230
SUMMARY							
<i>Arab State</i>	671,110	46,340	9,560	22,000	749,010	9,520	758,530
<i>Jewish State</i>	345,110	53,870	5,800	105,000	509,780	499,020	1,008,800
<i>City of Jerusalem</i>	60,560	44,850	130		105,540	99,690	205,230
TOTAL	1,076,780	145,060	15,490	127,000	1,364,330	608,230	1,972,560

APPENDIX B

ESTIMATED POPULATION OF PROPOSED JEWISH STATE AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1946

<i>Sub-district</i>	<i>Moslems</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total number of Arabs</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Eastern Galilee</i>						
Safad	39,910	550		40,460	7,170	47,630
Tiberias	23,950	2,470	1,420	27,830	13,640	41,470
Beisan	16,660	680	20	17,360	7,590	24,950
Nazareth	550			550	350	900
TOTAL	81,060	3,700	1,440	86,200	28,750	114,950
<i>Plains of Sharon and Esdraelon</i>						
Nazareth	3,040	980		4,020	7,630	11,650
Haifa	90,380	30,990	3,990	125,360	119,010	244,370
Tulkarm	33,750	30		33,780	16,180	49,960
Jaffa	95,980	17,790	360	114,130	295,160	409,290
Ramleh	26,500	170		26,670	29,970	56,640
Gaza	2,800			2,800	1,300	4,100
TOTAL	252,450	49,960	4,350	306,760	469,250	776,010
<i>Beersheba</i>						
Gaza	5,330			5,330	510	5,840
Beersheba	6,270	210	10	6,490	510	7,000
TOTAL	11,600	210	10	11,820	1,020	12,840
TOTALS	345,110	53,870	5,800	404,780*	499,020	903,800*

* These figures do not include Arab Bedouin. The number of Bedouin in Palestine in 1946 has been estimated by the Palestine administration at 127,000, of whom 105,000 reside in the area of the proposed Jewish State and 22,000 in the area of the proposed Arab State.

APPENDIX C

NOTE DATED 1 NOVEMBER 1947 ON THE BEDOUIN
POPULATION OF PALESTINE PRESENTED BY THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. The nomad population of Palestine has been enumerated completely on two occasions (1922 and 1931) and partially on one occasion (1946). The figures resulting from these enumerations were as follows:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number</i>
1922	103,000
1931	67,000
1946 (Beersheba area only)	92,000

2. The 1922 enumeration was not a direct one, certain indirect methods having been used. It was not possible for the census authority to state the degree of accuracy of the figures. The 1931 enumeration was more direct but was stated by the officer who carried out the work to be incomplete approximately by as much as 20 per cent. The author of the 1931 census report for all Palestine stated, however, on the basis of certain checks, that the degree of incompleteness was less than 20 per cent. The Government statistician has examined the checks made and does not consider that the conclusion of the author of the census report was justified. If we accept the estimate of the officer who took the 1931 census, the figure for the Bedouin of all Palestine would have been not 67,000 but 84,000.

3. The latest census of Bedouin resident in the Beersheba area was undertaken by the Government statistician in May 1946 as a preliminary operation of the census of Palestine scheduled for November 1946 but later postponed. The count was a direct one carried out by officers of the Department of Statistics working with enumerators recruited from among the literate members of the tribes. Each tribal chief was asked for particulars of the sub-tribes of his tribe, viz. . . . , name of sub-tribal chief and present location. The sub-tribal chiefs were then visited and asked to give particulars of the name and location of each *hamuleh* (clan). The clan chiefs were then called upon to proceed with the enumerator to each head of household where particulars were taken, *in situ*, of the name, age, sex, literacy and relationship of each member of the household. That method of enumeration, being based on the tribal structure of relationships and not on any geographical basis (other than that of restriction to the Beersheba area) was calculated to give a greater degree of accuracy than

either of the earlier enumerations.

4. In addition to the census method, some idea has been obtained of the size of the Bedouin population from a plotting of the tents and houses that could be spotted from aerial photographs taken by the Royal Air Force over northern Beersheba about the same period of the year. The results obtained from the aerial photographs indicate that the figure of 48,000 (which was the only estimate available of the Beersheba Bedouin up to 1946) is greatly understated if applied to the population of 1946. The number of houses shown was 3,389 and of tents 8,722. The bulk of the population lives in the northern and north-western parts of the Beersheba sub-district where the average rainfall is from 200 to 300 millimetres a year and where the greater part of the 2 million dunums of cereal land cultivated by the Bedouin is situated.

5. As regards the rest of the country, it is not possible to give any close estimate of the present Bedouin population. In 1931, the Beersheba tribes amounted to approximately 72 per cent of the total Bedouin population. If this relationship between Beersheba and the rest of Palestine still holds good, the total Bedouin population would be in the region of 127,000. The division of these figures as between the various sub-districts of normal residence is as follows:


<i>Sub-district</i>	<i>1931 Census</i>	<i>1946 Estimate</i>
Beersheba*	48,000	92,000
Nablus	220	400
Hebron	2,000	3,800
Jerusalem	7,070	13,400
Gaza	530	1,000
Ramleh	3,780	7,200
Jaffa and Tulkarm	5,000	9,500
<i>Total:</i>	66,000	127,300

Of these 127,000, approximately 22,000 may be taken as normally resident in the areas allocated to the Arab State under the plan proposed by the majority of the Special Committee.

6. It should be noted that the term "Beersheba Bedouin" has a meaning more definite than one would expect in the case of a nomad population. These tribes, wherever they are found in Palestine, will always describe themselves as Beersheba tribes. Their attachment to the area arises from their land rights there and their historic association with it.

* For the population statistics of the Beersheba sub-district, see above, p. 679, note, and below, p. 703, note.

Map 16 Jewish Population 1944



President Truman and the Negev*

November 19, 1947

ABBA EBAN**

...When it became evident that Jewish statehood would be proposed by the General Assembly, the opponents of Zionism moved away from wholehearted anti-partitionism towards a policy of truncating the Jewish area and making it unacceptable to Jewish opinion. Early in November the United States delegation, influenced by this campaign, pressed the Jewish Agency representatives to yield the southern Negev to the Arabs.† American diplomats even hinted that without this concession they would abandon support of the Partition plan, which would thus be defeated in the Assembly vote. On 19 November Weizmann arose from his sick bed and went to Washington for a talk with President Truman. When he arrived at the capital he was informed from New York that the American delegation was going to exclude the Negev from the Jewish State in the partition resolution. He decided to concentrate entirely on the importance of the Southern Negev in his talk with Truman. He was warmly received and plunged immediately into his

* From Meyer W. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael, eds., *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands*, with a Preface by David Ben-Gurion (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), pp. 301-3. The title of the chapter from which this excerpt is taken is "Tragedy and Triumph." Copyright © by Meyer W. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael. Reprinted by permission of George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Limited.

** The present Israeli Foreign Minister.

† On the eve of partition, the Jewish population of the Negev numbered possibly 1000, the bulk of whom first settled in the area on October 6, 1946, when "11 new strongpoints" were established in one day. The Arab population is estimated to have been 92,000 who were mostly bedouins living in 3,389 homes and 8,722 tents and cultivating about two million dunums of land. For Arab land ownership in the Negev, see above, p. 679, note.

theme, illustrating it with a memorandum prepared under his direction by Eliahu Elath:*

Akaba, which is found on the southern end of the Negev and the Red Sea, represents the only outlet for the Jewish State to the Indian Ocean, India, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand. For the Jewish State this outlet will be one of the important routes for commercial relations with that part of the world. The Jewish State, in order to absorb the refugees coming from Europe, will have to do its utmost to develop its industrial and commercial capacities and in this connection the importance of Akaba is much greater than just a piece of land on the Red Sea. . . .

Akaba has played an important role in Jewish history from the early days of the Jewish Kingdom, and the UNSCOP report giving this place to the Jewish State has recognized the historic connections of the Jews with this part of the Red Sea.

Akaba, in the hands of the Arabs, may be a permanent threat in the rear of the Jewish State. The Arab States have an outlet to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Akaba through Transjordan, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia.

Weizmann kept Truman's mind riveted on this point alone. The President became fascinated by the unexpected excursion into a phase of remote political geography. Grasping the simplicity and force of the argument he gave his assent.

But there was a race against time. At three o'clock the next day the Jewish Agency representatives were invited to meet the American delegate Herschel Johnson in the United Nations' lounge in New York, to hear the State Department's verdict—against the retention of the Negev in the Jewish State. Ambassador Johnson faced Sharett** and began to pronounce what amounted to a judgment of execution. In mid-sentence he was called to the telephone. He told the messenger that he could not be disturbed and sent his deputy General Hildring† to

* Eliahu Elath, formerly Epstein, born in Russia 1903, Head of the Middle East Division of the Jewish Agency's Political Department in Jerusalem, 1934-45, its political representative in U.S., 1945-48, and first Ambassador of Israel to the United States, 1949-50.

** For Moshe Sharett (Shertok), see above, p. 604, note.

† Major-General J.H. Hildring, the American alternate-delegate at the United Nations, acted as liaison officer to the policy-making section on Palestine in the State Department. According to Vera Weizmann in her *The Impossible Takes Longer* (London, 1967), p. 330, Hildring

take the call. The General returned to say that the President himself was holding on at the Washington end of the line.

Johnson leaped to the telephone booth like a startled and portly reindeer. Twenty minutes later he returned. Seating himself opposite Sharett and Horowitz* he blushed out an embarrassed retraction. 'What I really wanted to say to you, Mr Shertok, was that we have no changes to suggest.' Horowitz records the Jewish reaction with quiet understatement:

We sighed with relief. Dr Weizmann's talk had been successful. The struggle for the frontiers ended in victory.

The way was now clear for the final vote. In the desperate unforgettable week-end of 27-29 November, Weizmann threw himself into the frenzied pursuit of wavering votes. The prospect of French abstention threatened to disrupt the West European front. In a cable to Léon Blum,** Weizmann summoned the Socialist statesman to a supreme effort: 'Does France really wish to be absent from a moment unfading in the memory of man?' On 29 November, when the French vote for partition was announced, a gasp of surprise and a ripple of incredulous applause rang through the Assembly Hall.

He spent the day of 29 November in quiet contemplation at the Plaza Hotel. When the historic vote was announced, Jewish representatives led by Sharett and the veteran Labour leader Sprinzak and Shazar,† went to his suite and found him

was sympathetic to the Jewish cause and therefore was "coerced" into accepting the appointment by the Zionists: "No one knew Chaim [Weizmann] was behind it all."

* David Horowitz, born in Poland 1899, was Director of the Economic Department of the Jewish Agency, 1935-48, Liaison Officer to UNSCOP, 1947, member of the Jewish Delegation to Lake Success, November, 1947. He is currently (1969) Governor of the Bank of Israel.

** Léon Blum (1872-1950), a French statesman, became the first Socialist premier of France, June 1936-June 1937. According to Chaim Weizmann in his *Trial and Error* (London, 1950), p. 450, Blum worked closely with the French Zionist Organisation.

† Joseph Sprinzak, born in Russia 1885, co-founder and member of the Executive Committee of the Histadrut, 1920-47, Acting President of Israel, Nov. 1951-Dec. 1952, and Interim President, Nov.-Dec. 1952. Shneur Zalman Shazar (Rubashov), born in Russia 1889, was among the organisers of the *Halutzim* (pioneers) in Europe and of the Jewish Labour Movement in Palestine, and member of the Jewish delegation to Lake Success, 1947; President of the State of Israel since 1963.

profoundly moved. That evening at a Labour Zionist rally in Carnegie Hall he raised his hands aloft to a cheering crowd in speechless joy. His dark glasses concealed his tears.

History had taught him that there was never any respite. Every victory was short-lived and had to be consolidated at once. A few days before the vote he had looked at the map of the Assembly vote and found that the new Jewish State had received almost no Asian support. Must it for ever live in isolation within its continental family? A thought had come to him—of startling prescience. He had written a letter, almost out of the blue, to Nehru proposing scientific and technical co-operation between Palestine and India. On 2 December Nehru replied welcoming Weizmann's suggestion and inviting scientists from Palestine to attend the Indian Science Congress in January 1948. It was the first premonition of Israel's integration in the Asian world.


Weizmann now bethought himself of the Oxford scholar who had first propounded the partition solution in the Peel Commission Report. Sir Reginald Coupland* was surprised to receive an affectionate cable from Weizmann to which he made immediate reply:

It was kind of you to think of me at the moment of your victory, after so many and such perverse delays. I shall remember my association with Zionism as the most interesting chapter of my life—beginning with that meeting in the little room at Nahalal—and the best of it has been the privilege of your friendship.

You have now to impress your State with the stamp of your statesmanship—so that it can show the world what the Jews can do when restored to their historic home, and standing at last on an equal footing with other peoples.

* Professor Sir Reginald Coupland of Oxford University is generally considered to have been responsible for the partition recommendation made by the *Royal (Peel) Commission Report of 1937*.

Map 17
United Nations Recommendation, November 1947



Based on the map published in George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East, 1945-1950*.

Thanksgiving Day at Lake Success*

November 27, 1947

SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN**

A special session was summoned, in last April, I believe, of the General Assembly of the United Nations to deal with the matter. This special session appointed a Special Committee on Palestine and asked it to visit the country, to investigate on the spot and to make a report as to what the solution ought to be. This Committee consisted of 11 members. They went to Palestine; they took evidence; they visited some places outside Palestine also and eventually made two reports, a majority report and a minority report. The majority report was signed by 7 members and the minority report by 3 members and one member, Australia, remained neutral. The minority report was signed by the representatives of Yugoslavia, Iran and India, the Indian representative being the Honourable Mr. Justice Abdur Rehman. The majority report was signed, as I said, by 7 members and they put forward the solution of partition. The minority report put forward the solution of a federal State having two units, the Jewish State and the Arab State. Neither scheme was acceptable to the Arabs, but the Jews declared that they were prepared to accept the majority scheme.

The report of the Committee on Palestine was taken up by the General Assembly at its annual session, which concluded on the 29th of November 1947. Everybody felt that this was a most important matter. The Assembly, therefore, at the very outset appointed a Special Committee to deal with it and to report to the Assembly. The Assembly has six permanent Committees, but this seventh Committee was constituted for the time being to deal with Palestine. In all such Committees every

* From Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, *Palestine in the U.N.O.* (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1948), pp. 6-23.

** Judge on the International Court of Justice; formerly Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the United Nations.

country that is a member of the United Nations Organisation is represented; so that all the 57 nations are members of each one of them. And the same was the case with the Palestine Committee. Thus we were also represented on the Palestine Committee. Quite two or three weeks were taken up in this *ad hoc* Committee by the general discussion of the report of the Palestine Committee. At the end of this general discussion it appeared that nobody was paying much attention to the minority report and that there were two trends of opinion in the Committee. One was in favour of the majority report and the other was in favour of a unitary independent Palestine, in which naturally the Arabs being in the majority, they would have been in control.

At this stage it is necessary to keep a few facts in mind. The population of Palestine today is approximately 2,000,000 out of which 1,300,000 are Arabs; but remember this includes round about a couple of hundred thousand Christian Arabs. On the future of Palestine the Muslim Arabs and the Christian Arabs have taken up an identical stand and there are no differences between them on this question. There are roughly 700,000 Jews. The city of Jerusalem has a population of 205,000, of which 105,000 are Arabs and 100,000 Jews. Approximately, there are 200,000 Jews in the city of Tel Aviv, which is a wholly Jewish town, though almost next door to and practically connected with the town of Jaffa, which is almost entirely Arab. The area of Palestine is 10,000 sq. miles, equal to about, say, four average districts of the Punjab or, say, about two or three average districts of Sind. Of this area of 10,000 sq. miles, 5,000 sq. miles are waste desert and the rest is plains or hills or desert which is culturable when there is a rainfall. So, it is a very small country in area and only a very small number of human beings is directly concerned with it. But it raises very troublesome problems inasmuch as Palestine is the holy land of the three big religions,—Jews, Christians and the Musalmans.

As I have said, there were two trends in the Committee, one in favour of a unitary State with safeguards for the minorities and the other in favour of the majority report, which recommended partition with economic union, i.e., for economic purposes the two States would be together and for other purposes they would have their own separate arrangements.

These two proposals were committed to two Sub-Committees of the Committee on Palestine. These Sub-Committees were asked to study the various resolutions or proposals which had come before the Committee and to make their reports. One Sub-Committee was constituted of those delegations who supported the partition scheme. This was known as Sub-

Committee No. 1 on Palestine. The other Sub-Committee was composed of delegations that supported the unitary scheme. It was composed of the Arab States, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is, eight countries. There are six Arab States that are members of the United Nations, namely, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. The delegate for Poland was elected the Chairman of Sub-Committee No. 1 and I was elected the Chairman of Sub-Committee No. 2. I accepted this responsibility very reluctantly. Mr. Ayub, the Secretary of the Pakistan delegation, did all the drafting, and he did it so well that later on when our report was published the Polish delegate said to me: "Your report is very much better than ours", by which of course he meant to pay a tribute to the exposition and arrangement of the matter contained in the report and not that he approved of its recommendations. We had our report ready earlier than the other Sub-Committee. They were faced with the difficulty created by our contention, which was supported by a large number of delegations, that the United Nations had no legal or juristic authority to partition Palestine. This was their problem and they had to find a solution for it. They could have found a solution very easily if they had had the co-operation of the mandatory power, that is, Great Britain. But Great Britain's attitude was: "Whatever solution the Assembly adopts, we shall not oppose or obstruct; but we ourselves will not support either partition or any other solution that may be suggested unless it is a solution which the Arabs and the Jews are both willing to accept." So, at every stage the Sub-Committee had to ask Great Britain: "Are you willing to help in what this scheme visualises?" Great Britain's reply was "No; we won't. Whatever you suggest will have to be done by U.N.O." The ultimate British attitude was: "Up to the date on which we terminate the mandate—and we shall decide that date—we shall not share authority for the administration of Palestine with anybody else. We shall be the sole authority as the responsibility is ours and it is our troops that have to keep and maintain law and order. From the date of the termination of the mandate up to the date of the evacuation of our troops from Palestine, we shall be responsible for law and order only in our military camps to which we shall have withdrawn our troops. With regard to the rest of the country, we shall not be responsible and we shall withdraw our troops from Palestine at the latest by the 1st of August 1948". (They have since announced that they will terminate the mandate in May 1948.)

I will now give you a brief account of the two reports. Our report had three sections. The first section dealt with legal

questions about which we suggested that the General Assembly should ask the International Court of Justice to express its opinion. These questions were:—

1. Was not Palestine included in the pledges given by the British, and subsequently confirmed by the French, to the Arabs during the first World War, because if it was, then the Arabs were entitled to have it as a free and independent Arab country?
2. In view of these pledges, did the Balfour Declaration have any validity? Was it valid at all?
3. If it was valid, what was its meaning? Obviously, if you tell somebody that he shall be free in a certain country, then you cannot give him away to somebody else afterwards. And the Balfour Declaration must be read subject to the pledges given by the British to the Arabs.
4. Was the mandate for Palestine which was based upon the Balfour Declaration legally valid? But the League of Nations which had created the mandate had ceased to exist and therefore the mandate must be deemed to have come to an end. But the mandate continues. In any case, as the mandatory power had itself declared this year that it was going to terminate the mandate, Palestine must be free.
5. Did the United Nations have any legal authority to partition Palestine into two States, Jewish and Arab, without the consent and contrary to the wishes of the population of Palestine?

We had particularly in mind the first article of the Charter itself which says that one of the objectives of the United Nations is that people should have the right of self-determination and that the form of government to which this shall lead shall be settled with the consent of the people. This was the first part of our report.

The second part dealt with the question of the Jewish refugees. There are roughly at the moment 200,000 Jewish refugees and displaced persons collected together in camps on the continent of Europe, mainly in the central countries. A good deal of humanitarian feeling was sought to be excited by appeals to the different delegations by saying that if you do not agree to the partition of Palestine, then these 200,000 people, who are homeless and who have suffered a great deal during the war and after the war, will have to perish. We dealt with that in the second section of our report and said that since the beginning of the persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany, Palestine had

already taken more than 300,000 Jewish refugees and having regard to its area and its resources it should not be asked to have any more. Therefore, we went on to recommend that in accordance with the unanimous recommendation of the Special Committee, which the General Assembly had sent to Palestine, this question should be dealt with at an international level. Our agreed proposals, therefore, were:—

1. That as many of the Jewish refugees as can be repatriated to the countries from which they had been expelled should be repatriated to those countries.
2. Such of them as could not be repatriated to those countries should be distributed among the members of the United Nations according to the resources, area, population, capacity, etc. of the various States.
3. That a Committee should be set up to settle quotas for the Jewish immigration to various countries.

Our third section dealt with the future constitution of Palestine. We recommended that Palestine should be a unitary State in which all minorities would participate and in which the minorities would have ample safeguards with regard to their language, culture, education, religious instruction, holy places, etc.*

The report of the first Committee was that partition should be carried out as recommended in the majority report of the Special Committee on Palestine with economic union. They put forward a map, more or less the same map as the Palestine majority report had put forward, with certain modifications, most of them in favour of the Jews. According to it the whole of this tiny country was divided into eight parts—three Jewish portions, three Arab portions, the city of Jerusalem to be an international city to be governed under international arrangement and the city of Jaffa to be a part of the Arab State. They also recommended, as had the Special Committee on Palestine, economic union which was to be administered by a Joint Economic Board, which would be constituted by nine members, three representing the Arab State, three representing the Jewish State and three appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This Joint Economic Board would be in charge of customs, currency, foreign exchange, communications, development of irrigation and agriculture, water resources and so on and would distribute the proceeds of these different kinds

* For a full text of this report, see "Binationalism Not Partition," pp. 645-99.

of taxes and resources of the country between the two States according to a plan that they had put forward and would also finance the Government of the city of Jerusalem. In effect, as I pointed out in some of my speeches, this was not a scheme for the independence of Palestine at all. This was a scheme which would make the State of Jerusalem both in name and in practice international for ever. It would make the rest of Palestine a State to be governed by an Economic Board, but actually it was to be governed by a Council of 9 members, 3 Arabs, 3 Jews and 3 to be appointed by the United Nations. That is to say, the United Nations would for ever keep Palestine.

Now, let me make some comments on how this Federation would look in actual practice. In the city of Jerusalem, as I have already stated, there would be to start with a population of 205,000—100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs and others. In the Arab State there would be a population of roughly 747,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. If it had to be and if it was fair to partition the country, there was nothing wrong there; it was mainly an Arab State. But when one came to look at the map and figures of the Jewish State, one was astounded that this should be put forward as a fair solution of the problem at all. The proposed Jewish State, before Jaffa was excluded as a result of my efforts, contained 509,780 Arabs and 499,020 Jews, and this was going to be a Jewish State. That is to say, to start with the majority would be of Arabs though, of course, it was pointed out to us that the Jews by immigration would increase their numbers and become a majority. After the exclusion of Jaffa from the Jewish State, its population on the present frontiers which are accepted by the Assembly would consist of about 498,000 Jews and about 435,000 Arabs. I pointed out, first of all, the legal complications, historical claims and everything else. The argument in reply was that in the whole of Palestine there are 1,300,000 Arabs and 650,000 Jews and it is unfair and unjust to make this Jewish population for ever a minority to be governed by the Arabs. I said: "Supposing that is unfair, how can you say that it is fair to make 435,000 Arabs a minority in a Jewish State which had 498,000 Jews? If it is unfair that 33 per cent. of the population of the whole of Palestine should be subject to 67 per cent. of the population, it is much more unfair that 46 per cent. of the population should be subject to 54 per cent.?" However, the other side were not under obligation to accept any argument and they ignored it.

From the point of view of land-ownership inside the borders of the present proposed Jewish State 60 per cent. of the privately-owned land is owned by the Arabs and only 40 per cent. of the

privately-owned land is owned by the Jews. Take economic resources. Citrus, that is to say, oranges, are the biggest export from Palestine. Citrus production is owned almost half and half by Jews and Arabs. Almost the whole of the citrus area owned by the Arabs and not by the Jews has been placed within the Jewish territory. The Jewish State has the greater part of the plains culturable for some time. The Arab State consists mostly of hills and very little cultivation can be carried on in the hills. The greater part of the resources which can be expanded and developed have been assigned to the Jewish State and the obvious reason given is that the Jews want to bring in more Jews and there must be room for expansion. The Arabs have been given areas in which further development is extremely difficult and, in any case, there is not very much scope for it. It is admitted that to start with, and for a long time and perhaps for ever, economically the Arab State would not be able to stand by itself and therefore would be in need of subsidy, as it were, from Joint Economic Board over and above its share of the revenues of the Joint Economic Board.

When the report of the first Committee was under discussion in the main Committee, I pointed out, as we have throughout maintained, that there was no legal basis for the action which the first Sub-Committee had proposed that the Assembly should take, that the United Nations had no authority under their Charter to partition a country and to set up separate sovereign States in it and that no modification of the details of the maps or of the populations would make the scheme valid. Nevertheless, if there were delegations which were of the view that the scheme was legally valid and that the United Nations had authority to enforce it and thought that it was workable, then it was up to them at least to modify the harsh and obviously unjust features of the report. In view of that I put forward certain amendments with the details of which I need not worry you. I shall mention only one amendment.

With regard to the boundaries I put forward an amendment, but I had no hope that it would be accepted because if it had been accepted, the Jewish State could not have been set up. But I put it forward as a test of the good faith of the delegates. It was also put forward with the object that if they rejected it, it would give us a greater moral right to object to partition even if it was otherwise legally valid. Our amendment was such that I could not think that any fair and reasonable person would take objection to it. The amendment was to the effect that the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab States should be drawn by a Commission of three boundary experts to be appointed by the

Security Council with the object of ensuring (a) that within the Arab State there shall not be included Jewish-owned land which would constitute more than 10 per cent. of the total privately-owned land area in that State; and (b) that within the Jewish State there shall not be included Arab-owned land which would constitute more than 10 per cent. of the total privately-owned land area in that State.*

Our object was that the Arab State should be almost entirely Arab-owned and the Jewish State should be almost entirely Jewish-owned. It was true that had they accepted this amendment, the area of the Jewish State would have been reduced practically to the lands which the Jews owned. That is to say, it would have given the Jews only 40 per cent. of what is now being included within the Jewish State and it would have made the constitution of an independent Jewish State practically impossible. The United States Government, as was to be expected, did not accept the amendment.

These matters were put to the vote. As to our legal questions, the Committee rejected the resolutions on all the first 7 questions, but on the 8th question, i.e., whether the United Nations had any legal authority to do what they were proposing to do, the resolution to the effect that it had the authority was passed by 21 votes to 20. It is interesting to analyse these figures. In all, the members of the Committee were 57. Only 21 who gave a positive vote were satisfied that the United Nations had authority to do what they were proposing to do and 36 were not satisfied.

Now a word about our proposals with regard to Jewish refugees. The two paragraphs of our first proposals for repatriation of as many as possible and the distribution of the rest among the member States were carried by a bare majority. But the whole resolution, when it was put to the Committee, got an even number of votes, 16 on each side, and it was not carried. Our main constitutional proposal, which we knew would not be accepted, was lost by 21 votes to 8.

Then came the other report, which was the main thing. We were fighting all the time to avoid partition and we knew nobody would accept our unitary scheme. It is necessary here to explain that voting in all Committees is by majority. Whatever is carried by majority, the Committee adopts. Decision in the Assembly on procedural matters, such as, when it will adjourn, or for how long it shall sit, is by bare majority; but a decision on an important question in order to be effective has to have a

* See Reid, pp. 409-32.

majority of two-thirds in support of it. So, our objective was that if we could secure a sufficient number of delegations to oppose partition, so that it is not passed by a two-thirds majority, we would have won because without this majority the United Nations would not be deemed to have given a positive decision. The matter came before the Committee and there were 25 votes in support of partition out of 57 and 13 votes against it. If that had been the voting in the Assembly also, partition would have been lost, because 25 is not double of 13. But we knew that in the Assembly partition would get more votes. For instance, New Zealand had abstained on a technical point, but we knew that they would vote in support of partition in the Assembly. On the other hand, we also knew that we had got promises from some delegations that though they would abstain from voting in the Committee, they would vote against partition in the Assembly. The reason was that they were under great pressure from the United States Government and they did not want to show their hands too soon* and we had every reason to believe that these delegations would vote against partition.

Most of you are aware that the President of the United States of America, which is a great position for any man to hold, is elected every four years. He is elected every leap year; and so next year the President is going to be elected. I was told by a good many Americans that for about a month or two before the election, the nation goes mad. These are their words. At any rate, they attach great importance to this election: parties fight tooth and nail over it. Again, as you are aware, the Democratic Party has now been in power for nearly 16 years and those who have their ears close to the earth in political matters in the United States are of the opinion that there is going to be a swing over at the next election and the Republicans are going to win. Actually Mr. Truman was elected Vice-President in the last election. He stepped into the shoes of President Roosevelt because he died while he was in office, and it is provided in the constitution that if the President dies during his term of office, the Vice-President becomes President automatically. It is unusual for any one to have the personality and influence of Mr. Roosevelt. The Democratic Party is very nervous with regard to the result of the next election and every group of votes matters a great deal to it. The Jews command quite a large number of votes, their own and of those who are under their control.

There are, I believe, roughly 5,000,000 Jews in the United

* Cf. Romulo, pp. 723-26, and K. Roosevelt, pp. 727-29.

States, half of whom are concentrated in the State of New York. But the importance of Jews both in the administration and the finances of the country is very much in excess of what you may infer from their numbers or even their wealth. There was great pressure from these Jews upon the United States Government that they should support partition and see it through by the exercise of their influence. This was no secret; it was talked about in the press. As a matter of fact, one of the Jewish delegates representing the Jewish agency told me with reference to the complaint of the Arab delegates that the Jews were putting pressure: "Why should we not put pressure on the Government when we have got votes." I said: "I consider that it is unfair on the part of the Government of the United States to be influenced by your votes, by your money and by your power; but I do not blame you". Though there was a formal denial on behalf of the United States Government, they did not deny it in private conversation. However, that was the main reason for the attitude of the United States.*

The Committee voting being over, we went into the General Assembly. In the General Assembly the debate started on the morning of Wednesday, the 26th November. The 27th November is a festival in America known as "Thanksgiving" and everybody was anxious, the President himself most of all, that the session should be concluded by the midnight of Wednesday, the 26th. And believing that the session would conclude on that day, both sides mobilised their forces. The delegations which had promised us their votes had said that they would abstain in the Committee and would exert their influence during the discussion. The second speaker in the Assembly was the delegate for the Philippines.** He had absented himself from the Committee for three or four days so that nobody should know where he was and they should not be able to get hold of him. He had said: "Leave me alone. If I do not come into the Committee, you must not mind it. I will come to the Assembly; I will deliver my speech; I will condemn partition and I will tell my alternate delegate to oppose partition." One of the big British ships, *The Queen Mary*, was sailing that day and a good many delegates were leaving by it. The Philippine delegate came to the rostrum; he condemned partition in a very forcible speech and he left written instructions with one of his alternate delegates to vote against partition. We had 13 votes in the Committee and that

* Cf. "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 625-29, and Part IV, pp. 727-43.

** For the attitude of the Philippines towards Palestine, see Romulo, pp. 723-26.

made 14. Later on, the delegate for Greece came to the rostrum, condemned partition and said he was going to vote against it. That made 15. The Haiti delegate then came to the rostrum, condemned partition and said he was going to vote against partition. That made 16. We still had the promise of Liberia and we were trying to influence Colombia, whom we thought we might win. In the meantime, as you are aware, there was a revolution in Siam and the Siamese delegation, after the revolution in their country, ceased to attend the meetings. But three or four days later, after they had received the news of the revolution, I persuaded the leader of the delegation to start attending the meetings. I told him: "There is a Government in your country and that Government has not withdrawn your credentials. Why should you assume that you have no longer authority?" And he started attending the meetings. Actually, he was the Vice-Chairman of the *ad hoc* Committee on Palestine and in that Committee he had voted against partition. He was with us too. But unfortunately, by the time we got to the Assembly the Siamese delegates had received a telegram from the President withdrawing their credentials. Whether that telegram came from the Government of Siam or from some other source, we do not know. But we lost the Siamese vote and that brought down our strength to 16 again.

In order to win, the other side had to get 32 votes and there was no means by which they could get that number. We knew that certain delegations were bound to abstain. Great Britain, France, Argentina and some South American States were abstaining, so that by the early afternoon the other side found that they had lost and we were quite convinced in our minds that we had won and that partition was blocked. But they had apparently some other dodges up their sleeve. By about half-past three a rumour began to go round that the session would not be held that evening and that it would be postponed to Friday, the 28th November and votes would be taken on that day, Thursday, the 27th November being the 'Thanksgiving Day' in New York. Thereupon Dr. Jamali, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, and I went to the President* and asked him whether the session was going to be held and whether the Vice-President was going to preside. He said: "I am not going to announce a session for the evening as tomorrow is 'Thanksgiving Day' and the Secretary-General** tells me that it would be hard upon the staff

* Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, an ardent pro-Zionist, was president of the first special and second sessions of the U.N. in 1947.

** Trygve Lie, an equally ardent pro-Zionist.

to work at night." I said: "It is not a question of your fixing a session for the evening because the session has already been fixed and announced. There are three sessions fixed for today—one at 11 o'clock, the other at 3 o'clock and the last at half-past eight." He said: "Is that so?" He further said: "You know there are 8 more speakers and we cannot possibly finish tonight. We cannot take the vote: it will take too long." I said, "There are 8 speakers and out of them Dr. Jamali and myself were going to make long speeches, but we shall not speak. The Indian delegate also intended to make a speech, but we will persuade him not to make a speech at all. Russia is speaking and you may have one or two more speakers. That leaves you 3 speakers and you can easily take the vote." I further said: "You take the vote on the partition tonight and do the rest of the business tomorrow." He said: "Tomorrow is 'Thanksgiving Day'." I said: "Last year you sat on 'Thanksgiving Day' and you should sit this year also." He said: "What is your trouble?" Dr. Jamali said: "I have got to go tomorrow." I said: "Passages can be postponed. But the real trouble is, as you are doubtless aware, that the delegations are under great pressure and we do not know which of them might fail us because efforts are being made with their Governments to get their instructions countermanded. He said: "The delegations which were in doubt have declared themselves clearly. For instance, Haiti, Greece and the Philippines have expressed their case clearly and you are now quite certain that nothing will happen to their votes". He further said, "I will help you. I will come to the Assembly and find out whether they want a session this evening or not." Now, it is not fair to the President to say that he did not say definitely that the Assembly shall sit that evening. He did say so. But somebody moved for its adjournment, and the Assembly was adjourned. We realised that we would lose because of the interval of two days that was thus created.

The press gave publication to very significant news. We had it in the New York press and no doubt other newspapers must have carried the story that during the interval Jewish leaders saw Mr. Truman in Washington and said: "What is this? Those delegations that had never voted against you are going to vote against you now. The State Department is not doing proper canvassing." They further said: "If partition fails, the European Recovery Programme Bill is off." This last was of course not in the papers. The State Department got in touch by telephone and cablegram with the Governments of some of the delegations and persuaded them to countermand their instructions. The result of these machinations was that our

votes were reduced to 13. During the interval we talked to the delegates that had promised us their votes. For instance, I went to the Liberian delegate. He said: "We, as the delegation, are still determined to vote against partition and in your favour. But last night when I came back from the Assembly our Ambassador rang me up from Washington and tried to persuade me to vote in favour of partition. I have declined but he is an ex-President of the Republic of Liberia and is held in great prestige. Now, the trouble is that they will get on to the President of Liberia and instructions will be issued to us to vote against partition and then we will be helpless." I said: "If a telegram comes, you could put it in your pocket and forget all about it." He replied: "How long could I withhold it? The delegate of Haiti met us on Friday morning in the delegates' lounge and came up to me. There were actually tears in his eyes and he said: "What am I to do? I have spoken under instructions from my Government; I have announced that we shall vote against partition and I have now received instructions to vote for partition." I said: "We realise your position and we are grateful to you." But that was the way in which manœuvring went on and they got the votes.* On Friday I spoke and others also spoke not because we thought we could influence the decision but in order to point out to the Assembly that if it decided in favour of partition, what trouble it would cause. Then, finding that partition was bound to go through, two delegations tried to help us. The French delegate moved the adjournment of the Assembly for 24 hours to enable the delegations to see whether any solution other than partition could not be found. The Colombian delegate in the course of a speech said that even if partition went through it would have no moral validity. How many delegates are voting in favour of it freely? There was not even a bare majority. In the Committee it had only 25. That is all the support it had out of 57. Pressure was being put on some delegations to vote in favour of partition against their will. An effort must be made to find some solution which would be less open to objection than partition and, if possible, acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews. He, therefore, put forward a resolution that the Assembly should adjourn and remit the matter back to the Palestine Committee and ask them to explore some other possibility, possibly the minority scheme which meant two units constituting a federal State, and report by the 29th February 1948. Their report should then be circulated to various Governments and a special session should be called by April or as soon as possible and some solution

* See "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 731-36.

be then arrived at. Though the Assembly was adjourned for 24 hours, no solution was found and eventually partition went through. But it is a very sad decision. Most delegations, even some of those that had voted in favour of it, were very unhappy about it.

The Philippines Changes its Vote* 1947

GENERAL CARLOS P. ROMULO**

The project for the partitioning of Israel came up when I was in New York the year before. The problem of Israel was of major importance and had to be submitted to the highest authority.

I asked for instructions from President Roxas.

Because a great deal has been written and conjectured as to the role played by my country in the partitioning of Israel, I would like to tell here for the first time what actually happened.

Roxas told me he felt that the partitioning would mean potential danger to the peace of the world. He said, "I'm afraid the Arabs will never accept it. It will cause friction in the Middle East and also establish a dangerous precedent."

He cited a similar situation that had come up in the Philippines. Congressman Robert Low Bacon had presented a bill in the U.S. Congress to segregate the island of Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines. On Mindanao we have our Moslem population, about 750,000 of them, if not more. They are called Moros. They were never conquered either by the Spaniards or by the Americans. Some Americans had the mistaken idea that the Moros were against Philippine independence. The Bacon bill was finally squashed, but only after it had caused

* From Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 285-89. The chapter (Chapter 18) from which this excerpt is taken has no title in the original. Copyright © 1961 by Philip Andrew Wells, Trustee Under the Carlos P. Romulo Trust. Reprinted by permission of Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., and Harold Matson Co., Inc.

** Formerly permanent Representative of the Philippines at the UN, 1945-50, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1950-52, President of University of Philippines since 1962 and Secretary of Department of Education, 1966.

a great deal of resentment.

I discussed this thoroughly with Roxas in Manila, and, after learning that the Israel problem would come up before the United Nations at Lake Success, I discussed it with him again over the transoceanic telephone. He decided I was to vote against the partitioning.

In New York I wrote a speech detailing my specific instructions. I telephoned Roxas again and read the speech to him. He said it was fine, but why hadn't I used the Bacon bill by way of an analogy? I had forgotten to put it in.

I promised to make the correction and call him back in a couple of days.

During that time I heard from Jewish friends who had learned the Philippines was planning to oppose the partitioning.

I called Roxas again and told him of the pressure put upon me by friends, some of whom were very insistent that we change our position. I said, "I want you to know of this."

But Roxas said I should maintain the position as he had explained it to me. Then I read the corrected speech and he approved it.

"Fine," he said heartily, "deliver it just as it is."

This was just before the conference of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. The Philippines was a member of the Commission. I had asked for permission to leave the General Assembly and go to Geneva. In the morning of the day we were to sail I made the speech at Lake Success, explaining why the Philippines would vote against Israel.*

Several hours after that we went aboard the *Queen Mary*. In my party were my wife and I; our son Bobby; my secretary, Anne Dragon; my aide, Lieutenant Teofilo Benitez; and major Salvador Lopez, my political adviser. Major Lopez was with me on Corregidor; a profound thinker and writer, he had earlier been a columnist on my newspaper, *The Herald*.

Also on board was Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who was to serve as chairman of the Commission; Charles Malik, representative of Lebanon for the Commission; and Jan Masaryk of Czechoslovakia.

The next morning** an overseas call summoned me to the radio room, and there I spent the rest of the morning receiving messages on my stand against the division of Israel.

The first telephone call was from Congressman Sol Bloom,†

* Cf. Khan, pp. 718-19.

** November 27, 1947.

† See the letter of Louis Lipsky to Sol Bloom, May 8, 1944, pp. 549-52.

Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and my good friend. We had worked closely together in San Francisco. He was also a friend of President Roxas and of the Philippines. Bloom protested the speech on Israel.

"Is there no way of changing the stand you have taken?" he pleaded.

It was difficult to refuse this friend, but I frankly explained that I had acted under specific instructions from Roxas and he was the only one who could change the decision. Bloom understood.

Other Jewish friends telephoned and I explained to all as I had to Bloom that the Philippines had the greatest respect for the Jews, but that this was the position we thought best.

It is strange to remember that while I have many Arab as well as Jewish friends no word of advice or approval came from any Arab. Nor did any member of the Senate exert pressure. No politically influential Americans tried to influence me either way. Charges that I was directly approached via Washington are untrue.

There were two Jewish parties, for and against Israel, and I had friends on both sides. To all I laid my cards face up, explaining again and again that anti-partitioning was my stand and why it had to be so. President Roxas had given me my instructions; I was but a voice.

A fine restful sea journey this was turning out to be!

I have read fantastic "true" accounts of what happened next. One writer has asserted in a book that the "Jewish bloc" brought pressure to bear against me and threatened me with dire curtailment of any further American aid to the Philippines if I did not yield. This is sheer nonsense. I repeat, I was under no pressure from any official source, with the exception of Sol Bloom, and his was on a purely personal basis.

Actually I have no idea what happened while I was on the high seas, but an unexpected radiogram came from President Roxas, saying that for the sake of our higher national interests he was giving instructions to our Philippine delegate at Lake Success to vote in favor of the partitioning. Roxas hoped I would understand the situation and realize that his reversal of policy was dictated only by his desire to serve our people best.

I felt this public reversal of a stand I had taken was a slight. My pride was stung. I wired Roxas my resignation from the United Nations.

In my wire I stated that having made the speech he had approved and then having had my vote reversed made me feel I had lost his confidence and I was therefore resigning. I said

I would continue to serve on the Commission on Human Rights if he wished, but not as a permanent delegate to the United Nations.

His answer was a three-page telegram. Roxas hastened to explain that he had done what he thought was best for the Philippines, that his confidence in me was steadfast, his respect for me was what it had always been, and he asked me not to resign.

I withdrew my resignation.

No further explanation was given me nor did I ask what actually took place in Washington and Manila.

What happened I am sure is this: Some of Roxas' good friends informed him or our Ambassador in Washington of the resentment in New York and Washington over the Philippine attitude on the partitioning of Israel. Because of these friendships reappraisal was made. I had made up my mind to do what our president thought was right. Then my alternate delegate was told to change and our position was changed. That was all there was to it.

After the General Assembly and the United Nations had decided upon such a partitioning Israel became a separate nation, a creation of the United Nations. We, its members, were in duty bound to support it, otherwise of what use is the United Nations?

But as to the way it actually happened, I shall probably never know. I did not question President Roxas or anyone else. This particular chapter in history had been exceedingly unpleasant to me and the chapter was closed.

All in all, the year 1948 was for me a year to remember.

The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics*

KERMIT ROOSEVELT**

...The final act in the partition of Palestine was played out at the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1947. On October 11, our delegation declared itself, with a few reservations, in favor of the plan for partition as submitted by the UN's Special Committee. Its support was based on two assumptions: that Arab opposition would be negligible, and that the proposed Jewish state could be made a "going concern,"—despite the consensus of expert opinion that neither assumption was sound. After its decision was made, the delegation proceeded on the principle that other countries should be allowed to make up their own minds. This principle was modified, however, when it became apparent that if it were followed the partition plan would be defeated.

A straw vote taken in UN on Saturday, November 22, showed 24 states supporting partition, 16 opposed, and the rest abstaining or undecided.† The American delegation was told at that point that the United States was committed to partition and that it must go through.

By Wednesday, November 26, when the vote was taken in committee, the result was 25 to 13—one vote gained for partition, three lost to its opponents, and the abstentions increased by two. That was still not enough for the two-thirds majority needed for passage.

So the Zionists took the fight into their own hands. Rallying a group of influential Americans and selecting their targets with care, they exerted all possible influence—personal suasion, floods of telegrams and letters, and political and economic pressure. Six countries which had indicated their intention of voting

* From *The Middle East Journal*, II, No. 1 (1948), pp. 13-16.

** For the author see above, p. 515, note.

† Cf. Khan, pp. 716-22.

against partition were the chosen targets: Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines,* China, Ethiopia, and Greece. All except Greece were either won to voting for partition or persuaded to abstain.

That these countries, and others as well, may have had sound reasons for voting against partition was no impediment. Aside from moral scruples about "self-determination" and the possible injustice of imposing partition on a country against the will of a majority of its inhabitants, there were hard political facts to be taken into account. For instance, some of the countries concerned have "pressure groups" which might prove as powerful in their own land as the Zionists in the United States. Haiti has a sizable number of Syrian citizens. Liberia, China, and the Philippines have large numbers of Moslems among their populations. Ethiopia and Greece wish to be on good relations with their Moslem neighbors, who strongly oppose partition. But they are all small or weak countries; why should they be allowed the luxury of voting for interests which run counter to those of a powerful group in a powerful country like the United States?

The delegates of those six nations and their home governments as well were swamped with telegrams, phone calls, letters, and visitations. Many of the telegrams, particularly, were from Congressmen, and others as well invoked the name and prestige of the United States Government. An ex-Governor, a prominent Democrat with White House and other connections, personally telephoned Haiti urging that its delegation be instructed to change its vote. He spoke firmly, and might be presumed to speak with authority. A well-known economist also close to the White House, and acting in a liaison capacity for the Zionist organization, exerted his powers of persuasion upon the Liberian delegate. Both states reversed themselves and voted for partition. How far our delegation was directly involved in the lobbying is hard to say, and it must have been even harder for the small nations and their representatives at UN to put a true value on many of the tactics employed.

What happened at the United Nations was a repeat performance of what had already happened in the United States. Using the same methods that had been so successful here, and having the United States Government to assist in their use there, the Zionists succeeded in getting what they wanted. The very pertinent question is, where do we go now?

Partition has been approved, but no method of enforcing it

* For the attitude of the Philippines concerning the UN vote, see Romulo, pp. 723-26, and "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 731-36.

is provided. That problem, which will soon develop into a threat to peace, will fall within the jurisdiction of the Security Council. In other words, it will be subject to veto. The United States held the initiative for a time and produced partition. But because it was politically difficult to admit that Arab resistance would be strong, and even more politically difficult to commit United States force to putting down that resistance, we have let the question slide—right into the Security Council and the veto. The initiative is lost. The gain? Further complication and exacerbation of an already bitter tangle, which must now be handled by a council that has rarely found agreement. The future of Palestine itself looks blacker than ever before, and meanwhile important American economic and political interests in the Middle East have been placed in jeopardy.

If the future of our position in the Middle East is dark, at least the lesson to be learned from the Palestine case is clear. The process by which Zionist Jews have been able to promote American support for the partition of Palestine demonstrates the vital need of a foreign policy based on national rather than partisan interests. A Palestine Zionist, indeed, may dismiss the Russian threat to the United States from his consideration, but an American may not, even if he is a Zionist. And as every American Zionist should think of himself as an American first, so should every Democrat and Republican. Only when the national interests of the United States, in their highest terms, take precedence over all other considerations, can a logical, farseeing foreign policy be evolved. No American political leader has the right to compromise American interests to gain partisan votes. The role the United States has assumed in the Palestine question is not the responsibility of Zionists alone but of each American citizen. The present course of world crisis will increasingly force upon Americans the realization that their national interests and those of the proposed Jewish state in Palestine are going to conflict. It is to be hoped that American Zionists and non-Zionists alike will come to grips with the realities of the problem.

“Politics Looks Very Simple to the Outsider”

Washington, December 1947 - February 1948

THE FORRESTAL DIARIES*

1. 3 December, 1947

Lunch - Mr. Byrnes

Lunch today with Jimmy Byrnes. We talked Palestine. Byrnes recalled the fact that he had disassociated himself from his decision of a year ago to turn down the Grady report** which recommended a federated state for Palestine or a single Arabian state. He said the decision on the part of the President to reject this recommendation and to criticize the British for their conduct of Palestinian affairs had placed Bevin and Attlee in a most difficult position.† He said that Niles [David K. Niles, administrative assistant to the President] and Sam Rosenman were chiefly responsible for the President's decision; that both had told the President that Dewey was about to come out with a statement favoring the Zionist position on Palestine, and that they had insisted that unless the President anticipated this movement New York State would be lost to the Democrats.‡

I asked Byrnes what he thought of the possibility of getting Republican Leaders to agree with the Democrats to have the Palestine question placed on a nonpolitical basis. He wasn't particularly optimistic about the success of this effort because of the fact that Rabbi Silver was one of Taft's close associates and because Taft followed Silver on the Palestine-Haifa question. I said I thought it was a most disastrous and regrettable fact that the foreign policy of this country was determined by the contributions a particular bloc of special interests might make to the party funds. . . .

* From Millis, *The Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 346-49 and 362-65. For Forrestal and Millis see above, p. 625, note.

** For the Grady Report, see above, p. 626, note.

† See Williams, pp. 557-74.

‡ For the New York elections, see above, p. 626, note.

[Within a week Forrestal made his first attempt to enlist Republican support for a nonpartisan policy on Palestine. On December 10 he called on Senator Vandenberg; the Senator pointed to one obvious difficulty—"that there was a feeling among most Republicans that the Democratic Party had used the Palestine question politically, and the Republicans felt they were entitled to make similar use of the issue." Vandenberg himself had tried to keep aloof from the matter, but he quoted Stassen's remark, "if Republicans were to cooperate on foreign policy they would have to be in on the take-off as well as in the crash landing.'" Forrestal was to find Governor Dewey even less encouraging.] — note by Millis.

2. 13 December 1947

Gridiron Dinner

At the Gridiron Dinner tonight I spoke to Governor Dewey about Palestine and posed to him the question of getting nonpartisan action on this question, which I said was a matter of the deepest concern to me in terms of the security of the nation. The Governor said he agreed in principle but that it was a difficult matter to get results on because of the intemperate attitude of the Jewish people who had taken Palestine as the emotional symbol, because the Democratic Party would not be willing to relinquish the advantages of the Jewish vote. He said he had become very cynical about entering into "gentlemen's agreements" after his experience in the 1944 campaign, when he said he had a clear agreement with FDR not to bring the question of the use of force by the United Nations, and the American participation in the use of such force, into that campaign. Shortly after this agreement was entered upon, he said, FDR introduced that issue into his speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York City on October 27.

I said I was fully aware of all of the past actions and attitudes, political and otherwise, which would make a nonpartisan approach to this question difficult, but that I considered I would be derelict in my duty if I did not try, and that I knew that any engagements that the President entered into he would live up to most scrupulously. I said I was not authorized to speak for him beyond the fact that he had agreed to let me present my view of the matter before Republican leaders. Senator Vandenberg was sitting next to Dewey at dinner and after the dinner I asked the Senator if Dewey's attitude had been at all responsive. Vandenberg's reply was, "Responsive but skeptical."

At the same dinner Lovett was importuned by Felix Frank-

furter* on the subject of Palestine and upon his (Lovett's)** refusal to enter into discussion, Frankfurter became annoyed and Acheson† [Dean Acheson, having left the State Department, was at this time in private practice] reported to Lovett afterward that he, the Justice, had been offended. Lovett's conversation was very brief: he said he had had enough of Palestine for a time and did not want to hear to it again.

(In my conversation with Dewey I responded to his comment that we were already committed to an unfortunate course, and to his inquiry as to what we could do now, I said there would inevitably be two things coming up: (1) the arming of the Jews to fight the Arabs (2) unilateral action by the U.S. to enforce the decision of the General Assembly.

At this point Vandenberg interjected to say that on the question of unilateral action he was completely and unequivocally against such action because it would breed in his opinion a wave of violent anti-Semitism in this country.)

[For the time being Forrestal let the subject drop; but he was not easily discouraged, and he was to return to the crusade in the new year.] – note by Millis.

3. 3 February 1948

Meeting—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

Visit today from Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., who came in with a strong advocacy of the Jewish State in Palestine, that we should support the United Nations "decision," and in general a broad, across-the-board statement of the Zionist position. I pointed out that the United Nations had as yet taken no "decision," that it was only a recommendation of the General Assembly, that any implementation of this "decision" by the United States would probably result in the need for a partial mobilization, and that I thought the methods that had been used by people outside of the Executive branch of the government to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the General Assembly bordered closely onto scandal. He professed ignorance on this latter point and returned to his general exposition of the case of the Zionists.

He made no threats but made it very clear that the zealots in this cause had the conviction of trying to upset the government policy on Palestine. I replied that I had no power to make

* For Frankfurter, see above, pp. 195-200, and pp. 309-12.

** For Lovett, see above, p. 625, note.

† Dean Acheson was U.S. Under-Secretary of State, 1945-47, and Secretary of state, 1949-53.

policy but that I would be derelict in my duty if I did not point out what I thought would be the consequences of any particular policy which would endanger the security of this country. I said that I was merely directing my efforts to lifting the question out of politics, that is, to have the two parties agree they would not compete for votes on this issue. He said this was impossible, that the nation was too far committed and that, furthermore, the Democratic Party would be bound to lose and the Republicans gain by such an agreement. I said I was forced to repeat to him what I had said to Senator McGrath in response to the latter's observation that our failure to go along with the Zionists might lose the states of New York, Pennsylvania and California*—that I thought it was about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States.

[Here is an excellent statement of Forrestal's basic motives in a matter which was to involve him in more criticism than any other of his actions in his nine years in Washington. But he went on that same day to lunch with an older, wiser and certainly far more experienced mind than that of the younger Franklin Roosevelt. Bernard Baruch** in effect warned him to go slow.] -note by Millis.

Had lunch with B.M. Baruch. After lunch, raised the same question with him. He took the line of advising me not to be active in this particular matter and that I was already identified, to a degree that was not in my own interests, with opposition to the United Nations policy on Palestine. He said he himself did not approve of the Zionist's actions, but in the next breath said that the Democratic Party could only lose by trying to get our government's policy reversed, and said that it was a most inequitable thing to let the British arm the Arabs and for us not to furnish similar equipment to the Jews.

[It was on this same day, also, that Forrestal received a telephone call from Winthrop Aldrich, chairman of the Chase National Bank in New York, who had been discussing Palestine, evidently at Forrestal's instigation, with Governor Dewey. Dewey, Aldrich said, was very much interested in

* For Zionism and the American elections, see "The Forrestal Diaries," pp. 625-29.

** Bernard M. Baruch (1870-1965), American financier, was adviser to Democratic and Republican Presidents, and personal adviser to Director of Office of War Mobilisation, J.F. Byrnes, 1943-45; represented the U.S. on United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 1946-47.

Forrestal's campaign on Palestine; he thought Forrestal was doing just right; he was in entire sympathy and would cooperate in any way for the best interests of the country. Dewey, Aldrich continued, suggested that any discussions of cooperation be handled through the Secretary of State and John Foster Dulles. It is just conceivable that there echoed in Forrestal's mind a remark of Dewey's he had noted in the preceding fall: "Politics look very simple to the outsider whether he is a businessman or a soldier—it is only when you get into it that all the angles and hard work become apparent." At all events, Forrestal answered cheerfully into the telephone: "I appreciate that a lot, Winthrop. It's a long road, but that's a good beginning. . . . I think he is correct. I think that from now on it ought to be in channels that are, let's say, more correct."¹ And from that time on he left Palestine largely to those other, "more correct" channels.

He sent a transcript of this conversation to Marshall,* and on February 7 he drew up a memorandum for the President summarizing his findings. "Eisenhower," according to a concluding paragraph of this memorandum, "told me yesterday that effective U.S. participation in a Palestine police force would involve about one division with appropriate supporting units." But apparently the paper was never submitted. Forrestal probably had to admit to himself that Baruch was essentially right. The crusade to take Palestine out of politics, high-minded as it was in its inspiration had insufficiently grasped the powerful emotional factors involved. It was accomplishing very little of practical value; it was at the same time impairing Forrestal's own usefulness and bringing down on the Secretary of Defense a volume of criticism to which Forrestal could not, in fairness, subject that office. Forrestal made two appeals to Marshall, on February 12 and 18, to find a "nonpartisan" policy. But these ended his active efforts toward that end. He never changed his opinion; while his interest in Palestine never flagged—it could not, since the area was too deeply involved in every strategic and logistic calculation that he was required to confront. Occasionally and with vehemence he continued to speak of the strategic importance of Palestine and of the danger of letting domestic political maneuvers determine our course there. But his proselytizing in the matter was at an end.]—note by Millis.

* For Marshall, see above, p. 627, note.

NOTE

- 1 Telephone conversation with Winthrop Aldrich, 3 February 1948.

Chaim Weizmann Calls Again on President Truman*

March 18, 1948

ABBA EBAN

... Weizmann intended to spend a few weeks in London to wind up his affairs and then to arrive at Rehovoth at the end of the winter. He also planned a visit to Asia where he hoped to initiate scientific co-operation. During December and January [1948], however, his tranquillity was dashed by the news of bloodthirsty clashes in Palestine into which Arab 'Liberation Troops' were pouring from all sides to reinforce the revolt of Palestinian Arabs against the United Nations resolution.** The British Administration, formally responsible for law and order, was holding the door open to the Arab incursions and simultaneously harrying the desperate defence of the Jews. Mr Bevin† was in a truculent mood. He was going to teach the international community a lesson for presuming to reject his advice. As it became apparent that the Arabs would not peacefully acquiesce in partition, second thoughts began to grip many members of the United Nations who had supported the plan. In Washington the State Department repented of its good deed on the very morrow of its performance.

Weizmann found it hard to believe that anyone could seriously envisage a reversal of partition. In his eyes the thing to be wondered at was the inordinate time that it had taken for the obvious and logical solution to be reached.‡ In January he continued to plan large visions for the future Jewish State. Today, when assistance to newly emerging nations holds so large a place

* From M.W. Weisgal and J. Carmichael, eds., *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands*, pp. 303-8.

** For Zionist and Arab military forces in Palestine during the period Jan. 1947-May 1948, see Appendices VIII and IX.

† For Bevin, see Bullock, pp. 313-14, and Williams, pp. 557-74.

‡ Cf. Reid, pp. 409-32, and "Binationalism Not Partition," pp. 645-99.

For the partition plan of the Jewish Agency, 1946, see Map 12.

in Israel's policy, there is something impressive in the foresight which led Weizmann to correspond with the Government of Burma, which had invited him on 19 December 1947 to pay a visit to their country.

He wrote to Rangoon on 2 January accepting the Burmese Government's invitation. Three weeks later a reply from Rangoon proposed the dispatch of Burmese specialists to Palestine for work at Rehovoth.

These communications sound as though Weizmann already imagined himself to be involved in the practical deeds of statecraft. But many hurdles still remained. The news from the United Nations and Washington was bad. The vastest anti-climax in Jewish history was being prepared. Having been placed on the threshold of statehood the Jews were going to be urged back into the vacuum of tutelage. His friends amongst the Jewish delegation in the United Nations made an urgent appeal for Weizmann's return:

Cablegram, New York, 23 January 1948
Chaim Weizmann, Dorchester Hotel, London.

In view worsening situation advise you if possible reconsider decision to go Palestine January stop No conditions exist there your constructive political activity everything depending upon outcome negotiations here Lake Success and Washington stop Most crucial phase of all now approaches here in which we sorely miss your presence advice activity influence affectionately.

EBAN

He refused to act on this appeal until it was repeated officially, although in less enthusiastic terms, by the Jewish Agency Executive in New York.

He arrived in a snow-covered New York on the Queen Mary on 4 February. My diary for that day concludes:

Dined at Waldorf with Chief and Mrs Weizmann. He opened belligerently: 'Why in heaven did you drag me to this frozen waste when I might have been in Rehovoth?' Told him of our danger at Lake Success and our position in Washington where not a single contact on high level had been possible since November. Truman furious with Zionist leaders and won't even see them. Chief's contact with President our only hope at UN and Washington. Chief decided to seek interview with Truman this month.

President Truman in his memoirs frankly recounts his displeasure with the official Zionist leadership, some of whose spokesmen he considered wanting in moderation and in respect for his person and office. If Weizmann could achieve access and secure presidential intervention, the political victory of November 1947 might still be saved in time for the State to be proclaimed with unimpaired international authority during the early part of 1948.

It is difficult at this point of time to describe the choking suspense in which Jewish life was lived during those winter months. The community in Palestine was under violent attack by Arab invaders. The British authorities neither protected them, as they were legally bound to do, nor allowed them freedom of self-protection as moral duty commanded. The Five Power Commission,* established to carry out the Partition plan, languished impotently in New York, rejoicing in the facetious but significant title of the 'Five Lonely Pilgrims'. The United States was in full flight from partition. It was having every sort of nightmare—from Soviet military intervention,** to the massive influx of Communist agents in the guise of refugee immigrants to Palestine. The Jewish prospect had been incredibly transformed since the triumph of the previous November. The outlook was of political collapse and military defeat.

Weizmann's discussion with Truman was delayed by his own illness, by the President's absence on leave in the Caribbean, and, more ominously, by Truman's reluctance to have anything to do with Zionist leadership. At last, on 14 March, the opening appeared. To Weizmann's suite at the Waldorf came Eddie Jacobson of Kansas City who had been the President's partner in an unsuccessful clothing store in the 20's. He had a remarkable tale to tell. Stimulated by the leader of B'nai B'rith,† Frank Goldmann, he had urged the President by cable to receive Dr Weizmann. Jacobson was a non-Zionist, but he could not escape the exhilaration of the times. And Weizmann was his hero-figure.

Receiving no positive reply from Truman, Jacobson had flown to Washington and burst into the White House on the plea of personal business. He had met with a cold reception from his eminent friend. For the first time Truman was freezing

* The five member countries of this Commission were Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines.

** Cf. Krammer, pp. 745-54

† For the B'nai B'rith, see above, p. 488, note.

Jacobson, unfairly, with the blasts of his official dignity. In despair Jacobson noted the bust of Andrew Jackson on the President's desk. 'You admire him, don't you, Mr President?' he said. 'Well, my people has its founding father too. I admire him more than anyone else. He's old and ill and has come all the way, thousands of miles, to see you, and you won't see him. It isn't like you.'

The President looked out through the windows of the Oval Room over the rose garden. Jacobson feared that he was going to be withered by the storm. Truman turned on him with mock fury: 'All right, you bald-headed. . . . you win. Tell Matt [the appointment's secretary] to invite Dr Weizmann here.' Jacobson proceeded to New York and gave Weizmann the news. He was a loyal and humble Jew, meeting his hero for the first time. 'My feeling is,' he wrote later, 'that not another person in the whole world could have sold me as Dr Weizmann did that day.'

In his memoirs Mr Truman tells the same story, but with puritanical avoidance of expletive.

On 18 March Weizmann arose from his sick bed in New York and travelled by train to Washington. President Truman has written in detail about this meeting:¹

Dr Weizmann, by my specific instruction, was to be brought in through the East Gate. There was to be no press coverage of his visit and no public announcement. . . . We talked for almost three-quarters of an hour.

Dr Weizmann was a man of remarkable achievements and personality. His life had been dedicated to two ideals, that of science and that of the Zionist movement. He was past seventy now and in ill health. He had known many disappointments and had grown patient and wise in them. When he left my office I felt that he had reached a full understanding of my policy, and that I knew what he wanted.

The President gave his visitor a specific commitment. He would work for the establishment and recognition of a Jewish State, of which the Negev would be a part.*

The following day, 19 March, was to become known in Jewish diplomacy as 'Black Friday'. Warren Austen, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, addressed the Security Council with a sensational request. All efforts to implement partition should be suspended. The General Assembly was to be convened in special session to work out a plan for

* Cf. Eban, pp. 703-6.

temporary trusteeship. The dream of Jewish statehood which had illuminated the winter months was now to be shattered through the timidity and inconstancy of those who had fostered it.

A frenzy of rage and disappointment rolled through the Jewish world. President Truman was, not surprisingly, assailed by the formidable armoury of invective which Zionism had perforce stored up during the dark, long years of failure. The only absent voice was that of the man who had the most right to feel betrayed. On Monday 22 March Weizmann called Eddie Jacobson on the telephone to express his irrational belief that Truman would still fulfil his promise. The President was never to forget this act of faith. In his apartment at the Waldorf, Weizmann organized his plan of action, beginning with a clear summons to his people: 'I would now urge the Jewish people to redouble its efforts to secure the defence and freedom of the Jewish State.'

A few days later he addressed President Truman with a reasoned argument against trusteeship and in favour of partition. He concluded with incisive words: 'The choice for our people, Mr President, is between statehood and extermination.'

April 9 (Eban Diaries)

After drafting letter to President, the Chief called me back to the hotel. Dave [Ginsburg] had told him from Washington that there was some thought in the State Department of asking the British to carry on with the administration despite their categorical statement that they would leave. Chief thought this the worst possibility of all. He decided to add a paragraph on the theme 'Britain must go' and we worked on this till late. . . .

The new paragraph in the letter to Truman expressed all Weizmann's pain and despair after forty years of co-operation with the mandatory power:

I would sound a note of solemn warning against the prolongation of British rule in Palestine. As you may know, I have cherished the British-Jewish relationship all my life, I have upheld it in difficult times. I have been grievously disappointed by its recent decline. . . . I tremble to think of the wave of violence and repression which would sweep Palestine if the conditions and auspices of the recent unhappy years were to be continued under British, or indeed any foreign, rule. I also know how passionately the British people desire the end of this troubled chapter. Should your administration, despite all this, press for any prolongation

of British tenure, it would mean a responsibility for terrible events. . . .

Truman was already in deep turmoil of spirit. In his book *The Man of Independence* Jonathan Daniels has recounted the story of Black Friday in the White House.²

Truman called Clark Clifford* his [administrative assistant], on 7.30 Saturday morning [20 March].

‘Can you come right down,’ he said. ‘There is a story in the papers on Palestine and I don’t understand what has happened.’

In his office Truman was as disturbed as Clifford had ever seen him. ‘How could this have happened? I assured Chaim Weizmann that we were for partition and would stick to it. He must think I am a plain liar. Find out how this could have happened.’

When the General Assembly convened in April it became evident that partition was not going to be killed easily at the United Nations. And in Palestine itself it was coming spontaneously to life. As British power receded Jewish and Arab authority began to assert itself in the vacuum, in rough approximation to the partition boundaries except that the Negev was still empty and cut off.

The Jewish political effort at New York now branched off into two roads. The Jewish Agency executive mounted an assault on the ill-starred trusteeship proposal. Addresses were made to the General Assembly and delegations were mustered to support the principle that an international judgment must not be overthrown by armed force. The fate of the League of Nations, and indeed of the pre-war world, offered portentous support of this theme. If the 1947 resolution could not be actively implemented it was essential at least to prevent the annulment of its revolutionary principle—that of Jewish statehood. And while the Jewish delegation pursued this task, Chaim Weizmann, a private citizen in a hotel suite, conceived a daring enterprise of his own.

He would induce the President of the United States to recognize the Jewish State whose establishment the United States Government was at that moment trying to prevent. . . .

* Clark Clifford, an American lawyer, was appointed Naval Aide and Special Counsel to the President in 1946. He was in close contact with both the Democrats and the Zionists.

NOTES

- 1 Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1956, New York, Doubleday, 1956).
- 2 Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence* (New York, 1950).

Arms for Independence: When the Soviet Bloc Supported Israel*

ARNOLD KRAMMER**

In late 1947, the 27 years of British mandate in Palestine were drawing to a close just when Soviet Russia was being frustrated in her every attempt to penetrate the Middle East, having failed to gain a foothold in Persia or Turkey. At the crucial time the Russians were without friends or supporters in the Middle East while Palestine, moving swiftly towards independence through the machinery of the United Nations, was eagerly looking for any sympathetic offer of diplomatic, and eventually perhaps, military aid. From the Soviet point of view, involvement in the Palestine conflict might provide an answer to two problems. It would yield a desirable foothold in the Middle East while at the same time offering an opportunity to oppose and perhaps weaken British colonial interests.

The first major indication of Russia's willingness to back Jewish claims in Palestine against the British and Arabs came in a totally unexpected speech by Andrei Gromyko at the U.N. Special General Assembly in the summer of 1947. In it he described the death throes of the British Mandate in Palestine and, in a sudden surprise move, declared the Soviet Union in favour of the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. That this Soviet declaration should have taken the Assembly by surprise is somewhat doubtful, for Russia had been exploiting the Jewish struggle in its propaganda media for more than a year. For instance, as early as 22 January 1946, *Izvestia* began describing the bloody and heroic struggles of the Jewish underground against the British, often comparing these acts to similar events before the Revolution of 1917. The editorial in *Novoe Vremia*, 14 July 1948, stated that the official Soviet attitude

* From *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, XXII, No. 3, N.S. 12 (1968), 19-23. Reprinted by permission of the author.

** American expert on Russian and Middle Eastern Affairs.

towards the Arab war against Israel was that it was an act of aggression, and an unjust war by Marxist-Leninist standards.

As both the UN session and the British mandate were drawing to a close, Jewish Palestine, increasingly apprehensive of US vacillation, took the plunge, and on 14 May 1948, without warning, declared itself independent.* Although caught unawares in the UN, the Soviets quickly extended *de jure* recognition to the newly born Jewish State on 17 May—becoming the first country to do so. From this moment until 1951 when Israeli relations with Russia began to deteriorate, Czechoslovakia, as an instrument of Soviet policy, served Israel as one of the major sources of military supplies. Ehud Avriel's** appointment in May 1948 as diplomatic representative to Czechoslovakia was only a formal acknowledgement of what had existed since December 1947, when David Ben-Gurion first sent Avriel to Europe as a purchasing agent for desperately needed military supplies. Having been unsuccessful in obtaining the desired shipment of 10,000 rifles and 450 machine-guns in Paris, Avriel was referred to the Czechs, where he found the Ministries of Defence and Supply unexpectedly co-operative and willing to supply surplus weapons in return for sorely-needed American dollars. Czech exports to Israel in 1948 totalled 16.1 million dollars, 2.6 million in 1951, and 0.4 in 1952.¹

The growing rapprochement between Israel and Soviet Russia was a source of anxiety to the West which realised that generally no military aid is provided without a parallel programme of political involvement, and for the next eighteen months the Israelis made every effort to placate both the East and the West.

The Arabs exploited every opportunity to increase Western anxieties regarding Israel's political sympathies. By circulating rumours to the British and American press alleging deep Soviet penetrations into the nerve centres of Israeli planning, the Arabs hoped that the West would withdraw diplomatic and economic support, or at least tighten the embargo against the influx of weapons. The *New York Times* (1 February 1948) for instance, carried an article based on reports from Syria that Communist agents were entering Israel disguised as International Red Cross delegates. On 19 April, the press carried a Syrian accusation that a group of fifty Soviet advisers had appeared in Israel and were assisting the inexperienced Israeli High Command in their war effort.² The author's extensive research in the Middle East,

* Cf. Eban, pp. 737-43, and pp. 779-83.

** For Ehud Avriel, see above, p. 618, note.

ranging from interviews with participants to the examination of private archives, failed to substantiate these reports. With the exception of a small diplomatic mission headed by Pavel Ivanovich Yershov, no Soviet nationals had entered Israel during the War of Independence.

Towards the end of 1947, the future Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, dispatched agents to Europe and the United States to scour the world markets for surplus arms. One of them was Ehud Avriel, who had been dispatched to Paris in December 1947 where, though unable to locate any sizeable stocks, he learned through friends that Czechoslovakia might be willing to sell arms in exchange for hard currency. Travelling under the name of Mr. Ueberall, he arrived in Prague to find that not only were the Czechs enthusiastic, but that much of the groundwork had already been done by other emissaries, Pino Ginsburg, Uriel Doron, and an interesting figure in the history of Israeli politics, Mordechai Oren.³ In his memoirs, Oren describes a critical meeting with members of the Czech Government:

'I pressed him [Zapotocky] particularly on three points: the delivery of a certain number of fighters, the sale of which had already been decided upon, and that for some reason had still not been delivered; the sale of a larger number of a certain type of machine gun; and finally, the sale of tanks. A few days later I was called by the Secretary who officially announced that after a lively talk with the national defence officials, they were ordered [by Zapotocky] to do everything possible, with the exception of tanks, to satisfy my need.'⁴

The groundwork completed, Avriel had to arrange the details, the payment of \$180,000 per plane, and their secret dispatch to Israel. The first planes bought by Avriel were, ironically, obsolete German Messerschmitt 109 fighters, some of which had been refitted by the Czech Skoda Works.⁵ The Messerschmitts were short range aircraft and could not be flown directly to Israel. The Greek Government, in order to avoid any complications, had not granted permission for landing or refuelling, and consequently the planes had to be dismantled, crated, loaded aboard Dakota transport planes and flown, via Corsica, to the secret Israeli airfield Aqir.

For the next few months and until the break with Stalin, planes were also routed from Prague to a small, rarely used airfield near Monstar, Yugoslavia.* From there the refuelled

* For Yugoslav support of Zionism, see J. and D. Kimche, pp. 618, 623.

Messerschmitts were flown by night to a secret airfield in Israel. Some information as to the dispatch of planes from Eastern Europe came to light recently when Mordechai Hod stated at a press conference after becoming Commander of the Israeli Air Force:

'...I had five solo hours on a Spitfire to my credit. And there were six "Spits" we had bought that had to be brought home.... We flew the planes (from Czechoslovakia) to Yugoslavia, landed, refuelled and then took off again—this time behind a C-46 which served as pathfinder, with the rest of us trailing behind like ducklings. It took us about six hours and then, on landing at Ekron, my engine gave out.'⁶

Next to planes, infantry weapons were regarded as vital to the survival of the State. The code name given to missions ordered to search Europe for surplus rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and light artillery, months before the Israelis declared their independence, was *Rekesh*.^{*} Again Mordechai Oren—he made the initial contacts—mentions that:

'I eventually had a prolonged meeting with Dr. Bebler, the Yugoslav Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs... I argued the possibilities of acquiring a variety of small-arms. He promised to check the practical side of the question and make sure that aiding us would not compromise any of their principles. A few days later, I received a reassuring reply on this point and left the further negotiations to our Prague legation.'⁷

In addition to the officially sanctioned *Rekesh* mission, leaders of Israel's left-wing parties, notably the Secretary General of the Israeli Communist Party, Samuel Mikunis, also set out on individual missions to use their political contacts in Eastern Europe for the procurement of the much-needed arms. Mordechai Oren recalls that '... Mikunis left early in 1948, with the approval of the Israeli Government, to obtain Rumanian petroleum for the young Air Force. From Rumania, he went to Czechoslovakia to help in persuading them to sell as many arms as possible.'⁸

Once the agreements had been settled, the major problem, as in the case of the planes, was transportation and delivery. The possibilities of transferring them to Israel via Poland or Rumania were examined, but the *Rekesh* team received no positive answer from the respective governments. Eventually,

* For the *Rekesh*, see Ben-Gurion, pp. 399-402, and J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23.

after much negotiation, Yugoslavia volunteered to act as a transfer point and allowed the use of her harbours and airports for trans-shipment. The equipment was loaded on Czech boats, and sailed down the Danube through Hungary to the Yugoslav port of Vokovar. From there it was sent by rail to the Adriatic port of Shivinik. From the moment the arms reached Yugoslavia, they were guarded by members of the Yugoslav Communist Party who remained on duty until they were safely aboard the specially purchased ships which took them to Israel.

In a letter dated 26 May 1948, Avriel reported on the progress of his Czech mission:

‘Negotiations with the government are about to end and according to the Deputy Minister of Finance there is a 95% chance that we shall receive the loan within a few days. . . . The main acquisitions will be: (1) Planes. We have been offered 30 Messerschmitts, 30 Spitfires—Mark 9 (the Arabs have on older and poorer model, Mark 5), and 9 Mosquitoes. As to the last two kinds, we are still trying to find out the quantities of the ammunition on which the acquisition depends. (2) Tanks. We have been offered thirty 16-ton tanks which we could get at once, and another thirty at the end of June. Apart from these, they offered us twenty 9-ton tanks which we could get immediately. Tomorrow we shall hear offers of heavier tanks. (3) Field-guns and anti-aircraft weapons. . . (4) Flame-throwers and anti-tank cannon. . . . Apart from all this the regular things are going on as usual. At “Yoram”⁹ there are 5,000 rifles, 1,200 machine-guns, and 12,000,000 rounds of ammunition—but there is still no ship. The release of the rest of the things we bought (another 5,000 rifles, 2,200 machine-guns, and 18 mil. rounds) is delayed due to the shortage of money. . . .’¹⁰

The first transport of Czech weapons arrived under the code name of Balak¹¹ at a hidden airfield in Israel called Bet Daras shortly before midnight on 31 March 1948. The transport consisted of a D.C.4, on charter from a private American Company, carrying two hundred small-arms, forty machine-guns, and a quantity of ammunition for both. The remainder of this first shipment—200 machine-guns and 5,500,000 rounds of ammunition—arrived aboard the ship *Nora* which, dodging the British blockade, slipped into Tel Aviv harbour. Another reason for the desperate urgency in securing surplus arms, apart from the obvious need for them, was the fear of being outbid by representatives of the Arabs. The Czechs, although well disposed

towards the Israelis, were in no financial position to refuse the hard dollars offered by the other side. A Syrian delegation, headed by Major Fuad Mardam, nephew of the former Premier,* in fact arrived in Czechoslovakia even before the Israelis and had concluded a purchase of 8,000 rifles, 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition, hand-grenades and high explosives. Pinchas Vaze, the official chronicler of the Rekesh mission, writes that ‘. . . A feverish contest began between us and the Syrians. The question was: “Who would be the first to send the weapons to the front in Israel?” our men made an “impossible” effort to get our weapons to their destination before the Syrians and Egyptians could receive theirs. Desperate actions were fought to damage and delay the Syrian transport.’ He goes on to relate how the ship was trailed by a Haganah plane, blown off course by a chance storm, and sunk by Israeli frogmen, while the weapons were later salvaged by the Arabs, then transferred to a ship bound for an Arab port, only to be finally hijacked by the Israelis and rushed to the front.¹²

With the exception of an occasional cache of arms confiscated en route by the Austrian Government,¹³ a small but steady supply of weapons began to arrive in Israel. In the transport *Balak 2* which arrived on 12 May 1948, just two days before independence was declared, the Israelis received the following:

- 4 cases containing three machine-guns.
- 2 cases containing five tripods.
- 1 case containing compasses and direction indicators.
- 1 case containing rifle bolts.
- 3 cases containing three machine-guns with parts.
- 1 case containing one machine-gun, with parts.
- 7 cases containing sixteen boxes of ammo and belts.
- 1 case containing twelve boxes of ammo and belts.

On 14 May, *Balak 3* arrived from Czechoslovakia bringing:

- 13 cases containing sixteen boxes of ammo and belts.
- 6 cases containing sixteen boxes of ammo and belts.

The remaining weapons listed on this bill of lading are referred to in cryptic terms, such as:

- 6 cases containing three heavies.
- 3 cases containing six feet.
- 1 case containing three feet.

* Jamil Mardam Bey, several times Prime Minister of Syria, held this position as well as that of Defence Minister during the 1948 war.

- 2 cases containing five feet.
- 4 cases containing three heavies.
- 1 case containing eighteen optical instruments.
- 1 case containing four boxes of A, AA, and SA.¹⁴

The total amount of basic arms and ammunition brought by *Balak 2* and *Balak 3* were 6,000,000 rounds of 7.92 mm. ammunition, 5,000 rifles, and 1,200 machine-guns.

Once independence had been declared, and the expected massive Arab offensive* began in earnest, the steady flow of military supplies from Czechoslovakia became essential for the continued survival of the State. Between May 1948 and the end of February 1949, Israel received from Czechoslovakia about 43 million rounds of 7.92 mm., 350,000 rounds of 13 mm., and 150,000 rounds of 20 mm. ammunition; 1,500 rifles, 3,000 light and 200 heavy machine-guns; 2,600 70 kg., 3,000 10 kg., and 4,200 2 kg. bombs as well as desalination equipment and spare parts for planes. Shipments from Czechoslovakia began to decrease by the turn of the year, only five consignments arriving between 19 December 1948 and 19 February 1949. By this time the major crisis had been overcome and Israel's military position was tenuously stabilised.

In addition to obtaining arms, the Haganah was anxious to secure from Czechoslovakia something of equal though less tangible importance: Czech co-operation in extending facilities for the training of cadres for the young Israeli army. Under the leadership of Nachon Shadmi, commanding officer of the Haganah in Western Europe, and Yaakov Soloman, an Israeli military representative formerly assigned to Rumania and Hungary, a team of agents tried to set up training areas for Eastern European Jews who were soon to enter Israel as refugees. These training courses were often run in remote areas under the guise of sporting events of physical culture clubs without the knowledge of local Communist officials.¹⁵

The Israeli Haganah team, disguised as British businessmen or Allied officials registering displaced persons, moved freely through Czechoslovakia, organising a youth training programme near Bratislava, and then into Hungary, where a series of summer camps were initiated in the Tatra mountains. The entire programme, however, never really got off the ground since local Communist officials, especially in Hungary, hounded these 'British businessmen' who spent most of their time hiking in

* For a comparative estimate of Arab regular and Zionist military strength, see Appendix IX. See also Lorch, pp. 755-58.

the remote mountain areas, and refused to extend their visas. It was not long before the Hungarian Jews, themselves anxious to avoid antagonising the party, '...pressed the Haganah representative to leave, and often even threatened to report them to the authorities.'¹⁶

A training mission to Czechoslovakia fared better. Negotiations between the Haganah and the Czech Ministry of Defence led to the initiation of a training programme for young Israeli Army officers. Czech Army officers were assigned to remote training camps, most notably the airfield and area around Gatetz where groups of thirty to fifty Israeli officers were given intensive courses in aviation, communications, and parachuting. During the press interview upon his promotion to Air Force Commander, Mordechai Hod recalled that '...Later we all went to Czechoslovakia for a real fighter pilot's training course. Unfortunately, that was broken off in the middle. There was a new political wind blowing there...'¹⁷ These activities could not be kept entirely secret and rumours of Israeli attempts to establish Eastern European training missions created anxiety in the Arab camp. Increasingly exaggerated reports were circulated and gained credence; a *New York Times* (26 December 1948) report alleged:

'Six hundred Jewish men and women, many of them trained for the Israeli army by Czech officers, are en route to Palestine, informed sources said today. Informants said approximately 1,500 others were awaiting transportation. Infantrymen, paratroopers, communications men, pilots and nurses were among those who left and are waiting to leave, informants said. Part of their training programme was in Czechoslovakian Army Camps...'

Despite the various rumours the available evidence indicates that only about two hundred Israelis received military training.

By mid-1949, the Israeli War of Independence was over, and the achievements of the Israeli Army in repelling the Arabs and in reversing the tide of battle are now a matter of history. But what of the rapport built up between Israel and the Eastern Bloc, and especially Czechoslovakia? Professor Sami Hadawi of the Institute for Palestine Studies remarked to the author

'...I remember when the Arab representatives at the United Nations complained against the Soviet stand, Vishinsky replied: "The Arabs will soon find out that the Soviet Union was their friend".'¹⁸

In the years following the War of Independence, it became evident to the Soviet Union that they had backed the wrong horse, and that Israel could not promote Soviet interests. From mid-1950, relations between the two countries grew increasingly hostile, culminating in the Slansky Trial, the purge of high-ranking Jewish members of the Czech Communist Party. The trial, in which Mordechai Oren and the Yugoslavian statesman Moshe Pinjade featured as chief foreign culprits, resulted in a temporary severance of diplomatic relations, charges, counter-charges, and some vandalism involving the respective embassies.¹⁹ Relations between the Soviet bloc and Israel deteriorated still further at the time of the 'Doctor's Plot', (January 1953), from which they never recovered. By 1956 the wheel had come full circle. Hence, a Soviet 'Middle Eastern expert' could argue that the Soviets had always supported the Arab cause, quoting examples of Soviet sympathy for the Arabs long before 1948, and playing down the Soviet aid to Israel in 1948 as a somewhat inexplicable episode.²⁰

The eight years between 1948 and 1956, then, mark a complete reversal in Russia's foreign policy, which nevertheless and for all its cynicism achieved its primary objective: a Soviet foothold in the Middle East. The next Czech arms agreement was negotiated with Nasser's Egypt.

NOTES

- 1 Robert Loring Allen, *Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Mainland China*. (University of Virginia, 1958), table on p. 80.
- 2 *New York Times*, 19 April 1948, p. 5.
- 3 A controversial figure to this day, Mordechai Oren was, it appeared, a quasi-official representative of *Mapam*, sent to Europe as early as 1945 to enlist left-wing sympathies in the coming struggle for independence.
- 4 Mordechai Oren, *Prisonnier Politique à Prague, 1951-56*. (Les Temps Modernes, René Julliard, Paris, 1960), p. 97: also discussed during several conversations with the author, Tel Aviv, August 1966.
- 5 Although the original terms of the agreement called for Spitfires, a job lot of Messerschmitts, slightly less expensive, at only \$ 110,000 each, were available.
- 6 *The Jerusalem Post*, 27 April 1966.
- 7 Oren, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 207.
- 9 In the true underground style, every letter and diplomatic note involving the sale or transportation of arms utilizes cryptic references to key locations, i.e., 'Yoram' is Yugoslavia, 'Prantz' is Czechoslovakia, and 'Shatfanim' are American dollars.
- 10 Pinchas Vaze, *Rekesh* (Sifriat Hapoalim Marachot-Israeli Military Publishing House, 1966), pp. 239-40.
- 11 The code name Balak was taken from the Biblical story (Numbers 22:2) in which the Moabite King, Balak, son of Tsiptor, was dissuaded from attacking the Israelites by a divine messenger.
- 12 Pinchas Vaze, *op. cit.* p. 173.
- 13 For the news releases on the confiscation of arms and the arrest of Austrian, Rumanian, and Czech agents working for the Israelis, see the *New York Times*, 20 December 1948, p. 10; 22 January 1949, p. 5; 7 January, p. 15; 13 January, p. 3; 14 January, p. 8.
- 14 Pinchas Vaze, *op. cit.*, pp. 178/9.
- 15 Ammon Yona, *L'lo Akavot* (No Traces), *Za'vah Haganah L'Israel* 'Ma'archot', January 1965, pp. 23, 44.
- 16 Ammon Yona, *L'lo Akavot* (No Traces) p. 39.
- 17 *The Jerusalem Post*, 27 April 1966, p. 4; *Maariv*, 27 April 1966.
- 18 Letter from Professor Hadawi, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, Lebanon, to the author, 23 April 1966.
- 19 Oren *op. cit.*, pp. 59-61.
- 20 *Mizan Newsletter* (Translations of Soviet Writings by the Central Asian Research Centre in Association with St. Antony's College (Oxford) Soviet Affairs Study Group), No. 11, November 1959, p. 6.

In March [1948] Haganah High Command prepared a comprehensive operational plan D, replacing plans A, B, and C which had governed Haganah strategy in previous years.†

* From Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of The Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1961; London: Putnam & Co., Ltd., 1961), pp. 87-89. Copyright © 1961 by Netanel Lorch. Reprinted by permission of G.P. Putnam's Sons.

** Currently (1969) Director of Information, Israeli Foreign Ministry.

† Plan A was devised in February 1945 at a time when the Zionist leadership hoped for unconditional support from a post-war British Labour Government which would enable them to take over the country during a period of "transitional minority rule" (see Arlosoroff, pp. 245-54, and Ben-Gurion, the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, March 20, 1964, pp. 20-22). Because Zionist leadership counted on such British support the task set the Zionist military organization, according to Plan A, was to neutralize only the local Palestinian Arabs and *not* the forces of neighbouring Arab countries. Plan B was devised in May 1947, after the British had referred the Palestine question to the UN and after it became clear to the Zionists that both the two super powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., were in favour of partition, i.e. a Jewish state in Palestine. Since the partition "solution" was known to be opposed by the Arab states as well as the Palestine Arabs, the strategic objective of Plan B was to frustrate any interference by the neighbouring Arab forces on behalf of the Palestine Arabs. (Cf. *Toldot Melhemet Ha Komemiyot* [4th ed.; Tel Aviv, 1960], p. 79). Plan C was worked out in November 1947 when a partition resolution by the UN became a distinct possibility. It had more specific operational objectives than the two earlier plans. The principal objective was, however, a holding operation with the main reliance being on the striking force of the Palmach and the Jewish Settlement Police (for which see "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600. and Ben-Gurion, pp. 371-74, respectively) to enable the HIM and HISH brigades to be fully mobilized. This was replaced in March-April 1948 by Plan D

Zero hour for Plan D was to arrive when British evacuation had reached a point where the Haganah would be reasonably safe from British intervention and when mobilization had progressed to a point where the implementation of a large-scale plan would be feasible. The mission of Haganah was as simple as it was revolutionary: "To gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy operating from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State."

For this purpose the following operational objectives were defined: (a) defense against invasion by regular or pararegular forces; (b) insuring freedom of communications for military and economic purposes inside the area of the Jewish State and between it and the centers of Jewish population outside by gaining control of the major arteries of the country; (c) depriving the enemy of the use of forward bases by their capture; (d) applying economic pressure to the Arab population to compel it to discontinue hostilities in certain parts of the country by besieging some of its cities; (e) reducing enemy potential for guerilla warfare by the capture of certain centers, both in urban and rural areas, inside the borders of the Jewish State; (f) gaining control of government installations within the area of the Jewish State and insuring their normal and effective operation.

Commanders of territorial brigades were instructed to plan and prepare for executing the following operations:* the strengthening of the static defensive dispositions of all areas, and the blocking of all major avenues of approach from enemy areas into the area of the State; broadening of static defense lines, *inter alia* by the occupation of all police fortresses evacuated by British forces, and of Arab villages close to Jewish settlements; creating continuity between Jewish cities and neighboring Jewish settlements; gaining control of lines of communications; besieging enemy cities; capturing forward bases of the enemy;

described here, whose main objective was to seize as much territory as possible both within and outside the areas "allotted" to the Jews by the UN partition resolution, preliminary to the declaration of the Jewish state on the 15th of May, the date of the formal termination of the British mandate over Palestine.

* For the names and disposition of these brigades, see Map 18. For a list of operations carried out by the Zionist forces in accordance with "Plan Dalet" and before the end of the Mandate on May 15th, see Appendix VII. For the Zionist operations carried out during this period but outside the areas "allotted" to the Jewish State, see Map 19.

counterattacks both inside and outside the borders of the State.

Static defense tasks were to be carried out primarily by HIM and only in exceptional cases by the field army, HISH;* blocking lines of approach, local counterattacks, capture of bases inside the State or close to the static defense lines by HISH and only in exceptional cases by Palmach,** which was to form a strategic reserve to be activated in support of the field army, or on independent missions, particularly in depth into enemy territory. The total number of fully mobilized soldiers, according to the plan, by May 1 was set at 30,000. New establishments were fixed for each territorial brigade. The basic tactical unit was the company or the battalion, rather than the section or the platoon. The brigades had not yet reached the stage where they could be standardized. The number of battalions in each would still vary according to the operational needs, and mobilization potential.

“Haganah does not in any way intend to create a force to dominate others,” said Elyahu Golomb,† the man chiefly responsible for its creation and leadership in its early years as an underground organization. “We cannot imagine a situation in which Shechem (Nablus), an Arab city surrounded by Arab villages, would be captured by a Jewish force and turned into a Jewish city. . . .”

At first sight, it would seem that Plan D, which for the first time in Haganah history dealt with the capture of Arab villages and cities, constituted a drastic departure from Golomb's policy and a revolutionary change in the methods and objectives of Haganah. In fact, one finds now for the first time since the beginning of Zionist settlement in Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century instances of conquest by force of arms, while every inch of territory settled by Jews before had been paid for at full and often exorbitant prices in view of legal restrictions on acquisition of land by Jews. Yet such contradiction is illusory. In his policy statement Golomb had gone on to say: “Our function is to defend by force of arms—wherever and whenever and against whomever such defense will be required—our freedom of settlement, of immigration, of development and of self-determination. We do not envisage a force which will dominate others, which will terrorize or subject others, but a force which


* HIM stands for *Khayl Matzav*, or garrison troops, which numbered about 30,000. HISH stands for *Khayl Sadeh* or field force. See Appendix IX.

** For the strength of the Palmach forces, see Appendix IX.

† For Golomb, see above, p. 382, note.


Map 18

Disposition of the Zionist Brigades, January - May, 1948



Map 19

Zionist military operations outside U.N. proposed Jewish State
April 1st to May 15th, 1948



will defend the right of the Jews to come to their country, to settle it and to lead in it a free and sovereign existence.”

Such defense was now required, and there was no room for hesitation. If Jewish Jerusalem could not continue to exist without capture of the Arab village of Kastel, blocking its approaches, then Kastel must be captured;* if Jewish Haifa was not allowed to “coexist” peacefully with Arab Haifa, Arab Haifa must be captured.** Only Arab bases inside the Jewish State were destined to be permanently held; others would be held only temporarily as long as the need existed. Plan D included detailed instructions for the treatment of the Arab population; it insured its right to remain and to continue its normal life, as long as it did not revolt against the future military government.

British authorities had repeatedly declared the termination of the mandate would take place abruptly at one time in all areas; consequently Plan D was to be implemented with equal abruptness by each brigade in its own territory at the estimated time of evacuation early in May. In the meantime the Ides of March had come upon the Yishuv—political retreat at the United Nations, military failures on the roads—and it was found necessary to take the initiative even before Haganah was fully mobilized, before arms could be received from outside, and the British forces completed their evacuation and the fear of intervention disappeared.

* Kastel was taken by Zionist forces on April 11th, the day after the massacre of Deir Yasin.

** Haifa was completely occupied by April 22nd.

Deir Yasin*

April 10, 1948

JACQUES DE REYNIER**

On Saturday 10 April a very serious incident took place: I received a telephone call from the Arabs asking me to go immediately to the village of Deir Yassin,† where the civilian population of the whole village had just been massacred. I learned that this sector, situated very near to Jerusalem, was held by Irgun extremists.‡ The Jewish Agency and the Headquarters of the Haganah told me that they knew nothing of the affair and that in any case it was impossible for anyone to penetrate into Irgun territory. They advised me not to get mixed up in the affair, as, if I did, my mission would almost certainly be terminated.

Not only did they refuse to help me, they also refused to be responsible for what they were sure would happen to me. I replied that I intended to go, and that it was a matter of public knowledge that the Jewish Agency exercised its authority over all the territory in Jewish hands and was therefore responsible for my person as well as for my liberty of action, within the limits of my mission.

* From Jacques de Reynier, *A Jerusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu* (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1950), pp. 69-74. Reprinted by permission of Les Editions de la Baconnière, S.A. Translated by the Institute for Palestine Studies.

** Head of the delegation in Palestine of the International Red Cross throughout the period of hostilities, 1948.

† An Arab village of about four hundred inhabitants in the western suburbs of Jerusalem entirely surrounded by Jewish territory. A few weeks before the massacre its inhabitants had declared it an open village. The distance between Deir Yasin and Kastel is about two and a half miles.

‡ For the Irgun, see Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23, and "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600.

However, I did not know what to do. Without Jewish help, it was impossible for me to reach the village. Then, by thinking hard, I remembered that a Jewish nurse in a nearby hospital had given me her telephone number, telling me, with an odd expression, that I could call her if ever I found myself in an inextricable situation. Taking a chance, I rang her up late at night and explained the situation. She told me to go to a certain place with my car at 7 o'clock next morning, and there pick up the person I found waiting. Then she rang off.

The next morning, at the appointed place and time, a man in civilian clothes, but with pockets bulging with revolvers, jumped into my car and told me to drive on without stopping. At my request, he agreed to show me the road to Deir Yassin, but admitted that he could not do much for me. We went out of Jerusalem, leaving the main road behind the rear of the regular army, and took a road that cut across it. Very soon, we were stopped by two soldier-like individuals, whose looks were far from reassuring, with machine-guns in their hands, and large cutlasses in their belts. From their appearance I gathered they must be the men I was looking for. I got out of the car and submitted myself to a thorough search, then realized that I was a prisoner. Everything seemed lost, when, suddenly, a huge fellow, at least two meters tall, and as large as a cupboard, appeared, pushed his comrades aside, and seized my hand and squeezed it in his enormous paws, shouting incomprehensibly. He did not understand either English or French, but in German we seemed to be able to communicate perfectly. He expressed his joy at seeing a member of the Red Cross because, as he explained, its intervention had saved his life no less than three times when he was a prisoner in a German concentration camp. He said that I was more than a brother to him, and that he would do everything I asked him. With such a bodyguard I felt I could go to the end of the world, and so to start with, we went to Deir Yassin.

After reaching a hill, 500 yards away from the village which we could just see, we had to wait a long time for the order to proceed. Arab firing broke out whenever anybody tried to cross the road, and the commander of the Irgun detachment did not seem willing to receive me. At last he arrived, young, distinguished, and perfectly correct, but there was a peculiar glitter in his eyes, cold and cruel. I explained my mission to him, pointing out that it was no part of my task either to pass judgment or arbitrate—I only wanted to save the wounded and take back the dead. The Jews, in any case, had signed the Geneva Convention, so that my mission was an official one. This last statement angered the officer who asked me to under-

stand once and for all that here the Irgun were in command and no one else, not even the Jewish Agency, with whom they had nothing in common. Here my "wardrobe" intervened, seeing the tension growing higher, and he seemed to find the right arguments, for suddenly the officer said that I could do as I wished but on my own responsibility. He told me the story of this village, inhabited exclusively by Arabs, to the number of approximately 400, never armed, and living on good terms with the surrounding Jews. According to him the Irgun had arrived 24 hours earlier and ordered the inhabitants by loudspeaker to evacuate all houses and surrender: the time given to obey the order was a quarter of an hour. Some of these miserable people had come forward and were taken prisoners, to be released later in the direction of the Arab lines. The rest, not having obeyed the order, had met the fate they deserved. But there was no point in exaggerating things, there were only a few dead, and they would be buried as soon as the "cleaning up" of the village was over. If I found any bodies, I could take them, but there were certainly no wounded. This account made my blood run cold.

I went back then to the Jerusalem road and got an ambulance and a truck that I had alerted through the Red Shield. The two Jewish drivers and the Jewish doctor who boarded them were more dead than alive, but followed me courageously. Before reaching the Irgun outpost I stopped and inspected the two vehicles. A good thing I did, too, as I discovered two Jewish journalists preparing to get the scoop of their lives. Unfortunately for them, I very firmly got rid of them. I reached the village with my convoy, and the Arab firing stopped. The gang was wearing country uniform, with helmets. All of them were young, some even adolescents, men and women, armed to the teeth: revolvers, machine-guns, hand grenades, and also large cutlasses in their hands, most of them still blood-stained. A beautiful young girl, with criminal eyes, showed me hers still dripping with blood; she displayed it like a trophy. This was the "cleaning up" team, that was obviously performing its task very conscientiously.

I tried to go into a house. A dozen soldiers surrounded me, their machine-guns aimed at my body, and their officer forbade me to move. The dead, if any, would be brought to me, he said. I then flew into one of the most towering rages of my life, telling these criminals what I thought of their conduct, threatening them with everything I could think of, and then pushed them aside and went into the house.

The first room was dark, everything was in disorder, but

there was no one. In the second, amid disembowelled furniture and covers and all sorts of debris, I found some bodies cold. Here, the "cleaning up" had been done with machine-guns, then hand grenades. It had been finished off with knives, anyone could see that. The same thing in the next room, but as I was about to leave, I heard something like a sigh. I looked everywhere, turned over all the bodies, and eventually found a little foot, still warm. It was a little girl of ten, mutilated by a hand grenade, but still alive. As I was about to carry her out, the officer tried to stop me, blocking the doorway. I pushed him aside and went through with my precious load protected by my good friend the glass cupboard. The ambulance set off, with orders to come back as soon as possible. As the gang had not dared to attack me directly, I could continue. I gave orders for the bodies in this house to be loaded on the truck, and went into the next house, and so on. Everywhere, it was the same horrible sight. I found only two more people alive, both women, one of them an old grandmother, hidden behind a heap of firewood where she had kept quiet for at least 24 hours.

There had been 400 people in this village; about fifty of them had escaped, and were still alive. All the rest had been deliberately massacred in cold blood for, as I observed for myself, this gang was admirably disciplined and only acted under orders.

Back in Jerusalem I went straight to the Jewish Agency where I found the leaders dismayed, apologetic and pretending, which indeed was true, that they had no power over the Irgun or the Stern Gang.* However, they had done nothing to try and prevent about a hundred men from committing this unspeakable crime.

Then I went to visit the Arabs. I said nothing about what I had seen, but only that after a preliminary hurried visit to the place, it seemed to me that there were several dead people, and that I wondered what to do with them and where to put them. The indignation of the Arabs was understandable, but it prevented them from taking a decision. They would have liked the corpses brought back to the Arab side, but feared a revolt of the population and did not know where to put them or bury them. Finally, they decided to ask me to see to it that they were decently buried in a place that could be recognised later. I agreed to undertake this task and went back to Deir Yassin. I found the Irgun people in a very bad temper; they tried to prevent me from approaching the village. I understood their attitude when I saw the number, and especially the state of the corpses that had

* Cf. "White Paper on Violence, 1946," pp. 601-12.

been lined up all along the main road. I asked very firmly that the burial be started and insisted on being present. After discussion, digging was started on a big grave in a small garden. It was impossible to check the identity of the dead as they had no papers, but I took careful note of all their particulars, with approximate ages. As night fell, I went back to Jerusalem, stating clearly that I was coming back the next day.

Two days later, the Irgun had disappeared from the place, and the Haganah had taken over; we discovered several places where the corpses had been stacked, without decency or respect, in the open air.

After this last visit, I went back to my office where I was visited by two gentlemen, well-dressed in civilian clothes, who had been waiting for me for more than an hour. They were the commander of the Irgun detachment and his aide. They had prepared a paper that they wanted me to sign. It was a statement to the effect that I had been very courteously received by them, and obtained all the facilities I had requested, in the accomplishment of my mission, and thanking them for the help I had received.

As I showed signs of hesitation and even started to argue with them, they said that if I valued my life, I had better sign immediately. The only course open to me was to convince them that I did not value my life in the least and that a declaration quite contrary to theirs had already gone to Geneva. I added that in any case I was not in the habit of signing statements written by others, but only those exclusively drawn up by me. Before I let them go, I tried to explain to them once more the purpose of our mission and asked them whether or not they intended to oppose us in the future. I did not get an answer that day, but later, in Tel Aviv, I saw them again; they needed our help for some of their own people, and in gratitude for our cooperation, they were of great assistance to us on several occasions, returning some hostages we claimed without argument.

The affair of Deir Yassin had immense repercussions. The press and radio spread the news everywhere among Arabs as well as the Jews. In this way a general terror was built up among the Arabs, a terror astutely fostered by the Jews. On both sides, it was made into a political argument, and the results were tragic. Driven by fear, the Arabs left their homes to find shelter among their kindred; first isolated farms, then villages, and in the end whole towns were evacuated, even when the Jewish invader had done no more than make it appear that he intended to attack. Finally, about 700,000 Arabs became refugees, leaving

everything behind in their haste, their one hope being to avoid the fate of the people of Deir Yassin. The effects of this massacre are far from being over today, as this immense crowd of refugees is still living in makeshift camps, without work and without hope, the Red Cross distributing to them emergency aid provided by the United Nations.

The Jewish authorities were terribly shocked by the affair, which took place four days after they had signed the Geneva Convention. They begged me to use my good offices with the Arabs to persuade them that it was an isolated incident. I replied that I would try, but did not hide my displeasure nor my fears for the future. The Arabs were absolutely furious and totally discouraged. For their part, they had no further hopes of anything good coming from the Jewish side, and could not help wondering whether it would not be better to abandon such humanitarian ideas as they had concerning the Jews. It was not easy to appease them, or to persuade them that the mistakes of one people can in no way excuse those of another. On the contrary, we said, the fact that the Arabs had kept their promise would prove to the world their honesty and faithfulness to their word of honour. We assured them that our long experience made it impossible that we should doubt them, and that we knew that they would act with dignity and humanity, whatever happened. After this memorable meeting, we had the impression that all was not lost, although it had been a very near thing.

The Attack on the Arab Village, Kolonia*

April 12, 1948

HARRY LEVIN**

At last got the chance I've been waiting for, to eye-witness a Palmach† operation: capture of Kolonia. Just about getting into bed last night when Avri phoned: "Here it is," he said. "Meet me in half an hour." We drove to Kiriath Anavim,‡ just he and I in his car, and an armoured carload of men ahead of us. We drove without lights, but there was moon and starlight enough to show up the winding road.

It was a queer sensation, travelling like this along the road towards Tel-Aviv in an open car, Arab villages in the valleys and among the brooding hills. Everything dark, and wonderfully peaceful. Only frogs croaked in the *wadis* and a pariah dog barked half-heartedly somewhere in the distance. The air was fresh and brisk. Avri told me that most of the Kolonia villagers had left during the fighting around Castel.‡+ It was occupied now by an armed band that was attacking Castel and traffic on the road.

* From Harry Levin, *Jerusalem Embattled: A Diary of the City Under Siege, March 25th, 1948 to July 18th, 1948* (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1950), pp. 64-67. The title of the chapter from which this excerpt is taken is "12 April." Copyright 1950 by Harry Levin. Reprinted by permission of Victor Gollancz, Ltd.

** Middle East correspondent to the *Daily Herald* (London), 1930-49, and later Israeli diplomat.

† For the Palmach, see "The Zionist military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600, and Appendix IX.

‡ Kolonia, a hill village about two miles equidistant between Kastel and Deir Yasin and some five miles west of Jerusalem. Kiriath Anavim, a Zionist colony six miles west of Jerusalem. It was the headquarters of the Harel Brigade and of the Haportzim Battalion—one of the Brigade's units.

‡+ For the battle of Kastel, see below, pp. 775-76, note.

Advance base was among the trees at Kiriath Anavim. The boys were lolling on the ground, oiling weapons, chatting and laughing among themselves. A few girls among them, distributing sandwiches and tea. I got a brief and incidental welcome. Avri handed me a pair of rubber-soled shoes, like those the others were wearing, and a steel helmet. Zero hour was at midnight. They were to move across country, armoured cars and ambulances following along the road. Officers, maps in hand, made the rounds, checked on the preparations, issued final clipped instructions. That was the only way to tell the officers; nothing they wore distinguished them. "Any questions?" There were none.

We set out in two columns, one marching in the *wadi*, the other along a ridge. I went in the first, and was placed towards the rear. Scouts went ahead and behind us, and more, unseen by us, were on the hilltops. Everyone wore green camouflaged uniforms. They carried a medley of weapons, sten-guns, rifles, machine-guns and hand-grenades; a few carried "walkie-talkies." They moved like wraiths down the *wadi*. Their bodies hardly swung; every line and sag was part of an effortless motion. Their feet seemed to gloss over the earth. They were young, mere boys, but their sureness gave them years. Watching them by the dimmed light among the trees before we left, I saw what kids they were, hardly out of school. Some probably claimed to be 17 or 18, but looked 15 or 16, students, young clerks, apprentice craftsmen, or lads from the settlements. Here they seemed to belong to a world a million miles away from all of that, and even further away from the studies of Rehavia and the cafés of Tel-Aviv.

The hills around there aren't high, but are constant; and bare, except for occasional clumps of olives. We advanced in the direction of Jerusalem, only 20 minutes by car from Kiriath Anavim, but very remote it seemed from these winding *wadis*. Peering towards the city up on its height, it struck one again how much the fighting for Jerusalem to-day bears the stamp of the past. Pure Bible, this is. Tactics, strongpoints, lines of communication, all follow the ancient patterns. Only the weapons and characters are different. Joshua's men, the tribes of the Judge's days, Syrians, Greeks, Maccabees, Romans; and after them, Crusaders, and Allenby's forces in World War I—all marched before us along these *wadis* at dead of night. Even Kolonia's name is the relic of a colony of Roman Legionnaires. And what, except centuries of time, distinguishes Palmach from Gideon's picked 300, or the Maccabees?

No one talked. The rocks were like ghosts in the thin moon-

light. One skull-headed boulder seemed to move as I looked at it. Some shots rang out; they came from a distance, but their echo lingered among the hills. In under an hour we came to a halt, Kolonia before us. I couldn't see it, for it sprawled down the forward slopes of the hill, and I was at the rear. But a few houses on the summit were darkly outlined against the sky. The other unit had swung round and would attack from the further flank. Our men tightened their belts and waited. At the order they advanced, moving across the slope to approach from the given angle.

Suddenly the village seemed to erupt. Our mortars started it, and at once came a bedlam of answering fire. We saw the summer-lightning flashes of their guns and the shots passing overhead. They fired wildly, to all points of the compass—except to where our men had dropped and were crawling forward almost as fast as they had walked. All the time, the hissing rain of machine-guns poured down on the village. Suddenly, an explosion that seemed to rip open the hillside; shrieks of terror. Our shock troops and sappers had reached the houses. So had the advance party of the other unit. More explosions. The Arabs were firing with all they had, raggedly, as though in a panic.

Hardly any orders were given; it might all have been rehearsed a score of times, this party sped here, that one there, each knew its job. Afterwards I heard of one fellow in our detachment, a newcomer from Austria on his first operation, who lost his nerve and clung to a rock, groaning as though he had been shot. They hit him hard, and he moved on again. . . . Arab resistance, feeble from the start, soon crumbled. When our men got to them, many of the houses were empty. Others continued to spit fire, but not for long. I saw grim resistance from one house. More of our men came up and attacked it from three sides. Maybe the machine-gun ended its resistance, maybe the hand-grenades flung through the windows.

In half an hour it was over. Most of the Arabs had fled into the darkness. I counted 14 dead, but there were more; two of their officers killed, one looked like an Englishman. Our casualties were one dead, three wounded. I wondered at the swiftness of it all. Were our men so good, or the Arabs so poor?

From house to house they went looking for Arabs who might be hiding. They found some bodies and plenty of ammunition. One fellow, big-boned and narrow-faced, passed me clutching a chicken by the legs. "Join us for breakfast," he shouted as he dashed past. That was the longest sentence addressed to me since we set out from Kiriath Anavim.

When I left, sappers were blowing up the houses. One

after another the solid stone buildings, some built in elaborate city style, exploded and crashed. Within sight of Jerusalem I still heard the explosions rolling through the hills; and in between, somewhere in the lonely distance, still rose the half-hearted barking of the village dog.

The Battle for Haifa*

April 21-22, 1948

MAJOR R.D. WILSON**

The Jewish-Arab struggle for domination of the town continued to intensify, and by 19th April, 1948, it was obvious that an open battle was about to develop in which the British, by virtue of their relative weakness in numbers and their dispersion of troops would be unable to play a decisive part. An assault by Jews or Arabs would no longer respect British lives, as the major issue would be the domination of the town through the defeat of their opponents. In order to achieve this object, whichever side launched the offensive would require a number of the tactical positions then held by British troops. There would be heavy fighting and loss of life.

The Divisional Commander (now G.O.C. North Sector) was faced with a particularly difficult decision. There were no reinforcements available from outside the sector, as elsewhere British troops, now steadily withdrawing from the country, were no less occupied. Within the Sector, "Craforce"† constituted the only possible reserve, but not only was it doubtful whether the whole or part of it could be redeployed in time, but the British authorities were still responsible for the security of Galilee, and in that district "Craforce" was already having its own troubles. To have reduced it would have endangered the

* From R[oland] D[are] Wilson, *Cordon and Search: With 6th Airborne Division in Palestine*, with a Foreword by Major-General Sir Hugh Stockwell (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Limited, 1949), pp. 191-94. Reprinted by permission of Gale & Polden Ltd.

** British army officer; served on the Headquarters Staff of the 6th Airborne Division in Palestine, 1945-48.

† "Craforce," a combination of the 17th/21st Lancers, 1st Parachute Battalion, and 1st Battalion Irish Guards, was responsible for the frontiers in the Northern Sector of Palestine after the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force was disbanded in January, 1948.

balance of the force left behind; to have moved the whole of it would have been the signal for open warfare to develop behind it. It was therefore impossible to strengthen the British positions in Haifa. The decision to be taken was whether to leave the troops in their widely dispersed positions throughout the town or concentrate them in the areas which were vital to the successful completion of the British withdrawal. In the former case, heavy casualties were to be expected, one or both of the contestants were likely to be estranged with a resultant threat to the British withdrawal, and even then the effort might fail in its object. It was most questionable whether, with less than a month to go until the end of the Mandate, the possible retention of control over a non-vital area was worth the British lives at stake. The second course would enable the areas vital to the British, such as the port and the main roads leading to it, to be held firmly and the evacuation of troops and stores to proceed unopposed. Furthermore, it was less likely to involve the British in bloody fighting against either the Jews or the Arabs over an issue of no great material importance. On balance the evidence pointed towards this being the wiser course and it was therefore adopted.

No sooner was this decision made and put into effect than the final battle for Haifa took place. The Jews, who had been gradually gaining the upper hand, lost no time in mounting a well-planned attack which took place during the night 21st/22nd April. For several reasons it met with success so quick and complete that even the Jews themselves were confounded. Both Jews and Arabs had been informed of the British plan by the G.O.C. within an hour of each other on the morning of the redeployment (21st April), so there was no question of one side being in a position to plan an offensive through prior knowledge.* Unfortunately, the Arabs seized on this distorted theory in order to lessen the blow of defeat and avoid recriminations for their own shortcomings. In fact, all their responsible leaders fled from Haifa immediately before or in course of the battle,** and their troops who were completely demoralized by this example cracked under the weight of the Jewish attack. Early on 22nd April

* In fact, the Jewish side was informed by the British authorities of their decision to withdraw from the city well ahead of the Arabs and in time to allow them to prepare for an all-out attack on the Arab quarters. Cf. J. Kimche's review of E. Atiyah's novel *Lebanon Paradise*, in the *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, Nov. 13, 1953.

** This observation is refuted by the author himself in his statement below that members of the Arab National Committee (leaders of the Haifa Arabs) met the General Officer Commanding on April 22nd.

when complete Jewish victory was assured, members of the Arab National Committee approached the G.O.C. with the request that he should forthwith open truce negotiations on their behalf with the Jews. To this he readily agreed and the Jewish leaders were approached and expressed their willingness to enter into negotiations under British chairmanship. They produced their terms, which, considering the completeness of their victory, were fair and reasonable.* They provided for the disarming of all Arabs and the placing under British guard of all alien Arabs and Europeans of the A.L.A. then in Haifa.** After much deliberation the Arab leaders, fearing the consequences of agreeing to such total surrender, fought shy of their self-appointed task, and, on the pretext of not being able to guarantee observance of the truce terms, they withdrew. Nevertheless, the Jews had little difficulty in establishing their authority over all parts of the town not already under British control. There developed simultaneously an Arab refugee problem of vast proportions. The majority of the population panicked and thousands surged out of the town into the port whence they were evacuated to Acre. While they were thus in full flight they were engaged by the advanced Jewish posts which inflicted a number of casualties on them. The British Police did great work in restoring some measure of order outside the Suq and minimizing the effects of the panic, and the Royal Marines were equally outstanding in the port. The latter had three officers wounded by Jewish fire as they sought to control the stream of refugees, and there were some spirited exchanges of fire in which once again the armoured cars of the 3rd Hussars were prominent, using their 37-mm. and 3-in. guns with good effect. Meanwhile, the two Guards Battalions also had their problems in trying to restore confidence among the Arabs, helping to evacuate their wounded, and preventing looting. In all these tasks they were handicapped by Jewish snipers one of whom wounded Lieutenant-Colonel J. Chandos-Pole, commanding 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards.

As the situation was brought under control the firing died down and eventually stopped; the town was quiet by night for the first time for months, and the Jews set about consolidating their gains. Casualties were difficult to assess but from reports it appeared that the Jews had suffered some 20 killed and 40 wounded and the Arabs, 100 killed and 200 wounded. No sooner had the Jews consolidated their gains in Haifa than they planned

* Cf. the statement below that the Jewish terms amounted to "total surrender."

** There were no "Europeans" in the Arab garrison in Haifa.

to exploit their success with offensive operations farther afield using Haifa as their base. These intentions, however, were thoroughly thwarted by the Army which placed road-blocks on all exits from the town and denied passage to armed Jews. The town remained quiet until the final British evacuation, but the refugee problem increased. Tens of thousands of panic-stricken Arabs streamed out of Haifa and its surrounding villages, and made their way to the neighbouring States where they sought sanctuary. The journey was not without its perils since they were open to attack by the Jews on the way, so whenever practicable their convoys were afforded military protection as far as the frontiers. Within a week of their defeat at the hands of the Jews there were only 8-10,000 Arabs left in Haifa out of a normal population of some 50,000 and later that number was further reduced.

Deir Yasin and Jaffa*

April 1948

JON KIMCHE**

...Dir Yassin† was one of the few Arab villages whose inhabitants had refused permission for foreign Arab volunteers to use it as a base for operations against the Jewish life-line into Jerusalem; they had on occasions collaborated with the Jewish Agency. On Friday, April 9th, 1948, a commando force composed of Irgun and Stern soldiers‡ raided the village. There was no obvious occasion for them to do so. What happened afterwards has been the subject of conflicting versions, explanations and excuses by the terrorists; but nothing they have said has explained, or can explain away, the murder of some 250 innocent Arabs, among them more than a hundred women and children. No less disgusting was the subsequent publicity parade by the Irgun of a number of poor Arab prisoners through the streets of Jerusalem.‡‡

* From Jon Kimche, *Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915-1950* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950), pp. 217-18 and 222-24. These excerpts are taken from the chapter entitled "The Turn of the Tide." Reprinted by permission of Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd.

** For the author see above, p. 433, note.

† For Deir Yasin, see Reynier, pp. 761-66.

‡ For the Irgun, see Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23, and "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600. The Irgun was headed at the time by Mr. Menachem Begin, member of the Knesset since 1948, Leader of the Israeli Herut Party, and Israeli Minister of State since June 1, 1967. For the Stern Gang, see above, p. 599, note.

‡‡ Deir Yasin was no more than two and a half miles, as the crow flies, from Kastel, where a major battle was in progress from April 3rd to April 11th between Arab villagers and the Haganah. The massacre at Deir Yasin was probably intended to put pressure on villagers participating in the Kastel battle by threatening their own villages with a

The massacre of Dir Yassin was the darkest stain on the Jewish record throughout all the fighting. It is historically important because it was to become the beginning of a second legend with which the terrorists sought to serve their cause and justify their deeds. Just as they had claimed credit for the British decision to leave Palestine as being the result of the terrorists' attacks on British troops, so later they justified the massacre of Dir Yassin because it led to the panic flight of the remaining Arabs in the Jewish State area and so lessened the Jewish casualties.

But, at the time of the massacre, the Irgun had not thought of this excuse. They made the usual charge against the Haganah, that the Haganah knew of the operation; they explained that their force had been cornered by a superior force and had been compelled to shoot its way out as best as it could; but not till some time after did they claim it to have been an attempt to demoralize the Arab ranks—for it had been intended as a show-piece for the terrorists and nothing else. It was a cheap, ghastly and disgusting publicity stunt. . . .

. . . The occupation of Haifa and Tiberias* and the evacuation by the Arabs of numerous villages had stretched the demands on the Haganah to breaking point. For the moment they did not want to tie up more men in policing Jaffa. Jaffa had ceased to be a menace in the eyes of the Jewish military leaders. Arab snipers still exacted their daily toll of civilians in neighbouring Tel-Aviv, but this was part of the civilian contribution to the Jewish war effort, and civilian Tel-Aviv reflected some of the exaltation of London in 1940, the pride of the civilian in the front line.

But the Irgun leaders had other ideas. They had been assiduously spreading the report that the Haganah was no stronger than the Irgun, that the Irgun would be the deciding factor in the coming Jewish state, and that they had 20,000 soldiers under Irgun command. It is difficult now to see what reason there could have been for the deliberate circulation of this foolish and false information, but it was to have most damaging consequences for the Palestine Jews. Just before I left Haifa, the chief British intelligence officer attached to General

similar fate. For the Haganah's foreknowledge of the Deir Yasin massacre, see Menachem Begin's *The Revolt, Story of the Irgun* (New York, 1951), pp. 162-64.

* Tiberias was occupied on April 18th. The Battle of Haifa began on April 21st and the city was completely occupied by the Zionist forces by the next day.

Stockwell's* headquarters—one of the ablest and most impartial British intelligence officers in Palestine—assured me that his information showed convincingly that the terrorists were now as numerous as the Haganah. The British Foreign Office representative in Haifa sent similar reports to Whitehall; they were intercepted by the Haganah and copied before being forwarded to the Foreign Office. The information appeared in the London *Economist* and other British papers two or three weeks later. The London *Times* correspondent in Amman wrote: "By April it had become clear that the Irgun virtually controlled the all-Jewish city and Zionist Headquarters of Tel-Aviv."

This information had been passed on by the Foreign Office to the British envoys in the Arab countries, who in turn informed the Arab Governments to which they were accredited. It had the desired effect among the Arabs. It swayed many who had been hesitating on the brink of decision, whether to flout the United Nations and go to war against the Palestine Zionists or not. For though it has become a habit among Israelis and pro-Zionists to assume that there was nothing but evil hatred behind the Arab decision to go to war against Israel, and that the Arab explanation that they came to save their brethren from attack by the terrorists was a cheap excuse for the benefit of those who cared to believe it, it must be stressed that there was great and very real Arab concern for the fate of the Palestine Arabs. This concern reached fever-heat when the British information was passed on that the terrorists were becoming the decisive factor in the Jewish armed forces.

At this moment the Irgun, without informing the Haganah, and with less than a thousand combatants, launched its attack on Jaffa** accompanied by a flourish of ostentatious publicity. Irgun police took over the streets of Tel-Aviv leading to Jaffa, and Irgun lorries with singing boys and girls careered round Tel-Aviv. The great bombardment of Jaffa was started with 3-inch mortars which the Irgun had "captured" a few weeks earlier in a raid on a British camp in which an officer and four soldiers had been killed. This bombardment started a panic among the Jaffa Arabs. The remaining 20,000 started to leave

* General Stockwell was the British Commander responsible for the surrender of Haifa to the Haganah. He was subsequently General Officer Commanding Ground Operations against Egypt in 1956.

** In fact, the Haganah forces started operations against Jaffa on April 27th by first cutting it off from the rest of Palestine—Operation Chametz—for which, see Appendix VII. The Haganah entered Jaffa on May 13th.

the city by boat and by road. The Irgun captured a few streets bordering on Tel-Aviv and at one point penetrated into the shopping centre. Then they ran into trouble. They had had no practice in operating at battalion strength. Some of their leaders were killed. They were stuck. But, as their military progress waned, their publicity efforts rose. The Jewish and foreign press was invited to visit the "battlefield" and to inspect Arab prisoners. A few blindfolded prisoners were paraded through Tel-Aviv, to the disgust of a large section of the public.

The Irgun activities in Jaffa also extended to yet another field. For the first time in the still undeclared war a Jewish force commenced to loot in wholesale fashion. At first the young Irgunists pillaged only dresses, blouses and ornaments for their girl friends. But this discrimination was soon abandoned. Everything that was movable was carried from Jaffa—furniture, carpets, pictures, crockery and pottery, jewellery and cutlery. The occupied parts of Jaffa were stripped, and yet another traditional military characteristic raised its ugly head. What could not be taken away was smashed. Windows, pianos, fittings and lamps went in an orgy of destruction . . .

“And on Passover Eve, April 23, The Breakthrough Came*^{*}

ABBA EBAN

... March, April and May 1948 were golden autumn months in Weizmann's political life. He had an objective from which he never wavered, and he pursued it with zeal. United Nations delegates who came to see him on the assumption that he was a 'moderate' who would make their retreat easier found themselves shrivelled by the fury of his assault. Austin, Jessup and Ross** of the United States sat down on his hotel sofa and told him how dangerous it would be for peace if the Jews of Palestine proclaimed a State on 14 May. Weizmann replied that he was only a private Jew, but in his view 'Palestine Jewry would be off its head if it postponed statehood for anything as foolish as the American trusteeship proposal.' Typical of his uncompromising exposition in those days was his talk with the head of the French delegation.

March 13, 1948 (Eban Diaries)

Lunched with Chief and Alexandre Parodi. Latter full of doubts about partition. Fears that if Jewish State is established its inhabitants will be massacred by superior Arab forces. 'How can a few hundred thousand of you stand up against millions?' Chief replied that numbers are not decisive. 'The trouble with the Egyptian army is that its soldiers are too lean and its officers too fat.' If Jews stood firm they would win through.

In a wonderful climax Josef [Cohn] put his head round the door with a copy of the *New York Post* telling of spec-

* From M.W. Weisgal and J. Carmichael, eds., *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands*; pp. 308-12.

** Ambassador Warren Austin, American Representative to the UN; Ambassador (Professor) Philip K. Jessup, U.S. delegate to the Security Council; John C. Ross, Alternate U.S. Representative to the UN.

tacular Jewish victory at Mishmar Haemek.*

For Weizmann the importance of avoiding a vote for trusteeship was enhanced by his secret resolve to work for recognition. No American President would recognize a Jewish State after the United Nations had voted to place its territory under trusteeship. It was essential, at least, to preserve the vacuum. And on Passover Eve, April 23, the breakthrough came—to the knowledge of himself and of his closest circle alone.

He was due to go to his friends Siegfried and Lola Kramarsky for the Seder service. Before he set out he received an urgent request to see Judge Rosenman,** one of President Truman's closest political advisers. Rosenman, like Jacobson, was outside the range of official Zionist contacts. But he was a willing victim of Weizmann's personal spell. Weizmann went to see him at the Essex House Hotel, as the judge was incapacitated by a leg injury. The two men talked with quiet concentration for an hour. On emerging from the hotel Weizmann was tense with excitement. He sat through the Seder service in a mood of far-away contemplation, and left early. At ten o'clock he gathered his friends about him and told them of Rosenman's report.

It seemed an incredible story. It contained a massive refutation of all the 'hard-headed' theories which deny the personal and human factor in international relations. The President had called Rosenman into the Oval Room and told him quite simply, 'I have Dr Weizmann on my conscience.' He had not realized on 18 March that the State Department had gone so far in abandonment of the Partition plan. The President would like to find his way back to the United Nations resolution. If the General Assembly session could be surmounted without reversing partition and if a Jewish State was declared, the President would recognize it immediately. Thus fortified by international legitimacy the new State could fight for its survival, not as an unregarded outcast, but as a member of the international family.

But the President stipulated one absolute condition. He would deal with Dr Chaim Weizmann—and with him alone. It was essential, therefore, for Weizmann to stay in America and be available for the unfolding of the plan.

There was a certain pathos in the President's eagerness to regain Weizmann's respect. Harry Truman had ordered atomic

* The battle at Mishmar Haemek did not take place in March but between April 4th and April 8th.

** Judge Samuel Rosenman was Justice of the New York Supreme Court, 1932-43, and Special Counsel to Truman, 1945-46.

bombs to be used against Japan. He had boldly proclaimed the doctrine of intervention in defence of Greece and Turkey. He wielded supreme authority for the policies of the non-communist world. His political career had been full of tough battles and flexible compromises. Yet somehow he was moved to sentimental contrition by the thought that an aging Jewish leader, banished from office, might regard him as having dishonoured his pledge.

Weizmann lived the next three weeks in acute expectancy. Events moved towards a sharp transition. In Palestine, amidst furious fighting, the profile of a recognized Jewish authority began to emerge over much of the country.* At Flushing Meadows the United Nations reacted to the American trusteeship proposal with a sharp distaste. But in the absence of an alternative solution there was always a chance that this would be adopted. There was an even greater peril that some Jewish leaders would be intimidated by the prospect of military invasion and political solitude into renouncing the idea of immediate statehood.

All Weizmann's efforts were now directed to the second danger. It was a strange role for the so-called 'moderate'—to be summoning the Jewish people to the utmost intransigence and tenacity. To Meyer Weisgal,** telephoning from Nice at the request of Ben-Gurion to seek his views, he said briefly: 'Proclaim the State, no matter what ensues.' As Sharett† flew home to advise rejection of Secretary Marshall's warning against proclaiming the State, Weizmann pursued him to the airport with an entreaty, 'Don't let them weaken, Moshe, it is now or never.' A military cease-fire was legitimate. But the 'political stand-still' which the State Department was suggesting was anathema. For this would impede any new political moves such as the declaration of Jewish independence.

Meanwhile he hugged his secret and waited for its consummation. As in 1917 he was without official standing, and yet the key of a political triumph was in his hands.

On 29 April the House of Commons enacted the termination of the British Mandate for 15 May. On 7 May a puzzled Bartley Crum‡ came to see Weizmann with the 'strange story' that the President was going to recognize the Jewish State within a week.

* Cf. Part IV, pp. 755-78.

** Meyer Weisgal is currently the Head of the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel.

† For Moshe Sharett (Shertok), see above, p. 594, note.

‡ Bartley Crum, a San Franciscan corporation lawyer and ardent pro-Zionist, had been a member of the Anglo-American Commission of 1946. He is the author of *Behind The Silken Curtain* (New York, 1947).

On 13 May Weizmann was on tenterhooks. Would the crucial twenty-four hours be safely surmounted at the United Nations? And would the State actually be proclaimed? He was frankly nervous:

13 May 1948 (Eban Diaries)

I was in the UN delegates' lounge when the Chief came on the phone and asked me to come round at once. He had heard a rumour that the UN was going to adopt a trusteeship proposal and appoint a High Commissioner after all. Was this the position? If so all was wrecked.

I said that he need have no alarm. We had blocked trusteeship. Since the Political Committee meeting on 5 May I had seen support for it dwindling. Gromyko had told me at a party in Trygve Lie's home, 'You have buried trusteeship.* The Assembly would at most appoint a Mediator, not a High Commissioner; and this would create no juridical fact incompatible with the proclamation and recognition of a Jewish State. I pleaded with the Chief to let me go back to the UN. We were very thin on the ground with Moshe away.'

He sat down and wrote a letter to Truman asking for recognition of the Jewish State; Josef Cohn took the overnight train to Washington and gave it to the White House. On 14 May a message came from the Executive Office that Truman was sitting with Marshall and Lovett and deliberating on Weizmann's letter. Clark Clifford had telephoned to Eliahu Elath from the White House saying that a more formal approach was necessary. Elath, responding to this approach, drafted a letter as representative, not of the Jewish Agency, but of 'the Jewish State' and sent it in due style and form to the White House in a taxi-cab. Before the cab reached the White House the news came that a State called Israel had been proclaimed in Palestine at a moving ceremony conducted by Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, in the General Assembly, Dr Silver had broken in on the Committees' debate to announce that the State of Israel had been established.

In Weizmann's suite the minutes ticked by. Jonathan Daniels has told how the receipt of his letter in the White House had given Truman his chance. The President had summoned Marshall, Lovett, Niles, Clark Clifford and a State Department official, to consider Weizmann's letter. The meeting had dis-

* Cf. Krammer, pp. 745-54.

persed several times—once in order to elicit Elath’s formal letter announcing that the State referred to in Weizmann’s request for recognition had actually been established. Finally, the decision fell. At 5:16 Truman authorized the recognition of Israel by the United States.

He had kept his word. ‘The old Doctor will believe me now,’ he said.

The representatives of the United States in the General Assembly knew nothing of the President’s announcement. They were still advocating all kinds of proposals other than Jewish statehood. The news of Truman’s recognition broke on them like a thunderbolt. Ambassador Jessup went into a telephone booth to check with the White House and then read the Truman announcement to an Assembly now plunged in a pandemonium of surprise. . . .

The Battle for the Old City of Jerusalem* May 18-28, 1948

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN BAGOT GLUBB**

...Before the entry of the Arab Legion,† the Palmach on Mount Zion had broken into the Old City and made contact with the Jews inside it.‡ They brought eighty men as reinforcements, and renewed supplies of rations and ammunition. When the Arab Legion arrived in the Old City [May 18] a few hours later, the Jewish forces were obliged to withdraw and the Zion Gate was blocked up again. The Jews remained on Mount Zion outside the city walls.

On the top of Mount Zion stood the massive Church of the Dormition, the tall belfry of which overlooked a great part of the Old City from the south, just as Notre Dame overlooked it from the north. High in the belfry of the Dormition, Jewish

* From John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 127-30. Copyright © 1957 by John Bagot Glubb. Reprinted by permission of Hodder and Stoughton Limited.

** British army officer, served as the Chief of General Staff, Arab Legion of Jordan, 1939-56.

+ The Arab Legion was the name given to the regular army of the Hashemite Kingdom of Trans-Jordan. Under the pressure of Arab public opinion, and as a result of the Zionist military operations since early April 1948 (see Appendix VII), which had resulted in the occupation of scores of Arab villages and the main Arab towns of Tiberias, Haifa, and Jaffa, the Arab League, of which Trans-Jordan was a member, had decided to intervene in Palestine with regular military units (see Appendix IX) as soon as the Mandate ended on May 15th, 1948. The Government of Trans-Jordan, whose forces were subsidized by the British Government, had, however, undertaken to the British to move only into areas "allotted" to the Arabs in accordance with the UN partition decision.

‡ This Palmach action in the Old City had as its objective, not the evacuation of the Jewish inhabitants, as is usually claimed by Zionists, but the occupation of the whole city. Cf. Operations Jevussi and Schiffon in Appendix VII. See also Lorch, pp. 755-58.

snipers looked down on the lanes and open spaces within the walls, and took a heavy toll of civilians who were careless enough to come into view.

At the time of Christ, Zion had been within the city walls. Tradition places here the house of Caiaphas, where Our Saviour was brought after His arrest. Here also is shown the place where St. Peter heard the cock crow and went out and wept bitterly. Nearby is the reputed site of the Upper Room, where Our Lord partook of the Last Supper. The whole of the Old City was built in mediæval style, houses crowding on top of one another, and cellars and courtyards sinking down into the earth. The only thoroughfares were narrow streets, often paved in steps. In many places the narrow bazaars were roofed over, while the cobbled alley-ways were spanned by bridges of flying buttresses connecting houses on opposite sides of the street. Sometimes these bridges carried whole buildings, so that the narrow lanes passed through tunnels under blocks of houses. Old Jerusalem, moreover, is built on several small hills divided by little valleys, with the result that the narrow paved streets often enough climb up and down in steps, or in steep irregular slopes between overhanging houses.

Of all the narrow, tortuous and overcrowded quarters of Old Jerusalem, the Jewish quarter was perhaps the most crowded and ramshackle. A pedestrian threading his way through the narrow alleys caught glimpses through half-open doors of tiny inner courtyards, crowded with women and children, with staircases going up to rooms above, and steps going down to subterranean dwellings below. The whole of this teeming rabbit-warren lay on top of the spoil and rubble of centuries—perhaps rather millennia—of poor human dwellings. Throughout most of Palestine, the Jews were not Jews only—they were also (some predominantly) Germans, Russians, Poles or Americans. The ugly blocks of concrete flats, the cheap, slightly flashy and rather jerry-built modernism, testified to the cosmopolitan origin of the inhabitants. But the Jewish quarter of the Old City was essentially Jewish and nothing else—the ancient Judaism of the Law and the Prophets, the Middle Ages and the Ghetto.

So gentle, poor and old-world a community was but ill-fitted for fighting. Indeed, if its members had been left to themselves, the destruction of the Jewish quarter might have been avoided. But before the end of the mandate, a force of Hagana had been slipped into the city, and a fight became inevitable.

While the Arab Legion were defending the ancient walls of the city against repeated Jewish attacks from the outside, they were themselves besieging the inhabitants of the Jewish

quarter within the walls. The total strength of the Arab Legion inside the walled city was about four hundred all ranks, of whom the greater part were manning the walls and repulsing Jewish attacks from without. Only about a hundred men could normally be spared to fight in the Jewish quarter, though they were assisted by a small number of irregulars and civilian police.

It was sometimes possible to use a three-inch mortar, but most of the time the fighting consisted of slow progress from house to house. A hole was knocked in the wall, a hand-grenade thrown in, and then the troops crawled through into the room, weapons at the ready. Then, slowly and carefully, they opened the door into the next room, and followed from room to room, down dark passages, up and down tiny steps and staircases, out into courtyards and down into cellars. Sometimes explosive charges were laid against a dividing wall and detonated. The Arab Legion in those days was still armed with Piats (an abbreviation for Projectors, Infantry, Anti-Tank). The original role of this weapon was to incapacitate a tank at short range, but it was equally effective against masonry, and for breaching walls from one room or house into another.

The lanes in the centre of the Jewish quarter were dominated by the domes of two synagogues, which overlooked all the streets and houses in the vicinity. From these domes, Jewish snipers fired constantly at the surrounding quarters, whenever an Arab showed himself. The Arab Legion commander attempted at first to spare the synagogues, and when fire was opened from them, he warned the Jews that he would be obliged to fire. After the passage of forty-eight hours without a reply, fire was opened on the synagogues also.

The Jews in the Old City resisted the Arab Legion for ten days, withdrawing gradually from house to house in the mediaeval rabbit-warren of the Jewish quarter. On May 28th, white flags appeared on the roofs of the little group of houses into which the Jews had withdrawn. Two old rabbis, their backs bent with age, came forward down a narrow lane carrying a white flag.

There were about 1,500 Jewish prisoners captured in the Old City, including women and children. About three hundred of these were Palmach or Hagana soldiers, not residents of the Jewish quarter. They had been sent in to fight, some before the end of the mandate, and some after May 15th, but before the arrival of the Arab Legion, when the Jewish forces had scaled the walls of the city and for a few hours had re-established contact with the Jews within.

I visited the Old City shortly after the surrender. The prisoners had been moved to a large modern building, just

beyond the limits of the Jewish quarter. On the first floor of this building, many large rooms were occupied by them, while others sat or lay in the wide stone corridors. Men and women lay side by side, most of them looking pale and tired. A few had limbs bandaged owing to minor wounds. Arab orderlies and soldiers of the Arab Legion moved here and there through the crowd of Jews, speaking a word, giving a drink of water or talking among themselves.

As I came up the passage, the soldiers smilingly came to attention with a clatter of weapons. Two or three Jews came forward and shook hands. None of them had any complaints to make. A few attempted to produce documents testifying to their good characters in the days of the British mandate.

Two days later, the Hagana prisoners and young Jews of military age were transferred to a prisoner-of-war camp east of the Jordan. The old men, women and children were sent across the lines to the Jewish side, under the supervision of the Red Cross. As the sad little caravan straggled through the narrow alley-ways of Old Jerusalem, Arab Legion soldiers were seen to be helping along the sick and the old women, and carrying their little bundles of possessions.

"Well, that is what I call chivalry," exclaimed a European Press correspondent, as he watched the convoy hobble past.

It was our answer to Deir Yaseen....*

* For Deir Yasin, see Reynier, pp. 761-66, and J. Kimche, pp. 775-78.

The Death of Count Folke Bernadotte,* September 17, 1948

STATEMENT BY GENERAL AAGE LUNDSTRÖM**

I met Count Bernadotte in Beirut on Thursday morning, 16th September, and went with him to Damascus, where we spent the night. We left Damascus on Friday morning, 17th September, by air at approximately 9.30 a.m. (Arab time). On our way to Kalandia field† we received a message from Haifa to the effect that all aircraft landing at Kalandia would be fired on. As we had sent advance notice of our arrival and had received clearance, we discounted this warning as false and landed at Kalandia without incident. At the airfield we were met by United Nations Observers Colonel Bonnot (France), Colonel Sérot (France) and Major af Petersens (Sweden). With Major Massart (Belgium) as driver, the Count, Colonel Bonnot (France), Lieut.-Colonel Flach (Sweden), Major De Geer (Sweden) and myself, we left the airfield to visit Brigadier Lash of the Arab Legion at Ramallah. The rest of Count Bernadotte's party were ordered to proceed to the American School and to wait for us there.

Before we started, I was told that every other jeep or car was fired upon at the Mandelbaum Gate.‡ I then asked Count

* From Folke Bernadotte, *To Jerusalem*, translated from the Swedish by Joan Bulman (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), Appendix I, pp. 266-70. Reprinted by permission of ABP. A. Norstedt and Söner; and Hodder and Stoughton Limited.

** Count Folke Bernadotte was a member of the Swedish royal family. As representative of the International Red Cross in the later stages of World War II, he helped to save the lives of thousands of Jews and Allied prisoners of war. He was appointed on 14 May 1948, UN Mediator in Palestine. General A. Lundström was Chief of Staff, United Nations Truce Supervision and Personal Representative of Count F. Bernadotte in Palestine.

† A small Arab civilian airport just north of Jerusalem.

‡ The crossing point from Arab to Israeli territory in Jerusalem.

Bernadotte if it would not be wiser to proceed from Ramallah viâ Latrun to Jerusalem. This route would take an hour longer, but would undoubtedly be safer. Count Bernadotte answered: "I would not do that. I have to take the same risks as my Observers, and moreover, I think no one has the right to refuse me permission to pass through the lines. If I do not go, I will be admitting that they [Israeli authorities] have the right to prevent me from crossing the lines." I agreed, and it was decided that after the meeting with Brigadier Lash we would return through the lines at the Mandelbaum Gate. We then left to keep our appointment with Brigadier Lash. After the meeting I asked Brigadier Lash for a guard to take us to the front lines and received an armoured car, which met us on the way to the lines. *En route*, just past Kalandia, our car was fired on from a short distance (pistol shot) and one bullet hit the disc of the rear wheel. We then arrived at the American School,* where we collected the rest of the Count's staff and proceeded to the Mandelbaum Gate and on to the Y.M.C.A.** without incident of any kind.


During lunch at the Y.M.C.A. a programme for the afternoon was settled. Count Bernadotte was to see Dr. Joseph, Military Governor of the Jewish part of Jerusalem, at 6.30 p.m., and before that we were to visit the Government House† and Agricultural School‡ in the Red Cross Area. Three cars were ordered, but I decided that only two would be permitted to pass the lines to the Red Cross Area. One car was driven by Colonel Frank Begley, with Commander Cox in the front seat, the Count, Colonel Sérot and myself in the back seat. The other car was driven by Major Massart, with the Jewish liaison officer Captain Hillman, Miss Wessel, Lieut.-Colonel Flach and Major De Geer as passengers. We went first to Government House. From the roof of the tower Commander Cox pointed out the different areas where there had been a lot of firing, the front lines and neutral zone, etc. The question was raised about eighteen Jewish men who had been brought up to the Agricultural School, while it was desired that still more should be brought in to clean up. Count Bernadotte would not allow that, of course, as it was against his decision. He asked the Swiss doctor, Dr Façel, repre-

* The American School was in the Arab sector of Jerusalem.

** The Y.M.C.A. was in the Israeli sector.

† The former residence of the British High Commissioner had become UN Headquarters since the appointment of a UN mediator.

‡ The Jewish Agricultural School, which remained in the possession of the Jews, was about five hundred yards away from Government House.

Bernadotte's Amendment to the United Nations Partition Recommendation,
September 1948.

Based on the map published in George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East, 1946-1950*.

sending the interest of the International Red Cross Committee at Government House, to come with us to the Agricultural School. When we came to the school the woman in charge was away and Commander Cox was not sure about the terms of the agreement. He wanted to look at his papers in the Y.M.C.A., and the doctor was asked to come with us in order that we might get his opinion on how to deal with this situation. The doctor took his own Red Cross car, and otherwise the order of the cars remained the same, with the Count's car last in the convoy. We went from the neutral zone to the Jewish lines without incident, crossed the check-points and went on farther into the New City. In the Qatamon Quarter we were held up by a Jewish army-type jeep, placed in a road-block, and filled up with men in Jewish Army uniforms. At the same moment I saw a man running from this jeep. I took little notice of this because I merely thought that it was another check-point. However, he put a tommy gun through the open window on my side of the car and fired point-blank at Count Bernadotte and Colonel Sérot. I also heard shots fired from other points and there was considerable confusion. The Jewish liaison officer came running to our car and told Begley, who was at that time out of the car, to drive away as quickly as possible. In the meantime, the man was still firing. Colonel Sérot fell in the seat at the back of me and I saw at once that he was dead. Count Bernadotte bent forward and I thought at the time that he was trying to get cover. I asked him: "Are you wounded?" He nodded and fell back. I helped him to lie down in the car. I now realised that he was severely wounded; there was a considerable amount of blood on his clothes mainly around the heart. By this time the Jewish liaison officer had got into the car and was urging Begley to drive quickly to the Hadassah Hospital (the annex in the New Town), which was only a short distance away. I have the impression that the Jewish liaison officer did everything he possibly could to assist us to get to the hospital as quickly as possible. It could not have taken more than a couple of minutes to make the journey from the scene of the accident to the hospital. When we arrived, with the help of some other people I carried the Count inside and laid him on a bed. We had sent for a medical officer, but while waiting for him to arrive I took off the Count's jacket and tore away his shirt and undervest. I saw that he was wounded around the heart and that there was also a considerable quantity of blood on his clothes about the hip. When the doctor arrived I asked if anything could be done, but he replied that it was too late. Major De Geer went in Dr. Façel's car to fetch the Count's personal doctor, Dr. Ullmark. I stayed with the

Count, and was later joined by Major De Geer, Miss Wessel and Dr. Ullmark. I then left and went to see Colonel Sérot, who had been placed in another room. The doctor confirmed that he had died instantly. After a while I went in a car to the Y.M.C.A. and tried to get in touch with Dr. Joseph and Colonel Dayan, Military Commander of the Israeli Forces in Jerusalem. They arrived at the Y.M.C.A. after a very short time. I said that I would not do anything that would create an impression of panic, but that I had to decide before sunset whether the Observers could stay at their posts during the night without danger. If, in their opinion, there would be considerable danger for the Observers, I would recall them. They assured me that in their opinion, although of course they could make no guarantee, there was no added danger, and I decided that the Observers should remain at their posts. However, I asked Colonel Dayan for a guard to be placed around the Y.M.C.A. Later on Dr. Bunche and General Riley arrived from Kalandia airfield. By that time it had already been decided that the Count's and Colonel Sérot's bodies should be taken to the Y.M.C.A., and onwards, on Saturday morning, 18th September, to Haifa. The bodies would be accompanied by Colonel Bonnot, Lieut.-Colonel Flach and myself with members of the Count's personal staff. A room in the Y.M.C.A. was beautifully prepared by Mr. Miller, head of the Y.M.C.A., and the bodies of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Sérot were laid in state. A short, simple service was conducted by two Catholic priests, and a guard of Officer Observers was mounted inside the room to watch through the night with an enlisted Observer on guard at the door.

On reflection after the incident, I am convinced that this was a deliberate and carefully planned assassination. The spot where the cars were halted was carefully chosen, and the people who approached the cars quite obviously not only knew which car Count Bernadotte was in but also the exact position in the car which he occupied.

Jerusalem, 17th September 1948

The Palestine Arab refugees wait, and multiply, and are debated at the United Nations. In thirteen years, their numbers have increased from 650,000 to 1,145,000. Most of them survive only on rations from the UN agency, UNRWA.† Their subsistence has already cost £110,000,000. Each year, UNRWA has to plead at New York for the funds to carry on, against widespread and especially Western lack of sympathy. There is one reason for this impatience: the attitude created towards these refugees by Israeli argument. For over ten years, Israeli spokesmen have claimed that

Unless we understand how this problem was caused, we cannot rightly judge how it should be solved... The responsibility of the Arab Governments is threefold. Theirs is the initiative for its creation. Theirs is the onus for its endurance. Above all—theirs is the capacity for its solution [Abba Eban to the UN, 1957].

In this inquiry, I propose only briefly to examine the last two of these three claims. The last, about a 'solution,' is that if the Arab host governments were willing, they could resettle the refugees quite easily outside Palestine—where, as Israel claims and as President Kennedy's 1960 election platform also had it, 'there is room and opportunity for them.' This is not even remotely true. UNRWA's new chief, Dr. John Davis, has now bluntly and bravely warned against 'facile assumptions that it rests with the host governments to solve the problem... the simple truth is that the jobs... do not exist today within the host coun-

* From *The Spectator*, May 12, 1961, pp. 672-75. Reprinted by permission.

** Irish journalist and broadcaster; his writings include *The Road to Suez* (London: McGibbon & Kee, 1962).

† United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

tries'. Nor can the jobs be created, Dr. Davis reports, because most of the refugees are unskilled peasants—precisely the host countries' worst problem among their own rapidly expanding populations.

These Arabs, in short, are displaced persons in the fullest, most tragic meaning of the term—an economic truth cruelly different from the myth. But there is also the political myth, and it too has been soothing our highly pragmatic Western conscience for thirteen years. This is the Israeli charge, solemnly made every year and then reproduced around the world, that these refugees are—to quote a character in Leon Uri's *Exodus*—'kept caged like animals in suffering as a deliberate political weapon.'

This, again, Dr. Davis has now bravely called a 'misconception.' The reality here is that the refugees themselves fanatically oppose any resettlement outside Palestine. UNRWA even had to persuade them that concrete huts, even in the UN camps, replacing their squalid tents and hovels, would not be the thin end of a resettlement wedge. Unlike other refugees, *these refuse to move; they insist on going home.*

Why? the answer, I believe, lies in the third of the three issues Israel argues—in the cause itself of the mass exodus. The very fact that cause is argued by *both* sides is significant. Israel claims that the Arabs left because they were ordered to, and deliberately incited into panic, by their own leaders who wanted the field cleared for the 1948 war. It is also argued that there would today be no Arab refugees if the Arab States had not attacked the new Jewish State on May 15, 1948 (though 300,000 had already fled before that date). The Arabs charge that their people were evicted at bayonet-point and by panic deliberately incited by the Zionists.

Examining every official Israeli statement about the Arab exodus, I was struck by the fact that no primary evidence of evacuation orders was ever produced. The charge, Israel claimed was 'documented'; but where were the documents? There had allegedly been Arab radio broadcasts ordering the evacuation; but no dates, names of stations, or texts of messages were ever cited. In Israel in 1958, as a guest of the Foreign Office and therefore doubly hopeful of serious assistance, I asked to be shown the proofs. I was assured they existed, and was promised them. None had been offered when I left, but I was again assured. I asked to have the material sent on to me. I am still waiting.

While in Israel, however, I met Dr. Leo Kohn, professor of political science at Hebrew University and an ambassador-

rank adviser to the Israeli Foreign Office. He had written one of the first official pamphlets on the Arab refugees. I asked him for concrete evidence of the Arab evacuation orders. Agitatedly, Dr. Kohn replied: 'Evidence? Evidence? What more could you want than this?' and he took up his own pamphlet. 'Look at this *Economist* report,' and he pointed to a quotation. 'You will surely not suggest that the *Economist* is a Zionist journal?'

The quotation is one of about five that appear in every Israeli speech and pamphlet, and are in turn used by every sympathetic analysis. It seemed very impressive: it referred to the exodus from Haifa,* and to an Arab broadcast order as one major reason for that exodus.

I decided to turn up the relevant (October 2) 1948 issue of the *Economist*. The passage that has literally gone around the world was certainly there, but I had already noticed one curious word in it. This was a description of the massacre at Deir Yassin** as an 'incident.' No impartial observer of Palestine in 1948 calls what happened at this avowedly non-belligerent, unarmed Arab village in April, 1948, an 'incident'—any more than Lidice is called an 'incident.' Over 250 old men, women and children were deliberately butchered, stripped and mutilated or thrown into a well, by men of the Zionist Irgun Zvai Leumi.†

Seen in its place in the full *Economist* article, it was at once clear that Dr. Kohn's quotation was a second-hand account, inserted as that of an eye-witness at Haifa, by the journal's own correspondent who had not been in that city at the time. And in the rest of the same article, written by the *Economist* correspondent himself, but never quoted by Israel, the second great wave of refugees were described as 'all destitute, as the Jewish troops gave them an hour in which to quit, but simultaneously requisitioned all transport.'

It was now essential to check all other, even secondary, Israeli 'evidence.' Another stock quotation down the years has been that, supposedly, of the Greek-Catholic Archbishop of Galilee. For example, Israel's Abba Eban told the UN Special Political Committee in 1957 that the Archbishop had 'fully confirmed' that the Arabs were urged to flee by their own leaders.

I wrote to His Grace, asking for his evidence of such orders. I hold signed letters from him, with permission to publish, in

* For the exodus from Haifa, see Wilson, pp. 771-74, and above, p. 776, note.

** For Deir Yasin, see Reynier, pp. 761-66, and J. Kimche, pp. 775-78.

† For the Irgun, see Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, J. and D. Kimche, pp. 615-23, and "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600.

which he has categorically denied ever alleging Arab evacuation orders; he states that no such orders were ever given. He says that his name has been abused for years; and that the Arabs fled through panic and forcible eviction by Jewish troops.

As none of the other stock quotations in Israeli propaganda are worth comment, I next decided to test the undocumented charge that the Arab evacuation orders were broadcast by Arab radio—which could be done thoroughly because the BBC monitored all Middle Eastern broadcasts throughout 1948. The records, and companion ones by a US monitoring unit, can be seen at the British Museum.

There was not a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station, inside or outside Palestine, in 1948. There *is* repeated monitored record of Arab appeals, even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine *to stay put*. To select only two examples: on April 4, as the first great wave of flight began, Damascus Radio broadcast an appeal to everyone to stay at their homes and jobs. On April 24, with the exodus now a flood, Palestine Arab leaders warned that

Certain elements and Jewish agents are spreading defeatist news to create chaos and panic among the peaceful population. Some cowards are deserting their houses, villages or cities. . . . Zionist agents and corrupt cowards will be severely punished [Al-Inqaz, the Arab Liberation Radio, at 1200 hours.]

Even Jewish broadcasts (in *Hebrew*) mentioned such Arab appeals to stay put. Zionist newspapers in Palestine reported the same: none so much as hinted at any Arab evacuation orders.

* * *

The fact is that Israel's official charges, which have vitally influenced the last ten years of Western thought about the refugees, are demonstrably and totally hollow. And from this alone, suspicion is justified. Why make such charges at all? On the face of it, this mass exodus might have been entirely the result of 'normal' panic and wartime dislocation.

We need not even touch upon Arab evidence that panic was quite *deliberately* incited. The evidence is there, on the Zionist record. For example, on March 27, four days before the big offensive against Arab centres by the official Zionist (Haganah) forces,* the Irgun's radio unit broadcast in Arabic. Irgun, a

* See Part IV, pp. 755-78.

terrorist organisation like the Stern Gang, was officially disowned by Ben-Gurion and the Haganah. Yet just four days before the Haganah offensive Irgun warned 'Arabs in urban agglomerations' that typhus, cholera and similar diseases would break out 'heavily' among them 'in April and May.'

The effect may be imagined. Two weeks later, it was this same Irgun, apparently so solicitous of Arab welfare, that butchered the people of Deir Yassin. Irgun then called a press conference to announce the deed; paraded other captured Arabs through Jewish quarters of Jerusalem to be spat upon; then released them to tell their kin of the experience. Arthur Koestler called the 'bloodbath' of Deir Yassin 'the psychologically decisive factor in this spectacular exodus.' But this was only Irgun, it may be said. Is there evidence that official Zionist forces—the Haganah under Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency—were inciting panic? An Israeli Government pamphlet of 1958 states that 'the Jews tried, by every means open to them, to stop the Arab evacuation (this same 1958 pamphlet has diluted Deir Yassin to 'the one and only instance of Jewish high-handed [*sic*] action in this war').

There is one recorded instance of such an appeal. It is beyond dispute, even by Arabs, that in Haifa the late gentle Mayor, Shabetai Levi, with the tears streaming down his face, implored the city's Arabs to stay. But elsewhere in Haifa, other Zionists were terrorising Arabs. Arthur Koestler wrote in his book that Haganah loudspeaker vans and the Haganah radio promised that city's Arabs escort to 'Arab territory,' and 'hinted at terrible consequences if their warnings were disregarded.' There are many witnesses of this loudspeaker method elsewhere. In Jerusalem the Arabic warning from the vans was, 'The road to Jericho is open! Fly from Jerusalem before you are all killed!' (Harry Levin in *Jerusalem Embattled*). Bertha Vester, a Christian missionary, reported that another theme was, 'Unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate.' The Haganah radio station also broadcast, in Arabic, repeated news of Arabs fleeing 'in terror and fear' from named places.

Still, however, we have plumbed this exodus only so far as panic is concerned. There are UN and *Economist* reports of forcible expulsion, which is something else. How much evidence is there for this? And were only the 'unofficial' Irgun and Stern forces responsible? This is what Nathan Chofshi, one of the original Jewish pioneers in Palestine, wrote in an ashamed rebuttal of an American Zionist rabbi's charges of evacuation orders:

If Rabbi Kaplan really wanted to know what happened, we old Jewish settlers in Palestine who witnessed the fight could tell him how and in what manner we, Jews, forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages. . . some of them were driven out by force of arms; others were made to leave by deceit, lying and false promises. It is enough to cite the cities of Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, Acre from among numberless others [in *Jewish Newsletter*, New York, February 9, 1959].

Were official Zionist troops involved at any of these places? I propose to select, for the sake of brevity, only the Lydda-Ramle area. It was about the exodus from this area, among others, that the *Economist* reported, 'Jewish troops gave them an hour to quit.'

In their latest book, which has been publicly endorsed by Ben-Gurion, Jon Kimche and his brother devoted considerable detail to the Zionist offensive against Lydda and Ramle.* It was approved by Ben-Gurion; it was undertaken by official Israeli forces under Yigael Alon. And the immediately responsible officer was Moshe Dayan,** commander of the 1956 Sinai attack, now a Cabinet Minister. Kimche has described how, on July 11, 1948, Dayan with his column

drove at full speed into Lydda, shooting up the town and creating confusion and a degree of terror among the population. . . its Arab population of 30,000 either fled or were herded on the road to Ramallah. The next day Ramle also surrendered and its Arab population suffered the same fate. Both towns were sacked by the victorious Israelis.

Ramallah, on the road to which these particular Arabs—numbering over 60,000 from this one area alone—were herded, was up in the Judean hills, outside Zionist-held territory. The 'road to Jericho,' which Arabs in Jerusalem were warned to take, brought them into the Jordan Valley. Some 85,000 are still there in one UN camp alone, under the Mount of Temptation. The Arab population of Acre, mentioned by

* "But now Lydda fell on July 11th and its Arab population of 30,000 either fled or were herded on to the road to Ramallah. The next day Ramle also surrendered and its Arab population suffered the same fate. Both towns were sacked by the victorious Israelis." (Jon and David Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill* [London, 1960], pp. 227-28).

** For Moshe Dayan, see above, p. 373, note, and Mosley, pp. 375-82.

Chofshi, exceeded 45,000; Acre was attacked by official Zionist troops.

* * *

From this analysis of only some of the sources of the Arab exodus, then, it is clear beyond all doubt that official Zionist forces were responsible for expulsion of thousands upon thousands of Arabs, and for deliberate incitement to panic. Seen from the viewpoint of the Arab refugees themselves, little more would need to be said. And needless to say, even those Arabs expelled or who fled through 'unofficially' incited panic can hardly be asked to look differently on the Israeli Government today. It pays former Irgunists and Sternists the same war pensions as former Haganah troops; its denial of expulsion is total.

But is it conceivable that Ben-Gurion and his colleagues could have deliberately contemplated an 'emptying' of Palestine? That a motive existed is beyond doubt. The UN partition scheme had in no way solved the 'Arab problem' that a Jewish State would face.* It would have given Zionism what its leaders publicly called the 'irreducible minimum' of territory in a Palestine they claimed should entirely belong to them. And we know that the official Zionist movement had in fact no intention of accepting the UN territorial award. Six weeks before the British Mandate ended, before the Israeli State was proclaimed, and before the Arab States sent in their armies, an all-out Zionist military offensive was launched.** Later, Ben-Gurion publicly said of this offensive:

As fighting spread, the [Arab] exodus was joined by Bedouin and fellahin [peasants], but not the remotest Jewish homestead was abandoned and nothing a tottering [British] administration could unkindly do stopped us from reaching our goal on May 14, 1948, in a State made larger and Jewish by the Haganah [cf. *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*].

The Jewish State envisaged by the UN would have contained a 45 per cent. Arab population: the extra territory attacked by the Zionists before May 14 would have increased that ratio—for example, by more than 80,000 Arabs in Jaffa alone. But it was not just a question of numbers. The Arabs owned and occupied far too much of the territory's productive and social facilities to enable anything like the mass Jewish immigration of which Zionists dreamed.

* Cf. "Binationalism Not Partition," pp. 674-99, paragraphs 52 to the end.

** See Part IV, pp. 755-78.

What this meant in terms of motive can be seen in the statistics that followed the Arab exodus. More than 80 per cent of the entire land area of Israel is land abandoned by the Arab refugees. Nearly a quarter of all the standing buildings in Israel had been occupied by those Arabs. Ten thousands shops, stores and other firms inside new Israel had been Arab. Half of all the citrus fruit holdings in the new State had belonged to the Arabs now made refugees. By 1954, more than one-third of the entire Jewish population of Israel was living on 'absentee property'—most of it now 'absorbed' into the Israeli economy, and unilaterally sequestered by Israeli legislation against a 'global' compensation offer.

It is, then, little wonder that old Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first President, described the Arab exodus as 'a miraculous simplification of Israel's tasks.' But *was* it 'miraculous'? Unexpected? In no way part of the combined military and economic planning of nascent Israel's leaders?

We come to perhaps the most grave evidence of all. The mass exodus began in April, 1948. By June, the UN Mediator was fully seized of it.* He formally demanded a statement of policy from the new Israeli Government about the refugees. At first, he could get no satisfaction. Then, in an official letter dated August 1, 1948, Israel's Foreign Minister replied.

It was only four months since the first waves of flight; only eleven weeks since Israel had been proclaimed, ostensibly calling on the Arabs to 'play their part in the development of the State.' And it was at this time that a Government since claiming that this whole exodus was unexpected and despite its implorings, formally denied the refugees the right of return. Israel did not merely plead 'security,' but told the United Nations:

On the economic side, the reintegration of the returning Arabs into normal life, and even their mere sustenance, would present an insuperable problem. The difficulties of accomodation, employment, and ordinary livelihood would be insuperable.

* * *

The case rests. This is not the place to discuss a 'solution', and no summary conclusion is needed, save perhaps to recall the words of an official Israeli spokesman, though in rather different import:

* For an account of the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte, see Lundström, pp. 789-94.


Unless we understand how this problem was caused, we cannot rightly judge how it should be solved.

The Arabs of Palestine now enter their fourteenth year of exile. If you go among them in the hills of Judea, they will take you by the arm to a crest of land and point downwards, across the rusty skeins of barbed wire. 'Can you see it—over there beside those trees? That is my home.'

It is shaming beyond all brief descriptions to move among these million people, as a Westerner. It is shaming for many Jews, and some speak out as Nathan Chofshi has bravely done:


We came and turned the native Arabs into tragic refugees. And still we dare to slander and malign them, to besmirch their name. Instead of being deeply ashamed of what we did and trying to undo some of the evil we committed. . . we justify our terrible acts and even attempt to glorify them.

Map 21
Armistice Lines, Spring 1949



Reprinted from George Kirk, *Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East, 1945-1950*.

Map 22



Zion and the Jewish National
Idea*

HANS KOHN**

From the very beginning of its history two national concepts have dominated Jewish life—the concepts of the Chosen People and the Promised Land. From the ancient Hebrews, nationalism everywhere took over these two concepts: the first of a unique and exclusive relationship, God or History having selected one people as pre-eminently called upon to serve a Cause, often the greatest and ultimate Cause; and, secondly, the concept of a part of this earth being singled out by destiny and mystery to be owned forever by the one people. Though most Jews lived in Palestine only the shorter part of the last three thousand years, and though a Jewish state or states existed there only precariously for a few centuries,† nevertheless the Jews felt tied to the Land throughout the three thousand years by a close and unique link. Separated from the Land for many generations, they longed to return. But the Zion to which they longed to return was, until recently, the place where the Temple of the Lord stood, where the faithful could sacrifice to God as the Bible prescribed, and could live their lives in fulfilment of all His ancient commands. Nothing else would have been Zion nor a return to the Land.

“Zion” meant to live according to the word of the Lord. Such a life was a heavy burden. The Bible tells the story of the

* From *The Menorah Journal*, XLVI, Nos. 1 & 2 (1958). Reprinted by permission of the author.

** American Jewish historian and political scientist, Professor Emeritus, City College of New York since 1962, and President of International Society for the History of Ideas. His works include *Western Civilization in the Near East* (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1936) and *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origin and Background* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960).

† See Beatty, pp. 8-11.

ever-repeated attempts of the Hebrews to escape the burden, to liberate themselves from the yoke, to live a "normal" life. The unending procession of rejections started at the very beginning, with the dance around the Golden Calf. It is still going on. It has been one of the unifying threads of Jewish history. It took various forms at various times. Seen in a secular light, it can be interpreted as a search for the meaning of the Jewish national idea, for the realization or rejection of the message of Zion.

Of its ancient history only three high points need be mentioned here. At the very outset of a Jewish state-existence the Bible tells us of the Hebrew elders approaching the prophet Samuel with the request to set a king over them, such as all the other peoples have. What they asked for was something "natural"—to be a people like all the other peoples, to have a government like other governments, a state with all its paraphernalia. Yet Samuel refused their request. God, however, as the Bible narrates, told him to do according to the people's wishes; for, the Lord continued, in their desire to be like all other nations they have not rejected thee, but Me. Samuel warned the people once more, pointing out the consequences: they would become the state's servants instead of God's servants. But the people insisted on forming a state and having a king of their own, "so that we too may become as all the Gentiles are." Then Samuel, against his better judgment, yielded.

After the state had endured for some time amid the vicissitudes and injustices that were normal in the very existence of states, the long line of major prophets from Amos to Jeremiah arose, solitary voices, to challenge the state. Amos, a shepherd from the poor South, shocked his hearers who had gathered to celebrate the victory and prosperity of Israel. In the name of the Lord he proclaimed a new and daring interpretation of the familiar "Chosen People" idea. Recalling the deed by which the Lord had first shown His concern with the children of Israel—leading them out of Egypt into the Promised Land, from bondage to liberty—the Lord declared through Amos: "From all the families of the earth I have chosen you alone; for that very reason I will punish you for all your iniquities." Swollen with confidence and pride, the Israelites were made to hear that to be "chosen" does not imply the assurance of victory or prosperity; being "chosen" brings only the burden of more severe punishment for "normal" unrighteousness.

Amos was even more radical in reinterpreting the "Promised Land" idea. Through his mouth the Lord proclaimed that the children of Israel were unto Him no better than the children of

the Ethiopians. True, God had brought up Israel out of the Land of Egypt; but equally He brought the Philistines (then Israel's hereditary enemies) from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir, guiding each one into its land. Isaiah cherished a similar vision when he saw Egypt and Assyria, the valley of the Nile and Mesopotamia, united, with Israel a link between them, and the Lord of Hosts blessing them, saying: "Blessed be Egypt My people, and Assyria the work of My hands, and Israel My inheritance."

The third high point was reached when the statehood which began with Samuel was for a second time coming to its end. In the besieged city of Jerusalem the zealots fought heroically against the Roman might. But the leading representative of the Judaism of the day, Jochanan ben Zakkai, the disciple of Hillel, abandoned the cause of the Jewish state. Escaping from the city by a ruse, he founded outside its walls, with the agreement of the Roman commander, the academy at Jabne. The state perished. Judaism survived.

The state had been a passing phenomenon, buffeted by all the storms of history, like the states of all other peoples. Judaism lived, developed, grew, a unique phenomenon, strongly rooted in the spiritual instead of the political realm.

II

The dispersion of the Jews throughout the Graeco-Roman world started long before the final end of the Jewish state and the destruction of the Temple. Even after that event many Jews continued to live in Palestine. Wherever they lived, they longed for the rebuilding of the Temple. But also, wherever they lived, they adapted themselves to the environment. For almost two thousand five hundred years Judaism unfolded, in the diaspora, a life of spiritual fertility and variety. Periods of greater productivity alternated with periods of relative sterility. The Jews lived among other "peoples of the Book," Christians and Mohammedans, both of whom derived much of their own thought and spiritual life from the Jewish tradition. In the Age of Religion the Jews formed a distinct group, often persecuted and often tolerated like other religious groups. But though they lived on the peripheries of the Christian and Islamic worlds, they were nevertheless in close contact with them. Though they kept themselves separate, the Jews underwent common influences and participated in the great intellectual movements of the times.*

* Cf. Roth, pp. 45-48.

When the Age of Emancipation dawned for Europe in the eighteenth century, it dawned for the European Jew too. The renovation of life through individualism, through a new intensity of personal feeling, through a new concept of the dignity of man and the oneness of mankind, penetrated in to the Jewish communities of the various countries to the same degree it permeated those countries—in the West much more strongly than in Central Europe and hardly at all in Eastern Europe.* Thus the intellectual movements of the eighteenth century—the Enlightenment and Pietism—made their influence felt among the Jews. Religious Pietism received the Hebrew name of *Hassidism*, the *hassid* being “the pious,” and the rational Enlightenment was called *Haskalah*, again a literal translation of the European term “Enlightenment.”

The fate of the Jewish communities in the nineteenth century coincided with the strength of the general forces of intellectual Enlightenment and political Emancipation in the various countries. These two forces were most powerful in the West, especially in the United States which built its national life on them in the eighteenth century. In the Western World the Jews, like other newly emancipated groups, were becoming integrated into the national societies, stable political and social organisms in which they could fully participate. In Central Europe the situation was different. In the early nineteenth century neither a firm political and social form nor a strong liberal intellectual foundation existed there. The modern political form was found in Germany only in the latter part of the century, but at the price of the withering of the weak shoots of liberalism. The Habsburg Monarchy in Central Europe did not succeed at all in forming a modern national society within which Jewish emancipation and integration could have easily proceeded. That was true throughout the multi-ethnic empire with its burning nationality struggles. The Jew in Prague did not know whether to integrate with the Czechs or the Germans; in Czernowitz (Bukovina) the German, Roumanian, and Ukrainian incipient national societies competed with each other. The situation of the Jews in Central Europe was as fundamentally different from that in the English-speaking countries as the general political life differed in these two regions. Thus for the Jews living there, Central Europe held, as in all its political and social life, an intermediate position between the West and the East.

In nineteenth-century Eastern Europe the Enlightenment and Emancipation never took firm hold—in fact, political and

* Cf. Berger, pp. 57-88.

cultural emancipation for all classes and groups of the population began only half-heartedly with the year 1905. Under these conditions Eastern European Jews continued their life of former times, as a distinct and compact group, with its own culture, its own social structure, its own hopes and desires, without much contact with the surrounding world to which they did not and, in many cases, did not wish to belong. Yet among them, too, the desire and hope for emancipation was strong in the third quarter of the century, as it was among most of the people in Russia. The year 1881 marked a cruel setback for them, as for all the hopes of emancipation in Russia. It is understandable that the Eastern European Jews reacted to this shock of disillusionment, which made their present even more unbearable, in two ways: by starting a mass emigration to the liberal countries of the West, where they could find emancipation and where their children could be integrated in the life of modern nations; and by a renewed longing for the Promised Land, a hope for the restoration of a past seen in historical transfiguration. Looking to this past in the Age of Nationalism, which had meanwhile come to Eastern Europe too, they no longer envisaged it primarily as the restoration of the Temple, the resumption of the sacrifices, a life in the ways of the Lord, but as a state like the other modern nations-states, similar in nature to that which then enticed the hopes and imaginations of all the other unemancipated peoples in Eastern and Central Europe.

Thus from the eighteenth century onward the Jews shared fully in the life of their respective countries, different as they were. In their political and social ideals they reflected the aspirations of their fellow citizens. In 1830 they regarded themselves in Central Europe, with Gabriel Riesser, as "the sons of a century whose breath is freedom." As the century progressed, freedom grew in the West; but the hopes of a similar growth in Central and Eastern Europe were often blighted. Many Jews felt in the Enlightenment, or thought they felt, a profound kinship to Judaism, at least to its prophetic tradition. Were not the foundations of the Age of Enlightenment laid in seventeenth-century Holland and England, to a large extent in the covenants and bills of rights of Anglo-American Puritans who were deeply influenced by the Hebrew Bible? The growth of capitalism and urbanization which facilitated, and was in its turn stimulated by, Enlightenment and Emancipation accelerated in the West the social and economic integration of the Jews. From the early nineteenth century on, the hostility to Jewish emancipation in Central and Eastern Europe was based on the rejection not only of the Enlightenment but also of

capitalism.

Wherever nineteenth-century Emancipation succeeded, it enhanced—like all spiritually liberating movements—Jewish creative productiveness in all fields. The Jews participated prominently in all cultural activities, many of which were open to them now for the first time, in science and philosophy, in secular music and literature, in painting and sculpture. For obvious though opposite reasons Jewish life in the West and in the East was less fraught with complex intellectual tensions than Jewish life in the German-speaking lands. In the West the Jews were fully integrated in the life of their homelands; in the East they continued to live on its margin. In Central Europe the very tensions of an uncertain and questionable relationship became at the same time the soil for great dangers and great achievements.

In Germany the *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, putting Jewish scholarship on entirely new foundations, bore fruit in rejuvenating Jewish learning and thought throughout the world. In Heinrich Heine Jewish Germany contributed one of the greatest German poets, the landmark of German poetry between the death of Goethe and its new flowering at the turn of the century. Marx, Freud, Einstein were among the creative thinkers of the age who influenced it as strongly as Hegel, Darwin, or Nietzsche. An astonishing burst of creativeness rapidly threw the Jews, after centuries of relative sterility in the pre-Emancipation ghetto, into the ranks of all the cultural and social movements of the late nineteenth century.

Thus it was only natural that with the progress of the Age of Nationalism, in the countries where Emancipation was partly stultified by the survival of pre-emancipatory social structures or political ideologies, a Jewish nationalism should develop, though a late-comer among the national movements of Eastern and Central Europe. It was born out of the historical and ideological conditions in those countries; and, like all other national movements there, it looked for its historical foundations, its justification and its promise for the future, to the distant past which it reinterpreted in the light of the desires and aspirations of the modern movement.

III

The Jewish national movement as it arose in Eastern and Central Europe presented an amalgam of the traditional longing for Zion and an urge, an emotional attitude, which originated in the conditions of the late nineteenth-century environment.

The latter had nothing to do with Jewish traditions; it was in many ways opposed to them. The rising tide and the specific temper of Eastern and Central European nationalism, and the socio-political trends of the time, provided the framework within which Jewish nationalism interpreted the past and viewed the future.

Those Jews in Eastern Europe who were willing to abandon the exclusive structure of Jewish traditional life had hoped for political and social emancipation by the tide of liberalism which was to transform Eastern Europe to accord with Western ways. The dark years Russia lived through from 1881 to 1904 seemed to extinguish the hope. It was under these conditions that Dr. Leo Pinsker, a physician in Odessa, published his pamphlet "Auto-Emancipation."

Like other nationalists of the nineteenth century, Pinsker called upon his people to liberate themselves by their own effort. This effort would make the Jews a nation "like all other nations, a people with a common language, common customs, and a common land." Pinsker's call to action was coupled with the nineteenth-century belief in the redeeming force of productive manual labor and contact with the soil. Jews had been going to Palestine and had lived there throughout the centuries to pray and to study, to fulfil the commands of God, and to await the coming of the Messiah and the rebuilding of the Temple. Now they were to go and settle there as farmers and artisans in the hope of building a "normal" state where Jews would live what late nineteenth-century Europe regarded a "normal" life, in which the rebuilding of the Temple and even the fulfilment of all the commandments had no place, or at least no central place. In that sense Pinsker's "Auto-Emancipation" marked a break with Zion and with the Jewish tradition.

Pinsker's words moved only a very small circle of East-European Jews. An insignificant number of pioneers went forth to Palestine; the vast majority of emigrants preferred the West. The first Jewish agricultural settlements in Palestine, nurtured with great love by the society of "Lovers of Zion" founded by Dr. Pinsker, were saved from collapse by Baron Edmond Rothschild.

A decade later, however, a new start was made. This time a much more powerful personality than Pinsker, without knowing anything of Pinsker, of the East-European movement or of the Jewish tradition, assumed leadership. Its call came not from far-off Odessa but from Vienna. Theodor Herzl was a young successful journalist who represented the leading liberal Viennese newspaper in Paris at the time of the Dreyfus Affair.

During those years antisemitism was becoming a vital force in Vienna under the leadership of men like Georg von Schönerer and Dr. Karl Lueger. Under the pressure of the rising nationalist movements liberalism was retreating throughout the Austrian Empire. The experience of the Dreyfus Affair created in Herzl an impression of the ubiquity and inevitability of antisemitism. In a sudden inspiration he wrote his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* ("The State of Jews"). From that moment (1896) he dedicated himself for the rest of his short life to the cause of creating an internationally recognized Jewish state, which would by its very existence end antisemitism. Through the power of his personality and through indefatigable labor he succeeded in creating the first world-wide international political Jewish movement. He gave it a representative tribune in the Zionist Congress.* In its name he negotiated with statesmen and diplomats and tried to impress his faith upon the consciousness of the world. Characteristically he named the official organ the movement *Die Welt* ("The World").

On the fiftieth anniversary of *Der Judenstaat* Dr. Hannah Arendt pointed out, in a profound analysis in *Commentary*, that Herzl regarded antisemitism as a perpetual immutable force which the Jews must learn to use to their own advantage. He pictured the Jewish people everywhere and at all times "surrounded and forced together by a world of enemies." In his oversimplified picture of history and reality, "any segment of reality that could not be defined by antisemitism was not taken into account and any group that could not definitely be classed as antisemitic was not taken seriously as a political force." Regarding the situation of his own time and place as an eternally durable one, Herzl proposed a solution based upon the premises of his time and place, namely, to constitute the Jews, whom he considered a biological group, as a nation like all other nations in their own state. At the beginning he was interested neither in the history and character of the Jews and Judaism nor in the land where they were to settle. At first he did not think of Palestine as the needed homeland, nor of a Jewish cultural life expressed in its own language. His solution was a simple one—to give to the people without land a land without people. What kind of people this was, or whether such a land existed, were not his primary considerations.

His contact with the East-European Zionist movement made him determine on the land, Palestine, though not on Hebrew.

* Cf. "The Basle Program," p. 89.

But Palestine was not a land without people.* Herzl, under the influence of the liberal ideas that still prevailed when he was brought up, took this fact into consideration. In his Diaries (which Marvin Lowenthal has handsomely edited in English), Herzl wrote: "My testament for the Jewish people: so build your state that a stranger will feel contented among you."¹ He visited Palestine only once and very briefly, not to get in touch with the Jewish population nor with the Arabs of the land, but to present a request to the German Emperor who was then visiting Turkey. Yet he perceived more clearly than many others what was going on in the Middle East. On his visit to Egypt he was struck by the intelligence of the young Egyptians, and he recorded in his Diary: "They are the coming rulers of the country; and it is a wonder that the British don't see this." Others understood the rising force of Arab nationalism even less than the British. Yet for none outside the Middle East was the new force of Asian nationalisms of so great and vital a significance as for Jewish nationalism in its territorial Zionist form. This latecomer among the nationalisms of Central and Eastern Europe threatened by its transfer to the Middle East to come into conflict with the new nationalisms of Asia.

Herzl wished to avoid this conflict, perhaps because it ran counter to his liberal background, perhaps because he understood that such a conflict might ruin Zionism. In the last book he wrote, *Altneuland* ("Oldnewland"), which he left as a testament to the movement he had founded and inspired, he drew a picture of the future Jewish state, envisaging it as a New Society.² In its basic traits it reflected the liberal views of the Viennese Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century. Life in the Jewish state was not based on Jewish traditions, nor was Hebrew spoken there. It was not a new ghetto, living in seclusion from the world and animated by a feeling of hostility to its environment. "It is founded on the ideas which are a common product of all civilized nations," Herzl summed up his vision of his open society. "It would be immoral if we would exclude anyone, whatever his origin, his descent, or his religion, from participating in our achievements. For we stand on the shoulders of other civilized peoples. . . . What we own we owe to the preparatory work of other peoples. Therefore, we have to repay our debt. There is only one way to do it, the highest tolerance. Our motto must therefore be, now and ever: Man, you are my brother."

Picturing an electoral campaign in the new state, Herzl

* Cf. "Letter from Theodore Herzl to Youssef Zia al-Khalidi," pp. 91-93.

directed his wrath against the nationalist or chauvinist party which wished to make the Jews a privileged element in the land. Herzl regarded that as a betrayal of Zion, for Zion was identical to him with humanitarianism and tolerance. That was as true in politics as in religion. "Matters of faith were once and for all excluded from public influence," he wrote. "Whether anyone sought religious devotion in the synagogue, in the church, in the mosque, in the art museum, or in a philharmonic concert, did not concern society. That was his private affair."

One of the central passages of *Altneuland* deals with the situation of the Mohammedan Arabs in this new Zion. Their spokesman, Reshid Bey, explained to a Christian nobleman, Mr. Kingscourt, that the Arab inhabitants had lost nothing but gained very much from the new order. "You are strange people, you Mohammedans!" Mr. Kingscourt exclaimed. "Don't you look upon these Jews as intruders?" "Christian, how strange your speech sounds," the Mohammedan replied. "Would you regard those as intruders and robbers who don't take anything away from you but give you something? The Jews have enriched us, why should we be angry at them? They live with us like brothers, why should we not love them?"*

Fifty years after Herzl wrote his testament to the movement, the reality turned out to be the opposite of the hope he had expressed. Nowhere in the world was a Jewish community regarded with the hostility, distrust, and fear directed at the Jews in Palestine by their neighbours. Nowhere have Jews felt so exposed as in Palestine. Whereas Herzl erred in his generous prediction of Zionist humanitarianism, his oversimplification of antisemitism which formed the premise to the conclusions in *Der Judenstaat* seemed to be borne out, for a brief time at least, by the new and fearful reality of Hitlerism. Herzl had regarded antisemitic governments as Zionism's best allies, because they would help the transfer of Jews from their homelands to the Jewish state. In an indirect way, foreseen by neither Herzl nor Hitler, Hitlerism did make the Jewish state possible.

Herzl's great liberal vision of Zion as a common home of happy Jews, Mohammedans, and Christians was never accepted by the large majority of his followers.** But his oversimplified analysis of the Jewish situation did win him, after 1933, many millions of new adherents. Yet this analysis of the Jews everywhere and at all times, actually or potentially, living among enemies, could not make the realization of Zionism easier. "The

* For a different interpretation of Herzl, see Leonhard, pp. 115-24.

** See Leonhard, pp. 115-24.

universality with which Herzl applied his concept of antisemitism to all non-Jewish peoples made it impossible from the very beginning for the Zionists to seek truly loyal allies," writes Dr. Hannah Arendt. "His notion of reality as an eternal, unchanging hostile structure—all *goyim* everlastingly against all Jews—made the identification of hard-boiledness with realism plausible because it rendered any empirical analysis of actual political factors seemingly superfluous. All one had to do was to use the 'propelling force of antisemitism,' which, like 'the wave of the future,' would bring the Jews into the promised land. . . . If we actually are faced with open or concealed enemies on every side, if the whole world is ultimately against us, then we are lost."

IV

As Hannah Arendt has said, "Herzl thought in terms of nationalism inspired from German sources."³ According to the German theory, people of common descent or speaking a common language should form one common state. Pan-Germanism was based on the idea that all persons who were of German race, blood, or descent, wherever they lived or to whatever state they belonged, owed their primary loyalty to Germany and should become citizens of the German state, their true homeland. They, and even their fathers and forefathers, might have grown up under "foreign" skies or in "alien" environments, but their fundamental inner "reality" remained German.

Such ideas of nationalism run counter to those held by the Western peoples, among whom it is not common descent nor even a common language that determines the national character and personal loyalty. The great nations of the West, above all the United States, are the products not of "immutable laws of race," but of an intermingling of peoples and individuals of varied and often unknown descent. Herzl himself never carried his concept of Zionism as a pan-movement to an extreme. The Jewish state in Palestine, as he conceived it, was not to gather all Jews into their "true" homeland. It was to be a refuge for those who could not or did not wish to remain in their old homelands. Their emigration, Herzl believed, would diminish antisemitism everywhere and thus make the assimilation of the remaining Jews easier.

Far more important was the fact that Herzl's concept of "political" Zionism broke with two thousand years of Jewish history, during which the Jews were "a people of thinkers and poets." They called themselves *am hasepher*, "the People of the

Book," or *am haruach*, "the People of the Spirit." Herzl's appeal to Central and East-European young men was so powerful because it seemed to conform to a general trend of the time—from religion to secularism, from contemplation to activity, from the ivory tower to politics. Herzl himself never drew the ultimate conclusions inherent in his point of view. For he was too much a child of the mid-nineteenth century, an age when traditional ethical and humanitarian values survived in secularized form as a living force. That situation changed in Central and Eastern Europe with the approach of the twentieth century.

Under the influence of an oft misunderstood Nietzsche, a young Hebrew writer who had come from the strictest Jewish orthodoxy of Russia to the intellectual fermentation of Berlin, Micha Joseph Berdychewski, rejected the Jewish tradition in an attempt to re-evaluate all values. To him Nietzsche was the prophet of will-to-power and of the master-man, who proclaimed the need of a new vitality, of overflowing joy of life, of an ecstatic affirmation of primitive nature. Under his influence a reinterpretation of Jewish history became fashionable. The Hebrew prophets and the long line of rabbis and scholars of the last two thousand years appeared as the grave-diggers, the corruptors and defamers of the true Jewish life which was represented by the "sinful" kings, and the men of the soil, and the nationalist zealots of ancient Israel and Judah whose statesmanlike wisdom and heroic deeds equaled those of other peoples. Berdychewski turned to the Bible, to the documents of ancient Jewish tradition, in an entirely new spirit, to find remnants there of the natural polytheism, of colorful myth and barbaric strength, which the ancient Hebrew tribes had possessed and which prophets and priests later expurgated. The ancient Hebrews, Berdychewski believed, must have more resembled full-blooded pagans than the later "anemic" spiritualized and intellectualized Jews who lost all their natural vitality under the yoke of God's law.

Similarly, one of the notable modern Hebrew poets, Saul Tchernichowsky, celebrated the primitive Hebraism of those tribes which, emerging from the desert under Joshua's leadership, overran and conquered Canaan. To Tchernichowsky they were virile and beautiful like the ancient Greeks and to their Hebrew god Tchernichowsky paid homage in his poem, "Before the Statue of Apollo," in which he turned his back upon Judaism.

I have left the ancient paths,
 And far behind me in the dark wander the sons of death.
 See me here, the first who turns to thee.
 My living earthly soul,

Which hates the eternal rigidity of dying,
 Will now break the fetters of the spirit.
 Living sentiment, degenerated in the course of time,
 Breaks out of the prison built by one hundred generations. . .

Thine image is a symbol of light in life.

I bow before thee, life's strength and beauty,
 Bow before youth which like a whirlwind
 Frights and chases away those withered dried-up people
 Who have tried to take my God's life,
 And who fetter with their prayer-straps
El shaddai, the lord of the deserts,
 Who led Canaan's daring conquerors.

Thus Tchernichowsky turned away from the God of Israel to the tribal idol of the desert, glorifying its survival in the nature-cults of Baal and Astarte. Such pagan revolts have been known throughout ancient Jewish history; those "festivals of life" burst forth frequently, but always they were rejected as apostasy. Judaism did not arise in the gods of nature, of soil and blood, which the primitive Hebrew tribes may have adored as did their contemporaries. It was as a religious ethical insight that Judaism began. Without this there may be Hebrew tribes as good or as bad as other primitive peoples, but no Judaism.

Divested of their philosophical aura, the attitudes of Berdychevsky and Tchernichowsky influenced the gifted Russian journalist Vladimir Jabotinsky.* Jabotinsky called upon the Jewish youth to remember the heroic battles of the ancient zealots and to fill themselves with a soldiering spirit. He revived the names of Bethar and Massada, those small fortified positions where the last defenders of the Jewish state held out in a desperate struggle. He strove to reawaken pride in military deeds, in combat and arms. He held up those who died fighting the Arabs in Palestine as models to be ever present in the minds of the youth. Immediately following World War I he demanded the establishment in Palestine—a country where the Arabs then formed 90 per cent of the population—of a regime which would make possible such a mass immigration of Jews that they would rapidly become the majority. Such a "colonial" regime could be maintained only by strong armed forces against the bitter resistance of the Palestinian population and in complete disregard of their rights. The frontiers of Jewish Palestine were to be extended as far as they had ever reached in any period

* Cf. Jabotinsky, pp. 321-30, and above, p. 446, note.

of history.

Naturally, Jabotinsky rejected Herzl's concept of the coming Jewish state as outlined in *Altneuland*. Jabotinsky was convinced that the Arabs could not be reconciled to Jewish domination of Palestine. Rather, he believed that the same methods must be applied there as in other schemes of European colonization in backward lands. Like so many of the young men in Eastern and Central Europe after World War I and after the rise of fascism, Jabotinsky was deeply impressed by the "realism" of toughness. The old liberal world of the West seemed doomed. New forces, which scornfully rejected humanitarianism or concern for the rights of others, claimed to represent the wave of the future. National egoism alone seemed to guarantee survival in a world which gloried more in biological vitality than in ethical rationality.

The early triumph of Hitler convinced many that Jabotinsky was right. They overlooked the fact that Hitler like Mussolini went down in defeat, and that neither of them contributed to the strength or betterment of their peoples. What appeared supreme realism later revealed itself as a cynical illusion.

V

Until World War II Jabotinsky and his followers represented only a small minority in the Zionist movement. Its official leader, Chaim Weizmann,* was a steady target of Jabotinsky's violent attacks. Weizmann, though a fervent Zionist, was at the same time a true realist and a liberal. He was born in Eastern Europe, but lived his mature life in Britain, acquiring there the liberal outlook of the West. He knew the assumption that Zionism wanted to build a state at the expense of the national claims of the native population was, to liberal world opinion, especially in the English-speaking countries, the strongest argument against it.

In a penetrating study (in *Jewish Social Studies* of July, 1951), Robert Weltsch analyzed the tragedy of Weizmann's leadership. Weizmann had to mediate between liberal world opinion and the often disparate wishes of his followers. Officially the Zionists emphasized "that the Jews did not come to Palestine in order to dominate the Arabs, and they also declared most solemnly on many occasions that no Arab shall be expelled

* Cf. Weizmann, pp. 189-91, and pp. 331-33, Eban, pp. 737-43, and pp. 779-83.

from the country." At the meeting of the Zionist General Council in Berlin in August 1930, Weizmann declared that a transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state was impossible, "because we could not and would not expel the Arabs. . . . Moreover, the Arabs, he said, were as good Zionists as we are; they also loved their country and they could not be persuaded to hand it over to someone else. Their national awakening had made considerable progress. These were facts which Zionism couldn't afford to ignore." To speak of a Jewish state would make people believe the "calumnies" which were steadily being spread that Zionism aimed at the expulsion of the Arab population.

On the eve of the seventeenth Zionist Congress which met in Basle in 1931, Weizmann opposed proclaiming a Jewish state as the aim of Zionism. "The world will construe this demand only in one sense, that we want to acquire a majority in order to drive out the Arabs." In a speech before the Congress Weizmann rejected this interpretation as unfounded. "We Zionists know that this [to dominate the Arabs or to drive them out] is not our aim and we have always emphasized it. . . . A numerical majority alone would not be a sufficient guarantee of the security of our National Home. The security has to be created by reliable political guarantees and by friendly relations to the non-Jewish world surrounding us in Palestine. . . . It is our desire to eliminate all fear and to avoid everything that could cause fear, however erroneously, and in this way to create an atmosphere of quiet and confidence, which according to my view will be the best foundation for our work and for the growth of the National Home."

Robert Weltsch calls Weizmann one of the last representatives of humanist Zionism, a Zionism based on the assumption "that the reborn Jewish nation would avoid all those national excesses from which Jews had so much to suffer among other nations. Intolerant, brutal, egotistical nationalism would be unacceptable to Jews who had learned to know what it means. The Jewish people which has recovered its national self-consciousness and pride would be sympathetic to other peoples in similar conditions who are striving to recover their national freedom, and from this attitude a mutual understanding could arise which would enable different nationalities to live together and to co-operate for the sake of the well-being of all."

Such an attitude alone could mean "Zion." It had inspired also Herzl's vision of *Altneuland*.

The climate of strident nationalism and fascism after World War I changed the outlook of many Zionists. Weizmann lost his influence over the movement to the "activism" of David

Ben-Gurion.* During World War II Jabotinsky's program was accepted as the official Zionist goal in the so-called Biltmore Program.** In his autobiography Weizmann described the atmosphere which he found in Palestine in 1944 with a curious air of understatement. "Here and there a relaxation of the old traditional Zionist puritan ethics, a touch of militarization,† and a weakness for its trappings; here and there something worse—the tragic, futile, un-Jewish resort to terrorism‡... and worst of all, in certain circles, a readiness to compound with the evil, to play politics with it, to condemn and not to condemn it, to treat it not as the thing it was, namely an unmitigated curse to the National Home, but as a phenomenon which might have its advantages."

The "evil" was not only here and there; it was rapidly taking root and growing. Military victory created the new state; and, like Sparta or Prussia, on military virtue it remained based. The militarization of life and mind represented not only a break with humanist Zionism, but with the long history of Judaism. The *Zeitgeist*, or at least the *Zeitgeist* of twentieth-century Central and Eastern Europe, had won out over the Jewish tradition.

VI

Yet this development did not go unchallenged within the ranks of Zionism. The first to foresee it, and to combat it, was a fervent lover of Zion, a Russian Jew, who could not imagine a Zionism that would not be a fulfilment of Judaism. Ahad Ha-am (in Hebrew, "One of the People") was the pen-name of Asher Ginzberg. He assumed it when at the age of 33 (in 1889) he published his first article and became "accidentally" a writer, "a thing I had never thought of till then." He became the foremost Hebrew writer of his time, the creator of the modern Hebrew essay and the teacher of a whole generation; but he

* See Leonhard, pp. 115-24.

** For the "Biltmore Program," see pp. 495-97 and K. Roosevelt, pp. 515-26.

† Cf. Ben-Gurion, pp. 371-74, and pp. 399-402, and Mosley and Ben-Gurion, pp. 375-87.

‡ For Weizmann's attitude to Jewish terrorism, cf. Richard Crossman, *A Nation Reborn* (London, 1960), p. 77. After the King David Hotel had been blown up by the Irgun, Crossman reports, "As the tears streamed down his cheeks he [Weizmann] said to me, 'I can't help feeling proud of our boys. If only it had been a German headquarters, they would have got the V.C.!' " See also, p. 603, note.

never got to be a professional writer. He wrote only when he felt impelled by his deep sense of responsibility for the Jewish heritage and for the Jewish future. The pen-name is not without some irony. He considered himself as not more than "one of the people," with every fiber of his being devoted to the people's revival. Yet, in his emphasis on the spiritual and moral aspects of the national revival, Ahad Ha-am found himself increasingly opposed to the popular political nationalism which the people embraced.

He grew up in "one of the most benighted spots" in the Jewish districts of Russia, where the segregation from the surrounding world was complete to a degree incomprehensible to citizens of the West. His whole education was steeped in traditional Judaism. He was not allowed to look at the letters of the Russian alphabet, let alone to learn Russian. "The reason was," he wrote in his reminiscences, "that my mother's father had with his own ears heard one of the great religious leaders say that the sight of a foreign letter made the eyes unclean." Only at the age of twenty, and almost surreptitiously, he began to learn Russian and German. At thirty he escaped from the "isolation and fanaticism" of his small home town to Odessa, then the center of the Zionist movement. There he edited a famous Hebrew magazine, *Hashiloah*. The name was chosen from a passage in the prophet Isaiah, in which God threatened to punish Israel because it despised "the waters of Shiloah which flows softly" and instead trusted in strength and might. The monthly was not to be a party organ, but an open forum that would seek for a deeper understanding of the Jewish problem, and an unprejudiced approach to it.

The first essay that Ahad Ha-am published was called "This is Not the Way." It contained the warning, which all his future writings continued, that the revival of Zion was desirable and practicable only if the Jews did not become like other peoples. He opposed a settlement in the Holy Land based upon over-valuation of numbers and power and speed. He knew that the means determine the end, and the way in which the foundations are laid defines the strength of the structure. Like all ethicists, he was modest as regards the goal and exacting about the means. "The main point, upon which everything depends, is not how much we do but how we do it," he wrote in his report, "The Truth from Palestine," after his visit there in 1891.

There for the first time Ahad Ha-am laid his finger on the problem which, for practical and ethical reasons alike, was the fundamental though neglected problem of Zionism in Palestine

—the Arab problem. To the eyes of most Zionists the land of their forefathers appeared empty, waiting for the return of the dispersed descendants, as if history had stood still for two thousand years. From 1891 on Ahad Ha-am stressed that Palestine was not only a small land but not an empty one. It could never gather, as the prayer-book demands, all the scattered Jews from the four corners of the earth. The Bible foresaw this ingathering for the days of the Messiah, when all problems would be solved in a regenerated mankind. To confound Messianic hopes with political potentialities must lead of necessity to moral and ultimately physical disaster.

Ahad Ha-am pointed out that there was little untilled soil in Palestine, except for stony hills or sand dunes. He warned that the Jewish settlers must under no circumstances arouse the wrath of the natives by ugly actions: must meet them rather in the friendly spirit of respect. "Yet what do our brethren do in Palestine? Just the very opposite! Serfs they were in the lands of the diaspora and suddenly they find themselves in freedom, and this change has awakened in them an inclination to despotism. They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without cause, and even boast of these deeds; and nobody among us opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination." That was written in 1891 when the Zionist settlers formed a tiny minority in Palestine. "We think," Ahad Ha-am warned, "that the Arabs are all savages who live like animals and do not understand what is happening around. This is, however, a great error."

This error unfortunately has persisted ever since. Ahad Ha-am did not cease to warn against it, not only for the sake of the Arabs but for the sake of Judaism and of Zion. He remained faithful to his ethical standard to the end. Twenty years later, on July 9, 1911, he wrote to a friend in Jaffa: "As to the war against the Jews in Palestine, I am a spectator from afar with an aching heart, particularly because of the want of insight and understanding shown on our side to an extreme degree. As a matter of fact, it was evident twenty years ago that the day would come when the Arabs would stand up against us." He complained bitterly that the Zionists were unwilling to understand the people of the land to which they came and had learned neither its language nor its spirit.

Ahad Ha-am was a dedicated Jewish nationalist. But this Jew from the most secluded mid-nineteenth century Russian ghetto was akin in spirit to the English liberalism of Mill and Gladstone. So little does race or even early upbringing and environment count as compared with the spirit. In this spirit

Ahad Ha-am who loved Hebrew, who never wrote in any other language, who mastered Hebrew as did no other writer of his generation, opposed the boycott which the Hebrew teachers in Palestine proclaimed against the Jewish Institute of Technology in Haifa, when for practical reasons it decided to employ an "alien" language of instruction. In a letter of May 19, 1914, he wrote: "I am in general absolutely opposed to all forms of boycott. Even in childhood I detested the Jerusalem *herem* [religious boycott proclaimed by orthodox rabbis], and this feeling has remained in my heart to this day, even if the boycott emanates from the Hebrew Teachers' Union. Call it *herem* or call it boycott, I loathe it. If I were in Palestine, I would fight this loathsome practice with all my might. I do not care if they call me a reactionary, or even traitor; what was ugly in my eyes thirty years ago remains ugly now."

In a letter of November 18, 1913, to Moshe Smilansky, a pioneer settler in Palestine, Ahad Ha-am had protested against another form of nationalist boycott, proclaimed by the Zionist labor movement in Palestine against the employment of Arab labor, a racial boycott:* "Apart from the political danger, I can't put up with the idea that our brethren are morally capable of behaving in such a way to men of another people; and unwittingly the thought comes to my mind: if it is so now, what will be our relation to the others if in truth we shall achieve 'at the end of time' power in *Eretz Israel*? If this be the 'Messiah,' I do not wish to see his coming."

Ahad Ha-am was in the prophetic tradition not only because he subjected the doings of his own people to ethical standards. He also foresaw, when very few realized it, the ethical dangers threatening Zion.

Ahad Ha-am returned to the Arab problem in another letter to Smilansky written in February, 1914. Smilansky had been bitterly attacked by Palestinian Zionists because he had drawn attention to the Arab problem. Ahad Ha-am tried to comfort him by pointing out that the Zionists had not yet awakened to reality. "Therefore, they wax angry towards those who remind them that there is still another people in *Eretz Israel* that has been living there and does not intend at all to leave its place. In the future, when this illusion will have been torn from their hearts and they will look with open eyes upon the reality as it is, they will certainly understand how important this question is and how great is our duty to work for its solution."

In his confidence in the strength of the ethical tradition

* See Simpson, pp. 303-7.

among his fellow Zionists, Ahad Ha-am erred. Nearly half a century later the illusion of which he wrote in 1914 still persisted, and the reliance upon power and diplomacy had grown to an extent none could foresee in 1914.

In 1902 Ahad Ha-am subjected Herzl's *Altneuland* to a devastating criticism. Herzl's Zionism was to Ahad Ha-am too political, too devoid of Jewish traditional concepts, too mechanical, relying far too much on antisemitism as its driving force and not on the rebirth of the Jewish heart. Yet, despite their fundamental differences, the Hebraist steeped in the tradition of his people and the assimilated Central European Jew met on one decisive point. *Altneuland* was full of thriving Arab cities and villages with a highly contended population that had profited and increased as a result of the coming of Zionist settlers, with whom they lived in mutual respect and harmony. Neither Ahad Ha-am nor Herzl, neither the moralist nor the political leader, could envisage the dispossession of the Arab Palestinian people.* Such an eventuality seemed to them not only ethically repugnant but realistically most unwise, because it would hinder the growth of an atmosphere of peace between Israel and its neighbors. Without such an atmosphere Zion could not be built, and the existence of Israel would be ever threatened, not only morally but practically. Such an atmosphere of peace could be built only upon deeds and not upon words, upon compromise and not upon conquest.

VII

When after World War I Ahad Ha-am settled in Palestine the situation had deteriorated. Throughout Eastern and Central Europe the War had destroyed the forms of Jewish life. A violent wave of sanguinary pogroms swept the Ukraine and Poland. Under its impact the hopes of political Zionism were rekindled. Should not, in this hour of an apparent birth of a new world-order, the Jewish nation also be restored in its historic homeland? This hope was fanned by the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which the British Government promised "to view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. . . it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. . . ."

* For Herzl's contemplation of the dispossession of the indigenous peoples, see Leonhard, pp. 115-24.

** For the Balfour Declaration, see Manuel, pp. 165-72, and Jeffries, pp. 173-88.

was originally submitted to the Zionist Organization it wanted to substitute the words "the reconstitution of Palestine as the national home" for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home"; but the British Government rejected that demand.

Nevertheless, the Zionists interpreted the Balfour Declaration as a promise to restore the Jewish state in Palestine. They even demanded the inclusion of Trans-Jordan, Hauran, Hermon and the southern part of Lebanon in the area of the promised Jewish national home.* Their hopes and expectations were high. After two thousand years of migration they at last stood at the gates of a country which they regarded theirs by divine as well as historical right. Their indignation was great when they found the land occupied by a people who disputed their right to it.

By a tragic historical coincidence the Arabs were then, like all Asian peoples, awakening to national consciousness and undergoing a process of profound psychological change. World War I had stirred them to the depths; to them, as to the Zionists, the promises of the Great Powers had offered the vision of a new glorious life, the breath of a new freedom, the revival of their national culture. Few then understood the reality. In a speech in London on August 20, 1919 Weizmann pointed to the universal unrest then sweeping the East. Palestine's economic and ethnic conditions, he said, linked it with Syria and to some extent with Egypt, and all events in those two countries found their echo in Palestine where the pan-Arab movement had by then penetrated.

The consequences of the Balfour Declaration became quickly visible. The Arabs, not only in Palestine, opposed it violently.** They saw in it an attempt to occupy an Arab land and to drive a wedge against Arab unity at its most vulnerable junction. J. Ramsay Macdonald, then the leader of the British Labor Party, visited Palestine in 1922 and in a pamphlet published by the Zionist Labor Party he wrote: "We encouraged an Arab revolt against Turkey by promising to create an Arab kingdom including Palestine. At the same time we were encouraging the Jews to help us, by promising them that Palestine could be placed at their disposal for settlement and government; and also, at the same time, we were secretly making with France the Sykes-Picot Agreement partitioning the territory which we had instructed our governor-general of Egypt to promise to the Arabs. No one who has felt the undercurrents of Eastern movements can console himself with the belief that the Arab

* See Map 3.

** Cf. "The King-Crane Commission of Inquiry, 1919," pp. 213-18.

has forgotten or forgiven, or that the moral evil we committed will speedily cease to have political influence. Our treatment of the Moslems has been a madness.”

From 1919 on, the Arabs had felt all their hopes dashed by the imperial policies of the West; and their bitter disappointment and resentment have in no way been diminished by the events that followed after 1945. From the Arab point of view, the policy followed by the West after both World War I and World War II seemed to have the purpose of weakening, dividing, and humiliating the Arabs and driving them, against their will, into an attitude of hostility towards the West.

Nor did Western policy fulfil Zionist aspirations. The British tried to safeguard the minimum of Arab rights and interests in Palestine. The first British High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, who was appointed because of his active sympathy with Zionism, declared on June 3, 1921: “I hear it said in many quarters that the Arab population of Palestine will never agree to their country, their holy places, and their lands being taken from them and given to strangers. . . . People say that they cannot understand how it is that the British Government, which is famous throughout the world for its justice, could ever have consented to such a policy. I answer that the British Government. . . has never consented and will never consent to such a policy. . . [The Balfour Declaration] means that the Jews, a people who are scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always turned to Palestine, should be enabled to find their home, and that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers and interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in order to help by their resources and efforts to develop the country to the advantage of all its inhabitants. If any measures are needed to convince the Moslem and Christian population. . . that their rights are really safe, such measures will be taken. For the British Government, the trustee under the Mandate for the happiness of the people of Palestine, would never impose upon them a policy which that people had reason to think was contrary to their religious, their political, and their economic interests.”*

This statement was confirmed in the House of Commons on June 14, 1921 by Winston Churchill, at that time Colonial Secretary. Its spirit animated the declaration of British policy on Palestine of June 3, 1922.

But this British attitude satisfied neither the Zionists nor the Arabs. To the majority of Zionists the Balfour Declaration

* Cf. “Balfour’s Memorandum, 1919,” pp. 201-11.

appeared meaningless unless it was to lead to a Jewish state in Palestine. Only in Palestine, they believed, could Jews form the ruling majority; whereas the Arab nation possessed in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere, vast countries of its own. And only in a state of their own, the Zionists declared, could the Jews develop their capacities unhampered. The Arabs, on the other hand, resisted, as would every people, being turned into a minority in their own country by immigration from without. The Arabs accused Britain of promising something to the Zionists that did not belong to her. In the name of self-determination and democracy they demanded the right to determine the future of their country. Zionism, they predicted, would introduce an upsetting element of bitter strife into the whole Middle East, for the Arabs could not consent to being deprived of Palestine.

Thus, immediately after World War I, two apparently irreconcilable claims were staked out, and the blood-soaked and fear-ridden future of the "Holy Land" began to unfold.

Yet for many years after the Balfour Declaration funds provided by world Jewry for "building the Jewish homeland" were small, and Jewish immigration to Palestine was so slight that there seemed no prospect of establishing a Jewish majority.* Before the victorious sweep of Hitlerism neither Zionist hopes nor Arab fears were borne out by reality. From 1920 to 1929 the average yearly net Jewish immigration to Palestine amounted to 7700, the excess of Jewish births over deaths to 3500, so that the Jewish population in Palestine gained by about 11,000 a year. In the same period the settled Arab population, not counting the nomadic tribes, grew by natural increase alone at the rate of 16,000 yearly. Even after 1933, when anybody with a "capital" of \$5,000 could freely immigrate into Palestine, and when the American quota was wide open,** relatively few Jews were willing to leave their European and American fatherlands. Everything pointed to the possibility of a realistic compromise which would make a peaceful co-existence probable. The events seemed to bear out Ahad Ha-am's analysis and vision.

But though it then appeared unlikely that a Jewish majority could be attained in Palestine, the Zionists strove for it and the Arabs feared it. The Arabs believed that the Zionists had not only the world-wide support of Jewish wealth† and power but

* For Jewish immigration into Palestine, see Appendix I. For Zionist attitudes in the early thirties, see Arlosoroff, pp. 245-54.

** For American immigration legislation, see Appendix VI.

† For American funds to the Jews in Palestine, see Appendix V.

also the support of the League of Nations and the British Empire;* and though Britain did not fulfil all the wishes of the Jews she maintained them in Palestine by her power, and allowed them to gain steadily in strength at the expense of the Arabs. To the Zionists a Jewish state in Palestine appeared the only hope of survival. This conviction gave them a buoyant vigor which strengthened their power far beyond their numbers. In the Balfour Declaration they saw the beginning of the fulfilment of the Bible's messianic promise, which however they divested of its religious meaning.

VIII

In 1920 Ahad Ha-am opposed the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. Introducing a new edition of his collected essays, *At the Crossroads*, he warned against exaggerated Zionist hopes. "The Arab people," he wrote, "regarded by us as non-existent ever since the beginning of the colonization of Palestine, heard [of the Zionist expectations and plans] and believed that the Jews were coming to drive them from their soil and deal with them at their own will." Such an attitude on the part of his own people seemed to Ahad Ha-am unthinkable. In his interpretation of the Balfour Declaration he stressed that the historical right of the Jews in Palestine "does not affect the right of the other inhabitants who are entitled to invoke the right of actual dwelling and their work in the country for many generations. For them, too, the country is a national home, and they have a right to develop national forces to the extent of their ability. This situation makes Palestine the common land of several peoples, each of whom wishes to build its national home there. In such circumstances it is no longer possible that the national home of one of them could be total. . . . If you build your house not in an empty space, but in a place where there are also other houses and inhabitants, you are unrestricted master only inside your own house. Outside the door all the inhabitants are partners, and the management of the whole has to be directed in agreement with the interests of them all."

Years before World War I Ahad Ha-am had written a short essay which he called "In the Footsteps of the Messiah, Impudence Will Grow." In it he rejected the new dogmatic activists and enthusiasts—nationalists or socialists—who were

* For British strategic interests in Palestine, see Sidebotham, pp. 125-42, and Main, pp. 317-20. See also Martin, pp. 309-12, and Bullock, pp. 313-44.

convinced they could lead the people to "redemption." He feared their success, their arrogant self-assurance that they were acting as the spokesmen of destiny and the fulfillers of historical missions. He knew his own loneliness among them. "How hard is life in such an age," he had written in 1907, "for one who is not of them and who cannot go with closed eyes in the footsteps of this or that messiah; for one who does not hear the voice announcing redemption [*geulah*], neither for the immediate nor for the more distant future, neither for his own generation nor for the time when his grandchildren will be buried; one for whom truth and knowledge and reason remain mighty gods standing above all the camps and judging them all impartially, not as servants of the Messiah to herald him as his standard-bearers and trumpeters."

Many Eastern and Central European peoples have followed the will-o'-the-wisp of such messiahs in the half-century since Ahad Ha-am wrote these words. To his greatest sorrow some of his own people were among them. Ahad Ha-am died, a lonely man, in a Zion which he did not recognize.

The concluding passage of one of Ahad Ha-am's last letters speaks of his loneliness and despair. The old man had heard rumors of acts of Jewish terrorism and primitive vengeance against Arabs. He whose whole life was dedicated to the love of Zion wrote a pathetic and prophetic protest: "What should we say if this rumor is really true? My God! is *this* the end? Is *this* the goal for which our fathers have striven and for whose sake all generations have suffered? Is *this* the dream of a return to Zion which our people have dreamt for centuries: that we now come to Zion to stain its soil with innocent blood? Many years ago I wrote an essay in which I stated that our people will willingly give their money to build up their state, but they will never sacrifice their prophets for it. This was to me an axiomatic truth. And now God has afflicted me to have to live and to see with my own eyes that I apparently erred. The people do not part with their money to rebuild their national home but, instead, their inclination grows to sacrifice their prophets on the altar of their 'renaissance': the great ethical principles for the sake of which they have suffered, and for the sake of which alone it is worth while to return and become a people in the land of our fathers. For without these principles, my God, what are we and what can our future life in this country be, that we should bring all the endless sacrifices without which this land cannot be rebuilt? Are we really doing it only to add in an Oriental corner a small people of new Levantines who vie with other Levantines in shedding blood, in desire for vengeance,

and in angry violence? If this be the "Messiah," then I do not wish to see his coming."

IX

Ahad Ha-am's interpretation of the Balfour Declaration was not accepted. The Zionists expected much more, long before Hitler.* A well-known liberal Protestant clergyman of New York, a trusted friend of the Jews and one filled with deep sympathy for Zionism, John Haynes Holmes, wrote after his visit to Palestine in 1929: "Even the moderate Zionists show a disquieting tendency to take for granted Jewish ascendancy. They do not think at all in terms of violence or oppression. Yet they were silent when England and her allies tore to tatters the nationalistic aspiration of the Moslem world. They have refused the request of the Palestinian Arabs, presented in not immoderate terms, for co-operation in securing some form of popular government, and thus have conspired, as an obstructive minority backed by alien power, to deny to the majority their public rights. . . . However temperate the spirit of the Jews in Palestine, however idealistic their expectations of the future, the logic of the policy which they are tempted to follow is repression of a native population, interference with its rights, frustration of its ambitions, with all the inevitable consequences of sporadic rebellion and ultimate civil war. In such a policy of force, the whole destiny of Zionism is at stake. It is the one policy, of course, best calculated to precipitate those very chances of destruction which it was instituted to appease."

The events twenty years later bore out these predictions. Pseudomessianism and modern nationalism had gained the upper hand over the realism and the ethos of Ahad Ha-am's Zion.

In 1919 a philosopher in Prague, Hugo Bergmann, who was soon thereafter to settle in Palestine, wrote in a book called *Yavne and Jerusalem* that Palestine might become a Jewish state and yet be an entirely un-Jewish land—un-Jewish to such a degree that the smallest traditional Jewish school in a far-off Polish village would mean more for Judaism than all the new national institutions. "The trial by fire of the truly Jewish character of our settlement in Palestine will be our relationship to the Arabs," he went on. "An agreement with the inhabitants of the land is much more important for us than declarations of all the Governments in the world could be. Unfortunately, Zionist public

* Cf. "The Basle Program," p. 89, Leonhard, pp. 115-24, "Statement by Chaim Weizmann in Paris, (1919)," pp. 190-91, and Part II, 227-314.

opinion has not yet become conscious of it. What happened in Palestine before the [First World] War was almost totally of a kind to turn the Arabs into our enemies. A peaceful confrontation and understanding with them, however, is for us the question of life."

In the same year Martin Buber demanded that the Zionists should abstain from all political activities, "except those measures which are necessary to create and to maintain an enduring and solid agreement with the Arabs in all fields of public life, an encompassing brotherly solidarity."

Ahad Ha-am's insistence on quality rather than numbers, and on regard for the rights and human dignity of the Arab people, was indeed accepted by some Zionists. There were among them names well known outside Palestine, like the American rabbi Judah L. Magnes* and the German philosopher Martin Buber. There were many more unknown men among them. Gratitude and piety demand the mention of at least two of them, who both came from orthodox Russian Jewish homes and preserved their faith, who both lived in *Eretz Israel* for well over fifty years and dedicated all their life and thought to Zion. They may not have influenced the events in their lifetime; but they unflinchingly bore witness to the prophetic and spiritual tradition of Judaism under the most difficult circumstances.

The first was Moshe Smilansky, one of the pilgrim fathers of Zionism. When he died in 1953 Robert Weltsch, in a deeply felt and beautiful article of commemoration, wrote about his "independence of mind and the sacred fire of his moral conviction which made him a spiritual leader of the kind who, alas, is very rarely listened to by his own people. He never lost sight of supreme human values, which he regarded as overriding any guiding principles of collective as well as personal action. A nationalism which was merely founded on *sacro egoismo* and not rooted in humanity appeared to him utterly repulsive."

For many years Smilansky corresponded with his friend and mentor Ahad Ha-am over the steady deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations. His growing despair did not prevent him from raising his voice in the wilderness whenever the occasion warranted. In his last article, published when the Israeli parliament passed the "Land Requisition Law of 1953" that legalized the expropriation of Arab lands, Smilansky wrote: "When we came back to our country after having been evicted two thousand

* Dr. Judah Magnes, an American Reform rabbi, later to become President of the Hebrew University, was a consistent exponent of a binational Arab-Jewish state in Palestine.

years ago, we called ourselves 'daring' and we rightly complained before the whole world that the gates of the country were shut. And now when they [Arab refugees] dared to return to their country where they lived for one thousand years before they were evicted or fled, they are called 'infiltrates' and shot in cold blood. Where are you, Jews? Why do we not at least, with a generous hand, pay compensation to these miserable people? Where to take the money from? But we build palaces. . . instead of paying a debt that cries unto us from earth and heaven. . . . And do we sin only against the refugees? Do we not treat the Arabs who remain with us as second-class citizens? . . . Did a single Jewish farmer raise his hand in the parliament in opposition to a law that deprived Arab peasants of their land? . . . How does sit solitary, in the city of Jerusalem, the Jewish conscience!"

Smilansky hated nothing more than the "double book-keeping" which is so widely accepted in modern nationalism everywhere—a twofold scale of moral judgment, defining the same action as right for one's self but wrong in the neighbor.

The second of these men was best known under the pen-name of Reb Binyomin. He too wrote an article in 1953, "For the Sake of the Survival," in which he drew the conclusions of over half a century of intimate knowledge and connection with life in the Holy Land.

"After the State of Israel was established I began receiving news about the terrible things perpetrated both during and after the Israeli-Arab war. I did not recognize my own people for the changes which had occurred in their spirit. The acts of brutality were not the worst because those might have been explained somehow or other as accidental, or an expression of hysteria, or the sadism of individuals. Far more terrible was the benevolent attitude toward these acts on the part of public opinion. I had never imagined that such could be the spiritual and moral countenance of Israel. . . .

"What separates us from the mass of our people? It is our attitude toward the Arabs. They consider the Arab as an enemy, some even say an eternal enemy. So speak the candid among them. The less candid speak supposedly about peace, but these are only words. They want a peace of submission, which the Arabs cannot possibly accept. . . . We, however, do not see the Arab as an enemy, not in the past and not today. It is a mistake to think that we are dreamers and do not understand reality. No. . . we are realists with the Ten Commandments, and they are the wise men, the realists without the Ten Commandments. . . .

"War gave us a state, and war gave the Arabs, besides military defeat and the loss of territory, the problem of refugees.

At the same time it also gave them the concern that, when the State of Israel feels strengthened economically and population-wise through immigration, it will attempt sooner or later to invade the neighboring Arab countries. Theirs is a very simple calculation: if the small army of Israel, which had to be developed underground and which hardly possessed any arms,* was able to defeat all the Arab armies, then a large organized and disciplined Israeli army, which has now taken women too into its ranks, will surely be able to do it in the future.

"The Jewish state is dear to us because it could turn into a treasure for its inhabitants and for Jews all over the world. . . . But the first condition for its continued existence is a true peace with the Arab states. What we failed to do before the war we must do now. . . . Such a solution is not easy, but it is a guarantee for the very existence of the State of Israel. . . . The Arabs were once a warlike people. But the Turks who vanquished them suppressed their warring spirit. When the Arabs were freed from the Turkish yoke, they were least prepared to develop a military spirit. They had no stimulus. Their wars of the past were carried out with the power of Moslem religious fervor. This fervor still lives among them, but it has no warlike character whatsoever. They know that the period of religious military conquest is gone, and they do not want to see it revived. The national idea was still alien to them. . . . They had neither a national hymn nor a national flag. . . . In the years after their liberation the Arabs were dilettantes in questions of politics, armies and war. . . .

"That was true until the war with Israel. . . . The outcome of the war has created for the Arabs that 'enemy' which serves as a stimulus for a new military spirit. None of the European Powers, not even Turkey, can become that kind of enemy. Israel presents almost an ideal opportunity. It prepared, and carried through, a war which brought humiliating defeat on the Arabs. Israel is proud as a peacock over its victory and boasts of it. Israel is not prepared to give in on any issue for the sake of peace. Israel is in the very midst of the Arabs. Truly, an 'ideal enemy' that can serve as a factor in the military education of the Arabs in this generation and in generations to come, if Israel will not discover the way to assure a real peace in the near future. The Arab peoples have plenty of time. . . .

"I have written all this not for the sake of propaganda,"

* Cf. Ben-Gurion, pp. 371-74, and pp. 399-402, Mosley and Ben-Gurion, pp. 375-87, "The Zionist Military Organisations, 1946," pp. 595-600, Krammer, pp. 745-54, and Appendix III.

the old man concluded. "I am not so foolish as to believe that these words would have any influence on today's rulers of Israel. I have not written this for the sake of polemics either. I wrote it because I believe that it is my duty to say what I think."

He was right. The large majority of Zionists did not heed his or his friends' anguished words. For the youth in the new state the old hopes and dreams of the early Zionists have meant little. Yet it should never be forgotten that there were men in Israel who raised their warning voices for Zion.

Many of the young Israeli generation in Palestine not only look down on the native Arabs; they have turned also, with pride in their own valor and in bitter disgust, from the two thousand years of the diaspora, from the life of their fathers and grandfathers, which they reject. They have cut themselves off from the "ghetto" and they try to restore a link with a far-off primitive past. Over thousands of years they stretch out their hands to reach the zealots who died defending Bethar, Massada, and Jerusalem; the Maccabees who threw off the foreign yoke; the proud kings who conquered neighboring lands and against whom the prophets rose; and the desert tribes who subjugated and exterminated the native population of Canaan. Out of opposition to the spiritual foundations of prophetic Judaism and Jewish life in the diaspora, the youth wishes to be the more "valiant," the more tough-minded. From one extreme they have gone to the other.

The events of the year 1948 appeared to them a miracle that initiated a new epoch of history. But the "miracle" was performed by the toughness and all-out dedication of the Jewish army which in 1948 won "the war of liberation." The question, from whom was the land "liberated," is difficult to answer. From the British, whose administration after 1920 had alone made possible the growth of the Jewish settlement against the will of the great majority of Palestinians?* From its native inhabitants who, though ruled by foreign empires, had tilled and owned the soil for many centuries?***

Few people realized that the victory of 1948 was due not only to the superior quality of Zionist military training, equipment and dedication, and the exaltation of nationalism among the youth. The victory was due also to the disunity and backwardness of the Arab regimes and the still underdeveloped nationalism of the Arab people. These, however, were temporary

* See "Balfour's Memorandum, 1919," pp. 201-11, and Part II.

** On Arab population statistics, see Map 15, and on agricultural production, see Appendix II.

conditions which the coming years were to change. Indeed, the victory of 1948 and its territorial exploitation created the very conditions some early Zionists had feared: the stimulation of the Arab national revival, unity, and strength.

In the long run the foundation of a nation-state on military victory and its continuing temper usually defeats its own purpose. Militarism rapidly changes the whole character of the nation which succumbs to its temptation, and establishes in firm control those trends which Ahad Ha-am in "The Truth from Palestine" and Herzl in *Altneuland* saw, for both ethical and realistic reasons, as a threat to Zion.

X

For Ahad Ha-am hoped and believed that the return to Zion would rekindle the spiritual heritage and ethical tradition of Judaism. Like so many Central and East-European nationalists, he believed in the biological-spiritual continuity of generations over hundreds and even thousands of years. He saw in the Jews of his own day the heirs of the prophets—as the Greeks, when they achieved their independence in 1821, were convinced they were the heirs of the poets and philosophers and artists of ancient Greece and independence would revive their spirit and deeds.

But does such a continuity exist? Are biological endurance, national independence, and national language the sources of creative insight and imagination? Did not Spinoza and Marx, Freud and Bergson contribute to man's patrimony, though they lived in "exile" as seen by the Zionists, and though they did not write in Hebrew? Would they have contributed more if they had lived in a Jewish state and written in Hebrew? Can two thousand years of existence be simply effaced or regarded as sterile?

Might not perhaps the "abnormal" existence of the Jews represent a higher form of historical development than territorial nationalism? Has not the diaspora been an essential part of Jewish existence? Did it not secure Jewish survival better than the state could do?

Such questions were affirmatively answered by the historian Simon Dubnow, whose theories Professor Koppel S. Pinson has recently presented to the American public;⁴ and also by a lonely God-seeker, Nathan Birnbaum, who is almost forgotten today.

In his youth Birnbaum started as a Zionist in Vienna more than a decade before Herzl wrote *Der Judenstaat*; he ended as a deeply pious orthodox Jew. Love of Zion, of a quiet unostentatious life on its soil, always remained a source of hope and

inspiration to him. But he could not regard the diaspora as either an evil or as an historical accident. To him it was the specific form of latter-day Jewish existence, the existence of a people which is not like the nations of this earth and yet lives amidst this world.

It is of interest to recall that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the poet Goethe willingly foresaw a similar fate for the Germans. He was convinced that they could best fulfil their real task in history without creating a nation-state. With little hesitation he accepted and predicted for them a future like that of the Jews, surviving as a people, preserving their character, and accomplishing great things without a common fatherland. Goethe judged that the Germans, like the Jews, were most valuable as individuals but rather "miserable" as a people. In his conversations throughout the years he returned to this analogy several times. "The German nation is nothing," he told his friend Friedrich von Müller on December 14, 1808, "but the individual German is something, and yet they imagine the opposite to be true. The Germans should be dispersed throughout the world, like the Jews, in order fully to develop all the good that is in them for the benefit of mankind."

Dubnow and Birnbaum, whatever the validity of their theories, testify to the variety and breadth of Jewish life throughout all the ages and in its many homelands. Its unifying link has been a spiritual conception which, fundamentally ethical, has found expression in changing forms. The "miracle" and "uniqueness" of Jewish life is based not on political structures. Through three thousand years, whether there was a Jewish state or not, whether Jerusalem formed part of it or not, the Jewish people and Judaism have lived—and in all probability will continue to live.

As long as they live, there will be a "Jewish problem." It is an oversimplification to believe that there exists one "solution" to the Jewish problem. The Jewish problem is not the same in various ages, in various countries, nay, even in various individuals. The form of modern Jewish life in the context of East-European society with its theories of ethnic nationalism and national minorities was and will be different from Jewish life in the West, above all in the United States where people of many ethnic origins are integrated into one open society and one dynamic civilization. The life of the Jews everywhere depends on the historical and social conditions and the political ideas prevailing in their environment.

Ultimately the Jewish problem is but part of the human problem. In 1854, when he had found his way back to the God

of Judaism, Heinrich Heine added to his memorial for Ludwig Marcus that "Jews will achieve their true emancipation only when the Christians do." The cause of the German Jew was to him identical with that of the German people. "The Jews must not demand as Jews what has long been due to them as Germans."

Modern Jewish life with its great promise of creativeness in freedom is based on Enlightenment and Emancipation everywhere. Enlightenment and Emancipation are nowhere secure against the resurgence of atavistic forces. Enlightenment and Emancipation have to be defended and revitalized everywhere and at all times. This is the difficult task of modern life of which the Jews form part. As a result of their history they are, wherever they live, in an exposed position. For wherever Enlightenment and Emancipation are rejected or scorned, they will be endangered, morally or physically, more than others.

In that sense, even in a secular age, the Jews continue, willingly or not, to bear witness to the verities which their prophetic tradition first established so many centuries ago.

NOTES

- 1 *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl*. Edited and Translated, with an Introduction, by Marvin Lowenthal (The Dial Press, Inc., New York 1956).

Mr. Lowenthal wrote an extensive study of the character and career of Herzl, with copious extracts (in his own translation) from the *Diaries*, in *The Menorah Journal* of June-July 1924, August-September 1924, and November-December 1924 (Vol. X, Nos. 3, 4 & 5).—Ed.

- 2 The distinguished social thinker Lewis Mumford made a thoroughgoing analysis of *Altneuland* ("Herzl's Utopia") in *The Menorah Journal* of August 1923 (Vol. IX, No. 3).

Mr. Mumford wrote: "To have arrived at such a clear and definite conception of a new organic polity was a singular achievement. Perhaps Herzl did not realize its importance; perhaps he did not see how thoroughly his plans for a scientifically designed polity in *Altneuland* were at odds with the notions outlined in *The Jewish State*. If Herzl himself did not see this great disparity, and did not follow out its implications—a fact partly accounted for, perhaps, by his early death—it is not altogether surprising that those who were immersed in the Zionist movement did not observe it either. At any rate, the piece of original thinking which makes *Altneuland* a distinctive contribution to politics, by suggesting the expedience of forms of political co-operation and government outside the framework of the national state, has remained unnoticed; with the result that the classic modern discussion of the *Genossenschaft and Genossenschaftsrecht* is currently supposed to be solely that of Gierke in his *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*."—Ed.

- 3 See her article "Zionism Reconsidered" in *The Menorah Journal* of Autumn 1945 (Vol. XXXIII, No. 2), page 188.—Ed.

- 4 In a book of selected writings by Dubnow, *Nationalism and History*, edited with an Introductory Essay by Professor Pinson (The Jewish Publication Society of America, Philadelphia 1958).

Appendix I

POPULATION, IMMIGRATION, AND LAND STATISTICS, 1919-1946*

	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	—	5,514	9,149	7,844	7,421
Jewish Immigration (Zionist est.)	—	8,223	8,294	8,685	8,175
Jewish Population	57,000	61,000	72,000	82,100	89,505
Arab Population	533,000	542,000	551,000	562,002	572,508
Total Population	590,000	603,000	623,000	644,300	662,013
% Arab Population	91.3	89.9	88.4	87.3	86.5
% Jewish Population	9.7	10.1	11.6	12.7	13.5
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews**	—	1,048	90,785	39,359	17,493
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	650,000	651,048	741,833	781,192	798,685
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	2.04	2.04	2.08	2.90	3.0
	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	12,856	33,801	13,081	2,713	2,178
Jewish Immigration (Zionist est.)	13,892	34,586	13,855	3,034	2,178
Jewish Population	94,669	120,559	147,398	147,687	152,050
Arab Population	586,576	598,949	614,398	630,682	727,492
Total Population	681,245	719,508	761,896	778,369	879,542
% Arab Population	86.1	83.2	80.6	81.0	82.7
% Jewish Population	13.9	16.8	19.4	19.0	17.3
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews	44,765	176,124	38,978	18,995	21,515
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	843,450	1,019,574	1,058,552	1,077,547	1,099,062
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	3.2	3.8	4.0	4.1	4.2

* From John Chapple, *Jewish Land Settlement in Palestine*, (unpublished paper, 1964) pp. 30-32. Reprinted by permission.

** 1 dunum equals one thousand sq. meters.

Appendix I — *con't.*

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	5,249	4,944	4,075	9,553	30,327
Jewish Immigration (Zionist est.)	5,249	4,944	4,075	9,553	30,327
Jewish Population	156,840	164,950	172,300	180,789	209,207
Arab Population	744,250	763,218	784,891	805,536	829,124
Total Population	901,090	928,158	957,191	986,329	1,038,331
% Arab Population	82.4	82.2	82.0	81.7	79.8
% Jewish Population	17.6	17.8	18.0	18.3	20.2
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews	64,517	19,365	18,585	18,893	36,991
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	1,163,579	1,182,944	1,201,529	1,220,422	1,257,413
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.7
	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	42,359	61,854	29,727	10,536	12,868
Jewish Immigration (Zionist est.)	42,359	—	—	—	—
Jewish Illegal Immigration (Zionist est.)	—	—	—	—	—
Jewish Population	253,700	355,157	384,078	395,836	411,222
Arab Population	850,905	886,402	916,061	939,405	957,510
Total Population	1,104,608	1,241,559	1,300,139	1,335,241	1,368,732
% Arab Population	77.0	71.4	70.5	70.4	70.0
% Jewish Population	23.0	28.6	29.5	29.6	30.0
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews	62,114	72,905	18,146	29,367	27,280
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	1,319,527	1,392,432	1,410,578	1,439,945	1,467,225
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	5.0	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6

Appendix I — *con't.*

	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	16,405	4,547	3,647	2,194	8,507
Jewish Immigration (Zionist est.)	—	4,347	3,467	—	—
Jewish Illegal Immigration (Zionist est.)	11,150	3,900	2,135	840	—
Jewish Population	445,457	463,535	474,102	484,408	502,912
Arab Population	989,688	1,014,442	1,044,845	1,069,044	1,107,106
Total Population	1,435,145	1,477,977	1,518,947	1,533,452	1,610,018
% Arab Population	69.0	68.6	68.8	68.8	68.8
% Jewish Population	31.0	31.4	31.2	31.2	31.2
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews	27,973	22,481	14,530	18,810	18,035
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	1,495,198	1,517,679	1,532,209	1,551,019	1,569,054
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	5.7	5.8	5.8	5.8	5.9

	1944	1945	1946
Jewish Immigration (British est.)	14,464	12,032	—
Jewish Population	533,600	579,227	608,225
Arab Population	1,144,369	1,189,155	1,237,334
Total Population	1,697,969	1,768,382	1,845,559
% Arab Population	67.4	67.3	64.9
% Jewish Population	32.6	32.7	35.1
Land (dunums) purchased by Jews	8,311	11,000	24,479
Total Jewish owned land (dunums)	1,577,365	1,588,365	1,585,365
% Area of Palestine Jewish owned	5.9	6.0	7.0

Appendix II*

ARAB AND JEWISH AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, 1944-1945

	JEWISH		ARAB		TOTALS	
	Dunums	Tons	Dunums	Tons	Dunums	Tons
Grains	215,191	16,579	4,152,480	193,376	4,367,629	209,955
Vegetables	40,207	55,780	239,733	189,104	279,940	244,834
Fodder	119,573	176,525	23,970	20,827	149,548	197,852
Fruits (excluding citrus)	37,217	21,398	355,709	73,320	392,926	94,718
Olives	7,587	1,182	592,546	78,287	600,133	79,469
Melons	5,675	7,193	120,304	135,634	125,979	142,827

* From *A Survey of Palestine*, I, 323.

Appendix III*

SEIZURES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES, 1936-1945

TABLE A: SEIZURES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM ARABS

Period	Machine guns	Sub-machine guns	Rifles	Pistols	Bombs and grenades	Shotguns	Small arms ammunition	Shotgun ammunition
1/7/36-31/12/36	—	—	205	108	—	9	10,185	9
1937	—	—	1240	1340	107	100	20,732	396
1938	—	—	528	354	178	43	45,288	352
1939	—	—	2546	757	323	124	87,853	181
1940	—	—	1852	661	602	149	33,229	149
1941	—	—	488	338	17	73	16,421	387
1942	—	12	281	339	78	73	46,383	496
1943	1	4	215	435	22	52	29,927	519
1944	1	7	139	337	18	47	45,278	1225
1945	—	5	123	222	31	25	12,079	210
	2	28	7617	4891	1376	695	347,375	3924

TABLE B: SEIZURES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION FROM JEWS

Period	Machine guns	Sub-machine guns	Rifles	Pistols	Bombs and Grenades	Shotguns	Small arms ammunition	Shotgun ammunition
1/7/36-31/12/36	—	—	2	19	—	1	264	—
1937	—	—	5	75	8	7	1,047	3,242
1938	—	—	1	33	1	—	2,074	1
1939	—	—	24	43	31	1	1,519	47
1940	—	5	73	17	117	—	18,705	77
1941	—	—	16	54	1	1	2,175	—
1942	—	—	4	30	2	—	13,409	—
1943	1	2	1	31	74	—	12,186	2
1944	—	—	—	34	309	2	1,096	33
1945	—	1	9	29	114	—	653	210
	1	8	135	365	657	12	53,128	3,614

* *Ibid.*, II, 594-95.

Appendix IV

NOTE ON ARAB CASUALTIES IN THE 1936-39 REBELLION

Published British official figures of Arab casualties during the Great Arab Rebellion 1936-39 are as follows:

For 1936:

According to the annual report for this year submitted by the British Government on its administration in Palestine to the League of Nations: "unconfirmed information received from a reliable source places the number of Arabs killed during the disturbances at approximately 1000."¹

That this figure is a conservative estimate is clear from *A Survey of Palestine* which, with reference to Arab casualties during 1936, stated that "it has been estimated that *upward* of 1000 Arab rebels were killed, mostly fighting with troops and police."²

Neither the report to the League of Nations nor *A Survey etc.*, gives estimates of Arabs wounded. However, both give the numbers of Arab casualties during 1936 based "on verified deaths and treatment in hospital", as 195 Arabs killed and 804 wounded, indicating a 1 to 4 ratio as between killed and wounded.

For 1937:

The annual report to the League of Nations for the year 1937 gives the number of Arab casualties "resulting from terrorist and gang activities" as 44 killed and 53 wounded.³ It also gives an additional number of 148 Arab casualties "inflicted upon the bands" by the Military and Air Forces without specifying the numbers of killed or wounded.

A Survey of Palestine gives a total of 97 killed and 149 wounded "from terrorist or gang activities," including Jewish and British casualties, without breaking down the figure into nationalities. It also does not mention any Arab casualties as a result of clashes with the Military.

These estimates must be considered unsatisfactory. The ratio of Arab killed to wounded given by the report to the League is improbable, and, together with the vagueness in both sources concerning Arab casualties at the hands of the Military, probably reflects the anxiety of the British

¹ Great Britain, *Report on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan, 1936*, p. 20.

² *Survey*, I, 38.

³ Great Britain, *op. cit.*, 1937, p. 12 ff. These include casualties from Arab-Jewish inter-communal fighting and bomb incidents.

Government, at the time, to play down Arab opposition to the partition proposals of the Palestine Royal Commission.

For 1938:

A Survey etc. gives Arab casualties from "terrorist and gang activities" as 503 killed and 598 wounded.¹ It also states: "The number of Arab rebels killed by military and police action was *conservatively* estimated at *not less* than 1000." In addition, 54 death sentences were confirmed on Arabs as opposed to 3 in 1937, whereas the number of Arab detainees rose from 816 in 1937 to 2,463.²

The ratio given of killed to wounded in the casualties from "terrorist and gang activities" is open to question; it is also noticeable that no estimate is made of Arab wounded through the action of the Military.

For 1939:

A Survey etc. gives the Arab casualties from "terrorist and gang activities" as 414 killed and 373 wounded.³ These figures *exclude* "those inflicted on the rebels by military and police action."⁴ No numbers, however, are given of these latter casualties.

The ratio of killed to wounded given here must again be treated with reserve. The complete omission of estimates of Arab casualties at the hands of the Military is remarkable, considering the fact that "the breaking up of the large gangs which had *begun* at the end of 1938 proceeded under the pressure of continuous military operations against them."⁵ Further evidence of unabated British pressure against the Arabs is the confirmation of 55 death sentences (all Arab) during 1939 and the detention of 5,679 Arabs as compared to 2,463 in 1938.⁶

Conclusions:

Figures of Arab casualties explicitly conceded by the British for the years 1936-39 are as follows:

	Killed	Wounded	
Military and Police action	2000+	?	(+ 148 unidentified "casualties" for the year 1937)
"Gang and Terrorist activities"	961	934	
Execution	112	—	
	<u>3073</u>	<u>934</u>	

¹ *Survey*, I, 46.

² Cf. *Survey* I, 43.

³ *Survey*, I, 49.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 46, respectively.

In the light of the remarks made above we believe this estimate should be revised and elaborated as follows:

For the years 1936 and 1938 the estimate of killed should be increased by at least 20%. For both these years the official estimates themselves concede that their figures are conservative. A more accurate estimate of the total number of Arabs killed by British military action during these two years would therefore be 2400. The figure of 148 for Arab casualties during 1937 was probably largely of Arabs killed. It is relevant to point out that in the two other years in which the Military did give specific estimates of Arabs killed, they made no mention of the wounded. The complete absence of figures for Arab casualties during 1939 probably again reflects political considerations—in this case the desire to play down Arab casualties because of the new White Paper policy. Considering, however, the tempo and scale of military operations during 1939 the assumption is plausible that the number of Arabs killed by the military during 1939 was at least the same as that in 1936 and 1938. This would put the number of Arabs killed by military action during this year at 1200.

As for the number of Arabs killed from so-called gang and terrorist activities, the British official figures must also be considered an underestimate, since it is based on verified death and hospital treatment only. A 25% increase in this case would probably produce a more accurate total.

These calculations would not be complete if they did not consider the official estimates of the wounded. As noticed, no estimates are given by the British for wounded from military action for the years 1936, 38 and 39. If the ratio of 1 to 4 in the sample given by the British official estimates for the year 1936 is characteristic of the whole period the revised estimates of total Arab casualties would be as follows:

Killed

(1) <i>Military</i>	1200	(1936, official estimate + 20%)
	120	(1937, estimate)
	1200	(1938, official estimate + 20%)
	1200	(1939, estimate)
Executed	112	
	<hr/>	
	3832	
(2) <i>Terrorism</i>	1200	(official estimate increased by 25%)
Total killed	<hr/>	
	5032	

Wounded(a) *Military*

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| (1) On the basis of 1 to 4 ratio | $3720^* \times 4 = 14,880$ |
| (2) On the basis of 1 to 3 ratio | $3720 \times 3 = 11,160$ |

(b) *Terrorism*

- | | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| (1) On the basis of 1 to 4 ratio | $1200 \times 4 = 4800$ |
| (2) On the basis of 1 to 3 ratio | $1200 \times 3 = 3600$ |

Total wounded

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--------------|
| (1) On the basis of 1 to 4 ratio | 14,880 |
| | <u>4,800</u> |
| | 19,680 |
| (2) On the basis of 1 to 3 ratio | 11,160 |
| | <u>3,600</u> |
| | 14,760 |

Taking the lower estimate of wounded, the total Arab "casualties for 1936-39 would amount to 5032 (k) + 14,760 (w) = 19,792.

It should be noted that the official figures given above do not include Arab casualties suffered at the hands of the notorious Jewish SNS (Special Night Squads) organized by Wingate, (see Mosley and David Ben-Gurion, pp. 375-87), the JSP (Jewish Settlement Police) or the Haganah, since casualties inflicted by these forces would not have been described at the time as "resulting from terrorist or gang activities" nor from "military and police action." Arabs killed by these Jewish forces would have died unofficially.

When one remembers that the total Arab population of Palestine was at the time about 1,000,000 these figures translated, for example, into British and US terms (on the basis of populations of 40 million and 200 million for the U.K. and the U.S. respectively) would amount to:

British killed: c. 200,000; British wounded: c. 600,000

American killed: c. 1,000,000; American wounded: c. 3,000,000.

If you make the same calculation with regard to the Arab detainees who numbered 5,600 in 1939, your comparative figures would be:

British detainees: c. 224,000; American detainees: c. 1,120,000.

* Total "killed" 3832-112 "executed" = 3720.

Appendix V

AMERICAN JEWRY'S FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JEWS OF PALESTINE

	Founded	1948	1947	1946	1945	1944	1943	1942	1941	1940	1939	1938	1937	1936	1935	1934	1933	1932	1931	1930	Before 1930
A. United Palestine Appeal Beneficiaries																					
Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemeth Le-Israel) ¹	1901	\$39,006,102	\$17,736,963	\$13,067,073	\$6,995,806	\$4,688,955	\$2,947,167	\$1,919,341	\$1,713,332	\$1,801,011	\$1,744,556	\$1,038,752	\$704,993	\$297,873	\$297,846	\$200,379	\$144,276	\$246,890	\$332,001	\$418,226	\$3,089,908
Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) ²	1921	35,841,225	41,459,506	13,800,000	7,810,000	5,680,000	3,185,000	2,270,000	1,870,000	1,940,000	1,745,000	1,070,000	845,000	520,000	335,000	395,000	195,000	300,000	465,000	305,000	10,945,000
B. Other Major Palestine Funds																					
American Committee for Weizmann Institute	1945	654,918	659,052	403,940																	
American Friends of the Hebrew University	1925	487,535	770,915	429,074	511,792	452,516	368,219	287,074	241,570	155,107	196,481										
American Technion Society	1940	192,920	211,712	217,276	66,980	126,579	49,041														
American Fund for Palestine Institutions	1939	828,760	643,997	460,379		252,427	138,252	68,540	24,808												
Federated Council of Palestine Institutions	1940	304,445	170,988	182,249	111,993	69,686	38,182	34,159	87,924												
Hadassah ³	1912	7,958,632	6,300,954	4,802,221	4,004,175	2,426,689	2,124,743	1,397,162	1,359,230	1,272,929	1,339,667	685,000	610,000	310,000	325,000	320,000	360,000	455,000	470,000	505,000	4,445,000
Junior Hadassah	1920	200,440	164,804	180,617	161,221	92,284	94,652	93,033													
National Labor Committee for Palestine (<i>Gewerkschaften</i>) ⁴	1923	3,365,468	1,926,004	1,840,921	1,360,790	1,178,257	818,767	571,092	477,468	432,151	381,151	276,843	222,936	196,756	144,046	117,527	69,971	83,654	119,696	174,845	597,154
Pioneer Women	1925	1,084,294	818,218	685,963	557,641	413,127	372,413														
Red Mogen Dovid (Palestine Red Cross)	1941	364,519	86,879		20,500	69,604															
Ezrath Torah Fund	—	162,302	144,347	207,776	185,791	142,627		59,862	51,890												
Joint Distribution Committee (allotments to Palestine) ⁵	1914	15,458,000	6,880,000	2,334,000	820,000	3,495,500	872,000	410,496	269,253	643,530	676,025	270,700	129,500	156,230	140,505	296,248	100,596	10	201,036	63,867	9,203,498
Provisional Zionist Committee (August 1914-July 1918)																					1,634,188
Palestine Restoration Fund (July 1918-May 1921)																					
Palestine Emergency Fund	1929																				4,404,809
Palestine Endowment Funds	—																				2,100,000
																					800,000
C. Investment corporations (Assets)⁶																					
Palestine Economic Corporation	1925	6,256,081	5,417,171	4,979,371	4,470,411	3,543,855	3,453,643	3,661,499	3,558,638	3,670,875	3,643,425	3,674,278	3,680,260	3,681,937	3,563,934	3,402,903	3,308,189	3,167,095	2,697,648	2,316,264	2,238,027
Ampal-American Palestine Trading Corporation	1942	3,055,471	1,992,783	1,209,451	1,052,451	522,901	292,964														

The table is a composite product of numerous sources, the most important of which are: Letter to the author from Deborah I. Offenbacher (Director of Research of United Israel Appeal), September 15, 1955; Jewish Agency for Palestine (Jerusalem), *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947*; Jewish National Fund (New York), *Pocket Diary, 1954-1955*, p. 6; Isaac Hamlin, "National Labor Committee for Palestine," *PYB*, I (1945), 442; Ampal-American Palestine Trading Corporation, *Eleventh Annual Report*, January 31, 1953; Palestine Economic Corporation, *Annual Reports*; Letter to the author from Irving R. Dickman (Publicity Director of American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), March 30, 1956; Letter to the author from Mendel N. Fisher (Executive Director of the Jewish National Fund), September 2, 1955; AZEC, *Economic Aspects of American Interest in Palestine* (New York, 1946).

The table does not include numerous other American Jewish financial aids to Palestine, such as: (1) direct gifts of U.S. private Jews and associations to friends, relatives and associations in Palestine; (2) money taken by U.S. Jews to Palestine as tourists or immigrants; (3) purchase by U.S.

Jews of land, citrus groves and other real estate, as well as shares in Palestinian industry; (4) outright transfer of goods, such as medical supplies, food, clothing and machinery; (5) normal trade relations and purchase of Palestinian goods; and (6) regular and emergency collections of numerous organizations, for example, local clubs and fraternal lodges, for various standing projects in Palestine, such as maintenance of an orphanage, agricultural school, library, etc.

In this connection, it might be noted that over one hundred separate fund-raising efforts for Israel were reported to the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds between August and November, 1948, alone and no estimates of these collections are available. Also, private American investments in Palestine in 1946 were estimated at \$45,000,000. See *AJTB*, LI (1950), 181, and AZEC, *Economic Aspects of American Interest in Palestine* (New York, 1946).

¹ Figures are for fiscal years. Thus, "1930" covers 1929-30, "1935" covers 1934-35, etc.

² Figures are for fiscal years (see n. 1) and are approximate sums based on Palestinian pounds multiplied by five; the approximate value of the pound was \$5.00 during this period.

³ Figures before 1939 are based on Palestinian pounds received in Palestine during fiscal years (see n. 1), multiplied by five, the approximate value of the pound being \$5.00. Figures from 1939-48 are based on U.S. dollars received during calendar years.

⁴ Figures from 1945-48 are for calendar years. Those before 1945 are for fiscal years (see n. 1). There is probably a small error, therefore, between 1944-45.

⁵ Also expended \$860,000 on cultural activities in Palestine, 1914-35, and turned over assets valued at \$646,307 to the Palestine Economic Corporation.

⁶ PEG and Ampal are not fund-raising organizations but American corporations established for the purpose of selling securities of Palestinian industry and for making investments in Palestine in behalf of U.S. citizens. Figures cited are gross assets of the corporations—roughly equivalent to their investments in Palestine—as of January 31 of the years listed for Ampal, and December 31, for PEG.

Appendix VI

NOTE ON AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. AND PALESTINE

Although the year 1882 was a peak year in the admission of aliens to the United States, this year marked also the beginning of immigration legislation which placed progressively tighter restrictions on the admission of foreigners. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was followed by the Act of 1917 which set up a "barred zone" excluding the natives of parts of China, all of India, Burma, Siam, the Malay States, part of Arabia, part of Afghanistan, and most of the Polynesian and East Indian Islands.

The 1921 Act, prompted by the fear that millions of war-torn Europeans were about to descend on the United States, created a new basis for the selection of immigrants. Whereas before, each applicant was judged individually, according to character and ability, now an immigrant was selected on the basis of national and racial affiliation. The annual quota of any nationality was limited to 3% of the members of this nationality resident in the United States, as determined by the 1910 census. The Act of 1924, following this method of selection, reduced the quota of each nationality to 2%, but used the 1890 census, instead, which, in effect, granted still greater preference to Northern and Western Europeans. Out of 164,667 admissions annually, 85.6% were to come from this area.

The 1924 Act, however, was a temporary measure and provided for a new system, the National Origins Plan, to become operative on July 1, 1927 (postponed until July 1, 1929). The quotas were to be computed on the basis of the national composition of the total American population in 1920. The number of immigrants from any country would be in the same ratio to 150,000 (the total annual immigration quota) as the number of residents of the United States, originally of that nationality was to 94,000,000 (the total American population in 1920). Only 10% of the quota permits for each nationality could be issued each month. Restrictionists (such as the American Legion and the Sons of the American Revolution) supported the National Origins Plan on the grounds that racial purity, ethnic balance, and homogeneity were essential for the preservation of both nationalism and democracy in the United States. Opposition to the plan quite naturally came from minority groups who interpreted this system as racial discrimination. The new quota system allotted 81% of the total quota to Northern and Western Europe, 16% to Southern and Eastern Europe, and the remaining 2.1% to non-Europeans.

However, immigration statistics show that since the enactment of the 1924 law, non-quota immigrants nearly equalled quota immigration. In the period between 1924 to 1944, while 52.8% of those admitted were quota immigrants, 47.2% were admitted as non-quota immigrants. These immigrants were admitted as non-quota immigrants under certain regulations allowing the entry of dependents of quota immigrants, specified occupations, and students. Throughout the 1930's and 40's quota fulfillments for Northern and Western Europe remained at a low level, at no time exceeding 32%, while the quotas for Southern and Eastern Europe were entirely filled from 1938 to 1940.

With regard to the impact of this American Immigration Legislation on the development of the Palestine problem, the key-factor is, of course, the actual distribution of the Jewish population in the world, in the inter-war period, and the size of the annual American quota in relation to the size of the respective Jewish communities. Table A, below throws some light on this:

TABLE A: ANNUAL QUOTAS UNDER THE NATIONAL ORIGINS LAW, AND JEWISH POPULATION STATISTICS OF SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1933.*

Country	Annual Quota	Jewish Population
Britain & Ireland	65,721	330,000
Czechoslovakia	2,874	360,000
Germany	27,370	550,000
Hungary	869	500,000
Latvia	236	95,000
Poland	6,524	3,050,000
Rumania	377	900,000
Russia	2,712	2,750,000

Table B gives an idea of the volume of immigration to the U.S. from selected European countries:

* These statistics are taken from the Recommendations of the American Jewish Committee entitled *Toward Peace and Equity* (New York 1946), p. 73.

TABLE B: IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. 1931-1944

Immigrants (Both Jewish and non-Jewish)						
Country	1931	1934	1937	1939	1941	1944
Britain & Ireland	15,040	1,882	2,584	3,426	4,257	2,303
Czechoslovakia	1,448	389	1,519	2,716	1,787	323
Germany	10,100	3,515	11,127	32,729	13,051	1,324
Hungary	624	209	739	1,087	584	212
Latvia	138	48	114	223	171	62
Poland	2,841	1,138	1,855	6,512	4,406	1,388
Rumania	497	199	371	499	286	230
Russia	1,533	425	592	1,772	1,612	389

Table C, below, serves, perhaps, to give some idea of the respective "share" of the U.S. and Palestine in the solution of the problem of Jewish emigration in the crucial pre-war years.

TABLE C: JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. AND PALESTINE, 1932-1943

Year	Jewish Immigration to U.S.A. and percentage of total American Immigration	Jewish Immigration to Palestine
1932	2,755 7.74	9,553
1933	2,372 10.28	30,327
1934	4,134 14.03	42,359
1935	4,837 13.84	61,854
1936	6,252 17.21	29,727
1937	11,352 22.59	10,536
1938	19,736 29.07	12,868
1939	43,450 52.35	16,405
1940	36,945 52.21	4,547
1941	23,737 45.85	3,647
1942	10,608 36.86	2,194
1943	4,705 19.83	8,507
Total	170,883	Total 232,524

Appendix VII

ZIONIST MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PALESTINE, 1 APRIL 1948–15 MAY 1948, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF PLAN DALET

- *1. Operation Nachshon: 1st April—
To carve out a corridor connecting Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, and by so doing, to split the main part of the Arab state into two. (Defeated)
- *2. Operation Harel: 15 April—
A continuation of Nachshon, but centered specifically on Arab villages near Latrun. (Defeated)
3. Operation Misparayim: 21 April—
To capture Haifa and rout its Arab population. (Successful)
- *4. Operation Chametz: 27 April—
To destroy the Arab villages round Jaffa and so cut Jaffa off from physical contact with the rest of Palestine, as a preliminary to its capture. (Successful)
- *5. Operation Jevussi: 27 April—
To isolate Jerusalem by destroying the ring of surrounding Arab villages and dominating the Ramallah-Jerusalem road to the North, the Jericho-Jerusalem road to the East, and the Bethlehem-Jerusalem road to the South. This operation would have caused the whole of Jerusalem to fall and would have made the Arab position west of River Jordan altogether untenable. (Defeated)
6. Operation Yiftach: 28 April—
To purify Eastern Galilee of Arabs. (Successful)
7. Operation Matatch: 3 May—
To destroy Arab villages connecting Tiberias to Eastern Galilee. (Successful)

- *8. Operation Maccabi: 7 May—
To destroy the Arab villages near Latrun, and, by an outflanking movement, to penetrate into Ramallah district north of Jerusalem. (Defeated)
- 9. Operation Gideon: 11 May—
To occupy Beisan and drive out the semi-sedentary Bedouin communities in the neighbourhood. (Successful)
- 10. Operation Barak: 12 May—
To destroy the Arab villages in the neighbourhood of Bureir on the way to the Negev. (Partially successful)
- *11. Operation Ben Ami: 14 May —
To occupy Acre and purify Western Galilee of Arabs. (Successful)
- *12. Operation Pitchfork: 14 May—
To occupy the Arab residential quarters in the New City of Jerusalem. (Successful)
- *13. Operation Schiffon: 14 May—
To occupy the Old City of Jerusalem. (Defeated)

* The asterisks above indicate the operations which were carried out *before* the entry of the Arab regular armies and *inside* the areas allotted by the UN to the Arab state. It will be noted that of thirteen specific full-scale operations under Plan D, eight were carried out outside the area given by the UN to the Zionists. It is interesting to note that the Kimches in their book *Both Sides of the Hill* (London, 1960) mention by name only five of these thirteen operations, in spite of their learned introduction to the book entitled "On Writing Contemporary History."

Appendix VIII

NOTE ON ARAB STRENGTH IN PALESTINE

JAN.—15 MAY 1948

A: THE PALESTINIAN ARABS

Only the most rudimentary military organization existed among the Palestinian Arabs when the partition resolution was passed in the General Assembly of the UN on 29 November, 1947. This was largely due to the very effective measures taken by the British to crush organized Palestinian Arab resistance during the 1936-39 Rebellion. Appendix IV above indicates our estimate of Arab casualties suffered during the rebellion; while Appendix III indicates the scale of the simultaneous and subsequent British policy of disarming the Palestinian Arab population, a policy which was continued right up to the eve of the partition resolution. But perhaps the most devastating effect of British policy vis-à-vis the Palestinian Arabs during these years was the suppression of their central political institution, the Arab Higher Committee. This Committee was allowed to re-form only in 1945, after a total ban on its activities which had lasted since 1937. Permission for the A.H.C. to resume its existence was, however, accompanied by a refusal to allow the return to Palestine of its chairman, Haj Amin Husseini. The British attitude towards Haj Amin was maintained until the end of the Mandate, while Haj Amin's deputy, Jamal Husseini, was not allowed back into the country until 1946. The reorganized A.H.C. in 1946 faced the colossal task of building up Palestinian Arab military strength virtually from scratch, under severe handicaps. The total absence of Palestinian Arab military organization in 1946 (only one year before the partition resolution) is attested to, if only implicitly, by the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This report (published in 1946) while indicating in its chapter on public security in Palestine that the Jews had a military establishment of 65,000, made no mention at all of any Palestinian Arab military organization. The greatest liabilities suffered by the A.H.C., apart from the time factor, were the inadequacy of financial resources (Compare Appendix V for the resources available to the Jewish community) and the reluctance of the Arab governments to give it full-hearted support. In the event, the A.H.C. disposed of the following forces between January and 15 May 1948:

There was, in principle, one general organization, the "Shabāb" or Youth Organization. This comprised two types of forces:

- (1) Rural forces
- (2) Town garrisons.

1) *The Rural forces*

The main units were the following:

Western Galilee :	c. 140 rifles under Abu Mahmud Saffouri
Southern and	
Eastern Galilee :	210 rifles under Abu Ibrahim al Saghir
Haifa Area :	25 rifles under Abdul Haq 'Azzawi
Tulkarm Area :	130 rifles under Abdul Rahman Zaydan
Jaffa Area :	c. 150 rifles under Hasan Salameh
Jerusalem Area :	c. 250 rifles under Abdul Qader Husseini
Gaza Area :	c. 150 rifles under Tareq al Ifriqi

The total rifle strength of the rural units was therefore about 1000. Total rifle strength does not necessarily indicate that the units were fully mobilized, only that the A.H.C. had general knowledge of the whereabouts of the weapons in question and some degree of control over their use. Nor did these units necessarily operate as single groups. Organization within each unit was on partisan rather than military lines. Due to the distances between the areas of operation of each unit and the direct reliance of unit commanders on Haj Amin in person, wherever the latter happened to be, at any point of time, in his endless odyssey between the Arab capitals, the problem of coordinating operations between the units was, to put it mildly, never quite surmounted. The total rifle strength mentioned above was built up gradually and only towards the end of the Mandate. In the all important area of Jerusalem, for example, the rifle strength of the Shabāb in early December 1947 was 25.

2) *The Town Garrisons*

These were even more tenuously under the command of the A.H.C. than the rural forces. Intervening bodies were the local municipal councils, the local National or Defence committees which sometimes overlapped, but at other times, were at odds with the municipal councils, and, later, the town commanders appointed by the Arab League Military Committee based on Damascus (for which see below). Members of these garrisons were a mixed lot indeed, ranging from unpaid part-time amateur citizen volunteers to full-time professional Palestinian ex-servicemen, to, in certain cases, (e.g. Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa) small contingents from the Arab Liberation Army, the ALA (for which, see below). These garrisons were, of course, static defence forces, loosely organized on a locality basis with no reserves and no effective over-all command. Numbers varied according to the towns. The following is the strength of the garrisons in the main cities. The figures

indicate maximum strength in April.¹

Jerusalem	380	rifles	(excluding the ALA contingents)
Jaffa	264	rifles	(excluding the ALA contingents)
Haifa	370	rifles	(excluding the ALA contingent)
Gaza	150	rifles	
Beisan	200	rifles	
Acre	30	rifles	
Tiberias	97	rifles	
Nazareth	—	covered, in principle, by the rural force of Southern Galilee (see above)	
Safed	72	rifles	
	<u>1563</u>		

B: THE ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA)

Hastily formed and trained by the Arab League from volunteers from the various Arab countries (including Palestine) after the partition resolution, this army was organized into 8 battalions under the central control of an Arab League Military Committee based on Damascus. Its strength was as follows:

1st Yarmuk Bat.	3 companies	500 (including Palestinians)
2nd Yarmuk Bat.	3 companies	430
3rd Yarmuk Bat.	2 companies	c.250
Hittin Bat.	3 companies	500 (including Palestinians)
Hussein Bat.	3 companies	c.500 (including Palestinians)
Druze Bat.	3 companies	500 (including Palestinians)
Kadisiya Bat.	3 companies	c.450
Ajnadin Bat.	2 companies	c.250 (wholly Palestinian)
4 independent companies.		<u>450</u>
		3830 of whom at least 1000 were Palestinians

These units entered Palestine only gradually and over a period of four months. About 1500 entered in January 1948, 500 in February, 1000 in March and the balance in April and the first half of May.

Sources used: A.H.C. and ALA files.

¹ Many of these rifles were sent by the Arab League Military Committee from Damascus.

Appendix IX-A

ZIONIST FORCES ON 15/5/48

TRAINED MANPOWER AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

The Zionist forces were made up of many components:

I. **FIRST-LINE TROOPS (FULLY MOBILIZED)**. These included the Strategic Reserve and the Field Army:

1) *The Strategic Mobile Reserve (Palmach)*¹. This comprised 3 brigades:

Yiftach or 9th Brigade	2750 ²
Harel or 10th Brigade	2750
Hanegev or 12th Brigade	2750
	<hr/>
	8150

This force was conscripted from the pick of the 18-25 age group.

2) *The Field Army (Khayl Sadeh-KHISH)*. This comprised at this time 7 brigades as follows:

Golani or 1st Bde	2750*
Carmeli or 2nd Bde	2750
Alexandroni or 3rd Bde	2750
Kiryati or 4th Bde	2750
Givati or 5th Bde	2750
Etzioni or 6th Bde	2750
Sheva or 7th Bde	2750
	<hr/>
	19,250

Total First-Line troops:

Palmach	8150
KHISH	19,250
	<hr/>
	27,400

¹ Short for Plugat Machats—"Striking Force".

² This was the complement to be achieved by 1st May 1948. According to figures given by Kimche and Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill*, (p. 158) several of these units seemed on their way to reaching this goal as early as 1st April 1948. According to Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword*, (p. 88) the total of fully mobilized troops was set at 30,000 by 1st May. This would tally with our estimate of 27,300 given above though some brigades soon after 15 May exceeded their complements e.g. Givati or 5th Bde which, according to Kimche and Kimche (p. 167) numbered 4800.

II. SECOND-LINE TROOPS (RESERVES). These included:

1) *The Garrison Troops (Khayl Matzav-KHIM)*

This in effect was the Territorial Army and General Reserve. It was recruited from the 25 + age groups. Units of KHIM were fully mobilized and attached to KHISH units only as the occasion demanded; otherwise they were engaged in static defence and regional operations. According to Lorch (p. 46), they already numbered 32,000 by "the fall of 1947," though "many more could be called up in the time of need." As early as 1939, KHIM units had been divided into battalions of 600, according to Ben Gurion in the *Jewish Observer etc.* 8th Nov. 1963.

2) *The Jewish Settlement Police*

This was a British sponsored force and in June 1947¹ numbered:

1,929	fully mobilized.
<u>13,481</u>	"special constables" i.e. reserves.
15,410	

The J.S.P. was equipped by the British and in June 1947 possessed the following *official* armament:

4,921	rifles
2,992	"training" rifles
48	Lewis guns
377	Greener guns
40	grenade rifles
17	armoured trucks
30	pick ups

The J.S.P. maintained communications between Jewish colonies and after 15/5/48 was gradually absorbed into the various first and second line units.

The J.S.P. does not exhaust all the British sponsored Jewish police forces. There were substantial Jewish components in the various other Mandatory police forces totalling in all 7,903 (Palestinian ranks) i.e. the District Police, the Temporary Additional Police (General), the Temporary Additional Police (Railways and Ports), and the Special Constables (Urban).¹

3) *Gadna* or Youth Battalions. These received premilitary and military training between the ages of 14-17 and served as a general reserve for the Palmach. In April 1947, they numbered 9000 according to Ben Gurion in the *Jewish Observer etc.* 19 March, 1965.

¹ *Supplement to Survey of Palestine*, p. 3.

III. THE HOME GUARD (*Mishmar Haam*)

This was recruited from 37 + age groups and carried out civil defence responsibilities as well as the manning of road-blocs. According to Dov Joseph, *The Faithful City* (p. 29), this force numbered 32,000.

IV. THE "DISSIDENT" GROUPS

All the forces mentioned in I-III belonged to the Hagana or so-called Defence Forces of the Jewish Agency, although the J.S.P. had a special status within the Hagana in that it was officially recognized and maintained by the British Government. The "Dissident" groups, the name given them by the Hagana itself, often came under joint command with the Hagana for specific operations, but were to all intents and purposes independent in structure and organization. Their armament would certainly not be included in any official Hagana figures.

1) *The Irgun Zvai Leumi* (IZL or Irgun)

According to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry¹ this group already numbered 3000-5000 in 1946. According to Lorch (p. 49) "their armaments were similar to the Hagana with perhaps a larger share of automatics."

2) *The Stern Gang* (Lochmae Herut LiIsrael—or Fighters for the Freedom of Israel—LEHI)

According to the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry,² this numbered 200-300. Its armament was similar to that of the Irgun.

ARMAMENT

The figures of arms available to the Jews by 15/5/48 as given by some Zionist writers are open to question. To take only their estimate of rifle strength, for example: Kimche and Kimche (p. 76) quote an estimate allegedly made by Ben Gurion in April 1947 after he had "checked the armouries of the Haganah", in which the stock of rifles is put at 10,073. This, however, is difficult to tally with the results of the researches made into the matter by Baeur ("Middle East Studies", Vol. 2, April 1966) who gives the number of rifles available to the Hagana in 1944 as 10,338. From what we know of Zionist strategic plans and of the strenuous and extensive efforts made by the Jewish Agency in the years 1944-1947 to acquire arms for the Hagana, it is inconceivable that the rifle stocks available to the Hagana would have remained constant during this crucial period.

But even if this were true, and not a single rifle was added to the Hagana armoury between 1944 and April 1947, the figure of 10,073 certainly does

¹ p. 41.

² *Ibid.*

not include the *total* Jewish rifle strength in the country in April 1947. For to the number of 10,073 rifles available to the Hagana, must be added the rifle stocks of the Jewish Settlement Police, the other Jewish police forces and the "dissident" groups. According to estimates made above, these stocks would amount to another 10,000 rifles as follows:

J.S.P.	7000
Other Jewish police forces	1500 – 2000
IZL and LEHI	1500 – 2000
	<hr/>
	c. 10,000 rifles

The minimum known number of rifles in the possession of the Jews of Palestine in April 1947 must therefore be set at c. 20,000 and *not* 10,000 as philosophically assumed by Bowyer Bell in *The Long War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969) p. 156. Now between April 1947 and 15 May, 1948, there was a tremendous increase in Hagana rifle strength. The three Czech arms consignments known as *Balak 1* to *3*, which all arrived before May 15, comprised 9,300 rifles. Krammer mentions only the 5,000 rifles of *Balak 2* and *Balak 3* (Krammer, p. 751), but, for some reason, not the 4,300 rifles on board the *Nora*¹ whose load was, as he admits, part of *Balak 1* (Krammer, p. 749). We also know that between the summer of 1947 and the end of 1947, 1500 rifles were brought into the country from a Hagana base at Magenta near Milan,² making a total of 10,800 *additional* rifles to the Hagana armoury from these two sources *alone*, between April 1947 and 15 May 1948. Since there was another big consignment of arms from Magenta, *between* January 1948 and 15 May 1948, totalling 535 tons,³ as well as many other consignments during the same period, from Belgium,⁴ France,⁵ the U.S.,⁶ and Canada⁷—not to mention the vast stocks bought, stolen from, or simply donated by the retreating British Mandatory forces, it is inconceivable that the 10,800 rifles added to Hagana stocks from Czechoslovakia and Magenta were the only rifles added to the Hagana armoury between April 1947 and 15 May 1948. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that even the new ostensibly revised total of 22,000 rifles, as of 15/5/1948, given by the Kimche brothers, (p. 161) is hardly reliable.

It would be tedious, though not difficult, similarly to analyze the figures for the arms, other than rifles, as well as for the ammunition stocks, given by Kimche and Kimche (p. 76 and p. 161) as being in the Hagana armouries in April 1947 and on 14 May 1948 respectively. These figures are as follows:

¹ Kagan, *The Secret Battle for Israel* (N.Y., 1966), p. 57.

² Munya Mardor, *Strictly Illegal* (London, 1964), p. 183.

³ Mardor, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

⁴ Mardor, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁵ Compare Krammer, p. 747 above.

⁶ Kagan, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁷ Kimche and Kimche, *op. cit.* p. 75.

April 1947 14 May 1948

sub-machine-guns	1,900	11,100
light machine-guns	444	1,500
medium machine-guns	186	“A few medium machines guns” (sic)
2-inch mortars	672	682
3-inch mortars	96	105
6-inch mortars (Davidka)	—	16
PIATS and anti-tank rifles	—	75
field guns (65 mm)	—	4

The sub-machine gun and light machine-gun estimates for 14 May seem reasonable, particularly as the former could be locally produced. With regard to the medium machine-guns, there seems to be here (see second column) an attempt at obfuscation; while the claim that the 2-inch and 3-inch mortars increased by only 10 and 9 respectively in one whole crucial year, though these weapons were produced locally is altogether implausible. It would also be interesting to determine if the estimate of the field guns given in the second column included the ship-load of the *Borea* (for which see below).

On the other hand, Bell makes the point¹ that “the Israelis had no armour and no artillery except the homemade variety” and that “this lack, not the lack of rifles was their real weakness.” Bell is clearly unaware of how small Arab strength in armour was on D. Day. He is equally unaware of just how strong the Jews were in armoured cars. Kirk (*The Middle East 1945-50*, London, 1954, p. 270) puts their number at 800. Moreover the *Flying Arrow* with 50 armoured half-tracks on board from the U.S. had arrived in Palestinian waters as early as 23 March, 1948; and the Jews had acquired at least 3 tanks from the British by 15/5/48 (2 Cromwells and one Sherman) which were an easy match for the Egyptian “Locusts” and Syrian “Renaults.”² Also by the time the Egyptian armour was “thrown in” at least some of the heavy Czech equipment must have arrived. Nor were the Jews as defenceless as all that against such Arab armour as there was. The Kimches admit³ that the Jews had 75 PIATS and anti-tank rifles on 15/5/48. What they do not mention for Bell’s benefit is the practically inexhaustible supply of anti-tank mines the Jews possessed—their real “secret weapon” against Arab “armour.”⁴ Bell also seems unaware that the *Borea* with field guns

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 157.

² Compare below Appendix IX-B.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 161. Compare also the Krammer statement (p. 749 above) that by 26 May 1948 the Czech Communist Government had promised *thirty* 16-ton tanks “at once”, *twenty* 9-ton tanks “immediately”, *thirty* 16-ton tanks “at the end of June”, with offers of “*heavier*” tanks to be made “tomorrow”.

⁴ The bulk of the anti-tank and anti-personnel mines used by the Eighth Army against Rommel in North Africa during World War II was of the “homemade variety”, manufactured in Jewish factories in Palestine (*Survey of Palestine* vol. II pp. 1011-2).

on board unloaded on 15 May 1948 in Haifa. He does not take sufficient account of the overwhelming Israeli superiority of at least 9 to 1 in mortars (an ideal "artillery" weapon in the hilly country of Palestine) which offset any initial numerical superiority in field guns the Arabs may have possessed. But above all, Bell underestimates the military implications of the political restraints imposed on the use of the "armour" and the artillery of the best equipped Arab army—the Arab Legion, as well as the logistical problems faced by the motorised Arab forces from Egypt and Iraq.

As for the Jewish air force the figures for 15/5/1948 are as follows:

		Total
fighters ¹	10 Messerschmitt ME 109's ¹	10
heavy transports	3 4-engine ² Constellations	3
medium transports	9 Curtiss C 46 Commandos ²	
	1 2-engine transport. ³	10
light transports	9 Austers ⁴	9
trainers	25 Piper Cubs ⁵	25

¹ Krammer (p. 749 above) indicates that it was on 26 May i.e. eleven days *after* 15/5/48 that Avriel, the Hagana agent in Czechoslovakia, reported on the progress of his mission with regard to the supply of planes and other arms to the Jews in Palestine. But Kagan (p. 62) reports: "another contract had been signed with the Czechs, and as of *April 23*, 1948, our Air Force was augmented by *ten* Messerschmitt ME-190's. A special clause assured our pilots of a training period in Czechoslovakia. It also guaranteed the assistance of Czechoslovakian specialists in reassembling the planes which would have to be disassembled for the transport to Palestine". The difference in dates between the Krammer reference and the Kagan account is important since the latter indicates that the Jewish leaders had definite assurances of fighter cover *prior* to 15/5/48 (Did they have similar assurances with regard to tanks?). Moreover, by *May 20th* (i.e. 6 days *before* the date indicated in Krammer's above reference) the Messerschmitts were *beginning to arrive* in Palestine (Kagan, p. 76). The total number of fighters promised by the Czechs by 26 May was 69, and it is interesting to note that Avriel refers to "a loan" from the Czech government to cover the deal (cp Krammer p. 749 above).

² Purchased in the U.S. and landed in Catania, Sicily, by 8 May, 1948, with the apparent connivance of, at least, the local American and Italian authorities respectively. (Kagan, p. 23 ff, and pp. 49 and 63).

For the use of these and the other transports and trainers in a bomber role see note 4 below.

³ Mentioned by Lorch (p. 48); unidentifiable, possibly a Dakota C-47.

⁴ Compare Lorch (p. 48) and Kagan (p. 54). Thanks to the expertise of an American armament engineer these were fitted with 6 125-lb bombs (4 under the fuselage and 2 under the wings) and so used against the Palestinian Arabs as from *April*, 1948 (cp. Kagan p. 55).

⁵ Compare Lorch (p. 48) and Kagan (p. 55).

Appendix IX-B

THE ARAB EXPEDITIONARY FORCES TO PALESTINE, 15/5/48

The expeditionary forces¹ sent to Palestine by the Arab States on 15/5/48 numbered 8 brigades, whose total strength was rather less than 15,000.

The distribution of these forces was as follows:

Syria	1 brigade	1876
Iraq	2 brigades	4000
Trans-Jordan	3 brigades	4500
Egypt	2 brigades	2800
Lebanon	1 battalion	700
		13,876

The "armour" at the disposal of these forces was as follows:

	<i>Light Tanks</i>	<i>Heavy Armoured cars</i>	<i>Light Armoured cars</i>
Syria	4	—	23
Iraq	—	—	37
T.J.	—	38	24
Egypt	13 ²	—	—
Lebanon	5 ³	—	9
	22	38	63

¹ Compare *inter alia* Krammer's reference (p. 751 above) to the "massive Arab offensive"; the absurd figure of 120,000 Arab troops entering Palestine on 15/5/48 given by Col. Benjamin Kagan in *The Secret Battle for Israel* (N.Y., 1966), with an introduction by Brig. Gen. Dan Tolkowsky, Israeli Air Force, p. 69; and the equally absurd statement by Kimche and Kimche *Both Sides of the Hill* (London, 1960) p. 165, that 1,500 vehicles belonging to the Egyptian expeditionary force were seen to be advancing into Palestine on 15/5/48.

² These did not appear until D Day + 11.

³ There is no conclusive evidence that these were actually committed to battle.

The artillery at the disposal of these forces was as follows:

Syria	12 guns (75mm)
Iraq	12 guns (25-pounders)
	12 guns (3.7")
T.J.	24 guns (25-pounders)
	6 guns (6-pounders)
	40 mortars (3 inch)
Egypt	24 guns (25-pounders)
Lebanon	12 guns (75 mm).

The air forces at the disposal of all the Arab armies (Lebanon and Trans-Jordan had no air forces) consisted of:

10 fighters
 12-15 medium transports
 12 light transports
 18-21 trainers

as follows:

	<i>fighters</i>	<i>bombers</i>	<i>medium transports</i>	<i>light transport</i>	<i>trainers</i>
Egypt	10 Spitfires ¹ (Mark 5)	—	6-9 (Dakota C-47s) ² max. sp. 215 m.p.h. 6 (Commandos C-46s) ² max.sp. 241 m.p.h.	—	6-9 (Harvards) max.sp. 212.m.p.h
Syria	—	—	—	—	6(Harvards) max.sp. 212m.p.h.
Iraq	—	—	—	12(Avro Ansons) max.sp. 190 m.p.h.	6(Kaydet biplanes) max.sp. 124m.p.h.
	10 fighters		12-15 medium transports	12 light transports	18-21 trainers

¹ Towards the end of May 1968, the British shot down 2 of these and damaged 2 others because they had allegedly attacked the RAF base at Ramat David near Haifa. See N. Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword* (London, 1961) p. 229.

² Most of these could not be used on bombing missions because of lack of armament expertise and inadequate fighter support.

Only Iraq had a small-arms ammunition factory and all, except Egypt, were desperately short of artillery ammunition.

The details of each expeditionary force are as follows:

Syria: The Syrian force consisted of one brigade. This was 1st Brigade and comprised:

H.Q. Co.	159 men
1st Armoured Regiment	555 men
1st Artillery Regiment	344 men
1st Infantry Battalion	404 men
2nd Infantry Battalion	414 men
	<hr/>
	1876

The 1st Armoured Regiment comprised 23 light armoured cars and 6 Renault tanks. These latter were of 1935 vintage. They were equipped with a 37 mm. gun and weighed 11 tons. 2 of the 6 tanks broke down on the way to the front, while one accidentally fell into Lake Tiberias just before the attack on Samakh on 15/5/48.

The Artillery Regiment had 12 guns with ammunition for less than one week's fighting.

Iraq: The Iraqi force consisted of 2 brigades: one motorised, one infantry. The motorised brigade comprised:

1st Light Armoured Car Regt.	37 armoured cars
3rd Desert Artillery Regt.	12 guns (25-pounders)

The infantry brigade was the 1st Infantry Brigade comprising:

1st Inf. Bat.	750 men ¹
2nd Inf. Bat.	750 men
1st Inf. Bat. 15th Bde	750 men
Motorised Art. Regt. (12 3.7" guns)	750 men
	<hr/>
	3000

1st Inf. Bde also had attached to it 2nd Light A A Battery. This last unit was equipped with 12 German 20 mm. machine guns for which ammunition was very scarce. None of the armoured cars carried guns. They were mostly light (4.5 tons) Humbers, thinly-plated against small arms, and mounting one Hotchkiss and one Bren machine-gun. The Iraqis had *no* tanks, and their artillery was very short of ammunition.

¹ This was full complement, but it is doubtful whether all of the brigade units were at full strength.

Trans-Jordan: The entire Arab Legion of Trans-Jordan comprised 2 brigades, 6 independent companies and 1 artillery regiment. Of these the 2 brigades, two independent companies, and the artillery regiment were sent to Palestine on 15/5/48:

1st Brigade:

1st Regt.	}	1750
3rd Regt.		

3rd Brigade:

2nd Regt.	}	1889
4th Regt.		
		3639

The 6 independent companies were eventually formed into 4th Brigade (comprising 5th and 6th Regts.) which was 2100 strong. 1st Brigade had 38 heavy armoured cars and 24 light reconnaissance armoured cars. The former mounted 2-pounder guns, the latter two machine-guns each. The Artillery Regiment had 24 25-pounders and 6 6-pounders. The entire Legion boasted of 40 3" mortars. It had *no* tanks, and *no* planes, and was always desperately short of ammunition of all kinds.

Egypt: The Egyptian force comprised 2 infantry brigades as follows:

1st Brigade comprising:

1st Inf. Bat.	700
2nd Inf. Bat.	700

and 2nd Brigade comprising:

6th Inf. Bat.	700
9th Inf. Bat.	700
2800	

Each battalion had 13 Bren gun carriers. The expeditionary force was supported by an artillery regiment comprising 24 25-pounders. Subsequently 13 tanks were attached to "Divisional" H.Q.,—the entire Egyptian armoured strength. 6 of these tanks were tiny Locust M 22s weighing 8 tons and mounting one 37 mm. gun (originally designed for airborne operations) and 7 "Meadows." A force of irregulars was also attached to the Egyptian expeditionary force. This was about 400 strong and was composed mostly of members of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, including 120 Tunisians. The irregulars were under the command of an ex-Egyptian officer Ahmad Abdul Aziz and operated south of Jerusalem. The entire irregular force was commanded by 8 Egyptian officers (including Abdul Aziz).

Lebanon: The Lebanese "expeditionary" force consisted of the following units of 1st Battalion:

2 infantry companies	c. 300 men
1 squadron of Renault tanks	5 tanks
1 squadron of light armoured cars	9 armoured cars

Lebanese military operations were restricted to a single engagement at the Zionist colony of Malkiyeh on the Palestinian border which dominated roads leading into the interior of Lebanon. The Lebanese were short of ammunition of all types.

Sources used: For Syria, the official files of the Syrian Ministry of Defence (which constitute part of the private papers of the late Jamil Mardam Bey, Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Syria during 1948); for Trans-Jordan, the Battle Order of the Arab Legion as given by Col. Abdallah Tall in his memoirs *Kārithat Filastin* (Cairo, 1959); for Egypt, the Palestine war memoirs of Col. Nasser, the "official" Moslem Brotherhood history of the war by Kamel Sharif, and interviews conducted by the author with participants; for Iraq, the official history of the expedition (which clearly draws on the files of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence); and for all the Arab forces, the secret report of the Iraqi Royal Commission on the 1948 war.

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