The Second Palestinian Intifada

Civil resistance

Julie M. Norman



Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics

The Second Palestinian Intifada

Palestinian civilians engaged in numerous acts of unarmed resistance during the second intifada. However, these attempts in using nonviolent strategies were frequently overshadowed by the armed tactics of militant groups. Drawing from extensive interviews, surveys, and observations in the West Bank, this book provides an in-depth study of the often-overlooked aspects of popular resistance in Palestine.

The book demonstrates how such unarmed tactics have considerable support amongst the local population, particularly when they are framed as a strategy rather than just as a moral preference. However, whilst recognizing the successes of many civil-based initiatives, the author examines why a unified popular movement never fully emerged. She argues that obstacles extended beyond occupation policies to include political constraints from the Palestinian Authority, and agendasetting efforts from sectors of the international community. Nevertheless, many activists continue to work creatively through diverse channels and networks to broaden the space for civil resistance.

Combining critical analysis with activist narratives and community case studies, the book provides a comprehensive and compelling look at nonviolent activism in the second intifada, offering a fresh perspective on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and illustrating both the challenges and the opportunities in mobilizing for popular struggle.

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24. The Second Palestinian Intifada
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For my parents,
Mark and Deborah Norman,
And for all who work for a just peace.

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Map (opposite) The Separation Barrier in the West Bank (based on a map by B'Tselem, 2008), http://btselem.org/English/Index.asp


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'Green Line'
ISRAEL
Jenin
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Tulkarm
Nablus
Qualqilya
Jiftlil
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Area C
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completed
Barrier
Incomplete or
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Introduction

"The trees have names."

I am walking through an olive grove with Abu Iyad,[1] a coordinator of the popular resistance campaign in the West Bank village of Budrous. "If you ask someone in the village if they know me, Abu Iyad, maybe they will and maybe they won't.
But if you ask them if they know Umm Haya," he continues, gesturing towards a gnarled tree ahead, "they will know that tree. So when a tree is uprooted, it is like watching an old woman whom you have known your whole life die in a single moment."

The uprooting of olive trees occurs frequently in the West Bank when Palestinian-owned land is confiscated by Israeli occupation forces, usually for the expansion of settlements or the construction of the separation barrier. Bulldozers contracted by the Israeli government, and accompanied by Israeli Defense Force (IDF) escorts, can uproot hundreds of trees in a single day, heedless of the literal and figurative significance of the trees to the Palestinian communities to which they belong.

In the case of Budrous, however, the villagers refused to see their land and livelihoods destroyed. When the bulldozers first arrived at the outskirts of the village in November 2003, approximately 80 community members staged a demonstration that proved to be the first of many in what would become a sustained campaign of civil-based resistance. When the bulldozers returned a month later, nearly 500 people, one-third of the small village's population, engaged in a mass act of civil disobedience and succeeded in halting the bulldozers yet again. In the subsequent days, weeks, and months, villagers from all political parties, old and young, male and female, braved rubber bullets, tear gas, injury, and arrest to prevent the destruction of the olive trees and the confiscation of village land by the separation barrier.

Using a variety of unarmed direct action tactics, combined with pursuing a legal case in Israeli courts, the village of Budrous managed to save all but 90 dunams (approximately 23 acres) of the 1,250 dunams originally targeted for confiscation, and the route of the separation barrier was moved back to the Green Line, the mutually recognized 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank. In addition, the success of the villagers in Budrous inspired similar popular resistance campaigns in other West Bank villages being affected by the construction of the separation barrier and other occupation policies.

Despite numerous nonviolent episodes of this nature, unarmed popular struggle during the second intifada (2000–8) was largely overshadowed by militant resistance. What, then, was the role of nonviolent resistance during this period? If there were successful episodes of popular struggle like Budrous, why did local campaigns fail to coalesce and realize the mass mobilization witnessed in the first intifada? Finally, is there a space for a more widespread civil movement to emerge in Palestine in the period following the second intifada?

In this book, I attempt to answer these questions by engaging in an in-depth study and analysis of civil resistance in Palestine during the second intifada. In drawing attention to this phenomenon, I hope to shed light on the scale and scope of unarmed tactics employed by

Palestinians that have been overlooked in both the international media and academic literature on the region. In addition, I explore why popular mobilization for this type of resistance remained limited and fragmented during the second intifada, even as grievances increased. In this way, I neither idealize nor disparage nonviolent resistance in Palestine, but rather provide a critical, nuanced account of what happened, what worked, and what didn't work. I hope that, through this empirically based study, I can offer insights into the multi-level factors that either facilitate or constrain popular resistance in Palestine, and draw lessons that apply to other areas of conflict.

I use the term "civil resistance" to refer to community-based, unarmed struggle, usually termed *muqau'ama sha'bia* (popular resistance) or *muqau'ama mudania* (civil-based resistance) in Arabic. While I occasionally use the term "nonviolent resistance" in this study, the term *la'anf* (nonviolence) in Arabic is usually associated with passivity, which is *not* the subject of this book. Rather, I follow Kurt Schock (2005) and Stephen Zunes (2004) in defining nonviolent resistance as a form of "unarmed insurrection," a challenge to authorities that relies on tactics other than arms as the primary means of struggle.

Civil resistance cannot be considered as wholly separate from violence. First, even purely nonviolent actions are often met with violence from the state, and, second, nonviolent campaigns often occur in parallel with armed resistance movements, as was the case in Palestine during the second intifada. Furthermore, even internally, few "nonviolent" movements are completely nonviolent, with activists sometimes responding to state violence with typically nonlethal weapons, such as stones in the case of Palestine, or the use of Molotov cocktails in the first intifada. The utility of these forms of limited violence are often debated within the movement itself, but both supporters and opponents of these tactics generally see them as distinct from armed resistance (Rigby 1991, Kaufman 1991, Zunes 1999a, Schock 2005).

In addition to being "unarmed," the type of resistance addressed in this book is described as being "popular," in the sense that it is coordinated and carried out by civilians, rather than by soldiers, militants, or militias. In the case of Palestine, "popular struggle" typically refers to resistance that is organized independently of both Palestine's governing body, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and armed resistance groups. In this way, popular resistance draws its strength directly from the people, rather than from institutions or militant groups, hence the term "people power" often applied to these types of movements.

When conceptualized as "nonviolence," the type of resistance addressed in this book involves pragmatic rather than principled nonviolence. Pragmatic approaches to nonviolence entail the use of nonviolent tactics as a strategy, while principled approaches focus on the perceived moral or ethical merit of nonviolence. In general, adherents to the pragmatic approach to nonviolence view nonviolent action as a method of struggle, while adherents to the principled approach view it as a way of life (Schock 2005: xvii). While some activists interviewed for this study do approach nonviolence as a lifestyle, or cited both ethical and tactical motivations, the majority of Palestinians engaged in nonviolent struggle described it as a pragmatic, strategic choice.

In this book, I hope to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon of civil resistance during the second intifada, from 2000 to 2008. To date, very few books have been written on unarmed struggle in Palestine, and those few have focused almost exclusively on the use of nonviolent tactics during the first intifada (1987–93). For example, Mary King's *A Quiet Revolution* (2007), Souad Dajani's *Eyes Without Country* (1994), and Andrew Rigby's *Living the Intifada* (1991) provide superb historical accounts of the tradition of strategic nonviolence in Palestine, but their scope does not extend beyond the first intifada.

Works on popular resistance focusing on the second intifada, including Nancy Stohlman and

Lauriann Aladin's *Live from Palestine: International and Palestinian Direct Action Against the Occupation* (2003), and Anna Baltzer's *Witness in Palestine: A Jewish American Woman in the Occupied Territories* (2007), provide valuable descriptive, personal accounts of nonviolent struggle, but they do not attempt to extend their observations to an analytical discussion. In addition, these works focus more on the perspectives of international rather than Palestinian activists. I thus hope to fill what I see as a gap in the literature by further shedding light on Palestinian civil resistance in the second intifada, and developing an analytical framework to better understand the movement's successes, failures, and potential for future mobilization.

My framework for analysis draws from both social movement theory and the nonviolence literature, seeking to contribute to the convergence of these areas of inquiry.[2] Social movement theory, with its three main subfields of political processes, resource mobilization, and cultural framings, is helpful for understanding the emergence of movements and initial trends of mobilization,[3] while nonviolent action theory is useful for analyzing the coordination and trajectories of popular movements.[4] Although social movement theory traditionally has targeted scholars, and nonviolent action theory typically has been aimed at activists, the two bodies of literature are clearly complementary in comprehensive studies like this one. Indeed, this book is unique in that it provides a holistic investigation of civil resistance in Palestine, including the emergence, coordination, and outcomes of popular struggle, which I anticipate will be of interest to scholars and activists alike.

The study also differs methodologically from other recent books on nonviolent direct action, which rely on broad comparisons across time and space. For example, *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective*, edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (1999b), and *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, by Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall (2000), do an excellent job of illustrating the scope of nonviolence through historical accounts of the use of unarmed struggle in various contexts. However, their primarily descriptive approach does not include an analysis of how nonviolent movements emerge, or when they are successful.

Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, by Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler (1994), and *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, by Kurt Schock (2005), do offer useful analytical frameworks, especially Schock, who superbly utilizes both the political process and nonviolent action literatures. Schock also makes a unique contribution to the literature by examining unsuccessful cases of unarmed struggle, in addition to successful campaigns. However, the nature of the cross-comparative approach typically constrains analysis to just one aspect of nonviolent campaigns, namely trajectories or outcomes in these studies. In addition, the comparative approach lends itself best to historical cases; accordingly, there is a lack of research on contemporary struggles emerging in the twenty-first century.

My approach to studying unarmed resistance is unique in several ways. First, it extends the literature on popular struggle to a contemporary case, illustrating that civil resistance was not merely a short-lived, twentieth-century phenomenon.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, it locates nonviolent episodes in Palestine in the second intifada within a broader cycle of contention (Tarrow 1998), which extends back to the first intifada. In this way, the study is in part a comparative study across time rather than place, assessing the emergence, dynamics, and outcomes of second-intifada nonviolent struggle *as compared to* the use of nonviolence in the first intifada. This type of temporal comparison integrates the rich, contextual data of a case study with broader insights afforded by comparative

approaches.

Third, my principal use of anthropological methods grounds the study directly in the lived experiences of primary sources. My research is based on 88 semistructured interviews; 234 surveys with Palestinian youth, 16–34 years of age; and participant-observation at nonviolent demonstrations, protests, meetings, conferences, and other events from 2005 to 2009. This direct approach is distinct from methods used in other social movement and nonviolent action literature, which, because of their historical nature, rely mostly on secondary data and documents, and often focus more on organizations and institutions than on individuals. By taking a more anthropological approach, this study highlights the agency and identity of individuals in informing broader social processes and movements.[5]

I hope that this internally comparative case study provides a more nuanced understanding of resistance in Palestine. Furthermore, I hope it inspires other scholars to consider the natural links between the social movement and nonviolent action literatures, the complementary aspects of the case study and comparative approaches, and the benefits of integrating personal narrative with broader social processes and trends. In addition, I hope that the book will provide valuable insights to activists and practitioners associated with nonviolent movements.

Specifically, I aim to identify the forms of civil resistance that were taking place in Palestine between 2000 and 2009, and investigate why, despite episodes of nonviolent resistance, the second intifada never realized the mass mobilization for popular struggle witnessed in the first intifada, even as the scope of grievances expanded and intensified. On the one hand, I challenge the mainstream argument that Palestinians "prefer" armed resistance over other kinds of struggle, and, on the other hand, I question the assumption by many international activists that the fragmentation of the popular movement in Palestine is solely the result of occupation policies. Instead, I use a social movements approach to analyze sources of fragmentation at the local, national, and international levels. In this way, I bring attention to often ignored factors within both Palestinian society and the international community that constrain, rather than facilitate, unarmed resistance.

I argue that there is significant popular support for unarmed resistance in Palestine, but actual mobilization depends largely on reclaiming a space for civil resistance in the post-Oslo context, as well as re-framing "nonviolence" as resistance, rather than peacebuilding.

In Chapter 1, I define civil resistance, focusing on direct action strategies such a protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention (Sharp 1973). I also use Chapter 1 to introduce my analytical framework, drawing from social movement theory. I first describe how the second intifada can be located within a longer cycle of contention, then discuss how social movement theory can be useful for identifying local, national, and global level factors that converged in such a way as to hinder widespread mobilization for unarmed resistance.

In Chapter 2, I provide a historical context for the study by describing the use of nonviolence throughout Palestinian history. In this way, I offer a brief introduction to the conflict itself, while also illustrating the tradition of nonviolent resistance in the region. The chapter emphasizes how Palestinians used nonviolent resistance during the first intifada, serving as a point of comparison for the second intifada.

In Chapter 3, I describe how Palestinians used nonviolent resistance during the second intifada, beginning with community-based direct action campaigns, primarily led by village popular committees. In Chapter 4, I discuss the role of nongovernmental organizations in supporting direct actions, coordinating trainings, organizing education campaigns, and appealing to regional and international solidarity networks. I also include a brief discussion of the role of

Israeli and international activists in supporting these efforts. Finally, I examine everyday acts of resistance that may not fit traditional notions of activism, but reflect the Palestinian concept of *sumoud*, or resistance through steadfastness. In Chapter 5, I explore the factors to contributed to individual participation in different forms of resistance, and examine the extent of popular support for both civil resistance and armed struggle.

In Chapters 6 through 8, I examine sources of this fragmentation and limited mobilization. In Chapter 6 I discuss local-level constraints that existed within the organization of the movement itself, especially in comparison to the first intifada. I emphasize the lack of a unified movement leadership, as well as the institutionalization of political parties and the professionalization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the post-Oslo context, as factors that ultimately limited mobilization.

In Chapter 7, I discuss the political constraints at the national level that developed during the post-Oslo period and extended through the years of the uprising. I acknowledge how widespread mobilization for civil resistance was inhibited by constraints stemming from the Israeli occupation, including separation policies, restrictions on movement, and crackdowns on activists. However, I also emphasize constraints on activism from the PA itself, including the stifling of opposition voices, the repression of resistance, and internal political tensions.

In Chapter 8, I extend beyond the organizational and political lenses to discuss how global re-framings of nonviolence as peacebuilding rather than resistance, and as a moral rather than a strategic choice, ultimately hindered mobilization, especially for youth. Indeed, while most first intifada activists saw nonviolent tactics as an integral aspect of a wider sphere of resistance, many second intifada youth perceived “nonviolence” as a euphemism for normalization or reconciliation, as propagated by the international community under Oslo. They thus tended to distance themselves from the concept, if not the practice, of nonviolence.

I offer conclusions in Chapter 9 by discussing how mobilization for civil resistance in the second intifada was limited by local, national, and global factors that had emerged or shifted in the period since the first intifada. However, I illustrate that popular attitudes indicate greater support for unarmed resistance than commonly acknowledged, suggesting that a space does exist for a more unified, widespread popular movement. I close by discussing practical steps being undertaken by activists to reclaim a space for civil resistance and re-frame nonviolence as a strategy for resistance.

The future trajectory of civil resistance in Palestine is clearly unknown. In this book, I do not intend to make large claims about the resolution of the conflict, formulate causal models, or advocate or condemn the tactics employed by different parties. I do hope to broaden the space for thinking seriously about civil resistance in Palestine, and inspire others, scholars and practitioners alike, to engage more fully with this topic in the Middle East and in other contexts.

1 Civil resistance and contentious politics

"We do not work for peace. We work to end the occupation."

Majdi, nonviolent activist, Bethlehem

Hani was ready to race. The 17-year-old had traveled to Ramallah the previous day from his village near Jericho and stayed overnight in the home of his cousins.
Now, at nine o'clock in the morning, he found himself on a school soccer field with over 300 other Palestinian youth, as well as several dozen Israeli and international supporters, all sporting bright, numbered t-shirts and sitting astride bicycles.

A 50-kilometer bike race from Ramallah to Jericho was organized by the East Jerusalem YMCA Youth-to-Youth Initiative on 23 March 2007, as a display of local and international solidarity against checkpoints, the separation barrier, and the occupation, and a show of support for freedom of movement. Local clubs donated hundreds of bicycles and helmets for the event, which drew Palestinians from all areas of the West Bank, as well as supporters from over twenty countries.

The governor and mayor of Ramallah, and the PA Deputy Minister for Youth and Sport, opened the event with speeches expressing support for a just peace and freedom of movement in Palestine, and rejecting human rights violations. Then, following the remarks, the race was under way, with hundreds of bikes jostling down the bumpy Ramallah–Jerusalem Road. The route, planned entirely on Palestinian roads within the West Bank, would swing east before reaching the Qalandiya checkpoint, and continue through the Jordan Valley to Jericho.

I spoke with Hani about eight kilometers into the race, when the riders were stopped by Israeli soldiers at the Jabaa' checkpoint, one of 63 internal checkpoints regulating the movement of Palestinians within the West Bank. The participants dismounted from their bicycles, but remained at the checkpoint, while the organizers and international volunteers tried to negotiate with the soldiers to allow the riders to pass. Hani informed me that it seemed the soldiers were willing to let a small number of the riders pass, but the participants were determined to stay together. They maintained a sit-in at the checkpoint for nearly an hour, before finally turning back to Ramallah. "Of course I'm disappointed," Hani told me as he untied a small Palestinian flag from the back of his bike frame, "But maybe the race ending this way will draw attention to the movement restrictions we face everyday."

Despite Hani's hopes, creative acts of resistance like the bike race were largely overlooked during the second intifada, in both the academic literature and the local and international media, overshadowed by incidents of armed struggle, such as suicide bombings and rocket attacks. However, episodes of unarmed resistance were taking place throughout East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza on a daily basis, sometimes in visible forms such as protests and demonstrations, and other times in more subtle forms of everyday resistance and steadfastness. Episodes like the

bike race thus inspired the research questions that guide the discussion in this book: What was really happening in Palestine in terms of unarmed struggle during the second intifada, what were the constraints that limited mobilization, and to what extent does a space exist for a widespread popular movement in Palestine today?

In this chapter, I define civil resistance, drawing from nonviolent action theory, and introduce my framework for analysis, drawing from social movement theory. I indicate that there were many nonviolent episodes during the second intifada, but I argue that a widespread nonviolent movement failed to emerge, not because of a lack of popular support for unarmed methods, as often assumed by activists and scholars alike, but rather because of constraints at the local, national, and international levels. I suggest that there is significant potential support for unarmed tactics, but actual mobilization depends largely on re-framing nonviolence as strategic civil-based resistance, and re-claiming a space for such resistance in the current political context.

Civil resistance

Although the term "nonviolence" has many meanings, the idea of strategic nonviolence, or nonviolent action, forms the foundation for the kinds of civil resistance discussed in this book. According to Gene Sharp, strategic nonviolence is based on the idea that "the exercise of power depends on the consent of the ruled who, by withdrawing that consent, can control and even destroy the power of their opponent" (1973: 4). From this viewpoint, it is believed that "governments depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on many groups for reinforcement of its power sources" (8). Thus, people can transform situations of oppression by withdrawing their consent through refusal of cooperation, withholding of help, and persistence in disobedience and defiance (64).

Direct action refers to strategic nonviolent tactics that deliberately challenge the authority of the oppressor. Direct action is usually the most visible form of popular resistance and is the approach typically associated with civil resistance. Nonviolent direct actions can include acts of omission, when people refuse to perform acts that they are required to do by practice, custom, or law; acts of commission, when people perform acts that they are not usually expected or allowed to perform; or combinations of the two (Sharp 1973). Both acts of omission and acts of commission can be categorized in the areas of protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention (Sharp 1973, Helvey 2004, Ackerman and Kruegler 1994).

Protest and persuasion

Acts of protest and persuasion include public actions such as mass demonstrations, marches, and vigils; formal statements such as petitions, declarations, and public statements; symbolic acts such as displaying flags, colors, and symbols; and communicative acts such as hanging banners and posters, distributing newspapers and leaflets, and holding meetings and teach-ins. While often used strategically throughout nonviolent movements, acts of protest and persuasion usually emerge early in a struggle, and can function as tools for mobilization and consciousness-raising (Sharp 1973). The bike race provides an example of this type of tactic, in that it sought to mobilize local youth in protest of movement restrictions, while simultaneously raising awareness about freedom of movement violations in the hopes of persuading others to act on the issue.

Protest and persuasion techniques have several objectives. First, actions of this nature seek to provide a signal to oppressive forces that the participants seriously object to certain policies or acts. Moreover, these actions serve to show the wider oppressed population that the opposition

movement is challenging the oppressor, thus encouraging others to critically analyze their situation and, ultimately, work for change. Finally, persuasive actions can raise consciousness about the situation outside of the region, thus calling attention to the situation and increasing international solidarity. In these ways, protest and persuasion tactics serve as challenges to the oppressor on the one hand, and as appeals for local participation and external support on the other hand. The bike race again provided an example of this type of action, in aiming for exposure, expression, and persuasion.

Noncooperation

Often considered the most powerful category of nonviolent tactics (Helvey 2004), noncooperation includes acts of social, political, and economic noncooperation.
Social noncooperation includes acts such as shunning and ostracism, suspension or boycott of social events, and disobeying social norms, thus marginalizing the oppressive community. Acts of economic noncooperation, including boycotts, strikes, and nonpayment of taxes, aim to impair the means available to a government to provide goods and services to its supporters, thus decreasing supporter loyalty. In addition, reducing government means can ultimately hinder its ability to carry out oppressive policies. While nearly all nonviolent acts are political to a degree, acts of political noncooperation refer specifically to actions that aim to reject the authority of the occupying power, such as withdrawal of political support, boycott of government bodies, and refusal to recognize government institutions.

The objective of noncooperation is to make it difficult for the government to function by withdrawing the people's consent to the occupying power. While impairing the oppressor, noncooperation can also increase solidarity within the community and strengthen civil society (Helvey 2004). In the case of Palestine, acts of noncooperation such as strikes and boycotts did take place during the second intifada, however, because of the effective separation of the Israeli and Palestinian populations, these actions often went unnoticed in Israel. However, there were still numerous incidents of noncooperation, including many daily interactions between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers at checkpoints. In the bike race for example, the refusal of the bikers to turn around when instructed to do so reflected the spirit of noncooperation.

Intervention

Intervention refers to acts of civil disobedience, such as sit-ins, pray-ins, defiance of blockades, land seizure, and use of alternative social, economic, transportation, and communication systems (Sharp 1973). Interventionist tactics aim to disrupt established practices and policies with the aim of creating new relationships, institutions, and patterns of behavior (Helvey 2004). Because they are more confrontational, interventionist acts often put activists at greater risk for more severe repression than other actions, including detention, arrest, personal injury, and even death. However, because they are provocative, interventionist actions are sometimes more effective than other tactics in forcing attention on the issue.

Even when the oppressive power responds to interventionist tactics with violence, such harsh responses can bring about change by initiating political jiu-jitsu. According to Helvey, political jiu-jitsu occurs when "negative reactions to the opponents' violent repression against nonviolent resisters is turned to operate politically against the opponents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of the nonviolent resisters" (2004: 150). In this way, harsh responses by an occupying power to activist tactics can convince other bodies, such as international organizations, institutions, and states, to put pressure on the regime or lend support to the

movement.

In the case of the bike race for example, if the youth had collectively decided to defy the soldiers' orders and attempt to push through or around the checkpoint, this would have been an interventionist act of civil disobedience. The youth would almost certainly have been subject to arrests, tear gas, rubber bullets, and possibly live ammunition, thus, organizers of the event needed to decide if the risks to participants were worth the potential political gains. While in this instance, the organizers ultimately decided to obey the soldiers' orders, I witnessed numerous episodes when activists defied authorities by damaging separation barrier infrastructure, entering prohibited "security zones," and dismantling road blocks.

Acts of protest and persuasion (such as marches, demonstrations, and protests), noncooperation (such as boycotts and strikes), and direct intervention (including civil disobedience) characterize some of the most visible nonviolent tactics in Palestine and elsewhere. This book focuses primarily on mobilization related to these direct actions, but also explores indirect actions, including civil society initiatives and everyday acts of resistance, which characterized the broader sphere of nonviolence in Palestine in the second intifada.

Broadening the lens of nonviolence in this way offers both benefits and risks.
On the one hand, this extension may be necessary to accommodate the range of actors and actions that contribute to activism in situations of protracted conflict, such as Palestine, in which the lines between activists and non-activists are not always clearly defined. From this perspective, resistance becomes a part of daily life, extending beyond activist networks and becoming incorporated into institutions such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), schools, and media outlets.
On the other hand, expanding the discussion of nonviolence in this way risks conceptual stretching, blurring the meaning of resistance not only for scholars, but also for activists attempting to mobilize others for strategic action. Thus, in this study, while I include both direct and indirect actions in my discussion, I distinguish between them in my analysis, exploring how indirect actions can both facilitate and constrain direct resistance.

Ultimately, the strategic nonviolence discussed in this book refers to action, in contrast to passivity or pacification, as sometimes implied by critics. Likewise, it is distinct from dialogue and conflict resolution, in that it actively confronts systems of direct violence and structural violence and seeks change, not accommodation. Finally, strategic nonviolence is different from forgiveness and reconciliation, which are processes of healing that, when possible, are generally more appropriate in post-conflict settings. Strategic nonviolence, or civil resistance, is ultimately a method of popular struggle and a mode of contentious politics.

Civil resistance in the second intifada

Palestine presents a unique case in that the PA functions as a state-like institution, yet East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza remain occupied territories under Israel. This arrangement creates a double challenge for activists. First, it requires them to confront challenges from their own government while focusing the crux of their efforts on the occupying force. Second, the occupation status complicates Sharp's assumption that power depends on the consent of the ruled, and its corollary that withdrawal of consent can destroy the power of the oppressor. While this theory may pertain in internal situations, it is difficult to apply in situations of occupation, as even complete withdrawal of Palestinian consent does not undercut the power of the Israeli government if it still has the support of the Israeli constituency. Similarly, situations of occupation present activists with an even greater challenge than removing a dictator or political

party from office, in that they must seek to change the relational structure between themselves and the occupier. They thus need to negotiate a space for resisting the occupying force while convincing the occupying state's people and leadership of the need for change.

Because the framework of power and consent is different in the Palestinian context, methods of nonviolent action also vary in strategic effect. Strategies such as protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention are all difficult to employ in the Palestinian context in which the Israeli and Palestinian societies function separately. This has especially become the case since the construction of the separation barrier, which has further limited contact points between Palestinians and Israelis. As a result, protests and demonstrations within Palestine are rarely noticed in Israel, Palestinian strikes affect only Palestinians, and few opportunities exist for public civil disobedience. The bike race for example took place within the West Bank on Palestinian roads; thus, even the sit-in at the internal checkpoint was only witnessed by other Palestinian travelers. Thus, Palestinians have had to develop other creative nonviolent strategies to influence the Israeli public and government, and have shifted much of their activism to target the international community rather than Israeli society.

The direct action campaigns that did take place in the West Bank emerged largely in response to the construction of the separation barrier, which divides many rural communities from their farmland and water sources. Though most actions focused on "stopping the wall," the village campaigns became a nexus of resistance to the occupation itself. The majority of village-based direct action campaigns were coordinated by local popular committees, consisting of individual volunteers from local communities who led demonstrations, mobilized villagers, organized boycotts, and often maintained communications with other committees, media outlets, and solidarity groups.

Many local campaigns were directly or indirectly supported by civil society organizations, which helped local communities initiate legal cases, facilitated research and documentation, and organized trainings, conferences, and workshops to disseminate nonviolent strategies. Other NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) encouraged international outreach and solidarity, especially in the form of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaigns, and coordinated alternative tourism and encounter programs to increase international awareness of the occupation. Other civil society groups used independent media to raise awareness about the occupation in general and the unarmed struggle in particular, both regionally and internationally. Finally, countless Palestinians participated in everyday acts of resistance, specifically remaining on their land in spite of encroaching settlements and construction of the separation barrier, in the spirit of *sumoud* (steadfastness).

A social movements approach

In terms of both direct and indirect actions, popular struggle was not absent during the second intifada. However, civil resistance was episodic at best, with participation limited, never garnering the mass mobilization necessary to constitute a cohesive movement. Activists and scholars alike often assume that there is a lack of public support for unarmed resistance in Palestine. This book challenges that assumption by demonstrating that that there is in fact significant support for strategic nonviolent methods as part of a larger toolbox of activism. The fragmentation of the movement is thus better explained by constraints at the local, national, and global levels. A social movements, or contentious politics, approach offers a theoretical framework for examining these levels in terms of movement coordination, political constraints, and movement framings (Tarrow 1998;

McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996).

Local level: resource mobilization

Palestinians found (or indeed, created) opportunities for resistance throughout the second intifada. However, activists lacked the sufficient organization necessary for translating local actions and campaigns into a viable *movement*. Challenges to effective resource coordination were evident both within and between political parties, NGOs, and grassroots networks, specifically in terms of agreeing on common goals and utilizing strategic tactics, thus inhibiting widespread mobilization.

How do social movements actually form and function? According to some scholars, a movement's relative success or failure depends largely on the efficiency of its mobilizing structures, the "collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3). This dimension of analysis includes resource mobilization theory, which examines mobilization in the context of professional social movement organizations (SMOs) (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977); and the political process model, which examines the role of informal, grassroots institutions as mobilizing entities.

The mobilizing structures approach is particularly relevant to this research for its focus on movement goals, which, in contrast to the first intifada, Palestinian activists failed to collectively articulate; attention to effects of extremists, which is significant in Palestinian resistance in terms of the role of armed groups; and perhaps most importantly, analysis of tactics. The distinction between the SMO focus of the resource-mobilization model and the grassroots focus of the political process model also allow for analysis of both the complementary and competitive efforts of mid-level NGOs and grassroots-level community-based organizations (CBOs) in Palestine.

In Palestine, resource mobilization during the second intifada faced particular challenges at the political level. Palestinian political parties had proved ineffective in mobilizing for popular resistance in the post-Oslo period (1993–99), in sharp contrast to the first intifada, in which political movements consistently mobilized members for participation in the struggle. This was largely due to the institutionalization of the major parties under Oslo, which necessitated the transformation of former "movements" under the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) into more conventional parties under the Palestinian Authority (PA). This change was especially evident on university campuses, where the organizing workshops and political theory teach-ins that used to be coordinated by the political movements were phased out following the first intifada.

The failure of Fateh to serve as a leader of resistance, combined with the internal corruption of the PA in the late 1990s and its inability to provide social services, created a space for the rising influence of Hamas, which had several implications for popular resistance. First, it shifted the focus of the popular struggle from strategic nonviolence, as employed during the first intifada, to armed resistance, thus militarizing the struggle and, in doing so, limiting opportunities for popular participation. Second, rising tensions between Hamas and Fateh fractured resistance against the occupation, as the parties either organized their own separate actions against the occupation, or prioritized their mobilization regarding the internal struggle over resisting the occupation.

The institutionalization of political parties was not the only organizational factor fragmenting mobilization for civil resistance. At the civil society level, many NGOs were seen as co-opting

nonviolence during the post-Oslo period, leading to the professionalization of activism. For many, the shift to NGO-based "activism" depleted the voluntary spirit of nonviolence, rendering it a business rather than resistance. Furthermore, the proliferation of NGOs created a marketplace of sorts for nonviolence, with organizations competing for funding and becoming increasingly influenced by donor-driven agendas. This phenomenon created challenges in mobilizing for nonviolent resistance specifically, as NGOs during the post-Oslo period frequently adopted interpretations of nonviolence as peacebuilding or dialogue, in accordance with donor definitions.

Organizational structures at both the formal and informal levels thus faced challenges in effectively mobilizing for widespread participation. While some popular committees and CBOs had success at the local level, mass mobilization remained limited largely due to shortcomings in various mobilizing structures, including political parties, NGOs, and grassroots networks.

National level(s): political constraints

Shortcomings at the movement level were further exacerbated by political constraints stemming from Israel, the PA, and the structural dynamic between the two. According to social movement theory, political opportunities refer to the "changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3), which either create opportunities that "encourage people to engage in contentious politics" (Tarrow 1998, 20), or create constraints that discourage contention. This structural approach focuses primarily on the emergence of social movements, guided by the idea that movements "are shaped by the broader set of political constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are embedded" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3). Political opportunities and constraints might include dynamic factors such as the level of political access, shifting alignments, united/divided elites, influential allies, and the degree of repression/ facilitation;[1] while stable aspects might include the level of state strength and prevailing modes of systematic repression (Tarrow 1998).

In the case of Palestine, Israel's state strength, support from the United States, and tradition of suppressing resistance represented constraints to contention, in combination with the problematic PA structure and divisions among Palestinian elites. Israeli policies of separation, visibly manifest in the separation barrier, limited contact points between Israeli and Palestinian societies, restricting opportunities for direct actions to checkpoints and wall construction zones, limiting Palestinian interactions with Israelis to soldiers and settlers, and preventing opportunities to engage directly with mainstream Israelis. For these reasons, attempts at demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts went largely unheeded in Israel, thus prompting a shift to more symbolic, advocacy-based actions and reliance on media coverage to appeal to the international community for solidarity.

Likewise, Israeli measures restricting freedom of movement within the West Bank, including checkpoints, roadblocks, and the separation barrier, further fragmented Palestinian resistance by localizing actions, and making large-scale events and campaigns difficult to organize and implement. In addition, Israel's use of military violence in response to unarmed actions, as well as frequent arrests of activists and their families, further hindered participation.

Political constraints also emerged within Palestine from the PA during the post-Oslo period. In the years following Oslo, Arafat marginalized the activist-intellectuals who were leaders during the first intifada by replacing them with new institutions led by individuals loyal to him, and hindering these activists' organizations by attempting to supplant their services, influencing their

agendas, and ultimately, repressing popular resistance. This apparent clamp on activists was largely due to the fact that both nonviolent leaders and militant groups posed threats to Arafat's authority; however, it was also due to the nature of the Oslo agreement itself, which tasked Arafat personally with maintaining security in the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, the "semi-autonomous" structure of the PA under Oslo made Palestinian institutions increasingly dependent on Israel, politically and economically. Thus, rather than functioning as a site of Palestinian leadership, the PA came to be perceived as an ineffective bureaucracy at best, and a puppet of Israel and the West at worst. Indeed, the PA was not only seen as being under the thumb of Israel, but of the broader international community, either through direct political pressure from the US and the Quartet,[2] or through indirect economic pressure from donor governments and agencies promoting the Oslo "peace process."

Palestinian activists thus faced considerable political constraints in mobilizing for popular resistance, in terms of repression from both the Israeli government and the PA. In this way, the political structure established under the Oslo Accords resulted in the development of two polities that generated constraints to Palestinian resistance.

International level: movement frames

While political opportunities and mobilizing structures identify some factors for potential collective action, they overlook the salience of ideas, meaning, and identity in individual and collective decisions to resist. As McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald summarize, "people need to feel both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem" (1996: 5). The presence or absence of those perceptions is informed by the social construction of movements, or framings, which link the individual to the structural, and build a bridge between movement emergence and dynamics.

In most social movement theory, movement framings refer to the packaging of the *issue* for mobilization. In the case of Palestine however, I extend the framing theory to examine the packaging of *tactics*, specifically nonviolence. Indeed, most Palestinians identify strongly with the issue of resisting the occupation, but do not necessarily identify with the concept of nonviolence as a useful tactic. I attributed this phenomenon largely to western framings of nonviolence during the Oslo period, which shifted the meaning of nonviolence from resistance to pacification, especially for youth.

Indeed, many second-intifada youth experienced "nonviolence" as a euphemism for normalization, as propagated during the Oslo period. In particular, the international community's support for dialogue initiatives in the 1990s created a discourse that linked nonviolence with notions of peace, coexistence, dialogue, toleration, forgiveness, and reconciliation. While these concepts may complement a principled approach to nonviolence, they were distinct from the pragmatic nonviolent resistance practiced by Palestinians in the first intifada. In this way, the concept of nonviolence was re-framed under Oslo from one of struggle and resistance to one of accommodation and coexistence. As a result, post-Oslo youth tended to distance themselves from civil resistance when framed in the context of nonviolence.

Mobilization for civil resistance in the second intifada was limited by demobilizing organizations, political constraints, and ineffective framings of "nonviolence" under Oslo. However, potential mobilization for unarmed resistance remains high, indicating that a space does exist for a more unified, widespread popular movement.[3] Although many divisive factors remain, there is public support for civil resistance, and, perhaps more importantly, popular willingness to participate in unarmed actions, particularly amongst Palestinian youth. However,

the realization of a widespread movement depends largely on reclaiming a space for popular struggle in the post-Oslo political context, and reframing “nonviolence” in the broader framework of civil resistance.

2 Historical background

"No taxation without representation." This familiar phrase became more than just words when local organizers in the Palestinian village of Beit Sahour adopted its philosophy as a basis for a city-wide tax strike during the first intifada. Residents of the village, like Palestinians throughout the West Bank, had been paying taxes to Israel since the start of the occupation, when Israel inherited and adapted the tax-collection system previously administered by Jordan. During the first intifada, regular taxes were further increased by a general intifada tax and taxes for damages resulting from clashes. Organizers in Beit Sahour decided to respond through a tax boycott, claiming in a statement, "The military authorities do not represent us, and we did not invite them to come to our land. Must we pay for the bullets that kill our children or for the expenses of the occupying army?" (Gradstein 1989: 12A).

Israeli military authorities responded to the tax strike by placing Beit Sahour under curfew for 42 days, blocking food shipments to the village, and restricting access to the village by journalists and foreign diplomats. They also engaged in house-by-house raids, seizing property and money belonging to approximately 350 families, and imprisoning 40 residents. Despite these responses, villagers remained committed to the strike for six weeks, drawing international attention both to Palestinian grievances and to civil-based resistance during the first intifada. The tax strike at Beit Sahour was not the first episode of civil resistance or boycott in Palestinian history, however. Palestinians have utilized unarmed tactics since the beginning of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, developing a tradition of civil-based resistance.

Early Zionism to British Mandate

Modern Jewish colonization of Palestine dates to the 1880s, when millions of Eastern European Jews, fleeing from oppression and pogroms, sought new lives in areas as diverse as western Europe, the United States, South America, and, ultimately, Palestine. Despite the occurrence of isolated violent encounters between the early Jewish immigrants and the approximately half a million Muslim and Christian Arabs living in Palestine,[1] relations between the communities were relatively peaceful (King 2007).

As the World Zionism Organization (WZO) increasingly focused on purchasing Arab land and replacing Arab workers with Jewish workers, however, Palestinians started asserting their claims to the land, and, subsequently, their own national sentiments, thus resulting in conflicting national aspirations (King 2007: 26). These competing nationalisms were further intensified by the colonial presence of the British, first with the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement that divided the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence, followed by the League of Nations' acceptance of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1922.

However, it was the 1917 letter of Arthur James Balfour expressing support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" (Balfour Declaration 1917),

subsequently known as the Balfour Declaration, that ultimately motivated Arab leaders to organize for resistance, forming six Palestine Arab congresses between 1919 and 1923 in opposition to the document. In addition to these formal meetings, hundreds of Palestinian Arabs demonstrated peacefully on 27 February 1920, in response to the rumored contents of the document, with a second demonstration on 8 March in which stones were thrown. On 11 March, Palestinians engaged in acts of civil disobedience by holding unsanctioned public protests in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa, in addition to closing their shops and submitting petitions to British authorities (King 2007).

Despite these nonviolent beginnings, a prayer gathering following the yearly Al-Nabi Musa celebrations turned violent on 12 April, when demonstrations left five Jews killed and 216 injured, and four Arabs killed and 21 injured (Peel Report 1937, King 2007: 31). Protests and riots continued throughout Palestine following the ratification of the Balfour Declaration on 25 April.[2] One year later, violent riots erupted yet again on 1 May in Jaffa, instigated by disputes over May Day parades, leaving 47 Jews dead and 146 injured, and 48 Arabs dead and 73 injured (Peel Report 1937, King 2007: 33).

During most of the 1920s however, according to King, Palestinians directed their resistance towards the British through "the simplest and most basic nonviolent action methods of protest and persuasion: formal statements, declarations, petitions, manifestos, assemblies, delegations, processions, marches, and motorcades" (2007: 32). Arabs held street demonstrations, organized local strikes, sent delegations to London, organized support from Muslims in Mecca, and passed resolutions rejecting a Jewish homeland, opposing Jewish immigration, and calling for the establishment of their own representative government (King 2007: 33). In addition to these protest and persuasion techniques, Palestinians utilized methods of noncooperation, including withdrawal from political systems and elections, general strikes, boycotts, tax withholding, and civil disobedience (King 2007: 37).

Palestinian resistance to exponentially increasing Jewish immigration[3] expanded and intensified in the 1930s, including acts of noncooperation such as "suspension of social activities, withdrawal from institutions, breaking contact with British administrators, resignation from official jobs, and civil disobedience" (King 2007: 42). In March 1933, over 500 Palestinians met in Jaffa for the Noncooperation Congress, which adopted the principles of social boycotts of government events, political boycotts of government bodies, and a consumers' boycott of British and Jewish goods (King 2007: 43).

These strategies were followed in September 1933 by a one-day general strike, with subsequent rallies and demonstrations in October. The early 1930s also saw more Palestinian political organizing, with the emergence in 1932 of Istiqlal (Independence), the first modern Palestinian political party, and five others by 1935.[4] This period also saw increasing youth involvement through the first National Congress of Youth in Jaffa in 1932, which organized campaigns to support Palestinian businesses and industries, and the establishment of the Arab Youth Congress in 1935.

Not all episodes of resistance were nonviolent, with the Buraq Revolt in August 1929 leaving 133 Jews killed and more than 300 injured (King 2007: 38). In October 1933, approximately 7,000 armed demonstrators gathered in Jaffa, where police resorted to the use of firearms to restore order, resulting in the deaths of twelve demonstrators and 78 more wounded; the so-called "Jaffa Massacre" prompted riots and protests throughout Palestine.

Meanwhile, the 1920s and 1930s saw the rise of small armed groups like Al- Fidaiyya (Self-Sacrifice), Al-Kaff al-Aswad (the Black Hand), Al-Kaff al-Khadra (the Green Hand), Al-Jihad

al-Muqaddas (Sacred Struggle) and Ikhwan al-Qassam (the Brotherhood of Qassam), led by Syria-born Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, deemed “the true father of the armed Palestinian revolution” (Abu-Amr 1994: 98) for establishing the first attempt at organized violence for national resistance.

According to King, “Qassam’s example of guerrilla warfare through secret societies became the example followed during the revolt of 1936–39 by Islamic revivalist factions” (2007: 49), which erupted in April 1936. However, the “Great Revolt” is notable in its primary reliance on nonviolent methods, namely, a general strike by Palestinians working in labor, transport, and business, called by the Arab National Committee in Nablus on 20 April, and ratified by leaders of the five main Arab parties the following day. The parties also united to form Al-Lajna al-Arabiyya al-Ulya (the Arab Higher Committee), which demanded a halt to Jewish immigration, restrictions on land sales to Jews, and the establishment of a national Palestinian government (Peel Report 1937: 97, King 2007: 50).

Meanwhile, national committees organized to provide provisions for the poor, raise funds, and promote Arab products, while local committees formed to establish self-governing capabilities throughout Palestine. Other nonviolent methods included nonpayment of taxes, boycotts, and unsanctioned marches and demonstrations organized primarily by women and student organizations.

The British responded to the strike with collective fines, forcible opening of businesses, home demolitions, and mass arrests, with over 2,500 Palestinians detained by mid-June (King 2007: 52). According to King, violent resistance led by underground Qassamite militias grew in the summer of 1936 in response to the incarcerations, but the general population remained committed to the strike, which ultimately lasted nearly six months, finally ending on 10 October. Armed rebellion erupted yet again a year later in July 1937 in response to Peel’s recommendation to partition Palestine, a proposal which split Palestinian leadership and reinvigorated violent actions by militant groups against the British, the Jews, and even other Palestinian Arabs whom the militias saw as moderates or traitors. Chaos, violence, and organized intimidation continued through 1938 with extortion, kidnapping, assassination, and attacks on public roads and buildings.

As the British continued to debate Palestinian partition in London and resorted to military suppression on the ground, the revolt finally came to an end in early 1939, with 547 Jews and 494 Arabs killed over the three-year period (King 2007: 55). As King concludes, “Although the general strike had been well organized and nonviolent—its boycotts and noncooperation methods carefully implemented through local coordinating committees—its discipline and restraint ultimately collapsed” (2007: 56). Palestinians were militarily defeated, while Zionist armed resistance grew stronger, paving the way for subsequent Arab defeat in the war of 1948.

Despite the presence of armed groups, a review of Palestinian resistance prior to the Nakba indicates that most Palestinians “utilized predominantly nonviolent strategies to preserve their way of life” (King 2007: 57). Palestinians relied primarily on methods of protest and persuasion, such as marches, demonstrations, petitions, and declarations, as well as methods of noncooperation, including strikes, boycotts, withholding of taxes, and civil disobedience. As King suggests, support for violence really grew only when these nonviolent methods proved ineffective at changing British and Zionist policies.

The Nakba to 1967

On 27 November 1947, following World War II, western powers in the newly formed United

Nations General Assembly approved Resolution 181, calling for the partition of Palestine, largely to allow for the resettlement of Jewish refugees emerging from the horrors of the Holocaust in a Jewish state. Palestinian Arab leaders rejected the partition, which gave 55 percent of the land to the Zionists, including most of the coastal areas, the western Galilee, and the Negev, as well as one-third of the Palestinian population (King 2007: 60). Violent clashes occurred throughout the region following the announcement of the resolution, but most Palestinians were disinclined to take up arms (Pappe 1992: 65, King 2007: 60), and many Arab villages initiated peace meetings, agreements, pacts, and ceasefires with nearby Jewish communities (Morris 2004: 90–99).

Meanwhile, Zionist forces including the Haganah (the pre-state army), and militias like the Irgun and Lohamei Herut Israel (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or LEHI) attempted to secure a Jewish majority in their apportioned land by forcibly capturing and destroying hundreds of Palestinian villages. According to Morris, a "policy of clearing out Arab communities sitting astride or near vital routes and along some borders was instituted" (2004: 166–67), while securing the interior of the new Jewish state and its borders meant "the depopulation and destruction of the villages that hosted hostile militias and irregulars" (2004: 163–66). Even villages with no history of hostilities were targeted, the most famous perhaps being Deir Yassin, where 240 men, women, and children were killed by armed groups, the few survivors paraded as captives through the streets of Jerusalem. As King concludes, "a chain of operations were aimed at militarily occupying areas beyond the proposed state and driving out the Palestinians" (2007: 61).

The state of Israel declared its independence on the evening of 14 May 1948, an event commemorated as the *Nakba* (disaster or catastrophe) by Palestinians.
The following day, British troops withdrew, and forces from Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan invaded. Despite their numbers, the Arab armies were ill prepared and disunited, and the fighting officially ended in February 1949, with over 75 percent of the land occupied by Israel.

Between 1947 and 1949, approximately 400 Palestinian villages were depopulated, and 700,000 Palestinians, about half of the Palestinian population at the time, were forced from their homes or left to flee the fighting (Morris 2004: 342).
Refugees fled east to Palestinian land that was annexed by Jordan in December 1948 and termed the "West Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom," or the present-day West Bank, as well as to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. As noted by Mendolsohn, policymakers in the United States and Europe assumed that "the Palestinians would literally be absorbed into the Arab states" (1989: 74). However, as King writes, "the Arab states, in the throes of decolonization, tended to act as competitors more interested in their own self-aggrandizement than in reaching a just solution on Palestine" (2007: 62), often suppressing Palestinian attempts to articulate their national identity.

In January 1964, Egyptian president Gamel Abd-al-Nasser pushed for the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), purportedly to spearhead the liberation movement, though, according to King, "the primary purpose was to circumscribe the Palestinian struggle to preclude the possibility that the Palestinians might drag the Arab states into unwanted war with Israel" (2007: 62).
The PLO thus initially became known for restricting Palestinian guerrilla activities, until its takeover in 1969 by Fateh, a militant group founded in the late 1950s by Yasser Arafat, then the primary organization calling for armed struggle to liberate Palestine.

In addition to these political organizations, the period between the Nakba and the 1967 war saw the increasing role of Palestinian civil society, led by women's organizations. Nine

prominent new organizations were formed between 1948 and 1967 to address the social needs of Palestinians, almost all of them run by women (King 2007: 94). Organizations like these would continue to expand and adapt in subsequent years to form one of the core bases of Palestinian nonviolent resistance. Meanwhile, this period saw the emergence of another kind of day-to- day resistance, termed *sumoud*, or steadfastness. This form of resistance refers to Palestinians' resolve to stay on the land, resist expulsion, and persevere with daily life, in spite of grievances imposed by the occupation.

1967 to the first intifada

The present-day West Bank and Gaza Strip were controlled by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, until the War of 1967, in which Israel occupied these territories and East Jerusalem, as well as the Sinai peninsula, which was returned to Egypt in 1979 following the Camp David Accords; and the Golan Heights, annexed by Israel in 1981. Following the June 1967 War, there were numerous demonstrations and protests in both the West Bank and Gaza that were largely suppressed by Israeli forces. Teachers' associations organized strikes in August and signed petitions protesting Israeli curriculum changes and attempts at censorship. Strikes were called in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, and Tulkarem in the spring of 1968, and public protests were held against home demolitions in Hebron and Nablus.

While recruitment for armed resistance continued in refugee camps outside the territories, inside the territories, the focus was on civil and political organizing, led initially by the communist party.[5] The communists were unique at the time in concentrating their work inside the territories, focusing on popular participation, and advocating for nonviolent approaches to resistance across Palestinian society (King 2007: 71). The communists' efforts catalyzed other parties to start promoting *al-tanzim al-sha'bi* (popular organizing), including the Leftist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and finally, following the Arab defeat in the October 1973 war, Fateh and the PLO. Though turning to popular organizing later than some of the other parties, the size, influence, and resources available to Fateh enabled them to be more effective in civilian mobilization. With popular organizing activities led by Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Fateh "tipped the balance and mobilized the majority of the West Bank and Gaza communities into conscious participation in the nationalist political effort" (Sayigh 1989: 256).

Popular organizing in the 1970s and early 1980s consisted largely of building networks of social organizations and civic associations, created to provide the social, cultural, and political infrastructure lacking under the occupation. These organizations established a tradition of civic participation in Palestine, and later functioned as centers for political organizing during the first intifada. Once again, women's organizations were leaders in civic organizing, with 38 women's organizations operating in 1976, focused on generating jobs, providing relief, establishing orphanages, offering child care and elderly care (King 2007: 94).

According to King, local work committees became the main way for women to become involved in national politics, prompting tens of thousands to participate in nonpartisan voluntary organizations. Following the establishment of the first women's work committee in Ramallah in 1978, similar committees spread to villages and refugee camps, seeking to address shortcomings in female education and job opportunities by offering literacy classes and trade workshops, and establishing nursery schools and kindergartens. Known collectively as the Women's Work Committees (WWC), these groups focused on mass recruitment of women to fight oppression at

home, at work, and under occupation. Women's groups were thus among the first to put civilian mobilization into action and illustrate the potential capacity for widespread resistance.

Women's organizations worked closely with the voluntary work committees, associated with the Community Work Program of Birzeit University near Ramallah.
These nonpartisan groups brought together men and women of all ages from various classes and social backgrounds for manual labor and social work, such as coordinating schools, planting trees, fixing roads, and addressing other community needs. In addition to providing needed services, the committees served as a way to preserve Palestinian identity, establish a sense of nationalism, reclaim land, and, ultimately, struggle nonviolently against the occupation.

University student movements were also instrumental in civic mobilization of the 1970s, particularly at Birzeit University, as well as at West Bank universities in Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron. Youth were eager to play a role in West Bank politics, and the lack of employment opportunities gave students time, energy, and grievances to channel into political mobilizations. In addition to student movements, Fateh's Al-Shabiba (Young People) movement consisted of youth committees engaged in social work, primarily in the refugee camps, and served as a network for political mobilization.

Prisoners' groups or clubs also proved to be mobilizing networks that utilized civil resistance. Palestinian detainees in Israeli prisons elected multi-level representational committees, allowing for communication and coordination within and between prisons. Although communications were officially forbidden, prisoners managed to organize hunger strikes and utilize other nonviolent tactics such as banging on bars, using forbidden items, and refusing to address soldiers formally.
Prisoners also struggled for the right to take classes through correspondence courses, and to organize Hebrew and English language workshops. Thus, prisons ironically "became a place where democratic proceedings, processes of debate, parliamentary procedures, aspects of institutionalized action, and mechanisms of citizenship were learned" (King 2007: 119).

During this period, as King summarizes, "Girls, boys, men, women, university students, labor unionists, and prisoners were involved in collective action—a wedging open of nongovernmental political space and development of institutions not under official purview—which represented germination of an evolving Palestinian civil society" (2007: 125). Indeed, organizations flourished both because of and in spite of the military occupation, with Palestinians establishing alternative institutions, engaging in democratic procedures, and both directly and indirectly acquiring strategies of civil action that would form the foundation of the first intifada.

The first intifada

The civil-based nature of the first intifada (1987–93), especially in its early years, has been documented by numerous scholars. As King writes, in the first intifada, Palestinians "conceptualized new ways of waging struggle for basic civil and political rights and in so doing reshaped the sources of power within Palestinian society, causing shifts away from adherence to the dogma of military means [and] building leadership structures that emerged from the organizing of a civil society" (2007: 343). Other scholars (Galtung 1989, Rigby 1991, Dajani 1999, Abu-Nimer 2003) have likewise examined the nonviolent nature of the first intifada. As Dajani summarizes, "Stone-throwing demonstrations and individual armed attacks . . . notwithstanding, the intifada was consciously and deliberately envisioned as an organized and universal unarmed civilian struggle against the Israeli occupation" (1999: 58).

It is worth noting Dajani's use of the word "universal" to emphasize the widespread

participation in the uprising, as it is this difference in mass mobilization between the first and second intifadas that underscores this book. Ackerman and DuVall likewise note how “Palestinians from every walk of life were willing to protest, strike, and improvise” in the first intifada (2000: 420). In other words, nearly all Palestinians were both able and willing to participate in the first intifada largely because of its predominantly nonviolent nature.

These civil-based actions did not emerge spontaneously in 1987, but rather grew from the spirit of civic participation that emerged in the network of organizations mentioned above, in combination with the deliberate efforts of activist intellectuals and nonviolent activists. Organized nonviolent action against the occupation started in 1980 through the work of the Lajnat Muwajahat al-Qabda al-Hadidiyya (Committee Confronting the Iron Fist), led by Palestinian Faisal Abd al-Qadir Husseini and Israeli journalist Gideon Spiro.

The Committee Confronting the Iron Fist started as a series of committees focusing on protesting arrests and deportations of Palestinian intellectuals and activists by raising awareness about their cases within Israel. The committees officially merged in 1985, seeking to persuade Israelis and the international community about the need to recognize the grievances and rights of Palestinians more generally. Specifically, the committee was committed to ending administrative detention, eliminating collective punishment, putting a stop to torture, and stopping the practice of forced deportation. The Committee Confronting the Iron First utilized tools being employed in concurrent nonviolent movements in eastern Europe and Latin America, including acts of persuasion and protest like demonstrations, marches, vigils, public speeches, documentation, media releases, letters of opposition, and lobbying (King 2007: 166).

In June 1987, on the twentieth anniversary of the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the committee organized a march protesting the occupation and calling for an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel with Jerusalem as its capital. Meanwhile, by the early 1980s, Husseini, along with Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh, were engaging in discussions with Israeli intellectuals and government officials, laying a foundation for future direct negotiations.

In the early 1980s, at the same time that the Committee Confronting the Iron Fist was taking shape, handouts describing successful campaigns of nonviolent resistance in other conflict areas began appearing throughout Palestine. According to King, the mimeographed fliers “suggested that action was better than inaction, nonviolent resistance was less self-destructive than armed struggle and within the limited capacity of the disarmed Palestinians, and fighting with political weapons could be more effective than violence in redressing fundamental injustices” (2007: 127). The fliers were later attributed to the cousins Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian psychologist schooled in the nonviolent methods of Martin Luther King, Jr., and Gandhi; and Jonathan Kuttab, a Palestinian lawyer who co-founded Al-Haq, the first Palestinian human rights organization.

In addition to distributing the leaflets, Kuttab and Awad started offering workshops and meetings on nonviolent resistance, publishing booklets, and distributing Arabic copies of writings by Gene Sharp describing new conceptualizations of power and civilian strength. In 1984, Awad opened the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence (PCSN) in East Jerusalem, which continued disseminating materials, initiated a library on wheels, and began organizing early acts of civil disobedience.

According to Awad, he and other leaders began by calling for simple acts of disobedience that nearly all individuals were both willing and able to do. Early actions included refusing to pay bills printed in Hebrew; eating only local produce, buying Palestinian products, and boycotting Israeli goods; using alternative business hours, and even adopting a different time zone. As

Awad remembers, these acts made it possible for many people to get involved in the initial days and weeks of the uprising, after which leaders could start raising the stakes of the action and still maintain widespread participation (author interview 2004).

The actual start of the intifada is usually referenced as 9 December 1987, following an automobile collision between an Israeli truck and two cars of Gazan laborers, whose funerals turned into mass protests in Gaza, especially in Jabaliya refugee camp. Protests then broke out across the territories, as Palestinians from all walks of life participated in the "shaking off" (the literal translation of *intifada*) of the occupation. Acts of defiance included shouting and wailing to prevent soldiers from entering people's homes, blowing car horns at designated times, wearing the Palestinian *kuffiyeh* (traditional headdress), burning tires, and writing on public walls. Flying the Palestinian flag, which was illegal, was also encouraged as a symbol of resistance. Some of these actions resulted in mass arrests that nonviolent leaders hoped would "overcrowd and paralyze Israeli prison systems"
(Dajani 1995: 69). Indeed, the prisons came to form a solid foundation for the movement, as nonviolent leaders held large meetings in jail. Some activists also used the time in prison to engage directly with Israeli soldiers to try to influence their morale.

Other nonviolent tactics included methods of protest such as demonstrations, sit-ins, marches, mock funerals, hunger strikes, and teach-ins. In addition to boycotting Israeli products, economic noncooperation extended to strikes, withdrawal of work from Israeli factories and farms, and withholding taxes. As Ackerman and DuVall write, "all these steps were designed to amplify the spirit of resistance and make it impossible for the Israelis to conduct business as usual" (2000: 410).

While trying to frustrate Israeli daily systems, Palestinians were at the same time creating alternative institutions in the forms of specialized committees in towns, villages, and camps throughout the territories. These committees performed a variety of functions, from providing humanitarian aid to mobilizing and organizing the general population to serving as an alternative civilian administration.

Perhaps one of the most noteworthy groups to emerge during this time was Al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada lil-Intifada, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). Comprised of representatives from all the major political parties, including Fateh, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the PCP, the UNLU became the primary initiator of calls for action and civil disobedience, which it disseminated through a series of leaflets of communiqués. According to a report completed by the Palestine Center for the Study of Nonviolence, over 95 percent of the 163 actions called for in the initial 17 leaflets were specifically nonviolent, and over 90 percent of the 291 calls in leaflets 18–39 were nonviolent (Dajani 1995: 194). The few calls that were not specifically nonviolent generally called for acts of "limited violence" such as throwing stones. Meanwhile, at the local level, popular committees emerged throughout Palestine, especially in the villages and rural areas, organizing actions, providing social relief, and functioning effectively as local government institutions.

The majority of the nonviolent tactics used in the first intifada allowed for, and indeed, depended on, extensive youth involvement and leadership. To be sure, youth were the leaders of the first intifada and the initiators of the stone-throwing demonstrations. As D. Kuttab explains, youth of all ages had a role in typical demonstrations. Seven-to-ten-year-olds for example were usually responsible for setting tires on fire to block traffic and attract soldiers. The eleven-to-14 age group was assigned the task of placing large stones in the road to slow down or stop traffic. The 15-to-19-year-olds were the veteran stone throwers, as well as the smugglers of supplies and

resources during curfews. Finally, young Palestinians over the age of 19 led the entire team of youth by taking key positions around the demonstration area (1988: 19).

To be sure, the child stone thrower is an image often associated with the first intifada (D. Kuttab 1988: 14). However, youth were involved in the first intifada in other ways as well. Many youth participated in nonviolent actions such as protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, walks-outs, boycotts, and strikes. Many youth also assumed leadership roles. According to Seif, "the youth were widely engaged in the organization and leadership of the Intifada, its striking forces, its popular committees, its educational and solidarity committees" (2000: 20). Universities became centers of popular mobilization, and, even after schools and universities were closed, the diffusion of students and faculty into their villages and camps throughout the West Bank and Gaza "hastened the spread of ideas about Palestinian nonviolence resistance" (King 2007: 222).

J. Kuttab goes so far as to refer to the first intifada as "the children's revolt," arguing that youth "possessed a new spirit that challenged the occupation" and also "infuse[d] the rest of Palestinian society with the same spirit" (1988: 26). According to J. Kuttab, youth leadership in the first intifada was instrumental in Palestine in removing the barrier of fear, fostering pragmatic unity, creating a sense of self-reliance, developing a sense of generosity in daily life, encouraging new organizations and grassroots committees, and opening people's minds to new ideas

(1988: 26–31). Clearly, youth played major roles in the coordination and implementation of the first intifada, with approximately 90 percent of young males and 80 percent of young females participating in some form of demonstration or activism (Barber 2000: 7).

Though stone-throwing and more directly violent acts such as gasoline bombs and stabbings became more common in subsequent years, it is clear that the first intifada was based on an initial foundation of nonviolent activism and civil disobedience. To be sure, as Abu-Nimer explains, though some actions of the intifada were "indisputably violent . . . what was remarkable about the uprising was the infrequency of these incidents and the degree to which they stood outside the strategy and structure of the resistance as a whole" (2003: 145). Nearly all Palestinians were both able and willing to participate in the first intifada largely because of its predominantly nonviolent nature. As King summarizes, the first intifada represented an "historic instance of intellectuals, academicians, and elite activists being joined with savvy young street organizers in common cause" (2007:
222).

Although the exiled PLO would take over the leadership of the intifada in its later years, initially at least there was a feeling of popular ownership to the movement, and willingness of the masses to participate "if it meant plowing the ground of their own society" (Ackerman and DuVall 2000: 420). The entire population therefore took it upon themselves to challenge the status quo that had paralyzed the region, not through violent rebellion or militant opposition but through *intifada*, a literal "waking up" of the people and "shaking off" of both their oppressor and their own quietude. There was hence a sense of internal empowerment that found its expression in the nonviolent tactics and acts of civil disobedience in the initial phases of the intifada.

Legacy of the first intifada

The first intifada was essentially a visible extension of the Palestinian national movement that had been building for some time, emerging from the efforts of civic organizations, activist individuals, and advocates of nonviolence. In other words, it was not merely a resistance

movement *against* Israel but a nationalist movement *for* Palestine. It thus allowed for the public emergence of a veritable Palestinian national identity, which according to Ackerman and DuVall, "transferred the motive power behind the Palestinian cause from militants and guerrillas to the Palestinian people themselves, and thereby endowed that cause with a legitimacy and urgency it did not have before" (2000: 420). Accordingly, there was a sense of reclaiming the Palestinian movement for the people, and thus restoring to it a sense of united hope and optimism.

Many activists felt that the sense of a collective national identity[6] became truly evident in the first intifada. As the coordinator of the Stop the Wall campaign explained,

The Palestinian people have a long history of resistance, going back as far as 1918 and 1936 with the strikes, and continuing through the years. The highest point of our resistance though was the first intifada . . . Our resistance then was unprecedented, in that we used stones and simplicity in confronting a big army, and we faced guns with our chests open to them. The intifada is deeply rooted in people's minds as the main resistance. We mobilized all the people in the streets, and mobilized the entire community for confrontation.

(author interview 2007)

In this way, the first intifada translated the idea of national struggle into a veritable *movement* identity, a shared identity based on participation in a movement. As one activist described, "It was the intifada of the people . . . If there was a demonstration, you wouldn't only see the younger generation, you would see mothers, old people, the whole village participating" (author interview 2007).

What prompted such widespread participation? Typically, according to Olson (1965), in the absence of selective rewards, shared interests are not enough to motivate individuals to act, especially in cases like the intifada in which actions are not guaranteed to bring about change, and/or participating in actions puts the individual at risk. In these cases, Olson argues, it makes more sense from a rational perspective for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others. However, this was not the case in Palestine, largely because of the Palestinian collective identity and sense of responsibility to the community. As Fireman and Gamson argue, "A person whose life is intertwined with the group . . . has a big stake in the group's fate. When collective action is urgent, the person is likely to contribute his or her share even if the impact of that share is not noticeable" (1979: 22). Polletta and Jasper likewise note that collective identity can include "affective connections one has to members of a group that oblige one to protest along with or on behalf of them" (2001: 290).

To be sure, activists recalled that in the first intifada, "The youth would be throwing stones, the mothers would be bringing water, the old people would be protecting the children from arrest, so you would see the whole community working together" (author interview 2007). A nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem likewise recalled, "Everyone was together. You could go to any house if you needed to eat or you needed to sleep, and people would welcome you. Whether you were Christian or Muslim, it didn't matter, because all were open to each other" (author interview 2007). Another activist added that communities worked together to become self-reliant, holding classes for students in different houses when schools were closed, and planting gardens to grow food. As he summarized, "We knew how to make a community together, and to support each other for food, shelter, education, everything" (author interview 2007). The coordinator of Stop the Wall added that there was a depth of trust within communities during the first intifada, and asserted, "This is the real resistance, when there is unity within the society"

(author interview 2007).

This level of community participation and cooperation around nonviolent activism was especially notable because of the organic way in which it emerged. As the founder of the Tent of Nations explained,

Nobody knew about the theory of nonviolence, but people were working together to build a constructive future. Everyone was fighting for one goal, so the struggle came about practically. People were helping neighbors, . . . not because someone told them to do this, but because they wanted to.

(interview 2007)

Civil-based resistance in the first intifada proved to be both individually and collectively empowering, thus further reinforcing a veritable movement identity.
As one activist recalled, “The best part was that Palestinians were in control of their own revolt . . . You could feel the pride, because we were in action” (author interview 2007). Abu-Nimer agrees, describing the first intifada as “an excellent example of a political movement in which *the masses of people were able to take control of their destiny* [emphasis added] and bring political change into their environment by organizing themselves to fight oppression using nonviolent tactics” (2003: 180). The first intifada thus not only strengthened local communities but also contributed to the articulation of a national Palestinian identity of resistance. As one activist commented, “My generation was organizing people for the national aspiration and revolting against the oppression of the occupation. We were sending out a message saying, ‘Hey, we are a people here’” (author interview 2007). Although the idea of a Palestinian nation was not new, the first intifada firmly articulated a national identity of resistance.

The shared experience of popular resistance thus contributed to the emergence of a collective activist identity. According to Polletta and Jasper, this development can be considered as a movement outcome, in addition to the institutional impacts of collective action. In the case of Palestine for example, while most assessments of first intifada outcomes focus on the institutional components of the Oslo Accords, the collective identity lens makes it possible to consider impacts such as developing national pride, building solidarity, and strengthening the social fabric of communities.

The shared experience of popular struggle also informs the individual identity of activists. As Polletta and Jasper note, participation marks activists’ personal identities even after the movement ends (2001: 296). This was the case for many activists in Palestine, particularly those who were youth during the time, as the first intifada provided them with a sense of purpose and a place in society. As Mahmoud remembered, “When you were holding the flag, you felt like you were deciding things, coordinating things, and deciding where the cause was going. It was a great feeling” (author interview 2007). Likewise, Majdi recalled, “There was such a feeling of power, and of love, and of friends. The feeling was beautiful. I found myself there, and I found the Palestinian way” (author interview 2007).[7] As Polletta and Jasper suggest, “Core collective identity continues to shape an individual’s sense of self ” (2001: 296). In this way, the collective experience of resistance in the first intifada informed the individual identity of then youth activists, who drew from that experience to initiate popular struggle in the second intifada following the Oslo period.

The Oslo period

Despite its nationalist roots, the intifada did not culminate with the formation of a Palestinian state, but rather with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) following the Oslo Accords, which provided for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a semi-autonomous governing body in parts of the occupied territories. Under the 1993 Oslo I Accords, the PA was installed in Gaza and, at least in name, in Jericho. Two year later, the Oslo II Accords articulated the framework for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), scheduled the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian urban centers, and divided the West Bank into three areas: Area A consisting of Palestinian population centers to be under Palestinian control; Area B consisting of Palestinian village areas to be under joint Israeli and Palestinian jurisdiction; and Area C to be under Israeli control.

At this point, most Palestinians assumed that the Oslo process eventually would bring statehood, and that the PA would form the foundation of a Palestinian national government. However, the Oslo period saw a continuation of the status quo and the extension of economic and political oppression in the West Bank and Gaza. According to Khalidi, “Israel was allowed by the United States . . . to help itself to huge bites of the pie that the two sides were supposed to be negotiating” (2007: 198). It appeared to many Palestinians that Israel was taking advantage of the interim period by creating so-called “facts on the ground,” specifically in the form of settlement construction, which would make the formation of a Palestinian state increasingly difficult and unlikely.[8]

Meanwhile, frequent border closings, often in response to militant attacks by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, contributed to rising poverty in the West Bank and Gaza, while Israel also maintained control over water resources serving the majority of the land (three-quarters in the West Bank and one-third in Gaza) (King 2007: 326). Thus, in spite of the discourse on coexistence, peacebuilding, and “nonviolence” under Oslo, Palestinians quickly became disillusioned with both the PA as a body and the DOP as an agreement as the economy worsened, settlement activity continued, autonomy was withheld, and other promises were left unmet. As Andoni summarizes, owing to the “malfunctioning of the PA on the one hand, and the continuity of the Israeli occupation on the other . . . Palestinians had lost interest in the peace process, having given up hope that they would get anything substantial out of it” (2001: 214).

The second intifada

It was in this context that the second intifada emerged in 2000, with the hope and optimism of the first intifada largely replaced by anger and frustration. While the ultimate goal of Palestinian statehood remained, the previous pro-Palestinian nationalist idealism was overshadowed by anti-Israeli cynicism. This context was reflected in a surge of armed resistance in the second intifada, including suicide bombs and rocket attacks. As Andoni explains, “Intifada 2000 started explosively, with many confrontations and high casualties, quickly escalated into militant clashes . . . and then normalized into less intense clashes with frequent military operations from both sides” (2001: 212). Instead of a widespread campaign of civil disobedience, the second intifada consisted largely of violent resistance, including the use of suicide bomb attacks. Israel likewise adopted a more direct violent strategy, which included massive raids, assassinations, and extensive home demolitions in addition to checkpoints, curfews, and other forms of political, social, and economic oppression. This resulted in the intifada becoming a cycle of violence between armed groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Al-Aqsa Brigades and the IDF, with

both sides justifying their violent actions by the violence of the other.

However, this shift in emphasis to violence limited opportunities for popular resistance, thus decreasing the scale of the struggle while increasing its intensity, and resulting in a kind of hijacking of the movement by militants. Although many Palestinians continued to work for nonviolent change, the primary use of armed violence overshadowed other efforts both in practice and in public discourse for the majority of the second intifada. As Andoni notes, “once armed groups became involved, the majority of the population stayed away from direct confrontation” (2001: 211). D. Kuttab agrees, stating that, while the first intifada’s “use of nonviolent tactics allowed all sectors of Palestinian society to participate in the resistance,” the second intifada was dominated by “just the armed few” (2003: 21).

As a result, public participation was significantly lower than it was during the first intifada, with little space available for widespread popular participation, even for youth who largely spearheaded the actions of the first intifada. As J. Hart explains, the “highly militarized environment offer[ed] few avenues for the young to play a meaningful role in the struggle of their people” (2004: 28). Abu-Nimer agrees, noting that the second intifada’s level of “militancy had a far-reaching impact on the disempowerment of Palestinian youth who constituted the base for the 1987 intifada mobilization” (2006: 145).

Participation in the second intifada by Israeli peace groups and international supporters was also hindered by its predominantly violent nature. While many Israeli peace groups formed or expanded during the first intifada, as Andoni writes, “the fact that there [was] more armed resistance in [the second] uprising severely limited the chances even for the radical and extremely marginalized Israeli peace groups to participate in anti-occupation efforts” (2001: 217). In addition, the earlier nonviolent tactics of attempting to talk to Israeli soldiers to influence their morale, and reaching out to the Israeli public, were nearly impossible in the second intifada, owing to heightened mistrust and demonization of the “other” by both communities, as well as by limitations on mobility in the name of security. This lack of dialogue due to violence, and fear of violence, resulted in each community being “exposed to the uprising only through its own, relatively uncritical media” (Andoni 2001: 217), which only exacerbated the conflict. In addition, as Ackerman and DuVall point out, “Western sympathy for Palestinian underdogs—which could have been translated into pressure on Israel—was undercut when violence came from both sides” (2000: 420).

Popular resistance was also hindered by rising political tensions within Palestine. Hamas’ victory in the Palestinian legislative elections on 26 January 2006 resulted in internal power struggles between Fateh and Hamas, as well as a suspension of funds to the PA from outside donors, affecting thousands of civil servants. Meanwhile, confrontations between Hamas and Israel continued, with Israel conducting air raids and shellings in Gaza and Hamas launching Qassam rockets into nearby Sderot in Israel. In June 2006, both Palestinian and Israeli passions intensified respectively with the death of a family of seven on a beach in Gaza as a result of Israeli air strikes, and the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Hamas. These tensions were overshadowed however when Hezbollah militants attacked an Israeli patrol on the Lebanese–Israeli border, resulting in an Israeli bombing and artillery shelling offensive against Lebanon, and Hezbollah rocket attacks on northern Israel, which continued until a ceasefire was signed on 24 August 2006.

The following year, 2007, saw a continuation of Israeli raids and incursions in the West Bank and Gaza, combined with increasing daily difficulties and disillusionment with Palestinian leadership. Regarding daily life, Israel’s continuing construction of the 723-kilometer long

separation barrier, taking the form of a 6-to-8-meter concrete wall in some areas and barbed wire and electric fence in others, restricted movement, divided villages from their farming land, and limited access to Jerusalem and urban centers within the West Bank. Indeed, though allegedly erected for security purposes, the separation barrier was not built directly on the Green Line separating 1967 Israel and the West Bank, but rather weaves around, and sometimes through, Palestinian villages and towns within the West Bank. The resultant economic difficulties, combined with over a year of Israel withholding Palestinian tax money and the international community continuing to boycott the PA, contributed to increasing rates of poverty and unemployment.[9]

Meanwhile, tensions between Hamas and Fateh continued to rise, with outbreaks of factional violence in Gaza continuing through the spring. The confrontations reached an unprecedented level in June 2007, when Hamas militants expelled Fateh from Gaza, prompting PA President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to dissolve the unity government. While the parties continued to struggle for power, most Palestinians with whom I spoke during this time expressed increasing disillusionment with both parties and sadness at the occurrence of Palestinian–Palestinian violence. This sense of despair was further compounded in December 2008, when Israel launched a 25-day offensive on Gaza in a stated response to rocket attacks, resulting in the death of over 1,300 Gazans, thousands of injuries, and widespread destruction of homes and infrastructure.

However, throughout all of these developments, unarmed resistance did take place, as discussed further in the following chapters. These civil-based actions built on the tradition of popular resistance that has been part of Palestinian history, not only in the first intifada but also throughout the twentieth century.

3 Civil resistance in the second intifada
Direct actions

“I wanted to find a color other than blood.”

Mustafa, activist

Budrous is a small farming village of approximately 1,600 people, separated from the Green Line (the internationally recognized border between Israel and the West Bank) by about 700 dunams (about 175 acres) of olive groves. Civil resistance commenced in Budrous in November 2003 in response to the construction of the separation barrier, the original route of which would have cut through Budrous’ surrounding farm land, seizing approximately 1,200 dunams (300 acres) and uprooting hundreds of olive trees. In addition, the proposed route of the wall would have encircled Budrous and eight nearby villages, creating a closed enclave, and cutting off the 25,000 area residents from their fields, offices, and schools, as well as relatives and friends.

Israeli authorities informed the village that the wall would be built by hanging notices on olive trees in the surrounding groves, which were found by several shopkeepers and brought to the village leaders. The leaders in the village decided to coordinate with other villages to establish a popular committee, and to engage of initial acts of protest and persuasion. Abu Iyad, a leading activist in Budrous, explained the initial actions taken:

First, we initiated the popular committee, and agreed to call it the Popular Committee to Resist the Wall. We knew we needed to fulfill a real example of nonviolence on the ground, so we aimed to join all the movements and power points in the area to be together in a union. We gathered leaders from Hamas, Fateh, the communist parties, the municipality, youth clubs, schools, and other organizations, because we needed to work together to be effective. We also needed members who believed in nonviolence, so we looked for representatives from all the organizations, ranging from the youth clubs to Hamas, who were supportive of the nonviolent way.

We had a meeting on 9 November 2003 to start the popular committee, and invited 60 or 70 local leaders and coordinators from different organizations. We held the meeting in Na’ale, a neighboring village, and invited leaders from the different villages in the area, and elected the popular committee . . .

Not more than two days later, the bulldozers came. We had heard the wall would come, but we didn’t think it would come so fast. We thought there was no hope; we thought they would destroy everything. But on 11 November 2003, we held our first demonstration, which we organized very quickly. We just took 30 minutes to talk and gather people. We used the loudspeakers from the mosque to announce that the bulldozers were coming to the north of the village, and that we must

go and try to stop them. The turnout was small, about 80 or 90 people, and they were mostly children . . . but this was still good, and it meant a lot for us.

At this first demonstration, there were just three soldiers. When they saw us coming, they started to prepare their weapons. But we just walked with our bodies and carried Palestinian flags, and we didn't throw stones, and no one did anything. The soldiers were surprised by our action, and they started calling others on their mobiles. About 20 minutes later, five jeeps arrived. In one of them was a commander, who I later found out was the assistant to the Israeli military leader in the Ramallah region. He said, "What are you doing? Are you crazy? You won't change anything by resisting. This is a government decision that is already set." We said, "Okay, that is your decision. But we have another decision, and we will resist." So we managed to stop the bulldozer that day, but the commander told us that they would return.

(author interview 2007)

After the initial demonstration, the construction crews spent about six weeks completing other sections of the wall before returning to Budrous. During this time, Abu Iyad and other members of the popular committee tried to encourage nearby villages to resist the construction of the wall, but the other communities did not organize as effectively. Meanwhile, the popular committee continued to organize weekly demonstrations consisting of marches between Budrous and the nearby village of Qibya to send a message of resistance, in accordance with protest and persuasion strategies of nonviolence. However, it was soon necessary for the villagers to utilize strategies of noncooperation and intervention when the bulldozers returned in late December. As Abu Iyad recounted:

On 29 December, we had our first demonstration where there was real fighting. This was the first time the Israelis brought the bulldozers and we had to try to stop them. About 500 people came to the demonstration, which was about one-third of the village, including women, men, old, and young. At this first demonstration, we showed that the Palestinian people can do something. We had been waiting for this example. People always knew about nonviolent resistance, but they were waiting for someone to tell them how to do it. People were shocked by the wall, and were ready to resist. The Palestinian people are strong, and have the power to struggle and to defend their land and their olive trees.

Basically, we organized the people in such a way that they surprised the IDF jeeps and were able to pass through them and charge the bulldozers. Some of the soldiers fired rubber bullets and several people were injured, but we managed to occupy the bulldozers. Three bulldozers withdrew, and the IDF told us that they would take the remaining bulldozers if we removed the people from them. So we did, and we continued to sit in the field all day.

We continued resisting on the following days. On 31 December, the army imposed a curfew, but we broke curfew after four hours and pushed in from the fields. We continued on 1 January, and again on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, and finally on 4 January they stopped working. We had been suffering daily. Seventy people were wounded by rubber bullets, and even more were injured by the tear gas and by being beaten with batons. So we had no choice but to stop the daily struggling, but we continued demonstrating in the area once or twice a week, even when they weren't working, just to send a message that we wouldn't let them continue.

(author interview 2007)

Abu Iyad was arrested on 14 January and detained for ten days for participating in resistance,

and other community members were held for months. Nevertheless, the demonstrations in Budrous continued until 1 April 2003, when Israel decided to change the route of the wall to be on the Green Line, with the exception of the approximately 40 dunams (10 acres) that were taken on the first day of the demonstrations. However, in May 2004, the IDF returned to Budrous to confiscate an additional 200 dunams (50 acres) of land. At this point, the popular committee decided to take their case to court with the help of Israeli human rights attorney Ronit Robinson, who filed a petition with Israel's High Court of Justice.

The court was willing to reduce the amount of land to be confiscated from 200 dunams (50 acres) to 56 dunams (about 13 acres), but the villagers didn't accept the ruling, and continued to demonstrate to protect the land under dispute. In the course of these demonstrations in August 2004, a 17-year-old boy was killed by a rubber bullet, another 300 people were injured, and 45 were arrested. The villagers managed to protect 6 of the 56 dunams, but the remaining 50 were confiscated.

According to Abu Iyad, the villagers still felt they had succeeded. First, they managed to save over 1,000 dunams (250 acres) of land that would otherwise have been confiscated. At the same time, as Abu Iyad noted, "we also managed to encourage nonviolent resistance and create an example, and now it is growing in other villages . . . everywhere people are demonstrating nonviolently" (author interview 2007). He added that, "on another level, we have developed friends around the world . . . Now we know that we are not alone in the occupation.
People around the world know that we are victims, and not criminals" (author interview 2007). In summary, Budrous was a successful example of direct civil action on the local level, by saving land that otherwise would have been confiscated; on the regional level, by establishing a model for popular resistance for other villages; and on the global level, by showing the international community a form of Palestinian resistance distinct from the armed attacks that dominated headlines at the time.

Budrous was not the only community that employed unarmed tactics. Although the second intifada was characterized as mostly violent, especially relative to the first intifada, many individuals, organizations, and communities continued to utilize strategic nonviolence throughout the second intifada. In this chapter, I explore how Palestinians employed civil resistance in the form of direct action tactics, such as demonstrations, marches, and protests, primarily led by village popular committees in opposition to the construction of the separation barrier. This discussion does not intend to be exhaustive, but rather aims to highlight the scope and span of popular struggle in the second intifada.

Popular resistance during the second intifada was largely rooted at the village level, where local communities used strategies of protest, noncooperation, and intervention to resist the occupation. There are several explanations for this localization of action, as discussed in the later chapters. However, for many local communities, the decision to act was not so much a choice but a necessity. Indeed, the majority of village-based resistance aimed to halt (or at least re-route) the construction of the separation barrier, which has separated many village-based farmers from their agricultural land. The farmers, their families, and the communities themselves rely on the land for sustenance and livelihood, thus, prohibition of access instigated a number of grassroots resistance campaigns.

The majority of village-based direct action campaigns were (and continue to be) coordinated by local popular committees. Popular committees emerged in the first intifada to organize local resistance in accordance with strategies developed by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), an organized underground movement that coordinated resistance actions for

all of Palestine, through the use of weekly or biweekly fliers and communiqués. The role of the popular committees and the UNLU diminished significantly with the PLO centralization of actions in the latter half of the first intifada, and essentially remained dormant during the 1990s and the first three years of the second intifada. However, popular committees started to re-emerge in several villages to coordinate local resistance activities in 2003, largely in response to the construction of the separation barrier, and these served as models for other villages initiating their own committees in subsequent years.

Popular committees are grassroots in the truest sense of the word, consisting of local volunteers with natural ties to the land and community. This proximity, in terms of geography and lived experiences, gives popular committees a degree of legitimacy and respect that may be difficult for non-community members to attain. The committees are not formal, therefore giving them considerable flexibility and freedom to communicate and associate with various groups and stakeholders. The membership of the popular committees varies, but often includes village elders, farmers, activists, students, and local political leaders. The diverse composition of the popular committees allow community members to collaborate on various objectives and actions in such ways that overcome political divisions plaguing other levels of Palestinian society.

Village popular committees undertake a variety of duties. For the sake of this discussion, it is important to note the popular committees' roles in coordinating direct actions in terms of protest, noncooperation, and intervention. Regarding protest, popular committees are the primary organizers of sustained campaigns, usually consisting of weekly demonstrations following the Friday prayer. Villages throughout the West Bank have mobilized to organize and sustain these weekly marches, usually near the construction sites of the separation barrier. In terms of intervention, popular committees have organized episodes of civil disobedience, again focused on the separation barrier, by mobilizing villagers to physically block the destruction of olive groves and other land, or by taking control of the bulldozers and other equipment used for uprooting trees, home demolitions, or the construction of the wall. Finally, regarding noncooperation, popular committees have been instrumental in organizing boycotts of Israeli products, particularly those manufactured in settlements.

Each popular committee also performs other tasks in accordance with local grievances and needs, with several committees even pursuing legal cases in Israeli courts on behalf of the villagers. In addition to coordinating the direct actions described above, popular committees also typically handle the village's communications with Israeli authorities and sometimes settlers, maintain records and maps of land closures and seizures, act as spokespersons with the media, offer support to other villages, and coordinate actions, conferences, and events with other committees. In addition to the Budrous campaign popular committees coordinated notable village-based campaigns in Biddu, Bil'in, South Bethlehem, and the South Hebron Hills.

Biddu

Several months after the demonstrations commenced in Budrous, the village of Biddu initiated its own campaign of nonviolent resistance. Biddu is located 15 kilometers northwest of Jerusalem and 13 kilometers south of Ramallah, yet checkpoints and road closures have increased travel time to the urban areas to up to two hours. Biddu originally consisted of 6,000 dunams (about 1,500 acres), but it has been reduced to 1,500 dunams (about 375 acres) owing to land confiscations by settlements and, more recently, the separation barrier. Biddu is located in the middle of eight Palestinian villages constituting approximately 8,000 people, so the village's geographic centrality contributed to the widespread participation in its popular resistance efforts.

The first demonstration was held on 24 February 2004, in response to the commencement of construction of the separation barrier on the south side of the village. About thirty people participated in this initial action, supported by several international activists. Though the demonstrators managed to stop the bulldozers for one hour, the IDF responded by beating the participants, resulting in numerous broken bones and broken ribs, and arresting five activists. On the following day, bulldozers arrived on the north side of the village, so the popular committee went used the mosque's loudspeakers to implore villagers to resist. Hundreds of villagers participated in this demonstration, which was again met by beatings, as well as tear gas and rubber bullets. Demonstrations continued on 26 February, when three villagers were killed during the demonstration, and a fourth later died from a rubber bullet wound to the head.

According to Ali, a leading activist on Biddu's popular committee, the IDF was present 24 hours a day, and the demonstrators were becoming exhausted. The popular committee thus started coordinating demonstrations, such that most people demonstrated during the day, while others demonstrated at night. People from neighboring villages came to participate in the demonstrations, while others provided food and water to the activists in the field. According to Ali, "the moral meaning of this kind of solidarity helped us to want to stay and continue" (author interview 2007). The village did indeed continue the demonstrations, and intensified its actions from protest to noncooperation and intervention, such as physically preventing home demolitions and attacking bulldozers. The IDF continued to respond with violence; in a large demonstration on 18 April 2004, another villager was shot and killed, and over 500 people were wounded by rubber bullets.

As Ali explained, demonstrations still took place after this point, though some villagers were becoming hesitant to participate owing to the scale of the repression. In addition to the direct violence utilized during the protests, the IDF punished citizens from Biddu in indirect ways at this time as well, by refusing them permits to pass through the checkpoints to go to work, school, or the hospital, and by confiscating permits that had been granted earlier. According to Ali, "at the checkpoints, if the soldiers saw that people were from Biddu, they would make them wait in the sun for hours, or they would tell them they had to go home . . . We know that they deny permits to militants, but people like me were not engaged in militant actions or violence, yet they still denied us permits" (author interview 2007). Despite the sanctions however, most villagers continued to resist.

As in Budrous, the popular committee pursued legal action to stop the construction of the barrier as well. They collected money from the farmers in the village and hired Mohammed Dahlan, a Palestinian lawyer and Israeli citizen, who framed his case around two central arguments. He first argued that the wall's route should be determined not only by Israeli security needs but also by recognizing the hardships that the wall would inflict on Palestinians. Second, he argued that the nonviolent demonstrations in Biddu and the farmers' willingness to take legal action were clear indications that the villagers were proactive in protecting their land. As a result of the legal case, Biddu managed to change the route of the wall, and save several homes that were to be demolished. However, according to Ali, Biddu's popular committee did not consider the decision to be a success, because the wall was simply moved to a different location that confiscated other land not included in the court case. Nevertheless, Biddu's daily demonstrations and widespread popular participation served as a model and inspiration for other villages to resist. In addition, the legal case set a *de jure* precedent that the route of the wall should be based not only on security but also on minimizing damages incurred by Palestinians.

Bil'in

The village of Bil'in became a symbol of popular resistance in Palestine during the second intifada. Bil'in is a small farming village of approximately 1,700 residents, located 12 kilometers west of Ramallah, and just 4 kilometers east of the Green Line. The separation barrier's route cut off the village from over 2,000 dunams (approximately 500 acres) of its agricultural land, to allow for the expansion of the nearby Modi'in Illit settlement.

Starting in January 2005, Bil'in residents began participating in weekly demonstrations to protest the construction of the separation barrier, in which villagers marched from the mosque to the construction site. However, as the protest and persuasion techniques were having little effect on the wall's construction, leaders in the village decided that they needed to organize a popular committee, re-evaluate their work, and explore alternative tactics. As Ibrahim, a member of Bil'in's popular committee explained,

We had to figure out how we wanted to continue, and what would be our aim. In the beginning, it was too simple, without any organization . . . No one was thinking in terms of mapping or planning a strategy, but that need arose from our experience in the field. We felt we needed to decide on a strategy, aims, tactics, and methods.

(author interview 2007)

The popular committee was formed on 20 February 2005, including members from Fateh, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Mubadara, and other parties, and with close communication with local NGOs and CBOs. The committee decided to emphasize at the demonstrations that they were not against the soldiers, but against the occupation. Furthermore, they decided to focus on calling attention to the problem of land confiscation, in addition to the direct violence of the occupation that was visible at the demonstrations.

The popular committee also began to consider more creative noncooperation and intervention strategies. For example, on 3 May 2005, the IDF informed the village that the bulldozers would be coming to uproot a grove of Bil'in's olive trees. Rather than replanting the trees after the uprooting, an act of protest conducted by other villages, the popular committee, along with several Israeli activists, instead tied themselves to the olive trees and prevented their destruction. According to Ibrahim,

It was like a day of revolution in how to resist. It communicated our real message, and it was successful, because the soldiers couldn't do anything, like arrest us or beat us. We weren't doing anything illegal, we weren't aiming at them, we didn't damage their property, and they couldn't claim it as a military zone since it was clearly our land. So this started a new way in our resistance.

(author interview 2007)

The popular committee continued to experiment with different types of actions. At several demonstrations, they used mirrors to reflect anti-occupation slogans onto the IDF soldiers and jeeps. At another protest, they had a group of activists distract the soldiers while Tito Kayak, a Puerto Rican activist and climber, scaled a nearby Israeli surveillance tower and unfurled the Palestinian flag at its top. These actions were successful in delaying the construction of the

barrier, and also in drawing media attention to Bil'in and the plight of villages affected by the wall, settlements, and land confiscation. The media exposure subsequently increased international and Israeli activist support for the village, thus providing the weekly demonstrations with additional support and participation from the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) and Israeli solidarity groups such as Ta'ayush, Gush Shalom, and Anarchists Against the Wall; as well as visits from international leaders, politicians, and activists, including former Irish president Mary Robinson, former US president Jimmy Carter, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu.

Popular resistance continued in Bil'in even after the initial construction and closure of the wall. On 22 December 2005, the popular committee worked with Israeli activists to coordinate a caravan to their land on the opposite side of the wall, which resulted in the participants being arrested and detained. They tried again on the night of 24 December, when one of the Israeli civil administration officers told them that it was illegal for them to go to the other side of the wall unless they had a house there. As Ibrahim explained,

That gave me an idea to build a house there between the wall and the settlement. We knew the police wouldn't be back until the next morning, so I got everyone to agree to help build the house. I went back to the village and got materials, someone else went and found workers, and I found someone with a vehicle to help bring the supplies . . . It was raining, but we managed to finish the house by the morning. When the policeman returned, he was shocked and yelled at the soldiers, because now they couldn't arrest us! So we succeeded, and the house is still there.

(author interview 2007)

Villagers, as well as international and Israeli activists, ensure that someone inhabits the house 24 hours a day, thus giving the Palestinians claim to the land and forcing several policy changes. First, the presence of the Palestinian house on the settlement side of the wall blocked the construction of additional settlement structures, and required the settlement to dismantle several buildings and change the route of the main road. Second, a decision by Israel's Supreme Court mandated that the Palestinian presence requires that farmers have access to the land on the far side of the wall by way of a gate. However, the presence of the gate has not been a viable solution for most farmers. As Bil'in farmer and activist Abu Sami explained,

Even with the gate, I still consider the land lost. It takes several hours to get back and forth by going through the gate, and you never know when they might close it and you get stuck either inside or outside. There are many restrictions also; for several months we haven't been able to bring in our livestock, like sheep and donkeys, and there are limitations on the hours that the gate is open.

(author interview 2007)

Abu Sami also reported that the Israeli soldiers often harass the farmers when they are on the far side of the wall:

Once I was on the other side of the wall, on my land, and a soldier challenged me, and I said that I was just abiding by the court decision to let us enter the land. But the soldier didn't believe me, and he arrested me, and blindfolded me, and handcuffed me, and took me into detention. Finally,

they took me back to the gate area, but I was still blindfolded and handcuffed, and they laughed at me while I tried to figure out where I was. I told them to untie me, but they just laughed . . .
(author interview, 2007)

As the farmers continued to suffer, the village continued to struggle. Like the nearby villages of Budrous and Biddu, Bil'in's popular committee sought legal assistance through the Israeli court system, with the help of Israeli legal organization Yesh Din and Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard. Although it took almost two years for the case to be heard, on 4 September 2007 the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the government to redraw the route of a 1.7 kilometer section of the wall near Bil'in because the current route was "highly prejudicial" to the villagers and not justified on security grounds (Asser 2007). The village was supposed to win back between 1,000 and 1,400 dunams (between 250 and 350 acres) of the 2,000 dunams confiscated; however, as of October 2009, no action had been taken on the ground to return the land or change the route of the wall.
Meanwhile, the court also upheld the legality of the Mattiyahu East neighborhood, a section of the Modi'in Illit settlement built on village land. Nevertheless, the legal decision to change the route of the wall was hailed as a major victory by Bil'in activists.

The legal victory once again garnered regional and global media attention for Bil'in, which has been one of the objectives of the popular committee. Raed, a videographer from Bil'in who heads the media section of the popular committee, commented, "Media is very important in Bil'in. The whole world sees the story of Bil'in so it has changed the whole situation. The general media likes the story because we do creative, different things" (author interview 2007). According to Raed, the village has deliberately used media as a tool for resistance. Bil'in has also increased publicity by holding annual nonviolent activism conferences in the village for Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals, and assisting in organizing popular committees and resistance in other villages.

South Bethlehem

The South Bethlehem popular committee is made up of representatives from a number of small villages south of Bethlehem, including farmers, teachers, and local village council leaders from Umm Salamouna, Wadi Al-Nais, Mas'ara, Al-Khader, Battir, and Ertas. The committee formed in the summer of 2006 in anticipation of the construction of the separation barrier, the route of which will separate villagers from up to 70 percent of their agricultural land, as well as block their access to main roads and to the city of Bethlehem. As in Budrous, Biddu, and Bil'in, the wall's route around these Palestinian villages is due to the presence of settlements, especially the large settlements of Efrata and Gush Etzion.

After several months of meeting, the popular committee started to organize demonstrations against the construction of the wall near Umm Salamouna in January 2007. They started coordinating weekly demonstrations, and they contacted Israeli and international activists to join them in the actions. The committee usually meets during the week to plan the Friday action, then holds a town hall style meeting after the Friday demonstrations with other participants and activists to discuss the action.

Although the initial demonstrations were met with violence from the IDF, the popular committee continued to focus on ways to confront the soldiers without provoking them to the point of using tear gas and rubber bullets, as had been the norm in Bil'in and other villagers. As

Yousef, the Coordinator of the Popular Committees Against the Wall in South Bethlehem, explained:

We are using a new model of nonviolent resistance that is more complicated than violence, because you need to control it. You don't want chaos. It's like nuclear power. If you use it recklessly and drop the bomb, you will just have chaos. But if you control it, you can use its power for energy.

(author interview 2007)

According to Yousef, the South Bethlehem demonstrations have remained relatively peaceful by avoiding stone throwing, which provokes the soldiers, and instead using creative methods of protest and persuasion to send the message to stop the wall. Actions have included pray-ins, in which Friday prayers are held on land that is planned for confiscation, and crossing ribbons and streamers over constructed sections of the wall. Other actions have appealed to the international community, including a Good Friday procession to call attention to suffering in the Holy Land, and a tree-planting in honor of victims of an American university shooting. The organizers also try to avoid violence during demonstrations by instructing participants to sit on the ground if the soldiers start using aggression, to make it clear that the activists are not the aggressors. Despite these deliberate efforts, many of the villagers and activists have suffered from beatings and arrests during the demonstrations.

As in the villages to the north, residents of Umm Salamouna also petitioned Israel's High Court to change the route of the wall, which will confiscate 280

dunams (70 acres) of their agricultural land. Their appeals managed to halt the construction of the wall temporarily, but, on 3 August 2007, the court ruled that the wall's route was necessary for security purposes, and construction resumed.

South Hebron Hills

A number of small farming villages have joined together for common actions against the wall in a rural area south of Hebron known as Shafa. Since 1982, the villages have been losing land to the construction of settlements, namely Karmel, Mo'an, Susya, and Beit Yatir, while connections between the villages have been cut off by illegal outposts. Harassment and violent attacks from settlers, combined with legal restrictions on Palestinian construction and land cultivation in the area, drew the attention of Israeli organizations like Rabbis for Human Rights and Ta'ayush in 2000, and the international organization Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) has maintained a presence in the area since that time.

The villagers themselves initiated a campaign of direct action in April 2006, with the start of construction of the separation barrier in the area, which would limit villager access to their land to a single gate. The first demonstration was held on 22 April at the village of Al-Tawani, and had a large turnout of villagers, internationals, and Israeli activists, as well as media coverage. However, the demonstration faced strong resistance by the IDF, which halted the demonstration after ten minutes, severely beating and arresting the coordinator, Sari, and holding him in detention for two weeks with a broken rib. However, the experience only reaffirmed Sari's commitment to popular resistance. As he explained,

When I was released and got home, all the people were waiting for me, so I knew this was an

important opportunity to talk to them. I said, "I am strong, and we are all strong, so we will have another demonstration next week." The people couldn't believe what I had said, and it was difficult for me too, since I knew I would be a target. But we did this demonstration in another place, and it was bigger than the first, and then the following week we had another, and then another.

(author interview 2007)

In addition to the weekly demonstrations, Sari started talking to leaders in other nearby villages to start a popular committee for the area. He also continued to develop relationships with Israeli and international activists, who have continued to support the actions of Al-Tawani, Susya, and other villages in Shafa. Finally, Sari has initiated an education campaign within the villages to teach people about nonviolent resistance and the importance of remaining on the land.

Israeli and international solidarity

Palestinian direct action in the West Bank has been supported by Israeli activist groups, including Ta'ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, Gush Shalom, and Peace Now; as well as international groups such as the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), the Palestinian Solidarity Project (PSP), and Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT). While the scope of this study does not allow for an in-depth discussion of these groups' participation, it is important to note their ongoing involvement in direct action in the West Bank. Although Palestinian organizers have different opinions on the role of Israeli and international activists, most popular committees welcome their participation in a supportive capacity. In the immediate short term, soldiers tend to use less violent measures when Israelis and internationals are present, and, in the long term, Israeli and international participation increases media attention and global publicity. Because this study focuses on Palestinian resistance efforts specifically, further description and analysis of Israeli and international activist support remains a subject for future research. However, I briefly call attention to Ta'ayush and ISM, since both of these groups include Palestinian participants.

Ta'ayush (Arabic for "life in common") was founded in 2000 by Jewish and Palestinian Israelis as "a grassroots movement of Arabs and Jews working to break down the walls of racism and segregation by constructing a true Arab-Jewish partnership" (Ta'ayush 2007). The organization undertakes different projects to help Palestinians stay on their land, and to educate the Israeli public about the situation. However, according to Lina, a Palestinian–Israeli member of Ta'ayush, the main activities are supporting Palestinian villages by participating in demonstrations organized by the popular committees. As Lina explained, "Despite the doubts about their effectiveness and necessity, there is always a need to demonstrate and express a collective cry of protest. The demonstration is an old and traditional method, but it is irreplaceable and we are determined to preserve it" (Just Vision interview 2005).

ISM was founded in August 2001 by Palestinian and international activists to support nonviolent resistance in Palestine through participation in direct action, emergency mobilization, and documentation. International activists with ISM worked closely with Palestinian activists at the Palestinian Center for Rapprochement between Peoples (PCR) and also with the popular committees to coordinate actions. ISM also offers nonviolence trainings in some Palestinian communities, and supports Palestinian activists by providing financial aid and resources. Sami, a 23-year-old activist from the village of Beit Ommar, was active in nonviolent resistance for years through Fateh Youth, but he joined ISM during the second intifada to further engage in activism.

Attempts at coordination

As local resistance campaigns expanded, there were efforts to coordinate a more unified movement on the national level, or to at least link local village actions through a shared framework of organization and operation. These efforts were not distinct from village-based resistance so much as they overlapped with local movements and expanded beyond them in geographic scope and issue focus. Whereas local village resistance usually concentrated on opposing small sections of the wall that affect a specific local community, national resistance efforts resisted the wall in its entirety. In addition, national efforts expanded resistance beyond the issue of the separation barrier to the entirety of the occupation.

One effort to increase coordination between the popular committees was through the creation of a National Committee for Popular Resistance, within the PA's Office of Settlements and the Wall, in the Ministry of the Interior.

According to Abu Nadr, the coordinator of the national committee, the PA was slow to understand and respond to the initial construction of the wall. The PA finally started responding in 2004, after Palestinian popular committees working with Israeli human rights lawyers brought a legal case to the United Nations' International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague. On 9 July, the ICJ ruled that the wall violates international law, that construction should be halted, that constructed sections of the wall should be demolished, and that reparations should be given to Palestinians as damages (ICJ 2004). Although the ICJ's ruling was non-binding, it was hailed as a victory and succeeded in bringing local and global attention to the issue of the wall.

The PA responded by creating a department within the Ministry of the Interior to concentrate on the wall and settlements. Abu Nadr, who had been involved with the popular committees in Bil'in and Biddu as an individual, was appointed to direct the office, and he started by trying to organize the popular committees through a national committee. The aims of Abu Nadr and the national committee were to create a collective vision for the popular committees, work with Israeli lawyers in pursuing legal action, and garner funding to cover the basic needs of the popular committees, such as transportation and phone cards. The national committee also worked to develop partnerships between the popular committees and Israeli and international solidarity organizations, noting that the use of force by the IDF in response to demonstrations was considerably lower when those groups were present. However, Abu Nadr was careful to ensure that the local committees maintained decision-making power and ownership of their campaigns. As he explained, “we made sure to give the popular committees fifty-one percent vote on decisions so it wouldn't be the national committee taking over and enforcing opinions” (author interview 2007).

Despite these efforts, Abu Nadr recognized that popular resistance remained very localized, and he noted that the loss of funds after the electoral victory of Hamas in 2006 limited the national committee's ability to support widespread actions. However, in March 2007, the national committee worked with local popular committees to organize a conference for activists, which was held in Bil'in. According to Abu Nadr, “As the national committee, we wanted to try to get everyone working together. So, at the conference, we discussed the mistakes of the past, and set up a new committee to deal with the challenges” (author interview 2007). Some of the issues that the committee continues to explore include using international law to support resistance, discussing the role of internationals and Israelis in resistance, increasing the participation of students, using the media more effectively, and developing creative popular resistance tactics.

Many other direct actions take place without the institutional framework of a political party or even a popular committee. For example, Yared, a young professional in Ramallah, explained how he and his friends decided to organize actions to protest Israel's 2006 offensive in Lebanon:

We coordinated different activities each day for a month. Each day we met at 6 p.m. in Al-Manara [the city-center of Ramallah], and every day we did something unique. We played the national anthem, flew balloons, passed out [political] cartoons, organized a boycott by putting Israeli products on the street with a big "X" over them, and just did anything we could to increase public awareness. It was mainly just a group of friends who did this.

(author interview 2007)

Yared's experience is just one of many direct action initiatives that were not affiliated with any specific group, but still used tactics of protest and persuasion, and sometimes noncooperation and intervention. There were also numerous "spontaneous" occurrences of direct civil action, including removals of roadblocks, re-planting of olive trees, demonstrations at checkpoints, and hunger strikes in prisons.

Clearly, direct action continued to be used as a tactic in Palestinian resistance, utilized by village-based popular committees, as well as by solidarity groups, national campaigns, and individual community members. Although different episodes varied in their aims and means, the majority of direct actions consisted of protest and persuasion tactics, usually focused on the separation barrier. Indeed, the construction of the separation wall ironically created a political opportunity for resistance, by providing a common cause for activists, a visible image of oppression to export internationally, and access to contact points with Israeli soldiers and police at construction sites. However, the separation barrier was also effective in its purpose of restricting movement, and further isolating Palestinians from Israelis and from each other. Thus, Palestinians utilized other channels of indirect resistance, which are discussed in the following chapter.

4 Supportive nonviolence
Indirect actions

Loai focused the camera lens on the nearby guard tower and pressed the exposure button. He studied the digital image of the separation wall, adjusted the camera settings to accommodate the evening light, and snapped a few more pictures before heading back inside the Lajee Center. The Lajee Center is a youth center in Aida Refugee Camp, just outside Bethlehem. The eight-meter high separation wall has been constructed just across the street from the center, cutting off the community from the olive groves that have provided an income, as well as an open space, for Aida residents for nearly 60 years. The youth at Lajee have been instrumental in bringing local and international attention to the effects of the wall, as well as other issues faced by refugees, by documenting the wall in photographs and films, hosting international visitors for “alternative tours” of the camp, and participating in human rights advocacy.

In addition to grassroots campaigns, many Palestinian civil society organizations like the Lajee Center have been active in coordinating or supporting resistance efforts. According to mobilization structure theorists, social movement organizations (SMOs) are distinct from other organizations in that they “mobilize their constituency for collection action, and they do so with a political goal”
(Kriesi 1996: 152). However, as Kriesi notes, SMOs are just one part of a broader social movement sector (SMS) that includes supportive organizations, movement associations, and political parties (1996: 152–53), all of which contribute to popular resistance in the West Bank through the sphere of civil society.

Civil society has played a leading role in activism, education, and advocacy throughout Palestinian history. As the deputy secretary at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) commented, numerous civil organizations have existed since the early years of the occupation, essentially “keeping the country going before the PA, and still very active” after Oslo and during the present period (author interview 2005). Similarly, Dajani notes that, in Palestine, civil groups, or NGOs, have assumed governmental roles for decades to fill the gap left by the absence of a state, including the task of political socialization (1997). These organizations have assumed a variety of roles and duties, including the provision of social services, political activism, human rights monitoring, education, advocacy, media and outreach. Civil society groups have thus taken a number of forms, such as women’s groups, media outlets, trade unions, democracy development groups, youth initiatives, human rights organizations, health services, and religious institutions.

Some civil society attempts to promote “nonviolence” during the second intifada actually constrained resistance, as discussed in later chapters. In this chapter however, I focus on highlighting some of the many initiatives that facilitated, supported, or complemented the direct action tactics discussed in Chapter 3. Many of these actions, including teach-ins, trainings, media advocacy, and popular education, represented creative efforts to sustain activism despite

decreasing contact points between Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand, which are typically necessary for meaningful direct actions, and movement restrictions within Palestine on the other hand. These actions thus focused largely on supporting local campaigns, or advocating to the international community.

Civil society initiatives often blur the lines between direct and indirect activism, and I recognize that most actions and organizations cannot be neatly categorized in separate categories. However, I offer a loose typology here for organizational and conceptual purposes. Using Kriesi's framework (1996), I first discuss how SMOs have coordinated and supported resistance efforts, provided trainings, and raised awareness locally and globally about the situation in Palestine. Second, I examine the role of action dialogue organizations as solidarity and advocacy groups. Third, I examine the role of political parties in organizing popular resistance. Finally, I explore how alternative media initiatives, including grassroots news outlets and participatory media projects, function as supportive organizations for activism and advocacy by directly and indirectly supporting popular struggle. Again, I do not claim this to be an all-inclusive discussion; rather, I aim to offer examples of the range of activities that further facilitated civil resistance during the second intifada.

Social movement organizations

In this section, I focus on examples of civil society organizations participating in civil resistance through the direct action strategies of protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention, as described in the last chapter. These organizations help coordinate popular resistance campaigns, support local activist initiatives, and educate the public about nonviolence. SMOs actively coordinate resistance efforts by working with local communities to establish popular committees, or by supporting grassroots campaigns, coordinating actions, assisting with local trainings, and educating the public about nonviolent activism.

Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall)

The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign is a coalition of Palestinian NGOs and popular committees that coordinate efforts on local, national, and international levels to resist the separation barrier and the occupation. Specifically, the campaign aims to halt the construction of the wall, dismantle the existing sections, return confiscated land to Palestinian owners, and compensate landowners for losses, in accordance with the 2004 ICJ ruling. A seven-member coordinating committee works with local popular committees and NGOs to support grassroots resistance, encourage NGO and national mobilization, facilitate research and documentation, and encourage international outreach and solidarity, especially in the form of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) on Israel.[1]

Although the Stop the Wall campaign aims for more organization and cooperation between popular committees, the coordinators view the initiative as a true campaign, rather than an NGO. As Ahmed, a member of the Coordinating Committee, notes, “Stop the Wall is a campaign; we didn't want it to be an NGO, focusing on proposals and collecting money. We didn't want it to be like any organization just looking for profits. It had to be a grassroots struggle” (author interview 2007). Stop the Wall's resistance activities are also primarily land-based;

the campaign emerged out of the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON), a collective of Palestinian environmental and agricultural NGOs, and the campaign's activities remain focused on supporting rural areas and agricultural villages. As Ahmed stated, “We

needed to establish something national to support the farmers, especially those who depended on the land for generations" (author interview 2007). In the same way, Stop the Wall is committed to grounding its work in the local communities. As Ahmed explained,

The idea of Stop the Wall was to establish a network of popular committees and land defense committees. Each committee consists of ten to fifteen people who are the main contacts for Stop the Wall. They let us know what is going on locally, and we assist them by helping them get media coverage, sending internationals, and writing reports on our website.

(author interview 2007)

Ahmed pointed out that Stop the Wall goes beyond the strategies of protest and demonstrations, however. Indeed, the organization also conducts research on the effects of the wall and the occupation, assists villages and families in using the legal system to argue their cases, and encourages internationals to pressure their governments to support Palestinian rights. In 2005, the campaign also started a youth initiative, in which they offer courses at university campuses on the effects of the wall, the history of Palestinian struggle, and the importance of strategies like boycotting, and they take youth on trips to other areas of the West Bank to see the effects of the wall. As Ahmed stated, "If we want to educate youth, we should teach them about the history of the struggle, about the leaders, and about why we have spent our lives fighting" (author interview 2007). In addition to the courses and trips, Stop the Wall involves youth in their research and documentation, and supports students in organizing actions and campaigns at their universities.

Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC)[2]

In the second intifada, PARC worked closely with the Stop the Wall campaign to reform the popular committees in rural areas as Land Defense Committees, to support farmers in areas affected by the wall. According to Marwan, the coordinator of PARC's Land Defense Committees, the committees have three main dimensions: empowering farmers by "reinforcing farmers' confidence in themselves and the land" (author interview 2007), challenging Israeli claims regarding the purpose of the wall, and lobbying the PA to address the issue of the wall and aid farmers. Specifically, PARC works with farmers in areas threatened by the wall, holds workshops and meetings with other groups related to the agricultural sector to discuss possible solutions, and pursues a legal track to address land and water confiscation. PARC was instrumental in coordinating a successful case regarding the water issue:

Our main concern was in determining how we could get water to reach the land behind the wall. PARC was successful in the northern region on this issue. Land had been confiscated behind the wall, but Israel didn't want bad media coverage. So when PARC tried to sue regarding the construction of the wall and the resultant water problems, Israel retreated because of the threat of the bad publicity. So, as a result, we were able to set up water pump lines to continue through the wall.

(author interview 2007)

PARC's Land Defense Committees have since merged with Stop the Wall's popular committees to join their efforts against the common concern of the wall, as well as against

checkpoints, settlements, and the occupation itself.

Holy Land Trust (HLT)

Holy Land Trust is an NGO founded in Bethlehem in 1998 to encourage the use of nonviolence to resist the occupation, through community programs and local and international advocacy initiatives. HLT coordinates a number of projects, including the Palestine News Network, and travel and encounter programs for international visitors and activists. However, the projects most relevant to this section of the study consist of various nonviolence training programs. First, HLT organizes trainings for villages being affected by the wall and settlements. As Suheil, HLT's Nonviolence Coordinator, explained, the trainings last three days, and take place in the villages, so the people can see the situation on the ground, and set up an action plan. The first day focuses on conflict analysis, and applying different approaches to Israel–Palestine. The second day concentrates on understanding violence; as Suheil notes, "To understand nonviolence, you have to recognize violence. Some of the people practice nonviolence and don't know it is nonviolence. It's important to recognize violence and nonviolence so people can differentiate" (author interview 2007). The third day consists of exploring nonviolence in theory and practice, and the trainings conclude with developing an action plan, and using role-playing to see how proposed actions might play out in reality.

In addition to the village trainings, HLT offers short trainings on nonviolence in various youth centers and sports clubs, and helps to organize conferences and summer camps on nonviolence. HLT has also initiated a Training of Trainers (TOT) project, in which they provided in-depth nonviolence training to a group of 14 young people, who work in pairs to provide nonviolence trainings and workshops to their respective local communities. According to Majdi, HLT's office manager, the goal of the TOT initiative is to spread the concept of nonviolent resistance to "build a nonviolent army in Palestine" (author interview 2007). As Majdi explained, "We don't just want to train people, we want them to lead, to develop an action plan, and to act" (author interview 2007). HLT thus focuses on nonviolence training, and supports local villages in their direct actions and demonstrations.

Palestinian organizations like Stop the Wall, PARC, and Holy Land Trust, as well as the Israeli and international solidarity groups described in Chapter 3, all function as SMOs in terms of mobilizing their constituencies for action, and working towards a political goal (Kriesi 1996: 152). In contrast to other more formal institutions, these organizations function structurally as networks of individuals and groups, rely on committed adherents as their primary resources, and engage in protest actions as their main mode of operation (Rucht 1996: 187).
They are thus distinct from NGOs and interest groups in general, and movement organizations, supportive associations, and political parties in particular.

I include these examples of SMOs to illustrate how civil resistance during the second intifada was not always clearly visible in its typical forms of demonstrations, protests, marches, and other public actions. While these forms of resistance were evident as well, as discussed in the previous section, much of the nonviolent activism during this period was also located in the "submerged networks" (Melucci 1985) of Palestinian SMOs. While some activists criticized the partial shift of activism from local communities to organizations, it is important to recognize the role of these groups in both directly and indirectly contributing to popular resistance. I also discuss these organizations' work to further underline the fact that nonviolent efforts were simultaneously focused on mobilizing (or "training") local populations and appealing to international networks, but often had limited engagement with Israeli society directly. All of these phenomena (the shift

from grassroots to organizational activism, the focus on international solidarity, and the limited direct contact with Israeli society) represented shifts in activism from the first intifada.

Action dialogue

Some Palestinian organizations do not engage in direct action or nonviolence trainings, but rather use public dialogues between reflect the persuasion technique of resistance. The Parents' Circle—Families' Forum (PCFF) is a grassroots organization of bereaved Palestinians and Israelis who have lost family members to violence related to the conflict. In addition to engaging in dialogue with each other, PCFF members organize public dialogues in schools, arrange tours overseas, and participate in interviews on television and radio and in publications.
Although dialogue is an unorthodox form of resistance, many participants in PCFF regard their work in the Forum as a form of activism, including Ali Abu Awwad, a Palestinian activist who was active in the first intifada, was shot by an Israeli settler, spent several years in jail, and whose brother was killed by an Israeli soldier. According to Ali, spreading the message of Palestinian suffering, and talking about checkpoints, the occupation, settlements, and martyrs, is a kind of revolution:

Extremists carry out operations because they want to convey that they are suffering, to an extent that life and death have the same value. We talk in order to exploit the suffering in a more efficient way, and our work presents a greater danger to the Israeli state . . . because it undermines all the excuses for the occupation and the legitimacy they claim to have.
(Just Vision interview 2005)

Though Ali now views the work of the Forum as an approach to resistance, he notes that participating was difficult at first because "we were accustomed to thinking that talking with the other, the occupier, is treason and normalizing. It isn't easy for a patriot to do such a thing. But I discovered that these weren't normalization meetings" (Just Vision interview 2005). Indeed, Ali has become a leader in PCFF, encouraging other Palestinians to participate in the meetings and use the Forum as an alternative means of resistance.

Combatants for Peace is another "action dialogue" organization, started in 2005 by Israelis and Palestinians who have participated in acts of violence, the Israelis as soldiers in the IDF, and the Palestinians as activists in violent resistance. Like PCFF, Combatants for Peace holds private dialogues for members, but also coordinates public dialogues in schools, universities, youth groups, media outlets, and other public forums to raise consciousness in both publics about the "other," educate for nonviolent struggle, and pressure both governments to end the occupation through nonviolent means.

According to Bassem, one of the Palestinian founders of Combatants for Peace, the group aims to develop a network for nonviolence through three main principles: "First, to commit to fighting in a nonviolent way. Second, to end the occupation, which we see as the root of the violence. Third, to struggle for a two-state solution with 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as the capital" (author interview 2007). Like Ali, Bassem views the work of Combatants for Peace as a form of resistance, though he also noted the "normalization" connotations that others often associate with any dialogue initiative. However, he recognized that the identity of the members as former combatants gives the group a degree of legitimacy that may be absent in traditional civilian dialogues.

Action dialogues, though viewed by some as normalization, contribute to the social movement structure by functioning as supportive associations. Though perhaps less contentious than SMOs, these groups provide movement members, many of whom are actively involved in more visible forms of resistance, with a space for both solidarity and advocacy. Furthermore, the public nature of these action dialogues contributes to consciousness-raising in the wider community, thus indirectly facilitating mobilization. In these ways, action dialogue groups complement the work of SMOs and civil resistance efforts.

Political parties

According to Kriesi, while parties pursue political goals in the same way as SMOs, they generally have more sufficient resources in terms of institutionalized access, authority, and expertise that preclude their reliance on popular mobilization. While political parties "mobilize their constituencies from time to time, this is not essential to their activities, which are typically carried out by an elite" (1996, 153).

To be sure, Palestinian political groups are becoming increasingly institutionalized and dominated by elites who, according to my interviews, are often perceived as being out of touch with public sentiments. However, owing to the fact that most Palestinian parties emerged from political movement organizations that did rely on constituent mobilization in the past, these elements of contention still play a role in party dynamics, especially at the local level.

As noted previously, the majority of popular committees include representatives from various political parties. Despite the cleavages between parties at the toplevel leadership, members of nearly all parties are represented in local events and in joint actions, such as rallies and events on dates such as 15 May (date of Israeli independence) and 5 June (date of the 1967 war and Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai, and the Golan Heights). The parties also coordinate independent actions, and support respective youth parties on university campuses. Indeed, many adult activists currently leading the popular committees first became involved in activism through the political youth movements.

Fateh remains one of the most prominent political parties, with Fateh Youth (formerly known as Al-Shabiba) constituting one of the main activist movements.

According to Nidal, a spokesman for Fateh Youth, the organization aims to continue resistance against the Israeli occupation until a Palestinian state is declared, as well as develop Palestinian civil society and build Fateh membership. As Nidal indicates, Fateh Youth is instrumental in mobilizing young people through direct action strategies such as protest and persuasion:

The main popular method of Fateh Youth resistance is demonstrations. In the beginning of the [second] intifada, Fateh Youth had demonstrations daily or weekly. Many of the actions were organized for the apartheid wall, checkpoints, campaigns to release prisoners, and solidarity with many people, especially Arafat, who was under siege, as well as people who were under curfew.

(author interview 2007)

According to Nidal, Fateh Youth coordination with other political movements varied, but, at central campuses like Birzeit University, students participated in joint actions and demonstrations through June 2007, when Fateh and Hamas relations fractured.

While Hamas and Islamic Jihad, together referred to as the Islamic Block, openly support

armed resistance, many of their members also support and participate in nonviolent actions. One Hamas official explained, “We need nonviolent resistance; first, because the world needs to hear us; second, because we are tired, we don’t want to be in jail any more, we want our prisoners to be released” (author interview 2007). As this statement illustrates, many members of the Islamic Block participate in all forms of resistance, including civil resistance, thus contributing to the wider sphere of protest and persuasion efforts.

Many smaller parties are also involved in popular resistance. Mubadara, headed by former PA minister of information Mustafa Barghouthi, organizes and actively participates in demonstrations against the wall. Many other activists subscribe to Leftist parties such as the Palestinian People’s Party (PPP), which has advocated for land-based resistance through popular committees, and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), which has facilitated the Land Defense Committees (LDCs), a sort of popular committee in rural areas.

Like action dialogue groups, political parties are not social movements or SMOs themselves, but they function as movement-related organizations (Kriesi 1996: 153) within the broader social movement sector. Like SMOs, they work towards political goals and mobilize their constituencies for collective action; however, their main mode of operation is through the holding of political offices (rather than protest actions), they rely on voters (rather than activists), and they maintain formal structural features rather than operating as networks (Rucht 1996: 188). Political parties are thus distinct from SMOs, but their contentious history in the Palestinian context still makes them influential actors in popular mobilization and participation, especially at the local level.

Alternative media

According to Kriesi, supportive organizations are institutions such as friendly media outlets, which “contribute to the social organization of the constituency of a given movement without directly taking part in the mobilization for collective action” (1996: 152). In Palestine, alternative media centers, documentary filmmakers, and participatory media initiatives contribute to this sort of consensus mobilization in that they often “work on behalf of the movement [and] their personnel may sympathize with the movement” (Kriesi 1996: 152), but they utilize a more indirect approach to mobilization through media. Though less direct, these efforts are still significant in the broader cycles of contention to raise awareness of both the issue and the movement, both locally and globally, thus using media as a persuasive tactic. The direct action campaigns and SMOs mentioned above all rely heavily on media for drawing attention to violations, informing others about their efforts, and disseminating a call for nonviolent resistance. While many NGOs and direct action campaigns are trying to get their message heard through the mass media, other groups have initiated grassroots media projects to cover stories often overlooked by the mainstream media, alternative media outlets, documentaries, and participatory initiatives.

Alternative media outlets

Many Palestinians are critical of both the international mass media’s coverage of Palestine and Palestinians’ efforts in negotiating that public sphere. As one activist noted, “Palestinians have failed in the media. We need to stop acting as victims and waiting for other countries to take action. Israel know how to use the media, but Palestinians don’t have much credibility . . . We need to work more on owning our media” (author interview 2007). In response to this sentiment,

several NGOs have launched their own independent new networks, including the Palestine News Network (PNN), launched in 2000 by Holy Land Trust; the International Middle East Media Center (IMEMC), which grew out of the joint efforts of the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between Peoples (PCR) and the International Solidarity Movement (ISM) in 2003;[3] the Ma'an News Agency (MNA), launched in 2005; and the Alternative Information Center (AIC), a Palestinian–Israeli activist organization that uses information for political advocacy.

These news groups have two main objectives, the first being to report on issues related to the occupation to tell another side of the Israeli–Palestinian story that is often overlooked in the mainstream media. As Ghaleb, a reporter and producer for IMEMC, explained,

We report on stories that you won't hear anywhere else. All the international news agencies have their correspondents based in Jerusalem, so they only hear one side of the news, or they only hear some of the stories . . . We have a network of contacts who are actually in the field all over Palestine, and we try to present both sides of the story.

(author author interview 2007)

The websites thus include updated news in multiple languages on developments within the West Bank and Gaza, and also maintain special sections on topics like refugees, prisoners, checkpoints, settlements, and incursions, while PNN and IMEMC host radio programs on timely issues and AIC produces publications based on more in-depth research.

PNN, IMEMC, and AIC also focus largely on nonviolent activism, which reflects their second objective of drawing attention to popular resistance efforts. As Majdi, one of the founders of PNN, stated:

There are many kinds of nonviolent activities, but no one covers them. The [mainstream] media doesn't cover them regularly because they are not "exciting" without killing and shooting . . . We want to show nonviolence, and we want to show it working. This is not for self-promotion, but to spread the message of nonviolence and publicize the activities. This is the power of nonviolence, and the media is essential for nonviolence.

(author interview 2007)

Ghaleb also noted that, like PNN, IMEMC aims to draw more attention to stories of nonviolent resistance:

The mainstream news does not report on nonviolence, only violence. We do many nonviolent activities, but we are only in the news if someone dies if there is blood. And this does not help the cause of nonviolence, because people just hear about the violence, and it reinforces it. It is good for people participating in nonviolence to see that their activities are being publicized. It reinforces what we are doing, and show that it is making a difference.

(author interview 2007)

In documenting acts of nonviolence, as well as the violations and abuses that go unreported, these alternative news outlets thus contribute to both consensus formation and mobilization through their framings of both the issue and the movement, respectively. They provide

affirmation and solidarity for local movement activists, while raising consciousness and prompting participation both locally and globally.

Documentary media

In addition to the groups mentioned above, it is also important to note the ways in which individuals have utilized documentary media as a form of activism. For example, Raed, a former videographer for Reuters and a member of Bil'in's popular committee, has documented the village's demonstrations with several objectives. First, as Raed explains, "Some of the footage has helped free people arrested in the demonstrations. Often the army will say they arrested someone for attacking the soldiers, but the footage often shows that was not the case, so the army has to release the activist" (author interview 2007). Second, Raed's footage has been important in getting the story of Bil'in out to the world, and attracting people from different countries to support the village. Raed has shared his footage with other news agencies, including Reuters, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiyya, and Israeli TV, and has also produced a documentary entitled *One Year of Peace and Resistance* that has been screened in several festivals, in efforts to draw attention to the situation in Bil'in and the village's nonviolent action campaign. In these ways, Raed identified media as a powerful form of resistance, commenting, "The camera isn't violent, but I can still use it as my weapon. It is a way to show what is happening in a nonviolent way" (2007).

Zeinab, another documentary filmmaker, agreed, stating, "The best form of advocacy right now is the documentary, which helps the Palestinian story get out in the right way to the West . . . When you see things you believe it" (author interview 2007). According to Zeinab, documentary media is a way of appealing to the international community by "sending our story in the right way" (2007) that appeals to universal values and uses the human rights frame. In these ways, documentary films functioned as tools for indirect mobilization by raising awareness, increasing solidarity, and prompting transnational activism.

Participatory media and arts

Participatory media are a specific form of alternative media in which individuals and communities use photography, film, video, publications, websites, theater, and other forms of arts and media to share personal narratives and collective experiences, often with the goal of raising awareness about a specific issue or challenging dominant discourses in the mainstream media. Youth media, as the term implies, involves youth development and production of media with the aim amplifying young people's voices on issues of importance and relevance to them.

While the process of youth media can be transformative for participants, the products created in media workshops can influence change beyond the community as well. Photographs, films, plays, publications, websites, and other media address issues of injustice in the context of personal realities and community experiences, thus humanizing situations of conflict and oppression, and creating new frameworks for dialogue and action. The fact that participatory media projects are produced directly by people living in the conflict situation also makes them a legitimate tool for challenging dominant discourses in the mainstream media. Like alternative news networks and documentary films, participatory media projects can thus raise awareness, increase solidarity, and inspire action and movement participation through the introduction of new narratives.

Alternative media initiatives, including grassroots networks, documentaries, and participatory projects, thus function as movement supporters that complement the work of SMOs and contribute to more widespread participation. On the one hand, alternative media provides a

contrasting framing of the issue that offers an alternative narrative to mainstream media discourses, thus making more people aware of, and sympathetic to, the movement's cause. On the other hand, alternative media provides coverage of the movement itself, thus affirming activist strategies and tactics and indirectly contributing to mobilization. Media outlets clearly function as movement-related organizations in the broader social movement sector, contributing to local and transnational cycles of contention.

Various sectors of civil society contribute to the cycle of nonviolent contention in Palestine, as discussed in the context of Kriesi's typology of movement-related organizations (1996: 153), mainly by adopting strategies of protest and persuasion. First, direct action campaigns function as SMOs, working towards political goals by mobilizing for collective action. Second, action-dialogue groups serve as movement associations, contributing to consensus mobilization amongst movement actors. Third, political parties act as formal institutions that promote mobilization, but place greater emphasis on elections and formal processes.
Finally, alternative media, in terms of grassroots networks, documentary teams, and participatory initiatives, function as supportive organizations in terms of indirectly contributing to mobilization through information advocacy. These different spheres overlap to form the wider social movement sector, which shapes the dynamics of cycles of contention.

Sumoud (steadfastness)

The majority of this discussion has focused on direct action campaigns, and on civil society organizations like SMOs, NGOs, media outlets, and youth groups, that utilize the approaches of protest, persuasion, noncooperation, and intervention. However, it is also important to note the presence of everyday acts of resistance in the West Bank, conducted by individuals and communities, employing the uniquely Palestinian nonviolent tactic of *sumoud*, or steadfastness.

The development of consciousness and the will to resist can occur outside the scope of popular committees and civil society, particularly among peasant and rural communities. As Scott explains in *Weapons of the Weak*, daily experience is one of the most organic sources of consciousness development that leads to everyday acts of resistance. As Scott notes, these acts reflect the tactics of relatively powerless groups, such as "foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, arson, sabotage, and so on" (1985: xvi). As Scott continues, in contrast to more visible social movements, these forms of struggle "require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority" (1985: xvi).

Everyday acts of resistance are often more a reflection of individual resilience and survival strategy than a deliberate effort to be part of a greater collective movement. As Scott notes, "Where institutionalized politics is formal, overt, concerned with systematic, de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, often covert, and concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains" (1985: xv). Despite what may be more humble intentions however, everyday acts of resistance can have a powerful transformative effect when accumulated over time. As Scott writes, "such kinds of resistance are often the most significant and the most effective over the long run" (1985: xvi). Indeed, although revolutions and social movements flow largely from dramatic large-scale processes, such movements are created and sustained by countless individual acts, both seen and unseen, that form the foundation for larger cycles of contention.

It is thus clear that everyday acts of resistance are complementary to, and indeed inherent to, larger social movements. In the case of Palestine, this type of resistance includes staying on

one's land and refusing to be moved. Within the West Bank, there were countless stories of daily acts of resistance and examples of *sumoud* during the second intifada (Allen 2008). At the village level in particular, Palestinian farmers and their families have stayed on their land despite harassment from soldiers, abuses from settlers, and land confiscation from the separation wall and encroaching settlements and outposts. In this section, I provide two brief case studies to reflect the everyday land-based resistance tactics employed by Palestinians in West Bank villages.

Nahalin is a village near Bethlehem, where the local Palestinian community has resolved to remain, despite Israeli threats of land confiscation. Alex, whose family's land is targeted for confiscation, has pursued various avenues to holding on to the land, including taking a case to the Israeli courts, and calling for international solidarity. However, his main form of resistance is encouraging Palestinians to stay on the land. According to Alex, "Nonviolence is connected to the land. Without land, there is no future. Land is worth nothing without a people, and a people is worth nothing without land. So the land and the people should be connected" (author interview 2007). Alex started an organization to involve Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals in land-based resistance. The idea is to support local farmers, re-connect people with the land, and nurture a sense of selfsufficiency in Palestine.

According to Alex, this type of land-based activism is useful in several ways. First, working the land is therapeutic for people; as Alex notes, "When people dig, their frustration comes out. It helps them relax, and helps them think in another way" (author interview 2007). Second, working the land renews people's sense of hope by engaging them in something active and constructive. Third, in keeping the land populated and making it productive, Alex and others prevent it from being confiscated. In these ways, Alex and other villagers in Nahalin have made working the land a form of community empowerment and nonviolent resistance.

Ghwein is a small village consisting of eight families who live in caves on the southern border of the West Bank. The people are mainly shepherds, and rely on the surrounding land for grazing. However, in the past twenty years, a number of settlements and outposts have been built in the area, including the large settlements Karmel, Mo'an, and Susya. The settlers, with the approval of the army, have taken much of the land in the region, including over 100 dunams (25 acres) from Ghwein, significantly reducing the land available for grazing. It has also limited access to the land on which the villagers produce beans and grains to feed the livestock, and, perhaps more importantly, it has cut off the village from several wells and water sources.

The residents' very presence on the land is a form of resistance, according to Khaled, the director of a volunteer organization in Hebron that assists Ghwein with food, clothes, books, and medical care. Khaled notes that, if the villagers left the area to avoid the encroaching settlements, Israel would take the land *ala tul* (quickly and completely). Ghwein is thus one of many villages in the West Bank in which people's steadfastness and determination to remain on their land function as a form of resistance. As one villager from the Jordan Valley succinctly stated, "My weapon of defense is that I won't leave this place" (author interview 2008).

This chapter has described broader sphere of civil resistance during the second intifada by providing examples of civil society-based initiatives, coordinated by SMOs, NGOs, dialogue groups, political parties, and media outlets; and everyday acts of resistance. It is important to note that these categories are not distinct, as many efforts occur at various levels and employ multiple strategies; rather, these categories serve as an organizing framework for examining the scope of resistance activities. It is also important to re-emphasize that these categories, and the

examples discussed, are by no means exhaustive; rather, my goal is to give a sense of the breadth and depth of popular resistance in the West Bank through the discussion of specific examples.

This mapping of nonviolent activities during the second intifada reveals several trends. First, it is evident that nonviolence was utilized as a form of resistance during the second intifada. Although civil resistance never became a widespread phenomenon as it did during the first intifada, unarmed actions were taking place throughout the Occupied Territories.

Second, it is clear that there was a broad scope of nonviolent activities, with various groups and individuals becoming engaged in nonviolence in different ways. At the same time, within that scope, it is evident that the many actions were coordinated through organized groups, creating a delicate balance between the organization and institutionalization of activism.

Third, while the breadth of nonviolent actions was notable during the second intifada, nonviolent tactics were somewhat lacking in depth. Indeed, the majority of actions can be classified in Sharp's category of "protest and persuasion," rarely expanding or intensifying to acts of noncooperation and civil disobedience. While protest and persuasion techniques should not be discounted, they generally characterize actions taken at the beginning of a movement, establishing a foundation for more engaged tactics.

Fourth, and closely related, it is evident that many actions were conducted to raise awareness about Palestine outside the region, in a sort of boomerang approach to activism. While this targeting was strategic in some ways, it also sometimes had the effect of "exporting" activism.

Finally, despite the extent of individual episodes of civil resistance, it is clear that participation was limited, and the movement itself was fragmented. Indeed, most efforts were localized and/or episodic, resulting in a fragmented series of nonviolent episodes, rather than a unified, cohesive movement. The later chapters analyze the causes of this fragmentation, and explore possibilities for the emergence of a viable national movement.

5 Identity, attitudes, and resistance

Mustafa had been an active member in Islamic Jihad for years, fully supporting the use of all means to resist the occupation. However, in 2002, while waiting at a checkpoint, he saw a news broadcast on the soldiers' television about a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in which teenagers were killed, and it "moved something" in him (author interview 2007), prompting him to re-examine his own focus on armed resistance and consciously confront the civilian suffering on both sides of the conflict. As Mustafa remembered, "One image that really stuck with me was a man carrying the bodies of four children, and they were all dead. It is the same for us, when Palestinian kids are killed. So I found myself wondering, what do we get from this blood?" (author interview 2007).

While still recognizing the legitimacy of all forms of resistance, Mustafa decided at that point to start focusing his own resistance on unarmed struggle at the local level. In an attempt to shift the role of youth from victims to activists, he worked with a core group of young people from his village to develop a local boycott campaign, mobilize villagers for direct actions against the separation barrier, and establish a local clinic to address community needs. According to Mustafa, the goal of his emphasis on civil resistance was twofold. First, while he acknowledged the legitimacy of armed struggle, he felt that violent resistance should be contained to armies and militant groups, not to civilians. Second, he wanted to broaden the space for popular participation in resistance, and he recognized that civil tactics allowed for anyone in the community to participate, in contrast to the small number of those engaged in militant activities.

Mustafa's shift of focus to civil resistance, while still recognizing the legitimacy of armed struggle, reflects the nuanced attitudes of many Palestinians towards different forms of activism. Like Mustafa, most individuals I spoke with declined to see "violence" and "nonviolence" as black and white, either/or categories. Rather, both violent and nonviolent tactics were conceived as legitimate strategies within a broad toolbox of activism. Thus, many supporters of armed resistance also supported civil resistance, and many leaders of civil resistance also recognized the legitimacy of armed resistance. In this chapter, I examine these attitudes on the individual and collective levels by first exploring why some groups and individuals chose to act, while others did not, and second by analyzing the extent of support for different forms of resistance.

Activist identity

Nearly all civil resistance leaders in the second intifada based their actions on a core activist identity that they attributed to their involvement in the first intifada. As an activist in Salfit commented, "During the first intifada, I felt that I did something, and it gave me a commitment to continue. I felt something in my heart, and I adopted that feeling afterwards" (author interview 2007). This activist attributed his motivation for his efforts during the second intifada to a foundation of activism developed during the first intifada. Likewise, when describing his decision to launch the Stop the Wall campaign, Mahmoud stated, "We created the campaign out

of our experiences . . . looking to get back the way of resistance that we admired, night by night, stone by stone" (author interview 2007).

Interviews indicated that first intifada experiences as activists, militants, or prisoners were instrumental in motivating resistance leaders to reclaim a space for popular resistance in the second intifada. Collective movement identity from the first intifada not only informed some activists' decision to organize in the second intifada but also influenced their decisions regarding tactics and strategy.[1] Specifically, first intifada experiences informed a tactical—rather than a moral— preference for civil resistance.

Community activist identity

The majority of second intifada leaders in nonviolence were first intifada activists striving to reclaim a space for popular resistance in the new intifada. As one activist who participated in nonviolent actions in both intifadas explained, "Palestinians who were active in the first intifada still use the same thing, the nonviolence . . . So there are many leaders from the first intifada who are still leaders" (author interview 2007). While most of these activists used the language of nonviolence, they admitted that their decision to use nonviolent tactics was to reintroduce the spirit of *resistance* of the first intifada, when they did not define their actions as nonviolent. As a nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem remembered, "In the first intifada, when we spoke about nonviolence, we laughed about it; we said, 'This is stupid,' not realizing that everything we did during that time was nonviolent. When things became clearer to me and I realized that everything I did was nonviolence, and that I practiced it, I said, 'Gosh, I need to look into this'" (author interview 2007).

Likewise, a youth trainer at Holy Land Trust explained that he didn't know he was practicing nonviolence until he went to a training and recognized the tactics as the same actions he and his friends were doing: "At that time I wasn't really aware if things were violent or nonviolent, so actually, I was involved in nonviolence for a long time before I knew what it was called. I have always worked as this kind of activist, so nothing changed in me, I just became more aware of it" (author interview 2007). The fact that these activists had relied on nonviolent methods while assuming them to be a form of violent resistance indicates that their preference for such methods was linked more to their association with activism than to their nonviolent distinction. Thus, it was their activist identity, not their nonviolent identity, that attracted these leaders to such tactics in the first intifada. Likewise, it was the association of these methods with resistance, not nonviolence, that inspired these activists to re-initiate similar tactics in the second intifada.

"Militant" activist identity

While most activists who had engaged primarily in civil resistance in the first intifada did not deliberately choose nonviolence, activists with militant backgrounds made a more conscious decision to use unarmed tactics in the second intifada over armed resistance. However, they still viewed nonviolent struggle as a natural extension of their previous resistance work, considering it to be more personally empowering and collectively strategic for Palestinians, thus integrating nonviolence as part of their activist identity.

Many of the older civil resistance leaders in the second intifada were former militants who had engaged in various forms of armed struggle, mostly through the PLO in the years prior to the first intifada. While these activists did not necessarily condemn violence, many had experiences in their roles as militants that caused them to question the value of armed resistance. Khaled, a Hebron-based activist who now subscribes to civil resistance, recounted an incident during his

time with the PLO in Lebanon in the early 1980s that altered how he viewed his role in resistance:

One day I went to a shooting exercise, and I pointed to a small tree in the distance, and I told my trainer that I would hit that tree. But then, I remember this very well, my trainer seized me hard by the shoulder and said, "You have no right to shoot anything or anyone without a reason. You have no right to shoot any person, tree, or stone without some purpose." I went back to the military base, but that night I couldn't sleep. At that time we always slept with two guns and with grenades and other weapons all around. But I couldn't sleep; I kept thinking about what the trainer had said. By the end of the night, I knew I couldn't continue in this way, in the way of violence.

(author interview 2007)

Other activists had similar experiences. Daoud, who later founded the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between Peoples (PCR), and was a co-founder of ISM, recalled:

I was active in national militant organizations for a long period of time, but this became problematic when I volunteered to go to Lebanon during the civil war. I realized then that there is something wrong with the concept, that people are killing each other without any meaning. It was the only thing we knew how to do. People were refraining from asking the questions, why? For what? What's next? I had a very severe internal dispute, which I couldn't resolve.

(author interview 2007)

Similarly, Nidal, who coordinates land-based resistance in Tubas in coordination with Stop the Wall and PARC, remembered:

I spent 18 years with the PLO, in military camps . . . but then I underwent a change, not so much in my behaviors at first, but in my mind, about our way of struggle, and I started to move towards nonviolence. I felt that everyone has a right to live in peace. If I am against the occupation for using force and control, then I must not accept using force myself. If I don't want others using violence against my people, I shouldn't want my people to use it against others.

(author interview 2007)

Although these former militants questioned the logic and value of armed resistance, they still identified strongly as activists and sought other ways to engage. As Khaled explained, "When I told my commander my feelings [to leave the armed resistance], he respected my choice. They knew that I was from the West Bank, so they said, 'Okay, go back as an activist instead of a fighter'" (author interview 2007).[2] Likewise, Daoud returned to Palestine looking for other ways to resist. As he remembered,

The first intifada was eye-opening for me. People took the lead in massive civil based resistance with limited employment of violence, and that was what I was looking for, because I do believe in engagement. I believe that you cannot disengage, or pretend the problem does not exist. You have to engage in all things that are important to your people.

(author interview 2007)

Similarly, Nidal continued to work as an activist upon returning to the West Bank by organizing rural workers and establishing the Palestinian Farmers Union (PFU) in Tubas. As he stated, “I became interested in a new kind of resistance, and started investing in new groups . . . As the situation changes, we must react also, and change to resist in different ways. So I still consider most of my work to be resistance against the occupation” (author interview 2007).

Likewise, Bassem, a Fateh Youth leader who disengaged from violent resistance at the start of the second intifada, still considers himself to be an activist in his current work with Combatants for Peace (CFP), an action dialogue group he co-founded consisting of former Israeli soldiers and former Palestinian violent resisters. According to Bassem, “When I decided to not be active [during the second intifada], the decision confused me. I had always been active, so it was hard to decide to not be active. Because of my confusion, I searched for an alternative, and the alternative I found was nonviolence” (author interview 2007).

It is thus evident that, while activists who had militant backgrounds made a more deliberate decision to engage in unarmed resistance than those without such direct experiences with violence, they still saw strategic nonviolence as a natural extension of their other resistance, and considered it to be in accordance with their activist identity. Like the activists cited in the previous section, these former militants noted that nonviolent resistance emerged organically “on the battlefields” (author interview 2007) as a strategic form of struggle. As Daoud commented, “We started fully on an experimental basis, not following any philosophy or methodology . . . It wasn’t based on any education or research or study of other examples. It came from engagement in a conflict where I felt my values were comfortable with what was happening” (author interview 2007).

Indeed, the notion of “engagement” was a primary draw of popular resistance for activists like Daoud, who saw civil resistance as more empowering and strategic than violence by enabling people to take action to change their situation.

Daoud did not feel this same sort of empowerment from armed resistance, in which he commented, “The gun was leading us, not the other way around” (author interview 2007). In regards to civil-based resistance, however, he stated, “Activism helps you overcome anger and despair. You feel you are doing something. You see that the situation is not a destiny, it’s not something you have to submit to” (author interview 2007). Other activists agreed that civil resistance creates, rather than limits, opportunities for increased engagement. In addition to being individually empowering, Mustafa noted that the increased participation afforded through unarmed tactics is strategic for involving more people in resistance. As he explained:

I am not advocating for [unarmed tactics] because I am afraid. I have suffered much from the occupation, I have spent years in jail and have been wanted and injured, so I do not fear these things. But there are others who cannot take these risks, and we should give a chance to others to participate . . . We need to start thinking from the eyes of the Palestinian people and be one in all actions.

(author interview 2007)

It is thus clear that even former militants do not see nonviolence as distinct from resistance, but rather view it as a natural and necessary form of struggle that is both individually empowering and collectively strategic. While these activists may seek out unarmed strategies

more consciously than others, owing to their own personal experiences with direct violence, they still locate nonviolence within their broader activist identity.

Prisoner identity

Whether activists had a history of civil or militant resistance, the majority of those interviewed had been arrested at least once and spent time in administrative detention or prison for periods ranging from several hours to over ten years. For activists who were in prison for a significant amount of time, the experience often informed their decision to engage in civil resistance by introducing them to nonviolent tactics.

Several activists noted that they were introduced to unarmed resistance in prison, in which nonviolence was the only means of struggle available. Mustafa, the activist affiliated with Islamic Jihad, spent significant time in both prison and administrative detention, where his six-month term was renewed repeatedly, resulting in him being held in jail for several years without charge. Mustafa used his time to organize demonstrations and hunger strikes with the other prisoners, and managed to produce some small results regarding their treatment. As Mustafa explained, nonviolence was the only option for resistance in jail:

In jail you don't have anything you can use to throw at the soldiers or use to resist violently. What are you going to use? Even if we had something that would work, you needed to hold on to everything you had, so we just didn't do it. Yet through this other kind of [unarmed] resistance, even in jail, we still had a way to struggle, and we still produced spots of hope.

(author interview 2007)

Likewise, Hassan, originally from Jenin and currently the coordinator of the Gandhi Youth Clubs through Relief International, recalled being arrested five times, first at the age of 16 for starting a student group to resist the occupation. According to Hassan, the power of nonviolence became evident to him when he and other prisoners participated in a 15-day hunger strike. As he recalled,

The hunger strike was a powerful and effective way of achieving a goal, though it wasn't easy. By the end you just accepted that you were hungry, knowing that you could die, because by that point you couldn't even move. Finally, the guards came and asked us what we wanted. This was because they didn't know how to respond to our nonviolence, because with nonviolence, they can't use their power. They had the power to beat us and kill us if we so much as threw a blanket at them, but they didn't know what to do with the hunger strike.

(author interview 2007)

As noted by other activists previously, Hassan and the other prisoners did not know to call the hunger strike "nonviolence;" rather, it emerged naturally as a tactic that was both empowering and strategic. As Hassan continued,

They listened to us and said, "Okay, let's negotiate." This was the one time when I actually felt like their equal, even though I was a prisoner. They invited us to their offices and we talked there. Here we were, weakened by the hunger strike, yet still so powerful. So this was a very important event, but we didn't know it was nonviolence. We just saw it as a way of reaching our

goals.

(author interview 2007)

In addition to demonstrations and hunger strikes, other activists noted that their time in prison made it necessary for them to acquire skills in persuasion and negotiation, which informed their subsequent work in resistance. Usama, a former Fateh activist who now coordinates nonviolence workshops for youth in Tulkarem, recalled being the representative of the prisoners to the Prison Commission, who were the officers in charge of the prison. As he commented, “I changed my thinking in prison. The time in prison pushed me to find another way of struggle, and that involved nonviolence. I had to use dialogue with the officers to struggle for prisoners’ needs and try to improve our situation, in terms of treatment, food, and number of visits per month” (author interview 2007). Prison thus prompted activists to adopt different methods of struggle out of necessity. However, the relative success of some of these methods convinced many activists to extend their use beyond the prison walls.

In addition to forcing activists to adopt new tactics, prison also compelled some activists to adopt new ways of thinking. Specifically, prisoners had to learn to control their emotions and act rationally, rather than reactively. According to Hassan, the humiliation, abuse, and torture sustained in prison made him stronger in some ways because, by resolving to not give the guards the satisfaction of a response, he had to learn to control his anger:

They did a mix of things, like making us sit still in tiny chairs for long periods of time, putting bags on our heads like in Abu Ghraib,[3] *not allowing us to sleep, plus physical abuse . . . They used to put their cigarettes out on us, so I had cigarette burns all up and down my arms. Sometimes they would have us lie on the floor, and they would prop their feet on our heads for six or seven hours while they laughed and ate . . . They wanted to destroy the personalities of the people.*

(author interview 2007)

However, Hassan and many others refused to respond to the provocations. As he continued, “We realized they wanted us to react . . . You could see the power trip between the Israelis and you. But they didn’t realize that people in prisons think deeply on things, not in an emotional way. We are still human, but we are more rational in our decisions and our actions” (author interview 2007). As Hassan explained, learning to control his emotions in such a way, and becoming a more rational and logical thinker, encouraged him to adopt unarmed methods of struggle. As he commented, if he and others acted only on emotional responses to the occupation, they would quickly seek revenge through violent means. However, the endurance of abuses in prison, combined with the extended periods of self-reflection, allowed for a more rational approach to resistance, which included strategic nonviolence.

Many activists thus used their time in prison as a period of learning, in terms of learning new methods of resistance and ways of thinking, as well as learning from other activists. As Fuad, a member of Combatants for Peace, commented, “Activists who spent long years in prison were not only serving time, but were learning a new philosophy about nonviolence” (author interview 2007). In addition, several activists noted that they used their time in prison for political education, by immersing themselves in literature and theory. Naser, an activist who was in prison from the age of 15 to 21, explained that he read for at least ten hours a day, allowing him to

develop a critical perspective which influenced his views on popular struggle. According to Naser, he read “philosophy for the logic and the vision, and economics for the political view” (author interview 2007). Both disciplines influenced his ideals and ways of thinking, and informed his later commitment to resistance through popular struggle and community development.

Activists’ time in prison clearly affected their later activism in different ways, by introducing them to new forms of struggle and different ways of thinking. Despite suffering abuses and having severe grievances, many former prisoners chose popular resistance as their preferred means of struggle, seeing it as more strategic than emotionally charged violence, and incorporating it as an integral dimension of their activist identity.

Activists’ decisions to engage in civil resistance in the second intifada were clearly informed by their individual assumptions of an action identity, shaped by previous shared experiences in the first intifada. Whether their prior participation involved civil resistance, armed struggle, or time in prison, these activists clearly included strategic nonviolence as part of their broader activist identity.

Youth participation

If the first intifada was largely coordinated and implemented by youth leaders like the activists, former militants, and prisoners described above, what was the role of youth participation in the second intifada? Youth attitudes towards resistance are particularly relevant to understanding mobilization. First, youth comprise approximately 60 percent of the population in Palestine (Sharek Youth Forum 2008);[4] second, youth are often considered the most volatile age group, and the demographic most likely to support violent resistance;[5] and, third, youth were the primary leaders and activists in the first intifada, in which popular participation was widespread.

According to civil resistance leaders, youth participation and leadership in activism was visibly lacking during the second intifada.[6] Indeed, nearly all of the activist leaders and popular committee members interviewed during this research were above the age of 35 years, having been youth leaders in the first intifada 20 years ago. According to many of these activists, youth participation in civil resistance was low in the second intifada because youth were either embracing violent resistance, on the one hand, or withdrawing from political conflict, on the other hand.

In terms of perceiving a youth preference for armed resistance in the second intifada, some activists invoked recent public discourse portraying youth primarily as perpetrators of violence.[7] For example, a 2007 *New York Times* article stated that “worried parents call [today’s youth] the lost generation of Palestine: its most radical, most accepting of violence and most despairing” (Erlanger 2007: 1). Many activists likewise noted the violent nature of youth. As one of the Palestinian founders of ISM characterized the second intifada,

Youth were more into clashing with soldiers than developing the infrastructure for civil-based resistance. Younger people are more emotional and less responsible, so they usually are attracted more to “heroic” violent actions than long-term processes. I think it was the younger generation that made the second intifada so much more violent than it should have been.

(author interview 2007)

Others likewise commented that youth are “more ready to embrace violence” (author interview 2007), and “want to be heroes, want to have guns, and want to have glory” (author interview 2007). Several activists even attributed their past attraction to violent resistance to their youthfulness at the time, noting that “age plays a role in how you resist” (author interview 2007), reflecting a perceived association between youth and the tendency towards armed resistance.

Other activists claimed that youth have responded to the occupation by withdrawing from the conflict. As the youth organizer for Stop the Wall explained, “Youth have decided not to think about living under occupation, and instead each focuses on creating an atmosphere around himself to escape” (author interview 2007). Many activists described youth as “lost” or “depressed,” while others commented that youth were immersing themselves in media, technology, fashion, and entertainment in an attempt to block out the political situation. Others indicated that youth were trying to escape the situation in the literal sense, by leaving Palestine in pursuit of jobs and education overseas. Whereas the Palestinian commitment to remaining on the land used to be a source of national pride, nearly 50 percent of Palestinians between the ages of 18 and 30 now say they would emigrate if they could, according to N. Said’s polls at Birzeit University (Erlanger 2007: 5).

As the above discussion indicates, it is often assumed that youth in Palestine are either inclined towards armed resistance or disengaged from activism altogether. These assumptions seem to imply that second intifada youth, in contrast to first intifada youth, eschew civil resistance in both theory and practice, and collectively have little potential for mobilization. Yet is that really the case?

According to some activists, unarmed resistance might represent a way to engage youth in the idea of popular struggle as an alternative to the “fight or flight” options of violence and emigration or withdrawal. As one activist explained, “We don’t want [youth] to embrace violence on the one hand, or to be apathetic and leave on the other hand. We want them to be moderate, national people who believe in resistance in the way of solidarity” (author interview 2007). The following section examines the potential space for increased youth involvement in nonviolent struggle by exploring youth attitudes, opinions, and behaviors regarding civil based resistance.

Popular opinions and attitudes towards resistance

Survey data collected for this study indicate nuanced conceptions of both nonviolence and violence, which may affect mobilization and perceptions of public support for various tactics. Furthermore, findings indicate that the majority of young Palestinians support both nonviolent *and* violent resistance, but are highly more likely to participate in civil resistance than armed actions. Finally, the data suggest supporters of both violent and nonviolent resistance are often linked by a common activist identity, or consensus, which could be utilized to collectively re-frame nonviolence for increased action mobilization.

Few studies have been conducted to gauge Palestinian attitudes towards unarmed resistance. This study draws from 265 surveys[8] conducted in July 2007 with youth 14 to 34 years of age,[9] with a mean age of 22, at university campuses throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The findings from this research support trends noted in a 2006 Joint Advocacy Initiative (JAI) report, coordinated through the East Jerusalem YMCA and YWCA of Palestine, which surveyed youth in the Bethlehem area, as well as a 2002 survey of the general public conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, sponsored by

Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The data indicates that support for violent and/or nonviolent resistance is not clear-cut; rather, perceptions, behaviors, and attitudes associated with popular resistance are complex and multi-faceted, requiring careful examination and understanding for translation into action mobilization and effective nonviolent strategy.

Perceptions

Perhaps the most notable finding from the data is that the majority of Palestinian youth (56.6 percent) viewed both violence *and* nonviolence as effective means of resisting the occupation. It should be noted that nearly the same percentage of youth (59.3 percent) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “Violent resistance is the most effective means of challenging the occupation.” However, closer examination of the data indicates that 64.3 percent of those respondents also agreed or strongly agreed that both violence and nonviolence are effective; thus even the majority of respondents who viewed violence as the most effective form of resistance still recognized the merits of nonviolence.[10]

Support for both forms of resistance reflects the fact that while the majority of Palestinian youth support nonviolent resistance, they are unsure of its effectiveness alone, with only 37.7 percent viewing nonviolence as the most effective way of resisting the occupation, and just 31.7 percent perceiving nonviolent resistance as more strategic than violence.[11] In addition, a majority of respondents agreed with statements expressing doubts about the effectiveness of nonviolent action, including “Palestinians have tried massive nonviolent action in the past and it did not succeed in changing Israel’s behavior” (68 percent), “Israelis are so stubborn that mass nonviolent action will have no impact on their behavior” (62 percent), and “It would take too long for mass nonviolent action to produce any real change” (61 percent) (Kull 2002). It is thus clear that while the majority of Palestinian youth support nonviolence resistance, they have doubts about its effectiveness when employed as the only form of resistance.

Support for both forms of resistance may also stem from the fact that the majority of Palestinian youth do not see a moral advantage to using nonviolent action, with only 38.5 percent viewing nonviolence as more ethical than violence. This indicates that the majority of support for nonviolence is based on strategic, or pragmatic, conceptualizations of nonviolence, rather than moral, or principled, approaches.[12] This perspective is perhaps related to Palestinian youths’ familiarity with the right to resistance, with 82.3 percent of youth agreeing that Palestinians have a legal right to resist the occupation by any means.[13] Because the majority of Palestinians view all forms of resistance as legitimate under international law, the principled approach of using only nonviolence for ethical reasons lacks widespread merit.

Behaviors

Despite doubts regarding the effectiveness of nonviolence, the majority of youth reported participating in nonviolent actions, while only a small minority reported participating in violent resistance,[14] with no significant difference between youth of different genders, religions, or political parties. However, youth did not always consider their actions to fall into violent or nonviolent categories, indicating nuanced interpretations of the terms.

Looking at participation in acts of nonviolent and violent resistance collectively, the highest percentage of youth reported participating in demonstrations (71.3 percent), followed by boycotting Israeli goods (52.1 percent), throwing stones (37.7 percent), signing petitions (34 percent), and replanting trees (32.5 percent), with only a small minority reporting participation in armed resistance (6.8 percent). These findings indicate that, while youth view both violent and

nonviolent tactics as effective means of resistance, with a slight preference for violence, they are much more likely to participate in nonviolent actions.

It is also important to recognize the nuances of reported youth participation in regards to “limited violence” tactics, such as throwing stones. Although only 17.4 percent of youth admitted to participating in violent resistance against the occupation, over twice that number (37.7 percent) reported throwing stones at soldiers. Indeed, a closer look at the numbers indicates that 54 percent of those who admitted to throwing stones did not report using violent means of resistance, implying that more than half of the youth surveyed do not consider stone throwing to be a form of violence. In the JAI study, an even greater percentage (82.5 percent) classified throwing stones as nonviolent.[15]

Another consideration may be the aforementioned observation that many Palestinians view all forms of resistance as “nonviolent,” because they are not technically “violating” international law by resisting the occupation. To be sure, of the 6.8 percent of youth who reported participating in armed resistance, 16.7 percent did not consider those actions to be violent, and, in the JAI report, 49.1 percent classified “armed fire against occupation forces and settlers” as nonviolent. These findings indicate that at least a segment of youth adopt a more rights-based conception of violence than the usual interpretation of the word implying any use of physical harm, by again seeing all forms of resistance as legal and legitimate.

To summarize, the behavioral findings indicate that youth are much more likely to participate in nonviolent actions, despite perceiving violence to be more effective, as discussed above. This finding reflects the JAI report’s claim that there is a “tendency towards [support for] violence, but not necessarily to practice violence” (2006). Furthermore, of the youth who did participate in some form of violent resistance, nearly all also participated in nonviolent actions, indicating that youth do not necessarily choose between violent and nonviolent actions, nor do they eschew nonviolent resistance for violence; rather, they *adopt both approaches in a broader framework of resistance and struggle*.

Similarly, 78.4 percent of those who had participated in some kind of nonviolence training also participated in acts of violent resistance. While it is possible to view this finding as indicating the “failure” of nonviolence trainings, it more likely indicates that even those youth most actively seeking nonviolent strategies and resources are integrating those tactics into a larger toolbox of resistance methods. This lack of clear distinction between violent and nonviolent actions indicates that youth see both means as overlapping in a broader sphere of activism.

Attitudes

Attitudes towards potential actions reveal similar trends to those identified in youth perceptions and behaviors. First, a majority of youth indicated that they would support a nonviolent movement as well as a violent movement. Though there were slightly higher levels of support for a violent movement (63.8 percent) than a nonviolent movement (56.2 percent), the fact that the majority of youth would support nonviolence is significant in itself. At the same time, the fact that many more youth expressed willingness to participate in potential nonviolent actions (with 74.7 percent willing to take part in demonstrations and 70.9 percent willing to participate in a boycott) than violent actions (45.3 percent) again indicates a distinction between articulated support for means of resistance and actual willingness to participate via that means.[16]

While there is an apparent contradiction between stated support for nonviolent and violent resistance on the one hand, and actual willingness to participate in actions on the other hand,

deeper inquiries into Palestinian attitudes towards both forms of resistance reveal that support for specific forms of violence are actually relatively low, while support for specific forms of nonviolence are relatively high. In terms of violent resistance for example, while the majority of Palestinian youth support stone throwing (55.5 percent) and armed resistance (66 percent) against Israeli soldiers, only small minorities report supporting rocket attacks on civilians inside Israel (22.3 percent) and suicide bomb attacks on civilians (19.3 percent).

Conversations with youth indicated that the majority of those who "supported violence" saw armed resistance as necessary and just when used against *soldiers* and, in some cases, settlers, inside the West Bank, but did not approve of armed attacks on Israeli *civilians*. As one youth commented, "I'm not saying we don't need violence, but I'm against suicide bombings. I believe we have a right to fight the settlers and the army, but not the people in Israel. I'm not saying that I support them living there . . . but we can't fight *in* Israel" (author interview 2007). Similarly, a member of Islamic Jihad who supported violent actions but also organized boycotts and supported nonviolent resistance explained:

The Jews are human beings. I'm not against them as human beings, or against them for their religion. I'm against them only when they come into our land with their jeeps and are killing our people. When they are in this role, they are the enemy. But I don't believe in targeting kids or civilians.

(author interview 2007; emphasis added)

Noting this finding is imperative for recognizing that the oft-cited Palestinian "preference" for violence is more accurately an affirmation of support for violence when used for self-defense or defense of one's land. Thus, it is misleading to interpret even stated support for violence as an endorsement of rocket attacks or suicide bomb attacks on civilians living in Israel. It is therefore necessary that apparent support for violence be interpreted with this contextualization as mind.

To be sure, the majority of youth viewed popular resistance as part of their cultural and generational identity. A sizable majority (67.2 percent) of youth recognized a tradition of popular resistance in Palestine, while an overwhelming 92 percent felt that youth have a major role to play in resistance. This finding indicates that recent observations of youth apathy and withdrawal from activism may not be as entrenched as suggested.[17] These findings indicate that there may be greater youth willingness to participate in resistance than perceived by older activists interviewed for this study. Furthermore, as the previous discussion indicates, such participation is more likely to take the form of nonviolent resistance than violence.

Despite the fragmented nature of popular resistance described previously, the findings in this section indicate that there is a *potential* space for a more unified, widespread popular movement. Although many divisive factors remain, there is public support among youth for civil resistance, and, perhaps more importantly, popular willingness among youth to participate in unarmed actions. However, data reflect that support for nonviolent resistance is not straightforward, which may contribute to the apparent lack of widespread participation noted by activists.

Perhaps the most notable finding is the overlap of support for nonviolent and violent resistance in terms of perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. In terms of perceptions, while a minority of youth sees nonviolence alone as more strategic or ethical than violence, most do see both violent and nonviolent resistance as effective means of struggle. Likewise, regarding attitudes, the majority of youth would support a nonviolent resistance movement as well as a violent movement. In addition, the fact that nearly all respondents who had participated in armed

resistance also participated in nonviolent resistance suggests that even violent resisters see merit in nonviolent tactics.

The findings in this chapter indicate that, for both the first and second intifada generations, a broader activist identity overrides violent/nonviolent categorizations when determining support for and participation in popular resistance. In other words, activists may not consciously differentiate between "violence" and "nonviolence" when determining how they engage in resistance, but rather differentiate between "action" and "non-action." Thus, individuals may combine nonviolent tactics with methods of limited violence in a broader toolbox of resistance, rather than intentionally selecting one means over the other.

The findings also indicate that the terms "nonviolence" and "violence" have nuanced meanings and are constantly being re-negotiated. Indeed, youth were less willing to admit to participating in or supporting nonviolent resistance than they were to participating in specific nonviolent tactics, such as demonstrations and boycotts, indicating a disassociation from the term nonviolence. At the same time, youth displayed complex support for strategies of "violence," with the majority of support for armed resistance limited to operations against soldiers, and sometimes settlers, inside the West Bank, with low levels of support for rocket or suicide bomb attacks on Israeli civilians.

Finally, the strong majority of those surveyed indicated a willingness to participate in popular resistance. If this is the case, and there is in fact popular support for civil resistance, why didn't a more widespread movement emerge during the second intifada? In this chapter, I have countered the frequent claim by local activists and external observers alike that many Palestinians, youth particularly, are prone either to violence on the one hand or to apathy on the other hand. If there was indeed potential support for popular struggle, as indicated by the youth surveys, why did the first intifada generation leaders face so much difficulty in developing a national movement comparable to the uprising in the 1980s? In the following three chapters, I employ a social movements approach to analyze why mobilization was relatively limited in the post-Oslo context.

6 Local constraints
Resource mobilization

A variety of tactics were implemented throughout Palestine to challenge the occupation during the second intifada. However, the majority of activists hesitated to define the cycle of contention as a popular movement, because of its fragmented and localized nature. As one activist commented, “There are events, and different communities are trying to be active . . . But it’s not a movement. It is still fragmented” (author interview 2007). Similarly, another activist noted, “Many organizations are trying to bring a nonviolent movement, but there is still not a movement. We are still working as individuals and small groups, so it’s not a movement from the people” (author interview 2007). Others agreed, stating that, despite various individual efforts, “there is no networking, no vision, no shared meaning, no tools” (author interview 2007).

As the previous comments indicate, even activists deeply engaged in popular struggle acknowledged that a popular, national *movement* had yet to emerge. Indeed, even the most “successful” initiatives involved local actions and campaigns, never coalescing into a unified or centralized movement. As one activist summarized, “The Palestinian community has many activists. But because every person or every area has its own needs . . . or different issues, they are fragmented too much . . . Fragmentation is a symptom of the illness of the civil-based resistance movement” (author interview 2007). Activists attributed the fragmentation to factors at multiple levels, including divisions among activists, within civil society, and within Palestinian politics, as well as physical barriers imposed by the occupation. As one nonviolence trainer explained,

One of the biggest challenges is the Palestinian community. We need to make them understand that [nonviolence] is the approach to use. Another problem is the Israeli army; they won’t accept even nonviolent activities. We also have the challenge of reaching the international community, and making them understand and believe in the problems here, and make them support us. So we have challenges in three domains, the local, the regional, and the international.

(author interview 2007)

In the following chapters, I examine these different levels of fragmentation through the social movement theory lenses of weak mobilizing structures, political constraints, and ineffective movement frames. This chapter focuses on fragmentation from within, that is, factors identified by activists related to movement coordination and resource mobilization.

The majority of activists were reflexively critical of the struggle itself, acknowledging problems in the coordination of popular resistance. In this way, activists recognized numerous weaknesses in the movement’s organizing structures, defined as the “collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3). This analytical framework is especially useful for

assessing movement goals, tactics, and organizational dynamics, all of which represented challenges in the case of Palestine. As one activist in the Bethlehem area summarized,

We don't have a clear strategy of what we want to achieve . . . There's no good leader, there's no networking between groups, there's no clear understanding of nonviolence. And there's no structure, no clear goal . . . Most importantly, there is no commitment and continuity to nonviolent activities.

(author interview 2007)

This chapter thus examines the challenges existing within the organization of the struggle itself, including the lack of a unified movement leadership, the institutionalization of political parties, and the professionalization of NGOs.

Lack of unified movement leadership

The majority of activists identified the lack of vision and leadership in the struggle as a primary weakness in the organizational structure of the movement.

Despite the local leadership of the popular committees, there was no unified leadership for popular resistance during the second intifada, and thus no shared vision. As one activist explained, "People felt the absence of a charismatic leader who could lead people with a common vision" (author interview 2007). Even the few organizations that worked for more coordinated resistance, such Stop the Wall and the National Committee for Popular Resistance, functioned more as umbrellas for networks of local committees, rather than as a united, national leadership. This lack of leadership contrasted with the presence of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) of the first intifada, and resulted somewhat ironically from the presence of the PA in the second intifada. According to several activists, while the absence of any present Palestinian leadership structure in the first intifada allowed for the emergence of the UNLU, the existence of the PA in the second intifada provided leaders and institutions that should have embraced and encouraged popular resistance, yet failed to do so.

The lack of a unified leadership made it difficult to articulate common goals. As an activist from the Salfit region explained:

First, there are lots of organizations working in the same field, and each promotes nonviolence in its own way. Some talk about it as peace, some in terms of struggle, and so on, so it confuses people. Second, there are lots of leaders, and all of them want to be the big leader. Third, there is no single goal. People can't decide if they are focusing on the wall or independence or what. People concentrate on actions but not on a larger goal.

(author interview 2007)

According to the literature on resource mobilization, social movements typically rely heavily on their stated goals to shape their interactions with the broader political and cultural environments (McAdam 1996b: 15). First, in terms of substance, stated goals inform perceptions of the group's opportunity and threat potential, thus influencing levels of support and opposition. Second, according to empirical studies, the ability to focus on one clear goal is instrumental in both preserving resources and maintaining unity (Gamson 1990: 44–46). According to McAdam,

“the pursuit of a number of goals promises to spread thin the already precious resources and energy of the SMO. Just as dangerous is the impetus to internal dissension and factionalism that may accompany the pursuit of multiple goals” (1996a: 15). A movement that is unable to articulate a clear goal that resonates with the public will thus face challenges in garnering widespread support, as has been the case in Palestine.

To be sure, many activists noted that the failure to articulate a common goal was a major impediment to mobilizing for nonviolent resistance. For example, in a single conversation with three activists in Ramallah, when asked about their goal for nonviolent resistance, all three answered differently. One claimed the goal is to “affect the path of the wall” (author interview 2007), while another aimed to “resolve social issues in Palestinian society and end the occupation” (author interview 2007), while another said that “each action has its own goal” (author interview 2007), such as preventing the demolition of a house or stopping the uprooting of an olive grove.

Such variation in both the scope and content of objectives was evident across nearly all of the interviews. In many episodes of village-based resistance, the objective is locally focused, such as stopping the construction of the separation barrier in that particular village, or preventing the confiscation of local land. However, even more broadly stated goals range from halting the wall to ending the occupation, with variation within these objectives as well. Regarding the separation barrier, some expressed the goal of stopping construction of the wall (author interview 2007), while others aimed to dismantle the wall (author interview 2007), and others sought to change the path of the wall to stay on the Green Line. Such differences regarding wall-related objectives often cause fractures between activists, who may view each other’s goals as too soft or too extreme. As Nour explained, “It’s important for us to define our goals . . . Maybe in the future we will focus on ending the wall completely, but now we are using nonviolence just to keep the wall on a straight route. Others criticize this and say, how can we tell the society that we approve of the wall at all?” (author interview 2007).

Likewise, there are different long-term objectives amongst those aiming for an end to the occupation. Some advocate for a two-state solution, with an independent Palestinian state on 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, while others hope for one democratic state, to secure equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians, and to allow for the return of refugees. Others have called for a complete overhaul of the PA in the short term, and restructuring towards “one state for both peoples” in the future (author interview 2007). The range of objectives limits activists from developing a shared vision, and hinders the development of effective strategies.

The absence of a unified leadership and vision contributed to the existence of many different interpretations and applications of strategic nonviolence, which further contributed to fragmentation in both the spirit and strategy of the struggle. To begin with, there was notable disagreement between activists regarding terminology, with some using the term “nonviolence” comfortably, but most eschewing that word in favor of “popular resistance” (*muqau’ama sha’bia*) or “civil-based resistance” (*muqau’ama mudania*). Some saw popular resistance and nonviolence as the same thing, but were uncomfortable with the term “nonviolence” (*la’anf*). As one activist commented,

I tend to use the term civil-based resistance. I don’t mind the term “nonviolence,” but . . . when you say “nonviolence” in Arabic [la’anf], it appears in the negative, as if you are stripping away a certain right from somebody. When you say “civil-based resistance,” you actually mean nonviolence and mass participation of people.

(author interview 2007)

Another agreed, noting, "Nonviolence itself is natural, especially in Palestine. People do it every day. It's normal, but people don't want to mention that word [because of] the 'non' part of 'nonviolence,'" which implies submission, passivity, or normalization to many Palestinians (author interview 2007).

Indeed, others saw a marked difference between the meaning of "nonviolence" and "popular resistance," arguing that the latter is more aptly suited to describe contention. As one activist explained,

I prefer to call it popular resistance, rather than nonviolence. Some nonviolent activists want to go to the checkpoints and sing or raise flags for peace. But popular resistance is better. We don't want to kill or injure anyone, but we are going to fight using our bodies, to push through the bulldozers and jeeps, and not just stop in front of the checkpoints and sing.

(author interview 2007)

Others prefer the term "popular resistance" over "nonviolence" to avoid making difficult distinctions between nonviolence and violence in the legal sense of literally violating or non-violating. According to a member of Bil'in's popular committee,

Palestinians are living under occupation, and under international law, we have a right to violent resistance. So when you say "nonviolence," it implies that other resistance is violent, when we believe that all resistance is nonviolent . . . You can't distinguish between violent and nonviolent resistance, because both are legitimate.

(author interview 2007)

Likewise, another activist commented, "Armed resistance is not the same thing as violence. We have a right to resist" (author interview 2007). Since conceptualizations of nonviolence and violence differ between activists in these ways, the terms "popular resistance" and "civil-based resistance" were most commonly used.

The meaning of nonviolence also differs between activists, with some seeing nonviolence as a way of life, and others viewing it as a strategy, even within the same organization. For example, two Palestinian activists with Combatants for Peace defined nonviolence in different ways, with one seeing it from the principled perspective, which typically views nonviolence as a way of life, and the other from the pragmatic point of view, which generally considers nonviolence a form of strategy. However, both agreed that "the meaning of nonviolence is different and complicated" (author interview 2007), and that "everyone has their own meaning" (author interview 2007).

Indeed, even those who think of nonviolence as a way of life describe their understanding of nonviolence in different ways. For example, some activists' principled nonviolence grows out of religion or spirituality. According to one participant who defines nonviolence as a way of life, both Christian and Muslim religious leaders refer to "verses that support nonviolence, and tell you how to use nonviolence to save our dignity and the other's dignity" (author interview 2007). Another activist explained, "Many people are nonviolent simply because their faith tells them: I am Muslim, so that is why I'm nonviolent. I am Christian, so that is why I'm nonviolent . . . You always use nonviolence, no matter what" (author interview 2007).

In addition to faith-based nonviolence, other activists who define nonviolence as a way of life pointed to family influence, with one stating, “the most important influence was through my family. They never believed in armed resistance, and they actually pushed us towards nonviolence” (author interview 2007). Others were not raised with nonviolence, but have since adopted it as a way of life to transition from a militant past. As one former supporter of armed resistance explained, “Nonviolence is not just a strategy, but instead it is an ideology, a way of life. I want to clear myself, and to have a vision, and nonviolence enables you to do this” (author interview 2007).

Many activists have a principled view of nonviolence for themselves personally, but they do not try to convince others to see it that way. Indeed, trainers committed to nonviolence as a way of life often present it to others as a strategy. For example, as one trainer explained, “When I teach children about nonviolence, I tell them that they have a choice . . . I say that violence is okay, but I just want them to know that there is another way. For me, I never knew there was an alternative [to violence]” (author interview 2007). Another activist agreed, stating:

My beliefs are that nonviolence is moral, principled, and spiritual, but I can’t impose that belief on society. People want answers; they want things that will save their lives, and save their land. So, in the short term, I hope that Palestinians will adopt the pragmatic approach, and use nonviolence because it is strategic and creative. But in the long term, I hope the principle of nonviolence becomes embedded in the community, so that people live it in the home and school and workplace.

(author interview 2007)

Others referred to nonviolence as a “way of life,” but in the sense that nonviolence can be employed in everyday situations, and not just as a tactic to confront the occupation. Several activists noted the need for nonviolence within Palestine, in light of the violent confrontations between Fateh and Hamas taking place during the time of the research, as well as in community and family disputes. As one activist commented, “I choose nonviolence not just against the occupation, but I feel it should be a lifestyle in Palestine” (author interview 2007). Another activist who sees nonviolence as both a strategy and a way of life noted, “It’s not just when you face an Israeli soldier that you act in nonviolent ways” (author interview 2007). Although these activists described nonviolence as a way of life, their understanding is different from a principled commitment to nonviolence, as they do not necessarily condemn the use of violence as a form of resistance.

Likewise, most activists who see nonviolence as a strategy do not condemn violence, but rather see popular resistance as a pragmatic form of resistance. For some, nonviolence is strategic for protecting Palestinians from Israeli responses to more violent forms of resistance. As one activist explained, “Nonviolence is a way of resisting the occupation in order to present the justice of your situation without using weapons or the flow of blood. It is more effective because blood lets your enemy use blood, too, and we don’t want any more blood” (author interview 2007). For others, nonviolence is preferred for protecting both Palestinian and Israeli civilians, even if they are not against the use of violence in regard to other segments of the population. For example, an activist with Combatants for Peace commented, “We do not believe in hurting civilians, we condemn suicide bombings, and . . . we encourage the nonviolent way. But I can’t condemn resistance against the army and settlers in the West Bank” (author interview 2007).

Similarly, an activist and trainer in the Bethlehem area who took a pragmatic approach defined nonviolence as a way to “address injustice, but in a right way, without creating another injustice” (author interview 2007). Other activists see popular resistance as strategic by recognizing the relative strength of the IDF to any form of Palestinian armed resistance. As the coordinator of the National Committee for Popular Resistance explained, “I believe in nonviolence as a strategy. I think the IDF is stronger, and Palestinians can’t realistically face it with violence, so we need a different approach” (author interview 2007). Others agreed, including the campaign coordinator of Stop the Wall, who stated:

I believe strongly that all means of resisting the occupation are legitimate. But strategically, we have no chance of military success. To have this, you need certain conditions, like an army, weapons, and a country with areas to retreat to and places to have trainings, but we don’t have these things, and the Arab states don’t help us, so we don’t have a chance.

(author interview 2007)

The majority of activists supporting unarmed resistance see it as a way to “bring the situation to the attention of the Israeli and international communities” (author interview 2007). Many commented that most of the world views Palestinians as terrorists, so civil resistance provides a means of changing that image. Indeed, perhaps owing to the fact that few contact points limit the potential for actions that might affect Israelis directly, activists instead are appealing more to the international community, and thus Israel indirectly, in a sort of boomerang model (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

Nonviolence is useful in attracting the international community to the Palestinian cause in two ways. First, nonviolence allows for international activists to join with Palestinians in solidarity against the occupation, with activists noting that “nonviolence can help get people all over the world to help and support the Palestinian cause” (author interview 2007). Second, nonviolence can appeal to the Israeli and international communities through the media, since Israel “can’t defend itself to the world in using violence against unarmed civilians” (author interview 2007). As another activist noted, “Israel responds to nonviolence with violence.
We must expose this to the world and to the Israeli public” (author interview 2007). This reasoning reflects Sharp’s notion of political jiu-jitsu, in which even violent repression of nonviolent action is strategic for drawing attention to the tactics of the oppressor.

Clearly, there are many different interpretations of nonviolence, and many different rationales for employing unarmed tactics in resistance. When combined with the lack of a common goal, vision, or leadership, these variations in the conceptualization and application of nonviolence only further contributed to the fragmentation of the struggle and the continued challenge of developing a more unified, coordinated widespread movement.

Variations in conceptual approaches to nonviolent resistance have resulted in different strategic approaches, which have further divided the struggle, leading to an overall lack of strategy cited by nearly all activists interviewed. The absence of a coordinated strategy rendered many actions ineffective, and further hindered popular mobilization. As the director of the Al-Watan Center in Hebron noted, “Nonviolence without a strategy is like swimming with no direction, because you don’t know where you are going. There are many methods that can increase the number of people involved, but there needs to be a plan and a strategy” (author interview 2007). Indeed, according to McAdam, the success or failure of a movement largely depends on its “ability to devise innovative and disruptive tactics” (1996a: 13).

One of the major problems acknowledged by Palestinian activists that both reflects and contributes to the fragmented nature of the struggle was the fact that most actions were reactions to direct damages at the local level, such as wall construction and land confiscation, rather than being proactive acts. As one activist stated, "Reacting to the other side is not nonviolence. Nonviolence needs to be a proactive movement, it needs to be a creative movement. We should be initiating actions, and [the Israelis] should have to figure out how to deal with them" (author interview 2007). Likewise, another activist commented, "Our strategy should be to build something. We should not just be reacting, but rather we should be acting and achieving something" (author interview 2007). However, articulating a strategic action plan proved difficult owing to varying opinions on the utility of armed violence, throwing stones, partnering with Israeli and international activists, and pursuing legal paths.

Despite the collective commitment of the popular committees to unarmed struggle, individual activists expressed different opinions on the use of violence. Some activists echoed nonviolent theorists in claiming that any acts of armed resistance hurt nonviolent movements, with several activists stating, "Rockets and violence weaken nonviolent resistance" (author interview 2007), and "bombs are not strategic" (author interview 2007). Similarly, many activists referred to the second intifada's reliance on predominantly militant resistance as moving Palestine backwards. Others, though preferring nonviolent resistance, considered it more realistic to accommodate militant acts until there is more support for nonviolence. An activist from Salfit commented, "It is better to just have popular resistance, but it's hard to convince people of that. So maybe we will continue with militant actions for a while and then build nonviolence gradually as there are more successes" (author interview 2007). However, the same activist emphasized the need for nonviolent actions themselves to remain nonviolent, noting, "The problem is that at a nonviolent demonstration, if 99 percent of the people are nonviolent, but there is one percent violent, that one percent can mess up the whole protest" (author interview 2007). An activist from a village south of Bethlehem likewise acknowledged that, while there is a place for armed resistance,

We should keep our civil-based resistance movement, which is nonviolent, from being violent, keep it away from the militants, from all the things that bring it closer to violence. It's important. Because the closer it comes to violence, the more it will lose its character and identity, and the more it will lose the vision.

(author interview 2007)

Thus, even many activists who recognized the legitimacy of armed resistance still aimed to keep popular resistance distinct from violence for strategic purposes.

Other activists however view violent and nonviolent resistance as part of the same movement, and feel that the inclusion of violence is a necessary strategy. As a trainer and activist in Bethlehem stated,

Nonviolence and violence should go together. I don't think the movement should be only nonviolent, because first of all, it is our legitimate right to use violence, recognized by the UN. But the other important thing is that it is natural, it is normal, for people to use violence. Why do you use violence?
When you get humiliated. And we are humiliated on a daily basis.

(author interview 2007)

Others agreed, feeling that nonviolence alone is not strategic. An activist in the southern village of Beit Ommar who supports both violent and nonviolent resistance summarized the frequently voiced belief that "violent resistance makes you a stronger partner for negotiations" (author interview 2007), by providing a source of leverage. As another activist noted, "Nonviolence is good, but it's not enough . . . it does not provide enough pressure; that's why we need armed resistance"
(interview 2007).

For many activists, there is not a clear line between violent and nonviolent resistance. To be sure, for many who view nonviolence as a strategy, it represents just one approach to resistance. Likewise, many activists who identify strongly with violent resistance also support nonviolence as a strategy, including members of notoriously "violent" groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. For example, a Hamas official in Tulkarem, who participated regularly in unarmed actions, stated the importance of nonviolence, but acknowledged that violence is sometimes necessary for self-defense: "Sometimes nonviolence is good, but sometimes you need something else. If a soldier is coming into your home and using violence, how else can you respond to him?" (author interview 2007).

Similarly, a member of Islamic Jihad who supports armed resistance also supports nonviolence because it accommodates more widespread participation.
He explained, "If you use just military action, you only have a few members, but with nonviolence you can get a lot of people involved . . . We need to start thinking from the eyes of the Palestinian people and be one in all actions" (author interview 2007). It is thus clear that activists participating in nonviolent resistance come from a range of backgrounds and perspectives, which enhances the struggle in some ways, but complicates it in others. The absence of a common viewpoint on the use of violence in resistance is one important issue that hinders the development of a cohesive strategy.

The debate regarding the merit of violent resistance becomes even more nuanced when considering the question of what constitutes violence. As noted above, some activists did not view any form of resistance as violent, since they recognized the right of Palestinians under international law to resist occupation. However, most activists distinguish between the strategic value of *armed* resistance, such as bombs, rockets, and guns, and other forms of *violent* popular resistance, most notably throwing stones. For example, one activist who supports throwing stones criticized that tactic's common classification as violent: "There has never been one Palestinian bullet fired in any of our demonstrations. If throwing stones is violent, if setting tires on fire is violent, if storming the wall is violent, then yes, we are violent" (author interview 2007).

Other activists however, while supporting stone throwing in principle, acknowledged that it was not strategic. As a resistance leader in the weekly Um Salamouna demonstrations commented, "You have to decide how much to accelerate the situation. Do you want to throw stones, or do you want to pass on your message? Sometimes you need stones, but that is not our message" (interview 2007). This activist and the other popular committee members in Um Salamouna decided to prohibit the throwing of stones at the demonstrations when they saw that the stones provoked the IDF to crack down on the demonstrations with tear gas, bullets, and arrests. The popular committee coordinating Bil'in's weekly demonstrations made a similar decision, with one member noting, "During the demonstrations, it's forbidden to throw stones, because we know the IDF will respond violently to stones. Besides, our message is not communicated by throwing stones" (author interview 2007). However, the same activist

acknowledged, "If the army comes into the village using violence in a raid or incursion, then we can't control the stones or tell the kids not to use them" (author interview 2007). The popular committee leader from the northern village of Budrous recounted a similar sequence of events, with a popular committee decision to prohibit stones during demonstrations for strategic purposes, but willing acknowledgement of stone throwing when the army entered the village in other instances.

Many activists' and popular committees' decisions to prohibit stone throwing is a significant departure from first intifada tactics, in which the stone became a symbol of the uprising. As one activist acknowledged, "At first it was hard to talk about not using stones. Throwing stones is in our history; it was a symbol of the first intifada" (author interview 2007). However, the twofold objective of protecting civilians from violent IDF responses and sending a message to the international community prompted a move away from the tactic for pragmatic, if not principled, purposes. Nevertheless, different opinions on the strategic value of throwing stones further hindered the development of a coordinated strategy.

In addition to divisions regarding the strategic value of various forms of violence, a cohesive action plan was further hindered by different opinions on other tactical issues, including the role of international and Israeli activists. Regarding internationals, most participants expressed appreciation for the presence of internationals who worked in solidarity with Palestinians, both for reducing the extent of the IDF's violent response to demonstrations and for attracting more support for the Palestinian cause in the international community. However, nearly all activists emphasized the need for internationals to play a supporting, rather than leading, role in actions, and some activists were critical of internationals' participation. As one activist in Bethlehem commented, "We do not want any nonviolent internationals to come teach us. We know what we are doing. We want them to go teach *their* leaders, work in *their* communities, and with *their* people" (author interview 2007). Another activist agreed, stating, "Internationals can spoil nonviolence sometimes. It's better if they come here and learn and then take their stories back home to advocate. They're not as important in the direct actions" (author interview 2007).

On the other hand, other activists saw strategic benefit in the participation of supporters from the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), the Palestinian Solidarity Project (PSP), Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI), the International Women's Peace Service (IWPS), and other international groups. The role of international activists thus remains another divisive point for strategic planning.

The role of Israeli activists is also controversial, with many activists seeing the presence of supporters from groups like Ta'ayush, Anarchists Against the Wall, Gush Shalom, and Peace Now as strategic for once again reducing the degree of Israeli responses to demonstrations and for raising awareness about the Palestinian situation in Israel. However, other activists maintain that the place for Israeli activism is within Israel: "We need Israeli activists to work inside Israel, to start to convince their government to not use violence against the Palestinian people . . . and to let the public know that we are not a violent people" (author interview 2007). Others commented that sometimes the presence of Israeli activists reduces Palestinian participation in demonstrations.

However, most saw Israeli involvement as beneficial on several levels. First, several activists noted that the IDF is less likely to use lethal means of responding to demonstrations when they know Israeli activists are present. In addition, as noted by one activist whose village worked closely with Israeli activists, "It was good for our people to see another face of the Jews.

Palestinians are used to seeing Jews as either soldiers or settlers, so they only see the bad side. From the Israelis' participation in resistance, they now see the good side" (author interview 2007).

Israeli participation also helps raise awareness in Israeli about issues like the separation barrier, as well as giving publicity to Palestinian nonviolence, by increasing coverage of actions in Israeli publications like *Ha'aretz*. However, the question of how and if Israeli activists should be involved remains a significant strategic question for Palestinian activists.

The strategic value of using Israeli courts has also been contentious. Villages like Bil'in and Budrous challenged the wall in Israeli courts and managed to prevent land confiscation by the separation barrier. However, some activists are critical of using the legal path because "it's clear that the Israeli legal system just facilitates the government's wishes" (author interview 2007). Others recognized this concern, but drew from international law to assert that the occupying authority has duties to ensure certain rights that can be enforced legally. As Naser explained,

In the past, people here said any person that deals with the Israeli legal institution is a collaborator or normalizer with Israel. But there is a duty for the occupying authority to guarantee security and human rights, and if we keep ignoring these things, we are losing a good, pragmatic tool to deal with what's happening.

(interview 2007)

The question of how and when to use the Israeli legal system strategically thus remains unanswered.

This section has illustrated that fragmentation both contributes to and is reinforced by the lack of leadership and strategy in civil resistance. Disagreements regarding the use of violence, ranging from armed resistance to throwing stones, have made it difficult to agree on tactics, while divisions over the utility of internationals, Israeli activists, and legal frameworks have further hindered the development of a unified action plan. The lack of strategy is a symptom of the broader structural issues related to the lack of a common conception of or goal for nonviolence, and the absence of a strong leadership to provide a guiding vision.

Professionalization of NGOs

NGOs have become divisive actors in terms of resistance on several levels. Many NGOs focusing on "nonviolence" have different definitions of the term, which makes it difficult to coordinate efforts or develop joint strategies. However, many activists' frustration with NGOs stems more from systemic and structural issues relating to their role in resistance.

First, several activists perceived NGOs as being plagued by corruption and mismanagement of funds. For example, one activist explained that he had started an NGO several years ago to distribute donated food and clothes to needy children, only to find that another NGO supposedly helping with distribution was actually selling the donated items for profit. Another activist complained that, "The corruption in the NGOs is worse than in the PA. In the PA it is so evident you can touch it, but it is more concealed in the NGOs" (author interview 2007). Other activists criticized NGOs for wasting funding, by spending significant amounts of money just to talk or hold trainings about nonviolence, without any real action. As one interviewee commented, "When you compare what NGOs are saying about nonviolence to what real nonviolence they are doing, you see how many millions of dollars have been wasted on this" (author interview 2007).

To be sure, NGOs' inherent focus on funding was viewed as problematic by many activists, who criticized the NGOs for turning "activism" into a profession. According to one activist, "volunteer work has been going away from struggling against the occupation. Now many people involved in resistance want money or salaries, but I don't want this. I prefer to volunteer, and I am trying to develop the idea of grassroots volunteer work against the occupation" (author interview 2007).

The shift of NGOs to salaried activism, and reliance on funding to conduct nonviolence, put many NGOs in competition with each other "like different companies in a market" (author interview 2007). As an activist with Combatants Against the Wall explained, "The competition between NGOs is a problem . . . There are too many people pulling in different directions, and too many organizations working for their own benefits and agendas" (author interview 2007). According to many activists, this competition contributes to the lack of clear vision and lack of strategic action noted above.

Competition between NGOs in terms of both agenda-setting and funding is linked to reliance on outside donors. According to a community activist from a village south of Bethlehem, NGOs are often driven by both national and international agendas, in contrast to grassroots community-based organizations (CBOs), which are directly connected to local people (author interview 2007). As this activist explained, NGOs are also often subject to political influence: "In other places, NGOs tend to present the needs of the local communities to the authority. Here it works the other way. The NGOs work under agendas that are linked to some political group, and pass on ideas in an ideological way" (author interview 2007).

Indeed, according to Amaney Jamal, several hundred organizations were extensions of Palestinian political parties during the Oslo period. On the one hand, "pro-PNA and pro-Fateh associations . . . used their organizations to generate support for Arafat's government, for instance, by using their sites for PNA employment opportunities" (2007: 53; see also Amal Jamal 2005: 145). On the other hand, "because the Oslo Accords provided governmental institutions for Fateh and PLO supporters, members of other factions, less supportive of the PNA, clung to their former civic associations both to maintain their political allegiances and to counter the prevailing PNA discourse" (Amaney Jamal 2007:
53). In these ways, NGOs served as "convenient shelter[s] for disappointed political figures" (Amal Jamal 2005: 146), using their associations as "safe haven[s] from which to address PNA propaganda" (Amaney Jamal 2007: 53).

Meanwhile, even NGOs that were not affiliated with a specific faction were forced to cooperate with the PA to remain active. To be sure, "a major source of weakness of the civil organizations stemmed from the fact that they had to negotiate political deals with governmental agencies in order to survive and be effective"
(Amal Jamal 2005: 146).

While some NGOs have been driven by PA interests, others reflect the agendas of western donors. As a nonviolence trainer in Bethlehem claimed, "Many NGOs get their funds from the international community, so they end up being donordriven. So when many NGOs talk about nonviolence, they end up focusing on how to live with the occupation, not how to end the occupation" (author interview 2007). In addition to agenda setting, donor-driven activism can also result in dependency on international funding. As the same trainer in Bethlehem explained, "Many NGOs start working on the idea of nonviolence, but then stop working when their funding ends" (author interview 2007). Other activists agreed, noting that, while some outside support is good, Palestinians need to become more selfsufficient to avoid being locked in to

European, American, and Israeli agendas:
“Palestine is often seen as a humanitarian problem, but this is not right. We have educated people, and we should be dependent on ourselves, not on outside aid.
We should be looking for solutions from inside and not outside, and start building independently” (author interview 2007).

It is thus clear that, while many NGOs support nonviolence in some way, corruption within NGOs, competition between NGOs, and divisions between NGOs, CBOs, and grassroots activists further contribute to the fragmentation of activism.

However, activists’ primary concern with NGOs was their increasing “institutionalization” of resistance, reflected in prioritizing the organization over the struggle itself. This phenomenon illustrates the special form of goal transformation called “organizational maintenance,” in which “the primary activity of the SMO becomes the maintenance of membership, funds, and other requirements of organizational existence” (Kriesi 1996: 156; see also Zald and Ash 1966; Michels 1949). In this process, the action repertoire of the SMO also becomes “more moderate, more conventional, more institutionalized” (Kriesi 1996, 156). According to Kriesi, this institutionalization of SMOs transforms some movement groups into parties or interest groups, while similar processes of commercialization transform SMOs into service organizations.

Indeed, the institutionalized nature of many NGOs, combined with their ties to the PA (be it willingly or not) and reliance on western donor agendas, made them appear “detached from the daily burdens of most Palestinians” (Amal Jamal 2005: 146). According to Amal Jamal, “Although the NGOs provided central services, such as education, health care, and agricultural assistance to Palestinian society, they were at the same time detached from the real social dynamics and as a result had no serious impact on politics” (2005: 146).

Conventional NGOs can complement the work of more contentious SMOs in the broader social movement sector. However, they can also create additional challenges for SMOs when they undercut, rather than reinforce, action mobilization. This has recently been the case in Palestine, in which NGO framings of nonviolence, informed by western donor agendas, have conflicted with competing movement frames, resulting in the disassociation of nonviolence from contention in the public view, thus hindering mobilization, as discussed further in Chapter 8.

Institutionalization of politcal parties

Similarly to the professionalization of NGOs, the institutionalization of political parties during the post-Oslo period also limited mobilization, especially the mobilization of youth and students on university campuses. Indeed, with the signing of the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the PA, the very structure of the parties had shifted from resistance movements to more conventional parties. During the first intifada for example, major parties such as Fateh, the PFLP, the DFLP, the Islamic parties, and the socialist parties engaged youth directly through political education. As Mahmoud remembered:

We had weekly party meetings at university where we would learn about other revolutions, read philosophy, and discuss and debate the news with each other and with members of other parties. So we really learned in our parties, not in the university; for us, our degrees were in politics, not academics. It was a resistance culture, which was real education. But this is not happening now.

(author interview 2007)

Indeed, according to Nidal, a former secretary general of Fateh Youth, the Oslo Accords created new social realities for political parties by redefining relations with Israel and by establishing the PA. Prior to Oslo, Al-Shabibeh (as Fateh Youth was called before 1995) "focused on mobilizing people and fighting the occupation" (author interview 2007) with youth from the universities and in the prisons.
However, after Oslo, Fateh Youth needed to shift its tactics to be in accordance with the peace agreement. As Nidal explained,

In the past, the relationship between the resistance and the occupation was clear. We were against them, and they were against us. But after the peace agreement, it became very complicated . . . We resolved to continue fighting the occupation until we achieved an independent state, but our fighting had to be stable and suitable with the peace negotiations.
(author interview 2007)

The establishment of the PA thus affected the structure and activities of Fateh Youth. Prior to the PA, students initiated and directed actions and formed the core of the national resistance leadership, yet, after the PA was established, the students' leadership role in Palestinian society was replaced. Not only did they lose their leadership influence on the general public, but they also became subject themselves to the decisions of officials who redefined their roles. According to Nidal, after the establishment of the PA, "the actions of youth were minimized so that they focused more of their work in the university and on youth development in the local society" (interview, 2007). Indeed, in conversations with Fateh Youth and Islamic Block student leaders, it was clear that their main responsibilities focused on assisting fellow students by helping them with school assignments and fees as means for recruitment, rather than emphasizing resistance.

In addition to political constraints, youth involvement was also limited on the organizational level, through the shift of coordination from the universities to NGOs, and from a general lack of leadership. Youth were instrumental in the first intifada, particularly at university campuses, in assuming leadership roles, coordinating actions, articulating visions, and determining strategies. As several activists noted, "In the past, the leaders came from the university students. In the first intifada for example, many of the leaders came from Birzeit University" (interview 2007). Indeed, according to Seif, "youth were widely engaged in the organization and leadership of the [first] intifada, its striking forces, its popular committees, its educational and solidarity committees," and the UNLU, which coordinated the daily acts of resistance (2000: 20). However, youth did not assume those responsibilities in the second intifada, creating a void that older activists found difficult to fill. Indeed, the lack of work and family duties for most students, combined with the natural mobilization space of university campuses, seemingly makes the university an organic site for initiating and sustaining resistance, as in the first intifada. Several activists expressed their desire to ground the movement in the universities once again, commenting, "I hope the university students will go back to taking the lead; they can do more" (interview 2007), and, "We need to encourage the youth; university students should be the coordinators" (interview 2007). Clearly, many activists saw youth, and students in particular, as the source for the vision, leadership, and strategy absent in the movement, and were puzzled as to their lack of engagement.

At the same time, the inability of Fateh to function as a viable leader of resistance, combined with corruption in the PA under Arafat, opened a space for the rising influence of Hamas, which affected mobilization for civil resistance in several ways. As Abu-Nimer summarizes, "the

overall impact of the organized Islamic groups was to undercut nonviolent resistance either by . . . fostering dissension among Palestinians, by accenting violence, or by resisting any compromise with Israel" (2003: 265). Indeed, whereas political parties functioned as machines mobilizing against the occupation in the first intifada, their efforts during the second intifada were often targeted at each other. For example, at a graduation ceremony at Birzeit University on 9 July 2007, the Hamas-affiliated Student Council president was kidnapped for several hours, allegedly by Fateh supporters, who demanded an apology from him on behalf of Hamas' actions during the ousting of Fateh from the Gaza Strip several weeks earlier. While animosities were not always so extreme, student leaders of both Fateh Youth (the youth arm of Fateh) and the Islamic Block (the youth arm of Hamas and Islamic Jihad) noted that inter-party tensions limited coordinated actions. While they had joint demonstrations on major dates of remembrance such as the Nakba and 5 June, their activities were generally separate.

The civil strife caused by the internal political conflict, and the resultant lack of leadership, also contributed to a broader sense of despair, distrust, and uncertainty, which further limited mobilization by depleting people's sense of agency. The internal power struggle at the elite level thus made it difficult to organize a unified, national movement.

As this chapter has described, there were many organizational factors within the Palestinian popular "movement" itself that hindered mobilization and resulted in fragmentation. First, in the absence of a unified leadership comparable to the first intifada's UNLU, activists found it difficult to articulate common goals or agree to coordinated strategies. Second, divisions related to activists' mistrust of NGOs, and competition between NGOs, combined with the professionalization of the civil society sector in general, limited the mobilizing capacity of mid-level organizations. Finally, the institutionalization of the political parties after Oslo and the rising tensions between Fateh and Hamas further hindered mobilization. However, these internal variables were not the only factors inhibiting widespread participation; as the next two chapters discuss, popular mobilization was also hindered by political constraints and movement frames.

7 National constraints
Political structures

In addition to weak organizational structures at the local level, political constraints at the national level also limited widespread participation. Political opportunities refer to the "changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system" (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996: 3), which either create opportunities that "encourage people to engage in contentious politics" (Tarrow 1998: 20) or create constraints that discourage contention. In the case of Palestinian politics, changes in formal Palestinian political institutions prior to the second intifada discouraged contention, while shifts in the informal power relations between Palestinian political parties during the second intifada further hindered opportunities for engagement. In addition to Palestinian political constraints, the movement was also limited by Israeli political constraints and the perpetuation (and indeed, intensification) of the occupation's policies. This chapter explores how these variables limited action mobilization, indicating that fragmentation was rooted not only at the movement level but at the national level(s) as well.

Political constraints within Palestine

In 1993, the signing of the Declaration of Principles following the Oslo Accords provided for the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), a semiautonomous governing body with jurisdiction in specified areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Although the PA was initially viewed by most Palestinians as a foundation for a permanent national government, many Palestinians became increasingly disillusioned with the new body's poor governance inside the territories, as well as its seemingly placating relationship with Israel. Thus, rather than serving as a strong leadership for the Palestinian movement, the PA actually created constraints to popular struggle by adopting autocratic policies, limiting the role of civil society, and repressing activism.

According to Andoni, the PA functioned "as a corrupt, one-party leadership, [resulting in] a lack of democracy [that] cast a malaise over Palestinian society and politics" (2001: 212). Indeed, corruption was believed to be rampant in the PA, particularly under Arafat, who served as the president of the Authority from its establishment to his death on 11 November 2004. This period was also characterized by centralization of power, lack of accountability, and absence of transparency, which had severe implications for the development of Palestinian democracy.

In the years following the Oslo Accords, power was largely concentrated in the executive branch under the leadership of Arafat, who tended to bypass the majority of institutions to extend his personal influence. While this strategy was arguably motivated by Arafat's attempt to unite various factions of Palestinians with different opinions and interests, and to bolster his status as the unifying symbol of Palestine, the centralization of power proved detrimental and only further crippled the already limited legitimacy of the PA.

This centralization manifested itself in various ways. Financially, over onequarter of the PA

revenues were placed under the direct and unaccountable control of Arafat by 1997, while, politically, the legislative branch was kept weak. To be sure, while the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) had the authority to draft and pass laws, all laws were subject to Arafat's approval, and thus served more as resolutions than actual legislation.[1] The PLC was further hindered by the fact that the DOP forbade the body from legislating on "final status" issues, including Jerusalem, settlements, refugee, and borders, which were delegated solely to negotiations between Israel and the PLO, even though all of these issues also affected Palestinian national governance. In addition, any legislation that was passed by the PLC was subject to approval by the Israeli side of the legal subcommittee before becoming law (Parsons 2005: 205–6).

While factors such as the structure of the DOP and the ultimate subjugation of the PA to Israel affected the emerging form of the PA, many scholars attribute the centralization of power primarily to Arafat. As Amal Jamal writes, "Although Arafat alone should not be blamed for the emerging Palestinian governing structures, he [was] without a doubt a central source of authoritarianism in Palestinian politics, having marginalized official institutional state structures and established instead a patrimonial political system" (2005: 121). One such institution in which Arafat's authoritarian role was evident was the security sector. According to Sirriyeh, "the absence of an effective control by an identifiable institution led to the excessive manipulation of [the security sector's] responsibilities by members and leaders of these organizations" (2000: 51). To be sure, as Brown notes, "the security services effectively answered to the president regardless of the content of the Basic Law. When Arafat was president, he encouraged multiple security services but declined to draw clear divisions of responsibilities among them" (2005: 16). This resulted in a lack of both organization and mandate, with over a dozen security organizations operating under Arafat, and none of them proving effective in providing either internal or external security. As Brown suggests, "the myriad layers of overlapping forces and command structures" contributed to a general lack of transparency and accountability within the security sector, which was mirrored in other PA institutions (2005: 17).

Arafat's centralization of power was largely linked to his reliance on patronage. As Rubin writes, "All power came ultimately from Arafat himself. As frequently happens in politics, a strong leader prefers lieutenants with a plodding loyalty over those whose brilliance and ambition seem to threaten his own position" (1999: 23). In addition to his inner circles, Arafat relied on clientilism to ensure support from all levels of the ever-increasing PA bureaucracy, as well as from non-PA Palestinians. As Amaney Jamal notes, "Arafat's monopoly on the resources and unchecked power to reward and punish Palestinians allowed him to exert his influence over every Palestinian" (2007: 42). Indeed, Arafat's supporters had access to permits, jobs, and contracts, while his opponents were subject to harassment and sanctions against themselves and their families; thus, "the costs of opposing Arafat were certainly higher than the costs of supporting him" (Amaney Jamal 2007: 42; see also Rubin 1999: 25). Some opportunities and costs were not material, but rather represented the chance to participate (or not) in the development of the Palestinian state, for which many Palestinians had been striving for years (Rubin 1999: 25).

The patronage system provided a "natural seedbed for corruption" (Rubin 1999: 25; see also Amaney Jamal 2007: 42). This corruption not only hindered the internal functioning of PA institutions by inhibiting accountability and transparency but also curbed the ability of the PA to provide necessary services to the general population. As Abu-Nimer writes, "the internal corruption scandals left the Palestinian community trapped between an occupation force and a

symbolic system of authority ineffective in its negotiation policy and blocking other resistance forces from emerging" (2006: 144). Indeed, the lack of good governance in the years following the Oslo Accords extended beyond the PA institutions to inhibit Palestinian civil society, limit local leadership, and curb popular participation in politics.

The PA centralized power not only within the governing institutions but also within Palestinian society itself, by limiting the role of alternative institutions and local committees, many of which had played key roles in the first intifada. Arafat and most other leaders of the PA in 1994 had been in exile in Tunis during the first intifada, and thus had not experienced the democratic processes initiated by the local leadership through the UNLU, popular committees, and civil society organizations. Rather, they saw these local leaders as threats and deliberately attempted to push them aside or at least limit their influence (King 2007, Rubin 1999). As King summarizes, "The main political exploit of the returning exiles became that of neutralizing the potency of such groups, even while lauding their accomplishments, because they stood as the sole force capable of jeopardizing the consolidation of power by the new regime" (2007: 327).

Arafat pressured these local leaders and organizations in multiple ways. Regarding local leaders, he "tried to empty of any political role the political structures established by the local political elite in the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the struggle against occupation" (Amal Jamal 2005: 133). He thus marginalized activist-intellectuals who were leaders during the first intifada, and their respective organizations, replacing them with new institutions led by individuals loyal to him. For example, to ensure that first intifada leader Faisal Husseini did not become a threat, Arafat cut the budget of the Husseini's Orient House and limited Husseini's duties to Jerusalem-related issues (Rubin 1999: 21).

Regarding organizations, the PA sought to have more regulation over NGO affairs. According to Amaney Jamal, soon after its establishment, the PA "began to monitor associational activities, demand a portion of the funding these associations received, and to play a more visible role in daily associational life" (2007: 51). It also limited the independence of these groups by formally requiring them to register through the Ministry of the Interior, and informally establishing patron– client relationships that many NGOs deemed necessary for survival (Amaney Jamal 2007: 54). Meanwhile, the PA sought to limit NGO influence by attempting to supplant their services and constrain NGO agendas. As Parsons notes, the PA "tightened the space available to the NGOs from two sides, marginalizing their role in promotion of the nationalist agenda and supplanting their role in the provision of services through the expansion of the apparatus of the PA" (2005: 178). In these ways, the PA marginalized local leaders, restricted NGOs, and squeezed the public space available to civil society in an attempt to consolidate authority.

Perhaps most important for this study, the PA also repressed popular resistance. As one activist explained, "For the seven years of Oslo, it was like the leadership was giving the people sedatives, and people became content with the promise that everything would be better, and they stopped resisting. So in reality, the PA was shutting up the resistance before the wall" (author interview 2007). According to Parsons, the PA adopted a "mandate for social demobilization" (2005: 175) that it applied to violent and nonviolent activists alike.

This was largely due to the fact that both civil leaders and militant groups posed threats to Arafat's authority, as mentioned above. However, it is also due to the nature of the Oslo Accords, which sought to establish a "Palestinian apparatus to do what the IDF could not: demobilize the resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism in the West Bank and Gaza" (Parsons 2005: 178). Because Israel essentially tasked Arafat personally with maintaining security in the West Bank and Gaza, he could somewhat justify his authoritarian policies, even to opponents,

who recognized the difficult task of “balancing between domestic radicals, Palestinian public opinion, and Israel” (Rubin 1999: 26).

Sirriyeh proposes several reasons to explain the authoritarian nature of the PA under Arafat. Some of these reasons include the desire of the PA to make an impression on the Israelis by suppressing anti-Oslo opposition, the issue of internalized PA insecurity, the “outsider” status of the original PA leadership, the lack of political experience of the PA, and the desire to promote national unity by subordinating divisions within Palestine (2000: 49). However, the PA continued to adopt repressive policies towards popular resistance even after Arafat’s death, and throughout the second intifada. Indeed, under the mandate of “maintaining security,” the PA went so far as to diffuse demonstrations of solidarity with Gazans during the Israeli incursion of December 2008 to January 2009.

Whether because of pressure from Israel, internal corruption, or a combination of both, the PA failed to provide sufficient leadership in guiding the second intifada. According to Parsons, the failings of the PA, including lack of political accountability and transparency, poor governance, and limits on civil society participation, “were nowhere more obvious, or the consequences more disastrous, than in the PA’s inability to confront Israel’s colonization campaign” (2005: 208), beginning with settlement construction in the years following Oslo and continuing with further settlement expansion during the years of the second intifada.

Meanwhile, activists pointed out how the PA’s lack of leadership hindered civil-based resistance in general. As one activist commented, in the second intifada, “leaders didn’t make resisting the occupation a priority, so that blocked our work for several years. Meanwhile, the people are getting more and more lost. There is no vision, no leadership, so people don’t know where Palestine is going” (author interview 2007).

Even when local grassroots activism began taking place independent of the PA, leaders were slow to respond. As another activist explained, “People have lost trust . . . not in nonviolence itself, but in the leadership . . . For example, the other day, [then Minister of Information] Barghouthi said the leadership was ‘pleased’ with the nonviolence efforts. But we don’t want them just to be ‘pleased,’ we want them to be out there with us” (author interview 2007).

Scholars agree, noting that the lack of leadership hindered the development of effective coordination and strategy during the second intifada. As Amal Jamal states:

The Palestinian elite structure contributed very much to the lack of a united Palestinian strategy to face Israeli policies. This lack of a common strategy led both to uncoordinated responses to Israeli provocations and to internal clashes that weakened Palestinian society and its ability to face the overwhelming power utilized by the Israeli army to crush the PA’s infrastructure and other symbols of Palestinian sovereignty.

(2005: 155)

The failure of the Palestinian leadership to coordinate or even support nonviolent resistance thus hindered the national coordination of the struggle.

As Parsons summarizes, the PA sought control over all aspects of resistance through

co-option, demobilization, and the centralization of power . . . Rather than harnessing the mobilization capacities developed during the first intifada and leading resistance to colonization, the PA engineered social control through patronage. The expansion of the PA bureaucracy diminished the political salience of the NGO community—the heart of Palestinian civil society

and a stronghold of the left—through centralizing the provision of services [and] redirecting resources away from the non-state sector.

(2005: 222)

In these ways, the centralization of power, compounded by widespread corruption within the PA, resulted in a system that lacked transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, while limitations on NGOs and activists ultimately constrained opportunities for popular struggle.

While the Fateh-led PA was viewed at best as weak and at worst as “a guarantor of Israeli security” as stipulated by the Oslo Accords (Andoni 2001: 212), Islamic parties saw an increase in support. Groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad capitalized on the perceived illegitimacy of the Fateh-controlled PA by offering alternative organizations with the capacity to confront Israel. As Amal Jamal notes, “the lack of formal political procedures and functional institutions encouraged the opposition to establish its own institutional and political networks in order to compete with the national elite for power” (2005: 122). Indeed, Hamas capitalized on the weakness of the PA under Fateh through their campaign slogan, “Israel says no. The US says no. What will you say?” This slogan not only posited Fateh as a puppet of Israel and the US but also implied that Hamas would bring back a sense of resistance to Palestinian politics, suggesting that even voting for Hamas would be an act against Israeli (and American) oppression. According to my research, it was Hamas’ general framing of resistance over submission, and change over the status quo, that garnered their victory in the 2006 elections, rather than increasing support for Islamic fundamentalism or armed struggle. Hamas also gained support by providing social services to Palestinian communities that the PA had proved unable to deliver.

Tensions between Fateh and Hamas continued to rise during the second intifada, culminating with Hamas’ ousting of Fateh and seizure of control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007. The internal politics fragmented popular resistance by dividing actions, distracting activism from the occupation, and contributing to the lack of leadership, hope, and vision. As Abu-Nimer states, “The failure of the Palestinian leadership (both of the authority and opposition groups) to unify at an early stage of the second intifada resulted in fragmentation and prevented it from launching a systematic campaign against Israeli incursions into Palestiniancontrolled areas” (2006: 143). He goes on to point out that attempts at coordination were more “forum[s] of factions competing for control” (2006: 143) than real efforts at cooperation, reflecting divisions that “played into the hands of the Israeli government” (Amal Jamal 2005: 155), which capitalized on the infighting between Palestinian political movements.

The political fragmentation had a direct effect on activism by frequently limiting participation in actions to certain parties. While these divisions were sometimes overcome in the villages and rural areas, it was evident in large, urban protests that were generally organized by a specific party or movement. Even large-scale actions that included multiple parties, such as the 5 June demonstrations, reflected more a federation of parties than a unified movement, with protesters wearing their parties’ colors and symbols and carrying the parties’ flags. Though most activists agreed that “the struggle should be organized as a popular [national] movement” (author interview 2007), nearly all acknowledged that “right now, society is separated into political factions” that present a “burden” to resistance (author interview 2007).

Though the majority of activists were critical of all political infighting, some especially faulted Hamas for hindering popular resistance. According to one activist, “Most Hamas members don’t participate in mass activities. If we are able to achieve social change from nonviolence, this will decrease the power of Hamas, because they rely so much on armed resistance. It’s a paradox,

because if they use nonviolence, and it works, then they become weaker" (author interview 2007).

Others blamed Hamas for the lack of funding to Palestinian civil society, a result of the international boycott of the PA after the election of Hamas in 2006, which lasted until the establishment of the interim government in July 2007. As the coordinator for the National Committee for Popular Resistance explained, "After the election of Hamas, there was no funding going to the popular committees, so there was not even money for transportation, phones to contact each other, cameras to document abuses, or care for individuals in prison or in the hospital"
(author interview 2007).

Despite these frustrations, most activists, even those who identified as Fateh, Leftist, or independent, felt it was "important to try to push Hamas to participate,"
noting that there were some "positive responses" to civil resistance from the Islamist parties (author interview 2007). Indeed, popular committee members in villages with the most successful episodes of unarmed resistance attributed their achievements to the participation of all the parties. As a leader of the resistance in Budrous explained,

Just the presence of leaders from Hamas and Fateh, as well as the school, the youth club, and the mayor, let people realize the importance of resisting. If it was only the Fateh leaders participating, then you would just have Fateh people participating. This not only reduces the numbers, but also causes tensions between the sides.

(author interview 2007)

Other activists agreed, noting the importance of shifting primary allegiance from individual parties to Palestine, in the spirit of the first intifada. As an organizer in Salfit explained, "We work with both Fateh and Hamas, to see how we can have actions as a Palestinian people. During the first intifada, many sectors worked together with one goal, so we are relying largely on that experience" (author interview 2007).

Others sought alternatives to Fateh and Hamas through third parties such as Leftist movements like the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the PPP (Palestinian People's Party), Hanan Ashrawi's Third Way, and Mustafa Barghouthi's Al-Mubadara. As one activist with the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) commented, "We need to establish a social movement which is open to all Palestinians who believe in democracy, composed of Left-wing parties and popular committees, to function as a strong alternative third political party, distinct from Fateh and Hamas" (author interview 2007). Others sought to be completely independent from politics, not aligning with any party or carrying any flag or banner.

However, several activists acknowledged that the movement could not function independently of the political leadership. As one activist noted, "NGOs and civil society have an important role, but you need the political will. You need both political parties and civil society working together to expand the grassroots activities on the national level" (author interview 2007). The political question has thus further complicated strategizing for resistance, with several activists noting that their nonviolent efforts must now focus on two levels: ending the occupation and improving the internal situation.

In addition to causing splinters amongst those resisting the occupation, the political strife further hindered resistance by shifting activism to the party level. Instead of mobilizing against the occupation, party elites and their members focused their demonstrations and rallies on the

internal situation. As one activist from the northern village of Tubas explained, “The internal situation is so bad that many people have forgotten about the occupation and are focusing on dealing with local issues. People need rehabilitation to make them remember the real cause again” (author interview 2007). A youth organizer with Stop the Wall agreed, commenting, “The struggle has been affected. The parties are fighting to control the PA, but have forgotten their own people” (author interview 2007). Although still using the rhetoric of resistance, many youth activists in particular expressed the feeling that they were being used by the parties for political gain, rather than engaging in true resistance. Indeed, over 43 percent of Palestinian university students surveyed for this study did not identify with any political party, preferring instead to identify as independent (2007).

Disillusionment with the political parties increased cynicism about the PA in general. As one activist stated, “The current leadership is not capable . . . They move back and forth between civil conflict and diplomacy, rather than trying to examine other options” (author interview 2007). The void of leadership has contributed to an overall lack of hope and vision, which has stunted popular resistance. As an activist from Biddu, near Ramallah, commented, “Palestinians have been misled. We don’t know if we can trust the PA or Hamas; we feel Fateh betrayed us. We don’t know what will happen tomorrow” (author interview 2007). The majority of activists noted this uncertainty about the future, which complicated their short-term and long-term strategizing ability, as well as hindering mobilization.

Clearly, the internal political situation in Palestine hindered popular resistance in the West Bank. The civil strife fractured participation in resistance against the occupation, diverted energy and activism from the occupation to the internal situation, and further contributed to feelings of despair, distrust, and uncertainty. The infighting contributed to divisions within civil society and the general public, as well as hurting solidarity between Gaza and the West Bank. Moreover, the PA’s deliberate repression of resistance efforts at the grassroots and civil society levels drastically limited the space for popular struggle, prompting some activists to acknowledge that any future intifada would most likely need to challenge the PA as well as the occupation.

Political constraints from Israel

While many of the challenges faced by activists resulted from internal factors, nearly all activists commented that measures imposed by the occupation have significantly hindered or splintered nonviolent efforts. The centrality of the effect of Israeli policies on Palestinian resistance underscores the role of political constraints on the emergence of social movements. Specific constraints imposed by Israel include physical barriers and restrictions on movement, crackdowns on activists, and continued violence affecting Palestinian civilians.

Israeli security measures that aim to restrict Palestinian movement, including the separation barrier, checkpoints, and roadblocks, have fragmented the movement by limiting contact amongst Palestinians, and between Palestinians and Israelis. Both of these limitations decrease mobilization for and coordination of resistance efforts, by making it difficult for activists to plan and participate in actions, and by restricting the types of actions that can be implemented.

Checkpoints, roadblocks, and construction of the separation wall within the West Bank (in areas near settlements) have localized actions by making it difficult for Palestinians to travel between different cities and villages. As of November 2008, the IDF maintained 63 permanent checkpoints within the West Bank, 49 of which were regularly staffed (B’Tselem 2008). In addition, the IDF maintains flying, or surprise, checkpoints throughout the West Bank, which are temporary, staffed checkpoints set up for several hours and then dismantled, averaging 89 per

week between September 2007 and April 2008, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008). Further restrictions on movement within the West Bank, documented by OCHA in October 2008, included physical barriers such as roadside fences, trenches barring vehicles from crossing, locked entrance gates to villages, and dirt and debris piles blocking roads or entrances to villages, with a monthly average of 537 obstructions documented.

Additionally, as reported by B'Tselem, 430 kilometers of roads within the West Bank were restricted or forbidden to Palestinian traffic as of July 2008.

These measures have severely hindered travel and movement for all Palestinians within the West Bank, including activists, thus contributing to the fragmentation and localization of popular resistance. As the coordinator for the National Committee on Popular Resistance noted, "Resistance [during the second intifada] was remaining isolated and localized because Palestinians couldn't move between cities" (author interview 2007). For example, he pointed out that, although Bil'in, a center of popular resistance, is usually just a short ride from Ramallah, an IDF roadblock restricted movement between the city and the village for almost two years, thus making it difficult both to organize actions and to facilitate participation. Another activist in Bethlehem commented, "People don't leave their areas in Palestine right now. The areas are disconnected, so we can't understand the struggle in different places" (author interview 2007). He noted that the physical separation has hurt Palestinians psychologically as well in terms of their feelings of connectedness, which also hinders mobilization.

In addition to restrictions on movement within the West Bank, Israel's policy of separation, enforced by the separation barrier and checkpoints, has also limited opportunities for nonviolent resistance by reducing contact between the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Palestinians are separated from Israelis by forty permanent, staffed, around-the-clock checkpoints along the Green Line (B'Tselem 2008), and, more recently, by the separation barrier. Construction of the wall commenced in 2002, ranging in form from a 6-to-8-meter wall to an electric fence bordered by trenches up to 20 metres wide. Although there are 87 gates in the separation barrier, only half serve Palestinians, their hours are irregular, and Palestinians wishing to cross must have a special permit (B'Tselem 2008). Despite the ICJ advisory ruling against the legality of the separation barrier on 9 July 2004, 409 kilometers, or 56.6 percent of the wall, had been built by 2007, while 66 kilometers (9.1 percent) were under construction, and 248 kilometers (34.4 percent) were planned for construction (United Nations OCHA 2007).

While the separation barrier has affected Palestinians in the West Bank in numerous ways, it has had a significant impact on popular resistance by limiting contact between Palestinians and Israelis, which is essential for instigating the political jiu-jitsu that makes nonviolent activism effective (Sharp 1973). As one activist from Salfit explained,

The problem is that the Israeli occupation has created a separation, so we need more and more tools and methods to create interactions with Israelis. The apartheid plan is difficult, because we need to make actions, but we're rarely in touch with the military or with Israelis. How can we show this injustice to the world if we can't get the interactions?

(author interview 2007)

The director of an NGO focusing on nonviolent activism and training, agreed:

The biggest challenge is finding opportunities for confrontation. For nonviolence to be

successful, there needs to be direct confrontation with the opposition to expose their use of violence and beatings . . . But there are not many areas left to do this any more. How can we engage in nonviolence when we are living in a prison? If we just demonstrate in circles among ourselves, what will that do?

(author interview 2007)

Clearly, because of the policy of separation, opportunities for strategic nonviolent action are limited, with activism being restricted to contact points such as checkpoints, construction sites of the separation barrier, and villages along the Green Line. This phenomenon has both hindered the widespread growth of nonviolence, and contributed to the localization of existing efforts.

In addition to movement restrictions, Israeli crackdowns on activists have also contributed to the episodic nature of popular resistance. Beatings, detentions, and arrests are commonplace at weekly demonstrations at villages like Bil'in and Um Salamouna and at other actions, though punishments often extend beyond the events themselves, in terms of denial of permits to village residents to access work, school, or hospitals. In addition to denying or confiscating permits, Israel has deported leaders of civil resistance; as one activist noted, "Many nonviolent resistance people have been expelled because Israel perceives us as dangerous, even if we're not in political [militant] work" (author interview 2007).

While activists expressed concern for their own wellbeing, they also explained that the IDF often targets their family members as another tactic of intimidation.
As one activist in the South Bethlehem area recounted,

Recently they broke into my brother's house next door during the night and arrested him, and he is still in jail. They shot one of the panes on his door and said they would keep shooting out the glass unless he came out, then they arrested him. I heard the commotion and was about to go outside, but when I saw them, I stayed hidden. But I would prefer it was me who was arrested, and not my brother.

(author interview 2007)

Activists themselves are often arrested as well, with nearly all those interviewed for this study having spent time in administrative detention or prison, ranging from days to years. These types of crackdowns have contributed to a climate of fear that inhibits popular participation in resistance. As one activist noted, "For a lot of people, it is an issue of fear. They think that if we do anything, we may lose more than we have already lost" (author interview 2007). It is thus difficult for activists to instigate widespread mobilization, leaving the struggle fragmented and localized.

In addition to restrictions on movement and crackdowns on activists, widespread participation in resistance is also limited owing to many Palestinians being preoccupied with the daily struggles imposed by the occupation. As one activist stated,

We realize that, until now, we have sadly failed to form a strong, united popular movement against the wall. But I should point out that the wall is not the only issue for Palestinians right now. There are many issues, including checkpoints, settlements, poverty, imprisonment . . . Many people are depressed or affected by the situation, so the wall is not the only enemy. Most Palestinians are so caught up with their daily problems that it's hard to see the big picture.

(author interview 2007)

A leader of nonviolent resistance in Budrous agreed, noting, “There is a lot of talk right now about nonviolence, but not a lot of action . . . Violent suffering and poverty is stressing and oppressing people” (author interview 2007). Other activists likewise identified the biggest challenge to widespread participation in civil-based resistance to be “the Israeli occupation in the territories” (author interview 2007), the “continued Israeli brutality and the land confiscation” (author interview 2007), and the ongoing “siege, control, humiliation, and accumulating anger” (author interview 2007).

According to Palestinian activists, it is evident that the day-to-day difficulties resulting from the occupation reduce popular participation, either by forcing people to focus on more immediate priorities or by instilling a sense of futility and despair. As many activists noted, the majority of Palestinians don’t have the liberty to engage in a long-term campaign because the situation has made even day-today survival a struggle for many, regardless of location. As one Bethlehem-based activist explained, “It’s hard for people to work for a goal that seems far-off. It’s gotten to a point where most people need to work and are more focused on that. People need to think about food before strategy” (author interview 2007). The former director of Rapprochement, which works throughout the West Bank, agreed, noting that, during the second intifada, “because of the severity of the conditions, the need for survival was so huge that we couldn’t really attract the human resources from the community that we need for civil-based resistance” (author interview 2007).

Combined with physical restrictions on movement and crackdowns and activists, it is clear that the political constraints created by the occupation contribute largely to the fragmentation of popular resistance in the West Bank. Constraints from within the PA, and from factional politics within Palestine, also squeezed the space available for popular collective action. In these ways, Palestinian activists faced a double imposition of political constraints, confronting occupation policies on the one hand and internal corruption and repression on the other hand. The individual and collective influence of these policies created both literal and figurative obstacles to mobilization and action.

8 International constraints
Movement frames

"This is my struggle! This is my freedom!"

Coordinator, Stop the Wall campaign

In addition to organizing weaknesses at the local level and political constraints at the national level, mobilization for civil resistance was also influenced by the international community in terms of the framing of nonviolence put forth during the Oslo period. While the concept of framing is usually used to examine the packaging of an *issue*, I apply the idea here to explore the packaging of nonviolence as a *tactic*.

Specifically, this chapter analyzes the "Oslo effect," or the redefinition and institutionalization of "nonviolence" during the Oslo period. In the years following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, nonviolence became synonymous with dialogue and coexistence programs like the people-to-people initiative, while nonviolent actions became increasingly limited by repression from the PA and the structural and financial constraints of NGOs. The resultant re-framing of nonviolence caused many Palestinians to view nonviolence as a form of accommodation rather than activism.

In particular, for youth who did not have a memory of the use of nonviolent resistance in the first intifada, the Oslo effect redefined nonviolence in such a way as to disassociate it from resistance. In this chapter, I describe the re-definition of nonviolence as linked to the people-to-people strategy, and the institutionalization of nonviolence through the NGO sector. I then discuss how new framings affected public perceptions of nonviolence, and ultimately hindered widespread mobilization during the second intifada.

The negotiations that comprised the Oslo Accords were preceded by a series of dialogues that took place between mid-level Israelis and Palestinians from the 1970s through the early 1990s. These conversations started as clandestine meetings between members on the political margins of both societies, gradually evolving to allow for direct talks between officials from the political center. Finally, with the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993, "the door was opened for a large number of Israelis and Palestinians, including opinion shapers, strategists, policymakers, academics, security officials, economists, civil servants, and politicians alike to begin working together to develop a variety of compromise solutions related to permanent status" (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000: 24).

The DOP first called for the establishment of a people-to-people strategy in Annex 3, in the Protocol on Israeli–Palestinian Co-operation in Economic and Development Programmes, with further guidelines stipulated in Annex VI of the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995. According to the Protocol Concerning Israeli–Palestinian Co-operation Programmes, the two sides were to work to enhance the dialogue and relations between their peoples, expose their publics to the peace process, and foster public engagement and debate to

encourage personal interaction and exchange.[1] The people-to-people strategy thus formed with the goals of “preparing the ground for the signing of an Israeli–Palestinian permanent status deal, creating the necessary conditions for a sustainable peace, and paving the way toward the consolidation of peace” (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000: 23).

Accordingly, Israelis and Palestinians, and sometimes internationals, met throughout the 1990s to discuss issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, economic relations, and security in an effort to imagine possible compromises. As Maoz describes, “meetings ranged from one-time single events to long-term and continuous series of meetings, and from youth encounters to dialogues among schoolteachers, university students, university professors, and other professionals” (2004: 566). Other initiatives included outreach campaigns, promotions of solidarity between Leftist Israeli groups like Peace Now, Bat Shalom, and B’Tselem with Palestinian partners; and cross-border projects involving cooperation through the environmental, agricultural, and business sectors (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000: 24–26). Baskin and Dajani likewise categorize the people-to-people activities in the areas of Track II brainstorming, women’s and shared identity issues, professional meetings, professional trainings, formal education activities, cultural activities, capacity-building trainings, environmental cooperation, joint advocacy groups, religious dialogue, and grassroots dialogue (2006: 91–93).

However, as Hirschfeld and Roling point out, “In preparing a sustainable peace, the creation of compromise solutions and acts of solidarity and outreach are important, yet not enough” (2000: 24). Indeed, in most cases, people-to-people initiatives failed to move beyond talk to developing actual policies or action plans to address economic disparities, social rifts, and political realities. Other limitations included language barriers, elite target groups, lack of sustainability, lack of funding, lack of public exposure and legitimacy, and logistical issues related to increasing violence, restrictions on movement, and the inability to hold regular meetings (Baskin and Dajani 2006: 95–98).

Another significant impediment was the difference between most Israeli and Palestinian participants’ motivations and expectations from the meetings. According to Dajani and Baskin, most Israeli participants believed that “by participating in joint activities with Palestinians they [were] making a real contribution to peace” (2006: 89), thus focusing on cultivating personal relationships and viewing dialogue as an end in itself. In contrast, most Palestinian participants approached the dialogues as spaces to share their narrative, have their suffering affirmed, and work towards ending the occupation and creating a Palestinian state. In this way, they saw the dialogues as a means to an end, and part of a larger political process (Baskin and Dajani 2006: 89). These differences in expectations hindered the success of the dialogues, as perceived by participants from both communities.

Indeed, some argue that dialogues may have had a negative impact on Palestinian participants by perpetuating asymmetric power dynamics (Abu-Nimer 1999). This was partly due to Israeli NGOs’ organizational capacity and access to funds relative to Palestinian NGOs, thus leading to a disproportionate number of Israeli organizations initiating projects, writing proposals, managing implementation, and controlling finances. As Baskin and Dajani note, “this was extremely problematic in developing partnerships. Many Palestinian institutions and individuals noted that many of the joint activities were beginning to resemble already well-established models of asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians” (2006: 95). Meanwhile, as dialogues remained at the surface level and failed to address issues of justice, such meetings started to be perceived by many Palestinians as exercises in normalizing relations rather than working towards any real change, especially as realities on the ground

continued to worsen.[2]

Disillusionment with people-to-people programs and the Oslo Accords in general increased in the late 1990s as dialogue groups continued with the promise of change, while on the ground grievances increased, through the continued expansion of settlements, increased restrictions on Palestinian movement, and worsening economic conditions. According to Hassassian, "the perception quickly grew that the peace process was nothing more than something that legitimized the Israeli occupation, Palestinian Authority corruption, and . . . ultimately Israel's securing control over fundamental Palestinian rights, resources, and properties" (2006: 83).

Meanwhile, organizers, donors, and some participants began conflating the idea of nonviolence with people-to-people dialogues and the peace process in general. While some of the individuals and groups participating in people-to-people initiatives were nonviolent activists, nonviolent resistance is a different method from dialogue, and it has a different aim from the peace process. As Hassassian explains, nonviolent activists more commonly reflect a "pre-established commitment to the national struggle before they have any commitment to what is commonly seen as the peace process" (2006: 72). According to Hassassian, such activists favor a "comprehensive, just solution to the plight of and injustices to the Palestinian people," which the Oslo peace process did not offer (2006: 72).

Nevertheless, a discourse emerged under Oslo that linked nonviolence with notions of peace, coexistence, dialogue, toleration, forgiveness, and reconciliation. While these concepts may complement a principled approach to nonviolence, they were distinct from the pragmatic nonviolent resistance practiced by Palestinians in the first intifada. However, the international community's articulation of a donor agenda collectively promoting "peace, tolerance, and *non violence* [through] practical activities which will promote communication and understanding by demonstrating the advantages of working together for mutual benefit" (EU Partnership for Peace Programme 2006; emphasis added) conflated the idea of nonviolence with coexistence, appearing to some Palestinians as advocating normalization of relations with Israel and acceptance of the occupation. In this way, the concept of nonviolence was re-framed under Oslo from one of struggle and resistance to one of accommodation and pacification.

Regardless of the intentions of the Oslo Accords in general, and the people-to-people initiative in particular, the by-product was the institutionalization of nonviolence through NGOs, and the redefinition of nonviolence by western agendas, or at least the perception thereof. This section discusses how Oslo transformed the civil society sector financially, programmatically, and structurally, resulting in new approaches to nonviolence that emphasized the peace process over activism. First I examine the impact of donor-driven agendas on NGO articulation of nonviolence, then I discuss the "NGO-ization" of nonviolence on the structural level.

As Amaney Jamal states, "After Oslo, donors almost exclusively funded associations and projects that were linked to or supportive of the goals of the Accords. Those who did not wholeheartedly support Oslo found it difficult to solicit funds" (2007: 69). Funding was poured into dialogue groups, coexistence projects, and people-to-people initiatives, with the European Union alone channeling $5 to $10 million per year into organizations promoting dialogue and "nonviolence,"[3] supporting an average of 15 programs each year with contributions of $50,000 to $500,000. Other major funders included European governments, primarily the Norwegian, Swedish, Dutch, and Belgian governments, the American and Canadian governments, the Palestinian Centre for Peace, and philanthropic organizations such as the Charles Bronfman, Nathan Cummings, and Dorot and Yad Nadiv Foundations (Hirschfeld and Roling 2000: 26).

As Amaney Jamal notes, “Most donor projects aimed to secure one objective— the success of the peace process with Israel . . . None of the donor programs were aimed at addressing the occupation or the political difficulties caused by that Occupation” (2007: 70–73). Accordingly, Palestinian NGOs competing for funds and struggling for survival increasingly adopted the language of nonviolence as dialogue, and moved away from activities related to activism or resistance. This resulted in a shift away from civil-based resistance in the short term, and a re-framing of nonviolence in the long term. Both phenomena were evident in the second intifada, with the limited participation of nonviolent resistance on the one hand, and the public misperception of nonviolence as normalization on the other hand.

The re-framing of nonviolence during the Oslo period was due in part to the structural shift of civil society groups from grassroots associations to formal organizations. The shifting of nonviolence from a grassroots movement to an NGO-based program objective was problematic in that it institutionalized nonviolence in several ways. First, it changed the very nature of civil society organizations from community-based activist groups to organizations focused on the peace process. As Hassassian notes,

The formation of Palestinian NGOs can generally be divided into two different groups: those that were started before or during the first intifada and those that began after its ending, generally with the signing of the Oslo Accords. In the former category, organizations tended to be characterized by a sense of strong ideology and activism . . . The group of organizations that began after the Oslo process . . . were a function of the political process, namely the Oslo Accords.

(2006: 68–69)

Indeed, pre-Oslo organizations “tended to be characterized by a sense of strong ideology and activism,” and were inclined to “fight for the right of Palestinians and have that message heard by a foreign audience,” regardless of the political climate (Hassassian 2006: 68–69), while post-Oslo organizations, influenced largely by donor agendas, were more focused on furthering the peace process.

Despite their varied missions and activities, NGOs in both groups tended to identify themselves as promoting nonviolence.

Second, the NGO-ization of nonviolence replaced the prior spirit of voluntarism and activism associated with nonviolence with professional positions. As one longtime activist observed, “There has been a big change in the Palestinian community, a change in the spirit of voluntary work and social efforts and struggling. The NGOs have affected the spirit a lot, by making resistance a profession, but you can’t make a revolution this way” (author interview 2007). Likewise, another activist explained, “NGOs tend to institutionalize activism, but you can’t be creative through the institution. Most NGOs have employees, and employed people just follow the procedure and focus on their own work. But if you’re talking about a movement, you’re talking about volunteer work” (author interview 2007). Indeed, the Oslo period saw a shift of nonviolence from the popular to the organizational level, which ultimately limited popular participation in nonviolence in terms of both numbers and sectors of society, with most NGO employees representing the educated, urban sector.

Third, because of their organizational structure, the ways in which NGOs approached nonviolence under Oslo were less about practical actions and more about sessions and trainings. As one activist explained, “Everyone was talking about peace, but no one was really raising

awareness or using nonviolence . . . We shouldn't be approaching nonviolence through trainings in five-star hotels. Instead, we must go to the people, and go to the action" (author interview 2007). Another agreed, noting, "When I see NGOs spending money to hold a workshop in a fancy hotel, this makes no sense to me. Why not hold a workshop on the land, or in public places? They should do it practically, so they can invest in other ways" (author interview 2007). In other words, the institutionalization, or "NGO-ization" of nonviolence made the concept seem to be more about talk than action.

Finally, the NGO-ization of nonviolence also resulted in the development of a nonviolence "market" in Palestine. As one activist noted, "Many people were just doing nonviolence for the money, and were turning it into a business. Now many Palestinian people have a bad image of nonviolence, because they feel that money drives it" (author interview 2007). To be sure, the competition over funds for nonviolence made it into a commodity of sorts.

The reliance on western trainers and donors alike resulted in many Palestinians assuming that nonviolence was a western construct designed to subdue them. As the breakdown of the peace process became apparent in the late 1990s, many Palestinians became convinced that "nonviolence" was a western-imposed concept to promote submission and normalization, in complete contrast to resistance. Mahmoud's perception of "nonviolence" under Oslo reflected the opinions of many Palestinians who spoke with me:

Nonviolence has come at the wrong time and the wrong place, brought by the international community. After September 11, the terrorism issue divided the world into terrorists and non-terrorists, and the world classified Palestinians as terrorists. So now it's like the world wants to make the Palestinian "terrorists" not be violent anymore. But I don't want to use this word, "nonviolence." Go to Israel and teach them nonviolence. We have been using nonviolence for years. At least be fair! By focusing nonviolence trainings on us, it makes us seem worse than the victimizers! How dare they say that we need to be nonviolent? F— them! This is my struggle! This is my freedom!
I know how to fight for it! I respect our nonviolent history, but the way they are talking about it is not acceptable now.

(author interview 2007)

Many activists agreed that nonviolence was redefined during the Oslo period in such a way that it came to be associated with business over activism, talk over action, and an international agenda of subjugation. As Majdi summarized,

Nonviolence itself is natural in Palestine . . . but the word "nonviolence" has been a term that the EU [and other western donors] has been using in the past few years to fund certain projects. People knew about nonviolence before these projects, but not the word. So now people think of nonviolence as part of the international agenda. They say, "The world doesn't want us to resist, so why should we think that nonviolence has anything to do with resistance if they are advocating it now?"

(author interview 2007)

As a result, nearly all activists noted that, in addition to opposition from the occupation, they also face criticism from other Palestinians "saying that our efforts are useless, that we won't

achieve anything, or sometimes that we are spies with Israel" (author interview 2007). Nearly all activists attributed movement fragmentation to the popular misconception of nonviolence as passivity or normalization, due largely to NGO portrayals of nonviolence as dialogue or peacebuilding. As one activist explained, many "think nonviolence means the desire not to resist, just sitting back, or relying on dialogue and negotiations. But this is not what nonviolence means" (author interview 2007). Another activist also noted, "A lot of people don't understand what nonviolence is. It often seems to people like normalization, or being passive, or giving up your rights, or living with what's there. It's not about that at all, but it's hard to convince people" (author interview 2007). An activist from Tulkarem likewise commented, "Some people think nonviolence is a concept from America that was created to quell resistance" (author interview 2007).

Several activists also attributed misunderstandings of nonviolence to the association of the concept to western theories. According to one activist, this is often due to NGO trainings that "generally connect nonviolence to the West by speaking about Martin Luther King, Gandhi, and Gene Sharp" (author interview 2007), rather than grounding nonviolence in Palestinian history. Although there is a rich tradition of nonviolence in Palestine, many NGOs removed nonviolence from its local context. As one trainer explained, "Many people working in nonviolence were basing it on 'projects' and 'models.' But nonviolence must come from within the community and be connected to the local people. We need Palestinians, not Americans, leading nonviolence" (author interview 2007).

While this redefinition made older activists more deliberate in their choice of words regarding nonviolence, the strong association of nonviolence with the first intifada overrode the negative image of nonviolence put forth under Oslo, so that they were more critical of how nonviolence was presented than of nonviolence itself. Although many older activists chose to use terms like "popular resistance" or "civil-based resistance" rather than "nonviolence," most still associated nonviolence with the first intifada's spirit of community activism.

In contrast, youth with no memory of the use of nonviolence in the first intifada came to identify the concept with its post-Oslo definition. Thus, rather than viewing nonviolence as a form of national struggle, many youth associated the concept with coexistence and normalization with Israel. As one activist commented, "When I discuss nonviolence with youth, there is just silence. They need to find that special energy, and feel it in their hearts" (author interview 2007). Yet it is difficult for youth to feel the same passion or excitement for nonviolence when their experience with the term is more through talk than action. As Alex asserted, "The first intifada emerged from the belief that we could achieve something. Now, we *talk* about nonviolent resistance, but when it is just through education, it's not the same. People may be educated about it, but still not believe it in their hearts" (author interview 2007).

To be sure, most older activists experienced and participated in nonviolence before studying it, thus engaging in the practice first and grounding it in theory later. In contrast, most youth were exposed to a theory of nonviolence that focused primarily on peacebuilding and dialogue, rather than resistance. This representation of nonviolence shifted its meaning away from activism, and thus may have alienated youth from rather than attracting them to the practice of nonviolence. To be sure, when asked about their participation in nonviolent actions, youth were less likely to identify with nonviolence in general (59.3 percent) than they were to report participation in specific unarmed tactics, such as demonstrations (71.3 percent). Taking a closer look at this shift, 37.4 percent of youth who

claimed in the survey that they had not participated in nonviolent resistance did report taking part in a demonstration. This seeming contradiction indicates that even youth who engage in unarmed tactics like demonstrations do not necessarily view their actions as forms of "nonviolence."

The relationship between framings of nonviolence and youth action mobilization in Palestine reflect the theories of Snow and Benford (1992) on master frames and cycles of protest (see also Tarrow 1998). As Gamson (1995: 1992) reminds us, collective action frames both shape and are shaped by the movement(s), and typically consist of three components: (1) injustice frames, referring to moral indignation in response to a political situation or suffering; (2) agency frames, referring to the belief that it is possible to create effective change through collective action; and (3) identity frames, referring to a defined "we" in opposition to an identifiable "they" with different interests (Gamson 1995: 90). As Gamson notes, while injustice frames focus on the packaging of the *issue*, the agency and identity frames are concerned with the framing of the *movement* (1995), thus including tactical approaches, or nonviolence specifically in this study.

As Gamson summarizes, the injustice frame refers to the "moral indignation expressed in . . . political consciousness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgment about what is equitable, but is what cognitive psychologists call a 'hot cognition'—one that is laden with emotion" (1995: 90). Gamson adds that effective injustice frames also require the identification of a recognizable other responsible for the harm or suffering. In the case of Palestine, first intifada leaders drew on the injustices imposed by the occupation to develop a master frame based on the principle of national Palestinian independence through ending the occupation. In accordance with Gamson's definition, Palestinian grievances regarding the Israeli occupation were emotionally "hot" and easily attributable to the state of Israel. Furthermore, this injustice frame reflected empirical credibility (evidential basis), experiential commensurability (individual proximity), and narrative fidelity (ideational fit) (Snow and Benford 1992, 1988), in that nearly all Palestinians had suffered to some extent because of the occupation, making it an inherent part of Palestinian discourse. Thus, the issue/injustice frame had resonant mobilizing potency that was manifest in broad actual mobilization in the first intifada, and potential mobilization in the second intifada.

The differences in mobilization between the two intifadas can largely be explained by the fact that, despite resonant *issue* frames, the absence of effective *movement* frames limited actual participation, especially in regards to youth. As noted above, movement frames consist of both agency and identity components, both of which are relevant in the case of Palestine. As Gamson states, agency refers to "the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action"; thus, agency frames "empower people by defining them as potential agents of their own history" (1995: 90). In the first intifada, the UNLU and popular committees managed to imbue the public with this sense of collective agency, resulting in widespread action mobilization. However, when the first intifada failed to result in Palestinian independence or the end of the occupation, and, moreover, when the anticipated changes promised under the Oslo Accords failed to translate into realities on the ground, the sense of collective efficacy proved much harder to develop in the second intifada. As Gamson asserts, "As long as history making is centralized and hierarchical, with very little opportunity for people to participate in any of the institutions that set the conditions of their daily lives," they will inevitably feel powerless (1995, 95). This was indeed the case in Palestine after Oslo, as first intifada activists became increasingly disillusioned with both the continuation of the occupation and the ineptitude of the PA.

For this study, it is helpful to examine agency frames in Palestine in the specific context of

nonviolent tactics. As Snow and Benford state, “Tactical innovation is spawned in part by the emergence of new master frames” (1992: 146).

This was indeed the case in the first intifada, in which, in ways similar to the American civil rights movement (McAdam 1996b; Snow and Benford 1992), movement leaders adopted nonviolent strategies in congruence with their master frame. For resistance leaders, nonviolence allowed for widespread participation, which complemented the master frame component of Palestinian nationalism.

Moreover, nonviolence allowed for the juxtaposition of the popular movement set against Israel’s powerful military force, thus reinforcing the master frame of an oppressed people struggling for freedom from an aggressive occupier, reminiscent of a David and Goliath dichotomy (invoked by Israel in the past).

In this way, like King and the SCLC in Birmingham, the Palestinian UNLU sought to court violence while restraining violence, and thus frame events in the first intifada as “highly dramatic confrontations between a ‘good’ movement and an ‘evil’ system” (McAdam 1996b: 349).

However, the framing of nonviolent tactics as innovative and radical in the first intifada was largely replaced in the second intifada by the framing of nonviolence as institutionalized “peacemaking” under Oslo. Indeed, the redefinition of nonviolence as peacebuilding (rather than resistance) by international organizations and western-funded NGOs during the Oslo period created a “structural impediment to collective agency” by incorporating nonviolence in a political culture that, from the view of many Palestinians, “operates to produce quiescence and passivity” (Gamson 1995: 95). Combined with the perceived “failure” of nonviolent tactics in the first intifada, and the emergence of competing frames[4] advocating for armed resistance, nonviolence came to be seen by many as diminishing, rather than enhancing, agency and empowerment. Thus, even though injustice/issue frames remained consistently relevant, the lack of resonance of nonviolent movement frames in general, and agency frames in particular, hindered action mobilization.

This chapter has illustrated how framing nonviolence in the context of dialogue and peacebuilding under Oslo ultimately led to misperceptions of nonviolence as accommodation of the occupation rather than resistance. Following the signing of the DOP in 1993, civil society organizations in both communities initiated countless dialogue groups and joint activities under Oslo’s people-to-people mandate, supported largely by western governments and foundations. The majority of donors were firmly committed to the peace process outlined by Oslo, and promoted an agenda of tolerance, coexistence, and reconciliation, often conflating “nonviolence” with those ideals. NGOs in the region adapted their programs accordingly, increasingly focusing on conflict resolution and dialogue, while essentially co-opting the term “nonviolence” to describe their activities.

While dialogue and reconciliation initiatives may be successful in a post-conflict situation, the realities of the conflict during the Oslo period, combined with programmatic and logistical challenges, ultimately made both communities disillusioned with the people-to-people initiatives, and joint activities declined rapidly with the start of the second intifada. However, the legacy of these failed attempts at “nonviolence” carried over into the second intifada, Thus, attempts to mobilize for nonviolent action during the second intifada were hindered by these skewed perceptions of nonviolence, especially in terms of youth who had no memory of the use of nonviolent tactics in the first intifada. For these youth, the ideational frame of the Palestinian national movement remained the same, but the tactical frame itself appeared to contradict, rather than support, popular struggle.

9 Conclusion

This study began with the question, to what extent does a space exist for the (re)emergence of a widespread civil resistance movement in Palestine?
Specifically, I was interested in understanding why, despite episodes of popular resistance, the second intifada never realized the mass mobilization for popular struggle witnessed in the first intifada, even as the scope of grievances expanded and intensified. To understand this phenomenon, I have (1) inventoried the types of resistance that were evident in Palestine during the second intifada; (2) examined youth attitudes towards different forms of popular struggle; (3) analyzed sources of fragmentation and barriers to widespread mobilization, in terms of resource mobilization challenges, political constraints, and ineffective movement framings; and (4) used an identity-based approach to analyze the contextual mechanisms informing individual and collective participation in activism.

Using a social movements theoretical framework, I have concluded that, while *potential* mobilization for civil resistance in Palestine has remained high, *action* mobilization has been fragmented by the interaction of ineffective organizational structures, political constraints and misapplied movement framings of nonviolence during the post-Oslo period. Specifically, the second intifada saw the increasing institutionalization NGOs and political parties, repression of resistance from both the PA and Israel, and the shifting meaning of nonviolence from activism to accommodation. Space exists for the re-emergence of a widespread civil movement, but it depends largely on reclaiming a space for popular struggle in the post-Oslo context, and redefining nonviolence as civil resistance, rather than peacebuilding. Indeed, many activists are already working to relocate activism at the grassroots level, ground civil resistance in local histories and traditions, and re-frame nonviolence as strategic action.

Recommendations from local activists

One of the key steps identified by activists for re-defining nonviolence is to shift the primary coordination of nonviolence from the NGOs to the grassroots level.
This shift started to take place during the second intifada, somewhat ironically in response to the construction of the separation barrier, as villages had to rely on local CBOs, village councils, and popular committees to deal with the issues created by the wall. While NGOs can still play supportive roles in the development, implementation, and dissemination of popular campaigns, most activists agree that the crux of the leadership should come from the local level. To be sure, some of the most successful episodes of civil resistance during the second intifada emerged from local, grassroots activism, as seen in the villages of Tubas in the north; Bil’in, Biddu, and Budrous near Ramallah; Umm Salamouna and the surrounding villages south of Bethlehem, and Al-Tawani, Susya, and other villages in the South Hebron Hills.

Indeed, activists from all of these villages largely attributed their relative success in mobilizing their communities to the grassroots organization of their struggle. While some received support

from Palestinian NGOs such as PARC, Ma'an, Holy Land Trust, and PCR, as well as support from Israeli groups such as Anarchists Against the Wall and Ta'ayush, the campaigns were locally led and initiated. This local leadership, particularly in the form of the popular committees, proved to be especially effective in overcoming some of the challenges contributing to fragmentation at the NGO level.

First, the fact that the popular committees operated on a volunteer basis imbued them with a spirit of activism that was lacking in the professionalized NGOs. This voluntarism assuaged concerns about corruption or misuse of funds associated with NGOs, as well as cynicism regarding NGOs making nonviolence into a business. Furthermore, the voluntary aspect of the popular committees helped strengthen communities by setting examples of service and civic engagement.

Second, the fact that popular committees were composed of local leaders established a sense of trust that was absent with outside NGO "nonviolence trainers," who were often from different socioeconomic classes, educational backgrounds, or regions, if not countries. According to Abu Iyad in Budrous, successful mobilization depended largely on the "trust between the people and the coordinators of the demonstrations" (author interview 2007). Abu Iyad's comment also reflects how local leaders in the popular committees were often able to overcome some of the political divisions that were typically evident in NGO affiliations, managing to involve leaders from various parties and movements.

Finally, the popular committees were committed to action. By being distinct from the NGO structure, the trainings and conferences associated with nonviolence at that level were eschewed in favor of direct action, allowing notions of nonviolence to emerge in practice rather than theory. In addition, these actions addressed specific issues facing the community, thus reflecting a local agenda of resistance over the (perceived) international agenda of submission or normalization. The revival of the popular committees, which echo the first intifada in both spirit and practice, thus represents a unique opportunity to shift the core of resistance from the institutionalized sphere of NGOs to the activist realm of grassroots communities. NGOs may still play a major role in supporting local committees and publicizing nonviolence both inside and outside Palestine, but most activists maintain that increased reliance on popular committees will help to realign nonviolence with resistance, while also helping to overcome other issues of fragmentation.

Other activists noted that relating nonviolent resistance to Palestinian history may also contribute to the re-association of nonviolence with the national activist identity. Instead of relying on NGO-sponsored trainings focusing on abstract theories and western examples of nonviolence, these activists recommend taking a popular education approach to teaching about nonviolence by engaging youth in the tradition of nonviolence in Palestine. From this perspective, if one of the reasons that youth have a difficult time conceptualizing nonviolence as activism is because they lack a memory of times when nonviolent methods were employed for resistance, then exposing them to past and recent examples of Palestinian nonviolent struggle may offer a natural way of overcoming that disconnection.

Although many NGOs were committed to "nonviolence education" under Oslo, those trainings often focused more on peacebuilding and dialogue than on resistance, while others emphasized the use of nonviolence in daily life rather than nonviolence as a strategy for challenging the occupation. While these approaches to nonviolence may be valuable in their own ways, they did not link nonviolence to resistance. As Mahmoud commented, "Most organizations do s—t for programs . . . There are hundreds of youth organizations, and, if they would do political work,

the youth would create a revolution. But the money changes the focus to normalization" (author interview 2007).

Meanwhile, trainings that did include at least some aspect of nonviolence as activism often focused on theories developed by outside scholars, such as Gene Sharp, and activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela.

While many local activists found these ideas and examples useful, they noted the importance of linking those outside sources to the Palestinian context, especially when engaging youth. Popular education, or learning for social change, is one approach cited by several activists to help youth re-conceptualize nonviolence as activism by raising their consciousness of episodes of nonviolent resistance in Palestinian history. As Ahmed, the youth coordinator for Stop the Wall, commented, "If we want to educate youth . . . we should teach them about the history of the struggle, about the leaders, and about why we have spent our lives fighting" (author interview 2007). Ahmed thus designed a program for youth that consists of not only learning about the history of Palestinian struggle through presentations but actually taking trips throughout the West Bank to talk to activists, visit sites of past struggles, and view the effects of current measures like the separation barrier. According to Mahmoud,

> *They came back very angry . . . you feel like something exploded in them.*
> *They were in another world; they couldn't compare themselves afterwards to the way they were before they participated. The youth need this. When you focus on their history and their ancestors, and you say, "This is your responsibility," it opens their eyes.*
> *(author interview 2007)*

Indeed, although survey data indicates that the majority of youth (67.2 percent) are aware of a tradition of popular resistance in Palestine, many may not be aware of the specific ways in which civil resistance has been used, or the ways in which past episodes relate to their current context.

Popular education thus offers an approach to teaching youth about civil resistance in a way that is engaging and inspires action and mobilization. Perhaps one of the keys to popular education, in addition to grounding the substance in local content, is facilitating that knowledge through respected leaders. As one nonviolence trainer commented, "My political background is helpful when I speak about nonviolence; I was in prison, I was shot by Israeli soldiers, I was wanted for two years. So people know that I am not just talking about nonviolence for the fun of it. They know it is something I believe in, and they know my history" (author interview 2007). Indeed, the majority of activists, most of whom had a reputation of resistance based on previous activism, time spent in prison, or physical injury, stated that their activist identity was a key element in their work regarding nonviolence. According to these activists, their legacy of resistance work gave them a level of legitimacy that international trainers and NGO professionals were lacking. They thus noted that it is important for popular education initiatives to be conducted by respected activists in the community to further reinforce the link between nonviolence and resistance.

Perhaps the most important challenge for activists is to re-frame nonviolence in the context of civil resistance, distinct from normalization or passivity. Activists are already taking steps to help youth re-conceptualize nonviolence in this way, primarily by eschewing the term "nonviolence" in favor of "popular resistance" or "civil-based resistance" (CBR). However, activists are further helping youth locate nonviolence within the sphere of resistance by emphasizing its allowance for increased engagement, and by presenting it as a pragmatic option rather than a principled

mandate.

First, activists are emphasizing that civil resistance allows for much greater popular involvement. One activist used a series of concentric circles to illustrate this phenomenon, noting, “Just a very small percentage of the population will be willing to be suicide bombers or martyrs. Just slightly more will be willing to use guns. Then maybe using stones will bring slightly more. But with nonviolent resistance . . . every person in the society can participate” (author interview 2007). Zeinab made a similar point by comparing the first and second intifadas:

The problem with the second intifada was that it was highly militarized. Usually with such a high level of militarization in a revolution, the majority of the population will not participate because not everyone is ready to engage in a military armed conflict. So you are left with a small number of people fighting with arms, and you isolate the majority of the public who have a stake in the resistance movement.

(author interview 2007)

Activists are already emphasizing these points in their mobilization efforts, especially with youth who claim they want to engage in resistance, by illustrat- ing that strategic nonviolence creates rather than negates opportunities for activism.

Re-framing nonviolence in accordance with an activist identity will not be automatic, but activists are already facilitating this process by re-focusing activism at the grassroots level, grounding popular struggle in Palestinian history, and emphasizing strategic nonviolence as a tactic allowing for increased engagement in resistance. In these ways, local activists are already attempting to redefine nonviolence and engage community members, thus furthering mobilization and participation in some contexts.

A greater challenge may be in creating a viable space for civil resistance with the double pressure of political constraints from both Israel and the PA. Some local activists are seeking to address these issues by adopting a human rights approach, using international law both to articulate grievances and claim rights of resistance.

Others are attempting to use media to develop new spaces for activism, while also calling Palestinian, Israeli, and international attention to rights issues. However, the extent to which activists will be able to challenge dual systems of political constraints remains to be seen.

Contributions

This study is one of the first to provide an in-depth analysis of civil resistance in Palestine in the second intifada. It thus offers unique contributions to scholars and practitioners alike, both inside and outside Palestine. Popular struggle in Palestine was overshadowed by militant acts of resistance, such as suicide bombings and rocket attacks, since the inception of the second intifada. Policy towards Palestine has largely focused on responding to these acts and the groups that conduct them, and both the academic literature and mainstream media have focused almost exclusively on violent resistance. While these studies are undoubtedly important, it is imperative for theorists and practitioners alike to recognize the widespread acts of unarmed resistance that also occurred, and are occurring, and explore the potential of civil-based activism as an alternative framework for popular participation in Palestine.

In terms of social movement theory, this study has expanded the notion of framing from its

usual ideational basis to apply to tactics as well, reflecting the interaction of both the issue and movement aspects of collective action frames.

The study has also created new links between the social movement and nonviolence literatures, which are often studied separately in the sociology and peace studies fields, respectively.

Regarding application, it is hoped that the findings from this study are useful to activists, practitioners, and policymakers. By identifying episodes of successful resistance and analyzing sources of fragmentation and localization, I hope that this research provides a constructive assessment of civil resistance in the current context. Such knowledge can inform the interventions of conflict resolution practitioners, community activists, and policymakers by providing insight into how perceptions of nonviolence are created, maintained, and challenged, and how such perceptions affect participation. Furthermore, I hope that enhanced understanding of mechanisms affecting popular attitudes towards both violence and nonviolence, as well as more nuanced understandings of how Palestinians define those terms, will assist politicians and social scientists in examining the implications of policy decisions that are based on assumptions of widespread Palestinian support in general, and youth support in particular, for militant resistance.

The research has implications beyond Palestine as well, as its findings can be applied to other conflicts and struggles for self-determination in which non-state actors are employing both armed and unarmed resistance. The study challenges the linear assumption that conflicts escalate from nonviolent to violent tactics by illustrating that community-based resistance occurred concurrently with militant resistance during the second intifada, and by showing that both civilians and former militants have utilized unarmed tactics. This finding can be useful to both theorists and policymakers by suggesting that popular movements can emerge even in the midst of militant violence, and indicating that while violence can beget violence, sustained armed resistance without substantive achievements can also inspire alternative approaches of struggle.

Finally, it is hoped that this book contributes to expanding interest in civil resistance in the second intifada. Some themes briefly discussed in this study may inspire more in-depth research on subsets of actors in civil resistance (such as prisoners, women, and refugee populations), tactics used (such as indirect activism), and outcomes of popular campaigns (in terms of short-term and long-term effects).

This book has aimed to provide students, scholars, activists, practitioners, and mainstream readers with an introduction to the dynamics of civil resistance during the second intifada. On the one hand, I have shown that unarmed resistance did take place throughout the second intifada, and continues to occur today. On the other hand, I have shown how civil resistance actions failed to become a veritable widespread movement, especially when compared to the mass mobilization of the early years of the first intifada. Using a social movements approach, I attributed this phenomenon to several factors that emerged during the post-Oslo period, including the institutionalization of mobilizing organizations (namely NGOs and political parties), constraints from both the PA and Israel, and the re-framing of nonviolence outside the context of resistance. The future trajectory of civil resistance in Palestine is uncertain, but I hope that this study has indicated the importance and relevance of unarmed struggle in the pursuit of a just peace in the region.

Appendix 1
Methodology and research design

Scope of fieldwork

All fieldwork was conducted in East Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Palestinian Territories. Gaza was not included as part of the domain of study for several reasons. First, I anticipated logistical problems with attempting to enter Gaza. At the time of the research, all individuals wishing to travel to Gaza were required to apply for special permission from the Israeli government, which usually granted permits only to international journalists and humanitarian aid workers, and even those requests were often denied.

Second, in addition to logistical reasons, the conflict dynamics in Gaza during the time of research became increasingly intense. The situation was already difficult in the summer of 2006, when Hamas was launching rockets from Gaza into Israel, and Israel was conducting air strikes and incursions into Gaza. However, the internal situation further deteriorated over the following year as factional fighting within Gaza intensified, culminating with Hamas' expulsion of Fateh forces in June 2007.

Third, in corresponding with friends and colleagues in Gaza, it was clear that the political, economic, and social realities in Gaza were becoming increasingly distinct from the West Bank, a view that was shared by interviewees in the West Bank. Thus, research conducted in Gaza would have had a different context and content from that conducted in the West Bank. While I believe research on popular resistance in Gaza to be important and, indeed, necessary, such research is beyond the scope of this study. It will however be a possible and probable follow-up to the current study.

I also decided not to extend my research to Palestinians living in Israel. Unlike Palestinians living in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, most Palestinian-Israelis are citizens of the State of Israel and experience a different lived reality from Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Again, my decision to not include these Palestinians in the study does not in any way discount their own challenges, but rather recognizes the uniqueness of their experiences. As with Gaza, I anticipate future research with interviews and surveys with this population, but their inclusion was not within the scope of this study.

Data collection

Data collection was based on a mixed methodology approach, including interviews, surveys, and participant observation.

Interviews

Data collection was based primarily on narrative research and semi-structured interviews.

Participants

A total of 88 interviews were conducted between May 2005 and August 2007, with 61 interviews conducted during the main fieldwork period of March–August 2007, 19 interviews conducted between May and August 2006, and eight interviews conducted between May and July 2005. Informal follow-up interviews were conducted in the summers of 2008 and 2009. The diversity of participants[1] in terms of geographic location, profession, gender, religion, age, political affiliation, and socioeconomic class, is reflective of the West Bank population itself, and was thus considered an asset to the research.

The majority of the interviews were conducted with male participants, and were conducted in urban settings or large villages, in accordance with the high number of participants from those demographics. In regards to gender, although the study aimed for balance, both male and female participants noted that women's participation in popular resistance was limited, a statement verified by my own observations at events, conferences, and demonstrations. There are many possible reasons for this trend, one simply being the fact that many women's domestic responsibilities limit the time available to them to participate in actions. In addition, many actions are coordinated with the Friday prayer, which is a predominantly male gathering. The research shifted from being primarily NGO-based to being more focused on grassroots popular resistance. This shift reflected not only my evolving interests but also my level of access, as well as the concentration of activist efforts.

The interview process

In each stage of administration, the interviews began with a verbal assent agreement. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at American University waived written consent (and parental consent for minors), acknowledging the possible risk that participants might face from (1) Israeli security officials seeking to minimize resistance activities, and (2) Palestinian extremists who might view nonviolence initiatives as normalization or collaboration with Israel. Thus, I began each interview by introducing myself and explaining the purpose of the research. Participants were told that their participation was voluntary, and that they could end the interview at any time.

Participants were also asked if they preferred to conduct the interview in Arabic or English. The majority of the interviews were conducted in English. The conversations that were conducted in Arabic were translated during the interviews by native Palestinian Arabic speakers. Several interviews were conducted by myself in Arabic, or in a mix of Arabic and English (me asking questions in Arabic, and the participant responding in English).

I also asked participants for their permission to record the interview on a digital voice recorder, and/or take notes during the interview. All recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim, except for slight changes to ensure comprehensibility, usually to correct language errors. Interviews documented using written notes were also transcribed, and were close to verbatim when compared with audio transcripts.

I also recorded notes in the transcripts of different observations made during the interviews, including participant mannerisms, speech, and appearance. Transcripts were completed as soon as possible after each interview, usually the same day, to ensure that interviewee statements and interviewer observations were as accurate as possible.

I deliberately avoided a standardized interview protocol, both to accommodate the diversity of the participants and their experiences, and to foster a more open and comfortable dynamic. I thus adopted a semi-structured interview format (sometimes referred to as a focused interview approach), in which the interviewer establishes the focus for the interview, but the actual content

and order of the questions remains flexible. The approach uses open-ended questions, some of which are prepared before the interview, and others that emerge during the conversation. In accordance with this model, I developed a standard list of prepared questions, but the wording, order, and content of questions varied between interviews.

The semi-structured interview approach is useful for understanding the individual experiences and opinions of diverse interviewees, while also allowing for comparisons and generalizations between participants. I chose this approach primarily to maximize the validity of participants' responses, as the semi-structured model allows interviewees to speak in depth about difficult subjects and experiences without pre-direction from the researcher, and allows the interviewer to ask for further explanation or clarification on complex issues. The conversational dynamic also establishes a positive rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee, fostering a safer space for revealing emotions, past experiences, and controversial opinions. For example, the dynamic allowed me to spend hours with different activists, often in their homes, and established a level of trust that enabled them to share personal accounts of former militant activities, abuses sustained in prison, and losses of friends and family members to violence.

The lack of standardization can be considered a limitation of the semi-structured approach, since interviews are rarely, if ever, conducted the same way twice. Indeed, even in the rare instances when the same questions are covered, the order and wording of the questions usually vary, allegedly making it more difficult to cross-analyze responses or generalize findings. However, while I can see how the variation in format and content might be a limitation in some studies, I argue that this diversity was both deliberate and desirable in this study. It was deliberate to allow for more detailed discussions with diverse participants, and it was desirable to create a comfortable, conversational dynamic when broaching sensitive issues. To be sure, for this study, a standardized protocol would have proved more limiting in forcing a uniform question set on diverse participants, and for establishing a scientific rather than a personal rapport, which I imagine would have restricted participants' responses.

Survey

While narrative research provided me with important data on the personal level, I wanted to ground those individual stories and experiences within a societal level framework. This was important because, while I was interested in the identity development and decisions made by individual activists, I was interested also in the dynamics of the movement itself. Surveying the behaviors and attitudes of the larger population was important both to assess the level of popular participation in resistance and to compare and contrast the perceptions of the resistance leaders with those of the wider public. It thus made sense to conduct a survey to describe the characteristics and opinions of the broader society, in order to complement the personal stories and narratives elicited in the interviews.

The use of surveys was complementary not only in terms of content but also in terms of methodological strength. Indeed, the survey dimension compensates for some of the limitations of the narrative approach, in that its standardized nature gives it high reliability when compared to interviews or observation. This uniformity helps decrease observer subjectivity, ensures that similar data can be collected from different groups, and makes measurements more precise. The benefits of survey research thus balance the weaknesses of narrative research, and vice versa. In the case of Palestine for example, the surveys allowed for a uniform assessment of the broader population's attitudes towards popular resistance, rather than relying on the personal accounts of diverse activists.

Survey overview

I first conducted one hundred preliminary surveys in August 2006 to gauge basic youth attitudes towards nonviolent and violent resistance. These surveys were administered at the MEND summer camp, to youth ages ten to18 years from Jerusalem, Azariyeh, Jericho, Hebron, Ramallah, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, and Nablus. I administered the survey to all willing participants during the beginning of one of the workshops in the camp. It is important to note that these initial survey participants were youth already involved in nonviolence training programs, as that was both my context and my research focus at the time. (This is in contrast to the main survey sample, most of whom had not been exposed to nonviolence trainings. The main survey sample was also older than the preliminary survey sample.)

Following the grounded theory tradition of using fieldwork to inform later research design, I used the data from the preliminary survey to help shape my

research questions, and to develop a more in-depth survey for administration in 2007. This second survey was further informed by my narrative research and expanded literature review. I drafted the survey in English, and it was translated into formal Arabic (*fusha*) by a native Arabic speaker. It was then edited by myself and a second native Arabic speaker, and was further edited and formatted by a contact at the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). Six former students of a Palestinian contact at Al-Quds University took the pilot version of the survey, and their comments were used to finalize the document.

The survey is two pages in length, consisting of five sections. The first section uses open-ended factual questions to request demographic information, including gender, religion, geographic location, and political affiliation. The second section uses a closed-ended question format by asking participants to circle yes or no in response to questions regarding their participation in different forms of nonviolent and violent resistance. This section aims to gather data on youth participation in resistance, as well as gauge youths' perceptions of actions as violent or nonviolent.

The third section uses a scaled single-variable closed-ended response format to gauge participants' attitudes towards the morality and efficacy of violent and nonviolent approaches to resistance on a rating scale of five qualifiers (strongly agree, agree, depends, disagree, strongly disagree). The fourth section, also using the same rating scale, asks for participants' attitudes towards specific forms of action. The second, third, and fourth sections all use a matrix format for organizing the questions. The final section uses an open-ended response format, consisting of a space for optional comments.

Survey sample

The research focuses on the population of Palestinian university students in East Jerusalem and the West Bank as the survey sample for several reasons. First, many of the participants in the narrative research emphasized the importance of student involvement in initiating and coordinating a viable popular resistance campaign.

Numerous interviewees referred to the role of students in leading the first intifada, and many referred to their own experiences as student activists as being foundations for their continued activism. In addition, when asked about challenges facing popular resistance in the West Bank, many interviewees pointed to the lack of student participation. Clearly, there was a pattern of references in the narrative research to the importance of student engagement for building a widespread movement, an idea also reflected frequently in social movement literature and in historical examples. Thus, previous research suggested that it was important to examine the attitudes and opinions of this particular segment of the Palestinian population.

Second, the study focuses mainly on university students since this sample is often associated with violent resistance. The average age of Palestinian suicide bombers from 2000 to 2005 was 20.9 years, and 18.8 percent were graduates or students in higher education, compared to 8 percent of the national average in Palestine (Benmelech and Berrebi 2007). Interviewees in my narrative research also commented that it was sometimes difficult to engage youth and students in nonviolent activism because they are more inclined towards violence, ranging from throwing stones to armed resistance. As scholars and practitioners alike thus look at Palestinian university students as potential violent activists, I wanted to examine the attitudes of this population towards various methods of resistance.

Third, Palestinian university students were an accessible sample. I recognized that the survey would be controversial, since it explicitly asks participants to report on both behaviors and attitudes associated with violent resistance. Even though I emphasized orally and in writing that the survey was voluntary and that all responses would remain confidential, I understood that many individuals might suspect me of collecting information for the Israeli government or the CIA. Indeed, three universities that I approached would not allow me to administer the survey owing to its sensitive nature. However, in general, the university campuses provided a safe space to administer the surveys, especially with the assistance of contacts in the university faculties, administrations, and student leaders, who helped in administering the survey to minimize suspicion of my intent. The university environment also allowed me to attain a diverse sample, since students represented different genders, religions, political affiliations, and geographic backgrounds.

Since it was not logistically feasible to have a random sample of students, the study instead employed purposive non-proportional quota sampling to ensure a diverse sample. The sampling was purposive in that, as stated above, the research targets Palestinian university students, and it was reflective of the non-proportional quota approach in that I sought to have at least 30 percent of the respondents be female to ensure gender diversity; 63 percent of participants were male and 37 percent were female. The survey was administered in July 2007 to 273 participants, ages 14–34 years, in Jerusalem (Al-Quds University), Bethlehem (Bethlehem University), Hebron (students from Hebron University, though the surveys took place off-campus at the university's request), Ramallah (Al-Quds Open University), Birzeit (Birzeit University), Tulkarem (Al-Quds Open University), and Jenin (Arab American University of Jenin).[2]

Survey procedure

To distribute the survey, I first contacted friends and colleagues at the various university campuses to assist me in administering the survey. We met on their respective campuses on agreed-upon dates, and approached different students individually or in small groups in the cafeteria and the quad. My contact asked the students for a moment of their time and briefly introduced me. I then introduced myself (in Arabic), explained the nature and purpose of my research, and, if the student was interested in participating, secured a verbal assent agreement. (As noted above, the IRB at American University recognized the possible risk of associating names with opinions and reported behaviors related to popular resistance, thus the requirement for written consent forms was waived.) I orally reiterated the statement that was printed on the survey, reminding the student that their participation was entirely voluntary, they could stop at any time, they could

skip any questions they did not want to answer, and their responses would be kept

confidential. I provided pens for the participants, and then waited nearby while they completed the survey. I tried to answer any clarification questions they had, and my contacts served as translators when necessary. Some participants also expressed interest in discussing the topics raised in the survey after completion, or asking me questions about my research and/or opinions. I welcomed these conversations, and incorporated them in my fieldnotes.

Participant observation

Though this study does not claim or strive to be an ethnography, it incorporates interactionist ethnographic methods (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995) in the form of participant observation. Acting in different contexts as a participant observer and an observing participant (Tedlock 1991, Hammack 2006), I have relied on my immersion in the field to provide me with a “thick” understanding (Geertz 1973) of the context in which the research was conducted. The majority of observation data comes from my presence, and thus participation, at various nonviolent direct actions, including demonstrations, protests, replantings of olive trees, and dismantling of roadblocks. While I usually focused on documenting the events through photography or video, my presence amongst the Palestinian activists made me a default participant also.

Data collection consisted of keeping detailed fieldnotes on my observations and experiences throughout the various research periods, including additional observations from the interviews and survey administration; documentations from events, meetings, and conferences that I attended related to popular resistance; reflections on my involvement as a photography and film/video trainer with several youth media projects in the West Bank; and notes on conversations and interactions with different people in cafés, shops, taxis, and around town. I usually jotted notes in a notebook, then expanded my jottings into more developed fieldnotes at the end of each day. I drew from an interpretive understanding of ethnography (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995) in writing my fieldnotes, which is based on an immersive understanding of participation, and acknowledges the role of the researcher’s experience in producing written accounts. In this way, my notes reflect what I observed, as well as my own interpretations and responses to those observations.

My role as a participant observer was important in several ways. First, contextual awareness was necessary for acquiring and interpreting the data I gained in my narrative and survey research. At every stage of research, I relied on my awareness of the political, social, cultural, economic, and geographic contexts that I had obtained from immersion in the field in shaping my interview questions and survey design and in conducting the research. Moreover, it was necessary to have a deep contextual understanding when interpreting and processing my findings from the other methods.

Furthermore, being a participant observer provided me with types and sources of data that were distinct from the other methods. For example, my presence at various actions, events, and trainings introduced me to activism strategies that I would not have encountered through narrative or survey research alone. In other instances, my role as a participant observer enhanced my understanding of themes and phenomena that were raised in the interviews or surveys, but which I could not fully appreciate without being present to experience them directly. For example, several interviews with grassroots activists had revealed tensions between themselves and NGOs claiming to be engaged in nonviolence. While I at first thought these criticisms might be due to personal differences, my presence at actions revealed different levels of participation and engagement between the local organizers and the NGO staffs that I had not expected to see.

Engaging in participant observation also increased both my access to activists and my

legitimacy. In terms of access, I was able to meet numerous activists and make contacts with various leaders simply by being present at different actions and events. Moreover, the fact that I was a regular participant at events such as demonstrations, rallies, tree re-plantings, and other direct actions made activists willing to talk to me or help me distribute surveys. For example, after seeing me at the weekly protests, local resistance leaders in the villages south of Bethlehem whom I interviewed early in my fieldwork later called to invite me to unpublicized meetings and events. Similarly, my ongoing role as a coordinator of youth media trainings in the region gave me credibility that I would not have had if I relied solely on interviews and surveys. Indeed, an activist and photographer in Hebron who learned about photography trainings I coordinated invited me to meet with friends of his in a rural cave community near the South Hebron Hills that I would not have had access to otherwise. Finally, my "embededness" at events allowed me to encounter some of the direct challenges faced by the activists, ranging from movement restrictions to tear gas to near arrest, enabling me to understand their experiences more deeply and giving me a better reference point during interviews.

While my level of engagement was usually beneficial to the study, it presented limitations as well. First, I had to be careful not to get too friendly with certain individuals or organizations, not only to retain a comfortable analytical perspective but also to avoid alienating other activists who might have concerns with other people or groups. For example, I had to disassociate myself from an organization with whom I had partnered for youth media projects because I found that the group had a bad reputation with other people I wanted to meet. Second, from a more academic perspective, I recognize that my participation and engagement limit my objectivity, and indeed influence the very phenomena that this study examines.

Data analysis

Qualitative data analysis

The initial reading of the qualitative data—in terms of transcribing interviews and rewriting rough fieldnotes—functioned as the first step in analysis, in which I wrote short notes and memos to start developing ideas about relationships and trends in the data (Maxwell 2005, Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995). I then used both categorical and holistic approaches (Hammack 2006, Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach, and Zilber 1998) to organize and analyze the data, with categorical analysis exploring themes across narratives and observations; and holistic analysis, or connecting strategies (Maxwell 2005), examining ideas within a single individual's narrative or observed episode. These approaches allow the researcher to consider patterns both between and within participant responses and observations.

Both approaches were necessary in this study to be compatible with the set of research questions. On the one hand, the primary question exploring the extent to which a space exists for the re-emergence of a nonviolent movement in the case of post-Oslo Palestine requires a connecting approach to assess attitudes and events in the given context. Likewise, the question examining the role of activist identity in mobilization and participation requires a holistic analysis of activist narratives and the use of connecting strategies within the context of Palestine. On the other hand, the question of real and potential challenges and opportunities facing nonviolent activists both in and beyond the Palestinian context requires a categorizing strategy. The two strategies thus complement each other (Maxwell 2005), allowing for both specific contextual analysis and broader theory generation.

Categorization analysis

The categorization strategy of thematic analysis was first used to organize the data into broader themes through the development of organizational, substantive, and theoretical categories (Maxwell 2005: 97). According to Maxwell, organizational categories are anticipated topics that "function primarily as 'bins' for sorting the data for further analysis" (2005: 97). I thus used this classification approach to organize the main forms of nonviolent resistance into broad categories, namely direct action, NGO efforts, media activism, youth media initiatives, and daily acts of resistance.[3] This step in categorization was useful and necessary in this study because of the lack of previous research on popular resistance in the given time period. Because of this dearth of knowledge, it was appropriate to use this categorization strategy to first identify the various forms of nonviolent activism taking place before attempting to analyze those methods.

Using the organizational categories as a framework, I described the beliefs and concepts used by, or observed in, participants to develop substantive categories critically examining the fragmentation of popular resistance efforts. In addition to physically divisive Israeli measures like the wall and checkpoints, these emic categories include divisions between activists, within civil society, and in Palestinian political culture, all of which inhibit the emergence of a unified, widespread movement.

These classifications were then further developed into theoretical categories, which "place the coded data into a more general abstract framework" (Maxwell 2005: 97). In this study, these etic, or researcher-developed, theories were developed inductively, in accordance with grounded theory, and include categories related to activist identity formation, framings of nonviolent resistance, and youth participation. These categories were used for extrapolating beyond the case of Palestine to build more widely applicable theory.

Connecting/holistic analysis

In contrast to categorizing analysis, connecting or holistic strategies seek to understand the data in context. Thus, rather than dissecting and sorting data into categories, the researcher looks for "relationships that connect statements and events within a context into a coherent whole" (Maxwell 2005: 98). This approach was used in the research to identify connections between various narratives and observations to better understand the phenomenon of popular resistance in the given time period, and to examine aspects of collective identity. For example, holistic analyses of narratives and observations revealed trends in redefining resistance, re-activating the popular committees, and reclaiming activism at the village level. These themes were not discussed as generic categories, but rather emerged to reveal how popular resistance is conceived at this particular point in Palestinian history, specifically in response to the second intifada and inspired by the first intifada. Likewise, the shared identity of most of today's nonviolence leaders as former activists or militants in the first intifada provided insight into individual and collective identity construction that contributes to levels of participation in resistance. In these ways, holistic analyses of notes and transcripts allowed for the emergence of connecting relationships within the current Palestinian context, which complemented the organizational, substantive, and theoretical categories developed using categorization techniques.

Quantitative analysis

The survey data were coded and entered into an Excel spreadsheet using direct data entry, and

descriptive statistics were used to interpret the data in terms of mean responses. I also examined means of subsets of the data to investigate relationships between gender, religion, and political affiliation and attitudes towards popular resistance. These tests were important to support the hypothesis that a space for popular nonviolent resistance exists across demographics.

Researcher influence

I do not claim to know how exactly different people responded to different aspects of my background and identity. However, in this section, I aim to reflect on how participant responses may have been influenced by two notable aspects of my identity while conducting this research: the fact that I was an outsider and the fact that I am a person of privilege.

In terms of being an outsider, the fact that I had no direct ties to either Israel or Palestine had both positive and negative effects. On the one hand, although I do not claim to be objective, the outsider identity can give the impression of relative objectivity, which can elicit more honest responses from some participants (Hammack 2006). On the other hand, I recognize that, because I am an outsider, some people may have told me what they thought I wanted to hear, rather than what they really believed. Gaining credibility and legitimacy was also difficult in some circumstances, as some people questioned my motives for researching a topic and an area to which I have no personal connection. (However, my participation in actions and events and my involvement in the youth activism projects helped me gain credibility, as did my reliance on personal references for making contacts.)

Logistically, being an outsider sometimes made communication difficult, as my Arabic, though functional, is not fluent, and possibly made it difficult for people to communicate openly with me, and vice versa. Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the very presence of any outsider in any situation naturally alters the environment, especially when the researcher acts as a participant, thus unavoidably shaping the environment being observed.

In addition to being an outsider in terms of nationality, I was also a minority in many situations because of my gender. The majorities of interviews were conducted with men, and most meetings, conferences, and actions were predominantly male. While the fact that I was a foreign female gave me access to some mostly male settings, including certain cafés, offices, and social gatherings, I did not attempt access in many situations because of my gender. When I did gain access, I was very conscious of my female status, such as when I was the only female in a bus of activists attending a conference in Bil'in, or when I was the only female at a popular committee meeting and demonstration in Hebron. At the same time, I found that I did not always fit in with groups of females either, owing to my outsider status and our different gender identities.

The fact that I was an outsider also contributed to my privileged identity.
Any international is automatically privileged in Palestine, from the fact that internationals are immune from freedom of movement restrictions, that we can "escape" from the conflict at any time, and that we have a state of our own to which we can return home. For these reasons, no matter how "immersed" one becomes, an outside researcher can never truly understand the Palestinian experience. I felt this privilege on a daily basis, from being able to walk through the checkpoints with minimal questioning, to traveling freely between Jerusalem and the West Bank, to being able to confront soldiers at demonstrations without risking long-term detention. I was very conscious of this position of privilege, and these privileges were pointed out to me by various people I spoke with.

My privileged identity was also influenced by the fact that I am an American.

Indeed, from some perspectives, Americans are not pure “outsiders” like some other internationals, because of the United States’ current and historical role in the conflict. The US government’s alignment with Israel on most policy issues automatically links Americans to the oppressive system of the occupation, a fact which many people made clear to me. I had to acknowledge the role that my country plays in the conflict, and patiently respond to people’s suspicions that I was working for the CIA or the Israeli Ministry of the Interior.

I also was aware that my educational level and middle-class background gave me a privileged identity in Palestine. While at times my educational level was almost a liability, especially with some grassroots activists who viewed researchers and academics as disconnected from true resistance, in most cases it gave me legitimacy and even an (undesired) aura of prestige that gave me access to different individuals and events. My position as a well-educated American also put me in a different socioeconomic position from many of the people I interacted with, which may have had an effect on how we perceived each other.

Appendix 2
Field sites

Jerusalem

Jerusalem has a population of approximately 724,000 people, 65 percent Jewish, 32 percent Palestinian Muslim, and 2 percent Palestinian Christian. The city was divided from 1949 to 1967, with West Jerusalem being the capital of Israel and East Jerusalem being part of Jordan. Israel gained control of East Jerusalem in the Six Days War in 1967 and annexed it immediately, formally declaring the “complete and unified” Jerusalem as the Israeli capital in 1980. However, the international community did not recognize this move, and many Palestinians still view East Jerusalem as the future capital of a potential Palestinian state. The Oslo Accords stipulated that the final status of Jerusalem be determined by peaceful negotiations, but the current status remains disputed, and the city remains divided in two distinct sections.

The daily life of Palestinian residents of Jerusalem differs from that of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Regarding legal status, most Palestinians living in Jerusalem hold the status of “permanent resident” of the state of Israel, which is the same status given to immigrants to Israel, and is distinct from citizenship. The permanent resident status also affects daily life, by allowing Jerusalem residents to live and work in Israel and Jerusalem without the special permission required for West Bank residents. These Palestinians face other issues and pressures within Jerusalem, however, that are different from challenges faced by West Bank Palestinians.

I lived on the Mount of Olives in East Jerusalem during my fieldwork, and I conducted a number of interviews in East Jerusalem and the nearby suburbs of Beit Hanina and Al-Ram. Most of these interviews took place in the offices of individuals working with NGOs in East Jerusalem, while other interviews were held in hotels and cafés in East Jerusalem. I also used East Jerusalem as a transit base for my travel to and between different cities in the West Bank. I relied on the East Jerusalem busses to travel to Ramallah and Bethlehem, from where I would find services and shared taxis to other destinations in the north and south, respectively. This enabled me to interact on a daily basis with mainstream Palestinians, have informal conversations, go through checkpoints, and experience different parts of the West Bank.

The West Bank

The West Bank is home to approximately 2.1 million Palestinians, about one-third of whom are refugees from towns and villages that became part of Israel in 1948. The West Bank is considered an occupied territory under international law, and is regulated by Israeli checkpoints and border controls. Although the West Bank is not large in size (at 5,860 square kilometers), it is geographically, politically, economically, and socially diverse. I was fortunate to be able to travel extensively in the West Bank (via public transportation), sometimes for day visits but

often for more extended stays in different cities, villages, and refugee camps.

Cities

Cities in the West Bank all have their own unique qualities and character. I spent the most time in Ramallah (15 kilometers north of Jerusalem) and Bethlehem (10 kilometers south of Jerusalem). Ramallah is home to the PA, as well as numerous businesses, media center, local NGOs, and international organizations. The city has a lively, cosmopolitan nature, and integrates its political and economic concentrations with a relatively vibrant arts scene, a popular café culture, and association with nearby Birzeit University. Al-Manara, the city-center of Ramallah, is a visible example of these intersections, serving as the site of numerous political events and cultural festivities, flanked by shops, restaurants, businesses and enterprises that range from the trendy Stars & Bucks Café to young boys selling kites in the street.

Bethlehem has a much more subdued atmosphere. Although the areas near the Old City, Nativity Square, and the universities are usually busy, the main road into town is characterized by shop after shop that has been forced to close in recent years because of the drop in tourism, attributed to a combination of the second intifada and the construction of the separation barrier and Rachel's Tomb checkpoint. The presence of the separation barrier has been felt especially hard in Bethlehem, where the wall runs around the city on three sides and even through the middle of the city in places. The wall has cut off many workers from Jerusalem, as well as farmers from their land and olive groves, and even students from their schools and universities. Despite these challenges, there is an active NGO community in Bethlehem, with a number of organizations and individuals dedicated to nonviolence, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution, thus making it a natural center for much of my research.

I also conducted interviews in other Palestinian cities, making visits to Hebron, a large city in the south that faces significant challenges from extremist Israeli settlers and the resultant IDF force stationed in the city; Nablus, the largest city in Palestine, located in the north, and a frequent site of Israeli incursions; Tulkarem, located in the northwest close to the Green Line; as well as Jenin in the north and Jericho to the east.

Villages

I also conducted a number of interviews in villages throughout the West Bank.
Most villages can be accessed by service or taxi from urban centers like Hebron, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. Villages are agriculturally based, with residents living in the village while farming the surrounding land. Many villages have been focal points for popular resistance as the separation wall has cut off many villages from their surrounding lands, and thus cut off many farmers from their livelihood. I spent time in a number of villages, usually staying with Palestinian friends and colleagues. Interviews were usually conducted in the participants' homes, or while sitting or walking on the land itself.

The villages I visited included Ghwain, a cave village facing water shortages from nearby settlements; At-Tawani, a village south of Hebron that has organized numerous nonviolent protests against settler violence in the area; Beit Ommar, an active village between Hebron and Bethlehem; Um Salamouna, south of Bethlehem, the site of weekly demonstrations against the separation wall; Battir, west of Bethlehem, a village losing land to the wall; Bil'in, outside Ramallah, where weekly demonstrations have continued for several years; Biddu and Budrous, villages near Ramallah that employed nonviolent resistance early in the second intifada and have served as models for current demonstrations; Yanoun, a village near Nablus surrounded by

actively hostile settlements; and many others.

Refugee camps

I also conducted interviews and worked on youth projects in a number of the refugee camps, first established in 1948 to accommodate the thousands of Palestinians coming from towns and villages in what became the state of Israel.

The camps have since expanded from tent villages to tightly packed neighborhoods, consisting of narrow alleys, close buildings, and UN schools and centers administered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

The economic conditions tend to be worse in the camps than in the cities and villages, and the camps are often the sites of Israeli incursions. However, the communities in the camps tend to be tight and close-knit, and there is a spirit of resistance in the camps that is distinct from other parts of the West Bank. I spent time in Aida Camp (Bethlehem), Shu'fat Camp (near Jerusalem), Qalandiya Camp (near Ramallah), Al-Am'ari Camp (near Ramallah), Nur al-Shams (Tulkarem), and Balata Camp (Nablus). Most interviews were conducted in community centers or in participants' homes.

Appendix 3
Sample interview questions

Tell me more about your work in popular resistance.
How did you first get involved in activism?
Do you think of yourself as an activist? Why or why not?
How were you involved in activism as a youth and/or during the first intifada?
What attracts you to nonviolent resistance?
Why do you prefer nonviolence?
How do you define nonviolence?
Do you see nonviolence more as a strategy or a way of life?
How do other people in your community view nonviolence?
How much do people in your community participate in nonviolence?
What kinds of strategies or tactics do you engage in or support?
What is your opinion on throwing stones or using other forms of limited violence in popular resistance?
What role does armed resistance have? Do violent and nonviolent resistance complement or hinder each other?
How involved are youth in nonviolent resistance?
How involved are women in nonviolent resistance?
How much do different political parties participate in nonviolent resistance?
How do you see the role of NGOs in organizing/supporting activism?
How do you see the role of CBOs and popular committees in coordinating resistance?
How do you see the role of internationals?
To what extent is there a popular movement right now in Palestine?
Why do you think the “movement” is so fragmented and localized?
What are the biggest challenges to nonviolence right now?
How do you think the events in Gaza affect nonviolence in the West Bank?
What do you think should be the next step for popular resistance in Palestine?
What do you think should be the long-term vision for Palestine?
How optimistic are you?
What hopes do you have for your own children in terms of their future?

Appendix 4
Youth survey

[The following text is translated from the Arabic.]

This survey is for research purposes only. All responses will remain confidential. You may skip any questions you do not want to answer, and you may choose to stop at any time. Thank you for your participation.

Please circle the most accurate response:

V0. Age: . . . .

V1. Location: . . . .

V2. Gender: . . . .

V3. Religion: Muslim Christian

V4. Level of Devoutness to Faith: High Medium Low

V5. Political Party: . . . .

Ql.	Have you ever received training in popular resistance or nonviolence?	Yes	No
	If yes, when and where?		
Q2.	Have you ever participated in a nonviolent action against the occupation?	Yes	No
Q2-2.	Have you ever participated in demonstrations or protests?	Yes	No
Q2-3.	Have you ever participated in a boycott?	Yes	No
Q2-4.	Have you ever participated in a petition?	Yes	No
Q2-5.	Have you ever participated in replanting trees on bulldozed land?	Yes	No

Q3.	Have you ever participated in violent resistance against the occupation?	Yes	No
Q3-2.	Have you ever participated in throwing stones?	Yes	No
Q3-3.	Have you ever participated in armed resistance?	Yes	No

Please respond to the following statements on a scale of 1-5 (1 = Strongly DISAGREE, 5 = Strongly AGREE).						
Q4-1.	Nonviolent popular resistance is the most effective way to resist the occupation.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-2.	Armed resistance is the most effective way to resist the occupation.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-3.	Both nonviolent and violent resistance are effective ways of resisting the occupation.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-4.	Nonviolent resistance is more *strategic* than armed resistance.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-5.	Nonviolent resistance is more *ethical* than armed resistance.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-6	There is a history of nonviolent resistance in Palestine.	1	2	3	4	5

Q4-7.	Palestinians have a right to all means of resistance.	1	2	3	4	5
Q4-8.	Youth play an important role in resisting the occupation.	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-1.	Would you support a nonviolent movement against the occupation?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-2.	Would you support nonviolent demonstrations and protests?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-3.	Would you support a boycott against Israeli products?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-4.	Would you support a violent uprising against the occupation?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-5.	Would you participate in violent actions?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-6.	Do you support throwing stones at soldiers?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-7.	Do you support armed resistance against soldiers?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-8.	Do you support using rockets against civilians?	1	2	3	4	5
Q5-9.	Do you support using suicide bombs against civilians?	1	2	3	4	5

Notes

Introduction

1 Names have been changed with the consent of activists for the purpose of confidentiality.

2 See Schock 2005: xviii, Smithey and Kurtz 2003, and Lipsitz and Kritzer 1975: 729, for more on integrating social movement and nonviolent action literature.

3 See McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001.

4 See Sharp 1973.

5 It should be noted that this methodology also produces constraints, in that some participants may have been hesitant to fully disclose opinions and actions to an American researcher.

1 Civil resistance and contentious politics

1 According to Tilly, “repression is any action by another group that raises the contender’s cost of collective action. An action which lowers the group’s cost of collective action is a form of facilitation” (1978: 100).

2 The Quartet, consisting of the U.S., United Nations, European Union, and Russia, was established in 2002 to help mediate the Middle East peace process.

3 This study draws from Klandermans’ concepts of consensus formation, consensus (or potential) mobilization, and action mobilization. I argue that Palestinian youth embody aspects of a collective Palestinian identity, or consensus, of resistance, that results from both organic consensus formation and intentional consensus mobilization. Klandermans defines consensus formation as “the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures” and consensus mobilization as “a deliberate attempt by a social actor to create consensus among a subset of the population” (1992: 80). However, the consensus mobilization to date, while generating “a set of individuals predisposed to participate in a social movement,” has failed to extend to action mobilization, or “the legitimation of concrete goals and means of action” (Klandermans 1992: 80).

Youth thus represent a sector with significant “mobilization potential” (Klandermans 1992: 80), which requires new cultural framings, as well as improved organizational structures and creation of political opportunities, to translate into action.

2 Historical background

1 Approximately forty violent encounters between Jewish immigrants and Palestinian Arabs were documented between 1886 and the 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement (King 2007: 25, McDowall 1989: 17).

2 Britain’s Peel Commission later concluded that the causes of the riots had been “(1) the Arabs’ disappointment at the non-fulfillment of the promises of independence . . . (2) the Arabs’ belief that the Balfour Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination, and their

fear that the establishment of the National Home would mean a great increase of Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political subjection to the Jews" (Peel 2001, King 2007: 31).

3 In response to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, the Jewish population in Palestine nearly doubled between 1931 and 1936, reaching 1,336,518 (or 31 percent of the population) in 1936 (King 2007: 43–44, Peel 2001: 279).

4 These included the Reform party (Islah) (1933), the National Bloc (1933), the National Defense Party (1934), the Palestine Arab Party (1935), and the Arab Youth Congress (1935) (Kayyali 1978: 178, King 2007: 48).

5 After Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, the communist party was known as the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) in the West Bank and the Palestinian Communist Party of Gaza (PCPG) in Gaza. The Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) was officially founded in 1982.

6 According to Polletta and Jasper, collective identity is "an individual's cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution" (2001: 285). Collective identities are based on perception and construction, and can apply to both imagined and concrete communities. Similarly, as noted in Chapter 1, Melucci (1995) describes collective identity as a process that extends across time and space, involves a network of active relationships, and contains a sense of emotional investment that establishes a common unity between individuals. In this way, collective identity is "fluid and relational, emerging out of interactions with a number of different audiences, rather than fixed" (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 298). Though dynamic in nature, collective identity "channels words and actions . . . [and] provides categories by which individuals divide up and make sense of the social world" (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 298).

7 While some activists' memory of the first intifada may be somewhat idealistic, the constructed memory and narrative of those experiences can be equally influential on identity formation as, if not more so than, the actual lived reality.

8 According to B'Tselem, since 1967, Israel has established 135 settlements in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), which are illegal under international humanitarian law. The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring citizens from its own territory to the occupied territory (Article 49). The Hague Regulations prohibit an occupying power from undertaking permanent changes in the occupied area unless these are due to military needs in the narrow sense of the term, or unless they are undertaken for the benefit of the local population (B'Tselem 2008).

9 According to the UNDP, approximately 70 percent of Palestinians were living under the poverty line (of US$2 per day) in 2008 (UNDP/PAPP 2008), up from 51 percent in 2004 and 23 percent in 1998, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs (Madhoun 2006).

4 Supportive nonviolence: indirect actions

1 The Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign started in October 2002, when construction of the wall first began. As the founder and coordinator of the campaign explained, "We started by visiting people in the affected areas to try to get a real sense of what was going on . . . and started to bring things together . . . We decided that the only way to respond was through resistance and confrontation. We decided on three main dimensions of work. First, documentation and research. Second, organizing local committees to function as local contact groups and to organize local activities. And third, contacting international delegations and sending them to affected villages" (author interview 2007).The campaign started by supporting the village of Jayyous, which was organizing daily demonstrations against the wall in the fall of 2002. It then expanded to develop

links with other villages in the northern region of the West Bank affected by the wall.
In June 2003, the campaign convened a meeting in Tulkarem for the popular committees in the north, in which the local committees agreed to meet regularly to plan and coordinate activities together. They also declared an International Day Against the Wall on 9 November, the date of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

2 The largest Palestinian NGO, PARC focuses on various aspects of rural development and environmental protection, as well as the empowerment of rural women. PARC started in 1983 as a voluntary project in which local and international agronomists provided trainings and support to farmers whose land was being affected by the occupation. When the first intifada began in 1987, PARC organized a campaign to boycott Israeli goods, developed projects to aid the domestic economy, and played a role in getting food to areas under siege. According to PARC's director of lobbying and advocacy, these actions inspired PARC and its beneficiaries to start focusing on resistance, so they established a network of popular committees called Land Defense Committees, which coordinated resistance activities throughout the West Bank, especially in areas where land was being confiscated.

3 IMEMC grew out of the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement Between Peoples (PCR), an action-oriented NGO that has functioned as a dialogue group and an activist organization, and was the primary Palestinian group involved in the development of ISM. Indeed, IMEMC grew out the Palestine Media Alert Project that PCR coordinated with ISM. In 2001, PCR started utilizing ISM activists' stories, photos, and footage as alternative information sources on their website, to counter the stories given to the mainstream media by Israeli military reporters, then moved the reports and images to the ISM website in 2002. According to the director of PCR, "these images started raising awareness about what was happening, because people started to see news and read reports that they never heard about in the media" (author interview 2007). The positive response prompted PCR in 2003 to launch IMEMC, which now works closely with PNN.

5 Identity, attitudes, and resistance

1 As Polletta and Jasper note, "Important to understanding tactical choice within movements is the operation of numerous identities, with varying salience. Activists may identify primarily with a movement organization, affinity group, style of protest, or degree of moderation or radicalism" (2001: 293). Such primary identifications may determine the extent to which activists base tactical choices on strategic logic or expressive logic. For example, Jasper (1997) distinguishes between activist, organization, and tactical identities, similar to Gamson's solidary, movement, and organizational identities (1991). In this model, activist identities "involve a history of political activity that is usually broader than a specific movement," organizational identities refer to loyalties to a specific group, and tactical identities related to commitment to particular styles of action (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 293). In the case of the second intifada, most Palestinian activists' tactical choices regarding nonviolence were based on an activist (or solidary (Gamson 1991)) identity developed during the first intifada, rather than an organizational affiliation or moral tactical preference.

2 Prior to the Oslo Accords, because the PLO was exiled from Palestine, most armed resistance was coordinated in Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia; thus, civil-based resistance was respected as the primary form of activism within the West Bank.

3 A reference to a prison in Iraq, operated by the U.S. military during the Iraq War, where photographs showed American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners in 2004.

4 According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 56.4 percent of Palestinians are

under 19, and in Gaza, 75.6 percent are under 30 (Erlanger 2007).

5 See Urdal 2004; Kaplan 1994.

6 See also Erlanger 2007.

7 Much of the discourse surrounding youth and conflict portrays youth as perpetrators of violence (Wessells 1998), with recent scholarly analyses focusing on the link between violence and the phenomenon referred to as the "youth bulge." For example, in "The Devil in the Demographics," Urdal (2004) uses statistical analysis to indicate the correlation between increased youth populations and the onset of domestic armed conflict between 1950 and 2000. El-Kenz (1996) also perceives a link between youth bulges and violent conflict, and Kaplan (1994) associates youth demographics with increased crime, conflict, and instability.

8 See Appendix 4 for a copy of the survey.

9 Most Palestinian youth NGOs (including the International Palestinian Youth League (IPYL) and Panorama) define youth as up to 35 years of age.

10 This simultaneous support for both forms of resistance was reflected in earlier surveys as well. In a preliminary survey of 100 youth conducted for this study in 2006, 44 percent of youth recognized the legitimacy of both forms of resistance, while 24 percent favored only violence, 22 percent favored only nonviolence, and 10 percent felt that neither form of resistance was effective. Similarly, in the JAI study, although 63 percent of youth agreed with the statement, "Armed resistance is the best means to get rid of the Israeli occupation," over 82 percent also agreed that "Boycotting Israeli products is a successful means of resistance" (2006), indicating support for nonviolent tactics as well. Likewise, the PIPA study noted, "concurrent with their strong support for nonviolent methods, Palestinians show equal levels of support for violent methods"
(Kull 2002).

11 The arguments presented in favor of nonviolent action's effectiveness were all found unconvincing by majorities. The statement "Mass nonviolent action can help direct international attention to unjust Israeli behavior and repression" was found convincing by 41 percent and unconvincing by 52 percent. Another argument related to world opinion went: "When Palestinians use nonviolent forms of resistance this improves the image of Palestinians in the eyes of the world." Only 38 percent found this convincing, while 57 percent did not—quite possibly because it implies that violent resistance worsens the Palestinians' image, something a majority does not believe. A third argument asserted that nonviolent action had the capacity to put Israeli policy in a bind: "Mass nonviolent action puts pressure on Israel while also undermining its excuse that it cannot negotiate as long as there is violence." Only 36 percent found this convincing; 59 percent found it unconvincing (Kull 2002).

12 See Chapter 1 for more on principled and pragmatic nonviolence.

13 See UN General Assembly Resolution {37/42}, which "reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle" (A/RES/37/43 1982).

14 It should be noted that reported behaviors may differ from actual behaviors because of security concerns and lack of a developed trust relationship with the researcher.

15 See D. Kuttab (1988, 2003) and Kaufman (1991) for more on the classification of stone throwing as a violent or nonviolent tactic.

16 Indeed, willingness to participate in nonviolent action was documented in the PIPA survey as well, with 69 percent willing to participate in boycotts of Israeli goods such as cigarettes and

soft drinks, and 44 percent willing to engage in acts of civil disobedience such as blocking home demolitions (Kull 2002). It is important to acknowledge that the number of people who would actually mobilize (action mobilization) would most likely be less than the number of those simply stating they would act (consensus mobilization), yet even the recognition of the will to participate is a notable finding.

17 To be sure, according to the JAI report, 51.3 percent of youth identified "antiemigration," or remaining on Palestinian land in the spirit of sumoud, as the most effective form of nonviolent resistance (2006), indicating that many youth are also concerned by the departure of their peers to schools and jobs outside Palestine.

7 National constraints: political structures

1 Similarly, the judiciary branch was almost nonexistent, and, like the PLC, had to channel court orders through the executive branch, which often ignored them (Sirriyeh 2000).

8 International constraints: movement frames

1 The Protocol states: "1) The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing the dialogue and relations between their peoples in accordance with the concepts developed in cooperation with the Kingdom of Norway. 2) The two sides shall cooperate in enhancing dialogue and relations between their peoples, as well as in gaining a wider exposure of the two publics to the peace process, its current situation and predicted results. 3) The two sides shall take steps to foster public debate and involvement, to remove barriers to interaction and to increase the people-to-people exchange and interaction within all areas of cooperation described in this Annex and in accordance with the overall objectives and principles set out in this Annex" (Annex VI, Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement, 28 September 1995).

2 To be sure, participants from both communities faced opposition from their respective communities for "normalizing relations." While there was perhaps greater acceptance of establishing positive relations with "the other" in Israel, blacklists were still published on the internet stating the names and addresses of participants and accusing them of being self-hating Jews and threatening the state of Israel. Meanwhile, a similar list of Palestinian names was published in Arabic as the book *Intellectuals in the Service of the Other*, naming participants and organizations "collaborating" with Israelis through joint activities.

3 See EU Partnership for Peace Program (www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/content/cooperation_and_funding/3.asp), accessed 23 September 2008. See also Dajani and Baskin, who estimate that $26 million was allocated to people-to-people programs from September 1993 to September 2000 under the Oslo Accords (2006: 95); and Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven who estimate that $60 million from the US government was earmarked for peace work in Israel–Palestine during the same period (2006: 215).

4 According to Snow and Benford, "The emergence of competing frames can suggest the vulnerabilities and irrelevance of the anchoring master frame, thus challenging its resonance and rendering it increasingly impotent" (1992: 150). This phenomenon was evident in Palestine during the second intifada in the form of militant groups calling for the employment of armed resistance against Israel, predominantly in the form of suicide bomb attacks. These measures created not only competing tactical frames but competing master frames as well, as such tactics overshadowed the frame of an oppressed people struggling for justice against an occupying aggressor.

Appendix 1

[1] While traditional social science research studies usually refer to interviewees as subjects, I prefer to use the term "participants," which I believe to be both more accurate and more respectful towards the individuals who shared their time and their stories with me. First, the term "participant" emphasizes the voluntary nature of the interviews.
While nearly all narrative research endeavors clearly require some sort of voluntary consent, the majority of the individuals with whom I spoke did not merely consent to participating in the interviews, but, rather, they actively facilitated participation. Most were very open to speaking with me, and several mentioned that they saw the research as a sort of indirect advocacy, a way to get their stories of activism efforts disseminated to a wider global audience. The term "participant" is also more appropriate for describing the dynamic, conversational quality of most of the interviews. Rather than viewing myself as "the researcher" and the interviewees as "the subjects," I tried to be an active listener, and approached the participants as leaders, activists, and storytellers with experiences and insights to share. I also encouraged participants to ask me questions, so our roles were not always as definite as implied by traditional labels.

[2] Surveys were not administered at An-Najah National University in Nablus despite my efforts, at the request of the university. However, youth from Nablus were represented in other university samples, including Birzeit and AAUJ.

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