Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel

The Necessary 'Other' in the Making of a Nation

Riad M. Nasser

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To *Adam, Irene and my life companion, Hana*

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Preface

In an age dominated by buzz words such as globalization, a discussion of nationalism might sound like an archaic scholarly exercise. But nationalism can also be viewed as an integral process of a previous phase of globalization, where cultural imperialism during the era of colonialism forced local cultures to reconfigure their identification after colonial forces drew new boundaries. Alternatively, it could be argued that the past phase of globalization marked by colonialism, disintegrated empires, and differentiated communities has given birth to a new form of identity—nationalism (see Berberoglu, 1995).

With the rise of nationalism toward the end of the 18th century, communal identification transcended into an "imagined community," as Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1991) have argued. This process of nationalization of communities continued to dominate the international system, even during the post WWII era. However, for a while during the late 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, there was a sense that the glamour of nationalism was declining with the rise of the new phase of globalization (see Fukuyama, 1992). Soon, those expectations were rebuffed with the break down of the Soviet Union and the ethnic and national conflicts that followed.

More recently, with the further advancement of globalization and its spread across continents, local identities, whether of nations, cultures, or religions, persist as another form of resistance to this late invasion of imperial forces (see Mirsepassi, Basu and Weaver, 2003; *Loomba*, 1998). As Beyer (1990) argues, global processes and the weakening of the nation-state system have invoked another form of identification, which is manifested in the emergence of religious fundamentalism on a global scale. He adds that "A global society has no outsiders who can serve as the social representation of evil. Without these, the forces of good also become more difficult to identify, undermining, for instance, deontological moral codes and the salience of other-worldly salvation" (ibid, 374; see also, Basu and Weaver, 2003; *Loomba*, 1998).

The underlying principle in these processes of identity configuration, whether of a small community, a nation, an ethnic group, or a religious community, is that identity requires an 'Other' against whom it becomes meaningful. The Other as an outsider sets the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion for a collective. Further, self identity is realized when it encounters an Other at the time of interaction. More generally, collective identity, like an individual's identity, is not an organic quality that can survive the forces of change; rather, as Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm have argued, it is "imagined" and "invented."

This study examines the process of national identity formation. It argues that national discourses are systems of meanings in which identities develop via difference. While modernist theories on nationalism have focused on similarity to establish categories of the "same," in this study my focus is on "difference," which constructs identities of the We in relation to the Other. Since meanings of a collective self and Other develop in language, the study focuses on the political economy of meanings. More specifically, it looks at how meanings change over time and space, yielding a dynamic view of national identity.

I examine these ideas with specific reference to Jordan and Israel, and examine how the Palestinian exclusion played a major role in the making of their national identities. Historically, those relations between Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians started to take shape toward the end of World War I. The end of the war marked the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, colonial countries occupied the region, wars of liberation followed and by 1948, Israel and Jordan became a reality. In the same year, the Palestinian people were expelled from their homeland, Palestine. Since then, the Palestinians have become refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, etc., a few have become Israeli citizens, and a majority of them came under Jordanian and Egyptian custody. Jordan soon extended its sovereignty into the Palestinian towns, villages, and most important, seized their identity and made them "new" citizens of the Hashemite Kingdom. Likewise did Israel with its original Palestinian community, make them Israeli Arabs. With that transformation, only the refugees were left to be called Palestinians.

Further, the destruction of the Palestinian homeland, and the appropriation of the Palestinian land, history, and identity by Israel and then Jordan, was imperative to help those states become what they are today. While Israel expelled the Palestinians from their homeland and denied them their historical rights as people of the land for the last several millenniums, Jordan denied them their national identity by making them Jordanians. In both instances, the Palestinian collective memory and history were suppressed for other identities and histories to be born.

Thus, the Othering and the exclusion of the Palestinians became a necessary strategy in the making of both Jordan and Israel's collective identity. These ideas of exclusion are evident in history school textbooks in both states, Israel and Jordan. Since directly or indirectly, school textbooks are produced, commissioned, or supervised by the state, they can be treated as an integral part of the state ideological apparatus. Their analysis, therefore, provides us with a significant insight on how those states tried to construct their national narratives while excluding the Palestinians.

In this study I analyze history textbooks that have been in use in both Israel and Jordan between 1948 and 1967. In my analysis, I focus on the strategies by which both Israel's and Jordan's national narrative attempt to construct their collective identity through the exclusion of Palestinians. I focus on this period, since it was the formative era of both states, during which their national narratives came to be shaped. The narrative that developed during this period has had serious ramifications on the relations between Palestinians, Jordanians, and Israelis for the years that followed. As I write these pages in 2004, the Palestinians are still an Other: in Israel as Israeli Arabs, in Jordan as Jordanians, in the West Bank and Gaza living behind "security walls," and about half of all Palestinians remain refugees.

This study would not have been possible without the devotion and help I have received from my wife, Hana, and my beloved children, Adam and Irene. Furthermore, I would like to thank my parents, brothers, sisters, and friends and colleagues who through the last few years have encouraged me to commit myself to bring this project to its final stages. Although some of my brothers and sisters were not as lucky as I to receive higher education, their insights and life experiences have given me the glimpse of hope I needed during the hard hours of the research. For all that, I am thankful to them all.

Chapter One
Conceptualizing Identity

CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY

Nothing is more fundamental in sociology than the relationship between the individual and social structure. This problem was recognized by all of the founders of sociology—whether Marx or Martineau or Weber or Durkheim, and none more so than Mead. For Mead, it went a step further to include "mind, self and society." In time, sociology began to grapple not only with the basic tension and causal relations among these things, but also to ask what role was played by such social forces as gender, race, and national identity. If you will, in a very Meadian sense, national identity became an expression of the generalized Other, a manifestation of "community" writ large—a sort of merger of Töennies' *"Gemeinschaft"* and *"Gesellschaft."* It was in the process of the individual's transformation from an inert thing to social being that all manner of social forces were felt and registered.

At the societal level, nothing is more important to consider than the way in which society shapes one's sense of national identity—that is, not just a person but an American or British or French or Israeli or Palestinian. Indeed, history is full of lessons in which lives have been lost over the issue of national sovereignty and the identity (at both macro and micro levels) that comes with it. Nationhood and a sense of it are things constructed out of social interactions, but having a reified existence—taking on a life of their own and, in the most Durkheimian "social fact" way, acting back upon us. At the micro level, of course, there is a drama played out in which these macro things become known, and they are conveyed to us through language. As Mead (1934) long ago noted, gestures become symbols and signs, imbued with far more than mere physicality; it is their meanings which transcend them and make them knowable and interpretable and things which can be shared; or as Weber would have put it, which gives them "intersubjectivity."

There are several problems with such conceptualizations. First, they look at society as totality, system, or as an organic whole. Second, they assume that human societies develop in evolutionary process. Third, the theoretical models that develop out of these conceptualizations are the Western European experience. That Western experience is treated as if it should be a universal yardstick by which other society's experience is measured. Most important is that the assumptions of modern sociological theories have developed out of and are deeply rooted in Enlightenment philosophy and natural sciences (McKim & McMahan, 1997; Seidman, 1994). As such, essentialism, causality, and

tautological reasoning are what explain social phenomena as the development of national identity and collective identity. For example, a nation's and an individual's identity are conceived by those classical and modern theories as real things which evolve and progress through time. Moreover, nations are classified according to their similarity to the Western European model of nationalism (Chatterjee, 1986).

A far more interesting point is the idea of *similarity,* which is the basis of developing systems of classifications. Similarity is the criterion employed in the study of social phenomena to create "identity of the same." By that means, Western sciences have developed into a scientific discourse of classification where sameness, not difference, is the criterion employed to classify the various human experiences. One of its consequences is the attempt to universalize the Western experience (McKim, & McMahan, 1997; Rose, 1991; Said, 1979; Scott, 1988; Seidman, 1994). Such reasoning is what weakens those models' power. But there is an alternative way of conceptualizing this—poststructuralism.

According to many postmodern and poststructuralist theories, the idea that individuals as well as groups have "fixed," bounded entities, or contain some essence or substance that is expressed in distinctive attributes, is a product of a "substance metaphysics" that has dominated Western thought from its beginning to the present. Such a way of thought suffers from essentialism and being tautological (Derrida, 1984; Kristeva, 1991; Said, 1993; Seidman, 1991; Spivak, 1993).

In his critique of modernist thought and modern sociological theories, Seidman (1991) argues that such theories are seen as essentialist. Social phenomena are viewed as expressions of those essences rather than as products of a specific social condition. In our case, this is how the modernists' theories treated nations and their identities as if they have a "basic, fixed, and unchanging character." Consequently, this produced confusion in the conception and in the understanding of such phenomena, under the assumption that something essentialist needs to be uncovered, which is in fact only the criteria by which making distinctions became possible.

The tautological reasoning is evident and rooted also in this Western thought. In all conceptions, if one assumes the existence of one factor, that factor will later lead to its determinate result. For example, if one assumes "consciousness" then the nation "emerges naturally" as a "logical" outcome. Or if one assumes the "nation," then "nationalism," emerges as "natural" (Anderson, 1991).

Another problem with the modernist social theory, according to Deutsch (1969), is to be found in the nature of Enlightenment and modernity, and their theoretical reasoning. Modernity assumes causal explanations and linear processes. Once the "causes" to set a process in motion exist, the process will proceed to its determinant end point. In our case, if one assumes that nationalism is an expression of a nation's sentiments, once these sentiments exist in a nation, they will set a process in motion to reach for and develop into nationalism.

Other aspects of Western thought assume sameness, unity, the existence of an entity, and simultaneity. Derrida (1984) argues that difference, rather than sameness, unity, or simultaneity, is the appropriate way of understanding Western culture in general, and the concept of identity and self in particular. While criticizing the dominant Western views that see culture as unified and self-contained, Derrida insists that a culture can be understood only in relation to Other cultures over and against which it defines itself:

> No culture is closed in on itself, especially in our own times when the impact of European civilization is so all-pervasive. Similarly, what we call the deconstruction of our own Western culture is aided and abetted by the fact that Europe has always registered the impact of heterogeneous, non-European influences. Because it has always been thus exposed to, and shadowed by, its other, it has been compelled to question itself. Every culture is haunted by its other (116).

Looking at cultures and identities in this way refutes the idea that identities have a kind of essence. It also refutes the claim of "natural" development of self and or of a nation. Instead Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Nicholson, and Said, for example, seek to develop theories which look at *difference* (Other) rather than *similarity* to understand the process of constructing identities. In the modernist and classical theories, the Other plays a marginal role in giving meanings to self and a sense of collective identity such as a nation; in the poststructuralist view, by contrast, the Other plays a major role in this process of constructing and understanding the way identities are shaped (Benhabib, 1990; Derrida, 1981, Nicholson, 1990; Krestiva, 1986; Said, 1979).

Based on the aforementioned arguments, this study attempts to understand the role of Other and difference in constructing identities of self, in this case of a national identity. While classical theories assumed the existence of objective traits or "essences" that distinguish one nation from another, and recently, Anderson (1991) has argued that nations are imagined communities, still there is no reference to the role of Other in constructing national identities. My argument is that national identities are, like gender and race identity, socially constructed, and it is in relation to Other that self develops a kind of independent "essence." Such an "essence" of self identity is imagined, it is not "fixed." It is always in a process of becoming, which places self and Other in a dialectical relationship and makes both interdependent, as I will explain below. In sociology this approach is surprisingly lacking.

IDENTITY AND THE SELF-OTHER RELATIONSHIP

Identity as a process of exclusion and Othering is often associated with the linguistic paradigm, or poststructuralism. For poststructuralist theory, the common factor in the analysis of social organization, social meanings, power and individual consciousness is language. Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organization and their likely social and political consequences are defined. Yet, it is also the place where our sense of us, our subjectivity, is constructed (Benhabib, 1990; McGowan, 1991; Nicholson, 1990; Scott, 1988).

From a poststructuralist approach, meanings develop in a relational manner. In the process of defining identity categories and establishing borders between categories, difference becomes represented and placed as the polar opposite of self. Identity is always "alterity identity," that is, identity dependent upon the Other to define self (Cole McNaught, 1996; Derrida, 1978). For self to have a "distinctive" identity, it needs to "gain" such an identity in relation to Other, and not separate from that Other, as if self has "organic" qualities that distinguish it. This kind of constructing social categories and

looking at the world is rooted within the binary way of Western thought (Derrida, 1981). Derrida (1981) has found, based on Plato's work, that Western thought has been a project of grounding of culture upon the construction of rigid boundaries between the world of logos (which is understood here, as truth, knowledge, and reason) and mythos (understood as sophistry, falsehood, mystification, and illusion). He adds that Western history: "has been produced in its entirety in the…difference between mythos and logos, blindly sinking down into that difference as natural obliviousness of its own elements" (ibid., 86),

In contrast to what Derrida argues, it is possible to view the process of constructing identity from a different perspective such as social psychology. Tajfel (1978) Tajfel and Turner (1979), or Sherif and Sherif (1953), and many other social psychologists have studied the individual's social identity and identities in small groups. In those studies the relation between self and Other is well documented. In such studies the focus has been on the arbitrariness of categorization processes, and the formation of in-groups and out-groups.

A well documented study that uncovers this kind of process is that of Zimbardo (1971). In that study, Zimbardo (1971) has shown how members of one group develop their identity in relation to an Other and the arbitrariness of forming groups. Since Zimbardo randomly assigned students one of two groups, it could be argued that it is not anything that could count as "essence" of each group that made members of one group develop a sense of "us." Therefore, based on Zimbardo's study, it could be concluded that the sense of "imagined us" is developed in relation to an Other.

Other social psychological studies have focused on processes of dehumanizing Others. In many cases, these studies have looked at minority/majority, male/female and enemies' dehumanizing images (see Bar-Tal, 1989; Christian-Smith, 1991; Holsti, 1968; 1969; Rouhana, 1997). Similar studies have focused on dehumanizing images of the Other in literature (Cohen, 1985; *El-Asmar*, 1986). In education, we find a similar focus on male/female and ethnic representations and dehumanization in school curricula (Christian-Smith, 1991; Martin, 1985; McLaren, 1989; Pinar, 1975, 1998; Zohar, 1972). In all these studies scholars have found that images of self and Other are organized in binary opposition, where one category is valued compared to its devalued opposite.

From a poststructuralist point of view, while identities develop in a relational manner, it is the power differential between two social groupings that transforms the nature of the relationship into a hierarchal order where one category is dominant while the other is dominated. In other words, power constructs a relation of dominant and subordinate between male and female, blacks and whites, and minority and majority. Further, power allows the dominant to construct knowledge about self and Other, which, in turn, influences both the self conceptions of self and that of the Other. As a result, such knowledge becomes a form of domination and, in other cases, of dehumanization of the Other. Consequently, the relational meanings of self identity and Other are transformed by power into various forms of domination, of inclusion and exclusion.

A more complex relation of Other and self is the case of colonized Other and the colonizer, which has been discussed by Said (1979), Memmi (1965), Fanon (1967), Chatterjee (1986), and many other scholars. Those scholars discussed these relations and how they shape the identities of the colonized as well as of the colonizer. In their studies they found that, colonialism always involved representing the colonized or native Other

as savage, immoral, childlike, and operating at a lower or more primitive level of intelligence. The colonizer's identity, on the other hand, was represented through the colonial project as having a civilizing mission in the world, to subdue and govern the racial and inferior Other.

Another aspect of those relations is the dichotomy of "East-West." Said (1979) for example, has argued that the concept of the "West" as a social category became distinctive only when it encountered the "East." Since the colonizers defined themselves in relation to the colonized, it was their encounter with the colonized that made their identities as Westerners, "distinctive" and "different." The colonizer's discourse attributed different traits to themselves and to the colonized. They also, mobilized *their* definitions to dominate the scientific, economic, political and social discourses. In addition, the colonizers in their discourse attempted to make their view of the colonized the only possible reality for the colonized themselves. Yet, the resistance of the colonized resulted in changing both the colonized and the colonizer's perceptions of self and Other. Thus, both became dynamically and dialectically interdependent. However, the power differential between the two made one discourse more dominant than the other, and with that, transformed the relationship into one of domination and subordination.

Although these various studies have shown that self and Other are organized in binary opposition, they dealt only with specific local instances, be it gender relations, racial relations or colonialism. In addition, most are intellectually rooted in literature or history, not sociology. Few studies, if any, have examined the phenomenon of nationalism in light of self/other relations.

When historical studies have focused on nationalism (Deutsch, 1969; Gellner, 1983; Hayes, 1931; Kohn; 1944; Plamenatz, 1976; Seton Watson, 1977; Smith, 1983; etc.), they tend to utilize a variety of essentialist and causal explanations for what is a "nation" and what is "nationalism." They study the "distinctive" characteristics of a nation, whether these characteristics are "real" or "imaginary" (see Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1991). By doing so, historical studies attempted to create models of nationalism and classification systems based on factors such as "progress," levels of "modernity," complexity of economy, etc. Such criteria have then been used to distinguish between "types" of nationalism, to define what a "nation" is and how to look at other cases. Such approaches are basically rooted in the modernity discourse of classifications and making distinctions, which is central to Western binary thought. As I argue, such approaches are problematic, since many criteria might be used to classify collective, historical or social phenomena. Various scholars might consider different criteria more significant in their classifications. Any such criterion might be considered arbitrary and artificial.

Recently, philosophical studies have started to focus on difference instead of similarities and sameness as a methodological way of understanding how identities could develop. French intellectuals have been especially active in this movement of thought. Examples include, Derrida's (1978, 1981, 1984) focus on difference; Kristeva's (1991) focus on the "stranger" and gender identities, Foucault's focus on deviancy (1965,1979), and the Other.

Several studies have shown how gender identities are socially constructed in relation to the opposite sex, and how each gender gains meaning in relation to an Other. Moreover, feminist studies (Nicholson, 1995; Scott, 1988; Spivak, 1993) have shown that male/female identities emerge together as social categories and neither can develop away

from the other. Still, it is the power of males over females that makes females subordinate. In a similar way, several studies have looked at race identities (Glenn, 1992; Omi and Winant, 1994), and social classes (Poulantzas, 1975) as relational categories, where one's identity is defined in relation to the other, and each identity constitutes a kind of affirmation by negation of the other. That is to say, identities do not develop out of an essence, but rather as not being like the Other, and that negation of the Other is what gives meanings to self as such.

One example is the case of Zionism. In its attempt to develop a national identity, Zionism claimed that its essence is based on three negations: negation of Diaspora (Shlilat Hagalut), negation of the Orient (Shlilat Hamizrach), and negation of the Mandate (British mandate on Palestine during the years 1917–1947). Out of these three negations a Jewish "essence" in Palestine emerges, this "essence" makes the diverse Jewish ethnic groups feel united and distinctive. In spite of the three negations, the Zionist discourse has mobilized its argument by making Jewish identity in Palestine appear as "objectively distinctive" from Other identities, in opposition to which it was constructed.

Few studies on national identities have incorporated difference, whereby the self gains its distinctiveness in opposition to the Other. As in the colonial experience, Other emerged with self, and thus, self is constructed and becomes meaningful in opposition to Other. The West has become significant to itself in relation to the Orient, and the colonized in relation to the colonizer. When conceptualized in this way Self and Other could be looked at as if they are bounded within a totality. Each identity is attempting to construct itself in relation to Other, and by doing that, both Self and Other become parts of a dynamic process of shifting meanings and becoming. When national identity is conceptualized in this way, such identities become dynamic and are always in a state of becoming; they are never fixed nor can they develop apart from other "nations." This inter dependency creates a dialectical relationship between self and Other which keeps self always in a process of shifting boundaries that change over time and space.

This complexity is well illustrated when considering the case of Palestinians in Israel. From an Israeli perspective, Palestinians citizens of the state of Israel are Israelis in times of war. But they are excluded when decisions on peace are required with the Arab countries. Debates over whether the culture of the state of Israel should be Western or Eastern divides society into two camps: those Israeli Jews who support a Western orientation, and those Israeli Jews and Arabs who support an Eastern culture. Debates over a secular state or a religious Jewish state exclude Palestinians in Israel from the "nation." And a war with the Arab countries or anti-Semitic phenomenon brings Jewish Israelis and none Israeli Jewish people together as a unified "nation." In a similar manner, conflicts that touch upon issues sacred to Moslems unite Moslems across countries and continents. Those ever shifting boundaries of self identity and Other is what keeps such identities in a dynamic process of becoming rather than fixed.

The case of Jordan and Israel is especially relevant to this project because it is where I situate my study. In both countries, I look at the process of national identity formation and study the relations of self/Other in each country's national historical narrative. I ask several broad fundamental questions: What is the relation between self and Other in each country's national discourse? How does the self identity of a nation change over time and space? Moreover, what is the relation between Self and Other, in the modern history, in a

place where the legitimacy of one is dependent upon the negation of the Other (the Palestinians)? Thus my study is at once an inquiry into the self-Other nexus and, importantly, takes into account the role that is played by nationalism in shaping such relations and identities.

SUMMARY

The Self/Other relationship is fundamental to any understanding of how individuals are socialized into society. As argued above, it is in relation to Other that our sense of self becomes evident to us. Unlike classical and modernist perspectives on identity formation, which assume an "essence" to a collective identity, poststructuralism focuses on how meanings are constructed and contested in language. Difference and Otherness is what makes meanings of self distinctive. The production of knowledge about self is part of micro and macro structures of power and knowledge nexus within a collective such as a state's apparatuses, which control the way meanings are conveyed and how identities are constructed within a language and consequently within a national narrative. Thus any attempt to understand the Self/Other relationship must also consider the role played by micro and macro centers of power within a collective. In this project, I use poststructuralist perspectives to address such complexities.

The following chapters are organized as follows: Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. Section one is a review of the relevant literature on nation and nationalism. In section two, I discuss the various types and classifications of nationalism, and in the last section of this chapter, I conclude with theorization of the relationship between self and Other. In Chapter 3, the main focus is on the politics of schooling, school textbooks, and how they contribute to the shaping of identity. Research methods are also included in this chapter. Next, in Chapter 4 and 5, I present the analysis of the two case studies of Israel and Jordan. I conclude this study with a summary (Chapter 6) of my major findings and an attempt to identify the beginnings of a new theory on the self-Other-nation relationships.

Chapter Two
Challenging Nation and Nationalism

DILEMMAS IN THE STUDY OF NATIONALISM

The return of nationalism, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, has contributed to an explosion in the literature studying this phenomenon. Yet, for all the richness of this literature, there are still three major difficulties in the study of national identities and the rise of modern nations. The first problem is an adequate definition of the terms: nation, national identity, and nationalism. These concepts are often defined in relation to one another, which adds to the confusion. Moreover, there is a multiplicity of criteria used to define nation such as language, territory, religion, common origin, tradition, culture, race, size, history, spirit, collective memories, state and government, common interests, same economic system, etc. Such richness in criteria adds to the confusion in the definition of these concepts.

Addressing this same issue, Anderson (1991:5) has noted that:

> Part of the difficulty is that one tends unconsciously to hypostatize the existence of Nationalism-with-a-big-N (rather as one might Age-with-a-capital-A) and then to classify 'it' as an ideology. (Note that if everyone has an age, Age is merely an analytical expression). It would, I think, make things easier if one treated it as if it belonged with 'kinship' and 'religion,' rather than with 'liberalism' or 'fascism.'

The second problem is the unresolved debate over whether nations and nationalism are "naturally" and "organically" developing, or being politically constructed. In other words, the debate is between essentialist approaches and constructionist ones. The questions that arise in such debates are whether there is a criterion or a set of criteria such as language, religion, territory, culture, history, common ancestors, economic development, or levels of modernity, by which one can classify or distinguish between nations, or whether nationalism is socially constructed, aiming at giving meanings of "essence" to an "imagined" community as Hobsbawm (1991), has argued.

Some partial answers to the second problem are found in the studies of Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1991), where they argue that "nation" is an artificial construct, or an "imagined community" with an "invented tradition." Anderson, in particular, puts his main emphasis on how print-capitalism enabled the dissemination of an idea such as

"imagined" community over the territory of a sovereign state. The sense of an "imagined" community was made possible, according to Anderson, by language which has allowed individuals in a collective to "imagine" themselves "simultaneously." He talks about this sharing of identification through the idea of "simultaneity" which leads to this feeling of "sameness" and "we the nation." In other words, Anderson's study explores what makes a collective develop their sense of sameness. Thus, for him, identity is made possible by looking at sameness. But, logically and from the poststructuralist perspective, the ideas of "simultaneity" and "sameness," are relational social categories that gain their meanings in relation to an Other (Derrida, 1984). While Anderson rejects the essentialism of national identities, he has not addressed the relationship between self and Other. As argued earlier, self and Other emerge simultaneously. Self does not emerge separate from Other, as Hegel argued in the Science of Logic and as postmodernist theorists elaborated (Derrida, 1981; Foucault, 1979).

Another point which is important in my study and it has been marginalized in many studies, is the relation between power (in its varied manifestations), on the one hand, and the state's production of knowledge that shapes and constructs identities, on the other. While meanings are produced in language, their interpretations are not free from macro and micro structures of power that restrict their scope. This argument is in line with Foucault's idea on the interrelations between power/knowledge and meanings. For example, Foucault (1969; 1971; 1976) argued, power and knowledge are inseparable. This collaboration of power and knowledge is what enables a collective to produce meanings which distinguish "true" (our narrative) from "false" (the "Other's" narrative): at the same time, it mobilizes its own definition of self while excluding Others, as if self could exist apart from the Other. Moreover, the interrelation between political power and knowledge is what allows a collective to define itself through time and space and thus to construct its own history, past, and "essence" as a "true" representation of self (Sleeter & Grant, 1991; Williams, 1989).

Derrida (1984) goes so far as to interpret the practices of such a power as an act of violence. Derrida (1984:117) has stated that any effort by a group to establish the parameters of its own identity entails the exclusion or silencing of the voices of Others. Consequently, the process of identity formation entails acts of symbolic violence against the excluded Other. As argued before, these intertwined relations between power and knowledge and between self and Other were not addressed in Anderson's argument. In this study, I try to understand the relation between self and Other and the dynamics of identity formation and how they are related to power.

The third problem in the study of nationalism and national identities is the multiplicity of perspectives that are mostly based on Western Europe's experience of nationalism. How can one make use of any of those perspectives to explain, for example, the rise of nationalism in other communities in the Americas, Asia, Africa, etc.? The perspectives (discussed below) are essentialist and/or tautological. In other cases we find descriptive analysis of various experiences. Within most perspectives there are conflicting ideas especially when they discuss the process of nation development, national identity, and the nation state. I start with the problem of definitions.

NATION AND NATIONALISM

The basic term "nation" comes from the Latin word *natio.* Originally, the word referred to a human group characterized by the community of birththat is, a human group in a particular geographic area. *Natio* was conceived to be bigger than a family, but not large enough to compose a clan or people *(gens).* Although modern collectives do not share common origins of birth, because of historical fusion processes between collectives, in the formation of modern nations that original meaning of nation was used to define a large human collective as if a modern collective has common values, common ideals, common customs, common territory, common religion, common race, common past, common future, and so on (Rejai, 1995; Snyder, 1990). One could argue that the use of the old terminology to refer to a new phenomenon is ideological and political. Its purpose was to impose on a conglomerate of people the idea of cohesiveness, shared past, shared destiny, and common origins.

One of the earlier definitions of nation is that of the French historian Ernest Renan. In his famous *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* (What is a Nation?)(1882), Renan provided the following definition:

> A nation is a grand solidarity constituted by the sentiment of sacrifices which one has made and those that one is disposed to make again. It supposes a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire, clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite (905–06).

Here, Renan defines a nation in terms of sentiments that generates in a collective the sense of nationalism. He uses "solidarity," "sentiments," a collective consciousness of their shared "past," and readiness to "continue the communal life" in the future. Fundamental questions about how such "sentiments" develop and arise remain unanswered. As we know, history and consciousness are politically dominated. Friedman (1994:118) has argued that:

> The construction of history is the construction of a meaningful universe of events and narratives for an individual or collectively defined subject. And since the motivation of this process of construction emanates from the subject inhabiting a social world, we may say that history is an imprinting of the present on the past. In this sense, all history including modern historiography is mythology.

Similar to Renan, but somewhat different, Stalin (1912:8) like Ernest Barker (1927), says that "A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture." In Stalin's words, a nation is a coherent entity, like other species which develop in an isolated environment, and comes into being through history. More importantly, Stalin, as

a Marxist, attributes the sense of common culture and collective consciousness to material conditions and economic forces. In his view, culture and collective consciousness are part of the superstructure that is molded through history by economic conditions. Can one seriously use this definition to analyze modern nationalism? Can one say that the working class, based on this definition, needs to be a different nation separate from the capitalist class in the same territory? Or do we need to combine the two classes as a nation?

Herder, quoted in Heater (1998) argued that "…nationality is a plant of nature; a nation is as natural a plant as a family, only with more branches; the most natural state is…one nation, an extended family with one national character." Again, *similar* to the previous definitions, the nation in Herder's words is an organic entity, like a plant, but somehow more complex than a family. His conceptualization of nation implies that nations emerge from a "core" or a distinctive origin, which can be traced to an original father or "parents." Further, Herder assumes that members of a nation, like members of a family, share the same genetic code which distinguishes them from other nations. Needless to say, that Herder's definition ignores fusion processes that took place and changed the *purity* of nations over time and geographies.

So far, I have discussed definitions that conceived nation as an organic entity and by assuming that, nationalism emerges as a natural sentiment expressing the collective will. Interestingly enough, a century or more after the appearance of nationalism on the world political stage, one of the pioneers in the study of nationalism and national identities, Hans Kohn (1932), continues the same previous tradition of definitions. Although, he focuses on nationalism as a state of mind, or as a sentiment shared by a collective, nevertheless, he assumes the existence of a nation and then explains the development of sentiment in a collective. In other words, Kohn's argument is tautological since he explains nationalism as an expression of a general will of a collective that he had initially assumed. Further, he assumes that for each nation there is a kind of "character" that keeps the "essence" of a nation over decades and centuries intact. He argued (1975:3) that:

> Throughout the ever flowing change of time and events the ever-broadening diversity of occupations and classes, and above all the unfathomable variety of individual character, there is, at least over centuries or decades, a very definite constancy and consistency in national character, a national "idea."

Thus, "a national idea," in Kohn's conception is a social fact above individuals, which reifies itself upon them regardless of the passage of time. It forces members of a nation to act "rationally" and stay "loyal" to a collective so that their "interest" is served. In other words, Kohn on the one hand assumes the nation, and then tries to explain nationalism. Then, he returns and says that nationalism is a social fact that enforces people's loyal behavior and rational actions, which maintain a nation, which is necessary and functional to achieve people's interests. Then, what is a nation? Is a nation an association of people acting rationally to serve and maintain their interests through that association?!

Similar arguments which conceive the nation as a collection of rational actors, developed from utilitarian theories. For example, Mill's (1972:359–60) emphasis is on

"rationality" as a factor that binds people together in a nation while attempting to achieve their egoistic goals. He argued that:

> A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.

Here in this passage and in his other writings, Mill focused on political and economic interests as bonding forces of individuals to "make up" a nation. There is no reference to history, language, religion and other major criteria mentioned earlier by other scholars. The basic question remains: What did Mill mean by "common sympathies" and how does a "portion of mankind" come to have such common sympathies? Can such "sympathies" and interests constitute a nation?

Renan (1882:902) could be contrasted with Mill. Renan says:

> Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. Are interests, however, sufficient to make a nation? I do not believe so. Community of interests makes commercial treaties. In nationality there is an emotional side. It is at one and the same time soul and body.

For Renan, a nation is not an association or a "community of interests." A nation is a combination of soul and body; a soul that is a sort of spirit or culture shared by all, and a body that possess qualities that distinguish one nation from another. A partially similar conception of nationalism and nation is John Plamenatz's (1976:23–24) definition of nationalism:

> The desire to preserve or enhance a people's natural or cultural identity when that identity is threatened or the desire to transform or create it where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking. I say natural or cultural, for what distinguishes a people from other peoples in their own eyes consists of ways of thinking, feeling, or behaving which are or which they believe to be, peculiar to them. Thus nationalism is primarily a cultural phenomenon, though it can, and often does, take a political form.

Here nationalism is a social structure above and beyond individuals' control which enforces itself on them. Then, from Plamenatz's definition, nationalism is "functional" to preserve the culture and nation. Nations are different from one another due to subjective "belief" in the peculiar ways of "thinking," "feeling," or "behaving," of their members, and nationalism is the glue that maintains and help "national character" develop and survive external dangers and threats. Is not it a tautological argument? Yes, however, questions remain open: What did Plamenatz mean by "threatened" and "inadequate?" Who decides on such transformations?

Another group of theories makes nation congruent with state. For example, Deutsch (1969:19) looks at nations in terms of their political system. For him, nationalism is a kind of "common will" that is enforced by a state which is "identical with one people." A nation is defined as: "…a people who have hold of a state or who have developed quasi-governmental capabilities for forming, supporting, and enforcing a common will. And a nationstate is a state that has become largely identical with one people."

Needless to say, that nation and state are not identical. In addition, not every state is comprised of "one people," and not every "one people" forms a state. However, such a definition is more descriptive than analytical. Deutsch looks at the political arrangement of societies, that is, the nationstate arrangements, and argues that a nation is congruent with a state. In addition, a people become a "nation" if they are capable of forming a political system such as a nation-state. Needless to say, there are many collectives who consider themselves nations, but were not fortunate enough to form a state.

Far more interesting attempts to define nation and nationalism are those scholars who focus solely on the role of language in shaping a collective's self perception. For example, Karl Deutsch's (1966) definition of a nationality focuses on aspects of communication. He proposed that nationality—not nationalism—is the ability to communicate more effectively with fellow members than outsiders. This definition places heavy emphasis on language assuming that communication creates the forms of solidarity in a collective, and consequently, leads to their sense of "togetherness" and "solidarity." While language is the arena where self perception of individuals as well as of collectives, is shaped, Deutsch assumes that *nation* is a homogenous entity defined by a state. Further, the ability to communicate within a bounded territory does not explain how people in Canada, India, and Switzerland see themselves as nations.

The same point was raised more than a century ago by Renan. Renan (1882:720–1) put the emphasis on shared practices. He says, "What constitutes a nation, is not speaking the same language or belonging to the same ethnographic group, it is having done great things together in the past and wishing to do still more in the future."

In other words, he emphasizes the shared practices of common history that could mold the common character of a people and make them wish to share a common destiny. This attribute of the existence of national character or national spirit regardless of language and ethnography is in itself problematic. As Rousseau argued (1966), this *character* or *spirit* may be manufactured where it does not naturally exist. In other words, Deutsch's definition does not explain how a community becomes possibly "imagined," as Anderson has argued.

Fichte has emphasized language as a medium of shaping consciousness and molding a collective into a whole of what could be called a nation. Fichte, (1807–8) in the *Addresses to the German Nation)*, argued that "… men are formed by language more than language is formed by men" (p. 48), and on page 59, he wrote "…the character of its language [has] an immeasurable influence on the whole human development of a people…[it] unites within its domain the whole mass of men who speak it into one single and common understanding." Furthermore, on page 190 he added:

> …the first original, and truly natural boundaries of states are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself,

> long before any human art begins…they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole.

This definition brings us closer to Anderson's (1991) argument on the centrality of language in constructing nations and their sense of nationalism. What is missing in Fichte's definition is how language creates those "invisible bonds." In Fichte's argument they are seen as naturally developing. He believed that such "entities" have always existed in the past and will continue to exist in the future. National identities are conceived as something organic which has developed in language. In other words, in Fichte's definition we are left with no answer to questions such as how identities and collective consciousness are constituted by and through language.

A similar emphasis on language, but somewhat different, is advanced by Anderson (1991:6). He suggests the following definition of a nation: "it is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." It is not imagined in the sense that is fabricated, as Gellner (1964) argued, but in the ways it is made possible and created. Therefore, Anderson (1991) explains, that: "Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (p.6).

The question to be asked now is how did this imagining become possible? Anderson replies that it was by the rise of a new culture, the culture of nationalism. This culture developed with print-capitalism. Print-capitalism, through novels and the press, made it possible for individuals in a Western country to imagine the nation and thus develop their attachment to other fellow persons that they never saw and probably never will see.

This change, which came about with the wake of the new communication systems, resulted in shaping new images of self as members of a large collective, although one not really having the sense of face-to-face interaction that previously molded identities. Now it is possible to have a new conception of the "We" developed by new perceptions of time and space that have been made possible by the new concept of *simultaneity.* Anderson (1991) concludes that through novels, the press, academic centers, and other political socialization institutions, an individual can *"simultaneously"* share images of self and the "nation." That simultaneity was not restricted to the present history of a nation; rather, nationals have assumed its existence in time and space. By that, nationals could argue that nations have existed since antiquity, and that they have evolved as coherent entities of homogeneous peoples.

Moreover, Anderson argues that nations emerged in the dialectical process of conflicting factors such as the French Revolution, modernity, and the decline of religion, but not in an evolutionary process. Thus, it could be argued that on the one hand, nations and nationalism emerged from preceding cultural systems. On the other hand, they emerged with the French Revolution and against the rationalization process of Enlightenment. Therefore, out of these conflicting processes, nationalism emerged as a new culture, coinciding with modernity and the French Revolution. This new culture also changed the process of knowledge production in society by replacing God and religion as the source of knowledge, with human being who became the subject that knows.

Another issue pertains to the way individuals in a nation could imagine themselves. For that to happen, Anderson argues that languages below Latin emerged and enabled

people to imagine the nation as a collective more than a community and less than a universal category of believers, as was the case in the pre-nationalism era.

To my understanding, the central point is not the rise of languages below Latin, but the way identities are constructed in language. The transition from the religious discourse into the modern discourse of nationalism is a transition from a discourse where identities were constructed in the sacred text written in Latin, into a secular discourse where identities are constructed by means of a new hegemonic local language below Latin which is understood by the local community, the "nation." In both cases, identities were constructed in language where meanings of self varied in relation to Other. Thus, in the "Old" (pre-nationalism) discourse, the boundaries between self and other were constructed in the religious texts, now the boundaries between self and Other are constructed in a secular text. The transition from one discourse into another has been accompanied by and was a result of social changes, which shifted the control of production of knowledge from religious authority and dynasty into a defused locus of power, the modern state and its knowledge production apparatuses.

The change in the medium of constructing identity and meanings of self and Other, which came about with the spread of education and language below Latin, has given individuals the opportunity to construct their self identity in the absence of an immediate Other. That is to say, while in the previous discourse the community was considered the collective where iden-titles were negotiated by face-to-face relations, now the collective has expanded and it includes individuals beyond the immediate community. As a result, the Other who was immediate in the small community now has become remote. What we have now is a system of constructing meanings of self as *present* while Other is *absent*, remote as Derrida (1997) has argued. This opens up a variety of ways for personal speculations about which could develop in a written text, regardless of the specific language it is written in. However, we need to remember that the modern state and its institutions of knowledge production are in fact centers of power which control and limit the variety of individual interpretation within a collective. Only a few among the many possible ways of constructing self identity in relation to Other survive. However, by looking at self/Other relations, identity is seen as more dynamic than static. This is particularly true, when we look at those relations in the various discourses. Phrased in this manner, this conclusion stands in contrast to the static conception of national identity as it has been argued by Anderson.

From a poststructural perspective, we need to look at national identities as a process of "production" where self and Other are dialectically related. Thus, instead of conceiving identity as "fixed," identity becomes dynamic and changes over time and space. As argued before, meanings in language are relational. They could be constructed in an analogous or negating manner, but the meanings of self identity of a nation cannot exist in a vacuum. They need to be constructed in a relational manner, too, where the "Other" becomes essential to define the "We." The meaning, in this case of a nation or "who we are," exists in the boundaries and they become "visible" at the encounter of nations, and not within a nation, as if there are inherent differences that exist and are expressed by modes of consumption of cultural artifacts produced in language and by language. This is how "sovereignty," for example, becomes meaningful in relation to other sovereign nations. In fact, sovereignty exists whenever there are Others to recognize it. Without recognition, sovereignty is meaningless.

Identities—such as gender, race, class, nationality, for example from a poststructuralist perspective—have no meanings in themselves. Their meanings become "visible" when encountered. A male identity takes on a meaning at the encounter with a female identity. The encounter, physical or symbolic, creates boundaries. Such boundaries between the two "identities" make each identity seem as if it has "objective" qualities that could define it apart from the Other. In the same way, a French person's "Frenchness," becomes visible and meaningful when encountering an English person, etc.

To summarize, there are several problems in the attempts to define national identity and nationalism. Such problems are common in all definitions whether the criteria to define a nation are "sentiment" (Renan), "fixed entity" (Stalin), "organic-natural" (Herder), "interests-functions" (Mill), "communication" (Deutsch), "language" (Fichte), "language/culture" (Anderson), or others, such as territory, common past, religion, etc. The major problem with all these definitions is the absence of any discussion of Self/Other relations in the process of constructing national identity. I turn now to the discussion of classifications of nationalism.

CLASSIFICATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONALISM

Another facet of the discourses of national identities is the multiplicity of classifications and perspectives on nationalism. A brief review of the literature shows a variety of perspectives: Marxist, liberal, ethnic, modernist, Eastern-Western, etc. While I am aware of the richness in perspectives, I argue that most of them have stemmed from, and base their basic assumptions on, the discourse of modernity from which positivist social theories on nationalism developed.

According to Seidman (1994), Western social theories suffer three major problems: They are essentialist, totalizing, and foundational. In addition to that, according to Derrida (1981:86), modern social theories could be seen as classification systems of categorizations and groupings of social phenomena by using binary oppositions to establish unity of categories—sameness—as their main criteria. For example, modern social theories have made distinctions between male-female, white-nonwhite, us-them, subjective-objective, Eastern-Western, oral-written, modern-traditional, scientific and mythic. Generally speaking, Western social theories are based on classification of binary oppositions aimed at uncovering universal laws. They look at human societies in terms of an evolutionary process, assuming that human societies have been progressing from one stage to another. In short, modern theories can be seen as systems of classification that provide knowledge and meanings about those included in their classification as if the classified are objectively placed in their social categories (McKim and McMahan, 1997; Rose, 1991).

Western discourse on nationalism is no different than other social theories. Classification of types of nationalism uses economic, cultural, etc. factors as those which "objectively" distinguish between nations. Such claims for "objective" causes have become possible by the differences in power between East and West. The dominance of the West has made it possible for Western discourse to mobilize its claims and present them as "objective" criteria, a yardstick by which other experiences are measured.

Moreover, while meanings of self stem from relation to Other, the Western discourse has degraded the Other, and often made them "invisible." By advancing these claims, nationalism in the West is seen as if it emerged "organically" and "naturally" out of the "objective" social processes in those societies.

In the West, this progressive process culminated in the French Enlightenment and Revolution, industrial revolution and modern sciences. Scholars like Kohn (1944), Plamenatz (1976), and Smith (1983) argued that the rise of nationalism in the West was a natural outcome of such a progressive process. For these reasons, nationalism is an outcome of a process that matured with the last stage of progress, meaning political, economic, and scientific development in the West. Such an experience has become the yard stick by which other societies' progress is measured. Accordingly, these other societies, which did not reach such economic, political and scientific levels of progress, are less likely to be able to transform their sense of collective into a sense of "nation," a higher evolutionary stage of progress. Following this reasoning, economic, political and scientific systems have become criteria for classifying nationalism in different cases. In time several perspectives developed, the socioeconomic/sociocultural, Eastern/Western, and ethnic/civic perspectives. What all these classifications have in common is the distinction they make between nationalism in the West and East.

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISCOURSE

The socioeconomic perspective associates nationalism with the emergence of modernity, the industrial revolution, and the French revolution. Its proponents argue that the modern economy requires a mobile, flexible, and educated workforce. This workforce requires a common language, a common culture and, therefore, a uniform set of educational standards. Modern states have a strong incentive to foster and sustain nationalist sentiments among citizenry as a whole (Gellner, 1964; McMahan, 1997). This has been made possible by defining (and sometimes creating) and requiring the use of a specific language and making it the main vehicle to convey this sense of belonging to a nation or to create this political cohesion. For this process to take place, the nation-state became essential as a centralized political system of knowledge production, aimed at enhancing political cohesiveness, and social stability, which were seen as necessary conditions for efficiency and higher productivity. In other words, this discourse views nationalism and nations as part of the changing economic conditions in society. These changes are the transition from feudalism to capitalism or what Karl Deutsch (1953) calls the "Great Transformation." Here, one could distinguish between the Marxist and the liberal and utilitarian perspectives.

In the Marxist perspective, the nation was explained as a historically evolved phenomenon that comes into existence only with the rise of capitalism and the demise of the feudal economic order (Marx, 1845 Communist Manifesto). Before the rise of capitalism, there were human groupings such as tribes, clans, and people. Changes in the modes of production created new economic relations, which, in turn, created nations. Therefore, nations are economic units that came into existence with the capitalist mode of production.

Moreover, Marx & Engels in their book *The German Ideology* (1845; 1970), argued that nationalism was mainly a device of the bourgeoisie for identifying their class interests as the interests of the society as a whole. Consequently, by promoting national identification the bourgeoisie could obscure the conflicting class interests within each nation, and thus encourage conflicts between the proletariat of various nations.

In addition, Connor (1984) argues that, for Marx, the nation developed with the development and advancement of capitalism. Under this new mode of production, new social relations emerged. These social relations are dominated by the capitalists. Put differently, capitalists dominate not only the economic relations, but also the superstructure that includes the political and the ideological structures in a society. This kind of control allows the future control of all the social, economic, and political aspects of society. In other words, the nation and the nation-state are inventions of the bourgeoisie to protect their property rights, obscure the class conflicts in society, and institutionalize their control.

Nationalism, therefore, is part of the ideological apparatus of the superstructure, and it is controlled and manipulated by capitalism. This ideology is not a one-to-one reflection of the production relations in society, but a representation of the capitalist interests presented as the interests of society as a whole.

Since the nation is seen in economic terms, identification with a given nation rested simply upon ties to an economic unit. As Connor (1984:8) argued, Marx believed that workers in a modern industrialized setting were deaf to ethno-national appeals that conflicted with their economic interests. The main criteria of being included in a nation were identification with a given nation as an economic unit, regardless of dissimilarities in culture and ethnic origins. However, the persistence of the phenomenon forced Marx and Engels to accommodate national struggles by making national identification and the rise of nations, under modern capitalism, a necessary and an intermediate stage in the class struggle toward socialism. Capitalism and the inherent contradictions with its mode of production will bring about the self-destruction of capitalism and the advancement toward socialism (Marx, 1976).

Moreover, viewing industrial capitalism as a revolutionary force brought Marx and Engels to justify colonialism and imperialism. Colonialism of a non-industrialized people by industrialized Western nations, Marx and Engels argued, offered the people of Asia and Africa the most potent means of advancing to higher economic stages (Avineri, 1969). These higher economic stages will intensify the class struggle, which is a necessary stage, in the progression toward socialism.

Western societies were seen as having a civilizing mission—that of bringing the colonized and the non-Westerners to higher levers of economic development. Ultimately, pre-industrialized people were not seen as nations. Those in the pre-industrial stage were referred to, by Marx and Engels as “people without history,” “remains of nations,” “ruins of people,” and “ethnic trash” (Connor (1984:9). In other words, the different stages of economic development were used as the main criteria by which Marx and Engels made distinctions between Western and Eastern people, between “advanced” and “backward” societies, and between a “nation” and a “non-nation.”

Such theorization constructs a binary opposition between Western and Eastern societies, which are both measured against the Western experience as the prototype for

societal “progress.” Furthermore, this discourse has mobilized itself as if the criteria by which classifications are made are in fact, “objective” and “scientific.

A slight change in the Marxist theorization of a nation and nationalism took place later in Marx and Engel’s thought. Facing the Polish problem and the Irish question, both had to acknowledge the issue of subjective criteria of defining a nation rather than “objective economic achievements” alone.

At the Second International held in Paris in July 1889 (Bottomore, 1983), two main ideas were advanced, and both are worth mentioning. First, Marxists such as Otto Bauer and Stalin expanded their definition of a nation. A nation was defined as a large collective, sharing common economy, territory, language, culture, ancestors, and shared history (Connor, 1984). It is not clear to what collectives this conception of a nation could be applied. Yet, it has been at the center of political national demands for nation-states, and the right of self-determination, of many collectives in Europe and elsewhere in the years that follow.

Second, while colonialism had been viewed previously as the most advanced stage of capitalism, at the Second International it was portrayed as an attempt of the national bourgeoisies of Europe to expand exploitation and capitalism into other spaces. By that means, they aimed to diminish the revolutionary class consciousness of their respective working classes.

With this theoretical change in Marxist thought, nations, instead of social classes, became the historical driving force of social change and class struggles. Such development in Marxist thought led to the collapse of the earlier Marxist distinction between national and class struggles. It is a convergence of the initial Marxist distinctions between the horizontal-class division, and the vertical-the national divisions of human societies. The nation could now be defined not in economic terms only, but in addition, by the sense of identification with a specific history, culture, language, and a belief in common ancestors. This conceptualization blurs the distinction between the Marxist and the liberal view of a nation and national identities, as discussed below.

The liberal perspective looks at the rise of nations and nationalism as a direct outcome of the French Revolution, the free market economy, and modernization. Spinner (1994) argues that nations and nationalism came about at a time when changes in the economy, urbanization, modernization, and the new complex division of labor took place. The consequences of these changes brought to the surface demands for equality, citizen’s rights, and prosperity. As a result, new social organizations were needed while collectives where in a transition from a community-based existence *(Gemeinschaft*—in Tonnies famous formulation), to an association or society *(Gesellschaft)* based social organization (Tonnies, 1955).

Therefore, according to the liberal view, political, economic, and cultural changes transformed Western societies. People’s expectations were changed, and new social needs emerged. Among these were the need for efficient organization, the need to enhance social solidarity of newly formed collectives and the need for the satisfaction of individual’s rights and expectations. These three elements are intertwined and sometimes hard to separate from one another. They form the principles on which liberalism is based. In other words, nations and nationalism are viewed by liberals as a social phenomenon, which arose to meet the new needs of individuals in society by increasing productivity

and efficiency. This could be achieved by the rationalization of society. Rationalization is reached by implementing scientific methods in economy, politics, and culture.

It is argued that individuals have the need for physical and economic security. In all societies, individual households are seen as insufficient to achieve these goals. Hence, it "becomes" essential that individuals will form large collectives such as a nation, and develop a sense of identification with it, if they wish to achieve their goals. As Snyder (1993:8) argues, "Larger groups are more effective for military defense. Likewise, a larger group enhances economic productivity by allowing a more efficient division of labor."

Thus, from the liberal perspective, on the one hand, nationalism is viewed as emerging from political, economic and cultural social changes. On the other hand, social changes required social solidarity such as nationalism. Put differently, on the one hand, social changes gave rise to new expectations that made it necessary to develop nationalism. On the other hand, to cope with people's expectations, there was a need to make social changes that resulted in the rise of nationalism. Here, the emphasis is on how the individual's needs might best be met. The answer given is by association in a large social organization such as the nation. To meet the needs of society, nationalism became a necessity. The function of nationalism is made to serve as a motivation for association. Besides being tautological, such reasoning does not say much about what a nation is.

From another perspective, advocates of the liberal view assume the pre-existence of a nation prior to the process of urbanization, industrialization, and the French Revolution. They argue that modernization was the main vehicle by which nationalism was enhanced in Western Europe. Social changes simply brought to the surface that which already had existed in a collective, "nationhood."

Welsh (1993:63) defines a nation as "a people welded together by common ties of culture, descent and territory." These ties are seen as historically created, and form the basis of affiliation. Snyder (1993) argues that under pre-modern conditions, national identification was weak. With modernization, these ties were enhanced. This enhanced identification gave legitimacy to the demands of self rule of nations, resulting in the modern nation-state.

Therefore, the process which has led to the rise of nationalism in the West is seen as a natural process of evolution and progress of nations. Hence, nations were not created, but identification with a nation was enhanced by the development of modernization processes such as communication and education. Such processes emerged first in the "advanced" societies of Western Europe and later they have became universal.

It could be concluded, based on these arguments, that the difference between a variety of societies is not whether they are nations. Rather, the difference is in their enhanced sense of nationalism reached along with economic and social transformations. Accordingly, the emergence of nationalism in Western societies is seen as an indicator of the levels of progress and modernity. Nationalism, therefore, becomes a criterion by which this discourse distinguishes between "advanced" and "backward" societies.

Conversely, modernity and economic progress are criteria by which classifications of nationalism are made. Jack Snyder (1993) argues that four factors enhanced the modern national identification: A more complex division of labor; the increasing scale and complexity of warfare; the diffusion of political power in society and the technology of mass communications. Each of these four, he argues, explains partially the means by

which the modern state, in managing these processes of social change, created modern nationalism.

The last argument reminds me of the distinction made by Durkheim between mechanical and organic solidarity as explained in his study, *The Division of Labor (1893).* There, Durkheim explained the differences between "primitive" and "modern" society. While in the "primitive" society there was simple division of labor, in the modern, a more complex division of labor exists. According to Durkheim, the state has a coordinating role which smoothes the functioning of a society as a total system. Also, the state creates the sense of "social morality" and "solidarity" within the collective. This role was played by the nation-state. Without this coordination by the nation-state, the parts fall apart. Hence, the nation is defined in terms of its functions, economic efficiency, defense, and providing support to the political system, the state, which in turn, acts to enhance solidarity of the co-nationals by making use of modern communication systems such as print and education.

Moreover, in Durkheim's work, rationality (science) is the central pillar on which the modern society stands. Here again, rational calculations are the factors that guide individuals' decisions to join a nation or not. In other words, individuals are conceived as rational who act to maximize their chances in their attempts to meet their (basic) needs. They are seen as if they "voluntarily" choose to associate with a nation or not. Hence, joining a nation is presented as a question of free will of rational individuals who are mostly engaged in calculation of loss and gain.

Such reasoning is problematic for several factors. First, in many cases, belonging to a collective is not left to the individual's choice. Individuals and groups are included or excluded according to a set of criteria that is a manifestation of powerful elites among the co-nationals. Second, if the central purpose behind the rise of nationalism was to meet individuals' expectations, and to increase productivity and efficiency, one could challenge the idea that nation is the best way to meet such needs. There might be other alternatives for meeting the needs of people.

Third, theoretically, the liberal approach treats nations as a given. Nationalism is conceived as the culmination of an evolutionary process of accumulation of social characteristics. These social characteristics, "produced" nationalism as the most "natural" expected outcomes.

To summarize, in both the Marxist and the liberal approaches, the criteria by which distinctions between industrialized, "advanced," "modern" and non-industrialized, "backward," and "primitive" societies are made, are rooted in socioeconomic factors. By that means, Western discourse was able to make distinctions among the various experiences of societies. Western experience was placed at the top of the hierarchy, and in relation to it, other experiences were judged.

In both the Marxist and the liberal view, there is a direct link between the nation and the rise of the state. In both arguments the state and the nation are congruent forms that fit each other. The state is defined by its functionality to the nation and the nation is defined by its needs for a state, a political system. As argued earlier, there is no necessary congruency between the two. There are many multi-ethnic or multi-national states. Also, there are many nations fragmented politically into several states. Hence, it is evident that these problems and many others weaken both the Marxist and the liberal perspectives.

THE SOCIOCULTURAL DISCOURSE

This discourse uses culture in its broadest meaning to make distinctions between Eastern and Western types of nationalism. A common assumption among scholars of the cultural approach is that with the transition from premodern to modern times, nationalism emerged. Various explanations are found in the literature about the relation between culture and nationalism. Most scholars assign a central role to language for maintaining or constructing national culture. Two schools have developed: One assumes that national language was behind the process of developing national culture and in turn, nationalism. Two, culture is politically invented by elite groups in a society through a process of making one language dominant. Both arguments are problematic.

The argument which attributes nationalism to the pre-existence of a national language is hard to support. A close reading of the development of national identities in Europe shows a different story. Alexis de Tocqueville (1955) argued that, before the French Revolution of 1789, the apparently homogeneous population of France "was still divided within itself into a great number of watertight compartments, small self-contained units, each of which watched vigilantly over its own interests and took no part in the life of community at large" (Eley & Suny, 1996). Only 50 percent of the population spoke French, local dialects being the language of the ordinary people outside the major cities. In Italy, at the time of unification in 1880, only 2.5 percent of the population spoke "standard" Italian. As Massimo d'Azeglio observed in a famous comment, "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians!" (Eley &: Suny, 1996). Consequently, talking about national language and culture as "natural" is not supported by empirical studies (see Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1991).

The other argument looks at culture as invented and considers language as essential in this process of forming the nation and national culture. Gellner (1964) and Deutsch (1953) both connected the emergence of national identities, and by implication, the nation-state to the Great Transformation of modern times—the rise of the modern, or what Marxists called the transition from feudalism to capitalism (similar to the socioeconomic approach discussed earlier).

With the rise of capitalism, Gellner (1964) asserts that there was a need to homogenize the social culture. The necessity of complex communication elevated the role of culture in the broadest sense. Membership in a nation required literacy, which had to be produced by a nationwide education system in a chosen language. As a result, membership and becoming a co-national in a nation demanded that members master the national language.

This homogenization was thought to be imposed on the emerging nation. Gellner argued that this imposition of a common high culture on the variegated complex of local folk cultures has been the role of leading elites in Western societies. Therefore, the rise of national identities is seen as emerging out of the hegemonic discourse of elites in society.

A similar argument is advanced by Deutsch (1966:97). He too, looks at communication in a collective as a main facilitator of a nation and national culture. He defines nationality "…in the ability to communicate, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders." Moreover, he argues that, constructing homogenized communication systems among and between members of a collective, becomes the main force by which, a collective is transformed into a nation.

In other words, the transition from nationality to a nation becomes possible with the processes of cultural homogenization, or what Deutsch calls cultural assimilation. For him, cultural assimilation is when cultural minorities have adopted the language of the dominant majority or when subordinate groups adopt the hegemonic group's language.

Examples such as Canada, Switzerland, India, the United States, or sub-Saharan Africa show how language is likely to divide populations and thwart communications networks, not necessarily to create nations. Therefore, it could be argued that assimilation and homogenization are forms of exclusion and Othering. It is not language that matters, rather the process of delegitimization of Others, their languages and culture, in short, their identity. As Smith (1983:11) argued:

> Within Europe the more frequent sequence has been an excess of mobilization to assimilation…leading to growing cultural differences and eventually a reactive ethnic nationalism among the fully mobilized population who stress their separate cultural identity. That is what occurred in Eastern Europe with the failure of *Russification* or *Germanization* policies in the last century; and the same phenomena is reappearing today in Western Europe's plural states with their high rates of social mobilization.

In other words, the attempts to impose one language, and by that to create a homogenized communication among a collective, is in fact, a process of Othering where one collective's identity and culture becomes hegemonic by exclusion (assimilation) of less powerful collectives. This leads me to conclude that nations are constructed by mobilization of hegemonic discourses which attempt to reach homogeneity by means of exclusion and Othering.

From a different perspective, Anderson (1983) claims that the rise of nationalism in Western Europe was due to the requirements of industrial society. For him, the nation is "an imagined political community." It is not uniquely produced by the constellation of certain objective social facts; rather, the nation is "thought out," "created."

Thus, according to Anderson (1991:7), the nation, as an "imagined" community, emerges out of the process of homogenization of language under industrial capitalism and at the time in which the technology of print was commonly in use. Anderson describes the process by which it was possible to "imagine" the nation: "What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and fatality an ignoring of human diversity." The innumerable and varied dialects of pre-print Europe were now "…assembled, within definite limits, into print-languages far fewer in number." This was crucial for the emergence of national consciousness, because print-languages created the emergence of fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars, gave a new fixity to language, and created a new kind of language-of-power.

Homogenization of language was not sufficient to create national "consciousness," by assimilation (exclusion) of Other's language. There was a need for political intervention to mobilize the fragmented population into a coherent collective. The goal of this political intervention has been to create the national culture, which included treatment of history,

language, literature, and other cultural artifacts. This national cultural could not develop without the political creativity of some members in a given population. In other words, there has been a need to create this imagined cultural community. It has been made possible to create this national culture through national language (Eley & Suny, 1996). In other words, mobilization of a "national" language has been a necessary step to allow dominant groups in a society to construct a discourse of nationalism that, by and through that language, constructed a story about the "nation," its past, its historical boundaries and roots. Thus, "national" language is both a medium and an end in itself to facilitate the emergence of a national discourse.

To summarize, regardless of the differences between the two approaches to Western nationalism, most scholars associate Western nationalism with the emergence of political, social and economic development in Western Europe. This discourse emphasizes that nationalism developed in Western Europe toward the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. It is viewed as part of the progressive, civilization process of Western societies where economic development, the spread of education and communication, urbanization, modernity and rationality, and the development of liberal political ideology took place as Deutsch (1969) and Plamenatz (1976) both argued.

Both Deutsch's (1969) and Plamenatz's (1976) ideas, like other Western views on this subject, associate the development of nationalism in the West with the process of Enlightenment, the French and Industrial Revolutions, modernity and the political democratic ideologies that occurred first in the West. In this conception, the Western discourse of nationalism is perceived as historical development that succeeded in breaking with the past; a past of dynasties, of religion, and lack of rationality and development. According to Plamenatz (1976), Western nationalism is the culmination of rationality, liberty and Enlightenment. Hence, there is a historical process of evolution of nations that distinguishes Western nationalism as if it were based on a "superior" Western civilization. Consequently, this discourse looks at Western nations as leading forces in the historical march of civilizations, a model to be imitated and followed in non-Western societies.

In contrast, Eastern nationalism, as it was developed by Western scholars, such as Plamenatz, Kohn, and others, has emerged in post colonial Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Resistance to colonialism has been the driving force of such nationalism. Accordingly, Western scholars argue that Eastern nationalism has appeared among "…peoples recently drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards" (Chatterjee, 1986:23).

The emphasis in this discourse is on the development of nationalism in advanced societies. It is a phenomenon associated with an advanced culture ready to accept such social change. This is a phenomenon appearing in the specific material realities of Western nations. Such material realities have not yet developed in the East. In the West, it is argued, there has developed a culture that believes in rationality, individualism, success, and universalism. Hence, we have two types of nationalism; one is "advanced" and the other is "drawn into a culture alien to it," the former Western and the latter Eastern (Chatterjee, 1986).

In addition, according to this approach, it is not the historical development of those Eastern societies that produced nationalism; it is the contact with an alien culture that

placed those nations in the arena of the search for national identities as Kohn (1955) and Plamenatz (1976) argued. This contact has *caught* the Eastern nations unready for such Western ideas. It is so since their "... material reality did not develop (in the process of evolution) the right culture and ideas to absorb such changes" (Plamenatz, 1976).

The power relation between the colonizer and the colonized and the ability of the colonizer to make its discourse universal are evident in the next argument. It was argued that Western nationalism has developed "naturally" into a social and cultural context ready for it, in the Eastern type, the social culture was not well equipped to face it. This posed a dilemma for the Eastern societies.

The dilemma of Eastern nationalists, as Chatterjee (1986) and Smith (1983) argued, is that Eastern national elites too have measured the backwardness of their nations in terms of certain global criteria set by the "advanced" nations of Western Europe. What is interesting here is that there is also a basic understanding among Eastern nationalists that those standards have come from an alien culture, and that the inherited cultures of their own nations did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable them to reach those standards of (Western) progress. The Eastern type of nationalism, consequently, has been accompanied by an effort to "re-equip" the nation culturally, to transform it. But it could not do so simply by imitating the alien culture, for then the nation would lose its distinctive identity. The search, therefore, was for a representation of the national culture, adapted to the requirements of progress, but retaining at the same time its distinctiveness.

To put this last argument in terms of this study, Western nationalism has perceived itself when facing Eastern societies, as more modern, industrialized, rational, and civilized, while projecting on Eastern societies images of traditionalism, backwardness, irrationality, and primitiveness. Western nationalism looks at itself inclusively, while excluding the Other in its perception of collective-self. In the Eastern national discourse, the collective-self and Other are part of one totality. In this case, the Other is the ex-colonizer. Hence, in the Eastern model, while the included and the excluded are dialectically related, both make up the national identity of the collective. In the West, the collective-self is perceived as real while the excluded is seen as imaginary, general and/or "invisible," which is another type of exclusion (Memmi, 1965; Nandy, 1983).

Furthermore, Eastern nationalism, as conveyed in the literature of western discourse, is seen as if it seeks to construct an "imaginary" community, while for the West the same discourse talks about "natural" and "organic" development of nationalism from a historically evolving nation. How, then, may these contradictions in the Western discourse be explained?! Does this discourse, emerging in the West, project onto the East its negation, and by that attributes its own social context to the difference, rather than at tributing the difference to the encounter as such?

THE CIVIC-ETHNIC DISCOURSE

The civic-ethnic is another classification system of nationalism. While, theoretically, it was supposed to distinguish between two constructed forms of political systems, in practice, it is mainly applied to distinguish between the Eastern and Western experiences of nationalism. Greenfeld (1992) subdivides nationalism into two types: ethnic nationality and civic nationality. Ethnic nationalism is based on the consciousness of a

shared identity within a group, rooted in a shared culture and a belief in common ancestry. Civic nationalism is inclusive within a territory: membership in the national group is generally open to everyone born or permanently resident within the national territory, irrespective of language, culture and ancestry. Civic nationalism was developed in the process of modernization in Western Europe, "It occurred, in Western Europe, well before the rise of popular democratic rights" (Welsh, 1993:64).

Emerson (1960:94) claims that "civic nationality, based on democratic values of equality between citizens was developed in European states, while ethnic nationalism became the first task on the agenda of newly independent colonies, which were suddenly endowed with the full panoply of democratic institutions."

The basic assumptions upon which this classification is made seem to stem from the same discourse discussed before, the modernity discourse. Here again, Emerson, Welsh, and Greenfeld, like other modernity scholars, use political, economic and scientific criteria to set boundaries between East and West, between self and Other. What emerges from that distinction is the description of the West as "rational," "advanced," and "democratic." These attributes are seen as organically developing in the West before they start to appear in the East. By advancing that argument, the West takes ascendancy over the East. With that, it is made to seem as if the West reached higher stages in the scale of human "progress." According to this discourse, nationalism in the West is seen as "based on democratic values" which were "developed in European states" in a kind of "natural" process of "societal progress." Nationalism in the East is seen as an "alien" culture which was "suddenly" imposed upon those societies "democratic institutions." In short, this classification, while it seeks to construct an "objective" distinctiveness of the West, uses binary opposition and by that means, claims the "objective" nature of its classification. Thus, as one can see, it makes a comparison between "superior, advanced" and "democratic" Western cultures and "inferior," "backward," and "undemocratic" Eastern cultures. The question, then, is, can this classification explain the rise of fascist states and racism in Europe and in other non-European states? Is it a "natural" outcome of those "advanced" societies?!

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The discussion has shown the problems in the modernist social theories and their study of nationalism and national identity. In this discourse we find dichotomies that distinguish between types of nationalism such as: EasternWestern and subclassifications like, modern/capitalist-primitive/agrarian, good-evil, civic-ethnic, and state-nation and nation-state, also organic-artificial, rational-irrational, and core (colonizer) and periphery (colonized).

An important point which needs to be observed is the relational and binary opposition by which these classifications advance their arguments about the differences between West and East nationalism. The central principles by which types of nationalism are measured are: The differences in levels of scientific, economic, technological and political development which are seen as setting a scale for levels of modernity. Such ideas are based on the assumption that human societies develop in a progressive evolutionary manner. In this process, Western societies are seen as those which have

preceded others, and are, themselves, placed higher on the human progress hierarchy. Western discourse is presented as a universal prototype which should be imitated, and the yardstick by which other experiences are judged. Moreover, the same discourse denies Eastern collectives having a sense of identity prior to colonialism. More important, it associates having a sense of collective identity with progress and with having a proper culture ready to support it.

In the case study under discussion, the general literature associates progress, Western culture, and modernity with Israel as a nation-state. Most literature looks at the process of nation-building in Israel as if it developed according to the Western model, first came the nation and later came the state (Avineri, 1981; Owen, 1992; Peters, 1983; Pfaff, 1993; Zerubavel, 1995).

In the case of Jordan, the same literature associates traditionalism, tribalism, and backwardness with this nation. Here, the process of nationbuilding is described as fitting into the Eastern nationalism model, meaning it has developed from a state into a nation. The state emerged first in response to colonialism. Later, the nation was "invented" (Day, 1986; Khoury and Kostiner, 1990; Owen, 1992; Peretz, 1988: Pfaff, 1993).

Other scholars such as Lerner (1958) look at the national development in the Arab countries as part of a universal movement from closed, localized, traditional communities, to open, mobile and participant, national societies. These societies, Lerner emphasized, are in a transitional stage from tribalism to the nation state, in which urbanization, literacy, exposure to mass media and political participation are key elements, on their path to achieving a nation-state. Lerner (1958:47) argued that these societies still live in conflict between modernity and traditionalism: "What the West is, in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become."

The centrality of the Western-Eastern distinction is evident in these approaches to the study of Arab and Israeli nationalism, as if there are inherent differences between those nations. There is no reference in the modern history of these countries to the role of Other, whether in their ancient or modern history such as the Palestinians, or to the role of the West as Other, in the case of the ex-colonized Arab countries.

It is clear that the previous classification becomes meaningful because collective identities are constructed via fields of difference that are also changeable and dynamic. Also, collective identities are socially constructed around systems of negative distinction, that the positivity of the nation presumes the existence of a variety of unassimilated (or un-assimilable) Others. These Others may be external, in the colonialist representation of non-Western peoples via racialized constructions of cultural superiority, or in internal relations via differences of race, ethnicity, religion, and of course, class and gender.

The carriers and the media for such transformation are language and the reinventing of history (Anderson, 1991; Hobsbawm, 1991). Language and history are what makes it possible for a collective to construct a symbolic system of meanings by which they develop their "nobility" and their "national pride." They are constructed to evoke emotions and impel people to action. Such "markers" of difference between We and the Other are experienced and explained as if they are inherent differences between collectives. These markers of difference constitute the system of belief where the We is at the center as "superior" compared to the "inferior" Other. These processes of constructing self and Other result in contested boundaries between collectives.

Theoretically, then, modern social theory seems to be inadequate for the study of national identity when it is conceptualized in this way. In particular, the modern discourse is inadequate when we incorporate in our discussion of nationalism and national identity the ideas about self and Other, and the relationship between power, knowledge, and national identity. These relations of power, knowledge, identity and the role of Other in the process of shaping identity, are best approached from poststructuralist perspectives, which I turn, now, to discuss.

IDENTITY AND SELF/OTHER THEORIZATION

The conclusion from the previous discussion was that national identities develop via fields of differences, where one nation defines itself in relation to another nation, and thus, their conception of their collective self is shaped in relation to that "Other," rather than by a "fixed" and an "essentialist essence" that distinguishes one collective "objectively" or "organically," from another. These relations of self and Other are constructed in language and by language. As argued before, language is not a neutral system by which meanings about self and Other emerge "naturally." Meanings are manifestations of power in society and they are best demonstrated in a discourse. Similarly, I look at nationalism as a discourse in which meanings of self and Other are produced and contested over time. This conception of identity leads to the conclusion that identity is dynamic, rather than fixed in time and space. Then, a national narrative could be looked at as a body of knowledge that helps individuals in the collective imagine themselves via difference from others. It also helps an individual as well as a collective imagine the territorial, historical, and cultural boundaries of their identity vis-à-vis others. As mentioned before, those boundaries are always in the process of becoming; they shift and change over time and space.

Conceptualized in this way, national identity seems to be best analyzed by the linguistic paradigm. This paradigm includes a variety of theories; some are structuralist while others are poststructuralist. Within the poststructuralist perspective there are many approaches that discuss meanings in language. But, not all these approaches are adequate to the study of the relation of self, Other, power, and knowledge. Particularly, since my study is looking at history textbooks and on representations of self identity and Other, in the different historical epochs, of the two case studies, it seems that I need to make use of poststructuralist theories which incorporate such a historical analysis.

Historically, poststructuralism developed out of structuralism, and both analyze language. However, structuralism involves a method of analysis in which individual elements are considered not in terms of any intrinsic identity, but in terms of their relationship within the system in which they function (Attridge, Bennington, and Young, 1987). At the center of this analysis is the way social categories make up a structure similar to the structure of language. This approach is based on Saussure's analysis of semiotic systems.

Moreover, as a theory, structuralism focuses on the human intellect (reason, understanding, cognition, thought), which causes it to be a "synchronic," ahistorical theory whose structures are related transformationally, typologically, rather than dialectically. Time is factored out as Berman (1988) argued. Poststructuralism reinstalls

time into the theory of language and self by identifying not intellect, but subjectivity. Instead of a "fixed" entity, the subject is constructed over time, it becomes a process not simply a product (Derrida, 1978, McGowan, 1991; Nicholson, 1991).

While different forms of poststructuralism vary both in their practices and in their political implications, they share certain fundamental assumptions about language and identity. The most shared assumption by many poststructuralist scholars is that subjectivity or identity is socially constructed in language discourses. This assumption implies that subjectivity is innate—not genetically determined, but socially produced. Subjectivity is produced in a whole range of discursive practices—economic, social and political—the meaning of which is a constant site of struggle over power (Scott, 1988).

Further, language is not the expression of a unique individuality; it constructs the individual's subjectivity in ways which are socially specific. For poststructuralism, subjectivity is neither unified nor is it fixed (Seidman, 1994:201). Unlike humanism, which implies conscious, knowing, unified, rational subject, poststructuralism theorizes subjectivity as a site of disunity and conflict, central to the process of political change and to preserving the status quo (Scott, 1988; Spivak, 1993).

Similar to structuralism, poststructuralists argue that the meaning of categories within the general structure develop via difference and opposition, and those meaning are historical culturally dependent. Derrida (1976), for example, argues that the meaning of the sign is unstable, multivocal, and changing. He adds that while the meanings of the binary oppositions of man/woman may be considered universal, in fact, they vary across cultures, according to class, race, age, and gender. In one culture, women may be conveyed as passive, emotional, desexualized, while in other cultural contexts women may be conveyed as erotic, powerful, rational, etc. In other words, the meanings of signs are never fixed or static, according to Derrida, they are always subject to contestation. It is because meanings have broad social, economic, and political significance (Scott, 1988; Nicholson, 1991).

As May (1997) and Seidman (1994) have argued, the structuralist attempted to uncover general linguistic and social patterns organized around binary oppositions. But, the political meaning of this linguistic and social order is left unquestioned. For example, Levi-Strauss thought of the binary opposition of language and society as indicating fixed mental structures to be found in the brain. Derrida, on the other hand, argued that the meanings of signifiers, words and sounds, are always in a state of continuous flux and contestation. Indeed, he argued that whenever a linguistic and social order is said to be fixed or whenever meanings are assumed to be stable and fixed, this should be understood less as a disclosure of truth than as an act of power—a power that is the capacity of a social group to impose its will on others by freezing linguistic and cultural meanings. For Derrida, then, the role of a poststructuralist approach is to reject efforts at linguistic, social, and political closure. For him, poststructuralism is a kind of permanent rebellion against authority, be that of science, philosophy, the church, the state or any other forms of power (Cherryholmes, 1988; May, 1997; McGowan, 1991).

For our purposes, the first point is that for poststructuralist theory the common factor in the analysis of social organization, social meanings, power and individual consciousness is language. Language is the place where actual and possible forms of social organization and their likely social and political consequences are defined. Yet, it

is also the place where our sense of us, our subjectivity, is constructed (Benhabib, 1991; McGowan, 1991; Nicholson, 1991; Scott, 1988).

Second, from a poststructuralist approach, meanings develop in a relational manner. In the process of defining identity, social categories and establishing borders, between categories, difference becomes represented and placed as the polar opposite of self. So identity is always "alterity identity," that is, identity dependent upon the Other to define self (Cole McNaught, 1996; Derrida, 1978). For self to have a "distinctive" identity, it needs to "gain" such an identity in relation to Other and not separate from that Other as if self has "organic" qualities that make them seem as such.

As Weedon (1987) argued, in the poststructuralist perspective, language is not a transparent medium as in humanist discourse; it is not expressive and does not label a "real" world. Further, she argued that:

> Meanings do not exist prior to their articulation in language and language is not an abstract system, but is always socially and historically located in discourse. Discourses represent political interests and in consequence are constantly vying for status and power. The site of this battle for power is the subjectivity of the individual and it is a battle in which the individual is an active but not a sovereign protagonist" (Weedon, 1987:41).

Thus, the struggle is over meaning that constructs and shapes individuals' identity and their consciousness. In this process of identity formation, individuals are not entirely active participants, rather collaborative and subject to the authoritarian power that generates meanings as truths. In other words, identities develop by authoritarian discourses that compete with existing discourses over meanings that shape identities. In our case, a hegemonic national narrative constructs identities of individuals in a society and it presents itself as truth.

Claims to truth are achieved through opposition where the Other is silenced and made invisible. For example, Derrida (1981) points out that in Western thought dualism such as speech/writing, presence/absence, meaning/form, soul/body, masculine/feminine, man/woman, literal/metaphorical, nature/culture, positive/negative, transcendental/empirical, Western/ Oriental, and cause/effect reappear time and again and lie at the core of Western culture. In fact, he adds, that these dual oppositions do not represent equal values. The first term is considered superior while the second is seen as a derivative, undesirable, and subordinate. By making use of these hierarchical oppositions, Western thinkers have sought to identify an order of truth and reality that could function as an authoritative basis for judging truth/false, knowledge/ideology, reality/illusion, or other forms such as right/wrong, or us and them.

Similar relations of Self/Other have been discussed in *Madness and Civilization*. There, Foucault discussed how identity of the madman was constructed in opposition to the sane. This discourse operated in the opposition between reason and madness. The discourse of the madmen was treated as untrue, unimportant, and ineffective. By that the discourse of madmen was silenced and marginalized and, madmen themselves became voiceless. In turn, the discourse of 'reason' became the 'hegemonic' discourse on madness. In other words, this discourse created dual identities of sanity and madness; it gave voice to sanity (us) while it silenced the Other, the madman.

For Foucault, as well for Derrida, Western thought, in general and the project of modernity, in particular, as they are presented in Western discourses, are a history of telling the story of the "same" and its discourses. The Other has been excluded, invisible, silenced and his/her discourse has been presented as untrue. For Foucault, the "same" and the Other are tied up in a totality. The interplay of this dual totality is manifested in a discourse. A discourse has the power to silence, obscure, and make the Other invisible and secondary.

Both Derrida and Foucault attempt to address the relation of self to Other. While both are investigating and analyzing discourses, Foucault's work is more focusing on the historical changes of the relation between self and Other. He decodes the relationship of power, knowledge about Other and self, and meanings, and how they are transformed from one discourse into another, and from one episteme into another (see *Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish, The Birth of the Clinic, History of Sexuality*, etc.)

To conclude this long journey, poststructuralists, Foucault in particular, argue that language constitutes identities and the way we perceive the world around us. Language is a system like other systems in society, like economy, politics, etc. In turn, language is the site for social contestation over production and control of meanings, and knowledge in general. Consequently, language becomes a major tool for domination and control the way identities are constructed. In addition, identities are not fixed, and do not have an essential nature, they are constructed historically within a discourse and by it. A discourse that manifests complex forms of power within a society.

Discourse has several functions: first, it conceals power relations. Second, it presents knowledge as neutral and objective. It also acts to normalize the social order, the way we perceive our selves, and distinguish true from false. Discourse has the power to exclude Others, make them invisible, and secondary. Within a discourse, self and Other stand in an opposition where one is primary, visible, true, valued, and the Other is invisible, silenced, and untrue.

Translating this argument into the analysis of national identity allows me to conclude that nationalism as a macro discourse is a structured system of meanings. It is organized by rules of its formation which are embedded in the field of power. It is linked to power and it's a manifestation of it. In turn, it functions as a system of exclusion for other discourses. National discourse imposes "sameness" on a collective, albeit the apparent differences among and between its members.

Phrased differently, a national narrative is a body of knowledge produced by elite groups within a collective that helps them "know" themselves as imagined community. National narratives help collectives construct their identity via exclusion and Othering and by imaging the historical, cultural and territorial boundaries of the nation. It portrays the nation as a unified and stable entity from ancestry to the present generation. Also, it elevates members of the nation to the status of "existing," "chosen," "unique," "having natural and objective qualities," while Others are viewed as "nonexisting," "secondary," "artificial," and "common."

Occasionally, in a national narrative, one finds that the relation of self to Other is historical and the nation's collective boundaries change with time. Despite that, a national narrative portrays the sense of Us as stable entity across time and space, and it presents our identities as unrelated to Other as if we have natural qualities that distinguish Us from Others. Moreover, as Foucault argued, our identity is dynamic and subject to change

since it faces constant challenge from those excluded. The excluded develop its own narrative which is often in opposition to ours and it also challenges our claims to truth. Thus, a collective's identity, while it becomes meaningful by exclusion of Others, it also becomes subject to the excluded narrative which in turn influences the way our narrative is structured. This dialectic makes self and Other always in a process of becoming, in a flux. Self-Other identity are never fixed or essential.

This conceptualization of national narratives and the way identity is formed helps us understand how national narratives often present the collective identity of a nation as if it is stable, fixed, and continuous over time and space. By doing that, national identities become ahistorical, as if they emerge from an inner core that distinguishes them from Others. Such an analysis makes us understand national discourse as a system of meanings embedded in power relations, which makes its claim for "truth" questionable.

As argued before, in the modern times, the socialization process and the construction of identity has shifted from the family to the state. Now the state is the primary agency of shaping identities of the new generation as conationals. One of the important socialization institutions in modern states is the school system. It is viewed by scholars as one of the most influential institutions of the production of knowledge that has significant effect on identity formation and identification of individuals with their collective in the past as well as at the present. Schools are not only sites for shaping identities of individuals in society, they act as normalizing institutions to the power relations in society. Such a normalizing function of power makes schools and their curricula a site for contesting forces in a society. For that reason, this study analyzes school textbooks in Jordan and Israel to understand the strategies by which the national state narrative of both countries constructs via difference and by exclusion their national identity.

Chapter Three
School Textbooks and the Politics of Identity

Since World War II, schooling and the messages embedded in them has become the site of political contestation between parties in conflicts. For example, Japan and Germany had to reform their school textbooks after the war. Both countries were asked to omit all inciting images from their textbooks that pertained to their former enemies. Recently, similar concern about the content of school textbooks has been at the center of debate between Arabs and Israelis. Israelis, in particular, have been demanding the "cleaning" out of textbooks of images that portray Israelis and Jews in pejorative and negative light. Likewise, the Arab countries that signed peace agreements with Israel demanded the same from Israel.

Thus, the discussion of school textbooks and their role in shaping identity is crucial to the understanding of the process of identity formation in this study. As Russell (2001) argues, "Education is a double-edged sword." On the one hand it constructs individuals' identity as part of a larger cohesive whole. On the other hand, it provides collectives with the necessary power and legitimation to challenge a certain social order. Thus, control of education systems and the content of school textbooks is a powerful resource that influences the process of identity formation within a certain collective.

In the following sections, I discuss these relations between schools, textbooks, state power and the process of identity formation. Next, I present several examples of text analysis with regard to the Israeli and Arab identity and conflict, and finally, I outline the design for this study of Jordanian and Israeli school textbooks.

SCHOOLS, STATES, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Schooling is viewed by many sociologists as one of the most important arms of the modern state. It has a normalizing, disciplining, and controlling power over individuals within a society (Foucault, 1977a). It shapes their identities in ways that reproduce and justify the social order while the mechanisms of power stay hidden from those socialized and indoctrinated by it.

A similar argument is found in the classical essay *"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"* (Althusser, 1971). In that article Althusser argues that the institution of ideology is located in the "educational apparatus" (the school and the university). He added that education is the "dominant ideological State apparatus in capitalist social

formation" (146). For Althusser schooling has a dual function: one is to socialize, and second by socialization the state achieves control over citizens; a control that reproduces the social relations within a society. In short, schooling has the power to construct subjects and to subject them. Also, socialization in schools is about constructing identities of indoctrinated subjects. The mechanism by which this process is accomplished is not by coercive power, but rather by means of selecting knowledge and contents of the school curriculum. In fact, Althusser pointed out how the very content of education could not be neutral and separate from centers of power in society.

Gramsci (1979:294) argued that the state is not simply a "coercive apparatus" but can work with velvet gloves through supposedly civilizing apparatuses by means of which "the hegemony of one social group over the entire nation" is exercised. In other words, the schooling system is a tool used to maintain and reproduce the existing social relations, which ensures the social and political dominance of those in power in a state.

The role of educational institutions was criticized also by Foucault after the 1968 Students Revolt in France. For Foucault, the political events during 1968 turned attention to "the full range of hidden mechanisms through which a society conveys its knowledge and ensures its survival under the mask of knowledge: newspapers, television, technical schools, and lycee (even more than the university)" (1977a: 225). Therefore, it is not only the educational institutions themselves that are controlled by those in power in society, but also, and as a result of that control, the content and knowledge produced by and in these institutions becomes one of the powerful forms of discipline and control of subjects. It is not a direct coercive domination which is viewed as neutral, but rather a control that is achieved by the internalization of the mechanisms of the system itself. By doing so, the control becomes self-control that hides the mechanisms of power that stand behind the production of knowledge.

THE STATE AND SCHOOL CURRICULUM

Control of production and distribution of knowledge—school curricula—has many implications. The control affects what should be considered legitimate, relevant, and important knowledge that needs to be included in the curricula (Carlson & Apple, 1998). In Israel, the publication of school textbooks is centrally controlled by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Such control is not unusual in any state. Indeed, in a country such as France, not only are the textbooks centrally controlled, but so is much about the entire pedagogical process and the pace at which students are expected to move through the school curriculum; thus the adage that any given time during the school year, all of France's students in any given grade will be working on the same topic (Apple & Christian—Smith, 1991). In America, although with seemingly much greater freedom, school books are often an emotional issue of local control. Thus local school boards (which might represent only small geographic parts of counties) determine which books are deemed "appropriate" for their children (Apple, 1982; Apple & Christian-Smith, 1991). But prior to this, it is usually the case that a state-level "schoolbook committee" decides which books can and cannot be purchased with state funds. Thus local school boards are really making decisions on a subset of all books from which they might have been able to choose. In fact, Carlson and Apple (1998) argue that market forces make

publishers homogenize textbooks for them to sell as many as possible in all states. This homogenization is dictated by the culture at the time in the U.S. as it is manifested in a national discourse that tells the publishers what is acceptable and not acceptable, what needs to be considered legitimate knowledge, and what needs to be omitted from textbooks.

In Israel, a very small country, textbook decisions are made at the national level. This guarantees a kind of uniformity to the sort of history and cultural experience that the school children receive. Similar to what happens in the U.S., the Ministry of Education in Israel approves a list of textbooks for use in schools and this gives a kind of local freedom to school's boards. Approved textbooks cover similar topics and their discussion of these topics is similar. In other words, there is homogeneity in content as well in pedagogic strategies.

In the case of Jordan, the Ministry of Education publishes a unified curriculum that is adopted in all the kingdom's schools. These issues will be discussed later in chapters five and six. Meanwhile, I would like to move to the next issue, which is the relation between power and truth, and how these issues are manifested in school textbooks.

TEXTBOOKS, TRUTH, AND POWER

The term "text", throughout most of the twentieth century, has been associated with that of "textbook." Seeing texts as textbooks has implied that textbooks are a codified body of knowledge about a particular field of inquiry. From that perspective, texts are meant to speak with authority; and the students' job is to learn the supposedly "objective" knowledge inscribed in the texts (Carlson & Apple, 1998; Cherryholmes, 1988). From the poststructuralist perspective, the term "text" takes on broader meaning. It is expanded to include any piece of discourse—spoken or written narrative—and also any constructed visual image (film production, pictures, commercials, etc.). The curriculum is expanded to include all cultural production of artifacts (Luke, 1988). Still the textbook continues to play an important role in shaping the public school curriculum (Apple, 1979; Carlson ScApple, 1998; Giroux, 1988). In fact, we could reword the first statement saying that school curriculum is the text of a codified body of knowledge about a specific field of inquiry. This body of codified knowledge is presented to students as objective and bias free, a "universal truth."

Apple (1993) argues that traditional curriculum theorists assumed that there is a body of knowledge that is objective and free from values and biases. In contrast to that, critical educational theorists view school knowledge as historically and socially rooted and interest bound (Cherryholmes, 1988; Luke, 1988; McLaren, 1989). In this perspective, knowledge that is acquired in school is never neutral or objective, but is ordered and structured in particular ways; its emphases and exclusions partake of a silent logic. Williams (1989:58) argues that the content of texts, how they represent reality, is influenced by hegemonic discourse, and that discourses are materially produced by specific social, political, and economic arrangements. Following Foucault's (1972) argument, discourses have rules that govern what is said and what remains unsaid. These rules identify who can speak with authority and who must listen. They are anonymous because there is no identifiable author (Foucault, 1980b), nor do they have a clear-cut

beginning (Said, 1985, 1987). This point is well documented in Apple's (1993) study on the "hidden" aspects of the curriculum. Those hidden elements defuse the way a curriculum is organized and how power constitutes the way textbooks convey "truth."

A discourse analysis of history books, according to Williams (1989), demonstrates these points. History books, for example, represent a "selective tradition." By this Williams means that "from a whole possible area of past and present, in a particular culture, certain meanings and practices are selected for emphasis and certain other meanings and practices are neglected or excluded." Further, he argued that this selection process is presented as "the tradition," and "the significant past." Williams adds that "the tradition" is a constructed version of the past which is intended to "connect with and ratify the present."

Thus, the selective narrative of a nation is aiming at forming a collective consciousness that is based on binary oppositions of triumph and defeat of We and Others, respectively, as Halbwachs (1980) has argued. It makes the nation look distinctive in its origins, culture, and history vis-à-vis Other collectives. In turn, history textbooks present selective usages of linguistic concepts and they order historical events in some specific ways to shape our consciousness about our national identities from its origins to the present. At the center of this process, set forward by the national discourse, is the way our identities are constituted in language by difference or oppositions from Others.

Similarly, Apple (1993), McLaren (1989), Giroux (1988), and Luke (1988), argued that textbooks' knowledge, like other forms of knowledge, is not objective and not neutral. In fact, they argued that knowledge is a social construction deeply rooted in a nexus of power relations. As such, the school curriculum is a reflection of the power relations in society, and it is, in particular, the discourse of the hegemonic group, whether it is a class, an ethnic group, or a group of hegemonic groups. In other words, knowledge is interest bound, socially and historically constructed, and it is rooted within the nexus of power in society.

Further, saying that knowledge is socially constructed usually means that the world we live in is constructed symbolically by the mind through the social interaction with others and is heavily dependent on culture, context custom, and historical specificity. As Berger and Luckmann (1976) have argued, there is no ideal, autonomous, pristine, or an aboriginal world to which our social constructions necessarily correspond; instead there is always a referential field in which symbols are situated. And this referential field (e.g., language, culture, place and time) will influence how symbols generate meanings. In turn how symbols and meanings shape identities and self perception, a process that reproduces the social relations within a collective and across collectives (Apple, 1979, 1993; Bourdieu, 1973). But for such a process to take place, a nexus and context of power is required. Since it is power that "normalizes" self identities and it is power that allows some meanings to become "universal truths" while Other "truths" are excluded, marginalized and silenced. In turn, identities emerge in the web of power relations that are manifested in the relational meanings in a discourse.

Put differently, individuals are linked to macro-social processes and institutions when they become socialized, and by this mechanism power helps shape how we think of ourselves and act. Further, the self is understood to have no meaning apart from the

power relations it constitutes and constituted by, which is to say that the self is relational and defined by a web of relationships with Others (Carlson & Apple, 1998).

To conclude, schools are an influential arm of the state. The state, through its control of this apparatus, controls the socialization process by which the construction of social identities of individuals in society is monitored and controlled. By that, the social order and the social reproduction are maintained.

School curriculum and textbooks can be thought of as a collection of statements that make authoritative knowledge claims. It is a body of knowledge emerging in a context of power, specific to historical, political and social arrangements. It speaks with authority on what is legitimate and not, what needs to be said and unsaid. They assert by inclusion and exclusion what is important and unimportant to study and present meaning of words as fixed (Cherryholmes, 1988). In turn, meanings in textbooks become forms of exclusion and inclusion, since what is present in a text depends upon what is absent, and what is written upon what is not written. Consequently, meanings in textbooks and the process of selection shape identities in opposition or difference while it presents those identities as fixed and stable over time and space. Thus, power, knowledge, and identity formation are intertwined in a discourse that constitutes identities in opposition to Others, in the school textbooks.

A more significant conclusion is that school textbooks provide knowledge that helps students "know" themselves as members of a collective. This sort of knowledge acquired from school textbooks helps individuals delineate the symbolic and territorial boundaries of their identity and by that it contributes to the construction of the criteria by which inclusion and exclusion is made. It also helps members of a community imagine the evolution of their collective through time. In the next discussion, I present several examples that illustrate these points.

SELF AND OTHER IN THE ISRAELI NARRATIVE

In the following I discuss several examples of Israeli national narrative as it is manifested in some studies. As the reader will find, most of these studies are focusing on the relationship between self, the Jewish collective, and Other, the Arabs. Most of these analysis look at national identity from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In his analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Finkelstein (1995) has focused on five major myths dominant in the Israeli discourse on nationalism:

1. A land without people,
2. 'Born of War, Not by Design,'
3. Settlement, Not Conquest,
4. To Live or Perish,
5. Language of Force.

These five myths present in black and white the relationship of self to Other. Specifically, they give legitimacy to the Israeli view of themselves: their "historical rights," "their constructive role" in building settlements in contrast to the image of colonialism. It emphasizes the "naive role" played by Israelis in the making of the Palestinian experience. In addition, it valorizes the identity of the "We" in opposition to the Other.

Finkelstein used deconstructionism to analyze the structure of each myth. He found that images of self, such as "peace seeking," "victims of the Arabs," "coming back to land of the fathers," "our historical rights," etc., are in fact part of the national discourse. At the center of this discourse is the manipulation of language that conceals the active role of Israelis in the making of the Palestinian problem.

Finkelstein analyzes each of these five myths he identifies. He reveals the contradictions within each myth. For example, he argues against the claim of "a land without people" that if this claim was to be true, then why there was a need to fight against "non-existent" Arabs? His argument is that Israelis constructed this myth to minimize the injustice done to the locals. This shows a "humane" face rather than an image of a brutal colonizer.

Further, the myth of "settlement, not conquest" comes to show the "civilizing, constructive" mission of Zionism rather than a savage colonial power seeking to expand into other territories. The destruction of the local culture and community is reversed by the "constructive" and "civilizing" mission" of the colonizer who is presented as "coming back home" to "rebuild and reborn."

Of special interest is the question of Palestinian refugees as it is represented in the Israeli discourse. There, it is a problem "born of war, not by design" that implies that Israelis "never" had a calculated policy to expel Palestinians from Palestine. The Israeli discourse then takes no responsibility for the refuge's problem; to the contrary, Israeli discourse places all responsibility on the victims themselves, the Palestinians, and on the Arab countries for not resettling them.

Benny Morris (1987) refutes the Israeli claims and argues that the Israeli official discourse and statements contradict their actual practices. He provides Israeli documents showing that Israeli leaders had plans for expelling Palestinians from Palestine during the 1947–9 war. To further support his argument Morris asks, if the Israeli claims were true, then why did Israel refuse the return of those refugees to their homes even decades later? For Israel, developing that myth comes to emphasize "lack of responsibility" on their side, which leaves no traces of guilt for them. On the contrary, it shifts responsibility from the victimizer to the victim, and in turn, places the final responsibility on the Arab countries for their "inhuman role" in keeping the refugees as they are.

Finkelstein's myths present binary oppositions of "We" versus "Them," of "good" and "bad," of "war seeking Arabs" versus "peace seeking Jews" of "we" as "victims" and "they" as "victimizers," etc. In short, there is a dichotomy of images that places self and Other in black and white binary oppositions within a totality of a text, a discourse. These binary oppositions transcend the self to the status of "superior, humane, constructive" compared to "inferior, victimizer, and destructive" Others.

Flapan (1987), "The Birth of Israel, Myths and Reality," is a similar study using myth analysis to examine Israeli national narrative. Flapan analyzes seven myths that, again, constitute the main part of the Israeli discourse on the Arab-Israeli relations. These are:

1. "Myth One: Zionists Accepted the UN Partition and Planned for Peace,"
2. "Myth Two: Arabs Rejected the Partition and Launched War,"
3. "Myth Three: Palestinians Fled Voluntarily, Intending Reconquest,"
4. "Myth Four: All the Arab States United to Expel the Jews from Palestine,"
5. "Myth Five: The Arab Invasion Made War Inevitable,"
6. "Myth Six: Defenseless Israel Faced Destruction by the Arab Goliath,"

7. “Myth Seven: Israel Has Always Sought Peace, but No Arab Leader Has Responded.”

As in Finkelstein’s study, Flapan deconstructs each myth by comparing between the official statements and the Israeli practices, and by comparing data Israeli and non-Israeli sources to refute the Israeli claims. He shows the contradictions in the Israeli discourse. These contradictions are concealed by producing these forms of history as facts about what allegedly has happened. For example, the claim of “defenseless Israel facing the destruction of the Arab Goliath” does not correspond to historical facts. He argues that Israel, on the eve of the “Arab invasion” had between 25,000 and 65,000 (low and high estimates) standing soldiers, while all the “Arab Goliath” had was 20,269 to 23,500. By June of 1948, the Israeli fighting forces reached 41,000, and by December of the same year 96,441 (Flapan, 1987:194–199). Concealing this fact came to valorize the “national spirit” and show its “superior and just cause” compared to the “evil, unjust, and destructive Arabs.” Then, in this discourse, the powerful is presented as “defenseless” and the “defenseless” is presented as the “destructive Goliath.”

In addition, instead of talking about the standing forces of the enemy, Israel focused on the “Arab Goliath,” which shifts the focus from the standing armies to the Arab masses. By doing that, it could shift the focus from actual to potential threats. In turn, this shifting and concealing came to show how great “the Arab threat” was, and later, how great the victory has been. This treatment of the historical events transcends the collective and the event itself to a status of a miracle, and the We is transformed by that to a “miracle maker.”

In Flapan’s study, in each myth of the Israeli national discourse we find that binary oppositions are the basic blocks. Thus, these several myths are organized in a way to claim truth and demand validity by using the negativepositive categories as the main strategy to build upon it meanings in that discourse, and to legitimate political claims.

Bar-Tal (1989) studied the image of the Arab in the Israeli elementary school textbooks. He used content analysis to look at the Arab images. BarTal focused on analyzing those texts that had some sort of reference to Arabs. In such texts he tried to answer whether Arab images were presented as positive, negative, or neutral. He also studied images of Arabs in the context of their behavior and asked what kind of images, such as by the use of adjectives and menial professions were conveyed. To do this, he used three guiding criteria in the analysis of each text: (1). Level of relations: He looked at whether the described relations between Arabs and Jews were on a personal, or/and national level. (2). Type of relation: Whether these relations were described in a war context, peace or confrontation. (3). Quality of relations: In this case Bar-Tal asked whether the Arab-Jewish relations described in the text were friendly, hostile, or neutral relations. Also, he studied whether such relations were presented in a symmetrical way or not. In addition to that, Bar-Tal applied quantitative methods to count frequencies and distribution of images of Arabs in the school textbook. What he found was that there was little Arab presence in the Jewish school textbooks and when there is a reference, they are described as:

> The Arabs are on the whole negatively stereotyped. They are predominantly associated with aggressive behavior on the one hand and with primitivism, on the other hand…. It is interesting that although the textbooks deal with periods during which Arabs were a substantial

> majority in Palestine, some books hardly mention Arabs at all…. Moreover, whereas, almost all books strongly feature the national aspiration of the Jewish people and impart Zionist ideology, they almost completely disregard the national aspiration of the Arab population in Palestine and do not elaborate on the nature of the conflict between Jews and Arabs (Bar-Tal, 1998:24–25).

In Bar-Tal's study the Other is mostly invisible or they are described in negative images. Therefore, the Othering ranges from "invisibility" to negative images. In turn what we have is a binary opposition of presence/absence and positive/negative. The "invisibility" or the "absence" of the Other comes to highlight and emphasize the "presence" of the We. If we remember that the Israeli "presence" in Palestine was questioned at that time, and Jews in fact were a minority, then the over emphasis of the Jewish presence comes to conceal these relations and by that to legitimate later practices such as expulsion of Palestinians, and claims of historical rights. It is a reassurance to the Israeli Jewish claim of "a land without people to a people without a land."

Zerubavel (1995) studied three common myths in the history of the Israeli Jews: "The Battle of Tel Hai," "The Bar Kokhba Revolt, and "The Fall of Masada." The first is from the modern history of Jews in Palestine, the other two are from ancient history. Through the analysis of these three myths, Zerubavel shows how Zionist national discourse creates continuity and bridges over the two thousand years of exile. In addition, she studied the structure of such myths and the dominant images of self and Other in them. To her argument by combining images from ancient history of Romans and Plishtins (the Biblical word for the people of Palestine at that time) and with that of Arabs these myths convey messages of Jews as "historical victims" and Others as "persecutors" of the Jews. The Romans as the historical enemy blend into the current enemy, the Arabs, and the negative images of the past are recovered to serve in the conflict of the present. This is how Zerubavel has been able to demonstrate these complex systems of meanings and how these myths have become central part of reenactment and commemoration in the Israeli culture of today. By these reenactments, the state discourse on nationalism constructs the narrative of the nation and goes back into the past to recover its roots. By doing that, the state's national discourse creates the effect of continuity. In turn, a two thousand-years gap is bridged and becomes insignificant with the power of imagining self through time and space—as if the "we" has always existed with marginal differences.

Another interesting study is that of Firer (1985). Firer used content analysis to study history textbooks of Jewish students during the 1950s and 60s. She found that history textbooks dealt with few major issues such as "origins of Jews" in Palestine, their "return back" to "Eretz Israel" after two thousand years of exile. The school textbooks while attempting to legitimize "Israelis' historical rights" over Palestine, they delegitimized the Arabs by denying their national movement and refusing to recognize the Palestinians as a national entity.

Further, Firer has found that all the history books presented an image of the Jewish people as victims. The history textbooks presented the Jewish history as a continuous sequence of pogroms and forced conversions, where the Holocaust stands at the apex of this long term persecution experience. She argued that these books advanced the idea that Jews all over places and historical periods were subject to hatred and oppression. In

addition, the history textbooks transmitted negative images of non-Jews, shaped negative attitude against "Goyim" (Gentiles), and referred to them with offensive names. Firer reminds us that same textbooks emphasized the positive image of the Jewish people: their uniqueness such as "the chosen people," "the special people," and even the "pure race." Jews are presented as having superior human qualities and special spirit that made them survive persecution and hatred. The Jewish immigrants to Palestine are presented as pioneers who:

> Having heroic traits and they rebelled against their historic oppression, and left to conquer the old Eretz Israel. In their new homeland, the pioneers struggled with immense difficulties: the virgin land, deadly swamps, the Arabs, the hostile authorities. By sheer will power and their readiness for self-sacrifice, they overcome these difficulties, holding a gun in the hand, and a plough in the other, while under their feet stretched green fields and fertile orchards, and before their eyes the Jewish nation was being renewed in its country as during the First and Second Temple (Firer, 1985:156).

Arab images in Firer's study are primitive, hostile to Jews, violent and easily agitated. Similar to the negative images of Arabs vis-à-vis positive images of Jews were also found in Zohar's (1972) study of language textbooks for Jewish schools in Israel. Arabs emerge as "robbers," "wicked ones," "blood thirsty mob," "killers," "gangs," or "rioters."

In Bar-Gal's (1993) analysis of geography school textbooks used by Jewish students, he found that Arabs are perceived as those who have "neglected the country" "did not cultivate the land," and were described as primitive and backward people. Arab images also included descriptions of Arabs as:

> Unenlightened, inferior, fatalistic, unproductive, apathetic, their occupations and ways of life are different, they are divided, tribal, exotic, people of the backward East, poor, sick, dirty, noisy, colored. Arabs are not progressive, they are fast to increase, thankless, not part of us, nonJews. And they do burn, murder, destroy, are easily inflamed, and vengeful (Bar-Gal, 1993:189).

Positive descriptions of Arabs referred mainly to those Arabs who collaborated and supported the Jews.

Bar-Gal's study showed that the geography textbooks have attempted to impart nationalistic beliefs of Jews. They also nourished love of the country, emphasized the Jewish attachment to it, and glorified the Jewish "pioneers" who have made immense sacrifices for the revival of the Jewish nation in Palestine. Jewish "pioneers" were described as determinant people, industrious, brave, and as people who never saved efforts to love and defend the country against the Arabs. These "heroes" are presented as role models of loyalty, devotion, and commitment to the Jewish enterprise in Palestine. It is clear how these categories stand in binary opposition. Meanings of self are made possible in difference from Other, in this case the Arabs.

What can we learn from these studies? First, most studies done in Israel have focused on textbooks used by Jewish Israeli students. Particularly, what one finds in these studies is a focus on images of self and Other as Jews and Palestinians or Arabs. Those studies have looked at self and Other from the Arab-Israeli conflict perspective, which is only the modern history of the Jewish and Arab people. By doing so, they have limited the scope of their inquiry and concealed the role of Other in the constitution of self national identity. As we know, history textbooks do discuss the ancient as well the modern history of a nation. Therefore, my interest is to expand the scope of inquiry of Self/Other into other historical periods of the Jewish people. This is important to our understanding of the historical dynamic of the construction of national identity and the relationship between Self and Other. Thus, in my discussion and analysis I study, the self identity of Jews and their Other in various historical periods.

Second, no studies have been made on the Arab national identity in the Arab school textbook, and the relationship between self and Other, neither in Israel nor in the Arab countries. It is important to remedy this, to study specifically the changes in the Arab self identity and the relationship to Other as they might be changing over time and space. Therefore, a study of Othering, in both Israel and Jordan allows me to compare the two case studies and how Self-Other relations are conveyed in the respective school textbooks. In particular, I will compare the process of Othering, in both countries of modern history, and look at how the Palestinians as Others are treated in a place more sympathetic to them, such as Jordan, compared to Israel. In other words, studying the Arab and Jewish school textbooks in both countries, Israel and Jordan, will shed light on how each state constructs its self identity and that of the Other, and how self identity of Other is used by state agencies to make self more meaningful. A comparative study of these pairs will allow us to better understand the national narrative of Jordan and Israel and in addition, the process of Othering in modern times of Palestinians.

METHODS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This project is attempting to study national identity as it is represented in the formal education system, in school curricula. As I have argued, the school curriculum is a central apparatus for production of knowledge that is behind the transmission of meanings which construct the national identity of a collective. The argument is that national discourses construct identity via difference from Others. In our case, the construction of Israeli and Jordanian national identity is made in an opposition to the Other. In these two countries' modern history, the primary Other seems to be the Palestinians.

In the following, I discuss first the study setting and then the methods used in this study. I especially discuss content analysis and discourse analysis. Third, I discuss sources of data, and finally, the research design.

STUDY SETTING

My study is situated mostly in Israel, but with the same objective, also in Jordan. My focus on Israel and Jordan is for three primary reasons: first, both Israel and Jordan share

some similarities. Both are postcolonial states. They emerged out of national struggles during the colonial British rule of the region. In both states the primary Other, in the modern history, is the Palestinians.

Second, I am a native citizen of Israel, and as a Palestinian, I have experienced first-hand the process of inclusion/exclusion (Self-Other) which forms the central topic for this project. Such a personal biography, in addition, to knowing both languages, Arabic and Hebrew, gives me a certain insight to the Self/Other relations in both countries. Third, in Israel, there is an unusually heightened sense of the relationship between those in control and those excluded from it. Consequently, one would anticipate finding some manifestation of this in official publications. For school children, the "next generation," nothing is more important in their formal encounter with the state than the school curriculum, especially as experienced in school textbooks (see Carlson & Apple, 1998). I expect a similar thing in examining history school textbooks in Jordan, although there the Palestinian's "Otherness" should differ in form and content (thus degree as well) from what one would find in Israel. In other words, in both countries, Jordan and Israel, the process of national identity formation, as I argue, has been made possible by and, through the process of Othering. In particular, in the modern history, one would expect to find extreme cases of Othering of Palestinians and Arabs in Israel, and less so in the case of Jordan. My study explores the relationship of self/Other across the national history of both countries, from antiquity to the modern times. Therefore, this exploration is not limited to one Other; it is my claim that along the national history of both collectives, there were several Others. It is in relation to those Others that a sense of "Jordanianness" and "Israeliness" (my terms) is constructed.

METHODS

This study is an exploratory attempt not only in its sociological theoretical scope, but also in applying a different method to study nationalism in school textbooks. In contrast to the many historical case studies of nationalism, I use discourse analysis, which focuses on the political economy of meanings. Meanings, as already argued, are constituted in language in difference. They are not set apart from the political, social, economic power in society. Within this context, meanings are forms of struggle between various social and political groupings within a social context. Then, the hegemonic meaning, at a given time, emerges out of the contestation with competing discourses and they become an arm of that hegemonic power.

From several studies of Foucault such as: *Madness and Civilization, The History of Sexuality, The Order of Things, The Birth of The Clinic,* etc., we learn how meanings become hegemonic and how discourses are the center of political and social struggle over meanings that constitute identities. For example, the "true" discourse on madness has gained its status as such in an opposition to the "untrue" discourse of the mad person. No meanings of sanity would become relevant unless they have been encountered and confronted with an Other, the insane.

Another example, in the *Birth of the Clinic*, power differential influences the social hierarchy of meanings, subjects, and their identities. Foucault has shown how social, political, and economic power have contributed to the appearance of the clinic. As a

result of that, he discussed the emergence of doctors' knowledge and their authoritative discourse on sickness and health. Foucault asserts that a doctor's discourse cannot be challenged because it speaks "truth," which is a manifestation of their social power in society.

In the many examples, those of Foucault, and others who followed him, we learn several things: first, the relationship between various forms of power, knowledge, and meanings; second, the way meanings are constructed in opposition in language; third, the lack of stability of meanings over time and space; fourth, the rules by which persons with authority are allowed to claim that their discourse is a "universal truth"; fifth, the ability of a discourse and the "speaker" or the "author" of a discourse, to hide the rules by which it operates. Meanwhile, I turn to methods and school textbooks' analysis.

METHODS OF SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS' ANALYSIS

Studies of school textbooks may be either quantitative or qualitative (Apple, 1982, 1993, 1998). It is the latter approach I have adopted for this project. Specifically, discourse analysis. Discourse analysis links meanings, identities and power. Since, as I have already argued, nationalism can be treated as a discourse, and because these three elements are culturally, historically, and politically related, qualitative analysis is often used to study them.

Several researchers have applied content analysis to study stereotypes and images of one group or another in textbooks. For example, El-Asmar (1986) studied the images of Arabs in the Hebrew children's books. Berg (1989) and Griswold (1981) conducted their own studies using the same techniques. Griswold (1981) used content analysis to study changes in the American character in novels. But content analysis does not address forms of exclusion such as invisibility of Others in texts. Content analysis focuses more on frequencies of signs (images such as adjectives, nouns, etc.), rather than on the totality of meanings and how power relations influence the way claims to "truth" on the "objective qualities" of a collective are achieved in a discourse. In short, content analysis does not address the political economy of meanings, but rather focuses on the atomistic aspects of those meanings.

Therefore, although there is no exemplar or existing study for an analysis on nationalism and textbooks, the few existing studies done on school curriculum—gender and race in particular—will be useful in developing my analysis. Too, I am essentially examining school textbooks for statements, passages, and interpretations that may often be matters of degree and nuance rather than obvious or overt. This is precisely why radical critics such as Apple (1982,1990) refer to parts of the school curriculum as "hidden"; they are there—in textbooks and teachers' interpretations of them—but they are not necessarily part of the formal, state approved curriculum. As with many social forces, one must look for them to find them. I turn now to discuss content analysis and its short comings, and later to discourse analysis.

CONTENT ANALYSIS AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

Content analysis is defined as "any technique for making inferences by systematic and objective identifying [of the] special characteristics of messages" (Holsti, 1968:608). What content analysis analyzes are artifacts of social communication. Typically, these are documents or transcripts.

Berelson (1952) stated the condition under which such an analysis should be attempted: objective, systematic, and quantitative descriptions of manifest content of communication. The essence of objective, scientific content analysis is that researchers make absolutely explicit the rules they have used in classifying the content of any communication.

In principle, we do not have to agree with the categories researchers develop for their analyzation of the content of materials. Also, we need not agree on the way researchers classify their categories. What is important is to know how the rules were made; this will help us evaluate how conclusions were reached. Furthermore, we can expect that any researcher following those rules, regardless of his/her personal system of values and beliefs, will document the content materials in exactly the same way. This clear ruleguided objectivity will allow other researcher using the same procedures to easily replicate the findings of earlier studies (Berg, 1989; Holsti, 1969; Rosengren, 1981 and Williamson, 1982).

As we know, this claim for "objectivity" is central to the positivist approaches. Scientists are not detached both culturally and socially from the objects of their studies. As a result, their choices are politically oriented under the cover of scientific "objectivity." Such researchers, instead of deconstructing the structure of power of a discourse that allows some meanings to become universal while others are dismissed, they in fact help that discourse obscure these forces.

The second condition mentioned by those scholars as a necessary condition for content analysis, is systematic analysis. A systematic analysis procedure adds something to our characterization of objectivity. When we use a particular strategy systematically for evaluating data, we considerably minimize any personal biases that might intrude in that evaluation. Systematically applying the same strategy helps us to avoid collecting data conforming to our theoretical ideas.

Third, the general tendency in content analysis, as Williamson (1982) and Rosengren (1981) argue, is to give a quantitative description of communications. It employs one of several systems of enumeration for gauging frequency and intensity. One of the most common uses of content analysis is to detail the frequency with which symbols or themes appear in a written document. As argued before, this procedure misses the main issues this study is concerned with, such as forms of exclusion and the strategies by which a discourse establishes meanings.

The shortcomings of content analysis are evident even when we distinguish between two types of analysis. As Holsti (1969) argued, there are two types of content: manifest and latent. Researchers should count and apply their strategy to manifest content more than to the latent. Rosengern (1981) asserts that it's much easier and more reliable to count specific negative adjectives applied to members of an ethnic group in a text than it

is to definitively characterize a variety of situations described in a text as being examples of prejudiced behavior.

In short, content analysis seems to be inadequate to address the major concerns of this study such as Self/Other relations, forms of exclusion, meanings and their relationship to power. In other words, content analysis is inadequate to address the political economy of meanings by which self identity is formed and constructed in a discourse by difference. The claim of "objectivity" is widely criticized by poststructuralist approaches (for example Benhabib, 1990; Derrida, 1976; Seidman, 1994; etc.). It is the argument that "objectivity" is a manifestation of power that limits meanings in a discourse.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

In the previous discussion, I rejected content analysis for my study. Thus, the obvious question: Why discourse analysis? Discourse analysis, as Seidel (1985) argues, focuses on the study of sign systems, or codes in terms of user relations. It focuses on the study of the content, function, and the social significance of meanings. This has important advantages over other methods of content analysis. Discourse analysis enables researchers to understand both the explicit and implicit meanings in a discourse, and also the present and absent things in a discourse. Such meanings are obscured when we use only quantitative or qualitative content analysis. Additionally, it allows us to study meanings within cultural, political, and discursive contexts. Meanings become anchored within their realm of power and knowledge, and not apart from such social milieu.

Discourse analysis studies texts. In our case, studying the school textbooks is a study of texts. While texts are linguistics structures, written and spoken, as Derrida (1981, 1984) has argued, discourse is part of the social domain. The relation between a text and a discourse is that of relation, where discourse manifests itself in a text and not the other way around. Kress (1985:27) says that:

> Discourse is a category that belongs to and derives from the social domain, and text is a category that belongs to and derives from the linguistic domain. The relation between the two is one of realization: Discourse finds its expression in text. However, this is never a straight forward relation; anyone text may be the expression or realization of a number of sometimes competing and contradictory discourses.

Therefore, studying texts allows us to understand the structure of discourses that are representations and manifestations of social forces within a society at a specific historical time. The argument is that there is an accumulative effect, a structure of meanings that could emerge when focusing on the macro analysis of a text rather than focusing on the atomic and mechanical counting of symbols, like in content analysis. Content analysis alone will not be helpful in this case, since it will reduce every thing to a related number of signs and words detached from their social context and could be understood within their linguistics context alone. This is why I use discourse analysis in this study.

The basic unit of analysis in a discourse is the *statement* (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Fabian, 1983; Macdonell,1986). A statement could be a sentence, a short paragraph, a

long story, a myth, etc. From Foucault's studies (1970, 1972, 1977, 1981), a discourse is best understood as a system of possibility for knowledge. In discourse analysis Foucault did not mean to offer a definitive interpretation of the elusive meaning of a text, rather his attention is focused on statements and objects of analysis. His method is to ask what rules permit certain statements to be made; what rules order these statements; what rules permit us to identify some statements as true and some as false; what rules allow the construction of a model, a system of classification; what rules allow us to identify certain individuals as authors. In turn, to look at statements as those which speak with authority and they are made by persons in authority positions, an author. This is why they claim to speak the "truth." In our analysis we need to understand statements and how they are organized. Within a discourse, we need to study whether these statements contradict other statements. In short, in discourse analysis we attempt to uncover the rules which allow the formation of groups of statements which are either "true" or "false," or the rules by which a discourse is organized and speaks (Foucault, 1972, 1981; Sykes, 1985; West and Zimmermann, 1985). That is why a discourse can be seen as a system of possibility: it is what allows us to produce statements which will be either true or false—it makes possible a field of knowledge.

Further, as argued before, discourse constructs meanings by inclusion and exclusion. We need to know the forms of exclusion. In this case, the discourse of nationalism has the power to impose "sameness" on a variety of individuals, never mind their differences. We need to learn the boundaries between the excluded and the included, between self and Other. In turn, what are the rules by which a collective sets its own boundaries of exclusion? How do they establish the inclusion criteria? And how many forms of exclusion could there be?

FORMS OF EXCLUSION IN A DISCOURSE

From the examples mentioned above, discussed in this chapter on forms of Othering, and from Foucault's studies, there are three main categories of Othering: negative, invisible, and positive. As I have shown, the Arab representation in the Israeli national discourse ranges from negative (devalued and dehumanized Arabs) to invisible Arabs. In *Madness and Civilization* we had the dehumanized madman's images. These representations of the mad person have been constituted negatively (in opposition) to the positive representations of the sane, the reasonable person.

Invisibility, or absence, is a total ignoring of the existence of the Other, compared to how self is constructed. This is how, until recently, the dominant male discourse has made women invisible in society. Their role in history is of no existence. Likewise, the same is true when we talk about race relations, etc. Both negativity and invisibility imply power relations. In contrast to that, positive images of the Other could be conveyed in a chain of positive self images. Again, from the Israeli discourse, one should find a positive image of the Arabs at the same time that positive image is contrasted with another more valued image of self: "Arab houses are well built;" "Arab food is delicious;" etc., but instead we find, "We are smarter," "more successful," and "intellectually superior" (Bar-Tal, 1990). In this case, there are two separate sets of inclusion and exclusion. While

"we" acknowledge the Other's positive qualities, yet, our general qualities are superior than theirs.

In short, I expect to find all three categories of Othering. Also, that these categories will be organized in a binary opposition in reference to self and its Other. In my analysis I focus on the various forms of Othering and how they might be part of the national discourse. I analyze self identity and how it is constructed in history textbooks in both Israel and Jordan.

WHAT TO STUDY?

From the literature review, we can see that the national narrative of a collective focuses on: origins, language, religion, territory, myths of heroic past, enemies of the nation, and its unique culture. These elements are dealt with in the collective's past, its present, and its future. The national discourse and its narrative constructs a "story" about "who we are," "where we have come from," "how we have overcome our enemies in the past," and "how we plan to deal with our present and future challenges." In other words, national narratives create bodies of knowledge that make it possible for a community to imagine itself. The national narrative organizes its knowledge around three main tenants that set the symbolic, territorial, and historical boundaries between collective. These tenants are: relationship to space, culture, and history. Thus, in this study, I use those three tenants to understand the following themes:

- The nation: Who are we? The criteria by which a nation defines itself. What makes it distinctive, and how it could be distinguished from other nations? The role of Other in defining a collective self identity, and how self and Other vary over time in the collective's historical narrative.
- Origins of the nation: This includes myths about the origins of a nation, from a Founding Father or a deity, and how the present generation is linked to their ancestors. How the glorification of origins contributes to the making of national character and national traits.
- Claims of Homogeneity: How national narratives maintain claims of national homogeneity despite processes of intermarriages and cultural fusion that create visible internal differences within one collective? In other words, how one's national narrative maintains claims of purity and fixity of a nation from origins to the present. This point will be discussed not as a separate issue; rather it will be concluded from the previous two.

Methodologically, I follow methods of discourse analysis and school textbook strategies that have been used by other scholars. School textbooks, as Carlson & Apple (1998), Cherryholmes (1988), and many other scholars have argued, are a body of knowledge organized in the form of short texts. Each short text covers one sub-topic within the general topic of the textbook or it is part of a sub-section or chapter. While the textbook (and all textbooks) as a whole has an accumulative meaning, each text has a specific meaning, which could support the general thesis of the textbook, or contradict it. In my study I focus on each individual text within the general frame of the textbook and later look at how each text contributes to the structure of the whole.

In each short text, similar to Foucault's procedures in *Madness and Civilization* and *Discipline and Punish*, I assemble all the statements that refer to Self and Other, and look at variations in these descriptions over time. Next, I look at the "absence" and/or "presence" of Self and Other, and the various forms of Othering. Third, I look at the explicit and implicit meanings within the short text and what kind of "truth" they tell. Fourth, after completing the study of all the short texts within the textbook, I try to understand what the general thesis of the book is, and how it structures a general meaning—a kind of story about Self and Other. Here, I try to see if there is one discourse or several, and how they coexist within a textbook and generate a narrative about the nation and its Others. In the last stage, I try to make sense out of all textbooks' meanings and structures, and how they basically contribute to the construction of a national narrative that shapes the collective memory of a nation about itself, its origins, and its boundaries.

I have done this in such a way that other scholars who follow these procedures should arrive at similar results. Such detailed procedures should enhance both reliability and validity, since it enhances the likelihood of other researchers finding the same results.

SOURCES OF DATA AND SAMPLING

History school textbooks are the major source of data for this study. In particular, I analyze history textbooks used in Israel and Jordan during the years 1948 to 1967. In the Israeli case, I analyze history school textbooks used by Jewish students. As mentioned before, Israel has enforced two separate school systems—one for the Palestinians and another for the Jewish students. Each school system uses different textbooks and decisions for both schools are made by Jewish educators. In Jordan, my data includes those textbooks used by all students in the kingdom. The Palestinians in the West Bank, until the Israeli occupation in 1967, were part of Jordan. Therefore, in their schools they used the same textbooks as the rest of Jordan's students.

In both countries, history is taught from the 4th through the 12th grades. In the early years the school curriculum primarily focuses on mastering the basic knowledge of the language, arithmetic, etc. and later starts to address identity issues. As a separate subject, history textbooks are introduced to students from the fourth grade. Hence, the history curriculum is taught for eight years from the fourth to the twelfth grade. It is spread over primary, middle, and high school years in Jordan, while in Israel, during this period the school curriculum is divided into two levels: elementary and high school.

Changes in the school curricula did not take place until the late sixties in Israel and Jordan alike. For that reason, one cannot find dramatic changes in textbooks during this period of time. Despite lack of change in the curriculum, in the case of Jordan, there was a change in authorship of textbooks. In the early 1950s, most school textbooks were not published by the Ministry of Education in Jordan. Jordan imported textbooks from Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other countries. Gradually, during the late 1950s, Jordan started commissioning and publishing their own school textbooks to replace the non-Jordanian ones. That process was not concluded until the late 1960s. Most textbooks included in this study were commissioned and published by the Ministry of Education and Culture in Jordan.

In the case of Israel, all the textbooks included in the sample were published in Israel. The Ministry of Education and Culture has control over what is taught in schools there. The Ministry, through a special committee of the curricula, issues guidelines on each subject. Authors receive those detailed and strict guidelines, which specify the goals, the breakdown of chapters, and the level of depth for each subject level. Thus, authors must follow those guidelines if they wish their textbook to be approved by the ministry's committee. Those approved textbooks are included in a list of recommended textbooks that each school receives annually. By this method, the textbooks are unified and homogenized in their presentation of the information to students, and the Ministry controls that process.

Another point to consider is the schools included in my study. While there are two school systems in both Israel and Jordan—private and public—there are only marginal differences in the curricula used in both systems. In the private schools, additional hours are added to the regular state requirements. In this study I focus on the public schools in the two respective countries, since the private school system covers only a low percentage of the population and the role of the state is somewhat less clear there.

I focus on the time period from 1948–1967. The interest in this particular time period is based on the assumption that states, like organizations, have a formative era. That is, I believe the initial conditions under which the state shaped and developed its ideological system are part of the Self-Other relationship, and must be recognized as such. These ideological structures are crucial in defining the state's ideal identity as a collective, and reproducing this ideal in its school and education systems to meet the needs of the collective. Focusing on the formative post-colonial era, in this case, can give us deeper insights into the ideological structures that made these states what they are today.

In addition, neither Israel's nor Jordan population were homogeneous during that period of history. Both countries had a large minority of Palestinians. In Israel they numbered about 12 percent, and in Jordan the size of the Palestinian population was estimated at 70 percent. The Palestinians during this period lived in the two different states and thus experienced separate socialization processes. In neither country did they have a say on the scope and content of their school textbooks. Surprisingly, in both states the Palestinians, as an Other, were considered citizens in both, although they were marginalized and denied full participation in the social, economic, and political life in those states. In Junel967, Israel occupied the West Bank, among other Arab territories. Between 1967 and 1993, the Palestinian school textbooks were censured by the Israeli military administration. Those school textbooks had no resemblance to either the Israeli nor the Jordanian texts, and were not even similar to those of the Palestinians in Israel.

RESEARCH DESIGN

During the years 1948 to 1967, schools in Israel and Jordan were structured differently. In Jordan there were three levels: elementary, middle, and high school. In Israel, there were just two levels: elementary and high school. Thus, the history curriculum was also designed according to the school structure. On average, however, the history curriculum was organized in a way that allowed coverage of all important historical periods and topics from the fourth to the twelfth grade. There were 1–2 textbooks per grade. I made

copies of all books from Jordan during a trip to the region in the spring of 1998. I found most of the Jewish Israeli school textbooks in the archives of Tel-Aviv University.

A close review of the topics covered in the Jordanian textbooks shows that they focus on the following: they start with the local and the present in the fourth grade, and end up with the modern history of Jordan and the Arab world. In between, the textbooks delve into two important periods, the Islamic and the ancient. In other words, the history textbooks start in the fourth grade with the local Jordanian identity, later in the Middle school they cover the ancient and the Islamic, and in high school they focus on the modern history of Jordan. By doing that, the textbooks close a circle that starts from the local and immediate environment of the student, and as he/she grows up in age, the texts develop in topics too. Therefore, my sampling takes into consideration two factors: one the structural differences in school organization and second, the topics covered.

While I do make reference to the whole history textbooks in Jordan and analyze all textbooks, I use primary textbooks to cover the topics as specified before. Similar considerations are used in the case of Israel. My analysis is based on the review of all textbooks. However, as in the Jordanian case, I follow the main topics of history studies. For that purpose, I make some textbooks primary to cover each one of the following periods: the ancient, middle ages, and modern era. This design will allow me to examine the gradual development of national identities and the ways in which inclusion and exclusion dimensions are experienced as the individual matures. My design is similar to studies done by scholars such as McLaren (1989) and Giroux (1988), both of whom studied the sociology of schools and school curriculum, as well as Minnich's (1990) study of gender exclusion from the school curricula in the U.S. .

The major ethical problem that I faced in this study was the problematic nature of the techniques that I used. How could I treat the texts as a whole representing all texts and avoid personal biases in the analysis? First, my knowledge of the histories and cultures of the two countries sensitized me to the complexities of the analysis. Second, my study needed to stand in relation to other studies done by Israeli Jewish scholars on textbooks. Therefore, I used their studies as a guide to adopt in my case. If their biases did not reduce their study of reliability, why should mine be treated differently? However, I document each step here, so that other scholars can follow and look at the same texts. This procedure should help to reduce biases as much as possible. In the next chapter, I present my findings for analysis of the history textbooks.

Chapter Four
The Three Identities of Jordan

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of the textbooks shows that the Jordanian national narrative promotes multiple identifications of its citizens. On the one hand, Jordan is presented as an integral part of the Arab and Islamic nations. On the other hand, the same narrative seeks to advocate for Jordan's legitimacy as a separate Hashemite state by exclusively focusing on the local identity of Jordanians and their distinctiveness compared to other Arabs. However, Jordan as a separate nation-state is presented as temporary, since the textbooks argue that the aspiration of all Arabs is to achieve a future unity under one flag, and Jordan's separation from other Arab countries has been enforced on the Arab nation by the colonial powers (see al-Budoor et al., 1964; al-Dajani et al., 1966; & al-Durrah et al., 1967). In my analysis, I discuss those multiple identities of Jordan, and show how they contribute to the making of Jordan's national identity, and how in this process, the Palestinian exclusion becomes possible. Before I do that, it is important to mention a few general findings.

The textbooks discuss Jordan's history not as a separate entity, but rather as an integral part of the Arab and Islamic history. Jordan's history became distinctive from other Arab countries' history during colonialism in the Arab region in the 1920s. For that reason, the Jordanian national narrative starts with Arab history and culminates with the emergence of Jordan as a nation-state in the post-colonial era.

Further, the findings in this study show that the textbooks' discussion of identity is organized around two dimensions, the synchronic and the diachronic. The synchronic describes the contemporary Jordanian identity by providing examples of who the Jordanians are. Here, the focus is on the local characteristics of Jordanians and their identification with the regional (Arab) and the universal (Islamic) collectives. More specifically, the synchronic is a description of the present (mid 1960s) boundaries of the identity of the Jordanians, and its links to Arabs and Muslims.

The diachronic dimension discusses the historical evolution of the nation. It starts with the Arabs' ancient history and culminates with the differentiation of Jordan from the Arab and Islamic collectives, resulting in a separate entity in modern times. The intersection of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions delineates the Jordanian identity in time and space.

Further, multiple identification seems to be achieved by moving in two intersecting ways: one, from the local to the regional and universal along the synchronic dimension; another, in the opposite direction, from a historical larger whole (Arabs and Muslims) into the local in the present, the diachronic dimension. Alternatively, this point could be rephrased as advancement from the micro to the macro, and in the discussion of the historical aspect differentiation, from the macro into the micro. By simultaneously advocating these multiple discourses, Jordanian identity is legitimized. In particular, in these discourses the Palestinian particularism, among other groups, is erased under the banner of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism.

These points are elaborated in the following, and for analytical purposes they are discussed separately. In my presentation, I use "contemporary" and "historical narrative" to refer to the synchronic and the diachronic dimensions of identity.

THE CONTEMPORARY NARRATIVE

The contemporary narrative seeks to define the boundaries of the present generation of Jordanians and show how they are linked to a larger regional and universal collective of Arabs and Muslims. Thus, on the local level, the textbooks discuss Jordan's population composition, its cities, geography, boundaries, its archaeological sites, and its leaders' kinship, among other things.

In the discussion of the local characteristics of Jordan, the textbooks focus more on the population distribution and life-style rather than the population's ethnic, religious, gender, or national background. For example, one textbook states that in 1962 the total population of Jordan was about two million people, divided evenly between the West and East Bank of the Jordan River (al-Budoor, et al., 1964:40). Jordan's population on both sides of the Jordan River is described as Jordanians. There is no reference to the population of the West bank as Palestinians.

To avoid discussion of the complex religious and national structure of Jordan, the textbooks discussing Jordanian society focus on life-style not ethnicity or religion as the main dividing line between the various collectives within Jordan. The textbooks declare that the Jordanian nation includes three separate cultural entities divided according to life-styles. These entities are defined as distinctive groups and they are discussed in the al-Dajani et al. (1966:21) textbook, which states that "The nation is divided into three life styles: urbanites, villagers, and nomads." Each group's identity is defined by its difference from others. For example, "City people do celebrate and mourn their dead in their own unique ways. These celebrations are less joyful than those in the rural or nomad camps. In the city, birth, death, and marriage are held in quiet manners" (ibid., 23–24). In contrast to that, identity of people of the village is different, since:

> The family relations are stronger in the village than [they are] in the city. Village people are more religious than city people. A village person has many more skills and occupations than a city person. The latter has one occupation… A village person is more committed and obedient to his family than a city person (ibid., 27).

It is clear that the identity of each group is constituted by its difference from other groups. Further distinctions between groups are made according to variation in dress, occupation, public services, culture, social beliefs, and place of residency (ibid., 21–9). Again, there is no reference to other dividing lines, which in reality make the major distinctions between collectives in Jordan.

Similar distinctions between rural, urban, and nomad life-styles are found in al-Budoor et al (1964:40–41). However, al-Budoor in his discussion of the differences between the West and East Bank of the Jordan River in terms of population density, distinguishes between 'indigenous' and "returnees" [Palestinian refugees], and between Arabs and Circassians who migrated to Jordan in 1864. In terms of religion, he provides no data except that there is "…a tiny minority of Christians (1/12) who live in the districts of Jerusalem, Ajloon, and Karak" (ibid., 41). The emphasis is on the majority, "If we look at the inhabitants' origins, we find that the majority are Arabs, except a tiny minority of Circassians…" (al-Budoor et al., 1964:41).

What is noteworthy here is the use of a general category "Arabs," instead of a more specific one of "Palestinians." By turning to a general category, the particularism of Palestinians, among other ethnic and national groups, is erased and in its place Jordanian identity is implanted. In addition, the reference to the Palestinian refugees as returnees suggests that they are displaced Jordanians awaiting their return to the "homeland" and not displaced Palestinians.

Considering Jordan's internal divisions, except in al-Budoor's text, no other reference is made in any of the textbooks to religion, gender, social class, ethnicity, nationality differences or those between rulers and ruled. The most frequently used categories are Arabs, Muslims, and Jordanians. The Palestinian invisibility is extremely evident in these textbooks, especially because there are recurring references to Israel as "Israel, Jewish entity, Zionists," etc. (al-Budoor et al., 1964 & al-Dajani et al., 1966; al-Durrah et al., 1967; Ubari et al., 1967). The Palestinians are only discussed as a historical episode that was ended by 1949 (the Unification of the West Bank with Jordan). The textbooks focus on the idea of the unity of the nation in spite of the aforementioned differences in culture and types of residency:

> Despite our differences we are united and cooperative. Our unity is manifested in the army and government institutions. In these institutions we find urban, village and nomad people. Since all are acting for the best interest of the nation, the motherland, the Arab nation, Islam, and unity of Arabs and Moslems (al-Dajani et al., 1966:33).

Thus, the previously discussed local differences become less significant, since there is unity and cooperation among these groups. The nation's unity is exemplified in the smooth functioning of the state institutions. These institutions transcend the factional composition of the nation into a universal entity driven by the general interest of the nation. Above all, the local differences are made less significant since each member of the (Jordanian) nation acts for the general good of the nation (Arabs and Muslims).

Another way of promoting Jordan's national identity is achieved through the appropriation and naming of Palestinian cities, geography, land and natural resources as Jordanian. For example, al-Budoor et al. (1964:41–43) lists all Jordan's main cities. In

that list he includes Jericho, Nablus, Jerusalem, Tool -Karim, among other Palestinian cities (see also al-Dajani, et al., 1966:46–53). The same strategy is applied to natural resources, irrigation projects, local industry, rivers, the replacement of the Palestinian currency with Jordanian in 1950, etc. (al-Budoor et al., 1964:43–68).

More interesting is the issue of state boundaries. First, Jordan is presented as an integral part of Great Syria (Bilad al-Sham) in al-Budoor et al. (1964:12). In the next paragraph the author argues that "Today, Bilad alSham includes The Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon, Jordan, and the extorted part [al-Qism al-Mughtassab]…" The textbook does not specify what he means by the "extorted part." Is it Palestine that is Israel, or is the "it" part of Jordan, or does it belong to the Arab land?

A clearer answer to that question is found in al-Dajani's (1966:17) textbook, where he discusses the borders of Jordan. Thus, he mentions that "In the West, the Mediterranean…" (see also al-Budoor et al., 1964:12, 68). Here Jordan is extended into historical Palestine appropriated as Jordan's own.

Another form of establishing the localism of Jordan is by attempting to highlight its particularism and distinctiveness. That goal is achieved through the description of similarity and difference of Jordan from Arabs and Muslims. It is clear why Jordan's identity is similar to Arabs and Muslims, but it is not obvious how Jordan's identity becomes different. The distinction from Arabs and Muslims is manifested in Jordan's "sacred origins." This argument is repeated by almost all authors, for example, in al-Dajai et al. (1966), alDurah et al. (1967), al-Siba'ai et al (1967), etc. In al-Dajani et al. (1966:12) students read that "…the Hashemite dynasty…is related to the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless his name, who was from the Hashim ancestors from Quraish" (see also al-Durah et al., 1967:123–4, 128).

If one is to judge the sacred origins of these alleged kinship ties by the practices of Jordan's former king Hussein and his descendant Abdullah, one finds that diffusion and intermarriages were the norm of the Hashemite dynasty. Therefore, their alleged kinship is imagined rather than real. However, emphasizing kin relations serves as a legitimizing factor for Jordan's foreign rulers. The appeal to Islamic kin comes to make the rulers and their state legitimate since they serve a universal noble cause—continuation of the Islamic tradition.

Moreover, not only do the leaders of the nation have sacred origins, but the land itself is a sacred land. For example, in another case from alDajani et al. (1966) textbook, the authors describe a "trip" Jordanian students took to make themselves acquainted with Jordan's historical sites:

> Hebron is the city of our grandfather Ibrahim (p.46–47). In Jericho we visited the palace of the Omayya Caliph, Hisham (p.47). Ajloon…the teacher mentioned that Salah al-Deen al-Ayyobi built a castle in the town. It is called the Ajloon Castle (p.48). In Jerusalem, we felt the beauty of the holy city which is the first Qiblah, and it is the place of the third holy mosque (p.40–43). We went from there to Alqiyama Church… We walked in and saw its high posts. The teacher explained its history and its centrality for the Christian world (p.45). We visited Petra…the archeological remains of the city reminded us of the glory which the Arab Nabatees enjoyed in their capital (p.51). My country is beautiful indeed.

> What makes it more important and beautiful is the fact that it is full of holy places and archeological sites. It is in fact a large museum… (p.53).

The text emphasizes the historical, religious, Arab, glorious, and aesthetic features of "Jordan's" cities, features by which Jordan is made distinctive from other Arab countries. When one combines the sacred kin of the Hashemites with these religious, historical, and aesthetic features of Jordan, Jordan gains individualistic identity separate from other Arabs. By appropriating the Palestinians' historical sites and their glorious Arab and Muslim heroes and associating them with Jordan's rulers as Islamic kin, Jordan gains identity as a continuation of the past. From now on, the 'nation' and its space are valorized in relation to Other "regular" Arabs who have neither sacred origins, nor land as holy as "Jordan's." By emphasizing these points, the textbooks construct Jordan's collective identity as different and distinctive from both Arabs and Muslims, whether in antiquity, the Islamic era, or modern times (see al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Sasi et al., 1966). It is this distinctiveness through time that the archeology of the textbooks attempts to establish. By doing so, they link the present to the past, presenting the national narrative as a natural process of evolution of nationhood from its "origins" to the present.

Another way to achieve the same sense of distinctiveness for Jordan is by promoting multiple identifications. Here, internal differences are ignored. The individual's identity is directly transmuted into identification with a regional and universal entity like Arab and Muslim. By advocating this type of identification, local differences become less significant and are assimilated into external solidarity with the Arab and Islamic world. For example, on page 1 in the al-Dajani et al. (1966) introduction:

> The student is asked to memorize the name of his town, region, district, county and the Jordanian Kingdom, his small motherland…emphasizing that his small motherland is part of the larger Arab homeland…we emphasize the Arab unity to encourage the spirit of the Arab unity in students' identities,

What we have here is identity in progress, from the individual to the larger entity of Arabs, from the micro to the macro. The emphasis is on promoting similarities rather than differences. The individual's identity is presented as part of a chain of identification, no longer bounded by the boundaries of the "small motherland." However, by making it necessary for a person to identify with the larger whole—the Arabs—the local Jordanian identity also gains legitimacy.

Another way of making Jordan distinctive and legitimate is by blurring the boundaries between Jordan and the larger whole, the Arab and Muslim brothers. There is no reference to Jordan as a separate entity: "I am an Arab, proud of my beliefs and country. My country is the country of the Arabs" (al-Dajani et al., 1966:4). Further, on this same page: "The Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom is my small motherland [Watani al-Saghir] which is part of my larger Arab motherland [al-Watan al-Arabi al-Kabir]." The same argument is presented again: "…my small motherland is an integral part of the larger Arab motherland, and it is also an integral part of the glorious Islamic nation [al-Umma al-Islamiyyah]" (ibid., 7).

Further, not only is identification with a larger whole is encouraged; the textbooks argue that ever since Jordan was established its aspiration has always been toward achieving Arab unity. The emergence of Jordan like other Arab states, as a separate entity, the textbooks argue, has developed out of the suppressive forces and "betrayal" of Western colonialism in the Arab region (al-Durah et al., 1967:123–4, 128, 158, and 161). Jordan then as a separate nation-state from other Arab nations is portrayed as a temporary stage in the ultimate comprehensive unity of all Arabs under one flag:

> The current fragmented and disputed Arab states were once united under one state. [They were] ruled by one ruler, and shared one flag. This was during the flourishing Islamic regime. But, because of the colonial interventions, the cultural and ideological backwardness, and due to different circumstances, the Arab country has become fragmented and divided into many kingdoms, republics, and small states. The Arabs in all their regions are planning, and willing to achieve a comprehensive unity (ibid., 6–7).

This text provides legitimacy to the next section:

> The Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom is an Arab state which includes Jordan and Palestine. After the 1948 Palestinian war, both Banks were united. The union was agreed upon in the Jericho public convention in 1949. The agreement was made anonymously, by that it came to answer the people's will to unify the two Banks. This unification was considered by all as the first step toward a comprehensive unification of the Arab motherland (ibid., 10).

Jordan is portrayed as if it is the first to take the initiative toward achieving pan-Arabism. The assimilation of and rendering the Palestinians invisible from that moment of "unification" is explicable as serving a more "noble" cause, Arab unity, which is higher than any form of particularism of this group or that. Thus, the particularity of Jordanianness is made possible by advocating the universal (Arab unity). By doing so, the particular distinctiveness of one group or another within Jordan is made less important.

Moreover, advocating pan-Arabism not only marginalizes particularism, it also gives legitimacy to non-indigenous leaders of Jordan (origins from the Arab Peninsula). For example, by defining the nation (in Jordan) in terms of a larger collective, it makes it irrelevant who runs the state (of Jordan). Above all, if the goal of all Arabs, as the textbooks argue, is to revive the Arab nation to its glorious Arab-Islamic past, then the alleged lineage of the (Jordanian) dynasty to the Prophet makes them better candidates to rule and lead that Arab nation. For that reason, Jordan for example, becomes a legitimate claimant of Palestine on behalf of all Arabs and Muslims.

The advancement of such a discourse carries within it serious ramifications for the Palestinians in Jordan. Raising the flag of pan-Arabism in Jordan actually pushed the Palestinians to a minor position by which they became excluded as a national collective. Consequently, they were denied the right to have a distinctive national identity, and be

national claimants for Palestine. As the textbook notes, “Jordan is at the fore front of the extorted parts of Palestine. It is also the center of all Arabs as well as of all Muslims” (al-Dajani et al., 1966:15).

To conclude these points, the invisibility of the Palestinians in the Jordanian national narrative serves as one element in a chain of practices which are employed to define Jordan by its minority and non-indigenous leaders, the Hashemites. For the same reason, the textbooks over—emphasize the Arab and Islamic nature of the Jordanian national identity. Such an emphasis achieves two main goals: the particularism of the state, and the legitimacy of its leaders. In this process, the exclusion of Palestinians became an imperative for these goals to be achieved.

THE OTHER

There are several types and forms of Othering in the textbook. Some are direct and explicit such as the descriptions of Zionists and colonial Western states, while others are implicit like Palestinians, Christians, and other Arab states, as I have shown above. What is important to mention is that the explicit reference to Others occupies less than one percent of the textbook.

Zionists and colonial Western states are described in negative terms. They are those who divided the Arab lands into fragmented and weak nation-states. Zionists, in particular, are those who have extorted the “beautiful parts of the motherland, Palestine” (al-Dajani et al., 1966:10). They are colonialists too: “Extortionist, colonial Zionists” (ibid., 38).

In contrast to the direct description of the Other, the Zionist, there are several texts where the Other is made invisible. Invisibility of the Other is evident in the discussion of the state’s borders. al-Dajani et al. (1966:17) discusses the state’s boundaries from the north, east, south and west. While the existence of other Arab countries is mentioned as bordering Jordan, Israel is invisible. Thus, the text states that: “from the west the Mediterranean sea.” This is to say, that between Jordan and the sea there is no other entity.

By making the Mediterranean the western border of Jordan, the text does two things: First it makes the Israeli existence invisible, and consequently illegitimate. Second, it makes the Palestinians and their homeland invisible too. While earlier the text mentioned the “extorted parts of Palestine,” now there is no reference to that land or its people.

Another contradiction is evident when the text talks about the cities of Palestine and includes in them the Jewish cities.

> Tel-Aviv, it was a suburb of the Arab Jaffa. A tiny group of the Jewish minority in Palestine lived in it. Nowadays it has become a large city. It is certain that a day will come and we will return the city of Jaffa and its suburbs to the Arabs. By that we will clean it [Jaffa] and others [cites] from the extortionist Jews (ibid., 103–104).

Those statements reconcile the “legitimate, and natural state boundaries,” and the illegitimate situation. Also, to compare between the reality and history or between what is

just, in relation to what exists as unjust—at least as presented in the textbooks. What we have, then, is a binary opposition: one is temporary, unnatural, and illegitimate, and the other is natural, legitimate, and historically just. On the one hand, the Other, the Zionists, are invisible, and on the other hand, they are visible. What is being asserted is that they are colonialists and extortionists compared to Us, the real people of the land.

THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE: FROM TRIBES TO NATION-STATES

The historical—diachronic- narrative discusses the evolution of the "nation" from antiquity to the present. Its goal is to trace the nation from its roots and origins and show how it evolved in time into its contemporary form. In this discussion the attempt is to show commonality in terms of shared history and culture, and demonstrate continuity of living and occupying the same geography or space from the dawn of history to the present. These three dimensions—common history, culture, space—constitute the main structure on which the national discourse stands. The three dimensions combined allow the national narrative to present a distinguished national identity that occupies a space, for a long history, and has its distinctive culture. The discussion below shows that these alleged coherent aspects are politically invented; at the center of this process is selection of events which serves as the main vehicle that gives these dimensions their own "objective" reality.

In terms of organization, the Jordanian historical narrative is organized around three separate historical blocks, each of them constituting a different discourse in terms of identity of the Arabs. They are:

1. The tribal discourse (from antiquity, about 4000 B.C. to the rise of Islam in the seventh century A.D.);
2. The religious discourse (from the rise of Islam to the beginning of the 20th century and fall of the Ottoman Empire);
3. The national discourse (from late nineteenth century to the present, mid 1960s).

While the first two discourses discuss the Arab identity in general, the national discourse specifies the rise of Jordan as a nation in the modern history of the Arabs. Further, Jordan local ancient history is mentioned among other Arab histories. More emphasis is placed on the Arab peninsula as the birth place of the Arab people, and on the rise of Islam as the unifying force that made the Arabs into one nation (see al-Durrah & al-Kird, et al., 1967; al-Kird, et al., 1967; al-Rifa'ai et al., 1966; al-Kird et al., 1967; & al-Sasi et al., 1966). Jordan's history as a separate entity becomes significant in the postcolonial era in the Arab region. Focus is thus on the emergence of Jordan as a separate entity within its regional and historical context.

Further, each of these periods is defined in opposition to the other. For example, the Islamic era is defined in opposition to the "ignorance" era of pre-Islam. Pre-Islam is conceived as the age of ignorance, while the Islamic era is perceived as the age of enlightenment. Not only is each epoch defined in opposition to the other, each stage of the three time blocks has its own discourse and its own system of meaning which shapes "who we are," and "what the nation is." As a result of that, the boundaries of the

collective or the "nation" are different in each one of those discourses. In turn, each discourse plays a separate role in shaping the collective memory of Arabs and their identities at the present.

In addition, while these three blocks are presented as separate ones, they are perceived as being elements of a linear process where one develops out of the preceding stage, and in opposition to it. In other words, the next stage in the nation's history is dialectically evolving out of the contradictions in the preceding stage. The nation is conceived as developing in a progressive manner out of those separate, but yet interrelated processes.

ARABS IN ANTIQUITY—THE TRIBAL DISCOURSE

The history of Arabs in antiquity goes back to 4000 B.C. It covers the Arab history both on the Arab Peninsula and outside it. In the textbooks, the preIslamic Arabs are described both in a derogatory and a laudatory manner. For one, it seems essential to glorify the pre-Islamic era. The glorification of the nation in pre-Islam is a glorification of origins of the nation's ancestors, which the textbooks argue go back to Noah and his son Sam (al-Sasi et al., 1966:11). Without these foundations the Arab identity would seem rootless. However, compared to the Islamic era, pre-Islam is the age of people of "ill morals," "disputed tribes," "pagans," "gamblers," "drunk," "women abusers," etc. (al-Durah et al., 1967:20–22; al-Kird et al., 1967:15–16; alSasi et al., 1966:34–51). These descriptions show the ambivalence of the Arab narrative toward ancestors and their culture.

Further, there seem to be several reasons for this emphasis on that remote history and the specific geographies included in it. One, going so far back in time comes to say that the Arab nation is an ancient nation and that its roots are deep. Second, as I have mentioned earlier, history of the Arab Peninsula is essential for the discussion of origins and ancestors of the Arab people. Third, the history of Hijaz and Mecca in particular is significant to understanding later historical developments, and the rise of Islam, which marks the birth of the Arab nation as a political identity. Fourth, history of Arabs outside the Arab Peninsula is very important in promoting the idea of continuous presence in the same geographies that the Arab people came to occupy today. Thus, in addition to the history of the Arab people in Yemen, Najed, and Hijaz, in the Arab Peninsula, the textbooks, for example, make reference to the history of the Amours in Syria and their city-state Palmyra, the Phoenicians in Lebanon and Palestine, the Canaanites in Palestine, the Aramaeans between Iraq and Syria, the Akkacds in Iraq, and the Nabataeans and their famous city Petra in Trans-Jordan as parts of the general Arab ancient history rather than as separate Syrian, Lebanese, or Jordanian, etc., histories (Abed al-Salam et al., 1960; al-Rifa'ai et al., 1966–7; al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Sasi et al., 1966; and al-Siba'ai et al., 1967–8).

All of these points, the glorification of ancestors, the ambivalence toward pre-Islamic history, and the attempt to show continuity in the same places that the contemporary Arabs occupy today, find their expression in the discussion of the myth of origins and identity in antiquity. As I discussed below, myth of origin describes the nation as a homogenized collective sharing the same traits that developed in the same geography. In contrast, the discussion of identity in antiquity shows the fragmentation and diversity of the Arab communities more than unity and cohesive culture.

MYTH OF ORIGIN

Origins are important in order to establish historical continuity of the "nation" and it is essential to answer the question of "where we came from?" The myth of origin discusses the nation's roots and its emergence in antiquity. It is organized around three dimensions: 1) space of origin, 2) ancestry, and 3) cultural traits and national distinctiveness. These dimensions of myth of origin are the foundations upon which the birth of the Arab nation and its "golden age" is founded. For the nation to be a viable entity it does not seem sufficient to discuss origins only. It seems imperative to make the link between origin and birth.

Birth marks the emergence of political identity, which is associated in the textbooks with the rise of Islam in the seventh century A.D. Consequently, Islam is considered the "golden age" of the nation, which transformed the "disputed Arab tribes in the Jahiliyya" into an integrated, glorious, powerful nation. In turn, when the textbooks talk about rebirth of the Arab nation and revival of its glorious past, they are not making the reference to the cultural and social life of ancestors, rather to the era of the rise of Islam, the birth of the Arab political identity. However, the discussion and the emphasis on ancestors seem to be important to ratify the presence of Arabs in the spaces they occupy today and their culture.

As I will show, each one of these dimensions is constructed by employing opposition and Othering to construct meanings. Such meanings come to give a collective a sense of identity and establish their legitimate claims over a historical past. In these cases, meanings of identity are constructed via difference from Others. For example, we occasionally find expressions such as "sacred space—polluted space," "moral ancestors—immoral Others," "superior—inferior," "victims—victimizers," "strong—weak," "united—fragmented," "real owners of the land—foreigners to the land," "just—unjust," "slavery—freedom," "darkness—light," etc.. In addition, in all cases, keeping the "nation's line" of kinship and purity is a central theme. It is this symbolic structure that gives a collective the sense of belonging to a kin community. In the following sections, I discuss each of the main categories of the myth of origin as they are presented in the textbooks.

SPACE OF ORIGIN

The narrative of space of origin uses two main approaches to establish continuity between ancestors and the current generation in the spaces that the Arabs occupy today. The first is the historical approach. This approach discusses human societies as developing in an evolutionary and progressive manner. The second is the ecological approach. It assumes the existence of symbiotic relations between people and land. Based on this approach, the textbooks attributed the rise of Arab civilization in antiquity to a set of distinctive ecological factors that existed in the Arab land itself. They argued that those distinctive ecological qualities were the driving force that supported the development of a unique Arab civilization in antiquity. For the same reason, the textbooks argued that lack or shortage of such ecological ingredients within a certain environment could deprive a community from developing an advanced culture.

In the textbooks, the two approaches are intertwined. For example, the notion of nation was depicted as a tree or as a plant that started from seeds and later developed into maturity. Those "seeds" could not develop unless the soil in which they were planted was supportive to their growth. Thus, while the historical approach had argued that the space of origin of Arabs was the Arab Peninsula, later, the nation grew and expanded into nearby geographies. This is how history and ecology interact and provide an explanation to the myth and space of origin.

The textbook often described space of origin as the "natural habitat" of the nation's ancestors. By that they meant that there was an exclusive relation between space and people. For example, in al-Sasi et al. (1966:10) we read that: "It is well known that the Arab Peninsula is the motherland of the Semitics who when they experienced drought or demographic pressures migrated into other lands ... mainly to the north" (al-Sasi et al., 1966, p.10).

A similar argument is found in al-Siba'i, al-Sham, al-Shaqfah, and alAsaad (1967). In their textbook they argued that: "Most historians agree that the Arab Peninsula was the cradle of the Semitic Arabs and from there their migration waves went toward Bilad al-Sham [Great Syria] and Bilad alRafidien [the Fertile Crescent]…" (ibid., 19).

Against these assertions on space of origin, al-Durah et al. (1967:8) stated that:

> Historians disagree on the original homeland of the Semites. Some consider the Fertile Crescent to be the original homeland of the Semites. Others consider Africa as their original homeland, and a third group [of scholars] believed Armenia to be the [Semites] homeland. But most historians share the belief that the Arab Peninsula is the most ancient homeland that the Semites lived in. We support this [latter] opinion.

Given this, how can one explain the present existence of Arabs outside the space of origins? This link is constructed by arguing that the Arab ancestors had migrated from their place of origin into nearby geographies. Here, most authors of the textbooks argue that there were six waves of migration from the Arab Peninsula outward. Those migration waves spread into Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and North Africa. The first wave of migration started around 4000 B.C. of the Assyrians and the Akkadians, and the last and the most significant wave was the Islamic expansion beginning in the seventh century A.D. (al-Rifa'i et al., 1966–67). However, the discrepancies between the various authors pertain to North Africa and to the question of when the Arabs came to occupy those geographies. For example, al-Siba'i et al. (1967:20) stated that:

> The oldest of those migration [waves] toward Africa used two paths. The first through Bab al-Mandab [the Gulf of Aden], and the second through Sinai. Those waves spread from Somalia into the Nile valley and from there into North Africa, but it is not possible to determine when they occurred…[However], the clues detecting [those people's] ancient Arab origins is in the remote similarity between their languages and the Semitic languages and the uniformity in their body shape, skin color, head shape and the Arab race.

The uncertainty about whether and when those migration waves took place is marginalized. In stead, the remote similarity seems to be satisfactory for claiming identity since the implicit assumption in the quotation is that identity is established by biological factors. Therein, since there is a remote similarity between those African communities and the Arabs, then both have to belong to the same species, the Arabs. However, against these arguments, one could argue that remote similarity does not create identity. In addition, fusion processes make it difficult for an observer to determine the purity of a collective. More important, as many studies have shown, differences in collective identities are not attributed to biological differences. On the contrary, it is the social construction of identity that abridges differences and demarcates identities as distinctive. But, the importance of these arguments lies not in their factuality, rather in their attempt to show as if the present and the past are inseparable unites and that the Arab presence in the current geographies has been so since the dawn of history. This same idea is advanced in al-Rifa'i et al. (1967) textbook where he says on page 12 that:

> If we go back to the ancient history of the Arab homeland, we would find that those nations were connected by blood ties and emerged from one origin. The birth place of those nations was the Arab Peninsula and from there they moved out toward the Fertile Crescent, Bilad al-Sham [great Syria], Canaan, and crossed Sinai and settled in Egypt and Sudan. From Egypt some of those migration waves reached Lybia. The Maghreb [was settled] by communities from the cost of Bilad al-Sham [the Phoenicians]. They built [in North Africa] a great capital and developed a great empire which had spread the Arab blood in the entire Maghreb.

From reading the previous quotation one may get the impression that the presence of a few Arabs in North Africa had the power to Arabize the rest of those countries. While there is support to the claim that the Phoenician Arabs had established trade centers along the Mediterranean coast (Carthage for example), this does not mean that one could conclude from that fact that all North Africans came from an Arab origin. As many historians argue, the Arab Muslims came to occupy Egypt and North Africa in the mid of the seventh century.

The historical findings supporting the massive entry of Arabs into North Africa in 650 A.D. does not seem to satisfy the pan-Arab national discourse, which in the 1960s aspired to unite all the Arab homelands as one nation since the dawn of history. For that reason, we find conflicting ideas in the textbooks pertaining to the relations between contemporary spaces and the ancient. For example, al-Rifa'i et al. (1966–7:29) argued that "… the Hyksos originated from Syria, and the northern parts of the Arab Peninsula were Semitic Arabs who invaded Egypt and ruled over it for two centuries. During their reign many of Syria's inhabitants migrated to Egypt." In addition, in al-Siba'i et al. (1967:22) I found two conflicting ideas. First, in his table of migration waves from the Arab Peninsula outward toward North Africa, we find no evidence that Arabs had migrated into North Africa prior to the Islamic conquest in 650 A.D. Surprisingly, on the same page, after presenting his table of migration waves the author said that:

> In 1789 B.C. Egypt was invaded by Arab people who came from Sinai and the Eastern desert. They settled in the Delta and Upper Egypt was under their control. Those people were known as the Hyksos or the shepherds' kings. Their reign of Egypt lasted for two hundred years during which the Arab race mixed with the Egyptians especially in the Delta. [The Hyksos's rule] left its linguistic and racial mark [on Egypt].

Similar conflicting ideas I found in Mukhtar's textbook. On page 12 he mentioned that all the nations that lived in the Arab homeland in antiquity, including Egypt and North Africa, stemmed from one origin, the Semitic Arabs. But on page 32–34, in contrast to earlier descriptions of the Hyksos as sharing the same Arab blood, he described them as "outside invaders" and "enemies of the Egyptian nation" who tried to disrupt the Egyptians' "unity," and "independence."

The ecological approach advanced the same idea of Arab presence in their current homeland by discussing the Arab country as if it was a distinctive geography or a natural habitat that could only support the development of one specific species of human kind, the Arab nation. By saying that, the place of origin is elevated to the level of a sacred space that bestows upon the nation's ancestors glory, honor, and distinctiveness. More important, the place of origin is discussed as the cradle of human civilization. For example, al-Sasi et al. (1966:9) said that:

> Since the dawn of history, glorious civilizations have risen in this part of the world, at a time where ignorance and darkness dominated the rest of it. A set of factors has helped the emergence of such civilizations. Some of these are the middle place of our motherland between East and West, its moderate climate, its fertile soil, its excessive supply of river waters, and the desert that surrounds and protects it from destructive invasions.

Further, al-Rifa'i et al. (1967:12, 20 and 26), like the rest of the textbooks stated that:

> If you look at the Arab homeland map, you will clearly notice that this homeland extends over a larger piece of land surrounded by the Mediterranean and the Taurus mountains in the north, and in the east by the Arab gulf and the Zagros mountains, from the south by the Arab sea, Ethiopia and, and the great desert; and the Atlantic ocean in the west.

From both citations we learn that the Arab homeland is the cradle of civilization, it is a geographical unit which has natural boundaries, and its climate and soil were behind the homogeneity of its cultures which all stemmed from an Arab origin. We need to remember that not all ancient civilizations had been Arab. In fact most had not. Egypt and North Africa's civilizations had existed centuries before the Arab occupation of those spaces. However, the goal of the Arab narrative is to make the link between the space of origins and the present spaces of the Arab nation. This goal is achieved by first, making a general statement about the region ancient history which suppresses the particular differences between Arab and nonArab civilization. Later, in the textbooks, the link is "supported" by extensively discussing trade and cultural influences between ancient

Egypt and various parts of the ancient Arabs in Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia (al-Salam et al., 1960; al-Siba'i et al., 1967–8). Consequently, the reader gets the impression that the present and the past have always been one integrated and united geography.

To conclude, the textbooks used the historical and ecological approaches to make the link between space of origins and the current space of Arabs. First, the nation is conceived as if it has been a living organism or a tree that started from seeds, and later, had required larger spaces during each stage of its development-growth. This is where the waves of migration come in to explain the current presence of Arabs in North Africa, for example. Second, demographic pressures and lack of resources that could sustain life were behind the migration waves and expansion of the nation. Saying that makes the present and the past no longer in conflict; they become parts of a historical organic chain in which migration waves are described as acts of survival, a process which culminated in "the last and the greatest wave of migration out of the Arab Peninsula, which took place in 650 A.C. and later" (al-Sasi et al., 1966:13).

What these arguments do not speak of and hinder is the real factors that motivated the Arab tribes to migrate from the Arab Peninsula outward, especially the last wave of the Islamic expansion and Arabization of many geographies. The way the argument is structured, it suppresses the religious, economic, and political forces behind the Arab expansion. Instead, the textbooks present a set of natural and human necessity factors as those that stood behind the migration waves. In other words, the power issues of expansion are hidden behind the presentation of the migration waves as an essential part of a natural human development.

ANCESTRY

The narrative of ancestry uses biological and cultural attributes to establish the connection between ancestors and the contemporary members of the Arab nation. To maintain the sense of kin between the present and ancestry, the nation is depicted metaphorically, as a tree (an image which is often used in national narratives), that has roots and branches. While there might be variations among branches, nevertheless, all had stemmed from the same roots. Of the many branches which appeared in history, the textbooks argue, all are related to the sacred and heroic origins. Thus, on page 13, in al-Sasi et al. (1966) we read that: "The Arabs are divided into two parts: the *endured* (Baqiyah) and the *extinguished* (Ba'idah)." The *Extinguished Arabs:*

> appeared in the Arab peninsula, they lived in it and in its remote outskirts. No one knows until now when and where they came from. They are of two kinds: a. The archaic Arab nations those who lived in the Arab Peninsula long ago before Islam, b. the archaic Semitic nations those who played an important role in history. Their motherland was the Fertile Crescent. Among them the Babylonians, the Assyrian, the Chaldees in Iraq, and the Canaanite, the Phoenicians, and the Aramaic in larger Syria (ibid., 13).

One of the *Extinct* Arab communities is *Thamoud*. It is argued that:

> Their origin goes back to Sam the son of Noah. His name was given to his people who settled in between Hijaz and al-Sham [great Syria]. They were very advanced in the art of construction and architecture. They crafted mountains into houses. Evidence of their skills could be seen in what has remained of their cities such as "Mad'in Salih" near the city of al-Ulla in the vicinity of al-Madinah al-Munawarah. They worshiped a multiplicity of god idols. God sent them a prophet, and when they denied his call, they were destroyed (ibid., 20).

While earlier the origins were clear, now the "nation" takes a more complex description. Not only, that the text refers occasionally to Semitic as Arabs, also those "who lived in the Arab Peninsula long ago before Islam," their roots, and where they came from, is not really known. Moreover, while earlier the place of origin was delineated as the Arab Peninsula, now the textbook extends that space to include most of the contemporary Arab countries. Interestingly enough, the *Extinguished* had disappeared from the stage of history, not due to conflicts and wars, but rather, destruction came upon them due to their ill character and worshiping of multiple gods.

In contrast to the *Extinguished* Arabs, we have the *Endured*. The *Endured* are defined in opposition to the *Extinguished.* This binary opposition develops further and becomes the main strategy by which origins of the nation are traced back in time. This is how it is used in the next quotation which tells us about the *Endured* Arabs:

Those appeared in the Arab peninsula after the *Extinguished* Arabs. They lived in the outskirts, particularly in Yemen and Hijaz. They are divided into two parts:

1. The Arabied Arabs *[al-Arab al-Al'aribah](*Alqahtaniyyoon). They are the source of all Arabs and the source of their archaic civilization. They appeared in Yemen. Their migration waves settled down on the banks of the Fertile Crescent after the leak of the al-'Aram dam. Among them al-Manathera in al-Hira, Kinda in Najd, and the al-Ghasasina in great Syria.
2. The Arabized Arabs (al-Arab al-Musta'ribah, al-Adnaniyyoon or al-Muddariyyoon): They are non-Arabs who entered into the Arabied Arabs (al'Arab al-A'ribah), particularly, those from the descent of Isma'il the son of Ibrahim, the blessed. They resided in Hijaz. From those descendants emerged the tribe of Quraish which is related to Mudar and Adnan. Therefore, [those Arabs] are named the *Adnanians* or the *Mudaranians* (ibid., 15).

Before analyzing this quotation I would like to introduce another one. Both will make my argument later, clearer.

> We are deeply sorry to say that we know little about those nations which lived in the Arab Peninsula before they started the waves of migration to the neighboring countries. Albeit that we will see that the nations which settled in the Arab Peninsula had created a particular civilization of their own and had developed governments and cities. From those Arabs who resided in the Arab Peninsula in Hijaz and Najd, we inherited the Arabic language which is, now a days, spoken by more than eighty million people. A language of the holy Qura'an, the book of God… The language

> which the messenger of God spoke, God blessed him, and by that he enchanted the hearts and ears, [who] moved people from darkness into light…(ibid., 17).

A few points need to be discussed. First, earlier the text explained that the origins of Arabs could be traced back to Noah, now we have those binary oppositions of Extinguished/ Endured, "real Arabs" and "Arabized," etc. Second, the sacred origins are attributed to those nonArabs who blended into Arabs and became Arabs. Strategic syncretism is what makes it possible to consider those non-Arabs as part of the nation's origins. The relationship of those non-Arabs to prophets like Ibrahim and his descendant, Isma'il is what marginalizes their non-Arab origins. In fact, the connection of those non-Arabs to sacred origins gentrifies the Arab nation. Thus, the lack of knowledge about the origins, the non-Arab aspects of it, and the historical gaps in the evolution of the nation, are compensated by the relationship to sacred origins. In turn, the lack of knowledge about origins, and their Otherness, is turned into strength. Eventually, it makes the nation seem as a people who are connected to holy roots; people who have a holy text and language. To strengthen that argument, the textbook says: "And in this country God sent his inspiring angel to the master of all [God's] messengers and the last of prophets [Muhammad] and thus he dissolved darkness and ignorance and replaced them with the true light" (ibid., 17).

Therefore, in this chain of origins we have several sacred or prophetic ancestors: Noah, Ibrahim, and culminating with the prophet Muhammad, the prophet of glorious Islam. These connections to such glorious prophets elevate the nation to a status of chosen, unique, privileged, historical, and beloved by God. The nation is seen as superior. Its superiority is demonstrated in the role it has played in human history, as those who took upon themselves a civilizing mission, like the transformation of nations from "darkness to light."

The historical gaps in the history of origins from Noah and Muhammad, passing through the non-Arab origins of Isma'il, are bridged by the use of the prophetic characteristics of those ancestors. They seem to endow the nation with glory, pride, and heroism. The emphasis is on their role as prophets. They are described as those who shared the common belief in an "eternal truth," an issue that makes their particular affiliation no longer important. What is important is that the nation is connected to those prophets and they have become the nation's mythical figures.

CULTURAL TRAITS AND NATIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS

The last issue in the myth of origin is the discussion of ancestors' characteristics, traits, and physical attributes. Here is where we see the confusion emerging. On the one hand, the textbooks use biological and psychological traits to distinguish the Arab collective identity through history. On the other hand, they emphasize language and religion as those things that shaped the collective Arab identity and maintained it through time. These two aspects are not presented in the textbooks as mutually exclusive. Therein, if we choose biological and psychological criteria, the question becomes where would the Arab narrative place all the non-Arabs who became Arabs with the spread of Islam?

Alternatively, if we choose religion, then what would be the fate of pre-Islamic Arabs? And finally, if we choose language, then what role would be assigned to Islam in the making of the nation? These contradictions are resolved in the historical narrative by choosing one criterion by which ancestors, and the nation's identity, is presented.

The first step in the discussion of the cultural and human distinctiveness of the Arab ancestors is a glorification and valorization of the notion of the Arab nation. This is done by attributing sacred meaning or origins to the nation. In al-Sasi et al. (1966:11), it says that:

> Historians have long debated the origins and meanings of the word Semitic. Some scholars attributed the name to their grandfather Sam the son of Noah. Others said that the name describes the people's physical appearance as tall people [Arabic: Sumou means high or majestic].

Either way, whether, the meaning of Semitic goes back to the son of Noah who is considered by Arab Moslems as a holy prophet, or attributed to body size, in both cases the discourse attributes glory, antiquity, and Janus to the nation's origins. Upon those sacred or glorified ancestors, the discourse now turns to establish the link between ancestors, and the people of the nation at the present. This is similar to the attempt of making the links between space of origins and present space of the nation. Arabs as Semitic people are described as a distinctive collective, which has similar traits such as:

> The Semitic people have common physical and psychological characteristics. Some of their psychological (mental) characteristics are their love of goodness, their obsession for freedom, smartness, seriousness, a strong will, imagination, and hot temper. Some of their physical characteristics…a thin body, black eyes, long nose, a long face, and black hair (ibid., 11).

The nation, as a homogeneous collective, is made distinctive not only by superior or sacred origins, but also by its superior traits. The physical and the psychological traits are what makes the nation distinctive from others, as if it was a unified body moving from antiquity into the present without being subject to change or fusion processes. In other words, the above description gives the impression that the present Arab population has been reproduced by a blueprint made out of the "original ancestors."

Moreover, this distinctiveness is made possible by the use of binary opposition. What is implied is that We possess such traits as "sacred origins, majestic people, love of goodness, a strong well, imagination, obsession for freedom," etc. These traits are presented as if they have an objective meaning that can be discerned, and as if they are taboos for the Arab possession only. Implicitly, those categories become meaningful when they are compared to traits of non-Arabs. However, the non-Arabs to whom these traits are compared are not mentioned; they are erased. Therein, the glorification of the We becomes possible in relation to an invisible group of people who are not us, the Arabs.

In addition to the psychological, cultural, and physical traits, the textbooks emphasize the role of language in shaping the collective memory and identity of Arabs. Arabic is

described as the thread that runs through those controversial arguments about origin. For example, al-Siba'i et al. (1967) stated that "Those nations which migrated from the Arab Peninsula and resided in Bilad al-Sham [Great Syria] and in the Fertile Crescent originally spoke one language"(p. 23). The authors mentioned that with time, each one of those communities had developed its own dialectic due to economic and cultural factors in their new environment. However, they added that the "Original language from which those sub-languages had been differentiated had disappeared and lost" (p. 23).

In contrast to that al-Durah et al. (1967) distinguished between several Semitic languages. He argued that the people of Yemen spoke a Semitic language similar to the Ethiopian, and it was different than that of the people of Hijaz (p. 20). But al-Sasi et al. (1966) insisted on the unity of language. In their textbook al-Sasi et al. (1966) elevated the Arabic language to the status of sacredness which had bestowed upon its speakers commonality, homogeneity, and continuity. Here is how the textbook described the centrality of language:

> From those Arabs who resided in the Arab Peninsula in Hijaz and Najd, we inherited the Arabic language which is, now-a-days, spoken by more than eighty million people. A language of the holy Qura'an, the book of God… The language which the messenger of God spoke, God blessed him, and by that he enchanted the hearts and ears, [which] moved people from darkness into light…(ibid., 17).

From the citation, Arabic is described as the holy language of the Qura'an. When the prophet spoke it to non-believers it had "enchanted the hearts and ears," and through that sacred text of the Arabic Qura'an, "people moved from darkness to light." The textbook added that since the time of our ancestors, those "from whom we inherited the Arabic language," language has shaped our Arab identity. In other words, language as a system of symbols has constructed the Arabs collective memory, their consciousness, and linked those contemporary Arabs with the nation's ancestors in antiquity.

ARAB IDENTITY IN ANTIQUITY

Against the glorification of the nation discussed in the myth of origin, when discussing identity, the textbooks refer to pre-Islamic Arabs as the age of people of "ill morals," "disputed tribes," "pagans," "gamblers," "drunks," "women abusers," etc. (al-Durah et al., 1967:20–22; al-Kird et al., 1967:15–16; al-Sasi et al., 1966:34–51). Those descriptions do not portray the Arabs in antiquity as a unified and homogeneous collective sharing the same identity. On the contrary, the nation, during that era, is viewed in terms of a small community, the tribe. The tribe is conceived as an organic entity that is composed of various families. The family is the tribe's basic building blocks. Families are connected by blood ties. In addition, members of the tribe share the belief in common ancestors, history, specific way of life, and their own religion and gods.

The individual's loyalty is to his/her tribe. Identity of the tribe's members is defined in opposition to another tribe. Evidence of that is found in the classical poetry. A tribe's honor was defined, among other things, by the tribe's poet, who speaks of their unique

traits and valorizes the Other's negative traits. Blood ties and the descendant's origins played a major role in shaping the individual's status and identity. Conflict between tribes is over power in its various forms: economic, political, cultural, social, etc. Then, the history of the nation in pre-Islam is the history of tribes that are defined in an opposition to each other. Those who maintained more power over others played a major role in that pre-Islamic history. In other words, the history of Arabs in pre-Islam, as it is told, is the history of those tribes who were in power—those who could create their own narrative and make it the narrative of all other Arabs.

In addition, the individual's identity in a tribe and the collective identity of a tribe were distinguished by using the following set of binary oppositions: first, Arab tribes in the Arab Peninsula are defined in opposition to non-Arabs. Second, among Arab tribes several criteria defined identities such as: social status, kinship, economic status, religion, etc. Within a tribe social hierarchies of genealogy made some members more respected than others. In addition, individuals within a tribe defined their identity in opposition/similarity to other members and with opposition to another tribe's members. Although kinship was the main criterion by which members of a tribe came to believe in their common shared ancestors and past, difference rather than similarity informed their sense of distinctive identity within the tribe and between tribes (al-Kird et al., 1966:13; al-Sasi et al., 1966:41–4).

Specifically, the textbooks used four main differences to distinguish between collectives in the Arab Peninsula: first, their dwelling type—nomads or urbanites. Second, their origins—originally Arabs or Arabized. Third, their gods and religion. Finally, their language—Southern as in Yemen, or Northern as in Hijaz.

As mentioned, one of the criteria by which the textbooks distinguish between identities is according to the Arabs' type of dwelling in antiquity—urbanites or nomads. Thus, we read that "Urban people [were] those who lived a stable life and built houses and palaces. They were less brave and fond of wealth and luxurious life style. The Yemeni people were more advanced than the Hijaz Arabs" (al-Sasi et al., 1966:41).

On the one hand, the urban Arabs are perceived as advanced in terms of technology and culture. On the other hand, they are less "brave and fond of wealth and luxurious life style." In contrast to that, nomads and the tribal communities are depicted in a derogatory manner except the tribe of Quriash: "Quraish was more advanced than others in the region. They became rich from trade and pilgrimage. They lived in luxury more than others in Hijaz (as-Sasi et al., 1966:41). While, "wealth and luxury" were condemned in the discussion of urban Yemen, now they are praised in the case of the prophet Mohamad's tribe. In addition, this tribe is defined in opposition to others. It is "more advanced than others in the region." It is evident that these oppositions and dualities valorize the tribe and give it considerable prestige.

Other markers of differences in identity between the many Arab communities in antiquity are attributed to religion. For example, the Yemeni Arabs' gods are like the Babylonian, while the Hijazi gods are different in name and shape. These two collectives were not distinctively different from other communities. In fact, there were multiple religions in the Arab Peninsula and outside it whether it was in Canaan, Syria, Phoenicia, the Nabateans, etc. Some of them were monotheistic while others were pagans:

> Monotheism is Ibrahim's religion. He called upon people to abandon worship of idol gods and to worship one God. Ibrahim is considered the father of all prophets, since all prophets are his offspring. Here we have two branches: the first Izhaq [Isac]. From him came all Bani Israel's prophets, and the most great of those are Moses, and Jesus, may God bless them. The religion of the first is Judaism, and the second Christianity. The second branch of Ibrahim's offspring is Isma'il, Izhaq's brother. He who called upon Arabs to follow Ibrahim's religion (ibid., 32–3).

In addition to that, in the Arab Peninsula there was al-Hanafiyya. It is a belief in one God and it called upon people to abandon the worshiping of idols, getting rid of bad practices and habits of the "ignorance" era such as killing of female infants, drinking of wine, gambling, belief in resurrection. "Followers of this sect were believed to follow the original call of Ibrahim [Abraham] and by that the textbooks depict them as neither Jewish nor Christian but a "Hanafi Moslem (ibid., 34)."

Further, the textbooks acknowledge the presence of Other's religions such Judaism, which was widespread in Yemen country and around Mecca, in al-Madina. Christianity was more widespread, especially among the people of al-Hira in Iraq, and al-Ghasanenah in Syria, among the people of Najran in the southern regions of the Arab Peninsula. It did not spread deeper into the Arab Peninsula.

In contrast to those monotheistic religions, most Arab communities in antiquity worshiped multiple gods. Those communities were influenced by other civilizations such as the Persians. What is interesting to know is the manner in which the textbook describes the non-monotheistic religions of Arabs in the pre-Islamic era. Those religions are rejected since: "None of those religions did triumph over the others, since all were corrupt and were based on false foundations, yet, all of those set the ground for Islam: Islam is the religion of God" (ibid., 35).

The reason behind the lack of triumph of any of those religions over others is attributed to their nature, they were "corrupt." Consequently, if the religion is corrupt, then the people who believed in it were corrupt too. A corrupt community that had a corrupt religion is weak. This is why none of them could triumph. On the contrary, they were defeated by the true religion of Islam. This thesis is consistent as a case of assertion becoming a fact.

Further, those religions are false because they are manmade compared to the true religion of God. In other words, there is one truth in comparison to one falsehood. The binary oppositions are not only between true and false, and man and god, but also between universal and particular. The dichotomy of particular-universal is similar to the differences between a religion of one community and a religion of all humans. Implicitly, the universal religion carries within it the idea of eternal truth versus the eternal falsehoods of a particular community.

An additional criterion used in the textbook to further emphasize the differences and cleavages between the Arab communities in antiquity is language. Language differences are pointed out between northern and southern parts of the Arab Peninsula, between the language that was spoken by Yemeni and Hijazi Arabs. Al-Sasi et al. (1966:106) goes so far to describe them as separate languages. However, the textbook emphasizes that the

Arabic of Quraish "continued to flourish and develop until finally the Qura'an came using it" (ibid., 48).

Outside the Arab Peninsula, Arabic was not the language of all Arabs prior to Islam and many centuries after. Many communities outside the Arab Peninsula, the textbooks mentioned, did not speak Arabic. In Great Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq they spoke Aramaic, Assyrian, and other languages prior to the Islamic expansion. Even in the Arab Peninsula people of the north did not speak the same Arabic as people of Yemen. These contradictions were marginalized in the textbooks in the discussion of origins for example. Because in that discussion it was important to claim uniformity and continuity of the Arab culture prior to Islam and afterward. Such a uniformity and continuity seems to be important in linking ancestors with the present generation.

THE RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE—ISLAM AND THE BIRTH OF THE NATION

The appearance of Islam transformed society and the way people conceived of themselves, regardless of their blood ties, language, gender, skin color and their previous social status. For the Arabs as a collective, Islam transformed them from disputed tribes into a united and powerful nation (Abed alHamid et al., 1960:15–42). Tribal conflicts were forgotten in the face of a shared belief in one God, one nation. Under Islam, the weak Arabs turned into a great empire with extended boundaries and advanced culture. This transformation is demonstrated in the following:

> Islam had made Arabs a united, integrated, homogenous nation tied together, not by tribalism, rather by the Islamic faith and Islamic brotherhood…they were a conglomerate of tribes where conflicts dominated their lives. Under Islam they had become integrated and powerful. The [Arab-Islamic] state comprised all the Arab Peninsula, and it extended its boundaries to reach…the Atlantic Ocean and mid Asia (al-Kird et al., 1967:57).

With the rise of Islam, the world was divided into two spheres, the world of Islam, and the world of infidels. However, while in other national narratives the boundaries between Us and Them are static and stable, the nation in Islam is always in a process of becoming. Its boundaries are never fixed or stationary. At the early stages, the nation included a small group of Muhammad's followers in Mecca. Thereafter, within less than a century, the nation expanded to include the entire Arab Peninsula, Syria, Palestine, Iraq, Persia, North Africa, and territories in Asia, Africa and Europe. During that time, many communities and peoples of different colors and cultures had been Arabized. The textbooks emphasize that as long as the Arabs controlled the posts of power in the Islamic empire, the process of Arabization proceeded. With such an emphasis, the nation is that of Arabs as Muslims. However, the separation between Islam and Arabism began when non-Arab "elements" took over the most important posts of power.

The entry of Turks into military posts toward the end of the 9th century marks the beginning of the decline of the Arab hegemony in the Islamic empire (Abed al-Hamid et

al., 1960:82–7). The decline continued during the Buyids' domination (945–1055 A.D.), and the era of the Saljuq Turks, 1055–1258 A.D. (al-Kird et al., 1967:133–4). The same authors describe the invasion of Islamic lands by the Crusaders and later the Moghuls and the destruction of the Arab-Islamic civilization in Baghdad in 1258 A.D. (ibid., 134).

The Arab Islamic empire continued to decline until 1517 A.D. when the Ottomans came to power and their dynasties became the Caliphs of the Islamic Empire. The consequences of that historical shift had a dramatic impact on how the collective identity of Arabs is described. From then on, the salient aspect of identity was religious Islamic and not Arab (ibid., 224). alurah et al. (1967:41) add that: "The Arab world…under the Turks rule, had lost its sense of the Arab character." Between the rise of the Ottomans to power in the Islamic empire and the beginning of the 19th century, Arabism as a political identity became dormant, but the Islamic identity was salient and dominant. In the following section I trace these historical shifts in the process of identity formation and show how the emergence of religion made it possible to imagine the nation and how it was transformed.

THE REVOLUTIONIZING POWER OF ISLAM

Islam had appeared in the second decade of the seventh century A.D. in Mecca, which is part of the Hijaz region in the Arab Peninsula. The prophet Muhammad came from a prestigious tribe, Quraish, which was a wealthy and powerful tribe among the Arabs of the region. In fact, the textbooks describe how in the last decades prior to the emergence of Islam, Quraish became an integrating force among the Arab tribes in the region by creating several religious and cultural institutions such as the tribe's advisory council, the poetry contests, regulation of pilgrimage of the Ka'bah, etc. (al-Kird et al., 1967:14).

Amid this process of social transformation marked by the beginning of integration of Arabs in Hijaz under Quraish leadership, and at a time when their economic, social, and political institutions were undergoing a process of routinization and regulation, Islam appeared as a new challenging force (ibid., 15–21). Its appearance and the ideas it introduced threatened the foundation upon which that society was organized. No wonder then, that since its inception it came under attack from the same kin of the prophet himself and many other Arab tribes.

Islam offered a new social order and suggested a set of new rules for humans and their relation with God. Its appearance had divided the community of Arabs in Mecca and its surrounding communities into two camps of Moslems and heathens or of Us and Them. By doing that, it set in motion a process of differentiation, while gradually creating new ways of shaping identities of individuals as well as of communities. With that, a new conflict started, not between "honorable" and "dishonored" tribes, but rather between believers in the new religion and non-believers. The line was drawn between self and Other based on a system of ideas not kinship, origin, or blood ties as had been the case in the tribal discourse.

The new discourse offered a new system of meaning that changed the way people perceived of themselves and their Other. For example, we read that Islam "believed that all humans came from one origin and they share the same destiny" (ibid., 38). These new ideas threatened to undermine the dominant social order based on social class distinctions

and social status of kinship honor. The textbook says that Islam equated slaves with their masters, believing that both have the same soul and the same spirit (ibid., 39). In addition to that, Christians and Jews, who until then were excluded from the Arab collective had been acknowledged as having similar rights to Moslems (ibid., 42).

Al-Kird et al. (1967:34–5) summarizes these points saying that:

> In essence, Islam is an enormous revolution which had encompassed all aspects of human life. [An essence] stemming from the individual's inner consciousness and directed toward the principles of society, which had broken the chains that imprisoned thought and society, and had pronounced the rule of comprehensive human rights. It had brought humanity, led by Arabs and Moslems, to progress prosperity and advancement. That message [of Islam] is still capable of guiding humanity toward a Utopian life of justice, privileges, liberty and peace. Islam is the religion of all humans, and it suites all places and periods (ibid., 34–35).

From the quotation it is clear that Islam is perceived as a revolutionizing force in the lives of Arabs and their self image. Also, it is understood as a liberating force for the individual as well as for the Arabs as a nation and humanity as a whole. It introduced the principles of freedom, justice, and progress. Above all, Islam is conceived as a transforming power in the lives of Arabs, which made them an advanced and powerful nation.

In terms of culture, Islam had homogenized the Arabs' culture and enforced new norms of conduct on individuals as well as on communities. The previously diverse tribal cultures were homogenized under Islamic culture, guided by principles from the Qura'an which became the main source for social, political, cultural, religious organization of society and its norms. The textbook states that:

> Socially, Islam had eliminated bad habits such as wine drinking, homosexuality, and gambling. It returned to the human spirit its dignity… and returned to the woman her freedom and her social status. She is no longer exchanged like a commodity. It protected private property and banned violation of a person's property… It gave slaves freedom and [the right] to be treated as humans. It also eliminated differences between nations and races (an Arab is no better than non-Arab but in his faith), encouraged good conduct such as endurance, shyness, and faithfulness (al-Kird et al., 1967:57).

We later read in the same textbook that Islam: "…had made laws for marriage and divorce and for civil and criminal life which later became laws for conducting the Islamic social, economic, and political life" (ibid., 60). In particular, the Qura'an portrays women as equal to men, entitled to share family wealth, and prohibited female infanticide. In addition to that change in social life, Islamic discourse changed the individual's self perception. It gave the individual a sense of being "chosen," "superior," "moral," and a person of "truth." Thus, the textbook provides an assertion of these points:

> From a religion point of view, Islam had saved the Arabs from their dull paganism. It had transcended their spirits and placed them above myths, and it opened their minds to the light after ossification. Thus, their conduct improved and their manners became civilized, by that they became the best of nations that humanity had ever seen (ibid., 58–9).

The textbooks add that in terms of faith, Islam "freed people from illusions and myths and called for a belief in one God" (ibid., 35). Saying that implies that Islam had transformed people's ways of thought from mythic into rational. Instead of being dominated by multiple mythic powers of idols, Islam offered people a system of meaning that transcended power from human made idol-gods to an abstract integrated center, the Divine order. As a result of that, Divine became the apex of an order whereas humans occupied its base. Thus, instead of making humans the objects and subjects of power and social order, humans had become equal in their powerlessness and equally subject to God's will. In addition, by advancing the idea of the existence of a unitary Divine power, Islam had to acknowledge previous monotheistic religions, their prophets, and consequently, reject religiocenterism.

Another change in culture was the Arabic language. As mentioned before, Islam started with commanding the prophet to "proclaim." Thus, language and literacy had been the main pillars upon which culture, society and identity had been formed. Language had been the center of transformation and the arena of contestations, consequently of power. The textbook argues that "Islam had spread the Arabic language of Quraish among people from the Atlantic ocean to China. Arabic was the language of trade, science, politics, and religion. With that many countries had been Arabized such as north Africa, Syria and Iraq" (ibid., 61–2).

In addition, Islam had set norms and rules for economic, social, and political institutions and people's interactions and transactions. It had also set the rules by which Moslems are asked to achieve Islam's mission, universalism. In that respect, the textbook mentions that "The war that Moslems enter is in the cause of justice and for lifting oppression upon others, and not for achieving material gains or to enforce superiority, this is why it is a Jihad for God's cause" (ibid., 42).

For those principles and ideas to come true, Islam asked its followers to adapt several practices to set the ideas into motion. Such practices are called al-a'ibadat, the worships or rituals. Those practices came to complete the Muslim's belief system. His/her faith won't be completed unless he/she had accompanied the belief with action and practice. They are aiming at strengthening the individual's consciousness and the constant awareness of the presence and power of God (ibid., 35).

Based on these points, Islamic discourse is seen as a break with the past, a past that had been based on an earthy social order, while now the universal Divine order is the rule by which identities of self and the Other are constituted. This Divine order is argued to be beyond space and time and beyond the existence of individuals and specific communities. In Islamic discourse, these ideas were the only path toward salvation and deviating from these principles would leave humans doomed.

What is clear is that the religious discourse of Islam made the nation and its space possibly imagined through a new meaning system, which was rooted in the sacred text of the Qura'an. Muslims became bound in brotherhood by sharing the same belief system

that set the boundaries of the Umma. In the previous tribal discourse the tribe's poet had constructed its discourse and by that had made the community possibly imagined. The transition from one discourse into another is marked by a break and rapture in the meaning system. One system was believed to be of people's own make while the other is of God. The latter had been constructed to set the boundaries between self and Other, in the sacred text. Thus, the transition from one discourse into another is not a continuous process; rather it is marked by a rupture.

Historically, the textbooks describe the process that brought about the rise and institutionalization of Islam and made it into a religion with followers and institutions worldwide. The textbooks discuss in length the new religion and the prophet's character. Muhammad himself is described as a person who was endowed with high morals and for that reason he was chosen by the Lord to bring His message to the world. In other words, the new religion is depicted as an act of Divine and not a will to power of the prophet himself. This is how the textbook describes the revelation. On page 30, alKird et al. (1967) says that:

> While the prophet was contemplating in the cave of Hora,' at the age of forty, God's angel Gabriel came to him…the prophet, may God bless his name, said, "[Gabriel] said: Proclaim." I said, what to proclaim? He whelmed in his embrace until I thought it is death and then released me. He repeated that three times. At the fourth time he said: Proclaim. What to proclaim? What to say? And he said: "Proclaim in the name of your Lord who created!… Who teaches by the pen; Teaches man that which he knew not." The prophet, may God bless his name said, "I read it and he was gone and as if he wrote a book in my heart."

This encounter of the Prophet marks the beginning of his message and call for the new religion. In fact, the recurrence of these revelations transmitted orally to the Prophet later became the written scripture of the Arabic Qura'an. However, with the first revelation, Islam was sat in motion. Among the Prophet's first followers were several dignitaries from Quraish, and several slaves. But the majority of Arabs in Mecca rejected his call. For that majority, Islam was a direct threat to their religious, cultural, economic, and political power. Consequently, they were determined to put an end to this rising religion. They translated their fears into deeds and started a long campaign of persecuting, humiliating, and torturing of Muhammad's followers. When these practices did not put an end to Muhammad's religion, they conspired to assassinate him. This development forced the prophet, accompanied by a few followers, to escape (the textbooks use 'migrate') Mecca and seek refugee in a nearby town of Yathrib. This "migration" is called the Hijra. It was in 622 A.D., and it marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar. What is important to mention is that in Yathrib (later to be called alMadina), which was mostly populated by Christians and Jews, the prophet received massive support, especially from the Christian community.

During his stay in al-Madina, Muhammad achieved two things. One, he laid the foundation for the new Islamic society based on the principles of Islam. His teaching and deeds during that period became the guiding principles upon which the Islamic state was founded. Equally important, the Prophet established rules by which non-Muslims should

be treated in the Islamic state. Second, the Prophet's teaching increased the number of his followers and gave power to the nation of Islam—al-Umma al-Islamiyya. As his power increased, Mecca's hostility toward Muslims intensified. Thus, in the year 624 A.D., the first confrontation between Muslims and heathens took place. The triumph of Muslims was a turning point in the relation between the two camps, but that triumph did not put an end to hostilities. Muhammad and his followers had to fight a series of battles against Mecca in the years to come (ibid., 46). Finally, Muslims were able to capture Mecca and made it their first capital (ibid., 47–8). Those events marked the end of the first stage in the process of routinization of Islam and its transformation from an idea into a social, religious, cultural, and political institution.

THE CALIPHS' ERA—EXPANSION AND FACTIONALISM

During its formative era, Islam emerged among the Arabs of Hijaz. As a new discourse, it transformed the belief system within the community of Mecca and its surrounding towns, and as a result of that, it changed the social, economic, and political structure of those communities. However, with the death of the prophet Muhammad, the second stage in the development of the Islamic religion and the Umma started.

The first dilemma facing Muslims upon Muhammad's death was how to choose new leaders. Since the Prophet had not indicated how to choose his successor, his companions nominated one from among their ranks to lead the Islamic nation, or Umma. In the next thirty years to come, this same issue of choosing a successor was the cause of many bloody internal conflicts within the Islamic Umma. It had torn the nation and fragmented it into factions (Sunni—Shi'a) that are still politically antagonizing each other to this day.

The first Caliph was drawn into events, and his efforts went into building the nation of Islam and its institutions. Abu-Bakr, the first Caliph, had to resolve irredentism, which started to spread with the death of the Prophet. Some of the recently converted Muslims believed that Muhammad was eternal like the God he was teaching about. His death, then, was perceived as proof of his false religion. Second, the consolidation of power in the Arab Peninsula under Islam posed a threat to the Roman and Persian empires, which started to conspire against the Muslims. Third, as a result of that, the Caliph found himself forced to disseminate Islam into territories under the rule of the Romans and Persians. Finally, it was imperative to achieve these goals to strengthen state institutions. The consequences of these developments had a long lasting effect on the structure of the Muslim nation, culture, economy, and politics for many years to come.

The immediate success of Abu-Bakr in restoring order and reintegrating the Umma strengthened his position and legitimated his rule. The textbooks emphasize the importance of Abu Bakr's rule as one who had "strengthened the foundations of the young Islamic state by eliminating the separatist movement. He also had set into motion the opening [conquest] process outside the Arab Peninsula" (al-Kird et al., 1967:67).

There are conflicting arguments in the textbooks about why Muslims turned to conquest and expansion. One explanation promotes the idea of "self defense" against the "aggression" of Persians and Romans. Thus, alKird et al. (1967:76) says that:

> The separatist's wars had shown that the Persians tried to obliterate the rising Arab Islamic state by conspiring with its enemies. The Romans also had the same goal since they had conspired with some Jews in north Hijaz. Thus, there was no alternative way but fighting both the collaborators and their master in order to ensure the security of the state.

Simultaneously, the textbooks describe this process of expansion and conquest as a process of liberation for those nations under Roman and Persian rule. In the textbooks, instead of conquest they use the term "opening," Fatih (plural Futohat). By using Fatih, the Islamic discourse makes a distinction between colonization driven by economic profits and conquest for spreading God's "true" religion as a liberating force for enlightenment. Thus, "opening" implies a closed domain that the Muslims took upon themselves to "open" for "truth," the Islamic religion. Futohat also included "freeing people from oppression" and "bringing them the light of Islam." For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:75), similar to Abed al-Salam et al. (1960), and al-Durrah et al. (1967), says that:

> Two foreign states ruled the Middle East on the eve of the Islamic opening [conquest]: the Persians in the outskirts of the Arab Peninsula and Iraq, and the Byzantine empire in great Syria, Anatolia, Egypt and North Africa… Hostility and atrocities dominated their relations. Particularly, the religious wars which consumed the lives of tens of thousands of victims had weakened both empires… The feudal system had been the empires' main strategy by which they extracted resources from peasants and the poor… The people who came under the rule of those empires had suffered injustice and oppression, and they looked for the day for it to end. For those people the Islamic opening was a real relief.

Thus, the Byzantines and the Persians are "conspires, oppressors, feudal, unjust, exploiters" etc. This conception of the Other sets the stage for the Arabs' intervention, which is aimed at "liberating" the oppressed. It presents Muslims as "enlightened, just, moral, savior and liberator," which was promoted as one of the central ideas of Islam and as an integral part of its mission as a universal religion for all of humanity. Here, the binary opposition of images of Muslims against non-Muslims perpetuated the supremacy of Islamic ideas over others, and by that, legitimated its wars of conquest.

Closely related to the previous argument is the idea of Jihad as the individual responsibility of every Muslims to spread religion. Thus, the textbook argues that the call for Jihad came to:

> protect Islam and Muslims and to allow the spread of the Islamic religion among people so they can take advantage of its just rule. The Prophet had called upon some of the nearby kings to accept Islam, some took a hostile attitude against it. Thus, those openings became inevitable steps for a free dissemination of Islam, and as a legitimate act of self defense (ibid., 76).

On the same page, the textbook states that: "Abu Bakr thought it was wise to direct the Arab tribes toward Jihad—fighting in God's cause—right after ending the separatist's wars, because it distracted them from fighting against each other. Therefore, he sent two Islamic-Arab armies simultaneously to two fronts, the Persian and the Roman" (ibid., 76).

While previously, the reasons mentioned behind the start of the waves of Islamic conquest were religious and humanitarian—"liberating" the oppressed—they also came to eliminate internal fragmentation of the new Islamic nation. It seems that by shifting the focus from internal conflicts into external ones, Abu-Bakr was able to keep the Umma united. In other words, by making external threats existential to Arabs it helped him mobilize the community of Muslims into a united front against the Umma's enemies at the time.

What is interesting is that from the moment the Islamic forces turned to conquests driven by the idea of spreading Islam and other reasons, the nation was no longer limited to Arabs. Gradually, the whole Arab Peninsula and other nations were incorporated into Islam and became an integral part of the nation. In turn, the boundaries of the nation were kept moving outward and changing fast. With that too, those who were excluded from the Umma and were perceived infidels changed accordingly.

Another facet of this process of nation building in Islam is related to the process of glorifying national heroes. Early Islamic heroes became icons in the Arab collective memory and their names are frequently mentioned in daily Arabic language even in the modern Arab narrative. In particular, the textbooks emphasize the ability of a number of military leaders to defeat well equipped and organized empires' armies such as the Persians and the Romans. The textbooks mentioned that in a few years the Islamic armies occupied great Syria, Iraq, Persia, and Egypt (see al-Durrah et al., 1967; alBudoor et al., 1960; al-Kird et al., 1967). For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:87) attributes the Arab-Muslims victories against the Romans and the Persians due to a number of factors:

> One, the strength of the Islamic faith, which the Arabs were willing to defend, and wished to die for. Second, uniformity of the Arab-Islamic armies, which is in contrast to the diverse religious and racial composition of their enemies' armies. Third, the exasperation of the Roman and Persian subjects due to heavy taxes or religious persecution. Fourth, the availability of a few military Arab-Muslim commanders who had unique skills in leadership and war affairs, such as Khalid ibn al-Walid, Amrou ibn al-A'ass In addition, the ability of the Arab soldier to endure the hardships, his simplicity and his enthusiasm in fighting.

Those factors made Muslims look distinguished and superior compared to their enemies. First, Muslims are portrayed as having "strong faith, ready to make sacrifices, determinate, integrated and homogenous, superior and skilled in warfare, the ability to endure hardships, simple, and fast in movement and fighting."

In contrast to that, the Other, whether they are Romans or Persians, are "composed of diverse religious and racial groups, inferior to Arabs in warfare and leadership, oppressors and persecutors of their subjects, heavy in fighting because of their equipment." In other words, the Arab triumph is attributed to two things: one is their

faith, and second, their skills and action. The defeat of their enemies was due to inferior characteristics, lack of faith, and their enemies' oppressive policies.

What the historical narrative is trying to say is that Arab unity, strong faith in Islam, and natural characteristics helped them triumph over their enemies. These same factors were behind their miraculous conquests and heroism. Among the legendary figures of the nation of Islam, the textbooks discuss Khalid ibn al-Walid as one of the most courageous, wise, strong, and brave commanders among Muslims, who brought glory to Arabs due to his swift victories against the enemies of Islam. His name has become a symbol of bravery and devotion to Arabism even in the contemporary Arab narrative.

Other forms of heroism are attributed to the political and religious leaders of that period, the Caliphs. Occupying both political and religious roles, the textbooks say, after the Prophet's death they made a great contribution to Islam. As heads of the Islamic community, they spread Islam worldwide. As political leaders, they organized the state and created a new structure for government. Their rule was characterized by advanced democracy, justice, and a developed welfare state system. Both of their contributions to the nation, religious and governmental, are seen as ideal types that should be emulated even in the modern times. Al-Kird et al. (1967:92) says that:

> The Caliph was in charge of all aspects of life of his community, the religious and the secular. He was liable of protecting religion and its spread and ensuring that it was applied, and he was liable for protecting the Islamic sovereignty and ensuring that justice prevails among people. The Caliph was the one who prepared armies and sent them to war, and to him the collected taxes were sent to be spent on the community according to the religious laws, and he was the one who nominated governors and dismissed them.

These descriptions of the Caliph's role had become the cornerstones upon which the politico-religious discourse of Islam was organized. In this discourse, politics, economy, and religion were not dealt with as separate realms. A Muslim, a ruler as well as an individual in the Umma, was not expected to make distinctions between religion and politics, but rather, to balance and integrate social, political, economic, and religious life into one entity (see alBudoor et al., 1964). As a result, the religious and mundane aspects of life were combined into one whole in the individual's identity. A person's identity was then dialectically achieved through balancing between different realms, and the result of it ensured the appropriate measures necessary for an earthly and a divine life. Those ideas are still at the core of the Islamic discourse in our contemporary times.

Another form of heroism was the Arab-Muslim's quick assimilation and acculturation of many diverse racial and ethnic communities into Islam (see al-Durrah et al., 1967). As the textbooks mention, the Islamic conquests brought into the Umma new members that had to be acculturated into Islam, and in many cases Arabized. However, the massive incorporation of Persians, Romans, Egyptians, etc., had significant consequences on the self conception of Muslims.

By the end of that phase, it was no longer possible to talk about Muslims as Arabs. On the one hand, the new Islamized non-Arab underwent an acculturation process into Islam, a change that enforced expansion of the way the self identity of Muslims was perceived.

On the other hand, the Arab identity itself, by incorporating those non-Arab cultures into it, had changed too. In other words, while the Arabs attempted to change Others, they themselves had changed too. Further, the process of acculturation and Arabization of the Islamic state did not happen overnight. It took more a century to achieve that. Al-Kird et al. (1967:93) states that:

> The state offices and administration positions, in great Syria, Iraq and Egypt were occupied by Roman, Persian, and Coptic clerks. This had continued until the rule of Abed al-Malik ibn Marwan and his son alWalid when the state ministry offices were Arabized and the clerks who occupied those positions became Arabs.

It took nearly one century for the Arab-Islamic state to Arabize its offices and ministries. During this time both the new non-Arab Muslims who had been Arabized, and the Arabs had absorbed the non-Arab cultures and made them Arab under their hegemony.

To conclude, during the first Caliphs' era, the identity of Muslims had been transformed, and with that, their various Others. Arabs had changed from being a marginal collective subject, to Persians and Romans, into a rising superpower in their region. Their self identity had been in a dynamic process of expansion with every new space that Islam had conquered. Likewise, the Other changed from being internal collectives and remote enemies, into outsiders not yet subject to Islamic forces. At the same time, with the process of expanding of spaces new communities became Islamized and some Arabized. Consequently, the Arab collective identity had changed too.

THE UMAYYAD CALIPHS

The Umayyad Caliphate developed dialectically out of conflicts that brought about the end of al-Khulafa' al-Rashidun (Rightly Guided) era. While that period was marked by strengthening the foundations of both religion and state, it also witnessed serious internal conflicts and factionalism of the Muslim nation. Four Caliphs ruled for about thirty years. None of them, except of Abu-Bakr, who was the first Caliph, succeeded to end his Caliphate naturally. From Umar to Ali all were assassinated. Umar was assassinated by a Persian convert, Othman ibn Affan; the third Caliph was accused of favoritism and was assassinated. Ali's Caliphate was challenged by his opponents and ended up with the rise of the Shi'a (party) as a separate faction from the mainstream Sunnis, after his death in the battle field. Another faction was the Khawarij ("gone out" from the community) (see al-Budoor et al., 1964; al-Durrah et al., 1967; al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Siba'ai et al., 1967–8). Most of those conflicts revolved around power struggle, and raised questions on who was eligible to become a Caliph.

In spite of those conflicts, in the Arab-Islamic narrative, the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphate is significant since it laid the foundation for political Islam and provided guidelines on how an Islamic community should conduct its earthly affairs. The Caliphs are portrayed as symbols of religiosity, modesty, and justice that should be emulated. The textbooks mention that during that era, Muslims had chosen their leaders democratically. The Caliph was chosen by an elite group of representatives of Mecca's families. Those

practices came to an end with the rise of Umayyad dynasty to power. From now on, the Caliph position was hereditary and power stayed in the hands of a family known from an ancestor, Umayyad.

As for the nation of the Arab-Muslims, the aftermath of those events led to the rise of factions contesting each other over posts of power. With that development, the seeds of conflict were planted, though occasionally conflicts were dormant. Muawiya and his sons ruled for two decades. However, shortly after the death of Muawiya, a civil war broke between various branches within his dynasty. As a result of that conflict, the throne was passed to another branch of the family, which managed to sustain power until in 750 A.D. It was succeeded by another dynasty (Abbasids). The Umayyad Caliphs ruled from 661 A.D. to 750 A.D.

In spite of those conflicts within the Islamic Umma, the textbooks continue to claim that Muslims were united and integrated during the Umyyads' reign. For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:99), says that "All Muslims had agreed on one Caliph, Muawiya ibn abi Sufyan. It was in the year 41 Islamic [calendar]; that year is also known as the consensus year since all Muslims were in consensus back again under the flag of one Caliph. That was after a short period of irredentism. Thus, [with Muawiya coming to power] the Islamic state was founded."

In contrast to those descriptions of the Islamic Umma, as homogeneous and cohesive, one finds evidence of exclusion of Arabs in the Islamic state under the Umayyads dynasty. For example, the exclusion of the Ali's faction from the mainstream of religion and politics is a good example of that. The same textbook, on page 109–110, asserts that:

> Umar ibn Abed al-Aziz had abandoned damning Ali in Mosques after the Friday prayer (as was the habit during the Umayyad rule since Muawiya)…the Shi'a were pleased with Umar ibn Abed al-Aziz sentence who did not persecute or oppress them [Shi'a]. [As a result of that, the Shi'a] disseminated their ideology and thus, they gained power. [These developments] contributed to the transition [of power] from the Umayyads to the Abbasid dynasty.

The excluded factions, such as the Shi'a, had appealed to non-Arab Muslims for support. As a result of that, enemies of the Islamic Umayyad empire were no longer infidels and external. On the contrary, threats to their rule came from within the Muslim community itself. Thus, the struggle over power had made the confrontation between the two camps inevitable and finally brought about the decline of the Umayyads dynasty and their rule. AlKird et al. (1967:112–113) states that: "the enemies of the Umayyads (in particular the Shi'a and the Abbasids) started to recruit non-Arab Muslims against the Umayyads. They continued [their struggle] until they brought about the end of the Umayyad era."

What had intensified the internal conflicts and resistance to the Umayyads at the time was their over-indulgent, luxurious lifestyle. The previous balance in the Islamic discourse of identity between earthly and divine, and between politics and religion had turned toward materialism and luxury of life. One of its results was the emergence of an elite social class very distanced from the people. The textbook states that "They [the Caliphs] had imitated the Persian's and the Roman's kings. They lived in palaces and were engaged in luxuries. They surrounded themselves with guards and middlemen who

stood between them and the people. They abandoned the thrifty way of life of the earlier Caliphs and made Damascus their capital" (al-Kird et al., 1967:126).

Those cultural, political, and social changes made many factions collide against the center of power of the Caliph. "A group of religious figures who were furious at the Umayyad's Caliphs for their indulgence in luxuries joined the…opposition parties such as the Khawarig and Shi'a against Umayyad's Caliphs" (ibid., 112–3).

As becomes evident, the process of identity formation and exclusion was no longer cut across the line of Arabs and non-Arabs or Muslims and non-Muslims. In fact more cleavages that had been suppressed for many decades start to surface again. The textbooks mention among the social and political conflicts, "The return of the tribal factionalism, in particular the conflict between Arabs of the North and South. That tribalism which Islam had eliminated [resurfaced again]" (ibid., 113).

Another interesting process during the Umayyad rule was the mixing and fusion of cultures, ethnic groups and races into the Islamic state. That process changed the collective identity of the people from an identity anchored in Arabism into an identity anchored in Islamism. It could be argued that the process of Islamization of non-Arabs dialectically brought about the destruction of its own foundation based in Arabism. The universal principles of Islam that had suppressed national, biological, or cultural differences had let non-Arab-Muslims conceive of themselves as an integral part of the nation. With that, the original foundation of the Islamic hegemonic discourse of Arabs and Arabic language lost its validity. This process intensified with expansion of Islamic domains during the Umayyads Caliphate. For example, al-Kird et al., (1967:114), argues that "The Umayyad era is considered an era of mixing and fusion between Arabs and others, in terms of culture, languages and traditions. The Arabized added many of their ideas, beliefs, and values to the Muslim Arabs."

The wars of conquest and spreading of Islam curtailed the hegemony of Arab-Muslim culture and transformed identities of people. Thus, it was no longer possible for Arabs to suppress the local cultures of the new converts. Islamic principles of equality regardless of race, color, etc., helped local non-Arab cultures resume some of their former cultural practices. Gradually, they started pressing demands for equality and participation in the Islamic state. Also, those local, non-Arab cultures started to compete with the Arab-Muslim culture over hegemony (see al-Buddor et al. (1964), al-Durrah et al. (1967). For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:112) reminds us that "[After] the completion of Islamization processes among the converts and after their acculturalization by Arabs, [they] start[ed] pressing demands for equality with other Muslims, as Islam [had] promised them."

Other groups in the Islamic state were excluded. Such was the case of Christians and Jews. Those two groups had been given an "advantageous" status since they were believers in one God like Moslems. In spite of this fact, and although they were the first allies of the prophet, they had to pay tribute to the state (Thimma tribute, or as it is know in the English language, as Dhimmi). In return, the state acknowledged their right for self-autonomy. The state also released them from military service and fighting with the Muslims. At the same time the state provided them with protection and security (alBuddor et al., 1964). In fact they were freer to practice their rituals than Ali's followers (Shiites), who were persecuted and damned for decades in the Friday prayers (see al-Durrah et al., 1967 and al-Kird et al., 1967:113).

It is clear that the state had a duality of attitudes toward those nonMuslim communities. On the one hand, they were portrayed as similar to Muslims, on the other hand differently. Their similarity gave them an autonomous status, while their difference resulted in a forced tribute to the state (Dhimmi). For those excluded and non-Muslim communities, the key to being fully included in the Islamic empire was conversion to Islam. Conversion promised lifting of tributes and an equal share in the national goods of the Umma.

Simultaneously, and in spite of those conflicts, the process of expansion of the Islamic empire continued unabated. The Islamic conquests advanced in several fronts: north-east toward Asia, and north-west toward Europe. Al-Kird et al. (1967:117–8) asserts that:

> During the Umayyad rule the Arabs opened Turkestan and took over its important cities such as Bukhara, Balkh, and Samarcand…. They overcame its Turkish pagan population and Islam spread in it, and Arab elements moved to live in it. The Muslim's conquest of those places had cleared the road to China's culture and trade.

In the last quotation, the Arab-Muslims are described as a powerful nation that was able to "overcome" the Turkish armies and take over their cities. Also, this process of Islamization was accompanied by a process of population movement wherein Arabs moved into those new spaces and made them their own. Thus, the expansion of domains added new converts and new cultures to the Umma, and by that pushed behind the frontiers those non-Muslim Other. At the same time, expansion weakened the Arab's ability to maintain an Arab control of the Empire's posts.

While the drive to conquer Turkestan was described as spread of Islam, in the case of Spain, the textbooks present other reasons. Spain's occupation came after the conquest of North Africa (al-Buddor et al., 1964; al-Durrah et al., 1967). Spain, in al-Kird et al. (1967:121–4), is described as:

> Toward the end of the 7th century, Andalus was ruled by the Goths[Visigoths]…riots [spread] due to heavy taxes, religious persecutionand discrimination, and due to its rulers' ill policies. Roderick, [the newking came to] power through extortion; as a result of that many of theformer ruling family found refuge in North Africa. A group of them contacted the [Arab-Muslim] governor of Morocco…[Then]Tariq ibnZiad led an army across the bay that was named after him and crashedRoderick's force, and [he] advanced with his Islamic forces…until hereached the Pyrenees mountains.

In the last quotation, Muslims are described as saviors of the "persecuted" and "discriminated" against, and as a tolerant nation that permitted freedom of worship. Muslims are also portrayed as powerful, heroic, glorious, and implicitly a religion of justice and freedom, unlike Others. Implicitly and explicitly, the textbook attempts to emphasize those points and presents a heroic aspect of the Arabs' history, and more importantly, a unified Arab identity.

To conclude, the Umayyad Caliphate was characterized by several conflicting processes. It is described as the era of expansion of the Islamic empire. During that era, Arabs ruled over territories from Spain in the West to India in the East. With those expansions, the Arab-Muslim empire had become a superpower due to its material and cultural wealth. However, at the same time, the expansion into those vast spaces had resulted in mixing and fusion processes between Arab-Muslims and non-Arab Muslims that changed the collective identity of Muslims. More important was the rising expectation of those diverse groups for participation in the political, economic, and religious life of the Umma. In turn, those same processes that were behind the rise of the Islamic state and made it a superpower were also behind its decline and fragmentation in the centuries to come.

Another interesting conclusion to be drawn is the fluidity of the nation's identity. As mentioned, those processes of expansion were fast and included larger territories with diverse cultures, languages, and races. In spite of the fact that Arabs were outnumbered, they succeeded in Islamizing all those communities, and simultaneously kept their control and dominance in the empire.

THE ABBASID CALIPHATE

The rise of the Abbasid Caliphs marked a dramatic shift in the Islamic empire's political structure, culture, and the nation's identity. Until that moment, the Abbasids were at the margins of society, and often they were subject to persecution and condemnation in the Friday prayers across the Umayyads' Caliphate. They were denied access to political posts in the state apparatuses, and their rise to power changed power relations within the empire especially, between Arab-Muslims and Mawali—the convert Muslims.

In fact, the Abbasid rise to power became possible due to their collaboration with the Mawalis. Without the latter's help it is doubtful if the Abbasids would have a chance against the Umayyads' forces. The ramification of this collaboration between the Arab-Muslims and the Mawali, as we will see, had far reaching consequences.

The Abbasids ruled from 750 A.D. to 1258 A.D. During their Caliphate they introduced several changes into the empire's political culture. First, as the textbooks mention, they moved the empire's capital from Damascus to Bagdad. Second, instead of expansion and additional conquests, the Abbasids turned their energy inward to build the empire and develop cultural and scientific institutions. The result of that change in priorities of the Caliphate led simultaneously to the development of two conflicting processes. On the one hand, during their rule, Arabs had become very advanced in sciences, arts, and culture and they had a prosperous economy that stretched worldwide. On the other hand, during the Abbasids' rule the process that had started before, of mixing and fusion of cultures, languages, and traditions accelerated. That process, once it was set in motion, evolved and intensified internal conflicts that brought about the fragmentation of the empire into several states, each of them ruled by a ruler who was no longer appointed by the Caliph in Baghdad (al-Budoor et al., 1964; alDurrah et al., 1967; al-Siba'ai et al., 1967).

In addition, the textbooks argue that the proliferation of the Mawalis into the state's posts of power contributed to the decline of Arab hegemony. With that change, multiple

ethnic cultures thrived, which enriched the Arab culture and made that era the golden age of the Islamic civilization. However, as mentioned before, this same process of progress and advancement brought with it internal conflicts that weakened the empire and made it more vulnerable to external attacks by the European Crusaders and later the Moghuls.

In terms of identity, the Umma's identity gradually shifted from an Arab hegemony into multiculturalism. This trend toward multiculturalism received its legitimacy from Islam itself. That is to say, since the basic principles of Islam do not discriminate against other Muslims of different color, ethnicity or race, then, it was not unusual for non-Arab Muslims to conceive of their culture as legitimate. In fact, non-Muslim cultures became dominant with the Mawalis' rise to power during the Abbasids dynasty. Conversely, the Arab culture in the Islamic empire started to decline and it gave way to the revival of various ethnic cultures.

Further, the concept of the nation's boundaries changed too, due to the weakening of the central power in Baghdad. Thus, instead of one integrated space of the empire, several independent states emerged and each had its own ethnic distinctive culture, whether that of Turks, Buyids, Arab, etc. Each one of those states challenged the Caliph's power in Baghdad, who ceased to be seen as a symbol of an integrated political entity of Muslims (al-Budoor et al., 1964; alDurrah et al., 1967, al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Siba'ai et al., 1967).

Al-Kird et al. (1967:133–4) describes this historical process under the Abbasid dynasty. He discusses four gradual stages each one marked by the rise to power by a different group of Mawalis:

1. The age of political power and advancement, 750–847 A.D. During that time nine Abbasid Caliphs came to power;
2. The age of Turks power, 847–945 A.D. During this period the Turk military commanders controlled the Caliphate. Consequently, many Islamic states within the empire became independent;
3. The age of the Buyids' domination, 945–1055 A.D. The Buyids were Persians. They were called upon to help the Caliph restore order in the empire. Instead, they took over the empire's capital Baghdad;
4. The age of the Saljuqs Turks domination, 1055–1258 A.D. Their origin was Turkestan. During their era the Islamic lands were invaded by the Crusaders and later the Moghuls conquered Bagdad and destroyed its civilization.

These four stages are described in the textbooks as historically linked together into one process, which brought about the destruction of the ArabIslamic empire during the Abbasids dynasty. What is clear is that the textbooks, while praising the contribution of non-Arabs to the Islamic civilization, attribute to them the decline of the Islamic empire. Saying that implies that the Arab's hegemony was a necessary factor in maintaining the empire and keep the nation intact. Thus, as the textbooks argue, with the decline of Arab hegemony the empire itself had declined and Others could easily conquer its lands. In other words, during this era enemies of the Umma were no longer non-Muslims, they were in fact Muslims whose "main concern was power" and not the integrity of the Islamic empire.

Strangely enough, while earlier the textbooks had emphasized the fairness and justice of the Islamic system as that which had treated all as equals regardless of race, color, and

ethnicity, now the same discourse retreats from its earlier ideas and argues that Islam and Arabism were twin entities and that as long as they were attached together, the empire survived and thrived. This point is demonstrated in al-Kird et al. (1967:138–9) who remind us of the numerous threats that faced Haroon al-Rashid for example, and the ways he dealt with those threats to maintain the integrity of the nation:

> He was able to uproot the Alawis movements which erupted during his rule…al-Rashid also eradicated the Persian Baramika when their influence had increased and they had become a threat to the state. This shows us how strong the Caliph was and how he did not allow any element [non-Arab Muslim] of the foreign elements dominated the state apparatuses.

Here, the enemies of the Umma were not limited to external forces but also to those Arabs and Muslims who sought power, such as the Alawis (shiites) and Bramika-the Persian converts. Non-Arabs are no longer depicted as Muslims rather, as "foreign elements" that were a "threat" to the state and probably to the general social order. Their resistance to the Caliph is not depicted as rejection of Islam. Rather, it is implied as an attempt on their behalf to actualize their right to participate in the Islamic empire. Since the empire was mostly dominated by Arab Muslims, they clashed with the Caliph. For a while they were kept excluded and were not able to materialize their rights as non-Arabs. However, their clash with the Caliph and their attempts to share power divided the empire upon itself.

Other groups are also depicted as Others and enemies of the Umma, for example, the former Umayyads descendants who clashed with another Abbasids Caliph. It says that: "Abu al-Abbas al- Saffah, the first of the Abbasid Caliphs…eliminated the Umayyads, and silenced the Alawis" (alKird et al., 1967:135).

Those attempts did not put an end to cleavages and internal conflicts within the empire in the years to follow. On the contrary, they intensified.

During the rule of another Abbasid Caliph, other groups rose. This had made other Caliphs turn to other ethnic groups to help them restore power against claims of the Umayyads' or the Baramika's groups. For example,

> al-Mua'tasim saw that his extended state needed a powerful army to defend. He learned that the Umayyads had drafted only Arabs, and the Abbasid Caliph before him had turned to Persians for help. He saw in both [groups] a threat. Thus, he decided to organize an army of Turks, because his mother was from a Turkish origin… He organized an army of Turkish soldiers, and released Arabs from the ministry of the army. By that act he eliminated the influence of Arabs in the army…alMua'tasim was wrong in his decision, sooner than later he came to realize the consequences of his mistake when the influence of Turks commanders in the state's affairs had increased. They had attempted to take over all posts of government (al-Kird et al., 1967:144–5).

Those conflicts were not limited to Baghdad and its surrounding regions; they spread into Andalus too. In Spain, the Umayyad dynasty continued its rule and it had declined the

Abbasids claims of the Islamic Caliphate. The implication of that irredentism was further weakening of the empire that had made it more vulnerable to external threats and attacks. This is

> how al-Kird et al. (1967:174) describe that:
>
> At the time when separatism and weakness had surfaced between and among Arabs and Muslims in Spain, Europe had started its colonialCrusade invasions of the East. The kings of Europe started to send military supplies and financial aid to Spain's Christians which was part of the Crusade's wars to put an end to the Arab-Islamic rule in Spain.

Against those external dangers, the textbooks describe the further decline of the Islamic empire and its fragmentation due to "foreigners" will to power such as Turks and Persians. Those foreigners were mindless in their attempts to seize power, which led to more divisions in the empire, breaking it into several independent states. Al-Kird et al. (1967:157–8) state that:

> When the weakness took over the Abbasid Caliphs, and when the domination of Turks had deepened, the separatist movement from the central state had increased. The Tulunid, and the Akhshids declared independence in Egypt…and the Fatimids in Morocco…and the governor of Cordova declared independence too…and al-Hamdanids in Mosul and great Syria.

To summarize these points, it seems that the crisis in the Abbasid Islamic empire, like the Umyyad before, intensified because there were discrepancies between the core principles of Islam, such as equality of all Muslims regardless of color, ethnicity, and gender, and the ways the various dynasties seized power in the empire. Unlike the era of al-Khulafa' alRashidun, where the Caliph was chosen by representatives of the community, both the Ummayyad and the Abbasid dynasty seized power by force and kept it within the family until another faction took over. In addition, the process of expansion of the Islamic empire, though it transformed many diverse ethnic and racial groups' identities and converted them to Islam, fell short in transforming the Islamic state institutions and the procedures for choosing or electing a Caliph. It is true that the extended boundaries of the empire made it difficult to put in place a democratic process for transition of power within the empire. However, it seems that the insistence of Arabs on holding the posts of power undermined their claims that Islam was based on equality, justice and fairness, since the converts did not experience it.

Simply put, the diversity of the Umma, and the lack of democratic institutions for transition of power left many marginalized groups with one alternative but to seize power and claim autonomy. In fact, the Arabs failed to universalize Islam and transform it from an Arab religion into a universal political system driven by religious ideas of universality and equality. They also failed to put in place institutions above and beyond factionalism and the particular interests of one ethnic group or another. Thus, the same ideas that brought about the glory of the Arab-Muslims, when they were not practiced and were

abandoned, became the seeds of the Arab power's own destruction and decline as a political entity. Islam had transformed itself without Arab dominance, but the fact that Islam as a political system was not routinized and democraticized was the source of later internal conflicts during the Ottoman Caliphate.

Ironically, amid this gloomy portrayal of the Islamic nation, the Abbasid Caliphate was described as a heroic age of Muslims. First, it was the age when Muslims defeated the colonial Crusaders. Here the textbooks transcribe the Muslim weakness into mythical glory. The fact that the Crusaders were able to maintain their hold of Palestine, the heart of the Arab land, for two centuries is marginalized. Conversely, the Muslims' struggle against the Crusaders is elevated to the level of a miracle and a myth, which is still mentioned as a symbol of the spirit of Islam and its ability to regenerate itself and win struggles against powerful enemies. Second, the Abbasid age is depicted as the golden age of the Islamic civilization. That was due to the multicultural nature of the empire that enriched it and made it into a center of civilization of the time. I will come back later to this separation between culture and political spheres. Meanwhile, I turn to the construction of the mythical victory against the Crusaders.

The textbooks say that when the Umma faced external enemies it transcended its disputation into unity. For example, the Roman threat is described as an external force that united the Umma and made it become glorious, victorious, and brave against its external enemies. The textbooks emphasize the triumphs achieved during the Abbasid empire against the Romans (see al-Buddor et al., 1964; al-Durrah et al., 1967; al-Siba'i et al., 1967). The Romans are described as cruel savages. For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:145), mentions that "The Romans had launched several raids against the Islamic countries, and they took women into captivity and killed the men. Al- Mua'tasim organized a huge army to fight the Romans. He conquered Ankara, and entered the city of Amoria, demolished it and avenged those Muslims who were killed."

In opposition to Muslims, the Crusaders are considered as "colonialists, aggressors, [who] brought destruction upon the Islamic world, cruel, conspirators, exploiters, greedy, expansionists, using religion for achieving personal goals, accusing Muslims of oppression" etc. Those ideas are discussed over 17 pages in the al-Kird et al. (1967) textbook. For example, we read that:

> The European Christian countries launched several raids against our Arab-Islamic East, The claimed goal behind them was the conquering of the Holy Land (Palestine) because they argued it is improper to leave it under the Moslem control. It is important to remember that the Moslems had guaranteed the freedom of worship for the various Christians factions as they are commanded by the tolerant Islamic religious laws. Those wars were called Crusades because the raiders used the cross as their symbol. They lasted for two centuries, during which many of the cities of great Syria were destroyed and millions of its sons were killed. The final result, the Muslims triumphed over the Europeans and pushed them back to where came from (ibid., 185).

Thus, the Crusade wars, according to the textbook, had been imperialistic and colonial wars that used deception, such as religious sentiments, to incite people for sacrifices in

the name of the Cross. In addition to their imperial and colonial character the Europeans are depicted as “cruel, savages, and inhumane” as conquers.

> The first wave of Crusades was made up of Germans, French, and Italians…an army that reached one hundred thousand cavalry and six hundred infantries…apart from women and children…they crossed the Bosphorus toward Anatolia, toke over the Saljuqs (1098)…the rest continued to Antakia…conquered it…and they massacred its inhabitants. They killed more than ten thousand, looted the city…and destroyed the city…the Crusaders went on south and they continued to massacre, kill people, loot villages and cities until they reached Jerusalem…they conquered it (1098), and killed seventy thousand of its people and upon it they established a kingdom called the Latin Kingdom and made Jerusalem its capital (ibid., 188).

The Arab defeat did not last long, as the textbook say, and soon after, under Salah al-Din leadership, Muslims triumphed again:

> The Muslims were astounded to see their country occupied and themselves triumphed over. They were incited for Jihad to derive out the extortionists and liberate their motherland… In the summer of 1187 A.D., the two armies met at Hitin; the Crusaders were badly defeated and many of them were killed. Others were taken into captivity, among them the Jerusalem king Arnatt. Salah al-Din set free some of them but he killed Arnatt because of his deep hatred and oppression of Muslims (ibid., 193).

Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi became an icon for Muslims since that triumph over the Crusaders. However, the fact that the Crusaders were able to maintain their grip over parts of the Palestine for two centuries shows how weak the Islamic empire had become at the time. Those signs of weakness proved to be true when the Mughols conquered Baghdad in 1258 A.D. Al-Kird et al. (1967:196-7) describe the end of the Abbasid Caliphate and the Mughols conquest saying that:

> Ginghis Khan had completed his occupation of the Eastern Islamic capitals. He set fire in its libraries, destroyed its palaces, and made the mosques of Bukhara barns for his horses, and he shed blood with no remorse…and in the 1258 A.D. Hulako attacked Bagdad, massacred its people and set the city on fire for forty days. With that he abolished all signs of civilization in the city. Thus, the era of the Abbasid came to an end.

Later, historical developments show the continuous decline of the Islamic power with more fragmentation to follow. Partial unity or integration under one rule came later with the Ottoman's rise to power in 1517 A.D., which continued until 1917 A.D. Arabs, however, since the Mughol invasion, ceased to play important political roles in the Islamic Umma.

From another perspective, the Abbasid era is described as the golden age of Islamic history and civilization. During that era, the Islamic culture, sciences, arts, and medicine were the most advanced. This was due to the diverse cultures and ethnic tradition that started to mix and as a result, evolved into one culture. What had helped that culture become to some extent homogenized, was the fact that it used Arabic as its main vehicle of expression.

Arabic was the language of Qur'an, which made it possible for the diverse groups to imagine themselves as members of the same Umma. The Qura'an, considered by Muslims as the words of God, was written in a Quraish Arabic and is not subject to addition or omission. During its formative era, Islam had to enforce the Quraishi dialect on the new Arab comers to Islam. As a result, the Qura'an became an important tool helping in achieving uniformity among the Arab communities in the Arab Peninsula. With the expansion of Islam into non-Arab domains, it became imperative in this process of Islamization also to Arabize many communities. It is especially so since Muslims do not recognize translations of the sacred text of the Qura'an. To be a Muslim it meant a person needed to know Arabic. Consequently, Arabic became the medium through which Arabs and nonArabs alike came to recognize themselves as members of the Islamic Umma. In later years, and with the further institutionalization of the Islamic state, Arabic became not only the language of religion, but also of government, literature, trade, and science. Then, participation in the cultural, economic, and political life of the state required mastery of Arabic.

To be more specific, most knowledge production under the caliph's rule came in Arabic. One of the main reasons to that was the simple fact that the state and the caliph's courts were the main employment agencies at the time. The caliphs commissioned and rewarded both financially and socially scholars, artists, and scientists. In turn, mastery of Arabic and production in Arabic were imperative if a person wished to gain a social status or be rewarded. This process contributed to the continuous hegemony of the Arab culture and language.

The centrality of Arabic, which increased with its secularization, continued even when the Abbasids Caliphate was on the decline. Its role became more significant during the era of the early Abbasids Caliphs, where translations from Greek, Persian, Hindu, etc., increased. Symbolically, then, Arabic helped the Arab culture preserve its status although the Arab's political power started to decline. This is why the textbooks depict the Abbasid era as the golden age of the Arab Islamic civilization, though politically, the Arabs lost their hegemony. For example, al-Kird et al. (1967:138) state that:

> The rule of Harun al-Rashid is considered the golden age of the Abbasids Calipahte. During his rule, the state reached its highest peaks of power, wealth, science, and literature. He is considered the most famous figure who ever ruled that extended state… At his time, Bagdad was the Ka'bah for people of science, literature, and philosophy of religion, and a center of trade between East and West. His name was known to the kings of Europe who sought to win his friendship… His era is well documented in folk tales like One Thousand Nights and One, which has been translated to most of the world languages.

Another example discusses the richness of the era in terms of translations and scientific discoveries. Thus, we read that:

> The Arab-Islamic civilization and the translations from Hindu, Persian and Greek into Arabic, and the advancement of the Arab sciences, literature, and arts which came with the expansion of the Islamic countries, reached their highest point during the rule of the Ma'mun Caliph. People did not engage in religion's sciences only, they went beyond to explore medicine, astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, logic, etc… Those scientific texts were translated into the European language during the Renaissance (ibid., 142).

We read also that the Caliph had divided the translators by the language of their mastery into groups (ibid., 143). Those translators were paid by the treasury of the state. In addition, because of the Caliph's affection for science, he had a weekly scientific seminar in his palace in which the most important persons of that era came to participate.

In another case, on page 158, in al-Kird et al. (1967), we read that the prince of Hamdanid state who ruled great Syria and Mosul in Iraq between 929 and 1003 A.D. was "…generous, brave, and initiative that left his mark on history by his triumphs on the Byzantines…. In spite of all the atrocities of the Roman Byzantines in the north, and the Fatimids in the south, his court was a center for scientists and poets. He encouraged science and literature (ibid., 158). Moreover:

> The Fatimid state is a Shia'a state which was established in al-Maghrib [909–1171 A.D.], and later extended its power to all of North Africa, including Egypt and great Syria, Hijaz and Yemen. One of its famous Caliphs…built the city of Cairo and…al-Azhar mosque…that later became a university for the study of religion, language, medicine, astronomy and engineering… He constructed a shipyard and built more than 600 military ships (ibid., 160–1).

Thus, the process of translation and the rise of new sciences such as astronomy, mathematics, chemistry, medicine, literature etc. in the Arabic language secularized the language itself. Instead of being the language of sacred text and religion only, Arabic had become the language of science and "foreign" literature (ibid., 142, 152–5). This led to the separation between language and Arabs. With that change, the exclusiveness of the relations between Arabs, Arabic, and Islam had broken down. In turn, we witnessed (in the textbooks) the rise of cultures below Arabic and the increase in the attempts of separatism from the central power of the Caliphs. In other words, multiculturalism had resulted in secularization of Arabic and with that the end of Arab hegemony as a universal political power. Those processes led to an increase in particularism of collectives against the attempts of Arabization of Islam and a demand for autonomous states. This process matured under the Ottomans, when a further separation between religion and politics was advanced. Arabic under the Ottomans rule was the language of religion, while Turkish was the language of politics in the state.

To conclude, the Abbasid era is a turning point in the history of ArabMuslims. It is an era of glory and defeat, of expansion of spaces and extraction of lands. During that era, the long historical link between Islamism and Arabism started to weaken, and with that change, the nation's self identity underwent severe changes too. The dialectical relations between multiculturalism and secularization of the Arabic language and the rise of Others (non-Arab Muslims) to power shaped the way the Umma's collective identity was conceived. Simultaneously, the Other had varied, from separatist Muslims and Arabs to those outsider Crusaders, Byzantines, and Mughols. Finally, it could be argued that the seeds of the decline of the Arab-Islamic identity were implanted with the appearance of the Islamic discourse itself, a discourse that advanced universalism and in the process had been abused to exclude and silence non-Arab voices within the Umma. Those excluded and silenced non-Arab Muslims, a short time later, came to demand their share as members of the Islamic collective using the same principles that initially made them members of the Umma. However, the non-Arab Muslims, once they came to power, implemented the same exclusion practices previously used to marginalize them to exclude other groups within the Islamic collective, be those Turks, Persians, Arabs, etc. This is how the nation came to power and expanded, and this is how it declined.

THE OTTOMAN CALIPHS

Between the Mughol invasion of Baghdad in 1258 A.D. and the Ottoman take over of that city in 1517 A.D., the Islamic world was divided into many provinces and states. There was no central authority, and the nation was not united under one rule or one caliph. The rise of the Ottoman Caliphate came to restore the institution of the Caliphate and bring back under one authority the Islamic nation.

For the Arab people at the time, the rise of the Ottomans to power put an end to their power. From that moment on, Arabs, like other groups within the Umma, became subjects of the Sultan in Istanbul. This change was the final detachment between Islam and Arabism. While Arabic continued to be the language of religion, it ceased to be the official language of commerce, literature, and politics. It was replaced by Turkish, which became the secular state language of the Ottoman Caliphate, and the nation's official language. Arabic became one of many local dialects within the empire.

Not only Arabic, but also other dialectics and languages were localized in the face of the official language. With that too, the status of various ethnic groups changed, especially when the Ottomans introduced their new social ranking system based on profession and religion. This ranking system carried within it political rights and it determined each group's status. The new policies increased factionalism and tribalism within the same Umma (al-Kirdetal., 1967:215–8).

The first new system was Nizam al-Tawa'if, the "order of factions." It was an order of ranking people by their profession. Society was organized into professions; each profession was a community of its own. It was a semi-autonomous social and economic organization. Each profession had its own unwritten norms, and tradition. Further, each profession was headed by a Shiekh, who was a middleman between the state's institutions and the community.

Second, came the religious ranking system. This system gave each religious community the freedom to run its own religious affairs with no state intervention. Thus, Christians, Jews and Muslims, each had their own religious community separate from the others. While Islam was the official religion of the state, freedom of worship was granted to each religious group. However, non-Muslims had to pay tribute to the state, the dhimmi tax.

As a result of the previous ranking system, a third system developed, the political ranking system. At the top of this ranking were the Ottomans, whether they were Caliphs or state administrators. At the bottom of the system were the peasants, the majority of the people from whom the state extracted its tribute (taxes). Basically, for the Ottomans there were rulers and ruled, the Turks and the Other, something which increased the gulf between them and their subjects, mostly the Arabs.

For those reasons, the previous—Arab-Islamic—discourse, which had attempted to keep the link between Arabs and Islam united, broke down with the triad ranking system of the Ottomans. As a result, the self identity of the individual had been shaped by his immediate affiliation to a small community that was defined in an opposition to another one living nearby, whether that was based on profession, religion, or political status. Islam as a way of life, which previously integrated culture, politics, economics, and people into one entity, was reduced to practices privately performed and which separated rulers from ruled. In other words, collective identity was transmuted into fragmented communal identities organized next to each other within a certain geographical space and separated by difference of particularism of culture from one another. As for the Arabs, a person's identity shrank and retreated back to where it started centuries before, to the tribe and locality. At the same time, Islam as a political identity for the Arabs became secondary, and it occupied the peripheral domains of their identity.

The Ottomans ruled the Arab countries for four centuries, from 1517–1917 A.D. The textbooks have conflicting attitudes toward the Ottomans. On the one hand they are considered Others; on the other hand, they are considered Muslims, which links them to the Arabs (al-Budoor et al., 1964; al-Durrah et al., 1967; al-Kird et al., 1967; al-Ubari et al., 1967).

In the textbooks the Ottomans are described as those who had encouraged "the corruption of the administration and the spread of bribes" (al-Kird et al., 1967:212). Their era is characterized by "the widespread oppression and the decline of culture which resulted in an increase in illiteracy" among Arabs and non Arabs alike (ibid., 212). Also, "The main driving force behind dividing the empire into provinces was to ensure the governor's [personal] interests and [which allowed them] use the provinces…for collecting tribute" (ibid., 220). The empire is also blamed for keeping the Arab countries backward compared to the modernization processes in Europe. Thus, we read that:

> Arabs had become subjects of the empire during its era of power. Later, during the 17th and 18th centuries the empire deteriorated, it stayed backward and did not cope with the processes of modernization as was the case in Europe. Thus, Europe was in a race for advancement, while the Ottoman Empire was accelerating toward stagnation and backwardness. It was natural that these processes would effect the Arab countries which were part of the Ottomans' possessions (ibid., 222).

What the textbook is trying to say is that while the Other, the Europeans, had been advancing and gaining more power, "We" had been on the retreat because of the ill management of the state by the Ottomans and their abusive polices toward Arabs. "The Ottomans did not pay much attention to improving or advancing the Arab provinces; their major concern was collecting tributes and sending them back to the capital. Also, insuring enlistment in the army" (ibid., 224).

This dissatisfaction concerning the Ottomans' policies deepened when the Arabs realized that they were not advancing as other nations. In particular, the blame is attributed to the Ottomans' neglect of education among the Arabs, "Education was backward during the Ottoman rule. People had become more and more illiterate. The only literate people were the religious people and the administration clerks…diseases and poverty had dominated the life of people" (ibid., 225).

In short, the textbooks depict the Arabs under the Ottoman's rule as "oppressed, alienated, backward, exploited, disputed, divided into factions, under siege, a deteriorating society, a cheap labor and a fighting force," etc. (ibid., 220–226; al-Budoor et al., 1967:41). These descriptions portray the Arabs as a weak collective that had been a victim of the Ottomans, not one that was backward because of their own wrongdoing.

This theme of victim-victimizer had long been absent in the Arab historical narrative. Now, it resurfaced again. It provides explanation and rationalization to later historical developments, where the Arabs fell short of achieving their collective goals of unity under one rule, and in fact, were unable to confront colonialism and shape their societies. Whatever the authors' motives, those descriptions leave little doubt of how the Arab political identity is portrayed as an identity on the retreat while living under the Ottoman rule.

Against those alienating characteristics of the Arabs from Ottomans, one finds several examples that provide explanations as to why the Arabs did not oppose the Ottomans. Al-Kird et al. (1967:223) says that "There is no doubt that the conquest of the Arab countries by the Ottomans had protected the Arab countries from foreigners like the Shia'a and Safawiyyin in Persia, and from Spain which…planned to take over the Arab North African countries."

Thus, in spite of being abusive to Arabs, the textbooks do acknowledge the Ottomans' role in keeping the geographical integrity of the Arab lands from invasion by colonial forces as well as from other Muslims such as the Shi'a and the Safawiyyin of Persia. But, saying that the "Ottomans had protected the Arab countries," implies that the Arabs were in fact in no position to resist the Ottoman's rule nor able to defend themselves against other threats. This, of course, is in contrast to the Arab self image a few centuries before, when they were a powerful empire.

Another factor in the lack of resistance to the Ottomans' rule is said to be the religious ties between Arabs and Ottomans. It says that: "The Arabs, because of the Islamic religion ties considered the Ottoman state as theirs and the Ottoman caliph, their caliph" (ibid., 224). However, those ties by themselves were not sufficient to keep the Arabs loyal to the Ottomans, especially "when parts of the Arab countries were colonized by the aggressor Europeans, in the nineteenth century, and because the Ottoman empire could not provide them [the Arabs] with protection against the aggressors. Since it [the empire] was weak, the Arabs lost confidence in them [the Ottomans]. Thus, they [the Arabs] started to organize their power to drive out the threats (ibid., 224).

Thus, the decline of the Ottoman's power, toward the end of the 18th century, triggered colonialism which in turn had forced the Arabs to question their ties with Islam and the Ottomans. What is described here is the beginning of the Arab identity crisis in modern history, where religious ties were no longer the primary system of identification binding Arabs to other Muslims in one collective. The crisis led to the separation of Arabs from Ottomans and the return of Arabism as an alternative way of collective solidarity among the Arabs. Arabism, as the textbooks argue, was a dormant identity under the Ottomans, and it had to be awakened. In modern era, it emerged dialectically when religious ties became no longer sufficient to protect the Arabs against the invading colonial forces of Europe. Later, it will become clear that the way Arab nationalism developed in response to the collective identity crisis led to more divisions within the Arab world, when each local Arab community looked after its particular local political ends against its colonizer, whether they were the French, the Spanish, the British or the Italians. Thus, the rise of nationalism at the turn of the 19th century, emerged when religious ties were no longer sufficient to protect the collective, and as a result of the encounters with the colonizing powers. Nationalism is portrayed as a political discourse claiming solidarity of Arabs that developed above Islamic identification, but it fell short of meeting the collective's expectation and needs when they faced colonial threats.

NATIONALISM AND MODERN HISTORY

The first signs of Arab nationalism surfaced toward the end of the 18th century. At that time the Arab countries were divided into provinces under the Ottoman's rule. Each one was ruled by a Turkish governor. In Egypt, there were several attempts to achieve autonomy, and the conflict with the Ottoman Sultan continued into the 19th century. While formally the Arabs were under one rule, in reality the beginning of French colonialism had changed that purported unity. Later, toward the end of the 19th century, with the further expansion of British and French colonialism into North Africa, cleavages in Arab unity started to surface, and the separation from Ottomans' empire started to materialize. By the turn of the 20th century, each province in the Arab world had to face its own colonial power, and a concerted Arab effort to coordinate struggle against colonialism failed. That failure set the stage for the rise of localized nation-states in the Arab world, which one of its consequences was the emergence of Jordan as a separate political entity.

In terms of the collective identity of Arabs, those historical developments reflect the various stages of its making and the changes in it from a religious universal identity of Muslims into localized entities of Jordanians, Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis, etc. As mentioned, those changes in identity were a direct result of the Ottomans' polices towards the Arabs and the beginning of colonialism toward the end of the 18th century. Both forces created a crisis in Arab identity that the textbooks say had triggered the Arab "awakening" in modern history.

Under the Ottoman Caliphate, ethnic or national solidarity was private. Publicly, the state demanded loyalty to the Sultan himself, who received his legitimacy from being the caliph of Islam. Ethnic and national solidarity were considered private and all the various collectives in the empire were subjects of the Sultan, not citizens of a state with equal

political rights. Thus, political identification was limited to religious solidarity, and the Arab political identity was dormant. For example, al-Durrah et al. (1967:41 says that:

> The Arab world…under the Turks' rule had lost their sense of the Arab character. Arabs considered themselves part of the Ottoman's empire. Their ties with Turkey were stronger than their inter-Arab ties. What had made things even worse is the fact that Turks did not give access to power to non-Turks. They considered ruling as their role alone and they sanctioned relations between the rulers and the ruled. This is how Arabs …were denied the experience of ruling, which resulted in their low self esteem, and their lack of will for independence.

Arabs were bound to the Ottomans by Islam. Islam was the primary avenue of identification and identity for Arabs. Under these circumstances, Arab national identity and their glorious past had to be suppressed. In fact, since the mid-19th century, a process of Turkishization of Arabs intensified as the Ottoman power weakened. The implication of those processes was the domestication of all other forms of non-religious identities. Arabism as a collective political identity of Arabs was limited to the private sphere of family and locality without being a source of any collective pride and solidarity. What added to the Arabs' frustration was their realization of their lack of basic skills for self-rule, and their inferiority, with no motivation to seek independence.

Amid these developments, the textbooks say, with the first wave of colonialism—begun with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and Palestine, starting in 1798 and ended by 1801—the question of identity went into another phase. The French colonialism is described as more oppressive than the Mamluks or the Turks. This is how the textbook describes it:

> Napoleon tried to acquire the sympathy of the Egyptians by establishing the national Diwan, which included many Sheikhs, to help him rule. He pretended to show respect to religion, and participated in public festivities. Soon, the Egyptian people realized they had come under a foreign rule more oppressive and more zealous to power than the Mamluks or the corrupted Turkish rule. The French were very abusive in collecting tributes and they exploited the Egyptians and disseminated immorality and obscenity. A strong revolt started against them, in which the Egyptian people showed bravery and sacrifice, in spite of the brutal means the French used to stop it (ibid., 35).

As it is evident, colonialism tripled the Arab crisis of identity. While Egyptians had tolerated the rule of Turks as sharing with them religious ties, the French were conceived as "different in terms of language, race, and religion. That difference aggravated the Arab national sentiment, not in Egypt only, also in great Syria" (ibid., 41).

Thus, what had awakened in Egyptians and other Arabs their Arab identity was that complex situation of rejection of Turks and Mamluks, on the one hand, and their resistance to French colonialism. In other words, it was the encounter with colonialism and the marginalization under the Turks that led to the development of an Arab sense of

collective identity distinctive from both. However, this complex situation had not developed without ambivalent attitudes toward both the Ottomans and colonialism. Thus, in the same textbook, on page 38, it reads that:

> The Arab world under the Ottoman rule faced the European continent with its modernity, which it owes to the Arabs. [It is] a rapidly progressing culture with its use of technology, science, liberty and the principles of democracy. France came to Egypt and great Syria…not to disseminate those ideas among the Arab nation or other nations. Rather, it came to master those nations. Egypt and great Syria were more influenced by the modern European culture than other Arabs.

This quotation, like many others in the textbooks, shows the ambivalence in the Arab narrative toward the European colonial countries. On the one hand, Europeans are described as advanced, modern, powerful, and democratic, and on the other hand, colonialist, power-seeking, oppressive, and brutal. Similarly, these dual images correspond to dichotomous Arab images too. In the quotation, the Europeans are in debt to Arabs for their modernity and progress. By saying that, the textbook's narrative compares the contemporary Arab weakness to their glorious past that had helped the Europeans achieve their contemporary advantage. Thus, contemporary Arab weakness could be temporary, since they potentially could revive their glorious past. This argument is supplemented by another one that emphasizes that the contemporary Arab weakness and backwardness is not due to their ill characteristics, but rather to the Ottoman's ill policies that forced Arab societies into stagnation.

Later descriptions in the textbook, instead of portraying colonialism as an evil force, focus on the modernizing force inherent in it, especially its scientific approach, which helped Arabs catch up with the advanced European cultures. It says that:

> The French came to the East with no previous knowledge, but with a will to master its regions by scientific methods. Bonaparte brought with him a select group of French scientists in mathematics, engineering, geography, history, mechanics, etc. Among them there was the orientalist, the artist, and the novelist. Those scientists were provided with printing machines and entire sets of engineering tools and chemical laboratories. They were divided into teams. Each of them studied one aspect of the Egyptian life: legal, administrative, archaeological…etc. They drew a map of Egypt, and discussed a project to connect the Nile with the Red Sea… They studied many chronic diseases… What is important is not the studies themselves, but the methods used…the scientific experimental approaches. With that, the Arab world gradually started to discover the European modernity (ibid., 38–9).

This fascination with the European advancement leaves no place for doubt that the crisis of identity had deepened among Arabs during their encounter with European colonization. The Europeans are no longer depicted as an oppressive force, but rather a modernizing force that Arabs could only benefit from. In fact, the textbook regrets the

fact that other regions of the Arab world, such as great Syria and Palestine, had only a little chance "to drink from the springs of the European modernity, of science and literature. That is due to the closure which the Ottomans had placed on those regions" (ibid., 39).

This is exactly what the colonizers endeavored to achieve; conveying to the colonized that the Europeans were superior, advanced, and progressive, and simultaneously implanting in the colonized minds a sense of worthlessness and backwardness. By doing that, the colonial discourse succeeded to induce the colonized to submissiveness and dependency while presenting itself as a modernizing force that will help the colonized find the right path to progress and advancement in the image of Europe.

Gradually, the textbooks move away from glorifying the European modernity into praising the Arab ability to make use of the European advancement in order to resist them. One of those strategies was the use of literary studies, language, history, etc., to resist the Europeans' cultural imperialism, and to revive Arab culture, history, and collective identity. Colonial countries used missionary schools to disseminate European ideas and set the ground for European cultural domination. Most of the missionaries targeted Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. They came from many countries, France, Italy, Germany, England, Russia, the United States, etc. The textbook states that:

> We need to recognize that the goal of those missionary schools was not the revival of the Arab literature and the awakening of Arab nationalism. Their main purposes were religious missionary and care for the Christian Arab congregations. Occasionally, they [the missionaries] preferred using their national languages than Arabic. The awakening of the Arabs was an unexpected consequence of the missionaries' goals when some [Arabs] joined them and it accidentally emerged by making use of their printing houses to publish classical Arab literature (ibid., 104).

Thus, instead of disseminating their colonial ideas, the textbook argues, Arabs used the colonial technological progress for their own "national awakening." This awakening is described as a literary, educational movement that later developed into a political movement. It developed out of resistance to both colonialism and Ottomans:

> The awakening of Arabs, at first, was literary and intellectual. But the continuous oppression of the Ottoman's rule, especially, the rule of Sultan Abed al-Hamid the Second, his tyranny, in spite of his fake siding with Arabs, and the disclosure of the European countries cravings in the Arab countries…all that had contributed to the transformation of the Arab movement into political and national. With that, Arabs had a political goal, which was achieving self rule (ibid., 105).

Ironically, while the Arabs, as the textbooks say, resisted cultural imperialism, this way of theorizing the process of national awakening was deeply rooted in the European model of nationalism. In that classical model, nationalism starts with literature, the study of the national history, and then moves to political demands. Implicitly, by saying that, it means that the Arabs had internalized the European ideas that the textbooks denounced as a

European attempt for cultural imperialism. Thus, while the textbook rejects the cultural hegemony of the West, and its attempts to colonize not only the Arab countries but also the minds of Arabs, it uses its logic for both resistance and development of national identity. Those contradictions were manifested in the discourses that developed in several intellectual centers across the Arab world at the time. They show how deep the crisis of identity was.

DISCOURSES OF RESISTANCE AND THE DILEMMA OF IDENTITY

By the end of the 19th century the actual and the cultural colonization of the Arab countries was complete. Simultaneously, the process of Turkishization (my term) of the Arabs deepened. Thus, nationalism was seen as the only viable alternative to assert identity separate from both colonialism and the Ottomans. Debates among Arab intellectuals led to the development of several schools of nationalism. Some of those centers were in the Arab world, while others were in several European capitals: Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Istanbul, Paris, etc. Those centers produced several discourses. Each of them was shaped by both the context in which it had emerged and the Western model of nationalism. Thus, the center in Beirut was more secular than the center in Cairo, and the latter is different from the Paris center. The composition of the leading figures in each of them, whether they were intellectuals, religious leaders, or political opposition, gave each center its own characteristics. What all of them had in common was the intensive engagement in intellectual activity in addition to their political organization. That intellectual activity was aimed at recovering the roots of their collective identity through the study of Arab history, culture, language, geography, and religion. In addition, each of those centers developed its own information dissemination network, such as newspapers and magazines. However, the strategies of how to face the current crisis of identity also varied.

For example, the French colonialist targeting of Egypt and Palestine had several consequences for the Arabs. First, the French occupation of Egypt and the introduction of Egypt to the French revolutionary ideas made the Egyptian resistance and consequently its discourse localized. Thus, colonialism became a local phenomenon, which makes it more an Egyptian than an Arab problem. Second, the attempt of Napoleon to colonize the Holy Land invoked a larger Arab and Islamic resistance. It made Arabs and Moslems see themselves as the next in a process of colonization. Consequently, several voices called for the revival of Arabism, or Islamism, or a combination of both. In other words, the beginning of colonialism invoked three responses: 1) A localized national movement; 2) An ArabIslamic movement; 3) An Islamic movement. While one (1) is advocating for localism, which implies separation from the mother Arab collective, others (2&3) call for a collective reaction against colonialism.

The debates between the various schools of nationalism continued until WWI During the war all the Arab countries came under colonialism. However, the differences between the various schools were in their view of colonialism and the Ottomans. In fact, many voices claimed that the modern phase of the European colonialism is a continuation of the Crusaders' wars. It is a war against Islam. Advocates of this approach called for

integration of the Islamic world under the Ottomans to defend the Holly Land from the new Crusaders. To achieve the collective Islamic goal, those voices demanded reform of the Ottoman state and more participation of Arabs in the state to defeat the "Crusaders." In turn, the Ottomans made several changes which they called "reforms" to please and silence the Arabs (alDurrah et al., 1967:57–66; al-Ubari et al., 1967).

Other voices argued that the Ottomans were no different than the European colonialists. The Ottomans were behind much of the deteriorating Arab culture, society, economy, and Arab oppression. Believers in this discourse advocated for bringing back Islamism to Arabism. They argued it was under Arab-Muslim rule that Arabs had been powerful, advanced, and proud. The current weakness and backwardness of the Arabs was explained as a result of the alienation of Arabs from Islam. Islam had emerged from the Arab Peninsula as an Arab religion and the salvation of Arabs could only come from that sacred place. Those feelings received support not only from the Arabs but were especially encouraged by the British whose aim was the weakening of the Ottoman empire (al-Durrah et al., 1967:92–3). Those discourses are still at the center of debates in the Arab world in our times too.

As previously mentioned, by the end of the 19th century, parts of the Arab Peninsula, Egypt, and parts of Yemen were under British rule. Morocco was occupied by the Spanish, and Algeria by the French. Those colonial occupations of parts of the Arab countries invoked, at the beginning, local resistance. Later, by the end of World War I, when all the Arab countries were colonized, a more massive resistance of Arabs against colonialism erupted (ibid., 92–104).

Since the colonizers varied from one country to another, so did the resistance to them. Arabs did not /could not coordinate their resistance efforts against colonialism, since there were many colonialists: the French, British, Italians, etc. While the British promised independence for Arabs in the Arab Peninsula, in exchange for their support in World War I against Germany, they were colonizers of Egypt and Palestine. Thus, on the one hand they were colonizers and enemies; on the other hand, they were "allies." Likewise was the case with the French in Lebanon, Syria and Algeria.

Such contradictions resulted in more localized efforts of resistance to colonialism. Even when a British-allied Arab collective movement appeared, soon it became localized—a direct result of the priorities the British had at the time for each part of the Arab countries. Thus, the modern Arab local national movements and their later nation-states developed as a reaction to and in response to the various colonizers, which made the Arabs fight against several local enemies. Moreover, while the colonizing countries could coordinate their interests and divide the region amongst themselves, it was difficult for the Arab movements to coordinate their local efforts into a united Arab movement, particularly when some of those colonizers, like the British, played dual roles in separate countries, such as colonizers in Egypt, and allies in another.

THE ARAB REVOLT AND THE RISE OF NATION-STATES

For several years before WWI, the Sharif of Mecca, Sharif Hussein, negotiated with the Ottomans over extending his rule in Saudi Arabia and on the holy places of Islam there. When the Ottomans came short in meeting his demands, he sought alliances with the

British. The British saw in that development a golden opportunity to weaken the "sick man," the Ottoman empire and a safe strategy to deepen their colonialism into the Arab countries. This development had two interrelated results. One, the beginning of the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein in 1916 which was closely coordinated with the British. The Arab Revolt's declared aim was the liberation of the Arab countries from the Ottomans and the creation of an Arab-Islamic caliphate under the leadership of Sharif Hussein.

Second, and as a result of the Revolt, the Arab national movement was divided into three main forces: Egypt and North African countries, Great Syria (which included Palestine, Syria and Lebanon), and the movement in Mecca of Sharif Hussein. Later, Great Syria's nationalists joined forces with the son of Sharif Hussein, Faisal, advocating for pan-Arab unity. Those inter-Arab divisions became a reality as a result of the colonial countries' strategies in the region and their secret agreements on how to divide the Arab lands between themselves. In addition, the Ottomans' ill policy toward the Arabs had weakened the Arabs and made one camp seek collaboration with the colonial forces against their own interests and that of the Ottomans, while the other camp sided with the Ottomans. This is how the textbooks describe these confusions:

> The relations of Arabs and Ottomans deteriorated at the eve of World War I. It was a direct result of the [Turkish] Unionists to continue with their racist policy and their attempt to make all the Ottoman's subjects Turks. The [Unionists] started to oppose the Arab movement. They considered themselves as masters and the Arabs their subjects who had to be submissive to them, by abandoning their language, culture, nationality, in order to become Turks or like Turks. What had prevented the Arabs from revolting against them was a thin loyalty to a caliph's state, and their fear of changing one master by another such as the French, the British, the Germans, etc.(al-Durrah et al., 1967:120). For the British colonialists, they used many maneuvers to gain the Arabs to their side. Britain feared the consequences of the Sultan's call, since he was the Muslim caliph and the head of the largest Islamic state which was fighting against a Christian state. [Britain feared] making the various Islamic nations, Arabs and non-Arabs which were under British rule, rise against it, which might lead…to its defeat in the war. Consequently, Britain sought and used various means to entice the Arabs stand on its side and make use of their national movement against the Ottomans (ibid., 121).

Under those circumstances, while the Arab national movements realized the hidden agenda of the colonialist, the Young Arabs underground movement decided that:

> The consequence of Turkey's entry into the war placed the Arab parts of the Ottoman state under real threat. We have to donate all efforts to guarantee the liberation of those parts. It was also decided that if the Europeans disclosed interests in the Arab motherland, the movement should act in coordination with Turkey to oppose the foreign domination whatever it is (ibid., 121).

On the other hand, the Turkish governor of Syria, in May of 1916, arrested several Arab nationalist leaders, accusing them of an attempt to separate Syria and Palestine from the Ottoman empire. Those leaders were sentenced to death. All attempts to alter the Turkish governor's sentence were in vain. The impact on the Arab national movement was dramatic. The textbook says that "the Arabs were shocked, and their desire for vengeance against the Turks increased. This had an enormous effect on declaring the Arab Revolt" (ibid., 123). The textbook explains that:

> The betrayal of the Ottomans…their execution of Arab nationalists …[and] the conflict over power in Hijaz between the governor and Sharif Hussein. Thus, Hussein saw to take advantage of this opportunity in order to extract the independence of the Arabs. Especially when he had noticed the willingness of the Allies to help him and grant him what he wants after the triumph (ibid., 123).

Thus, as the textbook says, the execution of the Arab nationalists in May 1916 was the straw that made the Sharif abandon his historical ties with the Ottomans and turn to the British. But what was the main reason for the revolt? Was it the betrayal of the Ottomans? Was it Sharif Hussein's desire for power? Or was it the enticements of the colonial British to achieve his own private goal? It becomes clearer when we read the discussion of the 1915 correspondence of Sharif Hussein with McMahon, the British consulate to Egypt, a year before the Revolt. Thus, the Turkish "betrayal" is less likely to be the reason. It is more likely that the British set the time for D-Day according to their needs, as it is hinted in the textbook: "England tried to communicate with the Sharif Hussein for setting a date to declare the Revolt" (ibid., 124).

The McMahon-Hussein correspondence discloses the demands of Hussein in exchange for his help with the British against the Ottomans and the Germans. In those letters, Hussein demanded to grant him the Arab parts of the Ottoman's empire for his dynasty to rule as the new Islamic caliph, after the allies triumph over Turkey and Germany (ibid., 124). The emphasis in his demands of the Islamic-religious family ties to the sacred family of the prophet Muhammad was expected to give him legitimacy in the Arab countries to become a caliph.

Thus, at a time when Britain was occupying many parts of the Arab countries, and while the Egyptians were paying high sacrifices against the British, the "savior" of the Arabs, Sharif Hussein, was negotiating with them for his post war demands-needs. However, the textbook describes the Sharif, and his sons Faisel and Abdullah as the "saviors and heroes of the Arab nation," and as those "wise men who were eager to bring glory back to the nation of Moslem-Arab" (ibid., 128,130). In other words, the Sharif is a hero who uses cunning to get to his goals.

What is surprising is how the textbook moves from these descriptions into another opposing one in the limited space of two pages. Thus, it argues that while Hussein was negotiating with the British, they, with the Russians and the French, were intensively negotiating the Sykes-Picot Treaty, in May of 1916. In that agreement, the three colonial countries agreed to divide the Arab countries between themselves. Since Russia did not benefit much from these agreements, in 1917, after the Bolshevik revolution, the documents were leaked to the press.

What comes next in the textbook is a dramatic change in the self conception of the Arab "Leader." The previously depicted "glorious, heroic, savior of the Arabs" and "the wise leader," turns into a "victim" of the colonial British. Further, the Arabs become "victims" of the British not only for their betrayal of the Sharif, but also due to their conspiracy with the Jews to take over Palestine.

> The allies' betrayal was not only due to their Sykes-Picot Treaty; they had secretly negotiated with the Jews to make the Arab Palestine their homeland. Secretly, they had agreed to help them convince other governments to put Palestine under the British Mandate… This agreement was known later as the Balfour Declaration (ibid.,128).

Further, the sense of victimization and being left alone is what characterizes the textbook's discourse. It started with choosing between the least worst of the two Others, the colonial British and the Ottomans, and ended up with two more Others, Zionism and colonialism. What had started as a large Arab movement "to liberate the Arab countries and establish a new Arab Islamic caliph" (ibid., 124), ended with more division and fewer resources than it started.

> When the big war ended with the Allies' victory, they started the implementation of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and they called for gaining support for the Balfour Declaration. As if that was not enough, they sent a representative to his majesty, Hussein ibn Ali asking his consent for the Balfour Declaration in exchange for allowing him stay king of Hijaz… His answer was… "Even if my body would be chopped into seven pieces and thrown in the corners of the Ka'abah, I won't sign this agreement" (ibid., 128).

The "failure of the leader" is not due to his ill character, but rather due to the "cunning and betrayal" (ibid., 128) of colonialism and their allies, the Zionists. In order to clear his name, the textbook provides more descriptions of the victimization of the Sharif and emphasis of his mythic traits and doing for the nation, such as the "heroic sacrifices of the savior," which are contrasted with the "betrayal of the British and the Zionism extortionists."

> He started, God bless his soul, his resistance to colonialism in the Arab countries. He heroically tried to keep the Arab nature of Palestine and saving it from the Zionists and colonialism. But…he could not fight the tyrannies of the colonial countries. When he demanded from the allies to deliver on their promises he was taken to Cyprus for medical treatment. In fact, he was not ill, rather he was taken in captivity by the British… He lived there and when he felt his time to die was close, he asked to be buried in the country he had sacrificed for. He was buried in the Jerusalem mosque ... His grave is urging Arabs and Muslims to save the Holy Land from Zionism and colonialism (ibid., 128).

Those descriptions show how weak the Arabs were at the time; at least that is how they are described. It seems as if it was the "hand of destiny" that marked the paths of history for the Arabs. Consequently, they must make the best of what was possible for them. This position helps to legitimate later development, the rise of the nation-state, which in Jordan was led by the son of the Sharif, Abdullah, and in other countries by the local national movements.

Thus, the rise of the local Arab national movements and nation-states were the best of choices given the very harsh circumstances under which the Arabs found themselves, as the textbook attempts to say. The failure of the Arab national movement, led by Sharif Hussein, produced nation-states designed by colonialism. Those nation-states, in the textbooks, are seen as a temporary stage in the process of reaching an integrated Arab state as it was during the glorious era of Islam.

In the transition from Ottoman's rule to colonialism and nationstates, the Arab collective identity has undergone transformation: From an Islamic identity, where Arabs as Muslims defined themselves by opposition to non-Muslims, into a secular identity of Arabism based on the belief in common history, language, and culture. The latter, under colonialism, has provoked Arabs to revive Arab-Islamism solidarity to counter the threats of colonialism, the Other. Finally, the failure of the Arab national movement to bring about unity of Arabs resulted in the rise of localized identities where the boundaries of the collective identity of one Arab state were defined in an opposition to another Arab state. This is how Jordan, like many other Arab nation-states, emerged from the failure of those regional Arab national movements.

THE MAKING OF JORDAN

For many centuries Jordan did not have any strategic significance. For the Ottomans as well as for the British, it served as a crossing place between Great Syria and Egypt and between the Arab Peninsula and Palestine. The rise of Jordan as separate nation-state developed accidently and as a result of the tragic failure of Faisal—the son of Sharif Hussein—to liberate Syria from French colonialism and maintain a pan-Arab rule in Damascus in 1920. Abdullah, his brother, while he was heading with his small army toward Damascus, was advised by the British to become a prince of Jordan and give up on his dream of a pan-Arab state. But, the textbooks tell a different story.

In a March 1921 conference in Cairo, it is said of Winston Churchill, who was Britain's Secretary of Defense, that "after studying the conditions of great Syria and Iraq, [Churchill] decided to please King Faisal and Prince Abdullah. He chose the first to be the king of Iraq, and the latter the prince of Jordan" (al-Durrah et al., 1967:146). Further, with the British nomination of Abdullah, as the prince of Jordan, "…[he] stopped his military activities to invade Syria" (ibid., 47), which was at the time under the French colonialism. The "prince" was pleased with what he received and had given up on the dream of Arab Unity.

With that agreement Jordan came under the British mandate until 1946. Meanwhile, the boundaries of the new nation of Jordan were defined by the boundaries set by the colonialists: in the north, Syria (under the French mandate), in the east, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and in the west, the Palestinians and the emerging Jewish entity in Palestine.

What differentiated Jordan from the Others are the lines drawn by the British and French colonialism. Those lines have solidified over time to make the Jordanian nation.

By setting the political boundaries, the state emerged, and gradually it attempted to construct its own local culture and its own identity. What is interesting is that Jordan's national identity did not emerge out of a confrontation and conflicts with the British; on the contrary, it emerged out of a well-concerted conflict with other Arab countries or the indifference to what occurs to those Arabs. In fact, Jordan as a state emerged out of the anomalies of power between the Arabs, Britain, the Zionist movement, and the French. The power anomalies also made it possible for Jordan to "unite" the two banks of the Jordan River after the Palestinian expulsion from Palestine. This is how the textbook describes that:

> When the Palestinian catastrophe occurred, Jordan participated together with the Arab League in the war over Palestine. It heroically defended many parts of it such as Jerusalem, and the middle part of Palestine. When the Arab armies withdrew from Palestine due to the cease fire treaty, [Jordanian] forces stayed in the Arab parts to protect them from Israel. The people of those [Arab] parts had thought about their fate, a group of them met in (Jericho) in November of 1948…. They solicited king Abdullah to unite what was left of Palestine to his kingdom. [Abdullah] agreed (ibid., 158).

Thus, the opportunism of the king of Jordan is described as a heroic and noble act which was part of his "Master Plan" to unite all Arabs under one country. What the textbook do not discuss is what were the reasons behind the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 by a Palestinian. Instead, the textbook mentions that "In June of 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated [and he died] as a martyr."

What emerges is that Jordan has been shaped by colonial countries that had the power to construct a Jordanian entity detached from other Arab counties. Without that colonial intervention, it is doubtful if Jordan would have emerged as a separate nation-state. However, the textbook provides contradictory descriptions of those colonial forces and their role in the shaping of modern Arab countries, including Jordan. Sometimes they are depicted as allies, on other occasions, they are the enemies of Arabs.

Moreover, the textbook uses simultaneous ambiguities and dualities toward the British, as if it attempts to please the rulers and the ruled—the rulers, because they had gained a state, thanks to the British, and the ruled, because of their antagonism toward the British as those who brought catastrophes on the Arabs. The textbook states that the British financed Jordan, and when that became too costly, the British threatened to leave the King without protection and without further funding for his army. But this humiliating Jordanian financial dependency on a former colonial country is then turned into heroism in the textbook. The King, instead of appealing to the British, turned to other Arab leaders, asking them to finance his state:

> Because, may God protect him, the King could not accept anything less than a comprehensive sovereignty of the state… He instructed his government to negotiate with other brother Arab countries [as options] to

> finance the army instead of the British aid. The negotiation was successful. A treaty of Arab Solidarity was signed with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria on the 19th of December, 1957. The terms of that treaty, [said that] the first and the second will pay an amount of five million Egyptian Jinaih…annually, for a period of ten years (ibid., 161).

Now, the textbook claims that with these assurances from the Arab countries, the king turned to end the British presence in Jordan. He demanded the evacuation of all British forces from the kingdom. In the textbooks from this moment on, the British are no longer described as allies. Instead, they are transformed into an evil enemy, an occupier, a colonizer of an Arab land. But later, the textbook adds that the Arab countries did not live up to their promises, and soon after, they abandoned Jordan. As the textbook says:

> It is of great regret that things did not go the way the Arabs wished for. An intra-Arab conflict emerged, and fast it was contained. [The conflict was a result of] foreign intervention [which led to a] misunderstanding between Jordan, Egypt and Syria. Egypt and Syria did not pay their share according to the Arab Solidarity treaty… [By turning to the Arab countries] Jordan sought to advance Arab unification… [During that time] Hussein repeated his grandfather's—the Great Savior's- call for Arab unity… The King invited an Iraqi delegation to negotiate unification… The unification [of the two states] was declared on the 14th of February in 1958… [However,] the festive feeling that followed the unification did not last long, since in June of 1958, a military coup in Iraq brought to power a republican regime… [Soon after,] Iraq withdrew from the [unification] treaty (ibid., 161).

Thus, as we see, this narrative presents Jordan's rulers as those who turned every stone to achieve Arab unification. As such, they are discussed as pioneers of pan-Arabism in modern history. There is no reference to their will to power and their collaboration with colonialism to achieve their narrow personal interests. Those narrow interests had brought them back to appeal to pan-Arabism when they were abandoned by the colonial British.

Evidently, pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism were perused by Jordan not as an end by themselves, rather as means to achieve local and particular interests. It seems so, since as the textbooks mentioned, it was the crisis with Britain that made Jordan turn to Arabs as an alternative source of financing their state. Jordan appealed to common sentiments of pan-Arabism while it was seeking to achieve its legitimacy as a separate entity detached from other Arabs.

A similar strategy is pursued in the elaborate discussion in the textbooks of Jordan's leaders, their genealogy, and their "noble" intentions. In these discussions, there is little reference to the "nation" in Jordan and its distinctive characteristics. The textbook discusses in detail, as we have seen, the history of the rulers, but not of the ruled. Again, similar to the use of pan-Arab sentiments, the textbooks use Islam and Jordan's kinship ties to provide legitimacy to the rulers of Jordan. Linking those rulers to the Prophet, it bestows upon them a sense of sacredness and holiness that makes them advantageous and

different from other Arab leaders. These qualities make them better candidates for Arab and Muslim leadership toward a future unification. Those arguments provide the necessary legitimacy of Jordan's rulers despite the fact that they are from a non-Jordanian origin. This is why the Jordanian narrative focuses on the rulers and not the ruled.

In addition, as the textbooks argued, if the aspiration of Arabs is to revive their glorious past and achieve a future unification, then who rules now is less important. By the same logic, by promoting Islam and Arabism, Jordan's narrative makes the internal composition of Jordan's population and all forms of particularism within Jordan—such as the Palestinian population—irrelevant, since the future goal is unification of all Arabs. Reference to Jordan's internal population structure would undermine the rulers' rights to rule over a majority of Palestinians in the Kingdom. This is why Jordan's narrative emphasizes regional (pan-Arab) and universal (Islamic) solidarity to legitimate itself and by that manages to perpetuate Jordan as an ArabIslamic state while excluding the Palestinians.

In this process of seeking legitimacy, the disappearance of Palestinians from the discussions held shortly after the "Unification of 1951" plan becomes imperative. It is true that there is a separate chapter in the textbook that discusses the 'Palestinian Cause.' It focuses on the history of Palestine since the beginning of Zionism and the interrelation between Zionism and colonialism. But, since 1951 unification, the Palestinians as a people, land, and culture cease to exist. This exclusion of the Palestinians was made possible by appealing to pan-Arabism as a noble identification form beyond particular locality of Palestinians, Syrians, Egyptians, etc.

EXCLUSION AND LEGITIMACY: COLONIALISM, PALESTINIANS, AND ZIONISTS

The question of legitimacy of Jordan's rulers and its right to exist as a separate state detached from other Arab countries is central to the Jordanian narrative. There are two levels in the Jordanian narrative that when combined provide legitimacy of Jordan as a separate state, and make the Palestinian exclusion possible. First, there is the question of the legitimacy of Jordan as a separate state. In the Jordanian narrative, Jordan as a nation-state is presented as a temporary solution toward a nobler future goal of Arab unification. In addition, Jordan's leaders are presented as those who exhausted all means trying to serve the noble goal of Arab unity. As I have shown, the textbooks glorified Jordan's role in "protecting" what has been spared from Palestine. Also, the appropriation of the West Bank, and the unification attempts therein are all presented as a "first step" toward Arab integration under one Arab leadership. Islam and the kinship ties of Jordan's rulers to the Prophet family have been exploited too to provide legitimacy. In other words Jordan, by turning to pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, and by emphasizing its rulers' kinship ties to the Prophet, acts to achieve its legitimacy. By advancing this form of multiple identifications, the Jordanian narrative makes the particular of being a Palestinian, for example, irrelevant. This argument becomes stronger when Jordan's narrative emphasizes the temporariness of these political arrangements that have resulted in dividing the Arab land into many nation-states. Thus, by appealing to pan-Arabism and

pan-Islamism Jordan's narrative makes the Palestinian particularism irrelevant. And in turn, makes the Palestinians invisible.

The second level in perfecting the Palestinian exclusion in Jordan is through the discussion of the evolution of the Palestinian catastrophe. In this discussion, the textbooks carefully shift the blame from Arabs and Jordanians to colonialism and Zionism. By doing so, the textbooks disguise the Jordanian collaboration with Zionism and colonialism and present the Jordanian betrayal of Palestinians as heroism. For example, it says of the colonial intentions toward Palestine that:

> The English started to think of colonizing Palestine, to protect their passage to India, since the beginning of the 19th century. When they realized they lacked the power to achieve that, they turned to promoting the return of Jews [to Palestine]. They had modified this from a spiritual return into a political idea that aimed at establishing a Jewish state under the British custody. In 1840, Lord Shaftesbury came up with a project [to start] the Jewish colonization [of Palestine]. [At the time] many English figures [in Britain] helped disseminate the Zionist idea in their speeches and conferences. [Those British politicians] demanded, as a first step [in that colonization project], the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, [later] to be autonomous under the Sultan's sovereignty, hoping that finally the sovereignty would be transferred to Britain. Those people convinced the British Foreign Ministry with that idea. They [British Foreign Ministry] started negotiation with the Sultan but it [the idea] failed (al-Durrah et al., 1967:186)

Thus, the British and Zionism, from the early 19th century, are described as plotting to colonize Palestine. Palestine was the target of colonialism and Zionism. Moreover, while this textbook implicitly acknowledges the religious sentiments of Jews toward Palestine, it declines to mention their political claims on Palestine. In addition, the textbook accuses the British of conspiracy, as those who modified these noble religious sentiments into their "cheap" political goals, such as protecting the passage to India. We read that:

> The British move had given hope in the hearts of the Jewish dignitaries in Britain. A Jewish dignitary (Abraham Benish) sent a proposal to the minister of British Foreign Affairs in the year 1842, suggesting to him the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine. He emphasized that such a state would be a market for British goods and would secure the Suez [Canal] and the passage to India (ibid., 187).

The last quotation suggests that the Jewish leaders had accepted the role assigned to them by colonialism and they were more than willing to play that role. Thus, the goals of the Zionists and the British coincided. This sort of description leaves no doubt that Zionism and colonialism are both imperialistic movements that sought to dominate other lands, in this case, Palestine.

Further, the textbooks later discuss how those old plans of colonizing Palestine materialized toward the end of WWI, when Britain granted Palestine to the Zionists. The

Balfour Declaration of 1917 makes Britain a colonial power, the sole power responsible for the loss of Palestine and the suffering of the Palestinians (ibid., 188). In the textbooks, it says that what started as a secret plot later was translated into a plan to transfer Jews to Palestine and gradually drive out the Palestinians from their homeland (ibid., 198).

Britain was behind the process of transformation of Palestine, from an Arab land into a Zionist entity. After the Balfour Declaration, Britain started encouraging Jewish immigration to Palestine. As a result, the ethnic demographic balance in Palestine started to change. Soon after that, the British policy helped in transferring Palestinian lands and their natural resources to Zionists. The textbook states that Britain:

> treated the Muslims [in Palestine] like other minority groups. In 1922, it established a committee called the Supreme Islamic Council that was granted the supervision over the Islamic courts, and the Islamic Waqf. Justice would have required that Muslims be the [sole] authority of legislation since they were the original inhabitants of the country and they were the majority. [The Muslims] were 589 hundred thousand, the Jews 83 thousand, and the Christians 71 thousand. In addition, Britain had expended the country's natural resources. It gave rights to Rotenberg, the [owner of a] Jewish company to generate electricity from the Jordan [River], and gave another Jewish company the rights for Potassium extraction from the Dead sea… Thus Britain has acknowledged the Jewish Agency and shared its policy with it… This agency had become the mind behind the British policy as a result of the international Zionists' pressure. Thus it [Jewish Agency] became involved in legislation, and immigration to make it advantageous for the Jews and to the disadvantage of the indigenous population (ibid., 189).

What is puzzling in these descriptions is the fact that during those same years while Britain was transforming Palestine into a Jewish national home, the founding fathers of Jordan, king Abdullah and Sharif Hussein, were the only Arab allies of colonial Britain in the region. Evidently, their collaboration with colonialism played a significant role in the success of British colonization of Arabs. Sharif Hussein and his sons were rewarded for their collaboration with the British. Abdullah became a king in Jordan, and Faisal a king in Iraq. But, the textbooks are trying to exonerate Jordan's leaders from those accusations by squarely putting all the blame on Zionism and colonialism.

Moreover, during those years, the textbook argues that Arabs and the Palestinians could only resist colonialism but they were not able to change the course of its evil development. However, the fact that Arabs abandoned the Palestinians is not mentioned. The textbook describes the Palestinian resistance only and the heavy sacrifices they had to pay during their struggle, especially during the Palestinian revolts in 1929 and 1936–9 (ibid., 192–6).

Again, when it comes to heroism and glorification, the textbook makes Jordan and other Arab volunteers full participants. It says that during the Palestinian struggle against the Zionist forces, Arab [heroic] forces were halted by the intervention of the super powers—the European countries—which sided with the Zionists and stopped the Arabs' advancement in the war. This is why the Palestinians, like all other Arab volunteers,

could not stand against those powerful enemies. Saying that means that the Palestinians and all Arabs were in fact victims of a biased international community with their allies, the colonial powers. The Zionists, as part of that colonial power, are depicted as "well equipped with what the British left for them [after their withdrawal from Palestine in 1948]" (ibid., 199). Not only that, the Zionists are described as "brutal, savages, colonialists, conspirators, used deception, terrorists, supported by the European countries" (ibid., 199).

The closing chapter in the Palestinian existence as a separate entity comes with the loss of their homeland in the war of 1948, which resulted in turning them into refugees awaiting U.N. aid organization. Short after that, they were made into Jordanians, and by that they ceased to exists as people, land, history, or future. The textbook summarizes this transition in the following:

> The Palestinians lost the best part of their country. About a million people were expelled from their homes and they left behind all they had possessed. They became refugees in need of clothing, food, and shelter. They became refugees in all the neighboring Arab countries. The UN initiated aid for them and encouraged them to settle where they are now (ibid., 199).

As I mentioned at the outset of this section, since those events the textbooks make no reference to the Palestinians, they are forced into assimilation and consequently, they become "invisible" in Jordan. The fact that the Palestinians were more than eighty percent of the population, their invisibility made Jordan as a state more visible and distinctive. Through the exclusion of Palestinians, Jordan emerges and becomes a nation. More significantly, Jordan came into existence not only by excluding the Palestinian people, but mainly through the appropriation of their land as well as their history and memory. This was made possible through the "legal" process of "unification" that allowed Jordan to claim the Palestinian land and people as theirs, and with that, to make them invisible, and non-existent.

SUMMARY

In my discussion and analysis of the Jordanian national narrative, I have focused on two main issues: One, the myth of Jordanian origins and two, the evolution of the nation, be that of Arabs, Muslims, or Jordanians. As I have shown, the main strategy by which the Jordanian national narrative constructs origins and nation as meaningful entities is by employing binary oppositions. Those binary oppositions are cardinal in the process of delineating the boundaries of the nation in time and space, and in making distinctions between self and Other.

Three main discourses were identified in the Jordanian national narrative: the ancient-antiquity, the Islamic, and the modern-national. In all three discourses Otherness is the main strategy by which self identity is defined. In addition, Otherness is what allows the general narrative to move from one discourse to another. Otherness in and between those three main discourses, gives the sense of continuity in the evolution of the nation and it

makes the distinction between identities more visible. This strategy becomes successful when the nation is depicted as a plant which develops from seeds (origins) into maturity (contemporary Arab nations) with branches.

Another important point is that the collective identity of an Arab and its Other has taken different meaning at each of those epochs. In the tribal discourse, membership in the collective has been defined in terms of kinship. The individual's and the collective's identity were shaped in opposition to members of another tribe. In the Islamic epoch, identities were defined by a sacred text and its belief system. Islam has defined the boundaries between Us and Them. In the modern era, Jordan as a nation-state emerged out of the dialectical relationship between the larger Arab collective and the colonial powers. The particularism of the Jordanian nation-state is in contrast to Arabism and colonialism.

Jordan, as a separate entity from other Arabs, seems to emerge as a synthesis of the dialectical relations between the discourse of Arabism and the discourse of colonialism. This is how, for example, the Palestinians in Jordan are excluded by enforced assimilation, since acknowledgment of their distinctiveness blurs the boundaries between Jordanianism and Arabism. Palestinian identity then is suppressed in order to make Jordanianism have meaning in opposition to Other Arabs.

Moreover, the national discourse organizes the whole historical narrative around two main poles: triumph and defeat. Consequently, the national Arab historical narrative is seen as a series of events in which the nation is described either as powerful and victorious, or weak and is conveyed as a victim of cruel Others. Thus, power relations become the strategy by which meanings are conveyed and self identity is discussed in relation to Others. In our case, the historical changes in economic, political, cultural, and religious power are reflected in the way the collective identity of Arabs is conveyed, as powerful or weak. In other words, it shows the history of the nation as a history of triumph or defeat.

One of the consequences of change in power is changes in self identity and its Other. As the analysis has shown, pre-Islamic Arab identities were described different from the post Islamic era, likewise in modern history. Variations and change in Arab power resulted in different political, religious, geographical, and cultural boundaries of identity. The golden age of Arab civilization came with the rise of Islam. It is this period that the pan-Arab narrative wishes to revive and shape modern Arab society in its image of glory.

Moreover, the analysis of the textbooks showed that the various forms of power allow a collective to employ first, a variety of exclusion processes such as assimilation, expulsion, extermination, marginalization, or passive rejection of Others. Second, another form of power is the possibility to employ in national narrative strategies such as strategic syncretism and invention of tradition. Using the first strategy allowed the national narrative to integrate elements taken from Others and incorporate them into the self. Those elements could be material such as land or cultural elements. In the case of the Palestinians, Jordan has incorporated both human (Palestinians) and material (land) elements and claimed them to be theirs. Through this process of transformation into Jordanians, the Palestinians as people and land have become invisible and excluded.

Another point is the historical narrative seen as a collection of events in which the centers of power in the nation's history are selectively discussed. In that regard, history becomes a selection process by which some events become mythically important, while

others are either ignored or marginalized. In addition, the process of selection is governed by later developments in the nation's history, meaning that the nation's history becomes the contemporary interpretation of the past, which changes with the change of power over time.

In the case of Jordan, the rise of the Hashemite kingdom in Jordan, as described in the textbooks, makes the present and the past converge in one place with one origin, the sacred family of the prophet Muhammad in Mecca. It is clear that this is the most salient link in the "modern Arab history." It serves the local interests of Jordan rather than attempting to tell the "truth" about modern Arab history. The history of the Arabs, as it was told in the history textbooks of Jordan, is, in fact, the Jordanian version of that history. It could be similar to or very different from other Arab national narratives, but it clearly shows how history is a social construction written most influentially by those in power. Textbooks then are important ideological texts, via which more than just a sense of history is shaped.

Chapter Five
From Israelites to Israelis

INTRODUCTION

Similar to the Jordanian case, Israel's history does not start with the establishment of the state in 1948. Israeli history as it is discussed in the textbooks goes back in time and space to antiquity and beyond. In fact, in the Israeli narrative there are two dimensions, the contemporary or the synchronic and the historical or the diachronic. The discussion of both dimensions makes the Israeli identity appear continuous, deeply rooted, and well defined in terms of time and space.

The synchronic describes the contemporary Israeli identity by focusing on recent events. It delineates to the students the contemporary social, political, and geographical boundaries of the nation. It also, provides examples of who the Israelis are and what distinguishes them from Others. Here, the focus is on the contemporary Israelis and their identification with the Jewish people in the past and the diaspora. As for the regional relations of Israelis to their neighboring countries, those relations are either ignored or described in derogatory terms where the "neighbors" are discussed as brutal enemies of the nation who seek its destruction. Israel is described as an island of civilization and modernity amongst a "bared" landscape of primitivism, hostility, destruction, and backwardness. There is no reference to the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel that became Israeli citizens in 1948, neither as people, nor as a historical and national entity. The Arab-Palestinian towns are erased from geographical maps, and as people, they are made invisible.

The diachronic dimension discusses the historical evolution of the nation. It starts with the Jewish ancient history and culminates with the establishment of Israel in modern times. The textbooks organize their historical narrative into three historical blocks: antiquity, diaspora, and modern history. Modern history is presented as the age of the nation's rebirth in the "same land of the fathers." As such, it is discussed as if it naturally emerged from the ancient epoch in which the nation came into existence. By making the modern a natural continuation of the ancient past, the history of the diaspora is marginalized, as if it never took place.

This issue of how to bridge over the time gap of two thousand years of no Jewish history in Palestine becomes a central theme in the Israeli national narrative. In the textbooks, antiquity is described as the era of the Jewish birth in the God-given homeland. The diaspora is a history of symbolic death away from the natural habitat of

the nation or out of the land of the Fathers. Modern history is the era of rebirth in the "same place of the Fathers." However, to make the national narrative seem continuous, the textbooks present the modern history as if it is shaped by the same forces that molded the collective in antiquity and is presented as a natural development and continuation of that ancient epoch. By doing this, the Israeli national narrative makes time an irrelevant factor in the evolution of the nation. Time is presented as if it was static and not subject to change. According to this logic, ancient events are presented as if they took place recently, or "yesterday."

Further, the state of the nation in antiquity is described as glorious, heroic, sacred, where people, land, and their God were in perfect fit. It is depicted as the normal state of the nation compared to the abnormal or anomalous status of living in the diaspora. Thus, modern history is the age of rebirth where the aim is to restore the nation's roots, its glorious past, and recover its spirit. This process should lead to "normalization" of the nation in its Fathers' land where the ancient Covenant between the Lord, his people, and their land is reaffirmed.

For those reasons, the textbooks invest a lot of energy to recover the ancient roots of the nation. Recovery of roots is seen a natural process by which the normality and stability of the nation's identity are achieved. Thus, the modern history is not the evolution of the past. It is a return to the past in a different dress. Consequently, we find an elaborate discussion of the ancient history both in detail and volume of text.

The previously discussed ideas are manifested in the way the national narrative in the textbooks is organized. Like in the Jordanian case, here again we see that the textbooks are organized by four main poles:

1. Relationship to space;
2. Relationship to culture;
3. Relationship to history;
4. Relationship to demography.

These four poles are the main elements upon which the textbooks make their own claims. In the Jordanian case we had three poles, demography is an additional pole added to the Israeli narrative. It seems that the numbers and size of the community in each of its historical periods become part of the evidence brought in the textbooks to show continuity of life and existence in the "historical land" of Israel and outside it.

Thus, I use those four poles to organize my discussion and to present my findings. Variations in these four poles imply changes in the collective identity of the nation whether in antiquity or the modern times. For example, in antiquity the four poles converged together and that is why that period is seen as the glorious of all other epochs. In contrast, during the diaspora there was a mismatch between space, culture, people, and history. That is why that period is described as a time of loss of identity.

Another point worth mentioning at this stage is the presence of two additional processes that are employed simultaneously in the national narrative:

1. Strategic syncretism, which means integration of elements taken from Others and incorporating them to belong to self. This could be cultural, material, or human elements that are incorporated to belong to self;
2. Invention of tradition—this process seeks to legitimate changes by rewriting the past. This is evident in the process of nation building in Israel, a process that allows the

state educational system to rewrite the past and by that to link the past to the present as if both were organic units of a natural historical process. Also, the process of organization and selection of historical events is included in this process. Both points will be incorporated in my discussion, though not the focal point in it.

In the following sections, I discuss the synchronic and the diachronic dimensions of the Israeli identity. I use "contemporary" to refer to the synchronic, and "historical" to refer to the diachronic aspects of the Israeli national narrative. In the "historical" I discuss the ancient and modern history of Israel and the ways the nation's collective identity is depicted. As I mentioned before, history of the diaspora is marginalized. Thus, I spend little time on that period. In my discussion, I present changes over time in the nation's boundaries, whether in terms of space, people, culture, and its Other—the same attributes of the Jordanian chapter.

THE CONTEMPORARY NARRATIVE

The contemporary narrative seeks to define the boundaries of the present generation of Israelis and show how they are linked to the Jewish people and their ancient Biblical homeland. It attempts to answer the question: "Who am I?" in terms of who T belong to as a collective and what are my historical roots in this place?

In the textbooks, the nation is described as "young," which makes it vulnerable to external dangers. At the same time, it is depicted as strong, modern, miraculous in its achievements, and as that which stood fast against its dangerous enemies. Among those enemies the textbooks mention "nature, the Arabs," and "the diaspora." In addition, the textbooks depict Oriental Jews and Orthodox Jews of Palestine as weak, living in misery, and subject to Arab humiliation. The "new Jew" is the "pioneer" who is described as "brave, courageous, Western, progressive" and "proud of him/herself." Due to the efforts of those modern pioneers, rebirth of nation became possible in the land of the Fathers (Gara'in, 1963).

The land of the nation is described as the only natural place where the survival of the Jewish people could be secured. All other forms of Jewish life outside that Fatherland seem to be abnormal, temporary, and futureless. Not only that, but living on the land reaffirms the Biblical Covenant of unity between people, the Lord, and the land. Thus, living on the land makes both people and land flourish and grow, while abandoning the land is not only a violation of the Covenant, but puts the Jewish people and their land at risk.

In fact, as Gara'in (1963) mentions, the Jewish "absence" from their fatherland for two thousand years had resulted in the "blasphemy, pollution" and "abuse" of the nation's space. Therefore, to secure a safe rebirth of the nation in its historical fatherland, it is imperative, first to reclaim the land, second, to restore it to its original and pristine status, and third, populate it with Jews. In the textbook, it says that the land requires "cleansing" and "purification" from those natural and human "hazards" (swamps, soil erosion, and Arab presence). This mission becomes essential to the rebirth of the nation in a safe, danger-free, and healthy "habitat." Again, the textbook emphasizes that under Others' (Arabs) rule, the nation's space was "neglected," and "destroyed," and as a result needs to be restored.

These descriptions imply that the land has been abused by "foreign tenants" who had no attachment to or respect for this "sacred" land, since it is not theirs. Thus, their main mission as Israelis is to retain purity in the land by cleansing it from those tenants and the damages they inflicted on it. This is to say that the process of nation-building in the land of the Fathers requires, first and foremost, restoration. Land recovery is essential to restore unity of people with their ancient land. Here, restoration is depicted as a process of regaining "ownership" of the land whose "sons" had been "loyal" to it in the last two thousand years.

In the textbooks, space of the nation, "Eretz Yisrael" (Land of Israel), is described as part of the historical Biblical Fatherland. Its current boundaries are defined by the frontiers which separate Us from Our enemies (the Arabs). Repeatedly, Gara'in (1963) emphasizes that it is "a tiny space surrounded by those who wish to take over our land." The same tiny piece of land, at the eve of Jewish immigration to Palestine toward the end of the 19th century and the turn of the 20th, is depicted as an "empty" space, which has been "awaiting" its redemption (by the Jewish people).

In addition, Gara'in says that "we have made many sacrifices to purify it from nature's enemies such as "swamps and Arabs." For Us, he adds, it is considered a space of refuge for Jews in the diaspora. The same author argues that "we have made it become civilized, due to our use of technology, science and heroic efforts." Finally, he says that for Us, this space of the nation is a sacred place where our ancestors and where our roots are found. For that, it is "a place where our rebirth starts." A few examples will illuminate these points.

> Eretz Yisrael is an ancient land. We have read a lot about it in the Bible. Our fathers walked on the same land that is now cultivated by the cooperative settlements and the Kibbutzim. On the [same] places where ancient cities were once built there are now cities of Israel. It is so because the history of Israel does not start merely with the newcomers [immigrants], but thousands of years before (Gara'in, 1963:172).

First, there is a "link" between the past and the present. The statement links the nation's rebirth to "the same place" where the founding fathers started. By saying that, rebirth emerges as a natural continuation of the nation's ancestry. In the second part of the statement, it says that "now, cities of Israel" are built on the same "place where ancient cities were once built." This is to say that the nation's rebirth is not taking place on other people's land; on the contrary, it is "on the same places were once [our] cities were built." These national rights of land ownership, according to the textbook, cannot be denied since there are first, "physical evidence" that no human or natural power could erase, and second, the rest of the "world acknowledges our rights because they respect the Bible." Thus, it says that:

> During thousands of years, rain and sand storms came upon the land. More than once, conquerors occupied it and destroyed it. In spite of that, one can still find from those ancient days many remains—wreckage of houses, castles, tools, coins, and ornaments. From those remains it is

> possible to learn about the past of the country and the people who lived in it (ibid., 172).

The author, without providing solid evidence of Jewish presence, implies that archeological findings support their claims of ownership of the land. He adds that our knowledge of the past and about our ancestors is discovered by the use of scientific methods. Here, science is introduced as unbiased tool to support the nation's claims. On the same page the text reads:

> Anyone could look for antiques and find them, but few can uncover and tell when tools were used, or for what purposes an ornament was made. The scholars who work in this field are the archeologists. They examine every piece of evidence carefully… This is how they learn about the daily life of our fathers (ibid., 172).

Therefore, "our" roots in the land are "proven" by the use of scientific methods. Since science is "unbiased" then, knowledge about our roots is a fact that no one can deny. It is especially so, since Others have myths to support their rights to this land. In turn, where Jewish claims are based on science, Other's (Arab) claims are based on myth, which is subjective and unreliable. In addition to scientific "evidence," the Israeli narrative supplements its argument with Biblical sources as another proof to their historical claims over Palestine as the Jewish homeland. The Bible is introduced as if it was a legal document binding to Jews and non-Jews alike. The author mentions that: "…our land is the land of the fathers. Our fathers were already in our land thousands of years ago. [On the same land] they lived, worked their land, and fought their wars. Not only you [the student] learn about this in the Bible classes, [many] others over the world learn about it. The Bible is a sacred book for the people of many nations too" (ibid., 135–6).

Similar to the scientific argument, which is implied to be unbiased, objective and universal, the religious argument is presented as factual because the Bible is respected by many nations, which makes its claims universal and in turn, objective and unbiased. Thus, by combining the two arguments, the scientific and the religious, the national narrative instills in the student's mind that it's legitimate to reclaim the land of the fathers, regardless of who currently lives there. And it becomes the student's duty to actualize that national right without having any moral dilemmas.

Claims of ownership by themselves are not sufficient; there is a need to secure ownership with deeds. In the Israeli narrative, that goal is achieved through the establishment of a chain of settlements along the frontier lines with the "enemies." As it was in antiquity, the textbook emphasizes, where the Fathers worked and defended the land, at the present we need to do the same. For this reason, the textbook argues that "The best way to protect the land is by agriculture settlements. The man who works his land will not recede from it. [Because of this] a chain of settlements was built along the Egyptian borders, and they will be castles for us" (ibid., 47).

In other frontiers, agricultural settlements were founded to protect the nation's interior lands and to reclaim the father's lands. Gara'in (1963:92–3), mentions that "Dan and Dafna [settlements] were built along the northern borders [with Lebanon and Syria]…along the eastern borders [with Syria and Jordan], Kfar Sold and Shamir were

built." Later, along the Syrian borders, other settlements were built for the same purposes. It says that "After the war [1948], along the Syrian borders the Kibbutzim Own and Tel Katzir were founded. Thus, a continuous line of border-settlements stretches from Ain Kev to Sha'ar-Hagolan (ibid., 222).

By marking the frontiers of the nation's land with a continuous line of border agriculture settlements, it makes taking over the interior an easy task. Especially, when the Jewish population was a minority compared to the overwhelming majority of Palestine's Arab population during the pre-state era. Also, those settlements separate between the Jewish population and its "hostile" neighbors.

Another myth pertaining to land conveys Palestine as an "empty" space awaiting to be populated. It says, "The Jews knew that south of Gaderah there is an expansive land that should be populated by Jews" (ibid., 44). Further, on page 255 in the same textbook, the same image of "empty" land is repeated in the story of the Jewish settlements' project, which was called Homa v-Migdal (Wall and Tower). The textbook reads the following:

> Finally, the day had arrived. We waited anxiously for dawn. Then, we left with loaded donkeys, our hearts were beating like drums, but we marched with courage and virility toward the wilderness. [There were] thistles and prickles all around, a large swamp, in it and around it, wild plants of different kinds… Across from us the grey and unpopulated mountains of the Kilboa.' In spite of the frightening silence of the wilderness we did not back down and we continued to march… We worked intensively. Since we knew that by evening we had to finish building the wall, the tower, and the four huts… By evening the first [light] projector was turned on in the Beit-Shan valley. [The light projector] shined with confidence and power over the surrounding neglected wilderness.

Again, the land is described as empty, wild and full of swamps. To valorize the "emptiness" of the land, and by that erase Palestinian presence, the textbook discusses the difficulties that the "pioneers" faced at the beginning of their settlement in the country.

> In particular they were not lucky in agriculture. They were worried since they and those who were expected to follow them later, were supposed to make their living from working the land. What was the reason for that? They lacked the tools and the professional agricultural knowledge… The Baron [de Rothschild] arrived in the country; he visited the places that the settlers held. He understood that they had a strong will to succeed in their new settlements… He sent agriculture experts to teach the settlers… and he sent seeds, cows, goats, and agriculture tools (ibid., 41–2).

Thus, the "emptiness" of the country is "evident" in the argument where the settlers had no one to learn from about agriculture. For that reason, the Baron "sent experts" from abroad to teach them the basic knowledge of working the land. Also, it says that tools were in shortage, and the settlers had no place to buy them. Finally, in this "wilderness and empty spaces" even "seeds" and domestic "animals" were in shortage and they had to be purchased abroad.

Based on these descriptions of "emptiness" and "wilderness," it seems logical that the land "should be populated with Jews," whose main task should be to husband the land and make it habitable. The Israeli narrative portrays the Jewish settlers as heroic pioneers who paid heavy sacrifices in "taming" and "cleaning" the land from those natural "diseases." Thus, we read that:

> A'meq Hefer is between Haderah and Netanya. Its lands were once known for their swamps. Menahim Usishkin…succeeded in purchasing those lands of the valley. It might be true that they were sold because no one believed those lands could ever get rid of the swamps. In many parts of the valley Eucalyptus bushes are still seen. Those bushes were planted by the pioneers who dried the marshes. Many of them paid with their life for that (ibid., 115).

The last quotation raises several points. One, the argument that "We" have purchased a degraded land that no one ever believed could be turned into livable or arable land. At this stage, the textbook does not say from whom that swamp land was purchased. Because if the land was empty, then why there was a need to purchase this degraded area? However, the second important point is the emphasis on the human sacrifices the settlers pay for transforming the swamps. Thus, by "our courage and heroism" they succeeded to transform the land itself to their advantage. This point is discussed in the textbook, when it argues that:

> The pioneers who arrived at the Holla Valley were attracted to the place by the abundance of water in it. The settlers of Ysod Hama'leh saw Bedouins living in the same valley, under harsh conditions, making their living from papyrus baskets, living in flimsy huts and serving as prey to mosquitoes. In spite of the harsh conditions of the Bedouins, the people of Ysod Hama'leh believed that their energy and enthusiasm would help them against all the place's hardships. The first years were harsher than the people of Ysod Hama'leh had thought. Malaria caused them many casualties (ibid., 191).

In this process of transforming the land and make it habitable, the Israeli narrative emphasizes the collective efforts of the nation including its soldiers, scientists, engineers, and those pioneers. On page 198, in the same textbook, we read: "In draining [the marshes] many people worked: engineers, landscapers, diggers…and soldiers. Soldiers protected the worker." After those collaborated efforts, the textbook stresses that: "Finally, the day has come when there was no sea, only draining tunnels were left. It was a day of victory. Thus, man defeated nature."

Unlike the description of the Bedouin Arabs who lived in "mean huts" and were "prey to mosquitoes" the pioneers had over come nature's hardships. They did not give up against its destructive forces, and finally, they succeeded. By using their "advanced" knowledge, science and technology, courage, and creativity they succeeded in turning the swamps into "paradise-like land."

This image of the settler's determination, virility, and use of technology is central in the Israeli myth of the pioneers who are portrayed as those who transformed the land into a "blooming desert." The pioneers are depicted as "super heroes" who not only succeeded in dominating nature and the wilderness of the land but also transformed it into a civilized, advanced, beautiful space. In this process of glorification of the Jewish mission in Palestine, the Arabs are depicted as submissive and docile against nature's forces, while the Jewish people are portrayed as possessing a strong will and were able to transform the land from a wilderness into a civilized place. Viewed from this perspective, the Israeli colonization of Palestine is presented as a "civilizing mission" of a backward country.

The myth of the pioneer who was able to transform the wilderness is repeated in the story of the founding of Tel-Aviv.

> The beginning of Tel-Aviv was in Jaffa. Thousands of Jews lived in the Arab town. One day a number of Jews came to the conclusion, "We won't live any more in the narrow allies of Jaffa. We will build for us a new neighborhood, with beautiful houses with gardens around." Those who wanted organized an association named "Ahozat Beit." The association members turned to "Keren Kayemet," and it purchased for them lands north of Jaffa. There they built their neighborhood. The land was like a sea of sand… During the day it was a paradise for camels and at night, for jackals (ibid., 80).

Here the emphasis is on transforming the landscape from wilderness of a "sea of sand" in which camels and jackals thrived into a modern city with modern institutions, such as schools, theaters, factories, transportation, etc.(ibid., 87). Also, moving out of the "crowded" Arab city with its "narrow" streets into "new houses with gardens around" is another way of portraying the Jewish community as an extension of modernity amongst a backward Arab environment.

Of special importance in the quotation is the idea that the Jewish rebirth and progress cannot be achieved by living side by side with the Arabs. There was a need to disassociate the Jewish community from its Arab environment to achieve this sort of modernity, progress, and better quality of life. In other words, only through segregation and disassociation from Arabs, their cities, and their lifestyle could a Jewish community flourish and achieve self fulfillment. The Arabs, like the wilderness, are portrayed as obstacles Jews needed to overcome.

The irony is that this process of self-seclusion later depicts Israel as a small island in a hostile region where the nation is portrayed as living under siege. Gara'in (1963:110–111), says that:

> Citizens of other countries can travel out of their countries' borders by land, sea, or air. Have you ever thought that the citizens of Israel cannot travel abroad neither by train nor by car? Why? Look around our country's borders and see who our neighbors are. Will they let an Israeli train pass through their territory?… Our connection with other countries is either by sea or air. We have many friends in the world. The airplane takes

> us to friendly countries fast and easy. It brings us closer to our friends…. Airplanes played an important role in bringing newcomers (p.110–1).

Previously, the Israeli narrative disassociated itself from the "abused" land, and the backward Arabs. Both, land and Arabs had to be overcome to achieve a thriving Jewish community in Palestine, which is conveyed as a necessary precondition for Jewish national redemption and its normalization. Now, the same narrative seeks Arab approval and their acknowledgment of the Zionist project. Since the Jewish community is alienated from its surrounding neighbors, it seeks to strengthen its ties with other nations, which elsewhere in the textbooks are described as more hostile to Jews than Arabs. Thus, the abnormal contemporary situation of living under siege is normalized by turning to the same diaspora culture and societies to normalize Jewish life in Palestine. Those contradictions in the Israeli narrative transmit to students a sense of alienation from the immediate neighboring countries and to some extent alienation from those remote ones as well.

Despite these gloomy conclusions, the Israeli narrative praises the Zionist project in Palestine and describes it as a miraculous project able to restore the Jewish glory in the land of the Fathers. Above all, the Israeli narrative emphasizes the spiritual transformation of the Jewish identity essential to making material achievements meaningful. It presents the pioneer as a "new Jew" who is detached from the religious submissive Jew of pre-state Palestine, and different from the humiliated Jew of the diaspora. The "pioneer" is portrayed as one who was/is able to "transform" nature and dominate it; a person who rejects his/her fate as a people of nowhere. He/she is a modernized person, civilized and scientifically advanced. In addition to that, pioneers as Zionists were "ready to make sacrifices," they "loved," and are "attached" to their country. The textbook emphasizes the role that was played by those pioneers in transforming the Jewish life in modern history. Pioneers were those who came first to Palestine to set the ground for other Jews to follow. For example, we read that:

> The first settlers…came from abroad. They wanted to be role models for the Jews of Hebron and Jerusalem. In particular they wanted to be pioneers to a larger camp of newcomers that will follow from the diaspora. The pioneers of that period were partially organized abroad in "HuvivyTzion" and in "BILU" organization. "BILU" was made their slogan which is taken from the initials of [the prophet's] words "Bet Ya'kov L'chu v'naylcha" [House of Jacob, come let us go up] (ibid., 40–1).

Thus, pioneers as "super heroes" were role models to be followed. Unlike the religious Jews of Hebron and Jerusalem who were mostly engaged in worshiping God, the pioneers are (secular) nationalists. A pioneer is a nationalist "who makes sacrifices to defend his land, a person that can endure many hardships." Due to those pioneers' efforts and sacrifices, the Zionist projects were a success. Evidence to this "collective miraculous" achievement is described in the textbook:

> What attracts tourists to visit our state?… The name of Israel, the young state, has enchanted the hearts of many tourists. Israel is a young state that is in a process of growing stronger and stronger. It is a small state that knew [how] to stand against many enemies. It is a state on the edge of the desert, and it is successful in agriculture. The press, the radio, and the television in the world's countries tell much about Israel (ibid., 133–4).

The achievements of the Jewish people are conceived as "miracles" that Jews of the diaspora and non-Jews alike come to see. It is argued that despite the fact that it is a "state on the edge of the desert," still it is successful in agriculture. What was impossible has been made possible in "our state" (the same idea is discussed also on p.276). The Jews are described as those "who build" while "Others, neglect, and destroy the space." The new Jew is a person who is ready to defend the country against its Arab enemies. The perception is of "a few" against the "many" Arabs (also discussed on p.47). With "courage, braveness and technology we are able to protect our tiny land." "Our success" is not "our" subjective view of things, rather it is "universally known" as it is "evident" in the reports of all the means of information abroad. This is how the "miracle" is valorized and becomes part of the myth of the nation, which in turn shapes the nation's self conception.

These achievements and self glorification of the Israeli narrative turn Israel into the center of Jewish life, both as a place of refugee and as a spiritual center. Israel extends its national collective boundaries to embrace all Jews worldwide. As a result, the Israeli-Jewish identity is no longer bound by geographical boundaries; rather, it becomes a universal identity beyond national boundaries. Likewise, for the diaspora Jews, the Israeli narrative treats them as a potential demographic reservoir to insure Israel's growth and survival.

Finally, in the Israeli contemporary narrative, the nation is conceived as an organic and well-organized entity that operates harmoniously. These descriptions ignore internal cleavages and ethnic diversity within the Jewish community in Israel. The impression is that the nation is made of European Jewish immigrants and not of Jews from Arab or African countries. There is only one reference in the textbook to non-Western Jews which is the case of the Yemeni immigrants. Except that one reference, the Israeli narrative makes it appear that all Jews in Israel are Westerners. Also, its emphasis on presenting Israel as an extension of Western culture leads to the marginalization and exclusion of the various non-Western Jewish ethnic groups.

THE *OTHER* IN THE CONTEMPORARY ISRAELI NARRATIVE

My separate discussion of the Other is for analytical purposes only. In the textbooks, the discussion of Jewish and non-Jewish collectives is intertwined. Thus, separating the discussion of Others from the rest has allowed me to focus on the process of exclusion and the complex ways by which the Israeli narrative portrays those various collectives as Other. As I have mentioned at the outset of the previous section, in the Israeli narrative the Other is portrayed as part of a series of "obstacles" and "dangers" that the Jewish settlers had to overcome during the early stages of the colonization of Palestine.

In Gara'in (1963), who discusses the contemporary Israeli identity, reference to Others is rare and when there is such a reference, it is very brief. From all the Others, the Arabs are discussed most often. This does not mean that the Arabs as a collective category occupy most of the texts. On the contrary, they are mentioned no more than 6 times in a 285 pages of the Gara'in textbook. The majority of texts in this textbook focus on the story of the evolution and rebirth of the Jewish nation and its heroic sacrifices.

British and Turks (the Ottomans), are mentioned in the textbook briefly. For example, the Turks are described as those "who ruled the country." As such they had put "restrictions on the development of the Jewish colonies in Palestine" (Gara'in, 1963:39). Similarly, the British who colonized Palestine between 1917 and 1948 are described as those who attempted to:

> close the country's gates for Jewish immigration. The diaspora Jews did not give up. They came [migrated to Palestine] in crumbled boats. They came, although they knew what kind of fate is waiting for them on the shores of our country. When they were captured by the English, all ended up in the Detention Camp in Atlit (ibid., 114).

Thus, the British colonizers are conceived as those who attempted to "kill" the Zionist project in Palestine. What is puzzling in these derogatory descriptions of colonial Britain, is the fact that without the British colonial force, the Jewish ability to establish a state in Palestine would be null. Was it not Britain that issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917 granting Palestine to the Jewish people as their national home?! However, the same textbook on page 248 argues that: "During the British rule, establishing a new settlement was tangled with many difficulties." Similar argument against the British and their "negative" role in undermining the Zionist project in Palestine is stated on page 44.

A different form of Othering was used in the case of Arabs. Reference to Arabs is made in nine occasions in the textbook. Six of those references are made to Arabs inside the "nation's domains," and in the other three, the textbook refers to Arab countries. What is interesting is the fact that the textbook does not differentiate between Arabs inside and outside of Palestine. All are described as enemies. In the rest of the textbook, where Arabs were or still live, they are made "invisible." Arab towns and cities in Israel and during the Mandate era are not mentioned. This invisibility of the Arab-Palestinian in Israel coincides with previous images of Palestine as an "empty" space. As the reader recalls, Palestine was described as a "wilderness" awaiting the Jewish restoration of its landscapes and to populate it. Thus, Arab presence in Palestine is erased through the portrayal of the country as an "emptiness," which in turn makes the idea of Arab invisibility emerge naturally.

Arabs are not only invisible in the modern times. They are also made invisible in the history of Palestine. In the contemporary narrative, where it seeks to make the link between the present generation of Jews and their ancestors, Arab and non-Arab histories in Palestine are ignored and erased. With that, the link between the present and past becomes continuous and uninterrupted by histories of other nations in Palestine. Consequently, this form of exclusion leaves the Jewish history in Palestine as the only visible one worth of being noticed and researched (see Gara'in, 1963, 142, 219–220).

This form of Othering makes the negation stronger between invisible and visible, and between people of no history with people of a long history.

Other descriptions of Arabs emphasize their "aggressive nature," and their "desire to kill, occupy, stop our development, and take over our country." The textbook contrasts the two conflicting sides of Us and Them:

> Three settlements were built… The three are in the Negev and they are close to the Egyptian border. The Jews feared that the day of confrontation with the Arab states was soon to come… Those fears came true with the beginning of the war of independence. The Egyptians advanced through the area. They were the strongest among the Arab countries. Their army was large, well equipped with tanks, and many cannons. In addition to that, the Hebrew settlements were not many… In the fierce battles against the enemy, the people of Negba, Kfar Darum, Yad Murdachy, Netzanim and others excelled. Finally, our army got stronger, our airplanes started bombing the enemy, our war ships guarded the costs to prevent Egyptian supplies. The enemy started to retreat, leaving behind thousands of captivities (ibid., 46–7).

The quotation illustrates the striking negating images of Us and Them. First, "we build," *they* come to "destroy." Further, we "build for defense" against *their* "destructive aggression." Second, they are "many, well equipped, the strongest among the Arab countries." In contrast to that, "we" is described as those who "had a few settlements for defense." "Our" people made heroic efforts, they turned from defense to attack, and finally, were able to win the war and capture many enemy prisoners.

These descriptions, which are often repeated in the Israeli narrative, come to valorize the Jewish success and by that glorify the nation. It starts with stressing the disparity in numbers between the Jewish fighters and the Arab fighters. Next, it exaggerates the enemy's threat to the existence of the Jewish community by stressing that the Egyptian army was the strongest among Arab countries. Then, it turns to elevating the Jewish fighters to the level of super-humans who won the battle against their enemies. And finally, concluding with diminishing the enemy by stressing the "thousands" they left behind on the battle field. This valorization and glorification resembles the myth of David against Goliath, which is so often mentioned in the Israeli narrative.

Arabs as a "destructive force" are not limited to the battle field and against Jewish settlements. They are often mentioned as a "self-destructive" collective. For example, destruction of Arab cities as a result of Jewish attacks is reversed and attributed to the Arab nature or ill-character. It says that:

> Lydia and Ramlah before the war of independence were large Arab cities. Majdal was an important Arab city as well. There were fierce battles in those cities during the war of independence [1948]. When Tzahal [Israeli Defense Forces] occupied Lydia, Ramlah and Majdal, they found them destroyed… By the end of the war, [there was] an influx of new settlers in those three cities. The destroyed houses were renovated, new houses were

> built, gardens were planted, and new roads were paved. Today, those cities are blossoming and progressing (ibid., 49).

While the textbook does acknowledge the presence of Arabs before the war of "independence," Arab cities are found "destroyed." It is not clear what caused their destruction, or who "attacked" them—the Israeli forces, or some other party? What the text implies, is that those large and important Arab cities "were found destroyed." It leads the reader to the conclusion that it was the Arabs themselves who brought about the destruction of their own cities. After making that implication, promoting the Jewish image as constructive emerges naturally by adding that "when we moved into them …the destroyed houses were renovated, new houses were built [with] gardens and new roads." Thus, progress and new life became possible despite the implied images of the destructive Arabs (see Gara'in, 1963:134).

In addition, occupation of Arab cities, like the occupation of the "abused" and "neglected" land discussed before, due to the "miraculous" Jewish efforts, is depicted as a process of gentrification. As mentioned, in Arab hands, destruction was the fate of Arab cities. In contrast, with the Jewish occupation a new life emerges in those cities, with new buildings, gar-dens, and roads; all are symbols of progress and modernity. Thus, taking over Arab property and land is legitimized under the claim that due to Jewish efforts those cities, like the land itself, have been gentrified and saved from destruction. Occupation as a violent act is legitimized because it is done for a noble cause of bringing a new life to a place previously destroyed.

To perpetuate those negating images of Arabs and Jews, in Gara'in (1963), we find similar descriptions of Jaffa and its Arab population. On page 80, the author describes Jaffa as "crowded" with "narrow roads," which make its Jewish population leave and build a new city, Tel-Aviv, with its modern institutions, houses, roads, and gardens. However, to set the stage for later Israeli actions against Arabs, the textbook says of the Arabs of Jaffa that:

> When the conflicts between Jews and Arabs broke [in the 1920s], the Arabs wanted to destroy the Jewish Yishuv [colonies]. The Arabs [of Jaffa] thought that if they held the sea ports, the Jews would not be able to get their supplies and food from abroad. Thus, the Jews would surrender to the Arabs. Also, [Arabs harassed Jews and often threw] stones on Jewish trucks, and even [shot] bullets (ibid., 82–3).

Later, during the 1948 war, Jaffa like Lydia, is found "destroyed" and then renovated and populated by Jews. It reads that:

> During the war of independence Jaffa's residents harassed their Jewish neighbors in Tel-Aviv. But this time the Jews had the upper hand. By the end of the war the majority of the residents of Arab Jaffa fled and abandoned the destroyed city. Many Jews and new immigrants from Tel-Aviv moved to live in it. Since then, the ruins of Jaffa were renovated. Many new houses were built. And one more thing, Jaffa is no longer a separate city; both [cities] make up one city, Tel-Aviv—Jaffa (ibid., 83).

As discussed previously, the responsibility for destruction is blamed on the Arabs themselves. In contrast to the Arab self destruction of their city, the text argues, "since then, [since Jews have moved into the city], the ruins of Jaffa were renovated." Not only that, the occupation of Jaffa and taking over the Arabs' property is legitimized, first by saying that "they fled" and "abandoned" the city, and second, by stressing that we built and renovated the ruins, thus giving new life to many immigrants and people from Tel-Aviv to move in. The same pattern of contrasting negating images of Us and Them is repeated time and again: they destroy, we build. They flew the ruins, we move in to fix and regenerate life.

While in the previous cases, Arab presence was acknowledged, in Haifa, Tiberias, and Beit Shan cities, Arab presence is erased and they are turned into an invisible collective. In the case of Haifa, Arab invisibility is striking since until the war of 1948, the majority of Haifa's population was Arabs. After the war, Arabs continued to live in the city, and today they make up about 20% of the city's population. Again, Arab presence in that city has never been mentioned. Also, in Tiberias and Beit Shan, which were thriving Arab cities before the 1948 war, there is no reference to their Arab population, their history, and culture. In particular, in the case of Tiberias, the text discusses the history of Jews in the city since the Roman era, and in Beit Shan, Jewish history since the Bible is discussed. By erasing the Arab history and presence, this narrative valorizes the Jewish presence and makes it appear actual, real, and continuous.

From the discussion of these cases a systematic pattern emerges. First, the textbooks portray the Arabs as inferior and primitive (when there is reference to them). Second, they magnify the Arab threat to the Jewish project in Palestine, which provides the pretext for attacking them and ending their threat. Third, Arabs fled, and Jews moved in to resettle their towns and cities while emphasizing the Jewish efforts to rebuild "their ruins." By advancing these arguments, not only the occupation of Arab cities is legitimated, but, more importantly, the expulsion of Palestinians as well. In fact, this narrative reverses the parties' roles in the conflict; instead of making Zionism the victimizer of Palestinians, it blames the victims—the Palestinians—for their behavior of self-victimization.

In Gara'in textbooks, like in many others, Arabs are described as those who fled these cities and abandoned them. In other cases, when Arabs did not "flee," they were "extracted" to end their threat to Jewish life. The Arab threat, in the case of Acre, is conveyed as an existential threat to Jewish settlements in Galilee. It says that:

> During the war of independence the city was in the enemy's hands. The enemy had control over the road that crosses the city and connects [the city] to the north [parts of the country]. The northern settlements were cut from the city of Haifa…. After the enemy was driven out, the connection with the northern settlements was renewed, and Acre became an Israeli city (Gara'in, 1963:147).

Thus, expelling the enemy is legitimated because of their deliberate intention to destroy the Jewish project and destroy its settlements. This leads to the "logical" conclusion that getting rid of the enemy was justified, since the enemy was attempting to "kill" the Jewish settlements. Again, in the case of Acre, Arabs are treated the same way as the

swamps that were also risky and dangerous to the Jewish settlements. By draining the swamps, the land was "cleaned" and even turned into an arable land. A similar process of cleansing was "necessary" in the case of the Arab city of Acre. After driving out the "enemy" from Acre, the northern settlements and Haifa were connected again. Acre itself was transformed into an Israeli Jewish city.

To conclude, the contemporary Israeli national discourse discusses the process of Jewish identity formation in Palestine and the threats it faced. It is described as a process of recovery and union of people and land in their ancient fatherland. The union is aimed at normalizing Jewish life in Palestine, which is depicted as an essential process for restoring the past glory of the nation. It starts with "a well-prepared group of pioneers," in Europe who went to Palestine to "recover, recapture," and "clean a tiny space" in the large homeland from the hazards of humanity and nature, and ends up with gathering of a large collective in an extensive space. In between these two time points, the nation's self identity seems to be in a process of becoming. The process of becoming is dependent on two factors, the ability to capture additional spaces, and the ability to bring in more Jewish immigrants.

Land recovery did not advance without conflicts with the Palestinians. The conflicts contributed to the formation of a Jewish identity through the process of erasing Palestinian presence, their inferiorization when mentioned, rejecting and resisting them when they opposed the Zionists colonization, and finally, expelling them to make the rebirth of the Jewish nation possible.

Rejection and exclusion were not limited to the Palestinians. The Israeli narrative rejects the diaspora culture and Jewish life outside their "ancient homeland." Thus, massive Jewish migration from Europe and elsewhere into Palestine became imperative for the formation of a national entity in Palestine. That new entity was developed by rejecting the traditional Jewish religious identity in Palestine, in negation to Arabs and in negation to the diaspora culture.

Therefore, the Israeli national identity developed dialectically in the process of exclusions and rejections of Others. Those Others could be from within or without. The consequences of exclusion and Othering have resulted in conflicts. During these conflicts, the nation evolved and transformed from a "weak" and "small" collective into a "powerful, advanced, modern" and "independent" one. In other words, Othering, conflicts, and identity formation are interrelated, and they are evolving by the power relations between self and Other. Consequently, Other and self are both kept in a process of becoming, since those power relations are dynamic and not fixed. I turn now to discuss the ancient history of Israel and the dynamic of self identity and Other during antiquity.

THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

The Israeli historical narrative is the diachronic dimension of identity. This narrative discusses the historical evolution of the nation from its origins to the present. It is divided into three historical blocks: the ancient, the middle ages, and the modern history. The ancient era focuses on two things—the origins of the nation, and the birth of the nation, including its golden past. The middle ages incorporates the period of dispersion and diaspora, loss of geographical, political, and unified cultural identity in the lands of the

fathers. Modern history is the history of rebirth and redemption of the nation in its historical homeland.

In the textbooks, the middle period is symbolized as the period of "death," where the nation was scattered around the world out of its "homeland." Thus, in the Israeli narrative, this period is ignored and often depicted as the time when Jews were persecuted, and suffered humiliation and oppression. In contrast, modern history symbolizes rebirth, heroism, and recovery of the nation's golden age. The Israeli narrative valorizes the relation between antiquity and modern history as if diaspora never happened. Modern history, and rebirth of the nation are portrayed as continuous events in the historical record, and thus, in the nation's evolution. As a result of this, I mostly focus on the ancient and modern history and discuss the various ways by which the Jewish collective identity is discussed.

THE ANCIENT HISTORY

Several themes dominate the discussion of ancient history. First are the myth of origins and the idea of the "chosen people" that are manifested in the Covenant. Second is the discussion of the Jewish golden age in Canaan (Palestine), and third, the attempt to construct a continuous historical Jewish presence in Canaan over an extended period of time. These themes are the central pillars upon which the Israelis base their political claims over Palestine in modern history.

The ancient history is discussed in two textbooks, one for the fifth grade and the second for the tenth. All information in the textbooks was mostly based on the Bible and partially on Flavius Josephus' book *Antiquity of the Jews* (A.D. 37). Using the Bible as the source of knowledge of antiquity eliminates scholarly debates and shifts the discussion from academic research to the realm of faith and myth, which makes it hard for others to challenge and question. I start with the myth of origins.

ORIGINS AND NATION

Understanding the myth of origins requires understanding the nation and what is meant by self identity. In the textbook, the Jewish nation is described as an organic entity. The nation is a grand solidarity related by blood ties to a founding father, Abraham. It came into existence from sacred ancestors, advanced to "childhood," and then to "maturity." Each of those stages is described in the textbook as taking place under harsh conditions and conflicts with Other entities. In the textbook, it says that:

> You [the student] will learn…that your people marched a long way…fought many fierce wars for their survival. Also they had a "childhood," a "beginning" stage in which they walked their first steps until [they] reached a stage of being a nation who gave the world a strong belief [system] with superior and deeply rooted moral values (Ahiyah & Herpaz, 1957:7).

Thus, the nation emerged out of conflicts and survived the hardships of time. Conflicts did not weaken the nation. On the contrary, conflicts helped the nation gain physical, moral strength and superiority over other nations. Its superior values have become universal and laid the foundation for human civilization. This sense of self glorification comes to delineate the nation's distinctiveness in history compared to other nations and enhances the sense of solidarity among its members. By doing so, it makes the contemporary generation an integral unit in a historic chain marked by glorious distinctiveness from origins to present.

To link the present with the past and make it appear as a continuation of the past, the textbooks discuss the origins of the nation and its historical evolution through time. The origins of the Jewish people go back to a religious deity or a founding father, Abraham. Abraham is considered the Father of both the Jews and the Arabs. He was born in the rich city of Iraq, Ur-Kasdim in 1900 B.C. He is described as the Father of the nation, born among heathens and pagans.

Abraham was chosen by the Lord to bring salvation to his community, which would be a "role model" for humanity. Following the Lord's command, he left his place of birth and traveled to a remote country to establish his new religion. The text says, "In his [Lord's] command he [Abraham] left his country and homeland and migrated to a remote country" (ibid., 8–9). Abraham reached Canaan, which later became the "promised land."

In the textbooks, the Lord chose Abraham to found a community of his blood to be "light to the gentiles." He was chosen for his "superior" qualities and high morals. Since the Jewish people believe themselves to be the offspring of Abraham's dynasty, in antiquity as well as today, the nation as a community of blood ties is chosen too. Then the sense of being "chosen" and the privileges that come with that are no longer limited to Abraham, but a quality and a property of the community as a whole. Those privileges will be in effect as long as the community fulfills the Lord's commands and meet His expectations. Deviation from the "right path" of the Lord leads to punishment and severe sanctions.

The second issue is the search for a sacred land to suit the chosen people. Abraham was led by the Lord to Canaan, where the Lord showed him the Promised Land. Locating the right space for the chosen people builds a triad relationship between the Lord, his chosen people, and their chosen land. From now on, there is a binding Covenant between Abraham and the Lord who granted him the Promised Land for him and his future offspring.

Thus, the divine mediates between the people and their sacred land. On the one hand, the people acceptance of the Lord's commands allows the relations to exist. On the other hand, deviation of the people from the Lord's laws results in "punishment" of the people, in which one of its consequences is the separation of people from their sacred space. Further, the triad relation endows each of the three participants with a sense of holiness. For example, the nation is sacred; as such it is superior to Others, which explains its being "chosen" by the Lord. Likewise, the land is sacred, and this is why it was chosen. However, the sacredness and superiority exist as long as all the three forms of relation in the triad stay at work.

From another perspective, this myth of origin could be looked at as a manifestation of the community's status in the region, its social organization, and its kinship ties. First, in the myth of origin, it says that Abraham was born in Ur and the Lord chose him to be His

aide to bring salvation to humanity. If this was the case, then why would the Lord order Abraham to leave his community? Was not that community at his place of birth part of humanity? With the Lord's power, Abraham could have had the ability to transform his community of birth. Instead, it says that the Lord commanded him to leave and take his family members with him to a place that He shall show him.

Thus, in this myth the weakness of Abraham and his lack of ability to make a change in his community of birth is transformed into strength by making him chosen to save himself and his offspring elsewhere, away from Mesopotamia, which was the center of power at the time. Here, the Lord's intervention empowered Abraham and made his weakness at his place of birth into a strength elsewhere. This is a process of redemption of Abraham's tribe. In addition, the lack of fitness between Abraham and his community of birth is transmuted into a search for a *better* land to suit his chosen community. By that, the weakness of Abraham is turned into glorification that elevates him from a regular person into one who was chosen by the Lord and rewarded by Him with a "promised land" for his chosen people.

Those kin relations between a community, a deity (the Lord), and their land, makes the nation, like a plant, thrive only in its "natural" habitat. In the myth of origin, then, what is implied is that the "normal" condition is to match habitat and plant, people with land. In turn, there was a need for Abraham to migrate to another land to plant the seeds of his chosen people in the right habitat, and thus, give them life and glory. Elsewhere Abraham's calling could not materialize. As long as that match is observed, the conditions of the Covenant ensure the Lord's support of His chosen people in their "promised land."

What is interesting in the myth of origin is that, in contrast to Islam and Christianity, where the new faith attempted to become hegemonic over existing discourses in their place of birth, Judaism had to migrate and was displaced into another land. This kind of exclusiveness between people, the Lord, and land is in contrast to the nature of calling in other religions. For example, Islam and Christianity address humanity at large and are not particularly limited to a community or a tribe. In contrast to that, Judaism came to save a particular community or a tribe. It plays a limited function for that specific community first and for most. In turn, its separation from its own surroundings became a necessary condition for its own salvation and redemption. Here, self seclusion seems to be necessary for a community of blood ties to develop. Needless to say, that self exclusion is developing out of rejection of Others who are no longer an integral part of the Lord's plan, neither should be included in the process of salvation. In the textbooks, this process of shaping and molding the community as a chosen people and bring them to their safe heaven developed over a period of 800 years.

Other discussions in the textbooks provide additional support to the notion that Abraham's faith and his new religion was more tribal than universal and more an affirmation of the tribe's relations than being a general movement toward human salvation. For example, the textbooks mention how Abraham rejected intermarriage with "people of the land" to maintain the tribal kinship boundaries of his community. Endogamy was preferred by Abraham when he thought of a spouse for his son. In Ahiyah and Herpaz (1957:9), it discusses Abraham's dilemma saying that:

> [Abraham] traveled across the country and in his heart he carried the Lord's command… He saw the many people who lived in the land, and observed their customs and culture. Due to his deep understanding of his superior belief and aspirations over theirs, he commanded his servant Eliazer, that at a time when his son would reach the age of marriage: "Do not take a wife for my son from the Canaanites… Go to my country and my homeland, from there take a wife for my son Yitzhak.

If it was true that Abraham's rejection of the Canaanites was due to his superior belief system and values, then why did he ask his servant to look for a woman for his son from his homeland? This issue is especially interesting since earlier, Abraham was asked to leave his homeland due to their illsuitedness. What seems to be more convincing is that Abraham's tribal loyalty was more binding than his faith, and his sense of superiority was based on his superior genealogy and kin ties than faith. Faith, in this instance, added another facet to the tribe's blood ties superiority and strengthened their internal cohesiveness.

Those attempts to maintain tribal or dynastic boundaries and cohesiveness through endogamy and communal religion were behind Abraham's continuous alienation first, from his homeland community, and second, from the Canaanites in the "promised land." Alienation and rejection of Others was based on the idea of self superiority and the inferiority of Others. Those dichotomous relations made Abraham's tribe more prone to conflicts with other communities. At the same time, those conflicts strengthened the tribe's identity and its self conception as a distinctive collective. When conflicts intensified it was no longer possible for Abraham to keep his tribe intact and the previously superior community had to split. For example, Abraham's inability to grab a piece of land and establish a community in Canaan, because of the frequent conflicts over water resources, made him abandon that place, uproot his tribe, and continue his journey. It says that:

> To avoid such conflicts, Abraham and his nephew Lot, who had migrated with him from Mesopotamia, separated: One stayed in Canaan and the other migrated east. This split continued during the age of Yitzhak and Yaacob. Ishmael, the brother [of Yitzhak] and his son Esu [the son of Yitzhak], one went toward the desert (the sons of Ishmael), and the second went to the land of Edom. But the sons of Yitzhak and Yaacob who stayed in Canaan continued in what their first father had started. They recognized the creator of the world; by that they were superior in their pure morals over the people of Canaan (ibid., 10).

This development was a turning point in the history of Abraham's tribe. First, this development came at a time when Abraham failed to keep his community integrated in one place. This was due to the fact that Canaan (the "promised land"), was populated by many more powerful nations.

Abraham's tribe lacked the power to fight the people of Canaan and could not take over their property. Yitzhak had to settle in the remote areas of the south (the margins of the land), on the edge of the Negev desert, away from the reach of the more powerful

Canaanites, in a less disputed and desirable land. This is more an indication of weakness than of strength. Later, this same tribe will be forced, like many others in its vicinity, to seek better opportunities in Egypt.

Second, the division of Abraham's family into two separate communities led also to religious divisions that could be understood as indications of social structure and kinship relations. Some of Abraham's sons continued their Father's tradition, while Others like Ishmael, did not. It is not clear why some continued and others not. But, from other sources, and elsewhere in the textbooks, Ishamel is described as the son of an Egyptian maid, which places him at a lower status compared to other family members like Yitzhak. It also reduces his rights within the family, which explains why he had to leave and settle elsewhere away from his family. For the same reasons, following tribal traditions, Ishmael was denied the right to continue what his father started, recognition of the unitary nature of the Lord. This right was granted to Yitzhak, the other son of Abraham, who had more privileges within his family than Ishmael. Again, Abraham's religion, and his "superior" faith is more an affirmation of the social structure of his tribe and the kin relations than anything else.

However, the myth of origin continues through Yitzhak and his decedents, who later migrated to Egypt. By taking that path, the notion of being chosen is maintained with this branch of Abraham's tribe. As I have mentioned earlier, being chosen is no longer a quality of one person. Rather, any member of Yitzhak's decendants is described as having the qualities of being "chosen," since the nation is a grand solidarity of blood ties. Thus, later generations, like their original father's, all are described as being bestowed with the same qualities of chosenness.

This is why Moses—as the new Father of the nation—emerges in Egypt as the nation's savior who will "lead his people to the promised land." In the textbook, we read that: "The annunciation of redemption was brought to them by Moses, who had fought for the liberation of his people, took them out of the land of slavery, and led them in the desert to the promised land" (ibid., 14).

Moses, like Abraham, is described as one who was motivated by his "loyalty to his people," the "biological ties between him and them," and finally, doing the Lord's will. As a leader, Moses is depicted as one who rejected power, wealth, and status under the Pharaohs' rule. He took upon himself the mission of the redemption of his people, the responsibility of their social transformation from slaves into a free people, from living in an alien country to living in the promised land, and from a misfortunate reality in the present, to a promising future.

What made Moses' mission relatively achievable, as the textbooks argue, is the deeply rooted notion of the "people" being one collective linked by blood ties. In other words, despite the fact that about 800 years separated Moses and the founding father of his nation, and despite living in slavery, prone to intermarriages and fusion processes, the "nation" succeeded in keeping its ethnic boundaries and purity as a collective. These statements do not explain how that collective multiplied, and how it was possible for them to maintain their collective boundaries when initially, the Jewish community in Egypt started with twelve brothers. As twelve males, they had to marry Egyptian women if the community was to later multiply. But the textbook abandons the kinship ties as a source of nationhood, at this point, and with no further explanation says, "Because of their faith, they kept their distinctive language, their customs and belief. They knew they

were distinct from the people of the country [Egypt], and that they were superior to them in their faith and life style"(ibid., 15).

Here, blood ties are no longer a source of collective identification. Rather, it's their faith, lifestyle, language, and culture. More important in this process is the emphasis on Moses' role as cultural broker of his community, and as a leader who was able to form for his nation its imagined past and it imagined heroes. The text says that Moses started to "encourage his brothers…reminding them of their glorious past and promising them a glorious future. He found those who had listen to him…because it was not absent from their hearts the memory of their fathers with the memory of the land that had been promised to them and their sons" (ibid., 15).

Again, the myth of the Promised Land, and the notion of being chosen returns as a full force behind the regeneration of the collective identity of the nation. In this process, Moses' role became central. In the textbooks, it says that after living in Egypt, the nation had to be re-equipped in order to be entitled to enter the "promised land." That was the role of Moses and the Bible, a scripture by which the nation was transcended from an aggregate of individuals into a collective, a community of believers with rules of conduct for individuals as well as for the collective. We read that "At a time when all nations were deeply indulged in myths and lived by unjust laws, Moses gave to his people laws of life, laws of justice…which transcended the spirit of the nation and made the people superior and distinctive from other nations" (ibid., 17).

Thus, the transformation process helped the nation transcend from slaves into a "superior" nation. That superiority was gained by acquiring a new belief system (accepting the Lord's commands), which was particularly *given* to that "sacred" and "superior" nation. By that, the nation's "chosenness" was reconfirmed. This in turn, was a reconfirmation of the triad relations between the Lord, the people, and the land. Thus, at its origin as well as at the birth of the nation at Mount Sinai, the triad relations existed and played a cardinal role in the making of the nation, and its sacred origins.

NATION AND THE PROMISED LAND IN ANTIQUITY

The Egyptian Exodus gave birth to the nation at Mount Sinai, and it marked the beginning of a process that led later to the wedding of the nation with "their" promised land. From now on, the nation was no longer a dynasty of an elected tribe. Rather, it became a chosen community acting according to the given laws of Mount Sinai. Those laws specified individuals' rights and regulated social relations within the community. In other words, they created codes of behavior that became the foundations of the community's culture and its claimed distinctiveness as a nation. These developments moved the nation into the next stage, the wedding with its "promised land."

Thus, the Jewish history and its golden age start around mid twelve century B.C., with the end of the Exodus and the occupation of Canaan, followed by a series of historical episodes which end up with the destruction of the Jewish Temple in the first century A.D. This whole period is discussed as the glorious era of the nation's history, and when the Israeli narrative talks about rebirth, revival, and recovery of roots, it refers to this same era. However, this period had its ups and downs, and often during that period the nation is described as weak and oppressed and/or disputed. Despite that, the textbooks glorify it

and present it as a continuous narrative of Jewish presence in Canaan. In turn, it becomes the basis for modern claims of sovereignty and historical rights on that land.

The textbooks divide this era into several episodes. During each of those, the nation, its space, and culture vary according to a complex dynamic of relations between the Jewish community on the one hand, and the local and neighboring powers on the other. Also, the intra-Jewish relations leave their mark on the community's culture, its religion, and its geopolitical status in the region. Those episodes include (1) occupation of Canaan and the first Jewish settlements, (2) the era of the Judges, (3) the rise and fall of the first Temple, (4) Babylonian exile, and finally (5) the rise and fall of the second Temple.

As mentioned, the textbooks portray these separate episodes as integral units in a historical chain that contribute to the impression that Jewish presence in Canaan was never interrupted by other nations, and as if the Jewish people were the sole inhabitants of that land for those long centuries. This is evident in the excessive details of events and people of this period, which make the reader of the textbooks "acquainted" with these ancestors and their history as if they lived in that land only a short time ago.

To better understand the Israeli narrative and its version of the ancient history of the Jewish people in Canaan, we need to understand the geopolitical historical conditions of the region. Canaan was a buffer zone between competing regional empires at the time. In the east were the Assyrian and the Babylonian empires. In the South, was the Egyptian empire, and in the North, the forces of Little Asia, the Greeks, and later the Romans. In this context, Canaan was a buffer zone and for most of those empires it was a peripheral area. However, shifts in the balance of power in the region between those empires resulted in turning Canaan into a bloody battlefield to restore or affirm control of one empire or another. Conversely, as long as the balance of power was maintained in the region, Canaan was free of any direct external domination.

As a buffer zone between regional competing empires, Canaan enjoyed local self-rule of city states, a prototype of the Canaanites' society. Whenever there were attempts to extend power beyond city-states into a united and centralized rule, it disturbed the regional balance and as a result, led to external invasions. These important points were behind the rise and decline of the Israelites' kingdom in Canaan at the time, and later behind their expulsion from the "promised land." The Israelites' attempts to create an integrated state on parts of Canaan during the golden age of David and Solomon led to outside invasions and destruction of their power. Evidence on this is found in the Israeli history textbooks, which mention that the Israelites were able to maintain an integrated state over parts of Canaan for only seventy years. This short-lived golden age raises many questions about the Israeli claims and their narrative.

CANAAN—LAND AND PEOPLE

In the Israeli narrative there are conflicting statements about the land of Canaan and its people. Canaan is often described as an "empty" land awaiting redemption by the Jewish people. Occasionally, however, it is mentioned as the "promised land," a property of the Jewish people set apart for their own use only. One might tend to interpret the notion of "empty" land in its political meaning as referring to Canaan as a buffer zone between empires, but not literally as an empty space. However, in the Israeli narrative, in the

ancient as well as in the modern, the land is portrayed as literally empty, which is used to legitimate the Israeli claims of ownership. With the frequent reference to Canaan as well as to Palestine as "empty" land, Israelites try to rid themselves from bearing moral responsibility for taking over property that is not theirs. Similarly, the notion of the "promised land" in the Israeli narrative shifts responsibility from human action to divine intervention. The Jewish people become entitled to claim the land, since it was the Lord's command, which a few can dispute.

In other occasions, the same narratives describe the land as populated by various groups. However, in such cases, those collectives are conveyed as "people on the move," which implies that they had no attachment to the place, as the Jewish people claim to have. Other conflicting statements also pertain to the local inhabitants of the land. In the textbooks they are discussed as both inferior and superior, and as powerful and weak, in many cases on the same page. These conflicting issues seem to reflect ambivalence toward the Jewish community itself, which in this case, is projected onto others or attributed to them.

In the textbooks, Canaan is the promised land of the Jewish people. It is discussed in general terms as a space between the Arab desert in the east and the Mediterranean Sea in the west (Ahiyah & Herpaz, 1957:20–1). The text says that the value of the land is not in its wealth, but rather in its geographical position as a connecting unit between the other countries around. It is depicted as a sacred place, and as the land that Moses led his people to settle and flourish as a nation. Canaan is conceived as an integral part of the historical collective memory of the Jewish people that gave them a sense of collective identity over generations while in Egypt. As the textbook says, it is the land that the "people carried in their hearts" (ibid., 20).

At the eve of the Jewish conquest of Canaan in mid 11th century B.C., Canaan is discussed as populated by seven nations. In the textbook, it says that:

> Although the country was small, seven nations made it their home. The Bible numbered seven such people. Some lived in the mountains, and others in the valleys: the Hittite, and the Girgashite, and the Amorite, and the Canaanite, and the Perizzite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, seven nations greater and mightier [than thou] (Deuteronomy, Chap. VII, 1) (ibid., 21).

Those diverse nations that populated the land are described as "mightier than thou." Despite this image of the Canaanites, the textbook says that they were "people on the move." Describing Canaan's population as "people on the move" implies that they were nomads who never settle in one place, people who were just crossing the land to reach another destination. Although they were mightier than the Israelites, nevertheless, they had no attachment to the land. Denying the Canaanites and other local communities their attachment to their land valorizes the Jewish claims and makes their argument valid. Especially, when it says that We "carried the land in our hearts." In other words, We cherish and value the land, while Others do not. Others are depicted as strangers to the land, and for those Others, it was a crossing place to other places.

Another contrast between the Israelites and the Canaanites is the emphasis on the Canaanites' diverse ethnic structure, which implies lack of common faith, culture, history

or interests. The lack of homogeneity is exemplified by the diverse cultural origins of those people. In contrast, the Israelites are an integrated collective due to their faith. This sense of common solidarity among the Israelites becomes a source of strength to combat the "mightier" Others. In addition, lack of originality in the culture of "people of the land," makes them "inferior" compared to Israelites. The textbook says that:

> …those people who settled in this narrow strip of the country…were not made into one nation and did not create one culture. They came to Canaan from the sea islands (Philistines), from Little Asia (the Hittites) and from the [Arab] desert (the Canaanites). They brought with them their lifestyle, their beliefs, and were not made into an integrated nation. Since they lived in between two great cultures, they were influenced from them, but their contribution was minimal (ibid., 21).

On the same page, the textbook acknowledges the glorious cultures of those previously degraded. Among those people the "advanced civilization of the Amorites," the "Jebusites the people of Jerusalem," etc. (ibid., 24). On page 25–9, in contrast to what has been previously said about the "inferior cultures" of those people, on these pages the textbook describes the glorious cultures of the Canaanite and Phoenician (Arab), and their contribution to humanity. In the textbook, we read that:

> This is how the Canaanite-Phoenicians made a major contribution to the development of the trade relations between nations. But, their distinctive contribution was the invention of the "Alphabet," which they gave to the people of Europe. They were the first to invent the signs of letters that replaced the shapes and figures…of the Egyptians, and the writing signs of the Chinese and the Japanese. It was transferred to Europe through the Greeks with whom the Canaanite-Phoenicians had relations, from there to Rome and later to the rest of Europe (ibid., 27–8).

Against those descriptions of the Canaanite-Phoenician culture and civilization on page 28, the textbook argues that the Canaanites had no original cultural contribution. They "learned" from others, which makes their culture a "copy." As a people, they are described as a "medium" to other great cultures. It is clear that by portraying the Canaanites as such, the Israeli discourse denigrates them. At the same time, the same discourse portrays them as an "important" civilization. Those dual images of the Canaanite-Phoenicians are evident in the following:

> The original culture of the Phoenicians was not particularly rich. But, because of their relations with a diversity of nations and people, they adopted some elements of their civilizations and passed them to others. Their religion was similar to other people's religion in Canaan… Their language was Semitic, close to Hebrew. Evidence of the Canaanite's important position among the people of the country, is the naming of the whole country after them-the Land of Canaan.

These conflicting descriptions leave little doubt that they in fact reflect the ambivalence of the Jewish community toward itself, and are signs of their identity crisis. In fact, the cyclical changes in Israelite status and identity are reflected in their self images, which repeatedly change from strong to weak, or from an integrated nation into tribes. Identity crisis is also evident in the discussion of the land as a geographical space that gives boundaries to the collective. Thus, we find that despite depicting the Israelites as strong and united under one faith, they failed to conquer Canaan and enforce their rule over its people. In the textbooks, it says that the occupation of Canaan lasted for several decades. At the end, and despite the "victorious battles," "The wars of occupations of Joshua lasted for many years. He had many victories, but a complete occupation of the country he could not achieve. Many large parts, especially in the coastal planes and the valleys stayed in the hands of the people of the country" (ibid., 38).

This failure led to disintegration of the nation and later made it vulnerable to attacks by its enemies. This is how the textbook presents this point:

> As long as Israel fought against the people of the country, under the leadership of Joshua, and [Israel] was a nation of arms, which had one clear goal, the occupation of the country, they were united and cohesive. But when they succeeded to occupy parts of the country, the spirit of fighting gradually disappeared. Instead, the desire to settle and take over the land won… This was how they [the Jewish people] were transformed from conquerors into settlers… Each tribe learned from the people of the land the art of working the land. The courageous ties that had united the fighters loosened now. Each tribe took care of their own affairs… With that, the power of the nation was shattered and diminished. Shortly after, the people of the country rose up and started harassing Israel (ibid., 38–9).

As we can see, self identity is at the heart of those discussions. Initially, the Israeli narrative emphasized the supremacy of the Israelites over the Canaanites due to their beliefs and religion. But, from the last quotation we learn that what had united the nation was the sense of a common enemy and a common goal. A belief in common goal transcended the tribal factional identity of the Israelites into a united collective. Once that goal was partially achieved, the collective returned to its tribal and particular identity. With no common goal, pores within the collective boundaries started and later expanded into internal conflicts and assimilation within the local community of the Canaanites. Israelites' interactions with the people of the land increased; they learned from the locals' culture and religion. That process of inter-cultural learning made the Israelites abandon their own "distinctive" culture and consequently, assimilate into the Canaanite's culture. With that development, the Israelites were no longer separated from the people of the land, but separated from each other. As the textbooks say, that process of assimilation weakened the Israelites and made them subject to attacks. This is how the process is described in the textbook:

> Also the belief in one God, which had encouraged and united them at the outset, gradually faded away. The tribes started learning from their neighbors—each tribe from its neighbors—their culture and beliefs. They

> [the Jewish tribes] became used to worshipping "Baal" and "Ashtoreth"… [They] made sacrifices to them and built temples, like their neighbors, the Canaanites (ibid., 44).

This process of assimilation and the return to tribalism continued later during the Judges era, which lasted for two hundred years. It curtailed all attempts to unite the Jewish people under one rule and by that made the Israelites weak against the rising power of the Philistines and Other external forces. In addition to that, the Israelite control of parts of the mountain areas of Canaan shrunk as a result of the Philistines attacks. Those attacks made the Philistine "…during the Judges' era the most dangerous enemy for Israel ever. The Philistines had an advantage over the sons of Israel in terms of their lifestyle, their cohesiveness, and their war deceptions" (ibid., 48).

Further, against this weakness of the Israelites, the Philistines are described as those who "continuously harassed Israel." There were no reasons offered in the textbooks for this animosity, and the fact that the Israelites were invaders of Canaan, fighting to occupy their land, is marginalized. Conversely, the textbooks categorize the Canaanites' resistance to the invaders as "cruelty" and acts of "oppression," and describe the Canaanites as those who had "forced the Jewish people to pay them tribute" (ibid., 56–7). In addition, the Canaanites' resistance is also attributed to their inherent "cruel" characteristics such as "their love of wars and fighting." In short, Others were cruel and oppressive, while We became fragmented, tribal, weak, and as a result, "victimized." This set the stage for the next stage in the evolution of the nation, the era of the Kings and the construction of the first Temple.

THE GOLDEN AGE—THE KINGS AND THE FIRST TEMPLE

The rise of the kings marks a turning point in the history of the Jews in Canaan. At the eve of this unsettling period (1000–586 B.C.) the nation was deeply divided upon itself, weak and subject to the domination of the local nations and outside forces. The territorial space of the nation shrunk and its religious leaders could not meet the challenges the nation faced at that time. Out of this sense of hopelessness, the Jewish tribes saw the need for an integrating force. This is how the textbook describes this situation of the Jewish nation at the time:

> We have seen that the tribes came to the conclusion that they could not stand against their enemies around, unless they united and became a cohesive nation… They decided that only a king could integrate them and enforce his will upon all the tribes and lead them to victory… Many tribes thought they would be the best fit for that role. Some thought they were entitled for that privilege because of their size or because they considered themselves superior to other tribes (ibid., 53).

From the quotation, two points require further explanation, first, the lack of integration and the spread of internal cleavages and exclusion processes. The dilemma was how to transcend the collective with their emphasis on their particular identities into a nation that

shared a common interest above and beyond their particular tribal differences and interests.

Second, deciding on a king implies that the traditional religious leaders were unable to lead the nation. Religion alone seemed to be insufficient to integrate and unite the collective. There was a need for a political leader, a state person. Implicitly again, the need for a king shows that the nation had been transformed from a religious community into a political entity that required political organization of the community itself. In other words, under the circumstances of fragmentation and weakness, the collective came to the conclusion that the separation of religion and state is necessary. What is interesting in the nomination of kings was the authority of the religious people in the community, who had a status of prophets among their people, was transformed. Finally, the need for a king shows how symbiotic processes between Jews, Canaanites, and Philistines influenced the political culture of the Jewish collective. It seems that the Jewish people learned from their neighbors new ways of organizing a nation socially and politically.

With the nomination of Saul, the "First King of the Jews," a Jewish uprising started against the Philistines. In that war the Jewish forces won the battle. The victory of the Jewish forces is described as a moment that needs to be "remembered in the Jewish history" (ibid., 57). With his military successes, Saul seemed to have succeeded in integrating the people against their "cruel and savage enemies" the Philistines. He also expanded his territorial control to the east and south. In fact, he defeated two outside enemies. This triumph did not last long. Soon after, the Philistines deployed a large army against the Jewish forces in the Valley of Yisrael. The textbook states that:

> Unequal forces stood against each other: many Philistines who were experienced fighters, anxious to fight. The Israel-army was small and with a few arms at hand and a king who was distracted by his rage. A man like Saul won't retreat or run away, even though he knew he was going to die. He stood by himself with his sons at the forefront of the army. There he found his death. A death of heroes he died, he and his three sons (ibid., 61).

In contrast to those heroic descriptions of Saul, other images are also discussed in the textbook. The failure of the "heroic king" is attributed to his other aspect, which was his lack of experience as a statesperson. We read that:

> It is not enough for a king to be only a man of war, talented as an army person. He did a few things to organize the state internally. The continuous tension under which he had come, the wars against his enemies, and the rupture between him and the prophet who had chosen him led to his weakening and his nervous break down… In the end he felt as if he were surrounded by enemies, and that everyone was conspiring against him, even his family members he did not trust (ibid., 59).

Amid these feelings of hopelessness and despair during Saul's reign, David emerged as a national legend. His success against the Philistines and his famous confrontation with Goliath made him a high risk to Saul's authority. David's kinship and the status of his

prestigious tribe compared to Saul's small tribe made him a natural claimant of Saul's position. These events set the stage for a direct confrontation between David and Saul, and with that, internal conflicts intensified. From now on, power struggles dominated the collective's life for several decades. As a result, the Israelites' power instead of rising retreats.

Ahiyah and Herpaz (1957:69) mention that the escalation in the conflict between David and Saul made David seek refuge, first among other Jewish tribes. He fled to the town of Nov, where he was received as a national hero. When the news of that reception reached King Saul's palace, he ordered all of Nov's priests to attend in his court. Upon their arrival, Saul issued orders for their execution and the demolishing of their town. Following those events, David sought refuge in the towns of the Philistines, the enemies of the Israelites at the time.

THE GOLDEN AGE

The Israelite "Golden Age," is the era of the kingdoms of David and Solomon that lasted for seventy years. During that age, the nation's territorial control expanded and was united under one central authority. However, that era was not without conflicts and power struggles between King David himself and his son Avshalom. Despite those conflicts, it is remembered in the Jewish collective memory as the "Golden Age."

David's kingdom lasted for thirty three years. It was the death of Saul that made the nomination of David as king possible. Under his rule, the Israelites were united, their culture thrived, their power was extensive, and the nation's territory expanded. David's years, as the textbooks mention, were glorious days for the Jewish people and should be remembered for many centuries to come.

Under David's rule, the nation is described as a nation of glorious heroes, with a well trained and organized army, and even the most protected city of the Jebusites fell under David's attacks. One of David's first tasks was subduing the Philistines:

> The unexpected conquering of Jerusalem and the fast establishment of the Kingdom triggered the Philistines to go to war against David. But now the king was heading an army that was well equipped and well trained… The two armies met west of the city of Jerusalem. The Philistines' [aggressive] arm was broken fast. Since then, they ceased to intimidate Israel (ibid., 75).

Not only against the Philistines did David record success. As a result of success in the battlefield, many nations came under his domination, and the kingdom's boundaries "extended from the Egypt River, to the Euphrates river. All nations paid tribute to the state and gave in to the [state] governors who lived in the cities" (ibid., 76).

As David aged, struggles over the royal position surfaced. The nation was divided into two camps, supporters of David and supporters of his son Avshalom. David's camp received a minority support. Despite that, David's army went to war against the majority of the Israelites who supported his son, Avshalom. David's army triumphed, but that triumph did not bring him peace. On the contrary, he faced harsh criticism and was

accused by his opponents of dividing the nation and "bloodshed, and cruelty" (ibid., 76–8). Those internal conflicts subsided upon David's death, and the nomination of his son Solomon.

Those traumatic events and conflicts raise serious questions about David's morality and character, especially the choices he made in favoring one son over the other, and his willingness to fight his own son until death. Nevertheless, the textbook glorifies him, saying that "In the collective memory of our people, David is alive forever. The nation saw in him a man superior to all, courageous, a hero of wars, [who] expanded the boundaries of Israel and integrated the tribes into one nation around Jerusalem, the center and the house of David" (ibid., 79).

David's death brought to the scene his other son, King Solomon. Solomon is considered the Founding Father of the Jewish sovereignty in Canaan. His rule is characterized by his personal wisdom, national achievements, and his ability to maintain peace and prosperity during all of his era. We read that "With his political talent and wisdom he knew how to keep his father's conquests and secure them for many years to come. He developed friendly relations with the people around his kingdom, if by marriage or by trade relations. All the nations around accepted his rule and paid him tribute" (ibid., 84).

As a peaceful period, where the Jewish forces dominated remote lands, Solomon turned to building the nation from the inside. He initiated construction projects to emulate other kings in the region. For example, the textbooks mention that he invested vast resources in construction projects in the "city of David-Jerusalem," which had become the capital of his state. Those projects came to make the city a national (personal) symbol of glory and power not only among his people, but, as a symbol of his power in the region. Not only did he turn the city into a political symbol of his kingdom, he made the city a center of religion too. By doing so, he gained control over political power as well as religious affairs.

The textbook reminds us that Solomon is well known for his ambitious construction projects, which came to valorize his royal position rather than glorify the nation's achievements. He built palaces in Jerusalem and rebuilt the city's walls. His projects attempted to make the city "a royal city" similar to the courts of most famous kings of the east (ibid., 86). Above all, his name became "forever glorious in the nation's history" after his "construction of the Temple, the house of the Lord."

Thus, by building the First Temple, Solomon succeeded in turning Jerusalem into a political and a religious center for the Israelites, which later became a national and a religious symbol for other generations too. However, he was criticized for his political ambitions and for his projects of self-worship. Those prolonged projects made people rise against him. In particular, this happened when those projects required the collaboration and subjection of many nations and their resources including the resources of his own people. Besides a huge supply of construction materials, he needed huge amounts of gold to decorate buildings and other royal artifacts. Gold, for example, was collected from both the Jewish citizens of the kingdom, and the non-Jews who were under his domination. Consequently, the "peaceful era" described earlier became an era of suffering, exploitation, and oppression for many groups, both among his own people, and among the conquered collectives.

> With the increase in the [number of] construction projects, and with the addition of luxury and glory in the king's court, the expenses increased and the tribute became heavier. Many peasants were forced to abandon their fields and join the king's construction projects… Now, for the first time, the people felt the meaning of the "king's sentence," which Samuel the prophet, had warned against…. From the luxury and glory, voices of complaint had risen. And in the glorious kingdom of Solomon the first cleavages started to emerge (ibid., 88).

Resistance to Solomon was fueled by the spread of non-Jewish culture and influence in his court. Foreign influence and alien cultures were brought to the court by the many women Solomon had married. Each of those women brought her own "foreign and alien culture." Thus, while Solomon's projects were intended to glorify the Jewish achievements and culture, they ended up with the infiltration of other cultures into his court, which gradually marginalized the Jewish culture. Consequently, the king was estranged from his own people, and from the culture he initially wanted to glorify.

Resistance to Solomon came from two camps, the Israelites and the non-Jews in his kingdom. First, among the Israelites, inter-cultural blending and fusion processes blurred the distinction between insiders and outsiders. In turn, this increased fusion and intermarriages among the masses. This development increased the conservative Jewish resistance to Solomon among those who feared loss of identity. Soon, internal cleavages started to surface and the threat of return to tribalism and factionalism became real. Second, among the non-Jews who were under Solomon's domination, voices of resistance against the king's ambitious and oppressive projects increased. The textbook, adds that "Soon, the resistance increased among the conquered nation with the encouragement and support of the Egyptians (ibid., 89).

In other words, Solomon's policies contributed to the rise of resistance against his rule both inside and outside the Jewish collective. Among the Jews, those who voiced resistance were the many exploited peasants, marginalized religious people, and other tribes who had no access to the court's power system. Thus, out of those complex relationships, cleavages and conflicts intensified. They became even stronger with the death of King Solomon and the rise to power of his son. The son's lack of political experience had resulted in the division of the kingdom into two: Israel and Judea.

Therefore, what started as a project to integrate, unite, expand the boundaries, and institutionalize the nation, ended up weakening the nation more than ever before. Now there were many things at stake to struggle for such as wealth, political power, and religious prestige. It seems as if the processes and actions that were set into motion to glorify the nation under one ruler were at the same time the seeds of this glory's own decline. Or dialectically, what had contributed to integration of the nation carried with it also the seeds of its own destruction and decline.

In the Jewish collective memory, both David and his son Solomon are commemorated for their glorious contribution to the Jewish people, both politically and religiously. David's and Solomon's kingdoms, with all the destructive consequences for the Jewish people, are remembered as symbols of the nation's unity, integration, sovereignty, and a proof of roots in the "promised land." They have become models for emulation even in current Israeli politics.

THE POST-SOLOMON PERIOD

The period after Solomon was a period of decline for the nation at large. As mentioned before, one of the consequences of Solomon's policy was the disintegration of the state. Thus, we read, "Instead of one united and large state that extended from the Egyptian creek to the Euphrates, two kingdoms were formed: Israel and Judea. The two weak kingdoms, instead of a strong one, could not survive against outside enemies and brother's-hate inside, both [external and internal threats] dwindled the two kingdoms" (ibid., 95).

Furthermore, each kingdom suffered internal conflicts and simultaneously had to face external enemies. This new development required internal restructuring of each community to meet the new challenges. For example, under Solomon's rule the religious and political affairs were separate spheres each headed by a different person. Now, all authority and power were centralized in the hands of the king, who was the commander of the army, chief of staff, and head of the state. The consequences of this centralization of power, instead of increasing the community's cohesiveness, intensified the internal struggles over power within each of the kingdoms.

> Time and again, military officers, talented and power hungry had become kings after they had demolished, with no mercy, the house of the previous king. Thus, the throne…was held by nineteen kings during a short period of time. Some ruled for a few days or months, most of them were murdered by their adversaries, military people like them (ibid., 96).

Lack of political stability was more a characteristic of Israel's kingdom rather than Judea. Judea is described as stable under the rule of David's house. It also enjoyed geographical advantage since it was surrounded by mountains and the desert to the east. However, these facts did not stop the conflicts between Judea and Israel, and for decades the struggle between the two continued. Judea controlled Jerusalem, which was a symbolic center of political power and religion. In its struggle against Judea, Israel advanced a two-step plan: One, it established its own religious center, and second, it made alliances with "foreign states against Judea."

The first step brought back the idol-worshiping tradition among the Jewish community of Israel. The textbook states that:

> Yarbia'm Ben-Nevett…not only did not clear the country of idol gods; rather he added to them the Golden Calves in Beit-Al and Dan, the two holy places in the Jewish tradition Why had he established these two new religious centers? Why had he invented new feasts?… He feared if the people continue their pilgrimage to Jerusalem, in the end they might reconcile with the king of Judea and accept his rule…. During his twenty-two years of rule, his goal was to distance his people from Jerusalem and establish his kingdom by wars…against the kings of Judea (ibid., 98–9).

The second step in the king of Israel's plan was political alliances with other forces to help him conquer Jerusalem. He made alliances with the former enemies of the Israelite

state, the Pharaohs of Egypt. Similarly, Judea's king made his own alliances with the Amorites and other kings in the region. Despite that, the Pharaohs' army marched into Jerusalem, conquered it, and emptied all the Temple's treasures and the treasures of the king's palace. The Egyptian conquest of Jerusalem led to the defeat of Judea's king, but, it did not end the struggle between the two opponents.

Amid those developments, a new king came to power in Israel's kingdom. This new king took over power after he murdered the previous king and massacred his whole family. Israel's new king launched a series of raids against external enemies such as the Amorites. In these wars, Israel triumphed against the Amorites and in one of the battles its army killed the Amorites' king.

The social, cultural, and religious ramifications of those struggles and conflicts was the increase in the infiltration of Other cultures and religions into Israel's kingdom. Judaism was no longer a primary system of identification and identity. On the contrary, the Canaanites' religion came back and intermarriages intensified and became frequent among the Jewish community. For example, the textbooks mention that the king of Israel, Ahi'ab Ben Umri, married a woman from Saida's kingdom in the Lebanon. Since the king was engaged in his wars, the internal affairs were in the hands of Isabel, the queen. The textbook accuses the queen of abuse of her power by promoting her culture and religion among the people of her kingdom. This implies that Judaism became marginalized and was no longer an integrating force of the Jewish people at the time.

For many years, the conflicts between Israel and Judea continued. Also, the wars of Israel against surrounding nations continued. What added to this unstable era was the frequent rise and fall of kings. Those kings in most cases were assassinated. The textbook states, "In the midst of that bloody period, the Assyrians conquered the country, enforced tribute on the people…expelled the residents and dispersed them among many gentile nations and in their place they brought foreign people to settle in the destroyed land and in the wilderness" (ibid., 104).

Soon after that, in 722 B.C., Israel came to its end as a political power in the region. Several factors contributed to its decline. One major factor was Israel's continuous wars against surrounding nations. In particular their territorial expansionist policies into other nation's lands, which not only intensified the assimilation processes in the state but also resulted in crossing the fine lines that maintained the balance of power between empires in the region at the time. For example, Israel's expansion into the backyard frontier of the Assyrians triggered the Assyrians to send their armies, which led to the occupation of the whole country, except the tiny enclave of the city-state of Jerusalem. Moreover, the fall of Israel cleared the road to Jerusalem, and brought Judea face to face with the Assyrian and Babylonians empires. It was only a question of time until Judea was conquered by the Babylonians and the people of Judea were sent to exile in Babylon (ibid., 108).

Later events accelerated the process toward the final fall of Judea. The region was divided into two camps: the Assyrians and their allies, and the Egyptians and their allies. In Judea, the Jewish community was divided upon itself. Some supported the resistance forces against the Assyrians; others adopted the position of sitting and waiting.

In the rest of Canaan, the Canaanites and other nations in the region started a revolt against the Assyrians. The Egyptian army was called to help the rebellions against the Assyrians. Judea was a kind of buffer zone between the rebellions of Canaan and the Egyptian forces. To integrate their powers against the Assyrians, the Canaanites and the

defeated king of Israel asked the king of Judea to join the rebellions. Not only did the Judea king reject their request, he turned to the Assyrians for help against his "brother." Soon after that, the Assyrian army entered Jerusalem and turned the city into an Assyrian camp. We read that "Judea was enslaved by the Assyrians, not only politically, but also rather religiously. The Jewish king of Jerusalem commanded the people to build an altar like the one in Damascus, and thus the Assyrian culture stared to disseminate among the people" (ibid., 112).

In the years to come, Judea's new kings rebelled against the Assyrians and the dissemination of their religion among the Jewish people. Time and again, Judea rebelled and occasionally it was defeated by the Assyrians. The continuous conflicts with the enemies from the east did not end, and when Babylon became a regional power, the king of Judea repeatedly rebelled against them, too. It was not long after that Babylon decided to put an end to Judea's power and its repeated rebellions. Thus, in 586 B.C. they organized the army that conquered Jerusalem, demolished the city, including Solomon's Temple, and took its residents into captivity in Babylon. A few stayed behind in Canaan, but the majority of the Jewish people were sent into exile. With that, the Jewish presence in Canaan came to an end (ibid., 114–121).

THE BABYLON EXILE AND IDENTITY

In the Jewish collective memory the destruction of the first Temple is marked as a traumatic event in the history of the nation. Most explanations attribute the destruction and the loss of Jewish sovereignty to the internal disputes over power and prestige. Those struggles had come to an end in exile. Now, in Babylon, the Jewish community's concerns shifted from political mundane issues into questions of survival. Religion returned to the scene and it became the primary system for shaping the individual's and the community's distinctive identity. Consequently, the role of the religious leaders became more important than before. Those leaders took upon themselves the role of organizing the community, and keeping its religion alive.

In exile, the Jewish community lived in isolation from other communities in Babylon. It had its own institutions, lived in separate neighborhoods, and its members had their own professions. The tribal system became the primary source of the community's social organization. Each tribe lived in a separate area, and was headed by its own religious leader (ibid., 133). Not only the boundaries between Jews and non Jews were kept clear; the internal tribal cleavages were kept too. Both practices, of geographical and social self-exclusion, maintained the tribal divisions within the Israelite community, and vis-à-vis outsiders, they delayed the process of assimilation, but they did not prevent it.

These societal arrangements became possible under the relatively autonomous system of the Babylonians' empire. The Babylonians gave autonomy to all ethnic groups. They did not interfere in their daily practices, as long as those practices didn't cross the lines of risking the empire or challenging the political system itself. We read that "The truth is, that the Babylonians, who were known as cruel during their war against the rebelling Judea, did not keep hatred against the expelled, and they allowed them to live their own lifestyle without harassment, to live where they had chosen, and to keep their social ties as before" (ibid., 133).

From the Jewish perspective, this semi-autonomy of the various ethnic groups under Babylon's rule contributed to two things, first, immediate participation of Jews in the many economic opportunities the country had offered; second, already mentioned before, thriving of their religious life and the dissemination of religion among the members of the community. Consequently, the particular and tribal conflicting political interests that the Jewish community had before and which were behind their fragmentation and weakness was dialectically transformed into a common concern of shared destiny, shared faith system, and a shared aspiration.

Actually, the two processes of economic opportunity and religious attachment were in fact negating processes. On the one hand, material success carried with it the "risk" of cultural and ethnic assimilation. On the other hand, over emphasis of their religious attachment carried with it the risk of further self-exclusion, which also carried within it the risks of oppression by the rulers and the local community. Thus, the balance of these two oppositions had to be considered and weighed carefully. Indeed, that was the dilemma of the religious leaders who took it upon themselves to warn the community on the risks of assimilation, which carried within it the risk of loss of hope of return. Religious priests conveyed to the community that they were being punished with exile since they had abandoned the Lord's laws and His religion. The road to salvation and redemption, those priests emphasized, could only be achieved by return to the Bible, its laws, and the Fathers' tradition.

Later political development in the region brought the Jewish community closer to its goal, return to Canaan. Babylon's power declined after it lost the war against the rising power of the Persians. The triumphant king of Persia, Cyrus, was more tolerant of the Jewish community's aspirations. In the textbooks, he is described as the new Messiah, since he allowed each religious group to restore its own temples. We read that:

> Unlike the Assyrian and Babylonian kings, Cyrus showed much more understanding and tolerance toward the conquered nations. He did not assault any nation, and allowed each nation to worship its God freely. Not only that, he generously helped the nations restore their temples and their lives as before…it seems that Cyrus did not forget the fact that the prophets of Israel had predicted his triumph and that they called him "The Messiah of the Lord." He thought to reward them… He pronounced a declaration in all countries under his rule urging the expelled Jews to return to their country and restore the Temple… He also ordered to return to them all the stolen property of the Lord's House, and encouraged those who stayed behind to support their brothers, those who returned, with gold and money…in the history of our people, Cyrus occupied a dear place with his declaration. Only the Balfour declaration could be equated with his (ibid.,142–3).

Despite Cyrus' declaration, not many Jews answered the call and returned to their country. Some had become wealthy, and return meant they had to give it up. Others had prestigious positions they did not want to abandon, and some feared the journey itself. However, as the textbooks mention, about fifty thousand left, about seven thousand of these were slaves and maids.

In the Israeli narrative, this event is described similarly to the modern era Jewish "return" to Palestine. The emphasis is on the shattered dreams of the returnees since "Life was hard upon the returnees. The land that was abandoned for many years did not cooperate with those who worked it. In addition, years of drought hit the country. Others found that their Father's land was taken by others, [and they] turned to be daily employed who had no joy in their work, just suffering" (ibid., 157).

The central theme is that the land of the Fathers was "destroyed, abandoned," and "did not cooperate" because it was "left to suffer" in the hands of foreigners and non-Jews. Again, like in the modern discourse, the emphasis is on the Covenant between the Jewish people, the Lord, and the land. It meant that the land would only "answer" the call of "its owners," not anyone else. Since, in this case, its "original owners" were forced into exile, the land kept its "loyalty" to the people and "did not cooperate with strangers." As long as they were absent, the land was awaiting for the "original owners" return to redeem it from its "abusers."

In the modern Zionist discourse the land is described as "empty, abandoned, and destroyed," yearning for the "people" to redeem it, and the people are conceived as "chosen by the Lord," which gives them the privilege to accomplish that mission of the Lord, a wedding of people with land. In both narratives, of the ancient and the modern history, the land is depicted in a similar manner, and the Jewish people as the only people who could regenerate life in it. More interesting is the conception of time and history. This narrative implies that human history is static and the absence of the Jewish people from "their" land would create a void in both, land and history.

Further, the returnees not only faced this new reality of alienation from the land, they felt alienated from the rest of the Jewish community who had stayed in Canaan. The conflict was over identity and the nature of religion. The returnees claimed that they were the "real Jews" and accused the indigenous Jewish community of assimilation through inter-marriages. In their perception, religion is a family heritage, which stays in the tribe and is transferred to the new generation by birth only. Other forms of becoming a Jew were rejected.

From another perspective, the conflict seems to be over social resources that carry with them religious power and authority. With the ab-sence of political posts to fight over, religion became the site of factional struggles. An illustration of this struggle is found in the discussion of the re-construction of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. The textbook says that the returnees started the reconstruction of the Temple. The Samaritans, who had converted to Judaism, offered their help, thinking themselves part of the Jewish people. But their offer was rejected, since they were not considered "real Jews." It says that:

> The Samaritans are the people who were brought by the Assyrians to settle in the country… They had adopted the Jewish religion and some aspects of Israel's tradition. They asked to join the efforts of reconstructing the Temple. They saw themselves as Jews and insisted on contributing their share to restore the Temple. But the [Jews who] returned to Zion saw themselves as superior compared to the [Jewish] people living in the country. [These were conceived as] those who had mixed faith of idol-

> worshiping and the worshiping of one Lord. Thus, their request was rejected (ibid., 157).

Thus, the conflict was between those who claimed that Jewishness is maintained through blood and tribal ties, and those who advocated that religion is acquired. The former accused the latter of assimilation and blending of Judaism with pagan religion. To acquire legitimacy and power, Ezra the prophet, who returned from exile to Canaan claimed that his mission was to recover religion from its destructive forces. The textbook states that:

> When he [Ezra] was informed of the deteriorating situation of religion in Judea, of the assimilation with the gentiles, and of the weakness of the [religious] spirit, he decided to come to the country to encourage people and make Moses' religion dominant in people's lives… Those who were loyal to Moses' Bible came to Jerusalem to complain to Ezra about the inter-marriages, the violation of the Sabbath and Israel's feasts. When Ezra heard their complaints he tore his gown, cried bitterly, and then fasted. Later, he asked the people to gather in front of him. He demanded emphatically from them to expel and send away all the foreign women and their children. Those people who listened to him in fear and respect, unanimously promised to do as he demanded (ibid., 160–1).

Ezra's decree had in fact achieved its opposite goals—instead of integrating the people, it had divided them. Soon, armed conflict erupted, and Era's followers attacked the towns and villages of their opponents. The latter, who were married to non-Jewish women, were forced to send their wives and children away or face death. The end result was destruction of many Jewish settlements and fields. Those measures were followed by another one—geographical separation between Ezra's followers and the rest. Upon completion of the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple, Ezra turned to strengthen the walls of the city of Jerusalem. When that was achieved, Nehemya and Ezra called upon those Jews who wished to live according to the laws of the Bible to come and live in Jerusalem. Ezra read the laws of the Bible and demanded the people's compliance with the Bible's laws (ibid., 164–5).

Thus, Ezra became the sole authority on religious affairs and the chief priest of the self-excluded Jewish community in Jerusalem. His measures enforced one interpretation of the Bible and its laws. To affirm that, and to distance himself from other Jews, Ezra and Nehemya re-edited the Bible and wrote it, instead of in the hard classical Hebrew alphabet letters, in the Assyrian alphabet (ibid., 166). Change in the alphabet came to make the distinction between Ezra's followers and the Samaritans Jews, who used the classical Hebrew alphabet (ibid., 166). Those changes made the distinction between sacred and profane complete. After that, it was no longer possible to bridge the gulf between the "real Jews" and the "false." Both became geographically and symbolically segregated for many centuries to follow.

Ezra's measures of ancient history resemble those promoted by the modern narrative of Zionism. In the modern narrative, the "pioneer" is discussed as a negation to the religious Jews in Palestine. The latter are portrayed as weak, humiliated, and unfit to redeem the land and restore past history of the nation. In contrast, the "pioneer" is

conveyed as a "new" Jew with "superhuman" qualities. He is a national symbol that due to his efforts the nation is alive and thriving in its Father's land.

IDENTITY UNDER THE PERSIANS/THE GREEKS

Jewish identity during those various periods underwent severe changes. Under the Persians, the Israelites, like the Canaanites, had no political control over their cities and towns. The Persians granted religious autonomy to the Israelites. In turn, religion and religious priests became the primary source of authority and identification. We read that:

> The boundaries of the Jewish settlements were marked by the Persians as a separate "Phaha" [district], which was called in Aramaic "Medinata Deyahoud," in Hebrew—"Judea State." Such Phahot were in all parts of the country. All Phahot were subordinate to the Persian Ahshdrephan [governor], who governed all the [countries] beyond the river. That is to say [he governed] over the countries west of the Euphrates river. Like in every other small "state," a Phaha governed "Judea state" aided with deputies… The Phaha's…main responsibility was collecting tribute and keeping the public order. Autonomy was given to the Jews in internal, religious, and social affairs. In fact, the Phahot intervened in the internal affairs when they found it proper (Shohat, 1960:22–3).

This kind of spatial organization probably gave the Persians a tight control over the population. Under such tight control, the Jewish community, as it was the case during exile, focused more on building religious institutions. Such institutions aimed at keeping the boundaries of the community, and slow the processes of assimilation. The importance of such institutions became very important because the Jewish community in Canaan was extremely small in size, and the danger of assimilation was perceived as real. Those concerns are discussed in the textbook, which states that:

> There is no doubt... that the small and dwindled Jewish community in the country was facing the danger of losing its religious and national color. The marriages of Jewish women to foreigners were perceived as tearing parts of the Jewish body… The danger was clear… From a national perspective, the Hebrew language was in danger too, especially, it had to compete with the Aramaic which was similar to it (ibid., 22).

The remedy to those challenges was the return to religion and the building of religious institutions. Religion became the only source of identification that kept the sense of a collective alive. As a result of that, religious priests became the sole authority of the community, especially when there was no possible political expression for the collective. From now on, the public manifestation of identity was religious and not political.

These changes in the political status of Israelite in Canaan and their social organization contributed to two developments: first, there was an increase in the assimilation process, which leaders of the community had feared would happen.

Secondly, the rise of religion as a symbol of identity and collective affirmation of history turned Jerusalem into a symbolic center for all Jews in diaspora at that time. Jerusalem as a religious center replaced the notion of Jerusalem as a political center. Now the religious leaders of Jerusalem emphasized the role of Jerusalem in keeping the collective's identity boundaries. Advancing the system of Jewish faith as "superior" to other heathen faiths made the diasporaic Jews look at Jerusalem as the center of a superior world. The diaspora communities were then conceived as satellite communities to the holy center of their spirits and identity.

Those ideas were encouraged by advancing the idea of pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Shohat (1960:24) mentions that "the Temple and Jerusalem had enchanted the hearts of the diaspora Jews. With the pilgrimage, the feeling of integration of the nation in all its dispersion places was cultivated. In addition to that, building Temples on another land was prohibited since other lands were considered 'profane' for such a holy site to be built on" (ibid., 79). Jerusalem and its religious leaders kept their power over the various diaspora communities. They also kept the centrality of the "promised land" as the sacred place for Jews, wherever they resided. In turn, the political identity that was expected to develop in the "promised land," was replaced by a religious one in which Jerusalem was the center that kept the bonds tight between the periphery and the center. With that transformation, this discourse hoped to keep the boundaries between self and Other active beyond the limited space of Jerusalem, the center of the nation.

Further, the emphasis of Jerusalem as the center of Jewish spiritual life resulted in dividing space in terms of "sacred" and "profane." These oppositions had not divided space only, but also had made living outside of the "sacred place" temporary compared to the "permanent" life in the holy city of Jerusalem. Again, those ideas became possible by dividing the space into sacred and profane, consequently making the division between the dichotomies of "temporary" and "permanent" or "normal" and "abnormal." Those arguments became central points in the modern Zionist discourse that advances the idea of "coming back to Israel" as a "normalization" of the Jewish life. I will discuss these points further, later in this chapter.

Meanwhile, in 333 B.C., the Persians were defeated by the Greeks, and their former colonies were conquered by the Greeks. This period was characterized by its unstable politics. The textbook emphasizes the frequent change of power from one Greek army commander to another. With those changes, the people who came under the Greeks' rule experienced rapid changes in their lives.

One of the important issues was the way the Greeks divided the society of the colonized. There were two groups, Greeks and non-Greeks. Residents of the Polis were Greeks or Hellenistic. As such they were exempt from paying individual taxes, which the rest had to pay. In addition, the hegemonic culture was Hellenistic. Thus, all non-Hellenistic cultures had to assimilate or retreat and live in exclusion.

Like the Persians, the Greeks authorized the Canaanites and the Jews to have self-autonomy. The extent of that autonomy varied according to the Greek ruler's will and character at the time. For example, we read that:

> Alexander the Great gave several tax exemptions to the Jews: He exempted them from paying taxes during a fallow year. According to another version "he added to their land the country of Samaria."

> Consequently, he annexed territories south of Samaria to the Judea state. With that, the Persian administration was canceled and maybe the role of the Persian Paha was given to the chief priest (ibid., 29).

Upon Alexander the Great's death, those privileges were revoked. Alexander's successor conquered the city of Jerusalem and subjected its people to the Egyptian Greek ruler, the Ptolemies' dynasty, which ruled the country for one hundred years. During their rule, the Egyptian-Greeks exploited the people of the country and made them pay tribute (ibid., 30). More significant was the dramatic transformation of cities in Canaan. All cities became Greek cities governed by a Greek commander, which allowed the Greeks to have tight control of the country, its people, culture, and religions. Shohat (1960:30) mentions that:

> To establish their rule in the country…they [the Greeks] had transformed all the Philistine cities and the Canaanite costal ancient cities, and a few towns in the Yisrael Valley and trans-Jordan into Greek cities… The Hellenistic cities were organized similar to the Greek Polis… The Hellenistic city was autonomous only in its internal affairs. In each city, there was a military governor, who was nominated by the king, to supervise it. Citizenship was given not only to the Greeks but also to those who had adopted the Hellenistic culture (ibid., 30).

In terms of administration, the Persian administrative organization stayed as before, with one minor change. Instead of Paha, now the administrative districts were called Hyparchia. The Jewish community continued its life as before, in the Judea Hyparchia. Between the community and their rulers, a religious leader was chosen as a middleman. His main responsibility was collection of taxes (ibid., 30).

In the Jewish community, a rich strata developed out of those who were fast to assimilate into the Hellenistic culture. The majority were left behind to live in poverty but maintained their Jewish culture. While the rich enjoyed privileges similar to the Greeks, the poor suffered harsh economic conditions. And above all, the poor felt disdain for both the Greeks and the assimilated rich Jews (ibid., 32).

The poor's resistance to assimilation did not last long. Soon, the majority of the people no longer resisted the Hellenistic culture. On the contrary, it became a desired status. In the textbook, it says that:

> Apart from the dissemination of the Greek language, the Jews had adopted also Greek names. It seemed that they did not see wrong in doing so…. One of Shimon's…students was named Antigonus…. Recently, [scholars] argued that already before the Hashmonaem Revolt, Greek ideas were incorporated in the religious Jewish thought, even in the Halacha [the religious laws]…. The last stage in the process of Hellenization [assimilation into the Hellenistic culture] in Judea came with the denial of the "Sinai Bible." Those who had become Hellenistic violated the laws of the Bible, since they denied it was given by the Lord ….Finally, the

> Hellenization had become an "idea." The Hellenized hoped to be like other gentiles (ibid., 34–5).

Despite that, Hellenization provoked resistance among another group of Israelites, the Hasidim. They rejected the Hellenistic culture and the process of assimilation. They urged their community in Judea to return to religion and tradition. Ironically, as the textbook argues, the Hasidim's own ideas were based on the Greek philosophy of Plato's texts. We read that:

> The Hasidic believed that the human soul continues to exist after death, and that there is reward and punishment in the world of spirits. It seems that this belief was influenced directly or indirectly by Plato's books…. It is important to mention that this belief was not part of the Jewish heritage; now it came to strengthen the Hasidic spiritual power to help them defend the Lord's name [to die for it] during the sternest decree of Antiochus, and during the courageous wars of Mattathias the Hashmonaei and his sons (ibid., 35).

Thus, under the Greek influence the Israelites were not a cohesive and integrated community. Conflicts, rather than solidarity characterized their identity, culture, and religion. Cultural differences were not the only source of conflicts. More often struggles over leadership and the position of the chief priest were just as frequent as struggles over religious and social differences. For example, the Hasidic chief priest rejected demands to give up his position to another. This, in turn, triggered internal conflicts that made the Seleucids from Syria intervene in the matter. The Seleucids' army marched into Jerusalem and conquered it. Soon, Jerusalem was turned into a Polis and the Jewish Temple into a Greek altar in the year 167 B.C. (Ibid., 36–39).

Conquest of Jerusalem did not put an end to the Hasidic resistance. It opened a new stage in the long struggle between the Syrians and the Hasidic group, which later came to be known as the Hashmonites, during the revolt led by Judah the Maccabee. During the several years of the war, the Maccabees won and lost battles. They succeeded in capturing some of the Syrian army officers, and they massacred the Jewish Hellenistic leaders (ibid., 38–40). Further, to help the Maccabees defeat the Syrian army, they turned to the Arab king of the Nabataean state in trans-Jordan (ibid., 42). That did not end the war. The Maccabees then turned to the Romans, asking them for support against the Syrian Greeks. A treaty was signed between the two parties, but before the Romans could come to help, the Syrians organized a large army. The Maccabees had 3000 soldiers. Faced with the imbalanced numbers, most of the Jewish soldiers fled. The Maccabees were left with 800 soldiers. In the battle in 161 B.C., Judah the Maccabee died, and with his death, the chances of defeating the Syrian army and their Hellenistic Jewish allies evaporated (ibid., 44–5). The country was put under Syrian domination again, and in the coming years, wars and conflicts of triumph and defeat came in tandem. Twenty years later, the Hasidic camp succeeded in "cleansing" the city of Jerusalem from Hellenistic presence, and with that, Jewish life in the city resumed, (ibid., 47–9).

The Hasidic (Maccabees) partial triumph marked a turning point in Jewish history at that time. Now the Jewish community could enjoy a semi-autonomous self rule. In the

textbooks, it is emphasized that during this period Jerusalem became more than ever before the spiritual and the national center for Jews in their diasporaic places (ibid., 68, 71, 97).

Further, despite the fact that the Jewish self-rule was short lived, this period was glorified and discussed in the texts as the most prosperous era in the Jewish history. More significantly, during this period the Jewish population in Canaan reached three million. As mentioned at the outset, one of the central themes in the Israeli narrative is demography. Jewish presence in antiquity in Canaan is often used in the modern Israeli narrative as a "proof" of ownership, which is advanced to claim "historical rights" in Palestine. Besides being ridiculous as a basis for modern political claims, it does not make any sense that on that tiny strip of land during that ancient history, with their simple technology, that there were three million Jews. Because as the textbook argue, the Jews were still a minority, which means that the total population of Canaanites, Greeks, and Jews exceeded seven million. For comparison reasons only, in Israel today, there are about six million people. However, in the textbooks we read the following:

> One of the unclear issues is the growth of the Jewish population in Eretz Yisrael in [such] a short period. The commanders of Antiochus Apipan decided to sell all Jews in the state of Judea for two thousand Kikar [monetary unit] of money, 90 slaves for each Kikar. Thus, in the state of Judea there were 180,000 persons only. In other words during 375 years, since their return from exile, the Jewish population inside the state of Judea had increased [only] slightly; because, except for the fifty thousand people who returned, there were few of the poor. Now, in a shorter period of time, during the Hashmonites' reign, the Jewish population in the same boundaries tripled itself several times. And in all Eretz Yisrael, [the Jewish population had] reached three million by the end of the second Temple. In spite of all the killings and wars, how can one explain that phenomenon? (ibid., 50).

The textbook speculates that the Hashmonites' era was an era of progress, heroism and expansion of the Jewish state, and a period when Jerusalem was a symbolic center for the Jews, which made many Jews migrate to Canaan and settle in the country (ibid., 51). But, on the previous page in the same textbook, it is argued that "Most of the events during that period are obscure and unknown to us. The source from which we draw out information has come mainly from Yosef Ben Mattathiaho's books. He, himself had drawn his information from previous sources. But they [Mattathioho's books] have no answer to many questions" (ibid., 50).

Similar arguments appear in the textbook on page 52 with regard to the demographic structure of Jerusalem. The textbook argues that the Jewish population of Jerusalem reached 100,000 people during Alexander Yanai's times. It seems unrealistic that such a large number of people could fit into the tiny space of the old city of Jerusalem. Moreover, those demographic discussions are not limited to the size of the Jewish population in Canaan. The discussion is extended to the size of Jewish communities in the countries of the Middle East. The textbook argues that during the second Temple, the Jewish community in Egypt was more than 13% of the population, which was ten

million. However, the textbook, while it is aware of the unrealistic numbers that it presents, tries to provide a logical explanation. Thus, on page 72 we read that "The growth of the Jewish population in the diaspora was not only a result of natural growth, but rather due to conversion of pagans." While earlier the textbook emphasized the assimilation processes of the Jewish people under semi-autonomous conditions in Canaan as a source of that community's depletion, now, it is claiming that the opposite happened in the diaspora. It says that the Jewish minorities in the diaspora, under a much more powerful hegemonic culture than was the case in Canaan, were able to convert pagans and incorporate them into the Jewish collective. These contradictions do not seem to be resolved or explained in the textbook. Whatever the case, my point is not to argue with the truth or falsity of the numbers, but to draw attention to the point I have made earlier about the significance of demography in the Israeli narrative. It seems to me that demography becomes a concern for a collective whenever there are doubts pertaining to its history and its claims for political privileges.

To conclude, in the Israeli national narrative, the Maccabees' revolt and that whole time period are described as a chapter of heroism and triumph of the spirit of the Jewish people over the tyrannies of that time—the Greeks and their allies the Syrians. Its symbolic value is mentioned time and again as an important landmark in the collective memory of the Jews in Palestine or Canaan. It is perceived as an era in which the Jewish community was united around Jerusalem as a symbol of bonding for the various Jewish communities.

UNDER THE ROMAN RULE

The history of the Jewish people under the Romans' rule (69 B.C.—70 A.D.) is described as a series of conflicts and victories, not necessarily against external enemies, but rather against other Jewish factions. The social unity that characterized the short-lived era of the Maccabees in the city-state of Judea did not last for long. Soon, internal conflicts tore the community and struggles over power surfaced again. Factionalism, rather than unity, became the social order of the various communities. Each faction sought to maximize its chances to capture power in Jerusalem through alliances with non-Jewish forces. This, in turn, induced foreign interventions that developed into occupation of Jewish sites and cities, and finally brought about the destruction of one of the holy sites of Judaism, Jerusalem's Temple. With that, the Jewish presence and their collective identity in Canaan came to an end.

The textbooks mention that the main factions in the Jewish community were the Proshim, the Essenes, and the Tsdukim. The Proshim were the spiritual hires of the Hasidic group. They came from the lower classes of society, and among their supporters were the majority of the people, which included the peasants and the middle classes. In their view, the essence of life was in making moral and religious aspects unite. They were called Proshim (separatists) for their extra emphasis on the Bible's commandments (ibid., 59).

The Tsdukim were stricter in their interpretation of the Bible and its laws. What is interesting is that those differences did not remain religious; they had developed into political differences. For example, the Tsdukim argued that the political claims for

statehood should have ascendancy over religious claims. For the Tsdukim the separation between religion and state was artificial. In contrast to that, the Proshim had claimed separation of state and religion (ibid., 59).

The Tsdukim advocated for making a better use of the international politics. They demanded the expansion of the boundaries of the nation to include territories from the Euphrates to the Nile River. The state, not the Bible was on the top of their agenda. The Tsdukim came from the upper classes of society such as the priests, the army officers, the aristocracy, and high government officials. In addition to that, the Tsdukim considered the Bible (Halacha) to be the main source of all legislation in the state. While considering the Bible as the source of political and social life they also rejected any deviation from the original interpretation of the Bible. For them, all modern interpretations and expansion of the original Bible were an unnecessary complication.

Another difference was that the Proshim argued that the Jewish people are a distinctive nation, and therefore they should establish a state that would be different in its essence from any existing state of another nation. In other words, the distinctiveness of the Jewish people should also manifest itself in their state system. According to the textbook, what was important to the Proshim was not having a strong army to secure the land, but rather achieving social justice and establishing a state upon the principles of the Bible (ibid., 60). Finally, for the Proshim the people and the Bible were the central pillars upon which the Jewish collective stood.

The Essenes were a cult of extreme Hasidic. Their position was pronounced in their conception of the nature of social relation and the nature of the relation between a person and a place. They were very strict in admitting new members to their cult. A new member had to undergo a three-year "experience period." Later, when admitted, a person had to give up his/(her?) private property. A special court of 100 members discussed claims of violations in place of the cult's rulers (ibid., 60–1).

One of the unclear questions the textbook raises is what the reasons were behind the differences of these groups and why they had developed. On page 58 we read that "Not only do we not know the factors that contributed to their emergence, but also what was the essence of differences between them, and what was the essence of their names?" However these groups formed, these perceived differences were behind a long history of conflicts between the groups. These conflicts were not limited to religion and state; they also pertained to struggles over power and control in the Jewish community itself.

Despite that, one could say there were some common shared points among the three major groups. First, in their perception, the Jewish people are distinctive and superior to others, thus, they should establish a system to keep that distinction. That system could exist regardless whether one advocates for statehood or a religious community. In other words, the Jews are a collective who perceive themselves as different from Other by their superior faith. The boundaries of that collective needed to be kept intact. The dilemma was over whether those boundaries need to be kept by state authority or by religious authority.

However, the pronounced differences between the factions were marginalized in the years under the Roman rule. Conflicts and power struggles seem to be the connecting thread during that history. For example, during Queen Shlomo Zion's rule, a conflict over the throne started between the two sons of the queen, Aristobulus and Horcanus. The conflict was whether the king should hold both the political and the religious positions.

This conflict divided the collective into two camps. Horcanus, the weaker brother with the less communal support, fled to the Nabataean's king, Harith, and asked him for help to fight his brother and his brother's allies (ibid., 99). Harith, the Arab king in Petra, agreed to help, and in exchange, he received back twelve towns that were occupied earlier by Shlomo Zion.

That conflict did not stop; the two fighting brothers and their allies asked the intervention of the Roman commander in Syria. The latter used that opportunity to conquer Jerusalem and destroy its religious altar. We read that:

> The two brothers came to his court. Also a delegation of the Proshim came and demanded to end the monarchy. They have argued that according to an ancient tradition, the Jews have to take order from the chief priest only. The Proshim delegation claimed that while it is true that the two brothers were offspring of priests and they are priests themselves, with all the political changes that had taken place with the Hashmonites, the Jewish people had become slaves, and when the Roman senate had signed a treaty with the Jewish people, the monarchy went out of existence. Horcanus claimed that he deserved to be a king since he was the first born…. Against that, Aristobulus claimed that Horcanus was not skilled enough to run a state Pampas [the Roman commander]…ordered the two brothers to wait until after he was finished with his war with the Nabatees…. Aristobulus left Pampas without his knowledge…. Pampas then postponed his war with the Nabatees and followed Aristobulus (ibid., 100–1).

As it is becoming evident, the power struggles were fueled by religion and politics. The end result was the occupation of Jerusalem and all of the Judaic state. With that occupation the Jewish community came under the total domination of the Romans. It was in the year 63 B.C. We read the following, "The Roman army penetrated to the Temple and conducted a terrible massacre…. About twelve thousand people were cruelly killed at the time by the Romans and by their brothers. Pompios even did profanation of the Temple…walked into it…. He ordered the Temple purged and renewed the idolatry worship" (ibid., 101).

The textbook doesn't explicitly accuse the Proshim's intervention and their complaint to the Romans' commander as the final act that brought about the Roman's reoccupation of Jerusalem. In fact, the textbook hints that the source of those conflicts was the deep social cleavages between the various social groups in the Jewish community. For example, it discusses the conflict between the aristocracy, those who had benefited from the tax collection, and the masses. The textbook states that:

> At the request of the chief priest Yonathan, who was among the Jewish dignitaries' delegation to Rome, Felix Antonio was nominated a supervisor in Judea. But the situation during his very long years of rule, (60–52 B.C.) deteriorated. The Zealots' party had strengthened among the masses, and the political tension had increased. As a result, the internal tension increased too, which stemmed from differences in political and

> social affairs. The lower classes of the people supported the Zealots' party, which was fighting for liberty. Their hope of getting rid of Rome was related to their own social suffering. Against that, the Jerusalem aristocracy, the chief priest's families, had accepted Rome's rule. The Proshim did not speak in one voice.... The Roman supervisor fought the Zealots…but during his rule another radical Zealots group emerged, the Sekaaeim…. They had terrorized their internal enemies ….They had assassinated Yonathan, the chief priest…. The uprising in the country had spread all over. They were partly encouraged by people who had promised liberty from Rome… . This event ended with a massive killing, which was conducted by the Roman supervisor…. On the other hand, the oppression of the rebellion movement empowered the Zealots party, which advocated for fighting the Romans and did not rely on miracles only. More fiercely than before, now, they terrorized their internal opponents [Jewish opposition], to start the spark of the war against Rome (ibid., 138).

From the last quotation, we can conclude that the Jewish community was divided upon itself into several factions. Among those were the aristocracy, the lower classes, and the Zealots party. Some of the conflicts were over economic power, some over political power, others were fighting to achieve social justice, while still another group was fighting for freedom, and political sovereignty.

The distance between the Romans' Jewish collaborators, the priests, and the masses was large and unbridgeable. At the same time, the gap between those who had advocated for armed resistance to Rome and the submissive camp was big too. The conflicts and differences had also made religion and ethnicity a less important factor in setting boundaries between groups. Occasionally, the Romans were allies for one Jewish group against another. In other cases, the Arab (pagan) kings were also allies for one Jewish group against another.

In short, the factors that previously were claimed to integrate the Jewish collective now were out of existence. Moreover, while the emergence of factions was expected to change that situation, in reality it made it even worse than before. The Jewish collective included several sub-collectives, each with its own agenda and its own allies. The nation as a cohesive collective ceased to have control over a defined territory, and ceased to have an exclusive land of its own separate from the Greeks and the Canaanites in the cities under the Roman rule.

CONFLICTS AND DESTRUCTION

The final chapter in the Jewish ancient history in Canaan is distinguished by its dramatic events, including the internal factionalism within the Jewish community, the Bar-Kohba revolt against the Roman's oppressive measures, which brought about the destruction of the second Temple and the expulsion of Jews from Canaan. And finally, the rise of a competing religion, Christianity, which viewed Judaism as a tribal, primitive, inferior religion.

I start with the Bar-Kokhba revolt because of its centrality in the Israeli modern discourse. For many years, the Bar-Kokhba revolt was banned from school curricula. It was described as a fanatic act of collective suicide. After, 1967, the meaning of the Bar-Kokhba revolt started to change. Gradually it has become a landmark of courage, honor, and bravery in the Jewish history. For that reason, I find it important to discuss as one of the historical events that continues to shape the collective memory of the Jewish people.

In the textbooks, the authors discuss the general and indirect factors leading to the revolt. Among these were the continuous religious persecution by the Romans and their excessive oppression of the Jews, and more specifically, the heavy taxes levied on the population. The general feeling among the majority of the people was despair and loss of hope. Added to that were the internal social, religious, and political cleavages in the Jewish community itself.

The textbooks also mention two events which ignited the revolt. One was an incident of harassment of Jews in the city of Caesarea by a number of the Greek and Roman citizens of the city (ibid., 141). The second reason behind the revolt was the robbery of the Temple's treasures by one of the Roman deputies stationed in Jerusalem. That robbery was committed with the knowledge of Florous, the Roman commander. The Jewish community disdained the name of Florous. In turn, Florous sent a troop of soldiers to Jerusalem to salvage his honor. But the people of Jerusalem mocked him and his soldiers. He left the city enraged (ibid., 141–2).

After that, it became clear to the people of Jerusalem that the war was close. This most recent development divided the Jewish community in Jerusalem into two camps: the peace camp and theZealots' camp. The peace camp was led by Agrippa, one of the Jewish aristocrats, who was the chief priest of Jerusalem. He gathered the population of the city and asked them to seek peaceful ways to resolve the conflict with the Romans. In his speech to the people he mentioned that:

> Rome is powerful. Most nations surrendered to it, and they pay tribute. Among those [are] powerful nations and nations with larger numbers of people than the Jews in the country…. Agrippa was expelled from the city and Jerusalem went into the chaos of war (66 B.C.). Following the advice of Eleazer, the son of Hanania the chief priest, it was decided to stop the sacrifice rituals for the well being of Cesar. That decision meant declaration of war on Rome…. The peace party took over upper Jerusalem. The Zealots' party was on the Temple mountain and lower Jerusalem. In a battle that lasted for a week, the Zealots party occupied upper Jerusalem (ibid., 142–3).

The forces of the Zealots' party purged the city of Jerusalem of the peace camp followers, and chased the Roman soldiers who were stationed in the Herodotus castle. The zealots massacred both the Jewish peace party leaders and the Roman soldiers. As a result of that, the Jews became a target of murder in all the country's cities and towns. In cities where the Jews were a majority, they massacred the non-Jews, and in places where they were a minority they were massacred (ibid., 141–4). This is how the Jewish population found themselves in the midst of turmoil against the Roman Empire.

The Roman revenge was soon to come. On their way to Jerusalem, the Romans massacred many Jews (ibid., 145). In other cities and towns the number of Jews who were killed or sold as slaves reached 100, 000 (ibid., 149). In Jaffa, the Jews escaped to the sea, fearing the Romans' revenge. Most of them drowned (ibid., 150). A civil war broke out between the Zealots' party and the peace party. In Jerusalem, the Zealots were driven out of most of the city. They took refuge in the Temple mountain (ibid., 151). The Roman army reached Jerusalem and put it under siege. The year was 70 A.D. (Ibid., 153). The siege over Jerusalem was a death sentence to the people in the city. Diseases spread, and many died. Those who could escape were killed by the Romans stationed around the city (ibid., 154–5). Finally, the Roman army burned the gates leading to the Temple mountain. They entered the city and massacred those who got in their way. The Zealots "bravely and with courage tried to defend the Temple mountain" (ibid., 154).

The textbook then describes in detail the battle between the Romans and the Zealot fighters. Thus, we read that:

> The battles were fierce. The Romans penetrated the temple mountain on the eighth of Av. They pounded the external wall of the temple. The wall stood firm…. Those [Roman] soldiers who dared to climb up the wall were all killed in the battle. Titus ordered them to burn the wall gate The victorious [Romans] poured their rage on the defeated [zealots], who until the last minute did not believe that the Lord of Israel would let the fire consume His House. The Roman soldiers killed every person they encountered…. Titus gathered his soldiers to decide what to do with the Temple…. There were [soldiers'] voices that demanded to demolish it, and by that, to end any hope for future revolt. Others suggested keeping it as a symbol of the great Roman triumph over the Jews…. From the walls of the Temple mountain one wall survived, the Wailing Wall (ibid., 155, 156, 157).

The war did not end, and one of the symbolic tales of the Jewish "heroism" is told in the story of Masada. A group of about 1,000 Jews escaped from Jerusalem to a mountain in the desert called Masada. Its steep sides and flat top made it a natural fortress. There the Jews remained safe from the Roman army for three years. At last, the Romans built a ramp to the top of Masada. They marched up the ramp and smashed the defending walls. They were met by solemn silence. The defenders, preferring death to slavery, had taken their own lives. This is how the textbook describes it:

> Eleazer gathered them and gave a speech in which he influenced his friends to commit the great and terrible act. "They hugged their women with love and their children and with tears they kissed them for the last time…. Each massacred his own family…. Next, they chose by lottery ten people to slaughter them all. Each one laid down on the soil next to his slaughtered family members…. Each one willingly offered his neck for slaughtering by the people chosen for that terrible act." Next, the last ten killed each other. The last one "plunged his sword into his own flesh…and he fell dead next to his relatives." It was on the Passover night

> of sacrifice (73 A.D.). Only two women were saved with their five children who had hid. On the next morning when the Romans walked into the fortress they found piles of bodies and when they heard about what had happened from the two women "they did not cheer for what they saw…" They wondered in admiration for the act"…the heroism of the last heroes of Judea (ibid., 159–160).

To conclude, the destruction of the second Temple is a landmark in Jewish history. It is considered an event that brought about the suffering of Jews for two thousand more years. It was also behind the creation of the diaspora and the loss of Jewish presence in the country. The Jews were dispersed into many countries under the Roman rule; some were sold as slaves, while others gathered in their exclusive communities.

In addition to that, with the fall of the second Temple, the Jewish community was left without a temple and without a political leadership. Under these circumstances, the Jewish community turned back to religion for refuge from its political defeats and losses. Ever since that time, the religious priests have prayed for the "rebirth and rebuilding of the Temple." This yearning to Zion was the essence of the Jewish prayers in the diaspora, as the textbook mentions (ibid., 161).

JEWISH IDENTITY AND CHRISTIANITY

The destruction of the Jewish religious and political symbols in Jerusalem coincided with the rise of another competing force to their political-religious exclusiveness. During that era of turmoil, Christianity emerges as a serious challenge to the foundation of Jewish identity and its tribal nature. In the textbook, it says that Christianity emerged as an extension of the Jewish setbacks at the time. However, as a separatist movement, Christianity had to "distance itself from its origins" (ibid., 127–8). Paul's preaching is conveyed as "divorcing the Messiah from His national basis, revoking the Jewish national value of the Bible, and by adopting the pagan discourse at the time, the new religion swiftly disseminated in the world" (ibid., 131).

Not only that, "Christianity had to present itself as different and superior to the Jewish religion" (ibid., 130). In other words, Christianity is viewed as a Jewish religion that went astray to distance itself from its origin. It denounced its origin to gain its own legitimacy. This argument is discussed in the textbook, which states that:

> To succeed in his mission among the pagans, Paulus [Paul] made additional claims. [He said] with the crucifixion of Jesus a new era began. Again, there is no need for the Bible given to Israel because "it is the Bible of sin and death," "since without the Bible, sin is as dead" ... He presented a "spiritual Bible" shared only by those who believed in Jesus the master. Now after Jesus was crucified, we have been "rescued from the Bible, and its tradition, we were thrown away after we had died for it."… "We have to worship the Lord in new ways and not by the meaning of the old words" (ibid., 130).

Again, the emergence of Christianity from its "mother" religion is conceived as an act of disloyalty to Judaism. This disloyalty led in later centuries to tragic consequences, especially those misinterpretations of the origins of Christianity by the Church, which were behind the suffering and persecution of Jews in the centuries to come. We read that:

> Paulus [Paul] was the first Jew to "sacrifice" his own people for "saving the world"… Not only that, but in addition, he encouraged hatred against them. Like many of the heathens, he concluded that the divine enslavement of the people of Israel was a sign of their inferiority…[he said] The Jews who reject the new annunciation should be treated as sons of a female slave. "And what was said in the writings, expel that female slave and her son, because the son of a female slave will never inherit like the son of noble women." Later, from those sayings, the Christian church had drawn very tragic conclusions (ibid., 131).

The implications of these developments for the Jewish believers were dramatic. The basis of their "moral power" and sense of "distinctiveness, superiority, and chosen-ness," had been displaced to describe another rising discourse, Christianity. Judaism had lost its lure, since Jewish religion had been transformed from its particular and tribal basis into the universal. It was no longer a religion of a community bound by blood ties. Thus, with that triumph of Christianity, Judaism was left as a religion of a minority, which by means of strategic syncretism had lost its cultural capital—a capital that was incorporated into the new discourse and had become an organic element of it.

In conclusion, it could be argued that both the Masada revolt, which was led by the zealots' party, and the rise of Christianity are in fact opposite faces to the same social crisis. As discussed earlier, the social, political, and religious unrest had made many search for a new spiritual, political, and cultural alternative. There was a pressing need to seek hope when loss of identity on both the individual and collective level dominated people's lives. The remedies to the crisis, as I have shown, were the development of two opposing perspectives: One group headed by the Zealots' party advocated for resistance and rebellion to the Romans, and by that they hoped to "save" the community. The second group preached for self salvation through the universal salvation of all humanity. Oppression for them was not the experience of Jews only. Thus, by turning to the universal they aimed at saving the individual, whoever and wherever they were. From those debates Christianity emerged. The zealots' party knew of the rise of Christianity and its successes, and had chosen to fight its last predetermined war. It was a war against both the new Christians and the Romans. Their final decision to commit collective suicide was a form of protest against their weakness in maintaining their tribal and local religion in a world of globalizing forces of cultures, religions, societies and identities.

THE MIDDLE AGES

Briefly, I discuss the Middle Ages, since in the Israeli political and national narrative this period is presented as if it never existed. The textbooks discuss the Jewish history after the destruction of the second Temple in the Arab countries and Europe. One of the

recurring themes is the Jewish presence in Palestine. Time and again, the textbooks draw to the reader's attention that Jews never ceased to live in Palestine or they never stopped hoping for their redemption in "their homeland"(Zev, 1966:191).

Outside of Palestine, the textbook mentions Babel as one of the thriving Jewish centers during the Middle Ages. However, the textbook is ambivalent toward the Arab-Muslim culture there. On the one hand, it says that under Islamic rule, Jews enjoyed autonomy, and their cultural, economic, and religious life flourished. On the other hand, it emphasizes the Muslim persecution of Jews. Similarly, it talks about the Arab culture as most advanced, but in contrast the books portray it as a redundant culture that had no originality.

In Europe, Jews are described as those who were frequently subject to humiliation, persecution, and massacres (Zev, 1966:192). At the same time, on page 196, the text says that the Christian rulers in Europe often treated the Jewish communities there well. But on page 198–201, it then details the Inquisition Courts and the Jewish suffering both in Spain and in other European countries.

In short, the Middle Ages are discussed as an era of loss of identity and living abnormal lives outside the Father's land. More importantly, it is an era where religion was the only binding glue of the various dispersed Jewish communities in the diaspora. The Jewish communities had no political power to support them or protect them against the many waves of anti-Semitism.

THE MODERN HISTORY AND JEWISH NATIONALISM

In modern history the focus in the textbooks is on the historical, social, and political forces that influenced the Jewish people and led to the rise of Zionism and the establishment of the state of Israel. The emphasis is on the process of transformation of the collective from religious communities scattered all over the globe into a nation bound by a territory and political system. In this process, religion and historical memory play significant roles in constructing the imagined community and the rights for political privileges of statehood. In the textbooks, this history is divided into separate epochs: first, Jewish life in Europe and the rise of Zionism; second, the Yishuv (prestate) epoch; and finally, independence in 1948. Needless to say, each one of those epochs is divided into sub-periods according to the major events that dominated them at the time. I follow this periodization in my discussion, and show how the Jewish identity is described during each one of those epochs, and how it was transformed.

ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE RISE OF ZIONISM

Zionism appeared in Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century as a reaction to two interrelated processes, anti-Semitism, and the rise of nationalism in eastern and western Europe. Both anti-Semitism and nationalism denied Jews any collective rights, and in turn, made them subject to exclusion and marginalization in their states. These political processes prompted some Jewish leaders to seek solutions to the "Jewish question." The "Jewish question," was not the question of individual rights. Modern nationalism and the

ideas of citizenship, in western European states, ensured the individual rights of all citizens in the state, regardless of religion, ethnicity, and gender. As individuals, the Jew's rights as citizens of their state were secured like the rest of the population. Zimmerman (1966:5) reminds us that:

> The laws were clear: The Jew has the right to be a citizen like any other citizen in the state. To vote and be elected to public posts and participate in political life. In fact, Jews entered the civil service, participated in elections; they even were elected to parliaments and local institutions. In theory, it seems that the Jewish struggle has succeeded: the Jews have equal political rights like all other citizens.

Despite those dramatic political changes in the European countries, and in spite of the fact that the modern state had guaranteed equal rights and participation to the Jews as citizens, Jews during the 19th century continued to be concentrated in several professions, "trade, banking, journalism, or in academic professions such as teaching at universities, medicine, or lawyers" (ibid., 6). In other words, the new political organization of nation-states in Western Europe that was based on equal citizenship rights benefited Jews and opened for them new opportunities of social mobility. But those advancements, as the textbook asserts, were not without a price. The same political forces that opened the doors for Jewish participation in all fields of life made them the target of envy and hatred of the disadvantaged social classes in the society. Hatred toward Jews appeared more often during the rapid economic and social changes accompanying the social urbanization processes in Western Europe. During those times, Jews have become the "scapegoat" of society's ills and social inequalities. In particular, they were perceived as those who were behind all the political, economic, and social national problems (ibid., 6–7).

The explanation provided in the textbooks for this social exclusion and Othering of Jews is attributed to the process of nation-building and the sense of imagined communities in European states. It is argued that in most Western countries, collective history and religion were the bonding glue to the new co-nationals, and Jews seemed to be different. In other words, the process of constructing national history, roots, and national culture in Western countries left Jews out from those national histories and narratives, not as individuals, but as a collective. Thus, while the emancipation did resolve the problem of the Jew as an individual, it did not eliminate the collective exclusion of Jews that was deeply rooted in the European history of anti-Semitism. Against this historical process of inventing national histories, and amid the processes of social transformation, the Jews became the "national Other" in many of those European societies. Thus, we read that:

> It was a period of rapid developments in all fields—economics, politics,society; even the news traveled fast. That period brought with it manyadvantages but also many insecurities for many people. No wonder thatpeople searched for a scapegoat! When workers were fighting due totheir hardships, it seemed natural that they stand against the capitalists… But, is not it easier to blame the Jews for all? (Ibid., 7).

"It was enough," the textbook adds, "to invoke reactions such as The Jews are taking over the economy,' that the banker who was Bismarck's right arm was Jewish, or mentioning the Rothschild family," (ibid., 6–7). In other words, the Jews according to the textbook, were "scapegoats, victims, and persecuted," and they were conceived as the "national Other," and as those who were behind all social ills.

In fact, the textbook argues, blaming the Jews for all the social problems in society was not limited to random events in Europe of the late 19th century. They were part of a historical institution of Jewish exclusion. They were part of "a long historical European tradition of hatred toward the Jews" (ibid., 8). That ancient hatred, it is argued, was deeply rooted in the cultural fabric of those societies. In other words, hatred toward Jews in the late 19th century, like anti-Semitism, was not an ephemeral phenomenon; it was an institution with "historical roots," and with a well-developed machinery of persecution. These arguments are discussed in the textbook in the following:

> A long tradition of hatred toward Jews existed in Europe: hatred of Jews for their religion, their professions, and for their tradition. The Jews achieved equal rights in spite of those who resented them. Now, those who hated them renewed their war more fiercely than before: if there are difficulties—the blame is on the Jews, particularly after the emancipation and because of it (ibid., 8).

Since anti-Semitism is seen as an institution, and not an ephemeral phenomenon, it certainly should always create social grouping of Them verses Us, of Jews and non-Jews. Thus, the emancipation that aimed at solving the individual's problem is in fact incapable of eliminating such a historical and collective tradition of exclusion of Jews. Any solution, the textbook argues, should focus on eliminating and putting an end to anti-Semitism as an institution. To support this view, the textbook discusses in detail one of the most known cases of anti-Semitism, the case of the Jewish French army officer Dreyfus' trial, (ibid.,15–27).

During the Dreyfus trial, the textbook argues, the French press was behind a well-organized campaign of Jewish hatred. Jews were conveyed as people "of lower race" (ibid., 10). Other headlines said, "Jews should be expelled to keep the nation clean" (ibid., 11), "The Jewish France" (ibid.,18), "Jews like Dreyfus are small spies who work for the rich Jews" (ibid., 9). Yet, other newspapers claimed that Dreyfus was part of an "international Jewish conspiracy" (ibid., 20), and Jews were those who "hold the republic in their hands" (ibid., 26), etc.

Thus, in Western Europe, the emancipation and citizenship rights opened the door to Jewish participation in the economic, cultural, and political life of their countries. But at the same time, their success placed them in the spotlight for public scrutiny. Often, they were made scapegoats as a result of national or international economic decline and political unrest. Jewish hatred resurfaced especially in countries where there was a history of anti-Semitism (ibid., 6).

In Eastern Europe, the textbook argues, the situation was even worse. The Jewish population wanted to take part in the country's life, "In order to achieve equal rights, the Jewish intelligentsia planned the following, 'Our plan is to make the Jews Russians…. We live in Russia, so we must be Russians'" (ibid., 28). But, despite the fact that Jews

wanted to be equal Russian citizens, at times of economic decline, they became the government's scapegoats. Often, the same government turned its citizens against Jews with "pogroms and massacres of Jews."

The pogroms against Jews started in Russia in March of 1881, and lasted four years (ibid., 29). In those pogroms, Jewish property was "damaged, stolen, corrupted, and Jews were injured and killed" (ibid., 29–33). The Jewish reaction to those pogroms in most cases was massive migration to Germany, and from there to the United States, Canada, Argentina, etc. Tens of thousands of Jews migrated to those countries. At the same time, only 3.2% (about 20,000) of all immigrants went to Palestine (ibid., 34–8).

Another strategy of coping with anti-Semitism was assimilation. It was more widespread in some Western countries than others. Assimilation resolved the problem of the Jew as an individual, but it did not address the expectations of Jews as a collective with ethnic or national demands. Evidently, citizenship was never intended to resolve collective ethnic demands within a society based on civic nationalism. Ethnic or national demands were resolved through national struggles. In Eastern Europe, as elsewhere, national movements rebelled and demanded independence. The success of several of those revolutions gave hope to some Jewish groups, who started organizing themselves into a Zionist movement aimed at resolving the "Jewish question" as a collective once and for all.

ZIONISM AND JEWISH IDENTITY

Zionism's main goal was to transform the Jewish people from religious communities into a national entity, and by that to end their "suffering and humiliation" as a collective. As a dominant ideology toward the end of 19th century, nationalism was seen as a miraculous remedy that could bring an end to human humiliation and suffering, induce pride in the crushed souls and spirits of many collectives that endured oppression and poverty. Those ideas gave hope to some Jewish leaders, who sought to end the "Jewish question" in Europe, and by that to put an end to their suffering.

The early Zionists are described in the textbooks as people with noble goals and ideas. Their main concern was to organize the Jewish people into a national entity. Implicitly, Zionists are portrayed as superior, with a unique sense of national commitment. Unlike those who chose assimilation, migration, or submission to their fate, Zionists have chosen a different path. They started their movement under unfavorable conditions where most Jews were weak, persecuted, and a few had a sense of nationalism. For example, in the textbook, Jews are depicted as "weak, persecuted," and "humiliated." In several other occasions however, they are described as "proud people, courageous, well organized," and "have a developed sense of nationalism." It also says that Jews had a sense of "collective solidarity" and that during those hard times, the "hidden power in the people," was "invoked" in a crisis of necessity.

Those conflicting descriptions are clearer in the textbook where it discusses the German Jews' attitudes toward the Russian Jewish immigrants who stopped in Germany seeking a destination for themselves. The textbook presents excerpts from a diary of one of the Zionist activists in Western Europe saying, "While looking at the miserable characters who arrived at our offices to process their immigration papers, occasionally,

we found ourselves in an embarrassing situation, 'What impression will these people make on the people in the U.S.A., Canada and Argentina? Would not they invoke disdain or prejudices?"(ibid., 44).

In addition to that, on page 42 of the same textbook, the Russian Jews are described as "liars, dishonest, parasites, uneducated, and poor." On the next page, they are described as those who "deserve mercy," and therefore, a person should feel sorry for their misfortune. Among those descriptions we find, "miserable, suffered for a long time, living in fear, and humiliated." It is clear that these descriptions make the Russian Jews the ultimate Other for the German Jews.

Against these descriptions, of the Russian Jews as Others, the textbook argues that the Jewish solidarity and the sense of nationhood are manifested in the willingness of the European Jews to help their brothers, the Russians. That help was not limited to financing of their immigration costs to the United States, but rather caring for them as part of the collective. Again, from the same diary, we read:

> I have discovered another thing, the sense of collective national solidarity among the Jews is stronger than I have ever thought… When the call for help came, the sense of solidarity did not feel it has faded, it was alive more than expected. And what the Jews had done in the last half year needs to be admired… Among the committee [members] there were people from different currents—educated and religious—who worked together in faith. I said to myself, if these miserable Jews of Russia invoke such a sense of sacrifice, commitment and national sense… Then, there will be enough awaking for the national idea (ibid., 45–6).

Despite the earlier descriptions of the various Jews, the quotation glorifies the national spirit and the collective solidarity among all Jews, regardless of their nationality. Implicitly, it is trying to say that while on the surface the "collective seems weak," there is a sense of Us which is deeply rooted in the collective. That hidden force of collective solidarity and mutual commitment is what gives hope to the Zionist activists that their "national idea" might materialize.

Those "discoveries" the textbook has advanced set the stage for the Zionist movement that aimed at transforming the Jewish people from an aggregate of unrelated individuals into a nation. By that, it meant to "recover" the sense of nationalism among the various religious communities that was hidden for two thousand years. To achieve those goals, it was imperative for the Zionist leaders to denounce the emancipation option, since in their view it addressed the problem of individuals and not the political aspirations of Jews as a collective. It dealt with religion as a private matter and not a source of political action and national solidarity. In turn, emancipation was a threat equal in its consequences to assimilation or other forms of loss of identity.

In contrast, Zionism as a project aimed at transforming the self perception of Jews, and invoking the dormant sense of nationalism in the people that would make each individual "proud of himself, fearless, secure, advanced," and above all, "living a free life in their own state like many other nations." In other words, Zionism wanted to create a "new Jew" different from those who assimilated, or those who submitted to their unfortunate destiny of humiliation and despair.

Those goals were translated into a plan with a clear strategy. First, since Jews were scattered all over the globe, it was necessary to locate a territory to gather them in. Second, the Jews would gradually displace to that land several chosen groups to set the ground for massive displacement of Jews later. Third, it would then be necessary to organize the massive migration to the future homeland. Finally, they needed to build national institutions appropriate for statehood in the land. The beginning of the Zionist project began toward the end of the nineteenth century, and the actual materialization of it came in 1948 with the establishment of Israel in Palestine.

The driving forces behind those ideas and plans were two Zionist activists, Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, who was born in 1860 and studied at the law school, but later moved to journalism (ibid., 126), and Yehoda-Lev Pinsker, a Russian scholar who "initially believed in the project of emancipation, but later discovered nationalism as the only solution for the Jews" (ibid., 72–3).

For Pinsker:

> The Jews are not "a live nation." They are foreigners in every place, [thus] they will be [subject to] mockery… In the eyes of the living, the Jew is considered dead, in the eyes of citizens, he is a stranger, in the eyes of the residents, he never stays in one place, [he is] always on the move. In the eyes of the rich—[the Jew is] a beggar, [and] in the eyes of the poor, taking advantage. In the eyes of a patriot [the Jew is] a person of no homeland, [in short], in the eyes of all a hated competitor (ibid., 73).

Viewing the Jewish existence through this perspective, Pinsker thought that the only solution to the Jewish problem was a national solution that would solve their problem as a group. In 1882, Pinsker wrote that, "The Jewish question needs to be resolved in national ways. The best and the only remedy is the construction of a Jewish nation. The self liberation of Jews as a nation [will only be achieved] on its land. [To] make them an equal nation among nations, [is] by purchasing a country especially for them" (ibid., 74).

In addition to Pinsker, the textbook mentions that Herzl, on the other side of Europe, came to the conclusion that the Jewish problem was a national problem. It could only be resolved by national transformation. Since, as he thought, the Jews, unlike many nations, had no country to claim as theirs, the Jewish national problem could be resolved by appealing to the international community to allocate a country for the Jewish needs. In the Israeli textbook, Herzl says that, "The Jewish problem is a national problem. In order to resolve it, we have first to make an international political issue that requires solution in the councils of the civilized nations. We are a nation, one nation ... Give us sovereignty over a piece of land on this globe that will be sufficient for our justified nation's needs, and the rest will provide" (ibid., 127).

Herzl thought that the Zionist goals could only be achieved within an international consensus that would first acknowledge the Jewish needs of statehood, and second, allocate that territory for them. He argued, "We need to achieve a charter which will be approved by the international council of the civilized nations." For Herzl, those "civilized nations" who had land at their disposal were the colonial Western countries, who also happened to be the superpowers at the time.

In his search for a homeland, Herzl would initiate talks with the Ottomans, the British, the French and the Germans, hoping to receive a country for the Zionist project. The Ottomans' rejection of the repeated requests of Herzl to allow Jews to migrate to Palestine led him to accept the Uganda proposal set by the British (ibid., 151–6). That project was presented in the Jewish Congress, where 295 approved it, and 178 voted against it, with another 132 abstaining (ibid., 153). These results led to the rejection of the Uganda proposal in the sixth Jewish Congress, held in Basel.

Herzl's opponents suggested that Palestine would be the only place that would attract Jews. The failure of Herzl's negotiations with the Ottomans only made their position stronger. Against the Ottoman refusal, they suggested a more aggressive approach—direct occupation and settlement of Palestine. These differences were later resolved by adopting a dual process strategy. First, they accepted Herzl's position to "choose Palestine as the future home of Jews" (ibid., 156), subject to international approval before any form of settlements started (ibid., 156–7). Secondly, they started gradual infiltration into Palestine by illegal migration and "creating facts on the ground" (ibid., 157).

This compromise satisfied both camps within the Jewish Congress. It simply meant creating facts on the ground and simultaneously, seeking ways to legitimate them internationally. In practice, it created a division of labor between the two camps. One camp took upon itself the diplomatic task. Soon, they started negotiations with the superpowers, seeking their support and approval. The other task force organized youth groups from all European countries to be shipped to Palestine. Those youth groups were the "pioneers," whose main goal was to prepare the land for later massive mi- gration of Jews from Europe to Palestine.

PALESTINE, PEOPLE AND LAND

Palestine was an Ottoman province from the middle of the 16th century on. From an Arab perspective, Palestine became Arab in the mid of the fourth millennium B.C., with the arrival of the first migration wave of the Canaanite Arabs from the Arab Peninsula. Since then, the Arab historians argue, Arabs never left Palestine, and they were always the majority population in Palestine, whether Palestine came under the Persian, Egyptian, Greek, or Roman empires' rule. Since the 7th century, it became an Arab-Muslim province and the second holy place after Mecca. When Zionists started migrating to Palestine, it was already heavily populated in terms of those days. Close to a half a million Arabs lived there in hundreds of towns and villages.

Zionists viewed Palestine as the land of the Fathers (Ibid., 164–5), and as an ideal place for creating a "new Jew." This "new Jew," in contrast to the diasporaic Jew, who was considered spiritually dead, would restore the past glory of the nation through his/her rebirth on the land. In the textbook, it says, "The Land of Yisrael should create a Jewish society of a new kind. If, in the diaspora the Jews worked in trade…in their [new] country, they needed to create a 'healthy' and productive society: a society mostly tied to the land, working on the land, working with their hands" (ibid., 164). It then says, "The 'rebirth' was based on the idea of living from land labor, to return to nature; in particular, to be peasants in the Land of Yisrael, and build a new society according to the socialist theory" (ibid., 165).

Tragically, to achieve those "noble" goals it was not sufficient displace Jews from Europe to Palestine and by that start the process of creating a "new Jew." It became imperative to depopulate Palestine to allow this change to take place, and thus, achieve those national goals. In other words, there was a need to transform Palestine itself—people as well as land.

But to avoid the moral dilemma of colonizing other people's lands, the Zionist narrative portrays Palestine as a "wilderness, empty, abused, neglected, [and] full of diseases." The process by which this neglect and abuse was achieved is described as historical and due to the "Arabs' misuse" of the land. In the textbook it states, "With the turn of the 17th century, the story of the decline of Eretz Yisrael began. The main reason to that, was the malfunctioning of the government: killers' gangs, thieves, and bandits were everywhere" (ibid, 78).

In addition to that emptiness and wilderness, the land of Palestine is portrayed as an unsafe place full of dangers, and a land of chaos where the government came up short in "protecting its subjects from the gangs of killers and bandits." The "killers" and "bandits" are the Arabs of Palestine, who are described as "strangers" to the land, and as such, the land "began to deteriorate." Other descriptions leave the reader with little doubt that the country was a large wilderness, and would deteriorate further if it were left to the Arabs. The text says, "The land is becoming wilderness and many villages disappear. Since 1838, many villages disappeared from the map and their residents were annihilated… The Bedouins quickly move into every place a horse can approach, and the government is helpless against them and unable to protect its subjects (ibid., 79).

The Bedouin Arabs are portrayed as an "incurable disease" that makes "the government, helpless." On the same page we read from a voyager's diary, "There was no shade in the wilderness around us, we were burned under the sun… The country is bare and rocky. The air and the wilderness are depressing… There was no tree or bush in the place. Even the olive tree and the cactus, the land's loyal friends, were absent." Similar descriptions continue on the next page. This time not only the land is "empty" of plants, it is in fact "empty" of people: "You won't find a village in this valley. Indeed you find two to three groups of Bedouin tents, but not even one sedentary. You can ride ten miles in this area and you won't encounter ten people." Such descriptions of the "empty land, wilderness, neglected land," and "abused land" continue on pages 98, 99, and 115. The textbook often describes the land as "empty" of both people and plants. Occasionally, it is described as a "land of wild animals, of foxes and jackals" (ibid., 115). Further, the people of the land are described as "thieves, bandits," and "killers" (ibid., 78–9), "dirty, noisy, primitive, sick, vulgar, living among diseases" (ibid.,180, 193), "abusers of Jews" (ibid.,79), "hate [us] and willing to kill and rob Jews" (ibid., 80–96), "cheap labor" (ibid., 180), etc.

Further, while the textbook does provide statistical data that indicates that the land was populated by 300,000 Palestinians, and less than 25,000 Jews, the Palestinians are made "invisible" in all the descriptions (ibid., 86). What we see in the land are "dispersed tents" of Bedouins. No towns or cities are present in those descriptions. No Arab farmers or other signs of living that indicate that there are people there, just a "wilderness and bared mountains."

Those descriptions of the land and people seem to be "necessary" for the Zionist discourse to achieve legitimacy to "populate" the "empty" land. It could be argued that

this discourse implies, “we are not taking land of Others. It is an empty space that we can make livable and civilized.” The possibility of claiming the land becomes legitimate by employing the binary oppositions of empty against “our will to make it full (populated),” by that the “invisibility” of the Other, which helps to valorize “our presence or visibility.”

In addition to that, the textbook denies the Palestinians any attachment to their country, by emphasizing the “value, advantages” and “holiness” of the land for the Jewish people. As such, it implies, “we won’t abuse it or neglect it because it is dear to us.” This is how the textbook describes the Zionist attachment to the land, and the sense of holiness they attribute to it as it is mentioned in “literature and religion.” We read the following;

> The secret behind settling in and migrating to Israel is due to the high advantages mentioned in the literature and the religion of Israel. The Jews deeply believed that living in Eretz Yisrael is a Mitsva [commandment] and it is the key for the nation’s redemption. In the country, all commandments could be practiced including those related to the land (ibid., 85).

Further, similar to other colonial cases, the Zionist discourse advances the idea that the locals (“natives”) are “not a people.” In fact, they are “gangs, bandits,” and “killers.” In contrast to them, the Zionist discourse implies, “we are a nation of civilized people who dream to recover our father’s land.” The notion of “civilized” is concluded from the previous quotation where the textbook mentions expressions of attachment to the land in “literature and religion.” Thus, people who have “literature” are “certainly” conceived as “civilized” compared to those who are just “gangs of killers” and “bandits.”

Again, the opposition of “people” and “non people,” “civilized” and “gangs of thieves and killers,” “visible Jews” and “invisible Arabs,” are the means by which the Zionist narrative aimed at valorizing the Jews compared to the Palestinian Others. These arguments were not limited to the early Zionist migration to Palestine; they became central pillars of the Israeli na- tional narrative in the years to come.

THE OLD JEWISH SETTLEMENTS IN PALESTINE

In the Zionist narrative, the old Jewish minority in Palestine, like the Palestinians, is described in pejorative manner. Specifically, their descriptions resemble those mentioned earlier of the Russian Jews in Eastern Europe. The religious Jewish community in Palestine is often seen as people who lived in “poverty, fear, oppression, and persecution.” They are portrayed as weak, and as those who could not defend themselves. The textbook states that:

> Jerusalem was in a dismal condition, it moaned under the yoke of the tyrant… Jews who came to die in the land of their fathers were suffering daily abuses and harassment with no sense of shame or mercy [from the Arabs]… They did not know who to turn to… Those Jews who wish to live decently are occasionally forced to waste their time and work for the

> Turkish…the ungrateful, and with no payment… [The Arabs] attack them and steal their money and property, and if the Jews dare to resist they will be beaten to death. This is not done by bandits or Bedouins; it is performed by people with whom the Jews talk daily (ibid., 80).

Thus, the Jews are conceived as "helpless" against their "poverty, harassment," and "persecution." The Arabs who "subject them to all kinds of oppression," are conveyed as "shameless, with no mercy, thieves and bandits," and "dishonest" since they show their "disloyalty" to the Jews whom they "meet and talk with, daily." Therefore, what is conveyed is a contrast between "victims" and "victimizers." The "victims" are "helpless," which implies "weakness," compared to the "victimizers," who are "powerful" and evil.

To valorize the weakness of the Jewish minority in Palestine, the textbook provides statistical data on the Jewish population. Thus, it states that the total number of Jews who lived in Palestine, toward the end of the nineteenth century did not exceed 25 thousand. Against that number the textbook argues there were 300,000 Arabs. The Jews lived in four cities in Palestine and they focused on practicing their religion (ibid., 86).

It becomes evident that by depicting both the religious Jewish minority in Palestine and the Russian Jews as weak, poor, humiliated, victims, etc., this narrative glorifies the role of Zionists in "saving" those Jews from their misfortune. Also, like the Arabs, Europe's anti-Semitism is depicted as evil too. By saying that, Zionism's purpose becomes ending all of those injustices through the creation of a "new Jew" who is proud, dignified, and secure in his Father's land. The "new Jew" is in negation to the diaspora and the religious Jews of Palestine, and different from the Arabs of Palestine.

In the textbook, the Zionist project starts with ethnic geographical segregation of building new Jewish neighborhoods separate from the Palestinian Arabs. The project of "saving the Jews" from the "crowded and narrow streets" of Jerusalem, Jaffa, and other Arab cities started toward the end of the nineteenth century. For example, in Jerusalem, displacing the Jews into segregated ethnic enclaves started with the generous funds arriving from Moses Montefiore.

Similar to the European Jews, "saving" the old Jewish minority in Palestine meant segregating them from the Arabs. Zionists hoped to transform the religious Jews' identity through their geographical displacement. As mentioned before, in the case of Jerusalem and Jaffa, the displacement forced Jews to build houses outside the Arab cities. While this displacement "rid" Jews of the Arab "threat," nevertheless, it exposed them to other dangers and risks such as "wilderness, bandits, killers," etc. In spite of that, the textbook adds, the “displaced” Jews were willing to take upon themselves those risks. Saying that implies that facing those risks was much better than living in the “crowded” and “populated” Arab cities and enduring their hostilities. It also glorifies the displaced self-commitment, devotion, sacrifices, and their courage (ibid., 80–96).

The Jewish neighborhoods outside the walls of the old city of Jerusalem were organized according to ethnic affiliation. Thus, the textbook mentions that in the new neighborhoods, each ethnic group lived in its own area. There were Sephardi, Ashkenazi, Persian, Iraqi, etc., neighborhoods segregated from each other (ibid., 96). This is an interesting situation, since earlier, it seemed as if the separation from Arabs aimed at creating a cohesive collective, now it turns out to be different. The previous distinction between Our space and Theirs does not hold in this case. The segregation between Arabs

and Jews extends itself into what is perceived to be Us, the Jewish collective. In other words, while earlier the segregation was presented as a precondition to the "normalization" of Jewish life, it fell short of achieving that collective solidarity beyond the ethnic differences.

ZIONISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE

While Zionism aimed at transforming the Jewish identity, it could not escape impacting the Other, the Palestinians. Because the new Jewish identity was constructed through segregation and in opposition to both people and land of Palestine, it could not escape making a dramatic impact on them. Thus, as early as the turn of the twentieth century, the Palestinians realized the negative consequences of the Zionist project that later forced them into exile from their homeland. Meanwhile, in the Israeli narrative, Zionism is portrayed as a modernizing force for Palestine. More significant is the portrayal of Zionism as a "blessing," that the Palestinians "should be thankful for."

Like many western colonial thinkers, Herzl also viewed the Zionists' project in Palestine as a manifestation of modernity and progress of the advanced west in the orient. For him, the local Palestinian population would seize this opportunity to modernize and sooner or later, would recognize the "blessing that Zionism would bring the Arabs." Consequently, he did not envisage any Arab resistance to the Zionist colonization of Palestine.

Herzl's vision was made public in his novel *"Altneuland"* (Old-New land), published in 1902. In this novel, Herzl describes a trip of two fictional characters from Europe who travel around the world. One of the characters is Jewish and the other is a German Christian. On their trip, they stop in Palestine. There, they meet people and travel in the country. In one of their encounters, they engage in a dialogue with a fictional Arab character named Rashid Pasha (Pasha, is a name that was given by the Turks to dignify a person, like Sir, etc.). The textbook provides a lengthy excerpt from Herzl's novel, which reads:

> "One question, Rashid Pasha, the status of the previous residents of Palestine did not deteriorate by the immigration of the Jewish people? Didn't the residents have to leave the country? I am referring to the masses. [For me], the fact that a few individuals had benefited from this, does not prove a thing."
>
> "What a question!" answered Rashid. "This was a blessing to us all. It is obvious that the first to benefit were the property owners, who were able to sell their land to the Jewish people at high costs, or even to keep it under their ownership in a wait for higher prices. I myself sold my land to our new company, because I found out it was more worthwhile." "And what happened to the previous people who had no property of their own—[what happened] to the masses of Muslim Arabs?"
>
> "Mr., the answer is implied in the question," said Rashid. "Those who had nothing, and had nothing to lose anyway, were in a position to gain. Indeed, they did [gain]: Employment opportunities, improved nutrition,

> and a better financial status.There was nothing more wretched and miserable than an Arab village in Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century. The peasants lived in dens which were not suitable enough even for beasts. The children loitered outside, naked and neglected, and grew up like the animals in the field. Now, all this has changed. They enjoyed the services of the welfare institutions, whether they wanted so or not. When the swamps in the country were drained, when the channels were dug and eucalyptus trees were planted, which bettered the soil, they [the Jews] used local manpower, which was well immune and well paid. Look over there, to the field! I remember, since I was a young boy, that swamps were located here. This land was purchased by the new company, who received it for the lowest price, and it transformed into a crown jewel. These fields belong to that clean village that you see over there, on the hill. That is an Arab village. Do you see that small mosque? Those miserable people became a lot happier; they are able to sustain themselves properly, their children are healthier and they are learning something. Their belief and old tradition were not affected—only great prosperity came upon them…
>
> "Actually, you are strange people, you Muslims! Don't you see these Jews as foreign invaders?"
>
> "Christian, why is it strange!" answered the lovely Rashid, "Would you have seen a thief in a person who takes nothing from you, but brings you some of his? The Jews enriched us, why should we be mad at them? They are living with us like brothers, why should not we…love them? I have never had, among the people of my own religion, a better friend than this David Ludwig (ibid., 140–1).

Clearly, the Zionist project, according to Herzl, was conceived as a "blessing" not only for Jews but for Arabs as well. Here the Zionists are conveyed as an extension of European modernity and progress. Their colonization project in Palestine is depicted as a "civilizing" mission toward the locals, who were previously living in "dens, dirt and sicknesses, ignorance, poverty, in wilderness" etc. With the Jewish arrival, this "primitive, backward" way of life "was transformed" and "improved for the better." Thus, the arrival of the Jews and the taking over of the Arab land is described as bringing progress and prosperity to the Arabs, which in turn, made them recover from their "miserable life."

In addition, while in previous texts the land is discussed as "empty," in the last quotation it is portrayed as inhibited but with people who need to be changed or maybe "saved." Those "animal-like" people had "gained" from the Zionist project. To achieve that level of human "progress," similar to the way the land itself was drained form its "swamps, diseases," the Arab people were "cured from their diseases" such as "fears, poverty, ignorance and their wild nature."

Another point that demonstrates the colonial attitude in Herzl's vision is the cultural differences of the participating characters themselves. The man who was questioning the local Arab is a European Jew. He was not an oriental Jew who could share with the Palestinians cultural and historical experiences. This Jew was alien to both place and

culture, and alien as well to both Jewish and Arab Palestinians. He was a westerner who believed that he carried the "burden of the White man" to civilize the colonized.

But, what is more surprising in Herzl's vision, like the rest of the Zionist narrative, is the ambivalence toward European countries and cultures. On the one hand, Europe is the evil anti-Semitic culture and history that Zionists opt to escape. On the other hand, the same Zionist narrative presents itself as an extension of that European culture. In both cases, the Zionists are alienated, if not from Europe, then from the Orient, and if not from the Orient, then from Europe. Those contradictions have never been addressed in the textbooks; never was there an attempt to reconcile them.

THE YISHUV PERIOD AND THE HALUTZ IDENTITY

The Yishuv is the Jewish community in Palestine prior to the foundation of Israel. This period started with the first wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine in 1881 and culminated with the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948. It is the period of settlements, successive waves of Jewish migration into Palestine, and the period of developing separate Jewish political and economic institutions for the future state. It is also the period of British colonization of Palestine, which started in 1917 with the Balfour Declaration, in which they granted Palestine to the Jewish people to establish their state on its lands, and ended in 1947.

In the Israeli narrative, the Yishuv period is an era of heroism, rebirth of the nation, and miraculous national achievements. The achievements made in the project of nation building during this time are attributed to the "pioneer," the "new Jew," whose devotion, efforts, and commitment were the driving force behind the national Zionists. Thus, we find in the textbook that the pioneer is one who fought on several fronts. He is conceived as a person who wanted to transform both people and land. He had to "fight many enemies" such as "Arabs, swamps, Turks, and British." Often, the pioneer is described as a person who could "endure" all kinds of hardship and with his "devotion and love for the land" he made "miracles," and made the "desert blossom."

To understand the glorification of the myth of the "pioneer" in the Israeli narrative, I quote below correspondence between a group of Jewish immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century in Palestine, and their families in Russia. The textbook presents this correspondence as evidence of the pioneers' readiness to make sacrifices. It highlights their miraculous historical role in preparing the ground for massive Jewish immigration later. The letter, the book says, was published at the time in the local Jewish press in Palestine. Those immigrants were members of the BILU group. BILU is an acronym for the Biblical Hebrew phrase "House of Jacob group, let us go" (Isaiah, 2:5). In their letter, these pioneers were "students, who had left all to come to the land of the Fathers." It reads:

> …We the signed below are all the sons of the new generation; our strength is fresh and our whole life is ahead of us. We will be able to employ our physical [and] mental strengths for the good of the land of our fathers, and to rebuild its ruins…. We know, in advance, that we will not reach our ultimate goal easily…. We know that many years of hard labor

> will pass before we are able to celebrate the great day. But only by embarking on this road does our future have a hope; this road gives us the courage to redirect our steps toward the new horizon. We appeal to the sons of Israel, and from the bottom of our hearts we call: Carry the miracle of Zion… The end to our bitter exile will come, and, after two thousand years of wandering, we will rest in the land of our fathers. By our own hard work we will be able to make our living We no longer will be foreign (Zimmerman, 1966:102).

The pioneers vow to use their ultimate physical and mental capacities to make their mission successful, and this makes them national heroes. Unlike, the Jews of Eastern Europe, they are described as those who "will make their living by [their] hard work." In other words, they are no longer dependent on charity or others' support; they know how to make their own living with their hard labor. Not only that—the pioneers are described as adventurous. The textbook says that they forced their entry into the country by bribing the Turk's officers who prohibited immigration into Palestine at the time (ibid., 104). More importantly, the pioneers are described as those, who by returning to Zion "will no longer be foreign." Thus, after two thousand years of diaspora, the pioneers return to their "home," making the prophecy of Jewish redemption come true.

Another aspect of the myth of the pioneer is related to his relationship to the land. Land has both symbolic and actual value. Without land, the Zionist project could not succeed in displacing Jewish immigrants from Europe into Palestine, which was essential for later claims of political rights of statehood. Also, the land stands as a symbol of normalization of the Jews' lifestyle from trade, banking, etc., into a "normal" nation, where land is a main source of living and a symbol of stability. As mentioned earlier, in the Zionist discourse, life in the diaspora was conceived as abnormal, where Jews concentrated in certain occupations, most of which were not related to land. Thus, land ownership and husbanding the land became indications of normal occupations and signs of attachment to a place. In the myth of the pioneer one finds that the issue of land takes center stage.

Ussishkin (a Zionist leader who was part of Herzl's opposition), discusses some of the principles that guided the "pioneers'" action during the early years of Jewish settlement in Palestine, and their relations to the land:

> For the land to become the property of the nation who is making it her center, they need to become its owner and governor, even if not de facto. The people must be faithful and dedicated to it and their soul connected to its soul. They must saturate the land with the sweat of their labor ... It is necessary that all the Land of Israel or at least, most of it will be [under] the ownership of the people of Israel. Without the right of ownership, the Land of Israel will never be Jewish (ibid., 147).

It is evident that one of the most important goals of the "pioneers" and the Zionists was to take over the land, make it their "own." In the original Hebrew text it uses ba'lot for ownership, which also means "being as a husband" or "penetrating." Thus, to work the land is to "husband" it. More significant, the land itself is feminine, mother earth, while

the Halutz is a masculine owner, ba'l. There is no reference to the Halutz as a female. In other words, those relations between the Halutz and land are in fact relations of "husband" and "wife," relations of marriage. This marriage is patriarchal, where males dominate and subordinate their females. In fact, Ussishkin is urging the pioneers to own land—ba'lut—and to dominate it, shlitta. Similar to a human patriarchal family, in which the main purpose of the marriage is reproduction, here again, in Ussishkin's conception, both strategies of ownership and domination are seen essential for achieving national "reproduction"—rebirth—in the land of the Fathers, and a step toward national redemption. Without achieving ownership and/or control of the land, the whole Zionist project—of wedding the Halutz with mother earth, the land—would be in jeopardy.

To achieve these goals, the Zionist movement started with the establishment of agricultural settlements scattered in various areas. Those small, economically independent islands put pressure on the Palestinians, forcing them later to leave. In the years after, those small islands expanded into the surrounding territory. With that, more land came under the Zionists' control. But the *massive* land expansion was not achieved through land acquisition, but rather through war, and the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland in 1947–1949.

There is another issue that is important in the Zionist discourse that pertains to land. In Ussishkin's ideology, husbanding the land strengthens a person's social bonds with it and each other. Again, there is resemblance in those relations of husbanding land and the role played by the family in society. The family, as a social institution is conceived, is the building block of society, and it also brings social attachment and solidarity.

Another interesting point is the portrayal of husbanding the land as a process of resocialization or acculturation to a new social status, the "new Jew." Like the change in one's status from pre-marriage to marriage, resocialization through husbanding the land is conveyed as achieving the same goal of transforming people's identity and their self perception. For the Zionists, without such a transformation, the project would collapse. In other words, they needed to create people with new identities different from their previous diaspora identities and lifestyle, and to induce them to choose jobs different from the diaspora "speculative jobs" Jews used to have. The textbook states that:

> [The pioneers shared] rejection of the lifestyle in exile…. These people saw in the land of Israel not only a shelter for the Jews in exile…. the land of Israel must create a Jewish society of a new kind. If in exile most of Jews were merchants or worked in "speculative jobs," in their country they must create a "healthy" and a productive society: A society in which most of it is connected to the land, working in the land, and working in a true hand labor (ibid., 162–3).

The quotation suggests that unity of humans and nature through work on the land creates personal fulfillment and reduces social injustice. Providing for one's living from his/her own labor eliminates exploitation, and thus creates a "healthy" and an egalitarian society. This theme of creating a Jewish socialist society in Palestine is central to the Zionist discourse. Several Israeli thinkers made it the heart of their Zionist ideology. Implicitly, it provided Zionism with the moral support, especially in the West, which was needed to perfect the colonization of Palestine. The emphasis of egalitarian socialist (Jewish)

society hid the savage consequences of their action for the Palestinians, and made their project appear morally right.

Coming back to the pioneers and land, working the land makes people more "connected to the land," and thus makes them more willing to defend it as their personal property. But, the gap between those ideas and reality was large. The inexperienced "pioneers" soon realized that fact. Instead of creating a separate collective of Jewish land workers, they had to compete with the more experienced local Arab agricultural workers. The textbook states that:

> With…excitement the pioneers turned to the Hebrew settlements to fulfill their aspirations to become farmers in the Land of Israel, Yet, a surprise came upon them: The Hebrew settlements, at that time, were in the midst of a crisis. The grants of the Baron were stopped, and the farmers, the sons of the first immigration, were forced to struggle to keep their farms afloat.The Arab worker was experienced in land work, tough and strong, and was satisfied with a very low wage (ibid., 167).

The new reality that was created by the financial crisis, and which forced the settlers to turn to "cheap Arab labor," did not last long. A short time after, the Baron renewed his commitment to finance the settler's project. But, once that crisis was over, the Jewish pioneers sought to resolve the problem of their disadvantage compared to the Arab worker. Since they could not do the work, and since it was essential to create a segregated "Hebrew labor" market (Avoda Evrit), they turned to importing Oriental Jews from Yemen to help them against the Arab worker. By that, they hoped to keep the boundaries of the Jewish labor force and market separate from the Arabs, which resulted in an ethnically segmented labor market.

Since the problem with the Arab work was not only a question of skills and experience, but rather a question of low wages, by importing to the country Yemeni Jewish workers, the pioneers sought to reduce their costs. While previously they talked disdainfully against exploitation in the diaspora, now they became the "new exploiting capitalists" who exploited not only the Arab worker, but also their Jewish brothers. From now on, the Jewish collective was no longer a cohesive and egalitarian collective; it became a segmented collective of Western and Eastern Jews, of exploiters and exploited, under the hegemony of the Western Jews. That division later became central to the Israeli reality. However, the textbook discusses the pioneers turning to the Yemeni Jews as a positive development in the Zionist project at the time. The textbook states that:

> With the Yemeni Jews, the pioneers of the second immigration [wave] had great expectations [to succeed] in their struggle over Hebrew work. Those Yemeni Jews were great competitors to the Arab workers, since they had few needs and were willing to work hard. Ruppin and the people of the Israeli Office made some inquires [about how] to encourage immigration from Yemen. As a result, in 1911, [Ruppin] sent a messenger to Yemen, Samuel Yevniali, of the second immigration wave (ibid., 168).

Until that point, most of the Zionist concern had been directed toward the European Jews. It considered them the best potential candidates for the new Jewish nation in Palestine. There was no discussion of the Sephardic Jews. In fact, this was the first time the Zionist narrative made reference to them. Ironically, they are mentioned here as a reserved army of cheap labor, kept to compete with the Arab workers in Palestine, not as members of the nation, who should be treated equally and fairly.

Another surprising point is the description of those Yemeni Jews as hard workers like the Arabs. Those qualities, of hard work and strong will, were earlier mentioned as exclusive characteristics of the pioneer. The question then was what changed that such attributes were no longer attached to the pioneer, and had become less valued? My guess is that the "ability to work hard" was seen now as a non-human attribution. It was an attribution that implied animal ability to work hard with few needs. An alternative explanation might be the implicit conception of the Yemeni Jews as people of the Orient like Arabs, i.e.: "they have few needs." Whatever the explanation for that, it seems the Zionists drew a line between Us and Them. The result of that Othering made the Yemeni Jews closer to the Zionists' conception of the Arabs than to the "new Jew," the pioneer.

Coming back to the issue of the segmentation of the labor market, the addition of the Yemeni Jews did not change much in the situation of the labor market. The pioneers could not maintain a segregated labor market, since Arabs still "worked for less." As a result, their attempts to create a separatist "Hebrew labor force" did not succeed. We read that:

> And so, step-by-step, while [engaged] in an exhausting struggle with the Arab laborers, with the farmers' lack of faith and their untrained bodies, the young pioneers managed to take their place in working the land. Yet, despite all that, by the end of that period (1914), the number of Jewish laborers reached 1500 only. Still, the prevailing majority of labor in the settlements was in the hands of the Arabs, and most of the immigrants of the second wave became urban (ibid., 169).

The attempts to be land workers "close to the land," had mostly failed, particularly when the majority of the new waves of immigrants went directly to urban centers. Thus, the ideas of socialism, a just society, and attachment to the land, all evaporated when exploitation became easier and easier, and also when other alternative ways of making a living started to develop in urban centers. What the early dreams had wished for did not come true. The "new Jew" had to go back to a "traditional way of living" in urban cities:

> We came to realize that most of us believed that the agricultural settlement in particular was the way to settle in the Land of Israel, and the way to create a new Jewish society, different from that in the exile. Nevertheless, the agricultural settlers in the settlements were a minority during the first and second wave of immigration. The vast majority of immigrants turned to urban settlement. Out of about 60,000 Jews who immigrated to Israel between the years 1881–1914,12 thousand settled in the new settlements, and the rest, about 48 thousand, settled in the cities (ibid., 190).

To rationalize this change in orientation, the Zionist discourse presents the change as part of a Western process of modernization and progress. Implicitly, the rationalization could be interpreted as, if change from land work toward urbanization is good for the West, why should it not be good for us too? This is how the textbook describes it:

> It is not surprising that the majority of the immigrants turned to the cities: The whole western world was experiencing the migration from the village to the city. The industry and commerce in the capitalist society attracted the people to the urban centers—as laborers, merchants, and as providers of services. Why wouldn't this happen in the land of Israel?! (Ibid., 191).

Despite the failure to make the Jewish people a people of land workers, the myth that is developed in the Israeli discourse glorifies the pioneer who symbolizes the "new Jew." In this myth there are two stages. First, the pioneer works as a land worker, having to endure hardships, environmental risks, and Arab hostility. The emphasis here is on the role the pioneers play in the land redemption project. The land was essential to create a territorial base for Jewish migration later. The textbooks glorify the pioneer as if he was a "super human" who was able to stand against all odds and make "miracles" for the nation.

The second stage is where the pioneer is no longer a land worker only; he is also a "warrior" who defended his property and settlement. In other words, in the second stage the pioneer is portrayed as both a land worker and as a heroic warrior who stood firm to defend his land and nation. For example, in the pre-state era, it says that the pioneers organized the "Jewish Mule Force" to protect them against the "Arab attacks and the dangers of the wilderness." The textbook states that:

> …The body that took upon itself the responsibility of "enforcing" these decisions was the "Shomer." With the establishment of the "Shomer" the "Labor Legion" was established as well. Its members dealt with security and labor. Most of the members, when they are guarding they are in the "Guard." And when they are working they are in the "Labor." They go to work or to guard by duty, since work and security are tied together (ibid., 182).

These ideas of land work and security will later become central to the Israeli policy and practice toward the Palestinian Arab citizens of the state. The government would seize land for "security" purposes. Then it started to build new settlements, families moved in, which made the issue of security crucial, which in turn, required more land as buffer zones to protect those settlements. The cycle would repeat itself, in the case of the Arab Palestinians in Israel after 1948, several times, until most of their land was consumed. However, in the pre-state period, that responsibility of capturing land and protecting it was the main responsibility of those paramilitary settlements of "pioneers" like the "Jewish Mule Force," ha-Shomer.

In the years to come, the Labor party, which was the hegemonic political force in the Yishuv and the party that dominated the Israeli politics until 1977, would expand the size of ha-Shomer forces. Those forces will play a significant role during the war of 1948, and from them the Israeli Defense Forces emerged. Officially, however, ha-Shomer's role

ends with the establishment of the state. Since then, the state agencies bear sole responsibility of defense and land seizing.

Finally, what is ironic in this image of the pioneer is the fact that after 1967, with the occupation of the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza strip, the "pioneer" ideology was appropriated by the radical right Jewish groups.

Those groups claimed that the Labor party abandoned its pre-state Zionist ideology of settlements and redemption of the Father's land. They took it upon themselves to continue the Zionist project, and to implement it in the occupied Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza. The settlers, as they came to be known later, would receive land that the government allocated for "security" purposes first. Then, a few families would move in, including children, which would make their safety crucial. Gradually, the settlement would expand through confiscation of additional Palestinian land. Expansion of a settlement creates new opportunities for more settler families to move in, which makes the security and safety of settlers even more crucial. This cycle would repeat itself, and since the 1967, the various Israeli governments approved, funded, and continued to protect those settlers. By now, there are around two hundred settlements with about quarter of a million inhabitants in those areas. Those settlements, as many know, have become the main obstacle to a Palestinian Israeli peace agreement. Regardless of that, the settlers managed to bring the image of the pioneer to new heights.

Finally, I would like to close this section with a quotation from Herzl. This quotation shows how ideas construct reality and in turn motivate people to take certain actions. By that, their identity, and the way they conceive their reality changes. The textbook cites from Herzl's book "The Jewish State," which read: "… one is powerful or rich enough to be able to displace a whole nation from one place to another, an idea only can do that" (ibid., 129).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Israeli national narrative is structured around two dimensions—the synchronic and the diachronic. In the diachronic, there were three historical blocks. Two of those, the ancient and the modern, were discussed thoroughly here, since they are conceived as central to the process of nation formation. The middle period, which lasted two thousand years, is considered by Israelis as a "dead" time. During this period the nation was scattered, weak, and lived away from the Father's land.

However, in all the three historical blocks, the source of identity and collective solidarity was the Bible. The Bible is what made an aggregate of tribal people become a community of believers sharing the same faith. It is the source of their collective action and reciprocal commitment toward each other during the diaspora period. In short, it was the source of their collective belief in self distinction—"chosen people"—from other nations. Above all, the Bible was the drive behind their claims for political privileges of statehood.

With all that said, still there are differences between the ancient and the modern era, in the way the collective identity is structured. In ancient history, there was the tribe; then came a deity of prophets and leaders who were men of God. Those men of God united the collective under one faith and a belief in their own superiority above other humans. The

individual's identity, as well as that of the collective, was shaped by exclusionary processes based on faith and a belief in biological distinctions. At the time, then, religion was their main source of identity and identification with a collective.

In contrast, in the modern era, the individual's identity is only partially related to religion. Religion is important as a source of cultural identification and political claims. But religion is not the sole source of identity. In fact, in modern history, the Halutz replaces the men of God in inducing a sense of identity and solidarity in the collective. As we have seen, the Halutz is not depicted as a man of God. On the contrary, his identity is formed in rejection of the religious image of submissive Jews in the diaspora. The Halutz uses the Bible as a historical document of proof of political rights on the land. His identity is more influenced from Western discourses of nationalism than religious texts. His sense of superiority stems from two sources: first, religion provides him with a sense of rooted-ness as an "ancient" nation with a "glorious" past. Second, Western colonial discourse assumed superiority of Westerners over non-Westerns, and of a secular over a religious person, and of the "modern" over the "traditional" and the "uncivilized." According to that, the Halutz carried the "burden of the white man" to civilize and save the savages from their misery and backwardness. In his character, the Halutz combined modernity, progress, and commitment to the collective, simultaneously with love of nature, land, history, and the people's tradition. In his actions, he drained the swamps, and by that saved the land from its "abusers," the Arabs. He also defended the nation, recovered its history and tradition, and made the ancient come to life in a new dress. Above all, he helped create an island of modernity in a bare land of "ignorance and backwardness."

Another point in the Israeli discourse is the expanded discussion of the ancient history, which provides a selective organization of heroic events in the nation's past. The excessive descriptions personalize the historical past. By that, the national discourse aims at achieving identification with the heroes of the past. In addition, thorough learning and commemoration of that past brings back to life those heroes, which in turn helps the collective relive the past. Such re-experiencing of the past strengthens the ties of the current collective to the nation of the past.

Equally important is the way the history is organized around a series of binary oppositions of triumph and defeat. During those periods the nation's identity is in a flux of continuous change. For example, in ancient history the collective identity changed from members in a tribe to a larger religious community, and next to a tribal nation, and finally, to a community of believers after the destruction of the second Temple.

In modern history, the dichotomization is reversed. The nation moves from symbolic defeat into a "glorious" triumph. As I have shown, in the textbooks the change was from a weak religious community into a strong and proud nation bound together by blood ties and history. Also, the nation changed from being fragmented communities scattered across many countries into one united national body concentrated in one territory. In short, the peoples' identity has changed from being "dead" in the diaspora, which also meant the potential risk of assimilation among the gentiles, into "rebirth" in the land of the Fathers.

Those dichotomous relations that make identity meaningful are also manifested in the Covenant between the Lord and his "chosen people" and their "sacred land." These relations, in the ancient history as well as in the modern, seem to imply a manifestation of

"sacred ties," which are presented as the "ideal" condition necessary to the survival and development of the nation. Life outside the "promised land" violates the Covenant and brings destruction upon the nation. In other words, identity seems to be incomplete or impossible when one of the relations is not at work. In particular, the ties between the "promised land" and the "chosen people" seem to exist only in the "land of the fathers."

Moreover, forms of Othering vary according to time and place. In ancient history there were a variety of Others. Those Others could be from within the collective or from outside. They could also be positive or destructive Others. In all cases, the collective identity of self was always in opposition to one of those forms of Othering. Likewise, in the modern history the "new Jewish" identity is developed in negation to the "oppressive diaspora culture," and in negation to the Arab "abusers, killers, and backward people" of Palestine. As we have seen, the Palestinians in the pre-state as well as in post-independence were made invisible. That invisibility leaves the stage free to be occupied by the "presence" of the Israelis themselves.

Finally, the historical narrative selectively chose specific "heroes" and specific "enemies" to mark the boundaries of the collective identity of the nation and its Other. Those markers are dynamic and are seen in a process of becoming. It seems that the markers help individuals shape their identity as members of the collective. Markers are used to set the boundaries of identity, which in turn gives meanings to both the positive and the negative, the valued and the disliked, Us and Them.

Chapter Six
Summary and Conclusions

My concluding remarks are organized in three parts. First, I include a summary of the thesis that includes the study questions and how I addressed nationalism and national identity. Second, there is a summary of the main findings from the two case studies of Jordan and Israel. Finally, there are general conclusions about the theoretical aspects of identity formation and identity construction.

1. SUMMARY OF THE THESIS

At the outset of this project, I identified various problems in the study of nationalism. The first problem was to define adequately the terms nation, national identity, and nationalism. These concepts are often defined in relation to one another, which adds to the confusion.

The second problem was the unresolved debate between essentialist approaches and constructionist ones over whether nations and nationalism are "naturally" and "organically" developing or politically constructed. The questions that arise in such debates are whether there is a criterion or a set of criteria such as language, religion, territory, culture, history, common ancestors, economic development, or levels of modernity by which one can classify or distinguish between nations, or whether nationalism is socially constructed, aimed at giving meanings of "essence" to an "imagined" community, as Hobsbawm (1991) has argued.

The third problem in the study of nationalism and national identities is the multiplicity of perspectives, which are mostly based on Western Europe's experience of nationalism. These perspectives have emerged in the context of the rising power of the West. That power was manifested in the successful ways by which the West's knowledge and experiences have claimed universality and objectivity. These developments allowed Western discourse to develop their criteria, which became the standards by which Others are measured, studied and compared.

In my discussion, I questioned the ability of such perspectives and classifications—as essentialist and/or tautological—to explain, for example, the rise of nationalism in other communities in the Americas, Asia, Africa, etc. In other cases, I argued that these perspectives do not provide an analytical understanding of nationalism; rather they provide descriptive analysis of various experiences. In addition, within most perspectives

there are conflicting ideas, especially when they discuss the process of nation development, national identity, and the nation state.

Another critique of those perspectives is the way by which they establish categories of sameness. From the discussion in Chapter 2, it is evident that a close review of these classifications shows that they establish types of nationalism by employing the modernist discourse principles' of binary oppositions. In these binary oppositions, similarity rather than difference was the criterion by which identities were formed. For example, the use of binary opposition has resulted in developing classifications such as: Western/Eastern, civic/ethnic, modern/traditional, nation-state/state-nation, etc., types of nationalism. In such classifications the various experiences are attributed to qualitative difference within each type rather than to the relations themselves. In other words, instead of attributing the difference to the classification itself, which places one type in relation to another, and by that each type gains its meanings in relation to the other, these classifications attribute the difference to inherent qualities of each type. Thus, Western nationalism becomes qualitatively different from Eastern nationalism, and likewise, civic from ethnic, etc.

These three identified problems have helped me shape my thesis. I concluded that first, "nations" and "nationalism" are socially constructed, and second, that national identities are constructed via fields of difference than sameness, as the modernist discourse argues. My focus on difference has made my thesis distinctive from previous studies on the subject.

This study adds to the ongoing debate over the ways by which national identities are imagined and constructed. Again, the contribution of this study is in its discussion of the relationship between Self and Other in the process of identity formation as it is manifested in national narratives. It also argued that the Self/Other relations are dynamic and subject to change across time and space. Identity is not a fixed quality; rather, it is a narrative that evolves and forms over time and in time. In addition to that, the relationship between Self and Other are bounded and anchored in power—the power to include, exclude, or disseminate the notion of We and the power to set the boundaries between self and its Other. This has become important, since meanings are produced in language, and their interpretations are not free from macro and micro structures of power that restrict their scope.

My conceptualization of power has been central to understanding not only the relation between Self and Other, but also the practices by which power allows certain meanings to emerge. Power allows certain meanings to become "true," while others are credited with falseness. In turn, power and meanings intertwine to set the criteria of exclusion and Othering, resulting in shaping the collective memory and consciousness of a collective, a nation.

To conclude this section, my project has been conceptualized and organized to at least partially address and, I hope, remedy the intellectual research problems discussed before. In the broadest way, *the main research question I posed was: What is the relation between Self and Other*? Important secondary questions: are Self and Other relational and dynamic? Does change in one necessarily lead to change in the other? Are Self and Other always present and explicit and standing in opposition to each Other?

To study these questions, I analyzed school history textbooks as a body of knowledge produced or commissioned by the state. I treated this body of knowledge as part of the state national narrative by which the state attempts to form the identities of students, their

collective memory, and their identification with a larger collective, the nation. In Chapter 3, I mentioned that schools are an influential arm of the state. The state, through its control of the schools, controls the socialization process by which the construction of social identities of individuals in society is monitored. By that, the social order and its social reproduction are maintained.

An important aspect of the school curriculum is that it portrays knowledge included in school textbooks as legitimate and true. Textbooks assert by inclusion and exclusion what is important and unimportant to study, and present meaning of words, events, and histories as fixed. In turn, meanings in textbooks become forms of exclusion and inclusion, since what is present in a textbook depends upon what is absent, and what is written upon and what is not written.

I studied history textbooks in both Israel and Jordan. My focus on history textbooks was based on the assumption that the study of a nation's history is central to the process of identity formation of a collective and the ways its collective memory is organized. Construction of history helps to ratify the present, to legitimate the boundaries of a collective's present, and to give a sense of continuity over time. It makes it possible for a collective to project the present onto the past and by that to read through it the evolution of the nation from its sacred "origin" to the present.

In addition to that, I argued that the reconstructed narrative of a nation provides the collective with an account of its origin and development and thus allows the collective to recognize itself through time. Further, constructing history or collective memory is a dynamic story about the past. For a collective, their national narrative is about remembering and forgetting. In that regard, a nation's selective narrative is aimed at forming collective consciousness which is based on binary oppositions of triumph and defeat, of We and Others. It makes the nation look distinctive in its origins, culture, and history vis-à-vis Other collectives.

I made the link between nationalism and history textbooks by showing that nationalism, as a discourse, sets a process of constructing identities which links social practices and reality to individual consciousness. In turn, history textbooks present a selective usage of linguistic concepts, and they order historical events in a specific ways to shape our consciousness about our national identities from its origins to the present. At the center of this process, set forward by the national discourse, is the way our identities are constituted in language by difference or opposition from Others.

2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The analysis of the Jordanian and the Israeli case studies shows both similarities and differences. One of the similarities is that both narratives are organized around three main tenants, space, culture and history. In the case of Israel, an additional one is the relation to demography in homeland and territory of the nation. Demography in the ancient history, as well as in the present, is important for Israelis. It is used as a legitimizing factor of their claims over the territory of Palestine as their ancient, as well as present homeland. In both eras, Palestine is discussed as "heavily" populated by Jews, while the Palestinians or the Canaanites are either invisible or presented as marginal minorities.

The three dimensions of space, culture, and history are used to demonstrate that the nation is a homogenous entity with a distinguished culture that has been developing within a bounded territory. As we have seen, the historical analysis of both cases does not support any of those claims. Culture and geography of both Arabs and Jews alike have been in a process of change from antiquity to the present. The claim that the nation at the present is directly linked to a founding father or a deity is not supported. On the contrary, contradictions within both national narratives show that origins, culture, and homeland are more imagined than real. In the Jordanian case, throughout the Arab history, intermarriages, ethnic, and cultural mixing were a frequent phenomena. Likewise, the Arab homeland itself has been shrinking and expanding according to changes in the political, economic, and religious power of Arabs and Muslims. The same argument is valid in the case of Israel. In antiquity as well as in the diaspora, Jews were subject to intermarriages, and ethnic and religious fusion like many other nations. Purity of the nation and the claim of its distinctive culture are imagined.

Moreover, in the Jordanian case, Jordanians are portrayed as part of a larger whole of Arabs and Muslims. The categories of Arab and Muslim are not fixed entities. Both have been in the making and change since they first appear as collective affiliations. Second, Jordanianism is a recent entity, which is constructed by exclusion of the Palestinians. The appropriation of the Palestinians' identity, people, history, and land is achieved by promoting pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism, which makes the particular of being a Palestinian irrelevant. Thus, the Palestinian exclusion helps the state's narrative perpetuate the sense of Jordanianism dialectically by turning to the universal—pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism—while making the particular irrelevant in its quest for a noble future Arab unity. The same narrative exploits religion and kinship relations to the prophet Muhammad to make itself the best candidate to lead Arabs to a future glory and unity.

In the Israeli case, in antiquity as well as in the modern history, the nation emerges out of exclusion of Others. In antiquity it was defined against the Canaanites and in the modern era, the Palestinian exclusion and rejection of the diaspora culture makes the Israeli collective imagined as a nation. However, in the Israeli national narrative, the nation is a community of blood ties bound together by religion. The lack of separation between the community and its religious belief system makes the nation a small tribe bound together by faith and connected by blood ties to a founding Father. As we have seen, both the community of believers and religion itself as a grand narrative of the nation's history and its collective memory underwent dramatic changes as a result of inter-cultural experiences, migration, intermarriages, and other influences.

Moreover, in the case of Jordan, the analysis has shown that the nation has changed from tribes in the pre-Islamic era, to a large religious community united by Islam, and in the modern history, the Arab nation is divided into many states. In each one of those phases, culture and geography of the nation changed all the time. With that change, the nation itself and the criterion by which the nation is defined is different too.

In the Israeli narrative the nation changed from a tribe into a politicoreligious community, into many religious communities scattered all over the globe and finally, a collective defined by religion and blood ties in the state of Israel. The Israeli narrative tried to present the nation as homogenous entity moving in time from origins to the present. As we have seen, neither space, nor culture of the collective could be claimed as

fixed and stable. Fusion, intermarriages, migration, and internal conflicts have often changed the boundaries of the collective over time.

In both the Israeli and Jordanian narratives, religion and the sacred texts of the Bible and the Qura'an are the main source of identification and defining identity of individuals as well as a collective. In the Jordanian narrative the claim is that Islam made the Arabs become a nation and abandon their tribal customs. Similar argument is presented in the Israeli narrative, which views the Bible as the main source of identification and identity for the Jewish people. The Bible is presented as a proof of national rights over Canaan in the past and over Palestine at the present. It also gives the nation a sense of pride and uniqueness as chosen people. Moreover, both countries' national narratives emphasize that their goal at the present is to recover and revive each nation's glorious past.

Another strategy employed in both cases is the organization of their whole historical narrative around two main poles: triumph and defeat. Consequently, the national narrative is seen as a series of events in which the nation is described as either powerful and victorious, or weak and it is conveyed as a victim of cruel Others. This dichotomized description of the nation's historical record stems from the same logic of defining identity, which uses Other to define self. However, the binary opposition of triumph and defeat indicates changes in the status of a collective over time, and as a result of that, it shows changes in the way its identity is depicted.

Not only that, in fact, change in the status of a collective reflects changes in the practices of exclusion that have been employed by the collective or by others against it. A triumphant nation is not limited in its practices to symbolic exclusion of Others who are perceived as outsiders. Exclusion of Others could include one or several of the following strategies: invisibility, assimilation, expulsion, extermination, marginalization, or passive rejection of Others.

3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON IDENTITY

There are several conclusions that I would like to draw from this study. Some of these conclusions are theoretical and others are more specific to the issue of identity. First, this study contributes to the field of sociology and sociological research. The theoretical approach developed in this study is a synthesis of poststructuralism, linguistics, psychology, education, history, and post-colonial theory. Such a variety of theoretical perspectives make this study multi-disciplinary.

While identity in general is one of the main issues discussed in sociology, nationalism is not. Sociology, among other things, studies the relationship of macro social institutions and social structures to socialization processes and identity formation. Sociology also studies the relationship between language and the social construction of reality and self consciousness. These issues are similar to the study question advanced in this project. Moreover, the synthesis of the many theoretical perspectives developed in this study and its application to a sociological phenomenon add another facet to the sociology of knowledge in general.

Further, my analysis of the national identity of Israel and Jordan has shown how historical sociological research helps us better understand a complex issue such as nationalism. The historical research gives insight to the dynamic nature of social forces

and their impact on individuals in society. In other words, it helps us understand the dynamic relations between social forces and identity and how an individual's consciousness is shaped by those historical, cultural, and economic forces. By saying that, identity becomes a process that is never concluded, rather than a natural quality that a person posses at the time of his/her birth.

My treatment of nationalism helped me better understand changes in identity. It allowed me to look at the historical context in which networks of social forces affect the collective consciousness of a community, a nation. Treating the notion of nationalism like kinship relations allowed me to better understand the dynamic nature of such relationships and their variations over time and in space. I concluded that identities are not fixed; rather, identities are better understood as a process of formation, as a relationship.

Looking at identity as a relationship is in line with my argument of treating nationalism as a discourse, since a discourse is a manifestation of social relations and social forces. A discourse is dominated by rules of its own. These rules are what allow some meanings to prevail while others vanish. In turn, the rules of the discourse set the boundaries of the discourse itself. They claim some statements to be true, and reject others as false. The rules of a discourse are set by those who control the production of meanings in a discourse. Consequently, the rules of the discourse become a manifestation of power relations and social forces that in turn, shape the way our sense of self is constructed and how our identity could change too.

In this study, the discourses that shaped the national identities of Jordanians and Israelis were/are produced by the state educational system. As we have seen, the state production of historical narrative is supported by the use of experts in the "field" who present their historical records as "objective," and scientific. By doing so, they set the rules for what is true and what is false. The experts' power under the gaze of the state is presented as neutral. Such a strategy obscures their true influence and makes their statements seem objective and unrelated to the state apparatus. This is how the state acts in this process of mass socialization and shaping of the collective memory of its citizens as co-nationals in the public school system.

The second part of my conclusions focuses on the study question and national identity. The main thesis advanced in this study is supported by the empirical findings. I posited, first, that identities are socially constructed. Second, that identities develop via difference, and it is in relation to Others that a sense of self develops. The first argument is in line with the constructionist view on how identities develop. It is in contrast to the essentialist approach, which argues that identities stem from an essence. As my analysis showed, national identity, as a social identity, is socially constructed via school textbooks.

The second part of my thesis supports the poststructuralist view, which states that identities develop via difference and they change over time and in space. As my findings showed, national identities change over time and in space and the meaning of who we are develops in relation to Others.

My other conclusion was that identity is realized in an encounter with the Other. The question of whether the Other is physically present or not is irrelevant. Encounters can be symbolic, via literature, media, and other communication systems, or actual, through economic, religious, or political interactions. Since self has no meaning in itself, but the

meanings of self are drawn from opposition to an Other, therefore, meanings of self identity become "visible" when encountered. The encounter creates boundaries; such boundaries between the two encountered make such identities seen as if each one has an "objective" quality that could be used to define them apart from the Other. This conclusion was discussed in depth in the two case studies. Also it is supported by Said (1979), Memmi (1965), and Fanon's (1967) findings. Said (1979) for example, has argued that the concept of the "West" as a social category became distinctive only when it encountered the "East." He, like Memmi (1965), adds that since the colonizers defined themselves in relation to the colonized, it was their encounter with the colonized that made their identities as Westerners, "distinctive" and "different." In other words, at the encounter with an Other, self identity becomes visible, as if it has a qualitative difference.

I conclude also that self identity and Others emerge simultaneously. Since self identity is defined in opposition to the Other, and the Other's self identity is defined by the previous self, then Other and Self could not be defined separate from each other. That does not mean that there is only one Other, or that Other is fixed in time and space. This conclusion emerges out of the previous discussion and was well covered in my analysis. For example, the rise of the Islamic identity in the Arab history was marked with reference to non-Moslems. Both emerged at the same time and each one was defined in relation to the Other.

Self identity is always in a processing of becoming. It is never fixed and never stable. It is due to the various Others that self is defined in an opposition to, and due to the fact, that the two identities are dialectically defined by negation. As such, self perception is developed in negation to the Other, also it develops a conception of that Other. Consequently, the resistance to or acceptance of these negotiations of identity of self and Other places both in a dynamic process that makes self identity a process of becoming. In other words, identity is a process rather than a stable artifact. The analysis of both the Jordanian and the Israeli discourses showed that identity of each collective changed in space and time according to different Others.

Next, the sheer power between self and Other is what allows some meanings to become hegemonic, whether they pertain to self or to the Other. As many of the examples in this study have shown, those who have more power can mobilize their own conception of themselves and that of the Other. With that, power allows some meanings to be hegemonic and by that to construct a discourse by which we conceive identity. This is not only true in my case study, but this was also discussed extensively in the postcolonial discourses in which the Western edge of power allowed them to control both the way they conceive themselves and the way the Others view themselves too. One of the examples I discussed in my theoretical section was Kristeva's (1991) book, *Strangers to Ourselves*. There she explained how power influences the way we portray the Other, and how we try to control the way They and We conceive the Other too. I showed a similar procedural outcome.

Another aspect of the role of power in this process of identity formation in relation to Others is that it results with an implicit or explicit conflict between self and its Other. Thus, any criteria used to draw a line between Self and Other is in fact, a manifestation of power which sets the ground for competition between the included and excluded. As Derrida (1984:117) argued, any effort by a group to establish the parameters of its own identity entails the exclusion or silencing of the voices of Others. Consequently, the

process of identity formation entails acts of symbolic violence against the excluded Other. Both case studies demonstrated and support this conclusion.

National discourses organize the national narratives by selecting events that symbolize the triumph and defeat of our heroes, and their tyrants. The selection process is governed by oppositions that in turn give meanings to the collective identity of a people as glorious or victims. In that way, the historical narrative marks the boundaries of Self and Other over time and space.

In spite of the fact that the national narrative is organized by a selection of events, those events are made to seem related to one another. By doing so, the national narrative conveys the message that the national history and the national identity of a collective is continuous, integrated, and developing in a progressive fashion. It presents the history of a nation as a story of continuous development, in spite of the time gaps between events in the nation's narrative.

This process is similar to the production of a film story. As we know, films are made out of separate frames. Each frame carries a separate image or tells a separate small story. Frames that are chosen to be included in a final film episode are selected from a large record of frames. The excluded are made irrelevant to the telling of the specific story. When those frames are viewed together, their continuity and meanings are made possible by the intersection of hegemonic cultural discourses and micro interpretation of subjects. Continuity and the meaningful universe that is advanced in a national narrative are made possible by the authors of a national discourse and the internalized interpretation of subjects.

The previous discussion leads to the conclusion that the selection of events and periods, employed in a national narrative, comes to legitimate the present structure of power in society and the means by which identity is constructed. As such, history could be argued to be the story of those in power at a specific point in time. It is the viewpoint of the present projected into the past that acts to legitimate the present power relation in society.

In addition to that, the selection process sets in time a process of exclusion and Othering. In the cases discussed in this study, selection is a primary strategy by which events and agents are omitted from the national narrative. Additionally, the history of the nation is a history of those males who had political, economic, cultural and religious power. Females were excluded. Consequently, it could be argued that many national histories are stories of males in power, organized in time and space by selection and exclusion.

The consequences of Othering could include, and are not limited to, assimilation, expulsion, extermination, separatism, invisibility, exclusion, and domination. These consequences of Othering are a function of power between the excluded and included. The history of Arabs and Jews, whether one looks at the ancient or the modern history, supports this conclusion.

From both cases, we learn that difference plays a major role in the process of identity formation. This point takes additional importance in a world that is moving more and more toward a stage where many Others participate in a culture "global village." This presents identity with the challenge of being formed in difference, and at the same time, being in a dialectical process of becoming.

Finally, I am well aware of the limitations of this study: first, I analyzed two cases only. It could be argued that they are not sufficient to make generalizations. What is my answer then? This is one of the first studies using the linguistic paradigm to study nationalism and the role of the Other in the process of national identity formation. As such, it opens new opportunities in sociology for others to add and study additional cases. Second, in the two case studies, the classical and the modern approaches, "qualitative" differences between them were found. The Israeli case is discussed in the literature such that it fits the European experience. It is considered part of the West European model. In contrast, the Jordanian case is described as Eastern nationalism. My analysis shows that in both cases when the Other is incorporated in the analysis the "qualitative" difference found in the literature between them disappears. In turn the Eastern-Western approach to classification of nationalism loses its validity. For these reasons, I believe that my study has expanded the theoretical debate on the study of nationalism.

The third issue relates to methods and interpretations as they were applied in this study. I provided extensive citations from the textbooks themselves. Thus, other scholars may look at these textbooks and realize similar findings. However, their interpretations might vary in one way or another. This point does not weaken my study, rather it strengthens it.

Despite what I listed as a "limitation," I believe that my study does a good job of charting new waters for sociological research as a crucial topic—how the sense of "Otherness" may influence who we become, who we think we are. Surely the Cartesian attitude is applicable here: We think, therefore we think we are. And how and what we think are social processes influenced dramatically by where, when, and under what conditions they occur.

Appendix

JORDANIAN TEXTBOOKS

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