Historical Dictionary *of the*

Arab–Israeli Conflict

P. R. Kumaraswamy

SECOND EDITION

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Historical Dictionary of the Arab–Israeli Conflict

Second Edition

P. R. Kumaraswamy

With love and affection
to my mother-in-law
Hu Wenluan
胡文鸾

Contents

Editor's Foreword

Not all conflicts come to an end, but exceedingly few have been around as long as the one between Arab countries and Israel, which has lasted more than half a century with no sign of ending. All this time, it has poisoned relations not only between Israel and its Arab neighbors but much further afield, afflicting the Middle East and the Muslim world as a whole and seriously complicating relations between the United States and European countries. Repeated attempts have been made to resolve it, with no real success. The new Palestinian leadership has done no better than the old one and is divided; the Israeli leadership has shown less interest in compromise than ever before. The United States has not tired of launching peace initiatives, while the United Nations debates the situation but never takes action. Many scenarios are possible, but the least likely remains a satisfactory solution.

Whatever the future may bring, a comprehensive guide to the past is indispensable. *Historical Dictionary of the Arab–Israeli Conflict* will be of great use to anyone who wants to better understand the situation. Moreover, this second edition builds on the first to provide considerably more information. The chronology traces the conflict, the introduction places it in a broader context to explain why it is so intractable, and a list of acronyms helps readers of not only this but other books on the topic. The dictionary section provides hundreds of entries on the military, political, economic, and social aspects of the situation in Israel and its rival nations, among the Palestinians, and also within outside countries that have sought to resolve or destabilize the situation. These entries include major wars and lesser actions, acts of terrorism and assassinations, political parties and resistance organizations, countless plans and proposals along with those who supported or blocked them, and the resolutions ritually adopted in the UN. The bibliography provides further sources of reading.

This book was not written by an Arab or an Israeli or a Westerner, but by an Indian—one who has extensive familiarity with the subject and region. P. R. Kumaraswamy specializes in international relations at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, in New Delhi, where he is professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies. Prior to this, he was a research fellow at the Truman Institute in Jerusalem and held the ICCR India Chair at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. All this while he has been researching, teaching, and writing on Middle Eastern affairs with particular attention to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Among his many books, of

special relevance are *India's Israel Policy*, *Israel and the Islamic World*, *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians*, and *Revisiting the Yom Kippur War*. He has also published numerous articles and edits *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*. In a field in which bias is almost impossible to avoid, there are advantages to relative neutrality and careful study, and this book does a better job than most in presenting fact rather than opinion, leaving it up to readers to draw their own conclusions.

Jon Woronoff
Series Editor

Preface

How does one describe the perplexing and never-ending Arab–Israeli conflict? I primarily see it—especially the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—as two intense and rival nationalisms fighting over the same piece of territory. There can only be one way out: a fair and honorable settlement based on mutual respect, compromise, and accommodation of each other's interests. This can be achieved either after more violence, conflict, and suffering or with fewer deaths. The choice rests with the people of the region and their leaders.

One is blessed. I am an outsider not only to the Middle East but also to its dominant faiths. I have approached the Arab–Israeli conflict with sympathy to none and compassion for all. There is no overall bias in favor of, or against, any party to the conflict in this work. I honestly tried to be as fair as was humanly possible without being politically correct or fashionable. I could try this because I see and recognize the city of Jerusalem—where most of my understanding of the conflict evolved—as it is. Chronology, late arrival, or demographic superiority does not change the simple fact that the city is holy and sacrosanct to all three major religions of the region—namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

As a gentile, infidel, kafir, and pagan, I am aware of my ethno-cultural baggage and have tried to be conscious of the cultural diversity within which my understanding of the region, its people, and the conflict has evolved. Hence, without being judgmental or prescriptive, I have tried to present an outsider's view of the complex and ever-puzzling conflict.

Naturally, there would be disagreements over the selection of entries or the choice of expressions. With each passing day, a dictionary like this would have to be constantly updated, revised, and relooked at. Worldviews also change with age and the maturing of the mind. And ultimately this work must be judged by the benchmarks of balance and fairness.

A word about style. While most of the entries are about contemporary issues, the dictionary traces as the major milestone the Jewish immigration to Palestine, the Aliya that began in the late 19th century. Military operations undertaken by Israel are referred to here by their specific titles because they are widely known and present a better understanding; hence, it is *Peace for Galilee Operation*, not *Israeli Invasion of Lebanon*. At the same time, neutral expressions are used to refer to specific Arab–Israeli wars, for example, the *Arab–Israeli War of 1948* as opposed to the *War of Independence* or *al-Naqba*, as it is commonly known among Israelis and Palestinians, respectively. Likewise, the dual expression, *Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount*, is used for

the holiest of the holy sites in the walled city of Jerusalem. It is often forgotten that there were two massacres in Hebron, one in 1929 against the Jews and the other in 1994 against the Muslims.

While close to 200 entries are added in this edition, a substantial revision has been made from the previous edition published in 2006. Indeed, all except a handful of the entries have been reviewed and sharpened. In some cases, the terminologies are tweaked to make them appealing to and easier for the reader. With sufficient cross-references, the entries should provide the reader, scholar, and layperson alike with a rich but balanced reference on the basic aspects of the conflict.

No dictionary, this one included, is the endeavor of a single individual. My understanding of the complexities of the conflict was enhanced by similar pioneering dictionaries of scholars before me. Valuable inputs and critical comments from various people have enabled me to make this revised version sharper, simpler, and shorter.

Over to the reader.

Acknowledgments

My editor Jon Woronoff needs a special mention. He meticulously went through my draft, and his speed is second only to his professionalism. He often put up with my missed deadlines.

My brothers-in-law, Lin Xiaozhong and Lin Tong, have been generous with their kindness. Ever since I first met her in Jerusalem in the summer of 1988, my wife Lin Qian has smilingly endured my eccentricities, and saying *yes* to her is perhaps the only sensible thing I did in my life.

All along, I have been blessed with the unconditional love and affection of Appa, Jayanti, Sreedhar, and Ravi Mama. I dedicate this volume to my ever-positive and kindhearted mother-in-law with deep love and affection. All errors and omissions are mine.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADP	Arab Democratic Party
AHC	Arab Higher Committee
AIPAC	America–Israel Public Affairs Committee
AKP	Adalet Ve Kalkinma Partisi, or Justice and Development Party
ALA	Arab Liberation Army
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
AOLP	Active Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
APG	All Palestine Government
BDS	Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions
BSO	Black September Organization
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CNG	Committee for National Guidance
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DP	Displaced Persons
EEC	European Economic Community
EMFTA	European Union–Mediterranean Free Trade Area
EMG	East Mediterranean Gas Company
EU	European Union
FIDA	Al-Ittihad Al-Dimuqrati Al-Filastini, or Palestinian Democratic Union
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
FRC	Fatah Revolutionary Council

GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GSS	General Security Services, or Shin Bet
HAMAS	Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAF	Islamic Action Front
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IEC	Israel Electrical Company
IHH	Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MAC	Mixed Armistice Commissions
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MKs	Members of the Knesset
MNF	Multinational Force
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	National Democratic Party
NIS	New Israeli Shekel
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRP	National Religious Party (Israel)
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PCC	Palestine Conciliation Commission
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command

PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNC	Palestinian National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PNI	Palestinian National Initiative
PNIF	Palestinian National and Islamic Forces
PNSF	Palestine National Salvation Front
POW	prisoner of war
PPP	Palestine People's Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
PSF	Popular Struggle Front
RCD	Regional Cooperation for Development
SLA	South Lebanese Army
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean
UN	United Nations
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTJ	United Torah Judaism
WZO	World Zionist Organization

Maps

Map 1. Mandate Palestine. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/ cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/fb142c75310db0a90525655600795225/ $FILE/palestine1.jpg.

Map 2. UN Partition Plan 1947. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/ cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/ 3cbe4ee1ef30169085256b98006f540d?OpenDocument.

Map 3. The Armistice Lines of 1949. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/ unispal.nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/ e55f901779c1f8e485256b9800714cef?OpenDocument.

Map 4. Greater Jerusalem Area. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/ cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/ a4af80394a992d1f85256b98006db20d?OpenDocument.

Map 5. Jerusalem, Occupied and Expanded by Israel in June 1967. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/ b2093ae6ac9de94985256b98006e3ad2?OpenDocument.

Map 6. Territory Occupied by Israel since 1967. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/8b149dc95a7e6f4f85256b98006fc901?OpenDocument.

Map 7. Line of Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from Lebanon in June 2000. Source: UN, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/blueline.pdf.

Map 8. Phased Redeployment (Areas A, B, and C) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Source: UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/ cf02d057b04d356385256ddb006dc02f/ 4b4d1a17cee72b30852571af006364ba?OpenDocument.

Map 9. Gaza Disengagement 2005. Source: MFA, Israel, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Israels%20Disengagement%20Plan-%202005.aspx.

Chronology

1869 Opening of the Suez Canal.

1882 First Aliya to Palestine.

1888 Constantinople Convention signed.

1894 Alfred Dreyfus trial in France.

1896 Theodore Herzl publishes *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*).

1897 The First Zionist Congress is held in Basel, Switzerland.

1915–1916 July–March: Hussein–McMahon correspondence.

1916 May: Sykes–Picot Agreement. **June:** Arab Revolt against the Ottomans begins.

1917 2 November: Balfour Declaration. **9 December:** British forces led by General Allenby enter Jerusalem.

1920 March: Arab Congress in Damascus proclaims Faisal king of Syria. **April:** Nabi Musa riots in Hebron and Jerusalem. San Remo Conference assigns mandate for Palestine to Great Britain. **December:** Histadrut labor federation is formed.

1921 March: Britain appoints Faisal king of Iraq. Emirate of Transjordan is formed with Abdullah as head. **May:** Formation of Haganah. Arab riots in Jaffa against Jewish population.

1922 June: Churchill White Paper proclaimed. **24 July:** League of Nations ratifies Palestine Mandate.

1929 August: Western Wall riots in Jerusalem, which soon spread to other parts of Palestine.

1930 21 October: Passfield White Paper proposes to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine.

1936 April–October: Arab general strike in Palestine and beginning of Arab Revolt.

1937 7 July: Peel Commission recommends partition of Palestine.

1938 5 January: Woodhead Commission recommends partition of Palestine.

1939 17 May: MacDonald White Paper restricts Jewish immigration and land purchase. **1 September:** Outbreak of World War II.

1942 11 May: Biltmore Program recommends an end to British Mandate and calls for the founding a Jewish commonwealth.

1945 22 May: Arab League formed in Cairo.

1946 22 March: Transjordan gains independence. **1 May:** Anglo-American Committee recommends admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine.

1947 2 April: Britain requests a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to consider future government of Palestine. **15 May:** General Assembly establishes a UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). **3 September:** UNSCOP issues a majority report recommending partition of Palestine with an internationalized Jerusalem and a minority report recommending a federal scheme. **29 November:** General Assembly votes to partition Palestine and to establish, by 1 October 1948, independent Jewish and Arab states and recommends international status for Jerusalem.

1948 19 March: United States proposes suspension of the Partition Plan and calls for a special session of the General Assembly to discuss trusteeship for Palestine. **1 April:** Security Council calls for truce in Palestine and a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider future of Palestine. **9 April:** Large number of Palestinian civilians killed by Jewish groups Irgun and Lehi in Deir Yassin Massacre. **13 April:** Medical convoy to Jerusalem's Hadassah Hospital ambushed and massacred in retaliation for the Deir Yassin Massacre. **14 May:** State of Israel proclaimed. **15 May:** Armies of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria invade the newly formed State of Israel. **20 May:** General Assembly committee appoints Count Folke Bernadotte as mediator for Palestine. **11 June:** Four-week Arab–Israeli truce commences. **22 June:** *Altalena* Affair. **18 July:** Second Arab–Israeli truce begins. **16 September:** Bernadotte Plan. **17 September:** Count Bernadotte assassinated by Stern Gang in Jerusalem. **22 September:** All Palestine Government formed. **16 November:** Security Council calls for armistice talks. **1 December:** Jericho Congress asks the Hashemite king to take over the West Bank. **11 December:** UN General Assembly establishes Palestine Conciliation Commission, reaffirms decision on Jerusalem, and recognizes Palestinian refugees' right to return to their homes or to be paid compensation (Resolution 194).

1949 24 February: Israel and Egypt sign the Armistice Agreement. **10 March:** Israeli army reaches Eilat on the Red Sea. **23 March:** Israel and Lebanon sign the Armistice Agreement. **3 April:** Israel and Jordan sign the Armistice Agreement. **11 May:** Israel admitted to the United Nations. **20 July:** Israel and Syria sign the Armistice Agreement.

1950 24 April: Jordan annexes West Bank, including East Jerusalem. **25 May:** United States, Great Britain, and France issue Tripartite Declaration on Middle East.

1951 20 July: King Abdullah of Jordan assassinated at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

1953 15 October: U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower appoints Ambassador Eric Johnston to help establish a regional water development project based on the Jordan River. Qibya raid.

1954 July: Lavon Affair. **28 September:** *Bat Galim* Affair begins. **October:** Anglo-American Alpha Plan aimed at securing a comprehensive Egypt–Israeli peace is put in place.

1955 24 February: Baghdad Pact comes into force. **28 February:** Gaza raid. **31 August–1 September:** Khan Yunis raid. **27 September:** Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal announced. **11 October:** Arab League rejects Eric Johnston's Jordan River plan. **11 December:** Kinneret Operation.

1956 20 July: United States and Great Britain back out of their pledge to provide financial aid for Egypt's Aswan High Dam. **26 July:** Nasser announces nationalization of Suez Canal. **16 August:** 22 nations meet in London on Suez Canal crisis. **23 October:** Sèvres Conference.

29 October: Israel launches the Suez War. Kfar Kassem Massacre. **2 November:** UN General Assembly calls for a cease-fire in the Suez War. **5 November:** General Assembly establishes the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). **7 November:** General Assembly calls on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Sinai and Suez Canal zone. **21 December:** Last British and French troops leave Egypt. **24 December:** Israel begins its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.

1957 10 March: Israel completes its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. **23 March:** Suez Canal reopened.

1959 Formation of Fatah. **24 March:** Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact. **18 August:** Baghdad Pact renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

1964 13 January: First Arab Summit held in Cairo. **29 May:** Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) established at a conference held in East Jerusalem. **13 September:** Second Arab Summit held in Alexandria, Egypt.

1965 18 May: Eli Cohen hanged in Damascus for spying for Israel. **18 September:** Third Arab Summit held in Casablanca, Morocco.

1967 19 May: At Egypt's request, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) withdraws from the Sinai Peninsula. **22 May:** Egypt reimposes naval blockade on the Strait of Tiran. **1 June:** National unity government forms in Israel with Moshe Dayan as defense minister. **5 June:** Israel launches a preemptive air strike against Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi air bases; later in the morning, Jordan joins the war. **6 June:** Israel Defense Forces (IDF) make advances in Sinai, the West Bank, and Jerusalem. **7 June:** Israel captures East Jerusalem as well as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. **8 June:** Israel completes the capture of the Sinai Peninsula; Egypt accepts a cease-fire. **10 June:** Israeli offensive on the Syrian front captures the Golan Heights. **19 June:** U.S. president Lyndon Johnson outlines his five-point peace plan for the Middle East. **28 June:** Israel annexes East Jerusalem. **July:** Israeli minister Yigal Allon outlines his plan for the Occupied Territories. **1 September:** Arab summit conference in Khartoum adopts three no's: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel. **22 November:** UN Security Council adopts Resolution 242; Gunnar Jarring appointed special representative of the secretary-general.

1968 28 December: Israel conducts a raid on Beirut international airport, destroying 13 airliners in retaliation for the attack on an El Al plane in Athens by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

1969 6 January: France announces a ban on arms supplies to Israel. **23 April:** War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt begins. **21 August:** An Australian Christian tourist sets fire to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. **9 December:** Rogers Plan announced for Israel–Egypt peace settlement.

1970 7 August: Israeli–Egyptian cease-fire comes into effect along the Suez Canal. **September:** Civil war–like situation erupts in Jordan; King Hussein proclaims martial law and orders a military crackdown on the Palestinian militia. **27 September:** Gamal Abdel Nasser mediates an agreement to end hostilities in Jordan. **28 September:** Nasser dies of cardiac arrest; Anwar Sadat takes over as president of Egypt.

1971 26 February: Failure of the Jarring Mission. **6 October:** Israel and Egypt reject the Rogers proposals. **28 November:** Jordanian premier Wasfi Tal assassinated in Cairo by Palestinians.

1972 30 May: Lod Massacre. **18 July:** Sadat expels Soviet military advisers from Egypt. **5 September:** 11 Israeli athletes are murdered by the Black September Organization during the Munich Olympics. **1 November:** USSR agrees to supply limited quantities of air defense systems to Egypt.

1973 6 October: Egypt and Syria launch a surprise attack on Israel and the October War breaks out. **8 October:** Israeli counter-offensive in Sinai fails. **10 October:** Israel launches a successful attack against the Syrian forces on

the Golan Heights. **15 October:** Massive American arms airlift to Israel begins. **15 October:** Israeli forces cross the Suez Canal and establish a bridgehead on the western banks. **17 October:** Arab oil-producing states introduce an oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands. **22 October:** UN Security Council adopts Resolution 338 calling for a cease-fire. **25 October:** U.S. president Richard Nixon orders worldwide nuclear alert due to fears of Soviet military intervention on behalf of Egypt. **25 October:** Security Council establishes the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) II to supervise cease-fire. **21 November:** Israel appoints the Agranat Commission to inquire into intelligence failure prior to the October War. **21 December:** Geneva Middle East Peace Conference begins.

1974 18 January: Israel–Egypt Separation of Forces Agreement signed. **18 March:** Arab states lift their oil embargo against the United States. **1 April:** Agranat Commission publishes its interim report. **10 April:** Israeli prime minister Golda Meir resigns owing to Agranat Commission report; Yitzhak Rabin replaces her as prime minister. **11 April:** Kiryat Shmona Massacre. **13 May:** Ma'alot Massacre. **31 May:** Israel and Syria sign Separation of Forces Agreement. **14 October:** UN General Assembly resolves by 105 votes to 4 to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in the debate on the "Palestine question." **26–30 October:** Rabat Arab Summit recognizes the PLO as the "sole and legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. **13 November:** PLO chairman Yasser Arafat addresses the UN General Assembly. **22 November:** General Assembly grants observer status to the PLO and recognizes the right of the Palestinians to self-determination.

1975 30 January: Agranat Commission publishes its final report. **5 June:** Suez Canal reopens for navigation. **1 September:** Israel–Egypt Interim Agreement signed. **10 November:** UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism.

1976 27 June: Air France airliner from Tel Aviv to Paris is hijacked and flown to Entebbe, Uganda. **4 July:** Israeli commandos raid the Entebbe airport and free the hostages.

1977 9 November: President Sadat announces his readiness to come to Jerusalem to address the Knesset if that would promote peace. **19 November:** Sadat arrives in Israel and holds discussions with Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Jerusalem. **20 November:** Sadat addresses the Knesset. **5 December:** Egypt severs diplomatic relations with Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and South Yemen in retaliation for their decision to suspend relations with Egypt in protest against Sadat's initiative. **13 December:** Prime Minister Begin outlines his autonomy plan for the Occupied Territories. **25 December:** Begin and Sadat meet in Ismailia for a summit. **28 December:** Israeli Knesset approves the Begin Plan.

1978 11 March: Palestinian commandos hijack a bus on the Haifa–Tel Aviv road; in the ensuing Israeli rescue mission, 37 civilians are killed and scores of others injured. **13 March:** Israel launches Litani Operation, invading Lebanon. **19 March:** UN Security Council adopts Resolution 425 establishing the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). **11 April:** IDF begins withdrawal from Lebanon. **13 June:** IDF completes withdrawal from Lebanon but hands over control of southern Lebanon to South Lebanese Army (SLA). **6–17 September:** At the initiative of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Begin and Sadat meet at the presidential retreat at Camp David; on the 17th, both sign an Israel–Egypt peace treaty and a framework agreement for autonomy for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. **27 October:** President Sadat and Premier Begin are awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

1979 26 March: Peace Treaty officially signed between Israel and Egypt.

1980 2 June: Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah are seriously wounded in terrorist attacks carried out by Jewish underground. **13 June:** European Economic Community heads issue the Venice Declaration. **30 July:** Knesset approves the Jerusalem Law; protesting against this move, countries that have their legations in Jerusalem shift them to Tel Aviv.

1981 7 June: Israeli raid destroys the Osiraq nuclear reactor near Baghdad. **7 August:** Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia outlines his peace plan. **6 October:** President Sadat assassinated in Cairo. **14 December:** Knesset approves the Golan Heights Law.

1982 25 April: Israel completes its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. **3 June:** Israel's ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, is shot and gravely wounded by a Palestinian gunman belonging to an anti-Arafat faction. **6 June:** Israel launches Operation Peace for Galilee and invades Lebanon. **4 July:** IDF begins besieging West Beirut, cutting off power and water supplies. **1 August:** IDF occupies Beirut's international airport. **1 September:** U.S. president Ronald Reagan unveils Middle East peace plan. **1 September:** Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) completes its evacuation from Lebanon and relocates to Tunis. **6 September:** Arab summit in Fez endorses a modified version of the Fahd Plan. **14 September:** Lebanese president-elect Bachir Gemayel is murdered in the Phalange headquarters in Beirut. **16–18 September:** With Israeli knowledge, if not connivance, Phalange forces enter the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and massacre scores of Palestinian civilians, including women and children; Israel is accused of being indirectly responsible for the crime. **20 September:** Protesting against the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, Egypt recalls its ambassador from Tel Aviv. **28 September:** Following widespread public outcry, the Israeli government agrees to establish a commission of inquiry into the massacre, headed by the

president of the Supreme Court, Justice Yitzhak Kahan. **29 September:** Israel completes its withdrawal from West Beirut. **28 December:** Israel–Lebanon negotiations open in Khalde.

1983 8 February: Kahan Commission issues its final report, concluding that Israel was indirectly responsible for not anticipating the consequences of the Phalange entry into the camps and recommending the removal of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and a number of senior officers from their posts. **13 February:** Sharon resigns from his office but remains in the cabinet as minister without portfolio. **18 April:** Islamic Jihad launches a suicide attack against the U.S. embassy in West Beirut, killing 49 people. **17 May:** Israel–Lebanon agreement signed in Khalde and Kiryat Shmona. **23 October:** Hezbollah launches a suicide attack against the Lebanon headquarters of U.S. Marines, killing 241 soldiers.

1984 5 March: Under intense Syrian pressures, Lebanon abrogates the 17 May 1983 Israel–Lebanon agreement.

1985 14 January: Israel's National Unity government decides to redeploy the IDF in Lebanon in three stages to be completed by June. **11 February:** Arafat and King Hussein meet in Amman to coordinate their moves. **20 May:** Israel releases 1,150 Palestinians belonging to Ahmed Jibril's group in return for the release of three Israeli soldiers held by the group. **24 June:** Israel releases 31 Lebanese detainees in an effort to secure the release of passengers of a TWA airliner held hostage in Beirut. **1 October:** Israel bombs the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Force 17 in Tunis. **5 October:** An Egyptian soldier kills seven Israeli civilians touring in the Ras Bourka area in Sinai. **8 October:** *Achille Lauro* Affair. **28 December:** Terrorists attack El Al counters in the Rome and Vienna airports, killing 15 innocent bystanders.

1986 13 January: Israel's inner cabinet decides to resolve the dispute over Taba through international arbitration; Egypt agrees to the return of its ambassador in Tel Aviv.

1987 11 April: Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein of Jordan conclude the London Agreement. **17 April:** Hindawi Affair. **13 May:** Israel's inner cabinet fails to approve the London Agreement. **9 December:** Outbreak of the Intifada in the Occupied Territories.

1988 4 March: U.S. secretary of state George Shultz outlines his peace plan. **31 July:** King Hussein announces the severance of all legal and administrative links with the West Bank. **1 August:** Israel expels eight leaders of the Intifada to Lebanon. **15 November:** In Algiers, the Palestinian National Council proclaims the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that

would co-exist with Israel. **7 December:** Stockholm Declaration. **14 December:** President Reagan authorizes a U.S.–Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dialogue.

1989 1 January: Israel deports 15 Intifada activists to Lebanon. **20 January:** Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin outlines his peace plan. **15 March:** Israel returns Taba to Egyptian sovereignty. **14 May:** Israel unveils a four-point peace initiative. **29 June:** Israel deports eight Intifada leaders to Lebanon. **29 July:** Israeli forces kidnap Sheikh Obeid, Hezbollah's spiritual leader, from his village in southern Lebanon. **15 September:** Egypt outlines a 10-point peace plan for elections in the Occupied Territories. **6 October:** U.S. secretary of state James Baker unveils a five-point peace plan.

1990 30 May: Two motorboats manned by members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) try to attack a beach in central Israel but are nabbed before they can carry out any attacks. **20 June:** Failure of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to condemn the PLF attack results in suspension of the U.S.–PLO dialogue. **2 August:** Iraq invades Kuwait. **6 August:** UN Security Council imposes economic sanctions on Iraq. **8 August:** Iraq annexes Kuwait. **12 August:** Iraqi president Saddam Hussein links his withdrawal from Kuwait to the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. **8 October:** Rioting and subsequent firing by Israeli police result in the killing of 21 Arabs on the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. **12 October:** UN Security Council condemns Israel and sends a fact-finding mission to Jerusalem; Israel refuses to cooperate.

1991 17 January: United States launches a preemptive strike against Iraq. **17 January:** Abu Nidal group assassinates Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) in Tunis. **18 January:** Iraq fires eight Scuds against Israel; by the time the Kuwait War ends, 39 Scuds have been fired at Israel. **28 February:** Kuwait War ends; Iraq agrees to unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait. **18 October:** USSR reestablishes diplomatic ties with Israel; U.S. secretary of state Baker and Soviet foreign minister Alexander Bessmertnykh invite Israel and several Arab parties to the Madrid Peace Conference. **30–31 October:** Middle East peace conference commences in Madrid, with Israel represented by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and the Arab states represented by their foreign ministers; the Palestinians form a part of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation. **16 December:** UN General Assembly repeals its 1975 resolution on Zionism.

1992 3 January: Israel deports 12 Palestinians to southern Lebanon. **28–29 January:** Multilateral Middle East peace talks begin in Moscow. **17 March:** Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires is bombed; 5 people are killed and more than 100 wounded in the attack. **16 July:** Israel announces partial freezing of its settlement activities in the Occupied Territories. **20 July:** Israel makes a

formal request for $10 billion in loan guarantees from the United States. **11 August:** Prime Minister Rabin meets U.S. president George H. W. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, and reaches an understanding regarding the loan guarantees. **10 September:** Rabin announces Israeli readiness to accept a territorial compromise on the Golan Heights. **13 December:** An Israeli border policeman is kidnapped and killed by Hamas militants. **18 December:** In response to the kidnapping, Israel deports 415 suspected Hamas activists to the Lebanese border; because of Lebanon's refusal to admit them, they are left in the no-man's land near the Israel-held security zone.

1993 19 January: Knesset repeals a 1986 law banning meetings between Israelis and members of terrorist organizations, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). **25–31 July:** Responding to Katyusha rocket attacks, Israel conducts Operation Accountability, with air strikes on Hezbollah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) bases in southern Lebanon. **20 August:** Israel and the PLO secretly initial the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in Oslo. **9 September:** Israel and the PLO formally recognize one another. **11 September:** United States resumes ties with the PLO, suspended since 1990. **13 September:** Israel and the PLO sign the DoP in a White House ceremony. **14 September:** Israel and Jordan sign a "Common Agenda" for negotiations in Washington. **13 October:** Israeli and PLO officials meet in Taba to discuss the implementation of the DoP.

1994 4 February: Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Cairo sign the Agreement on Security in Gaza and Jericho. **25 February:** An Israeli settler from Kiryat Arba, Baruch Goldstein, opens fire at the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, killing 29 Muslim worshippers and wounding scores of others before being killed by those present. **27 February:** Israeli government appoints a commission of inquiry into the Hebron Massacre. **13 March:** Israel outlaws Kach and Kahane Hai. **29 April:** Israel and the PLO sign an economic agreement in Paris. **4 May:** Israel and the PLO sign an agreement on Gaza and Jericho in Cairo. **13 May:** Israel hands over the Jericho area to Palestinian police. **20 May:** Israel kidnaps Hezbollah leader Mustafa Dirani from southern Lebanon. **1 July:** Arafat enters Gaza. **5 July:** Arafat visits Jericho and is sworn in by the Palestinian Council. **18 July:** A car bomb destroys the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, killing 102 and wounding scores. **25–26 July:** Rabin and King Hussein sign the Washington Declaration, ending the state of war between Israel and Jordan. **30 September:** Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries announce the lifting of secondary and tertiary economic boycotts against Israel. **26 October:** Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty signed in the Arava. **30 October:** Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit opens in Casablanca.

1995 15 January: Rabin orders construction of bypass roads in the West Bank. **27 April:** Israel confirms its intention to confiscate 130 acres of land in East Jerusalem. **22 May:** Following severe protests and criticisms, Israel suspends the plan to seize East Jerusalem land. **11 August:** Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reach an agreement on the redeployment of forces in the West Bank. **24 September:** Israel and the PLO in Taba initiate an interim agreement on self-rule for Palestinians. **28 September:** Rabin and Arafat sign the Israel–Palestinian Interim Agreement at the White House. **24 October:** U.S. Congress approves a bill calling for the transfer of the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem no later than 1999. **29–30 October:** Amman hosts the second Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit. **31 October:** Beilin–Abu–Mazen Plan. **4 November:** Prime Minister Rabin assassinated in Tel Aviv by a Jewish extremist. **20 November:** Israel completes its pullout from six West Bank towns. **27 December:** Israeli and Syrian negotiators meet at Wye Plantation near Washington.

1996 5 January: Israel assassinates Yahya Ayyash (popularly known as "the Engineer"), a militant leader belonging to Hamas in the Gaza Strip who was accused of masterminding the killing of 60 to 70 Israeli civilians. **25 February:** A suicide bomber blows up a bus in Jerusalem, killing 12 and injuring 20; another explosion near Ashkelon kills 13 Israelis. **2 March:** Another suicide explosion kills 20 Israelis in Jerusalem. **4 March:** 14 more are killed in Tel Aviv in another suicide bombing; Hamas claims responsibility for all four recent attacks. **13 March:** Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak hosts an anti-terrorist summit conference, called the Summit of the Peace Makers, in Sharm al-Sheikh, attended by 25 world leaders. **11 April:** Israel launches Operation Grapes of Wrath against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. **18 April:** Kfar Kana Massacre. **28 April:** A cease-fire in Lebanon is arranged by the United States. **4 May:** The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) announces that it has amended its National Covenant by removing anti-Israel sections. **21 August:** Citing the Oslo Accords, Israel shuts down two offices of Force 17 in El-Izariyah near Jerusalem. **25 August:** Palestinian National Authority (PNA) claims that it closed down three Force 17 offices affiliated with the PNA in East Jerusalem. **4 September:** Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat meet for the first time at Erez Checkpoint. **5 September:** Speaking to the Likud Central Committee, Netanyahu vows to oppose the creation of a Palestinian state. **15 September:** Meeting in Cairo, Arab foreign ministers warn Israel that they would freeze ties with Israel if there is no progress in the peace process and also call on Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and Morocco to reexamine their ties with and their low-level missions in Israel. **23 September:** Israel opens a new exit to the Western Wall tunnel, resulting in large-scale violence in the Occupied Territories in which 14 Israelis and 56 Palestinians are killed in clashes. **8 October:** Israeli presi-

dent Ezer Weizman hosts Arafat in his Caesarea home. **25 October:** Israeli cabinet lists 10 major Palestinian violations of the Oslo Accords. **12–14 November:** Cairo hosts the third Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit. **13 December:** Israel reinstates financial subsidies to all settlements in the Occupied Territories.

1997 15 January: Netanyahu and Arafat meet in Erez and agree on the Hebron Protocol. **16 January:** Knesset approves the Hebron Agreement. **26 February:** Israel's Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem approves construction of new houses in Har Homa. **13 March:** Seven Israeli schoolgirls are killed in Naharayim by a Jordanian soldier. **16 March:** King Hussein pays a condolence call on the families of the slain Israeli girls. **1 April:** Arab League calls on the Arab states to freeze ties with Israel. **27 July:** Israel postpones construction and settlement in Ras al-Amud in East Jerusalem. **August:** Azzam Azzam is convicted of spying for Israel and given 15 years' imprisonment. **4 September:** A seaborne Israeli operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon fails and 11 Israeli soldiers are killed. **24 September:** Israeli agents make an unsuccessful attempt on Khalid Masha'al, the Hamas political bureau chief in Amman; the assassins are caught and, following political and diplomatic pressures from Jordan, Israel releases Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in return for its agents.

1998 2 January: Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Mordechai declares that Israel accepts the UN resolution on withdrawal from Lebanon but would insist on security guarantees. **13 January:** Israel issues a list of conditions for its agreeing to further redeployment in the West Bank. **20 January:** Prime Minister Netanyahu meets U.S. president Bill Clinton in the White House; the United States presents a plan for a three-stage further redeployment of at least 10 percent of the West Bank. **22 January:** Arafat informs Clinton that the anti-Israeli clauses in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Covenant (also known as the Palestine Liberation Organization Charter) were annulled in May 1996. **31 January:** PLO Executive Committee approves by voice vote the annulment of offensive PLO Covenant. **8 February:** King Hussein sends President Weizman a check for $1 million as compensation to the families of the seven girls slain by a Jordanian soldier in Naharayim in March 1997. **12 February:** Arafat threatens to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state in 1999 if no progress is achieved through negotiations. **1 March:** Netanyahu offers an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in return for adequate Lebanese security guarantees; Lebanon rejects the proposal. **22 March:** Israeli cabinet unanimously agrees that 13.1 percent further redeployment in the West Bank is unacceptable. **1 April:** Israel's inner cabinet accepts UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978. **21 June:** Israeli cabinet approves a plan for new Jerusalem boundaries. **7 July:** UN General Assembly votes to upgrade the PLO's observer status to that of

nonvoting member. **15–23 October:** Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) negotiate an agreement at the Wye River Plantation. **23 October:** Netanyahu and Arafat sign the Wye Memorandum in the White House in the presence of President Clinton and King Hussein. **11 November:** Israeli cabinet ratifies the Wye Memorandum but adds new conditions. **14 November:** Speaking in Nablus, Arafat calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital by 4 May 1999. **19 November:** Israeli cabinet authorizes the first phase of withdrawal. **20 November:** Israel carries out the first of the three further redeployments outlined in the Wye agreement. **24 November:** Israel allows the opening of Gaza International Airport. **14 December:** Meeting in Gaza, the Palestinian National Council reaffirms the annulment of the anti-Israel provisions of the PLO Covenant (also known as the Palestine Liberation Organization Charter), with Clinton present during the vote.

1999 26 January: Knesset adopts a bill requiring an absolute majority of Knesset members and a majority in a referendum before any territorial concessions are made on the Golan Heights. **28 May:** Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens approves plans to extend Ma'ale Adumim boundaries. **31 May:** South Lebanese Army (SLA) troops begin withdrawal from the Jezzin area in the security zone in southern Lebanon. **29 June:** Accusing Hezbollah of violations, Israel pulls out of April 1996 arrangements concerning Israel's participation in the Israel–Lebanon monitoring group; on 8 July, Prime Minister Ehud Barak reverses this decision. **27 July:** Barak and Arafat meet at Erez to discuss the implementation of the Wye agreement. **8 August:** Israel decides to implement the Wye agreement from 1 September. **9 August:** Chief Palestinian negotiator Mahmoud Abbas declares that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) agrees to delay the second stage of the further redeployment to 1 October. **4 September:** Barak and Arafat sign the second Wye Accord in Sharm al-Sheikh. **10 September:** Israel transfers 7 percent of the West Bank land from Area C to Area B. **5 October:** Israel and the PNA sign the Gaza–West Bank Safe Passage Protocol. **10 October:** Israeli cabinet approves removal of 42 settlements built since the October 1998 Wye Accord. **12 October:** Barak orders the dismantling of 15 settlements built since October 1998; 11 are to remain, while, in the remaining 16, no new buildings are to be allowed. **25 October:** Israel opens the safe passage road from Gaza to the West Bank. **8 November:** Israel and the PNA start talks on Framework Agreement on Final Status. **14 November:** Israel decides to delay the second stage of the Wye II further redeployment. **15–16 December:** Israel and Syria hold talks in Washington, D.C., following an opening ceremony at the White House attended by Barak, Clinton, and Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara.

2000 3–10 January: Israel and Syria hold negotiations in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with the active participation of President Clinton. **5 January:** Israel transfers to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) 3 percent of the land from Area C to Area B and 2 percent from Area B to Area A. **17 January:** United States announces freezing of the Israel–Syria talks due to fundamental differences. **19 January:** Syria declares that it will not resume talks with Israel unless Israel agrees to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 lines. **8–11 February:** Israel leaves the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group meeting. **5 March:** Israeli cabinet approves unilateral IDF withdrawal from Lebanon to be completed no later than July 2000. **21 March:** Israel hands over 6.1 percent of Area B to Area A; the PNA now controls 18.2 percent (Area A) and partially controls 21.8 percent (Area B) of the West Bank. **26 March:** Following his meeting with Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in Geneva, President Clinton admits that the Israel–Syrian differences could not be bridged. **24 April:** Israel gains full membership in the UN regional group of Western European and Others. **14 May:** Back-channel talks between Israel and the PNA in Stockholm become public knowledge. **15 May:** Israel's cabinet approves the transfer of Abu Dis, Izariyah, and Sawarah al-Sharquiya in the Jerusalem neighborhood to Area A. **21 May:** Following attacks on Israeli civilians near Jericho, Israel suspends the Stockholm talks and postpones transfer of the three villages near Jerusalem to the PNA. **21–23 May:** Israeli troops withdraw from southern Lebanon. **11–25 July:** Clinton, Barak, and Arafat hold a summit meeting at Camp David; the summit ends in failure. **5 August:** The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) completes its deployment along the Israel–Lebanese border. **10 September:** The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Central Committee votes to postpone plans to declare Palestinian statehood. **26 September:** Israeli and PNA peace teams start talks in Washington. **28 September:** Likud leader Ariel Sharon visits the Temple Mount under heavy security; this sparks violence in Jerusalem, which soon spreads to the Occupied Territories and transforms into the Al-Aqsa Intifada. **4 October:** Barak and Arafat meet in Paris with U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright, with French president Jacques Chirac and UN secretary-general Kofi Annan also involved in the intense talks; demanding an international inquiry, Arafat refuses to sign a document. **12 October:** Two Israeli reservist soldiers who strayed into Ramallah are captured and lynched by a Palestinian mob. **13 October:** Oman closes its trade office in Tel Aviv, and Morocco recalls its envoy from Israel. **16 October:** Sharm al-Sheikh Summit is attended by Barak, Arafat, Clinton, Mubarak, King Abdullah II of Jordan, and representatives of the European Union, with Israeli and Palestinian leaders reaching a verbal understanding on ending the Intifada; Clinton decides to appoint an international inquiry commission and later names Senator George Mitchell to head the commission. **22 October:** Citing continued Palestinian

violence, Barak suspends the peace process; Tunisia demands the closure of the Israeli trade mission in Tunis. **30 October:** Israel fires missiles at Force 17 and Fatah offices in Nablus, Khan Yunis, and El-Bireh. **7 November:** United States names members of the Mitchell Commission. **9 November:** Qatar orders the closure of the Israel trade mission in Doha. **21 November:** Egypt recalls its ambassador from Israel. **19 December:** Clinton presents his peace plans to Israel and the PNA.

2001 16 January: Israel–PNA talks resume at Erez. **20 January:** Israel accepts Arafat's offer to embark on intensive talks in Taba starting 21 January. **21–27 January:** Israeli and PNA negotiators meet in Taba to try to reach a comprehensive final status agreement; both sides agree that no progress is possible before the Knesset election in Israel slated for 6 February. **20 May:** Mitchell Committee Report is made public. **9 August:** Israeli forces seize and seal the Orient House in East Jerusalem. **27 August:** Israel assassinates Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leader Abu Ali Mustafa. **17 October:** PFLP militants assassinate right-wing Israeli minister Rehavam Ze'evi in a Jerusalem hotel. **4 December:** Israeli tanks encircle and seize Arafat's headquarters in Ramallah.

2002 3 January: Israel seizes the Lebanese-registered ship *Karine A* in international waters in the Red Sea carrying an arms shipment from Iran to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). **22 January:** Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid an explosives lab in Nablus, West Bank. **2 March:** 10 people are killed and about 50 injured in a suicide bombing in the Beit Yisrael neighborhood of Jerusalem. **9 March:** Suicide bombing at Café Moment in Jerusalem kills 11 people and injures more than 50 others; Hamas claims responsibility. **27 March:** Suicide bombing at Park Hotel in Netanya in the midst of the Passover Seder kills 30 people and injures 140; Hamas claims responsibility. **29 March:** Arab summit in Beirut endorses Abdullah peace plan. **29 March:** Israel launches Operation Defensive Shield against the PNA; the operation lasts until 21 April. **30 March:** Security Council Resolution 1402, calling on both Israelis and Palestinians to accept a cease-fire, passes by a vote of 14 to 0, with Syria abstaining. **5 June:** Suicide bombing of a bus at Megiddo Junction kills 17 people; Islamic Jihad claims responsibility. **18 June:** In another suicide bombing in Jerusalem, 19 people are killed and 74 injured; Hamas claims responsibility. **24 June:** U.S. president George W. Bush outlines his vision for Middle East peace. **16 July:** An attack on a bus at Emmanuel in the West Bank kills nine and injures about 20. **23 July:** Israel assassinates Saleh Shehadeh, head of Hamas's Izz Eddin al-Qassam armed brigades, who was held responsible for several terror attacks. **31 July:** Nine people are killed and 85 injured in an explosion at Hebrew University cafeteria; Hamas claims responsibility. **4 August:** 13 people are killed in simultaneous terror attacks in Israel. **19 August:** Pales-

tinian militant Abu Nidal is found dead in Baghdad. **21 October:** In a suicide bombing on a bus at Karkur Junction, 14 people are killed and 50 wounded; the Al-Quds Brigade, military wing of Islamic Jihad, claims responsibility.

2003 28 February: Ariel Sharon sworn in as prime minister. **29 April:** Mahmoud Abbas nominated as the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). **4 June:** At the Aqaba Summit in Jordan, Sharon and Abbas endorse the Middle East Road Map in the presence of President Bush and King Abdullah. **11 June:** Another suicide bombing on a bus in Jerusalem kills 17 people and wounds more than 100; Hamas claims responsibility. **29 June:** Militant Islamic organizations agree to a *hudna*—temporary cease-fire—vis-à-vis Israel. **1 July:** Prime ministers Abbas and Sharon meet in Jerusalem. **19 August:** Suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem kills 23 and wounds more than 130; Hamas claims responsibility. **6 September:** Owing to differences with Chairman Arafat, Abbas resigns as prime minister. **8 September:** Ahmed Qurei replaces Abbas as Palestinian National Authority (PNA) prime minister. **9 September:** 16 people are killed and more than 80 wounded in two separate suicide bombings in Israel; Hamas claims responsibility. **19 November:** UN Security Council passes Resolution 1515 in support of the Quartet Road Map for Peace. **1 December:** Geneva Initiative is launched by Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abed Rabbo.

2004 22 February: In a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, 8 people are killed and more than 80 wounded; the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claims responsibility. **8 March:** Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) leader Abu Abbas dies in Iraq in U.S. custody. **14 March:** In a double suicide bombing at the Ashdod Port, 10 people are killed and 16 wounded; Hamas and Fatah claim responsibility. **22 March:** IDF assassinates Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in Gaza City. **17 April:** IDF assassinates Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi. **17 May:** IDF launches Operation Rainbow to stop transfer of arms from the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip. **9 July:** International Court of Justice rules that the Israeli security fence violates international law and must be torn down. **7 October:** In terror attacks on two holiday resorts in Sinai (Taba Hilton and Ras-e-Satan), 32 people are killed and more than 120 wounded. **25 October:** Israeli parliament approves the Gaza Disengagement plan. **11 November:** Palestinian National Authority (PNA) president Yasser Arafat dies in a military hospital in Paris and is buried in Ramallah the following day.

2005 9 January: Mahmoud Abbas is elected president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). **8 February:** Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Abbas, Egyptian president Mubarak, and King Abdullah of Jordan participate in the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit. **25 February:** In a suicide bombing carried out by Islamic Jihad in Tel Aviv, five people are killed; in retaliation, Israel

freezes the planned handover of Palestinian towns. **1 March:** Great Britain hosts the London Conference aimed at reorganizing Palestinian security forces and getting financial backing for the PNA. **16 March:** In Cairo, Palestinian militant groups agree to a *tahidiyeh*—a lull in the fighting—vis-à-vis Israel. **16 March:** Israel withdraws from the West Bank town of Jericho. **5 May:** Palestinians from 82 districts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip take part in local elections to choose their village council members. **26 May:** President Bush hosts President Abbas at the White House and reiterates his support for a two-state solution; for his part, Abbas promises to promote an Israeli–Palestinian settlement on "an accelerated phase." **4 June:** Citing additional time needed "to resolve a dispute over proposed reforms to the voting law," Abbas postpones the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Assembly slated for 17 July. **9 June:** Israeli Supreme Court rejects a petition by a group of settlers against the Evacuation Compensation Law and the Disengagement Plan and rules that the Occupied Territories are "lands seized during warfare and are not part of Israel." **16 June:** Hamas discloses that the European Union is holding low-level contacts with the organization; this disclosure evokes strong protests from the Israeli government. **18 June:** Palestinian Legislative Assembly approves new electoral laws that increase the size of the parliament from 88 to 132 seats, with 66 seats to be filled by constituency-based elections and the other half by a proportional representation system. **21 June:** Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas meet for the first time in Jerusalem, and during the meeting, Israel makes a conditional offer to withdraw from the West Bank towns of Bethlehem and Qalqilya; however, on the substantial issues such as reopening of the Gaza airport, further release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, and the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, there is no progress; moreover, before the meeting, Israel had arrested more than 50 suspected militants belonging to the Islamic Jihad in the West Bank. **25 June:** An Israeli settler is killed and four others injured in a drive-by shooting incident near Hebron; both Hamas and Fatah claim responsibility. **26 June:** As the first step toward the impending Gaza withdrawal plan, Israel destroys a row of abandoned cottages in the Gaza Strip settlement of Shirat Hayam along the seashore. **27 June:** Israel's housing minister, Isaac Herzog, tells the ministerial committee on settlements that the construction work in 50 West Bank settlements has been suspended; Israeli settlers opposed to the Gaza withdrawal plan to stage massive protests in different parts of the country. **28 June:** Sharon warns that use of force by settlers against the security forces threatens Israeli democracy and criticizes calls for soldiers to refuse orders to evacuate settlers during the planned Gaza withdrawal plan. **29 June:** Israelis opposed to the planned disengagement block busy roads in many parts of the country. **30 June:** Sharon describes the right-wing extremists who were using violence in their campaign against the Gaza Withdrawal Plan as "radical gangs" and vows to

handle them "with an iron fist"; declaring the Gaza Strip a "closed military zone," the IDF evacuates a group of extremists. **30 June:** The Fatah Central Committee holds its first meeting in Amman since the death of its founder, Yasser Arafat; besides Palestinian president Abbas, it is also attended by Faruq Qaddumi, who took over the Fatah leadership after Arafat's death. **3 July:** Israeli cabinet rejects a proposal to delay the Gaza Disengagement by three months by a vote of 18 to 3. **11 July:** Hamas denies reports that its leaders abroad, mainly in Syria, would return to the Gaza Strip after the Israeli pullout. **13 July:** Gaza is closed to Israelis who are not residents of the Strip to prevent them from protesting against the planned disengagement. **14 July:** PNA declares a state of emergency in the Gaza Strip after an Israeli woman is killed when a Qassam rocket slams into her house in Moshav Netiv Ha'asara, north of the Strip; Hamas claims responsibility. **15 July:** IDF kills seven Hamas activists in operations in Gaza and in Salfit in the West Bank. **23 July:** U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice makes a brief visit to Ramallah. **24 July:** Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz meets with PNA interior minister Nasser Yousef to discuss measures to coordinate the Disengagement Plan and the question of allowing PNA security forces to carry weapons. **25 July:** President of the United Arab Emirates proposes to give $100 million to build a city that can accommodate 30,000 Palestinians on the remains of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, which will soon be evacuated. Palestinian leader Abbas relocates himself to the Gaza Strip in preparation for the Israeli Disengagement plan. **3 August:** King Abdullah of Jordan and Abbas hold talks in Amman on the Gaza Disengagement plan. **4 August:** Security forces prevent thousands of Israeli protesters from marching into Gaza settlements; a Jewish soldier who had gone AWOL several weeks earlier in protest over the Disengagement Plan opens fire in a bus in the Arab town of Shfaram, killing four people; he is beaten to death by an angry mob that storms the bus. **5 August:** The Higher Arab Monitoring Committee declares a general strike in protest against the previous day's killings. **7 August:** Israeli cabinet approves the evacuation of first batch of settlers from the Gaza Strip; following the cabinet decision, Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resigns from the government. **8 August:** Gunmen from the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade storm a building in the Gaza Strip owned by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and take away a top Fatah official; protesting against the deteriorating security situation, the International Committee of the Red Cross suspends its field operations in the Gaza Strip and also closes its offices in Khan Yunis after masked gunmen fire at them. **9 August:** Senior Palestinian cleric and Hamas leader Sheikh Hamed al-Bitawi is arrested by Israeli police in Jerusalem's old city. **14 August:** The Kissufim Crossing is shut down, and the Gaza Strip becomes officially closed to entrance by Israelis; a senior Palestinian official announces that leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad will attend a forthcoming meeting of the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO). **15 August:** The Israeli government formally notifies the Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip that they have 48 hours to leave their homes or they will be forcibly removed; thousands of soldiers deliver eviction orders, but most settlers refuse to leave. **17 August:** The first forced evacuation of settlers in the Gaza Strip starts with about 14,000 Israeli soldiers and police prepared to forcibly evacuate settlers and *mistanenim* (infiltrators). **20 August:** Abbas signs a decree appropriating lands belonging to the Jewish settlements for public use once Israel's evacuation of Gaza is complete; he also announces that Palestinian legislative elections will be held on 25 January 2006. **22 August:** The settlement of Netzarim is peacefully evacuated, marking the end of a 38-year-long Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip; the demolition crews continue to work as Israeli soldiers remove the last Jewish settlers and protesters from the Gaza Strip and move on to the final stages of the Disengagement Plan—namely, the withdrawal of four small settlements in the West Bank. **23 August:** The evacuation of the four West Bank settlements is accomplished; while the residents of Ganim and Kadim have long left their homes, several families and about 2,000 outsiders try to prevent the evacuation of Sa-Nur and Homesh, but following negotiations the evacuation is completed relatively peacefully. This ends the first of four stages of disengagement—namely, evacuation of residents, evacuation of civilian property, demolition of houses, and finally relocation of IDF installations. **1 September:** Hamas rejects any Israeli presence at the Rafah Crossing on the Gaza–Egypt border after the planned Israeli pullout. **3 September:** Israeli military says it will complete its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip by 15 September but threatens to strike back if Israel comes under threat. **7 September:** IDF advances its full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to 12 September. PNA interior minister Nasser Yousef puts security forces on alert after gunmen kill President Abbas's military adviser Moussa Arafat in the Gaza Strip; the armed wing of the Palestinian group the Popular Resistance Committees claims responsibility for the killing and for kidnapping Moussa Arafat's eldest son Manhal. **10 September:** Saudi Arabia agrees to lift certain aspects of its boycott against Israel in an attempt to satisfy U.S. demands regarding the Saudi application for World Trade Organization membership. **12 September:** General-officer-in-command Southern Command head Maj. Gen. Dan Harel signs a proclamation bringing to an end the 38-year military rule of the Gaza Strip and transferring responsibility for the area to the PNA. **13 September:** Egyptian and PNA security officials decide to close the Gaza–Egypt border, which had been overrun by thousands of people since Israeli troops withdrew. **15 September:** Israel's Supreme Court orders the government to reroute part of its security fence in the West Bank to reduce Palestinian hardship. The foreign ministers of Israel and Qatar meet on the sidelines of the UN summit. Sixteen Palestinian members of parliament file a motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Qurei, holding

his government responsible for the increasing anarchy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. **20 September:** Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar warns of ending a truce with Israel if the Jewish state is to disrupt the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections. Palestinian security sources say that the Israeli army has withdrawn from the northern West Bank settlement of Sa-Nur. **22 September:** IDF withdraws from the settlement of Mevo Dotan and completes its planned withdrawal in the northern West Bank. **23 September:** An explosion at a Hamas rally in a Gaza refugee camp kills 10 people and injures at least 85, some of them seriously; the blast in a pickup truck carrying Hamas fighters in the Jabaliya refugee camp happens hours after Palestinians fire rockets into Israel. **26 September:** Israel assassinates top Islamic Jihad commander Mohammed Khalil in a missile attack in Southern Gaza; Khalil's bodyguard is also killed in the attack and four bystanders are wounded. **29 September:** Israel shuts down charities with ties to Hamas across the West Bank and fires artillery into the Gaza Strip for the first time, as it widens a five-day offensive against Palestinian fighters, despite their pledges to stop firing rockets at Israel. **1 October:** In the third phase of the local Palestinian elections, Fatah wins 51 councils in Palestinian local elections, with Hamas gaining control of 13; the remaining 40 councils go to other factions. **8 October:** Rival Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, put up a united front to denounce interfactional kidnappings and violence. **10 October:** IDF soldiers shoot dead three Palestinians near the Israel–Gaza frontier, while internal violence in Gaza intensifies as militants and police engage in a gunfight. **15 October:** Israeli security guards find an unexploded Palestinian Qassam rocket on the property of Prime Minister Sharon's ranch in Negev. **16 October:** Three Israeli civilians are killed and three others are wounded in a drive-by shooting in the West Bank, while a fourth Israeli is moderately wounded in a separate attack a short while later; the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claims responsibility. A border police undercover unit kills a senior regional Islamic Jihad activist near Jenin. **23 October:** The main border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt reopens for 48 hours to allow humanitarian crossings; Israel closes the Rafah terminal shortly before withdrawing from the Gaza Strip on security grounds. **24 October:** IDF troops kill Luay Sa'adi, 26, the leader of Islamic Jihad's military wing in the West Bank; a few hours later, Islamic Jihad militants launch five Qassam rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip. **26 October:** President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran declares that the Jewish state is a "disgraceful blot" that should be "wiped off the map," evoking strong reactions in the Middle East and elsewhere. **27 October:** More than a million Iranians stage anti-Israel protests across the country; Ahmadinejad repeats his earlier call for Israel's destruction. **8 November:** IDF shoots and kills a wanted Islamic Jihad militant and wounds another south of Jenin. **9 November:** Bombs rock three hotels in Amman, one of

them popular with Israeli tourists, killing at least 57 people and wounding more than 115 in apparent suicide attacks; al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claims responsibility. **10 November:** In a close race, Amir Peretz defeats Shimon Peres in the election for the chairmanship of the Labor Party. **16 November:** Israeli and Palestinian officials clinch a long-awaited deal on the manning of the Gaza–Egypt and Gaza–Israel border crossings; under the deal, the Rafah border will open on 25 November, when the EU monitors arrive, and the terminal will be under the control of the PNA and Egypt, with each party patrolling its own side of the border. **17 November:** Two members of the military wing of Fatah are killed during an IDF operation near the West Bank city of Jenin. **21 November:** Prime Minister Sharon announces his resignation from Likud and the establishment of a new political party, Kadima (Forward), which he will lead in the upcoming elections; 13 Likud members of the Knesset (MKs), including some ministers, join the new party. **23 November:** A Palestinian man is shot dead and 12 more wounded in gunfights after IDF troops enter the West Bank town of Jenin in pursuit of suspected militants. **30 November:** Former Labor Party chairman Peres announces that he is leaving the party and expresses his support for Sharon's Kadima Party.

2006 4 January: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffers a massive stroke, leaving the leadership of Israel and the new Kadima Party in the hands of Ehud Olmert. **26 January:** Hamas wins a large majority in Palestinian Legislative Council elections. **2 February:** Riots and protests break out over Danish cartoons that depict the Prophet Mohammad and trigger attacks on Christians and Europeans in the West Bank. **18 February:** New Palestinian Council swears in. **28 March:** Ehud Olmert becomes the prime minister of Israel and heads the Kadima Party coalition. **29 March:** Ismail Haniyeh becomes the prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). **30 March:** Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade suicide bomber dressed as an orthodox Jew blows up in a car after being picked up as a hitchhiker near Kedumim, killing four Israeli civilians. **4 April:** Operation Southern Arrow is launched by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to attack Qassam launchpads in the Gaza Strip. **9 April:** The Israeli cabinet severs all direct contact with the Hamas-led PNA. **17 April:** Islamic Jihad suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv restaurant kills 11, of which 10 were Israeli civilians and 1 an American citizen. **20 April:** Palestinian minister of the interior and of national security Said Sayyam appoints Jamal Abu Samhadana, the head of the Popular Resistance Committees, as the general supervisor of the ministry, a position equivalent to that of director-general. Abu Samhadana is given the task to set up a new security apparatus that will absorb operatives from the military wings of the Palestinian terror organizations. This will be called the "Executive Security Force." President Mahmoud Abbas tries to cancel the appointment and to stop the forma-

tion of the Executive Force but fails. **4 May:** The new Israeli cabinet, which includes Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni (Kadima) and Defense Minister Amir Peretz (Labor), is sworn in. **11 May:** Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails issue document of national unity calling for a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. The Hamas government rejects the document, and Hamas prisoners who signed it repudiate it. Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas announces that he will hold a referendum on approval of the document if the factions cannot agree. **17 May:** Hamas interior minister Said Siyam announces the creation of a Hamas-controlled Executive Security Force, composed of Hamas and Popular Resistance Committees members. **24 May:** Palestinian Preventive Security chief for Central Gaza Nabil Hudud is killed by a bomb that explodes his car. Fatah and Hamas members clash in Gaza. **8 June:** IDF kills Jamal Abu Samhadana, head of the Popular Resistance Committees militants and Hamas's designated organizer of the Executive Force in a raid on a Popular Resistance Committees training camp in Gaza. **9 June:** Eight Palestinian civilians having a picnic at a Gaza beach are killed by an explosion attributed by Palestinians and Human Rights Watch to an IDF shell. **13 June:** Israel kills 11 Palestinians in a missile strike on a van carrying Palestinian militants and rockets and driving through a densely populated civilian area in Gaza. **25 June:** Two IDF soldiers are killed when Palestinian militants from the Hamas and Popular Resistance Committees militant organizations infiltrate Israeli territory between the Kerem Shalom and Sufa Crossings by means of a tunnel dug from the Rafah area. Corporal Gilad Shalit is abducted and four others are wounded. A settler from Itamar settlement is kidnapped by the Popular Resistance Committees near Ramallah, but it is later found that he was evidently murdered on the same day. Rafah Crossing closed. **27 June:** Hamas and Fatah sign the Palestinian Prisoners' Document. **28 June:** IDF launches Operation Summer Rains, invades Gaza Strip to rescue kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit and to stop Qassam rocket fire. **5 July:** First Qassam rocket of increased range is fired into the schoolyard in the Southern coastal city of Ashkelon; no damage reported. **6–8 July:** IDF kills about 40 in Gaza, mostly Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade militants. **1–12 July:** IDF kills about 47 in Gaza clashes as part of Operation Summer Rains. **12 July:** A Hezbollah ground contingent infiltrates the border into Israel through a "dead zone" in the Israel–Lebanon border fence and kills three soldiers, injuring two and capturing two more. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert describes the seizure of the soldiers as an "act of war" by the sovereign state of Lebanon. Start of the Second Lebanon War. **13 July:** Israel implements a land and sea blockade of Lebanon. Hezbollah declares an all-out military alert. As a result, Israeli defense minister Peretz tells commanders to prepare civil defense plans, and approximately 220,000 Israeli civilians spend the night in bomb shelters. Hezbollah continues to fire rockets at Israel. **14 July:**

Offices of Hezbollah are bombed. Hezbollah declares "open war." One hundred Katyusha rockets are fired by Hezbollah. **15 July:** Three patriot missiles are deployed in Haifa. Israeli defense minister Amir Peretz has declared martial law throughout northern Israel. **16 July:** Eight Israeli civilians are killed by rocket explosions in Haifa. Israeli cabinet releases a communiqué explaining that, although Israel had engaged in military operations within Lebanon, the war is not against the Lebanese government. **17–19 July:** Several rounds of rockets strike Haifa while Israel continues to bomb southern Lebanon inflicting heavy damage to the infrastructure. **19–21 July:** IDF army reserves are called for possible ground invasion; 300 soldiers and 30 Israeli tanks enter the Lebanon border. **22 July:** Some 2,000 ground forces of the IDF enter Lebanon, and Israeli air raids hit Beirut. Syria threatens to enter the war if the conflict continues. **24 July:** IDF ground force clashes with Hezbollah fighters in the Battle of Bint Jbeil, and 70 members of Hezbollah are killed. **26 July:** Four unarmed UN observers are killed due to the Israeli air strikes in Lebanon. Israel launches a counter-offensive to deprive cover to militants firing rockets into Israel from Gaza. **29 July:** IDF starts to withdraw from Bint Jbeil. **30 July:** Israeli air strikes in Qana kill 28 civilians, and the air strikes are halted for 48 hours after this. **1–3 August:** So far, 900 Lebanese and 68 Israelis have been killed. **3–4 August:** IDF kills 19 in Gaza raids. **14 August:** Cease-fire is declared in Lebanon based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Palestinian militants kidnap two Fox TV journalists, demanding that the United States release all Muslims in prison. **19 August:** Israel launches a raid in Lebanon's eastern Beqaa Valley. IDF says that the raid was aimed to disrupt weapons supplies to Hezbollah from Syria and Iran. **27 August:** The two kidnapped American journalists are released after they state that they have converted to Islam. **27–31 August:** IDF operations in Gaza to uncover tunnels leave about 19 Palestinians dead. **2 September:** PNA government employees union (Fatah) goes on strike because salaries are not paid. **7–8 September:** The air and naval blockade of Lebanon is lifted. **30 September:** Fatah and Hamas members clash in the Gaza Strip. Mahmoud Abbas tries to prevent civil war by calling for peace and restraint. **1 October:** IDF completes its withdrawal from Lebanon. **12–14 October:** IDF raids in Gaza launched to uncover tunnels, killing 19 including 10 Hamas and 1 Fatah member. **20 October:** Brokered by Egyptian mediators, Fatah and Hamas reach a deal to end fighting. **1–7 November:** IDF launches Operation Autumn Cloud and in a major raid in Gaza near Beit Hanoun kills about 60 Palestinians. Seven Qassam rockets fired into Israel, including four against Ashdod. **8 November:** IDF artillery strikes and kills 19 non-combatant Palestinians in residential Beit Hanoun Gaza area. IDF claims it was due to malfunctioning artillery radar range finder device. UN labels it as the "Beit Hanoun carnage." **21–25 November:** IDF operations in north Gaza in response to Qassam rocket barrages kill 22 including 6 civilians. Palestinians

and Israelis agree to a truce. **26 November:** Israelis and Palestinians announce a truce in the Gaza Strip, but rocket fire continues. Israeli incursions and arrests continue in West Bank. **23 December:** Ehud Olmert meets Mahmoud Abbas and promises to improve quality of life for Palestinians and remove checkpoints.

2007 4 January: President Mubarak and Prime Minister Olmert meet in Sharm al-Sheikh to revive the peace process. **19 January:** Israel transfers $100 million in tax revenues to cover humanitarian needs to the office of President Abbas. **1 February:** Hamas Executive Force intercepts a four-truck Fatah convoy and confiscates it, claiming it contains weapons sent by Americans to bolster Fatah in Gaza. The incident sparks widespread fighting in Gaza, leaving over 20 dead. **8 February:** Palestinian unity agreement is signed in Mecca, and Hamas and Fatah agree to share power. Hamas officials reiterate that they will never recognize Israel. The United States and Israel insist that the new government must recognize the right of Israel to exist, disarm terrorist groups, and agree to end violence. **19 February:** Trilateral Israeli–Palestinian–American summit with U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, Prime Minister Olmert, and President Abbas ends with no tangible results. **12 March:** BBC correspondent Alan Johnston is kidnapped in Gaza by unknown Palestinian militants. **17 March:** Palestinian Legislative Council establishes a national unity government with 83 representatives. Government ministers are sworn in by President Abbas at a ceremony held simultaneously in Gaza and Ramallah. **9 June:** Start of Palestinian internal violence with two Palestinians dead in Rafah from Hamas–Fatah exchanges. Fatah calls this the "Hamas Coup." **11 June:** 15 die in Hamas–Fatah fighting; Egypt steps in as a mediator and calls on both leaders for calm. **12 June:** 24 armed Palestinians and four non-combatants are killed in Fatah–Hamas violence. Abbas orders Fatah to defend its positions. **14 June:** At least 27 Palestinians are killed as Hamas takes control of Gaza including Abbas's Gaza City offices. Abbas dissolves the national unity government. The border at Rafah is effectively closed because the EU monitors who were placed there to prevent arms smuggling leave the check posts. Hamas insists it does not want the monitors and claims that Gaza is "under siege." **25 June:** A summit in Sharm al-Sheikh is attended by Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinians. Jordan pledges support to the Abbas government, but Egypt calls for reunification with Hamas. **4 July:** Hamas secures release of BBC reporter Alan Johnston from Jaish al-Islam ("Army of Islam"), the group that kidnapped him. **20 July:** Israel releases 255 Palestinian prisoners, mostly Fatah, to support the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) government of Abbas. **15 August:** Israel closes Nahal Oz fuel pipeline to shut off fuel to Gaza in retaliation for fresh rocket attacks. **28 September:** United States announces Annapolis summit to be held in November. **1 October:** Israel releases 57

West Bank prisoners and another 29 Gaza prisoners as gestures to support President Abbas against Hamas government in Gaza. **8 October:** Settlers in Hebron riot and attack Muslim worshippers. **12 November:** Hamas forces fire on Fatah demonstrators during commemoration of the death of Yasser Arafat in Gaza, which kills seven. **13 November:** So far, 450 people are killed in the Hamas–Fatah clashes. **19 November:** Israeli Supreme Court declares that the purchase of a Palestinian house near Kiryat Arba is illegal. **26–28 November:** United States convenes Middle East summit in Annapolis. Israelis and Palestinians agree to implement road map under U.S. monitoring and to negotiate continuously with the aim of reaching a final status agreement by the end of 2008. The agreement is to be implemented if and when the PNA can control all of its territory, including Gaza. In Gaza, Hamas organizes a protest of about 100,000 against the Annapolis summit. **3 December:** Israel releases 429 prisoners, mostly belonging to Fatah. **4 December:** Israel announces 350 settlement units in Har Homa neighborhood of East Jerusalem. Palestinians object and call for U.S. pressure to stop the settlement activity. **5 December:** Egypt allows 2,000 Gazans to enter Egypt from Rafah, ostensibly for the hajj. No security checks are performed. The move angers Israel, the United States, and the PNA. **30 December:** Under Israeli pressure, Egypt refuses to allow returning pilgrims to enter Gaza via Rafah, directing them to the Israeli Kerem Shalom terminal. The Hajj pilgrims are stranded in the Sinai for a while.

2008 2–3 January: Egypt allows over 2,000 Hajj pilgrims, including Hamas officials and militants, back into Gaza via the Rafah Crossing. **9–12 January:** U.S. president George W. Bush visits Israel and Palestine as part of his Middle East tour. Israelis and Palestinians pledge to negotiate on the "core issues" such as Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees during the regular meetings between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas. **23 January:** Hamas members blast holes in Rafah barrier, allowing many Gazans to enter Egypt freely. **26 January:** Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) founder George Habash dies in Amman at age 82 of a heart attack. **28 January:** Gaza border breach is partially closed by Egypt. **3 February:** Egypt reseals Rafah border and allows Palestinians still in Egypt to return to Gaza. **13 February:** Hezbollah terror mastermind Imad Moughnieh is killed in Damascus. **27 February–4 March:** Israel launches Operation Warm Winter to block several tunnels in Gaza, and the raid kills over 100 Palestinians. **13 March:** Israeli Jerusalem Planning Commission gives preliminary approval for construction of 2,200 housing units intended for Israelis in Givat Hamatos in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Beit Safafa. **7 April:** Abbas–Olmert biweekly meetings resume after a gap of one month. **14 May:** British prime minister Tony Blair announces a new plan for peace and for Palestinian rights. **2 June:** UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon voices deep

concern regarding Israel's new settlement plans to build 1,300 new housing units in East Jerusalem. He asks Israel to freeze all activity and to dismantle outposts erected since March 2001. **19 June:** A six-month cease-fire is mediated by Egypt between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. Israel agrees to cease its blockade of the Gaza Strip. **24 June:** Middle East Quartet consisting of the EU, the UN, Russia, and the United States meets in Berlin and issues a statement urging the parties to refrain from any steps that undermine confidence or could prejudice the outcome of the current peace negotiations. **29 June:** Israel–Hezbollah prisoner swap deal is approved. **4 August:** Israel permits Fatah loyalists fleeing from Gaza to cross to West Bank. **17 August:** Israeli cabinet approves release of 200 jailed Palestinians. **23 August:** Two boats of activists break Gaza blockade for the first time. Israel permits them to arrive and depart. **30 August:** Talks between Olmert and Abbas end with Olmert offering Abbas 100 percent of the West Bank with land swaps, to divide Jerusalem, and to take in thousands of Palestinian refugees. Abbas does not respond to the offer. **5 September:** Israel allows shipment of 1,000 rifles plus ammunition for Palestinian National Authority (PNA) forces. **17 September:** Prime Minister Olmert is forced to resign over financial improprieties. Tzipi Livni is elected to head Kadima Party. **26 October:** Tzipi Livni announces that she cannot form a coalition because of financial demands from the Shas Party and calls for fresh elections. **28 October:** Protest ship *Dignity* arrives in Gaza despite Israeli declaration that the ship would be boarded and prevented from entering Gaza. **4 November:** Israel launches a military incursion into a residential area of Dayr al-Balah in central Gaza. **13 December:** Israel announces that it favors extending the cease-fire, provided Hamas adheres to the conditions. **14 December:** A Hamas delegation in Cairo proposes that Hamas is prepared to stop all rocket attacks against Israel if the latter would open up the Gaza border crossings and pledge not to launch attacks in Gaza. **19 December:** The six-month cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip expires. **27 December:** IDF begins Operation Cast Lead, with a wave of air strikes and simultaneously strikes 100 pre-planned targets within a span of 220 seconds. **29 December:** UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon calls on both Israel and Hamas to halt violence and curb inflammatory rhetoric while Palestinian and Egyptian UN ambassadors ask the Security Council to bring Israel into compliance. The relief boat *Dignity*, on its second voyage to Gaza carrying volunteer doctors with 3.5 tons of medical supplies, human rights activists, and a CNN reporter, is involved in an altercation with Israeli patrol boats. **30 December:** The EU issues a statement proposing an immediate cease-fire, humanitarian action, and stepping up the peace process, including the inter-Palestinian reconciliation. **31 December:** EU and the Middle East Quartet call for a permanent

cease-fire. The United States emphasizes that it should be "durable and sustainable." Arab foreign ministers meet in Cairo in an emergency session of the Arab League.

2009 3 January: Israel begins ground incursions into the Gaza Strip. **5 January:** The foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Qatar, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, and Morocco and the Arab League secretary-general Amr Musa arrive in New York to push for a Security Council resolution. **6 January:** An estimated 40 people are killed when an Israeli tank shell explodes outside a UN school that was being used as a shelter. French president Nicolas Sarkozy meets President Mubarak, and they propose a three-point plan to solve the crisis. **8 January:** The UN suspends food deliveries in Gaza after a UN truck came under Israeli fire that killed two UNRWA staff. **9 January:** Three Hamas leaders visit Cairo to negotiate a cease-fire agreement with Israel. **10 January:** President Mahmoud Abbas meets President Mubarak in Cairo. Egypt says that it would not accept foreign troops on its side of the border with Gaza to stop arms smuggling. **14 January:** UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon begins a mission to the Middle East to strengthen diplomatic efforts to obtain a cease-fire. He meets with officials in Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Turkey, and Syria. **15 January:** Israeli tanks enter Gaza City. **16 January:** UN General Assembly adopts a resolution demanding an immediate end to the Gaza conflict and full respect for Security Council Resolution 1860. U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice signs a bilateral accord with Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni aimed at preventing arms smuggling into Gaza. **17 January:** Israel declares a unilateral cease-fire. **18 January:** Hamas agrees to a one-week cease-fire. President Sarkozy and President Mubarak co-head a summit between Arab and European leaders with the aim of consolidating the cease-fire. **21 January:** Israel's troop pullout from the Gaza Strip is completed. **29 January:** The UN launches an appeal for $613 million for Gaza's relief and reconstruction. **10 February:** Knesset elections take place in Israel. Kadima led by Tzipi Livni receives the most seats (28), followed by Likud (27), Yisrael Beiteinu (15), and Labor (13). **2 March:** At an international donors' conference on Gaza reconstruction held in Sharm al-Sheikh, $4.48 billion is pledged. **31 March:** Benjamin Netanyahu forms a right-wing Israeli government with Yisrael Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman as foreign minister. **3 April:** The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) announces the appointment of Richard Goldstone to lead the fact-finding mission to investigate human rights and humanitarian law violations during Israel's Cast Lead Operation in Gaza. **19 May:** Israeli prime minister Netanyahu meets U.S. president Barack Obama at the White House, where they discuss the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Israel's settlements in the West Bank. **1 June:** UNHRC panel led by Judge Richard Goldstone enters the Gaza Strip to

investigate alleged Israeli war crimes. **4 June:** President Obama gives a historic speech in Cairo. Addressing the Muslim and Arab world, he calls on Palestinians to renounce violence, on Arabs to recognize Israel's right to exist, and for an end to settlement construction. **13 June:** Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is reelected president of Iran. **14 June:** Netanyahu gives a speech at the Begin-Sadat Centre in which he endorses, for the first time, a "demilitarized Palestinian state." **11 August:** First Fatah congress is held after 20 years. **26 August:** PNA issues an EU-backed plan to declare a state unilaterally within two years. **15 September:** UN releases the Goldstone Report. **22 September:** President Abbas attends a trilateral meeting with U.S. president Barack Obama and Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. **2 October:** Israel releases 20 female Palestinian prisoners, and in exchange Hamas releases a videotape proving that captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit is still alive. **4 November:** Operation Four Species is launched by the IDF to capture MV *Francop* in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, along with its cargo of hundreds of tons of weapons allegedly bound from Iran to Hezbollah. **25 November:** Israeli prime minister Netanyahu announces a 10-month moratorium on permits for new settlement homes in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem).

2010 10 January: The Israeli government announces that it will build a barrier along Israel's border with Egypt to keep out illegal immigrants. **20 January:** U.S. special envoy for Middle East peace George Mitchell travels to the region to meet Israelis and Palestinians in a continued effort to get the parties back to the negotiating table. **9 February:** Israeli troops carry out a large-scale raid of Shufat refugee camp in Jerusalem that sparks two days of clashes. **21 February:** Israeli cabinet authorizes renovations to Bethlehem's Rachel's Tomb and Hebron's Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs as part of a national heritage plan. The move sets off Palestinian demonstrations in both towns, and President Mahmoud Abbas warns of a "religious war." **10 March:** Israel approves construction of an additional 1,600 apartments at Ramat Shlomo in northeastern Jerusalem. The announcement occurs during a visit by U.S. vice president Joe Biden, and the U.S. government subsequently issues a strongly worded condemnation. **16 March:** Hamas announces "day of rage" to express anger over mounting "provocations" from Israel, including increased settlements in East Jerusalem and the inauguration of the Hurva synagogue near the Temple Mount/Al-Aqsa Mosque. **9 May:** Palestinians announce the official start of indirect peace talks with Israel after a 17-month breakdown, with U.S. envoy George Mitchell serving as go-between. **31 May:** IDF begins Operation Sea Breeze in which Israeli naval forces raid and capture a flotilla of ships organized by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), which attempted to break the Israeli and Egyptian blockade of

Gaza. During the takeover, a violent confrontation erupts onboard the *Mavi Marmara*, and 10 activists, including 9 Turkish citizens, are killed and several dozen others and 7 IDF soldiers are wounded. **2 June:** UNHRC adopts a resolution condemning the flotilla incident and calls for an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate. **14 June:** Israel announces the formation of the Turkel Commission to investigate the Gaza flotilla raid and the blockade of Gaza. **17 June:** Israel's security cabinet announces changes in the Gaza blockade by allowing civilian goods to enter Gaza by land for the first time in three years. **5 July:** Israel releases the first list of banned goods and building materials that will be allowed into Gaza under international supervision. **3 August:** In a border clash in south Lebanon, an IDF officer is killed and another seriously wounded when they come under fire from the Lebanese armed forces while on a brush-clearing operation on Israel's side of the border with Lebanon. The IDF returns fire, resulting in the deaths of two Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist. **20 August:** U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton invites Palestinians and Israelis to hold direct talks, and both accept the invitation. **2 September:** United States launches direct Israel–PNA negotiations in Washington, D.C. **14 September:** A second round of Middle East peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) concludes in Sharm al-Sheikh. **26 September:** Israel's 10-month moratorium on the construction of new settlement homes in the West Bank expires. The Arab League throws its support behind President Abbas's decision to withdraw from direct negotiations with Israel. **28 September:** Israeli navy intercepts the ship *Irene* heading from Cyprus toward Gaza and carrying nine Jewish activists from the United States, Britain, Germany, and Israel, which was attempting to break the naval blockade of Gaza. **11 October:** At the opening of the Knesset session, Prime Minister Netanyahu offers a settlement freeze if the PNA would declare its recognition of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. The PNA rejects the proposal. **22 November:** The Knesset passes a bill requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament before withdrawal from East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights and a national referendum if that majority is not satisfied. **2 December:** A U.S. plan for a 90-day partial settlement moratorium in exchange for a package of U.S. incentives is rejected by Israel. **5–6 December:** Turkish and Israeli officials meet in Geneva in an effort to repair relations.

2011 23–26 January: Thousands of confidential documents relating to diplomatic correspondence detailing the inner workings of the Israeli–Palestinian talks are exposed by the Al-Jazeera news network. Known as the Palestine Papers, they trigger large-scale debates within the Israeli cabinet. **19 February:** United States vetoes a draft of a UN Security Council resolution critical of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. **15 March:** Israel launches Operation Iron Law to seize a ship from Syria bringing Iranian

weapons to Gaza. **23 March:** An explosive device, which was placed in a suitcase on the sidewalk, is exploded next to bus number 74 near the Jerusalem International Convention Center complex. **7 April:** The Iron Dome mobile air defense system successfully intercepts a Grad rocket launched from the Gaza Strip at Ashkelon, marking the first interception of a short-range rocket. **24 April:** A group of 15 Israeli Jewish worshippers enters Nablus to pray in the Jewish holy site of Joseph's Tomb without coordinating their visit with the IDF as required by law. After finishing their prayers, they leave Nablus in their cars, which come under fire from a PNA police jeep. **4 May:** Fatah and Hamas sign a reconciliation accord, citing the common cause of opposition to the Israeli occupation and shared disillusionment with American peace efforts as reasons for the détente. Abbas, the president of the PNA and the head of Fatah, and Khalid Masha'al, the leader of Hamas, meet for the first time in five years at the ceremony in Cairo. **15 May:** Palestinians commemorate Naqba Day, and various groups attempt to approach or breach Israel's borders from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. At least a dozen people are killed. **5 June:** Israeli forces defensibly fire on pro-Palestinian protesters attempting to breach the Syria–Israeli border in the Golan Heights. Syria claims that close to 20 people are killed and over 325 injured, while Israeli officials confirm at least 12 injuries. **12 June:** Egyptian officials report the arrest of 27-year-old Israeli American Ilan Grapel on suspicion of being a spy for Israel. Israeli officials reject the Egyptian accusations. **19 July:** The French-flagged yacht *Dignité Al Karama*, which was to have been part of the Freedom Flotilla II, is intercepted and boarded by Israeli commandos off the coast of Gaza and escorted to the Port of Ashdod. **18–19 August:** A series of targeted killings and raids in Gaza is conducted by the IDF in response to attacks on southern Israel. **2 September:** A UN report investigating the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid is published which finds that the IDF acted "legitimately" in trying to enforce Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip. In response, Turkey expels Israel's ambassador, downgrades ties with Israel to second secretary level, and cancels all military agreements with Israel. **9 September:** Several thousand Egyptian protesters forcibly infiltrate into the Israeli embassy in Egypt, situated in Giza, after breaking down a recently constructed wall to protect the compound. The six embassy staff in a safe room are evacuated from the site by Egyptian commandos following the personal intervention of U.S. president Barack Obama. **14 September:** Israel evacuates the Israeli embassy in Jordan following a warning of a planned demonstration near the embassy building. **23 September:** During the opening of the UN General Assembly, President Abbas makes a bid for UN recognition in a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, which would exist in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and have East Jerusalem as its capital. The Middle East Quartet calls on Israel and Palestine to resume negotiations. **18 October:** Israel and Hamas begin a major prison-

er swap in which the IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, who had been held in captivity for over five years, is released in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, of whom 477 prisoners are released immediately, including 280 serving life sentences for planning and perpetrating terror attacks, with 550 prisoners to be released in December. **27 October:** Israel releases 25 Egyptian prisoners to secure the release of Israeli American Ilan Grapel, who had been held in Egypt for more than four months on espionage charges. **11 November:** The UN Security Council's Admissions Committee reports that it is unable to reach a unanimous recommendation on Palestine's application for UN membership.

2012 3 January: Negotiators from Israel and the PNA meet in Amman for the first time in 16 months. **9–15 March:** Secretary-general of the Popular Resistance Committees Zuhir al-Qaisi and two additional Palestinian militants are assassinated during a targeted killing carried out by Israeli forces in Gaza. In retaliation, 300 rockets and Grad missiles are fired toward southern Israel for three consecutive days, wounding 23 Israeli civilians. Israel retaliates with air strikes on Gazan weapons storage facilities, rocket launching sites, weapons manufacturing facilities, training bases, posts, tunnels, and terror operatives. **5 April:** A rocket fired from Egypt's Sinai desert hits the Israeli city of Eilat. **6 June:** Hours after a bill to legalize outposts is rejected by the Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu orders the construction of 300 new homes at the Jewish settlement of Beit El in the West Bank. **7 June:** An additional 550 settler homes are announced by Israeli construction minister Ariel Attias. **18 June:** Israel hands over the bodies of 91 Palestinian suicide bombers and other militants as part of a gesture to help revive the peace talks and reinstate direct negotiations. **21 September:** Three heavily armed Egyptian militants, dressed as civilians, wearing explosive belts, and carrying rifles and rocket-propelled grenades, approach the Egypt–Israel border at an area where the separation barrier remains incomplete and open fire on a group of IDF soldiers. The three militants and one Israeli soldier are killed. **14 November:** Israel begins Operation Pillar of Defense. Hamas military chief Ahmed Jabari is killed in a targeted air strike carried out by the IDF. **15 November:** Three Israeli civilians are killed in Kiryat Malachi, Israel, in a barrage of rocket attacks on southern Israel from the Gaza Strip. Two rockets are fired from the Gaza Strip at Tel Aviv, with one landing in the sea and the other hitting an uninhabited area in the city's suburbs. Iran-backed Islamic Jihad claims responsibility for the incident, which was the first attack against the city since the 1991 Kuwait War. **16 November:** Palestinian militants fire a rocket aimed at Jerusalem setting off air raid sirens in the city. **21 November:** A cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, announced by Egyptian foreign minister Mohammad Kamel Amr and U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton, comes into effect. **29 November:** The 67th session of the United Nations

General Assembly approves an upgrade of Palestine's status from "observer" to "observer state," with 138 voting in favor, 9 against, and 41 abstaining. **30 November:** In response to the UN's approving the Palestinian application for non-member observer state status, Israel's inner cabinet approves the building of housing units in the E-1 area, connecting Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. **8 December:** Hamas leader Khalid Masha'al arrives in Gaza for the first time ever to celebrate the organization's 25th anniversary. In his speech, he states explicitly that the Palestinian people would never compromise with Israel's existence and that the organization will act decisively to gradually conquer and achieve full control over the territories of Mandate Palestine to establish one Islamic state in that area.

2013 22 January: Knesset elections take place. **23 January:** For the first time, Palestine addresses the UN Security Council after obtaining the status of non-member observer state. **30 January:** Israel conducts an air strike on a Syrian convoy transporting weapons to Hezbollah in Jamraya. **19 February:** Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu invites former foreign minister Tzipi Livni to join his coalition and head Israel's peace talks with Palestine. **18 March:** Benjamin Netanyahu forms the new government in coalition with Yair Lapid from the Yesh Atid Party. **3–5 May:** Israel conducts air strikes on Syria against long-range weapons sent from Iran to Hezbollah. **10 May:** China proposes a four-point plan for the settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict as Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas are on a state visit to China. **5 July:** IDF strikes a Syrian depot containing Russian-made Yakhont anti-ship missiles. **30 July:** Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agree to new peace talks with the goal of reaching an agreement within nine months. The initial meeting takes place at the State Department in Washington and is attended by Israel's chief negotiator Tzipi Livni and senior Palestinian official Saeb Erekat. **13 August:** Israelis and Palestinians officially begin peace talks in Jerusalem. The talks begin just hours after Israel releases 26 Palestinian prisoners. **22 August:** Mahmoud Abbas announces that there has been no development in the talks. **26 September:** Mahmoud Abbas addresses the UN Security Council during which he welcomes the resumption of peace talks. Due to the Sukkot holiday, the Israeli delegation is missing from the council. **22 October:** Both negotiating sides discuss the issue of water. **27 October:** Israel releases another round of Palestinian prisoners. **28 October:** Netanyahu rejects the idea of a Palestinian right of return and says that Jerusalem will remain undivided. **14 November:** Palestinian team quits the negotiations citing the "escalation of settlement building." **26 December:** Led by MK Miri Regev, Likud pushes for a bill to annex the Jordan Valley.

2014 10 January: Israel approves plans for 1,400 settler homes. **11 January:** Former prime minister Ariel Sharon passes away after being in a comatose state for over eight years. **18 January:** Finance Minister Yair Lapid

threatens to withdraw Yesh Atid from the coalition if peace talks are not resumed. **21 January:** Israel approves another plan to build 381 new settler homes in the West Bank. **3 February:** President Abbas suggests that U.S.-led NATO troops patrol a future Palestinian state instead of Israeli troops having a presence in the Jordan Valley and suggests that Israeli settlers and soldiers will have five years to leave Palestine once the state is formed. **9 February:** Private member bill to annex the Jordan Valley is voted down in the Knesset. **12–13 March:** British prime minister David Cameron visits Israel and Palestine to urge the leaders to resume peace talks. **28 March:** Israel fails to release the fourth group of 26 Palestinian prisoners, which is seen as a violation of the original terms of the peace talks. **1 April:** President Abbas signs 15 international conventions; Israel says the move is a violation of the terms of the peace talks. **23 April:** PLO and Hamas forge a new reconciliation agreement. **24 April:** Israel refuses to continue the latest round of peace talks. **30 April:** The deadline for the latest round of peace talks passes without an agreement. **24–26 May:** Pope Francis visits Jordan, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem. He meets the grand mufti of Jerusalem at the Temple Mount and the two chief rabbis of Israel. He invites President Shimon Peres and President Abbas to join him in the Vatican in early June for a prayer for peace. **23 April:** Hamas and Fatah reconcile following seven years of division. **2 June:** Palestinian Unity Government is sworn in. **12 June:** Three Israeli teenage boys, Naftali Fraenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah, are kidnapped, and Israel blames Hamas. **14–15 June:** The IDF begins Operation Brother's Keeper to rescue the kidnapped teenagers and arrests around 80 Palestinians. **30 June:** The bodies of the three missing Israeli teenagers are found in a shallow grave near Hebron. **2 July:** A Palestinian teenager from East Jerusalem is kidnapped and murdered in a revenge killing. **8 July:** The IDF launches Operation Protective Edge; Hamas and Islamic Jihad launch rockets into Israel. **13 July:** Indicating an impending ground operation, the IDF begins to drop leaflets, make telephone calls, and send texts to warn Palestinians in northern Gaza to evacuate by noon. **14 July:** Israel accepts an Egyptian cease-fire that is due to take effect at 9 a.m. the following day; Ziad al-Nakhalah, the deputy secretary-general of Hamas, says there could be no cease-fire without ending the Israeli aggression and the Gaza blockade. **15 July:** Netanyahu fires his deputy defense minister, Danny Danon, for reportedly saying that Hamas humiliated Israel. **16 July:** Netanyahu vows to intensify and expand Israeli strikes on Gaza. Hamas and Islamic Jihad offers a 10-year conditional truce with Israel that includes ending the Gaza blockade, reopening the Gaza seaport and airport, and releasing prisoners who were freed as part of the Gilad Shalit prisoner swap but were rearrested. **17 July:** A five-hour humanitarian cease-fire is proposed by the UN and is accepted by both sides; at 10:30 p.m., Israel launches a full ground invasion of Gaza. **19 July:** Nine Hamas militants enter Israel via a tunnel

wearing IDF uniforms and carrying weapons, handcuffs, syringes, and sedatives; in the exchange fire, one militant and two IDF soldiers are killed; 13 more tunnels are discovered and destroyed by the IDF. **20 July:** An Israeli armored personnel carrier is hit by an anti-tank missile in the Gaza Strip, killing all seven IDF soldiers inside; in the ensuing conflict, 72 Palestinians are killed. Hamas says that it has captured an Israeli soldier, but the IDF denies the claim. **22 July:** The United Arab Emirates announces $41 million in aid to Gaza; the EU condemns the firing of rockets from Gaza at Israeli civilians and the use of human shields and calls for the disarming of Hamas; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prohibits U.S. airlines from flying to or from the Ben-Gurion airport for up to 24 hours following rocket attacks near the airport; the European Aviation Safety Agency advises airlines not to fly in the airspace near the airport. **24 July:** Over 10,000 Palestinians in the West Bank protest the current operation at the Qalandia border crossing, resulting in at least 2 Palestinian deaths. **25 July:** Palestinian officials call for 25 July to be a "Day of Rage" in the West Bank and within Israel. **26 July:** Both Israel and Hamas agree to a 12-hour humanitarian cease-fire from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. **27 July:** Egypt announces that it has destroyed 13 tunnels connecting Gaza to Egypt, bringing the total number of tunnels destroyed on the Egyptian border to 1,639. Israel's Health Ministry offers humanitarian aid, which includes medical equipment and blood donations to the Gaza Strip, but the Palestinian Authority refuses to accept it. **30 July:** A UNRWA school is once again hit overnight resulting in 19 Palestinian deaths. **31 July:** The United States agrees to transfer a number of arms to Israel, including rocket launchers, mortar rounds, grenades, and other arms; the IDF calls up an additional 18,000 reservists, bringing the total to 84,000; the PNA states that it plans to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court for war crimes; Israel and Hamas agree to a 72-hour humanitarian cease-fire set to begin on 1 August at 8 a.m. **5 August:** Obama signs the Iron Dome Bill providing $225 million in additional funding for the Iron Dome. **7 August:** Israel agrees that it will release the blockade and expand the Gaza fishing zone on the condition that all the groups in Gaza are demilitarized. **9 August:** Senior Hamas official Moaaz Zaid is killed when an IDF air strike hits a mosque in Gaza. **10 August:** Israel and the Palestinian factions accept a three-day cease-fire. **11 August:** The UN says that a fact-finding mission will be sent to Gaza with William Schabas, Amal Alamuddin, and Doudou Diène as members. Alamuddin turns down the offer due to other commitments. **12 August:** The Turkish Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) announces a new attempt to breach the blockade of Gaza. **13 August:** The UK announces that if the fighting in Gaza continues after the cease-fire, it will suspend military sales to Israel. **14 August:** The United States confirms that it has suspended the sale of Hellfire missiles to Israel due to the current conflict. **20 August:** Israel targets the house of Mohammad Deif in Sheikh

Radwan, killing his wife and son; **26 August:** Israel approves the cease-fire; both sides claim victory. **1 September:** Israel announces its decision to seize 400 hectares, or 1,000 acres, of land in the Etzion settlement bloc near Bethlehem; the international community including the United States and the UN criticize Israel over the settlement announcement. **16 September:** The UN brokers a deal between Israel and Palestine to allow construction material inside Gaza. **23 September:** Two Palestinians, Marwan Kawashme and Amar Aby Aysha, suspects in the abduction of three Israeli teenagers in June, are killed by the IDF in Hebron; Patriot missile battery shoots down a Syrian fighter jet that infiltrated half a mile into airspace controlled by Israel over the Golan Heights. **9 October:** Palestinian unity government meets in Gaza for the first time, four months after it was sworn in. **12 October:** International donors pledge $5.4 billion toward the rebuilding of Gaza during a donors' conference in Cairo. **22 October:** Two are killed and seven wounded when Abdel Rahman al-Shaludi from East Jerusalem crashed his car into a crowd waiting at a station of Jerusalem's light rail. **29 October:** Rabbi Yehuda Glick is killed in a terror attack in Abu Tor. **30 October:** Supporters of Rabbi Glick hold a prayer vigil near the Al-Aqsa Mosque; the police raid the building and enter the mosque, and the area is closed to visitors for the first time in 14 years. **31 October:** Al-Aqsa Mosque is reopened under heavy security. **5 November:** An Israeli policeman is killed and 13 others wounded when a Palestinian slams his van into the crowd at a light rail stop in Jerusalem; Amnesty International accuses Israel of committing war crimes during its recent campaign in Gaza; Jordan recalls its envoy from Israel over the unprecedented closure of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. **8 November:** Police shoot and kill an Israeli Arab protestor at a demonstration in Galilee. **10 November:** Two separate knife attacks by Palestinians kill an Israeli woman and a soldier and leave two others wounded in Tel Aviv. **14 November:** Israel ends age restrictions on entry to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. **18 November:** Five orthodox Jews including four rabbis are killed and six others are injured when two Palestinians attack a synagogue in Har Nof, West Jerusalem. **19 November:** The IDF demolishes the house of Abdel Rahman al-Shaludi in Silwan, East Jerusalem, who was held responsible for the light rail attack that killed two on 22 October. **20 November:** Israel security authorities issue demolition orders for the family home of the two Palestinians who were involved in the synagogue attack on 18 November.

Introduction

The observer is observed.
—Jiddu Krishnamurti, 1946

Competing Jewish and Arab national claims over the Holy Land form the core of the Arab–Israeli conflict, thereby transforming it into one of the most intensely fought struggles in the history of humanity. The conflict evokes unparalleled passion and hostility not only among its immediate participants and neighbors but also in the wider international community. The involvement of three principal monotheistic religions makes the conflict a truly universal contestation. As a result, it often contributes to bouts of violence, turmoil, and terrorism in the Middle East and beyond.

Traditionally, the Arab–Israeli conflict is traced either to the beginning of the first wave of Jewish immigration—the first Aliya—to Palestine in 1882 or, more often, to the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, whereby Great Britain expressed support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Important as these moments are, the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the historic Jewish longing for statehood, could not be understood within such a narrow frame of reference. Even if one were to question, challenge, and even dismiss the Judeo-Christian tradition that God had promised the Holy Land to Moses, it would still be imperative to understand the historic links and emotional attachment of the Jewish people to the land of their forefathers.

Any meaningful appreciation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, therefore, would have to begin with the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 AD and the subsequent dispersal of the Jews—the Diaspora. For nearly two millennia, the Jewish people lived a life often marked by suffering, subjugation, destruction, and death. Their religious beliefs and cultural heritage differentiated them from the Christian and Muslim majorities among whom they lived during this period. Living as strangers everywhere, they by turns enjoyed benevolence and toleration while periodically suffering discrimination and persecution.

Despite living in a particular place for generations, for example, they remained unwelcomed strangers to a large extent. The Jewish stay had often been temporary and transient without any hope of permanency. The sense of Jewish alienation from the majority population was often mutual. Neither could they integrate with the majority, nor could the latter accept them as different but equal subjects.

There were significant differences in Jewish lives under Islam and Christianity. Their life in the Islamic world was generally peaceful. As a People of the Book, or *dhimmi*, Islam recognizes them as the possessors of a revealed and sacred (though not final) text, and hence their lives and properties were to be guaranteed and safeguarded. Of course, the protection and tolerance of Jews were conditional and available only to those who accepted Islamic rule. The protection of Jewish lives and properties should not be confused with equal socio-religious status vis-à-vis the majority population. In return for conditional protection, the Jews endured a number of social restrictions that accompanied their second-class status.

The Jewish life in Christian Europe was more complicated and uneven. At one level, the Jewish communities suffered from periodic Christian anti-Semitic activities such as organized violence, forced conversions, expulsions, persecution, ghettoization, and pogroms. Seen in this larger context, the Nazi Holocaust was the ultimate cruelty that visited the Jews under Christianity. At the same time, it is essential to recognize the positive contributions of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution, which brought about an overall improvement in their condition. Religion ceased to be a stigma in the public domain, and avenues that were hitherto closed to the Jews, such as educational opportunities, political participation, and commercial activities, were opened up, thereby enabling the Jews to play a constructive role in an industrializing Europe.

Correspondingly, the rising fervor of nationalism in Europe brought about two intense but conflicting trends. At one level, it rekindled anti-Semitism, as witnessed during the Dreyfus trial in France in 1894. Simultaneously, it generated similar nationalist aspirations among the Jewish people. Despite the absence of a clearly defined territorial dimension, the Jews living in Europe began perceiving themselves as a nation distinct from the majority among whom they lived. If the Jews perceived themselves as a nation different from the rest, then their nationalist aspirations could be fully realized only through achieving a national home. While Herzl call his book *Der Judenstaat*, or *The Jewish State*, the explicit Zionist endorsement of statehood had to wait until the Baltimore conference of May 1942.

It was within this European context that Zionism emerged as a rallying point for Jewish nationalism. It was not only a reaction to the prevailing anti-Jewish sentiments in Europe but also a response to prolonged Jewish suffering and longing. The establishment of a national home was seen as the answer to the centuries-old Jewish question. By aspiring to a "normal national life" in a Jewish environment, the pioneering Zionists sought to remedy the historic problem of statelessness.

Austrian journalist Theodore Herzl (1860–1904), who covered the Dreyfus trial, is often seen as the founder and architect of modern political Zionism. Synthesizing the prevailing nationalist sentiments in Europe and the

prolonged Jewish condition of statelessness, he visualized the formation of a homeland as the answer and solution to the Jewish problem. Through the convening of the first World Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1898, he sowed the seeds for the Jewish homeland project.

Zionism was not an ordinary national movement seeking liberation and statehood. Unlike other similar movements that emerged in different parts of the world against European colonialism and imperialism, Zionism had to confront a number of drawbacks and handicaps. While other national liberation movements sought to liberate both people and land from colonialism, Zionism was different. It primarily sought to free the Jews not from their immediate rulers in Europe but to liberate them from their historic suffering. The Diasporic life rather than any specific oppressor was its adversary. Unlike its counterparts, Zionism did not aspire to liberate the land where the Jews were living. On the contrary, it sought to liberate a land where Jews did not live in a substantial number but to where the Jews would go for their own liberation. Since most of them were living outside their proposed "homeland," the Jews living in the Diaspora would have to immigrate to that land and "liberate" it. This migration or Aliya became the central plank upon which the liberation of the Jewish people would take place.

Aliya, the cornerstone of Zionism, differs from other forms of human migration. Economic incentives, religious reasoning, or social violence have often resulted in mass movements of populations. By organizing a massive migration from the Diaspora to their ancient land, Zionism sought to create—or recreate after a two-millennium absence—a Jewish home in Palestine. It was not a home to which a group of people would return but a place where the people would go so that a home could be established. Its supporters believed and claimed that not only were a people in search of a home, but a home was also in search of its people. In this sense, Zionism is unique in the annals of history.

The first wave of organized Jewish immigration began in 1882, when a group of pioneers sought refuge from oppression. Since the first Aliya, thousands of Jews have immigrated to Palestine. Between 1882 and 1947, 512,000 Jews came to Palestine for the purpose of constructing their homeland. Within three years of the establishment of Israel in 1948, around 685,000 more Jews immigrated to the new state. Thus, in just over six decades, more than a million Jews from the Diaspora came to the land of their ancestors in a bid to transform it into their national home. The immigration movement not only proved to be a refuge for the Jews in the Diaspora but also contributed to massive population shifts that took place in Mandate Palestine (see map 1) and, later, Israel.

To ensure a massive and organized migration of the Jewish people toward creating a homeland, Zionism recognized the importance of two crucial factors—namely, securing the support and backing of the great powers and

generating productive employment for the migrating Jews. The latter was mitigated through the collective ownership of land—namely, kibbutzim and moshavim. If Aliya was central to the creation of a homeland for the Jews, the support of the great powers became its midwife. Therefore, since the days of Herzl, the Zionist leadership recognized the importance of and the need to cultivate the support of major powers that had a stake in the Middle East, especially Palestine. Of the numerous efforts and contacts, Great Britain proved extremely useful to the Zionist cause when Lord Arthur Balfour, on 2 November 1917, pledged the British government's support for a Jewish national home in Palestine (the Balfour Declaration). This changed the destiny of the Middle East beyond recognition.

The two key components—Aliya and imperial politics—placed Zionism in an inevitable conflict with other nationalist movements, especially the nascent Arab nationalism in the Middle East. As the rest were fighting the British, French, and other European imperial powers, Zionism was actively engaged with and benefiting from the colonial powers and their imperial designs in the Middle East. Any realistic achievement of a Jewish national home in Palestine necessitated the support of a great power. At the same time, the pro-British policies of the mainstream Zionist leadership undermined its equation with their contemporaries in other parts of the world. Even while seeking the support of Mahatma Gandhi, for example, the Zionists were not in a position to support India's struggle against the British. Thus, as the Arab nationalists were forging fraternal ties with other nationalist movements, Zionism was perceived to be a collaborator of imperialism. This perception of Zionism intensified following the establishment of Israel and the process of decolonization. Instead of viewing Israel as part of the newly independent world, the former colonies began to perceive the Jewish state as an ally of the imperial powers. Such a perception, though partly promoted by Israel's joining hands with Britain and France during the Suez War, largely contributed to the prolonged isolation of Israel among the developing world, whose member nations have constituted the numerical majority in the United Nations since the 1970s.

The realization of a Jewish homeland had to confront one major problem, however. Palestine—the Zionist destination for the Jewish national home—was not an empty land but had been inhabited by Arabs for centuries. Except for a brief period during the Crusades (1099–1291), it had continuously remained under Islamic rule since the mid-seventh century. Jewish aspirations for a homeland therefore inevitably put Zionism in confrontation with the rights of a well-established native population in Palestine.

Mainstream Zionist leaders, especially David Ben-Gurion who went on to become the first prime minister of Israel, recognized the inevitable conflict with the Palestinians and the impossible nature of a compromise with them. Hence the absence of substantial and meaningful political dialogue between

the Jewish community in Palestine, or Yishuv, and the Arabs of Palestine. Zionism, which otherwise exhibited foresight and vision, did not pursue negotiations with the Arabs toward realizing its nationalist aspirations. Conversely, it was an admission of the absence of common ground between the two, especially over the core issue of a Jewish homeland. The Arab opposition to the primary Zionist activities—Aliya and land purchases in Palestine—were dismissed in favor of the "economic absorptive capacity" of Palestine and the economic benefits brought about by the immigration of Jews from Europe.

If the rise of nationalism in Europe spurred the emergence of Jewish nationalism, the birth of Zionism spurred the emergence of a distinct Palestinian nationalism. In the early 20th century, therefore, Palestine became the battleground for two intense nationalist movements seeking to realize their respective politico-national aspirations. The Jewish and Arab nationalisms began fighting over the same piece of territory—namely Palestine. Since then, the conflict has remained intense, intransigent, and acrimonious, naturally evoking enormous and unparalleled passion among the participants as well as outside observers. For a long time, this confrontation between the two nationalist movements was manifested in their attempts to negate one another. Writing in the early 20th century, British author Israel Zangwill observed that Zionism was about "people without land going to land without people." This statement summed up the attitude of the pioneering Zionist leadership toward the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and their political rights. Even the Balfour Declaration only talked about "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine"—which constituted more than 90 percent of the population of Palestine in 1917.

Similarly, Palestinian nationalism found it difficult to recognize, let alone accept, the historic links of the Jews to the land of their forefathers. Driven by a desire to repudiate any Jewish claims to Palestine, in November 1947 the Arab leadership refused to consider even a federal option whereby the Jewish community would be given limited internal autonomy within a largely Arab state of Palestine. In 1947, while some Zionist leaders were advocating a binational Palestine as the solution, the Arab leadership adopted an uncompromising stand in favor of a unitary Palestine. The onset of the Middle East peace process in the 1990s did not alter the situation dramatically. Influential Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat, openly questioned even the religious links and claims of Jews to the city of Jerusalem. Recognizing the existence of the Second Temple in Jerusalem beneath the Al-Aqsa Mosque still remains a taboo to the vast majority of Arab and non-Arab Muslims. The Islamists among them see the formation of Israel as a violation of their religious rights and claims because Palestine is a *waqf* Islamic property, and hence non-Islamic sovereignty in any of its parts would be a violation of Islamic claims and justice.

Reflecting the prevailing rejectionist sentiments, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, explicitly called for the annulment of the Partition Plan and the destruction of the Jewish state. In its view, the Balfour Declaration and the immigration of Jews from the Diaspora were morally wrong and hence had to be reversed. This view prevailed until 1988, when the Algiers meeting of the Palestinian parliament-in-exile accepted the partition resolution of 1947 and declared a Palestinian state that would co-exist with Israel. This sentiment of co-existence was manifested in September 1993 when Israel and the PLO granted mutual recognition to each other, thereby ushering in the Oslo Process. This journey toward mutual accommodation was long and painful and still remains incomplete.

THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE

Conflicting and contradictory promises to rival claimants was the hallmark of British policy, which contributed greatly to the problems in Palestine. During World War I, through a series of letters known as the Hussein–McMahon Correspondence (July 1915–March 1916), Great Britain pledged its support for an independent Arab kingdom under the leadership of Sharif Hussein of Mecca in return for the latter joining forces with the British against the Ottoman Empire. Simultaneously, through the Balfour Declaration of 1917, London promised its support to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. When this commitment was made, the British forces were yet to enter Palestine.

These pledges to the Arabs and the Jews overlapped considerably. The British apparently meant to keep Palestine out of the Arab kingdom promised to Hussein, while the Arabs read it differently. To complicate the matter further, under the Sykes–Picot Agreement of May 1916, Britain and France agreed to divide the spoils of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the Great War. By the time World War I ended, these two European powers were in control of most of the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire including present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The League of Nations, which granted Palestine as a mandated territory to Britain in 1922, also included the Balfour Declaration, thereby bestowing international legitimacy to the Jewish homeland project. Working toward realizing a Jewish homeland became a British responsibility as the Mandate power. Upon taking over the Mandate, Great Britain tried to reconcile its conflicting commitments to the Arabs and the Jews. In the early years, while maintaining its commitments under the Balfour Declaration, it hoped to secure Arab consent for the waves of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. This

never happened, and Aliya and Zionist land purchases caused social tensions in Palestine. Both evoked strong opposition from the Arab inhabitants manifested through popular protests, inter-communal tensions, and organized or unorganized violence. Eventually this culminated in the protracted fighting in Palestine known as the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) and brought into focus the irreconcilable nature of the contradictory British promises to the Jews and Arabs. The persistent Arab opposition forced the British in 1939 to abandon their commitment to the Balfour Declaration and to impose a ceiling on Jewish immigration to and land purchases in Palestine.

The outbreak of World War II in 1939 soon posed new challenges to all parties. While supporting the British war efforts in Europe, the Zionists opted to oppose the Mandate policies in Palestine and to smuggle illegal immigrants into the region. The end of the war in 1945 left Britain militarily weak and economically dependent on the United States of America, thereby forcing the British political leadership to reconsider its overseas interests, possessions, and commitments. Its decision in 1946 to withdraw from the Indian Subcontinent considerably weakened British interests in Palestine, which was midway between London and New Delhi. The intensification of anti-British violence from the Revisionist Zionists stretched the British military. After a quarter of a century of futile efforts, Britain was forced to recognize the irreconcilable nature of its promises to the conflicting parties and its inability as the Mandate power to prepare Palestine for self-governance.

Eventually in April 1947, Great Britain formally handed over the problem of Palestine to the newly formed United Nations and requested the world body to suggest ways of determining the future of Palestine. After weeks of deliberations, on 15 May 1947 the UN formed an 11-member United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to determine the future of Palestine. The committee held its deliberations in New York, Palestine, Beirut, and Geneva and on 3 September 1947 submitted its report. There was widespread unanimity on a host of issues such as ending the Mandate, economic cooperation, and protection of holy places, but the committee was divided on the central issue, the future of Palestine. A seven-member majority advocated a Partition Plan, whereby Palestine would be partitioned into independent Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem and its environs being declared an international city. A three-member minority led by India advocated the Federal Plan, which would grant greater internal autonomy to the Jews within a federal Palestine. Australia abstained from endorsing either of the plans.

Both the Zionist leadership and the Arabs rejected the Federal Plan. The Indian plan offered Jews religious and civil rights when they were demanding political rights and sovereignty. For their part, the Arabs felt the plan offered too many concessions to the Jews who had immigrated to Palestine. Indeed, rejecting the Indian plan was the only occasion that Jews and Arabs agreed in 1947. Lacking political realism, the Federal Plan was never dis-

cussed in the United Nations. The Partition Plan, on the contrary, at least enjoyed the support of one of the parties to the conflict—the Zionists. Despite their reservations over its size and territorial limits, the proposed Jewish state was an attractive option and provided a hope for ending two millennia of Jewish statelessness. For the first time, it offered Jewish sovereignty over the land of their forefathers. Hence, the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, overwhelmingly endorsed the Partition Plan. After hectic diplomatic activities, political parleys, and pressure tactics from the United States, the UN General Assembly approved the Partition Plan on 29 November 1947 (see map 2). Thirty-three countries voted in favor and 13 voted against, while 10 members abstained.

The UN vote and the British decision to pull out of Palestine by 15 May 1948 intensified Arab–Jewish tension and violence in Palestine. As both sides were preparing for an eventual military confrontation, the neighboring Arab states committed themselves to prevent the implementation of the partition resolution. The British presence in Palestine kept them from directly intervening militarily, and hence they settled for raising Arab volunteers in support of the Arabs of Palestine. The intensification of violence forced the United Nations to convene a second special session of the General Assembly, where plans to "freeze" the partition resolution were actively pursued.

As the UN special session was in progress, on 14 May 1948, hours before the impending British departure from Palestine and the onset of Jewish Shabbat, Zionist leaders met in Tel Aviv and declared the establishment of the State of Israel. Within minutes, President Harry S. Truman communicated the American recognition of the Jewish state. Other countries around the world soon followed. The following day, the regular armies of the neighboring Arab states, along with Palestinian fighters and Iraqi and Saudi troops, invaded the territories of the erstwhile Palestine Mandate to prevent the emergence of Israel. Thus began the Arab–Israeli military confrontation and hostilities.

THE CONFLICT

While formal hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors began on 15 May 1948, the November UN vote on the Partition Plan had already unleashed large-scale violence in the Mandate Palestine and sown the seeds of the 1948 War. The Jewish–Arab fighting intensified as the British withdrawal approached and at times led to the brutal and premeditated killing of civilian populations, as exhibited by the Deir Yassin Massacre on 9 April 1948 and the killing of scores of Jewish doctors and medical personnel a few

days later at Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. The establishment of Israel and the subsequent declaration of war by the Arab states transformed the Arab–Jewish conflict in Palestine into an interstate Arab–Israeli conflict.

The military preparedness of the warring sides was uneven in 1948. Though numerically superior, the Arabs were less cohesive and more divided. This contrasted with the conditions of the Yishuv, which was organized and better prepared. In the early years of the Mandate, Arab–Jewish confrontation and violent incidents such as the Western Wall Riots and the Hebron Massacre (both in 1929) resulted in the socialist-Zionist-dominated Yishuv organizing into self-defense groups and forming organizations such as Hashomer and Haganah. Not to be left behind, Revisionist Zionists formed their own militant groups, such as Irgun and the Stern Gang. Upon the establishment of Israel, these groups were combined, and a unified Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was formed on 31 May 1948.

The unity exhibited by the Jewish military forces contrasted with the deep divisions that characterized the Arab side. By the summer of 1948, the official Palestinian leadership, including Hajj Amin al-Husseini (1893–1974), the grand mufti of Jerusalem, was residing outside of Mandate Palestine, and hence the Arab states took over the task of "liberating" Palestine and preventing the birth of the Jewish state. The Arab forces comprising the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, the erstwhile Transjordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were numerically larger than the fighters commanded by the embryonic Israeli state. Most of these Arab states were dependent on Great Britain, the Mandate power in Palestine, for political, economic, and military support. This prevented them from directly intervening in Palestine until after the departure of the last British soldier on the night of 14–15 May 1948.

Transjordan, which commanded the Arab Legion, the strongest and best-organized army in the Middle East at that time, had territorial ambitions. Its ruler, King Abdullah I, was coveting those territories that were to become part of the independent Arab state envisaged under the Partition Plan. Toward this end he was secretly meeting Zionist leaders, including Golda Meir, a future prime minister of Israel. These internal divisions, lack of coordination, conflicting political ambitions, and above all poor military planning proved to be too costly for the Arab states in their resolve to prevent the formation of Israel.

By the time the second UN-mediated cease-fire came into force on 18 July 1948, Israel had managed to preserve its independence and retained most of the territories allotted to it under the UN plan. It even made additional territorial gains: as against the 43 percent of Palestine that was allotted under the Partition Plan, Israel secured 60 percent of the territory by the end of the conflict. Palestinian territories west of the River Jordan—that is, the West

Bank, including East Jerusalem—had come under Jordanian control while Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip. Jordan formally annexed the West Bank in April 1950, further aggravating internal tensions within the Arab ranks.

In early 1949, under the UN-mediated talks on the Greek island of Rhodes, Israel and its Arab neighbors—namely, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, in that order—signed separate armistice agreements (see map 3). This arrangement signaled a temporary cessation of hostilities, but the much-awaited formal peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors did not materialize. For the next several years, there were a series of cross-border infiltrations from Jordan and the Gaza Strip into Israel that resulted in Israeli reprisal attacks. The emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt in 1954 and his growing popularity in the Arab world aroused concerns in Israel. Egypt's much-publicized Czech arms deal of 1955 added a security dimension to Israeli apprehensions over Nasser's designs. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement over British withdrawal from the Suez Canal area also contributed to Israeli fears.

Against this background, Nasser's decision in July 1956 to nationalize the Suez Canal to fund the ambitious Aswan Dam project and British and French determination to retain control eventually led to the Suez War. Joining hands with Great Britain and France, who owned the company that operated the Suez Canal, Israel launched a war against Egypt that resulted in Israel capturing the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. Under strong pressure from U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower, in early 1957 Israel was forced to vacate these territories. The end of hostilities witnessed the formation of the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I).

The Suez War was followed by a decade of relative quiet, but this was suddenly interrupted in June 1967. In the previous month, media reports had suggested a concentration of Israeli forces along its border with Syria, which prompted Nasser to demand a partial withdrawal of the UNEF deployed on the Egyptian side of its border with Israel. When this was not acceptable to the UN, the Egyptian leader demanded a complete withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. This was followed by his decision to close the Gulf of Tiran to Israeli shipping, thereby creating domestic apprehensions and security concerns in Israel. The inability of the international community, including the United Nations, to lift the closure of the Gulf—along with the formation of a military alliance among Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—compelled Israel to respond unilaterally.

In a well-planned military campaign on 5 June 1967, the Israeli air force launched a preemptive air strike against air bases in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and destroyed the bulk of the Arab air force, facilities, and runways. Their complete air superiority enabled Israel to take full control of the military campaign. The Jordanian decision to join the war in support of Nasser led to Israel's capture of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem (see maps 4 and

5). By the time the war ended on 10 June, besides the West Bank, Israel had captured the whole of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights. Thus, not only the entire Mandate Palestine came under its control, but Israel also captured sovereign territories belonging to Egypt and Syria.

The June War, also known as the Six-Day War, introduced a host of new issues and terms to the Arab–Israeli conflict, such as the Green Line, the Occupied Territories (see map 6), and settlements. On 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. At the same time, it acclaimed the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to live within "secured and recognized" borders.

The response of Israel and its Arab opponents to the war and its aftermath differed. The former sought to keep the newly captured territories as leverage in securing Arab recognition and regional acceptance. This posture did not prevent Israel from initiating a process of building Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. While seeking peace, Israel began articulating its desire to retain parts of the West Bank, especially the areas along the Jordan River Valley, in any future settlement with the Arabs. For their part, the Arab states reiterated and formalized their opposition to Israel. Meeting in Khartoum in August–September 1967, the members of the Arab League vowed not to recognize, negotiate with, or make peace with Israel. At the regional level, the military defeat brought about the political demise of the secular Arab nationalism represented by Nasser and paved the way for the conservative Islamist resurgence spearheaded by Saudi Arabia.

Egypt's refusal to recognize or negotiate with Israel was accompanied by its refusal to relinquish the Sinai Peninsula to Israeli occupation. This resulted in the low-intensity conflict along the Suez Canal commonly known as the War of Attrition (1969–1970). The death of Nasser in September 1970 and the emergence of Anwar Sadat as his successor brought about a new Egyptian calculation vis-à-vis Israel. Egypt lacked the military means to inflict a defeat on Israel and regain the Sinai, but at the same time Sadat was keen to initiate limited hostilities and establish a presence on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. This, he hoped, would galvanize the superpowers to alter the status quo and bring about the return of Sinai to Egypt.

Accordingly on 6 October 1973, in collaboration with Syria, Egypt launched a preemptive strike against Israel. Within the first few hours, Egyptian forces broke the Israeli defenses (or Bar-Lev lines) and established a foothold on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The war, which began on Yom Kippur—the holiest day in the Jewish calendar—dispelled the aura of Israeli invincibility, inflicted an element of surprise, and exposed Israeli dependence on the United States for urgent military supplies. In a bid to support the Egyptian-Syrian war efforts, the oil-exporting Arab countries introduced an oil embargo against those Western countries that supported

Israel. This resulted in a steep increase in oil prices and the disruption of oil supplies. The oil crisis in turn brought about swift changes in the Middle East policies of traditional friends of Israel in Europe, and they began to tilt in favor of the Arabs and Palestinians. Amid the war, there were apprehensions over the possible use of undeclared nuclear weapons by Israel.

By the time a cease-fire came into force on 22 October, Israel had made some territorial gains, and a small Israeli contingent led by Reserve Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon had established a foothold on the western bank of the Suez Canal, resulting in the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army. Similarly, in the north, Israel managed to repel the initial Syrian advances on the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, more than four decades later, the war continues to be remembered more for the strategic surprises inflicted by Egypt on Israel in the initial hours of the conflict than for the final gains by Israel.

While earlier Arab–Israeli wars sowed the seeds for the next round of hostilities, the October War resulted in the first peace between Israel and an Arab state. President Sadat's psychological victory over Israel enabled him to initiate a policy of accommodation with Israel. The defeat of the Labor Party in the 1977 Knesset elections and the emergence of Menachem Begin as the first right-wing prime minister of Israel proved to be favorable. On 20 November 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader to address the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem. The following September, U.S. president Jimmy Carter hosted both leaders at a retreat outside of Washington, D.C., and facilitated the Camp David Accords. In March 1979 the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty was signed, paving the way for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, a measure that was completed on 25 April 1982.

The Egypt–Israeli peace agreement led to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, and Egypt became the first Arab state and the second Islamic country after Turkey to establish formal relations with the Jewish state. Around the same time, the prolonged but clandestine relations between Israel and Iran came to an end following the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Sadat's decision to break ranks with other Arab countries and conclude a separate peace agreement with Israel did not enjoy regional support. Countries such as Iraq and Syria, as well as the PLO, were strongly opposed to Sadat's "Egypt first" policy and breaking with Arab unity vis-à-vis Israel. While Egypt was on the way to regaining full control over the Sinai Peninsula, its regional influence diminished considerably. As a punishment for the Camp David Accords, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now renamed the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). There were unsuccessful efforts to suspend Egypt from the Non-Aligned Movement. These measures in turn brought Egypt closer to the United States.

Meanwhile the Palestinian forces were gaining regional influence and attention following the formation of their umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization, in 1964. In the initial years, the PLO was largely seen as an Egyptian outfit functioning under the patronage of President Nasser. The Arab defeat in the June 1967 war and the entry of Fatah into its fold considerably changed the status and influence of the PLO. Under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, who took over as chairman in 1969, the organization slowly evolved into the most prominent and independent Palestinian force. The near civil war in Jordan in September 1970 resulted in the Hashemite Kingdom's crackdown against Palestinian militants and the expulsion of the PLO from Amman to Lebanon.

The 1970s witnessed the radicalization of Palestinian movements and the intensification of guerrilla attacks against Israel. This period saw the beginning of international terrorism and air piracy. Palestinian Fedayeen guerrillas frequently infiltrated into Israel and carried out militant attacks, often aimed at the civilian population. Ironically such terrorist attacks popularized the Palestinian cause and brought their plight to the attention of the international community. Correspondingly such attacks resulted in numerous counter-terrorism measures from Israel (one of the most successful being the Entebbe Operation of June 1976) and the West. Overruling opposition from Jordan, in 1974, the Arab summit in Rabat recognized the PLO as the "sole and legitimate representative" of the Palestinians and paved the way for its entry into the UN General Assembly as an observer later that year.

Meanwhile, since late 1970, Lebanon had become the focus of Palestinian guerrilla operations against Israel. Operating from the immunity granted by the Lebanese government, the Palestinians often carried out military attacks against northern Israel. Partly as a response to such attacks and partly to pacify critics within his ruling coalition over the Sinai withdrawal, Prime Minister Begin adopted a tougher stand against the PLO. In June 1982, Israel launched an invasion of Lebanon, commonly known as the Peace for Galilee Operation. Even though it managed to remove the PLO and Chairman Arafat from Beirut, Israel was unable to extricate itself from the Lebanese quagmire. Its occupation of the Lebanese capital proved to be a disaster. Responding angrily to the killing of President-Elect Bachir Gemayel in a bomb blast on 16 September 1982, Christian Phalangist militants entered Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila on the outskirts of Beirut and massacred scores of civilians. The camps had been under the control of the IDF, and in spite of the rising tensions over Bachir Gemayel's assassination, Israel had allowed the gunmen to enter the refugee camps. This brought renewed criticism both within Israel and from the international community over the Lebanese invasion.

By 1983, Israel had withdrawn from much of Lebanon but retained control over a narrow strip of territory in southern Lebanon. Known as the "security zone," this area remained under the nominal control of the pro-Israeli South Lebanese Army, which was trained, armed, paid, and managed by Israel. The Israeli invasion resulted in the birth of Hezbollah, a Shia militant group that became active in conducting raids both within the security zone and also against northern Israel. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed periodic confrontations involving Israel and Hezbollah. The weak Lebanese government was unable to act against either of the players.

The mounting Israeli casualties in southern Lebanon generated widespread opposition within Israel over its continued presence in southern Lebanon and the military rationale behind the security zone. After increasing casualties and protracted public pressure, in the summer of 2000 Israel unilaterally pulled out of the security zone and returned to the 1923 lines that marked the borders between Lebanon and Mandate Palestine.

As relations with Arab states became manageable, the Israeli–Palestinian front eluded a solution. In December 1987, the Arab–Israeli conflict took a turn for the worse with the onset of the Intifada in the Occupied Territories. What began as a protest over the deaths of a few Palestinian workers in a road accident in Gaza City on 8 December soon spread to other parts of the Strip and then engulfed the whole of the Occupied Territories. The popular uprising not only reinforced the impossibility of the status quo of occupation but also reintroduced the Palestinian issue as the principal problem facing the Middle East. It shifted the regional focus back from the ongoing Iran–Iraq War and reminded the international community that the Palestinian question remains the core of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Not only was Israel's regional isolation increased, but the Intifada also contributed to significant erosion in its support base in the West, especially among liberal elements in the United States.

The August 1990 Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait temporarily shifted the international focus from the Palestinians to the Persian Gulf region. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's efforts to link his occupation of Kuwait to the Israeli occupation of Arab territories evoked strong support among the Palestinians and the PLO leadership. This euphoria over linkage proved to be shortsighted, and the U.S.-led international campaign resulted in the defeat of Iraq and its expulsion from Kuwait in February 1991. The Palestinian leadership, which supported the Iraqi action, was regionally isolated once the status quo ante was restored in Kuwait. The end of the Kuwait War coincided with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new international climate.

PEACE PROCESS

The Egypt–Israel Camp David peace agreement was not followed by similar moves vis-à-vis other countries. The exclusion of the Palestinians considerably dissuaded other countries from seeking peace with the Jewish state. The near consensus against Iraq over Kuwait, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the United States as the preeminent global power proved to be conducive for resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Capitalizing on the new international climate, the United States initiated, with the USSR as a co-sponsor, a Middle East peace initiative. The Madrid Conference was inaugurated on 30 October 1991, whereby Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinians, agreed to seek a political and negotiated settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The formal exclusion of the PLO proved to be a major handicap to the peace efforts, though. The reelection of Yitzhak Rabin as Israeli prime minister in June 1992 brought a new momentum to the peace talks. He agreed to forgo the erstwhile taboo over the participation of the PLO and to seek a direct peace agreement with the official and recognized Palestinian leadership. This process, which came to be known as the Oslo Process, culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DoP) on the White House Lawns on 13 September 1993. Under the Gaza–Jericho agreement, signed on 4 May 1994, Israel agreed to hand over control of these two areas to the newly established Palestinian National Authority (PNA). On 1 July 1994 Arafat returned to the Gaza Strip and took control of the PNA. By late 1995, Israel had pulled out of most of the Arab towns except Hebron.

The Oslo Process, however, was anything but smooth. Opponents within both sides tried their best and succeeded at sabotaging the process. Militant Palestinian groups, principally Hamas and to a lesser extent the Islamic Jihad, sought to undermine the Oslo Process through a wave of suicide attacks inside Israel. This campaign reached its peak in early 1996, when nearly a hundred Israeli civilians were killed in a spate of suicide attacks. The spiral of violence and the sense of insecurity among Israeli citizens contributed to the defeat of the Labor Party and the victory of Likud, now headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. Continuing his erstwhile opposition to the DoP, he considerably reversed the progress made since 1993. Under his leadership, Israel not only slowed down the process but also stopped further withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and intensified various impediments to Palestinian statehood (see map 7).

In an effort to jump-start the process, Ehud Barak, who became prime minister in May 1999, decided to conclude a comprehensive agreement with the Palestinians. In the summer of 2000, U.S. president Bill Clinton hosted Barak and Arafat and hoped for the conclusion of a peace accord and an end

to the Arab–Israeli conflict. However, not only did the well-intentioned talks fail, but they also contributed to growing Palestinian disillusion over the peace process. The U.S. and Israeli leaders blaming Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Talks only exasperated the situation. The controversial visit of the leader of the opposition, Ariel Sharon, to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area on 28 September 2000 proved fatal. The visit was seen by the Palestinians as a demonstration of Israeli claims of sovereignty over the third-holiest site in Islam and sparked widespread protests, soon leading to the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Unlike the earlier Intifada, popular Palestinian participation was considerably absent from the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which was largely dominated by suicide attacks against Israeli civilians within the Green Line. The "militant Intifada," as it was called, rekindled the Israeli sense of insecurity witnessed in the early years of the state.

For its part, Israel resorted to a host of forceful military measures, including a policy of assassinating known militant as well as political leaders belonging to various militant organizations. In March 2004, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a founder and spiritual head of Hamas, was assassinated, and so was his successor, Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the following month. At the height of its campaign, Israel even threatened to assassinate PNA chairman Yasser Arafat. In addition, Israel resorted to the reoccupation of Palestinian towns it had vacated in late 1995 and introduced an array of measures such as detention, land confiscation, a general curfew, travel restrictions between Palestinian areas, and refusal to allow Palestinians to work inside Israel.

The onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada resulted in the marginalization of Arafat and his exclusion from the negotiating process. From the time he came to power in February 2001, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon refused to meet or negotiate with Arafat; rather, he confined the Palestinian leader to his headquarters in Ramallah. On a few occasions, Sharon even threatened to order the assassination of the Palestinian leader. On 11 November 2004, Arafat died in a military hospital in Paris after being airlifted from Ramallah following an illness. Allegations that Arafat died from polonium poisoning led to his body being exhumed and samples being taken by three international scientific teams from France, Russia, and Switzerland. While the former two ruled out polonium poisoning as the reason for Arafat's death, the Swiss team concluded otherwise. Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Arafat in December 2004, managed to secure a temporary truce among various Palestinian groups vis-à-vis Israel.

Israel's failure to reach a common understanding with its Arab interlocutors at times resulted in its pursuing a unilateral policy vis-à-vis Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. As prime ministers, both Labor leader Barak and Likud leader Sharon reached the same conclusion that a negotiated Israeli withdrawal was not possible vis-à-vis militant groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and hence both settled for unilateral withdrawals completed on 24

May 2000 and 12 September 2005, respectively. Despite its unilateral nature, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon has been recognized by the UN as its compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425. In the Gaza Strip, Israel had pulled out to the 4 June lines, a common Arab demand vis-à-vis Israel.

The unilateral withdrawals were not without their share of problems. The Second Lebanon War of 2006 and the spate of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip since August 2005 raised doubts among many Israelis over the wisdom of non-negotiated arrangements with Israel's adversaries. Though the intensity of the post-withdrawal violence was less, public opinion in Israel has remained skeptical over a similar arrangement vis-à-vis the West Bank.

Theoretically, unilateralism is still feasible regarding the Golan Heights, and Israel can unilaterally withdraw to the 4 June border as it defines it; that is, either as a land border or a waterfront as existed on 4 June 1967. This would imply an Israeli willingness to demolish all settlements on the Golan Heights and evacuate all settlers. This possibility of a unilateral move is not attractive as there are no incentives or punishment mechanisms for Israel to change the status quo. The 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights also poses a number of legal issues for the Israeli leaders.

Though the Gaza Disengagement (see map 9) was accompanied by Israel pulling out from four isolated settlements in the West Bank, a unilateral Israeli pullout from the West Bank does not appear feasible. The topographical nature of the West Bank and the spiraling settlements would mean Israel would have enclaves in the West Bank surrounded by Palestinian areas. Under Israeli occupation, the areas that are notionally controlled by the PNA since 1995 have become enclaves surrounded by Jewish settlements. Under this circumstance, if Israel were to unilaterally pull out of the West Bank, the Jewish settlements would become enclaves surrounded by Palestinian areas. Thus, short of complete evacuation of all settlements east of a unilaterally defined border in the West Bank, Israel would have to seek a negotiated agreement. Above all, the frequency with which Hamas and other militants have fired Qassam and other rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip has significantly undermined any scope for Israeli unilateralism vis-à-vis the West Bank.

Despite playing a key role in the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Sharon became the first Israeli prime minister or political leader to formally accept the idea of Palestinian statehood. Under intense American and Western pressure, Arafat partially relinquished control over the PNA and created the post of prime minister. Partly to overcome criticisms over his pro-Israel bias, President George W. Bush formalized U.S. policy in favor of a two-state solution. In his conversation with President Abbas, Prime Minister Olmert sought to resolve a number of sensitive issues including Jerusalem through functional and territorial compromises. However, since the death of Arafat in

November 2004, the peace process has remained stagnant, and various efforts have proved to be transient and elusive. The internal divisions within the Palestinian national movement have considerably weakened the ability of Abbas to effectively negotiate with Israel. Fears of criticisms have inhibited the Palestinian leadership from moving forward in the peace process with foresight. For its part, Israel has been less inclined to negotiate and conclude a peace agreement with the PNA, whose political and diplomatic legitimacy has been challenged by Hamas, which has remained autonomous since it forcefully took over the Gaza Strip in 2007.

The Arab–Israeli conflict has at times turned outward and adversely affected other Arab states as well. The civil strife in Jordan and the resultant Black September Massacre (1970) was largely linked to the conflict. Similarly, the expulsion of the PLO to Lebanon in 1970 eventually contributed to the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989). Attempts by regional leaders to seek a political settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict were often confronted brutally. The assassinations of King Abdullah of Jordan (July 1951), Anwar Sadat of Egypt (October 1981), and Yitzhak Rabin (November 1995) of Israel grew primarily out of complaints over their "concessions" to the enemy. The wider nature of the fallouts underscores the different levels at which the Arab–Israeli conflict is fought.

CONCENTRIC CIRCLES

The Arab–Israeli conflict manifests itself in three concentric circles: the Palestinian, Arab, and Islamic dimensions. With considerable overlapping, these three circles are the most prominent dimensions of the problem.

In the first ring, the Jewish–Palestinian and Israeli–Palestinian aspects form the core of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Its importance is neither uniform nor consistent. This was evident during the Yishuv years, when the Palestinians, under the leadership of the grand mufti of Jerusalem, resisted the Zionist policy of immigration and land purchase. The widespread Arab Revolt that began in 1936 was the high point of this confrontation that eventually compelled Great Britain to abandon its commitments to the Balfour Declaration.

It is essential to recognize that despite its long historic presence and affiliation to the land, modern Palestinian nationalism is of recent origin. Principally it was a response and reaction to Jewish nationalism and the Zionist policy of Aliya and land purchase. Like most other "nations" in the contemporary Middle East, the Palestinian nation has largely been newly constructed. The substantial dependence of the Palestinian leaders on the Arab states for political guidance during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War underscored

the limitations of Palestinian nationalism. This was in contrast to Jewish nationalism. Despite enjoying the support and backing of the British, the Yishuv leaders were able and willing to provide effective leadership, which eventually managed to challenge the British during the critical moments of 1948. This independence and assertion proved critical during the war when the Jewish forces led by David Ben-Gurion succeeded in consolidating and even expanding the newly formed state.

This was not the case for the Palestinians. On 14 May 1948, when the State of Israel was proclaimed, the top leadership of the Arab Executive was outside of Palestine. Critical decisions concerning the Palestinians were made by the Arab League, while there were serious conflicts of interest between Transjordan and other Arab states. These differences proved to be fatal for the Palestinians when Amman overruled the Arab consensus and annexed the West Bank in April 1950. It is often ignored that between 1948 and 1967, Jordan's claims to these areas rested on "acquisition of territories by war," something that was declared inadmissible by UN Resolution 242 following the June War. The Jordanian occupation of the West Bank and its refusal to accept prevailing Arab consensus was the most critical factor in the failure to realize the Arab state as envisaged by the UN Partition Plan. The collapse of the All Palestine Government that was proclaimed in September 1948 revealed the inter-Arab rivalry and its fallout on the Palestinians. Even though Israel is normally blamed for the absence of Palestinian statehood, at least until 1967 the Arab states were equally responsible for that failure. Until then, they occupied most of the territory that was allotted to Palestine under the UN partition, and their failure to create a state in these territories not only weakened the Palestinian cause but, more importantly, created doubts about their commitment to the Palestinian people.

Following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Palestinian dimension took a back seat, and Israel's confrontation with the neighboring Arab states became the prime focus of the conflict. Palestinians who had largely become refugees following the war were completely marginalized, and the problem was widely regarded as an Arab–Israeli conflict. The Arab states, led by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, were at the forefront of that anti-Israeli confrontation. Even the formation of the PLO in 1964 did not take away the primacy of the Arab component of the conflict.

The wording of UN Security Council Resolution 242, adopted in November 1967, illustrates this dilemma. It called for the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area. It also recognized their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. At the same time, it made no direct references to the Palestinians but merely talked about "a just settlement of the refugee problem."

Ironically, it was the defeat of the Arab states in June 1967 and the rise in the popularity of the Fedayeen that brought the focus back on the Palestinians. Though partly unpopular, the spate of plane hijackings and other militant acts gradually brought the Palestinians to the center stage. The October war temporarily halted, but did not reverse, this process. The recognition granted to the PLO by the Arab summit in Rabat in 1974 further firmed up the focus on the Palestinians.

The Palestine question has constituted the dominant discourse in Israel's confrontation with the Arab states. President Sadat's decision "to abandon" the larger Arab cause and to pursue the national interest of Egypt was perceived as the abandonment of the Palestinian cause by the most populous Arab state. For countries such as Iraq and Syria, Sadat's privileging of Egyptian interests over Arab unity proved to be a rallying point. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent dispersal of the PLO leadership to various Arab countries formed another milestone in the fluctuating fortunes of the centrality of the Palestinian question. The Intifada that broke out in December 1987 and the Oslo Accords once again brought the Palestinian dimension to the center stage.

For its part, Israel has been comfortable to present the whole question as an Arab–Israeli, rather than a Palestinian–Israeli, conflict. It is obvious that a successful conclusion of any peace agreement with neighboring Arab states would entail an Israeli withdrawal from the territories it conquered in 1967. For a long time, Israeli leaders, especially from the Labor Party, hoped to resolve the status of the West Bank through the Jordan Option. By "returning" most of the West Bank to Jordan, the Labor leaders were hoping to permanently annex and retain areas that were important for Israel's security. This, they hoped, would circumvent the formation of a Palestinian state. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing international consensus in favor of the Palestinian right to statehood, and under such circumstances any Israeli settlement with the Palestinians would have had to result in the formation of a separate Palestinian entity.

Hence, Israel resisted negotiating with the PLO and at times even looked for a "moderate" alternative leadership that would be willing to settle for autonomy rather than statehood. It banned all contacts between its citizens and members of the PLO. The Oslo Process once again brought the focus back to the Palestinians. It was the signing of the Israel–PLO Declaration of Principles that enabled Jordan to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. Israel's peace negotiations with the Palestinians encouraged and enabled a number of Arab and non-Arab countries (China and India, for example) to reexamine their erstwhile hostility and normalize diplomatic ties with the Jewish state.

Even after Oslo, when its negotiations with the Palestinians had reached an impasse, Israel shifted the focus to the Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese tracks. It has been relatively easier for Israel to be flexible in dealing with

Arab states than with the non-state Palestinian leadership. The outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 once again brought back the centrality of the Palestinian question to the Arab–Israeli conflict. As the hostilities intensified, they compelled a number of states, including Egypt and Jordan, which have diplomatic ties, to reevaluate their policies toward Israel. In recent years, however, there has been a significant shift. As discussed below, the Arab Spring has considerably shifted the regional and international focus to the stability of various Arab regimes and in the process diminished international interest in the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the Israeli–Palestinian dimension.

The Arab world forms the second ring of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Until the late 1970s, the conflict was largely dominated by the Arab states neighboring Israel. Since the late 19th century, the Palestinians have been the principal and immediate victims of the Aliya and Zionist land purchases. Internal rivalries among various factions paved the way for a greater role for external powers. Following the formation of the Arab League in 1945, the Palestinian question was transformed from not only an Arab agenda but also as the primary political platform that could unite rival Arab states. As a result, the Palestinian leadership became marginalized, and the Palestinian cause became subservient to the national-interest calculations of principal Arab states. Since the mid-1940s, therefore, the Palestinian struggle was largely led by the non-Palestinian Arab leadership and their agenda.

The formation of the PLO was primarily a gesture by Egypt and others to exhibit their commitment to the Palestinians. While the emergence of Yasser Arafat in 1969 ushered in a new era and an independent role for the Palestinians, it was only in 1974 that the Arab states recognized the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Palestinian and Arab interests were not always complementary, let alone coterminous. President Sadat's desire to pursue a separate peace with Israel and the protracted but clandestine relations maintained by Jordan underscore the deep differences between these countries and the Palestinians. The prolonged tension between the PLO and some of the Arab states should be read within the context of this dichotomous relationship. The Palestinian desire to upstage the Hashemite monarchy resulted in the civil war and the Black September Massacre of 1970. Similar conflicting interests and actions vitiated the Palestinian relations with countries such as Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria. A similar approach was apparent when Egypt under Mubarak and again under Mohammed Morsi sought to limit the movement of people from the Gaza Strip to the Sinai Peninsula, and in their determination to limit and destroy Palestinian tunnels used to smuggle food, medicine, and essential commodities as well as weapons. Indeed, the prolongation of the Israeli siege of the Gaza Strip since 2007 would not have been possible without Egypt's tacit support.

Despite the periodic tensions with the Palestinian leadership, the Arab world has not abandoned its support for the Palestinian cause, hence the hostility of Arab states toward Israel. Egypt became the first Arab state to recognize Israel when it signed the Camp David Accords in 1978, but contrary to the hopes of Israel and the United States, other Arab states did not follow Sadat's footsteps. For its part, Egypt was content with maintaining a cold peace with Israel. It was only after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO in September 1993 that Jordan was prepared to negotiate with Israel formally and openly. While the heyday of the Oslo Process enabled a number of countries such as Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia, and Oman to open low-level consular relations with Israel, the Arab world in general has been extremely reluctant to normalize political ties with Israel. Whenever there was a significant deterioration in the peace process, countries such as Egypt and Jordan have not hesitated to recall their ambassadors from Israel. Thus, more than six decades after the formation of Israel, Egypt and Jordan (and for a while Mauritania) remain the only Arab states to maintain normal ties with the Jewish state.

Even in the absence of any bilateral dispute with Israel, the Arab countries as a whole espouse the Palestinian cause to such an extent that their hostility toward Israel enjoys considerable domestic support. Their periodic differences with the Palestinian leadership have not forced the Arab states into adopting a friendlier posture vis-à-vis Israel. The resolution of the Palestinian question has thus become an essential if not sufficient precondition for Israel's normalization of relations with the Arab world.

The Arab circle of the conflict could also be seen through the prolonged policy of the economic boycott of Israel. In the late 1940s, the Arab states introduced a policy of imposing economic sanctions against national and international companies that were engaged in business activities with or in Israel. The formation of the Damascus-based Arab Boycott Office provided an institutional framework to this policy. Under this policy, a number of European and other non-Arab companies were threatened with economic sanctions if they pursued business ties with Israel. Fearing such measures, a number of companies avoided trading with Israel. During the October War of 1973, Arab oil-exporting countries instituted an oil embargo that brought about swift changes in the Middle East policies of Western Europe as well as Japan. This policy was somewhat diluted following the Oslo Process when the Arab states decided to abandon tertiary boycotts.

Most often, the Arab boycott policies permeated the political arena, and under Arab pressure, Israel was prevented from joining various regional organizations and forums. Its exclusion from the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, the forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77, could be directly traced to the Arab threat of boycott. This solidarity between Arab states and other members of the Third World largely

explains the innumerable anti-Israel resolutions adopted by the United Nations and other international forums. Primarily due to the Arab factor, anti-Israel rhetoric often became a common platform for most of these gatherings. The November 1975 decision of the UN General Assembly to describe Zionism as a form of racism was primarily the result of the Arab calls for a boycott.

Frustrations over the prolongation of the Arab–Israeli conflict have led to calls for various forms of boycott against Israel. In parallel to the prolonged but recently less effective Arab economic boycott, Palestinian activists have launched the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign that calls for a renewed boycott of Israel by various international companies. This is complemented by calls for an academic boycott of Israel whereby a number of scholars, academics, and cultural figures from the West as well as countries such as India have joined the boycott calls. The efficacy of the academic boycott has been questioned by many, as it demands an indiscriminate boycott of all academic institutions and individuals, including those Israelis who have been championing and working for an honorable political settlement with the Palestinians. The indiscriminate nature of the academic boycott undermines those constituencies in Israel whose support is crucial for the peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The Islamic dimension forms the third concentric circle of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Like Jewish nationalism, the Palestinian struggle also manifests itself through religion. The Islamization of the Arab–Israeli problem can be traced to the early 1920s. Embattled by the growing number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and the perceived pro-Zionist policies of the Mandate authorities, the grand mufti of Jerusalem al-Husseini sought to expand his power base by enlisting the support of influential Islamic leaders and groups in the Middle East and elsewhere. In an attempt to transform the problem faced by the Palestinians into a wider Islamic agenda, the mufti undertook foreign trips and organized meetings with Islamic leaders from various countries. By organizing a fund-raising campaign to renovate the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third-holiest shrine in Islam, al-Husseini forged personal ties with leaders of Muslim communities in the Middle East and India. As a result, Islam became an important component in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Following the establishment of the Jewish state and the domination of Arab states in the conflict, this Islamic undercurrent was replaced by secular Palestinian nationalism represented by Fatah and the PLO. The Arab defeat in the June War and the subsequent erosion of secular Arab nationalism witnessed a sweeping Islamization of the Middle East. The formation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 marked a new beginning and signaled the ascendance of Islamist forces in regional politics.

For a while, the Palestinian leadership remained immune to this shift and continued to be dominated by the secular Fatah/PLO combine. The outbreak of the Intifada and the formation of Hamas brought the secular–Islamist rivalry in the Middle East to the Palestinian turf. Since then, there has been an internal rivalry between secular forces, represented by Fatah, and the religious radicalism championed by Hamas. Through its persistent and uncompromising stand against any political settlement with Israel, Hamas has successfully challenged the monopoly of secular nationalism in Palestinian politics. This ascendency was consolidated in January 2006 when Hamas decisively won the second elections to the Palestinian parliament. The defeat of Fatah was followed by Hamas militarily taking complete control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007.

It is therefore no longer possible to visualize any settlement to the Israeli–Palestinian aspect of the larger Arab–Israeli conflict without Hamas playing a key role. While it might be too early to foresee Islamic radicalism as the public face of the official Palestinian leadership, it is essential to recognize that the ideology represented by Hamas is here to stay. This trend would not only influence any settlement with Israel but will also shape the nature of the future Palestinian state.

The Islamic dimension of the Arab–Israeli conflict, however, is not confined to the secular–religious contestations among the Palestinians. Even when secular Arab nationalism was the preeminent force in the region, the Palestinian issue—especially the Jerusalem question—remained high on the Islamic agenda. The prolonged Arab opposition to the idea of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine also flows from the traditional Islamic view toward the Jews. As a People of the Book—or *dhimmi*—the Jews were given a certain degree of conditional protection under Islam. In spite of a number of social and religious limitations, Jewish lives and properties were protected. At the same time, even under the most benevolent caliph, the Jews were never equal to the Muslims. Islamists and a considerable number of Muslims the world over view historic Palestine as an Islamic *waqf*—property that cannot be ceded, partitioned, or handed over to any non-Islamic rule, even within the context of a peaceful settlement. From this perspective, Israel's existence implies the granting of sovereign rights over an area that has been continuously (except for the period of the Crusades) under Islamic rule since the seventh century. From an Islamic viewpoint, therefore, recognition of Israel and its right to exist as a sovereign entity has been problematic.

This line of argument became vociferous following the defeat of Nasser in the June War and the resurgence of religious conservatism. Moreover, as a consequence of the war, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third-holiest shrine in Islam, came under Jewish control, and this in turn galvanized the support of Islamic countries in favor of the Palestinians. The refusal of militant groups such as Hamas to recognize Israel within the June 1967 boundaries high-

lights the Islamic dimension of the problem. The non-recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by the international community is largely due to the Islamic aspect of the conflict. As a result, a number of non-Arab Islamic countries have remained wary of establishing political ties with Israel. Even Muslim states such as Iran and Turkey that share an anti-Arab sentiment are not prepared to adopt anti-Palestinian positions. Perceived opposition from powerful Islamic countries inhibited Chairman Arafat from reaching any agreement on the Jerusalem question during the Camp David Talks in July 2000. The Islamic dimension of the Arab–Israeli conflict also contributes to the reluctance and refusal of countries such as Indonesia and Pakistan, which are far removed from the Middle East, to establish normal ties with Israel.

Therefore, most Islamic countries do not have any formal ties with Israel and are often in the forefront of anti-Israel resolutions and measures. This became more palpable in powerful forums such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (the erstwhile Organization of the Islamic Conference). The Islamic dimension of the conflict takes strange twists. Until the late 1970s, for example, Saudi Arabia kept Israeli Muslims from performing the hajj, one of the five pillars of Islam.

This religious angle of the Arab–Israeli conflict also has a Jewish dimension, which mirrors the image of the Islamists. The Israeli military conquest during the June War, especially the capture of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, ushered in what is commonly understood as Messianic Zionism and the emergence and political consolidation of a right–religious combination. Religion-based claims to the Occupied Territories intensified following the inauguration of the Oslo Process, when Israel was expected to cede a substantial portion of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinians. Right-wing elements opposed to the peace process were strengthened when religious leaders joined the fray. They argued that since these territories were part of the land promised by God to Moses, they could not be handed over to non-Jewish control. Some extremist elements within religious circles even suggested that anyone who "abandons" the Occupied Territories could be killed for violating God's commandments. The concept of *din rodef*, offering religious sanction to kill a fellow Jewish person, was used by former yeshiva student Yigal Amir to justify his assassination of Prime Minister Rabin in November 1995. Even though support for such a line of thinking has been minuscule, it still remains a potent force among the religious extremists in Israel.

DOMESTIC DILEMMA

The Arab–Israeli conflict has a strong internal Israeli dimension that is reflected not only in debates over Israel's identity but also its ability to reach a political settlement with the wider Arab world, including the Palestinians. Prior to the establishment of the state, prolonged statelessness and suffering compelled an internal cohesion in the Yishuv. Differences over ideology, mode of struggle, and religious preferences were subsumed by the larger problems facing the Jewish community. Hence, there was a wider agreement and relative cooperation among Jews of different hues and shades. This was largely maintained during the early years of the state. Surrounded by hostilities, isolation, periodic violence, and routine condemnation from the outside world, the ability of any Israeli government to ensure the welfare and security of its people depended entirely on its enjoying the unquestionable support of its citizens.

In the first two decades of statehood, this was not a problem, and the Labor Zionist Mapai/Labor Party enjoyed widespread support within the country, which ensured its monopoly over the foreign and security policies of the state. Even internal dissent from personalities such as Moshe Sharett did not undermine Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's determination to initiate and pursue the Suez War. In times of national emergencies, such as the run-up to the June War, hardened critics of the Mapai such as Menachem Begin did not hesitate to join hands for a national unity government.

This internal harmony was shattered on Yom Kippur day in 1973. The strategic surprise inflicted by President Sadat during the October War dented this internal cohesion on a host of issues. For one, the military establishment ceased to be a holy cow. While Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Labor Party managed to retain their positions in the elections held within weeks after hostilities ended, the general Israeli consensus in favor of a military approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict came to an end. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, described by Prime Minister Begin as "a war of choice," was the second watershed. As the Israeli army was embattled with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, domestic support for the war began to erode. The massacre of Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia in the Sabra and Shatila camps in September 1982 led to widespread public protests in Israel. The coastal city of Tel Aviv witnessed the largest anti-war demonstrations in the entire Middle East and culminated in the formation of Peace Now, a mass movement that eventually blossomed into the largest anti-occupation extra-parliamentary group in Israel.

These trends exhibited a lack of national consensus toward the war and underlined deep internal divisions over Israel's conflicts with the Arabs. While Begin and Likud took most of the blame for the unpopular Lebanon

War, it practically ended internal unanimity toward military confrontation. The erosion of public support became more acute during the two Intifadas in the Occupied Territories. Violence and the spate of suicide terrorism did not inhibit many in Israel from questioning the direction of the official policy. Even if the opposition was not decisive and overwhelming, domestic support for war and other forms of military operations against the Arabs could no longer be taken for granted.

This dissent manifested in the formation of various non-governmental groups and organizations committed to an alternative approach toward understanding, and hence resolving, the Arab–Israeli conflict. The onset of the Intifada in December 1987 led to the formation of B'Tselem, a human rights organization devoted exclusively to following Israel's policies in the Occupied Territories. There are scores of movements leading domestic campaigns in Israel against the occupation. The mounting Israeli casualties in the self-declared "security zone" in southern Lebanon spurred the formation of another activist group, the Four Mothers Movement. Members of this voluntary movement played a significant role in generating public opinion against the continued Israeli presence in southern Lebanon that ended in the summer of 2000 when the IDF unilaterally pulled out of the region.

Second, the Arab–Israeli conflict also influences and shapes the internal debate over Israel's identity. The wider conflict has a bearing on Jewish–Arab relations within Israel's borders. Internal tension and contradictions between Israel's Jewish and democratic identities are about as old as the state itself. So long as Israel faced an existential threat but had no genuine peace partner, these remained dormant, perhaps even less relevant. But with the gradual Israeli recognition of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories as a nation that is entitled to political rights, Israel's two identities came into conflict. The overwhelming support among Israeli Arabs for the political rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories unnerved many mainstream parties. Those segments of the Israeli public that are opposed to any territorial compromise with the Palestinians tend to view the support of Israeli Arabs for the PLO with suspicion. The political motives of Arab citizens came under greater scrutiny, and their demands for equal rights were viewed as a euphemism for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.

There is also a dichotomy on the part of the Israeli Arabs. They have the potential to function as a bridge between Israel and its neighboring Arab states, but their prolonged support for the groups committed to the defeat and even destruction of Israel jeopardizes their position. This dichotomous position of the Israeli Arabs emanates from the conflict between nation and state that exists among Israeli Arabs; they are citizens of the Israeli state but part of the wider Arab–Palestinian nation. Therefore, the Arab–Israeli conflict also affects Israel's ability to adopt an inclusive modus vivendi vis-à-vis its

Arab population, and, most often, Israeli governments have tended to view this population through the security prism rather than by the yardstick of democratic inclusion.

Since the early 1990s, Israel's Arab population has made some progress on the political front. While it continued to be excluded from coalition formation, this period witnessed the emergence of new non-feudal Arab groups contesting the Knesset election. The willingness of a faction of the Islamic movement to contest the 1996 election marked a new beginning for the Arab populations of Israel.

An alternate National Service has been opened for Arab citizens to reduce the conscription-based discrimination. The exclusion of Israeli Arabs from compulsory military service has been justified on the grounds of Israel not wishing its Arab citizens to fight the state's Arab adversaries. Suspicion over the loyalty of the Arabs in such a conflict resulted in this exclusion policy. For their part, the Arab citizens have been unwilling to serve in the military to avoid fighting their nationals across the border lest they bestow legitimacy on the Zionist state. Thus, for a while, the avoidance of military service suited both sides.

At the same time, a number of social welfare measures in Israel, including education and employment opportunities, mortgages, and the like, have been linked to conscription. The exclusion from the IDF thus significantly affects the socioeconomic conditions of the Israeli Arabs. Though the *haredi* community—considered the most conservative or orthodox of the Jewish communities—is also exempted from conscription, its members enjoy all benefits available to discharged IDF soldiers. To overcome this in-built discrimination, in 2007 Israel opened the non-military National Service to the Arabs and *haredi* community. The number of Israeli Arabs enlisted in the National Service is small but increasing.

Israel being a Jewish state evokes strong criticism from its Arab citizens and their supporters outside. Transforming Israel into a state of its citizens has been their long-standing demand. Such a move, they argue, would transform Israel into a truly democratic state with equal opportunities for all citizens, Jews and Arabs. This demand, which contrasts with the special nature of the Jewish state, has to be located in historical circumstances, just as the need for a Jewish homeland. The peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict would be a precondition for greater Arab political participation in Israel.

Third, since the Mapai defeat in 1977, Israeli society has been moving toward the right. While the Rabin-Peres government (1992–1996) and the Oslo Process temporarily halted this process, the electoral fortunes of the Mapai and its allies have been declining since the late 1970s. This drop was accelerated by the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Since then, shrinking of the peace camp

and the ascendance of the right wing are visible in Knesset elections. The spate of suicide attacks inside the Green Line has challenged the notion of a negotiated peace with the Palestinians.

This political shift is also reflected in the diminishing influence of the New Historians who challenged the traditional narratives on some of the controversial issues surrounding the 1948 war. In the 1990s, their conclusion, borne out of their historical research, that Israel was at least partially responsible for the origin of the Palestinian refugee problem met with some acceptance in mainstream Israeli academia. Some of its findings and nuanced arguments became part of Israeli government positions during the peace negotiations with the Palestinians. There were even attempts to modify school texts to reflect Palestinian views on the origins of the Arab–Israeli conflict. This limited progress was reversed following the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The willingness of the Palestinians to use the findings of the New Historians to vilify Israel without a corresponding introspection eroded the credibility and relevance of the New History. Benny Morris, one of the pioneers of New History, went on to challenge the notion of Arafat being a peace partner.

CORE ISSUES

The problem has been made intractable by a host of issues and contentions that are intertwined in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Of the many issues, one could identify seven as central to the resolution of the conflict. They are recognition of Israel's right to exist, the problem of borders, Palestinian statehood, the issue of occupation, the construction of settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the refugee question.

Recognition is a normal aspiration for any individual, community, or state but assumes special importance for Israel. The establishment of the state in 1948 has been seen as an end as well as an answer to centuries of suffering and statelessness of the Jewish people. Securing recognition from the outside world, including from its immediate Arab neighbors, has been a major goal of Israeli foreign policy. At the same time, for the Arab states, the possibility of Israel's recognition has meant accepting its consequences for the Palestinians and their statelessness.

Compared to other countries that have unresolved territorial disputes with their neighbors, the Israeli case is unique. The issue is not where the boundary is to be demarcated, but rather Israel's very existence continues to be contested. For many years, the Arab world was vehemently opposed to Israel's existence. Weeks after the June War of 1967, the Arab League pledged not to recognize, negotiate with, or make peace with Israel. The war and its aftermath, especially the October War, brought about a greater sense of real-

ism, ushering in recognition of and resignation toward Israel's existence among the Arabs. Arab peace initiatives such as the Fahd Plan of 1981 clearly indicated the willingness of principal Arab states to come to terms with Israel as a part of the Middle East.

This realism slowly permeated into mainstream Palestinian leaders' thinking and enabled them to come to terms with Israel's existence in the land of their forefathers. The Algiers Declaration of November 1988, which proclaimed the State of Palestine, also signaled Palestinian acceptance of UN Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine. However, until 9 September 1993, when Israel and the PLO granted mutual recognition as a prelude to the signing of the Declaration of Principles, neither side was prepared to formally recognize and accept the other as a distinct nation.

This does not mean that the mutual recognition is complete, wholehearted, and universal. On both sides, there are considerable forces that have sought to deny or underplay the political and national rights of the other. Hamas and other militant groups have consistently challenged Israel's legitimacy as a state, while right-wing elements inside Israel have argued against the portrayal of Palestinians as a distinct national group. The acceptance of Israel is far from settled. There are countries, groups, and powerful individuals who continue to challenge its existence. During his tenure as president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad periodically questioned Israel's existence and hoped for its demise. Similar sentiments have been voiced by other Iranian officials.

A far more sophisticated approach to denying Israel's existence comes from certain sections of the intellectual class who advocate a one-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The unresolved nature of the problem, the failure of the Oslo Process, and the continued non-realization of Palestinian statehood aspirations have led many Palestinians and their supporters to advocate reverting to the one-state solution. It is essential to remember that for long the PLO also sought a similar solution. It was only during the Algiers summit of November 1988 that Yasser Arafat and his PLO formally buried the one-state option and embraced UN Resolution 181, which recommended the partition of Palestine.

The end of the Oslo Process following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the hard-line position adopted by Israeli leadership, especially during the tenures of Sharon and Netanyahu, rekindled Palestinian revisionism vis-à-vis Israel. Under the new one-state formula, there would be a single state between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River common to Jews and Arabs. There is considerable support for this among intellectuals in the West and other Third World countries. Unfortunately the supporters of the notionally democratic one-state option do not recognize the Middle Eastern realities and the non-inclusive nature of all the post-Ottoman states including Turkey. The one-state solution renews Israeli fears over Arab-Islamic opposition to its existence as a step toward its annihilation.

Borders form the second complex dimension of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Israel is perhaps the only country that lacks well-recognized borders, and debates on this issue introduce terms such as *international borders*, *natural borders*, *Green Line*, *armistice line*, *recognized borders*, *defendable borders*, *security fence*, *historic border*, and *biblical frontiers*. It has never been a simple issue of Israel's boundaries.

This peculiar situation is partly the result of the historic process through which the Jewish state has evolved. In spite of its foresight, from the beginning the Zionist leadership consistently avoided defining the territorial limits of the proposed Jewish national home or, later on, the State of Israel. The question of the size of the homeland/state remained deliberately vague and imprecise. While accepting the Partition Plan of the United Nations, the Zionist leadership avoided committing itself to the actual size proposed by the plan and had reservations over the allotment of the Negev to the Arabs. In tune with this position, references to the territorial limits of Israel were excluded from the Declaration of Independence.

By the time Israel had signed the armistice agreements in 1949, it had acquired more territories than envisaged under the UN plan. The expanded territory of Israel, including the partition of the city of Jerusalem, was formalized in the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement signed on 3 April 1949. Because the armistice agreements did not lead to formal peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the boundary issue remained unresolved. This frontier that separated Israel and the Arab states on the eve of the June War of 1967 gradually emerged as the de facto border and was commonly known as the Green Line.

The signing of peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (2000) partly mitigated the situation and formalized its borders with these countries. However, the absence of a formal peace agreement has precluded the settlement of the border issue with the two other actors, Syria and the Palestinians. The resolution of the border issue vis-à-vis the Palestinians would imply that Zionism has finally defined its territorial limits. In the early part of the 20th century, Zionism visualized a Jewish national home on both sides of the Jordan River. As a result, the Revisionist Zionists were appalled when Great Britain decided to partition Palestine in 1921 and create the emirate of Transjordan. Indeed, until 1990 the party anthem of Likud contained references to the East Bank of the Jordan River. The capture of the West Bank in 1967, especially the Western Wall, ushered in a messianic spirit in sections of society, which spoke of the redemption and return of the biblical land of Judea and Samaria—including Hebron, where the Cave of the Patriarch/Ibrahimi Mosque is located—to Jewish control.

Since then, Eretz Yisrael (Greater Israel) has become a potent concept among religious-Zionist circles. The annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and the uninterrupted construction of Jewish settlements in the occupied Arab territories defined Zionism as an ideology that seeks, and is committed to, territorial expansion. For over a century, not only has Zionism refused to identify the territorial dimensions of its aspirations, but it has also enabled Israel to expand the scope and extent of the territories under its actual control. Resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict thus presupposes Israel accepting its territorial limits and limitations.

The demand for *Palestinian statehood*—the third component—has mutated over time, and the international community began seeing them as a distinct people deserving political rights, self-determination, and a sovereign state. The granting of UN observer status to the PLO in 1974 and the upgrading of Palestinian representation to non-member status in 2012 were significant milestones in the Palestinian search for an independent political identity among the comity of nations. Since the beginning of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference of October 1991, there has been a widespread international consensus in favor of a two-state solution, whereby Israel and Palestine would co-exist side by side in peace.

This international endorsement has been taking place under a peculiar Palestinian reality. Ever since Hamas militarily took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the PNA has fractured between the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and the Fatah-dominated West Bank. In some ways, it has taken the Palestinian situation back to the pre-1967 era when the Palestinians' population and territory remained under Egyptian and Jordanian control, the only difference being that Israel continues to occupy considerable territory of the West Bank and controls exits to the outside world. The division between the two halves was developing during the last years of Arafat when he moved his headquarters from Gaza City to Ramallah. Furthermore, since succeeding Arafat as president of the PNA in November 2004, Abbas traveled to different parts of the world but could not visit the Gaza Strip, the other half of the PNA.

The internal Fatah–Hamas schism became apparent during the three-week-long Cast Lead Operation launched by the IDF in December 2008. The war resulted in massive casualties in the Gaza Strip, and Israel was accused of using white phosphorous, which is banned, during the conflict. The UN-appointed Goldstone Commission accused Israel as well as Hamas of committing war crimes by deliberately targeting civilian populations. There were widespread protests in different parts of the Middle East and elsewhere against Israel and its brutal use of force. Yet the West Bank remained relatively calm and indifferent toward Israel's war with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The same was true during the shorter Pillar of Defense Operation in November 2012. Such apathy of West Bank residents toward the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip has underscored deep divisions within the Palestinian population and

could be a major impediment to any peaceful resolution of the conflict. Even Abbas's 2012 decision to upgrade the Palestinian representation in the UN did not elicit support from the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

Since the mid-1990s, especially following the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, peace talks have often denoted unity efforts between Hamas and Fatah more than peace negotiations between Israel and the PNA. While the latter has largely been spearheaded by the United States, a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, have unsuccessfully tried to bring about Palestinian unity. The internal division has considerably weakened the Palestinian cause and the ability of the PNA to garner greater international support. The prolongation of the internal tension and division has opened the possibility of a three-state solution—namely, Israel co-existing with a Fatah-ruled West Bank and a Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

Occupied Territories constitute the fourth dimension of the conflict. This phrase has been used to denote those lands that Israel captured during the June War of 1967, namely, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. If one defines "Occupied Territories" as those non-sovereign territories captured during armed conflict, then the Jordanian claims to the West Bank also become Occupied Territories. King Abdullah I captured these areas during the Arab–Israeli War of 1948 and subsequently annexed them, contrary to the prevailing sentiment in other Arab states. On the other hand, Egypt, which took control of the Gaza Strip, retained it as a custodian rather than its owner. Therefore, the West Bank was an occupied territory from 1948 to 1967 when it was part of Jordan. Following the June War, the areas remained occupied territories, but now under a new occupying power, Israel.

Israel's policy toward the Occupied Territories reveals another dilemma it faces. At one level, Israel, especially its right wing, stakes full claim to the territories, which it even refers to as "liberated" or "administered" territories. Commonly known by the biblical names Judea and Samaria, the West Bank is considered by some to be an integral part of the Eretz Yisrael. The settlement policy in the Occupied Territories has reflected that claim. If it is considered part of the state, the logic goes, Israel has full rights to pursue activities that promote the settling of its citizens in these areas.

Even those not swayed by religious sentiments have advocated some form of Israeli control over portions of the West Bank. There is a general view in the country that, for strategic reasons, Israel cannot afford to withdraw to the positions it held prior to the outbreak of the June War. Within weeks of that war, but before the Khartoum Arab Summit resolution of "three no's," Israeli minister Yigal Allon argued that Israel would have to retain portions of the Jordan Valley in any peace deal over the West Bank. Domestic opposition to

the idea of the Green Line becoming the final boundary between Israel and a future Palestinian state remains one of the few issues that enjoy widespread support in Israel.

Despite such assertions and aspirations, Israel has been unable to finalize its claims over the Occupied Territories. With the notable exception of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, it has refrained from annexing any other portions of territory. Even these two measures were linked to the Camp David Accords and the domestic opposition that Prime Minister Begin faced in agreeing to completely withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. The reason for this has to be found in the demographic dynamics of the annexation option.

Formal annexation of the Occupied Territories would have required Israel to follow the example set by Jordan earlier when it annexed the West Bank—namely, granting full citizenship to all Palestinian residents. Such a move would have immediately transformed Israel into a binational, rather than a Jewish, state. The alternative was to opt for the apartheid model—namely, annexation of territories without granting citizenship rights to the Palestinian residents. Alternatively, it would have had to engineer their expulsion from the Occupied Territories. Both apartheid and expulsion are not only unfeasible but would have plunged Israel into an irreversible cycle of violence, international uproar, and complete isolation. Above all, such a course would have deprived Israel of its democratic and moral credentials. It was largely due to this demographic nightmare that Israel not only refrained from annexing the Palestinian territories but also unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip in September 2005. This non-annexation did not prevent Israel from establishing Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories or exploiting their natural resources such as water.

Settlements are the fifth dimension of the conflict, which are closely related to Israel's policy toward the Occupied Territories. Since 1967, both the left-wing and right-wing governments in Israel have been aggressively pursuing settlement construction in the Occupied Territories. Though Israel had also constructed settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and on the Golan Heights, its primary focus has been on the Palestinian areas. Under the Labor Party, Israel built settlements in areas that were considered vital for security, such as the Jordan Valley. Likud, on the contrary, perceived Jewish settlements as an instrument for preventing the territorial continuity of the West Bank and thereby precluding the formation of a Palestinian state. As a result, while in power, Likud encouraged settlement activities in areas closer to Palestinian population centers. Even though the Labor Party was opposed to such a strategy, it was unable to escape from the consequences of this policy.

The fallout of the settlement policy became apparent following the Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian towns in 1995. The presence of Jewish settlements scattered all over the region meant that Palestinians could not move from one nominally free town to another without passing through barriers

and checkpoints at both ends. This was true for the Gaza Strip, where the presence of settlement blocs meant Israeli control over vast areas of Palestinian lands until the unilateral withdrawal in September 2005. Indeed, since 2009 the government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu has systematically increased the number of settlements and infrastructure developments in the Occupied Territories, thereby increasingly isolating the Palestinian towns and villages.

Jerusalem is the sixth component of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Israel is the only country in the world that does not have a recognized capital. This is partly because of the peculiar nature of the Partition Plan, which declared Jerusalem to be a *corpus separatum*. Given the importance of the city to all three Semitic religions, the United Nations preferred to declare Jerusalem to be an international city. At the same time, none could ignore the centrality of Jerusalem (or Zion) to the Jewish people and their struggle for a homeland.

Therefore, as they prepared to declare their statehood, the Zionist leaders were conscious of the international position regarding Jerusalem. While Zionism could not be expected to flourish without Zion, any explicit reference to Jerusalem would have resulted in international opposition to the newly born state. Given the prevailing Arab opposition to the Partition Plan, Zionism could ill afford to make new enemies in the West where, despite the avowed secularism of Western states, the influence of Christianity was considerable because it remained the faith of most Western citizens. Therefore, the Declaration of Independence issued in Tel Aviv eloquently highlighted the historic rights of the Jews to the land of their forefathers but was conspicuously silent on the question of the capital city of the newly declared state.

In the ensuing 1948 war, the city was divided, with Israel taking control over the western part while Jordan captured East Jerusalem, including the sites most holy to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Disregarding the prevailing international views, the division of Jerusalem was formalized in the Israel–Jordan Armistice Agreement signed on 3 April 1949. In December of that year, just a few months after its admission to the United Nations, Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital. During the June War of 1967, Israel captured the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, which it subsequently annexed.

Since the founding of the state, the international community has never recognized even West Jerusalem, let alone the post-1967 unified city, as Israel's capital. The United Nations and various other international forums and organizations have adopted innumerable resolutions condemning Israel's policy on Jerusalem. In the early 1980s, even those Latin American countries that had their embassies in Jerusalem moved them to Tel Aviv following Arab pressures. The international community considers the coastal city of Tel Aviv to be Israel's capital. There is, however, an anomaly. All the institutions and symbols of statehood such as the seat of the presidency, the Su-

preme Court, the Knesset, and most ministries and government offices are located in Jerusalem; for logistical reasons, the Ministry of Defense still remains in Tel Aviv. All official meetings and transactions take place in Jerusalem. Even though foreign embassies are located in Tel Aviv, all ambassadors, including Arab ambassadors accredited to Israel, present their credentials in Jerusalem. International recognition and ground reality are not in sync.

The Jerusalem issue has another dimension. If the international community led by the United Nations does not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, it also does not recognize the city to be the capital of a future Palestinian state. Since both parties stake exclusive claims to Jerusalem, especially the old city, an imaginative compromise acceptable to both becomes a precondition. By including Jerusalem in the DoP as an issue to be decided during the final status negotiations, Israel conceded that its claim to Jerusalem as the united, undivided, and eternal capital was not final but negotiable.

Because Jerusalem has been on the Islamic agenda, any compromise worked out between Israeli and Palestinian leaders would have to be acceptable to the larger *ummah*. Jerusalem is the issue where the wider non-Palestinian Islamic world wields a veto. This issue, in turn, makes the Jerusalem question the most intractable aspect of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The international dimension of Jerusalem partly contributed to the failure of the Camp David Talks in 2000.

Last, the question of refugees is the most complex and emotional issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Even six decades following the origin of the problem amid the 1948 war, its consequences and the number of refugees are hotly contested. The rejection of the UN Partition Plan by Palestinian and Arab leaderships, Israel's unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the absence any senior Arab leaders in Mandate Palestine on the eve of the British departure complicated the situation. While a small portion of Arabs who lived in the territory of Israel became Israeli Arabs, a vast majority of them fled to neighboring Arab countries or were living in areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that came under the control of Jordan and Egypt, respectively. The number of Palestinians who became refugees was estimated at between 700,000 and 750,000. In 1950 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, devoted exclusively to the refugees of the 1948 war, began operating, and in 2014 it put the number of Palestinian refugees at approximately five million.

Israel long argued that the Arabs fled their homes "voluntarily" or were asked to leave by leaders who were confident of an Arab victory over the Jewish forces during the 1948 war. However, based on official Israeli archival materials in the early 1980s a group of Israeli scholars, commonly known

as New Historians, have challenged this narrative and held Israel partly responsible for the refugee problem. In their view, the Arabs were forced to flee their homes and in some cases were expelled by the Jewish forces.

The refugees' right to return, recognized by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 in December 1948, remains the most contentious issue of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While Palestinians demand the full implementation of this right, Israel fears that a complete and unrestricted return of the refugees would make Israel into a "binational" state and destroy its Jewish character. Israel also raises the issue of Jews who were forced to leave Arab countries in the wake of the 1948 war. The Oslo process has added a new twist, and the emerging Palestinian state is seen as the home to which Palestinian refugees could return—as opposed to the actual houses they fled in 1948. A number of peace initiatives, including the Arab Peace Plan, collapsed due to disagreements over the refugee question.

MEDIATORS AND BYSTANDERS

External players occupy a significant place in the origin, development, intensification, and hence a possible resolution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The outcome of the external involvement has been mixed. The realization of the Jewish nationalist aspiration would not have been possible without active British support during the early stages of Zionism. Recognizing the difficulties facing the homeland project, Theodore Herzl visualized great power support as a precondition for its success. The Balfour Declaration played the most important role toward the realization of a Jewish national home. From 1917 until the issuance of the 1939 white paper, Great Britain was committed to the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This support was critical for Zionism and its ability to increase the number of Jews in Palestine through Aliya. When Britain reversed that policy in 1939, the Yishuv in relative terms was politically developed and militarily self-sufficient to take the process forward and accomplish statehood in 1948. While it is incorrect to suggest that Britain created Israel, the Balfour Declaration formally recognized the historical link between the Jewish people and Palestine.

By adopting Resolution 181, the United Nations provided the legal framework for the creation of the Jewish state. When the second special session was deliberating to suspend the Partition Plan due to Arab–Jewish violence in Palestine, the Zionist leaders used the UN resolution to unilaterally declare independence. Thus, while the UN did not create Israel, it provided the legal framework for its establishment. The Arab rejection of the UN plan, coupled with inter-Arab rivalries, resulted in the prolonged statelessness of the Palestinians.

The role and influence of the United States have been unique in the Arab–Israeli conflict. President Harry S. Truman's tacit support enabled the Zionist leadership to proclaim the Jewish state hours before the departure of the British from Palestine. Ever since it formally extended recognition within minutes of Israel's proclamation of independence, the United States has emerged as a staunch supporter of Israel. Over the years, Israel has enjoyed American political backing, diplomatic support, economic largess, technological transfers, security assistance, and military aid. Despite occasional tensions and differences, Israel has largely enjoyed a favorable bipartisan consensus in the United States. The domination of the United States during the Cold War and its emergence as the preeminent global power since 1991 worked in Israel's favor.

The Soviet political and military support for the Arab countries further consolidated this relationship as both Israel and the United States did not wish any role for Moscow in resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict. Thus, since the early 1950s, Washington emerged as the major, and at times only, external and effective interlocutor in resolving the conflict. While American involvement has not always resolved problems or reduced their intensity, its active role has become a precondition for any meaningful progress in resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict. The United States was instrumental in some accomplishments such as the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, the Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty, and bilateral talks between Israel and Syria during the 1990s. Even though its role in the early phase of the Oslo Process was limited, Washington gradually emerged as the most dominant player in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations since the signing of the Declaration of Principles.

The U.S. monopoly in the Middle East emerged when other great powers or the UN proved ineffective in resolving the conflict. Lacking similar influence and trust in Israel, both the USSR and Europe remained marginal players in the peace process. This holds true also for the United Nations. Under the influence of Arab states and the newly independent erstwhile colonies, the world body had become un-accommodative of Israel's concerns and interests and transformed itself into an anti-Israel forum. The loss of trust resulted not only in Israel's international isolation but also its indifference toward the UN. If one excludes Resolution 242, which provides the framework for any peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the United Nations has largely been irrelevant in resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict. On various sensitive issues of the conflict, political compulsions force the UN to pre-judge the final outcome, and this in turn eliminates any role for the UN. In the Quartet, the UN has to compete with the other three players—the European Union, Russia, and the United States—for influence.

The Arab countries also had a share in the conflict. Their involvement in Mandate Palestine was spurred by their opposition to the formation of a Jewish homeland in a land that had been inhabited for centuries by Arab populations of the Islamic faith. They, especially the six independent countries—Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen—who were members of the UN, used political and diplomatic means to prevent the adoption of the Partition Plan. When this failed, they sought to militarily prevent the formation and survival of Israel. The emergence of Israel as a de facto entity recognized by the major powers of the world resulted in the Arab countries enforcing political, economic, and cultural boycotts. Initially, through isolation and exclusion they hoped to bring about an end to the Jewish state. When this proved futile, they gradually sought to bring about a change in Israel's policy toward its conflict with the Arab world. The international recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians was possible largely because of the support provided by the Arab countries and populations since 1948.

Arab involvement did not always bring about positive outcomes for the Palestinians. Despite widespread support, the Palestinian issue has also exposed deep divisions among the Arabs, ego clashes of their leaders, and their shortsightedness. The Arab refusal to accept the UN plan and internal schisms among some Arab leaders were the prime reasons for the non-emergence of a Palestinian state since 1948. Their halfhearted attempt in the form of the All Palestine Government in September 1948 failed because of internal divisions. Various Arab countries and leaders have periodically used the Palestinian question to belittle their rivals, score brownie points, or prop up loyal groups. This pattern intensified after the formation of the PLO, the umbrella Palestinian organization. Arab countries played a significant role in the proliferation of Palestinian groups and the growth of Islamist elements.

Support for the Palestinian cause has not always brought benefits to Arab countries. The Palestinian Fedayeen almost brought down the Hashemite monarchy in September 1970. The state-within-a-state arrangement worked out by Nasser to relocate the PLO fighters from Jordan to Lebanon eventually resulted in a 15-year-long civil war. In August 1990, the PLO and Arafat wholeheartedly endorsed President Saddam Hussein because of his promise to withdraw from Kuwait in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. Many Kuwaitis and their supporters viewed this as a Palestinian endorsement of the Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait. President Mohammed Morsi's preference for Hamas over the Fatah-led PNA became an issue in Egypt following his overthrow by the military in 2013.

The Islamization of the Arab–Israeli conflict has brought a number of Muslim countries and countries with significant Muslim populations into the ambit of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Partly because of this, a number of non-

Arab and non-Islamic countries have been wary of seeking political and diplomatic ties with Israel. Until the end of the Cold War, for instance, countries like China and India were not prepared to even seek normal diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.

Jewish and Arab Diaspora populations have also emerged as key players. At one level, their support has enabled the international articulation of their respective rights and claims and in the process has contributed to their self-confidence. The emergence of Israel as a strong and viable state and the international recognition of Palestinian rights would not have happened without the support of the Diaspora populations. At the same time, external support has also hardened their respective stand and prevented political accommodation and compromise. The political support provided by the Diaspora community has contributed to an uncompromising Israeli position on some of the core issues of the Arab–Israeli conflict such as settlements. Similarly, the Diaspora factor diluted the Abdullah Peace Plan, which offered conditional Arab recognition of Israel and thereby made it ineffective.

Above all, the Cold War that dominated international relations for more than four decades has adversely affected the Arab–Israeli conflict. Since the days of the UN deliberations over the Partition Plan, the United States has been the principal supporter of the Jewish state, and in the mid-1960s this transformed itself into a strategic partnership. The political and economic support provided by Washington not only largely contributed to Israel's strength but also provided a sense of confidence. U.S.–Israeli relations were largely instrumental in Israel's emergence as a regional power in the Middle East. At the same time its political proximity to the United States prevented Israel from pursuing peace with its Arab neighbors more vigorously.

The situation was no different in the Arab world. Due to political and ideological considerations, the erstwhile Soviet Union found common cause with the Arab nationalists. This in turn enabled Arab countries neighboring Israel, especially Egypt and Syria, to reduce the security imbalance of power that favored Israel. Correspondingly, however, the support from Moscow strengthened their determination to not recognize Israel and instead to pursue a military option opposing the Jewish state. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, both parties were compelled to reexamine their erstwhile positions and look for a negotiated solution to the problem. It is in this context that one should view the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference that began on 30 October 1991.

NEW CHALLENGES

Two developments in recent years are likely to have far-reaching implications on the Arab–Israeli conflict, including the prospects of its resolution. These developments are the Arab Spring and the weakening international influence of the United States.

The Arab Spring can be traced to the self-immolation of marginalized vegetable vender Mohamed Bouazizi, which led to popular protests in Tunisia against President Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali, forcing his hasty departure in January 2011 to seek asylum in Saudi Arabia. The successful popular revolt against authoritarian rule in Tunisia soon spread to other Arab countries and came to be termed the Arab Spring. From late January 2011, Tahrir Square in Cairo emerged as the rallying point for Egyptians protesting against the three-decade-long rule of President Hosni Mubarak. His rule ended on 11 February 2011 when he was forced to resign. Even though rulers in other countries opted to stay on, popular protests plunged Libya, Syria, and Yemen into internal civil war. The Libyan situation evoked a UN-imposed no-fly zone that was used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to pursue a regime change policy. On 20 October 2011, Muammar Qaddafi, who had ruled Libya since September 1969, was lynched to death by the rebels. Yemeni ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh settled for a Gulf Cooperation Council–mediated exit plan that ensured him immunity.

The Syrian situation turned out to be different. Backed by Russia both inside and outside the UN Security Council, President Bashar al-Assad opted for a military solution and plunged his country into a civil war. By mid-2014, the conflict in Syria had already claimed over 200,000 lives and created a refugee population of over six million that has affected neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey.

The Arab monarchies also faced popular discontent, though they proved to be better prepared and adaptive than the republican regimes. Oil-rich Arab countries sought to mediate the situation through economic packages, subsidies, and welfare measures. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates also led the initiative to offer financial packages to poorer Arab monarchies such as Jordan and Morocco as well as Bahrain and Oman. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia initiated a military intervention to shore up support for the beleaguered al-Khalifa rule.

By mid-2014, more than three years after the beginning of the Arab Spring, most Arab countries appear confronted with political instability. The Islamists have emerged as the principal beneficiaries of the Arab Spring; they have been successful wherever free and fair elections were held since 2011. The electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of Mohammed Morsi as president did not bring about stability in Egypt. The deci-

sion of the military to overthrow Morsi in July 2013 plunged that country into violence and bloodshed. Despite numerous constitutional reforms and political concessions, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been trying to convince the Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, to be a part of the political process. There are question marks over the political survival of most Arab regimes, monarchical or republican.

These developments have affected the Arab–Israeli conflict in numerous ways. First, since January 2011, the region has witnessed some of the largest protests in history, which have been popular, widespread, and continuous, or in some cases unending. Unlike the past, the focus of these protests has been domestic and directed against their respective rulers. There were some criticisms toward the outside world, especially the prolonged support given to these rulers by the West. In the Syrian case, criticisms have been leveled against Russia, and in Bahrain they were directed at Iran. The protestors were primarily domestic in nature. If one excludes the siege of the Israeli embassy in Cairo on 9 September 2011, Israel has largely remained invisible. Though these protests may appear to have given Israel an opportunity to destabilize adversary Arab regimes, Israel has remained steadfastly uninterested in such measures. From Morocco in the west to Jordan in the east, the Palestinian issue has not been the focus of protesting Arab masses.

Second, preoccupied as they are with their political survival, for most Arab regimes the Palestinian issue has become a secondary if not a distant priority. This indifference was partly responsible for Abbas's decision in July 2013 to renew peace talks with Israel without a settlement freeze. The situation of the Palestinians turned for the worse in Syria following the outbreak of popular protests against the Assad regime in March 2011. The Palestinian refugees in Syria were sucked into the conflict resulting in a number of Palestinian leaders and groups leaving Damascus for Egypt, Jordan, or Qatar. The unrest forced the external Hamas leadership to leave Damascus and seek reconciliation with Jordan. The entry of Hezbollah on behalf of the Syrian regime resulted in Hamas making a public appeal against diverting Arab attention from the primary conflict with Israel.

Third, the electoral successes of the Islamists have raised expectations that the post-authoritarian Arab world would be more accommodative and sympathetic toward the Palestinians. In Egypt, Mubarak's downfall raised the hopes of a reversal of a policy that was relatively accommodative of Israel's interests. The Israeli siege of Gaza, for example, would not have been possible without the active support provided by Mubarak's Egypt which controls the Rafah border with Sinai. The expected Hamas–Egypt bonhomie did not last. Mubarak's downfall witnessed a spate of violence in the Sinai Peninsula and a series of attacks on gas pipelines to Israel and Jordan. In response, Morsi ordered the destruction of a number of tunnels along the Gaza–Sinai border that were used for smuggling food and medicine as well as arms. The

deposition of Morsi was followed by the army accusing the Islamist leader of collaborating with Hamas and in the process undermining Egyptian national interests. The same holds true for the much-awaited normalization of relations between Egypt and Iran, which were marred following the Islamic Revolution and Sadat's decision to provide refuge to the exiled shah.

Thus, the Palestinian issue appears to have become marginalized amid a protesting Arab public and beleaguered Arab regimes, both monarchical and republican. Even the Syrian regime, which prides itself as the steadfast supporter of the Palestinians, is fighting for its survival. The Arab Spring has weakened many Arab leaders, and the region lacks a leader who could project the Palestinian cause prominently.

Even if Israel did not actively intervene, it was not completely indifferent toward the Arab Spring. The ascendance of Islamists, especially in Egypt, aroused Israeli concerns. Amid the Tahrir Square protests, some Israeli leaders rallied behind President Mubarak and expressed concerns over Egypt's ability and willingness to continue the peace treaty if Mubarak were to fall. Erstwhile anti-Israeli rhetoric by various Muslim Brotherhood leaders strengthened their apprehension. Some of the Israeli criticisms were directed at President Barack Obama for his "hasty" abandonment of a long and trusted ally.

Subsequent events largely dispelled Israeli fears. The post-Mubarak leadership, including Morsi, reiterated its commitment to the Camp David Accords. The safe return of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit after more than five years of captivity through a prisoner swap arrangement on 18 October 2011 and the cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas after the eight-day Pillar of Defense Operation were possible because of the mediatory role played by the Egyptian leadership. The latter also offered a brief opportunity to President Morsi to exhibit his diplomatic skills in persuading Hamas to agree to a cessation of firing rockets against Israel.

For long, the non-resolution of the Palestinian problem and the continuation of Palestinian statelessness were described as the root causes of unrest and instability in the Middle East. The Arab Spring has challenged, weakened, and in some cases even demolished this conventional narrative. An alternative discourse has emerged in recent years. The Arab regimes have used the Palestinian issue to perpetuate domestic oppression and denial of basic human rights, good governance, and accountability. The prolonged statelessness of the Palestinians was partly due to the shortsighted policies pursued by various Arab leaders since 1947. Yet Israel and its policies provided a useful alibi for many Arab leaders to camouflage pressing issues of state in the post-Ottoman Middle East.

The second challenge, the decline of U.S. hegemony, could have more serious consequences for Israel as well as its conflicts with its neighbors. Since the end of World War II and the corresponding weakening of Britain

and France, the United States has emerged as the most important and influential actor in the Middle East. During the UN debates concerning the future of Palestine in late 1947, the United States actively promoted the Jewish homeland project. Its immediate recognition was critical for Israel's unilateral declaration of independence and subsequent survival as a viable political entity.

The part played by the United States in securing the complete withdrawal of Israeli as well as British and French forces from the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip in 1956–1957 has enshrined its dominant role in the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The shortsighted and ineffective Middle East policy pursued by the USSR, especially its decision to break off diplomatic relations with Israel following the June War, only consolidated the American monopoly in peacemaking in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union ensured American preeminence especially in the Middle East peace process.

During the Cold War the United States remained not only the most important external player in the Middle East but also the only country that wielded considerable political, military, economic, and hence diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis Israel. Even those Arab countries and leaders who were critical of American "partisanship" recognized the lack of alternatives. Like President Sadat, they sought to befriend the United States in the hope of securing a more "balanced" if not a pro-Arab Middle East policy from the United States.

The much-heralded unipolar world at the end of the Cold War did not endure. The economic ascendance of China was soon followed by a resurging Russia. Though neither of them developed the capacity to challenge U.S. domination, the latter faced a series of problems that undermined its predominance. Three things stand out prominently: the September 11 terror attacks, politically costly and militarily ill-defined wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the domestic housing and financial crises and the subsequent slide of the American economy. Taken together, these have considerably weakened America's economic power and correspondingly its political influence. While no other power has reached a stage to topple the United States, the decline of the latter is widely recognized.

Nowhere else is the decline of America's political and diplomatic influence more visible than in the Middle East. The region has emerged as the epitome of American diplomatic follies. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein not only plunged Iraq into a civil war but has also transformed that country into the first Shia-Arab-dominated country and a close ally of Iran. For over three decades, the United States has been struggling to adopt an effective policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, and this difficulty has only become more complex following suspicions over Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. The democracy experiment in Afghanistan is unlikely to survive the

American withdrawal slated for December 2014. These things have unnerved the Arab allies of the United States, making them doubt the wisdom and direction of American Middle East policy. This weakness has severely undermined the United States' ability to influence Israeli peace policy, especially toward the Palestinians. Israeli leaders have been skeptical about depending on the weakening United States and relying on the pledges of its leaders.

The election of Barack Obama as president in November 2008 marked a new beginning in the Israel–U.S. relationship. A few weeks after his election, Israel launched the Cast Lead Operation as a response to Qassam rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. This campaign against Hamas included a brief ground offensive and a massive and sustained use of air power. Lasting for 23 days, this operation resulted in the deaths of over 1,300 Palestinians, including a large number of civilians. Israel was accused of disproportionate use of force and of deliberately targeting the civilian population, and Israel accepted the cease-fire only hours before the inauguration of President Obama. Thus, relations with the new administration began on a sour note.

Things have only deteriorated since then. Though espousing a friendly policy toward Israel, Obama did not exhibit the warmth toward Israel apparent during the tenures of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Unlike his predecessors, Obama was vocal in expressing his opposition to Israel's settlement expansion and a territorial resolution based on the 4 June Line. The disagreements became more apparent over the issue of Iran's nuclear ambition and possible responses to curtailing it. While Israeli leaders, especially Benjamin Netanyahu, preferred a military operation to prevent the nuclear weaponization of Iran, Obama sought the same objective through diplomacy and economic sanctions.

But Obama's ability to push forward the peace process was seriously hampered by the Arab Spring and the lack of clarity exhibited by the U.S. administration in evolving its responses to the upsurge. The beleaguered Arab rulers felt let down by their most important ally, while the protesting masses complained of belated American support for their democratic aspirations. The confused handling became sharply apparent in Syria where the United States failed to develop a policy that enjoyed wide regional consensus. The continuation of the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain was more due to the resolute stand taken by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia than to American support or the presence of the Seventh Fleet headquartered in Manama. On the issue of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, the EU has of late been more active than the United States. In July 2013, the EU decided to ban settlement produce from enjoying the favorable status Israel enjoys under its tariff agreement with the EU. However, a similar move by the United States is unthinkable.

Israel's ability to withdraw from the Occupied Territories depends on its enjoying the support of a strong and dominant United States because withdrawal from the Occupied Territories entails security challenges. Under Obama, the United States is neither strong nor dependable. While the latter might change under a new administration after the 2016 elections, the return of the United States to its preeminent position would take longer, if it is possible at all.

IS THERE A SOLUTION ON THE HORIZON?

Over the decades, numerous attempts at Arab–Israeli reconciliation have collapsed because neither side was prepared to recognize the claims and demands of the other. The Arab leaders were looking for a non-Israeli partner to resolve their problem with Israel, while the Jewish state was looking for non-Palestinian leaders to solve the Palestinian problem. Ideally, the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO that led to the historic Rabin–Arafat–Clinton handshake on the White House Lawns in September 1993 should have resulted in an irreversible process of reconciliation. Despite their earlier grievances, reservations, and sense of injustice, both sides were prepared to leave the past behind and seek reconciliation. The mainstream Palestinian leadership was prepared to recognize the success of the Zionist enterprise in the Palestine Mandate, while the Israeli government was prepared to recognize the political rights of the Palestinians who were living under its occupation. In spite of delays, hiccups, and near-crisis situations, both were determined to pursue a peaceful settlement to the problem. Increasing domestic unpopularity did not prevent Rabin or Arafat from pushing steadily toward their goals.

Unfortunately, the assassination of Rabin in 1995 and the spate of suicide attacks in early 1996 brought the whole process to a grinding halt. Even though the Camp David Summit negotiations in the summer of 2000 were aimed at resolving some of the core issues, the trust evident during the earlier period was missing. Despite their best efforts, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Chairman Arafat could not resolve sensitive issues such as borders, refugees, and the Jerusalem question. And the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada more or less formalized the demise of the Oslo Process.

The spirit of compromise and reconciliation embedded in the Oslo Process still remains the essence of any resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Devoid of all other issues, it is primarily a conflict between two intense and rival nationalist movements over the same piece of territory. Compromise

and accommodation are the only way of resolving this enduring conflict. External players may facilitate a solution but cannot impose any settlement on the parties.

If domestic upheavals have diluted Arab support for the Palestinians, the weakening influence of the United States has adversely affected Israel. The Oslo Accords were possible partly because of the wisdom exhibited by both leaders. Despite internal opposition to a negotiated settlement, Rabin and Arafat represented mainstream forces and enjoyed the necessary support for a peace deal. One could also say the same for Sharon's initiatives during his tenure as prime minister. Their removal from the political scene at crucial moments undermined the pace of the peace process. Since the mid-1990s, leaders on both sides have been too weak to make a strategic agreement with the other.

Although it became weak after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the parameters and approach of the Oslo Process are still relevant. Any meaningful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict would have to be along the lines of the parameters that President Bill Clinton outlined days before he left office in January 2001. A near complete Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 lines accompanied by a territorial swap leading up to the formation of an independent Palestinian state co-existing with Israel is the only realistic solution. In order to realize this, Israel and its Arab neighbors would have to give up their grandiose designs and settle for a solution that is feasible and honorable to all parties to the dispute.

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ABBAS, MAHMOUD (1935–). Also known as Abu Mazen, Mahmoud Abbas is a veteran Palestinian leader and president of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) since 2004. Born in Safed in the **Mandate Palestine** on 26 March 1935, Abbas and his family fled from their hometown for **Syria** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. After pursuing initial studies in Syria and **Jordan**, he obtained a Ph.D. in history from the Oriental College in Moscow. In 1961, he joined **Fatah**, founded by **Yasser Arafat** and Farouq Qaddoumi (1934–), which later joined the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) in May 1968. In 1980, Abbas was elected to the PLO Executive Committee, and in following years he handled the PLO's negotiations with King **Hussein** of Jordan.

In early 1993, Abbas coordinated the secret Israeli–Palestinian negotiations in Norway that culminated in the **Oslo Accords**. On 13 September 1993, he signed the **Declaration of Principles** on behalf of the PLO with Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres**, who signed on behalf of Israel. After the establishment of the PNA, Abbas returned to the **Gaza Strip** in July 1995 and played an important role in the conclusion of the **Taba Agreement** that outlined the phased Israeli **redeployment** from Palestinian towns in the **West Bank**. Simultaneously, Abbas engaged in secret talks with Israeli officials that culminated in the **Beilin–Abu Mazen Plan**, a draft proposal concerning the permanent status agreement between the two sides. In July 2000, he took part in the **Camp David Talks** that discussed the final status of the **Occupied Territories**.

Abbas was critical of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, which broke out in September 2000. Publicly criticizing **suicide attacks**, he called for the cessation of the "militant Intifada." To this end, in January 2003 he took part in the **Cairo Dialogue** with **Hamas** and other Palestinian factions mediated by **Egypt**. Repeated demands from the **United States** and **European Union** countries for reform resulted in Arafat's creating the post of prime minister of the PNA, and in March 2003, Abbas became the first person to hold that office. Increased violence in the PNA-controlled areas, the Israeli policy of **targeted**

killing and reprisal attacks, and Arafat's refusal to relinquish substantive powers, undermined Abbas's position. On 6 September 2003, Abbas resigned and was replaced by **Ahmed Qurei**.

After the death of Arafat on 11 November 2004, Abbas took over as leader of the PNA as well as the PLO. He contested as the Fatah candidate in the direct presidential elections held on 9 January 2005 and secured 62 percent of the popular vote. Soon after his swearing in on 15 January, he secured a cease-fire agreement with Hamas and managed to stop **Qassam** rocket attacks from the **Gaza Strip** into Israel. In pursuance of the reform process, he attended the diminutive **London Conference** in January 2005.

Since assuming office in 2004, Abbas was confronted by the growing influence of Hamas that culminated in its victory in the January 2006 elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council**. In March 2006, Abbas asked **Ismail Haniyeh** to form the government, but tensions continued. The unity government formed in March 2007 following the **Mecca Accord** mediated by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** did not endure. The **Battle of Gaza** in June resulted in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, and Abbas imposed a state of emergency. In the same month he asked **Salam Fayyad** to form a government as opposed to the Haniyeh-led Hamas government that controlled the Gaza Strip.

Due to political differences, Fayyad was forced to resign in April 2013, and on 2 June 2013, Abbas asked Rami Hamdallah (1958–), a Palestinian academic from An-Najah National University in Nablus, to form a government. His appointment was not recognized by Hamas, and he resigned on 20 June 2013 but continued to hold that position. On 2 June 2014 Hamdallah formed a unity government with Hamas.

When **Ehud Olmert** was Israel's prime minister, Abbas pursued intense negotiations for a political settlement, but these were throttled largely by corruption allegations surrounding Olmert, and his resignation in June 2008. Since the election of **Benjamin Netanyahu** as prime minister in March 2009, negotiations were stalled over Abbas's insistence on a **settlement** freeze. Securing non-member **observer state** status for Palestine in the **United Nations** on 29 November 2012 was Abbas's most significant achievement.

See also AL-JAZEERA PAPERS; AL-QUDS; ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE; AQABA SUMMIT; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; ARAB SPRING; ARAFAT PROBE; BARGHOUTI, MUSTAFA (1954–); BATTLE OF GAZA; BUSH, GEORGE W. (1946–); CHINA; GAZA DISENGAGEMENT; GOLDSTONE REPORT; *HUDNA*; KERRY PLAN; KUWAIT WAR; RUSSIA; SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (2005); STATE OF PALESTINE; SULH.

ABDULLAH, KING (1924–2015). King of **Saudi Arabia**, Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud ascended to the throne on 1 August 2005 upon the death of his half brother King Fahd (1921–2005). The sixth ruler of Saudi Arabia was born on 1 August 1924 and was the 10th son of the founder King Ibn Saud (1876–1953). In 1963 Abdullah was made the commander of the Saudi National Guard whose duties include the protection of the House of Saud, a position he held until November 2010 when he appointed his son Prince Mutaib bin-Abdullah (1953–) to that position. In March 1975 Abdullah was named the second deputy prime minister by King Khalid (1913–1982), thereby making him the second in the line of succession. On 13 June 1982, when Fahd became king, Abdullah became crown prince. When King Fahd was incapacitated by a stroke in 1995, Abdullah became the de facto regent and became king in August 2005 following Fahd's death.

The shrewd and widely respected Abdullah initiated a number of reforms within Saudi society and has been preparing the transfer of power to the next generation. Considered to be a conservative, Abdullah was vocal in his criticisms of Israel and its treatment of Palestinians, and he disapproved of what he considered to be uncritical support of the **United States** for Israel. The September 11 terror attacks, which happened when he was the crown prince, resulted in Abdullah's initiating a number of reforms in education and **interfaith dialogues** with other religions. Partly to overcome the negative publicity due to the involvement of Saudi citizens in the September 11 attacks, in February 2002, he came up with the **Abdullah Plan** that offered conditional recognition to Israel. The following month the **Arab League** summit held in Beirut accepted it as the **Arab Peace Initiative**, and it was reiterated by the Riyadh Arab Summit in March 2007. Israel was not receptive to either of these proposals partly due to differences regarding the **refugee** question.

Toward securing inter-Palestinian unity, in February 2007 King Abdullah facilitated the **Mecca Accord** between **Hamas** and the **Palestinian National Authority**. This agreement, however, did not endure, and following the **Battle of Gaza** in June, Hamas took complete control over the **Gaza Strip**. Abdullah died in January 2015.

See also ARAB SPRING; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); KERRY PLAN; NUCLEAR IRAN; OBAMA, BARACK (1961–); QATAR; RESOLUTION 194; TERRORISM.

ABDULLAH I, KING (1882–1951). The second son of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali (1852–1931) of Mecca, Abdullah ruled **Transjordan**, and later **Jordan**, until his **assassination** on 20 July 1951. Born in Mecca in 1882, Abdullah traced his lineage to the scion of the Prophet Mohammed's Hashemite clan of the Quraishi tribe. The **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** resulted in Sharif Hussein's launching the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** against the **Otto-**

man Empire, and Abdullah played a leading role in the Arab drive for independence. He subsequently became foreign minister when his father briefly assumed the title of King of Hijaz (presently in **Saudi Arabia**).

In March 1921, following the defeat of his father by the forces of the House of Saud, Abdullah arrived in Amman with the intention of establishing Arab-Hashemite rule over an area that would include **Syria**. Determined to avoid a confrontation with **France**, in April 1921 **Great Britain** partitioned Palestine, created a new emirate called Transjordan, and made Abdullah its emir. In return, Abdullah renounced his ambitions regarding Syria and Mesopotamia (now **Iraq**). In May 1923, Britain recognized Transjordan as an autonomous emirate, began offering support in the form of political patronage and financial assistance, and helped in the formation and maintenance of the **Arab Legion**. On 25 May 1946, Britain granted independence, upon which Abdullah became king and Transjordan was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

In 1947, as the future political status of the Palestine **Mandate** was being debated by the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine**, King Abdullah developed an interest in acquiring parts of the territory inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. After the **United Nations** approved the **Partition Plan**, he had secret political contacts with the **Yishuv** leadership, meeting with **Golda Meir** days before the British Mandate ended. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the Arab Legion captured Arab-inhabited parts of the central areas of Palestine subsequently known as the **West Bank**. The legion fought bitterly and captured **East Jerusalem**, including the old city, which contains many sites holy for Jews, Christians, and Muslims.

Abdullah refused to recognize the **All Palestine Government** proclaimed by **Hajj Amin Al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, in September 1948 that was supported by other members of the Arab League. In December, prior to the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreement** with Israel, King Abdullah orchestrated the **Jericho Conference**, which asked the Hashemite ruler to "take over" the West Bank. As a result, in April 1950 Abdullah formally annexed the West Bank and granted Jordanian citizenship to all its residents, including the Palestinian **refugees** who were forced to flee from areas that became the State of Israel. On 3 April 1949, Jordan signed an Armistice Agreement with Israel, which formalized the de facto division of the city of **Jerusalem**. Palestinians vehemently resented his collaboration with Israel both during and after the 1948 war. On 20 July 1951, as he was entering the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for Friday prayers, Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian. King Abdullah was briefly succeeded by his son, and in May 1953 his grandson, **Hussein**, became the king of Jordan.

See also AL-QUDS; BERNADOTTE PLAN; FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENT; GAZA STRIP; JORDAN RIVER; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES.

ABDULLAH II, KING (1962–). Eldest son of King **Hussein**, Abdullah was enthroned as king of **Jordan** following the death of his father. Named after his great-grandfather, the founder of the Hashemite dynasty, he took the title Abdullah II after he assumed the throne on 7 February 1999. He was born to King Hussein and his British-born wife Princess Muna (1941–) on 30 January 1962. After schooling in **Great Britain** and the **United States**, Abdullah joined the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1980 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant. In 1993, he assumed command of Jordan's special forces and became major general in May 1998. Abdullah had served in an elite unit of the army and was rarely seen in public. In February 1999 King Hussein changed an earlier succession decree and replaced his younger brother, Crown Prince Hassan (1947–), with his son Abdullah in the line of succession.

After assuming power, Abdullah has adopted a tougher stance toward **Hamas**, and in September 1999 he declared it a non-Jordanian organization. Fearing an exodus of Palestinians from the **Occupied Territories** due to Israeli policies, in June 2001 he imposed travel restrictions on Palestinian residents of the **West Bank**. To express his displeasure at Israel's handling of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, after October 2000 he postponed appointing an envoy to Israel. At the same time, reflecting the prevailing criticisms from the United States, he had indirectly called upon the Palestinians to elect new leaders who were prepared to shoulder responsibilities and introduce internal reforms.

In June 2003, King Abdullah hosted the **Aqaba Summit** attended by U.S. president **George W. Bush**, Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon**, and Palestinian prime minister **Mahmoud Abbas**. The leaders endorsed the **Quartet Road Map**, but the exclusion of Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat** resulted in the summit's not making any progress in containing violence. In February 2005, during the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit**, King Abdullah agreed to name a new ambassador to Israel and, on 21 March 2005, Marouf Suleiman Bakhit presented his credentials to Israeli president Moshe Katsav (1945–). Abdullah's attempts to initiate a fresh peace initiative during the Algiers **Arab League** summit in March 2005 came under severe criticism for their pro-Israeli bias.

Since early 2011, King Abdullah has been confronted with the spread of the **Arab Spring** in Jordan and popular demands for political reforms including constitutional monarchy. Through the introduction of new electoral laws, an independent election commission, and other constitutional changes, Abdullah has been trying to reform the system. These measures have proved inadequate to satisfy the principal opposition party, the **Islamic Action Front** (IAF), the political wing of the **Muslim Brotherhood** in Jordan. The IAF boycotted the two recent elections held in November 2010 and January 2013. The IAF also plays a leading role in the **anti-normalization** campaign

against Israel and has carried out a number of protest rallies and demonstrations. Their frequency has increased since the Arab Spring. Partly to counter the domestic Islamist opposition, in January 2013 King Abdullah met **Khalid Masha'al** and restored relations with Hamas that were broken in 1999.

The ongoing **Arab Spring in Syria** and the subsequent exodus of **refugees** into Jordan have been causing financial as well as social pressures on Jordan. In February 2014 the number of refugees from **Syria** was estimated at over 600,000, and this is in addition to the 30,000 refugees who fled **Iraq** following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of that country. In March 2013 Abdullah signed an agreement with President Abbas of the **Palestinian National Authority** that ensures a Jordanian role in the Islamic holy sites in **East Jerusalem** including **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount**.

See also EGYPT; GULF OF AQABA; ISRAEL–JORDAN PEACE TREATY; JORDAN RIVER; RED SEA–DEAD SEA LINK; SINAI VIOLENCE; WATER.

ABDULLAH PLAN. In early 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud (1924–) of **Saudi Arabia** (who became king in August 2005) unveiled a Middle East peace initiative that called on Israel to withdraw completely from all the Arab territories it had occupied during the **June War of 1967** and proposed the establishment of a Palestinian state with **East Jerusalem** as its capital. In return, it offered collective Arab normalization of relations with Israel. A slightly diluted proposal, with a rider on the **refugee** question, was adopted unanimously by the **Arab League** summit held in Beirut in March 2002 and came to be known as the **Arab Peace Initiative**.

Palestine Liberation Organization chairman **Yasser Arafat**, whose Ramallah compound was surrounded by **Israel Defense Forces**, was prevented from attending the Beirut meeting. As a result, President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** and King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan** opted to stay away from the Arab summit, thereby underscoring the internal divisions within the Arab League. This plan was introduced against the background of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, an increase in Israeli–Palestinian violence and mounting **United States**–Saudi tensions following the September 11 attacks. Though periodically mentioned by various leaders, the plan did not fructify, largely because of internal divisions both within Israel and among Arab countries.

See also ABDULLAH, KING (1924–2015); ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); FAHD PLAN; FEZ PLAN; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; LEBANON; RESOLUTION 194; SIEGE OF RAMALLAH.

ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW. In March 1950, Israel adopted a law that declared anyone who was a citizen or resident of one of the Arab states or a Palestinian citizen on 29 November 1949, but who had fled from his or her

place of residence—even as a **refugee** within erstwhile **Mandate Palestine**—to be an "absentee." The Israeli "custodian of absentee property" was empowered by the Knesset to sell absentee-owned properties to the development authority. This legalized the possession and distribution of movable and immovable properties abandoned by the fleeing Arab population to the Jewish citizens of Israel. The law provided the legal framework for the custodian to appropriate lands, households, and farms and to distribute them for the welfare of a new wave of Jews who immigrated to Israel after 1948. As most of the Arab owners had fled Palestine following the outbreak of the **Arab-Israeli War of 1948**, compensation was dispensed with.

See also ISRAELI ARABS; LANDLESS ARAB INQUIRY; NAQBA, AL-; RESOLUTION 194.

ABU DIS. This Arab neighborhood of **East Jerusalem** is often suggested as the capital of the future Palestinian state. As part of the **redeployment** plan, on 15 May 2000 the Israeli cabinet headed by Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** approved a plan to transfer Abu Dis to Palestinian control, which was endorsed in the Knesset by a simple majority (56–48). This area, comprising the Arab villages of Azariya, Abu Dis, and Sawahara al-Sharqiyah, was to have constituted the next stage of the three-phase withdrawal agreed under the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** of 1998. However, the implementation of this cabinet decision was postponed due to rioting in **Jerusalem** connected to **Al-Naqba** Day.

See also AL-QUDS; AREAS OF PALESTINE; BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; CLINTON PARAMETERS; E-1 AREA; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION. *See* FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (FRC).

ABU SHARIF DOCUMENT. During the June 1988 Algiers summit meeting of the **Arab League**, Bassam Abu-Sharif (1946–), a close adviser of **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat**, distributed a paper called "The PLO Views Prospects of a Palestinian–Israeli Settlement," which came to be known as the Abu Sharif Document. This maintained that the PLO sought peace with Israel through direct negotiations based on all the relevant **United Nations** resolutions, including **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338**. The proposal was made against the backdrop of the **First Intifada**, and although Arafat did not endorse the document publicly, it generated a serious debate among Palestinians and eventually paved the way for the **Algiers Declaration** on 15 November 1988, which proclaimed the Palestinian state.

See also PARTITION PLAN.

ABU-MARZOK, MUSA (1951–). Born on 9 January 1951 in the **Gaza Strip**, Musa Abu-Marzok is a senior political leader of the Palestinian Islamic militant movement **Hamas**. His parents, who became **refugees** following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, were from Yebna (now Yavne) in **Mandate Palestine**. After pursuing his studies in Gaza and Cairo, Abu-Marzok worked in the Persian Gulf before moving to the **United States** for his higher studies and secured a doctorate in industrial engineering from Louisiana Tech. Involved in Islamic political activities since the late 1960s, he became active in Hamas after its formation in the wake of the **First Intifada**. He was elected as the first political bureau chief in 1992 and five years later became the deputy head of the Hamas Political Bureau, a position in which he continues to serve under **Khalid Masha'al**. Since 1995 he was designated as a terrorist by the United States. When King **Abdullah II** decided to sever ties with Hamas and close down its offices in **Jordan** in 1999, Abu-Marzok moved to **Syria** where he stayed until February 2012. Following the outbreak of the **Arab Spring** he moved to **Egypt**.
    See also TERRORISM.

ACADEMIC BOYCOTT. Inspired by the success of a similar effort against **South Africa** during the **apartheid** era, various academic organizations and institutions have been advocating a boycott of Israel and its academic community. This is one of the several campaigns coordinated by the **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaign established in 2007. For the proponents of the academic boycott, the Israeli policy and actions against the Palestinians resemble the apartheid regime, and hence a boycott of its academia is both a legitimate and effective instrument to bring about a change in Israeli policy. Academia in **Great Britain** played a leading role in this campaign, and the idea of it was spurred by an open letter published in the *Guardian* in April 2002 amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. A group of Palestinian academics and intellectuals formally launched the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel in April 2004, and this soon spread to other countries.

The academic boycott campaign does not distinguish those Israelis who campaign for an end to occupation from those who oppose that policy. Some Israeli citizens are also part of this campaign, and the most notable among them is Ilan Pappé (1954–), a prominent member of the **New Historians**. There are other Israelis who advocate a boycott of Israeli academic institutions in the **Occupied Territories** such as the university in the town of **Ariel** in the **West Bank**.

The comparing of Israeli policy regarding the Occupied Territories with apartheid evokes strong criticism and rebuffs from critics. Over the years, the boycott campaign has spread to a number of countries, which have established national chapters that campaign against any academic exchanges and interactions with Israel. The effectiveness of the campaign has been mixed, and in May 2013 British theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking (1942–), who received Israel's prestigious Wolf Prize in 1988, created an uproar when he joined the boycott campaign.

See also ANTI-NORMALIZATION; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; BANDUNG CONFERENCE; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; DURBAN CONFERENCE/S; FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; FREE GAZA MOVEMENT; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; IM TIRZU; INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE; INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM); KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); OIL CRISIS; WARFARE.

ACCOUNTABILITY OPERATION. In July 1993, tension along Israel's borders with **Lebanon** increased as **Hezbollah** and radical Palestinian groups in southern Lebanon fired a number of Katyusha rockets against Israel's self-declared **security zone** and northern Israel. When the intervention of the **United States** proved futile, on 25 July Israel launched a military campaign named Accountability. Primarily composed of artillery, air force, and naval units, it was aimed at putting pressure on the Lebanese government to act against the militants north of the security zone. This operation created a massive civilian exodus from southern Lebanon toward Beirut in the north. On 31 July, the military campaign ended when the United States managed to secure an informal understanding with **Syria** and Hezbollah, under which the latter agreed not to attack Israeli settlements in the north. This arrangement brought about a temporary truce in northern Israel, but attacks inside the security zone increased.

See also FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT; GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION; KFAR KANA MASSACRE; LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL; LITANI OPERATION; UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL); WARFARE.

ACHILLE LAURO **AFFAIR.** On 8 October 1985, four members of the **Palestine Liberation Front** (PLF) hijacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, which had 400 passengers on board. The hijackers threatened to blow up the ship if 50 Palestinian prisoners were not released from Israeli jails. To intensify the pressures, the hijackers threw Jewish-American passenger Leon Klinghoffer (1916–1985), who was confined to a wheelchair, overboard and killed him. This generated worldwide criticism, and the hijackers eventually

surrendered following mediation by **Egypt**. Though the hijacking was carried out by a faction opposed to **Yasser Arafat**, the membership of the PLF in the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee complicated matters for the PLO. Following the **Oslo Process**, on 19 January 1996 the PLO agreed to finance a Peace Studies Center in the **United States** in return for Klinghoffer's family dropping a lawsuit. In April 2003, during the U.S.-led military campaign against **Iraq**, Abu Abbas (1948–2004), the leader of the PLF, was captured by the Allied forces, and Klinghoffer's family demanded his trial for the murder. On 8 March 2004 he died while in allied custody. Following Israel's refusal to bury him in **Ramallah**, Abu Abbas was buried in Damascus.

See also EGYPT; ENTEBBE OPERATION; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

ACTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (AOLP). In 1967, Issam Sartawi (1935–1983) established the AOLP, a non-combatant medical aid organization. It temporarily merged with **Fatah** in February 1968 and rejoined the organization in July 1971. After dissolving the organization, Sartawi became a close adviser to **Yasser Arafat** and functioned as the unofficial ambassador of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in Western Europe. Together with Israeli peace activist Arie Lova Eliav (1921–2010), Sartawi encouraged and initiated an Israeli–Arab dialogue. On 12 April 1983, Sartawi was assassinated during the Socialists International Conference in Lisbon by members of the **Fatah Revolutionary Council**.

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. Since its occupation of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** in June 1967, Israel has placed thousands of Palestinians under what is termed "administrative detention." Even though such practices of detention without trial are common in a number of states, Israeli practice in the **Occupied Territories** adds further complications and criticisms, since this procedure enables the authorities to detain Palestinian individuals without charges and without judicial trial. Israel has used this as a deterrent and collective punishment. The outbreak of the **First Intifada** in 1987 saw a rapid increase of administrative detainees, and at one point more than 14,000 Palestinians were kept under administrative detention. Israel also used this measure against Lebanese citizens it captured in southern **Lebanon**. Some Lebanese citizens were imprisoned for more than 12 years before being brought to trial. To accommodate 4,000 new prisoners, Israel reopened the dreaded Ketziot Prison in the Negev, where most of the Palestinian prisoners were held during the First Intifada. The outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, especially the **Defensive Shield Operation**, resulted in the capture of a large number of Palestinians who were held without trial.

See also DEPORTATION; PRISONER EXCHANGE; WARFARE.

AGRANAT COMMISSION. On 21 November 1973, the Israeli government headed by Prime Minister **Golda Meir** appointed a commission of inquiry, headed by president of the Supreme Court Shimon Agranat (1906–1992), to investigate the events leading up to the **October War of 1973**. Other members of the commission were Justice Moshe Landau (1912–2011) of the Supreme Court, State Comptroller Yitzhak Nebenzahl (1907–1992), and two former chiefs of the **Israel Defense Forces**, Yigal Yadin (1917–1984) and Chaim Laskov (1919–1982). The commission published an interim report on 1 April 1974, a second report on 10 July 1974, and its final report on 30 January 1975.

The interim report dealt with the immediate events leading up to the outbreak of hostilities and the conduct of the war during the initial stages. It absolved Meir and Defense Minister **Moshe Dayan** of any direct responsibility for the lack of military preparedness. It attributed the element of surprise to Israel's "conception" that **Egypt** would not initiate an attack without superior airpower. It recommended, inter alia, the establishment of a ministerial committee on security, reevaluation of the intelligence establishment, the replacement of Maj. Gen. Eliahu Zaira (1928–) as chief of military intelligence, and the removal of Lt. Gen. David Elazar (1925–1976) as chief of staff.

The political consequences of the war took their toll. Despite victories in the Knesset elections held in December 1973, the political leadership came under pressure, and gradually all the senior leaders involved in the war, including Meir, Dayan, and Elazar, resigned from their positions. Meir was replaced as prime minister by **Yitzhak Rabin**, who at the time of the war was outside the government.

On 25 January 2005, the Knesset approved a law aimed at preventing the publication of the full report of the Agranat Commission as required by the 30-year principle governing official documents. The amendment to the Commissions of Inquiry Law would enable the prime minister to establish a public commission to consider whether the publication of a report would be in the national security interest. Forty years after the war, on 9 September 2013, the Golda Meir protocols from the Agranat Commission were released.

See also BAR-LEV LINE; BLUE-WHITE OPERATION; DOVECOTE OPERATION.

AHMADINEJAD, MAHMOUD (1956–). President of the Islamic Republic of **Iran** from August 2005 to August 2013, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a staunch critic of Israel, its policies, and, above all, its right to exist as a sovereign state. Born on 28 October 1956 in a village in Semnan Province in the north, he had humble origins and studied engineering in the Tehran-based Iran University of Science and Technology. He earned his doctorate in 1997 in transportation and engineering and planning from the same university.

While little is known about his public life during the 1980s, he served as unelected governor of two cities in West Azerbaijan Province during this period.

Ahmadinejad attained national status in 2003 when he was appointed mayor of the city of Tehran. Two years later, he contested the presidential elections, which were held to choose the successor to President Mohammed Khatami (1943–). Ahmadinejad was among the six candidates who were allowed to run by the Guardian Council. In the first round of elections held on 17 June 2005, he secured the second-highest number of votes after former president Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–). In the second round held a week later, he secured over 61 percent as against 35 percent secured by Rafsanjani and was declared elected. In the elections held on 12 June 2009, he was reelected, defeating Mir-Houssein Mousavi (1942–), though the results were contested and many irregularities reported. Supreme Leader **Ali Khamenei** was credited with Ahmadinejad's electoral successes in 2005 and 2009. However, following Ahmadinejad's reelection, the relations between the two deteriorated considerably.

After assuming office as president in August 2005, Ahmadinejad made a number of controversial statements against Israel and the Holocaust. In line with the direction set by **Ayatollah Khomeini**, the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad has adhered to the long-standing Iranian policy of non-recognition of Israel. While maintaining this position, Ahmadinejad's two immediate predecessors—namely, Rafsanjani and Khatami—avoided making controversial statements. This changed under Ahmadinejad, who garnered international publicity over his anti-Israeli and anti-Holocaust statements.

In conformity with the traditional policy of the Islamic Republic toward the Palestinians since the days of the **Madrid Conference** and the **Oslo Process**, Ahmadinejad was critical of Palestinian president **Mahmoud Abbas** over the latter's desire to pursue peace negotiations with Israel and supported the Palestinian militant group **Hamas**. Ahmadinejad's tenure coincided with the controversy over **nuclear Iran** and heightened regional tensions over the possibility of an Israeli military operation against Iran's nuclear installations.

See also ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE; HEZBOLLAH; ROUHANI, HASSAN (1948–).

AIPAC. Established in 1951, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a lobby group that advocates and pursues Israel's interests and causes in the **United States**. It is widely recognized that this is the most powerful and effective lobby group in the United States. From the mid-1970s it has acquired considerable clout to influence the opinions in the Capitol and hence the policies of various U.S. administrations. Its grassroot members are

estimated at over 100,000, and its annual conventions attract bipartisan support. A number of American policies and legislations that are supportive of Israel are attributed to the effective campaigning by AIPAC. Those considered to be opponents of or unfavorable to Israel are often targeted by AIPAC, especially during their election bids. Over the years, critics have argued that AIPAC has come to represent the right-wing elements within Israel and has misrepresented the views and positions of American Jews and their liberal values. The formation of **J Street** in 2008 was partially a response to AIPAC and its right-wing orientation. In their work *The Jewish Lobby*, American scholars John Mearsheimer (1947–) and Stephen Walt (1955–) have identified AIPAC as the key figure in the larger pro-Israel lobby that "distorts" American policy toward the Middle East.

See also NUCLEAR IRAN; OBAMA, BARACK (1961–).

AKP. Known more widely by its acronym AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or the Justice and Development Party, is an Islamist political party in **Turkey**, which came to power in November 2002 and has won two successive elections held in April 2007 and June 2011. Its leader, **Recep Tayyip Erdogan**, has been the prime minister since March 2003. Founded in 2001, its core was the reformist faction of the previous Islamic Value Party. Since coming to power, the AKP has championed Islamic causes both in the domestic and foreign policy arenas. It has managed to present itself as a synthesis of Islamic values and modernism. Critics have argued that it has diluted the traditional notion of Turkish secularism and made the country more conservative and Islamic.

After winning the 2002 election, Abdullah Gul (1950–) became prime minister, and a constitutional amendment in 2003 gave space for Erdogan to take his place. During 2003–2007, Erdogan was preoccupied with the domestic agenda, and hence Turkey's relations with Israel, including the military-security component, remained intact; but things began to change after Erdogan was reelected in 2007. The Islamist orientation of the party is held responsible for the growing tensions with Israel over issues such as **nuclear Iran**, the **Arab Spring in Syria**, and the Palestinian question. There have been a number of tensions and controversies between the two countries since 2007, including the **Davos Controversy**, the **Siege of Gaza**, and the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**. Erdogan won the presidential elections held on 10 August 2014 by securing 51.79 percent of the votes, and former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu (1959–) took over as prime minister on 28 August.

See also ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE; ARAB SPRING; IHH; OLMERT, EHUD (1945–); ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC); PERES, SHIMON (1923–); TERRORISM.

AL-AQSA FIRE. On 21 August 1969, a serious fire broke out in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the old city of **Jerusalem**, enraging Muslims all over the world. An official Israeli inquiry attributed the arson to a deranged Australian Christian tourist, Denis Michael Rohan (1941–1995). While the physical damage to the mosque was limited and was subsequently repaired, the incident raised widespread concerns over the safety of Islamic and Christian shrines in the Israeli-occupied old city. These concerns led to the Rabat Summit of Islamic countries in September 1969, which paved the way for the formation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (renamed as **Organization of Islamic Cooperation** in June 2011) and the Jerusalem Committee, headed by King Hassan II (1929–1999) of Morocco.

See also AL-QUDS; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES.

AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005). The second Palestinian uprising began in the wake of the visit by Israel's **Likud** leader **Ariel Sharon** to the Al-Aqsa compound at the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** area of the old city in **Jerusalem** on 28 September 2000. He was accompanied by a large contingent of bodyguards and security personnel. This visit came amid growing Palestinian disappointment with U.S. president **Bill Clinton** and Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** for blaming the **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** for the failure of the **Camp David Talks** in July. The Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** saw Sharon's visit as a provocation and an attempt by the leader of the opposition to reassert Israeli sovereignty over Islamic holy sites. The following day, Palestinians at the compound staged a demonstration after Friday midday prayers, and it soon turned violent. Israeli security forces responded with rubber bullets and live ammunition, resulting in the deaths of seven Palestinians and injuries to more than 200. The unrest quickly spread to other parts of the Occupied Territories and transformed into large-scale violence.

The Al-Aqsa Intifada differed from the **First Intifada** of 1987. Popular participation remained marginal, and violent actions by individuals and select groups dominated the uprising. Hence—despite widespread usage within the Middle East and elsewhere—many, including leading Palestinians, have questioned the usage of the term "Intifada" with respect to this phase of Palestinian protests. The availability of weapons provided to various Palestinian security agencies under the **Oslo Accords** enabled Palestinian security personnel to participate in militant campaigns against Israel.

Unlike the earlier Intifada, much of the anti-Israeli violence during this phase took the form of **suicide attacks** conducted inside the **Green Line** and against Israeli civilians. **Hamas** has emerged as the key player in this suicide campaign. This exposed the inability of the **Palestinian National Authority**

(PNA) to rein in militants, and at the same time it encouraged even secular elements such as **Fatah** to emulate Hamas in organizing militant and even suicide attacks against Israel.

At an emergency **Arab League** summit held in Cairo in October 2000, the member states refused Libya's call to use the oil weapon to counterbalance Israel and the **United States** but agreed to "halt" the establishment of new diplomatic ties with Israel. **Saudi Arabia** proposed setting up two funds: one of $800 million to preserve the Arab identity of Jerusalem and another of $200 million to support the families of those killed in the uprising. Various Arab countries organized live fund-raising television shows.

The cycle of violence has brought the Oslo Accords to a grinding halt. In a bid to revive the process, a host of bilateral and multilateral measures has been initiated. These include the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit (2000)**, the **Clinton Parameters** (December 2000), the **Mitchell Committee Report** (May 2001), the **Tenet Plan** (June 2001), the **Abdullah Plan** (February 2002), the **Bush Plan** (June 2002), the **Quartet Road Map** (April 2003), the **Ayalon-Nusseibeh Proposal** (September 2003), and the **Geneva Initiative** (December 2003). However, none of the ideas have succeeded in diminishing the level of violence or compelling the parties to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, the uprising has increased Israel's political and diplomatic isolation in the Middle East. The surging popular support for the Palestinians in the region obliged various Arab countries to reevaluate their policies vis-à-vis Israel. Oman, Tunisia, and Morocco closed down their trade offices in Tel Aviv, and, succumbing to pressure, **Qatar** briefly shut down the Israeli mission in Doha. In October 2000, **Jordan** postponed the departure of its new ambassador. Responding to the Israeli missile attack in Gaza on 21 November 2000 (itself a response to a mortar attack on an Israeli school bus in a Gaza settlement), **Egypt** recalled its ambassador from Israel. At the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit (2005)**, both Egypt and Jordan agreed to return their ambassadors to Israel.

The **targeted killing** of key political and militant Palestinian leaders by the **Israel Defense Forces** considerably weakened the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and early 2005 is generally recognized as its end point. The election of **Mahmoud Abbas** as the successor to Arafat in January 2005 and the **Gaza Disengagement** completed in September 2005 were some improvements. By May 2005, in the Intifada-related violence, 657 Israeli civilians had been killed by Palestinians and 3,235 Palestinians by Israeli security forces. Palestinians also killed 33 foreign citizens and 303 members of the Israeli security forces. For its part, Israel has extensively used its military power to systematically destroy and dismantle the Palestinian infrastructure.

See also AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE; AL-QUDS; AQABA SUMMIT; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; BARGHOUTI, MUSTAFA (1954–); DEFENSIVE SHIELD OPERATION; DETERMINED PATH OPERA-

TION; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); *HUDNA*; INTIFADA LAW; ISLAMIC JI-HAD; IZZ EDDIN AL-QASSAM; JENIN CONTROVERSY; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); OIL CRISIS; POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP); QASSAM; RAINBOW OPERATION; RANTISI, ABDEL AZIZ AL- (1947–2004); SECURITY FENCE/S; SIEGE OF BETH-LEHEM; SIEGE OF RAMALLAH; SULH; TANZIM; TERRORISM; TUN-NELS; UNITY TALKS; YASSIN, SHEIKH AHMED (c. 1933–2004); WARFARE.

AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE. Following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000, a group of Palestinians belonging to **Tanzim**, a militant outfit identified with **Fatah**, broke away and formed the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Largely composed of residents of the Balata **refugee** camps near Nablus, its members initially confined their campaign to shooting attacks against Israeli soldiers at roadblocks in the **West Bank**. This gradually escalated into **suicide attacks** inside Israel as well as the employment of female suicide bombers, both of which were not the hallmark of traditional Fatah strategy.

Until his death in November 2004, the members of the brigade remained loyal to **Yasser Arafat**, chairman of the **Palestinian National Authority**. After the Hamas takeover of the **Gaza Strip** in June 2007, its members launched **Qassam** rockets into Israel from the Strip. This led to the **Israel Defense Forces** launching the **Cast Lead Operation**, and its members were also targets of frequent Israeli incursions into the West Bank since 2007. By mid-2009 the brigade became largely inoperative.

See also GREEN LINE; HAMAS; ISLAMIC JIHAD; OCCUPIED TER-RITORIES; TARGETED KILLING; TERRORISM.

AL-ARD. *See* ARD, AL-.

ALGIERS DECLARATION. Responding to the **First Intifada**, the 19th extraordinary session of the Palestine National Congress met in Algiers in November 1988. After intense deliberations, on 15 November it adopted the Algiers Declaration, which proclaimed the **State of Palestine**. Out of 447 congress members, 338 attended the session; Israel, **Jordan**, and **Syria** prevented most of the others from going to Algiers. Among other things, the declaration recognized the 1947 **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**, demanded complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied during the **June War of 1967**, and called for a Palestinian state in the **Occupied Territories**, with **Jerusalem** as its capital. Some of the groups belonging to the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), as well as non-PLO groups such as **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad**, opposed the declaration.

See also JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT; MUTUAL RECOGNITION; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); STOCKHOLM DECLARATION.

AL-HUSSEINI, HAJJ AMIN (1897–1974). A prominent leader of Palestinians during the **Mandate** period, Hajj Mohammed Amin al-Husseini led the Palestinian struggle against the Zionist demand for a Jewish national home as outlined in the **Balfour Declaration**. Born in a notable **Jerusalem** family around 1897, he acquired the honorary title of hajj following his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1913 as a teenager. During World War I (1914–1918), he served with the Ottoman Army but returned to Jerusalem in 1916 due to illness, and during this period he recruited support for the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)**. He gradually gravitated toward Arab nationalism and took part in some of the violent protests in Palestine against Zionist aspirations. In March 1921, the first high commissioner of **Great Britain** in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel (1870–1963), named al-Husseini as the grand mufti of the city of Jerusalem. In the following year, he was elected president of the Supreme Muslim Council, a body created by Samuel to supervise the religious affairs of the community, and he held both these positions until 1937.

Al-Husseini used his positions effectively to carry out his political struggle against **Aliya** and Zionist land purchase in Palestine. He skillfully mixed religion into the nationalist struggle of the Palestinians and sought to rally the support of the Muslims outside Palestine by focusing on the Islamic importance of Jerusalem. Ostensibly to renovate the dilapidated Al-Aqsa Mosque, he launched a fund-raising campaign and sent delegations to a number of countries including **India**. Throughout his tenure, however, al-Husseini had to compete with the other powerful Jerusalem family, the Nashashibi.

By the late 1920s al-Husseini emerged as the popular and public face of the Palestinians in their struggle against the British presence and the Zionist goals in Palestine. He took a leadership role in the **Western Wall Riots** of 1929 and the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**. Following a British decision to arrest him, in October 1937 he fled to **Lebanon**, and from there he moved to **Syria** and **Iraq**. His struggle against the British and **Zionism** brought him closer to the Axis powers during World War II (1939–1945), and al-Husseini met Italian dictator Benito Mussolini (1883–1945) in October 1941 and Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) on 28 November 1941. These meetings with the Axis leaders, especially Hitler, proved controversial subsequently. His non-Palestinian critics often cite these meetings as evidence for anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic trends of not only al-Husseini but also the wider Palestinian nationalist struggle. The prolonged Holocaust denials by Arab and Palestinian leaders have also contributed to accusations of al-Husseini's "collaboration" in the Holocaust.

At the end of World War II, al-Husseini returned to the Middle East but could not enter the still British-controlled Palestine. He led the Palestinian opposition to the **United Nations** initiatives. Under his influence, the Arabs of Palestine boycotted the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly and the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine**. On the day of the **Declaration of Independence** and the British withdrawal from Palestine, al-Husseini was in exile in **Egypt**.

After the **Arab-Israeli War of 1948** ended in **al-Naqba** for the Palestinians, al-Husseini returned to the **Gaza Strip**, and on 22 September 1948, an **All Palestine Government** (APG) was declared, with al-Husseini being elected its president on 30 September. The APG was recognized by all the Arab countries except for **Jordan**. With the **West Bank** under the control of Jordan and the decision of King **Abdullah I** to annex these territories in April 1950, the APG collapsed and Egypt brought the Gaza Strip under military rule. Subsequently, al-Husseini became part of various Arab delegations and championed the Palestinian cause. In this context he attended the **Bandung Conference** of Asian and African countries in April 1955 and moved to Lebanon in 1959. He refused to endorse the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, which was founded in 1964. Following his death on 4 July 1974, al-Husseini was buried in Beirut.

See also AL-QUDS; ARAB EXECUTIVE; ARAB LEAGUE; ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT; JERICHO CONFERENCE; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PARTITION PLAN; ST. JAMES CONFERENCE; TRANSJORDAN.

ALIYA. This expression, meaning "to ascend," refers to the migration of **Diaspora** Jews to the historical Land of Israel. It is used to refer to the large-scale immigration that began in 1882. Unlike earlier immigration, the new wave sought Aliya as a means of "returning" to the land of their ancestors and ending their exile in the Diaspora. The immigration of Jews to and settlement in **Eretz Yisrael** was the core of **Zionism**, and an "ingathering of the exile" was the primary objective of the movement. Unlike the religion-induced immigrations in the past, the new group of Jews either sought refuge from prolonged persecution in the Diaspora or aspired to create a homeland for the Jews.

From 1882 until the end of World War II (1939–1945), Palestine experienced five major phases or waves of Aliya. During the First Aliya (1882–1903), around 20,000 to 30,000 Jews came from Russia, Romania, and Yemen. The Second Aliya (1904–1914) consisted of 35,000 to 40,000 pioneering youth who largely came from **Russia** and Poland. Another 35,000 young pioneers from Russia, Poland, and Romania constituted the Third Aliya (1919–1923); many of the future leaders of Israel belonged to this Aliya. The Fourth Aliya (1924–1931) included about 67,000 Jews who emi-

grated from Poland and Eastern Europe. The rise of Nazism in Europe then caused a large number of Jews to emigrate from Central Europe to Palestine. During this Fifth Aliya (1929/31–1939), about 215,000 Jews fled to Palestine. Later, during World War II, about 82,000 Jews arrived in Palestine, and another 57,000 made Aliya between the end of the war and the end of the British **Mandate** over Palestine.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, encouragement of Aliya has become the official policy that enjoys near unanimous consensus. The policy of granting Israeli citizenship to Jewish immigrants under the **Law of Return** encouraged large-scale Aliya. Determined and organized efforts to bring Jews from the Diaspora, especially from "crisis areas," resulted in massive immigration to Israel.

Between May 1948 and 1951, about 685,000 immigrants arrived in Israel and contributed to a fundamental demographic shift in favor of the Jews. Most of these immigrants came from Islamic countries in the Middle East. According to another estimate, between 1948 and 1986 as many as 1.8 million Jews immigrated to Israel. Following a thaw in relations with Israel, in 1987 the Soviet Union relaxed its emigration rules and facilitated a new wave of Aliya, which saw about 750,000 Jews reaching Israel. Since the 1990s there have been large immigrations from **European Union** countries, especially **France**.

Following the establishment of the state in 1948, over three million immigrants came to Israel from around the world. This significantly contributed to Israel emerging as the largest Jewish population center in the world. From the beginning of the 20th century, Aliya has been one of the two most important sources of Arab-Jewish tension (the other being Jewish land purchase) in Mandate Palestine. This contributed to periodic tension and violence such as the **Hebron Massacre (1929)**, the **Western Wall Riots**, and the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**. The unrestricted Aliya enshrined in the Law of Return has been contested by the **Israeli Arabs** as well as Palestinian **refugees** as a sign of discrimination.

See also ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE; BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992); BEN-GURION, DAVID (1886–1973); DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT; JEWISH AGENCY; LOAN GUARANTEES; MEIR, GOLDA (1898–1978); PERES, SHIMON (1923–); WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); YISHUV.

AL-JAZEERA PAPERS. In January 2011, the **Qatar**-based Al-Jazeera television released over 1,600 documents pertaining to the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations held between 1999 and 2010. Most of these documents pertained to the period when **Ehud Olmert** was Israel's prime minister and **Mahmoud Abbas** headed the **Palestinian National Authority**. The documents covered a number of core issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict such

as **Jerusalem**, **settlements**, borders, and **refugees**. These were supposedly leaked by the supportive staff of the Palestinian delegation headed by Saeb Erekat (1955–), and they highlighted the internal divisions within Israel and the Palestinians and signaled a more accommodative Palestinian approach toward some of the contentious issues. The Al-Jazeera papers were leaked on 23 January 2011, shortly after the onset of the **Arab Spring** and less than 10 days after Tunisian president Zine El-Abidine Ben-Ali (1936–) fled to **Saudi Arabia**. As a result of wider attention to the Arab Spring, these disclosures faded from public and media attention.

   See also EAST JERUSALEM; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT (APG). Responding to the Israeli Declaration of Independence on the eve of the termination of the **Mandate**, the Palestinian leaders met in Gaza on 3 September 1948 and proposed the formation of a Palestinian government. On 22 September, the **Arab Higher Committee** met in Gaza and announced the formation of the All Palestine Government, which assumed the responsibilities of the Administrative Council for Palestine established by the **Arab League** in July 1948. A national council met on 30 September and elected **Hajj Amin al-Husseini** as president. The following day, Palestinian independence was proclaimed, a cabinet headed by Jamal al-Husseini (1892–1982) was named, and an 86-member general assembly was elected. While **Egypt**, **Syria**, and **Saudi Arabia** recognized this move, King **Abdullah I** of **Jordan**, who controlled the **West Bank**, vehemently opposed it. The **Jericho Conference** of 1 December 1948 and the subsequent **annexation** of the West Bank into Jordan eroded the raison d'être of the APG. In 1952, the Arab League announced its demise and placed the Palestinians under the aegis of individual Arab states—Egypt for the **Gaza Strip** and Jordan for the West Bank.

   See also ALGIERS DECLARATION; EAST JERUSALEM; PLO CHARTER; STATE OF PALESTINE.

ALLON PLAN. In July 1967, weeks after the **June War of 1967**, Yigal Allon (1918–1980), minister of labor and former commander of the Israeli army (later foreign minister and deputy prime minister), proposed a plan that outlined the Israeli position toward the **Occupied Territories**, especially the **West Bank**. This plan was formulated prior to the **Khartoum Arab Summit** in August that rejected the recognition of and negotiations for peace with Israel. Allon's plan called for the return of densely populated areas in the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip** to Arab control and the return of most of the **Sinai Peninsula** to **Egypt**.

There was no single version of the Allon Plan, which was modified and amended in June 1968, December 1968, January 1969, and September 1970. Subsequently it served as the Alignment/**Labor Party** platform for the 1974, 1977, 1981, 1984, and 1988 Knesset elections. Though never officially approved, until 1977 it guided the **settlement** policies of the Alignment/Labor governments. The authorized version of the plan was never published, but in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1976, Allon outlined his ideas. However, he quickly renounced the accompanying map in the journal.

The Allon Plan sought to adjust the armistice lines established in 1949 in favor of Israel, with the **annexation** of strategically important and sparsely populated areas. Israel would also retain the whole of **Jerusalem** and the **Etzion Bloc** south of **Bethlehem**. The plan broadly advocated the return of Sinai to Egypt except for Sharm al-Sheikh and a connecting land corridor from Eilat, the Rafah area in the Gaza Strip, and a narrow strip along the Negev-Sinai border. On the Jordanian front, it suggested the return of most of the Occupied Territories but advocated Israel retaining most of the **Jordan Valley**, the eastern slopes of the Judean deserts toward the Dead Sea, the Etzion Bloc (owned and settled by Jews before 1948), and certain border areas. It primarily sought to annex areas that were uninhabited or sparsely inhabited by Palestinians. Through a limited territorial expansion, it sought to keep Israel a demographically Jewish and politically democratic state by minimizing the number of non-Jews living inside Israel. This gradually became the Labor Party's platform for "territorial compromise" with the Arabs, but it was never accepted by Israel's interlocutors as a basis for negotiations.

The Allon Plan resurfaced in 1996 when a new Israeli political party, the Third Way (1996–1999), remodeled it for the future status of the West Bank. In late 1996 and in June 1997, **Likud** prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** proposed the "Allon Plus" Plan, whereby Israel would keep **Greater Jerusalem**, including the **Ma'ale Adumim** and the **Etzion Bloc** settlements, under its sovereignty. It visualized the construction of a security belt parallel to but east of the **Green Line** incorporating all Jewish settlements west of this belt.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); ERETZ YISRAEL; GALILI DOCUMENT; JARRING MISSION; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; LAND-FOR-PEACE.

AL-MABHOUGH, MAHMOUD (1960–2010). Born in the Jabalia **refugee** camp in the **Gaza Strip** in February 1960, Mahmoud al-Mabhough was one of the founders of **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**, the military wing of the Palestinian militant group **Hamas**. Among others, he was involved in a number of operations against Israel, including the kidnapping and killing of two soldiers of the **Israel Defense Forces** in 1989 during the **First Intifada**. He subsequently lived in relative anonymity and quiet but was held responsible for arms

smuggling from the **Sinai Peninsula** into Gaza through **tunnels** and for weapons procurement from **Iran** for the Hamas government headed by Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh**.

On 19 January 2010, al-Mabhough was killed in the five-star Al Bustan Rotana Hotel in Dubai. Using an alias and one of the many passports he possessed, he had arrived the previous day from **Syria**. With the help of CCTV, the Dubai police reconstructed the movements leading up to his killing and accused the Israeli intelligence agency Mossad of his murder.

See also ASSASSINATION/S; DUBAI KILLING; TARGETED KILL-ING; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

AL-NAQBA. *See* NAQBA, AL-.

ALPHA PLAN. In October 1954, **Great Britain** and the **United States** conceived an ambitious plan that sought a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with rapprochement with **Egypt** as the initial move. They sought to resolve issues such as **refugees** and their reset-tlement, territorial adjustments between Israel and its neighbors, problems over the status of **Jerusalem**, sharing the waters of the **Jordan River**, and an end to the **Arab Boycott of Israel**. These efforts arose against the back-ground of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the presence and evacuation of British forces from the **Suez Canal** zone. Code-named the Alpha Plan, this coercive diplomacy remained secret until it was disclosed on 15 April 1955. The efforts ended in failure, as none of the principal players were ready to make the kind of concessions necessary for a peace agreement. This eventually paved the way for another Anglo-American plan named the **Ome-ga Operation**, which sought to contain **Gamal Abdel Nasser**.

See also CHAMELEON OPERATION; CZECH DEAL; GAZA RAID; JUNE WAR OF 1967; LAVON AFFAIR; NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL; SÈVRES CONFERENCE; TRIPARTITE DECLARA-TION; VOLCANO OPERATION; WARFARE; WATER.

AL-QUDS. The city of **Jerusalem** is known in Arabic as Al-Quds. Accord-ing to Islamic historiography, the city was the first *kibla* (direction of prayer) in Islam before it was changed to Mecca 16 months after Hijra (622 AD). Significant portions of the Quran are known as Al-Quds revelations, follow-ing the nocturnal journey of the Prophet Mohammed (570–632) from Mecca during which he is believed to have ascended to heaven from the rock where **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** now stands. During the reign of Umar (579–644), second caliph after Prophet Mohammed, the Islamic armies laid a siege of the city in 637 AD and captured it from Byzantine rule (c. 330–1453). The Al-Aqsa Mosque was built in 690, and since then it has been

expanded and modified many times. According to Islamic belief, the Al-Aqsa Mosque is the third-holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Medina. With the exception of the period of the Crusades (1099–1187) since the middle of the seventh century, Al-Quds remained under continuous Islamic rule until 1917 when the forces of **Great Britain** captured the city of Jerusalem.

See also ABU DIS; AL-AQSA FIRE; AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); GREATER JERUSALEM; JERUSALEM LAW/S; JERUSA-LEM PALESTINIANS; JERUSALEM VISIT; JORDAN; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES; SECURITY FENCE/S; TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL; TRANS-JORDAN; WESTERN WALL RIOTS.

ALTALENA **AFFAIR.** In June 1948, the *Altalena*, a French ship with immi-grants on board, sailed to Israel and anchored off the coast of Tel Aviv. This ship also carried arms and ammunition for the **Irgun**, the pre-state Jewish underground militia led by **Menachem Begin**. Unwilling to accept the pres-ence of private armed militia following the establishment of the state and its unified **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), Prime Minister **David Ben-Gurion** demanded that the weapons carried by the *Altalena* be handed over to the IDF. When the Irgun refused to comply, on 22 June an IDF unit led by deputy unit commander (and future prime minister) **Yitzhak Rabin** fired at and sank the ship. The determination of the government led to the disbanding of the Irgun and the absorption of its members into the IDF. The incident shaped, influenced, and even poisoned the relationship between Ben-Gurion and Begin and characterized the prolonged animosity between the two politi-cal parties that they led, respectively, Mapai (later the **Labor Party**) and Herut (later **Likud**). The sinking and the rationale behind it continues to be a controversial issue between the left and the right in Israel.

See also STERN GANG; WARFARE.

AMAL. Amal (Hope), the acronym for Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya (Lebanese Resistance Detachment), is a militant organization representing the Shia population of **Lebanon**. Though indigenous, it was founded in 1975 by Musa Sadr (1928–1978), a cleric from **Iran**, who came to Lebanon in 1957. Emerging on the eve of the civil war (1975–1989), Amal sought to reassert the Lebanese Shia population, especially in the wake of the demo-graphic shift in favor of the Sunnis following the arrival of Palestinians from **Jordan** in the aftermath of the **Black September Massacre** of 1970.

Israel's **Litani Operation** in 1978 and the expanding Israeli–Palestinian clashes in Shia-dominated southern Lebanon helped the growth of Amal. The Shia militia emerged also as a response to the militia groups operating on behalf of other sectarian groups, especially the **Phalanges** linked to Maronite

Christians. In the initial years following the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, the activities of Amal were confined to protecting Shia villages, but it was gradually sucked into the conflict and began siding with the forces of **Syria**.

The Islamic Revolution in Iran boosted its fortunes in the initial years because it was seen as an ally in the aspirations of **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini** for exporting Islamic Revolution. In August 1978, Musa Sadr disappeared while visiting Libya, and less charismatic but more secular leaders succeeded him. Amal actively pursued a militant-terrorist campaign against Western interests in Lebanon and against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the emergence of the more militant **Hezbollah** significantly eroded its influence among the Shias. Though Amal continues to be a significant player in the Lebanese political system, its importance to the Arab–Israeli conflict has been marginal.

See also LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; TERRORISM.

AMANA. This settlement movement is identified with the Israeli right wing and sought to promote Jewish settlements in the whole of **Eretz Yisrael**, especially in the **Occupied Territories**. In 1978, **Gush Emunim** established Amana to promote settlement activities, and Amana was active in opposing the Israeli withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula** and the demolition of the Yamit settlement. The first pioneering communities built by Amana were Ofra, Mevo Modi'in, Kedumim, and **Ma'ale Adumim**. Most of Amana's communities are pastoral in nature, limiting the total number of families to 200.

AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC). *See* AIPAC.

AMIR, YIGAL (1970–). A religiously observant Israeli citizen, Yigal Amir assassinated Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** on 4 November 1995 during a peace rally in Tel Aviv. During his military service, Amir served in a religious unit of the **Israel Defense Forces** and was studying at Bar-Ilan University at the time of the **assassination**. As an opponent of the **Oslo Accords**, Amir justified his action on the basis of *din rodef*, an archaic religious ruling that justified the killing of an enemy of the Jewish people in self-defense. In March 1996, he was given a life sentence and an additional eight years, which was subsequently extended to a 14-year jail term. While in prison, Amir was engaged to Larisa Trembovler (1971–), a divorced mother of four and a former Jewish immigrant from **Russia**, and their marriage was solemnized by a rabbinical court in July 2005. During his parole in October 2006, Amir fathered a son who was born on 28 October 2007. Both during his trial

and subsequently, he never expressed any remorse over the assassination, yet this has not prevented periodic demands from the Israeli right for a presidential pardon for him.

See also ERETZ YISRAEL; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP).

ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE. In November 1945, the governments of **Great Britain** and the **United States** appointed a 12-member committee of representatives to study the question of **Aliya** to Palestine and the future of **Mandate Palestine**. Following numerous meetings and hearings, including a visit to Palestine in March 1946, the committee submitted its report on 30 April 1946. It recommended, inter alia, the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants from the displaced persons (DP) camps in Europe. President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) accepted the report, especially its recommendation concerning immigration. Opposition from the region, including protest actions in Palestine, precluded the British from accepting the report, and this led to the formulation of the **Morrison-Grady Plan** of 1946.

See also MACDONALD WHITE PAPER; PARTITION PLAN.

ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE. U.S. president **George W. Bush** hosted the international conference in Annapolis during 26–27 November 2007 aimed at reviving the Middle East peace process. The conference was preceded by a number of bilateral meetings between **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) president **Mahmoud Abbas** and Israeli prime minister **Ehud Olmert** since early that year. Despite initial misgivings, the conference attracted widespread international support and 49 countries and international organizations, including **China**, **Egypt**, **India**, **Jordan**, **Russia**, and **Saudi Arabia**. It was seen as an attempt to bolster the fledgling PNA headed by Abbas, and hence **Iran**, **Syria**, and **Hamas** were not invited. In a joint declaration, Olmert and Abbas pledged to "immediately launch bilateral negotiations" toward concluding "a peace treaty to resolve all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements." However, before any progress could be made, Olmert was forced to resign due to a corruption scandal, and the Annapolis Conference was soon forgotten.

See also AL-JAZEERA PAPERS; SETTLEMENT/S; UNITED STATES.

ANNEXATION. Permanent acquisition of captured or occupied territory is the most contentious issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict. In 1950, following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the Kingdom of **Jordan** annexed the Arab-dominated areas of the **West Bank** of **Mandate Palestine**, including **East Jerusalem**. This annexation was not recognized by the international commu-

nity, but the expression "**Occupied Territories**" was never applied to the West Bank until 1967. The **United Nations** Security Council **Resolution 242**, which was adopted after the **June War of 1967**, explicitly declared "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This followed the Israeli capture of the **Sinai Peninsula** and **Gaza Strip** from **Egypt**; the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, from Jordan; and the **Golan Heights** from **Syria** during the war.

While Israel returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt following the **Camp David Accords**, its policy toward other occupied territories has been uneven. Initially Israel has refrained from formally annexing the Palestinian territories due to the demographic threats such a move would pose. Since the early 1990s, political issues such as **settlements** and support for a **two-state solution** made annexation unacceptable and problematic. East Jerusalem was an exception, and on 27 June 1967 Israel unilaterally extended its jurisdiction to East Jerusalem and surrounding areas and brought it under the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem municipality. On 30 July 1980 Israel adopted the **Jerusalem Law**, which declared the city to be the "complete and united" capital of Israel. Likewise, under the **Golan Law** adopted on 14 December 1981, Israel annexed the Golan Heights. As part of the settlement with the Palestinians, the **Clinton Parameters** suggested a **territorial swap** whereby Israel would annex some portions of the territory beyond the **Green Line** while transferring an equal size of territory to the Palestinians.

See also AL-QUDS; ARIEL; AUTONOMY PLAN; E-1 AREA; ERETZ YISRAEL; ETZION BLOC; FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION; GREATER JERUSALEM; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDAN OPTION; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; MA'ALE ADUMIM; SEA OF GALILEE; SECURITY FENCE/S.

ANNULMENT. In letters exchanged with Israel prior to the signing of the **Declaration of Principles** (DoP), **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** affirmed,

> Those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are not operative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council [PNC] for formal approval of the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

This commitment and **mutual recognition** enshrined in the letters exchanged between Israel and the PLO through Norway on 9 September 1993 paved the way for the signing of the DoP four days later.

Palestinian compliance with this commitment has remained a primary cause of disagreement between the two sides. Following the election of the **Palestinian National Authority** in January 1996, the Palestine National Congress (PNC) met in Gaza 22–25 April for an extraordinary session and decided to "cancel" the conflicting provisions of the **PLO Charter**. On the eve of the Israeli elections, on 4 May 1996, Arafat formally communicated this decision to Prime Minister **Shimon Peres**. Many in the Israeli opposition dismissed the move as vague, imprecise, illegal, and even unconstitutional under the PLO Charter. The controversy over the annulment continued, and on 10 December 1998 a full session of the Palestine Central Committee was held in Gaza. By a vote of 81 to 7 (with 7 abstentions), the PNC voted to revoke the clauses. This was ratified by a meeting of the PLO Central Committee on 14 December and was attended by U.S. president **Bill Clinton**. However, the official amended version of the PLO Charter was never published.

See also HAMAS; OSLO PROCESS; UNITED STATES.

ANTI-NORMALIZATION. There are powerful forces in a number of Arab countries that are opposed to any form of normalization of relations with Israel, even within the context of a formal peace agreement. This trend was common in **Egypt** following the **Camp David Accords** but was less formally organized. The prevalence of anti-normalization forces caused President **Hosni Mubarak** to maintain a safe distance from Israel. While he hosted a number of Israeli leaders including **Ariel Sharon**, **Benjamin Netanyahu**, **Ehud Barak**, **Shimon Peres**, and **Yitzhak Rabin**, Mubarak avoided visiting Israel primarily because of the domestic opposition to closer ties with Israel and maintained the relations as a cold peace.

The forces opposed to normalization with Israel are more organized in the Kingdom of **Jordan** and are spearheaded by the **Islamic Action Front**, the political wing of the **Muslim Brotherhood**. Through periodic rallies, public protests, and parliamentary moves, the anti-normalization forces in Jordan have been seeking to annul the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty**, terminate diplomatic relations, and expel the Israeli ambassador in Amman. The Jordanians of Palestinian origin, or West Bankers, play a prominent role in anti-normalization protests.

See also ACADEMIC BOYCOTT; APARTHEID; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; BOYCOTT, DISINVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS); CORRIE, RACHEL (1979–2003); DAVOS CONTROVERSY; DURBAN CONFERENCE/S; FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; FREE GAZA MOVEMENT; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; *HUDNA*; IHH; INTERFAITH DIALOGUE; INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT

(ISM); KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); *PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION*; QATAR; RESOLUTION 3379; SULH; WARFARE.

APARTHEID. The term refers to racial segregation that existed in **South Africa** before 1994, and the expression has been employed to describe Israel and some of its policies toward the Palestinians. A number of Israeli, Palestinian, and international personalities have drawn a parallel between Israel's policy toward the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** and the pre-1994 South African policy toward its non-white population. The prevalence of strong political and military ties between Israel and South Africa during the apartheid era was used to bracket Israel within the racial context. The apartheid analogy, however, has been controversial.

The most significant move in condemning Israel's policy as a form of racial discrimination came in November 1975 when **Zionism** was described as a form of racism. With the help of Arab and Islamic countries and the wider **Non-Aligned Movement**, the **United Nations** General Assembly overwhelmingly passed **Resolution 3379**, which described Zionism as a form of racism. This move came when there was no significant movement toward a peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and before the **Palestine Liberation Organization** was prepared to accept UN **Resolution 181** and thereby recognize the State of Israel. Shortly after the **Madrid Conference**, in December 1991, the UN annulled Resolution 3379.

This racism charge was resurrected during the **Durban Conference** of 2001. Disappointed by the slow progress of the **Oslo Accords**, some countries sought to describe Israel's policy as a racial discrimination. This move was spearheaded by **Iran**, which played a significant role in the drafting of the conference agenda. Israel's restriction of movements of Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories has often been described as a manifestation of apartheid. Periodic calls for the **academic boycott** of Israel and **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** have been justified within the context of apartheid. The **security fence** between Israel and the West Bank has been described by some as an apartheid wall. A book by former U.S. president **Jimmy Carter** published in 2006 was called *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid*.

See also INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM); WARFARE.

AQABA SUMMIT. Against the background of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and partial reforms introduced by **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat**, King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan** hosted a summit meeting in the port city of Aqaba on 4 June 2003. It was attended by U.S. president

George W. Bush, Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon**, and the newly appointed Palestinian prime minister **Mahmoud Abbas**. Arafat, however, was not invited. This was preceded by a meeting in Sharm al-Sheikh a day earlier, where Bush met Abdullah, President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt**, Crown Prince Abdullah of **Saudi Arabia**, and King Hamad al-Khalifa of Bahrain. In a statement issued after the Aqaba Summit, Sharon referred to the possibility of establishing a demilitarized **State of Palestine** within temporary borders if certain conditions were met. The leaders also endorsed a peace plan sponsored by the Quartet comprising the **United States**, the **United Nations**, the **European Union**, and **Russia**, which called for reciprocal steps to be taken by Israel and the PNA toward creating an independent Palestinian state by 2005.

See also ABDULLAH, KING (1924–2015); HAMAS; QUARTET ROAD MAP; SUICIDE ATTACK/S.

ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL. As the Jewish **Aliya** into **Mandate Palestine** continued, since the early 1920s the Arabs of Palestine campaigned for boycotting products and services offered by the Jewish community of Palestine or **Yishuv**. This partly contributed to the determination of the latter to rely exclusively on "Hebrew labor." In December 1945, months after its formation, the **Arab League** called for a complete economic boycott of the Jews of Palestine, which was extended to the State of Israel after the **Declaration of Independence**. Later on, the office of the Arab Boycott of Israel was established in Damascus with regional branches in various Arab countries.

Initially the boycott covered only the economic activities of Israel, but it was gradually extended to other countries when secondary and third-party boycotts were introduced. A number of firms and corporations doing business with Israel were put on the Arab blacklist and were prohibited from doing business in member states of the Arab League. The boycott was aimed at preventing foreign enterprises from investing in Israel, establishing plants, or granting franchises to Israeli companies. Over the years, a number of Western airlines were prevented from using Arab airspace for any flights to and from Israel, and a **naval blockade** was imposed on ships calling at Israeli ports. A number of Western countries, especially the **United States**, sought to introduce domestic legislation to prevent national companies from complying with the demands of the Arab boycott.

The Arab boycott was also extended to the political arena. In the early 1950s, the Arab League decided not to participate in any regional conferences, gatherings, or organizations if Israel was to be a participant, and this led to Israel's exclusion from the **Bandung Conference** in April 1955. The threat of political boycott led to Israel's exclusion from all Third World groupings, especially the **Non-Aligned Movement**.

The enforcement of the boycott has not been uniform, and Israel has managed to attract significant foreign investment. At the same time, the economic boycott affected Israel's progress, while the Arab-linked political boycott contributed to Israel's prolonged isolation and its growing condemnation by the **United Nations** and other international bodies.

The signing of the **Camp David Accords** removed **Egypt** from boycotting Israel, but the real progress was made following the **Madrid Conference** of 1991. In the wake of the **Oslo Accords** and the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** in September 1994, the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council announced the termination of the secondary boycott of Israel, and some Arab states established low-level trade missions in Israel. The annual **MENA Economic Summit**, inaugurated in November 1994, further dented the Arab boycott.

The deterioration of the peace process and the onset of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** rekindled boycott calls. The Arab League renewed its call for the political isolation of Israel, and at its meeting in Cairo on 21 October 2000, the league urged its member states to suspend normalization of relations with Israel. The Intifada has significantly reversed the normalization process, and Arab states have not only reintroduced the economic boycott but also frozen, suspended, or withdrawn their limited political relations with Israel. While countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Qatar closed down their trade offices, in November 2001 Egypt recalled its long-serving ambassador from Israel, and **Jordan** postponed the nomination of its new ambassador to Israel. After long behind-the-scenes negotiations, at the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit (2005)** both Arab countries agreed to return ambassadors to Israel. As part of its efforts to secure membership in the World Trade Organization, in November 2005 **Saudi Arabia** agreed to lift its economic embargo against Israel.

Lack of progress in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations resulted in grassroots movements in many non-Arab countries to demand political, economic, and even **academic boycotts** of Israel. Some of these movements are spearheaded by the Palestinians but others by pro-Palestinian groups in the West. Among these groups, the academic boycott of Israel and the **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaign are the most notable and influential. Some of these protest groups have managed to limit or even cancel visits by artists and cultural figures to Israel.

See also ANTI-NORMALIZATION; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; ARIEL; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; DURBAN CONFERENCE/S; FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; FREE GAZA MOVEMENT; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; GAS DEAL; GOLDSTONE REPORT; IHH; INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE; INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM); *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); OIL CRISIS; PALMER REPORT; *PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION*; REJECTIONIST FRONT; RESOLUTION 3379; WAR CRIMES; WARFARE.

ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP). The first Arab party in Israel was founded in February 1988 on the eve of the 12th Knesset elections. Abdul Wahab Darawshe (1943–), then a Knesset member, broke away from the **Labor Party** and formed the ADP. He was protesting against the policies of the party—then a partner in the national unity government (1984–1990) under Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir**—toward the **First Intifada**. Even though there were a number of attempts in the past, the political climate was not conducive for the **Israeli Arabs** to form an independent political party that would be exclusively Arab and would articulate the aspirations and demands of the Arab citizens of Israel. The ADP has been championing Palestinian rights, including the formation of an independent Palestinian state in the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**, with **East Jerusalem** as its capital. Domestically, it seeks equal rights for Israeli Arabs on par with Jewish citizens of Israel.

In 1988, the ADP crossed the threshold margin of 1 percent, and Darawshe entered the Knesset as the first member of an Arab political party. In the 13th Knesset elections held in 1992, the party secured two seats. Despite its desire and efforts, Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** was not prepared to include the ADP as part of the ruling coalition. At the same time, the defections from the ruling Labor Party and the withdrawal of **Shas** from the ruling coalition forced Rabin to treat the ADP and **Hadash** as part of the bloc majority and pursue the **Oslo Accords**. Political and Knesset support of the ADP was critical for the **Knesset approval** of the Oslo I and **Oslo II** Agreements on 24 September 1993 and 5 October 1995, respectively. In return for its support to the Labor-led government during 1992–1996, the ADP sought and obtained political and economic concessions aimed at improving the living standards of the Israeli Arabs. Though marginal, this period showed significant improvement in state financing for the Arab sector, and the ADP could take some credit for the same. Since the 1996 elections, the ADP has been contesting the elections as part of the **United Arab List** and has been represented in the Knesset.

See also ARAB PARTIES; BALAD; CONSCRIPTION; ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF ISRAEL; NATIONAL SERVICE; OCTOBER RIOTS; ZIONISM.

ARAB EXECUTIVE. The Arab Executive was set up in Haifa in December 1920 during the third Palestine national congress. It was headed by Mussa al-Husseini (1850–1934) who briefly served as the mayor of **Jerusalem**. This was the first attempt to politically unite various Palestinian groups and organizations to protest against Jewish immigration into **Mandate Palestine**, or **Aliya**. It sought formal recognition from the Mandate authorities, especially in the wake of the formation of the **Jewish Agency**. Husseini held numerous diplomatic parleys with **Great Britain** and unsuccessfully sought to have

the **Balfour Declaration** revoked. The executive disappeared following Husseini's death in March 1934, and its activities were taken over by the **Arab Higher Committee**, formed two years later.

See also AL-HUSSEINI, HAJJ AMIN (1897–1974).

ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (AHC). On 25 April 1936, grand mufti **Hajj Amin al-Husseini** formed the Arab Higher Committee as an umbrella organization, comprising six Arab parties and groups. It sought to unify and strengthen various Palestinian political parties and organizations in the aftermath of the demise of the **Arab Executive** headed by Mussa al-Husseini (1850–1934). The committee was primarily concerned about the growing **Aliya** into Palestine and its consequences for the demography of **Mandate Palestine**. Protesting against both of these developments, the AHC organized a series of strike actions in 1936 that lasted for six months. This gradually transformed into an open revolt against the Mandate authorities.

Accusing the AHC of directing the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**, the British banned the committee in October 1937 and deported some of its leaders to the Seychelles Islands. Even though the popular rebellion continued, the committee experienced internal differences, and some members left the group and formed a separate body called the Arab Higher Front. For his part, in 1937 the mufti escaped from Palestine and directed the AHC from abroad. Due to its changed policies toward the mufti, **Great Britain** did not invite the AHC to the **St**. **James Conference** of 1939.

In April 1947, when the **United Nations** General Assembly convened a special session to discuss the Palestine question, the AHC was invited to present the Palestinian case, but it declined. Similarly, it boycotted the proceedings of the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine** when that body visited Palestine to deliberate and decide the future political status of the Mandate. The AHC organized a general strike when the UN team came to Palestine. It led the Arab opposition to the **Partition Plan**, and in September 1948, meeting in Gaza, the AHC declared Palestinian independence and announced the formation of an **All Palestine Government** (APG). The APG soon folded up due to the control of the **West Bank** by **Jordan** and Jordanian opposition to the mufti's leadership.

See also GAZA STRIP; JERICHO CONFERENCE.

ARAB LEAGUE. In late 1944, six Arab countries—**Egypt**, **Iraq**, **Lebanon**, **Saudi Arabia**, **Transjordan**, and Yemen, along with a representative from the **Mandate Palestine**—met and deliberated on the idea of a commonwealth or league of Arab states. A protocol to this effect was signed at the Egyptian resort of Alexandria on 7 October 1944, and the Charter of the Arab League came into force on 10 May 1945. Despite calls for unification and

federation among Arab states, the charter opted for regional cooperation among member states and for an association based on "respect for the independence and sovereignty" of Arab states.

An appendix to the charter stressed the right of Palestine to be independent and pledged Arab support for the Palestinian struggle. This manifested in Arab states launching a war on Israel the day after it was proclaimed on 14 May 1948. The league was unable to prevent the Jordanian **annexation** of the West Bank following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. The support of the league was critical for the international recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians and support for a Palestinian state.

In January 1964, the heads of the Arab states met in Cairo for the first summit meeting to discuss and overcome inter-Arab differences. Even though the results were limited, the meeting established a precedent for a periodic summit meeting of the Arab League devoted to various intra-Arab and inter-regional issues. Subsequently, summit meetings have been held in September 1964 (Alexandria); September 1965 (Casablanca); August–September 1967 (Khartoum); December 1969 (Rabat); September 1970 (Cairo); November 1973 (Algiers); October–November 1974 (Rabat); October 1976 (Cairo); November 1978 (Baghdad); November 1979 (Tunis); November 1980 (Amman); September 1981 (Fez); September 1982 (Fez); August 1985 (Casablanca); November 1987 (Amman); June 1988 (Algiers); May 1989 (Casablanca); May 1990 (Baghdad); August 1990 (Cairo); June 1996 (Cairo); October 2000 (Cairo); March 2001 (Amman); March 2003 (Beirut); May 2004 (Tunis); March 2005 (Algiers); March 2006 (Khartoum); March 2007 (Riyadh); March 2008 (Damascus); March 2009 (Doha); March 2010 (Sirte, Libya); March 2012 (Baghdad); March 2013 (Doha); and March 2014 (Kuwait). Most of these summits were dominated by the Arab–Israeli conflict, and some of them were also overshadowed by boycotts and acrimonious disagreements.

The **Arab Spring** has cast a gloom over the Arab League, and no summit meeting was held in 2011. The league's support for the Libyan opposition paved the way for the **United Nations** sanctions that subsequently resulted in the military campaign led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011). The Arab League has been divided over the **Arab Spring in Syria**, and in November 2011 it suspended the membership of **Syria**, a move backed by **Qatar**; during the March 2013 Doha summit, the Syria opposition took the seat in the league.

See also ABDULLAH PLAN; ANTI-NORMALIZATION; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; EGYPT–ISRAEL PEACE TREATY; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM); NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); RABAT ARAB SUMMIT.

ARAB LEGION. At the time of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the Arab Legion was the most effective and best-organized Arab fighting force. Established by **Great Britain** in 1920–1921 when the Emirate of **Transjordan** was formed, the legion was funded, trained, and commanded by British officers. Until 1939, it was led by Lt. Col. F. G. Peake (1886–1970) and was followed by Sir John Bagot Glubb (popularly known as Glubb Pasha [1897–1986]).

When Jordan became an independent country in 1946, the legion became a regular army but continued to receive British subsidies, supplies, and advice. During the 1948 war, under Glubb Pasha, it was instrumental in the military successes of King **Abdullah I** in areas that the **Partition Plan** had allotted to the Arab Palestinian state, and in the capture of **East Jerusalem**. Other Arab countries and Palestinians blamed the Arab Legion for its failure to prevent the formation of the Jewish state and for the limited and restricted Arab advances in eastern Palestine.

Bowing to nationalist and anti-colonialist sentiments in the region, on 1 March 1956 King **Hussein** of **Jordan** dismissed Glubb Pasha and transferred the legion's leadership to Jordanian commanders, and in 1969 the legion was renamed as the Jordanian Armed Forces.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); WARFARE.

ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA). The Arab Liberation Army was an irregular force that played an important role in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. On the eve of the termination of the British **Mandate** over Palestine, **Syria** took over the responsibility for organizing, training, and arming the group of Arab volunteers. Recruited through centers set up in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Cairo, they were headed by Fawzi Kaukji (1890–1977), who had served in the Ottoman army during World War I (1914–1918). At the height of the 1948 war, the ALA had a strength of 5,000 fighters and was active in northeast Palestine as well as in the **Jerusalem** area. It bore the brunt of the fighting in the Castle area when the Jewish **Palmah** forces sought to lift the siege of Jerusalem by opening the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road.

See also GREAT BRITAIN; NACHSHON OPERATION; WARFARE.

ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF). The Jabhat at-Tahrir al-Arabiyya, or Arab Liberation Front, was founded by Zeid Haidar and Munif al-Razzaz (1919–1984) as a militant, pan-Arabist, and left-leaning group within the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Sponsored by the Ba'ath Party of **Iraq** and based in Baghdad, it was under the direct command of the Iraqi military and followed Iraqi positions on Middle East issues. It remained loyal

to **Yasser Arafat** during the 1983 coup backed by **Syria** against the Palestinian leader. Playing a key role in the **Rejectionist Front**, it is represented in the PLO Executive but remained less active.

ARAB PALESTINE CONGRESS. With the backing of Arab leaders, especially President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**, Palestinian leaders met on 28 May 1964 in the old city of **Jerusalem**, then held by **Jordan**, and announced the formation of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) under the leadership of Ahmed Shuqeiri (1908–1980). The congress adopted the **PLO Charter** comprising 29 articles.

See also WEST BANK.

ARAB PARTIES. Political parties that champion the rights and demands of the **Israeli Arabs** are commonly referred as Arab parties. This is a misnomer as it includes the exclusively Arab parties as well as the communist parties. The **al-Ard** movement was the first effort by the Israeli Arabs to organize themselves politically, but it was throttled by the state. The **military administration** imposed on the Arab-inhabited areas of Israel until 1966 was an impediment to the political organization of the Arab citizens. Hence for a long time the community parties like Maki (1948–1965), Rakah (1965–1977), and **Hadash** remained the only options for the Israeli Arabs wishing to support and vote for parties that were not Zionist in their orientation. Progressive List Peace, a party committed to Jewish–Arab co-existence, was represented in the Knesset during 1984–1992, but disappeared in 1992 when it failed to cross the 1.5 percent threshold margin.

The first exclusively Arab party, the **Arab Democratic Party**, was formed in 1988 on the eve of the 12th Knesset elections. In 1995 **Balad** emerged as a nationalist and non-communist alternative championing equal rights of Arab citizens. In 1996, a larger faction of the **Islamic Movement of Israel** decided to contest the Knesset elections and has been represented in the Knesset since then. At times, some of these parties contest the Knesset elections as a joint list or as a **United Arab List**, thereby increasing their Knesset representation. As a result, the size of the Arab parties has increased over time.

For long, left-wing Zionist parties have been giving representation to Israel's Arab minorities, though initially such representations were confined to Druze and Christian populations. Mapai, the forerunner of Meretz (1988–), was in the forefront of fielding Arabs in its list. From the first elections held in January 1949, the **Labor Party** had a separate Arab list affiliated to the party. This practice was discontinued following a decline in Arab support, and since 1981 the Arab candidates are placed within the one united Labor list. Other parties, such as **Kadima**, have elected Arabs on their list. The **Likud** Party has been fielding candidates belonging only to the Druze com-

munity, whose members perform **conscription** in the **Israel Defense Forces**. Other right-wing parties and religious parties do not grant representation to Arab citizens.

Arab parties have never been part of the ruling coalition since 1948. During 1992–1995, Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** treated them as part of the bloc majority that enabled him to pursue the **Oslo Accords** and conclude the Oslo I and **Oslo II** Agreements. Inclusion of Arab parties as part of the ruling coalition is still not kosher in Israel. In March 2001, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** took the credit for appointing the first Arab cabinet minister when he named Saleh Tariq (1954–), a member of the Labor Party, as a minister without portfolio.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); FIRST INTIFADA (1987–1993); NATIONAL SERVICE; OCTOBER RIOTS; PRICE TAG ATTACKS; TUBA ZANGARIA MOSQUE ATTACK; ZIONISM.

ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE. Against the backdrop of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and growing criticisms in the West against Islamic radicalism following the September 11 attacks on the **United States**, the then crown prince, and later king, **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia**, came out with a peace initiative in February 2002. Anchored on the **land-for-peace** principle, the **Abdullah Plan** offered conditional Arab recognition of Israel in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line**. With some modifications, the **Arab League** formally accepted the proposal at the Beirut Summit held in March 2002. Recognizing the concerns of **Lebanon** and **Syria** over the **refugee** question, the Arab Peace Initiative implicitly included the **United Nations** General Assembly **Resolution 194** that promised the Palestinian refugees the **right to return** to their homes or to be paid compensation. Though the initiative was adopted unanimously, some of the key personalities including Prince Abdullah, President **Hosni Mubarak**, and King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan** were absent from Beirut. **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**, whose **Ramallah** compound was surrounded by the **Israel Defense Forces**, was prevented from attending the meeting. In March 2007 the Riyadh Arab Summit reiterated the initiative. Initially the Israeli government rejected the initiative over the inclusion of the right of the refugees to return, but subsequently the spate of **terrorism** intensified its opposition.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); FAHD PLAN; FEZ PLAN; SIEGE OF RAMALLAH.

ARAB REVOLT (1916–1918). Acting on the promises of **Great Britain** expressed through the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** and aimed at creating an independent Arab kingdom comprising Hijaz, **Syria**, and Mesopotamia (now **Iraq**), on 10 June 1916 Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of

Mecca proclaimed Arab independence and called on his followers to rebel against the **Ottoman Empire**. Besides financial support to the tune of £200,000 per month, Britain also provided the revolt with arms, provisions, and direct artillery support, as well as guerrilla experts, including T. E. Lawrence (or Lawrence of Arabia, 1888–1935). Composed primarily of Bedouins from Hijaz, the Arab army attracted a small number of Arab officers serving in the Ottoman army. Despite differences over its contribution to Allied war efforts, the Arab Revolt was seen as the harbinger of Arab nationalism.

   See also BALFOUR DECLARATION; FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENT; MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE; SAUDI ARABIA; TRANSJORDAN; WARFARE.

ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939). Local rioting that erupted in Jaffa on 19 April 1936 soon spread and engulfed the whole of **Mandate Palestine**. Young Muslim groups affiliated with **Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of **Jerusalem**, organized strikes in Nablus, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, which quickly spread to other Arab-populated areas. Arab discontent over increasing **Aliya** into Palestine provided the impetus for the uprising, which took the form of popular protests against the British administration and its complicity and connivance in facilitating the Aliya. The **Arab Higher Committee**, with the mufti as its head, was formed to serve as the authoritative leadership of the Palestinian Arabs. The general strike organized by the committee made three distinct demands—namely, self-government for Palestine, an end to Aliya, and stoppage of land sales to Jews. The advocacy of a small Jewish state in Palestine by the **Peel Commission** only aggravated the Arab protests. Even though the prolonged agitation did not succeed in achieving any of these demands, it forced the Palestinian agenda on the Mandate authorities. A six-month general strike was followed by large-scale violence, which lasted until the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945).

   See also AL-QUDS; BALFOUR DECLARATION; BLACK LETTER; FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENT; GREAT BRITAIN; HAYCRAFT COMMISSION; HEBRON MASSACRE (1929); HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION; MACDONALD WHITE PAPER; PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER; WARFARE.

ARAB SPRING. This expression is used to describe the wave of popular protests in the Arab world that began with the self-immolation of marginalized vegetable vender Mohamed Bouazizi (1984–2011) in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on 17 December 2010. His death on 4 January 2011 sparked off popular protests against President Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali (1936–), forcing him to flee to **Saudi Arabia** on 14 January 2011. Since then, similar protests have spread across the Arab world.

Taking their cue from the Tunisian example, on 25 January 2011 thousands of Egyptians assembled in **Tahrir Square** in Cairo and protested against President **Hosni Mubarak**. As public protests increased on 11 February 2011, Mubarak resigned from office and handed over power to the military. In the presidential elections held in June 2012, **Mohammed Morsi** of the **Muslim Brotherhood** was elected, but he was deposed by the military on 3 July 2013 due to mounting popular protests.

In Libya the Arab Spring took a different turn. The refusal of Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011) to concede to the demands of the protesters was followed by the regime using force against protesters. This eventually led to an intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Qaddafi was eventually caught on 20 August 2011 and lynched by a mob. In Yemen, after a prolonged civil war, on 27 February 2012 President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1942–) abdicated power in favor of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (1945–).

The **Arab Spring in Syria** began on 15 March 2011 and has been continuing since then. The refusal of President **Bashar al-Assad** to accept popular demands for reforms was followed by a military crackdown on the opposition, which soon plunged the country into a civil war situation. A number of external players are active in support of the government and opposition forces. The regime is supported politically and militarily by **Russia**, and, backed by **China**, Russia has prevented the **United Nations** Security Council from adopting any resolution on Syria. The opposition forces, largely composed of jihadi elements, are backed by **Qatar** and Saudi Arabia with financial and military support.

Similar protests are prevalent in other countries such as Bahrain, **Jordan**, Kuwait, Oman, and parts of Saudi Arabia. The common thread of the Arab Spring is popular disenchantment with authoritarian rulers, anger and disappointment among the bulging youth population, economic disparity, widespread corruption, and lack of governance. More than four years after the outbreak of unrest, there are no clear models or road maps that would answer most of these problems.

There are two notable outcomes. One, Islamist forces are the major beneficiaries of the Arab Spring, and whenever free and fair elections were held since 2011 in the Middle East, they have won considerable popular support. This victory is not overwhelming, and hence they would have to negotiate with other segments of the population, especially the secular elements. Two, the Arab-Israeli conflict is marginal to the Arab Spring. The victory of Islamists in many countries, particularly Egypt, was not followed by any dramatic change in the policy of these countries toward Israel. President Morsi and his allies were quick to point out the importance of the **Camp David Accords** and their usefulness to Egypt. Hopes of **Hamas** for a reversal of the Egyptian attitude have not materialized, and the Egyptian position on issues

such as **tunnels** between the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula** or the firing of **Qassam** rockets into Israel have been governed by security concerns of Egypt rather than Islamist solidarity with Hamas. The same holds true for the anticipated normalization of relations between Egypt and **Iran** during Morsi's brief tenure as president.

See also ABDULLAH, KING (1924–2015); ABDULLAH II, KING (1962–); AL-NAQBA; ARAB LEAGUE; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; CAIRO EMBASSY ATTACK; EILAT TERROR ATTACK; GAS DEAL; GOLAN HEIGHTS; HEZBOLLAH; IRAN; PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION; SECURITY FENCE/S; SINAI VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; TURKEY; UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF); UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT. This refers to the popular protests that began in **Tahrir Square** in Cairo on 25 January 2011 against President **Hosni Mubarak**, which eventually led to his resignation on 11 February 2011 and his subsequent incarceration and trial. In the presidential elections held in June 2012, **Mohammed Morsi** of the **Muslim Brotherhood** was elected but was deposed by the military on 3 July 2013 due to mounting popular protests.

The protests against Mubarak caused fears and anxiety in Israel. For nearly three decades Mubarak was instrumental in keeping the Egypt–Israel cold peace, and he played a key role in Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. His role was crucial in efforts for a temporary cease-fire between **Hamas** and Israel following the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. The **Siege of Gaza** was not possible without tacit Egyptian cooperation and restrictions imposed upon the **Rafah Crossing**. The anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Islamists, the principal beneficiaries of the **Arab Spring**, in the past added to Israeli concerns. Hence, some Israeli leaders were critical of U.S. president **Barack Obama** for hastily "abandoning" a longtime friend. Israel soon came to terms with Mubarak's departure and began dealing with the new political leadership in Egypt, even during the brief tenure of President Morsi until he was overthrown by the military on 3 July 2013.

Once in office, President Morsi and his allies were quick to point out the importance of the **Camp David Accords** and their usefulness to Egypt. Hopes of Hamas for a reversal of the Egyptian attitude did not materialize, and Egyptian policy on issues such as **tunnels** between the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula** or the firing of **Qassam** rockets into Israel have been governed more by the security concerns of Egypt than by Islamist solidarity with Hamas. The same holds true for the anticipated normalization of relations between Egypt and **Iran** following Morsi's victory. Under President Morsi, there were political interactions between Egypt and the Islamist leaders of Hamas and Iran.

See also ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; CAIRO EMBASSY ATTACK; EI-LAT TERROR ATTACK; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); GAS DEAL; HANIYEH, ISMAIL (1963–); JORDAN; MUSLIM BROTHER-HOOD (MB); PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION; PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; QATAR; SAUDI ARABIA; SECURITY FENCE/S; SINAI VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; UNITED STATES.

ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA. The Arab Spring in **Syria**, which began on 15 March 2011, has been continuing. The refusal of President **Bashar al-Assad** to accept popular demands for political reforms was followed by a military crackdown on the opposition, which plunged Syria into a civil war. A number of external players are active in support of the government and opposition forces. The regime is supported politically and militarily by **Russia** and, with the help of **China**, Russia has prevented the **United Nations** Security Council from adopting any resolution on the Syrian situation. The opposition forces, largely composed of jihadi elements, are backed by Qatar and **Saudi Arabia**, which provide them with financial and military support.

The initial Israeli indifference toward Syria was marred by three developments. Since 1993, various Palestinian groups opposed to **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat**, the **Oslo Process**, and the **Palestinian National Authority** have enjoyed the support of **Hafez al-Assad** and later his son Bashar, and they operated from Damascus. The continuing unrest resulted in Hamas and its key leaders such as **Khalid Masha'al** and **Musa Abu-Marzok** leaving Syria for **Qatar** and **Jordan**. The crisis in Syria facilitated Hamas–Jordan reconciliation and also affected the Palestinian **refugees** living in Syria. Second, **Hezbollah** came to the rescue of Syria, and since mid-2012 its militants have been fighting alongside the government forces. In return for its support for the regime, Hezbollah has been receiving fresh supplies of arms from Syria and **Iran**. In May 2013, Israel carried out two strikes inside Syria against a weapons depot and convoys meant for Hezbollah. This was the first occasion Israel directly got involved in the **Arab Spring**. Third, as part of its efforts to shore up support, Russia has pledged to sell S-300 missile systems to Syria, which could considerably reduce Israel's freedom of operations against Syria and **Lebanon** and thereby raise speculations of more intense Israeli involvement in Syria.

See also AL-NAQBA; ARAB LEAGUE; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; GOLAN HEIGHTS; HAWATMEH, NAYEF (1938–); LEBANON; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; TERRORISM; UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF); UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948. The Arab–Israeli War, which was fought in the months following the formation of the State of Israel, intensified the Arab–Jewish conflict in Palestine. The military events of that war, however, began in November 1947 and ended with the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreements** in early 1949. They can be broadly classified into seven distinct phases.

The *first phase* began just after the adoption of the **Partition Plan** by the **United Nations** General Assembly on 29 November 1947 and lasted until 14 May 1948, the date the **Declaration of Independence** was proclaimed and the State of Israel formed. Following an announcement by **Great Britain** that it would withdraw its forces from **Mandate Palestine** by 15 May 1948, both Arab and Jewish forces sought to consolidate their advantages by securing military assets and strategic positions that were being vacated or abandoned by the British. This facts-on-the-ground strategy was accompanied by a series of low-level violence and underground operations. This period also witnessed the Jewish forces gaining control and access to predominantly Arab areas and the beginning of a mass exodus of Arab **refugees** out of Palestine.

The *second phase* (14 May–11 June 1948) began with the declaration of Israeli independence and continued until the first UN-enforced truce came into force. On 15 May, the day the Mandate officially ended, the regular armies of the Arab states neighboring Palestine—**Egypt**, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and **Syria**—as well as troops from **Iraq** and volunteers from Morocco, **Saudi Arabia**, Sudan, and Yemen, launched an invasion into the erstwhile Mandate territory. During this period, Israel managed to survive as a state but suffered numerous casualties and could not hold most of the areas allotted to it under the Partition Plan. The *third phase* (11 June–6 July 1948) covered the period of the UN-sponsored truce. Israel successfully exploited the truce to reorganize, reequip, and plan its positions, which proved decisive when fighting resumed. During this phase, internal political divisions and lack of military preparedness on the Arab side became apparent. These precluded any coordinated Arab politico-military strategy against Israel.

The *fourth phase*, also referred to as the "ten days' offensive," lasted from 8 to 18 July 1948. During this phase, Israel consolidated its gains, repulsed Arab armies on all fronts, and greatly expanded the areas under its control. The Negev, which was allotted to the Jews by the Partition Plan, still remained outside Israel's control and was partially occupied by Egyptian forces. However, Israeli forces captured the Arab towns of Lydda (now Lod) and Ramleh, and these conquests resulted in the fleeing of most of the Arab residents.

A second UN-enforced truce came into force on 18 July 1948 and marked the *fifth phase* of the Arab–Israeli War, and this lasted until October. This period witnessed UN mediatory efforts toward a peace agreement between Israel and the neighboring Arab states and the **assassination** of **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) by Jewish extremists.

The *sixth phase* began on 15 October 1948 when Israel broke the truce and launched an offensive against Egypt. During this phase, the Negev was captured and incorporated into Israel. Advancing southward, Israeli forces also managed to reach the eastern shores of the **Gulf of Aqaba**, ousting a small Jordanian contingent and gaining an outlet to the Red Sea. A similar offensive in the north resulted in Israeli gains in Galilee.

The *seventh phase* of the first Arab–Israeli War was marked by intense negotiations on the Greek island of Rhodes and the signing of the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, even while negotiating and concluding the Armistice Agreements, Israel sought to gain additional territories. Following fighting during 5–10 March 1949 in the Negev, Israeli forces moved southward and captured the port town of Eilat.

During the war, Israel suffered substantial casualties—more than 6,000, including 1,500 civilians, were killed, and another 3,000 wounded. On the Arab side, about 2,000 members of the invading armies were killed, along with an unknown number of irregulars and civilians. When the Armistice Agreements were signed, Israel controlled a territory of about 20,770 square kilometers—roughly 5,000 square kilometers more than it had been allotted under the UN plan. About 5,700 square kilometers of territory of Mandate Palestine or the **West Bank** came under Jordanian control, while the 360-square-kilometer **Gaza Strip** came under Egyptian control. The war also resulted in the mass exodus of Arab populations from the erstwhile Mandate Palestine and witnessed the birth of the refugee problem.

See also ABDULLAH I, KING (1882–1951); ANNEXATION; AL-HUSSEINI, HAJJ AMIN (1897–1974); AL-NAQBA; ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT (APG); *ALTALENA* AFFAIR; ARAB LEAGUE; BALFOUR DECLARATION; BERNADOTTE PLAN; DALET PLAN; DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE; DEKEL OPERATION; EAST JERUSALEM; FACT OPERATION; GREEN LINE; HAGANAH; HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT; HIRAM OPERATION; HOREV OPERATION; IRGUN; ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); ISRAELI ARABS; JERICHO CONFERENCE; KINNERET OPERATION; MACCABEE OPERATION; NACHSHON OPERATION; ONE-STATE SOLUTION; PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC); PALMAH; RESOLUTION 194; SCISSORS OPERATION; STERN GANG; TRANSJORDAN; UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA); UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP); UVDA OPERATION; VOLCANO OPERATION; WARFARE; ZIONISM.

ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004). Founder of **Fatah**, chairman of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) from 1969, and head of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) from 1996 until his death in November 2004, Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Rauf Arafat, also known as Abu Ammar, was born on 4 August 1929 in a merchant family from Khan Yunis in **Mandate Palestine**. Though he claimed **Jerusalem** to be the city of his birth, it is believed that he was born in Cairo during his father's temporary residence in **Egypt**. A distant relative of the prominent Jerusalem-based Husseini family, Arafat spent most of his childhood in Cairo and Jerusalem. Following the establishment of Israel, he became a **refugee**. In 1954, as an engineering student in Cairo, along with Abu Jihad (c. 1935–1988) and Abu Iyad (1934–1991), he founded a clandestine group that later transformed into Fatah. In 1957, during the campaign of President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** against the **Muslim Brotherhood**, Arafat was expelled from Egypt because of his membership in the organization. During 1958–1962, Arafat was employed as a civil engineer in Kuwait, after which he moved to Beirut and Damascus. Fatah was formed on 10 October 1959, and between 1956 and 1965 Arafat was active in recruiting and organizing Palestinian refugees in the **Diaspora**.

In March 1968, Palestinian commandos launched a successful raid against Israel in the battle of Karameh. Against the backdrop of the **June War of 1967**, when the Arab states were militarily defeated by Israel, this operation enhanced the prestige of Fatah and its leader. In July, ending four years of boycott, Fatah attended the fifth session of the Palestine National Council. In February 1969, Arafat took over the leadership of the revamped PLO, which had transformed itself into an umbrella Palestinian organization. Thereafter, he led the Palestinian struggle for independence. The absence of a territorial base to conduct military operations against Israel and the dispersal of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East compelled Arafat to depend upon the Arab states for political support, economic largess, and military assistance. However, this relationship has often been tense and troubled.

In September 1970, Arafat helped organize a civil war in **Jordan** aimed at ousting the regime of King **Hussein** and replacing it with a PLO-dominated government. This eventually led to the military crackdown or **Black September Massacre** which resulted in the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan and its relocation to Lebanon. Despite initial opposition from Jordan, in 1974 at the **Rabat Arab Summit**, Arafat was able to secure Arab recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO–Jordan tensions remained unresolved until February 1985, when Arafat and King Hussein reached an agreement on a Jordanian–Palestinian confederation. This did not go down well within the PLO, and Arafat made peace with his critics in April 1987 by annulling the accord.

After his expulsion from Jordan in September 1970, Lebanon emerged as the territorial base for Arafat's military operations against Israel. In June 1982, Israel carried out the **Peace for Galilee Operation** and invaded Lebanon with the aim of eliminating Beirut as the base for Palestinian guerrilla operations. Consequently, in August 1982, Arafat and his forces were evacuated from Beirut under international auspices, and he and the PLO headquarters moved to Tunis. Meanwhile, Arafat's relations with Egypt were strained following President **Anwar Sadat**'s peace initiatives toward Israel and the conclusion of the **Camp David Talks**.

During the Cold War period, Arafat established personal contacts with the leadership of the Soviet Union and **China** and secured ideological support and military supplies from these countries. The high point of Arafat's diplomacy was his address to the **United Nations** General Assembly on 22 November 1974 and the passage of **Resolution 3236**, which secured observer status for the PLO. The eruption of the **First Intifada** in December 1987 enhanced Arafat's position and led to the adoption of the **Algiers Declaration** on 15 November 1988, which declared the establishment of the **State of Palestine**.

Arafat's support for Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) during the **Kuwait War** led to his alienation from the oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinian workers from these Arab countries. Following the expulsion of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait in February 1992, the **United States** joined hands with the Soviet Union and launched the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991. The Palestinians were represented in the conference by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

The absence of progress in the Madrid peace process led to secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO facilitated by Norway. On 9 September 1993, Arafat and Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** exchanged letters of **mutual recognition**. This led to the signing of the **Declaration of Principles** on the White House Lawns and the start of the **Oslo Process**. Following the signing of the **Cairo Agreement** on 4 May 1994, Arafat entered the **Gaza Strip** on 1 July 1994 to establish the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip and **Jericho**. In the wake of the **Taba Agreement** of September 1995, Israel withdrew from major Palestinian towns.

On numerous occasions, **assassination** attempts were made against Arafat by Israel and the Arab states, as well as by rival Palestinian groups, the most prominent being the **Tunis raid** by Israel in August 1988, in which Arafat's confidant Abu Jihad (c. 1935–1988) was killed. In September 1992, a number of Palestinian organizations, including some affiliated with the PLO, met in Damascus and launched an opposition front against the official policy of the PLO. Similarly, following the **Oslo Accords**, **Hamas** emerged as a major opponent of Arafat and his peace policies toward Israel.

In 1994, Arafat shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Rabin and Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres**. Having remained a lifelong bachelor, in 1990 at the age of 61 he married Suha al-Tawil (1963–), a journalist and daughter of a prominent Palestinian. Their daughter Zahwa Arafat was born on 24 July 1995.

On 20 January 1996, Arafat was elected chairman of the PNA and head of the 88-member **Palestinian Legislative Council** (PLC). The election of **Benjamin Netanyahu** as Israeli prime minister a few months later marked a rapid deterioration in Arafat's relations with Israel. The signing of the **Hebron Protocol** and **Wye Memorandum** did not improve the situation.

The Camp David Talks initiated by U.S. president **Bill Clinton** in July 2000 ended in failure, as Arafat and Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** were unable to resolve some of the core issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September virtually ended the peace process, and the electoral victory of **Ariel Sharon** in February 2001 marked the marginalization of Arafat. Under pressure from the United States, in March 2003 Arafat created the post of PNA prime minister and appointed **Mahmoud Abbas** to the position. However, due to differences with Arafat, in September Abbas resigned and was replaced by **Ahmed Qurei**.

Meanwhile, in March 2002, the **Israel Defense Forces** began the **Siege of Ramallah**, which lasted intermittently for nearly three years. Upon falling ill, on 29 October 2004 Arafat was airlifted to **France** for treatment, and on 11 November 2004 he passed away in a military hospital in Paris. The following day he was buried in his **Ramallah** compound. After his death, Speaker of the PLC Rawhi Fattouh (1949–) became interim head of the PNA, Abbas the head of the PLO, and Farouq Qaddoumi (1934–) the leader of Fatah. In December, Abbas was elected president of the PNA through a popular vote.

Following Arafat's death there were suggestions that he was poisoned. Medical records that were made public in 2005 indicated that the doctors were unable to conclusively agree on the cause of death. Members of Arafat's inner circle, including his longtime personal physician Ashraf al-Kurdi (1937–) and wife Suha, have observed that the Palestinian leader was poisoned, with the finger of accusation directed at Israel as well as senior members of the PNA. In July 2012, **Qatar**-based Al-Jazeera broke a story that Arafat might have been poisoned through polonium, a highly radioactive isotope. This led to calls by Suha Arafat demanding the exhumation of Arafat's body for further scientific investigation to determine the cause of his death. On 9 July 2012 President Abbas authorized that the body be exhumed, and on 27 November three different scientific teams from France, **Russia**, and Switzerland took samples from the exhumed body for further tests, and

the body was reburied the same day. By late 2013, French and Russian teams ruled out poisoning, while the Swiss team concluded that Arafat might have died due to a polonium overdose but was unable to identify the source.

See also ANNULMENT; AQABA SUMMIT; ARAFAT PROBE; AS-SAD, BASHAR AL- (1965–); ASSAD, HAFEZ AL- (c. 1930–2000); AUTONOMY PLAN; AYALON-NUSSEIBEH PROPOSAL; BEI-LIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; BETHLEHEM; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; DEPORTATION; FATAH UPRISING; FEDAYEEN; FORCE 17; GENE-VA UNITED NATIONS SESSION; IRAQ; JERUSALEM VISIT; JORDA-NIAN DISENGAGEMENT; JORDANIAN–PLO JOINT COMMITTEE; LEBANON; LONDON AGREEMENT; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); PLO CHARTER; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE; SADAT, ANWAR (1918–1981); TERRORISM; YASSIN, SHEIKH AHMED (c. 1933–2004).

ARAFAT PROBE. Following the death of **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** in a military hospital in Paris on 11 November 2004, there were suggestions that the Palestinian leader had been poisoned. Medical records that were made public in 2005 indicated that the doctors were unable to conclusively agree on the cause of his death. Since then, there were statements by members of Arafat's inner circle, including his longtime personal physician Ashraf al-Kurdi (1937–) and wife Suha (1963–), that he was poisoned, with the finger of accusation being directed at Israel and senior members of the PNA. In July 2012, **Qatar**-based Al-Jazeera broke a story that Arafat might have been poisoned through polonium, a highly radioactive isotope. This led to calls by Suha Arafat demanding that Arafat's body be exhumed for further scientific investigation to identify the cause of his death.

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See also ASSASSINATION/S; RAMALLAH.

ARD, AL-. In 1959, **Israeli Arab** intellectuals such as Mansour Kardush (1921–1998) and Sabri Jeris (1938–) formed a non-communist Arab political group called Al-Ard, meaning "the land" in Arabic. Challenging the legitimacy of Israel, it was more radical than the Israel communist party, Maki (1948–1965), which accepted the legitimacy of the Jewish state. Al-Ard ran into legal problems when it sought to register as a political party. Reversing

its earlier opposition to Israel's legitimacy, it then sought to run for the 1965 Knesset elections but was prevented by a ban imposed by the minister of defense in late 1964.

See also ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (ADP); ARAB PARTIES; BALAD; HADASH; ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF ISRAEL.

AREAS OF ISRAEL. There are discrepancies over the territorial limits of **Mandate Palestine** as well as the states of Israel and Palestine. Originally Palestine covered an area of 90,976 square kilometers, but following the formation of **Transjordan**, the Mandate area was reduced to about 26,493 square kilometers (26,700 according to other sources). Under the 1947 **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**, the Jewish state was awarded an area of 14,936 square kilometers, or 56.74 percent, and the Arab state 11,287 square kilometers, or 42.88 percent of Mandate Palestine. **Jerusalem**, which was the *corpus separatum*, comprised 100 square kilometers. The **Armistice Agreements** of 1949 left Israel with an area of 20,770 square kilometers. The **West Bank**, including **East Jerusalem**, comprised about 5,700 square kilometers, and the **Gaza Strip** is about 360 square kilometers.

See also GOLAN HEIGHTS; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

AREAS OF PALESTINE. There are discrepancies over the territorial limits of **Mandate Palestine** as well as the states of Israel and Palestine. Originally Palestine covered an area of 90,976 square kilometers, but following the formation of **Transjordan**, the Mandate area was reduced to about 26,493 square kilometers (26,700 according to other sources). Under the 1947 **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**, the Jewish state was awarded an area of 14,936 square kilometers, or 56.74 percent, and the Arab state 11,287 square kilometers, or 42.88 percent of Mandate Palestine. **Jerusalem**, which was the *corpus separatum*, comprised 100 square kilometers. The **Armistice Agreements** of 1949 left Israel with an area of 20,770 square kilometers. The **West Bank**, including **East Jerusalem**, comprised about 5,700 square kilometers, and the **Gaza Strip** is about 360 square kilometers. At the end of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, came under the control of and later **annexation** by **Jordan** while **Egypt** controlled the Gaza Strip. Both of these territories were captured by Israel during the **June War of 1967** and came to be referred to as the **Occupied Territories**.

Under the **Taba Agreement** of 1996, the West Bank was divided into three categories. Area A denoted territories with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security, and this made up 3 percent of the West Bank; Area B denoted territories with Palestinian civil jurisdiction but with joint Israeli–Palestinian security control, and this made up 23 to 25 percent of the

West Bank; and Area C denotes where Israel enjoys complete civil and security control, and this comprised the remaining 72 to 74 percent of the West Bank.

See also AUTONOMOUS AREAS; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

ARIEL. Established in 1978 when **Menachem Begin** was Israel's prime minister, Ariel is the fourth-largest **settlement** in the **West Bank**. It lies about 16 kilometers east of the **Green Line**, and according to the **Oslo Accords**, Ariel is part of Area C where Israel retains full security control. Within the context of a **territorial swap**, Ariel is often mentioned as an area that would remain within Israel in any peace settlement with the Palestinians, and the route of the **security fence** that goes around Ariel confirms this interpretation. In 1982, the Ariel College was established, and this was upgraded to a university in 2005; since August 2007, it is called Ariel University Center of Samaria. Protesting against this move, a number of Israeli artists and educationists have refused to perform or cooperate with cultural activities in Ariel. This evoked strong condemnation from various Israeli leaders who called for cuts in government support for boycott callers. The Israeli moves regarding Ariel significantly contributed to calls for an **academic boycott** of Israel and the **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaign. The population of Ariel stood at 17,849 in 2011.

See also ANNEXATION; E-1 AREA; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; MA'ALE ADUMIM.

ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949). In early 1949, following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Israel and its neighboring Arab states signed separate agreements that formally marked the cessation of military hostilities. Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971), who became acting **UN mediator** following the **assassination** of Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948), played an important role in Israel's armistice negotiations with **Egypt**, which began on the Greek island of Rhodes on 12 January 1949. Israel's negotiations with **Lebanon** were held in the border town of Rosh Hanikra. In March 1949, Israel–**Jordan** talks took place at Rhodes, and in the following month, Israel and **Syria** began their negotiations at Gesher B'not Yaacov on the **Jordan River**. On 24 February 1949, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign an Armistice Agreement with Israel, and this was followed by Lebanon (23 March), Jordan (3 April), and Syria (20 July). The successful conclusion of the Armistice Agreements led to Bunche's being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950.

The agreements were meant to be a temporary arrangement or the first step toward the resumption of peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. This never happened, and the armistice lines—later known as the

Green Line—became Israel's de facto boundary with neighboring Arab states. The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan also formalized the partitioning of **Jerusalem** that was supposed to be an international city under the **Partition Plan** approved by the United Nations General Assembly in November 1947. The cease-fire boundaries set by the agreement between Israel and Lebanon were made redundant by frequent Israeli reprisal raids against Palestinian targets in Lebanon after the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989). The arrangements with the other Arab countries collapsed in the wake of the **June War of 1967**.

On 8 February 1949, **Saudi Arabia** informed the **United Nations** that it would accept "the decisions which have already been adopted, or which may be adopted by the **Arab League**, in respect of the situation in Palestine." In response to the invitation from Bunche, on 13 February (two weeks prior to the signing of the Egypt–Israel Armistice Agreement), **Iraq** informed the world body that "the terms of armistice which will be agreed upon by the Arab State neighbors of Palestine, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon will be regarded as acceptable" to it. The explicit Iraqi willingness to recognize and accept the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors is often ignored in the Arab–Israeli conflict. In June 1981, Israel sought to justify its air strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor (**Osiraq bombing**) by saying that a state of war still existed between the two countries because of Iraq's refusal to sign a formal Armistice Agreement in 1949.

See also AL-NAQBA; DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; FEDERAL PLAN; PARTITION PLAN; UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP); WARFARE.

ARMISTICE LINE. *See* GREEN LINE.

ASSAD, BASHAR AL- (1965–). The second son of **Hafez al-Assad**, Bashar has been the president of **Syria** since June 2000. An ophthalmologist by training, he studied at Damascus University and later in **Great Britain**. He was inducted into politics following the death of his elder brother, Basil (1962–1994), who had been groomed as a successor but died in a car crash on 22 January 1994. Born on 11 September 1965, Bashar entered the military academy at Homs, north of Damascus, and became a colonel in January 1999. Following the death of his father, on 10 June 2000 Bashar al-Assad became the 16th president of Syria and was named secretary-general of the ruling Ba'ath Party and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. His position was reaffirmed in a popular referendum, and Assad was formally inaugurated on 17 July as president. In the wake of the capture of Baghdad by the

forces led by the **United States** in the summer of 2003, Assad briefly ordered the closure of the Damascus offices of **Hamas** and other Palestinian groups that were opposed to the **Oslo Accords**.

Public protests in Lebanon following the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005) forced Syrian troops to leave **Lebanon** in May 2005, nearly 20 years after they first moved into that country. The militant Lebanese group **Hezbollah** supported by Syria stood by Assad, and the latter reciprocated this gesture during the 34-day **Second Lebanon War** between Israel and the Lebanese militant group in 2006.

Since March 2011, Assad has been preoccupied with growing protests and the emergence of the **Arab Spring in Syria**. The involvement of external players such as **Qatar** and **Saudi Arabia** and their support for the rebels, especially the jihadi elements, has plunged the country into a civil war. Various peace initiatives by the **United Nations**, the **Arab League**, and other players have not succeeded in bringing about a political settlement to the conflict. With the help of **Russia** and to a lesser extent **China**, Assad has managed to prevent the UN Security Council from adopting any resolutions against Syria. In November 2011 the Arab League suspended Syrian membership, and in March 2013 the Syrian opposition took the Syrian seat in the league. The spread of clashes to the **Golan Heights** has resulted in some of the countries, especially Austria, withdrawing their contingents from the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**. In the presidential elections held on 3 June 2014, Assad secured 88.7 percent of the votes in the first multi-candidate elections and was sworn in as president on 16 July.

See also ARAB SPRING; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); IRAN; ORCHARD OPERATION; NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); NUCLEAR SYRIA; RUSSIA; UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF).

ASSAD, HAFEZ AL- (c. 1930–2000). Born in Qardaha near Lataqia to an Alawi family on 6 October 1930, Hafez al-Assad provided political stability to **Syria** during his tenure as president from February 1971 to June 2000. In 1950, he joined the clandestine officers' cells linked to the Ba'ath Party and took part in the March 1963 coup that brought the Ba'ath officers to power and became commander of the air force. Following another coup in 1966, Assad became acting defense minister, a post he held during the **June War of 1967** during which Syria lost the **Golan Heights** to Israel. After a series of political maneuvers, in February 1971 Assad became president, and this was endorsed by a plebiscite held in March. After that, he won seven-year terms in elections held in February 1978, February 1985, December 1991, and February 1999; he was the only candidate in all of these elections.

In 1973, Assad joined hands with President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** and launched the **October War of 1973**. Even though military gains were marginal, the war undermined the Israeli aura of invincibility. Following the war, Assad accepted **Resolution 338** of the **United Nations** Security Council, and this in turn formalized the Syrian acceptance of **Resolution 242** adopted in November 1967. However, Assad's friendship with Egypt deteriorated following Sadat's **Jerusalem visit** and the latter's decision to seek a separate peace with Israel. In December 1977, Assad, together with other radical Arab states and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), established the **Rejectionist Front** and played a central role in Egypt's expulsion from the **Arab League** and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**). In 1990–1991, Syria joined the multi-national coalition against **Iraq** and participated in the **Kuwait War**. Deprived of the patronage of the **Soviet Union** following the end of the Cold War, Assad took Syria to the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991.

For long, Assad's relations with the PLO were tense, and he often hosted and supported a number of Palestinian factions hostile to **Yasser Arafat**. He opposed the **Oslo Accords** as well as the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty**, perceiving them to be contrary to Syrian interests and Arab unity. Under his leadership, Syria provided political and logistical support to **Hezbollah** and viewed the militant attacks against Israel's self-declared **security zone** in southern **Lebanon** as leverage for Israeli concessions over the Golan Heights. Assad insisted on a complete Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line** as a sine qua non for a peace settlement. Despite significant progress in the **Shepherdstown Talks** mediated by the **United States**, no agreement was reached. Israel's unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** in the summer of 2000 significantly reduced Assad's diplomatic space. After a prolonged but unpublicized illness, Assad died on 10 June 2000 and was succeeded by his second son **Bashar al-Assad** as president.

See also HAMAS; IRAN; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; RUSSIA.

ASSASSINATION/S. The Arab–Israeli conflict had witnessed numerous politically motivated murders or assassinations. Most of these murders were carried out by individuals or groups that disapproved of the policies followed by the victim. In some cases, states were also involved in assassinations or attempted assassinations. During the **Mandate** period, members of the **Stern Gang** assassinated the British minister for Middle Eastern affairs, Lord Moyne (1880–1944), in Cairo on 6 November 1944. Likewise, disapproving of his pro-Arab bias, on 17 September 1948 members of the same group assassinated **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) in **Jerusalem**.

The policies of King **Abdullah I** of **Jordan** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, especially his perceived collaboration with the Jewish leadership, were strongly resented by the Palestinians. On 20 July 1951, a Palestinian gunman assassinated Abdullah at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. In November 1971, the Black September Organization claimed responsibility for the assassination of Jordanian prime minister and defense minister Wasfi al-Tal (1919–1971), who played a crucial role in the Jordanian response to the civil war situation in September 1970, commonly referred to as the **Black September Massacre**. On 6 October 1981, Islamic extremists opposed to the **Camp David Accords** assassinated President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** during a military parade commemorating the **October War of 1973**.

Following the **Munich Massacre** of 1972, Israel began a policy of assassinating important Palestinian leaders it alleged were involved in **terrorism**-related violence. The most prominent result was the **Tunis raid** on the headquarters of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in August 1988, in which a close confidant of **Yasser Arafat**, Abu Jihad (c. 1935–1988), was killed.

Internal differences among the Palestinians have also resulted in assassinations. The Abu Nidal Organization was held responsible for the murders of Issam Sartawi (1935–1983), leader of the **Active Organization for the Liberation of Palestine**, in 1983 and **Fatah** founder Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf; 1934–1991) in January 1991 in Tunis. An unsuccessful assassination attempt on Israel's ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov (1929–2003), by radical Palestinian groups opposed to Arafat in June 1982 resulted in Israel's **Peace for Galilee Operation** against **Lebanon**. Similarly, the assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bachir Gemayel (1947–1982) on 14 September 1982 culminated in the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**.

On 4 November 1995, Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** was assassinated by **Yigal Amir**, an observant student of Bar-Ilan University, at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. Amir was motivated by his strong views against Rabin's peace policies, especially his "concessions" toward the Palestinians. Citing religious arguments, he justified his action saying that by agreeing to part with **Eretz Yisrael**, Rabin had turned against his own people.

Following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Israel pursued a policy of assassinating key Palestinian leaders belonging to militant organizations such as **Hamas**, **Islamic Jihad**, and the **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**. Under this policy, officially termed **targeted killing**, Israeli security agencies assassinated a number of key personalities, including **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi**, Abu Ali Mustafa (1938–2001), and **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin**. This policy largely resulted in the failure of the **Cairo Dialogue** whereby the militants would offer a temporary cease-fire to Israel.

Israel also targeted militant leaders in other parts of the Middle East. Its unsuccessful attempt to assassinate external leader of Hamas **Khalid Masha'al** in Amman in September 1997 caused severe tension with Jordan.

Some of the most notable assassinations carried out by Israel include that of **Imad Mughniyah** in Damascus in February 2008, **Mahmoud Al-Mabhough** in Dubai in January 2010, and Ahmed Jabari (1960–2012) in Gaza in November 2012. As part of the cease-fire agreement mediated by Egyptian president **Mohammed Morsi** following the **Pillar of Defense Operations** in November 2012, Israel agreed to the principal Hamas demand of not killing its leaders.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); DUBAI KILLING; ENTEBBE OPERATION; MASHA'AL AFFAIR; SAYERET MATKAL; WARFARE.

ASWAN DAM. To harness the **waters** of the Nile and for the generation of hydroelectric power, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** sought to construct a massive dam at Aswan in southern **Egypt**. Alarmed by the 1955 **Czech Deal**, the **United States** and **Great Britain** tried to dissuade Nasser from joining the Eastern Bloc by offering to finance the Aswan Dam. Through this cooperation, they sought to achieve peace between Egypt and Israel. In December 1955, an agreement was reached in principle, whereby the United States, Britain, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) offered substantial funding for the project. The United States agreed to provide $56 million while Britain would contribute $14 million for the first stage of construction, with a provision to consider subsequent grants of up to $200 million. Contingent upon the Anglo-American grants, the World Bank pledged to lend $200 million. Both sides began negotiating the terms and conditions of the funding. This became a political issue when the Western funding was linked to Nasser's acceptance of the **Alpha Plan** and peace with Israel.

By early 1956, it was clear to the Americans and British that the Alpha Plan, aimed at influencing Nasser toward an accommodative posture toward Israel, was a non-starter. The collapse of the plan resulted from their desire to undermine Nasser, and on 19 July 1956, U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) formally conveyed the Anglo-American decision to withdraw from financing the Aswan High Dam. Angered by this about-face, on 26 July Nasser announced the **nationalization of the Suez Canal** to fund the project. This move in turn precipitated the Suez crisis and the tripartite invasion of Egypt by British, French, and Israeli forces in October of that year in the **Suez War**.

See also CHAMELEON OPERATION; FRANCE; GAZA RAID; OMEGA OPERATION; SÈVRES CONFERENCE; SUEZ CANAL; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION.

AUTONOMOUS AREAS. This nomenclature refers to those areas of the **Occupied Territories** that were transferred to the control of the Palestinian authorities following the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**. Initially it covered 219 square kilometers of the **Gaza Strip** and 54 square kilometers of the **Jericho** District. By late 1995, six **West Bank** towns—namely, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, **Ramallah**, and **Bethlehem**, from where Israel carried out **redeployment**—were added to the autonomous areas. Amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, in March 2002 the **Israel Defense Forces** launched the **Defensive Shield Operation** and reoccupied Ramallah, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Bethlehem and withdrew from these areas in May 2002. Upon the completion of the unilateral **Gaza Disengagement** in September 2005, the Gaza Strip came under complete Palestinian control.

See also OSLO ACCORDS; OSLO PROCESS; WYE MEMORANDUM.

AUTONOMY PLAN. Officially presented by Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** on 13 December 1977, this plan offered limited self-administration for the Palestinian residents in the **Occupied Territories**. Among other things, it called for the cancellation of Israel's **military government** and the creation of a **civil administration** to govern the territories. The plan was formally presented to President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** on 25 December 1977 at the Ismailia summit and was approved by the Knesset three days later. It called for a limited role for **Jordan** in its implementation. It underwent additional modifications during the negotiations with Egypt leading up to the **Camp David Accords**, and a newer version, presented on 3 May 1979, clarified that autonomy would be personal and not territorial. Following the failure of negotiations with Egypt, for a while Israel even contemplated unilateral implementation of the Autonomy Plan.

In May 1979, Israel appointed a Ministerial Committee on Autonomy, headed by Minister Yosef Burg (1909–1999). The first round of Egypt–Israel talks on autonomy was inaugurated in Beersheba on 25 May 1978, and the talks were held alternatively in both countries. Egypt resisted Israeli attempts to hold the talks in **Jerusalem**, and hence they were held in Tel Aviv or Herzilya.

On 16 January 1980, Israel presented a model for the Self-Governing Authority for the Occupied Territories, which outlined kinds of powers to be granted to the Palestinians. It proposed full personal autonomy, "shared power, and residual powers," which would be administered by an 11-member council. Israel maintained that autonomy would not imply sovereignty or self-determination. The innumerable sessions of talks failed to make any progress, largely because of the Israeli government's refusal to envisage any role for the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). In an attempt to

circumvent the PLO, the Autonomy Plan unsuccessfully offered an elected Self-Governing Authority and as a prelude established the **Village League** to take control of the Palestinian areas.

See also BEGIN PLAN; PLO LAW.

AUTUMN CLOUDS OPERATION. This was the second Israeli military attack on the **Gaza Strip** following the unilateral **Gaza Disengagement** in September 2005. This was aimed at preventing the firing of **Qassam** rockets by the Palestinian militants belonging to **Hamas** and other groups and came immediately after the **Summer Rains Operation**. It was launched on 1 November 2006 and ended on 7 November when the **Israel Defense Forces** pulled out of the Gaza Strip. At least 53 Palestinians, including 16 civilians, and 1 Israeli soldier were killed during this operation.

See also PRISONER EXCHANGE; SHALIT AFFAIR; WARFARE.

AYALON-NUSSEIBEH PROPOSAL. Amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, on 3 September 2003 **Sari Nusseibeh**, president of Al-Quds University in **East Jerusalem**, and Ami Ayalon (1945–), former head of the General Security Service (February 1996–May 2000), Israel's internal intelligence agency, released a set of principles for an Israeli–Palestinian peace. Among other things, the proposal called for two states for two peoples; establishment of borders on the basis of the **Green Line**; any border modifications to be based on equal territorial exchanges; territorial connections between the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**; removal of all Jewish **settlements** from the Palestinian state; **Jerusalem** to be an open city and the capital of both states; neither side to exercise sovereignty over the holy places; Palestinian **refugees** to return only to the State of Palestine; Israel and the Palestinian state to contribute to an international fund for refugee compensation; the Palestinian state to be demilitarized, with the international community guaranteeing its security and independence; and both sides to agree to the termination of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Since its unveiling, nearly 200,000 Israelis and Palestinians have signed petitions in support of this proposal. However, its unofficial nature and the ongoing violence have made the proposal a nonstarter.

See also GENEVA INITIATIVE; SUICIDE ATTACK/S.

B

BAGHDAD PACT. During the Cold War, as part of the policy of containing the **Soviet Union**, the **United States** succeeded in encouraging **Iraq** and **Turkey** to sign a defense treaty on 24 February 1955. Later on, **Great Britain**, **Iran**, and Pakistan were brought into a larger ambit of the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, popularly termed the Baghdad Pact. Acting as an associate member, the United States provided the financial support for the arrangement. Even though Israel was interested in joining such a military arrangement, the United States was dissuaded because of its regional interests in the Arab world.

The Baghdad Pact drew widespread criticism from other countries in the region, especially **Egypt**, which opted for a non-aligned posture. The pact became a rallying cry for **Gamal Abdel Nasser** to oppose and even to discredit conservative monarchies opposed to him and his radical pan-Arabism. Serious internal strife forced King **Hussein** of **Jordan** to abandon his ideas of joining the pact.

The overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in July 1958 in a coup led by Gen. Abdul Karim Qassem (1914–1963) reduced the fortunes of the Baghdad Pact, and in March 1959 Iraq withdrew from the arrangement. Subsequently, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). In a bid to promote economic cooperation among the three member states—Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey—the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) was established. In February 1979, Iran withdrew from CENTO after the Islamic Revolution; Turkey and Pakistan followed suit, and CENTO ceased to exist, although the RCD remains functional.

The military arrangement failed primarily because of the American inability to convince the Arab states that the Soviet Union was the primary threat to the Middle East and "the Northern Tier" policy was an effective barrier against such a threat. Most countries of the region, especially Egypt, considered Israel to be their primary threat.

See also NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM).

BAKER, JAMES A. (1930–). As the U.S. secretary of state under President George H. W. Bush (1924–) during 1989–1992, James Addison Baker III played a crucial role in the convening of the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991 that ushered in the Middle East peace process. An attorney by profession, he held various positions under presidents Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) and Bush. He was instrumental in securing Arab consent for the **United Nations**–sanctioned and **United States**–led international campaign against President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) of **Iraq** following the invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait. The end of the **Kuwait War** in February 1991 resulted in Baker's initiating the preparation for an international conference toward seeking a political settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Between March and October 1991, Baker undertook eight visits to the region to secure the consent and approval of all the parties to the conflict. The impending disintegration of the **Soviet Union** and the end of the Cold War largely enabled Baker to induce and compel various interlocutors to agree on the format and content of the Madrid Conference jointly inaugurated by U.S. president Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–).

See also MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

BAKER PLAN. The deadlock between Israel and **Egypt** in 1989 over the **Mubarak Plan** led to U.S. secretary of state **James A**. **Baker** proposing a compromise formula. Published on 1 November 1989, the Baker Plan sought to accommodate Israeli opposition to negotiating with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and Egyptian reluctance to substitute itself for the Palestinians. Baker suggested that Israel would participate in the dialogue only after "a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out." While the dialogue would be based on Israel's **Shamir Plan** initiative of 14 May 1989, "the Palestinians will be free to raise issues that relate to their opinion on how to make elections and negotiations succeed." On 5 November, the Israeli cabinet endorsed this proposal. The exclusion of the PLO, especially when the United States was conducting a substantive dialogue with the organization in Tunis, made the plan a non-starter. Moreover, internal differences in Israel over the participation of the residents of **East Jerusalem** led to the collapse of the unity government on 15 March 1990, and the Baker Plan became defunct.

See also JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; KUWAIT WAR; MADRID CONFERENCE; MUBARAK PLAN (1989); PLO LAW; RABIN PLAN; SHULTZ PLAN; UNITED STATES.

BALAD. National Democratic Alliance, or Balad in Arabic, is a political party committed to the political rights and social welfare of the **Israeli Arabs**. Describing itself as "progressive and nationalist," Balad was founded in

1995 by a group of Arab intellectuals led by Azmi Bishara (1956–) and has been contesting the Knesset elections since 1999. Transforming Israel into a "state of its citizens" as opposed to its being a Jewish state has been the principal objective of Balad. Like other **Arab parties** in Israel, Balad supports the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip** with **East Jerusalem** as its capital. Demanding a complete Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line**, it supports the **right to return** of the Palestinian **refugees**. The party's refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state has been used by the Israeli right to periodically prevent Balad from contesting the elections, but these attempts have been overturned by the Israeli Supreme Court.

See also HADASH; ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF ISRAEL; RESOLUTION 194.

BALFOUR DECLARATION. Issued by the British government on 2 November 1917, the Balfour Declaration provided a formal basis for Zionist claims to Palestine. This was the result of sustained efforts by the **World Zionist Organization** and protracted internal discussions within the British government. In recognition of the special role played by **Chaim Weizmann** in the Allied war efforts during World War I (1914–1918), British foreign secretary Arthur James Balfour (1848–1930) wrote a letter to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild (1868–1937), a prominent British Zionist leader. The letter stated:

> His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

Though vague, the declaration remained contentious afterward. When Balfour made those commitments endorsing and legitimizing the creation of a Jewish national home, British forces were yet to take control of Palestine. In 1917, the "non-Jewish communities" constituted nearly 95 percent of the population in Palestine. The Arabs perceived it to be a violation of British commitments to Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of Mecca expressed through the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** in support of creating an independent Arab kingdom. However, interpreting that correspondence, the **Churchill White Paper** of 2 June 1922 excluded Palestine from the purview of British commitments to Hussein. Prominent Jews in **Great Britain**, as well

as influential sections of the British bureaucracy, especially the India Office, also opposed the Balfour Declaration because of its potential to cast aspersions on the loyalty of the Jews to the British Empire.

Embraced wholeheartedly by the Zionists, the homeland project suffered a setback in April 1921 when the British carved out areas east of the **Jordan River** and established **Transjordan** with **Abdullah I**, son of Sharif Hussein, as emir. This move formally excluded the East Bank from the purview of the Jewish national home and hence was criticized by influential segments of the **Yishuv** associated with Revisionist **Zionism**. On 24 July 1922, the **League of Nations** approved the **Mandate** of Palestine and made Britain responsible "for putting into effect" the Balfour Declaration and the formation of the **Jewish Agency**. Following prolonged Arab opposition to **Aliya**, especially the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**, the **MacDonald White Paper** of 1939 formally disassociated the British government from the Balfour Declaration.

BANDUNG CONFERENCE. In April 1955, 29 countries from Asia and Africa met in Bandung, Indonesia, for the first Afro-Asian meeting. Five Asian powers—Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), **India**, Indonesia, and Pakistan—were instrumental in the first official multilateral dialogue among the newly independent states. Nine Arab states—**Egypt**, **Iraq**, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, Libya, **Saudi Arabia**, Sudan, **Syria**, and Yemen— were represented at Bandung; two other Islamic countries, **Iran** and **Turkey**, were also present. While **Hajj Amin Al-Husseini**, the former grand mufti of **Jerusalem**, was present as part of the Yemeni delegation, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria attended the sessions on North Africa as part of the Iraqi delegation.

The explicit threat of an **Arab Boycott of Israel** precluded the Jewish state from being invited to the meeting, and the conference institutionalized Israel's subsequent political isolation from similar Third World gatherings in the future such as the **Non-Aligned Movement**. The Bandung Declaration expressed support for "the right of the Arab people of Palestine" and called for the implementation of **United Nations** resolutions on Palestine and a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The conference paved the way for the first high-level contact between Arab states and the People's Republic of **China** and witnessed the forging of strong ties between Egypt and communist China.

See also NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL (1918–1970).

BARAK, EHUD (1942–). The most highly decorated general of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), Ehud Barak served as prime minister of Israel from July 1999 to March 2001. Born in Kibbutz Mishmar Hasharon in **Mandate Palestine** on 12 February 1942, he joined the IDF in 1959 and served as a

soldier and commander of an elite unit that carried out a number of special operations against **terrorism** including the 1985 **Tunis raid**. After holding senior positions in the tank brigade and armored division, in April 1983 Barak was appointed head of the intelligence branch (Aman) of the IDF. In January 1986, he was made head of the central command and, in the following year, became deputy chief of staff. After the **Kuwait War**, in April 1991 he became the 14th IDF chief of staff and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general. After the signing of the **Cairo Agreement (1994)** between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in May, Barak oversaw the initial Israeli **redeployment** in the **Gaza Strip** and **Jericho**. He retired from the IDF on 1 January 1995.

After a brief stint in private business, Barak joined the **Labor Party**, and from July to November 1995 he served as minister of the interior in the government headed by Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**. He had misgivings about the **Taba Agreement** signed in September 1995 and abstained during a crucial cabinet vote. After Rabin's **assassination** in November 1995, Barak became minister of foreign affairs under **Shimon Peres**. In May 1996, he was elected to the Knesset on the Labor Party list, and following Peres's electoral defeat, Barak was elected leader of the Labor Party and successfully led the party in the May 1999 elections and became prime minister on 6 July 1999.

Promising to undo the damage done to the peace process by the government led by **Benjamin Netanyahu**, on 4 September 1999 Barak signed the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum**, which set out a phased Israeli redeployment from the **Occupied Territories**. In a bid to revive the negotiations with **Syria**, during October 1999–March 2000 he pursued the **Shepherdstown Talks**. Fulfilling his election promises on **Lebanon**, in May 2000 Barak completed the **Lebanese withdrawal**, unilaterally pulling the IDF out of the **security zone**.

In an effort to conclude the **Permanent Status Negotiations** with the Palestinians, in July 2000 Barak accepted the invitation of U.S. president **Bill Clinton** and pursued the **Camp David Talks** with Chairman **Yasser Arafat**. Deviating from past Israeli positions, he offered substantial territorial concessions to the Palestinians and adopted an accommodating position on the issue of **Jerusalem**. However, serious differences still existed between the two sides, and his attempt to quickly end the century-old hostilities with the Palestinians was seen by many as a hasty and unrealistic move. Both Clinton and Barak publicly blamed Arafat for the failure of the Camp David Talks. This in turn heightened the Palestinian disappointment and anger over the peace process.

Barak's decision to allow **Ariel Sharon**, the leader of the **Likud** Party, to visit the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** on 28 September 2000 sparked off violent protests from the Palestinians and resulted in the **Al-Aqsa Intifa-**

da. With dwindling support among his cabinet colleagues and the wider public, Barak ordered snap elections, and on 6 February 2001 he was convincingly defeated by Sharon in the direct election for prime minister. Following this, Barak briefly pursued business practice and returned to active politics in November 2004, supporting Peres in his unsuccessful bid for leadership of the Labor Party against Amir Peretz (1952–).

Barak won the leadership contest of the Labor Party in June 2007 and served as defense minister under **Ehud Olmert** and later under **Benjamin Netanyahu** from June 2007 to March 2013. Internal differences over the Labor Party continuing in the ruling coalition led to Barak's leaving the Labor Party to form **Ha'atzmaut** (Independence Party). In the wake of weak showing in opinion polls in November 2012, on the eve of the 19th Knesset elections, Barak announced his retirement from active politics.

See also BARAK PLAN; DEPORTATION; SAYERET MATKAL.

BARAK PLAN. Amid the continuing stalemate in the peace negotiations in September 2012, Israel's defense minister **Ehud Barak** suggested a unilateral withdrawal from a number of **settlements** in the **West Bank**. Similar unilateral pullouts had been implemented in the past. As prime minister in May 2000 Barak completed the **Lebanese withdrawal** without any agreement with **Lebanon** or **Hezbollah**. Likewise, his successor **Ariel Sharon** pursued the **Gaza Disengagement** in September 2005 without any agreement with the **Palestinian National Authority**. Outlining his plan in an interview to *Israel Hayom*, Barak advocated Israel retaining **Etzion Bloc**, **Ma'ale Adumim**, and **Ariel**, where 80 to 90 percent of the settler population lives. According to him, the rest of the settlers should be given financial compensation to leave or be given the option of living under Palestinian sovereignty for a five-year trial period. Under his plan, Israel would retain sensitive security areas such as the hills overlooking the Ben-Gurion international airport in Tel Aviv and the **Jordan Valley**. The proposal, which came just weeks before the January 2013 Knesset elections, did not evoke interest within Israel, and shortly after outlining his plan, Barak announced his retirement from politics.

See also CLINTON PARAMETERS; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

BARCELONA PROCESS. In November 1995, the then 15-member **European Union** (EU) joined with 14 Mediterranean countries to launch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, commonly known as the Barcelona Process. With the expansion of the EU, the partnership has 44 members including **Egypt**, **Israel**, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), **Syria**, and **Turkey**. Coming in the wake of the **Oslo Process** and the **Declaration of Principles** concluded between Israel and the **Palestine Lib-**

eration Organization, Barcelona hosted the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in November 1995 "to strengthen its relations with the countries of the Mashriq and Maghreb region." It hoped to create the Mediterranean as a region of peace, security, and shared prosperity through dialogue and cooperation among member states. Under its umbrella, periodic meetings were held to promote politico-security dialogue, economic partnership, and social, cultural, and human partnership. Both sides have been working toward the free trade agreement known as the European Union–Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), also called the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. The progress on the Barcelona Process has been minimal as the vagaries of the peace process have inhibited meaningful cooperation between the two sides. Periodic regional tensions and violence prevented Arab countries from engaging with Israel through the Barcelona Process.

During the presidential elections in **France** in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy (1955–) proposed the formation of a European Union–style **Union for the Mediterranean** (UfM), which would consist of countries along the Mediterranean. In 13 July 2008 as president, Sarkozy hosted a summit meeting in Paris attended by 43 heads of state and government and relaunched the Barcelona Process as the UfM. This was attended by Israel's prime minister **Ehud Olmert** and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas**. Subsequently the planned biannual summit meeting of the UfM could not be held due to the stalemate in the peace process and the cycle of violence, especially the **Cast Lead Operation** and the **Pillar of Defense Operation**.

BARGHOUTI, MARWAN HASIB IBRAHIM (1959–). A prominent Palestinian political figure in the **West Bank**, Marwan Barghouti is serving a life sentence in Israel for his alleged involvement in **terrorism**. Born in a village near **Ramallah** on 6 June 1959, he joined the **Fatah** youth movement as a teenager. At the age of 18, he was arrested by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) in 1976 for being a member of a militant Palestinian group. A student of politics and international relations, Barghouti emerged as an important leader during the **First Intifada**. He was deported to **Jordan** for his role in the popular protests against occupation and returned to the West Bank in 1994 after the **Oslo Accords**. In January 1996, he won the first Palestinian election, became a member of the **Palestinian Legislative Council**, and at one time served as the Fatah secretary-general in the West Bank.

A supporter of the Oslo Accords and the **land-for-peace** formula, Barghouti was disillusioned after the failure of the **Camp David Talks**. He became a key figure in the **Tanzim**, a militant faction of Fatah that sought to counter the growth of Islamism among the Palestinians. Israel accused Barghouti of being an instigator of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and the founder and senior member of the **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**, an organization that claimed responsibility for a number of terror attacks inside Israel. In 2002,

Barghouti was arrested in Ramallah and was charged with terrorist offenses. Following a military trial, on 6 June 2004 he was given five life sentences and 40 years' imprisonment for his role in the murder of Israeli civilians and attacks on the IDF. His incarceration has not reduced his influence both within and outside the Fatah movement. Israel refused the demand by Hamas for his release as a part of the **prisoner exchange** involving Gilad Shalit (1986–) in October 2011.

Because of his fluency in Hebrew, he often appeared in the Israeli media and effectively put across the Palestinian viewpoints on the **Oslo Process** and the Palestinian frustrations caused by the delayed implementation of various Israeli commitments. At one time, he was considered a possible challenger to **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**, and many see him as a possible successor to **Mahmoud Abbas** and a potential reconciler with **Hamas**. In early 2014, Abbas unsuccessfully demanded his release as a precondition to extending the Kerry Talks beyond the nine-month time frame agreed earlier.

See also BARGHOUTI, MUSTAFA (1954–); SHALIT AFFAIR.

BARGHOUTI, MUSTAFA (1954–). Palestinian activist-cum-politician, Mustafa Barghouti heads the Palestinian National Initiative (PNI), seen as a reformist alternative to the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. Born in **Jerusalem** on 1 January 1954, Barghouti belongs to the small clan by that name and is a distant cousin of **Marwan Hasib Ibrahim Barghouti** who serves multiple life terms in an Israeli prison. Mustafa was trained as a doctor in the **Soviet Union** and was a member of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that attended the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991. Unsuccessfully contesting the first Palestinian elections in January 1996, he joined hands with Haider Abdel Shafi (1919–2007)—the leader of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference—and **Edward Said** to start the PNI and has headed the party since then. In January 2005, he contested against **Mahmoud Abbas** in the presidential election of the **Palestinian National Authority** and secured 19 percent of the votes. In January 2006, he was elected to the **Palestinian Legislative Council** and served as information minister in the Palestinian national unity government during March–June 2007.

See also ARAB PARTIES; JORDAN.

BAR-LEV LINE. Responding to the **War of Attrition**, Israeli chief of staff Haim Bar-Lev (1924–1994) conceived and implemented a defensive system along the eastern bank of the **Suez Canal**. The defensive line in the **Sinai Peninsula**, which Israel captured from **Egypt** during the **June War of 1967**, came to be known as the Bar-Lev Line. Construction began in late 1968, and it comprised 30 strongholds along the Suez Canal, and another 11 strong-

holds 8 to 12 kilometers farther back. Only a limited number of the strongholds were fully operational when the **October War of 1973** broke out. The series of fortifications and other defensive arrangements at select points along the canal were expected to withstand any offensive on the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. However, during the early hours of the October war, Egyptian forces not only managed to cross the canal but also easily overran the Israel defensive fortifications. Some of the heavy Israeli casualties during the war occurred in those fortified bunkers and bases conceived by Bar-Lev.

See also AGRANAT COMMISSION; BLUE-WHITE OPERATION; DOVECOTE OPERATION; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE; WARFARE.

BASEL PROGRAM. On 23 August 1897, less than a year after his publication of *Der Judenstaat* (*The Jewish State*), Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) convened the first World Zionist Congress. Representatives of Jewish communities and organizations from around the world met in Basel, Switzerland, and established the **World Zionist Organization** (WZO). It adopted the Basel Program, which called for the establishment of "a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law." The WZO pursued this objective by organizing the **Aliya** to Palestine, and the **Balfour Declaration** of 1917 provided the guarantee of the "public law" outlined at Basel.

See also DIASPORA; LAW OF RETURN; ZIONISM.

BAT GALIM **AFFAIR.** On 28 September 1954, an Israel-registered ship, the *Bat Galim*, with a 10-member crew, was impounded by **Egypt** at the southern entrance of the **Suez Canal**. As part of the **Arab Boycott of Israel**, Egypt denied the right of passage to Israel-registered or Israel-bound vessels through the canal. It was carrying commercial cargo from the Eritrean port of Massawa to Haifa in northern Israel. The cargo, mainly meat and plywood, was expropriated by Egypt, and the ship was confiscated and added to the Egyptian navy. The crew was imprisoned until their eventual release on 1 January 1955.

See also CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION; NAVAL BLOCKADE; WARFARE.

BATTLE OF GAZA. The prolonged tension between **Hamas** and **Fatah** turned violent in June 2007 culminating in the Hamas takeover of the **Gaza Strip**. The immediate cause was the 25 January 2006 elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council** in which Hamas won 76 out of 132 seats and secured a majority. Fatah, which obtained only 45 seats, refused to accept the verdict and transfer power to Hamas. Following mediation by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** that led to the **Mecca Accord** on 17 March 2007, a national unity government was formed under Prime Minister **Ismail Haniy-**

eh of Hamas. The internal divisions continued. The refusal of Israel, the **United States**, and other Western countries to recognize Hamas, and hence the unity government, added to the tension.

Violence broke out in the Gaza Strip on 7 June 2007 and lasted until 15 June. In the clashes, more than 100 Palestinians were killed and over 500 were injured. On 14 June, **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) president **Mahmoud Abbas** dissolved the unity government and imposed a state of emergency. The following day, Hamas took complete control of the Gaza Strip and removed all Fatah officials. Since June 2007, the Strip has been under the control of Hamas prime minister Haniyeh. As a result, there exists a de facto division of the Palestinian territories—namely, the Gaza Strip ruled by Hamas and the **West Bank** controlled by the PNA. The division contributed to the prolonged **Siege of Gaza** imposed by Israel and the political and diplomatic isolation of Hamas. This in turn resulted in increased sufferings of the people of the Strip. The inter-Palestinian schism became vivid during the **Cast Lead Operation** in December 2008–January 2009 when the West Bank Palestinians remained a mute spectator to the Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip.

See also EGYPT; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; IHH; PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION; UNITY TALKS; WARFARE.

BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992). Israeli politician and leader of the right-wing **Likud** Party, Menachem Begin served as prime minister from June 1977 to October 1983. Born in Poland on 16 August 1913, he was active in Betar, a youth movement affiliated with Revisionist **Zionism**, and in 1932 became the head of its organization department in Poland. After the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945), Begin fled to Vilna, and in 1940 he was arrested by secret agents of the **Soviet Union** and sentenced to eight years in a labor camp in Siberia. He was freed the following year because of his Polish citizenship, and in May 1942 he made **Aliya** to **Mandate Palestine**.

Staunchly adhering to the Revisionist ideology of Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940), Begin opposed the moderate policies toward **Great Britain** pursued by the **Yishuv** leadership under **David Ben-Gurion**. In December 1943, Begin took over the leadership of the **Irgun**, a Jewish militant organization affiliated to Revisionist Zionism, and pursued a campaign of **terrorism** against the Mandate authorities. Irgun and its breakaway faction, the **Stern Gang**, were held responsible for the **King David Hotel Explosion** and a number of violent actions and **assassinations** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. His attempt to maintain an underground militia even after the establishment of the State of Israel and the formation of the **Israel Defense Forces**

(IDF) resulted in the sinking of a French ship that was carrying arms for Irgun. After this incident, known as the *Altalena* **Affair**, the Irgun was disbanded.

In August 1948, Begin formed Herut, contested the 1949 Knesset election, and emerged as the principal leader of the opposition. In 1965, he merged Herut with the Liberal Party and formed the Gahal faction. On the eve of the **June War of 1967**, he joined the national unity government of Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1895–1969) and, until 1 August 1970, served as minister without portfolio. In 1977, joining hands with **Ezer Weizman** and **Ariel Sharon**, Begin founded Likud. Ending a three-decade-old monopoly of the Mapai/**Labor Party**, Begin won the elections and, in June 1977, became prime minister. He successfully led the party in the June 1981 elections.

Taking advantage of **Anwar Sadat**'s initiative, in November 1977 Begin hosted the president of **Egypt** in **Jerusalem**. This visit eventually culminated in the **Camp David Accords** signed in September 1978, which called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula** and autonomy for the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories**. The **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** was signed in March 1979. As called for by the Camp David Accords, in April 1982 Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai. The progress on the **Autonomy Plan** formulated by Begin in December 1977 was marginal, and despite numerous rounds of talks between Israeli and Egyptian leaders, the exclusion of the Palestinians precluded any progress. In recognition of their peace efforts, in 1979 Begin and Sadat were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Begin's decision to completely withdraw from Sinai resulted in vehement criticism from within his Likud, which partly contributed to Begin's intensifying **settlement** activities in the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**, as well as enacting the **Golan Law** whereby Israeli laws were applied to the **Golan Heights**. Determined to maintain Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, on 7 June 1981 he ordered the **Osiraq bombing** of the nuclear reactor near Baghdad in **Iraq**.

Responding to a terror attack in northern Israel in March 1978, Begin launched the **Litani Operation** and sought to crush the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). After an assassination attempt on Israel's ambassador in London in June 1982, Begin ordered the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, which sought to keep northern Israel safe from Palestinian Katyusha rocket attacks. This eventually resulted in a large-scale Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**, and on 1 August the IDF reached Beirut. Responding to Israeli military presence and pressures, PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat** agreed to withdraw Palestinian **Fedayeen** from Lebanon and to disperse them to different Arab states.

As the evacuation was under way, on 14 September, Lebanese president-elect Bachir Gemayel (1945–1982) was assassinated by Palestinian elements. Angered by this, **Phalange**, a Maronite Christian militia, entered the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and perpetrated the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**. Since the area was under the control of the IDF, Begin came under strong domestic and international criticism. The anti-Begin protests in Israel resulted in the birth of **Peace Now**, and eventually, on 19 September 1983, Begin resigned as prime minister. The following month, he was succeeded by **Yitzhak Shamir**. After leaving office, Begin lived a secluded life until his death on 9 March 1992 and was buried on the Mount of Olives in **East Jerusalem**.

See also BEGIN PLAN; ERETZ YISRAEL; ISRAEL–LEBANON AGREEMENT; JERUSALEM VISIT; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; KAHAN COMMISSION; TERRORISM.

BEGIN PLAN. Upon his return from the Ismailia summit with President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** on 28 December 1977, Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** unveiled his peace plan. This gradually grew into the **Autonomy Plan** and was incorporated into the **Camp David Accords**. The Begin Plan promised limited self-rule to Palestinian residents of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**, with Israel retaining authority over security and public order. It pledged to recognize the right of the Palestinian residents of the **Occupied Territories** to apply for and be granted Israeli citizenship. At the same time, it recognized the right of Palestinians to apply for citizenship of **Jordan**. Numerous rounds of autonomy talks were held between Israeli and Egyptian delegations, but the exclusion of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** precluded any progress.

BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN. On 31 October 1995, just days before the **assassination** of Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin**, Israel's deputy foreign minister Yossi Beilin (1948–) and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**'s deputy and future successor, **Mahmoud Abbas** (aka Abu Mazen), drew up a secret plan for **Jerusalem**. It proposed the Israeli **annexation** of 4 to 5 percent of the **West Bank** and transfer of the remaining areas to the Palestinian state; Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel, while nearby **Abu Dis** would be the Palestinian capital. An international commission would be formed for the settlement of **refugees**. Formally called the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization**," the plan was made public in 1999. While Abu Mazen gradually disassociated himself from it, the plan came under criticism from the leaders on both sides.

See also CLINTON PARAMETERS; EAST JERUSALEM; GENEVA INITIATIVE; JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

BEIRUT AIRPORT BOMBING. On 23 October 1983, a Lebanese volunteer belonging to **Hezbollah** rammed a truck fully loaded with TNT into a building at Beirut international airport that was being used as temporary headquarters for the U.S. Marines, killing 241. This attack came against the backdrop of a similar suicide truck bombing by a member of the **Islamic Jihad** against the U.S. embassy in West Beirut on 18 April 1983, which resulted in the deaths of 49 people. These **suicide attacks**, especially the one against the marine barracks, led to the reevaluation of U.S. military involvement in **Lebanon** and resulted in the abrupt withdrawal in early 1984 of troops that the **United States** and **France** had deployed in Lebanon to stabilize and contain growing sectarian violence. At the same time, the attacks eliminated any possibility of an early Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon following its **Peace for Galilee Operation**.
    See also SECURITY ZONE; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BEIRUT RAID. On 28 December 1968, Israel carried out an air raid against the Beirut international airport, destroying a number of civilian aircraft belonging to the Lebanese Middle East Airways. This was in response to an attack two days earlier on an El Al aircraft in Athens, Greece, carried out by commandos belonging to the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**. In the Athens attack, one passenger was killed and scores of others were injured. Through such massive retaliation, Israel hoped to pressure the government of **Lebanon** into acting against Palestinian groups operating from that country against Israel.
    See also LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL; LITANI OPERATION; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BEIT LID BOMBING. In a **suicide attack** carried out on 22 January 1995, two bombers struck at a bus station in the Beit Lid junction in northern Israel that was frequented by hitchhiking soldiers returning to their bases. Nineteen Israelis, most of them soldiers, were killed in the attack.
    See also ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BELGIUM LAW. A piece of Belgian legislation introduced in 1999 gave courts in that country the authority to prosecute individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and **war crimes** regardless of any connection to Belgium or the presence of the accused on Belgian soil. As a result, complaints have been filed in Belgium against a number of leading interna-

tional personalities for their alleged human rights violations and war crimes. This paved the way for possible prosecution of Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon** over the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre** of 1982 and led to a major diplomatic row between the two countries. There were even suggestions that U.S. president **George W. Bush**, who had ordered the invasion of **Iraq** in March 2003, could also be brought under the ambit of the new law. The fact that Brussels is the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further complicated the situation and raised the possibility that Bush and other American leaders might avoid visiting Belgium because of potential prosecution. Eventually, in August 2003, the Belgian parliament amended the 1993 law, and in September, the Belgian Supreme Court dismissed the case against Sharon.

See also KAHAN COMMISSION; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; UNITED STATES.

BEN-GURION, DAVID (1886–1973). A prominent Israeli politician, David Ben-Gurion played a significant role in the establishment of the State of Israel and served as its first prime minister. Born in Plonsk, Poland, on 16 October 1886, he joined the socialist-Zionist group Poalei Zion ("Workers of Zion") at the age of 18. In 1906, he made **Aliya** to Palestine and worked in a kibbutz. Active in the **Yishuv**, he helped to establish the Jewish self-defense group **Hashomer** ("The Watchman") and the Histadrut labor federation. He served as Histadrut representative to the **World Zionist Organization** and the **Jewish Agency** and, in 1935, was elected head of both organizations.

In **Mandate Palestine**, Ben-Gurion provided leadership and successfully led the Yishuv to statehood. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, he was instrumental in Israel's securing and consolidating large areas beyond those allotted by the **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**. He became the prime minister and defense minister of the provisional government following the **Declaration of Independence** proclaimed on 14 May 1948. In that capacity, he occupied a pivotal position in the establishment of various institutions of the state including the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) and successfully managed a massive Aliya from the neighboring Arab and Islamic countries toward nation building. He was also the architect of Israel's strategic policy and its nuclear weapons program.

Ben-Gurion pursued a hard-line policy vis-à-vis the Arab states as well as toward the **Israeli Arabs**. Due to internal political differences, in late 1953 he left the government and retired to Kibbutz Sde Boker in the Negev. After the **Lavon Affair**, he returned to the government in 1955 as defense minister and, shortly afterward, took over as prime minister. His return to power hardened Israel's policy and resulted in massive retaliations against Palestinian infiltrations from the **Gaza Strip** (for example, the **Gaza raid**).

The **Czech Deal** concluded by **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** made Ben-Gurion seek the removal of the Egyptian leader before he could pose a strategic threat to Israel. The July 1956 **nationalization of the Suez Canal** offered Ben-Gurion the opportunity to implement his plans. He forged close ties with **France** and **Great Britain**, which owned and operated the **Suez Canal**. As agreed at the **Sèvres Conference**, Israel initiated the **Suez War** in October 1956. In less than 100 hours, the IDF captured the Gaza Strip and the **Sinai Peninsula**, and on 31 October, Israeli troops reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Under strong American pressure, Ben-Gurion agreed to completely withdraw from the Egyptian territories and the Gaza Strip. During the Suez crisis, he secured an agreement with the French for the construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor in the Negev.

In June 1963, Ben-Gurion resigned from the government and was succeeded by Levi Eshkol (1895–1969) as prime minister. Two years later, differences with the ruling **Mapai** resulted in Ben-Gurion's leaving the party, and along with his longtime associates **Moshe Dayan** and **Shimon Peres**, he started Rafi. On the eve of the **June War of 1967**, due to public pressure, Eshkol formed a unity government, with Dayan as defense minister. In 1968, Rafi joined Mapai to form the Israeli **Labor Party**. In June 1970, Ben-Gurion retired from political life and returned to Sde Boker, where he passed away on 1 December 1973.

See also ALTALENA AFFAIR; ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992); CONSCRIPTION; DALET PLAN; DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE; DIASPORA; *HAREDI* PARTIES; ISRAELI ARABS; LAW OF RETURN; NEW HISTORY; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; RABIN, YITZHAK (1922–1995); STERN GANG; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION; UN MEMBERSHIP; UNITED STATES; WARFARE; WEIZMANN, CHAIM (1874–1952); ZIONISM.

BERNADOTTE PLAN. On 20 May 1948, the **United Nations** appointed a Swedish diplomat, Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948), as the **UN mediator** for the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. On 27 June, shortly after the resumption of hostilities that ended the first cease-fire, Bernadotte suggested the handing over of **Jerusalem** to the Kingdom of **Jordan**. On 26 July, he proposed the demilitarization of the city, and, expanding this proposal, on 16 September he submitted a plan to the UN Security Council calling for a significant territorial revision of the **Partition Plan**. Among other things, he recommended the **annexation** of the Arab part of Palestine and of the Negev (originally allotted to the Jewish state under the Partition Plan) by Jordan, annexation of Western Galilee (originally allotted to the Arabs) by Israel, and the repatriation of Arab **refugees** who had fled from Palestine during the conflict. Initially, Bernadotte recommended the Arab annexation of Jerusalem, but he later modified and recommended the internationalization of the

city. He further suggested that Haifa be declared an international port, Lydda (now Lod) be an international airport, and Haifa harbor be a free zone. On 26 September, the Israeli government rejected the Bernadotte Plan.

Meanwhile, on 17 September 1948, two days after he submitted his plan, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem. Members of the Jewish militant **Stern Gang** who opposed his peace plan, which demanded substantial territorial concessions from Israel, carried out the **assassination**. Despite an international outcry, the killers were never arrested, and no one was prosecuted for the murder. During the debates over its **UN membership** application in early May 1949, Israel informed the General Assembly that the exact identification of the assassins was not available, and hence it was impossible to apprehend them. Israel paid compensation to the UN, and a panel of the International Court of Justice held Israel to be formally responsible for the assassination.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); BEGIN, MENACHEM (1913–1992); EAST JERUSALEM; SHAMIR, YITZHAK (1915–2012); TERRORISM.

BETHLEHEM. The historic city of Bethlehem located in the **West Bank**, south of **Jerusalem**, is considered the birthplace of Jesus Christ. In 637, following the capture of Jerusalem by the Muslim armies led by Umar ibn al-Khattab (579–644), the second caliph, the Christians of the city were allowed the continued use of the Church of the Nativity, believed to be the birthplace of Jesus Christ. A mosque dedicated to Umar was built next to the church in Manger Square, and the city remained under continuous Islamic rule, except for the Crusade period (1099–1187).

Bethlehem came under the administrative control of **Great Britain** during the **Mandate** period. Under the **Partition Plan** of 1947, Bethlehem was to be a part of the international city of Jerusalem. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the city was captured by the armies of the **Arab Legion** of **Jordan**, and in April 1950 King **Abdullah** annexed it along with other parts of the West Bank. During the **June War of 1967**, Israel captured Bethlehem.

As per the **Oslo II Agreement** signed in October 1995, the city was handed over to the control of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), and the Israeli withdrawal was completed on 21 December 1995; since 1995 the city remains under the administrative control of the PNA. This enabled PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** to attend the Christmas Mass held in Bethlehem from December 1995. The Palestinian leader could not attend the Christmas Mass in 2002 and 2003 due to the **Siege of Ramallah**. From 2004, **Mahmoud Abbas** has been leading the Christmas Day celebrations in the city.

Symbolizing the Christian nature of the city, the mayor and deputy major are required by law to be Christians. However, over the years the Christian character of the city has been diluted, and demographically Muslims constitute the majority population. Economically the city thrives on Christian pilgrims, who are often affected by periodic violence such as the **First Intifada** and the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. In a most violent incident in the city, in 2002 a group of Palestinian militants wanted by the **Israel Defense Forces** during the **Defensive Shield Operation** took shelter in the Church of the Nativity. The **security fence** built by Israel runs closest to the city and has hampered the free movement of people and goods. Checkpoints located between Bethlehem and Jerusalem evoked criticism from Christian pilgrims as a harassment technique. During his visit to the region in May 2014, Pope Francis (1936–) held a mass at Manger Square.

See also SIEGE OF BETHLEHEM.

BILTMORE PROGRAM. Adopted by the extraordinary Zionist Conference in New York on 11 May 1942, the Biltmore Program laid the foundations for the future Jewish state. Named after the hotel where the meeting took place, the program was in response to the **MacDonald White Paper** of 1939, which limited **Aliya** and restricted Jewish land purchases in **Mandate Palestine**. It gave a shape to the idea of a Jewish national home enshrined in the **Balfour Declaration** and demanded that "Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth." This was the first official demand from the Zionist leadership for statehood. The program also marked the shifting of Zionist political and diplomatic activities from **Great Britain** to the **United States**.

See also WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

BINATIONAL STATE. Since the 1920s when the Jewish national home was the dominant discourse in the **Yishuv** and among the Zionists, Jewish philosopher Martin Buber (1878–1965) proposed the idea whereby the two contesting nations could co-exist peacefully within a single state. It envisaged the resolution of the problem through the creation of a binational state of Palestine. Seeking parity between the two communities in the government, it sought internal autonomy and non-domination. The idea gained currency in the late 1940s when the future of Palestine was at stake but did not find favor among the mainstream Zionist leadership. The post-1967 Israeli reluctance to annex the **Occupied Territories** of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** partly emanated from the fear that Israel would cease to be a Jewish state but would be transformed into a binational state of Jews and Arabs.

Binationalism is different from the **one-state solution** as well as the **two-state solution**. The one-state solution is akin to the unitary state proposed by the Arabs during the **United Nations** debate on the **Partition Plan** and does

not recognize Jews as a distinct national entity. Unlike binationalism, the two-state solution recognizes Jews and Arabs as distinct nations, and hence they are entitled to separate sovereign rights and statehoods.

See also FEDERAL PLAN; ISRAELI ARABS; MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); ZIONISM.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. Israel and **Syria** are believed to be the only countries in the Middle East with biological weapons capabilities. Even though the exact nature of Israel's capabilities is not clear, the arrest and conviction in 1983 of Marcus Klingberg (1918–), a former scientist at the Ness Ziona Biological Institute, on charges of espionage provided a strong basis for suspicions of such a capability. Klingberg was convicted of spying for the **Soviet Union** and was released in early 2003 after his 20-year prison term was commuted on health grounds.

See also BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC); CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); WARFARE.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC). Officially known as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of the Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the BWC prohibits any possession of **biological weapons** or any biological warfare agents, toxins, equipment, or delivery systems. While most of the countries of the Middle East are signatories to the convention, which came into force on 26 March 1975, citing security considerations and the absence of peace, Israel has refused to sign it.

See also CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); WARFARE.

BLACK LETTER. The publication in October 1930 of the **Passfield White Paper**, which recommended restrictions upon **Aliya** to the **Mandate Palestine**, evoked strong reactions from the Zionist leadership. **Chaim Weizmann**, who was heading the **World Zionist Organization**, spearheaded the counter-offensive whereby the government of **Great Britain** came under strong pressure. As a result, on 13 February 1931, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937) sent an official letter to Weizmann wherein he nullified the Passfield recommendations, reiterated British commitments to world Jewry, upheld a policy of the Jewish national home through further land settlement and immigration, and condoned the Zionist insistence on the employment of only Jewish laborers in Jewish enterprises. This complete reversal of the recommendations of the Passfield White Paper was perceived by Arabs as the Black Letter.

See also ZIONISM.

BLACK SEPTEMBER MASSACRE. This refers to the September 1970 military confrontation in **Jordan** between the Jordanian army and Palestinian **Fedayeen**. The hijacking of three international civilian aircraft and their subsequent detonation in Jordan by commandos belonging to the radical Palestinian group **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** precipitated growing tensions between the Hashemite Kingdom and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). This eventually grew into a civil war–like situation. The attempts by the PLO to create a "state within a state" in Jordan resulted in King **Hussein** ordering a military crackdown against the PLO in which scores of Palestinians (estimates range from 2,000 to "several thousand") were killed at the hands of the Jordanian army.

The confrontation began on 16 September and lasted until 25 September, ending with a decisive victory for Jordanian forces. Following mediatory efforts by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**, on 27 September both sides signed a cease-fire in Cairo. The end of the Palestinian resistance in Jordan resulted in the expulsion of the PLO leadership and Fedayeen from Jordan. Assured of tactical Israeli support, the Jordanian air force repulsed a tank column from **Syria** that sought to intervene in the crisis on behalf of the beleaguered Palestinians. The crisis flared up when fighting was renewed in July 1971, and this resulted in the expulsion of all Palestinian organizations from Jordan and their movement to Beirut.

Relocated in **Lebanon**, a group of Fedayeen fighters belonging to **Fatah** established themselves as the Black September Organization (BSO). This group claimed responsibility for the **assassination** of Jordanian prime minister and defense minister Wasfi al-Tal (1919–1971) in Cairo on 28 November 1971. Tal had played a key role in the Jordanian crackdown on the Palestinians. In September 1972, the BSO carried out the **Munich Massacre**, which resulted in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games. Supported primarily by Libya, Syria, and **Iraq**, the BSO later broke into two factions led by Abu Iyad (1934–1991) and Abu Nidal (1937–2002). The PLO subsequently expelled the latter, named Black June, due to its "unauthorized" acts of **terrorism**.

See also CAIRO AGREEMENT (1970); HUSSEIN–ARAFAT ACCORD; WARFARE.

BLAIR, TONY (1953–). A socialist politician, Tony Blair served as prime minister of **Great Britain** from 1997 to 2007. He was also a member of parliament from 1983 until 2007 when he resigned from office and retired from British politics. He reinvented the British Labour Party and secured victory in the general elections in 1997 after a gap of almost two decades. He played a key role in the **Iraq** invasion initiated by U.S. president **George W. Bush** in March 2003. Upon his retirement from British politics, in June 2007 he was named the special envoy of the four-member Quartet on the Middle

East. Though he has been periodically visiting and meeting leaders of the Middle East, the progress has been meager. In January 2014 he represented the Quartet during the funeral of former Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon**.

See also EUROPEAN UNION (EU); QUARTET ROAD MAP; RUSSIA; UNITED NATIONS (UN); UNITED STATES.

BLUDAN CONFERENCE. Against the backdrop of the ongoing **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**, in September 1937 Arab nationalists from the region met in Bludan, **Syria**. They expressed their support for the Palestinian struggle against **Great Britain** and **Zionism** and their opposition to the **Peel Commission** report, which advocated the partition of Palestine. This was the first manifestation of pan-Arab concern and involvement in Palestinian affairs.

See also MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE.

BLUE-WHITE OPERATION. Acting on intelligence information from inside **Egypt**, Israel viewed an Egyptian mobilization in early 1973 as a precursor to war. While Chief of Military Intelligence Eliahu Zaira (1928–) was skeptical about Egyptian intentions, Chief of Staff David Elazar (1925–1976) and Defense Minister **Moshe Dayan** felt differently. On 19 April, Israel implemented the Blue-White Operation, which called for a large-scale mobilization of reserve soldiers. The expected Egyptian attack did not materialize, and the mobilization cost Israel $45 million. This unnecessary and costly mobilization partially contributed to Israeli laxity when President **Anwar Sadat** of Egypt initiated a surprise attack just seven weeks later in the **October War of 1973**.

See also BAR-LEV LINE; CONSCRIPTION; DOVECOTE OPERATION; ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); KAHAN COMMISSION; WARFARE.

BOYCOTT, DISINVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS). Unlike the **Arab Boycott of Israel** imposed by the member states of the **Arab League**, Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions is a private initiative. Started in July 2005 by a group of Palestinian non-governmental organizations, it seeks a political, economic, academic, and cultural boycott of Israel. It compares Israel's policies toward the Palestinians to **apartheid** and has chapters and branches in many countries, including **Great Britain**, **France**, **Germany**, **India**, **South Africa**, and the **United States**. Through a peaceful but active political campaign, the BDS seeks to enforce the boycott of Israel until the end of the occupation of the Palestinian territories. The BDS does not distinguish the Israeli peace camp, and hence it is criticized by a number of pro-peace groups inside Israel and by pro-peace Palestinian groups and others.

See also ACADEMIC BOYCOTT; AIPAC; ARIEL; DIASPORA; FREE-DOM FLOTILLA; IHH; WARFARE.

BREZHNEV PLAN. On 15 September 1982, days after the unveiling of the **Reagan Plan** and amid tension between Israel and **Syria** over the deployment of surface-to-air missile batteries in the Beka'a Valley in **Lebanon**, President Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982) of the **Soviet Union** outlined a peace plan for the Middle East. It proclaimed the inadmissibility of territorial conquest and called for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders, exercise of the inalienable Palestinian right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, safeguarding the security and independence of all states in the region, termination of war and the establishment of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and international guarantees for a peace settlement. Reflecting the prevailing Arab positions, the Brezhnev Plan was along the lines of **Resolution 242** of the **United Nations** Security Council and was an effort by Moscow to reenter the peacemaking efforts in the Middle East following President **Anwar Sadat**'s expulsion of Soviet military advisers prior to the **October War of 1973**. The plan, which called for the tacit recognition of Israel, was accepted by Arab states as well as by the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, but was summarily rejected by Israel. The absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel since the **June War of 1967** made the Brezhnev Plan ineffective.

See also MADRID CONFERENCE; MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION. This is the code name for the military operation launched by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) to secure the release of three Jewish teenagers—namely, Naftali Frankel (1998–2014), Gilad Shaer (1998–2014), and Eyal Yifrah (1995–2014)—who were kidnapped from the **settlements** in the **Etzion Bloc** in the **West Bank** on 12 June 2014. Israel immediately blamed Hamas for the kidnapping while the latter vehemently rejected the accusation. To rescue them, the IDF launched a large-scale crackdown on Hamas and its infrastructure in the West Bank. At least 10 Palestinians were killed and about 350 to 600 **Hamas** activists were arrested in the West Bank.

The bodies of three Jewish youths were discovered near Hebron on 30 June. The kidnapping and killing led to serious tension inside Israel, and the Arab youth Mohammad Abu Khdeir (1995–2014) was kidnapped from a street in East Jerusalem on 2 July and his half-burned body was discovered in the Jerusalem forests later in the day. Six Israeli youth were arrested for the crime, and three were later charged with the murder. Since the kidnapping of the Jewish youth, over 100 **Qassam** rockets have been fired from the Gaza

Strip, and in response Israel carried out 80 air strikes until the launching of the **Protective Edge Operation** on 6 July. Amid the conflict, on 20 August Hamas leader Salah al-Aruri admitted that a group belonging to **Izz Eddin al-Qassam** kidnapped the youth that precipitated into a full-blown Gaza crisis.

See also EGYPT; KERRY PLAN; NETANYAHU, BENJAMIN (1949–); TARGETED KILLING; TERRORISM.

B'TSELEM. The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, known by its Hebrew acronym B'Tselem, was established in 1989 by a group of prominent Israeli academics, attorneys, media personnel, and Knesset members. Coming in the wake of the **First Intifada**, it sought to document and educate the Israeli public about the human rights violations in the **Occupied Territories** and in the process change the policies of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) toward the Palestinian residents. It has focused on issues such as human rights abuses, **settlements**, land confiscation, use of firearms by the IDF, **administrative detention**, and **settler violence**.

Over the years, B'Tselem has emerged as the most authoritative source of information for Israel's policies regarding the occupied Palestinian territories. It is run primarily through funds from a number of Western governments and individual contributions. Over the years, B'Tselem has also been critical of the conduct of the Palestinian leadership and, since the **Oslo Accords** of the **Palestinian National Authority**, regarding the human rights situation in the Palestinian society. With its headquarters in **Jerusalem**, the reports of B'Tselem are accompanied by official responses from the IDF, thereby adding credibility and wider public acceptance. The non-governmental organization has been criticized by the nationalist camp in Israel, which accuses it of collaborating with the enemies of Israel and weakening the IDF.

See also ASSASSINATION/S; CORRIE, RACHEL (1979–2003); IM TIRZU; NAQBA LAW; TARGETED KILLING.

BUENOS AIRES BOMBING. On 18 July 1994, a powerful car bomb exploded at a building in the Argentinean capital that housed the office of the Jewish community in Buenos Aires. More than 90 people were killed, most of them Jews, and over 100 were injured. Due to the nature and target of the attack, it was immediately linked to the Middle East, with **Iran** being the prime suspect. The indictment report released by the Argentine government held a special operations committee connected to and mandated by Iran's Supreme National Security Council responsible for the attack. According to the indictment, Supreme Leader **Ali Khamenei** led the committee, and President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–) along with Khamenei took the decision to go ahead with the attack. Argentina has also accused the Iranian

government of directing the bombing and the Lebanon-based group **Hezbollah** of carrying it out. However, it has not made any arrests. The issue resurfaced in 2013 when **Hassan Rouhani** was elected president, as he was the secretary of the Supreme National Council at the time of the Buenos Aires bombing.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BURGAS TERROR ATTACK. On 18 July 2012, a suicide bomber carried out a terror attack on a passenger bus transporting Israeli tourists at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, 400 kilometers from the capital of Sofia. The **suicide attack** killed five Israelis and the Bulgarian bus driver and injured 32 Israelis who were traveling on the bus to their hotels after arriving from Tel Aviv. Israel's prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** immediately accused **Hezbollah** and **Iran** of involvement. After an investigation, in February 2013 the Bulgarian interior minister disclosed that two of three suspects in the case were members of the military wing of Hezbollah, carried Australian and Canadian passports, and lived in **Lebanon** from 2006 and 2010. Initially a few **European Union** (EU) countries resisted the call to label Hezbollah a terrorist organization, but on 22 July 2013 all EU foreign ministers signed the ban. This was partly due to Hezbollah's support of President **Bashar al-Assad** in the **Arab Spring in Syria**.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BUS 300 AFFAIR. On 12 April 1984, four Palestinians hijacked an Israeli bus traveling on the Tel Aviv–Ashkelon route. General Security Services (GSS), Israel's internal intelligence agency, claimed that all hijackers of Bus 300 were killed in the ensuing rescue operation. It was subsequently revealed that two Palestinians were taken prisoner following the operation, and their photographs appeared in Israeli media, thereby contradicting the earlier official claim. Initially, Yitzhak Mordechai (1944–), who commanded the Paratroops Corps that stormed the bus, was implicated in the cover-up.

Subsequent investigations revealed that the GSS chief, Avraham Shalom (1929–), had ordered the execution of the captured terrorists and had falsified evidence and suborned witnesses in two official inquiries. The demand for his removal was resisted, but efforts by Attorney-General Yitzhak Zamir (1931–) to secure Shalom's dismissal proved successful. On 25 June 1986, the GSS chief and three of his senior colleagues requested and obtained a presidential pardon from Chaim Herzog (1918–1997), and Shalom subsequently resigned. In August, the president pardoned another seven GSS agents. While most of the controversy was focused on who ordered and

carried out the execution and the subsequent falsehoods surrounding it, none of the Israelis were ever prosecuted for the deaths of the two captured Palestinians.

In a media interview published in January 1997, Shalom admitted that he had ordered the killing of the two captured terrorists and claimed that he had informed the then prime minister **Yitzhak Shamir**, but the latter denied this assertion. The controversy was resurrected when Ehud Yatom (1948–), one of those pardoned for their involvement, was nominated to a senior security position in the Knesset. Yatom was elected to the Knesset in 2003 as a **Likud** member.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

BUSH, GEORGE W. (1946–). The 43rd president of the **United States**, George W. Bush is the eldest son of George H. W. Bush (1924–), who served as president during 1988–1992. Born in New Haven, Connecticut, on 6 July 1946, Bush grew up in Midland and Houston, Texas. He studied at Yale University and Harvard Business School and served as an F-102 fighter pilot in the Texas Air National Guard. After graduation, he began a career in the energy business and started an oil and gas exploration company called Arbusto (Spanish for "bush"). Following the defeat of his father's reelection bid in the November 1992 presidential election, Bush entered politics with the Republican Party, and in 1994 he was elected governor of Texas and was reelected in 1998. Bush narrowly defeated Democratic candidate Al Gore (1948–) in the November 2000 presidential election and was sworn in as president on 20 January 2001. He convincingly won a second term in November 2004.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, D.C., by members of al-Qaeda galvanized President Bush into launching a global war on **terrorism** and pursuing al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan in 2001. Despite international unpopularity and domestic criticism, in March 2003 President Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, invaded **Iraq**, introduced regime change in Iraq, and replaced the Ba'athist regime of President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) with a more liberal but militancy-ridden polity.

Accusing **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** of a breach of his commitments to pursue peace and of collaborating with terrorism, Bush sided with Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon** and refused to meet with the Palestinian leader. Though less active than his predecessor, **Bill Clinton**, President Bush proposed the **Bush Plan** in June 2002 and was instrumental in the **Quartet Road Map**, the **Aqaba Summit** of 2003, and the **Annapolis Conference**. Bush's demands for internal Palestinian reforms outlined in his plan resulted in Arafat's creating the post of prime minister of

the PNA and nominating **Mahmoud Abbas** to that position. President Bush left office in January 2009 upon the completion of his two terms and was succeeded by **Barack Obama**.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); DURBAN CONFERENCE/S; GREATER MIDDLE EAST; OLMERT, EHUD (1945–); SECOND LEBANON WAR; TENET PLAN.

BUSH PLAN. Amid increased Israeli–Palestinian violence related to the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, on 24 June 2002 U.S. president **George W. Bush** outlined his vision for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The statement was aimed partly toward pacifying the critics of his hands-off Middle East policy and partly at shoring up support for the impending military campaign against **Iraq**. Bush called for "two states, living side by side in peace and security." Supporting the idea of an independent Palestinian state, Bush conditioned it on the Palestinians electing a new, reformed, and accountable leadership that would fight **terrorism**. He called on Israel to withdraw its forces to the positions held on 27 September 2000, the day before the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and to stop building **settlements**, but at the same time he endorsed Israel's right to fight terrorism. Reflecting the views of the Israeli government of **Ariel Sharon**, Bush indirectly declared **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** to be irrelevant to the peace process. The statement did not refer to the **Oslo Process** or to the **Abdullah Plan** unveiled a few months earlier. The Bush Plan brought about some cosmetic changes in the PNA and contributed to the creation of the post of prime minister, filled by **Mahmoud Abbas** and later by **Ahmed Qurei**.

See also QUARTET ROAD MAP.

BYPASS ROADS. An outcome of the **Oslo Accords**, bypass roads are the new roads that Israel built in the **Occupied Territories** following the peace agreement with the Palestinians. These roads, endorsed by various U.S. administrations, link various Jewish **settlements** with one another, as well as with Israel, thereby circumventing Palestinian population centers. Most of these roads are built on lands confiscated from the Palestinians. The costs incurred in the construction of the bypass roads were treated as "security-related" expenses in implementing the **redeployment** of the **Israel Defense Forces** as required under the Oslo Accords and hence were excluded from the conditions imposed by the U.S. government on the $10 billion **loan guarantees**.

See also SECURITY FENCE/S.

C

CAIRO AGREEMENT (1970). This agreement governed the relationship between **Lebanon** and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) in the aftermath of the Hashemite crackdown on the PLO in September 1970 and its subsequent expulsion from **Jordan**, commonly known as the **Black September Massacre**. The agreement was made possible through the mediatory efforts of President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**, who died days before the formal agreement was signed in Cairo on 27 September 1970. The agreement enabled the relocation of the PLO and its **Fedayeen** to southern Lebanon and the Lebanese concurrence and approval of the establishment of a "Fatah land" that the Palestinians could use as a base for their attacks against Israel. The arrangement enabled Palestinians to bear arms, conduct and administer their own affairs, and oversee the Palestinian **refugee** camps in Lebanon.

The establishment of a state-within-a-state arrangement undermined Lebanese sovereignty, and the PLO challenged any attempts by the Lebanese government to regain control in southern Lebanon. While it resolved the crisis emanating from the Jordan–Palestinian strife, the Cairo Agreement sowed the seeds for the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989) and the country's subsequent occupation by the military forces of **Syria** and Israel. The Palestinian militant campaign against Israel from Lebanon invariably resulted in an Israeli counter-offensive against Lebanon. This spiral of activities eventually culminated in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, forcing the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and its relocation to Tunis.

See also ABDULLAH PLAN; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; HUSSEIN, KING (1935–1999); HUSSEIN–ARAFAT ACCORD; LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL; LITANI OPERATION; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; SECOND LEBANON WAR.

CAIRO AGREEMENT (1994). Also termed the Gaza–Jericho Autonomy Agreement or the Oslo Implementation Agreement, this accord was signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994 by **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** and Israel's prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin**. It was the

first of a series of agreements between Israel and the PLO concerning the initial stage of Palestinian autonomy in the **Gaza Strip** and **Jericho** in the **West Bank**. The Cairo agreement outlined the provisions of Israeli **redeployment** from these two areas and the establishment of a Palestinian Self-Governing Authority.

Formal negotiations began on 13 October 1993, a month after the signing of the **Declaration of Principles** (DoP). Differences between the two sides over the geographical area of Jericho, the size and authority of the Palestinian police, the Palestinian presence on the King **Hussein** Bridge across the **Jordan River**, the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, and security measures around Jewish **settlements** in the Gaza Strip delayed an early agreement. Paving the way for the implementation of the DoP, the Cairo Agreement demarcated the areas of the **Occupied Territories** that would be handed over to the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Israeli forces would be redeployed from these areas to mutually agreed locations.

The signing ceremony was marred by Arafat's initial refusal to sign the accompanying maps that demarcated the Jericho area. The areas under the control of the PNA included 219 square kilometers of the Gaza Strip and 62 square kilometers of Jericho. Israeli troops pulled out of these two areas by 18 May 1994. The Cairo Agreement set a five-year time limit for the interim period, and the 4 May 1999 deadline passed without any progress concerning the **Permanent Status Negotiations**. This ignited a heated but inconclusive debate among the Palestinians for a possible unilateral declaration of independence.

See also EGYPT; MUBARAK, HOSNI (1928–); OSLO ACCORDS; OSLO PROCESS.

CAIRO DIALOGUE. Bowing to growing international pressures over **suicide attacks** against Israel, in November 2002 senior leaders of various Palestinian factions met in Cairo to negotiate a temporary cease-fire (***hudna***). The inter-Palestinian dialogue, commonly referred to as the Cairo Dialogue, was organized and facilitated by **Egypt**. All major Palestinian factions, including **Fatah**, **Hamas**, and **Islamic Jihad**, attended the talks. Further rounds of talks were held in January and December 2003. The dialogue sought to offer a temporary cessation of suicide attacks against Israel, but lack of reciprocal Israeli concessions undermined Egyptian efforts. The talks have underscored the fundamental differences between Hamas and the Palestinian institutions headed by **Yasser Arafat** such as Fatah, the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA).

Mahmoud Abbas, who took over the Palestinian leadership following Arafat's death, intensely pursued the dialogue for a cease-fire. In March 2005, weeks after he was elected president of the PNA, Abbas secured a *tahidiyeh* (lull in fighting) with the military groups. Though it was less than a full truce, **terrorism** against Israel has been considerably reduced since then.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); SULH; TARGETED KILLING; YASSIN, SHEIKH AHMED (c. 1933–2004).

CAIRO EMBASSY ATTACK. Amid the **Arab Spring in Egypt**, on the evening of 9 September 2011 about 3,000 protesters broke down the security perimeters of the compound and forcibly entered the Israeli embassy in the Giza District of Cairo. They ransacked the embassy offices located on the 20th and 21st floors of the building. Israel's ambassador, his staff, and his family members were safely evacuated before the attack, while security staff remained on the premises in a reinforced safe room. The immediate provocation for the protest was the killing of at least five Egyptian soldiers by the **Israel Defense Forces** in the clashes following the **Eilat terror attack** near Israel's border with the **Sinai Peninsula** on 18 August. Two days later, one protester climbed the facade of the building hosting the Israeli embassy and removed the Israeli flag. The 9 September attack took place despite increased security around the building. In August 2012 a number of Egyptians were convicted and given one-year suspended sentences for their role in the attack. Since the embassy attack, Israel has scaled down its diplomatic presence in Cairo, and its ambassador has only been visiting **Egypt** for official engagements and does not reside in Cairo.

See also ARAB SPRING; MUBARAK, HOSNI (1928–); SINAI VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. On 17 September 1978, following 13 days of secret negotiations at Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat in Maryland, Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** and President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** concluded two agreements that provided the basis for peace—namely, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East and the Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. The former focused on the fate of Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** and revolved around Israel's **Autonomy Plan** for Palestinians. The two documents were accompanied by an exchange of letters, which reiterated the positions of Egypt and Israel concerning **Jerusalem** and the definitional differences over expressions such as "**West Bank**" and "Palestinians." The Egyptian cabinet approved the accords on 19 September. On 28 September, the Israeli Knesset overwhelmingly (84 to 19,

with 17 abstentions) endorsed them, although a number of senior members of Begin's own **Likud** Party either voted against them (Moshe Arens [1925–]) or abstained (**Yitzhak Shamir**).

The process that culminated in the Camp David Accords was set in motion on 9 November 1977, when Sadat told the surprised Egyptian parliament that he was prepared to go to Jerusalem and negotiate peace with Israel directly. His offer was accepted by Israel, and on 19 November, Sadat flew to Israel for his historic **Jerusalem visit**. The following day, in an address to the Israeli Knesset, Sadat outlined his vision for peace. The two sides began negotiations on 25 December at the Egyptian resort of Ismailia, but the Palestinian issue and Israeli **settlements** in the **Sinai Peninsula** hampered progress. Personally intervening in the process, President **Jimmy Carter** of the **United States** invited both leaders to his Camp David retreat for intense negotiations, and this culminated in the Camp David Accords. On 26 March 1979, the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** was signed in Washington, D.C. The treaty called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and guaranteed freedom of passage for Israeli shipping through the **Suez Canal** and the **Straits of Tiran**.

The accords and the peace treaty were warmly welcomed by the West and resulted in Sadat and Begin receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979. The response in the Middle East was hostile. Sadat's peace initiatives and his willingness to negotiate and seek a separate peace with Israel were seen as a violation of Arab unity and contrary to the decisions of the **Khartoum Arab Summit** of 1967. While **Jordan** and **Saudi Arabia** had strong reservations over the Camp David Accords, radical Arab states led by **Syria** joined the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in their rejections.

In November 1978, **Arab League** representatives, without Egypt, met in **Iraq** to debate measures to isolate Sadat. Following the March 1979 signing of the peace treaty, Egypt, a founding member, was expelled from the Arab League, and the league's headquarters were shifted to Tunis. Egypt was also expelled from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**, OIC). Reflecting this negative mood in the Middle East, on 29 November 1979 the **United Nations** General Assembly declared, "The Camp David Accords and other agreements have no validity insofar as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967."

Despite uncertainties following the **assassination** of Sadat on 6 October 1981, Israel proceeded with the withdrawal process. During 23–25 April 1982, the town of Yamit on the northeast corner of the Sinai Peninsula was completely demolished, and on 26 April, the Rafa Salient was returned to Egypt. However, the tiny Egyptian territory of **Taba** remained a contentious

issue. Following international arbitration, on 15 March 1989, nearly seven years after its pullout from the Sinai Peninsula, Israel completed its withdrawal from the 700 square meters (7,500 square feet) of the Taba enclave.

Egypt was readmitted into the Islamic forum at the Casablanca OIC summit in May 1984, and on 23 September 1984 Jordan restored diplomatic ties with Cairo. In November 1987, Egypt was invited to attend the Arab summit held in Amman and was formally readmitted into the Arab League during the Casablanca summit in May 1989. On 1 November 1990, the league headquarters were moved back to Cairo.

Despite his refusal to visit Israel (except for his brief visit to attend the funeral of slain Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** in November 1995), and maintaining only cold peace with Israel, President **Hosni Mubarak** kept to the core of the Camp David Accords. The **Arab Spring in Egypt**, and the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, raised concerns about the durability of the Camp David Accords and the bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel. This was exasperated by the growing influence of Islamists and the election of **Mohammed Morsi** as president in June 2012. Upon assuming office, Morsi was quick to dispel any misgivings about the Camp David Accords and played a key role in bringing about a cease-fire between Israel and **Hamas** following the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012.

See also ARAB SPRING; GREEN LINE; ISRAEL–U.S. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU); OIL SUPPLIES; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; JUNE WAR OF 1967; KNESSET APPROVAL; MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO); NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM); OCTOBER WAR OF 1973.

CAMP DAVID TALKS. The delays in the Israeli **redeployment** in the **Occupied Territories** and threats by **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state before 13 September 2000 (the deadline for the conclusion of the **Permanent Status Negotiations** as stipulated by the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** of September 1999) led to high-level summit talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. At the invitation of U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** and Chairman Arafat came to the **United States** and held intense but unsuccessful negotiations at the presidential retreat of Camp David from 11 to 24 July 2000.

The talks focused on the core issues of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—namely, **Jerusalem**, **refugees**, borders, Israeli withdrawal, security, **settlements**, and **water**. These issues were identified in the **Declaration of Principles** of 1993, and both sides agreed to postpone them to the Permanent Status Negotiations. The Camp David Talks, however, failed to make headway, especially on Jerusalem and the refugee question. Following the talks, Clin-

ton and Barak publicly blamed Arafat for the failure. The Palestinian disappointment over the unsuccessful Camp David Talks was an important reason for the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000.

See also CLINTON PARAMETERS; QUARTET ROAD MAP; SHARON, ARIEL (1928–2014); SUICIDE ATTACK/S; TERRORISM.

CARTER, JIMMY (1924–). The 39th president of the **United States**, Jimmy Carter was born in Plains, Georgia, on 1 October 1924. Having served in the U.S. Navy, in 1962 he entered politics and was elected governor of Georgia in 1970. In 1976 he defeated President Gerald R. Ford (1913–2006) of the Republican Party and became president in January 1977. The crowning moments of his presidency came in 1978 when he persuaded **Anwar Sadat**, the president of **Egypt**, and Israel's prime minister **Menachem Begin** to conclude the **Camp David Accords**. This was the first Arab–Israel peace agreement since the **Armistice Agreements of 1949** and paved the way for the **Egypt–Israeli Peace Treaty** the following year and the subsequent normalization of relations. Carter, however, could not succeed in making progress on the Israeli–Palestinian track.

Carter's reelection bid in 1980 was dominated by the invasion of Afghanistan by the **Soviet Union** and the Islamic Revolution in **Iran**. In February 1979, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), a trusted ally of the United States, was overthrown, and on 4 November a group of students took over the American embassy in Tehran. Fifty-two hostages were held captive for 444 days until January 1981. The hostage crisis contributed to Carter's defeat to Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) in November 1980.

Through the Carter Center that he established in 1982, the former president has been engaged in mediating various international conflicts and monitoring and observing elections in emerging democracies. In 2002, Carter was awarded the Nobel Prize for "for his decades of untiring effort to find peaceful solutions to international conflicts." In 1997, **India** bestowed the Indira Gandhi Prize of Peace, Disarmament and Development on Carter. He is a frequent visitor to the Middle East, and he and his colleagues at the Carter Center contributed to the unofficial **Geneva Accord** between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. He was involved in securing the release of Gilad Shalit, a soldier of the **Israel Defense Forces** kidnapped by **Hamas**. He has been critical of American policies regarding **Iraq** and the Middle East peace process.

Against the backdrop of official American opposition, Carter has been meeting leaders of Hamas as well as **Bashar al-Assad**, the president of **Syria**. Over the years, he has emerged as the prominent voice in the West in support of the Palestinians and has been critical of Israel's positions regarding the peace process and its policies regarding **settlements**. His book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid*, published in November 2006, generated wide-

spread attention, praise, and criticism. His usage of the expression "**apartheid**" for Israel has evoked criticism from Israel and its supporters. Partly to assuage Israeli feelings, in 2009 he issued a public apology for any of his words and deeds that may have upset the Jewish community.

See also SHALIT AFFAIR.

CAST LEAD OPERATION. This was the code name for the military operation carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) against the **Hamas**-ruled **Gaza Strip** during the winter of 2008–2009. The offensive began on 27 December 2008 as a response to a prolonged firing of **Qassam** rockets by various Palestinian militant groups into Israel from the Gaza Strip, and it continued until 18 January 2009 when both sides announced a cease-fire. Besides stopping rocket attacks, the IDF also sought to keep weapons from being smuggled into Gaza through underground **tunnels** from the **Sinai Peninsula**. For the first time since its unilateral **Gaza Disengagement**, the IDF launched a full-fledged ground offensive on 3 January 2009. This resulted in close combat in densely populated Palestinian areas in the central and southern Gaza Strip.

According to **B'Tselem**, during this conflict 1,389 Palestinians, including 759 non-combatants, were killed, and more than 5,300 were injured. Citing **United Nations** estimates, the Israeli human rights organization also claimed that more than 3,500 residential dwellings were destroyed and 20,000 people were left homeless. There were 13 Israeli casualties, including 4 friendly fire deaths. During the conflict, militants fired 750 rockets into Israel. The operation highlighted the discord that existed between the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip and the **West Bank** controlled by the **Palestinian National Authority** headed by President **Mahmoud Abbas**. While there were protests in many countries in the Middle East and beyond, the West Bank remained relatively quiet and was indifferent toward the Cast Lead Operation.

Both sides were accused of committing **war crimes** and deliberately targeting the civilian population. These accusations led to the formation of the inquiry headed by **Richard Goldstone**. A cease-fire came into force two days before the inauguration of **Barack Obama** as the 44th president of the **United States**.

See also GOLDSTONE REPORT; IHH; SIEGE OF GAZA; WARFARE.

CHAMELEON OPERATION. Parallel to the **Alpha Plan** during November–December 1955, the **United States** Central Intelligence Agency launched a covert but unsuccessful mission aimed at arranging a secret meeting between Israeli prime minister **David Ben-Gurion** and **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**. Eric Johnston (1896–1963), a special envoy of President

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), who at that time was pursuing negotiations over the sharing of the waters of the **Jordan River**, was used as the cover. At one time, the Chameleon and Alpha plans were closely intertwined.

See also JOHNSTON PLAN; OMEGA OPERATION; SUEZ WAR; WATER.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC). The expanded and updated version of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical warfare, this convention prohibits not only the use of chemical weapons (banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol) but also their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. All parties to the convention undertook to disclose and destroy their chemical weapons and production facilities within a specific time frame. The convention came into force on 29 April 1998. Israel, which refused to sign the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** and the **Biological Weapons Convention**, signed the CWC when it was opened for signature in January 1993 but has not ratified it. Suspicions over the possible use of chemical weapons by **Syria** during the **Arab Spring in Syria** renewed the focus on the CWC. Under a plan mediated by **Russia**, in September 2013 President **Bashar al-Assad** agreed to sign the CWC and dismantle his chemical weapons stocks. Disarmament of chemical stocks has been progressing slowly due to ongoing violence in that country.

See also BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; WARFARE.

CHINA. For long the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been a staunch supporter of the Palestinians. During the 29 November 1947 **United Nations** General Assembly vote on the **Partition Plan**, the Republic of China was the only Asian country to abstain. On 1 November 1949 the revolution brought the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to power, and it proclaimed the PRC. In the initial years, the PRC was inclined to reciprocate Israel's diplomatic overtures when in January 1950 the latter became the first country in the Middle East to recognize the new political order in China. Their contacts came to an abrupt end following the **Bandung Conference** of Afro-Asian nations where China discovered the political value of the Arab countries and began forging closer ties with **Egypt** under **Gamal Abdel Nasser**. China's need for Arab support to regain its legitimate place in the **United Nations** resulted in China's rebuffing of Israeli overtures.

In January 1965 China became the first non-Arab country to recognize the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, and **Yasser Arafat** made a visit to China in March 1964 as the leader of **Fatah**. Since then, China has been providing political, ideological, and at times military support to various Pal-

estinian groups. The PRC's admission into the UN in 1971 and its assuming permanent membership on the Security Council enhanced China's support for the Palestinians.

The ascendance of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) and China's military modernization drive resulted in China's looking to Israel for assistance. Since the late 1970s, and despite the absence of political relations, both countries forged close military-security relations that eventually culminated in the establishment of diplomatic relations following the **Madrid Conference**. On the eve of the **Moscow Conference** on 24 January 1992, China formally recognized Israel and established full diplomatic relations. Since then, both countries have intensified their political and economic relations, though military ties were impeded by frequent interference and pressure from the **United States**. During his state visit to Israel in April 2000, President Jiang Zemin (1926–) visited the Palestinian areas and was given a ceremonial guard of honor in **Bethlehem** by **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman Arafat. The maiden visit of **Mahmoud Abbas** to China as president of the PNA took place in March 2005, and he has been visiting China since then.

Using its political influence as a permanent member of the Security Council and its growing economic power, China has been pursuing a delicate balance between Israel and the PNA. Likewise, its support for the **two-state solution** has not prevented China from engaging with **Hamas**. Following the success of the Islamic militant movement in the Palestinian elections held in January 2006, China hosted a Hamas delegation in a conference on China–Arab relations held in Beijing in May of that year. While supporting the Middle East peace process, for long China was passive, and in September 2002 it named its first special envoy to the Middle East; since then it has been periodically changing its envoy. In May 2013 during the separate visits by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and President Abbas, China proposed a four-point plan for the settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

See also ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; INDIA; NUCLEAR IRAN; RUSSIA.

CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER. In a policy statement issued on 1 July 1922, colonial secretary of **Great Britain** Winston Churchill (1874–1965) outlined the British policy in **Mandate Palestine**. The Churchill White Paper categorically declared that "the whole of Palestine West of the Jordan [River] was . . . excluded from" the pledge made by Henry McMahon (1862–1949) to Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of Mecca in his letter dated 24 October 1915. That letter formed a part of the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence**. Approved by the British House of Commons, the white paper sought to assuage the Arabs by stating that the **Balfour Declaration** did not envisage the conversion of the whole of the Palestine Mandate into a Jewish national home.

This policy statement reproduced a number of correspondences among the British government, Arab delegations, and the **World Zionist Organization** with regard to the future of Palestine. Among other things, the statement confirmed the right of **Aliya** to Palestine but conditioned it to the economic absorptive capacity of the region. While the Zionist Executive accepted the white paper, the fifth Arab Palestine Congress meeting in Nablus in August 1922 rejected the British policy statement.

See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS; TRANSJORDAN; ZIONISM.

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. After the **June War of 1967** and its occupation, Israel established a **military administration** that governed the **West Bank**. In a bid to change the image and as a partial concession to the autonomy talks with **Egypt**, on 8 November 1981 the Israeli cabinet decided to modify the arrangement and established a separate civilian administration to handle all local concerns of the **Occupied Territories**. Military and security matters, however, remained with the army. The **Oslo Accords** and the inauguration of the **Palestinian National Authority** superseded this arrangement.

See also AUTONOMY PLAN; VILLAGE LEAGUE.

CLINTON, BILL (1946–). As the 42nd president of the **United States** (1993–2001), William Jefferson Clinton played an active role in the Middle East peace process. He was born in Hope, Arkansas, on 19 August 1946. An attorney by training, initially Clinton facilitated bilateral negotiations between Israel and its Arab partners as a follow-up of the **Madrid Conference**, but the onset of the **Oslo Process** increased his active involvement in the peace process. Though initially kept in the dark, on 13 September 1993 he hosted the official ceremony where the **Declaration of Principles** (DoP) was signed by Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres** and **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee member **Mahmoud Abbas**. The White House ceremony was also attended by Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** and PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat**. The following day, Clinton hosted the signing of the Washington Declaration by Rabin and King **Hussein** of **Jordan**. On 25 July 1994, Clinton attended a ceremony in the Arava on the Israel–Jordan border where the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** was signed. He played an active role in Israel's negotiations with **Syria** and in January 2000 hosted the **Shepherdstown Talks**, though with limited success.

After the signing of the DoP, President Clinton played an active role in the peace process and periodically hosted Israeli and Palestinian leaders for talks. Against the backdrop of a wave of **suicide attacks** by the militant Islamic group **Hamas** in early 1996, Clinton took the initiative to organize the May 1996 **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit** in **Egypt**. He played a leading role

in the signing of the **Hebron Protocol** in January 1997, which called for the Israeli **redeployment** in Hebron. With a view to implementing the 1995 **Taba Agreement**, Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and Arafat signed the **Wye Memorandum** on 23 October 1998 that called for a three-phase second redeployment by the **Israel Defense Forces**. In December 1998, Clinton became the first U.S. president to visit the areas controlled by the **Palestinian National Authority**, where he witnessed the abrogation of the clauses in the **PLO Charter** that called for the destruction of Israel or contradicted the spirit of the **Oslo Accords**. However, the official amended version of the PLO Charter was never published.

Failure of the **Permanent Status Negotiations** resulted in President Clinton's organizing the **Camp David Talks**, where Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** and Chairman Arafat met during 11–24 July 2000. Despite his best efforts, the negotiations ended in failure, as both leaders were unable to resolve their key differences over **Jerusalem** and the **refugees**. Clinton publicly blamed Arafat for the failure, and Palestinian disappointment over the unsuccessful Camp David Talks was an important reason for the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000.

Only a month before he left office, on 19 December 2000, Clinton outlined a peace plan, formally known as the **Clinton Parameters**. It called for an Israeli withdrawal from most of the **Occupied Territories**, as well as shared sovereignty over **East Jerusalem**, including the old city. However, little progress was made before Clinton left the White House on 20 January 2001. He was succeeded by Republican president **George W. Bush**.

See also ANNULMENT; MITCHELL COMMITTEE REPORT; SHARON, ARIEL (1928–2014); TERRITORIAL SWAP.

CLINTON PARAMETERS. In a last-minute attempt before leaving office, U.S. president **Bill Clinton** outlined a peace plan to Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). The plan was formally presented to the parties on 19 December 2000, on the eve of Clinton's departure from the White House but after the election of **George W. Bush** as president. The plan came against the background of the ongoing **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. With significant modifications, it was largely based on the **Camp David Talks** held in July 2000.

The plan called for a non-militarized Palestinian state in 95 percent of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**. In return for the Israeli annexation of the three **settlement** blocs of **Ma'ale Adumim**, **Ariel**, and **Etzion Bloc**, the Palestinians would receive 3 percent of the land from Israel proper, west of the **Green Line**. The Palestinians would have sovereignty over **East Jerusalem**, and control of the holy sites in the old city would be "shared and functional." Palestinian **refugees** would have the **right to return** to their Palestinian homeland, but not to their original homes in what had become

Israel in 1948. Refugees who did not exercise this right would be entitled to compensation and resettlement. The plan demanded that the refugees forswear their right of return, recognized and guaranteed under **Resolution 194**, and this became controversial and unviable.

Even though Israeli and Palestinian delegates resumed talks in **Taba**, no agreement was possible before Clinton left the White House on 20 January 2001. The impending Israeli elections, slated for 6 February, precluded any meaningful progress, and talks were formally suspended on 28 January, following a disparaging remark by PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** against Prime Minister **Ehud Barak**.

See also MITCHELL COMMITTEE REPORT; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

COHEN, ELI (1924–1965). Eli Cohen was the most successful Israeli agent who operated from Damascus in the early 1960s. Immigrating to Israel in 1957 from **Egypt**, he was able to pass himself off as an Arab and operated under the assumed Arab name Camile Amin Thabbet and moved to **Syria** via Argentina. He befriended senior Syrian leaders, including cabinet ministers and high-ranking army officials, and periodically transmitted classified information to Israel. Cohen was eventually arrested in January 1965 and was hanged in a public square in Damascus on 18 May 1965. He was buried in the Jewish cemetery in Damascus. Israel has been unsuccessfully trying to exhume his body for reburial in Israel.

COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL GUIDANCE (CNG). Following the proscription of the **Palestine National Front** by Israel, in October 1978 a group of Palestinians, including Mahdi Abdul Hadi (1944–) and Ibrahim Dakkak (1929–), who were closely affiliated with the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, organized themselves into the CNG. The **Camp David Accords** and the **Autonomy Plan** of Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** provided the backdrop for its formation. Committed to the creation of a Palestinian state and the right of Palestinian **refugees** to return to their homes, the members of the committee were apprehensive that Israel would perpetuate its control of the **Occupied Territories** through the Autonomy Plan. On 11 March 1982, Israeli defense minister **Ariel Sharon** declared the CNG illegal and banned it.

CONSCRIPTION. Conscription is mandatory enlisting of able-bodied members of a national population, usually for the purpose of military service. Under conscription, all able-bodied Jewish citizens of Israel over the age of 18 are required to serve in the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). The normal period of service is three years for men and two years for women. Subsequently, many soldiers are obligated to serve in their respective units until

they reach the age of 40 to 49. Due to population growth and technological advancement, both the size and duration of conscription have been decreasing.

This arrangement is aimed at Israel meeting its security threats without maintaining a large standing army. The regular army was supposed to engage and hold the enemy front line until the reserves were called. The time gap between the onset of the conflict and mobilization of reserves proved costly during the **October War of 1973** when the forces of **Egypt** and **Syria** sprang a military surprise on Israel.

Conscription has been compulsory for the Jews since 1949, the Druze since 1956, and the Circassians since 1958 and voluntary for the Bedouins since 1948. The **Israeli Arabs** are exempted from compulsory military service, but they could volunteer. The prolonged Arab–Israeli conflict and mutual tension and animosity between Israel's Jewish and Arab populations have resulted in both sides accepting the conscript exemption. While women are normally conscripted, married and religious women are exempted. On religious grounds, Orthodox Jews or *haredi* are exempted from conscription but continue to receive all benefits granted to those doing military service.

Conscription brings a number of direct and indirect social benefits to those who serve in the military. These include favorable education, employment and social welfare benefits, favorable mortgage terms, and special privileges and patronages. For long, a number of sectors in Israel preferred conscripts. This proved to be a disadvantage not only to those women who are not conscripted due to family or religious reasons, but also to Israel's large Arab minorities. Hence, military service has emerged as a source of discrimination against Israeli Arabs.

Israel sought to overcome this situation through the alternative National Service, which was originally introduced in 1971 as a substitute avenue for IDF service for religious women. In 2007 this was extended to all citizens of Israel, including the Arabs. Those who volunteer for this alternative arrangement would be given benefits similar to those available to discharged soldiers. Though this is attracting more Arab youth, the number continues to be small as a result of the wider Arab–Israeli conflict. Due to growing support for the Palestinians, a section of the Druze community has been calling on the youth to abstain from conscription.

Since the **First Intifada** of 1987, a number of Israelis have been refusing to undertake conscription or reserve duties if they are required to serve in the **Occupied Territories**. Unlike the *haredi* population, they are conscientious objectors, and a few have been imprisoned for their defiance. Though the actual number of such people, commonly referred to as "refuseniks," is small, they pose a severe challenge to Israel's political and military authorities.

Under an arrangement worked out by Prime Minister **David Ben-Gurion** in 1949, religious Jews who study in seminaries, or yeshiva students, were exempted from the draft. Initially the number of such exemptions stood at 400 and gradually expanded and reached 62,500, or 13 percent, in 2010. The IDF estimates that the *haredi* exemption will reach 20 percent of the total draft in 2020. Growing draft exemptions have led to widespread resentment among the secular population who criticize the *haredi* **parties** for dodging military service and still benefiting from the largesse of the state. Various unsuccessful attempts have been made to bridge the gap between the *haredi* demand for exemptions and resentment among the secular population. The unity government cobbled together by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** with the centrist **Kadima** in July 2012 collapsed over the draft issue.

See also WARFARE.

CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION. On 29 October 1888, the major European powers—namely, Austria-Hungary, **France**, **Germany**, **Great Britain**, Italy, the Netherlands, **Russia**, Spain, and the **Ottoman Empire**—signed the Constantinople Convention on the **Suez Canal**. Under the convention, the canal would "always be free and open in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." The parties to the convention agreed not "in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace," and promised that the canal "shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade." In light of the political conditions prevailing in the latter part of the 19th century, the parties also agreed that "no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigating of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers." Due to Anglo-French rivalries, the convention did not come into force until 1904.

Even though **Egypt** was not a formal signatory, it recognized the convention. This, however, did not inhibit Egypt from imposing a **naval blockade** against Israel both before and after the **nationalization of the Suez Canal**, which in turn became the pretext for Israel to initiate the **Suez War** in October 1956.

In his statement announcing the nationalization of the canal, Egyptian president **Gamal Abdel Nasser** reiterated his country's commitment to honor the Constantinople Convention. On 13 October 1956, shortly after the canal's nationalization, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted a resolution reiterating that any solution of the Suez question should include "free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert—this covers both political and technical aspects." It was only after the signing of the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** that Cairo guaranteed freedom of passage for Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the **Straits of Tiran**.

See also ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; RESOLUTION 242.

CORRIE, RACHEL (1979–2003). American peace activist Rachel Corrie was a member of the **International Solidarity Movement** who was crushed to death by a bulldozer used by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). This incident happened on 16 March 2003 during a protest in **Rafah Crossing** in the **Gaza Strip** against the demolition of Palestinian houses. The killing led to calls for the boycott of Caterpillar Inc., the manufacturer of the bulldozers used by the IDF during the protest. Regretting the death, Israel maintained that it was an accident and not a deliberate killing. A military investigation absolved the Israeli government of any responsibility, and this verdict was upheld by the court in August 2012. Family and friends of Corrie set up the Rachel Corrie Foundation for Peace and Justice to promote "cooperation within and between local and global communities," especially within the context of Israel and Palestine.

CROSSING POINTS. There are three main access routes between Israel and the **Gaza Strip**—namely, Erez Crossing, Karni Crossing, and Kerem Shalom Crossing. The fourth **Rafah Crossing** has been controlled by the Palestinians on the Gaza side after Israel's unilateral **Gaza Disengagement**. The Erez Crossing at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip is meant for pedestrian and cargo crossing into Israel. It is also used by Palestinians who carry Israeli work permits and those seeking medical treatment in Israel. Foreigners use this crossing to enter the Gaza Strip. A number of meetings between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** representatives, including Chairman **Yasser Arafat**, were held close to the Erez Crossing on the Israeli side.

Karni Crossing in the north is meant for cargo and is used to transport goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. This crossing is closed periodically whenever Israel imposes closure either due to a security warning or on the eve of Israeli national holidays. The Kerem Shalom Crossing is close to the Israeli kibbutz by that name and is along the border between the southern Gaza Strip and northwestern Negev. The crossing is also close to **Egypt** and is used only for cargo transport. Following the **Siege of Gaza**, Israel has imposed a number of restrictions on the kind of goods that can be transported through the crossing. Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (1986–) was kidnapped in June 2006 near the Kibbutz Kerem Shalom.

See also OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; SHALIT AFFAIR.

CZECH DEAL. On 27 September 1955, Prime Minister **Gamal Abdel Nasser** announced the conclusion of an arms deal between **Egypt** and Czechoslovakia. This marked the formal entry of the **Soviet Union**, through its East European allies, into Middle Eastern politics and ushered in a pro-Arab Soviet foreign policy. While estimates of the quantities of the deal vary, the Israeli intelligence assessment suggested that it involved 170 T-34 medium tanks, 60 Stalin-3 heavy tanks, 200 BTR armored personnel carriers, 100 Su-100 armored mobile anti-tank guns, 80 122-mm Howitzers, 60 long-range field artillery pieces, 200 57-mm anti-tank guns, 100 30-mm light anti-aircraft guns, 34 85-mm heavy anti-aircraft guns, 90 to 100 MiG-15 fighter jets, 49 Il-28 bomber jets, 20 Il-14 transport planes, 4 radar installations, 3 *Skoryy*-class destroyers, 4 minesweepers, 12 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines. The deal also included a range of ammunitions, spare parts, general equipment, vehicles, small arms, and other service facilities. This was the largest single known military transaction in the world at that time and caused considerable anxiety and concern in Israel. The deal sowed the seeds of an Israeli desire to topple Nasser before he could pose a military threat to Israel, and this calculation resulted in the **Suez War**.

See also GAZA RAID; LAVON AFFAIR; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION.

D

DALET PLAN. Launched in April 1948, this was a highly controversial and contentious military operation in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. On the eve of the planned withdrawal of **Great Britain** from **Mandate Palestine**, the general staff of the Jewish forces devised a plan aimed at taking control of the areas that were allotted to the Jewish state under the **Partition Plan**. Wherever possible, it sought to capture strategic positions, with the purpose of blocking the progress of the armies from neighboring Arab states should they decide to invade Palestine. The plan also provided for the capture of territories allotted to the Arab state under the **United Nations** plan and the possible expulsion of Arab residents from these areas. Launched in April 1948, it outlined the plans of the pre-state Israeli leadership to capture as much territory as possible before the end of the British Mandate on 15 May 1948. With various sub-plots, the Dalet Plan guided the military operations of the **Yishuv** leadership and the capture of territories well beyond those allotted by the Partition Plan.

See also DAYAN, MOSHE (1915–1981); DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE; NAQBA, AL-; NEW HISTORY; REFUGEE/S; WARFARE.

DAVOS CONTROVERSY. During the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 29 January 2009, Prime Minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** of **Turkey** publicly clashed with Israel's president **Shimon Peres**. Speaking before Peres, Erdogan derided the Israeli policy following the **Gaza Disengagement** and described the **Gaza Strip** as an "open prison." Following his remarks, Peres blamed the Islamic militant movement **Hamas** for the plight of the Palestinians. When he was not given sufficient time to rebut and refute Peres's speech, which was widely applauded by the audience, Erdogan stormed off the dais.

The Davos incident marked one of the low points in Israeli–Turkish relations and symbolized growing antagonism between the two erstwhile allies. This was followed by a similar diplomatic row when Israeli officials publicly rebuked Turkey over its policy toward Hamas. In subsequent months, things

deteriorated and culminated in Turkey's recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv in September 2011 and expelling the Israeli ambassador in Ankara over the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**.

See also FREEDOM FLOTILLA; IHH; PALMER REPORT; PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION.

DAYAN, MOSHE (1915–1981). Born in the Nahalal agricultural settlement in the Jezreel Valley in northern Palestine on 20 May 1915, Moshe Dayan was Israel's most colorful general. As an active member of **Haganah**, he was detained for two years by **Mandate** authorities. Released in 1941, he joined the fight against the Vichy French forces in **Syria**. On 18 May 1941, he entered the newly formed **Palmah** and served under Maj. Gen. **Orde Wingate**. That June, during an Allied operation against **Lebanon**, Dayan lost his left eye and thereafter was personified by his famous eye patch.

During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Dayan fought in the **Jordan Valley** and later commanded the **Jerusalem** front. In 1949, he took part in the Rhodes talks with the Arab countries that culminated in the **Armistice Agreements**. After the formation of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), Dayan held a number of senior positions and headed the Southern and Northern Commands. In 1953, he became the chief of staff and commanded the IDF during the **Suez War**. He retired from the army in January 1958.

In November 1959, Dayan was elected to the Knesset on the **Mapai** Party list, and he served as minister of agriculture during 1959–1964. Following a split in the party, in 1965 he joined **David Ben-Gurion** and **Shimon Peres** to form Rafi. Owing to public pressure, on the eve of the **June War of 1967**, Dayan was made defense minister, and he took the credit for Israel's spectacular victory over the Arab armies. He continued in this position through the **October War of 1973**, which exposed Israel's military unpreparedness. After the **Agranat Commission** submitted its preliminary reports, **Golda Meir** resigned as prime minister, and **Yitzhak Rabin**, who succeeded Meir in June 1974, did not include Dayan in his cabinet.

In June 1977, Dayan joined the **Likud** government headed by **Menachem Begin** as foreign minister and played a crucial role in the **Camp David Accords**. Due to differences over the **Autonomy Plan** for the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories**, Dayan resigned from the government in October 1979. He died on 16 October 1981 and was buried in the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem.

See also DALET PLAN; NACHSHON OPERATION; OPEN BRIDGES POLICY.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. On the eve of the withdrawal of **Great Britain** from the **Mandate Palestine**, members of the People's Council of the **Yishuv** met in Tel Aviv on the Shabbat eve of 14 May 1948 and proclaimed the creation of the State of Israel. Among other things, their declaration pledged that Israel would be a Jewish and democratic state governed by laws based on equality, and promised non-discriminatory treatment of its Arab minority. The declaration was silent on the question of borders and the capital.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948; BEN-GURION, DAVID (1886–1973); ISRAELI ARABS; JERUSALEM; UN MEMBERSHIP.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DoP). On 13 September 1993, Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres** and **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee member **Mahmoud Abbas** signed a document that consummated months of Israeli–Palestinian secret negotiations in Oslo. U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin**, and PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat**, along with a host of international dignitaries, witnessed the signing of the DoP on the White House Lawns. On 9 September, in separate letters addressed to Norwegian foreign minister Johan Jorgen Holst (1937–1994), Rabin and Arafat exchanged **mutual recognition**; Israel recognized the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people," while Arafat recognized the State of Israel.

The key provisions of the DoP included acceptance of **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** as the basis for negotiations; renunciation by the PLO of the use of **terrorism** and violence to resolve outstanding disputes with Israel; formation of an interim Palestinian Self-Governing Authority to administer the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** during a five-year transitional period leading to a permanent settlement; and an agreement to postpone contentious issues such as **Jerusalem**, **refugees**, borders, **settlements**, and security arrangements to **Permanent Status Negotiations** that would begin no later than the third year of the interim period. The DoP came into force on 13 October 1993, and subsequent negotiations led to the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of **Jericho**, and the gradual **redeployment** of the **Israel Defense Forces** from Arab towns and population centers.

The unique feature of the DoP has been the commitment from both parties to a time-bound implementation. The DoP consisted of the following timeline for implementation:

- 13 October 1993: Formation of a joint Israel–PLO Liaison Committee to implement the DoP
- 13 December 1993: Implementation of an agreed protocol on the redeployment of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho

- 13 April 1994: Completion of Israeli redeployment from the Gaza Strip and Jericho
- 13 July 1994: Election to the **Palestinian Legislative Council** followed by the transfer of its powers to an elected PNA
- 13 December 1995: Commencement of Permanent Status Negotiations
- 13 December 1999: Conclusion of permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians

However, with the sole exception of the DoP coming into force, none of the other deadlines were met. While most of the deadlines were deferred, often by mutual consent, the conclusion and implementation of the permanent status agreement has not happened more than two decades after the DoP came into force.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); AUTONOMOUS AREAS; OSLO ACCORDS; OSLO PROCESS; QUARTET ROAD MAP; TERRORISM.

DEFENSIVE SHIELD OPERATION. This was the code name for a military offensive by the **Israel Defense Forces** in response to the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** against the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Israel sought "to vanquish" the Palestinian infrastructure that promoted **terrorism** and to wipe out militant networks and seize their weapons. The operation began on 29 March 2002, primarily as a response to a series of **suicide attacks** in **Jerusalem**, Tel Aviv, and, most specifically, in the coastal town of Netanya, where 29 Israelis celebrating the start of the Pessah/Passover were killed. The full-scale invasion of the Palestinian towns in the **West Bank** was aimed at wiping out militant networks and seizing weapons. Israeli forces surrounded **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat**'s office compound in **Ramallah**, while Palestinians in the West Bank were placed under prolonged internal curfews and other forms of movement restrictions inside areas nominally under the control of the PNA. The operation lasted until 21 April, when the Israeli forces pulled back from most of the West Bank towns. The **Siege of Ramallah**, Arafat's headquarters, continued until 2 May, when he agreed to comply with the Israeli demand to arrest those responsible for the **assassination** of Israeli cabinet minister Rehavam Ze'evi (1926–2001) in October 2001. The siege was reimposed on 19 September and lasted until October 2004.

During this military offensive, Israel systematically destroyed various infrastructures, including the security apparatus and numerous properties belonging to the PNA. The operation witnessed many Palestinian deaths, large-scale destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, capture of large quantities of weapons, and the arrest of a number of Palestinians suspected of involvement in terrorism and other forms of violence. The operations were dominated by

the **Siege of Bethlehem**, wherein a group of Palestinians took refuge in the Church of the Nativity in **Bethlehem**, and by Israeli operations in the Jenin **refugee** camps. Israel claimed that it had destroyed the terrorist infrastructure and diminished the capacity of the militants to wage attacks against Israel, but a **Hamas** suicide attack in Rishon le-Zion on 7 May reminded them of the operational limitations of the Defensive Shield Operation.

See also DETERMINED PATH OPERATION; JENIN CONTROVERSY; POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP); WARFARE.

DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE. A small Arab village overlooking the **Jerusalem**–Tel Aviv road was the scene of one of the most gruesome massacres witnessed in the Arab–Israeli conflict. On 9 April 1948, members of the Jewish underground groups **Irgun** and **Stern Gang** attacked and occupied Deir Yassin, reportedly resulting in the killing of 245 Palestinian civilians, including men, women, and children (recent estimates suggest a much lower figure of 107 Arab civilian deaths, plus 12 wounded, and the deaths of another 13 fighters). **Haganah**, the pre-state Jewish defense force led by future prime minister **David Ben-Gurion**, distanced itself from the activities of the underground groups led by another future prime minister, **Menachem Begin**. However, neither during the conflict nor afterward was any action taken to assign responsibility and punish the guilty.

Four days after the massacre, a convoy to the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem was ambushed near the Arab village of Sheikh Jarrah, and 77 Jews, mostly doctors and nurses working at the hospital, were killed. This ambush was seen as an Arab retaliatory attack for Deir Yassin.

Indeed, during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, "Remember Deir Yassin" became effective propaganda in encouraging the Arabs to flee from their homes. Deir Yassin was one of hundreds of Arab villages that politically and geographically "vanished" following the 1948 war. Currently, the area of Deir Yassin constitutes the religious neighborhood of Givat Shaul in western Jerusalem.

See also DALET PLAN; ISRAELI ARABS; NAQBA, AL-; REFUGEE/S; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

DEKEL OPERATION. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, when the fighting resumed on 8 July 1948 following the second cease-fire, Israel launched a concerted attack against the **Arab Liberation Army** headed by Fawzi Kaukji (1890–1977) in the center of Galilee. The Dekel ("Palm Tree") Operation ended on 16 July with the Israeli capture of the lower Galilee and the Arab Christian town of Nazareth, originally allotted to the Arabs under the **Partition Plan**.

See also ISRAELI ARABS; WARFARE.

DELHI TERROR ATTACK. On 13 February 2012, Yehoshua Koren (1970–), an Israeli embassy staff member and the wife of the embassy military attaché, was wounded along with a local employee and two passersby in a bomb blast on an Israeli diplomatic vehicle in New Delhi. This was the second time that Israeli citizens became a target of **terrorism** in **India**; four Israelis had been killed in the **Mumbai terror attack** carried out by a group of Pakistani citizens in November 2008. The New Delhi attack was carried out by a motorcycle-borne terrorist who managed to escape. Israel immediately accused **Iran** of the attack, which happened within a day of a terror attempt against the Israeli embassy in Tbilisi, Georgia. After an investigation, charges were filed against an Indian journalist, Syed Mohammad Ahmed Kazmi (1962–), and lookout notices were issued against four Iranian nationals for their suspected involvement. Indian attempts to secure the cooperation of the Iranian authorities have been futile. In the wake of the attack, new sets of security arrangements were put in place for the Israeli embassy and its diplomatic personnel in India.

See also WARFARE.

DEMILITARIZED ZONES. The **Armistice Agreement** of 1949 between Israel and **Syria** created three demilitarized zones whose sovereignty was left undetermined. Gradually, both sides resorted to what is known as "creeping **annexation**." These zones became moot when the **June War of 1967** broke out.

See also MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE; WARFARE.

DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP). In February 1969, **Nayef Hawatmeh** broke away from the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP) founded by **George Habash** and formed a rival group. Initially called the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), in August 1974 it became the DFLP (Al-Jabha ad-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin). Marxist in its orientation, it is more dogmatic than the PFLP and played an active role in demanding the establishment of a secular, democratic state in all of erstwhile **Mandate Palestine**. At the same time, it was one of the first Palestinian groups to initiate a dialogue with the extreme left in Israel. For long, it was located in Damascus. During the **First Intifada** the DFLP was an active player in the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**. In December 1990, Yasser Abed-Rabbo (1945–) broke away from the DFLP and formed the Democratic Union Party.

The DFLP refused to endorse the **Madrid Conference**, was opposed to the **Oslo Process**, and did not contest the **Palestinian Legislative Council** elections in January 1996. Gradually, it has accepted and recognized the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), and many DFLP members have returned to areas under the control of the PNA. In August 1999, following reconciliation talks in Cairo, the DFLP made peace with **Yasser Arafat** and came to be represented in the Executive Committee of the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. In October 2000, the Israeli government of **Ehud Barak** agreed to the request of Hawatmeh to return to PNA-held areas, but it rescinded the permission following Hawatmeh's statement in support of armed struggle by the Palestinians so long as Jewish **settlements** remained in the **Occupied Territories**. In August 2001, after a hiatus of a decade, the DFLP carried out an attack on an Israeli military base in Gaza. It took part in the January 2006 PLC elections and secured two seats; it was part of the unity government between **Hamas** and **Fatah** that lasted during March–June 2007.

DEPORTATION. Since its occupation of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** following the **June War of 1967**, Israel has deported hundreds of Palestinians from the **Occupied Territories**. Though explicitly prohibited by Article 49 of the **Fourth Geneva Convention**, Israel has applied deportation as a measure of deterrence as well as punishment. An estimated 1,700 Palestinians have been deported from their homes. The **United Nations** Security Council has periodically condemned such deportations.

On 2 June 1980, Israel deported the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and the *qadi* (Islamic judge) of Hebron for their alleged indirect responsibility for the killing of six Jewish worshippers in Hebron by the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. This policy of deportation became frequent during the **First Intifada**, when a number of suspected leaders of the uprising were exiled. In January 1988, Jibril al-Rajoub (1953–), the future security chief of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), was deported to **Jordan** for his role in the Intifada after he was released from prison in 1985 as part of the **prisoner exchange** deal with the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command**.

The largest single act of deportation took place in December 1992, when Israel decided to expel a large number of suspected members of **Hamas** into southern **Lebanon**. Responding to the kidnapping and murder of border police officer Nissim Toledano (1963–1992), Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** ordered the expulsion of 415 suspected Hamas activists. Following the rejection of their appeal by the Israeli Supreme Court, they were taken in a convoy and literally dumped inside Lebanon, north of Israel's self-declared **security zone**. Following international protests and condemnation, on 1 February 1993 Israel agreed to take back 100 deportees immediately and to

reduce the deportation period of the rest by half. The deportees, however, refused to accept and insisted on the return of all those deported, and the last of the deportees returned by April 1993.

At the height of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in early 2002, Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, suggested possible deportation of Chairman **Yasser Arafat** from PNA-administered areas, but the threat was not carried out due to international pressure and the explicit disapproval of the **United States**.

See also RANTISI, ABDEL AZIZ AL- (1947–2004); *SHIP OF RETURN AFFAIR*; SIEGE OF BETHLEHEM; TRANSFER; WARFARE.

DETERMINED PATH OPERATION. The limited success of the **Defensive Shield Operation** in March 2002 and the renewal of **suicide attacks** as part of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** led the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) to launch a much wider military operation against the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). On 19 June 2002, the IDF launched the monthlong Determined Path Operation, which paved the way for the reoccupation of any areas under the control of the PNA that Israel deemed necessary to meet its security needs. Within days, Israel had taken physical control of numerous towns of the **West Bank**. In the process, it had converted Area A, which was under full Palestinian control, into Area C, where Israel retained security control. The large-scale presence of Israeli troops in PNA-held areas reversed the Palestinian gains since the **Oslo Accords**.

See also TABA AGREEMENT; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

DIASPORA. Meaning "scattering" or "dispersion," the Greek term has been used to describe the dispersal of the Jews following the Roman conquest of **Jerusalem** and the destruction of the Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD) in 70 AD. Purists would object to the prevailing use of this term to describe the migrant population outside their homeland, like the expatriate communities in different oil-rich Arab countries along the Persian Gulf. For close to two millennia of Diasporic life, the Jews maintained emotional and spiritual connections with the land from which they were exiled. The Passover (*Pessah*) ritual "Next Year in Jerusalem" symbolized this yearning to return.

It was based on this historic longing that modern **Zionism** was able to build popular support for the idea of a Jewish national home. The idea of building a Jewish homeland in historic Palestine rested on the ability to bring the Diaspora home through massive **Aliya**, or the ingathering of the exiles. Between 1882 and 1948, Palestine witnessed six such Aliya and brought over 480,000 Jews to Palestine. This largely contributed to the demographic shift in Palestine in favor of the Jews, who at the time of the **Balfour Declaration** of 1971 constituted a small percentage of the population of Palestine. Be-

cause of Aliya from the Diaspora, the Jewish population in **Mandate Palestine** reached 30 percent at the end of World War II (1939–1945) and paved the way for the Jewish state. The establishment of the State of Israel did not diminish the importance of the Diaspora. The **Declaration of Independence** explicitly committed Israel to the "ingathering of the exile," and this was institutionalized through various means such as the **Law of Return**.

On the eve of World War II, the global Jewish population stood at 17 million but dropped to 11 million as a result of the Holocaust, in which over six million Jews were killed in Europe under Nazi rule in **Germany**. In 2013 the global Jewish population was estimated at between 13 and 15 million, or 0.2 percent of the world population, out of which six million live in Israel. For a long time, the **Soviet Union** and Eastern Europe had the largest concentrations of Jews, and then New York had the largest concentration of Jews. Over the years, this has changed, and currently Israel has the largest concentration of Jews in the world.

Both before and after the formation of Israel, the Jewish Diaspora played a crucial role toward the establishment and subsequent strengthening of the state. In the immediate aftermath of 1948, a large number of Jews from Arab and Islamic countries emigrated to Israel, and in some cases this ended centuries of Jewish presence in Arab lands. The emigration of Jews from **Iran**, **Iraq**, Morocco, and Yemen brought home large numbers of Jews and enabled Israel to consolidate its demographic base vis-à-vis the **Israeli Arabs**. At another level, this provided these migrants with a new identity, something the Palestinian **refugees** could not acquire following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**.

The Jewish Diaspora continues to influence Israel's foreign policy choices and priorities. The large number of Jews in Eastern Europe resulted in Israel pursuing a policy of non-identification toward the Cold War. Though this posture could not be sustained beyond the Korean War (1950–1953), Israel was careful not to antagonize the Soviet Union. The issue of emigration from Eastern Europe was the prime concern of the Israeli opposition to the **Jackson-Vanik Amendment**, which conditioned an American concession to the Soviet relaxation of emigration restrictions.

The Diaspora has been a major driving force in Israel's relations with the **United States**. The convergence of political and strategic interests between the two countries has been strengthened by the Jewish Diaspora, which at times has been accused of wielding undue influence over U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Israel's policy toward countries like Iran has also been governed by the Diaspora factor, which limits its ability to pursue a more aggressive policy. Having defined itself as the home of the Jewish people, Israel would not be able to carry out actions that jeopardize the Jews in those countries.

The Arab–Israeli War of 1948 and the refugee problem has led to the phenomenon of a Palestinian Diaspora that in 2010 was estimated at between 9 and 11 million. Dispersed in several countries in the Middle East and beyond, this Diaspora remained marginal and inactive until the late 1980s. Following the **First Intifada**, the Palestinian Diaspora has been politically active, especially in many Western countries such as **Great Britain**, **France**, and the United States. Political shifts against Israel in these countries were largely the result of the activism of the Palestinian Diaspora. The emergence of the **academic boycott** of Israel and the **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaign are the result of the growing influence of the Palestinian Diaspora. The slow pace of relations between Israel and **Jordan** has largely been due to the **anti-normalization** campaign carried out by the **Islamic Action Front** in that country backed by its Palestinian population.

See also AIPAC.

DIEF, MOHD (1965–). A militant Palestinian leader, Mohd Dief belongs to **Hamas**, and his current whereabouts remain a mystery. Born in Khan Yunis on 12 August 1965, Dief was active in the Islamic movement while studying science in the Islamic University of Gaza. After the formation of Hamas, he joined the movement and was briefly imprisoned by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) in 1990. Amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** he became the commander of **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**, the military wing of Hamas, and Israel accused him of being responsible for a number of acts of **terrorism**. He is considered to be one of the designers of the **Qassam** rockets that Hamas and other militant Palestinian groups have been launching against Israel from the **Gaza Strip**. From May 2000 to April 2001 he was imprisoned by the **Palestinian National Authority** as part of its crackdown against militant groups. Since September 2002 he was the target of a number of unsuccessful **assassination** attempts by the IDF, and in one such attack in July 2006, Dief lost his vision in his left eye. During the **Protective Edge Operation**, on 19 August the IDF attacked a building in the Gaza Strip that was believed to be a safe house used by Dief. Some reports suggest he was killed during the attack while Palestinians only admitted the deaths of his wife and child. Since then, the whereabouts of Dief are shrouded in mystery.

See also TARGETED KILLING.

DIN RODEF. Loosely translated as "law of the pursuer," this little-known Talmudic ruling came into prominence following the **assassination** of Israel's prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** by **Yigal Amir** on 4 November 1995. According to this ancient Jewish law, a person who is "pursuing" another to murder him or her must be killed by any bystander after such a "pursuer" refused to stop upon warning. During his trial, Amir argued that Rabin was

warned not to pursue the **Oslo Accords**, which were harmful to the Jewish people; but Rabin did not heed, and therefore Amir was justified in killing the Israeli prime minister. Some rabbis associated with the religious right argued that anyone giving away parts of **Eretz Yisrael** to the gentiles could be subjected to *din rodef*, a religious license to kill a fellow Jew. However, mainstream religious leaders and Talmudic scholars question such a narrow interpretation and its application to the Oslo context.

DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS. This refers to the bilateral agreements that Israel reached with **Egypt** (18 January 1974) and **Syria** (31 May 1974) following the **October War of 1973**, leading to limited troop reductions and disengagement. The agreements were made possible through the **shuttle diplomacy** of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–). Efforts toward a similar agreement between Israel and **Jordan** were throttled by the **Rabat Arab Summit**, which recognized the **Palestine Liberation Organization** as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." This October 1974 decision was rejected by Israel and strongly opposed by Jordan.

   See also MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO); SINAI I AGREEMENT; SINAI II AGREEMENT; UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II); UNITED STATES; WARFARE.

DOVECOTE OPERATION. In August 1970, Israel developed a plan to counter any possible military offensive from **Egypt**. Primarily defensive in nature, the plan divided the Egyptian–Israeli front into three sectors, each encompassing three lines of defense. The **Bar-Lev Line** constituted the frontal defense along the **Suez Canal**, with three battalions, and the second line of defense was placed about five to eight kilometers behind that. Reserve soldiers constituted the third line of defense, 19 to 32 kilometers east of the canal. When the **October War of 1973** broke out, this arrangement proved insufficient to hold back the massive Egyptian offensive.

   See also BLUE-WHITE OPERATION; JUNE WAR OF 1967; WAR OF ATTRITION; WARFARE.

DUBAI KILLING. On 19 January 2010, **Mahmoud Al-Mabhough**, one of the founders of **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**, the militant wing of **Hamas**, was found dead in his hotel room in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. With the help of CCTV footage, the Dubai police reconstructed the crime, and on 18 February 2010 its police chief Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Tamim (1951–) accused Israel of carrying out the killing. He called on the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to issue a "red notice" against the then Mossad chief Meir Dagan (1945–) for the killing. The Dubai police named and iden-

tified 18 people as members of the hit team that carried out the **assassination**. These members carried genuine or fake passports issued by Australia, **France**, **Germany**, **Great Britain**, and Ireland. Some of them entered Dubai impersonating genuine Israeli and other Western citizens but using fake passports. A number of Israeli officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (1955–), denied any Israeli involvement in the assassination.

The fraudulent use of passports and the theft of identities of their citizens resulted in Western countries registering protests with Israel. In May 2010, Australia expelled an Israeli diplomat over his involvement in the incident. On a similar charge in June 2010, Germany sought the extradition of a person who was arrested in Poland over the alleged misuse of his passport for the killing. The killing of Al-Mabhough was in line with Israel's stated policy of **targeted killing** under which it has killed a number of political and militant leaders belonging to Hamas, including **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** (March 2004) and **Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi** (April 2004), and made an unsuccessful attempt on **Khalid Masha'al** in September 1997.

See also DIEF, MOHD (1965–); MASHA'AL AFFAIR; MUGHNIYAH, IMAD (1962–2008); WARFARE.

DURBAN CONFERENCE/S. In September 2001 **South Africa** hosted the **United Nations**–sponsored World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in Durban. The Durban Conference took place against the backdrop of a faltering Middle East peace process and the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. The conference became controversial when Arab and Islamic countries sought to resurrect the UN General Assembly **Resolution 3379** that depicted **Zionism** as racism. Spearheaded by **Amr Musa**, secretary-general of the **Arab League**, and **Iran**, these countries sought to describe Israeli policies toward the Palestinians as racism. This move led to protests and walkouts by the delegations of Israel and the **United States**. In the end the conference voted to reject an explicit reference that accused Israel of racism. Three days after the conclusion of the conference, the world witnessed the September 11 attacks, and the Durban Conference and its deliberations were quickly forgotten.

In April 2009, South Africa hosted another conference in Durban to review the progress made since 2001. Dubbed the Durban II conference, this was boycotted by Israel and a number of Western countries including Australia, Canada, **Germany**, and the United States, which accused the conference of not rectifying the anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic slant of the previous meeting. The participation of President **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** of Iran, who at that time was making a number of controversial remarks about the Holocaust, also infuriated them. Both of the Durban conferences were aimed at fighting racial discrimination and slavery, but they were dominated by the Arab–Israeli conflict and in the process lost their prime focus and usefulness.

See also APARTHEID.

E

E-1 AREA. The area is part of the Israeli **settlement** of **Ma'ale Adumim** in the **West Bank** that Israel seeks to annex to link the largest settlement with the city of **Jerusalem**. Under the **Taba Agreement** or **Oslo II** signed on 28 September 1995, this area falls within Area C, where Israel has complete security control. This largely uninhabited area covers 12,000 *dunums* (a *dunum* is 1,000 square meters or about a quarter of an acre), and Israel has been planning to build more housing units and link it with Jerusalem. The plan was originally devised in January 1994 by the government headed by **Yitzhak Rabin** immediately after the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**. Peace plans that advocated a **territorial swap** such as the **Clinton Parameters** and **Barak Plan** suggest Israeli **annexation** of the Ma'ale Adumim, including the E-1 Area. To prevent the Israeli annexation, Palestinians have been building individual housing units in this area, which are periodically demolished by Israel. In March 2013, during the visit of President **Barack Obama** to the region, a group of Palestinians erected a temporary structure in this area.

See also UNITED STATES.

EAST JERUSALEM. Following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the city of **Jerusalem** was divided into East and West and came under the control of **Jordan** and Israel respectively. The division of the city was formalized through the **Armistice Agreement** signed on 3 April 1949. Along with the **West Bank** the Arab-dominated East Jerusalem was annexed by **Jordan** on 24 April 1950, and the city remained divided until June 1967. Following its capture and occupation during the **June War of 1967**, on 28 June Israel included the Arab parts within the municipal limits of Jerusalem, and on 30 June 1980 the Israeli Knesset passed the **Jerusalem Law**, formally annexing the eastern part of the city.

Besides the old city, East Jerusalem comprises the Arab areas of Beit Hanina, Essaweyeh, Jabal al-Mukaber, the Mount of Olives, Ras al-Amoud, Sheikh Jarrah, Shu'fat, Silwan, Sur Baher, and Wadi al-Joz. Despite Israeli claims of sovereignty, the international community recognizes East Jerusa-

lem to be beyond the **Green Line** and hence part of the **Occupied Territories**. The **Beilin–Abu Mazen Plan** of 1995 viewed the Arab areas around the old city as the possible capital of the future Palestinian state.

On 11 October 1993, less than a month after the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**, Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres** wrote to his Norwegian counterpart assuring him that Israel "will not hamper . . . all the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem, including the economic, social, educational and cultural and holy Christian and Muslim places." This letter was disclosed in June 1994, after **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** claimed that he had Israel's commitments on East Jerusalem.

On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link **Ma'ale Adumim**, the largest **settlement** in the West Bank, with Jerusalem. According to the Palestine Papers, which were made public in January 2011, in their negotiations from 1999 to 2010, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders reached an understanding whereby the PNA would concede most of the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem as well as the Armenian Quarter in the old city to Israel while retaining Har Homa. According to this disclosure, both sides agreed that the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** would be jointly administered by a body comprising Israel, **Egypt**, Jordan, the PNA, **Saudi Arabia**, and the **United States** until a permanent agreement was reached.

On 31 March 2013, King **Abdullah II** of Jordan and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** signed an agreement in Amman to coordinate their efforts to defend Jerusalem and its holy sites. According to the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, at the end of 2011 Israeli citizens residing in the East Jerusalem neighborhood stood at 190,423 whereas other estimates put the number at 198,629 at the end of 2010.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; HUSSEIN, KING (1935–1999); NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); ORIENT HOUSE; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES.

EGYPT. Egypt occupies a central role in the Arab–Israeli conflict and peacemaking. The formation of the **Arab League**, with Cairo as its headquarters, provided an institutional framework for Egypt to play a leading role in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. Though not as strong as the **Arab Legion** of **Jordan**, Egyptian forces captured the **Gaza Strip**, which was part of the territories that were allotted to the Arab state under the **Partition Plan**. In the initial stages of fighting, the Egyptian forces held the Negev and its surrounding areas before being pushed out by the newly formed **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). At the end of the hostilities, Egypt became the first Arab state

to enter into negotiations with Israel, and on 24 February 1949, both sides concluded an **Armistice Agreement**. This move was soon followed by similar agreements between Israel and other Arab countries.

Unlike Jordan, Egypt had no territorial ambitions over **Mandate Palestine**, and in September 1948 Egypt facilitated the formation of a short-lived **All Palestine Government**. When that collapsed, the Gaza Strip was brought under the rule of the Egyptian military. Cairo allowed **Fedayeen** to operate against Israel, which often resulted in massive Israeli retaliations, such as the **Gaza raid** and **Khan Yunis raid** in 1955.

Initially the **United States** and **Great Britain** adopted a carrot-and-stick policy toward Egypt, hoping that the then prime minister **Gamal Abdel Nasser**, who came to power in 1954, could be dissuaded from joining the bloc led by the **Soviet Union** and be persuaded to make peace with Israel. However, the opposition of Egypt to the U.S.-sponsored **Baghdad Pact** antagonized the West. Differences between the two sides widened in the wake of the **Czech Deal** and the Anglo-American refusal to fund the **Aswan Dam** project. Nasser retaliated with the **nationalization of the Suez Canal**. This eventually culminated in the tripartite aggression by Britain, **France**, and Israel known as the **Suez War**. The military defeat at the hands of the imperial powers produced immense political gains for Nasser, who soon emerged as the unquestioned leader of the Arab world. Under American pressure, Israel, which had captured the **Sinai Peninsula** and the Gaza Strip, was forced to withdraw completely.

Following the cease-fire, Egypt accepted the presence of a **United Nations Emergency Force** (UNEF) on its side of the international border with Israel. Responding to criticisms from his detractors, in May 1967 Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the UNEF and shortly afterward closed the **Straits of Tiran** to Israeli shipping. On 5 June, Israel responded with a massive pre-emptive air strike, followed by a full-scale ground war, the **June War of 1967**. By the time Nasser accepted the cease-fire on 8 June, Israel had captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula. Unlike **Syria**, Egypt immediately endorsed **Resolution 242** adopted on 22 November 1967. After that, regaining Sinai became a national priority for Egypt, which resulted in a prolonged but futile **War of Attrition**. Meanwhile, in 1964, Nasser facilitated the formation of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), which soon emerged as the representative of the Palestinian people.

In a bid to change the status quo, in October 1973 Nasser's successor, President **Anwar Sadat**, launched a limited surprise attack against Israel. This **October War of 1973** exposed Israel's military weaknesses and subsequently enabled Sadat to pursue a peace policy toward Israel. Helped by the **shuttle diplomacy** of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–), Egypt concluded the **Sinai I** and **Sinai II Agreements** with Israel. Sadat's efforts soon culminated in his **Jerusalem visit** in November 1977. With the active

participation of U.S. president **Jimmy Carter**, Egypt and Israel signed the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**. Normal diplomatic relations were established when Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in April 1982. The **autonomy talks**, which sought to resolve the Palestinian problem without the participation of the PLO, did not make any progress.

Its separate peace with Israel proved costly for Egypt, as most Arab countries considered it a violation of Arab unity. This eventually resulted in the formation of the **Rejectionist Front**, the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**), and the **assassination** of Sadat. However, on the positive side, Egypt received substantial military and economic aid from the United States.

The **Kuwait War** and the **Madrid Conference** brought Egypt back to the center stage of the Arab world. Following the signing of the **Declaration of Principles** in 1993, President **Hosni Mubarak** emerged as a principal troubleshooter in the peace process and facilitated a number of agreements between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority**, including the **Taba Agreement** (1995), the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** (1999), and the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit** (2000). Egypt played a significant role in the gradual dilution of the **Arab Boycott of Israel** and in the organization of the **MENA Economic Summits**.

Egypt–Israeli relations were marred by the cycle of violence in the region such as the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**, the **First Intifada**, the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, the **Second Lebanon War**, the **Cast Lead Operation**, and the **Pillar of Defense Operation**. Following the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**, Egypt recalled its ambassador and returned him only in September 1986 when Israel partially withdrew from Lebanon except from the self-declared **security zone**. Similarly, reacting to an Israeli missile attack in Gaza on 21 November 2000, Egypt again recalled its ambassador. This situation continued until February 2005 when, at the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit, Egypt agreed to return its ambassador to Israel.

The victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections, and its subsequent takeover of the Gaza Strip, compelled Egypt to tacitly support Israel's **Siege of Gaza**. International human rights groups that sought to highlight the plight of the Palestinians through the **Freedom Flotilla**, the **Fly-in Campaign**, and other protests targeted Israel and rarely spoke of the Egyptian role in the Siege of Gaza. Responding to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Egypt facilitated inter-Palestinian negotiations, popularly known as the **Cairo Dialogue**, aimed at suspending **suicide attacks** against Israel.

The onset of the **Arab Spring in Egypt** raised doubts about continued Egyptian commitments to Camp David in the post-Mubarak era. Anti-peace statements by Islamist leaders who gained popular endorsement caused con-

cerns and anxiety in Israel, and some leaders expressed open support for Mubarak when he was facing protesters in **Tahrir Square**. The post-Mubarak political leaderships, including the one briefly headed by **Mohammed Morsi**, reiterated Egypt's commitments to formal peace with Israel. Egyptian mediators played a key role in resolving the five-year-old **Shalit Affair** and in bringing about an early end to the Pillar of Defense Operation in November 2012.

During the Arab Spring in Egypt, it was disclosed that under a lucrative **gas deal**, Egypt supplied natural gas to Israel at a concessional price. Both the deal and its pricing became controversial and were criticized by the Egyptian protesters. The gas pipelines were sabotaged many times, leading eventually to the cancellation of the gas deal in April 2012. The positive views expressed by President Morsi toward Hamas and **Iran** indicated some shifts in Egyptian policy, but before any substantial changes could be made, Morsi was overthrown by the military, then headed by **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi**, on 3 July 2013 following widespread protests and unrest. In May 2014 el-Sisi was elected president, and he assumed office on 8 June.

The **Cairo embassy attack** on 10 September 2011 forced Israel to withdraw its ambassador and other personnel from Egypt, and the ambassador has been primarily functioning from Israel. The Arab Spring also intensified violence and lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula and led to border clashes, including the **Eilat terror attack** in August 2011. This forced Israel to build a **security fence** along the 245-kilometer-long Egyptian–Israeli border which was completed in April 2013. Following a spate of violence against the Egyptian security forces, Israel has agreed to an Egyptian demand to increase its military presence in the Sinai far above the limits prescribed in the Camp David Accords.

El-Sisi faced his first international crisis in July 2014 when the IDF launched the **Protective Edge Operation** against the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. After many unsuccessful attempts, on 26 August Israel and various Palestinian militant groups accepted an Egypt-mediated cease-fire.

See also ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR; ALPHA PLAN; ARAB SPRING; ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004); *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; BLACK SEPTEMBER MASSACRE; BLUE-WHITE OPERATION; CAIRO AGREEMENT (1970); CAIRO AGREEMENT (1994); CHAMELEON OPERATION; CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION; EGYPT PEACE PLAN; GAZA RAID; GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE; GREEN LINE; JARRING MISSION; KERRY PLAN; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO); NAVAL BLOCKADE; NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM); RESOLUTION 338; ROGERS PLAN; SINAI VIOLENCE; SUEZ CANAL; TABA; TERRORISM; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE.

EGYPT PEACE PLAN. In response to the **Autonomy Plan** proposed by Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin**, and partly in an attempt to enlist the support of other Arab countries, on 3 July 1978 the Foreign Ministry of **Egypt** released a six-point plan called the "Proposal Relative to Withdrawal from the **West Bank** and Gaza and Security Arrangements." It called for

1. "a just solution of the Palestinian question" and the "legitimate security concerns of all parties";
2. an orderly transfer of authority to the Palestinians for a five-year transition period, after which "the Palestinian people will be able to determine their own future";
3. Egypt, **Jordan**, Israel, representatives of the "Palestinian people," and the **United Nations** to discuss the modalities of an Israeli withdrawal and a transition regime;
4. Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 borders, including from **East Jerusalem**, and the withdrawal of all **settlements**;
5. the Israeli **military government** to be replaced during the transition period by a Jordanian-run authority in the West Bank and an Egyptian one in the **Gaza Strip**; and
6. Egypt and Jordan to guarantee "agreed upon" post-withdrawal security arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel immediately rejected the plan as "unacceptable" and a distortion of the "spirit of Jerusalem" and the "spirit of Ismailia," references to the summit meetings between President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** and Prime Minister Begin. Softening his position, Sadat nevertheless demanded Israeli withdrawal from El-Arish and St. Catharine in the **Sinai Peninsula** before peace negotiations could be resumed. These demands, however, were rejected by the Israeli cabinet.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; JERUSALEM VISIT; PLO LAW; RESOLUTION 242.

EGYPT–ISRAEL PEACE TREATY. As a follow-up of the **Camp David Accords**, on 26 March 1979 President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** and Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** signed a peace treaty in Washington, D.C., in the presence of U.S. president **Jimmy Carter**. The treaty came into force on 25 April when the instruments of ratification were exchanged, and the borders between the two were opened on 27 May with the symbolic inauguration of an air corridor. On 26 February 1980, ambassadors were exchanged.

Following the signing of the treaty, all the Arab states, with the exception of Oman and Sudan, broke off diplomatic ties with Cairo. Egypt was suspended from the **Arab League**, and the league's headquarters were moved to Tunis. The Arab countries imposed sanctions against Egyptian oil and closed their airspace to Egyptian planes.

Despite the signing of a peace treaty, Egyptian–Israeli relations were marred by periodic tensions, acrimony, and diplomatic disputes. Following the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**, Egypt recalled its ambassador and returned him only in September 1986 when Israel partially withdrew from Lebanon except from the self-declared **security zone**. Similarly, reacting to an Israeli missile attack in Gaza on 21 November 2000, Egypt again recalled its ambassador. This situation continued until February 2005 when, at the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit**, Egypt agreed to return its ambassador to Israel. The following month Mohamed Assem Ibrahim took over as the new Egyptian envoy.

See also ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION.

EILAT TERROR ATTACK. In a series of coordinated attacks, the southern Israeli port city of Eilat came under a terror assault on 18 August 2011. The first attack targeted a public bus traveling north of Eilat, along Israel's border with **Egypt**, while in the second attack an anti-tank rocket was fired at a private car. In these attacks, 8 Israelis, including 6 civilians, were killed, and another 30 were wounded. Those who carried out the attacks had infiltrated into Israel from the **Sinai Peninsula**. The **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) claimed that eight of the attackers were killed in its counter-attack and two more were killed by the Egyptian security forces. Five Egyptian soldiers were also killed by the IDF while it was chasing the attackers across the Egyptian border, and this resulted in a diplomatic row between the two countries and the **Cairo embassy attack**. On 25 August, both countries agreed to a joint investigation. These attacks were part of the prevailing tension and lawlessness in the peninsula following the **Arab Spring** in Egypt and the fall of President **Hosni Mubarak**.

See also SINAI VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

EISENHOWER DOCTRINE. As part of the containment doctrine as a response to the Cold War, on 5 January 1957, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) unveiled a policy of economic aid to the countries of the Middle East. He also sought the authorization of Congress to use American forces to protect the independence and territorial integrity of any country in the region "against overt aggression from any nation controlled by international communism." On 9 March, Congress gave its authorization.

In April 1958, **Jordan** accused communist-controlled forces—an allusion to elements sympathetic to President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**—of planning to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy. In response, the United States dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. Following the July 1958 military coup in **Iraq**, Jordan and **Lebanon** again invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine, obtaining limited military aid and assistance from the United States and **Great Britain**. The doctrine was closely embedded in the defunct Central Treaty Organization and has not been invoked since 1959.

See also BAGHDAD PACT; NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM); UNITED STATES.

EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–). Former general and politician, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is the president of **Egypt** since June 2014. Born into a religious family in Gamaleya in old Cairo on 19 November 1954, el-Sisi married his maternal cousin Entissar Amer, and they have three sons and a daughter.

El-Sisi graduated from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1977, pursued military studies in **Great Britain** and the **United States**, and served in the mechanized division of the Egyptian army. He held various senior positions in the army and was the military attaché in the Egyptian embassy in **Saudi Arabia** and commander of the Northern Military Zone.

El-Sisi came into prominence following the resignation of President **Hosni Mubarak** on 11 February 2011 in the wake of the **Arab Spring in Egypt** and popular protests in **Tahrir Square**. When the supreme council of the armed forces headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi (1935–) took the reins of power, el-Sisi was named director of military intelligence and reconnaissance. On 12 August 2012, President **Mohammed Morsi** ordered the retirement of Tantawi and appointed el-Sisi as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the minister of defense.

In the wake of popular protests against President Morsi and his policy of the Islamization of Egypt, on 2 July 2013 the Egyptian army issued a 48-hour ultimatum for Morsi to step down. When the latter refused to comply with the demand, el-Sisi stepped in, removed President Morsi, and imprisoned him. On 4 July, Adly Mansour (1945–), who took over as president of the Supreme Constitutional Court only three days earlier, was installed as the acting president of Egypt. El-Sisi was appointed deputy prime minister and defense minister in the cabinet headed by Prime Minister Hazen al-Beblawi (1936–) and was promoted to the rank of field marshal. Under el-Sisi's influence, the government ordered a crackdown on protestors identified with Morsi, and according to the **Muslim Brotherhood**, the army killed about 2,200 of Morsi's supporters from July 2013.

While still in uniform, on 26 March 2014 el-Sisi announced his intention to run for president, and in the elections held between 26 and 28 May, el-Sisi secured more than 90 percent of the votes polled. On 8 June el-Sisi was sworn in as president.

Under el-Sisi's orders since July 2013, Egypt clamped down on the Palestinian **tunnels** between the **Gaza Strip** and the **Sinai Peninsula** and destroyed over 1,600 of them. He sought to mediate during the **Protective Edge Operation**, which began on 6 July 2014 between Israel and the **Hamas**-ruled Gaza Strip, but exhibited a marked disdain for the Palestinian militant group. From the beginning of the hostilities, el-Sisi called for a cease-fire, which did not include any relaxation of the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by the **Israel Defense Forces**. An Egypt-mediated cease-fire came into force on 26 August and was followed by detailed discussions involving Israel and various Palestinian groups on issues such as the easing of border crossing, extension of the fishing zone of the Gaza Strip, the Gaza seaport and airport, prisoner releases, and the disarming of Hamas.

ENTEBBE OPERATION. On 27 June 1976, an Air France aircraft with 245 passengers and a 12-member crew flying from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens was hijacked by members of the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP). Initially it was diverted to Benghazi, Libya, and after refueling, it was flown to Entebbe airport in Uganda. The hijackers demanded the release of a number of prisoners held by **France**, Israel, Kenya, Switzerland, and West Germany. On 1 July, the hijackers released all non-Israeli and non-Jewish passengers but kept the remaining 103 passengers and crew as hostages. On 4 July, an Israeli commando team flew to Entebbe, carried out a dramatic operation, and rescued the hostages. The rescue mission remains the most daring anti-hijacking operation ever undertaken. Jonathan Netanyahu (1947–1976), the elder brother of future Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**, commanded the rescue mission and was killed in the operation.

See also GERMANY; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

ERDOGAN, RECEP TAYYIP (1954–). Recep Tayyip Erdogan became president of **Turkey** in August 2014 after serving as prime minister from March 2003 following the electoral victory of **AKP**, an Islamist party. He was born on 26 February 1954 in the neighborhood of Istanbul and studied economics and commercial sciences. He was elected mayor of Istanbul in March 1994 and was a member of the Islamist Welfare Party that was subsequently proscribed by the military in 1998. Erdogan was given a 10-month prison term for reciting a poem at a rally organized by the banned Welfare Party in 1997.

Along with former members of the Welfare Party, in 2001 Erdogan formed the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and successfully led the party to victory in November 2002, and again in April 2007 and June 2011. During his first term in office, Erdogan followed the traditional Turkish policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict and visited Israel in May 2005. On 13 November 2007, during a visit to Turkey, President **Shimon Peres** became the first Israeli leader to address the parliament of a Muslim nation.

However, the **Cast Lead Operation** against the **Gaza Strip** launched by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) in December 2008 considerably altered Erdogan's approach toward Israel, and he was involved in a diplomatic row with President Peres during the 2009 World Economic Summit in Davos. Gradually relations between the two countries began to deteriorate and reached their nadir in May 2010 following the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** in which 10 people, including 9 Turkish citizens, were killed when IDF commandos raided the ship that was carrying emergency food supplies to the Gaza Strip, which was under Israeli blockade. This resulted in Erdogan recalling the Turkish ambassador from Tel Aviv in June 2010. In protest against the **United Nations**–mandated **Palmer Report**, which endorsed Israel's right to impose the blockade of Gaza, in September 2011 Erdogan expelled the Israeli ambassador in Ankara. In March 2013 during his visit to the region, President **Barack Obama** persuaded Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** to formally apologize to Turkey for the flotilla incident, but relations continued to remain chilly between the two countries. Erdogan won the presidential elections held on 10 August 2014 by securing 51.79 percent of the votes, and former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu (1959–) took over as prime minister on 28 August.

See also ARAB SPRING; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; DAVOS CONTROVERSY; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; IHH; OLMERT, EHUD (1945–); SIEGE OF GAZA.

ERETZ YISRAEL. The biblical expression Eretz Yisrael, "Land of Israel," refers to the ancient Israel that constituted a part of the Jewish kingdoms during the First (957–586 BC) and Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD) periods. Since the biblical Eretz Yisrael also covers areas to the east of the **Jordan River**, right-wing elements in Israel laid claims to **Transjordan** and hence criticized the partition of Palestine in 1921 and the formation of the emirate of Transjordan. The expression has acquired political meaning to refer to all the areas of Palestine, including the present Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**. Following the **June War of 1967** and the Israeli capture of the **Occupied Territories**, especially the **West Bank**, this expression gradually came to symbolize the territorial expansion of Israel beyond the **Green Line**.

Since the **Oslo Process**, Israeli right-wing and right-leaning religious figures have used this expression to oppose any withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories**. Some have even declared the **Golan Heights**, which Israel captured from **Syria** in 1967, to be part of Eretz Yisrael, thereby precluding any Israeli withdrawal. In 1993, leading rabbis identified with the Israeli right issued a halachic ruling that forbade religious soldiers from taking part in the eviction from or handing over of parts of Eretz Yisrael to non-Jewish control. This seriously impeded Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** and his successors from making any public and explicit commitment concerning the dismantling of even isolated and sparsely populated Jewish **settlements** in the **Gaza Strip**. On 9 June 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the **Gaza Disengagement** and ruled that the Occupied Territories were not legally part of Israel.

See also ANNEXATION; BARAK PLAN; CLINTON PARAMETERS; ETZION BLOC; GUSH EMUNIM; LIKUD; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

ETZION BLOC. This is a group of Jewish **settlements** located between **Jerusalem** and the town of **Hebron** on the **West Bank**. The origins of these settlements can be traced to the **Mandate** phase when, in 1927, Jewish immigrants from Yemen established a community in Migdal Eder that was subsequently destroyed during the **Hebron Massacre (1929)**. Though the Etzion area was not part of the Jewish state under the **Partition Plan**, there was heavy fighting between Jewish and Arab forces in the area. Following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, it became part of the West Bank that was annexed by **Jordan** in 1950. During the **June War of 1967**, Israel captured the West Bank; the first settlement of Kfar Etzion was established in 1967; and as of May 2011 there were 22 settlements in Etzion with a population of 70,000. It is widely believed that under any **territorial swap** with the Palestinians, the Etzion Bloc would remain under Israeli control. The **Barak Plan** sought the **annexation** of the Etzion Bloc within a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; CLINTON PARAMETERS.

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE. *See* UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UfM).

EUROPEAN UNION (EU). The European Union is a political institution that evolved from the European Economic Community established in 1957. It transformed into the EU in 1993, and as of 2014 it has 28 full members and 5 candidate member countries. As part of the Quartet established in 2002, the EU has been playing a positive role in the Middle East peace process, espe-

cially in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. Since the early 1970s, especially in the wake of the **oil crisis**, the countries of Europe have taken a pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian position. At the same time, lacking political or strategic influences similar to those enjoyed by the **United States**, the EU has remained a marginal player in the Middle East peace process.

Through the **Barcelona Process** and the **Union for the Mediterranean**, the EU has been trying to engage with various countries of the region toward resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict. It supports the **two-state solution** and engagement with **Hamas** and has been opposing Israel's **settlement** activities in the **Occupied Territories**. In recent years, the EU has been critical of Israel's policy of **settlement labeling** whereby products and produce from the settlements in the Occupied Territories enjoy preferential trade benefits in the EU. The suspected involvement of **Hezbollah** in the **Burgas terror attack** in July 2012 has resulted in the EU declaring the Lebanese Islamic militant movement as terrorist. The EU, especially **Great Britain**, **France**, and **Germany**, have been active in seeking a political solution to the controversy surrounding **nuclear Iran**.

See also GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; QUARTET ROAD MAP; TERRORISM.

EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL. As part of the **Gaza Disengagement** announced by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, on 16 February 2005 the Knesset passed the Evacuation Compensation Bill. Besides endorsing the withdrawal of **Israel Defense Forces** from the Gush Katif **settlement** bloc in the **Gaza Strip**, it provided financial support to implement the plan. The initial budget was set at about $870 million, and $250 million was later added. Each of the 1,800 families evacuated from the Gaza Strip received between NIS 1.5 and 2 million as compensation.

F

FACT OPERATION. While the Rhodes negotiations were in progress following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, in early March 1949 the **Israel Defense Forces** moved toward the **Gulf of Aqaba** and, on 10 March, captured the port city of Eilat. This gave Israel access to the Red Sea. The following day, a new cease-fire agreement was signed between Israel and **Jordan**, which was later incorporated into the **Armistice Agreement**, signed on 3 April 1949.

See also WARFARE.

FAHD PLAN. On 7 August 1981, Crown Prince (later king) Fahd of **Saudi Arabia** (1921–2005) outlined an eight-point plan to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. It sought to fill the vacuum created by the failure of the **Camp David Accords** to generate similar moves on the Palestinian front and the resultant isolation of **Egypt** in the Middle East. Among other things, the plan called for an Israeli withdrawal from territories captured during the **June War of 1967**, the dismantling of Jewish **settlements**, guaranteeing freedom of worship for all faiths in **Jerusalem**, recognition of the right of the Palestinians to return or be paid compensation, establishment of a Palestinian state with **East Jerusalem** as its capital, and ensuring the rights of Palestinians and the states in the region to live in peace. The last point accorded tacit recognition to Israel and made the plan controversial among some Arab states. Attempts to secure Arab endorsement at the Fez **Arab League** summit in September 1981 ended in failure. Another attempt was made the following year, and on 9 September 1982, a version of the plan was approved by the league as the **Fez Plan**.

See also ABDULLAH PLAN; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; RESOLUTION 194.

FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENT. In June 1918, Zionist leader **Chaim Weizmann** met Emir Faisal ibn Hussein (1885–1933), the leader of the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** and third son of the sharif of Mecca, at Faisal's military camp between Ma'an and Aqaba. Coming against the backdrop

of the **Balfour Declaration**, the talks were aimed at establishing cooperation between Jews and Arabs toward establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. At the conclusion of additional talks during the Paris Peace Conference, Faisal and Weizmann signed a formal agreement on 3 January 1919. Endorsing the Balfour Declaration, both leaders agreed that "all necessary measures would be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale." At the same time, they also declared that Arab peasants and tenant farmers would be duly "protected in their right, and . . . assisted in forwarding their economic development." Faisal made this agreement conditional upon the fulfillment of his demands for Arab independence.

The Arab Federation, in whose name Faisal spoke, was never established. Emir Faisal's brief tenure as king of **Syria**, and his forced exile to Baghdad, where he was installed as king of **Iraq** in August 1921, removed any prospects of its implementation. The agreement was never accepted by the Arab nationalists and was rarely discussed by Arab commentators.

See also HUSSEIN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE; MANDATE/ MANDATE PALESTINE.

FATAH. Fatah—meaning "conquest" and also a reverse acronym for Harakat at-Tahrir al-Filistiniya (Palestine National Liberation Movement)—was founded in Kuwait in 1959 by **Yasser Arafat** and his associates, including Abu Iyad (1934–1991), Abu Jihad (c. 1935–1988), Mohammed Yussef al-Najjar (1930–1973), and Kamal Adwan (?–1973). Fatah grew out of a clandestine Palestinian student organization and formally became a political party on 10 October 1959. Since its inception, it was led by Arafat until his death in November 2004. At the fifth Palestinian National Council in Cairo in February 1969, it took control of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and became its largest bloc, and it has retained this position since then.

While enlisting support from the Arab world, Fatah sought to keep the Palestinian struggle free from all Arab governments. In the initial years, it advocated the liberation of all of **Mandate Palestine**, relying exclusively on armed struggle. After years of operating as clandestine cells, on 1 January 1965, Fatah began sabotage activities against Israel, and this event is marked as Fatah Day. Following the **June War of 1967**, the group operated from the territories of **Jordan**, and on 21 March 1968, it joined hands with the Jordanian army at the battle of Karameh against Israel. In the wake of the **Black September Massacre**, Fatah was forced out of Jordan. Thereafter it relocated itself to **Lebanon** and continued to operate against Israel. At the 1972 congress, it revised its earlier policy and declared guerrilla warfare to be one of the means of Palestinian struggle.

Fatah fighters fought in Beirut following Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, or the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, and in 1983 Fatah faced a **Syria**-backed internal rebellion that led to the formation of the breakaway factions **Fatah Revolutionary Council** and Fatah Revolutionary Council–Emergency Command.

When the **First Intifada** broke out in December 1987, Fatah joined hands with the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** and the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine** to form the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**. The **Oslo Accords** exposed internal differences within Fatah, yet despite their rejection of the accords, personal loyalty to Arafat prevented leaders such as Farouq al-Qaddumi (1935–), Khalid al-Hassan (1928–1994), and Hani al-Hassan (1939–2012) from joining the opposition. The formation of the Fatah Hawks in April 1994 and other such factions are manifestations of continuing internal divisions within the organization over the peace process.

In the first **Palestinian Legislative Council** elections held in January 1996, Fatah captured 52 seats in the 88-member council, but at the same time, the rebels who fought as independents won 12 seats. The rising fortunes of **Hamas** began to undermine Fatah, as shown by frequent clashes between the two groups, especially in the **Gaza Strip**. The emergence of new militant outfits associated with Fatah, such as **Tanzim** and the **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**, following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** highlighted Fatah's desire to imitate the militant campaigns of Hamas that evoke popular support and approval.

Following the death of Arafat in November 2004, his deputy **Mahmoud Abbas** was elected leader of Fatah, and in the popular elections held on 9 January 2005, Abbas was elected president of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Within the framework of the **Cairo Dialogue**, in March 2005 various Palestinian factions, including Fatah dissidents, agreed to "a lull in fighting" (*tahidiyeh*) vis-à-vis Israel. In the municipal elections held in the **West Bank** and Gaza Strip in May, Fatah faced tough competition from Hamas but managed to secure the largest number of seats. The completion of the **Gaza Disengagement** in August 2005 witnessed increased rivalry between different factions of Fatah.

Under pressure from Fatah, Abbas postponed the elections to the Palestinian parliament slated for July 2005 which were held on 25 January 2006. Hamas, which refused to take part in the 1996 elections, took part in this election and secured an absolute majority. Fatah could obtain only 45 seats in the 132-member Palestinian parliament. Internal divisions and corruption allegations played a significant role in the electoral reversal suffered by Fatah. The refusal of Fatah to accept the verdict resulted in prolonged tension and violence between the two Palestinian groups.

As part of the **unity talks**, on 8 February 2007 Fatah and Hamas signed the **Mecca Accord** mediated by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia**. As a follow-up, on 7 March Fatah joined the unity government formed under **Ismail Haniyeh**, but this arrangement did not endure. The **Battle of Gaza** erupted in June 2007 and ended with the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. In response, President Abbas dissolved the unity government, declared a state of emergency, and asked **Salam Fayyad** to form a government.

Since the death of Arafat, internal divisions within Fatah have only increased. After a gap of 20 years, Fatah held its sixth General Assembly meeting in **Bethlehem** in August 2009, wherein it decided not to resume peace negotiations with Israel until a number of preconditions were met. These included prisoner release, a freeze on **settlements**, and the lifting of the **Siege of Gaza**. Fatah members from the Gaza Strip could not attend the meeting because of the travel restrictions imposed by Hamas.

Various efforts by Arab leaders, such as King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Presidents **Hosni Mubarak** and later **Mohammed Morsi** of Egypt and Emir al-Thane (1952–) of **Qatar**, for Fatah–Hamas unity have been unsuccessful. The depth of internal discord became apparent when Fatah refused to join hands with Hamas during the **Pillar of Defense Operation** that resulted in the deaths of 167 to 173 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Despite internal tensions, confrontation with Hamas, and disagreements over Palestinian unity, Abbas continues to be the head of Fatah. On 23 April 2014, Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a unity government that would revitalize the PLO and set the stage for new elections to the PNA. In September both sides agreed to the PNA taking control of the Gaza Strip, but no progress was made.

See also FATAH UPRISING; FEDAYEEN; KUWAIT WAR; MADRID CONFERENCE; SIEGE OF RAMALLAH; SUICIDE ATTACK/S; TERRORISM.

FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (FRC). In 1974, Sabri Khalil al-Banna, better known as Abu Nidal (1937–2002), broke away from **Fatah** and established this faction opposed to the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) led by Chairman **Yasser Arafat**. Also known as the Abu Nidal Organization, the FRC was responsible for a number of terror attacks in Europe and was believed to have operated as the Black September Organization. An **assassination** attempt in October 1974 against **Mahmoud Abbas**, the future president of the **Palestinian National Authority**, led to the FRC's expulsion from the PLO, and Abu Nidal was sentenced to death in absentia. For many years, Abu Nidal operated from Libya, and the FRC was held responsible for the assassination of a number of Palestinian moderates, including the second in command of the PLO, Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), in January 1991 in Tunis. The group carried out simultaneous attacks on 27 December 1985 against the Israeli national airline El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna airports

where 20 civilians were killed and more than 100 were injured, most of the victims being non-Israeli tourists. Israel reacted by urging all countries that maintain diplomatic ties with the PLO to suspend their relations and expel the PLO mission in their countries. Since the early 1990s, the FRC has been less active. Abu Nidal spent his last years in **Iraq**, where he was found dead in Baghdad in August 2002.

See also TERRORISM.

FATAH UPRISING. Backed by **Syria**, in 1983 a Palestinian faction led by Sa'id Mussa Muragha (1927–2013), alias Abu Mussa, formed the National Salvation Front, which rebelled against **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** and unsuccessfully sought to oust the Palestinian leader. This move followed the expulsion of the PLO and Arafat from **Lebanon** in the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of that country, or the **Peace for Galilee Operation**.

See also WARFARE.

FAYYAD, SALAM (1952–). A trained economist, Salam Fayyad served as prime minister of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) between 15 June 2007 and 13 April 2013. He was born on 12 April 1952 in Deir al-Ghusun near Tulkaram in the northern **West Bank**. Following graduation from the American University of Beirut, he obtained a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Texas at Austin. After a brief teaching tenure at Yarmouk University in **Jordan**, Fayyad joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1987.

His political career began in 1996 when PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** appointed him as the representative of the PNA at the IMF, and he held this position until 2001. In June 2002, he was named finance minister and held that position until November 2006. He was reappointed to that position in March 2007. Following the **Hamas** takeover of the **Gaza Strip**, in June 2007 President **Mahmoud Abbas** chose Fayyad as the prime minister of the PNA. As part of the unity efforts, he resigned his position in March 2009 but was reappointed in May and held the position until 13 April 2013 when he resigned due to political differences with Abbas.

An internationally recognized economist, Fayyad sought the economic development of the West Bank and prioritized the nation-building process in the areas controlled by the PNA. Hamas has questioned Fayyad's appointment as prime minister because the Palestinian Basic Law demands the approval of the legislative council. Abbas could not fulfill this legal requirement because the council was dominated by Hamas following the January 2006 elections. There are suggestions that Fayyad was skeptical about Ab-

bas's application for the **observer state** status for the PNA at the **United Nations**. Due to political differences, Fayyad resigned his position and was replaced by Rami Hamdallah (1958–) in June 2013.

See also UNITY TALKS.

FEDAYEEN. Meaning "self-sacrificers," this term refers to Palestinian commandos who organized and conducted periodic raids into Israel from neighboring Arab states. After the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreements** in 1949, threats to Israel emanated primarily from Fedayeen attacks from the **Gaza Strip** and the **West Bank**. In the early 1950s, these attacks often resulted in massive retaliations by the **Israel Defense Forces** deep inside **Egypt** and **Jordan**. By the early 1960s, infiltration of Fedayeen forces into Israel and their attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets became the key component of the Palestinian struggle.

See also FATAH; GAZA RAID; KHAN YUNIS RAID; LEBANON; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); VOLCANO OPERATION; WARFARE.

FEDERAL PLAN. In 1947, while making a number of unanimous recommendations, the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine** was divided over the central issue of the future of the **Mandate Palestine**. Seven members of the committee recommended partition as the solution, and, supported by **Iran** and erstwhile Yugoslavia, **India** recommended the formation of a federal Palestine, with considerable internal autonomy for Arabs and Jews. The majority **Partition Plan** was acceptable to the Jewish leadership but not to the Arab-Palestinian leaders. Both Arabs and Jews, however, rejected the minority Federal Plan, and hence the **United Nations** never discussed it.

See also BINATIONAL STATE; ONE-STATE SOLUTION.

FEIGLIN, MOSHE ZALMAN (1962–). Israeli politician Moshe Zalman Feiglin belongs to the right-wing faction within **Likud**. Born in 1962 in Haifa, he lives in the **settlement** of Karnei Shomron in the **West Bank**. Since 2005 he has been challenging **Benjamin Netanyahu** for the leadership of Likud, and in January 2012 he secured 23 percent of the votes in the leadership elections of the party. After a few unsuccessful attempts in the past, in January 2013 he was elected to the Knesset on a Likud platform. Representing the right wing of the party, Feiglin has been advocating revocation of the **Oslo Accords** and the Israeli **annexation** of the **Occupied Territories**. He opposes the **two-state solution** and in January 2013 suggested paying $500,000 to each Palestinian family in the West Bank toward encouraging them to emigrate to other countries. As part of his opposition to the peace

process, in 1993 he co-founded the Zo Artzeinu (This Is Our Land) movement and has been active in the **Temple Mount Faithful** protests. In 1997 Feiglin was convicted for sedition, and **Great Britain** banned his entry in March 2008 on grounds of public safety. Because of his growing popularity within the party, he is seen as a possible successor to Netanyahu within Likud.

FEZ PLAN. An amended version of the **Fahd Plan** was accepted in the 12th summit meeting of the **Arab League** held in Fez, Morocco, on September 1982 as a settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Modifying the proposals put forward by the then crown prince (later king) Fahd (1921–2005) of **Saudi Arabia**, the Fez Plan called for an Israeli withdrawal "from all occupied Arab territories" and the dismantling of **settlements** "in the Arab territories." Affirming the Palestinian right to self-determination, it recognized the **Palestine Liberation Organization** as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. While the Fahd Plan had affirmed "the right of all states in the region to live in peace," the Fez Plan merely proposed "a **United Nations** Security Council guarantee for the peace and security of all states in the region including a Palestinian State." Israel found these modifications less palatable than the Fahd Plan and rejected them.

  See also ABDULLAH PLAN; ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

FIDA. In March 1990 Palestinian leader Yasser Abed Rabbo (1944–) broke away from the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (DFLP) and formed FIDA (Al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati Al-Filastini, or the Palestinian Democratic Union). In February 1993, it transformed itself into a political party. Advocating reforms and democratic pluralism, FIDA extends conditional support to the **Oslo Process** by advocating a **two-state solution** based on the **Green Line**, with **East Jerusalem** as the capital of an independent Palestinian state. It contested the first Palestinian elections held in January 1996 and secured two seats in the **Palestinian Legislative Council**. Its support base is largely confined to the **West Bank**. FIDA was represented in both the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee and the **Palestinian National Authority**. Abed Rabbo resigned in 2002 and was replaced by Saleh Raafat. During the 2006 legislative elections, FIDA formed a joint list called al-Badeel (the Alternative) with other left-wing parties, including the DFLP, the Palestinian People's Party, and independents, and received 2.8 percent of the vote. Raafat was appointed by the Palestinian National Council as the PLO's Central Council member and also serves as the head of the PLO's military affairs department.

FIRST INTIFADA (1987–1993). On 8 December 1987, four Palestinians were killed in a traffic accident near the Jabalia **refugee** camp in the Gaza Strip involving an Israeli vehicle. The funeral of the workers of the Jabalia refugee camp resulted in violent protests against the **Israel Defense Forces**, who responded with live ammunition leading to the deaths of three more youths. The unrest soon spread to the entire Gaza Strip and to the **West Bank** and transformed into a popular uprising against the Israeli occupation. The spontaneous outburst was initially led by Palestinian youths. The scope and intensity of the protest surprised both Israel and the Palestinian leadership. Soon the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising** (UNLU), consisting of various factions of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** as well as **Islamic Jihad**, began coordinating the movement. Through periodic pamphlets, the UNLU issued calls for various types of non-violent protest actions.

With notable exceptions, often associated with **Hamas**, the Intifada remained a non-violent mass movement supported by most segments of the Palestinian population. Except for stone throwing, the resistance to occupation manifested itself primarily as various forms of non-cooperation, including strikes, a boycott of Israeli goods, and similar moves. The heavy-handed Israeli responses—the prolonged closure of **Occupied Territories**, preventive detentions, **deportation** of Palestinians, house demolitions, travel restrictions, and other forms of collective punishment—not only fueled the popular protests but also undermined the Israeli position among Western countries. The image of sling-swinging young Palestinians taking on Israeli military might presented the Palestinians as the new David against the mighty Goliath.

The Intifada brought the Palestinian question, marginalized by the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), back to center stage and projected it as the prime destabilizing factor in the Middle East. By 1990, the Intifada had run its course, and the outbreak of the **Kuwait War** gradually shifted international focus away from the Palestinian problem. In 1993, the Intifada formally ended with the signing of the **Oslo Accords**. According to the Israeli human rights watch group **B'Tselem**, at least 1,346 Palestinians, including 276 children, and 256 Israeli civilians, including 18 children, were killed during the Intifada.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); ALGIERS DECLARATION; ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004); JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT; MADRID CONFERENCE; STATE OF PALESTINE; WARFARE.

FIRST LEBANON WAR. *See* PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION.

FIVE-STAGE ISRAELI PLAN. In response to the peace moves following the **Hussein–Arafat Accord** and the **Mubarak Plan**, in June 1985 Israeli prime minister **Shimon Peres** outlined a five-stage plan. It called for negotiations to be held among Israel, the **United States**, **Egypt**, **Jordan**, and Palestinian representatives who were not members of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO); the creation of an Israeli–Jordanian–Palestinian working group to prepare an international conference on the Middle East; solicitation of support for such a conference from other permanent members of the **United Nations** Security Council; appointment of "authentic Palestinian representatives" from the **Occupied Territories** who "will represent the inhabitants and will be acceptable to all parties"; and the convening of an international conference within three months. The explicit exclusion of the PLO and attempts to seek alternative Palestinian leadership made the plan unviable.

See also PLO LAW; VILLAGE LEAGUE.

FLY-IN CAMPAIGN. Protests over the continuing **Siege of Gaza** took a different turn in July 2011 when supporters of Palestinians from Western countries decided to express their support and solidarity by flying into Israel in large numbers. According to the organizers, about 800 protesters in the **United States**, **France**, **Great Britain**, and other countries signed up to fly to Israel and head for the **West Bank** to visit Palestinian families. This coincided with the planned sailing of a group of ships to break the siege of the **Gaza Strip** imposed by Israel. Preempting an impending confrontation, Israel prepared a list of blacklisted protesters and warned that they would be denied entry and advised foreign airliners "not to board" them on their flights to Israel. Most could not take the flights, as they were prevented in their original destinations, and about 120 who managed to reach Israel were arrested at the Ben-Gurion airport, briefly held, and then deported. In a similar protest in April 2012, Israel deported about 40 activists who managed to reach the Ben-Gurion airport from various Western capitals.

See also FREE GAZA MOVEMENT; FREEDOM FLOTILLA; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; PALMER REPORT; WARFARE.

FORCE 17. Shortly after their expulsion from **Jordan** following the **Black September Massacre** in 1970, senior **Fatah** officers formed Force 17 to provide personal security to Chairman **Yasser Arafat** and other senior leaders of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Gradually it evolved into an elite unit and played an active combatant role during the 1982 Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**, or the **Peace for Galilee Operation**. In August 1982, along with other PLO forces, Force 17 moved to Tunis. In the wake of the **Oslo Accords**, the members of the force returned to the **autonomous areas** and transformed into the Presidential Security Unit, which was again respon-

sible for Arafat's personal security. During the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Israel charged that members of Force 17 were responsible for a number of acts of **terrorism** against Israelis, including the killing of Kahane Hai leader Binyamin Kahane (1966–2000) on 31 December 2000. Following a number of attacks on Jewish settlers in Hebron, on 29 March 2001, Israeli helicopters raided the headquarters of Force 17 in Gaza and **Ramallah**, resulting in the deaths of three Palestinians and the wounding of 64 others. In February 2002, days after he lost the elections to **Ariel Sharon**, caretaker Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** ordered the **assassination** of Lt. Col. Massoud Ayad (1947–2001), a senior official in Force 17.

In the aftermath of Arafat's death, there were plans to dismantle Force 17 and integrate its members into the presidential guard of **Mahmoud Abbas**. This move did not materialize and was overshadowed by the **Battle of Gaza**, which resulted in the takeover of the Gaza Strip by **Hamas**. Since 2007, the members of Force 17 have taken part in various operations against Hamas in both the Gaza Strip and the **West Bank**.

See also KACH; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA).

FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF. *See* IHH.

FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT. In a helicopter accident near She'ar Yashuv close to Israel's border with **Lebanon**, 73 Israeli soldiers heading for Israel's self-declared **security zone** were killed on 4 February 1997. This galvanized domestic opposition to Israel's military presence in southern Lebanon. On 5 February, four women whose sons were serving in units of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) in the security zone held a demonstration at the Machaniyan Junction in northern Israel. They held similar protests in various parts of the country, and this gradually grew into a protest movement that took the name the Four Mothers Movement. Despite its name, a host of men and women joined the protest and endorsed the principal goal of the movement—namely, Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. It began to attract support from a wide spectrum of Israelis, including former IDF officers, academics, and politicians. As the Israeli casualties in the security zone increased, the movement gained widespread support, and **Lebanese withdrawal** became a major issue in Israeli society. During the 1999 election campaign, **Labor Party** leader **Ehud Barak** pledged to get the IDF out of Lebanon within a year, and on 24 May 2000, Israel completed its unilateral withdrawal. The Four Mothers Movement remains the most successful grassroots effort in fundamentally altering Israel's security and foreign policy.

See also PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; PEACE NOW; YACHIMOVICH, SHELLY (1960–).

FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION. Initiated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the fourth Geneva Convention came into force on 12 August 1949. It prohibits an occupying power from resorting to collective punishments and reprisals, **deportations**, hostage taking, torture, or discriminatory treatment of the civilian population under its occupation. Since 1967, Israel maintains that the convention does not apply to the **Occupied Territories** because **Jordan** and **Egypt** were not the sovereign powers of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**, respectively, but were themselves occupying powers of these areas at the time of the **June War of 1967**. At the same time, Israel took upon itself to apply the "humanitarian provisions" of the convention on a de facto basis.

In December 2001, the Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention met in Geneva and unanimously decided that the convention is applicable to the Occupied Territories. Both Israel and the **United States** boycotted the conference. The application of the Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories continues to be contentious inside Israel. In July 2012, the **Levy Report**, which examined the question of **outposts**, concluded that the Israeli presence in the West Bank does not constitute occupation and that the Jewish **settlements** are legal under international law.

See also GREEN LINE; KERRY PLAN; SECURITY FENCE/S.

FRANCE. The secret **Sykes–Picot Agreement** with **Great Britain**, aimed at dividing the Arab-dominated provinces of the **Ottoman Empire** after World War I (1914–1918), brought France into the Arab–Israeli conflict. Under this arrangement, France would take control of **Lebanon** and **Syria**, while **Iraq** and Palestine would go to Britain. Even though the Bolshevik Revolution in **Russia** compelled both parties to renounce the agreement, the post-war division of the Ottoman Empire nevertheless followed the Sykes–Picot arrangement. France briefly accepted Faisal (1885–1933), the son of Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of Mecca, as the emir of Syria but in July 1920 deposed him and established French supremacy in Syria.

The **League of Nations** granted the **Mandate** over Palestine to Britain, which largely removed France from the emerging Arab–Jewish conflict. Though it voted for the **Partition Plan** in the **United Nations**, France delayed its recognition of the Jewish state until 12 January 1949 because of its other interests in the Arab world. Along with the **United States** and **Turkey**, France was elected to the UN **Palestine Conciliation Commission** in December 1948. After the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreements** between Israel and its Arab neighbors, French officers also served in the UN peacekeeping missions. In May 1950, France joined the United States and Britain to issue the **Tripartite Declaration** and agreed not to supply arms they thought would create an arms race in the region.

The **nationalization of the Suez Canal** by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** dragged France solidly into the Arab–Israeli conflict. It joined hands with Britain, which had controlling interests in the **Suez Canal**, and with Israel, which sought to contain the growing regional influence of Nasser, in planning the **Suez War**. On 23 October 1956, leaders of these three countries met for the **Sèvres Conference** and concluded an agreement on initiating a military attack against Egypt. The parties set 29 October as D-day for the military operations. Despite the intended illusion of not cooperating, France openly operated from the military bases in Israel. Even though the Sèvres understanding was not made public at the time of the war, the veto exercised by Britain and France in the UN Security Council against the American proposal for a cease-fire and general withdrawal confirmed the premeditated nature of the tripartite aggression. Under intense pressure from the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961), the armed forces of these three countries were forced to withdraw from the canal, the **Sinai Peninsula**, and the **Gaza Strip**. The Suez crisis also witnessed the consolidation of Franco-Israeli strategic relations and the French agreement to build the Dimona nuclear reactor in the Negev.

The **June War of 1967** marked a significant setback in Franco-Israeli relations, as France opposed the use of force to remove the **naval blockade** of the **Straits of Tiran** imposed by Nasser. In the wake of Israel's preemptive strike, French president Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) imposed a total **French embargo** on arms supplies to the entire Middle East, and Israel became the principal victim of this policy. In December 1968, following the **Beirut airport bombing**, when an Israeli air raid destroyed a number of civilian aircraft, France placed a total embargo on arms supplies to Israel.

Since that time, Israeli–French relations have deteriorated, especially after France emerged as the key European player backing the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and the PLO's entry into the UN. The frequent Israeli raids against Lebanon in response to Palestinian **Fedayeen** attacks further contributed to bilateral tensions. For its part, France adopted lukewarm, if not unfriendly, postures toward various American peace initiatives in the Middle East, including the **Camp David Accords**, the **Madrid Conference**, and the **Oslo Process**. Following his serious illness, in October 2004 **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat** was airlifted to France for medical treatment. On 11 November, Arafat died in a military hospital in Paris.

As a part of his efforts to increase French influence in the region and to reenergize the **Euro-Mediterranean dialogue**, President Nicolas Sarkozy (1955–) proposed the formation of the **Union for the Mediterranean** (UfM). He hosted a summit meeting in Paris in July 2008 attended by heads of states and governments from 43 countries. From the Middle East, 13 leaders attended the meeting but did not include King **Abdullah II** of **Jor-**

dan or King Mohammed V of Morocco. Like the earlier **Barcelona Process**, the UfM has been bogged down by the lack of progress in the peace process, especially in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. There has been no summit meeting since the inaugural summit in 2008.

There are growing anti-Israeli sentiments in France, which at times turn into anti-Jewish feelings and are linked to periodic Israeli–Palestinian violence. These in turn have resulted in a number of French Jews making **Aliya** to Israel; for example, between 2000 and 2009, more than 13,000 emigrated to Israel.

The onset of the **Arab Spring** resulted in France playing a significant role in the Western response to the popular Arab demand for change. Having been wrong-footed on events in Tunisia, President Sarkozy played an important role in the operations against Libya led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that resulted in the removal of Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011) from power. Similarly, France has been vocal in criticizing President **Bashar al-Assad** over his response to popular protests in Syria. After prolonged hesitation, in September 2013 France agreed to supply arms to the Syrian rebels.

See also ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; ENTEBBE OPERATION; EUROPEAN UNION (EU); NUCLEAR ISRAEL; OSIRAQ BOMBING; UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC).

FREE GAZA MOVEMENT. In 2008 a group of human rights activists and pro-Palestinian groups established the Free Gaza Movement registered in Cyprus with the explicit purpose of ending the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by Israel and supported by **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak**. Prominent members of this campaign included Noam Chomsky (1928–) of the **United States** and civil rights activist Desmond Tutu (1931–) of **South Africa**.

Through a number of protests and campaigns, the movement sought to highlight the plight of the Palestinians and to generate international opinions against the blockade. The **Freedom Flotilla** was one such attempt by the movement, and its support extended to a number of Western countries including **Great Britain**, **France**, **Germany**, and Scandinavian countries. The movement got into controversies in October 2012 when one of its founders, Greta Berlin (1941–), was accused of making anti-Semitic statements and tweeting that Zionists "operated concentration camps" during the Holocaust.

See also ACADEMIC BOYCOTT; APARTHEID; BOYCOTT, DISINVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS); FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; IHH; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; PALMER REPORT; TURKEY.

FREEDOM FLOTILLA. This was the name given to a flotilla of six ships organized by the **Free Gaza Movement** and **IHH** of **Turkey** in 2010 to break the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by the **Israel Defense Forces** with the tacit support of **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak**. The ships were carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials and were accompanied by about 590 activists. The organizers refused the Israeli suggestion to off-load the supplies in an Israeli port for transportation into the **Gaza Strip** by road. On 31 May 2010, Israeli naval commandos boarded one of the ships, the *Mavi Marmara*, and sought to arrest the protestors. In the ensuing melee, 10 people, including 9 Turkish citizens and 1 citizen of the **United States**, were killed. The *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** heightened tensions between Israel and Turkey leading to Prime Minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan**'s downgrading diplomatic relations with Israel. A similar flotilla attempt in July 2011 failed to set sail due to pressures from Israel and an inadequate response.

See also ACADEMIC BOYCOTT; APARTHEID; BOYCOTT, DISIN-VESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS); FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; IHH; PALMER REPORT; TURKEY.

FRENCH EMBARGO. In protest against Israeli preemptive strikes on Arab states in the **June War of 1967**, **France** imposed an arms embargo on Israel and refused to deliver 50 supersonic Mirage IV fighters that Israel had ordered and paid for. Israel retaliated by clandestinely obtaining the technical details of Mirage IV designs and developed its own Kfir fighters for domestic use and for export. The French embargo terminated the strategic cooperation between the two countries forged on the eve of the **Suez War** and had three distinct fallouts. France ceased to be a close ally of Israel and was perceived to be sympathetic toward **Syria** and **Lebanon**. Subsequently, the **United States** emerged as the principal arms supplier of Israel. The French embargo acted as a catalyst for the development of Israel's indigenous arms industry.

See also NUCLEAR ISRAEL; WARFARE.

G

GAHAL. *See* LIKUD.

GALILI DOCUMENT. In early 1973, minister without portfolio and a close confidant of Israel's prime minister **Golda Meir**, Israel Galili (1910–1986), prepared a plan outlining the government's policy vis-à-vis the **Occupied Territories**. Approved by the **Labor Party** on 3 September 1973—just weeks before the **October War of 1973**—it outlined plans for the development of the economy, infrastructure, and social services of the residents of the Occupied Territories and their closer integration with the Israeli economy. Encouraging Jewish **settlements** in areas considered vital for security, the document largely reflected the parameters set by the **Allon Plan** in 1967. The Galili Document was overtaken by the October War, which exposed the limitations of Israel's military planning and the lack of foresight among the Israeli political leadership.

   See also BAR-LEV LINE; GAZA DISENGAGEMENT; JORDAN VALLEY.

GAS DEAL. In 2000 a group of business people close to the establishments in **Egypt** and Israel formed the East Mediterranean Gas Company (EMG). This initiative came in the wake of the **Oslo Accords** and despite the official Egyptian policy of keeping the cold peace with Israel. In June 2005 the EMG, along with two other Egyptian gas companies, entered into an agreement with the Israel Electrical Company (IEC) to supply 25 billion cubic meters of gas to Israel over a 15-year period, and the supplies began to flow in the middle of 2008. In 2010, the EMG was meeting 37 percent of the IEC's gas consumption. In the same year, some Egyptian activists appealed to the judiciary to stop the arrangement, arguing that the price paid by Israel was far below the market price. After the fall of President **Hosni Mubarak** in the wake of the **Arab Spring in Egypt**, the pipeline carrying the gas was sabotaged five times, and on 22 April 2012 it was announced that the agreement was revoked. While the company and Israeli leaders, including Prime

Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**, attributed the cancellation to commercial considerations, many suspected that it was due to a new political climate in Egypt.

See also ANTI-NORMALIZATION; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; ARAB SPRING; ILLEGAL TRADE; OIL SUPPLIES; SIEGE OF GAZA; SINAI VIOLENCE.

GAZA DISENGAGEMENT. On 28 May 2004, Israeli prime minister **Ariel Sharon** announced a four-stage unilateral disengagement plan. According to the plan, Israel would withdraw from the **Gaza Strip**, including all Israeli settlements; the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) would be **redeployed** outside the Strip, with the exception of a military presence in the area adjacent to the border between Gaza and **Egypt** (the Philadelphi route); and Israel would also withdraw from four Jewish **settlements** in the **West Bank**—namely, Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh. Israel would remove all permanent military installations in the West Bank and, along with the international community, would help improve the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank. Even though a few Jewish settlements in the West Bank were also included, the plan was largely seen as an Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip.

While the proposal enjoyed widespread public support in Israel, Sharon faced considerable opposition from within his own party, and on 18 August 2004, the **Likud** Central Committee voted down Sharon's proposal, and there were strong demands that Sharon should submit this plan to a national **referendum**. Despite these difficulties, on 26 October, Sharon secured the **Knesset approval** for his unilateral plan. Following the death of **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** in November of that year, there were suggestions that the plan could be transformed into a negotiated settlement with the post-Arafat Palestinian leadership. During the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit** in February 2005, Sharon agreed to coordinate the withdrawal with the PNA, now headed by **Mahmoud Abbas**, but no progress was made.

In a bid to mitigate the domestic opposition, Sharon enacted an **Evacuation Compensation Bill** in February 2005 to pay compensation to the settlers who were prepared to voluntarily move out of the settlements that would be evacuated. Amid growing protest from settlers and their supporters, in April 2005 the Knesset rejected a bill that demanded a referendum to decide on the pullout. A significant number of Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip refused to voluntarily withdraw by 22 August, and the withdrawal of the IDF was completed by 12 September 2005. Israel also removed four settlements in the West Bank under this plan.

The Israeli withdrawal was followed by the victory of **Hamas** in the Palestinian elections held in January 2006 and the eventual takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in July 2007 following the **Battle of Gaza**. In response, Israel imposed the **Siege of Gaza**, which severely limited the flow of goods and services into and out of the Strip. The siege was partially maintained with the cooperation of **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak** and provoked a number of protest movements such as the **Freedom Flotilla**.

The unilateral disengagement did not resolve Israel's security problems, and periodic firing of **Qassam** rockets from the Gaza Strip resulted in Israel's launching a military offensive against the Strip. The two important confrontations against Hamas since 2005 were the **Cast Lead Operation** and the **Pillar of Defense Operation**.

See also FLY-IN CAMPAIGN; IHH; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; QASSAM; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); SUMMER RAINS OPERATION; UNITY TALKS.

GAZA RAID. In response to frequent **Fedayeen** raids from the **Gaza Strip**, which was then under the control of **Egypt**, on 28 February 1955 the **Israel Defense Forces** attacked an Egyptian army position north of Gaza town. This occurred less than two weeks after **David Ben-Gurion** returned to the Israeli government and took over the Ministry of Defense. The raid also came just four days after the signing of the **Baghdad Pact**, which was vehemently opposed by Egyptian **Gamal Abdel Nasser**. The raid was the most serious clash between Israel and Egypt since the signing of the **Armistice Agreement** in February 1949. Thirty-six Egyptian soldiers and 2 civilians were killed, and another 31, including 2 civilians, were wounded; 8 Israelis were killed during the raid. Subsequently, Nasser cited this attack as a motivating factor for the **Czech Deal**.

See also WARFARE.

GAZA STRIP. Covering about 360 square kilometers, the Gaza Strip is a narrow coastal plain bordering the southeastern Mediterranean Sea and has been under the control of the Palestinian militant Islamic movement **Hamas** since June 2007. This 45-kilometer-long, 8-kilometer-wide stretch is densely populated and under the **Partition Plan** of 1947 was allotted to the Arab state. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, it came under the control of **Egypt** and was thereafter administered by a military governor. During the **Suez War** of 1956, Israel captured the Gaza Strip but was forced by the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961) to return it to Egyptian rule. Israel once again captured it during the **June War of 1967**.

Compared to the **West Bank**, the Gaza Strip suffers from a number of handicaps, such as high population density, meager economic resources, and growing religious extremism. The outbreak of the **First Intifada** in 1987 posed severe political and security challenges to Israel. As a result, since the late 1980s, a number of Israelis, especially right-wing groups, have advocated unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

In 1970, Israel established the first Jewish **settlement** in Kfar Darom; since then, it has established 20 settlements. In the initial period of the **Oslo Process**, Israel advocated a "Gaza first" policy, whereby it would withdraw from much of the Strip. This was vehemently opposed by the Palestinian leadership, especially **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat**, due to fears that Israel would try to hold on to the West Bank. Israel eventually agreed to include the West Bank town of **Jericho** in the first phase of Palestinian self-rule. Under the Interim Agreement of 1995, 219 square kilometers of the Gaza Strip were transferred to the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), but Israel controlled 40 percent of the Strip. On 1 July 1994, Arafat entered the Gaza Strip.

The movement of people and goods from the Gaza Strip into Israel was controlled through the Erez Crossing on the northern edge of the Strip. Under the **Oslo Accords**, this crossing, as well as the Rafah, Sufa, Kissufim, and Karni Crossings in the Gaza Strip, were under the overall security control of Israel. As part of its **Gaza Disengagement**, in September 2005 Israel completely pulled out of the Gaza Strip, and for the first time since the withdrawal of **Great Britain** in May 1948, the area came under the full control of the Palestinians.

The withdrawal of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) did not improve the situation of the Gaza Strip. While Israel controlled the Erez Crossing into Israel, Egypt controlled the **Rafah Crossing** into the **Sinai Peninsula**. Since 2005, various Palestinian militant groups have been firing **Qassam** rockets into Israel resulting in a series of military operations by the IDF. The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections held on 25 January 2006 increased the tension in the Gaza Strip. The internal differences between **Fatah** and Hamas broke into a violent **Battle of Gaza** during 10–15 June 2007 leading to the complete takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. Since then, the Palestinians have two distinct and separate political arrangements—namely, the Gaza Strip under the Hamas-led government headed by **Ismail Haniyeh**, and the West Bank controlled by the PNA headed by President **Mahmoud Abbas**. Since exercising complete control, the Hamas government headed by Haniyeh has imposed a number of social restrictions upon the residents of Gaza reflecting its conservative worldview.

The Hamas victory and control over the Gaza Strip led to the Israeli imposition of the **Siege of Gaza** with the active cooperation of Egypt under President **Hosni Mubarak**. This evoked strong criticisms from various hu-

man rights organizations which organized the **Freedom Flotilla** and other protest activities to highlight the plight of the residents of the Gaza Strip. The continued firing of **Qassam** rockets led to periodic clashes between the IDF and Palestinian militants, including the **Summer Rains Operation** in June–September 2006 and the **Autumn Clouds Operation** in November 2006. A far more serious confrontation broke out in December 2008 when Israel launched the **Cast Lead Operation**, which was also accompanied by a limited ground invasion. According to **B'Tselem**, approximately 1,385 Palestinians were killed during the conflict, including 330 combatants and 762 non-combatants. The UN-appointed **Goldstone Report** accused both Israel and Hamas militants of committing **war crimes**. In November 2012, Israel launched the **Pillar of Defense Operation**, which ended through the mediation of Egyptian president **Mohammed Morsi**.

Violence and lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula in the wake of the **Arab Spring** have put pressure on the Egyptian government to act against the **tunnels** from Sinai into Gaza. Despite political statements in favor of the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, both President Morsi and his successor **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi** have ordered the sealing and destruction of various underground tunnels between the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. During the **Protective Edge Operation** launched by the IDF, President el-Sisi came out strongly against Hamas and sought to isolate the militant group.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT (APG); BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; CROSSING POINTS; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; GAZA–JERICHO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT; IHH; IRON DOME; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; RAINBOW OPERATION; SHALIT AFFAIR; SINAI VIOLENCE; TURKEY; UNITED NATIONS (UN).

GAZA–JERICHO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT. *See* CAIRO AGREEMENT (1994).

GENEVA CONFERENCE (1971). On 21 December 1971, the Geneva Peace Conference was formally opened by **United Nations** secretary-general Kurt Waldheim (1918–2007), with the foreign ministers of two superpowers—Henry Kissinger (1923–) of the **United States** and Andrei Gromyko (1909–1989) of the **Soviet Union**—acting as co-chairs. The Arab states were eager to invite **Great Britain** and **France** but were overruled by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Israel. **Syria** refused to participate, and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** was not invited. After the ceremonial opening, the conference was adjourned and was never reconvened. However,

under its auspices, an Egyptian–Israeli Military Committee met on 26 December to discuss an agreement on the separation of forces in the **Sinai Peninsula**.

See also GENEVA CONFERENCE (1973); GENEVA CONFERENCE (1983); GENEVA INITIATIVE.

GENEVA CONFERENCE (1973). Resolution 338, which brought about a cease-fire in the **October War of 1973**, called for the commencement of negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors "under appropriate auspices." Accordingly, the **United States** and the **Soviet Union** co-chaired a Middle East peace conference that opened in Geneva on 21 December 1973. It was attended by **Egypt**, Israel, and **Jordan**, as well as by the **United Nations** secretary-general Kurt Waldheim (1918–2007). As happened during the **Geneva Conference of 1971**, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** was not invited. **Syria** was invited, but its participation was vetoed by Israel, which objected to the Syrian treatment of its prisoners of war. Israel and its neighbors established working groups to discuss various issues, but they did not make much progress. The conference was soon overshadowed by **shuttle diplomacy** conducted by U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–) and the determination of President **Anwar Sadat** of Egypt to seek a separate peace with Israel brokered by the United States.

See also GENEVA CONFERENCE (1971); GENEVA CONFERENCE (1983); GENEVA INITIATIVE.

GENEVA CONFERENCE (1983). Compelled by the stalemate in the Middle East and the inability of the **United Nations** Security Council to act decisively, the UN General Assembly took the initiative and organized an international conference on the Palestinian question. Backed by members of the **Non-Aligned Movement**, the General Assembly was primarily concerned with the continued exclusion of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO)—despite its near universal recognition as the "sole legitimate" representative of the Palestinians—from any major peace initiative in the region. Convened in Geneva from 23 August to 7 September 1983, the conference was attended by 137 countries but was boycotted by Israel and the **United States**. The Geneva Declaration adopted at the end of the meeting called for a peace conference under UN auspices with the full and equal participation of all parties to the conflict, including the PLO. On 13 December, this declaration was endorsed by the UN General Assembly and became part of the UN documents.

See also GENEVA CONFERENCE (1971); GENEVA CONFERENCE (1973); GENEVA INITIATIVE.

GENEVA CONVENTION. *See* FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION.

GENEVA INITIATIVE. After months of negotiations, on 1 December 2003, Yossi Beilin (1948–), a former Israeli minister, peace activist, and architect of the **Oslo Process**, and Yasser Abed Rabbo (1945–), a senior member of the Executive Committee of the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, unveiled a peace initiative in Geneva. Coming in the midst of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, this private, unofficial initiative sought to bridge the differences over some contentious issues that had led to the failure of the **Camp David Talks**.

According to this initiative, the Palestinian **refugees** would give up their right of return and recognize Israel as a Jewish state. In return, Israel would withdraw to the **Green Line**, except for certain mutually recognized territorial adjustments and exchanges. The city of **Jerusalem** would be divided, with the Arab part of **East Jerusalem** becoming a part of the Palestinian state. The **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** would be Palestinian, but an international force would ensure freedom of access for visitors of all faiths, while the Western Wall of the Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD) would remain under Jewish sovereignty. Palestinians would prevent **terrorism** and incitement and disarm all militants. The Palestinian state would be demilitarized, and border crossings would be supervised by an international force. This understanding would replace all previous **United Nations** resolutions as well as earlier agreements.

The opposition of the Israeli government headed by **Ariel Sharon** made the initiative a non-starter. The **Palestinian National Authority** was divided over the initiative. While **Yasser Arafat** tacitly endorsed it, other Palestinian groups, especially **Hamas**, **Islamic Jihad**, and the Popular Front including **Fatah**, attacked the initiative.

See also AL-QUDS; BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; CLINTON PARAMETERS.

GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT. Also known as the Joint Plan of Action, this was an agreement conduced between **Iran** and the P5+1 countries (**United States**, **Russia**, **China**, **France**, **Great Britain**, and **Germany**) in Geneva. It included a short-term freeze of portions of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran. It was concluded on 24 November 2013 and came into force on January 2014. Both sides are continuing negotiations toward a permanent agreement satisfactory to all the parties.

See also NUCLEAR IRAN; ROUHANI, HASSAN (1948–).

GENEVA UNITED NATIONS SESSION. On 9 November 1988, **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** applied for a **United States** visa to attend the annual **United Nations** General Assembly session in New York. This request came within weeks after the **Algiers Declaration** that proclaimed the **State of Palestine**. Due to domestic pressures from pro-Israeli groups, on 26 November U.S. secretary of state George Shultz (1920–) denied Arafat's request. This move violated the agreement between the UN and the United States and led the General Assembly to call for a special plenary session in Geneva with the participation of Arafat. A resolution to this effect was adopted on 2 December, with 154 members voting in favor and only the United States and Israel voting against. The session, with the participation of the Palestinian leader, was held in Geneva during 13–15 December.

See also AIPAC; NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM).

GERMANY. World War II (1939–1945) and the Nazi Holocaust dominate and influence Germany's relations with Israel and the Jewish people. On 10 September 1952, Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett (1894–1965) and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) signed the reparation agreement in Luxemburg, whereby Germany acknowledged its responsibility for the Holocaust and damage to their lives and property. As part of the agreement, West Germany transferred goods worth DM3.45 billion (approximately $845 million) to Israel as its compensation and contribution for the victims. Though strongly opposed within Israel, this reparations agreement eventually paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1965. East Germany, however, refused to own any responsibility for the Holocaust and hence never had diplomatic ties with Israel. During 1949–1990, when it was a separate political entity, East Germany supported various militant Palestinian groups and provided them with funds and weapons. This posture continued until the collapse of the Berlin Wall beginning in June 1990, the unification of East with West Germany, and the end of the Cold War.

Clouded over the past, Germany has been supportive of Israel and has supplied and funded large-scale military acquisitions by the **Israel Defense Forces**. It has been active in securing the freedom of kidnapped Israeli soldiers or retrieving their remains from militant groups such as **Hezbollah** and **Hamas**. In recent years, private individuals such as German novelist-poet Günter Grass (1927–2015) have been critical of Israel's policy toward the Palestinians.

See also GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; MUNICH MASSACRE; NUCLEAR IRAN; PRISONER EXCHANGE; SHALIT AFFAIR; TERRORISM; UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC).

GLIDER ATTACK. On 25 November 1987, an armed Palestinian belonging to Ahmed Jibril's **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command** infiltrated northern Israel from **Lebanon** in a glider. Entering an army camp near the town of Kiryat Shmona, he killed a number of Israeli officers and soldiers. This was the first glider attack on Israel by Palestinians.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

GOLAN DRUZE. At the time of the **June War of 1967**, the population of the **Golan Heights** stood at about 130,000, mostly Druze. While most of them fled to **Syria** during and after the conflict, about 7,000 Druze stayed behind and came under Israeli occupation. In the 1970s, Israeli offered citizenship to Golan Druze, and about 10 percent accepted the offer while the rest continued to retain their Syrian citizenship. Majdal Shams is the largest Druze town on the Golan Heights. Following the outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria**, some have been vocal in expressing their criticisms and disapproval of **Bashar al-Assad** and his handling of the Syrian demands for reforms. In 2011 the Golan Druze population stood around 22,000.

See also OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; QUNEITRA.

GOLAN HEIGHTS. The Golan Heights, the mountainous area east of the **Sea of Galilee** adjoining Mount Hermon, provides the common border to Israel, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and **Syria**. Roughly 65 kilometers long and 25 kilometers wide, the area is sparsely populated. This sovereign Syrian territory is about 48 kilometers west of Damascus and overlooks the Damascus–Beirut highway. The plateau gave a strategic advantage to Syria, enabling it to shell Israeli villages along the Sea of Galilee.

During its negotiations with **France** toward demarcating the boundaries between **Mandate Palestine** and Syria, **Great Britain** aspired to include parts of the Golan Heights within Palestine, and an agreement to this effect was signed in December 1920 only to be renounced by the British in 1922. A small area on the Heights formed the demilitarized zone under the **Armistice Agreement** of 1949 that was concluded between Israel and Syria following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. During the **June War of 1967**, Israel captured this Syrian territory, and in the **October War of 1973**, Israel repulsed Syrian efforts to regain control over Golan and captured some additional territory, but under the Israel–Syria **Disengagement Agreement** of 1974, Israel returned this newly captured area.

In June 1967, Israel established the first Jewish **settlement** in Merom Golan, and since then the governments headed by both the **Labor Party** and **Likud** have stepped up settlement activities. Israel has built 32 rural settlements and the urban center of Katzrin on the Golan Heights. Including

Mount Hermon, the total area of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights is about 1,158 square kilometers. The settlement drive increased following the **Camp David Accords** of 1978 when Israel agreed to return the **Sinai Peninsula** to **Egypt**. On 14 December 1981, the Knesset passed the **Golan Law** that extended Israeli jurisdiction to the Heights, a move condemned by the international community and the **United Nations**.

Israel's willingness to apply **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the UN Security Council to the Golan Heights enabled Syrian participation in the **Madrid Conference** and subsequent peace negotiations with Israel. Amid indications of progress on the Israeli–Syrian negotiations, in January 1994 Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** announced that any substantial territorial pullout from the Heights would be submitted to a **referendum**. According to a law passed by the Knesset on 26 January 1999, a majority vote in the Knesset would be needed if Israel were to withdraw from any parts of Israeli sovereign territory. Despite this, the legal status of the Golan Heights and the claims of Israeli sovereignty are contested even within Israel.

During the June 1967 War, when Israel captured the Heights, most of the Druze residents fled to Syria. Israel offered citizenship to Druze residents of the Heights who were separated from their clan on the other side of the cease-fire line. Most of them remained indifferent to this offer and retained their citizenship of and loyalty to Syria. According to the Forum for Middle East Peace at the end of 2011, the number of Israeli settlers on the Golan Heights stood at 20,347. The Druze population stands at 22,000.

The Golan Heights has remained peaceful since the **October War of 1973**, but the **Arab Spring** has posed a number of challenges to Israel. The first major confrontation took place on 15 May 2011 on **al-Naqba** Day when hundreds of Palestinian **refugees** from Syria sought to cross into Israel from the Golan Heights and four were killed in the clash with the **Israel Defense Forces**. This was the first time since 1973 that such an incident took place on the Golan Heights. The attack by the Syrian rebel forces on the UN post on May 2013 resulted in Austria, Croatia, and Japan withdrawing from the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** (UNDOF) that were deployed since 1974. Some of the fighting between the rebels and the Syrian army took place closer to the Golan Heights, and there were occasional firings on the Israeli positions on the Golan Heights from the Syrian side.

See also ASSAD, BASHAR AL- (1965–); ASSAD, HAFEZ AL- (c. 1930–2000); GOLAN DRUZE; GREEN LINE; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; QUNEITRA; SHEBA'A FARMS; SHEPHERDSTOWN TALKS.

GOLAN LAW. On 14 December 1981, Prime Minister **Menachem Begin** surprised his colleagues by announcing his decision to annex the **Golan Heights**. Formally presented as an "extension of Israeli law," the move was approved by the cabinet. On the same evening, the Knesset passed the Golan

Law by a majority of 63 to 21, with a number of opposition **Labor Party** members voting with the government. Israel had been building **settlements** on the Golan Heights since 1967, and the law legalized Israel's resolve to retain the Syrian territory. The international community, including the **United Nations** Security Council, swiftly condemned the move. An initiative by **Jordan** in January 1982 to impose sanctions on Israel due to the Golan Law was vetoed by the **United States** in the Security Council.

See also ANNEXATION; GOLAN DRUZE; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; QUNEITRA; REFERENDUM.

GOLDSTONE, RICHARD J. (1938–). Born on 26 October 1938 into a Jewish family near Johannesburg in **South Africa**, Richard J. Goldstone is a well-known expert on international law. He began his career as a commercial lawyer and became a judge in the Supreme Court during 1980–1994. He played a crucial role in fighting **apartheid**. In 1991, African National Congress chairperson Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) asked him to head an inquiry commission to facilitate South Africa's transition from apartheid to a multiracial democracy, and this paved the way for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995. Having established his credentials as an impeccable judge, during August 1994 and September 1996, Goldstone headed the **United Nations** international tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and prosecuted a number of key war crime suspects.

In 2009, the **United Nations Human Rights Council** (UNHRC) appointed Goldstone to head the international commission to investigate "all violations of international human rights law" that might have happened between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009 during the **Cast Lead Operation** carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** against the **Gaza Strip**. The report, known as the **Goldstone Report**, was submitted on 15 September 2009 and was highly critical of Israel as well as **Hamas**. Both of these parties, which refused to cooperate, dismissed the findings. On 16 October 2009, the UNHRC endorsed the report by an overwhelming majority. Israel and a number of American Jewish organizations accused Goldstone of having a bias against Israel.

In an op-ed article published in the *Washington Post* on 1 April 2011, Goldstone admitted that the conclusions would have been different had the committee been aware of the information that came to light after the publication of his report. He also concluded that Israel did not deliberately target civilian populations, but this was not the case with Hamas militants. Goldstone's retraction was rejected by the other three members of the commission.

GOLDSTONE REPORT. In April 2009, the Geneva-based **United Nations Human Rights Council** (UNHRC), formerly known as United Nations Commission on Human Rights, appointed a fact-finding commission to inquire into allegations of human rights violations during the **Cast Lead Operation** undertaken by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) during December 2008 and January 2009. This was at the request of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**), which accused Israel of violating international human rights laws during its campaign against the **Hamas**-controlled **Gaza Strip**. The four-member commission was headed by **Richard Goldstone**, a noted jurist from **South Africa**.

In its 575-page report submitted on 15 September 2009, the commission held both Israel and Palestinian militant groups guilty of **war crimes** and possible crimes against humanity. Both parties were accused of deliberately targeting civilian populations. The report urged both parties to investigate their conduct during the conflict, failing which it recommended bringing up the allegations to the International Criminal Court. Initially the Islamic militant group Hamas, which was also criticized by the Goldstone Report, refused to accept the finding, but it soon joined hands with the **Palestinian National Authority** in seeking stronger actions against Israel. On 16 October 2009 the UNHRC adopted a resolution that accepted the Goldstone findings against Israel, but it made no direct reference to the conduct of the Palestinian militant groups during the conflict. On 27 February 2010 the **United Nations** General Assembly endorsed the Goldstone findings and called for more credible investigations into allegations of war crimes.

From the very beginning, Israel refused to cooperate with the commission, denied permission to its members for an on-the-spot investigation, and accused the commission of partisanship and prejudice. On 24 September 2009, Israel issued a 32-point rebuttal to its findings. The human rights records of some of the members of the UNHRC that appointed the Goldstone Commission, such as **Saudi Arabia**, also came up for Israeli criticisms. Israel opened about 100 internal inquiries into the conduct of the IDF during the conflict.

On 1 April 2011, in a signed article carried by the *Washington Post*, Goldstone retracted the principal findings of the commission and concluded that Israel did not deliberately target civilian populations, but this was not the case with Hamas militants. He also admitted that the commission lacked evidence to back some of its findings. This retraction was rejected by the other three members of the commission.

GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE. This was the appendix to the 20 November 1956 report by the **United Nations** secretary-general to the General Assembly that outlined the functions and jurisdictions of the **United Nations Emergency Force I** (UNEF I) to be deployed in the **Sinai Peninsula** along the **Egypt**–Israel border. Speaking at the General Assembly on 27 November

after the **Suez War**, Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud Fawzi (1900–1981) declared that the General Assembly "could not request UNEF to be stationed or to operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the Government of the country." This recognition of Egyptian permission as a precondition for the continuance of the UNEF proved controversial and problematic in May 1967, when President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of Egypt demanded partial, and later complete, withdrawal of the peacekeeping force, which eventually led to the **June War of 1967**.

GOOD FENCE POLICY. This euphemism denotes the Israeli policy toward the Christian population in southern **Lebanon** following the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989). In early 1976, Israel began providing medical, economic, and subsequently limited military aid to Christian elements in southern Lebanon. This assistance was accelerated following the election of Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**, who transformed it into a cornerstone of his policy toward Lebanon. This policy was meant to limit the influence of **Syria** and keep Palestinian militants from establishing a strong independent foothold north of Israel. This policy of "helping beleaguered Christians" eventually led to the formation of the **South Lebanese Army**.

See also PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION.

GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION. This was the code name for the Israeli military response to **Hezbollah** attacks on northern Israel in the spring of 1996. The government of Prime Minister **Shimon Peres** was already under domestic pressure following a spate of **suicide attacks** in **Jerusalem** and Netanya carried out by **Hamas** militants that had claimed more than 50 victims in February and March 1996. The Katyusha rocket attacks from southern **Lebanon** complicated the situation. Hezbollah began this latest barrage of missile and artillery exchanges in response to the alleged Israeli killing of two Lebanese children inside Israel's self-declared **security zone**. Already trailing in opinion polls following the suicide attacks, Peres took a tough stand vis-à-vis Hezbollah to restore public confidence as well as to increase his prospects in the May elections against **Likud** candidate **Benjamin Netanyahu**.

In early April 1996 Israel initiated aerial and ground strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets. When the rocket attacks increased, Israel escalated the conflict and began attacking Lebanese targets beyond the immediate vicinity and bombed power stations near Beirut, the main north–south highway, and Beirut's international airport. During the operation, more than 400,000 Lebanese civilians were displaced. Israel sought to undermine local support for Hezbollah through such measures and pressured the Lebanese government to act against and disarm the militants. On 18 April 1996, an

Israeli shell accidentally landed on a **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** base in Kfar Kana and killed 105 Lebanese civilians who had sought refuge there. This attack changed the entire situation, resulting in strong international condemnation of Israel, and compelled the **United States** and **France** to mediate.

On 26 April, a cease-fire agreement known as the Grapes of Wrath Understanding was reached. U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher (1925–2011) announced that Israel and Hezbollah had agreed on terms that would end the fighting. According to this unsigned understanding, Israel would not fire at civilians or civilian targets in Lebanon, while Hezbollah agreed not to attack Israel. This was a reaffirmation of a similar understanding reached in July 1993 following the **Accountability Operation**. A five-member group made up of the United States, France, Israel, **Syria**, and Lebanon was formed to monitor the compliance and application of the understanding. This proved short-lived, and both sides accused each other of violating the agreement.

See also ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); KFAR KANA MASSACRE; LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL; SECOND LEBANON WAR; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

GREAT BRITAIN. Britain and its policies during the period between the two World Wars (1919–1939) are often blamed for the Arab–Israeli conflict and the plight of the Palestinians. Following the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918), Great Britain sought the help of Sharif Hussein ibn Ali of Mecca (1852–1931) to launch a rebellion against the **Ottoman Empire**. Through the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** (July 1915–March 1916), the British instigated the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** against the Ottomans and, in return, promised to create a unified Arab kingdom after the war, whose territorial limits remained vague and contentious. Simultaneously, in May 1916, Britain entered into a secret agreement with **France** (the **Sykes–Picot Agreement**) to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire between themselves after the war. Meanwhile, in an attempt to gain the support of the **United States**, Britain promised support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine through the **Balfour Declaration** issued on 2 November 1917.

After capturing Palestine during the war, in April 1921 Britain carved out areas east of the **Jordan River** and installed Sharif Hussein's second son, **Abdullah I**, as emir of **Transjordan**. The **Churchill White Paper** issued on 3 June 1922 declared that the region west of Transjordan was exempted from any assurances in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. On 24 July 1922, the **League of Nations** recognized the British **Mandate** over Palestine. Though a trust territory, Britain administered the territory without ever going to the league for approval or authorization.

Britain's contradictory promises to the Arabs and Zionists made the Mandate unworkable. While the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine primarily rested upon Jewish immigration or **Aliya**, the Palestinians were vehemently opposed to Jewish immigration and land purchases. This resulted in periodic clashes between Jews and Arabs and in 1936 exploded into full-fledged violence, commonly known as the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**. British attempts to secure Arab acquiescence to its pro-Zionist policy went nowhere, and in July 1937 the **Peel Commission**, for the first time, advocated partition as a solution to the irreconcilable situation. On the eve of World War II (1939–1945), Britain issued the **MacDonald White Paper**, which formally renounced the British commitments to the Balfour Declaration.

Unable to satisfy either of the parties, in April 1947 Britain handed over the Palestine problem to the newly founded **United Nations**, and the following month the UN appointed an 11-member **United Nations Special Commission on Palestine** (UNSCOP). On 3 September, UNSCOP submitted two recommendations as a solution to the Palestine question—namely, the **Partition Plan** and the **Federal Plan**. On 29 November 1947, the UN approved the Partition Plan, and shortly afterward Britain declared that it would withdraw from Palestine on 15 May 1948.

Hours before the scheduled British withdrawal, on the Sabbath eve of 14 May 1948, Zionist leaders met in Tel Aviv and declared the founding of the State of Israel, precipitating the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. The **Arab Legion** of **Jordan**, sponsored and supported by Britain, played a critical role in the war and captured the **West Bank** and **East Jerusalem**. These were annexed by Jordan in April 1950. Meanwhile, Britain recognized Israel on 13 May 1949 and on the same day supported its admission into the UN. On 25 May 1950, Great Britain joined with France and the United States to issue the **Tripartite Declaration**, which prohibited arms supplies to belligerents in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Similarly, Britain played a significant role in the formation of the **Baghdad Pact** in 1955.

The **nationalization of the Suez Canal** by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** resulted in Britain, France, and Israel colluding to attack Egypt in what became the **Suez War** of 1956. Because of strong U.S. pressure, the successful assault was reversed, and all foreign military forces withdrew from the **Sinai Peninsula**. Following the **June War of 1967**, Britain played an important role in the drafting of **Resolution 242**, which was adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. Since then, however, Britain has not been very prominent with regard to initiatives aimed at resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Britain largely follows the trend set by the **European Union** (EU) vis-à-vis the Arab–Israeli conflict. Over the years, Middle Eastern countries, which in the past were closer to Britain, like Jordan, have established stronger ties with the United States. The issue of Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied**

Territories and the practice of Israel exporting goods produced in the settlements as Israeli products to the EU countries have become a major cause of disagreement. Led by Britain, in July 2013 the EU introduced **settlement labeling** to prevent settlement products from enjoying the benefits of Israel's tariff agreement with the EU. In the same month, Britain took a leading role in the EU in declaring the military wing of **Hezbollah** as a terrorist organization over its suspected involvement in the **Burgas terror attack** in Bulgaria on 18 July 2012.

See also ABDULLAH II, KING (1962–); ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE; BLAIR, TONY (1953–); HUSSEIN, KING (1935–1999); LONDON AGREEMENT; LONDON CONFERENCE; OIL CRISIS; SÈVRES CONFERENCE; ST. JAMES CONFERENCE; TERRORISM; VENICE DECLARATION; UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UfM); UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC); ZIONISM.

GREATER JERUSALEM. On 21 June 1988, the Israeli cabinet approved a proposal to create "Greater Jerusalem" by extending the municipal boundaries eastward over the **Green Line** and incorporating the outlying areas. This move was aimed at consolidating the Jewish majority within the city and also envisaged the creation of an "umbrella municipality" comprising eight Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** bordering **Jerusalem**.

See also CLINTON PARAMETERS; E-1 AREA; JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; MA'ALE ADUMIM.

GREATER MIDDLE EAST. In the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks and its invasion of **Iraq** in March 2003, the **United States** floated the idea of a Greater Middle East Initiative. Among other objectives, the United States sought to promote democracy, human rights, and economic growth. During the summit meeting of G-8 heads of state and government at Sea Island in the U.S. state of Georgia in June 2004 attended by President **George W. Bush**, this was renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative. The geographical contours of the Greater/Broader Middle East varied. Besides countries of the Middle East and North Africa, some included the Central Asian Republics of the former **Soviet Union** as well as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and **Turkey**. Some saw it as a new cartography aimed at redrawing the state boundaries of the region and even dismemberment of some of them. Because of these controversies, some like Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (1954–) settled for the milder expression, the **New Middle East**.

GREATER SYRIA. The refusal of **Syria** to recognize **Lebanon** as a sovereign independent country until August 2008 was integral to the Greater Syria aspiration, and its origins can be traced to the early part of the 20th century. In return for his support to **Great Britain** against the **Ottoman Empire** during the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)**, Emir Faisal ibn Hussein (1885–1933), son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca (1852–1931), aspired to establish an Arab Syrian kingdom under his rule. With the active support of the British, Faisal proclaimed himself king of Syria in March 1920 and then sought to include and unify Lebanon, Palestine, and **Transjordan** under his rule. His reign proved to be short-lived, and he was soon driven out of Damascus. The British subsequently installed him as the monarch of **Iraq**.

Following independence in 1943, Syrian rulers treated Lebanon as part of the historic Greater Syria or Bilad al-Sham. In the wake of sectarian violence, in 1976 Syrian president **Hafez al-Assad** sent troops that stayed in Lebanon even after the end of the civil war in 1989. Despite demands by the international community, including the **United Nations**, the Syrian military presence in Lebanon continued until 2005. The Syrian forces were hastily withdrawn by 30 April 2005 soon after the **assassination** of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005), which evoked widespread anti-Syrian protests.

See also FRANCE.

GREECE. Israel's relations with Greece have been heavily influenced by the former's relations with **Turkey**. During the Cold War years, Israel and Greece maintained low-level diplomatic ties, which were upgraded in 1991 following the **Madrid Conference**. Israel's close military relations with **Turkey** and Greece's pro-Palestinian positions, especially since the 1970s, contributed to this situation. Within the **Non-Aligned Movement**, Greece emerged as a champion of the Palestinians and was one of the first members of the **European Union** to recognize and establish diplomatic relations with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). However, a terror attack on the British consulate in Athens in June 1991, when six people were killed, resulted in Greece's expelling 26 Palestinian diplomats and students, including Ahmed Massud al-Tchadur who headed the PLO mission in Athens during 1982–1985. The deterioration of Israel–Turkish relations following the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** led to a significant improvement in Greek–Israeli ties.

See also TERRORISM.

GREEN LINE. This refers to the frontier between Israel and the neighboring Arab states of **Egypt**, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and **Syria** as established by the **Armistice Agreements** of 1949. The Green Line delineated Israel's borders

on the eve of the **June War of 1967**, assuming this nomenclature because it was drawn on the maps with a green marker. Also referred to as the "4 June borders," the Green Line ceased to exist on official Israeli maps following the 1967 war.

The governments headed by the **Labor Party** and **Likud** have been vehemently opposed to any Israeli withdrawal back to the Green Line. Weeks after the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** told the **Herut** Party Conference in April 1979 that the "Green Line no longer exists, it has vanished forever." Nevertheless, it briefly resurfaced following the **First Intifada** and was institutionalized in the 1990s when Israel sought to prevent Palestinians from entering Israel, especially after acts of **terrorism**. Even though Israeli citizens are not prevented from crossing over the Green Line, the movement of Palestinian residents of the **Occupied Territories** into Israel is severely restricted.

A number of Arab peace proposals such as the **Fahd Plan**, the **Abdullah Plan**, and the **Arab Peace Initiative** revolved around an Israeli withdrawal to the Green Line. Implementing this Arab demand vis-à-vis Syria on the **Golan Heights** is problematic, as the Syrian demand for an Israeli withdrawal is accompanied by a demand for access to the waters of the **Sea of Galilee**. Since 1967, the sea level has receded, and this has complicated the definition of the Green Line vis-à-vis Syria.

Following the Oslo Process, various proposals concerning a **territorial swap** between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** refer to the Green Line as the benchmark. Suggestions by President **Barack Obama** in May 2011 that borders between Israel and Palestine "should be based" on the Green Line evoked strong criticism from Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and his supporters in the United States.

See also ANNEXATION; ARIEL; AYALON-NUSSEIBEH PROPOSAL; BARAK PLAN; BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; B'TSELEM; CLINTON PARAMETERS; EAST JERUSALEM; FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION; GENEVA INITIATIVE; *HUDNA*; JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; KERRY PLAN; LOAN GUARANTEES; MA'ALE ADUMIM; PEACE NOW; SECURITY FENCE/S; SETTLEMENT/S; SUICIDE ATTACK/S; UNITY TALKS; WATER.

GULF OF AQABA. Measuring about 24 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers long, the Gulf of Aqaba is the water body in the northern tip of the Red Sea where the land borders of **Egypt**, **Israel**, and **Jordan** meet while **Saudi Arabia** has a coastline. Israel refers to this body as the Gulf of Eilat. Adjacent to each other, the towns of **Taba**, Eilat, and Aqaba in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan, respectively, often function as the meeting place for many formal and clandestine meetings between Israel and Arab leaders.

The Gulf of Aqaba is Jordan's only access to the sea, while it gives Israel access to the Red Sea. The **Arab Boycott of Israel** and the closure of the **Suez Canal** to Israeli shipping enhanced the importance of the Gulf to Israel as it provides an alternative shipping route for Israel's trade with the Far East or the eastern coast of Africa. At the time of its withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula** following the **Suez War** of 1956, Israel announced that the closure of the Gulf of Tiran south of the Gulf of Aqaba at the edge of the Red Sea would be a casus belli. The closing of Tiran, and hence the Gulf of Aqaba, by Egypt's president **Gamal Abdel Nasser** on 22 May 1967 precipitated into the **June War of 1967**. Partly to access the Gulf of Aqaba for its shipping, various Israeli leaders, especially **Moshe Dayan**, argued that controlling the Egyptian town of **Sharm al-Sheikh** in the southern end of the Red Sea was more important than peace with Egypt. Abandonment of this stand contributed to the **Egypt–Israel Peace Agreement** and the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, including from Sharm al-Sheikh. Since June 1967, Israel has enjoyed unfettered access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

GULF WAR. *See* KUWAIT WAR.

GUSH EMUNIM. Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful") became active after the **June War of 1967** and seeks to promote Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**. Driven by a messianic zeal, it relies on biblical Jewish claims to **Judea and Samaria**. Following the **October War of 1973**, Gush Emunim organized itself into a political movement opposed to any territorial compromise vis-à-vis the Arabs. Seeking to promote Israeli sovereignty over the Occupied Territories, it promotes legal as well as illegal settlement activities, which often result in confrontations with the Palestinians. Rabbis identified with the movement have issued religious edicts opposing Israeli withdrawal from the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**. Rabbi Moshe Levinger (1935–), leader of the **Kiryat Arba** settlement near Hebron, was one of the founding members and the most influential figure in Gush Emunim.

Even though its first formal settlement plan was submitted to the **Likud** government in 1978, the group was active during the previous **Labor Party** governments. In defiance of the official policy, but with the backing of the then defense minister **Shimon Peres**, Gush Emunim began establishing settlements after April 1975 beyond the strategically important areas identified under the **Allon Plan**. One such settlement it established was **Ma'ale Adumim**, northeast of **Jerusalem**, which subsequently became the largest Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories.

Initially, Gush Emunim was affiliated with the **National Religious Party**; then, moving further to the right, it actively cooperated with other right-wing parties such as **Kach**, Kahane Hai, and Herut Leumi. Some of its members were involved in the **Jewish Underground**, which was active in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1978, Gush Emunim established **Amana** to promote settlement activities. In 1982, Gush Emunim was active in opposing the Israeli withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula** and the demolition of the Yamit settlement. The **Gaza Disengagement** of August 2005, which resulted in the removal of Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip, appeared to have dented the ideological resolve of the movement.

H

HA'ATZMAUT. Meaning "Independence" in Hebrew, Ha'atzmaut is an Israeli political party briefly founded and headed by **Ehud Barak**. In January 2011, Defense Minister Barak and four other members of the Knesset (MKs) broke away from the **Labor Party** to form a new centric block. As leader of the Labor Party, Barak was unable to convince the MKs to continue with the ruling coalition headed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**, and this led to his leaving the party and forming Ha'atzmaut. Following Barak's announcement in November 2012 that he was retiring from active politics, Ha'atzmaut decided not to take part in the January 2013 Knesset election and ceased to exist.

HABASH, GEORGE (1926–2008). Born into a Greek Orthodox family in Lydda (currently Lod in Israel) in 1926, George Habash was a radical Palestinian leader and a co-founder of the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP). In the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Habash was expelled from Lydda during the **Dalet Plan** operation and became a **refugee**. Initially he lived in **Jordan**.

In December 1967, because of the **June War of 1967**, Habash joined with Ahmad Jibril (1939–), **Nayef Hawatmeh**, and others to form the PFLP, which in 1972 joined the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). In late 1968, Jibril, by then a senior army officer in **Syria**, had broken away from the PFLP and formed the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command**. In 1970, the PFLP hijacked a number of Western civilian aircraft and blew them up in Jordan, and this precipitated Jordanian–Palestinian tension and the **Black September Massacre**. As a result, Habash was vehemently opposed to any reconciliation or political dialogue with the Hashemite Kingdom.

In November 1988, Habash endorsed the **Algiers Declaration**, which recognized the **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**. At the same time, he opposed the decision of PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat** to accept **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338**, which merely recognized the refugee rights of the Palestinians and not their political rights. Following the **Madrid Confer-**

ence, Habash joined other Palestinian factions based in Syria and formed the **Rejectionist Front**. He opposed the **Oslo Process** and the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority** under the **Cairo Agreement** of 1994. In April 2000, Habash resigned as secretary-general of the PFLP and was briefly replaced by Abu Ali Mustafa (1938–2001). After suffering from cancer, on 26 January 2008 Habash died in Amman and was buried in a Christian cemetery.

HADASH. Since 1977 the community party of Israel is called Hadash, meaning "New" in Hebrew, and it is the successor to Maki (1948–1965) and Rakah (1965–1977). While **Israeli Arabs** formed a large support base of the party, until 1990 it was headed by Jewish Knesset member Meir Vilner (1918–2003), who also signed the **Declaration of Independence**. From 1999, Mohammed Barakeh (1955–) has been heading the party. Before the formation of the **Arab Democratic Party** in 1988, the community party was the only non-Zionist option for the Israeli Arabs. It championed equality between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens as well as the political rights of the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** and Palestinian statehood. Hadash has secured between three and five seats in Knesset elections. The presence of other **Arab parties** such as the **Islamic Movement** and the United Arab List has eroded the party's support base among Israeli Arabs, and hence it has been contesting elections as a joint list with **Balad**.

See also ZIONISM.

HAGANAH. Meaning "defense," Haganah refers to the Jewish military force established in 1920 with the explicit purpose of defending "Jewish life, property, and honor" in the wake of Arab violence, especially in the Jewish quarters of **Jerusalem**. Consisting of volunteers, the self-defense force formed the rudimentary basis for the latter-day **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). In 1941, amid growing attacks and the abandonment of the **Balfour Declaration** by **Great Britain**, Haganah formed an elite strike force called **Palmah**. On 31 May 1948, Haganah ceased to exist following the establishment of a unified IDF. Most of the future officers of the IDF came from Haganah or had served in its Palmah units.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948; MACDONALD WHITE PAPER; RABIN, YITZHAK (1922–1995); WARFARE.

HAMAS. The acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), Hamas is a militant Islamic political movement that subscribes to the view that the whole of **Mandate Palestine** is an Islamic *waqf* in perpetuity, and hence no part can be ceded to or shared with non-Muslims. It advocates the spread of Islam toward the establishment of an

Islamic state in Palestine. While endorsing a temporary truce due to tactical considerations, Hamas is opposed to making peace with Israel because such a course would mean giving up parts of the land of Palestine. Its non-negotiable maximalist approach toward peace has precluded Hamas from being a negotiating partner in the Middle East peace process.

For many years, the Palestinian Islamists group, the forerunner of Hamas, functioned as a social welfare organization and sought Islamization of the Palestinians. Since the **June War of 1967** and the Israeli occupation of the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**, it has functioned as an arm of the **Muslim Brotherhood**, the mother of most contemporary Islamic movements in the Middle East. As such, the welfare activities of the Mujamma'al-Islami (Islamic Center) were tolerated by Israel, which perceived it to be an effective counterweight to the growing influence of **Fatah**. The Islamic activities of the center appeared less threatening to Israel than the nationalist activities of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO).

The outbreak of the **First Intifada** in 1987 and the popular support it evoked compelled the movement to reexamine itself. Transforming itself into a political party, in August 1988 Hamas issued a covenant that declared all of Palestine to be an Islamic trust and proclaimed a jihad, or holy war, against Israel. **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** was one of the founding leaders of Hamas. Working independently of the Fatah-dominated **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**, Hamas issued separate calls for protest actions against Israel.

To cleanse itself of past associations with Israeli authorities, Hamas launched a militant campaign against Israel and established a separate military wing named after the Muslim Brotherhood leader who conducted military campaigns against the Mandate authorities, **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**. On 18 June 1989, Israel declared Hamas to be an illegal organization, and on 16 October 1991, Sheikh Yassin was convicted on **terrorism** charges and was given a life sentence. The kidnapping and execution of an Israeli border police officer in December 1992 led to Israel's decision to deport 415 suspected Hamas members to **Lebanon**, but due to persistent international pressure, Israel eventually agreed to their return a year later.

Vehemently rejecting peace with Israel, and in continuation of its rejection of the **Madrid Conference**, Hamas opposed the **Oslo Process** and accused the Palestinian leadership of capitulating to Israel. Emerging as a strong critic of the peace process, it refused to participate in the January 1996 elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council**. However, aware of the popular support among the Palestinians for elections, Hamas refrained from issuing a boycott call.

Capitalizing on its role in promoting religious zeal, its members have conducted virulent **suicide attacks** against Israel, especially after the onset of the Oslo Process. The Israeli counter-offensive against suicide bombings and

the delayed implementation of the **Oslo Accords** significantly eroded the support for **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** while correspondingly increasing and reinforcing the popularity of Hamas and its militant campaign. In September 1997, following the botched **Masha'al Affair**, Israel was forced to release Sheikh Yassin from prison.

Since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Hamas has been active in its militant campaign against Israel and has claimed responsibility for a number of suicide attacks inside the **Green Line**. The formation of Fatah-linked militant groups in organizing suicide attacks against Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada was the result of the growing Palestinian endorsement of suicide terrorism against Israel. In response to increased violence, Israel resorted to the **assassination** of Hamas personalities, a policy known as **targeted killing**. In a deliberate policy of targeting the political leadership of Hamas in March 2004, Israel assassinated Sheikh Yassin as he was coming out of the Gaza Mosque. Shortly afterward, **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi**, who briefly took over as Hamas chief, was also assassinated by Israel. On 26 September 2004, Israeli agents assassinated another Hamas leader, Izz al-Deen Sheikh Khalil (c. 1964–2004), in Damascus.

Following the death of Arafat in November 2004, Hamas did not participate in the Palestinian elections held on 9 January 2005 in which **Mahmoud Abbas** was elected president of the PNA. However, it did take part in the May elections for the municipal councils and made impressive gains.

Hamas contested the elections to the second Palestinian parliament held on 25 January 2006 and won 76 out 132 seats while Fatah secured only 43 seats. The electoral victory ended the four decades of Fatah domination of the Palestinian struggle. In March 2006, Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh** formed a Hamas-dominated government that did not include members of Fatah. This resulted in periodic confrontations between the two groups that often turned violent. In February 2007, King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** mediated the **Mecca Accord**, and it was signed by Abbas on behalf of Fatah and **Khalid Masha'al** on behalf of Hamas. Following this, in March, Haniyeh formed a unity government that included Fatah members. This unity did not endure, and the **Battle of Gaza** erupted in June between the activists of both groups, culminating in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.

On 14 June 2007, President Abbas dissolved the government headed by Haniyeh, imposed a state of emergency, and asked **Salam Fayyad** to form a new government. Since then, the political administration of the Palestinian areas has been divided; while the Hamas government headed by Haniyeh has controlled the Gaza Strip, the PNA headed by Abbas controls the West Bank.

The Hamas victory and its subsequent control of the Gaza Strip evoked a strong response from Israel, which imposed the **Siege of Gaza** and prevented the flow of goods and the movement of personnel from and into the Gaza Strip. The blockade was facilitated by **Egypt** during the tenure of **Hosni**

Mubarak as it controlled the **Rafah Crossing** along the **Sinai Peninsula**. Various international human rights groups sought to highlight the plight of the residents of the Strip by organizing various protest events such as the **Freedom Flotilla**, the **Fly-in Campaign**, and other measures such as **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions**. One such event ended in a violent confrontation when the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) boarded the *Mavi Marmara*, resulting in the deaths of 10 activists, including nine from **Turkey**, which caused international uproar and led to the UN-sponsored **Palmer Report**.

Under its **Gaza Disengagement** plan, Israel completely pulled out of the Gaza Strip in September 2005, but tension between Israel and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip erupted periodically. In 25 June 2006, a group of Hamas operatives entered Israeli territory close to the Gaza border and kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit (1986–), and the **Shalit Affair** lasted for over five years until 18 October 2011 when he was released under a **prisoner exchange** deal facilitated by the post-Mubarak military leadership in Egypt.

The firing of **Qassam** rockets into Israel by various Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas, has led to a number of conflicts and confrontations, including the **Summer Rains Operation** (28 June–26 November 2006) and the **Autumn Clouds Operation** (31 October–7 November 2006). The most severe confrontation was the **Cast Lead Operation** that Israel launched in December 2008 that lasted for 23 days. Over 1,300 Palestinians, including 759 civilians, were killed in the conflict, which also included a limited ground offensive by the IDF. The **Goldstone Report** charged Israel with "disproportionate" use of force and accused both Israel and Hamas of committing **war crimes**. In November 2012, Israel launched the **Pillar of Defense Operation**, which lasted for seven days before Egyptian president **Mohammed Morsi** mediated a cease-fire.

While Israel had led the campaign to internationally isolate the Palestinian militant group, the electoral victory of Hamas, its emergence as the dominant Palestinian force, and periodic Israeli–Palestinian tension and conflict have compelled countries like **Russia** and **China** to engage with Hamas. There were direct and indirect calls for the inclusion of Hamas in any peace negotiations. Since the mid-2000s, **Qatar** has emerged as the principal supporter of Hamas.

The **Arab Spring**, which began in Tunisia in December 2010, has brought mixed fortunes for Hamas. At one level, the brief victory of the Islamist parties in Egypt, especially the election of Morsi, increased hopes for a fundamental Egyptian shift in favor of the Palestinian militant group. This view gained currency following a meeting between Haniyeh and Morsi in Cairo on 27 July 2012. The intensification of **Sinai violence** and lawlessness in the Sinai Peninsula compelled Morsi to order the demolition of a number

of **tunnels** that were used to smuggle food, medicine, and other essential commodities as well as arms into Gaza. The removal of Morsi by the military in July 2013 renewed fresh tension between Hamas and Egypt.

The onset of popular protests in **Syria** also undermined Hamas. Since the early 1990s, Damascus hosted Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to the Oslo Accords. The **Arab Spring in Syria**, and its handling by President **Bashar al-Assad**, resulted in various Palestinian leaders, including Masha'al, leaving Syria. The entry of **Hezbollah** on behalf of Assad added a new dimension to its dilemma, and in a public statement issued in June 2013, Hamas appealed to the Lebanese militant group to pull out its fighters from Syria on the plea that this contributed to the sectarian polarization of the region and diverted attention away from their common enemy, Israel. On 23 April 2014, Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a unity government that would revitalize the PLO and set the stage for fresh elections to the PNA. Before progress could be made, the IDF launched the **Protect Edge Operation**, and on 25 September the Palestinian groups agreed to the PNA's taking full control of the Gaza Strip, which would include Hamas's consent to a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders. However, no progress has been made.

See also AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE; BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; CAIRO DIALOGUE; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); IRAN; JORDAN; ONE-STATE SOLUTION; UNITY TALKS; YOUSEF, MOSAB HASSAN (1978–).

HANIYEH, ISMAIL (1963–). Leader of the Palestinian militant movement **Hamas**, Ismail Haniyeh took over as prime minister on 21 February 2006 following the Palestinian elections held on 25 January. He was born on 29 January 1963 in the Shati **refugee** camp in the **Gaza Strip** after his parents fled their home near Ashkelon in present-day Israel during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. He attended **United Nations**–run schools and in 1987 graduated from the Islamic University of Gaza with a degree in Arabic literature. He was briefly detained by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) following the outbreak of the **First Intifada**. Along with **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi** and **Mahmoud al-Zahar**, Haniyeh was among the 415 activists who were deported by Israel to south **Lebanon** following a terror incident in December 1992. Following the **Oslo Accords** between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, Haniyeh returned to Gaza in December 1993 and became dean of the Islamic University in Gaza City. He became an assistant to **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** after the founder of Hamas was freed in 1997 at the end of the **Masha'al Affair**. In the wake of the **assassination** of Yassin in March 2004 and Rantisi the following month by the IDF, Haniyeh became part of the unpublicized collective leadership of Hamas.

Haniyeh successfully led the organization in the 25 January 2006 elections, with Hamas securing 76 of the 132 seats. Upon the invitation of **Palestinian National Authority** president **Mahmoud Abbas**, in February 2006 Haniyeh formed a government consisting of Hamas members and technocrats. Following the **Battle of Gaza** and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Abbas dissolved the government headed by Haniyeh and appointed **Salam Fayyad** as prime minister. Haniyeh, however, continues to head the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.

The **Siege of Gaza** imposed by Israel severely undermined Haniyeh's ability to administer the impoverished Gaza Strip, and he had to face military confrontation with Israel in the form of **Operation Cast Lead** (December 2008–January 2009) and **Operation Pillar of Defense** (November 2012). He has been visiting a number of countries and has met Supreme Leader **Ali Khamenei** and President **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** of **Iran**, President **Mohammed Morsi** of **Egypt**, King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**, and Prime Minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** of **Turkey** and solicited their support. Various efforts aimed at **Fatah**–Hamas unity have been unsuccessful.

See also MECCA ACCORD; TERRORISM; TUNNELS; UNITY TALKS.

HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT. Known in Arabic as Haram al-Sharif, meaning "Nobel Sanctuary," and Har Ha'Bayit in Hebrew, meaning "Temple Mount," this is the most important religious site in **East Jerusalem**. It lays on the southeastern corner of the old city of **Jerusalem**, just adjacent to the Western Wall. Considered holy to Jews and Muslims, this is also the most hotly contested piece of territory on the planet. According to Jewish tradition, underneath the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount lie the ruins of the Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD) destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD. According to Islamic tradition, the "furthermost sanctuary" or Al-Aqsa Mosque was from where Prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven.

Since the early 1920s there were periodic tensions and conflicts over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount which intensified in the **Western Wall Riots** of 1929. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the **Arab Legion** of the then **Jordan** captured the old city including the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. When King **Abdullah I** annexed the **West Bank** in 1950, the old city became part of the territory of Jordan. Until 1967, when it controlled this area, Jordan prevented even non-Israeli Jews from accessing the Western Wall for prayers, and a number of Jewish synagogues, cemeteries, and historic sites were destroyed or desecrated. During the **June War of 1967**, Israel captured the old city including Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. Since then the Islamic *waqf*, or religious committee, manages the whole area.

Religious Jews do not enter the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area due to the fear of accidentally stepping onto the sanctum sanctorum, though political groups such as the **Temple Mount Faithful** periodically seek to enter the area. Non-Muslims can access the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount from the Mugrabi Gate located just above the Western Wall when it is not a prayer time for the Muslims.

Since the **First Intifada**, the access to the Dome of Rock in the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has been restricted only to Muslims. During periods of tension and violence, Israel has been imposing restrictions on Muslims during Friday prayers on Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount. The maintenance and renovation of the Mugrabi gate has often been contested by *waqf* and other Muslim leaders as an infringement of their rights and a sign of Israeli encroachment. Archeological excavations around and beneath the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount have resulted in violent protests as happened during the **Hasmonean Tunnel Controversy** of 1998. The visit of the leader of the opposition **Ariel Sharon** to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount on 28 September 2001 sparked off the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**.

See also AL-QUDS; BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; CLINTON PARAMETERS; ISRAEL–JORDAN PEACE TREATY; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES.

HAREDI PARTIES. The *haredi* (*hareadim* in plural) is an ultra-orthodox Jewish person who follows a strict religious code of conduct in personal and public life. Political parties, which support and represent this section of the Israeli population are called *haredi* parties. Over the years there have been two dominant *haredi* parties—namely, Degal Ha'Torah and Agudat Israel. Both trace their roots to the early 20th century when Palestine was under the **Mandate** of **Great Britain**. Ideologically *haredi* parties are opposed to **Zionism**. At the same time, Yitzhak-Meir Levin (1893–1971) signed Israel's **Declaration of Independence** on behalf of the *haredi* community. The insistence of the *haredi* community upon Talmudic laws being the foundation of the State of Israel obliged **David Ben-Gurion** and others to defer the adoption of a written constitution for Israel. Following the establishment of Israel, the *haredi* parties sought to benefit from the state that they had opposed ideologically.

Agudat Israel, founded in 1912, has been fighting Knesset elections from 1949 on, along with other smaller *haredi* parties under the banner of the United Religious Front (1949–1951) and Religious Torah Front (1955–1960 and 1973–1977). Another *haredi* party, Degal Ha'Torah, was formed in 1988, and since 1992 both Agudat Israel and Degal Ha'Torah are jointly contesting the elections under the banner of **United Torah Judaism** (UTJ). The joint list usually secures between four and seven seats in the 120-member Knesset. Until 1952, *haredi* parties held cabinet positions, but they aban-

doned this path as it was seen as a recognition of the Zionist ideology that they oppose. The UTJ, however, has been part of most coalition governments in Israel, and often its representatives headed the powerful Knesset Finance Committee.

In 1949, Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ben-Gurion exempted 400 yeshiva students from **conscription** in the **Israel Defense Forces**, and the size of this draft exemption has increased over the years, largely due to the demographic shift and the growing power of the *haredi* parties. The draft exemption has been a major political issue between the secular and *haredi* communities in Israel.

The *haredi* parties pay scant attention to foreign policy issues. The domination of Ashkenazi rabbis eventually led to a split in the *haredi* leadership, and in 1984 renowned Sephardic Torah scholar Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (1920–2013) founded Sfaradim HaOlamit Shomrei Torah, popularly known by its Hebrew acronym "**Shas**." Unlike the UTJ, Shas is not a *haredi* party and can be described as non-Zionist. In 2013, the UTJ joined hands with Shas and refused to join the government headed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** due to differences over conscription.

HASHOMER. Hashomer ("Guard") was an association of Jewish guards who were employed in defense of the Jewish **settlements** in the Palestine **Mandate**. Active since 1909, it was disbanded following the formation of **Haganah** in 1920.

See also PALMAH; WARFARE.

HASMONEAN TUNNEL CONTROVERSY. In a midnight operation shortly after the end of Yom Kippur on 23 September 1996, the government of Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** opened a historic tunnel that dates back to the Hasmonean period (10th to 1st century BC). This linked the Western Wall to an exit near the Temple Mount in the old city of **Jerusalem**. The opening of the 480-meter-long (1,500-foot) Hasmonean Tunnel, which runs under the Muslim quarters in the old city and alongside the Al-Aqsa Mosque, sparked a wave of violence in **East Jerusalem** that soon spread to the **Occupied Territories**. As many as 56 Arabs and 14 Israelis were killed in the violence that lasted for five days. For the first time, the Palestinian police force exchanged fire with the **Israel Defense Forces**, which sparked criticism in Israel over the **Oslo Accords**, which enabled Palestinian security forces to carry weapons.

See also AL-QUDS; HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT.

HATNUAH. Hatnuah, or "Movement," is a centrist political party in Israel that was founded on the eve of the 19th Knesset elections held on 22 January 2013. Its leader is **Tzipi Livni**, the former head of the **Kadima** Party. Following her defeat to Shaul Mofaz (1948–) in the leadership contest in March 2012, Tzipi Livni left Kadima and in November floated the Hatnuah Party. Getting just under 5 percent of the votes, Hatnuah secured six seats in the 120-member Knesset. The party platform emphasizes Arab–Israeli peace, social justice, and religious pluralism. In March 2013 the party joined the coalition headed by **Benjamin Netanyahu**, and Livni became justice minister. She was given the responsibility to oversee diplomatic initiatives with the Palestinians and emerged as a key point person in the peace talks initiated by **United States** secretary of state John Kerry (1943–) in 2013.

HAWATMEH, NAYEF (1938–). Born in Salt in the then **Transjordan** in November 1938, Nayef Hawatmeh is a Christian leader of **Jordan** who went on to become the leader of a Marxist Palestinian organization. At the age of 16 he joined the Arab National Movement in Jordan and went underground for a while due to his anti-Hashemite activities. From Jordan he moved to **Lebanon**, **Iraq**, and Yemen and took part in various protests and was imprisoned periodically by many Arab regimes. Following the Arab defeat in the **June War of 1967**, his focus shifted to the Palestinians. In August 1968 he joined the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, but in the following February he broke away and founded and since then has headed the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (DFLP).

Israel accused of him of involvement in the **Ma'alot Massacre** in May 1974, a terror attack that resulted in the deaths of 31 Israeli citizens, including 22 schoolchildren. The DFLP opposed the **Oslo Accords** concluded by **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** and described the peace agreement as a sellout; but Hawatmeh eventually met Arafat in 1999. During the funeral of King **Hussein** in Amman in February 1999, Hawatmeh briefly exchanged pleasantries with Israel's president **Ezer Weizman**, which evoked Arab criticism. For long he resided in **Syria**, and in February 2013, during the **Arab Spring in Syria**, he was slightly injured in a bomb blast near his home in Damascus. For the past few years Hawatmeh has been trying to return to the **West Bank**, but Israel has denied him permission.

See also TERRORISM.

HAYCRAFT COMMISSION. This was the first in a series of commissions appointed by **Great Britain** to investigate periodic violence in the **Mandate Palestine**. Headed by Sir Thomas Haycraft (1859–1936), chief justice of Palestine, the commission inquired into the May 1921 riots and attributed the

Arab violence to the pro-Zionist position of the administration before the Mandate was given to Britain. It dismissed suggestions that the Arab property owners instigated the disturbances due to their fears of losing their status and because of their resentment of the British.

See also ALIYA; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ZIONISM.

HEBRON. The largest Palestinian city in the **West Bank**, Hebron is located south of **Jerusalem** and since 1995 is divided into two sectors: H-1 controlled by the **Palestinian National Authority** and H-2 comprising 20 percent of Hebron controlled by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) and inhabited by Jewish settlers. The historical importance of the city lies in the Ibrahimi Mosque or Cave of the Patriarchs and is associated with Abraham, and hence, since the time of the **Mandate**, the city has seen some of the worst violence in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

During World War I (1914–1918), the forces of **Great Britain** occupied Hebron on 8 December 1917, or more than a month after the **Balfour Declaration**. The tension between Jews and Arabs in Palestine was manifested in the **Hebron Massacre (1929)** when 64 Jewish men, women, and children were killed by Arab rioters. The residents were subsequently evacuated by the British, and the last remaining Jewish person left Hebron in November 1947, on the eve of the **United Nations** vote on the **Partition Plan**.

During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the forces of **Egypt** initially took control of Hebron, and later the **Arab Legion** captured the city. As part of the Armistice Agreement signed on 3 April 1949, Hebron came under the control of **Jordan** along with other parts of the West Bank and was subsequently annexed by King **Abdullah I**. In the **June War of 1967**, Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, and Hebron came under Israeli occupation.

In April 1968 a group of right-wing activists led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger (1935–) reestablished a Jewish presence in Hebron, and since then the Jewish presence in the city has increased; the last Israel census in 2010 puts the Jewish population in Hebron at 520 and the Jewish settlers in the outskirts including **Kiryat Arba** at 7,000. A number of Jewish underground movements and violence are linked to the residents of Hebron. Under the **Oslo Accords** and the **Hebron Protocol**, the IDF maintains its presence only in the H-2 area of Hebron where approximately 400 Jews live along with 30,000 to 35,000 Palestinians.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; HEBRON MASSACRE (1994); SETTLEMENT/S; TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON (TIPH).

HEBRON MASSACRE (1929). Tensions between Jews and Muslims over the Western Wall in the old city of **Jerusalem** in 1928 reverberated into major communal violence in the historic southern city of **Hebron**. On 24 August 1929, 64 unarmed Jewish men, women, and children were killed by an Arab mob. This resulted in the complete evacuation of the Jewish population from Hebron, where the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahimi Mosque is located. Jewish life in Hebron was renewed after the **June War of 1967** when the first **settlement** was established in April 1968.

See also HEBRON MASSACRE (1994); MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE; WARFARE; WESTERN WALL RIOTS.

HEBRON MASSACRE (1994). On 25 February 1994, Baruch Goldstein (1956–1994), a resident of the Jewish **settlement** of **Kiryat Arba** near **Hebron**, opened fire on Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 and wounding more than 100 others. The survivors killed Goldstein. The Israeli government and all the political parties in the Knesset condemned the attack. Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** appointed a commission of inquiry, headed by the president of the Supreme Court, Justice Meir Shamgar (1925–), and which also included, for the first time, an Arab member, Nazareth District Court justice Abd el-Rahman Zoabi (1933–).

On 26 June 1994, the commission submitted its findings, and it ruled out the presence of any organization behind the massacre and concluded that Goldstein acted alone in committing this "base and murderous" massacre. The attack stalled the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations toward the conclusion of the 1994 **Cairo Agreement** and led to the formation of the **Temporary International Presence in Hebron**, an unarmed multilateral European observer unit. As a follow-up measure, on 13 March the Israeli government declared **Kach** and Kahane Hai to be "terrorist organizations" and proscribed them; a number of key functionaries of these two groups were also identified.

See also HEBRON MASSACRE (1929); HEBRON PROTOCOL; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

HEBRON PROTOCOL. On 15 January 1997, Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat** met at the Erez Checkpoint and agreed on the Hebron Protocol. Signed by Dan Shomron (1937–) on behalf of Israel and Saeb Erakat (1955–) on behalf of the Palestinians, the agreement called for an Israeli withdrawal from 80 percent of Hebron within 10 days. It also provided for an Israeli withdrawal from rural areas of the **West Bank** in three stages, the last to be completed by mid-1998. Both sides agreed that within two months after the signing of the protocol, they would begin the **Permanent Status Negotia-**

tions, to be completed by 4 May 1999. This was the first peace agreement signed by a **Likud** government with the Palestinian leadership. Opposing the move, Minister of Science Benny Begin (1943–) resigned from the cabinet.

Earlier, in accordance with the **Taba Agreement** of 1995, Israel withdrew from Palestinian towns and population centers on 25 October 1995. However, the religious significance of Hebron and the political opposition it evoked prevented the **Labor Party**–led government of **Shimon Peres** from contemplating an Israeli withdrawal from the city. Netanyahu's erstwhile opposition to the **Oslo Process** and making peace with Arafat further delayed an agreement on Hebron.

By concluding the Hebron Protocol, Israel agreed to withdraw from most of the city while retaining control of a **settlement** enclave for a period of at least two years. The area under Israeli control, designated as H-2, consisted of about 400 settlers and 30,000 to 35,000 Palestinians and contained the Tomb of the Patriarchs/Ibrahimi Mosque. The first phase of the withdrawal that was to begin on 7 March 1997 was delayed due to differences about the extent of the territory to be handed over to the Palestinians. The **United States** was in favor of handing over 13.1 percent of the land to the Palestinians, which Israel refused to accept.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON (TIPH).

HERUT. *See* LIKUD.

HERZOG, ISAAC (1960–). The leader of Israel's **Labor Party**, Isaac is the son of former president Chaim Herzog (1918–1997) and Aura Herzog (1928–), and the grandson of Rabbi Yitzhak Ha-Levi Herzog (1888–1959). A lawyer by profession, Isaac Herzog was born in Tel Aviv on 22 September 1960. He served as cabinet secretary under Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** until 2001. He was elected to the Knesset in 2003 as a Labor member, and his cabinet positions fluctuated according to the Labor Party being part of the ruling coalition. He held various positions under prime ministers **Ariel Sharon**, **Ehud Olmert**, and **Benjamin Netanyahu**. In November 2013 he defeated **Shelly Yachimovich** in the party primaries and became leader of the Labor Party.

HEZBOLLAH. Meaning "Party of God," Hezbollah is a Shia Muslim movement, militia, and political party in **Lebanon**. Inspired by the Islamic Revolution in **Iran**, and following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon (**Peace for Galilee Operation**), a group of members led by Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah (1935–) broke away from the **Amal** militia and formed Hezbollah. Radical in its outlook, Hezbollah offered itself as an

alternative to Amal and sought the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon along the Iranian model. This objective was gradually diluted as Hezbollah joined the Lebanese political process and contested the 1992 parliamentary elections. It enjoys the patronage of Iran as well as **Syria**.

Since 1983, Hezbollah has launched a militant campaign against the West and Israel, which has often taken the form of **suicide attacks**. Its attacks against the embassy of the **United States**, the U.S. Marine headquarters, and the French headquarters in Beirut in 1983 resulted in the hasty pullout of American and French forces from Lebanon. From the late 1980s, Hezbollah has been active in Israel's self-proclaimed **security zone** in southern Lebanon and led the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Its Katyusha attacks against northern Israel often led to retaliatory strikes from Israel and escalated into major Israeli offensives, for example, the **Accountability Operation** in 1993 and the **Grapes of Wrath Operation** in 1996.

Mounting military casualties in southern Lebanon and resultant domestic pressures eventually resulted in Israel's unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** from the security zone, which was completed in May 2000. New disputes over the status of **Sheba'a Farms** bordering Israel, Syria, and Lebanon renewed low-level hostilities between Hezbollah and the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). Following the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon, parliamentary elections were held in Lebanon in May–June 2005, in which Hezbollah made impressive gains in the Shia-dominated southern Lebanon.

The kidnapping of two IDF soldiers on 12 July 2006 close to the disputed Sheba'a Farms led to Israel's launching the **Second Lebanon War** to secure their release. The conflict resulted in a large-scale displacement of civilians on both sides and considerable destruction to the Lebanese infrastructure. About two million Lebanese became **refugees** or internally displaced persons. According to the Lebanon Higher Relief Council, around 1,190 were killed, and some of the rockets fired by Hezbollah reached the Israeli town of Hadera, about 45 kilometers south of Haifa. Hezbollah threatened to launch missiles that could reach the densely populated coastal city of Tel Aviv, the center of Israel's commercial activities. The war highlighted the transfer of missiles that were sold to Iran by **China**. Initially a number of Arab countries, including **Saudi Arabia**, were critical of its "adventurism," but gradually they changed their position in the wake of Hezbollah's popularity among the Arab masses.

The conflict, which lasted for 34 days, ended in a stalemate, and Israel secured the body parts of the two kidnapped soldiers on 16 July 2008 through a **prisoner exchange** mediated by **Germany**. The Security Council **Resolution 1701** that ended the conflict on 14 August 2006 explicitly called for the disarming of Hezbollah, but the organization's powers and the weakness of the central authority in Lebanon prevented its implementation. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (1960–) subsequently stated that his organization

would not have kidnapped the IDF soldiers had he foreseen such a devastation of Lebanon. Since the Second Lebanon War, Nasrallah has rarely been seen in public.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** in March 2011 put severe stress on Hezbollah, and after some hesitation its fighters fought alongside the Syrian army. This resulted in other sections of the Lebanese population, especially the Sunni leadership, becoming critical of Hezbollah and warning of domestic fallouts of active Hezbollah involvement in the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah's involvement in Syria put **Hamas** in a dilemma and, in a public statement issued in June 2013, the Palestinian militant group pleaded with Hezbollah to pull its fighters out of Syria lest this contribute to the sectarian polarization of the region and divert attention away from their common enemy, Israel. In July the **European Union** declared the military wing of Hezbollah a terrorist organization over its suspected involvement in the **Burgas terror attack** in Bulgaria on 18 July 2012.

See also BEIRUT AIRPORT BOMBING; FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT; FRANCE; LITANI RIVER; RESOLUTION 425; SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA); UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

HINDAWI AFFAIR. This refers to an unsuccessful attempt on 17 April 1986 to blow up an El Al plane en route from Heathrow Airport in London to Tel Aviv. A young, pregnant Irish woman was the innocent courier of an explosive device, timed to explode an hour after departure. It was discovered during a routine security check by El Al officials prior to departure. A day later, Scotland Yard police arrested Nizar Hindawi (1954–), the Jordanian journalist boyfriend of the Irish woman, who had provided the explosive device without revealing its contents. Hindawi carried a Syrian diplomatic passport, and this led to a brief severance of diplomatic relations between **Great Britain** and **Syria**.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

HIRAM OPERATION. Amid the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the **Israel Defense Forces** launched the Hiram Operation during 29–31 October, which resulted in the Israeli penetration of **Lebanon**. Israel reached up to the **Litani River** and along the way destroyed a number of military units belonging to Lebanon and **Syria**, as well as the **Arab Liberation Army**. The Israeli withdrawal from 14 Lebanese villages captured during the operation led to the Israel–Lebanese **Armistice Agreement** signed on 23 March 1949.

See also WARFARE.

HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION. In 1930, **Great Britain** asked Sir John Hope-Simpson (1868–1961) to inquire into the recommendations of the **Shaw Commission**, which had investigated the **Western Wall Riots** of September 1929. Hope-Simpson submitted his report in August, and it was published in October 1930. Focusing on the economic conditions of **Mandate Palestine**, the report concluded that there was no surplus land in Palestine and that the Arab rural population suffered from an acute shortage of land. The commission observed that the Jewish national institutions in Palestine were also causing unemployment among the Arabs due to their policy of employing only Jewish labor. Hence, it advocated a temporary halt to the immigration of Jewish laborers until the problem of Arab unemployment was resolved. The Hope-Simpson Report formed the basis of the **Passfield White Paper** of October 1930, which recommended some restrictions on **Aliya** and Jewish land purchase.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ZIONISM.

HOREV OPERATION. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, on 22 December Israel launched a major offensive on the **Egypt**–Negev front south of Beersheba. The operation, which lasted until early January, witnessed the newly formed **Israel Defense Forces** for the first time briefly crossing the 1923 international boundary into Egyptian territory. On 7 January 1949, the last day of operations, Israel shot down five reconnaissance planes belonging to **Great Britain** and drew widespread criticism. The operation was seen as the catalyst for Egyptian willingness to directly negotiate with Israel, and formal talks began at Rhodes on 13 January 1949 leading to an **Armistice Agreement**.

See also WARFARE.

HOT WINTER OPERATION. This was the code name for an operation launched by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) on 28 February 2008 against **Hamas** positions in the **Gaza Strip**. This was in response to a spate of six Grad missiles fired at the port city of Ashkelon north of the Gaza Strip a day earlier. Despite the IDF carrying out a number of air strikes against warehouses, rocket launchers, and other facilities, Hamas fired more than 200 rockets at Israel. There was a brief ground offensive into the Strip, and the IDF called off the operation on 4 March. At least 110 Palestinians, including 54 civilians, were known to have been killed during the operation.

HUDNA. Meaning cessation of fighting or cease-fire, this is temporary in nature and is by mutual consent. Scholars often refer to Prophet Mohammed's offer of truce with the polytheists of the Qaraysh tribe in March

628 AD. It should not be misinterpreted as an offer of peace. There is no specific time limit for *hudna*, and some suggest that it can be continued so long as both parties agree to it. The preference for *hudna* is primarily an indication and acceptance of the relative weaknesses of the Muslim forces and the need for time to regroup and reorganize their fighting capabilities. Hence its durability and credibility have been questioned not only by scholars but also by practitioners of statecraft.

Within the Arab–Israeli conflict context, the expression was frequently used by **Hamas** leaders, more prominently since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and as a response to Israel's actions such as **targeted killings**, **assassinations**, closure of the **Occupied Territories**, and prolonged incarceration of suspected militant leaders. **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak** played a crucial role in seeking *hudna* between Israel and Hamas. The criticisms of **suicide attacks** by Palestinian figures such as **Mahmoud Abbas** and **Sari Nusseibeh** provided additional incentive to reduce the level of violence. Israel's refusal to negotiate with or make any commitments to Hamas impeded Egypt's efforts. From the Palestinian side, pledging against carrying out any attacks within the **Green Line** implied Hamas's recognition of the partition of **Mandate Palestine**, which it considers to be a *waqf* property, and hence immutable. The **Cairo Dialogue**, however, indicated the willingness of both parties to reduce the level of violence that was harming both peoples.

See also PARTITION PLAN; SULH; TERRORISM.

HUSSEIN, KING (1935–1999). As the ruler of **Jordan**, King Hussein ibn Talal was the longest-reigning monarch in the Middle East. Born in Amman on 14 November 1935, Hussein was educated in **Great Britain** and graduated from Sandhurst Military Academy. He was with his grandfather King **Abdullah I** when the latter was assassinated near the Al-Aqsa Mosque in **Jerusalem** on 20 July 1951. After his father Talal, who succeeded Abdullah, was dethroned on grounds of mental illness in May 1953, Hussein became king of Jordan, and since then he has survived a number of internal crises, **assassination** attempts, and regional conflicts.

Amid growing Arab nationalism spearheaded by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**, in March 1956 Hussein dismissed Gen. Glubb Pasha (1897–1986) as the commander of the **Arab Legion** and renamed the legion as the Jordanian Armed Forces. Fearing threats to his newly born son Prince Abdullah (later King **Abdullah II**), in 1965 Hussein named his younger brother Prince Hassan (1947–) as crown prince, and hence next in the line of succession. This hierarchy was maintained until 1999, when Hussein suddenly and without any prior hint changed his earlier decision and named his son Abdullah as crown prince and successor.

Due to domestic pressures and regional tensions, Hussein signed a defense pact with Egypt on 30 May 1967. He was dragged into the **June War of 1967** through false information that claimed Egyptian successes in the early stages of the war. As a result of Israeli retaliation, Jordan lost control over **East Jerusalem** on 7 June 1967 and subsequently the rest of the **West Bank** as well.

From the time he ascended the throne, King Hussein competed for leadership of the Palestinians. The formation of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) in 1964 and the loss of the West Bank in 1967 did not dampen his interest. When the PLO and its **Fedayeen** threatened Hashemite rule in 1970, Hussein responded with a massive military crackdown known as the **Black September Massacre**. In the process, he not only secured public order in Jordan but also succeeded in expelling the PLO and its Fedayeen from Jordan. On 25 September 1973, only days before the **October War of 1973**, King Hussein secretly but unsuccessfully warned Israeli prime minister **Golda Meir** of an impending coordinated military campaign by Egypt and **Syria**.

Despite Hussein's opposition, in October 1974 the **Rabat Arab Summit** declared the PLO to be the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, which resulted in the admission of the PLO to the **United Nations** as an observer. Afraid that the **First Intifada**, which broke out in December 1987, would spill over into Jordan, in June 1988 Hussein announced the **Jordanian Disengagement** from the **Occupied Territories**.

King Hussein never lost hope of regaining some control over the West Bank. Despite periodic rapprochements with the Palestinian leadership, his relations with the PLO, especially with **Yasser Arafat**, always remained tense. The **Jordan Option** favored by Israel's **Labor Party** and its determination to circumvent the PLO and **Fatah** suited Hussein. On 11 April 1987, Hussein concluded the **London Agreement** with Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres**, which sought an enhanced role for Jordan in resolving the Palestinian problem. This was vetoed by **Likud** leader and prime minister **Yitzhak Shamir**.

Domestic pressures, especially from the Palestinian population, forced King Hussein to support President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) of **Iraq** during the **Kuwait War**. This considerably weakened his standing and influence among his regional friends and Western allies. Seeking to regain his previous influence, he became the foremost supporter of the new Middle East peace initiative of U.S. secretary of state **James A. Baker**. In October 1991, the Palestinians agreed to be part of the joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation that attended the **Madrid Conference**.

Initially King Hussein was surprised by Israel's desire to negotiate directly with the PLO and to conclude the **Oslo Accords**, but he was determined to capitalize on the new opening. Having maintained clandestine relations with

Israel since the 1950s, he was quick to sign the Washington Declaration a day after the **Declaration of Principles** between Israel and the PLO was signed on the White House Lawns. This paved the way for the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** signed on 26 October 1994. As part of this agreement, he secured a special role for Jordan over religious sites in the old city of Jerusalem.

King Hussein developed a close personal friendship with Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin**, and in November 1995 he attended and delivered a moving eulogy at Rabin's funeral in Jerusalem. His relations with **Benjamin Netanyahu** remained tense. The Israeli attempt to assassinate a **Hamas** leader in Amman in September 1997 sparked off some of the worst tension between the two countries. The incident, known as the **Masha'al Affair**, ended with Israel releasing Hamas leader **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** from prison.

Despite this, in October 1998 King Hussein came back from his hospital bed in Rochester, Minnesota, to help Netanyahu and Arafat conclude the **Wye Memorandum**. After a long battle with cancer, on 7 February 1999 King Hussein passed away and was succeeded to the throne by his eldest son Abdullah II.

See also AL-QUDS; HUSSEIN–ARAFAT ACCORD; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDANIAN–PLO JOINT COMMITTEE; OPEN BRIDGES POLICY; TERRORISM.

HUSSEIN–ARAFAT ACCORD. Following the **Black September Massacre** of 1970, relations between **Jordan** and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) remained tense. Prolonged reconciliation efforts by **Egypt** finally proved successful when the Palestine National Council met in Amman in November 1984 and paved the way for negotiations between King **Hussein** and PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat**. On 11 February 1985, they reached an agreement, calling for complete Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories** and the right of self-determination for the Palestinians. Both leaders agreed that Palestinians would exercise their inalienable right of self-determination toward the formation of the "proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine."

Proposing an international conference on the Middle East, the accord suggested a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. In July 1985, at the request of the **United States**, Hussein forwarded seven names suggested by Arafat for the possible Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with Israel. The list, which comprised senior and middle-level PLO functionaries, was rejected by Israel. Arafat insisted on U.S. recognition of the right of self-determination for Palestinians in return for the acceptance by the PLO of **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the Security Council. This led to another round of unsuccessful talks between Hussein and Arafat in Amman

on 8 February 1986. Soon each accused the other of reneging on previous agreements. In a nationwide address on 22 February 1987, King Hussein declared that Jordan was "unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO" and hinted that Palestinians should look for an alternative leadership. A few months later the **First Intifada** broke out in the **Occupied Territories**.

See also FIVE-STAGE ISRAELI PLAN; JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT.

HUSSEIN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE. During the early years of World War I (1914–1918), the high commissioner of **Great Britain** in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon (1862–1949), exchanged a series of letters with Sharif Hussein ibn Ali of Mecca (1852–1931) concerning the future of the **Ottoman Empire**. Between 14 July 1915 and 10 March 1916, they exchanged 10 letters wherein Britain urged the sharif to revolt against Turkish rule and in return promised to support the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom under his leadership. Based on this assurance, in June 1916 Sharif Hussein launched the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** and declared Arab independence from Ottoman rule.

The two sides, however, disagreed over the territorial limits of the proposed Arab state that was to be created out of the Ottoman Empire, especially over the inclusion of Palestine. This was partly due to the **Balfour Declaration**, which promised British support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine. In a bid to dispel the Arab claims, Britain came out with the **Churchill White Paper** in 1922 and clarified that the "whole of Palestine West of the Jordan [River] was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge" to Sharif Hussein. Arabs and Palestinians tend to differ with this interpretation, and in 1939 the British government admitted that the language in which the exclusion of Palestine "was expressed was not so specific and unmistakable as it was thought to be at the time."

See also FAISAL–WEIZMANN AGREEMENT; MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE.

I

IHH. The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı in Turkish), known more widely as IHH, is an Islamic charity organization registered in **Turkey**. Since its formation in 1992, IHH has been active in various charity activities during earthquakes and other calamities such as war, hunger, and famine in Turkey and other parts of the world, including **Iraq**, **Lebanon**, Pakistan, and the Palestinian territories. It was one of the prime organizers of the **Freedom Flotilla** that sought to break the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by the **Israel Defense Forces** and **Egypt**. Some Western intelligence assessments suspect the IHH of involvement with groups such as al-Qaeda, and this became prominent after the May 2010 *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**.

See also FREE GAZA MOVEMENT; TERRORISM.

ILLEGAL TRADE. This refers to limited but unauthorized trade between Israel and the Arab countries who under the **Arab Boycott of Israel** shun any economic or commercial trade with the Jewish state. **Egypt** formally ended the trade boycott following the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, and **Jordan** followed suit after the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** of 1994. In the wake of the **Oslo Accords** a number of Arab countries, especially **Saudi Arabia** and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, ended the secondary and tertiary boycott of Israel, but these countries still shun direct trade with Israel. Periodic media reports in the Middle East indicate the availability of Israeli goods and produce in a number of Arab countries, especially in the Persian Gulf region. Such reports are vehemently denied by the concerned Arab governments or are used to undermine the influence and status of their rivals. While accurate estimates are difficult to come by, they are more in the realm of millions of dollars than billions. Jordan and Cyprus are often suspected of being the conduit for Israeli exports to the Arab countries.

See also GAS DEAL; OIL SUPPLIES.

IM TIRZU. Established in 2006, Im Tirzu is an extra-parliamentary organization in Israel that takes its name from the expression, "If you will it, it is no dream," used by Theodore Herzl (1860–1904). It seeks to promote Zionist values among the Israeli youth, especially on university campuses. Though it describes itself as centrist, Im Tirzu has targeted Israeli academics, playwrights, and intelligentsia whom it accuses of pursuing an anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist agenda. It periodically publishes reports assessing the anti-Israeli slant of the academic curriculum and syllabi in various departments inside Israel. One such report demanded the closure of the Political Science Department of the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. It has frequently named Israeli citizens who have joined calls for an **academic boycott** of Israel.

See also NEW HISTORY; ZIONISM.

INDIA. The interest and involvement of India in the Arab–Israeli conflict can be traced to the early 1920s. Led by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), popularly known as Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian nationalists identified themselves with the Arabs of **Mandate Palestine**. Opposition to the colonialism of **Great Britain** prevented them from supporting the demand for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Moreover, during British rule, India had the largest Muslim population in the world, and the rivalry between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, which championed the cause of a separate state for Muslims, inhibited the Indian nationalists from supporting the Zionist cause in Palestine.

In May 1947, India was elected to the 11-member **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine**. While a seven-member majority proposed the partition of Palestine, supported by **Iran** and erstwhile Yugoslavia, India proposed a **Federal Plan** for Palestine whereby there would be two separate states for Jews and Arabs within one federal Palestinian state. The Arabs rejected the Indian plan because it gave too many rights to the immigrating Jews while the latter rejected it because it gave them civil and religious rights when they were demanding political rights and sovereignty. Rejecting the Indian plan was the only occasion when competing Arab and Jewish communities were united in 1947, and hence the **United Nations** never discussed the Indian plan.

On 29 November 1947, when the **Partition Plan** came before the UN General Assembly, India joined with other Arab and Islamic countries and voted against it. In May 1949, India opposed Israel's application for **UN membership**. At the same time, it did not support the extremist demands and did not recognize the **All Palestine Government** proclaimed in 1948. Israel's existence, its admission into the UN, and its recognition by the major powers of the world eventually compelled India to recognize it on 17 September 1950. The establishment of diplomatic relations, however, did not follow this recognition. Budgetary constraints and a shortage of personnel

were the initial reasons, and gradually a host of domestic compulsions and regional developments in the Middle East prevented India from normalization. In 1975 it joined with other countries of the **Non-Aligned Movement** and voted for **Resolution 3379**, which depicted **Zionism** as racism.

In September 1975, India recognized the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), and in 1980 the PLO representation in New Delhi was upgraded and was given a status similar to various UN offices in India. In November 1988, India was one of the first countries to recognize the **State of Palestine** proclaimed in Algiers, and since then it has received **Yasser Arafat** and subsequently **Mahmoud Abbas** as heads of state. In 1989 Arafat was given the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Peace, India's highest civilian award bestowed on foreign leaders.

The end of the Cold War and the inauguration of the **Madrid Conference** eventually resulted in India's establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel on 29 January 1992. Since then, both countries have expanded their political, economic, cultural, and, above all, military relations. Normalization of relations with Israel has not affected India's support for the Palestinians, and on all the key issues such as Palestinian statehood, borders, and **settlements**, there have been no major shifts in India's policies. Unlike in the past, India has been delinking its bilateral relations with Israel from its differences over the peace process. In the **Durban Conference** of 2001 it refused to join the Arab and Islamic countries in criticizing Israel's policy toward the Palestinians as racism. Despite its close relations with Israel and the Palestinians, India does not visualize any mediatory role for itself in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE. This refers to conferences, dialogues, and meetings among members of prominent religious faiths organized by various Arab countries in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the **United States**. This was different from the Dialogue among Civilization suggested by President Mohammed Khatami (1943–) of **Iran** as a response to the idea of a clash of civilizations propounded by American scholar Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008). The inter-faith dialogue was primarily a response to negative stereotypes against Islam and forced a few conservative Arab countries, especially along the Persian Gulf, to promote this concept.

The inter-faith dialogues have not been uniform. Some of them are confined to Islamic dialogues with the other two monotheistic religions—namely, Christianity and Judaism—while others included faiths such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Some inter-faith dialogues organized by **Qatar** included Israeli citizens and political figures. **Saudi Arabia** joined the process in July 2008 when King **Abdullah** sponsored an inter-faith conference in Madrid

that was attended by members of different religious groups including Hindus. Similar events have been patronized by the rulers of **Jordan**, Morocco, and Oman.

The dialogues are not universally endorsed, and there are periodic protests from conservative Islamic forces in these Arab countries, often directed at the presence of Jewish religious figures from Israel. Because it presupposes a sense of equality among different religious faiths, conservative elements have opposed Saudi sponsorship of the inter-faith dialogues, and hence they were held outside the Middle East.

See also TERRORISM.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC). The ICC, which came into force on 1 July 2002, is an independent international organization located at The Hague, the Netherlands, and until April 2014 it has 122 member countries. For long, Israel has supported the idea of an international regime to try individuals charged with crimes against humanity, aggression, genocide, and **war crimes**. However, growing anti-Israeli positions manifested in the **United Nations** and other regional and international organizations and groups compelled Israel to reexamine its position. It became apprehensive that such an international regime would be politicized and loaded against the Jewish state. Hence, when the Rome Conference approved the statute of the ICC on 17 July 1998, Israel voted against it and stated that it no longer wished to be a state party to the ICC. On 21 January 2009 the **Palestinian National Authority** accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC. In May 2013 the ICC initiated a probe into the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** after a request from Comoros, where the ship was registered at the time of the commando raid by the **Israel Defense Forces** on 31 May 2010.

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM). This is a protest movement established in the summer of 2001 amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** by a group of Israeli and Palestinian activists. Using non-violent methods, members of this voluntary group sought to resist the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Some of the protests resulted in violence, and American protestor **Rachel Corrie** was killed in Rafah on 16 March 2003. Israel accused the members of the ISM of indulging in illegal and violent activities.

See also ACADEMIC BOYCOTT; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; BOYCOTT, DISINVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS); FREEDOM FLOTILLA; IHH.

INTIFADA, AL-AQSA. *See* AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005).

INTIFADA, FIRST. *See* FIRST INTIFADA (1987–1993).

INTIFADA LAW. In 2002 the Israeli Knesset approved a law, commonly referred to as the Intifada Law, that gave immunity to the state from claims of compensation by the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** for personal injury or property loss due to the operations of **Israel Defense Forces** since September 2000. This was aimed at protecting Israel from any libel suit following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in that month. On 13 February 2006, a nine-member bench of the High Court overturned the law and declared it to be a violation of the Basic Laws, human dignity, and the liberty of Israel. In June 2008 the issue was revived, and the Knesset approved a private member bill that circumvents the court ruling, but this has not progressed since then.

    See also WAR CRIMES.

IRAN. The involvement of Iran in the Arab–Israeli conflict began in 1947, when it was nominated to the 11-member **United Nations Special Commission on Palestine**. Iran and erstwhile Yugoslavia supported the **Federal Plan** proposed by **India** as a solution to the Palestine problem. On 29 November 1947, Iran joined other Islamic countries in the **United Nations** in voting against the **Partition Plan**. However, on 6 March 1950, Iran recognized the Jewish state. As part of his policy in support of the **United States**, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980) developed close ties with Israel and even provided **oil supplies** to the Jewish state.

    The Islamic Revolution in February 1979 brought about a fundamental shift in Iran's policy toward the Arab–Israeli conflict, and opposition to Israel became a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Under the leadership of **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini**, the Islamic Republic recognized the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and called for the liberation of all Palestinian lands, including **Jerusalem**, from Israeli control and occupation. Since then, Iran has opposed any reconciliation with Israel and has emerged as a prime opponent of the **Oslo Process**. Critical of Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat**'s peaceful approach to Israel, Iran increased its support for **Hamas**.

    Iran was suspected of involvement in several incidents of **terrorism** against Israel, including the **Buenos Aires bombing** and the **Burgas terror attack**. In January 2002, in the *Karine* **Affair**, Israeli naval commandos seized the *Karine-A*, a freighter registered in **Lebanon**, in the international waters of the Red Sea. It was carrying about 50 tons of weapons, including rockets and missiles, which Israel claimed were supplied by Iran for the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA).

Similarly, Iran was also instrumental in the formation and growth of the Lebanese militant Islamic movement **Hezbollah**, which in the 1980s and 1990s conducted a militant campaign against the Israeli occupation of the self-declared **security zone** in southern Lebanon. Iranian support enabled the militant group to successfully withstand the Israeli offensive during the **Second Lebanon War** in 2006. With the help of missiles supplied by Iran, Hezbollah was able to strike deep into Israeli territory, and it even warned that it could strike the coastal commercial capital, Tel Aviv.

Following the election of **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** as president in June 2005, anti-Israeli rhetoric from Tehran increased, and, led by the president, senior Iranian officials made a number of statements that denied or questioned the Holocaust. A number of anti-Semitic events were organized by the government. This position was not universal, and some prominent Iranians, including former president Mohammed Khatami (1943–), were critical of Ahmadinejad's remarks.

The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections held in January 2006 and its subsequent takeover of the **Gaza Strip** intensified Iran's relations with the Palestinian militant group. Hamas leaders, especially **Khalid Masha'al** and **Ismail Haniyeh**, have been visiting Tehran and meeting its leaders including **Ali Khamenei**. The **Siege of Gaza** and international isolation brought Hamas closer to Iran and caused it to rely on the latter's political and financial support. This proximity led to occasional criticism from the officials of the PNA.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring**, the removal of President **Hosni Mubarak** from power, and the emergence of Islamists as the main force in **Egypt** raised hopes of an Iran–Egypt rapprochement. Days after the fall of Mubarak, Egypt allowed the passage of two Iranian warships through the **Suez Canal**, the first such move in three decades. The summit meetings of the **Non-Aligned Movement** in Tehran in August 2012 and the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation** in Cairo in February 2013 saw presidents **Mohammed Morsi** and Ahmadinejad visit each other. These were the first such high-level visits since relations were broken following the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

From 2003 on there were suspicions regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions and its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as guaranteed by the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**. The failure of various rounds of talks between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue led to international and national sanctions spearheaded by the United States. Because of these economic sanctions, countries such as India were forced to reduce their import of oil from Iran. The Iranian determination to pursue its nuclear program and to increase the production of enriched uranium led to periodic speculations about an impending Israeli military strike against Iranian nuclear installations. Israel has been held responsible for the killing of four Iranian scientists associated with its nuclear program. The tension between the two coun-

tries has spread to other countries, and a few terror attacks against Israeli targets, including the **New Delhi terror attack**, were linked to elements within Iran. The election of **Hassan Rouhani** as president in June 2013 relaxed regional tension, and the **Geneva Interim Agreement** reached in November was seen as an indication of an Iranian willingness to seek a political settlement of the nuclear controversy. In the summer of 2014, amid the **Protective Edge Operation**, Iran and its interlocutors agreed to extend the July 2014 deadline to conclude an agreement.

See also NUCLEAR IRAN.

IRAQ. The **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** marked the formal entry of Iraq into the Arab–Israeli conflict. During the early years of World War I (1914–1918), the high commissioner of **Great Britain** in **Egypt**, Sir Henry McMahon (1862–1949), and Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of Mecca exchanged 10 letters whereby Britain urged the sharif to launch a rebellion against **Ottoman Empire** rule. In return, Britain promised to support the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom under Sharif Hussein. Based on this assurance and aimed at creating an independent Arab kingdom comprising Hijaz, **Syria**, and Iraq, Sharif Hussein proclaimed Arab independence on 10 June 1916 and called on his followers to rebel against Ottoman rule. This proved short-lived, and Hussein was soon defeated and driven out by the al-Sauds.

Meanwhile, under a secret arrangement known as the **Sykes–Picot Agreement**, Britain and **France** agreed to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Under this plan, France would control **Lebanon** and Syria, while Iraq and Palestine would go to Britain. Czarist **Russia** approved the agreement in return for British and French recognition of its own territorial ambitions, but in November 1917 the plan was published and repudiated by the Bolsheviks. Even though Britain and France sought to distance themselves from the agreement, the final distribution of the Ottoman Empire partially reflected the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

In March 1920, in return for the support of Sharif Hussein against the Ottoman Empire and with active British support, Hussein's son Emir Faisal ibn Hussein (1885–1933) proclaimed himself king of Syria. He aspired to include and unify Lebanon, Palestine, and **Transjordan** under his rule, but he was soon driven out of French-controlled Damascus. The British then installed him as the monarch of Iraq, but meanwhile increasing Jewish **Aliya** to **Mandate Palestine** and Arabization of the Palestinian issue brought forth nationalist pressures in Iraq.

As a founding member of the **Arab League**, Iraq vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine. On 15 May 1948, the day after the Declaration of Independence, Iraqi forces joined other Arab armies in invading Israel and fought alongside the **Arab Legion** on the eastern front. At the end of the

Arab–Israeli War of 1948, acting **UN mediator** for the Middle East Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971) requested that Iraq join the armistice negotiations at Rhodes. On 13 February 1949 (two weeks prior to the signing of the Egypt–Israeli **Armistice Agreement**), Iraqi foreign minister Abdullah Hafudh informed the **United Nations** that "the terms of armistice which will be agreed upon by the Arab State neighbors of Palestine, namely, Egypt, **Jordan**, Syria and Lebanon will be regarded as acceptable" to Iraq. This explicit Iraqi willingness to recognize and accept the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors is often ignored.

As part of its policy of containing the Soviet Union, the **United States** succeeded in encouraging Iraq and **Turkey** to sign a mutual defense treaty in 1955. Gradually Britain, **Iran**, and Pakistan were brought into a larger agreement, popularly known as the **Baghdad Pact**. This arrangement drew widespread criticism from other countries of the region, especially Egypt, and the pact became a rallying cry for President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** to discredit conservative monarchs who opposed him and his radical pan-Arabism. The overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in July 1958 by a coup led by Gen. Abdul Karim Qassem (1914–1963) reduced the fortunes of the Baghdad Pact and, following the Iraqi withdrawal in March 1959, the alliance was renamed the Central Treaty Organization.

Iraq was an active participant during the **October War of 1973**, when the Arab oil-exporting countries decided to institute an oil embargo (the **oil crisis**) against the United States and its allies for their support of Israel. Similarly, in response to Israel adopting the **Jerusalem Law** in August 1980, Iraq joined **Saudi Arabia** and threatened to sever economic and diplomatic ties with any country that recognized **Jerusalem** as Israel's capital.

Iraq was vehemently opposed to the peace initiatives of President **Anwar Sadat** of Egypt and considered them a violation of Arab unity and a betrayal of the resolutions adopted at the **Khartoum Arab Summit** in 1967. Iraq became the rallying point for anti-Sadat forces in the region and played a pivotal role in the isolation of Egypt and its expulsion from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**).

Correspondingly, while supporting the Palestinian cause and the leadership of the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, Iraq also played host to a number of radical Palestinian groups opposed to the leadership of **Yasser Arafat**. One such group was the **Arab Liberation Front**, a militant, pan-Arabist, and left-leaning Palestinian group sponsored, based, and directed by the Iraqi military. Similarly, Iraq hosted the **Palestine Liberation Front**, which was linked to the *Achille Lauro* **Affair**; its leader Abu Abbas (1948–2004) was captured by allied forces in Iraq in April 2003 and died while in allied custody the following year. Another Palestinian military

group, the **Fatah Revolutionary Council**, headed by Abu Nidal, also enjoyed some Iraqi patronage; in August 2002, Abu Nidal was found dead in Baghdad under mysterious circumstances.

For its part, Israel long pursued an anti-Iraq policy. Besides the preemptive air strike during the **June War of 1967**, Israel conducted an air raid on 7 June 1981 on a nearly completed nuclear reactor close to Baghdad in Osiraq. Constructed with French cooperation, the reactor was under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the international nuclear regulatory body. The **Osiraq bombing** was seen as a sign of Israeli determination to prevent any of its adversaries in the region from acquiring nuclear capabilities.

If the prolonged Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) marginalized the Palestinian cause, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and the subsequent **Kuwait War** posed new challenges. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) linked his actions in Kuwait to the Palestinian problem and demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories** as a precondition for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The endorsement of this position by the Palestinian leadership proved counterproductive, alienating Arafat from oil-rich countries such as **Saudi Arabia** and Kuwait and resulting in the subsequent expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinian workers from these countries. Saddam Hussein hoped to break the U.S.-led international coalition against Iraq over Kuwait by dragging Israel into the Kuwait War. On 17 January 1991, a day after the United States launched its military campaign, Iraq launched a Scud missile against Israel. U.S. pressure and strategic calculations prevented Israel from responding to the 39 Scuds that were launched by Iraq.

Following the liberation of Kuwait, the United States launched the Middle East peace process. Having supported the losing side, Arafat's options were limited, and he agreed to Palestinians participating in the **Madrid Conference** as a joint delegation with **Jordan**. Since the late 1990s, the desire to weave an anti-Iraq coalition resulted in the United States promoting a number of halfhearted peace initiatives, such as the **Bush Plan** and the **Quartet Road Map**, aimed at placating the Arab world. With the American invasion in 2003, the country fell into sectarian strife, and by 2014 Iraq ceased being a major player in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

There have been some low-level contacts between Israel and Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. There were suggestions in Iraq for a review of its policy toward Israel, but political leaderships have maintained traditional opposition to any normalization of relations with Israel. On 1 July 2008, during the meeting of the Socialist International in Athens, Defense Minister **Ehud Barak** and Iraqi president Jalal Talabani (1933–) briefly exchanged pleasantries.

See also PARTITION PLAN.

IRGUN. At times referred to as Haganah Bet (Haganah-B), Irgun Tzvail Leumi was a Jewish military organization in the **Mandate Palestine** associated with the Revisionist stream of the Zionist movement. It was established in 1931, was headed by Avraham Tehomi (1903–1991), and was organized with strict military discipline. An attempt in 1937 at a merger between Irgun and **Haganah** led to a split in the movement.

Based on the teachings of Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940), the architect of Revisionist **Zionism**, Irgun believed that an armed Jewish force was a precondition for the realization of a Jewish state, and it was committed to establishing such a state on both sides of the **Jordan River**. This radical position and its refusal to abide by the decisions of the **Jewish Agency** brought Irgun into conflict with the mainstream **Yishuv** leadership dominated by the Labor Zionists. Until the publication of the **MacDonald White Paper** in 1939, the militant actions of Irgun were focused against the Arabs, but thereafter the Mandate authorities became the prime target of Irgun. Meanwhile, not satisfied with the policies of Irgun, in 1940 Avraham Stern (1907–1942) broke away and founded the **Stern Gang**. In December 1943, **Menachem Begin** took over as the commander of Irgun and remained in that position until its dissolution following the establishment of Israel.

Irgun conducted a militant campaign against the interests of **Great Britain** and, on 22 July 1946, blew up the Mandate headquarters in the **King David Hotel Explosion** in **Jerusalem**. On 10 April 1948, Irgun forces joined hands with the Stern Gang and carried out the **Deir Yassin Massacre** in which scores of Arab civilians were butchered. The organization was active even after the formation of the State of Israel and independently sought to import arms for its operations during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. However, on 20 June 1948, the *Altalena*, a ship carrying arms supplies for Irgun, was sunk off the coast of Tel Aviv on the orders of Israeli prime minister **David Ben-Gurion** in what became known as the *Altalena* **Affair**. Eventually, on 1 September 1948, Irgun was disbanded, and most of its members joined the **Israel Defense Forces**.

IRON DOME. This is an all-weather mobile anti-missile defense system developed by Israel's state-owned Rafael Advanced Defense System. The program began around 2004 as a response to possible missile and rocket attacks from **Hezbollah** in Lebanon. The need for a missile defense became clearer during the **Second Lebanon War** when over 4,000 rockets and missiles were fired at Israel, forcing more than a quarter of a million civilians to flee their homes in the north. Israel faced similar threats from the **Gaza Strip** from where over 8,000 rockets and missiles were fired between 2000 and 2008. Military operations such as the **Cast Lead Operation** to counter these missile attacks proved costly and ineffective. Hence, the **Israel Defense Forces** felt the need for a missile defense, which would protect the civilian

population while making such attacks politically costly and militarily less effective for Hezbollah and **Hamas**. Months after the Second Lebanon War, in February 2007, Defense Minister Amir Peretz (1952–) identified the Iron Dome as Israel's response to short-range missile and rocket threats.

The Iron Dome is capable of identifying, locking onto, and then destroying airborne rockets, artillery shells, or missiles fired from distances of 4 to 70 kilometers. The system was first deployed near the southern Israeli town of Beersheba in March 2011 to protect the civilian population against rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. This proved effective during the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012 as it considerably reduced the impact of the missiles fired from the Gaza Strip. Its success rate during the war was estimated at about 85 percent, high for a military system. It reportedly has the capability to intercept an incoming object, including aircraft, at an altitude of about 10,000 meters. The inbuilt system identifies incoming missiles that would land on populated areas and could cause damage and intercepts them, while leaving aside those likely to land in unpopulated areas. This discerning ability has contributed to a high success ratio of Iron Dome interceptions. During the Pillar of Defense Operation, about 70 percent of the incoming rockets were not intercepted by Iron Dome batteries, as their interception was not considered vital.

Though the initial funds for the system came from within, in May 2010 President **Barack Obama** sought and obtained congressional approval to fund $205 million for the Iron Dome, and in May 2012 the U.S. Congress approved additional funding to the tune of $680 million. The success during the Pillar of Defense Operation in 2012 resulted in a number of countries, including **India**, Singapore, South Korea, and **Turkey**, showing interest in the Iron Dome. The cost of each battery is estimated at $50 million, with each interception costing $35,000 to $50,000, and this high cost has come under scrutiny and criticism, especially when incoming **Qassam** rockets cost a fraction of this amount. As of August 2013, Israel has six such batteries, and its ability to completely stop all incoming missiles is not certain.

See also PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; WARFARE.

ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT (IAF). The Islamic Action Front is the political wing of the **Muslim Brotherhood** in **Jordan** and was founded in 1992. Though the Brotherhood has been supportive of and closely cooperated with the Hashemite Kingdom since the founding of the state in May 1946, the formation of the IAF was preceded by the reintroduction of elections to the lower house of parliament in 1989. Since then the IAF has emerged as the largest and most vocal political force in Jordan and has been putting emphasis on reforms, political moderation, and democratic process. Its participation in parliamentary elections has been erratic; while it took part in the November 1993, June 2003, and November 2007 parliamentary elections, it has

boycotted the elections held in November 1997, November 2010, and January 2013. Since the outbreak of the **Arab Spring** in Jordan, the IAF has emerged as the major political force demanding reforms, including a constitutional monarchy. The IAF is also the most vocal opponent of the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** and a powerful force behind the **anti-normalization** campaign in Jordan.

ISLAMIC JIHAD. In 1979, Abdul Aziz Oudeh (1950–) and Fathi Shiqaqi (1951–1995) split from the Palestinian branch of the **Muslim Brotherhood** and founded this militant Islamic group. The Islamic Revolution in **Iran** provided the political context for the split. Oudeh headed the movement until his **deportation** by Israel into **Lebanon** in 1988, and he was then succeeded by Shiqaqi. Following the **assassination** of Shiqaqi in Malta on 26 October 1995 by Israeli commandos, the leadership went to Ramadan Abdullah Salah (1958–).

Islamic Jihad advocates armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine, which it considers a precondition for the Islamization of society, and calls for the establishment of an Islamic state that would replace Israel. However, unlike **Hamas**, Islamic Jihad does not perceive itself to be a rival to the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, and during the **First Intifada**, it actively cooperated with the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**. Islamic Jihad vehemently opposes the **Oslo Process**, and since the early 1990s, it has claimed responsibility for various **suicide attacks** inside the **Green Line**. Following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000, it renewed its militant campaign against Israel. Islamic Jihad took part in the **Cairo Dialogue** aimed at temporarily stopping the suicide attacks against Israel and, in March 2005, joined other military groups in agreeing to a *tahidiyeh* (a temporary lull in fighting, as opposed to an actual cease-fire or *hudna*).

The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for some of the **Qassam** rockets fired into Israel from the **Gaza Strip**, and its support base and organizational network are smaller than those of Hamas. It has called for the boycott of the Palestinian elections held in January 2006, which resulted in the victory of Hamas. Besides its disagreements over the **Oslo Accords**, it has been critical of the **Palestinian National Authority** headed by **Mahmoud Abbas** for its secularism. Its competition with Hamas led to speculations about Islamic Jihad having gained from the deposing of **Mohammed Morsi**, the president of **Egypt**, in July 2013.

See also PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; SULH; TERRORISM.

ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF ISRAEL. Founded in 1971, the Islamic Movement of Israel began as a religious-social movement aimed at improving the social conditions of **Israeli Arabs**. The movement was influenced by the **Muslim Brotherhood**, which was active during the later years of the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)** in **Mandate Palestine**. Following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** and **al-Naqba**, the Israeli Arabs remained leaderless and without a political party of their own. Efforts such as **Al-Ard** to politically organize the Arabs were throttled by various Israeli governments. Under these circumstances, the Nablus-based religious leader Abdullah Nimar Darwish (1948–) founded the Islamic Movement of Israel devoted to providing charity-based social services to Muslims, including education and health-care services. After the **First Intifada**, in 1989 the movement decided to contest local elections in the Arab-dominated areas of Israel. Following the **Oslo Accords**, a section of the movement led by the southern branch under Darwish decided to participate in the national elections. In 1996 this branch of the movement contested the Knesset elections and won two seats. In 2000, the movement joined hands with the **Arab Democratic Party** and ran as the United Arab List and since then has been securing three to five seats.

Accused of charges related to **terrorism**, the movement's activities and affiliated organizations have periodically come under scrutiny and restrictions. The movement supports Palestinian independence and has endorsed the **Abdullah Plan**. At the same time, its leader Darwish was critical of the Holocaust denial remarks of President **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** of **Iran**. As a religious, cultural, and political movement, it has considerable influence among Israel's Muslim population.

See also ABDULLAH, KING (1924–2015); ARAB PARTIES; BALAD; HADASH.

ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF). Israel's land, air, and sea forces operate under the unified command of the IDF. With a civilian as its head, the Ministry of Defense is in charge of the IDF. Over the years, a number of former generals, including **Moshe Dayan**, **Yitzhak Rabin**, **Ehud Barak**, and **Ariel Sharon**, have held the position of defense minister. The chief of the general staff is the commander of the IDF and has the rank of lieutenant general. He is formally appointed on the defense minister's recommendation for three years, although the government can extend his service to four (and in rare occasions even five) years. The chief of the general staff reports directly to the defense minister and indirectly to the prime minister and the government.

The origin of the IDF can be traced to pre-state paramilitary security organizations such as **Hashomer**, **Haganah**, and **Palmah** in **Mandate Palestine**. On 31 May 1948, Prime Minister and Defense Minister **David Ben-**

Gurion unified the military arm of the **Yishuv**, and the IDF came into being amid the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. The IDF played a critical role in the consolidation of the Jewish state that had been proclaimed on 14 May 1948 as well as in expanding its territorial limits beyond those areas allotted under the **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**.

Since its establishment, the IDF has relied heavily on **conscription**. Men and women are drafted at the age of 18 and serve for three and two years, respectively. Male conscripts are liable for annual reserve duty until the age of 40. Conscription has been compulsory for the Jews since 1949, Druze since 1956, and Circassians since 1958, and voluntary for Bedouins since 1948. **Israeli Arabs** are exempted from compulsory military service, but they could volunteer. The IDF plays an important role in the absorption of new immigrants.

Following the **June War of 1967**, when Israel captured the **West Bank**, **Gaza Strip**, **Golan Heights**, and **Sinai Peninsula**, the operative responsibility of the IDF increased considerably. The treatment of the Palestinian population in the **Occupied Territories** by the IDF resulted in increased international criticism, especially during the **First Intifada** and the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**.

The intelligence arm of the IDF, Aman, occupies a pivotal role in Israel's security and strategic doctrine. Its failure to accurately read the intelligence information proved costly during the **October War of 1973**. Similarly, the IDF's involvement in **Lebanon** following the **Peace for Galilee Operation** was painful and protracted. Its occupation of the self-declared **security zone** ended with the unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** that was completed on 24 May 2000.

At the operational level, the IDF is divided into four branches—namely, ground forces, air force, navy, and military intelligence. The IDF operates as small units relying on swift movement, and its policy is based on preemptive strategy. In terms of territorial jurisdiction, the IDF is divided into three commands: northern, central, and southern. A new home front command was created during the **Kuwait War**. The IDF has undertaken various counter-terrorism operations, including the **Entebbe Operation**. Special units such as **Sayeret Matkal** have carried out distant military operations such as the **Tunis raid** and the **Osiraq bombing**. Over the years, the IDF has mastered the art of rescue missions and has been active in different parts of the world affected by earthquakes and other natural calamities.

As demanded by the **Camp David Accords**, the IDF withdrew from the **Sinai Peninsula** and, in April 1982, evacuated the Yamit **settlement**. Similarly, as part of the **Gaza Disengagement** plan proposed by Prime Minister Sharon, the IDF pulled out of the Gaza Strip on 12 September 2005. This resulted in the dismantling of IDF bases and settlements and the evacuation of settlers from the Strip. Because of protests and opposition, the IDF had to

forcibly evacuate some of the Jewish residents in the Gaza Strip. Under this plan, the IDF also evacuated its bases and Jewish residents from four isolated settlements in the West Bank. The unilateral withdrawal, however, did not result in peace as Israel continued to control the Eretz Crossing between its territory and the Gaza Strip and the Sea of Gaza. Control of the **Rafah Crossing** between the Strip and the Sinai Peninsula was handed over to Egypt in September 2005.

The electoral victory of **Hamas** in January 2006 and its takeover of the Gaza Strip after the **Battle of Gaza** in June 2007 were followed by the IDF's imposing the **Siege of Gaza**, which prevented the movement of goods and personnel. This led to various international human rights groups organizing protest actions such as the **Fly-in Campaign** and the **Freedom Flotilla**. On 31 May 2010, during the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**, 10 people, including 9 Turkish citizens, were killed by the IDF, and this led to political tension between Israel and **Turkey** and the lowering of diplomatic relations.

Since 2001, Hamas and other militant groups have been launching **Qassam** rockets into Israel, and this led to five major military confrontations commonly known as the **Summer Rains Operation** (28 June–26 November 2006), the **Autumn Spring Operation** (2007), the **Cast Lead Operation** (27 December 2008–18 January 2009), the **Pillar of Defense Operation** (14–21 November 2012), and the **Protective Edge Operation** (6 July–26 August 2014). Of these, the Cast Lead Operation was the most violent and lasted for three weeks, and according to **B'Tselem** it resulted in the deaths of at least 1,385 Gaza residents, including 762 civilians. On the Israeli side, 3 civilians and 13 soldiers were killed, and another 518 were wounded. Toward the end of this campaign, Israel launched a brief land campaign and for the first time since its 2005 withdrawal reentered the Gaza Strip. The UN-appointed **Goldstone Report** criticized the IDF for its disproportionate use of force but accused both the IDF and Hamas of committing **war crimes**. The Pillar of Defense Operation lasted for a week before the cease-fire mediated by President **Mohammed Morsi** of **Egypt** came into force on 21 November.

The kidnapping of IDF soldiers resulted in two major conflicts. On 12 July 2006, the Lebanese military group **Hezbollah** captured two IDF soldiers near the disputed **Sheba'a Farms**, and this led to Israel launching the **Second Lebanon War**, which lasted 34 days. The conflict established the staying power of Hezbollah and indicated the absence of an effective IDF strategy against non-state groups. When the cease-fire came into force on 14 August 2006 as per **Resolution 1701**, Israel was unable to secure the release of the two soldiers, and their body parts were returned as part of a **prisoner exchange** with Hezbollah in July 2008.

Similarly, the 25 June 2006 kidnapping by Hamas of Gilad Shalit (1986–), a soldier serving near the Gaza Strip, led to the Summer Rains Operation, which did not secure his release. The **Shalit Affair** ended on 18 October

2011 through a prisoner exchange deal mediated by the post-Mubarak leadership in Egypt. As part of the agreement, Israel agreed to stop its policy of the **targeted killing** of Palestinian leaders.

The issue of **conscription** has been a major domestic problem facing the IDF. Over the years, draft exemption given to the *haredi* population has been resented by the secular population, and the expansion of the non-IDF National Service to *haredi* as well as Israeli Arabs was one of the options actively pursued to overcome the problem and to mitigate military-service-linked discrimination against Israel's Arab minority. The response from these sectors, however, has been lukewarm.

The IDF is considered to be one of the most advanced armies in the world. The bulk of its military hardware is supplied by the **United States**, but Israel has a robust domestic military industry that includes Israel Aircraft Industries, Israel Military Industry, Elbit, El-Op, Rafael, Soltam, and dozens of smaller firms. Israel has been exporting arms and high-technology weapons to a number of countries, including **China**, **India**, and **South Africa**. On the technological front, the IDF has successfully deployed the **Iron Dome** missile defense system to reduce the number and lethality of Qassam rockets during the Pillar of Defense Operation.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; *HAREDI* PARTIES; JEWISH BRIGADE; MIGRON EVACUATION; MILITARY ADMINISTRATION; MILITARY GOVERNMENT; NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; OUTPOSTS; REDEPLOYMENT; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); SAMSON OPTION; TERRORISM; UNIT 101.

ISRAEL–JORDAN PEACE TREATY. On 14 September 1993, a day after the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**, Israel and **Jordan** initiated an agreement in Washington, D.C., that set the agenda for a formal peace agreement between the two countries. This brought into the open the prolonged ties that they had maintained even before the formation of Israel. On 25 July 1994, King **Hussein** of Jordan and Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** signed the Washington Declaration, which terminated the state of belligerency between the two countries. On 17 October 1994, Israel and Jordan initialed a peace agreement in Amman, and on 26 October, prime ministers Rabin and Abdul-Salam Majali (1925–) signed the formal peace treaty. A number of international leaders, including U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, attended the public ceremony in the Arava in the **Jordan Valley**. Chairman **Yasser Arafat**, who by then had become the head of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), was not invited. The peace treaty has been a source of tension within Jordan, and the principal political party, the **Islamic Action**

Front of the **Muslim Brotherhood**, has been leading the **anti-normaliza-tion** campaign. Periodic rallies and protests are accompanied by similar moves in parliament.

Consisting of 30 articles and five appendixes, the peace treaty addressed a number of issues, including border demarcation, **water** rights, environmental issues, Palestinian **refugees**, and border crossing. It demarcated and formalized the international borders between the two countries based on the maps of **Mandate Palestine**. Jordan agreed to lease back for 25 years the farmland in the Arava returned to its sovereignty but cultivated by Israeli farmers. Under the peace treaty, Israel is committed to supplying 50 million cubic meters of water to Jordan annually. Israel also recognized the "special interests" of Jordan in the Islamic holy places in **Jerusalem**. In November 1994, both countries agreed to establish full diplomatic relations.

The **Al-Aqsa Intifada** temporarily weakened Israeli–Jordanian ties, and Jordan did not nominate a new ambassador when the post fell vacant in late 2004, but at the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit** in 2005, it agreed to return an ambassador to Tel Aviv. On 31 March 2013, King **Abdullah II** and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** signed an agreement in Amman that recognized the Jordanian monarch "as the custodian of the Jerusalem holy sites" and empowered the king to exert "all possible efforts to preserve the Jerusalem holy sites," especially the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount**.

See also JORDAN RIVER; MASHA'AL AFFAIR; NAHARAYIM SHOOTING; UNITED STATES.

ISRAEL–LEBANON AGREEMENT. Following its invasion of **Lebanon** in 1982, designated the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, Israel sought a formal agreement with Lebanon. It hoped that its agreement with the Maronite Christian–dominated Lebanese government would ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Prime Minister **Menachem Begin** conditioned the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon upon a simultaneous withdrawal of the forces of **Syria** stationed in Lebanon since October 1976. The Israeli idea gradually culminated in a peace agreement, similar to the one it had signed with **Egypt**.

On 11 October 1982, during the controversy over the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**, the Israeli cabinet approved a working paper toward achieving a peace treaty with Lebanon. On 16 December, Defense Minister **Ariel Sharon** disclosed that a secret agreement had been reached with Lebanon, which would lead to political gains for Israel. As many as 35 sessions of negotiations were held in Khalde in southern Lebanon and Kiryat Shmona and Netanya in Israel between December 1982 and May 1983. Finally, on 17 May 1983, a formal agreement was signed in two separate ceremonies in Khalde and Kiryat Shmona. Hence, the Israel–Lebanon Agreement is also known as the May 17 Agreement.

Falling short of a peace treaty, it presented the modalities for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in return for specific security arrangements in southern Lebanon and certain elements of normalization. It formalized their border, and both sides agreed that "the existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon is inviolable." Though ratified by both sides, the willingness of the government of President Amine Gemayel (1942–) to sign such an agreement with Israel, even while the latter was militarily occupying large parts of Lebanon, considerably weakened the position of the Beirut government. Moreover, since the beginning of negotiations, the agreement had been vehemently opposed by Syria. On 5 March 1984, Lebanon formally abrogated the agreement.

See also ASSASSINATION/S.

ISRAEL–U.S. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU). As part of its interim agreement with **Egypt**, on 1 September 1975 Israel signed a memorandum of understanding with the **United States**, which formed part of the **Sinai II Agreement**. Through this MoU, Israel secured a number of politically significant concessions. The United States pledged to be "fully responsive" to Israel's defense, energy, and economic needs, subject to congressional approval and availability of resources; to consult with Israel in case of military involvement of the **Soviet Union** in the Middle East; to "coordinate" with Israel about the timing and format of the **Geneva Conference (1973)**; not to recognize the **Palestine Liberation Organization** as long as the latter "does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept" **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338**; and to oppose any changes and modifications to Resolutions 242 and 338. It also guaranteed American support for ensuring Israel's freedom of navigation through the **Suez Canal**.

Since then, Israel has signed a number of similar understandings with the United States and consolidated its strategic ties with Washington. As part of the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** on 26 March 1979, Israel and the United States signed an MoU that provided a number of economic and security guarantees to Israel. Under the agreement signed by Foreign Minister **Moshe Dayan** and U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance (1917–2002), the United States undertook to supply oil for 15 years should Israel find it difficult to procure it from the international market.

On 30 November 1981, Israeli defense minister **Ariel Sharon** and U.S. defense secretary Caspar Weinberger (1917–2006) signed an MoU on strategic cooperation that provided the framework for joint military exercises between the two armed forces. This was the first formal security agreement between the two countries and sought to deter threats to the Middle East from the Soviet Union.

On 21 April 1988, U.S. president Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) and Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Shamir** signed an MoU in Washington, D.C., that designated Israel as "a major non-NATO ally of the U.S." Coming in the midst of the **First Intifada** and growing international criticism of Israel over its handling of the Palestinian uprising, it established a comprehensive framework for bilateral consultations. On 31 October 1998, Israel and the United States signed an MoU on strategic cooperation. Unlike the previous ones, which were ministerial-level agreements, this one was signed by U.S. president **Bill Clinton** and Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**.

ISRAELI ARABS. After the outbreak of hostilities in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, a large number of Arabs opted to stay behind in areas that became the State of Israel; they are popularly called Israeli Arabs. The nomenclature underscores their dual identities and dilemmas. They are citizens of Israel but belong to the larger Arab-Palestinian nation. Due to security considerations, until 1966 Israel placed its Arab population areas under **military administration**.

The Israeli Arabs constitute about one-fifth of the Israeli population, and over 80 percent of them are Muslims. In 1948, Israeli Arabs numbered 150,000, and as of April 2013, there are 1.65 million Arabs in Israel, making up 20.7 percent of the total population. They predominantly inhabit the Galilee area, northern Israel, and the coastal plains. A large number of Israeli Arabs live in cities and towns such as **Jerusalem**, Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, and Nazareth. Due to distinct religious and cultural identities, the Israeli Arabs are subdivided into Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs, Druze, and Bedouins.

Free and equal before the law, Israeli Arabs enjoy all political rights in Israel and participate in, contest, and are elected to the Knesset as well as local councils. At the same time, numerous legal and quasi-legal impediments and deprivations hamper their aspirations for equality in Israeli society. The exclusive Jewish identities of Israel, unique legislations such as the **Law of Return**, and discrimination associated with **conscription** are resented by the Israeli Arabs.

The **First Intifada** rekindled the Palestinian consciousness of the Israeli Arabs, and this was manifested in the formation of the exclusive **Arab parties**. The Arab leaders have supported the demand for a Palestinian state for a long time, as well as the need for Israel to recognize and negotiate with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Their support from the backbenches ensured the survival of the **Labor Party** governments headed by **Yitzhak Rabin** and **Shimon Peres** during 1992–1996 and enabled them to pursue the peace process with the Palestinians. The outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** once again brought them to the forefront and, in October 2000, Israeli Arabs held demonstrations in various Arab towns and villages, during

which 13 Arabs were killed. This incident played a critical role in the Israeli Arabs abandoning the Labor Party during the reelection campaign by **Ehud Barak** in February 2001.

Since 1948 political options for the Israeli Arabs were limited to minority lists affiliated with the Labor Party or the communist parties like Maki (1948–1965), Rakah (1965–1977), and **Hadash**. In the 1980s the Progress List for Peace (1984–1992) committed to Arab–Jewish unity secured significant votes from the Arab electorate. In 1988 the **Arab Democratic Party** became the first Arab political party, and since then a number of other Arab parties such as the **Islamic Movement** and **Balad** have been contesting the Knesset election either on their own or as part of the United Arab List. While Arab members of the Knesset belonging to the Zionist parties have served in various governments, since 1948 no Arab political party has been accepted as a coalition partner.

A number of Arab political and community leaders have rejected the idea of their moving to or being repatriated to a future Palestinian state within the context of a political settlement between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). The idea of Arab-inhabited areas being transferred to the PNA within the framework of a **territorial swap** has also been opposed by them.

Unlike the Druze and Muslim Bedouins, Israeli Arabs do not perform the compulsory military service, while it is optional for Christian Arabs. A number of social welfare benefits as well as educational and job opportunities in Israel are linked to military service. To overcome the conscription-linked discrimination since 2007, the non-military National Service has been opened to Israeli Arabs. Though the number has been increasing, only a small share of Israeli Arabs enlist for the National Service.

Israel being a state for its citizens, and not a Jewish home, remains one of the principal demands of the Israeli Arabs. The inability and refusal to identify with state symbols like flag, emblem, and holidays have generated internal debates and controversies. Over the years, a number of the demands, which were aired only by the Israeli Arabs such as recognition of the PLO, Palestinian statehood, and the **two-state solution**, were gradually embraced by mainstream Zionist parties and have become the policies of the Israeli government. The ability of the Israeli Arabs to emerge as a bridge between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries is predicated on the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the Israeli–Palestinian track. Since the late 1970s, Israeli Muslims are performing hajj in **Saudi Arabia** through the use of temporary travel documents provided by **Jordan**.

See also ARD, AL-; JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; KFAR KASSEM MASSACRE; LAND DAY; NAQBA, AL-; OCTOBER RIOTS; ZIONISM.

IZZ EDDIN AL-QASSAM. The military wing of **Hamas** is named after **Muslim Brotherhood** member Sheikh Izz Eddin al-Qassam (1882–1935), who preached jihad against the **Mandate** administration of **Great Britain** and the Zionists. He was killed by the British in a military operation near Jenin in 1935 and was buried in Haifa.

The fighters of the Izz Eddin al-Qassam brigade claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist and **suicide attacks** against Israel inside the **Green Line**. The group is a closely knit organization, and since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Israel has pursued a policy of **assassination** and targeted a number of militants belonging to the Izz Eddin al-Qassam. The presence of distinct political and military wings impedes a number of Western countries from following the example of the **United States** and proscribing Hamas as a terrorist organization.

The electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 and the subsequent Gaza takeover witnessed a sharp drop in the operations of Izz Eddin al-Qassam. The group was responsible for the kidnapping of soldiers in the **Israel Defense Forces** in July 2007, known as the **Shalit Affair**, which ended in 18 October 2011 through a **prisoner exchange** mediated by **Egypt**.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); OSLO PROCESS; PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; QASSAM; TERRORISM; WARFARE; ZIONISM.

J

J STREET. The J Street is a liberal American activist group founded in April 2008 with an explicit agenda of promoting Arab–Israeli peace. It is primarily, but not exclusively, composed of Jewish members and positions itself as a pro-Israel and pro-peace non-profit organization. It takes its name from the absence of J Street in New York. It supports the **two-state solution** and urges the **United States** to play a more active role in the furtherance of peace in the Middle East. It depicts itself as a liberal alternative to **AIPAC**, which has increasingly been seen as an organization that promotes the policies and positions of right-wing Israeli parties such as **Likud**. J Street represents the liberal views among the Jewish community in the United States and their support for co-existence with the Palestinians.

JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT. Signed into law by U.S. president Gerald Ford (1913–2006) on 3 January 1975, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 linked the granting of most favored nation to the **Soviet Union** to the elimination of barriers to the Jewish **Aliya**. It was sponsored by Washington senator Henry M. Jackson (1912–1983) and Ohio congressman Charles Vanik (1913–2007), both Democrats. The amendment was passed unanimously by both houses of the U.S. Congress and remained in force even after the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, though a presidential waiver was granted periodically. It was repealed by both houses and was legalized by President **Barack Obama** in December 2012.

The effectiveness of the law is debatable; while the Jewish emigration out of the Soviet Union trickled since the early 1970s, the government of Israel was not very favorable to the imposition of formal sanctions against Moscow. It was only after Mikhail Gorbachev (1931–) became Soviet president in October 1988 and started the policy of glasnost (openness) that Jewish emigration increased considerably.

See also UNITED STATES.

JARRING MISSION. On 27 December 1967, following the adoption of **Resolution 242**, Gunnar Jarring (1907–2002), the Swedish ambassador to the **Soviet Union**, was appointed the special representative of the UN secretary-general to the Middle East. Jarring was entrusted with the task of implementing Resolution 242. Bound by the **Khartoum Arab Summit** resolution of the "three no's," **Egypt** was reluctant to conduct direct negotiations aimed at securing Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the **June War of 1967**. For its part, Israel was determined not to comply with the Arab demand for withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories** without ensuring Arab recognition and security arrangements. The determination of both sides to place their demands as a precondition for negotiation precluded any progress. To circumvent the difficulties facing direct negotiations, in March 1969 Jarring submitted a list of questions to Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, the **War of Attrition** overtook this, and soon the Jarring Mission was suspended.

Jarring renewed his mission in February 1971, following the end of the War of Attrition and the changing of the guard in Egypt after the death of President **Gamal Abdel Nasser**. On the Sinai front, Jarring demanded a complete Israeli withdrawal to the borders of **Mandate Palestine** and an Egyptian willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. Refusal of both parties to accept his proposal eventually led to the termination of the Jarring Mission.

See also OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; ROGERS PLAN; UNITED NATIONS (UN); UNITED STATES INITIATIVE.

JENIN CONTROVERSY. As a part of the **Defensive Shield Operation** in early April 2002, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) entered the town of Jenin in the **West Bank** from where it had pulled out in late 1995. This led to fierce resistance from its residents, especially in the adjacent **refugee** camps. The siege continued until 11 April, during which Israel conducted large-scale military operations described as a "cleanup," and Palestinians accused the IDF of organizing a massacre in Jenin. In response, the **United Nations** Security Council called for an international commission to investigate the claims—a move vehemently opposed by Israel. The report prepared by the UN commission, without any field investigation, dismissed Palestinian claims of a massacre, even though 52 Palestinians were killed during the military operations. The presence of training facilities and a huge quantity of weapons found inside the refugee camps run by the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency** raised doubts about the functioning of the refugee welfare organization.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); WARFARE.

JERICHO. Considered the oldest inhabited city in the world, Jericho lies northwest of the Dead Sea. Among other things, it is believed to be the place where Joshua led the Israelites to the Land of Canaan, and it contains the Mount of Temptation, where Jesus Christ was said to have fasted after his baptism. The city was rebuilt several times and, in modern times, was rediscovered in 1907.

It was at the **Jericho Conference** of December 1948 that the pro-Hashemite Palestinians met and asked the monarch of **Jordan** to assume control over the **West Bank**. Following the signing of the **Cairo Agreement** in May 1994, the city, along with the **Gaza Strip**, came under the control of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Disagreements between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** over the size of the Jericho area partly contributed to delays in the implementation of the **Declaration of Principles** and the Israeli **redeployment** from the Gaza–Jericho area.

In the wake of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Israel reoccupied Jericho, and the area remained under Israeli control until 16 March 2005, when the **Israel Defense Forces** handed over security control of the city to the PNA. The city remains the most popular tourist destination in the West Bank, especially for Christian pilgrims. During 1995 and 2000, it had the Oasis Casino frequented by Israeli and other gamblers. Located close to a **refugee** camp, it was closed down during the Al-Aqsa Intifada and has not reopened since then.

See also JERICHO PLAN.

JERICHO CONFERENCE. On 1 December 1948, a congress of Palestinian Arabs comprising notables and mayors from the **West Bank** met in **Jericho** with **Hebron** mayor Mohammed Ali al-Jabri (1900–1980) as president. It adopted a resolution calling on King **Abdullah I** to "unite" the West Bank and **East Jerusalem**, which were controlled by forces of **Jordan**, with the Hashemite Kingdom. This request was endorsed by the Jordanian parliament on 13 December. A second conference of Palestinian notables was held in Nablus on 28 December. In March 1949, the West Bank was brought under civilian rule. On 24 April 1950, the Jordanian House of Deputies and the House of Notables held a joint session in Jericho and adopted a resolution supporting the "complete unity between the two sides of the **Jordan River** and their union into one State, which is the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," with King Abdullah I as the monarch.

See also ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT (APG); ANNEXATION; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT.

JERICHO PLAN. Promoted by Israeli minister Yigal Allon (1918–1980) in 1974, the Jericho Plan advocated a partial Israeli disengagement agreement with **Jordan** and the return of the **West Bank** town of **Jericho** and its

environs to Jordanian rule. By this time, however, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) had emerged as a credible player and, despite opposition from King **Hussein**, the **Rabat Arab Summit** declared the PLO to be "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. This precluded Jordan as a partner, and Israeli opposition toward the PLO throttled any progress on the Jericho Plan.

See also ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT (APG); JORDAN IS PALESTINE.

JERUSALEM. The historic city of Jerusalem is considered holy to the three monotheistic faiths—namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—and hence occupies a central role in the Arab–Israeli conflict. While the city was never a capital of any Arab or Islamic empire, it gained prominence following the emergence of **Zionism** and the influx of **Aliya**. The **Partition Plan** adopted by the **United Nations** on 29 November 1947 declared Jerusalem to be an international city. The city witnessed some of the bloodiest battles during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**.

Despite its large Jewish majority, on 27 June 1948 **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) suggested handing over the city of Jerusalem to the Kingdom of **Jordan**. A month later, he visited Jerusalem and suggested the demilitarization of the city, a proposal vehemently rejected by Israel. The international status of Jerusalem was reiterated by UN General Assembly **Resolution 194** adopted in December 1948. On 9 December 1949, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 303 (IV), which declares that "the city of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the UN." It also asserts that the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority. This move was vehemently opposed by Israel as well as Jordan, which controlled much of the city. On 5 December 1950, Sweden unsuccessfully proposed a resolution in the General Assembly that called for an international regime for Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places.

The **Armistice Agreement** of April 1949 signed between Israel and Jordan recognized the de facto partition of Jerusalem. Jordan, however, refused to honor its commitment to ensure "free access to the Holy Places and to cultural institutions and use of the [Jewish] cemetery on the Mount of Olives." Jews were prevented from praying at the Western Wall until June 1967, when Israel captured the old city as well as the **West Bank**. Until then, even Israeli Muslims were denied access to the holy places.

Meanwhile, on 2 August 1948, Israel, which controlled the western part of the city, declared Jerusalem to be Israel-controlled territory and temporarily appointed a military governor. On 30 January 1949, Israel abolished the governor and appointed a civilian administration. Following the elections to

the first Knesset, on 14 February Israel's parliament met in Jerusalem and elected **Chaim Weizmann** as the first president of Israel. Following the UN adoption of Resolution 303, the Knesset met in Tel Aviv on 13 December and approved a government-sponsored motion to move its seat and that of all government offices to Jerusalem. The Knesset held its first session in Jerusalem on 27 December, and soon other government offices were gradually moved to the city. While the Defense Ministry continues to function from Tel Aviv, the Foreign Ministry moved to Jerusalem in 1953.

During the **June War of 1967**, the West Bank, including **East Jerusalem**, was captured by the **Israel Defense Forces**. On 27 June the Knesset "extended" Israel's jurisdiction to the old city in East Jerusalem. On 15 August 1967, UN secretary-general U Thant (1909–1974) appointed Ernesto Thalmann (1914–1993) of Switzerland to visit and examine the situation in Jerusalem following de facto **annexation** by Israel. In his report to the secretary-general, Thalmann recorded, "It was made clear [by Israeli leaders] beyond any doubt that Israel was taking every step to place under its sovereignty those parts of the city which were not controlled by Israel before June 1967." The Israel authorities stated unequivocally that the process of integration was irreversible and not negotiable.

Under the **Jerusalem Law** enacted on 30 July 1980, Israel declared the city to be its complete and united capital. This has not been recognized by the international community, including the **United States**. Since the early 1990s, supported by an overwhelming majority, both houses of the U.S. Congress have been adopting non-binding resolutions that recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Presidents, however, have used executive powers to avoid implementing these resolutions due to diplomatic and strategic reasons.

After the June War, Israel offered citizenship to **Jerusalem Palestinians**, but only a limited number availed themselves of this offer. The Palestinian residents of the city took part in the Palestinian presidential elections held in January 1996 and January 2005 as well as in the Palestinian parliamentary elections held in January 1996 and January 2006.

The status of the city, especially East Jerusalem, was a major issue during the unsuccessful **Camp David Talks** in July between Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**. On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link the largest **settlement** of **Ma'ale Adumim** in the West Bank with Jerusalem. In October 2014, **Peace Now** disclosed government plans to build 2,600 housing units in Givat Hamatos, which would effectively cut off Jerusalem from the West Bank through a ring of Jewish settlements around the city.

All state symbols of Israel such as the residence of the president, the seat of the Knesset, and the Supreme Court and all government ministries (except defense) are located in Jerusalem. Foreign ambassadors accredited to Israel,

including from countries such as **Egypt**, Jordan, and **Turkey**, present their credentials in Jerusalem. At the same time, all embassies are located in Tel Aviv, and even those Latin American countries that had their embassies in Jerusalem gradually moved out due to Arab pressures. The demographic profile of the city has been shifting in favor of the *haredi* community who constitute about a third of its population.

See also ABU DIS; AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); AL-QUDS; BEILIN–ABU MAZEN PLAN; BERNADOTTE PLAN; DEIR YASSIN MASSACRE; E-1 AREA; GREEN LINE; HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT; *HAREDI* PARTIES; JERUSALEM LAW/S; JERUSALEM VISIT; KERRY PLAN; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; ORIENT HOUSE; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES; SECURITY FENCE/S; TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL.

JERUSALEM LAW/S. On 21 June 1967, the Israeli cabinet decided to expand the territorial jurisdiction of **Jerusalem**, and on 27 June 1967, the Knesset amended two existing laws and brought the eastern part of Jerusalem captured during the **June War of 1967** within the municipal and administrative jurisdiction of the city. This move was aimed at consolidating the Jewish demography of the city. Israel never explicitly described this move as an "**annexation**," calling it merely an "extension" of Israeli laws to the eastern part. However, since 4 July 1967, when the **United Nations** General Assembly passed Resolution 2253 in its emergency session, the international community has vehemently denounced this change in the status of Jerusalem.

On 30 July 1980, Israel adopted the Jerusalem Law, which declared the city to be the "complete and united" capital of Israel. Reacting to an Israeli attempt to shift foreign embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, on 6 August 1980 **Saudi Arabia** and **Iraq**, the two principal Arab oil producers of the region, warned that they would sever economic and diplomatic ties with any country that recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital. A number of states that previously had missions in Jerusalem moved their missions out of the city to Tel Aviv. Since the early 1990s, both houses of the **United States** Congress have been pressing the administration to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

On 26 December 1994, the Knesset adopted the Law Implementing Agreement on Gaza and **Jericho** Areas (Restrictions of Activity), which sought to prevent the **Palestinian National Authority** from engaging in political, diplomatic, security, or other activities within the city limits of Jerusalem, including those areas annexed by Israel. Coupled with this legislation, Israel has periodically requested European leaders and envoys not to conduct any official meetings with the Palestinians in the eastern part of the city lest it be construed as European recognition of Palestinian claims to **East Jerusalem** as the capital of the future Palestinian state. In the past few years, there have

been several visits to East Jerusalem by various foreign dignitaries. U.S. vice president Joseph Biden (1942–) visited East Jerusalem in March 2010. Early in 2012, the Egyptian grand mufti Ali Gomaa (1951–) paid a visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, which caused quite a stir back in Egypt.

See also JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS; OIL CRISIS; ORIENT HOUSE.

JERUSALEM PALESTINIANS. Various peace plans in the late 1980s, such as the **Baker Plan**, **Mubarak Plan (1985)**, **Mubarak Plan (1989)**, and **Shamir Plan**, proved non-starters because of Israel's refusal to accept any role for the Palestinians who were residents of **East Jerusalem**. In April 1993, the Israeli government headed by **Yitzhak Rabin** modified this stance. Faisal Husseini (1940–2001), who led the Palestinian negotiations with U.S. secretary of state **James A. Baker** during the run-up to the **Madrid Conference** on behalf of the Palestinians, was chosen as the leader of the Palestinian delegation. Until then, he had been part of the steering committee and, due to Israel's opposition, was not part of the bilateral talks that were taking place in Washington, D.C. Husseini led the eighth round of talks with Israel, which began on 27 April 1993. This Israeli concession came in the midst of growing international criticism over the **deportation** of 415 suspected **Hamas** activists.

On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link the largest Jewish settlement in the **West Bank**, **Ma'ale Adumim**, with Jerusalem. This move further diluted the proportion of Palestinians living in areas beyond the **Green Line** that were annexed by Israel following the **June War of 1967**.

The participation of Jerusalem Palestinians in the elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council** (PLC) in January 1996 and January 2006 were closely watched. On both occasions, the Israel governments headed by **Shimon Peres** and **Ehud Olmert**, respectively, allowed the Palestinian residents to take part in the elections. Under the new arrangement adopted by the **Palestinian National Authority** in June 2005, **Jerusalem** had six seats in the 132-member PLC, including two reserved for Christians.

See also AL-QUDS; JERUSALEM LAW/S; NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–); PLO LAW; SECURITY FENCE/S.

JERUSALEM VISIT. This refers to the historic visit to **Jerusalem** undertaken by President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt**. On 19 November 1977, President Sadat of Egypt flew to Israel, met Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin**, and addressed the Knesset the following day. This dramatic gesture sowed the seeds for the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace**

Treaty. This move did not go down well within Egypt or in the Arab world. Egyptian foreign minister Ismail Fahmi (1922–1997) resigned in protest before Sadat's visit.

JEWISH AGENCY. The Jewish Agency was established in 1929 under the terms of the **Mandate** for Palestine given to **Great Britain**. Article 4 of the **League of Nations** mandate called for the establishment of an appropriate "Jewish Agency . . . for the purpose of advising and cooperating" with the Mandate administration "in such economic, social, and other matters." It further stated that the administration "shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency . . . close settlement by Jews, on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes" (Article 6). Until 1929, the **World Zionist Organization** acted as the body specified in the mandate.

The newly formed Jewish Agency consisted of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jewish groups and became the worldwide organization responsible for the establishment of a Jewish national home. Through diverse activities such as promoting **Aliya**, fund-raising, social welfare activities, economic enterprises, and cultural activities, the Jewish Agency formulated and conducted the domestic and external policies of the **Yishuv**. On the eve of the establishment of Israel, it emerged as an important governing structure of the Jewish community in Mandate Palestine. In 1952, many of the internal functions of the agency were transferred to the government of Israel, and the agency thereafter concentrated on **Diaspora** activities and encouraging Aliya. In 2008 the agency was awarded the highest national honor, the Israel Prize, for its lifetime achievement and contribution to the state.

See also ZIONISM.

JEWISH BRIGADE. During World War II (1939–1945), Jewish volunteers from **Mandate Palestine** served in the army of **Great Britain**, especially in the East Kent Regiment. By the outbreak of the war in September 1939, about 13,000 Jews from Palestine had registered with the British. This came against the backdrop of the **MacDonald White Paper** of 1939 and the British abandonment of the **Balfour Declaration**. At one time, the number of Jews serving with the British rose to 26,000. Prime Minister Winston Churchill (1874–1965) decided to establish separate Jewish units of volunteers to fight against the Axis powers. Three of the companies were separated and made into a Palestine Regiment, and in September 1944 it was converted into a Jewish Brigade under the command of Brig. Ernest Frank Benjamin (1900–1969). The brigade was disbanded in the summer of 1946, and most of the volunteers subsequently moved to Israel and joined the **Israel Defense Forces**.

See also JEWISH LEGION; WARFARE.

JEWISH HOME PARTY. The Jewish Home, or HaBayit HaYehudi in Hebrew, is a religious-nationalist Zionist political party in Israel and is part of the government formed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** in March 2013. In November 2008 a few right-wing political parties joined hands with the **National Religious Party** and formed the Jewish Home Party. In the 2013 Knesset elections the party obtained 12 seats and emerged as the fourth-largest party. Its leader, Naftali Bennett (1972–), was born in Israel but pursued a career in software in the **United States**. Upon returning to Israel, he took part in the **Second Lebanon War** of 2006 and subsequently served as an aide to Netanyahu, the then leader of the opposition. Upon his election to the Knesset, Bennett renounced his American citizenship and became minister of industry and trade as well as religious affairs. He is opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state and suggests **annexation** by **Egypt** of the **Gaza Strip** and Israeli annexation of some portions of the **West Bank**. According to him the **Palestinian National Authority** should administer the remaining parts of the West Bank but under the overall supervision of the **Israel Defense Forces**.

See also AREAS OF PALESTINE; ZIONISM.

JEWISH LEGION. Following the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918), a small number of Jews living in Palestine sought to aid **Great Britain**. With the help of Captain Trumpeldor (1880–1920), they organized the Zion Mule Corps, which took part in the Dardanelles Campaign from March 1915 to May 1916 in the **Ottoman Empire**. This gradually expanded into the Jewish Legion. The Zionist movement encouraged and organized Jewish volunteers from the **United States** and Palestine, as well as **Egypt**, to fight alongside the British. Organized into various battalions, the Jewish Legion, at its height, totaled around 6,400. The experience in the legion during the war proved useful to the Jewish cause in Palestine, and many joined the **Haganah**, which was formed in 1920. The participation of some members of the Jewish Legion in defense of the Jewish quarters in **East Jerusalem** against Arab violence in May 1921 led to its dismemberment.

See also JEWISH BRIGADE; WARFARE; ZIONISM.

JEWISH UNDERGROUND. In the early 1980s, a number of Jewish settlers in the **West Bank** carried out organized and violent attacks against the Palestinians, including grenade and bomb attacks. The clandestine Jewish militant groups operated under the names of Ya'al, Sikari, and Lifta. On 2 June 1980, members of the Jewish underground planted bombs in the cars of

the mayors of the West Bank towns of Nablus, **Ramallah**, and Bireh. The mayor of Nablus lost both his legs, and the Ramallah mayor lost his foot; the third bomb was dismantled, but an Israeli sapper lost an eye.

In 1984, a three-member Lifta group was arrested for a conspiracy to blow up the Dome of the Rock on the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** in the old city of **Jerusalem**. They managed to bring a large quantity of arms into the courtyard of the mosque before they were discovered. They were convicted but were gradually released due to remission or clemency. In April 1984, General Security Services, the internal intelligence agency, discovered and thwarted a plot to plant explosives on several Arab buses in the **Occupied Territories**.

Three members of the Jewish underground were convicted for a hand grenade attack on the Islamic College of Hebron in July 1983 in which three students were killed and 33 others were injured. Though they were given life sentences, President Chaim Herzog (1918–1997) commuted their sentences, and the three were freed in 1990 after serving less than seven years.

See also KARP REPORT; TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

JOHNSON MISSION. In November 1961, the **Palestine Conciliation Commission** (PCC) appointed Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Foundation, to explore the possibilities of seeking progress on the question of Palestinian **refugees**. In his interim report to the PCC submitted in November 1961, Johnson concluded, "No progress can be made on the Palestinian Arab refugees question apart from, or in advance of, an overall settlement."

JOHNSON PLAN. On 19 June, a week after the cessation of hostilities in the **June War of 1967**, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson (1908–1973) outlined a five-point peace program for the region. It called for recognition of the fundamental right of every state in the region to exist, justice for the **refugees**, respect for the maritime rights of all states, the need to curb the dangerous arms race, and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states. This plan was overshadowed by the ongoing debates in the **United Nations** Security Council over the drafting of a resolution acceptable to all state parties. Some of the provisions of the Johnson Plan were incorporated into **Resolution 242** adopted on 22 November 1967.

See also UNITED STATES.

JOHNSTON PLAN. On 16 October 1953, **United States** president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) appointed Eric Johnston (1896–1963) as his special representative to undertake discussions with states along the **Jordan River** and to recommend a comprehensive plan for the development of the

Jordan Valley. At that time, Israel was constructing a National Water Carrier and diverted **water** from the Jordan River north of the **Sea of Galilee** to the Negev in the south. Johnston held intense but separate negotiations with all four riparian states and worked out a plan under which **Syria** and **Lebanon** would use 20 and 35 million cubic meters (mcm), respectively, from the Jordan River tributaries, the Banias and Hasbani Rivers; Syria would use an additional 22 mcm from the River Jordan. The remaining waters of the Jordan River would be used by Israel (around 375 to 450 mcm) and **Jordan** (about 100 mcm). From the Yarmouk River, Syria would receive about 90 mcm, Jordan around 380 to 430 mcm, and Israel around 25 to 40 mcm. The plan envisaged the Sea of Galilee as a reservoir for Israel and Jordan.

The plan was never implemented, as the Arab states refused to enter into any agreement with Israel. On 18 August 1955, the **Arab Higher Committee**, headed by **Hajj Amin Al-Husseini**, the former grand mufti of **Jerusalem**, urged the Arab states to reject any schemes or projects connected with Israel, and in October 1955 the **Arab League** formally rejected the Johnston Plan. In 1964, Jordan and Syria sought to divert the Banias and Hasbani Rivers and reduce the flow of water into the Sea of Galilee. Israel conducted air raids over the construction sites in early 1965 and forced the Arab states to abandon the diversion plan.

JORDAN. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was established by **Great Britain** in 1921 as the semi-autonomous Emirate of **Transjordan**, with Abdullah ibn Hussein (1852–1931), the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, as the emir. On 25 May 1946, Transjordan gained independence from Britain, and the emir became King **Abdullah I**. The country assumed the name of Jordan in 1950.

The involvement of the Hashemites in the Arab–Israeli conflict predates the establishment of Transjordan and can be traced to the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence** of 1915–1916. In appreciation for the support of Sharif Hussein during the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)**, Britain partitioned Palestine in 1921 and created Transjordan.

Beginning in the mid-1940s, Abdullah had close contacts with the **Yishuv** leadership, and this continued after the British decision to refer the Palestine question to the **United Nations**. Though nominally opposed to the **Partition Plan**, Abdullah had strong territorial ambitions. A day after the establishment of Israel in 1948, Arab states invaded erstwhile **Mandate Palestine**. Jordan's **Arab Legion**, the strongest and best-trained army in the region, fought mainly in areas that were allotted to the Arabs by the UN. The city of **Jerusalem** was an exception, and the legion captured the old city, which houses the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount**. By the time hostilities ended, Jordan was

in control of eastern Palestine. After the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Jordan signed an **Armistice Agreement** with Israel on 3 April 1949, which consolidated and recognized its hold over the **West Bank** and **East Jerusalem**.

In December 1948, weeks after the formation of the **All Palestine Government**, Arab Palestinian notables who were sympathetic to Abdullah met for the **Jericho Conference** and urged the Hashemite ruler to officially take over the West Bank, which was duly annexed in 1950. Consequently, the Palestinian residents of the West Bank as well as Palestinian **refugees** living in the West Bank were given full Jordanian citizenship.

The **annexation** of the West Bank by Jordan was strongly resented by other Arab states, and they even contemplated suspending Jordan from the **Arab League**. This popular resentment led to the **assassination** of King Abdullah near the Al-Aqsa Mosque on 20 July 1951 in Jerusalem. King **Hussein**, who assumed the throne in 1953, faced a host of threats not only from his Palestinian subjects but also from Arab nationalists led by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**. The precarious domestic situation forced him to see the West and Israel as his potential allies.

The **June War of 1967** changed Jordan's fortunes. The compulsions of Arab nationalism and false information about military successes spread by Egypt induced King Hussein to ignore Israeli warnings, and Jordan joined the war. Capitalizing on the Jordanian offensive, Israel captured East Jerusalem as well as the West Bank. Afterward, Hussein's desire to regain control over these territories brought Jordan closer to Israel. On the eve of the **October War of 1973**, Hussein unsuccessfully tried to warn Israeli prime minister **Golda Meir** of an impending coordinated attack by Egypt and **Syria**.

Meanwhile, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), formed in 1964, was gathering widespread support and began undermining Hussein's efforts to be the representative of the Palestinians. In 1970, the tension between the two manifested in a civil war situation, and Hussein responded with a large-scale crackdown, commonly referred to as the **Black September Massacre**. Under the **Cairo Agreement of 1970**, mediated by Nasser, the PLO leaders and **Fedayeen** were expelled from Jordan. Nevertheless, despite Jordanian opposition, the **Rabat Arab Summit** in 1974 declared the PLO to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Seeking to isolate the PLO, Israel has often looked to Jordan as a possible solution to the problem posed by its occupation of the West Bank, as evidenced by the **Jordan Option** pursued by the **Labor Party** and **London Agreement** of 1987. The outbreak of the **First Intifada** in December 1987 radically altered the situation, and in June 1988, King Hussein directed the **Jordanian Disengagement**, formally severing Jordanian ties to the West Bank. Jordan's relations with **Yasser Arafat** were mixed, and at times Hussein perceived **Hamas** to be an effective counterweight to the **Fatah**-led PLO.

Jordan's support for President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) of **Iraq** during the **Kuwait War** resulted in its regional isolation and economic hardships. Afterward, seeking to regain its earlier influence with the West, Jordan became one of the earliest supporters of the new Middle East peace initiative of U.S. secretary of state **James A. Baker**. Jordan endorsed his idea of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation to the **Madrid Conference**, which began on 30 October 1991.

The signing of the **Declaration of Principles** by Israel and the PLO enabled Jordan to formalize its close but clandestine relations with Israel. The Washington Declaration, signed on 14 September 1993, resulted in the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** signed in the Arava along the Israel–Jordan border in October 1994. Despite occasional tensions (for example, the **Masha'al Affair**), both Israel and Jordan have maintained close ties.

After the death of King Hussein on 7 February 1999, his eldest son **Abdullah II** ascended to the throne. In June 2003, Abdullah hosted the **Aqaba Summit**, attended by President **George W. Bush**, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, and Palestinian prime minister **Mahmoud Abbas**, and the meeting accepted the **Quartet Road Map**. At the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit** in 2005, King Abdullah agreed to return a Jordanian ambassador to Israel; the new envoy, Marouf Suleiman Bakhit, assumed office in March 2005.

Since early 2011, Jordan has been witnessing popular protest for political and economic reform, or the **Arab Spring**. Though the intensity was less than similar protests in other countries, especially Egypt and Syria, the protests resulted in King Abdullah's initiating a number of political reforms including the establishment of an independent election commission and a constitutional court and the formation of governments through elections rather than through nomination by the royal court. These reforms, however, were insufficient for the main opposition party, the **Islamic Action Front**, which boycotted the parliamentary elections, held in January 2013.

The popular protests in **Tahrir Square** that overthrew Egyptian president **Hosni Mubarak** led to a spiral of **Sinai violence**, and pipelines, which carry Egyptian gas to Jordan, were periodically sabotaged. These attacks created an energy shortage in Jordan and resulted in price hikes and intensified popular protests. Jordan has been negotiating with Iraq and **Qatar** for alternative supplies and has been exploring nuclear energy generation and shale gas options.

The **Arab Spring in Syria** resulted in a large number of Syrian refugees fleeing to Jordan. As of February 2014, Jordan hosts over 600,000 refugees from Syria, and this was in addition to the large number of refugees who fled Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion of March 2003 and did not return. The presence of refugees poses considerable economic and social problems for Jordan and drains its already meager resources.

As part of their response to the Arab Spring, in September 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council accepted the membership request of Jordan (and of Morocco) and agreed to provide $5 billion as aid to both countries. No progress has been made on the membership issue, and by early 2014 Jordan had received only a portion of the pledged aid package.

According to the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency**, there were about 1.95 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan as of 2008, most of them being Jordanian citizens. Others put the figure much higher, making them the largest population group, constituting over 50 percent of Jordan's population.

A decade after Jordan closed down Hamas offices and expelled its leaders, **Khalid Masha'al** visited Jordan in January 2012, and this marked a new beginning in Jordan's relations with the Palestinian Islamic movement. Coming in the midst of the Arab Spring and popular protests within Jordan led by Islamists, the reconciliation was seen as an attempt by King Abdullah to ward off domestic pressures on the Israeli–Palestinian front. For its part, Hamas appeared to have assured the king that it would not interfere in domestic Jordanian affairs.

In March 2013, Abdullah and **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) president Mahmoud Abbas concluded an agreement that gave an important role to Jordan in the preservation of Islamic holy sites in East Jerusalem, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Toward alleviating its perennial **water** shortage and for economic development, Jordan initiated the **Red Sea–Dead Sea Link** project in cooperation with Israel and the PNA. The $10 billion project has been delayed due to a number of financial problems and environmental concerns.

See also GREEN LINE; JERICHO PLAN; JOHNSTON PLAN; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDANIAN–PLO JOINT COMMITTEE; OPEN BRIDGES POLICY; PEEL COMMISSION; PLO CHARTER; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES; QIBYA RAID.

JORDAN IS PALESTINE. Right-wing groups in Israel consider **Jordan** to be the solution to Israel's problems with the Palestinians. In their view, both the **Balfour Declaration** and the British **Mandate** were applicable to lands on both sides of the **Jordan River**, and hence the partition of Palestine and the formation of **Transjordan** in 1921 by **Great Britain** were a violation and injustice to the Jewish people and an illegitimate act.

This position, espoused by Revisionist **Zionism**, persisted even after the formation of Israel, and for long the Israeli right laid claims over the East Bank of the Jordan River. According to this view, because of the predominant presence of the Palestinian population, Jordan is in fact a Palestinian state, even though it is ruled by the non-Palestinian Hashemite monarchy. Hence, it was argued that there was no need for a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River.

Ariel Sharon, during his tenure as defense minister under **Menachem Begin**, used this slogan as a solution to the Palestinian problem through Jordan. He even advocated Israeli contacts with the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, aimed at helping the latter take control of Jordan. In September 1980, Foreign Minister **Yitzhak Shamir** told the **United Nations** General Assembly that Jordan is "a state which is the Arab state in Palestine."

This position has been vehemently rejected by the Palestinians and Jordanians, as well as by the Israeli left. In the past, as part of his plan for unification of the **West Bank** and Jordan, King **Hussein** of Jordan sought to propagate the notion that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan. This position changed, however, when the Israeli right began to use similar arguments to undermine Hashemite rule. Such Israeli plans called for the expulsion of Palestinians in the West Bank into Jordan and hence caused apprehension about Israel's intentions among the Jordanian and Palestinian leadership. The 1988 **Jordanian Disengagement** from the West Bank and the **Oslo Accords** significantly eroded the popular appeal of the slogan "Jordan is Palestine" inside Israel. Therefore, the overwhelming **Knesset approval** of the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** by the Israeli Knesset on 25 December 1994 did not go unnoticed and unappreciated in Amman.

See also ERETZ YISRAEL; JORDAN OPTION; LABOR PARTY; LONDON AGREEMENT; PEEL COMMISSION; ZIONISM.

JORDAN OPTION. Since the late 1960s, the Israeli **Labor Party** looked to **Jordan** as the means of resolving the Palestinian problems. While recognizing the sovereignty and independence of Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom was seen as the interlocutor in deciding the future status of the **West Bank**. As the power in control of the territories from 1948 to 1967, Jordan was equally keen to regain the West Bank. Capitalizing on this, the Labor Party sought to circumvent the difficult and thorny issue of the Palestinian state and the need to negotiate with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and instead pursued a Jordanian–Palestinian federation. The most visible articulation of this position was the **London Agreement** of April 1987, concluded between King **Hussein** of Jordan and Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres**. A host of developments such as the **First Intifada**, the **Jordanian Disengagement** (1988), the **Oslo Process** (1993), and the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** (1994) made the idea redundant and irrelevant.

See also JORDAN IS PALESTINE; PEEL COMMISSION.

JORDAN RIVER. The 250-kilometer-long Jordan River forms the boundary between the states of Israel and **Jordan**, and the latter is named after the river. In 1921, **Great Britain** carved out the territories east of the river to create the Emirate of **Transjordan**. Originating in Mount Hermon on the

Golan Heights, the river flows out of the **Sea of Galilee** and ends at the Dead Sea in the south. The Hasbani in **Lebanon** and Banias in Israel are its major tributaries. It is the major fresh **water** source for Jordan and has been the focus of tension among the four riparian countries—namely, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and **Syria**. The efforts by **United States** president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) to secure a water-sharing arrangement in 1955 through the **Johnston Plan** proved futile. The river is considered by Christians to be the site of the baptism of Jesus Christ, but Bethany in Jordan and Qasr Al-Yahud, near Jericho in the **West Bank**, are claimed as the actual site of his baptism.

See also IRGUN; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDAN OPTION; JORDAN VALLEY; OPEN BRIDGES POLICY.

JORDAN VALLEY. This refers to the territory west of the **Jordan River** from the Hula Valley north of the **Sea of Galilee** to the Dead Sea in the south. Parts of it lie in Israel, and the valley accounts for about 30 percent of the **West Bank**. The **Allon Plan**, formulated weeks after the **June War of 1967**, considered the Jordan Valley to be vital for Israel's security from the eastern front, primarily from **Iraq** through the Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**. Since then, various leaders of Israel's **Labor Party**, including **Golda Meir**, **Moshe Dayan**, **Yitzhak Rabin**, and **Ehud Barak**, have argued in favor of Israeli control over portions of the Jordan Valley. Most of the **settlements** established by the Labor Party, which were subsequently termed "security settlements," are located in the Jordan Valley.

JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT. On 31 July 1988, King **Hussein** announced that **Jordan** was severing legal and administrative links with the **West Bank**. This was seen as a response to the ongoing **First Intifada** and his impatience with Chairman **Yasser Arafat** of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). The move formally ended four decades of a Jordanian quest for Palestinian allegiance and loyalty.

Since the **Mandate** years, the Hashemites had coveted parts of Palestine, and the establishment of the **All Palestine Government** under the leadership of **Hajj Amin al-Husseini** had not inhibited King **Abdullah I** from annexing the **West Bank** in April 1950. The formation of the PLO in 1964 and its growing international stature and influence did not diminish the Jordanian drive. Even after losing the territories during the **June War of 1967**, tacit Israeli concurrence enabled Jordan to wield considerable influence in the West Bank. Bowing to the growing strength of the PLO, in November 1974 Jordan went along with other Arab states and recognized the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Still, opposition from Israel and the **United States** to bestowing any role on the PLO, Arafat's

failure to advance the Palestinian cause through diplomacy, and the **Jordan Option** pursued by the Israeli **Labor Party** kept alive the Hashemite desire to regain the West Bank.

The July 1988 disengagement was thus the Jordanian response to growing international support for an independent Palestinian state. On 4 August, the Jordanian cabinet decided to dismiss all Palestinian employees in the West Bank starting 16 August, and reports put the number of dismissed former Jordanian employees at more than 20,000. On 23 August, Arafat signed the order signaling the PLO takeover of responsibilities for the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip**.

This disengagement from the West Bank did not prevent Jordan from securing a "special role" as the guardian of the Muslim holy sites in **Jerusalem** under the 1994 **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty**. In March 2013, King **Abdullah II** and **Palestinian National Authority** president **Mahmoud Abbas** concluded an agreement that gave an important role to Jordan in the preservation of Islamic holy sites in **East Jerusalem**, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

JORDANIAN–PLO JOINT COMMITTEE. Following the conclusion of the **Camp David Accords** in September 1978, Arab states opposed to the peace initiative of President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** organized a summit meeting in Baghdad. During this summit, a joint committee comprising Jordan and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) was formed to consolidate Palestinian opposition to the Camp David process, which had excluded the PLO. It set up a special fund called Sumud, or the Steadfastness Aid Fund, to provide financial assistance to the Palestinians living in the **Occupied Territories**.

See also JERUSALEM VISIT; REJECTIONIST FRONT.

JUDEA AND SAMARIA. These biblical expressions are used in Israel to denote the land west of the **Jordan River** that was occupied and subsequently annexed by **Jordan** following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. The terminology acquired ideological connotations following Israel's capture of the **West Bank** in 1967. In 1979, residents of the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip** established a Council of Jewish Communities in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip called Yesha ("Salvation"), which became an extra-parliamentary group.

In the letters exchanged as part of the **Camp David Accords** with **Egypt**, Israel categorically stated, with the acquiescence of the **United States**, that the term "West Bank" appearing in the accords "is being and will be understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria." For the first time Israel used the expression "the West Bank" in the **Declaration of Principles**

signed in September 1993. On 9 June 2005, the Israeli Supreme Court dismissed petitions challenging the **Gaza Disengagement**, which also included four isolated **settlements** in the West Bank, and ruled that these areas were not legally part of Israel.

See also ERETZ YISRAEL; EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL.

JUNE WAR OF 1967. The mounting tension between Israel and **Egypt** over the withdrawal of the **United Nations Emergency Force I** from the **Sinai Peninsula** and the imposition of the Egyptian **naval blockade** of the **Straits of Tiran** climaxed on 5 June 1967 when Israel launched a preemptive strike on 25 airfields in Egypt and **Syria**, as well as **Iraq**. A large portion of the Arab air force was destroyed on the ground, and their runways were made non-operational. During the first day of the conflict, more than 400 Arab aircraft were destroyed on the ground, giving air supremacy to the Israeli air force and depriving the Arab ground forces of any air cover. **Jordan** was initially spared the Israeli attack, but following the shelling of West **Jerusalem** later in the day, Israel expanded its military offensive to include Jordan.

A simultaneous ground offensive began against Egypt and Jordan, and by 7 June, Israel had captured the whole of the Sinai Peninsula and the **Gaza Strip** and reached the banks of the **Suez Canal**. On 8 June, a cease-fire came into effect on the Egyptian front. On the Jordanian front, **East Jerusalem**, including the old city, was captured on 6 June, and the remaining portions of the **West Bank** came under Israeli control the following day. Israel initiated a ground offensive against Syria on 9 June, which lasted for 20 hours and captured the whole of the **Golan Heights**, including the Syrian town of **Quneitra**.

When a general cease-fire came into force on 10 June, the **Israel Defense Forces** were less than 50 kilometers from Amman, 60 kilometers from Damascus, and 110 kilometers from Cairo and controlled an area of 88,000 square kilometers compared to about 20,770 square kilometers a week earlier.

See also ALLON PLAN; ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; ERETZ YISRAEL; GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE; GREEN LINE; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; RESOLUTION 242; SETTLEMENT/S; WARFARE.

K

KACH. An extreme right-wing political movement in Israel, Kach was founded and led by Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932–1990) until his **assassination** in New York on 5 November 1990. Though secular and nationalist, it sought to maintain the Jewish character of Israel and advocated **transfer** or expulsion of **Israeli Arabs**. As an extension of his Jewish Defense League, in 1971 Kahane established a political party, which adopted the name Kach when it decided to run for the 1973 Knesset elections. Its first electoral success came in 1984, when it crossed the threshold margin of 1 percent of votes. Prior to the election, the Election Commission had sought to prevent Kach from contesting because of its anti-Arab posture, but the Supreme Court quashed the ban. Gaining nearly 26,000 votes, Kach secured one seat, and Kahane entered the Knesset.

The extremism of Kach led the Knesset to introduce legislation in August 1986 that prevented groups with racist postures from contesting elections. Kach was proscribed from contesting the 1988 Knesset elections. The ban has remained in force since then. Following Kahane's murder in 1990, Rabbi Avraham Toledano was chosen as the leader of Kach, but internal differences and personal rivalry have led to the formation of a breakaway faction called Kahane Hai ("Kahane Lives"), headed by Kahane's son Benjamin (1966–2000).

On 25 February 1994, Baruch Goldstein (1956–1994), a member of the Kach movement, killed 29 Muslim worshippers in the **Hebron Massacre**. As a result, the Israel government outlawed Kach and Kahane Hai on 13 March 1994. Despite the ban, the activists of both groups have virulently opposed the **Oslo Process** and the territorial compromise with the Palestinians. On 30 December 2000, Benjamin Kahane, his wife, and his five children were killed in an ambush by Palestinian gunmen near the **settlement** of Ofra in the **West Bank**.

The U.S. State Department held sympathizers of Kach responsible for some low-level attacks against the Palestinians during the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. The leader of the **Yisrael Beiteinu** Party, **Avigdor Lieberman**, denied re-

ports that he was a former member of Kach. Over the years, the movement has lost much of its earlier appeal even among the fringe elements inside Israel.

See also FORCE 17; PRICE TAG ATTACKS; SETTLER VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; UNITED STATES.

KADESH OPERATION. *See* SUEZ WAR.

KADIMA. Kadima, which means "Forward" in Hebrew, is a political party formed by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** in November 2005 on the eve of the 17th Knesset election. Disagreements within **Likud** over the **Gaza Disengagement** resulted in Sharon's breaking away from Likud to form Kadima, and he was joined by others including former prime minister **Shimon Peres** who left the **Labor Party**. On 4 January 2006, amid the election campaign, Sharon suffered a massive stroke and soon went into a coma, and **Ehud Olmert** became the leader of Kadima. In the 2006 Knesset elections, Kadima secured 26 seats, and Olmert became prime minister. After Olmert was forced to resign following charges of corruption, **Tzipi Livni** became the leader of Kadima in September 2008.

The Kadima Party obtained 28 seats in the February 2009 elections. Livni's failure to form a government resulted in Kadima's becoming the principal opposition. In the party elections held in March 2012, former chief of the **Israel Defense Forces** Shaul Mofaz (1948–) became the leader of Kadima. His brief unity government under **Benjamin Netanyahu** collapsed over the issue of **conscription** of the *haredi* population. On the eve of the January 2013 elections, former Kadima leader Livni floated a new party, **Hatnuah**, that secured six seats in the Knesset. Kadima, which fought under Mofaz, could secure only two seats.

See also CAST LEAD OPERATION; SECOND LEBANON WAR.

KAHAN COMMISSION. Amid the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre** of Palestinian civilians in **refugee** camps in the Beirut area in September 1982 evoked widespread domestic and international criticism of Israel. Since the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) were in control of the areas, critics have argued that Israel must have been aware of the impending massacre and could have prevented it. Initially the Israeli government headed by **Menachem Begin** sought to appoint a judicial commission to investigate, but due to growing domestic criticism, on 28 September 1982 the cabinet was forced to appoint a commission of inquiry to examine "all the facts and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese forces" against the residents of the refugee camps. On 1 October 1982, a commission headed by the president of the Supreme Court justice

Yitzhak Kahan (1913–1985) was appointed; the other members were Justice Aharon Barak (1936–) and Yona Efrat (1926–1993), a reserve major general in the IDF.

On 7 February 1983, the commission submitted its final report, which recommended that Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy (1933–) not continue as director of military intelligence. It found that division commander Brig. Gen. Amos Yaron (1940–) "did not act properly" regarding the operations of the **Phalange** forces in the camps and hence advised that he no longer serve in the capacity as a field commander. The commission declined to make any recommendations against the IDF chief of staff Lt. Gen. Rafael Eitan (1929–2004) because of the government's decision against extending his tenure. Above all, the commission ruled that, in view of his overall political responsibility, Defense Minister **Ariel Sharon** should not be given any "sensitive" position in the future. On 13 February, Sharon resigned as defense minister.

Subsequently, most of those mentioned in the Kahan Commission have returned to prominence. Most notably, Sharon continued to serve in government, first as minister without portfolio (October 1983–September 1984); then as minister of trade and industry (September 1984–February 1990), housing (June 1990–July 1992), and national infrastructure (July 1996–October 1998); and then as foreign minister (1998–1999). On 6 February 2001, Sharon was elected prime minister of Israel in the direct elections, and he retained this position following the **Likud** victory in January 2003.

After his retirement from the army, Eitan founded Tsomet and successfully ran in the 1988 elections. He served as minister under **Yitzhak Shamir** (1990–1992) and **Benjamin Netanyahu** (1996–1999). Saguy joined Likud and became a member of the Knesset. Yaron was made director-general of the Defense Ministry. Reacting to this, the Belgian Supreme Court used the findings of the Kahan Commission to rule that Yaron, despite being the director-general, could be prosecuted and tried for **war crimes** over the Sabra and Shatila Massacre.

See also BELGIUM LAW.

KARINE **AFFAIR.** In January 2002, Israeli naval commandos seized the *Karine-A*, a freighter registered in **Lebanon**, in international waters in the Red Sea. It was carrying about 50 tons of weapons, including rockets and missiles, which Israel claimed were bound for the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) in the Gaza Strip from **Iran**. Even though Iran and the PNA denied the allegations, a lieutenant colonel of the Palestinian naval police was the ship's captain. The incident further emboldened the Israeli **Siege of Ramallah** and brought the **United States** closer to the negative Israeli view regarding the relevance of Chairman **Yasser Arafat** in the peace process.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

KARP REPORT. Acting on complaints about the activities of Jewish settlers vis-à-vis the Arab residents of the **Occupied Territories**, in 1981 Israel's attorney-general Yitzhak Zamir (1931–) appointed a committee headed by Judith Karp (1937–). The committee's report, published in February 1984, concluded that police investigations into Arab complaints against Jewish settlers were inadequate and incomplete.

See also HEBRON MASSACRE (1994); JEWISH UNDERGROUND; PRICE TAG ATTACKS; SETTLER VIOLENCE.

KERRY PLAN. In July 2013, **United States** president **Barack Obama** appointed former American ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk (1951–) as special envoy to the Middle East to assist Secretary of State John Kerry (1943–) toward furthering the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations. The bilateral talks were stalled since September 2010 over the continuation of settlement activities. On 29 July 2013, Kerry announced a nine-month time frame for the successful conclusion of the talks and an agreement over key issues. Toward this end, Kerry frequently visited the Middle East and met Israel's prime minister, **Benjamin Netanyahu**, and **Palestinian National Authority** president **Mahmoud Abbas**. He regularly met other leaders in the region including King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia**, President **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi** of **Egypt**, and King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**. Despite his efforts, Kerry could not organize any direct talks between Netanyahu and Abbas.

While the authenticated draft was never made public, in early March 2014 it was suggested that the Kerry Plan was finalized. Among other things it recommended the Palestinian recognition of Israel as the "Jewish state," division of the city of **Jerusalem**, a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the **West Bank**, Israel retaining control over significant portions of **settlement** blocs, a **territorial swap** based on the **Green Line**, and compensation for Palestinian refugees but the denial of their **right to return**.

Thus the Kerry Plan accommodated most of the key Israeli demands, but the latter refused to consider any settlement freeze. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 11 April 2014, Kerry observed that the Israeli–Palestinian talks were thrown into a crisis because of Israel's refusal to release the last batch of Palestinian prisoners as agreed. This led to Abbas seeking Palestinian membership in 15 UN agencies and conventions including the **Fourth Geneva Convention**. Israel responded by announcing the construction of 708 new apartments in the **East Jerusalem** neighborhood of Gilo. The futile Kerry Plan was complicated by a fresh round of violence, especially the **Protective Edge Operation**.

KFAR KANA MASSACRE. On 18 April 1996, during the offensive against **Hezbollah** targets in **Lebanon** code-named the **Grapes of Wrath Operation**, an Israeli artillery shell landed on a **United Nations** compound where numerous Lebanese civilians were taking refuge. More than 100 civilians were killed, and scores of others were injured in the attack. While Israel described it as a mistake, the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** authorities argued that the camp had clear UN markings. The magnitude of the deaths compelled U.S. president **Bill Clinton** to call for an immediate cease-fire, and the Israeli offensive ended on 26 April. The Israeli government formally expressed its sorrow over the attack. Israeli prime minister **Shimon Peres** was unable to capitalize on the offensive and reverse his dwindling popularity in the opinion polls in Israel. The Kfar Kana Massacre indeed worked against him, as many leaders of the **Israeli Arab** community accused the government of deliberately targeting the civilians and called for boycotting the closely contested prime ministerial elections held on 29 May 1996.

See also UNITED STATES; WARFARE.

KFAR KASSEM MASSACRE. Amid the ongoing **Suez War**, on 29 October 1956, 49 **Israeli Arab** citizens were killed in the village of Kfar Kassem in central Israel. As in many other Arab areas, the village had been placed under curfew, and Israeli border police officers fired at the Arabs, who were returning to their homes without recognizing that a curfew had been imposed. An official inquiry commission headed by a district judge found eight border police officers guilty of murder, and they were given long prison sentences. However, most of the sentences were reduced, and the last convict was freed in 1960. Both the killings and the lenience shown to the police officers undermined the trust and confidence of the Arabs in the government of Israel.

See also OCTOBER RIOTS.

KHAMENEI, ALI (1939–). A prominent figure in the 1979 Islamic Revolution of **Iran**, Ali Khamenei succeeded **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini** as the Vilayat-e-Faqih, or the supreme leader. Khamenei was born on 17 July 1939 into a religious family in Mashhad, the second most populous city in the country. He studied at the religious seminaries including Qum and was active politically. During the Islamic Revolution, he emerged as a close confidant of Ayatollah Khomeini and was soon appointed to head Friday prayers in Teheran. In June 1981, he narrowly escaped an **assassination** attempt, and in October he secured more than 95 percent of the valid votes and was elected

the first president of the Islamic Republic. He was reelected in August 1985 with a slightly reduced margin, and in July 1989 he was succeeded by Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–).

In July 1989, following the death of Khomeini, Khamenei was elected the supreme leader, and he continues to hold this lifetime position. Even though he issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons, he is seen as the key figure in **nuclear Iran** and the ongoing controversies over Iran's nuclear ambitions. For long he opposed various moves toward the peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict including the **Madrid Conference** and was critical of **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** for concluding the **Oslo Accords**. Following the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority**, he has supported **Hamas** and other Palestinian groups opposed to co-existence with Israel. In one of his sermons in 2009, Khamenei described Israel as a Zionist "cancer" against the Muslims. Though condemning the September 11 terror attacks, he has been critical of the **United States** and its policies in the Middle East. In the initial years, he was supportive of President **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** and his policies toward Israel and the Middle East peace process, but gradually both of them fell out over domestic issues.

See also GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; ROUHANI, HASSAN (1948–); ZIONISM.

KHAN YUNIS RAID. Frequent **Fedayeen** attacks from the **Egypt**-held **Gaza Strip** into Israel began to intensify in late August 1955 and culminated in large-scale attacks on the southern Israeli towns of Rehovot and Rishon le-Zion, just 16 kilometers south of Tel Aviv. In these attacks, which lasted four days, 11 Israeli civilians were killed, scores of others were injured, and many installations were destroyed. In retaliation, on the night of 31 August, Israel attacked and destroyed the police headquarters in Khan Yunis and killed 72 Egyptians, wounding another 58. The Israeli attack was one of the largest against Egyptian positions in Gaza, resulting in a temporary lull in Fedayeen attacks.

See also WARFARE.

KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT. From 29 August to 1 September 1967, members of the **Arab League** held a summit meeting in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum to consider the impact and consequences of the **June War of 1967**. The leaders agreed on a unified effort "to eliminate the effects of the [Israeli] aggression" and to secure an Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories**. The summit, however, assumed prominence because of its "three no's" with regard to Israel: "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel [and] no negotiations with [Israel]." The three no's at Khartoum resulted in Israel complaining about not having an Arab peace "partner" to

negotiate with. The detractors of **Egypt** subsequently cited the Khartoum resolution when President **Anwar Sadat** initiated a separate bilateral peace with Israel.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; JERUSALEM VISIT.

KHOMEINI, AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH (1902–1989). A religious leader and political personality, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the founder of the Islamic Republic of **Iran**. He was born in September 1902 in the city of Khomeyn in western Iran. He lost both his parents rather early in his life. During World War I (1914–1918) he studied at Islamic seminaries in Esfahan and Arak, and finally at Qum, where he studied under the Grand Ayatollah Abdul-Karim Haeri Yazdi (1859–1937). For a decade, he taught at various seminaries, and his political activism began in 1963 when he opposed the policies of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), especially regarding land reforms.

In October 1964, he issued a public declaration denouncing the shah, his policies, and the **United States** for backing the monarch. After brief incarcerations in November 1964, he was exiled to **Turkey** and then to **Iraq** where he settled down in Najaf, a prominent Shia center of learning. For the next 14 years he continued his anti-Shah policies from Iraq until he was forced to leave by Vice President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006). Khomeini went to **France** on a tourist visa and settled in a suburb of Paris from where he continued his anti-Shah sermons.

On 1 February 1979, he returned to Iran and was received by an estimated five million people in Tehran. By then the shah had fled the country, and the royal regime collapsed on 11 February, which was declared as the victory day of the Islamic Revolution. Through a referendum held in April, Khomeini established a political order in Iran dominated and controlled by the clergy, or Vilayat-e-Faqih ("Supreme Leader").

Both during his exile and upon returning to Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini has been highly critical of Israel and the shah's relations with the Jewish state. He declared Israel to be an "enemy of Islam." On 18 February, within a week after the Islamic Revolution, **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** became the first foreign leader to meet Khomeini. Shortly afterward the building occupied by the Israeli mission during the reign of the shah was handed over to the PLO. In August 1979, during the month of Ramadan, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the last Friday of the month as Al-Quds Day ("Jerusalem Day" in Arabic), which has since been commemorated by Muslims all over the world. The day is marked by rallies, protest marches, and other forms of public exhibition of support for the Palestinians. In April 2012, a ministerial meeting of the **Organization of**

Islamic Cooperation held in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad urged the member states to declare the last Friday of the month of Ramadan as Al-Quds Day.

During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iranian military faced serious challenges and reversals, and to overcome this, Khomeini approved the procurement of limited quantities of arms from Israel, which subsequently became part of the Iran–Contra scandal in the United States. Khomeini died on 3 June 1989 and was buried in Tehran.

KILOMETER 101. This location along the Cairo–Suez road was the venue where military commanders of **Egypt** and Israel met on 28 October 1973 to negotiate the implementation of **Resolution 338**. Gen. Abdul Ghani Gamassy (1921–2003) and Gen. Aharon Yariv (1920–1994) signed the agreement on 11 November, and it paved the way for the **Sinai I Agreement** of 1974. The agreement formalized and stabilized the cease-fire following the **October War of 1973**. Mediated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1923–) and Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco (1923–) of the **United States**, the six-point Sinai I Agreement was the first to be signed between Israel and Egypt since the February 1949 **Armistice Agreement**.

KING DAVID HOTEL EXPLOSION. On 22 July 1946, the Jewish underground militant group **Irgun**, commanded by **Menachem Begin**, blew up the southwest corner of the King David Hotel, where the civilian as well as the military headquarters of the **Mandate Palestine** administration were located. Ninety-one people—41 Arabs, 28 British, and 17 Jews—were killed in the attack, which was condemned by the mainstream leadership of the **Yishuv**. Irgun presented the attack as a demonstration of its ability and willingness to strike at the heart of the Mandate administration, and this resulted in a British crackdown against various militant Jewish groups in Palestine.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

KING-CRANE COMMISSION. The King-Crane Commission was the first formal political involvement of the **United States** in the Middle East. Following a meeting of the Big Four (**Great Britain**, **France**, the United States, and the **Soviet Union**) in March 1919, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) suggested the formation of an international commission that would visit **Syria**, evaluate the prevailing opinion of the region, and report back to the forthcoming Versailles Peace Conference. Wilson appointed Henry C. King (1858–1934), president of Oberlin College, and manufacturer Charles R. Crane (1858–1939) to visit the region. Imperial designs and rivalry in the region prevented Britain and France from participating in the mission. In June 1919, the King-Crane Commission arrived in Palestine,

conducted interviews, and studied reports and documents, and in August it submitted its report to the U.S. delegation to the Versailles Conference. Coming less than a year after the **Balfour Declaration** and in the midst of a trickling **Aliya**, the commission warned against Zionist aspirations in Palestine. With the British forces in physical control of Palestine and their future remaining uncertain, the commission suggested the inclusion of Palestine within a larger Syrian mandate. The recommendations of the commission were largely ignored by the United States as well as by its European allies.

　See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ZIONISM.

KINNERET OPERATION. In the early 1950s, Israel and **Syria** accused each other of violating the 1949 **Armistice Agreement**, and the former also complained of harassment of its fishermen. These took a turn for the worse when, on the night of 11 December 1955, the **Israel Defense Forces** launched a massive three-pronged attack on Syrian outposts on the eastern bank of the **Sea of Galilee**. Commanded by Col. **Ariel Sharon**, the Kinneret operation involved a two-column attack from the north and south on the Syrian positions, with an amphibious attack from the **water**. In a short but powerful raid, Israel captured the entire shore strip and destroyed all Syrian fortifications. Thirty-seven Syrian soldiers and 12 civilians were killed in the operation, and another 30 were taken prisoner; Israel lost 6 men. While many were surprised by the timing and magnitude of the Israeli attack, the operation seemed to result in Syrian non-involvement when Israel launched the **Suez War** a few months later. This was also known as the Olive Leaves Operation.

　See also WARFARE.

KIRYAT ARBA. This Jewish **settlement** on the outskirts of **Hebron** in the southern **West Bank** was established in 1968 and emerged as the nerve center of settler extremism and the **Gush Emunim** movement. In February 1994, during the **Hebron Massacre**, Baruch Goldstein (1956–1994), a Jewish settler from Kiryat Arba, killed 29 Muslim worshippers in the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs. In 2012 the population of the settlement stood at 7,593.

　See also HEBRON PROTOCOL; REDEPLOYMENT; SETTLER VIOLENCE.

KNESSET APPROVAL. Though lacking any legal sanction or requirements, Israeli prime ministers have sought the approval of the Knesset for any peace agreements signed with neighboring Arab countries. Normally this precedent is attributed to Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**, who sought Knesset endorsement for the **Camp David Accords**. However, it was **Golda**

Meir who started the practice on 22 January 1974 when she placed the **Sinai I Agreement** before the Knesset and sought its approval; the agreement was approved 76 to 36 votes.

Since then, various Israeli leaders have sought and obtained Knesset approval for a number of peace agreements with the Arab states and the Palestinians, including the Interim Agreement between Israel and **Egypt** (3 September 1975, 70–43, with 7 abstentions); the **Camp David Accords** (27 September 1977, 84–19–17); the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** (21 March 1979, 95–18–2); the **Declaration of Principles** (24 September 1993, 61–50–8); the Washington Declaration (3 August 1994, 91–3–2); the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** (26 October 1994, 105–3–6); the **Taba Agreement** (5 October 1995, 61–59); the **Hebron Protocol** (16 January 1997, 87–17); the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** (8 September 1999, 54–23); and the **Gaza Disengagement** (26 October 2004, 67–45–7).

Since January 1994 various Israeli leaders have been suggesting a **referendum** if a peace agreement was reached with **Syria** that required substantial territorial withdrawal. This was gradually expanded to include agreements with the Palestinians that required Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories**. In November 2010, the Knesset approved, by 65 votes to 33, a law mandating national referenda prior to any decision regarding withdrawal from territories that are subjected to Israeli law. Under this provision, territorial compromise regarding the **Golan Heights** and **East Jerusalem** would require a referendum. Legally this provision would not apply to other parts of the **West Bank** that are not annexed by Israel. Some political parties are seeking similar referenda for any territorial compromise with the **Palestinian National Authority**.

KUWAIT WAR. The invasion of Kuwait by **Iraq** on 2 August 1990 diverted the attention of the international community from the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the **First Intifada**, to the Persian Gulf. On 12 August, after annexing Kuwait, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) offered to withdraw his forces from Kuwait if Israel did the same from the **Occupied Territories**. Although this increased his popularity among the Palestinians, who warmly greeted his proposal, the linkage offer generated a negative image about the Palestinians in the Israeli peace camp and in the West. This stand considerably weakened Palestinian influence in the region, especially among the oil-rich Arab states in the Persian Gulf.

In weaving a coalition to secure the Iraqi withdrawal, President George H. W. Bush (1924–) was keen to exclude Israel and was determined to prevent its participation in any military confrontation with Iraq. This was finally achieved through diplomatic cajoling, political pressure, and restricted military access.

On 17 January 1991, a day after the **United States** initiated its military campaign against Iraq, Iraq launched a Scud missile against Israel. Over the duration of the conflict in the Persian Gulf, Iraq launched at least 39 Scud missiles against Israel. One Israeli was killed and 12 others died due to indirect consequences of the attacks, about 200 civilians were injured, and more than 4,000 buildings suffered severe damage. Despite some internal criticisms and pressure, Israel maintained its restraint and did not retaliate. The removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait eventually resulted in the resumption of the Middle East peace process at the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991.

See also WARFARE.

L

LABOR PARTY. This is the successor to **Mapai**, the left-wing Zionist party that dominated the politics of the pre-state **Yishuv** and the State of Israel during the first three decades after its establishment. Socialist in orientation, Mapai focused on developing a Jewish national home rooted in agriculture and industrial economy and developing Hebrew culture. Unlike the Revisionist Zionists, it supported and cooperated with the **Mandate** administration and **Great Britain**. This changed, however, following the publication of the **MacDonald White Paper** in 1939, which announced the reversal of the British support for a Jewish national home enshrined in the **Balfour Declaration**.

After the establishment of Israel, **David Ben-Gurion** of Labor became the first prime minister and a dominant figure. Due to internal differences, in June 1965 **Moshe Dayan** and **Shimon Peres** joined hands with Ben-Gurion to form a new party called Rafi. On the eve of the **June War of 1967**, Rafi joined the unity government formed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (1895–1969), with Dayan becoming defense minister. On 21 January 1968, Mapai merged with two other labor parties, Ahdut Ha'Avoda and Rafi, to form the Israel Labor Party.

The policies of the Labor Party have included support for **Aliya**, establishment of a social welfare state, a state-planned and publicly regulated economy, full employment, a minimum wage, and the right to strike. The party stands for the separation of religion and state and supports equality for minorities, including the **Israeli Arabs**. In the initial years, it organized separate minority lists for Knesset elections, but since 1981 it has been placing Arab members of the party in one unified list. For long, the Histadrut labor union was closely linked to the party and functioned as a strong support base.

The intelligence failure during the **October War of 1973** proved politically costly for the Labor Party. Though it managed to retain its dominant position in the December 1973 Knesset elections, in May 1977 Labor lost its monopoly to the **Likud** Party. During 1984–1990, it joined with Likud to form a national unity government. Labor briefly returned to power in 1992

(under **Yitzhak Rabin**) and again in 1999 (under **Ehud Barak**), but since the 2001 elections, its support base has gradually dwindled and it has ceased to be the largest faction in the Knesset.

With regard to peace, having accepted the **Partition Plan** in 1947, the Labor Party has adopted a pragmatic and relatively moderate posture toward the Palestinians. Following the June War, in which Israel captured the **West Bank**, **Gaza Strip**, **Sinai Peninsula**, and **Golan Heights**, the Labor Party government began the construction of Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**. The party was instrumental in the signing of the **Armistice Agreements**, the **Sinai I Agreement**, and the **Sinai II Agreement**. However, the honor of signing the first peace treaty with an Arab country went to its traditional rival, Likud, which signed the **Camp David Accords** with **Egypt**. Reflecting the national consensus, until the early 1990s the Labor Party opposed the recognition of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). During most of the 1980s, it toyed with the **Jordan Option** to resolve the Palestinian question.

In 1992, the Labor Party led by Rabin returned to power. The lack of progress in the peace negotiations following the **Madrid Conference** brought about a change in the attitude of the Labor Party. In 1993 secret contacts with the PLO paved the way for the **Oslo Process** and culminated in the signing of the **Declaration of Principles** and other agreements. The party lost the 1996 elections fought under Peres but returned to power in 1999 under the leadership of Barak. The Labor government's failure to hasten the process and fulfill some of the basic expectations of the Palestinians resulted in the failure of the **Camp David Talks** held in the summer of 2000. These developments and the controversial visit of Likud leader **Ariel Sharon** to the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** resulted in the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000. The violence undermined not only Israeli influence over the Palestinians but also the Labor Party's domestic support. These brought about a surge of popularity for right-wing parties and the victories of Sharon in the 2001 and 2003 elections. Labor briefly served in the unity government under Prime Minister Sharon in March 2001–November 2002 and in January–November 2005.

In 2005 Peres resigned from the party and joined the **Kadima** ("Forward") party floated by Sharon. Under Barak's leadership the Labor Party joined the coalition government formed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** in March 2009, with Barak becoming defense minister. Internal disagreement over the continuation of the party in the coalition, especially regarding the peace process, forced Barak to split the Labor and float a new party called **Ha'atzmaut** ("Independence"). With four members of the Knesset (MKs), including Barak, it stayed with the government until the January 2013 elections, which Barak and Ha'atzmaut chose not to contest. This split reduced the Labor Party's strength to nine MKs, and the party left the coalition.

In March 2011 a former journalist **Shelly Yachimovich** was elected leader and briefly served as the leader of the opposition. In the January 2013 election, the Labor Party obtained 15 seats and emerged as the third-largest party after Likud and **Yesh Atid** and refused to join the coalition government formed in March and led by Netanyahu.

Since the **assassination** of Rabin in November 1995 and the defeat of Peres in May 1996, the Labor Party has suffered from a series of internal differences, weak leadership, and inept handling of coalition formation, especially with Likud-led governments. As a result, the party faced internal divisions and splits and had the following as party heads: Ehud Barak (1997–2001), Binyamin Ben Eliezer (2001–2002), Amram Mitzna (2002–2003), Shimon Peres (2003–2005), Amir Peretz (2005–2007), Ehud Barak (2007–2011), Michael Harish (2011), Shelly Yachimovich (2011–2013), and **Isaac Herzog** (since November 2013).

The gradual dilution and abandonment of the social agenda to **Shas** in the 1980s also considerably eroded the party's support base. The failure of the peace process was compounded by the emergence of Kadima as the mainstream party to further peace with the Palestinians. The withdrawal, departure, or defection of key Labor Party personalities such as Peres, Haim Ramon (1950–), Dalia Itzik (1952–), and Ami Ayalon (1945–) dented the party. The financial crisis facing the kibbutz movement and the divorce of the Histadrut trade union and national insurance from the Labor Party in the 1990s eroded the institutional support for the party.

See also ZIONISM.

LAND DAY. On 30 March 1976, **Israeli Arabs** organized a general strike protesting against the confiscation of their lands by Israel. The protest was sparked by the official decision to expropriate 20,000 *dunums* (a *dunum* is 1,000 square meters, or about a quarter of an acre) of Arab lands in Galilee. This resulted in six protestors being killed in Nazareth when soldiers opened fire. Since then, 30 March is annually observed as Land Day. Over the years, Arabs in the **Occupied Territories** have joined the commemoration of Land Day. While protests have generally remained peaceful, the day marked a new phase in the politicization and political participation of Israeli Arabs. The annual celebrations have become a symbol of the larger Palestinian struggle for land and are used to highlight Israeli laws that are discriminatory toward Arab citizens.

LAND-FOR-PEACE. This formula refers to Israel returning the **Occupied Territories** to the Arab states and Palestinians in return for peace and recognition from its neighbors. The idea took concrete shape in the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** whereby Israel returned the

Sinai Peninsula to **Egypt** and secured recognition from the largest Arab country. The **Madrid Conference** was possible because of Israeli willingness to consider territorial compromise for a peace agreement. The **Oslo Accords** were based on the premise that Israel would secure peace from the Palestinians in return for its withdrawal from the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**. Though this has yet to materialize, land-for-peace remains the only realistic option for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

See also GOLAN HEIGHTS; JUNE WAR OF 1967; ONE-STATE SOLUTION; SYRIA; TWO-STATE SOLUTION.

LANDAU COMMISSION. Two Palestinians who were arrested for terrorist offenses during the **Bus 300 Affair** on 12 April 1984 subsequently died in police custody due to torture. This sparked off a serious debate in Israel over the interrogation procedure, and in May 1987 a three-member commission headed by a former judge of the Supreme Court, Moshe Landau (1912–2011), was appointed to examine the interrogation methods of the General Security Services (GSS), Israel's internal security agency. It found that the GSS routinely used physical force during interrogations of Palestinian prisoners. In its report, approved by the cabinet headed by Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir**, the commission stated that "the use of a moderate degree of pressure, including physical pressure, in order to obtain crucial information, is unavoidable under certain circumstances." This provided the legal sanction for the use of violence against prisoners as an acceptable method of interrogation. The cabinet approval of the recommendations of the Landau Commission recommendations came just a month before the outbreak of the **First Intifada**.

See also TERRORISM.

LANDLESS ARAB INQUIRY. The 1930 **Passfield White Paper** severely criticized **Aliya** and land purchases, as well as the Jews-only policy of the Histadrut labor federation. Most of these recommendations were nullified through the **Black Letter** that British prime minister Ramsey MacDonald (1866–1937) sent to **Chaim Weizmann** in February 1931. On the question of land purchase, Lewis French was appointed to head the Landless Arab Inquiry, which concluded that fewer than 900 Arab claims were valid. This enabled the **Yishuv** leadership to maintain that the Zionist settlement activities in Palestine had little or no impact on the Arab peasant society or caused their landlessness. At the same time, the inquiry concluded that a number of leading Arab families were involved in selling lands to the Jews. This disclosure consolidated **Hajj Amin al-Husseini** and his followers and gave rise to

opposition to land sales. These protests did not impede the land purchases; the Jews owned 456,000 *dunums* (a *dunum* is about a quarter of an acre) of land in 1920, and this figure rose to 1.3 million in 1939.

See also GREAT BRITAIN; ZIONISM.

LANGUAGE ROW. Along with Hebrew, Arabic is also the official language in Israel, but its usage remains contentious. The **Israeli Arabs** complain that most official documents are not available in Arabic, and Arabic usage in street signs has not been universal. The number of Arabs knowing the Hebrew language far exceeds the number of Jews familiar with Arabic. In 2000 the Supreme Court demanded the state use Arabic extensively. In March 2007 the Knesset approved the establishment of an Arabic-language academy along the lines of the Academy of Hebrew Language, and this was set up in the mixed city of Haifa the following year. In 2008 a group of members of the Knesset unsuccessfully sought to remove the official status of Arabic. A controversy arose in 2009 when the Ministry of Transport sought to standardize street and road signs and replace traditional Arabic names with Hebrew or English names; for example, the Arabic sign would carry **Jerusalem** rather than the traditional name **Al-Quds**.

LAVON AFFAIR. In July 1954, without the knowledge of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett (1894–1965), Israel's security establishment carried out a plot designed to abort the Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the withdrawal of British troops from the **Suez Canal** zone. Viewing the withdrawal as a security threat, its agents detonated bombs in **Egypt** against targets of **Great Britain** and the **United States**. These were intended to create popular discontent and distrust about the ability of Egyptian leadership under **Gamal Abdel Nasser** to safeguard foreigners. The plan, which mainly involved Egyptian Jews, collapsed when the spy ring was caught. Of these, six members were given long prison terms, two were tried in absentia, and two were publicly hanged on 31 January 1955. Nasser, who had executed leaders of the **Muslim Brotherhood** for conspiracy, could not be lenient with the Israeli agents.

Prime Minister Sharett initially took a cautious response to the incident. The head of the Aman (Military Intelligence), Col. Binyamin Gibli (1919–2008), refuted the plea of ignorance of Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon (1904–1976) and stated that Lavon had orally approved the bombing campaign. As a result, in February 1955 Lavon was forced to resign and was replaced by **David Ben-Gurion** as defense minister. Later, Lavon was elected secretary-general of the Histadrut labor federation. In 1961, Lavon

was exonerated, and the Israeli cabinet maintained that the operation was ordered without the knowledge of the defense minister and no responsibility was fixed for the bombing campaign in Egypt.

See also TERRORISM.

LAW OF RETURN. On 5 July 1950, the Knesset passed the Law of Return, bestowing almost unlimited rights on the Jews in the **Diaspora** to immigrate to Israel. Except for those who indulge in activities "directed against the Jewish people" or who might "endanger public health or the security of the state," this right is available to Jews everywhere. Though controversial, the Law of Return enjoys near unanimous support among Israel's Jewish population. The Citizenship Law of 1952 grants automatic Israeli citizenship to any Jew who immigrates to Israel under the Law of Return. On 19 March 1970, the Law of Return was amended to define a Jew as a person who is born to a Jewish mother or who has converted to Judaism and is not a member of any other religion. In 1977, Israel added the Extradition Law, which explicitly prevents the extradition of an Israeli citizen for crimes committed abroad before he or she became an Israeli citizen. This unique and unparalleled law forms the basis for large waves of **Aliya** that have occurred after the law's passage, and over 3 million Jews have emigrated into Israel and thus significantly contributed to the demographic balance in favor of Jews.

The presence of large numbers of non-Jews joining the massive Aliya from the **Soviet Union** in the late 1980s led to renewed calls for modification of the law. Religious circles are apprehensive that those who are not considered Jewish according to halacha (Jewish religious law) are taking advantage of the law and bringing in non-Jewish spouses and children. This law remains one of the most contentious issues in the Arab–Israeli conflict. While granting unrestricted immigration rights to Jews, Israel refuses to recognize the rights of Palestinians who were forced to flee their homes in 1948 and became **refugees**.

See also RESOLUTION 194; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); ZIONISM.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Established at the end of World War I (1914–1918), the League of Nations was an international organization that existed during the inter-war period and was the forerunner of the **United Nations**. The league was founded in 1919 and was dissolved in April 1946. It presided over the dismantling of the **Ottoman Empire**, including various Arab-dominated areas that were awarded as **Mandate** territories to **France** and **Great Britain**. Based on the decisions of the **San Remo Conference** of April 1920, the league placed **Syria** and **Lebanon** under the French mandate and Palestine and Mesopotamia (present-day **Iraq**) under the British.

On 24 July 1922, the league approved the Mandate of Palestine and made Britain responsible "for putting into effect" the **Balfour Declaration** of 1917. It called for the formation of a **Jewish Agency** "for the purpose of advising and cooperating" the **Yishuv** with the Mandate administration. In the interim, in April 1921, Britain had carved off the East Bank of the **Jordan River** from Palestine and formed the Emirate of **Transjordan**. In September 1922, Britain informed the league that provisions pertaining to **Zionism** would not be applicable to Transjordan or areas east of the **Jordan River**. Despite Palestine being a Mandate territory, Britain administered it without any reference to the league. The outbreak of World War II (1939–1945) in September 1939 brought the demise of the league, which was replaced by the **United Nations**.

LEBANESE WITHDRAWAL. This refers to the Israeli decision for a phased withdrawal from **Lebanon** in the wake of its invasion of that country in the **Peace for Galilee Operation**. There were strong criticisms over the invasion and subsequent occupation of vast areas of Lebanon by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). As part of the national unity government platform, on 14 January 1985 the Israeli cabinet agreed to a three-stage unilateral withdrawal. In the first phase in February, Israel pulled out of the western sector, including the **Litani River** area, and the area around Nabatiya. In the second stage, Israel vacated Tyre on 29 April. In the final phase, it pulled out of the remaining areas, except for a small strip along the border in southern Lebanon, which it designated the **security zone**. This zone was to be controlled by the **South Lebanese Army** (SLA), with military, logistical, and financial support from the IDF.

Since its invasion of Lebanon during the **Litani Operation** in 1978, Israel had lost about 900 soldiers in Lebanon, and mounting casualties were primarily responsible for the increased domestic pressures and eventually the successful campaign for pulling the IDF out of Lebanon. For its part, **Hezbollah** had lost more than 1,200 fighters since 1978 during clashes with the IDF. In addition, hundreds of Lebanese civilians were killed during periodic air raids, artillery exchanges, and other military offensives carried out by the IDF from 1978 to 2000, especially the **Grapes of Wrath Operation** and the **Accountability Operation**.

On 5 March 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously decided to pull out of the security zone and return to the international borders, even without reaching an agreement with **Syria**. The withdrawal was to be completed by July 2000, and fortified Israeli positions were gradually handed over to the SLA. However, deprived of the Israeli military presence and support, the SLA soon disintegrated, and its positions in the security zone were overrun by Hezbollah. This accelerated the process of Israeli withdrawal, and Israel completed a disorganized withdrawal by 24 May 2000.

See also FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT; ISRAEL–LEBANON AGREEMENT; RESOLUTION 425; SHEBA'A FARMS; WARFARE.

LEBANON. The role of Lebanon in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** was limited and confined to small-scale operations in northern Israel. Following the end of hostilities, Israel–Lebanon negotiations were held in the border town of Rosh Hanikra, and an **Armistice Agreement** was signed on 23 March 1949. Even though Lebanon was not involved in the **June War of 1967**, under pressure from **Syria** it refused to accept **Resolution 242** because it recognized Israel's right to exist.

The **Black September Massacre** in **Jordan** in 1970 and the resultant expulsion of the Palestinian **Fedayeen** brought Lebanon to the center stage of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Under the **Cairo Agreement of 1970** worked out by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and its militia were relocated to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government approved the establishment of "Fatah land," a state within a state, from where the Palestinians could carry out their military attacks against Israel. The arrangement enabled the Palestinians to bear arms, to conduct and administer their own affairs, and to oversee Palestinian **refugee** camps in Lebanon. However, this arrangement undermined Lebanese sovereignty as the PLO challenged any attempts by the Lebanese government to regain control in southern Lebanon. This sowed the seeds for the Lebanese civil war that raged from 1975 to 1989 and was brought to a close only by the country's division and occupation by Syrian and Israeli military forces.

The Palestinian militant campaign against Israel resulted in periodic Israeli counter-offensives against Lebanon. In March 1978, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) launched the **Litani Operation**, a combined offensive against the PLO positions in Tyre and Sidon and sought to "wipe out" the PLO. The invasion resulted in the **United Nations** Security Council adopting **Resolution 425** and the formation of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** (UNIFIL).

This spiral of Palestinian violence (for example, the **Ma'alot Massacre**) and Israeli retaliations (the **Beirut airport bombing** and the **Beirut raid**) eventually culminated in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, designated the **Peace for Galilee Operation**. This resulted in the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and its relocation to Tunis. Taking advantage of its continued military presence in Lebanon, Israel sought and, on 17 May 1983, concluded a formal peace agreement with the Maronite Christian–dominated Lebanese government. Falling short of a peace treaty, the **Israel–Lebanon Agreement** delineated the criteria for Israeli withdrawal in return for specific security arrangements in southern Lebanon. It also contained certain elements of

normalization, and both sides agreed that "the existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon is inviolable." Under vehement Syrian pressure, Lebanon abrogated the agreement on 5 March 1984.

In January 1985, the Israeli cabinet, as part of the policies of the national unity government, agreed to a three-stage unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, and the last of these was completed in June of that year. Israel, however, retained control over a narrow strip in southern Lebanon bordering Israel, designated as the **security zone**, and handed over the area to the **South Lebanese Army** (SLA). This arrangement proved insufficient to ensure Israel's security. Militant attacks from Palestinian groups, and later **Hezbollah**, against northern Israel often resulted in massive Israeli retaliations. On two occasions, these attacks led to full-scale military operations against Lebanon, the **Accountability Operation** in 1993 and the **Grapes of Wrath Operation** in 1996.

The presence of the IDF in the security zone and mounting casualties became domestically unpopular in Israel and witnessed grassroots protests in the form of the **Four Mothers Movement**. On 5 March 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously decided to pull out of the security zone, declaring that the **Lebanese withdrawal** would be carried out even without an agreement with Syria and would be completed by July 2000. The sudden collapse of the SLA accelerated the process, and on 24 May 2000, Israel completed a hasty withdrawal. On 16 June, United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan (1938–) informed the Security Council that Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon and had complied with the demands of Resolution 425. Differences, however, exist over the status of **Sheba'a Farms**, which Israel had captured from Syria during the June War.

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters kidnapped two IDF soldiers from inside the Israeli territory close to the disputed Sheba'a Farms. Toward securing their release, within hours after the kidnapping, Israel launched the **Second Lebanon War** that lasted for 34 days. Hezbollah received strong political support from Syria and **Iran** during the conflict. Initially many Arab countries, including **Saudi Arabia**, criticized Hezbollah for its "adventurism" in creating the crisis. The ability of a Lebanese militant group to sustain a prolonged Israeli military campaign generated a groundswell of support for Hezbollah, and this resulted in Arab countries rallying behind the resistance against Israel. During the conflict, Israel severely damaged the infrastructure in southern Lebanon and forced over one million people to flee their homes. While most fled to the northern part of the country, a large number of them fled to neighboring Syria and Jordan.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (1960–) subsequently admitted that, had he foreseen the extent of destruction brought on by the Second Lebanon War, his organization would not have kidnapped the Israeli soldiers. The body parts of the soldiers were returned to Israel through a swap arrangement

on 16 July 2008. During the conflict, over 1,100 Lebanese citizens including at least 64 Hezbollah fighters were killed, while 165 Israelis, including 43 civilians, were killed in the rocket and missile attacks carried out by Hezbollah. Hezbollah also threatened to strike at the coastal city of Tel Aviv. The conflict came to an end on 14 August 2006 with the adoption of UN Security Council **Resolution 1701**, which, among other things, called for the strengthening of the UNIFIL and disarming of all non-state military forces in Lebanon. Backed by Syria and due to its influence within Lebanon, Hezbollah has resisted any attempt by the central authority to disarm.

Following the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war of 1975, President **Hafez al-Assad** sent the military to that country. What began as a measure to protect various sectarian elements, especially the Christians in that country, gradually transformed into a Syrian occupation of Lebanon. For long, Syria refused to recognize Lebanese independence and treated the latter as part of the historical Syrian homeland. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which brought the civil war to a close explicitly, called for the withdrawal of the Syrian military. Hafez al-Assad and later his son **Bashar al-Assad** refused to comply with such a demand but emerged as the principal ally and patron of Hezbollah. The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon did not result in any modification of the Syrian position. On 2 September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, which among other things called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, but to no avail.

Under these circumstances, the **assassination** of former prime minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005) in a bomb blast on 14 February 2005, and the suspected involvement of Syrian elements in the killing, led to mass protests against the continued Syrian military presence. Under growing unpopularity, Syria completed its hasty withdrawal from Lebanon by 30 April 2005. During the first summit meeting of the **Union for the Mediterranean** held in Paris on 13 July 2008, Syria formally agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon, and relations were established on 13 August 2008. Syria opened its first embassy in Beirut in December 2008, and the Lebanese embassy was opened in Damascus in March 2009.

Lebanon is home to a large number of Palestinian refugees, and according to Human Rights Watch, there were 300,000 refugees in Lebanon in 2011. Various Lebanese governments and political parties have opposed their permanent settlement in Lebanon within the context of a settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict. This issue figured prominently when Beirut hosted the Arab summit in March 2002 that discussed the **Abdullah Plan**. Under pressure from Syria, Lebanon forced the Arab states to explicitly include relevant resolutions to resolve all issues pertaining to the Arab–Israeli conflict. This meant that the refugee question has to be resolved within the framework of General Assembly **Resolution 194** adopted in December 1948. Many believe that the demand for the right to return has largely contributed to Israeli

indifference and rejection of the **Arab Peace Initiative** adopted at the Beirut Summit. In June 2005, the Lebanese government announced its decision to allow Palestinian refugees born in Lebanon to legally work at manual and clerical jobs in the country. This removed restrictions that had prevented the Palestinians from working in more than 70 professions.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** in March 2011 spilled over into Lebanon as numerous refugees took shelter there. As of April 2014, their number was estimated to be over a million, and this represents more than one-fifth of the Lebanese population of 4.5 million. While **Hamas** has dissociated itself from the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah fighters have been actively fighting the Syrian rebels along with the forces loyal to the Assad regime. This brought Lebanon into the conflict and contributed to the tension and sectarian violence. The escalating conflict has also forced some countries to reconsider their participation in UNIFIL, and Austria, Japan, and Croatia withdrew from the UN peacekeeping force on the **Golan Heights** while **Turkey** threatened to do so after the kidnapping of two pilots of its civilian airliner in Beirut in August 2013. The discovery of huge gas reserves off the Israeli coast in the Mediterranean in 2010 has led to disputes between Israel and Lebanon over their respective exclusive economic zones.

See also AMAL; BURGAS TERROR ATTACK; FATAH UPRISING; GLIDER ATTACK; GOOD FENCE POLICY; KFAR KANA MASSACRE; PHALANGE; PRISONER EXCHANGE; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE; UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF).

LEHI. *See* STERN GANG.

LEVY REPORT. In January 2012, Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** appointed a three-member committee headed by a former judge of the Supreme Court, Edmund Levy (1941–), to look into the legal status of the **outposts** in the **West Bank**. The committee submitted its report in July 2012 wherein it concluded that Israel's presence in the West Bank could not be described as occupation and that the **settlements** are legal under international law. It also called for the approval of unauthorized outposts and for new guidelines for settlement construction. The findings of the committee are controversial and are in violation of the **Fourth Geneva Convention** and the prevailing international position regarding **Occupied Territories**. Until December 2013, the report was not brought before the Knesset, but there are suggestions that the government has been covertly implementing the recommendations of the Levy Report.

See also MIGRON EVACUATION.

LIEBERMAN, AVIGDOR (1958–). Born on 5 June 1958 in Kishinev, in the erstwhile **Soviet Union** (or present-day Moldavia), Avigdor Lieberman is a controversial Israeli politician. He made **Aliya** to Israel in 1978, and during his **conscription** period he served in the Artillery Corps of the **Israel Defense Forces** and became a corporal. While studying at the Hebrew University of **Jerusalem**, Lieberman was associated with the student wing of **Likud** and was involved in confrontations with the Arab students at the university. Active in Zionist activities, in 1988 he began working with **Benjamin Netanyahu**. Following Netanyahu's election as the leader of Likud, Lieberman became the director-general of the party and, after Netanyahu's election as prime minister in May 1996, he was named director-general of the prime minister's office. Protesting against Netanyahu's concessions regarding the **Wye Memorandum**, in October 1998 Lieberman resigned his position and his membership in Likud.

After a brief association with Yisrael Ba'Aliya, the immigrant party headed by former refusenik Nathan Sharansky (1948–), in 1999 Lieberman formed **Yisrael Beiteinu**, contested the 15th elections, and was elected to the Knesset. Since then, he has been reelected for five consecutive terms. In 2001, he became the national infrastructure minister under **Ariel Sharon**, and he has held various cabinet positions since then. His opposition to Sharon's **Gaza Disengagement** plan resulted in his dismissal in May 2004. Following the 2009 elections, he became the minister of foreign affairs, a position he held until his resignation in December 2012 after he was charged with fraud and breach of trust. Lieberman joined with Netanyahu and jointly contested the 19th Knesset elections held in January 2013 and returned as foreign minister when Netanyahu formed the government in March.

Lieberman's right-wing positions are often at odds with various Israeli leaders. In 1997, he left Prime Minister Netanyahu and resigned his membership of Likud over the Wye Memorandum. On 4 June 2005, Prime Minister Sharon dismissed him over his opposition to the Gaza Disengagement plan. He left the government of **Ehud Olmert** due to his opposition to the **Annapolis Conference**.

A supporter of the **settlement** movement, Lieberman lives in the settlement of Nokdim, in the southern **West Bank**, but supports the **two-state solution**. Through the Lieberman Plan, in May 2004 he advocated **annexation** of a significant number of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. His statements questioning the loyalty of the **Israeli Arabs** have led to his being depicted as a racist. He unsuccessfully sponsored a bill that would have partially disenfranchised the Israeli Arabs. Internally, he has been advocating secularization of personal laws and an end to the domination of the *haredi* **parties** over issues such as marriage, conversion, and citizenship rights for secular Jews. This has often put him at odds with the orthodox religious party, **Shas**. His controversial statements against foreign leaders, especially

President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Mahmoud Abbas**, have caused diplomatic embarrassments to Israel.

See also ZIONISM.

LIKUD. Formally established on the eve of the December 1973 Israeli Knesset elections, Likud is the ideological successor of Herut, a right-wing Zionist party that was established on 15 June 1948. Founded by **Menachem Begin**, Herut was modeled on the ideology of Ze'ev Jabotinsky (1880–1940). In 1965, Begin merged Herut with the Liberal Party and formed Gahal, which took part in the national unity government established on the eve of the **June War of 1967**.

In the 1977 Knesset elections, Likud defeated the **Labor Party** and ended the monopoly on power that the latter had enjoyed since 1948. Until his resignation in 1983, Likud was headed by Begin, and the party won the Knesset elections held in 1981, 1996, and 2003. Since 1977, Likud prime ministers have been Begin (1977–1983), **Yitzhak Shamir** (1983–1984 and 1986–1992), **Benjamin Netanyahu** (1996–1999), **Ariel Sharon** (2001–2006), and Netanyahu again (since March 2009). Through careful political maneuvers and alliances with religious parties, Likud has dominated the political landscape since 1977.

As a right-of-center party, Likud is strongly nationalist and follows an assertive foreign policy. For a long time, it was opposed to Palestinian statehood and maintained that **Jordan is Palestine**. In 1986, the party was instrumental in the adoption of the **PLO Law**, which prevented any contacts between Israeli citizens and members of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). When in power, it actively pursued and accelerated **settlement** activities in the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**.

The visit of President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** in November 1977 and the conclusion of the **Camp David Accords** in 1978 and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** the following year were the crowning achievements of Likud. Peace with Egypt did not enjoy the unanimous support of the party. Influential figures such as Moshe Arens (1925–) and Shamir were opposed to the Camp David Accords. Responding to internal opposition, Prime Minister Begin enacted the **Golan Law** in 1981 and brought the **Golan Heights** under Israeli rule.

Likud portrayed its **Peace for Galilee Operation**, the code name for the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**, as "a war of choice" but in the process exposed serious differences inside the country. Likud was, however, responsible for the Israeli restraint during the **Kuwait War** (1990–1991) and for its decision not to respond to Scud missiles fired by **Iraq**. After the war, Prime Minister

Shamir led the Israeli delegation to the **Madrid Conference**. Overshadowed by the **loan guarantee** controversy with the **United States**, the party lost the 1992 elections to the Labor Party.

In the wake of the **Oslo Process** initiated by Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**, Likud led the opposition to the peace process. It perceived the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) as a forerunner for an independent Palestinian state. Following his 1996 election victory, Prime Minister Netanyahu was forced to negotiate with the PNA and its leader **Yasser Arafat** and concluded the **Hebron Protocol**. This in turn brought about internal divisions within Likud and resulted in the victory of Labor leader **Ehud Barak** in the 1999 Knesset elections. In September 2000, the controversial visit of Likud leader Sharon to the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** sparked the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. Capitalizing on the failure of Barak, Likud won the February 2001 prime ministerial and January 2003 Knesset elections. The **Gaza Disengagement** announced by Sharon in May 2004 created strong tension and opposition within the party. In November 2005, Sharon resigned from Likud and floated a new party called **Kadima** ("Forward"); the following month, Netanyahu was again elected the leader of Likud.

In the March 2006 elections, Likud fared badly, could secure only 12 seats, and was the principal opposition party when the government headed by **Ehud Olmert** led Israel into the **Second Lebanon War** and **Cast Lead Operation** against the Gaza Strip. Likud fared better in the February 2009 election to the 18th Knesset and secured 27 seats as against 28 won by Kadima. The failure of **Tzipi Livni** to form the government resulted in Netanyahu's staking claims, and he formed the government in March 2009 that included **Yisrael Beiteinu**, **Shas**, and the *haredi* **parties**. Following a leadership change in Kadima, Netanyahu briefly formed a unity government, but it collapsed over the issue of **conscription** for the *haredi* population.

Likud fought the January 2013 Knesset election under a joint list with Yisrael Beiteinu and obtained 31 seats in the 19th Knesset. In March, Netanyahu formed the government that included **Yesh Atid**, the **Jewish Home Party**, and **Hatnuah** but did not include Shas or the *haredi* parties due to differences over conscription for the *haredi* population.

The party primaries held before the 2013 elections witnessed a rightward shift of Likud, and some prominent figures such as Benny Begin (1943–) and Don Meridor (1947–) could not secure a realistic slot in the party list. The emergence of settler leader **Moshe Feiglin** was seen as a victory for the right wing of the party.

Since the formation of the government following the 2013 elections, some Likud leaders have been openly critical of the **two-state solution**, thereby raising doubts about the feasibility of a negotiated settlement with the Pales-

tinians. Under pressures from the party faithful, the government has been increasing settlement activities even while seeking to resume negotiations with the PNA.

See also EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); ZIONISM.

LITANI OPERATION. This was the code name for the brief Israeli invasion of Lebanon carried out in 1978. In the early hours of 15 March, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) launched a military offensive against **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) positions in Tyre and Sidon in **Lebanon**. It came four days after a terrorist attack, when an 11-member Palestinian commando unit hijacked two Israeli buses on the Haifa–Tel Aviv route, resulting in the deaths of 37 people, with injuries to more than 75. Israel responded with a full-scale invasion of Lebanon with an explicit intention of "wiping out" the PLO. The IDF occupied a 10-kilometer-wide strip north of the Israeli border to the south of the **Litani River**. In this operation, more than 1,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians were killed, and more than 200,000 fled their homes.

On 19 March, without any reference to the hijacking and killings that preceded the conflict, the **United Nations** Security Council unanimously adopted **Resolution 425**, which called on Israel to "immediately . . . cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory." The resolution also established the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** (UNIFIL) "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces." Israel pulled out of the area on 13 June 1978, following the formation of UNIFIL, but handed over its positions to its right-wing Christian militia allies, the **South Lebanese Army**, rather than to UNIFIL. This led to the continued presence of UNIFIL even after the eventual Israeli pullout from Lebanon in May 2000.

See also GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; RESOLUTION 1701; SECURITY ZONE; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

LITANI RIVER. The 140-kilometer-long Litani River is the main source of fresh **water** for **Lebanon**, and it originates in the Beka'a Valley in the north and falls into the Mediterranean about 29 kilometers north of the Israel–Lebanon border. There were suggestions that Israel has been coveting the Litani River due to its perennial shortage of water. The **Litani Operation** of 1978 and the **Peace for Galilee Operation** in 1982 and the subsequent occupation of the **security zone** in southern Lebanon are often cited as examples of Israel's territorial ambitions.

LIVNI, TZIPI (1958–). A minister in the cabinet of Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** formed in March 2013, Tzipi Livni is an Israeli politician and leader of the **Hatnuah** ("Movement") Party founded in November 2012. Born in Tel Aviv on 8 July 1958, Livni is the daughter of a prominent figure in the Jewish underground **Irgun** movement in **Mandate Palestine**. After serving in the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), she joined the external intelligence agency Mossad. Then she pursued and practiced public and commercial law. In 1996, she failed in her Knesset bid but was named by Prime Minister Netanyahu to head the authority on government-owned companies to oversee privatization. She was elected to the Knesset in 1999 as a **Likud** member and was reelected since then, but as a member of different political parties.

Livni became a minister in July 2001 under Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**. She supported the **Gaza Disengagement** plan, which was unpopular within the ruling Likud Party, which resulted in Sharon's forming **Kadima** in November 2005. Livni joined Sharon and became one of the founding members of the party. The debilitating stroke suffered by Sharon in January 2006 resulted in **Ehud Olmert** taking over the leadership of Kadima. Following the March 2006 Knesset election, Livni became deputy prime minister and foreign minister under Olmert. Her reluctance to express reservations over the **Second Lebanon War** came under severe criticism. Following Olmert's resignation due to a corruption scandal, Livni became the leader of Kadima in September 2008.

Livni's efforts to form the government after the 18th Knesset elections proved futile due to increased budget allocations demanded by **Shas**, and she became the leader of the opposition when Netanyahu formed the government in March 2009. In September 2008, she won the leadership contest for Kadima but lost it to Shaul Mofaz (1948–) in March 2012. After that, Livni resigned from Kadima and briefly stayed out of politics.

On the eve of the 19th Knesset elections in November 2012, she launched Hatnuah, which secured six seats in the 120-member Knesset. In March 2013 she became justice minister under the coalition headed by Netanyahu and was given responsibility for the government's diplomatic initiatives and peace talks with the Palestinians.

LOAN GUARANTEES. During the **Kuwait War** against **Iraq**, the Israeli government floated the idea of the **United States** providing loans to fund infrastructure programs for the absorption of the new wave of Jewish immigrants from the then **Soviet Union**. As Scud missiles were falling on Israel, U.S. secretary of state **James A. Baker** signed a $400 million loan guarantee, which gradually grew to guarantees of $10 billion. Even though the George H. W. Bush administration (1989–1993) was inclined toward the idea, it wanted to use the economic largesse to influence and curtail Israel's

settlement activities in the **Occupied Territories**. The government headed by Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir** was less transparent in pursuing settlements in **Jerusalem** beyond the **Green Line**, and this led to acrimony between Israel and the United States and partially contributed to the victory of the **Labor Party** in the 1992 Knesset elections.

On 11 August 1992, Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** met President Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, and worked out a formula that satisfied both sides. Rabin's assurance of a "partial" freeze of settlement activities and a "change of priorities" enabled the United States to agree to a $10 billion loan guaranteed over a five-year period. Both sides agreed that the United States would determine the amount to be deducted from the guarantees that were spent by Israel for settlement activities. On 13 December 1996, the Israeli government headed by **Benjamin Netanyahu** rescinded the restrictions and established the pre-1992 policy of official subsidies and other concessions for the settlements.

Though the dollar-for-dollar penalty warranted much larger deductions, the United States often deducted symbolic amounts to convey its displeasure over settlements. In 1997, it deducted only $60 million, even though it identified Israel as having spent $307 million for settlement-related activities. The administration ruled that the $247 million spent on **bypass roads** and other expenses were incurred to implement the **Oslo Accords** and hence were exempted. Between 1992 and 2003, the United States deducted $1.1 billion from the total loan guarantees given to Israel, in accordance with the terms. In January 2012, both sides signed an agreement that extended the loan program until 2016.

LOD MASSACRE. On 30 May 1972, three members of the Japanese Red Army, acting on behalf of the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, attacked passengers arriving on an Air France flight at Israel's Lod (later Ben-Gurion) international airport outside Tel Aviv with machine guns and hand grenades. Thirty people, including two of the hijackers, were killed, and more than 70 were injured. The sole surviving attacker, Kozo Okamoto (1947–), was arrested and tried in Israel. His release was demanded during some of the post-1972 Palestinian hostage takings against Israel, including the **Munich Massacre** of 1972 and the **Entebbe Operation** of 1976. Okamoto was eventually released in 1985 due to proven insanity. The Lod attack marked the first coordinated Palestinian attempt to enlist the support of non–Middle Eastern terrorist groups in support of their cause.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

LONDON AGREEMENT. On 11 April 1987, Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres** held a secret meeting with King **Hussein** of **Jordan** in London, and both leaders agreed on a six-point plan that outlined the purposes and format of an international conference. Subsequently termed the London Agreement, it was discussed by Israel's inner cabinet in May and was opposed by Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Shamir** who headed the national unity government (1984–1990). On 30 September, Peres outlined his agreement with King Hussein before the **United Nations** General Assembly. Among other things, it called for an international conference that would neither impose any solution nor veto any agreements concluded by the parties. The resolution of the Palestinian problem "in all its aspects" would be accomplished "in negotiations between the Jordanian–Palestinian delegation and the Israeli delegation." The inability of Peres to secure the backing of the prime minister not only stymied any progress, however, but also raised doubts among the Arab leaders of the wisdom of reaching agreements with only a section of political leadership in Israel.

See also JORDAN OPTION.

LONDON CONFERENCE. On 1 March 2005, Prime Minister **Tony Blair** of **Great Britain** hosted a conference in London to promote Middle East peace. It was attended by U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice (1954–), **United Nations** secretary-general Kofi Annan (1938–), British foreign secretary Jack Straw (1946–), and the newly elected president of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), **Mahmoud Abbas**. The meeting was boycotted by Israel because Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** refused to attend the meeting to discuss the **Quartet Road Map** until Palestine gave an undertaking to stop **terrorism** against Israel. Hence it was converted into a conference urging the Palestinian leadership to pursue "reforms." It strongly condemned **suicide attacks** inside Israel and called on the PNA to pursue sustained actions against terrorism.

See also UNITED STATES.

M

MA'ALE ADUMIM. This Jewish **settlement** in the **West Bank** on the outskirts of **Jerusalem** was established in 1975 and was recognized and legalized through a cabinet decision of 26 July 1977. On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link Ma'ale Adumim with Jerusalem. At the end of 2012, its population stood at 40,000.

   See also AMANA; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

MA'ALOT MASSACRE. On 13 May 1974, a three-member **Palestine Liberation Organization** team took 85 students and teachers of Nativ Meir School in the Upper Galilee township of Ma'alot as hostages. The hijackers demanded the release of 20 of their comrades held in Israeli prisons and their safe passage to Damascus. Israel agreed to release the prisoners but refused to concede to the demand of the militants to take the hostages to **Syria**. Following the impasse, Israel ordered a commando raid on the school, and during the operation, 21 children, all three Palestinian hostage takers, and a soldier were killed.

   See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

MACCABEE OPERATION. On 1 May 1948, during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Jewish forces launched an offensive on the Hulda–Latrun road, which formed a part of the Tel Aviv–**Jerusalem** road. After intense fighting, on 16 May, the Hulda–Jerusalem road was opened for Jews living in western Jerusalem. This was one of the decisive phases of the 1948 war.

   See also WARFARE.

MACDONALD WHITE PAPER. Responding to mounting Arab opposition to its policy in **Mandate Palestine**, on 17 May 1939 **Great Britain** came out with a white paper named after its author, Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald (1901–1981). Having failed to satisfy its contradictory commitments to Arabs and Jews, the government opted to revise its policy of following the **Balfour Declaration**. The policy paper called for a unitary

state in Palestine to be established gradually over the next 10 years. It imposed severe restrictions on **Aliya** and stipulated that for the next five years, Jews would be admitted at the rate of 15,000 per year, the total number for the entire period was not to exceed 75,000, and any illegal entrants into Palestine would be deducted from that figure. It also stated that additional Aliya into Palestine would require the consent of the Arab community. The white paper imposed restrictions on Jewish land purchase in Palestine.

In addressing the two key Arab complaints against the Mandate authorities—Jewish immigration and land purchase—the white paper angered Zionists, who regarded it as a reversal and abandonment of the Balfour Declaration and a betrayal of the decision of the **League of Nations** to award the Mandate to Britain. Coming against the backdrop of mounting tensions following the advent of Nazism, the Zionists coined a strategy "to fight the war [against Nazism] as if there is no White Paper and to fight the White Paper as if there is no war." Thus, the white paper marked a distinct phase in Zionist–Mandate relations and consolidated anti-British sentiments in the **Yishuv**.

See also ST. JAMES CONFERENCE; ZIONISM.

MADRID CONFERENCE. The Middle East peace conference was inaugurated in Madrid on 30 October 1991 under the co-chairpersonship of the **United States** and the **Soviet Union**. It was attended by delegates from Israel, **Egypt**, **Lebanon**, **Syria**, and **Jordan**, as well as the Palestinians. This was the most visible and positive outcome in Arab–Israeli relations following the **Kuwait War**, which took place earlier that year. This was made possible by prolonged diplomatic initiatives of U.S. secretary of state **James A**. **Baker**, who undertook as many as eight trips to the Middle East to convince the participants to attend.

The format of the conference satisfied all the key participants. Though not sponsored by the **United Nations**, the international nature of the conference satisfied the long-standing Arab demand for a multi-national forum and guarantees for peace with Israel. The Arab willingness to negotiate directly satisfied Israel's aspirations of recognition and acceptance. Weakened by its support for Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) during the Kuwait War, the Palestinian leadership agreed to the formal exclusion of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and to attend the conference as a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation.

All the Middle East participants agreed that **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the UN Security Council would be the basis for any peace settlement. It was also agreed that all bilateral negotiations would be conducted independently and that progress on one track would not be linked to or conditional upon progress on other tracks. Adjourned after three days, the participants went to Washington, D.C., on 9 December for follow-up bilater-

al negotiations. The 10 rounds of bilateral talks held during 1991–1993 did not produce any meaningful progress and paved the way for the **Oslo Accords**.

Under the Madrid format, multilateral talks began in the **Moscow Conference** on 28 January 1992. Five separate working groups were formed, devoted to **water**, the environment, arms control and regional security, **refugees**, and regional economic development. Even though progress from the Madrid Conference has been minimal, it established a procedure and direct negotiations between both sides.

See also SHAMIR, YITZHAK (1915–2012).

MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE. At the end of World War I (1914–1918), the **League of Nations** placed Arab-dominated areas of the **Ottoman Empire** under **France** and **Great Britain**. Based on the decisions of the **San Remo Conference** of April 1920, it placed **Syria** and **Lebanon** under the French Mandate and Palestine and Mesopotamia (later **Iraq**) under the British. In none of these cases was the consent of the inhabitants sought.

The Palestine Mandate was approved by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, and the league made Britain responsible for "putting into effect" the **Balfour Declaration** of 1917. It called for the formation of a **Jewish Agency**, "for the purpose of advising and cooperating" with the Mandate administration in its relations with the Jewish population of Palestine. The Mandate formally came into force on 29 September 1923. Meanwhile, in April 1921, Britain carved out the territories east of the **Jordan River** to form the Emirate of **Transjordan**. On 16 September 1922, Britain informed the League of Nations that the provisions pertaining to **Zionism** would not be applicable to Transjordan.

The British proposals in the 1920s and 1930s for an elected legislative council met with strong opposition from the Arabs due to differences over representation for the Jews and Arabs. When Britain was granted the Mandate, the Arabs constituted 92 percent of the population and owned 98 percent of the land in Palestine. Despite the formal authority of the league, Britain ruled Palestine as a crown colony and administered it through the colonial office.

On 1 July 1920, even before the conferment of the Mandate, Sir Herbert Samuel (1870–1963) was appointed the first high commissioner of Palestine. Under the Mandate, most of the political, economic, social, and military institutions and state structures of the future State of Israel were established. With a view to implementing the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate authorities initially favored and facilitated **Aliya** and Jewish land purchases in Palestine. As Arab opposition to these two measures grew, Britain gradually

modified and, through the **MacDonald White Paper** of 1939, reversed its sympathetic attitude toward the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Unable to reconcile its contradictory promises to the Arabs and Jews, in April 1947 Britain expressed its inability to continue with the Mandate and asked the newly formed **United Nations** to find a political settlement. Upon the approval of the partition resolution by the UN General Assembly, Britain announced its decision to terminate its presence in Palestine on 15 May 1948. Hours before this deadline, the Zionist leaders met in Tel Aviv and announced the establishment of the Jewish state.

See also ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939); CHURCHILL WHITE PAPER; DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION; HUSSEIN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE; KING DAVID HOTEL EXPLOSION; MORRISON-GRADY PLAN; NABI MUSA RIOTS; PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER; SHAW COMMISSION; UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP); WESTERN WALL RIOTS; WOODHEAD COMMISSION.

MAPAI. *See* LABOR PARTY.

MARRIAGE LAW. In 2003 Israel enacted a law that prohibits Palestinians from the **Occupied Territories** from acquiring Israeli citizenship through marriage. This came in the midst of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and increased acts of **terrorism**. Though temporary, the law was periodically extended and is attributed to the involvement of naturalized Palestinians in some terror activities inside Israel. This law not only prevents **Israeli Arabs** but also Jewish Israelis from giving Israeli citizenship to their spouses living in the Occupied Territories. In January 2012, the Israeli High Court upheld the law and rejected petitions against its constitutionality. In most Arab countries, Arab women cannot transfer citizenship rights to their non-Arab husbands or to their children.

MASADA. Overlooking the Dead Sea, the fortress of Masada is located about 145 kilometers south of **Jerusalem**. It gained prominence due to an event that occurred three years after the Roman conquest of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD). At 400 meters from the ground, facing an imminent defeat at the hands of the Roman army led by Lucius Flavius Silva (b. c. 40 AD), the 960 Jewish residents of the fortification, including men, women, and children, committed mass suicide in 73 AD. Since the establishment of the State of Israel, Masada is seen as the first

Jewish revolt and has come to symbolize Jewish fortitude and valor. Members of some elite units of the **Israel Defense Forces** take their oath at a ceremony held in Masada with the pledge "Masada shall not fall again."

MASHA'AL, KHALID (1956–). A leader of the militant Palestinian Islamic group **Hamas**, Khalid Masha'al, was born on 28 May 1956 in a village near **Ramallah** in the **West Bank** while it was under the occupation of the Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**. He studied physics in **Kuwait**, and after the formation of Hamas in the wake of the **First Intifada**, he represented the group in Kuwait. In 1991 he moved to Jordan after the Kuwait crisis when thousands of Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and other Arab countries. This was in response to the support given by the **Palestine Liberation Organization** to President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) of **Iraq** following his Kuwaiti invasion, occupation, and annexation. Masha'al stayed in Amman until King **Abdullah II** decided in August 1999 to close down the Hamas offices in Jordan and to expel its leaders. After a brief stay in **Qatar**, Masha'al moved to **Syria** where he lived until the **Arab Spring in Syria**. As part of the reconciliation efforts, in January 2012 Masha'al met King Abdullah in Amman and reestablished relations with the Hashemite Kingdom.

In September 1997 Israeli agents tried to assassinate Masha'al in what is commonly referred to as the **Masha'al Affair**, but he survived and gained greater recognition and admiration among the Palestinians. He was often seen as the leader of the "outsider" component of Hamas—that is, outside the Palestinian territories. As a prominent political leader, he has been giving mixed signals about the willingness of Hamas to accept Israel's right to exist and was part of various cease-fire attempts mediated by **Egypt** during the tenure of President **Hosni Mubarak**. Following Israel's **assassination** of **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** and **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi** in 2004, Masha'al emerged as the most dominant figure in Hamas. Masha'al represented Hamas in the short-lived **Mecca Accord** mediated by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** in March 2007. Since 1996 he has been heading its political bureau and was reelected in April 2013.

See also TARGETED KILLING.

MASHA'AL AFFAIR. On 25 September 1997, Israeli agents made an unsuccessful **assassination** attempt on **Khalid Masha'al**, the political bureau chief of Hamas in Amman. The capture of two Israeli agents with false Canadian passports led to a serious diplomatic crisis between Israel and **Jordan**, as well as between Israel and Canada. The affair was amicably ended when Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** agreed to provide an antidote against the lethal chemical used in the attack and to release Hamas's spiritual leader **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** from prison. Israel also promised not

to use Jordanian territory for such attacks in the future. An official Israeli inquiry commission headed by Joseph Ciechanover (1933–) criticized the technical aspects of the operation and questioned the wisdom of the political leadership in approving such an operation in Jordan. In February 1998, Danny Yatom (1945–) resigned as Mossad chief, and this was seen as an attempt to placate King **Hussein** who expressed his public anger over the attack. Following the election of Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** in 1999, Yatom returned to diplomacy as a senior aide to Barak and played an important role in relations with Jordan.

See also TARGETED KILLING; WARFARE.

MAVI MARMARA AFFAIR. *Mavi Marmara* is a merchant vessel owned by **IHH**, a humanitarian organization of **Turkey**, and was part of the **Freedom Flotilla** that sought to break the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by Israel. In May 2010, along with five other ships, the *Mavi Marmara* was carrying relief materials for the beleaguered people of the **Gaza Strip**, which came under the control of **Hamas** in June 2007. The organizers of the flotilla refused suggestions to offload the cargo at an Israeli port for onward movement into Gaza over land.

In the early hours of 31 May 2010, elite commandos of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) boarded the *Mavi Marmara* in the international waters off the coast of Israel. In the ensuing scuffle, 10 protesters, including 9 Turkish citizens and 1 from the **United States**, were killed. This caused severe tensions in Israeli–Turkish relations.

Refusing to heed the calls for an impartial international commission, in June 2010 Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** appointed the **Turkel Commission**. In its initial report submitted in January 2011, the commission absolved Israel of any responsibility for the killings on the *Mavi Marmara*. Following a similar internal investigation on 23 May 2012, the Turkish state prosecutor prepared an indictment that carries life sentences against four senior Israeli commanders including Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi (1954–), who was the chief of staff of the IDF during the incident, and they were indicted in absentia by an Istanbul court a few days later.

The **Palmer Commission** appointed by the **United Nations** submitted its report in September 2011 and blamed both Israel and Turkey for not acting earlier to prevent the deaths. Like the Turkel Commission, the Palmer Commission upheld the legality of Israel's right to impose the Gaza blockade. This angered Turkey and resulted in a deterioration of relations. In June 2010 Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv and, following the publication of the Palmer Report in September 2011, expelled Israel's ambassador in Ankara. Prime Minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** conditioned normalization upon Israel's apology, compensation, and willingness to own up to the deaths and to end the Siege of Gaza. In March 2013, during his first official visit to

Israel, U.S. president **Barack Obama** persuaded Netanyahu to make a telephone call to Erdogan and convey his apologies. Both sides are working out the details of the compensation package.

See also DAVOS CONTROVERSY; UNITED STATES; WARFARE.

MAY 17 AGREEMENT. *See* ISRAEL–LEBANON AGREEMENT.

MECCA ACCORD. Fatah and **Hamas** signed the Mecca Accord on 8 February 2007 with the goal of ending the internal division and working toward Palestinian unity. The Palestinian elections held on 25 January 2006 saw the decisive victory of the militant Islamic group and the formation of a Hamas-led government headed by Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh** in February 2006 at the invitation of **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) president **Mahmoud Abbas**. This did not resolve the tension between the two Palestinian groups. At the invitation of King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia**, rival Palestinian groups went to Mecca for **unity talks**. In the past Egypt had coordinated such talks. Fatah representatives in Mecca included Abbas and member of parliament Mohammed Dahlan (1961–), while Haniyeh and **Khalid Masha'al** represented Hamas. Both sides agreed to stop the "shedding of the Palestinian blood" and work toward national unity.

This Mecca agreement was followed by the formation of a unity government in March 2007 that included Fatah members, and centrist party member **Salam Fayyad** became finance minister. This arrangement did not last, and on 7 June violent clashes broke out in the **Gaza Strip** between Fatah and Hamas members. The **Battle of Gaza** continued until 15 June when Hamas forces militarily took over the Gaza Strip. On 14 June, Abbas dissolved the unity government and imposed a state of emergency. As a result, there exists a de facto division of the Palestinian territories—namely, the Gaza Strip ruled by Hamas and the **West Bank** controlled by the PNA. The failure of the Mecca Accord resulted in Saudi Arabia not playing any role in the inter-Palestinian negotiations and paved the way for a greater role by **Qatar**.

See also CAIRO DIALOGUE.

MEIR, GOLDA (1898–1978). A leading Israeli politician, Golda Mabovitch served as Israel's first and only woman prime minister, from March 1969 to June 1974. Born on 3 May 1898 in Kiev, Ukraine, Meir immigrated to the **United States** in 1906 and studied in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 1917, she married Morris Meyerson; in 1956, she Hebraicized her name and came to be known as Golda Meir.

Meir made **Aliya** to Palestine in 1921 and became active in the Histadrut labor federation. After holding senior positions in the trade union, in 1946 she replaced Moshe Sharett (1894–1965) as acting head of the political de-

partment of the **Jewish Agency**. In that capacity, in April 1948, she held secret talks with King **Abdullah I** of **Transjordan** over the **Partition Plan** for Palestine. Weeks before Israel's formation, she also conducted a highly successful fund-raising campaign in the United States.

In June 1948, Meir was appointed Israel's first ambassador to the **Soviet Union** and held that position until her election to the Knesset in 1949. During 1949–1956, she served as minister of labor and national insurance. In June 1956, she took over as foreign minister and continued until January 1966, initiating and consolidating Israel's relations with the newly independent countries of Africa. Between 1966 and 1968, Meir served as secretary-general of the Mapai and later headed the newly formed Labor Alignment, both forerunners of the **Labor Party**.

In March 1969, after the death of Levi Eshkol (1895–1969), Meir became Israel's prime minister. She presided over Israel's debacle in the **October War of 1973** and managed to lead the party to victory in the December 1973 elections. Even though the **Agranat Commission** that inquired into the October war absolved her of any direct responsibility for the Israeli unpreparedness, in April 1974 Meir resigned as prime minister and was succeeded by **Yitzhak Rabin**. She withdrew from public life but was present when President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt** visited **Jerusalem** in November 1977. Meir died on 8 December 1978.

See also JERUSALEM VISIT.

MENA ECONOMIC SUMMITS. The first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summit Conference was held in Casablanca, Morocco, from 30 October to 1 November 1994. Believed to be the initiative of Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres**, the economic summit was intended to complement the political aspects of the peace process and to facilitate Israel's eventual integration into the Middle East. Reflecting the prevailing enthusiasm over the **Oslo Process**, the Casablanca Summit was attended by representatives from 61 countries, including Israel. The second MENA Summit was held in Amman, **Jordan**, in October 1995. The political climate in the region following the 1996 electoral victory of **Benjamin Netanyahu** resulted in **Egypt**'s downgrading the third meeting that took place in Cairo in November 1996. The fourth and last MENA Conference was held in **Qatar** in November 1997, with only six Arab participants. Most of the key members of the region, including the **Palestinian National Authority**, boycotted the Doha conference due to lack of progress in the peace process. MENA summits have not taken place since 1997.

See also ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE PROPOSAL. On 6 December 1976, Israel presented a proposal to the **United Nations** General Assembly that called for the immediate convening of a Middle East peace conference to resume negotiations toward implementing **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338**. Under the proposal, **Egypt**, Israel, **Jordan**, and **Syria** would participate in the conference under the co-chairpersonship of the **United States** and the **Soviet Union**. However, a number of countries belonging to the **Non-Aligned Movement** introduced an amendment and called for the participation of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in the proposed conference, and as a result Israel withdrew its draft proposal on 9 December.

MIDDLE EAST ROAD MAP. *See* QUARTET ROAD MAP.

MIGRON EVACUATION. Migron was an Israeli **outpost** in the **West Bank** north of **Jerusalem** that was established in 1999, long after the conclusion of the **Declaration of Principles**. In August 2011, the Israeli Supreme Court declared that Migron was built illegally on lands belonging to the Palestinians and should be dismantled. This ruling was reaffirmed in March 2012. On 2 September the **Israel Defense Forces** completed the evacuation of Migron. There are still a number of illegal outposts in the West Bank whose removal is contested and opposed within Israel.

   See also LEVY REPORT.

MILITARY ADMINISTRATION. In 1948, as an emergency measure during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Israel established a military administration to govern its Arab citizens. Arabs and Druze living in Galilee and its environs, in the Negev, and in the towns of Ramleh, Lod, Jaffa, Ashkelon, and **Jerusalem** were brought under this administration. This minority-targeted, non-territorial arrangement was seen as essential to preventing the Arab citizens of Israel from acting against the state in collaborating with its enemies. The arrangement imposed severe restrictions on the movements and civil rights of the **Israeli Arabs** and was criticized both inside and outside Israel. In 1962, following their classification as a separate minority, the Druze population was excluded from the military administration. Even though the military administration was formally abolished in 1966, some of the emergency regulations could still be enforced by the heads of various military commands of the **Israel Defense Forces**.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT. Following the **June War of 1967**, Israel established a military government headed by a serving military officer to govern and administer the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**. The governor was responsible for the overall security as well as civic administration of the

Occupied Territories and was aided by an array of serving military officials who looked after both the military and civilian aspects of the administration. This dual role often created frictions inside the government as well as the military establishment. Officially termed "coordinator of activities in the Territories," this arrangement continued until the **Oslo Accords** were implemented and the **Palestinian National Authority** was put in place.

MITCHELL COMMITTEE REPORT. On 17 October 2000, following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, U.S. president **Bill Clinton** and President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** organized the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit**, attended by the leaders of Israel, **Jordan**, the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), the **United Nations**, and the **European Union**. The conferees decided to establish a committee to investigate the ongoing violence and the events leading up to the Al-Aqsa Intifada and to suggest measures to prevent its recurrence, to rebuild mutual confidence, and to resume negotiations. Subsequently, U.S. senator George J. Mitchell (1933–) was named head of the committee, which also consisted of former U.S. senator Warren Rudman (1930–), former Turkish president Suleiman Demirel (1924–), former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (1942–), and Norwegian foreign minister Thorbjorn Jagland (1950–).

On 30 April 2001, the committee completed its report, which was published on 20 May. Refraining from apportioning blame for the Intifada, it ruled out the controversial visit of Israel's leader of the opposition **Ariel Sharon** to the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** area as the cause for Palestinian violence. It also rejected the Israeli government's position that the PNA and **Yasser Arafat** had orchestrated the Palestinian violence. The report called for a complete freeze on **settlement** activities and an end to Israel's economic blockade on Palestinian areas. It requested the PNA to make greater efforts to prevent **terrorism** against Israeli civilians.

While the PNA accepted the report and called for its implementation, the Israeli government declined to accept its recommendations—especially due to its call for a total freeze of settlements. Israel argued that linking the settlement freeze to an end to Palestinian violence would reward terrorism. Gradually the **United States** diluted the linkage between cessation of Palestinian violence and Israeli confidence-building measures, but no progress was made.

See also TENET PLAN.

MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS (MAC). Following the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreements** in 1949, four Mixed Armistice Commissions were established to maintain and consolidate the agreements between Israel and the four neighboring Arab countries—namely, **Egypt**, **Jordan**,

Lebanon, and **Syria**. Chaired by a **United Nations** official serving with the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization**, each of these commissions was composed of equal numbers of Israeli and Arab military or police representatives. The initial hopes of these MACs turning into avenues for broader political exchanges did not materialize, and the MACs were confined to addressing issues concerning local border policing and were hampered by other developments in the wake of the **Suez War**.

MORRISON-GRADY PLAN. The disagreements between U.S. president Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) and Prime Minister Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) of **Great Britain** over the recommendations of the **Anglo-American Committee** announced on 30 April 1946 compelled Bevin to suggest a new cabinet-level committee to discuss the implications of the report. Headed by British deputy prime minister Herbert Morrison (1888–1965) and U.S. ambassador to Britain Henry Grady (1882–1957), this second committee reached an agreement in July 1946 that largely nullified the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee. It advocated a federal solution for Palestine, recommending the establishment of semi-autonomous Arab and Jewish cantons. Under this arrangement, the British **Mandate** would be converted into a trusteeship and would be divided into two provinces, Arab and Jewish, plus two districts, **Jerusalem** and the Negev. On the contentious issue of the entry of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, the Morrison-Grady Plan concluded that this should be undertaken only if acceptable to both Arabs and Jews.

In September, this plan was discussed at the roundtable conference held in London, where it was rejected by the Palestinian delegation, which advocated a unitary Palestine with adequate civil rights for Jews. Though initially favorable to the plan, Truman came under pressure from Zionists to stick to his earlier demand for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees from Europe into Palestine. This forced Bevin to reject the U.S. demand, and the plan subsequently collapsed.

See also UNITED STATES; ZIONISM.

MORSI, MOHAMMED (1951–). Mohammed Morsi briefly served as president of **Egypt** from June 2012 through July 2013. He was elected president on 30 June 2012 in the wake of the **Arab Spring** and the resignation of President **Hosni Mubarak** in February 2011. Morsi was born in a small village north of Cairo on 20 August 1951. After graduating in engineering from Cairo University, he went to the **United States** for higher studies and received a Ph.D. in material science from the University of Southern Califor-

nia in 1982. He briefly worked at the California State University, Northridge, but returned to Egypt in 1985 and joined Zagazig University in 1985 where he worked until 2010.

Morsi was politically active with the **Muslim Brotherhood** (MB), and in 2000 he was elected to the Egyptian parliament as an independent member, as the MB was proscribed by the Mubarak government. He became the chairperson of the Freedom and Justice Party formed by the Brotherhood in the wake of the fall of Mubarak and was fielded as the party's candidate in the presidential elections held in May and June 2012. In the second round of elections held on 24 June, Morsi narrowly defeated Ahmed Shafik (1941–), was elected president, and was sworn in on 30 June. Upon his election, Morsi resigned his membership of the MB and sought to present himself as the representative of all Egyptians.

In the past, Morsi reflected the mainstream views of the MB and questioned Israel's historic rights to Palestine and argued that the "land of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians and not Zionists." Similarly the Brotherhood was critical of the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**. This led to apprehensions over Egypt's willingness to continue the cold peace. This concern was fueled by a number of incidents such as growing lawlessness in the **Sinai Peninsula**; sabotage attacks on the **gas** pipelines to Israel and **Jordan**; militant infiltration into Israel; Morsi hosting **Ismail Haniyeh**, the prime minister of the **Hamas**-ruled **Gaza Strip**, in July 2012; and suggestions of possible overtures toward **Iran**. Morsi dispelled any apprehensions of a radical transformation of Egypt–Israeli relations and established formal contacts and communications with the Israeli leaders. Following the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012, Morsi mediated between Israel and Hamas and brought about a cease-fire, which came into force on 21 November. Due to growing internal opposition, on 3 July 2013 Morsi was overthrown by the military headed by **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi** and was incarcerated and is being tried for treason.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE. As a follow-up to the **Madrid Conference** of October 1991, Moscow hosted the inaugural session of the multilateral talks of the Middle East peace process on 28 January 1992. The conference was co-sponsored by **Russia** and the **United States**. The desire to participate in the multilateral talks influenced countries such as **China** and **India** to normalize relations with Israel on the eve of the Moscow Conference. Five separate working groups were formed in the conference and were devoted to **water**, the environment, arms control and regional security, **refugees**, and regional economic development. Citing a lack of progress in the bilateral talks, **Syria** and **Lebanon** boycotted the Moscow Conference as well as all subsequent sessions. The Palestinian delegation boycotted the inaugural meeting protesting over the American refusal to accept the participation of

Diaspora Palestinians. Until November 1993 the five working groups set up at the Moscow Conference met in different venues including European capitals and in the Middle East, but subsequently no meetings were held. The stalemate in the peace process, especially following the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, led to unsuccessful calls for the reconvening of the Moscow Conference.

MUBARAK, HOSNI (1928–). A former air force officer and politician, Hosni Mubarak was the president of **Egypt** between October 1981 and February 2011. He was born on 4 May 1928 in the village of Kafr al-Musaliha, northeast of Cairo, and graduated from the Egyptian Air Force Academy in 1950. During the **June War of 1967**, he commanded the Western Air Base in Cairo and became chief of air staff in 1969. In 1972, President **Anwar Sadat** appointed him commander of the air force and deputy minister of war, a position he held during the **October War of 1973**. He became vice president of Egypt in April 1975 and the vice president of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDA) four years later. After the **assassination** of Sadat, Mubarak became president on 6 October 1981. The following year he took over the leadership of the NDA. Since then Mubarak successively won all the presidential elections held in Egypt.

A supporter of Sadat's peace with Israel, Mubarak presided over the implementation of the **Camp David Accords** and regained the **Sinai Peninsula** from Israel in April 1982. During much of the 1980s, he sought to mend fences with the Arab countries, healed the rift, and managed to secure the return of Egypt to the **Arab League** and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**). Mubarak played a pivotal role in securing Arab endorsement of the **United Nations**–backed and **United States**–led military action against **Iraq** during the **Kuwait War** of 1990–1991.

Having contributed to the **Madrid Conference**, Mubarak played an important part in the continuation of the **Oslo Process** and in bridging differences between the Israeli leaders and **Yasser Arafat**. He periodically hosted negotiators from both sides and facilitated the conclusion of the **Taba Agreement** in September 1995 and the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** in September 1999, and he played an important role in the **Cairo Dialogue** between **Hamas** and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA).

At the same time, Mubarak has been the architect of the Egyptian–Israeli cold peace. With the sole exception of his last-minute decision to attend the funeral of slain Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** in November 1995, Mubarak refused to visit Israel. He permitted only limited political and economic contacts with Israel and twice recalled the Egyptian ambassador to Israel (in June 1982 and November 2000) due to regional tensions. After the electoral victory of **Benjamin Netanyahu** in 1996, Mubarak called for Israel's isolation in the Middle East. The onset of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, the

Israeli policy of **targeted killing**, and its periodic incursions into territories held by the PNA heightened Mubarak's tension with Israel. In February 2005, during the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit**, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** declared a joint cease-fire. During that summit, Mubarak also agreed to the return of an Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv.

On 25 January 2011, within days after President Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali (1936–) fled Tunisia, large numbers of Egyptians assembled in **Tahrir Square** in Cairo protesting against the three-decade-long Mubarak rule. The **Arab Spring in Egypt** reached its peak on 11 February when Mubarak announced his resignation. On 28 February, under orders of the state prosecutor, he and his family members were placed under house arrest in a presidential residence in the Red Sea resort of Sharm al-Sheikh. Subsequently, he was arrested on 13 April and brought before a judge in Cairo for trial for the deaths of protestors in Tahrir Square. When the trial began on 3 August 2011, Mubarak was brought in on a stretcher from the hospital and was placed in a cage in the courtroom.

In June 2012, Hosni Mubarak was found guilty of conspiring in the killing of protestors and sentenced to life imprisonment, but he was found not guilty on corruption charges. In January 2013, a Cairo court overturned his life sentence and ordered a retrial. On 21 August, he was released from prison and put under house arrest. In May 2014, Mubarak was found guilty of embezzlement of public funds and given a three-year jail sentence by an Egyptian court. Two of his sons were given four-year prison terms, and all three were fined $3 million. They were also asked to return $17.6 million that they were accused of stealing.

During the Tahrir Square protests, some Israeli leaders expressed support for Mubarak and criticized what they considered his hasty abandonment by President **Barack Obama**. Mubarak's willingness to maintain the Camp David Accords and the cold peace with Israel and the prospect of an Islamist leader coming to power were worrisome to Israel. Initial statements by post-Mubarak Egyptian leadership of a possible rapprochement with **Iran** and the passage of Iranian naval ships through the **Suez Canal** within days after Mubarak's downfall added to its concern. Likewise, the Hamas-ruled Gaza government, which faced the Israeli blockade and international isolation, welcomed the new developments in Egypt. As subsequent events indicated, the post-Mubarak Egypt was prepared to keep the formal peace with Israel albeit with much less commitment.

See also ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; BAKER PLAN; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); MORSI, MOHAMMED (1951–); MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); SHALIT AFFAIR; SHAMIR PLAN; SIEGE OF GAZA; SINAI VIOLENCE.

MUBARAK PLAN (1985). In an interview published in the *New York Times* on 25 February 1985, President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** called for direct negotiations between Israel and a joint delegation of **Jordan** and the Palestinians. The **Hussein–Arafat Accord** of 11 February and the tacit acceptance of **Resolution 242** by the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) provided the framework for this plan. However, the Israeli opposition to any involvement of the PLO made the plan a non-starter.

See also FIVE-STAGE ISRAELI PLAN; MUBARAK PLAN (1989).

MUBARAK PLAN (1989). Following the **First Intifada** and in a bid to bridge the gap between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** over peace negotiations, in July 1989 President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** came up with a peace plan. Formally communicated to Israel on 15 September, it called for Israeli acceptance of the results of the Palestinian elections under international supervision, complete immunity for elected representatives, withdrawal of Israeli forces from voting stations, an Israeli guarantee to start "a dialogue on the final status of the '**Occupied Territories**' by an appropriate date," a freeze on **settlement** activities, complete freedom of election campaigning, and barring Israelis from entering the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** on election day.

The plan stated that residents of **Jerusalem** "may participate" in the election and that Israel must accept the four core principles of the **United Nations** policy in the Middle East. The solution must be based on **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338**, with a trade land for peace, a guarantee of security for all countries in the region, and an acknowledgment of Palestinian political rights. While **Yasser Arafat** endorsed the Egyptian format for the elections, Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir** found it unacceptable, and the Israeli cabinet rejected the Mubarak Plan on 6 October due to **Likud** opposition. Meanwhile, U.S. secretary of state **James A**. **Baker** suggested a five-point bridging proposal, the **Baker Plan**, which also failed to break the deadlock.

See also MUBARAK PLAN (1985); RABIN PLAN; SHAMIR PLAN; SHULTZ PLAN.

MUGHNIYAH, IMAD (1962–2008). Imad Mughniyah was a senior leader of **Hezbollah** and was killed on 12 February 2008 by a car bomb blast in the Kfar Suseh neighborhood of Damascus in **Syria**. While Israel denied any involvement, it is widely believed that its external intelligence agency Mossad carried out the car blast. Mughniyah was born on 7 December 1962 in a poor Shia farmer family in southern **Lebanon** and was a student at the American University of Beirut during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, called the **Peace for Galilee Operation**. Initially he was drawn into **Fatah** and fought the **Israel Defense Forces** in Beirut along with the forces of the

Palestine Liberation Organization. In 1984 he joined Hezbollah and received training in **Iran**. He was accused of involvement in a number of acts of **terrorism** including the **Beirut airport bombing** and the U.S. embassy bombing (both of which took place in 1983) as well as the **Buenos Aires bombing** in 1992. In October 2001 the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation put him on the list of most wanted terrorists and offered a $5 million reward.

   See also UNITED STATES.

MULTILATERAL TALKS. *See* MOSCOW CONFERENCE.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO). Reflecting growing disapproval of the **Camp David Accords** in the Middle East, in July 1979 the **United Nations** Security Council decided against renewing the mandate of the **United Nations Emergency Force II**. Therefore, as provided for by the Camp David Accords, **Egypt**, Israel, and the **United States** reached an agreement to create the Multinational Force and Observers, which would monitor the security arrangements in the **Sinai Peninsula** after Israel completed its withdrawal slated for April 1982. Speaking for the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the **European Union**, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington (1919–) of **Great Britain** declared that European states would participate in the MFO only within the context of the **Venice Declaration** of 1980, which, inter alia, recognized the Palestinian right to self-determination. Since 2012 the 700-member-strong MFO became the target for popular protests, and four peacekeepers were wounded by Islamist protestors later that year.

MUMBAI TERROR ATTACK. In a coordinated terror attack, 12 suspected Pakistani nationals reached the port city of Mumbai by sea and carried out the largest single act of **terrorism** in **India**. It began on 26 November 2008 and continued until the 29th, during which they attacked a major railway station, two prominent five-star hotels, and the Chabad House in Mumbai. A group of terrorists took over the Chabad House, which catered to the religious needs of India's Jewish community and Israeli tourists, and took eight Jews hostage. By the time a successful rescue mission was launched, the terrorists had killed four of their captives, including the director of the House, Rabbi Gavriel Holtzberg (1979–2008), and his wife. Their two-year-old son Moshe survived the ordeal. This was the first-known terror attack on an Israeli or Jewish target on Indian soil.

   See also DELHI TERROR ATTACK; WARFARE.

MUNICH MASSACRE. On 5 September 1972, an eight-member Palestinian Black September Organization (BSO) team attacked a group of 13 Israeli athletes participating in the Munich Summer Olympic Games. While two Israeli athletes escaped and two were killed, the remaining nine were taken hostage. In exchange for their release, the group demanded the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners held in Israel and the then West Germany and threatened to execute the hostages if their demands were not met. Subsequently, the hostage takers demanded a plane to carry them and the hostages to Cairo. While they were boarding the plane, a German anti-terrorism unit conducted a botched rescue operation in which all the athletes and five of the eight terrorists were killed. The three hijackers who were captured alive during the raid were subsequently released when another BSO group hijacked a Lufthansa plane on 29 October 1972.

Responding to the terrorist attack, Prime Minister **Golda Meir** authorized the **assassination** of those responsible for the Munich Massacre. Several Palestinian terrorists were subsequently killed, but one such operation ended disastrously. In July 1973, Ahmed Bouchikhi (1943–1973), an innocent Moroccan waiter, was mistakenly killed by a special Israeli anti-terrorism unit in Lillehammer, Norway. Israel expressed "remorse" for his death but refused to accept legal and financial responsibility for the killing. Norway was not allowed to interrogate former Mossad operative Mike Harari (1927–) regarding his involvement in the killing of Bouchikhi, who was mistaken for the **Palestine Liberation Organization** intelligence chief Hassan Salameh (1948–).

Family members of the Israeli victims in Munich have been unsuccessfully trying to persuade the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to officially mark the massacre during the Olympics, and the last effort during the July 2012 London Olympics was also unsuccessful. However, IOC president Jacques Rogge (1942–) attended a separate function to mark the event.

See also ENTEBBE OPERATION; GERMANY; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

MUSA, AMR (1936–). As a diplomat, statesman, and political leader, Amr Musa has been closely associated with the foreign policy of **Egypt** for over four decades. The son of a former member of parliament, Musa was born on 3 October 1936, studied law at Cairo University, and began his career as a diplomat. Between 1958 and 1991 he held various positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served in the Egyptian missions in the **United Nations** and was Egypt's ambassador to **India** during 1983–1986. In May 1991 he was named foreign minister and served in that capacity until May 2001, when he was elected secretary-general of the **Arab League**. He relinquished the league position in June 2011 to contest the presidential elections in Egypt.

Though supportive of the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, Musa was often seen as a hard-liner on Israel. He strongly advocated Palestinian rights and was critical of various Israeli policies toward the Palestinians. In some ways, he was instrumental in the increased Israeli isolation following the election of **Benjamin Netanyahu** in 1996 and the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. It was widely suggested that because of his criticisms of Israel, President **Hosni Mubarak** moved him from the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to the Arab League.

As an Arab nationalist, he articulated and influenced Egyptian policy on a number of issues, especially regarding nuclear non-proliferation, and was highly critical of the Western double standards regarding **nuclear Israel**. He maintained his positions after he took over the leadership of the Arab League. In the first round of elections held in May 2012, with just over 11 percent of the votes, Musa came in fifth. Following the overthrow of President **Mohammed Morsi**, on 3 July 2013, Musa was elected president of a 50-member committee to draft a new Egyptian constitution.

See also NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT).

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (MB). The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) is the source of most of the present-day Islamic groups and Islamist parties in the Middle East and elsewhere. Established by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) in **Egypt** in 1928, the MB provides a strong inspiration for anti-Western feelings in the region. Through a well-organized network of mosques and educational institutions, the MB soon swept throughout Egypt and spread to other parts of the region, including **Iraq**, **Jordan**, **Mandate Palestine**, **Saudi Arabia**, and **Syria**. The relations between the Brotherhood and host governments have often been strained and resulted in violence and suppression. The Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1942, and following the outbreak of the **First Intifada**, the MB transformed itself into the militant group **Hamas**.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring** in Tunisia in 2011 and its subsequent spread to other parts of the Middle East saw the emergence of the MB as the preeminent political force in many Arab countries. Brotherhood members were not in the forefront of popular protests against authoritarian rule and were lukewarm in their initial response to popular protests largely led by non-religious youth. Gradually, the MB gained ground and became the leading source of opposition. Their organizational skills and widespread social welfare network enabled them to secure political power and influence when elections were introduced in Tunisia and Egypt. While Ennahda emerged as the dominant force in Tunisia, the Brotherhood floated the Freedom and Justice Party, which secured victory in the parliamentary elections held in

Egypt in September 2011. Its candidate **Mohammed Morsi** was elected president in June 2012 but was overthrown by the military in July 2013 due to growing domestic protests over the Islamist agenda pursued by Morsi.

Despite its past rhetoric against Israel and its existence, the electoral victory in Egypt temporarily moderated the MB. While in office Morsi did not seek to modify, dilute, or annul the **Camp David Accords**, and he played an active role in bringing about a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas following the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012. Morsi, however, avoided meeting or exchanging contacts with Israeli leaders and never mentioned Israel by name in his public statements. After he was deposed, the MB in Egypt and its supporters outside accused Israel of involvement in the overthrow of the first elected Egyptian leader.

The MB branch in Jordan, the **Islamic Action Front** (IAF), has been cooperating with the Hashemite regime for long, but the relations have been strained in recent years. The IAF has emerged as the prominent force in the popular protests in Jordan demanding political reforms, which also included demands for a constitutional monarchy. It has not been satisfied with the reform measures initiated by King **Abdullah II**, which included a constitutional court, an independent election commission, the partial introduction of proportional representation to parliament, and elected rather than appointed prime ministers. Elections in Kuwait and Bahrain also witnessed gains to political parties affiliated with or influenced by the MB. In some cases, especially in Egypt, a more radical version of the Muslim Brotherhood in the form of salafism has emerged, thereby making the MB a moderate force among the Islamists.

See also EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–).

MUTUAL RECOGNITION. In an interview on ABC-TV in August 1988, the deputy of Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat**, Abu Iyad (1934–1991), called for a mutual recognition of Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). The realization of this suggestion had to wait until 9 September 1993, four days before the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**, when Israel and the PLO accorded mutual recognition to one another.

See also ANNULMENT.

N

NABI MUSA RIOTS. In 1920, the Nabi Musa ("Prophet Moses") festival in **Mandate Palestine** coincided with Passover and Easter. During the festivities on 4–5 April, the growing tension between the Arabs and Jews over **Aliya** manifested in a Muslim attack on the Jewish Quarter in the old city of **Jerusalem**. During the clashes, a number of Jews and Muslims were killed or wounded. Similar rioting took place the following year, when a number of Jewish villages came under attack and the Mandate authorities resorted to air attacks on the Arab rioters. In the ensuing violence, 47 Jews and 48 Arabs were killed and more than 200 Jews and Arabs were wounded. The riots in 1920 and 1921 were the first major incidents of inter-communal violence in Palestine.

See also HEBRON MASSACRE (1929); WARFARE; WESTERN WALL RIOTS.

NACHSHON OPERATION. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the city of **Jerusalem** was virtually cut off from the coastal plains by late March. With the impending end of the **Mandate**, the Jewish forces sought to establish access to the city. A plan code-named the Nachshon Operation called for creating an access route to Jerusalem that would be 10 meters wide in the coastal plain and 3 meters wide in the mountains. The road would be secured by the occupation of high ground and nearby Arab villages. On 6 April, a Jewish convoy of 60 trucks carrying civilian and military supplies slowly moved toward Jerusalem. On the night of 7–8 April at Castel, Arab volunteers led by Abd al-Qader al-Husseini (1907–1948) ambushed the convoy. After six days of fighting, al-Husseini was killed and Castel fell into the hands of the Jewish forces. The success of the operation was short-lived, and on 20 April the Arab forces reinforced the blockade and brought Jerusalem under siege. A similar operation called the **Dalet Plan** eventually secured access to Jerusalem for the Jewish forces.

See also WARFARE.

NAHARAYIM SHOOTING. On 13 March 1997 a soldier from **Jordan** opened fire on a group of Israeli students visiting a Jordanian enclave near the Israeli territory of Naharayim. The attack came amid growing tensions between Israel and Jordan following the election of Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**. In the shooting, seven Israeli girls were killed, and a number of others were injured. On 16 March, King **Hussein** visited all seven families and offered his condolences. The soldier, Lance Col. Ahmed Mousa (al-) Daqamseh, was tried and given a life sentence. On 12 April 2013, 110 members of the Jordanian parliament signed a petition demanding pardon for Daqamseh.

See also WARFARE.

NAQBA, AL-. This Arabic term, meaning "catastrophe," is used by Arabs to describe the exodus of Palestinians from the **Mandate Palestine** during and after the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. Coined by Constantine Zurayk (1909–2000), a professor of history at the American University of Beirut, the term refers to the onset of the Palestinian **refugee** problem. Palestinians fled areas of the Mandate that became the State of Israel. Since then, Palestinians mark 15 May—the day **Great Britain** formally withdrew from Palestine—as Al-Naqba Day. While Israel commemorates its independence day according to the Jewish calendar, the Naqba is marked as per the Gregorian calendar and not according to the Islamic calendar. On 23 March 2011, Israel approved a law, commonly referred as the **Naqba Law**, limiting state funding to institutions and groups that mark or support Naqba Day events.

See also GOLAN HEIGHTS.

NAQBA LAW. On 23 March 2011, the Knesset approved a law that is commonly known as the Naqba Law. Initiated by a member of the Knesset belonging to **Yisrael Beiteinu**, this law prevents and limits state funding to groups that are involved in "activity that involves the negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people; the negation of the state's democratic character; support for armed struggle, or terror acts by an enemy or a terror organization against the State of Israel; incitement to racism, violence and terror and dishonoring the national flag or the national symbol." This move was criticized as racist and discriminatory toward the **Israeli Arabs** as it prevents the Palestinian narrative of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** and **al-Naqba**. The law does not formally ban the commemoration of al-Naqba. In January 2012, the High Court rejected a petition calling for the repeal of the Naqba Law.

NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL (1918–1970). Widely popular in the Arab world, Gamal Abdel Nasser was an Arab nationalist who served as president of **Egypt** from 23 June 1956 until his death on 28 September 1970. Born in Alexandria on 15 January 1918, he graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1938 and joined the Egyptian army. From 1942 to 1948, he formed the nucleus of the Society of Free Officers, which led the revolution that deposed King Farouq (1920–1965) on 23 July 1952. As a young soldier, Nasser took part in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** and was deeply affected by the poor performance of the Arab armies.

After staying behind the scenes in the Free Officers Movement that deposed the monarchy, in April 1954 Nasser became prime minister, and he became president on 23 June 1956. In April 1955, he attended the **Bandung Conference** of Afro-Asian nations and gradually forged close personal relations with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) of **India** and President Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) of the then Yugoslavia. These three leaders were instrumental in the formation of the **Non-Aligned Movement** in 1961.

Nasser's nationalist position and his opposition to conservative monarchs and the Cold War–related military blocs raised tensions in the Middle East. He emerged as the strongest critic of the **Baghdad Pact**, and in 1955, through the **Czech Deal**, he obtained large quantities of arms from Eastern Europe. He allowed the Palestinian **Fedayeen** to conduct military raids against Israel from the Egypt-held **Gaza Strip**. All these developments raised his popularity among the Arab masses and brought him into confrontation with Israel.

Having failed to secure the promised Anglo-American funding for the **Aswan Dam** project, on 26 July 1956 Nasser announced the **nationalization of the Suez Canal**. The anger and disappointment of **Great Britain** and **France**, who operated the **Suez Canal**, offered an opportunity for Israel to work toward curtailing Nasser's regional influence. As agreed at the **Sèvres Conference**, Israel invaded the **Sinai Peninsula** on 23 October 1956 and was joined later by the forces of Britain and France. Under pressure from the **United States**, the tripartite aggression was reversed, and the Sinai and Gaza Strip were returned to Egyptian control. The **Suez War** and the military defeat at the hands of Israel and its Western allies enhanced Nasser's regional position, influence, and popularity. He was seen as someone who could stand up to the military might of the imperial powers and their regional ally, Israel. At the end of the war, **United Nations Emergency Force I** (UNEF I) was deployed on the Egyptian side of the border with Israel.

In January 1964, Nasser convened the first summit meeting of the **Arab League**. Shortly afterward, in May, with Nasser's backing, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) was formed. Though it was initially under the patronage and control of Nasser, the PLO gradually established its autonomy and independence from the Arab states.

In May 1967, tensions along Israel's borders with **Syria** heightened over media reports of increased Israeli military activities. As an ally of Syria, Nasser could not remain indifferent. Bowing to criticism from his Arab detractors that he was "hiding behind the UN's skirts," on 16 May, Nasser demanded a partial withdrawal of UNEF I from **Sharm al-Sheikh**. This was unacceptable to UN secretary-general U Thant (1909–1974), and hence, on 18 May, Nasser demanded the complete withdrawal of the peacekeeping forces. Four days later, he closed the **Straits of Tiran** to Israeli shipping. International indifference to these measures heightened Israeli security concerns and anxieties, and on 5 June, Israel launched a preemptive air strike against the Arab air forces, including Egypt's. The **June War of 1967** ended in a disaster for the Arabs, with Egypt losing the whole of the Sinai as well as its control over the Gaza Strip. Taking personal responsibility for the military debacle, Nasser offered his resignation on 9 June, but it was overwhelmingly rejected by massive popular demonstrations.

Nasser played a critical role in the **Khartoum Arab Summit**, which declared a policy of the "three no's" toward Israel. Having accepted **Resolution 242**, he sought a peaceful resolution concerning the **Occupied Territories**, but neither the **Jarring Mission** nor the **Rogers Plan** yielded any meaningful results. Toward the end of his tenure, Nasser initiated the **War of Attrition**, which sought to harass Israeli positions on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, and in August 1970 he accepted the cease-fire proposal by U.S. secretary of state William Rogers (1913–2001). After the **Black September Massacre** of Palestinians in **Jordan**, Nasser arranged a truce between the warring sides (**Cairo Agreement of 1970**). Within hours after securing an agreement, Nasser died on 28 September 1970 and was succeeded by **Anwar Sadat** as president. Despite his many failings, Nasser's name continues to evoke strong support and admiration both in Egypt and in the larger Arab world.

See also ALPHA PLAN; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; GAZA RAID; GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE; OMEGA OPERATION; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE.

NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP). The National Religious Party dominated Israel's political landscape for close to five decades. As the name indicates, unlike the anti-Zionist *haredi* **parties**, it is a religious Zionist party. Its origins can be traced to the **Mandate Palestine** period, and the first Ashkenazi chief rabbi Avraham Issac Kook (1865–1935) was the spiritual and ideological mentor for the religious Zionist movement. The formation of

the NRP happened when two other parties Mizrahi (1902–1956) and Hapoel HaMizrahi (1922–1956) joined hands to contest the 1955 Knesset elections as the Nation Religious Front, and the NRP was formed as a single party the following year.

The party is committed to keeping the Sabbath and kosher regulation and **conscription** in the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). From 1955, the NRP was part of all the governments except the ones headed by prime ministers **Yitzhak Rabin** and **Shimon Peres** during 1992–1996. Until 1977, the NRP was part of the ruling coalition headed by the **Labor Party** and was responsible for the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In 1977 the party shifted its allegiance to **Likud** and enabled **Menachem Begin** to become the prime minister, and for the first time the NRP took control of the Ministry of Education. Since 1977, the party has moved to the right, though the signs of this trend could be noticed in the immediate aftermath of the **June War of 1967** when the IDF captured the **West Bank** including **East Jerusalem** and brought the Western Wall under Israeli control.

The NRP has been active in the construction of **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** and has been a driving force behind the Yesha Council. In the wake of the **Oslo Accords**, some of the rabbis associated with the party called on religious soldiers to defy any IDF orders for the evacuation of the settlements. The party opposed the **Gaza Disengagement** initiated by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, and its ministers were dismissed from the government for their opposition. The NRP went through a series of internal conflicts since 2006, and in 2009 it joined forces with other smaller right-wing parties to establish the **Jewish Home Party**. This was part of the ruling coalition formed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** in March 2013.

See also ZIONISM.

NATIONAL SERVICE. *See* CONSCRIPTION.

NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL. On 26 July 1956, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** declared the nationalization of the **Suez Canal** in retaliation for the decision by the **United States** and **Great Britain** to reverse their earlier commitment to fund the **Aswan Dam** project. Announcing his move through a public statement in Alexandria, Nasser pledged to adhere to the **Constantinople Convention**, which guarantees non-discriminatory freedom of navigation of the canal both in peacetime and during war. This soon precipitated into the **Suez War** involving Israel, Britain, and **France**.

See also ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; NAVAL BLOCKADE.

NAVAL BLOCKADE. Within days of the outbreak of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the Arab state of **Egypt** imposed a blockade against Israel-bound shipping through the **Suez Canal**. The blockade continued even after the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreement** between the two countries in February 1949. The blockade was formalized on 6 February 1950 through a royal decree and was gradually extended to the **Straits of Tiran**, whose entrance is controlled by Egypt through the islands of Tiran and Sanafir. The naval blockade was partially lifted in the spring of 1957 following the **Suez War** when Israel was still in control of the **Sinai Peninsula**.

In January 1957, Israel conditioned its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the **Gaza Strip** on the international recognition of its freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. Even though no formal understanding was reached, the closure of the straits in May 1967 was interpreted as the casus belli for the Israeli response. The reimposition of a naval blockade in the Straits of Tiran on 23 May heightened the prevailing tension following the withdrawal of the **United Nations Emergency Force I** from the Sinai Peninsula. This eventually led to the **June War of 1967**.

See also ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL; *BAT GALIM* AFFAIR; WARFARE.

NETANYAHU, BENJAMIN (1949–). A politician and leader of **Likud**, Benjamin Netanyahu has been serving as Israel's prime minister since 31 March 2009. Born in Tel Aviv on 21 October 1949, he is the younger brother of Jonathan Netanyahu (1947–1976), who commanded the **Entebbe Operation** in July 1976. After studying at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University, Netanyahu served in the **Sayeret Matkal** anti-terrorism unit of the **Israel Defense Forces** from 1967 to 1972.

After a brief stint in business, in 1982 he began his diplomatic career and served as deputy chief of mission under Moshe Arens (1925–), Israel's ambassador to the **United States**. From 1984 to 1988, Netanyahu was Israel's permanent representative to the **United Nations**. In November 1988, he was elected to the Knesset on the Likud platform and became deputy foreign minister. During the **Kuwait War**, when Iraqi Scud missiles were falling on the country, Netanyahu became Israel's most articulate spokesperson to the outside world.

After Likud's defeat in the 1992 Knesset elections, Netanyahu was elected leader of Likud. In the wake of the **Oslo Process**, he emerged as a hardened critic of the peace process and was often held responsible for the rising right-wing extremism within Israel against Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**.

In May 1996, Netanyahu narrowly defeated **Shimon Peres** and became Israel's youngest prime minister. After weeks of hesitation, he met Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat** in October 1996 and renewed peace negotiations. In January 1997, both leaders concluded the **Hebron Protocol**. Citing Pales-

tinian violations and non-compliance, he repeatedly stalled the implementation of further Israeli **redeployment**. Under international pressure, Netanyahu concluded the **Wye Memorandum** in October 1998, but two months later, owing to internal pressures, he suspended the agreement.

Netanyahu's tenure witnessed increased tensions in Israel's relations with **Egypt** and **Jordan**. His decision to reopen the historic Hasmonean Tunnel in the old city of **Jerusalem** in September 1996 sparked widespread violence in the **Occupied Territories**. In October 1997, the **assassination** attempt on a senior member of **Hamas** in Amman resulted in a rapid deterioration of relations with Jordan. The incident, known as the **Masha'al Affair**, was resolved when Netanyahu released the imprisoned **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin**, the spiritual leader of Hamas.

On 17 May 1999, Netanyahu was convincingly defeated by **Labor Party** leader **Ehud Barak**. Netanyahu then resigned as Likud leader and also from the Knesset. In 2001, he returned to politics and was reelected to the Knesset. Following the withdrawal of the Labor Party from the unity government headed by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon**, Netanyahu became foreign minister in November 2002, and in February 2003 he was shifted to the Finance Ministry. In his bid to regain party leadership, Netanyahu actively campaigned against the **Gaza Disengagement** outlined by Sharon. He resigned from the cabinet in August 2005, shortly before the Israeli withdrawal from the **Gaza Strip**.

In the wake of Sharon's decision to leave Likud and form **Kadima** ("Forward") in December 2005, Netanyahu was again elected leader of Likud and served as leader of the opposition from December 2006 to March 2009 when **Ehud Olmert** was the prime minister. Following the February 2009 Knesset elections, he outmaneuvered Kadima leader **Tzipi Livni** and formed the government and was reelected after the January 2013 elections. He is the only Israeli leader after **David Ben-Gurion** to be elected to the office of prime minister thrice.

Netanyahu has been the principal voice in Israel seeking a military solution to the controversies surrounding **nuclear Iran**, and this put Israel into public disagreements with President **Barack Obama** of the **United States**. Pandering to the right-wing elements both within and outside Likud, he has been expanding **settlements** in the Occupied Territories and working to undermine the formation of a viable Palestinian state.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; FEIGLIN, MOSHE ZALMAN (1962–); HASMONEAN TUNNEL CONTROVERSY; KERRY PLAN; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); TURKEY.

NETUREI KARTA. Neturei Karta ("Guardians of the City" in Aramaic) is an extremist Jewish religious group that inhabits the Mea Shearim neighborhood of **Jerusalem**, as well as Bnei Brak near Tel Aviv. Following a strict Orthodox lifestyle, it is vehemently opposed to **Zionism**, believes that the redemption of the Jewish people and the establishment of a Jewish state can be brought about only by God, and refuses to recognize the State of Israel and its numerous manifestations, such as its currency, the Hebrew language, its education system, or its social welfare programs. It does not seek or accept any social security benefits from the state. Though marginal in Israel, it garners widespread publicity outside and is seen as a manifestation of ultra-orthodox opposition to Zionism. The **Palestine Liberation Organization** has considered Neturei Karta to be the representative of the "Palestinian Jews" and accommodated them in the Palestinian institutions. In 1994, a member of Neturei Karta was included in the Palestinian cabinet headed by Chairman **Yasser Arafat**.

See also *HAREDI* PARTIES.

NEW HISTORY. In the early 1980s a group of Israeli historians challenged the conventional narrative of history, especially regarding the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. They were helped by the declassified archival materials that were made available by the Israel State Archives in 1978 under the 30-year rule. These scholars questioned the traditional official narrative regarding the origin of the Palestinian **refugee** problem and the supposed Arab unwillingness to make peace with the Jewish state. The term "New History" was coined by Benny Morris (1948–), one of the members of the new breed of historians. Some prominent figures who belong to this category include Avi Shlaim (1945–), Ilan Pappé (1954–), Tom Segev (1945–), and Simha Flapan (1911–1987). Their conclusions, especially on the refugee issue, are not unanimous, and some accuse Israel of carrying out a premeditated expulsion policy toward the Palestinians. Most of the New Historians remained within academia, while Pappé turned activist and played a key role in the **academic boycott** and **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaigns against Israel.

See also IM TIRZU.

NEW MIDDLE EAST. Since the end of the Cold War, this expression has been used by many scholars and statesmen to describe the situation in the region and the opportunities for peace. This gained popularity when Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres** published a book by that title in 1993. In his view, there were new opportunities for Israel to forge peace not only with its immediate Arab neighbors but also with Arab countries in North Africa and along the Persian Gulf. The spate of **terrorism** in the wake of the **Oslo**

Accords resulted in many Israelis questioning the "New Middle East" and faulting Peres for lacking realism. During a press conference in Tel Aviv in June 2006, U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice (1954–) reintroduced the term. This replaced the more controversial and unpopular **Greater Middle East** used by some U.S. officials at that time.

NILI. The acronym of *Netzah Israel lo yeshaker*, "The glory of Israel will not fail," Nili was a Jewish underground intelligence group that was formed in the spring of 1915 to help **Great Britain** conquer Palestine from the **Ottoman Empire** during World War I (1914–1918). By 1919, following the death of a number of its leading figures, Nili had ceased to exist. The group was opposed by the official leadership of the **Yishuv**, who perceived Nili to be adventurous, irresponsible, and even dangerous to the Jewish community in Palestine. In 1967, the services of its members in the formation of the state were formally recognized.
    See also WARFARE.

NINE-POINT ISRAELI PEACE PLAN. In a bid to break the stalemate in the **Jarring Mission** and to circumvent Arab demands for an unconditional withdrawal from the territories Israel had captured during the **June War of 1967**, on 8 October 1968 Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban (1915–2002) outlined a nine-point peace plan before the **United Nations** General Assembly. It called for a cease-fire, to be followed by "a just and lasting peace, duly negotiated and contractually expressed"; secured and recognized borders; security arrangements to avoid the vulnerable situation that preceded the June War; freedom of navigation through international waterways; a comprehensive settlement to the **refugee** problem through integration and rehabilitation; Israeli recognition of Christian and Islamic rights to their respective holy places; "acknowledgement and recognition of sovereignty, integrity and right to national life"; and regional cooperation. The prevailing climate in the Middle East, especially the resounding Arab defeat in the June War, was not conducive for any progress.
    See also KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES; RESOLUTION 242.

NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM). The largest international organization of member states after the **United Nations**, in 2014 the membership of the Non-Aligned Movement stood at 120 states, with 17 observer countries. The origin of this group of largely developing countries can be traced to the Asian Relation Conference hosted by **India** in March–April 1947. Toward forging greater understanding and cooperation among the decolonized and newly independent countries, the **Bandung Conference** was held in

April 1955. The formation of NAM as an institution happened in the Belgrade conference held in September 1961. India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), President Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) of the then Yugoslavia, and President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** were recognized as the triumvirate who were instrumental in its formation. The members of NAM sought to keep out of the Euro-centric Cold War by seeking friendly relations with both of the rival blocs headed by the **Soviet Union** and the **United States**. During the later part of the Cold War years, the NAM came to be increasingly identified with the former.

The non-invitation of Israel for the Bandung Conference resulted in its subsequent exclusion from the Belgrade meeting, and hence from the NAM. This resulted in NAM increasingly adopting positions hostile toward Israel and playing a pivotal role in various anti-Israeli resolutions and policies adopted by the UN and other international bodies. The NAM has been instrumental in the success of the **Arab Boycott of Israel** and Israel's exclusion from various international non-political and professional bodies. One such example is the adoption of **Resolution 3379** by the UN General Assembly in November 1975 that declared **Zionism** to be a form of racism. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more defused political order have partially diminished the anti-Israeli rhetoric of the NAM for a while, but it was resurrected during the **Durban Conference** of 2001.

NUCLEAR IRAN. Like most countries of the world, Iran is a voluntary signatory to the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT) of 1968, which recognizes and legitimizes the nuclear weapon status of the five permanent members of the **United Nations** Security Council—namely **China**, **Great Britain**, **France**, the **Soviet Union**, and the **United States**. It also prohibits the acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons or technology by other non-nuclear weapons states. Iran signed the NPT on 1 July 1968 when the treaty was opened and submitted its ratification on 2 February 1970. Since the 1950s Iran has pursued a civilian nuclear program and benefited from the Atoms for Peace initiative of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969). During the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), Iran clandestinely pursued a nuclear weapons program, which was halted after the Islamic Revolution led by **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini**.

In August 2002 an Iranian dissident group revealed the presence of nuclear sites that Iran had failed to disclose to the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following this controversy, in October 2003 Iran voluntarily entered into an additional protocol with the IAEA as a confidence-building measure. Since then, however, there were serious disagreements between Iran and the IAEA over the scope and purpose of Iran's nuclear program. Iranian leaders, including **Ali Khamenei** and President **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad**, claim that the Iranian nuclear program

has been peaceful and was aimed at energy generation. There was much skepticism in the West, especially regarding the higher levels of the nuclear enrichment program pursued by Iran.

Both the IAEA and the UN Security Council have adopted a number of resolutions that were critical of Iran, and these were endorsed by the two countries close to Iran—namely, China and Russia. Since 2003, the United States has imposed a series of unilateral sanctions directed at the Iranian nuclear program. A few Arab neighbors of Iran, especially **Saudi Arabia**, have expressed concerns over Iran's acquiring a nuclear capability and upsetting the regional balance.

Israel has been highly critical of Iranian nuclear ambitions, and its leaders have been issuing veiled and explicit threats of possible military strikes against key Iranian nuclear installations. There are disagreements between Israel and the United States over the level of enrichment, the time limit for Iran acquiring nuclear capability, and possible counter-measures. These have caused tension, especially between Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and President **Barack Obama**.

See also GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; ROUHANI, HASSAN (1948–).

NUCLEAR ISRAEL. Though it never carried out a nuclear test, Israel is widely recognized as a nuclear weapons state. Along with **India** and Pakistan, Israel refused to sign the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT) of 1968, which prohibits the acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons or technology beyond the five nuclear weapons states, namely, **China**, **Great Britain**, **France**, the **Soviet Union**, and the **United States**. Citing security concerns, Israel refused to join the NPT but benefited from its close nuclear cooperation with France, **South Africa**, and the United States and has nuclear-capable aircrafts and missiles. Many analysts depict nuclear weapons as the last-resort **Samson Option** for Israel.

Maintaining its stated official position of nuclear ambiguity, Israel has sought to establish and preserve its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. The **Osiraq bombing** against Iraq in 1981, the **Orchard Operation** against **Syria** in September 2007, and its belligerent posture against **nuclear Iran** are part of this policy. While other Arab countries have largely been indifferent, **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak** vehemently opposed Israel's nuclear monopoly. The **Oslo Accords** and the expected Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories** compelled many to see the nuclear option as the ultimate guarantor of any peace agreements between Israel and its Arab interlocutors.

See also BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC); CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); MUSA, AMR (1936–); PLUMBAT OPERATION; VANUNU AFFAIR.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). Coming into force on 5 March 1970, the NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons or technology by nuclear weapons states to any non–nuclear weapons states. It also prohibits the receipt by non–nuclear weapons states of any transfer, manufacture, or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It recognizes the five states that had nuclear weapons as of 1 January 1967—namely, the **United States**, the **Soviet Union**, **Great Britain**, **France**, and **China**—as nuclear weapons states. By entering into the NPT, signatories agree to give up their nuclear ambitions and abide by the international non-proliferation regime.

Citing security concerns and non-recognition by its neighbors, Israel remains the only state in the Middle East that has refused to sign the NPT. Israel is recognized as a country with a significant nuclear weapon capability though it has officially adopted a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel has vowed to prevent any hostile country in the Middle East from acquiring a nuclear capability, and under this logic it carried out the **Osiraq bombing** to destroy the nuclear reactor in **Iraq** in June 1981. In 1995, at the time of international negotiations for the indefinite extension of the NPT, **Egypt** threatened to oppose the move unless Israel became a party to the non-proliferation regime. President **Hosni Mubarak** backtracked due to U.S. threats to withhold annual economic aid.

Since early 2003, international suspicions over **nuclear Iran** have rekindled the non-proliferation debate in the Middle East. The effectiveness of the NPT has been under stress due to controversies surrounding nuclear Iran and **nuclear Syria**. Tensions between Israel and President **Barack Obama** partly emanate from their differences over effective responses to the suspected nuclear ambitions of Iran. The **Orchard Operation** carried out by Israel against **Syria** in September 2007 was seen as an indication of the inefficiency of the non-proliferation regime. The controversies surrounding the Iranian nuclear program have raised concerns about the nuclear ambitions of other Middle Eastern countries, especiall**y Saudi Arabia** and **Turkey**.

See also BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC); CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); PLUMBAT OPERATION; SAMSON OPTION; VANUNU AFFAIR.

NUCLEAR SYRIA. Syria is a voluntary signatory to the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** (NPT), which prohibits the acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons or technology beyond the five nuclear weapons states—namely, **China**, **Great Britain**, **France**, the **Soviet Union**, and the **United States**. Syria signed the NPT on 1 July 1968 and submitted its ratification on 24 September 1969. It was considered to be an adherent to the treaty and its obligations until September 2007, when Israel carried out the **Orchard Operation** against an installation in Deir ez-Zor in the southeastern part of

Syria. An investigation by the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that the site was an undisclosed nuclear reactor possibly built in collaboration with North Korea.

See also NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; OSIRAQ BOMBING.

NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–). Sari Nusseibeh is a Palestinian academic and professor of philosophy at the **Al-Quds** University in **East Jerusalem**. He was born in 1949 in Damascus, **Syria**, into a Palestinian family that claims a continuous presence and residence in Jerusalem for 13 centuries. He studied at Oxford University, and upon receiving a Ph.D. in 1978 from Harvard in Islamic philosophy, Nusseibeh returned to the **West Bank** to teach at Birzeit University. He was one of the few Palestinians who taught at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Even prior to the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in December 1987, he was active in promoting peaceful co-existence and met important political figures in Israel. He played a crucial role in the drafting of the **Algiers Declaration** of November 1988 that proclaimed the **State of Palestine** and accepted the **two-state solution**.

During the **Kuwait** crisis he was briefly arrested by Israel and was adopted as a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International. He actively supported the **Oslo Accords** between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Much to the anger of many **Diaspora** Palestinians, he urged them to give up their **right to return** in exchange for a Palestinian state in the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**. He was one of the few Palestinian figures who were highly critical of the **suicide attacks** during the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and argued that **terrorism** against Israeli civilians was harmful and counterproductive. In response to Nusseibeh's maverick peace initiatives, in 2002 **Yasser Arafat** dropped him from his position as the PLO's representative in East Jerusalem, a position Nusseibeh held following the death of Faisal Husseini (1940–2001) in May 2001.

Nusseibeh is not a supporter of the **academic boycott** of Israel, but the failure of the **Oslo Process** and the stalemate in the peace process have diluted his hopes and he has been advocating a temporary Israeli **annexation** of the Palestinian territories in return for full social rights of the Palestinians. This is different from the **one-state solution** because he is prepared to recognize Israel's concerns to remain a Jewish state.

O

OBAMA, BARACK (1961–). The first African American to hold the position, Barack Hussein Obama was elected the 44th president of the **United States** in November 2008 and assumed office in January 2009. He was born on 4 August 1961 in Hawaii and went on to study law at Columbia and Harvard Universities. He worked as an attorney and taught at the University of Chicago Law School during 1992–2004. He was elected to the Illinois Senate during 1997–2004 on the Democratic Party platform, then was elected to the U.S. Senate from Illinois and served until 2008 when he won the presidential campaign against Republican challenger John McCain (1936–). In October 2009 he won the Nobel Peace Prize and was reelected president in November 2012 with a reduced margin against Mitt Romney (1947–). Though raised as a Catholic, a section of the American right had a problem with Obama's biological father being a Muslim. Many leaders and commentators from Arab and Islamic countries are fond of referring to his middle name, Hussein.

Even though Obama visited Israel in 2008 during his election campaign, relations have been tense since he assumed office. The **Cast Lead Operation** carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** against **Hamas** in the **Gaza Strip** ended two days before Obama assumed office on 20 January 2009. Though supportive of the **two-state solution**, his reference to the **Green Line** being the point of reference for any agreement with the Palestinians and his opposition to **settlement** activities in the **Occupied Territories** added to the tension. During the 2012 presidential campaign, there were suggestions that Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** favored Romney to Obama. Some Israeli leaders were critical of Obama for suddenly abandoning long-term friend and ally President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** following the **Tahrir Square** protests and the **Arab Spring**.

As part of a reorganization of American priorities, Obama reversed some of the controversial polices pursued by President **George W. Bush**. Under his watch the United States decided to pull its combat troops out of **Iraq** by December 2011, and a similar move would happen in Afghanistan in December 2014. Differences over **nuclear Iran** have been another sour point be-

tween Israel and the United States. Though committed against **Iran** gaining nuclear capability, both in public and in private, Obama registered his opposition to any unilateral Israeli military actions against suspected nuclear targets in Iran. During his visit to Israel, the **West Bank**, and **Jordan** in March 2013, President Obama persuaded Netanyahu to tender a formal apology to President **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** of **Turkey** for the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**, which resulted in the killing of 10 people, including 9 Turkish citizens.

See also GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; KERRY PLAN.

OBSERVER STATE. On 29 November 2012, coinciding with the adoption of the **Partition Plan** 65 years before, the **United Nations** General Assembly approved the request of the **State of Palestine** for observer state status in the UN. Resolution 67/19 was approved by 138 votes in favor to 9 against, with 41 abstentions and 5 absences. Besides Israel, the **United States**, Canada, and the Czech Republic voted against the resolution. A number of **European Union** countries such as **France** voted with the majority while **Germany** and **Great Britain** abstained. The resolution granted Palestine non-voting member status, similar to the one enjoyed by the Holy See since 1964 and by Switzerland from 1948 to 2002. This was an improvement on the earlier observer status enjoyed by the **Palestine Liberation Organization** since 1974.

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. This expression refers to those territories captured by Israel during the **June War of 1967**—namely, the **West Bank**, including **East Jerusalem**; the **Sinai Peninsula**; the **Gaza Strip**; and the **Golan Heights**. Under the **Camp David Accords**, Israel returned the entire Sinai Peninsula to **Egypt**. Thereafter, the Occupied Territories consisted of about 5,700 square kilometers of the West Bank, about 360 square kilometers of the Gaza Strip, and about 1,800 square kilometers of the Golan Heights.

From June 1967, the Occupied Territories were controlled and administered by Israel through a **military administration**. In September 1981, the Israeli cabinet approved Defense Minister **Ariel Sharon**'s plan to separate the military from the **civil administration** and the appointment of Menahem Milson (1933–) as the new civilian administrator. While the Palestinian residents were subjected to the amended pre-1967 laws of **Jordan** and the Mandatory Emergency Regulations of 1945, Israeli settlers living in the Occupied Territories are subjected to Israeli laws and the regulations of the Ministry of the Interior.

The expression "Occupied Territories" has not been very popular in Israel, but the biblical expression "**Judea and Samaria**" is commonly used to describe the West Bank. Many on the right consider the West Bank to be an

integral part of the **Eretz Yisrael**. Because of demographic fears, Israel has resisted formally annexing the Occupied Territories, but this did not prevent governments led by the **Labor Party** and **Likud** from establishing Jewish **settlements** in the Occupied Territories. Through the **Jerusalem Law** and the **Golan Law**, respectively, Israel had extended its jurisdiction to the areas beyond the **Green Line** in Jerusalem and to the Golan Heights.

Israel maintains that the **Fourth Geneva Convention** of 1949 is not applicable to the Occupied Territories because of their unresolved legal status between 1948 and 1967, when the West Bank was occupied and subsequently annexed by Jordan. Nevertheless, Israel undertook to voluntarily apply the humanitarian rules of the Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories.

In December 2001, a Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Convention was held in Geneva, and it reiterated that the Geneva Convention *does* apply to the Occupied Territories and urged Israel to implement the provisions there, including in East Jerusalem. On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link the largest settlement in the West Bank, **Ma'ale Adumim**, with Jerusalem. Dismissing petitions challenging the **Gaza Disengagement** plan, on 9 June 2005 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the Occupied Territories were not legally part of Israel and were "seized" during the June War of 1967. In September 2005, Israel completed its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from four isolated settlements in the northern West Bank.

The issue of occupation continues to be contentious inside Israel. In July 2012 the **Levy Report**, which examined the question of **outposts**, concluded that the Israeli presence in the West Bank did not constitute occupation and that Jewish settlements are legal under international law. Both of these observations not only ran counter to the prevailing international consensus regarding the Occupied Territories but are also against the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Israel is a party.

The expression "Occupied Territories" can also be applied to a small piece of territory east of the **Sea of Galilee** or the Himmah areas that **Syria** captured during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. Under the **Armistice Agreement**, this piece of territory denotes the Green Line, but it was a part of **Mandate Palestine**. Likewise, international non-recognition makes the West Bank an occupied territory when it was under Jordanian control and **annexation** during 1948 and 1967.

See also E-1 AREA; REFERENDUM; RESOLUTION 242; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); SECURITY FENCE/S.

OCTOBER RIOTS. Against the backdrop of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, there were tensions in many Arab towns in northern Israel, and **Israeli Arabs** were protesting against the killing of Palestinians in **Jerusalem**. On 1 October

2000 the leadership of the Arab Higher Monitoring Committee, an umbrella organization of the Israeli Arabs, called for a general strike. The protests in Arab towns in the Galilee area such as Umm al-Fahm and Nazareth turned violent, and the Israeli police and border police responded with tear gas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition. The violence turned into an Arab–Jewish riot after a Jewish motorist was injured in a stone-throwing incident on 6 October leading to clashes between Jewish and Arab residents of Nazareth. By the time the violence was eventually brought under control on 9 October, 12 Israeli Arabs and 1 Palestinian were killed.

Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** appointed a three-member inquiry commission comprising Theodore Orr, a judge in the Israeli High Court; Shimon Shamir (1933–), former Israeli ambassador to **Egypt** and **Jordan**; and Hashim Khatib, a district judge from Nazareth. In its report released on 3 September 2003, the Orr Commission observed a pattern of official "prejudice and neglect" toward the Arab minority and accused the establishment of being insensitive to the widespread discrimination against the Arabs. It accused the police of using excessive force to control the riots and faulted them for using sniper fire to disperse the crowd. It also held three Arab figures, including two members of the Knesset, responsible for the incitement prior to the riots. Criticizing the handling of the situation by Shlomo Ben-Ami (1943–), the commission recommended that he be disqualified from serving as interior minister in the future.

See also WARFARE.

OCTOBER WAR OF 1973. Also known as the Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War, this conflict broke out on 6 October 1973 when **Egypt** launched a surprise offensive against Israel in coordination with **Syria**. With about 70,000 troops, five Egyptian divisions crossed the **Suez Canal** and overpowered the 500-odd Israelis who were defending the **Bar-Lev Line**. By 8 October, most of the defensive Israeli fortifications in the **Sinai Peninsula** were either captured by the Egyptians or were abandoned by the Israelis. On the same day, Israel launched an unplanned counter-offensive and suffered heavy losses. Meanwhile, after some initial setbacks, Israel was able to push the Syrian forces back from the **Golan Heights** and by 10 October had made some territorial gains.

The initial Egyptian strategy revolved around crossing the canal, establishing a foothold on the eastern bank, and holding on to its position. Following urgent pleas from Syria, on 11 October President **Anwar Sadat** ordered an Egyptian offensive strategy aimed at capturing the strategic Mitla and Gidi Passes about 50 kilometers from the canal. This exposed the Egyptian rear when Israel regrouped and launched a counter-offensive on the night of

15–16 October. Israeli forces encircled the Egyptian Third Army, crossed the Suez Canal, and cut off supplies. This compelled Egypt to accept an immediate cease-fire that it had rejected earlier.

When the cease-fire finally came into effect on 22 October, as called for by **Resolution 338** of the **United Nations** Security Council, Egypt was holding about 1,000 square kilometers of territory east of the Suez Canal, while Israel had managed to capture 1,600 square kilometers of territory west of the canal. On the Syrian front, Israel had captured about 600 square kilometers of additional Syrian territory. Both sides suffered enormous casualties in the war, with combined Egyptian and Syrian casualties estimated at 15,000, while 2,700 Israelis were killed and another 5,000 were wounded. The war witnessed a massive airlift of weapons from the **United States** to Israel beginning on 14 October. As an expression of solidarity with Egypt and Syria, **Saudi Arabia** imposed an embargo on the United States and the Netherlands on 16 October. This was soon followed by similar moves by other oil-exporting Arab states, and the resulting **oil crisis** affected a number of Western states and Japan and compelled them to modify their position on the Arab–Israeli conflict.

The war is remembered for the initial Israeli failure to read intelligence signals regarding Egyptian intentions. The war resulted in the complete overhaul of Israeli political-military leadership and eventually contributed to the erosion of the **Mapai** monopoly. The **Agranat Commission** severely criticized the intelligence failure that led to the war. The surprise offensive enabled Egypt, despite its loss, to shatter the myth of Israeli invincibility and subsequently enabled Sadat to come to terms with Israel's existence and make peace.

See also ASSAD, HAFEZ AL- (c. 1930–2000); BLUE-WHITE OPERATION; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; DAYAN, MOSHE (1915–1981); DOVECOTE OPERATION; JERUSALEM VISIT; JUNE WAR OF 1967; LABOR PARTY; MEIR, GOLDA (1898–1978); MUBARAK, HOSNI (1928–); OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; RABIN, YITZHAK (1922–1995); WARFARE.

OIL CRISIS. Following the outbreak of the **October War of 1973**, Arab oil-exporting countries met in Kuwait and agreed to cut production, while Abu Dhabi decided to halt its oil exports to the **United States**. These moves were part of the Arab displeasure with countries that were supporting Israel during the war. This policy partly influenced a number of European allies of the United States to deny refueling/overflight facilities for the massive airlift of American military supplies to Israel during the war. Only the Netherlands was willing to provide transit facilities.

The production cuts and supply dislocation resulted in a massive oil price increase. As a result, in early November 1973, the European Council, the forerunner of the **European Union**, called for an Israeli withdrawal from the **Occupied Territories** and endorsed the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Its dependency on the Middle East for its energy requirements also compelled Japan, a key ally of the United States, to modify its Middle East policy. Israel called such shifts a surrender to Arab "blackmail." Even though similar proposals have been made subsequently, oil was never used again as a political instrument in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

See also VENICE DECLARATION.

OIL SUPPLIES. Israel has depended heavily on imports for its hydrocarbon needs. Despite political rhetoric and the oil crisis, Israel was securing about 80 percent of its oil requirements from **Iran** during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980). In the 1970s, the discovery and production of oil in the **Sinai Peninsula** in **Egypt** partly met Israel's energy needs. As part of the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, Israel agreed to completely withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, and in return Egypt agreed to supply oil to Israel under commercial terms. To underwrite this arrangement, the **United States** offered to supply oil from its strategic oil reserves if Israel were unable to meet its energy needs.

Under the **gas deal** concluded in June 2005, Egypt agreed to supply 25 billion cubic meters of gas to Israel over a 15-year period, and supplies began to flow in the middle of 2008. This arrangement was terminated in April 2012, months after the downfall of President **Hosni Mubarak** and the **Arab Spring in Egypt**. Meanwhile, the discovery of large deposits of natural gas in 2009 raised hopes for Israel's energy self-sufficiency and possible exports. The Mediterranean gas field is spread across the exclusive economic zones of Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, **Lebanon**, and **Syria** and is off the coast of the **Gaza Strip**. This would require regional cooperation if Israel and other countries were to benefit from the fossil fuel. In January 2014, the **Palestinian National Authority** concluded a gas deal with **Russia** during the visit of President **Mahmoud Abbas**.

See also ILLEGAL TRADE.

OLMERT, EHUD (1945–). Israeli politician Ehud Olmert served as prime minister from January 2006 to March 2009. Olmert was born on 30 September 1945 in Binyamina in northern **Mandate Palestine**. Following his studies at the Hebrew University of **Jerusalem**, Olmert practiced law. He was active in Betar, the youth wing of Herut, and during his military service in the **Israel Defense Forces** he served in the Golani Brigade. In 1966, Olmert unsuccessfully challenged Gahal leader **Menachem Begin** for leadership. He

was elected to the Knesset in 1973 at the age of 28 as Gahal and later **Likud** member and elected for seven consecutive terms. He reentered the Knesset in 2003 and was reelected in 2006.

In 1978, Olmert was among the handful of Likud members of the Knesset who voted against the **Knesset approval** of the **Camp David Accords** with **Egypt**. He served as minister from 1988 to 1992 and from 2003 to 2006 under **Yitzhak Shamir** and **Ariel Sharon**. From 1993 to 2003, he served as the first Likud mayor of Jerusalem. In November 2005, he left Likud, joined Sharon, and formed **Kadima**. After Sharon suffered a stroke on 4 January 2006, Olmert was named acting prime minister and then leader of Kadima. In March 2006, he led Kadima in the Knesset elections and on 4 May became prime minister.

During his tenure, Israel fought two major wars—namely, the **Second Lebanon War** and the **Cast Lead Operation**. Accused of corruption, Olmert resigned as leader of Kadima and was replaced by **Tzipi Livni**. Following the Knesset election, in March 2009 Olmert was succeeded by **Benjamin Netanyahu** as prime minister. On 30 August 2009, indictments were filed against Olmert including corruption, and on 31 March 2014 Olmert was convicted on bribery charges while serving as the mayor of Jerusalem. On 13 May he was sentenced to six years in prison and fined NIS1.5 million.

See also AL-JAZEERA PAPERS; ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE.

OMEGA OPERATION. By March 1956, the Anglo-American frustrations over the failure of the **Alpha Plan** led to their desire to isolate and undermine **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt**. Growing contacts between Nasser and the **Soviet Union** increased their apprehensions. While the Alpha Plan involved positive inducements for Egypt, Omega contained veiled but real threats harmful to Egyptian interests. These included threats to suspend Anglo-American financing of the **Aswan Dam**, to encourage anti-Nasser conservative Islamic forces, and to engage in economic warfare against the cotton industry of Egypt. **Great Britain** and the **United States** even contemplated taking "more drastic actions" to influence Nasser.

See also CHAMELEON OPERATION; NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL; SUEZ WAR; WARFARE.

ONE-STATE SOLUTION. The idea of one state where Arabs and Jews would be living within a single territory has gone through three distinct phases. When **Great Britain** decided to withdraw from **Mandate Palestine** in 1947, neighboring Arab states opposed the **Partition Plan** approved by the **United Nations** and advocated a single unitary Palestinian state. They even opposed the **Federal Plan** proposed by **India** because it gave limited autonomy to the Jews. The second phase of this idea came after the **June**

War of 1967. In 1969, **Fatah**, the largest group in the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), recognized the presence of Jews in historic Palestine and suggested a single Palestinian state that would include Jews and Arabs. Though democratic in nature, this would negate the idea of the Jewish state and hence would imply the annulling of the partition of Palestine in 1947.

The collapse of the **Oslo Accords** and the stalemate in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations resulted in the revival of the one-state option, especially among activists and intellectuals. In their view the **two-state solution** has become unviable because of Israeli policies, especially the continued presence and intensification of **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**. Hence, they came up with the idea of a one-state solution, whereby Jews and Arabs would live under one democratic political entity with equal citizens. In practical terms this would mean the destruction of Israel, and hence it has been controversial and contested. Political differences between the PLO-controlled **Palestinian National Authority** and **Hamas** since the January 2006 Palestinian elections and the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2006 have opened the possibility of a three-state solution—namely, a PLO-controlled state of the **West Bank** and a Hamas state of the **Gaza Strip** co-existing along with the Jewish State of Israel.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); NUSSEIBEH, SARI (1949–).

OPEN BRIDGES POLICY. Following the **June War of 1967**, Israel and **Jordan** agreed to use the King **Hussein** Bridge (known until January 1957 as the Allenby Bridge) north of the Dead Sea and the Damia Bridge in the **Jordan Valley** to link the **Occupied Territories** to the outside world. Introduced by Israeli defense minister **Moshe Dayan**, this policy provided access for the Palestinians to the Arab world and enabled the export of Palestinian produce and the migration of Palestinian laborers to the Gulf countries. At the same time, through various security measures directed against Palestinians of age 20 to 40, it encouraged Palestinian emigration from the Occupied Territories. Following the implementation of the **Cairo Agreement** in 1994, nominal control of the western end of the Allenby Bridge went to the **Palestinian National Authority**, with Israel maintaining a security presence. Following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Jordan became apprehensive of massive Israeli **deportations** of Palestinians, and in June 2001, it imposed severe restrictions on the entry of Palestinians from the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**. The bridge is also used by **Israeli Arabs** making their hajj and *umrah* pilgrimages to **Saudi Arabia**.

ORCHARD OPERATION. This was the code name for the September 2007 Israeli air raid against a nuclear reactor in Al-Kibar along the Euphrates River in southeast **Syria**. As a voluntary signatory to the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, Syria was expected to disclose all nuclear facilities to the Vienna-based nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The raid was carried out in the early hours of 6 September against a facility built with technical support and cooperation from North Korea. Initially Syrian officials described the site as a civilian center for arid zones and an empty military complex under construction. A subsequent investigation by the IAEA confirmed it to be a nuclear reactor.

This attack was similar to the **Osiraq bombing** of 1981, where Israel sought to maintain its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, and it came against the backdrop of growing controversies over **nuclear Iran** and concerns over a possible Israeli military strike against nuclear installations in **Iran**. While Syria condemned the attack, responses from other Arab countries were mild. After a diplomatic controversy with **Turkey**, Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert** offered a personal apology to his Turkish counterpart **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** for any possible violation of Turkish airspace during the operation.

See also WARFARE.

ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC). Earlier known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference until 2011, the OIC was established at the summit meeting of the Islamic countries held in Rabat in September 1969. With 56 members and 5 observers, the OIC is the second-largest international organization of sovereign states after the **Non-Aligned Movement**. The **Al-Aqsa fire** set by a deranged Australian tourist on 21 September 1969 ignited calls for the conference as there were growing demands among Muslim communities in different parts of the world to ensure the protection of Islam's third-holiest site in **East Jerusalem**. This was primarily the brainchild of King Faisal of **Saudi Arabia** (1903/6–1975) and King Hassan (1929–1999) of Morocco. Over the years the political influence of the OIC has increased considerably, especially in the wake of the **oil crisis**, which strengthened the economic influence of oil-rich Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia. In June 2011 the OIC changed its name to the current form. In August 2012, a ministerial meeting of the OIC endorsed the idea first propounded by **Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini** in 1979 to commemorate the last Friday of the month of Ramadan as **Al-Quds** Day.

See also HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT; ISRAEL–JORDAN PEACE TREATY; JERUSALEM; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES; TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. *See* ORGAN-IZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION (OIC).

ORIENT HOUSE. The property of the Husseini family, a prominent Arab family in **Mandate Palestine**, the Orient House in **East Jerusalem** was built in 1897. Following the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, it became part of the **West Bank** that came under the control of **Jordan**. During 1949–1950, it functioned as the headquarters of the **Palestine Conciliation Committee** and the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency**, and subsequently it was operated as a hotel. Following the **June War of 1967**, when Israel captured East Jerusalem, it was converted into a private residence. In 1983, the Arab Studies Societies headed by Faisal al-Husseini (1940–2001) rented a portion of the house. During the **First Intifada**, citing security reasons, Israeli authorities briefly closed it. In early 1991, the Orient House emerged as the headquarters of the Palestinian delegation to the **Madrid Conference** and hosted pre-conference negotiations with the **United States**. Since then, it has hosted meetings with foreign diplomats, journalists, and occasionally junior officials from other countries.

As part of the **Oslo Process**, on 11 October 1993 Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres** sent a letter to his Norwegian counterpart Johan Jorgen Holst (1937–1994) stating that Israel would not change the status of economic, social, educational, and cultural institutions operating in Jerusalem. However, the conduct of what was seen as diplomatic activities became a controversial issue in the domestic Israeli agenda. Citing such activities as a violation of the **Declaration of Principles**, on 26 December 1994 the Israeli government enacted a law commonly known as the Orient House Law, which restricted political activities at the House and prohibited the establishment of any institution connected to the **Palestinian National Authority** in East Jerusalem. The law enables the Israeli government to act against Palestinian political activities in the Orient House or in any other institution located in East Jerusalem.

Days before the May 1999 Knesset elections, Israel sought to close three Palestinian offices located in the Orient House but was stopped by the Supreme Court. Despite the legislative sanctions, Israeli governments followed a hands-off policy vis-à-vis the Orient House until August 2001. In the midst of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, responding to a **suicide attack** in West **Jerusalem** in which 15 Israelis were killed, on 9 August Israeli forces stormed the Orient House; confiscated computers, data, files, and other materials; and sealed the building. With the closure order being renewed every six months, in August 2011 the **European Union** called on Israel to let Palestinians reopen the Orient House and the Arab Chamber of Commerce to fulfill its obligations as part of the **Quartet Road Map**, but to no avail.

OSIRAQ BOMBING. On 7 June 1981, the **Israel Defense Forces** conducted an air raid on a nearly completed nuclear reactor near Baghdad, **Iraq**. Constructed with the cooperation of **France**, the reactor—known as Tammuz I to the Iraqis and Osiraq to the French—was under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the international nuclear regulatory body. The attack was seen as the ushering in of Israel's nuclear hegemony whereby it is determined to prevent any of its adversaries in the region from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. Even though Israel is not a signatory to the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, it accused Iraq—which is a signatory—of deviating from peaceful nuclear means and pursuing a weaponization program. Israel justified its preemptive strike by clarifying that it would be the prime target of a nuclear Iraq. The international community was critical of Israel, and the **United Nations** Security Council unanimously condemned the raid. The **United States** briefly suspended the delivery of four F-16 jet fighters. Even though the Reagan administration (1981–1989) admonished Israel and joined in the international condemnation of Israel, a decade later the United States used the same arguments to partly justify its campaigns against Baghdad in the **Kuwait War**.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; SAMSON OPTION; WARFARE.

OSLO ACCORDS. This expression refers to all the agreements concluded between Israel and the Palestinian leadership—namely, the **Declaration of Principles** (1993), the **Cairo Agreement** (1994), the **Paris Agreement** (1994), the **Taba Agreement** (1995), the **Wye Memorandum** (1998), and the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** (1999).

See also OSLO PROCESS; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO); PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA).

OSLO II AGREEMENT. *See* TABA AGREEMENT.

OSLO PROCESS. This nomenclature refers to the peace talks that began in the Norwegian capital of Oslo between the officials of Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and the various **Oslo Accords** concluded between the two sides as a follow-up to such talks. In late 1992, Israel and the PLO initiated secret negotiations to circumvent the impasse in the bilateral talks that were taking place in Washington. These talks held in the **United States** within the framework of the **Madrid Conference** formally excluded the PLO, and the Palestinians were represented by a joint Jorda-

nian–Palestinian delegation. Controversy over the **deportation** of 415 suspected **Hamas** activists in December 1992 provided another impetus to resolve the stalemate.

Back-channel diplomacy initiated by two Israeli academics—namely, Yair Hirschfield and Ron Pundik (1955–2014)—gradually became official with the involvement of Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin (1948–) and, later, Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres**. The Israel–PLO talks were held in Oslo, where Norwegian foreign minister Johan Jorgen Holst (1937–1994) played host. After many drafts, the **Declaration of Principles** was secretly initialed on 20 August 1993.

On 9 September 1993, Israel and the PLO exchanged letters, signed by Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** and PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat**, that granted **mutual recognition**. The PLO formally accepted Israel's right to exist, and Israel recognized the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people." The PLO also committed to **annulment** clauses in the **PLO Charter** that questioned Israel's existence.

On 13 September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the **Declaration of Principles** in a ceremony on the White House Lawns hosted by President **Bill Clinton**. This was followed by the conclusion of the **Cairo Agreement** (1994), the **Paris Agreement** (1994), the **Taba Agreement** (1995), the **Wye Memorandum** (1998), and the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** (1999). The Cairo Agreement paved the way for the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority** under the leadership of Chairman Arafat. However, in practice, the failure of the **Camp David Talks** in 2000 and the onset of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** marked the collapse of the Oslo Process.

Since the electoral victory of **Hamas** in January 2006, Israel, the United States, and other countries have demanded that the militant movement accept the Oslo Accords as a precondition for its inclusion in the peace process. International support for the **two-state solution** and peace initiatives such as the **Quartet Road Map**, the **Abdullah Plan**, and the **Arab Peace Initiative** also revolved around the Oslo Process.

OSLO TIMETABLE. *See* DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DoP).

OTTOMAN EMPIRE. The Ottoman Empire, the forerunner of the present-day Republic of **Turkey**, ruled or controlled most of the modern Middle East from 1299 until 1923. Since 1571 the sultan of the Ottoman Empire also served as the caliph of the Sunni Muslims the world over. Most of the modern Middle East was part of or paid allegiance to the Ottoman Empire. During World War I (1914–1918), the Zionist leaders, especially **Chaim Weizmann**, sought the support of the Ottoman sultan for the creation of the Jewish national home in Palestine. Around the same time, under the

Sykes–Picot Agreement, **France**, **Great Britain**, and initially czarist **Russia** sought to divide up the Ottoman Empire into various protectorates under their control. The formation of **Mandate Palestine** and similar arrangements for **Iraq** and **Syria**, which then included present-day **Lebanon**, reflected the Sykes–Picot understanding. The **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** was part of the British strategy to undermine and divide the Ottoman Empire.

The promise of an independent Arab kingdom as outlined in the **Hussein–McMahon correspondence** incorporating Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire ran counter to the British promise to support a Jewish national home under the **Balfour Declaration**. At the end of World War I and the defeat of the empire, a new Turkish Republic was proclaimed by Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938) on 29 October 1923, and the office of caliph was abolished on 3 March 1924.

OUTPOSTS. This expression refers to unauthorized Israeli **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**, which sprang up since the early 1990s following the **Oslo Accords**. These violate not only the **Fourth Geneva Convention** regarding occupation but also are contrary to the housing and planning regulations of Israel vis-à-vis the Occupied Territories. Despite their illegal nature, some of these outposts are protected by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). These outposts, located in the **West Bank**, are efforts by the settlers and their supporters to make evacuation of settlements militarily difficult and politically controversial within Israel. In 2002 the government headed by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** told the courts that there were 69 such outposts established in the West Bank since 1996, and these numbers subsequently rose to about 100. In March 2005 a report published by a committee headed by a former official in the state prosecutor's office disclosed that officials in the Ministries of Defense and Construction and Housing and a division of the **World Zionist Organization** transferred official funds to these unauthorized constructions. Most of these outposts are located on lands privately owned by the Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories. In 2012 Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** legalized 10 outposts by attaching them into nearby Jewish settlements.

In August 2011, the Israeli Supreme Court declared that Migron, an outpost in the West Bank north of Jerusalem, was built illegally on lands belonging to Palestinians and hence should be dismantled. The IDF completed the evacuation of Migron on 2 September 2012. There are still a number of illegal outposts in the West Bank whose removal is contested and opposed inside Israel. On 18 November 2013, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the government to demolish three outposts—Givat Assaf, Ma'ale Rehavam, and Mitzpeh Yitzhar—within six months.

See also LEVY REPORT; MIGRON EVACUATION.

P

PACT OF MUTUAL COOPERATION. *See* BAGHDAD PACT.

PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC). On 11 December 1948, the **United Nations** General Assembly adopted **Resolution 194**, which, among other things, established a three-member Palestine Conciliation Commission to take over the functions and responsibilities of **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) following his **assassination** in September. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council were authorized by the resolution to recommend the commission's members, and they nominated **France**, **Turkey**, and the **United States**. On 27 April 1949, the PCC convened a meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland, attended by Israel and neighboring Arab states. By then, Israel had signed **Armistice Agreements** with **Egypt**, **Lebanon**, and **Jordan** and had begun negotiations with **Syria** for a similar agreement. Nevertheless, the Arabs refused to participate in direct negotiations with Israel, so the PCC held separate consultations with both sides. Based on its consultations, the PCC developed the Protocol of Lausanne, which set out a number of principles for future resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Signed on 12 May 1949, the protocol recognized the **Partition Plan** and the accompanying map that outlined the territorial jurisdiction of Jewish and Arab states in the Palestine **Mandate** as "*a basis* for discussion with the Commission."

In late 1950, the PCC sought to resolve the **refugee** question through a three-pronged approach: repatriation to Israel, resettlement in Arab countries, and absorption by other countries. However, differences between parties over the territorial issue and the refugee problem prevented any agreement, and in November 1951 the commission conceded its inability to function and fulfill its mandate. Years later, the commission tried to revive its refugee proposal. To investigate the possibility of such an option, in 1961 the PCC sent a team to the region, headed by Joseph E. Johnson (1895–1990), and the PCC submitted its last report in 1962.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY (PLA). This military branch of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** was established in 1964 and consisted of three brigades. Their autonomy and independence were severely curtailed, and the PLA units were soon absorbed into the armies of the host countries: Ein Jalut under the control of the army of **Egypt**, Qadisiyya under **Iraq**, and Hittin under **Syria**. Following the **June War of 1967**, the Qadisiyya brigade was transferred to **Jordan** and renamed al-Badr. Apprehensive of Israeli retaliation, the PLA units were prohibited from organizing, assisting, or supporting any commando raids against Israel. Following the signing of the **Taba Agreement** in May 1994, some units returned to the **Occupied Territories** and were deployed as the police force of the **Palestinian National Authority**.

See also WARFARE.

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF). Following a split from the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** and the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command**, Mohammed Zeidan (aka Abu Abbas [1948–2004]) formed this militant group in April 1977. It subsequently split into three factions, two supported by **Syria** and one led by Abu Abbas, which was supported by **Iraq**. At one time, Abu Abbas was a member of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee and headed the department of **refugees**. In the 1980s, his group was held responsible for a number of terrorist incidents, including the *Achille Lauro Affair* in 1985. On 30 May 1990, the PLF launched an unsuccessful commando raid on the beaches of Tel Aviv, and this led to the suspension of the dialogue between the PLO and the **United States** that had begun in December 1988. Despite its opposition to the **Madrid Conference** and **Oslo Process**, the PLF is still represented in the PLO Executive Committee. During the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Abu Abbas was captured in South Baghdad on 15 April, and the following March he died in allied custody.

See also GLIDER ATTACK.

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). This umbrella organization was set up on 28 May 1964 to represent the dispersed Palestinian people and to enable them to liberate their homeland and shape their destiny. A decision to this effect was made at the first **Arab League** summit in Cairo in January 1964. Subsequently, the PLO held its first Palestine National Congress in May 1964 in **East Jerusalem**, then under the control of **Jordan**, and adopted the **PLO Charter**. Veteran Arab diplomat Ahmad Shuqeiri (1908–1980) was chosen as the first chairman of the PLO.

The first Palestinian Congress also set up the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the PLO Executive Committee, a national fund, and the **Palestine Liberation Army** (PLA). The PLO created a number of organizations to provide education, health, and relief services and formed a quasi-government with a security apparatus, financial system, information offices, and diplomatic missions. Since 1967, the PLO has strengthened its organizational, social, financial, educational, propagandist, and political activities. Its successful **Fedayeen** campaign helped consolidate its support base among Palestinian **refugees** as well as among the Arab masses elsewhere. At its height, the PLO functioned inside the areas controlled by Israel and along Israel's borders and worked against Israeli interests around the world.

From its inauguration in 1964, the PNC functioned as the Palestinian parliament in exile. Normally the PNC met once a year. Its membership was allocated to the various component bodies of the PLO, as well as to affiliated mass organizations representing workers, students, women, teachers, doctors, and others; the membership included representatives from the **Occupied Territories** and the Palestinian **Diaspora** in Jordan, **Syria**, **Lebanon**, and the Gulf states. The PLO Charter called for the establishment of a secular and democratic Palestinian state in the whole of Palestine, as it existed during the **Mandate** period.

The **Arab Higher Committee** headed by **Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, the former grand mufti of **Jerusalem**, was not in favor of creating the PLO. Similarly, Jordan, which annexed the **West Bank** on 24 April 1950, was opposed to the formation of a separate non-territorial entity to represent the Palestinians. To mitigate this opposition, the Palestinian demand for independent statehood carefully excluded those parts of Palestine occupied by Jordan and **Egypt** during 1948–1967. However, this distinction became irrelevant following the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip** after the **June War of 1967** and hence was removed from the revised PLO Charter adopted in 1968.

While the performance of the Arab armies was dismal in the June War, the Fedayeen rose to prominence. In July 1968, the fourth PNC in Cairo identified "armed struggle" as "the only way to liberate Palestine." The session also transformed the PLO from being merely a political representation of the Palestinians into an umbrella organization of various military and civilian Palestinian groups, with guerrilla groups at its core.

Fatah, formally established on 10 October 1959, has been a prominent component of the PLO; the other major constituents of the PLO are the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** and the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**. At the fifth session of the PNC in February 1969, Fatah seized control of the PLO and gained a majority in the 13-member executive. **Yasser Arafat**, the leader of Fatah, became the chairman of the PLO and held that position until his death in November 2004.

In September 1970, a violent confrontation erupted between the PLO and the Jordanian army, culminating in the **Black September Massacre**. The confrontation arose from the apprehensions of King **Hussein** that the PLO would try to take over Jordan and end the Hashemite rule. At the end of the crisis, Jordan ceased to be a base for the operations of the PLO against Israel; the organization was ousted from Amman, and by the **Cairo Agreement (1970)**, worked out by Egyptian president **Gamal Abdel Nasser**, the PLO shifted to Beirut.

In June 1974, the PLO moved toward the idea of establishing a Palestinian state in parts of the Occupied Territories as the first step toward the total liberation of the Palestine Mandate. Despite Jordanian opposition, in 1974 the Arab League recognized the PLO as the "sole legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people. This was followed by similar recognition by a number of Third World countries. Following an address by Arafat in the United Nations General Assembly on 22 November 1974, the world body recognized the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people," reaffirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination and national independence, and granted it observer status. Since then, the PLO has been participating in all UN deliberations concerning Palestinians.

Most of the PLO activities against Israel have emanated from the Occupied Territories, southern Lebanon, Jordan (until the Black September crackdown), Syria (until the 1975 separation of forces agreement), or Egypt (until Sadat's peace initiative in 1978). At one time or another, its guerrilla tactics against Israel put the PLO at odds with the host Arab countries. Its financial dependence on oil-rich Arab states also made the PLO vulnerable to pressure tactics. More than its diplomatic successes, the PLO gained international attention and recognition primarily through its guerrilla campaign and **terrorism** against Israel and its interests in the Middle East.

After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, or the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, the PLO, its commandos, and the PLA troops were evacuated from Beirut and were dispersed to various Arab countries. On 16 September 1982, Lebanese Christian **Phalange** militants entered the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and committed the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre** in which nearly 2,000 Palestinians, including women and children, were killed. The PLO headquarters, which were moved to Tunis as part of the evacuation from Lebanon, were raided by Israel on 1 October 1985, resulting in the deaths of more than 70 people, with Arafat making a providential escape.

Though the **First Intifada** was spontaneous, the PLO quickly took control of the situation and became part of the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**. Capitalizing on international attention and support, the PNC adopted the **Algiers Declaration** on 15 November 1988 and proclaimed the establishment of the **State of Palestine**, with Arafat as its president. In a

historical shift, it accepted the **Partition Plan** of 1947, renounced the use of violence to achieve the aims of the PLO, and became reconciled to the idea of Palestinian self-determination in co-existence with Israel. The outbreak of the Intifada also led to the formation of the militant Palestinian group **Hamas**.

Meanwhile, responding to the Intifada, in July 1988 King Hussein announced **Jordanian Disengagement** from the West Bank and cut off administrative links. Following these developments and Arafat's renunciation of violence, in 1988, the **United States** initiated a dialogue with the PLO, only to suspend it in July 1990 after an aborted terrorist attack against Israel carried out by the **Palestine Liberation Front** headed by Abu Abbas (1948–2004).

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the Palestinian endorsement of Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) brought the PLO into conflict with the prevailing Arab consensus. Oil-rich countries such as Kuwait and **Saudi Arabia**, the principal benefactors of the PLO, resented Palestinian approval of the Iraqi linkage between the **Kuwait War** and the future of the Occupied Territories. Arafat became persona non grata in the Arab world. Following a series of negotiations with U.S. secretary of state **James A**. **Baker**, however, the PLO backed the idea of a peaceful and negotiated settlement with Israel and endorsed the idea of a Middle East peace conference. The PLO agreed to form a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation for the **Madrid Conference**, which opened on 30 October 1991. Even though the negotiations were supposedly conducted with the Palestinians based in the Occupied Territories, the Tunis-based PLO leadership was deeply involved. The bilateral talks did not make any progress.

After his election as prime minister in July 1992, **Labor Party** leader **Yitzhak Rabin** expressed Israel's commitment to a land-for-peace policy, and in January 1993, Israel repealed the **PLO Law**. These moves set off the **Oslo Process** between Israel and the PLO. On 9 September 1993, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat exchanged letters of **mutual recognition**. On 13 September, the **Declaration of Principles** (DoP), signed on the White House Lawns in the presence of President **Bill Clinton** and other international leaders, outlined the terms of reference for achieving a negotiated settlement.

The DoP was transformed into a working document in May 1994, when both parties agreed to the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), delineated the geographical and functional limits of autonomy, and agreed on a framework for **Permanent Status Negotiations**. In July 1994, the PLO and Arafat moved to the Gaza Strip from Tunis to administer Gaza and **Jericho**. By late 1995, Israel completed its **redeployment** from all the Palestinian towns in the West Bank except **Hebron**.

In January 1996, a popular vote was held to elect the president of the PNA and an 88-member **Palestinian Legislative Council**. The **Oslo Accords** were not acceptable to a number of Palestinian groups, including some affiliated with the PLO, and they launched a **Rejectionist Front** in Damascus. They often staged protest rallies and demonstrations against the peace process. The most violent protest against the Oslo Process came from Hamas, which conducted a series of **suicide attacks** inside the **Green Line**.

On 24 April 1996, a few weeks before crucial parliamentary elections in Israel, the PNC met in Gaza and passed a resolution declaring that "the articles [of the Covenant] that are contrary to the [9 September 1993] letters of Mutual Recognition" were null and void. This declaration, approved by 504 to 54 (with 14 abstentions), was rejected by many Israelis as vague, imprecise, and insufficient. On 10 December 1998, the PNC met again in the Gaza Strip and by 81 to 7 votes (with 7 abstentions) decided to revoke the specific clauses of the covenant. The PLO Centre Committee ratified this decision on 14 December with a show of hands rather than through a formal vote. U.S. president Bill Clinton was present during this meeting. However, the official amended version of the PLO Charter was never published. After the death of Arafat on 11 November 2004, **Mahmoud Abbas** was elected leader of the PLO. The following month he visited Kuwait, met members of the ruling family, and offered an apology for the policies pursued by the Palestinian leadership during the Kuwait War.

The victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian elections considerably weakened the PLO and its influence. Various efforts were made to bring about a Hamas–Fatah reconciliation and unity, and the **Mecca Accord** mediated by King **Abdullah** of Saudi Arabia was signed by these two groups. These efforts did not endure. The **Battle of Gaza** and the Gaza takeover by Hamas in June 2007 formally broke the PNA into two units, the West Bank controlled by the Fatah-dominated PLO and the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas. Backed by the PLO, in November 2012 the PNA applied and secured **observer state** status in the **United Nations**. On 23 April 2014, Fatah and Hamas agreed to form a unity government and hold fresh elections to the PNA, but before any progress could be made the **Israel Defense Forces** launched the **Protective Edge Operation** following the kidnapping and killing of three Jewish youths in July 2014.

See also AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE; AUTONOMY PLAN; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; IRAQ; JERUSALEM VISIT; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; KERRY PLAN; QUREI, AHMED (1937–); SADAT, ANWAR (1918–1981); TUNIS RAID.

PALESTINE MANDATE. *See* MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE.

PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT (PNF). This secret body was set up by the Palestine National Council in January 1973 to organize Palestinian resistance in the **Occupied Territories** against Israel and to weaken the influence of **Jordan** in the **West Bank**. Israeli and Jordanian efforts to circumvent the influence of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) in the Occupied Territories compelled the PLO to work toward strengthening its influence. As a follow-up to the 11th Palestinian National Council, the PNF was established in 1973 to function as a PLO-guided framework for all nationalist activities in the West Bank and **Gaza Strip**. Members of the PNF were harshly persecuted by the Israeli military authorities for their "subversive" activities. In 1976, the PNF contested the local elections conducted by the Israeli **military administration** and won a number of seats. Its growing popularity caused concerns not only for Israel and Jordan but also for the PLO leadership then based in Beirut, which sought to exercise greater control over the PLF's activities. In May 1980, Israel resorted to the **deportation** of some key leaders of the PNF, including the mayors of **Hebron** and Halhul, to **Lebanon**. The PNF was outlawed by Israel in 1978, and the newly formed **Committee for National Guidance** became the principal organ of nationalist activities in the West Bank.

PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF). On 25 March 1985, a number of groups opposed to **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** and supported by **Syria** organized themselves into the PNSF to oppose the **Hussein–Arafat Accord** of February 1985. The PNSF was led by Khalid al-Fahum (1923–), the head of the PLO Central Council. The faction backed by Syria had earlier boycotted the Palestinian National Council (PNC) meeting held during 22–29 November 1984. At that meeting, the PNC decided to remove al-Fahum as its speaker and replace him with Abdal-Hamid al-Sayyeh (1933–1996).

PALESTINE PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP). In February 1982, Bashir al-Barghouti (1931–2000) founded the Palestine Communist Party in the **Occupied Territories**. In the late 1980s, this party discarded the Leninist ideology and relaunched itself as the Palestine People's Party. The PPP was one of the constituent members of the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising** during the **First Intifada**. It pioneered the Israeli–Palestinian dialogue and advocated a **two-state solution**. The PPP supported the **Oslo Process** and was the only organized political party besides **Fatah** to contest the January 1996 elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council**. Though the PPP was unsuccessful, its leader Barghouti was appointed a minister in the **Palestinian National Authority**. The PPP calls for the reorganization of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and a political dialogue with opposition fac-

tions. In 2002, **Mustafa Barghouti** left the party with some supporters to establish the Palestinian National Initiative. In the 2005 presidential election, the PPP's candidate Bassam al-Salhi (1960–) received 2.67 percent of the votes. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, the PPP formed a joint list called Al-Badeel with the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, the Palestine Democratic Union, and other independents and won two seats in the 132-member council.

PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE. During the 1975 annual session, the **United Nations** General Assembly formed a 20-member committee (later increased to 24) to devise plans for the implementation of Palestinian "self-determination and national independence." The current members of the Palestine Committee are Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Cyprus, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, **India**, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, **South Africa**, Tunisia, **Turkey**, and Ukraine. The committee periodically meets and organizes various conferences on the Palestinian question.

PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC). The **Taba Agreement**, also known as Oslo II, signed on 28 September 1995, stipulated that upon the completion of Israeli **redeployment** from major Palestinian towns, Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** would directly elect an 82-member legislative council and the chairman of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Accordingly, Israeli redeployment from six Palestinian towns in the **West Bank** was completed by late 1995. Between 12 November and 12 December 1995, voter registration was undertaken in the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip**, and 1,013,235 Palestinians were registered as eligible voters. A Central Election Commission headed by **Mahmoud Abbas** was appointed on 22 December.

Due to internal demands, **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** increased the size of the council from 82 seats to 88. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip were divided into 16 multi-member electoral districts as follows: Balah (5 seats), **Bethlehem** (4), Deir Nablus (8), Gaza (12), Hebron (10), Jabaliya (7), Jenin (6), **Jericho** (1), **Jerusalem** (7), Khan Yunis (8), Qalqilya (2), Rafah (5), **Ramallah** (7), Salfit (1), Toubas (1), and Tulkaram (4). Out of the 88 seats, seven were reserved for religious minorities: one each in Gaza and Ramallah and two each in Bethlehem and Jerusalem were reserved for Christians, and one seat was allotted for the 400-member Samaritan community of Deir Nablus.

The elections, which were held on 20 January 1996, witnessed a high voter turnout of 79 percent. **Fatah** fielded the highest number of candidates, and the **Palestine People's Party** was the only other organized political party to

contest the elections. A number of important Palestinian groups and parties—including **Hamas**, the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, and **Islamic Jihad**—did not take part in the elections, primarily because of their disapproval of, and opposition to, the **Oslo Process**. Fatah won 52 seats, and 12 seats went to former members of Fatah who contested as rebels. Of the others, 16 seats went to independents, 2 to **FIDA**, 4 to independents affiliated with Islamists, 1 to Samaritans, and 1 to Arafat, who was also elected president of the PNA.

The Palestinian Legislative Council held its first session on 7 March 1996, and **Ahmed Qurei** was elected Speaker of the council. The members of the PLC were automatically made members of the Palestinian National Council. The PLC is responsible for drafting a Palestinian constitution and any other legal and regulatory framework, all of which require a formal approval from Israel. However, the PLC lacks foreign policy powers. Following the death of Chairman Arafat on 11 November, Speaker of the PLC Rawhi Fattouh (1949–) became interim head of the PNA and was succeeded by Mahmoud Abbas, who was elected president in the elections held on 9 January 2005.

The elections for the new council were slated for July 2005, but following internal tensions between Fatah and other militant groups, President Abbas postponed them to January 2006. In June 2005, the PLC adopted new laws under which the strength of the parliament was raised to 132 seats; out of this, 66 members would be elected in constituency-based regional elections, and the other 66 would be elected through proportional representation.

The elections were held on 25 January 2006, and Hamas secured 44.45 percent of the popular vote and 76 out of 132 seats and gained an absolute majority. With 41.43 percent of the vote, Fatah secured 45 seats, and the remaining seats were shared by other Palestinian factions. The monitors from the **European Union** declared the elections to be free and fair, and in March 2006, Aziz Duwaik (1950–) of Hamas became the speaker of the PLC. Since mid-2006 a number of members of parliament belonging to Hamas have been periodically arrested by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) on various **terrorism**-related charges, and one of them, Said Seyam (1959–2009), who was also the interior minister of the Hamas government in Gaza, was killed in an IDF raid carried out in January 2009. As with the first elections in January 1996, the tenure of the second PLC remains open ended and was not fixed.

The refusal of Fatah to accept the January 2006 verdict and the failure of Hamas to work toward a unity government resulted in internal divisions among the Palestinians and contributed to the emergence of two separate political units—namely, the West Bank controlled by the Fatah-dominated PNA and the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas. This division was formalized following the **Battle of Gaza** and the Gaza takeover by Hamas in June 2007.

On 23 April 2014, Fatah and Hamas agreed to form a unity government and hold fresh elections to the PNA, but before any progress could be made, the IDF launched the **Protective Edge Operation** following the kidnapping and killing of three Jewish youths in July 2014.

See also FAYYAD, SALAM (1952–); HANIYEH, ISMAIL (1963–); MECCA ACCORD.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AND ISLAMIC FORCES (PNIF). This umbrella organization was the product of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It consists of members of the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, **Hamas**, and **Islamic Jihad**. These groups enjoyed significant influence during the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** but have been less active since then, especially after the election of **Mahmoud Abbas** as president of the **Palestinian National Authority** on 9 January 2005.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). The PNA was established on 4 May 1994 in line with the **Declaration of Principles** signed on the White House Lawns on 13 September 1993 with the explicit purpose of governing Palestinian affairs in the self-rule area. The terms and conditions were established under the **Cairo Agreement** of May 1994. The initial contingent of Palestinian police arrived in the **Gaza Strip** in May 1994, and **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** made a triumphant entry into the Gaza Strip on 1 July.

Initially the name "Palestinian National Authority" had been given to the Palestinian self-government entity established to implement this accord. Subsequently, it was used to describe the Palestinian body administering the **West Bank** and the Gaza Strip. Despite its limited powers, the PNA is responsible for the entire **Occupied Territories**, including those areas under nominal Israeli security control. In the beginning, the PNA took over the responsibilities for tourism, education, health, taxes, and social welfare. On 20 August 1995, it assumed the administration of commerce and industry, agriculture, local government, gas and petrol, postal services, labor, insurance, and statistics.

The **Taba Agreement** of 1995 provided for the election of 82 (subsequently increased to 88) representatives to a **Palestinian Legislative Council** and the formation of an Executive Authority under a *ra'ees* (chairman or president). The elections were held on 20 January 1996, and the Palestinian cabinet was formed during March–June 1996. The PNA lacks foreign relations powers but is empowered to conduct **Permanent Status Negotiations**. However, since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** and especially during the **Defensive Shield Operation** in 2002, Israel has systematically destroyed the physical as well as administrative infrastructure of the PNA.

Under pressure from the **United States** in March 2003, Arafat created the post of prime minister and appointed **Mahmoud Abbas** to the position. Due to differences with Arafat, Abbas resigned in September and was replaced by **Ahmed Qurei**. After the death of Arafat on 11 November 2004, Speaker of the Council Rawhi Fattouh (1949–) became interim head of the PNA. On 9 January 2005, elections were held to choose Arafat's successor. Seven candidates contested the elections, and with over 62 percent of the valid votes, Abbas, who represented **Fatah**, defeated **Mustafa Barghouti** who fought as an independent. In August 2005, Israel completed its **Gaza Disengagement**, and the PNA took control of the Gaza Strip.

The second parliamentary elections were held on 25 January 2006, and **Hamas** secured 76 seats in the 132-member parliament. Fatah, which had been controlling the PNA since 1996, could secure only 45 seats and was not prepared to accept the electoral verdict. On 19 February 2006, **Ismail Haniyeh** formed a government. This led to periodic tension and confrontation between the supporters of Hamas and Fatah. In March 2007 Hamas and Fatah signed the **Mecca Accord** mediated by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** and formed a unity government on 17 March 2007. This did not endure, and the **Battle of Gaza** broke out on 10 June between Hamas and Fatah activists, culminating in the Gaza takeover by Hamas on 15 June. Meanwhile, on 14 June Abbas dissolved the unity government headed by Haniyeh and imposed a state of emergency, and the following day Abbas asked **Salam Fayyad** to form a government. Since June 2007, the Palestinian territories have been governed by two governments, the Hamas government headed by Haniyeh controlling the Gaza Strip and the PNA government headed by Fayyad and subsequently by Rami Hamdallah (1958–) controlling the West Bank.

Because of the security situation and confrontation between the two, Abbas has not visited the Gaza Strip since September 2005. Various efforts toward internal unity have not been fruitful. The Fatah–Hamas internal schism became apparent during the periodic violence between Israel and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. The PNA played a minimal role in the international campaign against the **Siege of Gaza** imposed by Israel and supported by **Egypt** under **Hosni Mubarak**. Campaigns such as the **Freedom Flotilla** and the **Fly-in Campaign** were organized by international human rights organizations, not by the PNA. Likewise, the West Bank remained relatively quiet and tranquil during some of the bloodiest confrontations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. This was more apparent during the **Cast Lead Operation** of December 2008–January 2009 and the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012.

On 29 November 2012, coinciding with the **Partition Plan** approved in 1947, the UN approved the PNA's application for non-member **observer state** status for the **State of Palestine**. This was supported by 138 votes to 9,

with 41 abstentions and 5 countries absent during the vote. Along with Israel, the United States and Canada voted against the resolution, while Australia, **Germany**, and **Great Britain** abstained. A number of **European Union** countries including **France** voted for the resolution. Though Israel vehemently opposed the move, it did not impose any severe sanctions as it had threatened to do. Abbas abandoned his earlier move for full membership in the UN because the United States expressed its opposition and threatened to exercise its veto power in the Security Council. As a consequence, on 5 January 2013, Mahmoud Abbas issued a presidential decree renaming the PNA as the State of Palestine.

Abbas's demand for a **settlement** freeze as a precondition led to a stalemate in the peace talks with Israel. After weeks of negotiations, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry (1943–) persuaded Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas to resume talks, which began in Washington on 30 July 2013. Influential sections of the Israeli leadership have been questioning Abbas's commitments and hence his relevance to the peace process. Internal tensions between Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad led to the latter's resigning his position in April 2013, but Abbas's efforts to found an alternate government headed by Rami Hamdallah (1958–) were unsuccessful, though Hamdallah has headed the interim government since 6 June 2013. On 23 April 2014, Fatah and Hamas agreed to form a unity government and hold fresh elections to the PNA, but before any progress could be made, the IDF launched the **Protective Edge Operation** following the kidnapping and killing of three Jewish youths in July 2014.

See also DIEF, MOHD (1965–); KERRY PLAN.

PALMAH. In 1941, when Palestine was a **Mandate** territory under **Great Britain**, Palmah was established by the **Yishuv** as the "striking force" of **Haganah** and was headed by Yitzhak Sadeh (1890–1952). It gradually became the principal force of Haganah, and on the eve of the **Declaration of Independence**, it consisted of 3,000 men in 15 companies organized into four battalions, one of which consisted of special units. Highly trained and motivated, the Palmah played a crucial role in Israel's victories in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. After the formation of the **Israel Defense Forces**, the Palmah was disbanded in October 1948 as the government decided not to allow any independent military command. Most members of the Palmah, including **Yitzhak Rabin**, joined the regular army.

See also ALTALENA AFFAIR; IRGUN; STERN GANG; WARFARE.

PALMER REPORT. The Palmer Commission was set up by **United Nations** secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon (1944–) on 2 August 2010 to investigate the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** in which 10 civilians were killed during the

commando raid carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). Following his consultations with the leaders of Israel and **Turkey**, Ban appointed the four-member commission headed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer (1942–), former prime minister of New Zealand. The commission also had one representative each from Israel and Turkey. After many delays aimed at mutual reconciliation, the commission released its report on 2 September 2011. It declared Israel's **Siege of Gaza** to be legal under international law but faulted Israel for sending the IDF onto the *Mavi Marmara* without any prior warning. It also questioned the motives of the organizers, especially the **IHH**, in organizing the **Freedom Flotilla**. While Israel described the findings to be fair and balanced, the report angered Turkish prime minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** for declaring the Gaza blockade to be legal. He responded by expelling the Israeli ambassador from Ankara. Turkey had earlier recalled its ambassador from Israel immediately after the *Mavi Marmara* Affair in June 2010.

Following internal investigations on 23 May 2012, the Turkish state prosecutor prepared an indictment, which carries life sentences, against four senior Israeli commanders, including Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi (1954–), who was the chief of staff of the IDF during the *Mavi Marmara* Affair, and they were indicted in absentia by an Istanbul court a few days later.

PARIS AGREEMENT. As part of the **Oslo Accords**, Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) negotiated the terms and conditions of an economic arrangement between the Jewish state and the **Palestinian National Authority**. The dialogue began in Paris on 13 October 1993, and after five months of negotiations, a formal agreement called the Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the PLO was signed in Paris on 29 April 1994 by Israeli finance minister Avraham Shochat (1936–) and his Palestinian counterpart, **Ahmed Qurei**. It was subsequently incorporated as an appendix to the **Taba Agreement** signed in May 1994.

PARTITION PLAN. Acting on the recommendations of the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine** (UNSCOP), on 29 November 1947 the **United Nations** General Assembly voted with 33 to 13 votes, with 10 abstentions, to partition Palestine. In July 1937, the **Peel Commission** had first floated the idea of partitioning Palestine.

Modifying the majority plan proposed by the UNSCOP in favor of the Jews, the Partition Plan allotted the Negev to the Jewish state and granted access to the Red Sea through the port of Eilat. The plan was welcomed by the Zionists but was completely rejected by the Arab and Palestinian leadership. The UN plan granted 56.47 percent of the **Mandate Palestine** to the

Jews and 43.53 percent to the Arabs. At that time, the Jews owned less than 7 percent of the land in Palestine and constituted 30 percent of the total population.

Under this UN plan, the Jewish state would have a 58 percent Jewish population (498,000 Jews, 325,000 Arab Muslims, and 90,000 Bedouins), while the Arab state would be 99 percent Arab (807,000 Arab inhabitants and 10,000 Jews). The Partition Plan called for an internationalized status (*corpus separatum*) for the city of **Jerusalem** and its environs, with guaranteed free access to places holy to Christians, Jews, and Muslims. About 100,000 Jews and 105,000 Arabs would reside in Jerusalem.

The partition decision intensified Arab–Jewish violence in Palestine, and hence, on the eve of the decision by **Great Britain** to withdraw from Palestine by 15 May 1948, the General Assembly convened a special session to discuss a proposal by the **United States** to temporarily suspend the partition resolution. This move was preempted by the **Declaration of Independence** by **Yishuv** hours before the British departure.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948; FEDERAL PLAN; INDIA; NAQBA, AL-; WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO); ZIONISM.

PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER. As a follow-up to the **Shaw Commission** report, in October 1930 **Great Britain** came out with the Passfield White Paper. Addressing the key Arab demands vis-à-vis the **Mandate** authorities, it called for a halt to the **Aliya** and Jewish land purchases. This indirect repudiation of the **Balfour Declaration** evoked strong protest from the **Yishuv** and the Zionist leadership. On 13 February 1931, British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald (1866–1937) sent a letter—described by Palestinians as the **Black Letter**—to **Chaim Weizmann**, the president of the **World Zionist Organization**, nullifying the objectionable clauses of the white paper.

See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ZIONISM.

PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION. This was the code name for the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon**. On 6 June 1982, the **Israel Defense Forces** launched an offensive against the positions held by the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). An **assassination** attempt on 2 June 1982 on Israel's ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov (1929–2003), by radical Palestinian groups opposed to **Yasser Arafat** provided the spark. Since the PLO's expulsion from **Jordan** following the **Black September Massacre**, there were frequent attacks against Israel by the **Fedayeen** located in southern Lebanon. Determined to put the Galilee region out of reach of Palestinian shelling, Israel sought to remove the military threats posed by the PLO.

The offensive was sudden, and Israeli forces swiftly moved deep into Lebanese territory and captured and destroyed numerous PLO positions. Within weeks, hundreds of Palestinians were either killed or captured in southern Lebanon. The quick military advances gradually expanded the objectives of the Israeli invasion, and by mid-June, Beirut came under virtual Israeli siege. On 1 August, the IDF captured the Beirut international airport. On 12 August, PLO leader Arafat gave in to the Israeli conditions and agreed to withdraw his forces from Lebanon under international supervision. The first contingent of PLO fighters bound for Cyprus, Jordan, and **Iraq** left Beirut aboard a Greek ship on 21 August 1982. By end of the month, the Palestinian combatants had evacuated Beirut and headed for various Arab states. In July, Arafat himself left Lebanon for Tunis.

In the midst of the Israeli offensive, Bachir Gemayel (1947–1982) was elected president of Lebanon on 23 August. His inauguration was scheduled for 23 September, but on 14 September he was assassinated by Palestinian elements. With the knowledge and approval of the IDF, right-wing Christian **Phalangist** elements then entered the Palestinian **refugee** camps on 16 September and carried out the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**. The campaign exposed serious domestic divisions in Israel over the logic of the invasion, the expansion of the military objectives, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Shatila. Following the publication of the **Kahan Commission** report, **Ariel Sharon** resigned as defense minister. Meanwhile, in May 1983, Prime Minister **Menachem Begin** managed to sign the **Israel–Lebanon Agreement**, but due to persistent opposition from **Syria**, Beirut abrogated it by the following March.

The domestic opposition inside Israel and mounting military casualties in Lebanon eventually compelled Israel to pursue a unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal**. On 10 June 1985, Israel evacuated its forces from most of the Lebanese territory but retained a narrow strip in southern Lebanon as a self-declared **security zone**. Its efforts to rely on the **South Lebanese Army** to control the security zone proved inadequate, and Israel had to fight periodic military campaigns against **Hezbollah** and its campaign of resistance. After a sustained protest campaign spearheaded by the **Four Mothers Movement** in May 2000, Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** completed the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

See also ACCOUNTABILITY OPERATION; BELGIUM LAW; GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION; PEACE NOW; WARFARE.

PEACE NOW. In 1978, a group of 350 reserve army officers made an appeal to Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin** urging him to pursue the road to peace. This gradually swelled into an extra-parliamentary movement that sought to promote peace with Israel's Arab neighbors. This group organized a number of rallies and demonstrations to keep up the pressure and

eventually became the embryonic peace bloc in Israel. It transformed into an organized peace group, Shalom Achshav ("Peace Now"), following the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon** in 1982. On 25 September 1982, in the wake of the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**, it organized the largest demonstration in the Middle East, which eventually compelled the government to institute the **Kahan Commission** to inquire into the massacre. Not a pacifist movement, Peace Now adopts much of the mainstream Israeli position concerning the indivisibility of **Jerusalem** and opposition to complete Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line**. Among other things, Peace Now has been advocating a territorial compromise with the Palestinians and monitors **settlement** activities in the **Occupied Territories**.

Peace Now has taken up a number of cases with the Israeli judiciary regarding Palestinian rights and in the process has been criticized by the Israeli right. The movement has been targeted by **Im Tirzu** as well as by **price tag attacks**. The January 2008 Knesset law mandating that Israeli organizations receiving funds from abroad disclose the details was partly aimed at Peace Now. The **Naqba Law** adopted in 2011 was also partly aimed at curtailing the role and influence of Peace Now.

See also B'TSELEM; FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT.

PEEL COMMISSION. In 1936 **Great Britain** appointed a royal commission headed by Sir Robert Peel (1867–1937) to investigate the causes of disturbances in **Mandate Palestine**, which subsequently transformed into the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**. The report of the commission was published on 7 July 1937. It concluded that the British government had given contradictory promises and hopes to Arabs and Jews and that the events since 1922 indicated the Mandate's unworkable nature. It found no scope for cooperation between the two communities and ruled out the possibility of their co-existence within one state. Hence the Peel Commission called for partitioning Palestine as a solution to the Jewish–Arab tension and violence. It called for an independent Jewish state and the incorporation of the remaining territories of Mandate Palestine with **Transjordan**. As a follow-up measure, another commission was appointed in 1938 to work out the technical details of the partition recommended by the Peel Commission. This Palestine Partition Commission, headed by Sir John Ackroyd Woodhead and known as the **Woodhead Commission**, submitted its report in November 1938.

The Zionists adopted a rather circumspect position. While many viewed the Peel Commission report as a departure from the British commitments to the **Balfour Declaration**, the idea of an independent state was seen as a positive development. Despite disagreements over the exclusion of **Jerusalem** and limited territories allotted to the proposed Jewish state, the **Yishuv** leadership was eventually favorable to the idea. The Arabs vehemently rejected the idea of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, and contrary to its

intentions, the Peel Commission aggravated the Arab Revolt and compelled the British to abandon the proposed partition. Instead, two years later, the Mandate authorities came out with the **MacDonald White Paper**, which formally distanced Britain from the Balfour Declaration.

See also JORDAN; JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDAN OPTION; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; PARTITION PLAN; ZIONISM.

PERES, SHIMON (1923–). A leading Israeli politician, Shimon Peres twice served as prime minister and served as president from July 2007 to July 2014. Born as Shimon Perksy in Poland on 16 August 1923, he made **Aliya** to Palestine when he was 11. Active in the kibbutz movement, in 1943 he was elected secretary of the Labor-Zionist youth movement. In the late 1940s, he joined the **Haganah** and was made responsible for manpower and arms procurement, a position he held during and after the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. In 1952, Peres joined the Ministry of Defense as deputy director-general and became director-general the following year at the young age of 29, and he held this position until 1959. He was instrumental in a number of strategic projects, including the Dimona nuclear reactor and the founding of Israel Aircraft Industries. In 1956, he played an important role in the **Sèvres Conference** when Israel forged close ties with **Great Britain** and **France** prior to the **Suez War**.

In 1959, Peres was elected to the Knesset and was continuously reelected until his resignation in 2007 to take over the office of president. From 1959 to 1965, he served as deputy defense minister. In the wake of the rift within Mapai, Peres joined **David Ben-Gurion** and **Moshe Dayan** in 1965 and formed Rafi. Three years later, he was instrumental in Rafi's rejoining with Mapai to form the **Labor Party**. From 1969 to 1974, Peres served as a minister under **Golda Meir**, and after the resignation of Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** in 1977, he briefly served as acting prime minister. In the wake of the defeat of the Labor Party in the 1977 Knesset elections, Peres was elected leader of the party, a position he held until 1992.

Under the national unity government (1984–1990), Peres served as prime minister from 1984 to 1986 and later as foreign minister (1986–1988) and finance minister (1988–1990). In the internal party elections held on the eve of the 1992 Knesset elections, Peres lost the leadership race to Rabin, his longtime rival. When Rabin became prime minister, Peres became foreign minister (1992–1995) and played an active role in the **Oslo Process** and the conclusion of the **Declaration of Principles**. He soon emerged as the troubleshooter in the negotiations. Peres shared the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize with Rabin and **Yasser Arafat** for his contributions to the peace process.

After the **assassination** of Rabin in November 1995, Peres became prime minister and concurrently held the defense portfolio. In May 1996, he narrowly lost the direct election of prime minister to **Likud** leader **Benjamin**

Netanyahu. In July 1999, Peres became minister for regional cooperation under **Ehud Barak**, and in July 2000 he unsuccessfully contested the presidential election against Moshe Katsav (1945–). In March 2001, Peres joined the national unity government headed by **Ariel Sharon** as foreign minister, but due to differences over the peace process, he and other Labor ministers resigned from the unity government in October 2002. After the Labor Party's defeat in the January 2003 Knesset elections, Peres briefly replaced Amram Mitzna (1945–) as chairman. In November 2005, he lost to Amir Peretz (1952–) for the leadership of the party, and shortly afterward, Peres resigned from Labor and joined **Kadima** ("Forward"), a new party floated by Prime Minister Sharon.

After the 17th Knesset election held in March 2006, Peres served as vice prime minister and minister responsible for the Negev and Galilee under Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert**. In June 2007 he was elected president and was sworn in on 15 July, becoming the first Israeli leader to serve both as prime minister and president. In July 2012 President **Barack Obama** of the **United States** awarded him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest U.S. civilian honor bestowed on a foreign leader for his "meritorious contributions to world peace." Despite the ceremonial nature of his position, Peres continues to speak and push for a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians based on the **two-state solution**.

See also GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION; GUSH EMUNIM; JORDAN OPTION; KFAR KANA MASSACRE; KIRYAT ARBA; LONDON AGREEMENT; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); SEVEN-POINT ISRAELI PLAN; SUICIDE ATTACK/S; ZIONISM.

PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS. As part of the **Oslo Accords**, the **Taba Agreement** was signed on 26 September 1995, whereby Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) agreed to commence Permanent Status Negotiations in early 1996, with May 1999 as the target date for an agreement. Accordingly, on the eve of the 1996 Israeli elections, Israeli prime minister **Shimon Peres** and PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** met in **Taba** under the sponsorship of President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** and symbolically inaugurated the Permanent Status Negotiations. Due to the impending Israeli elections, both sides agreed to establish a negotiating group to work out the specifics. However, the victory of **Likud** leader **Benjamin Netanyahu** reversed the whole process, and the Permanent Status Negotiations were stalled forever and were overtaken by other events and crises.

PHALANGE. Inspired by the Nazi Youth Movement, Christian leader Pierre Gemayel (1905–1984) of **Lebanon** established the Phalange in 1936. Both a political party and a militia, it attracted widespread support among

Maronite Christians and sought to promote the idea that Lebanon constitutes a separate historic identity that can be traced back to the Phoenicians. While recognizing Lebanon's cultural linkages with the Arabs, the Phalangists deny political attachment to and unity with the Arab world. On the eve of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989), the Phalangists were the bastion of Christian military power and were headed by Pierre Gemayel's son Bachir (1947–1982).

On 14 September 1982, before his inauguration as president of Lebanon, Bachir was assassinated. In retaliation, Phalangist militia entered the Palestinian **refugee** camps in West Beirut and killed hundreds of Palestinian civilians in the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**. Elie Hubeika (1956–2002), who headed the Phalange's secret service, reportedly commanded the militia at that time. Though the **Israel Defense Forces** and **Ariel Sharon** were repeatedly held responsible and condemned for the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, the Phalange and Hubeika were never held accountable or punished.

Following the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1989, the Phalange was transformed into a political party and agreed to dismantle its militia. The Lebanese Phalanges Party, also known as the Kataeb Party, played an important part in the civil war as well as in the Cedar Revolution, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanon in April 2005.

See also ASSASSINATION/S; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA); SYRIA; WARFARE.

PILLAR OF DEFENSE OPERATION. This was the code name for the eight-day military campaign launched by the **Israel Defense Forces** against the **Hamas**-ruled **Gaza Strip** in November 2012. Against the backdrop of renewed **Qassam** attacks from Gaza into Israel, the conflict began with the killing of Ahmed Jabari (1960–2012), a senior figure in **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**, the military wing of Hamas, on 14 November 2012. This was followed by Israel striking at over 1,500 sites in the Gaza Strip, including rocket launchers, ammunition storages, government offices, and other infrastructure projects that Israel suspected of assisting Hamas. In response, Hamas, **Islamic Jihad**, and other Palestinian groups launched over 1,400 rockets against Israel. Some of the rockets were fired at the Israeli cities of Beersheba, and two landed close to **Jerusalem** and Tel Aviv. A large number of rockets were successfully intercepted by the **Iron Dome** anti-missile defense deployed by Israel. During the conflict, over 130 Palestinians, including 79 militants, were killed, and 840 others were injured. On the Israeli side, 6 people including 2 soldiers were killed, and about 250 others were injured.

President **Mohammed Morsi** of **Egypt** mediated the cease-fire, which came into force on 21 November 2012. Under the arrangement, Israel agreed to stop all hostilities against the Gaza Strip, including **targeted killing** of

Palestinian militants, and the Palestinian militant groups agreed to stop firing rockets against Israel. The cease-fire was seen as a major diplomatic accomplishment for the Islamist president of Egypt.

See also WARFARE.

PLO CHARTER. The charter of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), also known as the PLO Covenant, was adopted at the first **Arab Palestine Congress** convened in the old city of **Jerusalem** on 28 May 1964. Consisting of 29 articles, it not only outlined the Palestinian problem but also set the territorial limits of the Palestinian struggle. It declared Palestine to be "a regional indivisible unit" as it existed at the time of the **Mandate**. Recognizing the Palestinian right to a homeland, it identified three mottoes, "national unity, national mobilization and liberation." The charter proclaimed the **Balfour Declaration**, the Mandate, and "all that has been based upon them" to be a "fraud" and portrayed **Zionism** as "a colonialist movement in its inception, aggressive and expansionist in its goal, racist and segregationist in its configurations and Fascist in its means and aims." Accommodating the position of **Jordan** with regard to the **West Bank**, the charter declared that it would not operate in "the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in the **Gaza Strip** or the Himmah area." The latter was captured by **Syria** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**.

The charter underwent substantial revision following the **June War of 1967**, when Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip and thereby controlled the entire territory of the Mandate Palestine. The change in the regional political environment after the Arab defeat compelled the PLO to reexamine its position and revise its 1964 charter. Meeting in Cairo from 10 to 17 July 1968, the Palestine National Congress adopted a new and revised charter comprising 33 articles. Retaining most of the provisions of the earlier document, it removed references to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Himmah areas and declared its determination to assume "its full role in liberating Palestine."

The charter and its anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli positions became problematic in the wake of the **Oslo Process** and the **Declaration of Principles** signed on 13 September 1993. As demanded by the **Oslo Accords**, articles of the charter that called for the destruction of Israel or contravened peace efforts were removed through their **annulment** in December 1998. However, the official amended version of the PLO Charter was never published.

See also MUTUAL RECOGNITION.

PLO LAW. On 13 August 1986, the Knesset adopted a law that banned any contact between Israeli citizens and members of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) and other "terrorist organizations." The legislation was adopted by the national unity government (1984–1990), which comprised the

Labor Party and **Likud**. The so-called PLO Law and the circumstances surrounding it prevented progress in the host of proposals floated in the mid-1980s, as it precluded any role for the PLO. This law did not stop Israeli peace activists from meeting with PLO functionaries, often under the ambit of international meetings or academic conferences. The impasse in the **Madrid Conference** process and the need to recognize the centrality of the PLO in any negotiation compelled Israel to reexamine its opposition to the PLO, and the PLO Law was repealed on 19 January 1993, following the election of Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**. This move, coming in the midst of the controversial Israeli **deportation** of 415 suspected **Hamas** activists to southern **Lebanon**, paved the way for the formal but secret dialogues with the PLO that became the **Oslo Process**.

See also BAKER PLAN; BEGIN PLAN; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); RABIN PLAN; SHAMIR PLAN; SHULTZ PLAN; TERRORISM.

PLUMBAT OPERATION. This was a covert operation that Israel undertook to buy and smuggle large quantities of "yellowcake," or uranium oxide, for the Dimona nuclear reactor. In 1968, through a complex operation conducted through a host of front companies, Israel smuggled 200 tons of yellowcake obtained from a Belgian company based in Antwerp. It took Euratom, the nuclear agency of the European Economic Community (succeeded by the **European Union**), more than six months to discover the "disappearance" of the yellowcake, a key component for making nuclear bombs.

See also NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); ORCHARD OPERATION; OSIRAQ BOMBING; WARFARE.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). George Habash, who became a **refugee** from Lydda in 1948, and Hani al-Hindi, a volunteer from **Syria** who fought in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, founded the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1951, when both were studying in Beirut. This eventually grew, and on 11 December 1967, Habash established the PFLP (Al-Jabha al-Sha'biyya li-Tahrir Filastin), which gradually adopted a Marxist-Leninist approach toward the Palestinian problem and portrayed the struggle as part of a larger revolution in the entire Arab world. Though headquartered in Damascus, the PFLP acted independently of the Syrian army as well as the Ba'athist ideology. The rank and file of the PFLP largely came from refugee camps in **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and Syria. In 1968, one group split from the PFLP and formed the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command**, and in 1969, another split led to the formation of the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**.

In the early 1970s, the PFLP acquired widespread notoriety when its military wing, the Red Eagles, headed by Wadi Haddad (1927–1978), carried out a number of airplane hijackings. On 30 May 1972, together with members of the Japanese Red Army, the PFLP carried out an attack at Israel's Lod International Airport. The **Lod Massacre** resulted in the deaths of 30 people, including 2 hijackers. While such acts focused international attention on the Palestinian cause, the spate of hijackings and an unsuccessful **assassination** attempt on King **Hussein** of Jordan led to the expulsion of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) from Jordan.

Since 1973, the PFLP has moderated its position but was often at odds with **Yasser Arafat** and the PLO. It withdrew from the PLO Executive Committee during 1974–1981 and 1983–1987. The PFLP opposed the reconciliation talks with Jordan in the early 1980s as well as the **Fez Plan** of 1982, but during the **First Intifada**, it joined the **Unified National Leadership of the Uprising**. Despite its opposition to the **Oslo Accords**, it remains a member of the PLO Executive Committee. The PFLP advocates the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in the entire **Mandate Palestine**, where all, including Jews, would be treated as equal citizens.

Owing to its opposition to the policy of the PLO in seeking a political settlement with Israel, the PFLP refused to participate in the January 1996 elections to the **Palestinian Legislative Council** (PLC). With Israeli concurrence and approval, the deputy head of the PFLP, Abu Ali Mustafa (1938–2001), returned to areas controlled by the **Palestinian National Authority** in September 1999. In July 2001, following Habash's resignation, Ali Mustafa took over as head of the PFLP, but on 27 August 2001, he was assassinated by the **Israel Defense Forces**. This revived the organization, and it responded by assassinating a senior Israeli cabinet minister, Rehavam Ze'evi (1926–2001), on 17 October 2001. Acting under pressure from Israel and the **United States** to arrest those responsible for the killing, Chairman Arafat arrested the new PFLP chief, Ahmed Sadaat (1953–), for his alleged role in Ze'evi's killing. On 3 June 2002, the Gaza High Court ordered the release of Sadaat, but it was overruled by Arafat.

The PFLP took part in the January 2006 elections and secured three seats in the 132-member PLC. It did not join the unity government formed by Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh** in March 2007 that lasted until June 2007. Former PFLP member Riyad al-Malki (1955–) joined the government of Prime Minister **Salam Fayyad** formed in June 2007 as foreign minister and continues to serve in that capacity under Rami Hamdallah (1958–).

See also ENTEBBE OPERATION; GLIDER ATTACK; ONE-STATE SOLUTION; TARGETED KILLING.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALES-TINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC). In late 1968, under the leadership of Ahmed Jibril (1939–), a senior army officer from **Syria**, a faction broke away from the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP) and formed the PFLP-GC. Consisting of secret cells, it has been based in Damascus and, unlike the PFLP, had close links with the Syrian military, intelligence, and Ba'ath Party. Militantly pro-Syrian, in 1983 the PFLP-GC led the factions within the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) opposed to **Yasser Arafat**. Committed to armed struggle and guerrilla warfare, it opposed any peace settlement with Israel and was involved in numerous attacks against it. However, unlike the PFLP, this group lacks popular support and does not appear to have a significant support base in the **Occupied Territories**. It is also not represented in the PLO Executive Committee. In the early 1990s, the PFLP-GC emerged as a key player in the Damascus-based **Rejectionist Front** opposed to the **Oslo Accords**. It refused to participate in the **Palestinian Legislative Council** held in January 1996 and January 2006.

In the initial stage of the **Arab Spring in Syria**, the PFLF-GC supported President **Bashar al-Assad** and was criticized by President **Mahmoud Abbas** of the **Palestinian National Authority** for dragging the Palestinians into the Syrian civil war. Gradually some of their members joined the Syrian opposition fighters. In December 2012, the Palestinian National Council decided to expel Jibril over the Syrian situation. The PFLP-GC has been designated as a terrorist organization by Canada, the **European Union**, Israel, and the **United States**.

See also GLIDER ATTACK; SYRIA; TERRORISM.

PRICE TAG ATTACKS. This expression is used to describe attacks on the Palestinians and **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) by Jewish settlers in the **Occupied Territories** as retaliation for various measures against **settlement** activities. Revengeful in nature, these attacks are "the price" extracted from the Palestinians and the IDF for working against the development of settlements. The first known attack under this category took place in July 2008 when a group of settlers attacked and vandalized the Palestinian village of Burin near Nablus. This was in retaliation for the IDF's evacuating the settlers from a nearby illegal **outpost**. Since then, the attacks against Palestinian lives and properties have increased, and there were also attacks against IDF positions and personnel. Price tag attacks normally take place after terror attacks or anti-settlement moves by the IDF. In February 2013, a Muslim cemetery in **Jerusalem** was vandalized, and in April a similar incident happened in a Palestinian mosque south of **Bethlehem**. In May 2013 anti-Christian slurs were painted on the wall of the Church of Dormition, also known as the Basilica of the Assumption, in Jerusalem.

See also TERRORISM; TUBA ZANGARIA MOSQUE ATTACK; WAR-FARE.

PRISONER EXCHANGE. At the time of the **Entebbe Operation** in July 1975, Israel resolved not to negotiate with hostage takers or groups it identified as terrorists. Despite this policy, Israel has often released prisoners in return for the safe passage of its citizens and soldiers held by militant Palestinian and Lebanese groups. In November 1983, Israel released 4,500 prisoners it had captured during the **Peace for Galilee Operation** in return for six **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) soldiers held by **Palestine Liberation Organization** factions in northern **Lebanon**. On 20 May 1985, Israel agreed to release 1,150 prisoners it had captured in Lebanon in return for the freedom of nine Israeli soldiers held by the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command**.

On 14 June 1985, a group of Lebanese militia hijacked a TWA flight from Athens to Rome and diverted it to Beirut. The group demanded the release of 766 Lebanese prisoners, mostly Shias, in return for the lives of 39 American passengers. After lengthy political deliberations and tension, Israel released 31 Lebanese prisoners on 24 June, and the hostages were freed on 30 June. Similarly, in February 2004, Israel released a large number of Lebanese citizens held in Israeli prisons, including members of **Hezbollah**, in exchange for the return of the remains of three Israeli soldiers and the release of an Israeli businessman.

Through a prisoner exchange deal with Hezbollah, in July 2008 Israel secured the bodies of two IDF soldiers whose kidnapping on 12 July 2006 sparked off the **Second Lebanon War**. In return, Israel freed five Hezbollah fighters and returned the bodies of 199 Arab, Lebanese, and Palestinian fighters who were killed during military operations. Similarly, on 18 October 2011 Israel closed the **Shalit Affair** through an exchange, and in return for the kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit (1986–), Israel freed 1,027 Palestinian prisoners. In an effort to revive the stalled peace negotiations with the **Palestinian National Authority**, in 2013 Israel agreed to free 104 Palestinian prisoners. However, following the decision by **Mahmoud Abbas** to push for Palestinian membership in various **United Nations** bodies, on 3 April 2014, Israel announced the scrapping of the prisoner exchange deal.

The prisoner exchange deals, often with militant groups such as **Hamas** and Hezbollah, considerably weaken Israel's stated policy of not negotiating with terror groups. As in the case of the Shalit Affair, such exchanges also became necessary due to domestic pressure on the government.

See also GLIDER ATTACK; MASHA'AL AFFAIR; TERRORISM; YASSIN, SHEIKH AHMED (c. 1933–2004).

PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES. The status of and access to holy places in the **Jerusalem** area is a sensitive issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict. This concern was recognized by the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine**, and because of this the **Partition Plan** declared Jerusalem to be an international city, or *corpus separatum*. On 27 June 1967, shortly after the **June War of 1967**, the Knesset passed the Protection of Holy Places Law, which guaranteed the protection of holy places "from desecration and any other violation" and mandated a seven-year prison term for violators.

Since the September 1969 **Al-Aqsa fire**, Arab and Islamic countries have challenged Israel's ability to protect religious places in the **Occupied Territories**, especially in **East Jerusalem**. Despite occasional restrictions, since 1967 Muslims and Christians from the Occupied Territories have had unfettered access to the holy sites in the old city. This was not the case when the old city and other parts of the **West Bank** were under the occupation of **Jordan**, and even non-Israeli Jewish pilgrims were denied access to the Western Wall. Since the **First Intifada**, periodic tensions even prevent repairs to the access bridge to the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** from the Western Wall.

On 31 March 2013 King **Abdullah II** of Jordan and **Palestinian National Authority** president **Mahmoud Abbas** signed an agreement in Amman that recognized the Jordanian monarch "as the custodian of the Jerusalem holy sites" and empowered him to exert "all possible efforts to preserve the Jerusalem holy sites," especially the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount.

See also TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL; WESTERN WALL RIOTS.

PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION. This was the code name for the military operation carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) against the **Hamas**-ruled **Gaza Strip**. It began on 6 July and lasted until 26 August 2014 when the Egypt-mediated cease-fire came into force. The IDF carried out this military offensive against the backdrop of the kidnapping and killing of three Jewish youths. Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups started firing **Qassam** rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel after the youths were abducted on 12 June. While there were retaliatory strikes from Israel, on 6 July the IDF carried out an air raid on the house of a senior Hamas leader in Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip in which seven people were killed. In response, over 100 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip the following day, and a full-scale conflict began.

On 16 July, Hamas and **Islamic Jihad** offered a 10-year truce to Israel with a number of conditions, including an end to the **Siege of Gaza** and the release of Palestinian prisoners who were released as part of the **Shalit Affair** but were rearrested. A five-hour humanitarian cease-fire came into force on 17 July, and this was repeated 11 times, with only 5 being partially successful. Egyptian president **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi** offered to mediate a

cease-fire, which did not include an end to the Siege of Gaza. Meanwhile, on 17 July, militants belonging to Hamas unsuccessfully tried to enter Israel through underground **tunnels**, and subsequently many such attacks were carried out through the tunnels between Israel and the Gaza Strip. After many false starts, a cease-fire came into force on 26 August. This was followed by detailed discussions involving Israel and various Palestinian groups in Egypt regarding issues such as the easing of border crossing, extension of the fishing zone of the Gaza Strip, the Gaza seaport and airport, prisoner release, and the disarming of Hamas.

During the Protective Edge Operation, at least 2,139 Palestinians were killed, including about 1,462 civilians, 490 children, and 253 women, and about 11,000 people were injured. According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, 540,000 people were displaced, and about 100,000 were rendered homeless; it also reported that 17,200 homes were destroyed, 244 schools were damaged, 5 hospitals were shut down, and over 200 mosques were destroyed or damaged.

On the Israeli side, 70 people were killed, including 64 soldiers, and 469 or 842 were injured. During the operation, over 4,500 projectiles, including 3,659 rockets, were launched into Israel from the Gaza Strip, though most were successfully intercepted by the **Iron Dome** anti-missile system. Israel also identified and destroyed at least 32 underground tunnels that were dug from the Gaza Strip into Israel.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION.

PROTOCOLS OF THE ELDERS OF ZION. Though declared a forgery in 1921, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* is the most widely known anti-Semitic literature in the annals of history. Originally published in Russian in 1903 in czarist **Russia**, it was soon translated into many languages and distributed widely. It purports to describe the Jewish design for global control and domination and hence has been popular among various anti-Semitic groups and organizations. Over the years, *The Protocols* have entered the political discourse in many Islamic societies, which historically remained friendlier toward the Jewish people. The first Arabic translations appeared in the late 1920s in **Egypt**, translated by an Arab Christian, and the first Arab Muslim translation of *The Protocols* appeared only after 1948 and can be attributed to the formation of the State of Israel and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Since 1979 the Islamic Republic of **Iran** has emerged as the principal producer and distributor of *The Protocols*.

PUTIN, VLADIMIR (1952–). President of **Russia** since May 2012, Vladimir Putin is a nationalist and hard-liner who seeks to restore Russia to its erstwhile position in the world. Born in Leningrad on 7 October 1952, Putin

jointed the KGB, the principal security agency of the Soviet Union, in 1975 and served it until his resignation in August 1991. After the end of the Cold War he held various positions in Russia; he became the chief of staff of President Boris Yeltsin (1931–2007) in March 1997 and briefly headed the post-Soviet Federal Security Service. Upon the resignation of Yeltsin, on 31 December 1999 Putin became president and was elected to the position in March 2000 and again in March 2004. When Dmitry Medvedev (1965–) was elected president in March 2008, Putin served as prime minister until March 2012, when he was reelected president and assumed office in May 2012.

Pursuing an aggressive policy both within and outside the country, Putin worked toward reenergizing Russia and enhancing its political and economic influences. Though criticized in the West for his anti-democratic trends, he rescued the Russian economy and in the process enhanced its international standing. Putin has been trying to boost the Russian influence in the Middle East peace process, especially as part of the four-member Quartet, which also includes Russia. Putin's policy regarding **Iran**, especially **nuclear Iran**, and his continued support for President **Bashar al-Assad** of **Syria** since the **Arab Spring in Syria** have resulted in growing tensions between Israel and Russia.

See also QUARTET ROAD MAP.

Q

QASSAM. The rudimentary short-range missiles developed by **Hamas** are called Qassam and are named after its military wing, **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**. They are inexpensive to produce and easy to transport. The first Qassam rocket with a range of about three kilometers was launched in October 2001, shortly after the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. A slightly longer-version Qassam II rocket was first fired against Israel on 10 February 2002, and the rocket range and intensity of launching have increased since then. There are suggestions that the Palestinians are working on a new Qassam IV with a possible range of over 15 kilometers. Even though the military significance is limited, Hamas has launched a number of missiles at Jewish **settlements** in the **Gaza Strip** and occasionally into the Israeli territories bordering Gaza. This could be seen as an imitation of the tactics of **Hezbollah**, which intimidated the Israeli civilian population with its Katyusha rockets during the Israeli occupation of the **security zone** in southern **Lebanon**.

The firing of Qassam rockets into Israel intensified following the **Gaza Disengagement** implemented in September 2005, thereby raising questions inside Israel over the wisdom of a unilateral Gaza pullout. The Hamas victory in the January 2006 Palestinian elections and the Gaza takeover by Hamas in June 2007 witnessed an increase in the number of rockets fired against Israel, which in turn resulted in periodic Israeli reprisals. Disruption to daily lives in Israeli towns and villages bordering the Gaza Strip resulted in a temporary and even permanent exodus of residents to other parts of the country. A number of **Israel Defense Forces** military campaigns—such as the **Summer Rains Operation** (2006), **Hot Winter Operation** (2008), **Cast Lead Operation** (2008–2009), and **Pillar of Defense Operation** (2012)— were provoked by a barrage of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip.

In addition to the military campaigns, Israel has been developing defensive measures such as the **Iron Dome** anti-missile defense to counter Qassam rockets. This proved effective during the Pillar of Defense Operation in November 2012 and reduced the number of Israeli casualties through high-altitude interceptions. The explosive materials for the rockets are smuggled

through **tunnels** in the Gaza Strip, and the destruction of the tunnels following a spate of **Sinai violence** has considerably reduced the military potential of the rockets.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; WARFARE.

QATAR. Rich in oil and natural gas reserves, this Arab country along the Persian Gulf is emerging as a major player in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Initial steps in this direction began in 1993 when Qatar established a low-level trade legation in Tel Aviv following the **Oslo Accords** and the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**. Information Minister Hamad bin Abdul Aziz al-Kuwari represented his country during the funeral of slain Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** in November 1995. When King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan** closed down the **Hamas** offices in his country and expelled its leaders **Khalid Masha'al** and **Musa Abu-Marzok**, Qatar offered to host them. In 2005 the emir of Qatar donated $10 million to the **Israeli Arab** town of Sakhnin to build a sports complex.

After the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Qatar withdrew its mission in Tel Aviv. Under pressure from a number of countries including **Iran** and **Saudi Arabia**, Qatar closed down the Israeli mission in Doha temporarily prior to hosting the summit meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**) in November 2000. In April, Israeli foreign minister **Tzipi Livni** visited Doha for a **United Nations** conference during which she met Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani (1952–) and other Qatari leaders. In December 2008, in the wake of the **Cast Lead Operation** against the **Gaza Strip**, Qatar closed down the Israeli mission and asked its diplomat to leave the country. As part of its bid to host the 2022 football world cup, Qatar assured the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) that it would allow the participation of Israel. In October 2012, Emir al-Thani became the first Arab head of state to visit the Gaza Strip, during which he met with Hamas prime minister **Ismail Haniyeh** and other officials. This move was seen as a vote of no confidence in the **Palestinian National Authority**, which controls the **West Bank**, and its leader **Mahmoud Abbas**.

See also PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION.

QIBYA RAID. In retaliation for an infiltration from **Jordan** that resulted in the deaths of three civilians, including two children, in the Israeli village of Yehud on 14–15 October 1953, a special anti-terrorist squad conducted a military operation against the Jordanian village of Qibya. The raid, carried out by **Unit 101** under the command of **Ariel Sharon**, was the first major Israeli military operation against Jordan. Twelve Jordanian soldiers were

killed, along with 60 civilians. The operation was carried out despite opposition from Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett (1894–1965), but the unit was never court-martialed for undermining the civilian authority. The raid evoked strong criticism and condemnation from the **United Nations** Security Council but appeared to have compelled the **Arab Legion**, led by Gen. Glubb Pasha (1897–1986), to exercise greater control over infiltration into Israel. The raid resulted in a temporary reduction of infiltration from Jordan into Israel.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

QUARTET ROAD MAP. Formally unveiled on 30 April 2003, the Quartet Road Map was aimed at reviving the peace process, which had been stalled after the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000. It was the result of the protracted efforts of the "Quartet," comprising the **European Union**, **Russia**, the **United Nations**, and the **United States**. In November 2003, through Resolution 1515, the Security Council of the United Nations endorsed the road map.

Projected as "performance based and goal driven," the road map demanded specific and time-bound commitments from Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). It formally endorsed the **two-state solution**, whereby Israel and a sovereign, independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state would co-exist side by side. During the first phase, the road map required unconditional cessation of Palestinian violence and the withdrawal of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) to positions held prior to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. It called on the Palestinians to undertake political reforms and to resume security cooperation with Israel. In the second phase, an independent Palestinian state with provisional boundaries would be created in 2003. And in the third phase, Israeli–Palestinian negotiations aimed at concluding a permanent status agreement would be reached in 2005.

The implementation of the road map did not materialize as the PNA could not control **terrorism** and Israel did not withdraw the IDF to the pre–28 September 2000 position. Following the death of PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat**, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** unilaterally implemented the **Gaza Disengagement** plan in September 2005. The stroke suffered by Sharon in January 2006 further complicated the process, and the victory of **Hamas** in the January 2006 Palestinian elections and its subsequent Gaza takeover in July 2007 made the road map irrelevant. The appointment of **Mahmoud Abbas** as the first Palestinian prime minister in March 2003 was the only positive outcome.

See also BUSH PLAN.

QUNEITRA. Quneitra is a town on the **Golan Heights** established under the **Ottoman Empire**. During the **June War of 1967**, it was captured by Israel, which forced the residents to flee. The ghost town witnessed heavy fighting during the **October War of 1973**. Under the 1974 **Disengagement Agreement**, Israel agreed to pull out and return the town to **Syria**. Before withdrawing from Quneitra, Israel dynamited and destroyed all the houses in the town. As a result, Syria keeps this ruined city as a symbol of Israeli atrocities, and the town has become an important itinerary for foreign leaders visiting Syria.

QUREI, AHMED (1937–). Better known as Abu Ala, Ahmed Qurei is a Palestinian leader who briefly served as prime minister of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). Born in the **Jerusalem** suburb of **Abu Dis** in 1937, Qurei and his family became **refugees** in the wake of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. In the late 1960s, he joined the **Fatah** wing of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). He came to prominence in the mid-1970s when he took over the economic and production activities of the PLO in **Lebanon**. In 1982, he accompanied **Yasser Arafat** when the Palestinian leadership was exiled to Tunis from Beirut following Israel's **Peace for Galilee Operation**. Qurei was elected to the Fatah Central Committee in 1989.

In 1991, Qurei coordinated the Palestinian delegation to the **Madrid Conference** and headed the Palestinian delegation during the secret negotiations with Israel that led to the **Oslo Accords** in September 1993. He was the chief Palestinian negotiator in talks with Israel that resulted in the **Paris Agreement** in April 1994. The following year, he negotiated the **Taba Agreement**, which outlined further Israeli **redeployment** from the **Occupied Territories**. During 1994–1996, he served as a minister in the PNA, and after the Palestinian elections in January 1996, Qurei was elected speaker of the **Palestinian Legislative Council**. In September 2003, he succeeded **Mahmoud Abbas** as prime minister of the PNA. In the wake of the electoral defeat suffered by Fatah in January 2006, he resigned from office, and since then Queri remains in semi-retirement and occasionally comments in the media.

R

RABAT ARAB SUMMIT. At its summit meeting held in Rabat, Morocco, in October 1974, the members of the **Arab League** voted to recognize the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) as "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people and to endorse their **right to return** to their country and determine their own future. This move, adopted on 25 October, went against **Jordan**, which controlled the **West Bank** from 1948 to 1967. It also ended Arab legitimacy to Jordanian aspirations to regain the West Bank and paved the way for the admission of the PLO into the **United Nations** the following month.

See also JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT.

RABIN, YITZHAK (1922–1995). An Israeli general and politician, Yitzhak Rabin served as prime minister during 1974–1977 and 1992–1995. Born in **Jerusalem** on 1 March 1922, Rabin studied at the Kadourie Agriculture High School. In 1941, he joined the **Palmah** and became its deputy commander in October 1947. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, Rabin commanded the Harel Brigade, which fought to keep the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road open and to free Jerusalem from the Arab siege. In the *Altalena* **Affair** in June 1948, he commanded the unit that sank the ship *Altalena*, which was carrying arms for **Irgun** headed by **Menachem Begin**. Following the war, Rabin briefly took part in the negotiations with **Jordan** but objected to the **Armistice Agreement** signed on 3 April 1949.

After the formation of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), Rabin held senior positions in the military, and in 1962 he became the chief of staff. He established the IDF training doctrine and introduced the preemptive doctrine implemented during the **June War of 1967**. Even though Defense Minister **Moshe Dayan** took the credit for that spectacular military victory, Rabin was instrumental in the war preparations. In January 1968, after serving 26 years in the military, he retired from the IDF. Later that year, he was appointed Israel's ambassador to the **United States**, returning to Israel in March 1973.

In December 1973, Rabin was elected to the Knesset on the **Labor Party** platform and became minister of labor in the government headed by **Golda Meir**. After Meir's resignation in June 1974, Rabin became prime minister. A controversy surrounding his wife's U.S. bank accounts led to his resignation in May 1977. After the victory of **Likud** in the 1977 Knesset elections, Rabin lost the leadership of the Labor Party to his archrival **Shimon Peres**. During the tenure of the national unity government from 1984 to 1990, Rabin served as Israel's defense minister and presided over the brutal Israeli response to the **First Intifada**.

In 1992, Rabin was elected leader of the Labor Party, and he successfully led the party to victory in the June Knesset elections. Breaking with past Israeli practice, Prime Minister Rabin was prepared to negotiate with the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, which ushered in the **Oslo Process** that culminated in the **Declaration of Principles** signed in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993. Despite initial misgivings, he embraced Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat** as his peace partner and continued to pursue a tough but accommodative policy toward the Palestinians. The following year, he concluded the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** and periodically interacted with King **Hussein** of Jordan and President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt**. In 1994, Rabin shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Peres and Arafat. He actively pursued negotiations with **Syria** over the **Golan Heights**; though no formal agreements were reached, Rabin was prepared for a complete but conditional Israeli withdrawal from the Heights.

Rabin was confronted by the onset of **suicide attacks** unleashed by **Hamas** and by increased domestic opposition to the peace process. Neither Palestinian **terrorism** nor internal incitement prevented Rabin from concluding the **Cairo Agreement** of 1994, the **Paris Agreement**, and the **Taba Agreement**. Following the **Hebron Massacre** on 25 February 1994, Rabin banned the right-wing Jewish group **Kach**.

On 4 November 1995, Rabin was assassinated by **Yigal Amir**, an observant Jewish student of Bar-Ilan University, at a peace rally in Tel Aviv. Amir was motivated by his strong views over Rabin's peace policies, especially Rabin's "concessions" toward the Palestinians. Citing religious arguments, Amir justified his **assassination** by saying that by agreeing to part with **Eretz Yisrael**, Rabin had turned against his own people. An official investigation headed by a former president of the Supreme Court, Justice Meir Shamgar (1925–), concluded that Amir had acted alone. Rabin's funeral at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem was attended by a number of world leaders, including U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, King Hussein, President Mubarak, and ministers from Oman and **Qatar**.

See also ACCOUNTABILITY OPERATION; DALET PLAN; DEPORTATION; **DIN RODEF**; ENTEBBE OPERATION; PLO LAW; RABIN PLAN.

RABIN PLAN. Against the backdrop of the **First Intifada** and the decision of the **United States** to initiate a substantive dialogue with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), in January 1989 Defense Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** outlined a peace proposal, which he termed "extended autonomy." Unlike the earlier suggestions, this called for the election of Palestinian delegates who would negotiate with Israel concerning the final status of the **Occupied Territories**, together with the suspension of the uprising for six months. Through elections of local leaders, the plan sought to isolate and marginalize the influence of the PLO in the Occupied Territories. The plan was derailed due to internal differences within Israel over the rights of the **Jerusalem Palestinians** to contest and vote in such elections.

See also BAKER PLAN; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); PLO LAW; SHAMIR PLAN; SHULTZ PLAN.

RAFAH CROSSING. The Rafah Crossing is located near the Palestinian town of that name in the southern **Gaza Strip** close to **Egypt**. This is the only exit for the Palestinians into Egypt and was formally opened in 1982. This was preceded by the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** that led to the Israeli withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula**. It was through this crossing that **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** entered the Gaza Strip on 1 July 1994 following the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**. Since then, foreign leaders have used this crossing when visiting the Strip.

In September 2005 following the implementation of the **Gaza Disengagement**, Israel handed over complete control of the Rafah Crossing to the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). For a while monitors from the **European Union** supervised the crossing, and in April 2006 the PNA took full responsibility. The **Battle of Gaza** and the subsequent Gaza takeover by **Hamas** brought the crossing under the control of this militant Palestinian group. Israel was criticized by the Arab countries, **Iran**, **Turkey**, and the international community for the **Siege of Gaza**, but the blockade was possible because of similar control exercised by **Egypt**. Since the mid-1990s, Palestinian groups have dug **tunnels** between the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula to smuggle in food, medicine, and people as well as weapons.

Following the **Arab Spring in Egypt** and the overthrow of President **Hosni Mubarak**, a number of violent attacks in the Sinai Peninsula were attributed to illegal tunnels. Under the orders of President **Mohammed Morsi**, many tunnels were destroyed. The Hamas government under Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh** also took similar measures to control the illegal movement of people and goods through the underground tunnels around the Rafah Crossing.

See also OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; SINAI VIOLENCE.

RAINBOW OPERATION. On 18 May 2004, Israel launched a large-scale military operation in the **Gaza Strip** with the stated objective of removing the Palestinian infrastructure used for **terrorism**, including the underground **tunnels** in the Gaza Strip through which weapons were smuggled from **Egypt**. The operation was sparked by the killing of 13 Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip. Israel alleged that missiles and rockets stored on the Egyptian side of the border were to be smuggled in through the tunnels. During the operation, which lasted until 1 June, more than 50 Palestinians, including 12 civilians, were killed.

See also SINAI PENINSULA; WARFARE.

RAMADAN WAR. See OCTOBER WAR OF 1973.

RAMALLAH. The town of Ramallah is located in the **West Bank** about 10 kilometers north of **Jerusalem** and since 1996 serves as the headquarters of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). It came under the control of the PNA in December 1995 after the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) withdrew from the town. The entrance into and exit from Ramallah were controlled by IDF check posts. PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** established the Mukatta, the administrative headquarters for the West Bank, in the town. Following violence in the **Gaza Strip**, from late 2001 Arafat operated from Ramallah and did not go to the Gaza Strip, the other part of the Palestinian territories. During the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** the town came under periodic Israeli incursions and military attacks, especially during the **Defensive Shield Operation**. Arafat was confined to the Mukatta during the **Siege of Ramallah**, which lasted intermittently from March 2002 to October 2004. The siege was partially relaxed when the IDF moved out of the compound and stationed a few hundred meters away. This continued until Arafat was airlifted to **France** following an illness on 25 October 2004. After his death in a Paris military hospital, on 12 November 2004 Arafat was buried within the Mukatta and a mausoleum has been built.

See also ABBAS, MAHMOUD (1935–); ARAFAT PROBE.

RANTISI, ABDEL AZIZ AL- (1947–2004). A leader of **Hamas**, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi was born on 23 October 1947 in Yebna (now Yavne) near Ashkelon in present-day Israel. As an infant during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, he became a **refugee** along with his family, which moved to the **Gaza Strip**, and he grew up in a refugee camp. In the 1970s, Rantisi pursued his studies in **Egypt** and became a trained pediatrician. During this period, he was attracted to the **Muslim Brotherhood**, an Islamic movement outlawed earlier by Egyptian president **Gamal Abdel Nasser**, and became active in the movement's Gaza branch. Following the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in

December 1987, Rantisi joined with **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** and others to transform the social activist movement into a political force, Hamas. He was often identified as one of the founding members of the militant Islamic movement and was frequently arrested by the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) during the Intifada.

Rantisi came to prominence following the Israeli **deportation** of 415 suspected Hamas activists to southern **Lebanon** in December 1992. He emerged as the spokesperson of the deportees in the Marj al-Zahour camp. Upon his return to Gaza in 1993, and reflecting the prevailing position of Hamas, he vehemently opposed the **Oslo Process** and emerged as a hardened critic of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA). In 1998, he was briefly incarcerated under the orders of PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat**.

Frequently appearing in the international media, Rantisi explained and justified **suicide attacks** conducted by Hamas against Israeli civilians. As the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** progressed, the Israeli government under Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** changed its policy and began conducting **targeted killings** of political and non-militant leaders of Hamas and **Islamic Jihad**. After the Israeli **assassination** of Yassin in March 2004, Rantisi was named leader of Hamas. On 17 April, Rantisi was killed when an Israeli missile struck his vehicle in Gaza City. As a result of the successive killing of two of its leaders by the IDF, Hamas refrained from disclosing the identity of his successor.

See also TERRORISM.

REAGAN PLAN. On 1 September 1982, weeks after the Israeli invasion of **Lebanon** and the evacuation of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) from Beirut, U.S. president Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) unveiled an initiative to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. In a public address, Reagan called for the need to "reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." Calling for Israeli "magnanimity, vision, and courage," Reagan admitted that the Palestinian cause was "more than a question of **refugees**" but reiterated the American opposition to recognizing the PLO until the latter accepted **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the **United Nations** Security Council.

The Reagan Plan called for a five-year transition period, beginning with free elections for a self-governing Palestinian administration and the freezing of Israeli **settlement** activities in the **Occupied Territories**. Opposed to an independent Palestinian state, it instead visualized a Palestinian entity in confederation with **Jordan**. The final status of **Jerusalem**, which "must remain undivided," would be decided through negotiations. Israel was not consulted prior to Reagan's speech, and the plan was immediately rejected by Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**. Israel objected to the right of Palestin-

ians in **East Jerusalem** to participate in any elections, to the handing over of internal security to an interim Palestinian authority, and to a settlement freeze. On 9 September, the Arabs responded with the **Fez Plan**.

See also BREZHNEV PLAN; PEACE FOR GALILEE OPERATION; UNITED STATES.

RED SEA–DEAD SEA LINK. With the aim of promoting regional economic cooperation, on 9 May 2005 representatives from Israel, **Jordan**, and the **Palestinian National Authority** signed an agreement for linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. Due to low rainfall, a decreasing inflow from the **Jordan River**, and a higher rate of evaporation, the **water** levels of the Dead Sea have dropped considerably. The plan is to flood the Dead Sea with waters from the Red Sea brought in through pipelines and in the process increase the availability of fresh water in Jordan. Similar plans were floated by **Great Britain** in the early 20th century to circumvent the **Suez Canal**, and the idea was revived by Israeli officials close to the then Israeli foreign minister **Shimon Peres** following the **Oslo Accords**.

Through 180 kilometers of underground pipelines on Jordanian territory, the plan hopes to bring up to two billion cubic meters of water from the **Gulf of Aqaba** on the Red Sea to the Dead Sea. Besides increasing the availability of water, it would also be used to generate electricity. The project is estimated to cost $10 billion. The Sea Link is also known as the Two Seas Canal.

REDEPLOYMENT. First appearing in the **Declaration of Principles** in 1993, "redeployment" is the formal Israeli euphemism for the withdrawal of **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) units from the **Occupied Territories** to positions worked out through mutual consultation and agreement with the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. The abandoned Israeli military positions and bases were to be either formally handed over to the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) or dismantled and shifted to other locations in the Occupied Territories. The term "withdrawal" does not appear in any official Israeli agreement signed with the Palestinians. In practice, redeployment actually meant a gradual change in the status of the areas in question; from complete Israeli control, they were transferred to partial, joint, or complete Palestinian control. Israel withdrew from Jenin on 25 October 1995, and the IDF completely pulled out of all Palestinian population centers (except Hebron) by the end of that year. However, these areas were reoccupied by the IDF following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. Israel handed over the security control of Jenin to the PNA in March 2005 and of the northern West Bank including Jericho and Tulkarem by September.

See also EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; GAZA DISENGAGEMENT.

REFERENDUM. Following the Geneva meeting between U.S. president **Bill Clinton** and President **Hafez al-Assad** of **Syria** in January 1994, Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** declared that any agreement with Syria involving a "substantial" territorial withdrawal from the **Golan Heights** would be put to a referendum. This commitment was gradually extended, as **Labor Party** leaders pledged to refer the question of a Palestinian state to popular approval. The entire practice had no legal standing in Israel, and a referendum was never applied when Israel initiated a number of military operations as well as controversial political moves, such as the **annexation** of the Golan Heights or **East Jerusalem**. Referendum pledges are seen as another legal mechanism to delay, and even preclude, any territorial concessions vis-à-vis the Arabs.

After years of delays and political debates, in November 2010 the Knesset approved by 65 votes to 33 a law mandating a national referendum prior to any decision regarding withdrawal from territories that are subject to Israeli law. Under this provision, territorial compromise regarding the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem would require a referendum, but not so the other parts of the **West Bank** that are not formally annexed by Israel. Some political parties on the right are seeking similar referenda for any territorial compromise with the **Palestinian National Authority**.

See also UNITED STATES.

REFUGEE/S. The refugee problem remains the most complicated and controversial issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict. The outbreak of hostilities in Palestine following the adoption of the **Partition Plan** in November 1947 led to the first flight of refugees, which only increased following the establishment of Israel on 14 May 1948. The Zionist leadership has been accused of pursuing a deliberate policy of expulsion of Arab civilians during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** or at least of not preventing the flight of Arabs from areas the Jewish forces captured during the conflict. Brutal incidents such as the **Deir Yassin Massacre** contributed to the departure of Arabs from areas captured by the Jewish forces. The lack of Arab Palestinian leadership inside Palestine during this critical period also contributed to the mass exodus.

The fate of the Palestinian refugees became the primary focus of a number of peace proposals by the **United Nations** and others, such as the **Bernadotte Plan**, and the **Johnson Mission**. The most significant move in this direction was the formation of the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency** (UNRWA), which was established to assist the Palestinians who had become refugees following the 1948 war. The UNRWA has been operating refugee camps in the Middle East for anyone who was a resident of **Mandate Palestine** for at least two years before the 1948 conflict and who fled follow-

ing the outbreak of hostilities. In 1950, the number of refugees registered with UNRWA was 914,221. An additional 300,000 were made homeless following the **June War of 1967**.

According to the UNRWA, as of 2010 the total number of registered Palestinian refugees stood at 4.9 million, and they were living in 59 official camps maintained by the UNRWA; out of these, 10 were in **Jordan**, 9 in **Syria**, 12 in **Lebanon**, 19 in the **West Bank**, and 8 in the **Gaza Strip**. Close to two million reside in the refugee camps in Jordan while about half a million live in Lebanon and Syria.

Meanwhile, on 11 December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted **Resolution 194**, which recognized the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or be paid compensation. This resolution dominates the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations on the refugee question. While the Palestinians reiterate their right to return, Israel argues that it would cease to be a Jewish state if the resolution were to be implemented in toto.

The emergence of **New History** in Israel in the 1990s rekindled the debates over the origin of the refugee problem. Led by Benny Morris (1948–2014), a new group of historians questioned the traditional Israeli portrayal of the Arabs of Mandate Palestine "leaving" their homes voluntarily or being asked to leave by the Arab leaders who were confident of victory over the Jewish forces. Some like Ilan Pappé (1954–) go further and argue that **transfer** was part of the Zionist plan during the 1948 war and the Arabs were expelled by the Jewish forces.

The refugee issue figured prominently during the **Camp David Talks** held in July 2000 between Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**. The **Abdullah Plan** proposed by the then crown prince of **Saudi Arabia** in February 2002 fumbled on the refugee question. In the summit meeting of the **Arab League** held in Beirut in March 2002, **Syria** and **Lebanon** insisted that any resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict should be based on all relevant UN resolutions. This included UN General Assembly Resolution 194 regarding the right to return and went against the general Israeli position of a limited number of refugees returning to their homes rather than an unlimited number.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** in March 2011 severely affected the Palestinian refugees. Yarmouk camp, the largest in Syria, on the outskirts of Damascus witnessed some of the most serious conflicts between the government and rebel forces and forced the leadership of some Palestinian groups including **Hamas** to move out of Syria. The unrest also resulted in a Syrian refugee crisis whereby a large number have been internally displaced or are fleeing to neighboring **Iraq**, Jordan, and Lebanon. The commemoration of **al-Naqba** Day in May 2011 witnessed violent clashes on the **Golan Heights** when a number of Palestinian refugees marched toward the 1973 cease-fire line with the intention of "returning." Four people were

killed and 20 injured when the **Israel Defense Forces** opened fire on the protesters. This was also the first attempted infiltration from Syria since the **October War of 1973**.

See also ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; KERRY PLAN; LAW OF RE-TURN; NAQBA, AL-; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE; WAR-FARE; VENICE DECLARATION; ZIONISM.

REJECTIONIST FRONT. At periodic intervals, various Palestinian groups opposed to any compromise with Israel have organized themselves into loose partnerships called the Rejectionist Front. They normally include groups such as the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine** (PFLP), the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command** (PFLP-GC), the Popular Struggle Front, and the **Palestine Liberation Front**. On 26 September 1974, protesting against the Palestinian willingness to participate in the Geneva peace conference, PFLP leader **George Habash** resigned from the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) Executive Committee and joined hands with the PFLP-GC and the **Arab Liberation Front** and formed the Rejectionist Front.

Arab states that often opposed any Middle East peace talks organized themselves into a Front of Steadfastness (Jabhat al-Sumud) and articulated their position. In the mid-1970s, it consisted of **Iraq**, Libya, **Syria**, Algeria, South Yemen, and the PLO. A similar front was formed on 1 October 1977 in response to President **Anwar Sadat**'s peace initiatives toward Israel. On 2 December, less than two weeks after Sadat's **Jerusalem visit**, leaders of Algeria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, and Syria and PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat** met at the **Tripoli Conference** in Libya to coordinate their opposition.

In the 1990s, the **Oslo Process** led to the formation of another Rejectionist Front, but unlike in the past, this time it comprised Palestinian groups opposed to Arafat and his peace efforts toward Israel. This tussle continued even after the death of Arafat in November 2004 and the January 2006 Palestinian elections in which **Hamas** won a decisive victory over Fatah. Damascus became the base for the external leadership of Hamas and often played a negative role toward some of the low-level understandings between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority**. Syria also became the base for Hamas leaders such as **Khalid Masha'al** and **Musa Abu-Marzok** after their expulsion from **Jordan** in 1999.

The **Arab Spring in Syria** considerably weakened the presence of the Rejectionist Front and its leaders and forced them to relocate to **Egypt**, Jordan, and **Qatar**. No prominent Palestinian group, including Hamas, which benefited from the political support of Syria, was prepared to support **Bashar al-Assad** following the popular protests. This was in contrast to **Hezbollah** whose fighters have been taking an active part in support of the regime.

RESOLUTION 181. *See* PARTITION PLAN.

RESOLUTION 194. On 11 December 1948, amid the temporary cease-fire in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** but before the conclusion of any **Armistice Agreements** between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the **United Nations** General Assembly adopted Resolution 194, which outlined a number of guidelines for the settlement of the conflict. The resolution established a three-member **Palestine Conciliation Commission** to take over and implement the functions and responsibilities of **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) who was assassinated in September. Reiterating the internationalization of **Jerusalem** as recommended by the partition resolution, Resolution 194 recognized the rights of the Palestinians who had become **refugees** following the outbreak of hostilities to return to their homes or, should the refugees decide against returning, to be paid compensation. The operative part of the resolution reads:

> The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

This resolution dominates the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations concerning the refugee question. While the Palestinians reiterate their right to return, Israel argues that if they were to return in large numbers, it would cease to be a Jewish state. Resolution 194 thus became the most contentious issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict concerning the refugees and was incorporated into General Assembly Resolution 273 of 11 May 1949, which granted **UN membership** to Israel.

The portrayal of the Palestinian question merely as a "refugee" problem also precluded the Palestinian leadership, especially the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, from accepting UN Security Council **Resolution 242**. The **Moscow Conference** that began in January 1992 as a follow-up to the **Madrid Conference** set up a separate working group devoted to the refugee question. Likewise, the **Declaration of Principles** recognized the importance of the refugee question and placed it on the agenda of the **Permanent Status Negotiations** between Israel and the Palestinians.

The failure of the **Camp David Talks** of 2000 was largely due to the difficulties facing both sides in resolving the refugee issue. While Israel was prepared to accept a limited number of refugees within the framework of "family reunion," it demanded that the Palestinians give up their right of return to their erstwhile homes that they had left during the **Arab–Israeli**

War of 1948. The **Clinton Parameters**, which were unveiled days before U.S. president **Bill Clinton** left office in January 2001, proposed that the Palestinian refugees would have the right to return to their Palestinian homeland but not to their original homes in Israel; refugees who did not exercise this right would be entitled to compensation and resettlement. However, the demand for the refugees to give up their right of return was a non-starter.

See also ASSASSINATION/S; KERRY PLAN; NAQBA, AL-; UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA); UNITED STATES.

RESOLUTION 242. On 22 November 1967, more than six months after the **June War of 1967** ended, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 242 sponsored by **Great Britain**. Intense diplomatic negotiations and deliberate ambiguity ensured its unanimous approval by the Security Council. Various efforts since then to resolve the inbuilt ambiguity and different interpretations have failed.

The resolution proclaimed the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," the right of every state in the region to "live in security" and "to live in peace within secure and recognized borders" free from acts or threats of force, and the need for "a just settlement of the **refugee** problem." It furthermore called for the withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied during the **June War of 1967**; termination of "all claims or states of belligerency"; recognition of the "sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state" in the Middle East; guarantees of freedom of navigation through international waterways; assurance of "the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State" in the region; and the establishment of "demilitarized zones."

The principal players of the June War—Israel, **Egypt**, and **Jordan**—accepted the plan. However, the recognition of Israel's right to exist prevented **Syria** and its ally **Lebanon** (though not involved in the conflict) from accepting the resolution. The portrayal of the Palestinian question as a "refugee" problem also precluded the Palestinian leadership, especially the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, from accepting it. In October 1973, the Security Council adopted **Resolution 338**, calling for the implementation of Resolution 242.

Despite the initial reservations expressed by Syria and Palestinians, since the October War of 1973, all Arab countries and Palestinians have been demanding the implementation of Resolution 242. In calling for its complete implementation, both Israel and the Arab parties have been exploiting the resolution's vagueness to suit their respective national interests. For example, Israel has been arguing that the resolution calls for withdrawal "from territories *occupied in the recent conflict*," not "from *the* territories," and hence it does not demand a complete Israeli pullout from the **Occupied Territories**.

The reference to the right of all states in the region to live "within secure and recognized" borders is also used by Israel to reiterate its opposition to withdrawal to the pre–June 1967 position.

The resolution's declaration of the "inadmissibility of territorial conquest" was also applicable to Jordan, which annexed the **West Bank** in 1950 and controlled it until the June War, and to the Syrian encroachment on Palestinian territories beyond the 1948 Armistice lines. The reference to "recognized" borders precludes the possibility of unilateral moves by any party, including Israel. The Arab countries argue that by refusing to withdraw to the pre–June 1967 position, Israel has prevented the implementation of the resolution.

As provided for by Resolution 242, in November 1967 the UN appointed a special representative to implement the resolution, selecting Gunner Jarring (1907–2002), the Swedish ambassador in Moscow. The rigid position adopted by all the parties prevented any progress in the **Jarring Mission**. Resolution 242 nevertheless provided the framework for future negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors and established **land-for-peace** as the guiding principle for peace in the Middle East.

The **Venice Declaration** of 1980 was the first significant move toward the recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians. Meeting in Italy, the leaders of the European Council declared that the Palestinian problem was more than "simply one of refugees" and recognized the right of the Palestinian people "to exercise fully its right to self-determination." This was followed by a similar move by the **United States** when the **Reagan Plan** admitted that the Palestinian cause was "more than a question of refugees." The willingness of the Arab countries and Palestinians to attend the **Madrid Conference** in 1991 was conditional upon Israel's willingness to recognize Resolution 242 as the basis for any Middle East peace settlement.

See also ABDULLAH PLAN; BREZHNEV PLAN; EUROPEAN UNION (EU); FAHD PLAN; FEZ PLAN; GREEN LINE; SOVIET PROPOSAL.

RESOLUTION 338. On 22 October 1973, following the **October War of 1973**, the **United Nations** Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 338, which called on all parties in the Middle East to implement **Resolution 242** and to accept and enforce an immediate cease-fire, which came into force on 24 October. The resolution explicitly called for negotiations "between the parties" toward establishing "a just and durable peace in the Middle East." It also called for "appropriate auspices," a tacit reference to the international conference demanded by the Arab countries. **Syria** and **Lebanon**, which did not formally accept **Resolution 242**, accepted Resolution 338. This resolution provided the basis for post-war military disengagement negotiations among Israel, **Egypt**, and Syria.

Since 1973, Resolutions 242 and 338 formed the core in the search for Middle East peace. As called for in the resolution, the Geneva Conference was convened, on 21 December 1973. Israel, Egypt, and **Jordan**, with the **United States** and the **Soviet Union** acting as co-chairs, attended it. The **Palestine Liberation Organization** was not invited, and the Israeli opposition over the treatment of its prisoners of war precluded Syrian participation. Only meager progress was achieved in the **Geneva Conference (1973)**.

RESOLUTION 425. On 19 March 1978, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 425, which called for "strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence" of **Lebanon**. Coming days after the brief Israeli invasion of Lebanon which began on 15 March (the **Litani Operation**), the resolution called on Israel "to cease its military action against Lebanon" and to withdraw "its forces from all Lebanese territory." It also established the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** (UNIFIL) to confirm Israeli compliance with the UN demand.

Citing the presence of the army of **Syria** in Lebanon since the onset of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Israel argued that its compliance with the UN demands would be conditional upon the withdrawal of Syrian troops as well as the **Palestine Liberation Organization** from Lebanon. Subsequent governments headed by both the **Labor** and **Likud** parties reiterated this Israeli position, especially following the 1982 Israeli invasion (**Peace for Galilee Operation**). In June 1985 Israel implemented a partial withdrawal from Lebanon but retained the self-declared **security zone** in southern Lebanon.

In early 1998, the government headed by **Benjamin Netanyahu** declared Israel's willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of the **Israel Defense Forces** from Lebanon based on Resolution 425. Due to the continued Lebanese refusal to negotiate with Israel without Syrian involvement, on 5 March 2000 the government headed by Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** decided in favor of a unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** and implemented it by 24 May 2000. On 16 June, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan (1938–) informed the Security Council that Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon and hence had complied with the demands of Resolution 425. Initially a few countries did not accept this assessment, but the Security Council endorsed Annan's report on 18 June, and on 24 July the secretary-general informed the Security Council that Israel had rectified all the violations along the Israel–Lebanon border and fully complied with Resolution 425.

Differences, however, persist between Israel and Lebanon over **Sheba'a Farms**. Israel maintained that it was a Syrian territory when it captured the **Golan Heights** during the **June War of 1967** and hence would be discussed in any peace agreement with Syria. Under pressure from **Hezbollah**, Beirut claimed that it was Lebanese territory. Based on UNIFIL maps, the UN

concurred with the Israeli position. The Israel–Hezbollah dispute over She-ba'a Farms eventually resulted in the 2006 **Second Lebanon War**. Despite the Israeli withdrawal and UN acceptance of Israeli compliance, UNIFIL continues to operate in southern Lebanon.

See also FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT; GRAPES OF WRATH OP-ERATION; SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA).

RESOLUTION 1701. With the sole abstention of the **United States**, on 11 August 2006 the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 1701 that brought to an end the 34-day **Second Lebanon War** between Israel and **Hezbollah**. The resolution increased the strength of the **United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon** to 15,000 and authorized the UN force to take "all necessary action" to prevent any hostile activity in areas under its control in southern **Lebanon**. The resolution urged the Lebanese government to take control of the southern parts of the country bordering Israel from where Hezbollah had kidnapped two **Israel Defense Forces** soldiers, which led to the conflict. The resolution also called on the Lebanese government to dis-arm Hezbollah and other militias and exercise authority over the entire coun-try. While the Israel–Lebanon border has remained quiet since August 2006, the disarming of militias has not happened because of strong resistance from Hezbollah.

RESOLUTION 3210. On 14 October 1974, the **United Nations** General Assembly overwhelmingly approved Resolution 3210, which was sponsored by countries belonging to the **Non-Aligned Movement**. With only Israel, the **United States**, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic voting against and 20 countries abstaining, 105 countries voted to recognize the Palestinian people as "the principal party to the question of Palestine" and decided to invite the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) "to participate" in General As-sembly deliberations on "the question of Palestine." This paved the way for the participation of the PLO in all UN deliberations concerning the Palestine question.

See also OBSERVER STATE; UN MEMBERSHIP.

RESOLUTION 3236. In response to growing support for the Palestinians, on 22 November 1974, the **United Nations** General Assembly adopted Reso-lution 3236 by 95 to 17 votes, which recognized that the "Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination" and "to regain its right by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles" of the UN Charter. The latter provision was a tacit UN recognition of the then prevailing Palestinian strate-

gy of armed struggle against Israel. For a long time, Israel and its supporters viewed this as international acquiescence in violence and **terrorism** perpetrated by certain Palestinian groups against Israel and its Western allies.

Resolution 3236 also granted observer status to the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Citing similar moves by the World Food Conference and the World Population Conference, the General Assembly voted to invite the PLO "to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences" convened by the UN. Since then, the PLO has been participating in all UN deliberations pertaining to the Palestinian question.

On 7 July 1998, the General Assembly voted to upgrade the observer status of the PLO and to confer upon it "additional rights and privileges." The move was passed almost unanimously, with only Israel, the **United States**, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands voting against. On 29 November 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to accord nonmember **observer state** status to Palestine.

See also ARAFAT, YASSER (1929–2004).

RESOLUTION 3379. On 27 June 1975, the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico City adopted a resolution that called for the elimination of "colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, **Zionism**, **Apartheid**, racial discrimination in all forms as well as recognition of peoples and their rights to self-determination." This formulation was subsequently used by the **United Nations** General Assembly, which on 10 November 1975 adopted the non-binding Resolution 3379 that, inter alia, declared that Zionism "is a form of racism and discrimination." Sponsored by a number of Arab and Islamic countries, this resolution was adopted by a vote of 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions, and demonstrated Israel's deteriorating relationship with the UN and its increasing international isolation.

The racism resolution was reversed following the end of the Cold War and the inauguration of the **Madrid Conference**. On 16 December 1991, the General Assembly adopted a statement revoking Resolution 3379. This was supported by 111 countries, many of which had voted for the original resolution. A few Arab and Islamic countries either voted against the revocation or were absent during the vote. The racism resolution was unsuccessfully sought to be resurrected during the August 2001 **Durban Conference**.

RIGHT TO RETURN. *See* RESOLUTION 194.

RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–). A politician and leader of **Likud**, Reuven Rivlin became president of Israel in July 2014. Born into a **Jerusalem** family on 9 September 1939, Rivlin studied law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and served in the **Israel Defense Forces** and rose to the rank of major. He is married to Nechama, and the couple have four children.

Rivlin was first elected to the Knesset in 1988 on the Likud platform and was reelected regularly except in 1992. He held various positions in the Knesset and in Likud until 2014. He served as minister of communication from March 2001 to February 2003 in the government headed by Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** and was elected Speaker of the 16th (2003–2006) and 18th (2009–2013) Knesset. He came under criticism for breaking the tradition of political neutrality of the office of Speaker for his opposition to Sharon's **Gaza Disengagement** plan of 2005. In 2007 Rivlin unsuccessfully contested against **Shimon Peres** for the presidency. On 10 June 2014, Rivlin defeated Meir Sheetrit (1948–) and was elected president.

Amid the **Protective Edge Operation** on 24 July, Rivlin was sworn in as the 10th president of Israel and succeeded Peres. Seen as a political hawk on most issues pertaining to the peace process, Rivlin opposes a Palestinian state and supports **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** and the recognition of the Armenian genocide. Despite his position, his relations with Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** have been tense.

ROAD MAP. *See* QUARTET ROAD MAP.

ROGERS PLAN. Due to the impasse faced by the **Jarring Mission** caused by the **War of Attrition**, on 9 December 1969, U.S. secretary of state William Rogers (1913–2001) announced a two-pronged initiative: first, a cease-fire agreement between **Egypt** and Israel along the **Suez Canal** and, second, progress in Israel's negotiations with Egypt and **Jordan** based on **Resolution 242** of the **United Nations** Security Council. While Egypt and Jordan welcomed the initiative, the Israeli cabinet formally rejected the Rogers Plan on 22 December because it believed that if the ideas of the **United States** were implemented, Israel's "security and peace" would be in grave danger.

In January 1970, Rogers came out with a new set of proposals, often referred to as Rogers II. It primarily sought to reactivate the peace-making efforts of the UN envoy Gunnar Jarring (1907–2002), to mediate an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel, and to reopen the Suez Canal in return for a partial Israeli withdrawal in the **Sinai Peninsula**. However, Egypt demanded a full withdrawal, while Israel was not prepared to contemplate any moves without direct negotiations with Egypt. On 19 June, Rogers outlined another plan aimed at ending the War of Attrition. It called for a 90-day

cease-fire by both parties and a military standstill zone on either side of the Suez Canal. After prolonged efforts and consultations, all parties accepted the proposal, and the cease-fire came into force on 7 August 1970.

In December, Rogers outlined a similar proposal on the Israel–Jordan front that called for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines; equal religious, civil, and economic rights for Israel and Jordan in the unified city of **Jerusalem**, whose political status was to be determined through negotiations; and a settlement for the **refugee** problem. While Jordan accepted the proposal, Israel rejected it.

See also GREEN LINE; NASSER, GAMAL ABDEL (1918–1970); UNITED STATES INITIATIVE.

ROUHANI, HASSAN (1948–). The seventh president of **Iran**, who assumed office on 4 August 2013. Born into a religious family on 12 November 1948, he was politically active since the early 1960s and participated in the Islamic Revolution in 1979. He has been a member of Iran's Assembly of Experts since 1999, a member of the Expediency Council since 1991, and head of the Center for Strategic Research since 1992. He was also the deputy speaker of the Iranian parliament during 1992–2000. As the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council during 1989–2005, he was the principal negotiator with **France**, **Germany**, and **Great Britain** on the nuclear controversy. On 14 June 2013, Rouhani was elected president and assumed office on 4 August. Seen as a moderate reformer, Rouhani began a new opening to the **United States** and reached the **Geneva Interim Agreement** on the nuclear controversy.

See also BUENOS AIRES BOMBING; KHAMENEI, ALI (1939–); NUCLEAR IRAN.

RUSSIA. Even though it was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Israel, since the early 1950s the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or the Soviet Union, emerged as the staunchest supporter of the Arab countries in their conflict with Israel. The conclusion in 1955 of the military deal between its East European ally Czechoslovakia and **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** was a landmark in Soviet Middle East policy. The **Czech Deal** included the supply of a wide range of offensive arms, ammunition, and support systems, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers, artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, fighter jets, bombers, transport planes, radar installations, destroyers, minesweepers, torpedo boats, and six submarines. This was the largest single known military transaction in the world at that time and caused considerable anxiety in Israel. It sowed the seeds of an Israeli desire to topple Nasser before he could pose a military threat, and it eventually led to the **Suez War**.

The **June War of 1967** exposed the weaknesses of the Soviet military equipment supplied to Egypt and **Syria** as well as the limited Soviet political influence. Partly to regain its lost prestige, in June 1967 Moscow and most of its East European allies broke off diplomatic ties with Israel and emerged as the harshest critics of its policies. The renewal of Soviet military supplies played an important role in the prolongation of the **War of Attrition**.

At the same time, the ongoing détente between the Soviet Union and the **United States** largely influenced President **Anwar Sadat** of Egypt to initiate a limited military campaign against Israel in the form of the **October War of 1973**. At the end of this conflict, Sadat sided with Israel in precluding the Soviet Union from the peace negotiations. The Arab opposition to the **Camp David Accords** did not improve the Soviet influence in the region.

At the political level, the growing Soviet support for Arab countries opposed to Israel contributed to various international bodies such as the **United Nations** adopting a series of anti-Israel resolutions. This trend peaked in November 1975 when the UN General Assembly adopted **Resolution 3379**, which declared **Zionism** to be a form of racism. The Soviet Union played a critical role in the international political and diplomatic recognition of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and its chairman **Yasser Arafat**. On 7 October 1976, it unveiled a four-point **Soviet Proposal**, which failed to gather momentum.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally altered the situation in the Middle East. After endorsing the U.S. lead during the **Kuwait War**, Moscow played a secondary role in the **Madrid Conference** of October 1991. Days before the conference, it restored diplomatic ties with Israel. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had a much reduced role in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

In January 1992, Russia hosted the **Moscow Conference** of multilateral talks which led to the setting up of five separate working groups on **water**, the environment, arms control and regional security, **refugees**, and regional economic development. Since the mid-1990s, most of these working groups have remained dormant as Russia was preoccupied with domestic difficulties. The **Al-Aqsa Intifada** rekindled hopes for a Russian reentry into the Middle East peace process through the **Quartet Road Map** unveiled in early 2003. **Vladimir Putin** became president in August 2000, and he rekindled the Russian engagement with the Middle East. Following the victory of **Hamas** in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, Russia reached out to the Palestinian militant group and hosted its leader, **Khalid Masha'al**, in March.

Likewise, Russia has emerged as a strong supporter of **Iran** over the nuclear controversy. Even while voting with the United States in the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Russia continued to oppose any military solution to the problem. By threatening to use its veto powers in the Security Council, it has diluted the American plans to impose harsher UN

sanctions against Iran. The same trend was prevalent regarding the **Arab Spring**. Its tacit support at the Security Council facilitated the military campaign led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against Libya that overthrew Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011) and resulted in his eventual death on 20 October 2011. The Western use of the UN-mandated no-fly zone to bring about regime change in Libya resulted in Russia's opposing similar moves in Syria after the outbreak of widespread protest in March 2011. Russian support for President **Bashar al-Assad**, and its opposition to UN sanctions, partly contributed to the continuing violence in Syria. Russia has a military base in the coastal Syrian city of Tartus, its only such facility in the eastern Mediterranean. After some hesitation, Russia has resumed military sales to Syria and pledged to supply missile defense systems despite strong protests from the United States and Israel. At the regional level, under Putin Russia is trying to balance its desire for closer ties with Israel as well as Iran, Syria, and Hamas.

See also ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; NUCLEAR IRAN; SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE.

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SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE. On 14 September 1982, during the Israeli occupation of Beirut following its invasion of **Lebanon** during the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, Lebanese president-elect Bachir Gemayel (1947–1982) was killed by Palestinian elements. In retaliation, Christian forces of **Phalange** affiliated with Gemayel's political party moved into Palestinian **refugee** camps in Sabra and Shatila in the southern part of Beirut. The force was reportedly commanded by Elie Hubeika (1956–2002), who headed the Phalange secret service. Despite being aware of the prevailing mood for vengeance, **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), which were in control of the areas where the refugee camps were located, did not prevent the entry of the Phalangist forces. During 16–18 September, hundreds of unarmed innocent Palestinian men, women, and children in the refugee camps were massacred.

The killings evoked widespread condemnation in the Middle East and elsewhere, and on 25 September, Tel Aviv witnessed an enormous demonstration against the massacre. Initially Prime Minister **Menachem Begin** opposed a judicial committee, but President Yitzhak Navon (1921–) threatened to resign. On 28 September, bowing to public pressure, the government appointed an official commission of inquiry headed by the president of the Supreme Court, Yitzhak Kahan (1913–1985). While absolving the IDF of any direct responsibility, the **Kahan Commission** severely criticized the top brass and ruled that Defense Minister **Ariel Sharon** should not be given any "sensitive" position in the cabinet. Protesting against the carnage, **Egypt** withdrew its ambassador from Israel but continued with its **oil supplies** as stipulated by the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**.

See also BELGIUM LAW; WARFARE.

SADAT, ANWAR (1918–1981). As president of **Egypt**, Anwar Sadat was the first Arab leader who recognized and sought peace with the State of Israel. Born in Menofia in the northeast of Cairo on 25 December 1918, Sadat graduated from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1938 and joined the army. In the wake of the July 1952 revolution by the Free Officers, Sadat

held numerous minor positions in the government and in the ruling Revolution Command Council. In 1960, he was elected Speaker of the parliament, and in 1964, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** appointed Sadat to the visible but relatively powerless position of vice president. After the death of Nasser in September 1970, Sadat was appointed president, and this was reaffirmed through a referendum in October.

In a calculated attempt to regain the **Sinai Peninsula**, which Egypt had lost during the **June War of 1967**, Sadat sought a limited conflict with Israel that would trigger great power involvement. Moving away from Nasser's policies, he distanced himself from the **Soviet Union** and in July 1972 expelled Soviet military advisers stationed in Egypt. Coordinating his moves with President **Hafez al-Assad** of **Syria**, Sadat launched a surprise attack on Israel on 6 October 1973 and initiated the **October War of 1973**. Though the war eventually ended with Israel regaining its initial losses and the Egyptian Third Army being encircled in the Sinai by a small unit headed by **Ariel Sharon**, Sadat managed to shatter the image of Israeli invincibility. The war also revealed Israel's dependence on an urgent airlift of military supplies from the **United States**. Helped by the **shuttle diplomacy** of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–), Sadat concluded the **Sinai I** and **Sinai II Agreements** with Israel.

In the wake of the victory of **Likud** in the 1977 Israeli Knesset elections, Sadat surprised the world by offering a **Jerusalem visit** in pursuit of peace. This eventually resulted in Sadat's addressing the Knesset on 20 November 1977, and his diplomatic initiative was followed by the conclusion of the **Camp David Accords** in 1978 and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** in 1979. Egyptian efforts toward securing Palestinian rights through the **Autonomy Plan**, however, proved futile. In 1978, Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Israeli prime minister **Menachem Begin**.

Sadat's determination to move away from the decisions of the **Khartoum Arab Summit** of 1967 and to pursue a separate peace with Israel angered the Arab world. Syria and **Iraq** led and organized the **Rejectionist Front** aimed at isolating Egypt. In 1979, Egypt was expelled from the **Arab League** and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**), and the league headquarters were moved from Cairo to Tunis.

Sadat's peace with Israel also angered the Egyptian public and some of his senior colleagues who resigned in protest. On 6 October 1981, while he was watching a military parade commemorating the October War, Sadat was assassinated by a member of a militant Islamic group; following this, **Hosni Mubarak** took over as president. Sadat's funeral was attended by many Western and Israeli leaders but was largely boycotted by the Egyptian

masses. Despite his widespread support and endorsement in Israel and in the West, Sadat continues to evoke a negative image in Egypt and in the rest of the Arab world.

See also ASSASSINATION/S; CARTER, JIMMY (1924–).

SAID, EDWARD (1935–2003). The most prominent Palestinian intellectual, Edward Said was a professor of English and comparative literature at Columbia University. He was born on 1 November 1935 into a prominent Palestinian family in **Jerusalem**. His father was a wealthy businessman who served with the forces of the **United States** during World War I (1914–1918) and in the process acquired U.S. citizenship. On the eve of the partition of Palestine, Said's family moved to Cairo where Said pursued his education, and then they moved to the United States in 1951. Said studied at Princeton and Harvard Universities and got his doctorate at the latter with a specialization in English literature. Said gained international attention and praise for his *Orientalism* published in 1978 that criticized the Western cultural approach to the East and its inherent prejudice in understanding the Arab-Islamic people through romanticized images.

In 1977 Said was elected to the Palestinian National Council, the Palestinian parliament-in-exile, and continued in this position until 1991. He was one of the earliest Palestinian proponents of the **two-state solution** and voted for the **State of Palestine** proclaimed through the **Algiers Declaration** of 1988. He quit the membership of the council in 1991 due to his differences with **Yasser Arafat**, the chairman of the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, over the **Madrid Conference**. In 1993 he was critical of the **Oslo Accords** and argued that the **Declaration of Principles** and the historic handshake would not result in the formation of an independent Palestinian state. After a 12-year battle with leukemia, on 25 September 2003 Said passed away in New York City.

See also BARGHOUTI, MUSTAFA (1954–).

SAIQA. Saiqa was a pan-Arabist commando unit, backed by **Syria**, of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) established by Yousef Zu'ayyin (1931–) in February 1968. The name is an Arabic acronym for the Vanguard of the Popular War of Liberation. Strongly influenced by the Syrian Ba'athist ideology, it saw the liberation of Palestine within the broader pan-Arab context, and under the leadership of Syria. Like the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, it sought to balance pan-Arab ideology with Palestinian specificity. After coming to power in November 1970, President **Hafez al-Assad** purged Saiqa and brought its military and political wings under the complete control of the Syrian Army. Though it is the second-largest Palestinian guerrilla organization, its presence was limited to Syria and **Lebanon**.

In 1983, Saiqa withdrew from the PLO due to differences with the policies of **Yasser Arafat**, and later on opposed the **Madrid Conference** and the **Oslo Process**. Some of its leaders, including Zuheir Muhsen (1936–1979), were killed because of internal violence, and in 1979 Issam al-Qadi (?–2006) took over as leader of Saiqa; since 2007 the organization is headed by Farhan Abu al-Hayja.

SAMSON OPTION. The expression is used by security experts to describe Israel's nuclear posture vis-à-vis its adversaries. Israel has neither signed the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty** nor admitted its nuclear capability but is widely recognized as a nuclear weapons state. Some suggest that in the hypothetical situation of a failure of deterrence, Israel would apply a strategy adopted by the biblical figure of Samson. According to the New Testament, "Samson said, 'Let me die with the Philistines!' Then he pushed with all his might, and down came the temple on the rulers and all the people in it. Thus he killed many more when he died than while he lived."

See also NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; OSIRAQ BOMBING; WARFARE.

SAN REMO CONFERENCE. At the end of World War I (1914–1918), Japan, **Great Britain**, **France**, and Italy met in the Italian town of San Remo from 16 to 20 April 1920 to consider the future of the Middle Eastern territories that were part of the **Ottoman Empire** before the war. This conference discussed and ratified some of the secret decisions that had been made during wartime between Britain and France, especially the **Sykes–Picot Agreement** of 1916. Accordingly, France was to be given mandatory rights in **Lebanon** and **Syria**, while Britain would obtain similar rights to Palestine and Mesopotamia (**Iraq**). A second San Remo Conference eight months later delineated the boundaries of these areas. Despite the subsequent repudiation of the Sykes–Picot Agreement by both signatories, the Palestine **Mandate** outlined in this agreement was formally approved by the **League of Nations** on 22 July 1922 and came into force on 29 September 1923.

SAUDI ARABIA. Since the days of its founder Ibn Saud (1876–1953), Saudi Arabia has been actively championing the Palestinian cause, perceiving it to be an important political tool to promote its influence in the region. However, Saudi Arabia has also been careful not to jeopardize its close ties with the West, especially with **Great Britain** and later the **United States**, and has refrained from adopting radical positions with regard to the Palestinian question.

Although it was a party to the decision of the **Arab League** to offer political, diplomatic, and military support in preventing the realization of the Jewish national home in Palestine, Saudi involvement in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** was minimal. Its contingents played some role in southwestern Palestine. At the end of the war, acting **UN mediator** Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971) invited Saudi Arabia to participate in the armistice negotiations at Rhodes. Declining the invitation, Saudi Arabia informed the **United Nations** on 8 February 1949 that it would accept "the decisions which have already been adopted, or which may be adopted by the Arab League, in respect of the situation in Palestine."

Since then, the Saudi role in the Arab–Israeli conflict has been passive. The growth of radical Arab nationalism and the popularity of President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** prevented Saudi Arabia from pursuing an activist Palestine policy. The defeat of the Arab armies in the **June War of 1967** and the subsequent decline of Nasser rekindled Saudi hopes for a regional order more inclined to its religious conservatism. Capitalizing on the **Al-Aqsa fire** that destroyed portions of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the old city of **Jerusalem**, King Faisal (c. 1903–1975) of Saudi Arabia joined with King Hassan II (1929–1999) of Morocco to organize a summit meeting of heads of state and government of Islamic countries. The Rabat Summit of September 1969 witnessed the formation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later renamed as the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**), where Saudi Arabia plays a pivotal role.

The **October War of 1973** witnessed a more assertive Saudi policy, and as an expression of solidarity with Egypt and **Syria**, on 16 October Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands because of their pro-Israeli policy. The oil embargo continued until March 1974 and created an **oil crisis**. Similarly, Saudi Arabia exerted its influence when Israel sought the transfer of foreign embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On 6 August 1980, Saudi Arabia and **Iraq**, the two principal oil suppliers of the region, warned that they would sever economic and diplomatic ties with any country that recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital. As a result, a number of states that already had missions in Jerusalem moved their diplomatic presence out of the city.

The peace initiatives of Egyptian president **Anwar Sadat** toward Israel posed a serious challenge to Saudi Arabia, and it joined the rest of the Arab countries in isolating Egypt and suspending diplomatic ties with Cairo. On 7 August 1981, Crown Prince (later King) Fahd (1921–2005) outlined an eight-point plan to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. The **Fahd Plan** came against the background of Egyptian isolation in the Middle East and the failure of the **Camp David Accords** to make progress on the Palestinian front. Among other things, the Saudi proposal called for an Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967, the dismantling of Jewish **settlements**, a

guarantee of freedom of worship for all faiths in Jerusalem, recognition of the right of Palestinian **refugees** to return to their homes or to be paid compensation, a UN mandate for the **Occupied Territories**, the establishment of a Palestinian state with **East Jerusalem** as its capital, and ensuring the rights of Palestinians and the states in the region to live in peace. The last point accorded tacit recognition to Israel and hence made the proposal controversial in the Arab world.

Crown Prince Fahd initially put forward his peace plan in September 1981 at the Fez Summit of the Arab League, where it was rejected. He submitted another draft in September 1982 at the Fez Summit, which came to be known as the **Fez Plan** and laid down certain guidelines for an Arab–Israeli agreement. While the Fahd Plan affirmed "the right of all states in the region to live in peace," the Fez Plan merely proposed "a UN Security Council guarantee for the peace and security of all states in the region including a Palestinian state." These efforts were unsuccessful.

The Saudi relationship with the Palestinian leadership, especially the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and its chairman, **Yasser Arafat**, became increasingly strained. Following the formation of **Hamas** in 1988, Saudi Arabia emerged as that organization's principal supporter due to the ideological proximity between Hamas and the Sunni Wahhabism of Saudi Arabia. Arafat's political support of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) during the **Kuwait War** infuriated the Saudis and contributed to Arafat's alienation from the oil-rich Arab countries, which also resulted in the expulsion of tens of thousands of Palestinian workers from these countries. Even though the **Oslo Process** has somewhat mitigated the situation, Saudi Arabia continues to be sympathetic toward Hamas.

Amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in early 2002, the then Crown Prince (and later King) Abdullah unveiled an initiative that called on Israel to withdraw completely from all the Arab territories it had occupied during the June 1967 War. The **Abdullah Plan** called for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital in return for a collective Arab normalization of relations with Israel. The summit meeting of the Arab League held in Beirut in March 2002 considerably diluted the Abdullah Plan. Under pressure from Syria and **Lebanon**, the meeting explicitly stated that issues concerning the Arab–Israeli conflict would be resolved in accordance with all relevant UN resolutions. This meant that the resolution of the refugee question would be within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly **Resolution 194**, which recognizes the refugees' right to return. The **Arab Peace Initiative** was reiterated during the Riyadh Summit held in March 2007. Meanwhile, as part of its efforts to secure membership in the World Trade Organization, in November 2005 Saudi Arabia agreed to partially lift its economic embargo against Israel.

Likewise, the Saudi efforts to mediate in internal Lebanese and Palestinian affairs were not very fruitful. Following the **assassination** of its ally and former prime minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005) on 14 February 2005 and the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian military forces from Lebanon, Saudi Arabia sought to mediate between the warring parties in the hope of forming a national unity government. Upon its failure, **Qatar** entered the fray and facilitated the election of former army chief Michael Suleiman (1948–) as president in May 2008.

The victory of Hamas in the January 2006 parliamentary elections intensified inter-Palestinian tension leading to Saudi mediation. At the behest of King **Abdullah** on 8 February 2007, **Mahmoud Abbas** (representing **Fatah**) and **Khalid Masha'al** (representing Hamas) signed the **Mecca Accord**. The unity arrangement did not last long, and the **Battle of Gaza** broke out on 10 June, resulting in the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.

In the early stages of the **Second Lebanon War**, Saudi Arabia criticized the Lebanese militant group **Hezbollah** for its "adventurism" in the kidnapping of two **Israel Defense Forces** soldiers that led to the conflict. However, the ability of Hezbollah to resist the Israeli military offensive, and its success in launching missiles and rockets deep into Israeli territory, generated a groundswell of Arab support for the Lebanese group. This forced Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries to rally behind Hezbollah in its resistance against Israel.

Meanwhile, the involvement of 15 of its citizens in the September 11 terror attacks against the United States generated negative publicity against Saudi Arabia and created stereotypes against Islam. Partly to overcome these, Saudi Arabia organized an **inter-faith dialogue**. Unlike other countries, opposition from conservative elements both within and outside the country prevented Saudi Arabia from holding such events on its territory, and King Abdullah hosted the first inter-faith meeting involving all major religions, including Judaism, in Madrid in July 2008.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring** in January 2011 resulted in Saudi Arabia rallying behind the status quo and opposing any far-reaching political changes in most countries. Past differences played a role in Saudi support for the opposition forces in Libya and later on in Syria. Saudi Arabia has been one of the principal supporters—the other being Qatar—of the Syrian opposition and has been providing political, financial, and military support to the assorted Syrian rebels, which also included jihadi elements. In other cases, for both republican and monarchical regimes, Saudi Arabia supported the beleaguered leaders. While King Abdullah gave refuge to Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali (1936–) who fled his country on 14 January 2011, it was supportive of Egyptian president **Hosni Mubarak** during the popular protests in **Tahrir Square**. Its relations with Egypt during the tenure of President **Mohammed Morsi** were tense, and Saudi Arabia was quick to

embrace the military regime when Morsi was overthrown on 3 July 2013. Saudi Arabia was quick to recognize **Abdel Fattah el-Sisi** upon his election as president in May 2014 and offered a $5 billion grant to Egypt.

Saudi Arabia has been providing strong political and military support to the al-Khalifa in Bahrain. There are suggestions that Saudi Arabia has been dissuading other monarchies, especially **Jordan**, from proceeding with greater political reforms due to fears of a cascading effect upon itself. Since early 2011, King Abdullah has been trying to control internal dissent, especially from the Shia minority, through economic incentives and strong security measures. His efforts toward forging a political union with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have not been successful.

Since the disclosure of the clandestine nuclear program pursued by **Iran**, there have been tensions between the two countries. Both in private and in public, Saudi rulers have been expressing their concerns over the Iranian nuclear program. The outbreak of the Arab Spring and Iranian support for the Shia opposition in Bahrain often led to tension and a verbal duel between the two. Common concerns vis-à-vis Iran have brought Saudi Arabia and Israel closer, and there were suggestions of low-level contacts and a tactical understanding between the two.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949); GENEVA INTERIM AGREEMENT; NUCLEAR IRAN; TERRORISM.

SAYERET MATKAL. This elite reconnaissance unit of the **Israel Defense Forces** controlled by general staff has been responsible for several special operations carried out by Israel. A number of leading Israeli personalities, including **Ehud Barak** and **Benjamin Netanyahu**, have served in Sayeret Matkal. Its activities have included the **assassination** of Abu Jihad (c. 1935–1988) in Tunis in April 1988.

See also WARFARE.

SCISSORS OPERATION. This was the code name for the military operation to capture the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Haifa in the north during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. On 21 April 1948, the forces of **Great Britain** evacuated their positions and moved to the Haifa port for their impending departure from **Mandate Palestine**. Mounting an attack from the high ground of Mount Carmel, the Jewish forces surprised the Arab population and trifurcated the city, eventually capturing it. As the Arab commander fled to neighboring **Lebanon**, the Arab fighters were outnumbered and outmaneuvered. When the city surrendered to the Jewish forces, most of the Arab population of Haifa fled eastward as **refugees**.

See also ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); ISRAELI ARABS; WARFARE.

SEA OF GALILEE. Also know as Lake Kinneret and Lake Tiberius, the Sea of Galilee is the lowest freshwater lake located between Israel and **Syria**. Its main **water** source is the **Jordan River**, which egresses in the south and flows into the Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**. In 1923 **France** and **Great Britain** set the borders of **Mandate Palestine** on the east of the Sea of Galilee, which denied water access to Syria. This situation was altered after the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** and, under the **Armistice Agreement** concluded between Israel and Syria on 20 July 1949, the latter had a foothold on the northeast shoreline of the Sea of Galilee. This tiny piece of territory of Mandate Palestine beyond the 1923 borders thus remained under Syrian occupation until the **June War of 1967**, when Israel captured the **Golan Heights**.

Following the **Madrid Conference**, Syria has been demanding an Israeli withdrawal that would include Syrian access to the waters of the Sea of Galilee. Over the years, the water level of the sea has dropped, and hence an Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line** along with Syria accessing the waters of the Sea of Galilee would imply Israel moving to a position west of that which it held on 4 June 1967. Hence both sides would have to agree on the actual location of the Green Line before any withdrawal could be accomplished.

The Sea of Galilee is a major source of water for Israel, and in 1964 it built the national water carrier that carries water to population centers. Under the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** signed in 1994, Israel is committed to supplying 50 million cubic meters of water to Jordan annually.

See also JOHNSON PLAN.

SECOND INTIFADA. *See* AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005).

SECOND LEBANON WAR. Also known as the Israel–Hezbollah War, the Second Lebanon War was the first major conflict since Israel's unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** completed on 24 May 2000. The conflict began on 12 July 2006 following a military intrusion by a group of fighters belonging to **Hezbollah** into Israel around the disputed **Sheba'a Farms** along the borders with **Lebanon**. The attack resulted in the deaths of three **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) soldiers and the kidnapping by Hezbollah of two others who were taken into Lebanon. After a failed rescue mission, Israel launched a military campaign to secure their release. Hezbollah responded with a barrage of missiles against Israel, and the conflict continued until 14 August 2006 when a cease-fire came into force.

The 34-day-long conflict resulted in the deaths of over 1,190 Lebanese and 165 Israelis. The Israeli military campaign resulted in a mass exodus of people from the southern parts of Lebanon and large-scale destruction. An

estimated 15,000 homes were destroyed and another 130,000 were damaged during the conflict. The IDF also destroyed and damaged a number of public buildings and infrastructure such as bridges.

During this period Hezbollah launched about 4,000 rockets against Israel, and for the first time since the **Kuwait War** of 1991, Israel's home front came under direct missile attack. More than 300,000 Israeli residents from the north had to be evacuated to safer places in the central and southern parts of the country. The Lebanese government headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora (1943–) was unable to rein in Hezbollah and bring an early end to the conflict. While **Syria** and **Iran** supported the Lebanese militant group, a number of countries, including **Saudi Arabia**, were initially critical of Hezbollah for its "adventurism." The militant group's resistance against the IDF galvanized popular Arab support for Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah (1960–), and this forced the Arab countries to modify their stand and rally behind Hezbollah.

The conflict exposed the IDF's lack of an effective military strategy against non-state militant groups such as Hezbollah and its reluctance to engage in urban guerrilla warfare with a well-organized militant group. The conflict ended without Israel securing the release of the two IDF soldiers, and their bodies were returned in July 2008 through a **prisoner exchange** whereby Israel freed five Hezbollah fighters and released the bodies of 199 fighters who were killed and buried in secret locations inside Israel. The war evoked widespread criticism against Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert**, Defense Minister Amir Peretz (1952–), and higher echelons of the IDF, including chief of staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz (1948–).

Resolution 1701, adopted by the **United Nations** Security Council to end the conflict, increased the strength of the **United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon** to 15,000, and authorized the UN force to take "all necessary action" to prevent any hostile activity in areas under its control. The resolution urged the government of Lebanon to take control of the southern parts of the country bordering Israel from where Hezbollah carried out the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers which sparked the conflict.

See also WARFARE; WINOGRAD COMMISSION.

SECURITY FENCE/S. Presently Israel has three sets of security fences vis-à-vis the Palestinians, **Syria**, and **Egypt**. Parts of the first two fences are built on **Occupied Territories**, and the third one is located along international borders. In an attempt to prevent Palestinian militants from entering Israel from the **West Bank** and to reduce **suicide attacks**, in June 2002 Israel decided to erect a physical barrier that would separate Israel from the West Bank. Though the idea was not new, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** sought the fence as an effective measure against **terrorism**. The barrier mostly consists of a fence equipped with electronic sensors with dirt paths, barbed wire, and

trenches on both sides, with an average width of 60 meters (200 feet). In some areas, a wall 6 to 8 meters (20 to 25 feet) high has been erected in place of the barrier system.

Though built generally along the **Green Line**, it does not follow it strictly but instead incorporates significant Palestinian territories of the West Bank on the Israeli side and entails movement restrictions upon the Palestinians living near the barrier's route. On 1 October 2003, the government approved the new route proposed by the defense establishment covering 270 kilometers. On 30 June 2004, responding to a petition, the Israeli High Court ruled against the separation barrier northwest of **Jerusalem** because it harms Palestinians living along the route. This forced the government to make slight modifications.

On 9 July 2004, acting on a request from the **United Nations** General Assembly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the construction of the barrier inside the Occupied Territories was forbidden under the **Fourth Geneva Convention** and constituted a violation of the rights of the Palestinian residents. Rejecting Israel's arguments about security requirements, it ruled that "the infringement of Palestinian human rights cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order." The ICJ felt that the construction constituted breaches of Israel's obligations to international humanitarian law and human rights. However, since the construction of the fence, the number of terrorist attacks, especially from the West Bank, has decreased considerably.

About 225 kilometers of the fence were completed by March 2005. According to **B'Tselem**, by July 2012, 62 percent of the construction was complete. This had left about 3 percent of territories lying west of the barrier and hence cut them off from the West Bank, and this would increase to 6 percent once the wall was completed. In April 2013, a Catholic monastery and convent in a secluded valley outside **Bethlehem** lost a seven-year legal battle against the construction of the fence on its land.

The second security fence was aimed at Syria and emerged following the outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** and the clashes between the government and opposition forces close to the **Golan Heights**. By the end of 2013, Israel had completed a 90-kilometer multi-sensor border fence system from the Golan Heights to the Mediterranean at a cost of over $60 million.

The third fence was along the 1923 borders with Egypt. The deteriorating security situation in the south following the overthrow of President **Hosni Mubarak** in the **Arab Spring in Egypt** and spiraling **Sinai violence** forced Israel to build a security fence along the 230-kilometer-long 1923 borders between the two countries. The $270 million project was completed in January 2013 and included barbed wire, surveillance cameras, and radars and stretches from the southern end of the Gaza Strip to north of Eilat. Though it

began in late 2010 within the context of blocking illegal African migrants from the Sinai, the pace of construction was accelerated following the **Arab Spring**.

SECURITY ZONE. This denotes the territory in southern **Lebanon** that remained under Israeli occupation from 1983 to 2000. Due to the mounting casualties and international criticism following the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, on 3–4 September 1983, Israeli forces were withdrawn 30 kilometers from the Shouf Mountains and established a new line along the Awali River, south of the Lebanese coastal city of Sidon. In the process, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) withdrew from Beirut, the Beirut–Damascus highway, and the Shouf Mountains. It also withdrew its "legation" from Beirut on 25 July 1984.

On 14 January 1985, the Israeli cabinet decided in favor of a three-stage **Lebanese withdrawal**. In the first stage, the IDF would pull out from the Sidon area and deploy in the Litani-Nabatiya region; in the second stage, it would be deployed in the Nabatiya region on the east; and in the third, the IDF would withdraw to international borders but would maintain a "zone in southern Lebanon where local forces [namely, the **South Lebanese Army**, or SLA] will operate with IDF backing." The first stage was completed on 16 February 1985, and Sidon was handed over to local Lebanese forces. In the second phase, completed on 11 April 1985, the IDF pulled out of the Beka'a Valley and sections in the central sector, but Israel still controlled 20 percent of the Lebanese territory.

On 21 April 1985 the Israeli cabinet authorized the beginning of the third stage of the withdrawal from most of the Lebanese territory while retaining a small portion along Israel's international borders with its northern neighbor. This narrow security zone corridor extended 5 to 15 kilometers into southern Lebanon and was manned by the SLA, which was sponsored, armed, and financed by Israel. The purpose was to protect northern Israeli towns and villages from militant attacks by the Palestinian forces and Katyusha attacks by **Hezbollah**. Between 1985 and 2000, 256 soldiers were killed in combat and 840 were injured. The continued Israeli casualties eventually compelled Israel to reexamine its policy and resulted in its unilateral withdrawal, a process that was completed in May 2000.

See also FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT; WARFARE.

SEPARATION OF FORCES AGREEMENT. *See* SINAI I AGREEMENT; SINAI II AGREEMENT.

SETTLEMENT/S. In the context of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the term "settlements" refers to Jewish housing units established in territories that Israel captured during the **June War of 1967**—that is, in the **West Bank**, **East Jerusalem**, **Gaza Strip**, **Sinai Peninsula**, and **Golan Heights**. The first settlement after the war was established in **Etzion Bloc** in the West Bank in September 1967, and since then more than 150 settlements have been established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Following the **Camp David Accords**, Israel withdrew its settlements and destroyed the town of Yamit on the northeastern edge of the Sinai Peninsula. On the Golan Heights, the first settlement was built in 1967, and since then Israel has established 32 settlements and the town of Katzrin. After the **annexation** of East Jerusalem following the June War, Israel established a number of large Jewish neighborhoods east of the **Green Line**. As of January 2014, there were 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem inhabited by approximately 344,391 settlers, and the total population of the West Bank including East Jerusalem was about 550,000.

According to *Settlement Watch*, at the end of 2010 the number of settlers in East Jerusalem stood at 198,629, and during the same period there were 19,797 Israeli settlers on the Gaza Strip and 314,132 in the West Bank. Settlements in Jerusalem beyond the Green Line occupy 24,754 *dunums* (a *dunum* is 1,000 square meters or about a quarter of an acre) of land. When in government, both the **Labor Party** and **Likud** pursued a policy of unhindered settlement activity. While Labor focused on establishing Jewish settlements in areas considered vital for Israel's security such as the **Jordan Valley**, Likud sought to promote settlement activities as a means of preventing Palestinian territorial continuity and thereby inhibiting the creation of a Palestinian state. The settlement activities have been promoted by the Israeli government as well as by the Settlement Department of the **Jewish Agency** and the **World Zionist Organization**. In an effort to encourage settlement activities, Israelis living in the **Occupied Territories** have been offered a host of financial subsidies, concessions, tax rebates, and other incentives.

The settlement policy of Israel has remained one of the most controversial issues in the Israel–Palestinian conflict and in Israel's relations with the outside world. The international community, including the **United States**, considers the settlements in the Occupied Territories as a violation of the **Fourth Geneva Convention**. Efforts by various U.S. administrations to freeze the settlements have proved futile and ineffective. In 1992, the Israeli government headed by Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** agreed to a limited and partial settlement freeze in return for $10 billion worth of U.S. **loan guarantees**, but settlement activities continued unhindered. Under the **Declaration of Principles** (DoP) signed with the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, Israel agreed to discuss the question of settlements during the **Per-**

manent **Status Negotiations** with the Palestinians. Even though the negotiations were formally initiated in the summer of 1996, no progress was made on the settlements issue.

On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link **Ma'ale Adumim**, the largest settlement in the West Bank, with Jerusalem. Dismissing petitions challenging the **Gaza Disengagement**, on 9 June 2005 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the Occupied Territories were not legally part of Israel and were "seized" during the June War of 1967. This makes the legal status of the settlements even in the domestic Israeli context questionable. As part of the Gaza disagreement plan completed on 12 September 2005, Israel completely withdrew from the Gaza Strip and evacuated 8,500 Israeli citizens from the 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 in the West Bank. The use of produce from the settlements under the preferential trade agreement has generated tension between Israel and the **European Union**.

There have been periodic acts of **settler violence** against the Palestinians, but since July 2008 this has taken a different turn. Many attacks commonly known as **price tag attacks** have taken place not only against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories but also against Israeli security forces and officials. After the signing of the DoP in September 1993, a number of religious leaders associated with the right wing have been advocating for religious soldiers in the **Israel Defense Forces** to disobey orders to evacuate Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories. Such an order, in their view, contradicts the religious commandments and commitment to **Eretz Israel**.

In 2010 the Knesset approved the bill that demanded a parliamentary majority for any decisions concerning Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. A number of Israeli settlements such as **Ariel** and Ma'ale Adumim lie west of the **security fence** that Israel has been building in the West Bank. This is seen as an effort by Israel to stake claims and formally annex these settlements in any peace agreement with the Palestinians. Between November 2009 and July 2013, Israel–**Palestinian National Authority** peace talks were stalled over the Palestinian demand for a settlement freeze. After the **Protective Edge Operation**, Israel announced plans for the construction of new settlements on over 1,000 acres in the West Bank and the expropriation of 400 hectares of land in the West Bank.

See also AMANA; BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; CLINTON PARAMETERS; EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; GUSH EMUNIM; KERRY PLAN; MIGRON EVACUATION; OUTPOSTS; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); SETTLEMENT LABELING; SHARON PLAN.

SETTLEMENT LABELING. Israel is an associated state of the **European Union** (EU), and an agreement to this effect was signed on 20 November 1995 and came into force on 1 June 2000. The 1975 agreement between

Israel and the EU that falls under the Community's Overall Mediterranean Policy came into force on 1 January 1989, and under this Israel enjoys preferential economic, commercial, technological, and research status with the EU. Israel has been exporting produce and products from the **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** to the EU as Israeli products. This had come under increased criticism as a violation of the **Fourth Geneva Convention** and a misuse of the preferential trade arrangement. In 2010 the Luxemburg-based European Court of Justice ruled that products originating from the **West Bank** (under the **Gaza Disengagement** plan, Israel had pulled out of the **Gaza Strip** in 2005) do not qualify for preferential trade treatment.

In March 2013 a group of European members of parliament called for the suspension of the Association Agreement with Israel over the misuse of the labeling. A month earlier, EU consul-generals in **East Jerusalem** and **Ramallah** recommended explicit labeling of products from the settlements so that they do not benefit from the preferential Israel–EU trade arrangement. This was subsequently accepted by the EU, and the measure was put in place in June 2013.

SETTLER VIOLENCE. Since the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in December 1987, the inhabitants of the Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** have carried out sporadic violent activities against the Palestinians. This has increased considerably since the **Oslo Accords**. The settler violence involves physical attacks, vandalizing Palestinian properties, uprooting of olive trees, and other forms of destruction. There were cases of widespread use of verbal and physical abuse and attacks on Palestinians. Arson attacks on mosques and illegal occupation of private Palestinian properties and lands can be included in this category. The human rights group **B'Tselem** has periodically documented settler violence, but to no avail. The 2011 country report published by the U.S. State Department has defined settler violence as **terrorism**. Israel has rarely prosecuted settler violence, and despite international criticism, Israel has adopted a lackadaisical attitude toward settler violence, which in turn has become a carte blanche for such actions.

See also KIRYAT ARBA; PRICE TAG ATTACKS; TUBA ZANGARIA MOSQUE ATTACK; WARFARE.

SEVEN-POINT ISRAELI PLAN. On 21 October 1985, speaking before the **United Nations** General Assembly shortly after the **Tunis raid**, Israeli prime minister **Shimon Peres** outlined a seven-point peace plan. It called for negotiations between Israel and the Arab states toward concluding peace treaties and resolving the Palestinian issue. Such negotiations would be direct and unconditional and would be based on Security Council **Resolution 242**.

If necessary, it would be supported by a mutually agreed upon international forum to be held within three months. On the sensitive Palestinian question, Peres proposed that negotiations "between Israel and **Jordan** are to be conducted between an Israeli delegation on the one hand and a Jordanian—or a Jordanian–Palestinian—delegation on the other, both comprising delegates that represent peace, not terror." The explicit non-inclusion of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** made the process a non-starter.

Nonetheless, some of the components of the proposal proved useful in subsequent years. The format of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation enabled both Israel and the Palestinians to attend the **Madrid Conference** six years later. Similarly, the Arab states that attended the October 1991 meeting agreed to pursue direct and unconditional negotiations with Israel, based on Resolution 242 and **Resolution 338** of the Security Council.

SÈVRES CONFERENCE. The **nationalization of the Suez Canal** by President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** generated intense diplomatic activities in Europe and elsewhere. At a high-level meeting in the Parisian suburb of Sèvres, **Great Britain**, **France**, and Israel agreed on a plan to launch military attacks against Egypt. Under the formal agreement reached on 23 October 1956, Israel would initiate a limited military operation that would represent "an actual threat" to the **Suez Canal**. Following the Israeli attack, the other powers would issue a time-bound "call" for a cease-fire. The parties anticipated that Egypt would reject the call for a cease-fire while Israeli forces were occupying its territories, and hence Anglo-French forces would attack the canal zone area with the intention of "ensuring freedom of navigation."

The parties set 29 October as D-day for the operations. Britain, because of its interests in the Arab world and colonial possessions in the Persian Gulf, sought to pretend that it was not a party to the Israeli aggression. France was less pretentious about its involvement and operated from bases in Israel. Even though the Sèvres agreement was not made public at the time of the **Suez War**, the veto exercised by Britain and France in the **United Nations** Security Council against a cease-fire proposed by the **United States** confirmed the premeditated nature of the tripartite aggression. Israel's collusion with the imperial powers severely undermined its position among Third World countries and led to its subsequent exclusion from the **Non-Aligned Movement**.

See also CONSTANTINOPLE CONVENTION.

SHALIT AFFAIR. On 25 June 2006 Gilad Shalit (1986–), a soldier in the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), was kidnapped from inside Israel by militants belonging to **Hamas**. A group of militants entered Israel close to the kibbutz

of Karen Shalom on Israel's border with the **Gaza Strip**, attacked a military post, and kidnapped the soldier. Two Palestinians and two Israeli soldiers were killed in the attack. For the next five years, Shalit remained under captivity of the Palestinian militant group. Besides imposing and strengthening the **Siege of Gaza**, Israel unsuccessfully tried to rescue him through the **Summer Rains Operation** and the **Cast Lead Operation**. A number of players including **Egypt**, **France** (Shalit is a dual citizen and also holds a French passport), **Germany**, and former U.S. president **Jimmy Carter** tried to resolve the issue diplomatically.

Modeling on the successful **Four Mothers Movement**, the Shalit family organized a strong public campaign for his release. Shalit was eventually released by Hamas on 18 October 2011 as part of a **prisoner exchange** arrangement. In return for his freedom, Israel agreed to release 1,027 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. While 477 were released in October, 550 were freed in December 2011. Most of the freed prisoners belonged to Hamas, even though at one point Hamas was demanding the release of **Fatah** leader **Marwan Hasib Ibrahim Barghouti**.

The agreement, which happened shortly after the overthrow of President **Hosni Mubarak**, was seen as a positive outcome of the unfolding political situation in the wake of the **Arab Spring in Egypt**. Though Shalit was not the first IDF soldier to be kidnapped by the Palestinian militants since the outbreak of the **First Intifada**, he was the first one to be freed alive. All other soldiers who were kidnapped since Avi Sasportas in February 1989 were killed by the captors.

See also PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; WARFARE.

SHAMIR, YITZHAK (1915–2012). Right-wing Israeli politician Yitzhak Shamir twice served as prime minister, during 1983–1984 and 1986–1992. Born Yitzhak Yzernitzky in Poland on 15 October 1915, he joined the Revisionist youth movement Betar at the age of 14. In 1935, he left Warsaw and made **Aliya** to Palestine. Two years later, he joined the Revisionist underground organization **Irgun**. In 1940, Shamir joined with Avraham Stern (1907–1942) and formed the Irgun splinter group called the **Stern Gang**, which was held responsible for a number of acts of **terrorism** and **assassinations**, including the killing of **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) in September 1948. After the establishment of Israel, Shamir joined the secret service and held senior positions in the Mossad, the agency responsible for external intelligence.

In 1970, Shamir joined the Herut Party headed by **Menachem Begin** and was elected to the Knesset in 1973, a position he held until 1996. Following the victory of **Likud** in 1977, he became the Speaker of the Knesset and then served as foreign minister from 1980 to 1983. In the wake of Begin's resignation in October 1983, Shamir became prime minister. Under the national

unity government (1984–1990) with the opposition **Labor Party**, he first served as foreign minister (1984–1988) and later as prime minister (1986–1988). He continued in that post after the Labor Party left the government in March 1990.

Adopting an uncompromising position toward the **Palestine Liberation Organization**, Shamir strongly opposed various peace efforts undertaken by the **United States** during the 1980s. Bowing to international pressure, in 1989 he outlined a five-year transitional arrangement for the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories** known as the **Shamir Plan**. The plan bogged down due to differences over the participation of **Jerusalem Palestinians**. Shamir also vetoed the **London Agreement** that Foreign Minister **Shimon Peres** had worked out with King **Hussein** of **Jordan**.

During the **Kuwait War**, as **Iraq** was firing Scud missiles at Israel, Shamir reversed the traditional Israeli policy of retaliation and decided not to respond to the missile attacks. At the end of the war, he led Israel to the **Madrid Conference**, which began on 30 October 1991. Toward the end of his tenure, Shamir was involved in a bitter controversy with the United States over **loan guarantees** and severely undermined Israel's relations with Washington. After Likud lost the 1992 Knesset elections, Shamir stepped down from the party leadership and in 1996 retired from the Knesset. In 1998 Shamir resigned from Likud and briefly supported the political party Herut started by Benjamin Begin (1943–). He returned to Likud and during the 2001 elections supported **Ariel Sharon**. After suffering from Alzheimer's disease, he died on 30 June 2012 and was buried in the national cemetery in Mount Herzl in **Jerusalem**.

See also BAKER PLAN; BUS 300 AFFAIR; CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; FIRST INTIFADA (1987–1993); JORDAN IS PALESTINE; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); RABIN PLAN.

SHAMIR PLAN. Against the background of increased international criticism over Israel's handling of the **First Intifada**, Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Shamir** met U.S. president George H. W. Bush (1924–) and Secretary of State **James A**. **Baker** in Washington, D.C., in April 1989 and outlined a four-point plan. It called for the **Camp David Accords** to be the foundation of the peace process; the ending of Arab hostility and belligerency against Israel; multilateral efforts to resolve the problem of Arab **refugees**; and the election of Palestinian delegates to "negotiate an interim period of self-governing administration."

The Shamir Plan was rejected by Chairman **Yasser Arafat** as well as by Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories**, who viewed it as an attempt to circumvent the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO). Since the whole process was based on the Camp David Accords, the plan, if implemented, would give personal and not territorial autonomy to Palestinian residents. It

also raised a number of unresolved questions, such as whether elections would be municipal or political, the provision of international supervision, the size of the Self-Governing Authority, and the linkage between the interim and final settlement.

On 14 May 1989, the Israeli cabinet approved a modified version of the Shamir Plan. Among other things, it declared that there would be no Palestinian state; that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO; that there would be no change in the status of the Occupied Territories; that there would be a five-year transition period of "interim agreement" followed by a "permanent solution"; and that during this transition period Palestinians would have self-rule while Israel would retain control over defense, foreign affairs, and "all matters pertaining to Israeli citizens" living in the Occupied Territories. The Knesset approved the plan a couple of days later. The following month, 95 U.S. senators signed a letter addressed to Secretary Baker urging the administration to be "fully supportive" of the Israeli initiative. However, endorsing the position of the PLO that elections should be held only after Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, the Casablanca **Arab League** summit rejected the Israeli initiative in May 1989.

Meanwhile, Shamir's own **Likud** Party was opposed to the plan and sought to tighten it by bringing in additional restrictions concerning the Palestinian elections. In July, the Likud Central Committee demanded that **East Jerusalem** Arabs be excluded from the electoral process and that the uprising cease before negotiations began. Such conditions were rejected by the Israeli cabinet, which resolved to continue with the 14 May initiative, but to no avail.

See also BAKER PLAN; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); PLO LAW; RABIN PLAN; SHULTZ PLAN; UNITED STATES.

SHARM AL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM. On 4 September 1999, Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** and Palestinian chairman **Yasser Arafat** signed this agreement at the Sharm al-Sheikh resort in **Egypt**. Witnessed by U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright (1937–), President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt**, and King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**, it paved the way for the implementation of the **Wye Memorandum** of October 1998. In Sharm al-Sheikh, both sides agreed on a further Israeli **redeployment** from 11 percent of the **Occupied Territories** in a two-phase withdrawal, and on transferring areas from full or partial Israeli control to full or partial Palestinian control, to be implemented in three stages: on 5 September 1999, to transfer 7 percent from Area C to Area B; on 15 November 1999, to transfer 2 percent from Area B to Area A and 3 percent from Area C to Area B; and on 20 January 2000, to transfer 1 percent from Area C to Area A and 5.1 percent from Area B to Area A.

No official map was attached to the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum, and Israel was given the discretion to determine the specific areas from which it would withdraw. The agreement further stipulated that Israel would release about 350 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails, open a safe passage between the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip** to become operational from 1 October, and commence the **Permanent Status Negotiations** on 13 September 1999. It called for a framework for a permanent settlement to be reached by February 2000 and a final peace agreement by September 2000. Israel completed the first stage of its withdrawal on 10 September 1999. After protracted negotiations and differences, on 21 March 2000 Israel redeployed from another 6.1 percent of the Occupied Territories.

See also TABA AGREEMENT; UNITED STATES.

SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (1996). In 1996, Israel was reeling from a spate of **suicide attacks** carried out by **Hamas** militants, which began on 25 February. These attacks were in response to the killing of Yahya Ayyash (1966–1996) in early January. Popularly known as "the Engineer," he was suspected of involvement in terrorist violence. In the wave of violence in late February, as many as 59 Israelis were killed and nearly 200 injured in four suicide attacks in **Jerusalem**, Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv. These attacks not only eroded the popularity of the **Shimon Peres** government but also instilled a sense of fear among ordinary Israelis over their personal safety. In order to shore up public support for the Israeli government that was facing renewed domestic challenges from the right and to provide a political response to the militant campaign, the **United States** sought to organize a summit meeting at the Sharm al-Sheikh resort in **Egypt**.

Presented as the "Summit of Peace Makers," this meeting was attended by a number of world leaders, including U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, President Jacques Chirac (1932–) of **France**, King **Hussein** of **Jordan**, Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1930–) of **Germany**, Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin (1938–) of **Russia**, Prime Minister John Major (1943–) of **Great Britain**, **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat**, and representatives from 13 Arab states. On 13 May 1996, the leaders vowed not to allow **terrorism** to scuttle the hopes of the peoples of the Middle East for peace. The international support, however, did not prevent the defeat of Peres and the election of **Benjamin Netanyahu** of **Likud** as prime minister in May 1996.

SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (2000). In 2000, the intensification of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** was torpedoing the slow and painstaking gains made since the **Madrid Conference**. In a bid to stem the cycle of violence, on 17 October President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt** hosted a summit in Sharm al-

Sheikh attended by U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak**, Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat**, and King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**. All of the participants agreed to work toward controlling violence. The meeting agreed to appoint a fact-finding committee to look into the causes of the violence and to suggest ways of renewing the peace process. As a follow-up on 7 November, Clinton appointed a three-member committee headed by former senator George Mitchell (1933–).

See also MITCHELL COMMITTEE REPORT.

SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (2005). Within days after his election as the president of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), **Mahmoud Abbas** held a summit meeting with Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** in Sharm al-Sheikh on 8 February 2005. Hosted by President **Hosni Mubarak** of **Egypt**, it was also attended by King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**. Following their deliberations, Sharon and Abbas declared a joint cease-fire and renewed a call for reducing the violence that had been raging since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000. Sharon also agreed to coordinate the **Gaza Disengagement** with the PNA. Furthermore, both sides agreed to set up four committees to implement confidence-building measures, including prisoner release, responding to problems of **deportees**, and improving Israeli–Palestinian coordination. Egypt and Jordan decided to return ambassadors to Israel.

SHARON, ARIEL (1928–2014). Known as "Arik" to his admirers, Ariel Sharon was a colorful but controversial Israeli politician who served as prime minister from March 2001 to January 2006. Born on 27 February 1928 in Kfar Malal in **Mandate Palestine**, he joined the **Haganah** in 1945 at the tender age of 14. During the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, he commanded an infantry company. After the war, he joined the newly established **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF). In 1953, Sharon founded and led **Unit 101**, a special commando force that conducted a series of retaliatory operations against Palestinian guerrillas who were operating from **Jordan**. In one such attack, known as the **Qibya raid** in October 1953, 12 Jordanian soldiers and 60 civilians were killed. The operation, which was carried out over the opposition of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett (1894–1965), reduced the level of infiltrations from Jordan.

In 1956, Sharon was appointed commander of a paratrooper brigade and fought in the **Suez War**. Afterward, he held various senior positions in the IDF, including head of the Southern Command, but he was never made the chief of staff, apparently due to his right-wing political leanings. Disappointed at the treatment meted out by the **Mapai** leadership, Sharon retired from the IDF in 1973. When the **October War of 1973** broke out, however,

he returned to active military duty and commanded an armored division. His small unit successfully crossed the **Suez Canal** and encircled the Third Army of **Egypt**.

In December 1973, Sharon was elected to the Knesset, but he soon resigned his seat and briefly served as security adviser to Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**. During the 1977 Knesset elections, he played an active role in the victory of **Likud** and served as minister of agriculture under Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**. During this time, he promoted the **Sharon Plan** toward annexing most of the **West Bank**.

Sharon became defense minister in 1981, and in that capacity Sharon bulldozed the cabinet into agreeing to his military operations against the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) in **Lebanon**, which eventually resulted in the June 1982 Israeli invasion known as the **Peace for Galilee Operation**. The war, especially the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre**, made Sharon extremely unpopular both inside and outside the country. The **Kahan Commission**, which looked into the massacre, concluded that Sharon should not be given any "sensitive" positions in the government again. As a result, from 1983 to 1990, he held minor portfolios in government; in 1990, he became minister of construction and housing under **Yitzhak Shamir**.

In the aftermath of the victory of **Benjamin Netanyahu** in 1996, Sharon returned to prominence. He became minister of national infrastructure and, following a cabinet crisis in October 1998, was made foreign minister. In that capacity, he attended the peace negotiations in the **United States** and played a critical role in the conclusion of the **Wye Memorandum**. The defeat of Netanyahu in the May 1999 elections saw the emergence of Sharon as the leader of Likud. In February 2001 he defeated **Ehud Barak** in the elections, and on 7 March he became prime minister. After a series of cabinet crises, he ordered a snap poll in January 2003 and returned to power.

Throughout his political career, Sharon pursued an aggressive **settlement** policy in the **Occupied Territories**. With the explicit intention of breaking up the territorial continuity of any future Palestinian entity, he established Jewish settlements within the vicinity of Palestinian population centers. Vehemently opposed to the **Oslo Process** and the creation of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), Sharon maintained his opposition to directly negotiating with Chairman **Yasser Arafat**. In their brief meeting during the Wye Plantation negotiations in October 1998—the only occasion when the archrivals ever met—Sharon refused to shake hands with Arafat even in private. His controversial visit to the **Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount** on 28 September 2000 sparked off the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**.

In the wake of increased violence and **suicide attacks**, as Prime Minister Sharon initiated the **Siege of Ramallah** in March 2002 and publicly regretted that he had not killed the Palestinian leader during the Lebanese operations

when the IDF encircled and eventually forced Arafat to leave Lebanon in 1982. Pressured by the United States, he reluctantly avoided physically harming or expelling Arafat from **Ramallah**.

Such restraint, however, was not extended to others. After assuming office in 2001, Sharon stepped up the military campaign against suspected Palestinian militants in the Occupied Territories and elsewhere. His policy of **targeted killing** was partly responsible for the failure of the **Cairo Dialogue**, wherein **Hamas** and the PNA were negotiating a limited and conditional suspension of suicide attacks against Israel. Clearly departing from past Israeli practice, Sharon targeted political as well as military leaders of Hamas, and this resulted in the **assassinations** of **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** and **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi**. In a bid to reduce violence, in June 2002 Sharon authorized the construction of a controversial **security fence** in the West Bank. In the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit (2005)**, Sharon and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** declared a joint cease-fire, but a month later, however, Sharon approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link **Ma'ale Adumim** in the West Bank with **Jerusalem**.

Because of the growing violence in the **Gaza Strip** and the precarious nature of the Jewish settlements there, in May 2004, with the backing of U.S. president **George W. Bush**, Sharon offered the **Gaza Disengagement**. This plan, received with skepticism by the Palestinians and others, exhibits a different side of Sharon. Though an architect of settlement activities, Sharon was instrumental in completing the Israeli withdrawal from the **Sinai Peninsula** as required under the **Camp David Accords**. As defense minister in April 1982, he presided over the demolition of the last Israeli settlement in Yamit. Sharon's right-wing critics thus perceived the Gaza Disengagement as a reenactment of the Yamit example. Similarly, in 1997 Sharon played a central role in resolving tensions with Jordan following the **Masha'al Affair**, when Israeli agents sought to assassinate the leader of Hamas in Jordan.

In November 2005, protracted internal tensions and schism within Likud resulted in Sharon's leaving the party and creating a new centrist party called **Kadima** ("Forward"), which attracted sizable support from former Likud members as well as Labor Party members such as **Shimon Peres**. On 6 January, amid the Knesset election campaign, Sharon suffered a massive stroke and entered into a permanent vegetative state, and his responsibilities were transferred to his deputy, **Ehud Olmert**. After being in a comatose stage for over eight years, Sharon died on 11 January 2014 and was buried at his family farm in the Negev.

See also BELGIUM LAW; EVACUATION COMPENSATION BILL; RIVLIN, REUVEN (1939–); VILLAGE LEAGUE.

SHARON PLAN. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, **Likud** leader **Ariel Sharon** advocated a plan that would facilitate an Israeli **annexation** of most of the **West Bank**. In contrast to the **Allon Plan**, which preferred Jewish **settlement** in areas along the **Jordan Valley** vital for Israeli security, Sharon sought to hasten settlements on the mountain plateau before any conclusion of the **Autonomy Plan** of Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**. Both as agricultural minister (June 1977–August 1981) and later as defense minister (August 1981–February 1983), Sharon pursued settlement activities that sought to keep enclaves of Palestinian population centers outside of Israeli control. Even though the plan did not explicitly call for the **annexation** of the entire West Bank, it rejected any territorial compromise regarding the **Occupied Territories**.

See also GAZA DISENGAGEMENT.

SHAS. The Sfaradim HaOlamit Shomrei, known more widely by its Hebrew acronym "Shas," is an orthodox religious party in Israel. Unlike the *haredi parties*, Shas takes part in the Israeli government, and its members serve as full cabinet ministers. Its rejection of the state symbols is less rigid than the *haredi* parties, and hence Shas can be described more as a non-Zionist than an anti-Zionist party. Shas is the first successful ethnic party in Israel, and its constituency is largely Sephardim or Jewish immigrants from Arab and Islamic countries. Prolonged neglect and domination by the Ashkenazi leadership of the *haredi* community resulted in the formation of Shas. Renowned torah scholar and former Sephardic chief rabbi Ovadia Yosef (1920–2013) founded Shas in 1984 on the eve of the 11th Knesset elections. Since then the party has emerged as a dominant political force in Israel.

In one of his religious rulings, Rabbi Yosef observed that saving lives was more important than **Occupied Territories**, and this moderate religious position helped Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** in pursuing the **Oslo Accords** and concluding the **Declaration of Principles**. In later years, especially in the wake of a spate of **terrorism** and the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Shas has moved to the right. Rabbi Yosef received rebukes over some of his controversial remarks against the Palestinians and their leadership. In 2013, Shas joined hands with **United Torah Judaism** and refused to join the government headed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** due to differences over **conscription**.

See also ZIONISM.

SHAW COMMISSION. In September 1929, Sir Walter Shaw (1863–1937) was appointed to head a commission to inquire into the **Western Wall Riots**. The report attributed the violence to Arab apprehensions over **Aliya** and land purchases by the Zionists. In the commission's view, the Arab–Jewish con-

flict was rooted in the contradictory promises by **Great Britain** to both communities. Among other things, it called on the British government to clearly articulate its policy, including its measures to safeguard the interests of the non-Jewish majority in Mandate Palestine.

See also BALFOUR DECLARATION; HUSSEIN–MCMAHON COR-RESPONDENCE; LEAGUE OF NATIONS; ZIONISM.

SHEBA'A FARMS. Located on the triborder of **Syria**, **Lebanon**, and Israel, the status of this 25-square-kilometer enclave remains controversial. Following Israel's **Lebanese withdrawal** in May 2000, **Hezbollah** and the Lebanese government demanded an Israeli withdrawal from Sheba'a Farms. However, Israel maintains that this Syrian territory was captured along with the **Golan Heights** during the **June War of 1967**, and hence its fate can be decided only in the Israeli–Syrian negotiations. Based on the maps of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**, the **United Nations** endorsed the Israeli position that Sheba'a Farms was a Syrian territory at the time of the June War. The Arab states and Hezbollah maintain that Syria "transferred" Sheba'a Farms to Lebanese control after the June War. Since the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has periodically carried out limited military operations in the disputed enclave. The kidnapping of two **Israel Defense Forces** soldiers near the farms on 12 July 2006 led to the **Second Lebanon War**, which lasted for 34 days.

See also SECURITY ZONE; SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA).

SHEPHERDSTOWN TALKS. On 3 January 2000, senior leaders of Israel and **Syria** met in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for talks. In the presence of U.S. president **Bill Clinton**, Israeli prime minister **Ehud Barak** and Syrian foreign minister Farouq al-Shara (1938–) met and held talks. The Israeli–Syrian negotiations were stalled since early 1996 after **Likud** leader **Benjamin Netanyahu** was elected prime minister. They were resumed only when Barak and al-Shara had met in Washington, D.C., on 15 December 1999. The Shepherdstown Talks failed to make progress due to the Syrian insistence on prior Israeli commitments regarding a complete withdrawal from the **Golan Heights**.

See also GREEN LINE; ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF); SEA OF GALILEE; UNITED STATES.

***SHIP OF RETURN* AFFAIR.** In early 1988, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) planned to organize the return of Palestinians who were deported by Israel as a symbolic move to highlight their plight. On 15 February, the *Ship of Return*, which was to take on a small number of deportees, was sabotaged and crippled at Limasol, Cyprus. A day earlier, three PLO

functionaries who had purchased the vessel on behalf of the PLO were killed in the same port city. Both of these activities were attributed to Israeli commando raids.

See also DEPORTATION.

SHULTZ PLAN. On 4 March 1988, U.S. secretary of state George Shultz (1920–) sent a formal letter to Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir** outlining a new American initiative to resolve the Palestinian problem. Prior to this, he held discussions with the leaders of Israel, **Egypt**, and **Syria**; the Palestinians had boycotted his planned meeting with them on 26 February in **East Jerusalem**. According to Shultz's proposal, negotiations between Israel and its neighbors would start on 1 May and would be based on **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the **United Nations** Security Council. Two weeks before negotiations commenced, an international conference would be held at the invitation of the UN secretary-general, which would not impose solutions or veto agreements among the parties.

The key component of the Shultz Plan was the negotiations between Israel and a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation, to conclude within six months an agreement for a five-year interim autonomy. The Palestinians rejected the proposal. Israel's national unity government (1984–1990) was divided over the Shultz Plan, and Prime Minister Shamir's opposition revolved around the idea of an international conference and his insistence on an Israeli veto over the Palestinian representation. Differences between the coalition partners in the national unity government precluded any decision concerning the plan. Suggesting modifications, on 29 March 1988 Israel countered the Shultz Plan with the six-point **Shamir Plan**.

See also BAKER PLAN; LABOR PARTY; MUBARAK PLAN (1985); MUBARAK PLAN (1989); PLO LAW; RABIN PLAN.

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY. At the end of the **October War of 1973**, U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–) shuttled between Israel and various Arab capitals in the hope of reaching **disengagement agreements** between Israel and its neighbors. These efforts resulted in the **Sinai I Agreement** signed with **Egypt** on 18 January 1974. That was followed by a similar agreement between Israel and Syria concluded on 31 May 1974. In subsequent years, shuttle diplomacy has become the pattern for engagements between the **United States** and countries of the Middle East toward reaching agreements, especially after a cycle of violence or toward peacemaking efforts.

See also MADRID CONFERENCE; SINAI II AGREEMENT.

SIEGE OF BETHLEHEM. As part of its **Defensive Shield Operation** on 29 March 2002, Israeli tanks moved into the town of **Bethlehem** in the **West Bank**, and in the ensuing fighting on 2 April, more than 100 Palestinian policemen and militants, mostly Muslims, took refuge in the Church of the Nativity, along with clerics and non-combatants. Israeli troops encircled the church and launched a prolonged siege, which continued until 10 May. Under a plan worked out by the **European Union** and the **United States**, the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) agreed to transfer 26 gunmen who were holed up in the church to the **Gaza Strip**, and the 13 other higher-level cadres to permanent exile in various European states. The willingness of PNA chairman **Yasser Arafat** to comply with the Israeli demand for **deportation** evoked strong criticism among the Palestinians.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2005); WARFARE.

SIEGE OF GAZA. Israel imposed a land and naval blockade on the **Gaza Strip** in June 2007 following the **Battle of Gaza**, which had resulted in the Gaza takeover by the militant Palestinian Islamic group **Hamas**. This was different from the periodic restrictions imposed by Israel upon the Gaza Strip since the **First Intifada**, or from the limitations imposed on the movement of goods and products from and to the Gaza Strip following the **Oslo Accords** and the establishment of the **Palestinian National Authority**. Those earlier measures were Israeli responses to acts of **terrorism** within the **Green Line** carried out by various Palestinian groups.

The Gaza siege followed Israel's unilateral **Gaza Disengagement** and was severe and hermetic in nature. Israel has imposed a complete blockade of the Strip as a means of fighting Hamas, but this has been occasionally relaxed due to international pressures and demands. The blockade was made possible because of the tacit cooperation extended by **Egypt** under President **Hosni Mubarak**, which limited access into the Gaza Strip from the **Sinai Peninsula** through the **Rafah Crossing**. There are reports of starvation and a shortage of medicine and other harmful effects on the population.

The prolongation of the blockade resulted in a number of international protest groups aimed exclusively at ending the siege, and these include the **Free Gaza Movement**, the **Freedom Flotilla**, and **Fly-in** protests. The blockade intensified the construction of new underground **tunnels** between the Strip and the **Sinai Peninsula**, which are used to bring in foods and other essential commodities. Occasionally the tunnels are also used to smuggle weapons to various militant groups operating in the Gaza Strip. In June 2010 Israel approved a new policy whereby it agreed to allow all non-military or dual-use items into Gaza. The situation in the Gaza Strip improved slightly after President **Mohammed Morsi** relaxed the Rafah Crossing. A complete

end to the Siege of Gaza was one of the preconditions set by **Recep Tayyip Erdogan**, the prime minister of **Turkey**, for the return of the Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; BOYCOTT, DISINVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS (BDS); CROSSING POINTS; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); IHH; *MAVI MARMARA* AFFAIR; PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; SINAI VIOLENCE; WARFARE.

SIEGE OF RAMALLAH. Against the backdrop of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, on 4 December 2001 Israeli tanks encircled and fired on the official headquarters of **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat** in **Ramallah** in the **West Bank**. A few days later, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** declared that the Palestinian leader was "irrelevant" to the political process. Earlier, Israel had disabled the helicopter fleet of Arafat stationed in Gaza City. On 29 March 2002, Israel laid a siege of Arafat's headquarters that lasted intermittently until October 2004. Sharon also prevented Arafat from attending the Christmas celebrations in **Bethlehem** in December 2002, and his determination to stop Arafat from returning to Ramallah prevented the Palestinian leader from attending the Beirut **Arab League** summit in March 2003. The siege continued until October 2004, when Arafat was shifted to Paris for medical treatment. On 11 November 2004, Arafat succumbed to his illness, and the following day he was buried at his Ramallah headquarters.

See also ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; WARFARE.

SINAI I AGREEMENT. With the **shuttle diplomacy** mediation of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–), on 18 January 1974 Israel and **Egypt** signed the Sinai I Agreement regarding the disengagement of both of their armies from the **Sinai Peninsula**. While Israel was allowed to retain its control of the Mitla and Gidi Passes, Egypt agreed to restrict its military presence east of the **Suez Canal** to 7,000 troops and 30 tanks. This separate agreement between Egypt and Israel formally ended Egypt's pre-war military alliance with **Syria**. As part of the agreement, the **United States** was able to persuade the Arab states to end their oil embargo against the West imposed during the **October War of 1973**.

In January 1974 Israel and Egypt concluded an agreement that paved the way for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the eastern banks of the Suez Canal. Under the new armistice line, Israel withdrew 32 kilometers east of the canal, which eventually resulted in the reopening of the Suez Canal in June 1975. As part of the agreement brokered by Kissinger, Egypt also agreed to restore diplomatic relations with the United States, which were broken off in 1973. On 4 September 1975, Israel and Egypt concluded a second agreement on

Sinai, the **Sinai II Agreement**, which paved the way for further Israeli withdrawals east of the Mitla and Gidi Passes, as well as from the oil fields in the Gulf of Suez.

See also MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO); OIL CRISIS; UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II).

SINAI II AGREEMENT. On 4 September 1975, **Egypt** and Israel signed the Sinai II Agreement in Geneva, helped by the intensive **shuttle diplomacy** of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–). The agreement consisted of three published agreements and four secret documents. The accords widened the buffer zone between the two countries created by the **Sinai I Agreement**, and Egypt formally renounced the use of force against Israel. Of the secret appendixes, one pledged Egypt to the construction of an early warning station by the **United States** in the **Sinai Peninsula** and American assurance of consultation in the event of an Israeli violation. The remaining three, comprising the **Israel–U.S. Memorandum of Understanding**, concerned promises to Israel of American assistance in maintaining Israel's military superiority, a guaranteed supply of oil in the event of an Egyptian embargo against Israel, and an American commitment not to recognize or negotiate with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** until the latter recognized Israel's right to exist.

See also OCTOBER WAR OF 1973.

SINAI PENINSULA. Surrounded by the Gulf of Suez and the **Suez Canal** in the west, the **Gulf of Aqaba** in the east, and the Mediterranean Sea in the north, the Sinai Peninsula links the continents of Asia and Africa. Spread over 53,000 square kilometers, this territory of **Egypt** was briefly occupied by Israel during the **Suez War** in 1956 and was returned to Egypt in 1957 under pressure from the **United States**. Israel recaptured the Sinai in the **June War of 1967** but completely withdrew from the peninsula in April 1982 following the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**. During its occupation of the Sinai, Israel depended on the Abu Rudeis oil fields in the Sinai Desert for nearly 50 percent of its oil needs.

See also EILAT TERROR ATTACK; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); FRANCE; GREAT BRITAIN; NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL; SECURITY FENCE/S; SINAI I AGREEMENT; SINAI II AGREEMENT; SINAI VIOLENCE; TABA; TABA TERROR ATTACK; TERRORISM; TUNNELS.

SINAI VIOLENCE. Since the fall of President **Hosni Mubarak** on 11 February 2011, the **Sinai Peninsula** has witnessed a number of violent attacks against the security forces of **Egypt** as well as Israel. Police stations

and security posts in the Sinai have come under repeated attack by militants belonging to various Bedouin groups. Though similar attacks had happened in the past, both the number and intensity have increased since the outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Egypt**. Pipelines, which carry Egyptian gas exports to Israel and **Jordan**, have repeatedly come under attack. While the **gas deal** with Israel was terminated in 22 April 2012 due to economic and political reasons, supplies to Jordan have been frequently disrupted, causing an energy shortage and hardship to its citizens.

The violence has been fueled by the smuggling of arms into the **Gaza Strip** through the underground **tunnels** operated by various Palestinian militant groups. The attacks on, and kidnapping of, Egyptian security personnel created tension between President **Mohammed Morsi** and the security establishment and partly contributed to his overthrow by the military on 3 July 2013. As a means of controlling lawlessness, the Egyptian military has imposed harsher restrictions upon the **Rafah Crossing** and has demolished a number of underground tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The continuing violence in the Sinai has contributed to a dampening of relations between the **Hamas**-ruled Gaza and the post-Mubarak leadership in Egypt. Partly to insulate itself from this situation, Israel has built a new 230-kilometer **security fence** along the 1923 borders between the two countries, and the $270 million project was completed in January 2013.

See also EILAT TERROR ATTACK; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); GAZA DISENGAGEMENT; WARFARE.

SINAI WAR. *See* SUEZ WAR.

SIX-DAY WAR. *See* JUNE WAR OF 1967.

SOUTH AFRICA. Israel's relationship with South Africa has been a troubled one. When South Africa was under the **apartheid** regime, the relations were close and friendly. In 1947 South Africa voted in favor of the **Partition Plan**, recognized Israel on 24 May 1948, and established diplomatic relations in early 1949. Partly due to their isolation in their immediate neighborhood, since the late 1960s both countries have forged closer cooperation in the military-security and nuclear arenas.

Following the **October War of 1973** and the intensification of the **Arab Boycott of Israel**, countries belonging to the **Non-Aligned Movement** began drawing a parallel between the apartheid regime in South Africa and Israel. This culminated in **Resolution 3379** adopted by the **United Nations** General Assembly in November 1975, which described **Zionism** as racism. The resolution, however, was annulled in December 1991 shortly after the end of the Cold War and the opening of the **Madrid Conference**.

The end of South Africa's apartheid regime in 1994 substantially altered Israel's diplomatic fortunes, and South Africa emerged as the principal supporter of the Palestinian cause in the UN and other international and regional forums. In February 1995, it established full diplomatic relations with the State of Palestine, and its leaders, including Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) and Desmond Tutu (1931–), have been highly critical of many Israeli policies, including **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**.

In recent years a number of activists and campaigners, including former U.S. president **Jimmy Carter**, have drawn a parallel between apartheid and the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. Many have described the **security fence** against the Palestinian territories as an apartheid wall. South Africa hosted the **Durban Conference** against racism in 2001 during which Arab and Islamic countries unsuccessfully sought to resurrect the 1975 UN resolution on Zionism. Many South African institutions have been active in the **academic boycott** of Israel and the **Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions** campaign.

SOUTH LEBANESE ARMY (SLA). The origin of this right-wing Christian militia force, which operated in southern **Lebanon** for more than two decades, can be traced to the **Litani Operation** of 1978 carried out by Israel against **Palestine Liberation Organization** bases in Lebanon. In June 1978, the **Israel Defense Forces** withdrew from southern Lebanon except for a long strip of land between Naqoura on the Mediterranean Coast and Mount Hermon, and they placed this enclave under the control of Major Sa'ad Haddad (1936–1984) who headed the Free Lebanon Army. In May 1980, the force came to be known as the South Lebanese Army. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, known as the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, the SLA closely cooperated with the IDF and took control of Israel's self-declared **security zone** when Israel partially pulled out of Lebanon. After Haddad's death in 1984, Maj. Antoine Lahad (1929–) succeeded him.

The SLA was armed, trained, paid, funded, and supplied by Israel. The members of the SLA and their families were provided easy access to Israeli markets as well as employment opportunities. On the eve of its unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal**, Israel left a quantity of arms and ammunition as a "farewell gift"; however, this proved insufficient to prevent the SLA's quick disintegration after the Israeli pullout. At the time of the May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, Israel absorbed about 6,000 members of the SLA, including its leader Lahad, while about 1,500 fighters surrendered to **Hezbollah** and the Lebanese police.

See also WARFARE.

SOVIET PROPOSAL. Sidelined by its exclusion from the interim agreement between Israel and **Egypt** following the **October War of 1973** and the lack of progress in the **Geneva Conference (1973)**, on 7 October 1976, the **Soviet Union** outlined a four-point proposal for the Middle East. It called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967; recognition and realization of Palestinian rights to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; recognition of the existence and security of all states including Israel through international guarantees; and cessation of the state of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The reluctance of the principal players—Egypt, Israel, and the **United States**—to agree to any Soviet involvement in the peace efforts hindered progress on the proposal.

See also RESOLUTION 242.

SOVIET UNION. *See* RUSSIA.

SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR JERUSALEM. On 6 May 1948, the **United Nations** General Assembly formally asked the **Mandate** power to appoint "before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews" as a special municipal commissioner for **Jerusalem**. With the cooperation of both communities, he was to "carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission." **Great Britain** appointed Harold Evens (1886–1977) as the commissioner, but he never had a chance to take up his duties due to the outbreak of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**.

See also DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC); PARTITION PLAN.

ST. JAMES CONFERENCE. On 7 February 1939, **Great Britain** organized this roundtable conference in London, which sought to secure the Zionist acceptance of the need for an Arab agreement on future **Aliya** to **Mandate Palestine**. Pending a compromise formula, it delayed the publication of the **MacDonald White Paper**, which formally repudiated British commitments to the **Balfour Declaration**. The Arab leaders who attended the conference included **Hajj Amin Al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, as well as more moderate leaders from the Arab National Defense Party of the Nashashibis. The Arabs, however, refused to meet the Jews, since they did not recognize the **Jewish Agency**. Thus, the British were forced to meet with both delegations separately. The outbreak of World War II (1939–1945) precluded any progress.

See also ZIONISM.

STATE OF PALESTINE. Since the end of the **Mandate** in May 1948, the Palestinians have declared independence on two occasions. In September 1948, **Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of **Jerusalem**, proclaimed the **All Palestine Government**. It was recognized by all the Arab countries except **Jordan**, but the attempt soon fizzled out. Similarly, amid the **First Intifada**, on 15 November 1988, the **Algiers Declaration** proclaimed the State of Palestine. Though recognized by more than a hundred countries, mostly those belonging to the **Non-Aligned Movement**, it lacked all the attributes of a state.

Under the **Declaration of Principles** signed between Israel and the **Palestine Liberation Organization** on 13 September 1993, the final status of the **Occupied Territories** was to be resolved by September 1999. As the deadline neared, **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman **Yasser Arafat** threatened to again unilaterally declare statehood, but he was dissuaded by the international community from such an action. On 12 March 2002, the **United Nations** Security Council unanimously adopted (with **Syria** abstaining) Resolution 1397 sponsored by the **United States**, which for the first time affirmed the "vision" of a Palestinian state.

On 29 November 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/ 19, which granted non-member **observer state** status to Palestine. This was endorsed by 138 votes to 9, with 41 abstentions and 5 absences. Along with Israel, the United States and Canada voted against the resolution, while Australia, **Germany**, and **Great Britain** abstained. A number of **European Union** countries, including **France**, voted for the resolution. Subsequently on 5 January 2013, **Mahmoud Abbas** issued a presidential decree renaming the PNA as the State of Palestine.

STERN GANG. The Stern Group—also referred to as Lehi (short for Lohamei Herut Yisrael, "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel") and known to **Great Britain** as the Stern Gang—was a **Jewish Underground** force that broke away from **Irgun**. Founded by Avraham Stern (1907–1942) in 1940, the Stern Gang was held responsible for a number of violent anti-British terror attacks both inside and outside the **Mandate Palestine**. The mainstream **Yishuv** leadership, as represented by the **Jewish Agency** and its military arm **Haganah**, as well as Irgun, was critical of Stern.

In February 1942, the British killed Stern, and other leaders were rounded up. However, a three-member team comprising Nathan Friedmann-Yelling (1913–1980), Yitzhak Yzernitsky (later **Yitzhak Shamir**), and Israel Scheib (Eldad) (1910–1996) took over the leadership of the Stern Gang and pursued a policy of **assassination** and **terrorism**. Members of the Stern Gang assassinated British minister for Middle Eastern Affairs Lord Moyne (1880–1944) in Cairo on 6 November 1944. The group was also responsible for a number

of attacks against British interests in Palestine, including military installations, business and government offices, military and police personnel, military vehicles, and the oil refinery in Haifa.

In April 1948, members of the Stern Gang raided an Arab village and killed a number of civilians, including women and children, in the **Deir Yassin Massacre**, and the number of civilians killed varies from 107 to 254. Following the formation of the State of Israel, the group was disbanded, and its fighters were incorporated into the **Israel Defense Forces**. On 17 September 1948, former members of the Stern Gang assassinated **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948) due to strong differences over the **Bernadotte Plan**, which advocated significant territorial adjustments in favor of the Arabs. Membership and service in Lehi were subsequently recognized by the state, and former members were given pensions similar to retired army service personnel.

See also ALTALENA AFFAIR; WARFARE.

STOCKHOLM DECLARATION. In December 1988, amid the controversy over the decision of the **United States** to deny his visa request to attend the **United Nations** General Assembly session in New York, **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) chairman **Yasser Arafat** met five leading American Jewish leaders in Stockholm. With the participation of Swedish foreign minister Sten Andersson (1923–2006), on 7 December both sides agreed on a four-point statement: the recognition by the PLO of **Resolution 242** and **Resolution 338** of the UN Security Council; recognition of Israel's right to exist; rejection and condemnation of all forms of **terrorism**; and a resolution of the Palestinian **refugee** problem "in accordance with international law and practices and relevant UN resolutions." This move enabled the United States to abandon its erstwhile opposition (as stipulated by the September 1975 **Memorandum of Understanding** with Israel) to negotiating with the PLO. Following additional clarification, on 14 December President Ronald Reagan (1911–2004) authorized the State Department "to enter into a substantive dialogue with the PLO representatives." The U.S. ambassador in Tunis, Robert Pelletreau (1935–), carried out initial contacts with the PLO.

See also FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (FRC); GENEVA UNITED NATIONS SESSION.

STRAITS OF TIRAN. The Gulf of Tiran is a narrow passage of about 13 kilometers between the **Sinai Peninsula** of **Egypt** and the Peninsula of **Saudi Arabia** and links the **Gulf of Aqaba** with the Red Sea. It provides the only maritime access for **Jordan** through the port city of Aqaba and is Israel's only access to the Red Sea through the port of Eilat. Israel was using the straits for its maritime trade with Africa and Asia because of the **Arab**

Boycott of Israel and the resultant non-availability of the **Suez Canal**. In May 1967, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and this precipitated the **June War of 1967**. Following the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, the straits again became available to Israel. The **Multinational Force and Observers** headed by the **United States** has a monitoring post in the island of Tiran for the purpose of ensuring Israel's unfettered access to the straits. Israel's national airliner, El Al, uses the airspace of the straits for reaching destinations in Africa and Asia.

See also NAVAL BLOCKADE.

SUEZ CANAL. The 101-kilometer-long Suez Canal linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas was opened on 17 November 1869. The government of **Egypt** had a substantial share in the venture. It was built by **France**, which later sold its shares to **Great Britain** in 1875. The canal zone came under British control following its occupation of Egypt in 1882. In 1888, the major maritime powers met and signed the **Constantinople Convention**, which guaranteed that the canal would be "always free and open in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag." This provision was tested when, as part of the **Arab Boycott of Israel**, Egypt prevented use of the Suez Canal for cargos to or from Israel.

After protracted negotiations, Britain agreed to withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal zone in October 1954, completing the process in July 1956. On 26 July, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of Egypt announced the **nationalization of the Suez Canal** to fund the Aswan Dam, and this precipitated the **Suez War**. The canal was briefly closed during the war but reopened in January 1957. It was closed for a second time following the **June War of 1967** and the **War of Attrition**. It was reopened for international shipping only on 5 June 1975, after the signing of the Egypt–Israel **Disengagement Agreement** of 1974 and the Interim Agreement, also known as **Sinai II Agreement**, on 4 September. Under Article 5 of the **Camp David Accords**, Egypt agreed to keep the canal open for Israeli cargo, and the first Israeli freighter passed through the canal on 30 April 1979.

In February 2011, days after the **Arab Spring in Egypt** and the overthrow of President **Hosni Mubarak**, two warships belonging to **Iran** sailed through the canal to ports in **Syria**. This was the first such passage since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and hence caused some anxieties in the region as to the foreign policy direction of post-Mubarak Egypt.

See also BAT GALIM AFFAIR.

SUEZ WAR. Amid tensions between **Egypt** and the government of **Great Britain** and **France** over the **nationalization of the Suez Canal**, on 29 October 1956 Israel launched its military campaign against Egypt. Based on an agreement reached with the British and French at the **Sèvres Conference**, Israel launched a military attack on the **Sinai Peninsula** with the stated objectives of preventing guerrilla attacks from the **Gaza Strip** and opening the **Suez Canal** to Israeli shipping. It exploited the Anglo-Egyptian crisis over the Suez Canal to pursue its desire to seek a foothold at the mouth of the **Straits of Tiran** and to capture the Egyptian resort of **Sharm al-Sheikh**.

Within 100 hours, the **Israel Defense Forces** routed the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula as well as their positions in Gaza. Meanwhile, as agreed, Britain and France issued an ultimatum on 31 October for both Israel and Egypt to "withdraw" 16 kilometers from the canal. At this time, Israeli forces were about 48 kilometers east of the canal, and therefore they still needed to advance another 32 kilometers into the Sinai before complying with the Anglo-French ultimatum. When Egyptian president **Gamal Abdel Nasser** refused to accept the cease-fire demands, British planes from Cyprus attacked Egyptian airfields, while French planes took off from the bases in Israel for similar raids. When the **United Nations** demanded an immediate cease-fire on 3 November, Israel was in complete control of the whole of the Sinai Peninsula, except for Sharm al-Sheikh, which it captured a few days later.

On 6 November, Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire. Following international pressure, especially from U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), on 8 November the Israeli cabinet accepted the cease-fire demands "after suitable arrangements" were made with the newly formed peacekeeping force, the **United Nations Emergency Force I** (UNEF I). Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai began in November, but it made its withdrawal from the Sharm al-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip conditional on Egypt's ensuring freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. This became a major friction point between Israel and the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961). Eisenhower's public statement against a reimposition of the **naval blockade** in the straits and the deployment of UNEF I to take over the civilian administration of the Gaza Strip resolved the crisis. Israel completed its withdrawal from the Sharm al-Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip on 22 January 1957. On 11 March, Egypt replaced the civilian administration and appointed a military governor for the Gaza Strip.

See also BAT GALIM AFFAIR; JUNE WAR OF 1967; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE; WARFARE.

SUICIDE ATTACK/S. On 23 October 1983, a Lebanese volunteer belonging to **Hezbollah** rammed a truck fully loaded with TNT into a building at Beirut International Airport in **Lebanon** that was being used as a temporary

U.S. military headquarters and killed 241 marines. This **Beirut airport bombing** came against the backdrop of a similar suicide truck bombing by a member of **Islamic Jihad** against the U.S. embassy in West Beirut on 18 April 1983, which resulted in the deaths of 49 people. These suicide attacks, especially the one against the barracks, led to a reevaluation of American military involvement in Lebanon and resulted in the withdrawal in early 1984 of troops deployed by the **United States** and **France** in Lebanon aimed at stabilizing and containing sectarian violence. These were the first kind of suicide terrorism in the modern Middle East in pursuit of political goals.

Since the signing of the **Declaration of Principles**, the militant Palestinian group **Hamas** has used this strategy against Israeli civilians inside the **Green Line** to sabotage the **Oslo Process**. Unlike Islamic Jihad, Hamas does not distinguish Israeli civilians from military personnel. The number of suicide attacks—described by Palestinians as "armed Intifada" or martyrdom operations—increased following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. Some Palestinians have questioned the nomenclature "Intifada" to describe the Palestinian protests against Israeli occupation. Crowded buses, bus stops, restaurants, and shopping malls have been the prime targets of the suicide attacks, all of which have been carried out by one of four Palestinian groups—namely, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, and **Fatah**. The emergence of groups such as the **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade**, a group identified with the Fatah movement led by **Yasser Arafat**, signals the popularity of such attacks.

Though they did not cease, the number and lethality of the suicide attacks have dropped considerably since mid-2004. This was largely due to the elimination of militants and the **assassination** of political leaders associated with various terror groups by Israel under its policy of **targeted killing**. The imposition of the **Siege of Gaza** and the **security fence** in the **West Bank** also contributed to the dwindling number of terror attacks.

See also BURGAS TERROR ATTACK; CAIRO DIALOGUE; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA); TERRORISM; WARFARE.

SULH. This Arabic term is widely used to mean reconciliation and peacemaking rather than a temporary cease-fire or *hudna*. The latter is supposed to be a precondition for *sulh*, which is the eventual objective. *Sulh* came into vogue during the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. Increases in **terrorism** against Israel and the resultant retaliatory measures by the **Israel Defense Forces**, such as **targeted killing** and **assassinations** of militant as well as political leaders of various Palestinian groups caused severe tensions and hardships. These efforts toward *sulh* were mainly spearheaded by **Egypt** and its president **Hosni Mubarak**, with intelligence chief Omar Suleiman (1936–2012) playing a key role. As part of the process, Egypt unsuccessfully hosted a number of meetings with and between Hamas and **Fatah**.

See also CAIRO DIALOGUE.

SUMMER RAINS OPERATION. This was a brief incursion carried out by the **Israel Defense Forces** into the **Gaza Strip** on 28 June 2006, three days after the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit (1986–) and the unfolding of the **Shalit Affair**. This was also the first Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip since its unilateral **Gaza Disengagement** and the first military offensive ordered by Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert**. Five Israeli soldiers and over 400 Palestinians, including about 280 militants, were killed during the conflict. It was aimed at both securing the release of Shalit and reducing the number of **Qassam** rockets launched from the Gaza Strip. Neither of these objectives could be achieved, and fighting in the Gaza Strip was soon overtaken by the crisis in the north along Israel's border with **Lebanon** and the unfolding of the **Second Lebanon War**.

See also WARFARE.

SYKES–PICOT AGREEMENT. A secret agreement was signed by **Great Britain** and **France** in May 1916 to divide the Arab provinces of the **Ottoman Empire** after World War I (1914–1918). It was named after its two architects, British orientalist Sir Mark Sykes (1879–1919) and former French consul general in Beirut François Georges-Picot (1870–1951). Under the agreement, France would control **Lebanon** and **Syria**, while Mesopotamia (**Iraq**) and Palestine would go to Britain. The agreement was approved in principle by czarist **Russia** until the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. Disclosing the secret agreement, the newly formed Soviet Union annulled its commitments and compelled both the signatories to renounce the agreement. However, following World War I and the 1920 **San Remo Conference**, the Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire were divided along the lines suggested in the Sykes–Picot Agreement.

See also MANDATE/MANDATE PALESTINE.

SYRIA. The involvement of Syria in the Arab–Israeli conflict began in March 1920 when Emir Faisal ibn Hussein (1885–1933), the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca (1852–1931), proclaimed himself king of Syria. He aspired to include and unify **Lebanon**, Palestine, and **Transjordan** under his rule, but his reign proved short-lived and he was driven out of Damascus; on 23 August 1921 **Great Britain** installed him as the monarch of **Iraq**.

Despite being transformed into a mandate under **France** following World War I (1914–1918), Syria remained the prime ideological torchbearer of Palestinian nationalism. On the eve of the formation of Israel, Syria took over the responsibility of organizing, training, and arming the **Arab Liberation Army** (ALA). This irregular force played an important role in the

Arab–Israeli War of 1948, and Arab volunteers were recruited through centers set up in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, and Cairo. At the height of the 1948 War, the ALA had a strength of 5,000 fighters and was active in northeast Palestine as well as in the **Jerusalem** area. At the end of the war, Syria followed the examples of other Arab neighbors and entered into armistice negotiations with Israel in April 1949. On 20 July, Syria became the last Arab country to sign the **Armistice Agreement**.

The Israeli–Syrian disputes over violations of the Armistice Agreement, and the Israeli complaints of Syrian harassment of its fishermen, took a turn for the worse when, on the night of 11 December 1955, Israel launched a massive three-pronged attack on Syrian outposts on the eastern bank of the **Sea of Galilee**, inflicting heavy Syrian casualties. This operation seems to have resulted in Syrian non-involvement when Israel launched the **Suez War** against **Egypt** a few months later.

On 6 June 1967, Israel launched a preemptive air strike against the Arab air forces, including Syria's, and crippled its air force. On 9 June, a day after the cease-fire in the **June War of 1967** came into force on the war front with Egypt, Israel initiated a ground offensive against Syria. Within 20 hours, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) had captured the whole of the **Golan Heights**, including the Syrian town of **Quneitra**. Because of the clause that tacitly recognized Israel's right to exist, Syria refused to accept **Resolution 242** of the **United Nations** Security Council until 1972.

In a bid to regain the Golan Heights, Syrian president **Hafez al-Assad** joined his Egyptian counterpart **Anwar Sadat** and launched a surprise offensive against Israel in the **October War of 1973**. After some initial setbacks, Israel was able to push the Syrian forces back from the Golan Heights, and by 10 October, it had made further territorial gains into Syria. When the cease-fire came into force on 22 October, Israel was in control of about 600 square kilometers of additional Syrian territory. Shortly after the October War of 1973 ended, Syria accepted **Resolution 338**.

Thanks to the **shuttle diplomacy** efforts of U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger (1923–), Israel and Syria reached an agreement in May 1974 that reaffirmed the cease-fire achieved at the end of the October War. The Israel–Syria **Disengagement Agreement** paved the way for the pullback of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights and the creation of disengagement zones between the two armies. On 31 May 1974, a new cease-fire line was established on the Heights, slightly to the west of the post-1967 cease-fire line. As a part of the agreement, Israel withdrew from the Syrian town of Quneitra.

Syria was critical of Sadat's peace initiatives toward Israel, his **Jerusalem visit**, and the conclusion of the **Camp David Accords**. Damascus emerged as the rallying point for groups opposed to Sadat's peace with Israel. It also became the main force behind a number of Palestinian groups opposed to

Palestine Liberation Organization chairman **Yasser Arafat**. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, commonly referred to as the **Peace for Galilee Operation**, offered new opportunities for Syria to support Lebanese groups such as **Amal** and **Hezbollah** in opposing the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Similarly, Syrian pressures compelled Beirut to abandon the **Israel–Lebanon Agreement** signed on 17 May 1983.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union removed the Syrian ability to pursue a military option against Israel. Deprived of its patron and having supported the efforts of the **United States** during the **Kuwait War**, President Assad was persuaded to attend the **Madrid Conference**. The Israeli willingness to apply Resolutions 242 and 338 to the Golan Heights enhanced the Syrian position. However, citing a lack of progress, Syria and Lebanon boycotted the **Moscow Conference** of multilateral talks.

Following the Israeli launching of the **Grapes of Wrath Operation** in early 1996, Syria joined the United States and France in arranging a limited cease-fire agreement that involved Hezbollah. During the tenure of **Yitzhak Rabin** and **Shimon Peres** (1992–1996), Israeli–Syrian negotiations showed signs of a breakthrough. However, disagreements over the time frame and security arrangements impeded any progress. In a bid to revive the negotiations, in January 2000 Israeli and Syrian leaders met in Shepherdstown, West Virginia, but the **Shepherdstown Talks** proved unsuccessful. Meanwhile, on 5 March 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously decided to pull out of the self-declared **security zone** in southern Lebanon, and the pullout was completed by May 2000. Israel's unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** has significantly weakened any prospects of an agreement with Syria over the Golan Heights.

The **assassination** of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri (1944–2005) in a car bomb on 14 February 2005 evoked strong anti-Syrian sentiments in Lebanon, and Syria was forced to withdraw its military from Lebanon, which was completed by 30 April. During the first summit meeting of the **Union for the Mediterranean** held in Paris on 13 July 2008, Syria formally agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon, and relations were established on 13 August 2008. Syria opened its embassy in Beirut in December 2008, and the Lebanese embassy was opened in Damascus in March 2009.

The outbreak of the **Second Lebanon War** in July 2006 following the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers by Hezbollah brought home the Syrian role in Lebanese politics, even after its formal withdrawal. Syria strongly supported Hezbollah during the 34-day confrontation, and the ability of the Lebanese militant group to resist the Israeli offensive forced countries like **Saudi Arabia** to change their earlier position and rally behind Hezbollah. On the issue of **nuclear Iran**, Syria supported Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy enshrined in the **Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**. **Nuclear Syria** came under international scrutiny following the Israeli military

strike against a nuclear reactor in the Deir ez-Zor region on 6 September 2007. After onsite inspections, the International Atomic Energy Agency declared that it was an undeclared nuclear reactor.

As of the mid-1990s Damascus became the base for the external leadership of **Hamas** and often played a negative role toward some of the low-level understandings between Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority**. Syria also became the base for Hamas leaders such as **Khalid Masha'al** and **Musa Abu-Marzok** after their expulsion from **Jordan** in 1999.

Syria significantly undermined the **Abdullah Plan** of February 2002, and under Syrian pressure, the Beirut Arab Summit explicitly stated that all issues pertaining to the Arab–Israeli conflict would be resolved according to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations. This meant that the **refugee** question has to be resolved within the framework of **Resolution 194** adopted in December 1948. Many believe that this has largely contributed to Israeli indifference to and rejection of the **Arab Peace Initiative**.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** in March 2011 considerably weakened the position of President **Bashar al-Assad**. His decision to abandon the political process and respond militarily to popular protests plunged the country into a civil war. By mid-2014, over 200,000 persons had been killed, and over nine million Syrians were displaced or had become refugees. Most Syrian refugees fled to neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, or Iraq. The presence of Syrian refugees has become an economic burden to Lebanon and Jordan and is an internal social threat to both of those countries.

The decision of Hezbollah to actively take part in the Syrian civil war and fight alongside the official Syrian army has intensified sectarian tension and violence in Lebanon. Some of the terror attacks in Lebanon since July 2013 were directly linked to the Syrian crisis and Hezbollah's role in it. The Syrian unrest considerably weakened the presence of the **Rejectionist Front** and its leaders and forced them to relocate in Egypt, Jordan, and **Qatar**. Prominent Palestinian groups, including Hamas, that had benefited from Syrian political support in the past were not prepared to support Bashar al-Assad following the popular protests.

The Syrian crisis posed a number of challenges to Israel regarding the Golan Heights. The first major confrontation took place on **al-Naqba** Day in May 2011 when hundreds of Palestinian **refugees** from Syria sought to cross into Israel and four were killed on the Syrian side. This was the first time since 1973 that such an incident had taken place on the Golan Heights. The attack by the Syrian rebel forces on the UN post resulted in Austria and Croatia withdrawing from the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** in May 2013. Some of the fighting between the rebels and the Syrian army took place closer to the Golan Heights, and there were occasional firings on Israeli positions from the Syrian side.

The **Arab Spring** caused considerable tension between Syria and oil rich countries in the Persian Gulf, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which have emerged as the principal supporters of the Syrian opposition and a conduit for political and military support to some of the rebel forces, including jihadi elements. As a result, since November 2011 Syrian membership in the **Arab League** remains suspended, and in March 2013 the Syrian seat was given to the Syrian National Coalition. The Qatari news channel Al-Jazeera has emerged as the principal vehicle for the anti-Syrian propaganda war. Adverse comments by Prime Minister **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** of **Turkey** and President **Mohammed Morsi** of Egypt have caused tension between these countries and Syria. Some of the terror attacks in Turkey along its border with Syria are directly linked to the situation in Syria. On 22 June 2012 a Turkish fighter was shot down by Syria close to its borders.

Israel has largely remained silent regarding the Syrian crisis and has indirectly warned the United States and other countries of the dangers of supporting the jihadi elements in the Syrian opposition. During May–June 2013 Israel carried out two military strikes against suspected Hezbollah targets inside Syria and warned that it would act against any supply of arms to the Lebanese groups. Israel has been unsuccessfully trying to prevent **Russia** from supplying arms, especially anti-missile defense systems, to Syria. In the presidential elections held on 3 June 2014, Assad secured 88.7 percent of the votes in the first multi-candidate elections and was sworn in as president on 16 July.

See also ACCOUNTABILITY OPERATION; COHEN, ELI (1924–1965); FATAH UPRISING; GREATER SYRIA; GREEN LINE; HINDAWI AFFAIR; KINNERET OPERATION; OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; ORCHARD OPERATION; PLO CHARTER; SETTLEMENT/S; SHEBA'A FARMS; TERRORISM; TRIPOLI CONFERENCE.

T

TABA. This is a small area on the **Egypt**–Israel border southwest of the Israeli town of Eilat along the **Gulf of Aqaba**. When Israel withdrew from the **Sinai Peninsula** in April 1982 in accordance with the **Camp David Accords**, it refused to withdraw from Taba, challenging Egyptian claims over Taba. After months of protracted negotiations, both sides agreed to resolve the dispute through reconciliation talks. When these efforts failed, on 12 January 1986 the Israeli cabinet resolved to refer the Taba dispute to an arbitration panel. On 11 September, Egypt and Israel formally agreed to the arbitration panel comprising jurists from **France**, Sweden, and Switzerland. On 29 May 1988 the five-member international arbitration panel ruled in favor of Egypt, and on 15 March 1989, nearly seven years after its pullout from the rest of the Sinai, Israel completed its withdrawal from the 700 square meters (one-sixth of an acre) of the Taba enclave. Since then this border town has been the venue for many Arab–Israeli meetings and consultations.

TABA AGREEMENT. Also referred to as the Oslo II Agreement, this accord was drawn up and initialed at the **Taba** resort in **Egypt** on 26 September 1995 by Israeli prime minister **Yitzhak Rabin** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat**. The agreement was formally signed in Washington, D.C., on 28 September. The Taba Agreement outlined the second stage of Palestinian autonomy and the gradual extension of Palestinian rule beyond the **Gaza Strip** and **Jericho**. It comprised five main chapters and dealt with a number of central issues, such as the election of the **Palestinian Legislative Council** (PLC) and its powers and responsibilities, and the **redeployment** of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) from the six Palestinian towns of **Bethlehem**, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, **Ramallah**, and Tulkaram. Concerning the sensitive question of withdrawal from **Hebron**, the agreement provided for Israeli control of 15 percent of the city, inhabited by 450 Jewish settlers. It also provided for an additional three-stage phased Israeli redeploy-

ment to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the PLC. It set October 1999 as the deadline for finalizing the **Permanent Status Negotiations**.

The Taba Agreement divided the **Occupied Territories** into three categories: Area A (territories with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security), Area B (territories with Palestinian civil jurisdiction but joint Israeli–Palestinian security control), and Area C (territories where Israel enjoys complete civil and security control). In geographical terms, Area A would constitute 3 percent of the **West Bank**, Area B would include 450 small towns and villages constituting 27 percent of the West Bank, and Area C would make up the remaining 70 percent and would include Jewish **settlements** and Israeli military bases.

Israeli withdrawals from Arab population centers were completed by late 1995, and elections to the PLC were held in January 1996. Other provisions of the Taba Agreement were delayed considerably, and the withdrawal from Hebron was not completed until the conclusion of the **Hebron Protocol** in January 1997. The delays in the implementation of the Oslo II Agreement, especially the additional redeployment of the IDF, compelled both parties to sign the **Wye Memorandum** in October 1998.

See also AREAS OF PALESTINE.

TABA TERROR ATTACK. Thirty-two people were killed and more than 120 were wounded on 7 October 2004 in terrorist attacks on two holiday resorts in **Taba** in the **Sinai Peninsula**. These hotels were frequented by Israelis, and 12 Israelis were among the dead. Powerful explosions were caused by two separate car bombs, causing the collapse of part of the Hilton Hotel, which bore the maximum damage and casualties. A previously unknown Jamaa al-Islamiya Al-Alamiya (World Islamist Group) claimed responsibility for the attack.

See also TERRORISM; WARFARE.

TAHRIR SQUARE. The 74,000-square-meter busy traffic circle and open public space in the heart of Cairo is called Tahrir Square. This has witnessed a number of events in the history of **Egypt**. It gained recent prominence when an estimated 50,000 Egyptian citizens assembled in the square on 25 January 2011 in protest against President **Hosni Mubarak** and his three-decade-long rule. Millions of protesters soon poured into Tahrir Square, and, bowing to public pressures, on 11 February Mubarak announced his resignation. Since then Tahrir Square has come to symbolize public protest against authoritarian rulers in the Middle East, and protesters in many countries in the region, especially in Bahrain, Libya, and others, began establishing their own Tahrir Squares in the heart of the national capitals. Since the June 2012

presidential elections, the square has also witnessed similar demonstrations in support of, and in opposition to, President **Mohammed Morsi** and his removal by the military on 3 July 2013.

See also ARAB SPRING; ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT; ARAB SPRING IN SYRIA; EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–).

TAL LAW. For the purpose of finding an amicable solution to the issue of **conscription** in the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF), on 22 August 1999 Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** appointed a committee headed by Tzvi Tal, a former judge of the Supreme Court. The committee had nine other members and was asked to deal with the exemption from conscription granted to yeshiva students. Though they are not technically exempted from compulsory service, the *haredi* enlistment is deferred during the period when ultra-orthodox youth pursue their religious studies. Over the years, the number of such exemptions has increased considerably, leading to strong protests and resentment from the secular population, which undertakes military service. The Tal committee became necessary after the 1998 Supreme Court ruling that the defense minister has no authority to grant exemption to yeshiva students, because the numbers were increasing, and that a legislative solution was required.

The committee presented its reports in April 2000, and on 23 July 2002 the Knesset enacted the Tal Law. This temporary law was to be in force for five years and could be extended. Under this, yeshiva students would be granted conditional exemption from military service until the age of 22, and afterward they could either join the army for a minimum of 16 months to be followed by annual reserve duty or perform one year of unpaid duty in National Service. The law also expanded the orthodox units in the IDF where more *haredi* youth could join without affecting their religious way of life.

In July 2005 the government informed the Supreme Court that the response of the *haredi* youth has been poor and only a handful had enlisted under the Tal Law. Therefore, in May 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that the Tal Law conflicted with the dignity of those who serve in the IDF but decided to keep it for a year. On 18 July 2007 the Knesset extended the Tal Law by five more years, but on 21 February 2012, the High Court declared the Tal Law to be unconstitutional. It also ruled that the legislation had failed to encourage *haredi* enlistment and that the law could not be extended when it expired on 1 August 2012.

Responding to the new situation, Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** appointed a 10-member committee headed by **Kadima** member of the Knesset Yohanan Plesner (1972–), but before it could submit its report, many members withdrew due to a coalition crisis. Based on the deliberations, Plesner published a report in July 2012 that visualized 80 percent *haredi* enlistment through a host of incentives and fines. On 2 July 2012 Prime Minister

Netanyahu was informed that the committee would be dissolved because it lacked a majority, and this in turn created a new crisis within the ruling coalition and forced early Knesset elections in January 2013. On 4 February 2014, the High Court issued an interim injunction that prohibited the state from transferring financial stipends to yeshiva students born between 1994 and mid-1996—that is, those who are eligible for conscription.

See also *HAREDI* PARTIES; SHAS.

TANZIM. This armed wing of the Palestinian group **Fatah** was set up in 1995 as an attempt to counter the Islamic militants who opposed the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) and its chairman, **Yasser Arafat**. Most of its members were active during the **First Intifada**. The November 1994 showdown between **Hamas** and the security forces of the PNA in Gaza City, which resulted in the deaths of 13 civilians, was seen as the inducement for the formation of this quasi-military force, which was supportive of and sympathetic to Arafat. It was also a counterweight to other security forces belonging to the PNA, but with mass appeal and grassroots support.

Members of Tanzim were in the forefront of confrontation with the **Israel Defense Forces** and assumed a prominent role in the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, which broke out in September 2000. A number of attacks in the **Occupied Territories** against Israeli settlers and civilians have been attributed to Tanzim. **Marwan Hasib Ibrahim Barghouti**, a prominent Palestinian leader from **Ramallah** and a member of the **Fatah Revolutionary Council**, emerged as a key leader of Tanzim. Gradually this group lost its appeal and faded away.

See also ISLAMIC JIHAD; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

TARGETED KILLING. This refers to the practice adopted by Israel to target and kill key Palestinians suspected of involvement in various acts of violence and **terrorism** against its citizens. Since the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in 1987, the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) have killed several people it accused of engaging in terrorism. The **Oslo Process** imposed a political price for such operations, but the targeted killings continued. The handing over of territories to the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) posed logistical problems for such operations, but in January 1996 Israeli agents in Gaza killed Yahya Ayyash (1966–1996) (popularly known as "the Engineer"), who was suspected of involvement in many terrorist acts.

The targeted killings and **assassinations** increased after the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, and Israel killed a number of Palestinian militants as well as political leaders. In a major policy escalation, in March 2004 the IDF

killed **Hamas** spiritual leader **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** in Gaza City, and less than a month later **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi**, who briefly succeeded Yassin, was also killed.

On 3 February 2005, when **Ariel Sharon** was the prime minister, a cabinet committee on security approved a decision to end the targeted killing of suspected Palestinian terrorists. Under the new policy guidelines, Israel would give a list of suspected militants to Palestinian security officials. The suspects would then be located and offered amnesty by the PNA if they renounced violence. However, following a series of incidents, in June 2005 senior IDF officials declared that targeted killing would be resumed.

Israel continued to target various militant leaders both in the **Occupied Territories** and in other parts of the Middle East. Some of the most notable assassinations carried out by Israeli security forces include those of **Imad Mughniyah** in Damascus in February 2008, **Mahmoud Al-Mabhough** in Dubai in January 2010, and Ahmed Jabari (1960–2012) in the **Gaza Strip** in November 2012. As part of the cease-fire agreement mediated by President **Mohammed Morsi** of **Egypt** following the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in November 2012, Israel agreed to the principal Hamas demand of not killing its leaders.

See also CAIRO DIALOGUE; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); MASHA'AL AFFAIR; MUNICH MASSACRE; WARFARE.

TEMPLE MOUNT. *See* HARAM AL-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT.

TEMPLE MOUNT FAITHFUL. This religious messianic group is committed to the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple in the **Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount** area of the old city of **Jerusalem**. Its attempts to highlight its stated object often result in violent clashes in the old city as well as in the **Occupied Territories**. On 8 October 1990, amid the ongoing tension in the Persian Gulf in the wake of the **Kuwait War**, the Israeli High Court rejected a petition from the group to lay the cornerstone for the Third Temple. However, rumors spread of an impending move by the group to carry out its threat. In response, Arab youths began throwing stones from the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area at the Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall below. This injured scores of Jewish worshippers and resulted in police firing at the rioters. The riots led to the deaths of 20 Palestinians and injuries to scores of others.

The need to maintain the anti-**Iraq** coalition resulted in the **United States** voting in favor of **United Nations** Security Council Resolution 672 adopted on 12 October 1990, which denounced the Israeli action and called on Israel to receive a UN mission to investigate the killings. Israel refused to comply with the UN demand and instead appointed its own inquiry, which concluded

that the police officers had acted in self-defense when they feared for their lives and the lives of other worshippers in the area. However, the report also criticized the police for not foreseeing the events, especially after the Temple Mount Faithful petitioned the High Court, and for not conveying the court's rejection of its appeal to the *waqf* leaders. There have been periodic protests and attempted visits to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area by the members of this group. Such provocative actions normally coincide with the holy holiday season around the Jewish new year.

See also FEIGLIN, MOSHE ZALMAN (1962–); JEWISH UNDERGROUND; PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES.

TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON (TIPH). Responding to the **Hebron Massacre (1994)**, when 29 Muslim worshippers were killed in the Ibrahimi Mosque/Tomb of the Patriarchs by Baruch Goldstein (1956–1994), a member of **Kach**, on 18 March the **United Nations** Security Council adopted a resolution that called for "a temporary international or foreign presence" to ensure the "safety and protection" of the Palestinians in the **Occupied Territories**. On 31 March, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators reached an agreement in Cairo to set up an international observer unit in Hebron. Accordingly, Israel agreed to the formation of the 150-member TIPH, comprising unarmed observers from Norway, Denmark, and Italy. Later on, this was expanded to a 180-member contingent with the participation of observers from Sweden, Switzerland, and **Turkey**. The Security Council resolution, which was also supported by Israel, paved the way for the renewal of peace talks between Israel and its Arab interlocutors that were stalled following the massacre.

The TIPH unit was meant to ensure normal life, and a sense of security among the Palestinian residents of Hebron in areas that remained under Israeli occupation. On 9 May 1996, following a partial Israeli **redeployment** from Hebron, both sides concluded another agreement that established the framework for the TIPH. Consisting of unarmed volunteers from the six countries, the TIPH was accountable to a joint Israeli–Palestinian committee and to an ad hoc commission consisting of the participating countries. Though meant to be a temporary measure, the mandate of the TIPH has been periodically extended and continues to operate.

See also HEBRON PROTOCOL.

TENET PLAN. In the wake of Israeli reservations and opposition to the **Mitchell Committee Report**, in June 2001 U.S. president **George W. Bush** asked the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Tenet (1953–), to work toward establishing and consolidating a significant period of cessation of Palestinian violence to enable Israel to initiate confidence-building

measures. Toward implementing the recommendation of the Mitchell Report and ensuring a temporary cease-fire in the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, Tenet outlined a security plan on 13 June 2001. It called on both parties to resume security cooperation and work toward establishing an immediate cease-fire. Following the stabilization of the situation, it called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Palestinian areas to positions held prior to 28 September 2000, the lifting of internal closures, and the reopening of border crossings. While Israel demanded that such a quiet period be extended to six weeks, the **United States** sought a seven-day cessation of violence before a longer "cooling-off" period would begin. The continuation of Palestinian violence and Israeli **targeted killing** ensured that even a limited period of quiet was not possible. The plan was not put into practice, as neither side would ensure a cessation of hostilities.

TERRITORIAL SWAP. Since the onset of the **Madrid Conference** in October 1990 and the possible implementation of the **land-for-peace** idea, there were suggestions of an exchange of territories between Israel and the Palestinians. This idea has been talked about within the context of the **West Bank** and not the **Gaza Strip**. This is partly due to the refusal of various Israeli leaders to accept a complete Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line** of 1967. Citing security concerns, **Yitzhak Rabin**, who signed the **Oslo Accords**, as well as his successors have argued that Israel could not return to the 1967 borders. The construction of Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** following the **June War of 1967**, and their geographic proximity to the pre-1967 border, were often cited as additional reasons. Hence, since the mid-1990s there were suggestions that both Israel and the **Palestinian National Authority** could agree to an exchange of territory with the Green Line being the point of reference. Though not enthusiastic, the Palestinian leaders including **Yasser Arafat** and his successor **Mahmoud Abbas** have not rejected the idea.

While the actual extent of the swap is disputed, the **Clinton Parameters** outlined in January 2001 put this area at around 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank. In exchange for **annexation** of nearby settlements such as **Ariel** and **Ma'ale Adumim**, Israel would swap an area equal in size from within its pre-1967 borders. A number of **Israeli Arab** leaders and **Arab parties** oppose the idea of an exchange of population as suggested by some Israeli parties such as Moledet and **Yisrael Beiteinu**. The territorial swap does not include the city of **Jerusalem**, one of the core issues of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

See also AREAS OF PALESTINE; BARAK PLAN; KERRY PLAN.

TERRORISM. Deliberately targeting unarmed civilians for political purposes—the most commonly accepted definition of terrorism—has become integral to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Even though the term gained international currency much later, targeting civilians has been in vogue since at least the early 1920s, when the Zionist aspirations for a Jewish national home in Palestine gained international recognition through the **Balfour Declaration** and the **League of Nations** granting Palestine as a **Mandate** to **Great Britain**. This erupted into widespread violence in Palestine and was manifested in inter-communal riots as highlighted by numerous massacres where innocent Arab and Jewish civilians were killed for explicit political purposes, including the **Western Wall Riots**, the **Hebron Massacre (1929)**, and the **Arab Revolt (1936–1939)**. This trend increased after the **United Nations** approved the **Partition Plan** on 29 November 1947 and with the onset of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. During this period, scores of civilians were killed, for example, during the **Deir Yassin Massacre** and the ambush of Jewish doctors a few days later in **Jerusalem**.

The 1960s witnessed the beginning of the guerrilla campaign by Palestinian **Fedayeen** and ushered in a new cycle of violence recognized as international terrorism. Palestinian militants often entered Israel and carried out numerous terror acts, such as the **Bus 300 Affair** and the **Ma'alot Massacre**. Even though political motives and the struggle for national liberation were used to justify and explain the wanton killing of unarmed civilians, the international community increasingly began to recognize the negative consequences of the new trend. The hijacking of three civilian aircraft by militant Palestinians, widely condemned by the international community, eventually resulted in the military crackdown by **Jordan** commonly known as the **Black September Massacre** of 1970.

International terrorism reached new lows in the **Munich Massacre** of September 1972, when Palestinian guerrillas killed and took hostage Israeli athletes during the Olympic Games in **Germany**. The hostage taking of Israeli passengers aboard an Air France plane in 1976 resulted in the successful rescue mission known as the **Entebbe Operation**. Frequent actions against civilian aircraft led to a tougher international regime against air piracy. International disapproval and counter-measures have significantly reduced air piracy since then.

While the **First Intifada** witnessed a popular uprising against the continued Israeli occupation of the **West Bank** and **Gaza Strip**, the onset of the **Oslo Process** increased terrorism. **Suicide attacks** have become the most frequently used terrorist tactic employed by militant Palestinian groups opposed to the peace process, especially **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad**. The popularity of such attacks among the Palestinians even influenced the non-religious **Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade** to adopt similar tactics against the Israeli civilian population.

The **United States** has designated a number of Palestinian groups as terrorist organizations and imposed a series of sanctions. Likewise, countries such as **Iran**, **Iraq**, Libya, and **Syria** have often faced similar U.S. sanctions due to their suspected "involvement" in various acts of terrorism or their support for militant groups.

For their part, the Palestinians have tended to view Israeli reprisal raids and the **targeted killing** of Palestinian leaders as terrorism. Since the 1980s, the **Jewish Underground** and Israeli individuals have conducted a number of terrorist attacks against the Palestinians (for example, the **Hebron Massacre** in 1994), and they were rarely prosecuted by Israel or were given light sentences.

The September 11 attacks on the United States significantly shifted the international discourse against terrorism. Recognizing the growing international disapproval of suicide attacks, **Egypt**, amid the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, sought to mediate with different Palestinian groups to bring about a temporary suspension of such attacks. This **Cairo Dialogue** failed due to serious differences between Hamas and the **Palestinian National Authority**.

Though they did not cease, the number and lethality of the suicide attacks have dropped considerably since mid-2004. This is largely due to the elimination of militants and the **assassination** of political leaders associated with various terror groups under Israel's policy of targeted killing. The imposition of the **Siege of Gaza** and the creation of a **security fence** in the West Bank also contributed to the dwindling number of terror attacks.

See also BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; BURGAS TERROR ATTACK; DELHI TERROR ATTACK; DIEF, MOHD (1965–); EILAT TERROR ATTACK; *HUDNA*; IHH; KACH; SINAI VIOLENCE; SULH; TABA TERROR ATTACK; TUNIS RAID; WARFARE; ZIONISM.

TRANSFER. Right-wing extremist elements in Israel advocate transfer—that is, expulsion—of Palestinians from the **Occupied Territories** and also **Israeli Arabs** as a means of resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The violent advocacy of this platform led to the proscription in 1986 of the **Kach** Party founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932–1990). Until his **assassination** on 17 October 2001, Rehavam Ze'evi (1926–2001), who founded and led Moledet, advocated a peaceful transfer of Israeli Arabs. Since the mid-1990s there were suggestions of a **territorial swap** between Israel and a Palestinian state, most vividly outlined in the **Clinton Parameters**. While exploring the exchange of territories, these peace plans do not speak of population transfers, even though some Israeli leaders like **Avigdor Lieberman** suggest such a possibility.

TRANSJORDAN. In 1921, in appreciation of the support of Sharif Hussein (1852–1931) of Mecca during the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)**, **Great Britain** partitioned Palestine and created the semi-autonomous Emirate of Transjordan east of the **Jordan River**. Abdullah ibn Hussein (later King **Abdullah I**), the son of Sharif Hussein, was installed as the emir. Transjordan was granted independence from Britain on 25 May 1946 and became the Hashemite Kingdom of **Jordan**.

See also HUSSEIN–MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE; WEST BANK.

TRIPARTITE DECLARATION. In an attempt to stabilize the **Armistice Agreements** between Israel and its neighbors, the **United States**, **Great Britain**, and **France** voluntarily agreed to control the flow of arms to the Middle East. In a public declaration issued on 25 May 1950, these three Western powers committed themselves not to supply arms to any state in the Middle East that had an aggressive design against its neighbors. By controlling the flow of weapons, they sought to guarantee regional stability. France broke this understanding by clandestinely supplying large quantities of arms to Israel prior to the **Suez War**, and both concluded an arms deal in August 1954, long before the **Czech Deal**, that was often seen as a precursor to the Suez War.

TRIPOLI CONFERENCE. Critical of the **Jerusalem visit** by President **Anwar Sadat** of **Egypt**, the leaders of Algeria, **Syria**, South Yemen, and Libya met in the Libyan capital of Tripoli on 5 December 1977. Declaring their determination to fight the Egyptian initiative, they decided to freeze relations with Egypt. In retaliation, Sadat decided to suspend diplomatic ties with these countries as well as **Iraq**, which was also critical of his peace initiatives toward Israel.

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; KHARTOUM ARAB SUMMIT; REJECTIONIST FRONT.

TRUCE COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE. Amid continued violence in **Mandate Palestine** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** and the lack of cooperation from **Great Britain**, the Mandate authorities prevented the **Palestine Conciliation Commission** (PCC) from fulfilling its mandate in implementing the **United Nations** resolution on the **Partition Plan**. After the PCC reported that it was unable to fulfill its assignment because of "the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of cooperation from the Mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine," the Security Council appointed a Truce Commission composed of the consuls of Belgium, **France**, and the **United States** in **Jerusalem** "to assist the Security Council in supervising the implementation" of Resolution

46 of 1948. **Syria**, which also had a consular office in Jerusalem, refused to serve in the commission. Besides providing on-the-spot information to the Security Council, the Truce Commission managed to arrange several agreements to limit fighting in Jerusalem as well as in supervising relief convoys to the city.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL. On 26 April 1948, less than three weeks before the expiry of the Palestine **Mandate**, the **United Nations** General Assembly voted to establish a Trusteeship Council to prepare a draft statute for **Jerusalem**, which under the **Partition Plan** was to have a special international regime under direct UN administration. As fighting continued in Palestine between the Jews and Arabs in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the **United States**, which exercised its political, diplomatic, and economic power and influence to secure the UN endorsement of the Partition Plan in November 1947, began to have second thoughts. However, the decision made by **Great Britain** to abandon the Mandate and to unilaterally withdraw from Palestine on 15 May 1948, along with Israel's **Declaration of Independence**, made the Trusteeship Council irrelevant.

TUBA ZANGARIA MOSQUE ATTACK. Tuba Zangaria is a small Bedouin town in northern Israel. It achieved local council status in 1988. The little-known town close to the **Sea of Galilee** gained attention following the torching of its mosque on the eve of Yom Kippur on 3 October 2011. The arson attack, which also damaged the council building, was widely condemned by Israeli leaders and public figures including President **Shimon Peres**. A number of Bedouins from the town serve in the **Israel Defense Forces**, and during the **October riots** of 2000 the elders declared that the residents of the town would not take part in the protests organized by the leaders of **Israeli Arabs**. The arson attack was seen as part of the **price tag attacks** and was attributed to right-wing extremists and linked to the murder of a father and son in a terror attack in **Kiryat Arba** in the **West Bank** the previous month. No one has been convicted for the arson attack.

See also SETTLER VIOLENCE; TERRORISM; WARFARE.

TUNIS RAID. On 25 September 1985, members of **Fatah**, the principal component of the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), murdered three Israeli tourists in the Cypriot city of Larnaca. As a response to this **terrorism**, on 1 October the **Israel Defense Forces** conducted an air raid against the headquarters of the PLO, which were located in the Haram al-Sharif neighborhood of Tunis in Tunisia. PLO chairman **Yasser Arafat** was not in the office at the time, but more than 60 Palestinians, including some senior members of **Force 17**, the elite force responsible for Arafat's personal

security, were killed. In ordering a raid some 4,800 kilometers from the Israeli shores, Defense Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** declared, "No PLO element anywhere in the world has immunity." The **United Nations** Security Council condemned the raid, and the **United States** abstained when the council adopted Resolution 573 on 4 October. The violation of Tunisian airspace during the attack came in for international criticism. The direct military attack on Arafat precluded any progress on the **Hussein–Arafat Accord** or in the efforts by the United States for a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with Israel.

See also BARAK, EHUD (1942–); WARFARE.

TUNNELS. Over the years, Palestinians have built underground tunnels in the sand dunes surrounding the Palestinian town of Rafah in the southern **Gaza Strip** and used them to smuggle weapons, explosives, ammunition, and drugs to and from the **Sinai Peninsula** of **Egypt**. Some of the tunnels run more than a kilometer on either side of the border, are well lit, and even contain food and **water** supplies. Citing smuggling activities, Israel periodically closed the **Rafah Crossing** when the Gaza Strip was under its control until 2005. The Rafah Crossing was the only access point for the residents of Gaza to Egypt and to the outside world. Under the **Oslo Accords**, Israel obtained a small strip of land along the border with Egypt known as the Philadelphi route, which it used to prevent the illegal movement of people and goods into the Gaza Strip. In the **Rainbow Operation** of 2004, pursued during the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, the **Israel Defense Forces** demolished a large number of houses along the Philadelphi road and expanded the zone. After the unilateral **Gaza Disengagement** completed in September 2005, Israel handed over control of the Rafah Crossing to Egypt.

The imposition of the Gaza blockade in June 2007 following the **Battle of Gaza** increased the usage of the tunnels. Facing the Israeli ban on the movement of goods and services, which was also tacitly supported by President **Hosni Mubarak**, Palestinian militants used the tunnels to smuggle much-needed food, medicine, and livestock as well as money and weapons. The **Sinai violence** following the **Arab Spring in Egypt** forced the government of President **Mohammed Morsi** and the successor military regime to destroy a number of tunnels in Rafah.

See also EL-SISI, ABDEL FATTAH (1954–); PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION.

TURKEL COMMISSION. On 14 June 2010 Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** that resulted in the deaths of 10 civilians, including 9 citizens from **Turkey**. Israel vehemently opposed any demands for an international

commission and refused to cooperate with the Palmer Commission appointed by the **United Nations**. The Israeli inquiry was headed by Jacob Turkel (1935–), a former judge of the Israeli Supreme Court, four other Israeli citizens, as well as two international observers—namely, the former leader of the North Irish Ulster Unionist Party William David Trimble (1944–) and former military judge from Canada Ken Watkin (1954–). In March 2011, the government extended the mandate of the commission to include allegations of **war crimes** against the **Israel Defense Forces**.

In its initial report published on 23 January 2011, the commission absolved "the government and military of wrongdoing" and ruled that the imposition of the **Siege of Gaza** was valid under international law. The **Palmer Report** submitted on 2 September 2011 also declared Israel's blockade to be legal under international law. The Turkel Commission blamed the **IHH**, the principal organization of the **Freedom Flotilla**, for the deaths of Turkish citizens. The findings were rejected by Turkish prime minister **Tayyip Recep Erdogan**.

See also GAZA STRIP.

TURKEY. The defeat and disintegration of the **Ottoman Empire** and the division of its Arab-dominated areas by **France** and **Great Britain** brought Turkey into the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Arab resentment of Ottoman rule encouraged Britain to instigate the **Arab Revolt (1916–1918)** through the **Hussein–McMahon Correspondence**, promising a unified Arab state in return for Arab support for Britain in World War I (1914–1918). When the war ended, most of the Arab areas became **Mandate** territories of the two European powers, with Britain taking over Palestine. The defeat and Arab "betrayal" kept Turkey from showing any interest in Palestine until the 1940s.

On 29 November 1947, Turkey joined other Arab and Islamic countries and voted against the **Partition Plan** of the **United Nations**. As the Arab–Jewish tensions in Palestine increased during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the UN appointed a **Palestine Conciliation Commission** (PCC), with Turkey as one of its members, to reduce the violence and forestall partition. Though it met periodically, the PCC remained ineffective and was overtaken by events following the **Declaration of Independence** and the establishment of the State of Israel.

As part of its pro-Western orientation in 1949, Turkey granted de facto recognition to Israel and established and maintained low-level diplomatic ties with the Jewish state. After the **Suez War**, it reduced its diplomatic representation in Israel. Turkey joined the Arabs in criticizing the Israeli occupation of Arab and Islamic territories following the **June War of 1967**, and the **Jerusalem Law** introduced by Prime Minister **Menachem Begin** in 1980 further eroded the bilateral ties.

The **Kuwait War** and subsequent **Madrid Conference** brought about a strategic shift in the Turkish position, and in December 1991 Turkey upgraded its relations with Israel to ambassadorial level. Simultaneously it recognized the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. Since then, Turkey has sought and established a strategic relationship with Israel and concluded a number of defense-related agreements. The close security ties brought about by the military establishment, however, resulted in increased domestic criticism in Turkey, especially from religious elements.

Turkey's relations with Israel underwent significant changes since early 2003 after the Justice and Development Party, or **AKP**, won the February 2003 election and **Recep Tayyip Erdogan** became prime minister the following month. Initially Erdogan maintained the traditional policy dominated by military-security ties. Both countries shared common threat perceptions, especially vis-à-vis Syria, and in May 2005 Erdogan visited Israel and laid a wreath at the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem. In November 2007 Erdogan hosted President **Shimon Peres**, who also became the first Israeli leader to address the parliament of a Muslim country.

Things began to deteriorate, however, following the **Cast Lead Operation** in 2008–2009, which started a few days after Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert** visited Turkey and met Erdogan. The latter felt that the attack had compromised his diplomatic position and strongly criticized Israel and its human rights violations during the operation. In the subsequent economic summit in Davos on 29 January 2009, Erdogan publicly clashed with President Peres. Erdogan used the findings of the **Goldstone Report**, which also criticized **Hamas**, to accuse Israel of **war crimes**.

Relations between the two countries began to deteriorate further when international human rights organizations sought to organize the **Freedom Flotilla** to highlight the plight of the residents of the **Gaza Strip** who suffered due to the **Siege of Gaza**. Israel, which imposed the blockade around the sea of Gaza, was not prepared to permit a relief convoy but suggested their offloading at an Israeli port and subsequent transportation by land. On 31 May 2010 soldiers from the **Israel Defense Forces** boarded the *Mavi Marmara*, the largest ship in the convoy, in the international waters off the coast of southern **Lebanon** to prevent its passage to Gaza. In the ensuing melee, nine Turkish citizens were killed. This evoked strong reactions in Turkey, and the Turkish government and Erdogan demanded that Israel own up to its responsibility for the deaths, offer a public apology, and pay compensation to the victims. Israel's refusal to meet these demands resulted in Turkey recalling its ambassador from Tel Aviv on 31 May 2010 while the Israeli ambassador continued in Ankara for a while.

To reduce the tension between the former allies, the United Nations appointed an international commission headed by the former prime minister of New Zealand Sir Geoffrey Palmer (1942–). The four-member commission

had representatives from Israel and Turkey, and after months of deliberations, the **Palmer Report** was published in 2 September 2011. It equally blamed both countries for the loss of life but upheld Israel's legal right to impose the Siege of the Gaza. This angered Turkey, which expelled the Israeli ambassador on 2 September 2011. After months of persuasion, during his visit to Israel on 22 May 2013, U.S. president **Barack Obama** coerced Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** to call Erdogan and convey Israel's apology over the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair**. Despite this, relations between the countries remain at their lowest level, and their ambassadors have not returned to their posts.

Following the electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006, Turkey has been suggesting the inclusion of the Palestinian militant group in any peace negotiations. This has caused tension with Israel, which sought to isolate Hamas through economic sanctions and political non-recognition. In February 2006, within a month after the electoral victory of Hamas but before **Ismail Haniyeh** formed a government, a Hamas delegation headed by **Khalid Masha'al** visited Turkey. Since then there have been regular visits by Hamas officials to Turkey.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring** in January 2011 rekindled Turkish aspirations for a leadership role in the wider Middle East. Erdogan was quick to present the AKP rule in Turkey as a model for Islam–democracy co-existence. After some initial hesitation, he joined hands with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011) in Libya. Erdogan was among the very first leaders to openly call for the resignation of President **Hosni Mubarak** in the wake of the **Tahrir Square** protests in Egypt. The overthrow of President **Mohammed Morsi** of Egypt by the Egyptian military in July 2013 was strongly criticized by Erdogan.

The onset of the **Arab Spring in Syria** led Turkey to call for political reforms in that country, and when the conflict intensified, Erdogan demanded the resignation of President **Bashar al-Assad**. The crisis in Syria has led to a large number of Syrians taking refuge in Turkey, and according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in early 2014 the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey was close to 750,000. The flow has also resulted in tension between the two countries leading up to the shooting down of a Turkish fighter jet on 22 June 2012 over the Mediterranean Sea close to the Syrian border. Some of the terror attacks in Turkish border towns were directly linked to the Syrian crisis.

Erdogan won the presidential elections held on 10 August 2014 by securing 51.79 percent of the votes, and former foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu (1959–) took over as prime minister on 28 August.

See also BAGHDAD PACT; DAVOS CONTROVERSY; TERRORISM.

TWO-STATE SOLUTION. This refers to the willingness of the international community to support the implementation of the **Partition Plan** adopted by the **United Nations** General Assembly on 29 November 1947 and to accept the State of Israel and State of Palestine co-existing side by side. The actual boundaries would have to be negotiated, with the **Green Line** as the basis, and the Palestinian state would consist of the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**. Control and sovereignty over the city of **Jerusalem** would have to be decided and resolved by the parties concerned.

See also AL-QUDS; ALGIERS DECLARATION; AREAS OF ISRAEL; AREAS OF PALESTINE; BINATIONAL STATE; EAST JERUSALEM; ONE-STATE SOLUTION; TERRITORIAL SWAP.

U

UN COMMISSION. Acting on a request from **Jordan**, on 22 March 1979 the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 446, which called for a three-member commission "to examine the situation relating to the **settlements** in the Arab territories occupied since 1967." Since this came on the eve of the signing of the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, the **United States** abstained. Israel, however, refused to cooperate with the commission.

UN MEDIATOR. On 13 May 1948, during the Second Special Session of the **United Nations** General Assembly, the **United States** suggested the idea of a UN mediator, which was approved the following day. Subsequently, Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948), the president of the Swedish Red Cross, was nominated for the position. The UN mediator was entrusted with the task of securing an overall political settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict and supervising the UN arms embargo. Until the formation of the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency**, he also assumed the responsibility for Arab **refugees**. Following Bernadotte's **assassination** on 17 September, Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971) was appointed as acting mediator. With the conclusion of the **Armistice Agreements** between Israel and its neighbors, the functions of the UN mediator lapsed.

See also LEHI.

UN MEMBERSHIP. On 15 May 1948, and again on 29 November 1948, Israel applied for membership in the **United Nations**, but the Security Council committee on the admission of new states did not take cognizance of the applications. On 24 February 1949, the day **Egypt** and Israel signed their **Armistice Agreement**, Israel applied for UN membership a third time. Following the approval of Israel's application by the Security Council, the General Assembly asked Israel to clarify its positions on five key issues: internationalization of **Jerusalem**, borders, Arab **refugees**, the investigation into the **assassination** of **UN mediator** Count Folke Bernadotte (1895–1948), and its attitude toward its obligations to the UN and the implementation of UN resolutions. Upon receiving clarifications from Israel on rights concerning

religious and political minorities, on 11 May 1949, the General Assembly approved the Israeli application, with 37 members voting in favor, 12 against, and 9 abstaining.

Deviating from normal procedure, this decision was accompanied by explicit references to Israel's commitments toward the "implementation" of the partition resolution of 29 November 1947 as well as **Resolution 194** of 11 December 1948, which recognized the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes or to be paid compensation. While **Egypt**, **Lebanon**, **Saudi Arabia**, and **Syria** have been UN members since its founding in 1945, and **Jordan** became a member in 1955, on 22 November 1974, **Resolution 3236** granted observer status to the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and, on 29 November 2012, the Palestinian representation has been upgraded to a non-member **observer state** status.

UN PALESTINE COMMISSION. On 29 November 1947, following the approval of the **Partition Plan**, the **United Nations** General Assembly voted to establish a Palestine Commission consisting of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines to implement the consequences of the partition resolution. While the **Jewish Agency** cooperated with the commission, the Arabs and **Great Britain**, the **Mandate** power, were less cooperative with the five-member secretariat, which arrived in Palestine in early March 1948. The commission was adjourned sine die on 17 May, three days after the **Declaration of Independence** by Israel.

UNIFIED NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF THE UPRISING (UNLU). During the **First Intifada**, a number of major Palestinian political factions and groups were organized under the UNLU, which served as the underground leadership. The umbrella organization consisted of the mainstream **Fatah**, the **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, and the **Palestine People's Party**. The newly established Islamic resistance movement **Hamas** did not join the UNLU. It worked independently but did not challenge the UNLU. Through periodic leaflets, the UNLU evolved a host of strategies to oppose the Israeli occupation, directed the popular struggle, and was in constant contact with the Tunis-based **Palestine Liberation Organization** leadership.

UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN (UfM). On 13 July 2008, heads of state and government from 43 countries in the Euro-Mediterranean zone attended a summit meeting in Paris hosted by President Nicolas Sarkozy (1955–) of **France** and established the Union for the Mediterranean. Headquartered in Barcelona, it is a continuation of the **Barcelona Process**, which was too heavily tilted in favor of the **European Union** countries. This UfM

seeks a multilateral partnership toward regional integration and cohesion among member states. From the Middle East, it includes Algeria, **Egypt**, Israel, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, Morocco, Palestine, **Syria**, **Turkey**, and Tunisia. While Libya is given observer status, the **Arab League** is a permanent invitee. The membership of Syria was suspended in June 2011 following the outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria**. The tangible progress of the UfM in reaching its objectives was undermined by frequent bouts of violence, and no summit meetings have been held since 2008.

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS (USSR). *See* RUSSIA.

UNIT 101. This was a special unit of the **Israel Defense Forces** formed in 1953 and led by Col. **Ariel Sharon** to undertake punitive attacks against neighboring Arab states from where **Fedayeen** forces were operating against Israel. The **Qibya raid** in October 1953 was carried out by this unit.
See also WARFARE.

UNITED ARAB KINGDOM. Having consolidated his position following the **Black September Massacre**, on 15 March 1972 King **Hussein** of **Jordan** outlined a reconciliatory posture toward the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and its leader **Yasser Arafat**. He called for the formation of a United Arab Kingdom comprising two regions: the East Bank—that is, Jordan—and a Palestinian region consisting of "the **West Bank** and any other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants desire to join it." Under this plan, **Jerusalem** would be the capital of the "Palestine region" and Amman the capital of the Jordan region as well as of the kingdom as a whole.

Sometimes known as the Federation Plan, it was a redefined version of the pre-1967 situation comprising a confederation between the state of Jordan and the West Bank–based Palestinian state. Each region would have executive powers, while sovereignty would rest with the Hashemite king. There would be a unified armed force, with the king as the commander-in-chief. This bid by King Hussein to regain the West Bank he had lost in 1967 did not go down well with the Palestinians, who were still furious about the events of Black September, when scores of Palestinians were killed by the Jordanian army and the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan. The idea of a united Jordanian–Palestinian entity has frequently resurfaced, and Israel's **Labor Party** long advocated the "**Jordan Option**."

See also JORDAN IS PALESTINE; JORDANIAN DISENGAGEMENT; LONDON AGREEMENT; RABAT ARAB SUMMIT.

UNITED NATIONS (UN). Ever since the government of **Great Britain** headed by Prime Minister Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) referred the Palestine question to it, the UN has occupied a prime place in the Arab–Israeli conflict. Acting on the British request, the UN General Assembly convened a special session in April 1947 and, on 15 May, appointed an 11-member **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine** (UNSCOP) to resolve the issue. On 3 September, the UNSCOP submitted two different recommendations regarding the future of **Mandate Palestine**; a seven-member majority recommended partition of Palestine, and a three-member minority report authored by **India** recommended a **Federal Plan** as the solution. After intense negotiations and lobbying from both sides, on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly voted to partition Palestine.

As the British deadline for withdrawal from Palestine neared, Arab–Jewish violence in Palestine was growing. In April 1948 the UN held the Second Special Session of the General Assembly to deliberate on a proposal from the **United States** to postpone the implementation of the **Partition Plan**. However, the Israeli **Declaration of Independence** and the subsequent outbreak of full-scale hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors forced the UN to abandon those moves and to seek a temporary truce between the combatants. By the time the second truce of the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948** came into force on 18 July 1948, Israel had made significant territorial gains and consolidated its military-political position.

Since then, the UN has been undertaking numerous unsuccessful efforts to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict. Its efforts partially succeeded in 1949, when **Armistice Agreements** were signed between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This temporary arrangement, however, did not transform into a lasting peace agreement. As a result, the UN sponsored a number of international peacekeeping forces that sought to maintain, monitor, or ensure compliance with the Armistice Agreements as well as cease-fire arrangements following the **Suez War**, the **June War of 1967**, and the **October War of 1973**.

The formation of the **United Nations Relief and Works Agency** in 1950 marked a significant institutional effort by the UN to ensure the welfare of Arabs who had become **refugees** following the 1948 War. Through **Resolution 194**, adopted in December 1948, the UN recognized the right of the Palestinian refugees to return home or to be paid compensation. **Resolution 242** of 1967 and **Resolution 338** of 1973 eventually emerged as the basic framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East that would be acceptable to all parties.

The UN, especially the General Assembly, played a major role in the internationalization of the plight of the Palestinians and the recognition of their right of self-determination. In 1974, **Resolution 3236** accorded observer status to the **Palestine Liberation Organization**. Continuing with its pro-

Arab stance brought about by the countries belonging to the **Non-Aligned Movement** in 1975, the General Assembly adopted **Resolution 3379** that equated **Zionism** with racism.

The success of UN peace initiatives has been negligible. Great power rivalry, lack of imaginative leadership, absence of influence, and Israeli reservations over the fairness of the world body have impeded the UN from playing any significant role in the peacemaking efforts in the Middle East. The major peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, such as the **Camp David Accords**, **Oslo Accords**, **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**, **Israel–Jordan Peace Agreement**, **Sinai I Agreement**, **Sinai II Agreement**, and **Disengagement Agreement** between Israel and **Syria** were all concluded outside the UN framework. Likewise, the UN had no role in the **Madrid Conference**, which was co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The outbreak of the **Second Lebanon War** on 12 July 2006 forced the UN to act, albeit with its usual compunctions. **Lebanon** faced severe destruction of its civilian infrastructure, large-scale internal displacement of people, and an exodus of refugees to neighboring Syria. Rockets fired by **Hezbollah** also created large-scale internal displacement within Israel. After intense negotiations on 11 August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted **Resolution 1701**, which brought the conflict to an end. Among other things, it called for the strengthening of the size and mandate of the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon** and the disarming of all militia in Lebanon, including Hezbollah. While the former was made possible with the addition of more troops, the disarming of Hezbollah has not happened. The political influence and military strength of Hezbollah have prevented the weak Lebanese government from implementing its disarmament.

In the wake of the **Cast Lead Operation** in December 2008–January 2009 and the accusations of human rights violations and **war crimes**, in April 2009 the UN appointed an international inquiry commission headed by **Richard Goldstone**. On 15 September, the **Goldstone Report** accused Israel of resorting to disproportionate use of force and deliberately targeting the civilian population in the Gaza Strip. The commission also accused the Palestinian militant group **Hamas** of war crimes. The report was endorsed by the UN, but subsequent retractions of some of its crucial observations by Goldstone significantly dented its findings.

The killing of 10 people, including 9 Turkish citizens, by the **Israel Defense Forces** during the *Mavi Marmara* **Affair** on 31 May 2010 led to political tension between Israel and **Turkey**. Toward resolving the issue, on 2 August 2010 the UN appointed an international commission headed by Sir Geoffrey Palmer (1942–), former prime minister of New Zealand. The **Palmer Report** published on 2 September 2011 equally blamed Israel and Turkey for their handling of the **Freedom Flotilla** and the *Mavi Marmara* Affair and

for their failure to prevent the bloodshed. The Palmer Report, however, upheld Israel's legal right to impose the **Siege of Gaza**, which precipitated the problem.

On 29 November 2012, coinciding with the Partition Plan approved in 1947, the UN approved the application of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) for non-member **observer state** status for the **State of Palestine**. This was supported by 138 votes to 9, with 41 abstentions and 5 absences. Along with Israel, the United States and Canada voted against the resolution, while Australia, Britain, and **Germany** abstained. A number of **European Union** countries including **France** voted for the resolution. PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** abandoned his earlier move in 2011 for full membership because the United States expressed its opposition and threatened to exercise its veto power in the Security Council.

The **Arab Spring** has exposed the limitations of the UN and the Security Council. The adoption of Resolution 1973 facilitated the no-fly zone in Libya led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which culminated in the overthrow and killing of Muammar Qaddafi (1942–2011). This regime change prevented **Russia** and **China** from approving similar moves on Syria. In February 2012 the Security Council appointed former secretary-general Kofi Annan (1938–) as the joint UN–Arab League special envoy for the Syrian crisis. Upon his resignation in August, Lakhdar Brahimi (1934–), former foreign minister of Algeria, was appointed and resigned in May 2014. Neither of them was able to bring about any change on the ground. The UN estimates that between March 2011, when popular protests broke out in Syria, and July 2013, over 100,000 people were killed, and by September 2013 at least 6.5 million Syrians were displaced or had become refugees.

See also BERNADOTTE PLAN; GENEVA CONFERENCE (1971); GENEVA CONFERENCE (1973); GENEVA CONFERENCE (1983); GENEVA UNITED NATIONS SESSION; GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE; JARRING MISSION; JENIN CONTROVERSY; MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS (MAC); PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC); PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE; RESOLUTION 425; RESOLUTION 3210; SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR JERUSALEM; TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON (TIPH); TRUCE COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE; TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL; UN COMMISSION; UN MEDIATOR; UN MEMBERSHIP; UN PALESTINE COMMISSION; UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UNDOF); UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE I (UNEF I); UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II); UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC); UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO).

UNITED NATIONS DISENGAGEMENT OBSERVER FORCE (UN-DOF). Following the conclusion of the **Disengagement Agreement** between Israel and **Syria** of 31 May 1974, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 350 to establish a peacekeeping force to monitor the implementation of the agreement. This paved the way for the formation of UNDOF, whose jurisdiction extends from Mount Hermon to the northern **Jordan River**. Though originally intended for six months, the mandate of UNDOF has been extended periodically. Because of the absence of any skirmishes in its area, it is considered one of the more successful peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN.

Following the normalization of relations with Israel, from December 1998 **India** has been contributing troops to UNDOF. The outbreak of the **Arab Spring in Syria** and the spread of violence to the **Golan Heights** in November 2012 caused concerns over the presence of UNDOF. Citing security concerns in March 2013, Croatia pulled out of UNDOF and was followed by the Philippines after four of its soldiers were briefly kidnapped by the rebel forces in May. Austria withdrew its troops in June following a battle close to the UN positions on the Golan Heights. India also expressed concerns over the safety of its 190-member contingent, while **Russia** offered to join UNDOF and to contribute troops.

See also OCTOBER WAR OF 1973; UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL).

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE I (UNEF I). In the aftermath of the **Suez War**, the **United Nations** decided to establish a peacekeeping force along the borders of Israel and **Egypt** until a peace settlement could be reached. On 5 November 1956, even before Israel agreed to withdraw the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) from the **Sinai Peninsula**, UN General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-1) called for the formation of an emergency force that would act as a buffer between the two sides. The temporary armed police force was asked to secure the cessation of hostilities and supervise the ceasefire; to ensure an orderly withdrawal of the forces of **Great Britain**, **France**, and Israel from the Egyptian territory; to patrol the Egyptian–Israeli border; and to ensure the observance of the Egypt–Israel Armistice. On 7 November, the General Assembly defined the scope of the UNEF activities and its composition. The first UNEF units were deployed along the **Suez Canal** on 15 November 1956 and in the **Gaza Strip** on 7 March 1957, following the withdrawal of the IDF.

According to the General Assembly resolution, the force was to be deployed on either side of the Egypt–Israel border, but because of the Israeli refusal to cooperate, it was deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border. In May 1967, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of Egypt demanded a partial UNEF withdrawal from **Sharm al-Sheikh** overlooking the **Gulf of Aqaba**.

When the UN refused to accept the request for a partial pullout, on 18 May Egypt demanded the complete withdrawal of the peacekeeping force. On the same day, Israel rejected an urgent UN request to reconsider its earlier position and accept the UNEF on its side of the international border. Since the peacekeeping force was not an occupation army, UN secretary-general U Thant (1909–1974) had no option but to comply with the Egyptian request. Even before the UNEF units could be completely withdrawn from the region, the **June War of 1967** broke out, and some peacekeepers contributed by **India** were killed in the initial Israeli offensive on the Gaza Strip.

See also GOOD FAITH AIDE MEMOIRE.

UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE II (UNEF II). On 25 October 1973, following the **October War of 1973**, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 340 establishing the second UN Emergency Force to be deployed between the forces of Israel and **Egypt**. Since Israel was still occupying the **Sinai Peninsula**, the deployment was confined to occupied Egyptian territories. Because of the bitter experiences of **United Nations Emergency Force I**, the resolution maintained that any decision concerning the withdrawal of the peacekeeping force could not be made unilaterally by either of the belligerents but must be approved by the Security Council.

On 27 October, the first units of UNEF II were deployed on the western banks of the **Suez Canal**. Following the conclusion of the Egypt–Israel **Disengagement Agreement** signed at **Kilometer 101** on 18 January 1974, the mandate of UNEF II was extended to supervise the agreement. The Security Council periodically extended the six-month mandate for the peacekeeping force. The conclusion of the **Camp David Accords** generated tension and differences between the **United States** and other members of the Security Council because the security provisions enshrined in the accords undermined the position of UNEF II. As a result, on 24 July 1979, the Security Council declined to extend the mandate of UNEF II and allowed the peacekeeping force to lapse. Due to Israeli opposition to the deployment of the **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization** to undertake the functions of UNEF II, as agreed in the Camp David Accords, a U.S.-sponsored **Multinational Force and Observers** was created instead.

UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC). An intergovernmental body of the **United Nations**, the UNHRC is the successor to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). On 15 March 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to establish the UNHRC because of prolonged criticisms against UNCHR over the human rights records of a number of member states.

The UN members elect the 47-member UNHRC for a three-year term. The membership is distributed among the UN groupings as follows: 13 each for Asia and Africa, 8 for Latin America and the Caribbean, 7 for Western European and other groups, and 6 for Eastern Europe. The UN General Assembly has the power to suspend any member from the UNHRC if it decides that the country in question has persistently committed gross and systematic violations of human rights during its term with the council.

Since its formation in 2006 and until July 2014, out of the 103 resolutions adopted by UNHRC, 56 were directed against Israel. Amid the **Protective Edge Operation**, on 23 July the UNHRC adopted a resolution, with 29 out of 47 members voting in favor, to set up a commission of inquiry into possible violation of laws of war by Israel. While 17 countries including **Germany**, **France**, and **Great Britain** abstained, the **United States** was the only country to vote against the resolution. Subsequently the UNHRC appointed a three-member commission headed by Canadian law professor William Schabas and consisting of attorney Mary McGowan Davis of the United States and Doudou Dienne of Senegal.

See also GOLDSTONE, RICHARD J. (1938–); GOLDSTONE REPORT; WAR CRIMES.

UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON (UNIFIL). UNIFIL is an international peacekeeping force created by the **United Nations** in 1978 as a response to Israel's military operations against **Lebanon** codenamed the **Litani Operation**. On 15 March 1978, four days after the Israeli invasion, the UN Security Council adopted **Resolution 425**, which called for the formation of an interim international peacekeeping force "for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces" from southern Lebanon. It sought to restore peace and security in the region and to enable the Lebanese government, torn apart by the civil war (1975–1989), to regain effective authority over southern Lebanon, from where Palestinian **Fedayeen** had been carrying out periodic attacks against northern Israel.

Headquartered in Naqoura in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL was originally entrusted with monitoring territories bounded by the Israel–Lebanon border in the south, the **Litani River** in the north, the Mediterranean Sea in the west, and the Lebanon–**Syria** border in the east. Due to Israeli opposition, however, it was never allowed to operate in the Christian-dominated southernmost zone, which in 1985 became Israel's self-declared **security zone**.

A number of factors have impeded the functioning of UNIFIL, including Israeli distrust of the UN, its retaliatory tactics against Palestinian violence across the international border, and the weakness of the central authority in Lebanon to enforce its writ in southern Lebanon. Moreover, a peacekeeping

force has neither the mandate nor the ability to respond to the growth of various paramilitary organizations and militia such as **Amal**, **Hezbollah**, and the **South Lebanese Army** within the UNIFIL-designated areas.

Composed of military personnel from various countries, UNIFIL remains one of the largest peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN. While containing the overall situation, it has been unable to prevent periodic escalations of tension in the region. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (the **Peace for Galilee Operation**) and its military offensives in 1993 and 1996 (the **Accountability Operation** and the **Grapes of Wrath Operation**, respectively) occurred against the backdrop of the UNIFIL presence. An accidental Israeli missile attack on a UNIFIL position in Kfar Kana on 18 April 1996 resulted in the deaths of more than 100 Lebanese citizens who had taken refuge at the position in what became known as the **Kfar Kana Massacre**.

Conceived as an "interim" arrangement, UNIFIL has become a permanent fixture in the Middle East, and its original six-month mandate has been renewed numerous times. Its operations continued despite the unilateral Israeli **Lebanese withdrawal** in May 2000, the primary mandate of Resolution 425. In August 2001, the strength of UNIFIL was reduced from 7,900 to 4,500, and by 2002 it had stabilized at 2,000 personnel.

UNIFIL regained its relevance and importance in the wake of the 34-day **Second Lebanon War**. The UN Security Council **Resolution 1701** adopted on 11 August 2006 increased its strength to 15,000 personnel and authorized the force to take "all necessary action" to prevent any hostile activity in areas under its control. While the Israel–Lebanon border has remained quiet since 2006, the disarming of militias, another demand of Resolution 1701, has not happened because of strong resistance from Hezbollah. In the wake of normalization of relations with Israel, in December 1998 **India** began contributing troops to UNIFIL as well as to the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force**.

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA). This is an organization of the **United Nations** established to assist the Palestinians who became **refugees** due to the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. Upon the recommendations of acting **UN mediator** Ralph J. Bunche (1904–1971) on 19 November 1948, the UN General Assembly authorized the secretary-general to establish a special fund and an "administrative organization" toward "the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees." The General Assembly declared that such an agency would work toward "the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities," but in practice, it was concerned exclusively with the Palestinians who became

refugees following the 1948 war. This initial arrangement was intended for nine months between December 1948 and August 1949, but it gradually became permanent due to the prolongation of the conflict.

Immediately after the hostilities, the UN sent an economic survey mission to the region, which proposed the establishment of an organization to temporarily assist the estimated 700,000 Palestinian refugees. Despite the existence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, an exclusive arrangement was proposed. Thus, through Resolution 302 adopted on 8 December 1949, the General Assembly established UNRWA, which began functioning from 1 May 1950.

With its headquarters in Gaza, UNRWA is mandated to provide housing, food, medical services, primary health care, education, essential relief, and vocational training to Palestinian refugees living in the **West Bank** and the **Gaza Strip**, as well as in neighboring Arab countries such as **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, and **Syria**.

The UNRWA recognized as refugees anyone who was a resident of Palestine for at least two years before the 1948 conflict and who had fled following the outbreak of hostilities. In 1950, 914,221 refugees were registered with UNRWA. Another 300,000 were made homeless following the **June War of 1967**; by the end of that year, the UNRWA-registered refugee count stood at just under four million.

As of 2014 the total number of registered Palestinian refugees stood at five million, and they were located in 59 official camps maintained by UNRWA; out of these, 10 were in Jordan, 9 in Syria, 12 in Lebanon, 19 in the West Bank, and 8 in the Gaza Strip. In terms of distribution, close to two million reside in the refugee camps in Jordan, and about half a million live in Lebanon and Syria.

Critics have argued that, since its inception, UNRWA has never conducted any census in the refugee camps, and hence the refugee figures are inflated. Contrary to the agency's mandate, some Palestinian militant groups have operated from UNRWA-run refugee camps, a complaint highlighted during the **Jenin Controversy** in April 2002.

During the **Cast Lead Operation** in December–January 2009, a number of UNRWA installations in the Gaza Strip such as schools came under Israeli attacks; 18 schools were completely destroyed and over 260 damaged during the conflict. Israel justified these attacks saying the Palestinian militant group **Hamas** was firing **Qassam** rockets into Israel from areas close to the UNRWA camps. These allegations were subsequently proved to be unsubstantiated by internal inquiry by the **Israel Defense Forces**.

UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UN-SCOP). Unable to adopt a policy satisfactory to both the Arabs and Jews, on 2 April 1947 **Great Britain** asked the newly formed **United Nations** to find a solution to the future of **Mandate Palestine**. Acting on the British request, the UN convened the First Special Session of the General Assembly on 28 April to discuss the issue. After prolonged and serious deliberations, the assembly on 15 May voted by 47 to 7 votes (with one abstention) to establish an 11-member UNSCOP to resolve the issue. Opposition to the formation of UNSCOP came from the Arab members of the UN—namely, **Egypt**, **Iraq**, **Lebanon**, **Saudi Arabia**, and **Syria**, and the two Islamic countries, Afghanistan and **Turkey**.

The UN committee consisted of Australia, Canada, the then Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, **India**, **Iran**, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. During the visit of UNSCOP to Palestine, the leaders of the **Yishuv** deposed before the committee, but the Palestinian leadership largely boycotted it. The committee also visited Beirut to hear the views of the neighboring Arab states. On 3 September, UNSCOP submitted its recommendations to the UN and unanimously recommended the termination of the British Mandate and the granting of independence to Palestine. The committee was divided over the future status of Palestine, however. A seven-member majority advocated partition of Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab states, with international status for **Jerusalem**, while a three-member minority (India, Iran, and Yugoslavia) recommended the formation of a federal Palestine with Arabs and Jews enjoying considerable internal autonomy.

The majority **Partition Plan** was acceptable to the Jewish leadership but was rejected by the Arabs and Palestinians. Both Arabs and Jews rejected the minority **Federal Plan**, and it was dropped from consideration by the UN. Acting on the UNSCOP report, the General Assembly set up two sub-committees, one to draft a viable Partition Plan and the other to consider the Arab counter-proposal for a unitary Palestine. On 24 November, the ad hoc committee of the General Assembly rejected the unitary plan proposal and recommended the Partition Plan to the full assembly. On 29 November, by a two-thirds margin (33 to 13, with 10 abstentions), Resolution 181, recommending the partition of Palestine, was adopted.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948; ARMISTICE AGREEMENT/S (1949).

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO). On 29 May 1948, within days after the first cease-fire in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, the **United Nations** Security Council adopted Resolution 50 establishing a logistical mechanism to provide advisory and observation support to the **Jerusalem**-based **Truce Commission for Palestine**. In 1948, the UNTSO, consisting of military observers, was sent to the

Middle East to supervise the truce and cease-fire arrangements between Israel and neighboring Arab states. On 11 August 1949, the Security Council mandated UNTSO to "observe and maintain" the cease-fire and to assist the parties "in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms" of the **Armistice Agreements**. The UNTSO thus supervised the implementation of the Armistice Agreements and chaired the **Mixed Armistice Commissions** between Israel and various Arab states.

Subsequent military conflicts strengthened UNTSO's activities. Following the **Suez War** of 1956, the UNTSO personnel patrolled the **Sinai Peninsula** and supported the **United Nations Emergency Force I** (UNEF I), which was deployed on the Egyptian side of the border with Israel. It became inoperative following the **June War of 1967**. Though ineffective, UNTSO continued to monitor cease-fire arrangements following the **October War of 1973**. In 1973, it contributed to the formation of the **United Nations Emergency Force II** in the Sinai and the **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force** in the **Golan Heights**. Later in the 1970s, UNTSO was attached to the **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon**. With headquarters in Jerusalem, UNTSO observers are located in Beirut and the Golan Heights. Despite the **Camp David Accords** and the presence of the **United States**–led **Multinational Force and Observers**, UNTSO observers are still present in the Sinai.

UNITED STATES. Since the early 20th century, the United States has been a major player in the Middle East, especially in Arab–Israeli peacemaking efforts. After World War I (1914–1918), the Zionists shifted their focus from **Great Britain** to the United States as the principal arena of their diplomatic activities toward establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. By the time the **Biltmore Program** was outlined in 1942, the demographic strength of the **Yishuv** had grown considerably, and the idea of self-determination for the Jews in Palestine seemed a feasible and realistic option.

This strategy proved effective when the United States supported, endorsed, and lobbied for the **Partition Plan** proposed by the **United Nations Special Committee on Palestine**. The violence in Palestine following the 29 November 1947 General Assembly vote, however, compelled the United States to reconsider its position, and it advocated the suspension of the Partition Plan. On the eve of the British departure, the Yishuv leaders met and declared the establishment of the State of Israel. Overriding the advice of the State Department, President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) recognized the Jewish state within minutes, and this move was followed by other countries.

At least in the initial years, the United States followed a cautious policy and sought to balance its Israel policy within the larger context of its friendly ties with the Arab world. Its desire to exclude Israel from the **Baghdad Pact** and the disapproval of President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) of the

tripartite aggression against **Egypt** in the **Suez War** were a clear indication of this. Despite its disappointments with **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of Egypt over the **Czech Deal**, as well as the **nationalization of the Suez Canal**, which precipitated the Suez War, the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961) forced Israel to pull out from the **Sinai Peninsula** and the **Gaza Strip**.

However, things began to change and reached a decisive level on the eve of the **June War of 1967**. Washington began to understand and accommodate the Israeli position. The spectacular military victory of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) consecrated a pro-Israeli bias in U.S. policy. Sidelining the **United Nations**, the United States began to play a greater role in the management of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The adoption of **Resolution 242** of the UN Security Council, despite its built-in ambiguity, was only possible because of strong American efforts.

The military setbacks suffered by Israel during the early days of the **October War of 1973** compelled the Richard Nixon administration (1969–1974) to provide massive arms supplies to Israel. This unprecedented move provoked the Arab states to institute an oil embargo against the United States and its allies. The United States not only weathered the **oil crisis** but also succeeded in having Israel accept limited **Disengagement Agreements** with Egypt and **Syria**. Furthermore, it managed to wean Egypt away from the Soviet Union and secure the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**. Similar attempts with **Lebanon**, such as the **Israel–Lebanon Agreement**, however, did not succeed.

Serious disagreements with Israel over issues such as the status of **Jerusalem**, **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories**, and the rights of Palestinians did not impede various U.S. administrations from pursuing a policy sympathetic toward the Jewish state. In 1975, Washington even agreed not to recognize or negotiate with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) until the latter recognized Israel's right to exist.

The **Kuwait War**, coming on the heels of the end of the Cold War and the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union, offered an opportunity for the United States to monopolize peacemaking in the Middle East through the **Madrid Conference**. Even though Norway played a key role in the formulation of the **Declaration of Principles**, U.S. president **Bill Clinton** hosted the signing ceremony. Since then, the United States has become the main force behind the **Oslo Process**, as well as various other peace efforts between Israel and its neighbors. In 1994, the Jordanian track culminated in the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty**, but progress on the Syrian (**Shepherdstown Talks**) and Lebanese tracks was minimal.

The failure of the **Camp David Talks** in July 2000 between Prime Minister **Ehud Barak** and Chairman **Yasser Arafat** led to the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. With the onset of violence, the United States strengthened its efforts to secure a comprehensive peace, promoting the **Clinton Parameters**,

the **Mitchell Committee Report**, and the **Sharm al-Sheikh Summit (2000)**, but was unsuccessful. Following the election of **George W. Bush** in 2000, Washington became less involved in the peace process. However, periodic **suicide attacks** compelled the United States to unveil a number of measures for Israeli–Palestinian reconciliation, including the **Bush Plan**, the **Quartet Road Map**, and the **Tenet Plan**.

Since the June War, while not all American efforts were fruitful, any meaningful peace agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors invariably demanded active U.S. involvement and commitment. The United States also campaigned vigorously for the dilution and removal of the **Arab Boycott of Israel** and was instrumental in organizing the **MENA Economic Summits**.

President Bush shared the view of Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** regarding **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) chairman Yasser Arafat and his lack of commitments for a peace settlement with Israel. Hence, the United States did not exercise any influence over Israel when Arafat was confined to his headquarters during the **Siege of Ramallah**. Protracted American demands eventually resulted in Arafat creating a post of prime minister in the PNA and naming **Mahmoud Abbas** (March–September 2003) and later **Ahmed Queri** (September 2003–December 2005) to the position. Under President Bush, Arafat never visited the United States or interacted with senior American officials. Abbas represented the PNA at the **Aqaba Summit** held on 4 June 2003, also attended by President Bush, King **Abdullah II** of **Jordan**, and Prime Minister Sharon.

U.S. support for the **Abdullah Plan** and the **Arab Peace Initiative** was lukewarm. The Abdullah Plan did not figure in Bush's June 2002 speech that for the first time committed explicit American support for a Palestinian state. The United States played an important role in delaying UN Security Council moves following the outbreak of the **Second Lebanon War** in the summer of 2006. **Resolution 1701** was adopted unanimously on 11 August 2006, more than 30 days after the outbreak of the conflict between the IDF and **Hezbollah**.

The invasion of **Iraq** in March 2003, subsequent sectarian violence in that country, and regional concerns over **nuclear Iran** led to the United States' hosting the **Annapolis Conference** on 27 November 2007. Despite some reservations, the conference was attended by all the major countries of the Middle East including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and **Saudi Arabia** as well as by **China**, the **European Union**, **India**, **Russia**, and the **Arab League**. However, **Iran** and Syria were not invited.

The election of **Barack Obama** as president in November 2008 marked some shifts in the U.S. posture toward the Arab–Israeli conflict. Though committed to Israel's security, the administration began publicly expressing its disagreements with the Israeli government on a number of issues. Differ-

ences between the two, especially after the election of **Benjamin Netanyahu** as prime minister in March 2009, revolved around nuclear Iran, settlements, and the pace of political negotiations with the Palestinians. Obama's observation in May 2011 that the **Green Line** be the basis for any agreement between Israel and the PNA evoked strong criticism from Israeli leaders.

The Obama administration's handling of the Iranian nuclear controversy came under greater Israeli scrutiny. Obama appeared to endorse the more cautious approach on Iran suggested by President **Shimon Peres** and senior members of the Israeli security establishment than the one pushed by Prime Minister Netanyahu. The United States was highly critical of the **Goldstone Report** that examined the conduct of the IDF and **Hamas** during the **Cast Lead Operation** and accused the United Nations of continued bias against Israel. The threat of a U.S. veto prevented the 2011 bid by the PNA for full membership in the UN. Circumventing the need for Security Council approval, on 29 November 2012 the General Assembly approved the Palestinian application for non-member **observer state** status similar to the one enjoyed by the Vatican.

The outbreak of the **Arab Spring** exposed fault lines in the U.S. Middle East policy. At one level, it was slow in responding to the popular protests and yearning for change in the Middle East, especially in Egypt. At another level, its public statements forced the military in Egypt to abandon President **Hosni Mubarak**, thereby forcing him to resign. The Obama administration's willingness to engage with the Islamists during the brief tenure of President **Mohammed Morsi** has come under criticism. The United States was initially reluctant to intervene in Libya and has been unwilling to exercise greater pressure on Bahrain for political reforms. U.S. efforts to secure the support of the UN Security Council on the **Arab Spring in Syria** were throttled by the exercise of veto power by Russia and China.

After weeks of shuttle diplomacy to the region and meetings with key figures, U.S. secretary of state John Kerry (1943–) managed to restart the Israeli–PNA negotiations, which began in Washington on 29 July 2013, after a gap of almost three years. Both sides agreed to continue the talks toward concluding an agreement on all major issues within nine months. The negotiations were led by **Tzipi Livni** on the Israeli side and Saeb Erakat (1955–) on the Palestinian side, but these efforts were unsuccessful.

The economic downturn and the two costly and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seriously undermined American influence in the Middle East. If the United States is unable to influence Israel beyond a point, the number of its allies in the region has also dwindled. Its growing disagreements with its allies such as Saudi Arabia and **Turkey** are not related to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The absence of an effective policy regarding the Arab

Spring, the Iranian nuclear controversy, and the civil war in Syria have significantly undermined the American ability to play a leadership role in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Over the years a number of Jewish and Muslim groups have been proscribed as terrorist by the United States because of their involvement in various acts of terrorism. These include Hamas (April 1993), Hezbollah (October 1997), and **Kach** (October 1997). Until the Madrid Conference, even the PLO was proscribed as terrorist.

See also ALPHA PLAN; ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE; ASWAN DAM; BAKER PLAN; BYPASS ROADS; CARTER, JIMMY (1924–); CHAMELEON OPERATION; EISENHOWER DOCTRINE; FRANCE; GENEVA UNITED NATIONS SESSION; GRAPES OF WRATH OPERATION; ISRAEL–U.S. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MoU); JOHNSON PLAN; JOHNSTON PLAN; JORDAN RIVER; JORDAN VALLEY; KERRY PLAN; KING-CRANE COMMISSION; LOAN GUARANTEES; MORRISON-GRADY PLAN; MULTILATERAL TALKS; MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS (MFO); NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); OMEGA OPERATION; REAGAN PLAN; ROGERS PLAN; SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (1996); SHARM AL-SHEIKH SUMMIT (2000); SHULTZ PLAN; SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY; SINAI I AGREEMENT; SINAI II AGREEMENT; STOCKHOLM DECLARATION; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION; UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (UNHRC); UNITED STATES INITIATIVE; WYE MEMORANDUM; ZIONISM.

UNITED STATES INITIATIVE. In the wake of the stalemated **Jarring Mission** and the unsuccessful **Rogers Plan**, on 19 June 1970, the **United States** unveiled another proposal to end the **War of Attrition** and reduce regional tension. This proposal, communicated to Israel, **Egypt**, and **Jordan** as well as the **Soviet Union**, called for mutual recognition by the warring parties of "each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence" and for "Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict." After initial hesitation, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of Egypt agreed to a 90-day cease-fire and an 80-kilometer standstill zone on either side of the **Suez Canal**. This agreement eventually ended the War of Attrition, and hostilities stopped at midnight on 7 August 1970.

UNITED TORAH JUDAISM (UTJ). The UTJ is a religious bloc in Israel consisting of two *haredi* **parties**—namely, Degal Ha'Torah and Agudat Israel. Both are Ashkenazi parties and are anti-Zionist in their political orientation. They are part of most of the coalitions, but since 1952 members of the bloc have refrained from holding full cabinet positions. The demand of both

parties for a Torah-based Jewish state prevented Prime Minister **David Ben-Gurion** and other leaders from drafting a constitution for Israel. They demanded a strict enforcement of the Sabbath and kosher regulations. Under their influence, yeshiva students are exempted from **conscription** in the **Israel Defense Forces**. This exemption has become a controversial issue in Israeli society. The formation of **Shas** in 1984 was partly a response to the Ashkenazi domination of the *haredi* parties. The UTJ was not part of the government formed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** in March 2013 because of differences over conscription.

See also ZIONISM.

UNITY TALKS. This refers to the inter-Palestinian negotiations toward forging unity and evolving a common approach toward the realization of Palestinian statehood. At the summit meeting of the **Arab League** in Rabat in 1974, the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO) under the leadership of Chairman **Yasser Arafat** was recognized as "the sole legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people. The formation of **Hamas** in 1988 in the wake of the **First Intifada** challenged the monopoly enjoyed by the **Fatah**-dominated PLO. The militant group viewed the issue through a religious prism and argued that the whole of **Mandate Palestine** is a *waqf* property and hence could not be given to or shared with non-Muslims.

The inter-Palestinian disagreement intensified following the **Madrid Conference** and the **Oslo Accords**, and Hamas began challenging all the political institutions headed by Arafat—namely, Fatah, the PLO, and the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA)—formed in the aftermath of the **Declaration of Principles**. The disagreement was manifested in the form of a spate of **suicide attacks** inside the **Green Line** that killed scores of Israeli civilians and evoked strong Israeli reprisal measures such as the periodic closure of the **Occupied Territories**, detention without trial, and denial of access to jobs inside Israel. These in turn increased the hardships of the Palestinians and in the process diluted popular support for the **two-state solution**. These differences intensified in the wake of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, and Israel responded to a new wave of **terrorism** with **targeted killing** and **assassination** of the political leaders of Palestinian militant groups.

Toward overcoming these internal Palestinian differences, since the early 1990s leaders of both sides, primarily Hamas and Fatah, have met frequently with a view to reaching an understanding. Initially a mediatory role was played by the Sudanese Islamist scholar Hassan Turabi (1932–), and this was subsequently taken over by **Egypt** under the leadership of President **Hosni Mubarak** who facilitated the **Cairo Dialogue**. On behalf of Arafat, some of these meetings were attended by the future president of the PNA, **Mahmoud Abbas**, while **Khalid Masha'al** represented Hamas. The differences continued even after the death of Arafat in 2004 and the January 2006 elections

where Hamas won a decisive victory. In March 2006 King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia** brought both sides together and facilitated the **Mecca Accord**. In recent years other players such as **Qatar** and **Mohammed Morsi** have tried to mediate an agreement.

None of these measures were effective, and the **Battle of Gaza** in June 2007 resulted in the military takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. Since then the Palestinian territories have come under a de facto bifurcation, with Gaza ruled by Hamas and the **West Bank** ruled by the Fatah-dominated PNA. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, negotiations within the context of the Middle East peace process refer to inter-Palestinian negotiations for unity rather than Israeli–Palestinian negotiations for a political settlement.

See also HUDNA; SULH.

UVDA OPERATION. On 5 March 1949, within days of signing the **Armistice Agreement** with **Egypt**, Israel launched military operations in the southern Negev and captured additional territories. By the time the Uvda Operation ended on 10 March, Israel had extended its boundaries to the **Gulf of Aqaba** and secured a sea route from the south.

See also ARAB–ISRAELI WAR OF 1948; JORDAN; WARFARE.

V

VANUNU AFFAIR. Based on information revealed by Mordechai Vanunu (1954–), a former technician at the Negev nuclear research facility in Dimona, in October 1986 the *Sunday Times* (London) claimed that Israel had developed thermonuclear weapons. This revelation confirmed long-held suspicions about Israel's nuclear capabilities and the extent of its nuclear arsenal. Shortly after this disclosure, Vanunu was kidnapped from Europe, brought to Israel, and tried for treason. In March 1988, he was given an 18-year prison term for disclosing Israel's nuclear secrets. Until 1998, he was kept in solitary confinement. Vanunu was released on 21 April 2004, still with severe restrictions on his movements and activities; among other things, he was prevented from leaving Israel. In May 2005, fresh charges were filed against Vanunu following a media interview.

   See also NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); NUCLEAR SYRIA; ORCHARD OPERATION; OSIRAQ BOMBING; PLUMBAT OPERATION; SAMSON OPTION.

VATICAN. For long the relations between the Vatican and the State of Israel have been complex and tense. The role of Pope Pius XII (1876–1958) during the Second World War (1939–1945) was partly compensated by the Vatican's support for the **Partition Plan** in 1947, which paved the way for the creation of Israel. This was not followed by the Vatican's recognition of the Jewish state. The historic and theological tensions between the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish people improved during the papacy of Paul VI (1897–1978) who remained the pope from 1963 to 1978. Through the *Nostra Aetate* (literally meaning "In Our Age" in Latin, this redefines the relations of the Catholic Church with non-Christian religions) issued on 28 October 1965, he observed that the death and crucifixion of Jesus Christ "cannot be charged against all Jews, without distinction, then alive, nor against the Jews of today." Afterward various Israeli leaders, including prime ministers **Golda Meir**, **Yitzhak Shamir**, **Yitzhak Rabin**, and **Shimon Peres**, have met the pope. The normalization of relations between Israel and

the Vatican took place on 30 December 1993 following the **Madrid Conference** and the **Oslo Accords**. The Vatican concluded a similar agreement with the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) on 15 February 2000.

Despite the improvements, there were periodic tensions between Israel and the Vatican over issues such as **settlements**, the appointment of Palestinians to senior church positions, the role of the Vatican during the Second World War, and the beatification of Pope Pius XII. These were partly governed by the Vatican's concerns for the welfare of the diminishing Christian community in the Middle East. From 1948 the Vatican has been supportive of the Palestinians, and **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** met Pope Paul II in 1987.

Since the establishment of Israel, there have been four papal visits to the Holy Land. In January 1964 Paul VI visited Israel and **Jordan** when **East Jerusalem** was under the occupation of the Hashemite Kingdom. In March 2000 Pope John Paul II (1920–2005) visited Israel and the PNA-controlled **Bethlehem** and Jordan. The third visit to the region was undertaken by Pope Benedict XVI (1927–) in May 2009. The fourth papal visit took place in May 2014 when Pope Francis (1936–) visited the region and invited Israel's president Shimon Peres and PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** to join him in the Vatican to pray for peace.

VENICE DECLARATION. On 13 June 1980, at the summit meeting of the European Council (the forerunner of the **European Union**) held in Venice, the member states adopted a declaration on the Middle East outlining the council's policy toward finding a "comprehensive solution" to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The conclusion of the **Camp David Accords** and the lack of progress on the Palestinian track provided the backdrop to this declaration, which has since guided European policies toward the region. Recognizing the right of "existence and security" of all the states in the region, the Venice Declaration ruled that the Palestinian problem was more than "simply one of **refugees**," and it recognized the right of the Palestinian people "to exercise fully its right to self-determination." All nine members of the council expressed their determination not to accept "any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of **Jerusalem**." The declaration demanded that the **Palestine Liberation Organization** be "associated with the negotiations" that seek to establish and promote peace in the Middle East. It declared the Israeli **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** to be "illegal under international law." The Israeli government headed by **Menachem Begin** reacted angrily to the Venice Declaration and dismissed it as an appeasement of the Arabs and a move calculated to undermine the Camp David Accords.

VILLAGE LEAGUE. In an attempt to marginalize the **Palestine Libera-tion Organization** (PLO) and to encourage an alternative Palestinian leader-ship that would take control of the civil, economic, and social life of the **Occupied Territories**, in the early 1980s the Israeli government headed by **Menachem Begin** encouraged the formation of the Village League. Largely drawn from conservative rural figures in the **West Bank**, the league was meant to be a substitute to the PLO-dominated nationalist leadership. Con-ceived by Menachem Milson (1933–), who in November 1981 took over as the new head of the **civil administration** in the West Bank, the Village League sought to create a pliant Palestinian leadership that would accept, co-exist with, and facilitate Israeli occupation.

Besides financial incentives, the league members were provided protection and personal arms. In late 1982, Israel even organized a thinly attended convention of all Village League members in **Hebron**. This arrangement, however, failed to function. Perceived by the majority of Palestinians as collaborators, the members of the league lived under perpetual threat and were socially ostracized. In March 1982, **Jordan** threatened to impose the death penalty on league members. Accused of being traitors to the Palestin-ian cause, they gradually became reluctant to accept Israeli dictates and began to lose their limited influence. As a result, Israel disengaged from the Village League and proscribed it in 1983.

VOLCANO OPERATION. The conclusion of the **Czech Deal** by **Egypt** and bellicose statements by Arab leaders provided an opportunity for Israel to test its new strategy of limited "reprisal raids" aimed at provoking **Gamal Abdel Nasser** into launching an all-out war. Thus, on 2 November 1955, the **Israel Defense Forces** launched an attack on As-Sabha in the Egyptian side of the Al-Auja demilitarized zone. The limited raid, code-named Volcano, took place far from the **Gaza Strip**, the hotbed of **Fedayeen** attacks, and resulted in the deaths of 70 Egyptians and 7 Israeli soldiers and the wounding of dozens, as well as the capture of 50 Egyptian prisoners of war. Israeli prime minister **David Ben-Gurion** overruled the plans of Gen. **Moshe Day-an** to hold on to the Egyptian position. The attack was the most extensive Israeli operation inside Egypt since the **Armistice Agreement** of 1949.

See also GAZA RAID; SUEZ WAR; TRIPARTITE DECLARATION; WARFARE.

W

WAR CRIMES. The Hague convention of 1907 defines war crimes as a serious violation of customary international laws governing wars and conflicts, and states that the right of belligerent states "to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." Crimes such as mass murder, ill treatment, **deportation** of civilians from the **Occupied Territories**, rape, or wanton destruction of towns and villages fall under the category of war crimes. The application of these principles became the norm following the Nuremberg trials of 1945 at the end of World War II (1939–1945).

The Arab–Israeli conflict has witnessed the periodic killing of large numbers of Arab and Jewish non-combatants since the early days of **Mandate Palestine**. The **Western Wall Riots** of 1929, the **Hebron Massacre (1929)**, the **Deir Yassin Massacre**, and the retaliatory Mount Scopus Massacre a few days later could be cited as prime examples of large-scale killings of civilians. Since the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, there were other killings such as the **Ma'alot Massacre** and the **Hebron Massacre (1994)**. The expression "war crime" has not been used within the context of inter-state wars such as the **Suez War**, the **June War**, or the **October War**. This was true also for the **Black September Massacre** of 1970, the **Sabra and Shatila Massacre** of Palestinians in 1982, and various acts of **terrorism** committed by many militant Palestinian groups.

The issue of war crimes became prominent following Israel's **Second Lebanon War** with Hezbollah and the **Cast Lead Operation** directed against **Hamas** in the **Gaza Strip**. The killing of civilians and destruction of non-military civilian infrastructure during these two conflicts resulted in many accusing Israel of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The **Goldstone Report**, which looked into the Cast Lead Operation, accused Israel and Hamas of premeditated targeting of the civilian population. Militant groups in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip fighting from, and taking shelter in, densely populated areas considerably weakened the accusation of war crimes leveled against Israel. **Richard Goldstone** who headed the **United Nations Human Rights Council** committee retracted his earlier accusation of premeditated killing of civilians by Israel. Moreover, despite the principal

focus against Israel, the Goldstone Report also accused the non-state Hamas of possible war crimes. As in other issues, the charges of war crimes are highly politicized and lack a fair and balanced treatment.

See also PROTECTIVE EDGE OPERATION; WARFARE.

WAR OF ATTRITION. Amid low-level artillery duels along the **Suez Canal** in July 1969, President **Gamal Abdel Nasser** of **Egypt** declared that "a war of attrition" would be necessary to dislodge Israel from the Arab territories it had occupied during the **June War of 1967**. Following mediation by U.S. secretary of state William Rogers (1913–2001), a three-month-long cease-fire came into force on 7 August 1970, paving the way for indirect Egypt–Israeli negotiations through the **United Nations**–sponsored **Jarring Mission**. The negotiations were called off after the first meeting when Israel pulled out protesting against the movement of missiles supplied by the **Soviet Union** behind the Egyptian lines. The installation of Soviet artillery west of the canal led to tension, and Israel retaliated with a massive air and artillery attack, forcing Egypt to temporarily evacuate Egyptian towns in the Canal Zone. After assuming office, President **Anwar Sadat** of Egypt agreed to a renewed cease-fire after the **United States** promised a $500 million credit to Egypt.

See also SINAI PENINSULA; UNITED STATES INITIATIVE; WARFARE.

WARFARE. The competing Arab and Jewish national claims over **Mandate Palestine** have transformed the dispute into a wider issue affecting the larger Arab and Islamic world. This in turn made warfare an inevitable component of the problem. The determination of the Zionists to secure political rights in their historic homeland of Palestine placed them in conflict with the Arab inhabitants. The Zionists sought to create a Jewish national home in Palestine with the help of **Aliya** from the **Diaspora**. The **Balfour Declaration** of 1917 provided the international guarantees visualized by Theodore Herzl (1860–1904), founder of modern political **Zionism**. The increased flow of Aliya into Palestine, the Zionist drive for land purchase, and the support of **Great Britain** for the Zionist enterprise generated an inevitable conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

In the initial years of the Mandate, the conflict was manifested in the form of periodic inter-communal tension, organized and unorganized riots, and other forms of political violence. Incidents such as the **Western Wall Riots** and the **Hebron Massacre (1929)** resulted in the socialist-Zionist-dominated **Yishuv** organizing into self-defense groups and organizations such as **Hashomer** and **Haganah**. Not to be left out, the Revisionist Zionists also formed their own militant groups such as **Irgun** and the **Stern Gang**. With this,

inter-communal violence became an integral part of Mandate Palestine, forcing Britain to reconsider and eventually abandon its conflicting, contradictory, and irreconcilable promises to both communities.

The **Partition Plan** approved by the **United Nations** General Assembly on 29 November 1947 further aggravated the Jewish–Arab conflict in Palestine and resulted in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**, which at times witnessed the brutal and wanton killing of civilian populations, such as in the **Deir Yassin Massacre** in April 1948 and the killing of scores of Jewish doctors a few days later in **Jerusalem**. The establishment of the Jewish State of Israel on 14 May 1948, hours before the British withdrawal from Palestine, and the declaration of war by neighboring Arab states turned this into an inter-state conflict.

With the official Palestinian leadership, including **Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, residing outside Mandate Palestine, the Arab states took over the task of "liberating" Palestine and preventing the birth of the Jewish state. Though numerically larger than the Jewish forces, the Arab armies of **Egypt**, **Syria**, **Lebanon**, **Jordan**, and **Iraq** fought the war with deep internal divisions and suspicions. Jordan, which had the strongest and best-organized army, the **Arab Legion**, also had territorial ambitions. This prevented the Arab states from defeating Israel. By the time the second cease-fire came into force on 18 July 1948, Israel had not only consolidated itself but also managed to secure areas beyond those allotted by the UN plan. The **West Bank**, including **East Jerusalem**, had come under the control of Jordan, and Egypt controlled the **Gaza Strip**. The **Armistice Agreements** signed in 1949 signaled a temporary cessation of hostilities but did not result in a formal peace between Israel and its neighbors. During 1949–1956, Israel witnessed a series of cross-border infiltrations leading to reprisal attacks against Egypt (the **Gaza raid**) and Jordan (the **Qibya raid**).

The **nationalization of the Suez Canal** by Egyptian president **Gamal Abdel Nasser** in July 1956 precipitated the **Suez War**. The tripartite aggression involving **France** and Britain resulted in Israel capturing the **Sinai Peninsula** and the Gaza Strip. Under strong pressure from **United States** president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969), Israel was forced to vacate these territories.

In May 1967 media reports suggested a concentration of Israeli forces along its borders with Syria. The decision of President Nasser to demand the withdrawal of the **United Nations Emergency Force** deployed on the Egyptian side of its borders since the Suez War eventually culminated in Israel launching a preemptive air strike on 5 June and starting the **June War of 1967**. By the time the cease-fire came into force on 10 June, Israel had captured the whole of the Sinai Peninsula, the **Golan Heights**, the Gaza

Strip, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. A month later at the **Khartoum Arab Summit** meeting, the members of the **Arab League** decided not to recognize, negotiate with, or make peace with Israel.

At the same time, Arab states, especially Egypt, were determined to regain the **Occupied Territories** held by Israel. This resulted in the low-intensity conflict along the Suez Canal commonly known as the **War of Attrition** (1969–1970). On 6 October 1973, President **Anwar Sadat** launched a preemptive strike against Israel on **Yom Kippur**, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and initiated the **October War of 1973**. Though the military success of the war, undertaken in collaboration with Syrian president **Hafez al-Assad**, was limited, it dispelled the aura of Israeli invincibility and exposed Israel's dependence on the United States for urgent military supplies. The **oil crisis**, which accompanied the war, also marked a new phase in the international arena and brought about swift changes in the Middle East policies of Europe and Japan.

The psychological victory over Israel enabled Sadat to initiate his **Jerusalem visit**, which culminated in the **Camp David Accords** and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty**. Sadat's decision to pursue a separate peace with Israel was not popular in the region and resulted in the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation**).

The early 1970s witnessed the radicalization of the Palestinian movements, the intensification of **Fedayeen** attacks against Israel, and the beginning of international **terrorism**, air piracy, and the **Munich Massacre**. While acts of terrorism popularized the Palestinian cause, they induced numerous counter-terrorism measures from Israel (the **Entebbe Operation**) and the West. Palestinian Fedayeen frequently infiltrated into Israel and carried out militant attacks, often aimed at the civilian population (the **Ma'alot Massacre**).

In an attempt to curtail the military attacks carried out by the **Palestine Liberation Organization** (PLO), in June 1982 Israel launched the **Peace for Galilee Operation** against Lebanon. Even though it managed to remove the PLO and its chairman **Yasser Arafat** from Beirut, it was unable to extricate itself from Lebanon. The September 1982 **Sabra and Shatila Massacre** of Palestinians by Christian Phalangist forces conducted in areas controlled by the **Israel Defense Forces** brought renewed criticism of the Israeli invasion. By 1985, Israel withdrew from much of Lebanon but retained control over a narrow strip of territory in southern Lebanon. Known as the **security zone**, this area was under the nominal control of the pro-Israeli **South Lebanese Army**. After protracted violence involving **Hezbollah**, in the summer of 2000 Israel unilaterally withdrew from the security zone and returned to the international borders.

Meanwhile, in December 1987, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict became a popular protest with the onset of the **First Intifada** in the Occupied Territories. The popular uprising not only reinforced the impossibility of the status quo but also reintroduced the Palestinian issue as the principal problem facing the Middle East. The end of the **Kuwait War** in February 1991, the inauguration of the **Madrid Conference** in October 1991, and the beginning of the **Oslo Process** in 1993 temporarily suspended military confrontation and violence.

However, the opponents of the Oslo Process, especially **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad**, sought to sabotage the process through a wave of **suicide attacks** against Israel. These attacks contributed to the return to power of **Likud** in 1996. Now headed by **Benjamin Netanyahu**, Israel significantly reversed the progress made earlier and gradually slowed down the peace process. The onset of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada** in September 2000, shortly after the ill-fated **Camp David Talks**, not only ended the Oslo Process but also rekindled a sense of insecurity among ordinary Israelis. The absence of progress in the peace talks was accompanied by a spiral of violence resulting in the **Second Lebanon War** in 2006, the **Cast Lead Operation** in 2008–2009, and the **Pillar of Defense Operation** in 2012.

The Arab–Israeli conflict at times turned outward and affected states neighboring Israel adversely. The civil war situation in Jordan that resulted in the **Black September Massacre** in 1970 and the Lebanese civil war (1975–1989) were largely linked to the Arab–Israeli conflict. Growing acts of violence by Palestinian groups have influenced other groups to indulge in terrorist violence directed against their respective governments. At times, attempts by regional leaders to seek a peaceful solution for the Arab–Israeli conflict have resulted in their **assassination** (for example, Anwar Sadat, King **Abdullah I**, and **Yitzhak Rabin**). Regional tension has also contributed to a growing arms race between Israel and its neighbors and the involvement of extra-regional powers and the formation of military blocs such as the **Baghdad Pact**.

See also BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC); CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC); FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION; GOLDSTONE REPORT; IRON DOME; NUCLEAR IRAN; NUCLEAR ISRAEL; NUCLEAR SYRIA; QASSAM; QUNEITRA; TARGETED KILLING; WAR CRIMES; ZIONISM.

WASHINGTON DECLARATION. *See* ISRAEL–JORDAN PEACE TREATY.

WATER. Besides the territorial dimension, the issue of water affects the ordinary lives of people involved in the Arab–Israeli conflict and is a contentious issue in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This is largely because of the scarcity of water and rising consumption due to population growth, industrialization, and immigration. Over the years, water levels of the **Sea of Galilee** and the Dead Sea have dropped considerably, and the flow of water into the **Jordan River** has been dwindling. Israel and its immediate neighbors—namely, **Jordan**, **Lebanon**, the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA), and **Syria**—have been forced to choose between sharing the scarce water resources or generating more through conservation, desalination, and better water management techniques. The latter rests upon regional cooperation and the settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

According to the **Declaration of Principles** signed on 13 September 1993, water was among the five core issues to be discussed during the **Permanent Status Negotiations**. The stalemate in the peace process has resulted in water concerns being pushed aside. Besides the natural depletion of water resources, the Palestinians face a growing number of Jewish **settlements** in the **Occupied Territories** and the resultant increase in the consumption of water resources by Israeli settlers. The terrain of the **West Bank** is also unfavorable to the Palestinians, as much of the mountain aquifers run westward toward the Mediterranean Sea.

The Jordan River is the principal source of fresh water for Israel, Jordan, the PNA, and Syria. Israel's unilateral diversion of its waters in September 1953 raised tension in the Middle East. In 1955, the **Johnston Plan** unsuccessfully sought to share the Jordan waters among the three countries, and the Knesset discussed the plan in July 1955 but it ended without a vote. Under the **Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty** signed in 1994, Israel is committed to supplying 50 million cubic meters of water to Jordan annually. To overcome the water shortage, following the **Oslo Accords**, Israel contemplated importing water from **Turkey**. The proposed **Red Sea–Dead Sea Link** involving Israel, Jordan, and the PNA is partly aimed at alleviating the water shortage in Jordan.

Some of the Israeli military actions against Lebanon were attributed to covert Israeli desires to secure access to the waters of the **Litani River**. For nearly two decades, the northern end of Israel's self-declared **security zone** in southern Lebanon was close to the Litani River and its tributaries.

The issue of water has complicated any resolution of the border issue between Israel and Syria. During the negotiations in the late 1990s, President **Hafez al-Assad** sought an Israeli withdrawal to the **Green Line** as well as access to the waters of the Sea of Galilee. These two conditions are inherently contradictory because the water levels of the sea have receded since 1967, and accepting the Syrian demand for a water level demarcation would require an Israeli withdrawal to the west of the Green Line.

WEIZMAN, EZER (1924–2005). A former air force pilot and nephew of Israel's first president, **Chaim Weizmann**, Ezer Weizman served as the seventh president of Israel during 1993–2000. Born in Tel Aviv on 15 June 1924, he joined the Royal Air Force of **Great Britain** in 1942 at the age of 18. He was serving in **India** when the end of World War II (1939–1945) was announced, and after that he returned to **Mandate Palestine** to be part of the rudimentary air force of the underground **Haganah** and took part in the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**.

After the **Declaration of Independence** and the formation of the **Israel Defense Forces**, Weizman joined the air force and took part in the **June War of 1967** as chief of operations of the general staff and became the deputy chief of staff. Upon his retirement in 1969, with the rank of major general, Weizman went into politics and became one of the first retired generals to join the opposition Gahal Party under the leadership of **Menachem Begin**. Known for his outspoken personality, he united the party and helped in the formation of **Likud**, which won the 1977 Knesset elections.

Under Prime Minister Begin, Weizman became defense minister and played a key role in the peace talks with **Egypt** that culminated in the **Camp David Accords** of 1978 and the **Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty** of 1979. Differences with Begin over the peace process forced Weizman to leave the government and Likud and take a temporary plunge into business. Returning to politics, he headed a small centrist party called Yahad ("Together") and in 1984 joined the national unity government (1984–1990) headed by **Shimon Peres** and **Yitzhak Shamir**.

After a short retirement from politics, in 1992 Weizman was elected president and assumed office on 13 May 1993. Though holding a ceremonial position, he was less ceremonious and reached out to different sections of the Israeli public and periodically made controversial statements on the peace process. He was strongly supportive of Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** over the **Oslo Accords** and the **Declaration of Principles** with the **Palestine Liberation Organization** and openly supported an Israeli withdrawal from the **Golan Heights** within the context of a peace settlement with **Syria**. Both as minister and as president, he frequently visited Egypt and established a strong personal friendship with President **Hosni Mubarak**. Weizman's meetings with the family members of the victims of **terrorism**, often during the seven-day mourning period, created problems for the Rabin-Peres government (1992–1996). His pronouncements over the peace process during the tenure of Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** became controversial, and partly to revive the peace talks in 1996, he hosted Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat** at his private home in Caesarea in northern Israel.

During the funeral of King **Hussein** on 8 February 1999, he briefly met and exchanged pleasantries with **Nayef Hawatmeh**, the leader of the **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine**, who was accused of master-

minding the **Ma'alot Massacre**. Weizman was reelected as president in May 1998, but following a bribery allegation regarding his earlier tenure as a member of the Knesset and cabinet minister, in July 2000 he resigned from office. On 24 April 2005 Weizman died at his home in Caesarea.

WEIZMANN, CHAIM (1874–1952). The principal architect of the **Balfour Declaration** of 1917, Chaim Weizmann was a prominent figure in the Zionist movement who later became the first president of the State of Israel. He was born on 27 November 1874 in Motol near Pinsk in present-day Belarus. His father was a timber dealer, and Weizmann studied chemistry in Berlin and then in Switzerland. During this period, he was drawn into discourses on **Zionism**. In 1901 he became professor of biochemistry at the University of Geneva, and in 1904 he moved to the University of Manchester.

During World War I (1914–1918), Weizmann developed a new method for the manufacture of acetone, which was used by the navy of **Great Britain**, and this brought him closer to the British administration, especially to Arthur James Balfour (1948–1930). This proved useful in securing the 2 November 1917 declaration that pledged British support for the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine and the Balfour Declaration. Through the **Faisal–Weizmann Agreement** of 3 January 1919, he secured the support of Emir Faisal I (1885–1933), the son of **Sharif Hussein** of Mecca, for Arab–Jewish cooperation toward the establishment of a Jewish homeland. The anticipated cooperation did not survive for more than a few months as the Arabs failed to gain their independence from the **Ottoman Empire**, which was promised to them by the British. In 1920 Weizmann was elected president of the **World Zionist Organization** and served in that position during 1920–1931 and 1936–1946.

In May 1948, on the eve of the **Declaration of Independence**, he met President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) of the **United States** and secured his support for the Jewish state. On 1 February 1949, Weizmann was elected the first president of Israel and served in that capacity until his death on 9 November 1952. In 1934 Weizmann founded a research institute in Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, focusing on scientific research, and this was named after him in 1952. It attracts a large number of young scientists, Jewish and non-Jewish, from different parts of the world, especially from the countries of the **Non-Aligned Movement**.

See also WEIZMAN, EZER (1924–2005).

WEST BANK. This term denotes those areas of **Mandate Palestine** that lie west of the **Jordan River** but were captured by the **Arab Legion** of **Jordan** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. This area was formally annexed by Jordan on 24 April 1950 following the **Jericho Conference** of December

1948. The international community did not recognize the Jordanian **annexation** of the West Bank, but the **PLO Charter** adopted in 1964 made no reference to the West Bank as an area to be liberated.

On 6 June 1967, within hours after the capture of these territories during the **June War of 1967**, Israel removed Jordanian rule, and on the following day, the authority of the **Israel Defense Forces** (IDF) over the West Bank was formally proclaimed. The area was soon brought under the control of the **military administration** based in Beit-el, north of **Jerusalem**. Until the late 1980s, Jordan was satisfied with the **Labor Party**'s desire to circumvent the **Palestine Liberation Organization** in negotiating the fate of the **Occupied Territories**. In line with Labor's policy of the **Jordan Option**, King **Hussein** concluded the **London Agreement** of 1987.

This strategy of Jordan's ultimately failed because the right-wing parties, especially **Likud**, viewed the West Bank as part of **Eretz Yisrael** and hence were opposed to any territorial compromise. Shortly after the outbreak of the **First Intifada**, King Hussein announced the **Jordanian Disengagement** in July 1988 and formally renounced any claims to the territories.

The inauguration of the **Oslo Process** and installation of the **Palestinian National Authority** (PNA) resulted in Palestinian towns of the West Bank coming under Palestinian control. Since the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**, though, the IDF has periodically violated the Palestinian authority. On 21 March 2005, Prime Minister **Ariel Sharon** approved the construction of 3,500 new homes in a neighborhood that would link **Ma'ale Adumim** in the West Bank with Jerusalem. Dismissing petitions challenging the **Gaza Disengagement**, on 9 June 2005 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the Occupied Territories were not legally part of Israel and were "seized" during the June War. As part of the Gaza Disengagement plan, in September 2005 Israel withdrew from four isolated settlements in the northern West Bank.

The Palestinian militant Islamic group **Hamas**, which refused to take part in the January 1996 first parliament elections, participated in the second elections held in January 2006 and secured an absolute majority. **Fatah**, which was the governing party since 1996, refused to accept the outcome, and this contributed to tension between the two movements. The **Mecca Accord** of March 2007, mediated by King **Abdullah** of **Saudi Arabia**, and the subsequent unity government did not endure. The **Battle of Gaza** broke out in June 2007 and culminated in the takeover of Gaza by Hamas. On 14 June, PNA president **Mahmoud Abbas** dissolved the unity government, imposed a state of emergency, and asked **Salam Fayyad** to form a government.

Since June 2007, the PNA has been divided between the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip headed by its prime minister **Ismail Haniyeh** and the Fatah-dominated PNA government that controls the West Bank. Many efforts toward inter-Palestinian unity have failed since then. The internal schism between the two wings of the Palestinian territories became public when the

West Bank remained calm and indifferent during Israel's **Cast Lead Operation** against the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip in December 2008. The 23-day conflict led to the widespread destruction of infrastructure and the death of at least 1,385 Palestinians. While there were protests in different parts of the Middle East and beyond, there was no major reaction in the West Bank.

After the Gaza Disengagement, the West Bank witnessed a new wave of **settler violence** commonly known as **price tag attacks** aimed at Palestinian residents and Israeli defense personnel. Since the late 1990s a **territorial swap** in the West Bank has been suggested as integral to any Israeli–Palestinian peace settlement. As of January 2014, there were 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, inhabited by approximately 550,000 people, and the settler population excluding East Jerusalem was just under 350,000.

See also AREAS OF PALESTINE; ARIEL; BROTHER'S KEEPER OPERATION; CLINTON PARAMETERS; HEBRON; JUDEA AND SAMARIA; KERRY PLAN; KIRYAT ARBA; LEVY REPORT; MIGRON EVACUATION; OUTPOSTS; SECURITY FENCE/S.

WESTERN WALL RIOTS. In September 1928, during Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, Jewish worshippers installed a screen to separate men and women praying at the Western Wall, the last vestige of the biblical Second Temple (516 BC–70 AD) in **Jerusalem**. They also set up seats and benches for the benefit of the aged and infirm worshippers. Such efforts by Jews to conduct prayers in front of the Western Wall according to Jewish customs were vehemently opposed by the Muslims, who saw them as a violation of the status quo. There were apprehensions among Muslims that the Jews intended to encroach upon the Wall, part of the **Haram al-Sharif/ Temple Mount**, which is a *waqf* (Islamic welfare trust) property.

The **Hajj Amin al-Husseini**, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, protested against this purported violation of Muslim rights and thereby caused tensions to run high between Jews and Muslims. Acting on the complaint from the *waqf* authorities, British police forcefully removed the separators, seats, and benches at the Wall. On 14–15 August 1929, a large number of Jews demonstrated in Tel Aviv reiterating Jewish rights, and the following day a group of Jewish youth raised the Jewish flag and sang the Jewish anthem at the Wall. A couple of days later, Muslims burned Jewish prayer books. On 23 August, which was a Friday, the Muslim Sabbath, the Western Wall Riots broke out in Jerusalem and soon spread to other parts of **Mandate Palestine**. In the ensuing violence, 113 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, the latter mostly from British shooting, and scores of others were wounded.

In September 1929, the Mandate administration issued general guidelines for Jewish worshippers at the Western Wall, preventing them from using benches, chairs, or stools for the benefit of worshippers or using screens or

curtains to segregate male and female worshippers. Even though the Jews held the mufti to be responsible for orchestrating the communal flare-up, his complicity was never established. The small Jewish community in the historic town of **Hebron** bore the brunt of this violence; more than 50 men, women, and children were killed in the **Hebron Massacre (1929)**, and the remaining Jews were forced to evacuate the town. Meanwhile **Great Britain** appointed Sir Walter Shaw (1863–1937) to investigate the riots and recommend policies to prevent their recurrence. Published in March 1930, the findings of the **Shaw Commission** absolved the mufti of any responsibility and identified **Aliya** and Jewish land practices as the underlying causes.

Due to the religious controversies, in 1930 Great Britain, with the consent of the **League of Nations**, appointed an international commission to determine the rights and claims of Jews and Muslims. The report of the commission, headed by Eliel Lofgren (1872–1940), was published in June 1931, and it declared Muslims to be the sole owners of the Wall itself, as well as the area in front of and adjacent to it. It granted Jews free access to the Wall but endorsed the temporary restrictions introduced in September 1929. It also prohibited Jews from blowing the traditional shofar (ram's horn) at the Wall. These limitations remained in force for the rest of the Mandate period. The Western Wall was inaccessible to Jews from Israel after **Jordan** occupied **East Jerusalem** during the **Arab–Israeli War of 1948**. This situation lasted until 7 June 1967, when Israel captured the old city during the **June War of 1967**.

See also WARFARE; ZIONISM.

WINGATE, ORDE (1903–1944). During the period between the two world wars (1919–1939), Orde Wingate (1903–1944), a captain in the army of **Great Britain** in the Palestine **Mandate**, commanded a special mixed British-Jewish unit created to protect the **Iraq** Petroleum Company pipeline. The pipeline was used for exporting Iraqi crude through the port city of Haifa but came under repeated attacks from the Arabs. Wingate's unconventional military methods had a lasting impact on the military doctrines and tactics of **Haganah**, the predecessor of the **Israel Defense Forces**.

See also WARFARE.

WINOGRAD COMMISSION. Internal criticisms over the **Second Lebanon War** resulted in Israel's Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert** appointing a commission of inquiry under retired judge of the Supreme Court Eliyahu Winograd (1926–). On 17 September 2006 a five-member commission was appointed to look into the "preparation and conduct" of the political and security establishments following the kidnapping of two soldiers belonging to the **Israel Defense Forces**. The commission submitted an interim report

on 30 April 2007, which contained criticisms of the conduct of Prime Minister Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz (1952–), and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz (1948–). The report justified the launching of the war, and hence both the prime minister and the defense minister refused to quit as demanded by a large section of the Israeli public. The commission submitted its final report on 30 January 2008 and described the Second Lebanon War as "a missed opportunity" and observed that Israel "initiated a long war, which ended without a clear victory." It found "serious failings and shortcomings" in the decision-making process in the political-military echelons.

WOODHEAD COMMISSION. Following the submission of the **Peel Commission** report, which recommended the partition of Palestine, on 5 March 1938 **Great Britain** appointed a four-member technical committee headed by Sir John Ackroyd Woodhead to investigate the feasibility of partitioning Palestine. In November, the Woodhead Commission submitted its findings, which reversed the recommendations of the Peel Commission, concluding that the partition of Palestine was impractical and unviable. On 9 November, the British government renounced the partition as "impracticable."

See also ZIONISM.

WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO). Founded by Theodore Herzl (1860–1904), the World Zionist Organization is the official organization of the Zionist movement. From the first WZO Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in August 1897, it conducted the political, economic, and **settlement** activities leading to the establishment of Israel, as outlined in the **Basel Program**. It organized the **Aliya** to Palestine and worked toward the **Balfour Declaration**. In 1929, the **Jewish Agency** was created to coordinate between the **Yishuv** and the **Mandate** administration. The Zionist General Council, which is elected by the Zionist Congress, functioned in the period between congresses and was empowered to deliberate and decide on all matters affecting the WZO and its institutions, including the budget. The Zionist Executive is the executive arm of the WZO and is elected by the congress for a period of four years. Some of its members are placed in charge of the various departments of the executive. The WZO Congress met annually until 1901, when it was resolved to meet every two years. Subsequently, until 1939, it met every other year, except during World War I (1914–1918).

After the establishment of Israel, in November 1952 the Knesset passed the Zionist Organization–Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law, and later a covenant was signed between the government of Israel and the Zionist Executive defining the major responsibilities of the WZO. Under a revised arrangement worked out in 1970, the WZO was made responsible for immigra-

tion from affluent countries, whereas the Jewish Agency was to take care of **Aliya** from countries where Jews faced persecution. Its role in the settlement activities in the **Occupied Territories** depicts the WZO as an organization endorsing the settlement policies of the Israeli right. An official report prepared in 2005 established that a number of illegal and unauthorized **outposts** established in the **West Bank** since the **Oslo Accords** were built on private lands that the WZO had illegally taken from the Palestinians.

See also WEIZMANN, CHAIM (1874–1952); ZIONISM.

WYE MEMORANDUM. With a view to implementing the **Taba Agreement** of 1995, Israeli prime minister **Benjamin Netanyahu** and **Palestinian National Authority** chairman **Yasser Arafat** signed an agreement on 23 October 1998 at the historic Wye Plantation in Maryland. **United States** president **Bill Clinton** also signed the memorandum, which called for a three-phased second **redeployment** (which should have been implemented by April 1997, according to the Taba Agreement). Under this revised plan, Israel agreed to withdraw from 13 percent of the **West Bank** and to transfer another 14 percent of the West Bank from joint Israeli–Palestinian control (Area B) to full Palestinian control (Area A). The memorandum also provided for the opening of the Gaza airport; safe passage between the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip**; the release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails; unconditional amendments to those provisions of the **PLO Charter** that were contrary to the **Oslo Process**; and immediate resumption of **Permanent Status Negotiations** covering issues such as **Jerusalem**, **refugees**, **water**, **settlements**, and the nature and configuration of boundaries between Israel and a future Palestinian entity in the **Occupied Territories**.

Israel subsequently withdrew from 2 percent of the territories near Jenin, facilitated the opening of the Gaza airport, and released a limited number of Palestinian prisoners. After some delays, the first stage of the third redeployment was completed on 20 November, which involved the transfer of 7.1 percent of the West Bank to complete Palestinian control and the transfer of an additional 2 percent of nature reserves from sole Israeli control to joint Israeli–Palestinian control. Following the decision of the Israeli Knesset in December 1998 to hold an early election, the Wye Memorandum was suspended. It was superseded by the **Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum** signed on 4 September 1999.

Y

YACHIMOVICH, SHELLY (1960–). A member of the Knesset, Shelly Yachimovich was the leader of the **Labor Party** from September 2011 to March 2013. Born in Kfar Saba near Tel Aviv on 28 March 1960, she studied at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and pursued a career in journalism. She is credited with providing media publicity to the **Four Mothers Movement**, the grassroots protest movement against the prolonged Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in Israel's unilateral **Lebanese withdrawal** from the security zone in May 2000. In December 2005 she quit journalism, joined the Labor Party, and was elected to the Knesset in 2006. She was opposed to the party joining the **Kadima** government headed by **Ehud Olmert**, and, after Amir Peretz (1952–) was forced to resign following the **Second Lebanon War**, Yachimovich endorsed **Ehud Barak** for leadership.

Yachimovich was reelected to the Knesset in 2009, and after Barak left the Labor Party in January 2011 to form the Ha'atzmaut Party, Yachimovich won the September 2011 leadership contest and briefly served as the leader of the opposition. She led the party in the 2013 Knesset elections, and the Labor Party secured 15 seats. After the formation of the government headed by **Benjamin Netanyahu** in March 2013, Yachimovich briefly served as leader of the opposition until she lost the party leadership contest to Isaac Herzog in November.

YASSIN, SHEIKH AHMED (c. 1933–2004). A Palestinian Islamic scholar, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was the founder and spiritual leader of the militant Islamic organization **Hamas**. Born in Ashkelon in 1933 or 1934, he became a quadriplegic at a young age due to a serious illness. Following the Israeli capture of the **Gaza Strip** during the **June War of 1967**, Yassin became active in social welfare activities, and in 1973 he founded the Gaza wing of the **Muslim Brotherhood**. In 1979, with Israel's knowledge and partial connivance, he founded the Islamic Society. Devoted to social welfare activities, it sought to Islamize Palestinian society, which was under the influence of the more secular **Fatah** and the **Palestine Liberation Organization**.

In 1984, Yassin was sentenced to 13 years' imprisonment for possession of arms, but he was released a year later in a **prisoner exchange** deal when Israel released 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in return for 6 Israeli soldiers captured in **Lebanon**. Months after the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in the **Occupied Territories**, Yassin decided to join the political process, and in August 1988 the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was formed with Yassin as one of its founders. On 16 October 1991, Yassin was imprisoned on a life term for ordering the kidnapping and killing of four Israeli soldiers.

In September 1997 after Israel made an unsuccessful **assassination** attempt on the political head of Hamas in Amman (the **Masha'al Affair**), King **Hussein** of **Jordan** pressured Israel to release the visually impaired and invalid cleric. Yassin was set free from Israeli prison on 1 October 1997, and a few days later he returned to the **Gaza Strip** and continued his opposition to the **Oslo Accords** and the **Palestinian National Authority** headed by Chairman **Yasser Arafat**. Despite repeated Israeli pressures, Yassin refused to condemn **suicide attacks** or other acts of **terrorism** that increased following the outbreak of the **Al-Aqsa Intifada**. In September 2003, Israel made an unsuccessful assassination attempt on him, but on 22 March 2004, Yassin was assassinated as he exited a mosque after early morning prayers in Gaza City. Yassin was briefly replaced by **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi**, who was also soon killed by Israeli agents.

YESH ATID. Meaning "There Is a Future" in Hebrew, Yesh Atid is a centrist political party founded by former journalist Yair Lapid (1963–) in 2012 on the eve of the 19th Knesset election. It positions itself as the representative of the secular middle class and secured 19 seats in the January 2013 elections and then emerged as the second-largest party in the 120-member Knesset. Following an agreement with **Likud**, in March 2013 Yesh Atid joined the government headed by Prime Minister **Benjamin Netanyahu**, and Lapid became the finance minister. The party supports the **two-state solution** and reducing the exemption for the ultra-orthodox *haredi* community from **conscription** duties in the **Israel Defense Forces**.

See also HAREDI PARTIES.

YISHUV. This Hebrew expression refers to the Jewish community in Palestine during the **Mandate**. The growth and development of the Yishuv was brought about by successive waves of **Aliya** from the **Diaspora**. The Yishuv functioned autonomously with its own political institutions, educational system, Histadrut labor federation, and self-defense forces. As directed by the **League of Nations**, in 1929 the **Jewish Agency** was formed to be a liaison between the Yishuv and the Mandate authorities.

YISRAEL BEITEINU. Meaning "Israel Our Home" in Hebrew, Yisrael Beiteinu is a right-wing nationalist political party headed by **Avigdor Lieberman**. In 1996 the former refusenik Natan Sharansky (1948–) started Yisrael Ba'Aliya (Israel on Aliya), which targeted immigrants from the former **Soviet Union**, but its political life was short. However, established in 1999, Yisrael Beiteinu has emerged as the most successful and politically influential force catering to those who made **Aliya** from the former Soviet Union. Since 2001, it has been part of the ruling coalition headed by prime ministers **Ariel Sharon**, **Ehud Olmert**, and **Benjamin Netanyahu**. On the eve of the 2013 Knesset elections, the party joined hands with **Likud** and fought the elections together, and the joint list obtained 31 seats in the 120-member Knesset.

The party adopts a hard-line position vis-à-vis the Palestinians and their demand for statehood, and its positions toward the **Israeli Arabs** are seen as racist by many Israelis. Though it recognizes the **two-state solution**, according to the party, any peace settlement with the Palestinians must include an exchange of territory as well as of population. The latter implies the **transfer** of **Israeli Arabs** to the future Palestinian state, and this position is seen by many Israelis as racists. Domestically the party strongly opposes the excessive political influence of the *haredi* **parties** and advocates secular laws to govern the personal lives of Israeli citizens. It demands that Israel's religious community should undertake the **conscription** duties of the **Israel Defense Forces**.

See also TERRITORIAL SWAP.

YOM KIPPUR WAR. *See* OCTOBER WAR OF 1973.

YOUSEF, MOSAB HASSAN (1978–). A son of one of the founders and leaders of **Hamas**, Sheikh Hassan Yousef (1955–), Mosab worked as an undercover agent for Israel's internal security service, the General Security Services, during 1997–2007. Born in **Ramallah** in 1978, he was first arrested by the **Israel Defense Forces** at the age of 10 during the **First Intifada**. In the wake of a spate of **suicide attacks** following the **Oslo Accords** in 1996, he agreed to be an informer for the Israeli intelligence service. In the autobiography first published in Hebrew in 2010, he admitted to preventing a number of acts of **terrorism** and exposing numerous terror cells of the militant Palestinian group. He converted to Christianity and sought political asylum in the **United States**, and his request was granted in June 2010.

Z

ZAHAR, MAHMOUD AL- (1945–). One of the co-founders of the militant Palestinian group **Hamas**, since March 2006 Mahmoud al-Zahar has been the foreign minister of the Hamas-led government in the **Gaza Strip** under Prime Minister **Ismail Haniyeh**. He was born in **Jerusalem** in 1945. He studied medicine at Cairo University and was instrumental in the formation of the Palestinian medical society and the Islamic University in Gaza. Following the outbreak of the **First Intifada** in December 1987, he joined hands with **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin** and others to form Hamas. Along with other leaders, he was critical of **Palestine Liberation Organization** chairman **Yasser Arafat** for agreeing to participate in the **Madrid Conference** and the subsequent **Oslo Process** with Israel. Zahar was among the 415 Hamas activists who were deported to southern **Lebanon** in December 1992 following a terror attack inside Israel.

In the wake of the formation of the **Palestinian National Authority**, al-Zahar emerged as a major spokesperson for Hamas. In September 2003 he escaped an Israeli **assassination** attempt, and following the killing of Sheikh Yassin and **Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi** in 2004, Zahar took over the leadership of Hamas. In January 2008 his son, a senior figure in **Izz Eddin al-Qassam**, the military wing of Hamas, was killed in an air strike by the **Israel Defense Forces**.

Zahar took part in the Palestinian elections held in January 2006 and in March was named the foreign minister. He has been actively courting international support for Hamas, especially in light of the **Siege of Gaza**. He was a key figure in the **Cairo Dialogue** and other inter-Palestinian dialogues between Hamas and **Fatah** toward forging Palestinian unity.

See also TERRORISM.

ZIONISM. Zionism can be defined as a political movement that sought the return of the Jewish people to their historic homeland. The name is derived from Zion, a biblical expression for **Jerusalem**. Emerging toward the end of the 19th century, its fortunes rose following the efforts of Theodore Herzl (1860–1904) and the publication of his *Der Judenstaat*, or *The Jewish State*.

The movement was primarily a response to the increasing anti-Semitism in Europe as well as the outcome of growing nationalist consciousness. It sought to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine through international guarantees that would facilitate the "return of the Jews" to the Holy Land through migration of Jews, or **Aliya**, from the **Diaspora**. The fulfillment of the Jewish aspiration for a homeland, and later statehood, in Palestine became problematic because Palestine was not an empty uninhabited land. The movement took institutional form through the **World Zionist Organization** and other bodies. The emergence of **New History** in the early 1990s has generated a new debate within Israel regarding Zionism and its impact on the Arab–Israeli conflict.

See also DURBAN CONFERENCE/S; RESOLUTION 3379.

Bibliography

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Since the late 19th century, the problems of Jewish statelessness, the Jewish desire for a national home, and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 have dominated the Middle East and, at times, international politics. As a result, Israel's conflict with the Arab world has been the most widely studied issue in the contemporary world.

Despite the large number of publications on the subject, most of the works have been devoted to a particular conflict, issue, or even a specific war. There are only a handful of works that provide a broad picture of the Arab–Israeli conflict. These include Avi Shlaim's *The Iron Wall*, Alan Dowty's *Israel/Palestine*, and Ritchie Ovendale's *The Origins of the Arab–Israeli Wars*. In *The Arab–Israeli Wars*, Chaim Herzog provides a detailed account of Israel's military campaigns from 1948 to 1982.

The relative availability of archival material in Israel compared to other neighboring states has resulted in a proliferation of scholarship and evolution of the foreign policy of Israel as a fully grown discipline. While most of the works are available in English, a more detailed and nuanced treatment of the problem is generally available in Hebrew only. The lack of available archival materials is a problem in the Arab world. However, access to private papers,

as well as personal memoirs by individuals, is slowly providing an unofficial version of the course of events. Hanan Ashrawi's *This Side of the Peace*, Itamar Rabinovich's *The Brink of Peace*, Uri Savir's *The Process*, and Dennis Ross's *The Missing Peace* offer valuable insights to the Arab–Israeli negotiations.

Since the early 1980s, Israel has witnessed the emergence of scholars known as "New Historians" who have sought to question, challenge, and even rewrite some of the official history in Israel concerning controversial issues such as the refugee problem and the direction and course of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. This new group of scholars is led by people such as Simha Flapan, Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, and Ilan Pappé, and their works have evoked strong rebuttal from others, led by Efraim Karsh.

Autobiographies and biographies of the principal players—David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Yitzhak Rabin, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres, King Hussein, Ariel Sharon, and Henry Kissinger, among others—have also contributed to the understanding of the problem. Key individuals such as James Baker, Dennis Ross, Mahmoud Abbas, and Condoleezza Rice have described their roles during some aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Scholars like Edward Said and Noam Chomsky have significantly contributed to the greater but often controversial discourse on the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the role played by the United States.

The conflict is the principal staple for most of the Middle East centers and programs in different parts of the world. The growth of think tanks both in the region and elsewhere has also contributed to the rapidly growing knowledge of the subject. These include the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Institute for Palestine Studies, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs), and Washington Institute for Near East Policy, as well as the Middle East programs of the American Enterprise Institute, Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, and United States Institute for Peace.

Various scholarly journals pertaining to the Middle East, such as the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, *Middle Eastern Studies*, *Middle East Insight*, *Middle East Journal*, *Middle East Report*, *Middle East Policy*, *Middle East Quarterly*, and *Mediterranean Quarterly*, have prominently covered different aspects of the conflict. Specialized journals such as *Arab Studies Quarterly*, *Israel Affairs*, *Israel Studies*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, and *Palestine-Israel Journal* have been in the forefront of serious and scholarly debates on the Arab–Israeli conflict. Given the international attention it evokes, the subject of the Arab–Israeli conflict has also been widely commented on in such highly regarded journals as *Orbis*, *Survivor*, *Survival*, *Journal of Democracy*, *National Interest*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Security Dialogue*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Peace Research*, and *Review of International Affairs*.

The conflict dominates Middle East series brought out by various premier academic publishers, including Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press, Harvard University Press, and State University of New York Press. The conflict has also become the prime focus of various academic societies that deal with the Middle East, such as the Association of Israel Studies, the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, and the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

With the advent of information technology, the Arab–Israeli conflict has become a major focus of the electronic world. *MERIA* (the Middle East Review of International Affairs), published by the Herzliya-based Interdisciplinary Center, has become the principal vehicle in which Israel's conflict with the outside world is widely discussed, commented on, and analyzed. Capitalizing on technological advancements, a number of traditional journals have also gone electronic, thereby reaching a wider audience. Sites such as Electronic Intifada have put out periodic bulletins on various aspects of ongoing Israeli–Palestinian violence. Technological advancements, especially in the New Media, and the proliferation of social media have revolutionized the knowledge of the Arab–Israeli conflict, with the result that numerous nongovernmental organizations, political parties, and even known militant groups such as Hamas have periodically publicized their plans and agendas through the Internet.

In recent years, specific groups have been set up to study a particular aspect of the Arab–Israeli conflict. These specialized forums include the Washington-based Foundation for Middle East Peace, which specializes in settlement activities, and the Jerusalem-based *B'Tselem*, devoted to Israel's human rights violations in the Occupied Territories.

The U.S. State Department, through its Congressional Research Service, periodically publishes and updates some aspects of Arab–Israeli conflict. The official site of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides access to a plethora of official documents pertaining to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

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About the Author

P. R. Kumaraswamy is professor of Middle Eastern studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi, India. He obtained a Ph.D. from the same university for his thesis "India's Policy towards Israel, 1948–1980." From 1992 to 1999, he was a research fellow in Jerusalem at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace. He was also briefly associated with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. In 2013, he held the ICCR India Chair at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.

Since joining the faculty of JNU in September 1999, Professor Kumaraswamy has been researching, teaching, and writing on various aspects of the Middle East. His works include *India's Israel Policy* (2010); *Caught in Crossfire: Civilians in Conflicts in the Middle East* (edited, 2008); *Security beyond Survival: Essays for K. Subrahmanyam* (edited, 2004); *Revisiting the Yom Kippur War* (2000); *China and the Middle East* (1999); *Israel and the Islamic World* (edited, 2008); and *The Fateful Triangle: Israel, the Hashemites and the Palestinians* (co-edited, 2000). He has published monographs with the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (Ramat Gan), the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies Research (Abu Dhabi), the Gulf Research Center (Dubai), the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (New Delhi), the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv), and the Middle East Institute (Singapore). Professor Kumaraswamy has also published in a number of refereed and other international journals and periodicals.

Since January 2014, he has edited *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, a quarterly refereed journal published by Sage (India). In February 2010, Professor Kumaraswamy set up the virtual Middle East Institute, New Delhi (www.mei.org.in), of which he is the honorary director.