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The Development of Palestinian Resistance

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University of Minnesota

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WALTER LEHN

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

The tragedy of the Palestinian Arabs has been that by and large they have had only bit-parts in the drama in which their fate as a people has been determined. The principal actors within the last century have been--successively and at times in concert--the Zionists, the Ottomans, the British, Israel and the Arab states, and the superpowers--the USSR and the USA.

While Palestinian Arab resistance is generally seen as a reaction to the State of Israel established in May 1948, the thesis of this paper is that it arose as a reaction to foreign--specifically European Jewish--colonization in Palestine, beginning in 1882. The opposition of the Palestinian Arabs to this stemmed from the readily foreseeable outcome of colonization on the scale envisioned by the Zionist Movement--establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state and therefore displacement of the indigenous Arab population. That the Palestinian Arabs were not, and are not even today, ready to accept with equanimity such developments is surely neither surprising nor unexpected.

This paper is a contribution to the history of the Palestinian[1] Arab Resistance Movement (hereafter PRM or simply RM) from 1882 to 1971. Although in somewhat greater detail from 1956 on, what is provided here can only be a sketch for two reasons: (1) space limitations in a study such as this; and (2), and more important, much of the requisite research on primary sources for the earlier periods has yet to be completed or, in any case, to be made available.[2]

The development of the PRM is marked by four main phases and a brief interlude. Phase I begins with the onset of Zionist-organized immigration to Palestine in 1882 and ends with the replacement of Ottoman by British administration in 1917. Phase II begins in December 1917 with the occupation of Jerusalem by British forces under the command of General Sir Edmund Allenby and ends with the signing of the bilateral armistice agreements in 1949 between Israel

and Egypt (in February), Lebanon (March), Transjordan (April), and Syria (July), signifying the dispossession and displacement of the Palestinians.

Among others, a major difference between these phases is that during the second, the Palestinians were under an administration committed to the implementation of Zionist objectives, a policy to which the former Ottoman administration had been unwilling to commit itself.

Phase III begins with the Egyptian revolution in July 1952 and ends with the secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic in September 1961, symbolizing--in the eyes of the Palestinians--the bankruptcy of Arab unity and therefore the hopelessness of an Arab, as distinguished from a Palestinian, solution. Phase IV begins in September 1961 and ends with the complete rupture of Palestinian-Jordanian relations in September 1971, symbolizing a new relationship between the PRM and the Arab states. Each of the four phases can of course be usefully subdivided. The brief interlude--July 1949 to July 1952--is characterized primarily by the absence of activity; the Palestinians were searching for answers to what had happened, and why, and what lay ahead.[3]

PHASE I: 1882-1917

The late nineteenth century saw two distinct types of European Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Those of the first came as individuals or as families and were motivated primarily by religious considerations--a return to Jerusalem and the Holy Land. The numbers involved, total as well as at any given time, were small; e.g. in 1882, the estimated Jewish population in Palestine was 24,000, almost all in four urban areas--Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safad.[4] To this type of immigration, which had gone on for centuries, the indigenous population--whether Muslim, Jewish, or Christian--never registered opposition prior to the British Mandate administration. Thereafter Palestinian opposition to Zionist colonization reached the point where a distinction between the two types of immigration was no longer recognized.

In sharp contrast, beginning in 1882 a second and new type of immigrant came, typically in larger and organized groups. More significantly, these immigrants were motivated primarily by political objectives--colonization and eventually the establishment of a state, if not exclusively Jewish, then one with a substantial Jewish majority. Zionist colonization thus was distinct from other European colonization efforts, e.g. in Africa. The former foresaw the need for the displacement of the natives, not just their exploitation, as was characteristic of the latter.[5] To such immigration--organized and sponsored by the Zionist Movement in cynical exploitation of what Theodor Herzl called "the mighty legend"[6] of Palestine as the ancestral home of all Jews--the Palestinians registered opposition virtually from its beginning.

In 1891, Palestinian leaders in Jerusalem demanded that Sultân 'Abdülhamid II issue a decree forbidding the acquisition of title to land in Palestine by Zionist immigrants. Although only indifferently enforced, such a decree was issued. In 1898, Palestinians in the area later known as Transjordan expelled a group of Zionist immigrants who had established a colony near Jarash.[7] In 1912, Arab deputies in the Ottoman Chamber in Constantinople, who "kept up a drumfire of complaints"[8] about Zionist colonization, "protested against the acquisition...of arable land in the Plain of Esdraelon and the threatened dispossession of the Arab peasants."[9]

In Phase I, Zionist immigration and colonization became a fact, its political objectives became clear, and the Palestinians made explicit their opposition and their determination to resist with whatever means were at their disposal. In part because they were under an administration which was unwilling to underwrite Zionist objectives,[10] the Palestinians only rarely resorted to extra-legal means of registering their opposition. At the same time, partly because the Ottoman authorities were preoccupied with other problems in various parts of the crumbling empire, and partly because of Zionist collaboration with the so-called Young Turks, the Ottomans did little to stop implementation of the Zionist program. Thus in effect, if not in intent, the Ottoman authorities helped to further Zionist objectives in helping to set the stage for the eventual realization of the Zionist program.

PHASE II: 1917-1949

The year 1917 is a major turning point in the development of the PRM. It saw the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in November and the beginning of British administration in December, when General Allenby's forces captured Jerusalem. The military administration was replaced in 1920 by a civilian administration, eventually under the terms of the Mandate, formally approved by the League of Nations in 1922, and becoming effective in 1923.

When the Balfour Declaration was issued, the British rightly judged that it would provoke Arab, and specifically Palestinian opposition.[11] Accordingly General Allenby ordered that it not be published in Palestine. At the same time, when its terms became known, as they shortly were, a series of messengers (e.g. Commander Hogarth in January 1918) and declarations (e.g. Declaration to the Seven Arabs in June) were dispatched to allay the fears of the Arabs.[12] The efforts of the British to assure the Palestinians that the Balfour Declaration did not mean what it appeared to were unsuccessful, in part because the Zionists did not hesitate to insist publicly in Palestine and particularly elsewhere that the Declaration meant precisely what the Palestinians feared--the establishment of a Jewish state.

That Palestinian opposition to the Balfour Declaration was widespread is amply attested by reports by British officials in Jerusalem and Cairo. One example must suffice. In August 1919, Colonel C. French in forwarding to London a report by Major J. N. Camp, Assistant Political Officer in Jerusalem, stated in his covering dispatch:

> There is every reason to believe that the facts as stated therein are accurate and unexaggerated and that they may be taken as indicative of the widespread antagonism and organization against the Zionist programme which is prevalent throughout Palestine at the present juncture.[13]

Major Camp in his report identified various societies in Jerusalem who were in the foreground of the struggle for independence and of the opposition to Zionist immigration. The Literary Club, "the leading and most powerful," had among its aims "prevention of any and every sort of Zionism and Jewish immigration." He noted that the other organizations were "just as much opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration," and "that similar societies exist in almost every place of importance in Palestine." Accordingly, if the leaders in Jerusalem were

> to be interned, a similar policy should be followed at Nablus, Jaffa, Gaza, Tul Keram, Haifa, etc. In brief, practically all Moslems and Christians of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionist, and bitterly so.

Major Camp also warned that

> Dr. Weizmann's agreement[14] with Emir Feisal is not worth the paper it is written on. . . If it becomes sufficiently known among the Arabs, . . . he will be regarded. . .as a traitor. No greater mistake could be made than to regard Feisal as a representative of Palestinian Arabs (Moslem and Christian natives of Palestine who speak Arabic); he is in favour with them so long as he embodies Arab nationalism and represents their views, but would no longer have any power over them if they thought he had made any sort of agreement with Zionists and meant to abide by it.

The first formal inquiry in Palestine into the attitudes and aspirations of the Palestinians and of the impact of the implementation of Zionist objectives was undertaken by two Americans, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, sent by President Woodrow Wilson in May 1919. Their report states, inter alia, that

> the fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. . . . The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commission, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms.

Accordingly, the King-Crane Commission recommended

> serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.[15]

The initial reaction of the Palestinians to the Mandate administration was essentially one of resignation. Their disappointment at failing to achieve independence as part of an Arab state and their resentment of British (rather than American) administration--if independence was not possible--were tempered by faith in the second of two obligations assumed by Britain under the Mandate for Palestine, Article 2:

> The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure [1] the establishment of the Jewish national home. . . and [2] the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.[16]

The efforts of the Palestinians to hold Britain responsible for the implementation of this obligation were unsuccessful. As it became obvious that when the two obligations came into conflict that the first took precedence over the second, or that the second would be implemented only when and to the extent that it was consistent with the first, the Palestinians increasingly turned to extra-legal means of making their views known. Thus there were major anti-Zionist, and increasingly anti-British, demonstrations and outbursts of violence in April 1920, May 1921, August 1929, and October 1933. After each outburst the British appointed a Commission to go to Palestine to inquire "into the underlying causes" and to make "recommendations for the removal of any legitimate grievances."[17]

Although several attempts to establish some kind of representative government were made, all of them came to naught because either the Palestinians or the Zionists saw them as attempts by Britain to renege on her mandatory obligations. Accordingly "from 1922 until the present day [1947], the High Commissioner. . .governed Palestine with the aid of Councils consisting exclusively of British officials."

The 1930s saw greatly increased political activity and the emergence of guerrilla groups in Palestine, foreshadowing the political and military emphases of the PRM several decades later. A number of political parties were formed, among them the Independence Party (in 1932), the National Defense Party (1934), and three in 1935--Palestine Arab, Arab Reform, and National Bloc Parties. With the exception of the Independence Party, all were organized and/or controlled by important families, or groups of families, and their differences often amounted to little more than personalities or personal loyalties to one or another of the influential families--Ḥusaynî, Nashâshîbî, Khâlidî, 'Alamî, Khaṭîb, etc. All were for independence and opposed Zionist colonization, but differed on how these ends were to be achieved. On such matters "discussion was endless and ineffectual."[18]

The Independence (istiqlâl) Party alone cut across family and class lines, had a more clearly articulated political program, and opposed the other parties on a number of grounds. It saw them as little more than extensions of family influence and accordingly refused to cooperate with them. In retrospect, this was an error in tactics, but one which is repeated over and over by the PRM. It took a militant and uncompromising stand vis-a-vis the British and the Zionists, demanding an end to the Mandate, immediate and

complete independence, and union of Palestine with Syria. Its members were primarily the younger nationalists, predominantly professionals and government employees. However, it too failed to build broad support among the population and in the end was little more effective than the others.

As early as 1931, guerrillas began operating in the Galilee hills under the leadership of Shaykh 'Izz al-Dîn al-Qassâm. Under the slogans of Arab unity and independence, and militantly anti-British and anti-Zionist, he rallied a following largely from peasants living in urban poverty, having been dispossessed and uprooted by Zionist colonization. The Shaykh and some of his followers were captured and killed by the British in November 1935, and therewith he became a hero and a martyr. His example inspired others, and soon additional guerrilla groups were formed, whose members wore the traditional peasant headcloth (ḥaṭṭah or kûfiyyah), which became their trademark, foreshadowing its use much later by Fatḥ and other guerrilla groups. By 1937 these guerrilla groups were challenging British control in areas such as Beersheba, Hebron, Jaffa, and Old Jerusalem, and a year later controlled large areas of Palestine. Enlarged British military forces working in cooperation with the Zionist colonists, whom the British armed, crushed these groups in late 1938, aided in part by dissension among them and their loss of popularity with the Palestinian population due to uncompromising demands for support by the guerrillas and to British reprisals for such support. While the eventual impact of these groups was minimal, their formation was significant. It was the beginning of the notion of popular armed struggle and, since it was opposed by the political parties, represented a challenge to the influence of the traditional leaders, the so-called notables.

The high-point of Palestinian resistance came in 1936 when they rose in open revolt against the British administration and the Zionists, allies and partners in crime in the eyes of the Palestinians. In support of the uprising, which began as a general strike, the various factions and most of the political parties in Palestine joined to establish in April what was later known as the Arab Higher Committee (outlawed by the British in October 1937). The Committee declared that the general strike was to continue until Zionist immigration had been stopped and steps taken to establish independence. Later the same year, to deal with the growing revolt, sweeping powers were granted to the High Commissioner and his district representatives.

The Emergency Regulations (1936) gave virtually absolute power to the government officials, civilian and military, enabling them to suspend all rights and legal safeguards enjoyed by the Palestinians.[19]

In accordance with precedent, the British responded to the 1936 revolt by also appointing a Royal Commission which finally concluded what had been obvious from the beginning. The Commission in its report in June 1937 declared that the two obligations assumed under the Mandate were mutually exclusive and irreconcilable:

> To put it in one sentence, we cannot--in Palestine as it now is--both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

The only way out of this dilemma for the Commission was to recommend partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish areas, anticipating transfer, which "in the last resort. . .would be compulsory," of a large number of Palestinians from the proposed Jewish area so that it would have a Jewish majority. The proposal pleased no one, including the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and in September 1937 the League Council advised Britain "to prepare a detailed plan for the partition of Palestine," meanwhile taking no action on the substantive question. The subject of partition was further considered by Britain, and it became increasingly obvious that it was anything but a satisfactory solution; on the contrary, it was simply an invitation to increased strife and even bloodshed.

Meanwhile, in spite of ruthless attempts to crush the on-going revolt in Palestine and considerable loss of life (some five thousand, mostly Palestinians, lost their lives), the revolt did not subside until May 1939 when the British issued a White Paper abandoning partition, restricting Jewish immigration and transfer of land title to Jews, and declaring Britain's objective to be "the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State. . .in which Arabs and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded."

This new policy, welcomed by the Palestinians, was bitterly attacked and denounced by the Zionists, since under it Palestine would become independent before a Jewish majority had been attained; in 1939 Jews constituted 30 percent of the population and owned five percent of the land. The issuance of the White Paper was followed by a marked rise in Jewish-Zionist terrorism which subsided only on

the outbreak of World War II, but rose again beginning in 1942. Along with increased terrorism, directed against both the British and the Palestinians, there was an increase in arms theft from British supply depots, in arms smuggling into Palestine, and in illegal immigration of Jews.[20] Whereas formerly the Zionists had looked on the British as allies in their struggle with the Palestinians, they now saw the British as allies of the Palestinians and therefore both of them as fair game.

By the end of World War II, the level of civil disturbances, now (in contrast to before 1939) perpetrated largely by the Zionists, and of the breakdown in administration had reached the point where the British were ready to throw in the sponge. Accordingly they turned for assistance to the Americans, who had aided and abetted the Zionists. As a result an Anglo-American Committee was established and went to Palestine in early 1946. The Committee's report in April rejected any notion of partition or of immediate independence for Palestine, concluding that either "would result in civil strife such as might threaten the peace of the world," and declared "that Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew" and "that Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state."[21] The Committee,however, failed to make explicit how in practice a happy state of affairs was to be achieved.

This report was followed by conferences involving the British, the Palestinians, and the Zionists. Predictably these conferences produced no solution acceptable to all, and in February 1947 the British announced their decision to turn the problem over to the United Nations. The UN General Assembly, following long-established precedent, established in May a Special Committee on Palestine. The majority report of this Committee revived the notion of partition and recommended to the General Assembly in August partition of Palestine into (1) a Jewish state, (2) an Arab state, and (3) a corpus separatum under international administration for the cities of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and environs. This recommendation, with minor modifications, and two more subcommittee reports later, was adopted by a narrow margin by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947,[22] and therewith the Mandate for Palestine was laid to rest, without honor.[23]

The General Assembly recommendation was attacked by the Palestinians on two grounds: (1) its unfairness, and (2) its unworkability. In support of the former they pointed out that the recommendation assigned to the proposed Jewish state 56 percent of the area of Palestine, while Jews

constituted only 33 percent of the population and owned six percent of the nonurban land. In support of the latter, they noted that, if implemented, the recommendation would have fragmented Palestine (a small area of only 10,450 square miles) into six principal parts, joined by narrow corridors, and two enclaves--the cities of Jaffa and Jerusalem-Bethlehem. Three of the principal parts were to become the Jewish state, the remaining three and the enclave of Jaffa the Arab state, and Jerusalem-Bethlehem were to be under international administration. In addition, if the estimated nomadic population of the Negeb were included, then the proposed Jewish state would have had an Arab majority, with Arabs owning 34 percent of its land. To the Palestinians, this was nothing short of a patently unworkable arrangement and an open invitation to further strife, hence in no sense a solution to the so-called Palestine Question.

Although for the record the Zionists accepted the partition recommendation, they were in complete agreement with the Palestinians on its unworkability and developed plans to achieve control of areas beyond those assigned to the proposed Jewish state and to expel as many of the Palestinians from these areas as possible.[24]

Since it was evident to the British that partition could be imposed only by force, they announced that they would not do so and would evacuate their forces and relinquish all responsibility in Palestine no later than 15 May 1948. For this eventuality the Zionist colonists were prepared. They had quasi-governmental organizations such as the Jewish Agency and the nucleus of an army--the Haganah had existed since 1929--trained and equipped in part by the British.[25] The Palestinians on the other hand were anything but prepared. Effective leadership was lacking, and what existed was factionalized. They had no organizations ready to assume the government and no effective means of defense, having been kept unarmed by the British.[26]

Four days after the UN General Assembly recommended partition, violent clashes between the Palestinians and the Zionists began and continued more or less uninterruptedly until the end of March 1948. At this point the Zionists took the initiative. On the night of April 9, 254 men, women, and children in the village of Dayr Yasîn, just outside of Jerusalem, were massacred and the survivors were paraded in Jerusalem the following day with loud speakers "warning the inhabitants that if they did not leave, the Deir Yaseen treatment would be their fate."[27] Subsequently areas such as Jaffa and eastern Galilee in April, and

western Galilee and eastern Jerusalem in May were captured by Zionist forces. With the exception of Jerusalem, all of these were areas assigned by the UN to the proposed Arab state; all were occupied and most of the inhabitants were expelled before May 15 and before the forces of the adjoining Arab states entered Palestine.

At midnight on 14 May 1948 the State of Israel was proclaimed and the provisional government sought recognition, which was immediately granted by the USA and the USSR. The fighting which had gone on since December 1947 escalated with the entry of forces from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. While the USA and the USSR aided and provided military assistance to the new state, the UN stood helplessly by, except to arrange for several truces, to send a mediator--Count Folke Bernadotte, who was assassinated by Israelis in September 1948--and to pass a series of resolutions "deploring" or "noting with concern" what was happening in Palestine and declaring that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. . ."[28] (As of this writing, two and a half decades later, this "practicable date" has not yet been found nor has any compensation been paid.) By the end of 1948 the Israelis had consolidated their hold on most of Palestine and agreed to negotiate under UN auspices an armistice with the adjoining Arab states, a process which occupied, with intermittent fighting, January through July 1949.[29]

By the time the bilateral armistice agreements had been signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria (but, significantly, never by the Palestinians), the Palestinians had lost most of Palestine and most of them had been scattered as stateless refugees among the surrounding Arab countries.[30]

Throughout Phase II, the Palestinians never ceased to demand independence and to resist Zionist colonization. Yet in the end they lost and the resistance in this phase must accordingly be judged to have been a failure. Throughout this period the Palestinians had been kept on a tight rein by the British. While many individual Palestinians became highly trained in various aspects of governmental administration, the predominantly rural and agricultural society as a whole was not allowed to develop institutions requisite for the business of twentieth century statecraft and to assume responsibility for its affairs. Whatever Palestinian leadership existed, beyond the local level,

was either factionalized or corrupt.[31] In addition, the Palestinians consistently underestimated the strength of the British-Zionist alliance and, accordingly, overestimated their ability to resist and the ability of the other Arab states to come to their assistance.

In summary, the outcome of Phase II was the result of three major factors. (1) Zionist single-minded determination to build a Jewish national home, a euphemism for a Jewish state, the realization of which was predicated on the dispossession and displacement of the Palestinians. (2) British commitment, under the terms of the Mandate, to support and further the objectives of Zionism. And (3), in part a consequence of the first two, the failure of Palestinian nationalist leadership. Palestinian leadership was divided by personal rivalries and in terms of both tactics and objectives, and frequently failed to distinguish between immediate and ultimate objectives. They were unable to agree on whether independence was to be sought within the context of Palestine or the larger Arab context. In addition the leadership came almost exclusively from the upper classes, the so-called notables, who did little to organize broad support from the masses; the strike and revolt in 1936 is only an apparent exception, since most of the traditional leadership was opposed to the revolt. The notables clustered around some half a dozen influential families, e.g. the Ḥusaynîs and the Nashâshîbîs. These family groupings, in addition to failing to organize the masses of the lower classes, spent time and energy in often acrimonious debate on which one was to be the spokesman for the Palestinians. In short, the question of who should rule Palestine was often not discussed in terms of (1) the British, (2) the Zionists, or (3) the Palestinians, but in terms of (1) the British, (2) the Zionists, (3) the Ḥusaynîs, (4) the Nashâshîbîs, (5) the Khâlidîs, etc. This factionalization helped to provide the British with a pretext for ignoring the growing and deepening Palestinian resistance throughout the Mandate period, by the end of which the die had been cast.

Another measure of the failure of nationalist leadership is the ease with which the Palestinians were repeatedly deflected from striving for their ultimate objective. Too often, short-term gains were mistaken for, or wishfully seen as, ultimate victory. For example, the White Paper of 1939 appeared to go a long way toward meeting--but did not achieve--Palestinian objectives of independence and self-determination. Yet it helped to a large extent to brake the momentum of resistance. Since at the same time it

spurred the Zionists on to more determined and accelerated efforts to achieve their objective, the net effect of the White Paper was that a short-term gain became a long-term loss.

AN INTERLUDE: 1949-1952

The period July 1949 to July 1952 is characterized primarily by the absence of resistance. The Palestinians had been scattered, thoroughly demoralized, and more or less in a state of shock. Their leaders had been discredited, and the two parts of Palestine not under Isreali occupation lost their identity. The Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration and the West Bank was annexed by Transjordan, which then became known as the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.[32] It was even reported that King 'Abd Allâh was prepared to make some settlement with Israel. True or not, it was believed by the Palestinians, one of whom assassinated the King while he was on a visit to Jerusalem in July 1951.

Apart from this act of defiance, most Palestinians continued to hope, vainly and, in retrospect, naively, that the peoples of the world would come to realize that an injustice had been committed and that it would somehow be made right. In the context of current rhetoric about the USSR as a friend of the Arabs, it is worth recalling that at that time, as indeed from the establishment of Israel in 1948 through March 1954, the USSR and its East European allies were firm friends of Israel and consistent supporters of her interests. Thus the Palestinians had no illusions about support from the USSR, and very few about Britain and France. As for the UN, even here their hopes were tempered by the recollection that a majority of its Euro-American members had voted in support of partition. As the Palestinians saw it, in voting for partition these states had thus been prepared to right the wrong committed against Jews in Europe at the expense of the Muslims and Christians of Palestine who had in no way been responsible for the wrong. The Palestinians, in the words of Yâsir 'Arafât,

> sympathized with the suffering of the Jews under the Nazis, but this sympathy does not mean that we ought to pay the price for Hitler's crimes. Why do we as Palestinians have to suffer terror, hunger, and deportation for what someone else has done?[33]

In view of the magnitude of the loss, it is not surprising that many writers addressed themselves to what be-

came known as the catastrophe or the disaster (al-nakbah). What is surprising is that (in the judgment of this writer) most never came to grips with the underlying causes of the disaster, contenting themselves with assertions of its inevitability and with excoriations of the British, the Zionists, and others. Two Arabs stand out as exceptions: in late 1948, Qustanṭîn Zurayq published a penetrating and, to many, a disturbing analysis entitled The Meaning of the Disaster.[34] This was followed by The Lesson of Palestine by Mûsâ al-'Alamî.[35] Both recognized that while the British had played a major role, the Palestinians and (after 15 May 1948) the Arab states had been

> faced by a challenge. . .they did not meet. . . The disaster was not inevitable. During the course of the struggle we had an opportunity to finish with Zionism and its dangers altogether, but we did not take it.

The fundamental source of the weakness of the Palestinians and of the Arab states

> was that we were unprepared even though not taken by surprise. . .; that we worked on a local basis, without unity, without totality, without a general command, our defence disjointed and our affairs disordered, every town fighting on its own and only those in areas adjacent to the Jews entering the battle at all. . . .
>
> Just as we failed in the military sphere, so we failed in the political. Our actions were improvised, our conduct of affairs a chain of enormous mistakes; we had no clear objective and no fixed policy. The natural result of all this was disaster and the loss of Palestine.

The remedy for this state of affairs, according to Zurayq and al-'Alamî, was greater unity, or at least closer cooperation, of the Arab states and modernization and democratization of political and social structures, to be achieved through universal education, with the result that control of Arab affairs, including exploitation of sources of wealth such as petroleum, would devolve into the hands of "a new, powerful, conscious generation capable of defending the Arab homeland and of recovering its self-respect." In other words, since Arab disunity was in part the cause of the disaster, Arab unity was a prerequisite to the solution.

While the analyses of Zurayq and al-'Alamî were not accepted by many Palestinians at the time, most of them did agree that the solution lay within the context of Arab unity, believing that somehow a restructured and unified Arab nation would undo the disaster.

PHASE III: 1952-1961

In the light of this belief, it is not surprising that most Palestinians saw the overthrow of King Farûq of Egypt in July 1952 as the dawning of a new day. To them King Farûq symbolized everything that was corrupt in Arab society and leadership, and his removal meant the beginning of hope. If Farûq could be swept aside, then the failure he had come to symbolize could similarly be swept aside and the disaster undone. Accordingly the Palestinians were among the most enthusiastic supporters of the Egyptian revolution and, in time, of its leader, Jamâl 'Abd al-Nâṣir, whom they saw as a modern day Salâḥ al-Dîn who would restore Palestine to its rightful owners.

Four years later disillusionment began with the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October and November 1956. In spite of the fact that Egypt salvaged a political victory from the wreck of military defeat, for the younger Palestinians the lessons to be drawn were clear; the Arab states were unable, and the superpowers were unwilling, to undo the disaster.

As a consequence, small groups of young Palestinians--predominantly students in the Gaza Strip--began meeting, searching for more satisfying answers than those given by their elders. As the number of groups and their participants grew, discussion centered around two orientations--neither in fact new--to the problem. In spite of what had happened, there were those who saw the solution only within the larger Arab context and argued that the Palestinians should strive to further Arab unity and help to reform and restructure Arab society. While in no way opposed to Arab unity, others--the activists--argued that Arab unity was a distant goal, and that for the Arab states the disaster was only one among other problems, and by no means of the highest priority. Therefore, it was unrealistic for the Palestinians to expect the Arab states to take the initiative; the initiative and the responsibility lay with the Palestinians. They further argued that the struggle was one of national liberation, not of refugee repatriation or compensation, and that liberation could be achieved only with the involvement and support of the Palestinians as a whole, although primarily those in Gaza, Jordan, the West Bank,

and Israel. Thus the idea of popular armed struggle as a means of achieving national liberation, and thus of undoing the disaster, was developed; it might be more accurate to say revived, since popular armed struggle began in 1931. At about the same time as in Gaza, groups of Palestinians in Kuwayt and West Germany began meeting and addressing themselves to the same questions.

A concern of all these groups was the possibility that the Arab states might make some sort of a settlement with Israel. To publicize any such moves, and thereby hopefully to frustrate them, a secretly published weekly called Revenge Bulletin (Nashrat al-Tha'r), published in Beirut by Palestinian students, had been circulating among Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan since 1952. These same students, under the leadership of a Palestinian physician, Dr. George Habash, formed the nucleus of the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a strong supporter of Arab unity and reform, and opposed to the notion of Palestinian armed struggle, a tactic they regarded as divisive and suicidal at that stage. The Bulletin also opposed efforts by UNRWA to provide better living quarters in the refugee camps, seeing such moves as attempts to settle the Palestinians, thus lessening their determination to return to Palestine and to support struggle to this end.

During this period, Palestinian commandos trained in Egypt by Egyptian officers began to infiltrate into Israel in August 1955. The student groups saw these as heroes and in an unorganized way provided whatever assistance they could. The actions of these commandos, called fidâ'iyîn[36] "self-sacrificers," helped to strengthen the position of the activists, committed to Palestinian armed struggle. Here were Palestinians who were doing something more than talking about the disaster and waiting for Arab unity to undo it. Israeli reprisals on camps in Gaza merely served to strengthen the arguments and therefore the influence of the activists.

As a result of these various factors, in 1958 the Palestinian National Liberation Movement was founded, which came to be known as Fatḥ.[37] Fatḥ was the first and is still the largest of the guerrilla groups, and the first distinctly Palestinian (as opposed to Arab) organization committed to national liberation by means of popular armed struggle. Since its leadership was relatively young, well-educated, and generally not of upper-class background, Fatḥ symbolized the taking over of a new generation of Palestinians. The authority of the old notables had collapsed, and their influence had waned markedly.

In 1959 another secretly published magazine made its appearance, a monthly of limited circulation published in Beirut called Our Palestine (Filasṭînûna). Our Palestine called for a Palestinian approach and solution, for popular armed struggle, and saw the ultimate solution in the establishment of a democratic, nonsectarian state in Palestine. Later it became known that Our Palestine was issued by Fatḥ; its publication continues to date.

Disillusionment with the Arab states and with President Jamal 'Abd al-Nâṣir was made complete by the secession in September 1961 of Syria from the United Arab Republic. If the formation of the UAR in 1958 had been an argument in support of an Arab, as distinguished from a Palestinian, approach, its dissolution in 1961 seemed an even stronger argument for a Palestinian approach. From this point on, the majority of the young Palestinians supported a Palestinian approach to undoing the disaster, reflecting their determination to control their own affairs and their disenchantment with the leadership of the Arab states. By the end of Phase III, the activists had won the debate; the struggle for national liberation still lay ahead.[38]

PHASE IV: 1961-1971

In addition to disillusionment with the Arab states, and mounting frustration and bitterness on the part of the younger Palestinians, the commitment to national liberation by means of popular armed struggle was strengthened by the example of the Algerian resistance. When Algeria won her independence in July 1962, the leaders of the PRM saw this as evidence of the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare against vastly superior forces. While the leadership was not unaware of the differences between French colonization in Algeria and Zionist in Palestine, and of the differences in terrain, they tended to underrate these factors. Most of all they underestimated the importance and the difficulties of political organization of the scattered Palestinian population. Their efforts were directed largely to preparation for armed struggle, and accordingly planning, fund-raising, and training were directed primarily to this end. In 1963 Fatḥ began reconnaissance operations inside Israeli occupied territories and suffered its first casualties in July.

The revolutionary potential of the nascent and increasingly independent PRM was early recognized by the Arab states. While they were by no means unsympathetic to the

plight of the Palestinians, they were at the same time concerned that the PRM might provoke increased Israeli retaliation and, at worst, thrust them into another armed conflict for which they were not prepared. At the same time they were reluctant to oppose openly the PRM. On the initiative of Egypt, a compromise of sorts was achieved and in September 1963 the Arab League Council affirmed a Palestinian entity and called for a Palestinian organization which would assume responsibility for their affairs, including the liberation of Palestine. The call for something more than the implementation of UN resolutions was significant, a testimony to the growing influence of the Palestinians and of the PRM. Aḥmad al-Shuqayrî, a Palestinian lawyer, was appointed to the League as a representative of the Palestinians and charged with responsibility for exploring the possibility of establishing an organization to function as a government-in-exile. The decision of the League Council was reaffirmed by the Arab Summit Conference in January 1964, which recognized the "right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and the liberation of its homeland from Zionist colonization. . .through the organization of the Palestinian people. . . ."[39]

Al-Shuqayrî toured the Arab states, meeting with government officials and many Palestinians, during February, March, and April and called for a conference to adopt decisions. The first Palestinian National Congress was convened in May 1964 in Jerusalem, under the auspices of King Ḥusayn, attended by 388 Palestinian delegates and by representatives of the League and of all Arab states except Saudi Arabia.[40] During six days of meetings, the Congress (1) adopted a National Charter, (2) established the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and (3) a National Fund to finance the PLO through annual subscriptions to be paid by every Palestinian over 18 years, grants from Arab and other friendly states, and contributions, and (4) called for the immediate opening of camps for military training of Palestinians to be placed under the Unified Arab Command. In addition, Aḥmad al-Shuqayrî was elected chairman of the PLO Executive Committee.

While many Palestinians supported the new PLO, and no Arab government expressed opposition, a significant number of the younger Palestinians had misgivings. They saw the PLO as a creation of the Arab states, created in part by them to contain and ultimately to use the growing influence of the Palestinians, thus entangling the PLO in inter-Arab rivalries. Accordingly, while an open clash with the PLO was avoided, many of the younger Palestinians identified with and supported Fatḥ, and not the PLO. Thus the strength and influence of Fatḥ and of the notion of popular armed struggle continued to grow.

In August 1964 the first clash between Israeli border patrols and Fatḥ guerrillas occurred, and on New Year's Eve the first operation within Israeli-occupied territory took place. On New Year's Day 1965 Fatḥ issued its first communique, which read in part:

> Sixteen years have elapsed while our people live detached from their cause which has been shelved at the United Nations as a problem of displaced refugees, whereas the enemy plans, with all his means, on the local and international levels, for an extended stay on our homeland. . . . In the light of this distressing fact, and because of the adverse effect of the lapse of time, the Asifah forces have been launched forth to reiterate to the enemy and the world at large that this people did not die and that armed revolution is the road to return and to victory.[41]

The communique notwithstanding, most of Fatḥ's activities were carried on clandestinely because the PLO frowned on any guerrilla activities not under the control of its (regular forces) Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and tried to stop what it regarded as premature, and therefore foolhardy, military activities. Essentially the PLO reflected the views of the Arab states, who regarded with growing concern developments which they felt unable to control, being unwilling to pay the political cost involved in doing so. They had, not without misgivings, supported the establishment of the PLO and had seen to it that a man sufficiently independent and outspoken to be credible, yet sensitive to their wishes, had been placed at its head. They were even willing to put up with al-Shuqayrî's at times barbed rhetoric, but they expected him and the PLO to control the PRM, including the guerrillas. This he was increasingly unable to do. The Arab states had misjudged the extent to which the notion of popular armed struggle had won support among the younger Palestinians and the degree to which a new leadership was emerging, and therefore had overestimated al-Shuqayrî's influence with the PRM's rank and file. At the same time, while they undoubtedly could have crushed the RM, they were reluctant to do so, since to the Arab masses it would have appeared like a sellout of the Palestinians.

An index of the PLO's influence was the fact that the Palestinian branch of the ANM, formerly a critic of armed struggle, committed itself to it and established a military reconnaissance group in September 1964. Two months later they suffered their first casualty in an unplanned clash with an Israeli army unit. Not wishing to jeopardize their operations, they gave out no details, not even the man's name. Two years later, in November 1966, the reconnaissance group was transformed into a guerrilla group and came to be known as Heroes of the Return (abṭâl al-'awdah).

Meanwhile, after just a year of guerrilla operations, Israel took official cognizance of the Palestinian guerrillas and on 3 May 1966 the Israeli UN delegate complained to the Security Council:

> In January 1965, an Arab terrorist and sabotage group known as El Fatah commenced organized armed incursions into Israel territory. . . . Since January 1965 there have been a total of forty-three such terrorist attacks across the frontiers. . . . The El Fatah organization publishes in the Arab press "communiques" about its exploits. Although boastful and exaggerated, these stories are reasonably accurate about times and places.[42]

The shattering defeat by Israel in June 1967 of the forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and her occupation of all Palestine plus the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Heights, also radically affected the PRM. The guerrilla leadership saw in this full vindication for their decisions to opt for a Palestinian approach and to maintain their independence from the PLO. Any prior doubts about these decisions were now swept aside, and therewith the PRM, now, for all practical purposes, synonymous with the guerrilla organizations, passed the point of no return on a course on which conflict with the Arab states was increasingly probable. To the Palestinians associated with the RM, if not to all, the June debacle demonstrated the impotence of the leadership of the Arab states and of the PLO. This leadership, they felt, had indulged in irresponsible and self-deluding rhetoric and self-defeating actions and had thoroughly discredited itself. In fact, in the view of all Arabs, the only force to emerge untainted were the PRM guerrillas. The guerrillas came to be viewed by the masses, Palestinians, and others, as the new Salaḥ al-Dîn and were quickly thrust into the foreground and into a leadership role for which they were not prepared, neither militarily,

nor politically, nor organizationally, and for which they eventually paid a high price. Accordingly, and ironically, the June fighting contributed significantly to both "making" and eventually almost "unmaking" the Palestinian guerrilla organizations.

After the June fighting, representatives of Fatḥ and three smaller groups,[43] all outgrowths of the ANM, met to assess the situation and to develop appropriate strategy and tactics. Except for agreement on armed struggle, these meetings produced neither needed unity nor other practical results. In August Fatḥ resumed its guerrilla operations. A month later, the three small groups agreed to join forces and established the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which began guerrilla operations in October and issued its first political statement on 11 December 1967.[44]

During the period of June through December 1967, there was a flurry of activity at the United Nations. The Security Council and the General Assembly met repeatedly, heard reports, and debated and adopted resolutions by the handful.[45] Beginning on June 6, the Security Council repeatedly called for a cease-fire, acceded to by Israel when she had achieved her military objectives. The General Assembly on July 4 adopted 99 to 0, and reiterated on July 14 by the same vote, a resolution declaring Israel's annexation of Old Jerusalem "invalid," and calling "upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem."[46] Israel, in the words of Foreign Minister Abba Eban, having already declared that "what should be condemned is not Israel's action, but the attempt to condemn it," and having rhetorically transformed her military conquest into a holy crusade on behalf of international morality--"Never have freedom, honor, justice, national interest and international morality been so righteously protected."[47]--absented herself from the General Assembly July 4 meeting and completely ignored the resolution. Accordingly the net effect of all the UN activity was essentially zero.[48]

By the end of 1967, it was clear that the different politico-military guerrilla organizations, especially Fatḥ and PFLP, would have to come to some accommodation among themselves and with the PLO. Along with the leadership of the Arab states, Aḥmad al-Shuqayrî had been discredited and, under considerable pressure, resigned in December the chairmanship of the PLO Executive Committee. Fatḥ saw this as an opportunity to coordinate, if not to unify, the var-

ious branches of the RM and called for a conference of all Palestinian organizations. The conference was held in Cairo in January 1968, although the PLO and the PFLP refused to attend on the grounds that some of the organizations were too small to warrant representation. The conference ended by establishing a Permanent Bureau for Palestinian Armed Struggle, representing Fatḥ and eight smaller groups. Its political functions were absorbed in due course by the PLO, as reorganized in July 1968, and the military branches of the smaller groups merged with Fatḥ's.

The need to come to some accommodation with the PLO took the form of gradually taking it over and reshaping it into a distinctly Palestinian organization, with prominence given to the notion of armed struggle, testimony to the extent to which the guerrilla organizations had taken over leadership of the PRM and to the increasing radicalization of the movement. After the resignation of Aḥmad al-Shuqayrî, Fatḥ moved to consolidate and to increase its influence. At the fourth National Congress in July 1968, Fatḥ's influence was significant, resulting in restructuring the PLO and revision of the National Charter.[49] This Congress was attended by representatives of most of the guerrilla organizations; only the PFLP, unwilling to concede Fatḥ's supremacy, refused to attend. The Congress elected an acting chairman of the Executive Committee and instructed him to contact all Palestinian organizations and to convene another meeting of the Congress within six months. After meetings with the different organizations, the Executive Committee suggested a new formula for representation in the Congress. Of the 105 seats, guerrilla organizations were to hold 57, with 33 for Fatḥ and 12 each for the PFLP and al-Ṣâ'iqah.[50] the PFLP rejected this formula and proposed instead a front comprising all groups with each having one vote. When this was not accepted, the PFLP chose not to participate in the fifth National Congress. At this Congress, held in February 1969, a new Executive Committee was elected. Of its eleven members, four were from Fatḥ, and one of these, Yâsir 'Arafât, was elected chairman of the Committee. Although Fatḥ chose to retain its organizational independence, it was now openly and officially the dominant element within the PLO, thus ending the former rivalry between it and the PLO.

This gain in organizational unity was partly offset by fragmentation of the PFLP. In September 1968, the former Palestine Liberation Front seceded from the PFLP and adopted the name PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC). In February 1969, the PFLP again split, the new group--avowedly Marxist-

Leninist--calling itself Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). Later the same year, the PFLP-GC split into two groups. Apart from the PDFLP, all of these groups, like the earlier PFLP, were somewhat leftist in ideological orientation. The fragmentation was hence more the result either of leadership clashes or of disagreements on tactics; (neither sympton was in fact new, both having been displayed by the PRM even in the 1930's).

At this point the PRM was displaying, at the same time, opposing and seemingly contradictory tendencies--fragmentation and consolidation. The ideological left was being increasingly fragmented while Fatḥ with its nationalistic but otherwise nonpolitical orientation, and disavowing any ideology, right or left, was absorbing various groups and hence growing in strength. Accordingly, the net result of the various restructurings was a gain in organizational unity. Since, as already noted, by early 1969 Fatḥ had for all practical purposes taken over the PLO, there were now essentially only two Palestinian resistance organizations of consequence: Fatḥ-PLO, by far the largest, and the PFLP. Although Fatḥ-PFLP rivalry continued to plague the PRM, the differences between them were increasingly ones of rhetorical styles and methods; there were no differences in objectives.[51]

Given the reaction of the Palestinian and other Arab masses to the guerrillas after the June 1967 fighting, the guerrilla organizations were unable to resist the temptation to abandon more or less underground activities and to operate openly. They were also increasingly apprehensive of the possibility of some political settlement which would freeze the status quo, making the disaster simply an accomplished fact and leaving their basic grievances unmet. It thus became increasingly imperative that, to avoid a clash, they come to some working arrangement with the Arab states. This was particularly true in the case of Jordan, which, given its location and the fact that some two thirds of its population were Palestinian, was clearly the most important base for the RM.

The implications of this were equally obvious to King Ḥusayn, who as early as 1967 flung down the gauntlet before the guerrillas, accusing them of treason and labeling their activities "a crime. . .which. . .can only assist the enemy."[52] He made it quite clear that the only accommodation he was interested in was one in which the guerrillas would be under the control of his army and took steps to effect this. A month later Fatḥ charged in a statement that "the counter-revolutionary forces in the East Bank

[Jordan] are still opposing, hunting down and arresting the commandos."[53] Similar charges in the following months were repeated as the Jordanian forces attempted to prevent the guerrillas from becoming an independent force of consequence. These attempts were unsuccessful and therewith the guerrilla organizations, far from being merely a pawn in Arab politics, as Israel charged, entrenched themselves more firmly and established, beginning in late 1967, a line of bases on the east side of the Jordan River and increased their raids into the occupied West Bank. In January 1968, Fath announced that it had established underground bases "in the occupied homeland."[54]

In 1968, Fath and the PLO assumed greater responsibility for the affairs in general of the Palestinians. They took over security in the refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon, organized schools, clinics, and a hospital on the edge of Amman, and provided financially and educationally for the widows and children of guerrillas who were killed, disabled, or imprisoned. In short, increasingly the PRM was assuming the functions of a state and was developing appropriate infrastructures.

These were developments which Jordan and Israel found intolerable. The guerrillas were with growing frequency conducting raids not only in the areas occupied in 1967 but even into cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv.[55] This in turn was creating unrest and forcing the Israelis to turn to harsher measures in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Finally they launched a series of military operations across the Jordan River, hoping thereby to eliminate the guerrillas or to force Jordan to control them. Since many of the guerrilla bases were near or in refugee encampments, and it was not always obvious who was or was not a guerrilla, the Palestinian population in Jordan bore the brunt of these attacks by air and by land. If the Israelis thought that these attacks would turn the Palestinians against the guerrillas, then they had badly misjudged the situation; the effect was indeed the opposite.

A striking example of this was the Israeli attack on Karamah, a village of some 40,000 Palestinians across the River Jordan from Jericho. Although the Israelis destroyed most of the village, they sustained "a greater blow than they suffered in any comparable action," according to the correspondent for The Guardian reporting from Tel Aviv.[56] At Karamah, the outgunned Palestinians, in violation of a basic rule of guerrilla warfare, stood and fought along with Jordanian forces. Whether or not, as claimed by the Palestinians, this was a military defeat for Israel, is

not important. What is important is that it was believed to be and hence showed that the Israelis were not invincible. For the Palestinians the battle of Karamah was a psychological victory, a crucial event dividing their experience into a before or an after, and gave a tremendous boost to their morale and determination. Most significantly perhaps, since it destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility--invincible enemies are impersonal, nonhuman--it enabled the Palestinians to begin to come to terms with their irrational fear and hatred and to begin to see the Israelis as persons whose motivation, strengths, and weaknesses could be studied, understood, and dealt with. In addition, probably more than any other single event, the battle of Karamah resulted in massive popular support for the RM, not only among the Palestinians but also among Arabs elsewhere.

For the Jordanian government, the lesson of Karamah was that--regardless of the internal and international political costs--the guerrillas could not be allowed to continue to "call the shots" in Jordan's relationship with Israel. Given the openness with which the guerrillas at this point conducted their affairs, they at times needlessly provoked the government and made it easy for the government to infiltrate their ranks with agents provocateurs. An opportunity presented itself on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. On 2 November 1968, there were large demonstrations with thousands participating in Amman as well as in other cities and the refugee camps. The guerrillas were aware of the possibility of confrontations with government forces and saw to it that the crowds remained peaceful and more or less orderly. Nevertheless a minor clash with security forces did take place. The following day the government charged the guerrilla organizations with provoking the clash and with undermining public security, a charge promptly denied by the guerrillas. On the pretext of restoring order, Jordanian military forces the next day were placed at various points in Amman and surrounded the refugee camps. The situation rapidly deteriorated and shooting resulted. Several days later, close to a hundred, mostly nonguerrilla Palestinians, had been killed, and many shelters in the camps had been destroyed before a cease-fire was agreed upon. The guerrillas accused King Husayn personally of having masterminded the confrontation. True or not, the fact remained that the guerrillas had allowed themselves to be drawn into a readily predictable and useless confrontation,[57] a pattern which was to be repeated with Lebanese forces in 1969 and again with Jordanian forces in 1970.

This continuing series of crises was a harsh reminder to the guerrillas that factional and ideological disputes were luxuries which they could not afford, that they would have to close ranks, and that they would have to come to an effective accommodation with Lebanon and Jordan. In April 1969, the PLO established the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command as a step toward unification of activities. Activities were to be coordinated through, and communiques issued only by and in the name of, the Command. By October all organizations--representing over ninety percent of the guerrillas--had agreed to join and work through the Command, except, again, the PFLP, which continued to insist on maintaining its independence.[58]

Following the October 1969 clash with the Lebanese army, Egypt offered to mediate. In early November, PLO-Fatḥ head 'Arafât and Lebanese Chief of Staff Bustânî negotiated under Egyptian auspices an agreement, later known as the Cairo Agreement, under which the guerrillas agreed to respect Lebanese sovereignty and to restrict their bases to southern Lebanon--the so-called Arqûb region, and Lebanon agreed to allow the guerrillas freedom of action in this area.[59]

In February 1970, the Jordanian government announced new measures restricting guerrilla activities. The measures prohibited, among other things, carrying weapons in towns, demonstrations, publications, and political activity not authorized by the government, and demanded that weapons stockpiles be surrendered. The guerrilla organizations realized that under these terms they would be unable to continue and in response formed a Unified Command comprising all major organizations, including the PFLP, and announced their refusal to comply with these measures, which, they claimed, violated earlier understandings. After a few days of Jordanian-Palestinian armed conflict--resulting, as in earlier clashes, in a standoff--the Jordanian government and the Unified Command announced an agreement similar to the Cairo Agreement negotiated with Lebanon.

The seventh Palestinian National Congress, in recognition of the step toward unity represented by the Unified Command, ended its meetings on 4 June 1970 by reorganizing the PLO. Among other measures, a policymaking Central Committee was established with representatives of the ten major guerrilla organizations, including the PFLP (which, however, was not a member of the Congress nor of the powerful Executive Committee). Two days after the Congress ended, fighting again erupted in Amman and quickly escalated into a major clash, in which, for the first time, non-Arabs were

involved. Some eighty British, Americans, and Germans were held hostage by the PFLP in a hotel in Amman and an American military attache was killed. In the fighting PLO-PFLP rivalry again surfaced with the latter rejecting a cease-fire arranged by the PLO with government forces. Egypt and Libya called for an effective cease-fire and on King Ḥusayn to do everything possible to end the crisis. On June 12 a cease-fire was agreed on, and all hostages were released by the guerrillas. Red Crescent officials claimed that casualties--again predominantly Palestinian civilians--amounted to seven hundred, including two hundred killed. During the following uneasy truce, a mediation committee representing Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, and Algeria attempted to work out a more abiding arrangement between the guerrillas and the Jordanian government and on July 10 announced an agreement which was essentially the same as the various earlier agreements.

This clash showed the uncompromising stance of the PFLP and that it was totally insensitive to the position in which their actions placed the Jordanian government and King Ḥusayn. The taking and holding of non-Arab hostages (like the hijackings in September) served mainly to embarrass the government, tending to demonstrate its inability to govern effectively. The actions of the PFLP, probably as much as Israeli attacks, forced King Ḥusayn to conclude that the Jordanians would have to choose either his government or the guerrillas. Since the dominant PLO-Fatḥ group in the PRM was not interested in taking over in Jordan, this was a choice which was not in the interests of the PRM and which, at least in retrospect, it appears they could have done more to avoid. Although this could not have been done without acknowledging an open break in guerrilla ranks, it would in fact have changed nothing, since the split existed in any case and continued to plague the PRM.

Whatever the costs to the PRM of these clashes, on the premise that, unless annihilated, guerrillas are the winners, the cumulative effect of the fighting, as of the resulting agreements with the Lebanese and Jordanian governments, was to establish the PRM as an increasingly independent force, one able materially to affect the interests of all parties to the continuing conflict over Palestine. At the same time, these conflicts did not resolve the inherent contradictions in the relationship of the PRM to the Arab states, especially Jordan. Clearly a RM enjoying the loyalty of a large proportion of the population, with many of the infrastructures of a state, including military forces, could not continue to coexist indefinitely with

the regime in Jordan. A situation had accordingly developed which could no longer be ignored by the superpowers.

The response of the USA was to launch in June 1970 what has since come to be called the Rogers Plan.[60] This was accepted by Egypt on July 23 and by Jordan three days later. The result was a cease-fire on the Suez Canal, effective August 7, and the renewal of efforts by the UN to implement Security Council Resolution 242 (November 1967).

The Palestinians saw this as a trap, a device to defuse the RM, to isolate it from support by the Arab states, and to freeze the status quo in the relationship between Israel and her neighbors, a situation in which the Palestinians have essentially no stake. They accordingly denounced the Rogers Plan, the cease-fire, and Egypt's and Jordan's acceptance of both, and the PLO Executive Committee announced on the day the cease-fire went into effect that the guerrilla organizations would neither honor nor abide by it. Given the relationship between King Ḥusayn and the Palestinians at this point, their denunciation of his acceptance of the Rogers Plan probably did not change this relationship. In the case of President Nâṣir however, their denunciation meant that they were attacking one who had on more than one occasion risen to their defense, most recently just two months ago. Reportedly he was stung by the verbal attack, especially by that of Fatḥ, and decided that the Palestinian leadership needed to be taught a lesson. He ordered closure of the Cairo office of Fatḥ and suspension of their broadcasts from Egypt. Apparently also for the same reason he did not intervene immediately in September when Jordanian forces launched an all-out attack on the Palestinians, guerrillas and civilians alike.[61]

The June Agreement between the Jordanian government and the guerrillas did not last long. In late August skirmishes began and continued at a low level. King Ḥusayn, who by now had several scores to settle with the Palestinians, was presented an opportunity to do so by the successful hijacking in early September by the PFLP of four civilian airliners. The hijackings were denounced by Fatḥ, which proceeded to have the PFLP removed from the PLO Central Committee. With the guerrilla ranks in open disarray, and with Jordan's ability to make good any agreement with Israel it entered into called into question by the hijackings, the Jordanian army--assured of support if needed by the USA and Israel--struck hard, using heavy artillery as well as its air force. Although the fighting began in Amman, it quickly spread to other areas. As was true in earlier clashes, Palestinian civilians in the camps bore the brunt. The severity of the

fighting and of the high number of casualties--some 5,000--shocked even those who had willingly seen Jordan attempt to bring the guerrillas to heel. The physical destruction in the camps and Palestinian areas of Amman was extensive. In addition to guerrilla supplies and weapons stockpiles, many dwellings, schools, clinics, and even the Palestinian Red Crescent hospital were totally demolished.

After several abortive attempts to arrange a cease-fire, at the initiative of Egyptian President Nâṣir, the Arab League sent a mediation team of four headed by Sudanese President Numayrî to Amman. On September 25 the government and the guerrillas agreed on a cease-fire, but the fighting did not stop. The following day President Numayrî returned to Cairo and reported that the Jordanian army was continuing its attacks on Palestinian camps in Amman. President Nâṣir sent a telegram to King Ḥusayn accusing the Jordanian government of carrying out a plan "to liquidate the Palestinian resistance."[62] Finally on September 27, the day before President Nâṣir's fatal heart attack, King Ḥusayn and Yâsir 'Arafât signed an accord in Cairo calling for an immediate cease-fire, release of prisoners, withdrawal of guerrillas and Jordanian army units from Amman, and formation of a Supervisory Committee--headed by Tunisian Premier Ladgham--to oversee the agreement. The accord, called also the Cairo Agreement, notwithstanding, sporadic fighting continued; since nothing had been settled, this was hardly surprising. On October 4 fighting again escalated. The Supervisory Committee accused both sides of violating the cease-fire and managed on October 13 to negotiate a supplementary (Amman) Agreement, and the fighting subsided during the following week.

Although the Jordanian government--which on September 22 had posted a reward of $11,000 for PFLP head George Ḥabash--had announced on October 1 that it recognized Fatḥ-PLO as a legitimate guerrilla organization and that it would be permitted to continue its struggle against Israel, by the end of October it was obvious that there remained little, if any, basis for trust and cooperation between the government and the Palestinians. Increasingly bitter reciprocal accusations of violations of the Agreements, alternating with periods of fighting, and punctuated by short periods of truce became the pattern in subsequent months. By late May 1971 the confrontation had passed the point of no return, and in June the fighting grew more intense. The army moved supplies to the north of Jordan, to which the guerrillas had been largely restricted since the fighting in the fall, and in mid-July began shelling the guerrilla

bases, followed by a full-scale offensive and the route of most of the guerrillas. Many were captured, others fled into Syria and Lebanon, and a few even crossed the truce line and sought refuge in Israeli-occupied territory.

This action by Jordan was condemned by the other Arab states. Kuwayt and Libya suspended their financial aid; Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria broke relations with Jordan. Egypt and Saudi Arabia called for adherence to the Cairo and Amman Agreements and arranged for a meeting in Jiddah in September 1971 of Jordanian and guerrilla representatives.[63] The guerrillas insisted that Jordan had violated the Agreements, that implementation of these was called for, and that any new agreements must be based on the former. The Jordanian government argued sophistically that the Cairo and Amman Agreements had achieved their objectives and, in effect, called for Jordanian control of all Palestinian affairs and over all guerrilla activities. Predictably the conference ended in failure to reach any accord, both sides accusing the other of bad faith and of wrecking the talks, and therewith the Jordanian-Palestinian rupture was complete.[64]

Meanwhile the guerrilla organizations made another attempt to close ranks, realizing that their confrontation with the Jordanian regime was more than a sparring match. Due in no small measure to this pressure, at the eighth Palestinian National Congress in July 1971 the highest degree of organizational unity to date was achieved. The membership in the Congress was increased to 155, with 85 representing the guerrilla organizations. The Executive Committee was also enlarged, giving a voice in the PLO, for the first time, to the PFLP. Therewith all organizations were included, except for the small communist-backed al-Anṣâr, "the partisans," which applied for, but was refused, membership. Enlarging the Congress and the Executive Committee did not, however, affect the dominant position of Fatḥ. Yâsir 'Arafât continued as chairman of the Executive and of the Central Committees, which he had been, respectively, since February 1969 and June 1970. In addition, in July 1971 he was elected commander-in-chief of the PLO Forces of the Palestinian Revolution and continued to represent the Palestinians in negotiations with Jordan and the Arab League, an acknowledgment that he and the PLO--and not King Ḥusayn--spoke for the Palestinians. This acknowledgment, while certainly not sought by the Jordanian government, was sought by the Palestinians and was therefore a clear gain for the PRM. In effect, it gave recognition to the independence of the Palestinians and to the legitimacy of their struggle.

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

The PRM is the response of the Palestinians to Zionist colonization in Palestine beginning in 1882 and the establishment in 1948 of a Jewish state, Israel. At no time have the Palestinians been willing to acquiesce, let alone cooperate, in this enterprise, whose legitimacy they have never conceded, realizing that it could be accomplished only at the expense of their national political rights and existence.[65] Their bitterness was compounded (during Phase II) by the realization that Britian's mandatory obligations to prepare Palestine for independence were not intended to take effect until a Jewish majority in Palestine had been achieved.

When, after the establishment of Israel, they recognized that the world community and the existing Arab states were prepared to accept the status quo (Phase III), they took the initiative (Phase IV) in an attempt to prevent this and to try to reverse what they regarded as a miscarriage of justice, called "the disaster." Their strategies at this point placed them in conflict, not only with Israel, but with the Arab states and the superpowers. The odds against them in this conflict, while discouraging, did not persuade them to alter strategies, but only served to strengthen their determination and efforts to achieve them. As a consequence of the confrontations in Lebanon and particularly Jordan, the PRM has again gone underground, not inappropriate for such a movement, and a position from which it was not ready to emerge when thrust into prominence by the defeat of the Arab states in 1967.

By September 1971, the Palestinians had not only recaptured a central position in the continuing conflict over Palestine, but had given it an international dimension. They had come to see their struggle as part of a larger and on-going third-world struggle for equality and dignity. Spokesmen for this view were initially the PFLP and its various offshoots. It has come, however, to be held by a majority of the younger generations of Palestinians.

Along with Palestinianization and internationalization of the conflict, a new and predominantly young leadership has emerged. This fact and its long-range significance has received little notice in the western world. A clear exception is the report by Robert Stephens. After the battle of Karamah, he noted the emergence of "a new generation of revolutionary nationalist leaders in place of the old 'notables' whose authority collapsed after 1958, and who are as different from them in education, determination and techni-

cal abilities as the Zionist activist leaders were in their time from the wealthy assimilationists of the Diaspora or the passive patriarchs of the ghettoes."[66]

The young Palestinians, recognizing that the status quo ante 1947 could not be restored, seriously addressed themselves to the kind of a state they envision as a replacement for an exclusivist Israel. The feasibility of their objectives may be open to question, but their sincerity is not, although--for obvious reasons--the Israelis question the latter.[67] In the view of the Palestinians, to substitute a Muslim or a Muslim-Christian state for the existing Jewish state would be merely replacing an existing undemocratic and exclusivist state by another equally undemocratic and exclusivist state; the Palestinians see no gain in this. The state to the creation of which they have dedicated themselves is not a non-Jewish replacement for Israel, but a democratic, pluralist, and nonsectarian alternative to Israel, with equality for all as individuals and discrimination against none on the basis of religion or nationality. In other words, while the Palestinians see their having been "thrown into the desert" as an injustice demanding rectification, they do not see "throwing the Jews into the sea" as a solution. The state they are fighting for is indeed new, not the old Palestine recreated; the latter is not worth fighting for.[68]

The attitude of the superpowers to the Palestinians has remained unchanged. They continue to regard them and the PRM as, at best, an annoying and disruptive element, and, at worst, a revolutionary force which--since it can no longer be ignored--must be contained and ultimately destroyed. Accordingly neither the USA nor the USSR is willing to accede to the demand of the Palestinians that they be recognized as a primary party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In short, the USA and the USSR have made their investment in the Middle East, find the status quo not incompatible with their interests, and have come to an understanding and a mutual acceptance of each other's interests.[69] In this situation there is no room for the Palestinians as a national entity.

Since becoming a member of the UN in 1971, China has indicated an unwillingness to support or be identified with USSR or USA Middle East policies. To date this has had no impact on the situation. China, of course, unlike the USA and the USSR, has no stake in the status quo and therefore, like the Palestinians, has a motive for seeing it changed.[70]

Among the problems facing the PRM, most critical and interrelated are (1) disunity within its ranks, (2) its inability to arrive at an effective modus vivendi with the

Arab states, and (3) its inability to mobilize the Palestinians as a whole into an effective supporting base for guerrilla activities.[71]

The leadership of the PRM is not unaware of the need for unity and of the cost of its lack. Factionalism, based in part on ideological differences and in part on personal rivalries, continues to plague the RM; the Fath-PFLP rivalry is illustrative.[72] At the same time, progress in achieving unity of action--unity of purpose has always existed--is clearly exhibited with each effort to this end. The PRM is much less divided today than in 1968 or even 1970. Steps to achieve unity have been furthered, unintentionally to be sure, by efforts to exploit intergroup differences. Fath for example, denounced the 1970 hijackings by the PFLP and had it expelled from the PLO Central Committee because of them. Yet the result of King Husayn's efforts to exploit this break and to separate "good" (Fath) from "bad" (PFLP) guerrillas was that the open break was immediately repaired and the PFLP was welcomed back into the fold. Accordingly, while they sustained heavy losses, Fath and the PFLP stood together and weathered the storm.

While Palestinianization of the conflict opened the door to clashes with the Arab states, it did not make them inevitable. The PRM could, and, in its own interest, should, have done more to avoid the confrontations in Jordan and in Lebanon. In Jordan, for example, the PRM should either have overthrown King Husayn or--with due regard to his problems and sensitivities--have found a way of living with him. In fact it did neither, but repeatedly twitted him in public and at times acted like an army of occupation in Amman. The leadership of the PRM failed to appreciate the significance of the differences, especially after 1967, between their objectives and those of the Arab states. The response of the leadership to such criticism has been to assert that the clashes, for example in Jordan, were indeed inevitable and that the regime was looking for an opportunity to crush the guerrillas even before September 1970. While this was undoubtedly true, the extent to which the clash was inevitable it was also predictable; this being so, the leadership could have gone to greater lengths to avoid giving the Jordanian regime the opportunity it sought. While purchased at considerable cost, these confrontations did have a positive result--they helped to prevent hopeless fragmentation of the PRM.

The failure of the PRM to build broad support from the rank and file of Palestinians, in and outside of the occupied areas, is unquestionably their most serious problem.

This failure is related to the lack of unity of the RM and to the high level of support demanded by the guerrillas, a level which, most notably in the West Bank and Gaza, and in pre-1967 Israeli territory, the Palestinians simply could not provide. This tended to divide the guerrillas from the people and led to disenchantment with the guerrillas and therewith to the RM in general.

While the reestablishment of the centrality of the Palestinians to the conflict over Palestine was clearly a prerequisite to any settlement, and therefore a gain, as long as the PRM needed its bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, it could not afford to cut itself off from the populations in these countries. The Palestinianization of the conflict, however, made it more difficult for non-Palestinian Arabs to continue to see the conflict as their own cause. And as Israeli attacks on the populations in these countries raised the cost of support for the PRM, it required only a small step to come to feel that the conflict was not an Arab but a Palestinian problem. Unintentionally, the leadership of the PRM contributed to furthering this attitude.

In spite of these problems and the odds against the PRM achieving its objectives, the PRM still exists, and will continue to exist, as long as the basic grievance which gave rise to the movement remains unresolved. And this can be resolved, ultimately, in only one of two ways: Annihilation of the Palestinian people--in short, genocide--or recognition of the injustices done to the Palestinians and forthright attempts to redress them. To date the only viable suggestion to achieve this end is that of the Palestinians themselves--the establishment of a democratic, pluralist state. Under no other arrangement can Jew, Muslim, Christian, or atheist live together without discrimination and exploitation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although the label Palestine is old, it has not always denoted the same area. Precise geographic delineation emerged from the peace settlements after World War I. In 1923 Britain divided the mandated area into Transjordan and Palestine, respectively east and west of the River Jordan. This usage came in time to be widely accepted and is here followed. Different figures on population and land ownership in part derive from the ambiguity of the area denoted by Palestine.

Since before the establishment of Israel the overwhelming majority of the population of Palestine was Arab, hereafter Palestinian(s) is used instead of the longer phrase Palestinian Arab(s).

Since the focus of this article is the PRM, Zionist colonization is not dealt with in detail; this is readily available in, among others, Amos Elon, The Israelis: Founders and Sons (New York 1971); Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (London 1950); and Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine Prepared for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 3 vols. (Jerusalem 1946), and a Supplement [prepared for UNSCOP], (Jerusalem 1947).

2. Among others, useful for the earlier periods: Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (ed.), The Transformation of Palestine: Essays on the Origin and Development of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Evanston 1971); George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Philadelphia 1939); J. M. N. Jeffries, Palestine: The Reality (London 1939); Robert John and Sami Hadawi, The Palestine Diary, vol. I: 1914-1945, and II: 1945-1948 (New York 1970), hereafter John and Hadawi; William R. Polk, David M. Stamler and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine (Boston 1957); Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London 1961); A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine (London 1969); the brief but well-done survey in David Waines, The Unholy War: Israel and Palestine 1897-1971 (Wilmette 1971); and Government of Palestine, op. cit.

3. As of this writing, Phase V (or, more probably, another interlude) beginning in September 1971 cannot be adequately dealt with. The PRM, reflecting the increasing radicalization of the Palestinians, appears to be moving to increasing militancy, e.g. the Black September, increasing isolation from the Arab states, and, if so, then

probably also finding itself increasingly at odds with the latter. The seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassy in the Sudan by Black September guerrillas in March 1973, and the reaction of the Arab states to this, appears to lend support to this thesis.

4. Survey of Palestine, I, 114.

5. In a 12 June 1895 entry in his diary, Theodor Herzl records the need to expropriate the landholders and to "spirit the penniless population across the borders." He adds that "the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly." Raphael Patai (ed.), The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, 5 vols. (New York 1960).

6. Diaries, 9 June 1895.

7. Anis Sayegh, Palestine and Arab Nationalism, PLO Research Center Palestine Essays No. 3 (Beirut 1970), 24.

8. Halpern, op. cit., 267.

9. Antonius, op. cit., 259.

10. E.g. when Herzl was in Constantinople in 1896 to "purchase" rights for Jewish colonization in Palestine "on a large scale," the Sultan refused to see him but sent a message via a mutual acquaintance: "If Mr. Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. . . Let the Jews save their billions. When my Empire is partitioned, they may get Palestine for nothing. But only our corpse will be divided. I will not agree to vivisection." Diaries, 19 June 1896.

11. Although the Palestinians were never consulted, the British had been forewarned of their opposition. In August 1917, General Clayton (Allenby's chief political officer) telegraphed Mark Sykes in London regarding the proposed Balfour Declaration: "I am not sure that it is not as well to refrain from any public pronouncement. . . It will not help matters if the Arabs. . .are given yet another bone of contention in the shape of Zionism in Palestine. . . ." Quoted in Stein, op. cit., 522-3. In addition, British anti-Zionist Jews also warned of Palestinian opposition; e.g. Edwin Samuel Montagu, the only Jew in the Lloyd George cabinet, in memoranda and letters written in August-October 1917 (available since 1966 in the Public Records Office, London) argues forcibly against Zionism--"a mischievous political creed"--in part because its implementation would require the displacement of the Palestinians and because it would not solve the Jewish question in Europe. The full text of three documents has been published by the Arab League Office, Edwin Montagu and the Balfour Declaration (New York n.d.).

12. Details in Antonius, op. cit., 267-77; text of the Declaration, 433-4; John & Hadawi, I, 75-106; Stein, op.cit. 628-51, a British Zionist, gives one of the fuller and more interesting accounts of Arab opposition to the Balfour Declaration.

13. This and following quotations are from the text of the report, E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, Vol. IV (London 1952), 360-5.

14. For the text of this January 1919 agreement, according to which Fayṣal is held to have agreed to the terms of the Balfour Declaration and therefore the Zionist program, Antonius, op. cit., 437-9; for a valuable critical study, A. L. Tibawi, "T. E. Lawrence, Faisal and Weizmann: The 1919 Attempt to Secure an Arab Balfour Declaration," Middle East Forum XLV (No. 1, 1969), 81-90, hereafter MEF.

15. For the full text of the recommendations for Syria and Palestine, Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the Middle East (Beirut 1963), 345-56; quotations are from Recommendation 5, 349-52.

16. For the full text of the Mandate, J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol. II, 1914-1956 (Princeton 1956), 106-11.

The ambiguous phrase "national home," here, in the Balfour Declaration, and in Zionist writings, was used first at the Basle Conference in 1897 and was chosen to mask Zionist intentions, hoping thereby not to evoke Arab and Ottoman opposition. Max Nordau, a close associate of Theodor Herzl, claimed credit for the phrase "Heimstätte [literally 'homestead'] as a synonym for 'State'. . . It was equivocal, but we all understood what it meant. To us it signified Judenstaat [Jewish state]. . . " Quoted in Christopher Sykes, Cross Roads to Israel (London 1965), 24. In English, national home came to be used as the equivalent of German Heimstätte.

There is no question that British and Zionist leaders understood the phrase in the same way. John Shuckburgh, an official in the India Office in 1921, quotes Chaim Weizmann asking Prime Minister Lloyd George "what meaning His Majesty's Government had attached to the phrase 'Jewish National Home' in the famous Balfour Declaration. The Prime Minister replied: 'We meant a Jewish State'. . . " Quoted in Doreen Ingrams, Palestine Papers 1917-1922: Seeds of Conflict (London 1972), 146. Similarly Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen reporting on a conversation on 22 July 1921

with Lloyd George, Arthur James Balfour, Winston Churchill, Chaim Weizmann, et. al., states: "L. G. and A. J. B. both said that by the [Balfour] Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish State." Middle East Diary 1917-1956 (New York 1960), 104. Hubert Young, a Foreign Office official in 1921, in a memorandum on British policy in Palestine states that the problem in dealing with Palestinian opposition is "one of tactics, not strategy, the general strategic idea . . . being the gradual immigration of Jews into Palestine until that country becomes a predominantly Jewish State... But it is questionable whether we are in a position to tell the Arabs what our policy really means." Quoted in Ingrams, op. cit., 140.

17. Unless otherwise indicated, this and following quotations are from the Memorandum by H. M. G. to the UNSCOP, The Political History of Palestine under British Administration (Jerusalem 1947), a brief but useful summary. Since the "underlying causes" were well known, the Commissions' reports--except for details--could just as well have been written in London and in advance of the outbursts.

18. John & Hadawi, I, 348; for more information on political parties and guerrilla activities, idem, 239, 249-51, 347-8, and J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York 1950, reprinted 1968), 51-63, 112-7, 182-8.

19. When these Regulations were reenacted in 1945 to enable the British to deal with Zionist terrorism, Ya'acov Shapiro--now Israeli Minister of Justice--declared them to be "unparalled in any civilized country; there were no such laws even in Nazi Germany. . . " Quoted in Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel 1948-1966 (Beirut 1968), 4. This book, originally published in Hebrew, Haifa 1966, is a useful source of information about the application of these Regulations--adopted by Israel in 1949--to Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

20. For a colorful account of arms smuggling into Palestine from the British point of view, Norman Phillips, Guns, Drugs and Deserters: The Special Investigation Branch in the Middle East (London 1954), 102-25. On Zionist terrorism at this time, John & Hadawi, I, 351-62; George Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs (London 1954), 209-11, 218-23.

21. The report was accordingly hardly "a strong endorsement that Palestine become a national home for the Jewish people," as is claimed by Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York 1972), 383. To correct her error she need only have consulted her father's Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City 1956), 144-8.

22. For a fuller account of UN action in 1947, John & Hadawi, II, 125-274. For the final subcommittee reports, United Nations Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 1947, pp. 270-310 contain the report of Subcommittee Two which gives detailed information about population and land ownership in Palestine at that time, argued against partition, and raised a series of legal questions, including the competency of the UN to recommend and enforce partition of a country, for which it recommended that an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice be sought. These arguments were brushed aside and such an opinion was never sought; for a closely-reasoned opinion by an international lawyer on this question, Henry Cattan, Palestine, The Arabs and Israel: The Search for Justice (London 1969), 242-75.

For the role of the USA in pressuring other states to support partition in the General Assembly, Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics," Middle East Journal II (1948), 1-16, hereafter MEJ; Alfred M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago 1953), 48-87; Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1942-1947 (New York 1962; reprinted Beirut 1970), 161-85; for President Truman's account, including that of the pressure brought on him to support partition, Harry S. Truman, op. cit., 156-69.

23. Valuable for the mandate period, among many others, are accounts by two Palestinians, officials in the mandatory government: M. F. Abcarius, for 23 years Financial Secretary, Palestine through the Fog of Propaganda (London 1946), and Sami Hadawi, from 1937-48 Official Land Valuer and Inspector of Tax Assessments, Palestine: Loss of a Heritage (San Antonio 1963) and his later Bitter Harvest: Palestine 1914-1967 (New York 1967); also the account by R. M. Graves, a British official of the mandatory government and mayor of Jerusalem from June 1947 to April 1948, Experiment in Anarchy (London 1949), and John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate: An Account of the Palestine Mandate (London 1959).

24. Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," MEF (November 1961), 22-8, based on Hebrew sources. In contrast to public assurances by Zionist leaders that there was room for both Jews and Arabs in Palestine, R. Weitz, for many years head of the Jewish Agency's colonization department, writing in Davar, 29 September 1967, quotes a revealing entry from his diary for 1940: "Between ourselves it must be clear that there

is no room for both peoples together in this country. . . We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is a Palestine, at least Western Palestine (west of the Jordan River), without Arabs. . . And there is no other way than to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them: Not one village, not one tribe, should be left." Quoted in Arie Bober (ed.), The Other Israel: The Radical Case against Zionism (New York 1972), 13. Lt.-Gen. Sir John Bagot Glubb relates a conversation with a Jewish district officer in Palestine in December 1947. The Jewish officer was asked "whether the new Jewish State would not have many internal troubles, in view of the fact that the Arab inhabitants of the Jewish State would be equal in number to the Jews. 'Oh, no!' replied the Jewish officer. 'That will be fixed. A few calculated massacres will soon get rid of them!' The speaker was not a terrorist--he was a respectable moderate Jewish official, employed in the mandatory government." A Soldier with the Arabs (London 1957), 81.

25. For an account of how the Zionists managed to receive many of their arms from Czechoslavokia, Canda, and the USA, Leonard Slater, The Pledge (New York 1970).

26. One index of the different treatment of Palestinians and Zionist colonists in the matter of arms is the number confiscated by the mandatory government. Between 1935 and 1947, over 7,600 rifles were confiscated from Palestinians, whereas only 135 from the colonists; Survey of Palestine, II, 594-5.

27. An eyewitness account by an American missionary in Jerusalem, Bertha Spafford Vester, "Our Jerusalem: The Final Chapter," al Kulliyah (March 1954), 15. The final chapter of her book Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881-1949 (New York 1950) was omitted by the publisher Doubleday & Co. without her prior knowledge or consent; accordingly she gave it to al Kulliyah, magazine of the American University of Beirut Alumni Association, where it appears in the February and March 1954 issues.

For a Zionist assessment of this massacre, Menachem Beigin, The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun (New York 1951). Beigin (also spelled Begin), leader of one of the terrorist groups responsible, justifies the massacre on the grounds that it saved Jewish lives (164). See also the account by Jon Kimche, a British Zionist, Seven Fallen Pillars (New York 1953), 227-8.

28. General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948, paragraph 11. The texts of this and other resolutions have been helpfully compiled by Sami Hadawi (ed.), United Nations Resolutions on Palestine, 1947-1965 (Beirut 1965).

29. For fuller accounts of the period 1947-1949: Glubb, op. cit., John & Hadawi, op. cit., Kirk, op. cit., Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York 1970); for an Israeli account, Nataniel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949 (New York 1961).

30. A useful study of the dimensions of the refugee problem is Don Peretz, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington 1958); also John H. Davis, 1959-64 Commissioner-General of UNRWA, The Evasive Peace: A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem (London 1968), 53-72.

31. During the revolt beginning in 1936, Ḥâjj Amîn al-Ḥusaynî, who advocated firm and organized resistance to the British, eliminated somewhat ruthlessly opponents who advocated more moderate tactics toward the British. When the revolt was crushed and Ḥâjj Amîn exiled, resistance waned in part due to the absence of effective leadership.

32. To the Palestinians, the fact that King 'Abd Allâh agreed, after the cease-fire in March 1949, to cede to Israel approximately 110 square miles of the area under control of the Arab Legion in central Palestine, and in 1950 annexed the West Bank (though this was never recognized by the other Arab League members), made him an accomplice in the loss of Palestine and accounts for their bitter denunciation of him; for details of the cession of land, Kirk, op. cit., 297-9.

33. Interview by Edmund Ghareeb, The Arab World (May 1969), 27.

34. Ma'nâ al-nakbah (Beirut 1948). An English translation is available: Constantine K. Zurayk, The Meaning of the Disaster (Beirut 1956). After the June 1967 fighting, this was followed by a similarly perceptive study Ma'nâ al-nakbah mujaddadan (Beirut 1967).

35. 'Ibrat Filasṭîn (Beirut 1949), available in a condensed English translation: Musa Alami, "The Lesson of Palestine," MEJ III (1949), 373-405, from which following quotations are taken. Although written in 1967, the comments of Cecil Hourani are equally insightful: "The Moment of Truth," Encounter (November 1967) and reprinted in Current (January 1968), reportedly a translation of an article published earlier in the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahâr.

36. The notion of fidâ'î is an old one in Arab history. The modern sense of politically motivated guerrillas occurs at least as early as 1919. In August of that year a report

(see fn. 13) by a British official identifies Arab nationalist societies in Palestine. One of the most militant is the Fedaiyeh, "a society of persons who are ready to sacrifice themselves."

37. The name Fatḥ (popularly also spelled Fateh or Fatah) appears to have been formed as sort of a reverse acronym from the abbreviation ḥtf of the name: ḥarakat al-taḥrîr al-waṭanî al-filasṭînî.

38. Details in this and following sections have been derived from various sources. Among those most readily available, most helpful has been the introductory "Historical Background" in Leila S. Kadi (ed.), Basic Political Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, PLO Research Center Palestine Books, No. 27 (Beirut 1969); also Gérard Chaliand (Michael Perl, translator), The Palestinian Resistance (Penguin Books, 1972); two booklets published by Fatḥ: Political and Armed Struggle and Revolution until Victory, both published in Beirut (n.d.), the former apparently in mid 1968 and the latter in mid 1969; and various articles in the English bimonthly Fateh, a publication of Fatḥ issued in Beirut, 1969-71. In addition discussions, often long, at times heated, but always helpful, with many Palestinians from 1953 on, and especially in the summer of 1972 in Beirut with members of the PLO, the Palestinian Red Crescent, and Fatḥ, in deference to whose request a more explicit acknowledgement for their assistance is not made.

39. Text of the communique issued at the Conference, Leila S. Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem, PLO Research Center Palestine Books No. 4 (Beirut 1966), 197-9. See also pp. 91-109 for details on actions of the League Council, the 1964 Summit Conference, and establishment of the PLO.

40. Crown Prince Faysal and Hâjj Amîn al-Ḥusaynî, the former Mufti of Jerusalem, boycotted the conference, objecting that the Palestinian delegates should have been elected rather than appointed. Al-Shuqayrî reasonably felt that elections would be unfeasible with the Palestinians scattered as they are.

41. Fateh, Beirut, 1 January 1970. Asifah ('âṣifah "storm") was the military branch of Fatḥ.

42. UN Doc. S/7277 (1966).

43. Heroes of the Return, Revenge Youth Organization (munaẓẓamat shabâb al-tha'r), and Palestine Liberation Front (jabhat taḥrîr filasṭîn), the latter two established just prior to the June fighting.

44. The text is available as Doc. 452 in Fuad A. Jabber (ed.), International Documents on Palestine, 1967 (Beirut 1970), hereafter IDP 67.

45. A selected list of these, Doc's. 226-277, IDP 67.

46. IDP 67, Doc's. 254 and 255.

47. Text of the Address by Israel's Foreign Minister, Mr. Abba Eban, in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 June 1967, Embassy of Israel, Washington, 15.

48. Which explains why the PRM leadership does not expect any redress of their grievances via the UN. When the Security Council adopted Resolution 242 (22 November 1967; IDP 67, Doc. 268), the PLO issued a statement rejecting it for a number of reasons, "the most important of which is that the Security Council ignores the existence of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination . . ." (Doc. 445). As the Palestinians see it, the central issue is not "settlement of the refugee problem," but the violation of their national political rights.

The attitude of most Palestinians toward the UN is summed up in a statement issued by a Fatḥ spokesman on 17 December 1967: "We have waited twenty years for the United Nations and the Security Council to arrive at a solution to our problem. With what result? . . . Under these circumstances, I think we may be permitted to regard whatever issues from the Security Council. . .as being no more than empty words" (Doc. 454).

49. Text of the 1968 revision of the Charter, Zuhair Diab (ed.), International Documents on Palestine, 1968 (Beirut 1971), hereafter IDP 68, Doc. 360; the revised Constitution of the PLO (Doc. 361) and the political decisions adopted (Doc. 362) are also given.

50. Al-Ṣâ'iqah "thunderbolt" which, in point of size, was larger than the PFLP, was organized and financed by the Syrian Ba'th Party after the June 1967 fighting. Accordingly, while its members were predominantly Palestinian, its credentials were somewhat suspect and its influence in the PRM has remained minimal.

51. Among many evaluations of the PRM at this point: Naseer Aruri (ed.), The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation, Association of Arab-American University Graduates Monograph Series No. 2 (Wilmette 1970); Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," MEJ XXIII (1969), 291-307; Don Peretz, "Arab Palestine: Phoenix or Phantom?" Foreign Affairs XLVIII (January 1970), 322-33; Don Peretz et al., A Palestine Entity?, Middle East Institute Special Study No. 1 (Washington 1970); Herbert Mason (ed.), Reflections on the Middle East Crisis (The Hague 1970); Hisham Sharabi, Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness, Supplementary Papers, Georgetown University Cen-

ter for Strategic & International Studies (Washington 1970). In contrast are the accounts in John B. Wolf, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement," Current History LX (January 1971), 26-31, which represents a misreading of the objectives of the Palestinians, and Y. Harkabi (retired Chief of Israeli Military Intelligence), Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy, Adelphi Papers No. 53 (London 1968), which presents a distorted picture and concludes, reassuringly from an Israeli point of view, that the guerrilla organizations are simply another futile attempt by the Arab states to delude themselves. A much more balanced evaluation by an Israeli is Shlomo Avineri, "The Palestinians and Israel," Commentary XLIX (June 1970), 31-44.

52. IDP 67, Doc. 415, interview granted by King Ḥusayn on 4 September 1967.

53. IDP 67, Doc. 426.

54. IDP 68, Doc. 283.

55. In a statement to the Knesset, Prime Minister Eshkol on 25 March 1968 credited the guerrillas with "dozens of killing and sabotage operations. . .with more than 50 military and civilian casualties" during the period February 16 to March 20; IDP 68, Doc. 53.

56. He further added: "Apart from the fairly heavy casualties, there was the additional blow for the Israelis of seeing captured tanks and other equipment being shown on Jordan television." The Guardian, Manchester, 25 March 1968. A week later the correspondent for The Observer, London, 31 March 1968, saw the long-range significance: "Apart from increasing the precariousness of the cease-fire, its main effect has been to put the Palestinian Arabs themselves as a separate people back on the Middle East political map for the first time since 1948. There is no longer any question of the Palestine problem being settled by the Arab Governments over the heads of the Palestinian Arabs."

For statements issued by various sources on the Karamah attack: IDP 68, Doc's 48 (USA), 50 (USSR), 228 (UN Security Council condemnation of Israel), 309 & 310 (Jordan), and a press conference by King Ḥusayn, 312.

57. King Ḥusayn's version of the clashes, IDP 68, Doc's. 402 & 403; for Fatḥ's, Doc. 405.

58. The PFLP was not unaware of the dangers to the PRM of the lack of unity, but, since it saw itself as the repository of ideological truth, it was unwilling to compromise. Its inflammatory statements and actions such as hijacking of airliners were aggravating factors of significant proportions in the deteriorating relationship between the Arab states and the PRM. In a large report in February

1969 the PFLP identified the enemy--with essentially no differentiation--as "Israel, Zionism, world imperialism, and Arab reaction." For the full text see Kadi, Basic Political Documents, 181-247; substantial excerpts are in Walid Khadduri (ed.), International Documents on Palestine, 1969 (Beirut 1972), hereafter IDP 69, Doc. 449. For a comprehensive Fatḥ assessment as of June 1969, see interview with Abû Iyyâḍ, IDP 69, Doc. 409.

During 1969, the notion of a democratic, secular state replacing sectarian Israel received considerable attention. In addition to ones already cited, IDP 69, Doc's. 370 (PLO), 376 & 458 (PFLP), 402, 425, & 463 (Fatḥ), 427 (PDFLP).

59. Unofficial text of this secret agreement, IDP 69, Doc. 449. For the letter of President Nâṣir to Lebanese President Ḥilû, and the latter's reply, Doc's. 444 & 445; statement by Lebanese government, Doc. 454.

60. Secretary of State William Rogers' June 19 letter to Egyptian Foreign Minister Maḥmûd Riyâḍ, The New York Times, 23 July 1970.

In early 1970, according to Fatḥ sources, the USA considered supporting the Palestinians and having them form the government in Jordan, believing this might be the best way of coming to grips with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The leadership of the PRM showed little interest in this possibility and Israel's recommendations were negative. Accordingly nothing came of it and the USA continued to support King Ḥusayn.

61. In August 1972, PLO spokesmen in conversations with this writer acknowledged that their 1970 denunciation of President Nâṣir was a serious error in tactics. As one put it: "We should have denounced the Rogers Plan, but not Nâṣir's acceptance of it, recognizing that he was in a difficult position. By denouncing Nâṣir, we gave Ḥusayn the opportunity to destroy us using Nâṣir's sword."

62. Chronology, MEJ XXV (1971), 70.

63. A report on these talks, "Notes on the Quarter: The Jedda Talks," Journal of Palestine Studies I (Winter 1972), 142-4; hereafter JPS.

64. For fuller details see the chronologies in MEJ and, beginning in 1971, JPS, the latter based heavily on Arabic and Hebrew sources. See also "Notes on the Quarter: The Palestinian Resistance and Jordan," JPS I (Autumn 1971), 162-70, and report of a press conference with Nabîl Sha'th, a Fatḥ spokesman, Free Palestine, July 1971.

A useful bibliography of peridical literature in English, JPS I (Spring 1972), 120-31. JPS is one of very

few periodicals which can be called indispensable for serious students of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; every issue has significant material. Especially useful are: Samir Franjieh, "How Revolutionary is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation," I (Winter 1972), 52-60; Fuad Jabber, "The Arab Regimes and the Palestinian Revolution, 1967-71," II (Winter 1973), 79-101; W. T. Mallison, Jr. & S. V. Mallison, "The Juridical Characteristics of the Palestinian Resistance: An Appraisal in International Law," II (Winter 1973), 64-78; Interview with Mohammed Yazid, a leader of the Algerian NLF, on "Algeria and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," I (Winter 1972), 3-18.

Although lacking in historical depth, useful for 1967 to 1971 is William B. Quandt, Palestinian Nationalism: Its Political and Military Dimensions, A Report Prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Department of Defense,1971.

65. The argument has been advanced by Israelis and their friends that if the Palestinians had been willing to settle for less than their maximal demands, the disaster would not have taken place; e.g. Shlomo Avineri, op. cit., Uri Avnery, Israel without Zionists: A Plea for Peace in the Middle East (New York 1968), and Paul Jacobs, Between the Rock and the Hard Place (New York 1970). Since at no time did the Zionists indicate any willingness to settle for less than their maximal demands, it is not immediately obvious that even if the Palestinians had been willing that the end result would have been significantly different. In any case, this argument misses the main point. As the Palestinians see it, why should they--as the vast majority of the population, and as descendants of earlier generations of inhabitants--be expected to make room for large numbers of immigrants who had never been inhabitants, nor descendants of former inhabitants, of Palestine, in an attempt to solve injustices toward Jews in Europe and by Europeans?

66. The Observer, London, 31 March 1968. For a study of the attitudes of Palestinian teenagers about themselves and others, see Yasumasa Kuroda & Alice Kuroda, "Palestinians and World Politics: A Social-Psychological Analysis," MEF XLVIII (Spring 1972), 45-57, and Yasumasa Kuroda, "Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective," MEJ XXVI (1972), 253-70. The attitudes of many of the young Palestinians are perceptively reflected in Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of Palestinian Exile (New York 1972).

67. Y. Harkabi, "The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and their National Covenant (1968)," New York University Journal of International Law & Politics III (Spring 1970), 209-44.

68. For fuller treatments, Mohammad Rasheed, Towards a Democratic State in Palestine, PLO Research Center Palestine Essays No. 24 (Beirut 1970), and the section Toward a New Palestine in this writer's "The Palestinians: Refugees to Guerrillas," MEF XLVIII (Spring 1972), 27-44.

69. Somewhat different assumptions concerning the role of the superpowers in the Middle East underlie the extensive literature, much of it in rather simplistic cold war terms; a typical example of the latter is Eugene V. Rostow, "The Middle Eastern Crisis in the Perspective of World Politics," International Affairs XLVII (April 1971), 275-88. Otherwise noteworthy are: Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, "Soviet Attitudes toward Arab Revolutions: Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Palestine," MEF XLVI (No. 4, 1970), 41-65; John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," Foreign Affairs XLIX (Ocotber 1970), 51-69; John K. Cooley, "Moscow Faces a Palestinian Dilemma," Mid East XI (June 1970), 32-5; David P. Forsythe, "The Soviets and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," MEF XLVI (No. 4, 1970), 29-39; Tareq Y. Ismael, "The Palestinian Emergence and U.S. Foreign Policy," MEF XLVI (Nos. 2-3, 1970), 65-71; Richard H. Pfaff, "The American Military Presence in the Middle East," MEF XLVIII (Summer 1972), 29-42; William B. Quandt, "The Middle East Conflict in US Strategy, 1970-71," JPS I (Autumn 1971), 39-52.

70. John K. Cooley, "China and the Palestinians," JPS I (Winter 1972), 19-34.

71. Among other problems, not insignificant is the reaction of Israelis to the objectives of the PRM. This, however, is by no means as uniformly negative as the public media, including Israeli intended for foreign consumption, might lead one to conclude; e.g. the biweekly news service providing translations from Israel's Hebrew press, KNOW, edited by Norton Mezvinsky; the reports issued by the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, Tel Aviv; Arie Bober, op. cit.; Uri Davis, "Journey out of Zionism: The Radicalization of an Israeli Pacifist," JPS I (Summer 1972), 59-72; and Arie L. Eliav, New Targets for Israel (Jerusalem 1971).

72. As of this writing in May 1973, apparently Fath and the PFLP have recently taken steps to ensure cooperation and coordination in both the political and military spheres; details, however, are not available. If these steps prove effective, they should strengthen the PRM in its recently strained relations with the Lebanese government.

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