



**TO
RIGHT
A WRONG**

**The Revocation of the UN General Assembly
Resolution 3379 Defaming Zionism**

Yohanan Manor

\$25.00

TO RIGHT A WRONG

by Yohanan Manor

To Right A Wrong is a dramatic and thoroughly documented monograph detailing the background, genesis, impact and abrogation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution which, in November 1975, had equated Zionism with racism.

Although in its essence anti-Zionism is clearly different from anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism's most famous and biting expression can be clearly traced back to the United Nations refusal to condemn anti-Semitism as a form of racism, in the middle of the 1960s.

In spite of several ominous signs, the adoption of the Z-R resolution took Israel and the Jewish people by complete surprise. The UNGA resolution 3379(XXX) was relegated to a kind of supernatural world, of demons and negative forces, which simply did not fit with the reality and perceptions in which we lived.

It took almost nine years to overcome the shock and the indignation over the passing of the Resolution and to find the will to embark on a coordinated effort which addresses this issue in its entirety, weighing its destructive cumulative effects, and even dare to look at ways to overturn the resolution which seemed, at the time, to be a mission impossible both from a legal and political point of view.

The crucial involvement of the United States was achieved by the unrelenting efforts and pressures exerted by several Jewish and non-Jewish groups and personalities in the United States. A most indispensable contribution was the remarkable resolution adopted by the Australian parliament, on the initiative of the Australian government.

The overturn of the Z-R resolution in December 1991 not only contributed to putting an end to Israel's pariah status in the United Nations and other international institutions, but it also paved the way for a UN involvement in fighting anti-Semitism, hence closing the circle of the 60s, with its reluctance to condemn anti-Semitism. For the United States also, it was a way of correcting its earlier mistake of pulling back and not standing firm in its demand to have anti-Semitism condemned as a form of racism in the 60s.

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*THE REVOCATION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTION 3379 DEFAMING ZIONISM*

BY

YOHANAN MANOR

**SHENGOLD PUBLISHERS, INC.
NEW YORK**

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Mr. Andre Marcus
whose generosity and support made possible this publication.

The Israel Enhancement Trust
Uzi Narkiss, Chairman
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“Zionism is first and foremost a great victory against racism”

Shimon Peres, Prime Minister of Israel

To document history is an essential but perilous exercise, especially when carried out close to the events reviewed and by people directly involved in them. It is nevertheless a risk worth taking since it can yield an irreplaceable testimony and reading of historical developments. I therefore commend the author, Dr. Yohanan Manor, for taking up this challenge.

It was difficult for the State of Israel and the Jewish people to withstand the defamation delivered in November 1975 against Zionism, the movement for self-determination of the Jewish people, by the very international organization committed to developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples” (UN Charter, Chap.I, Art.I)

Calumny works through malicious distortion of truth. The subject of libel tends to react in accordance with “Tacitus” maxim that “neglected calumny soon expires.” So the victim is often ready to swallow the insults and ignore humiliation in the hope that the slanderers will tire, and even perhaps feel uncomfortable with their blatant fabrications.

In fact, experience shows that this tactic does not work. The slanderers continue with their falsehoods and often succeed in destroying the victim’s reputation.

Sooner or later there is no choice but to confront the slanderers. The cardinal question is: how to confront them and effectively contest the calumny without repeating and exacerbating it.

One possible course of action, as was adopted then, is to explain the true meaning of Zionism. Not to argue and contest what Zionism is not, but to clarify and reassert what Zionism is, namely, first and foremost “a great victory against racism,” as I recalled in my address to the UN General Assembly, October 21, 1985.

However, reacting positively was obviously not enough to placate the vicious crusade against Zionism, since the defamating resolution was still on the records of the UN, and still enjoy international legitimacy. So the defamers could legitimately refer to it. And so they did with no remorse.

Finally, Israel had no option, but to challenge this legal travesty, since the delegitimization of Israel made it an easy game for terrorist attacks. This task could rightly appear as a mission impossible, in view of the political makeup of the UN, and the fact that there was no precedent for the international or-

ganization to admit a wrong, express regret, and rectify such wrong.

After seven years of laborious work, the impossible actually occurred. The slanderous determination contained in the UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) was formally dropped by a very large majority, on December 16, 1991. This was achieved thanks to the far reaching change on the international scene and to all those who persevered in their demand for the resolution's repudiation, especially the Steering Committee in charge of this endeavor, headed by General (Res.) Uzi Narkiss.

This is an opportunity to express the gratitude of the Jewish people and of the State of Israel to all those who understood the need to take the offensive, fought for the repeal of this mendacious resolution by the international community, and who did persist until its actual demise.

I would like to convey a special thanks to the United States of America and its Administration for having decided to put this moral issue high on its agenda, and for having forcefully mustered the largest possible majority to repeal the resolution.

By its dignified and active involvement the US Administration not only contributed decisively to righting a wrong. It also absolved the UN from a disgrace which prevented it from playing its genuine role, and paved the way for a clear cut rejection of terrorism by the international community, as just displayed these very days by the peace makers summit in Sharm El Sheikh.

March 1996

FOREWORD

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Former U.S. Secretary of State

In a diplomatic career spanning more than thirty years I can think of no more satisfying moment than when—representing the United States—I spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in support of a resolution expunging the “Zionism is Racism” Resolution from the U.N.’s records. We won the vote, thereby reversing one of the most despicable acts in the history of the U.N. We also demonstrated that dedication, perseverance, the rightness of our cause, and the strong support of the United States, can overcome the wiles and evil intent of those who seek the destruction of the State of Israel.

The struggle to right the wrong of the “Zionism is Racism” Resolution was protracted; eventual success depended on the dedicated work of individuals, organizations and states that would not rest until they achieved success. Eliminating the Resolution has not brought peace to the beleaguered people of Israel. Nor could it be expected to do so. But the consequences have, nevertheless, been profound. Israel’s international standing has been substantially strengthened, the lemming-like quality that has so characterized Third World attitudes and actions with regard to the State of Israel has been reversed, and the loss of the “respectability” that the Resolution gave to those who hate Israel has shown them for what they are: anti Semites, terrorists, international gangsters, gangster states and other such despicable trash.

Our common victory in forcing the U.N. to redress the wrongs of the “Zionism is Racism” Resolution is clear proof that men and women of good will can achieve miracles if they put their minds and hearts into the fight.

P R E F A C E

Uzi Narkiss

It is impossible to change mentalities, very difficult to change attitudes and hard to change opinions, especially when they are deeply embedded in the psyche. That is why I do not believe we can fight and win against anti-Semitism. People imbibe it with their mothers' milk and cannot rid themselves of it.

But the challenge facing me, as chairman of the Information Department of the World Zionist Organization, was a political one. The United Nations had been the mother of the state of Israel with Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, creating a Jewish state. Over the years, however, it had become a stepmother, punishing its child by equating Zionism with racism and allowing for Israel's delegitimization. The objective, then, was to acquire enough votes at the United Nations to rescind the infamous Resolution 3379.

I knew we would not be able to perform miracles, but what we could do was light a fire at the U.N. and feed the flames by initiating an active campaign against the resolution through member-states, Jewish communities and prominent individuals. I also deemed that the USSR, having supported the state of Israel in 1947, might again do so under certain circumstances.

So, equipped with hope, we began operating steadily and relentlessly, two steps forward and one back, like diligent ants, until the decisive day of December 16, 1991.

At the end of the first seminar we organized on Resolution 3379 on November 11, 1985, U.S. Sen. Patrick Moynihan said to me, "In 1975, only two people understood the real significance of the 3379 resolution, both of Irish origin." He meant Israeli President Chaim Herzog and himself. To them, and to many others, including former U.S. President George Bush and former Secretary James Baker, Mark Liebler, Bernice Tannenbaum, Binyamin Netanyahu and Yohanan Manor, we owe our thanks.

Last, but not least, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Andre Marcus. Without his support, this work would never have seen the light.

"Point n'est besoin d'esperer pour entreprendre ni de reussir pour persever." Guillaume d'Orange dit le Taciturne, 1533-1584.

William the Silent, 1533-1584

INTRODUCTION

Yohanan Manor

“To Right a Wrong” is a modest monograph about the libel perpetrated by the United Nations General Assembly in its adoption on November 10, 1975, of Resolution 3379 [XXX] that equated Zionism with racism. It is also a chronicle of the systematic efforts to undo this libel, achieved by the revocation of 3379 sixteen years later on December 12, 1991, by UNGA Resolution 46/48. In the process, it demonstrates the impact of a galvanized public opinion on public policy in nations throughout the world. It illustrates most particularly the interplay between Jewish and Zionist organizational politics on Israeli foreign policy. It also highlights the influence of U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy on the international community and it underscores the distance between lip service and action by leaders of that international community.

Foremost, though, it is a case study of an informational, political and diplomatic campaign waged for a cause considered by most to be just but lost, almost until the historic United Nations vote in 1991. Above all, it testifies to the critical role played by intellectual perspicacity, moral determination and unwavering perseverance in a fight against a calumny which aroused outrage and sympathy, but seemed at the same time impossible to challenge and therefore necessary to tolerate.

This work does not attempt an analysis of anti-Zionism, though it addresses its basic history, tenets, proponents and impact, as well as its relationship to anti-Semitism. It is also not an historical analysis of the distortion, demise and ultimate resurrection of the ideals and mission of the United Nations, though this is recorded in our work. And it is not yet another study of the Middle East peace process, though this is part of the backdrop for our story and sometimes plays a central role. Nor is this a critical review of the United States’ Middle East or human rights policies, though these policies had a decisive influence in the development and outcome of our subject. Finally, it is not a review or defense of Zionism, though it contains comprehensive definition and defense of the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.

I was fortunate to have been involved from the start in the campaign to fight the resolution as the coordinator of the campaign’s steering committee on behalf of the Information Department of the World Zionist Organization.

Much of the documentation for this was in the archives of this department. The rest came from the files of the American section of the WZO which were transferred to the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem. By contrast, we had only sporadic and indirect access to the files of Israel's Foreign Ministry. There were several interviews and correspondences with individuals directly involved in the story, such as former President Chaim Herzog, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Foreign Ministry Director General Uri Savir, but these did not add substantially to the documentation already at hand.

Chapters II through VIII focus exclusively on the United Nations General Assembly's [UNGA's] resolution equating Zionism with racism [hereafter often referred to as the "ZR" resolution], from its birth to its death. The first chapter serves as a framework and foundation for that story. It will introduce the trends of anti-Zionism and show how the dramatic rise in Arab and Soviet anti-Zionism in the years after the Six Day War paved the way for the U.N. defamation and vilification of Zionism.

Jerusalem, 1996

CHAPTER I

FROM OPPOSITION TO VILIFICATION

Opposition to Zionism is as old as Zionism itself. Both Jews and non-Jews have, at various times, resisted the idea of Jews asserting their national bonds and returning to Zion to give them concrete expression.

From the emergence and crystallization of modern political Zionism until now, there were two major trends in the response to Zionism. For one, Jewish opposition steadily declined to near negligibility. At the same time, there was a steady increase in non-Jewish opposition to Zionism and a change in its pattern. It evolved from a regional, rather objective political or ideological dispute to a worldwide "reification of Zionism"¹ as a global demonizing fiction.

The years spanning from 1815 to 1914 had been from every conceivable point of view "the best century Jews had ever experienced, collectively and individually, since the destruction of the Temple," as observed by Hebrew University Professor Shlomo Avineri.² The conditions in the lives of the Jews improved tremendously under the influence of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the industrial revolution.

The Jewish population grew from 2.5 million in 1815 to 13 million in 1914, and substantially changed its geographic locus westward. (From 40 percent in the Mediterranean and Near East, 44 percent in Eastern Europe, and 12 percent in Western Europe, it shifted to 5.2 percent, 66 percent, 9 percent, respectively, and 18.6 percent in America.)³ But the more far-reaching changes were social and cultural. Jewish communities had been closed, organized exclusively upon religious bases, located mostly in village outskirts or rural regions, discriminated against and barred from most economic, social and cultural activities. In the newly emerging European society, the Jews began to play a central role, living in large numbers in the big cities, filling pre-eminent roles in economic, scientific, cultural and even political life, and enjoying full equality under the law. Religion became confined to the private arena.

These developments, combined with the strengthening of the nation-states and the rise of nationalism all over Europe, forced the Jews to confront agonizing dilemmas about their identity. They had four major options. One was to cling to the traditional, Orthodox way of life. Another was to enjoy full emancipation and assimilate into the various national societies, reducing the influence of Jewish religion and expunging the national components from

it. A third was to transcend national bonds and aspire to a universal society by embracing socialism and internationalism. The last was to affirm and maintain the Jewish national bond, with or without a specific and exclusive territorial basis. One of its expressions was Zionism, with its territorial basis in the ancient homeland of Palestine. It was also probably the most utopian one, given Palestine's rule by the Ottomans and the paltry Jewish population there at the time.

But, from its very inception at the end of the 19th century, political Zionism was opposed by many circles among Jewry. Most Orthodox Jews questioned and even rejected it on the grounds that it was religious heresy, an arrogant effort to substitute self-made redemption for salvation through the coming of the Messiah. "It has made nationalism a substitute for Torah and commandments," they claimed, creating "the impression among the people of Israel that the whole purpose of the Torah and the commandments is merely to strengthen collective feeling."⁴

There were a few Orthodox Jews who tried to provide theological justification for Zionism, arguing that it was laying the groundwork for messianic redemption, not interfering with it. But these individuals, who included Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (1795-1874), Judah Solomon Hai Alkalai (1798-1878), Shmuel Mohilever (1824-1898), and Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) were to have a limited influence, with their followers a tiny minority among Orthodox Jewry.

Emancipated and assimilated Jews also nurtured strong reservations about Zionism. They feared it would jeopardize their newly acquired status as full citizens granted to them in the United States and France at the end of the 18th century and in most European countries during the following century. Sir Edwin Montagu, appointed secretary of state for India in September 1917, several weeks before the Balfour Declaration, is a good example. He vehemently protested against a British commitment to Zionism, explaining in a personal letter to Lloyd George that he feared being forced back into the ghetto he had strived to escape all his life.

*"If you make a statement about Palestine as the National Home for Jews, every anti-Semitic organisation and newspaper will ask what right a Jewish Englishman, with the status at best of a naturalized foreigner, has to take a foremost part in the government of the British Empire . . . The country for which I have worked ever since I left the University—England, the country for which my family have fought, tells me that my national home, if I desire to go there, therefore my natural home, is Palestine."*⁵

Most assimilated Jews held similar views until the turning points of World War II and the Six Day War in 1967, when a growing number of them started to identify with Israel and openly express their identification. The

shock over the Holocaust and the indifferent response of the international community to the unprecedented plight of European Jewry simply shattered the reticence of many. Any lingering doubts were replaced in 1967 by a new confidence and pride in Israel's stunning triumph over Arab aggression and by Zionism's ability to take root in a hostile environment.

Meanwhile, Jewish supporters of socialism, communism and internationalism, joined Bundists to form another broad circle opposed to Zionism. They believed it was a pernicious utopian and retrograde ideology, an archaic nationalist movement unable to solve the Jewish problem.

These currents were popular among the Jews, especially in Russia and Poland, from the turn of the 19th century through the 1950s. But this kind of opposition to Zionism virtually disappeared in the wake of the revelations about the crimes of the Stalinist period [in the famous Khrushchev Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], the irrefutable evidence of its anti-Semitism, the dissolution of the communist empire and the very concept of sovietism, and the consequent eruption of local nationalism. And, despite the rise of the new Left in the 1970s, which had a significant impact on students in campuses all over Western democracies, among Jews the credibility of socialism and internationalism was not restored.

THE DECLINE IN JEWISH OPPOSITION TO ZIONISM

By the beginning of the '70s, most Jewish reluctance toward Zionism had disappeared, hastened by deep disillusion with communism in general and its relationship to Jews in particular. Also at play was the impact of the Holocaust on the view Jews held of their status in Western societies and political-cultural changes within these societies which legitimized the existence of concurrent loyalties.

Above all, however, stood the ability of the Zionist movement not only to survive, but to evolve into a social and political reality and ultimately a mid-wife to the new state of Israel in 1948. This, and Israel's later steadfastness in the face of ceaseless efforts by its neighbors to uproot it, created a broad consensus among Jews that Zionism was not only viable and tenacious, but also legitimate.

Moreover, a new understanding of Zionism was forged by the Zionist movement and the Jewish communities of the Diaspora. From the Six Day War on, Zionism would reflect the centrality of Israel in the identification of Jewish people everywhere. It would represent the collective concern for Israel's development and welfare as well as for the fate of the Jewish communities all over the world. This was spelled out in the revised program of the Zionist movement adopted at its 27th Congress in 1968 and known as the

Jerusalem Program. It was also reflected in 1970 in the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency for Israel as a joint institutional framework for a partnership between the Jewish communities and Israel in developing the Jewish state and strengthening the bonds between Jews inside and outside Israel.

In sharp contrast to this nearly complete disappearance of Jewish opposition to Zionism, traditional antipathy to Zionism from Arab and Soviet quarters not only persisted, but stiffened. From the start, political Zionism had been fiercely opposed by Arab nationalism, in spite of some brief and occasional periods of cooperation between representatives of the two national movements.⁶

After the military failure by the Arab states in 1948 to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel, Arab hostility to Zionism deepened. Labelled until then by the Arabs merely as an agent of "both imperialism and Bolshevism," Zionism from then on was elevated to the status of an "imperialist conspiracy" against the unity of the Arab world.

The Arab charge that Zionism was racist came years later. It surfaced in the first version of the Palestinian National Covenant in 1964 with the claim that Zionism is "racist and segregationist in its structure and fascist in its means and aims."⁷ The clause appears to reflect the first attempt to broaden the opposition to Zionism by taking it out of a regional context and throwing it into the international arena where it would be linked with the rejection of South African apartheid.

The early Zionist movement had by and large ignored Palestinian nationalism, though it had always taken Arab nationalism into account. The Feisal-Weizman agreement of January 1919, for example, sought to satisfy Arab national aspirations outside of Palestine in exchange for Arab support of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. Very soon after the start of the British Mandate over Palestine, however, the Zionist movement recognized the existence of specific Palestinian nationalist aspirations. The 12th Zionist Congress in Karlsbad in 1921 employed what had become the classic indistinct reference to the Arabs as people with whom it was necessary "to live in relations of harmony and mutual respect" and with whom to achieve "a sincere understanding." But, significantly, it also referred to Palestine as a "common homeland."⁸

Following the 1929 Arab riots against Jews in Palestine and Great Britain's subsequent decision to restrict the establishment of the Jewish national home in Palestine, the Zionist movement began to view an agreement with Palestinian Arabs as a priority that would determine the very fate of the Jewish national home. To this end, some in the Zionist movement were ready to make far-reaching concessions. They included relinquishing the idea of Jewish majority rule and establishing a state of two nationalities enjoying parity, a state which would not impose the rule of one nation upon the other.⁹ This modest formula, as well as the 1937 Peel partition plan recommending

the establishment of two states [a Jewish one on 20 percent of the land and an Arab one on the remaining 80 percent], was rejected by both the Arab countries and the Arab Palestinian leadership, since neither ensured Arab majority rule over all of Palestine. Meanwhile, the 1939 British White Paper almost struck a deathblow to the idea of the Jewish national home just as its need was becoming imperative in light of the Jewish tragedy in Europe. Hence, at this juncture the Zionist movement decided at the Biltmore conference again to change its order of priorities. A Jewish state ensuring free immigration became the most urgent one.

At the same time, as we have glimpsed, Marxism and its subscribers within the socialist and communist movements were hostile to the very notion of a Jewish state as "an aberration, a false path, a utopia, a dead end."¹⁰ This rested largely on Marx's conviction that Jewish emancipation was only possible through "the emancipation of humanity from Judaism."

Anti-Zionism was also to become a salient reality in the USSR and in the Eastern European countries that fell under its domination after World War II. Zionism was accused of hatching international plots in staged trials (the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia in 1951-1952, the so-called doctors' plot in the USSR in 1953), or through the media (in Poland in 1956 and 1968 and again in Czechoslovakia in 1968). These were the fruits of campaigns carefully organized to target scapegoats as a means of dealing with internal political crises. In this way, anti-Zionism was used as a legal substitute for more traditional anti-Semitism, which was officially outlawed.

Such cynical use of anti-Zionist propaganda for domestic purposes sheds light on the maneuvers by the USSR in 1964 and 1965 to prevent the condemnation of anti-Semitism by the international community.

This condensed picture of non-Jewish opposition to Zionism could not be complete without mention of the Vatican which, for decades, had a very reserved and embarrassed position on Zionism. It clung to the view expressed by Pius X to Theodore Herzl that the Church was not able to prevent but could not support the return of the infidel Jews to the Holy Land.¹¹ This resistance began eroding in 1965 with the adoption by the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council of a revised declaration on the Jews which dismissed Jewish responsibility for the crucifixion of Jesus. Further progress was evidenced in an official document prepared by the Holy See Commission for Justice and Peace, called "The Church and Racism: Towards a More Fraternal Society," published in November, 1988. Finally, the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the state of Israel in 1994 marked a full and official turn-around by the Vatican toward Zionism.

THE REFUSAL TO CONDEMN ANTI-SEMITISM

In March 1964, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights was preparing a multi-national agreement on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The U.S. representative, Mariette Tree, proposed a formal amendment to include in the agreement a specific condemnation of anti-Semitism and a commitment by the signatories to act to eliminate all residues of anti-Semitism in the territories subject to their jurisdiction. Tree made the proposal in response to a request by Rabbi Yitzhak Lewin, a delegate of the World Agudat Israel, an NGO representing a current in Orthodox Jewry with an anti-Zionist posture. This did not sit well with some of the U.N. delegations.

The Soviet Union privately warned the United States that it would be forced by such an action to submit its own amendment condemning Zionism and Nazism. For their part, France and the United Kingdom were displeased. They had not been consulted about the planned amendment and feared the final text might contain a reference to neo-Nazism which in turn would be viewed as a condemnation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

In fact, the U.S. initiative was prompted almost exclusively by domestic electoral considerations. President Lyndon Johnson was running for re-election and in an address to an important Jewish gathering at Hunter College in New York on October 28, 1964, Johnson referred explicitly to the U.S. initiative. He stressed that Tree had been "instructed to submit a proposal condemning anti-Semitism in the [human rights] convention to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination."¹²

In any event, a year later, in October of 1965, the final draft of the convention prepared by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights was to be discussed by the General Assembly Third Committee. On the agenda was an amendment sponsored by the United States and Brazil urging member states to "condemn anti-Semitism, and to take action appropriate for its speedy eradication in the territories subject to [their] jurisdiction."¹³

The Soviet Union then made good on its threat from the year before. It submitted an amendment declaring that "state parties condemn anti-Semitism, Zionism, Nazism, neo-Nazism and all forms of the policy and ideology of colonialism, national and race hatred and exclusiveness and shall take action as appropriate for the speedy eradication of those misanthropic ideas and practices in the territories subject to their jurisdiction."¹⁴

At this point a Greek-Hungarian amendment to drop all reference to any specific kind of discrimination (except apartheid which had already been condemned) was submitted and adopted almost immediately by a huge majority. The action, which completely contravened procedure, surprisingly

was not opposed by the United States or Brazil and threatened to prevent the debate on the proposed U.S.-Brazil amendment to condemn anti-Semitism. Due to the vigilance of the Israeli delegation, however, the debate was held, enabling the discrimination against Soviet Jewry to be discussed at the United Nations for the first time. The amendment itself, however, was defeated by an overwhelming majority—82 to 12, with 10 abstentions!

Two years later another attempt to have anti-Semitism condemned by the United Nations was defeated by an even greater majority—87 to 2 with 7 abstentions—in the framework of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The defeat came in spite of the fact that the human rights commission, which prepared the draft convention in 1966, had voted, 12 to 4, with 5 abstentions, to include a reference to anti-Semitism. The USSR was among the abstainees. This time it did not resort to the counter-tactics used in 1965. Its amendment called for the condemnation of “those prejudices in respect of the Christian, Moslem, Buddhist, Hindu and other religions.” In the debate in the General Assembly Third Committee in October 1967, the Soviet Union requested “redoing” the article containing the reference to anti-Semitism. But it refrained from attacking Zionism directly, leaving that task to the Arabs.

The failure to include anti-Semitism in these conventions has rightly been attributed to the “intersecting interests of three major components of the General Assembly: The Arab states which opposed it as part of their general attitude toward Jewish and Israeli interests; the socialist states which feared its application to Soviet Jews; and the Afro-Asian bloc which rejected the diversion of attention from purely racial matters, in particular Apartheid.”¹⁵

Even so, it is noteworthy that a formula was not found to have anti-Semitism condemned in one way or another and that the U.S. amendment was defeated by such an overwhelming majority. It must be emphasized that these two human rights conventions were “ordered” by the General Assembly of the U.N. as a response to a worldwide outbreak of swatiska daubings and anti-Semitic events in 1959–1960.¹⁶ At the same time the second Vatican Council was revising its declaration on the Jews by deleting the word “deicide” and adding a specific reference to “anti-Semitism.”

Here one must point to the fickle posture of the United States. The U.S. administration had initiated this 1964 amendment largely for domestic political reasons and then did not work very hard to win the support needed to pass it. Instead, it exerted pressure on Israel to approve the removal of the amendment, or to have it killed by various procedural tricks. For instance it did not use its right to have its amendment discussed first. It also asked Israel to concede to the United States the right it had secured to speak first in the debate. Here, the U.S. was being duplicitous because it intended to use the right to close the debate immediately after its own address!¹⁷

Ultimately, the USSR failed in its efforts to link Zionism with Nazism to

prevent the condemnation of anti-Semitism and hence a public examination of the plight of Soviet Jewry. The issue was raised at the U.N. and the tactic used by the representatives of the Soviet Union was denounced as "bulldozing" the international body. It was also cited as proof that the USSR was not sincere, since it was ready to give up its explicit condemnation of Nazism in return for thwarting the explicit mention of anti-Semitism. This incident tarnished the international standing of the USSR which then became more cautious in resorting to these kinds of tactics. However its move created a precedent which had at least two major consequences. First, it eroded the quasi-taboo imposed against anti-Semitism since the end of World War II. Second, it showed the Arabs and the Soviet Union that it was possible to have Zionism condemned if they could just find a way to secure the support of the Afro-Asian bloc.

THE VILIFICATION OF ZIONISM

The defeat of Arab armies and Soviet arms during the Six Day War prompted a sharp increase in the attacks against Zionism. In the Arab world, "Mein Kampf" and the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" were reprinted several times and quoted frequently by Arab leaders, such as Kamaal Rifaat, Egyptian minister of labor, or Saad Jumaa and Wasfi Tal, both prime ministers of Jordan.¹⁸

Understanding that their call for the liquidation of Israel was counter-productive in the international arena, the Arabs focused their energy on the denunciation of Zionism, on the "uprooting of the Zionist entity" and on the "de-Zionization" of Israel. Zionism was thereby accused of all possible evil, but racism became its principal crime. The "emphasis on racism, on the one hand, is a way to enlist the support of the Third World and on the other recalls the crime of the West and awakens [a] guilt complex in Western circles,"¹⁹ observed Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former head of Israeli army intelligence and afterward a professor of international relations and Middle Eastern Studies at Hebrew University.

The Six Day War had dealt a huge blow to Soviet prestige and lent inspiration to the Jewish national movement in the USSR, prompting the Soviet authorities to harden their attacks on Zionism. They began to demonize it as a racist movement,²⁰ an accomplice of the Nazis, and the evil on earth stemming from the "theory of the chosen people."²¹

Before the Six Day War there was almost no literature in the USSR devoted to Jewish and Zionist subjects, except for the notable book of Trofim Kychko, "Judaism Without Embellishment" (1963). Edited by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, it was withdrawn from circulation due to protests from all parts of the world against its vicious anti-Semitism. Under the cover of a

very negative exposition of Judaism as a religious, cultural and historical phenomenon, the author actually invited Soviet citizens to assault the "descendants of pariahs."²² It was part of Khrushchev's systematic effort to strike the Jews from leadership positions in the party as well as in the government.

Immediately after the Six Day War, from July to August, 1967, all the large provincial newspapers published an article entitled, "What is Zionism." The movement was defined as "a vast network of organizations with a common center, a common program, and a budget greater than of the Mafia, acting behind the scene of the international arena."²³

Between 1967 and 1975, more than 120 anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic works were published and printed in the tens of thousands, sometimes even the hundreds of thousands. According to one expert, in the decade after the Six Day War, "there has not been a single ideology or enemy that has been the object of so much attention and abuse [as Zionism]; even Maoism was not treated so harshly."²⁴ In a book published in 1973, Vladimir Zagladine, the deputy director of the international department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote that in the near future "Zionism will be condemned as a serious international offense."²⁵

Conventional political wisdom had held that Israel was an asset to the Soviet Union to keep the Arabs off balance and increase Soviet influence in the Middle East. But a second school of thought, which gained currency after the Six Day War, held that Israel curbed Soviet influence in the region because it was such a powerful unifying force among the otherwise divided Arabs. Backing the revolutionary PLO, which threatened the Arab establishment, became a more effective means of promoting Soviet interests and influence. The policy imperatives thus became eliminating Israel, replacing it with a Palestinian state and, in the meantime, discrediting Zionism.²⁶

For their part, the Arabs began to use the new international economic and political leverage they acquired through the oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices. Within a short period of time and with the help of the Soviet Union, they were able to pass several resolutions condemning Zionism and promoting the international status of the PLO.

In December of 1973 they managed for the first time to have Zionism associated with racism in a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] on "Policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa." This resolution emphasized the "collusion between Portuguese colonialism, the apartheid regime and Zionism, as exemplified by the political, military and financial aid supplied to each other by Portugal, South Africa and Israel." It condemned, "in particular, the unholy alliance between Portuguese colonialism, South African racism, Zionism and Israeli imperialism."²⁷

A year later, the Arab states won for the PLO the status of observer to the various U.N. fora as a "national liberation movement." They also secured the

recognition that “the Palestine people is entitled to self-determination” and the recognition of “the right of the Palestinian people to regain its right by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N.”²⁸ Fortified by this moral and political support the PLO not only got legitimacy for its terrorist activity but planned to go a step further. It sought to have Israel expelled from the U.N. and to take its place. For this purpose, discrediting Zionism by denouncing its collusion with the apartheid regime was not enough. The PLO worked also to have Zionism condemned directly and to get backing for its explicit elimination! It was a goal first achieved at the International Women’s Year Conference at Mexico, June 19 to July 2, 1975.

The Final Declaration of the Conference, “On the equality of women and their contribution to development and peace,” was adopted by a vote of 89 to 3 (Israel, the United States and Denmark), and 18 abstentions.²⁹

It stated that the Conference:

“Taking into account the role played by women in the history of humanity, especially in the struggle for national liberation. . . and the elimination of imperialism, colonialism. . . Zionism, alien domination, racism and apartheid. . .

“Recognising that . . . having received unequal treatment. . . they (women) will become natural allies in the struggle against any form of oppression, such as is practiced under colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination and apartheid. . .

“Decides that international cooperation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms.”

At the same time, the PLO worked to muster international support for the expulsion of Israel from the U.N. At its initiative, the Jeddah conference of Islamic States in July of 1975 unanimously adopted a resolution calling on all Islamic nations to sever their relations with Israel and to work for its expulsion from the U.N. and all other international bodies. But Arab consensus was far from ironclad. Although Egypt and Syria voted for this resolution, the first was more in favor of “sanctions” against Israel, while the latter seemed to prefer its “suspension” from the U.N.³⁰

Differences surfaced again at the Organization of African Unity [OAU] Conference in Kampala July 28 to August 1, 1975. PLO Chief Yasser Arafat’s demand for the expulsion of the Zionist entity from the U.N. was opposed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who thought it counter-productive to jeopardize the “interim agreement” that Egypt was then negotiating with Israel and which was to be guaranteed and supervised by the U.N.

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Soviet at UN Lumps Nazism and Zionism

UN RESOLUTION

VATICAN VOTE

By Darius S. Jhabvala
Of The Herald Tribune Staff

By The Associated Press

VATICAN CITY.

UNITED NATIONS.
The Soviet Union yesterday
voted on the United Nations
condemn Zionism as well as
Nazism, neo-Nazism and anti-
Semitism.

The Second Vatican (Ecu-
menical) Council began voting
yesterday on a revised declar-
ation on the Jews. Council
sources believed it would win
approval.

The proposal came as an
amendment to an amendment
inspired by the United States
and Brazil to a multi-national
treaty on the elimination
of all forms of racial dis-
crimination.

The Roman Catholic bish-
ops, meeting in St. Peter's
Basilica, gave sweeping 10-to-1
approval to initial sections of
the document, "On the Relation
of the Church to Non-
Christian Religions."

This amendment urged
condemnation of anti-
Semitism and to work
for its speedy eradication.
Israeli Ambassador Michael
Eban characterized the
Soviet demand as "beneath
dignity."

They also voted on contro-
versial sections dealing with
Jewish responsibility for the
Crucifixion, but the Council
adjourned for the day before
the results were announced.

It is ironic to recall,
Cornay told the Herald
Tribune, "that in 1947 the
Soviet Union supported the
UN RESOLUTION—P 22

But Council sources as-
sumed from the strength of
the vote on the early sections
that the others also were ap-
proved.

A Council spokesman, an-
nouncing the results, gave this
summary on VATICAN—P 22

Soviet at UN Lumps Nazism and Zionism

UN RESOLUTION

VATICAN VOTE

(Continued from page one)

(Continued from page one)

establishment of the Jewish
state which was born out of
the Zionist movement and
emerged from the Nazi
slaughter of Jews."

A U. S. Mission spokesman
said that "we consider it an
outrage to equate Zionism
with anti-Semitism."

The agreement on the elimi-
nation of racial discrimina-
tion has been worked on by
the Commission on Human
Rights since 1962, at the re-
quest of the General Assem-
bly. It is now being considered
by the Assembly's Third (So-
cial, Humanitarian and Cul-
tural) Committee.

Last week, U. S. representa-
tive Frances Willis, a former
ambassador to Cerin, Nor-
way and Switzerland, proposed
an amendment that would
bind member states "to con-
demn anti-Semitism" and to
take "action appropriate for
its speedy eradication."

The Soviet demand yester-
day that Zionism be included
with Nazism and neo-Nazism,
as an addition to the U. S.
amendment, came as a com-
plete surprise to most commit-
tee members.

Some feel the Soviet propo-
sal is a cover for anti-
Semitism, reported to be pre-
valent in the Soviet Union.
Others believe the Russians
are catering to Arab anti-
Zionist views.

Some Arab delegations have
come out in favor of including
Zionism in the agreement on
racial discrimination. On
Tuesday, Faras Sharaf of
Jordan proposed including the
words "Fascist, colonialist,
tribalist and Zionist."

The following day, Mudda-
thir Abdul Rahim, of the
Sudan, said the Arabs are op-
posed to Zionism in Israel "not
because they were anti-Semites,
but because Arabs oppose
colonialism and imperialism."

Israel's Mrs. Hadassah Ben-
Itto, a judge from Tel Aviv,
replied that "to include Zionism
in a list of racist doctrines
would, in effect, equate per-
secutors with the persecuted."

announcing the results, gave this
rundown of the sections ap-
proved yesterday:

(General introduction on
the spirituality of other re-
ligions, 2.071 to 2.072)

(On the section on Jews
in Hinduism, Buddhism and
other religions, 1.073 to 1.074)

(On the religion of Islam,
1.910 to 1.911)

(Introduction to the sec-
tion on the Jewish religion,
saying there is a spiritual
bond between Christians and
Jews, 1.937 to 1.938)

The controversial sections,
on which the vote result will
not be known until today,
contained changes from the
declaration as it was tenta-
tively approved by the Council
last year.

These changes included the
deletion of the word "decide"
and the addition of a specific
mention of "anti-Semitism."
Although the declaration still
says the Jewish people cannot
be held collectively responsible
for the death of Christ and
says the Church "deplores
anti-Semitism," many bishops
felt the new version was
weaker.

Augustin Cardinal Bra-
sileiro, president of the Vatican
Christian Unity Secretariat,
which drafted the document,
defended the new wording in a
statement to the Council before
the voting started.

A leading progressive, Car-
dinal Bea cited the deletion
of "decide" and said:

"It is known that difficulties
and controversies—for exam-
ple, that the schema could con-
tradict the Gospel—have in
fact arisen, especially because
of the use of this word."

The Cardinal said "the sub-
stance of what we wished to
express in the prior text by this
word is found exactly and com-
pletely expressed in the new
text."

In other action yesterday,
the Council gave final ap-
proval, 1.912 to 1.913, to a docu-
ment on Christian education,
putting the Catholic Church
behind the use of government
funds for all schools—public
and parochial alike.

ont page of the New York Herald Tribune.
oviet at UN Lumps Nazism and Zionism."

(signed September 1, 1975). As a result of Egypt's opposition, the PLO proposal was watered down. It became a call "to intensify pressure against Israel at the U.N. and the other agencies, including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its status as a member of these agencies." However, still another resolution on the Middle East attacked Zionism even more harshly than in Mexico, defining it as "a danger to world peace." The Arabs also decided to "organize an information campaign. . . to unmask the racist aggressive nature of the Zionist entity. . ." ³¹

A similar scene was repeated several days later at the conference of the seventy-five non-aligned countries at Lima (August 25-30, 1975), when Syria and the PLO proposed a resolution to expel or suspend Israel from the U.N. Behind the scenes there were heated clashes between Arabs and Africans, with the Africans refusing to agree even to the suspension of Israel. Finally the conference restricted itself to a severe condemnation of Zionism as a "threat to world peace and security" without asking for the expulsion or the suspension of Israel. ³²

With such a broad and unbending resistance to Zionism, the road was open to its quasi-automatic condemnation by the U.N.

NOTES

- (1) Wistrich Robert Ed, *Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism in the Contemporary World*, MacMillan in Association with the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1990, p4. Cf. also Yohanan Manor, "L'Antisionisme," in *Revue Francaise de Science Politique*, Vol. 34, No 2, Avril 1984, pp. 295-323. Shortened English version, "Anti-Zionism," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 35, Spring 1985, pp. 125-144.
- (2) Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism. The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State*, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1981, p. 5.
- (3) Based on the data provided by Arthur Ruppin, *Les Juifs dans le Monde Moderne*, Payot, Paris, 1934. Cf. Table in Yohanan Manor, *Naissance du Sionisme Politique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1981, p. 34.
- (4) Rabbi Shulem Ber Schneersohn, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, on Zionism (1903), in Michael Selzer, Ed. *Zionism Reconsidered: The Rejection of Jewish Normalcy*, Macmillan, New York, 1970, pp. 12-13.
- (5) Letter to Lloyd George, October 4, 1917, in Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1961, p. 500.
- (6) For instance, the cooperation between Chaim Weizman, leader of the World Zionist Organization, and the Emir Feisal, chief representative of the Arab Monarchy of Hedjaz, during the negotiations of the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, and the agreement that they concluded in January 1919.
- (7) Art. 19 of the Palestinian National Covenant. Meron Medzini, Ed. *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents, 1947-1974*, Volume Two, p. 669.

- (8) Shmuel Almog, Ed., *Zionism and the Arabs*, Jerusalem, The Historical Society of Israel and the Zalman Shazar Center, 1983, p. 13
- (9) Shmuel Almog, Ed., op. cit., p. 20.
- (10) Robert Wistrich, "Marxism and Jewish Nationalism: The Theoretical Roots of Confrontation," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, June 1975.
- (11) Alex Bein, *Theodore Herzl, A Biography*, London, East and West Library, 1957, p. 490.
- (12) "Haseif Leginui Haantishemiut Behatzat Haamana Lebeur kol Tsurot Haaflia Hagizit" (The paragraph to condemn anti-Semitism in the draft convention to eradicate all forms of racial discrimination), New York, October 25, 1965, p. 1. A top-secret report by Meir Rosenne. CZA/S110/12.
- (13) US-Brazil proposal, L/1211, General Assembly Third Committee.
- (14) USSR amendment, L/1231, General Assembly Third Committee.
- (15) Roberta Cohen, "United Nations' Stand on anti-Semitism," in *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 2 No. 2, March-April 1968, p. 24.
- (16) Notably in West Germany. Some have put forward the view that most had been the work of Soviet intelligence in order to discredit West Germany. For instance, Thierry Wolton, *Le KGB en France*, Paris, Grasset, 1986, pp. 216-221.
- (17) Details on the "U.S. betrayal" in Meir Rosenne's report on "The paragraph to condemn anti-Semitism in the draft convention to eradicate all forms of racial discrimination," New York, October 5, 1965, pp. 2-3; pp. 5-7. Rosenne was then a member of the Israeli delegation to the UNGA. From this report it appears that Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir had instructed the Israeli delegation to submit its own amendment condemning anti-Semitism if the U.S. changed its position and removed its proposal. p. 2. CZA/S110/12.
- (18) Institute of Jewish Affairs, *The Career of the Protocols of Zion*, Research Report, December 1981, No. 15, pp. 6-7.
- (19) Yehoshafat Harkabi, "Arab Positions on Zionism," in Shmuel Almog, Ed., op. cit., p. 189.
- (20) According to Professor Bernard Lewis, "The term racist is used more particularly of those (national) movements which have an actual or potential focus outside the Soviet Union." "The Anti-Zionist Resolution," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1975, p. 60.
- (21) *Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, its Roots and Consequences*, Jerusalem, The Hebrew University, Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, 1979.
- (22) Anne Marie Rosenthal, *L'antisemitisme en Russie, des origines a nos jours*, Paris, PUF, 1982, p. 195.
- (23) *Anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, Its Roots and Consequences*, op. cit. For a thorough and concise review of Soviet anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, Cf. Emmanuel Litvinoff, Ed., *Soviet Anti-Semitism: The Paris Trial*, Wilwood House Ltd., London 1974, 120 pages.
- (24) William Korey, "The Soviet Media Campaign. Updating the Protocols of Zion," *New Leader*, January 1979, p. 10.
- (25) Vladimir Zagladin and F. Ryzhenko Ed., *Sovpomennoe revolutzionnoe dvizhenie i natsionalizm* (Contemporary revolutionary movement and nationalism), Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatry, Moscow 1973, p. 205.
- (26) Michael Chechinski, "The real meaning of Soviet anti-Zionism," *Jerusalem Post*, May 31, 1974. p. 8.
- (27) Resolution 3151 (XXVIII), December 14, 1973, Section G.
- (28) Resolution 3236 (XXIX), November 22, 1974.
- (29) For details on the International Woman's Year Conference in Mexico see Ruth Raeli, *The Steps that Led to the UNGA Resolution 3379*, Jerusalem, WZO, Department of Information, November 1984, pp. 28-33.
- (30) Thomas Mayer, *The UN Resolution equating Zionism with Racism: Genesis and Repercussions*, London, Institute of Jewish Affairs, Research Report, 1985, p. 4.
- (31) Ruth Raeli, op. cit., pp. 34-36; Thomas Mayer, *ibidem*.
- (32) Ruth Raeli, op. cit. pp. 38-41.

CHAPTER II

UNGA RESOLUTION AGAINST ZIONISM

Anti-Zionism thus intensified in the international arena after the Six Day War heightened Arab and Soviet hostility to the state of Israel. The Soviet Union's anti-Israel policy was further hardened by Egypt's subsequent decision to sever its close ties with it [Egypt expelled its Soviet experts from the country in July 1972]. Egypt then effected a rapprochement with the United States which, in turn, was helping to broker historic accords between Egypt and Israel. This realignment, of course, cracked the post-'67 Arab-Soviet solidarity bloc and posed a direct threat to Soviet influence and interests in the region.

Meanwhile, the anti-Israel movement, as we have seen, had thus far succeeded in winning international recognition of the PLO and in damaging Zionism by linking it with apartheid. The stepped up anti-Israel campaign now sought to have Israel expelled or at least suspended from the United Nations, as was the case with South Africa, and to be replaced by the PLO. At the same time, it continued its corollary strategy of systematically discrediting Zionism.

It quickly became apparent, however, to both the USSR and the Arab states, that the plan to expel or suspend Israel would be stymied by the opposition of Western nations, particularly the United States. On July 17, 1975, the European Community hinted it opposed abridging Israel's rights at the United Nations by expressing its intention "to defend and promote respect for the charter, for the rights of member states and for the existing rules of procedure." The United States took an even stronger stand. On July 18, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution warning that if Israel was expelled from the United Nations, the United States would be forced to reassess its membership in that body. The threat implicit in the resolution echoed an address by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Milwaukee on July 14 in which he warned of dramatic consequences if Israel was to be so much as suspended from the UNGA.

The warning had the desired impact. African as well as non-aligned nations thereafter refrained from adopting resolutions calling for Israel's expulsion or suspension from the United Nations and its specialized agencies. "The United States had won. Kissinger had won," remarked Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.¹

But the success drove the Arabs and the Soviet Union to push forward

with their other, parallel strategy of discrediting Zionism. They would seek at least to have Zionism condemned as a major offense by the international community. The groundwork for such a move, as previously noted, had already been laid by the international conferences in Mexico (U.N. on women), Kampala (OAU), and Lima (non-aligned nations). Their next opportunity unfolded on September 24, 1975, when the Third Committee for Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions of the United Nations General Assembly started a series of deliberations. They were to focus mainly on racism and apartheid in South Africa and to launch a United Nations-sponsored decade against racism.

During the following week, about fifty countries took part in these deliberations and, by U.N. standards, they deviated only marginally from the formal agenda. Here and there, Israel and Zionism were attacked, but these attacks remained within typical parameters. Egypt and Bangladesh contented themselves with anti-Israel allusions. China, Byelorussia and Algeria opted for a ritual inclusion of Zionism in the usual litany of evils beside imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid.

The United Arab Emirates, Albania, Jordan, Morocco and South Yemen went a step further, however. They pointed to the discriminatory nature of Zionism and drew a parallel with the racist regime of South Africa. Only the representatives of Ukraine and the PLO asserted, point-blank, that Zionism was racism. A. B. Glovoko of Ukraine argued that the planned decade against racism was intended to combat all forms of racial discrimination and that "Zionism was one of these forms since it was based on the alleged superiority of one race and had consequently been condemned on a number of occasions by the United Nations."²

Abdul Rahman, a representative of the PLO, placed Zionism in the last of three categories of racism defined by British historian Arnold Toynbee. There was, "first, the kind that annihilate an entire race, such as Nazism; second, the kind based on racial segregation, such as the racism practised in South Africa; and, lastly, racism that expelled and expatriated a population in order to replace it by another; that was Zionist racism." Zionism also mirrored Nazism, Rahman added, because "it was trying to exterminate the Palestinian people."

Finally, he argued, Zionism also resembled anti-Semitism because it posited that Jews could not live together with the citizens of the country in which they reside, nor could they belong to that country. "When Zionism maintained that the only solution to the Jewish problem was to separate the Jews from the society of which they have formed a part during their long history and to transport them to the lands of others, displacing those others by force and terror, it was taking the same position as anti-Semitism."³

The momentum against Israel was growing. On October 1, Idi Amin Dada, the president of Uganda and the chairman of the OAU, appeared

before the U.N. General Assembly and launched one of the most virulent attacks on the Jewish state ever witnessed within the halls of the United Nations, culminating in a demand for its elimination as a nation.

Zionism, he charged, was a colonial superpower ruling the United States by a massive conspiracy:

"The United States of America has been colonized by the Zionists who hold all the tools of development and power. They own virtually all the banking institutions, the major manufacturing and processing industries and the major means of communication; and have so much infiltrated the CIA that they are posing a great threat to nations and peoples which may be opposed to the atrocious Zionist movement. They have turned the CIA into a murder squad to eliminate any form of resistance anywhere in the world."

"... How can we expect freedom, peace and justice in the world when such a powerful nation as the United States is in the hands of the Zionists? I call upon the people of the United States of America. . . to rid their society from the Zionists in order that the true citizens of this nation may control their own destiny and exploit the natural resources of their country to their own benefit. I call for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and the extinction of Israel as a state, so that the territorial integrity of Palestine may be ensured and upheld."

Idi Amin Dada had received a standing ovation from the General Assembly when he had come to the podium. At the end of this speech, he was wildly cheered.⁴

Daniel Patrick Moynihan had been appointed only several months earlier as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. But he did not miss the opportunity to offer a stinging response to the Idi Amin address and the U.N. reaction on October 3 in a speech to an AFL-CIO convention in San Francisco:

*"It is no accident that on Wednesday, His Excellency Field Marshal Al Hadj Amin Dada, President of the Republic of Uganda—to give him his U.N. title—called for the 'extinction of Israel as a state.' And it is no accident, I fear, that this 'racist murderer'—as one of our leading newspapers called him this morning—is the head of the Organization of African Unity. For Israel is a democracy and it is simply the fact that despotisms will seek whatever opportunities come to hand to destroy that which threatens them most, which is democracy."*⁵

Moynihan's words made the front page of the *New York Times*, provoking harsh criticism by commentators and politicians alike. Some blamed his

attack on Idi Amin Dada for the subsequent hardening of the African position toward Israel and Zionism.⁴ But Moynihan had at least one defender in conservative, pro-Israel *New York Times* columnist William Safire, who wrote:

“‘For too long,’ Ambassador Moynihan says, ‘we have been given private assurances that the public obscenities were not meant. That currency is no longer acceptable.’ However, we can soon expect the handwringing of our own diplomatic Munchkins. Here it comes: We know other Africans privately despise General Amin: why do we drive them together? The dictator serves as the head of the Organization of African Unity by rotation only, why should we take his speech to heart?

“The answer is that when a dictator with the blood of tens of thousands of his countrymen on his hands talks extinction he must be taken seriously. And when the U.N. diplomats rise to their feet and clap hands at a call to genocide by a man with such impressive credentials, they must understand that their public display of support cannot be ameliorated by murmurings of, ‘We don’t really mean it’ in private. . . If a nation wishes to act publicly as an enemy of democracy, or a supporter of racist murderer, that will cost it something. The price of a delicious diatribe against the United States is the aid and friendship of the United States.”⁶

TAKEN ABACK

Two days before his speech at the convention of the AFL-CIO in San Francisco, Moynihan got a telephone call from Chaim Herzog, Israel’s ambassador to the U.N. Herzog called to draw Moynihan’s attention to a “Zionism resolution which had sprung out of the blue”⁷ during the deliberations of the U.N. Third Committee.

Herzog was referring to a series of seven amendments submitted by Somalia to item 68(a) on the charter of the Programme of the Decade Against Racism and Racial Discrimination. These were amendments that were to prove fateful. In effect, they proposed that the program recognize Zionism as a form of racism, provide moral and material support to national liberation movements and victims of Zionism, and study the colonial roots of Zionism.

Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, appeared to have raised a red flag over these initiatives in his address to the UNGA on September 30, 1975, a few days before the Moynihan speech. In his concluding remarks, Allon had warned against growing attacks on Zionism as threat to the Jewish people wherever they may be. “Let me state categorically that anti-Zionism is but a euphemism for anti-Semitism,” he said. “Subscribing to a resolution con-

demning Zionism means an endorsement of anti-Semitism and the legitimization of aggression against Israel."⁸

While Allon warned that the Jewish people would not tolerate a revival of the cancer of anti-Semitism, he seemed deliberately to omit any reference to this attack on Zionism as a threat to the legitimacy of the state of Israel, which had been recognized by the United Nations as an official member state since 1949.

It is possible that Allon's stance reflected Israel's relief over the successful efforts to frustrate Arab and Soviet attempts to expel or suspend it from the United Nations. Thus, perhaps because he considered this main danger to have been neutralized, he believed the question of Israel's very legitimacy should not be raised for fear of exposing Israel's vulnerability.

Moynihan believed otherwise. He was convinced the Israelis as well as the American Jewish leadership simply did not recognize the nature of the threat posed by this resolution. In Moynihan's view, American Jews and Israelis had "a great difficulty imagining that anyone could see Israel" as a remnant of white, European colonialism. "Hence, this attack was deadly dangerous," he concluded. "The Israelis and their supporters thought of themselves as the very model of the modern anti-imperialistic, collectivistic society. And of all the things they could never be accused of was racism: certainly not after the Holocaust. And so the jets came screaming in under their radar screen; undetected, utterly unexpected."⁹

Moynihan and Herzog devised a common strategy to confront the unexpected initiative by Somalia. Since they knew there was no chance of winning the votes, they sought "at least to gain the argument" and get the amendments withdrawn. First, they decided they needed to secure the support of the European Economic Community, which had disappointed Israel and the United States at the Women's International Conference in Mexico. Second, they wanted to dissuade as many African countries as possible from lending a hand to killing the decade against racism. And third, they aimed "to stir the opinion in the United States, to which, after all, both Europeans and Africans looked for support in more than a few matters."¹⁰

On October 3, the Third Committee held a session devoted to a general debate and to the consideration of draft resolutions. At this session, Faduma Issac Bihi, the representative of Somalia, introduced an amendment linking Zionism with racism in a draft resolution on the decade against racism [document A/C.3/L.2157]. It was co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Algeria, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates.

Bihi pointed out that the General Assembly had in a 1974 resolution already condemned the "unholy alliance" between the Zionist regime and apartheid. She claimed that this "regime had shown beyond doubt that it used the same methods against [its] indigenous populations as the racist regimes of southern Africa, since it had uprooted the Palestinians from their

homeland and deprived them of the free exercise of the right of self-determination. That had been confirmed in the General Assembly Resolution 3236" (in the 29th session of UNGA).¹¹ The "Zionist regime," she added, had been condemned on several occasions by the United Nations for the practice of racial discrimination against the population and its tradition, culture and religion, and "Zionism, through the practices of the Zionist military authorities in Palestine, showed beyond doubt the abominable nature of racial discrimination."¹¹

Italy's delegate, Piero Vinci, on behalf of the nine members of the EEC, reacted immediately against the proposal. They did not believe, he stated, "that it was appropriate or relevant for the proposed amendments to identify Zionism as a form of racial discrimination. To do so would be to work against the objectives of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Furthermore it would hamper the efforts being made to find a solution to the conflict in the Middle East."¹² Vinci made it clear the EEC members would not only oppose the proposed amendments, but that if they were adopted, would not vote to adopt the resolution on the program of the decade, thereby preventing a consensus on its adoption.

U.S. delegate Leonard Garment also reacted sharply. He said he found the content of the amendments not only unjust but also ominous because they "treated the word racism as if it were merely an epithet to be flung at whoever happened to be one's adversary. It turned an idea with vivid and obnoxious meaning into an ideological tool and deprived the members of the committee of the ability to see the reality together and deal with it together,"¹³ he said.

In substance, he added, the amendments completely distorted the history of the Zionist movement which was "born out of centuries of oppression suffered by the Jewish people in the Western world, and designed to liberate an oppressed people by returning them to the land of their fathers."¹³ Therefore, he made it plain, the United States would oppose the entire draft resolution if these amendments were adopted.

The unequivocal opposition of both the United States and the European Economic Community convinced the African countries that upholding the amendments would provoke a crisis and jeopardize the program of the decade against racism by risking moral, political and financial support for it. Hence, on October 6, Bihi declared that after consulting some of the delegations, it had been decided in order to maintain the spirit of constructive cooperation which characterized the committee's work, to ask the chairman and the members of the committee to agree to postpone the vote on the draft resolution.¹⁴ She asked for a delay of several days to allow them to reach a decision by consensus and to adjourn the debate on this item.

Following feverish behind-the-scenes discussions between the delegations, Somalia announced on October 15 that the sponsors had decided "with

a view of accommodating the interests expressed by some delegations, to revise the amendments and submit them in a separate draft resolution.”¹⁵ Procedural efforts by the United States and Costa Rica to prevent the admissibility of a new Somalian draft resolution were rejected on October 15, by a vote of 72 to 24, with 28 abstentions. On the same day, the committee approved by 75 to 22, with 26 abstentions, the admissibility of Somalia’s new draft resolution replacing the amendments circulated in document A/C.3/L.2157.

The new text was presented by Somalia on October 16 with the same sponsors of the earlier amendments with the addition of Ukraine. The preamble recalled and quoted UNGA Resolutions 1904 (17th UNGA session) and 3151 G (28th UNGA session) as well as the statements against Zionism adopted by the three international conference mentioned above (Mexico, Kampala, Lima). But its single operative paragraph read:

“Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.”

LOSING THE VOTES

The interval between the introduction of the Somalian draft resolution A/C.3/L.2159 on October 16, its adoption by the Third Committee on October 17, and its final adoption by the Plenary of the General Assembly on November 10, was marked by argument and invective, threats and pressure. It was also filled with procedural confrontations over whether to postpone discussion of the resolution in light of its explosiveness and the damage it would cause to the planned decade against racism.

In the middle of the debate, Sierra Leone’s representative, supported by Zambia, formally proposed postponing the discussion until the following year.¹⁶

It was a carefully calculated move. It would have enabled African delegates who were offended by the mention of the OAU resolution in Kampala, which was non-binding since it had not been adopted by consensus,¹⁷ to exit gracefully from this imbroglio. Above all, it would ensure the adoption by consensus in the current General Assembly of the two other draft resolutions concerning the decade program.

But this proposed postponement was rejected by 68 to 45, with 16 abstentions and 13 absences.¹⁸

Moynihan later observed how difficult it always is to know whether and how a debate affects the outcome of a vote. Nevertheless, he believed that the debate on the ZR determination in the Third Committee did have an influence on the final tally, “at least somewhat.”

“It was intense and at times vituperative,” he recalled. “The Arabs were at their worst, or best, as they might think. Replete with charters and pacts and

proclamations of long ago, leering with proofs of Jewish wickedness sniped from editorials of Israeli newspapers or the pronouncements of anti-Zionist Jews. Bitter with near to thirty years of defeat on the battlefield. Quick to belittle, incapable of praise. They would invoke Saladin, but these descendants had quite lost his largeness, his munificence."¹⁹

After the defeat of the Sierra Leone motion for postponement, others tried but failed to "find a way to put the whole thing off."²⁰ The Dutch delegation, in particular, sought the involvement of the legal adviser, but the move was blocked by the chairman of the committee, Ladislav Smid from Czechoslovakia, "the liberal who had become Smid the apparatchik."²⁰ The United States then moved to adjourn the meeting, but this, too, was defeated by 65 to 40 and 21 abstentions.²¹

A vote was scheduled for three draft resolutions, labeled A, B and C. A and B dealt, respectively, with adopting the program for the decade against racism and sponsoring an international conference to launch the decade. Resolution C equated Zionism with racism.

Before the vote, the United States, Sweden on behalf of all the Nordic countries, and Canada declared that if the proposed draft resolution against Zionism (C) was adopted, they would vote against the other two draft resolutions both in the Third Committee, as well as in the Plenary, despite their support for the decade. But these threats seemed to have had a very limited effect. So did a stern warning delivered by Chaim Herzog. "The Jewish people will never forget this scene nor this vote," he declared. "We shall never forget those who spoke up for decency and civilization. . . We shall not forget those who voted to attack our religion and faith. We shall never forget."²²

Resolutions A and B were adopted by 126 to 1 (Israel) with 2 abstentions in the first vote and one abstention in the second.²³ Immediately after, in an atmosphere Moynihan described as filled with drama, the committee proceeded to the vote on draft Resolution C [A/C.3/L.2159]. "The Committee room grew crowded, hot, and excited. Something obscene was about to happen."²⁴

After a separate vote on each of the resolution's five preambular paragraphs, the draft resolution was adopted by 70 to 29, with 27 abstentions. Sixteen delegates were absent.²⁵ [see Tables I and II]

The British critic Goronwy Rees, who had been invited by Ambassador Moynihan to attend the vote, described several weeks later how deeply it stirred him:

"There were ghosts haunting the Third Committee that day; the ghosts of Hitler and Goebbels and Julius Streicher, grinning with delight to hear, not only Israel, but Jews as such denounced in language which would have provoked hysterical applause at any

Nuremberg rally and justified a special edition of Der Sturmer. And there were other ghosts also at the debate; the ghosts of the 6 million dead in Dachau and Sachsenhausen and other extermination camps, listening to the same voices which had cheered and jeered and abused them as they made their way to the gas chambers.

“For the fundamental thesis advanced by the supporters of the resolution, and approved by the majority of the Third Committee, was that to be a Jew, and to be proud of it, and to be determined to preserve the right to be a Jew, is to be an enemy of the human race. After the defeat of National Socialism, which cost the world millions of lives, and the horrors of the Final Solution, one had thought that such voices had been silenced forever, at least in any society which even half-pretended to be civilised. The truth is otherwise.

“Today, the authentic voice of anti-Semitism, strengthened and invigorated by the riches and hatreds of the oil-producing nations, is once again respectable; it has become salonfähig and speaks in the best society, and nowhere more blatantly and stridently than in the General Assembly of the United Nations.”²⁶

The report of the Third Committee was submitted for discussion and approval to the Plenary of the General Assembly on November 10. Resolution A/C.3/L.2159 was now draft Resolution III. Belgium requested that the General Assembly, under rules of procedure 74 and 77, postpone the debate and the vote on the draft resolution until the next (the thirty-first) session. This request was rejected by 67 to 55, with 15 abstentions and 5 absences.

At this point, Belgium's delegate asked that the Plenary take a decision on draft Resolution III before a decision on draft Resolutions I and II. It would be “a last effort—I repeat, one last effort—to obtain something that is very dear to our hearts, namely the possibility, in the event of draft Resolution III being rejected, of our reaching a consensus on draft Resolutions I and II.”²⁷ This motion failed by 13 votes.

Throughout this session of the Plenary, tension had been growing alongside the sense that something unusual and important was about to occur. It was evident the ZR resolution would be adopted. But it was not at all clear by what majority, especially in light of the strenuous, last-minute jockeying for votes behind the scenes.

Up to the very moment of the voting, many delegations heads were undecided, having not received final instruction from their capitals. Some African and Latin America delegations were on the phone directly to their heads of state.²⁸

Herzog added an element of drama to the strained expectation in the air. Just before the vote, he delivered an eloquent and moving defense of Zionism, which he concluded by tearing in two the text of draft Resolution III. Forty years earlier, in the Yeshurun Synagogue in Jerusalem, his father, Isaac Herzog, had angrily ripped up a copy of the British White Paper which limited Jewish immigration to Palestine.

The passage of draft Resolution III, by 72 to 35, with 32 abstentions and 3 absences, was followed by a veritable explosion of joy on the part of the victors. Judge Hadassa Ben Ito, a member of the Israeli delegation to the U.N., several years later recalled her impressions.

"It was not only an excitement. The hatred was crawling on the floor. People embraced as if they had won the biggest victory of their lives after the resolution was passed. We felt like pariahs. It is not only a sentimental reflection I'm telling you about this. We should know that it was not just another resolution of the United Nations. Somebody like myself, who has never really felt personally attacked by, or maligned by, an act of anti-Semitism, really felt it physically while sitting there."²⁹

The Soviet-Arab coalition had won. But the victory was far from resounding. It actually fell short of the 100 or more votes the coalition was used to achieving at the U.N. In his address to the Israeli Knesset on October 20, 1975, Foreign Minister Allon called the voting in the Third Committee "among the least impressive they (the Arab countries) have attained in recent years—in terms of both scope and composition of the various camps."³⁰

Still, the U.S. and Israeli efforts to prevent bringing the ZR draft resolutions to a vote had failed. The Belgian motion was encouraging because it won the most support [55 votes—See Tables I and II]. But it fell short of passage by 13 votes, leaving questions in its wake about what went wrong.

Some believe it would have been possible to secure a better outcome and to win postponement had it not been for Moynihan's "confrontational tactics." Clearly, Moynihan had a penchant for overriding the proprieties usually subscribed to at the U.N. In this case he had pronounced in plain, harsh and undiplomatic terms his view of the anti-Zionist initiative and the disreputable identity of its sponsors and supporters. For Moynihan, the ZR equation was a lie, an obscene and indecent act, and the chairman of the OAU a "racist murderer."

Radha Krishna Ramphul, the representative of Mauritius, for one, alluded to the strong negative reaction to Moynihan in his explanation of why he had failed to reach a compromise. His main reason, he said, was "two words that were used by two representatives of one country. They choose to describe the action of seventy independent sovereign countries as obscene, and by implication described those same countries as indecent and not to be considered

among one's friends. Many are those delegations which would have changed their position were it not for those two words."³¹

A similar but far more weighty and treacherous charge was made by Ivor Richard, the UK ambassador to the U.N. In his address before the Plenary of the General Assembly he had hinted at the UK's reservations about ideological strong-arm tactics: ". . . by its very nature, the U.N. cannot succeed in an atmosphere of discord and division. We should surely be trying to lessen differences, not to provoke them."³²

Several days later, on November 17, Richard was even more explicit when he addressed the board of directors of the U.N. Association about the British view of the U.N. Britain, he said, saw the U.N. as a major instrument of its policy, a place in which and from which to extend British influence and defend British interests.

*"I do not see it as a forum in which to argue my own particular brand of political theology. Certainly I do not see it as a confrontational arena in which to 'take on' those countries whose political systems and ideology are different from mine. I spent a lot of time preventing rows at the U.N.—not looking for them. Whatever the place, it is not OK Corral and I am hardly Wyatt Earp. There is nothing whatsoever to be gained by ideological disputes of the most intense sort which one is probably going to lose anyway or at best to end up with a rather unsatisfactory statement. My function is to use the U.N. not to purge it particularly if in order to purge it the chances are I would end up by encouraging enemies, irritating my friends and isolating my country."*³³

Moynihan's behavior drew notice well beyond the United Nations. On November 21, 1975, the *New York Times* reported on Richard's charges along with the hint that they were shared by many at the U.S. State Department. At the same time, *Newsweek* magazine claimed that some diplomats, including friends of Moynihan, were complaining that his policy of talking tough to the Third World had led him to use language that was injudicious and intemperate.

The *Newsweek* piece quoted Seymour Maxwell Finger, who was the former ambassador to the U.N. and director of the New York's Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations. Finger defended Moynihan for speaking out on U.S. beliefs, but said "he must stop insulting nations unnecessarily. By doing so he is losing votes."³⁴ The U.S. weekly claimed also that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had taken "Pat to the woodshed" and raked him "over the coals at the White House last week for his behavior at the U.N. and for his independent efforts to stir up congressional reaction to the Zionism resolution."³⁴

Moynihan, meanwhile, tried to flatten the allegations that his tough ap-

proach had adversely affected the vote, especially with the African countries. First, he pointed out that on the key question of postponement, there were nineteen sub-Sahara African countries which supported it or did not oppose it. Only one of them, Upper Volta, had a significant Muslim population. Out of the twenty-one sub-Sahara states that had opposed postponement, nine had significant Muslim populations (Chad, Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan) and naturally allied themselves with the Arabs. When Moynihan made his tally, then, the Muslim sub-Sahara countries were left out of the Black African count and “. . . the outcome was that we had eighteen countries with us, and only twelve against. . . We have never had so many African votes.”³⁴

Moynihan next argued that between October 17 and November 10, ten African countries changed their stances. Five switched to supporters and five to the opposition. In fact, a systematic comparison between the four major votes that took place during this period shows that not only ten, but fourteen African countries switched positions, sometimes even twice. In Table III, we have made a distinction between four attitudes: (b), change for the better; (w,b), change for worse, and then for the better; (w), change for worse; and (b,w), change for better and then for worse. Table III shows that ten out of fourteen of these African countries did at some time switch their vote to oppose the anti-Zionist measure.

This certainly appears to contradict the claim that Moynihan's tactics had antagonized most African countries. Moreover, one must take into consideration the very basic fact that the Soviet-Arab coalition had generally and blindly at its disposal a minimum of sixty votes—two from Latin America (Cuba, Guyana); nine from Eastern European countries (not Romania), five from other Communists countries; twenty from the Arab League; six from Moslem countries; twelve Africans (Cape Verde, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda); four Middle Eastern countries (not Greece), and two countries from Asia (India, Sri Lanka).

In fact, this coalition could muster a far larger number of votes, more than 100, by employing an anti-apartheid front, non-aligned solidarity and, of course, a host of political and economic threats and pressures. Therefore the final result achieved by the Soviet-Arab bloc indeed was far more meager than it was accustomed to achieving. One could even venture that the huge majority this coalition automatically enjoyed had been seriously shaken. It was a notable accomplishment, especially taking into account the coercion exerted by the Arab countries, as testified to by some African delegations which had informed Israel they had been targets of “intolerable pressure.”

One country delegate told Israel that Kuwait threatened to cut off its oil supplies if it voted against the resolution. As revealed far later by Chaim Herzog,³⁵ Israel in turn promised to provide alternate supplies. For his part, a



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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the Third Committee (A/10320)]

3379 (XXX). Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures",

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1/ proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination",

1/ E/5725, part one, sect. I.

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, 2/ held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at the suppression of the dignity and integrity of the human being",

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, 3/ adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

2400th plenary meeting
10 November 1975

2/ See A/10297, annex II.

3/ A/10217 and Corr.1, annex, p. 3.

Kenyan delegate confessed that the states of black Africa were coerced into reaching a compromise with the Arabs on the anti-Israeli resolutions.³⁶ The same delegate told the Israeli delegate that Israel had to understand that the constraints of the African struggle against the Arabs forced them into compromises on "secondary issues" and that for the Africans, the resolution about Israel was merely a tangle of meaningless slogans.³⁶

Taking into account these probably unprecedented Arab pressures on African countries, the African vote was a pleasant surprise. Out of thirty-seven non-Arab African countries, five opposed what was now known as Resolution 3379 (Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi and Swaziland). Twelve abstained (Botswana, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire and Zambia).

By contrast, the vote of the Latin American countries was disappointing. This was especially so in light of their decisive role in the historic UNGA vote of November 29, 1947, which adopted the partition plan for two states of Palestine, one Jewish, one Arab. At that time, of twenty Latin American states, thirteen had supported the partition plan, six had abstained (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico) and one had voted against it (Cuba). This time, of twenty-six Latin American countries, only ten opposed the ZR resolution, eleven abstained [among them important countries such as Argentina and Venezuela], and five supported it, including two leading countries, Mexico and Brazil.

This gloomy tally was partly but not exclusively the result of Arab-Soviet pressures or political and economic considerations related to them. Certainly, Chile's efforts to get Arab support against a vote denouncing its torture of political prisoners played a role, as did Panama's need for support for a resolution in its favor on the canal, and the widespread anti-Yankee attitude among most Latin American countries, which boomeranged against Israel.

But it was also the result of a flawed assumption by the United States and Israel that Latin American countries, notably those with significant Jewish populations, would oppose the ZR resolution. It must be noted that while some of these countries may not have considered Zionism a form of racism, they nurtured strong reservations about it. One of the senior members of the Israeli delegation to the U.N., who had personal conversations shortly before the vote with several Latin American representatives, wrote in an internal memo to the Foreign Ministry that although Brazil, Argentina and some other countries which abstained in the vote, were not convinced that Zionism could be defined as racist, they regarded it with disfavor. They considered Zionism a movement which attracted the Jewish and professional elite and raised funds for Israel, creating a problem of dual loyalty and preventing the complete integration of Jews in their countries.³⁷

In any case, it was indisputable that the votes of many countries had been determined by a variety of extraneous considerations, and not mainly by the

merits or demerits of the case. Japan's abstention was based on its dependence on Arab oil, while Iran explained its support for the ZR resolution, despite what it described as its vagueness, as an expression of solidarity with the Arabs: ". . . the term 'Zionism' may be interpreted in many different ways and is not very clear to us in the context of this draft resolution. If we, nevertheless, voted in favor of that resolution in the Third Committee, and if we are voting today in the same way, it is out of a spirit of solidarity with our Arab brothers."³⁸

But, even a sustained effort to clarify the concept and meaning of Zionism did not inspire a rejection of the ZR draft resolution. Singapore's vote is a case in point. Its ambassador to the U.N., Tommy T.B. Koh, recalled many years later that in 1975, most of his friends and colleagues at the United Nations, including those who had voted for the resolution, knew little or nothing about Zionism. For Koh this was also true until he decided "to read some of the literature on Zionism. I read the writings of Herzl and of other Zionist leaders. After reading them, I felt that the Zionist movement was similar to the National Liberation Movements of the Third World. It was therefore factually incorrect to describe Zionism as a form of racial discrimination."³⁹ But this factual conclusion did not prompt Singapore to take part in the debate and express its views nor to vote against the ZR resolution. It merely abstained!

Given this complex picture, the final vote could be considered an honorable defeat. And since it cracked the famous so-called "automatic majority," perhaps it can even be seen as some sort of victory. It was a defeat which could not have been prevented, but might have been narrowed if public opinion against the resolution had been galvanized in time, especially in the United States and in Europe. But it was not. It was difficult to stir public opinion and, ironically, Jewish public opinion in particular!

Arousing public opinion had, in fact, been a key element in the strategy agreed upon by Ambassadors Moynihan and Herzog to come to grips with the move to condemn Zionism as racism. But all their attempts to do so before the vote in the Third Committee—in the press, in relevant bodies such as the United Nations Association, and of course in the Jewish community—failed.

Herzog pressed Rabbi Israel Miller, the chairman of the U.S. Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, to explain why there was no reaction from the Jewish community, not even a statement, an ad, a petition. Miller's answer stunned him. He said he had been told by the Israeli embassy in Washington to "ignore the whole issue since it was nonsense."⁴⁰

There are several plausible explanations for this curious counsel by the embassy. First, Israeli diplomatic personnel in Washington as well as Jerusalem were said to be unhappy with Herzog's nomination as Israel's permanent representative at the United Nations in New York. This was not

mainly because he was not a career diplomat, but rather because of his independence and close relationships with some U.S. foreign policy decision makers such as Lawrence Eagleburger, executive assistant to the secretary of state, and William Scranton, special consultant to the U.S. president, as well as with Premier Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Allon. In this theory, the envy and pettiness of some Israeli career diplomats led them to react with skepticism and scorn to his warnings and assessments. They viewed them as exaggerated and unprofessional.

In addition, and far more serious, there was a tendency among these professionals to view the United Nations with condescension. It was David Ben-Gurion himself, after all, who used the Hebrew acronym for the international body to coin the famous expression "Um-Shmum," meaning the U.N. was worthless. In this tradition, the U.N. was viewed as unimportant and its hostility could not be curbed. This meant the ZR resolution was simply another measure to have been passed by an unimportant body in a long series of unimportant and even absurd measures. It thus was better not to be upset than to over-react and thereby attach undue importance to this body.

But this view was a pernicious one because it hampered any initiative Israel might have taken to fight the measure and led it to disregard the danger of the ZR resolution to Israel's legitimacy. The Arab failure to expel or suspend Israel from the U.N. had also bolstered this disregard.

After the Third Committee's adoption of the Zionism-is-racism draft resolution [A/C.3/L.2519], at long last the media in the United States as well as in Europe began to react. Indeed, their headlines sometimes reflected the colorful language used by U.S. representatives Leonard Garment and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. They referred to the ZR resolution as an indecent and obscene act, an outrage and a vote of hatred, and lambasted the U.N., pointing to its collapse: "Wrecking of the UN," "Undermining the UN Ideals," "A Blot on the U.N." . . .⁴¹

The Third Committee's resolution on Zionism also was vigorously condemned by both houses of the U.S. Congress in a declaration stating that "under the guise of a program to eliminate racism, the United Nations is at the point of officially endorsing anti-Semitism, one of the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history." Senator Jacob K. Javits from New York called for a halt to "the vicious brand of name calling which brings echoes of the propaganda machine of Goebbels and his Nazi party colleagues."⁴² Other senators warned that the passage of the resolution on Zionism would affect U.S. funding of the U.N.⁴³

The European press also began to react sharply, in marked contrast to the caution and timidity of most of their governments which "were terrified of the combination of the Soviets and Persian Gulf Arabs and would abandon the Jews as they had done in 1938 and 1939."⁴⁴

In France there was reportage in *Le Figaro*, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, *Le*

U.S.A.

Lurie's Opinion



'All those condemning Zionism raise their hands'

Lurie's cartoon which appeared in American publications.

Soir; in Italy in *Il Giornale, Il Giorno, Il Matino*; in Holland, in the *Telegraaf, Trouw, Elsevier's Magazine*; in Norway in *Aftenposten, Arbeidetbladet, Nationen*; in Sweden in *Arbetet, Geflie Dagbladet, Svebska Dagbladet*, and in England in *The Times* and the *New Statesman*. Paul Johnson wrote a forceful article in *The New Statesman* entitled "The Resources of Civilization," in which he excoriated the international body for its hypocrisy and corruption:

"Indeed the U.N. is rapidly becoming one of the most corrupted and corrupting creations in the whole history of human institutions. How many delegates were actually bribed by Arab governments to vote against Israel on this occasion is a matter of speculation; but almost without exception those in the majority came from states notable for racist oppression of every conceivable hue. . ."

"Some of these states—which might more accurately be described as tribal barbarisms—have a perfectly genuine hatred for Israel. For Israel is a social democracy, the nearest approach to a free socialist state in the world; its people and government have a profound respect for human life, so passionate indeed that, despite every conceivable provocation, they have refused for a quarter of a century to execute a single captured terrorist. They also have an ancient but vigorous culture, and a flourishing technology. The combination of national qualities they have assembled in their brief existence as a state is a perpetual and embittering reproach to most of the new countries whose representatives swagger about the U.N. building. So Israel is envied and hated; efforts are made to destroy her. The extermination of the Israelis has long been the prime objective of the terrorist international; they calculate that if they break Israel, then all the rest of civilization is vulnerable to their assaults. . ."

"The melancholy truth, I fear, is that the candles of civilization are burning low. The world is increasingly governed not so much by capitalism, or communism, or social democracy, or even tribal barbarism, as by a false lexicon of political cliches, accumulated over half a century and now assuming a kind of sacerdotal authority. . ."

"Has not time come to change our strategy? What I think the rest of the world is waiting for—indeed hoping for—is some positive sign that the civilized powers are going to uphold the standards of international behavior set by their forebears."⁴⁵

While a part of the Western media was beginning to react to the calumny of the Third Committee, this was not yet true of the world's Jewish communities. A remarkable exception was a group of Jews from fifteen cities of the USSR who on October 26 had dared to issue a public statement against the resolution. But Jewish inaction was most notable in the United States and Israel.

On October 24, Herzog appeared for the first time before the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and tried to prod the Jewish establishment into taking action. After a brief historical review of the deteriorating relationship between the United Nations and the state of Israel from the historic session of 1947 to the 1974 session of the General Assembly, Herzog did his utmost to convince his audience that the United Nations was an important arena for the state of Israel. Israel, unlike a bigger power, could not remain aloof from this international body:

*"For a big power the U.N. at its worst is not much more than a nuisance. But for a small and embattled country such as Israel the U.N. can become a major headache. U.N. mediators and conciliation committees, troops and observers—not to mention refugee agencies and special missions—have traditionally played important political roles in the Middle East, for better or worse. In any likelihood, the U.N. presence in the Middle East will continue to be felt by Israel for some time to come. In these circumstances, Israel has to and must regard the U.N. as an important arena."*⁴⁶

Herzog explained that Israel's ability to balance and neutralize the international body's militant hostility toward it was very limited, because of the automatic majority controlled by the Soviet-Arab partnership. This ability had largely been crippled by the U.S. disengagement from the U.N. Now, the U.S. appeared to be reversing its policy of abdication and to be reasserting itself in the U.N. In this respect, the fight against the ZR resolution had been a test case of the U.S. re-engagement.

After laying out the background, Herzog tried to place responsibility before the Jewish people and its leadership.

"The Jewish people must not lose sight of the very serious nature of this document. A document which recalls from the shadows of the past the racist vituperations of the "Sturmer" in Nazi Germany. The anti-Semitic tone which had been injected into these resolutions is gradually joining the automatic slogans of vilification and hate which have become part of the international political vocabulary. We Jews must learn from the past that we cannot and will not ignore this modern anti-Semitism. For that is what it is. Plain, unadulterated anti-Semitism. And if we do not today, as one

GUARDIAN

12-11-75
**A wild swipe
at Israel**

THE OBSERVER
14 November 1975
110 Queen Victoria Street, London EC4Q 1DA 01-224 0207

Great Britain

Eastern Daily Press, Monday, November 17, 1975

Eastern Daily Press

Norwich, Monday, November 17, 1975
Telephone Norwich 1221

DANGEROUS TO U.N.

USE by the Arab states of their influence with the majority of the membership of the United Nations to secure the passage of a resolution condemning Zionism in extreme terms was to be deplored in any case. American reactions make the matter particularly serious. It would be specially regrettable if behaviour illustrating certain weaknesses and lack of communication within the U.N.

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

November 16, 1975
20 FLEET STREET, LONDON EC2A 4BH
TELEPHONE 01-353 3451
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FACSIMILE 01-353 3451
ISSUES: 1000

Anti-semitism

NOTHING that the United Nations has so far done in its ignominious history is so shameful as the resolution passed last week condemning Israel as a racist State. For the Jewish home to be so described is a piece of grossly perverse casuistry — at once strictly true and utterly false.

Dr. Goebbels would have been proud to lend his name to such a novel form of anti-semitism.

UN stigma on Zionism

THE United Nations resolution equating Zionism with racism is a travesty. It was proposed by a temporary coalition of members which found it more convenient to "rather than resist" the anti-Israel "policies pursued by the UN."

THE ECONOMIST NOVEMBER 15, 1975



The wrong way

United Nations

**The barbarians
take over**
Raymond Fletcher

On Monday the United Nations General Assembly voted, by a vote of 72 to 33, that Zionism is "a form of racism and racial discrimination", thus turning itself, in effect, into a propagandist organ of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It is important, therefore, to look back to discover what sort of organisation the UN originally meant to be, in order to see how it has become as a

Daily Mail
COMMENT
12-11-75

**Racial pride and
UN prejudice**

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1975

UNO'S RACIST ORGY



Offensive

12-11-75

SERIOUS world opinion has long since been disenchanted with the United Nations. The extraordinary resolution condemning Zionism as "a form of racism and racial discrimination" brings this already suspect organisation into even deeper disrepute. The resolution is pointless. It is offensive. Above all, it is hypocritical. The Jews, hop-fully, will treat it with the contempt it deserves.

GLASGOW HERALD Wednesday November 12 1975
Established 1793
Scotland's Newspaper

United Nations nonsense

THE IRISH TIME

Body Blow

Headlines on UN resolution in the British press.

people all over the world, speak out against this new international outburst of anti-Semitism, this Medieval attack on our religion, we shall sin towards the future generations of Jews who will ask where we were when this occurred. . .¹⁴⁷

Herzog then challenged the leadership of the Jewish community, taking it to task for its passivity. "My friends," he said, "I tried desperately in the two weeks in which the debate was going on to bring home to the Jewish community the enormity of the resolution and the fact that I felt that this was the

first major international attack of anti-Semitism since the days of Hitler. I tried to emphasize that this could be considered the first attack on an established religion of an international nature since the Middle Ages. I cannot say that I was encouraged by the Jewish reaction."⁴⁷

Herzog compared the insight and mobilization of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. to the passivity and lack of understanding of the Jewish community. He then asked if the dangerous significance of the resolution had managed to penetrate the American Jewish consciousness. Herzog pressed his audience to recognize the ominous character of its passivity, of its lack of sensitivity and awareness in the face of a battle to undercut Israel's right to exist:

"... Where were the Jewish people? I felt that an outcry before the vote might be of help. But our senses have become so dulled that we do not perceive the danger of this resolution. . . . Do you really believe that the reaction in this, the greatest Jewish center in the world, answers the requirements of the hour? Communities in this continent are being threatened by the Government's vote. Have they felt your helping hand?"

"True, we have had an impressive official reaction in Israel and a major diplomatic effort throughout the world. But has the public reacted as it should? The media in Israel paid comparatively scant attention to this development. They were reporting the antics of the strikes in Ashdod, when our enemies were and are planning that Ashdod should not exist. . . . I think that it is time that world Jewry appreciated the dangers that threaten it and mobilized and deployed itself to meet them and to thwart our enemies."⁴⁸

Two days later, on October 26, the Conference of Presidents put an advertisement in the *New York Times* under the headline, "This is an obscene act." The text commended the U.S. government as well as those Western democracies and African and other states that refused to take part in the "immoral act" of condemning Zionism. The ad concluded by suggesting how Americans were to respond to what a U.S. government spokesman had called a supreme deceit against the moral realities of the world:

"Finally, we will resist the obscene attempt to equate Zionism with racism as we defend democracy against religious bigotry and anti-Americanism in the U.N. and around the world," the text reads. "For we know that this anti-Zionism campaign is an attack against the State of Israel, against the Jewish religion, against the Jewish people. It is an assault against the values of democracy and civilization that all Americans cherish. It is a horrifying reminder of the Nazi campaign that began with words of hate and ended with acts of extermination. In this struggle we look for support to all men and women of every race and religion, who love freedom."

Large excerpts of Herzog's address were published on October 25 in the *New York Times* under the headline, "Herzog says Jews let Israelis down during the UN Debate." In response, some members of the Israeli Cabinet, notably Interior Minister Yosef Burg and Justice Minister Chaim Tzadok, suggested calling Herzog back to Jerusalem to account for his action. But, due to firm opposition by Allon, the matter was dropped and Herzog was spared.

GAINING THE ARGUMENT

We have already taken note of the fact that most delegations did not decide their votes on the basis of an examination of the issue. In essence, they did not arrive at an accepted and shared definition of racism and racial discrimination and determine whether Zionism fit these definitions. And so, while some delegates in the Third Committee or the Plenary offered some defense or explanation for their equation of Zionism with racism, or their rejection of the equation, very few took up the challenge of presenting systematic argumentation. Forty delegations took the opportunity to explain their votes, thirty-two of them before casting them.^{49a} Nine used their right to explain their votes afterward or to exercise their right of reply.^{49b}

There was, however, a substantive exchange of views between Moynihan and Abdallah Al-Sayegh, a member of the Kuwaiti delegation who was of Palestinian origin. In fact, their "exchange" had begun on October 29 at a lunch to which Moynihan had been invited by the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.N., which was also attended by Al-Sayegh. At the lunch as well as at the Plenary, Al-Sayegh based most of his argumentation equating Zionism with racism on Article I of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which he claimed provided a definition of racism:

*“. . . in this convention the term racial discrimination shall mean any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, descent or national or other ethnic origin. . .”*⁵⁰

It was an argument that unsettled Moynihan when he first heard it at lunch. Indeed, he had confided he had taken it as "a blow. I allowed that I had better learn my texts."⁵¹ Immediately afterward, however, he was informed by the legal adviser to the U.S. mission at the U.N. that the Kuwaiti was quite wrong, that Article I referred only to racial discrimination, and that the Convention did not contain the term racism.⁵¹

Nevertheless, in the Plenary, Al-Sayegh stressed that the Arabs would accept no abridgement of this definition:

"Racial discrimination is not only discrimination based on race in

the biological, genetic sense of the term. Racial discrimination, the U.N. maintains, is not only the discrimination that is based on colour; racial discrimination is also based on descent, on national origin or on ethnic origin. This is the definition of racial discrimination less than which we shall not accept, because this is already the approved, formal, authoritative definition by the U.N. Remarks to the effect that Zionism does not involve discrimination on the basis of colour begin from an abbreviated and abridged definition of racism, instead of beginning from the total definition adopted and espoused by the United Nations.”⁵⁰

The U.S. delegation was the only one to challenge this basic assertion that there was a U.N. definition of racism and racial discrimination and that it applied to Zionism. This was done by Moynihan, and only after the vote on Resolution 3379(XXX). Moynihan had chosen to speak after the vote because he was determined to avoid being accused once again of triggering a backlash.^{49c}

Moynihan observed that the U.N. had declared Zionism to be racism without ever having defined racism. “Lest I be unclear, the United Nations has in fact on several occasions defined racial discrimination. The definitions have been loose but recognizable. It is racism, incomparably the more serious charge—racial discrimination is a practice—it is racism that has never been defined.”⁵²

Moynihan then proceeded to prove that the ZR equation was a lie, and that “whatever else Zionism may be, it is not and cannot be a form of racism.” Logically, he said, “the state of Israel could be, and could become, many things, theoretically including many undesirable things, but it could not be and could not become racist unless it ceased to be Zionist.”⁵³

This was a strong and far-reaching statement. To substantiate his claim, Moynihan had to explicitly define the singular nature of Zionism as a national liberation movement, a movement that “in contrast with the movements that preceded it, those of that time and those that have come since, defined its members not in terms of birth but of belief.”⁵³

In order to clarify this fundamental difference between Zionism and other national liberation movements, Moynihan offered several examples showing that national movements and peoples were defined in terms of birth. His examples included the movement of the Irish to free Ireland, of Polish to free Poland, of Algerians to free Algeria and Indians to free India. He also offered examples of people connected by historical membership in a genetic pool, such as the Chinese, or of groups occupying the same territory such as the American people.

By contrast, Zionism was defined in terms of belief since “Zionists defined themselves merely as Jews, and declared to be Jewish anyone born of

a Jewish mother or—and that is absolutely crucial fact—anyone who converted to Judaism. Which is to say, in the terms of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. . . regardless of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin.”⁵³

In other words, Moynihan was showing that Zionism, a form of nationalism, or “to use the current nomenclature, a national liberation movement,” was not only “no more racial and no more discriminatory than other movements of this type,” but even less discriminatory since it defined its members not in term of birth but of belief, as noted by Ruth Lapidot, a professor of international law and for several years the legal adviser of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁴

Most of the countries supporting the ZR equation apparently did not really believe that Zionism was racism or racial discrimination in the sense of Article I of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, as Kuwait tried to establish. Some claimed that Zionism was close to racism, had close relations with the apartheid regime of South Africa, and that by its dealings with the Palestinians, was tantamount to racial discrimination. But they did not really claim that Zionism was racism. Most of their arguments were of a different nature.

First and foremost, they questioned the legitimacy of Zionism as the national movement of the Jewish people, since the Jews were merely followers of Jewish faith and not an authentic nation.

Jamil M. Baroody was a talented and veteran diplomat of Palestinian origin and of a fiery disposition, who for years represented Saudi Arabia at the U.N. He claimed that the Zionists wanted “to set the pendulum of history back and make a people out of a religion. You cannot do that. A people consist of those who belong to the same geographic region, who have common interests, who usually have a common language and a common way of life. That is what constitutes a people.”⁵⁵

Taher Al Hussamy, the representative of Syria, took a slightly different line. In his eyes, the pretension of the Zionists to assert the peoplehood of the Jews was the product of their racist mentality! “The Zionists’ claim that they represent the Jews of the world, and that the latter were subjected to discrimination in the countries where they lived, was the product of their racist mentality, which led them to believe that other peoples practised racism and racial discrimination as they did. Religion did not constitute a nationality in itself; it was one of the many factors and bonds which shaped a nation. There were Muslims in various parts of the world, and no one claimed that they constitute a nation.”⁵⁶

For Sherif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, the representative of Jordan, Zionism was a negative and hostile reaction “based on the same negative premises on which anti-Semitism was predicated, namely that Judaism should constitute the basis of a distinct national identity, that it should be exclusive and in a

necessary relationship of hostility with its environment. Zionism emerged as a call to the Jews not to seek their future in universal brotherhood but in a perverted national chauvinism.”⁵⁷

The second argument in support of the resolution was that the Zionist political movement was exclusive and segregationist, since it was premised on presumptuous concepts such as the “chosen people of God” for “the promised land by God.”

Here, Baroody’s remarks were the most cutting ones.

*“When the Zionists contend that they do not want to live side by side in a binational or any other state because they are exclusive and God gave them Palestine—since when was God in the real estate business, my good friend Mr. Moynihan? Show us the title deed. And since when did He give Mr. Balfour and Mr. Truman powers-of-attorney to transfer land that does not belong to them—land that was populated by people who, some of them at least, had at one time been Jews and who embraced Christianity because they got fed up with some of their rabbis, our rabbis who were fundamentalists? Does God parcel out land? . . .”*⁵⁸

*“I should not say that it is a great shame that you should engage in such diatribes against seventy-two nations which to the best of their knowledge, thought that the Zionists had gone too far—their exclusivity; the chosen people of God, as if God discriminates and chooses one people. That is what we are fighting here: discrimination. . . .”*⁵⁹

*“Yet Zionism would gather in, if it could, 16 million Jews dispersed all over the world, many of whom have identified themselves with their country of birth or of adoption and have done very well for themselves in the field of business or science or culture. Yet the Zionists still want to claim them as an exclusive people because they practise Judaism, maintaining they should be ‘enfolded’ in Palestine, because God gave them Palestine—although I do not think that any of the Zionists have direct or indirect communication with God Almighty.”*⁶⁰

Jordan held similar views, arguing that it was not possible to exclude from the category of racist ideology an ideology which professed implicitly or explicitly, racial and religious superiority.⁵⁷ For its part, Ukraine claimed that Zionism was based on the alleged superiority of one race,⁶¹ while Brazil also invoked the term “exclusivistic,” but conferred on it a substantially different meaning:

The “Brazilian vote means that we do not support Zionism as a ra-

cial and exclusivistic doctrine. Brazil does not wish to be led to acquire, contrary to its national traditions, any kind of racism, be it in sophisticated forms or by the simple ignoring of reality. . . in Brazil the phenomenon of separation or segregation of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities is non-existent. It would therefore be displeasing to Brazilian citizens to recognize that in their midst some might feel closer links to their race or to the country of their ancestors than to Brazil itself.”⁶²

The third accusation against Zionism was its implicit colonization and expulsion of the indigenous population and the refusal to recognize this population’s basic human and national rights. This was proffered by both Arab and non-Arab countries such as Dahomey, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Pakistan and India. Dahomey, for instance, explained that although it respected Judaism and had nothing against the Jewish people, which had suffered Nazi atrocities, it rejected Zionism as a racist expansionist ideology in its practices since it was “not normal that after having left this land so many centuries ago the Jewish people should return to it, thanks to the U.N. and, by a stroke of irony, relentlessly expel the indigenous inhabitants.”⁶³

Arab states throughout the debates focused their grievances on what they considered discriminatory laws such as the Law of Return and the nationality law. Ibrahim Ali Badawi, the representative of Egypt, pointed out that under Israel’s Law of Return any Jew who went to Israel could obtain Israeli citizenship, but the same right was denied to the Palestinians Arabs.⁶⁴

Kuwait similarly offered that a country in which “there is a law called the Law of Return, permitting a Jew who has never been in Palestine to return, and a policy prohibiting a Palestinian from actually returning to his home, both on the basis that the first is a Jew and the second is a non-Jew,” should be labeled as racist and not considered a democracy.⁶⁵

The fourth argument was that Israel practiced discrimination against both Jews (of Oriental origin) and non-Jews (Arab Israeli citizens). According to Kuwait’s representative, “The non-Jew who has not been pumped out—or not yet been pumped out—of the Judenstaat suffers disability, de facto inequalities which if suffered by Jews in any other country, the Zionists would be the first to call anti-Semitism. But when the Jew, in the name of Zionism and in the name of the Judenstaat, inflicts that same disability, that same inequality on the non-Jew we are told that this is not racism, this is not racial discrimination.”⁶⁵

Finally, various countries which supported the ZR equation did their utmost to prove that their opposition to Zionism could not in any way be construed as anti-Semitism. Since, in their eyes, Zionism was not coextensive to Judaism and to the Jewish people, anti-Zionism could not be anti-Semitism, they argued.

Kuwait's Al Sayegh did his best to present the Arabs' positive view of Judaism while rejecting the claim that Zionism was the same as Judaism:

*"We in the Arab world, be we Christian Arabs or Muslim Arabs or Jewish Arabs, have nothing but reverence for Judaism as a faith, Judaism as a religion, Judaism as a tradition of religious and spiritual values. We revere Judaism as Christians, whose Christ proclaimed that He came to fulfill and not to destroy. We revere Judaism as Muslims, whose faith teaches us respect and veneration for all the prophets of Judaism. We reject the claim of Zionism to be coextensive with Judaism. We reject the claim of Zionism to be coextensive with the Jewish people. And therefore we reject the claim of Zionism that to be anti-Zionist is to be anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic."*⁶⁶

Iraq further refined this argument, positing that anti-Semitism was not in the interest of the Arabs, but profited the Zionist movement and the State of Israel most:

*"The Arabs had nothing to gain and much to lose from it and the Jews certainly did not profit from it. But what about the Zionist movement and the Zionist State of Israel? The representative of Israel had stated at the 2117th meeting that anti-Semitism was the raison d'être of the Zionist movement; if anti-Semitism disappeared, political Zionism would become redundant, and immigration to Israel and also contributions to the Zionist movement, would come to an end. The assimilation of Jews into communities where they happened to be living was the greatest enemy of Zionism. The fact was that it was precisely political Zionism that the committee was considering: the discussion had nothing to do with cultural and religious Zionism."*⁶⁷

*... "Anti-Semitism as a basic tool of Zionism should be condemned as strongly as Zionism. If there was a roll-call vote on a draft resolution condemning anti-Semitism, the Zionist representative would find that his maneuver had failed; he would see that delegations could have different stands on anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, because they were two separate and different issues."*⁶⁸

The countries which did oppose the ZR equation defended their positions with several key arguments, aside from Moynihan's dismissal of the Kuwaiti claim. Their first major argument was that the equation of Zionism with racism was irrelevant and unfounded, since it rested on a manipulation. The French delegation, for one, insisted it would not be "misled by confused terms and confused thought nor be drawn into an insignificant game of

words. . .”⁶⁹ The delegation of Uruguay held the same view: “Even partisan fervor cannot justify these excesses, which will not stand up to the slightest historical and intellectual analysis. To equate Zionism with racism would be tantamount not only to diverting us from the item before us but also to confusing two entirely different concepts.”⁷⁰

UK Ambassador Richard was far more specific in spelling out the nature of the confusion: “We consider that to stigmatize Zionism as racism is, as the International Commission of Jurists has pointed out, to confuse racism and racial discrimination with nationalism. Such a confusion can serve only to undermine the right of the State of Israel to exist. . .”⁷¹

Second, several delegations, notably from Western Europe and Scandinavia, held that the ZR equation was false and should be rejected outright and unconditionally. The representative of the Netherlands, for instance, noted that the attempt to equate Zionism with racism was “a falsification of history and an attack on the integrity and existence of a people.”⁷² But generally these countries stated this position without spelling out their reasoning.

Here, as we have seen, Moynihan, the ardent, outraged and eloquent U.S. diplomat, stood out, baldly exposing the falsity of the ZR resolution.

“What we have here is a lie, a political lie of a variety well known to the twentieth century and scarcely exceeded in that annal of untruth and outrage,” he said. “The lie is that Zionism is a form of racism. The overwhelming clear truth is that it is not. . . Racism as defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is the ‘assumption that traits and capacities are determined by biological race and that races differ decisively from one another.’ It further involves a ‘belief in the inherent superiority of a particular race and in its right to dominate over others.’ That meaning is clear. It is equally clear that that assumption, that belief, has always been altogether alien to the political and religious movement known as Zionism.”⁷³

Third, opponents of the resolution argued it was an incitement and return to anti-Semitism. Australia asserted that the designation itself violated the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination. The Rev. Benjamin Nunez, representing Costa Rica, denounced the fundamental anti-Semitism of the ZR equation by quoting a letter sent to the secretary general of the U.N. by the leaders of the Catholic and Protestant Churches who had met in Memphis shortly before:

“To compare Zionism with racism is a calumny against the Jews and a return to the old anti-Semitism that was a scourge of mankind for centuries.”⁷⁴ In addition, Nunez warned the Arabs and the PLO that adopting the draft resolution, which he called “an unbridled invitation to genocide against the Jewish people and to reopening chapters of history of pain and persecution for that people,” would cause the biggest problems for its supporters.⁷⁵

Moynihan also underlined in the strongest terms the international

legitimacy given to anti-Semitism by UNGA Resolution 3379: "The abomination of anti-Semitism—as this year's Nobel Peace Laureate Andrei Sakharov observed in Moscow just a few days ago—has been given the appearance of international sanction. The General Assembly today grants symbolic amnesty—and more—to the murders of 6 million European Jews."⁷⁶

Moynihan also drew attention to the fact that the idea of the Jews as a race "was invented by the 19th century anti-Semites such as Houston Steward Chamberlain and Edouard Drumont who saw that in an increasingly secular age, which is to say an age which made for fewer distinctions between people based on religion, the old religious grounds for anti-Semitism were losing force. New justifications were needed for excluding and persecuting Jews, and so the idea of Jews as a race—rather than as adherents of a religion—was born. It was a contemptible idea at the beginning, and no civilized person would be associated with it. To think that it is an idea now endorsed by the United Nations is to reflect on what civilization has come to."⁷⁷

The fourth argument used by substantial number of delegations to try and frustrate the anti-Zionist initiative was to warn it would completely transform the planned Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination from a universally agreed upon program against apartheid into a "decade against Zionism."⁷⁸ Consequently, it would divert, alter and distort the original goals of the decade and seriously hinder its achievement.

Austria stressed that the introduction of elements unconnected with and totally alien to the noble cause of eradicating racism "*constitutes a tragic and meaningless aberration in our common effort, and can only have grave and disruptive effects on the organization. This attempt clearly distorts the original purpose of the decade and upsets the splendid record the Assembly and the Organization have achieved in their fight against racism and real racial discrimination.*"⁷⁹

Zambia went on to detail the adverse effects upon the decade:

"Resolutions relating to the decade and its program have so far been adopted mostly by consensus. The proceedings in the Third Committee and indeed, in the Hall this afternoon on the issue, show us all that this consensus will not be maintained once the draft resolution is adopted. We believe that there should be universal participation in the Decade Program to ensure widespread success in the fight against racism. Moves that may get in the way of universal support and participation cannot be welcomed. . . My delegation has taken this decision to abstain, albeit reluctantly, mainly on the basis of the fact that the question of Zionism is being linked to the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. We want this decade to succeed. We therefore cannot

be party to any action by the Assembly which could have the effect of defeating the very purpose of the Decade.”⁸⁰

Liberia expressed the same reluctance to break both the consensus practice and the unity of the African Group. It also speculated about the ostensible lack of interest by promoters of the decade in its success: “When the Decade was launched a few years ago, all the resolutions regarding the Decade were adopted by consensus. Consequently, the delegation of Liberia had fervently hoped that the tradition of voting by consensus would have been maintained. Unfortunately, and most regrettably, this draft resolution. . . completely shattered that tradition. Not only that, it also affected the unity of the African Group, which has always put a united front on all resolutions dealing with the Decade. Is this the intention of the sponsors?”⁸¹

Liberia’s representative did not hesitate to venture an answer to this question by observing that in all the brilliant and eloquent statements of these sponsors not a word was said about the Program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and that “it was completely overshadowed by the question of equating Zionism with racism. If a member of the racist regime of South Africa had been present at the meeting he would probably have danced with joy.”⁸¹

In a way, Liberia echoed the warning sounded during the debate in the Third Committee by the delegate of Barbados, W. Waldron-Ramsey, to whom Israeli diplomats had probably whispered one of the allegories he then used in his speech:

“The attempt to win support for those amendments had been defied by the African Group for two solid weeks because they had not contained any proof that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination. The defiance of the African Group was significant because it brought to mind the Old Testament chapter in which the prophet Daniel had been imprisoned in Babylon by the King Nebuchadnezzar. When the writing had appeared on the wall, Daniel had interpreted it for the King and told him that God had numbered the days of his kingdom and finished it. He had been weighed in the balance and had been found wanting. His kingdom had been divided.”

“In the same way,” the delegate continued, “the days of a certain group of states within the African Group were numbered. Their power and influence had been weighed in the balance and found wanting because draft resolution A/C.3/L.2159 was unworthy and had no place in any discussion of the question of the elimination of all forms of racism and racial discrimination.”⁸²

A fifth argument focused on the impact of the initiative on the United Nations itself and its fundamental values. According to Moynihan, who was the

most perspicacious and forward-looking in this respect, the ZR calumny would cause grave and perhaps irreparable harm to the cause of human rights and, in turn, to the independence of many U.N. member states which derived from this notion of human rights:

“The harm will arise first because it will strip from racism the precise and abhorrent meaning that it still precariously holds today,” he ventured. “How will peoples of the world feel about racism, and about the need to struggle against it, when they are told that that it is an idea so broad as to include the Jewish national liberation movement?”

“As this lie spreads, it will do harm in a second way,” he continued.

“Many of the members of the U.N. owe their independence in no small part to the notion of Human Rights, as it has spread from the domestic sphere to the international sphere and exercise its influence over the old colonial powers. We are now coming into a time when that independence is likely to be threatened again. There will be new forces, some of them arising and visible now, new prophets and new despots, who will justify their actions with the help of just such distortions of words as we have sanctioned here today. Today we have drained the word racism of its meaning. Tomorrow, terms like ‘national self-determination’ and ‘national honor’ will be perverted in the same way to serve the purposes of conquest and exploitation.”⁸³

Moynihan’s views were to be prophetic when applied later to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the country which had spearheaded the attack against Zionism and contributed perhaps more than any country to strip the meaning from racism.

It was left to Fiji and Israel to respond to the claim that the State of Israel practiced discrimination against both Jews and non-Jews. Semesa K. Sikivou, Fiji’s representative, tried to put in perspective such a sweeping accusation:

“How many representatives present here can truthfully say that racial discrimination, or tribal discrimination for that matter, is not practised in their countries? I suggest that the sponsors of the draft resolution may find some racial discrimination also, for example, in their respective countries’ immigration laws and aid programs, the allocation of job opportunities and job levels. A close examination of the practices and principles obtaining in our respective countries would, I suggest, reveal that most, if not all, of them have racial discrimination practised in some form or another. The only place I can think of that would be free from racial discrimination is the Kingdom of Heaven. All of us practise it in various forms and

shades, with South Africa as by far the worst and most extreme. Its government, its business and its society as a whole are riddled with it. That is why we must attend to racial discrimination as it exists in South Africa and not weaken our efforts by linking our endeavours with Zionism."⁸⁴

Ambassador Herzog answered the allegations by drawing an emphatically positive picture of Israel as a democratic and pluralistic society:

*"We in Israel have endeavored to create a society which strives to implement the highest ideals of society—political, social and cultural—for all the inhabitants of Israel, irrespective of religious belief, race or sex. Show me another pluralistic society in this world in which, despite all the difficult problems among which we live, Jew and Arab live together with such a degree of harmony, in which the dignity of rights of man are observed before the law, in which no death sentence is applied, in which freedom of speech, of movement, of thought, of expression are guaranteed, in which even movements which are opposed to our national aims are represented in our Parliament."*⁸⁵

Surprisingly, no delegation thought of invoking the restrictions in the same Article I, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which defined racial discrimination. This article stated that the Convention shall not apply to discriminations, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made between citizens and non-citizens. "Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of states. . . concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality."

Indeed, this could have helped to shed light on the Israel's legal system since, as emphasized later by Ruth Lapidot, "Israeli legislation does not impose any restriction on any particular group" and therefore stands within the letter and spirit of the Convention.⁸⁶

RESTATING THE TRUTH

Several delegations in addition to Israel, such as Barbados, Costa Rica, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the United States, did not rest with arguments against the sponsors of the ZR initiative or with pointing to disastrous consequences for both the decade and the U.N. These delegations took up the challenge of restating the essence of Zionism.

First, they explained that Zionism was a "Jewish way of thought which was intimately bound to Judaism."⁸⁷

Israel's Ambassador Herzog called Zionism synonymous with "Jewish homeland, symbolic of Judaism, of Jewish national aspirations."⁸⁸ It was a point he had stated and reiterated on several occasions in his various addresses before both the Third Committee and the Plenary.

"When one talked about Zionism, one was talking about an integral part of the Jewish religion," he said. "For 4,000 years the sanctification of Jerusalem and of Zion has been a basic tenet of the Jewish religion. There was nothing mysterious or sinister about the Zionist movement which based itself on Biblical Zionism."⁸⁹

In the Plenary, Herzog delivered what amounted to an eloquent and comprehensive treatise on Zionism and its Jewish roots:

"The key to understanding Zionism lies in its name. In the Bible, the easternmost of the two hills of ancient Jerusalem was called Zion. The period was the tenth century BC: in fact the name "Zion" appears 152 times in the Old Testament referring to Jerusalem. The name is overwhelmingly a poetic and prophetic designation. The religious and emotional qualities of the name arise from the importance of Jerusalem as the Royal City and the City of the Temple. Mount Zion is the place where God dwells according to the Bible. Jerusalem or Zion, is a place where the Lord is King according to Isaiah and where he has installed his King, David, as quoted in the Psalms."

"King David made Jerusalem the capital of Israel almost 3,000 years ago, and Jerusalem has remained the capital ever since," he continued. "During the centuries the term Zion grew and expanded to mean the whole of Israel. The Israelites in exile could not forget Zion. The Hebrew psalmist sat by the waters of Babylon and swore 'If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.' This oath has been repeated for thousands of years by Jews throughout the world. . . Every Jew, while praying to his God, faces toward Jerusalem. These prayers have expressed for over 2,000 years of exile the yearning of the Jewish people to return to its ancient homeland, Israel."⁹⁰

Second, Zionism's defenders argued the movement had been inspired by two forces, anti-Semitism and nationalism. In her remarks, Liberia's representative, [Mrs.] David Wilson, offered that it was "an historic fact that anti-Semitism gave birth to the Zionist movement" and mentioned several landmarks in the history of anti-Semitism.⁹¹

Costa Rica's Father Nunez, in turn, recalled that the supreme objective of the Zionist movement was not merely to reconstruct the Jewish state, but rather to solve the problem of the Jewish people:

*"The state it [Zionism] was to construct and that it constructed was only instrumental as a mean towards finding a solution to a wider problem. So long as there exist in the world manifestations and vestiges of anti-Semitism, the Zionist movement has a purpose to fulfill. . . I therefore believe that the anti-Semitic draft resolution. . . demonstrate quite clearly the need for the hard struggle that Zionism must still wage before it achieves its ultimate goals in favor of its Jewish people."*⁹²

Herzog also invoked the role of anti-Semitic persecutions in the development of the Zionist movement: "Zionism as a political movement was a revolt of an oppressed nation against the depredations and wicked discrimination and oppression of the countries in which anti-Semitism flourished."⁹³ But at the same time and in the same breath, he also mentioned the role of the ancient dreams and aspirations to return to Zion in shaping the Zionist movement: "The Jewish people organized the Zionist movement in order to transform its dream into reality."⁹³

Third, Israel's supporters argued Zionism was therefore an authentic rebellion against many centuries of oppression.⁹⁴ According to Moynihan's formulation, it was to these persons of Jewish faith a Jewish form of what today is called a national liberation movement.⁹⁵

For Herzog, the revived freedom of the Jewish people on its ancient land, and the re-establishment of Jewish independence in Israel after centuries of struggle to overcome foreign conquest and exile, "was the vindication of the fundamental concepts of equality of nations and of self-determination."⁹⁶

Nunez did not give in to the formulation "en vogue" and preferred to resort to a concept which was both more accurate and more relevant to Jewish history, that is the concept of national redemption:

"The Zionist movement represents the authentic rebellion of a people that, tired of persecution and insults for so many centuries and of participating in the revolutions of the world which freed other peoples, decided one day to start its own revolution of national redemption. The truth is that the Jews participated and sacrificed their lives in many revolutions for human freedom. They took part in the American Revolution, in the French Revolution and to a large extent in the Russian Revolution."

*"Let us now have the courage to say and acknowledge that they were betrayed by almost all revolutions, which were unable or did not wish to solve the Jewish problem, which represents the age-old suffering of an entire people. That is why they listened to the voice of their prophets who preached the return to Zion, that is why they rebuilt their State on the lands of Israel."*⁹⁷

Nunez's remarks strongly supported the idea of return, which had been invoked in positive though cautious terms during the debate in the Third Committee by the representative of Sierra Leone. B.S.A. Kamarake noted that the word Zionism was not unknown in his country and in other West African countries where it had been used in their early struggle for political emancipation:

"Thus authors and political scientists such as George Padmore, Edward W. Blyden I, Dr. Azikwe and the late Dr. Nkrumah had used the term 'Black Zionism,' which referred to a movement to encourage the return to Africa of displaced Africans whose forebears had been uprooted from their homelands and sold into slavery in many areas of the Western world, in particular the United Kingdom, the United States and the West Indies," he said.⁹⁸

At the time, he suggested, the world did not seem to have considered that the countries advocating Black Zionism were racist: "Rather, it had been considered that they were simply conscious of their race. Thus, Black Zionism had been looked upon in a positive sense."⁹⁸

The fourth line of argument was that Zionism also resonated deeply for people who were not Jews, as emphasized by the representative of Liberia:

"Zionism, as it is known to many Christians all over the world, has a deep spiritual meaning. The fact that the sponsors have ignored this particular aspect of Zionism is no surprise to us. The spiritual and moral aspect of Zionism was stressed a few days ago by Bishop Ralph Ward, President of the Bishops of the United Methodist Church. He said: Zionism means more than a political entity. It implies moral and spiritual values, characteristic of the Jewish people through the ages."⁹⁹

Nunez enlarged upon this by pointing to the general significance of Jewish national redemption for humankind. He urged the Jews not to be dismayed by this diabolical draft resolution, not to lose faith in mankind and to continue to fight for their sacred ideals and yearnings: "Nothing and no one can stop you, for your struggle for national redemption is not yours alone but that of all free men of goodwill. In your long history you have survived worse resolutions than this, and you will also survive this one. Do not lose faith or hope in a better world or in human decency. Let your children and the children of your children continue to set an example of heroic and constant affirmation of human dignity until the final redemption of the whole mankind."¹⁰⁰

Herzog added to this by recalling the role of the Jewish people over the centuries as the "testing agent of human decency, the touchstone of civilization, the crucible in which enduring human values are to be tested."¹⁰¹

Herzog's lucid and unyielding stand against the move to condemn Zionism and against Israeli and Jewish insensitivity and passivity made him

very popular in Israel and in the Jewish world, especially among U.S. Jews.

After the publication by the *New York Times* of excerpts of his address to the Presidents' Conference, he began to receive bundles of mail from Jews who castigated their leadership for their lack of national pride and lauded the Israeli ambassador for his dignity, pride and action.

This flow of mail intensified with Herzog's address before the Plenary of the UNGA, and its full broadcast three times on public broadcasting in New York. The flow lasted for two months, with letters arriving from all over the world both from Jews and non-Jews.

In all, the fight against the ZR equation was characterized by uncertainty and ambivalence. On the one hand, the passage of the resolution was felt as a very serious blow, though it was not yet clear even to its proponents what they would manage to achieve as a result of it. In spite of the small majority that the sponsors had garnered in support of the initiative there was no doubt that they considered it a major step forward, paving the way for the disappearance of the state of Israel. This conviction was strengthened by the fact that the very day Resolution 3379 was adopted, they also passed in the General Assembly Resolution 3376 (XXX), which set up a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. This was an important and concrete political, administrative and informational instrument to advance their aspirations.

On the other hand, there was a feeling of elation over the vote by the ZR opponents who had found the fight encouraging and even rewarding. It had helped strip away and lay bare the abysmal bias and corruption of the United Nations, and stirred renewed interest by the United States in the international body. In addition, it had presented for the first time the opportunity to bring about a split in the basic alliance between the Arab-Islamic bloc and the African bloc.

Finally, it seemed to have created new opportunities for Zionism in the hearts of the Jews. In Herzog's words, "The event did more for Zionism than Jews getting a million speeches from Zionist functionaries."¹⁰²

TABLE I
VOTING PATTERNS ON THE 7R RESOLUTION BY COUNTRIES

SIERRA LEONE MOTION 17 Oct. 75	A/C 3/L 2519 17 Oct. 75	BELGIUM MOTION 11 Nov 75	RESOLUTION 3379 11 Nov. 75
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1 Western (21)

Australia	Y	NO	Y	NO
Austria	Y	NO	Y	NO
Belgium	Y	NO	Y	NO
Canada	Y	NO	Y	NO
Denmark	Y	NO	Y	NO
Finland	Y	NO	Y	NO
France	Y	NO	Y	NO
Germany Fed Rep	Y	NO	Y	NO
Iceland	Y	NO	Y	NO
Ireland	Y	NO	Y	NO
Italy	Y	NO	Y	NO
Luxembourg	Y	NO	Y	NO
Netherlands	Y	NO	Y	NO
New Zealand	Y	NO	Y	NO
Norway	Y	NO	Y	NO
Portugal	NO	Y	Y	Y
Spain		Y	Y	-
Sweden	Y	NO	Y	NO
United Kingdom	Y	NO	Y	NO
United States	Y	NO	Y	NO
Israel	Y	NO	Y	NO

2 Latin America (26)

Argentina	A		Y	A
Bahamas	Y	NO	Y	NO
Barbados	Y	NO	Y	NO
Bolivia	Y		Y	A
Brazil	NO	Y	NO	Y
Chile	NO	Y	A	A
Colombia	Y	A	Y	A
Costa Rica	Y	NO	Y	NO
Cuba	NO	Y	NO	Y
Dominican Rep.	Y	NO	Y	NO
Ecuador	Y	NO	Y	A
El Salvador			Y	NO

	SIERRA LEONE MOTION 17 Oct. 75	A/C.3/L.2519 17 Oct. 75	BELGIUM MOTION 11 Nov 75	RESOLUTION 3379 11 Nov. 75
Grenada	A	A	A	Y
Guatemala	A		A	A
Guyana	NO	Y	NO	Y
Haiti	Y	NO	Y	NO
Honduras	A	A	Y	NO
Jamaica	A	A	A	A
Mexico	A	Y	Y	Y
Nicaragua	Y	NO	Y	NO
Panama			Y	NO
Paraguay			Y	A
Peru	NO	A	A	A
Trinidad & Tobago			Y	A
Uruguay	Y	NO	Y	NO
Venezuela	A	A	A	A

3 Eastern European (10)

Bulgaria	NO	Y	NO	Y
Byelorussia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Czechoslovakia	NO	Y	NO	Y
East Germany	NO	Y	NO	Y
Hungary	NO	Y	NO	Y
Mongolia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Poland	NO	Y	NO	Y
Romania	NO	A	—	—
Ukraine	NO	Y	NO	Y
USSR	NO	Y	NO	Y

4 Other Communists (5)

Albania	NO	Y	NO	Y
China	NO	Y	NO	Y
Kampuchea	NO	Y	NO	Y
Laos	NO	Y	NO	Y
Yugoslavia	NO	Y	NO	Y

SIERRA LEONE MOTION 17 Oct. 75	A/C.4/L.2519 17 Oct. 75	BELGIUM MOTION 11 Nov 75	RESOLUTION 3379 11 Nov. 75
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5 Arab League (20)

Algeria	NO	Y	NO	Y
Bahrain	NO	Y	NO	Y
Egypt	NO	Y	NO	Y
Iraq	NO	Y	NO	Y
Jordan	NO	Y	NO	Y
Kuwait	NO	Y	NO	Y
Lebanon	NO	Y	NO	Y
Libya	NO	Y	NO	Y
Mauritania	NO	Y	NO	Y
Morocco	NO	Y	NO	Y
Oman	NO	Y	NO	Y
Qatar	NO	Y	NO	Y
Saudi Arabia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Somalia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Sudan	NO	Y	NO	Y
Syria	NO	Y	NO	Y
Tunisia	NO	Y	NO	Y
United Arab Emirates	NO	Y	NO	Y
Yemen	NO	Y	NO	Y
Popular Yemen	NO	Y	NO	Y

6 Moslems (6)

Afghanistan	NO	Y	NO	Y
Bangladesh	NO	Y	NO	Y
Indonesia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Malaysia	NO	Y	NO	Y
Maldives			NO	Y
Pakistan	NO	Y	NO	Y

7 Africans (38)

Lesotho	A	A	A	A
Malawi	Y	A	Y	NO
Mauritius	NO	Y	NO	A
Swaziland	Y	A	Y	NO

	SERRA LEONE MOTION 17 Oct. 75	A/C.3/L.2519 17 Oct. 75	BELGIUM MOTION 11 Nov 75	RESOLUTION 3379 11 Nov. 75
Botswana	Y	A	Y	A
Burundi			NO	Y
Cameroon	NO	Y	A	Y
Cape Verde	NO	Y	NO	Y
Chad	NO	Y	NO	Y
Central Afr. Rep.		-	—	NO
Congo	NO	Y	—	Y
Dahomey (Benin)	NO	Y	NO	Y
Equatorial Guinea		—	NO	Y
Ethiopia	Y	A	Y	A
Gabon	Y	Y	A	A
Gambia	A	A	NO	Y
Ghana	A	A	Y	A
Guinea	NO	Y	NO	Y
Guinea-Bissau	NO	Y	NO	Y
Ivory Coast	Y	NO	Y	NO
Kenya	Y	A	Y	A
Liberia	Y	NO	Y	NO
Madagascar	NO	Y	NO	Y
Mali	NO	Y	NO	Y
Mozambique	NO	Y	NO	Y
Niger	NO	Y	NO	Y
Nigeria	NO	Y	NO	Y
Rwanda	Y	A	NO	Y
Sao Tome		-	—	Y
Sierra Leone	Y	A	Y	A
Senegal	NO	Y	NO	Y
Tanzania	NO	Y	NO	Y
Togo	A	A	Y	A
Uganda	NO	Y	NO	Y
Upper Volta	Y	A	Y	A
Zaire	Y	A	Y	A
Zambia	Y	A	Y	A
South Africa				

SIERRA LEONE MOTION 17 Oct. 75	A/C.3/L.2519 17 Oct. 75	BELGIUM MOTION 11 Nov 75	RESOLUTION 3379 11 Nov. 75
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8 Middle Eastern (5)

Greece				A
Cyprus	NO	Y	NO	Y
Turkey	NO	Y	NO	Y
Iran	NO	Y	NO	Y
Malta	NO	Y	NO	Y

9 Asians (11)

Bhutan			A	A
Burma	Y	Y	A	A
China	Y	A	Y	NO
Japan	Y	A	Y	A
Nepal	Y	A	Y	A
Papua	Y	A	A	A
Philippines	Y	A	A	A
Singapore	Y	A	Y	A
Thailand	Y		A	A
Taiwan	NO	Y	NO	Y
Sri Lanka	NO	Y	NO	Y

10 Summary

YES	45	70	55	72
NO	68	29	67	35
A	16	27	15	32
	18	16	5	3

TABLE II
VOTING PATTERN ON THE ZR BY BLOCS

	THIRD COMMITTEE SIERRA LEONE MOTION POSTPONEMENT				THIRD COMMITTEE ZR A/C.3/L.2159				ASSEMBLY PLENUM BELGIUM MOTION POSTPONMENT				ASSEMBLY PLENUM ZR RES./3379 (XXX)			
1) WESTERN (21)	19	1		1	2	19			21				1	19		1
2) LATIN AMERICA(26)	10	5	7	4	5	8	6	7	17	3	6		5	10	11	
3) EASTERN EUROPEAN (10)		10			9		1		9		1		9			1
4) OTHER COMMUNISTS (5)		5			5				5				5			
5) ARAB LEAGUE (20)		20			20				20				20			
6) MOSLEMS (6)		5		1	5			1	6				6			
7) AFRICANS (37) SOUTH AFRICA	13	16	4	4	17	2	14	4	13	18	3	3	20	5	12	1
8) MIDDLE EASTERN (5)		4		1	4			1	4	1			4		1	
9) ASIANS (11)	3	2	5	1	3		6	2	4	2	5		2	1	8	
10) TOTAL (142)	45	68		13	70	29	27	16	55	67	15	5	72	35	32	3

TABLE III
AFRICAN COUNTRIES HAVING CHANGED THEIR VOTES ON THE ZR

	SIERRA LEONE MOTION 17/10/75	A/C 3/L.2159 17/10/75	BELGIUM MOTION 10/11/75	RESOL 3379 10/11/75
MALAWI	Y	A	Y	NO (W,B)
MAURITIUS	NO	Y	NO	A (B)
SWAZILAND	Y	A	Y	NO (W,B)
BURUNDI	--	--	NO	Y (W)
CAMEROON	NO	Y	A	Y (B,W)
CEN. AFRICA	--	--	--	NO (B)
CONGO	NO	Y	--	Y (B,W)
EQUAT. GUINEA	Y	--	--	NO (W,B)
GABON	A	Y	Y	A (W,B)
GAMBIA	A	A	NO	Y (W)
GHANA	A	A	Y	A (B,W)
RWANDA	Y	A	NO	Y (W)
SAO TOME	--	--	--	Y (W)
TOGO	A	A	Y	Y (B,W)

14 COUNTRIES CHANGED THEIR POSITIONS:

- 2 FOR THE BETTER (B)
- 4 FOR THE WORSE AND THEN FOR THE BETTER (W,B)
- 4 FOR THE WORSE (W)
- 4 FOR THE BETTER AND THEN FOR THE WORSE (B,W)

NOTES

- (1) Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Suzanne Weaver, *A Dangerous Place*, London, Secker and Warburg, 1979, p. 172.
- (2) Third Committee, *Summary Records of Meetings, September 17–December 5, 1975*, United Nations, New York, 1976, 2117th meeting, September 30, p. 25. Hereafter, Third Committee.
- (3) Third Committee, op. cit., 2118th session, October 1, pp. 34-5.
- (4) Ruth Raeli, *The Steps that Led to the UNGA Resolution 3379: Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination*, November 10, 1975, World Zionist Organization, Department of Information, Research Section, Jerusalem, November 1984, p. 5.
- (5) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 159.
- (6) *New York Times*, October 9, 1975.
- (7) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 179.
- (8) Meron Medzini, Ed., *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1974-1977*, Vol. Three, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, p. 325.
- (9) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 173.
- (10) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 180
- (11) Third Committee, 2121st meeting, October 3, 1975, p. 52.
- (12) Third Committee, “ ”, pp. 53-4.
- (13) Third Committee, “ ”, p. 54.
- (14) Third Committee, 2122nd meeting, October 6, 1975, p. 57.
- (15) Third Committee, 2130th meeting, October 15, 1975, p. 93.
- (16) Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, 1975, p. 110.
- (17) Mr. Wilson, the representative of Liberia, noted with reference to the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.3/L.2159, “that resolution 77(XII) on the question of Palestine, had not been adopted unanimously; the governments of Ghana, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone had expressed reservations. The resolutions on the Middle East and the occupied territories had not been unanimously adopted either. Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, had expressed reservations. Zaire had voted against.” Third Committee, October 17, p. 115.
- (18) Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, p. 112.
- (19) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 181.
- (20) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 182.
- (21) Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, p. 115.
- (22) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 184. Quite curiously, this declaration of Chaim Herzog was not reprinted fully in the Records of the Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, pp. 117-8.
- (23) Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, p. 119. Cf. Also Ruth Raeli, op cit., p. 7.
- (24) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 183.
- (25) Third Committee, 2134th meeting, October 17, p. 119.
- (26) Goronwy Rees, “Column,” *Encounter*, January 1976, p. 30.
- (27) *Plenary Meetings, Official Records of the General Assembly*, Thirtieth Session, Vol. II, 2400th meeting, November 10, 1975, p. 772. Hereafter, Plenary Meetings.
- (28) Ruth Raeli, op. cit., p. 9.
- (29) Taped recording of the study day, “*Refuting the Zionism-Racism Equation*”, Jerusalem, November 11, 1984. CZA/S110/40.

- (30) Meron Medzini Ed, op. cit., p.340.
- (31) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 781.
- (32) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 782.
- (33) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 213.
- (34) *Newsweek*, November 24, 1975, p. 22.
- (35) Judy Siegel-Izkovitch, "A Day of Infamy," *Jerusalem Post*, November 8, 1975, p. 5.
- (36) Raeli, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
- (37) Raeli, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
- (38) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 789.
- (39) Tommy T. B. Koh's address to the Conference, "*Zionism is Racism: An Assault on Human Rights*", co-sponsored by B'nai Brith International, World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization. Hosted by the State Department, Washington, December 10, 1985. BBI, Washington, D.C. CZA/S110/26.
- (40) Interview with Chaim Herzog by Yohanan Manor, November 6, 1994. Also see *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 180.
- (41) Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Moyen Orient, *World Reaction to the U.N. Resolution on Zionism*, Geneve. 94 pages but without pagination.
- (42) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 189.
- (43) *Newsweek*, November 3, 1975. Interview with Leonard Garment.
- (44) Moynihan quoting J.H. Plumb, *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 190.
- (45) *New Statesman*, October 31, 1975.
- (46) Statement by Ambassador Herzog, permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations at the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, October 24, 1975, p. 8. CZA/S110/47.
- (47) Statement by Herzog, op. cit., p. 11.
- (48) Statement by Herzog, op. cit., p. 15-17.
- (49) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 795.
- (49a) Israel, Dahomey, Costa Rica, Liberia, Yugoslavia, Mauritius, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Canada, Kenya, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Australia, Zambia, Uruguay, Ireland, Fiji, France, Sweden, Italy, Chile, Iran, Kuwait, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, Dominican Republic, Austria.
- (49b) United States, Brazil, Japan, Pakistan, Colombia, Haiti, Ireland, Saudi Arabia and, again, Kuwait.
- (49c) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 795.
- (50) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 790.
- (51) *A Dangerous Place*, op. cit., p. 194.
- (52) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 796.
- (53) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 797.
- (54) Ruth Lapidot, *On Some Fallacies Concerning Zionism*, WZO, Information Department, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 2. CZA/S110/48.
- (55) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 804.
- (56) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 50.
- (57) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 105.
- (58) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 802.
- (59) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 803.
- (60) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 804.
- (61) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 25.
- (62) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 798.
- (63) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 777.
- (64) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 56.
- (65) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 790.
- (66) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 791.

- (67) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 101.
- (68) *Third Committee*, op. cit., pp. 101-2.
- (69) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 788.
- (70) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 785.
- (71) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 782.
- (72) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 784.
- (73) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 797.
- (74) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 778.
- (75) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 779.
- (76) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., pp. 795-6.
- (77) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 797.
- (78) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 782.
- (79) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 794.
- (80) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 785.
- (81) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 780.
- (82) *Third Committee*, op. cit., pp. 107-8.
- (83) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., pp. 797-8.
- (84) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 787.
- (85) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 775.
- (86) Ruth Lapidot, op. cit., p. 4.
- (87) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 100.
- (88) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 774.
- (89) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 104.
- (90) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 774.
- (91) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 780.
- (92) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 778.
- (93) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 774.
- (94) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 797.
- (95) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 797.
- (96) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 774.
- (97) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 778.
- (98) *Third Committee*, op. cit., p. 106.
- (99) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 780.
- (100) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 779.
- (101) *Plenary Meetings*, op. cit., p. 776.
- (102) *Jerusalem Post*, November 8, 1985.

CHAPTER III

A VERY DAMAGING RESOLUTION

The vote on draft resolution III by the Third Committee and afterward by the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly unleashed a huge and somewhat unexpected wave of protest in many parts of the world. Many viewed it as a singular and unprecedented action which shook the credibility and prestige of the international body to their core.

Indeed, for Abba Eban, former Israeli ambassador and foreign minister, the greatest surprise about the anti-Zionist resolution was "the depth, the ardour and the almost uniform sense of revulsion that it aroused. For the first time in history an international agency directed its criticism not against the policy of a State, but against ideas and articles of faith which are revered by one of the member-states and which have had an impact upon universal cultural history."¹

Outrage poured from North America, Europe, Latin America, Australia and even from Asia (India, Iran, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Singapore) and Africa (Kenya). And it came from all circles—Jewish as well as non-Jewish organizations and personalities: Christian bodies and human rights organizations,² intellectuals and Nobel Prize laureates,³ politicians and trade unions, governments and parliaments.⁴

The United Nations action was denounced in demonstrations, articles, cartoons, telegrams and declarations as obscene, hypocritical and disgraceful. The institution was assailed for the hatred and stupidity it had displayed, the perversion of its ideals, the treason of its vocation, its legitimation of anti-Semitism, its harm to the program against racism, its paralysis and ultimate demise as a productive organization.

This avalanche of worldwide condemnation had a paradoxical effect in shaping and even hindering the efforts to fight against the resolution for years to come. It inspired in some Israeli and U.S. officials and Jewish leaders a complacent but misplaced confidence that the ZR resolution ultimately would be exposed, even to its proponents, as an enormous blunder that would be impossible to sustain. In this light, the action was merely an ephemeral episode whose "inadvertent result" would be to strengthen Zionism and to weaken the United Nations, already at its lowest point of discredit.⁵

These subscribers had a strong tendency, even temptation, to minimize in any way possible the importance of the UNGA resolutions and to see them as some kind of vacuous ritual, adopted thanks only to the automatic majority

built around the Islamic, African and communist blocs, and devoid of real value. They viewed the United Nations as an unreal talkshop and the ZR resolution as "little more than a scrap of paper. It had no binding effect on any nation. . ."⁶

Conservative U.S. columnist William Buckley, for instance, called the United Nations "nothing but a powerless laughingstock." Hence, the ZR equation was to be treated accordingly with contempt and disregarded with disdain.⁶

Others held a different view. They insisted that this resolution was substantively different from the usual litany of slogans and slurs against the West, the U.S. and Israel. Andrei Sakharov, for example, a Nobel Prize laureate and renowned human rights activist, sensed immediately that the ZR resolution would give anti-Semitism the appearance of international sanction.

Some Western diplomats focused their concern on the impact of the resolution on Israel's future, and warned Israel to take it seriously.⁷ As British historian Paul Johnson later stated, they were mindful that "the real danger of the U.N. was that paper majorities tended to grow into real policies: the corrupt arithmetic of the General Assembly, where in the '70s votes could be bought by arms or even personal bribes to delegates, tended to become the conventional wisdom of society."⁸

In Israel on November 11, 1975, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made a statement showing he shared these diplomats' apprehensions over the danger to Israel inherent in the resolution. "Let us have no illusions," he said. "This is no matter of an abstract ideological debate, but an offensive with a definitively political significance and purpose, and as such it is unprecedented in the history of the struggle in which we have been engaged for decades. The purpose of the Arab representatives and their supporters is to place Israel beyond the Pale, to undermine the essence and foundation of Israel, so as to prepare the political conditions for the intensification of their struggle against its very existence as an independent state on its own land, to prepare the ground for the establishment of an 'Arafatist' state in place of the state of Israel and on its ruins."⁹

Publicly, the Arabs unanimously applauded the resolution, although in private there were Arab delegates who disagreed on its merits. The Arab media described the action as a great victory for the Palestinian cause and a crushing defeat for Zionism.¹⁰ Although not voiced explicitly, some Arab states, such as Libya, and naturally the PLO, viewed the ZR resolution not only as balancing the 1947 UNGA partition plan of Palestine, but also as a precursor of its possible reversal.

In fact, it was no secret that the PLO was already seeking to exploit the ZR resolution not only to try again to expel or suspend Israel from the U.N., but also and probably far more to win support for its actual "de-Zionization" and "deJudaization." Faruk al-Kadumi, head of the PLO's political depart-

ment, made this strategy plain in a statement to *Newsweek* magazine after the vote in the Third Committee and just before the vote in the Plenary. He said, "This Zionist ghetto of Israel must be destroyed" and replaced by a secular, democratic Palestinian state.¹¹

What the PLO had in mind was a "practical" scheme of repatriation of the Jews of Israel to their original homelands: Ashkenazi Jews to Europe and the Sephardic ones back to Arab countries. In fact, immediately after the adoption of the ZR resolution by the Plenary of the General Assembly, the PLO turned to the Arab countries asking them to reopen their gates to Jewish immigration.¹²

Of course, Western countries which opposed the ZR initiative and supported Israel obviously posed an obstacle to this plan. But the PLO was not deterred by this opposition. It appeared strongly convinced that the posture of European countries in particular was disingenuous and reversible since it stemmed from a guilt complex over the Holocaust. Consequently, the PLO and its allies waged an impressive propaganda and diplomatic campaign to try to convince Western and especially European public opinion to reverse its view and accept the de-Zionization of the state of Israel, that is, the dismantling of the Jewish state.

At the time, Rabin's insight was an exception in Israel. Foreign Minister Allon also took the ZR resolution seriously, but his main concern seemed to have been about its impact on the education of world youth, especially in the Third World.¹³ Most Israeli politicians and diplomats simply did not perceive the ZR resolution as a serious threat. Along with most of their colleagues in the Western world, they expected it to be shelved and forgotten, to fade away like a nightmare. But they were wrong.

The ZR equation was kept alive on the international agenda and was even reiterated several times. And its impact was to be even broader and deeper than expected by those few sensitive in the first place to its potential dangers. Above all, the resolution did become the "conventional wisdom of society" and turned Zionism into a metaphor for universal evil. Also, the improvement expected by some in the standing of Zionism among Jews did not really materialize. In fact, the resolution had the opposite effect on Jewry.

But, while the cumulative impact of the ZR initiative was far more negative than expected even by the most pessimistic, it also had an important and unexpected positive effect. It provoked the recognition by some Israelis that it was necessary to change Israeli policy and recognize Palestinian nationalism.

A PERSISTENT VILIFICATION

Again, instead of being swept under the rug and forgotten, Resolution

3379 was reiterated time and again, explicitly or indirectly by recalling other resolutions containing an explicit reference to the ZR equation passed at the United Nations and in other international organizations, wreaking substantial damage in the process.

Between 1975 and 1984, there was almost not a single year without the adoption of one or more such ZR resolutions. The following Table IV features a non-exhaustive list of such resolutions with an indication of the vote where available.

TABLE IV

ZR Resolutions adopted by International Fora, 1976-1984

				Yes	No	Abs
1976	UN Conf. on Human Settlement,	Vancouver,	indirect	89	15	10
1978	UN World Conf. to Combat Racism,	Geneva,	indirect	67	18	18
1979	UNGA, Inadmissibility of Hegemonism,	New York,	direct	111	4	26
1979	Non Aligned Movement, NAM	Havana,	direct			
1980	UN Women Conference,	Copenhagen,	direct	94	4	22
1980	ISMUN (Students Movement for the UN)	Geneva,	direct	34	3	
1981	Non Aligned Movement, NAM	New-Delhi,	direct			
1981	OAU, African Charter Human Rights,	Banjul,	direct			
1982	UNGA Living conditions of, Palestinian People (Ref.to Vancouver)	New York,	indirect	145	2	3
1982	UNESCO Conf. on Cultural Policies,	Mexico,	direct	45	29	75
1983	UN World Conf. to Combat Racism,	Geneva,	indirect	87	15	16
1983	UN sponsored International Conf. on 'The Palestine Question'	Geneva,	indirect			
1983	NAM Summit	New-Delhi,	direct			
1984	International Parliamentary Union,	Geneva,	direct	677	137	241

So, the ZR equation was kept on the agenda of the international community during the entire decade after its passage as Resolution 3379. And contrary to certain schools of thought, U.S. inattention to the resolution did not make it go away. Such a view did not take into account the numerous resolutions which reiterated Resolution 3379 each year,¹⁴ as stressed later by Richard S. Williamson, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for International Organizations Affairs.

The increasing majority of states supporting the condemnation of Zionism should also be noted. A first peak was reached in 1979 with 111 votes in favor of a resolution on the inadmissibility of the policy of

hegemonism in international relations. This referred to "racism including Zionism." In 1975, only seventy-two had been in favor! Moreover, this time the members of the European Community did not oppose the resolution, they merely abstained.

Chaim Herzog held that the 1979 vote highlighted the disastrous disarray of Israel's foreign policy. Israel's poor international standing, he charged, was the result of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan's inadequate attention to foreign affairs. "The vote in the UNGA last week, in which the Zionism-Racism libel was repeated, must sound the alarm because it highlights the shambles of our foreign policy," Herzog said. "The results of a two-and-a-half years of neglect, of lack of guidance, of an inability to appreciate the significance of certain international developments as they affect Israel, are only too self-evident. The explanation will always be given that in matters of foreign policy we were concentrating on the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, which obviously must occupy a central position. But the recent vote in the United Nations on the Camp David proposals and the Egyptian agreement only tends to emphasize the fact that even on this issue one cannot ignore world opinion."¹⁵

An even higher peak of anti-Zionist voting was reached three years later in 1982 in a resolution on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories. UNGA adopted it on December 20 with 145 votes, including all the European countries, with only 2 opposed [the United States and Israel]. The resolution recalled the Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements of 1976, which had stated that it was a "duty to take part in the struggle against all forms of racism and racial discrimination, referred to in resolutions adopted by the General Assembly."

The stiffening of the international posture against Zionism could be felt not only in the rise in numbers but also in the shift from rhetoric to more operative steps. At the U.N. mid-decade international women's conference in Copenhagen in July 1980, for example, the "struggle to eliminate. . . Zionism" was for the first time included in an operative document, "The Program of Action for the second half of the U.N. decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace." This reference meant that the units of the general secretary of the U.N., notably the Office of Public Information, would have to include the opposition to Zionism in their informational and promotional activities.

Some found evidence between 1975 and 1984 of an ebbing in the anti-Zionist tide, especially at the U.N. They pointed to the decline in the explicit reiteration of the ZR equation in spite of the concomitant increase in the indirect condemnation of Zionism.

One was James Jonah, deputy general secretary of the UN and secretary general of the Second World Conference to Combat Racism. He explained the trend was not a chance one, but the result of a deliberate and unanimous

policy of the African Group to include the support of the Western nations in the struggle against racism to ensure its success. This meant that, "even those regional groups that held strong views on the desirability of re-affirming that resolution, in the end voiced respect for the African consensus and refrained from insisting on language that would have implied re-affirmation of the resolution."¹⁶

By contrast, the by-now former U.S. ambassador, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, believed this change did not augur any improvement. He held that if the original formulation of the ZR equation appeared less frequently than before it was "because it has metastasized." The "disease," as he referred to the anti-Zionist trend, had spread throughout the language of the body politic, and it had to be recognized for what it was when it appeared under secondary and tertiary formulation, he said.¹⁷

In our view, it is Moynihan who had a correct grasp of the currents at the United Nation. There was no doubt there had been some slow-down in the explicit reiteration of the ZR by the United Nations General Assembly. But the ZR formula itself, with its explicit and what was becoming almost the "allant de soi," self-evident link between Zionism and racism, was reiterated time and again in oral and written form and disseminated worldwide through the mass media. In this way, it increasingly became the model for public opinion as well as for key constituencies such as students, scholars, liberals, intellectuals and journalists, with which to relate to Zionism. The ZR formula thus was fast on its way to becoming society's "conventional wisdom."

A METAPHOR FOR UNIVERSAL EVIL

The ZR equation in its different manifestations therefore contributed to the consolidation of a common international view on Zionism, first and foremost in the Third World, but also in the West.

Both developing and oil-producing Third World countries increasingly began to base their analyses of world affairs on a Zionist demonology. For instance, at its Havana Conference in 1979, the Non-Aligned Movement of about 100 countries from Latin America, Africa, Asia and even from Europe, not only outlawed Zionism as racism but condemned it as a crime against humanity! In the economic declaration in which the Non-Aligned movement called for the establishment of a new international economic order, some blame for economic injustice and other evils afflicting developing nations was leveled at "racism including Zionism."

In a study called, "The abuse of Zionism," issued in December 1981 by the London-based Institute of Jewish Affairs, Tony Lerman observed that Zionism was increasingly used as a term of abuse. He further pointed out that the sources of abusive references to Zionism were not confined to Arab states

and went far beyond references to Israel. In fact, this study found that since the passage of the UNGA ZR resolution, Zionism had taken on mythic proportions in international discourse as a global cause of most of the world problems. There was no doubt the negative use of Zionism was deep-rooted and was spreading.¹⁸

But this trend was by no means confined to Arab-Islamic countries and to the Third World. According to Lerman, there were signs that even states in the West previously sympathetic to Zionism were viewing the term with increasing caution and refraining from using it, and not only because of sincerely held disagreements with the policies of the state of Israel.

"If Third World countries, LDCs, oil-producers, non-aligned states, the Group of 77, the mass of U.N. members all equate Zionism with racism and continue to do so in every resolution, debate, speech and communique," Lerman wrote, "there are some Western industrialized countries who feel they cannot afford to ignore them and some who feel they should not. And if industrialized states, the armaments producers, the technologically rich countries are intent on dialogue with the 'have-nots,' in whatever form—Euro-Arab, North-South, rich-poor—they will be forced to listen not only to their problems of development, per capita income and balance of payments difficulties, but also to their analysis of world affairs."¹⁸

In the West, especially in its universities and campuses, Zionism became a major target of denunciation and vilification. In Britain in 1976-77, for example, eight student unions adopted ZR resolutions, in sheer contradiction to previously held policies not to deal with the Middle East.¹⁹ Subsequently, several student unions, such as those at York and Salford universities, decided to strike Jewish societies from their registers or to restrict their activities.²⁰

Other less formal but no less significant developments testified to growing anti-Zionist influence. At a private gathering in Jerusalem in 1983, Professor Martin Gilbert, a Fellow of Merton College and official biographer of Winston Churchill, illustrated how deeply the ZR equation had penetrated the intellectual elite in Britain. He mentioned a play about the dismal state of the Third World in which one of the actors asks the audience to name what is linked to racism that begins with a 'Z.' The loud reply is "Zionism." What made this example so telling was the fact that there was no connection whatsoever between Zionism and the subject of the play.²¹

Meanwhile, in some U.S. universities where students leaned to the extreme left or right, they refused to invite lecturers recommended by Jewish organizations on the grounds that most Jews are Zionists and, as Zionism is racism, Jews are racists. At the University of California at Riverside, Arab students prevented Jews from attending a program on racism on the grounds that "Zionism is a form of racism."²²

The trend began to balloon and win academic sanction. In September of

1983 at the Stonybrook campus of the State University of New York, Professor Ernest Dube, 56, a South African-born professor in the African Studies Department, included Zionism in a course on "the politics of race" as one of three forms of racism. The others were apartheid and Nazism. One of the research subjects he proposed to his students was "Zionism is as much racism as Nazism." He defended his calculation by invoking Resolution 3379.²³

In Canada, a Jewish group asked to join the anti-racist "Quebec contre Racisme," an organization founded by Yvon Charbonneau, the president of the teachers' trade union. It was denied entry unless it renounced Zionism. In 1982, the student organization in Ontario adopted a decision condemning the war in Lebanon and declaring: "The State of Israel is Zionism, Zionism is racism." It also decided not to admit Jewish students groups to its ranks, since they were presumed to sympathize with Zionism. Moreover, in the fall of 1982, the student federation at Ottawa University decided to prevent the Jewish student organization from meeting on the campus on the grounds that Zionism was racism.²⁴

Meanwhile, the U.N. resolution against Zionism was having "a destructive impact on the liberal left as well as on educational institutions," as observed by Isi Liebler, the chairman of the executive committee of Australian Jewry.²⁵ Radio 3CR, a station at the disposal of the "Socialist Left," the left wing of the Labour Party of Australia, forbade Jewish groups access to its airwaves on the grounds that Zionism was a form of racism.²⁶

Ehud Sprinzak, a professor of political science at the Hebrew University, noted the emergence of a new brand of respectable anti-Zionist literature, which he referred to as "a sophisticated front for vulgar anti-Zionism." It included books such as "Zionism: False Messiah" (1979) by Nathan Weinstock, "Non-Jewish Zionism" (1983) by Regina Shariff, "The Case of Israel" (1983) by Roger Garaudy and "Zionism in the Age of Dictators" (1983) by Lenni Brenner. All that these "respectable" writers did, according to Sprinzak, was to "scholarly inflate marginal aberrations and facts in Zionism's history. These deviations combined could then be easily presented as the sum total of the history of Zionism which in turn was shown to be a mischievous movement from its inception."²⁷

But this literature would provide a solid intellectual backing to the "inflated symbolic superstructure created by the Arab and Soviet propaganda machines and now backed by the U.N. and other international organizations. . . And for those who are not attracted by leftist literature, there exists today the school of historic Revision, which is trying to accomplish nearly the same thing on the right."²⁸

Although there is no research available to measure the actual impact and the degree of penetration of the ZR demonology in the political and cultural discourse of the West, one can find traces of important evidence. For example, there was the passage of a resolution at the 71st session of the Inter-

Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva in April 1984. A draft resolution submitted by Iraq reaffirmed the "right of all people oppressed by colonialism, racism, including Zionism and apartheid, to self-determination, independence, national sovereignty and equality, and the right to struggle in every way possible, included armed struggle, for the attainment of these rights." It was adopted by 677 to 137, with 241 abstentions. This time important segments of the Western European parliamentary delegations lent their support to it or abstained.²⁹

This erosion in Western opinion reflected a culmination of an anti-Zionist trend begun after the Six Day War and strongly propelled by Resolution 3379 and its offshoots. Professor Robert Wistrich, a graduate of Cambridge and London Universities, holding the Neuberger Chair of Modern European History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, described his view of the historical shift: "It has taken about fifteen years for midstream Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Conservative soft center of Western public opinion driven partly by political shifts in the Middle East itself and partly by slanted media coverage of these events to finally join the anti-Zionist bandwagon and lend a new respectability to what could once be dismissed as the ravings of the lunatic fringe. . . Distorted, inhuman stereotypes..have now penetrated the mainstream of the Western World, whereas previously they were exclusively the preserve of aggressive sectarian groups of the Far Right and Far Left, of the neo-Nazis, neo-Fascists, Anarco-Communists, Trotskyists, Maoists, or else of the pro-Arab lobbies, hard-line Stalinists, and Black Power Third Worldists."³⁰

The vilification of Zionism during this period turned into a permanent feature of international life. Zionism as a metaphor for universal evil became part of the "common knowledge" accepted or at least not contradicted by almost the whole international body politic.

This was a powerful impact not anticipated when Resolution 3379 was adopted. And it came not instead of but in addition to the consequences that were foreseen, including placing Israel beyond the pale and giving anti-Semitism international sanction.

Sprinzak has delineated three major types of injury caused by the ZR equation: the political one, the cultural and symbolic one and the psycho-personal one.³¹ In his scheme, the political damage refers to the harassment and isolation of Israel, but in reality its reach was far more extensive. The damage is therefore more aptly described as the "Delegitimization of Israel."

For Sprinzak, the cultural and symbolic damage of the equation refers to the introduction and activation of anti-Semitic stereotypes. Here again we would go further. A taboo was broken and a new justification was provided for the hatred of Jews and we thus prefer to define this type of damage as, "Providing a new Rationale for anti-Semitism." The third, the psycho-per-

sonal damage, refers to the tendency among Jews to feel unease over Zionism and Israel, and we shall call it "Restoring Jewish Anxiety toward Zionism."

THE DELEGITIMIZATION OF ISRAEL

There is no doubt that the vilification of Zionism, with its elevation to the status of a metaphor for universal evil and the international atmosphere of excommunication attached to it, was an important factor in the growing number of anti-Israel resolutions adopted each year by the United Nations. According to a report issued by the Heritage Foundation in October 1982, since 1967 nearly two hundred resolutions hostile to Israel had been adopted in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Commission on Human Rights. In recent years half the time of the Security Council and half the total of its resolutions have condemned the Jewish state.³²

A breakdown of this hostile trend reveals the following: the anti-Israel resolutions rose from four a year between 1969-1972, to sixteen a year between 1973-78, to a peak of forty-four in 1982.³³ Of course, there is a natural inclination to link this anti-Israel peak to the hostilities in Lebanon, labeled by Israel as "Operation Peace for the Galilee." However, it is doubtful that these numbers would have spiralled to such heights had it not been for the cumulative effect of Zionism's demonization. Already on February 5, 1982, several months before the war in Lebanon, for example, the U.N. General Assembly adopted an unprecedented resolution declaring that Israel's record and actions confirmed that it is not a peace-loving member-state.

There was also an increase in the virulence of these anti-Israel resolutions that seemed aimed at giving international legal sanction to placing Israel and the Jewish people beyond the pale. Israel systematically was being made into a pariah, according to Irwin Cotler, professor of law at McGill University in Montreal and chairman of the Canadian National Commission on Economic Coercion and Discrimination.

"And so it was that Israel was declared the enemy of the working people in the resolution of the International Labour Organization condemning Israeli suppression of trade unions, the enemy of health in the resolution of the World Health Organization condemning Israeli brutality in the occupied territories, the enemy of culture in the resolution of UNESCO (United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization) condemning Israeli desecration of historic rights, the enemy of human rights in the resolution of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights condemning Israeli practices in the occupied territories, and the enemy of women in the resolution of International Women's Year condemn-

ing Zionism as racism. In short, Israel is the enemy of mankind; Israel is the pariah of humanity."³⁴

In light of the above-mentioned UNGA resolution of February, 1982, Cotler might have added that Israel was also the enemy of peace!

This harassment kept Israel on the defensive and consumed a large portion of its resources in the conduct of its foreign policy. It effectively hindered Israel's efforts to resume and develop diplomatic ties with many countries, only deepening its isolation. Very often only the United States voted with Israel and in its defense. In fact, U.S. support was absolutely decisive in foiling all the recurring attempts to suspend or expel it from the United Nations. In such instances, the United States did not hesitate to threaten it would be forced to reconsider its membership at the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Such support was Israel's only source of comfort during these difficult years at the U.N., while at the same time it also underscored its isolation.

Some Americans, including Moynihan and Alan Keyes, a black intellectual who was an ambassador and assistant secretary of state for international organizations in 1985-87, have argued with some logic that the condemnation of Zionism as racism was a second-best strategy for those trying to expel or at least suspend Israel from the U.N. This effort, after all, was doomed to fail in the face of firm U.S. opposition.

But this argument is not entirely accurate. The condemnation and vilification of Zionism must be seen not merely as a substitute for the expulsion strategy. It was a variation and an extension of it by other means. And in a sense it was even worse. It called for maintaining Israel's formal membership in the U.N., while at the same time seeking to deprive Israel of the basic rights of a member state and of actual participation in U.N. activities. The practical consequence of such a strategy, as explained by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, a U.S. ambassador to the U.N. from 1981 to 1985, was "to deny membership by denying participation." Israel may have continued its formal membership but was de facto suspended or excluded from the U.N. and other international agencies. At the same time, there was constant pressure on the U.N. to invite the PLO to participate in them.³⁵

The vilification of Zionism therefore was not to remain a mere slogan but to be turned into a program for the delegitimization and the disappearance of the state of Israel. On more than one occasion Israel's representatives reported experiencing the humiliating feeling of irrelevance and impotence. They would not initiate draft resolutions, for instance, knowing full well that taking such initiatives would invariably result in their dismissal and rejection.

The process of delegitimization which involves ideological and symbolic manipulation has been analyzed thoroughly by Sprinzak, who has outlined this status of irrelevancy attached to it: "The loss of legitimacy effectively

means the loss of the right to speak or debate in certain forums. When a political entity is subjected to widespread delegitimization, whatever its spokesmen may have to say on a given concrete subject is perceived as irrelevant. They are no longer accepted as partners in legitimate discourse."³⁶

Since the creation of the Jewish state, the Arabs tried to bring about its delegitimization in the international community by resorting to propaganda, isolation, boycott, terrorism and war. For a long time they made no headway. But with Resolution 3379 and its ZR equation, and the numerous anti-Israel resolutions adopted in its wake, they managed to set in motion a process which called into question the entire legitimacy of Israel—as a state, as a regime and as a people! Through the condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism, the state of Israel had been “exposed” at the U.N. as a sheer aggression, an entity having only obligations, and deprived of fundamental rights. For in the balance hung not only the right to speak, to debate, to initiate and to propose draft resolutions, but also the very basic and natural right to self-defense and even the right to exist.

Sprinzak points to two degrees of illegitimacy. He calls the first delegitimization and applies it to a policy or a regime, for instance. He describes the second as dehumanization:

“The sovereign state of Israel which is the real target of the attacks on Zionism is now. . . no longer among the ordinary evil-doers of this world,” Sprinzak observed. “Israel is even worse than those countries that from time to time make the prestigious Amnesty International blacklist. Israel is presented today as a country in which these crimes are committed as part of an entire ideological system.”

Therefore, labelling Zionism as a kind of racism is much more than an attack on particular concrete policies of the Israeli government. It is the very notion of Zionism that is being derogated. For Sprinzak, “the conclusions are clear. Every war Israel has ever fought, including the War of Independence and the Six Day War, has been a racist war. Every military response to Arab terror has been a racist response. And of course every domestic law. . . is a racist one.”³⁷

Ambassador Kirkpatrick also has shown strikingly how the delegitimization of the “Zionist entity” led not only to the deprivation of Israel’s rights, but also to the freedom to attack it without constraint.

“Speech after speech, resolution after resolution inside the United Nations, reams of official propaganda produced inside the United Nations by the Committee on Palestinian Rights and all the other committees associated with it, describe the founding and existence of Israel as aggression. It is very important to understand that by defining the foundation of Israel as aggression, the intention is

clear: to brand . . . Israel's very existence as [a] crime against international law, utterly, totally lacking in legitimacy."

"Any Israeli effort to defend herself against attack is defined as unjustified aggression against the attacker. PLO firing into Israeli villages, for example, is ignored or justified as the legitimate right of a national liberation movement. But Israelis firing back is a serious threat against international peace and security, a crime against civilized society. This sounds like exaggeration, and yet it is not. It is necessary to listen to and to read the speeches and resolutions of the U.N. to understand the extent to which the campaign of delegitimization against Israel, the branding of Israel as an international outlaw, dominates the body."³⁸

Ambassador Keyes explained how the dehumanization of Israel was made possible at the U.N. through what he described as the elaborate machinery built around the concept of racism and its embodiment in apartheid. Such machinery was developed at the U.N., he said, for purposes of moral condemnation and delegitimization and acted as an "elaborate system for the dehumanization of certain peoples." Keyes emphasized that its proponents sought "to lead you to believe that the perpetrators of that evil are no longer subject to the protection accorded to human being who are members of the international community."³⁹

The isolation of Israel and the decline in its international standing therefore was not the sole and probably not the primary damage caused by Resolution 3379. Rather there was the process it had set in motion of Israel's delegitimization and dehumanization and the consequent collapse of its basic rights as a state and a nation.

PROVIDING A NEW RATIONALE FOR ANTI-SEMITISM

Some had predicted the ZR equation would have a notable impact on anti-Semitism, but its actual impact went far beyond anyone's imagination.

As foreseen by Sakharov, Herzog, Moynihan, Nunez and others, the U.N.'s anti-Zionist formulation first and foremost contributed to breaking a long-held taboo around Jews, providing anti-Semitism with renewed legitimacy and international sanction. It also signalled the revival of overt anti-Semitism, in words as well as in deeds. Above all, it filled a vacuum. It provided a justification and rationalization for anti-Semitism where there had been none for more than thirty years. And this development had not been foreseen.

After World War II, the revelation of the Shoah and the birth of the state of Israel, the shape of anti-Semitism had changed. Its overt expression was

discredited and even outlawed, and in many countries Jews and Jewish topics became taboo. "Since the end of the Second World War, the Jews of the West and to some extent also those of Eastern Europe, have been enjoying an almost privileged status: that of an accepted group, one wedged firmly into society, enjoying even a certain prestige thanks to the existence of Israel."⁴⁰

Here and there, there were sporadic outbursts of anti-Semitic incidents, notably in 1959 and 1960 with the "Swastika epidemic" which spread in many cities: Köln, Antwerp, Copenhagen, Glasgow, London, Milan, New York, Oslo, Paris, Parma, Stockholm, Vienna, Manchester, Athens, Melbourne, Perth, Bogota and Buenos Aires. But on the whole, anti-Semitism remained covert and latent, without any structured ideology or rationalization to justify it.

From the middle of the seventies, all this changed. Instead of sporadic explosions of incidents based on latent anti-Semitism, there was a steady yearly increase in the number and severity of these incidents. We have described this trend elsewhere, and even tried to quantify it.⁴¹ What should be emphasized here is the fact that after the adoption of Resolution 3379, there was no return to latent anti-Semitism. If in the past there was always a sharp decrease in anti-Semitic incidents after a particular flare-up, this was no longer the case. While, from time to time there was a decrease in the number of anti-Semitic incidents, it was only a marginal one in the midst of a trend toward a sharp rise in such incidents.

This shift was not confined to the realm of incidents and deeds, however, but was also found in social discourse. In 1982, Nathan Perlmutter, national director of the Anti-Defamation League and a vice president of Brandeis University, recounted an incident that reflected a changing climate in the United States:

"I got a call from Louis Lapham, the former editor of Harper's. . . He called because he had this notion running through his head that over the last two or three years people in social gatherings he's attended have been far more apt uninhibitedly to say something that is anti-Semitic, or tell patently anti-Jewish jokes. And I found myself telling him that in the last two or three years, he's the fourth or fifth journalist who has said the identical thing, that she or he hears more and more a kind of freedom in expressing views that are clearly anti-Semitic."⁴²

New anti-Israel heights were reached in the reaction of the Western media to the Israeli action in Lebanon and the subsequent siege of Beirut. Jews all over the world were not only saddled with the responsibility of Israel's deeds but became targets for unbridled anti-Semitic slurs and defamatory statements.^{42a}

A similar trend could be observed at the United Nations, begun with its

refusal to condemn anti-Semitism, indeed, even to discuss and deal with it. It was a trend protested by Judge Hadassa Ben Ito, Israeli representative to the UNESCO Assembly in November of 1982. Ben Ito recalled in her address that the main impetus for the United Nations commitment to draft declarations and conventions against racial and religious discrimination was the above-mentioned "Swastika Epidemic." But, she chastised, the United Nations had abandoned its original program.

"... Little by little, the evil of anti-Semitism has been excluded and deleted from all resolutions and instruments of the United Nations," she said. "We are all aware that anti-Semitism exists to this very day, raising its ugly head at any slight chance. Jews are still singled out today as Jews, to serve not only as targets for religious and cultural discrimination, but also as the victims of murderous attacks within the sanctity of prayer-houses. But is anti-Semitism mentioned in the halls of the United Nations? Is it mentioned here? Not the practise of anti-Semitism, but the mention of it has become unacceptable. It is legitimate to mention and condemn any form of discrimination, but the one which caused the Holocaust."

Several times, Israel officially protested anti-Semitic statements made by official representatives of member-states, especially during the U.N. General Assembly. Official letters of complaint were dispatched to the U.N. secretary general in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by Israel's permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Yehuda Blum, as well as by U.N. Ambassador Binyamin Netanyahu in 1985. They asked for urgent attention to the ominous upsurge of anti-Semitism at the United Nations.⁴³ On December 9, 1983, U.N. Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar responded by expressing publicly his regrets for the "use of epithets and slurs of a racial, religious or personal nature."⁴⁴

The U.N.'s permissive attitude toward anti-Semitic expression was traced by many to the ZR equation. "Resolution 3379 has encouraged a willingness to use anti-Semitic rhetoric, utter egregious religious and racial slurs, or attempt anti-Jewish actions,"⁴⁴ said Michael Curtis, professor of political science at Rutgers University. As evidence, he pointed to the unsuccessful effort by the Arab states in April 1982 to suspend six of the seven Jewish NGOs from the Committee of Non-Governmental Organizations of the General Assembly.

Leon Hadar, the *Jerusalem Post* correspondent in New York, described in detail the rationales of the Arab and Soviet delegates on this committee.

The Iraqi delegate explained his country's position: " 'You see we are against Zionists and Jews.' Then, conscious that he has committed a faux pas, he 'corrects' himself: 'Not against all Jews, but against Zionists.' The

man on the receiving end of the Iraqi diplomat's explanation was Dr. Isaac Lewin, who represented Agudat Israel at the hearing. What aroused the intense suspicion of the Arab and Soviet blocs delegates was, of course, the fact that the word "Israel" in the organization's title. The Soviet delegate on the committee made the extraordinary gibe that the organization's title indicates its singular interest in Israel. Lewin recalled the Agudat's anti-Zionist past and pointed out that its two main leaders not live in Israel. "But that did not satisfy the Soviet and Arab delegates. The former demanded to know his views on 'conditions in the occupied territories' and the latter wondered about Lewin's connections with Zionist organizations. Lewin managed to infuriate the Iraqi by saying, in answer to a question, that his organization did not consider Zionism a form of racism. . . 'What is the point of sitting here if a General Assembly resolution is wrong? I hope Mr. Lewin would change his ideas,' the Iraqi delegate burst out. And his Soviet counterpart added that since there are several Jewish organizations 'about whose reports similar questions might be raised, the committee might perhaps postpone taking a decision on their reports'—a step which. . . would effectively suspend their activity in the ECOSOC."⁴⁵

A thorough examination of the anti-Semitic impact of the ZR equation on the U.N. was carried out in April 1986 by the "International Legal Conference on Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N.," convened under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at the School of Law of New York University. The conference was attended by forty-four international law scholars and practitioners from eleven countries. It found in the records of the United Nations statements containing anti-Semitic imagery and language manifesting hostility to Judaism, the Jewish people and Jews as such, and reached the conclusion that such anti-Semitic expressions violated the general principles of international law."⁴⁶

Yoram Dinstein, Yanowicz Professor of Human Rights and pro-Rector of Tel-Aviv University, was one of the initiators of this conference. He observed that at the United Nations there was a "slippery slope leading from anti-Israelism, through anti-Zionism, to anti-Semitism" and that the most pernicious aspect of anti-Zionism in the U.N. was not the ZR resolution per se, but the open propagation of anti-Semitism:

"Anti-Semitic statements should be judged not only as intolerable acts of commission (on the part of the speakers), but also as inexcusable acts of omission (on the part of the audience)," Dinstein said. "The fact of the matter is that when the statements are made, other delegates do not intervene on a point of order, the presiding officer does not rule that the speaker has overstepped permissible bounds, and the U.N. secretary general (or his representative) does not advise the presiding officer to issue such a ruling. To top it off, patently anti-Semitic statements are not expunged from the public records of the U.N. This is the main reason why in the mind of many people

the whole organization has become tainted with anti-Semitic poison which is allowed to flow freely within its halls."⁴⁷

Resolution 3379 thus was decisive in breaking the taboo which had contained anti-Semitism as latent and unspeakable, described brilliantly by Bernard Henri Levy, an outstanding member of a group known as the New Philosophers in France, and an ardent fighter for human rights, notably in Afghanistan:

*"Now at last, very gradually, through tiny slips of meaning within these drifts of language and words, the taboo is being broken. Ideas, subjects, pictures, speeches which until very recently were unacceptable, inadmissible, liable to legal procedure or to universal reprobation. . . are gradually and quietly becoming acceptable and admissible. . . They are building the portrait of a shameful people, a satanic people, so that the portrait of this abominable people, universally loathed, is literally once more and more explicit, and more and more official the portrait of the Jewish People as such."*⁴⁸

But Resolution 3379 had even more far-reaching consequences than helping break the taboo and providing an opportune and timely guise for anti-Semitism. It posited a new "rationale" for anti-Semitism. Now the overtly expressed excuse for anti-Semitism was not religious, philosophical, economical or racial, as had been the case in the past. Now it was political. Now the wholesale indictment of the Jewish People and of Judaism was brought by contesting and refuting the Jewish state and the national movement that was its *raison d'être*.

French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut explained the trend: "Today everything has been turned upside down. The accusation against us now is based on our solidarity with Israel, and it is the Zionist inside us who is forced constantly to justify himself. . . If we, Jews, are accused of anything, it is of Israel. Israel is, in fact, the element which makes us all guilty."⁴⁹

During the decade following the adoption of the ZR equation, a compelling need surfaced for the haters of Jews to have at their disposal some "ideology" to justify this otherwise inexplicable surfeit of hate. Since World War II, there had been a vacuum, less due to the absence of anti-Semitic ideologies than by the loss of credibility of their various and successive rationalizations: deicide, obscurantism, embodiment of capitalism and racism.

Anti-Zionism, based on the ZR, was now filling the vacuum. It was offering a new rationalization and, above all, a brand new credibility to anti-Semitism. Its rationale was the fundamental lack of morality and the total illegitimacy of the Jewish state because of the ZR equation. Whereas old-style anti-Semitism sought Jewish genocide, new-style anti-Semites sought Jewish politicicide.⁵⁰

Nowhere would Resolution 3379 have as powerful an impact as it would in the USSR and nowhere was the ZR rationalization to be used as it was in the USSR. Indeed, the fall of 1974 in the USSR marked a new stage in the "anti-Semitic propaganda drive masquerading as anti-Zionism," according to William Korey, a Sovietologist and director of policy research of the International Council of the B'nai Brith in New York. Korey was referring to a secret directive entitled "Plan of Measures to Strengthen Anti-Zionist Propaganda and Improve Patriotic and National Education of Workers and Youth." It had been issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and sent to every party district in the USSR for its implementation.

For Korey, what was missing was the kind of moral sanction that could provide ideological legitimacy to the campaign which had clear anti-Semitic overtones. There was discouragingly little in the subject of Zionism in the sacred writings of Bolshevism's founding fathers, including Lenin, to offer a justification for the media drive. On the other hand, the U.N. "resolution could offer a rationalization for virulent anti-Zionism that was international in character and that [sprang] from the single most prominent global institution."⁵¹

Resolution 3379 therefore provided an authoritative ideological underpinning and moral legitimization for anti-Semitism. After the vote in the Third Committee, but far more so after the adoption of the ZR resolution by the Plenary of the General Assembly, the Soviet press launched a "monumental effort" lauding the action for putting "Zionism in the pillory."⁵² The most important statements were reserved for three key Soviet organs: in March 1976, in *Sovetskoya 'gosudarstvo i pravo*, the organ of the legal profession; in April, in *Agitator*, the organ instructing party propagandists, and in December in the government organ, *Izvestia*.

In the first one, an article was published entitled, "A Justified Decision." It equated Zionism with the "mad Nazi theories of the superiority of the Aryan race," arguing that Zionism was based upon the "exclusivity and the God-chosenness of Jews" and that it conceives of a world Jewish nation which is "racially pure" and "chosen by God."⁵³ The following year, the prestigious Soviet Academy of Sciences joined in this drive in publishing an extraordinarily tendentious and distorted work called "International Zionism: History and Politics." This posited that Zionist ideology and politics were characterized by racism and chauvinism as described by the resolution adopted by the General Assembly.⁵⁴

From 1975 on, the ZR resolution became the inevitable justification for the massive anti-Zionist campaign carried out in the USSR in dozens of books (more than fifteen such books per year!), thousands of articles and cartoons, numerous radio and television programs and public lectures.

All this anti-Zionist matter was packed with basic anti-Semitism and harped on the themes of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion." In this scheme

the "Zionists" or "International Jewry" invariably were seeking world domination, using the rationale that they were the "chosen people." Vladimir Begun's book, for instance, "Invasion without Arms," (1977) stated that the Old Testament was a text unsurpassed in its bloodthirstiness, hypocrisy, treachery, perfidy and moral degeneracy, and that "Zionist gangsterism . . . has its ideological roots in the scrolls of the holy Torah and the precepts of the Talmud."

This anti-Zionist campaign generated a climate more conducive to overt discriminatory acts against Jews, notably restricting their access to higher education. By the academic year 1976-7, the enrollment of Jews had plummeted to almost one-half of what it had been seven years earlier. At the major universities admission of Jews has been reduced to either zero or, at most, a handful.⁵⁴ Resolution 3379 was also officially invoked by the Soviet authorities to try and condemn the renowned "refusenik" Anatoly Sharansky.

To our knowledge the only other places where the ZR resolution was used to justify discriminatory measures against Jews were Britain and Canada. In the above section, "A Metaphor for Universal Evil," we have already noted the impact of the ZR resolutions on UK campuses. What is less known is that some of these resolutions were used to justify discriminatory steps against societies of Jewish students in the United Kingdom.

In the aftermath of Resolution 3379, the rule of giving no platform to racism was used against Jewish student societies. During the spring of 1977, anti-Zionist motions equating Zionism with racism were adopted by eleven British student unions, some of which were used afterwards to deprive Jewish societies of access to union facilities.

In April 1977, for instance, the Jewish student society of Salford University, near Manchester, applied to the student union for permission to hold an Israeli cultural week and sponsor various speakers. A specific request was made of the student president, John Owen, for permission for a rabbi to speak on the relationship between Zionism and Judaism. "It would be all right to speak about the differences between the two but not about the links," Owen replied. The facilities of the union then were not made available for the rabbi!⁵⁵

In January 1985 at the Sunderland Polytechnic in England, the student union approved again a resolution adopted in 1982 equating Zionism with racism. Afterward, the union refused to recognize a Jewish student society. It argued that among its officially declared aims, which were to promote a greater understanding of the Jewish religion, culture, people, the State of Israel and Zionism, the last one was contrary to the student union policy against giving a platform to racism.⁵⁶

In the autumn of 1983 the executive committee of the student union at the University of Ottawa, Canada, barred Jewish student organizations from its

facilities on the grounds that they were Zionists, hence racists and hence disqualified from using the common rooms.⁵⁷

From all these examples, it does not seem excessive to conclude the ZR resolution had a decisive role in the revival and transmutation of anti-Semitism.

RESTORING JEWISH ANXIETY TOWARD ZIONISM

We referred earlier to the substantial decrease in Jewish opposition to Zionism, especially in light of Israel's ability to survive and triumph over the ceaseless attacks launched against it by its inflexible adversaries. But there was a notable change in Jewish opinion under the pressure of the global defamation campaign carried out against Zionism after the Six Day War, which peaked with Resolution 3379 and during and after the 1982 war in Lebanon.

Without scientific research, it is difficult to assess the actual impact of the international vilification of Zionism on Jews. But it is irrefutable that the campaign managed to supplant the positive image they had of Zionism as a legitimate movement of national liberation with a negative image. Zionism, in short, had been turned into a dirty word and this markedly affected overt Jewish identification with it.

American Jewish commentator Norman Podhoretz, the editor of *Commentary* magazine, viewed the impact of this phenomenon as potentially dangerous but limited: "... From a strictly political point of view, the resurgence of Jewish anti-Zionism is at the same time relatively unimportant because it influences only a small minority of Jews, but it is potentially dangerous because it lends a highly visible measure of added plausibility to the campaign against the legitimacy of Israel."⁵⁸

In the eyes of Hebrew University political scientist Ehud Sprinzak, the impact would be far greater, affecting the willingness and ability of Jews to challenge the anti-Zionist propaganda, identify with Zionism and defend its image and ideals:

"Especially within progressive and leftist intellectual circles it has recently become uneasy to identify with Zionism. There exist psychological inhibitions from overt association with that ideology which was once a symbol of a genuine liberation movement. This psychology of anticipated inhibition is especially identifiable among Jewish and Israeli students who attend universities with [a] vocal Arab presence or extreme Left associations. In such anti-Zionist climates it is sometimes preferable not to have one's professor know of one's association with Zionism. The same is true for certain trade unions and other professional associations that

have been taken over by strong anti-Israel forces. The incremental result of the psychopersonal pressures is that many Jews feel badly about the whole thing. Israel may remain part of their collective identity but they do not want to hear about Zionism.”⁵⁹

An even more pessimistic calculation was made by Ruth Wisse, a professor of Yiddish literature at McGill University, Montreal. She observed:

“Distinct signs of demoralization among some Jews nowadays, a growing sense of confusion, a loss of confidence in Israel’s meaning, a mood of defeatism that finds frequent expression in the word ‘tragedy.’ One hears among Jews (not among Arabs) about the tragedy of Zionism, the moral tragedy of the Jews, the tragedy of



Seeking Support. Eli Eyal (right), Chairman of the Information Department, WZO, meets with Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 1982, and receives Mr. Begin’s blessing for convening the international conference “Anti-Zionism: A Threat to Democracy.” Looking on, Yechiel Kadishai, Secretary to Mr. Begin.

*Israel's success! There are also hints of apocalyptic doom. A nice young Jew at Harvard says in conversation that may be it will be necessary to conceive once again of a Jewish Diaspora without a Jewish homeland because 'the price of maintaining it may be growing too high.' Apparently those who pay the least may come to feel least inclined to pay; a passing mood, but the worm has gotten into the apple."*⁶⁰

It is not possible to know the number of Jews who were so disaffected. But it seems this was not a marginal phenomenon and that a significant number had been influenced by the persistent anti-Zionist offensive, preferring to establish a distance from Zionism. And this embarrassment was not only a reaction to be found among Diaspora Jewry. Some Israelis had a similar response and not only those studying abroad. Some began suggesting that Israel should rid itself of the burdensome and antiquated concept of Zionism.

It is important to note there was a dispute over whether this embarrassment among Jews over Zionism was first and foremost the result of the ZR equation. For some, the anxiety and even shame came primarily from Israel's refusal to recognize Palestinian political rights.

Barett Litvinoff, the general editor of *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizman*, plainly expressed this view in an article published in *The Observer* in August 1980, entitled, "How Zionism Became a Dirty Word." In this short and provocative piece, Litvinoff maintained that Zionism's image began to tarnish as a result of the growing tendency of the Israeli government to justify its Palestinian policy by invoking Zionism.⁶¹

This unorthodox view is remarkable in that it was uttered far before the peak of the anti-Zionist and the anti-Israeli offensive which developed in the wake of the 1982 war in Lebanon.

In 1975 there was almost nobody to foresee such a development following the adoption of the ZR resolution. At the time, the prevalent theory, as proclaimed by Herzog and others, was that such blatant anti-Semitism should and would be opposed and rejected as such.

Bernard Lewis, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, correctly noted the disparate character of the coalition which supported the ZR: "The innocent majority, beguiled by semantics' sleight of hand and irrelevant slogans and diverted from their own needs and interests; the trimmers, daunted by the power or tempted by the wealth of one or other of the sponsors, offering private apologies for their public actions; the Arabs and their associates, obsessed with one danger, oblivious of others; the Russians, as always carefully pursuing their special purposes, and convoking the grand alliance of all who opposes the West, its institutions, its way of life, its friends."⁶²

However, Lewis, like most, failed to note the common denominator of all

these countries: support for Palestinian self-determination. In fact, the support for Palestinian political rights was far greater than the support for the ZR resolution. It included almost all the members of the U.N., as illustrated by the General Assembly's adoption on the same very day that it had adopted Resolution 3379 of two other resolutions related to the Palestinian problem.

Resolution 3376, to which we have already referred, established a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, passed by 93 to 18, with 24 abstentions and 4 absences. Resolution 3375, which called for "the invitation of the PLO, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in efforts for peace in the Middle East on equal footing," was supported by 101 to 8 with 25 abstentions and 8 absences.

These two resolutions were still opposed by the United States and a few other European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Holland. But there were cracks even in this facade. One should recall that on November 12, 1975, Harold Saunders, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, in testimony before the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, made a thundering statement calling for a reckoning with the Palestinians.

"It is a fact that many of the 3 million or so people who call themselves Palestinian today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status," he said. "As with any people in this situation, they have differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors."

In November 1975, there were very few Israelis to express such a view, and even fewer to point to the link between Israeli policy on the Palestinian problem and the adoption of Resolution 3379. Nevertheless, some sounded a warning. Political commentator Boaz Evron wrote an article in the *Yediot Ahronot* daily newspaper immediately after the vote in the Plenary, entitled "A Very Serious Resolution."

Evron noted that the measure sought Israel's delegitimization, giving a green light to resort to illegitimate means against the Jewish state. But he then advanced that this was because of Israel's policy on the Palestinian problem: "There is even not a single country except [ours] which is not convinced that the Palestinians are entitled to political expression and to take part in the Geneva conference and in the U.N. The countries which supported our position in this affair only maintain that this Palestinian political expression must not come instead of Israel, but beside Israel. Our attempt to prevent any political expression from the Palestinians is not preferable, from a moral point of view, in the eyes of our friends, over the PLO aspiration to abolish our existence. These facts were dealt with by some of our newspapers (for instance in an editorial in *Davar*), which mentioned that we cannot [avoid] any more [offering] clear alternatives to solve the Palestinian problem."⁶³ Final-

ly, Evron claimed that exposing the resolution on Zionism as anti-Semitism was missing the point.

It does not seem that these warnings were taken into consideration by the Israeli government or by the Israeli Knesset, with the notable exception of Foreign Minister Allon. Allon attempted, albeit furtively, to address the challenge of some Israeli intellectuals to recognize Palestinian political rights by calling in Professor Shlomo Avineri as director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Avineri, who advocated a change in the Palestinian policy, was appointed to the post in January 1976. After Labor's resounding defeat in the 1977 elections, the issue of political Palestinian rights was pushed aside, but it resurfaced and for the first time enjoyed some formal recognition in the 1979 Camp David accords.

But it is critical here to note that the long-held Israeli policy of rejecting any Palestinian political expression was to be a serious handicap for Israel both in preventing the adoption of Resolution 3379 and trying to fight it afterward. This handicap was at the background of a decision to fight the resolution in the United Nations on the grounds of anti-Semitism, thus avoiding the explosive issue of political Palestinian expression. But we have seen that, in the end, such a strategy failed to prevent the ZR adoption. It also seems that afterward, this Israeli policy seriously compromised Israel's willingness and ability to deal with the ZR resolution and try to bring about its abrogation, as we shall see in the following chapters.

We have seen, then, the damaging impact of the ZR resolution and its offshoots on the state of Israel and the Jewish people. We must also look at the damage it caused to the integrity of the United Nations and the distortion of its fundamental values,⁶⁴ to democracy and the language of freedom,⁶⁵ to human rights and the struggle against racism,⁶⁶ and to the deepening of Arab hostility towards Israel.⁶⁷ It was a far-reaching achievement for a resolution adopted by a mere simple majority of the member-states.

NOTES

- (1) Abba Eban, "Israel, Anti-Semitism and the U.N.," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Jerusalem, Vol. I, Fall 1976, p. 110.
- (2) World Council of Churches, The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Donald Coggan, The Council of Dutch Churches, Card. Willebrands, President of the Vatican's Commission for Religious Relations with Jews, The West German Roman Catholic Church.
- (3) Simone de Beauvoir, Allan Sillitoe, Jean Paul Sartre, Mendes France, Rene Cassin, Andre Malraux, Francois Mitterand, Francois Jacob, Alfred Kastler, Andre Lwoff, Christian Anfinsen, Kenneth Arrow, Werner Frossmann, Eyvind Johnson, Arthur Kornberg, Simon Kuznets, Sir George Porter, George Wald, Jorge Luis Borges, Ernesto Sabato. . . .
- (4) The Dutch Parliament, the European Parliament, the U.S. Congress, the Canadian House of Commons.
- (5) Abba Eban, "Zionism and the U.N.," *The New York Times*, November 3, 1975.
- (6) *Newsweek*, November 24; William F. Buckley Jr., *The New York Times*, November 3, 1975.
- (7) Testimony by Judge Hadassa Ben Ito on the entreaties of a Dutch diplomat, Study Day "Refuting the Z-R Equation," The president's house, Jerusalem, November 11, 1985. CZA/S110/40.
- (8) Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties*. New York, Harper and Row, 1983. p. 650.
- (9) Meron Medzini, Ed., *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents, 1974-1977*, Vol. III. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, pp. 359-360.
- (10) Thomas Mayer, "The UN Resolution Equating Zionism with Racism: Genesis and Repercussions," Research Report, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, April 1985, p. 7. Originally prepared as a position paper for the conference on "Rejecting the Zionism-Racism Equation" held in Jerusalem on November 1, 1984, under the auspices of the World Zionist Organization and the Israel Foreign Office. CZA/S110/40.
- (11) *Newsweek*, November 17, 1975.
- (12) Thomas Mayer, op. cit., p. 8.
- (13) According to President Herzog, in a meeting with Uzi Narkiss and Yohanan Manor, February 11, 1984.
- (14) "Serpents at the U.N.," *Midstream*, January 1989, p. 8.
- (15) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 21, 1979, p. 6.
- (16) James Jonah, conference "For an Authentic Moral Code of International Organizations. A Test Case: Zionism," Paris, June 11, 1986, p. 19. CZA/S110/31.
- (17) Address to the conference, "Z-R: An Assault on Human Rights," co-sponsored by the BBI, The WJC and the WZO, Washington, December 10, 1984. CZA/S110/26.
- (18) Tony Lerman, *The Abuse of Zionism*, Research Report, Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, December 1981, No. 20.
- (19) Ann Hulbert and Peter Galison, "Zionism, Racism and Free Speech," *Commentary*, October 1978, p. 72; "Anti-Zionism at British Universities" in *Patterns of Prejudice*, July-August 1977, pp. 1-3.
- (20) "Anti-Zionism at British Universities," op. cit., p. 2.
- (21) Interview with Yohanan Manor, November 2, 1983. CZA/S110/9.

- (22) Ruth Raeli, *The Implications of Resolution 3379 on Zionism*, WZO Research Division, May 1986, p. 45. CZA/S110/48.
- (23) Ruth Raeli, op. cit., pp. 45-6.
- (24) Ruth Raeli, op. cit., p. 47.
- (25) Ruth Raeli, op. cit., p. 40.
- (26) Information Department, WZO, *Anti-Zionism in Australia—1982*, Jerusalem, p. 9. CZA/S110/48.
- (27) Ehud Sprinzak, *The Fallacy of Respectable Anti-Zionism*, unpublished research commissioned by the Information Department of the WZO, 1985, 56 pages. The quote is from page 5. CZA/S110/48.
- (28) "Anti-Zionism: A Critical Evaluation," a project proposal by Yohanan Manor and Ehud Sprinzak submitted to the Memorial Foundation, March 1985, p. 6. CZA/S110/?
- (29) Ireland (9 in favor, 2 against); Italy (17, all in favor); Netherlands (8 against, 5 abstain); United Kingdom (4 in favor, 4 against, 4 abstain); Greece (8 in favor, 4 against); Portugal (2 in favor, 10 abstain); Austria (5 against, 7 abstain), Finland (11 Abs); Sweden (2 against, 10 abstain); New Zealand (10 abstain); Australia (2 against, 11 abstain); Canada (all abstain).
- (30) Robert Wistrich, "The Anti-Zionist Masquerade," *Midstream*, August-September 1983, pp. 12-13.
- (31) Ehud Sprinzak, *The Damage of Anti-Zionism: A Preliminary Analysis*, Department of Information, WZO, Jerusalem, 1984, p. 5. CZA/S110/48.
- (32) Juliana Geran Pilon, *What does the UN have against Israel*, Executive Memorandum, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, October 21, 1982, p. 1. Richard Williamson claimed that by the early 1980s, more than 25 percent of the General Assembly's "sessions was devoted to vituperations against the Jewish state." *The Chicago Tribune*, May 16, 1989.
- (33) Michael Curtis, "The United Nations Zionism and Racism," *Global Affairs*, Vol.1, No. 2, Spring 1986, p. 20.
- (34) Irwin Cotler, "The Legitimacy of Israel," *Middle East Focus*, January 1981, p.10. Cf. J. Kirkpatrick about the WHO.
- (35) Michael Curtis, op. cit., p. 21.
- (36) Ehud Sprinzak, "Anti-Zionism: From Delegitimization to Dehumanization," *Forum-53*, Jerusalem, 1985, p.5.
- (37) Ehud Sprinzak, op. cit., p. 6.
- (38) Address to the Conference, "Z-R: An Assault on Human Rights," Washington, December 1984, op. cit., p. 2. CZA/S110/26.
- (39) Alan Lee Keyes, "Israel and the Politics of the U.N.," in *Security Affairs*, JINSA, Washington, Vol V, No. 1, January 1987, p. 117.
- (40) Yohanan Manor, "The New Anti-Zionism," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 5, Spring 185, p. 129. This article is an abridged English version of the original article published in French, "L'antisionisme," *Revue française de science politique*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Avril 1984, p. 300.
- (41) Yohanan Manor, "L'Antisionisme," op. cit., Table 1, p. 303.
- (42) "The New Anti-Semitism: A Moment Symposium," *Moment*, January-February 1982, p. 17.
- (42a) Annie Kriegel, *L'antisionisme a la lumiere de la guerre du Liban*, Serie "La menace de l'antisionisme." No. 7, Jerusalem, OSM, Departement de l'information. CZA/S110/48; Roger Dufour, Analyse d'une campagne exemplaire contre le judaisme dans le medias francais, *Le Droit de Vivre*; Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Anti-Jewists on the March," *Jerusalem Post*, July 8, 1982; Edward Alexander, "The Journalist's War Against Israel," *Encounter*, September-October, 1982, pp. 87-97.
- (43) Letter dated January 16, 1984, from the permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, p. 1.
- (44) Michael Curtis, op. cit., p. 24.
- (45) Leon Hadar, "Accident of Truth," *Jerusalem Post*, April 22, 1982, p. 7.
- (46) Concluding Statement of International Legal Conference on Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and

- the U.N., in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Nijhoff, Vol 17, 1987, p. 13. For further details on this conference see chapter 6.
- (47) Yoram Dinstein, "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the United Nations" in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Vol 17, 1987, op. cit., p. 21.
- (48) Bernard Henri Levy, Address to the XXXth Zionist Congress, Special Session on Anti-Semitism, Jerusalem, December 13, 1982, in *Forum*, WZO, Jerusalem, Summer 1983, No. 49, p. 6.
- (49) Testimony at the special session on anti-Semitism of the XXXth Zionist Congress, December 13, 1982. Edited version in *Forum*, op. cit., p. 28.
- (50) According to the incisive formula of Canadian professor of Jewish philosophy, Emil Fackenheim, *Forum*, WZO, Jerusalem, No. 50, p. 4.
- (51) William Korey, "The Kremlin and the U.N.," "Zionism Equals Racism Resolution," *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University, Vol. 17, 1987, p. 138.
- (52) According to the headline of an article published in *Zie rubezhom*, on November 21-27, 1975, in W. Korey, op. cit., p. 146.
- (53) William Korey, "How the Kremlin Uses the U.N. Zionist Resolution," *The American Zionist*, Vol. 68, June 1978, p. 20.
- (54) W. Korey, *The American Zionist*, op. cit., p. 21.
- (55) Ann Hulbert, Peter Gallison, op. cit., p. 72.
- (56) Michael Curtis, op. cit., p. 28; Report from the Israeli Embassy in London to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, February 1, 1985. See also Professor Yoram Dinstein's letter to Y. Manor, February 24, 1985. CZA/S110/18.
- (57) Ruth R. Wisse, "Blaming Israel," *Commentary*, February 1984, p. 33.
- (58) Norman Podhoretz, "The State of World Jewry" *Commentary*, December 1983, p.37. et. svt.
- (59) Ehud Sprinzak, *The Damage of anti-Zionism*, op. cit., p. 4.
- (60) Ruth R. Wisse, op. cit., p.34.
- (61) *The Observer*, August 24, 1980.
- (62) Bernard Lewis, "The anti-Zionist Resolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 1, October 1976, p. 64.
- (63) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 14, 1975, Supplement, p. 16.
- (64) See, for instance, Seymour Maxwell Finger's contribution to the International Legal Conference on Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N., "The effect of the Institutionalization of anti-Zionism on the integrity of the U.N. Secretariat, *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, op. cit., pp. 74-94. See also Per Ahlmark's statement before the Committee on U.N. integrity, New York City, September 22, 1981, *Documents*, The Threat of Anti-Zionism, No. 6, WZO, Jerusalem, pp. 8-12. CZA/S110/48.
- (65) Daniel Patrick Moynihan has addressed this issue on numerous occasions, but notably in his book, *Loyalties*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984?
- (66) See, for instance, the interview given to *World Chronicle* by James Jonah, Secretary General of the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, February 3, 1983, where he recognized that the achievements of the Decade against racism had been "quite minimal" since the Western countries had withdrawn from the Decade because of Resolution 3379.
- (67) Thomas Mayer, op. cit., p. 10.

CHAPTER IV

SPINNING WHEELS

For almost nine years no serious moves were made to revoke UNGA Resolution 3379 [XXX]. Indeed, there was a marked reluctance to take such steps and the few made failed or were foiled.

There are several rationales for such surprising inaction. In the eyes of many, the revocation was not possible given the balance of power at the United Nations. In this light, failed attempts at revocation would be harmful and lend renewed credibility to the resolution as well as to the United Nations itself. Hence, the practical conclusion was to ignore Resolution 3379, as advanced by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger the day after the vote in the Plenary.

Others justified what in hindsight looked like complacency by their confidence that the adoption of the resolution would soon be understood by its own proponents as a Pyrrhic victory. Most of the members of the U.N., including some of its supporters, already were believed to resent the resolution as an embarrassment. Therefore, there was no need to combat the resolution because it was self-incriminating and would itself deal the heaviest blow to the United Nations, even to the point of threatening its existence. This view was explicitly stated by Foreign Minister Allon before the Belgian Parliament.¹ This approach also assumed the resolution would inflict only limited and temporary damage on the state of Israel and the Jewish people.

But these are only superficial and perhaps even convenient explanations for the inaction in the face of the anti-Zionist onslaught. We are inclined to attribute more weight to three other factors leading to the paralysis which characterized nearly a decade following the adoption of the ZR resolution.

First, there was the emotional and apologetic nature of the initial Israeli and Jewish reactions to the ZR resolution. This prompted an "internal" strategy with an emphasis on information and education and curbed a full-fledged political and diplomatic struggle in the international arena.

Second, there was a marked reluctance on the part of the Israeli government to address the issue. This likely came from a deep but publicly unspoken conviction that the resolution was closely connected with the issue of Palestinian political rights and representation. Any successful effort to revoke the measure clearly would necessitate what were considered at the time to be unacceptable Israeli concessions to the Palestinians. Hence, the government

abdicated its leadership in the struggle against anti-Zionism because it was unwilling to take the political risks.

Third, whenever some plan of action was drawn up by those Jewish and Zionist groups and individuals which did assume the responsibility for the fight, it was foiled by political infighting and organizational divisiveness. Most damaging were the both petty and serious struggles between the World Zionist Organization and the World Jewish Congress.

INITIAL EMOTIONAL REACTIONS

The initial Jewish and Israeli reactions to the UNGA vote were anger and outrage and a decision to stand up to the blow by minimizing its actual impact on the Jewish state and the Jewish people. Instead, a counter-offensive was adopted which insisted the U.N. would sustain the most serious injury.

A protest against the action drew 100,000 on November 11, 1984 at New York's Times Square. Many demonstrators were wearing badges proclaiming, "I am a Zionist," and singing "Am Yisrael Chai" (the people of Israel live). They brandished placards and chanted slogans denouncing the U.N. resolution and the countries which had supported it. Similar demonstrations, though far more modest in numbers, were held in other Diaspora Jewish communities, notably in France.

In Israel there were demonstrations in most of the big cities: Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Ramat Gan, Netanya, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Bat Yam, Tiberias and Eilat, as well as in each of the universities, at the initiative of the student unions. Streets, squares and even buildings bearing names of countries which supported the resolution were symbolically renamed with the name "Zionism." Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek announced that the municipality would turn to the mayors of the big cities in the world asking them to condemn the resolution.

This awakening of public opinion in Israel was unexpected and stood in sharp contrast to the apparent apathy over the attacks on Zionism which had marked the previous weeks. Some, such as Chaim Ben Shahar, president of Tel Aviv University, observed the UNGA resolution had jarred the Israeli public out of its contempt for Zionism, which increasingly had been viewed as an outdated and moralistic ideology.¹

Several Israeli scholars noted that the decline in disaffection with Zionism in fact had already been triggered before the ZR resolution. Research had shown that during the last decade, there had been a substantial increase in the number of Israeli students identifying themselves as Zionist: from 65 percent in 1965 to 80 percent in 1974, and that the gap between the percentage of parents and children considering themselves part of the Jewish

people was narrowing.² Education was considered the decisive factor in this evolution.

Therefore, and in spite of the impressive protest by the Israeli public, most official reactions to the resolution simply were calls for still more education about Zionism. "Zionism will be put on top of our concerns and we will return and teach its views, values and history," declared Education and Cultural Minister Aharon Yadlin, in the wake of the resolution's adoption.³

The impulse to minimize the importance of the ZR action was roundly expressed by some top Israeli politicians, including former Prime Minister Golda Meir and former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Meir, the keynote speaker at the protest in Tel Aviv, maintained that "U.N. resolutions were not worth the paper on which they were written," and that in the presence of such resolutions what "we need is an additional million Jews" in Israel.⁴ Dayan, for his part, claimed in a press conference before a fund-raising dinner for the United Jewish Appeal in Skokie, Illinois, that the U.N. resolution's passage did not mark an especially black day for the Jews. "For 4,000 years the members of the Jewish people have been used to expressions of hostility and lack of understanding," he said. "The fate of Zionism will be decided in the hearts of the members of the Jewish people and not by the U.N."⁵

Other Israeli leaders preferred to emphasize the damage the ZR equation would inflict upon the United Nations. Health Minister Victor Shemtov, for instance, warned that if the U.N. members did not distance themselves from this shameful episode, "they [would] bring about the liquidation of this organization."⁶

Foreign Minister Allon told the Belgium Parliament that at stake was not "Zionism, which is indeed able to take care of itself, but the U.N., which is in mortal danger."⁷ But Allon did more than sound warnings with the European leaders in Brussels. He was also pragmatic. He proposed amending the U.N. Charter to prevent the possibility of any bloc passing resolutions contrary to the spirit of the Charter. According to Allon's proposal, such draft resolutions would have to be submitted to the International Court in The Hague.⁸ But this proposal never went anywhere.

Meanwhile, the executive of the World Zionist Organization in Jerusalem issued a statement which branded the ZR resolution racist and anti-Semitic in its essence. It also warned of dangerous implications for all of humanity. But its practical response was essentially internal. It announced that it would increase its information and solidarity drive so Jews all over the world would proclaim proudly, "We are Zionists" and do their utmost "to deepen the Zionist idea and push for its realization."⁹

This statement was similar in spirit to Golda Meir's exhortations, which had included an appeal to all Jews to wear badges pronouncing, "I am a Zionist." Incidentally, the first to heed Meir's appeal seems to have been

Allon. He wore the badge during the national conference of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Manheim, where he was an honored guest. His action won him a standing ovation as well as symbolic declarations by some of the participants, such as Bremen Mayor Hans Kochnik, of "*I am a Zionist*." It also was widely covered in the Israeli press.¹⁰

American Jews were invited to do the same in advertisements in the Jewish press. However, with the exception of demonstrators in Times Square, there is no evidence that Allon's example was widely followed. Another protest tactic suggested in similar ads called on Jews, "when making travel plans," to bear in mind the countries which unexpectedly had supported the ZR, notably Mexico, Brazil and Portugal.¹¹ This campaign was said to have had some effect on U.S. tourism to Mexico in particular, but there is little evidence to support such a claim.

A more concrete initiative was taken by Prime Minister Rabin and Arie Dulzin, who was the acting chairman of the WZO and Jewish Agency. They decided to convene in Jerusalem an emergency conference of 100 prominent Jewish leaders from November 27 to 29. The aim was to launch a general offensive on world public opinion "to explain properly the essence of Zionism as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people."

Actually, what both the Israeli government and the WZO were really seeking was an opportunity for the Jewish people to express "its identification with the state of Israel and with the Zionist idea."¹² The major practical result of this conference was to establish a "Joint Committee on Zionist Information Issues." It included representatives of the Foreign Ministry and of the Zionist Executive and was headed by former Ambassador Ya'akov Tsur, then chairman of the Jewish National Fund.¹³

One of the committee's major recommendations, issued on January 1, 1976, was to mount an information counter-offensive and an educational Zionist program. The committee held that, "Only limited attention has been devoted to the ideological origins of Zionism, its role in the rebirth of Israel as a solution for the universal Jewish problem. Thus, Zionism was conceived by public opinion as a doctrine belonging to the past."¹⁴ In the committee's view, then, it was the lack of knowledge and understanding about Zionism that was somehow responsible for the shameful resolution! Hence its stress on adopting an information program on Zionism.

The recommendations and program of action were based on the assumption of joint planning and close cooperation between the the WZO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This would include establishing a joint staff in Jerusalem.¹⁵

In fact, these recommendations were shelved soon after they came to light, as had been foreseen by Chairman Tsur: "If you ask me what will be the fate of this report, I'll tell you that I am skeptical that obvious things will be carried out because of the whirlpool, maelstrom of means that we are using

and which are completely disconnected. . . When you try to bring about a common action you are running against a brick wall. . . every department of the Jewish Agency is doing its own [thing], and every embassy is doing its own [thing and], so on and so forth."¹⁶

In the meantime, between September 1975 and January 1976, the Foreign Affairs Ministry produced, in cooperation with the WZO, an impressive amount of informational material on Zionism. It was to be distributed abroad through their respective representations.¹⁷ There is no way to assess the impact of such an effort, since there are no data about its actual use and the constituencies reached. What is clear, however, is how naive it was to expect that even a successful information campaign could compete with the impact of the Zionism-is-racism strategy. The primary problem was not, after all, a mere lack of knowledge. It was a calculated political ploy to delegitimize the Jewish state by activating the automatic majority secured by the Soviet Union in conjunction with the Arab states.

The pertinent question here is whether it would have been possible to



U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan welcomed at Ben Gurion airport by the organizers of the Study Day "Refuting the ZR Equation." From left to right: Uzi Narkiss, Morris Zilka, Director General of the Information Department of the WZO, Senator Moynihan, and Yohanan Manor.

fight the ploy by challenging this automatic majority in the international arena and trying to rescind UNGA Resolution 3379. Would this have been more fruitful than the emotional and apologetic response of an inward-oriented information and education program? The idea of such an international political-diplomatic campaign had not only been broached but "officially" announced less than a week after the adoption of the ZR, ironically by a group of American women! In a press conference at the U.N. press club in New York, Eleanor Holmes-Norton, head of the Human Rights Committee of New York, reported an international committee of women had been set up to annul the UNGA resolution. Senior women from all the nations were to be enlisted to win the support necessary for a reconsideration of Resolution 3379, she declared.

The initiative followed a petition signed by seventy well-known women and addressed to Kurt Waldheim, the secretary general of the U.N. and to Gaston Thorn, the president of UNGA. It demanded the annulment of the ZR resolution, claiming it threatened the credibility of the U.N. and its ability to fight against genuine racism and colonialism.¹⁸ To our knowledge there was no follow-up to this initiative. It probably was discouraged by both U.S. and Israeli diplomats.

Israeli officialdom, as a whole, held for years that it was impossible to fight the ZR ploy by challenging the U.N.'s automatic majority. This was in spite of two noteworthy victories achieved in 1975 and 1976 at UNESCO and at the United Nations itself in 1978, victories which proved the officials wrong.

A draft resolution condemning UNGA Resolution 3379 was proposed at the fifteenth conference of the NGO affiliated with UNESCO, November 18-21, 1975. The admissibility of this draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 38 to 19, with 26 abstentions. However since no agreement was reached on the redrafting of the text, it was sent back to the permanent committee which set up an ad hoc Study Group on Zionism and on the positions adopted previously by UNESCO on racism. The purpose of the draft resolution was to prevent UNESCO from incorporating UNGA Resolution 3379 into its own work and thought. Its sponsors argued that this resolution was a patently political act and, as such, failed to meet the criteria of the scientific definition of racism to which UNESCO was committed. Furthermore, they argued, its adoption by UNESCO would lead to a loss of support for the fight against racism and for UNESCO itself.

Although not adopted, the draft resolution was instrumental in preventing the inclusion of or reference to Resolution 3379 in the resolutions of the 1976 General Conference of UNESCO in Nairobi, in spite of Iraq's efforts to mention it in the preamble. Another attempt to introduce 3379 as part of a recommendation connected to a declaration on the mass media was thwarted by the walk-out of several Western European countries, the U.S. and Canada.



Official kick-off of the campaign to revoke the ZR at Study Day "Refuting the ZR Equation." Residence of Israel's President in Jerusalem, November 11, 1984. From left to right: Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs; Father Nunez, Costa Rica Ambassador to UNESCO; U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan; President Chaim Herzog; General (res.) Uzi Narkiss, head of the Information Department of the WZO.

UNESCO's anti-Zionist initiatives, though consistently stymied, increased U.S. congressional resistance to funding UNESCO.¹⁹ Ultimately, strong U.S. leadership and a more moderate attitude by Egypt and other Arab countries, following pressure by African states, prompted UNESCO to restore Israel to full membership in the European regional grouping from which it had been ousted in 1974.²⁰ The example of UNESCO showed that it was possible to fight back and win in spite of heavy odds.

This conviction drove an effort to overturn Resolution 3379 at the U.N. in 1977-1978. It was based on the belief that with leadership, skill and the success of Ambassador Andrew Young in reaching out to the Third World, especially Black Africa, it would be possible to shatter the automatic majority.

The International Council of B'nai B'rith initiated, in cooperation with Israel, a move to rescind the Zionism-is-racism equation through one of

Young's deputies, Ambassador Allard Lowenstein, according to Harris Schoenberg, director of U.N. Affairs of the Council. Lowenstein, a lawyer and a peace activist during the war in Vietnam, had been a Democratic congressman representing Long Island. He was appointed in 1977 by President Carter as a human rights specialist to the U.S. delegation to the U.N. But Lowenstein did not get very far, Schoenberg reported. He "ran into such a determined opposition in New York and lack of will in Washington that he came back trying to get our organization to influence Israel to change its policies."²¹

Indeed, the resolution appears to have been viewed by U.S. diplomacy at the time as an unfortunate stumbling block to be bypassed, not a serious obstacle that had to be removed because of its far-reaching destructive implications. After he resigned from his U.N. post, Lowenstein eloquently explained the high stakes for the international body and the United States in getting the resolution expunged. In an article entitled, "Why I Quit," he wrote:

"The U.N. resolution defining Zionism as racism multiplied the number of people who dismiss the U.N. as a kind of radicalized Lewis Carroll contraption filled with leftist mad hatters who might next announce that slavery is freedom, or that Jews are Nazis, or who for that matter might direct the Mississippi river to flow uphill.

"But the U.N. cannot be dismissed. The world, not Lewis Carroll, created the U.N. and the U.N. reflects and affects the world in which we must go on living, like it or not. A world as interconnected and imperiled as ours, desperately needs a credible functioning world organization. To abandon the U.N. would be dangerous and self-defeating. . . So the same stinking little resolution gave anti-Semitism a brand new respectability, impugns our credentials while discrediting the U.N., and helps racism as well by splattering the unity against racism (rationally defined) that might otherwise have been effective, if only because of its novelty.

"Thus freeing the U.N. from the Z-R is as important for the U.N. and Israel as I believe it is for the U.S. government. That is why the U.S. delegation set out at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March to reverse the ZR spiral—a goal regarded as noble but hopeless."²²

The reversal was regarded as "noble" because it sought to free the United Nations from both an aberration and an embarrassment. And it was termed "hopeless" because there was no chance whatsoever to rescind the resolution in the face of the isolation of Israel and the United States and the quasi-auto-

matic majority hostile to them. Indeed, there was even a risk that the resolution would be reinforced and reiterated.

But here is where Lowenstein's experience in the U.N. Human Rights Commission had exceptional value. It proved conclusively that the "noble" struggle was not hopeless. Indeed, it could have been victorious if it had been properly handled and, above all, if it had been a high priority for U.S. diplomacy.

In the same article, Lowenstein went on to explain how the United States managed to break through its isolation at the Human Rights Commission and to win a majority for a proposal that turned the U.N. away from the bias that had tainted it for years and back to its genuine universal vocation.

To everyone's surprise, he wrote, a U.S. proposal for a Year Against Apartheid was adopted with no contaminating additions. It meant a U.N. body had approved an American proposal allowing for Israel and the United States to participate in programs dealing with racism. The Commission then did something "utterly unprecedented and even more astonishing," Lowenstein wrote. It supported U.S. insistence, over and above Soviet objections, that the Soviet Union could not be exempted from discussions about human rights violations. "These were only the first steps on a journey of thousands miles, but they were steps in the right direction for a change, and that is where this story ends—just where it should have begun," wrote Lowenstein.

In fact, "the opportunity provided by the turn of events in Geneva evaporated in Washington some time before the General Assembly where the next and first major steps would have had to occur. An effort to disentangle ZR at the General Assembly would have required a decision to make that a major priority in the give and take that characterizes international negotiations." And while, "it would be inexact to say that someone decided against making ZR a priority," Lowenstein concluded, it was "more likely the matter was never really resolved at all. I don't know if the [U.S.] president was aware of the decision of non-decision that cost his Administration its best chance to do something valuable simultaneously for human rights, Israel, American influence, and the U.N. itself—"²³

The prevailing opinion among the U.S. and Israeli governments was that UNGA's sheer numbers made a vote to rescind Resolution 3379 impossible. Therefore, they held, it would be wiser to play down the measure in the hope it would disappear under the weight of the embarrassment it had caused the U.N. and many of its members. This, of course, accounted for several years of inaction. Does this mean that the U.S. and Israeli assumptions were unfounded? Not entirely. The isolation of Israel and U.S. at the U.N. was real, as was the aberrant nature of Resolution 3379 and the embarrassment it had caused. But these do not fade away with the sheer passage of time. When unchallenged, they become more entrenched.

But for reasons which were not clear until now, the United States "decided not to decide," while Israel clung to its belief that the ZR resolution was both not very damaging and not possible to rescind, driven by the unspoken conviction that any substantial change in this posture would require a painful and costly change in Israel's Palestinian policy.

PARALYSIS OF WILL

The Israeli political paralysis on the Palestinian issue was seen by some as only part of a more general and dangerous paralysis of will that had fallen upon the country in the wake of the Six Day War and spread to the whole of Israel's body politic. For them, Israel's refusal to consider a different strategy to challenge the ZR therefore came not merely from an unwillingness to accept the implied necessity of changing its Palestinian policy. Rather it came from Israel's inability in these years to think on its own and squarely address its political problems.

Professor Amos Shapira, dean of the Faculty of Law of Tel Aviv University, for one, characterized this state as a mental paralysis and spiritual imbalance which had engulfed Israeli society after the Six Day War. For him, it came as a result of unbridgeable gaps between desires and abilities, between aspirations and hard facts, between pretensions and the limitations of reality. "The ongoing serious trauma of the [Yom] Kippur War and the impotent wrath in the face of the condemnation of Zionism as racism by seventy-two nations are symptoms for a nation whose spiritual balance had been upset. . . ." he offered. "Hypnotized and paralyzed, trapped by pseudo-religious myths, wrapped in national introversion and self-righteousness, nurturing an inflated vision of greatness, the Israeli society froze. But very quickly the demographic, economic, political and military reality slapped our face. Whereas pretensions skyrocketed, it appeared that they were not backed up by the limited resources at our disposal in the field of economy, man-power, security and international relations. This painful contradiction between desire and ability, between visions and the ability to fulfill them, generated confusion and blurred every field of our public life, from the ideological one on which our national existence was resting to [that] of daily security measures."²⁴

According to Shapira, this state of mind was responsible for the spiritual frustration, the moral confusion, the intellectual fossilization of the Israeli society. It was also to engender political disaster since it prevented Israeli society from anticipating "in due time, merciless political problems" and to suggest its own solutions. Instead it looked for scapegoats: the aging leadership, the failure of Hasbara [informational campaigns], and the ever-present hostility of the non Jewish world. Indeed, it sought to put the blame on the

devil on duty, whether it be Gunnar Jarring, William Rogers, Henry Kissinger and now Harold Saunders.

It therefore became urgent to scrap hollow slogans, to confront reality and to turn to practicable Zionism as was preached and practiced by Ben Gurion, "looking for vision but with legs solidly planted in the soil of reality." This meant, first and foremost, addressing in a genuine fashion the Palestinian problem, including "its PLO's dimension." It meant giving up obscure and undefined formulas which sought "to postpone the verdict," such as finding a solution to the Palestinian problem "within the framework of negotiations with Jordan."²⁴

On July 21, 1974, the Israeli Cabinet rejected by 9 to 7 a draft resolution by Prime Minister Rabin to close the debate on Israel's policy on the Palestinian issue and declare that Israel "reject[ed] the creation of a separate Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan." The Cabinet also rejected, 11 to 5, a [draft resolution tabled] proposal by Gideon Hausner and Moshe Kol, two members of the Independent Liberal Party, suggesting that peace negotiations be held with "Jordan and with Palestinian factors recognizing the state of Israel and its independence, and ready to reach with Israel a durable peace agreement on the basis of secure and agreed upon borders."

Instead, the Cabinet adopted by 9 to 7, Yigal Allon's formula that "peace should be established on the basis of two independent states." Allon was one of the very few Israeli politicians who, together with Haim Tzadok, Yitzhak Ben Aharon, Victor Shemtov and Aharon Yariv, had always been conscious of the specific national identity of the Palestinians and who had tried to introduce some flexibility in Israel's policy regarding them. But he changed his approach a year and a half later in the wake of his trip to Europe almost immediately after UNGA's adoption of the ZR resolution and the two other Palestinian resolutions. He became convinced that the Palestinian issue was "acute and urgent" and that Israel had to take a new initiative in this respect.²⁵

Several days later, at the end of November 1975, the chairman of the Knesset's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Yitzhak Navon, issued a thundering statement in utter contradiction to the official policy of the government as adopted in July of the year before. He argued that Israel should "announce that it was ready to negotiate with any Palestinian factor, body or organization, on three conditions: that it recognize Israel and its right to exist; that it commit itself to stop terrorist acts; that it accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242," the 1967 framework for the settlement of the Middle East conflict. "Till now," said Navon, "the government has said with whom among the Palestinians it is not ready to sit: not with the PLO or any other Palestinian organization. The time has come for the government of Israel to say clearly and loudly with whom it will be ready to sit."²⁶

Also at the end of November 1975, a more realistic approach to the Pales-

tinian problem was being advocated by leaders of the Liberal Party who, together with Menachem Begin of the Herut Party, founded the Likud party in 1973. "The Palestinian issue has turned today into a political fact, and ignoring this fact will not abolish it,"²⁶ said Liberal Party Chairman Elimelech Rimalt. Arie Dulzin, the treasurer of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency, also stressed that "the Palestinian problem existed and had to be solved."²⁶

Nothing concrete came out of these urgent calls for change, except for Shlomo Avineri's appointment as director general of the Foreign Ministry. And the likelihood the status quo would be upheld was reinforced in a *Newsweek* magazine interview with Prime Minister Rabin published December 7, 1975. In it, Rabin dismissed out of hand the possibility that Israel would agree to the creation of a West Bank-Gaza Palestinian state if the PLO in turn would recognize the "legitimacy and permanency of Israel."

"I don't believe the PLO can really change its position apart from lip service to our existence, . . . They are not going to abandon their objective of a secular state in a greater Palestine because they would then lose their raison d'etre. Their basic philosophy is that the Jews have no right to a state of their own and that their own state should be erected on the ruins of the Israeli state. In any event I don't believe we should change our policy on the Palestinian issue and that is, that it is not the key to a Mideast solution.

"Only when the Arab states decide to reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel and to sign peace treaties with us will peace be achieved," Rabin continued. "And it is in the context of these peace treaties that we must solve the Palestinian issue. This can only be done in negotiations with Jordan. We will flatly refuse any attempt to detach the Palestinian problem from Jordan. To do so would be a grave mistake with the direst consequences. There will never be room for a third state between Israel and Jordan. Therefore I don't see any room for political negotiations with the Palestinians."²⁷

Indeed, the Palestinian policy of Israel was to remain unchanged for more than two years. In that time, political upheaval brought Begin and the Likud to power in May 1977, Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in November 1977, the plan for the self-administration of the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza was presented to the Knesset by Begin on December 13, 1977 and the Camp David Accords were signed in September 1978. These accords made specific reference to the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements," and offered the innovative autonomy formula for the Palestinians.

GROPINGS

Meanwhile, the 29th Zionist Congress had convened in Jerusalem at the end of February 1978 and had elected Arie Dulzin as the chairman of the WZO-Jewish Agency. Among the recommendations adopted was one to set up an independent Information Department to reclaim Hasbara in general and Zionist information in particular. This, together with the major political developments cited above, created a far more favorable climate in which to fight the ZR calumny.

The inspiration to challenge and fight the ZR came from Eli Eyal, in fits and starts, in reaction to yet another faint-hearted and sterile debate by the governing board of the World Jewish Congress in Jerusalem at the beginning of May 1978. Instead of debating the problem again and again, Eyal believed something should be done. Only several weeks earlier, Eyal had been chosen to represent the Democratic Movement for Change on the Zionist Executive and to set up and operate the new information department. The DMC was a new political party which had won a stunning fifteen Knesset seats in the 1977 elections. It was headed by Professor Yigal Yadin, a prominent archaeologist and former chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces. Eyal, for his part, was a well known journalist who for several years had been the U.S. correspondent of *Ha'aretz*, later a special correspondent of *Ma'ariv*, and then a diplomatic commentator for Israel Television.

In August 1978, Eyal convened a brainstorming session dealing with Resolution 3379 in Dulzin's office with former Ambassador Herzog, former Knesset Member Zalman Abramov, Meir Rosenne, the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and former Ambassador Yossef Tekoa. Dulzin's aim was to find out how to use the Zionism-is-racism libel to breathe new life into Zionism, to inject some Zionist content into Jewish communities and to unite them around the state of Israel to a degree they had not been since the establishment of the state. The damage caused by Resolution 3379 was left almost unmentioned, though there was a subtle reference to the continuing erosion of Israel's status among Western countries. Dulzin wanted to involve Jewish communities in convincing "the nations of the world to change their verdict."²⁸ He also suggested establishing a serious Institute on Zionism that would win the interest and support of intellectuals and of the younger generation.

At the meeting, Eyal suggested as a mobilizing tool a manifesto on Zionism to be signed by luminaries such as Olaf Palme, Saul Bellow, Jean-Paul Sartre, Isaiah Berlin, Edward Kennedy and others. He was not sure whether this manifesto should call explicitly for the revocation of Resolution 3379. Herzog argued it was important to reach out not only to the internation-

al community on 3379 but also to focus on Israel. He lamented there was no Israeli awareness of the gravity of this development, and Israeli politicians and press were providing all the accusations and arguments against Israel and Zionism.²⁸ But Herzog was not in favor of demanding the revocation because of its virtual impossibility in light of the U.N.'s current composition. Instead, for purposes of mobilizing public opinion he suggested adopting the model of Teddy Kollek's "Jerusalem Conference." He noted that Kollek's conferences, with the participation of Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals, had succeeded in deflecting international attacks against Israeli sovereignty over the city.

The idea of rescinding the resolution was brushed aside at this meeting. Instead, the Information Department of the WZO embarked on a campaign to improve the image of Zionism by linking it with the peace process. Such a campaign would also aim to counter the new "International Day of Solidarity with the People of Palestine" sponsored by the U.N. Division for Palestinian Rights (November 1978). A poster, "Peace is the Zionist Way" and a special *Jerusalem Post* supplement, "Zionism confronts Peace," were produced and widely distributed. A first version of the poster was in fact rejected by the Zionist Executive and its many thousands copies shelved after its style was deemed offensive (Cf. photo). What offended many of the members of the Zionist Executive was not so much the original and provocative style of Ori Hofmekler, the young and promising artist Eyal asked to draw the poster, as it was Eyal's idea of putting the founding fathers of the Zionist Movement in the same frame as Anwar Sadat. In the supplement were articles on Resolution 3379 by Bernard Lewis and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan as well as by historians Yigal Elam, Professor Yosef Nedava and Professor Martin Gilbert, on Zionism's historical development and commitment to peace (Cf. photo).

During the following year different proposals were discussed in recognition of the need to wage an ongoing pro-Zionism campaign. The objective was at least to gnaw away at Resolution 3379 and clear Zionism from the ZR libel.

The strategy finally adopted was inspired by the "Brussels Conference for Soviet Jewry." This was an international umbrella body composed of prominent Jewish as well as non-Jewish personalities from all over the world. It provided moral clout and public impetus for the many local and national committees fighting for the rights of the Jews in the USSR. But the challenge for the pro-Zionism campaign was to find an effective link between the struggle against the ZR libel and the general human interest at stake in the campaign. Such general interest was completely clear in the case of the rights of Soviet Jewry, but not so in the case of the ZR equation.

Ultimately, it was decided to issue a statement on Zionism which emphasized universal values and which was to be signed by figures of interna-

tional reputation. The statement would also be instrumental in setting up an International Committee against the ZR libel and would endorse a series of national, regional and international symposia on anti-Zionism and racism, thereby giving them added weight and prestige. This program was conceived in April 1979 and was attached to a specific timetable. It would begin with the drafting of the "Statement on Zionism" in June, the convening of the International Committee in October, and a second meeting after a year of activity in October 1980.²⁹

But these plans collapsed at a very early stage, a harbinger of things to come. Although the first version of the Statement on Zionism was drafted in June of 1979, it took another six months to draft the final version because of the remarks and objections raised by several members of the Zionist Executive. Eyal found himself convincing them that this statement was not a new "Jerusalem Program" for the Zionist Movement but a general statement which could be endorsed by non-Jews. The statement read as follows:

"Zionism is the national expression and embodiment of the Jewish People's age-old yearning and hope to return to Zion, its historical homeland, from which it was forcibly uprooted, but with which its links have continued unbroken throughout the centuries. Zionism is the Jewish People's reply to centuries of persecution which culminated in the Holocaust. It is the Jews who have been the classical victims of racism and persecution, and by its very nature and origin Zionism is fundamentally opposed to every form and manifestation of racism.

"Zionism is the symbol of Jewish self-determination. It is the moral basis of the State of Israel, whose renaissance is a vindication of the fundamental concept of the equality of nations. Zionism, in its fulfillment, guarantees the right of every Jew, who so desires, to live in Israel. Zionism strives to achieve its objectives through peaceful means without infringing on the rights of other peoples.

"We, the undersigned, profoundly aspire to see the relations between nations conducted in accordance with the true principles of the United Nations—equality of rights, justice and tolerance, and call on all like-minded people to sign this statement."³⁰

There was another reason for the long delay. Some Israeli diplomats as well as some members of the Zionist Executive viewed some versions of this statement as a sign that the Information Department of the WZO was to embark on a politico-diplomatic campaign and they had reservations about it, arguing such a campaign was beyond its mandate.³¹

The main reason for the delays, however, was the reluctance of the personalities who were sought to endorse the statement. Willy Brandt, the chair-

man of the SPD and of the Socialist International, is one example. He was chosen by Eyal as a particularly suitable "ballon d'essai" since he belonged to those circles of the Left in which support for Israel had been eroding beside a growing sympathy for the Palestinians and the PLO. Eyal reasoned that Brandt's consent could lead many other prominent members of these circles and beyond to join in the endeavor.

Eyal met with Brandt in Bonn on August 28, 1980 and harshly criticized the European Community's Venice Declaration of June 30, 1980. In it, the Europeans offered not only support for Palestinian rights to self-determination, but declared the PLO had to be associated with the peace negotiations. Brandt angrily told Eyal he was the wrong address for such criticism. Eyal replied by saying it was possible to speak honestly only to people like Brandt who had shown understanding and support for Israel and the Jewish people. The atmosphere of the meeting warmed immediately. Brandt criticized those attacking Zionism and said he was ready to express his commitment to Israel and the Jews. But he balked at signing a Zionist declaration because he was a non-Jew. "Why, as a non-Jew, who indeed is close to Jews, but who actually does not belong to their people, should I sign a Zionist declaration," he asked. ". . . During World War II, I had Jewish friends who were not Zionist and expressed doubts regarding the future of Palestine."³²

Eyal rejected Brandt's view that those signing the manifesto on Zionism had to be Zionist or members of the Zionist movement. He pointed to John Kennedy's cry in 1961 of, "I am a Berliner," that was meant to stress his identification with the fight for liberty; in the same vein, if Brandt identified himself with the enlightened principles of Zionism as formulated in the declaration, he could feel he was a Zionist. Though Brandt promised that he would think it over, he never replied.³²

The delays and difficulties which plagued this fledgling international campaign against the ZR equation with its emphasis on Zionism's positive aspects, prompted the search for a different strategy that would have broader appeal. The WZO decided to fight the ZR and anti-Zionism as a form of anti-Semitism.

To this end, the WZO's Department of Information in late 1980 proposed setting up a "Task Force to Combat Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism." Its mission would be to coordinate the activities of world Jewish communities in this campaign and to provide them with international support.³³

Eyal, as chairman of the WZO's Information Department, briefed the Zionist Executive on the rationale for this program. The Zionist movement, he told the members, had the task of leading the fight against anti-Zionism which today was an expression of anti-Semitism. He noted that the 1975 U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism encouraged rampant anti-Zionism around the world and intensified classical anti-Semitism. Anti-Zionism was becoming the current substitute for what was once crude

anti-Semitism, he said. The proposed umbrella task force would coordinate the activities of various organizations and entities engaged in this multi-pronged fight against anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism. To be headquartered in Jerusalem, it would track anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic incidents, issue periodic reports summing up the trends, and provide advice and guidelines to the various organizations and bodies concerned.³³

This proposal was sent to major Jewish and Israeli institutions and officials along with the suggestion of meeting to discuss the new plan. On the whole, most of the responses were positive and encouraging, though some strong opposition was also expressed. Strong support was given by Shimon Peres, then the leader of the government opposition; Yitzhak Berman, the speaker of the Knesset; Knesset Member Uzi Baram; Bernice Tannenbaum, chairman of Hadassah in the United States; Albert Chernin, the executive vice-chairman of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council [NJCRAC]; Adam Loss, the director general of the FSJU (the French umbrella group for Jewish welfare); Morton Mandel, a wealthy Cleveland businessman and member of the Jewish Agency board; Nava Arad, secretary general of Na'amat, the women's branch of Histadrut; Chaim Herzog; Matti Shmuelevitz, the director general of the prime minister's office; Moshe Yegar, the deputy director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Meir Rosenne, Israeli ambassador to France; Shaul Ramati, Israeli ambassador to Brazil; Alexander Schindler, the president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. They all stressed the time was ripe for such a proposal.³⁴

Reservations about the plan focused on the fear a new organization would duplicate the activities already being carried out by other organizations. Moshe Yegar, for instance, observed that Yehuda Bauer's Center on the Study of Anti-Semitism, the Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial, the World Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League were already researching and analyzing the subject. He also stressed that programmatic reactions to anti-Semitic activities would be decided by local factors which "obviously will consult with whom was empowered to do so here by the government."³⁵

Shaul Ramati believed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take the lead in this fight. He reasoned that the campaign against Zionism was not the spontaneous expression of traditional anti-Semitism but "a state-financed essential part of a political campaign to create an intellectual infrastructure and international atmosphere which would make possible the destruction of the State of Israel and its replacement by a Palestinian Arab state. The terrorization and weakening of the Jewish communities throughout the world to neutralize their support for Israel is of course a part of this grand design."³⁶ Ramati also was convinced that it would be easier for the Foreign Ministry to secure the cooperation of the various Jewish organizations and coordinate their activities than for the WZO to do so, and to operate the Task Force on an "ad hoc" basis. His fear was simply but presciently of turf wars. "The

main Jewish organizations who see the fight against anti-Semitism as the central purpose and as the basis for their fund-raising and membership drives, would not wish to officially surrender or share with another body their responsibilities and activities in this sphere."³⁶

As expected, the misgivings came precisely from the strongest among these Jewish organizations—the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish Congress. Quite unexpectedly, however, they also came from the WZO's own treasurer, Akiba Lewinsky. In his view, "the proposal outlined in the document is outside the mandate of the WZO, and does not take into consideration the role of the different Jewish organizations which deal with the subject. I don't believe it is possible to combine into one the war on anti-Semitism, the battle on behalf of the state of Israel and the defense of Zionism itself."³⁷

Eyal responded to all these warnings and doubts by modifying the original proposal. He established an International Coordinating Committee focused exclusively on anti-Zionism. He then called for a working session to be convened in Europe in October to fashion a consensus on policy and joint action.³⁸ But this modification failed to appease the WJC, which in the meantime had announced the establishment of an International Commission to fight anti-Semitism,³⁹ a move, incidentally, also approved by the representatives of the WZO in the World Jewish Congress.

The resistance to Eyal's plan lingered out of the continuing fear of duplication, in spite of Eyal's shift to a sole focus on anti-Zionism. The fear was made plain by Stephen Roth, the director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs, a London-based research institution attached to the WJC, in his reply to Eyal's invitation to the working meeting. Roth referred to the program of this new WJC Commission, stressing that "we naturally envisaged dealing with anti-Zionism as well as anti-Semitism, or rather with its anti-Semitic form, which I assume is also the subject of your concern. In view of the foregoing, I am sure you will understand why I feel that your plans would lead to duplication. I think that the matter needs careful consideration and full discussion before you engaged in implementation. I should be grateful to receive your reaction, perhaps not just by way of a circular."⁴⁰

SERIOUS AND PETTY BONES OF CONTENTION

The stage was thus set for more than a year of intense conflict between the WJC and some leaders of the WZO as well as among leaders of the WZO, over both substantive and petty concerns. The most serious challenge was determining what threat to the Jews and to Israel should be fought as the highest priority and what role should be played by the WZO in that fight.

The WJC acknowledged the international campaign afoot to delegitimize

the state of Israel and to discredit Jews identifying with Israel. But it tended to view the upsurge of anti-Semitic incidents, especially in Western democracies, as local and unconnected, as not adding up "to a serious anti-Semitic revival."⁴¹ Nevertheless it decided to concentrate on fighting anti-Semitism, which in its view included "anti-Zionism in its anti-Semitic form," as mentioned above. In light of this, the WZO program to fight anti-Zionism was seen as redundant.

Most of the leadership of the WZO held a different view, especially the heads of the Information Department. They maintained the central and true danger was anti-Zionism rather than anti-Semitism, and that it should be fought head-on. That put them on a strategic collision course with the WJC. "The meaning of the decision taken by the Executive of the WJC [to set up an International Commission on Anti-Semitism] is that the real danger has been soft-pedalled or even hidden, as could be expected from this organization because of its character and its inclinations," wrote Yohanan Manor, director general of the WZO's Information Department. "All attention is focused exclusively on anti-Semitism, i.e., on occurrences which no one can afford not to deplore. Even our enemies, the enemies of the Jewish People as well as of Israel, join in the chorus which deplores anti-Semitism or at least pay lip service to deploring it."⁴²

Despite their similarities, anti-Zionism clearly was not identical to classical anti-Semitism. It reflected something new which sought to deprive the Jewish people of its extraordinary historical achievement of renewed independent nationhood. Moreover, as argued by Eliyahu Biletzki, a prolific Israeli publicist who had encouraged Eyal to fight the libel against Zionism, the non-recognition of Zionism was to give rebirth to anti-Semitism.⁴³ A former prominent MAPAM activist, Biletzki had given up all political activity to devote himself to writing about Israel's Labor movement and the crisis of values in Israeli society.

Eyal brought the tussle before Arie Dulzin, the Chairman of the WZO and of the Jewish Agency. He urged him not to allow the struggle against anti-Zionism to be hidden behind the struggle against anti-Semitism. He also pressed him not to give up the leadership of the campaign against anti-Zionism to the WJC, which would mean succumbing to trends in world Jewry which threatened the centrality of Israel.⁴⁴

Charles Bronfman, a wealthy and influential Canadian Jewish industrialist and head of the Seagram company, had just become a member of the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency and Eyal had invited him to play an active role at the planned working session. Eyal later said he sought Bronfman's involvement in the session in the hope of offsetting the influence of [his brother] Edgar Bronfman in the World Jewish Congress. In the invitation, Eyal wrote that "the struggle of Jewish organizations (such as the WJC) against anti-Semitism, however important it is, does not substitute for, or

compare with, the fight against anti-Zionism. It is clear that in the fight against anti-Zionism it is the World Zionist Organization which must not only spearhead, but also be the soul of the campaign."⁴⁵

At the same time, the role of the WZO in confronting the campaign against Zionism was turning into a political controversy within the Zionist movement. A debate about it was prompted in July of 1981 in the Zionist Executive by Yehiel Leket, the secretary general of the World Labor Zionist Movement. He demanded to know what the WZO was doing to fight Resolution 3379, challenging whether it was even sufficiently aware of the dangers the measure posed to Zionism.⁴⁶ A movement that did not fight its own delegitimization was but a cadaver, Leket said.

Eyal offered a comprehensive reply at the opening of the workshop on Hasbara (Information) of the General Zionist Council on September 2, 1981. He declared the intent of Resolution 3379 was to undermine the ideological and moral foundations of the state of Israel and, "as a result, the very existence of Jews wherever they are." He also mentioned instances of discrimination against Jews that this resolution had inspired and wondered whether it was not "the task of the Zionist Organization and of the Zionist Movement to stand up and fight such phenomena."⁴⁷ Eyal asked the Council to declare the establishment of a task force to fight anti-Zionism. "This is the fight par excellence of the Zionist Movement," he said. "No other Jewish organization—even if its sympathies lie with Zionism—should regard the fight against anti-Zionism as its main objective. Their fight against anti-Zionism will always be in the shadow of their fight against anti-Semitism. Our conclusion is that it is impossible to wage an effective war against anti-Zionism by way of a war against anti-Semitism."⁴⁷

The task force would enlist a wide Jewish front, aided by non-Jews, to "bring home the truth that anti-Zionism in the final analysis is harmful to the basic principles and values of Western society," Eyal said. "For a dogmatic Marxist, the state of Israel could not have existed," he added. "It contradicts its dogma. Either the state of Israel succeeds and the dogma is damaged, or it will be destroyed and his dogma will regain its integrity. The same applies to a devout Catholic. The same is true also for a man who adopts Toynbee's theory—that we are fossils and ghosts."⁴⁷

The General Zionist Council endorsed the proposal to set up a task force to combat anti-Zionism. This was still short of the goal of effecting the repeal of Resolution 3379, as very few dared even to suggest.⁴⁸ But it was at least an attempt to devise a strategy to challenge the ideological, political and propaganda warfare being waged against Zionism. And it marked an advance from previous efforts to fight the anti-Zionist scourge either by denouncing it as anti-Semitism or by trying to fill the informational gaps about Zionism!

It was critical to understand and admit what many Jews—and also a lot of Israeli officials—failed to grasp: anti-Zionism was at once a source of anti-

Semitism, a device to destroy the moral and ideological basis of the state of Israel and harm the relationship between Israel and world Jewry, and a key element in mounting an anti-Western coalition that sought to undermine Western culture based on democracy and human rights. It was therefore futile to fight anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism only and vital to fight it for what it was. Of course this was far more difficult than fighting it only as anti-Semitism, which at the time was still almost universally discredited. But by not recognizing anti-Zionist propaganda as a source of anti-Semitism, world Jewry was fighting on the wrong field. Anti-Zionist advocacy was a covert way of discriminating against Jews, and "when Jews react by fighting only anti-Semitism they play into the hands of their enemies."⁴⁹ Similarly, by trying to overlook the seriousness of the warfare against Zionism by viewing it as a basic lack of knowledge, and not as a well-designed strategy, Israel also was fighting on the wrong field. The war at hand was the struggle against anti-Zionism.⁵⁰

Some of the strongest reservations about the task force project against anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism did not spring from basic differences in analysis and ideology but from the wish of some organizations to protect their standing and interests.

Almost all the negative responses to the letter announcing the establishment of the task force as well as to the invitation to the October working session came from people connected in one way or another with the World Jewish Congress. In addition to the so-called concern for preventing duplication, the WJC was not happy with the WZO's plan to lead the campaign against anti-Zionism.

For his part, Eyal viewed this unhappiness not only as "a tendency to opportunism or to protect organizational vested interests."⁵¹ He saw it more broadly as a symptom and a reflection of those Diaspora Jews who "love Israel, help her and support her politically and financially, but are opposed ideologically to accept the solution that Zionism proposes to the Jewish people. I don't refer to tactical proposals concerning the venue of such and such conference, but to questioning in principle the leadership of Jerusalem and the Zionist movement in this respect."⁵²

Perhaps even more disturbing and surprising was the fact that reluctance came also from some other members of the Zionist Executive, as hinted at by Eyal: "Unfortunately, I differ with some of my friends and colleagues who, for reasons they are keeping to themselves, expressed their reservation about the clear intention of the WZO and Jerusalem to steer the campaign against anti-Zionism in full coordination with the relevant Jewish and Zionist organizations."⁵¹

The opponents inside the WZO Executive, notably its powerful treasurer, never voiced clearly the true reason they opposed the task force plan against anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. It may have been the result of personal or

political enmity, or because of the very close links between the top leadership of the WZO and the leadership of the WJC, Edgar Bronfman and Israel Singer. It is difficult to say for certain. What is certain is that the clash over this issue was largely responsible for the various postponements of the international conference which eventually would launch the whole project to fight anti-Zionism.

After the General Zionist Council met in September, plans were changed. The working session that had been scheduled for Basel in October for the Jewish organizations to discuss the task force was cancelled. Instead there would be an international conference to draw attention to the aims, methods and dangers of the global anti-Zionist campaign and officially announce the establishment of the task force. It was set for May 1982, in Paris and entitled, "Anti-Zionism: A Threat to Democracy." Such a focus was deemed both more relevant to the international context and more likely to enlist non-Jewish support.

Most of the prominent personalities approached to sponsor this conference and serve as its convening committee responded positively. The list included Per Ahlmark, former deputy prime minister of Sweden; Christian B. Arriens, former ambassador of Holland to Israel; the well known sociologist Daniel Bell; Nobel Prize author Saul Bellow; Nobel Prize Laureate Sir Isaiah Berlin; Leonard Bernstein; Adolpho Bloch, editor of the famous "Manchete" (Brazil); The Duke of Devonshire; Father Thomas Drinan, professor at Georgetown University Law School; Jacques Ellul, professor of the Faculty of Law of Bordeaux (France); Graham Greene; Lars Gyllensten, professor at the Swedish Academy; U.S. Rep. Jack Kemp; Ephraim Katzir, former president of Israel; U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy; French sociologist Annie Kriegel; Claude Lanzman, author and film-maker; Joseph Lane-Kirkland, president of the U.S. AFL-CIO; General Jean Lecomte (France); Arrigo Levi, former editor, *La Stampa*; Indro Montanelli, Italian journalist, *La Repubblica*; Bernard Henri Levy, French author and philosopher; Julian Marias, author and philosopher, Spanish Royal Academy; Albert Memmi, French author and sociologist; U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan; Harvard Professor Robert Nozick; Father Benyamin Nunez, Costa Rica's ambassador to UNESCO; Martin Peretz, editor, *New Republic*; Alain Poper, president of the French Senate; Lynne Reid-Banks (England); Professor Eugenio Pucciarelli, president of the Academy of Sciences (Argentina); Harvard professor of philosophy, Hilary Putman; Bayard Rustin, head of the U.S. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); Reverend Pere Riquet, France; Nathan Rotenstreich, Israel Academy of Sciences; Ernesto Sabato (Argentina); Alan Sillitoe, English author; Albert Sabin, U.S. professor of biomedicine; Osvaldo Svanascini, (Argentina); Torgny Segerstedt, Swedish professor of philosophy, Uppsala; Julius Stone, professor of international law (Australia); Ephraim E. Urbach, professor, Israel Academy of

Sciences; Simone Veil, former president of the European Parliament; Harold Wilson, former UK prime minister; Yigal Yadin, professor and former deputy prime minister of Israel.

This convening committee was indisputably impressive, offering clear proof that there was no basis to the fears of some WJC officials that non-Jewish personalities would be reluctant to participate because of the WZO's leading role on the task force against anti-Zionism. WJC officials had also claimed the topic chosen for the conference, originally, "Anti-Zionism versus the Democratic Process," would deter participation.

In February 1982, Eyal had two meetings with Prime Minister Menachem Begin to brief him about plans to establish the task force and to try to enlist his support. These meetings surpassed Eyal's expectations. Begin displayed genuine interest in the whole project, even suggesting names for the convening committee as well as for keynote speakers, and asking the Mossad to provide all possible help.⁵³ He also took pains to express his support in writing. Reacting to a letter from Eyal summing up these meetings,⁵⁴ Begin expressed his pleasure that the project was progressing along with his regret he would not be able to participate. ". . . at the date stated my health will not yet be up to par in order to take part in this important conference. An excellent idea, of course is for the minister of foreign affairs to give an address before the conference. Please turn to him directly."⁵⁵

There were also positive preliminary responses from the people asked to deliver keynote addresses such as Walter Mondale, a former U.S. vice president, and Professor Raymond Aron, a French political scientist and commentator. Almost all the major Jewish organizations expressed a willingness to take an active part in the conference, notably the Anti-Defamation League.⁵⁶

This positive atmosphere made it easier for the WZO's Information Department to display both flexibility and firmness with the World Jewish Congress. There were several attempts made to overcome WJC's reservations and to get its full cooperation without giving up the WZO's leading role in the fight against anti-Zionism. But the efforts were in vain, not because of genuine ideological differences, but because the WJC refused to accept the clear and sole leadership of the WZO and seemed to nurture a deep resentment against this initiative. The problem between the two organizations was one of "co-operation and tactics," according to WJC's Stephen Roth.⁵⁷ But in plainer words, it was about turf. In a cable to Eyal, WJC Director General Israel Singer spelled it out very clearly: "No, we cannot go on with specifics of the conference without agreement on the principle [WZO Information Department Director General] Manor and I talked about, which is the relationship between the WZO and the WJC in area of anti-Zionism-anti-Semitism. We are working not only on one conference but on principle."⁵⁸

Roth was even more explicit in stating that he envisioned a "joint venture," that is at least sharing with the WZO the leadership and credit for the

campaign against anti-Zionism. "It is not a question of the WJC having a spot at a WZO conference, any more than I think the WZO would be anxious to have a spot in a WJC conference," he wrote. "What you are suggesting still means that there are two independent actions devoted to very similar themes with a little contribution here and there from each side. What I was aiming at was fully integrated, joint action."⁵⁹ For Eyal, this would have meant "the WZO dismantling itself from spearheading the fight against anti-Zionism."⁶⁰

There was at this juncture in the WZO's Information Department both a strong feeling of confidence in the task force concept and a growing impression that time was too short to prepare adequately for what had evolved from a working meeting into an international conference. A letter from Alain Poher, the French Senate president, conveying his willingness to be a member of the convening committee, reinforced this concern: "In view of the importance that you intend rightly to confer on this event, I think it difficult to imagine that it could take place this coming spring. There are therefore questions of dates to be settled and I am open to any proposal on this point, notably because I agree that at least one session of the conference could take place in the Senate. . ."⁶¹

A decision was made to postpone the conference to September 13. It would be held before the forthcoming Zionist Congress scheduled for the beginning of December, but not close enough to it to arouse anxiety within the WZO establishment that the conference was aimed at strengthening Eyal's position in the Zionist movement. It also coincided with the opening of the United National General Assembly, providing the opportunity to fight back against the anti-Zionist stance of the UNGA. It would give a "smashing answer" to those libeling Zionism as racism, as suggested by Meir Rosenne.⁶² Finally, the date took into consideration Begin's planned official visit to France.

There was a fear that the conference might collide with the Third Brussels Conference for Soviet Jewry scheduled for the end of October in Paris. This was dismissed, however, since the conference on "Anti-Zionism: a Threat to Democracy" was not addressing the same constituency and could even pave the way for the success of the Brussels Conference.⁶³ But those planning the Brussels Conference were not assuaged, especially Yehuda Lapidot, the head of the prime minister's liaison unit [Lishkat HaKeshet] in charge of Soviet Jewry, and most of the members of its presidium. Albert D. Chernin, the executive vice chairman of NJCRAC, wrote to Eyal that many Jewish leaders in the United States were deeply concerned about the impact of the anti-Zionism conference on the Soviet Jewry Conference. "The timing of the conference, its location and the names of those who are listed in your telegram to Charlotte Jacobson [the chairman of the American section of the WZO] all would undermine the impact that the conference on Soviet Jewry had in 1971

and 1976. I urge that you re-examine the timing of this conference. . . [and hold it] some time after the conference on Soviet Jewry.”⁶⁴ Accordingly, Eyal invoked a special request by Prime Minister Begin and informed all the members of the convening committee and the keynote speakers that the international conference on anti-Zionism would be postponed to November 8, 1982.⁶⁵

During the following months, intensive work was invested in preparations for the Paris conference⁶⁶ and everything seemed to go smoothly. There were even favorable articles in the Israeli press, well known for its harsh and cynical coverage of the Israeli establishment in general and the Zionist one in particular. The writers saluted the Department of Information of the WZO and praised its initiative in the fight against anti-Zionism, heightened after the war in Lebanon, and called on the coming Zionist Congress to uphold its 1978 decision to create an independent Department of Information.⁶⁷

But events suddenly took a different turn. At the beginning of September, some of the people in charge of the Soviet Jewry conference expressed their doubts about the wisdom of convening in Paris at the end of October. They pointed to the hostile stand against Israel taken by France during the war in Lebanon, and to indications the French government would probably give an official welcome in Paris to Yasser Arafat, the head of the PLO. They argued further that if their conference were not held, it would be impossible to hold the one on anti-Zionism. This sounded the alarm at the WZO. On September 6, Eyal met again with Begin to try to convince him that the two conferences were completely different and the same ruling should not apply to both.⁶⁸ He argued that precisely in light of the political context of Paris, it was the perfect place to launch the campaign against anti-Zionism. According to Eyal, Begin seemed to agree to his arguments and gave him “his blessing for continuing the preparations of this important conference.”⁶⁹

Two days later, on September 8, the picture changed after a meeting between the prime minister and Arie Dulzin, the Chairman of the WZO, on whether to postpone “Brussels III,” the Soviet Jewry conference in Paris. Begin opted to reschedule it. He did so based on reports by Yehuda Avner, his adviser for Jewish communities, that the majority of the members of the presidium of Brussels III, except the French representatives, wanted the conference postponed and relocated in Israel. At the end of the meeting, Dulzin expressed his reservations about the anti-Zionism conference, arguing it would be ill-advised to raise ideological issues in France at the current moment. He pointed to the declaration by President Reagan of September 1 calling for an immediate settlement freeze by Israel and for Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza in an arrangement linked with Jordan. In light of this, he said, the conference against anti-Zionism could be used as a platform against Israel. Begin evidently expressed his understanding and said he

would leave it to Dulzin to decide. Dulzin, however, told Eyal that Begin had decided to postpone his conference!^{69a}

While Begin did not withdraw his support,⁶⁹ Eyal had lost his main booster and he now had no alternative but to try to regain Dulzin's support for the conference. It was a price Eyal had to pay for having slighted the WZO chairman, who had not been asked to sit on the convening committee and had been confined to the role of greetings-giver.⁶⁸ But Dulzin's opposition to the conference was not solely the result of personal resentment. He doubtless was forced to take into account strong pressure by Edgar Bronfman, the chairman of the WJC, to cancel the conference and the whole task force project.

Meanwhile, Eyal sent an angry letter to Begin.

"If indeed you pull back your support, I will regret it." he wrote. "I believed, and I still want to believe, that in spite of being a member of a party which is in the opposition to the government that you are heading, you were ready to lend your backing for a goal unifying all the Zionist parties in the Knesset and in the people in Israel: to repel the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic onslaught against Israel and the Jewish people.

"It seems to me not excessive to say that throughout the period of the existence of the State of Israel, especially after the disgraceful resolution of 1975 identifying Zionism as a form of racism, there was not a more vital and decisive hour than now for the struggle against anti-Zionism. I cannot believe that I have to place before the Prime Minister the gravity of the decision to cancel the conference (since postponing, this time, boils down to cancellation). You surely know that if the establishment will wash its hands of this mission, private citizens will come and take into their hands the management of the battle to defend the Zionist concept, the soul of the State of Israel, which is being smeared among the peoples."⁶⁸

The letter was to no avail. The prime minister, for his part, later noted he did not have the authority to give orders to the Zionist Executive,⁶⁹ before which the matter was brought on October 6. On several occasions during the meeting, Dulzin gave the floor to Edgar Bronfman, who had appeared at Dulzin's invitation, prompting the feeling by some that he was trying to please the "benefactor." In the end, Eyal's proposal to convene the Paris conference on anti-Zionism as planned was rejected by a vote. Instead, a proposal by Dulzin was adopted to have an international conference on anti-Semitism within the framework of the coming Zionist Congress.⁷⁰ This was both a denial and a mockery of the concept of the task force against anti-Zionism. Likud members of the Executive, with the exception of Eli Tavin,

chairman of the Education Department, voted in favor of Dulzin's proposal. It was also supported by Rabbi Richard Hirsch of the Reform Movement. All members representing the Labor Party voted against it, including the reluctant Akiba Lewinski. Eyal wrote a disappointed note to Matityahu Drobles of Likud, saying: "I don't recognize the child from the ghetto."

The Israeli press highlighted two main reasons for the decision to cancel the conference. First, there was the opposition voiced by members of the French Jewish establishment, notably the heads of the CRIF, who were skeptical about both the need for and efficiency of a strong, public international action against anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Indeed, some even dismissed the very existence of the latter. Second, there were the fears harbored mainly by Likud's people that the conference would provide an opportunity to criticize the Israeli government and that its yield would not be worth this price.⁷¹

The decision of the Zionist Executive was sharply criticized by several Israeli politicians. Uzi Baram, the chairman of the Immigration and Absorption Committee of the Knesset, wrote a letter to the chairman of the WZO denouncing the cancellation as, "the continuation of the tendency followed by the leaders of the Likud who presently are afraid to meet Jewish as well as international public opinion."⁷² In his view the decision to cancel Brussels III showed these leaders preferred to run away from such confrontation. It was the right time, he said, to stand against worrisome trends on the condition that one was gifted with political logic and moral sensitivity, and not beset by a bad conscience, such as that which dictated the actions of the Likud leaders.⁷²

Nor did Eyal mince his words. Though Begin had reiterated his support for the anti-Zionism conference, Eyal wrote him a final letter in which he excoriated "the lack of leadership and responsibility" which allowed for "reckless responses to frightened Jews . . . who don't believe that the Zionist movement is able to help them."⁷³ It would be better, he said, if at least it will not hurt them. He then challenged Begin directly. Was it proper for the prime minister to remain silent on these issues out of concern he might interfere in matters outside his direct jurisdiction? Were the Jewish people a matter outside of his judgment? Moreover, was anyone entitled to give up important international support for Israel and Zionism just because of the fear that some criticism would be voiced against the policy of the government?⁷³

In accordance with the decision of the Zionist Executive, the international conference, "Anti-Zionism: a Threat to Democracy," was replaced not by an international conference on anti-Semitism, but by a special session of the Zionist Congress on anti-Semitism. Jewish individuals and organizations were invited to participate. Thanks to its high quality, this symposium on anti-Semitism served as a respite in the harsh and unseemly infighting among the different factions of the Zionist movement. It was a rare moment of grace

which contributed to giving the Zionist Congress and the movement a bit more dignity and respect.

A striking picture of anti-Semitism's revival in the guise of anti-Zionism⁷⁴ was drawn at the symposium by seventeen scholars, philosophers, writers, professional and lay leaders of Jewish communities and Jewish organizations from all corners of Jewish world.

Perhaps the most fascinating analysis was delivered by the young French philosopher Bernard Henri Levy. He ventured that anti-Semitism was looking for a new style decked out with new ideological trappings, which had at their core the "inversion of the role of hangman and victim, this semantic hysterical use of words and meanings."⁷⁵ In this manipulation the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians played a central role. Here, stressed Henri Levy,

"the foil is no longer the poor French People, humiliated and crushed by cosmopolitan Jewish finance, but rather the Palestinian people, the most damned of all damned, the most rejected of all rejected, for whose rejection the Jewish people are working unceasingly.

*"Their caricature is no longer the hooked-nose Jew with the big cigar of the time of the Dreyfus affair, it is no longer the Christ-killer Jew, which the Catholic tradition speaks of, but the Jew whose caricatured features, emblematic and significant, and offered up to a kind of universal execration, now resemble Ariel Sharon or Menachem Begin."*⁷⁶

All the participants recognized the potential danger of this rising tide of anti-Semitism and urged that it be challenged. They called for strengthening the Jewish state as "the most essential and the most efficacious of all possible replies to this outbreak of madness."⁷⁷ They also recommended tightening the ties between Israel and the Diaspora, celebrating the genius of Judaism and its values and implementing them to solve problems of universal concern, notably human rights abuses.

But these were only very general guidelines and most were focused inward on the Jewish world. Only Henri Levy and Professor Yehuda Bauer went further. Henri Levy almost created a scandal during his presentation when he suggested the recognition of Palestinian national identity! For his part, Bauer held that anti-Semitism had also been a matter of concern for non-Jews and suggested forging an alliance with them in fighting this social disease.⁷⁸

But there was almost no reference during this symposium to the struggle against the ZR and the plan of the task force, which had been discussed and adopted just a year earlier by the Zionist Council. Nor was there a mention of

the role of the Zionist movement in the fight against anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism, aside from critical remarks by WJC's Israel Singer. In a plenary speech, he deplored making the fight against anti-Semitism the only goal of Zionism. Anti-Zionism was being used at this Congress to fill an ideological void, he charged.

"The fight against it is being offered as an example of the dynamism of Zionism but it is an example of its ideological vacuousness.

". . . Instead of wasting time denying slanderous charges by the U.N. which costs them millions to propound and all our energy to refute, why don't we remind that body that it costs only six cents to inoculate one child against disease."

Only Eyal expressed his dismay over the hesitation of the Jewish people and the Zionist movement to "organize themselves for an orderly, systematic struggle against the U.N. equation of Zionism with racism."⁷⁹

In the end, the sole serious attempt to challenge anti-Zionism and to fight the ZR resolution was aborted, turned into a brilliant but impotent Jewish symposium on anti-Semitism. On the face of it, political infighting, organizational divisiveness, ideological differences on the meaning of Zionism and leadership of world Jewry and, of course, personal feuds, contributed to this failure.

One must also take into account, however, the irresolution of Prime Minister Begin. He had explained his reluctance to impose on the Zionist Executive his support for the international conference, "Anti-Zionism: a Threat to Democracy," claiming that it was outside his jurisdiction. But this reluctance, as pointed out by Knesset Member Baram, reflected a basic uneasiness, even a troubled conscience, in confronting international public opinion about anti-Zionism. Again, we return to that which had handicapped Israel's ability from the start to prevent the ZR and fight against it, namely its Palestinian policy. Of course, since the Camp David Accords there had been at least a nominal and semantical change in that policy. But the reluctance and uneasiness were to remain. Probably Eyal's crudest mistake was to have made the task force against anti-Zionism almost exclusively dependent on Begin's support, without being fully aware of its fragility.

NOTES

- (1) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 14, 1975.
- (2) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 28, 1975, p. 5. Cf. Menachem Roi's article, quoting from the research by Professor Shimon Herman on the "Changes and stability in the Jewish-Israeli Identity of Learning Youth in Israel," as well as from the research of Professor Elihu Gutman on the "Values and Positions of Learning Youth in Israel."
- (3) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 12, 1975, p. 4.
- (4) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 13, 1975.
- (5) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 12, 1975, p. 8.
- (6) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 12, 1975, p. 4.
- (7) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 14, 1975, p. 1.
- (8) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 14, 1975, p. 1.
- (9) WZO press release or *Yediot Ahronot*, November 12, 1975.
- (10) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 13, 1975.
- (11) Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur le Moyen Orient, *Reactions dans le Monde a la Resolution de l'ONU sur le Sionisme*, Geneve, n.d. CZA/S110/47.
- (12) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 13, 1975, p. 4.
- (13) Moshe Yegar, *Letoldoteia shel Maarechet Hasbarat Hahutz shel Israel* (A history of Israel's external information), Lahav, Herzlia, 1986, pp. 111-112.
- (14) *Havada Hameshutefet Leinianeit Hasbara Tsionit*, Jerusalem, January 1, 1976, p. 2.
- (15) Moshe Yegar, op. cite. pp. 112-113.
- (16) Dina Goren and Michael Gidron, *Hasbara Tsionit: Baaiot vi Shitot*, (Zionist Information: Problems and Methods). Seminar of the Communications Department of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977, p. 24.
- (17) Briefings and Background for information activities on Zionism Documents Agreement between Emir Feisal and Dr. Weizman—1919; Feisal-Frankfurter Correspondence—1919; Excerpts from the Palestine Royal Commission—1937; Gromyko's declarations, November 1947; May 1948. Articles and speeches by Professor Ben Halpern (Examination of Zionism); Professor M.S. Armoni (A Letter to One-time Friends and Comrades); Pere Dubois (Zionism and racism); Professor Zwi Werbłowski (Israel: The people and the Land); Cham Herzog (Speech before the Third Committee); Rav Moshe Tsvi Neriah (The Jewish People's Title to the Land of Israel); David Ben Gurion (Zionism The Jewish Liberation Movement); Igal Allon (Speech before the UNGA); David Rokeach (Historical Perspectives on the Rights of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel); Herzi Fishman (Zionism and Redemption).
- (18) *Yediot Ahronot*, November 18, 1975, p. 2.
- (19) Annex 3, attached to a Note from S.H. Hoffenberg, representant permanent a l'UNESCO, du Conseil International du B'nai B'rith, June 3, 1985, Annexe III, by the International League of Human Rights. CZA/S110/49.
- (20) ADL's "UNESCO's War Against Israel and Press Freedom," Facts, Vol. 25, No 2, June 1979, p. 7. CZA/S110/49.
- (21) Harris O. Schoenberg, *Freeing the UN from Z.R.* A World Report from the International Council of the B'nai B'rith, January 1985, p. 2.
- (22) Allard Lowenstein, "Why I Quit," *New York Post*, July 14, 1978.

- (23) *Ibidem*.
- (24) Professor Amos Shapira, "Drusha Zionut Maasit" ("Needed: Practicable Zionism"), *Yediot Ahronot*, November 24, 1975, p. 11.
- (25) Cf. Yeshayahu Ben Porat article, *Yediot Ahronot*, November 21, 1975, p. 2.
- (26) Cf. Yeshayahu Ben Porat article, *Yediot Ahronot*, November 28, 1975, p. 3.
- (27) Medzini, Ed., *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1974-1977*, Vol. Three, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, p. 385.
- (28) Hand-written protocol of this meeting by Lifсах Ben-Shah, senior aide to Eli Eyal. Not dated, probably middle of July or beginning of August 1978, in Archives of the WZO Information Department, under the reference "Koah' Hamesima" (Task Force), 1978-1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (29) "Tohmit Peula Lemarah'a Bizhut Hazionut" (Plan of action for a Campaign in Favor of Zionism), a paper for discussion prepared by Yohanan Manor, May 13, 1979. 4 pages. CZA/S110/2.
- (30) WZO, Inf. Dep.-Task Force. Between June 1979 and summer of 1980 there were more than a score of different versions of this manifesto. CZA/S110/2.
- (31) For instance, one version stressed that 1) the negation of Zionism was emptying the principle of self-determination and creating a precedent providing a legal basis for murdering a people and its state. 2) The goal of Zionism was never the negation of another people's rights. Zionism has always preferred an approach for compromise and mutual respect. 3) The campaign in favor of Zionism was meaningful for all those supporting the true principles of the United Nations. CZA/S110/2.
- (32) Report by Eli Eyal on his meeting with Willy Brandt, August 28, 1980. CZA/S110/2.
- (33) "Proposal for setting up a Task Force to coordinate the campaign against anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism," by Eli Eyal, January 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (34) "Preliminary responses to the proposal for setting up a task force to coordinate the campaign against anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism," May 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (35) Letter from Moshe Yegar to Eli Eyal, May 15, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (36) Letter from Shaul Ramati to Eyal, February 19, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (37) Letter from Akiba Lewinsky to Eyal, January 23, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (38) Circular from Eli Eyal, May 5, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (39) *Davar*, June 1, 1981.
- (40) Letter from Stephen Roth to Eli Eyal, June 4, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (41) *Davar*, June 1, 1981; IJA Research Report, "Anti-Semitism in the Western World Today," No. 7, June 1981.
- (42) Letter from Yohanan Manor, Director General of the WZO Department of Information to Hanna Zemer, the Chief Editor of *Davar*, June 3, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (43) Eliyahu Biletsky, *Libel, Zionism=Racism*, Tel Aviv, Amal 1979, p. 179.
- (44) Letter from Eli Eyal to Dulzin, July 8, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (45) Letter from Eyal to Charles Bronfman, June 14, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (46) Question to Eyal by Yehiel Leket, July 29, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (47) "The Fight against anti-Zionism," opening speech by Eli Eyal, Hasbara Workshop, General Zionist Council, September 2, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (48) Letter from Meir Rosenne to Eyal, February 1, 1981: "In my opinion the idea of a special committee which will deal with fighting anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism comes in due time. . . It is desirable that one of the objectives of the committee to be set up will be a specific [fight] against the U.N. resolution and to try to organize a world action to bring about its repeal." CZA/S110/2.
- (49) "Anti-Zionism source of anti-Semitism," *Jewish Telegraph*, August 21, 1981.
- (50) Yohanan Manor, "Hazira Haamitit: Hamaavak ba-Antizionut," (The true arena: the struggle against anti-Zionism), *Davar*, September 17, 1981; "The Struggle against anti-Zionism," *Jerusalem Post*, November 25, 1981.
- (51) Letter From Eli Eyal to Yohanan Manor, June 26, 1981. CZA/S110/2.
- (52) Letter from Eli Eyal to Arie Dulzin, July 7, 1981. CZA/S110/2.

- (53) During the second meeting with Begin in February, Eyal asked him for the support of the Mossad. On the spot, Begin telephoned the head of the Mossad (H'aka) and spoke with his deputy, Admoni, asking him to provide all possible help for the conference and the task force initiated by Eyal. A week later, there was a meeting with a person sent by the Mossad (Ephraim Halevi). While he was very reserved at the beginning, he became more cooperative when he grasped the whole concept of the task force.
- (54) Letter from Eli Eyal to Prime Minister Begin, March 7, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (55) Letter from Begin to Eyal, March 26, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (56) Daniel Mariashin's letter to Eyal, March 19, 1982, proposing to prepare background papers for two of sessions of the conference for which his organization had "expertise and a research capability." CZA/S110/1.
- (57) Letter from Stephen Roth to Eli Eyal, April 1, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (58) Telex cable from Singer to Eyal, April 23, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (59) Letter from S. Roth to Eyal, April 1, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (60) Letter from Eyal to S. Roth, April 18, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (61) Letter from Alain Poher to Arie Dulzin, April 7, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (62) Letter from Eyal to Begin, April 21, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (63) Letter from Eyal to Begin, April 20, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (64) Letter from Al Chernin to Eyal, April 26, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (65) Cable from Eli Eyal to Walter Mondale, April 26, 1982. CZA/S110/1.
- (66) The following background material was prepared for the Paris Conference, "Anti-Zionism: a Threat to Democracy."
 1: Shmuel Ettinger, "Anti-Semitism in our time."
 2: Tony Lerman, "The abuse of Zionism."
 3: Daniel Pipes, "The politics of Muslim anti-Semitism."
 4: IJA Staff, "The post-war career of the protocols of Zion."
 5: C.C. Aronsfeld, "Revisionists who whitewash Nazism."
 6: Documents: Proclamation of Independence; U.N. Resolution 3379(XXX); Statement on Zionism, Eli Eyal; Statement on U.N. Policy, Per Ahlmark; Struggle against Anti-Zionism, Yohanan Manor.
 7: A. Kriegel, "Anti-Zionism in the Light of the War in Lebanon."
 8: Erol Araf, "The Barcelona Syndrom: Ultra Right and Palestinian Terrorism in Europe."
 9: "Anti-Zionism in Australia."
 10: Jacques Ellul, "Contemporary Totalitarianism and Anti-Semitism."
 11: Roger Dufour, "An analysis of a typical campaign against Judaism in the French media."
 12: Amos Yovel, Ed. *Task Force Bulletin No. 1*, "Anti-Zionism: a Threat to Democracy." CZA/S110/48.
- (67) Shmuel Seguev, "Hamillhama beAntizionut" (The war against anti-Zionism). Maariv, August 31, 1982.
- (68) Letter from Eyal to Begin, September 30, 1982. CZA/S110/3.
- (69) Letter from Begin to Eyal, October 10, 1982. CZA/S110/3.
- (69a) According to Eyal's testimony.
- (70) *Ha'aretz*, October 7, 1982.
- (71) *Davar*, October 25, 1982.
- (72) *Ha'aretz*, October 6, 1982.
- (73) Press release, WZO Department of Information, October 20, 1982. CZA/S110/3.
- (74) The participants in the session on anti-Semitism were: Professor Yehuda Bauer, head of the Department of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University, MP Greville Janner, Chairman of the British Board of Deputies, Abba Kovner, a poet and author, leader of Jewish partisans during WWII, Edgar Bronfman, world chairman of Seagram Corporation, and chairman of the WJC, Moises Camji, vice president of DAIA, the representative body of Argentine Jewry, Arie Dulzin, chairman of the WZO, Eli Eyal, chairman of the Information Department of the WZO,

Alan Finkelkraut, a French philosopher, Eugene Gold, former district attorney in Kings County, Brooklyn, Sam Jacobs, General Secretary of Poalei Zion, England, Abraham Karlikow, director of international affairs for the American Jewish Committee, Marshall T. Meyer, Rector of the Seminario Rabbinico Latino Americano, Israel Singer, Executive Director of the WJC, Kalman Sultanik, Co-president of the World Confederation of Union Zionists, Daniel Thursz, vice president of B'nai Brith International, Elyahu Toaf, Chief Rabbi of Rome. The edited proceedings were published in *Forum*, Jerusalem, Fall 1983, No. 49, pp. 1-49.

(75) *Forum*, No. 49, op. cit., p. 7.

(76) *Forum*, No. 49, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

(77) *Forum*, No. 49, op. cit., p. 9.

(78) *Forum*, No. 49, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

(79) *Forum*, No. 49, op. cit., p. 26.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN TO RESCIND RESOLUTION 3379

The series of frustrated attempts to come to grips with the anti-Zionist wave made two things abundantly clear. One, the playing field was highly attractive, featuring high-profile international activity and potential political reward. Two, the competition was harsh and the risks were high.

General (Reserve) Uzi Narkiss, who was to succeed to Eli Eyal as the head of the WZO's Information Department, had a background that made him especially suited to the challenge before him. He was a long-time military officer who was commander of the central military region which recaptured and reunified Jerusalem during the Six Day War. After retiring from the Army, he joined the Labor Party and was appointed the director general of the Jewish Agency's department of immigration and absorption. As such, he had experience and contacts in both the Israeli and Diaspora political establishments.

Narkiss' experience initially made him wary about taking on the fight against anti-Zionism, and the fact that he had no experience working with information made him even more cautious. Also, he tended to view the whole problem of anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism. As such and in accordance with classical Zionist ideology, he believed that it was not an issue that should be addressed by the Zionist movement.

But circumstances were to dictate otherwise. Narkiss decided in July of 1983 to replace Yohanan Manor, the department's director general under Eyal, with one of his own men, Morris Zilka, who had served for several years as an adviser on Arab affairs to Mayor Teddy Kollek. But Manor wanted to stay on in the department to deal with anti-Zionism, and Narkiss agreed, despite his reservations about dealing with the issue.

QUE FAIRE?

For several weeks, Manor met with scores of people in an effort to devise a plan of action to fight anti-Zionism that would win the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They included scholars, such as Martin Gilbert, Ted Friedgut, Michael Agursky, Galia Golan, Emmanuel Sivan, and high civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Moshe Yegar, Moshe Gilboa, Elyakim Rubinstein, Alan Baker, Yitzhak Minervi and Yehuda Milo. Manor learned from Yegar that there was a growing concern in the Ministry

about the attack on Zionism and its pernicious aftermath, and that during the previous May there had been a series of consultations at the Ministry but that they had "led nowhere."¹

At the beginning of November 1983, Manor sent Narkiss and Yegar a working paper, entitled "Plan of action to exonerate Zionism."² It chronicled the serious damage caused by Resolution 3379 and stressed the vital need for a long-term campaign to restore Zionism's reputation. It also pointed to auspicious signs the U.N. might change its anti-Zionist posture. There was Israel's improving international standing, as evidenced by its resumption of relations with Zaire and Chad. And there was apparent fatigue among Third World countries with the continuing exploitation of the ZR equation. As examples, Manor cited the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in New Delhi of April 1983, and the U.N. conference closing the decade for the eradication of racism held in Geneva in August of the same year. At both, condemnations of Zionism failed to win overwhelming support. Moreover, said Manor, "with Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and the beginning of some negotiations with the Palestinians these chances [for a U.N. improvement] will grow." In conclusion, Manor recommended taking steps to create the proper conditions in the international arena to revoke Resolution 3379.²

In response, Yegar suggested holding a working session with experts to discuss the document in detail and determine its final wording.³ Yegar's suggestion was incorporated into a new document submitted to Narkiss. It called for a series of meetings with a large working group to finalize, on the basis of this document, the strategy to combat the "anti-Zionist libel."⁴ Narkiss accepted the proposal. In the meantime he turned to the chairman of the WZO and got his blessing for these working sessions as well as for the idea of a conference to be held under the auspices of the president of the state of Israel at the end of 1984.⁵

In January 1984, Narkiss sent an invitation in the name of the WZO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a large group of Israeli luminaries. It invited them to discuss "a proposal devised in recent discussions between the Department of Information of the WZO and the Information Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to plan an ongoing and continuous action to rescind UNGA Resolution 3379."⁶ A paper called, "Guidelines for the Campaign Against the U.N. Resolution Censuring Zionism," was attached to the invitation. It stated that Resolution 3379 had had a very destructive effect on the Jewish people as well as on the State of Israel. It said that the prevailing tendency to underplay the issue did not work and did not result in its disappearance from the international agenda. Rather, the "evil has spread to a wide audience among the Jewish people and the whole world."⁷ The document suggested that public opinion could be more effectively influenced by initiating an ongoing "activity which will create a critical mass which can, when the time comes, if and when conditions will appear ripe and ap-

propriate, help pass a series of resolutions in international fora which will signify the negation of the libel."⁷

More than twenty people took part in the meeting on February 28, 1984 at the Weizman Hall in the building of the National Institutions in Jerusalem. It was co-chaired by Dulzin, Narkiss and Yegar and resulted in a consensus that the anti-Zionist wave was causing serious damage. But the participants also agreed there was no chance of overturning Resolution 3379, because there was no legal precedent and no majority among member-countries of the United Nations. They further ventured that the fight against the resolution would be a very difficult and long one, perhaps taking one or two generations!

Mordechai Gazit, for one, a former director general of the prime minister's bureau under Golda Meir, held that there was no reason to focus on Resolution 3379, which was only one of many anti-Zionist and anti-Israel resolutions and that, instead, the whole anti-Zionist trend should be fought.⁸ Hillel Ashkenazi, general director of the Absorption Ministry in the '70s, went even further and argued that even if it were possible to achieve the overturn of the ZR resolution, the anti-Zionist trend would not be stopped.⁹ This grim assessment ran the risk of leading once again to the conclusion that there was not much to do to reverse the dangerous trend.

Most of the people at the meeting were not impressed by the conviction expressed by Yehiel Leket that the fight against the anti-Zionist libel was a vital issue for the Zionist movement. He argued that the failure of the movement to take up the cudgel in the face of the attacks on its morality in the international arena was proof of its weakness and sluggishness. Leket viewed the initiative to combat the ZR both as an imperative to halt the damage it was inflicting and as a possible turning point in the life of the Zionist movement.¹⁰

Three different strategies were proposed to deal with what seemed like the unstoppable tide. One held that the only option was to embark on a long-range educational program for Jews as well as non-Jews. (Its advocates included Akzin, Arnon, Ashkenazi, Lapidot, Minervi.) The program would enhance the image of Zionism, explain its meaning and achievements, and provide clear answers to the charges leveled against it by addressing the origin and purpose of the Law of Return, Who is a Jew, the question of Jewish peoplehood and the status of other religions in Israel.¹¹

Here, Minervi, the inspector general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offered pragmatic plans, reiterating the outline of a note he had sent to Director General David Kimche a month earlier after a meeting with Manor. He suggested staging a public trial to discredit the U.N. in general and its resolution on Zionism in particular; a systematic investigation in a wide range of countries of how the subject of Zionism was taught in universities in various disciplines to determine the anti-Zionist impact; academic courses in univer-

sities for the authentic study of Zionism; a survey of the books on Zionism and the Arab-Israeli conflict in public and academic libraries and the preparation of a package of books on Israel and Zionism to be distributed to these libraries in the native language, and the distribution of positive material on Israel and Zionism to the most important data banks in the United States and in Europe.¹²

Samuel Katz, a writer and editor who had been Prime Minister Begin's adviser on external information [hasbara], had been unable to attend the meeting. Instead, he sent a long letter to Narkiss expressing his view that it was not possible for hasbara to rescind 3379. Nevertheless he wanted hasbara to be directed first and foremost to Jews and friends in order to remove the doubts from their hearts about Zionism and to provide them with ammunition against the libel. Katz was against an apologetic approach "which turns us into the accused, and our enemies into accusers. Yes," he said, "we have to present Zionism as the movement of renaissance and liberation of the Jewish people, but in addition to attack our enemies," that is, their hegemonic and exclusive ambitions, and their relentless effort to liquidate the Jewish State.¹³

The second call was for international action to discredit the United Nations and to press for its reform and even its replacement. This was adopted by Yosef Nedava, history professor at Haifa University, Yegar, Ijo Rager, a former journalist and diplomat, who had been a senior adviser to the chairman of the Jewish Agency in the late '70s, Minervi, and Gideon Raphael, a former Foreign Ministry director general. This view had currency in very influential circles in the United States, notably by people connected with the conservative Heritage Foundation.¹⁴

"We should not act to abrogate resolution 3379, but to abrogate the importance of the U.N., and to hitch our carriage to the the train heading to reduce the importance of the U.N.," observed Raphael.¹⁵ Benjamin Akzin, a well known political science professor, expressed strong reservations about this scheme, fearing it would spur a backlash. It would "not contribute to Israel," he claimed, "but only add criticism and blame against it. Such a train is only taking shape. Perhaps nothing will come out of it. And if it will get momentum, I think that we should join only as the last carriage in this train. But this train did not yet leave the station, and I prefer that we shall not start with this openly [or] even covertly."¹⁶

Ehud Sprinzak and Alan Baker advocated the third way—adopting the abrogation of Resolution 3379 as the major objective of a long-term campaign, even if it could not be realized. Sprinzak observed that for the first time the proposal under discussion tried to provide a "strategic answer to a hasbara problem" and that its main virtue was establishing a specific, albeit "long-term goal."¹⁷ Sprinzak also challenged Gazit's view that Resolution 3379 had no more weight than other anti-Zionist and anti-Israel resolutions. As evidence, he pointed to the results achieved by its proponents.

"I accept the reservations of the people who think that it is perhaps not possible to reach this [abrogation] target," he said, "but its very specificity is precisely what the U.N. did to us. This is probably the greatest blow dealt to the State of Israel, to its ideological and spiritual foundations, and therefore in spite of the fact that perhaps it is not possible to achieve, as a direction it is a good and correct one and it is important that we focus on it."¹⁷

Alan Baker, the deputy legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also emphasized the importance of Resolution 3379 by calling upon his personal and professional experience as Israel's representative to international conferences of the U.N. and affiliated agencies such as UNESCO, WHO and ILO. "I can see the political, historical and legal meaning of this resolution," he said. "It is therefore very important for my everyday work to try and empty its content. But how to do it? Since it is obvious that even in the best parliamentary situation at the U.N. we will not be able to get a new resolution which will actually mean the abrogation of 3379, we have to find ways to empty it of its meaning." Baker pointed to countries that supported 3379 or abstained which had diplomatic relations with Israel as well as countries with substantial Jewish communities. He suggested getting declarations from parliaments or other "political factors" in these countries pledging a change in their nation's positions on the resolution.¹⁸

The end of this long session was frustratingly ambiguous. There was a clear consensus on the urgency to run a long-range campaign against the anti-Zionist crusade. But, once again, there was no agreement whatsoever on the strategy to be employed. The ambiguity notwithstanding, Narkiss drew up a plan. He took stock of Gazit's experience and observation that the only practical way to deal with an ongoing problem, such as the Arab boycott against Israel or the rights of Soviet Jews to emigrate was to set up a special administrative framework under clear government ministerial jurisdiction. He then suggested assembling a simple working group with people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the WZO and the university community. He offered to head it and named Manor as its coordinator. He expected the working group to prepare a program to be carried out by the three entities.¹⁹

Although Eyal was successful in recruiting many distinguished public figures for the Convening Committee and the Task Force, Narkiss chose a different direction. Contrary to Eyal, the reserve general did not seek international legitimacy. While such a group of prominent personalities represented a very important, even perhaps decisive asset for the success of the Task Force, it could not and did not provide the legitimacy needed.

Narkiss, with his long experience in the Israeli as well as in the Jewish and Zionist systems, understood that he had to win legitimacy from inside these establishments. He secured Dulzin's backing, Lewinsky's understanding, and the close cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Above all, he had the Ministry's formal blessing to lead the endeavor. A few days

after the brainstorming session, Narkiss informed David Kimche, the Ministry's director general, of the proposal to set up a working group, and he suggested that Foreign Affairs take the lead. Kimche told Narkiss the WZO should steer the campaign which would have the full cooperation of the Ministry. The Ministry, however, would have the exclusive responsibility for diplomatic steps when they were needed, he stipulated.

Hence, without fuss or fanfare, at the beginning of March 1984, Narkiss was assigned by the Zionist and Israeli establishments the mission of fighting the ZR resolution, considered by most to be a mission impossible! Several months later he was to get the support of Jewish international organizations as well.

ESTABLISHING A PROCESS

The working group met several times and agreed upon a practical strategy to deal with the ongoing defamation of Zionism. It first resolved to prepare several position papers to better grasp the nature and impact of the ZR strategem. They were to address whether the ZR resolution reflected a carefully calculated strategy to delegitimize the state of Israel and to assess the damage it caused and might still be causing. One of the papers would debunk the ZR equation and show that it had no legal grounding.

Moreover, a clear goal for the campaign was formulated. Despite the widely held belief that the abrogation of 3379 was unattainable and would not in itself put an end to the far larger crusade against Zionism, the campaign set its sights on breaking or nullifying the ZR equation. This was very close to rescinding 3379, but fell short of stating it explicitly. In practice, however, no one stuck to this more restrained formulation, increasingly referring to the campaign to abrogate Resolution 3379.

Organizers decided to enlist international public opinion to help undermine the ZR equation and pave the way for the revocation of the resolution. They would target the countries which had supported the U.N.'s adoption of the resolution or had abstained and try to persuade them to shift their positions. They planned to obtain resolutions expressing support for such a change from national and international elected bodies and influential organizations as well as individuals. Their strategy also included five international conferences,²⁰ to be kicked off on November 11, 1984 with the conference in Jerusalem under the auspices of President Chaim Herzog.²¹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an outline of the campaign plan to all the Israeli embassies through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,²² while the WZO sent one to Zionist and Jewish organizations and Friendship Leagues.²³ Accompanying the outline was a detailed questionnaire which aimed to measure anti-Zionism in each country and to elicit suggestions for initiatives

for the campaign. Israeli organizations, such as the Histadrut,²⁴ political parties, Friendship Leagues, women's organizations,²⁵ as well as churches²⁶ and intellectuals²⁷ also were approached to increase their level of interest and to win their commitment to involve their colleagues abroad.

The reactions to this plan as well as the answers to the questionnaire, which was returned by forty-four countries, were disappointing. Most respondents chose to emphasize the difficulty in assessing the measure's impact and did not recommend taking any initiative to overturn it. Also, there were some sarcastic comments, perhaps predictably, about the belated interest in Resolution 3379 and the seriousness of the new campaign from people such as Costa Rica's Nunez and Jacques Givet, a French political commentator and author of such books as *The Anti-Zionist Complex* [*Le Genocide Inacheve*]. And some of the answers by Israeli diplomatic missions contained surprising errors on the positions adopted on the ZR resolution by the countries in which they were stationed, such as Malawi and Singapore.

But most disturbing were the signs of an erosion in the position of some Western countries which had opposed 3379, such as Sweden, New Zealand and Italy. They seemed likely to shift their position from opposition to abstention!

The few diplomats who pointed to the extensive and cumulative damage caused by Resolution 3379 included Yaakov Levy (Italy), David Danieli (U.N., Geneva), David Peleg (U.K.), Dov B. Shmorak (Argentina) and Meir Rosenne (U.S.). But the best insight on the subtle but powerful impact of 3379 was expressed by Evelyne Guffens, a member of the French CEAI (Comite des Enseignants Amis d'Israel). Guffens believed the damage caused by the resolution was "extensive" and pointed as evidence to the perversion of language at the U.N. "We are witness to the fact that it is possible to attack Zionism with complete impunity and that the term itself has become a derogatory one."²⁸ But the consequences were felt particularly in the media and in the universities, she noted. Interestingly, Guffens held a view quite distinct from that of Colette Avital, the counselor in charge of information at the Israeli embassy in Paris. For Avital, if "the term Zionism did not evoke positive associations," it was not because of the U.N. resolution, but because of questions raised from time to time, especially in the media, as to "whether this movement was achieving or not [achieving] its goals."²⁹

The staff of the Israeli embassy in Washington held conflicting views on the circular and its attached questionnaire. Some, among them Ambassador Rosenne himself, noted "that since its adoption, Resolution 3379 had been included in reference books for the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and served as material for teaching students in universities all over the world."³⁰ The practical recommendation of the embassy was to renew the basic information campaign about Zionism's essence as the Jews' national liberation movement but "it was not desirable to link it with the U.N. resolution on Zionism."³¹

Others viewed it as a moribund episode that should not be revived. The consul general in Boston, Michael Shiloh, went even further. "I suppose that we will find out that militant anti-Zionism is a problem in some European countries, in the U.N. corridors, and of course in the leftist margins of the USA," he said. "But I don't think that among our main target groups this stupid equation enjoys any support. There is nobody that is something, in the administration, in the media, in the universities (and I am speaking of non-Jews only) that thinks or says that Zionism is a form of racism."³¹

By contrast, the consul general in Philadelphia, Pinchas Gonen, strongly supported the idea of requesting nations which could be influenced by Western countries to distance themselves from Resolution 3379. It was a realizable goal, he maintained, "on the condition that we mobilize the support of public opinion in the U.S. and in Europe to this demand."³² Gonen had in mind countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Portugal. Respondents to the questionnaire mentioned other possible candidate-countries as well: Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Singapore, Lesotho, Botswana, and Spain (after the warming of ties with Israel which began in the early '80s and culminated in the formal establishment of diplomatic relations in 1986).

All in all, several months after sending the circular, the attempt to interest and involve in this campaign the Israeli embassies, the Jewish communities and organizations, and the different sectoral organizations and groups, Israeli as well as Jewish, yielded only limited results. The women's organizations, Histadrut, the political parties, especially MAPAM and the Labor Party, were very cooperative. They suggested some promising strategies which unfortunately were not carried out in most cases due to the lack of funding. Moreover, some Jewish leaders took upon themselves the responsibility for organizing the planned international conference: Eric Moonman and Georges Garai from the Zionist Federation in London, Theo Klein, the chairman of the CRIF in Paris, and Bernice Tannenbaum, the chairman of the American section of the WZO in New York.

On the other hand, most of the embassies displayed more than reluctance about the suggested campaign and many communities did not react at all. Also, some good projects were proposed but never got off the ground, such as an appeal by Nobel Prize winners against the ZR equation and the establishment of an independent academic committee to reach out and mobilize international support among intellectuals and scholars.³³ Indeed, the lack of interest displayed by the Israeli intellectuals who were approached was particularly disappointing, including A.B. Yehoshua, Yehuda Bauer, Menachem Brinker, Father Marcel Dubois, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Shaul Friedlander, Amos Oz, Anita Shapira and Yermiyahu Yovel. There was apparently no reaction to letters sent them by Narkiss seeking to enlist their support for the international outreach committee.

Narkiss sent the letters two weeks after a day-long seminar held on June 3

at the Hebrew University, entitled, "Israel and the Anti-Zionist Drive." Sponsored by the Information Department of the WZO and the University's Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, it was aimed at raising Israeli public awareness of the issue. The participants included notable academicians such as Yehoshafat Harkabi, Ruth Lapidot and Ehud Sprinzak, Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Pinchas Eliav, who was in charge of international organizations, Knesset Members Ehud Olmert and Simcha Dinitz, and Narkiss.

The seminar was productive. For one, it helped eliminate the remaining reservations about the campaign in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially those of Deputy Director General Eliav. Eliav considered himself the Ministry's specialist on the resolution but he was opposed to combating it directly and by political means. He believed this would contribute to a renewal and even enhancement of the U.N.'s credibility. Instead, he favored a campaign to present Zionism positively. In this spirit Eliav supported the plan for five international conferences, though he insisted they be held on dates of Jewish or Zionist significance, and not on days connected with U.N. activity.³⁴ With the study day at Hebrew University, he began to change his view, largely due to the incisive, penetrating and alarming analysis delivered by Sprinzak on anti-Zionism and its threat to Israel's existence.

In his lecture, Sprinzak underscored the serious danger to the state of Israel of the new anti-Zionism, i.e., the one built around the ZR equation.³⁵ The unanimous view that the outrageous condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism was but a blunt anti-Semitic slander aimed at Jews and Zionists alike had led, he said, to the deceptive conclusion "that there was no special cause for alarm over the new campaign since it is only a reincarnation of an old libel."

The new anti-Semitism, while not pleasant, is still not a great threat, he went on. It has no teeth, its menace is merely verbal, and hence it can be met with relative equanimity. But, from the moment that the new Zionism-equals-racism formula gained currency at the U.N. and in other international bodies, a much graver thing occurred than merely a resurgence of a modern form of anti-Semitism. "Effective weapons had been forged with which to attack the state of Israel itself and the spiritual and historical basis of its right to exist. . . a qualitative change ushered in the anti-Zionism of the '70s, a change arising from the fact that Zionism had ceased being an object of delegitimization and had become an object of dehumanization."³⁵

Sprinzak's words were to become the "manifesto" of the campaign to overturn 3379.

FIRST SUCCESS

We have already observed that the efforts to involve the Jewish communities and the Israeli embassies in fighting the ZR equation yielded paltry results. They did, however, contribute to raising the profile of this issue among them, and prepare the ground for a more active involvement at a later juncture.

At the end of August 1984, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an alert to its diplomatic representatives and to the Steering Committee Against Anti-Zionism (the new name given to the working group). It advised them that at the upcoming September Inter-Parliamentary Conference in Geneva there would be an attempt to reiterate the ZR equation. It was clear sponsors would bank on Iraq's success at the previous session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in April. At that time, Iraq had submitted a draft resolution containing a paragraph reaffirming "the right of all peoples oppressed by colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism including Zionism, and apartheid, to self-determination, independence, national sovereignty and equality and the right to struggle in every way possible, including armed struggle, for the attainment of those rights." The resolution had been adopted by an overwhelming majority of 658 to 137, with 195 abstentions and 30 absences.

Several Western and Latin America delegations had split their votes on the Kuwaiti initiative: Ireland (9 Yes, 2 No), UK (4 Yes, 4 No, 4 Abs.), Australia (2 No, 11 Abs.), Switzerland (8 No, 4 Abs.) Greece (8 Yes, 4 No), Portugal (2 Yes, 10 Abs.) Bolivia (6 Yes, 6 Abs.). Other supported it unanimously: Italy (17), Argentina (15), Peru (11).

Under item 3 of the agenda for the upcoming Inter-Parliamentary Conference, the Kuwait group proposed a draft resolution dealing with "the contribution of parliaments to the elimination of colonialism, racism, racial and ethnic discrimination. . ." It recalled, among others UNGA Resolution 3379, and asserted in paragraph 10 that Zionism was a form of racism and racial discrimination. In paragraph 12 it found "the Zionist military, legislative and administrative measures designed to prevent Palestinians from practicing these rights (of return) to be a crime against humanity." In paragraph 13, it denounced "the Zionist racialist policies aimed at enticing the subjects of other States to immigrate to Palestine on religious bases and settle them in the place of the Palestinian Arabs, after expelling the latter and seizing their lands."

A memorandum sprinkled with a host of unfounded accusations against Zionism and distorted quotes from Zionist leaders was attached to this draft resolution. It claimed that the "Jews were never planning to establish a national homeland for themselves" and that "since its inception, the Zionist

movement was characterized by ethnic and racial discrimination based on the theory of the chosen people of God which is instilled into the mind of every Zionist.”

The anti-Zionism steering committee swung into action by turning to the leaders of the major Jewish organizations as well as to the leaders of about forty Jewish communities worldwide. It gave them background material and asked them to urge their countries’ delegates to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference to prevent the Kuwaiti initiative or to defeat it.^{35a} At the same time, the Israeli Labor Party was approached and asked to solicit the support of all the socialist and social-democratic parties having ties with it. Accordingly, Israel Gat, the chairman of the International Department of the Labor Party, sent a cable to forty socialist leaders urging them to instruct their representatives at this conference to oppose strongly the slander of the national movement of the Jewish people. In addition, Gat was sent at the beginning of September to the Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden to lobby the party as well as representatives of other participating socialist parties. There he got a commitment to prevent the Kuwaiti move from nine socialist and social-democratic parties (from Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden).

These steps and those taken by Jewish communities—especially of Australia, United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Venezuela and Argentina—combined with the deft maneuvering of the Israeli delegation headed by Knesset Member Simcha Dinitz—created conditions that helped neutralize the Kuwait initiative.³⁶

Upon his return from this conference, the chairman of the British Group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, MP Peter Temple-Morris, wrote to the president of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, MP Greville Janner. “I am pleased to tell you that by taking a strong line within the Ten Plus Group of Western Nations, of which I am chairman, and generally, we managed to remove all references of Zionism and racism from Conference resolutions. Indeed, we managed to take out all references to the Middle East, which must rank as somewhat of an achievement!”³⁷

OFFICIAL KICK-OFF

This first success was energizing. It showed the decisive importance of mobilization and proved that fighting back could yield rewards. It also helped remove the remaining reservations of some Foreign Ministry officials. Somewhat unexpectedly, Eliav, the head of its international organizations, turned to the WZO to ask for its help in preventing the forthcoming U.N. conference on women in Nairobi from adopting an anti-Zionist stance.³⁸

Meanwhile, the official kick-off of the campaign to overturn Resolution

3379, and in accordance with the steering committee plan, was a conference on November 11, 1984, called "Refuting the Zionism-Racism Equation." It was held at the residence of Israeli President Herzog under the auspices of both the WZO and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although awkward and apologetic in its title, the conference achieved its goals. More than 200 people took part: politicians, Knesset members, members of the Zionist Executive, officials from the Foreign Ministry, representatives of the main Jewish organizations, scholars and academics, writers, journalists and members of the diplomatic corps. Several position papers, most specially commissioned for the occasion, analyzed the origins, motivations, consequences and impact of the ZR resolution.³⁹

The symposium received wide coverage by the foreign media (U.S. Canada, France, Belgium, Italy, Austria, Germany, England and Spain) and in the Israeli press—in the newspapers, (*Haaretz*, *Davar*, *Hatsofeh*, *Maariv*, *Yediot Ahronot*, *Al Hamishmar*, *Jerusalem Post*)⁴⁰ on the radio, and even on television, in spite of Israel Television's decision not to cover the event. Herzog's subsequent protest prompted ITV to broadcast an interview with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, by now a U.S. senator. This initial recalcitrance, however, was for Herzog and Moynihan another reminder of the strong reluctance of Israelis as well as all Jews to take the problem of anti-Zionism seriously.⁴¹

Most of the keynote speakers, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, also the vice premier, Moynihan, Father Nunez, Costa Rica's permanent ambassador to UNESCO, and Herzog, focused their remarks on the danger of the ZR link, the damage it had caused, and what could be done to combat it.

But it was Nunez, who in 1975 was ambassador to the U.N., who set the tone of the day by stressing the *raison d'être* of the conference.

*"We come here to become more conscious of the ominous meaning of an act of darkness by a world organization which betrayed the very purpose of its existence, which was to promote peace among nations, to become more aware of the consequences of an infamous resolution used once more to condemn the Jewish people just for the 'crime' of its determination to live its cultural and spiritual values in a land where its national personality was shaped as an independent and sovereign nation, just for the crime of being Jewish. We come here, Jews and non-Jews, to find ways to stop the growing tide of hate and return to the old anti-Semitism, which for generations was a crime against Humanity."*⁴²

Shamir took a strong and surprising stand at the conference. He called for the abrogation of Resolution 3379, which stood in sharp contradiction to the position advocated by most Ministry officials. He even advocated the possibility of setting up a new United Nations organization!

Shamir's very presence was a notable, behind-the-scenes success. Narkiss had been convinced that without his active participation, the seminar would lose a lot of its value. Only after exerting heavy pressure on Shamir's secretary, however, was he able to secure an appointment, but it was for the day after the conference! Narkiss refused to be deterred and when he finally was granted a meeting, he found himself surprised by the reaction of the foreign minister, whom he had known well for many years. Shamir told Narkiss he believed he was being invited in order to be set up as a target for criticism that not enough was being done by the government. He also feared attacks simply because he was a member of the Likud party. Narkiss promised Shamir he would protect him by allowing only two, non-threatening questions to be asked after a prepared address, and would then announce Shamir had to return to a busy schedule at the office. Narkiss did as he had promised.

In his remarks, Shamir recalled how some of Israel's "friends" had tried to persuade it not to attach too much importance to this resolution. "They argued that, after all, it is only a piece of paper; it is not even an operative resolution, calling for action; it is a declaration without impact that will be forgotten in time." But, unfortunately, noted Shamir, these friends "underrated the nature of declarative resolutions which gather impetus and became an accepted norm. We, of course treated this resolution with the contempt it deserved. But, we are an ancient people with long experience and sense of history, and we cannot allow such a malicious slander to stand on the record and burden future generations of our people. Already, the wording has, like poison, filtered into the minds of many people. The accusation that Zionism is racism has consciously or unwittingly been accepted as an axiom and self-evident truth by parties on the left and right of the political spectrum even in many countries of the Western world."⁴³

Moynihan was more specific about the nature of the danger of the ZR linkage: "Having failed to destroy Israel in combat, because Israel could rely on the aid of other democratic countries, and-most especially the United States, the Soviet Union set out to undermine the very legitimacy of the Israeli state," he said. "Its leaders presumably calculated that Western governments would find it difficult to marshal popular support in the future for a country widely perceived to be illegitimate. And in this they would not be wrong. . . (On previous occasions) I suggested that Israel has become a metaphor for democracy in a struggle being waged with something more than planes and tanks."⁴⁴

Moynihan then spoke of an alternative "balance of power," that of ideas and ideologies, which is as decisive in the long run as the military power balance. For the moment, he said, "Israel has little to fear from the strictly military balance. But I believe that Israel has much to fear from the ideological" assault aimed at branding Israel as illegitimate.⁴⁵ The senator also observed that although the original ZR formulation was surfacing less

frequently than before, it had metastasized, and the lie was to be recognized for what it was when it appeared under second and third formulations, turning Zionism into a general statement for evil in the world.⁴⁶

For Herzog, the fight also was for truth and against what he termed “this hatred cloaked in ill-digested terminology which continues to threaten the spiritual health of the world’s nations.” He noted the Soviet-Arab-inspired attack against the Jewish people which came to full expression in the resolution on Zionism and aimed at the gradual delegitimization of Israel. But “most serious” and even “more sinister, because it is so much more subtle,” was what he labeled the “process of disinformation in the West, which creates the atmosphere in which the more brutal political and physical anti-Semitic attacks can be mounted with comparative impunity. Because the Western countries adopt the communist semantics or code words, the communists have won half the battle.”⁴⁷

Herzog also put the conference into perspective and looked ahead. “What we have done today in preparation for other gatherings in other centers, will help to restore appreciation for precision of thought and language for impartial examination of issues, most simply for truth.”⁴⁷

The participants offered different ideas for fighting the resolution, with Nunez suggesting that efforts be made to influence opinion makers. “Only by enlightening them properly and constantly, by bringing to the media the real meaning of this aberration, can we break the equation.” He also turned to the Jewish communities, exhorting them to gain strength from their own roots. “Zionism means also the return to your values, to more Jewish values and traditions, to be proud of being Jewish. . . Jews should not be disheartened by this diabolic resolution. They must continue to fight, to strengthen their belief in their sacred ideals.”⁴⁸

Herzog also called on the Jewish people to awaken from its indifference and to fight back, while Moynihan noted his surprised at the slowness of the Jewish response to the anti-Zionist campaign. At the same time, Moynihan praised the conference, offering it was “the first time since the resolution was passed. . . that the matter has been dealt with in an appropriately scholarly manner.”⁴⁹ He went on to suggest that the single most important contribution that intellectuals can make to refuting the equation is to “write more of the history, to discover and reveal the origins and the motivations of the lie. . . To tell the truth—say it loudly and often and insist upon it, abroad as we would at home.”⁵⁰

Shamir sounded an alarm and called for urgent action, seeming to mark a departure from the complacent posture taken for years by the Israeli government in the face of 3379. “We the Government of Israel and the World Zionist Movement are becoming more and more aware of the need to develop special counter-measures. We must find ways of erasing and negating this resolution.”

“It is not a minute too soon to marshal our forces in Israel, in world Jewry and among our good friends to refute the equation and to restore the noble image of Zionism. Regimes have changed and governments have been replaced in some countries that voted for the resolution or abstained. We may succeed in getting them to see the error of their ways and bring about a revision of the resolution. Alternatively we ought to support current moves to bring into being another United Nations of democratic countries.”⁵¹

The conference adopted at its conclusion a statement called, “The defamation of Zionism—The new anti-Semitism,” submitted by Uzi Narkiss, the chairman of the study day. The participants, said the statement,

“DECLARE their abhorrence at the travesty committed by the UN Resolution 3379 defaming Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish People.

“STRESS their conviction that Resolution 3379 subverts the principles and purposes of the U.N. Charter, perverts the tenets of truth and human dignity, corrupts the minds of uninformed people.

“MAINTAIN that this resolution was meant to provide the justification for an all-out assault against the Jewish State, in order to bring an end to Jewish independence, to serve the spreading and deepening of hatred against the Jewish people and its spiritual and cultural heritage, substituting the age old anti-Semitism with the defamation of modern Zionism.

“EMPHASIZE their vigorous opposition to any form of racism and dissemination of racist ideology, and warn against the danger of ideological and religious extremes where they occur, which must be met with resolute dedication to practice mutual tolerance.

“REAFFIRM that Zionism is the fulfillment of the Jewish People’s right to self-determination and its aspiration to live in freedom and political independence in its ancient homeland; that Zionism has always been committed to liberal humanistic and democratic values, and that from its inception it has always endeavored, by negotiation and compromise, to reconcile its aims with the rights and national aspirations of its Arab neighbours, even when confronted by hostility and aggression.

“EXPRESS their deep concern at the lack of public awareness of the nefarious implications of Resolution 3379 and the designs of its originators.

“CALL UPON Jews wherever they live, people dedicated to democratic values, and Human Rights, and governments of enlightened countries everywhere to resist this insidious campaign of defamation of Zionism and of the Jewish People and expose its underlying designs:

- *to eliminate the sovereign existence of Israel*
- *to incite hatred against the Jewish People*
- *to subvert the power of resistance of nations upholding human liberty and national freedom.*⁵²

Three major conclusions were drawn from the study day. First, the ZR equation had been effective, especially among people relying on U.N. informational material, such as journalists, scholars and students. And although it had not created a wedge between Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora, it appeared to have made Diaspora Jewry increasingly wary of Zionism. Second, the Arabs and the USSR even more so, were the driving force behind the on-going defamation of Zionism and had managed to turn the U.N. into a stronghold of anti-Semitism. The ZR resolution was a symptom of the dangerous disease eroding the institution's standing as well as its political and moral role. Third, only a sustained ideological and political effort would stop the on-going anti-Zionist drive. In this effort, abrogating the ZR resolution was to be part and parcel of the effort to rescue the U.N. and restore it to its actual vocation, while the proponents of the defamation campaign against Zionism would be unmasked as violators of human rights and self-determination.

The campaign abroad was kicked off by a seminar, “ZR, an Assault on Human Rights,” at the State Department on December 10, International Human Rights Day. It was carried out by Bernice Tannenbaum, the chairman of the America section of the WZO. But she had taken pains to involve the State Department which hosted the seminar, and to secure the co-sponsorship of two other major worldwide Jewish organizations, the World Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith International. This politic inclusivity was an auspicious departure from the petty infighting which had plagued the organizations' earlier efforts to fight anti-Semitism. Ironically, the meeting took place in Loy Henderson Hall, named for a U.S. assistant secretary of state during the Truman presidency who was staunchly opposed to the establishment of the state of Israel.

The attendees included 300 carefully selected leaders of fifty Jewish organizations, the ambassadors of eleven nations, and top clergymen, academicians and politicians, and representatives of the three co-sponsoring organizations, WZO (Tannenbaum and Narkiss.), BBI (Gerald Kraft, president, and Philip Lax, chairman, of the International Council of B'nai Brith) and WJC (Frieda Lewis, chairman of the American Section; Arthur Herzberg, vice president). There were also six prominent speakers: Elliot

Abrams, assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs; T.T.B. Koh, ambassador of Singapore to the U.S.; Senator Moynihan; Meir Rosenne, Israel's U.S. ambassador; Professor Marshal Breger, special assistant to the president for public liaison with American Jewry; Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. ambassador to the U.N.

Naturally, many of same views expressed in Jerusalem were heard at the State Department. But sometimes the formulations were more striking. There was Kraft's notable quote from Edmond Burke: "All that is needed for evil to triumph is for good men to remain silent."

For her part, Kirkpatrick warned that the ZR equation was not a mere slogan but a program for the delegitimization and the destruction of the state of Israel. It also played a key role, she noted, in the log-rolling process by which Africans would support the Arabs on Middle East issues. That alliance, plus the Soviet bloc, provided the stable structural base for anti-Israeli actions inside the U.N., she concluded.

Kirkpatrick claimed it was difficult for those who had not worked inside the U.N. and witnessed it first-hand to understand the ferocity and the perversity of the ongoing assault on Israel. Not only is there moral double-speak, she said, but there is a "kind of moral double-bookkeeping in which Israel can do no right and her detractors can do no harm."

No crime literally is too indecent for Israel to be thought guilty of,⁵⁸ she said. Any attack against Israel is justified. Any defense is unjustified. No one can expect that Israel will receive fair treatment at the U.N., where anathema is called down on her as on no other nation in U.N. history.⁵⁹ Israel would have been expelled from the U.N. "had it not been for the laws on our books making clear that if the State of Israel is denied participation in any body of the U.N., the United States will withdraw also and will withhold all financial contributions until Israel's right to participate has been restored."⁶⁰ It was imperative to challenge lies which, if left unchallenged, are transformed into policies which, if left unchallenged, are transformed into murder, Kirkpatrick charged. "The lie that Zionism is racism has already spread far, and damaged many. That lie will only be expunged when it is pursued" to demonstrate the facts are incorrect and "to demonstrate that its consequences are deadly for all of us and for the institutions through which we would like to make peace and improve our society."⁶¹

Ambassador Rosenne recalled the first time the USSR made the Z-R connection in 1965 in order to prevent an explicit inclusion of anti-Semitism in the international "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination."⁵⁴ "We simply did not realize at the time what was truly at stake," he said. "Knowing that these resolutions are not legally binding, like all GA resolutions, many countries did not react to it. What we did not grasp was the full magnitude of the system by which each such text is translated and disseminated in the millions throughout the world, so that this resolution

has found its way into thousands of universities, libraries, schools, churches and other such institutions. In this manner, the distortion of the principles of the U.N. has even been insinuated into textbooks, used in high schools and even primary schools—poisoning the minds of receptive young people.”⁵⁵

Moynihan, referring to a position paper from the Jerusalem conference,⁵⁶ advanced the theory that “behind the Soviet scenes there was an effort to discredit Andrei Gromyko,” and . . . “to cast doubts on Soviet support for the creation of Israel in 1947.”⁵⁶

Breger viewed anti-Zionism as anti-American and anti-Western, as well as anti-Semitic and anti-Israel. He ventured that the best cure was a “*public diplomacy campaign. . . on behalf of Western ideals and values, among them the Zionist enterprise.*” He said the United States “*should send a strong signal to friends and non-friends alike, that they must not exceed certain limits of discourse*”⁵² and use its influence to pull the U.N. and its specialized agencies away from their obsessive preoccupation with anti-Zionism. In this respect, he said, the upcoming Nairobi Women’s Conference—scheduled for July, 1985—was an opportunity to take the initiative and not merely be reactive.⁵⁷

Some interesting new light was shed on the actual passage of the ZR resolution. Ambassador Koh, for instance, said that some nations which had voted for the offending resolution were uninformed about Zionism and later regretted their condemnation of it. He did not believe, he said, that its adoption “persuaded the majority of countries of the Third World to accept the proposition that Zionism is a form of racism or that Israel is an illegitimate state. Indeed, the passage of the resolution created a backlash of sympathy for Israel. Some of the supporters of the resolution later regretted their decision.” Mexican President Alvarez Echevarria, he recalled, actually went to Israel to apologize for his delegation’s vote.⁵³

Koh suggested three approaches to counter the effects of the resolution in the Third World. First, the government of Israel should disseminate information about Zionism in these countries.⁵³ Second, Israel and its allies in the West should continue to persuade its friends in the Third World to refrain from supporting resolutions in which the ZR proposition could be found. And third, Israel should scrupulously practice racial equality at home. “If the Arab minority within Israel were treated on terms of absolute equality with other Israeli citizens, this would be the best refutation of the charge that Zionism is racist.”⁵³ Koh added that he believed the most damaging effect of the resolution was on the United Nations and consequently on the “small and militarily weak countries” at risk of losing the “principal forum through which their voices can be heard.”⁵³

The seminar adopted a resolution submitted by Tannenbaum along the lines of the declaration adopted in Jerusalem. Tannenbaum also announced that a proposed non-binding resolution [called “Sense of the Congress”] was

on the desks of the leaders of the House and Senate and would be passed by unanimous consent.⁶²

Several Israeli diplomats expressed their skepticism about the effectiveness of these seminars. They claimed the initiatives were "preaching to the converted" (Dani Kiram, Washington), that they were not covered by the general press (Issachar Ben Yaakov, Canberra, and D. Kiram), and that they were no more than "an analysis of the problem and a call to fight" (Yehezkel Barnea, Athens). Each of these critics suggested what they believed were more effective ways to combat the defamation of Zionism.

Barnea took as an illustration the case of Soviet Jewry, which he said got momentum only after it went from the stage of "analyzing it and treating it sporadically to the stage of a directed, systematically organized, ongoing and budgeted action." Such organized action is carried out, he said, with regard to the "consequences of Zionism" such as "the daily aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the achievements of the Israeli society, but not with regard to the essence of Zionism and its history. I am not sure that the young generation is familiar enough with it (Zionism). I hope that the training program for our [Foreign Ministry] cadets answers this need and provides them with proper education. . ."⁶³

To increase the scanty media coverage, Ben Yaakov suggested sending the "Jerusalem Declaration" to the U.N., where it would be circulated as an official Israeli diplomatic document, and to instruct the Israeli embassies to send this document as well as a summary of the main addresses to politicians, scholars, clergy and journalists.⁶⁴ For his part, Kiram believed that the campaign would not be able to provide the necessary "education on Zionism and a large public denunciation of the ZR." He claimed that the best counter-offensive instrument available was the Israel broadcast TV series chronicling Zionism and the birth of the state of Israel, called "Amud Haesh," or Pillars of Fire. If this could be introduced to the U.S. Public Broadcasting Service, it would achieve what would not be achieved by countless symposia, articles and addresses, he said.⁶⁵

In fact, Israeli embassies were instructed to disseminate widely the reports on the study day and the seminar. But this apparently was not an easy job, even with friends. The Israeli embassy in Washington, for instance, apparently was not able to get even a mention of the seminar in the official bulletin which the State Department sent its embassies and delegations. Moreover, Assistant Secretary Abrams was criticized for having opened and hosted the conference at the State Department.⁶⁶

In a letter to Kiram, Manor, the coordinator of the Steering Committee to Combat Anti-Zionism, tried hard to defend the strategy adopted in Jerusalem. While conceding that many who attended were already "believers," he said not all of them could be defined as such, especially the ambassadors from Greece and Latin America countries.

The lack of appreciation for the importance of these conferences for "believers," Manor wrote, "shows that you are not aware of their reservations, hesitations and recoiling from acting vigorously against the defamation of Zionism, and of the need to push and stir them to action in this field, with the help of some good non-Jews who grasp far more clearly the meaning of the phenomenon and the need to combat it."

One action by itself, whether it be a TV series or set of symposia, will not suffice to stop or counter the slandering of Zionism, Manor wrote. Only an ongoing struggle, carried out simultaneously by many different means, will make a difference.

"Achieving success depends on creating a process that will gain momentum gradually," Manor wrote. "For this purpose we have to raise awareness, muster our forces and involve other forces, through an extensive set of actions and initiatives. This is our plan, and the conferences are but only a part of it."⁶⁷

NOTES

- (1) Report of the meeting between Yegar and Manor, September 19, 1983, CZA/S110/9.
- (2) "Tochnit Peula Leman Tehur Shma shel Hatzionut," November 10, 1983, CZA/S110/9.
- (3) Letter from Yegar to Manor, November 13, 1983, CZA/S110/9.
- (4) Memo from Manor to Uzi Narkiss, December 12, 1983, CZA/S110/9. It included suggestions regarding the staffing of the working group.
- (5) Summary of a meeting between Narkiss and Manor, December 20, 1983, CZA/S110/9.
- (6) January 29, 1984, CZA/S110/9.
- (7) "Kavim Lema'avak Beah'latat Haum Begnut Hatzionut" (Guidelines for the Campaign against the U.N. resolution censuring Zionism), February 1984, CZA/S110/9. It suggested a plan to get declarations of support from several target groups.
- (8) "Kvutzat Haavoda/Meh'leket Hahasbara," (Working Group/Information Department) February 28, 1984, pp. 12-13, CZA/S110/9.
- (9) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . .," op. cit., p. 5, CZA/S110/9.
- (10) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . .," op. cit., p. 7, CZA/S110/9.
- (11) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . .," op. cit., p. 12, CZA/S110/9.
- (12) Letter from Minervi to Kimche, January 17, 1984, CZA/S110/9. "Yehuda Milo proposal does not seem to be a practical one. In view of our present parliamentary situation at the U.N., there is no chance at all to get a substantive majority friendly to Zionism. As you know, Dr. Yohanan Manor initiated a year ago a far-reaching activity in this respect. I met him again yesterday and suggested the following."

- (13) Letter from S. Katz to Narkiss, February 20, 1984, CZA/S110/9.
- (14) See the numerous studies from the Heritage Foundation on the U.N., the General Assembly, and the specialized agencies, notably UNESCO. For instance, Burton Yale Pines, Ed., *A World Without the U.N. What Would Happen if the United Nations Shut Down*, 1984; Arieh Eilan, *The General Assembly. Can it be Salvaged?* 1984; Roger Brooks, *The U.N. Department of Public Information: A House of Mirrors*; Owen Harries, *The UN and UNESCO at the Crossroads*; Juliana Pilon, *The UN's Campaign against Israel*; Juliana Pilon, *What Does the UN Have Against Israel*; Thomas G. Gulick, *For UNESCO, a Failing Grade on Education*, 1982; Thomas G. Gulick, *UNESCO, Where Culture Becomes Propaganda*, 1982; Burton Yale Pines, *The US and the UN: Time for Reappraisal*; Juliana G. Pilon, *The US and the UN: A Balance Sheet*; Stanley J. Michalak, *UNCTAD: An Organization Betraying its Mission*, 1983.
- (15) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . ." op. cit., pp. 6-7, CZA/S110/9.
- (16) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . ." op. cit., pp. 10-11, CZA/S110/9.
- (17) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . ." op. cit., p. 20, CZA/S110/9.
- (18) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . ." op. cit., p. 3, CZA/S110/9.
- (19) "Kvutzat Haavoda. . ." op. cit., pp. 4-5, CZA/S110/9.
- (20) Jerusalem (November 1984), Washington (December 1984), Paris (March 1985). London (May 1985), Buenos Aires (July 1985).
- (21) Letter from Narkiss to Herzog, March, 1984, CZA/S110/9.
- (22) Circular from Moshe Yegar, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28, 1984, CZA/S110/11.
- (23) Circular from Uzi Narkiss, Chairman of the Information Department of the WZO, April 15, 1984, CZA/S110/11.
- (24) Meeting with Avraham Alon, director of the International Department of the Histadrut, May 9, 1984, and with his deputy Grisha Arlozer, May 14. Letter from Narkiss to Israel Keisar, the General Secretary of the Histadrut, May 23, CZ/S110/11.
- (25) The Israeli Council of Women Organizations, headed by Iritia Lewin, WIZO, headed in Israel by Mihal Mudai, and the International Council of Jewish Women, directed by Leila Seigel.
- (26) Memo on the meeting with Father Benjamin Nunez, at the Embassy of Costa Rica in Jerusalem, April 20, 1984, CZA/S110/11. Nunez suggested drawing up a list of church leaders from Latin America who embraced a positive view of the Jewish people and the Jewish State, often in contradiction with the policy of the Vatican. He suggested holding a seminar for them on the changes in the official position of the Church with regard to Israel, the Jewish people, and Jerusalem, following Vatican II, since it was still ignored by many of them! See Also meeting with Dr. Rigner, of the WJC, July 25, 1984. CZA/S110/11.
- (27) Letter from Ehud Sprinzak to Uzi Narkiss, April 29, 1984, proposing to set up an "Intellectual academic committee to combat the ZR equation," to involve well-known, left-wing intellectuals such as professors Shaul Friedlander, Shlomo Avineri, S.N. Eisenstadt, authors such as Amos Oz and A.B. Yehoshua, and perhaps Yossi Sarid who would be able to "influence salient personalities from the Third World." CZA/S110/11.
- (28) Answer from Evelyne Guffens to the questionnaire, July 1, 1984, CZ/S110/10.
- (29) Letter from Colette Avital to Yegar, September 10, 1984, CZA/S110/10.
- (30) Cable from Meir Rosenne to Yegar, June 5, 1984, CZA/S110/10.
- (31) Letters from M. Shiloh to M. Yegar, May 29 and July 24, 1984, CZA/S110/10.
- (32) Letter from Pinhas Gonen to Yegar, July 12, 1984, CZA/S110/10.
- (33) Circular by Uzi Narkiss, *Confronting Anti-Zionism, Goals and a Plan of Action*, June 18, 1984, p. 2, CZA/S110/11.
- (34) Report on Manor's meeting with P. Eliav and Esther Efrat-Smilag, May 15, 1984, CZA/S110/11.
- (35) An adapted version of this lecture was published in the quarterly FORUM, under the title "Anti-Zionism: from Delegitimization to Dehumanization," No 53, Jerusalem 1985, p. 2.
- (35a) CZA/S110/49. (Inter-parliamentary Union.)

- (36) Yohanan Manor's Report to the Steering Committee against anti Zionism on "Defeating of the Kuwaiti draft resolution blaming Zionism at the last session of the I.P.U. in Geneva, September 1984", p. 2. CZA/S110/11.
- (37) Letter from Temple-Morris to Greville Janner, October 1, 1984. CZA/S110/11.
- (38) Letter from P. Eliav to Manor, December 9, 1984, CZA/S110/17.
- (39) Ruth Arieli, *The steps leading to resolution 3379*; Ehud Sprinzak, *Anti-Zionism: From Delegitimization to Dehumanization*; Yohanan Manor, *Resolution 3379, Documents and Data*; Ruth Lapidot, *On some Fallacies concerning Zionism*; Michael Agursky, *The Zionist Controversy in the Soviet Establishment. Historical background*; Ehud Sprinzak, *The damage of anti-Zionism: A preliminary analysis*; Thomas Mayer, *The Zionism-Racism Equation: An Arab Propaganda Weapon or Political Strategy?*; Yohanan Manor, *Anti-Zionism*. CZA/S110/48.
- (40) Cf. CZA/S110/28.
- (41) Mira Avrech, "Senator Moynihan looked in vain for the TV," *Yediot Ahronot*, November 13, 1984; G. Adam, "TV guilt," *Ha'aretz*, November 12, 1984.
- (42) *Jerusalem Post*, November 12, 1984 6C.
- (43) Official text of Shamir's address, November 11 1984, p. 3, CZA/S110/40.
- (44) "Z=R, plus 9," written text of Moynihan's at the study-day, "Refuting the Zionism-is-racism Equation," the president's residence, Jerusalem, November 11, 1984, p. 3. CZ/S110/40.
- (45) Moynihan, "Z=R, plus 9," op. cit., p. 4. quoting from an address to the Weizman Institute of Science, New York, October 1976.
- (46) *Report on the study day*, "Refuting the Zionism-is-Racism Equation," by Yohanan Manor, November 22, 1984, p. 7. Summary of Moynihan's oral address. Cf. also, script, side 7, p. 31, CZA/S110/40.
- (47) *Report on the study day*, op. cite, p. 9.
- (48) *Report on the study day*, op. cit., p.2
- (49) *Newsview*, November 21-27, 1984, p.10.
- (50) "Z=R plus 9", op cit., pp. 8-9, CZ/S110/40.
- (51) Official text of Shamir's address, op. cit., pp. 6-7, Hatzofe, November 12.
- (52) Annex to the *report on the study day*, op cit., CZA/S110/40.
- (53) B.B.I., *Z-R: An Assault on Human Rights, A Report and Program Guide*, a conference co-sponsored by BBI,WJC,WZO, hosted by the U.S. State Department, December 10, 1984, Washington, D.C., 1985, (no paging). See also *Report on Human Rights Day Seminar*, "Z=R—An Assault on Human Rights", December 10, 1984, at the U.S. State Department, p.3, CZA/S110/26. JTA, December 12, 1984, pp. 2-3.
- (54) See below Chapter I, under the section "The international refusal to condemn anti-Semitism."
- (55) BBI, *Z=R: An Assault on Human Rights, A Report and Program Guide*, op. cit.,
- (56) Michael Agursky, *The Zionist Controversy in the Soviet Establishment: Historical Background*, WZO, Department of Information, 1984, pp. 7-8. CZA/S110/48.
- (57) *Report on Human Rights Day Seminar*, op. cit., p. 5; B.B.I., *Z=R: An Assault on Human Rights, A Report and Program Guide*, op. cit.,
- (58) BBI, *Z=R: An Assault on Human Rights*, Kirkpatrick's speech, p.3, CZA/S110/26.
- (59) *Report on Human Rights Day Seminar*, p. 10, CZA/S110/26.
- (60) BBI, *Z=R: An Assault on Human Rights, Kirkpatrick's speech*, p.5, CZA/S110/26.
- (61) BBI, *Z=R: An Assault on Human Rights, Kirkpatrick's speech*, p.6, CZA/S110/26.
- (62) *Report on Human Rights Day Seminar*, pp. 8-9, CZA/S110/26.
- (63) Letter from Ambassador Yeh'ezkel Barnea to Assistant Director General Moshe Yegar, January 3, 1985, CZA/S110/16.
- (64) Letter from Ambassador Issachar Ben Yaakov to M. Yegar, March 10, 1985, CZA/S110/16.
- (65) Letter from Dani Kiram to Yegar, December 19, 1984, CZA/S110/17.
- (66) Cable 0940 from Israeli Embassy in Washington, December 21, 1984, CZA/S110/17.
- (67) Letter from Yohanan Manor to Dani Kiram, January 25, 1985, CZA/S110/16

CHAPTER VI

STILL SHORT OF THE MARK

The international campaign proceeded, on the whole, according to plan. Its main goal was to raise public awareness of the harmful impact of Resolution 3379 and of the urgent need to fight it. Its success therefore hinged on mobilizing influential people and organizations and on finding ways to erode the resolution's moral and political standing.

The tools were to be a series of international, national and regional conferences following the same basic parameters of the two kick-off conferences in Jerusalem and Washington. They would expose the falsehood of the resolution as well as of the world institution which had endorsed it in a complete break with its calling and ideals.¹

Already, the first two conferences seemed to have spurred some Jewish organizations and communities toward a consensus demanding the abrogation of Resolution 3379. Important organizations such as the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, the North American Jewish Students Network, the National Jewish Law Students Network, the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, the American Professors for Peace in the Middle East (APPME), and the Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East, decided to follow the examples of the World Jewish Congress and B'nai Brith International and put this issue on their agenda, embarking both on educational programs and political initiatives.

Encouraged by the WJC and BBI, for instance, a delegation of Brazilian Jewish leaders met with Tancredo Neves, the projected front-runner in the elections for the first civilian president in twenty years, and secured his commitment that Brazil would revise its vote on the ZR resolution.² And APPME, a U.S. non-Jewish organization, decided to conduct for its leadership a seminar to investigate the impact of the resolution on students and faculty and to develop a program on it for U.S. campuses.

Meanwhile, Jewish communities seemed to have become more receptive than before to the idea of the conferences. In June of 1984, for instance, Theo Klein, the chairman of the CRIF, the Representative Council of France's Jewish Institutions, had accepted a proposal by Narkiss to host a conference in Paris scheduled for March of 1985. But in November of 1984, CRIF's director general tried to pass the ball for the meeting to the Jewish community in Brussels.³ After the kick-off conferences, this kind of reluctance dissipated. Meanwhile, the conferences to come were even more successful

since they managed to attract far more non-Jewish participation and much better media coverage.

RAISING AWARENESS AND ENLISTING SUPPORT

During 1985 no fewer than six such conferences were organized: in April in Caracas, in June in Paris, in August in Montevideo, in September in Buenos Aires, in October in London and in November in New York.

The conference in Caracas, "New Forms of Anti-Semitism," was convened by the CAIV, the Confederation of the Jewish Associations of Venezuela. It was attended by more than 400 people, among them Science Minister Arens, and prominent members of the National Congress, notably the deputy chairman of the two major parties, Dr. Paulina Gamus Gallegos and Dr. Gustavo Tarre Briceno. According to the report of Israel's ambassador to Venezuela, Yaakov Cohen, "The study-day was very successful and widely covered by the press. . . Uzi Narkiss, head of the Information Department of the WZO, gave an impressive address. . . Many journalists attended whose reports are sent to you separately. . . In sum, this was an impressive educational and informational action, and the community's intention is to publish the proceedings and to distribute them widely in Venezuela and abroad."⁴

In Paris, the conference, "For an Authentic Code of International Organizations. A Test Case: Zionism," was convened by the CRIF, in cooperation with the World Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith and the Federation of Zionist Organizations in France. More than 260 people packed the French Senate's beautiful Medicis Hall, most of them non-Jewish. There were top politicians, magistrates, diplomats and representatives of NGOs, while many members of the French political leadership who did not come sent messages: former President Giscard d'Estaing, former Prime Ministers Raymond Barre, Chaban Delmas, Pierre Mauroy, and Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac; Louis Mermaz, the chairman of the National Assembly, Lionel Jospin, member of the European Parliament and first secretary general of the Socialist Party.

When Jacques Orphus, the chairman of the Federation of Zionist Organizations, learned that the planned conference would be chaired by CRIF, he demanded of Narkiss that he be entrusted with the responsibility. Narkiss agreed, but several days before the conference Orphus called asking him to change his decision because his "Polish accent in French would not go through the Medicis Hall!" This is how the chairmanship of the conference returned to CRIF, namely its deputy chairman, Nicole Goldman.

The roster of participants was impressive. It included: Alain Poher, president of the Senate, former minister Michel Rocard, Dominique Baudis, mayor of Toulouse and member of the European Parliament, Francois

Valery, former French ambassador to UNESCO, Senator Robert Pontillon, senior foreign policy adviser to the French prime minister, Pastor Emmanuel La Graviere and Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, vice president of the Senate. Regis Debray, special adviser to French President F. Mitterand, could not attend because he had to join Prime Minister Laurent Fabius in his official visit to the Democratic Republic of Germany. Instead, he sent a thoughtful and sympathetic piece on Zionism, Israel and the Third World.

"I am not an established defender of the West, nor an ardent advocate of force in the service of spiritual concepts," he wrote. "Never have I viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict as a confrontation between the Western world, the cradle of anti-Semitism, and the East, where the religions of the Book—among others—were born. I do not take sides because I reject the very notion of taking sides, and even more the notion of crusade. I personally prefer epic stories of resistance to those of conquest."

But Debray said he found the equation of Zionism and racism to be aberrant. Racism is defined by law as "any discrimination, hatred or violence against an individual or a group of individuals, for reason of their origin, their belonging or not belonging to an ethnic, national, racial or religious group (French Law, July 1, 1972)." Zionism, in my view, is in its essence, an expression of what nowadays is referred to as a movement of national liberation, namely the one of the Jewish people. For every historical culture, there is a historical nation; to every nationality, there should be a corresponding sovereignty; to any people, a State. Since the XIXth century this has been the soul of the world progressive movement. At one time this was known as the 'principle of nationalities'; today it is 'the right of self-determination.'

"I wonder how one can defend the right to independence of France and Europe, without defending the legitimacy of the State of Israel," he contended, "and how one can defend the latter, without admitting the legitimacy of a Palestinian State, notwithstanding its configuration. The patriot differs from the nationalist in that he does not consider his own nation superior to the others and that he acknowledges the legitimacy of other nationalisms." Calling himself a left-wing patriot, Debray said he declared himself to his friends as a "pro-Palestinian Zionist, not in order to shuffle cards, but rather to turn them upside down. . . We are all well aware in Europe of the part played by legend in the birth and the history of the state of Israel: survivors of ghettos and camps, ghost ships, the world chains of solidarity, kibbutz pioneers, peasants-soldiers, the conquest of the desert. In our eyes, Zionism remains a romanticism which, together with yesterday's socialism, is the last great epic of our culture."^{5,6}

The conference stirred unanticipated interest in the French press, well known for its anti-Israel bias. *Le Monde* reported the event under the headline, "French Political Leaders Reject the Equation of Zionism with Racism," *Le Matin*, "Redefining Zionism," and *Le Figaro*, "The Zionism-Racism

Amalgam," and all the articles referred in positive terms to Zionism. Such a turn-around seemed a direct response to the uniformly positive stance on the issue taken by all the participants. It was doubtless also a reaction to a brilliant lecture on Zionism delivered by Andre Chouraqui, world renowned expert on the Bible and a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem.

Zionism, Chouraqui emphasized, is more than a form of nationalism. It is a message and a book that led the Jewish People to settle in the Land of Israel. Land, people, message, were the fundamental sources of the Jewish identity already asserted by Moses when facing Pharaoh. The Jewish people was a people of slaves moving toward liberty and Zionism was the oldest resistance movement against oppression. For Chouraqui, Herzl was a modern Moses who fought against 120 Pharaohs and knew how to rally the Jewish people around the Promised Land. International organizations are disgracing themselves in ignoring the weight of reality, he argued, for the Israeli nation is a multiracial entity, woven out of 120 ethnic groups. At that very moment, he said, Israel was welcoming the black Jews of Ethiopia, the real aristocracy of Israel.⁷

Rocard, for his part, presented a surprising view of Zionism. He had just resigned from the office of Minister of Agriculture in the Laurent Fabius government, in part because he opposed a return to the proportional rule in the electoral system. He believed that it favored extremists and threatened the stability of the regime. While thus well-known for his leftist ideas, he did not content himself merely with recounting Zionism's historical role. He also argued that Zionism and the Zionist movement still had a role to play!

"Thus Zionism is the ideal to reunite on its own land a people who is aware of itself through its relationship with its traditions as well as it is moved by a new determination not to be tossed [around] at the whim of others. . . For me today, Zionism is first and foremost founded on the Law of Return. This is not the place to comment upon that fundamental law. Nevertheless I would like to stress the living reality of this principle by referring to the moving adventure of the Falashas," a reference to the Ethiopian Jews. "I don't pretend nor aspire to act as an adviser," he went on. "I only testify that confusing Zionism with racism, is nonsense, given the ethnic mixture of Israel. This is true of Israel probably more than any other country in the world. . ."

Finally, for Rocard, Zionism's continuing role is "to sustain the young state which is facing, in addition to security problems, considerable financial ones. It is also to defend the international reputation of Israel, when it is unjustly attacked. But it is also to convey to Israel's leaders the view that solidarity does not mean permanent hagiography. Solidarity with possibly the right to criticize seems to me what should be the basis of the relationship between the Zionist movement and Israel. As for its traditional role—helping Jews who wish to reach the Promised Land, opposing the present policy of

the USSR which hinders the fundamental human right to choose freely its destiny, it seems to me that the Zionist movement is in great need of the help of all democrats, and that it should also deal with the numerous cases of racist persecutions throughout the world.”⁸

Eliezer Palmor, Israel’s plenipotentiary minister in Paris, deemed the conference “an impressive and positive event,” in spite of what he considered to be unfortunate remarks by both Senator Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt and James Jonah, the U.N. assistant secretary general. In his reports to Jerusalem, Palmor said, “Zionism in its genuine content got rehabilitation, notably by non-Jews, and the U.N., which committed the sin of the well-known equation, got loathsomeness and blame.”⁹

The U.N. not only was criticized and blamed. It was also called upon to change its stand on Resolution 3379. In the words of Debray: “It is high time



Podium of the Conference “For an Authentic Code of International Conferences. A test case: Zionism.” From left to right: Francois Valery, former French Ambassador to UNESCO; Michel Rocard, former minister in Fabius’ Cabinet; Michel Dreyfus Schmidt, Vice President of the Senate; Alain Poher, President of the Senate; Nicole Goldman, Vice Chairman of the CRIF; André Chouraqui, Renowned expert on the Bible; James Jonah, UN Assistant Secretary General; Senator Robert Pontillon, senior foreign policy advisor to the French Prime Minister; Pastor Emmanuel La Graviere.

for international organizations, calmly and without anger, to correct this absurdity in order to enable the blossoming of a thousand national memories and a thousand returns to Zion, so that every deprived people may also one day have the right to his vineyard in Judea."¹⁰

Senator Dreyfus Schmidt, who at the time was also chairman of the French section of the World Jewish Congress, upset many attendees when he said he did not believe in the existence of a Jewish people. Nonetheless, he said he considered himself a Zionist in the sense that he supported the State of Israel.¹¹

Meanwhile, Palmor was shocked by the fact that James Jonah had been invited to this conference. In Palmor's view, Jonah's role as U.N. assistant secretary general meant he was likely to speak only in defense of the international body. In fact, Jonah's invitation had been carefully planned to give weight to the possibility of a change at the U.N. on Zionism and Israel. Prior to the conference there had been two illuminating meetings on this score with the U.N. diplomat. One was in New York on February 27 with Manor and one in Jerusalem on March 10 with Narkiss and other members of the Steering Committee.¹²

Jonah, a brilliant graduate of Harvard, was a shrewd and articulate diplomat from Sierra Leone who won his post with the support of the Third World. At the conference he spoke more in defense of the Third World and of its role at the U.N. than in defense of the U.N.'s stand against Israel and Zionism. Above all, he challenged the common view of an automatic majority that was under the control of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Islamic bloc, and its systematic tendency to oppose Israel's interests.

The Third World countries did not vote against Israel because they opposed Israel and Zionism, he said, but because they opposed the occupation of territories. They had taken the same stand against the USSR, he pointed out, in the case of Afghanistan, against Vietnam in the case of Kampuchea, as well as in the case of the Falklands, Grenada and even against the military action conducted by India against East Pakistan. Moreover, he said, "There are very few who realize that it is the General Assembly with its large Third World component that rejected unambiguously the effort to demand the withdrawal of Israeli troops after the conflict in June 1967 without an agreement with the Arab States for a peaceful settlement of the dispute."¹³

According to Jonah, Israel actually enjoyed balanced treatment from the U.N. until 1971. The change in the General Assembly's Third World posture toward Israel, he said, occurred during the course of that year following Israel's reply to the Gunnar Jarring's aide memoire from February 8, 1971. This called on Egypt and Israel to accept in practical terms Resolution 242, which provided for Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territorial concessions by Israel. Egypt acceded, while Israel expressed its willingness to

withdraw to secure and recognized boundaries but stressed it would “not withdraw to pre-June 5, 1967 lines.”¹⁴

Some believed the ZR resolution marked the “quintessential evidence of the anti-Israeli posture of the General Assembly,” indeed evidence that UNGA itself had become the center of global anti-Semitism, Jonah said.¹⁵ But Jonah pointed out that the ZR equation had not been supported overwhelmingly by the Third World countries. Most of them did not know much about Zionism, he said, and they did not understand the implications of a vote which did not spring from anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism. True, a large number of the Third World nations did vote in favor of the resolution, but “equally true, there was a substantial number of Third World countries that either abstained or voted against that resolution.”¹⁶

Last but not least, the majority of the U.N. members were moderates looking to turn the U.N. into “an efficient negotiation framework” to further the goals of the U.N. Charter, Jonah said. As an example, he recalled how he had prepared for the Second World Conference Against Racism in his role as secretary general of this conference.

It had been obvious to all, said Jonah, that to ensure the success of the Second Conference, those controversies that had plagued the First Decade had to be minimized. There was a general belief, however, that it would be difficult to obtain Third World, and especially African consensus on such a plan. Nevertheless, the African Group, in search of a successful outcome of the conference, “showed a readiness to search for a consensus. In doing so this Group made a most significant concession that finally enabled Western European and other Groups of States to participate in the conference.”

“It was no secret that the Conference would break up were there to be any attempt to reaffirm, in the conference documents, the resolution relating to Zionism and racism,” Jonah elaborated. Accordingly, during the course of the conference, the African Group made it publicly clear that it was not prepared to support any move which would reflect that resolution in the conference documents. “Even those regional groups that held strong views on the desirability of re-affirming that resolution in the end voiced respect for African consensus and refrained from insisting on language that would have implied re-affirmation of the resolution.”¹⁷

Jonah viewed the majority of U.N. member states as moderate countries inclined to follow militant and extremist directions for lack of alternative leadership.¹⁸ With proper leadership, he believed moderation could get the upper hand. Ultimately, the forces of moderation did prevail at the Second World Conference Against Racism. Consensus was achieved on almost all the issues with only some abstentions motivated by a condemnation of Israel’s actions in the occupied territories. Further progress was achieved at the XXXVIIIth session of the UNGA, which approved by consensus the Program of Action of the Second Decade against Racism.

The quid pro quo orchestrated under the auspices of James Jonah meant the African Group would not support the reiteration of Resolution 3379 in exchange for the active support of the Western countries for measures against apartheid. It mirrored the device which had been effective in the hands of the USSR and the Arab countries. It also hinted at a possibly winning strategy against the ZR at the U.N.

Jonah did not recommend overlooking the ZR resolution. Rather he believed it should be rendered null and void [caduc] by actively preventing its reiteration. "Of course you have to defend Zionism," he said. The question was how? According to Jonah, it was not customary to revoke resolutions, nor to recognize a mistake. "When Communist China was to be accepted as a member of the U.N.," he said, "it stood firmly on one condition, that all the resolutions adopted against it at the U.N. would be cancelled. But very soon it became apparent that this was not feasible, and therefore it decided to concede the condition."¹⁸

"Resolutions at the U.N. are abolished naturally," said Jonah, "that is, by not being raised and adopted again. Therefore one should (work) both to prevent the raising and the re-affirmation of the ZR." Jonah believed this was possible despite the belief pressure to have it adopted would be exerted repeatedly, as it had been during the last two years at the UNGA and in U.N.-affiliated organizations.¹⁹ He said Israel and the Jewish NGOs should respond to the Third World expectations, especially those of the African Group, return to the U.N. Decade Against Racism and actively support their fight against apartheid.²⁰

Beyond Paris, there were noteworthy conferences in Buenos Aires and in London. In Buenos Aires on September 4, about 1,000 people attended a symposium rejecting the ZR equation organized by the central Jewish organizations. Among them were members of Parliament and leadership from all parties, including Peronistas, the speaker of the Parliament, Juan Carlos Pujliese, judges and many journalists and intellectuals, notably the Nobel prize winner, Perez Esquivel. The symposium received wide coverage in the Argentine general press. A declaration and summary of the proceedings were published as an ad in the major newspapers and seventy people signed the petition to the U.N. secretary general calling for the abrogation of the ZR resolution.²¹

On October 25, a meeting was held in Britain's House of Commons on the "Moral of the U.N.-Zionism a Test Case." It was sponsored by the Board of Deputies and the Zionist Federation in cooperation with B'nai B'rith, the Council of Christians and Jews, the Jewish Students Association, the Institute of Jewish Affairs (IJA), and the Academic Group on Israel and the Middle East. In the audience of more than 200, there were fifteen university professors from London, Oxford, Cambridge and other places, a dozen members of Parliament, notably MP Michael Latham (Conservative), MP Maurice Miller,



WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

Jerusalem, November 10 1985

Your Excellency Secretary General of the United Nations
Javier Perez de Cuellar

We the undersigned have the honor to submit to your excellency a petition concerning U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3379 adopted on November 10, 1975, containing false allegations on Zionism.

The petition is signed by close to 800 leading personalities in all fields of human endeavour, politics, arts, sciences, churches, trade unions, journalism from 27 countries where public opinion can express itself freely.

In taking this initiative, we felt compelled to alert the International Community to the dangers immanent in the resolution which not only distorts the facts, but perverts the principles and purposes of the U.N. "to practise tolerance and to promote and encourage respect for Human Rights".

This defamatory resolution directed against the whole Jewish People does not encourage respect for human rights but instigates bigotry and hate, worthy of those who have plunged the world into the abyss of World War II, out the ashes of which the U.N. aroused.

To call the Zionist Movement, one of the first universally recognized national liberation movements of this century, racist is a grotesque travesty and a shameful perversion of the struggle against racial discrimination, in which the Jewish People one of its principle victims, has always prided itself for taking a leading part.

For the sake of truth and justice, for the unimpaired prosecution of the fight against the evil of racism, wherever it occurs, the United Nations must disassociate itself from this aberration.



WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

We address ourselves to you, Sir, knowing your dedication to the ideals of the United Nations, and appreciating your efforts to strengthen its influence to make the World Organization an effective instrument for the advancement of Human Rights and to be "a center for harmonizing the actions of Nations", we call upon you to take appropriate action to help remove from the records of the U.N. the stain of Resolution 3379.

Leon A. Dulzin
Chairman
World Zionist Organization

Bernice S. Tannenbaum
Chairman
American Section
World Zionist Organization

Uzi Narkiss
Chairman
Information Department
World Zionist Organization

Edgar M. Bronfman
President
World Jewish Congress

Gerald Kraft
President
B'nai Brith International

Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu
Permanent Representative of the
State of Israel to the United Nations

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PETITION TO THE 40TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 40th General Assembly of the United Nations convenes in September 1985, forty years after the termination of World War II, the greatest man-induced catastrophe in all human history to date. Among the war's many hecatombs of casualties were millions of innocent civilians who were systematically murdered by the most inhuman death-machine ever invented in human history, driven by the ideology of racism. Its main victim was the Jewish People, six million of whom perished in the ghettos and death camps designed for their destruction during that Holocaust.

The United Nations which arose out of the ashes of the Nazi Holocaust adopted its charter binding the Nations of the World "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person..." and towards these ends "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours..."

In 1947 the United Nations recognized that the least that the family of nations could do, at this juncture, for the remnant of the Jewish People was to endorse its long-standing aspiration to independence and sovereignty in its ancient homeland.

Among the States which supported the UN Resolution was the Soviet Union. Its representative, Andrei Gromyko, said in his statement before the General Assembly on 14 May 1948:

"As we know the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish People are linked with the problem of Palestine and of its future administration... During the last war, the Jewish People underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering... The total number of Jews who perished at the hands of the Nazi executioners is estimated at approximately six million. The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference, since this would be incompatible with the highest principles proclaimed in its charter... It would be unjust... to deny the right of the Jewish People to realise this aspiration.

In disregard of the solemn decision of the United Nations recognizing and safeguarding the sovereign equality of the Jewish State, and in violation of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, Israel has been subjected from its initiation to military attack, economic boycott and unrelenting political warfare aimed at its delegitimization, at undermining its political bases, and ultimately at its elimination.

Instead of defending its own decision and upholding its Charter, the United Nations has tolerated this hostility.

Ten years ago, on 10 November 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 defaming Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish People, as a form of racism. This resolution was designed to provide justification for delegitimizing Israel's existence, and thereby encouraging an all out assault against Israel's right of membership in the International community as well as to spread and deepen hatred of the Jewish People and to intensify ingrained anti-Semitism, wherever it existed, by means of the defamation of Zionism.

Out of deep concern at the nefarious implications of Resolution 3379 and the designs of its originators, we call upon all people dedicated to democratic values and human rights and upon governments of all enlightened countries to resist this racist campaign of slander and help expose its underlying goals. Challenging Resolution 3379 is a moral duty incumbent upon all those who are genuinely concerned in the struggle against racism and racial discrimination.

Emphasizing our vigorous opposition to any form of racism and dissemination of racist ideology, we warn against the danger of ideological and religious bigotry, wherever it occurs and whoever its particular target.

On this 40th anniversary of the victory against the forces of darkness and racism, we call upon the General Assembly of the United Nations, to disavow the abusive Resolution 3379, and re-dedicate itself to its founding charter.

MP Gavin Laird (Labour), Lord Annan, Lord Weindenfeld, leading Christian clergymen and Christian lay people. Written messages by MP Tim Renton, the minister of state responsible for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Foreign Office, as well as by Lord Coggan, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, were received and read aloud.

At the conclusion the conference adopted a statement calling on the British Parliament to roundly denounce and condemn linking Zionism and racism and calling upon other parliaments to do the same. This statement was sent to the leaders of the four political parties, Margaret Thatcher, Neil Kinnock, David Owen and David Steel.²²

Thatcher responded in a statement of support to George Garai, the general secretary of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland: "Passage of this infamous resolution was a sad and discreditable episode and successive British Governments have expressed their disgust with it," she wrote. "It of course made no impact at all on serious discussion of how to achieve peace in the Middle East. We have announced in the Queen's Speech a busy legislative programme, which will inevitably mean that the scope for providing time for discussion of other important issues will be strictly limited. However, I hope that members of Parliament will have taken advantage of the debate this week on the Queen's Speech to raise the matter. And there will be no doubt other occasions in the course of the session when it will be relevant to do so."²³

In April of 1985 in Washington, Judge Hadassah Ben Ito convinced the annual convention of the American section of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (IAJLJ) to take a firm stand on the ZR equation. It adopted a resolution condemning the measure as a baseless slander, in spirit and letter, and as fundamentally an expression of anti-Semitism. It called on "lawyers and jurists, both Jewish and non-Jewish, everywhere and notably in those countries which originally voted against the resolution, to do their utmost to oppose and debunk the resolution and to fight its continuing adverse momentum."²⁵ It also urged its members to take personal responsibility for this effort by taking the substance of this cause to print and broadcast media, public officials, deans and professors of law schools, and bar associations²⁵ and to continue this effort to nullify the resolution for as long as this effort may require.

Ben Ito was a Tel Aviv District Court judge who was a member of the Israeli delegation at the UNGA in 1975 and whose will to fight the libel was ignited by the Jerusalem conference, "Refuting the ZR Equation." There, she had recalled the moment Resolution 3379 was passed, describing an atmosphere of hate and deep animosity. She also noted its utter singularity. It was not as any other resolution, she recalled. "But we did not know how to read the writing on the wall. . . In 1975 it took us some time to convince ourselves and some friends to take it seriously. The atmosphere was that it was no more

than another piece of paper. I'll never forget how a member of the Dutch delegation tried to convince us how important it was to fight this resolution. He said, 'Our generation who have been through World War II and the Holocaust know what an abomination it is only to mention Zionism in the same breath as racism. However if the new generation hears it mentioned it will not seem so terrible, and they will get used to it. It is important that we launch a well-planned campaign among Jews and in the international community.'"²⁴

As a result of the resolution by the IAJLJ America section, the matter was brought before the chairman of the entire body, the famous Justice Haim Cohen. He gave his blessing to the establishment of a special committee to "Combat U.N.-inspired anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism" to be headed by Ben Ito. Within several months, an original, carefully structured program "CASAZ" was conceived and carried out under the determined leadership of the judge and her American colleague, Frances B. Bernstein, Esq., with the support of the Steering Committee.²⁶

The kick-off conferences also inspired Bernice Tannenbaum, the former chairman of the Hadassah organization, to become deeply involved in the campaign to overturn 3379 and ultimately become the head of the U.S. effort.

Immediately after the conference in Washington at the State Department, which she had organized, Tannenbaum began intensive lobbying of the U.S. Congress to adopt a resolution repudiating the ZR equation. She also called upon the parliaments of all countries to do the same. She accomplished her goal in a relatively short time span and, as we will later see, was instrumental in the campaign's success at the International Women's Conference in Nairobi. Afterward, in 1986, she got proclamations of support from almost all the governors of the United States.

NAIROBI, A PYRRHIC VICTORY?

As we have seen, the war against Zionism had been one of the aims of the U.N. Decade for Women at its previous conferences in Mexico (1975) and in Copenhagen (1980). It therefore was self-evident that the upcoming Nairobi Conference closing the decade would become a showdown between those pushing for the re-affirmation of the ZR equation and those opposing it. The latter camp wanted to take advantage of the success achieved at the IPU in Geneva, and of the developing international pressure against the ZR distortion.

At the same time, the resolution's advocates were determined not to succumb to the mounting threat against what had been an effective political and propaganda device. They wanted to breathe new life into the malevolent anti-Zionist atmosphere which had dominated the former international women's

conferences, especially at Copenhagen. They did not want to fall into the trap of the "consensus" procedure, by which a text would have to be watered down in order to be adopted by general consensus rather than a majority.

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs favored a two-part strategy for Nairobi. For one, it wanted to be sure there were more well-prepared and committed Jewish women at the huge NGO forum [of more than 12,000 women] than at the past conferences.²⁷ The forum was slated to convene from July 10–19, before the governmental conference scheduled for July 15–26. The Ministry wanted these women to be able to contain and neutralize the tactics of systematic disruption by some delegations of the Arab-Islamic group. Indeed, more than 200 women from Jewish organizations, about three times the number at Copenhagen, took part in committees and working groups, most of them after attending preparatory seminars run primarily by the ADL and the BBI, the American Jewish Committee and WIZO.

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry expected world Jewish communities and organizations to try to win commitments from their respective governments to oppose the injection of the ZR allegation into the conference resolutions by sticking steadfastly to the planned consensus procedure.

At the end of February, 1985, an impressive number of mostly non-Jewish NGOs²⁸ submitted a statement to the Commission on the Status of Women, which was in charge of organizing the Nairobi Conference. To pave the way for a more conciliatory atmosphere, they commended the commission for "the success of its deliberations through the use of consensus."²⁹

For months this position seemed to draw considerable support, but as the conference drew closer, there were more and more signs that the wheel was rolling back to a far less conciliatory place. In mid-June, Gus Yatron, the chairman of the U.S. Congressional House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, wrote a letter to George Shultz in which he praised those in charge of the conference preparations "for striving to reach consensus."³⁰ He encouraged them "to continue to pursue this consensus."

At the same time, however, Yatron's anxiety at the prospect of divisive tactics was made plain when he asked the State Department to provide Congress with a report in compliance with the "Kassenbaum amendment, which was initiated to curtail the degree of politicization for this Conference."³⁰ He also called on the secretary of state to instruct the American delegation to take "appropriate steps" to prevent the passage of a resolution which equated Zionism with racism. He said he hoped the conference would further the goals of women "instead of lapsing into useless political name-calling."³⁰ Yatron's anxiety was well-founded. Several weeks before, at the end of May, an inter-Arab symposium on "Zionist propaganda and how to cope with it" was held in Kuwait, sponsored by the Arab League. This seemed to be the first organized expression of concern over the campaign to counter the anti-Zionist drive.³¹

On the eve of the conference itself the tension level increased as U.S. Rep. Edward F. Feighan observed in a letter to President Reagan that a coalition of radical states was once again attempting to disrupt the final Nairobi conference on the Women's Decade. As evidence, he pointed to the inclusion of Palestinian women as a subject of the conference. This choice, he said, "has as its clear aim diverting the proceedings at Nairobi."

Moreover, he added, "There are also clear indications that the insidious 'Zionism is racism' equation. . . will again be pushed for consideration. We strongly believe that the adoption of such biased items in the agenda would weaken and damage U.S. interests and those of women worldwide. The U.S. Congress has already expressed its concern in a provision of the FY 1984 State Department authorization bill which states that, 'every available means' be used to ensure that the 1985 Conference is not dominated by political issues extraneous to the goals of the conference. We hope to receive your report on those preparations, as required by that legislation, very shortly," he told Reagan.³²

At the same time, on July 9, five women heads of major American Jewish organizations sent a telegram to Reagan. They informed him they had just learned a resolution might be proposed at the Nairobi Conference "defining Zionism as an obstacle to development, like racism and apartheid."³³ They urged the president to reaffirm a personal commitment he had made to them a year earlier "that the U.S. will actively oppose any agenda item at the Nairobi Conference which associates Zionism with racism. . . and if despite our efforts, such an agenda item is adopted, the U.S. will have no choice but to consider seriously cancelling its participation in the conference."³⁴ They also called upon Reagan to instruct the U.S. delegation to "walk out of any session if such a resolution should be presented and to state that under the circumstances the U.S. will not finance this U.N. Program."³⁵

The women were referring to an amendment introduced by Senator Robert Kasten adopted by the Senate on June 10, 1985. Current law had reduced by 25 percent U.S. contributions for the U.N. "Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People," the special unit on Palestinian rights, projects for the PLO, [and] for the South West Africa People's Organization [SWAPO]. The amendment expanded the law to apply to the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination and to any other U.N. agency or conference whose sole or partial purpose was to implement the provisions of UNGA Resolution 3379.³⁶

The head of the U.S. delegation to the Nairobi Conference and the president's daughter, Maureen Reagan, responded immediately to this telegram by pledging that her delegation would do everything possible to prevent the adoption of anti-Zionist resolutions. She said that if such resolutions were adopted it would be up to the president to decide what action the U.S. delegation would take. However, she stressed that the U.S. delegation

would be reluctant to walk out as requested by some since radical delegations were trying during the preparatory meetings to find out how to force the U.S. to leave so they would be free to have such resolutions adopted.

Maureen Reagan, meanwhile, disclosed that the draft Nairobi document contained a catch-all proposed by the Soviet bloc which included Zionism among the cited obstacles to the development of women. She said the U.S. delegation would "work to get it out," primarily by proposing that the operative draft resolution, "Forward-looking Strategy for Women," be adopted on a consensus vote and that political issues be dealt with in a separate manner. She also indicated that she was not opposed to discussion of apartheid and the Palestinian question, but that she was against the political issues encroaching on the feminist causes of the conference:

"There has to be a place for radical views to be heard," she said. "There has to be a place for political debates to take place. But there also has to be a forward-looking strategy for the next fifteen years which deals with the very best agreement of women from all over the world with the things we have in common and we are working for and that doesn't eliminate any group of nations or any single nation simply because one group has more votes."³⁷

In sum, the U.S. delegation seemed to be looking for a deal ensuring that the "forward-looking strategy for women" would be adopted by consensus. At the same time, it seemed to seek passage by a majority vote of political resolutions dealing with Palestinian rights and Zionism. In addition, Maureen Reagan dismissed the possibility of cutting off U.S. funds if the conference became politicized, since the money appropriated by the U.S. for this conference had already been spent!

This was not good news for Israel and the Jewish people. It was a bad omen which was realized in Maureen Reagan's official speech to the plenum. In it she made a specific reference to the plight of the Palestinians, thereby taking part in and legitimizing the politicization game. A meeting the next day between the Israeli delegation headed by Knesset Member Sarah Doron and the American delegation helped allay only some of the Israelis' concerns. Doron could not get a clear answer to the question of whether Zionism would or would not be included in the list of obstacles to women's development to be mentioned in the concluding and operative document of the conference: "It all depends on how tough the U.S. is going to be," she said, "and on the support of the other democratic countries of Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and certain countries of goodwill in Africa and Asia."³⁸

Until now the United States had not displayed any notable toughness and its apparently inexhaustible willingness to reach a deal had not yet met a positive response. In fact, the tide was shifting away from it at both the NGO Forum and the Governmental Conference. There, stinging verbal attacks were launched against the U.S., Israel and Zionism, echoing those sustained at the Copenhagen conference.

"Death to the Zionists" and "No peace until we get rid of the Jews," were some of the slogans hurled during many workshops by Arab representatives.³⁹ Arab delegates, except those from Egypt and Jordan, joined by some delegates from the Soviet Bloc and the Third World, also staged a "noisy walk-out" from the Nairobi Conference Center when Sarah Doron, the head of the Israeli delegation, was invited to the rostrum of the Governmental Conference.⁴⁰ Doron's speech was masterful, but some of it was simply drowned out by the noisy protesters who chanted "*Palestina Arabi*," and the chairman did not give her the chance to complete her remarks.

The hidden, and sometimes not so hidden, agenda of many who came to the forum and the conference was to defame Israel and Zionism. The open agenda of the majority of delegates to the Governmental Conference was to condemn Zionism as a form of racism. At every opportunity, both in Committee One, where the Zionism-is-racism question was discussed, and on the floor of the Plenary, invective flowed. It was usually initiated by the delegate from Iran, who piously began each statement with, "In the name of the most compassionate Allah." This invariably was followed by a denunciation of Israel as an occupying force and a call to add the word "Zionism" to imperialism and racism as major obstacles to the attainment of women's goals and objectives. Thus, "calumny after calumny were spread upon the official record of the conference."⁴¹

The Soviet and Arab blocs were the most aggressive practitioners of anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist slander. With the Palestinian delegation spearheading this ritual, they attempted to disrupt every session focusing on Israel. They used "every session as an attempt to attack Israel and Zionism. Whatever session you went into, they went in to try to take over," said Charlotte Jacobson, the chairman of the Jewish National Fund in the United States.⁴²

Here and there, there were unexpected and encouraging reactions against the disruptions by delegates from Third World countries. Dame Nita Barrow of Barbados, the Convenor of the Forum, for instance, interrupted a demonstration against apartheid, Israel and U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, that was held on the campus as the forum was drawing to a close. She ordered that "*placards that would divide the women should be discarded, [while] those which called for 'No to Zionism' should be withdrawn.*"⁴³ At one of the workshops, a doctor of community health from Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem was presenting medical information to health professionals and African and Asian delegates refused to allow the Palestinians to break up her presentation, banging on their desks in protest.⁴²

According to AJCommittee delegate Inge Lederer Gibel, fewer than 10 percent of the 1,000 sessions were disrupted by the injection of non-germane issues.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the "major crisis of the Conference"⁴¹ was around the inclusion of Zionism as an obstacle to peace and to the advancement of women. In spite of a few gestures of support such as

those above, there was a growing sense that the U.S. plans to stymie the anti-Zionist derailment of the conference were going to fail.

That the tide turned was prompted in no small measure by the non-binding resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate on July 10, 1985, in response to Bernice Tannenbaum's lobbying campaign following the conference at the State Department. S.J. Res.98 urged the U.S. administration to take action to have Resolution 3379 expunged from the record of the U.N. Introduced by Senators Alfonso d'Amato and Richard Lugar, with the support of fourteen other senators, it declared:

"That the Congress—

(1) soundly denounces and condemns any linkage between Zionism and racism;

(2) considers UNGA Resolution 3379 to be a permanent smear upon the reputation of the U.N. and to be totally inconsistent with the organization's declared purposes and principles;

(3) unequivocally states that the premise of UNGA resolution 3379 which equates Zionism with racism is itself clearly a form of bigotry; and

(4) formally repudiates UNGA Resolution 3379, and calls upon the parliaments of all countries which value freedom and democracy to do the same.

Tannenbaum took with her to Nairobi the original copy of the Senate resolution. She gave it to Ambassador Alan Keyes, the chief adviser to the U.S. delegation, who included references to it in his statements on the floor. Keyes had clear instructions from Washington. Zionism was not to be included in any paragraph of the final document to be adopted at the conclusion of the conference. Indeed, if this occurred, the U.S. delegation was to leave the conference.⁴¹ It was a remarkable shift from Maureen Reagan's initial declaration!

The last day of the conference, July 26, was devoted to the adoption of the final documents. But the day was overshadowed by a very difficult debate on Zionism. The term "Zionism" appeared explicitly in paragraphs 45 and 95 of the document, "Forward-looking Strategies. . ." and indirectly in paragraph 36 via a reference to the Mexico conference declaration. During the morning, there was a dramatic appeal from the French, followed by appeals from several delegations, for the conference "not to deviate from its goal in favour of questions dividing the international community." Iran, wanting to show its "concern for compromise," took back its amendment to paragraph 45. In addition, a compromise was reached on paragraph 36 enabling the delegations opposed to mentioning the Mexico declaration to ex-

press their reservations in writing and to have them mentioned in the final report on the conference.

In the afternoon, however, there was a pitched battle over paragraph 95. Iran, Syria, Libya, Iraq and Jordan vehemently demanded the inclusion of Zionism. Senegal explained that it was committed to supporting the reference in paragraph 95 since it was a member of the Committee on the Exercise of Palestinian Rights, and in view of a recent declaration adopted by the OAU (Organization of African Unity) condemning Zionism. The pressure was kept on until late in the night, but it was met with a very firm stand by the U.S. representatives. Each time that Maureen Reagan spoke, "her voice was strong and her words were stronger. 'The United States will not accept the proposed wording and will walk out of the conference,'" she said.⁴¹ For his part, Ambassador Keyes "was a source of strength. . . like a rock. . . On the issue of Zionism, he was absolutely unyielding. It was absolutely unacceptable for the U.S. government that that word should be used."⁴⁵

This unequivocal U.S. position clearly stiffened the spines of the representatives of most Western European countries as well as some countries of Latin America. There was a remarkable change in atmosphere as positive words about Israel flowed from the microphone from the usual "abstention" nations. Country after country declared that the inclusion of the word "Zionism" in the formal document was unacceptable.⁴¹

At this juncture, the conference president suggested suspending the session to allow for consultations. It was clear that a vote for the insertion of Zionism in paragraph 95 would win a majority, but a consensus on a compromise amendment could prevent its inclusion. The Kenyan delegation, supported by Egypt, came up with a compromise proposing that the words "racism," and "Zionism" be replaced by "all forms of racial discrimination." Several delegations—the USSR, Iran, the PLO—rose to condemn Zionism, but, "the Soviet Union caved in and accepted the compromise."⁴⁵ The PLO delegation, bitterly resigned, did the same. Its delegate rose to deafening applause and said, "My delegation and Palestinian women are under Zionist occupation. We are in a country which suffered apartheid as my country suffers under Zionism. But there is blackmail in this hall, so we accept the Kenyan amendment."⁴⁵

In an internal report of the "Quai d'Orsay," the French Foreign Ministry, it was assumed that the compromise was perhaps due "to the U.S. threat to walk out of the conference which hung over the conference during all of Friday. . . [But] at no time did the Ten consider that, in case of an American walk-out, they would leave the conference."⁴⁶ Thus, the practical impact of U.S. Senate Resolution S.J. 98 on the U.S. delegation at Nairobi had a notable effect on many delegations, especially the ones of Western Europe. But it was not enough to make them walk out in a crunch. A more decisive role was played by Egypt, which "devoted great efforts to convincing the

African Group, upon which a decision on this point was depending, to resist the pressure exerted by the Arab delegations, above all, by Algeria."⁴⁶

Was the final outcome of the conference a turning point in the struggle against the anti-Zionist onslaught, or the hollow victory claimed by Marvin Schick in an article in the *Jewish World* called, "Jews Should Take Little Solace in Nairobi Document?" Schick protested the impulse to applaud an outcome simply "because it did not suggest the worst things about our people, that we are to find solace in the failure of the world community to condemn us.

"So we are not found guilty of blood libel and we are not required to say once more that we do not murder Arab babies but provide them with medical care. We should, I suppose, take some comfort from this, but our comfort must be proportionate; it must not erase the memory of days of vilification."⁴⁷

It could be further argued that the conference represented a Pyrrhic victory because indirect references to the ZR equation remained in its final documents. There was one in the reference to the Mexico Declaration of 1975, and one in the "compromise" formulation citing "all forms of racism." By virtue of 3379, of course, Zionism was still considered a form of racism! Still, the achievement in Nairobi was not to be underestimated. It provided clear proof that it was possible to win a few points and force the adversary on the defensive, even into retreat.

SAVING THE U.N. FROM ITSELF

As we have seen, one of the strategies suggested at the working group convened in January 1984 to fight Resolution 3379 was "to discredit the U.N., slur its reputation, press for its reformation and even for its replacement."⁴⁸ Although this plan ultimately was not adopted by the steering committee, it had some strong supporters, including Foreign Minister Shamir, who endorsed it in his address to the kick-off conference in Jerusalem.

If the objective of the campaign was to be the abrogation of Resolution 3379, obviously there was no room for such an extreme and far-reaching strategy. But if its objective, as a pragmatic second best, was to try to undermine the ZR libel resolution, then discrediting the standing of the U.N. and pressing for its reform was a logically complementary strategy.

This was the campaign's de facto course of action, taken primarily under the direction of Yoram Dinstein, professor of law and rector of the Tel Aviv University. Although he was not a formal member of the steering committee, he was closely involved with its activity. Dinstein viewed as totally unrealistic an attempt to abrogate the importance of the U.N. and to replace it with something else.⁴⁸ Instead, he believed that by exerting constant pressure and

by questioning the legitimacy of the deteriorating institution, it would be possible to convince a majority of its members to support the amendment of Resolution 3379. The resolution, in his view, embodied more than anything else the failure and degradation of the world institution.⁴⁹ He saw the conferences being organized to mobilize public support against the anti-Zionism campaign as a good opportunity to protest this state of affairs. Dinstein also proposed convening an academic conference of renowned U.N. experts to assess the U.N.'s departure from its mission and to recommend ways to get it back on track.

The idea of a legal conference on how to save the U.N. from itself was finally executed more than a year later, in April 1986. In the meantime, other ideas were floated about how to pressure the U.N. At the beginning of 1985, for instance, the steering committee decided to forward a petition to the U.N. 40th General Assembly, an idea suggested by Gideon Raphael, former director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and some other members. The petition would recall the fundamentals of the U.N. Charter and call upon it "to disavow the abusive Resolution 3379 and re-dedicate itself to its founding charter."⁵⁰

The text of the petition was drafted with the assistance of the Foreign Ministry, (I. Minervi, Elyakim Rubinstein, Pinchas Eliav, Asher Naim, Moshe Yegar) and others. The final draft was sent at the end of March to the heads of the Zionist Federations which were active in thirty countries, along with instructions about the personalities to be approached for signatures and about the deadline.⁵¹ In countries with no Zionist Federation, the Foreign Ministry was asked to take over, particularly in Africa.⁵²

An unanticipated reaction came from one of the first people approached to sign the petition, Conor Cruise O'Brien, a former Irish diplomat at the U.N., who for years had been the chief editor of the *Observer*. Although he recognized the destructive impact of Resolution 3379, he expressed strong reservations about submitting a petition to the U.N. In part, he was afraid it would provoke a backlash. He did not believe, he said, that, "as the General Assembly is now made up, there is any chance whatever" of getting it to withdraw its support from Resolution 3379.

The plan to send the petition to the chairman of the General Assembly and the general secretary of the U.N. "means the chairman of the U.N. can, at most, put your petition before the Assembly itself," said O'Brien. "In that case (in my opinion) the result is likely to be the reaffirmation of 3379—an outcome which to my mind leaves those of us who detest that resolution worse off than we were before. The original resolution was carried at a time when the PLO was at its peak in terms of international verbal support. To have its rhetorical achievement of that period solemnly confirmed at this low point in its fortunes is surely something that should be avoided."

There was a second point of no less importance, O'Brien continued. "The

more distinguished people you bring together and sign a petition to the General Assembly, the more you are enhancing the moral authority attributed to that Assembly—thereby also enhancing the importance of the rebuff you will receive from the Assembly in question.”⁵³ O’Brien’s objections were not taken into account partly because action on the petition was already under way. Also, the path he was suggesting, to treat the GA for what it was. . . a public international forum which had long since dissipated whatever moral authority it once possessed and was no longer taken seriously by either policy makers, or students of international affairs, would have meant continuing the former policy of contempt, indignation and inaction.

Yehuda Blum, a professor of international law who, until 1984, had been Israel’s ambassador to the U.N., also felt focusing on the repudiation of 3379 was a mistake. In the daily newspaper *Ma’ariv*, he criticized the program of the “Zionist counter-attack” outlined in an article by Shmuel Segev.⁵⁴ Blum first offered that the plan “was a two edged sword, which will push the Arabs and their supporters to renew their formal attack against Zionism that they had relinquished in the last years, and reiterate the position of 1975. In this case there was a risk that the anti-Zionist majority will be greater than in 1975,” he wrote.⁵⁴

Second, he said the organizers of the “Zionist counter-attack” were not intending really to overturn 3379. They were trying to use the campaign to raise the awareness of the Jewish and general public, he said, but not for any concrete results. They knew very well, he argued, that in the present political constellation, there was no possibility whatsoever of passing a resolution expressing regret or apology for the ZR equation, much less for winning its abrogation. In Blum’s view, basing this educational effort on refuting the ZR was a mistake. “It will miss the point since it will necessarily be an apologetic one, and be directed at rejecting what Zionism was not, in the sense that it was not racism, aggression, imperialism.”⁵⁴

Narkiss, the head of the international campaign, responded by protesting that the campaign was not a gimmick directed at the Jewish communities. Rather, it had genuine goal, to “erode the 1975 resolution in order to strip it of its content and of its moral value.”⁵⁵ As to the risk of prompting the Arabs to renew their formal attack against Zionism, Narkiss observed that the Arabs needed no cue, for they had already done so at least three times during the last year. Besides, he added, there was no reason at all to be apologetic about Zionism when attacking the ZR.

Blum’s article was an expression of the support still enjoyed by the previous Israeli policy. This had preferred to deal with the ZR libel by not coming to grips with it and hoping that it “would fade away naturally,” according to a statement made two years later by another Foreign Ministry official, Uri Savir.⁵⁶ But this view displayed a failure to understand the fundamental psychological drive of people deeply involved in any endeavor. For most, it

is far easier to remain committed to a cause when its objective is tangible and when progress is measurable, than when it is general and theoretical and achievement is difficult to assess.

In any case, the drive for the petition to the U.N. not only provided a concrete challenge for some Zionist and Jewish leaders. It also created a framework for a plan to call on the U.N. to reform itself around the dates marking the fortieth anniversary of the founding of the U.N. and the tenth anniversary of the ZR libel. There were to be five main components in this plan: 1) The petition was to be handed to the U.N. 2) Cables were to be sent by Jewish communities and organizations to the U.N. secretary general and to the president of the UNGA, with copies to the U.N. ambassadors of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The cables would warn the U.N. that the Jewish people would not be able to identify or fully cooperate with an organization singling out its national movement, and would not rest until the U.N. returned to the role for which it was founded and the resolution was expunged from its records. 3) On November 10, a conference on "Israel, Zionism and the U.N.," co-sponsored by the Israeli Mission to the U.N. and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, was to take place in one of the conference rooms of the U.N., as well as a public rally in front of the building. 4) On the same day, all over the world, in Jewish schools, community centers and synagogues, activities would be held denouncing a decade of U.N. libel against the liberation movement of the Jewish people.⁵⁷ 5) During the same period a mass mailing of 250,000 postcards, "All the Tribes of Israel Together," would be sent from all the corners of the Jewish world to the secretary general of the U.N. as a reminder of the absorption of thousands of Ethiopian Jews into Israeli society and symbolic of the pluralistic nature of the Israeli state and of Zionism.⁵⁸

With only minor changes, this entire plan was carried out. The petition was signed by 800 world renowned personalities from twenty-six free world nations.⁵⁹ They included prime ministers, former heads of state, parliamentarians, Nobel Laureates, scientists, clergy, creative and fine artists, trade unionists, authors and journalists. It was handed to U.N. Secretary General Xavier Perez de Cuellar by a delegation of six activists: Bernice Tannenbaum, Gerald Kraft, president of B'nai B'rith International, Israel's U.N. Ambassador Benyamin Netanyahu, Rah'amin Eliezer, secretary general of the National Council of Ethiopian Jews, Israel Singer, executive director of the WJC and Uzi Narkiss.

The delegation invoked the dedication of Perez de Cuellar to the ideals of the United Nations and his efforts to turn the world organization into an effective instrument for the advancement of human rights and into a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. It then called upon him "to take appropriate action to help remove from the records of the U.N. the stain of Resolution 3379."⁶⁰ Narkiss also presented Perez de Cuellar with an original

Yaacov Agam lithograph. Specially prepared for the occasion, it featured a quote from the U.N. Charter, "to practice and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors."

The petition was summed up and published, together with the full text of the U.S. Congressional joint resolution, as an ad in the U.S. press under the title, "To Right a Wrong." The ad read:

"Ten years ago this November 10, the U.N. committed a great wrong by adopting the infamous resolution equating Zionism with racism. In his speech before the U.N., President Reagan cited this resolution as "a glaring failure of the U.N." and a "total inversion of morality."

"This resolution was and is a betrayal of the principles on which the U.N. was founded, and opened a floodgate of internationally



Handling's ceremony of the Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations. From left to right: Dr. Israel Singer, Executive Director of the World Jewish Congress; Bernice Tannenbaum; General (res.) Uzi Narkiss; Rah'amin Eliezer, Secretary General of the National Council of Ethiopian Jews; U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar; Benyamin Netanyahu, Israel's Ambassador to the U.N. November 11, 1985, United Nations Headquarters, New York.

sponsored worldwide propaganda to delegitimize the State of Israel and the Jewish people.

"After a decade of calumny, it is time to right the wrong and remove this shameful stain from the records of the U.N.

"We, the leaders of the WZO, the WJC and BBI, will today present to the Secretary General of the U.N., Xavier Perez de Cuellar, a petition signed by more than 1,000 distinguished personalities from all walks of life throughout the free world calling upon the U.N. to expunge this infamous resolution. (The number cited included the signers of the U.S. congressional resolution.)

"We therefore call upon the parliaments of the world and men of good will everywhere to reaffirm the abhorrence of civilized society to this repugnant resolution, and to rededicate itself to the advancement of human rights and dignity. This is the great moral imperative of our time."⁶¹

Most of those approached merely signed the petition. Some, however, sent special messages. One was Jacques Chirac, mayor of Paris and the leader of the RPR, the Gaullist party. His message was clear proof that it was possible to fight the ZR libel without being on the defensive or apologetic about Zionism. In short, he conveyed the essence of Zionism:

"From the forerunners, such as Yehuda Hai Alkalai or Zeev Hirsch Kalischer to Nathan Birnbaum, who was the first to use the word Zionism in the May 16, 1890, edition of his magazine, "Selbst-Emanzipation," to Moshe Hess, Theodor Herzl or Isidor Bodenheimer; from Leon Pinsker to Horace Meyer Hallen, or in France itself from R.P. Riquet to Paul Claudel, from Jacques Ellul to Jacques Maritain, from Pierre Emmanuel to Georges Duhamel, all point to the fact that Zionism as defined by the same Nathan Birnbaum, for instance in his lecture before the association "Adamat Yeshouroun," January 23, 1892—could never be associated whatsoever with the tragic concept of race.

"Knowing the importance of the three fundamental sources of Zionism: the messianic religious tradition of Judaism and the faithfulness to the Alliance linked with the donation of a land; the national thinking of the end of the 18th century and of the 19th century—to which France had contributed so much; the destruction caused by all the persecutors, from Nebuchadnezzar to Antiochus, and all their tragic successors, knowing that nobody can equate Zionism with racism, since precisely the former is also an admirable means to combat the latter. It is important to recall it

Public Law 99-90
99th Congress

Joint Resolution

Concerning the passage of Resolution 3379, in the United Nations General Assembly on November 10, 1975, and urging the United States Ambassador and United States delegation to take all appropriate actions necessary to erase this shameful resolution from the record of the United Nations.

AUG 15 1985
S. J. RES. 90

Whereas, on November 10, 1975, the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3379 which sought to legitimize the lie, first perpetrated at the United Nations General Assembly by representatives of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1963, that Zionism is a form of racism; and Whereas Resolution 3379 of the thirtieth United Nations General Assembly directly contravenes the most basic principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and undermines universal human rights values and principles; and

50 Stat. 1130

Whereas that infamous resolution threatens directly the integrity and legitimacy of a member state by singling out for slanderous attack the national movement which gave birth to the State of Israel; and

Whereas the adoption of Resolution 3379 by the thirtieth United Nations General Assembly constituted one of that organization's darkest moments and may fuel the flames of antisemitism and anti-Zionism; and

Whereas the United States Congress sharply condemned the passage of Resolution 3379 ten years ago "in that said resolution encourages antisemitism by wrongly associating and equating Zionism with racism": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress—

Antisemitism

(1) soundly denounces and condemns any linkage between Zionism and racism;

(2) considers UNGA Resolution 3379 to be a permanent smear upon the reputation of the United Nations and to be totally inconsistent with that organization's declared purposes and principles;

(3) unequivocally states that the premise of UNGA Resolution 3379 which equates Zionism with racism is itself clearly a form of bigotry; and

(4) formally repudiates UNGA Resolution 3379, and calls upon the Parliaments of all countries which value freedom and democracy to do the same.

Approved August 15, 1985.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—S.J. Res. 90

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 131 (1985)
July 9, considered and passed Senate.
Aug. 1, considered and passed House

*now that by some fallacious hodge-podge of thought, this confusion against which you are justly rising up is unfortunately becoming more and more widespread. Besides, it concerns the so necessary "Teaching of Esteem" demanded with reason and wisdom by Jules Isaac, and after him by the Chief Rabbi Jacob Kaplan to react against the "Teaching of Contempt" developed by somber campaigns of disinformation. The adoption of Resolution 3379, in this perspective, is all the more blameworthy in that it is contrary in its spirit to the historical vote of November 29, 1947."*⁶²

Of all the cables sent to Perez de Cuellar, the one sent by Israel Kessar on behalf of 1,500 delegates to the 15th Histadrut Convention held November 5-7, 1985, is particularly noteworthy. Pointing out that the Histadrut represented 1.5 million Jewish, Moslem, Christian and Druze workers, it stressed that the content of the cable had been adopted as a unanimous resolution by the convention.

*"The 15th Histadrut Convention condemns in the strongest possible terms, the U.N. Resolution No. 3379 of 11.10.75 equating Zionism with racism, and calls for its immediate annulment. It is inconceivable that this resolution should be the only formal position that the U.N. has adopted with regard to Zionism. The Histadrut—General Federation of Labour in Israel—which symbolizes the significance of Zionism as a movement of national and social liberation of the Jewish people, and the progressive nature of Israeli society, rejects with utter disgust any attempt to equate Zionism with racism which is diametrically opposed to the Bible (Tanach) of Israel and to all the human values which characterized the Jewish people in every generation."*⁶³

The conference on "Israel, Zionism and the U.N." was held on November 10, 1985, in Conference Room 4 at the U.N. headquarters, and attracted a lot of press interest. The panel of speakers included the three most recent permanent U.S. representatives to the U.N., Vernon Walters, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Alan Keyes, assistant secretary designate for International Organizations Affairs, the Rev. Benjamin Nunez, Bayard Rustin, chairman of the Philip Randolph Institute, Kenneth Bialkin, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of the Major American Jewish Organizations and Conor Cruise O'Brien. But the main reason for the unusual amount of interest was not the speakers. It was the vocal Arab protest against the decision of the U.N. secretary general to allow such a conference to be held in a U.N. conference room.

Although the request to Perez de Cuellar for use of one of the U.N. halls was on its face a trivial one which had been granted easily to many U.N.

delegations for meetings, seminars or lectures, this time it provoked an outcry. It seemed intolerable to the Arab delegations, since it deviated from Israel's de facto ex-communication at the U.N. A delegation representing the twenty-one-member Arab group lodged a complaint with the secretary general claiming that granting the site "was an abuse and violation" of Israel's membership in the world body.⁶⁴ Clovis Maksoud, permanent representative of the Arab League at the U.N., told reporters that the seminar represented "an Israeli invasion" of the U.N. and a violation of the regulations of the world body.⁶⁵

For Netanyahu, this echoed the arguments by Israel's opponents that the celebration of the U.N.'s fortieth anniversary was marred by Israel's presence in the world body, and who constantly brought up the anti-Zionism resolution. "I don't remember a single day in the General Assembly that this slander was not repeated," said Netanyahu.⁶⁶ The very fact that Perez de Cuellar did not give in to the pressure was an encouraging sign that something could change at the U.N.

The American interest in the repudiation of 3379 was stressed at the conference. The U.S. president sent a message declaring, "Few events have so offended the American people as the ZR resolution of November 10, 1975. It was as if all America stood to affirm the response of our chief delegate Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 'The United States rises to declare before the General Assembly of the U.N. and before the world that it does not acknowledge, it will never abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act.' The United States, under the leadership of three different presidents, has remained true to that pledge. Today, I am proud to reaffirm that promise and further, to pledge my support for the removal of this blot from the U.N. record."

"The passage of the ZR resolution symbolized the death of the dream of the U.N. as an institution dedicated to reason, democracy and peace," said Kirkpatrick. And, with its passage came the declaration of "open season on Israel," she added. "Henceforth, Israel would be fair game. . . . Most of the same people and governments have minimized every subsequent defeat of democratic values inside the U.N. and every armed attack on Israel. They contributed to the growing body of U.N. resolutions that declare Israel the moral equivalent of Nazi Germany—a state guilty of war crimes and genocide, and by now a large number of governments have permitted themselves to become accomplices within the U.N. in the campaign to delegitimize and destroy Israel."⁶⁷

Moynihan suggested linking international technological cooperation with a repudiation of the ZR resolution. He also theorized that the Soviet Union had used the resolution to deflect the attention of the Arab world and the Third World from how little aid the Soviets were giving to the underdeveloped countries. He claimed that there had been virtually no scholarly inquiry into the origins of the resolution.⁶⁸

Netanyahu's contribution was two-fold. First, in a press conference before the seminar, he foresaw that Israel's big push to repeal the General Assembly Resolution 3379—or pass a resolution rebutting it—would not be brought to a vote that year.⁶⁹ He explained that a repudiation of the ZR was a realistic but not immediate goal of Israel. Second, in his address to the conference, he brought to light the unique role of the U.N. in spurring a renewal of anti-Semitism. In the speech, which was almost ignored by the U.S. press but published extensively in the Israeli daily, *Ma'ariv*, under the title "The lost honor of the U.N.," he underscored that Resolution 3379, indeed, was a watershed in the history of anti-Semitism. It was one of the biggest libels ever, wrapped in a cloak of international respectability and disseminated globally. For the very first time in history, he said, a world body was lending its imprimatur to a libel against a whole people, which he called a "prelude to murder," a "license to kill."⁷⁰

The Soviet press termed the conference a provocative and disgraceful action against the U.N. under the cover of a seminar to celebrate the fortieth anniversary of its foundation. It actually was "a political conference attacking the U.N. and its member-states. The real aim of this provocation was to discredit the United Nations General Assembly resolution by which ten years ago, the international community had defined Zionism as one form of racism. . . . Almost all the member-states of the U.N. questioned how the General Secretariat could allow a conference under the roof of the U.N. which actually attacked the organization itself and its decision."⁷¹

By contrast, there was little such reaction to the international legal conference on "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N." held several months later on April 13–15, 1986, at the New York University School of Law. It drew some of the best and best-known U.N. experts in the world. Yoram Dinstein had received the blessing of the Steering Committee to organize the conference and did so in consultation with some of his colleagues in the United States and Europe.⁷² Forty-four jurists from eleven countries took part in this conference, including advisers to ministries of foreign affairs and to the U.N. itself.⁷³

The jurists examined and found in the records of the U.N. organs and related bodies statements containing anti-Semitic expressions and manifesting hostility to Judaism and the Jewish people. They concluded that such anti-Semitic slurs were contrary to the general principles of international law as reflected in the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. They also examined statements made at U.N. organs and related bodies, advocating expressly or by implication the destruction of the State of Israel. They held that such statements as

well as the institutionalization of anti-Zionism, threaten international order, impugn the integrity of the U.N. and damage its credibility.

In its concluding statement the conference declared that: 1. U.N. organs, representatives of member states, accredited observers and other participants in the U.N. proceedings, must respect international legal principle proscribing incitement to national, racial, ethnic or religious hatred. 2. Member states should instruct their representatives in every U.N. forum to place on record their condemnation of violations of the aforementioned principle. 3. The U.N. Secretariat should counsel presiding officers of U.N. organs and related bodies to rule out of order such defamatory statements and try to assure that they are not incorporated in materials distributed by the U.N. 4. An equation of Zionism with racism must be rejected. 5. Implementation of these principles and recommendations will enhance cooperation by states in promoting the fundamental purposes of the U.N. Charter.⁷⁴

In his keynote address, entitled "Anti-Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the decline of the U.N. Ideal," Alan Keyes, U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organizations, charged that the U.N. had strayed from its original conception as an instrument of peace. "It has been used, not exclusively but with increasing frequency and consistency, as a mere instrument of war, a mirror of passionate hatred and resentment in the rivalries and conflict that beset the globe. Nowhere has this been more evident than in its role with respect to the Middle East, and the treatment of Israel by U.N. bodies. I believe, however that this role reflects an attitude toward the U.N. that has been present, in some form or another, since it began. The idea of the U.N. as an instrument of peace was rejected, ab initio, by those states, who subscribe to the tactical doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. . ."

As more and more nations of the developing world gained their independence, Keyes continued, "the Soviet view of the U.N. as an ideological and geo-political weapon gradually gained ascendancy over the Western constitutionalist view of the organization. . . Whether the cause ideological or cultural, the majority of the U.N. member states have either supported or shown little disposition to resist the tendency to reduce the U.N. to a mere polemical arena."

"Of all the U.N. wars," said Keyes, "that waged against Israel has been in many ways the most persistent, insidious and offensive. In recent years resolutions presented to the Security Council and the General Assembly have embodied shameless double standard, reflecting an unbridled hatred that leaves no room for fair judgment or a search for equitable solutions."⁷⁵ In his conclusion, Keyes pointed to the link between combating anti-Zionism and rededicating the U.N. to its original ideals. "The anti-Zionism campaign is an instance of the general tendency to degrade the intrinsic meaning of the U.N. idea, and to use the U.N. as an instrument of conflict. We should recognize

that our opposition to that campaign is an urgent part of our overall efforts to renew the original foundations of the U.N.”⁷⁶

Allan Gerson, deputy assistant attorney general of the U.S. Department of Justice, adopted the same arguments. He characterized the United Nations arena in his paper, “The U.N. and Racism: the Case of the ZR Resolution as Progenitor,” as an inversion of Von Clausewitz’s famous maxim. He said the U.N. was a “political arena for the continuation of war against the State of Israel by other means,” mainly by delegitimizing Israel’s existence through the ZR equation and by legitimating terror against the State of Israel itself.⁷⁷ The anti-Zionism resolution, he said, has also served as an element encouraging racism on a world-wide scale, but at the same time he advised against fighting the ZR on the terrain of the adversaries. For Gerson, it was not advisable to campaign for a U.N. vote to withdraw the resolution. He believed it would be far better to “declare the resolution null and void and to ask other governments, especially that of the U.S., to consider stating publicly that the resolution is a nullity, *ultra vires* the purposes of the U.N. Charter.”⁷⁸

Gerson urged that the UNGA’s ZR resolution be viewed as the kind of “standardless sweep” so often ruled invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court. In this context, the resolution could be considered void and unconstitutional under its own constitution, the U.N. Charter, which makes state action the only appropriate subject of U.N. debate. The Charter and various U.N. declarations and conventions provide standards for assessing improper state conduct in light of internationally accepted human rights standards, he pointed out. Gerson hence proposed “that any time the word Zionism is used at a U.N. forum the representatives of all friendly countries object on procedural grounds, stating that Zionism, no less than Americanism, Communism or Arabism, is not an appropriate subject for resolution and debate. . . .”

“The U.N. Charter,” he continued, “stands for the idea of standards—minimal standards of restraint in the use of force and respect for human rights. Anti-Zionism. . . is the very antithesis and abnegation of the U.N. Charter, indeed of the U.N. and law itself. Anti-Zionism, proclaiming Zionism to be racism, and the functioning of the U.N., as conceived in its Charter, are inherently incompatible. It turns the U.N. into a racist organization, encouraging and abetting the scourge of racism.”⁷⁹

By contrast, some participants praised the positive role played by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar who, “unlike some earlier secretaries general, has been quite active in attempting to modify the behavior of the Assembly, both as to anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist remarks and generally as to excessively offensive remarks directed towards member states and threatening the existence of member states.”⁸¹ Moreover, they said the U.N. of 1985-6 was not the U.N. of 1975. Although there were still efforts to introduce the ZR formulation in U.N. documents, it was clear that these efforts were regularly rebuffed by a combination of Western and moderate Third World

countries. Such had been the case of Nairobi, of the consensus resolution of the General Assembly regarding the Second Decade to Combat Racism, and of its resolution on Namibia, where each reference to Israel and Zionism was deleted as a result of a paragraph-by-paragraph vote.⁸²

Also, and perhaps even more important, there was now serious discussion about asking the GA to reverse its earlier action and reject the link between Zionism and racism. In the words of Edward Luck, president of the U.N. Association of the United States of America, "It may be too early to obtain such a remarkable reversal, since nobody likes to admit it was wrong, but the very fact that there are knowledgeable people who think that there is a serious possibility of accomplishing this sometime soon is eloquent testimony to the changes within the U.N."⁸² In the meantime, several participants held that there was a chance "that the resolution will be eroded to a vanishing point by subsequent contradictory pronouncements."⁸³

UNDERMINING THE VALIDITY OF 3379

After a year, the campaign against the defamation of Zionism was progressing steadily. As Uzi Narkiss observed, "We successfully increased international awareness, both among Jews and non-Jews of the dangers of such an equation taking root, and we secured their readiness to undertake ongoing and continuous activity, both on the educational and political level, against that perversion," he said.⁸⁴ Still, the impressive shake-up of public apathy was not enough to come close to realizing the goal of the international campaign's steering committee. The committee, it must be remembered, had sought not the abrogation of the resolution, which was considered unrealistic. It wanted to undermine its validity. The challenge remained to accomplish this.

In April 1985, there was an attempt to map the strategy. A document prepared by Yohanan Manor in cooperation with Yehuda Milo and Alan Baker was submitted to Pinchas Eliav, the deputy director general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in charge of the division of international organizations, as well as to the steering committee. Entitled, "An Interim Move," its main recommendation was to take steps to elicit official retractions from countries which had supported or abstained from the vote for Resolution 3379. The strategy pinpointed 12 countries as potential targets: Four from Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela; four from Africa: Zaire, Togo, Uganda and Tanzania; four from Asia: Japan, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore.⁸⁵ The list was changed after a feasibility check with the relevant desks and embassies⁸⁶ and included: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Singapore, Philippines, and Zaire.

The heads of the Jewish communities of these countries were approached and asked to put their weight behind the plan. In a letter, Narkiss referred to the assessment by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that there was a "chance that at least a dozen nations will change their stand, your country included."⁸⁷ The point of the exercise, he explained, was to get a public declaration emphasizing "the true character of the Zionist organization and to steer away from the present resolution." The Israeli ambassador in your country has already received suitable guidelines from the Foreign Ministry, he said.

In fact, the instructions transmitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the relevant Israeli embassies were significantly different in content. The Ministry noted that the upcoming UNGA would mark the fortieth anniversary of the U.N., as well as ten years since Resolution 3379 was adopted, and that both the prime minister and the foreign affairs minister would attend the UNGA and address these two events. The Ministry then explained that its plan was to win, in coordination with the WZO and other Jewish organizations, the maximum number of public retractions from the content of Resolution 3379.

The ambassadors were told to secure from the countries to which they were posted a public stand rejecting the equation of Zionism with racism, without necessarily making explicit reference to the resolution itself. It was to be a kind of public retraction from the stand this country took when it voted on the resolution in November 1975. "The public retreat could be made by any way considered fit by the government: by an answer to a parliamentary question, or an answer to question in a press conference, or by a mention in a speech, or by a press release. . . etc., all according to your judgment and to the prevailing conditions."⁸⁸

In any event, the sole references to Zionism and racism by delegations at the fortieth session of UNGA were the ones made by the U.S. and the Israeli delegations. In strict conformity with the line adopted by the Foreign Ministry, Prime Minister Shimon Peres did not refer explicitly to the ZR equation, but to Zionism and its actual essence:

"Search the map of Western civilizations across the ages—not a place will be found where the Jews were not persecuted. Save for the New World, you will find yourself marching along the trail of Jewish blood and tears, tracing the chronology of Jewish martyrdom.

"This, Mr. President, was the history of my people for a thousand years. Until there came a point when the Jews tired of dependence on the hatred or the tolerance of others to settle their fate.

"This is the very essence of Zionism. Jews were no longer willing to court the favor of others, and to contend with the force of their

fear. Israel was created not only as a home for persecuted Jews the world over, but also as the last refuge from any need to justify their Jewishness.

“Here is the hope of the people of Israel: to finally be the masters of their own fate, true to their own heritage, sovereign in their own land, free to practice their faith and continue their contribution to a world that rejected them.

“Zionism is thus a victory over racism.”⁸⁹

The eloquence of Peres aside, until the end of 1985, there was not even a single retraction by these countries! It was perhaps too early to draw conclusions from this failure, since the first practical steps in this direction were taken in August 1985 and additional measures considered only during the last quarter of 1985, such as the WJC taking responsibility for an educational program for the elite of the Third World, Africa in particular. But Uzi Narkiss had taken to heart the observation by Ambassador Koh at the seminar in Washington that most of the Third World representatives had little knowledge of Zionism. He proposed developing a program to teach some of its basics to members of the political, social as well as intellectual elite of Black African countries.⁹⁰ The International Department of the Histadrut was approached with the same idea. It was suggested that Histadrut could take advantage of its close ties with trade unions in many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, especially through the activity of its Afro-Asian Institute.⁹¹

Still, after a year of intense activity, the campaign was still far short of its mark. Public opinion had been sensitized to the issue and the explicit reiteration of the resolution had been prevented at the women's conference in Nairobi. But the resolution's validity had not been challenged internationally in any substantial way.

Perhaps the biggest accomplishment of the international campaign to date was proving that fighting back could bear fruit and that overturning Resolution 3379, while extremely difficult, was no longer to be considered an impossible goal. Of course, much work remained to be done to win retractions. But this strategy depended a great deal upon a commitment by Israel to target the abrogation as a national priority. Although Israeli policy had evolved considerably, this had not yet occurred. The Foreign Ministry had suspended its reservations over the fight to overturn the ZR and had cooperated fully with the WZO in this respect. But it did not view it as a priority. And this seemed unlikely to change, given Prime Minister Peres' failure to respond to Narkiss' suggestion to make the campaign against Zionism a national priority.⁹²

Notes

- (1) "UN Resolution 3379—A Challenge Still to be Met." Memo prepared by Yohanan Manor for Bernice Tannenbaum and Isidor Hamelin for a briefing session with congressional aides to lay the groundwork for a resolution by the U.S. Congress, March 1985. ZCA/S110/16.
- (2) *JTA*, December 28, 1984.
- (3) Letter from J. Keller to Narkiss, November 7, 1984. ZCA/S110/17.
- (4) Letter from Ambassador Yaakov Cohen to M. Yegar, April 29, 1985. ZCA/S110/16.
- (5) The text of Regis Debray's message was translated in English and distributed by the WZO under the title, "My View of Zionism", during the summer of 1985. Quotes in the French Press: *Le Monde*, June 13; *Le Figaro*, June 13; *Le Matin*, June 12; as well as in the *Report to Narkiss on the colloquium held at the Senate in Paris*, June 11 1985, by Y. Manor. WZO, Jerusalem, July 1985, p. 3. CZA/S110/31.
- (6) *Report on the colloquium*, op.cit.,pp. 2-3 and French press. CZA/S110/31.
- (7) *Report on the colloquium*, op. cit.,p. 6 and French press. CZA/S110/31.
- (8) Rocard's address, in French, pp. 6-8. CZA/S110/31.
- (9) Letter from E. Palmor to the Foreign Ministry, June 13, 1985, p. 2. CZA/S110/16.
- (10) Regis Debray, "My View of Zionism", WZO, Jerusalem, 1985, p. 2. CZA/S110/16.
- (11) Letter from E. Palmor, op cit., p. 2. CZA/S110/16.
- (12) *The U.N. and Zionism According to James Jonah*, a report from Y. Manor, (Hebrew), March 31, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (13) Address by James O.C. Jonah, Assistant U.N. Secretary General, before the CRIF Colloquium, Paris, France, June 11, 1985, p. 8. CZA/S110/31.
- (14) Address by James Jonah, op. cit.p. 9.
- (15) Address by James Jonah, op. cit.,p.11.
- (16) Address by James Jonah, op. cit.,p. 11.
- (17) Address by James Jonah, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
- (18) *The U.N. and Zionism According to J. Jonah*, op. cit.,p. 3.
- (19) *The U.N. and Zionism According to J. Jonah*, op. cit.,p. 2.
- (20) *JTA*, January 29, 1985.
- (21) Cable from Ambassador Shmorak to Tfusot (Diaspora) Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 6, 1985. The campaign against the Defamation of Zionism, Annual Report to the Chairman of the Zionist Executive, A.L. Dulzin, by Uzi Narkiss, November 1985, p. 3. ZCA/S110/24.
- (22) Letter from George Garai to U. Narkiss, October 29, 1985. CZA/S110/24.
- (23) Letter from Margaret Thatcher to George Garai, November 8, 1985. CZA/S110/37.
- (24) *Report on the study day, "Refuting the Z-R Equation"*, op. cit., p. 3. CZA/S110/40.
- (25) Annex to a letter from Judge Hadassa Ben Ito to Uzi Narkiss, May 13, 1985. CZA/S110/14.
- (26) Frances B. Bernstein, Esq. "Committee to Combat U.N.-Inspired Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism," *The Jewish Lawyer*, The International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, American Section, August 1986, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 4; "The Zionist is Racism Resolution: The Worst is Not Over," *The Jewish Lawyer*. . . , op. cit.,pp. 16-18. CZA/S110/14.
- (27) Letter from Pinh'as Eliav to Manor, December 9, 1984. CZA/S110/17.
- (28) International Council of Women, International Council on Social Welfare, International Federa-

- Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights, Associated Country Women of the World, Bahai International Community, International Council of Jewish Women, International Federation of University Women, International Federation of Women in Legal Careers, International Movement for Fraternal Union among Races and Peoples, Pan-Pacific and South-East Asia Women's Association, Soroptomist International, World Movement of Mothers, World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, World Young Women's Christian Association-YWCA, Zonta International, Category II: Governmental Organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.
- (29) A/CONF.116/PC/NGO/13, February 23, 1985, p. 2.
- (30) Letter from Gus Yatron to George Shultz, June 14, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (31) Shmuel Seguev, "Mitkafat-Neged Zionit" (Zionist Counter-Attack), *Maariv*, July 23, 1985.
- (32) Letter from E. Feighan to President Reagan, July 9, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (33) *JTA*, July 10, 1985.
- (34) The White House, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary, August 16, 1985.
- (35) *JTA*, July 10, 1985. Bernice Tannenbaum, Head of the American Section of the WZO; Frieda Lewis, Chairman of the American Section of the WJC; Charlotte Jacobson, President, Jewish National Fund; Barbara Mandel, President, National Council of Jewish Women; Midge Fecter, Executive Director, Committee for the Free World.
- (36) Congressional Record—Senate, June 10, 1985, S 7822.
- (37) *JTA*, July 11, 1985.
- (38) *Jerusalem Post*, July 19, 1985.
- (39) *Ha'aretz*, July 19, 1985; *Davar*, July 19, 1985.
- (40) *JTA*, July 23, 1985.
- (41) Cable from Bernice Tannenbaum to U. Narkiss, July 29, 1985. ZCA/S110/16. Also published in *UPDATE*, a publication of the Information Department of the WZO, Jerusalem, August, 1985.
- (42) *JTA*, August 6, 1985.
- (43) Report of the AJC delegation to Nairobi, July 25, 1985, quoting an article in the Kenyan *Daily Nation*, July 20, 1985.
- (44) Larry Cohler, "U.N. Decade for Women Conference," *Jewish World*, August 16-22, 1985, p. 2.
- (45) *JTA*, August 7, 1985.
- (46) Cable 271600-DI- from Head of French delegation to Nairobi to Pierret, the Director of International Organizations at the French Foreign Ministry, July 27, 1985. CZA/S110/44.
- (47) *Jewish World*, August 16-22, 1985.
- (48) See Chapter 5, under Section Que Faire.
- (49) Memo from Y. Manor to Uzi Narkiss on the main points of a meeting with Yoram Dinstein, November 28, 1984, p. 1. CZA/S110/17.
- (50) Last words of the petition. Full text in CZA/S110/18.
- (51) Letter from U. Narkiss to the chairs of the Zionist Federations, March 20, 1985. CZA/S110/18.
- (52) See, for instance, the letter from Y. Manor to I. Aviran, director of the Africa Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, May 5, 1985. CZA/S110/18.
- (53) Letter from Conor Cruise O'Brien to Y. Manor, May 9, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (54) Seguev's article, *Maariv*, July 23, 1985; Blum's article, *Maariv*, August 18, 1985.
- (55) Uzi Narkiss, "Hamitkafa Hazionit" (The Zionist Offensive), *Maariv*, September 4, 1985.
- (56) Letter from Uri Savir to Manor, August 24, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (57) Note from Uzi Narkiss to the Zionist Executive, "International Program to Refute the U.N. Resolution," July 24, 1985, p. 2; Note from Y. Manor to department heads and their director-generals, August 26, 1985; Manor, "The Campaign against the Defamation of Zionism," Updated Activities Report, September 1985, p. 4. CZA/S110/24.
- (58) From the text printed on the back of the postcard sent to Xavier Perez de Cuellar. CZA/S110/24.
- (59) Argentina; Australia; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Denmark; Ecuador; Finland; France; Greece; Guatemala; Holland; Italy; Luxemburg; Mexico; Paraguay; Peru; Sweden; Switzerland; Uruguay; United Kingdom; USA; Venezuela; West Germany.

- (60) Last sentence of the letter accompanying the petition handed to the U.N. Secretary General, and signed by Leon A. Dulzin, Chairman, WZO; Bernice Tannenbaum, Chairman, American Section of the WZO; Uzi Narkiss, Chairman, Information Department, WZO; Edgar Bronfman, President, WJC; Gerald Kraft, President, BBI; Ambassador Netanyahu.
- (61) *New York Times*, November 10, 1985.
- (62) Letter from Jacques Chirac to Jacques Orfus, President de la Federation des Organisations Sionistes de France, July 10, 1985. CZA/S110/39.
- (63) Cable From Israel Kessar to Perez de Cuellar, November 10, 1985, *Davar*, November 17, 1985. CZA/S110/18.
- (64) *New York Times*, November 11, 1985.
- (65) *Jerusalem Post*, November 11, 1985.
- (66) *The Jewish Week*, November 8, 1985.
- (67) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "The U.N.'s Day of Infamy," *The Washington Post*, November 11, 1985.
- (68) *Jerusalem Post*, November 11, 1985.
- (69) *Jewish Week*, November 8, 1985.
- (70) *Maariv*, November 13, 1985.
- (71) *Pravda*, November 12, 1985.
- (72) Letter from David Ruzie to Dinstein, February 18, 1985. CZA/S110/18.
- (73) Rudolf Bernhardt, Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg, FRG; Anne Bayefsky, Ottawa Law School; Richard B. Bilder, Wisconsin Law School; John Carey, Alternate U.S. Member, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; Irwin Cotler, McGill Law School, Canada; Michael Curtis, Rutgers University; Anthony D'Amato, Northwestern Law School; Yoram Dinstrein, NYU Law School; Tom J. Farer, President, University of New Mexico; Thomas M. Franck, NYU Law School; Seymour Maxwell Finger, CUNY; James O. Freedman, President, University of Iowa; Robert A. Friedlander, Assistant Counsel, Sub-Committee on the Constitution, Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate; Heribert Golsong (Arendt, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin and Kahn), Washington; Gidon Gottlieb, Chicago Law School; Atle Grahl-Madsen, Univ. Bergen, Norway; Leslie C. Green, Univ. Alberta, Political Science; Leo Gross, Tufts University, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Malvina Halberstam, Cardozo Law School; Louis Henkin, Columbia Law School; Ambassador A. Keyes, Assistant Secretary of State, International Organizations, Department of State; William Korey, Director of International Policy Research, BBI Council; Daniel Lack, WJC, Geneva; Howard S. Levie, St. Louis Law School; Ambassador Stephen Lewis, Permanent Canadian Representative to the U.N.; Sidney Liskofsky, Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights; Edward Luck, President, U.N. Association of the USA; Theodor Meron, NYU Law School; John Murphy, Villanova Law School; Ambassador Herbert S. Okun, Deputy U.S. Representative to the UN; Jordan Paust, Houston Law Center; Nathan Perceovits, John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Jose Domingo Ray, President, Argentine Association of Comparative Law; Norman Redlich, Dean, NYU School of Law; Stephen Roth, Director, Institute of Jewish Affairs; David Ruzie, Rene Descartes University, Faculty of Law; Pr. Giorgio Sacerdoti, Faculty of Law, University of Bergamo, Italy; Oscar Schachter, Columbia University Law School; Herman Schwartz, American University, Washington College of Law; Modesto Seara-Vazquez, National Autonomous University, Mexico; Malcolm N. Shaw, Chairman, Law Department, University of Essex, England; Jerome Shestak, Schnader, Harrison, Segal and Lewis, Philadelphia; Graham J. Zellik, Dean, Queen Mary College Faculty of Law, University of London.
- (74) Text of the concluding statement in *U.S. Congressional Record Extensions of Remarks*, E, 2523, July 22, 1985; also in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Faculty of Law, University of Tel Aviv, Vol. 17, 1987, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 13-14, where the edited papers presented to this conference were published: Yoram Dinstein, "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N.," pp. 15-23; Alan L. Keyes, "Anti-Zionism, Anti-Semitism and the Decline of the U.N.," pp. 24-28; John Carey, Henry F. Carey, "Hostility in UN Bodies to Judaism, the Jewish People

- pp. 24-28; John Carey, Henry F. Carey, "Hostility in UN Bodies to Judaism, the Jewish People and Jews as Such," pp. 29-40; Sidney Liskofsky, Donna E. Arzt, "Incitement to National, Racial and Religious Hatred in the U.N. Fora," pp. 41-67; Allan Gerson, "The United Nations and Racism: The Case of the Zionism as Racism Resolution as Progenitor," pp. 68-73; Seymour Maxwell Finger, "The Effect of the Institutionalization of Anti-Zionism on the Integrity of the U.N. Secretariat," pp. 74-94; Edward C. Luck, "The Impact of the ZR Resolution on the Standing of the U.N. in the U.S.," pp. 95-119; Gidon Gotlieb, "The Legitimacy of General Assembly Resolutions," pp. 120-132; William Korey, "The Kremlin and the U.N. ZR Resolution," pp. 133-148.
- (75) *Israel Year Book*, A. Keyes, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
- (76) *Israel Year Book*, A. Keyes, op. cit., p. 28.
- (77) *Israel Year Book*, Y. Dinstein, op. cit., p. 18; A. Gerson, p. 68.
- (78) *Israel Year Book*, A. Gerson, op. cit., p. 71.
- (79) *Israel Year Book*, A. Gerson, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
- (80) *Israel Year Book*, Y. Dinstein, op. cit., p. 21.
- (81) Tom Franck in his greetings to the participants at the opening session, "*Transcript of International Legal Conference on Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N.*," held at the NYU School of Law, April 13-15, 1986, p. 2. CZA/S110/50.
- (82) *Israel Year Book*, E. Luck, op. cit., p. 111.
- (83) *Israel Year Book*, Y. Dinstein, op. cit., p. 22.
- (84) The campaign against the defamation of Zionism, *Annual Progress Report to the Chairman of the Zionist Executive*, A.L. Dulzin by U. Narkiss, November 1985, p. 1. CZA/S110/24.
- (85) Letter from Manor to Pinh'as Eliav, April 3, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (86) Yehuda Milo's update to the meeting of the Steering Committee, July 23, 1985. Report on the meeting, p. 2. CZA/S110/16.
- (87) Letter from U. Narkiss to Alec Menasseh, Jewish Welfare Board, Singapore, August 12, 1985. CZA/S110/24.
- (88) Instructions sent by the International Organizations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1985. CZA/S110/24.
- (89) S. Peres Address to the UNGA, October 21, 1985, Medzini, Ed., *Israel's Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1984-8*, Vol. 9, p. 280.
- (90) Letter from Uzi Narkiss to Israel Singer, Executive Director of the WJC, September 6, 1985. CZA/S110/24.
- (91) Report on a meeting with Avraham Alon, Director of the International Department of the Histadrut, n.d. probably November 1985; Letter from Yaakov Lidar (In charge of Africa in the International Department of the Histadrut) to Y. Manor, December 29, 1985. CZA/S110/24.
- (92) Letter from Narkiss to S. Peres, July 31, 1985. CZA/S110/16.

CHAPTER VII

INVIGORATING THE CAMPAIGN

The meager achievements of the campaign at the 40th session of the UNGA were a clear signal that the steering committee's interim goal of winning retractions would be far more difficult to realize than expected. Another such sign came from the poor response to an appeal by the U.S. Congress. The Congress had formally repudiated UNGA Resolution 3379 and called upon "the parliaments of all countries which value freedom and democracy to do the same." There were at least four attempts to do so in 1985, in Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia. But, as we will examine, only the one in Australia was successful and only after an intensive and sustained campaign. Nonetheless, the steering committee decided to stick to its strategy and to pursue it with more energy.

Meanwhile, Narkiss had the opportunity to restate the principles of the campaign against anti-Zionism before the 8th Plenary Assembly of the World Jewish Congress, which had been convened in Jerusalem at the end of January 1986. At its base, he said, was the conviction that parties, organizations, legislative bodies and leaders throughout the world had to be convinced that not taking a clear stand on the U.N.'s anti-Zionism might damage their political futures and that public pressure was needed to "counterbalance the pressures exerted by our enemies."¹ Moreover, he added, it had to be made clear that important matters of principle for the international community were at stake. The fight against the odious equation was also a fight to restore the genuine meaning of racism, a fight for human rights and a fight to rehabilitate the United Nations and its original goal, the eradication of racism and bigotry, he said.²

Underscoring the successful cooperation with the WJC and the BBI and the promising potential of the campaign, Narkiss called for sustaining and enlarging the effort. He wanted it activated not only in Western democracies, but through the Third World, as well as against Soviet individuals and institutions which served as major sources of anti-Zionism. Furthermore he suggested institutionalizing the cooperation in the establishment of a "common permanent committee, based in Jerusalem and in New York, to devise and direct a more coordinated and effective strategy to counter anti-Semitism, in its classic as well as its modern form."² The crucial point, and the secret for success in this long and demanding endeavor lay not only in the proper strategy, but also in the persistence required to carry it out, he said.

The 8th Plenary Assembly of the WJC adopted a resolution expressing its support for the campaign “initiated by the WZO in close cooperation with the World Jewish Congress and the State of Israel to combat the defamation of Zionism.” It also called for developing “cooperation with its traditional partners in order to intensify the campaign against anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in whatever form they may appear.”³ However, it did not pick up Narkiss’ proposal to institutionalize this cooperation. Other directions were explored to energize the campaign.

PROJECT CASAZ

At the beginning of March 1986, the steering committee considered setting up an international infrastructure—inspired by the model of Amnesty International—with which to wage a more systematic campaign against all forms of anti-Semitism. Narkiss envisioned a large network of local, regional and national autonomous committees with a centralized data base. Such a proposal was discussed in a meeting held at Judge Haim Cohen’s home with Shlomo Gazit, Shmuel Ettinger, David Bartov, Narkiss and Manor.⁴

For Cohen, the biggest drawback of such a plan was the enormous investment required. Amnesty’s founder, Peter Benenson, he said, had been able to inject a huge amount of money as well as personal dedication into the organization from the start to ensure its success. Instead, it was decided to encourage the International Association of Jewish Jurists and Lawyers to set up a more modest infrastructure of local and national committees to operate against U.N.-inspired anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism—Project CASAZ.⁵

As noted in the previous chapter, the IAJLL appointed Judge Hadassa Ben Ito as coordinator of this program on the international level. Its American branch entrusted Frances Bernstein, a partner in the New York law firm of Pavia & Harcourt, with the responsibility of leading CASAZ and of setting up local committees in the United States. Bernstein devised an organizational concept which resembled Amnesty International.

First, CASAZ was to depend upon the self-education of its members on the basis of research provided largely by the WZO Information Department. Second, CASAZ was not to confine itself to the IAJLL. It was to try to reach as many organizations and communities as possible and be an umbrella body, suggesting programs and guidelines for all their activities in this field. The community relations councils (CRCs) of most of the Jewish communities were approached directly or through their federator, NJCRAC, as were the rabbis of many Jewish congregations, directly or through the three major rabbinical denominations. Third, and probably most important, materials and specific program guidance were suggested to local committees as well as to other organizations.⁶

In less than a year, thanks to the conceptual and organizational skills of Bernstein and to the extraordinary dedication and rhetorical talent of Ben Ito, local committees were set up in Boston, Minneapolis, Ann Arbor, Detroit, Orlando, Washington, Denver, Los Angeles and Chicago, and an unprecedented push was given to tackling the issue on the grassroots level. For instance, prior to the "Week To Combat Anti-Zionism," held at the beginning of November 1987, Bernstein sent letters to rabbis and lay leaders of congregations. She suggested sermon themes to be delivered by them on the Sabbath, November 6 and 7, "to recall the anniversaries of both Kristallnacht and the Resolution." In her letters, she also recalled Ambassador Kirkpatrick's words that unchallenged lies had been transformed into policies and unchallenged policies transformed into murder.

Bernstein also asked for the involvement of the local organizations and congregations in a nationwide campaign to flood the U.N. missions of eight countries (Japan, Mexico, Senegal, France, West Germany, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and Brazil) with letters or printed cards calling for the repudiation of the resolution. "These are nations whose support State Department experts feel is both indispensable and obtainable for a formal vote to repudiate the resolution," she wrote. "We have prepared pre-addressed postcards to be mailed directly to the U.N. missions of the above-noted countries."⁷

Ben Ito also succeeded during a brief visit in England and France at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987 to inspire the establishment of national committees in these countries. In England, she also reacted to the anti-Zionist play, "Perdition," which had been cancelled by the Royal Court Theatre following protests by British Jews, notably by Holocaust expert and Winston's Churchill biographer, Martin Gilbert. Ben Ito claimed that the cancellation was not enough. "People say that 'Perdition' should have been left alone and that only a few theater goers would have seen it anyway. But I think that is wrong," she said. "One should not allow these lies to be spread without setting the record straight. We have been libeled for so many years and it is now time to sue for libel. I think the Jewish people need legal representation so that anyone who begins to believe the story that there never was a Holocaust, or that Jews collaborated with the Nazis, would be told the true facts."⁸

In France, Ben Ito managed to involve some prominent jurists in the activity of the French Committee such as Daniel Jacoby, legal adviser to the National Commission for Human Rights, Pierre Drai, the president of the Appeal Court of Paris, Samuel Pissar, Mario Stasi, head of the Paris Bar, Daniel Soulez Lariviere, lawyer and writer, Xavier Delle Cro, a prominent law professor, and Simone Rozes, president of the Cour de Cassation.⁹ She also secured the participation of most of them in the forthcoming congress of the IAJLL to be devoted to "Combatting Racism in Criminal, Constitutional and International Law," and scheduled for the beginning of September 1987 in Jerusalem.

Although difficult to quantify, there is no doubt that CASAZ activities had an important impact. First, they helped put the repudiation of 3379 on the agenda of U.S. Jewish communities on the grassroots level, notably through the CRCs and through NJCRAC, an umbrella organization for more than 180 CRCs, which put it formally on its agenda for 1988.¹⁰ Second, with the active sponsorship of renowned figures such as Justice Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, Ambassador Alan Keyes, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Kenneth Bialkin, Bernice Tannenbaum and many others, CASAZ created an authentic movement of opinion pressing for and initiating action.

CASAZ's leadership, primarily under the influence of Netanyahu, believed that the repudiation of 3379 was possible, though it would take several years. But they were equally convinced that it would not be possible without "the active and public support of America's Jewish community."¹¹ This marked a clear departure from the passivity displayed by the leadership of the U.S. Jewish community before the passage of Resolution 3379. CASAZ activism was clearly felt and reported on by Israeli officials posted in the United States. In some respects, they were impressed and supportive. But they also were irritated by some initiatives they considered misplaced and untimely, such as the above-mentioned mailing to the ambassadors of the eight countries, the repeated attempts to extract from the U.N. secretary general some commitment in favor of the repudiation of 3379 and the pressure on the U.S. delegation to the U.N. to submit a draft resolution calling for the overturn of 3379 at the upcoming 42nd UNGA. This last move had been suggested by Ambassador Kirkpatrick in her address to a forum organized by the IAJJL at George Washington University to denounce the ZR and to discuss the best strategy to fight it.

Allan Gerson, deputy assistant attorney general and a former aide to Kirkpatrick at the U.N., considered a campaign to repeal 3379 "ridiculous because it will never happen."¹² Instead Gerson reiterated his recommendation before the international legal conference, "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N.," that the United States should make it clear that Zionism as an ideology was no more an appropriate topic for debate at the U.N. than Americanism, socialism, Buddhism or Arabism, and that anytime Zionism was used at a forum, the U.S. should object on procedural grounds. Gerson emphasized that it was an error from the start to enter into a defensive debate on Zionism as Israel's then-U.N. Ambassador Chaim Herzog did. Rather Israel should have stated that Zionism was dead. "As the liberation movement of the Jewish people, Zionism had died with Israel's creation."¹²

Professor Yoram Dinstein and Frances Bernstein rejected Gerson's approach as inadequate. They pointed out that as a result of the resolution, discussion of Zionism as a form of racism was legitimized at colleges and high schools around the world and printed in books accessible to all. Only the repeal of 3379 could rob these teachings and books of their legitimacy.¹²

Kirkpatrick held that Gerson's approach and the campaign to repeal 3379 were not mutually exclusive. She was in favor of both. On the one hand she advocated Gerson's approach at many fora of the world body where anti-Zionism "sometimes slips into old-fashioned anti-Semitism." There, simply refusing to debate and walking out if necessary would be appropriate. But not at the UNGA. There, the struggle to repeal the resolution was a much longer and more worthwhile enterprise.¹² Kirkpatrick even ventured that every year a draft resolution calling for the abrogation of 3379 should be proposed at the UNGA and the Security Council "in order for everyone to know who was with us and on our side."¹³

This move, of course, ran counter to the policy of Israel's Foreign Ministry which favored assessing the chances of a secure success, "in order not to expose ourself every year if the initiative—as suggested by Kirkpatrick—failed."¹³ The other move directed at the ambassadors of eight countries was also in conflict with the policy of the Ministry, which sought to keep activities away from the U.N. and to center the efforts of the campaign on a different list of countries: "Turning to ambassadors at the U.N. was premature and counter-productive. One had to choose some respectable target-countries (democratic ones with substantial international weight), and to concentrate activities in their capitals, as was done in Australia and in the U.S. Activity at the U.N. will only bring about damage."¹⁴ There were strong reservations regarding especially "problematic countries such as Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal and Japan."¹⁵

Finally Israel's diplomatic mission at the U.N. asked the Jewish organizations to stop their activities through the ambassadors at the U.N.¹⁵ It then pressed the Ministry in Jerusalem to provide a clear program of action, notably a precise list of countries to be approached. The diplomats stressed that the U.S. Jewish organizations would not be satisfied with the vague general statement that "the timing for action is not proper, and it is preferable to wait. They are not asking us what not to do, but are expecting from us—rightly—that we orient them [as to] what to do. . . . The lack of orientation from us will only cause the continuation of partisan activities."¹⁶ The executive director of Project CAZAS, Evan J. Kramer, wrote to Ambassador Netanyahu asking for his guidance in view of rumors that the lobbying of the eight U.N. ambassadors was being discouraged.

"Project CASAZ is the only project or organization whose efforts are solely dedicated to the repudiation of U.N. Resolution 3379," he wrote. "We have held events in each of a dozen cities and have received media coverage in newspapers and television. . . . If we have done little else, we have served as a catalyst for other major Jewish organizations to take notice of this long-neglected issue and engage their memberships to work for a repudiation of Resolution 3379. We continue to ask other organizations to work in cooperation with us. With the support of Israeli officials and Jewish organizations in

America, we hope to overcome Resolution 3379. Until such time, it is imperative that our time and efforts not be misspent. We look forward to your response in the near future."¹⁷

Netanyahu's answer was supportive and tried to clear up misunderstandings. "I fear you have been misinformed. There is no desire whatsoever to relent on our common effort to repeal Resolution 3379. On the contrary, there is every reason to intensify our efforts. At the moment we want to concentrate on Parliaments and leaders of friendly countries, and only later we will approach less receptive targets."¹⁸ The IAJLL also made a valuable contribution in helping to clarify basic concepts such as racism in order to include in its definition anti-Semitism and to exclude Zionism. It also discussed the limits of free speech versus collective libel. Ben Ito's efforts to systematically "sue for libel" seemed at the beginning to yield results. The threat of a libel suit by Nathan Dror, one of the people accused in the play, "Perdition," of collaborating with the Nazis, actually led to the removal of several sentences from the play. But the main thrust of the play was maintained, and the initiation of a countersuit by the writer, Jim Allan, led to an impasse.



Abba Eban and Willy Brandt, the two sponsors of the "Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue," Paris, September 6-7, 1986.

THE ISRAEL-EUROPE SOCIALIST DIALOGUE

In the search to invigorate the campaign, there was some interest in trying to bring the new generation of European politicians closer to Israel and Zionism. It was an idea suggested by Yehiel Leket at a steering committee meeting in July of 1985.¹⁹ Very soon, however, it became clear there was no proper framework that could accommodate the political and ideological differences of this group. Hence, Leket, then chairman of the World Labor Zionist Movement, the Zionist branch of the Israeli Labor Party, decided to focus his efforts on the socialist leadership of Europe. This seemed both easier and more natural in view of his political affiliations and perhaps more worthwhile in view of the growing role played in the '80s in Europe by the socialist parties in governments and parliaments.

Leket's first move was to establish a framework and to get proper sponsorship for it. He devised a formula with Yohanan Manor for an Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue, which was met at first with skepticism by the International Department of the Israeli Labor Party. For the party, the initiative was coming from an organization it considered old-fashioned and inadequate to the ambitious task. Moreover, it was feared that this kind of dialogue could backfire and lead to more pressure on the Labor Party to change its views regarding the PLO. Finally, the International Department gave its backing to the plan, and Leket won the sponsorship of Willy Brandt, the chairman of the Socialist International, and Abba Eban, former foreign minister who was then chairman of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset.

In the letter of invitation signed by Brandt and Eban, they wrote:

*"For decades, socialist parties world-wide supported the liberation and emancipation of the Jewish people, and the solution of the Jewish problem by the creation of a Jewish State in Israel. This support was inspired by ideological principles as well as by political considerations and were held by most socialist parties whether in office or opposition. In the meantime, significant developments have occurred in the Middle East, both within the Socialist parties themselves as on the international scene. . . . We have taken upon ourselves the responsibility of heading this encounter which is intended to review these issues. The dialogue is designed especially for the new generation of socialist leaders who were either not yet born or were only children when the State of Israel was established in 1948. Many of the invitees were leaders of the Socialist Youth International in the '60s and the '70s."*²⁰

More than sixty socialist leaders from twelve European countries took part in the first Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue on "European Socialist Views of Israel and Zionism," held in Paris September 6-7, 1986. Most of them held senior positions in their respective parties, while 40 percent were between 35 and 45 years old. A booklet of articles and documents about socialist views of Israel and Zionism and the Arab-Israel conflict was distributed to each participant.²¹

In outlining his conception of the dialogue, Yehiel Leket explained that "many younger socialists no longer view Israel as the outgrowth of a legitimate movement of national liberation. There are those who take the shameful Zionism-is-racism resolution of the U.N. as a statement of fact. For many young socialists Israel is an occupier state which denies Palestinian Arabs their elementary rights—and not a society which has managed to survive against all odds and seek a just solution to the Palestinian problem



Bill Hayden, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia on the left with Mark Liebler, Chairman of the Zionist Federation of Australia, at the opening of the Biennial Conference of the ZFA, April 13, 1986.



Yehiel Leket, the initiator of the "Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue," on the right with Lionel Jospin, First Secretary of the French Socialist party. To the left are Yohanan Manor and Abba Eban.

without endangering its own existence. There are many reasons for the development of this process, which we are trying to reverse. Hopefully, we shall be successful. I believe that gatherings such as this can serve an important role in getting the Middle East situation and Israel's place in it, into focus."²²

In his keynote address on "the Socialist parties and the creation of the State of Israel," Willy Brandt recalled the doubts about Zionism among many in the socialist movement, notably among its Jewish members, sometimes despite their respect for the achievements of the Zionist labor movement in Palestine. "Presumably it is known that in the '30s, as a young socialist of non-Jewish descent, I was skeptical vis-a-vis Zionist ideas and the quarrels which divided my Jewish friends," he recalled. "I shared the fears of those who saw the homecoming of a Jewish nation as a retreat from a problem that might be mastered more sensibly through a process of social and cultural in-

tegration and through society's ability to tolerate minorities. The Nazi Reich and its crimes later convinced me that if there was a group of Jewish survivors willing to found a nation state, such a possibility must not be denied. In view of the Holocaust—which was not yet known by that name—it could not be that the existence of Palestine as a refuge would be questioned."²³

Brandt reiterated the political principles of the Socialist International regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. He talked of "the undisputed existence of Israel as a state and the endeavour to convince the Arabs of its right to exist; the need to strike a balance between Israel's right to exist and the right of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs; a regime of peace guaranteed by both the major world powers and for which Europe too would have to engage itself."²⁴ He emphasized that the USSR would have to abandon anti-Zionism as an instrument of superpower politics. Brandt concluded his address by recalling that it was in Paris during the war that the underground organization



Former Prime Minister of Australia, Bob Hawke, special guest of honor at the 33rd Zionist Congress, July 22, 1992, at the reception commemorating the annulment of the ZR. On his left, Mark Liebler, Chairman of the Zionist Federation of Australia, and Uzi Narkiss, Uzi Narkiss, chairman of the Information Department of the WZO.

of Jewish socialists saved the lives of some of his German comrades, and gave them financial support so they could organize themselves.

Abba Eban's central message was that the Zionist vision was under internal Israeli assault. In addition to Jewish piety which was at its core, he maintained, Zionism was composed of three other ideas: national freedom and democracy, the guiding principle of Theodor Herzl, scientific rationalism as manifested by Chaim Weizman, and pioneering socialism which, under David Ben Gurion, became the dominant element in the creation of Jewish statehood.

According to Eban, these values were now being challenged by religious fundamentalism and political extremism joining hands to promote unrestrained self-assertion. Only under the influence of the Israeli Labor party and its chairman, Shimon Peres, who had served as prime minister from 1984 to 1986, had there been a significant shift in Israeli policy, namely an "irreversible decline of the annexationist idea."²⁵

But Eban expressed reservations about the advocacy by many European socialists of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while supporting the Israeli Labor Party concept of a Jordanian-Palestinian state. He emphasized that the latter was consistent with the conclusions of a U.N. special committee set up in 1970 which determined that the right of self-determination must not necessarily find its expression in the form of a separate state. He recalled the reaction by the Soviet representative on the committee to the chairman's statement that self-determination was a universal principle which brooks no exception. The Soviet insisted self-determination should not pose a threat to existing states or bring about their disintegration or secession, he noted.²⁶

There were other substantial contributions, notably those of Professor Shlomo Avineri, who devoted a large part of his address to the origins of Labor Zionism, as well as moving messages sent by Peres, Pierre Mauroy, Michel Rocard and Aldo Aniasi, the vice president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies.

The debate overall was very sharp, prompting the judgment that the event had been a success. In fact, the organizers and co-sponsors were asked to pursue the dialogue. In the meantime, a palpable change was already felt in the way these socialist leaders were now considering Zionism, as well as in their understanding of Israel's agonizing dilemma about the Palestinians.²⁷

Finally, most of them expressed support for the formula recommended by Israel's Labor Party to solve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. A second Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue actually took place a year later in Brussels, September 11-12, 1987, thanks to the help and involvement of David Suskind, chairman of the Centre Communautaire Laic Juif, CCLJ. This time the encounter was organized by a committee composed of prominent personalities from several socialist parties from Europe (Karl van

Miert, Chairman of the Socialist Party, Belgium; Roger Lallemand, Chairman of the Socialist Group in the Belgian Senate; Daniel Moro, head of the military department of the PSI—Italy; Peter Schieder, Secretary General of the SPO-Austria; Klaus Henning Rosen, Private Secretary of Willy Brandt; Gerd Kramer, adviser to the Socialist Group of the European Parliament). The Israeli side was represented by Yehiel Leket, Claude Laloum, Yohanan Manor and Arie Shafir, MAPAM representative in Europe.

In spite of the absence of Willy Brandt, this second encounter was also a success in terms of both its participants and tone of its debates.²⁸ Brandt sent a message praising the continuation of the dialogue. He referred to a simultaneous commitment to forge “a durable peace settlement for Israel and in the Middle East” and to fight anti-Semitism. “It is important to go on discussing how peace might become a reality. At the same time our solidarity in fighting the evil of anti-Semitism should be reconfirmed,” he said.²⁹

There is some evidence that the Israel-Europe Socialist dialogue initiated under the joint sponsorship of Brandt and Eban had some impact. For instance it was instrumental in the adoption of a resolution by the European Parliament denouncing UNGA Resolution 3379. MPE Ernest Glinne, one of the instigators, on behalf of the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, of one of the two draft resolutions, referred explicitly, although in a somewhat distorted manner, to the conference held in Brussels.

“Last Friday and Saturday, a colloquium between Israeli spokesmen, Arab and Palestinians, representing in various capacity populations from the Middle East, was held in Brussels. The upholding of UNGA Resolution 3379 was mentioned as one of the obstacles, and an important one, to the absolutely necessary progress towards a solution—better late than never—of the terrible problems of the Middle East.”³⁰ Even more significantly, Glinne did his utmost to draw a clear line between Zionism as a legitimate ideology of national assertion and isolated acts carried out on its behalf.

“First Zionism is inextricably linked with the right of the people of Israel to exist,” he said. “Second, Zionism is not a passport validating any behavior; there is a difference between accepting Zionism in its principle and periodic acts carried out by different governments and governmental coalitions in Israel.”³⁰

A MASTERPIECE FROM AUSTRALIA

We have seen that in March 1985, the Zionist Federations had been asked by the head of the steering committee to get signatures for the petition to be given by the WZO chairman to the U.N. secretary general and the chairman of the Security Council.³¹ The Zionist Federation of Australia (ZFA) did not seem to have displayed any special eagerness to met this request. Instead, at

the beginning of July, Mark Liebler, the ZFA chairman, decided to try and collect far more than signatures. He wrote to a long list of personalities asking for their support for the worldwide campaign launched by "the government of Israel together with the WZO to overturn U.N. Resolution 3379."³²

Liebler announced that WZO Chairman Arie Dulzin would on September 6, 1985 present the case for negating the ZR resolution to the secretary general and the chairman of the Security Council and take with him letters of support from world leaders. Hence he was calling on "distinguished Australians to give expression to their outrage at this blatant misuse of the United Nations forum" and to forward their written support.³²

This ingenious presentation yielded results that were "overwhelming. Letters were received from the prime minister, the foreign minister, the leader of the opposition, the leader of the Australian Democrats, many other ministers and members of Parliament—both on a federal and state level, representatives of the arts, academia, church leaders, as well as former Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser."³³ Immediate steps were taken to publicize this widespread support both in the Jewish and the general press.

The head of the ZFA had been particularly impressed by the letter of support sent by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, dated August 5, 1985. In it, Hayden recalled that the policy of successive Australian governments had been absolute opposition to any attempt to declare that Zionism is a form of racism. Indeed, he stressed that "Australia has made clear its belief that this unworthy claim has no basis in fact." Besides, and probably far more important, he wrote that "he would be glad to keep in contact with Mark Liebler as the campaign proceeds."³⁴ This was a striking development since Hayden was considered a staunch supporter of the PLO and a caustic critic of Israel. As leader of the Opposition, "he had been prepared to engage in a bitter and public confrontation with the Jewish community and the Zionist movement over his decision to visit Arafat" and had once referred to Menachem Begin "as the greatest threat to world peace."³⁵

Several weeks later, at the end of August, Mark Liebler was informed that President Reagan had signed into official policy a joint congressional resolution urging the U.S. ambassador and U.S. delegation to the U.N. "to take all appropriate actions necessary to erase the shameful resolution from the record of the U.N." This wording, however, was absent in the draft resolution. It nevertheless appeared in a short paragraph before the preamble of the resolution, as a way to sum up its intent.³⁶

Inspired by this inaccurate formulation of the U.S. joint congressional resolution, Liebler became convinced that "the principal objective of the Australian campaign should be to bring about a similar result, i.e. a resolution of both Houses of Parliament denouncing UNGA resolution and calling for its rescission."³⁷

On the face of it, Liebler seemed to be following the precise terms of the

joint congressional resolution calling upon "the parliaments of all countries which value freedom and democracy to do the same." In fact, though probably unknowingly, he was going a significant step ahead of the U.S. Congressional resolution since he was not only seeking the condemnation of the U.N. ZR but also calling for its annulment! Liebler was well aware that Australia's Parliament was quite different from the U.S. Congress and that the passage of a joint Parliamentary resolution was very unusual, unlike the common U.S. practice. He therefore understood he would have to take unconventional measures to ensure the passage of such a measure.

"When at a later point, I was attempting to check with Foreign Affairs Department officials the procedures associated with such a resolution," Liebler recalled, "they themselves were having some difficulty in ascertaining the relevant procedural steps." "Accordingly, it should be understood that the proposal for a joint Parliamentary resolution condemning UNGA Resolution 3379 and calling for its rescission, involved procedures of quite an unusual kind, and it was obvious that there would be some substantial hurdles to overcome in achieving the desired objective."³⁸ In any case it seemed to imply that contrary to the U.S., in Australia the procedure would have to be reversed, that is to say, not a congressional initiative adopted afterward by the administration, but an initiative from the government to be backed by the parliament.

At this juncture Liebler had a stroke of genius. He remembered Hayden's offer to keep in contact as the campaign proceeded and he decided to call his office to update him about the U.S. joint congressional resolution. He also suggested exploring the possibility of Australia doing something similar. Several days later, Michael Costello, principal private secretary to Hayden, wrote ZFA Executive Director Pearl Lipshut that the foreign minister would like to see Liebler upon his return from the U.N. and the U.S. in the middle of October. He also added that Hayden "was not unsympathetic to the proposal and looked forward to discussing it with Mr. Liebler when they met. He also asked me to mention that he has not forgotten the invitation to him to speak on Zionism and he has in mind that he might do the speech some time over Christmas. The reason that he had not done it earlier was that he felt he had not done enough reading himself on the subject to which he wanted to do full justice."³⁹

In his meeting with Liebler on October 25, 1985, Hayden made it clear that he was favorably inclined toward implementing the proposal, and that he would make the necessary inquiries into the possibility of taking action along the suggested lines. He indicated, however, that "he might have reservations about proceeding if this was likely to cause severe internal strains within the A.L.P." (Australian Labour Party). But even if "the resolution was not passed by the Parliament, he would continue on all appropriate occasions, and at the U.N., to press the viewpoint that there was no basis whatsoever for equating

Zionism with racism."⁴⁰ Finally, he accepted the invitation to be the keynote speaker at the opening of the Biennial Conference of the ZFA, scheduled for April 13, 1986.

On various occasions during the following months, the matter was raised again before Hayden not only by Liebler, but also by Ambassador Netanyahu during his visit to Australia for the United Israel Appeal, and by Richard Woolcott, Australia's ambassador to the U.N., who had talked at length with Liebler about the issue and about Australia's voting patterns at the U.N. Finally, on March 20, 1986, the foreign minister informed Liebler "that the United Nations Section of the Foreign Affairs Department was now working on the text of a proposed Parliamentary resolution calling for the rescission of UNGA Resolution 3379."⁴⁰ In this meeting Hayden agreed to use his address to the forthcoming 32nd Biennial conference of the ZFA to announce government sponsorship for the joint parliamentary resolution.

Hayden's keynote address to the conference was called "Israel: A Contemporary Democratic Socialist Perspective." In it, he outlined at great length the idealism and emancipatory principles at the roots of the State of Israel. He stressed the uniqueness of the Israeli social experience for the democratic socialist, and the great goodwill it entailed for Israel throughout the Democratic Socialist Movement. At the same time he pointed to ominous developments threatening Israel as an independent, self-sufficient, democratic and Jewish society.

Hayden then turned to the UNGA Resolution 3379, first recalling that the Australian Government was fundamentally committed to the security of Israel and its right to exist within secured and recognized borders. At the same time, he declared Australia acknowledged the Palestinian people's right of self-determination, including the right (if they so choose) to independence and the possibility of an independent state.

The Australian Government, he continued, has maintained "strong opposition to the U.N. Resolution 3379 which (in the Government view) is a distortion of fact, inclined to exacerbate religious animosity, obstructive to the cause of just peace in the Middle East and a threat to the continued existence of the U.N. itself. As minister of foreign affairs, I have drawn these points strongly to the attention of Arab leaders and ambassadors. The Australian Government sympathises with and supports the objectives of the campaign by the World Zionist Federation to overturn a resolution which is mischievous and unacceptable."⁴¹

Indeed, Hayden's was a very strong statement in support of the campaign to overturn 3379. It was nevertheless a disappointment because the foreign minister did not, in the end, see fit to mention the joint Parliamentary resolution and the support the government had seemed willing to grant it. Later the same day, in a private conversation with Liebler, Hayden maintained that he remembered a specific reference to the initiative in the original draft of his

speech and that the reference apparently had been deleted by a speech-writer without his knowledge or consent.⁴²

Hayden did tell Liebler he would "personally support the introduction into Parliament of a tripartisan resolution calling for a rescission of the infamous resolution."⁴³ Nonetheless, his answer revealed that he expected difficulties, throwing light on the likeliest reason for the omission in his speech. "I have no problems at all in supporting such a proposal to Parliament or elsewhere; it is a matter of judging what is the most suitable time for its success, and that will require, I believe, some active ground-work with other members of the Parliament."⁴³

The ZFA chairman did not waste time. At once, he had Hayden's statement of support in favor of the initiative widely publicized in the press. He then immediately embarked on "*active ground-work*" by approaching the leaders of all the other political parties: John Howard, leader of the opposition, Andrew Peacock, shadow minister for foreign affairs, Ira Sinclair, leader of the National Party, and Don Chipp, leader of the Australian Democrats, to secure their support for the Parliamentary initiative. All expressed their strong support for the initiative and subsequently confirmed it in writing to the ZFA.⁴² At the same time Liebler took steps to ensure both that the ZFA would have a role in drafting the resolution and that it would be adopted by the Parliament before Chaim Herzog's official visit to Australia, scheduled for the coming November 4.

Achieving success required Liebler to involve himself intensely in shepherding the process through to completion, including securing an adequate draft resolution by the Foreign Ministry; formal approval by the Caucus Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee; informal approval by the ALP, notably by its left faction; formal approval by the Cabinet; formal approval by both Houses of the Parliament. The approval by the ALP and its Socialist left faction was a delicate and crucial part of the strategy. It was achieved exclusively due to the personal and strong involvement of Hayden, who actually encountered less opposition than he had expected. "There was very little emotional/ideological opposition to the proposed resolution," he said. Some members of the Socialist Left had raised the question of the impact of the proposed joint resolution on Australia's trade relations with Arab countries.⁴⁴ Other remarks induced Hayden to look for changing the wording of the resolution.

But Hayden's role was a decisive one. As Sam Lipsky, a well-known journalist and political commentator, put it, "a vital ingredient, clearly, was the willingness by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden to preside over the resolution's unequivocal wording and to smooth the way for its passage."⁴⁵ This was achieved thanks in part to his steadfast stand and thanks to the fact that "a number of members of the Socialist Left Faction owed him debts which he was in a position to call upon."⁴⁶ Hayden, however, was eager to

downplay his role afterward when the ZFA announced the resolution's adoption by the Parliament. He believed it would "detrimentally affect his credibility in certain circles."⁴⁷

By contrast, Prime Minister Bob Hawke insisted on having the honor of introducing the resolution before the House of Representatives. Senator Buton did the same before the Senate. The text of the resolution now read as follows: "This House resolves that the UNGA Resolution 3379(XXX) which equates Zionism with racism:

- has been unhelpful in the context of the search for a settlement in the Middle East,
- is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,
- remains unacceptable as a misrepresentation of Zionism,
- has served to escalate religious animosity and incite anti-Semitism.

"This House Recommends that the Government of Australia lend support to efforts to overturn Resolution 3379(XXX) in the United Nations."

From the very start, Hawke set the tone of his whole speech: "I move this resolution from a conviction, which I believe will be shared by all Australians who value truth, fairness and tolerance, that the equation of Zionism with racism is profoundly wrong, disruptive and unacceptable."⁴⁸ The representatives of the Australian people, both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, gave their unanimous support to this resolution.

With regard to Zionism and its history and evolution, Hawke referred his listeners to the "outstanding address" delivered by Hayden before the ZFA. He added only that, "in the month in which the award to Elie Wiesel of the Nobel Peace Prize has reminded us all of the monstrous racial oppression suffered by the Jewish people less than fifty years ago, the characterization of Zionism as racism is a particular offence to decency and logic, not only to our Jewish community but to all Australians."

Apart from its distortion of reality, Hawke continued, Resolution 3379 was also an obstacle to the search for a settlement in the Middle East and a highly counterproductive diversion insulting the guiding philosophy of a people which served only to distract and disrupt efforts toward a peaceful, just and lasting solution of the Middle East dispute. He also pointed to the extremely negative role of this resolution in "the disaffection felt for the U.N. in recent years by such countries as the United States." For its part, Australia, especially as a member of the Security Council during the last two years, was fighting hard with others to maintain international [and financial] support for the U.N. and its specialized agencies.

Finally, the prime minister offered that it would be counterproductive to initiate a vote to annul 3379 at the U.N. at this stage. "There still will not be the support necessary to ensure the success of such a move," he said. "Indeed the opposite result might be achieved: countries which may have come to question their original position on the Resolution might be forced once again

to line up behind it. Nevertheless the world political climate is changing and there are grounds for believing that an expression of the Australian Parliament's view, along the lines I have outlined, could contribute to that change."⁴⁸

It is difficult to assess whether Hawke's hope for the impact and contribution of the Australian resolution was fulfilled or not. On the one hand, there was no doubt that the Australian resolution was referred to in many instances, as a "*modele du genre*." Even the U.S. Congress decided in October 1987 to adopt a new resolution reproducing the exact wording of the Australian one, precisely because its former resolution of July 1985, did not call formally for the overturn of 3379! Some leaders and politicians throughout the world invoked it explicitly or implicitly to support their stand in favor of the adoption of similar resolutions in their respective countries. (See below, the sections about Europe and Latin America). Still, only the U.S. Congress followed through. In spite of this modest formal result, however, it is unquestionable that the Australian resolution served to illuminate the path to be followed by the international community and by the U.N.

In all, the resolution was a stunning achievement, given the way it was engineered, its unequivocal wording, its active government sponsorship, its unanimous adoption by both Houses of Parliament, and above all, the fact that it came from a country deeply involved in international affairs which believed in the original role of the U.N. and was striving to restore its standing.

It could not have happened without the outstanding personal and profound involvement of two people, Bill Hayden and Mark Liebler, who at least shared the conviction that Resolution 3379 was not a petty matter for Jewish concern only, but an important international issue. No doubt that in his changed attitude to Israel and Zionism, Bill Hayden had "made a long journey of the intellect, and if the term was not so out of vogue in politics, of the psyche."⁴⁵

Here, Mark Liebler played a key role. He deserved special tribute not only for his skills in the art of "public and private diplomacy,"⁴⁵ for his "perseverance and astuteness,"⁴⁹ but even more so for the wisdom and daring he exhibited throughout the process. He improved the drive for the petition. He also overcame his loathing for Hayden's political views, looking for the opportunity to change them and to turn him into his most effective ally in orchestrating the Australian masterpiece.

EUROPE DISAPPOINTS

In Europe there were also attempts to have Parliaments adopt resolutions, at least along the lines of the U.S. congressional measure of July 1985. In

Italy, the initiative for a parliamentary motion came even earlier as a result of the effort to prevent the adoption of another ZR resolution at the Inter-Parliamentary Union's (IPU) 72nd session in Geneva, September 1984, and of the drive to get signatures for the U.N. petition.⁵⁰ The Zionist Federation of Italy was very active in this endeavor, but the driving force was the "Anzio Sireni Group," a Jewish faction within the Italian Socialist Party.

On July 23, 1985, at the initiative of several socialist MPs, a draft resolution was prepared to be submitted to the House of Representatives (*Camera dei Deputati*). According to a report from the Israeli Embassy in Rome, it called upon the Italian government to instruct its representatives to the coming UNGA to express its vigorous opposition to any attempt to link Zionism with racism.⁵¹

In fact, the so-called instruction was worded in a far more ambiguous way. The parliamentary motion under the title "40th UNGA: Zionism is not racism. Zionism is the right to freedom and independence of a people," read as follows: "Compels the government to act at the coming UNGA session in September this year, where the subject of Zionism will be mentioned again, to act in a different way from the [way] followed by the representatives of Italy at the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva in 1984, while reaffirming its strong condemnation of any form of racism, and expressing the renewed appreciation for the positive contribution of the Jewish Renaissance movement to peace and to the independence of peoples."⁵²

Nevertheless, this move was significant, since it was co-signed by eleven MPs from all the parties represented in Parliament, except for the Communist Party.⁵³ It also denounced the support given by Italian and Portuguese Parliamentary delegations at the 71st session of the IPU in April 1984 in Geneva to the Iraqi proposal linking Zionism with racism.

This motion was to be discussed during the session of the *Camera dei Deputati*, and before the summer's recess of the Parliament.⁵¹ But it was never brought to discussion or to a vote. A year later, in July of 1986, in a private conversation with the Consul General of Israel in Milan, Aldo Aniasi, one of the co-signators of the motion and vice president of the Parliament, was still referring to the initiative he had begun to work on with other MPs. It called upon the government to supply the Italian delegation to the coming UNGA with instructions to make a distinction between "racism which is to be blamed and Zionism which has to be viewed positively in being the Renaissance Movement of the Jewish People."⁵⁴

The same convoluted formulations were to be found in the message sent by Aniasi to the First Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue, at the beginning of September 1986: "One of the objectives we must maintain is that of the fight against international terrorism, and the manipulation of the Palestine question as a powder keg ready to explode and spread destruction throughout the Mediterranean area," he said.⁵⁵ "In this scenario I believe that the specific

aim of the Italian Socialists should be to return to the development of an even more complex analysis of the problem of Israel, and an increasing understanding of the attempts sometimes contrived to create uncertainty and to foment ill-will. To this end, several Italian deputies—myself among them—provoked by the monstrosity of U.N. Resolution 3379 which equated Zionism with racism, have demanded a commitment from our Italian representatives at the U.N. to condemn any maneuver which challenges the contribution to peace and independence given to its people by the Hebrew (Jewish) Renaissance.”⁵⁵

In March 1987, Aniasi went back to mentioning the same initiative in a conversation with Uzi Narkiss, this time displaying more caution. He said the motion would be proposed at the Chamber “at a convenient time.” It never was, in spite of the fact that the text of the U.S. congressional resolution and the joint Australian parliamentary resolution were sent shortly afterward to his personal attention and could have served as an inspiration.⁵⁶

Such also was the fate of a similar move initiated in July 1988 by three PSI MPs, Capria, Boniver and Buffoni, despite conditions that were far more favorable than before. In their draft, “*Risoluzione in Commissione*,” the three socialists invoked resolutions already adopted by the Parliaments of Australia, the European Parliament and the Peruvian one (see below). They called upon the government to “express at the coming UNGA session by principle the opposition to Resolution 3379, whose only contribution has been to increase the tension between the peoples of the Middle East, which instead should be put in a situation to live in conditions of mutual respect and good neighbourhood.”⁵⁷

The three had grounds to believe that even the Communist party would not oppose this resolution, in view of its opposition to the ZR equation expressed in 1975 and recent remarks by some of its leaders. Giorgio Napolitano, for instance, second in the party’s hierarchy, declared in an interview during a 1986 visit to Israel as guest of the International Center for Peace: “We never said, as others did, that Zionism in itself is a reactionary ideology. The fact that there is a Zionist left camp in Israel fighting for peace and progress, is decisive proof that Zionism does not lead as it is sometimes argued to the right and to reaction.”⁵⁸ Several months afterward, he wrote an unexpected article in which he posited Zionism as one of three legitimate options open to Jews: to assimilate, to safeguard their identity, or to emigrate and strengthen Israel.⁵⁹

Israel’s plenipotentiary minister in Rome referred explicitly to the influence of this article on this last initiative by the Italian socialists. It is also reasonable to consider that their move was influenced by the activity developed by the steering committee, through MAPAM and Israel’s Labor Party, in the direction of the socialist parties of Europe and of the International Socialist.⁶⁰ But again, the initiative remained a vague desire. Nothing came out of it.

Only at the end of July 1989, did the new Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, decide to take a clearer stand on the issue. In his programmatic declaration both before the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, he spoke about his government commitment to a reconciliation between the Arab world and Israel. In this context he mentioned that "we have included in our program an appeal to put an end to this insulting equation between Zionism and racism."⁶¹ However, at that point, Andreotti displayed no interest in looking at the broader implications of Resolution 3379, such as the dwindling standing of the U.N. and the legitimation of anti-Semitism.

In a letter commending his declaration, Uzi Narkiss recalled these other implications of the resolution, providing Andreotti with the proceedings of the legal conference on "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism and the U.N."⁶² In his answer, the Italian prime minister was content to restate that his declaration reflected the "Italian traditional position with regard to the relationship between the Arab States and Israel."⁶³ A year later, speaking before the Congress of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, Andreotti promised to take action to rescind Resolution 3379, and to strive to have the European Community make a clear-cut commitment to fight racial prejudice and anti-Semitism.⁶⁴ In fact, he did not depart from his basic stand.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Israel Embassy in Bonn had already come to the conclusion in August 1985 that the regulations of the Bundestag "did not enable declarative resolutions as passed by the Dutch Parliament (in 1975) or the U.S. Congress. Hence it was not possible here to act on the parliamentary level as suggested, but only by getting parliamentarians' signatures for the petition."⁶⁵

Several years later, at the beginning of 1988, Gideon Tadmor, adviser to the Israeli Foreign Minister for Diaspora Affairs, tried to revive the effort. Indeed, Tadmor was to display an outstanding and persistent involvement in pushing the international campaign against 3379. Having received the same answer from Bonn, he wrote to Israel's plenipotentiary minister that after extensive consultations in Jerusalem, it had been decided that "in those countries where there are regulatory and legislative difficulties, one might mobilize public support which will express itself in condemning the aforementioned equation. It could come from parliamentary groups, parties or suitable organizations. What we want finally to achieve is to create an atmosphere negating 3379, therefore declarations from important public factors contribute to (achieving) the goal."⁶⁶

But such declarations were never obtained, perhaps because they were never really sought. The only recorded German official declaration on this issue came in 1990, from East German Prime Minister Lothar de Maizere, in a letter sent to the president of the WJC, Edgar Bronfman, who had invited him to visit the United States. De Maizere, a Conservative Christian Democrat, wrote that the old Stalinist regime which had been replaced by a

freely elected government, was wrong in having joined the UNGA vote condemning Zionism. "East Germany considered the undifferentiated condemnation of Zionism as a form of racism as not helpful for making peace in the Near East, apart from the fact that this condemnation does not correspond with the historical experience of Jewish and German history," he wrote.⁶⁷ This was both a weak denial of Resolution 3379 and poorly executed side-stepping.

Regarding the United Kingdom, we recall the encouraging letters received by the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland from the leaders of the three major parties at the occasion of the seminar held in the Commons at the end of October 1985. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had expressed her sympathy and hinted that in spite of a very busy legislative program, "there will no doubt be other occasions in the course of the session when it will be relevant to do so."⁶⁸ Unfortunately these occasions were not to be found during the sessions of the Parliament in 1985-6, nor during the following years!

As a second best, an Early Day Motion (EDM) sponsored by MPs Rey Freeson and Laurie Pavitt was moved for the first time in May 1986, and was supported by twenty-four MPs. It was moved again in November-December 1986 and again in March 1987, when it received the support of thirty-six MPs. It read as follows:

*"This House calls for the repeal of the ZR UNGA Resolution 3379 of 10th November 1975 which is based on prejudice and emotion and not on logical argument; believes that this resolution has been used by unscrupulous persons to encourage anti-Semitism and anti-Jewish activities; and believes that Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people who had been oppressed by many generations and that the UN resolution charge that Zionism is Racism is without foundation, is an evil slur on the Jewish people and has demeaned the United Nations."*⁶⁹

Although an EDM was of little if any operative value, and in "itself will not assure any action,"⁷⁰ the Zionist Federation decided to ask its members to support it.⁷¹ But it was no wonder that the whole effort did not yield much, as was explained by one the MPs approached: "With regard to the Early Day Motion, there are now nearly 800 of these on the order Paper so that the whole process has fallen into total disrepute and Members of Parliament no longer sign them as they are not relevant."⁷² The problem was not mainly a question of timing or procedure but rather of substance and formulation. In view of the encouraging letters of support received by the leaders of all the political parties, the Zionist Federation probably felt that it would not be so difficult to get a supporting resolution from the Commons or some substitute such as an EDM, in favor of the repeal.

The Zionist Federation opted not to use Thatcher's letter to explore with the government when, how and to which end to raise this issue. Instead, it left the government out of the picture and in a way released Thatcher from even her modest commitment.

In sum, the Zionist Federation leaders did not draw the proper lesson from the Australian experience, on which they had been briefed at length. They did not understand that they had to invest their energy first and foremost in convincing the government to initiate or sponsor a move in the Parliament and that this entailed a lot of work. Yet their attention had indeed been attracted to this central aspect by both the Zionist Federation of Australia and the steering committee. Already in November 1986 Mark Liebler expressed his surprise to Martin Savitt, vice chairman of Britain's Zionist Federation, about the move his Federation was planning; "I do not understand why you say that the passage of a similar resolution in the House of Commons must be by the way of an adjournment debate, moved by a private member," said Liebler. "Is there no prospect of getting the government to introduce an appropriate motion with the support of the opposition parties?"⁷³

In June 1987 the steering committee also raised this issue before the ZF of England, stressing that "in view of the Australian experience" the Zionist Federation should try to coordinate its steps with the prime minister, and ask for a meeting with her "based on her letter in order to seek her advice on how to proceed to materialize her commitment to this cause."⁷⁴ It is not at all certain, however, that such intensive pressure on the British Government would have succeeded since, as was later to become apparent, both the government and the Labor Party seemed not to support the abrogation of Resolution 3379 *per se*, but as a package, in exchange for some *quid pro quo*.

It has already been noted that Margaret Thatcher's letter had been encouraging at the same time that it was evasive and shied away from commitment. The letter sent by Denis Healy instead of Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party, was even more revealing. It did not convey clear-cut support for the revocation of the ZR, but rather hinted at some desired *quid pro quo*, that is, at Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories:

"I share your concern about UNGA Resolution 3379 which equated Zionism with racism," said Healy. "In my view it is a dangerous nonsense to describe Israel's right to exist as a democratic and secular society as a form of racism. I hope that the General Assembly will reverse its decision. The Labour Party supports the right of Israel to exist in peace and security within secure and internationally recognised borders. We also support the right of the Palestinians to self-determination including the establishment of a Palestinian State. For Israel to enter into negotiations to facilitate its withdrawal from the occupied territories of the West Bank would be a major and critical step in the search for a solution of the problems of the Middle East. It would

also help facilitate a change in opinion in the United Nations that you seek."⁷⁵

Even more strikingly, it appears that the position of the Labour Party was actually shared by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who for years had succeeded to allay suspicion and create the impression that she supported the abrogation unconditionally. In February 1990, MP Greville Janner wrote to ask for her support for U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle's announced drive to get the resolution rescinded [see Chapter 8, "U.S. Active Involvement"]. Thatcher replied that it would not be a simple matter: "I suspect that the necessary voting majority will be forthcoming only if the repeal offers some substantial quid pro quo to the Arab side. That, sadly, is the way international relations are. But there is no doubt about our total abhorrence of the resolution."⁷⁶

In other words, Prime Minister Thatcher did not share the U.S. and Australian view that Resolution 3379 was going far beyond the Arab-Israeli dispute, that it tarnished and demeaned the U.N., and that it should be fought in itself by all the countries faithful to the original ideals of the U.N. Charter.

In the case of Holland, the attempt to get a parliamentary resolution was made first at the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1987 through the CIDI in The Hague, an information center on Israel and the Middle East. This was a very respected and dynamic institution ably directed by Ronny Naftaniel, which had developed excellent relations with all the segments of the Dutch body politic. Naftaniel had been extremely effective in securing the participation of several prominent Dutch socialist MPs in the two Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogues. Naftaniel apparently encountered some reservations about a parliamentary resolution. He was, in fact, told that one already had been adopted by the Dutch Parliament on November 11, 1975. It read: The Second Chamber of the States General of the Netherlands,

"Having taken note of the U.N. resolution adopted on November 10, that includes the statement of the UNGA that Zionism must be seen as a form of racism and racial discrimination; considering that this equation has to be rejected as a matter of principle; consequently is of the opinion that this statement does not contribute to the peace and security in the Middle East; greatly regrets the statement of the UNGA."⁷⁷

But the steering committee maintained that the aim of the current campaign was not only to condemn the ZR but to overturn it and that this justified the adoption of a new resolution in this spirit.⁷⁸ During the traditional yearly debate on the foreign policy of Holland before the Parliament, MP Meindert Leerling, from the PRPF, a small religious and right-wing party, called upon the government to issue a new resolution similar to the one passed twelve years earlier.⁷⁹

The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van den Broek, balked. "If there was even a slight chance that the General Assembly will rescind such a resolution I would be the first to press the issue. I expressed my absolute revulsion then for this resolution and I shall go on to do so. However in view of the balance of power at the U.N. presently, it is not realistic to think that it is possible to annul the resolution. I think that we risk a reiteration of it by trying to remove it. It will cause more damage than anything else. In this spirit I recommend firmly to Mr. Leerling to abstain from pushing forward a question on this issue."⁸⁰

Van der Broek's argument was really a specious one. At this stage, as was well known, no one was planning to go to the U.N. to propose an abrogation amendment or anything similar to it. This had been clearly explained by Bob Hawke in his introduction of the resolution before the Australian House of Representatives, and also by others. The question was whether Holland, by a resolution of its parliament, would or would not follow the example of the U.S. Congress and of Australia in expressing formally its support for the abrogation.

But the foreign minister clearly felt that his answers were not convincing the Honourable MP and that he needed to invoke the position of the Twelve in his defense. That position indeed expressed "the most explicit reservation" toward the ZR, but never called for its abrogation!

This line seemed to point at least to some kind of coordination between the European Community and its member states. This may well explain why even countries well-disposed to the campaign to overturn the ZR, such as the UK or even Holland, were in fact reluctant to support such a move formally. In the case of Holland, there seemed to be two other factors at play in the reluctance to take such an initiative. The Israeli diplomats in the Hague, as well as the Holland desk person in the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem seemed not to consider this an important issue worthy of a public drive.⁸¹

Second, there was considerable embarrassment at the prospect of such an initiative. The political climate had changed since the last resolution's passage more than decade before and there would no longer be even a majority—let alone unanimity—in support of a measure! MP Leerling explained this in a letter to the steering committee. He admitted that the response by the Dutch minister of foreign affairs might have been disappointing. "In our parliament however, there should be no majority for moving a motion asking the Dutch government to take the initiative to repeal Resolution 3379. In the near future, I shall urge our government with the utmost exertion to take the initiative to rescind the notorious Resolution 3379."⁸²

In France the ground for a parliamentary initiative had been well prepared by several very successful conferences: the conference in the Senate, June 1985, the First Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue in September 1986, and also

by the General Conference of the French Speaking Friendship Leagues with Israel held in Cannes at the beginning of November 1985.

This last conference, which was devoted mainly to the international campaign to overturn 3379, was opened by a very militant and convincing address by the mayor of Cannes, MEP Anne Marie Dupuy (RPR). Dupuy proclaimed the need to battle against the "many and sometimes insidious resurgences of anti-Semitism, and the appearance of its new expression, anti-Zionism." She urged steadfastness and international solidarity as the only cure for what she termed this "kind of leprosy of the spirit," decay and violence. "Our personal determination to fight against anti-Semitism should be coupled today with a national and international effort to combat anti-Zionism and terrorism."⁸³

A year later, on December 1, 1986, MP Georges Mesmin, the president of the France Israel Friendship League, who had taken part in the Cannes conference, submitted a written question to the foreign minister. He noted that the Australian Parliament had just stated that Resolution 3379 "gives a wrong and unacceptable view of Zionism, contradicts the U.N. Charter and has only served to escalate religious animosity and incite anti-Semitism." He then asked the foreign minister if the French Government shared this view, and in this event, "what steps he intended to take to support an effort to bring about the rescission of Resolution 3379."⁸⁴

The French foreign minister gave a detailed explanation of the policy of France regarding its dealings with Resolution 3379. He noted that France had clearly disapproved of Resolution 3379 and while it attached great value to the fight against racism and racial discrimination, it could not take part in such activities because of abusive equations like the ZR. In accordance with this policy, France and its European partners, along with some other Western countries, had left the First World Conference to Combat Racism in protest against the final declaration. Two paragraphs had been adopted accusing Israel of a policy of racial discrimination and condemning the relationship between "the Zionist State of Israel and the racist regime of South Africa." The same practice had been followed with regard to the declaration of the Second World Conference, which although far more moderate in its wording, was not acceptable in its substance. The foreign minister considered that, "thanks to this firm attitude adopted by France and most of the Western countries, the UNGA has not had to experience texts repeating the terms of Resolution 3379."

The foreign minister felt, in other words, that this policy of conditional cooperation with the U.N. had been very effective in preventing the reiteration of the anti-Zionist resolution. Therefore, he reasoned, there was no point for the time being in changing it. "If a new initiative would have to be taken, the Honourable MP can be assured that France, faithful to her traditions, will act according to the line she had decided to follow."⁸⁴ Obviously, such was

not the case in spite of the U.S. as well as the Australian resolutions, and their appeal to others to initiate steps to overturn 3379. In fact, France did not depart from this attitude during the following years, when the issue was raised again and again at the highest echelons and despite several attempts to change it.

Jean Pierre Bloch, a former minister, honorary president of the LICRA, an organization defending human rights and fighting racism and anti-Semitism, and chairman of the newly founded National Advisory Committee for Human Rights, agreed to work toward the adoption by the Parliament of a resolution calling upon the French Government to take action toward rescinding Resolution 3379.⁸⁵ Bloch, respected and known for his energy and dynamism, convened on September 15, 1987, a working session with Pierre Christian Taittinger, vice president of the Senate, Claude Marcus, chairman of the France-Israel Group at the National Assembly and Yohanan Manor, chairman of the Israel-France Friendship Association in Jerusalem.

At this meeting it was decided that the two France-Israel parliamentary groups should ask their colleagues to sign a letter requesting the French Government to join its allies in taking the steps needed to bring about the abrogation of Resolution 3379. MP Claude Marcus was to be in charge of coordinating this move.⁸⁶ But in spite of the seeming willingness of senior parliamentarians, it was never implemented.⁸⁷

A new initiative for the French Government was suggested more than a year later, in April 1989 after the visit to Israel of Pierre Guidoni, national secretary for international affairs of the French Socialist Party, who came as a guest of the Labor Party. Guidoni had stressed during his visit how important it was to secure the PLO's recognition of the legitimacy of Israel, and that France was working on it. One of the people he met with observed that such a recognition would actually mean a recognition of Zionism and that this would be a significant contribution by France in bringing about the abrogation of the U.N. resolution against Zionism. This would then create a proper atmosphere for a negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. Guidoni reacted favorably to the idea.⁸⁸

As a result, a memorandum calling for a "French initiative in view of rescinding the UNGA resolution on Zionism," was submitted to Prime Minister Michel Rocard. The memorandum suggested France take advantage of the recent Arafat declaration on the "caduc" character in the articles of the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel, and take a two-phased initiative: first, express the wish of France in a declaration by the prime minister before the Parliament that the U.N. dissociate itself from this resolution, and second, develop diplomatic activity in the direction of the Arab countries and the countries of the Third World to ensure that at least they would not hinder such a move.⁸⁹

Rocard seems to have agreed to the idea of an initiative to abrogate 3379.

Several days later he even suggested to the PLO leadership to make a move in this direction. But the PLO rejected the idea, claiming the time wasn't right. With regard to a French initiative, Rocard stressed that it depended exclusively on a decision of President Mitterand and that he could only forward a recommendation to him to take such a step. Thus there were no conflicting views on the need to abrogate the measure, only tactical considerations regarding its timing and political expediency. There was the question of whether such a move would weaken Arafat, and what its connection was to the thaw between the two blocs. In addition, Rocard was to raise before the coming UNGA an important resolution regarding environmental protection and he did not want to dilute France's efforts on other issues.⁹⁰

Such goodwill with no results was also the fate of an other attempt in the direction of the chairman of the National Assembly, Laurent Fabius. On July 17, 1989, Uzi Narkiss met with him in Paris, handing him the above-mentioned memorandum and asking him to take the initiative of a parliamentary resolution firmly condemning Resolution 3379, as had been done by Australia and other countries. Fabius maintained that in view of the relationship between Israel and France, he was not sure it was the proper time for such an initiative. But he assured Narkiss that he would examine the memorandum and check possible courses of action.⁹¹

Other attempts in European countries such as Belgium,⁹² Norway,⁹³ Denmark⁹⁴ and Greece, did not bear any fruit either.

In view of this disappointing overall picture of democratic Western Europe, there was at least some comfort in the measure adopted almost unanimously (188 to 3, 4 abstentions) by the European Parliament on September 17, 1987, on U.N. Resolution 3379. This resolution was a compromise between a motion on behalf of the EPP Group (Christian Democrats) and on behalf of the ED Group (Conservative) and another one on behalf of the Socialist Group.⁹⁵ All the groups supported it, including the Communists and the extreme right. Only some individuals opposed it or abstained.

After recalling the consistent rejection of the ZR formula by the governments of the member states of the European Community, in both joint and individual statements, the resolution stated that the European Parliament:

1. *Is convinced that the concept of Zionism cannot be equated with racism;*
2. *Considers Resolution No 3379 of the UNGA to be unacceptable;*
3. *Calls on the foreign ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to reaffirm at the next General Assembly of the U.N. their aversion to the very principle of Resolution No. 3379-30, which can only increase the tension between the peoples of the Middle East, who should all be able to live as equals and*

enjoy a relationship of mutual respect and good-neighbourliness;

4. *Calls further on the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to reiterate these fundamental principles in all the other international fora, to pursue their opposition to all forms of racial discrimination and, simultaneously, to defend the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and their legitimate aspiration to live within secure and internationally recognized borders;*
5. *Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation, the Commission and the Secretary-General of the U.N.*⁹⁶

This resolution was insipid and far less focused than the Australian one. There was no reference at all to anti-Semitism, for instance. Instead self-determination was mentioned, probably to appease anticipated critics. Moreover, this already watered-down resolution did not include the request that it be forwarded to “the ambassadors of the Middle Eastern states accredited to the Community in Brussels, and the Secretary General of the Arab League,” as suggested in the amendment submitted by the Socialist Group.⁹⁵ And far more distressing was the absence of an appeal to rescind Resolution 3379, although this had been the explicit intention of MEP Prag, one of the co-sponsors of Amendment No 1.

“The one thing that is certain is that peace will not come by either side calling the other names—that is a peculiarly childish and unfruitful exercise. Yet that is exactly what was done when the UNGA adopted its Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. It has served no other purpose than to exacerbate tensions and arouse bitter resentment among Israelis and Jews the world over and make solutions more difficult. I hope that we in this House will adopt the joint amendment and urge the UNGA to repeal that resolution at the earliest opportunity. In doing so we shall take a small but useful step towards real peace and understanding in the Middle East.”⁹⁷

Not only was no such appeal included in the resolution of the European Parliament. Even the simple phrase, “wish to see the resolution abrogated,” as suggested by French MEP Coste Floret (RDE-Conservative), was left out. Coste Floret was reiterating German MEP Habsburg’s request of the members of the European Community to lend active support to efforts to overturn 3379. For Habsburg this was “undoubtedly not a matter of convenience but a matter of political wisdom.”⁹⁸

To convey his point of view before the House, Habsburg referred to a Hindu saga. In it, two princes who were fighting each other endlessly went to Buddha to ask him how they could put an end to it. Buddha’s advice was “to restore the original meaning of words.” Habsburg stressed that this was

precisely what was required in this instance. "When there is no agreement on the words, the meaning is imposed by the strong. Unfortunately, there were also attempts at the U.N. to create confusion. . . This equation belongs to twisted language, for reason of propaganda."⁹⁸ However this allegory did not convince the president of the Council of Ministers that it was the duty of the European Community to lend support to restore the true meaning of words, that is to racism as well as to Zionism.

Coste Floret expressed his dismay at the objection voiced gently by the president of the council to Habsburg's request. "We don't ask him to take an initiative. This initiative has already been taken by Australia, Peru and the U.S., which will ask for the abrogation of this provision. We only ask him that the Europeans lend support to this move and try to get a majority in favor of it."⁹⁹ But the Council of Ministers was not willing to lend this support.

This staggering lack of goodwill reminded Coste Floret of the response he got from the council president several months earlier. Quoting the Australian resolution, Coste Floret had asked the council whether it shared the same opinion. And "since racism and anti-Semitism represent a serious threat [to] the values advocated by the EC as well as [to] Human Rights, can it tell the Parliament what measures it intends to take in view of bringing about the invalidation of Resolution 3379?"¹⁰⁰

The council president recalled that the Presidents of the European Institutions had signed on June 11, 1986, a declaration against racism and xenophobia condemning all forms of racism. Furthermore, he said, the position had constantly been supported by the Twelve with regard to UNGA Resolution 3379/75, which had not been supported by any member of the EC. There was no answer given to the question of specific steps to be taken to invalidate 3379, only a preemptory claim "that there was no procedure to annul a resolution adopted by the UNGA"! Coste Floret rejected this prevarication, noting that it was "always possible for an Assembly to adopt a resolution invalidating a former one. When someone is wrong, it is always possible to acknowledge that one has made a mistake."⁹⁹ There was therefore no solace to be found in this resolution of the European Parliament. It did not fill the vacuum created by the lack of resolutions from European Parliaments. At best it was a fig leaf for a degrading political deficiency.

HOPE FROM LATIN AMERICA

There were encouraging signals quite early from Latin America, especially from Uruguay following the annual conference of the Zionist Council of Latin America (COSLA) in Porto Alegre, August 6-7, 1986. The conference, which was organized by Boris Blinder, president of COSLA, took

place in the building of the National Assembly and was devoted to the campaign to repeal 3379. Its title was, "Para o Encontro sobre Sionismo: Expresso de Pluralismo, Liberdade, Democracia e Paz." Many MPs from Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay took part and had granted their support to a concluding statement demanding that efforts be made to bring about the annulment of Resolution 3379, "which contradicts the noble founding principles of the U.N."

Senator Luis Alberto Lacalle of Uruguay had taken an active role in this conference and had announced that he would submit to his Senate a draft resolution on this issue. He did so a month later. On September 9, 1986, he addressed the Senate requesting its approval for transmitting to the Foreign Ministry his statement denouncing UNGA Resolution 3379 and expressing "the hope that the Foreign Ministry of Uruguay will take the necessary steps in order to dissociate Uruguay from such an extreme resolution, which of course was not supported by Uruguay, and to initiate procedures to adopt a new resolution which will abrogate this unjust resolution."¹⁰¹ Approval was granted by the unanimous vote of the fifteen senators (out of thirty) attending the meeting, including Communist Senator Rodriguez Camusso.

Although this was not exactly a formal Senate resolution calling for the abrogation of Resolution 3379, it was nevertheless a clear indication of feeling on this issue. And only two years later, in August 1988, Uruguay's Senate adopted a formal resolution on the ZR. It included some new elements, but it was less committal overall than Lacalle's declaration. It evoked international conventions which were broken by Resolution 3379 such as Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (December 1965), Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (November 1966), Art. 20.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights banning by law "any apology of national, racial or religious hatred which constitutes an incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence." Moreover, it stated that Resolution 3379 was "part of an anti-Semitic campaign-directed at denying the existence of the State of Israel."¹⁰²

So, while it rejected Resolution 3379, painstakingly detailing why it was unacceptable, it did not call formally for its repeal. The wording of this resolution seemed to have been influenced by the spirit of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament, which was the only one mentioned explicitly in the Uruguay measure. All in all, it may have been wiser to be content with Lacalle's explicit statement with the Senate's imprimatur than to press for a more formal but looser resolution. In any case this step backward did not prompt a lessening of Lacalle's commitment to the repeal campaign. On the contrary, he was to involve himself very actively in encouraging other Latin America countries to reject Resolution 3379 and lend support to its repeal, even after he had been elected president of Uruguay.¹⁰³

In the meantime, there was a very significant development in May 1987 in Peru. Its Congress decided to adopt a very short resolution rejecting "any expression or measure which is not conducive to a peaceful solution of the Middle East problem and unequivocally condemns unacceptable concepts such as UNGA Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism."¹⁰⁴ This could have been dismissed as a very flimsy resolution. It was an indirect, implicit and exclusively instrumental rejection of 3379, referring to the measure as counterproductive in the search for a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel conflict. In fact, this was probably a turning point in the crusade against Zionism, since the resolution came from a country which had abstained in 1975, where there was a strong Marxist opposition.

The resolution was initiated by Carlos Rocca, the chairman of external relations of the A.T.R.A. party which, under the leadership of Alan Garcia, had won the general elections in 1985 and secured the presidency. The Marxist bloc which was opposed to the move left the House in protest.¹⁰⁵ The shifting trend was confirmed by the fact that the parliaments of four other Latin America countries which had also abstained in 1975 followed suit and even went further by adopting resolutions not only condemning 3379 but also calling for its abrogation and expressing the wish that their governments be active in convincing other countries to support the move. This was the case of the Congress of Guatemala on October 25, 1988, of Venezuela on April 26, 1990, of Ecuador on May 21, 1990 and of the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina in October of 1990. There was also a resolution adopted in May 1990 by the Parliament of the Dominican Republic and a draft resolution submitted to the Senate of Colombia in December 1988, but not brought to a vote.¹⁰⁶

Venezuela was probably the most interesting case. The ground had been fertile there since its Congress had agreed to sign the petition to the secretary general of the U.N. and since the very successful conference organized in Caracas in April 1985 (see Chapter 6) to denounce the ZR resolution. In November 1987 two members of Congress had expressed their support for a motion of the Congress condemning 3379.¹⁰⁷ Gustavo Tarre Briceno, of the opposition party COPEI, and Andres Eloy Blanco, of the party in power, A.D., made their views known at a conference organized by the Jewish community to mark the fortieth anniversary of the U.N. Partition Plan of Palestine.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless it took more than two years of hard work both on the part of Israel's ambassador to Caracas, Hanan Olami, and of Walter Chenstohovsky, the chairman of the Zionist Federation, to see a resolution not only condemning 3379 but also requesting its abrogation "for not being consistent (por no ajustarse) with the new era of democracy in the world."

The reluctance to proceed was due mainly to the very close ties enjoyed by Venezuela, as an important oil producer and member of the OPEC, with the Arab world. After the vote some members of the Congress expressed

their apprehensions. Senator Mercedes Pulido de Briceno, a well-known friend of Israel who had been close to the Jewish community, said she feared the impact of such a resolution on the "relationship between Venezuela and Arab countries which of course will be enraged by the resolution."¹⁰⁸ She believed it would have been better to postpone the vote. By contrast the president of the Congress, David Morales Bello, one of the leaders of the governmental party, A.D., enthusiastically defended the move in a private meeting with members of his political group who were hesitating about bringing the draft resolution to a vote.¹⁰⁸

To round out this encouraging trend were very important declarations made by the presidents of Mexico and Brazil, two countries which had voted in favor of Resolution 3379 in 1975. A short time after his election, the new president of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gotari, stated in December 1988, in a meeting with the leaders of the WJC, that "he opposed the U.N. resolution claiming to equate Zionism with racism and that he will spare no effort [for] its revocation."¹⁰⁹ This was a marked shift for a country which had not only supported the adoption of Resolution 3379, but had also played a leading role in paving the way for its adoption at the International Women's Conference in Mexico.¹¹⁰

A year later, at the end of January 1990, the leaders of the WJC, Chairman Edgar Bronfman, Secretary General Israel Singer and Executive Director Elan Steinberg, made a similar move in the direction of Fernando Collor de Mello, who on December 17, 1989 had won Brazil's presidential election against Luis Inacio Silva, a trade unionist with Marxist support. Collor, who was in the United States to discuss with President Bush Brazil's sinking economy and staggering international debt, agreed to the request of both Benno Milnitzky, chairman of the Latin American Jewish Congress and president of the Confederation of Brazilian Jews, and Rabbi Henry Sobel of the Congregacao Israelita of San Paolo, to meet with the leadership of the WJC. During the campaign for the presidential election, candidate Collor had already stated that he intended to re-examine the question of the U.N. vote on Zionism. This was to placate the anger of his Jewish supporters over his withdrawal under Arab pressure from a statement he had made that he would not permit the opening of a PLO office in Brasilia.¹¹¹

In the meeting with the WJC leadership Collor was far more committal. He stated that Brazil's vote in 1975 supporting the ZR was a mistake, that he would review it when he returned to Brazil, and that Brazil would not vote that way again.¹¹² The Israeli Embassy in Brasilia, which was not aware of this move, both rejoiced and worried. It feared the publicity surrounding this declaration, if Collor had not agreed to it, was an irresponsible act, since "this is an invitation for pressures from the Arabs and their supporters in Brazil, as already reported by the press, not to speak about the pressures from Arab countries, as we already experienced them after Collor's declaration during the campaign."¹¹³

These apprehensions were well founded. In his inaugural speech, President Collor de Mello said that his government would not jeopardize the economic ties that had developed with countries in the Arab world nor the ties of friendship developed with the descendants of Middle Eastern countries who had settled in Brazil. They numbered 3 million, compared to the tiny Jewish community of less than 120,000. Collor added that the policy of his country regarding peace in the Middle East would be to abide by the resolutions of the Security Council and put forward for consideration a peaceful solution in the framework of the U.N. through "recognition of the legitimate rights of all the peoples."¹¹¹

This statement was indeed a retreat from Collor's declaration at the meeting with Edgard Bronfman, though at the same time it was a clear indication Brazil would not stick to its previous position on UNGA Resolution 3379. Still, as emphasized by Brazilian Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek, a descendant of Lebanese immigrants, the matter was not at all a priority on his agenda.¹¹⁰

By contrast with Latin America, there was no perceptible sign of change from African and Asian countries, in spite of efforts developed specifically in their direction, (Senegal, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Zaire, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Philippines), notably via the International Department of the Histadrut.¹¹⁴ The only noteworthy reaction came from Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, during a meeting he had with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, during his visit to Washington at the end of January 1990.

President Moi did not depart from the "neutral" position adopted by his country since 1975 when it abstained, in spite of the fact that in December 1988, Kenya had resumed diplomatic relations with Israel. He was noncommittal when asked whether Kenya would support a repeal of the UNGA 3379. He said that when a repeal resolution came up, he would consult with his foreign minister on Kenya's position.¹¹⁵

On the whole, then, the balance sheet showing the results of reinvigorating the campaign was mixed. There was unquestionable progress in eroding the ZR resolution's standing, reducing international support for it and multiplying the calls for its abrogation. But, there was also a strong reluctance to take action leading to abrogation by countries which had voted against the ZR, notably in Western Europe. There, there was an increasing tendency to view the rescission of Resolution 3379 as part of a quid pro quo between Israel and the Arab states, that is, in exchange for Israeli concessions.

- (1) Narkiss, "War on Resolution 3379," *Jerusalem Post*, November 10, 1985.
- (2) Address to the Committee on anti-Semitism of the WJC 8th Plenary Assembly, January 27, 1986.
- (3) Resolution No. 12 on "Anti-Zionist and Anti-Jewish Abuse in U.N. Fora," sections X and XI, January 27, 1986.
- (4) The proposal is dated March 10, 1986; the meeting took place on March 16, 1986. CZA/S110/45.
- (5) See Chapter VI, under the section, "Raising awareness and enlisting support."
- (6) Letter from Frances Bernstein to H. Ben Ito, February 4, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (7) Circular sent by the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, American Section, Project CASAZ, n.d. probably September 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (8) Michael Evans, "Jews Should Sue for Libel," *Times*, January 24, 1987.
- (9) Report from Yoel Slepak, in charge of Information at the Israeli Embassy in Paris, to the Information Division of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, on H. Ben Ito's visit, January 30, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (10) Agenda of the NJCRAC Israel Task Force, December 15, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (11) Evan J. Krame, Executive Director, Project CASAZ, in *Project Casaz Newsletter*, Winter 1987-8, p.3. CZA/S110/14.
- (12) Larry Cohen, "Kirkpatrick, Others call for Zionism-Racism Repeal," *Washington Jewish Week*, November 13, 1986. CZA/S110/32.
- (13) Cable from Raphael Gvir, deputy to the head of the Israeli Mission to the U.N. in New York, to Yael Vered, Assistant Director General, International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 11, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (14) Cable from R. Gvir to the Foreign Minister's adviser for Diaspora, December 17, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (15) Cable from R. Gvir to the Foreign Minister's adviser for Diaspora, December 21, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (16) Cable from R. Gvir to G. Tadmor, the Foreign Minister's adviser for Diaspora, January 28, 1988. CZA/S110/14.
- (17) Letter from Evan J. Krame to Netanyahu, January 19, 1988. CZA/S110/14.
- (18) Letter from Netanyahu to Krame, January 28, 1988. CZA/S10/14.
- (19) Protocol of the meeting of the Steering Committee, July 23, 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (20) Text in *European Socialist Views of Israel and Zionism*, a 48-page review on the first "Israel-European Socialist Dialogue" published in Jerusalem, August 1987, p. 5. CZA/S110/42.
- (21) The title of this booklet containing documents and background articles was the same as the above-mentioned review. It was divided into two parts. The first one on Zionism and Israel: 1) R. Wistrich, German Democratic Socialism and the Jewish National Problem. 2) Y. Manor, Three Socialist Views on Zionism: K.Kautsky, L. Bernstein, L. Blum. 3) Resolutions from Socialist Bodies, 1891-1966. 4) Y. Peri, Fall from Favor: Israel and the Socialist International. 5) S. Avineri, Ben Gurion: The Vision and the Power 6) B. Hayden, Israel: A Contemporary Democratic Socialist Perspective.

- The second part related to the Arab-Israel conflict: 7) D. Shueftan, Trends in the Arab World vis a vis Israel: The perspective of a sober optimist. 8) J. Barromi, The U.N. and the Middle East. 9) E. Sprinzak, Anti-Zionism: From Delegitimization to Dehumanization. 10) S. Liskofsky, A Dismal Anniversary: A Decade of the U.N.'s Zionism Equals Racism Resolution, 1975-1985. 11) Excerpts from the 1986 Platform of the Israel Labor Party. CZA/S110/42.
- (22) *European Socialist Views of Israel and Zionism*, op. cit., p. 11.
- (23) *ibid*, op. cit., p. 15.
- (24) *ibid*, op. cit., p. 16.
- (25) *ibid*, op. cit., p. 17.
- (26) Y. Manor's written Report to Chairman of the WZO Information Department on the W. Brandt-A. Ebban conference in Paris, September 6-7, 1986, p. 3. (Hebrew, French). CZA/S110/42.
- (27) Susan Hattis Rolef, Some thoughts on a dialogue, *Jerusalem Post*, September 23, 1986. CZA/S110/42.14
- (28) About fifty MPs and MPEs from Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. took part in this second dialogue, notably Roland Dumas, former French Foreign Minister; Hans Kochnik, Prime Minister, Land of Bremen; Ed Melkert, former Dutch Defense Minister; Gerald Kaufman, Foreign Minister in the Shadow Cabinet, Labour, UK. CZA/S110/43
- (29) CZA/S110/43
- (30) European Parliament, Session Documents, 1987-8, September 16, 1987, p. 277.
- (31) Letter from U. Narkiss to the chairs of the Zionist Federations, March 1985. CZA/S110/16.
- (32) Letter from Mark Liebler, President of ZFA, dated July 1985.
- (33) Mark Liebler, *Australia's Contribution to the World-Wide Campaign to Annul UNGA Resolution 3379 Equating Zionism with Racism*, Background Memorandum, October 1986, p. 2. CZA/S110/15.
- (34) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 3.
- (35) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 18.
- (36) See Chapter 6, under "Nairobi, a Pyrrhic Victory?"
- (37) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 3. CZA/S110/15.
- (38) Mark Liebler, op. cit., pp. 3-4. CZA/S110/15.
- (39) Letter from Michael Costello to Pearl Lipshut, September 17, 1985, quoted in Mark Liebler, op. cit. CZA/S110/15.
- (40) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 6. CZA/S110/15.
- (41) Bill Hayden, "Israel: A Contemporary Democratic Socialist Perspective." Address to the Biennial Conference of the ZFA, April 13, 1986. The full text was also published in *European Socialist Views of Israel and Zionism*, 1986, p. 56. CZA/S110/42.
- (42) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 8. CZA/S110/15.
- (43) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 7. CZA/S110/15.
- (44) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 13. CZA/S110/15.
- (45) Sam Lipsky, "Partisan," *The Australian Jewish News*, Melbourne, October 30, 1986.
- (46) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 14. CZA/S110/15.
- (47) Mark Liebler, op. cit., p. 17. CZA/S110/15.
- (48) Full text of Bob Hawke speech in *European Socialist Views of Israel and Zionism*, Jerusalem, August 1987, p. 48.
- (49) Letter from Manor to Mark Liebler, January 22, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (50) See Chapter 5, Section "First Success."
- (51) Report from Shlomo Bino to the Europe 2 Division of the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, July 24, 1985. CZA/S110/15.
- (52) Mozione to the Camera Dei Deputati, July 23, 1985.
- (53) The draft resolution was co-signed by eleven MPs. Four Socialists (PSI): Gianpaolo Sodano, Aldo Aniasi, Francesco Colucci, Gianpaolo Pillitteri. Three Republicans (PRI): Mauro Dutto; Michele Cifarelli; Pellicano Giralmo. Two Liberals (PLI): Giuseppe Facchetti; Paolo Battistuzzi

- One Social Democrat (PSDI): Giovanni Cuojati. One Christian Democrat (DC): Giancarlo Abete. CZA/S110/15.
- (54) Cable from the Consul General Sultan in Milano to the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, July 8, 1986, about a large event organized by Aldo Aniasi with the participation of Shimon Wiesenthal and Mario Dido, Vice President of the European Parliament on July 7, 1986. CZA/S110/15.
- (55) *European Socialist Views of Zionism and Israel*, p. 26. CZA/S110/42
- (56) Letter from Yohanan Manor to Aldo Aniasi, March 18, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (57) Reference to this move in *AVANTI*, July 22, 1988, according to a cable from the Israel's Plenipotentiary Minister in Rome to the Foreign Ministry Division Europe A in Jerusalem. n.d. CZA/S110/15.
- (58) *Al Hamishmar*, October 31, 1986.
- (59) The text of this lecture before the Truman and Davis Institutes of the Hebrew University, October 27, 1986, was published in an ideological review of the PCI: Giorgio Napolitano, "Il Partito Comunista Italiano e il Conflitto in Medio Oriente." CZA/S110/15.
- (60) See above, the section, "The Israel-Europe Socialist Dialogue."
- (61) Senate: July 26, 1989; Chamber of Deputies: July 30, 1989.
- (62) Letter from Uzi Narkiss to Giulio Andreotti, September 29, 1989. CZA/S110/15. On the legal conference see Chapter 6, section "Saving the U.N. from Itself"
- (63) Letter from Giulio Andreotti to Narkiss, November 3, 1989. CZA/S110/15.
- (64) *JTA*, December 1990.
- (65) Letter from the Plenipotentiary Minister G. Padon to M. Yegar, Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, August 14, 1985. CZA/S110/15.
- (66) Letter from G. Tadmor to the Plenipotentiary Minister in Bonn, February 28, 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (67) *Reuter*, May 16, 1990.
- (68) Letter from Margaret Thatcher to George Garai, November 8, 1985. CZA/S110/37.
- (69) Notices of Questions and Motions: March 24, 1987, 436, No. 79. CZA/S110/37.
- (70) Letter from George Garai to U. Narkiss, January 7, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (71) Circular from Martin Savitt, March 1987. CZA/S110/43.
- (72) Letter from MP John Wheeler to Bella Dayan, March 23, 1987. CZA/S110/37.
- (73) Letter from Mark Liebler to Martin Savitt, November 19, 1986. CZA/S110/37
- (74) Letter from Manor to George Garai, June 25, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (75) Letter from Denis Healey to George Garai, November 28, 1985. CZA/S110/37.
- (76) *JTA*, February 15, 1990.
- (77) Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, Zitting 1975-76, 13600 Hoofdstuk V, Nr 15, Voorgesteld, November 11, 1975. CZA/S110/15.
- (78) Letter from Manor to Ronny Naftaniel, May 11, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (79) Letter from Dan Megido, Minister Counsellor, The Hague, to G. Tadmor, Adviser to the Foreign Minister, January 6, 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (80) Answer given by Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to MP Meindert Leerling about repealing U.N. Resolution 3379, The Hague, December 3, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (81) Letter from Y. Manor to Miriam Shomrat, Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, July 26, 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (82) Letter from MP Leerling to Manor, June 10, 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (83) *France Israel Information*, 1986, p. 18. CZA/S110/15.
- (84) *Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationale, Questions écrites*, No. 9. A.N. (Q) du 2 Mars 1987.
- (85) Letter from Manor to J-P Bloch, March 9, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (86) Letter from Manor to MP Georges Freche, Mayor of Montpellier, December 27, 1987. CZA/S110/15
- (87) Letter from Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, Vice President of the Senate, to Manor, October 29, 1987; Letter from Pierre Christian Taittinger, Vice President of the Senate to Manor, December 28, 1987. Letter from George Freche to Manor, January 4, 1988. CZA/S110/15.

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- (88) Letter from Y. Manor to Foreign Minister Misha Arens, April 16, 1989. CZA/S110/15.
- (89) Note "Pour une initiative française en faveur de la résiliation de la résolution des Nations Unies sur le Sionisme", by Yohanan Manor, Chairman of the Israel-France Friendship Association in Jerusalem, May 17, 1989, p. 3. CZA/S110/15.
- (90) Memo from Yohanan Manor to Uzi Narkiss, May 13, 1989. CZA/S110/15.
- (91) Letter from Narkiss to the Chairman of the WZO, Simcha Dinitz, August 6, 1989. CZA/S110/15.
- (92) The draft resolution to the Belgian Senate was proposed by Mmes. Delruelle-Ghobert and Herman-Michielsens, and called on the Belgian delegation to the U.N. to take the proper steps toward its rescission, May 5, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (93) Letter from Deputy Director General Dov Shmorak (Department of Information and Communication) to Yehudit Hibner, Israel Ambassador in Oslo, November 13, 1986. CZA/S110/15.
- (94) Letter from Israel Ambassador in Copenhagen, Ganor, to the Adviser on Diaspora Affairs, December 24, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (95) *European Parliament, Session Documents*, 1987-8; July 2, 1987, Series B, Document B 2-667/87.
- (96) Texts adopted by the European Parliament, Thursday, September 17, 1987, 8. U.N. Resolution No. 3379, Compromise Amendment replacing B2-666 and 667/87.
- (97) *European Parliament, Session Documents*, 1987-8; September 16, 1987, p. 157.
- (98) European Parliament, op. cit., p. 153.
- (99) European Parliament, op. cit., p. 156.
- (100) *France-Israel Information*, 1987, p. 7. CZA/S110/15.70
- (101) *El Pais*, September 14, 1986. CZA/S110/15.
- (102) Resolution of the Senate of Uruguay, August 17, 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (103) See Chapter 8.
- (104) Resolution of the Congress of Peru, May 30, 1987. CZA/S110/15.
- (105) *Ha'aretz*, June 2, 1987.
- (106) *Anales del Congreso*, Año XXXII, No. 6, 11 de Enero 1989. Senado de la Republica, Clausura de la sesiones ordinarias del priodo legilativo de 1989, December 16.
- (107) Cable from Israel's Ambassador in Caracas, Hanan Olami, November 11, 1987. CZA/S10/15.
- (108) Cable from Chanan Olami, April 27, 1990. CZA/S110/15.
- (109) Embajada de Israel, Comunicado de Prensa, Bogota, Diciembre 9 de 1988. CZA/S110/15.
- (110) See Chapter II.
- (111) *JTA*, March 16, 1990.
- (112) *JTA*, January 22, 1990.
- (113) Cable from Israeli Ambassador in Brazil, Efrati, January 30, 1990. CZA/S110/15.
- (114) Letter from Yaakov Lidar, in charge of Africa in the International Department of the Histadrut, to Manor, December 29, 1985. CZA/S110/24; Memo from Manor on a meeting with Y. Lidar, February 4, 1986; Letter from Manor to Abraham Alon, Director of the International Department of the Histadrut, February 13, 1990. CZA/S110/21.
- (115) *JTA*, February 2, 1990.

CHAPTER VIII

U.S. LEADERSHIP

We have already seen how the activities organized in the United States around the resolution since the 1984 kick-off conference in Washington enhanced public awareness and induced both the U.S. Congress and the administration to take a clear stand on the issue. It would be years, however, before the U.S. deemed it the right time to act on that stand.

On December 30, 1986, Vernon Walters, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., sent a letter to the U.N. secretary general stating the U.S. position on Resolution 3379, including the full text of U.S. Congressional Joint Resolution 98. Walters requested that the letter be circulated as an official document of the GA. In the letter, the ambassador recalled that the U.S. considered the resolution a reflection of one of the darkest moments in the history of the U.N. He noted that it had been condemned by every administration since 1975 and had contributed greatly to the "apparent decline in support of the U.N. among Americans and their elected officials."

Walters also declared, "As we have stated and will continue to state, General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX) is an absurdity which serves only to encourage the ancient evil of anti-Semitism and seeks to deny the legitimacy of a Member State in good standing, Israel, in whose creation the U.N. played a major role. This resolution is a travesty of the avowed principles of the U.N. and brings only shame to the organization."¹

This was an unequivocal statement, but it was only a statement. It expressed the U.S. view on the ZR, but did not even hint at any action that the U.S. might initiate against it. In fact, as we have seen, there was no consensus on the course of action to be followed. It was possible to disregard it completely, to try to curb its effects, to prevent its mention and reiteration principally by procedural means, to erode its validity and legitimacy, or to consider its revocation. This debate, which had gone on in Israel since the very beginning of the campaign,² was now also going on in the United States³ with the same lack of resoluteness. The predominant view was that overturning 3379 was an unattainable achievement.

This pessimism was sharply disputed by Uzi Narkiss and Benjamin Netanyahu at a conference on "Israel, Zionism and the U.N." held in Los Angeles in September 1986. The conference was organized by the Jewish Federation of Los Angeles in cooperation with the Zionist Federation and the Information Department of the WZO, whose representative in the United

States, Kobi Leket, had initiated it. Leket had encountered a lot of resistance, in fact, and still had to work very hard to overcome the reservations of the leadership of the local Jewish community. The leaders feared that this initiative in defense of Zionism would not be welcomed and would even lead once again to the question of Jewish dual loyalty. They thus were surprised to discover that the conference attracted more than 700 prominent Jews and non-Jews to the Century Plaza Hotel and drew heavy media coverage, including a whole page in the *Los Angeles Times*. It was the first time since the Six Day War that the Jewish leadership had convened such a large gathering.


Yitzhak Rabin, then Israel's defense minister, agreed to take part and, in his remarks, seemed to deviate from his initial views that 3379 was significant and dangerous.

"I remember quite vividly the day that the resolution was passed in the United Nations," he said. "I served my country then as prime minister. . . . When the resolution was passed I felt a certain amount of anger, a real feeling of disgust, about an organization that could pass such a resolution. To describe Zionism, the liberation movement of the Jewish people. . . . as racist, goes beyond the understanding of any human being who has not lost his values, his senses and his simple way of thinking. Jews, who for thousands of years were persecuted because of their faith, should be described as racist?"

"I do not believe the resolution carried any weight," he continued. "It served as a landmark in the moral and political deterioration of the United Nations. If this organization could pass such a resolution, I believe, first and foremost, someone has to find out what really happened to this organization. Two-thirds of its members play democracy in voting in the United Nations, but by no means do they allow the slightest possibility of democracy in their own country. No free press, no free elections, but in the United Nations they have the right to vote."

"An organization intended to bring dialogue into the world," said Rabin, "to eliminate hatred, to encourage peace, has contributed nothing and contributes nothing, to any effort to bring about peace in the Middle East. . . . Their voice is never heard concerning peace or the elimination of terrorism in the region. Did you hear any condemnation by the United Nations about the two atrocities that took place in Karachi and Istanbul? No, these events passed unnoticed by the organization with the fake name of 'United Nations.' "

"Therefore, let us not bother about the efforts to bring about a change in this resolution because there is no one in the organization who can achieve anything. Since the passing of this resolution, I believe that we have made it clear that it will have no impact whatsoever on the purpose for which it was passed, to undermine Israel, to prevent its growth, to prevent real meaningful peace talks between Arab countries and Israel, to prevent effective measures to be taken against terrorism which served as an obstacle to peace."^{3a}



Keynote speakers at the conference, "Israel, Zionism and the United Nations," on September 17, 1986, at the Century Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles.

Top: the late Yitzhak Rabin, Minister of Defense, and Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations.

Rabin said the answer to the resolution was for the free and democratic world not to turn to the United Nations but to wage its own fight against terrorism and for world peace. "Let us commit ourselves to do everything to strengthen Israel, to support every effort to bring real peace, to the ending of war in the Middle East and to cope with terrorism in the Middle East and international terror. This would be the most effective answer to the resolution that would be better for the United Nations to forget."

But, Narkiss, for his part, said it was an obligation to try and repeal the resolution, and that it was possible. Indeed, as described below, in 1950 the GA reversed a recommendation in a formal resolution when it admitted Spain as a member.

"Although it is now recognized that, in theory at least, the GA could rescind one of its resolutions, should an appropriate majority be mustered, it is held that the GA would never agree to publicly recognise its mistake and reverse its stand on Zionism," Narkiss said. "The events in Nairobi are probably the best proof that this attitude will not work: the issue will not be shelved so simply. There is therefore no choice but to fight Resolution 3379 to the ground, until its final eradication."⁴

Netanyahu went several steps further. "It is certainly realistic for us to try and rescind the atrocious ZR resolution. . . . There have been several governments, more than a few, that have told us they would vote differently if a vote were to be taken now. While the outcome would be significantly different, I would not say at this point we could roll it back."⁵

REMAINING LOW ON ISRAEL'S AGENDA

Following this unexpected assessment from Israel's permanent representative to the U.N., the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem decided to check the possibility of repeal. After a consultation between the foreign minister's legal adviser and Netanyahu in Jerusalem on January 4, 1987, Lydia Chukrun, a deputy to the legal adviser, was asked to analyze the prospects of repeal. She was to proceed on the assumption that "with a special effort, it will be possible to muster a simple majority in our favor." She was also asked to propose the wording of a draft resolution based on the "Spain precedent."⁶

The Spain precedent referred to UNGA Resolution 386 (V) of 1950, which revoked a recommendation in a previous UNGA resolution (39 (I), 1946), stating that it was not proper to admit the Spain of Franco as a member in international organizations, and calling on all U.N. member states to recall their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid.

Chukrun noted that according to the rules of the General Assembly, it was not possible to annul one of its resolutions. However, from a legal point of view it was possible for the GA to pass a resolution which contravened a

previous one, thereby nullifying it. The only known precedent was the above-mentioned case of Spain.

Chukrun pointed to five features which characterized this precedent. First, an essential change in the international context. Second, a resolution which required a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple majority. Third, the readiness to repeat the move every four years. Fourth, the mobilization of U.S. and Western support, in spite of their abstention in the vote. Fifth, an explicit formulation of revocation.⁷

She did not mention it explicitly in her report, but Chukrun must have been mindful that the precedent could be used to act against the UNGA resolution which had recommended the partition of Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. She may therefore have been inclined to favor a less risky alternative.

As one such option, Chukrun suggested the passage of a resolution on racism and racial discrimination which ostensibly would not mention Zionism. It would model itself on the resolution adopted by UNESCO on November 27, 1978. This condemned apartheid as an extreme form of racism, and any discrimination based on race, color, ethnic and national belonging, religious intolerance, race, racial discrimination and colonialism. . . but it did not mention Zionism. The main flaw of this option, however, in Chukrun's eyes, was the possibility it would not be considered a revocation of 3379. Also, there was a risk of amendments that could twist the heart of the resolution by introducing completely alien elements to it.

Chukrun was not asked to rule in favor of a particular strategy. But her analysis made it clear that despite the risks, the first option remained the only one which could lead to an actual abrogation.

Chukrun's report was important because it seemed to have erased any residual doubts in the Foreign Ministry over whether rescinding an UNGA resolution was a "legal" option. Such doubts had routinely been invoked to question the *raison d'être* of the campaign and to discourage its efforts. This hackneyed objection was still in fashion in countries, especially in Europe, which rejected the ZR resolution but were not eager to support an abrogation initiative.⁸ It was actually the only argument by the acting chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community against taking an initiative to overturn the ZR.

The steering committee, which was not yet informed of the conclusions of the Chukrun Report, had raised the issue before the legal adviser of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, asking him to clarify whether there was a "procedure to annul a UNGA resolution or a procedure having the same effect,"⁹ since a well-argued legal position could help to convince the European Parliament to take an initiative. Professor Elihu Lauterpacht from Cambridge, a distinguished authority on international law, also was approached and asked for his advice.¹⁰

No answer came from the Foreign Ministry, though the issue had been examined at the beginning of the year and a clear-cut opinion had been rendered, at least on the issue's legal aspect. For his part, Lauterpacht very quickly sent an answer dismissing any suggestion it would be legally impossible to rescind the resolution. He stressed the sole issue was one of arithmetic.

"The proposition that the General Assembly of the U.N. is incapable of changing or even reversing a resolution previously adopted by it greatly surprises me," said Lauterpacht. "Indeed it is quite nonsense. If that were the case, any aspect of international relations that had been crystallized in the shape of a General Assembly resolution would be immobilized forever. There could be no change in the system. The idea is absurd. I imagine that if one had time one could find examples of resolutions which the General Assembly adopted in contradiction or modification of ones previously adopted."

"However, the problem is not really one of law but of arithmetic. Ultimately the question is, would it be possible to secure the necessary majority in the General Assembly? The resolution was adopted by 72-35-32. Is it yet possible to persuade something like 40 States additional to the 35 that originally opposed the resolution to change their position? If the answer is no, then the law does not matter."

"Of one thing I am certain, namely, that it would be very unfortunate if an attempt to reverse the resolution were to fail. An assessment of the situation requires some very delicate calculation, and little is likely to be influenced by the opinions of even the most eminent jurists."¹¹

In this context the Steering Committee decided to adopt Gideon Raphael's plan to prepare the text of a draft resolution which could be submitted to the UNGA. Raphael's idea was to try and find a formulation which would debase and debunk Resolution 3379 both without referring to it explicitly and without mentioning Zionism. His proposal read as follows:

"MINDFUL that the United Nations arose from the coalition of states which fought and subdued the scourge of Nazism,

RECALLING that the horrible Nazi crime against humanity constituted the realization of the despicable doctrine of Racism and anti-Semitism culminating in the Holocaust,

BEING DEEPLY CONCERNED by indications of a recurrence of anti-Jewish agitation in a number of countries and its increased vehemence disguised as a fight against racism,

The General Assembly rejects unequivocally all attempts to deflect the struggle of the U.N. against Racism by abusing the Jewish people, the principal victim of racism, its national movement for political ends alien to the fight against Racism.

The General Assembly, unified in its determination to combat all emanations of Racism, warns strongly against invoking racism in vain as a means of propaganda and political action inside and outside the U.N. intended to serve purposes unconnected with the fight against Racism, and calls upon all states to take effective measures against all forms of anti-Jewish agitation and incitement.

This could be viewed as an improved version of the second alternative considered in Lydia Chukrun's report. It only hinted at the ZR resolution. But by focusing on the damage inflicted on the cause of the fight against racism, it offered a real opportunity for the UNGA to distance itself from the ZR and to limit the introduction of irrelevant amendments thanks to its subtle formulation. Several officials at the Foreign Ministry reacted to the proposal not by discussing its merits and flaws, but by emphasizing that the conditions were not ripe for such a move at the coming UNGA and that it was premature to deal with it.¹²

The most interesting reaction came from Uri Savir, then director of the office of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. He expressed his agreement with Yehezkel Barnea, deputy general director for international organizations, who had recommended waiting until the conditions were ripe. But Barnea had also suggested laying the groundwork "for an ongoing information effort which has already been carried out by the WZO steering committee of the campaign against the defamation of Zionism and also by our representatives worldwide."¹³ Here, Savir was reluctant. He feared working for the repeal contributed to resurrecting the problem. "As long as there is no secured majority, it is desirable [in] my humble opinion to let this issue die its natural death,"¹⁴ Savir said.

Barnea stressed in a letter to Savir the importance of repealing 3379 and his subsequent recommendations to begin securing the necessary majority. He had been less optimistic in his assessment than Netanyahu, claiming that in spite of the modest recent improvement in Israel's standing at the U.N. (and among African States) "we do not have yet the capability of mustering enough votes for a formal change of the resolution."¹³ However this did not lead him to conclude that the campaign against the defamation of Zionism should be slowed down or stopped. Quite the contrary. In view of the damage that this resolution was causing, he believed it should be fought until it was rescinded.

The Savir reaction thus was confounding. He did not challenge the view that the ZR was a sort of "sword of Damocles" menacing Israel's legitimacy and that it had to be neutralized.¹⁵ But there were two possible reasons he preferred to overlook it.

First, repealing 3379 was assigned a far lower priority on Israel's diplomatic agenda than getting the peace process between Israel and its Arab

neighbors underway. It was at this time that Foreign Minister Peres was promoting the idea of an international conference under the sponsorship of the United States and USSR to provide the framework for direct and simultaneous negotiations between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Peres and Jordan's King Hussein had discussed such an international conference during their secret talks in London in March 1987 and had agreed on an eight-point formula. It is probable that in this context an initiative to overturn 3379 could have been perceived as an hindrance more than a help.

Second, the success in bringing about direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbours would inevitably contribute—and perhaps more than anything else—to enhancing Israel's international legitimacy, eventually paving the way for the formal abrogation of Resolution 3379, or at least rendering it “caduc,” or null and void.

HIGHER ON US AGENDA

Ironically, during this period the issue seemed higher on the policy agenda of the United States than in Israel. This was largely in response to the unabated concern coming from U.S. Jewish organizations and the U.S. Congress. A concise account of the administration's posture toward the resolution can be found in a letter of acknowledgement to Bernice Tannenbaum of a booklet she sent to President Reagan entitled, “An American Response to the U.N. Resolution equating Zionism with Racism.” The booklet was a compilation of the proclamations of forty-nine U.S. governors requesting the repeal of the ZR.

Anne Higgins, special assistant to the president and director of correspondence, responded in a letter on behalf of the president:

“Over the years, the United States and our friends at the United Nations have made some headway in blunting the pernicious influence of Resolution 3379 and in keeping its themes out of most U.N. resolutions. But the President and its administration do not believe that this is enough. While there is no way to undo the harm already done, the Reagan Administration has dissociated the United States from the activities of the U.N. Decades to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Because of these efforts, the resolution is rarely referred to in U.N. deliberations and is for many countries an embarrassing episode that is best forgotten.

“Let me assure you that the Reagan Administration will remain vigilant to opportunities to counteract, and eventually do away with, the libel of Resolution 3379.”¹⁶

The U.S. administration clearly held, then, that despite some success, the tactics used to limit the damage of Resolution 3379 were inadequate and it was willing to do more. It would seek to erase the libel at the propitious moment. The prospects for such a move at this time were not very bright, but no longer seemed impossible.

At the beginning of June 1987, Richard Shifter, U.S. undersecretary of state for human rights, ventured that the position of eight to ten African countries had to be changed to ensure the success of such a move. And he "did not reject the idea of trying to influence this change through their embassies in Washington."¹⁷

The interest of the U.S. Congress in this matter sprang not only from pressures on members by Jewish organizations, but from their own concern for the standing and the role of the U.N. The most militant in this respect was undoubtedly Senator Moynihan who had always argued that Resolution 3379 marked a decline in the fortunes and reputation of the U.N., which would not recover until it was removed.

In his celebrated speech of November 1975 in which he denounced the adoption of the infamous resolution, he had stressed that even more than the honor and legitimacy of the state of Israel was at stake. Indeed, on the line was the integrity "of that whole body of moral and legal precepts which we know as human rights."

In October 1987, on the eve of the first-ever official visit of an Israeli president to the United States, the New York senator initiated a new congressional resolution. It featured the exact wording of the Australian resolution which, as we well know, did not stop with a condemnation of 3379 but called for its overturn. In introducing the resolution the fiery senator referred to 3379 as "a horrendous and in a way a defining event. . . an epiphany as to the true nature of the totalitarian assault on democratic institutions."¹⁸ He pressed hard for action to be taken, suggesting a program and schedule so that within a year the necessary majority to invalidate Resolution 3379 would be secured at the United Nations.

Moynihan's assessment of the "arithmetic" was far more optimistic than Barnea's, for instance. He clearly was banking on U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, who "would very much like to see this blemish erased, this fundamental defect overcome." One of Perez de Cuellar's deputies, Brian Urquhart, was even more blunt several days later when he defined the ZR as "the stupidest thing anybody ever did at the U.N. . . . It seemed to me to be an absolutely mindless piece of provocation, and did nothing for the Palestinians, who were supposed to be the recipients of the goodwill."¹⁹ Second, he expressed his conviction that many countries would vote differently the next time around. "I cannot imagine that today Mexico, for example, would vote as it did on that occasion. There are now members who have no commitment to that action. Indeed, it is more than likely that the

votes can be got to overturn that resolution by formally declaring it to be invalid.”¹⁸

Moynihan was bold and original in his choice of strategy. He sought to put to the test the freedom and democracy of member states of the U.N. through “multilateral diplomacy. We have to get the votes in the GA as we have to get the votes on the floor of the U.S. Senate.” Declaring that the Australians had “led the way,” he urged that all such democratic congresses adopt the Australian resolution “word by word and send it round-robin, as you could say, from one democratic institution to another.” He noted the United States would be the second nation to adopt the Australian resolution. “Then look to Ottawa; look to Dublin, where Mr. Herzog has addressed the issue. Send it to Westminster; to Paris; to Rome; to Bonn; to The Hague; to New Delhi, which would consider the mistake the Indian Government made and surely regrets; to Singapore which was with us; to Japan which was with us; to other nations that ought to have been and were not. Let the countries of the world define themselves. Are they free and representative democracies or are they not?”

Moynihan expressed his confidence that the resolution would be unanimously adopted by the Congress and then approved by the president. “Then I think we could consider the availability of the parliamentary unions to send it to other democracies. We might then begin to concert our efforts in New York at the GA such that a year from now we would have the necessary votes to overturn the resolution.”¹⁸

As expected, his resolution was adopted unanimously by both houses of the Congress and approved by President Reagan, while his view that the U.S. should take the leadership in repealing the ZR resolution was supported by many in the U.S.

Several weeks after the president’s approval, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young, now the mayor of Atlanta, sent a letter to Evelyn Auerbach, the president of the Women’s League for Conservative Judaism. He wrote that the events which led to the Zionism-Racism Resolution in the U.N. General Assembly marked the beginning of the decline of the United Nations as a body of moral authority and political vision, and expressed the hope that “the United States will take the lead in repealing this onerous resolution. . . . Repeal of the Racism-Zionism Resolution would go a long way toward restoring the moral authority of the United Nations and the partnership of the United States in the continuing search for peace, especially in the Middle East.”²⁰

In spite of the overwhelming support, Moynihan’s plan of action remained a dead letter. No other parliaments adopted resolutions with the Australian wording, and to our knowledge the parliamentary unions were not involved in pushing for the adoption of identical resolutions by democratic countries. Was it because of a lack of leadership? Was it because the move

was discouraged or at least not encouraged by both the Israeli and U.S. administrations? Or was it because of the eruption of the Palestinian "Intifada" at the beginning of December 1987, which gripped public attention and weakened interest in overturning the ZR? In the absence of documentation it is difficult to answer to these questions with certainty.

But John H. Sununu, the governor of New Hampshire, provided some clues. Of Lebanese origin, Sununu was a longtime active member of the NAAA, the National Association of Arab Americans, considered by some to be a pro-PLO lobby. He had also been the co-chairman of Bush's national presidential campaign and Bush's point man in drafting the GOP's 1988 strongly pro-Israel party platform which, among other things, called for the reversal of the U.N.'s ZR resolution. He indicated that "he supported [this platform] plank as he supported the entire platform."²¹

But Sununu had been the only governor who refused to sign a proclamation calling for the abrogation of Resolution 3379. In explaining why he did not sign it, Sununu had offered some weak arguments, including a so-called lack of interest in foreign affairs. He ultimately confessed that signing it would have "destroyed his credibility" in the quiet role he had played in Middle East diplomacy in the Reagan administration and expected to continue playing in the Bush government.²¹ Perhaps the U.S. administration nurtured similar reservations with regard to Moynihan's plan.

A substitute for Moynihan's plan was being considered by the steering committee. It called for a delegation of three to four prominent international figures such as Moynihan, Lacalle and Hawke to tour the capitals of several countries to convince their Parliaments to adopt the text of the Australian resolution. But this did not materialize either, mainly for budgetary reasons.²²

For almost an entire year the issue lay dormant. Then at the end of September 1988, Richard Williamson, assistant secretary of state for international organizations, appeared before the Presidents Conference of Major American Jewish Organizations and expressed very firmly his belief in the possibility of rescinding 3379. Williamson emphasized that the issue had remained high on the U.S. agenda. He pledged to "maintain our efforts, working with like-minded friends, to lay the groundwork for the eventual repeal of this shameful resolution. We realize that a vote in the General Assembly to overturn Resolution 3379 will require sustained commitment and we are prepared to make such a commitment."²⁴

Williamson's remarks renewed the determination of U.S. Jewish leaders to take appropriate steps.²³ In response to a request for guidance, he offered them a list of twenty-one countries where he believed action could bear fruit. It was divided into two categories. In category A, he included nine countries which voted against the resolution and "would likely be most concerned with achieving its repeal:" Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Ivory Coast,

Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, Uruguay. In a second category he referred to twelve countries which, "despite having either voted for the resolution or having abstained, might now be susceptible to a change in position and which themselves are influential at the UN:" Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Kenya, Mexico, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

In an article published several months later entitled, "Serpents in the U.N.," Williamson reiterated the message. He wrote of the need to take on the ZR resolution in light of the successful challenge by the U.S. of the double standard which had pervaded the U.N. under the whip of the Soviet Union and its Arab allies.

"Thanks to the concerted and conscientious efforts of U.S. ambassadors to the U.N., Moyhihan, Kirkpatrick and Walters, the 'kick-me' sign has now been taken off the back of the U.S. representatives to the U.N.," Williamson wrote. "We have successfully challenged the pervasive double standard by confronting serious human rights abuses."

"Earlier this year the U.S. won a significant victory in persuading the U.N. to investigate the human rights situation in Cuba," he continued. "The U.S. must now concentrate on building upon these successes by tackling one of the most egregious examples of bias within the U.N. In seeking to bring about a repudiation of the 'Zionism is Racism' formula, we will have to adopt a subtle and tenacious strategy that will utilize the full panoply of U.S. diplomatic assets. African countries which have little direct interest in the Middle East political equation should be targeted."²⁵

For Williamson, then, the drive for active U.S. efforts to repudiate 3379 was the drive to restore the integrity of the U.N. and to enable it to play its proper role in world affairs. In this respect Williamson was pursuing the policies of most U.S. ambassadors to the U.N., not only Moynihan, Kirkpatrick and Walters, but also Young and Lowenstein. Williamson called for the exploitation of the U.N. successes already achieved, highlighting the importance of bipartisan support from the U.S. Congress. "In the case of the odious 'Zionism is Racism' formula, the strong opinion of the Congress is on record," he noted, referring to the 1987 congressional joint resolution. The interest and support of Congress "always strengthens the hand of Administration foreign policy initiatives because the role of Congress in setting foreign aid levels is well understood in the developing world. It also helps to establish the broad-based support for an initiative in the minds of some who would otherwise doubt the seriousness or steadfastness of resolve on the part of the Administration."

Successful multilateral diplomacy requires the support and involvement of the president and other top administration officials, he continued. "President-elect Bush has to make a commitment to overturning the 'Zionism is Racism' proposition. He should be prepared to personally weigh in with the

heads of state of countries which we will attempt to enlist to support our effort. Presidential interest and involvement also is essential in mobilizing the full commitment of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy."²⁵

In 1989, the new Bush-Baker Administration appointed John Bolton to replace Williamson. But the latter's appeal for direct and active involvement by the highest U.S. echelon seemed, at least on the face of it, to have been heard. Just several days after Israel's peace initiative of May 14, 1989, James Baker addressed AIPAC. While he did not express any U.S. commitment to take action to repeal 3379, he surprisingly called on the Arab countries to take measures to spur the peace process forward. He suggested ending the economic boycott against Israel and stopping protests against Israel's position in the U.N., including a "retreat from the odious ZR."²⁶

Baker's move was extraordinary. He put the onus on the Arab states to take sensitive, even taboo, steps to signal Israel it was serious about the peace process. But he also left completely open the form that such a signal might take. At the same time, the administration did not seem willing at this juncture to lead a move to overturn the ZR resolution. Smoothing the path for the peace process clearly took precedence over other considerations such as erasing the ZR libel and restoring the integrity of the U.N.

Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., told the Presidents' Conference of Major American Jewish Organizations on May 1, 1989, that the U.S. wanted to change the resolution. But he stressed it was unwise to hurry since what counted were the votes, and a vote should not be brought until there was enough support to overturn 3379. In his judgment, the time clearly had not come. At the same time he viewed overturning the resolution as both a challenge and test for the U.N. to show it was not prejudiced against Israel. He hence favored the passage of more parliamentary resolutions.²⁷

It is difficult to judge the sincerity and accuracy of the determination that there were not enough votes to risk proposing a draft resolution revoking 3379. We have seen arguments that passage was possible but depended greatly on active U.S. involvement. Especially in light of the changing international climate, the decisive factor likely was not the number of votes already in favor of overturning the ZR, but the U.S. commitment to take an active lead in this endeavor.

At the beginning of 1989, during the first months of the new Bush Administration, there was not yet such a commitment. John Bolton, the new top administration official for the U.N., was vague when asked about getting the PLO and the Arab states to help rescind Resolution 3379. Of course he expressed his sympathy for the goal, but he evaded specifics by addressing the timing of such an effort: "I would say at this point we're looking at it actively, but we need a better tactical assesment of the lay of the land."²⁸ By contrast, during the same period the U.S. administration was successful in

undermining the PLO's new strategy to elevate its status from an observer-member to a member state at the U.N. and the U.N.'s agencies. The PLO did not meet the legal and political requirements necessary to enjoy such a status. At the same time, granting U.N. legitimacy to a unilateral act of Palestinian statehood could jeopardize the efforts to find an agreed-upon formula enabling direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors.²⁹

A CONVENIENT GRIEVANCE

At this juncture there was a noteworthy development in the policy of Israel's Foreign Ministry with regard to the resolution. As we have seen, the Ministry had adopted a low-key approach until the middle of 1989. The passage of parliamentary resolutions was encouraged, but there was no plan to propose in the UNGA a rescinding draft resolution. The encouragement therefore functioned more as a safety valve than as groundwork for an abrogation move, as was claimed.

In April 1989 this was confirmed at a meeting of the steering committee. Most of the participants, but notably the representatives of the Foreign Ministry, recommended no action in the U.N. Assembly that year, since "we were not sure to win."³⁰ In practical terms it was decided at this meeting to have a working team which included people from the Foreign Ministry "to research and pinpoint these countries where it will be relevant to place our energies in order to effect a change."³⁰

Several months later, in August 1989, there was a slight but significant change in this policy. It was adopted after a meeting convened by Yechezkel Barnea, deputy director general for international affairs, to discuss the recommendations in a report by David Sasson. Sasson was deputy director general in the Foreign Ministry in charge of special tasks and responsible for this issue. His report was based on an assessment provided by the Ministry's territorial desks.³¹

Sasson put forward two options. The first one was to propose a draft resolution in the UNGA. The second was to pursue ongoing activities more forcefully to keep the issue on the agenda. Sasson was clearly in favor of the second alternative given the lukewarm reports coming from Israel's embassies as well as from American diplomats. Barnea also favored the second option. At the same time, however, he responded sympathetically to the suggestion, once made by former U.S. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, that in spite of the dim prospects for passage, Israel should raise the issue every year so it could count its real friends.

Different plans of action were considered in addition to the passage of parliamentary resolutions. One was asking foreign ministers to raise the issue in their traditional addresses during the opening session of the UNGA.

Another was having petitions signed by well known people calling for the repeal in countries where parliamentary resolutions were not available, and another was turning to the speaker of the Knesset to raise this issue systematically with every parliamentary delegation visiting Israel.

Ten countries were pinpointed: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, New Zealand, Canada, France and the Philippines. It was also decided to prepare a memo summing up the major reasons for calling for the abrogation of the ZR, to make the case before policy makers, diplomats, journalists and other public opinion makers.³²

All of this was an unmistakable indication of renewed interest in tackling the issue. Indeed, the clearest signal was the suggestion at the Barnea meeting to set up a small operational unit in the Foreign Ministry and an international public committee to implement all the activities. This committee would be headed by a well known non-Israeli, who might be joined by an Israeli co-chairman, such as the Israeli president or a High Court judge, and steer national committees in different countries.³¹

This renewed interest in fighting the ZR seemed to have been inspired by Deputy Foreign Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. Some assumed it was for his personal political gain. More probably it was to further Israel's view of the proper framework for direct negotiations with its Arab neighbors. Shamir, Arens and Netanyahu saw the ZR as a grievance that could be used as leverage, notably in the light of Baker's appeal to the Arabs to "retreat from the ZR." They reasoned it could help both to prevent the participation of the U.N. in a negotiating framework and to press for direct and individual parallel negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The U.S. Congress strongly backed this position, as illustrated in the provisions introduced by the House/Senate conference committee on November 7, 1989, in the Fiscal Year 90/91 State Department Authorization Bill, to help advance the Middle East peace process.

One of these provisions stated that the UNGA ZR resolution "damages the credibility of the General Assembly as a forum for furthering the search for peace in the Middle East. . . the U.S. does not favor an international peace conference at this time and believes that the Israeli proposal for elections. . . is the best available vehicle for furthering the Middle East peace process." It also called on the United States to use "all appropriate means to obtain rescission of the General Assembly resolution and that as long as the resolution remains in effect the General Assembly and all affiliated agencies of the U.N. constitute an inappropriate forum for the sponsorship of any international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict."³³

In deciding how to respond to these developments, Uzi Narkiss, chairman of the steering committee, considered turning to Foreign Minister Moshe Arens. He thought to remind him that, contrary to some innuendos coming from the Foreign Ministry, not much had been done for fourteen years to

erase Resolution 3379. Indeed, it was actually the Foreign Ministry which for a long time had been reluctant to take up the issue. And, it was thanks only to the persistence of the WZO that it had changed its stand, agreed to support the campaign and take an active part in the steering committee.

In the draft letter that he contemplated sending to Arens, Narkiss recognized that during the last two years there had been a slow-down in the campaign. He noted both the poor timing in light of the intensifying Intifada and the severe budget constraints which limited the resources allocated to the fight against 3379. But now that the international climate was improving, he said, the time had come to resurrect a large, systematic and energetic campaign to bring about the abrogation of Resolution 3379, and to combine this activity with Israel's efforts to promote the peace process.³⁴

Actually Narkiss was reiterating a concern already conveyed formally to the government via "The Interministerial Antisemitism Monitoring Forum" headed by the secretary of the cabinet, Elyakim Rubinstein. This said that "within the framework of the process to further political negotiations between Israel and the Arab world, one should not forget this issue, both to further and stimulate the political process and to achieve this goal thanks to it."³⁵

Narkiss decided finally not to send this letter, and instead to convene a special meeting of the steering committee on November 7, 1989. At this meeting he reviewed the background for the establishment in 1984 of the committee under his chairmanship and the results already achieved by the international campaign. He pointed to the better international climate, with the renewal of diplomatic relations between Israel and countries from Eastern Europe and Africa, and the unprecedented number of countries³⁵ which that year had opposed the usual Arab maneuver denying Israel's credentials at the U.N. The time was indeed ripe for forceful actions to repeal the ZR, he said.

Narkiss also mentioned other positive developments such as the Vatican Document on the "Church and Racism: Towards a more Fraternal Society," which in its reference to anti-Semitism noted that "Anti-Zionism—which is not of the same order, since it questions the State of Israel and its policies—serves at times as a screen for anti-Semitism, feeding on it and leading to it."³⁶

He also noted a stunning declaration from the political counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in London, Alexander Golitsyn, as a possible omen of a fundamental change in Soviet policy. In reply to a question by Stephen Roth, chairman of the British Zionist Federation, Golitsyn had said that "the condemnation of Zionism as racism was part of the ideological war of the time when everything relating to Israel was presented in the Soviet Union in an unfavourable light. If we recognise the State of Israel which brings in Jews from the four corners of the world, we must also recognise the ideological movement on which it is founded."³⁷

David Sasson, one of the Foreign Ministry representatives in the steering committee, was skeptical about this Soviet declaration. Israel's embassies were not reporting any significant positive change, he said, a finding which was corroborated by the State Department. Moreover, he reported, only the Italian foreign minister had followed Israel's suggestion to raise the issue in his address to the last UNGA. He balanced this rather gloomy picture by pointing to the conclusion of a recent debate at the Foreign Ministry that Resolution 3379 could be used as a convenient grievance by Israel in the context of the peace process. Nevertheless, he said there was no sense in raising this issue in bodies dealing with human rights since any success with regard to 3379 would have to be paid for with Israeli concessions.³⁷

Several members of the steering committee disagreed. Chana Elroi, for instance, had for ten years been a representative of WIZO in international bodies and fora. She believed the ZR had to be fought relentlessly and testified to the positive influence the success in Nairobi had had on the behavior of NGO representatives who from then on ostensibly refrained from linking Zionism with racism. Yehiel Leket, chairman of the World Labour Zionist Movement, went even further, arguing that the negative influence of the ZR was so great on the younger generation, including Israelis(!), that it was worth getting the resolution's retraction even at the price of having Israel criticized for its activities in the territories.³⁸

Dov Puder, the representative of MAPAM in the Zionist Executive, observed that while the Foreign Ministry might have had its reasons for not dealing directly with this issue, other entities could do so. Uzi Narkiss concluded the meeting with the observation that the WZO was not the government, but was at the disposal of the state "and could be used when the state could not act." He urged the committee to try new avenues to develop the campaign.³⁹

ACTIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT

The U.S. administration then seemed to decide to step up its role. It would no longer confine itself to granting sympathy and support to the repeal of the ZR resolution, but would take the lead in achieving it. Two main considerations were behind this change. First, the United States wanted to create a favorable atmosphere around the nascent peace process to encourage Israel to move ahead and to lift its resolute opposition to any involvement of the United Nations. Second, the United States was determined to put the Soviet Union to the test and check whether it had truly given up its former policy regarding international politics in general and the U.N. in particular.

The first expression of such a change came to the fore in a notable speech by U.S. Vice President Dan Quayle at New York's Yeshiva University for International Human Rights Day on December 11, 1989.

“Today both the strength of the truth, and the weakness of falsehood, are evident around the world,” Quayle said. *“In Warsaw and in Bucharest, in Santiago and in Seoul, in Berlin and in Prague—men and women of all races and religions are casting off falsehoods, are speaking out for the truth.*

“In word and deed, they are demonstrating that one way of life really is preferable to all others. It is a way of life characterized by free elections; by pluralism and free enterprise; and by equality of concern for every human being. In short, this political, social and moral way of life is known as democracy. . .

“Unfortunately, not every government in the world supports democracy. Sometimes, their opposition to democratic values and ideals is explicit and direct. More often than not, our opponents dare not challenge us outright. They prefer to achieve their aims indirectly, by distorting, undermining and hijacking the very words with which we speak of human rights. . . In recent times, no attempt to distort the meaning of language has been more blatant, more shameful, and more shocking than the infamous General Assembly Resolution of November 10, 1975, equating Zionism with Racism.”⁴⁰

Quayle claimed that the goals of this resolution had not been realized, namely the delegitimization of Israel, laying the ground for its expulsion from the U.N., and winning international respectability for anti-Semitism in the guise of anti-Zionism. Instead, the major “achievement” of this resolution had been to seriously undermine “the moral authority and credibility of the U.N. itself.”

One might argue with the vice president’s dismissal of the resolution’s effectiveness, especially his belief it did not succeed in lending respectability to anti-Semitism. [*New York Times* columnist A.M. Rosenthal challenged this view.⁴¹] But no one could doubt the very negative impact of the ZR on the U.N. and the betrayal of its charter’s ideals. The United Nations “can never fulfill the dreams of its founders until it regains its reputation for moral integrity,” Quayle said. “Rescinding the Zionism-is-Racism [resolution] would be a major step in that direction.”⁴⁰

The vice president then referred to the new thinking emerging in the Soviet Union. He cited Mikhail Gorbachev’s desire to have the U.N. play a “more central role in world affairs” and the historic resolution in the General Assembly co-sponsored by the USSR and the United States calling all member states to respect the principles set forth in the U.N. Charter.

And he made a thunderous suggestion. “I would like to use this occasion, and this forum, to issue a call,” declared Quayle. On behalf of the U.S.

government, "I call on the Soviet Union and other nations to join us in co-sponsoring a second resolution in the General Assembly. That resolution will affirm that Zionism is what Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko rightly called it back in 1948: the National Liberation Movement of the Jewish people. This resolution would state that Zionism is not, and never has been a form of racism, and would have the Zionism-is-Racism declared null and void. And this resolution would promote, and not set back the prospects for peace in the Middle East by focusing on the real issues in dispute, not on Israel's right to exist."⁴⁰

The official reaction of the USSR was disappointing. Its U.N. representative, Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, rejected Quayle's call in a press conference, labeling the repeal movement as a divisive plan which would just cause trouble. "We have no need for such kind of thing," he said.⁴² It was clear that, in spite of Glasnost, the Soviet government was still clinging to its traditional anti-Zionist stand⁴³ as illustrated by a declaration from the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry that "the USSR was supporting the UNGA resolution defining Zionism as Racism" as well as by a statement issued in early August 1989 by the "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public." *Pravda*, the organ of the Communist Party, responded with a blistering verbal assault which included the charge that Zionism was racism, based on an explicit reference to the U.N. resolution, after a Jewish group in Moscow had announced the formation of a "Zionist Union."⁴⁴

The disappointment followed a series of promising Soviet actions and declarations over the previous months hinting at a possible shift in the quasi-axiomatic Soviet anti-Zionism. We have already mentioned the Alexander Golitsyn declaration. There was also the unusual publication in the Soviet press of two articles by Mikhael Agursky in which he had explained that Zionism was the National Liberation Movement of the Jewish people. Vladimir Nosiemko, a specialist on Israel at the Institute for International Economic Relations in Moscow, had also expressed the same view on Zionism at a public political meeting attended by more than 2,000 people in Moscow in June 1989.⁴⁵ And several weeks later, one of the leaders of the Politburo, Alexander Yakovlev, had upheld the rather heretical view that "Zionism was a domestic Jewish issue."⁴⁶ Another encouraging sign was found in the fact that the International Congress of Writers in Moscow in July 1989 did not adopt a draft resolution condemning Zionism, due primarily to the intercession of two Israeli writers, Nathan Zakh and Emil Habibi, but also due to the non-militant attitude of the Soviet delegates.

In addition, Dr. Yuri Reshetov, an official in charge of the humanitarian affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, had confided to Australian diplomats that, "if a majority of U.N. members were in favor of such a resolution to overturn 3379, the USSR would probably be able to go along."⁴⁶ Nonetheless, he ventured it would be better if no attempt were

made to put forward such a resolution since the basic problem of definition, which arose when 3379 was first adopted, remained.⁴⁶ In other words, "if Zionism was the love and desire for a homeland, the equation was unjust, wrong and absurd. But if Zionism was Israeli practices in occupied territories, then the Arab view was understandable. Agreement on a draft resolution to reflect this definitional problem would be difficult to obtain. Because the Intifada continued, Israeli practices were still very much an issue in the U.N., and there was yet no sign of progress on the overall issue."⁴⁶

What was more surprising was the lukewarm response to Quayle's appeal from many Western democratic countries which held that the repeal was impossible without a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process. They also feared that the U.S. Congress would engineer a confrontation with the United Nations the following year by threatening to withhold funds unless the Assembly cancelled the Zionism⁴⁷ resolution. UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had reacted skeptically to Dan Quayle's appeal by arguing that the necessary majority would be secured only if the repeal offered some substantial quid pro quo to the Arab side.⁴⁸

This completely twisted the fundamental notion of righting a wrong and set aside the objective of restoring the U.N.'s integrity and role. There was also the shocking statement at the beginning of January 1990 by Claude Cheysson, former French foreign minister in the first socialist government under Francois Mitterand. He said he never suggested supporting Zionism, "which I abhor. I see it as the most grave danger to Israel. I totally reject it."⁴⁹

Israel's reaction to the Quayle proposal was also rather puzzling. Israel seemed to have been surprised by the move and to have harbored very serious doubts about its authenticity and whether the United States was determined to take the lead. The matter was raised at a meeting convened at the Foreign Ministry on January 10, 1990 by Yechezkel Barnea. According to Neville Mandel, the head of the North American desk, Quayle's declaration was not necessarily a commitment by President Bush and the matter had to be checked. On the other hand, he gave more weight to the view expressed by Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Although he favored a rapid move to abrogate the resolution, he seemed to have conditioned it on securing the cooperation of the USSR, not very logical reasoning after the Petrovsky press conference.⁵⁰

Barnea suggested three possible alternatives: a resolution overturning the ZR according to the Spain precedent, a resolution stating the opposite of the ZR, and a reference to the overturn of the ZR in a resolution dealing with a different subject such as racial discrimination. The first alternative was obviously best, since it did not allow for undesirable amendments. According to the most updated information, only fifty countries would vote in favor of a repeal, while at least seventy-five were needed to overturn 3379. Therefore

Israel would not take the risk of such a move without being sure of securing at least seventy-five votes, especially in view of the fact that Resolution 3379 could be used as leverage against the U.N. and its bias against Israel, and could bar the U.N.'s involvement in the peace negotiation formula.⁵¹

Moreover, according to Barnea, Israel would not involve itself in the move if it would have to pay a political price for it. If it was impossible to secure a simple majority, the campaign would have to go on getting parliamentary resolutions as well as declarations from foreign ministers at the U.N. or elsewhere.⁵² Manor claimed that the count was being distorted since many countries would not disclose what their actual position would be as long as they were not faced with a formal move. But this was discounted,⁵³ and the main effort was focused on checking the position of the United States.

Whether Quayle's declaration reflected the actual determination of President Bush and his administration was addressed briefly at an unusual meeting held in Jerusalem on February 23, 1990, between the leaders of the three international Jewish bodies which had kicked off the campaign in the United States: the WZO, the WJC and BBI.⁵⁴ They unanimously decided there was no need to check the U.S. position, since it was clear and there was no sense in raising "superfluous questions" about the link between the U.S. position and the promotion of the peace process.⁵⁵

The answer came several weeks later at the beginning of March from the Americans themselves in the form of a stunning declaration from the U.S. representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Ambassador Morris Abram. Abram defined Zionism in the modern era as "the name for the national movement of the Jewish people that gave political expression to these ancient stirrings."⁵⁶ He stressed that Zionism was more than an expression of ethnic pride of an oppressed people striving for the same rights as any other.

"The mother of my five children, herself not born a Jew, captured the essence of the link between Judaism and Zionism when we were together at Nuremberg in 1946, when Goering, Ribbentrop and Speer stood in the dock," he said. "Upon seeing the remnants of Hitler's camps straggling through Germany, unwanted anywhere except by their own people in Palestine, she turned to me and said: 'A Jew is either a Zionist or he has no heart.'" ⁵⁶ Abram underlined that Zionism and racism were total contradictions and that whatever its failings, the modern State of Israel could not be branded as racist. He then suggested the U.N. Human Rights Commission "call upon the General Assembly to erase the lie that taints the organization just as surely as the segregation of my youth tainted the American Democracy."⁵⁶

Perhaps this cannot be strictly defined as "the opening of a U.S. campaign to rescind the 1975 resolution equating Zionist with racism," as described by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency. But there was no doubt that Abram's appeal could be viewed as a formal and official move in this direction. An official at

the Israeli Foreign Ministry claimed that Israel did not know of such a U.S. campaign, despite the close and ongoing cooperation with the State Department. The Israeli official ascribed this move to the growing pressure exerted by the U.S. Congress on the administration. Consequently the U.S. administration was willing to raise the issue at the U.N., though at this stage Israel was not interested in doing so. For the time being, its policy favored getting additional parliamentary resolutions and declarations from foreign ministers.⁵⁷

Indeed, the U.S. Congress did not relax its pressure on the administration. A public hearing was held on a Senate Joint Resolution 246 at the initiative of both Sen. Moynihan, chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asian Affairs, and his colleague, Sen. Rudy Boschwitz. Introduced by Boschwitz and 50 co-sponsors, this resolution called on the U.N. member-states to repeal the ZR and requested the U.S. president to report periodically on progress toward repeal.

Several U.S. Jewish leaders such as Seymour Reich, chairman of the Conference of Presidents, Kenneth Bialkin, president of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York, and Burton Joseph, the honorary chairman of the ADL, were invited to testify before the committee. Reich quoted the British critic, Goronowy Rees, when the Third Committee of the General Assembly was about to approve the "incendiary resolution," on October 17, 1975. "There were ghosts haunting the Third Committee that day; the ghosts of Hitler and Goebbels and Julius Streicher, grinning with delight, to hear not only Israel but Jews as such denounced in language which would have provoked hysterical applause at any Nuremberg rally. . ."

Reich told the subcommittee that it was time to exorcise these ghosts and revoke the odious lie. "The abomination" should be ended and "the supreme act of deceit" repealed. If the U.N. was to effectively assume a meaningful role in advancing peaceful settlement of disputes in the Middle East and in combating bigotry and hatred, it was obliged to remove the resolution which morally stained its image and severely damaged its credibility, he said.⁵⁸ Bialkin emphasized that the ZR embodied not a fear of Jewish settlements in the territories, but a hatred of Jews.⁵⁹

John Bolton, an assistant secretary of state, recalled that all U.S. administrations since 1975 had regarded the ZR as a fundamental contradiction in terms and a violation of U.N. principles. Now, he said, the administration was actively seeking to overturn it. "Political Zionism is the lawful embodiment of the Jewish national movement that was recognized when the U.N. established the modern state of Israel. The GA cannot validly adopt contradictory resolution such as this."⁶⁰

Bolton then went on to devote almost half of his testimony to reviewing successful U.S. moves to thwart the PLO's attempts to elevate its status at the U.N. and its special agencies from observer to the approximation of a mem-

ber state. The U.S. had a clear-cut stand that "any enhancement of PLO status in an international organization would [result in] the complete termination of U.S. funding for that organization."⁶¹

Bolton then gave an optimistic assessment of the prospects of overturning Resolution 3379. He observed that an analysis of the enormous changes that had been taking place in Eastern Europe and in Latin America led the administration to believe that the time "was ripe to consider whether we and other like-minded governments should attempt to nullify Zionism is racism."⁶² He reminded the senators that Israel stood "unreservedly" for the repeal of the ZR, but that at the same time, wanted to be certain that any effort to reverse the resolution would succeed comfortably. Securing a "moral victory" by almost nullifying the resolution would not be a satisfactory solution in Israel's eyes, even if the number of votes in support of the repeal would be substantially higher than in 1975.

Bolton then explained the U.S. had begun to explore diplomatically the various strategies for repeal. First, he said there were consultations with the thirty-five countries that joined the U.S. in opposing the resolution in 1975 to urge their support for repeal and solicit their views on strategy and timing. "Although we have not finished our consultations," he said, "we have detected no shifts away from the position taken in 1975."

Bolton said the U.S. was also consulting with countries which originally voted for the resolution, but which subsequently "acquired new governments and new thinking. Once again, our consultations are far from over, but we have seen substantial evidence of shifts of opinion." The administration, he continued, was also consulting with the twenty-nine countries which either abstained or were absent in 1975, or which joined the U.N. after that date. And, finally, he said, there were consultations taking place with Arab governments.

At such an early date, Bolton cautioned, "predictions would be uncertain at best." But he said there were "distinct signs of movement by several governments which originally voted in favor of Resolution 3379 to positions either opposing the concept that Zionism is racism or at least likely abstaining in a vote. Among the countries which abstained, did not vote, or were not members of the U.N. in 1975, we have seen similar movement toward supporting the resolution. Finally, as noted above, the thirty-five nations which courageously opposed Resolution 3379 in 1975 appear to be remaining steadfast."⁶³

Bolton said he still viewed the USSR as having a "pivotal potential role." At the same time, he expressed his disappointment that the positive change in the Soviet stance toward the U.N. and its promising cooperation with the U.S. did not extend to cooperation in a repeal of 3379. "Nonetheless, our dialogue with the Soviet Union continues, and they have had questions that encourage us to pursue this matter further. The Soviets have assured us that

the resolution represents a concept that is no longer acceptable according to the new political thinking in the Soviet Union."⁶⁴

Bolton clearly wanted to impress upon the subcommittee that the administration was seeking actively but cautiously to overturn the ZR.⁶⁵ But he was met with heavy-handed skepticism by the subcommittee, especially by Chairman Moynihan, who was infuriated by Bolton's apparent self-satisfaction. Moynihan criticized the State Department for its lack of energy in fighting the resolution and said that he wanted to see more action against it. "The West imposed no consequences of any kind on those nations that associated *themselves with this filthy proposition of the Soviet Union*."⁶⁶ He added that he would like to see the U.S. cut off assistance to countries which supported the resolution, asking how many of them received and were still receiving U.S. aid.

Bolton replied that of the seventy-two which had voted in favor of resolution 3379, a clear majority at that point received U.S. aid, and probably still did.

Moynihan continued pushing his point. "Did we ever tell one country, just one country, that you are getting American money, and you are not getting it anymore until you change your mind?"

On the defensive, Bolton tried to sketch a more balanced picture of the administration's action: "I don't know that any country's ever been told that, Senator, but I guess if I could leave one message with the committee here today, it is that the Bush Administration is most serious about having this resolution repealed."

But Moynihan did not content himself with these assurances. He said he would hold the record open for a list of aid recipients, and wondered whether these countries understood their aid was in jeopardy. "Mr. Secretary, this is the message we would like you to take back," he said. "We don't like that resolution one damn bit. We feel it is a residue of a Stalinist, totalitarian Soviet Union. . . and they lost. Do they know that we don't like it?"

"We are making it abundantly clear, Mr. Chairman, in our consultations in capitals," Bolton replied. . . . As we move closer to the opening of the Forty-Fifth General Assembly, we will be making an even broader circle of consultations, looking to see if the votes are not there to rescind that resolution. . . If the time looks right, we 'll do it this fall."⁶⁷

But the strong pressure exerted by the subcommittee and its fiery chairman failed to extract from Bolton a clear commitment to act more aggressively and to deviate from the "consultation" pattern. Bolton's mention of the fall was wrapped in such obvious qualification, the administration was left with a completely free hand.

Nevertheless, the administration now knew that it would be under the close scrutiny of the Congress. It would be expected to display its accomplishments, not only its assurances that it was working actively for the

repeal and releasing emotional declarations. At a congressional seder for Soviet Jews, Quayle had stated that the U.N. ZR resolution was "a modern-day version of Christian blood libel."⁶⁸

Joint Resolution S. 246 was not only adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also officially endorsed by President Bush on June 29, 1990:

"I have today signed S.J. Res. 246, a joint resolution of Congress calling upon the United Nations to repeal General Assembly Resolution 3379 which declared Zionism to be a form of racism and racial discrimination. S.J. Res. 246 requests the President to report periodically to the Congress on progress made to repeal the resolution.

"The United States vigorously opposed the 1975 adoption of the pernicious proposition, in UNGA Resolution 3379, that Zionism is a form of racism. We continue to work actively for its renunciation. It is long overdue that all the member states of the U.N. join us in renouncing UNGA Resolution 3379.

"For these reasons, I wholly agree with the sentiments underlying this congressional repudiation of a totally counterproductive UNGA resolution. By signing S.J. Res. 246, I add full endorsement as President of the United States, and the person charged by the Constitution with maintaining the foreign relations of this nation, to this otherwise non-binding expression of congressional sentiment."⁶⁹

Notably, Bush saw fit to add to this statement on the ZR repeal a paragraph on the U.S. commitment to promote peace in the Middle East.

"At this time, I also want to reaffirm U.S. determination to pursue efforts toward a comprehensive, just and lasting Middle East peace. In our view this peace must be achieved on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territories for peace. It must provide for Israel's security and recognition and for Palestinian political rights. We strongly hope that Israelis, Palestinians and the Arab states will take the necessary steps to create an environment in which a viable peace can thrive."

Of course, the U.S. administration never claimed that there was a link between the resolution and the peace process, and even less so that the chance of effecting the repeal was dependent on starting up the peace process. The administration, notably Secretary of State James Baker, seemed until now to view it the other way around. They saw it as some kind of confidence-build-

ing contribution by the Arab states which would signal their genuine willingness to enter into a peace process with Israel.

Now, President Bush's statement for the first time seemed to point to some clear connection between the two issues, a connection which, in spite of all denials, could very quickly turn into an implicit condition. In this context, it is illuminating to look at Bush's response to a letter from Bernice Tannenbaum praising him for his endorsement of S.J. Res. 246. William R. Brew, director of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs at the State Department, was asked to reply to her. He thanked Tannenbaum for her support and went on to devote one-third of his answer to reiterate, word for word, the passage included in the Bush statement on the promotion of peace in the Middle East. It was clear he wanted to ensure that U.S. policy would be fully grasped by those who had been in the forefront of the campaign to overturn 3379.⁷⁰

Nevertheless, Bush's endorsement of S.J. Res. 246 represented a stepped-up involvement, even if Congress had to prod him into it. And this new activism apparently had a beneficial impact on the European Community. The European Parliament had adopted a resolution condemning 3379, but had refused to go further and follow the Australian resolution calling for its repeal. Moreover, as already mentioned, some European leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher, had also expressed the view that the repeal of 3379 would have to be bargained for in exchange for some concession from Israel.

Now, several weeks after Bush's endorsement and statement, an official delegation of the "Troika" heading the European Community visited Israel. Led by Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis, it expressed a substantially new and different view. According to the Israeli press, they committed themselves to act for the repeal of ZR resolution.⁷¹ The actual wording of this European commitment, which was expressed during a meeting on July 22, 1990, with the almost brand-new Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy, was slightly less committal: "The fact that the UNGA resolution equating Zionism with racism is still on the international agenda is a scandal. The twelve members of the European Community will seek to have this resolution erased from U.N. records. We will fight against anti-Semitism at the U.N. as well as in other international fora. The resolution of the European summit in Dublin condemning anti-Semitism is for us a basic position."⁷²

THE DECISION TO POSTPONE

Unfortunately, President Bush's endorsement and statement came only after the systematic count carried out by the Australian government among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, at the request of Mark Liebler, the chairman of the Zionist Federation of Australia. The results were very disap-

pointing and did not point to any substantial shift in their position since 1975. The Australian government talked on a government-to-government basis to twenty-two regional governments of which seventeen were members of the U.N. in 1975. Their responses were the following:

Countries	Vote in 1975	Attitude to possible rescinding
Bangladesh	Yes	Oppose
Brunei	Not Member	Probably Oppose
China	Yes	Oppose
Fiji	No	Support
India	Yes	Oppose
Indonesia	Yes	Oppose
Japan	Abstain	Abstain
Laos	Yes	Oppose
Malaysia	Yes	Probably oppose
Myanmar	Abstain	Abstain
Nepal	Abstain	Support
New Zealand	No	Support
Pakistan	Yes	Oppose
Papua New Guinea	Abstain	Support
Philippines	Abstain	Abstain
Signapore	Abstain	Abstain
Solomon Islands	Not Member	Support
Sri Lanka	Yes	Oppose
Thailand	Abstain	Abstain
Vanuata	Not Member	Probably abstain
Vietnam	Not Member	Oppose
Western Samoa	Not Member	Probably abstain ⁷³

Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans said the results were discouraging and pledged to continue making Australia's opposition to 3379 very clear. He said that at a recent meeting with the Arab ambassadors in Canberra, he had conveyed his belief that "action on 3379 would be a significant gesture of goodwill which could help allay Israeli fears." But he said it seemed unlikely that any action on 3379 would succeed until the support is much stronger among U.N. member states. "I would hope that President Bush's signature on 29 June of a congressional Resolution calling for the repeal of 3379 will encourage that process," he said.⁷⁴

At the same time, in June 1990, the steering committee learned that Elie Wiesel was convening at the end of August in Oslo a gathering of prominent international personalities, among them many Nobel prize winners, to denounce anti-Semitism. The committee decided to approach him to get his

active support in the repeal move. He responded very positively to the suggestion that his conference should adopt an appeal supporting the repudiation of 3379,⁷⁵ and that he should try to set up a small group of outstanding international personalities, such as Francois Mitterand, Richard Wieszacker, Vaclav Havel, and Jimmy Carter, "who would come out with a joint statement recommending action to wipe out the stain."⁷⁶ Unfortunately, this did not materialize.

Meanwhile, Israel and the United States decided to assess the practical impact of both President Bush's endorsement and the new Persian Gulf crisis in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. They wanted to update their country surveys to find out the chances of putting to a vote a draft resolution to overturn 3379 at the coming UNGA. The whole issue was to be discussed with these updates in hand during a planned visit of Assistant Secretary John Bolton to Israel at the beginning of September.⁷⁷

For the time being, Bolton's assessment, as disclosed in an address to a small group of the Presidents' Conference on August 13, 1990, was that sixty countries would support it, sixty would reject it, and forty probably would abstain. He thought, however, that there was an opportunity for certain countries to move from undecided to the positive column.⁷⁸ Bolton was probably hoping that the new international order, and especially the role that the U.N. was called on to assume to resolve the Gulf crisis, would change at least the non-committal postures of many countries regarding a repeal resolution.

Some countries had qualified their positions on the text of the repeal resolution. There was no doubt that at least in some cases this was "ducking the question." "They don't want to have to provide an answer, and so they have come up with this as a formulation," said Bolton. "But second, in fairness to them, it's a rare U.N. resolution that's simple and straightforward. There are, you know, long preambular paragraphs, lots of operative paragraphs. In some cases it makes even Congressional legislation look good by comparison. So they are worried about what else might be put in. . . about amendments by Arab countries and things like that, and some are attempting to duck it."⁷⁹

Bolton disclosed some of the methods that the United States was considering regarding parliamentary techniques to stave off "killer" amendments. "One is a motion to accept no amendments. Two is to table amendments as they are brought up. Three is to put [the] original 3379 on table 'as is' and ask for re-vote on it," he said.⁷⁸ A defeat could then be interpreted as a repeal, he explained more fully several months later. "There are a number of possibilities. . . We're continuing to think about them," he said.⁷⁹

It later would become apparent that Bolton had been trying to put a smokescreen around the issue.

In the middle of September, the U.S. press reported quite suddenly that

the administration had decided to postpone plans to repeal the resolution in order not to jeopardize Arab support for sanctions against Iraq and for the American build-up in the Gulf. Israel's ambassador to the U.N., Yohanan Bein, claimed that the decision to postpone the move was actually not an American decision, but an Israeli one, though it was all coordinated with the United States.

"This has nothing to do with the U.S.," he said. "It has to do with our evaluation of what the backing will be."⁸⁰ According to Bein, this was not the most opportune moment to offer a resolution regarded by some as pro-Israel and anti-Arab "which it is not—but—but it might be misinterpreted, and therefore it will not be repealed at this time. But we leave the option open for some later date during the General Assembly, either this year or next year."⁸⁰

This explanation was confirmed by Bolton in the address he delivered to a symposium organized by B'nai Brith International in Washington on December 6, 1990. Bolton explained that, whereas the results of the new round of consultations carried out during August showed that a good number of states had reconsidered their original support, "a vote to rescind would still be in the iffy area. Some states have not given us a very clear indication; some states have said, 'we are not going to tell you until we actually see the text of the resolution.' And there has been other equivocations. And so we don't have definite answers. But, trying to project what some governments would do, it would be a very close vote one way or the other."⁸¹

Although he believed that the results of an actual vote would probably be better than expected,⁸¹ Bolton said he understood Israel's concern for ensuring a clear supporting majority: "Accordingly, we undertook further consultations in September at the beginning of the GA, with my Israeli counterpart and some of his colleagues. We discussed their view in light of the canvass they had been doing and the canvass we had been doing. And they told us then that they had taken this question all the way up to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and that he had concluded in September that it was not the time to proceed in this General Assembly. There are some who would have been a little bit more aggressive. But, I think that since this is a question that vitally affects Israel, we certainly needed to take its view into account in our decision-making."⁸¹

Although clearly voicing his understanding for Israel's decision, Bolton seemed to try to create the impression that he regretted it. In fact, at this juncture, Shamir's decision was more a relief than a disappointment to the U.S. administration.

Only a few days later on September 23, David Levy, the new Israeli foreign minister, made what could be viewed as a U-turn. He made public his intent to initiate together with the U.S. a draft resolution to repeal 3379 during the current session of the General Assembly! What could explain this conspicuous volte-face? Had he been so impressed by positive reactions from

foreign ministers he was then meeting with at the U.N.? Was he willing to depart from Shamir's decision and stand out in his active commitment to a cause which was very popular in Israel as well as among world Jewry? Whatever the motive, Narkiss was compelled to react. He wanted to put on the record his own contribution in convincing the Israeli Foreign Ministry of the need to embark on an international campaign to repeal the ZR and he wanted to commend Levy for his statement:

"This year the assessment in the Israeli Foreign Ministry as to the chances of repealing the resolution were pessimistic and even more severe than the American assessment," Narkiss wrote. "Last June I was told that it would not be possible to introduce a resolution this year to repeal Resolution 3379. When I heard that you decided to act on this issue, I wanted to congratulate you and to shed light on the long road I have tried to walk in the campaign against the resolution. I wish you success in your endeavour to repeal this resolution."⁸²

The announcement in the U.S. press of the U.S. administration's decision to postpone plans to rescind 3379 triggered harsh criticism from Moynihan. The New York senator seemed to be convinced that repudiation of the ugly resolution was now possible in view of the change in the Soviet position:

"On March 30 of this year I held a hearing entitled Revoking the U.N. Zionism Resolution," he said. "At that hearing the State Department revealed that the Soviets have assured us that the resolution represents a concept that is no longer acceptable according to the new political thinking of the Soviet Union."

"On August 10 of this year I received a letter from Judge Jerome Hornblass on behalf of the American section of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists. Judge Hornblass reports that the Soviet Acting Ambassador to the U.N. told a delegation from his organization that the Soviet Union is in favor of repudiating the statement that 'Zionism is racism' as it stands alone."⁸⁴

Moynihan recalled the warning he had issued the week before in the Senate. He said that without a commitment to international law, American foreign policy "would be without compass or rudder, swinging from one extreme to another based on short-term expediencies." Moynihan then expressed his amazement that this would apply to the administration's commitment to repeal Resolution 3379.

"For fifteen years the United States has made it clear that opposition to Resolution 3379 was a central principle of American Middle East policy. The suggestion that our commitment to work for the immediate repudiation of this odious resolution should be tempered by extraneous events—even events as serious as the situation in the Persian Gulf—is unacceptable.

“When Resolution 3379 was being considered fifteen years ago most Americans were not aware of the implications of this Soviet-inspired assault on the legitimacy of the democracy in the Middle East. One American who was aware and cared deeply was a beloved member of this body, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey. His body already badly weakened by the disease that would kill him, Senator Humphrey flew to New York on the night of GA vote and sat in the Assembly chamber as I later described him: unannounced, unabashed, outraged bearing witness.”

“Few Americans cherished the idea of the United Nations as much as Hubert Humphrey did. Few Americans loved this body or this country—or served either with such distinction—as Hubert Humphrey did. It might be well for the architects of the decision to suspend the efforts to repeal the Zionism is racism resolution to ponder what Sen. Hubert Humphrey said about Resolution 3379. ‘The continued efforts to repeal this resolution will tell us a lot about the U.N. and even more about the United States.’”⁸³

The postponement was also perceived as a disastrous development by those hoping that the abrogation of Resolution 3379 would help stanch the spreading tide of anti-Semitism. Andrei Sakharov’s initial warning that the ZR resolution would trigger a renewal of anti-Semitism by providing it with an international imprimatur sounded at the time excessive and even far-fetched. However with the passing of years, one had to recognize that the ZR resolution had filled such a function.

Surely, in analysis and reports, the ZR resolution was no longer mentioned as a key factor in the new upsurge of anti-Semitism. For instance, in the report submitted to the government of Israel by Cabinet Secretary Elyakim Rubinstein, and head of the inter-ministerial Forum Monitoring Anti-Semitism, the outburst of anti-Semitism was attributed to the changes in Eastern Europe, the Arab campaign against massive emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, the strengthening of extreme rightist parties in Europe and Latin America, and finally to religious factors.⁸⁴ The ZR was not even mentioned. However in the recommendations included in this report and which were adopted by the government, it was stressed that anti-Semitism was losing its shameful and illegitimate qualities.

In our view, there was no doubt that the ZR was a significant factor in freeing anti-Semitism from its shame. This impact of the ZR was analyzed lucidly in a brochure entitled “Anti-Zionism, the Sophisticated anti-Semitism,” published by the American Jewish Committee in 1990: “The effect of the AZ campaign, of which the U.N. Resolution 3379 is the philosophical anchor, is that Israel is criticized, no matter what it does, while twenty hostile

states that surround it are rarely criticized, whatever they do"⁸⁵. . . "The fight against tomorrow's anti-Semitism will require an understanding of anti-Zionism as an internationally legitimized means of attacking Jews and Israel. Bigotry is easier to express when it has its own built-in denial mechanism ("I'm not anti-Jewish, I'm only anti-Zionist"). As with all forms of bigotry, to ignore it is to let it grow. First and foremost, the resolution has to be attacked and deplored and even, even though the odds are long, repealed."⁸⁶

A similar view was expressed by Norman Appleton, the director of the Group Relations Educational Trust in London, in a written response to a lecture delivered by Elyakim Rubinstein at the Zionist Federation Hasbara Conference on combating anti-Semitism. . . . Perhaps the most important thing Israel can do at the moment to help us combat anti-Semitism in the United Kingdom is to ensure that the U.N. ZR resolution is repealed and thrown into the dustbin of history."⁸⁷

Quite significantly, Rubinstein had mentioned in his speech all possible means of fighting anti-Semitism except for repealing the ZR. This was in spite of the fact that several months earlier, his attention had been drawn again to the ZR's role in helping to remove anti-Semitism "from the shameful cubbyhole to which it had been confined for more than one generation." It called for countries "concerned with putting anti-Semitism back on its shameful pedestal to stop displaying indifference to the efforts to repeal 3379, and to really harness themselves to these efforts, without political calculations."⁸⁸

THE REPEAL

David Levy's stunning announcement was of course to remain a dead letter. The U.S. had to focus all its attention and energy on organizing the international response to the Iraqi coup against Kuwait, and to try to ensure its support by as many Arab states as possible. This was not the best time for a move to repeal the ZR. Later, the smashing defeat of Iraq, the undisputed world supremacy of the U.S., the new role of the U.N. and the new international order, along with the stated willingness of most Arab countries to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, made for a more hospitable climate in which to move toward a repeal.

At the end of April 1991, the *Jerusalem Post* reported that Israel and the U.S. had agreed to press for repeal of the ZR during the coming session of the General Assembly.⁸⁹ According to Ambassador Bein, it was at this time that Assistant Secretary Bolton raised a refined version of a repeal formula that he had already invoked before the Presidents' Conference in August 1990.⁹⁰

Bolton suggested employing the procedure used every year at the U.N. to

foil the Arab move against Israel's credentials. A proposal would be submitted asking for a new vote on Resolution 3379 and a procedural vote rejecting this request could then be considered a rejection of the ZR. Israel did not agree with this repeal formula, since it would leave the ZR formally on U.N. records and would not constitute a repeal.⁹¹

Meanwhile, two significant statements were to underscore the improvement of the international climate. One occurred on May 13, when U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar responded to a journalist asking whether the U.N. could play a specific role in the GA resolution equating Zionism with racism. "The United Nations has to play a role because it is an international organization of which Israel is a full member country," he said. "As far as the resolution on Zionism is concerned, my position has always been that there was a wrong and unfair interpretation of what Zionism is. Zionism was first of all the need of the Jewish people to preserve their identity and at the same time to try to get a state for their nation. You cannot say that trying and get a state for your nation is racism, [as] for instance the Kurds or the Basques in Spain are not racists. These are two different things that should not be mixed up."⁹²

Asked later if he would act to bring about the repeal of 3379, Perez De Cuellar observed that his role was not to act for the repeal or the effectuation of any resolution, but "of course if this resolution will be annulled, it will perhaps create in Israel as well as among its friends a better atmosphere with regard to the full involvement of the U.N. in the peace process."⁹³

The other remarkable statement came in a letter sent on July 3 by the president of the U.N. Human Rights Commission, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros of Peru, to Morris Abram, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva. Ballesteros was answering a letter of protest addressed to him and signed by the Geneva representatives of the U.S., Israel and twenty-eight other countries, against a declaration of the Syrian delegate, Nabila Shaalan. Shaalan had recommended to her fellow delegates a book called "The Matzoh of Zion," written by Syrian Defense Minister Mustapha Tlass, which presented as truth a blood libel against Jews in Damascus 150 years before and which, according to Shaalan, confirmed and "unmasked the racist character of Zionism."⁹⁴

For the first time ever, an anti-Semitic (and also anti-Zionist) indictment was condemned publicly by an official of the U.N. "Any declaration that could provoke racist or discriminatory sentiments must not be tolerated in the Commission on Human Rights," wrote the commissioner. "Neither myself nor anyone in the commission could share such extreme views, which deserve unequivocal condemnation and rejection. . . Such propositions are both contrary to the basic principles which inspired the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and threaten to neutralize the considerable work that the international system has accomplished since its adoption."⁹⁴ This condemna-

tion was extracted as a result of Abram's tenacity, but there was no doubt that it also reflected a change in the international atmosphere.

The Soviet position marked another favorable shift. The USSR was not only turning its back on its traditional hostility to Zionism and looking to resume diplomatic relations with Israel. It also seemed ready to support a "de facto" overturn of the ZR.⁹⁵ This notable change was at the background of a Senate resolution [S.J. Res 110] introduced by Moynihan on behalf of twenty-eight senators expressing the sense of the Congress that;

*"whereas the Soviet Union vigorously supported the adoption of Resolution 3379 but has now stated that it no longer supports the resolution; and whereas the Soviet Union has expressed a desire to participate in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and should demonstrate its commitment to peace by working to repeal Resolution 3379: Now, therefore be it, resolved. . . that the United States and the Soviet Union should lead an effort to promptly repeal UNGA Resolution 3379(XXX)."*⁹⁶

During this period, the only disheartening note came from Douglas Hogg, British deputy minister of foreign affairs. In a radio interview on the Voice of Israel he was asked by reporter Jerry Lewis whether Britain might be able to play a role in rescinding 3379. Hogg replied that the secretary general of the U.N. was quite right and that 3379 ought to be rescinded, but not yet. "We deplore it. We do not think, at the moment, there is necessarily a majority in the GA to secure its rescission, and therefore we have no immediate plans for seeking to achieve that but it is something that ought to be rescinded and at an appropriate time we will try to bring it about."⁹⁷

Dissatisfied with Hogg's answer, Lewis pressed him. "Would not Britain feel, would not you feel, as one of Britain's Ministers, that it might be a useful confidence-building measure if Britain was able to secure agreement to get that particular resolution expunged from the U.N. records?" Hogg avoided taking any commitment upon Britain. He simply remarked that, "As a proposition that is doubtless correct, but what if we failed, then the end result would be worse than the position in which we now stand."⁹⁷ Well, at least Her Majesty's Minister was no longer contesting the very possibility of rescinding a U.N. General Assembly resolution, as were some in the United Kingdom only several weeks earlier.⁹⁸

At this point, high officials at the Israeli Foreign Ministry were concluding that chances of securing a repeal resolution were good in view of the changes both on the international scene and in Israel's international relations. They saw them as even better if U.S. administration leaders were to "harness themselves to this endeavour. Until the middle of July, the Foreign Ministry will check the American readiness, which could change according to the progress in the political process."⁹⁹

A thorough deliberation was held at the beginning of July at the Foreign Ministry to assess the repeal prospects. There was no substantial change in the very conservative analysis of the voting pattern for a repeal resolution, (a bit more than sixty in favor, a bit less than sixty against, and forty uncertain). Nevertheless, the overwhelming feeling was that a comfortable majority could be reached if there was to be energetic U.S. involvement.

During these deliberations Ambassador Yohanan Bein pointed to the historical import of the ZR resolution. He said it was seeking to undo the historical achievement of Zionism of pulling the Jews out of the ghetto, and to return them back to the ghetto. Hence the repeal of the ZR would indeed be an historic event.

Ultimately, Foreign Minister Levy took up the recommendation to start a repeal initiative at the coming UNGA session. But he stipulated two conditions: First that a comfortable majority be ensured, and second, that adverse procedural moves or "killer" amendments would be prevented so that the resolution adopted would unequivocally constitute an actual repeal of the ZR.¹⁰⁰

The formula of the draft repeal resolution was also discussed. Since it was to be considered an actual repeal, there were only three options: One was a formal abrogation of 3379. In theory, such a resolution could be put to a vote, but there was no precedent, and no existing formal procedure for such a move. In addition, the Soviet Union was opposed to creating such a precedent, making it more difficult to secure a majority for it.

Second, there could be a resolution stating that Zionism was not racism. This was a formula which would be supported by the Soviet Union and have a far better chance of being adopted, according to the research carried out by the Heritage Foundation. The major shortcoming of this option, however, was that 3379 would remain on the records of the United Nations. Third, a resolution could be offered revoking only the ZR determination contained in Resolution 3379. This option looked the best, since it followed the Spain precedent and would debunk 3379. Hence, this was the formula adopted.¹⁰⁰

On the whole there was a good feeling on the Israeli side about U.S. cooperation and willingness to proceed. This was in spite of the growing tension between the two countries around the format and framework of a peace conference, the U.S. demand to freeze settlements in the territories, and the Israeli request for U.S. loan guarantees to help absorb the mass immigration from the USSR. At a press conference in New York at the end of June 1991, Israel's U.N. Ambassador Yoram Aridor revealed that the two countries were working very closely to prepare a draft resolution that could be submitted in the fall if its passage by a comfortable majority could be assured.¹⁰⁰

At this juncture, therefore, officials at the Israeli Foreign Ministry did not feel there was any need to prod the administration to take more action. They also feared unpleasant reactions from Jewish associations and organizations

if, for some reason, the move again was to be delayed.¹⁰⁰ So the steering committee's suggestion to encourage personal lobbying at the highest levels of the U.S. administration was discouraged.

Nevertheless, the steering committee took upon itself to encourage modest efforts in this direction, notably through the American section of the WZO and the ZFA, following their pressing inquiries about what should be done at this stage. It was stressed that a public statement by President Bush, not linking abrogation with "the peace process or loan guarantees or anything else," would be a decisive factor in securing a majority.¹⁰¹

However at the same time, during the summer of 1991, there were other signals which seemed to turn the whole picture around by pointing once again to the need to postpone the repeal move! One such signal was sent by J.S. Wall, the private secretary of Prime Minister John Major, in a letter to Secretary General George Harari. The letter was in reaction to a resolution passed by the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and sent to the British government which called its attention to the massive Ethiopian Jewish immigration known as Operation Solomon and urged its pursuit of efforts to rescind the ZR in the U.N.

"We deplore the ZR resolution," Wall wrote. "It is wholly unjust and provocative and we of course voted against it. But we believe that a majority may not at the moment exist in the GA for its repeal. We want to avoid an unsuccessful attempt to repeal it which would be particularly damaging: it would be better not to act until we are sure of success."¹⁰²

The same pessimistic assessment and "well-meant" advice were invoked in a letter sent by Australian Trade and Foreign Relations Minister Gareth Evans, to Mark Liebler, the chairman of the Zionist Federation of Australia. "Australia remains strongly opposed to Resolution 3379 and will continue to be in the forefront of the campaign to have it rescinded at the earliest possible opportunity," he wrote. "It does not appear, however, that there has yet been sufficient movement in the attitudes of the members states of the U.N. to enable successful action against 3379. You will recall that the survey we conducted last year of the attitudes of the regional countries gave little reason for optimism. We think it would be unwise to take action in the U.N. unless there was a reasonable hope of success. Failure would undoubtedly discourage further attempts in the future. The government will of course take any suitable opportunity to enunciate Australia's position and my Department will continue to examine whether or not there are realistic prospects of making progress on rescinding the resolution."¹⁰³

The biggest blow, however, came from the United States. On the one hand, it voiced its stalwart commitment to the repeal. On the other, it made it abundantly clear there was no guarantee the repeal would be possible during the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly, even though, according to its own evaluation, there were enough votes to secure it. This was explained

by Assistant Secretary Bolton in a closed-door meeting on July 31 with the Conference of Presidents. Bolton said it was not the right time to mount an organized campaign to have Resolution 3379 repealed since there was every likelihood that a motion to defer it would easily pass in the GA in September. "Not yet was the bottom line; hold off until 1992."¹⁰⁴

Bolton was referring to a possible move by the Arab countries to introduce a procedural delay that would effectively kill any attempt to rescind the resolution: ". . . The so-called moderate Arab states, with Egypt in the lead, have attempted to analogize from the procedural deferment of the Israel's credentials debate, to employ the same method in a possible effort to repeal the ZR."¹⁰⁵ This stratagem had been used in recent years to avoid bringing the challenge to Israel's credentials to a vote without its Arab sponsors losing face. In the event that a repeal resolution would be introduced, it was known that Egypt would lead such a procedural deferment.¹⁰⁵

Many countries were expected to support such a deferment since they were not very happy to support the repeal. According to Bolton, this was precisely the case of the Soviet Union which had termed 3379 "a harmful statement," while at the same time appeared "content to let the resolution gather dust, rather than work actively for its cancellation."¹⁰⁵

There was no doubt that Bolton was expressing a genuine concern for the success of the repeal. There was also no doubt that his remarks reflected heightened tensions developing between Israel and the United States over the framework of a Middle East peace conference. At the beginning of June, Prime Minister Shamir wrote a letter to President Bush in which he underscored Israel's sensitivities in convening such a conference, particularly with the participation of the United Nations, given its treatment of Israel over the years:

"Although Arab governments may say they have agreed to negotiate directly with us, they are counting on the international forum to serve as a means of mobilizing and applying pressure on Israel," Shamir wrote. "In the peculiar logic that prevails in this part of the world, our neighbours are still seeking a process that will enable them, at its conclusion, to argue that they have not recognized Israel's right to exist as a legitimate entity in this region. This is why they insist on an as wide-as-possible international context for negotiation and the participation of the U.N. This is also the reason for their insistence on defining the objective of the peace process in such terms as a comprehensive settlement based on resolution 242 and 338 rather than peace treaties with Israel."

"These are the reasons for our position throughout the years," Shamir continued, "that every Arab state that wishes to join the peace process should explicitly undertake to negotiate directly with Israel as an exclusive means of concluding bilateral peace treaties with Israel. Hence an international conference will undermine direct negotiations and deprive them of the chances

of success. Any kind of . . . reconvening of the conference will produce the same negative result and will shift the focus away from the direct bilateral negotiations. We know for a fact that this is the motive behind the insistence on the continuity and U.N. participation. . . ”

“The participation of the U.N. in the meeting under any guise would introduce that organization as a factor in the peace process. You may recall that the peace negotiations with Egypt were conducted without the U.N. I doubt if that agreement would have been achieved had we involved the U.N. Furthermore, the U.N. has rejected the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel treaty of peace, and it therefore makes no sense to invite them to a meeting whose objective is to implement the Accords.”

“But beyond that,” Shamir explained, “our hearts are heavy over the treatment. . . [of] us by the U.N. over the last four decades. Its records are replete with biased, grossly unfair and even malicious resolutions against Israel. Not the least of them is Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. Similarly, we have for years been attacked in the U.N. for our operation against the Iraqi reactor in 1981. The events of this year have proved convincingly how well humankind was served by this operation, just as the recent rescue of Ethiopian Jews has once again exposed the absurdity of the U.N.’s attitude to Zionism.”

“If the U.N. is introduced into the peace-making effort, it will bring with it a heavy and negative burden that will serve as an obstacle to progress. The U.N. representative will report to the organization and his report will undoubtedly trigger deliberations of the U.N., which can only hamper the effort toward agreement between Israel and the Arab states. Nevertheless we have agreed to present the bilateral agreements after their conclusion to the U.N., for endorsement.”¹⁰⁶

Resolution 3379 was mentioned by Shamir in his letter as only one example among others of U.N. bias against Israel and its constraints in contributing to the peace process. The repeal of 3379 was neither explicitly invoked nor hinted at as a step that could pave the way toward U.N. involvement.

In mid-July Syria accepted the format of a peace conference which answered most of Israel’s objections, making it difficult for Israel to stick to its intractable position on its own participation. At the beginning of August, Israel accepted what it had rejected two months earlier—the format of a peace conference which included the presence of a silent U.N. representative and which could be reconvened with the consent of the parties. In exchange for these concessions, Israel won from the United States a memorandum of agreement pledging that the U.N. Security Council would not debate an “alternative peace process” during the negotiations and that the United States would make the “maximum effort” to rescind the ZR when the GA reopened in September.¹⁰⁷

But this left some bitter residue in the relationship between the two countries. And this burgeoned into a "new wave of anger and distrust"¹⁰⁸ after yet another attempt by the U.S. administration in the beginning of September to delay the congressional authorization for \$10 billion in loan guarantees for immigrant resettlement.

The dispute between the two countries flared dramatically after a Bush press conference on September 12, in which the president repeated his call for a 120-day delay in the loan guarantee legislation, and harshly criticized the pro-Israel lobby, which was pushing hard for the guarantees. The tension reached such a pitch that the whole peace process seemed in jeopardy, while a domestic crisis loomed in the showdown between the Congress and the president.

The very next day, Bolton came to Israel for a meeting with a team of the Foreign Ministry where it was decided to start immediate preparations for submitting a draft resolution to repeal 3379. A short and simple text was then agreed upon stating that "the General Assembly decided to revoke the determination contained in its Resolution 3379 (XXX), November 10, 1975." In addition, in New York and Jerusalem programs of action were conceived to respond to every possible scenario.¹⁰⁹

Several days later, Bush took an unprecedented step and raised the issue of the repeal in his address to the UNGA on September 23, 1991. It was an obvious attempt to reduce the tension with Israel and to appease Israel's supporters in the U.S., notably the backers of the loan guarantees. Bush pointed to the renewed role of the U.N., which had mounted more peacekeeping missions in the previous 36 months than during its first 43 years and he recalled the challenge that the "renewal of history presents:"¹⁰⁹

"We should take seriously the Charter's pledge to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.

"UNGA Resolution 3379, the so-called Zionism-is-racism resolution, mocks this pledge and the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. And I call now for its repeal.

"Zionism is not a policy, it is the idea that led to the creation of a home for the Jewish people to the State of Israel. And to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the terrible plight of the Jews in World War II and indeed, throughout history. To equate Zionism with racism is to reject Israel itself, a member of good standing of the United Nations. This body cannot claim to seek peace and at the same time challenge Israel's right to exist. By repealing this resolution unconditionally, the United Nations will enhance its credibility and serve the cause of peace."¹¹⁰

This was a remarkable statement. Of course it was not the first time that the U.S. had unequivocally condemned the ZR and called for its repeal. But it was the first time it was done on the opening of the UNGA by the U.S. president himself and without linking it to any other issue. This was a sharp departure from his position only a year before. At that time, after he called on all the members of the U.N. to join the United States in renouncing 3379, he felt obliged to reaffirm "at the same time" the U.S. determination to pursue efforts toward a peace settlement that "must provide for Israel's security and recognition of Palestinian political rights."

Bush's U.N. speech was well received in the United States. It helped relax the tension between the two countries and between the administration and Israel's supporters as well as human rights advocates. However, many were skeptical about the speech's lasting effect, since it was widely perceived more as symbolic than substantive.

Some, such as U.S. Rep. Wayne Owens, a Democrat from Utah, believed that the crisis could be defused only if Bush would allow the loan guarantees to go through.¹¹¹ Others, such as Brookings Institute analyst William Quandt, believed that if the United States did not follow up the speech with action, it would quickly be overshadowed by predictable sources of friction such as the settlements, interpretations of Resolution 242, and the role of the United States in the peace negotiations. He maintained the speech could have a more lasting effect if Washington would use its growing international clout to convince other nations to vote for the repeal of the resolution. "If he is unable to do anything more than denounce the resolution," said Quandt, "then a week from now nothing will have changed. We've always been opposed to the resolution. We've never achieved a strategy for repealing it. It would be far more significant if we could get a few Arab countries to work for a repeal."¹¹²

Bush's speech did have an immediate and direct impact on the position of the Soviet Union, however. On September 24, the new Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin, in his address to the UNGA, called on the U.N. to "once and for all leave behind the legacy of the ice age, like the obnoxious resolution equating Zionism with racism."

The European Community, too, was compelled to make its voice heard. The EC chairman, Foreign Dutch Foreign Minister Van Den Broek, issued in mid-October a long statement which reiterated the EC's traditional policy regarding the peace process. For the first time, however, it devoted a full paragraph calling for the repeal of the UNGA resolution denigrating Zionism as a form of racism. Unfortunately, this positive step was blurred by the equivocal formulation that 3379 "should be consigned into oblivion." At about the same time, the leaders of several important Asian countries confided to an official Australian mission headed by Isi Leibler, head of the Jewish community of Australia and co-chairman of the WJC, that they would

consider changing their position regarding 3379. This was notably the case with Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Qichen, who made it plain that China regarded the wording of the resolution as a gross distortion of the truth and a slanderous slur on the Jewish people.¹¹¹

India, for its part, hinted at a possible change but refused both to acknowledge plainly that the U.N. ZR equation was wrong and to disclose whether it would support a repeal. Prime Minister Narasima Rao explained to Isi Liebler.

“As for our attitude, there has been a gradual, slow but definite change. . . We would like that change to be better perceived, but we do not want to do anything that will prevent us from taking subsequent steps. There are many constraining factors we have to overcome, and we are gradually overcoming them. Let us do things in our own way. We have mentally prepared ourselves to make changes. But we are grappling with our immediate problems. We are doing first things first, but my own mind is clear. We are working on it. Okay, we have supported the ZR resolution in the U.N., but I do not remember India ever making a statement that Zionism equals racism.

“We sometimes have to go along with things that we may not be 100 percent in agreement with. . . You can certainly tell them (your constituency) that things have been improving. But I agree not visibly improving. We will accelerate this process. If we have said that Zionism equals racism, we will have to review this in the proper manner. There is a change in our approach to this question.”¹¹²

Unfortunately, Bush’s U.N. speech did not have such a positive effect on the Arab countries. Most of them expressed their firm opposition to the U.S. move. However, they did not dare voice their opposition by defending the substance of the ZR calumny. Rather they opted to claim that this was not the proper time for a repeal, that it would hamper the peace process, and that it would signal to Israel that the international community would tolerate its settlement policy in the occupied territories. For these reasons, they argued, the repeal should be delayed until after the opening of the peace conference, or to a time when the peace process would be firmly on track. For instance, Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk Ashara stated in his address to the UNGA that “repeal of UNGA equating Zionism with racism should be the end process aiming at putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands.”

According to the Palestinian News Agency, WAFANA, Yasser Arafat believed the Bush proposal could be discussed, but only after Israel proved that it was reliable in its intent to realize peace and implement international

resolutions. Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa recognized in a meeting he had with David Levy at the U.N. that the ZR was a bad resolution. But he also explained why it was not the proper time to raise the issue of its repeal before the convening of the peace conference.

"Arab and other factors will pile up obstacles" on the road to the conference, and disrupt the good atmosphere so critical to it if such an emotionally loaded issue was to be raised at the U.N., he said.¹¹³ The same message was delivered by Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister, Boutros Ghali to a Likud delegation headed by Knesset Member Sarah Doron in a visit to Egypt.¹¹³

The fears of some that this Arab opposition, especially Egypt's militant stand, would convince a substantial number of Third World countries not to support the American initiative, did not materialize. This was not because the Arab resistance was only perfunctory, as claimed by PLO spokesmen, but because the United States had a massive investment in the repeal endeavor.

On the eve of the Bush address, it was believed that seven countries would join the United States to sponsor the repeal initiative: Australia, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay and European countries, and that only a small majority would support the repeal.¹¹⁴ Ten weeks later, these figures increased respectively to fifty sponsors and more than 100 supporters.¹¹⁵ To ensure this trend, the U.S. administration resorted not only to arguments that placating Israel would increase the pressure on it to compromise in the American-sponsored Middle East peace talks. It also resorted to arm twisting.

In the spirit of Moynihan's exhortations a year before, the United States decided to warn wavering countries that their relations with the United States were in the balance. Many months later, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, William Harrop, was to disclose that Bush had given "unprecedented instructions to all his ambassadors to warn countries that failure to vote for revoking the resolution could affect their ties with the U.S."¹¹⁶

The U.S. pressure was to be very effective, but not on the Arab countries, although U.S. diplomats did try hard to get them to agree to adopt at least a neutral position. This was apparently in vain. Moreover and quite surprisingly, the Arab country most militantly against the repeal was Egypt. Egypt, after all, had spearheaded the screaming Arab opposition to the massive emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and the efforts to deter African nations from resuming diplomatic relations with Israel. At the end of November, Egyptian ambassador to the U.N. Nabil Al-Araby, charged that repealing the ZR now "would create a lot of bad blood unless a peace accord takes place!"

On December 5, Khalil Makkawi, U.N. Lebanese representative and chairman of the Arab caucus, released a statement announcing the caucus' unanimous opposition to repeal, saying that "to overturn a General Assembly resolution would create a very serious precedent."¹¹⁷ Several days later it

was reported that Egypt's Al-Araby had gathered Arab support for the introduction of an alternative resolution containing the standard call upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and to recognize Palestinian rights, to be brought to a vote at the same time as the repeal draft resolution.

The spokesman of the Egyptian Mission to the U.N., Abdul Aleem Elabyad, confirmed that Al-Araby and other Arab delegates were privately discussing a parallel resolution to balance the repeal one, but that it was not yet clear whether it would be submitted. "So far we really have not received any specific instructions from our government on how to vote," he said.¹¹⁷

This was contradicted by a key State Department official who claimed that Al-Araby's active involvement was in direct "violation [of] his directives from Cairo not to interfere with the U.S.-Israeli drive"¹¹⁸ and that "the Eryp-

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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[without reference to a Main Committee (A/46/L.47 and Add.1)]

46/86. Elimination of racism and racial discrimination

The General Assembly

Decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.

74th plenary meeting
16 December 1991

tian government along with the Saudis and the Kuwaitis, have given instructions to their U.N. ambassadors not to be unhelpful."¹¹⁸

Finally the so-called alternative draft resolution was not submitted to the UNGA. There was nonetheless a last Arab attempt to thwart the repeal by asking the GA to place the repeal resolution in a category which, under the rules of procedure, required a two-thirds majority, rather than a simple majority, to be adopted.

This proposal submitted by Yemen's ambassador to the U.N., Abdallah Al-Ashtal, was soundly defeated in a vote of 96 opposed, 34 in favor and 13 abstentions.

One must puzzle over the incongruous behavior of Egypt, a country which had recognized Israel and signed with it a formal peace treaty. What was it aiming for? Was it moved by a genuine concern for the successful convening of the peace conference? After the conference was convened in Madrid at the end of October this could no longer be a valid argument. Was it because it wanted to ensure that all the members of the Arab-Muslim group would support the candidacy of Boutros Ghali as U.N. secretary general, which implied its reported commitment to oppose the repeal? After the Ghali election on November 22, this also could no longer be a valid reason.

In fact, Egypt had a strong desire to bolster its position in the Arab world and to bring most of its members in line with its policy of peace with Israel. After the Gulf war, Egypt had succeeded in ending Arab ostracism against it. It regained its central position principally by winning the shift back from Tunis to Cairo of the headquarters of the Arab League. Egypt was indeed ready to face unpleasant criticism and pressures from the U.S. and Israel, but not to let any Arab or Muslim entity use an emotionally loaded issue to jeopardize its hard-won, regained leadership within the Arab world.

The revocation of Resolution 3379 was finally achieved on December 16, 1991, by UNGA resolution 46/86. It was sponsored by eighty-six countries and passed by 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions. Sixteen member countries were absent. There was little surprise in the countries against the repeal: 13 Arab countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, UA Emirates, Yemen); eight Muslim countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran, Malyasia, Mali, Pakistan); and four other countries which were traditional allies of the Arab-Muslim bloc (Cuba, North Korea, Sri Lanka and Vietnam).

Apart from the expected Arab and Muslim attacks, the repeal was hailed as an historic act. Israel's Foreign Minister David Levy said as much in a special statement of gratitude he sent to all the countries which supported the revocation. Levy stressed it was "difficult to exaggerate the profound significance of the resolution just adopted here by the Assembly. The unacceptable distortion which determined that Zionism is a form of racism is now erased, as if it never existed. The revocation of the resolution is of impor-

tance to the entire world, no less than it is to Israel, since Resolution 3379 itself was a blot on the U.N. By revoking the mendacious determination, the international community has transmitted a loud and clear message that all expressions of hatred and intolerance are unacceptable to the enlightened nations. The adoption of today's resolution is the victory of morality over injustice, truth over falsehood, and courage over cowardice."¹¹⁹

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger painted an even broader picture of the repeal's ramifications. He spoke at the plenary of the GA devoted to the revocation instead of Secretary James Baker who was on an official visit to the Soviet Union. Eagleburger viewed the repeal as an expression of the historic watershed between two eras. One was the era of the Cold War, which had dashed the hopes of mankind for a different fate in a better future, turning the great parliament of the U.N. into a forum for sterile rhetoric, feckless name-calling and the willful distortion of reality.

At no time was this more evident than in 1975 when the GA adopted Resolution 3379, determining that Zionism was a form of racism, he said. "This determination demonstrated, like nothing else before or since, to what extent the Cold War has distorted the U.N.'s vision of reality, marginalized its political utility and separated it from its original moral purpose."¹²⁰

"Resolution 3379 was one of this body's most ungenerous acts," he said. "It branded the national aspirations of one people, and one people only, as illegitimate—a people which had been homeless, dispersed and exiled for the better part of two millenia. It labelled as racist the national aspirations of the one people more victimized by racism than any other. . . Now the endeavors of sixteen long years are about to come to fruition—not because of the United States, although we have never wavered in our determination, but because the era which produced Resolution 3379 has passed into history. With that era have gone many of the dictatorships whose repression was based on systematic lying and distortion of reality. With that era have gone the confrontational ideologies which held much of the world in their thrall."¹²¹

A new era was dawning, he said, an era of truth telling and openness, of a genuine commitment to universal human values, which reserved for the U.N. a central role in making and consolidating peace and, when necessary, in responding to aggression. "We believe," he said, "that with the world's and this body's passage into a new era, it is more than time to consign one of the last relics of the Cold War to the dustbin of history. . . this resolution we propose is aimed at no one, at no state, at no region and at no group. Its sole and simple aim is to right a wrong and to restore the moral authority of this organization."

"It is not aimed at or linked to the peace process in the Middle East. However I will say that my government believes that this action can only help, and not hinder, efforts currently under way to bring peace to that region. . . The resolution we introduce today would send a different message to the

people of Israel from the one this body sent in 1975. But fundamentally it is not Israel which needs this action; it is the U.N. which requires it.

"Its passage will vindicate the universal principles upon which the U.N. was founded, and redeem the hopes which all mankind vested in the U.N. in 1945."¹²²

One might also claim that the abrogation of Resolution 3379 reflected the shifting trends in the world balance of power. The Soviet empire had collapsed, the power of the Third World was fading, there was a split in both the Arab and Muslim World, the liberal and democratic model had achieved an undisputed supremacy, the U.S. had overwhelming influence and the U.N. was becoming the international police force.

It is not at all certain, however, that these changes by themselves would have ensured the revocation of 3379. Indeed we have seen that many obstacles remained after they occurred.

But all of these changes, in one way or another, were triggered by the active international role of the United States, so Eagleburger's disclaimer is unjustified. Without the U.S. determination to press for the revocation, it is doubtful it would have happened. It is due almost solely to the U.S. that the wrong was righted.

Notes

- (1) U.N. General Assembly, A/42/67, January 2, 1987.
- (2) See Chapters 5 and 6.
- (3) See the debate held at George Washington University between Y. Dinstein, Ambassador J. Kirkpatrick, A. Gerson, F. Bernstein, November 1986. (Chapter 7)
- (3a) Edited speech of Yitzhak Rabin, p. 1 and pp. 4-5, CZA/S110/35.
- (4) "Do we have to go on fighting for the rescinding of Resolution 3379," title of Narkiss' address to the Los Angeles Conference, "Israel, Zionism and the U.N.," September 14, 1986.
- (5) *The Jewish Journal*, op. cit., *Los Angeles Times*, op. cit.
- (6) Report from Lydia Chukrun, head of the Department of Israeli Law at the Foreign Ministry, to the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry on UNGA Resolution 3379(XXX), 1975. Equating Zionism with Racism, January 18, 1987, p. 1. (Hebrew). CZA/S110/14.
- (7) Chukrun's report, op. cit., pp. 2-3. CZA/S110/14.
- (8) Above, Chapter 6, section "Nairobi a Pyrrhic Victory?"
- (9) Letter from Y. Manor to the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry, June 23, 1987. CZA/S110/14.

- (10) Letter from Manor to Lauterpacht, June 21, 1987. CZA/S110/14.
- (11) Letter from Lauterpacht to Manor, July 1, 1987. CZA/S110/14
- (12) Letter from G. Tadmor to Manor, July 29, 1987; Letter from L. Chukrun to Manor, August 13, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (13) Letter from Yechezkel Barnea to Uri Savir, August 17, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (14) Letter from Uri Savir to Manor, August 24, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (15) Letter from Manor to Uri Savir, October 10, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (16) Letter from Anne Higgins to Bernice Tannenbaum, August 17, 1987. CZA/S110/13.
- (17) Report from Gershon Zohar, in charge of information at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, to the director of information at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, June 9, 1987. CZA/S110/13.
- (18) Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates 100th Congress, First session, Vol. 133, No. 167, October 23, 1987.
- (19) *Boston Globe*, November 9, 1987.
- (20) *The Atlanta Jewish Times*, December 18, 1987.
- (21) *The Jewish Week*, October 28, 1988.
- (22) Letter from Manor to Narkiss protesting about the meager resources allocated to the campaign, January 22, 1987. CZA/S110/20.
- (23) Letter from B. Tannenbaum to R. Williamson, October 14, 1988. CZA/S110/13.
- (24) Letter from R. Williamson to B. Tannenbaum, November 16, 1988. CZA/S110/13.
- (25) Richard Williamson, "Serpents in the U.N.," *Midstream*, New York, January 1989, p. 10.
- (26) James Baker address to AIPAC, *Near East Report*, May 9, 1989, p. 87.
- (27) Letter from E. Rubinstein to Manor, May 7, 1989. CZA/S110/13.
- (28) Bolton's interview to the *Near East Report*, July 24, 1987.
- (29) Richard Williamson, "The U.N. at least should do no harm," *The Chicago Tribune*, May 16, 1989.
- (30) Letter from Narkiss to B. Tannenbaum reporting on this meeting of the Steering Committee, April 30, 1989. CZA/S110/20.
- (31) The meeting took place on August 21, 1989. Cf. "Report on a debate in the Foreign Ministry on the campaign against 3379," by Manor, in Hebrew, August 24, 1989. CZA/S110/20.
- (32) Y. Manor, "Arguments in support of the abrogation of UNGA resolution against Zionism," October 1989, 4p and XVI annexes. CZA/S110/20.
- (33) *U.S. Congressional Report*, 101st Congress, November 1989, p. 7.
- (34) Draft letter from Narkiss to Moshe Arens, October 25, 1989. CZA/S110/20.
- (35) Memo from Manor to E. Rubinstein, August 6, 1989. CZA/S110/20.
- (36) Pontifical Commission "Justicia et Pax," *The Church and Racism. Toward a More Fraternal Society*, Vatican City, 1988, p. 23.
- (37) Alexander Golitsyn was speaking on November 2, 1989, at the Wilton Park Conference, an international gathering sponsored by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office discussing the subject "Israel 40 years On," News Release from the British Zionist Federation, November 3, 1989. CZA/S110/14.
- (38) Manor's report on the meeting of the Steering Committee November 7, 1989, p. 2. (Hebrew). CZA/S110/20.
- (39) Manor's report, November 7, 1989, op. cit., p. 4. CZA/S110/20.
- (40) United States Information Agency, Wireless File, December 11, 1989.
- (41) A.M. Rosenthal, "On My Mind. This Infamous Act," *New York Times*, December 1989.
- (42) Press Conference, December 15, 1989.
- (43) On the "Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public" (AKSO), Cf. Theodore H. Friedgut, "Soviet Anti-Zionism: Origins, Forms and Development" in Robert Wistrich, Ed., *Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism in the Contemporary World*, Institute of Jewish Affairs in association with MacMillan Press, London 1990, pp. 26-46.
- (44) William Korey, "The U.N.'s Decree," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1990.
- (45) According to the testimony given by Dr. Mikhael Agursky to Y. Manor. Cf. the memo, "Trends

- in the Defamation of Zionism," sent by Manor to E. Rubinstein, August 6, 1989. CZA/S110/20
- (46) Cable U.N. Resolution on Zionism/Racism, for PM (Prime Minister) and C, from Australian Embassy in Moscow, September 28, 1989. CZA/S110/14.
- (47) Paul Lewis, "US Delegate Calls UN's Session Constructive," *New York Times International*, December 20, 1989.
- (48) *JTA*, March 8, 1990. See also Chapter 7, "Europe Disappoints."
- (49) *Maariv*, January 9, 1990.
- (50) Manor's report on the meeting held at the Foreign Ministry, January 10, 1990, p. 2. CZA/S110/20
- (51) Manor's report, January 10, 1990, op. cit., p. 1. CZA/S110/20.
- (52) Manor's report, January 10, 1990, op. cit., p. 3. CZA/S110/20.
- (53) Manor's report on this meeting, CZA/S110/20.
- (54) WZO: Simcha Dinitz, Bernice Tannebaum, Uzi Narkiss, Yohanan Manor. WJC: Edgar Bronfman, Chairman; Israel Singer, Executive Director; Ilan Steinberg, Secretary General; BBI: Seymour Reich, Chairman, and Chairman of the Presidents' Conference; Malcolm Hoenlein, CJF; Zelig Chinitz, UIA.
- (55) Conclusions of the meeting between the heads of Jewish international bodies about turning over the U.N. resolution against Zionism, February 23, 1990, (Hebrew), p. 2. CZA/S110/20
- (56) Statement by Ambassador Morris B. Abram, U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. in Geneva, March 6, 1990, p. 4.
- (57) Note on a telephone conversation between David Sasson and Yohanan Manor, March 18, 1990. CZA/S110/20
- (58) Testimony of Seymour D. Reich before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs on S.J. Res. 246 which called upon the U.N. to repeal Resolution 3379, March 30, 1990, p. 2. CZA/S110/13.
- (59) U.S. Information Service (USIS), News Report, "Moynihan links aid cutoff to Zionism is Racism view," Tel Aviv-Jerusalem, April 2, 1990, p. 2.
- (60) USIS, Official Text, "Text of Senate testimony by J. Bolton," Tel Aviv-Jerusalem, April 2, 1990, p. 1.
- (61) USIS, Official Text, op. cit., p. 2.
- (62) USIS, Official Text, op. cit., p. 3.
- (63) USIS, Official Text, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
- (64) USIS, Official Text, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
- (65) USIS, Official Text, op. cit., p. 5.
- (66) USIS, News Report, op. cit., p. 1.
- (67) USIS, News Report, op. cit., p. 2.
- (68) *JTA*, April 5, 1990.
- (69) The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 29, 1990. CZA/S110/13
- (70) Letter from William R. Brew to B. Tannenbaum, August 14, 1990. CZA/S110/13
- (71) *Ha'aretz*, July 25, 1990.
- (72) According to Gwin Morgan, Ambassador of the European Community in Israel, to Yohanan Manor, August 8, 1990. CZA/S110/13.
- (73) Annex to the letter sent by the Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans to Mark Liebler, July 4, 1990. CZA/S110/13.
- (74) Gareth letter to Liebler, July 4, 1990, p. 2. CZA/S110/13.
- (75) Letter from Gideon Raphael to Manor, June 28, 1990; Letter from Elie Wiesel to Narkiss, July 24, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (76) Letter from Gideon Raphael to Eli Wiesel, June 28, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (77) Letter from Yechezkel Barnea to Narkiss, August 26, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (78) Fax from B. Tannenbaum to Uzi Narkiss, August 13, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (79) John Bolton address to the BBI symposium, December 6, 1990, p. 21. CZA/Z5/3561
- (80) *Jerusalem Post*, 18 September 1990.

- (81) Bolton address to BBI Symposium, op. cit., p. 19.
- (82) Letter from Narkiss to Foreign Minister David Levy, September 2, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (83) *Congressional Record-Senate*, S 13346, September 18, 1990.
- (84) Elyakim Rubinstein, *Anti-Semitism in the World—Follow-up Report* (3), Report to the members of the Government, September 12, 12, 1990, pp. 1-2.
- (85) Kenneth S. Stern, *Anti-Zionism, the Sophisticated anti-Semitism*, American Jewish Committee, New York, September 1990, p. 15.
- (86) Kenneth S. Stern, op. cit., p. 25.
- (87) Letter from Norman Appleton to E. Rubinstein, December 18, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (88) Letter from Manor to E. Rubinstein, July 2, 1990. CZA/S110/20.
- (89) *Jerusalem Post*, April 28, 1991.
- (90) See above, as well as note (78).
- (91) Memo on an update by Y. Bein, July 17, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (92) See also, "Perez de Cuellar's ambition," *Jerusalem Post*, May 17, 1991.
- (93) *Hadashot*, May 15, 1991. According to New York correspondent Yossi Werter.
- (94) *JTA*, July 16, 1991.
- (95) According to a working paper prepared by Christopher Gachek, a senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation. *Ha'aretz*, September 19, 1991.
- (96) S.J. Res. 110, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, March 22 (Legislative day, February 6) 1991.
- (97) Quotes of this interview in a fax from Norman Appleton to Y. Manor, June 18, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (98) Letter from Appleton to Manor, March 18, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (99) Memo from Manor to Narkiss, May 28, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (100) Memo on an update by Y. Bein to Manor, July 17, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (101) Memo from Herman L. Sainer to B. Tannenbaum, July 31, 1991. CZA/Z5/3561; fax from Manor to Helene Teichman, July 27, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (102) Letter from S.J. Wall to G. Garai, June 9, 1991. CZA/S110/13; *JTA*, July 24, 1991.
- (103) Letter from Gareth Evans to Mark Liebler, August 1, 1991. CZA/S110/13.
- (104) Memo from H. L. Sainer to Tannenbaum, July 31, 1991. CZA/Z5/3561
- (105) *Jerusalem Post*, August 4, 1991.
- (106) Letter from Prime Minister Shamir to President Bush, June 4, 1991. CZA/S110/20.
- (107) *Jerusalem Post*, August 5, 1991.
- (108) James D. Besser, "Is the President All Talk on Zionism-is-Racism," *Baltimore Jewish Times*, September 27, 1991.
- (109) *JTA*, September 18, 1991.
- (110) President Bush address to UNGA, New York, September 23, 1991.
- (111) *JTA*, October 16, 1994.
- (112) Record of Conversation between Isi Liebler, co-chairman of the WJC and Narasima Rao, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi, November 21, 1991. CZA/S110/13.
- (113) *Ha'aretz*, October 4, 1991.
- (114) *Ha'aretz*, September 2, 1991.
- (115) *Ha'aretz*, December 8, 1991.
- (116) *Jerusalem Post*, July 29, 1992.
- (117) *Jerusalem Post*, December 13, 1991.
- (118) *Jerusalem Post*, December 12, 1991.
- (119) Brochure, "Misrad Hah'utz, Bitul Hah'lata 3379" (Foreign Ministry, Revocation of Resolution 3379," December 26, 1991. CZA/S110/48.
- (120) United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release USUN 110-(91), December 16, 1991, p. 1.
- (121) Op. cit., p. 2.
- (122) Op. cit., pp. 2-3.

CONCLUSION

The abrogation was hailed as an unprecedented and historic event. Indeed, it sharply checked the decades-long trend of debasing the national movement of the Jewish people and trying to return them to the ghetto or, even worse, to deny them a place as a people and a nation.

It also marked a turning point in the history of the United Nations. It not only signalled the end of the Cold War that for decades had paralyzed the international institution and derailed its mission. It was also marked a departure from the spirit of one-sidedness, intolerance, hatred and name-calling which had taken it over. With Resolution 46/86, the UNGA was sending a loud message that the U.N was recovering the spirit of universal unity, fairness and true cooperation which had inspired its very establishment.

But was it unprecedented? Formally, the answer is no since in 1950, with Resolution 368(V), known as the "Spain precedent," there had already been a formal revocation of a recommendation adopted by the UNGA. However, the annulment of the recommendation in the 1948 UNGA Resolution 39 (I) dealing with Spain's admission to the U.N. was very different in substance as well as impact from the abrogation of 3379. In this sense, then, it was unprecedented.

Resolution 3379 did not refer to an unacceptable feature of a state seeking membership in the U.N. Rather, it singled out and disqualified a national movement and its founding ideology. This was viewed by some as entirely outside the prerogative and jurisdiction of the UNGA.

The impact of 3379 was also very different. Because of its scapegoating nature, it profoundly affected the language and atmosphere of the international body. This made it more difficult to change since it required a formal recognition of a mistake.

In this respect, the abrogation of 3379 was an act of wisdom and political courage as well as a message of hope, sharply distinguishing it from Resolution 386(V) of 1950.

Four other questions must be addressed in this conclusion. The first relates to the research itself. We noted in our work that the lack of data made it difficult to assess some developments, such as the impact of the ZR on world Jewry and on the Third World. But these issues were not central to our subject. We would, however, recommend serious investigation of two issues: why Soviet policy condemned Zionism (much easier with the increased ac-

cess to Soviet sources), and the reasons for Western Europe's staunch reluctance to join formal calls for the repeal of Resolution 3379.

The second question deals with Israel's reluctance to fight for the abrogation of the ZR. As observed by Moynihan, Nunez, Herzog and others, nearly the whole decade following the adoption of the ZR was marked by Israel's inaction. And when there was some departure from this pattern of inaction, it was in favor of an information campaign to teach and "explain" Zionism. The explicit abrogation of the ZR resolution was not targeted as a political goal.

In fact, Israeli diplomats and policy makers hoped and expected the resolution would vanish from the sheer force of its absurdity and the embarrassment it was supposed to have caused to most member states at the U.N. Viewing it any other way would only confer on it importance and legitimacy, they reasoned.

At the initial stage, then, the reluctance to fight for an overturn stemmed from a failure to understand the severity of the damage that this resolution, however absurd and embarrassing, nevertheless would inflict on Israel and the Jewish people. It is possible that this complacency was also a result of having successfully foiled plans to expel Israel from the U.N, thanks to the firm stand of the U.S.

The inability to grasp the danger of this substitute for expulsion was also due to the great difficulty of the people of an existing state and its representatives abroad to recognize and admit that the legitimacy of their state was being questioned by the international community. As observed by Ehud Sprinzak, the people directly affected by delegitimization are the last to perceive the danger.

It then became difficult for the Israelis to admit the ZR was not evolving according to expectation: it was not vanishing, it was not being forgotten, it was not an embarrassment to most. Instead, it was gaining more and more legitimacy and inflicting increasing damage. Still, the prevailing pattern was to ignore the whole issue and to provide elaborate rationalizations to justify the inaction. Legally and arithmetically, the main rationalization went, revocation was not a realistic goal and was even counterproductive since unsuccessful attempts would only cause additional damage for Israel.

When the damage was finally acknowledged in 1984 as a direct result of WZO's initiatives, there was still a pronounced hesitation to name abrogation as the explicit goal of the campaign. There was a fear this would create a dangerous precedent by opening the road to the revocation of the 1947's U.N. partition plan recommending the creation of a Jewish state and a Palestinian Arab state [UNGA resolution 181(II)].

The first successes, at the IPU in Geneva in September 1984, and at the Women's Conference in Nairobi in July 1985, showed that the fear of counterproductivity was not really founded. It was possible, after all, to fight

the ZR resolution and get results without triggering its reiteration. It was then accepted that overturning the ZR should be the declared goal of the campaign. It would prepare the ground for formal action without committing itself to a timetable.

Still, even after that, there were sporadic expressions of reluctance to pursue actual repudiation. When Shimon Peres was foreign affairs minister from 1987-88, for instance, the matter was not pushed forward, probably so as not to hinder the secret negotiations on a framework for an international peace conference (Peres-Hussein agreement). Under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir the issue was not advanced so concessions would not have to be made in exchange and because the ZR was viewed as leverage in keeping the U.N. out of a negotiating framework for a peace conference.

All these considerations were basically of a tactical nature. But some of them were not well grounded. The damage inflicted by the resolution was not recognized, for instance, first and foremost, because there was no desire to investigate it. Officials preferred to put their heads in the sand, or to claim that it was not possible to distinguish between the damage inflicted by the resolution and that inflicted by all other anti-Zionist attacks. One recalls that it was only in 1984 that the Israeli embassies were asked to provide their evaluations of the actual impact of the ZR. Some of the answers, notably from the European representatives, did not bother to provide an objective evaluation, as was to be apparent later on.

Also, there was no serious merit to the argument that the abrogation of the ZR could create a dangerous precedent regarding an UNGA resolution. First, as we know, such a precedent already existed (regarding the admission of Spain to the U.N.). Second, UNGA resolution 3379 (XXX) was having the same effect as an abrogation and working as some kind of nullification of UNGA resolution 181 (II), the partition plan for Palestine.

Under these circumstances, it is legitimate to wonder whether these tactical and unfounded reservations were indeed the reasons why the abrogation of the ZR resolution was so low on Israel's political agenda.

We are inclined to explain this persistent and even systematic reluctance to target abrogation as a goal with more profound strategic considerations. The official establishment believed that dealing with the abrogation would necessarily lead to the recognition of Palestinian political rights and of the PLO.

Of course, for a large part of the international community, Resolution 3379 and Palestinian self-determination were closely linked. This was made clear with UNGA's passage at the time the ZR was adopted of a resolution on "the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination. . ."

After the conclusion in 1978 of the Camp David accords, which referred to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, it should have been easier for Is-

rael to address the issue of the abrogation. But still Israel was wary. Abrogating the ZR would mean less freedom for Israel to limit these "legitimate rights" as well as concessions on the direct involvement of the PLO in the peace negotiations.

But we have noted also a similar reluctance by the leadership of Jewish communities, notably in the United States, to fight for the ZR's abrogation. This reluctance had been explained as a direct result of Israel's resistance to taking on such a fight. However, it was also possible to detect a specific Jewish uneasiness with regard to the ZR and with defending Zionism against the concomitant attacks on it.

It is never easy to sustain libelous and vicious attacks and it becomes more difficult when one's actions can be interpreted as evidence of dual loyalty. Jewish leaders seemed to have been more prone to this kind of faint-heartedness than Jews at large. In any event, it is likely that the international campaign contributed to freeing at least part of the Jewish leadership from its unease and faintheartedness in showing that fighting the ZR was a human rights cause that could be supported by non-Jews.

The third question is about the actual role of the international campaign in the revocation of the ZR.

For a long time the abrogation of Resolution 3379 was not considered possible in the face of the automatic anti-U.S. and anti-Israel majority controlled by the Soviet-Arab alliance at the U.N. Later, many pointed to the revocation as a direct and obvious outcome of the momentous changes on the international scene: the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the decline in the clout of oil-producing countries, the distancing of Third World countries from Soviet and Arab influences, the split in the Arab world, the triumph of the democratic-liberal model and the uncontested supremacy of the United States. These changes were to put an end to the partisan and prejudiced automatic majority, return the U.N. to its vocation as a champion of peace and cooperation and bring about the annulment of Resolution 3379.

From this perspective, the revocation would have taken place in any case, with or without the international campaign. But we disagree. We believe that the international campaign played a substantial role in the abrogation of the libel equation and that without it the ZR resolution might have been frozen or eventually considered "caduc," but not formally revoked.

First, no one can contest the role played by the WZO and the campaign in prodding Israel to address the issue, in spite of its fundamental reluctance.

Second, it should be recalled that contrary to widespread belief, the automatic majority began shattering long before Perestroika and the new Soviet "thinking" on international affairs. In fact, we have seen how the first crack in this automatic majority occurred in 1978 as a direct result of more U.S. involvement in U.N. affairs during the tenure of Ambassadors Young and

Lowenstein at the U.N. We can only speculate about the actual chance of a repeal move then, since it was decided not to try it.

Third, we have noted that already at the beginning of 1987, during Perestroika but long before the disintegration of the USSR, Israel's top diplomat at the U.N., Netanyahu, determined there was already a majority in favor of a repeal. However, Israel was afraid it was not a sure thing and probably also that such a move could hurt its efforts to get Arab approval for its peace conference framework. On the other hand, the half-hearted involvement of the United States was an essential factor in postponing this move.

Fourth, even after all the above-mentioned changes took place, on the very eve of the repeal there was still both strong skepticism (Europe, Australia) and persistent reluctance (Europe, Egypt) to submit a repeal draft resolution. After all, the ZR was a very convenient device to exert pressure on Israel in exchange for some "quid pro quo." Only strong and unconditional U.S. leadership helped secure a comfortable majority for the repeal.

Thus no one can deny that the changes in the international context and climate were contributing factors to a repeal move. But by no means could an actual proposal and its passage automatically result from them. In our eyes, then, the decisive factor was not the new international order. It was Israel's ultimate readiness to confront the ZR and seek its annulment as well as active U.S. involvement in leading the repeal. And these were achieved thanks to the vigorous international campaign, which succeeded in raising public awareness, first and foremost in the United States where it managed to impress both the U.S. Congress and administration, as well as among Israel's foreign policy makers. The practically unabated pressure over the seven years from the kick-off conferences until the repudiation was a decisive factor in putting and keeping this issue high on the U.S. foreign policy agenda.

The international campaign had other no less decisive merit. In indicating clearly that its goal was the abrogation of the ZR and it would not settle for less, it signaled that it was a possible endeavor.

One recalls that several devices other than a formal abrogation were proposed. James Jonah, for instance, favored a negotiated non-reiteration of the ZR in exchange for granting Western support to Third World interests. And John Bolton, among others, suggested holding a vote on the ZR and viewing a negative vote as a repeal!

In any case, the common practice at the U.N. was not a procedure of formal abrogation. As a striking example, when China was about to be accepted as a member of the U.N., it demanded the U.N. nullify the anti-China resolutions, but the U.N. balked and China conceded.

These tortuous devices reflected both the expected difficulties on the road to actual abrogation, and the lack of interest in submitting a draft resolution calling for a formal repeal of the ZR. All this, even long after all the above-mentioned international changes had taken place.

Many times it was claimed that the timing was not right for such a move. This was the rationale in October 1990 by the Bush administration so as not to jeopardize the international coalition against Iraq. This argument was also invoked by the Arab states, including Egypt, in September and December 1991, on the very eve of the repeal, out of concern for the peace process! Moreover, many countries, among them the Soviet Union and even Israel, feared a formal repeal, viewing it as a dangerous precedent.

Finally, as is well known, no person, organization or other entity, is eager to recognize publicly its errors. This was the case for the supporters of the ZR as well as for some of its staunchest opponents. We have already referred to the surprising Israeli reluctance to fight for the abrogation. As a matter of fairness, we should also remember that the United States, the crucial agent in the formal overturn, bore a heavy responsibility for the conditions which made possible the acceptance of the ZR linkage by the majority of the United Nations. In 1965, it gave in to Soviet blackmail and withdrew the amendment it had sponsored with Brazil to have anti-Semitism condemned as a form of racism, instead of fighting for it to the end.

All these were powerful factors against the submission of a formal repeal, and argued for milder substitutes or for postponement. Therefore, it is very doubtful that in the absence of the relentless push by the international campaign, the ZR would have been formally overturned.

* * *

The last point we want to address here will return us to the genesis of the Zionism-is-racism link. We remember the discussions at the U.N. in 1965 on an international convention for the eradication of racism which it had been decided to draft after the international anti-Semitic outburst of 1959-60. It was precisely the Soviet opposition to including anti-Semitism in this convention as an example of racism which first led to the cynical linkage of Zionism with racism.

We have also seen how the adoption of the ZR resolution, ten years later, had contributed to restoring legitimacy to anti-Semitism, which for more than a generation had been taboo. The UNGA resolution on Zionism had provided a guilt-free path and platform for anti-Semitism and to anti-Semites at the U.N. and the world over.

Therefore, we might ask whether the international campaign to rescind the ZR and ultimately the abrogation itself had an impact on undermining the legitimacy won back by anti-Semitism, thanks to the ZR, and to curbing anti-Semitism. This is very difficult to answer, but we can point to some signs of the possibility of such an influence.

First, we know the campaign helped raise public awareness that the ZR was tainted with bias, prejudice and bigotry, and as such was very close to anti-Semitism, as stressed in the Australian resolution (1986) and in the second U.S. congressional resolution (1987). Moreover, the international

legal conference held at New York University in April 1986 convincingly showed that the U.N. was increasingly infested with anti-Semitism.

Also, in our view it was not entirely coincidental that the Holy See waited until 1988 to state that anti-Zionism "serves at times as a screen for anti-Semitism, feeding on it and leading to it," in its official "The Church and Racism: Towards A More Fraternal Society."

Second, it is remarkable that even before the abrogation there were some very unusual reactions against anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism from high U.N. officials, notably the secretary general and also from the chairman of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. This marked a significant departure from the refusal to repudiate anti-Semitic diatribes which were heard so often before in U.N. fora, especially those dealing with human rights and religious tolerance!

Third, and far more substantial, it should be stressed that after the abrogation, and for the first time in the history of the United Nations, anti-Semitism was condemned by an official organ of the U.N. On March 9, 1994, the fifty-three members of the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva passed a resolution, "Measures to combat contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance," sponsored by Turkey with the support of Canada, Holland, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the UK, Romania and Russia. It referred explicitly to anti-Semitism in its introduction, as well as in its operative paragraph. The reference in the introduction was adopted with 34 votes, with 17 abstentions, while the operative paragraph was adopted by 51, with 2 abstentions.

It read as follows:

"Requests the special rapporteur to examine according to this mandate incidents of contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, any form of discrimination against blacks, Arabs and Muslims, xenophobia, negrophobia, anti-Semitism and related intolerance as well as governmental measures to overcome them, and to report on these matters to the commission at its fifty-first session."

So for the first time, the U.N. ceased to be mute and to "forgo the sin of silence" on the issue of anti-Semitism, in the words of Howard Squadron before the U.N. Human Rights Commission. For the first time anti-Semitism was both clearly denounced and subject to operative scrutiny by the U.N. human rights monitoring machinery.

It is very doubtful that this complete reversal in the U.N.'s treatment of anti-Semitism would have happened in the absence of a formal abrogation of the ZR.

Of course, it was not realistic to expect that the revocation of UNGA Resolution 3379 in itself would send us back to the '50s and '60s when anti-

Semitism was totally discredited and devoid of any legitimacy. And it is not at all certain that such a return would have been desirable. We should not forget that the opprobrium and the taboo surrounding anti-Semitism in the earlier years was both a morally reassuring and pragmatically sterile stand, since it was not followed by practical action to combat it. On the contrary, it was characterized by a reluctance to address and denounce the issue, by a paralysis of sorts.

There is no doubt that the current climate, in which anti-Semitism is considered one manifestation of racism and denounced and fought as such, is a far more better omen than in the future, anti-Semitism will be treated more fairly by the international community.

POSTSCRIPT

Eli Eyal

In May of 1978, I met with Phillip Klutznick in the lobby of the Sharon Hotel in Herzliya. He was then president of the World Jewish Congress, whose governing board was in session in the adjacent conference hall. Phil had been a guest of the Zionist Executive two days earlier and wanted to clarify with me a few things I said at that meeting concerning the distinction made between the involvement and intervention of Diaspora Jews in the affairs of the state of Israel.

While we were sitting and talking opposite the conference hall, Leon Dulzin came out of the meeting and said to me, "It would be a good idea if, as chairman of the Information Department, you went in because they have begun discussing the U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism."

Feeling somewhat guilty that I wasn't in the meeting room, I responded defensively. "Instead of discussing the resolution itself," I said, "they should be discussing the fight against it, how to rescind it."

On the way back to Jerusalem, I realized that my defensive comment, a chance retort, could indeed be transformed into an idea, a program. At that time I was in the process of setting up the Information Department and I decided that the campaign against the U.N. resolution censuring Zionism would be the main focus of this department's objectives. The newly appointed director general, Yochanan Manor, ardently embraced the idea.

* * *

Although the Zionist Movement is not a governing body in the constitutional sense of the word, it was clear that the fight against anti-Zionism would be the fight of all the Jewish people and that this fight would require allies who were not Jewish.

Zionist policy before the establishment of the state had left Israeli policy with inherent tensions between conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, Zionism had aspired to transform the Jewish people into a nation like all other nations, to shed idiosyncrasies the Jewish people had acquired during the years of exile. On the other, the Jews of Israel claimed a right to remain unique and separate unto themselves, different. ("... The people shall dwell alone, and shall not be reckoned among the nations.") We harbor suspicions of the world at large, yet there is a compelling desire to win international recognition and sympathy.

Indeed, we should not rely solely on international support, but at the same

time we must not minimize the importance of allies among the world's nations. The effectiveness of this battle will be greatly enhanced when prominent figures from enlightened circles in the non-Jewish world join the fray.

Against this background, we forged the crux of the campaign. The purpose of the U.N. resolution condemning Zionism was not only to negate the state of Israel both morally and ideologically, not only to prejudice the relationship between Diaspora Jews and Israeli Jews. Rather, it was a deliberate scheme to destroy the basic values of Western society: democracy, human rights, sovereignty. And all this by means of anti-Zionism.

* * *

The U.N. resolution against Zionism launched by the Arabs and the communist world testified that the conflict between Israel and the Arabs is not based on a misunderstanding. The Arabs viewed Zionism as the will of the Jewish people to be nation, to exist as a Jewish state.

At the Emunah Conference in the United States in the early '70s, Yitzhak Rabin, then ambassador to the U.S., said there would not be peace as long as the Arabs did not recognize the light of Zionism. That doesn't mean that in 1997 the Palestinians will be sending a delegation to the 100th anniversary of the Zionist Movement, because a peace agreement can be signed between two nations without their falling into an embrace.

The difficult and protracted peace process that began with Egypt has now included the PLO and Jordan and will possibly end with Syria, proving that it's possible to distinguish between a political settlement and the resolution of Jewish justice and Arab justice. A political solution doesn't require love. It usually requires a rational fear, a combination of fear and common sense and deference to reality.

Therefore, no real settlement is a just settlement. The heroes of the Greek tragedy are just; they kill one another, all succumb and justice reigns over the stage.

The U.N. resolution equating Zionism with racism was indeed rescinded. But only when the peace settlements are anchored in everyday realities can we begin resolving the question of Jewish justice and Arab justice. We will have to persuade the Arabs that Zionism never sought to be and never will be an antithesis to Arab national existence. But that objective has yet to be realized.

When I declared in 1979 that our aim would be the revocation of that infamous U.N. resolution in a way that would be commensurate with the charter of the U.N. and its regulations, many eyebrows were raised in skepticism. Would the campaign be successful? With no precedents, the prospects were not good. But we were confident in the rightness of our goal. As the saying goes, the way is wiser than those who traverse it. "*To Right a Wrong*" bears witness to this.

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
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Yohanan Manor was born in Paris in 1937, as Europe fell under the growing German menace. He emigrated to Israel in 1957 as a young man who lived through the darkest period of racism in modern history. His education continued in France where he completed his undergraduate work in International Relations at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, in Paris in 1963. He has a BA



in Economics and Law from the Sorbonne which he received in 1968. His MA was done at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris in 1965, and he is also a graduate of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA). His Ph.D. was awarded in Political Science by the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques in June 1970, for his doctoral thesis entitled, "Palestine in the Foreign Policy of Gamal abd El-Nasser." At home in Jerusalem, he first served as a lecturer in Political Science at the Hebrew University between 1970 and 1978. He was then appointed to the post of General Director of the Information Department of the World Zionist Organization, a role in which he served for a decade, until 1984. Since that time, he has been active in monitoring racism and anti-Semitism that is disguised as anti-Zionism, first as the Coordinator of the Campaign to rescind the United Nations General Assembly resolution that equated Zionism with racism.

He has also been a member of the "Anti-Semitism Monitoring Forum," of the Israel Government's Secretariat, since 1987.

Among his many publications related to Zionism and anti-Zionism are "The New Anti-Zionism" in the *Jerusalem Quarterly*, Spring 1965, pp. 125-144; "Contemporary Anti-Zionism" in the *Encyclopedia Judaica Yearbook*, 1983-1985, Keter, Jerusalem, 1985, pp. 119-127; and "Anti-Zionism after the Establishment of the State of Israel" in *New Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel*, Herzl Press, New York, 1994, vol. 1, pp. 87-88.

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David Weichman

Shimon Peres, *Prime Minister of Israel*: "Zionism is first and foremost a great victory against racism. However, reacting positively was not enough to placate the vicious crusade against Zionism. Israel had no option but to challenge this legal travesty, since the deligitimization of Israel made it an easy game for terrorist attacks."

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *Former U.S. Secretary of State*: "Eliminating the Resolution has not brought peace to the beleaguered people of Israel. But the consequences have, nevertheless, been profound; the loss of the 'respectability' that the resolution gave to those who hate Israel has shown them for what they are: anti-Semites, terrorists, international gangsters, gangster states, and other such despicable trash."

Jacques Chirac, *President of France*: "Knowing the importance of the three fundamental sources of Zionism: the messianic religious tradition of Judaism; the national thinking of the 19th century; the destructions caused by all the persecutors, knowing that, nobody can equate Zionism with racism, since precisely the former is also an admirable means to combat the latter."

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan: "Israel has little to fear from the strictly military balance. But I believe that Israel has much to fear from the ideological assault aimed at branding Israel as illegitimate."

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations*: "Any attack against Israel is justified. Any defense is unjustified. No one can expect that Israel will receive fair treatment at the U.N. where anathema is called down on her as on no other nation in U.N. history."

Alan Keyes, *Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations*: "The anti-Zionism campaign is an instance of the general tendency to degrade the intrinsic meaning of the U.N. idea, and to use the U.N. as an instrument of conflict. We should recognize that our opposition to that campaign is an urgent part of our overall efforts to renew the original foundation of the U.N."

Ambassador Morris Abram, *United States Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Commission*: "The mother of my five children, herself not born a Jew, captured the essence of the link between Judaism and Zionism when we were together at Nuremberg in 1946, when Goering, Ribbentrop and Speer stood in the dock. Upon seeing the remnants of Hitler's camps straggling through Germany, unwanted anywhere except by their own people in Palestine, she turned to me and said: 'A Jew is either a Zionist or he has no heart.' "

Hubert Humphrey, *Late Vice President of the United States*: "The continued efforts to repeal this resolution will tell us a lot about the U.N. and even more about the United States."